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AMENDMENTS TO NARRATIVETHE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE
KISKA OPERATION

Para 19 1. 13 Delete "Inf" and end the sentence at "Corps".
Delete "having successfully -----GSO II".

1. 16 After "Lieut-Colonel" add "(25A)".

Note 25 add
Note 25A Under the U.S. System of staff designation (of Para 20), the appointment of S-3 corresponded to the British Brigade Major. This appointment in 13 Inf Bde was held by Maj. (later Lt.Col.) LJ St. Laurent, OBE, ED. (C.A.R.O. 3388 of 1943).

Para 41 1. 1 for "Stated" read "States".

Appendix - Report of 13 Bde Sigs Offr Insert above the heading the following: With the following report should be read Lt.Col. LJ St. Laurent's comments on folios 102,103 of HQC 5393-5-4.

Para 88 1. 14 add
Canadian experience of combined operations gained in the Dieppe raid provided a basis for the early training programme, and knowledge gained from American operations in the Attu campaign played an important part.

Note 210 add
The record of the construction of this pier by personnel of 24 Fd Coy RCE is with D.E.S.

Appendix 55A - Japanese Evacuation of Kiska sub para (2) 1. 5
for
"destroyed" read "Deterred"

Appendices to be numbered as follows
On first page of appendices, above heading Note on SLEDS insert:-
Following are extracts from appendices to original report.

After Note on SLEDS add (Appx 11)
" " " ATHEY TRAILERS add (Appx 12)
" " " SLEEPING BAGS add (Appx 13)
" " " TRENCH FEET add (Appx 14)
" STRENGTH AT EMBARKATION add (Appx 18)
" Note on THE PART-----OPERATIONS add (Appx 35)
" REPORT OF 13 BDE SIGS OFFRS add (Appx 41)
" NOTE ON US HOSPITALIZATION add (Appx 43)
" RATIONS add (Appx 45)
" REPORTS ON ACTS OF COURAGE add (Appx 49)
" REPORT ON GRENADE EXPLOSION add (Appx 50)
" DDOS REPORT ON STORES add (Appx 52)
" JAPANESE EVACUATION OF KISKA add (Appx 55A)
" THE PROBABLE COST OF ENEMY RESISTANCE
add (Appx 56)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CANCELLED

THE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE KISKA OPERATIONS

FOREWORD

A. KISKA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DHD 3-3

by COE for DHist NDHQ

Date: NOV 7 1986

2900 miles from Vancouver, second largest island in the second westernmost island group of the Aleutian Chain, lying in the same longitude as New Zealand, the same latitude as London, and situated in the weather breeding zone between the frigid Bering Sea and the more temperate Japanese current of the North Pacific Ocean is Kiska, for fourteen months Japan's most far-reaching threat towards North American security (1).

Running generally from northeast to southwest, Kiska is 25 miles long, with a width varying from two to eight miles. The shore line includes few beaches suitable for landing (the better of which were well controlled by enemy fire) and generally consists of precipitous rocky cliffs bulwarked by reefs, pinnacle rocks, dangerous rip tides, and treacherous undertow. Normal surf to windward is seven feet high and has been recorded at 35 feet during a blow.

The island in general ranges in height from 3996 feet at the summit of the volcano to the north, through sea level lagoons and swamps at the volcano's foot, to a series of ridges averaging 1200 feet. Snow caps the volcano throughout most of the year, ranges down to cover the ridges for from six to eight months, reaches, and remains at, sea level for four months, from December to March inclusive.

Because of the terrific winds that blow for days on end across the island no trees can exist on Kiska, but the super-abundance of precipitation fosters the lush growth of tall, thick, fibrous grass along the lower slopes and in the deep precipitous gullies cut by the rushing, unnavigable streams which drain the heavily watered high ground. This grass, frequently two to three feet in height, is watersoaked and quickly drenches pedestrian passage. It forms interlaced matting which hides narrow gullies, water-filled pot holes and other obstacles, at all times providing a spongy, treacherous footing that quickly fatigues the walker who has not been thoroughly conditioned to its exhausting physical demands.

Such is Kiska, the unattractive once unknown island in the North Pacific whose name was to become a household word in thousands of Canadian homes across the Dominion.

B. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION (2)

As part of a general offensive against United States bases in the Central and Northern Pacific, the Japanese in Jun 42 invaded Alaskan waters with a large amphibious task force. On 3 Jun, and again on 4 Jun, carrier-based enemy bombers and fighters attacked Dutch Harbour. To the West, the No 3 Maizuru Special Landing Party, composed of 500 marines commanded by Lieut Commander Mukai, Hifumi, occupied Kiska Island on 6 Jun 42. Having captured the small ten-man naval detachment operating the US Weather Station on the island the Japanese immediately started construction of anti-aircraft positions. At the same time some twenty naval vessels moved into Kiska Harbour.

On 12 Jun, 11th Air Force heavy bombers made their first bombing runs over the island, hitting and setting fire to two cruisers and a destroyer. Through the months that followed US air attack, supplemented at times by naval bombardment and submarine activity, continued to harass the Japanese garrison, reinforced by military and naval units in August and December to an estimated strength approaching ten thousand. American occupation of Adak on 31 Aug 42, and Amchitka, on 12 Jan 43, followed in each case by the rapid construction of bomber and fighter-strips, speeded up the tempo of aerial attack on Kiska, and the completion of Attu's reduction in early June made possible the concentration of activities against the sole remaining Japanese stronghold in the Aleutians.

Aerial toll on shipping had forced the enemy to restrict his supply lines to the limited use of submarines. The US capture of Attu completed the isolation of the Kiska garrison. There is evidence in captured Japanese documents to show that the continual harassing from the air had a most depressing effect upon the morale of the defenders (3). It must have been apparent to them that it was only a matter of time before their island would become the target of invasion. The impending presence in the area of an overwhelming task force of all arms, - naval, land and air -- rendered their position untenable. When the American and Canadian forces came ashore on 15-16 Aug 43, they found the island deserted. Japan had been forced to give up her last foothold on North American soil.

I

THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

Aleutian Operations Proposed at Pacific Command - Ottawa explores possibilities - The two proposals - Authority is granted.

ALEUTIAN OPERATIONS PROPOSED AT PACIFIC COMMAND

1. The possibility of co-operation by the Canadian Army with the United States Forces in an Aleutian expedition in the summer of 1943 was first considered during a visit to Headquarters, Pacific Command, by Lt-Gen JL DeWitt, Commanding General, Western Defence Command and Fourth Army, on 19 Apr 43, when he discussed with Maj-Gen GR Pearkes, GOC-in-C Pacific Command, the projected American operations. Gen Pearkes reported this meeting to National Defence Headquarters, indicating that the proposed United States operations were to commence early in May (4).

OTTAWA EXPLORES POSSIBILITIES

2. On 10 May 43 Maj-Gen MA Pope, Commander Canadian Army Staff at Washington, drew to the attention of Lt-Gen K Stuart, Chief of the General Staff, NDHQ, an opinion expressed to him by the Secretary of the American Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence suggesting that (a) the presence of Japanese in the Aleutians could be considered a threat to continental security, (b) Canada, as continental neighbour of the United States was as much concerned as that nation, and (c) that nothing could be more appropriate than that Canada should associate herself with the United States in removing that threat (5).

3. Immediately upon receipt of Gen Pope's communication Gen Stuart wired the GOC-in-C Pacific Command as follows:

"Is it too late to consider some form of army participation? (6)" At the same time the CGS instructed Gen Pope to explore possibilities of Canadian participation with Gen George Marshall, United States Army Chief of Staff (7). On 24 May Gen Pope reported that Gen Marshall had found both Gen DeWitt and Maj-Gen SB Buckner, Commanding General, Alaska Defence Command, "delighted at the prospect of having Canadian units with them in present or future operations in the Aleutians (8)".

4. While Ottawa and Washington were coming to a formal understanding with regard to possible Canadian participation in Aleutian operations, out on the Pacific Coast tentative plans were being drawn up pending authority being granted to put them into effect. As an initial step ten Canadian Army Officers representing "G" Branch, Intelligence, Signals, and the Services, were, with Gen DeWitt's concurrence, sent as observers from Pacific Command to the Alaska Defence Command. They proceeded to Alaska to visit various posts and islands, and their reports on return proved of great value in the later planning of the Kiska operation (9).

THE TWO PROPOSALS

5. On 25 May Gen DeWitt at a conference at Headquarters Pacific Command, outlined two forms in which he would welcome Canadian participation:

PROPOSAL "A" - An infantry battalion with an anti-aircraft battery to proceed as soon as possible for garrison duties on Amchitka to provide additional strength in case of a possible Japanese counter offensive as a result of the loss of Attu.

PROPOSAL "B" - Provision of approximately a brigade group to take part in a United States task force that was to be employed in the capture of Kiska later in the summer.

These two proposals were forthwith submitted by the two Generals to their respective Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa and Washington (10).

6. In a memorandum to the Minister of National Defence, dated 26 May 43, setting forth the two proposals, the CGS pointed out the advantages accompanying the authorization of either or both plans (11):

- (a) Operations would give our troops much needed battle experience.
- (b) Participation would increase the prestige of the Army throughout Canada, and would raise the morale of all troops in Canada, especially those in the Pacific Command.
- (c) The use of "Home Defence" personnel would serve to break down the hostile attitude with which such personnel were regarded by a large section of the Canadian public.
- (d) The participation of elements of the Canadian Army in an active theatre of war in the Pacific in conjunction with the United States Army would not only serve to improve relations with the United States but would exemplify Canada's intentions of playing her full part in the Pacific as well as in the European and Mediterranean regions.
- (e) The participation of elements of the Canadian Army in the Aleutian theatre was in complete accord with the spirit of plans drawn up by the Joint Defence Board and approved by the United States and Canadian Governments.

AUTHORITY IS GRANTED

7. Government authority was granted, and on 3 Jun 43 a wire was sent to Pacific Command Headquarters from the CGS authorizing the formation of a brigade group for the purposes put forward in ...

proposal "B". Troops were to be picked and concentrated at Courtenay, (this was later changed to Nanaimo) (12), and the force was to be available to leave Pacific Command on approximately 1 Aug for one month's further training in Alaska, prior to offensive operations contemplated early in September. Proposal "A" had not been concurred in (13). Employment of troops in Canada for upwards of four years had been entirely in a defensive role, and the idea of assigning a battalion group to further garrison duties with only remote likelihood of gaining battle experience held little appeal for the Canadian General Staff. An Order of Battle for the force of proposal "B" had already tentatively been drawn up at Pacific Command Headquarters, and it was immediately submitted to NDHQ for approval. The same day saw the completion of an exchange of notes between US Secretary of War, Henry L Stimson and Defence Minister JL Ralston, in which the former welcomed Canadian participation in the Aleutians either as a garrison force or in an active operational capacity (14), and the latter gave notice of Canada's readiness "to provide an infantry brigade group for employment along with US troops in offensive operations in the Alaskan - Aleutian Area" (15).

8. "Greenlight" was launched. - It was a momentous occasion. For the first time in history a Canadian force was to be employed in war side by side with American troops on American soil. Nor was this all. The effect upon the morale of those in Pacific Command who knew the decision was dynamic. For over three years the role of the Command had been one of static defence of the West Coast, and as the war continued it had seemed more and more apparent that the Command was becoming merely a training and reinforcement area for the Canadian Army Overseas, with little chance offered for participation in active operations. The picture was now completely changed, the "Green Light" signal to go ahead had been flashed, and Pacific Command became overnight an important stage on the road to Tokyo.

II

THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

The Tactical Brigade Group - The Order of Battle - NRMA
Personnel - The Combat Teams.

THE TACTICAL BRIGADE GROUP

9. When Gen DeWitt first put forward to Gen Pearkes the proposal for a Canadian Brigade group to participate in Aleutian operations he visualized some kind of Canadian formation that would be able to function efficiently within the larger task force which it was proposed to assemble, and to this end the composition of the Canadian element was planned to follow as closely as possible that of the corresponding United States group. This formation, the United States Regimental Group, was composed of a Tactical Group HQ, including special troops, and three Battalion Landing Groups. Each of these BLGs was divided into a Forward Combat Team and a Beach Combat Team. The former comprised a headquarters, with headquarters of various detachments, an infantry battalion, a reinforced (Over establishment) battery of field artillery, a cannon and an anti-aircraft platoon, and detachments of engineer, supply and medical services. The Beach Combat Team included a headquarters and headquarters of detachments, a reinforced company of combat engineers, a reinforced anti-aircraft battery, and detachments of signals, police, quartermaster, ordnance and medical services (16).

10. Upon this pattern, with certain minor necessary modifications, the Canadian Brigade Group was modelled. It will be seen that the basic unit of the formation was the Battalion Landing Group (or Battalion Combat Team), a self-sustaining tactical and administrative organization capable of making an independent landing on a beach, fighting forward, and maintaining itself. As their names indicate both of the two main component parts of the BLG -- the Forward Combat Team and the Beach Combat Team were organized and equipped to fight. The Forward Combat Team had the primary objective of defeating the enemy's main body. The Beach Combat Team, constituting the base installation had as its principal missions:

- (a) To unload ships and small boats on the beach;
- (b) To establish dumps and to move supplies from the beach to the forward area dumps, - the success of the FCT depending upon the energy of the BCT in pushing forward supply;
- (c) To defend the beach and the lines of communication between the beach and the rear of the FCT;
- (d) To evacuate casualties.

In addition to being charged with these specific functions, all or part of the BCT might be called upon as a fighting reserve to the FCT (17).

THE ORDER OF BATTLE

11. The Order of Battle originally drawn up by the Pacific Command planners was as follows (18):

- HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde
- 13 Cdn Def Pl
- Canadian Fusiliers
- Winnipeg Grenadiers
- Rocky Mountain Rangers
- 24 Fd Regt RCA
- 24 Fd Coy RCE
- Coy Saint John Fusiliers (MG)
- Det 25 Fd Ambulance RCAMC
- Dets other services.

12. Units concerned were selected on grounds of their present strength and efficiency, the infantry battalions chosen being the three battalions in Pacific Command most nearly up to War Establishment. Each was recommended by the respective divisional commander as sufficiently well trained for combined operations, provided that a period of intensive training were authorized. The 13 Brigade was the senior brigade in the Command, the 24 Field Regiment was the most fully trained in the Command, and of the field companies the 24 Field Company was considered the best in the 8 Div and was regarded as being as efficient as any in the 6 Div.

13. To take the place of the Battalion of Combat Engineers divided among the Beach Combat Teams in the parallel US group, it was decided to include with the Greenlight Force, as the main labour and defence element of the Beach Combat Teams, Le Regiment de Hull (19). With the addition of this French Canadian unit all parts of Canada, - the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Middle West, and British Columbia was represented in the enterprise. The 19 Field Security Section was also added to the proposed force, and with the approval of the

Commanding General, Western Defence Command, inclusion was authorized of the 46 Light AA Battery and a complete Canadian Field Ambulance (the 25th).

NRMA PERSONNEL

14. The employment of NRMA personnel in the Greenlight Force required special governmental authorization. Order-in-Council PC 7995, dated 4 Sep 42, had already authorized the despatch to Alaska, for employment or defence, of certain units on whose strength were HD personnel, and PC 3238, dated 28 Apr 43, had extended the authority to cover all such NRMA personnel. PC 5011, dated 18 Jun 43, now specifically included with Alaska "the Aleutian Islands and other United States Islands adjacent thereto", giving to the Minister of National Defence the necessary authority to despatch NRMA personnel. Under the terms of the Order, the Minister issued a Direction, dated 11 Jul 43, approving the despatch of the "Greenlight Force" for training, service or duty at Alaska or any other Alaskan territory east of Adak. Upon receipt of a report from VCGS from Alaska on 11 Aug (20) that Greenlight training, morale, and equipment was satisfactory, the Minister issued Direction No 2, dated 12 Aug 43, removing the limitation imposed in the first Direction, and permitting the despatch of the Greenlight Force to any part of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

THE COMBAT TEAMS

15. By the middle of June the 13 Inf Bde had been reorganized into HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde Group and 14, 15 and 16 Cdn Combat Teams (BLGs). HQ Group consisted of Bde HQ, together with Group services and a reserve for the Battalion Combat Teams. Its establishment was 74 officers and 870 other ranks (21). To a large extent this group contained the headquarters of the various units whose elements were dispersed under the command of the Combat Teams, a concentration of command power that often made administration particularly difficult, introducing a double source of orders, at times somewhat confusing. Later experience led the Force Commander to suggest that once the Battalion Combat Teams had been formed the only HQ to remain as such should have been that of the Field Regiment, whose centralization at the earliest possible stage was desirable (22). Experience also questioned the value of the presence of detachments of the various services in HQ Group, as the Group invariably operated over a beach already being used by one or other of the Bn CTs, and some decentralization of these sub-units was later effected.

16. The 14, 15 and 16 Canadian Combat Teams were respectively built around 1 Bn Canadian Fusiliers, 1 Bn Winnipeg Grenadiers and 1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers. The Forward Combat Team component in each case consisted of the infantry battalion, a battery of the 24 Fd Regt RCA (the 49th, 84th and 85th respectively); a section of the 24 Fd Coy RCE (less Dets); a platoon of the Saint John Fusiliers (MG) and detachments of 13 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Sec RC Sigs, 24 Fd Regt Sig Sec RC Sigs, and the 25 Fd Amb RCAMC. Establishment of each Forward Combat Team was 51 Officers and 1016 other ranks (23).

17. Each Beach Combat Team comprised a rifle company of Le Regiment de Hull, a troop of the 46 Lt A A Bty RCA, and LAD (Type B) RCOC, an issue section of 99 Detachment RCASC; a clearing platoon of 6 US Fd Hospital; and detachments of 13 Cdn Bde Inf Sig Sec RC Sigs, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, 30 Ord Store Coy RCOC, 19 Sec Cdn Pro Corps, 24 Fd Regt Sig

Sec RCSigs and 14 Dental Det CDC. The Beach Combat Team had an establishment of 16 officers and 353 other ranks, making with the Forward Combat Team a total establishment of 67 officers and 1369 other ranks, or 1436 all ranks (24).

18. With the infantry battalion expanded by reinforcements of arms and services into a combat team nearly double its size, the need early became apparent for additional staff to assist the Bn HQ to train, fight and administer not only its own battalion but also the attached sub-units and detachments. Decentralization of the Bde HQ Group in returning to the combat team certain personnel of unit HQ of each team's various component arms and services did not completely solve the problem, and the Force Commander recommended that for future operations of a similar nature each Bn Combat Team should be given an "ad hoc" HQ establishment independent of the Bn HQ and comparable to a skeleton Bde HQ.

III

THE COMMAND

The Brigade Staff - Canadian-US Relationship

THE BRIGADE STAFF

19. In making the selection of a Force Commander, (Brig DR Sargent who was at the time commanding 13 Inf Brigade being disqualified by medical category) NDHQ asked Canadian Military Headquarters in London for recommendations. Gen McNaughton nominated Brig HW Foster, who was then commanding 7 Inf Bde. Brig Foster, Ld SH(RC), went overseas in 1939 as Bde Major of 1 Cdn Inf Bde, commanded the first Reconnaissance Regiment in the 1 Cdn Div, and had recently completed the Combined Training Course at Dorland (25). At the same time Gen McNaughton recommended as Brigade Major of the new force, Major WS Murdoch, Seaforth of C. Major Murdoch, who was a graduate of No 1 Canadian Junior War Staff Course, was serving at the time as GSO II (Oprs) with 1 Cdn Inf Corps, having successfully filled the posts of GSO III and GSO II. He had been Brigade Major with the Spitzbergen expedition. He was appointed to the Greenlight Force with the rank of Lieut-Colonel. These officers left England immediately and reported to HQ Pacific Command, on 17 Jun. They were joined in Eastern Canada by Lt-Col D Menard DSO, who had been appointed to command Le Regt de Hull.

20. In order to remove possible grounds of uncertainty on the part of co-operating US forces as to the functions and various duties of the members of Brig Foster's Staff it was considered highly desirable to reorganize 13 Cdn Inf Bde HQ on the US staff system. This resulted in the following establishment being filled:

Bde Comdr	Brig HW Foster	Ld SH(RC)
Chief of Staff	Lt-Col W.S. Murdoch	Seaforth of C.
S-1(Personnel)	Maj TA McWaters	HQ Pacific Command
S-2(Intelligence)	Capt AFP Freeman	1 Edm Fus
S-3(Oprs & Trg)	Maj LJ St Laurent	R de Hull
S-4(Supply & Evac)	Maj JG Stevens	RCR
Asst S-4	Capt RD Shaneman	11 DD

.....

In addition to these, in order to provide proper reliefs for Staff Officers and administration of the HQ itself certain other appointments were subsequently made, personnel being "borrowed" from the HQ of units whose sub-units had been detailed to combat teams. These were:

Asst S-2	Lt GT de Hueck	R de Hull
Asst S-3	Maj GP Murphy	Saint John Fus
Camp Commandant	Capt WF Dey	11 DD

CANADIAN-US RELATIONSHIP

21. The status of the Canadian Commander in relationship to the American force with which his troops were to serve was defined in instructions from the Chief of General Staff to the GOC-in-C (26) and conveyed to Brig Foster in his letter of appointment (27). Upon arrival in Alaska 13 Bde Group would come under operational control of Lt-Gen SB Buckner, Commanding General, Alaska Defence Command, and when the task force proceeded on its final mission Brig Foster would come under the command of Maj-Gen CH Corlett, Commanding General No 9 Amphibious Training Force. Further, since provision of supplies and transport was to be a United States responsibility the Canadian Commander's advice and views would undoubtedly be sought in matters not strictly operational. The relationship between Canadian and United States forces was that of co-belligerents, "serving together" as integral parts of a combined force in the field. The entity of the Canadian detachment was to be maintained at all times, but the degree of integration with US forces must be determined by local conditions and circumstances. Order-in-Council PC 5012, dated 18 Jun 43, defining the relationship in command, provided that except in matters affecting discipline and/or punishment the superior ranks of one force were given power of command over the junior members of the other force as if they all held relative rank in the same force. Throughout the entire operations this relationship was maintained in the most harmonious and co-operative manner. Full disciplinary powers over the Canadian Force were given to Brig Foster with powers to convene Field General Courts-Martial (28).

22. Brig Foster's command carried with it a further important responsibility. In coming to an agreement regarding joint participation in the Aleutian zone each Government had reserved to itself the right under extraordinary circumstances to withdraw from the undertaking. To Brig Foster, as Senior Combatant Officer, was given power to exercise this right, but to no officer at a lower level. Decision to withdraw was only to be reached on consultation with the GOC-in-C, unless such consultation were not feasible in point of time. It will be seen that the retention of this channel of communication linked Brig Foster at different stages of the projected operation into three chains of command:-

(i) US Navy

Brig HW Foster, OC 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp: Maj-Gen
CH Corlett, Commanding General Landing Force 16.8:
Vice Admiral TC Kincaid, USN, Commander North
Pacific Force, Pacific Fleet.

(ii) US Army

Brig HW Foster, OC 13 Bde Gp: Brig-Gen L Ready,
Commander Northern Sector: Maj-Gen CH Corlett,
Commanding General Landing Force 16.8: Maj-Gen SB
Buckner, Commanding General Alaska Defence Command:
Lt-Gen JD DeWitt, Commanding General Western Defence
Command.

(iii) Canadian Army

Brig HW Foster, OC 13 Bde Gp: Maj-Gen GR Pearkes,
GOC-in-C Pacific Command: Maj-Gen JC Murchie VCGS:
Lt-Gen K Stuart, CGS NDHQ.

IV

PLANNING FOR GREENLIGHT

The Planning Committee - The Operational Plan - Mobilization, Personnel - Reinforcements and Replacements - Mobilization, Equipping the Force - At Vancouver - At Seattle - At Nanaimo - Mobilization, Administration

THE PLANNING COMMITTEE

23. The exacting task of drawing up and supervising the preliminary execution of the Canadian plans for the Greenlight expedition was placed in the hands of an Operational and Administrative Planning Committee under the direction of the GOC-in-C, consisting of Brig WN Bostock, BGS Pacific Command; Brig WHS Macklin, Brig i/c Administration Pacific Command; and Brig Sherwood Lett, DCGS(B), who was functioning as an NDHQ Liaison Officer to HQ Pacific Command (29). The Committee throughout the planning period was in constant consultation with the Force Commander, Brig HW Foster. Time was short, the date of embarkation having been advanced to 10 Jul, and the Planning Committee worked under great pressure attacking the many problems arising out of the conversion and equipping of a Canadian force on American lines. A number of United States Officers came to Pacific Command to assist in their respective specialized spheres, their help, which was given unstintingly, proving invaluable to the Canadian planners.

THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

24. The U.S. Operational Plan, within the scope of which Greenlight plans were drawn up, provided for the occupation of the Island of Kiska, believed to be held by an estimated force of 11,000 Japanese, of which the great majority were fighting troops (30). The total military strength of the force to be employed against the enemy was approximately 32,000. It consisted of twelve American Battalion Combat Teams (BLGs) with HQ Reserves, a Special Duty Force (including the Canadian Special Service Battalion) for Commando duties, and the Canadian Greenlight Force of three Battalion Combat Teams, and a HQ Reserve. Supporting and co-operating with the military group were strong United States Air and Naval Forces. In accordance with US policy governing amphibious operations, the entire force would be under the command of Admiral TC Kincaid, US Navy, until the initial beach heads had been established, after which Maj-General CH Corlett, US Army, would assume command. The Canadian Force would proceed direct to an island in the Aleutians for approximately one month's further training prior to the assault on the final objective.

25. Under the Plan it was proposed that Canadian weapons would be used by the Greenlight Force with the following exceptions:
(a) 12 United States 75-mm pack howitzers to be substituted for the same number of 25-pounders in the 24 Field Regiment,

.....

