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Directorate of History  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0K2

July 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CANCELLED~~REPORT NO. 10  
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: DHD 3-3  
by Trace for DHist NDHQ  
Date: OCT 15 1986

## ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe,  
19 Aug 42.

## Information from German War Diaries

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APPENDIX "A": Report of German Commander-in-Chief West

APPENDIX "B": Report of 302 German Inf Div (Operations Section)

APPENDIX "C": Artillery Experience Report (302 Arty Regt)

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1 A series of Reports of the Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, has dealt in detail with the Dieppe operation of 19 Aug 42. Reports Nos. 100, 101, 108 and 109 presented a summary of the information on the operation available from Allied sources; these have been supplemented by certain more recent reports, notably Nos. 153 and 159. Report No. 116 presented information from enemy sources, based mainly upon the report of 81 German Corps, which fell into Allied hands early in 1944. Since the German surrender in May 1945 much additional information has become available from the enemy side, and upon it the present report is based.

2 The relevant War Diaries have been lent to Hist Sec (G.S.) by the German Military Document Section, Washington, D.C. The reports prepared by the enemy on this operation were numerous and detailed, and it seems likely from its very nature, to be the most completely documented operation of the War of 1939-45 from the German side. The most valuable new material which has become available is found in the reports of the Commander-in-Chief West (Field Marshal von Rundstedt) (3 Sep 42) and of the G.O.C. 302 Inf Div (Lt-Gen Conrad Haase) (25 Aug 42). Photostat copies of both these basic reports have been made and are being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.) for permanent reference. English translations of them are attached to the present report as appendices. The lengthy report of 302 Inf Div was translated by the Army Language Bureau, A.H.Q.; that of the C.-in-C. West was translated by Capt E. Skutezky, the translation being subsequently checked and modified in some particulars by Col C.P. Stacey.

3 Capt Skutezky has prepared a lengthy draft report on the German documents relating to Dieppe, including detailed translations of many special documents. Copies of this draft are being retained in Hist Sec (G.S.) and will be available for permanent reference; it has been felt, however, that the present briefer and simpler treatment is adequate for normal needs. An attempt is made in the present report to call attention to all the most essential points which have emerged from study of the German documents.

TIMING - BRITISH AND GERMAN

4 On 19 Aug 42 the United Kingdom, and the forces based there, were operating on British Summer Time ("A" time) - Greenwich Mean Time plus one hour. This is the time used in the British operation orders and in British reports relating to the operation. The Germans were operating on the equivalent of British Double Summer Time ("B" time) - Greenwich Mean Time plus two hours. This is the time used in their reports relating to the operation. Thus, for example, British accounts place the action between Group 5 and the German convoy at about 0350 hrs, while the Germans report it at about 0450 hrs.

5 In certain of the translations of German documents appended to the present report, "B" has been inserted after times. This has in all cases been supplied by the translator, and is not found in the original documents.

THE ENEMY'S DISPOSITIONS IN THE DIEPPE AREA,  
19 AUG 42

(a) General

6 As already noted, the German Commander-in-Chief West in 1942 was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who was also Commander of Army Group "D". Army Group Headquarters was at St. Germain, just west of Paris. The Dieppe area fell within the zone of H.Q. Fifteenth Army, commanded by Col-Gen Haase (not to be confused with the officer of the same name who commanded 302 Inf Div). The location of Army Headquarters is not indicated on the maps seen. The Corps concerned with the Dieppe area was 81 Corps, commanded by General der Panzertruppen Adolf Kuntzen. Corps Headquarters was at Canteleu, on the north bank of the Seine immediately west of Rouen (Map "Gliederung d. 302 I.D. und Korpsreserve", Appx 1 to Battle Report of 81 Corps (25 Aug 42): copy in War Diary No. 3 of 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-8).

7 81 Corps had under command three Infantry Divisions; 711, 302 and 332. The Corps' right boundary was the Somme Estuary, and 302 Inf Div held the right sector, extending from the Estuary to inclusive Sotteville-sur-Mer, a few miles east of St. Valery-en-Caux. To the left of 302 Inf Div was 332 Inf Div, with Headquarters at Bolbec, inland from Fécamp (Ibid). (1)

8 In August 1942 H.Q. 302 Inf Div was located in the village of Envermeu, roughly ten miles south-east of Dieppe. It had moved there from Arques-la-Bataille on 27 Apr 42 (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial 24353-1, 27 Apr 42). (cf. Report No. 116, para 31.)

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(1) The presence of 711 Inf Div is indicated by various references in W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps volume "Landungsunternehmen Dieppe", Serial No. 32684-4. The daily report for this division (Ibid, folio 59) indicates that Trouville, Houlgate and Honfleur were in its area.

9 The Division consisted of three Infantry Regiments: 570, 571 and 572. Of these 570 Inf Regt (less its 3 Bn) was in the Le Tréport area, and 572 Inf Regt held the sector immediately south of the Somme Estuary, while 571 Inf Regt held the Dieppe area. (2)

(b) Troops in the Dieppe Area

10 The Dieppe area was organized as a "strongpoint" (Stützpunkt) and held by a special "Stützpunktgruppe" under the direct control of H.Q. 571 Inf Regt, which was located on the West Headland of Dieppe (M.R. 221682). The Dieppe strongpoint appears on German maps as completely enclosed in wire defences which enclose Puy and Neuville-les-Dieppe and reach their most southerly point at 224654, near the main Paris road some two miles south of the Dieppe waterfront. From this point the wire defences ran in a north-westerly direction along the edge of the high ground overlooking the Scie valley from the east to the cliff overlooking the sea at 200683. The village of Pourville thus lay outside the wire defences, though it is clear that the troops holding it were reckoned part of the Stützpunktgruppe. These all-round wire defences appear on our defence overprints issued before the operation (see e.g., Report No. 130, Appx "C" (1)).

11 This Stützpunktgruppe consisted of the following troops:

H.Q. 571 Inf Regt  
H.Q. 2 Bn 571 Inf Regt (on West Headland, Dieppe)  
H.Q. 3 Bn 571 Inf Regt (on East Headland, Dieppe, 237691)  
H.Q. 3 Bn 302 Arty Regt (on West Headland, Dieppe)  
H.Q. Flakuntergruppe Dieppe (A.A. Arty Bn)  
H.Q. 302 Engr Bn

Infantry Companies: Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 571 Inf Regt

Artillery Batteries: Nos. 7, 8, "A" and "B" of 302 Arty Regt

Engineer Companies: Nos. 1 and 2 of 302 Engr Bn.

This information considerably modifies that heretofore available (see Report No. 116, para 7).

12 The greater part of this force was disposed in defensive localities on the coast itself, although two infantry companies (5 and 11) were in immediate reserve respectively west and east of the River d'Arques. The defended localities were mainly concentrated on the high ground, but the actual front of the town of Dieppe, from the Casino to the harbour mole, both inclusive, was held by two platoons of No. 7 Company plus what is described as "V. Kp.", evidently the "Versuchskompanie" referred to in Report No. 109, para 31, note 2. This "experimental company" was a Naval unit; it is shown in German diagrams as armed with five 37-mm anti-tank guns and three light machine-guns, while the two platoons of No. 7 Company are shown as equipped with one 75-mm gun, one 37-mm anti-tank gun, one tank (in a static position) and one 47-mm anti-tank gun (presumably Czech).

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(2) 570 Inf Regt, with headquarters at Eu, was actually in Divisional Reserve. 3 Bn 572 Inf Regt was responsible for the Le Tréport strongpoint area. (Map "Gliederung d. 302 I.D. ...", above, para 6.)

13 Puys was held by one platoon of No. 9 Company, a platoon of Luftwaffe, and "Sondergerät" (evidently personnel handling special equipment). The sector of Pourville west of the Scie was held by one platoon of No. 6 Company, while the sector east of the Scie was held by another platoon of No. 6 Company plus a group of No. 8 Company; there were one 47-mm anti-tank gun and two 75-mm guns in this latter sector.

14 Berneval lay outside the Dieppe strong-point area. It was held by 2/770 Coastal Bty (strength "127 Mann") plus a party of ten men from No. 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt. There were also 114 all ranks of the Luftwaffe in this area. (During the operation this area was reinforced by sub-units of 570 Inf Regt from the east as well as by portions of the Divisional Reserve from the south.)

15 The area of the Varengeville battery was held by 813 Coastal Bty, whose strength is given in the Report of 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below) as 93 men. The strongpoint at the Pointe d'Ailly lighthouse nearby is credited by the same source with a garrison of 77 men.

16 The above details of dispositions derive from the map "Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe, Stand vom 19.8.42", which forms Appx 2 to the report of 81 Corps (copy in W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-8).

(c) Artillery in the Sector

17 The Dieppe sector was strong in artillery. On the actual front of attack there were three coastal batteries, as follows:

- (a) Varengeville, No. 813 Army Coastal Battery, six 150-mm Krupp guns.
- (b) Berneval, 2/770 Army Coastal Battery, four 105-mm Czech guns and three 170-mm guns "in M. Laf."
- (c) Arques-la-Bataille (248638), No. 265 Coastal Battery, four 150-mm howitzers.

Certain other coastal batteries not comprehended within the limits of our operation were able to interfere with it to a limited extent, as follows:

- (d) St. Valery-en-Caux, 1/799 Coastal Battery, six French 150-mm guns: fired 13 rounds during the operation (Report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117, 20 Sep 42).
- (e) Position unknown, but probably west of St. Valery, 2/799 Coastal Battery, armament unknown but heavy: fired only two rounds during the operation, at 17,000 metres (Ibid).

- (f) Caveux-sur-Mer (south side of Somme Estuary), 1/770 Coastal Battery, armament unknown but heavy: fired nine rounds in the course of 19 Aug, at ranges up to 20,000 metres (Ibid).
- (g) Mesnil Val, (west of Le Tréport), 3/778 Coastal Battery, four Czech 150-mm guns: fired heavily on offshore targets at Berneval (Ibid).

18 There were on the front of attack in addition four "batteries" (troops) of Divisional Artillery, each armed with four 100-mm Czech field howitzers, disposed as follows:

- (a) Battery "A" (218664, near Appeville).
- (b) Battery "B" (258685, south of Puy).
- (c) Battery 7 (206676, near Les 4 Vents Ferme).
- (d) Battery 8 (262674, south of Puy).

All these batteries lay within the wire defences of the Dieppe strongpoint except 8 Bty, which was just outside them.

19 A total of eight French 75-mm guns were in position in a beach defence role on the coast between Pourville and the east cliff of Dieppe, both inclusive.

20 Anti-aircraft guns (manned by Luftwaffe troops) were also numerous. A diagram prepared by H.Q. Fifteenth Army and annexed to the report of the C.-in-C. West 3 Sep 42 (photostat copies in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.)) indicates the presence in the 302 Inf Div sector of a total of 30 A.A. guns. Of these, 12 were 20-mm, nine were 37-mm, three were 50-mm and six were heavy guns, shown on this diagram as 75-mm but on the disposition map prepared by 81 Corps (above, para 16) as 88-mm. The report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part I(B)) appears to confirm that they were 75-mm French guns.

21 The above account of the enemy's armament derives partly from the 81 Corps map "Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe, Stand vom 19.8.42" (above, para 16) and partly from the table "Gliederung der ... Gesamtkräfte der 3 Wehrmachtteile" forming Appx 3 to the report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42. Some details have been drawn from the map forming Appx 2 to the report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117, 20 Sep 42 (W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, Serial 32648-4: Photostat in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.)). The detailed report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below) has also been consulted and has been regarded as the best authority in cases of conflict between various sources.

#### (d) Available Reserves

22 The enemy's system of reserves was as follows.

23 The Regimental Reserve of 571 Inf Regt was in the area of Ouville-la-Rivière, on the River Saane some two and a half miles inland. It consisted of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt (less 3 Coy and one platoon of 4 Coy), plus an infantry anti-tank company (at Offranville) and an infantry gun platoon in process of formation.

24 The Divisional Reserve of 302 Inf Div consisted of 570 Inf Regt with its Headquarters at Eu and its 1 and 2 Bns under command (see above, para 9). There were also considerable numbers of divisional troops, including 302 A. Tk Coy and 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn, in the area Envermeu - Arques-la-Bataille. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part I(B).)

25 The Corps Reserve was disposed inland to the south-west of Dieppe with its headquarters at Doudeville, south of St. Valery-en-Caux. It consisted of H.Q. 676 Inf Regt (Col Klemm) with under command 1 and 3 Bns 676 Inf Regt and 3 Bn 570 Inf Regt. At Yvetot in the same area was 81 Tank Company.

26 The main element of the Army Reserve was a force of four Jäger battalions under a headquarters known as "Stb Golle", located at Barentin, north-west of Rouen. Also included were 226 Assault Gun Battalion, at Motteville, east of Yvetot, and some motorized artillery in the area between Duclair and Jumieges. (Map "Gliederung d. 302 I.D. und Korpsreserve", above, para 6.)

