

# AFSOC

TAC-umsizing the Air Force

*The Emerging Vision of the Future*



**BROWN PAPER**

*August 1991*

## INTRODUCTION

For many years the United States Air Force has evolved into an organization imitating the flawed structure of Corporate America. This evolution has produced a force that emphasizes management skills and weapon-system expertise. While this process has served USAF very well at the most basic unit level, the systems management ideal has also produced many leadership voids in the command structure of the force, particularly in its force enhancement missions. Unknowingly, those within these force enhancement areas now cry for a new direction, one based on the basic tenants of air power, one which returns to our roots of inspirational leadership that only true combat warriors can provide.

The Air Force, standing at the threshold of the 21st Century, must develop the means to remain at the cutting edge of progress: not only technologically, but organizationally as well. Recently inheriting a mediocre system of inbreeding within its force enhancement areas, the proper employment of air power now begs for a new concept of *ubermann*, a race of supermen to champion the conquest of the air and space, the final frontier. That Superman, that Champion is the manly man.

## THE EMERGENCE OF THE MANLY MAN

During the days of the "Massive Retaliation" strategy, USAF strategic offense capability served as its nucleus. All mission areas were designed to complement this primary role of aerospace power, with the Air Force providing two-thirds of the Nation's strategic triad. Informally known as the "Heyday of SAC", USAF policy focussed on its ability to wage strategic offensive operations on a global scale. To maintain this focus, most USAF chiefs of staff were bomber pilots.

USAF continued this focus as President Kennedy changed the national strategy to "Flexible Response". This strategy, although its application has evolved drastically over the last 25 years, continues today. The most drastic change in air power applications came during and shortly after the Vietnam conflict. Near the end of the conflict, it became apparent that the focus within this "Flexible Response" strategy needed to be directed towards a lower level in the conflict intensity continuum. This lower level was the broad area of conventional war, where Tactical Air Command provided the expertise, the combatants, and the potential for inspirational leadership.

Thus the process leading USAF to its current vision started less than twenty years ago, when manly men ascended to the position that demonstrates the direction to which the Air Force must focus its attention. That ascending to the very helm of the Air Force has led to a constant, long, and meaningful procession of manly men to do what they alone can do best: lead.

## A NEW DIRECTION

In confirmation hearings, Senator Barry Goldwater summarized the need for a manly man to be USAF Chief of Staff. He pointed out that the leader of the USAF needed to be from a single-seat, high performance aircraft. USAF needed a quick thinker, one who could rely on his own judgement and decisions, not merely manage the judgements and decisions of other crewmembers. The senator had made an important distinction between the manly man and the force enhancer: the manly man leads, while the force enhancer manages.

The new direction with a manly man as chief meant fewer and fewer bomber influences on the Air Staff and, inversely, more tactical influences. These influences needed to dominate not only from the top, but through the intermediate levels all the way down to the action officer level. The key during this new-age era of conventional wisdom was the procurement process and the need to maintain Air Force tactical priorities through its modernization programs. It was the same reinforcement process that the bomber proponents had used during the "Heyday" when they scrapped a huge and relatively young medium bomber fleet of B-47s in favor of buying brand new B-52Hs. Now it was the turn of the manly man, who did exceptionally well at providing his constituents with the latest aircraft money could buy.

Role	Category A	Category B
Aerospace Control	F-15	
	F-16	
Force Application	F-117	B-52
	A-10	F-111
	F-16	
	F-15	
Force Enhancement	KC-10	C-5
	C-21	C-141
	MH-60	RF-4
		EF-111
		(R)(K)(E)C-135
		(A)(M)(H)(E)C-130
		HH-3
		MH-53
Force Support		

Figure 1, Relative Ages of Desert Storm Aircraft by Role

To illustrate the manly man's exceptional prowess in procurement actions, Figure 1 breaks out relative age of Desert Storm airframes into two categories: Category A stands for aircraft where all of its crewmembers had to be older than the airframe itself. Category B stands for aircraft where it was possible for a crewmember to be younger than the airframe on which he or she was flying into combat. Further, to show how effective the Air Staff procurement actions have been, the types of aircraft have been

grouped according to their respective roles in the new Air Force Basic Doctrine manual, AFM 1-1.