(b) 24 United States 81-mm mortars to replace the 3-inch mortars in the Canadian infantry battalions. The 75-mm pack howitzers with pneumatic tires were provided as an alternative for the 25-pounders because of their greater ease of man-handling in difficult terrain. The 81-mm mortar was chosen for its superior range (approximately 1000 yards greater than that of the 3-inch mortar), and because the use of the American weapon would simplify the problem of ammunition supply. In addition to these American weapons some 400 United States carbines were issued to officers, and to stretcher bearers of the Field Ambulance, in place of rifles (31).

26. No Canadian vehicles other than guns and limbers were to be taken, the United States providing all mechanical transport. Equipment and supply in general became a matter of US provision, in order to avoid setting up a Canadian maintenance system, and to give Canadian troops the advantage of using many special items of United States and Alaskan equipment which were available, much of which had already been tested under campaign conditions in operations at Attu (32).

27. Ammunition was to be provided on a scale comparable to that used by the United States. The United States plan was to provide ten units of fire for ground weapons, and 15 units for anti-aircraft weapons, to accompany the Force and to be immediately available in the combat ships. The United States unit of fire being approximately the same as the Canadian G 1098 scale, it was decided to send ten to fifteen times G 1098 for each weapon of Canadian provision. Weapons supplied by the United States would be provided with United States ammunition on the United States scales (33).

28. Pacific Command Headquarters was now faced with the immense problem of mobilizing, equipping and providing for the maintenance of the Canadian component of the expedition. Important decisions had to be reached regarding policy, and attention given to the countless administrative details inseparable from the organization and mobilization of a force of the nature of Greenlight. Shortage of time demanded that these decisions be made with the least possible delay. Lack of availability of certain forms of equipment and supplies added to the difficulty of the planners. It must be borne in mind too that the type of terrain in which operations were contemplated was one entirely new to Canadian forces and the most difficult of any that had yet been contemplated. All these factors must be considered in making any evaluation of the manner in which the Canadian planning was effected.

MOBILIZATION - PERSONNEL

29. The administrative planning and execution may be said to have fallen broadly under three headings: mobilization, movement, and maintenance of the force. To carry out the first step in mobilization, the concentration of the troops, Nanaimo was selected for the main force, with one battalion and other units going to Courtenay. This decision was dictated by the lack of accommodation for the entire force at Courtenay. It meant that while Greenlight troops were enabled to undergo a short but intensive training in combined operations it was not found possible, in the limited time available, for combat teams to be fully organized and concentrated as teams prior to embarkation.

30. The units concerned assembled at their respective areas as fast as movement could be arranged (34). The Winnipeg Grenadiers came 1000 miles from Prince Rupert; the 24 Field Company came from Prince George; the 25 Field Ambulance had to be brought out from Vernon, while a large detachment of this unit doing duty in the

hospital at Wainwright was hurriedly returned from that point. Most of the other major units were already on Vancouver Island, and their concentration presented no difficulty. The small service detachments had to be organized "ab initio". By the 18 Jun, the three combat teams had been roughly segregated, the 14th and 15th at Nanaimo, and the 16th at Courtenay. The 24 Field Coy were temporarily quarantined for a case of suspected meningitis and were despatched to billets at Comox Airport, and as a result their sections were deprived of the opportunity of training continuously with their respective combat teams (35).

REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS

31. The problem of bringing the participating units up to strength was made more difficult by two conditions:

(a) the ruling of NDHQ that no soldier enlisted subsequent to 15 Feb 43 should be included in the Force and that no soldier who had not completed four months' training should be taken (36), and (b) the high percentage of rejects from all units that followed the medical boarding and interviews with Army Examiners. The policy of reinforcing units from the 6 and 8 Divs was generally followed except where it was necessary to obtain assistance from NDHQ to supply (a) French-speaking reinforcements for Le Regiment de Hull, (b) trained regimental signallers, of whom there was almost a total lack in Pacific Command because of successive overseas drafts, and (c) trained medical personnel for the 25 Field Ambulance.

32. It was also necessary to change a large number of officers. The Commanding Officer and the 2 i/c of Le Regiment de Hull were both replaced, together with thirteen other officers of this Unit, including the Adjutant (37). There was considerable difficulty also in finding officers for the 24 Field Regiment, from whose ranks drafts had been drawn for the 21 Field Regiment proceeding overseas. When Greenlight finally embarked, it carried over fifty 2/Lieutenants on its strength (38). The considerable amount of reposting of officers and other ranks that had to take place during mobilization was undoubtedly one of the factors causing later discontent, leading to the numerous cases of absence without leave that occurred prior to embarkation.

MOBILIZATION - EQUIPPING THE FORCE

33. It had been decided when Greenlight was first planned that the Canadian Force would be equipped mainly with its own weapons, that it would wear United States special Alaskan clothing, with a few items of identifying Canadian clothing and equipment being retained, and that all supply of rations, fuel, accommodation and general stores maintenance would be handled by United States lines of communication. The principal Canadian problem then in equipping the Force was that of obtaining and issuing a tremendous quantity of equipment and clothing of United States pattern, and that of moving an enormous amount of Canadian ammunition and spare weapons to the Seattle Port of Embarkation in time to be loaded into the transport ships.

34. Upon the shoulders of the DDOS, Pacific Command, fell the enormous task of creating a new set of Canadian equipment and store tables for the Greenlight Force. On the basis of the establishment of each unit, sub-unit and detachment in the Force the tables set down the scale of issue of more than 350 items of Canadian and US clothing and equipment, together with the quantities required for the 20% maintenance reserve. On completion the tables were printed for distribution by US Engineers at HQ WDC and Fourth Army, and represented a valuable contribution to the planning of this and possible future operations by combined US and Canadian Forces.

AT VANCOUVER

35. Lack of facilities at Nanaimo prompted the decision to assemble all equipment at the Ordnance Depot at Lapointe Pier, Vancouver, there to be broken into unit lots and transported by CPR Steamer, rail ferry and RCASC water transport to the concentration area. The 20,000 square feet of storage space at Lapointe Pier proving inadequate to handle the volume of stores within the available time, additional accommodation was rented at the Terminal Dock, Vancouver, and almost all of the American stores, equipment and clothing were handled over this dock (39).

36. The first consignments of United States equipment and clothing reached the Terminal Dock on the 26 Jun, and during the next ten days the work of breaking bulk and trans-shipment to Nanaimo was pressed forward with the utmost despatch. A large scow was rented capable of holding between 300 and 400 tons. It was loaded by expert stevedores and towed by a RCASC vessel. The scow made two trips carrying in all about 700 tons of stores. In addition a second RCASC vessel of the fish-packer type shuttled continuously between the Terminal Dock and Nanaimo carrying about 90 tons per trip. Much of the stores was shipped on freight cars on the ferry and many more consignments were sent each day by the regular CPR steamer. No little credit was reflected upon the staff of the Ordnance Depot at Lapointe Pier and the Terminal Dock, as well as upon the RCASC water transport section, for the speed and efficiency with which the exacting task was completed.

AT SEATTLE

37. At the same time arrangements were made for the loading of Canadian ammunition and spare weapons at Seattle. It had been decided that the four ships which were to transport the Canadian Force to the Aleutians should be "basically loaded" at SPOE (Seattle Port of Embarkation), and that upon arrival at the Canadian embarkation ports the remaining load of weapons, ammunition and equipment would be added. The "basic load" included (a) rations for the voyage, (b) normal maintenance for 30 days in rations, clothing, equipment and other stores, provided by the United States authorities, (c) reserve weapons of Canadian provision on a scale of 6% of G 1098 (d) 75% of the Canadian reserve ammunition. None of this load would be removed at Adak, the training area selected in the Aleutians (40).

38. A delegation of SPOE authorities came to Vancouver to discuss details. Maj JH McIntosh, SO, RCA, was despatched to San Francisco as Canadian Liaison Officer to HQ, WDC, and Maj HA Jones, RCE, went to SPOE in a similar capacity. An Inspector of Ordnance Equipment, Maj HA McFarlane, RCOC, and a staff of ammunition examiners were also established at Seattle for the purpose of sorting and checking Canadian consignments. Two of these examiners accompanied the initial cargo to Adak on 15 Jun to supervise of loading and storage of the Canadian ammunition and weapons at that point.

39. An unexpected complication was encountered in connection with the loading of Canadian 25-pounder ammunition at SPOE. Because of the soft nature of the ground on which it was expected Canadian Artillery would be finding its targets it was considered that detonation of the 25-pdr shell would be improved by the substitution of a time fuse (41). As a result it had been decided to re-fuse some 20,000 shells using fuses No 222 and No 234 to replace the No 119. Provision of these fuses was delayed and the re-fusing operation had to be done in a great hurry at Seattle. To complicate matters still further it was found that the shell when fitted with

No 222 fuse could not be replaced in its box with the cap on the fuse. It was therefore necessary to remove the caps and substitute special flexible fuse covers which had to be fastened on with tape. The 28 AA Regiment from Vancouver Defences provided a working party of 137 all ranks which was despatched to Seattle to operate under the command of Major A.D. Waddell, RCOC (42). Working without intermission for more than 36 hours the fusing party completed its emergency job in time for embarkation.

40. It early became apparent that two special items of equipment requisitioned from the United States would not be available in full quota. These were the sleds or pallets upon which it was proposed to load a large proportion of reserve ammunition and stores (43), and the pack boards, Yukon pattern, which had been selected in preference to the United States rucksack. In both cases "rush" contracts had to be let to Canadian firms, who produced a large proportion of the required equipment in time for the date of sailing, the balance following the force on the freighter "BURKE".

AT NANAIMO

41. One of the early shipments to arrive from the United States was the special transport being provided in place of Canadian MT. It consisted of 50 light cargo carriers, T-15, ("Snowjeeps"), 34 tractors and bulldozers (D-4 and D-6), and 18 six-ton Athey trailers (44). All this transport was overhauled at the new Ordnance Workshop in Nanaimo. The OME and his staff also overhauled in this Workshop all the guns, ie Canadian 25-pounders, 6-pounders, Bofors and Vickers machine guns as well as the 75-hows and the 81-mm mortars supplied by the United States.

42. The task of issuing clothing and personal equipment to the newly mobilized force proceeded as rapidly as stores became available. Each man retained Canadian battle dress with badges and insignia and was issued with Canadian high boots, special shoe packs and insoles of Canadian manufacture, cap comforter and black beret as well as exchanging his standard respirator for the British Light pattern. For the rest his clothing and equipment was of United States issue, and included many items specially designed for the Aleutian type of climate. The most popular piece of equipment received by the men was the American sleeping bag which was to prove far superior to the customary Army blankets (45).

43. Some difficulty was encountered in the fitting of the boots, leather high. These were being provided by a factory in Eastern Canada and although issues were pressed forward as fast as possible, distribution was not completed until a few days before embarkation. Le Regiment de Hull presented a particular problem in this regard because of the extra ordinary proportion of its men with very small feet demanding an unusual number of small sizes of boots. A boot exchange set up in Nanaimo prior to embarkation enable units to exchange a good many pairs of shoes to facilitate fitting, but a few men had still not been satisfactorily fitted by embarkation time and adjustment was left to be completed during the training period in the Aleutians.

44. Special medical stores were issued to units and to individuals to ensure that all personnel were protected as completely as possible against infection or disease. Medical records from Attu showed that in operations there, only one instance of an infected wound had been encountered, and in that case an old type dressing had been used. Every officer and other rank was therefore issued with the new type US Field Dressing a dressing that included an envelope of sulfanilamide crystals. These crystals were to be

placed on the wound before applying the dressing. He also carried a package of eight Sulfadiazine tablets to be taken internally should he become wounded. To assist in the provision of a safe drinking water supply in the field all ranks received an issue of halizone tablets, and were instructed in their proper use in chlorination. Unhappy experiences with frostbite and trench feet at Attu led to units being supplied with ratfish liver oil, a substitute for whale oil, frequent and systematic applications of which were designed to toughen the feet against the extremes of Aleutian weather (46).

45. The task of completing the equipping of Greenlight within so brief a time limit, a limit that had been shortened by almost three weeks, was completed by Administration only through the greatest possible effort and the good fortune in encounter no insuperable accidental delays. The source of supply in general lay many thousands of miles away. A Quebec factory provided Greenlight's boots in piece-meal lots; arsenals and magazines in Eastern Canada supplied the bulk of the ammunition; and United States equipment was shipped from a dozen widely separated depots situated in all parts of the country. Such extensive use had to be made of express shipments of Canadian stores that the Controller of Transport protested at the use of rolling-stock. One entire special express train-load of ammunition crossed the continent to Seattle. Shipments of minor key items such as blood plasma and fuse keys were even made by air express. But when the time came for embarkation there could be little doubt that Greenlight was the most completely equipped Force in all details ever to have sailed from a Canadian port.

MOBILIZATION, ADMINISTRATION

Medical

46. While the mobilization of the Greenlight Force was proceeding at the concentration area, administrative arrangements in various services were being carried to completion. Medical Boards examined not only the five thousand personnel who finally comprised the embarkation list but many hundreds of others who had to be rejected for category reasons. Inoculations, vaccinations and blood groupings were completed for all ranks and the blood group marked on each man's identity disk. Plans for the evacuation of casualties and the forwarding of casualty reports were formulated. The organization of the 25 Field Ambulance was adjusted to meet the requirements of the special nature of the Force (47).

Dental

47. Two Dental Sections of two officers each were kept busily employed checking dental sheets and performing emergency dental work upon the personnel of the force. These officers were attached, one to each Combat Team and one to Brigade Group Headquarters. Arrangements were made with the American Medical Corps for proper replacement of all expendable dental stores.

Pay

48. Shortly after concentration all officers and other ranks were placed on the Pay Book system. No 19 Field Cash Office, RCAPC, was organized with Maj JF Petrie as Field Cashier assisted by Capt ME Armstrong. It was felt that the size of the force demanded the appointment of an Assistant Cashier. Arrangements were made for the provision of American funds for the payment of troops on arrival at their destination. All pay was to be issued in American funds at par of exchange. Enough American funds were provided through the Field Cashier to Unit Paymasters to enable

them to make a cash payment on board ship of at least \$5.00 United States funds per man.

Postal

49. Postal arrangements provided for the establishment of an Army Post Office (CAPO 51) at Vancouver. Mail for the force would be sorted at MPO 1106 in Vancouver Barracks, placed in Unit bags and forward through Seattle. The appreciation of one battalion at these arrangements is shown in its war diary entry of 31 Aug. "Sorting took the minimum of time as the letters were already grouped by Companies and Sub-units, and tied in bundles, a happy thought on some one's part" (48). No 11 Postal Detachment, CPC (Lt H MacDonald and 4 ORs) would accompany the force to handle mail in the field and to work in close conjunction with the American Postal Units which would be conducting the sale of money orders and air mail stamps to Canadian troops.

Chaplains

50. Five Chaplains were provided for the Force, a Protestant Padre for each of the three Combat Teams and two Roman Catholics, one for Le Regt de Hull and one for Bde HQ. All had served for varying amounts of time with Units on the Pacific Coast and were thoroughly familiar with the type of men in their care and the problems that had to be faced.

Records

51. The Command Records Officer, Major S Henson, proceeded to Nanaimo where a staff of 45 records clerks made a thorough check of all documents. Particular attention was given to the examination of MFsm 4, in order to make sure that no one enlisted or enrolled subsequent to 15 Feb 43 remained on the strength of the Force. Under the direction of Lt-Col JJP. de Salaberry, NDHQ, 2 Echelon Pacific Command was established at Nanaimo, and the Force went on a Field Return basis on 26 Jun 43. Following the embarkation the main body of the 2 Echelon, under Capt GW Carr, moved to Vancouver, while an advance party consisting of Lieut TC Wilson and two NCOs accompanied the force to Adak. Arrangements were made for the advance party to communicate with its base in Vancouver by way of the US Signal Centre, Seattle, a teletype being installed direct from Seattle to 2 Echelon in Vancouver Barracks

Canteens

52. At the express wish of General DeWitt no Canadian Canteens were provided. In order that an equal distribution of the supplies available on board ship might be made, Officers Commanding detachments on the various ships were instructed to indent to the United States Post Exchanges for their supplies each day and to be responsible for their distribution among the troops. Arrangements were made for a supply of cigarettes and games by Auxiliary Services for use on the transports.

Graves

53. No provision was made for a Graves Registration Unit to accompany the force, the responsibility for devising and executing a system of marking and registering graves being placed upon Brigade Headquarters. Instructions were issued that crosses or other suitable memorials should be erected as opportunity provided and that photographs of graves should be taken whenever possible. All records of graves were to be sent through 2nd Echelon to the Graves registration Section, Director of Records, NDHQ.

Publicity

54. In order that Greenlight might receive adequate news coverage for release to the Canadian Public at the appropriate time, the consent of WDC and Fourth Army was obtained to the sending of three Canadian press representatives with the PRO, Pacific Command (Maj G Sivertz), accompanied by two Canadian Army photographers (49). All news despatches and pictures were to be cleared through the Naval Alaskan Sector Censor, and no public release was to be made without authority of the War Department at Washington, who would co-ordinate with Ottawa joint release in the United States and Canada. While the PRO photographers gave the Greenlight Force good coverage from the view point of public interest, their natural concentration was upon shots of public appeal rather than in the field of purely military interest. The two landed with the first wave at Green Beach and got good pictures there and later at Kiska Harbour. At no time however did they have liaison with Canadian Intelligence personnel on the Island and their early return to Canada left the Greenlight Force without photographic facilities. It was only due to the ingenuity of the Bde S-2 in borrowing for a day in September the services of a US Signals Photo Section cameraman, and retracing with him the path from Green Beach to Kiska Harbour that official pictures of the Canadian stay on Kiska went into the record.

55. The tremendous amount of administrative and clerical work involved in the planning and executing of all these arrangements on the "A" side can hardly be estimated. Each phase presented its own problems. New records had to be created for 2 Echelon. Printers could not be found to handle contracts in the limited time available. The necessary forms were drawn up and multilithed by Administrative Staff. The creation of the Field Cash Office with the work involved in changing 5000 accounts over to the Pay Book system was in itself no small administrative accomplishment.

An entirely new organization had to be set up in the establishment of the base post office, with a staff to be selected, organized and trained in the barest possible time. These problems were all new, faced by Pacific Command for the first time. That met and they were met successfully speaks well for the Administrative Staff. Working long hours at high pressure, the secret nature of their duties precluding the employment of outside assistance, Col HRW Allan (Col Administration), assisted by Mr DB Keir (Personal Assistant to Brig i/c Administration), and two civil service clerks, dealt with these administrative problems as they arose, and handled in one office the tremendous volume of correspondence that the planning of Greenlight entailed.

V

MOVEMENT OF THE FORCE

Transports provided by US - Combat Loading - The Shortage of Time - Embarkation.

TRANSPORTS PROVIDED BY US

56. Loading and embarkation plans were initiated at a conference in San Francisco on 11-13 June between GOC-in-C, Pacific Command BGS, and United States Western Defence Command. The United States provided four troop transports to move the Canadian formation, USAT "DAVID BRANCH", USAT "CHIRIKOFF", SS "SACAJAWEA" and SS "PERIDA". Their capacity for personnel and freight was as

follows (50):

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Allotted to</u>	<u>Capacity Personnel</u>	<u>Freight in tons</u>
"BRANCH"	HQ Group	1200	2500
"SACAJAWEA"	14 Bn Combat Team	1100	6000
"CHIRIKOFF"	15 Bn Combat Team	1300	4500
"PERIDA"	16 Bn Combat Team	1600	4000

These ships were basically loaded at Seattle, beginning 5 July, preparatory to proceeding to Vancouver Island for the embarkation of the Force. A few days before embarkation, as the centre of gravity of activity shifted from Vancouver to the Island, an advanced HQ Pacific Command, was set up at Nanaimo, with the GOC-in-C, BGS, AQMG, DAQMG, and Colonel Admin, moving there to supervise the final arrangements for the departure of the Force.

COMBAT LOADING

57. Considerable importance was attached by the Staff Planners to the need for careful and accurate combat loading of the ships. With off-loading plans completed to the finest detail every item of stores and equipment had to be put into the ships in reverse order to these plans so that when the time came for disembarkation there might be no delay in the rapid and efficient maintenance of supply (51). Maj CS Tracy of the United States Marines was sent by the Western Defence Command to instruct especially selected Officers and ORs of each Combat Team as to the methods of Combat loading of ships (52). Although it was handicap that a three months' course had to be telescoped into less than two weeks, the instructions received made it possible for the personnel selected to exercise a considerable amount of technical supervision over loading and off-loading of the stores. They proceeded to Seattle and were present during the loading operations as representatives of their respective Combat Team Commanders (53).

58. Consideration of the available ports of embarkation on Vancouver Island resulted in a decision reached on the advice of the Naval Officers and concurred in by Officers of the Seattle Port of Embarkation, that embarkation should take place as follows: the "BRANCH" and the "SACAJAWEA" to load at Nanaimo, and the "CHIRIKOFF" and the "PERIDA" at Chemainus. Wharves at Chemainus allowed two ships to be berthed and loaded simultaneously. At Nanaimo, however, the Government wharf had accommodation available for only one ship for loading of stores, so that it was necessary for the USAT "DAVID BRANCH" to load her cargo of stores at the Government wharf and move to the coal wharf for embarkation of her personnel, while the "SACAJAWEA" followed her into the Government wharf to load both cargo and personnel. These arrangements worked satisfactorily. The "BRANCH" arrived at Nanaimo on the evening of 8 July followed by the remaining three ships on the next day (54).

59. The offer of SPOE authorities to bring United States Stevedore Companies to do the loading at Nanaimo and Chemainus was not accepted because of the possibility of labour difficulties. Loading parties of 400 ORs were provided by the 6 Div (55).

60. Under the direction of the Transport Quartermasters a strict order of priority of loading was followed (56). Combat Teams produced loading plans based upon tonnage tables drawn up by Pacific Command Headquarters. Only the unit equipment and stores put on board at Nanaimo and Chemainus were to be off-loaded at Adak, where it was expected (and as events subsequently proved

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correctly so) that such off-loading would serve as a useful rehearsal for the final disembarkation. In the order arranged ships would first unload Forward Combat Teams and their weapons (on the "BRANCH", Brigade HQ and Signals), to be followed in turn by Beach Combat Teams, motor transport, artillery, engineer, ordnance and medical stores. Ammunition would be carried with the weapon or on the man, vehicles would carry enough POL for one day's operation, and all personnel would carry four days' rations on the man (57).

61. The ammunition to be taken had been previously strapped down on the special pallets or sleds for ease in loading, each sled containing three units of fire. These were now stacked on top of the sleds that formed part of the basic load. In addition to its guns each Combat Team loaded five 6-ton Athey Trailers, twelve light T-15 Cargo Carriers (snow-jeps), and ten tractors (D-4 and D-6). No 15 and 16 Combat Teams' share of this heavy equipment had to be shipped over the E & N Railway from Nanaimo to Chemainus. The movement through Nanaimo streets of this US mechanical equipment added considerable weight to the belief that the Greenlight Force was destined for an American theatre of war.

THE SHORTAGE OF TIME

62. As loading proceeded, the time element became more and more insistent (58). All boxes of stores had to be camouflage painted, and must further carry the numbers of the ship, a designation of the contents, its weight and cubic content, and the serial number of the unit for which it was intended. So intense was the pressure during the last few days that there were occasions when the Ordnance personnel had no time to check the contents of incoming boxes, being forced to accept the accompanying invoices on trust while spraying on the covering paint, which had not dried by the time the boxes were in the freighters' holds (59). That a similar shortage of time must have existed during the Seattle loading was shown later with the arrival on the Kiska beaches of large numbers of boxes from the basic loads bearing such unilluminating labels as "Engineer Stores", "Ordnance Stores", the covering of camouflage paint having effectively hidden all clues as to the identity of the contents.

EMBARKATION

63. Loading was completed without interruption and was followed by the embarkation of personnel according to carefully pre-arranged plans (60). Guided by members of advance billeting parties the Headquarters Group embarked upon the "DAVID BRANCH", No 14 Combat Team on the "SACAJAWEA" in the early hours of Monday, 12 July (61). The men, each carrying a 60-pound rucksack besides his weapon, marched with a new gait, holding themselves strangely, leaning well forward from the waist with head thrust out, as though to counter the pull of this new burden on their backs. The 15 Combat Team moving by rail from Nanaimo to Chemainus embarked on the "CHIRIKOFF" early on the 12th. The 16 Combat Team at Courtenay together with three companies of Canadian Fusiliers from Nanaimo boarded the "PERIDA" at Chemainus on Sunday, the 11th. The placing of approximately 300 all ranks from the Canadian Fusiliers on the "PERIDA" was necessitated by the large allotment of hold space in the "SACAJAWEA" to freight.

64. Up to the time of embarkation Combat Teams had not been completely segregated, so that the movement of personnel from the training areas to their respective Team boats required careful co-ordination and was accomplished in a manner that reflected skillful staff work.

65. By ten o'clock on the morning of the 12th 4800 heavily laden Canadian officers and men had walked up the gang planks, and embarkation was completed (62). The ships moved out into the harbour and remained there until evening when, sped on their way by the good wishes of the GOC-in-C (63), they proceeded to their rendezvous with the escorting convoy.

VI

SECURITY

Greenlight Security Plan - Confinement to Camp - Security at Embarkation.

GREENLIGHT SECURITY PLAN

66. The matter of security with regard to Greenlight received the most careful attention. It was inevitable that the speculation of troops and general public alike should be aroused by the training of Canadian Combat Groups in combined operations in Pacific Command, and in view of the fact that Parliamentary sanction had recently been announced to permit the use of NRMA troops in the Aleutians, it is not surprising that the finger of rumour frequently pointed in that direction. Any security measures that were taken in the final analysis of necessity had to concentrate on concealing the specific destination and the exact time of embarkation of the Canadian troops. From the inception of Greenlight the strictest precaution was taken to ensure secrecy. A security plan drawn up by the GSO I (Int) Pac Comd (Lt-Col BR Mullaly) was put into effect and all officers received implicit instructions regarding the need for close adherence to the plan (64). The code name "Greenlight" was used at all times in referring to the projected operation. At all stages of the proceedings channels of communication between NDHQ and Pacific Command were restricted so that all correspondence was directed from CGS, AG, and QMG at Ottawa to the GOC-in-C, the BGS and the Brig i/c Admin. Pacific Command (65). It must be admitted that this blanket of secrecy piled a tremendous burden upon the shoulders of a very small staff, and resulted in a situation where many officers not in the picture could not properly appreciate the great urgency of the situation which made it necessary, for example, for the Ordnance Depot at Vancouver to work in shifts 24 hours a day, including Sundays.

