


# Early A-12 History

- GD Missed Early Stealth Competition
  - Solicitation delivered to wrong location!
- Initial Studies – Mid-late 1970's early 80's
  - Air-to-Surface (ATS) Technology Integration and Evaluation – AFFDL Sponsor
    - “Sneaky Pete”, “Plain Jane”, “Short Snort”
- 1995 Fighter Technology
  - Air-to-Air Emphasis
- Internal Air Force Controversy




# Navy Interest

- Navy became interested in A-6 replacement in early to mid 1980's
- SecNav John Lehman directed formation of two competing teams
  - Northrop plus Grumman
  - GD plus McAir
- Sold as stealthy “Baby B-2”
  - Technology *already in hand* made fixed-price development feasible


# **The A-12 Avenger - Topics**

- ***Aircraft Description***
- ***Development History***
- ***High-Leverage Design Features***
- ***Configuration Rationale***
- ***Program Cancellation and Aftermath***


# The A-12 Was to Replace the A-6 and F-111




# A-12 Three-View



<b>Crew</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Wing Area</b>	<b>1317 Ft</b>
<b>Engines</b>	<b>(2) GE F412</b>
<b>Aspect Ratio</b>	<b>3.75</b>



Overall Height  
11 Ft., 3.4 In.



# **Aircraft Survivability - the Problem in the Mid 1970's**





- ***Threat Missiles were Improving***
  - Shorter Time Constants
  - Turn Capability > 3 Times Pilot Tolerance
  - Monopulse Seekers - Less Vulnerable to ECM
  - Speeds to Mach 3+
  - Effective at All Aspects
  
- ***Threat Aircraft were Improving***
  - Look-Down/Shoot Down Capability
  - High Maneuverability
  - Speeds to Thermal/Dynamic-Pressure Limits
  
- ***Cost-Effectiveness of Further “Classical” Performance Improvements was Questionable***
  - Speed
  - Maneuverability
  - Very High or Very Low Altitude

## **Cost Growth**

- ***Historical Trend for Military Aircraft Has Been to Strive for Maximum Performance***
- ***“Technology Explosion” has Meant That More Performance Can Now be Designed-In than Afforded***
- ***The New Problem - What Do You Leave Out?***
  - And How Much of Each Type of Performance Do You Buy?



# Cost-Constrained Aircraft Requirements Analysis



# Enthusiasm for Low Observables

**ENTHUSIASM  
LEVEL**

- **Discovery that RCS Reductions Could Defeat Many Enemy Radars**

**High**

**REACTIVE  
THREAT STUDIES**

- **Discovery that Aircraft Could Always be Detected, Given Threat Developments**

**Low**

**MORE IN-DEPTH  
TRADES**



- **Discovery that Low-Observables has Many Favorable Interactions with Other Variables**

**High**

- Design
- Tactics

# Survival is Influenced by a Chain of Events

## Example: Air Interceptor Engagement

Some Impact   
 Significant Impact 

		Survival Influenced By Aircrat Design Characteristics								
		Speed	Operating Altitude	Maneuverability	Hardening	Radar/IRST	Threat Warning	Self Def. Weapons	Countermeasures	Reduced Observables
<i>Air Intercept System Capability</i>	<b>EW/GCI Detection Probability (Pdet)</b>									
	<b>AI Vector Accuracy Timeliness (Pv/det)</b>									
	<b>AI Detection Probabilities (Padet/v)</b>									
	<b>AI Survival Probability (Pasur/adet)</b>									
	<b>Probability AI/Manuever to Launch (PI/Asur)</b>									
	<b>Prob. Missiles/Lock-Launch Track (Plock/L)</b>									
	<b>Missile Guidance Accuracy (Pg/Lock)</b>									
	<b>Missile Fuzing Probability (Pf/G)</b>									
	<b>Missile Warhead Lethality (Pk/F)</b>									


**Overall Loss Probability is Multiplicative:**

$$P_L \sim P_{det} \times P_{v/det} \times P_{a\ det/v} \times \dots \times P_{K/f}$$

**Large Improvements from Either:**

- A Break in the Chain
- Degradation of Several Links

# Penetrating a SAM Belt - Random Flight Path



Expected  
Number of  
SAM Site  
Encounters






FIGURE 5

# Penetrating a SAM Belt - Site Locations Known



# Low Observables

- ***A Powerful Contributor to Survivability***
  - Impacts Many Phases of an Engagement
- ***But Long-Term Robustness Comes Only in Combination with Other Design Features***
  - Sensors
  - Weapons
  - Countermeasures
  - Vulnerability Reduction
  - Compatible Levels of Speed and Maneuverability

# Situation Awareness

- ***Enhances Value of Low Observability***
  - And Crucial in Its Own Right
- ***Multi-Spectral Sensors***
  - Broad-Band RF Threat-Warning/Surveillance/Track
  - Infrared Search-While-Track Set
  - Infra Red Missile Warning
  - Large Field-of-Regard Low-Probability-of Intercept Radar
  - All-Around-View Canopy
- ***Full-Color Tactical Situation Displays***
  - Sensor Fusion
  - Two-Man Crew

# Speed

- ***“Speed is Life”***
  - Everything Else Equal, More Speed is Always Better for Survivability
- ***But for Supersonic Capability, Everything Else Cannot be Equal***
  - IR Signature Increases
  - Low RCS Shaping More Difficult and Expensive
  - Internal Volume More Costly
  - Target Acquisition More Difficult
  - Employment Frequently Constrained by Fuel Considerations
- ***High Subsonic Top Speed Best Compromise***
  - Air-to-Surface Mission Optimization