27 In Army Group Reserve were the 10th Panzer Division, in the Amiens area with its headquarters at Flixécourt, north-west of Amiens, and the S.S. "Adolf Hitler" Division (not yet shown as an armoured formation) with its headquarters at Rosny, west of Mantes-Gassicourt. (Map forming Appx 2 to Report of C-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42.) Along with these two formations, the "7th Flieger Division" was warned by Army Group at 0700 hrs (German time) on 19 Aug that it might be required (Report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42, part III). This division appears to have been a parachute formation (information from Historical Section, R.C.A.F.). Its location does not appear. It took no further part in the operation. (3)

#### THE SECURITY OF THE OPERATION

28 The question of whether the enemy had any foreknowledge of our intention to operate against Dieppe has been discussed at some length in Report No. 109 (paras 14-23) on the basis of our own information, and in Report No. 116 (para 6) on the basis of the report of 81 German Corps. Both reports reached the conclusion that the Germans had not been forewarned of the operation and that their first information resulted from the unfortunate encounter of Group 5 with a German convoy about 0350 hrs (see Report No. 101, para 24).

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(5) These formations were not the whole of the Army Group Reserves: see below, para 61.



29 These conclusions are now confirmed specifically and in detail by the new German evidence. Attention is particularly directed to the opening passages of the Report of the C.-in-C. West (see Appx "A" below). It will be noted from these passages that German information of the operation was limited entirely to the knowledge that a considerable assembly of landing craft had taken place during the summer on the south coast of England. Although Field Marshal von Rundstedt mentions a change in British wireless procedure on 15 Aug, which made interception more difficult, and also refers to cross-Channel flights of Allied aircraft which suggested "briefing flights" (Einweisungsflüge), later in this same report (part III(B)) he writes, "Up to the commencement of battle action on the morning of 19 Aug enemy air operations by day or night had not pointed in any particular way to an impending landing attempt", and adds, with respect to wireless, "Interception of operational and training traffic in England presented no deviation from normal". His statement that the first real warning of an impending operation came only with the encounter with the convoy at 0450 hrs on 19 Aug could not be more definite.

30 The Report of the C.-in-C. West notes further (part III(C)) that the Germans received no warning from their radar installations. Equipment at Le Tréport detected targets off Dieppe from 0400 hrs (German time) but, in the light of noises heard at the same time, these contacts were believed to be aircraft.

31 It is interesting to observe how relatively inefficient was the German intelligence service with respect to events in England. Responsible military authorities in the United Kingdom had thought it decidedly probable that some information might have reached the Germans concerning Operation "RUTTER", the first version of the Dieppe project which was cancelled, after all personnel had been briefed, on 7 Jul 42 (Report No. 100, para 110). With this in view, it will be recalled that the operations was re-mounted, on the suggestion of Capt Hughes-Hallett, on a different basis (involving no preliminary concentration) which it was believed would prevent the enemy from discovering that the project had been revived (see Reports Nos. 153 and 159). In the event, these German documents make it quite clear, not only was the Hughes-Hallett scheme effective, but the enemy had in fact heard nothing of the earlier project. He took precautions, but no more at Dieppe than elsewhere; he considered that in the summer of 1942 an attack (and possibly a major enterprise) was possible at any point along his extended front, and acted accordingly. On the night of 18/19 Aug weather and tide conditions were favourable for a raid in the eastern Channel sector, and his troops there had been placed in a heightened state of readiness accordingly. They had in fact been in such a state since 10 Aug (see below, para 35).

32 It is interesting and important to note that there had been repeated alarms during the spring and summer. On 3 Apr, for instance, the Germans believed that they had intercepted a radiotelephone message suggesting the possibility of a raid on Dieppe on 6 Apr; precautions were taken accordingly, but of course no raid developed (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-1, 3-7 Apr 42). There was another alarm covering the nights of 21/22 and 22/23 May (Ibid, 21-22 May 42).

33 It is of particular interest that on more than one occasion the situation on the Russian front was referred to in German orders as providing a likely motive for Allied attacks on the French shore. On 10 Jul 42 H.Q. 302 Inf Div records an order from 81 Corps for a heightened state of readiness. The same day Corps explained to 302 Inf Div that the Russian front had been partly broken; the Russians were believed to be "again" (nochmals) demanding of the British Government the opening of a second front (Errichtung der zweiten Front). For this reason, the C.-in-C. West had ordered special precautions. (Ibid, 10 Jul 42). It was added, however, that air reconnaissance and other information did not reveal actual preparations for an attack. The division was nevertheless to be brought up to full strength forthwith (Ibid).

34 In such circumstances, those periods when lunar and tidal conditions were favourable for seaborne attack on the French coast were naturally earmarked by the Germans as times of special precaution. On 20 Jul 42 the G.O.C. Fifteenth Army issued an order directing attention to three periods during which tidal conditions were considered particularly favourable to an Anglo-American enterprise: 27 Jul - 3 Aug; 10 Aug - 19 Aug; and 25 Aug - 1 Sep (W.D. "B", H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 26621-4).

35 On 8 Aug, accordingly, H.Q. 302 Inf Div ordered a state of "threatening danger" (Drohende Gefahr) for the nights from 10/11 to 19/20 Aug (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-1, 8 Aug 42). Two days later, the G.O.C. Fifteenth Army issued an order beginning with the remark, "Various reports permit the assumption that, because of the miserable position of the Russians, the Anglo-Americans will be forced to undertake something in the measurable future". The troops were warned that such an attack would be a grim business, reminded of their responsibilities in this crisis and urged to do their duty. (W.D., H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 75084-1, 10 Aug 42).

#### THE ENEMY REACTION TO OUR ATTACK

36 A map forming Appendix 7 to the report of the C.-in-C. West shows the encounter between the German convoy and Group 5 as taking place at 0448 hrs (German time) at a point a little more than 20 kilometres off Dieppe; the convoy is shown as turning towards Dieppe and being "dispersed" (zersprengt) at 0500 hrs. The convoy is described in this report (see Appx "A" below, part I) as a six-knot convoy consisting of five motor or motor sailing vessels escorted by three submarine-chasers; it had left Boulogne at 2100 hrs on 18 Aug, bound for Dieppe.

37 It has already been noted (Report No. 116, para 6) that the German 81 Corps reported that as a result of the convoy engagement "the entire coast defence system was alerted". Other evidence now available is to the same effect. The report of G.-in-C. West states specifically, "As a result of the noise of battle the alarm was given in the coastal sector" (Appx "A" below, part II).

38 It is not clear, however, that the alert resulting from the convoy fight was quite complete. There is no doubt, it is true, that it did cause immediate precautions at certain points. In particular, the report of 302 Inf Div notes that at 0457 hrs (German time) (i.e., within ten minutes of the encounter at sea beginning) the Luftwaffe crew of the radar equipment at Berneval manned their point of resistance (Appx "B" below, Part II(A)). This would appear, however, to have been a somewhat isolated measure of precaution, and the fact that Naval Group Command West reported nearly an hour after the encounter (i.e., at 0545 hrs German time) that it was probably a "customary attack on convoy" (Report of G.-in-C. West, Appx "A" below, part II) indicates that the battle at sea was certainly not at once recognized as indicating the imminence of a landing. It is important to note that H.Q. 302 Inf Div did not actually order "action stations" until 0601 hrs (German time) and it appears that 571 Inf Regt had itself issued the same order to its troops only one minute before (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(A)). By this time, there had been a definite report of our landing at Pourville. (*Ibid*). It will be recalled that at this place we obtained almost complete surprise, and no fire was directed at the L.C.As. before they touched down (Report No. 101, para 141).

39 What appears at first glance, at least, to be strong evidence that, whether as a result of the convoy fight or not, the German defences were in a high state of readiness, is contained in the detailed reports of German artillery commanders. The "Artillery Experience Report" of 302 Arty Regt (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div "Dieppe I", Serial No. 24353-8, Appx 16) and the Report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117 (W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, Serial No. 32648-4) both indicate that the first shot fired by German artillery was at 0541 hrs (German time) when 7 Bty 302 Arty Regt opened fire against "Zielraum C", which on a map attached to the Artillery Commander's Report appears as a defensive fire zone just offshore at Pourville. As The South Saskatchewan Regiment landed not more than five minutes late (i.e., at 0555 hrs German time) and report encountering no fire before landing (above, para 38), this German statement appears to be inaccurate. These artillery reports indicate, however, that the whole of the Divisional Artillery component in the Dieppe area (i.e., 7, 8, "A" and "B" Batteries, totalling 16 guns) was firing at "Zielraum C" by 0545 hrs (German time); that 813 Coastal Bty joined in at 0547 hrs, firing at boats off Quiberville, and 265 Coastal Bty at 0555 hrs, firing at "Zielraum B" (a defensive fire zone off the mouth of Dieppe harbour) which had first been fired at by 7 Bty at 0550 hrs. "Zielraum A" was a defensive fire zone offshore at Puy; the first fire recorded here was at 0555 hrs, when "B" Bty fired at "anlaufende Boote".

40 It seems fairly clear from our own evidence that these German artillery reports cannot be accepted without some reserve. They seem to display the same tendency mentioned in para 38 above; a desire to magnify the Germans' state of readiness and the promptitude with which their troops reacted to the first indications of an attack. This, no doubt, was for the benefit of higher authority.

41 From the foregoing it is apparent that to estimate the precise influence of the encounter with the convoy in arousing the German defenders is no simple matter. The German evidence cannot all be accepted at its precise face value. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the encounter at sea did contribute to the loss of surprise and thereby reduced the chances of the operation's being successful. In practice, we seem to have obtained a large degree of surprise at Pourville, though at no other point except perhaps the Varengeville area. The mere fact that at Puy the landing was made between 15 and 20 minutes late (Report No. 101, para 67-69) would in itself militate against obtaining surprise here, as the attacks at other points were well under way before that at Puy went in; while no surprise was of course to be expected on the main beaches in front of Dieppe, where the assault was timed to go in half an hour later than on the flanks.

#### THE MOVEMENT AND ACTION OF ENEMY RESERVES

42 Considerable light has previously been thrown upon the movement of the enemy's reserves as the result of study of the Report of 81 Corps (Report No. 116, paras 11-18). The further accounts now available do not alter the picture as previously known in any essential points.

##### (a) Local, Regimental and Divisional Reserves

43 The action of the enemy's more local reserves has already been outlined in Report No. 116 (paras 11-15). That account is in general confirmed by the new information.

##### (1) Berneval

44 Further information is now available concerning the counter-attack against 3 Commando in the Berneval area. This was carried out by a composite force commanded by Major von Blücher, O.C. 302 A. Tk Bn, which formed part of the Divisional Reserve (above, para 24). This force consisted ultimately of 302 Cyclist Sqn, 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn and 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt. Two reconnaissance patrols from 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt were also engaged in this area. The composite force succeeded in dealing with that small portion of 3 Commando which had landed in the Berneval area, and by 1030 hrs (German time) the German Command considered the situation here "as cleaned up", the attackers having been thrown out of Petit Berneval and off Hill 101, at the top of the cliffs to the north-east. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part III.) (4)

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(4) Major von Blücher is described in the report of 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part III) as "Kdr. der Pz. Jg. u. Aufkl. Abt. 302": that is, he commanded the anti-tank and reconnaissance elements of the divisional troops.

45 The German accounts suggest that the enemy never fully understood the action of Major Young's party which landed independently to the West of Berneval (Report No. 101, paras 39-42). None of the German maps gives an accurate picture of the movements of this party. The effects of its action, however, may be traced in detail in the German accounts. Of particular interest is the Report of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 (above, para 39). This notes that the Berneval battery (2/770 Coastal Bty) opened fire at 0600 hrs (German time) and during the next ten minutes fired 14 rounds against boats off the Berneval gully without effect. No more shots are shown until 0700 hrs (German time), when the troop fired 12 rounds over open sights at a range of 100-200 yards in defence of its fire position. That the enemy swung one of his heavy guns around and attempted to employ it against Major Young's snipers was already known (Report No. 101, para 40). It is of special importance to note that from this time the battery fired no further shots until 0845 hrs (German time), when it opened fire against ships off Dieppe. From this time onwards it was frequently in action.

46 The German evidence thus indicates that the action of 3 Commando, and particularly of Major Young's gallant little party, had the effect of neutralizing the Berneval battery for more than two hours and a half at a critical stage of the operation.

#### (11) Puys

47 Nothing in the German documents indicates that any action was taken during the operation to reinforce the German troops at Puys. Thanks to the extremely strong nature of the ground at this point, the small force stationed here (above, para 13) was able to deal with the attack of R. Regt C. without assistance.