67. Unit postal censorship supplemented by censorship of civilian mail was imposed at Nanaimo and Courtenay as from the 16 Jun, similar restrictions being instituted at Wainwright in order to divert attention from Greenlight (66). Telegraph censorship and monitoring of telephone messages to prevent all mention of military activities became effective in the embarkation areas four days before the boats sailed. Postal intercepts following the issue of American clothing and equipment revealed a wide variety of rumours current among the troops, with destinations estimated all the way from Chile to Alaska.

68. Personnel of the 13 Inf Bde Field Security Section, all specially selected, were distributed among units throughout the Force, while a Security Officer, of field rank, was appointed in each unit to lecture to ranks on security as an essential part of

training and to check and supervise unit security.

69. As part of the protective security plan a programme of deception was launched which included specially prepared press releases (67), the adoption of code names relating to the Southwest Pacific for each phase of training, unit lectures on tropical diseases and combined operations in Norway and the Mediterranean, and release of W/T messages in clear designed to give the impression that troops were returning to home stations on completion of training.

CONFINEMENT TO CAMP

70. The imposition of CB regulations and all personnel of Nanaimo Military Camp as from 1700 hours 8 Jul 43 was a security measure that found little favour among officers and men of the Greenlight Force (68). The order so added to the resentment felt at the refusal to grant embarkation leave, that, to lessen the danger to morale, the restriction was relaxed to allow soldiers' relatives and friends within camp boundaries. For four evenings in a row wives and sweethearts filled the camp, and the uncertainty of the imminent departure of their men made each successive night a new chapter in prolonging the agony of farewell.

SECURITY AT EMBARKATION

71. On the actual embarkation the protection and security of the dock areas and ships was made the responsibility of the DPM Pacific Command. Armed guards from 6 units were posted to prevent the close approach to the loading wharves of civilian and service personnel (69). "Gangway guards and ship guards were provided by the RCMP and a system of awarding passes was inaugurated for authorized personnel. A constant patrol of the waters adjacent to the ships and loading wharves was maintained by MLC's to ensure that no unauthorized ships, boats or persons approached. As each unit and detachment embarked an embarkation slip checked against the nominal roll and signed by the officer or NCO in charge was handed to the "Gangway" guard who again checked the number boarding the ship. The effect of all these precautions was that no unauthorized person had access to the transport ships at any time during the period of embarkation.

VII

DISCIPLINE

72. When the troop transports sailed from Vancouver Island 165 other ranks of Greenlight Force did not accompany them and were presumed to be AWL. Very few, if any of these cases occurred during the actual period of embarkation, most of them taking place during the period of mobilization which preceded it. As has been previously suggested, much of this absence could be traced to the dissatisfaction caused among those men who had been posted and in some cases re-posted from other units into the Greenlight Force, and who had had no opportunity to learn to know their officers and NCOs or to develop any esprit de corps in their new units. In this connection it is significant that the Regiment de Hull which had suffered less disruption of its other ranks than any other unit either from previous Overseas drafts or from inter-unit postings had at embarkation, according to records, only six men AWL while the other three Battalions had 42, 47 and 31 respectively (70).

73. Within a week of embarkation 45 absentees had been apprehended or had surrendered in various points. These "tourists" were despatched under escort via Seattle to rejoin their units (71). In the case of missing personnel who were apprehended at points too far distant to allow of immediate return to units, disciplinary action was taken at their respective District Depots.

74. It is unfortunate that the wildest rumours regarding embarkation were circulated. Allegations of the desertion of some 300 men and numerous officers, and forcing of troops on to the boats at the bayonet point and machine gun muzzle were circulated in various parts of the country, presumably finding their initiation in the fertile imaginations of those absentees who were not immediately apprehended (72).

VIII

MAINTENANCE

Weapons and Ammunition - Clothing, Equipment and Stores -
Accommodation - Reinforcements.

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

75. The policy of maintenance of Greenlight Force dealt mainly with (a) weapons and ammunition of Canadian provision and (b) stores and equipment and supplies of United States provision (73). The scale of reserve weapons laid down by the General Staff provided for 42 per cent of war equipment, being six months' wastage at an intense rate of six per cent per month plus six months at the normal rate of one per cent per month (74). Of the weapons six per cent were despatched on the freighter "LILOA" that sailed for Adak from SPOE 25 Jun; 6 per cent formed part of the "basic load" put on board the combat ships at Seattle on 5 Jul; and the remaining 30 per cent were sent by the freighter "BURKE", which followed the main Force from Seattle on 15 Jul. This freighter also carried spare parts for Canadian weapons.

76. Reserve ammunition and training ammunition of a Canadian nature was provided on the scale laid down by General Staff, ie 10 to 15 times G 1098, plus a training quota. In order to guard against the possible loss of all the ammunition of the Force at sea or on the beaches during the operation it had been decided that a freighter, the "LILOA", should load at Seattle 25 per cent of the reserve ammunition plus a training quota, to precede the Force to Adak, the island designated as the Aleutian training area (75). The remaining 75 per cent reserve ammunition was combat loaded on the four transport ships at Seattle and formed part of the "basis load", which would be carried right through to the final place of disembarkation without being off-loaded at Adak. Demands for additional Canadian ammunition to replace expenditure were to be submitted by the Force Commander through United States channels to Western Defence Command, which would obtain supplies from Pacific Command for shipment through SPOE.

CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT AND STORES

77. Since no Canadian lines of communication were established articles of clothing and equipment of Canadian pattern were to be replaced by United States equivalents when they became un-serviceable. However, such distinctive items of Canadian clothing as battle dress, berets, badges and insignia were to be replaced upon demand through the same channels as for Canadian ammunition (76).

78. The maintenance of all other clothing and equipment, rations, stores, fuel, construction materials and ammunition (75-mm and 81-mm) became a matter of United States provision. With the exception of the last two items provision of these stores and supplies would be automatic (77). Thirty days' maintenance was loaded in the combat ships, and shipment of a further sixty days' maintenance was arranged for the freighter "BURKE". Provision of engineer construction materials was the responsibility of the Commander of the Amphibian Force, as was the maintenance of the United States ammunition subsequent to the units of fire already provided in the combat ships and shipped as a reserve on the later freighter.

79. It was planned that the accounting for these United States supplies would be made by assessment on a per capita basis against the Canadians by the United States, such assessment being based upon accurate strength returns from the Force. When stores were needed in addition to those automatically provided, they must be accounted for upon properly prepared United States shipping tickets, signed by United States issuing officers and by Canadian Army officers designated by the Brigade Commander to authorize such demands. These shipping tickets would be forwarded through DDOS, Pacific Command to NDHQ for final settlement (78). As will be seen later, certain developments in the unloading of stores at Kiska beaches necessitated a revision in the system of Canadian accountability as originally planned (79).

ACCOMMODATION

80. Accommodation at Adak and subsequently at Kiska was to be provided by United States authorities. Initially each man would be prepared to use his half-tent shelter until the United States pyramidal tents were available. A few Canadian marquees, tables folding, and tubs laundry were sent in the combat ships to improve accommodation. When the Canadians arrived at Adak, however, they found 750 pyramidal tents (6 men) and 40 large wall-tents ready for them to set up in their bivouac area (80).

REINFORCEMENTS

81. It was decided that no pool of reinforcements would be maintained in the theatre of operations. Replacements of important key personnel who became casualties would be despatched from Pacific Command. Units remaining for a long period of time in the Aleutians area or being reduced to non-effective status could be replaced by other units undergoing special training in Pacific Command. Behind the US component of ATF 9 were thousands of potential reinforcements based along the Aleutian Chain, but with the invading task force outnumbering the supposed defenders by an estimated three to one it appeared highly improbable that further support would be needed (81).

IX

EN ROUTE

The Convoy - Accommodation on Board - Daily Routine

THE CONVOY

82. The original plan to have the ships carrying the Canadian force form part of a larger convoy of US troop transports to Adak was modified, and the Greenlight convoy proceeded as an

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individual unit to the Aleutian port, accompanied initially by the Canadian minesweepers "OUTARDE" and "CHIGNECTO" (82). Off Discovery Island four protecting naval vessels joined the movement, the US destroyer "HATFIELD", the Canadian corvette "DAWSON", the US gunboat "CHARLESTON" and the US minesweeper "ORACLE" (83). Throughout the entire route the convoy was continuously in reach of land-based patrol planes, both Canadian and US (84), while US naval authorities stood ready to furnish additional escort on the approaches to Adak if any were deemed necessary (85). On the decks of the transport ships US personnel manned the naval and Anti-Aircraft guns, with Canadian details standing by to act as ammunition passers or gun crew replacements (86). Every man on board wore a lifebelt whenever he left his bunk (87), and daily boat drills instilled into all ranks the routine to be followed in an emergency (88).

ACCOMMODATION ON BOARD

83. Sleeping accommodation on the ships varied from the point of view of space available. The men slept in bunks fitted in tiers of four to the walls of the holds. Additional mattresses were laid on the tops of large hatchways that led to the cargo holds below. Officers and Warrant Officers, were provided with state-room berths, but Sergeants, except those aboard the "BRANCH", slept with the men in the holds. Most crowded of all was the "SACAJAWEA", especially on the final move from Adak. On that stage of the journey, with the return to 14 Combat Team of the 300 Canadian Fusiliers originally placed on the "PERIDA", together with additional personnel from the US port battalion, she carried 1651 all ranks. As her official berth space was but 954, increased to 1100 by the use of hatchway mattresses, the men aboard were forced to take their rest in shifts, an arrangement that brought many of them to Kiska weary from lack of sleep (89).

84. Troop Messes were operated by 14 and 16 Combat Teams aboard the "SACAJAWEA" and the "PERIDA" respectively, but the "BRANCH" and the "CHIRIKOFF", fitted out as Army Transport vessels provided their own commissariat. On the less crowded boats the men were fed in four or five shifts for each meal, and received three meals per day, but on the less favoured "SACAJAWEA" it was impossible to arrange for more than two meals a day (89). From 0700 hours to 1100 hours, and again from 1500 hours to 2030 hours a continuous procession passed through the small dining saloon, which could accommodate only 150 at a time. The food was good, and all ranks spoke enthusiastically in favour of their American rations.

DAILY ROUTINE

85. In the intervals between meals there was much to keep everybody busy. Training consisted mainly of indoctrination lectures in the dining room (except aboard the "SACAJAWEA") and the holds, special attention being given to "Know your Enemy". On the first day out from Nanaimo Brig Foster had withdrawn the veil of secrecy from the primary destination and the final objective, and detailed studies of maps of Adak and Kiska occupied the attention of officers and NCOs (90). Aboard the "BRANCH" the Brigadier held daily conferences as the lessons of Attu were examined, and members of Brigade Headquarters Staff studied the aspects of their particular jobs. Every effort was made, through PT classes on deck to maintain the high peak of physical condition achieved on Vancouver Island (91).

86. Whenever men's time is usefully employed morale generally remains high. Their programme of daily training, together with

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their turns at the various ship's duties for which they were made responsible (92), served to keep the men well occupied and concerts arranged by the ships' padres provided excellent entertainment, but it is doubtful whether any single factor made a greater contribution to the morale than the discovery that cigarettes could be bought at the PX (Post Exchange, or US Canteen) for 45 cents a carton of 200, and that chocolate bars were correspondingly cheap (93). The advance of five dollars US funds per man paid on board was fully appreciated by all.

87. A week on board passed quickly by. For the great majority of the Greenlight Force, brought from prairie homes or inland towns and cities this was their first sea voyage. The weather was kind, and sailing was smooth, but there was no regret when the sight of land on July 20 brought the prospect of early relief from the inconvenience of cramped quarters aboard ship (91).

X

TRAINING

Physical Conditioning - Combined Operations - Specialist Training - US Courses of Instruction.

PHYSICAL CONDITIONING

88. Training of the Greenlight Force at Nanaimo and Courtenay under Brig DR Sargent, and later Brig HW Foster, was limited in time but intensive in character. A careful scrutiny of each man's record of service had been followed by the elimination from the Force of all who had not completed four months' basic training (94), and for the three weeks' period that was available between the time of organization of combat teams and embarkation, the Brigade Group concentrated upon special-to-arm and Combined Operations training. At all times emphasis was laid upon the offensive, and schemes were designed as operations "against an enemy stubborn and unyielding". Of primary importance were these objectives: (i) Perfect physical fitness of each officer and man, and (ii) an exact knowledge and proficiency in the handling of weapons (95).

89. One of the lessons learned from operations at Attu was the need for this physical hardening of the highest order "in order that all troops might be capable of conducting offensive operations continuously day and night as long as they were in the assault" (96). To meet this requirement Greenlight's training schedule included an adequate conditioning programme which sent all ranks over the obstacle course on the Tsolum River, down the scramble nets at Royston, and up the face of the cliffs at Balmoral Beach (97). Troops were required to carry five pounds of sand in small packs, to keep their water bottles filled, and to move at the double at all times, - an order which brought from one unit diarist the wry complaint: "another long day galloping madly about with a pack-horse load of sand and water" (98). The process of hardening was successfully carried to completion, and its fruits were seen in the splendid physical condition that enabled our men to meet the exacting demands made upon their stamina by the hostile weather and terrain of Great Sitkin and Kiska.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

90. For two of the combat teams only, the 15th and 16th, did time permit a combined scheme in field firing prior to embarkation. These schemes were held at Oyster River, and afforded an opportunity for all infantry weapons to be fired in conjunction with the machine guns of the Saint John Fusiliers and the 25-pdrs of the 24 Field Regt (99). Attu had shown the Japanese dislike for artillery fire (100), and such rehearsals as the Oyster River schemes were designed to impress infantry commanders with the importance of calling for and using fire support from the heavier weapons. The second of these exercises, held on 29 Jun, was observed by the GOC-in-C during an inspection of Greenlight training. What he saw enabled Gen Pearkes to despatch a wire to NDHQ to the effect that the state of training of the Force was satisfactory (101).

SPECIALIST TRAINING

91. The 24 Field Coy RCE, isolated at Comox until embarkation time as a result of a case of suspected meningitis, had no opportunity of training with the combat teams until Adak was reached (102). Fortunately the specialized nature of their work lessened the disadvantage of this enforced segregation, and the fullest use was made of the limited time available. In preparation for the engineers' anticipated role in shore operations the training programme concentrated upon beach clearing and road building, demolition, the detection and neutralization of mines and booby traps, accompanied by a course in physical hardening in which cliff scaling played a conspicuous part. Two days' driving practice with caterpillar tractors was the prelude to a later extensive period of experience with D-6 "cat" and bulldozer at Adak and Kiska, as the transport personnel rapidly caught the infectious enthusiasm with which the US "dozer" operator attacks every hill in sight (103).

92. The twofold training problem faced by the 24 Field Regiment RCA was that of bringing new reinforcements to uniform standard with the rest of the men, and of gaining experience with the new US 75-mm howitzers. The unit commander has yet to be found who feels that his incoming drafts comprise the best trained men that their former unit could supply, and the story of Greenlight mobilization appears to have provided no exception. A judicious distribution of new personnel throughout the different batteries made possible a leavening process which enabled all guns to be effectively manned. While only two batteries participated in the Oyster River scheme prior to embarkation, opportunities for firing occurred later at Adak and Great Sitkin, and all personnel qualified on both Canadian and US pieces (104).

93. As with the ground artillery the problem of the 46 Light AA Battery consisted of becoming accustomed to new equipment. Predictors were used for the first time at Nanaimo, personnel getting a week's practice with them. The crews gained further valuable experience at Adak as they sighted on hundreds of planes continually flying over the harbour. One of the chief objections to the employment of this new equipment was its weight. Each predictor set weighed over 300 lbs, a difficult six man-load on the uncertain footing of the Aleutian hills. The arrival at Kiska of British made Stiffkey Stick sets at the end of September provided the battery with a piece of equipment much preferred to the predictors (105).

US COURSES OF INSTRUCTION

94. The role of Greenlight as a force operating with American troops on an American organization basis made it highly desirable that Canadian representatives should receive special US training. To this end selected Officers and NCOs participated in various courses in the United States and American instructors were brought to Canada. Eight officers and thirteen NCOs attending Maj Tracey's transport and quartermaster course at Nanaimo proceeded to Seattle for five days to learn the system of loading (106). Four NCOs from 24 Field Regt RCA were despatched to HQ Amphibious Training Force 9, at Fort Orde for special instruction in the use of the US 75-mm pack howitzer (107). An officer from each infantry battalion, 25 Field Ambulance, and Brigade HQ, attended an intelligence course at Fort Orde, where they observed various phases of amphibious training and familiarized themselves with the lessons learnt at Attu, as well as gaining experience in the use of Japanese weapons (108). From Le Regiment de Hull, charged with the provision of beach teams, four lieutenants went to a Shore Course at San Diego to learn the US system of handling beach parties and the procedure in controlling the fire of naval guns (109).

XI

ADAK

Accommodation - Training - Great Sitkin Exercise -
Preparations for the Final Move

ACCOMMODATION

95. The Canadian convoy anchored in Adak Harbour on the evening of 20 July (110), and disembarkation began at an early hour next morning (111). As the troops marched towards their bivouac area, two and half miles back in the hills that enclosed Kuluk Bay, they were informally greeted by hundreds of American sailors and soldiers along the way. They looked at the treeless hills, that somehow seemed much steeper than they had appeared from the boat, and for the first time they saw Aleutian tundra. Before they left the island they were to learn from bitter experience what it was to walk, battle loaded, upon this same tundra. "Tundra" as one diarist put it, "is a crisscross matting of about twenty different kinds of grass, moss, and small wiry plants, which is laid upon a soft clay, which in turn rests upon a subsoil of soft volcanic ash. Walk on a Flexsteel mattress covered with grass and you can enjoy tundra in the security of your own home" (112).

96. Characteristic of the co-operation exhibited by the US authorities was the fact that the bivouac area selected for the use of the Canadians was probably the best allotted to any formation of ATF 9. Maj RJ Bolton, who with Capt Golding had preceded the Greenlight Force to Adak in a liaison capacity, was able to report the provision of 750 pyramidal tents, with supplies of rations, coal and wood, fuel oil and gasoline available in the Canadian area (80). All day long the olive green tents were popping up over the Canadian valley, as units, forewarned of the unpleasant nature of Aleutian weather, put forth every effort to gain protection from the expected rain. At the express wish of the Commanding General, tents were placed in an uneven pattern,

deliberately avoiding the orderly arrangement in rows that would have eased the task of raiding enemy aircraft.

97. The stay of a month originally planned for Adak was reduced to three weeks, and advantage was taken of every minute to push the training of forward and beach combat teams to completion (113). A week of comparatively fine weather found all personnel reaching up into the hills, pounding away at the spongy surface of the tundra covered mountain sides, building up the new muscles needed to tackle cross country movement in the tough Aleutian terrain (114). The engineers got in some valuable practice with the US bulldozers, assisting their temporary hosts in some road construction (103). Signals personnel, who had not had an opportunity of working with newly issued US equipment at Nanaimo, were now busily employed practising with the new sets, and rehearsing with the Brigade Staff tactical exercises in the field (115).

GREAT SITKIN EXERCISE

98. By far the most valuable combined training in which the Greenlight Force participated prior to the Kiska landing was the Great Sitkin exercise conducted during the first week of August (116). In planning and conducting the operation every effort was made to simulate the conditions of the Force's main objective, and as a result the many lessons learned as the exercise developed were to prove invaluable to all services in ironing out various wrinkles before the final move.

99. Sailing from Adak in a small convoy on the morning of 3 August, the Canadian troops reached the transport area of Ulak Island in a few hours, and from there disembarked into the landing barges for the 50-minute run into the Great Sitkin beach. A steep surf and heavy wind gave a foretaste of what might be expected in poor landing conditions, and the sight of two of their barges grounded and broken by the sea reminded the participating troops that they were engaged in no child's play (117).

100. For 48 hours the troops stayed on the island carrying out their allotted tasks and for half of that time they were exposed to the miseries of rain, fog and mist. Men learned that a carelessly fastened poncho or a rucksack left uncovered during the night resulted in a soaked sleeping bag or sodden clothing next morning (118). Nowhere and at no time during the entire Greenlight adventure did the opposition of weather and terrain surpass in aggressiveness that encountered on Great Sitkin, and in self-defence the Canadian soldier was rapidly learning the most important lesson that Greenlight taught him, to be able to look after himself. The return to Adak on 7 Aug afforded another opportunity to practise a tactical landing (119). The weather continued to be bad, and at the end of the eight-mile march from the beach the troops found the Canadian camp a sea of mud (120).

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FINAL MOVE

101. There was little time for resting. From the Brigade Commander, busy with his staff preparing for the final operation and administrative orders, down to the private soldier cleaning his weapon and trying to wash the mud out of his clothes, all were fully occupied getting ready for the move to Kiska. Actually there was not enough time to put into effect all the adjustments and improvements that experience at Great Sitkin recommended. A few extra days would have meant much to sorely harassed administrative officers as they tried to work out last minute details while office boxes were being packed for loading (121). Ordnance personnel worked like demons resorting and classifying various

types of stores; TQM's put finishing touches to their loading plans; and ship's adjutants worried their passenger list into shape to accommodate the extra US personnel who were to join the Force on leaving Adak (86). Among the troops "A" and "B" bags were packed for shipment as Combat Team Commanders issued instructions that men would embark equipped for battle. A single K-ration and a D-ration were issued to all ranks with the warning that these must suffice them for their first two days on Kiska (122). But shipboard appetites are often keen, and what could be more appetising for a midnight snack than the tasty chocolate of a D-ration?

XII

THE FINAL MOVE

Embarkation at Adak - Authority to Proceed - Through the Fog to Kiska.

EMBARKATION AT ADAK

102. Embarkation at Adak began on August 9, three days after the return from the Great Sitkin exercise, and continued to the 11, when the "BRANCH" and "CHIRIKOFF" were loaded (123). One by one the units of the various combat teams formed up in full marching order and moved down the muddy roads to the harbour. Burdened as they were with the bulky gear of American troops, the Canadians nevertheless presented a striking appearance of uniform orderliness as they marched smartly and cheerfully on to the Army Dock.

103. Here a scene of almost indescribable activity met the eye. Mountains of material, rows of guns and heavy vehicles, stacks of ammunition, thousands of rations, were being stored aboard barges for transports lying at anchor in the stream, or being loaded directly into the holds and on to the decks of ships berthed at the sturdy wharves. This was the fourth embarkation of men and cargo, and the experience gained from the previous loadings was evident in the precision that characterized the performance of the tremendous task.

104. Advance HQ Pacific Command had opened at Adak on 7 Aug, (124), and down to the dock on the third day came the GOC-in-C accompanied by Gen De Witt and Gen Buckner, Commanding Generals of Western Defence Command and Alaska Defence Command, all intently interested in the progress of this experiment to use Canadian and American troops together in combined operations. For more than two hours Gen Pearkes stood near the gang plank of the "CHIRIKOFF", speaking personally to several hundred of his men and cheering them with his obvious interest in their well-being and the success of their undertaking (125).

105. Late in the afternoon of the 11th the "CHIRIKOFF" and the "BRANCH" moved slowly out from the dock to join the "SACAJAWEA" and the "PERIDA" in Kuluk Bay. All types of craft crowded the harbour, from big battleships and transports to the long grey hulls of LSTs, - in all about 60 vessels riding outside the submarine boom in the busy bay (126).

106. For two days more they waited off Adak while officers and men settled down once again into quarters that had become more crowded than ever with the addition of further US personnel (127). Commanding officers and their staffs familiarized themselves with

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the maps of Kiska, 3000 of which had been distributed from Brigade Headquarters, and completed their plans for the assault (128). All day long flights of Liberators, Mitchells, Lightnings and Warhawks droned overhead on bombing missions to Kiska, emphasizing to all the realization of their presence in an actual theatre of war. It was on the evening of Friday, August 13th, that anchors were weighed and the long columns of ships steamed slowly out of Adak harbour into the fog.

AUTHORITY TO PROCEED

107. NDHQ authority for Greenlight to proceed to its final destination came at the last moment. On 11 Aug Maj-Gen Murchie had reported from Adv HQ at Adak to CGS that the Canadian training, morale, and equipment was satisfactory, and had recommended that authority to proceed be granted (129). On the following evening Gen Fearkes wired that the time of the Force's departure from Adak had been set for the morning of 13 Aug, and that unless he heard to the contrary he would assume that the recommendations of the VCGS had been approved (130). Late that same night (12 Aug), Pacific Command received the awaited approval from NDHQ (131), relaying it to Adak shortly before midnight (132). The authority, which took the form of a Ministerial Direction issued under the provisions of Order in Council PC 5011, permitted the despatch of the NRMA personnel of Greenlight to any part of the Aleutians or adjacent US islands (133).

THROUGH THE FOG TO KISKA

108. The convoy, consisting of the four Canadian transports and the US SS "BELL" bearing Northern Sector HQ, moved slowly through poor visibility along the northern side of the Andreanof and Rat Islands to the vicinity of Kiska. On Saturday the Canadians had their first submarine alert, and all hands stood to their boat stations in lifebelts until the "all-clear" was sounded (134). Early on Sunday morning, D-day, the sound of gunfire was heard as the US Navy began to pound Gertrude Cove. Simulating an attack at Tom Thumb Cove, on the south side of the island, fast assault boats roared in through the fog, their rails lined with dummy soldiers (135). But no answering fire came from the shore. Intercepted radio messages from the Southern Sector revealed that American troops were landing at Quisling Cove and meeting no opposition (136). Did that mean that the Japanese had withdrawn to the Northern part of the Island? Darkness fell on the tense troops, and shortly after midnight the ships of the Canadian convoy hove to in Bamboo Bay, on the northwest side of the island, opposite Beach 14, where tomorrow's attack was to be launched.