## BASIC AIR FORCE DOCTRINE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

This document, to drive Air Force policy well into the next century, clearly defines a hierarchy of good within the aerospace community. Those in the first role group will remain superior: it is from this category alone that all within it are manly men. And, those remembering the 1991 *hyperwar* of the desert will remember the young pilots and their younger aircraft. After all, the goal of this group is air superiority, and who else can achieve superiority but the Superman himself? The next role also demonstrated more Category A than B aircraft in the desert war. It is also from this group that manly men will emerge. But many within this second highest group of the hierarchy will not pass the Goldwater test because they do not base all their decisions strictly on their own judgement and experience, but must have a crew to guide them along.

The final group which has aircraft, and lowest ranking in the hierarchy of flyers, is the Force Enhancement area. According to the August 1990 Draft AFM 1-1, "Because none of these missions puts fire and steel on a target, they lack the glamorous aura associated with many other aerospace missions. Yet, each of these enhancing missions has become indispensable in modern warfare. In nearly every sense of the word, each is a *combat* mission." That's right, not *every* sense, but *nearly* every sense of the word. It's not important that you are logging combat time and being shot at, that's *nearly* combat. To be fully combat in every sense, you must exude the glamorous aura of putting fire and steel on a target.

Some detractors of the manly man concept even propose that we dilute the ranks of the manly men with women. Of course, by definition, they don't qualify. The problem is that Congress has changed the definition. What they are confused about is that women fly as combat crewmembers in certain force enhancement areas where they can receive enemy fire in combat. But, since none of these areas puts fire and steel on a target and lack the glamorous aura involved with such manly endeavors, women in this *nearly* combat role could never be true combat warriors. The official USAF position traditionally has been that women should not be allowed in combatant roles, only in force enhancement type "combat crew" positions, or fully in support functions. It is in the support area that they can best serve the interests of the manly men, and prove the true value of a "good 702" (referring to the Air Force Specialty Code 702XX, Administration Specialist).

Thus, to provide proper combat leadership of the Air Force, it has got to come from within its combat capability, as opposed to its *near combat* capability, which, again, lacks the glamorous aura of putting fire and steel on a target. You may be able to find a manly man from the top two groups in the hierarchy of Air Force missions, but the basic doctrine makes it absolutely clear: they cannot and will not be found among the force enhancers.

Another excellent feature of the new doctrine is the elimination of the troublesome missions of special operations and close air support as basic Air Force missions. Neither has very much of a role in *hyperwar*, a war in which the Air Force ruthlessly, but judiciously, launches its lightning speed and precise firepower to bear against the enemy, destroying the opponent *en masse*, any will to fight, and all ability to resist. As the sign said in CENTAF Special Plans during the last phase of the air war prior to the ground war commencing, "We are not preparing the battlefield, we are destroying it."

### THE MANAGEMENT VERSUS LEADERSHIP ANTI-THESIS

While the manly men develop their leadership traits, those within the force enhancement areas have been instilling management skills into their future chiefs through a process of organizational inbreeding. This inbreeding was the product of a misguided personnel policy where chiefs of the force enhancement areas were selected from those who had grown up professionally within those respective mission areas. Thus the chiefs of these force enhancers became those who demonstrated both expertise and management skills in employing that particular mission, instead of those with the glamorous aura and spark of leadership to inspire belief in mission and aggressive attitudes from the top down to the lowest levels.

It was the ultimate conflict between management and leadership: those with developed skills to efficiently run an organization versus those with the inherent traits to inspire extraordinary feats from ordinary men and women. It is now apparent that the proper force structure within these areas requires redirection, with a true leader placed in command of these organizations, surrounded by the most expert managers available to give proper advice and insure the organization's efficiency.

Thus the next phase of the emerging vision of the future requires the selective placement of a true leader, the manly man, to a position of leadership within all Air Force major commands, not just HQ USAF and its combatant command, TAC. The importance of developing the proper management skills for efficiency purposes is still critical so leadership can receive sound advice. Therefore, Total Quality Management (TQM) courses, as Management by Objective courses were necessary in the past, must continue in order to educate the future top advisors in force enhancement roles.

It is not necessary to take the absolute top positions initially. Vice commander positions at the MAJCOMs and Deputy Commander positions in the joint communities are a satisfactory point of departure to realize the ultimate goal: reshape the Air Force in its *nearly* combat commands to the same standard as the manly men have traditionally provided with their spark of leadership to USAF's combat command, TAC.