#### (111) Dieppe

48 As already noted (above, para 12), the front of the town of Dieppe itself was held by two infantry platoons and the naval Experimental Company. At 0916 hrs (German time) it was reported that the latter unit (which this entry credits with having eight anti-tank guns, not five as noted in para 12 above) had suffered heavy losses and had one gun put out of commission. At 0646 hrs (German time) 5 Coy 571 Inf Regt, the sector reserve at Dieppe (see above, para 12), assembled at the Garrison Commandant's Headquarters for an immediate counter-attack. There is no reference to its actual commitment until 1055 hrs (German time) when it and Nos. 2 and 3 Platoons of 2 Coy 302 Engr Bn (2/3 2./Pl. 302) were ordered to push forward to Dieppe beach "to roll up the enemy who is still firing there". There is no further reference to any specific counter-attack at this point until 1410 hrs (German time), at which time it was reported that mopping up was progressing satisfactorily on Dieppe beach. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(C).)

49 As a result, obviously, of our landing tanks on Dieppe beach, the German Command decided to strengthen the anti-tank defences there; and at 0900 hrs (German time) orders were issued for 302 A. Tk Coy (from Divisional Reserve) to be placed at the disposal of 571 Inf Regt and moved to Dieppe. The unit's normal station was south-west of the Divisional Headquarters at Envermeu and south-east of the Forêt d'Arques (Map: "Gliederung d. 302 I.D. und Korpsreserve", as above, para 6). This unit was armed with German 75-mm guns (Pak 97/38) nine of which had been received on 17 Jul 42 (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Quartiermeisterabteilung, Serial No. 24361-1, 17 Jul 42). At 1000 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt committed the company to action as follows: "1 platoon (Zug) Dieppe East, 1 platoon at drawbridge in Dieppe harbour, 1 platoon on west headland" (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(C)). How much effect this new deployment of heavier weapons had upon the tanks on the beach does not appear, but it was probably limited. (5)

(iv) Pourville: Regimental Reserve 571 Inf Regt

50 The sector to which the enemy throughout attached the greatest importance was that about Pourville. "Division considered Pourville and the Scie valley as the points of greatest danger in the divisional sector" (*Ibid*, part III). It was here that we made our greatest penetration; and it was here, as we shall see (below, paras 57, 60), that the enemy proposed to commit both his Corps Reserve and 10 Pz Div. Here also he did actually commit the Regimental Reserve of 571 Inf Regt.

51 As already noted (above, para 23) this consisted of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt with Headquarters at Ouville-la-Rivière. At 0612 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt ordered 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt to action stations for an immediate counter-attack on Quiberville, and the battalion arranged for reconnaissance towards Quiberville and St. Aubin-sur-Mer, to the west of it. It subsequently came to light, however, that there was no menace at either of these points. The Germans appear to have been somewhat slow to grasp the significance of our operations in this area, where the main body of 4 Commando had landed east of Quiberville and pushed rapidly inland to attack the Varengeville battery (Report No. 101, paras 44-54). At 0814 hrs (German time) H.Q. 302 Inf Div, hearing of the peril of the Varengeville battery, ordered 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt, in the event of this battery being endangered, to commit a reinforced company there for immediate counter-attack. This order, however, was not executed, "as previous instructions had been already received from 571 Inf Regt for action stations for attack on Pourville" (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B", below, part II(C)). These instructions had been issued at 0710 hrs (German time), the battalion being instructed to assemble "in south section of Hautot".

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- (5) The report of 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part III) notes that the roadblocks across the streets facing the beach, while preventing the tanks from breaking into the town, also prevented the 75-mm guns from coming into action at close range.

52 At 0930 hrs (German time) Division despatched a staff officer to the battalion to clarify the situation and also to establish the whereabouts of 3 Bn 570 Inf Regt, part of the Corps Reserve, which had been placed under the Division at 0726 hrs (German time) and ordered to move to Ouville. At 1055 hrs (German time) the staff officer returned to Division and reported that 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt had run into the enemy near Hautot in the course of its assembly. It had clearly come into contact with Camerons of C., who had advanced into this area (Report No. 101, paras 193-205, and cf. No. 116, para 13). It seems possible that the German close-support guns which the Camerons reported as coming into action here (Report No. 101, para 201) were the infantry gun platoon forming part of 571 Inf Regt's reserve (above, para 23), although there is no reference to it in German documents. The administrative report of 302 Inf Div (below, para 64) mentions two 75-mm infantry guns as being in action during the day.

53 At 1130 hrs (German time) 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt ordered an attack on Pourville for a zero hour not yet fixed. The Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div notes that at this time the battalion was "severely attacked by enemy low-level aircraft". It adds:

When C.S.M. Prögler who had been detailed as Observation N.C.O. of the battalion pushes forward towards Pourville on his own initiative with four men and brings in 200 prisoners of war, the companies of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt advance in the direction of Pourville-West without waiting for the order fixing zero hour.

It was obviously at this time that the Germans recovered the high ground west of Pourville (Report No. 116, para 13). There is little more detail about the operations of this battalion, and it would appear that it was content to follow up our men as they withdrew, maintaining moderate pressure. At 1437 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt was able to report, "Pourville firmly in our hands".

54 The foregoing details relating to the action of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt all derive from the Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part II(C)).

55 Two other small special units took part in the operations. One was an N.C.Os.' class which was employed in the Scie valley south of Pourville (along with men from 571 Inf Regt's engineer platoon) and was in action here, evidently with the Camerons and the S. Sask R. (Ibid, parts II(C) and III). The other was a reserve company composed of hospital patients fit for duty, which at 1022 hrs (German time) was moved to Janval, on the south edge of Dieppe, to relieve an engineer company there for employment in counter-attack against the beach (Ibid, part III).

(v) Main Body of Divisional Reserve

56 The nature and disposition of the Divisional Reserve of 302 Inf Div has been described above (para 24). The Division did not venture to use the whole of 570 Inf Regt at Dieppe, as attacks elsewhere seemed possible (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part III) but it did move 2 Bn 570 Inf Regt, which at the commencement of the operation had its headquarters at Mondy-sur-Eu, a few miles south-east of Le Tréport (Map: "Gliederung der 302 I.D. und Korpsreserve", as above, para 4). This battalion was ordered at 0840 hrs (German time) to concentrate on the western side of the Forêt d'Arques, south-east of Dieppe. At 0915 hrs (German time) it was reported that the battalion would arrive there about 0945 hrs. It was never committed to action, however, but remained at the forest with its transport ready for an immediate move, thus constituting a safeguard either against an unfavourable development at Dieppe or an Allied airborne landing. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, parts II(C)) and III.)

(b) Corps, Army and Army Group Reserves

57 The action of the Corps Reserves was as described in Report No. 116, para 16. Col Klemm's Regimental Headquarters, with 1 Bn 676 Inf Regt, 1 Bty 332 Arty Regt and 81 Tk Coy were placed under command of 302 Inf Div at 0845 hrs (German time) and put in motion towards "Tourville" (presumably Tourville-sur-Arques, 241612, some 2500 metres south of the aerodrome of Dieppe - St. Aubin) (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(C)). This force, or the greater part of it, was arriving in Tourville at 1145 hrs (German time), but these troops never actually came into action. Col Klemm was at 1240 hrs (German time) ordered to attack Pourville along the west bank of the Scie. He would have at his disposal 1 Bn 676 Inf Regt and 3 Bn 570 Inf Regt, the latter having come back to him (cf. above, para 52); 3 Bn 676 Inf Regt was to attack independently through Varengeville towards Pointe d'Ailly. It was assumed that Klemm's attack would go in about 1430 hrs (German time). Fighting had ceased, however, before this attack could be launched. (Ibid).

58 The Army Reserves (above, para 26) were also put in motion. At 0913 hrs (German time) Col Gollé's regiment was ordered forward; two battalions accompanied by "Batterie West" from the Jumièges-Duclair region were to move to Totes at the disposal of 81 Corps, the other two to Yvetot. The move was carried out, but so slowly as to arouse the ire of 81 Corps; Col Gollé's command post opened at Totes at 1430 hrs (German time). It was explained that the companies had been dispersed for training. (Operations Log of 81 Corps, W.D. 81 Corps, volume "Landungsunternehmen Dieppe", Serial No. 32648-4.)

59 Mention must be made of the movement of those portions of the Army Group Reserve which were sent forward. At 0725 and 0728 hrs respectively (German time), G.H.Q. West ordered "Alarm Scale II" for 10 Pz Div and S.S. Div "Adolf Hitler". At 0915 hrs (German time) 10 Pz Div reported that its vanguard



would be ready to move at 0945 hrs, and the main body at 1100 hrs; S.S. Div "Adolf Hitler" had previously reported that its vanguard would be ready to move at 0945 hrs, but that the main body was not yet ready. At 0940 hrs (German time) G.H.Q. West, recognizing that the enemy had committed at least two Brigades, and possibly a whole division, and appreciating that even larger developments were still possible, decided to commit 10 Pz Div. At 0944 hrs (German time) accordingly, 10 Pz Div was advised that it was being placed under command H.Q. 81 Corps "to clean up the situation at Dieppe immediately" (Report of C.-in-C. West, Appx "A" below, part III).

60 A report of H.Q. 10 Pz Div dated 25 Aug 42 (copy in W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, Serial No. 32648-4) states that the Division was warned at 0730 hrs (German time) and had warned its units directly under command by 0740 hrs. It received the order for commitment only at 1000 hrs, but its "Eingreifbataillon" had been ready to move since 0821 hrs, and it was actually on the march at 1045 hrs (German time), as were the leading units of 7 Pz Regt. The main body of the Panzer Regiment moved at 1100 hrs (German time). The leading column reached Longueville-sur-Scie, roughly ten miles due south of Dieppe, at 1455 hrs (German time) while the "Eingreifbataillon" reached Torcy at 1630 hrs. As the operation at Dieppe had already ended, the Division was ordered not to cross the line Tourville - Arques-la-Bataille, and proceeded to make camp on either side of its axis of advance. (6)

61 The raid on Dieppe resulted in virtually the whole German force in Northern France being prepared for action. At 1110 hrs (German time) air reconnaissance reported six large transports 40 kilometres north-west of Dieppe, three medium-sized freighters 60 kilometres north-west of Dieppe, and in the area of Selsey Bill "26 large transports each of 6000 tons, 3 destroyers in company. Decks closely packed with troops". To G.H.Q. West this suggested the decided possibility that the Dieppe operation might be the beginning of an attempt to establish a Second Front; and at 1130 hrs (German time) G.H.Q. West ordered Alarm Scale II (obviously a very high state of readiness) for the whole of the Seventh Army (Normandy and Brittany) and the following formations in Army Group Reserve: 7 Flieger Div, 6 Pz Div, 337 Inf Div, and the Hermann Göring Brigade. (Report of C.-in-C. West, Appx "A" below, part III) The Hermann Göring Brigade became the Hermann Göring Panzer Division the following year (Order of Battle of the German Army, 1 March 1945 (Washington, Military Intelligence Division, War Department), p. 304).

62 The convoy of 26 ships which so alarmed the Germans remains something of an enigma. It certainly had nothing to do with the operation and it may be assumed that the Luftwaffe was in error in reporting that its decks were crammed with troops. Capt Hughes-Hallett, the Naval Force Commander, in conversation with the present writer at Portsmouth on 29 Sep 46, indicated that this was probably a normal Channel merchant convey which was turned back into harbour, at his request, to make its destroyer escort available to assist him in escorting his own small craft back to Newhaven.

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(6) 81 Corps had proposed to use 10 Pz Div against the troops landed at Pourville (Report No. 116, Appx "B").

63 Although the German Command had made such comprehensive arrangements for the reinforcement of the Dieppe area, the Corps, Army and Army Group reserves never came into action and our raid was in fact repulsed by the troops manning the coastal positions and the immediate local and Divisional reserves.

#### ACTION OF GERMAN ARTILLERY

64 The action of the enemy's artillery, as already noted, can be studied in detail in the report of 302 Arty Regt (Appx "C" below) and in that of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 (above, para 39). According to the latter report, as we have seen, German artillery first opened fire at 0541 hrs (German time). Fire continued until 1458 hrs, and Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 records thereafter three final shots fired by 1/770 Coastal Bty at 2310 hrs (German time). His report lists a total of 5357 rounds fired by German artillery during the operation. This figure clearly does not include rounds fired by anti-aircraft artillery, by the anti-tank guns facing the Dieppe beach, or by the eight 75-mm beach defence guns; in other words it represents artillery rounds of a calibre larger than 75-mm. The reports of H.Q. 302 Inf Div enable us to be still more definite. The administrative (Ib) report (W.D. No. 3, 302 Inf Div Ib (Serial No. 24361-2), dated 25 Aug 42, computes the rounds fired by guns in the actual Dieppe area (including 265 Coastal Bty) at 6,500; this includes 2,011 rounds fired by the eight French 75s and 120 fired by two German 75-mm infantry guns. Add to this the expenditure of the more distant coastal batteries as listed in the operations report of 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part VII(F)) (958 rounds) and we arrive at a grand total of 7,458 rounds. This still does not include anti-tank or anti-aircraft rounds.