109. The lifting of the fog found thousands of curious eyes straining to catch their initial glimpse of enemy-occupied soil. To the left of the Canadian ships the cone of Kiska Volcano rose in perfect symmetry for four thousand feet, marking the northern extremity of the island. Below the mountain lay the flat surface of Kiska Lake still and silent in the moonlight, and to the south the rocky promontory of Witchcraft Point marked the right boundary of the Canadian beach.

XIII

THE PLAN OF ATTACK

ATF 9 Order - 13 Cdn Bde Group Order - Administrative Instructions.

ATF 9 ORDER

110. To the extent that achievement of military objective is in general dependent upon initial planning, the success of the Kiska operation was assured well in advance. It is doubtful whether the operation orders issued for the assault on the island could have been more complete in their scope or more specific in their detail. US Field Order No 1 issued on 1 Aug by command of Gen Corlett for Landing Force 16.8 (137) (the Army component of ATF 9), was an exhaustive document consisting of some eighty pages with attachments, charts and maps, giving in considerable detail the operation order and the administrative instructions for the engagement (138).

111. Amphibious Training Force No 9 was supported by all US Army, Navy and Air Force units in the Western Aleutians Area, as an actual and potential reserve. Landing Force 16.8, embarking at various planned staging areas in the Aleutian Chain, was to move under Navy control to specified transport areas off the coasts of Kiska, disembark and land on the island at designated beaches, move rapidly inland to carefully defined objectives, reorganize and prepare to launch a co-ordinated attack for the complete destruction of the enemy on Kiska Island. Prior to landings the plan called for a naval demonstration and diversion on the south side of the island with a simulated landing at Gertrude Cove and Vega Bay. Naval combat ships were to place harassing fire on enemy installations in Gertrude Cove and on the island of Little Kiska. The supporting Air Force (Task Group 16.2) was given the task prior to D-day of systematically destroying all vital enemy installations on the island. Beginning on the actual day of attack the Air Force, in close liaison with its ground observers, was to prevent the movement of enemy reserves, promptly report all changes in enemy positions, and closely support the defence of our ground force (139).

112. Land Force 16.8, commanded by Gen Corlett, was to attack in two sectors, the southern under the command of Col EM Southerland, and the northern under Brig-Gen Joseph L Ready. Operating in each sector command was one regiment of the Special Service Force based on Amchitka Island, whose task it was to precede the main bodies, land in rubber boats and move rapidly inland to neutralize enemy installations and give cover to landings of the Force (140). The 3 Regt Special Service Force, remaining in Force Reserve at Amchitka, was to be prepared to land on Little Kiska, either by rubber boat or parachute, and to destroy enemy resistance there (141).

113. The dividing boundary between the north and south sector areas was a line from Swallow Rocks in Beach Cove, on the north side of the island, through Middle Pass to a point about a mile south of Trout Lagoon on Kiska Harbour. Landings in the southern sector (Task Groups 87 and 17) were to be made at Beach 9 and Beach 10 (Quisling Cove and the mouth of Lilly Creek), commencing at H hour on D day (0620 hours, 15 Aug). Their objective was the hilly area of Leather Hill and Lawson Hill overlooking the enemy positions around Gertrude Cove (142).

114. On D plus 1 day the northern sector force, comprising US Tactical Group 184 and the Canadian Brigade Group (TG 13), was to land on Beach 14, immediately to the north of Witchcraft Point, and to advance and seize the high ground, Ranger Hill - Riot Hill - Rex Hill, Morgan Hill preparatory to continuing the attack south into the Kiska Harbour area (143).

13 CDN BDE GROUP ORDER

115. The Canadian order, Operation Order No 1, dated 9 Aug and issued by the Chief of Staff, 13 Cdn Bde, was closely based on the US Field Order, republishing from it instructions pertinent to the Canadian force (144). Information regarding the enemy as supplied by US Intelligence and overprinted upon the operations map estimated the strength of the Japanese garrison at 11,925 all ranks, a total that included 4400 infantry, 2970 artillery, and 1150 labour troops. The main concentrations were believed to be in the Kiska Harbour and Gertrude Cove areas (145).

116. Of the landing facilities in the northern sector it was reported that the usable portion of Beach 14 between Witchcraft Point and Lake Christine offered excellent landing and exit possibilities. There was believed to be over a mile of gravel beach averaging 100 yards in depth, offering ample dispersal areas for two BLGs landing abreast. Depths off shore were considered ample, with the three-foot line estimated about twenty-five feet from the waterline. Three exits from the beach permitted access to the high ground 4000 yds southeast, which commanded the enemy installations in the north and in their main camp area. How accurate were these reports of enemy strength and beach facilities later events were to determine.

117. To the Third Regiment, First Special Service Force, fell the honour of raising the curtain on operations in the Northern Sector. Moving by LST from Amchitka to a point offshore northwest of West Kiska Lake, the regiment was detailed to embark under cover of darkness in rubber boats and reach the bar between the lake and the Bering Sea not later than K - 300 on D plus 1 day. They would carry their boats over the bar and proceed in them across West Kiska Lake, landing at a point near the mouth of Robin Creek. Advancing inland by the best available routes they would seize and hold the Riot Hill - Ranger Hill ridge, organizing to cover landings of the main force on Beach 14 (146).

118. To the left of the Canadian landing beach, Beach 14 Green, the three BLGs of Tactical Group 184 were to land led by BLG 87-1 on Red Beach at K hour, and followed forty minutes later by BLGs 184-2 and 184-3 on Purple and Red Beaches respectively. Their objective was the north and east spans of the high ground Ranger Hill some 4000 yards inland, and they were responsible for ejecting the enemy from Witchcraft Point and for covering the landing of the first of the Canadian BLGs.

119. BLG 13-14, No. 14 Combat Team of the 13 Brigade Group, disembarking from the "SACAJAWEA" in landing barges of various types (147), was scheduled to land on Green Beach at K plus 210 mins and to advance inland to relieve BLG 87-1 on Ranger Hill. From that objective vigorous patrolling would be conducted to the south east in the direction of Model Hill and Kiska Harbour. No 14 Combat Team would be followed 65 minutes later by BLG 13-15 (Winnipeg Grenadiers), who would swing to the south and take up a position on the right of the Canadian Fusiliers, pushing out reconnaissance and fighting patrols towards the southern sector. BLG 13-16, the Rocky Mountain Rangers Combat Team, was to land on Green Beach at K plus 360, follow the route of the preceding teams,

and take up a position on the right flank of the Canadian Group in the Rooster Hills - Robert Ridge area.

120. Following the principle that all combat teams would cease to exist as such once the first objectives had been reached, the operation order called for withdrawal from their respective teams of all field and anti-aircraft artillery on the completion of the initial phase. Artillery batteries would then be massed by the northern sector Artillery Commander, Maj John T Ollinger, US Army, while anti-aircraft artillery would pass from BCTs to the control of US Army Lt-Col Lesikar, who would co-ordinate AA defence arrangements for the entire northern part of the island.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

121. Explicit Administrative Instructions were issued in conjunction with Operation Order No 1, and an appendix to these Instructions detailed the duties of the beach parties. Under the command of Lt-Col Menard, OC Le Regt de Hull, personnel in the units and detachments of the BCTs would have as their principal tasks the clearing of the beach and the construction of roads, the unloading of cargo and the establishing of separate dumps of the various types of stores, and the protection of the beach area against enemy attack.

122. Since every officer and man on landing would carry a one-day "K" ration and a one-day "D" ration, with canteen filled and a supply of halazone tablets, there was a period of 48 hours in which to establish messing facilities. Arrangements were made however for all unit kitchens in the beach area to operate on a 24-hour schedule to serve hot coffee to all personnel regardless of unit.

123. Operation orders and administrative instructions had been carefully studied and their contents thoroughly absorbed between the time of embarkation at Adak and the arrival at Kiska. Combat team commanders had prepared their landing plans and issued their own operation orders to their component units and detachments (148). Officers, NCOs and men were systematically briefed as to the part they were to play. As far as planning could go, Greenlight was ready to attack.

XIV

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

THE OCCUPATION - FORWARD COMBAT TEAMS.

16 Aug 43 - The Landings - Objectives reached -
17 Aug 43 - Fatigues Begin.
16 AUG 43

124A. It was "D plus 1" day, Monday, 16 Aug 43, and reveille on the crowded transports came at 0200 hrs. The convoy circled and drifted from two to three miles off shore until 0620 hrs (K hour), when the first barges pushed towards land with the forward elements of Tactical Group 184 (149). Shortly afterward loud explosions from the shore marked the progress of the US engineers in detecting and destroying Japanese land mines on the beaches. To the waiting men on the boats however the heavy detonations meant an opposed landing, and there was no hint of "make believe" in the determination with which they sprung to action when their turn for debarkation arrived (150).

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THE LANDINGS

124B. Forward companies of the Canadian Fusiliers in the first Canadian group, CT 14, their faces smeared with camouflage paint, started down the landing nets of the "SACAJAWEA" shortly after 0800 hours, and were on the beach by 0910 hours (149). Moving across the narrow strip of sand on which stores and supplies were soon to pile up in huge dumps, they halted in a forming-up area behind the first low rise to await the disembarkation of the second and third waves of their forward combat team. Then they started to advance up the deep valley of Rainbow Creek (151).

125. Throughout the morning the remaining transports were discharging their Canadian troops as fast as landing craft became available. Officers in charge of unloading found themselves compelled to make many last-minute changes in boat assignments as barges appeared without any apparent regard to prearranged debarkation tables (152). The Winnipeg Grenadiers (15 CT) landed at 1100 hours (149), followed by the Rocky Mountain Rangers (16 CT) shortly before noon (153). By mid-afternoon Forward Bde HQ had followed the other landings (149) and was receiving reports of the steady progress of the forward combat teams, as one by one checked in on their reporting lines, - Apple, Berry, Citron and Danson (154).

OBJECTIVES REACHED

126. By 1800 hours all objectives had been occupied without encountering any enemy resistance. Reports from two days' operations in the Southern Sector had shown that area to be free of Japanese, and it appeared probable that if any opposition were to be encountered, it would be from small bodies of soldiers lurking in fox holes and underground caves for a last ditch suicidal stand. That night the forward teams dug in to hold their positions against possible surprise, with a stand-to ordered for 0530 hrs next morning (149).

127. 14 Combat Team was bivouacked on Rex Hill, having sent patrols right down into Kiska Village during the night (155). 15 Combat Team having reached as far forward as Mandarin Hill, took up a position on Morgan Hill (150), while on their right 16 Combat Team dug in on the high ground of Rooster Hill overlooking Behring Sea (153). Forward Brigade HQ spent the night on the northern slope of Morgan Hill behind the Winnipeg Grenadiers (149).

128. At midnight Brig Foster called his "O" group together from the surrounding hills and passed on to BLG Commanders the plan for next day's operations based on instructions received from North Sector. Headquarters consisted of a single pup tent and into its shielded light the Brigadier took a CO, one at a time, to study the situation map for the day's moves (149). The plan called for the seizure of the high ground north of Middle Pass, the encirclement of the main Japanese camp and a push through to the shores of Kiska Harbour.

17 AUG 43

129. Early on the 17th the forward units resumed their advance, 14 CT in the centre, flanked on left and right by 15 CT and 16 CT respectively (154). As leading patrols moved down towards the harbour they found every hill and ridge thickly sown with Japanese foxholes, dummy emplacements and skillfully concealed gun positions, all carefully sited to command strategic approaches to

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the Main Camp (156). Caches of small arms and artillery ammunition, grenades and land mines, conveniently hidden close to gun pits bore striking evidence of the warmth of the reception that might have awaited the invaders (157). Over on the Canadian left members of US 184-3 BLG were busily engaged in blowing in dugouts that seemed too heavily mined to be worth while disarming, and the sound of exploding grenades continued throughout the day.

130. It was during the movement of 16 Combat Team down the coastal area during the morning that Greenlight sustained its first fatal casualty. Lieut S Vessey of "D" Coy, 1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers, while investigating one of the dugouts that commanded Barley Cove, stepped on a hidden land mine and was blown up. He died in about 20 minutes and was buried on the spot (158).

131. Lieut Vessey's death was the second Canadian casualty sustained during the operations on Kiska. On the day of the landing a member of 14 Combat Team, Fus DY Mills, was severely wounded when shot through the spine by unidentified machine gun fire in the thick fog on Rex Hill (159). The almost total lack of visibility on some of the fog-covered ridges during the first evening made it impossible to distinguish friend from foe at a time when none knew at what moment a Japanese-held position might be encountered, and several instances occurred of men firing upon moving figures suspected to be enemies. But there were other examples of "trigger-happiness" that were less excusable. On more than one occasion during the first twenty-four hours following the landing, BLG 184-3 and Canadian troops found that a brisk return of machine gun fire was the most effective method of reminding the Special Service Force that the impromptu field firing exercises by which the latter were lightening their ammunition load added nothing to the safety of the main body of the force (157).

132. By late afternoon all objectives for the second day had been reached (154). Setting out forward patrols the combat teams prepared for another night in the open on the high ground that rimmed the deserted Japanese camp. To the west the Rocky Mountain Rangers and their accompanying troops occupied Lady Hill and Monument Hill on the lip of Middle Pass; on the left, across the valley from the airfield, 15 Combat Team, with Brigade HQ behind them, dug in on the south slopes of Manoeuvre Hills, while in the centre the Canadian Fusilier Group took up its position a thousand yards north of Trout Lagoon. To the east of the Canadian bivouac area, on the crest above Salmon Lagoon, were the US troops of BLG 184-3, placed under the command of Brig Foster from 1200 hours on the 17th (157). The proximity of numerous Japanese caves and dugouts, with caches full of food, blankets and clothing provided Canadians and Americans alike with the wherewithal to add in some small measure to their physical comfort during the wet nights that followed (160).

FATIGUES BEGIN

133. Force Reserve transports moved down from the north west of the island on the next afternoon (18 Aug) and detachments of the 13 Bde Group covered their landing in Kiska Harbour (154). Two days later, a decision having been reached to halt unloading stores at Green Beach, the large freighters steamed around into the Harbour, and the job of discharging their cargoes began anew (161). Heavy demands for fatigue parties were made by Northern Sector HQ, each combat team supplying 400 men to work on the beach in six hour shifts (154).

134. On 22 Aug the three BLGs were disbanded, the various detachments recentralizing as complete units, - the infantry battalions returning to their normal organization (162). The time spent together had been a profitable one and each of the various arms had learnt much about the other fellow's job. A brigade campsite was selected in the valley through Manoeuvre Hills, about a mile and a half north west of Kiska Harbour, and on 24 Aug units moved into the new area, to settle down for the weeks ahead, and to begin the battle of pyramidal tents versus Kiska weather (163).

XV

THE OCCUPATION - BEACH COMBAT TEAMS

The Role of the Beach Party - Unloading Operations -
The Work of the Engineers - Unloading Stopped - The
Stay at Green Beach

THE ROLE OF THE BEACH PARTY

135. While the forward combat teams were rapidly advancing towards their objectives, to the beach teams, landing during the afternoon of "D plus one" day, fell the tremendous task of developing the supply lines and handling the hundreds of tons of stores that poured in from the transport ships during the next few days (164). Operating in the face of adverse conditions of disorganized unloading schedules, overcrowded beaches (165), and a high running sea that made landings difficult and treacherous, the combined beach party, under the unflagging leadership of Lt-Col Dollard Menard, did a job deserving of the highest commendation.

136. As a result of the redistribution of personnel in the Brigade Headquarters Group strengths of the three beach combat teams had been increased from 370 each to 506, 534 and 556 respectively (166). Organizing each team into a Headquarters and four sections (beach, defence, supply and medical), with further subdivision into parties responsible for communications, shore and sea labour, engineer duties, dump operations, records, evacuation, and traffic control, the Beach Commander had under his orders a complex but well co-ordinated group that functioned in general with an efficiency that amazed US observers on the ships and on the shore (167).

137. There was one factor of the landing that tended to alleviate the difficulties faced by the Beach Commander. The decision to operate over a single beach made it possible for many like detachments of the three teams to be reunited, and the resulting centralization did much to ease the burden of administration and intercommunication. The fact, too, that no enemy opposition was encountered reduced to a minimum the need for beach security, but the original plan of dividing all available personnel into three shifts, - labour, guard, and rest, - was adhered to, and each man took his eight-hour tour of duty daily, patrolling the heights above the beach (167).

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UNLOADING OPERATIONS

138. The increased allotment of workers was still barely adequate to cope with the precipitous speed with which the landing barges began to pile stores ashore. The discovery that Red and Purple Beaches, northwards towards Kiska Lakes, were strewn with massive boulders instead of the fine gravel that aerial reconnaissance had reported, had resulted in US Tactical Group 184 moving in over the left half of Green Beach, causing further restriction in the narrow shoreline on which Canadian stores were now being landed (168). Boat-loads of American and Canadian stores came in together, eight to ten at a time, to be offloaded with the greatest rapidity and moved to their allotted dumps on the rise of ground 200 yards back from the water line. That the stretch of sand on the Canadian part of Green Beach was kept at all times cleared of stores points to the despatch with which the labour parties carried out their duties.

139. The work of the men of Le Regiment de Hull was magnificent. On the first afternoon, before the tractors were unloaded, all material had to be manhandled across the beach regardless of its size. Bulky cases of stores of all kinds, heavy boxes of ammunition, sacks of coal, barrels of petrol and oil, 5-gallon containers filled with water, - all were carried, dragged, rolled or passed from hand to hand up to the dumps. Morale was high, and no job was too tough for the troops to tackle. Men stripped to the skin to wade through icy water to unload landing craft that had grounded out of reach of the shore (169).

140. Supplies and stores were piled into eight separate and individually marked dumps:- ammunition, rations, oil and petrol, water, medical stores, coal, vehicles and miscellaneous stores (170). At each post officers or NCOs assigned from the appropriate services kept a record of all incoming items and outgoing issues, so that at any time a correct situation report could be made available to the Brigade Commander. Here again could be seen the good fortune that led to the establishment of one set of dumps instead of three, as the small Army Service Corps and Ordnance detachments found their hands full with the responsibility that the care of such great quantities of stores entailed (171).

THE WORK OF THE ENGINEERS

141. Although no enemy remained to man the machine gun nests and artillery positions commanding the bay and to sweep Green Beach with Japanese bullets and shells, the danger from land mines in the shore area early became apparent, when an American snow-jeep moving off the beach was blown into the air by a concealed explosive. To remove this threat to landing operations a detachment from the Beach Party, consisting of RCE personnel and men from Le Regiment de Hull conducted a methodical search throughout the whole beach area. Slowly advancing, at arm's length apart, step by step, they prodded the ground ahead of them with fixed bayonets and the pitchfork mine detectors, discovering in this way some eighty mines, which the engineers promptly rendered harmless (165). In general the Japanese landmines and booby-traps were poorly concealed and of crude construction. Pathways through the sand often led the searchers directly to one of the destructive packages, which usually consisted of a flat canister containing about three pounds of picric acid, perhaps hidden under a board that would produce detonation when stepped on with a pressure of thirty pounds or more (172).

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142. By the second morning vehicles and engineering equipment had all been unloaded, and caterpillar tractors, D-4's and D-6's were in operation, dragging loaded sleds from the landing craft, and pulling Athey trailers, piled high with material, up the slope to the dump area (173). Bulldozers started their attack upon Kiska's contour lines, and a strong working party from the beach was assigned to assist the engineers in pushing a road inland over which supply might advance to forward teams. On the high ground a volcanic shale formation provided a useful road bed, but in cutting through the muskeg of the lower slopes it was necessary to pour sled-load and trailer-load of rock and gravel into the apparently bottomless mass of shaking quagmire (174). While snowjeeps laden with rations were able to struggle through to the forward teams (175), it was not until two weeks later that RCE personnel with heavy US bulldozer equipment arrived overland from Kiska Harbour, and working advantageously from the top of the hill down towards the beach completed a road over which tractor-drawn trailer-loads could be moved (176).

UNLOADING STOPPED

143. For three days the unloading at Green Beach continued. Although by the second day it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that no Japanese remained alive, on the island, it was not until 18 Aug that the US Navy complied with a written request from the ATF 9 Commander, Gen Corlett, to cease piling stores ashore (177). The dumps had grown to huge proportions, and now arose the problem of their further disposition. Sorting of the miscellaneous dump and segregation of unit stores began. Since 18 Aug rations had been moving up on snow-jeeps to a forward dump at the junction of the new Green Beach Road and the Japanese-built Race Road, as had also a quantity of such essential engineer stores as cookstoves and heaters. While Athey trailers could come overland from the Canadian camp above Kiska Harbour to the high ground above Green Beach, it was still impossible for tractors to climb the first steep slope from where the dumps were situated without undergoing a slow and laborious process of winching (178). When an urgent call came through for the personal rucksacks and barrack bags of the forward combat teams, who had been living for more than a week in the limited clothing and equipment with which they landed, there was only one way to get the sorely needed baggage up to the road above. On their backs, making from four to six exhausting trips a day, labour parties of the Hulls packed one hundred and fifty tons of "B" bags and rucksacks up the spongy side of the hill to where the vehicles were waiting 300 feet above (179).

THE STAY AT GREEN BEACH

144. For nearly a month Canadians and Americans camped at Green Beach. It was indeed a "bivouac" camp. Except for the 6th US Field Hospital whose pyramidal tents were set up on the American end of the foreshore, all troops gained what protection they could from the adverse weather by erecting their pup tents under the protection of the hillside, or putting up makeshift shelters of tarpaulin barricaded with disused sleds and boxes. The main bivouac area, that occupied by Le Regiment de Hull, was among the tundra covered sand dunes back of Witchcraft Point on the south end of the beach. Bofors guns of the 46 Lt AA Battery strategically placed along the shore, and six-pounder anti-tank guns pointing out over Bamboo Bay, gave protection to the camp against sudden attack from sky or sea (169). The health of the troops was excellent as the rigorous programme of conditioning that they had undergone and the lessons in self care that they had learned bore fruits as they faced the physical attacks of fatigue and weather.

145. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to transport stores from Green Beach by water. Twice the labour parties moved tons of material from the dumps down to the tide mark, and each time a rising sea prevented the huge LST from effecting a landing. The third attempt succeeded, and the stores remaining in the dumps were put aboard for transshipment to Kiska Harbour (180). Rear parties of the combat teams had already left the area to join their units in the new camp, and advance parties of Le Regiment de Hull had begun work on the site allotted to the French Canadian battalion. With the removal of the last stores the main body vacated the beach for their new area, and on 11 Sep Lt-Col Menard and his rear party moved out, leaving Green Beach empty and silent for the first time since D-day (181).

XVI

COMMUNICATIONS

Brigade Difficulties with Communications - Organization - Equipment - Training - Codes - The Operation - Recommendations.

BRIGADE DIFFICULTIES WITH COMMUNICATIONS

146. The preliminary report on the Kiska operation submitted on 3 Sep 43 by the Brigade Commander had the following to say about communications (22):-

"Throughout the operation one of the major problems faced by Comd and staff was that of communications. The difficulties experienced were due to several factors. These were:-

(a) New type equipment, issued at the last minute and without sufficient time or opportunity being allowed to permit personnel to become familiar with it.

(b) An organization put together, based on theory, and without full appreciation of the problems involved.

(c) Provision of personnel basically trained but who had never trained in an operational role.

(d) An elaborate system of codes and restrictions imposed for security measures but which tended to confuse personnel and slow up transmission."

From a consideration of each of these factors, dealing first with organization, and an examination of the actual operation, some recommendations for the organization of communications in any future force on a similar mission may be reached.

ORGANIZATION

147. The communications system for a tactical group employed in amphibious operations (182) provided in the initial phase for an advanced Brigade CP on shore to be in radio contact (using SCR 284s) with its rear HQ on board ship, as well as being connected (by 511 sets) with the forward combat teams moving inland (183). At the same time beach teams would be in communication on 284s with their respective transport ships and would keep touch with their

forward teams by means of the lighter 511 sets. As the situation developed the forward teams, moving up their heavy 284 sets and laying light combat wire along their advance, would keep in touch with their beaches by both R/T and L/T, while Brigade Signals, having established a command net (284s), became responsible for pushing forward heavy cable, No 110, to connect the forward teams with the Group Command Post, and thus supplement, and eventually replace, the brigade radio net. Communication between the Brigade CP and the beach was maintained by L/T.

148. To conform with this organization of communications it was decided to pool the RC Signals personnel of the Brigade and Field Regt HQ Sections, together with the signals platoon of the beach infantry battalion, and to reallocate them as detachment detailed to each of the forward and beach combat teams. This redistribution resulted in 7 officers and 110 other ranks becoming available from the following sources:- 13 Cdn Inf Bde Sec RC Signals, 2 and 36; 24 Fd Regt Sec RC Sigs, 4 and 39; Regt de Hull Sig Pl, 1 and 35. (49 RC Sigs personnel on the establishment of Bde HQ Signals Section remained with Headquarters throughout) (184).

149. The signals pool thus gathered was divided equally into three sections to serve the three BLGs. From each section detachments were allotted to operate the wireless sets on the beach net, one moving ahead with the forward combat team and the other staying on the transport ship. The remaining personnel were used to establish a beach message centre, and to assist the Bde HQ linesmen in maintaining the beach lines forward.

EQUIPMENT

150. In accordance with the general policy adopted by Greenlight planners of making use of American supply wherever feasible, all signal equipment carried by the force was of US issue. Not the least important factor in reaching this decision was the recognition of the necessity of having all equipment man portable. Canadian signal apparatus, the development of much of which had been largely based upon vehicular operations, had perforce to be rejected in favour of the American man-packed instruments (185).

151. The radio sets provided were the SCR 536, "Handy Talky", used by platoon and troop commanders on company or battery nets; the SCR 511, "Walky Talky", with a range of five miles, for employment by forward team commanders down to their subformations; and the large SCR 284, a three-man load, hand-generated set with a range of 20 miles R/T (or 30 miles C/W), utilized in the brigade command net and in the beach nets. It was with these 284 sets that the Canadians on the transport vessels "listened in" to the show in the Southern Sector on the day preceding the Green Beach landing (135).