# Infrared Signature and Afterburner

- **Infrared Signature**

- IR Missiles Have Caused Majority of Aircraft Combat Losses in Past Decade
- Optimized Blend of Reduced IR Signatures and Countermeasures Best Solution

- **Afterburner**

- Adding an Afterburner Predicted to Degrade Combat Survivability
  - *High All-Aspect IR (and Night Optical) Signature When in Use*
  - *Increases RCS and IR Even when Not in Use*

- **Maneuverability Should be Optimized in Dry Power**

# Rounding Out the Suite

- ***Hardening***

- Subsystem Separation
- Structural Design
- Fuel Inerting
- Fire Suppression

***Live Fire Tests Early  
in Development***

- ***Weapons***

- Standoff From Intense Point Defenses
- HARM

# Lethality

- ***Lethality Derived From***

- Good Intelligence
- Accurate Navigation
- Appropriate Target Acquisition Sensors - FLIR/Multi-Mode Radar
- Accurate Weapon Delivery System and/or Accurate Weapons

- ***Large Payload Remains Important***

- Multiple Kills per Sortie

- ***Internal Payload Best***

- Rapid Suppression of Defenses
- Supplemented by External Stores as Threats are Beat Down

# Also Vital

- ***Range - Frequently Under-Rated in Performance***
  - “Zone of Influence” ~  $R^2$
  - Tactical Flexibility
  - Reduced Tanker Burden
  - Convertable to Combat Speed or Endurance
  - Reduced Fleet Vulnerability
  
- ***Reliability and Maintainability***
  - Higher Sortie Rate
  - Lower Logistics Burden
  
- ***Growth and Versatility***
  - Large Internal Volume
  - Range and Endurance
  - Avionics and Control/Display Architecture
  - Power and Cooling Growth
  - Frontal-Looking Sensor “Real Estate”


# Bring Back Payload

- **Limited By**

- Recovery Wind Over Deck
- Aircraft Structural Capability

- **Weight Based on Status at Termination**

- Operational Fuel Reserves



# Configuration Rationale


## Low Observables

- Simple Planform
- No Vertical Tail
- Buried Engines

## Structural Efficiency


Low  $B'/t$

Aerodynamic Center and  
Center of Gravity




## Volumetric Efficiency

- High  $\left( \frac{V}{S_{WET}} \right)$
- Large Internal  
Weapon & Fuel Volume




# Excellent Packaging Efficiency




- ***Arrangement Yields Little Wasted Space***

# Planform Constraints for Fighter-Like Handling Qualities





# High Aerodynamic Efficiency




# Termination and Legal Aftermath

- Weight Growth – Composite Fabrication challenges led to schedule slippage
  - **Development Cost Growth**
- Collapse of Communism led to Defense budget cuts
  - **Altered Contractor Financial prospects and ability to absorb losses**
- Program terminated by SecDef Cheney Jan 7, 1991 – though Navy still wanted it
- Legal fight from 1991 through 2014
  - **Settled only after Supreme Court Push**


# Time from Start of Concept Exploration to First Flight

- *Production Aircraft*



# Development Costs

Billions of Dollars



 = Range of Uncertainty


# Technical Status at Termination


- ***Successfully Passed Critical Design Review (Nov 1990)***
- ***Relatively Mature Design***
  - 99.2% Drawing Release for Aircraft 1
  - 87.8% Production Tools Complete or Available
  - ~50% Part Complete A/C 1 and 2
  - A/C 1 Software Complete and in Test
  - 8 Engines Running
  - Most Major Subsystems in Test
- ***Weight Growth (Production Configuration)***
  - Less than 6,000 lbs at Termination
  - Navy Evaluation that Performance Acceptable with Additional 2,000 lbs Growth

# Aircraft Performance at Termination

- **Compared to Least of:**
  - FSD Specification Value
  - NAVAIR Estimate at FSD Start

- **Weight Status = Value at Termination**

Worse  Better



## **Weight Increase Compensated By:**

- Initial Conservatism
- Design Improvements in Other Areas



# DCP RELATED PERFORMANCE STATUS (w)



**UNCLASSIFIED**

PARAMETER	CNO (OP-05) Approved DCP Revision	CURRENT ESTIMATES		
		NAVAIR		CONTRACTOR
SEROC	200 FPM	380 FPM	=/+	400 FPM
SUSTAINED G	5.0	5.5	+	5.6
LAUNCH WOD	0 KTS	0 KTS	+	-5 KTS
ARREST WOD	24 KTS	22 KTS	+	23 KTS
SPECIFIC RNG	0.100	0.102	+	0.103
CRS CEILING	40.0K	43.1K	+	43.0K
V(max)	540 KTS*	568 KTS	+	568 KTS
P(s)	180 FPS*	180 FPS	=/-	178 FPS
STK RAD	785 NM	839 NM	+	839 NM

- + BETTER THAN DCP THRESHOLD
- EQUALS DCP THRESHOLD
- WORSE THAN DCP THRESHOLD

\* NO CHANGE - STATUS ONLY

# Some Thoughts on Looking Back

- The A-12 had many desirable qualities that would be valuable today
- Stealth
  - Large Payload (10 1,000 lb JDAMs Internal)
  - Long Range and endurance
  - Strategic Mobility
- The Biggest Problem – A Fixed-Price Development Contract
- The only winners were the Lawyers