65 It is of interest to note that higher German headquarters considered that too much ammunition had been fired. One battery (troop) of 302 Arty Regt ("B" Bty) fired 1163 rounds (of these, 550 were directed towards preventing the reinforcement or evacuation of Blue Beach), and 81 Corps commented adversely on this expenditure, which seemed to endanger the ammunition supply (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Quartiermeisterabteilung (Serial No. 24361-1) 25 Aug 42). The C-in-C. West, in his own comments on the operation (Report of C.-in-C. West, Part IX, "Basic Observations of the C.-in-C. West No. 8", 23 Aug 42) referred to this matter and observed that it was necessary to take precautions against excessive expenditure, conceding however that it was also important to be certain that ample ammunition was available, "for a landing operation does offer many rewarding targets"!

66 Attention has already been directed (para 45 above) to the light thrown by German documents on the effects of 3 Commando's attack on the Berneval battery. Similar information is available with reference to the Varengeville battery. The Report of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 (above, para 39) notes that this battery opened fire at 0547 hrs (German time) and fired chiefly at naval targets until 0735 hrs (German time).

From 0735 hrs until 0745 hrs the battery fired 13 rounds over open sights at ranges of 300 to 350 metres in defence of its fire position. No more shots are reported until 0845 hrs, when (it is said) six more rounds were fired in the same manner. This would suggest that it was at this time that 4 Commando made its final attack on the battery; information from that unit, however, is to the effect that it was actually considerably earlier, and that five of the guns were blown up at 0650 hrs (0750 hrs German time) and the sixth a little later (Report No. 101, para 51). In the circumstances, the records of the German battery were presumably written from memory; it is not surprising that the timing should be inaccurate, quite apart from the possibility that the survivors of the battery might wish to exaggerate the duration of their defence. The Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part II(D)) confirms the British timing with rather surprising exactitude; it records that 813 Bty reported at 0750 hrs (German time) the capture of its position and the blowing up of five of its guns. This further invalidates the report of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 as a source of exact information.

67 A pathetic short history of the fall of this battery at Varengeville was recorded in the operations log of H.Q. 81 Corps as received through 2 Bn 676 Inf Regt in the afternoon:-

Early this morning towards 0600 hrs this battery was suddenly attacked by men with blackened faces and all but 25 men were slaughtered. The guns were blown up by the enemy, and the black-faced men disappeared again.

(Heute früh gegen 6:00 Uhr ist diese Batterie von geschwärzten Männern überfallen und bis auf 25 Mann niedergemetzelt. Die Geschütze wurden vom Feind gesprengt, die geschwärzten Männer sind wieder verschwunden.)

(W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, volume "Landungsunternehmen Dieppe" (Serial No. 32648-4), folio 12.)

#### THE END OF THE OPERATION

68 It is important to establish, if possible, from the German accounts the time at which fighting ceased in the various sectors. From our own sources we are well aware that the remaining troops on the main beaches at Dieppe were overrun about 1308 hrs (Report No. 108, para 262). There is no such exact information available from Canadian sources for any other sector.

69 Report No. 101 (para 128) suggests the impossibility of settling from Canadian sources the time when the troops remaining alive on Blue Beach (at Puys) surrendered. The time can now be fixed with fair accuracy from the German sources; for at 0935 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt advised H.Q. 302 Inf Div, "Puys firmly in our hands; enemy has lost about 500 men prisoners and dead" (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(C)). This would indicate that the remnants of R. Regt C. had probably surrendered a little before 0830 hrs (British time).

70 With respect to Pourville, the evidence of some Canadian officers (Report No. 101, para 243) was to the effect that the men left on the beach here probably surrendered about 1500 hrs. German evidence, however, indicates that fighting actually ended here about the same time as at Dieppe; as we have seen (para 53, above) 571 Inf Regt reported "Pourville firmly in our hands" at 1437 hrs (German time). Evidence of this sort, pretty clearly derived from an operations log, is the best type of information normally available on actual times.

71 Concerning Berneval, the report of 302 Inf Div records at 1100 hrs (German time) that the remaining British troops had been taken prisoner in the gully north-east of Belleville and on Hill 101 east of Petit Berneval. At 1120 hrs Major von Blücher's headquarters reported that the situation in this area was "völlig bereinigt". (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II(B)).

72 As for the operation as a whole, at 1445 hrs (German time) 302 Inf Div reported to 81 Corps as follows:

Enemy attack as good as repulsed along the whole front. It is now only a matter of mopping up.

(Ibid, part II(C))

We have already noted that the enemy artillery may be said to have ceased fire at 1458 hrs (German time) (above, para 39).

#### GERMAN INFORMATION ON THE ACTION OF OUR TANKS

73 As noted in Report No. 116 (paras 34-5), the report of 81 German Corps confirmed the information concerning the action of our tanks obtained from repatriated personnel of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, stating that "probably 16" tanks crossed the sea-wall and reached the promenade, but that many of them subsequently returned to the beach. The Canadian evidence was to the effect that certainly 13, and probably 15, tanks crossed the wall.

74 There is no evidence in the new documents now available to alter the conclusions already arrived at, which in the light of the rather remarkable degree of agreement between the best Canadian and German evidence appear to be well established (in spite of the insistence of Lt-Col R.R. Labatt, O.C. R.H.L.I., that not more than three tanks reached the promenade). The report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, which would be an excellent source of information on this point, unfortunately makes only a vague reference to it (see below, para 78). There is a reference in the Report of C.-in-C. West (Appx "A" below, part IX, Basic Observations of C.-in-C. West No. 8, 23 Aug 42), which remarks: "24 tanks were immobilized, having been hit by fire and bogged down on the beach in the deep gravel. 5 just got as far as the beach promenade!" This report does not invalidate the more circumstantial account by 81 Corps, which is stated to be based on the evidence of eyewitnesses (Augenzeugen). This report of 81 Corps, incidentally, is attached as an Appendix to that of C.-in-C. West along with the conflicting "Basic Observations" just referred to.

75 The point was made in Report No. 108 (paras 123-25 and 134) that some tanks remained unaccounted for in R.A.F. reconnaissance photographs taken on 21 Aug. Some further light can now be thrown on this matter. Most German reports agree that 28 tanks fell into the enemy's hands. (See, e.g., Report No. 116, Appx "B", and cf. Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part V. But the C.-in-C. West's "Basic Observations, No. 8", above, para 74, give the total as 29, as does the list of captured equipment in the "Enemy Situation Report" annexed to his report.) We did leave 29 tanks behind, but it will be recalled (Report No. 108, para 119) that one went down into deep water. The problem of the tanks missing in the reconnaissance photographs is at least partially solved by a reference in the "Q" War Diary of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, 25 Aug 42 (see above, para 65) to the effect that tanks counted at low tide amount to 26 on the beach plus two taken away by 81 Tk Coy. This suggests what had happened to two of the missing tanks; the third presumably was present but not visible in the air photographs. The two tanks recovered by 81 Tk Coy were most likely taken from the promenade, and it may perhaps be assumed that, as three still remained there when the air photographs were taken on 21 Aug, there had been five there at the end of the operation. This may be the source of the remark in the observations of C.-in-C. West (above, para 74); some staff officer, seeing only five tanks on the promenade, doubtless not unnaturally assumed that only this number had crossed the wall.

#### COMMENTS ON OUR TROOPS AND METHODS

76 The report of 81 Corps (Report No. 116, para 33 and Appx "A") is the only German document to comment adversely on the fighting spirit of the Canadian troops, except for a remark occurring in a message "Personal impressions from the battlefield" sent at 1945 hrs (German time) 20 Aug 42 to the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmach (Gen Jodl) by the Chief of Staff G.H.Q. West (Gen Zeitzler). Zeitzler's message ran in part:

English fought well. Canadians and Americans not so well, later quickly surrendered under the influence of the high bloody losses.

(Report of C.-in-C. West, Appx "A" below, part IX.)

77 It is rather unfortunate that the report of 81 Corps has been the only German document to reach the public; it was published in Maclean's, 1 Mar 46. The comments made in this document are specifically repudiated in others, notably in the comments of H.Q. Fifteenth Army, 27 Aug 42 (Ibid, Appx II). Col-Gen Haase wrote:

The large number of English prisoners might leave the impression that the fighting value of the English and Canadian units employed should not be too highly estimated. This is not the case. The enemy, almost entirely Canadian soldiers, fought - so far as he was able to fight at all - well and bravely. The main reasons for the large number of prisoners and casualties are probably:

1. Lack of artillery support. The effect of naval artillery was seriously hampered by the smoke. After the loss of his tanks the enemy had hardly any heavy weapons at his disposal.
2. The Englishman had underestimated the strength of the defences and therefore, at most of his landing places - especially at Puy and Dieppe - found himself in a hopeless position as soon as he came ashore.
3. The effect of our own defensive weapons was superior to that of the weapons employed by the attacker.
4. The craft provided for re-embarkation were almost all hit and sank.

78 The remarks of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part IV(C)) are notable and worthy of separate quotation here:

The main attack at Dieppe, Puys and Pourville was commenced by the 2nd Canadian Division with great energy. That the enemy gained no ground at all in Puys, and in Dieppe could take only parts of the beach not including the west mole and the western edge of the beach, and this only for a short time, was not the result of lack of courage, but of the concentrated defensive fire of our Divisional Artillery and infantry heavy weapons. Moreover, his tank crews did not lack spirit. They could not penetrate the anti-tank walls which barred the way into the town of Dieppe (a large demolition charge failed to explode) and some of them were unable to get forward over the rolling beach shingle and cross the sea wall. In Puys the efforts made by the enemy, in spite of the heavy German machine-gun fire, to surmount the wire obstacles studded with booby traps on the first beach terrace are signs of a good offensive spirit (Angriffsfreudigkeit). The large number of prisoners at Puys was the result of the hopelessness of the situation for the men who had been landed, caught under German machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire between the cliffs and the sea on a beach which offered no cover.

At Pourville the enemy, immediately after landing, pushed forward into the interior without worrying about flank protection.

The 2nd Canadian Division which carried out this attack consisted predominantly of French-Canadians; about 90% of the names on a captured Company nominal roll were clearly of French origin.

The operations against the coastal batteries were conducted by the Commandos with great dash and skill. With the aid of technical devices of all sorts they succeeded in clambering up the steep cliffs at points which had seemed quite inaccessible.

79 The comments of the German reports on our plan and the direction of our operations follow the same lines as those of 81 Corps already noted in Report No. 116 (paras 24-30).

80 The general comment of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part IV(C)) is worthy of quotation:

The English higher command considerably underestimated the strength in all weapons required for such an attack. The strength of air and naval forces was not nearly sufficient to keep the defenders down during the landings and to destroy their signal communications. It is incomprehensible that it should be believed that a single Canadian Division should be able to overrun a German Infantry Regiment reinforced with artillery.

The English command at the middle levels (mittlere Führung) drew up the plan of attack moderately well (mässig), but drew the time-table for the intended withdrawal at "W" Hour in a theoretical manner which reflected inexperience of battle (mit einem kampffremden Schematismus).

The employment of the tanks against Dieppe alone was an error, even if they counted on destroying the anti-tank walls.

There is no information as yet on the English command at lower levels.

81 It is of interest that the C.-in-C. West took steps to have our captured operation order translated, reproduced, and distributed down to Divisions. The covering letter signed by Field Marshal von Rundstedt (Basic Observations of C.-in-C. West No. 9, W.D. No. 3, H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Volume "Dieppe II", Serial No. 24353-9) remarked, "According to German ideas, the order is not an order, but an aide-memoire or a scheme worked out for a map exercise. Nevertheless, it does contain many points of value to us." Formation staffs were directed to study the order closely with a view to profiting by it as much as possible. One observation of the Field Marshal is particularly interesting:

It would be an error to believe that the enemy will mount his next operation in the same manner. He will draw his lessons from his mistakes in planning and from his failure and next time he will do things differently.

82 In spite of the fact that they were in possession of our operation order, which it may be noted in passing they state was "found on a dead British major on the Dieppe beach" (bei einem am Diepper Strand gefallenem englischen Major) (W.D. No. 3, H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Volume "Dieppe I", Serial No. 24353-8, Appx 14, Intelligence Report of 302 Inf Div on the Landing Operation of 19 Aug 42), the Germans were unable to believe that the Dieppe operation was actually a mere raid. The Report of C.-in-C. West (Appx "A" below, part VIII) calls particular attention to the commitment of a large tank force: "One does not sacrifice 29 or 30 of the most modern tanks for a mere surprise raid". From this and other indications G.H.Q. West draws the conclusion that there was always in the background the possibility of new orders - orders for the beginning of large-scale invasion - being issued if the landings had been successful, and the report remarks with assurance, "That these orders would have been given, if Dieppe had fallen, appears certain".