152. Once they were in operation neither the 536 nor the 511 sets required adjusting as to frequency, the former being pre-set on one of six available wave lengths distributed through all companies, and the latter, with a variable band of six frequencies, being kept tuned to the particular channel allotted each combat team. While this arrangement undoubtedly contributed to ease of operation of the sets, the volume of signals traffic passing through the limited number of frequencies often caused overlapping that resulted in confusion and delay. Mechanically the US radio sets generally gave highly satisfactory service.

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153. The US Field Telephone, Type EE 8, with magneto ringing, replaced the D Mk V instrument, and proved to be more compact and rugged than the Canadian equivalent (186). The exchanges used, BD 71 and BD 72, six and twelve-line magneto drops type, were of an excessive weight as compared to the Canadian UC five and ten-line exchanges, the latter pattern being considered preferable if conditions of supply allowed their provision.

154. The light assault cable, W-130, provided by the American Signal Corps, weighing only 32 lbs per mile, was found excellent for initial communications (one man could carry two miles of wire) but had to be replaced at an early stage by the more rugged W-110 twisted field wire (130 lbs per mile), as the insulation on the lighter cable was quickly destroyed by the crossing of vehicles or the movement of troops (187).

155. To the group of signals personnel with varying amounts of training and experience gathered from all parts of Canada, time permitted only a demonstration of two types of American radio sets prior to embarkation at Nanaimo. Among the stores that continued to reach the point of embarkation right up to the last minute was the majority of the US provided signals equipment (188), and ordnance personnel could only make a very perfunctory check while spraying on camouflage paint before assigning it to the combat loads of the transport ships (59).

TRAINING

156. Collective training as a Brigade Signals Section cannot be said to have started to any definite extent until Adak was reached. Two exercises were held here, in addition to the Great Sitkin scheme, but for the majority of the time at this Aleutian training island all signals personnel were employed on internal communications or in the unpacking and repacking of equipment (115). As was the case with other units and detachments of the 13 TG, valuable lessons were learned from the Great Sitkin exercise, - experience of which pressure of time later unfortunately did not allow the fullest use being made. The unfamiliarity of signals personnel with their new equipment may have accounted in some measure for the tendency of signals officers to concern themselves too much with the technical and physical side of communications, instead of exploring the tactical situation with a view to ensuring the most efficient employment of their detachment. Best communications during the operation appear to have been maintained in those cases where the formation commander kept his signals officer completely in the picture. As one report puts it, "For two weeks the Combat Team commander lived with his signals officer in his pocket" (189).

CODES

157. The Signal Annex to Field Order No 1 of Landing Force 16.8 contained a series of schedules of codes and call signs for radio and telephone communication that to the Canadian signallers was staggering in its complexity (190). Code names were supplied for formation headquarters, combat teams, transport vessels, batteries, and staff officers of the entire Landing Force, the designations in the first three named categories changing daily. Thus No 14 Forward Combat Team became on successive days 8A3, 94T, 2D8, 13N, etc, while the Brigade Commander and the members of his staff became in order Limestone, Leopard, Legend, Layette and Lather, - their formation code name changing from day to day.

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158. A far greater obstacle in the path of the unfortunate Canadian signallers was the task of memorizing and applying in actual message the radio authenticator tables, and employing the telephone authentication system, a device intended to be used whenever any doubt existed as to the authenticity of either the sending or receiving party. Considerable adroitness would be required to put into operation either of these methods of authentication without causing delay in the transmission of urgent messages (191).

159. All this and similar material to be mastered was unloaded upon the Canadian signals at a four hour conference conducted at Adak under the US Force Chief Signals Officer. Col AR. St Louis, CSO Pacific Command, attended this meeting, and suggested that actually only three points were of importance:-

(a) That wave lengths should be allotted carefully to prevent jamming.

(b) That all should know each other's call letters.

(c) That they should "put elaborately prepared code books in their pockets and forget about them."

This was satisfactory to the US Command, who agreed to dispense with authentication in the case of Canadian messages.

THE OPERATION

160. To all the above factors that may have tended to mitigate against the efficient functioning of the communications system during the actual operations there must be added the unexpected feature of the rapidity of the Canadian advance. Heavily burdened linesmen laboured desperately up the steep hills, the weight upon their backs forcing their feet deep into the treacherous tundra, struggling to keep up with a command post that moved forward at a disheartening rate of speed (192).

161. The original plan of line communication called for eight pairs of heavy wire to be laid by Brigade Signals up the axis of advance to Random Creek, to connect with lines to the forward combat teams, but it was not until late in the afternoon of 17 Aug with the aid of a borrowed snow-jeep that a brigade line caught up with the forward position. During the first two days all telephone communications from the forward combat teams went back over their own beach lines to reach Rear HQ (193).

162. The Brigade Command Radio Net did not function according to plan due to shortages in the amount of signals equipment landed. Group HQ found itself without 284 sets with which to reach combat teams, but successful contact was maintained by using 511 sets tuned to the forward teams' allotted frequencies (184).

163. An American signal section of one officer and fifteen other ranks had been attached to 13 Brigade Signals just before the operation, its job being to maintain rear link wireless communication to Sector and Force HQ. Unfortunately the bulky 193 sets that it proposed to operate remained packed on a snow-jeep somewhere in the hold of a transport vessel. It was not until the evening of the second day that the US detachment having recovered its missing equipment caught up with Brigade HQ and relieved the Canadian signals of the communications work they had been carrying on for the American party on the Northern Sector net.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

164. From the experience gained with the Greenlight Force important recommendations have been submitted by the CSO, Pacific Command, and reference should be made to this appreciation (185). Among the more pertinent suggestions is the emphasis placed upon the need for a "capable Group Signals Officer, trained in combined operations, to serve on the operational staff of the Group Commander. He must be thoroughly in the operational picture at all times, capable of advising the Tactical Group Commander as to the limitations of time, range and vulnerability of the methods available to be employed in any proposed situation". In the suggested organization Tactical Group HQ would be served by a Signals Section (operating a Message Centre and Signal Office), and a Signal Supply Group established in close liaison with Ordnance and Supply troops. Forward and Beach Signals Section would comprise a number of well trained signal teams of 3, 5 or 8 men. In all some 34 teams would be available from the 364 other ranks on the present war establishment of an Amphibious Training Group. It is considered that the employment of such teams would give the flexibility desired to meet any situation that might arise.

XVII

MEDICAL SERVICES

Organization - Medical Supply - Lessons from Kiska - Plasma Equipment.

ORGANIZATION

165. In order to conform to the tactical organization of the 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp it was necessary to reorganize the Medical Services and to build them around combat groups (194). The aim at all times was to make each combat team medically self-sufficient and self-sustained. To accomplish this personnel of the 25 Field Ambulance together with unit medical personnel were reorganized into three sections, in American terminology, the Battalion Medical Section, the Field Medical Section, and the Shore Medical Section. Their composition and functions were as follows:

166. The Battalion Medical Section was composed of:

- Company Aid Men (Infantry Battalion - 10
- Battery RCA - 2)..12
- Battalion Stretcher Bearers12
- Battalion Aid Station 8
- Battalion Medical Officers 2

167. Company Aid Men supplied from infantry battalions and field batteries were thoroughly trained in Battle First Aid and carried with them well-equipped first aid kits. In the plan of evacuation of casualties (195) battalion stretcher bearers were responsible for collecting the wounded after preliminary treatment by the company aid men and carrying them to the Battalion Aid Station. This station, corresponding to a RAP, would be situated well forward provided with such shelter, tents, tarpaulins, caves or natural hollows as might be practicable. The Regimental Medical Officer with a second MO specially attached to the battalion, together with nursing orderlies and a cook, were assigned to the Battalion Aid Station for the care of casualties.

168. The Field Medical Station consisted of the following:

Liaison agent.....	1
Field Stretcher Bearers.....	28
Field Aid Station	
Treatment.....	7
Supply.....	3 ...10
Field Medical Officer.....	1

169. Field Stretcher Bearers, armed with carbines and provided with first aid kits which would serve as a source of forward supply to the Battalion Aid Station, were responsible for movement of casualties from the advanced stations to the Shore Aid Station. At the Field Aid Station was the Field Medical Officer, who was senior medical officer of the Combat Medical Team. His chief tasks were the evacuation of casualties to the Shore Medical installations and the maintenance of supply to the Battalion Aid Stations. A liaison agent was attached to the Battalion Aid Station to keep the Field Medical Officer informed regarding its site and the state of its supplies.

170. The Shore Medical Section was made up of the following:-

Shore Administrative Group

Shore Dental Officer.....	1
Shore Medical Officer.....	1
Shore Supply Section.....	6
Clerk.....	1
Cook.....	1
Stretcher bearers.....	11
Dental assistants.....	2

Shore Aid Station

Medical Officer.....	1
Nursing Orderlies.....	8
Cook.....	1

171. The Shore Aid Station was to function from the time of landing until replaced by a platoon from the 6 US Field Hospital. It would then move forward either in support of the Field Aid Station or form a Field Clearing Station at the head of a road in conjunction with one or more Shore Aid Stations from other combat teams in the same area. The Administrative Group of the Shore Medical Section contained personnel and equipment to consolidate all medical returns for the BCT and to handle medical supplies as they are landed. It also provided stretcher bearers (who were drawn from the Regiment de Hull) to assist in the evacuation of casualties from the shore medical installations to high-water mark on the beach, where they become the responsibility of naval medical services. The Shore Medical Officer assisted by the Shore Dental Officer was responsible for liaison with the Naval Medical Officer regarding evacuation of casualties, the consolidation of medical returns for the Battalion Combat Team, the maintenance of supply forward from the beach, and the supervision of sanitation in the shore area. The administration of all medical supplies, equipment and personnel was carried out by the Brigade Surgeon (Lt-Col TM Brown, OC 25 Field Ambulance RCAMC) assisted by his 2 i/c and the Field Medical Officer of each battalion combat team.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

172. Medical supply personnel were distributed in the Brigade Group as follows:

Battalion Medical Section	1
Field Medical Section	3

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Shore Medical Section 6
HQ Field Ambulance Group.....10

173. It was not anticipated that tracked vehicles could be used for the movement of medical supplies in the early stages of operations. Equipment was therefore divided into three categories:

- 1) Man-carried
- 2) Priority loaded equipment
- 3) Non-priority loaded equipment

1) Man-carried supply, which included enough medical supplies and ordnance equipment to allow for the care of casualties for at least 36 hours, was packed in loads of not more than fifty pounds, and distributed so that loss of any one load would not seriously handicap the functioning of the respective installations. Such equipment was carried by stretcher, rucksacks, and pack boards, field bags, or barrack bags.

2) Priority loaded equipment consisted of: (a) essential medical supplies too heavy to be man-carried, (b) essential equipment to shelter, feed and care for casualties and (c) initial medical replenishments. The movement of such supply when tracked vehicles became available would be a matter of liaison between the Shore Administrative Medical Officer and the Shore Supply Officer of Le Regiment de Hull.

3) Non-priority loads contained the bulk of medical supplies, barrack equipment and all other extra equipment.

174. Evacuation of casualties beyond the beach was to be carried out by the US Navy in conjunction with Alaska Defence Command. All cases except those requiring a long period of recovery were to be held in US hospitals in Alaska and returned to their units there. Other cases would be transported by sea or air, depending upon the nature of the casualty, to Canadian or US hospitals on the mainland. Based on previous operations it was tentatively estimated that total Canadian casualties might amount to 1800, of which some 1300 would require evacuation to stationary hospitals, with some 350 to 400 of those serious enough to be sent to the mainland (196). For such a number adequate hospital accommodation was available in Alaska and in Pacific Command (197).

LESSONS FROM KISKA

175. Although the unexpected turn of events at Kiska gave the medical service virtually no opportunity to put its plan of casualty evacuation to a practical test, it is the consensus of considered opinion that the changed organization of the Field Ambulance was entirely sound (198). As had been anticipated, all carrying had to be done by hand over the most difficult kind of terrain, and the task of keeping the Battalion Medical Section well forward with the rapidly advancing combat teams tested to the limit the physical stamina of the bearers. The difficult and lengthy process of moving a loaded stretcher long distances over the uncertain footing provided by tundra and down steep hills where skilled use of ropes and pulleys was often needed, emphasized the need for stretcher bearers trained to the peak of physical strength and fitness. It was the opinion of the Brigade Surgeon that had the number of casualties reached the expected estimate, the number of stretcher bearers in the various medical sections would have been inadequate, and it would have been necessary to demand auxiliary bearers from other sources.

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176. The difficulty of maintaining communications between the forward Battalion Medical Section and the Shore Medical Section suggested that for future operations of a similar nature the Brigade Surgeon should move with Advanced Brigade HQ to correlate the medical plans to the tactical situation. For the same reason the senior medical officer of the battalion combat team could function to better advantage if he were a Field Ambulance Officer attached to the battalion to be part of the team commander's recce and order groups (199). The major objection to such a disposition of control would seem to be the desirability of keeping the forward operational headquarters, both brigade and battalion, as compact and mobile as possible, and free of attachments from the administrative services.

PLASMA EQUIPMENT

177. All Canadian plasma transfusion equipment was replaced in Adak by American issue (200). It appeared that the Canadian equipment as supplied was best suited for use under regular hospital conditions, requiring as it did the mixing of plasma with water by openly pouring from one flask to another regardless of sterile conditions. An additional defect was the comparatively painfully large 16-gauge needle employed. The American equipment was so designed that mixing of the plasma was effected without exposure to the air, while the injection needle was only 18-gauge. The relative advantages of the US and Canadian plasma units are discussed in an appendix to this section (201).

XVIII

SETTLING DOWN

Accommodation - Supply - Daily Occupations - Morale -
Casualties - Postal Services - Pay - Honors and Awards

ACCOMMODATION

178. General Order No 1, issued on 24 Aug 43 by Gen Corlett to ATF 9, commending all officers and men for the part they had played in the occupation of Kiska, concluded with these words:

"It remains for us to establish ourselves here, secure against the enemy and in comfort. This will require hard work for all of us. The results of these efforts can be definitely foreseen. We will all have comfortable, heated huts or tents to live in, good water, baths, good roads, theatres, and recreation halls. All of these things are in prospect but through efficient planning and hard work we must make them come true."(202)

179. Observation of the astounding accomplishments of the US Engineer and Quartermaster Corps in establishing the various military installations on similar islands up and down the Aleutian Chain leads one to believe that the General was not promising the impossible. Nor were the Canadians afraid of the hard work that was indicated. For the next two months all units became labour detachments, paradoxically digging in for the Kiska Christmas that they hoped never to see.

180. The work of erecting tents and "winterizing" them claimed priority over all other tasks. As it was expected that Quanset or Pacific Huts would be issued at a later date, all excavations

for tents were made large enough to accommodate a 36-foot hut. In these dugouts, protected from 80-mile-an-hour "Williwaws" by 5-foot revetments, the American pyramidal tents were set up, - usually in pairs. Lightproof, and as waterproof as any protection made of canvas can be in the blast-driven rain of the Aleutians, these tents with their straight sides making for ease of extensibility are considered better in such conditions than the Canadian bell or marquee. When properly sited only the pyramidal top appears above the protecting revetment, but unfortunately even this limited amount of resistance proves sufficient target to the Kiska winds, and an early November gale that was estimated to run to gusts of 110 miles per hour, flattened close to thirty tents in the lines of one exposed unit at the top of Salmon Pass (203). The one Pacific Hut issued per unit was definitely earmarked for orderly room or re-creation room, so that all ranks were apparently destined to continue to sleep in tents during their stay on Kiska.

181. While a small coal heater in each tent provided cheerful warmth, lighting facilities were in the main restricted to a limited supply of candles. Some units were fortunate enough to resurrect old Japanese generators, whose fitful current supplied a rather wavering but definitely appreciated illumination (204), but an impending famine in light bulbs, which had a high rate of mortality in the storm-battered tents, threatened an enforced return to the universal dimness of candlelight.

SUPPLY

182. After existing for more than a week on K, D, and C rations, all units of the Canadian Force were glad to be placed on a daily schedule of B-ration issue from RCASC (205). Early in September a US Field Bakery commenced supplying bread to the force (206). Supply dumps were built up in the Canadian Brigade area to provide a 30-day stock (207). Distribution of coal, wood, POL, and rations was soon a matter of daily routine, as units hauled their supplies back to their lines on Athey trailers. Water, diverted from a stream above the camp and carried through Japanese pipes to a storage tank, was hauled in US 5-gallon cans, individually on a pack board, or collectively by tractor and trailer.

183. The task of the small RCASC detachment throughout the preliminary moves and the final operation was most exacting. Badly understaffed, and from the nature of its duties frequently forced to operate on a 24-hour basis, handicapped by complete lack of transport, and faced at times with forward supply lines that grew far more rapidly than did the ration dumps on the beach stunted as they were by faulty offloading of transport ships, the detachment of thirty odd men and their officers performed a job that reflected the highest credit upon them. Should a Canadian force be called upon again to serve in a similar capacity to Greenlight, undoubtedly a careful review will be made of the establishment allowed the RCASC detachment, with a view to a more equitable allotment of personnel to the tasks assigned (208).

DAILY OCCUPATIONS

184. Three major occupations employed the working hours of the Canadian troops on Kiska during September, October and November, - labour, defence and training. In addition to the task of providing themselves with habitable living quarters and wrestling with road building in the tenacious mud that immediately appears whenever surface tundra is worn down or removed, each unit supplied large fatigue quotas to attack the freight-laden beach below Kiska Village (209), or to assist the 24 Fd Coy RCE in its heavy assignment of completing the two-berth, 90-ft wide, No 1 Pier in

Kiska Harbour (210).

185. The defence role assigned to the 13 Brigade Group found the 24 Fd Regt RCA manning all its guns in twenty-four gun pits strategically placed throughout the Northern Sector, while the 46 Light AA Battery had thirteen Bofors in action, forming an important part of the anti-aircraft defence scheme of the whole island (211). The month of September found sections of "C" Coy, Saint John Fusiliers busily engaged in digging positions for their machine guns on Lady Hill and Rose Hill, sites that covered the west shore of the island north to Witchcraft Point and the northern boundary from West Kiska Lake to Soldier Bay (212). US artillery officers made no secret of their admiration for the skillful way in which the Canadian gunsites and A/A posts were located, protected and camouflaged.

186. Infantry battalions sent daily patrols around the Northern Sector's perimeter, and supplied outpost details for a month at a time. With their tents well dug in at lonely but strategic points along the island shores these coast watchers, usually at section or platoon strength, would keep in hourly contact with their unit headquarters by radio or telephone (213).

187. While at first sight there might appear to be something anti-climactical about going into training in a place of so obvious an operational nature as Kiska, brigade and unit authority wisely decided that both necessity and opportunity pointed the way towards progress in the training programme that embarkation at Nanaimo had interrupted. By the end of October all infantry units in the Canadian camp had participated in valuable field firing exercises on the Maple Hill and Moron Lake ranges, with 6-pdr shoots being held at Rainbow Creek (214), while the 46 Light AA Bty (215) and the 24 Fd Regt RCA (216) had also had opportunities of testing their weapons. As far as the Engineers, Ordnance and Army Service personnel were concerned, their daily duties in construction, maintenance and supply not only fully occupied their time but gave them practical experience of the most useful kind.

MORALE

188. What of the morale of the troops on Kiska? If one of the NRMA personnel there had been asked to compile a list of all his grievances, he might have supplied a catalogue something like this:- the unfairness of the Government in sending him to the Aleutians when he had believed that he could not be used outside of Canada; his failure to get embarkation leave, a grievance intensified by the CB imposed upon the Nanaimo camp prior to sailing: the "let-down" after being keyed for action at Green Beach; the possibility that the "promise" to get him home for Christmas might not be kept (217); the weather, with its depressing fog, its discomforting rain, and the savage wind that if it does not wreck his tent will madden him with an all night buffeting that makes sleep impossible (218); the mud in which he wades ankle-to-knee-deep while wondering if his sodden garments will dry out before morning; the lack of mail, particularly the time when none was delivered to the Canadians between 8 Aug and 31 Aug (couldn't the Government afford a plane or boat to bring it over from Adak?) (219); no huts, and no lights but strictly rationed candles; the belief that the Americans on Kiska were getting better and more supplies than were the Canadians (220), the lack of entertainment (he hears that on the other islands the Americans have USO shows, with girl entertainers, - here he just gets one picture show a week in the mess tent); the absence of a wet canteen.

189. Having delivered himself of so prolonged a "grouch" our subject would probably feel better, and be in a more receptive mood to listen to an enumeration of the credit entries on the balance sheet of his morale. An unbiased appraisal of the situation would bring out the following factors of his environment, - all positive builders of morale.

190. Health was good, the splendid physical condition of the men having provided them with apparent immunity against the attacks of the dampness and cold in their surroundings. Early in September a surgery was set up by the 25 Field Ambulance to handle minor surgery cases (221). By the middle of the month^{the} clinic of the 14 Dental Det CDC was ready for use, and morning parades ministered to the dental needs of the different units, who supplied patients on a limited quota basis until the first heavy demand for professional attention had been met (222). Full dental treatment was given, including the provision of artificial dentures until the lab's supply of teeth ran out in early October (223).

191. Rations were plentiful and generally popular in their quality and variety. (Although a steady course of "Spam" (224) and "Corned Beef Hash" might produce an intense craving for fresh meat and vegetables, there were compensations in the provision of generous allowances of such attractive dietary additions as mixed pickles, canned fruit salad, and real peanut butter.) The periodic issue of the rum ration, distributed first to counteract the exactions of fatigue and exposure at Green Beach, and later generally on a Saturday night, when reminiscences of distant week-end leaves were most likely to be undermining the morale, proved a great booster to the spirits of the Canadians, and made them the object of intense envy on the part of their less favoured American neighbours (225).

192. Under the direction of the S-1 (Maj TA McWaters), with unit arrangements being supervised by regimental officers and the chaplains, all possible entertainment facilities were utilized for the welfare of the men. "A" and "B" Kits of recreational supplies were provided by the US Special Service Division (comparable to Canadian Auxiliary Services) and distributed on a pro-rata basis. Seven "A" Kits were received, each packed in an adequately strong box, with the following welcome contents (226):-

1 Baseball outfit complete	1 Set of Horseshoes
3 Volley Ball Games complete	2 Sets of Table Tennis
3 Footballs	1 Dart Game
3 Rugby Footballs	1 Bingo Game
2 Sets of Boxing Gloves	Gards, Poker Chips, etc.

The "B" Kits, thirty of which were received for distribution, each contained:-

1 Radio Battery or Electric	1 Gramophone, with 20 Records
100 Penguin Library Books	6 Song Books

193. In late September a moving picture projector with a limited supply of films was made available to the Canadian camp (227), and all ranks looked forward eagerly to the weekly showing of a Hollywood drama, viewed in two or three sittings per unit in the crowded confines of mess tent or recreation hut. While musically inclined members of Greenlight were not encouraged to bring their instruments with them (one shudders to contemplate the probable fate of a Spanish guitar in the process of off-loading from ship to shore), ingenuity and determination conquers all obstacles, and the majority of units found little difficulty in organizing a weekly or fortnightly concert from the talent that so often lay innate in its nominal roll (228).

194. But probably the factor that did most to keep up the military self respect of the Canadian soldier on Kiska was the wise retention of a daily routine of parades, training and interior economy throughout the entire camp. From Brigade Headquarters down, units formed up smartly for inspection each morning on such limited parade grounds as Kiska's rolling topography would grudgingly afford, while from Reveille to Last Post the familiar calls rang out across the bleak Aleutian hills, boldly sounded by Canadian bugles (229). The tidiness of the Canadian lines, with tent revetments neatly sandbagged, and in some cases skillfully banked with stone from the hill-sides, drew the unsolicited admiration of American service visitors to the area (230). Church services were held each Sunday, with many units attending as a body. The practice of at least one battalion in assigning a portion of the censorship duties to the regimental chaplain gave that padre the means of keeping his finger on the pulse of the unit morale, and, as a result, the weekly sermon reached far into the hearts of the men as it analyzed their grievances and did much to resolve their problems (231).

195. Actions speak more loudly than words. The average soldier on Kiska might not hesitate to exercise his traditional right of grumbling (and he had not far to look for subject matter) but seriously disgruntled troops of low morale could hardly be expected to give a very active support to their Government's Victory Loan appeal. When the Fifth Victory Loan campaign came to Kiska, Canadian troops quickly over-subscribed their quota, finally reaching a total of a quarter of a million dollars! (232)

CASUALTIES

196. To the end of October Canadian casualties sustained at Kiska amounted to four killed and some thirty wounded, sick and injured (233). Of the fatalities two were killed by enemy action (Lieut. S. Vessey RMR, and Pte. Poshtar P. Wpg Gren) while two were listed as accidentally killed (Pte Boisclair G., and Pte Desjardins G., both of R de Hull). Pte Poshtar, a member of the Intelligence Section of his unit, met his death on 22 Aug at the entrance of a tunnel when he apparently kicked a trip-wire which detonated two Japanese anti-personnel mines (234). Pte Boisclair was killed at Mill Hill, on 29 Aug, by the explosion of a Japanese No 89 Mortar Grenade which he had found in an enemy ammunition dump (235). Le Regt de Hull's other fatality occurred on 28 Sep, when Pte Desjardins, on fatigue duty in the Sorting Yard area, was instantly killed by the explosion of a heavy calibre US naval shell which, it is thought, he must have banged on the nose with a shovel (236).

197. The bodies of the Canadian dead were first interred in various spots on the island, at or near the sites of their deaths. On 16 Oct they were moved to the US burial ground on the face of a hill overlooking Kiska Harbour (M3175), where the graves would always receive care and attention (237). Proper administrative arrangements were completed to ensure suitable marking of the Canadian plots.