### DEVELOPING A POOL OF FUTURE LEADERS


The problem with achieving this objective is promotion percentages. With the current personnel policy of in-breeding, all commands promote at nearly the same percentages. All commands receive, down to the wing level, the same percentage of officers that

they can designate "Definitely Promote" on a promotion recommendation to a promotion board. This means that an officer in a force enhancement command has almost the same promotion opportunity than that of a manly man from the USAF combatant command. Embarrassingly, many of USAF's combat warriors cannot realize their full potential because of a bureaucratic system that eliminates future leaders at the same rate as force enhancers with management deficiencies.

Thus the Air Force faces the ominous specter of a pool of leaders too small to be able to provide that glamorous aura, that spark of leadership so desperately needed in command of every USAF organization.

What is needed to overcome this in-breeding phenomenon is a reorganization at the lowest levels of promotion quotas, the wing. The wing therefore should be a composite wing, comprised of many force enhancement squadrons and one or two highly selected combat units. The composite wing can overcome small inefficiencies such as a disjointed logistics infrastructure, dissimilar missions, unit capability differentials, and lack of overall expertise in its overhead staff by serving as a fertile field for producing and nurturing the future leaders of the Air Force, the manly men.

As such, some prefer reference to this fertile organization as the compost wing, which of course will require a manly man to command. The organization of the compost wing is shown below:



The manly man at the top of the heap in command of the compost wing can, with this structure, grow and nurture the leadership which the Air Force will need in increasing

numbers as it realizes the emerging vision of the future. The more force enhancement squadrons within the wing, the more "definitely promotes" available in each grade on each promotion board to designate to the wing's combat warriors. For example, one AC-130, EC-130, or AWACS squadron, with its 75 or more navigators, can produce several "definitely promotes" for the wing on each board through lieutenant colonel. The same is true for many other *nearly* combat squadrons with many officer crewmembers on each flight crew. It is imperative, therefore, that all such squadrons be incorporated into the compost wing.

### CONCLUSION

In order for the Air Force to realize the emerging vision of the future, it must provide the spark of leadership that only combat warriors possess. This is a three step process: first, manly men must dominate HQ USAF. Second, they must command all Air Force major commands. Last, USAF must have a wing structure which will grow and nurture the future leaders of the Air Force.

## EPILOGUE

### THE PROPER IMAGE

To continue such excellence in wartime, combat warriors must be able to display the proper image to superiors, subordinates, the Congress, and the American people at large. Identifying such combat warriors early is the first step. Then, USAF can focus on personnel programs to obtain and enhance the right image for our future leaders. As the Air Force Chief of Staff recently said, "I think everybody likes to look good." When you look good, you feel good. When you feel good, you do good. When you do good, you are good. So why worry about anything else but looking good?

A good first step for identifying the manly men early in their careers is to develop a dual-track system in pilot training that weeds out the wheat from the chaff. Student pilots can be graded after completing T-37 training on a merit system considering flying, academics, and military performance (proper image). Those that rank highest will be given the opportunity to choose to go to the top two doctrinal roles and complete their training in the T-38 high performance jet trainer. Those that don't rank highest (or have the extremely poor judgement to actually turn down the opportunity to fly in the most important roles) will be denigrated to the force enhancement role and complete their pilot training in a Beechcraft trainer.

The second step is to change the emphasis of the Air Force weight control program to concentrate more on the proper image and genetic superiority aspects than on the health-related ones. The manly man has inherited his excellent physical traits through his superior genetic make-up and must be encouraged to keep that manly image. One way to concentrate on image is to compare neck measurement to waist measurement. The higher the neck-to-waist ratio, the better the genes for leadership. Some will be able to adjust their measurements through weight training and diet, but their genetic make-up will never be able to top the ratio of the manly men.

Another method of projecting proper image and identify the manly man at the same time is to remove the option of the crew-neck undershirt from the list of authorized male undergarments. What this type of undershirt hides is the amount of chest hair of the USAF member. The implication of course is that the more chest hair, the better. The image is very positive in American society. One often hears, "Here, have some of this. It'll put hair on your chest." One never hears, "Stop! What do you think you're doing? Don't you know that it'll put hair on your chest?" Therefore, chest hair, as a positive attribute in American society, should increase the image of the Air Force and identify the manly man.

Also, the genetic make-up of some will betray them over time, even with conditioning and dietary adjustment. Many of these genetically inferior personnel could be identified earlier with thorough chromosome testing when they enter the Air Force. Until USAF has the technology to perform such tests, we can still identify many such personnel through more in-depth medical histories of their parents and grandparents. Those with an obese parent or grandparent, one or more ancestors with clearly inferior neck-to-waist ratios, or one that increased in waist measurement as an adult, could be eliminated early, or at least properly placed in a force enhancement or support role. Genetic engineering holds many positive possibilities for even earlier development of the manly man.