83 The enemy thus remained convinced that the Dieppe operation was in fact intended to be the preliminary to the opening of the much-heralded Second Front, and he actually believed, in spite of the strong evidence in his hands to the contrary, that his effective defence of Dieppe had prevented the Second Front from becoming a reality. That this could be the case is certainly not to the credit of the German Intelligence service. It must however be remembered that in August 1942 the war stood at a point where the western Allies held the initiative; there were large disposable forces in the United Kingdom and it was not yet clear what use the Allies would make of them. It had in fact been decided, late in July, to open a new front in North Africa; but this the enemy did not know. When it is recalled that the highest United States military authorities had argued strongly for a Second Front in North-West Europe in 1942, the Germans' apprehensions appear rather better founded than they do in the light of the knowledge of later events which we possess today.

#### THE ENEMY'S LOSSES

84 In Report No. 116 (paras 19-23) it was noted that there is some discrepancy between the statement of German losses contained in the Combat Report of 81 Corps, and those contained in the German High Command official communiqué issued after the raid, which actually gave somewhat larger totals. Some doubt was expressed whether these figures had not actually been "doctored", and whether the German losses were not actually much larger than was admitted in their statement.

85 In the light of the additional German documents now available it seems necessary to accept the fact that these figures were not falsified and that the German casualties, at least so far as ground troops are concerned, were actually smaller than we have heretofore been prepared to concede.

86 The figures given in the Report of the C.-in-C. West are precisely those contained in the German High Command official communiqué, amounting in all to 591 men. It is rather remarkable that a table of losses attached to a report dated 3 Sep 42 should be so completely in accord on this matter with a statement published immediately after the operation, and one seems forced to the conclusion that the C.-in-C. West was in this instance more concerned with maintaining uniformity with the story already officially published than with producing a completely accurate statement. The fact remains however that the figures of losses he gives are larger than those found in any of the other German statements now available. (7)

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(7) In justice to the C.-in-C. West it should also be noted that he remarks that there has not been time for collation of the casualty figures reported by 81 Corps and 302 Inf Div.

87 It should be noted in passing that the discrepancy referred to in footnote 3 to para 36 of Report No. 109 is resolved by the figures given by C.-in-C. West. As suggested in Report No. 109, the figure of naval wounded should be 35, not 135.

88 For purposes of comparison, the four chief versions of the German casualties now available are set forth below. In some cases no distinction is made between officers and other ranks, in certain others the figures are divided by officers, N.C.Os. and soldiers, and in some cases by officers and other ranks.

(a) C.-in-C. West (and High Command Communiqué)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>Army</u>	115	187	14
<u>Navy</u>	78 <sup>8</sup>	35	
<u>Air Force</u>	104 <sup>9</sup>	58	
(Grand total: <u>591</u> )			

(b) 81 Corps (see Report No. 116)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>302 Inf Div</u>	5 - 14 - 68	5 - 27 - 124	0 - 1 - 9
(Total: 253)			
<u>Total all arms</u> (Army, Navy, Air and Org Todt)	6 ——— 144	5 ——— 270	———— 15
(Grand total: <u>440</u> )			

(c) 302 Inf Div (Operations Report 25 Aug 42) (Appx "B" below)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>302 Inf Div</u>	5 - 14 - 74	5 - 27 - 136	0 - 1 - 6
<u>Army Coast Arty</u>	———— 28	1 ——— 32	———— 4
<u>Navy</u>	———— 28	———— 27	
<u>Org Todt</u>	———— 3	———— 7	
(Grand total: <u>398</u> ) (Air Force not <u>included</u> )			

(8) Dead and missing: missing from the sunk submarine-chaser.

(9) Dead and missing (missing from aircraft shot down) (Vermisste durch Abschüsse!).

(d) 302 Inf Div (Quartiermeisterabteilung) 23 Aug 42  
(W.D. No 3, Serial No. 24361-1).

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>Army</u> <sup>10</sup>	5 — 111	5 — 195	— 5
<u>Navy</u>	1 — 31	— 27	
<u>Air Force</u>	2 — 30	— 55	— 41
<u>Ord Todt</u>	— 3	— 7	

(Grand total: 518)

89 These figures, reinforced by other references in the documents, appear to indicate beyond all probability of doubt that so far as the German Army was concerned it had fewer than 125 fatal casualties during the operation, and that its grand total of casualties was in the vicinity of 325 all ranks. For the total German losses of all services, the figure of 591 all ranks given in the original communique still remains the largest found in any German record yet seen.

90 It seems unlikely that any new evidence that may come to light in the future will materially change the situation with respect to German Army casualties. With respect to the Luftwaffe, however, the position is by no means so clear. The figure of air force casualties (104 dead and missing, 58 wounded) given in the Report of C.-in-C. West still seems very inadequate to cover the losses of the Luftwaffe in the air battle over Dieppe, the more so as in addition considerable numbers of Luftwaffe troops were engaged on the ground.

91 In this connection it is important to note such German evidence as is at present available concerning the enemy's losses of aircraft. It is very slight, consisting of a note in the Weekly Situation Report of H.Q. Fifteenth Army for the week 17-23 Aug 42 (W.D., H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 26621-6). It notes: "Aircraft shot down: 142 R.A.F., 34 German". These figures are so ludicrously at variance with the R.A.F. computation of 170 enemy aircraft destroyed (Report No. 109, paras 40-41) that they cannot possibly be accepted. Any firm conclusion on the Luftwaffe losses at Dieppe, either in aircraft or personnel, must it appears await the examination of Luftwaffe records not at present available to Hist Sec (G.S.).

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(10) Includes Army Coast Arty, 30 killed, 30 wounded.

NOTES ON GERMAN DOCUMENTS

92 The originals of the German documents referred to in this report are in the hands of the German Military Document Section at Washington, D.C. Photostatic copies of the most important (notably the Report of C.-in-C. West, the operations report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div and the report of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117) are preserved by Hist Sec (G.S.), Army Headquarters, Ottawa. No attempt has been made to reproduce maps and tracings, which are numerous, for the purposes of the present report, though a great deal of information drawn from them is incorporated in it. Photostats or tracings of the most important pieces of evidence of this type are in the hands of Hist Sec (G.S.).

93 It may be noted that H.Q. Fifteenth Army evidently prepared no report on the Dieppe operation; Col-Gen Haase contented himself with making detailed observations on the report of H.Q. 81 Corps. Both the Corps report and the Army observations upon it are attached as appendices to the report of C.-in-C. West.

94 Translations of the following documents are attached as appendices:

Appendix "A", Report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42  
(less appendices).

Appendix "B", Operations Report of H.Q. 302 Inf  
Div, 25 Aug 42.

Appendix "C", Report of 302 Arty Regt on artillery  
lessons, 2 Sep 42.

*C. P. Stacey*  
(C. P. Stacey) Colonel,  
Director Historical Section,  
Army Headquarters.

REPORT OF THE GERMAN  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WEST  
(FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNDSTEDT)  
ON THE DIEPPE RAID  
19 AUG 42

(Oberbefehlshaber West (Oberkommando Heeresgruppe D)  
Ia Nr. 2550/42 g. Kdos.,  
3 Sep 42)

(APPENDICES OMITTED)

NOTE: Times are equivalent to British Double Summer Time, i.e.,  
one hour in advance of the times given in Allied orders  
and reports concerning this operation.

Translated by  
Historical Section (G.S.),  
Army Headquarters, Ottawa,  
November 1946.

H.Q., 3 Sep 42.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WEST

(G.H.Q. ARMY GROUP D) ON THE ENGLISH LANDING

ATTEMPT AT, AND ON BOTH FLANKS OF DIEPPE

(19 Aug 42)

I. Previous History:

1) From the middle of June onwards, information accumulated at G.H.Q. West as the result of photographic and visual reconnaissance by the 3rd Air Fleet and reports from agents, of an assembly of numerous small landing craft on the South Coast of England.

A further reconnaissance flight, flown only at the end of July because of poor weather conditions, confirmed the assembly of vessels which had become still more numerous since the large number observed in June.

No further data - except from agents' reports of an English operation, which could not be checked - could be obtained up to 15 August. In spite of this, G.H.Q. West appreciated the situation from the middle of June to be such that it had to reckon with the possibility of an enemy operation, even a major undertaking, at any moment, and at any point on its extensive coastal front. The U-Boat strongpoints and defence sectors were therefore strengthened as much as possible, both by manpower and by construction (the landward fronts not being neglected), and the organization of the forces was repeatedly checked so that all reserves - local, divisional, corps, and army - would be ready for immediate employment.

G.H.Q. West paid particular attention to ensuring that its motorized Army Group reserves were readily available so near the coast as to enable them to go into action in force on the first day of a landing.

2) On 15 August, a sudden change took place in the English wireless procedure which made our interception service much more difficult. Numerous flights toward the Channel Coast suggested the possibility that these were briefing flights, and frequently aircraft shot down were found to have American crews. No further change in the enemy picture appeared until 0450 hours on 19 August, not even as a result of the early reconnaissance of the 3rd Air Fleet.

3) Every day, weather conditions, times of tides, and strength of winds were carefully observed and the troops were kept informed.

For the night following the 13 August, the weather conditions for the Channel area presented the following picture: (See Appendix 1).

Winds at first light and from about South, later freshening to strengths 2-4. Little cloud, visibility approximately 4-10 km; in the morning, haze with deterioration of visibility on the coast. Later, becoming overcast from the West with lower cloud ceiling to be expected.

Moon sets: at 0020 hrs.  
 Night hours from 18 August 2215 hrs until 19 August 0610 hrs.  
 Visibility improving after 0610 hrs.  
 Highwater at Dieppe on 19 August at 0503 hrs.

These weather conditions made an enemy landing in the eastern section of the Channel during the night of 18-19 August appear as a possibility.

4) Naval Group Command West, therefore, ordered the speed boat group stationed at Boulogne (4 boats) to be on half-an-hour's notice after 2400 hrs.

(Note: No order for action was given on 19 August as enemy attack took place at dawn and because action against destroyers seemed useless).

In the Channel, no other battle forces of the Navy were available, for the 5th Speed Boat Flotilla had been committed during the night of 18-19 August to laying mines in Lyme Bay.

18 Aug 42

On 18 August at 2100 hrs a German six-knot convoy cleared Boulogne for Dieppe. It consisted of five motor vessels or coastal motor sailing vessels protected by three sub-chasers. Between 0430 hrs and 0500 hrs on 19 August this convoy was off the coast at the level of Dieppe.

## II. First Contact with the Enemy.

(Sea battle in front of the Dieppe Sector, 302 Infantry Division).

19 Aug 42

0545 hrs: G.H.Q. West (Officer on Duty) receives the following message from Naval Group Command West: "At 0450 hrs our convoy attacked by surface craft 4 km off Dieppe. No further details yet available. In the opinion of Naval Group Command West customary attack on convoy."

0600 hrs: H.Q. 15th Army reports to G.H.Q. West: "According to a report of H.Q. 81 Corps English fast units attacked own convoy at 0500 hrs 20 km off Dieppe. Troops in higher state of alert. Navy and Air Force have been informed."

(Note: As appeared later, this convoy had run into the first wave of English landing craft and partly upset the time plan and beaching of the English, having at least the effect of delaying them.)

As a result of the noise of battle the alarm was given in the Coastal Sector.

### III. The Enemy Landing Attempt at and on both Flanks of Dieppe

(302 Infantry Division).

A. Original layout of 302 Infantry Division (including reserves of all kinds, in position behind the division) (See Appendix 2). War-organization of 302 Infantry Division in the sector attacked, including order of battle (See Appendix 3). Map 1:50,000 with Strongpoint Group Dieppe (See Appendix 4). Map of Port of Dieppe with local defensive positions (See Appendix 5).

B. Original position in the Luftwaffe:

1) Reconnaissance:

Since May 1942 air reconnaissance had been planned on basis of joint appreciation of the overall picture by G.H.Q. West and 3rd Air Fleet.

In detail, the following were assigned to it:

9 Flying Corps, Reconnaissance Group 123, and Air Force Commander Atlantic.

Reconnaissance Area: from the North Sea over the Channel as far as the Atlantic.

Focal Points of Reconnaissance: Thames Estuary, English South Coast ports, Bristol Channel, Bay of Biscay.

Evening Reconnaissance: areas between the Schelde and Thames Estuaries, the English South Coast and the area around Brittany as far as the Gironde Estuary.

Night Reconnaissance: Channel area off Cap Griz Nez, the Bay of the Seine, sea area around Normandy.