POSTAL SERVICES

198. Among all the administrative arrangements for the welfare of the Canadian troops on Kiska, undoubtedly the one that came in for most criticism from officers and men was that concerning the arrival and departure of mail. Unit war diaries during August, September and October contain frequent references to

the disappointment of all ranks at not receiving mail regularly, and such allusions are invariably accompanied by comments upon the resulting adverse effect upon morale (238). The longest wait came when no mail reached Canadian troops between the time of their embarking at Adak on 8 Aug, and the arrival at Kiska on 31 Aug of the rear party, including the Postal Detachment, who brought with them 150 bags of mail that had accumulated at Adak (239). Deliveries were made at the middle and the end of September, and with increasing frequency during October. Outgoing mail left the island only five times prior to 22 Oct (240), and incoming letters brought many inquiries regarding the irregularity of the service,

199. The delays were apparently occasioned by transportation difficulties between Adak and Kiska. (Once mail arrived on the island an energetic postal staff would work all night if necessary to ensure its early delivery to units next morning) (241). The large transport planes of the US Army Air Force, that made almost daily trips up and down the Aleutian Chain, carrying passengers, mail and freight could not land on the small Japanese-built airfield at Kiska, so that airborne matter consigned for Kiska had to be held at Adak for transshipment by water. The inauguration, late in October, of a twice weekly service of flights between Amchitka and Kiska by a small P-64 cabin plane promised to improve the situation, but unfavorable flying conditions wrecked the schedule, and Amchitka, with some 2000 lbs of mail for Kiska accumulating at the airport, was rapidly replacing Adak as a bottle neck to Canadian hopes (242).

200. US censorship regulations were appreciably relaxed for Canadians writing home from Kiska. In view of the fact that the names of Canadian units taking part in the Kiska operation were released by radio and press in the Dominion, HQ Alaska Defence Command was persuaded, after urgent representations on the part of the 13 Bde S-2 had been made to the US Censor Officer on the island (243), to permit correspondents to mention Kiska by name, describe the weather "in general terms" (such as "the wind blows a great deal"; "it rains a great deal"), and to mention life in tents ("no discussion of behaviour of tents under adverse weather conditions will be permitted") (244). As one diarist put it, easing of the censorship regulations removed a situation where "a man might quite conceivably receive a clipping from his home town paper of his photo with the caption, "Captures Kiska", and would have to write in reply, "Dear Maggie, I'm on an island somewhere, I can't say where'" (243).

PAY

201. With the breaking up of combat teams into their separate units, small orphaned detachments were re-attached to larger units for pay purposes, and semi-monthly pay parades were held as usual (245). Officers and men were quick to see possibilities connected with rates of exchange, and after every pay day the Army Post Office was besieged with applications for money order to Canada, purchased advantageously with US funds (246). By the same token a large part of the Victor, Loan bought by Canadian troops was paid for in cash, the exchange providing a useful discount.

202. Geographically minded officers of Greenlight were quick to discover that longitude 177 deg 30 min EAST passed through Witchcraft Point, and not less quick in appealing for a rebate of all income tax on the grounds of their location in the EASTERN Hemisphere (247). But they were doomed to disappointment (248). While administrative authorities at Pacific Command HQ

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pointed to the bend in the International Date Line that placed Kiska in the Western Hemisphere for purposes of Time, an NDHQ ruling through the PMG pointed out that

"the United States say the island is in the Western Hemisphere. There is no overriding authority to argue that it is not, therefore Kiska must of necessity be where its owners say it is - in the Western Hemisphere" (249).

Canadian officers on Kiska continued to pay income tax at one-half the Canadian rate, but the feeling remained that it was inequitable for personnel who had faced expected enemy opposition in so far-removed a theatre of war to receive less consideration than officers and men serving overseas in England (250).

HONORS AND AWARDS

203. The authority of US Commanding Generals to award decorations and confer promotions on the battlefield was not extended to the Canadian Commander of Greenlight (26). A ruling from NDHQ did however provide that "immediate awards made by the American Commander in consultation with the senior Canadian commander in the field, not below the rank of brigadier, shall be deemed to have been made with the concurrence of the Canadian Government" (251). While this emergency authority was not used, at the request of the Commanding General of the US Force the names of two Canadians, Lieut S Vessey, RM Rang and Fus DY Mills, Cdn Fus, were submitted for the award of the Order of the Purple Heart (158)(159).

204. At the conclusion of the operation in August, the Canadian Brigade Commander recommended for recognition in the New Year's Honours List some 25 officers and 20 other ranks "for their untiring devotion to duty under prolonged and exacting circumstances" (252). One officer (Lieut. John Corner RM Rang) and three other ranks were cited for specific acts of a courageous nature, performed in the operation and during the movement from Canada (253), a list that was later added to when on 28 Aug the presence of mind of a RM Rang private soldier in dealing with an exploding grenade saved three other ranks from serious injury or possible death (254).

205. US recognition of the service of the Greenlight Force in the defence of Alaska and the Aleutians, with special emphasis upon the part personally played by the GOC-in-C, Pacific Command, was fittingly shown, on 6 Nov 43, when Gen Pearkes was decorated by Gen Buckner, acting at the direction of President Roosevelt, with the Legion of Merit, for "exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service" (255). In making the presentation Gen Buckner voiced an opinion that is echoed wherever Canadians and Americans have served together: "A better acquaintance with the Canadians is one of the good results of this war". (256).

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ACCOUNTING FOR GREENLIGHT

The Original Arrangements - The Need for Revision -
Losses of Stores

THE ORIGINAL ARRANGEMENTS

206. Original plans for accounting for American supplies and stores issued to Greenlight had provided for settlement being made in three ways (257).

(1) US equipment and stores furnished the force in Canada and forming the combat and maintenance loads on the transport ships would be paid for by the Canadian Government on the basis of shipping tickets as delivered.

(2) Automatic supply of subsistence and fuel would be settled for on a per capita basis.

(3) Additional maintenance equipment and stores drawn on requisition by 13 Cdn Inf Bde Coy in the Aleutian area would be accounted for by supporting priced shipping tickets covering the US tally out charges (258).

207. The ultimate settlement for items (2) and (3) of the foregoing presented no serious problem other than the enormous amount of bookkeeping necessarily involved. Accurate strength returns provided the means of making use of a capitation basis. At a meeting held at Vancouver Barracks on 11 Oct 43, attended by administrative representatives of Pacific Command, the RCAF and US Army, daily rates in US currency were recommended as follows, (259)

For Class I Stores - Rations, 64.5 cents per capita per day.
For Class III Stores - Fuel (Including liquid and solid heating fuels, lubricants, gasoline, oil), 28.5 cents per capita per day.

While it was agreed that there would be a simplification of accounting were it possible to establish an overall capitation rate covering all classes of stores and supplies, the difficulties and complications in the way of determining such a rate on a sound basis appeared too formidable. It was considered that all such stores should be paid for at the actual costs shown on shipping tickets (259a)

THE NEED FOR REVISION

208. Settlement for the stores referred to in item 1 above, presented a more difficult problem. The 30- and 60-day maintenance supplies for the Canadian troops that had been charged to the account of the Canadian Government (the bill at the end of September was over one and a half million dollars) (260) and carried in the combat ships and on the freighter "BURKE", were not dealt with kindly by the US Navy in Bamboo Bay and Kiska Harbour. "Naval authorities insisted in piling thousands of tons of supplies on the shore, in whatever fashion they had managed to lift them from holds of the ships, regardless of loading plan or ownership" (261). There was inevitable loss from breakage, weather, tide, and pilfering (262).

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209. Salvaging of the mountains of stores on the narrow beach of Kiska Harbour became a US responsibility, and an agreement was reached between the DDOS, Pac Comd, and US Army officers representing Alaskan Defence Command, to recommend to WDC the cancellation of all US charges against the Canadian Government for all such 30- and 60-day maintenance supplies. Instead the assessment against the Dominion for maintenance subsequent to Greenlight's embarkation would consist of the daily capititation rate for subsistence and fuel, and the cost of stores or services actually delivered to the Force (262). It became the task of the Administrative Staff, Pacific Command, to sort out and tabulate the complete charges against the Dominion Government, having regard to (a) US stores delivered to the Greenlight Force prior to embarkation; (b) stores returned to Seattle unused; (c) stores taken by 13 Cdn Inf Bde to Adak and Kiska but subsequently returned to the Force pool at Kiska (263). Final figures were still lacking nearly a year after the brigades return to Canada.

LOSSES OF STORES

210. The loss of a certain amount of stores and equipment on charge to units and individuals was to a large extent unavoidable. Brigade Daily Orders during September carried inquiries regarding missing boxes marked with unit serial numbers (264), and numerous courts of inquiry were held to investigate the loss of personal equipment and the contents of rucksacks and "B-bags" (265). Reports of pilfering were common but hard to substantiate (266). While personnel of the US Navy and the SSF were prominently mentioned in this regard, war diaries contain allegations suggesting that the Canadians were not altogether blameless (266). Perhaps the matter can be summed up in the suggestion of the Brigade Commander, that troops coming upon broken boxes of stores decided to do their own salvaging from the possible damage of tide and weather (267).

XX

THE VALUE OF GREENLIGHT

The training value - Lessons learned from Greenlight -
Organization - Equipment and Supply - Landing Operations -
The Employment of NRMA Personnel - Japanese not Invincible

THE TRAINING VALUE

211. The Japanese Operation Order for the evacuation of Kiska was issued on 8 Jul 43 (268). Greenlight Force, after a month of mobilization, sailed from Canada on 12 Jul 43. To what extent the preparations for the Canadian move influenced the plans of the enemy will not be known until a post-war study of Japanese intelligence files may become possible. But even though the Canadian force was frustrated in its hopes of actual contact with the enemy, and although the 11th Air Force claimed that it was US air power that caused the Japanese to leave Kiska (269), the military value of Greenlight must not be underestimated.

212. American and Canadian officers agree that the training value of the Kiska operation was excellent (270). Nowhere in Canada could such exacting conditions of terrain and weather

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have been simulated, and throughout the whole procedure up to the final occupation of the island the factor of realism, ever present, placed the training in the category of operations. There were various mistakes, particularly in the exercises held at Adak and Great Sitkin (271), but units and formations were quick to profit by the lessons that their errors taught them (272), and weaknesses that showed up in the final operation will presumably receive corrective attention in future training plans (273). The Pacific Command had been occupying a role of static defense for three and a half years, and the rapid organization and training of the Greenlight Force revealed the existence among operational units of many conditions that required remedial action (274).

LESSONS LEARNED FROM GREENLIGHT

213. In many respects Greenlight was an experiment, - not an experiment the uncertain outcome of which might be either success or failure (to US and Canadian planners there could only be one result), but an experiment to prove how efficiently Canadian troops could participate with US forces in an amphibious operation American transported and American supplied. Many lessons with regard to organization, administration and supply have been learned. Detailed reports making recommendations for the future have been submitted by Greenlight units (275), by the Brigade Comdr 13 Cdn Inf Bde (276) and by heads of services at HQ Pacific Command (277). These reports are receiving careful attention at NDHQ and at CMHQ (278).

ORGANIZATION

214. In the organization of the Canadian Brigade Tactical Group it was suggested (276) that an adequate HQ staff be established to make calls on unit regimental officers unnecessary. In the same way an increased establishment for BLG HQ staffs was recommended. While the composition of FCTs required no change, there appeared to be a definite case for enlarging the BCTs. Particular stress was laid upon the need for additional engineer personnel (279), increased RCASC (280) and ordnance stores detachments (59), and the provision of more RCAMC personnel as stretcher bearers (281). These are establishment problems that require careful consideration by future planners.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

215. Much has been written in various reports about the comparative merits of US and Canadian pattern equipment and stores, with a view to making selections in future joint operations. To the DDOS Pacific Command there is only one question, - how can maintenance be secured? The logistical problems facing the Americans along the Aleutian Chain were gigantic, and they have been solved on a gigantic scale. Under US policy six months' bulk supply of all stores is maintained in huge dumps in every operational area, and a small army of Quartermaster Corps personnel is required to handle these ample reserves. Unless it is intended in future activities with US forces to establish all-Canadian supply lines with the provision of the necessary dispersal areas, storage houses, shipping facilities and manpower, it would appear that "while the original issue might be to a large extent Canadian, any future plans must contemplate almost complete replacement and all maintenance services beyond the first echelon being contributed from US sources" (277 ii).

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216. With the foregoing recommendation in mind it becomes a matter of satisfaction that the majority of US clothing, equipment and stores issued to the Canadians was reported on favourably by Greenlight personnel (277 iv). Preference was generally expressed however for Canadian pattern web equipment (282), Canadian pattern knives, forks and spoons (283), and Canadian battle dress (284). Such items of Canadian provision being used for the first time as the rubber shoe pack and the Yukon packboard were found highly satisfactory, and the newly adopted US pattern steel helmet with liner was "unanimously considered superior to the old British pattern both from the point of view of comfort and serviceability" (277 iv).

217. The question of how much clothing and equipment should be issued to the man and how much should remain in unit stores until needed came to the fore in the operation. Experience from Attu, where US troops had suffered acutely from exposure on snow covered hills, led to the decision to issue all ranks with an adequate supply of winter clothing. This not only added to the physical burdening of the man with heavy loaded rucksack and barrack bag, it added to his financial responsibility, - a responsibility that was difficult to safeguard when he was separated for days at a time, from the expensive equipment and clothing in his charge. It was the recommendation of the Greenlight commander that as much as possible of this heavy clothing should remain in unit or ordnance stores until climatic conditions warranted its issue (276).

LANDING OPERATIONS

218. Lessons learnt from the landing operations with regard to the need for correct combat loading, and the problem of offloading schedules have already been emphasized (285), and recommendations regarding communications (286) and medical services (287) were dealt with in their appropriate sections above. The report of the CEO Pacific Command (277 i) dealt with the adequacy of the engineer equipment on the beaches, and suggested the elimination of the D-4 type of bulldozer as being too light for operations of this kind. The steep banks above Green Beach were too much of an obstacle for tractors, and the provision of a heavy winch per combat team for moving freight and guns up the first sharp rise was recommended for future use, where similar topographical features are likely to be encountered. For early road building it was suggested that a number of 2½-ton dump trucks should accompany the landing party ashore. The snow jeep (cargo carrier light, T-15) proved its usefulness for the transportation of light loads over terrain that heavier tractors could not negotiate, and in the first week, before a road had been cut through from the beach, the demand for these vehicles far exceeded the supply. They were not meant for heavy loads, and the rocky surface of the upland ridges soon played havoc with their caterpillar treads and bogey wheels (288).

THE EMPLOYMENT OF NRMA PERSONNEL

219. The use in an active operational role of units largely composed of NRMA personnel conclusively proved two things. To the NRMA troops themselves it showed that they need labour no longer under the unwarranted delusion that they could not be employed beyond Canadian shores. To their comrades and their officers, it proved that these men could do as good a job as the next fellow when circumstances demanded it. There was little talk of "active" and "HD" personnel on Kiska. United action in the face of common difficulties and adversities welded together a group who would now be proud to call themselves soldiers (289).

JAPANESE NOT INVINCIBLE

220. Finally, the occupation of Kiska removed the Japanese threat against the North American continent. It marked too the first occasion on which Japanese had fled in the face of opposition. As Gen Pearkes put it, "The fable that all Japs will fight to the death has been debunked" (290). With the Aleutians freed from the enemy the way was paved for the next move on the road to Tokyo, whenever, it might come, and Greenlight personnel hoped that they would not have long to wait for that move.

XXI

WHERE WERE THE JAPANESE?

Intelligence Evaluation - Japanese Radio Reports - Conclusion

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION

221. The discovery on 16 Aug that Kiska was entirely free from Japanese occupation raised the question as to the time and manner of their evacuation. If we except the explanations given by radio Tokyo probably the most accurate estimate produced so far is the evaluation made by the G-2, Adv CP, Alaska Department, following a careful analysis of all available information (291).

222. His report indicates that the main body of the enemy forces evacuated the island on 28 July (29 Jul, Japan time). This force, amounting to approximately 7800 men, left either by barges that took them to waiting ships of the Fifth Fleet, or by submarines. Their destination, referred to in operation orders as "X", is assumed to have been Paramushiru. It appears possible that a small garrison of fifty or sixty men remained on Kiska to give some semblance of continued action in order to cover the withdrawal of the main body. This residue was apparently removed during the second week in August, - probably by submarine.

223. While the final withdrawal of the main body was evidently completed at great speed (many indications in the abandoned camp pointing to a hasty departure), a captured document shows that a definite plan for an organized evacuation was made known to all the garrison as early as 8 Jul. Aerial photographs taken from 22 Jul on gave evidence of what might be preparations for evacuation. They showed some barracks in the Main Camp area being demolished, the removal of a few guns from North Head positions, and unusual activity of barges far out in Kiska Harbour.

224. On 28 Jul the Japanese radio on Kiska lapsed into a silence never subsequently broken. From then on bombing and reconnaissance missions returning to Amchitka reported only light small arms fire or no anti-aircraft fire at all. Twelve heavy naval bombardments during the first two weeks of August brought no response from enemy positions. While Air Force pilots from time to time reported such signs of continued occupation as freshly-dug trenches, with hillside emplacements manned by visible troops, the later discovery on Kiska of false emplacements where only the top sod had been removed, and rows of dummy figures made of piled rocks, indicated that aerial observers might well have been the victims of skillful Japanese deception (292).

JAPANESE RADIO REPORTS

225. The Tokyo radio, playing up for all it was worth the two weeks' shelling and bombing of a "ghost" island, and the frustrated vigilance of the US Navy, declared the evacuation of Kiska to have been part of the Japanese major strategy. The completion of the inner Empire defences at Paramushiro made it no longer necessary for the outpost defences in the Aleutians to be maintained. Hence the withdrawal. A Japanese reporter speaks of the Dunkerque-like providential protection of the weather that enabled the evacuation to be successfully completed. A thick curtain of fog shielded the relieving ships from American naval observation; the fog miraculously lifted to allow them to enter the Harbour; in a few hours embarkation was completed; and as the transports moved out the protecting weather closed in again to guard them from American interception (293).

CONCLUSION

226. The whole truth of how, when and why the Japanese left Kiska will not be known to the United Nations until after the War, Nor, as events turned out, are the answers to these questions of particular importance to us. The thing that tremendously matters is that they did leave Kiska, and by their withdrawal not only saved the Canadian and American components of ATF 9 an expensive casualty list (294), but reversed the whole situation in the North Pacific area. A year ago Japan threatened our northern flank; now we threaten hers (295).

(Note: The narrative thus far was completed 11 Dec 43)

XXII

THE RETURN TO CANADA

(This Section added 16 Oct 44).

Planning the Movement - The Evacuation - Special Leave.

PLANNING THE MOVEMENT

227. On a visit of inspection early in November 1943, the GOC-in-C, Maj-Gen GR Pearkes, brought to the 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp preliminary plans for the withdrawal of the Canadians from Kiska. The welcome announcement revealed that 10 per cent of each unit would leave the island as an advance party before the end of the month, and that five subsequent sailings would complete the Canadian evacuation (296). The removal of the Greenlight force would be progressive, and it was expected that the major part of the brigade group would be back in Canada by the middle of January. As on the outward move to Kiska, transportation would be carried out in United States transports.

228. The advance party, 500 strong (297), sailed on the USSS "COLUMBIA", a comparatively small coastal passenger steamer temporarily converted to a troop transport. Leaving Kiska on 21 Nov the "COLUMBIA" reached Vancouver on 2 Dec, after a rough passage through the Alaskan Gulf. The party proceeded to Vernon, BC to prepare for the return of the main body to Canada.

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229. The planning of the schedule of sailings and the allocation of troops and equipment to the various transports was carried out by the Administrative Staff of HQ Pacific Command, in close liaison with the United States authorities. Administrative instructions for embarkation procedure were issued by HQ 13 Inf Bde (298). Contrary to the procedure followed in the outward voyage, when troops travelled grouped as Combat Teams, on the return journey units and sub-units were assigned intact to their respective boats. The bulk of the ammunition was carried in a freighter that bore no troops.

THE EVACUATION

230. Movement of the main party began on Christmas Eve, with the sailing of the USAT "DAVID W BRANCH", and the "COLUMBIA" on her second trip. In the familiar cabins and holds of the "BRANCH" were Bde HQ (less rear party), 13 Def Pl, Wpg Gren, "C" Coy St John Fus (MG), and the 19 Fd Security Sec, a total of 1153 Canadian troops (299). The smaller "COLUMBIA" could carry only 490 of the Canadian Fusiliers, and "A" Company with part of two other platoons had to wait for a later boat. Christmas Day and New Year's Day were spent at sea, and if the disturbing effects of rough water prevented a full attendance at the Christmas dinner, there was consolation in the thought that each turn of the propeller brought the ship a little closer home. After brief stops at Adak, Dutch Harbour, and Port Angeles, Wash, the "BRANCH" reached Victoria on 3 Jan. On disembarkation the Wpg Gren and St. John Fus went to Gordon Head Camp, and the 46 L A A Bty moved to Colwood Camp (300). The "COLUMBIA" having parted company with the bigger ship at Adak, came by way of Ketchikan and the Inner Passage to Vancouver, where the Canadian Fusiliers disembarked for Vernon on 4 Jan.

231. In the meantime the remaining units of the Canadian garrison experiencing some of the heaviest snowfalls of the winter (301), were preparing for the final move from the island. On the last day of 1943 the 24 Fd Regt RCA followed their guns and trailers aboard the USAT "WILLIAM L THOMPSON", and at anchor in Kiska Harbour saw the New Year in. Sailing on New Year's Day the "THOMPSON" made comparatively slow time on the eastward voyage, and it was 16 Jan when the artillery regiment disembarked at Vancouver, and immediately entrained for Vernon. Its landing in Canada was followed two days later by the arrival of the USSS "GEORGE FLAVELLE" carrying Le Regt de Hull, 24 Fd Coy RCE, and the balance of the Cdn Fus.

232. The last Canadian units to leave Kiska were the R M Rang, 24 Fd Amb, 13 Inf Bde Sigs, 13 Inf Bde Rear Party, and the CDC, RCASC, RCOO, C Pro C, CPC, and the RCAPC detachments. Their boat was the USAT "CHIRIKOFF", the same transport that had carried the 15 Combat Teams to Kiska. Accompanying the CHIRIKOFF was the US freighter "MEEK". The two boats tied up on opposite sides of the Canadian-built pier, and for six days fatigue parties worked on a 24-hour basis loading 3500 tons of Canadian ammunition aboard the "MEEK" (302). On 12 January, exactly six months after the departure from Vancouver Island, the last of the Greenlight Force sailed out of Kiska Harbour. Their arrival in Vancouver thirteen days later made possible the lifting of the security silence that had been imposed, and the announcement to the public that all Canadian troops had been safely evacuated from Kiska.

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SPECIAL LEAVE

233. As rapidly as they could be cleared through Vernon or Gordon Head all ranks proceeded on debarkation leave. As a special force returning from a theatre of war officers and men received thirty days' leave inclusive of travelling time, and transportation at public expense (303). For the next month the history of the Greenlight Force was made in cities and towns, villages and farm-homes, across the breadth of the Dominion. The blue circular patch with the silver bowie-knife became a familiar badge of identification to large numbers of the Canadian public. By late February all leaves were completed. The Wpg Gren at Gordon Head, the 46 L A A Bty at Colwood, the St John Fus at New Westminster, and the rest of the 13 Inf Bde Gp at Vernon, were once again entering upon the routine of training, in preparation for whatever role the future might bring.

THE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE KISKA OPERATIONS

REFERENCES

1. Topographical material on Kiska taken from The Enemy on Kiska, a 102 page intelligence summary compiled by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Advance Command Post, HQ Alaska Defence Command, and Advance Intelligence Centre, North Pacific Area.
2. The Enemy on Kiska p 1.
3. The Enemy on Kiska p 83.
4. PCO 2616 d/20 Apr 43. Pearkes to CGS.
5. CAW 305 d/10 May 43. Pope to Stuart.
6. CGS 464 d/11 May 43. Stuart to Pearkes.
7. CGS 475 d/12 May 43. Stuart to Pope.
8. CAW 335 d/24 May 43. Pope to Stuart.
9. PCS 504-1-10-1 GO d/25 May 43.
10. PCO 2020 d/25 May 43. Pearkes to Stuart.
11. File HQ MS 9055-1 Vol 1.
12. See "Mobilization", para 29 below.
13. CGS 619 d/3 Jun 43. Pearkes from Murchie.
14. CAW 357 d/29 May 43. Stuart from Pope. Text of message, Stimson to Ralston.
15. CGS 632 d/3 Jun 43. Pope from Murchie. Text of letter, Ralston to Stimson.
16. See Appendix 1 and 2.
17. Training Instruction "Greenlight", Directive No 2, PCS 502-1-10-2 (GS) d/14 Jun 43.
18. PCS 502-1-10-2 d/5 Jun 43 HQS 20-3-12-11. See appendix 3.
19. Military Members Discussion 7 Jun 43. HQ MS 9055 Vol 1
20. See Appendix 4.
21. See Appendix 5.
22. "Report on Kiska Operation" - 13 Cdn Inf Bde - HQ MS 9055-1 Vol 3 d/22 Sep 43.
23. See Appendix 6.
24. 14 CT with one more OR in its medical and one more in its dental detachments had a total establishment of 1438 all ranks.
25. GS 1311 d/6 Jun 43. Canmilitary to Defensor.
26. HQS 5618 FD 76 d/18 Jun 43.
27. PCS 504-1-10-2-1, GS d/28 Jun 43.
28. See Appendix 7.
29. "General Staff Report on Greenlight Force. Period from Inception to Despatch to Adak." PCS 504-1-10-2 GS.
30. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/23 Jun 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.
31. See Appendix 8.
32. See Appendix 9.
33. Staff Table - Greenlight. Scales of ammunition and distribution of Ammunition. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/29 Jun 43.
34. See Appendix 10.
35. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 18 Jun 43.
36. Military Members Discussion 7 Jun 43, HQMS 9055 Vol 1.
37. War Diary, 1 Bn R de Hull 20-22 Jun 43.
38. These second lieutenants were all promoted to rank of full lieutenant. Greenlight Conference 8 Jun 43. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC).
39. "Administrative Staff Report on Greenlight Force." PCS 609-25-1-34.