This is another reason why the official photograph is so important for promotion consideration and why it should be a full length depiction of the officer. The photograph is the only way that boards can determine from the official record many very significant genetic traits. Should the photograph ever be dropped from the promotion folder, it must be replaced with a complete chromosomal analysis or at least a genetic neck-to-waist ratio family history.

The last thing USAF needs to develop for a manly image is a distinctively Air Force uniform. It needs to be as streamlined as the latest flight suit, to reflect the aerodynamic image of the manly man.



## 'Brown Paper' Satire Pans McPeak Initiatives

In a biting satire that swipes at Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak's sweeping reorganization of air combat units and Washington-headquarters, a document circulating inside the service claims the management hierarchy is flavored too heavily with fighter pilot machismo.

Spooling a purported infusion of Tactical Air Command personnel, the document, entitled "TAC-umsizing The Air Force, The Emerging Vision of the Future," tells of the emergence inside the Air Force of the "Manly Man."

"In order for the Air Force to realize the emerging vision of the future, it must provide the spark of leadership that only combat warriors possess," said the self-proclaimed "Brown Paper," an allusion meant to parody the "white papers" that overrun the Pentagon.

"This is a three step process: First, manly men must dominate headquarters USAF. Second, they must command all Air Force major commands. Last, USAF must have a wing structure which will grow and nurture the future leaders of the Air Force."

Among the steps suggested by the paper to develop the perfect "ubermann, a race of supermen to champion the conquest of the air and space," is genetic engineering that identifies inferior personnel through the use of chromosome testing when they enter the Air Force. "Genetic engineering holds many positive possibilities for even earlier development of the manly man," it said.

Depending on one's point of view, the well-circulated paper represents "an insurrection" against McPeak's initiatives or poking-fun-

BY TONY CAPACCIO

at-the-boss jibes common to all jobs. "It's a satire," said McPeak spokesman Col. Darrell Hayes of the document. "He understands that there are other viewpoints out there."

That it comes on the heels of major reorganization initiatives suggests the "Brown Paper" might be more than an attempt at warped humor.

For several months industry and service sources said there has been growing discontent with former Thunderbird pilot McPeak's desire to stock his leadership with fighter brethren.

There's little doubt that some of McPeak's initiatives, especially a proposal to cut headquarters staff by 25 percent, has rankled some Air Force officials. McPeak alluded to the opposition during a recent speech before the Air Force Association. "We'll be doing our part to solve Washington's traffic congestion. Some of that departing traffic will be in nicer cars because 14 generals will be moving away from Washington...They are among my most loyal fans."

In brief remarks to *Defense Week*, McPeak said he was confident about service support for the top-level initiatives. "We've had very good support inside the organization."

But according to one Air Force source, "the Thunderbird mentality is starting to pervade the Air Staff," those officials who work for the chief. "Flight suit zipping, bravado actions toward women, disrespect toward fellow officers and other types of pilots is standard operating procedure," the source said.

The paper's discussion of women in Air Force ranks echoed these concerns: "Some detractors of the manly man concept even propose that we dilute the ranks of the manly men with women. Of course, by definition, they don't qualify."

In a poke at McPeak's initiative to redesign Air Force garb, said the paper: "The last thing the USAF needs to develop for a manly image is a distinctively Air Force uniform. It needs to be as streamlined as the latest flight suit to reflect the aerodynamic image of the manly man."

Yet another shot is taken at McPeak's major initiative to establish some so-called composite air wings for quick deployment missions. The wings would consist of a permanent mix of fighters, tankers, B-52G bombers and electronic warfare planes that would train as a unit during peacetime as they's fight.

The "Brown Paper" had another viewpoint. "Some prefer reference to this fertile organization as the 'compost' wing, which of course will require a manly man to command. The manly man at the top of the heap in command of the compost wing can, with this structure, grow and nurture the leadership which the Air Force will need in increasing numbers."

## Incomplete Documents Stall Pentagon ASAS Review

The Pentagon last week pushed back a key review of the Army's long-troubled All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) until mid-October because testing plans and requirements documents were incomplete, according to Pentagon sources.

The Defense Acquisition Board's command, control, communications and intelligence committee was supposed to review the program Sept. 25 and determine whether the project was ready to move into a crucial new phase, "Block II."

ASAS is being designed to gather information from a myriad of intelligence sources and present the data in a simplified form.