To ensure overlapping of reconnaissance the fighter forces were fitted in according to their ranges.

2) Fighter Units:

2 fighter commands with 6 fighter groups, 2 fighter bomber squadrons and replacement units were continuously committed for air defence.

3) Bomber Units:

9 Flying Corps (6 Bomber Groups and several replacement groups).

Air Force Command Atlantic (3 Bomber Groups and 1 replacement group).

(Note: On 19 August the battle strength of the 3rd Air Fleet, especially of the bomber units, amounted to approximately 35-40% of its normal strength.)

4) Preparedness for instant action as well as the control of all units fit for combat belonging to the replacement groups was arranged through 3rd Air Fleet.



5) All measures for the protection of aerodromes, etc., had been taken.

For Flak positions and disposition of signal equipment (See Appendix 4).

Appreciation - air: Up to the commencement of battle action the morning of 19 August enemy air operations by day or night did not point in any particular way to an impending landing attempt.

Appreciation - wireless: Interception of operational and training traffic in England presented no deviation from normal.

C. Original position in the Navy:

(See I, paras 4 and 5).

There were three port defence boats in position in front of Dieppe. No identifications about enemy forces were reported by R.D.F. equipment up to the receipt of the report of the sea battle of Dieppe. Single targets were briefly registered after 0400 hrs by the equipment at Treport as up to 10 sea miles north to northwest of Dieppe, and taken in connection with engine noises which had been reported they were held to be air targets.

#### The Landing:

0630 hrs: H.Q. 15th Army reports to G.H.Q. West:

"According to a message from H.Q. 31 Corps of 0605 hrs, bombs dropping on Dieppe, and enemy landing attempts at Berneval, Dieppe, Pourville, and Quiberville." Thereafter Chief of Staff G.H.Q. West, G-Ops Branch, Army Administration Officer, and Air Force Liaison Officer were called and put in the picture. (The officer on duty at G.H.Q. West passed on the message from H.Q. 15th Army to Naval Group West and 3rd Air Fleet.)

#### First Appreciation of the Situation by G.H.Q. West:

It cannot yet be estimated whether the operation is of a local character and what strengths are involved. But because there have been simultaneous landing attempts at several localities (for the first time!) on a front of 20-25 and in daylight it is possible that the landing is a major effort. Moreover, not known what is behind. The possibility of an attack at another point still open! Situation still unclear. For the resulting picture of situation at 0650 hrs (See Appendix 6).

0700 hrs: G.H.Q. West orders as an advance measure that 10 Pz Div, SS-Div "A.H." and 7 Air Force (Flieger) Div be notified as follows:

"Reports on enemy landing attempt as yet not clear. Must count on possibility of an alert".

- 0725 hrs: G.H.Q. West orders for 10 Pz Div: "Alarm scale II."
- 0728 hrs: G.H.Q. West orders for SS-Div "A.H.": "Alarm scale II."
- 0732 hrs: Naval Group Command West reports that according to a message received from Sea Commandant Seine-Somme at 0625 hrs, a landing attempt of enemy units in progress at Berneval. Naval Artillery firing on enemy ships.
- 0732 hrs: Simultaneously message from H.Q. 15th Army: "C. of S., H.Q. 31 Corps, reports enemy on land at Berneval. Counter-attack laid on with about three companies; details not known yet. Bombing attack on Dieppe continues. Landing attempt at Pourville repelled. Situation at Quiberville still unclear."
- 0740 hrs: Naval Group Command West reports that according to message of the Commanding Admiral France telephonic connection interrupted to Port Commandant Dieppe. Naval signal station Dieppe reports: "English continues to land at Dieppe. Destroyers laying smoke on coast. Up to now twelve tanks have landed, one is on fire."

Second Appreciation of the Position by G.H.Q. West:

Operation has greater extent and seems to aim at taking possession of Dieppe as bridgehead.

- 0800 hrs: Chief of the General Staff G.H.Q. West calls Gen of Arty Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and informs him about the enemy situation and about counter-measures taken (counter-attack by local reserves, alarming of Army Group reserves: 10 Pz Div and SS-Div "A.H."), and requests through Commander of U-Boats to lay on U-Boat attacks against the western flank of the enemy.
- 0800 hrs: First K.R. message to High Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operations Staff (Army High Command/G-Ops informed):
- "0605 hrs enemy landing attempts at, and around Dieppe, battle in progress. Detailed report follows."
- 0815 hrs: C.G.S. G.H.Q. West talks to G.O.C. 31 Corps; the latter at present considers enemy attack to be a local operation.
- Until 0825 hrs: Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands and the Armies are informed about the situation at Dieppe. Highest alertness is ordered! Thereafter the Military Commander in France is put in the picture to pass on information to Military Commanders Belgium and Northern France.
- 0830 hrs: Naval Group Commander West passes on ~~to the C.-in-C. West~~ the following message received at 0820 hrs from Commanding Admiral France:

"Naval Signal Station Dieppe reports: flak firing on landing troops at Casino and on attacking fighters (Casino on beach of Dieppe has, for reasons of defence, been partly blown up and demolished). A troop transport sunk off the Casino. German fighters over Dieppe. A second transport on fire. English attempting to land with assault craft".

0845 hrs: Naval Group Command West reports: Own convoy dispersed North of Dieppe during enemy landings. One enemy boat destroyed by ramming, several hits on S-Boats and 1 flotilla leader. Two aircraft shot down. Smaller part (of convoy) off Valery en Caux. Divisions in the respective coastal defence sector have been informed through Naval Group. (Position of convoy on 19 Aug 42 towards 0500 hrs has been afterwards established.) (See Appendix 7).

0850 hrs: G.H.Q. West to 3rd Air Fleet following discussion with H.Q. 81 Corps: H.Q. 81 Corps requests air effort against everything that floats but asks refrain meanwhile from any effort against the land. Will request land effort in due time.

0915 hrs: Sea Commandant Seine-Somme reports via Naval Commander Channel Coast: "English still landing (at Dieppe). 17 - 20 tanks on the beach firing at the town. English destroyers laying smoke-screen. One troop transport has been sunk east of Dieppe. M.G. and cannon attack of enemy fighters (time not given.)" Immediately following, a supplementary message from the same source: 0735 English are landing units. Destroyers laying smoke. About 20 tanks on the beach. Four destroyers cruising 3 sea miles off the port entrance. English fighters guard the landings.

0915 hrs: 10 Pz Div reports vanguard ready to move at 0945 hrs, main body at 1100 hrs (SS-Div "A.H." shortly before reported its advanced guard ready to move at 0945 hrs; main body of division not yet ready.)

0923 hrs: 3rd Air Fleet reports (via A.L.O.) that 9 Flying Corps has started to attack enemy shipping at 0900 hrs with aircraft in continuous commitment.

0925 to 0940 hrs: Conversations of the C.G.S. G.H.Q. West and GSO 1 with H.Q. 15th Army, H.Q. 81 Corps and 3rd Air Fleet about situation and enemy impression. Enemy picture becoming clearer.

Contradictory messages about appearance of enemy cruisers off St. Valery en Caux (later turn out to be wrong).

0940 hrs: Third Appreciation of the Position by C.-in-C. West: The enemy picture clears up. Although enemy landing attempts still continue, 302 Inf Div has already started to counter-attack with local reserves. While the heights on both sides of Dieppe remain firmly in our hands, little can as yet be said about the situation in Dieppe proper. Further to the West, near Pourville, landings still seem to continue. At

any rate, ships are moving to and from the beach at that point. Situation at Quiberville unclear, it has not yet been established whether Quiberville itself has been attacked at all. Enemy landing attempt at St. Aubin still possible.

On the basis of the above appreciation of the situation, which indicates that the enemy is landing in considerable strength having committed at least two brigades, and possibly a whole division; and because further developments are still uncertain, C.-in-C. West decides to commit 10 Pz Div.

0944 hrs: Order by C.-in-C. West to 10 Pz Div (H.Qs. 15th Army and 81 Corps informed): "10 Pz Div will be placed under command of General Kuntzen (H.Q. 31 Corps) to clean up the situation at Dieppe immediately. - 10 Pz Div can move vanguard at 1000 hrs, main force at 1100 hrs." (This order was received by telephone by H.Q. 15th Army at 0947 hrs, by 10 Pz Div at 0951 hrs, by H.Q. 81 Corps at 0954 hrs.) Situation as known at the time of decision to commit 10 Pz Div, (See Appendix 8).

Thereafter C.G.S. G.H.Q. West calls Gen. of Arty. Jodl, Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, to inform him about the situation, about our own position, the appreciation and the measures taken by G.H.Q. West.

1000 hrs: Second K.R. message to High Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operation Staff (Army High Command/G-Ops informed):  
"Enemy landing attempts continue. Army counter-attacking with local reserves. Situation in Dieppe still unclear. High ground on both sides of Dieppe firmly in our hands. Landings at Pourville continue. The situation there unclear. Apparently another landing attempt at St. Aubin being prepared."

1003 hrs: C.G.S. 81 Corps reports about the situation at Dieppe as follows:  
"Situation at Berneval apparently cleared up. Arty  $\text{tp } 2/7$  again firing with four guns. Enemy apparently flees underneath the bluffs (low tide) in a North-Easterly direction. Request fighter attacks against this group. Situation at Puy Northeast of Dieppe also cleared up. 302 Div reports approximately 500 enemy casualties or prisoners. High ground on either side of Dieppe in our hands as well as East height at Pourville; the English are on the West height. 813 Tp near St. Marguerite was taken and is now recaptured. They are again firing with two guns."

1020 hrs: From H.Q. 15th Army the following G-Int message arrives which however has not been confirmed by G-Ops H.Q. 15th Army: "At Criel-Plage (north of Criel Sur Mer, 10 km Northeast of Berneval) an enemy company has landed. Counter-attack in progress, proceeding favourably." Clarification of above by telephonic request of G-Ops G.H.Q. West arranged immediately. (Some time later yielded reply that near Criel-Plage there was no enemy!)

1046 hrs: Fighter protection for the commitment of 10 Pz Div has been requested as follows:

- a) For vanguard and command group over area Torcy Le Grand and Torcy Le Petit for 1200 hrs;
- b) For main force of 10 Pz Div over Neufchatel for 1430 hrs.

1047 hrs: A commitment of U-Boats for reconnaissance in the Channel requested by G.H.Q. West from Naval Group West has been refused by the Commander Naval Group West, because U-Boats are ill qualified for reconnaissance and because their commitment East of Cherbourg is impossible due to danger from mines and enemy air superiority. Commitment of same at the western exit of the Channel towards the Bristol Channel and in the Bay of Biscay has not yet been considered necessary.

1110 hrs: 3rd Air Fleet reports (via A.L.O.) the following reconnaissance results (time of return of reconnaissance plane 1010 hrs):

- a) In Dieppe two large fires, riding at anchor 5-6 destroyers which are taking cover in smoke; identified 50-80 landing craft.
- b) 40 km Northwest of Dieppe 6 large transports, apparently tank transports fully loaded.
- c) 60 km Northwest of Dieppe 3 medium-sized freighters, 1 S-Boat.
- d) Area Selsey Bill (England) 26 large transports each of 6,000 tons, 3 destroyers in convoy. Decks closely crowded with troops.
- e) South-east of Eastbourne small boats, moving East, apparently are protecting forces.
- f) Other sea areas: nothing observed.
- g) English fighter commitment over Dieppe very strong, in action with weaker own forces. Reports b, c, and d were food for thought. The question immediately asked by C.-in-C. West about the direction of movement of the 26 large transports could not be cleared up (at least not up to this point). These reports enforced a new appreciation of the situation.

Fourth Appreciation of the Situation by C.-in-C. West:

The ships under b and c according to the English landing plan probably belong to the "floating reserve." If one brings this reserve into operational connection with the fleet of transports in the rear mentioned under d, the enemy undertaking may be the beginning of an attempt to establish the "Second Front".

It is also possible that the enemy is carrying out the attack on Dieppe for reasons of deception, in order to attract the motorized reserves of G.H.Q. West thither and then carry out a major operation at another point - C.-in-C. West must keep Brittany in mind.

Whichever way this may be, it remains our task to batter and wipe out the enemy at Dieppe with all our means in the shortest possible time. The situation there has been so f.

clarified that the reserves already committed or moving up will suffice for this task.

If the enemy cannot establish a beachhead at Dieppe, neither the floating reserve nor the fleet of transports as an operation reserve will be of any use to him.

He may, however, have prepared the 26 transports as a second wave for a main effort, probably against Normandy.

As a result of these considerations, C.-in-C. West shortly thereafter decided to make the whole of the 7th Army sector (Normandy and Brittany) fully ready for defence.

For ship movements of the enemy at 1110 hrs known to G.H.Q. West: (See Appendix 9).