40. Report of discussions between GOC-in-C and Gen DeWitt at HQ WDC 11 Jun 43. Pearkes to Stuart. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/15 Jun 43.
41. PCO 6012 d/15 Jun 43. Pearkes to CGS.
42. War Diary, 28 AA Regt RCA, 1 Jul 43.
43. See Appendix 11. Note by Narrator.
44. See Appendix 12. Note by Narrator.
45. See Appendix 13. Note by Narrator.
46. HQ Pac Comd Macklin to OC 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 609-25-1-34 (6) d/29 Jun 43. See Also Appendix 14. Note by Narrator.
47. See below. Medical Services Sec XVII.
48. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 31 Aug 43.
49. PCO 6049 d/7 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. The original arrangement was that the Canadian Press and British United Press should each send an English language war-correspondent, and that the Canadian Press would also send a French Canadian correspondent to represent French member newspapers. To this arrangement BUP objected, nor could the D-in-C, Public Relations, come to an agreement with the two associations in the matter of sharing a French speaking correspondent. It was finally decided that only the two press representatives should proceed to the Aleutians, and that Capt Jean Marchand, PRO MD 4, would replace the third correspondent, and would act as French Liaison Officer, providing both CP and BUP with French Canadian material. - Memo D-in-C Public Relations to DM (C) Army d/23 Jul 43, and GS 821, Pearkes from Murchie, d/23 Jul 43, - both on HQMS 9055-1 FD 2.
50. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/26 Jun 43.
51. "Priorities for Off-loading Combat Ships in Training Phase II". Appx "A" and "B" to PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/25 Jun 43.
52. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC) d/18 Jun 43. Minutes of Greenlight Conference No 6.
53. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS). "General Staff Report on Greenlight Force." Para 36.
54. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8,9 Jul 43.
55. See Appendix 15. The number of men requested, 720, was later reduced to 400 as Greenlight provided its own working parties in the ships' holds. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/1 Jul 43. Appx 4 to War Diary, Greenlight GS Pac Comd Jul 43.
56. But later reports from Green Beach regarding the order in which stores came ashore suggest that the combat loading of the ships was not correctly done in all cases. In interviews at Kiska the following statements were made to the Narrator. "There was no breakdown of high and low priority ordnance, engineer and medical equipment in Seattle, when the lower nine tenths of the "SACAJAWEA's" holds were stowed - Maj RE Bricker, A/OC 1 Bn Cdn Fus. "The following sequence was observed in the unloading of equipment on Green Beach:- Ammunition - weapons - ammunition - rations (very little) - petrol and oil (large quantities) - ammunition - wood - coal - water (very little) - etc. The transport ships apparently were not combat loaded." Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull. See also Brig Foster's "Report on Kiska Operations" Sec V, Transportation (HQMS 9055-1 Vol 3 d/22 Sep 43).

57. See 51.
58. To allow more training time at Adak, the embarkation date was advanced five days by Gen DeWitt. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/11 Jun 43. Appx 11 to War Diary, Greenlight GS Pac Comd Jun 43.
59. Verbal report to Narrator at Kiska by Capt E Meads, OC 30 Ord Store Coy.
60. See Appendix 16.
61. See Appendix 17.
62. See Appendix 18. The Embarkation List by Units, however, supplied by 2 Echelon, (PC Ech 3-0 d/14 Jul 43) shows a total of 257 officers and 4574 men, or 4831 Canadians embarked as follows: "BRANCH" 79 and 886, "SACAJAVEA" 45 and 937, "CHIRIKOFF" 58 and 1325, and "PERIDA" 75 and 1526.
63. See Appendix 19.
64. See Appendix 20.
65. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC). GOC-in-C's Conference, 8 Jun 43 para 2.
66. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Appx 5, 16 Jun 43.
67. See Appendix 21.
68. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Jul 43.
69. See Appendix 22.
70. PCS 609-25-1-34 (37), d/24 Jul 43. Allan to Letson, enclosing nominal roll of absentees, also PCS 609-25-1-34 (30), d/5 Aug 43.
71. See Appendix 23.
72. It is difficult to footnote rumours as they seldom appear in written form. The Narrator met them in Nanaimo, in Vancouver, in Halifax and in Ottawa. An example of some of the wildest charges appears in a letter d/24 Jul 43 from a Mrs AJ Nightingale, Chemainus BC, to the Prime Minister.
73. Maintenance of Greenlight Force. PCMS 609-25-1-34 (19) d/8 Jul 43. See Appendix 23a.
74. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/14 Jun 43. See War Diary "Greenlight" GS Pac Comd Appx 10, Jun 43.
75. Ibid.
76. "Maintenance of Greenlight Force". PCMS 609-25-1-34 (19) d/8 Jul 43, Sec 6.
77. Ibid. Sec 5.
78. Ibid. Sec 5(f).
79. See below. Accounting for Greenlight.
80. Report of Maj RJ Bolton, LO, d/20 Jul 43. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jul 43. Appx 21.
81. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/23 Jun 43. Operational Plan, sec 8. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.
82. PCO 6060 d/8 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes.
83. Most Secret Memo CNS to CGS d/12 Jul 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 2.
84. PCO 6062 d/11 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. 9055-1 Vol 2
85. PCO 6060 d/8 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. 9055-1 Vol 2.
86. Interview with Capt WP Dey, Ship's Adjutant, "DAVID BRANCH", Capt PW Faulkner, Wpg Gren, and Capt JA Milton RM Rang, TQM s respectively of "CHIRIKOFF" and "DAVID BRANCH" - Kiska, 2 Nov 43.
87. Certificate re life saving and buoyancy equipment on combat ships, Maj GR Hansen, US Transportation Corps, OIC Maintenance and Repair Division, SPOE, d/28 Jun 43. Appx "A" to "Greenlight" Liaison Report No 15, d/29 Jun 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.

88. "Boat Drill Instructions for Canadian Troops" -
War Diary, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jun 43, Appx VIII.
89. Interview with Maj RE Bricker A/OC Cdn Fus - Kiska,
3 Nov 43. See also War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus 9 Aug 43.
90. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Jul 43.
91. See War Diaries for July of all Greenlight units for
descriptions of routine on board ship.
92. Appx A to "Ships' Standing Orders for Canadian troops",
by Brig HW Foster, d/11 Jul 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn
Inf Bde, Jul 43, Appx VIII.
93. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Jul 43.
94. PCO 6040 d/1 Jul 43, Murchie from Pearkes.
95. See Appendix 24.
96. "Lessons Learned from Operations on Attu" - Col LV
Castner, 2 i/c US Forces at Attu, Alaska Defence Command
7 Jun 43. Appendix to War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43.
97. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rangers, 24 Jun 43.
98. Ibid. 22 Jun 43.
99. War Diaries of Units named. Jun 43.
100. "Action on Attu" - Reproduced by G-2 Alaska Defence
Command, 30 Jul 43. Appendix to War Diary R de Hull,
Jul 43.
101. PCO 6038, d/30 Jun 43. Stuart from Pearkes.
102. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 18 Jun 43.
103. Interview with Maj DH Rochester, OC 24 Fd Coy RCE, -
Kiska, 3 Nov 43.
104. Interview with Lt-Col RP Drummond, OC 24 Fd Regt RCA,
Kiska, 5 Nov 43.
105. Interview with Maj JA MacDonald, OC 46 Lt AA Bty RCA -
Kiska, 5 Nov 43.
106. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 25 Jun 43.
107. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) over PC 609-25-1-34 (D2) d/18 Jun 43.
108. Ibid. Also War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Jun 43. In-
terviews with regimental IOs at Kiska, 1-7 Nov 43.
109. Ibid. Also War Diary, R de Hull, 23 Jun 43.
110. PCO 6089, Murchie from Pearkes, d/22 Jul 43.
111. HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp Operation Instruction No 1, d/21
Jul 43. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jul 43, Appx 9.
112. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Jul 43.
113. See Appendix 26.
114. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Jul 43.
115. Ibid. 26, 29 Jul 43.
116. See Appendix 27.
117. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 3 Aug 43.
118. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Aug 43.
119. See Appendix 28.
120. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Aug 43.
121. Ibid. 10 Aug 43. This opinion was also expressed by
Capt SA Hawkins, OC 13 Bde Sig Sec RC Sigs, and Capt
E Meads, OC 30 Ord Store Coy in interviews at Kiska,
3, 6 Nov 43.
122. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 9 Aug 43. For description of
American K and D rations See Appendix 45.
Note "A" and "B" Bags.

Every other rank was issued with a barrack bag (US) before leaving Canada. This was a dunnage bag somewhat larger than the Canadian issue kitbag. On it was stencilled the owners Regtl No and Name, and the serial number of his unit, all in letters one inch high. The letter "B" was stencilled at least 3 inches high. The soldier packed his personal clothing partly in the ruck sack and partly in his "B" bag.

At Adak those soldiers who were issued with pack-boards in place of rucksacks, were also issued with a second barrack bag, lettered "A", in lieu of his ruck-sack.

-PCS 609-25-1-34(20) d/29 Jun 43,

123. See Appendix 28.
124. PCO 6102, d/9 Aug 43, Stuart from Bostock.
125. Report by PRO Pac Comd, Maj G Siverus, 18 Oct 43.
126. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Aug 43.
127. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 11 Aug 43.
128. "Day by day maps were scanned by officers and men alike to become as familiar with the ground as they could. It was gratifying to hear some of the men in the ranks after we had landed say, That hill on your left is Riot Hill, we are on Rex Hill, and that one over there, is Rooster Hill, and that's where the 15 CT are supposed to be. The Americans are on our left. I think it's one of the 87th. That was the spirit with which we landed." War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, summary, Aug 43.
129. PCO 7001, d/11 Aug 43, CGS from Murchie.
130. PCO 7009, d/12 Aug 43, Stuart from Pearkes (deciphered 1245 hrs, 13 Aug).
131. GS 863, d/12 Aug 43, CGS to Pac Comd.
132. PCO 6110, d/12 Aug 43, Pearkes from Bostock.
133. See Appendix 29.
134. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 14 Aug 43.
135. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 15 Aug 43.
136. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 15 Aug 43.
137. See Appendix 30.
138. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43, Appx II.
139. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43.
140. Ibid, Sec 3a, Sec 3(1).
141. Ibid, Sec 3 s(4).
142. Ibid, Sec 3 b to g.
143. Ibid, Sec 3 j to o. See map at end of text.
144. See Appendix 31.
145. Operations Map and Intelligence overprint attached as appendix to War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43.
146. Field Order No 5, First Special Service Force, Amchitka, d/8 Aug 43, War Diary Special Service Regt, Sep 43 Appx "D".
147. See Appendix 32.
148. 14 Combat Team Operation Order No 2, d/10 Aug 43, War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, Aug 43, Appx "C". 15 Cdn Combat Team Operation Order No 1, War Diary 1 Bn Wpg Gren, Aug 43, Appx 5. 13-16 BLG Operation Order, d/12 Aug 43, War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 19.
149. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Aug 43.
150. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 16 Aug 43.
151. See Appendix 33 for Battle Log, Advanced HQ Pac Comd, Adak, and Appendix 34 for Battle Log, HQ 13 Cdn Tactical Group.
152. See Appendix 35, Note by Narrator. See also War Diaries of the infantry battalions of the Combat Teams.
153. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 16 Aug 43.
154. See Appendix 34. Report lines marked A,B,C,D on map at end of text.
155. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 16 Aug 43.
156. For diagram of camouflaged enemy position encountered by 15 CT see War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, Aug 43, Appx 4.
157. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 17 Aug 43.
158. See Appendix 36.
159. See Appendix 37.
160. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 17 Aug 43.
161. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 20 Aug 43.
162. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Aug 43.
163. For location of unit sites in Canadian Army Area see map.

164. See Appendix 38.
165. War Diary, Le Regt de Hull, 16 Aug 43.
166. Figures supplied to Narrator by Lt-Col Menard, Kiska, 6 Nov 43. See also "Report on Kiska Operation", No 99 Det RCASC - Capt ME McCormick, OC.
167. War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43. Appendix Jacket No 2, See also War Diary entry for 5 Sep 43.
168. "The 3rd Regt (SSF) found the sand beach shown on the map between Bamboo Bay and West Kiska Lake didn't have a grain of sand weighing less than 100 lbs. It was considered nothing less than a miracle the way they got their rubber boats and equipment across." - War Diary, 1 Cdn Special Service Bn, 23 Aug 43. See also 165 above.
169. From "Report on Kiska Operations", d/16 Aug 43, Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull.
170. See Appendix 31. Adm Instruction for Beach Area, Appx A to 13 TG Admin Instruction No 1, d/9 Aug 43. The CEO Pac Comd later questioned the wisdom of piling engineer stores in the misc dump. - See 277 1 below.
171. Interviews with OsC, No 99 Det RCASC and No 30 Ord Store Coy RCOC, Kiska, 3 Nov 43.
172. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 22 Aug 43.
173. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 16 Aug 43.
174. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 17 Aug 43.
175. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 17 Aug 43.
176. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 31 Aug 43 and 4 Sep 43.
177. Interview with Brig Foster, Vancouver, 18 Oct 43. See also War Diary, R de Hull, 18 Aug 43. For a parallel situation in the Southern Sector see Report by Col Rickard, Commander TG 87, on file G-2 Office, Alaskan Defence Command.
178. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 19 Aug 43.
179. War Diary, R de Hull, 30 Aug 43.
180. War Diary, R de Hull, 5 Sep 43 and 9 Sep 43.
181. Ibid, 12 Sep 43.
182. Signal Annex. Annex No 5 to Field Order No 1 Landing Force 16.8, d/1 Aug 43. In War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43, Appx 2.
183. See Appendix 39.
184. "Communications Report, Kiska Operation" - Capt SA Hawkins, OC, 13 Cdn Inf Bde Sigs Sec.
185. See "Signals Appreciation, Amphibious Operations", - Chief Signal Officer, Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.
186. "Appreciation of Signal Equipment as Employed by Amphibious Force - North Pacific" - Chief Signal Officer, Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.
187. Col Rickard's Report (see 177) points out the difficulty of maintaining communications with the light cable. "No matter which side of a ridge the wire was laid, shifting wind would blow it into space, or saw it against sharp rock edge."
188. PCS 504-1-10-2 (Sigs) 1/20, d/3 Jul 43. War Diary Greenlight GS, Jul 43, Appx 24.
189. Interview with Col AR St Louis, CSO Pac Comd, 15 Oct 43. He is referring to OC 14 Combat Team.
190. Signal Operation Instructions ATF 9. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 20.
191. See Appendix 40.
192. See Appendix 41.
193. Report on Kiska Operation, d/3 Sep 43, - Lt Col DB Holman, OC 16 CT. "16 BLG was the third group ashore, and as no wires had yet been laid forward it was necessary to revert to the original set-up, laying wire from the Beach. This line, as well as lines to our coys were maintained throughout with practically continuous L/T communications.

193. We were the right flanking unit but at no time was lateral communication established to us. It was only late on the second day that the brigade line reached us. Our beach line was in constant use by all units of the Tactical Group, indicating that either no other line had been laid to the Beach, or that it was not kept in operation."
194. "Organization of Medical Services - 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Greenlight Force - War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43, Appx 2.
195. See Appendix 41.
196. A report from Maj JH McIntosh, Greenlight LO to WDC showed casualties sustained at Attu to total 30 per cent of personnel engaged. - SF/5-2 d/14 Jun 43.
197. See Appendix 43. Note by Narrator.
198. Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation - Lt-Col TM Brown, OC 25 Fd Amb, RCAMC.
199. Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation - Lt-Col TM Brown, OC 25 Fd Amb RCAMC.
200. Interview with Maj D Smalls, A/OC 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, Kiska, 2 Nov 43.
201. See Appendix 44.
202. War Diary, "C" Coy St John Fus (MG), Aug 43, Appx 1.
203. 1 Bn Wpg Gren. The gale referred to reached its peak at noon on 6 Nov 43. The Narrator was present.
204. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 9 Sep 43.
205. For description of the various types of US rations issued see Appendix 45.
206. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 Sep 43.
207. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 20 Sep 43.
208. Report on Kiska Operations, No 99 Det RCASC, p.3. See also Report on Kiska by DAQMG, Pac Comd, Maj E Housley, d/3 Nov 43.
209. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Aug 43.
210. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 25 Sep 43.
211. 13 Cdn Inf Bde Operation Order No 1, d/2 Sep 43, War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx II.
212. War Diary, "C" Coy 1 Bn St John Fus (MG), 7, 9 Sep 43.
213. Observed on an inspection visit to Green Beach by the Narrator. 4 Nov 43.
214. Brigade Orders, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/27 Sep 43 and various Daily Orders in unit war diaries.
215. War Diary, 46 Lt AA Bty, 21 Sep 43.
216. Brigade Orders, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/28 Sep 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
217. War Diaries for September and October contain frequent allusions to the question of when the Canadians would return to Canada. Continuous rumours were prevalent, and hopes alternately rose and fell. Officers were not immune. For examples see:- War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 12, 23 Sep 43; R de Hull, 12 Sep, 12, 22, 29 Oct 43. For the "Home for Christmas" promise see War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, Sep 43, Summary for September.
218. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 26 Sep 43.
War Diary, 19 Fd Sec Section, 3 Sep 43.
See also Wpg Gren Pt I Order No 35, d/23 Sep 43, Sec .2
"All ranks will sleep with knives hunting by their sides in order to facilitate cutting themselves free of a collapsed tent in case of fire." - War Diary, Sep 43.
The following weather report for Kiska for the month of Oct 43 was furnished by the US Weather Station on the island.

218. Precipitation
(contd)

Rainfall for October 5.81 in.
It rained every day during the month. Snow fell on 3 days.

Wind

Over 30 mph steady on 22 days.
Maximum steady wind 58 mph.
Maximum gusts 80 mph.

Sky

Fair 1 per cent
Broken 34 per cent
Overcast 65 per cent

Fog

On 13 days

Temperature

Maximum 50 deg.
Minimum 29 deg.

(September, October and March are regarded as the three best months of the year.)
See also Appendix 46.

- 219. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43.
- 220. This belief, expressed in the hearing of the Narrator, while at Kiska, was declared unfounded by the Bde S-4, Maj JG Stevens, and OC 99 Det RCASC, Capt ME McCormick.
- 221. War Diary, 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, 7 Sep 43.
- 222. Brigade Order No 29, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/13 Sep 43.
- War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
- War Diary, 14 Dental Clinic CDC, 14 Sep 43.
- 223. War Diary, 14 Dental Clinic CDC, 5 Oct 43.
- 224. "Three meals out of five we encounter a pink, compressed, meatish substance rejoicing in the name of SPAM, its basic origin lost in the mist of bovine genealogical antiquity." - War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep 43.
- 225. 2000 gals of rum obtained from the Royal Canadian Navy accompanied the Greenlight Force, carried on the four transport ships. At Kiska it was stored for a time in a closely guarded Japanese-built tunnel, until the RCASC storage hut was erected. About 45 per cent overproof, the issue of one ounce per man was thoroughly appreciated by all ranks. - War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Sep 43.
- 226. "Report on Kiska", - DACMG, Pac Comd - Maj E Housley, d/3 Nov 43.
- 227. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 26 Sep 43.
- 228. War Diary, R de H, 15 Oct 43. Capt JF Dwy, Camp Commandant, who started a male voice choir and organized weekly Brigade concerts, emphasized the value of retaining unit orchestras and bands in future similar operations. See 226.
- 229. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 30 Sep 43.
- 230. Less comprehensible to the British military mind, but strikingly illustrative of the contrast that the Canadian troops presented to their American allies, was the surprised congratulatory comment of the visiting US General at the completion of an impromptu inspection of the 13th Brigade troops, as he remarked to the Chief of Staff, "And do you know, I believe that every one of your officers and men had shaved this morning!"

231. Interview with Capt GM Chaout, Adj R de Hull, 20 Nov 43.
232. Figures supplied by Maj JF Petrie, Field Cashier, Kiska, 7 Nov 43.
233. 2 Echelon Casualty Return, d/12 Nov 43.
234. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 22 Aug 43.
235. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43, Appx "D" and "E".
236. War Diary, R de Hull, 28 Sep 43.
237. War Diary, R de Hull, 16 Oct 43.
238. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43, 27 Sep 43.
War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 27 Aug 43.
239. War Diary, 11 Postal Det OPC, 31 Aug 43.
240. Ibid, 16 Oct 43.
241. Ibid, 14 Sep 43.
242. The Narrator spent eight days on Amchitka waiting for the mail plane to make the flight to Kiska.
243. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 Sep 43.
244. "C", St John Fus (MG) Coy Orders No 3, d/21 Sep 43 - War Diary, Sep 43, Appx 1.
245. War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 23 Aug 43.
246. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 6 Sep 43.
247. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep 43, See Appendix 47.
248. War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 17 Sep 43.
249. See Appendix 48.
250. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Sep 43.
251. Tele AG 0364 d/23 Jul 43.
252. Pac Comd Adm File Greenlight No 24, "Honors and Awards"- Letter from Brig HW Foster, Kiska, d/20 Aug 43.
253. See Appendix 49.
254. See Appendix 50.
255. Press Release, HQ Alaska Dept, PRO, d/6 Nov 43.
256. For congratulatory message to Canadian Troops from Gen Corlette see Appendix 51.
257. See para 79 above.
258. Report - Visit of DDOS Pac Comd to Alaska and Aleutian Islands, 16 Sep 43, - para 28.
259. For purposes of maintenance US Stores, equipment and supplies are divided into the following five main classifications:
(i) Class 1 - Rations
(ii) Class 2 - Clothing and Equipment
These terms cover all stores as listed below:
Chemical stores
Engineer stores
Medical and Dental stores
Ordnance stores (incl MT)
Quartermaster stores
Signal stores
(iii) Class 3 - Fuel
(iv) Class 4 - Engineer Construction Materials
(v) Class 5 - Ammunition.
259 a. "Capitation Rates Canadian Troops in Alaska"- PGS 609-25-1-34 (28), d/4 Nov 43.
260. A Transfer Directive by the US Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) undated, "Transfers to Dominion of Canada by the Commanding General, WDC, "lists a total dollar value of \$1,523,565.52 (Enclosure to PGS 658-25-1-34 AQ d/28 Sep 43).
261. See Appendix 52.
262. DDOS Report, para 26, 27.
263. PGS 658-25-1-34 AQ d/28 Sep 43.
264. Brigade Orders No 44, 50, 54, 77 d/18, 20, 23, 30 Sep 43.
War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1; Pt I Order No 7, d/6 Sep 43 War Diary 1 Bn RM Rang, Sep 43, Appx 1.

265. Brigade Orders No 20, d/8 Sep 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
266. (i) War Diary, 19 Fd Sec Section, 7 Sep 43.
(ii) War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 16 Sep 43.
(iii) Brigade Order No 9, d/4 Sep 43 - "A number of cases have been reported of "B" Bags, Rucksacks and Unit Stores having been pilfered while lying on beach or unit piles. Officers Commanding units will warn all ranks under their command that any offenders will be severely dealt with." War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
(iv) "Report on Kiska Operation"-
"Breaking in of stores, looting of supplies has been indulged in freely by both Canadian and American forces. It would seem that in future operations steps should be taken to prevent this and that if necessary looters should be shot. The loss in this connection in my opinion has reached enormous proportions". - Lt-Col JA Wilson, OC Wpg Gren. In War Diary, Aug 43, Appx V.
(v) War Diary, R de Hull, 14 Sep 43.
"In this concern it is felt that too much equipment was carried by each man, and consequently the delay in distributing personal belongings to each man was the chief cause of so much pilfering being done on all beaches".
(vi) "Report on Kiska"
16 (b) Poor system of unloading. Apparently on landing the US and Canadian stores were all unloaded and pooled on the one beach (Green Beach). Although MPs were stationed there, they themselves did not know markings of boxes and who should take what equipment. Boxes were broken open and if the contents looked interesting it was taken by the personnel sent to clear the beach." -Maj E Housley, D-OMG Pac Comd - 3 Nov 43.
267. Interview with Brig Foster, Vancouver, 18 Oct 43.
268. "The Enemy on Kiska" p.59.
269. Ibid p 98.
270. "Report on Kiska Operations - Southern Sector" - Col Rickard, OC TG 87.
War Diary, Cdn Fus, 30 Sep 43.
Interview with Canadian and US Army Officers in Aleutians, Oct-Nov 43.
271. See "Observer's Report on Embarkation and Landing Exercise of the 16th Combat Team, 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (Jul 31 - Aug 5, 1943, inclusive)" d/8 Aug 43 - War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 8.
272. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Aug 43.
273. "It is felt that officers and OR's of the 13 TG have got what it takes to be efficient in battle (guts), but unfortunately they were green as far as battle drill and proficiency in use of weapons is concerned. They must be given full opportunities for intensive training before another expedition begins. This training to be supervised by the Bde Comdr but to be entirely at the discretion of each Unit Comdr." - Report on Kiska Operations - 16 Aug 43, Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull.
274. (i) See Appendix 53.
(ii) For a report showing percentage of all soldiers of R de Hull qualified, partly qualified and unqualified prior to leaving for Adak on 12 Jul 43, see Appendix to War Diary, R de Hull, d/27 Sep 43.
275. All major Canadian units on Kiska submitted memoranda reports to HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde. These reports, on file with the Bde S-3, were made available to this Narrator, and were used in compiling the Brigade report of 3 Sep 43.