The review was postponed when requirements documents and the test and evaluation master plan were found to be incomplete, according to sources. The requirements documents are supposed to lay out precisely the standards to which the system will perform.

The review has been rescheduled for October 16.

One source called the objections to the test plans "bureaucratic nitpicking." But another described the omissions as a more serious problem: "You don't feel comfortable approving a program when you don't know what to test it to."

In Block II, the sophisticated system will be transferred to new common hardware and software it will share with other Army

Tactical Command and Control System components. According to congressional observers, the transition is fraught with technical complexity and risk.

Last July, the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned "whether the Army needs more direct technical assistance than it currently plans to have to support the program."

Last week, meanwhile, the Senate Appropriations Committee added \$6 million to the ASAS fiscal 1992 budget. The extra money would be used to "dramatically" improve the speed with which information can be retrieved from the ASAS data base.

When completed, ASAS will siphon information gathered by aircraft, helicopters, satellites, electronic eavesdroppers and commando forces to frontline intelligence analysts. They in turn will cue deep strike weapons like the Multiple Launch Rocket System.

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee's fiscal 1992 defense spending report: "Experience in the gulf highlighted the need to speed up the basic data base operations that are the heart of ASAS. It is critical to combine and assess the various sources of information quickly so that targets are not lost before action can be taken."

-- ANDREW WEINSCHENK



Pacific

# Stars and Stripes

AN AUTHORIZED UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION FOR PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND AUTHORIZED U.S. PERSONNEL WITHIN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

46th Year, No. 284

35¢

第054号 12月20日 第三卷 第17号  
发行所 星条旗报社 星条旗报社 星条旗报社  
〒106 東京都港区六本木 7丁目2番17号

SATURDAY Oct. 12, 1991

## Critics target McPeak's reorganization plan

By Robert Burns

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON — When Air Force chief Gen. Merrill McPeak laid out his plan for the biggest shakeup the service has ever seen, he waited for a backlash and wondered: "Is there anybody out there listening?"

Apparently there is. And those among them who don't like what they hear are talking back

with an anonymous "Brown Paper" that spoofs McPeak's grand scheme as a transparent plot to remake the Air Force in the self-inflated image of its fighter jocks, that elite fraternity with McPeak as its most powerful member.

Fighter pilots, the authors write with piercing sarcasm, are born to lead the Air Force because they are "a race of supermen," with a "superior genetic make-up" who can "inspire extraordinary feats from ordinary men and women."

The rest of the force — the navigators, bombers, tanker and cargo crews, administrators and other inferior species — are relegated to second-class status, incapable of "the spark of leadership that only combat warriors possess."

The unsigned Brown Paper, circulating unofficially in the Pentagon, is seven pages of biting humor in the form of an official Air Force policy document. McPeak calls it "hilariously funny" but acknowledges that it exposes a pocket of discontent over his reorganization ideas.

The title of the satirical paper — "TAC-critics' complaint that the deck is being stacked in the fighter jocks' favor at the expense of those in the service who fill less glamorous roles."

TAC is the acronym for Tactical Air Command, which is in charge of the Air Force's fighter jets, light bombers and close-air support aircraft.

See FIGHTER JOCKS, Page 4

## Fighter jocks

FROM PAGE 1

It was TAC's F-15 Eagles, F-16 Falcons and F-117A stealth light bombers that got most of the glory in the Persian Gulf War air campaign.

McPeak says his changes, which include taking more generals and colonels out of Pentagon desk jobs and putting them in charge of combat forces in the field, are designed mainly to make the Air Force a leaner, meaner fighting force.

The Brown Paper's authors see it differently. In their view, it's a four-star fighter pilot creating a "hierarchy of good" among service members.

At the top of the heap are "manly men" — the young pilots and their shiny aircraft who starred in the "1991 hyperwar of the desert." Below them is everyone else.

"The manly man has inherited his excellent

physical traits through his superior genetic make-up and must be encouraged to keep that manly image," the paper says.

In a sarcastic dig, the paper also complains about the fate of women in McPeak's Air Force. "Some detractors of the manly man concept even propose that we dilute the ranks of the manly men with women," it says. "Of course, by definition, they don't qualify."

McPeak was asked about the paper at a meeting with reporters Wednesday. He said it reflected a mistaken impression among some in the Air Force that the service exists "to provide equitable career tracks for everybody in the Air Force."

These people should understand, he said, that the Air Force "does not exist for any other purpose except to defend the United States well."