1120 hrs: Report received of a just-intercepted English wireless message saying that "four tanks have been shot up at Dieppe, situation serious."

1130 hrs: Order of G.H.Q. West to H.Q. 7th Army:  
(H.Q. 25 Corps, H.Q. 84 Corps, Motorized Army Group Reserves including 7 Air Force Div and Brigade "Hermann Goring" and Army Group Reserve: 3.7 Inf Div, all informed.) "26 troop transports, closely crowded with men, seen by air reconnaissance off Isle of Wright. I order Alarm Scale II for 7th Army Group Reserves: 7 Air Force Div, 6 Pz Div, 337 Inf Div, Brigade "Hermann Goring"!

Sgd. Von Rundstedt

Field Marshall.

(S.S.-Div. "Das Reich" was intentionally not alarmed to Scale II but was informed of the measures taken by C.-in-C. West, as were also Naval Group Command West and 3rd Air Fleet Command.)

1150 hrs: 3rd Air Fleet reports (via A.L.O.) from Air Reconnaissance Group 123:  
"Discussion with pilot reveals a convoy (26 ships of 6,000 tons each) strongly manned with troops; it left Selsey Bill towards North-west in direction of Portsmouth. Reconnaissance flights laid on for 1300 hrs will report further position.

This report led to further deliberation by C.-in-C. West:  
The shipwreck of the Dieppe operation had become clear to the enemy's Operational Command. To bring the precious shipping into an area rendered perilous by German aircraft did not seem advisable. But to move the convoy of transports nearer the strongly defended naval port of Portsmouth did not necessarily mean that the enemy had given up his intentions.

1200 hrs: G-Int Air, G.H.Q. West reports from 3rd (F) Staffel 122 (Long Distance Reconnaissance Squadron 122?) at tactical time 0930 hrs to 0953 hrs:

In area Fecamp-Dieppe 3-6 km off the coast 7 English large naval units, heavy and light cruisers, with 10-15 escort vessels, 1 light cruiser and another naval unit sighted moving in direction of English coast."

This rearward movement too may be connected with that above mentioned. Everything points to the enemy's having recognized the failure at Dieppe and cancelled the operation. This may mean annihilation for the parts of his force which landed.

G.H.Q. West doubts whether the size and class of the reported warships is correct. (Experience shows that large destroyers are easily confused with cruisers.)

1220 hrs: C.-in-C. West gives decision to General of the troops West (Gen. d. Tr. West) who have sent a L.O. to G-Ops G.H.Q. West, that in consideration of the favourable development of the situation neither a stoppage of railway lines and trains for civilian traffic, nor a suspension of furlough is in question.

But all provision is to be made so that the German railwaymen would be readily available for work at any time.

1225 hrs: A further appreciation of the situation is requested from H.Q. 81 Corps.

1230 hrs: Naval Commander Channel Coast (via Naval Group West) reports (message reached Naval Group West at 1220 hrs): "No more ships in front of Dieppe, destroyers have left. Burning landing craft on the beach. Several tanks still driving up and down, they are being fired at by Army guns which have been run up to the beach. Beach appears to be sealed off."

At the same time the following English wireless messages reached G.H.Q. West:

0745 hrs: "All goes well."

1044 hrs: "Many tanks destroyed. Situation is serious. The enemy trumps are strong."

1058 hrs: "An unknown English Commander requests "Smoke for re-embarkation."

1235 hrs: Report from 3rd Air Fleet to G.H.Q. West: "Fighter commitment until 1130 hrs 288 aircraft, of these 18 fighter bombers. Successes: 24 aircraft shot down for certain, 4 probables. 1 destroyer damaged, 3 own losses (3 eigene Verluste). Bombers so far committed: 54. No success reports are yet available."

1249 hrs: H.Q. 81 Corps reports its appreciation of the present position: "Situation east of Dieppe cleared up. No more danger at Penly and Berneval. Dieppe, about 1 dozen tanks shot up."

Mopping up on the beach proceeds satisfactorily. To the West of Dieppe enemy still in position at Pourville, counter-attack with two battalions is under way and going well. Entered the western position of Pourville. Apparently no more reinforcements from the sea. The general impression: withdrawal!"

Situation at 1249 hrs as per appreciation G.H.Q. West, (See Appendix 10).

This now confirms the C.-in-C. West's former appreciation made on the basis of reports of backward ship movements, that the enemy attack on Dieppe has failed.

1310 hrs: Report G-Int. G.H.Q. West that interception reveals the following: The English are retreating, a second simultaneous operation seems to have been cancelled.

Thus are confirmed the 31 Corps appreciation of the situation as well as that of G.H.Q. West that, taking into account the identified 26 enemy transports, additional special enemy intentions did exist; these may, in the event of successful occupation of Dieppe, have been the landing of additional waves, and therewith the beginning to a dash toward the operationally important key position of Le Havre, or possibly a second operation against Normandy/Brittany. This leads to the -

Fifth Appreciation of the Situation by C.-in-C. West:

The enemy is withdrawing. He has been repelled completely east of and at Dieppe; to the West of Dieppe near Pourville, and in the woods and gullies to the West of it, mopping up is in progress and it is merely a question of time.

Now, it is up to us to destroy what can be destroyed. For that purpose every weapon and every barrel must be employed. C.-in-C. West therefore orders the following:

1315 hrs: To H.Q. 15th Army (KRC), H.Q. 31 Corps Naval Group Command West, 3rd Air Fleet Command (by telephone, ahead). "Enemy who landed at Dieppe withdrawing. It is up to us now-- and I am pressing this point--to wipe out just as many of the enemy as is in any way possible. Therefore, battleworthy units of the 10 Pz Div, armour and artillery, drive forward at once! Every available weapon must now contribute to the complete destruction of the enemy. The whole front on which the enemy has landed must be cleared up in the shortest of time!

The Commander in Chief West  
S. Von Rundstedt,  
Field Marshal."

Thereafter C.G.S. G.H.Q. West calls Gen of Arty Jodl, Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, put him in the picture, gives him an appreciation of the situation and informs him



about the order issued by C.-in-C. West.

Immediately thereafter G-Int G.H.Q. West reports orders for the commitment of alarm units of the propaganda companies and that the prisoners are to be collected in a ~~camp~~ prepared in advance under the Commander of the Armed Forces in France. H.Q. 15th Army arranging for the remainder. The interpreters and interrogators provided for such emergency have already been sent off en route to H.Q. 15th Army.

1330 hrs: Confirmation of the appreciation of the situation by C.-in-C. West by report from 3rd Air Fleet (Reconnaissance Group 123) according to which there is no enemy reinforcement traffic noticeable in a southerly direction between Eastbourne and Dieppe.

\*  
1433 hrs: H.Q. 81 Corps reports: "Enemy who landed East of Dieppe annihilated! In Dieppe itself situation cleared up. A number of small points of resistance remain. Regiment in action estimates prisoners to number 1,000. High ground West of Dieppe to Pourville always remained in our hands. I Bn 571 Inf Regt committed against Pourville and have partly entered it. Enemy beachhead to the West of Pourville still 1 km deep on a front of 6 km in area offering poor view (gullies and woods). Corps Reserve placed at disposal of 302 Div and attacking from Offranville against sector Pourville - Varengeville. in support of attack by I Bn 571 Inf Regt. One Bn has been moved ahead to St. Marguerite to prevent the English from escaping from the beachhead there.

At sea, strong smoke cover by English, apparently for purpose of removing the landed troops.

All forces are committed to come to grips with the enemy and destroy him. General Kuntzen has been in Dieppe in person, and now is in area south of Pourville. He intends to carry through the commitment of 10 Pz Div in any event.

1500 - 1515 hrs: Following reports received at G.H.Q. West:

- a) From H.Q. 15th Army: the number of tanks hit at Dieppe is said to have reached 18.
- b) From 3rd Air Fleet: English requesting air support by wireless (fighters), because as a result of the strong defence unable to drop bombs on coast-defences; also request Mustangs for protection of their ships which are being attacked (Luftwaffe!). Enemy aircraft shot down so far 34 with 9 own losses. A direct hit with a 500-kg bomb on a 1,500-ton ship and well placed bomb-hits among enemy boats.

1525 hrs: C.-in-C. West orders 15th Army to submit within one hour an interim report with the following information:

- a) Estimated strength and commitment of the enemy.
- b) Results, up to the present, of the defence, especially captured enemy equipment, if any, equipment destroyed, numbers of prisoners etc., and a brief account of the battle.

\* Time not clear in photostat: might be 1333.

1545 hrs: H.Q. 81 Corps reports: "Dieppe and Pourville in our hands!  
In the woods of Varengeville only single stragglers. In  
the last hour three destroyers, two torpedo boats, and  
several landing craft were sunk by artillery fire. Operation  
 as good as ended; about 1100 prisoners is our estimate.  
 10 Pz Div is moving up. Advanced guard should be arriving at  
 Dieppe now. 302 Inf Div has cleared the situation up by  
 itself, assisted only by flak and Luftwaffe.  
 Situation after receipt of this message at G.H.Q. West:  
 (See Appendix 11).

Thus the enemy's Dieppe operation was smashed in just over  
9 hours! The extent of the English defeat began to appear as early as  
 midday and increased until 1700 hrs as detailed reports came  
 in. Not only did the enemy lose heavily on land, but also he  
 must have suffered very heavy losses at sea which can merely  
 be estimated.

Our own losses seem moderate and compared to the losses of  
 the English they appear trifling.

1710 hrs: Interim Report of H.Q. 15th Army arrives at G.H.Q. West  
 confirming the above mentioned appreciation; it is immediately  
 passed on for the information of High Command Armed Forces/  
 Armed Forces Operations Staff.

From this and other reports it is evident that the English  
 Army used for the attack two brigades, probably more, and in  
 addition "Commandos". Tanks landed only at Dieppe and they  
 were destroyed without exception. The number of landing  
 craft which the enemy put to sea from transports is estimated  
 at 300-400, which beached in waves of 40-60 craft. In the  
 early morning hours strong English fighter forces appeared,  
 about 16 squadrons, partly with fighter bombers as fighter  
 escort for the convoys. These squadrons were continuously re-  
 lieved by new units! At 1100 hrs a strong fighter force  
 (about 15 squadrons) with 12 twin-engined bombers went into  
 the Abbeville area and dropped bombs from a height of 4,000  
 metres.

English fighter escort regularly relieved remained above  
 the Dieppe area until 1500 hrs and after 1400 hrs it was  
 even reinforced. Thereafter gradual decrease in enemy fighter  
 activity.

1740 hrs: Order by C.-in-C. West that the senior staff officer for  
 tanks at G.H.Q. West proceed immediately to Dieppe to study  
 the enemy tanks lying there.

At about the same time C.G.S. G.H.Q. West reports to Gen of  
 Arty Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff:  
 "No armed Englishmen remains on the Continent", and informs  
 him about the battle results up to that time.

1750 hrs: Commanding Admiral France reports that the port barrier (net)  
 at Dieppe and the port remain intact (though, of course, some

damage has been caused by shelling and bombing).

1800 hrs: H.Q. 81 Corps reports: "Everything again in order in Dieppe and to both flanks of Dieppe. At Dieppe, 28 enemy tanks knocked out. Number of prisoners has increased to 60 officers and 1500 other ranks. The main burden of the fight was borne by 571 Inf Regt and it also took most of the prisoners."

Simultaneously Air Force L.O. reports from 3rd Air Fleet to G.H.Q. West: So far 57 enemy aircraft shot down.

1815 hrs: Third K.R. message to High Command Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operations Staff (High Command Army G-Ops informed):  
"C.-in-C. West reports: No armed Englishman remains on the Continent!"

The 302 Div Arty succeeded at the last moment in sinking three enemy destroyers and two torpedo boats which had come close inshore and several landing craft.

Prisoners 1500, of these 60 Canadian officers. 28 tanks destroyed, some of them American. Precise figures follow. High and bloody losses by the enemy. Initial interrogation of prisoners is being carried out. They were re-loaded at sea onto M-boats. There were Canadian, English, American, and Free French. Operation appears as follows: Landing group of 300-400 landing craft, protected by 13-15 cruisers and destroyers and several groups of fighters. Behind that a floating reserve of 6 transports and 3 freighters. Between the continent and England an operational reserve of 26 transports. According to present findings, about 3 brigades (Rgter.) and about 30 tanks landed. Our own losses not yet established but within moderate limits.

813 Arty Troop near Pourville held their strongpoint in close-quarter battle but the guns were blown. Troop had high bloody losses. Harbour of Dieppe intact, port barrier intact, in front of port entrance one destroyer ("Hunt" class) sunk by fighter bomber. Air Force equipment at Berneval is fit for immediate use. Crew together with Army Coastal Troop 2/770 defended strongpoint in close-quarter battle.

Commander in Chief West  
 S-d. Von Rundstedt  
 Field Marshal.