276. "Report on Kiska Operation" - 13 Cdn Inf Bde. HQMS 9055-1 Vol 3 22 Sep 43.
277. E.g. (i) "Report on Visit to Kiska", 9 Sep 43 - Col WG Swan CEO Pac Comd. PCS file 836-1-1, d/17 Sep 43.
(ii) "Visit of DDOS Pac Comd to Alaska and Aleutian Islands" Col JE Willis, DDOS Pac Comd, d/16 Sep 43.
(iii) "Appreciation of Communications Requirements and Proposed Organization for an Amphibious Force" - Col AR StLouis CSO Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.
(iv) "Special Alaska Equipment" - Letter Brig i/c Adm Pac Comd, 609-25-1-34.(37) d/15 Sep 43.
(v) "DAQMG's Report on Kiska" - Maj E Housley, DAQMG Pac Comd, d/3 Nov 43.
278. E.g. (i) Arrangements being made to send TQM candidates to Fort Orde, HQMS 9055-1 Vol 4, 15 Sep 43.
(ii) Interest shown by the War Office in US items of supply used by Canadians. - SDW 686 Canmilitary to Defensor d/20 Nov 43. HQMS 9055-3 Vol 3.
279. CEO Pac Comd urged the need for an increase of at least 200 sappers in the Field Coy. See 277 (i) above.
280. (i) Report on Kiska operations - Capt ME McCormick, OC No 99 Det RCASC.
(ii) See also 277 (v) above.
281. "Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation, 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, Lt-Col TM Brown, OC.
282. The US battlepack, worn by troops on the final move from Adak, was too small as compared with the British small pack. Many troops did not have access to rucksack or B-bag for over a week after landing.
283. US table cutlery was very light weight and rusted easily.
284. The OC Canadian Fusiliers expressed preference for the American pattern Kersey lined uniforms, and suggested that the desirability of Kersey lined clothing made in battle-dress pattern. Such an issue would of course be subject to the limitations of supply channels.
285. Sec XV above
The problem of co-ordinating US Army and Naval landing plans is one that appears improbable of settlement at any lower level than Washington.
286. Sec XVI above.
287. Sec XVII above.
288. War Diary, 103 LAD RCOC. "Continuous stream of broken Jeeps. Trucks won't stand up on this terrain." - 22 Aug 43. "Transmissions and differentials starting to go on Jeeps. No parts available. Only good use for a Jeep is to dry out clothing." - 23 Aug 43. "Found three more derelict Jeeps, and got some badly needed parts." - 29 Aug 43. "Trying to get as many Jeeps in working order as parts will permit. Robbing one to fix another." - 31 Aug 43. (Note that all of these references are to snowjeeps, T-15s. No "Cars 5-cwt 4x4" were taken to Kiska.)
289. See Appendix 54. Note by Narrator.
290. See Appendix 55.
291. "The Enemy on Kiska" pp 59-74.
292. At the end of October these rows of dummy figures still remained along the ridges, giving a most realistic appearance at a few hundred yards' distance.
293. (i) Radio Tokyo, Japanese Home and Empire Service, 22 Aug 8.00 am EWT, - Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission. (On file at Dept of External Affairs).
(ii) For more recent support of this story see Appendix 55a (added 16 Oct 44).

294. See Appendix 56. Note by Narrator.
295. The Message of congratulation sent to Greenlight by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Canadian people appears as Appendix 57.
296. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/7 Nov 43. For proposed list of sailings and allocations of units and equipment see Appendix 58.
297. See Appendix 59.
298. See Appendix 60.
299. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, d/23 Dec 43.
300. (i) War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, d/3 Jan 44.
(ii) War Diary, 46 LAA Bty, RCA d/3 Jan 44.
301. The mass of snow that fell during the last week of December and the first week of January flattened tents or drove tent poles many feet into the soft ground. Two US soldiers died when a Pacific Hut collapsed under the weight of the snow, and another lost his life in a terrible blizzard that swept the island on Christmas night.
-War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, d/26 Dec 43, and 10 Jan 44.
302. Ibid, d/6 Jan 44.
303. 13 Cdn Inf Bde Order No 18, d/19 Jan 44, and No 27 d/27 Jan 44 - Appx to War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde - Jan 44.

Note on SLEDS

The pallet, or sled, that proved so successful for the movement of stores on the Kiska beaches consisted of a sturdy wooden platform 8 ft by 4 ft mounted on three steel shod runners. It was fitted at each end with a steel towing cable with spliced eye, so that it could be pulled either forward or backward by a tractor. Each sled weighed about 500 lbs., and carried a load of from 1400 lbs to 1800 lbs consisting generally of three units of fire, or five days' supply of petrol and oil, or ten days' rations. These loads were securely bound to the sleds with sincode $1\frac{1}{2}$ " steel strapping, to form a compact piece of freight that was readily stacked in the hold of a transport ship or on the floor of a landing barge.

On debarkation it was only necessary for a tractor to back into the front of the landing craft, hook on to the towing cable, and haul the load (sometimes two sleds in tandem) to the appropriate dump. Here the steel lashings were cut, the load removed, and the pallet returned to the beach for a further cargo. Whether the direction lay over rough beaches, along rocky stream beds, or through the gelatinous inland mud, the sleds moved readily with the minimum of tractive power.

Note on ATHEY TRAILERS

For the ground movement of all loose supplies, barrack bags, tarpaulins, stores of all types, the Athey Trailer proved an invaluable aid. Its substantial steel platform, 14 ft. by 6 ft. with removable 4 ft. sides and ends, was solidly based on a massive undercarriage that rode on two broad caterpillar treads. With a carrying capacity of six tons the trailer was pulled by a D-6 or D-8 tractor. Except for a tendency to capsize when moving along very steep side hills, due to the high centre of gravity when fully loaded, the Athey trailer operated completely successfully over the roughest terrain. In the later stages of the Kiska operation, when the heavy traffic of moving stores and construction material had turned rapidly built roads into channels of souplike mud, the Athey trailers and the caterpillar tractor provided the only reliable means of transportation on the island.

Note on SLEEPING BAGS

The U.S. pattern sleeping bag issued to all ranks consisted of two parts, - an inner and outer bag, each of a quilted broadcloth material filled with down. The inner receptacle was tapered to fit the body and could be closed up to the neck by a zipper fastener which ran down about half the length of the body. The outer component, measuring $6\frac{1}{2}$ ft. by 6 ft. when opened out flat, was closed by a zipper track running across the bottom and up the side. Both bags were fitted with a hood and draw strings to tie about the neck. When rolled compactly the bag was wrapped in a waterproof cover, the whole forming a bundle about 20 inches long and a foot in diameter, and weighing about $11\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.

For sleeping indoors at temperatures above freezing point the inner bag alone proved comfortably warm, whether clothing was worn or not, while the two bags together offered the fullest resistance to the cold. For use in the open, on damp ground or in wet weather, protection was provided by the use of a heavy waterproof poncho, $5\frac{1}{2}$ ft by 7 ft, which was designed to wrap around the outer sleeping bag. Experience showed that some form of lacing was necessary to keep the outer covering securely in position. This poncho also served as a raincape, the wearer thrusting his head through a circular hole protected by a collar like flap.

Note on TRENCH FEET

Medical reports from Attu showed that one of the largest causes of disability in that operation was trench feet. With a view to determining the best preventive measures against this condition, both as regards footwear and prophylaxis, the 25 Field Ambulance RCAMC conducted a test during the Great Sitkin exercise. 300 men from

14 Combat Team were divided into two sections of 150 men each. One section wore the high leather boot continuously during the period of the test, the other training in the rubber shoe-pass. Each of the sections was further divided into three groups. The first received no treatment whatsoever, being used as a control group. The second group was supplied with ratfish oil and instructed as to its use. The men in the third group of each section were given formaldehyde footbaths prior to treatment with the ratfish oil. All the men trained for three days without removing their socks at any time.

Unfortunately the suddenness with which the Force embarked following its return to Adak from the Great Sitkin exercise interfered with the completion of the experiment. From what observations were made it was considered that the use of the ratfish oil was of definite value and its application was more effective when preceded by the formaldehyde treatment.

STRENGTH AT EMBARKATION

PAC COMD JERICHO

PCS 504-1-10-2 GS

COMMANDING PACIFIC

PC06081

12-7-43.

MOST IMMED

MOST SECRET

FOR COL HARRINGTON U.S.L.O.

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL DEWITT FROM GENERAL PEARKES QUOTE GREENLIGHT EMBARKED AND WEIGHED ANCHOR 1015 HRS 12-7-43 TOTAL STRENGTH 261 OFFICERS 4539 OTHER RANKS CANADIANS PLUS 6 US FD HOSPITAL 18 OFFICERS 229 ENLISTED MEN STOP TOTAL 279 OFFICERS 4769 OTHER RANKS GRAND TOTAL 5047 UNQUOTE

MOST SECRET 1 MOST IMMED 1.

Brig
for Maj Gen
GOC-in-C Pac Comd.

Note on the Part Played by US Navy in Ldg Oprs.

Considerable confusion in landing was caused by the failure of the U.S. Navy's landing plan to coincide with the schedules prepared by the Military component parts of the planning. Reports from Bn. Landing Group Commanders showed that their carefully prearranged schemes for tactical landings were badly disrupted when they found themselves at the mercy of Naval parties whose theories regarding debarkation differed materially from the Army viewpoint. The following reports illustrate the difficulties faced by the Combat Team Commanders:

"At K plus 100 five LCVPs came alongside, loaded with 2 pls. of A coy (right fwd coy) and 3 pls of D coy (left fwd coy) and without pausing at any assembly area or RV area, they headed immediately into shore, landing at K plus 170, - 40 mins. ahead of time, Meanwhile two LCI's came alongside, loaded up, one with C coy (right res. coy) and the other with B coy (left res coy). The balance of the fwd coys, were left waiting for boats that did not show up for approx. one hour. No attempt to control landing craft into moves was made. The result was that the first part of the first move landed at K plus 170 (0910hrs) and the rest of the first move at K plus 240. Part of the third move landed at K plus 200, the balance at K plus 240. The second move landed at K plus 210. There was no control over the cox's who were extremely "lippy", not in the picture, and took orders from no one, not even their own officers".

(From p.7 Memorandum Report on Greenlight Trg. 25 Aug 43 - R.E.Bricker Major, 2 i/c 1st Bn. Cdn. Fus). O.C.14 C.T.)

"For the operation on Kiska Island, the Army Plan was laid down including the 13 T.G. Operation. Before sailing for Kiska a Naval Commander came aboard ship, took charge of the operation, and this officer was not aware of or had received instructions contrary to the plan laid down. This officer apparently had received sealed orders from the Naval Commander. These orders were to get the troops to shore as soon as possible without regard to the Army Plan".

(From Report on Greenlight - J.A. Wilson, Lt-Col.
Wpg. Gren, O.C. 15 Combat Team).

"Amphibious Training - The main lesson learned was that no matter what was planned the opposite would happen and the resulting confusion would have caused a disaster of major proportion had there been any opposition.

C.T.'s were instructed to make up boat assignment tables, move diagrams and landing schedules - this was done with great care and thought and depended a great deal on the Commander's plans.

The actual landings both on Great Sitkin and on Kiska Island were carried out with complete disregard for the tactical situation, for the composition of the force being landed and for the congestion on the beaches.

Disembarkation stations had to be changed at the last minute, troops were loaded into boats and then changed to others - landing craft were called to certain stations and reported to different ones, necessitating troops being shifted from one station to another. All this resulted in a great deal of unnecessary confusion, both on ship and subsequently on shore, and was caused by an apparent ignorance on the part of the Navy of the way we had been taught that landings would be made".

(From Report on Kiska Operation - 3 Sep 43) -
D.B. Holman, Lt-Col., Rocky Mountain Rangers,
O.C. 16 Combat Team).

"The signal for sending the guns ashore was sent at 0930 hours. The 75 mm hows. landed at 1800 hours (16 Aug). They were manhandled 300 yds. inland and ready for action with 15 minutes' firing at 1830 hours. The 25 pdrs. left the boat at 2330 hours and after lying off shore all night were landed at 0800 hours on 17 Aug. They were hauled to their position on a plateau 100 ft. above sea level by D-6 Caterpillar Tractors, and were in action with ammunition for sustained fire by 1000 hours".

- (From Report on Kiska Operations-
R.P. Drummond, Lt-Col.,
O.C. 24 Field Regt., R.C.A.)

REPORT OF 13 BDE SIGS OFFR.

"A small signal centre was set up a few hundred yards inland. Without warning however the Brigade moved off and we were given incorrect information as to its objective. It was therefore some little time before communications caught up, and shortly after, again without warning, Brigade pushed on. A few moments later a call (from Gen. Ready, N.Sector) that could be taken by no one but the Brigadier came in, and men who had not eaten since 0400 hours had to race along with a line, which fell a quarter mile short of the ultimate objective for the night. This was later modified, while the rear party, left unprotected, staggered in at 0100 hours 17 August."

.....

"High priority equipment planned for the first five days' operations never reached us, and the situation was only partially relieved by the retiring Naval Gunfire Control Party leaving us its entire signal equipment."

- From Report of 13 Bde Signals
Officer - Sept 1943.

NOTE ON US HOSPITALIZATION

The Greenlight administrative planners found the U.S. authorities extremely reticent about hospital accommodation in Alaska, and loth to divulge any information regarding location or capacity of their hospitals in the Aleutian Chain. Failure to obtain this information created a difficult problem for the 13 Brigade S-1, Second Echelon and the pay services both at Kiska and at Pacific Command HQ and a considerable amount of correspondence flowed over the air in an attempt to trace the movement of Canadian casualties evacuated through US 6 Field Hospital at Kiska.

It was only after two or three Canadians had reached Vancouver after stops of varying lengths in American hospitals that the chain of evacuation became apparent. These casualties had been moved in turn through 179 Station Hospital, Adak; 183 Station Hospital, Ft. Richardson (Anchorage); and the A.W. Barnes General Hospital, Vancouver, Wash; and the assumption was reached that subsequent Canadian personnel requiring hospitalization would be so dealt with.

A visit to 179 Station Hospital at Adak on 8 Nov 43, when the Executive Officer, Maj. T. Shearer was good enough to conduct this narrator through the installation, disclosed the fact that while the present normal accommodation is 350 beds, at the time of the Kiska operation a temporary expansion to care for 1500 casualties was arranged. Patients are generally moved between stations by water transports, but a few ambulance planes are available, and in an emergency the regular Douglas C-47's of the Aleutian troop carrying squadrons may be used, provided a nurse or medical officer accompanies each plane.

The necessary crowding together of the Pacific Huts which house the various wards of the Station Hospital has produced a rather vulnerable air target, but as a partial security measure a large dummy hospital, with red cross emblems prominently displayed, has been erected on the opposite side of Adak Island, as an invitation to Japanese aerial attack.

RATIONS

U.S. rations used by the Canadian troops during the Kiska expedition were of the following types, "D", "K", "C", "5 in 1", "B" and "A". Listed in their order of degree from emergency to normal issue their respective composition is shown below.

"D" Ration

3 bars concentrated sweetened chocolate (600 cal. each).

"K" Ration

Breakfast

4 oz. potted ham and egg
1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits (sweetened)
1 pkg. coffee
3 cubes sugar
1 pkg. "Charm" candies
1 fruit bar

Dinner

4 oz. cheese
1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits
1 pkg. lemonade powder
3 cubes sugar
2 oz. dextrose tablets
1 stick chewing gum
4 cigarettes

Supper

3 $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. pork and veal loaf
10 gm. bouillon powder
1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits
2 oz. "D" Ration chocolate
1 stick chewing gum
4 cigarettes

Each meal packed in flat cardboard box in waterproof paper.

"C" Ration

A day's ration consisted of 3 tins of "B"-unit and 3 tins of "M"-unit. A meal consisted of one tin of each unit. Sterno heaters or heat tabs were issued for use with "C" rations.

"B"-unit

Bread ration (biscuits)
Beverage - cocoa, coffee or lemonade
3 pieces of sugar
candy or chocolate

"M"-unit

Meat and vegetable stew
or
Meat and vegetable hash
or
Meat and vegetable with beans

"5 in 1" Ration

A cardboard carton containing 28 lbs. of prepared "B" ration, issued to feed five men for one day, (not one man for five days). Strictly an emergency ration, all food being packed in cans. This ration was used to a limited extent towards the end of the first week on Kiska as a welcome relief from "C" rations.

"B" Ration

A complete bulk ration consisting solely of dried, dehydrated or canned foods. Menu No. 2 intended for Frigid or Cold areas, contained some 125 articles of diet. The "B" Ration was the standard issue during the stay at Kiska, except when it was supplemented from time to time by the arrival of a ship with "A" rations of fresh meat, vegetables and eggs. The full list of "B" ration items is given in "U.S. Issue Chart based on No. 2 Expeditionary Force Menu showing quantities required of each component for 10,000 rations. Revised 9/28/42."

REPORTS ON ACTS OF COURAGE

para 6(A)(B)(C)(D) of letter
d/20 Aug 43, from HQ 13 Cdn. Inf. Bde.

6. The following specific acts of a courageous nature are outlined in each case:

(a) K 602101 Sgt. Foster, E., R.M. Rangers

Who when his pl comd was fatally injured by a land mine went to his assistance without regard for his personal safety and subsequently led his pl in the face of what was believed to be a strong Jap position.

(b) Lt. John Corner, R.M. Rangers

For coolness and initiative - when his landing craft capsized during the initial landing leaped into the sea heavily laden and assisted men struggling in the water to get free from their equipment, thereby saving any loss of life.

(c) D 615241 Sgt. Lannucilli, J. Regt. de Hull

Who by his prompt action and disregard for his own safety assisted Pte. Benoit to remove a burning gas engine from the hold of the U.S.A.T. David W. Branch, thereby saving the ship from destruction, the hold containing petrol and high explosives.

(d) E 62005 Pte. Benoit, B. Regt. de Hull

who assisted Sgt. Lannucilli and was painfully burned.

(H.W. Foster) Brigadier,
13th Cdn. Inf. Bde.

REPORT ON GRENADE EXPLOSION

Salmon Pass Camp,
3 Sep 43.

Commanding Officer,
1 Bn. Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

REPORT ON GRENADE EXPLSION AT M-168891 28-8-43

On Saturday 28 Aug 43, I was in charge of a small detachment consisting of K-42577 L/Cpl. New, E.R. and K-42569 Pte. Ingham, K.A. We were dismantling Japanese sleeping quarters at a former Japanese Artillery Camp on Morgan Hill (M168991). We were watching carefully for booby traps and pulling up the panels on which the Jap beds are layed when a Jap grenade fell to the ground. This must have been fastened to the underside of the panels in some way next to the wall. The split pin was missing and the grenade made a sharp click on falling to the ground, which was stony. Pte. Ingham was the nearest man to the grenade and with great presence of mind he picked it up and ran about fifteen feet to the door which was partly blocked with debris throwing the grenade outside as far as he could. The grenade exploded before touchi touching the ground. L/Cpl New was about ten feet from where I was working at the time and probably did not see the occurrence as clearly as I did. In my opinion Pte. Ingham's promot action saved the three of us from serious injury or possible death.

(Sgd) D.O. DeWitt, Sgt.
"I" Section,
1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

Salmon Pass Camp
3 Sep 43.

The detachment, as described above, was sent out by me to bring in lumber for the flooring of the Bn. Orderly Room Tent.

(Sgd) H.G. Lunn, R.S.M.(W.O.1)
1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

DDOS REPORT ON STORES

Extract from letter from Headquarters, Pacific Command, Vancouver Barracks, Vancouver, B.C., dated 16 Sept 43 to Brigadier i/c Administration, Pacific Command, re visit of D.D.O.S. Pacific Command to Alaska and Aleutian Islands.

21. Brigadier Foster showed the A.D.O.S.(E) and the D.D.O.S., on a personal tour, the arrangements which were being set up for the units in his Command and their general disposition. He also arranged for their transportation to the beach encampment of Lieut. Colonel Mennard, Officer Commanding the Regiment de Hull, who was entrusted with the removal of the stores landed from the combat ships on Green Beach. At the time of the visit, which occupied a day and a half, a very substantial part of all unit stores and ammunition, including guns and small arms, were still stacked just beyond reach of the tide on this beach where they had been landed originally. While every effort had been made to store these in an organized fashion, there had been so many developments of an emergency nature that the beach still presented a very disturbing picture from a standpoint of valuable stores. It is understood, however, that two days later an L.S.T. was brought around to Green Beach and practically the whole of these stores were loaded and brought to the shore in Kiska Harbour where they were in the process of being removed as fast as possible to the various units areas, as manpower and tractor hauling facilities became available.

22. It was explained to the D.D.O.S. that U.S. Naval authorities insisted upon dumping stores contained in the combat ships of the whole force, Canadian and U.S. alike, on Kiska Harbour shores immediately following the occupation. No regard was made to any organized plans submitted by the Army and so long as an inch of space remained on the beach, the Naval authorities insisted on piling thousands of tons of supplies on the shore, in whatever fashion they had managed to lift them from holds of the ships, regardless of loading plans or ownership. The result was a scene of confusion that at first appeared to be of alarming proportions, particularly in view of the fact that thousands of rounds of high explosive ammunition were dumped in piles like cordwood and also thousands of drums of high octane fuel were also stacked in the immediate vicinity. Equally valuable stores, but of a less dangerous type, were spread in similar fashion over the whole area of the Harbour front.

23. It is understood that the Force Commander, following upon a period of intense confusion, when all units attempted to gather on the beach at once to find and withdraw their stores, finally ruled off all personnel and vehicles, excepting a limited allotment to the Canadian and U.S. Forces. This slowed down temporarily the removal of valuable stores to a point where they could be protected from the weather and the danger of pilfering and looting which was being carried on to a very great extent by the U.S. Naval personnel and the personnel of the U.S. Special Services. These references to pilfering and looting are hearsay only and cannot be verified by the D.D.O.S., but it was the opinion of every officer to whom the D.D.O.S. spoke that there had been a very great deal of such unauthorized practice carried on.

24. The D.D.O.S. in view of his responsibility for advising the staff in matters concerning stores, felt it incumbent upon him to make urgent representation to Brigadier Foster, requesting that he give whatever degree to precedence he could in the use of manpower and vehicles to the removal of these stores to a less dangerous and more protected area, both in the interests of the Unit Commanders and the Canadian public generally. Brigadier Foster expressed his willingness to do everything

ossible providing the defensive plan to which he was committed would not be impaired by the utilization of vehicles and manpower for this duty, which he considered to be of secondary importance to his military plan.

Japanese Evacuation of Kiska

The following extract from a U.S. Intelligence Report is reproduced for information:

"First detailed account of the enemy's evacuation of KISKA appears in a captured notebook picked up on TARAWA. The notebook, property of a naval ensign, himself a member of the evacuating fleet, reveals the following:

- (1) The enemy's first intention, to evacuate the KISKA garrison of "more than 7,000 men" by submarine, was abandoned as too slow and too costly "because the efficiency of the enemy's radar was far superior to what we had expected."
- (2) On 6 July, 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers with hastily installed "counter-radar" equipment aboard sailed from PARAMUSHIRO to effect evacuation by surface vessels. Between the 6th and the 14th when ordered to return to PARAMUSHIRO, these vessels set three separate dates for the "run" - but on each occasion were destroyed by clear weather and KISKA reports of U.S. air and naval activity.
- (3) Sailing from PARAMUSHIRO again on 22 July with the 10th Fifth Fleet aboard the cruiser TAMA, the fleet resumed its wait for favorable weather. Collision sent two destroyers limping home. The remaining vessels, under cover of fog that grew steadily thicker from the 27th on, set their course for KISKA, and guided by that garrison's radio beams, crept around the northern tip of the island and into KISKA Harbour on the afternoon of 28 July.

Anchoring at 1350, the garrison's remaining strength of "over 5,000" loaded from barges within the next 2 hours. On the return trip 1 U.S. submarine which submerged immediately was sighted off KISKA. PARAMUSHIRO was reached without incident on 30 and 31 July".

-PCS 540-3-3-1-8 (G10)
d. 5 Apr 44.

The Probable Cost of Enemy Resistance

While any estimate of what might have happened in an opposed landing is necessarily conjectural, considered opinion agreed that American and Canadian casualties would have been heavy. A frequent estimate set the probable minimum figure at 7,000.

In reaching such a conclusion observers draw attention to the following factors:

(a) U.S. casualties at Attu amounted to 30 per cent of the attacking force. Some 2000 Japanese defended the island, but many casualties came from frost bite and exposure. At Kiska the Allied force numbered 32,000 as opposed to 7,800 Japanese. Making allowances for the better precautions taken to withstand Aleutian weather conditions, and for the very much more accurate knowledge of the topography of the island to be attacked, it was, nevertheless, considered that so large a Japanese force, fighting to the death, might well have inflicted a number of casualties equal to its own strength.

(b) Although the plan of attack carried the assault on to beaches remote from the main Japanese concentrations, and in areas not as strongly manned with guns as was the east side of the island, estimates of enemy artillery coverage of Broad Beach showed no less than twelve of the island's fifteen Japanese batteries bearing up on the side chosen for the Northern sector attack. (See Map 24, AIC NORPAC, - War Diary Wpg. Gren., Aug 43. Appendix V). While it is true that some of the Japanese batteries had been probably

rendered harmless through aerial and naval bombardment prior to D-day, later observation showed that nothing short of a direct hit would put a heavy gun out of action, protected as they were from bomb blast and splinters.


(c) The hills behind Green Beach harboured many a skillfully concealed and well protected machine gun nest, strategically sited to sweep the shore with enfilade fire. These positions extended on every ridge to the centre of the island. Until each of these fox holes and hillside strongholds had been cleaned out by attacking grenade parties, the role of the beach party would have been an unenviable one.

(d) Reference has already been made to the disorganizing factors that threatened to disrupt the ship to shore movement of men and supplies. In the opinion of the commanders of the Canadian combat teams the failure of the naval plans to coincide with the military debarkation schedules, and the crowding on to Green Beach of the U.S. landing craft destined for the other beaches created a confusion that in the face of an alert enemy might well have been attended by serious consequences.

"APPENDIX 39"


COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM PHASE I

COMPANY NETS



NOTE: Combat Team Nets and Company Nets for 14 and 16 similar to those shown for 15 CT

KISKA NORTHERN SECTOR




CANADIAN CAMP

- ① Bde Hq. ② Wpg. Gren. ③ Cdn. Fus. ④ R. de Hull ⑤ R.M. Rang ⑥ 25 Fd Amb.
- ⑦ 24 Fd Regt. ⑧ 46 L.A.A. Bty. ⑨ St. John Fus ⑩ 24 Fd Coy.

----- Road constructed by Canadians

Canadian Forces shown in red



Historical Section, G.S.