Herewith the battle actions on land come to an end.

1945 hrs: Following teletype message of C.-in-C. West passed on to H.Q. 15th Army, H.Q. 81 Corps, 302 Inf Div as well as Naval Group Command West, 3rd Air Fleet, and Commanding Admiral France (remaining armies etc. all informed):  
 "English, Canadian, American troops undertook in the morning of 19 Aug 42 a large planned landing attempt in the area of 81 Army Corps near Dieppe. It was smashed by the brave 302 Div

in co-operation with the Air Force, local Reserves, Corps Reserves, part of 10 Pz Div and the coastal artillery committed in that sector.

The enemy has suffered very high bloody losses. He has lost many landing craft, several cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and many aircraft.

Over 1500 prisoners have been taken.

I wish to express to all commanders and troops who took part my appreciation and thanks. I was able to report today: "The troops have fought very well!" My thanks also go to the Air Fleet which helped the Division in continuous combat and again and again attacked the enemy at sea, and the members of the Navy who had a battle on the open sea before the landing and those who were committed on land."

Commander in Chief West  
 Gen. Von Rundstedt  
 Field Marshal

#### IV. Pursuit by the Luftwaffe.

The attack of the Luftwaffe continued against the enemy as he retreated across the sea. As early as about 1715 hrs the areas in front of Dieppe and about as far as the middle of the Channel were found and reported clear of the enemy. 3rd Air Fleet therefore assembled the formation it had employed for Dieppe; these then reverted to their original commands. 9 Air Corps and Air Force Commander Atlantic received the order to attack Portsmouth (port installations and ships) with moderate forces making use of the weather. On the basis of this order 50 planes were employed over the indicated targets.

The destructive attack was carried through right into darkness of 19 August. Numerous detonations and bomb hits were observed in the centre of Portsmouth, and on quay and port installations. The following successes were registered against ship targets, speed boats, barrage breakers (Sperrbrecher) and ships returning from Dieppe:

Sunk: Two transports with a combined displacement of 5000-6000 tons. In addition four hits with medium bombs among 10 returning landing craft sailing in dense formation.

Defence was very strong, and therefore further hits on ships could not be established but may be presumed.

#### V. Behaviour of the Civilian Population in Dieppe and Area:

According to reports by the Armed Forces Commander, France, the bearing of the population during and following the English attack was not only unobjectionable, but was absolutely loyal. Throughout the whole day of battle no sabotage whatever was committed in the

battle area. German wounded were cared for and the troops were handed refreshments. In addition the population participated in putting out fires and clearing up debris. The French authorities immediately placed themselves at the disposal of the German Military Authorities. At about 1800 hrs normal life returned to the streets of Dieppe. All shops were open.

#### VI Sixth (Last) Appreciation of the Situation by C.-in-C. West:

2015 hrs: At Dieppe the enemy has been battered to destruction. An immediate repetition of the landing attempt there is not to be expected; however, minor harassing and reconnaissance raids, as well as air-effort are still possible.

Neither has the overall picture been clarified to an extent to permit the condition of alertness of the 7th Army (Normandy-Brittany) to be cancelled. The possibility still exists that a second major operation may take place there, because all attention is concentrated on Dieppe. It is not known at the present time whether the fleet of transports in Portsmouth are unloading.

Therefore C.-in-C. West orders:

2040 hrs: Message to 15th Army, 7th Army, and G.H.Q. West-Reserve S.S.-Div "A.H." (the other armed services and Military Commander, France, all informed): "Alarm scale II remains in effect until 20 Aug 42, 0800 hrs, for 7th Army and the ordered Army Group reserves, also for S.S.-Div. "A.H.", 10 Pz Div and the respective parts of 15th Army. A new order will then be issued."

#### VII. Last Enemy Messages:

2240 hrs: According to a message from H.Q. 15th Army the following messages were intercepted from listening post at Etretat:

- 1) "Help, we are sinking!"
- 2) (From general area Portsmouth-Southampton): To all participating units: "Return immediately to point of departure!"

#### VIII. Observations of C.-in-C. West about the Enemy Landing at Dieppe:

What did the enemy aim at?

1. In view of its magnitude, and the fact that it was carried out, after months of almost too precise planning, in accordance with so rigid a scheme, as well as in view of the forces employed - one Canadian division, reinforced by Commandos and special troops - the operation at Dieppe cannot be considered a local raid.

For this the expenditure in men and materials is too great. One does not sacrifice 29 or 30 of the most modern tanks for a raid.

2. Much rather is it to be assumed that, by employing such considerable forces, the enemy thought to effect a rapid seizure of the Dieppe bridgehead, after elimination of its artillery defences, in order then to utilize the good port facilities for bringing up and landing in succession the floating and the operational reserves.

For with the floating reserve alone there were 28 tanks, certainly of the same types. An expenditure of 58 such tanks cannot be reconciled with a short destructive raid. Nor however can it be established without contradiction by the captured operation order whether the operation was of a local character or - in the event of success - was to be the beginning of the "Invasion". For the English instruction for the landing operation provides most definitely and elaborately for withdrawal or re-embarkation: It is however no proof of the enemy's final intention, that withdrawal and re-embarkation were planned in detail.

3. Thus Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos had orders to wait after completion of their task and re-embarkation, to see whether they were to return to England or to take their places in the reserve. (Only in case of failure in their tasks were they to return to England without delay on receiving orders to retreat.)

4. Also the hint in the captured order that the troops are not to destroy the gasworks in Dieppe, but to leave them going until the Engineers arrive, leaves open the possibility of issuing new orders at a given time.

It appears certain that, had Dieppe fallen, these orders would have been given.

5. The employment of the enemy air force and their tactics were extraordinary. It seems incomprehensible why, at the beginning of the enemy landings, the Dieppe bridgehead and other landing places were not isolated by a continuous curtain of bombs so as to prevent or at least delay the employment of local reserves.

An explanation for this could only be found, if the Englishman wished to save his massed bomber formation for employment in a second phase - namely the commencement of the "Invasion" - after the capture of Dieppe. As he knew accurately where 10 Pz Div were in position as reserve and he had to count on their coming into action it may be that this was decisive in inducing him to refrain temporarily from the use of his bomber formations.

He will not do it like this a second time!

#### IX. Evaluation:

20 Aug 42

0745 hrs: C.G.S. G.H.Q. West proceeds to 302 Inf Div at Dieppe to obtain personal impression of the battlefield and to survey the action of 813 Arty Tp on the spot.

0800 hrs: Because the enemy picture does not present any further points from which to assume a landing operation on part of the English (See page 22, VII, latest enemy reports), Alarm Scale II is cancelled for all participating units, as is also the placing of 10 Pz Div under command of 81 Corps.

The first casualty reports arrived in course of the day showing that the losses of the army were moderate, even though the figures were not yet final because first all the hospitals, etc., have to send in their returns.

Report arrived from Naval Group West that one of the three port defence craft which at the beginning of the enemy attack had been in position before Dieppe and had then withdrawn into the harbour, had been sunk inside the port, without its crew, probably as a result of a hit during the battle at Dieppe.

1200 hrs: Message from 3rd Air Fleet received through G-Int G.H.Q. West saying that the number of enemy aircraft shot down had risen to 112.

1340 hrs: Teletype message from 3rd Air Fleet confirming above message and giving further final success figures:

Total sinkings: 5 merchant ships of about 13,000 tons,  
 1 destroyer,  
 1 escort,  
 1 S-Boat (probable).  
 Damaged: 4 cruisers,  
 4 destroyers,  
 5 merchant ships of about 15,500 tons,  
 3 S-Boats,  
 1 sea rescue boat,  
 1 assault landing craft (Sturmlandungsboot),  
 1 towing boat.

Probably damaged:

4 merchant ships of about 12,000 tons,  
 1 S-Boat.

Towards 1800 hrs: C.G.S. G.H.Q. West returns from Dieppe and reports to C.-in-C. West about his impressions. As a result of these the following K.R. - F.S. messages originate to Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, Gen of Arty Jodl.

1945 hrs: i.) Personal Impressions of the battlefield:

"High bloody English losses. Although many already buried, everywhere still dead Englishmen, especially in front of positions of heavy weapons. In front of an M.G. position covering from the flank a narrow sector of beach between the sea and the bluffs, mountains of bodies (over 100 at this point alone). Great quantities of captured enemy equipment, light and heavy infantry weapons. English fought well. Canadians and Americans not so well, later quickly surrendered under the impression of the high bloody losses.

Prisoners make fairly orderly impression, are young, fresh, intelligent people. The beach sector west of Dieppe harbour presents a picture like Dunkirk. Three large transports burned out beached during low tide, some landing craft between them, much equipment, and about 20 tanks all of which were dealt with immediately on landing. At other points more single landing craft, tanks, and funnels and masts emerging from the water.

Damage in Dieppe at specific points heavy, otherwise moderate. During the battle the civilian population behaved well. No incident of sabotage or obstruction of military measures. At noon of the day of battle the shops in Dieppe were already open again. In the main battle areas civilians still made a confused impression. The quick arrival and good appearance of the Pz Div made strong impression among population.

Further report follows." Chief of the General Staff G.H.Q. West

Sgd. Zeitzler

Major-General.

2010 hrs: 2.) Personal impression of Arty Troop 813:

"Tp 813 situated on high level ground about 1 km from the coast, in front of a bluff. All-round protection for defence at close quarters, and barbed wire, but only lightly manned, because only the members of the tp available. Tp fired on sea targets. Then fighters fired at tp in low-level attack, and with tracer set the cartridges at nearly all the guns on fire. Gun-crews had to extinguish fires. Simultaneously infantry attack from two sides by about 150 men. Tp fought bravely. Infantry attack on guns took nearly 2 hours before enemy over-ran tp position. Guns still intact fired to the last at 250-m. range. Tp strength in fire position 112 men, losses were: 30 killed, 21 wounded recovered by own units, amongst them gravely wounded tp commander; at present still 10 missing, of these the majority probably have been recovered as wounded by relieving tps. Apparently removed from the tp position as prisoners: two. It seems doubtful whether these have been taken along on to the ships. A telephone operator in the telephone bunker did not allow himself to be overrun, held bunker alone until relieved, threw back a hand grenade which was thrown in, is now badly wounded in hospital. Guns damaged by blowing and partly burned out.

3.) Enemy Losses: 2095 prisoners, of these 617 wounded, 500 - 600 killed, number of drowned cannot be estimated.

4.) Teletype messages will follow on 21 Aug about the principal lessons which have been gained on the spot from discussion with commanding officers, company and tp commanders, arty F.O.Os., strongpoint commanders and gun-layers,



5.) Senior tank officer dispatched for thorough examination of tanks, also G.S.O. Int to P.W. camp. Reports follow.  
 Chief of the General Staff G.H.Q. West  
 Sgd. Zeitler  
 Major-General.

At the same time C.-in-C. West reports to High Command Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operations Staff by K.R. - F.S., giving details, that during the battle at Dieppe he was supported by units of the Luftwaffe in a most magnificent manner.

21 Aug 42: C.-in-C. West receives the following teletype from the FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER:

The Fuhrer's Headquarters, 21 August 1942.

"To the Commander in Chief West, the Herr Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.

Thanks to the careful preparations made by command and troops, an English landing attempt on a grand scale was completely broken up in the shortest of time.

I beg you, Herr Field Marshal, to express my thanks and my appreciation to all participating units of the three armed services. I know that in the future too I can rely on the Commanders and the soldiers of the Armed Forces in the West.

ADOLF HITLER."

The wording was passed on from G.H.Q. West without delay by K.R. - F.S. to all the participating units and commands of the three services.

High Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operations Staff were continuously informed in course of the day about statements by P.W., important items from captured orders, technical details of the captured tanks, recovered equipment, etc.

H.Q. 15th Army was ordered to report soonest:

- 1.) Captured equipment.
- 2.) Number of dead English buried.
- 3.) Continuously, the number of missing personnel, for whom a search is to be made by name in all hospitals.

The first lessons from the great enemy landing attempt were compiled and on orders of C.-in-C. West were passed on by teletype on 23 Aug 42, as "Basic Observations of Commander-in-Chief West No. 8", to Gen of Arty Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, to High Command Army (G-Ops), and within the command of G.H.Q. West to the armies and the other armed services.

On the same day they were mimeographed and sent out according to special distribution (Sonderverteiler) which also included commands employed in coastal defence on other fronts. They are as follows, word for word:

23 August 42

Basic Observations of the Commander-in-Chief West  
No. 8

(First lessons from the enemy's major landing attempt at Dieppe. Further lessons to follow after evaluation.)

1. Time of landing.

The landing took place in daylight and during a period which one might consider little suited for a landing.

Lesson:

G.H.Q. West in its basic orders and observations (See specially Basic Observations No. 1, para 3) has pointed out repeatedly: "A responsible commander reckons with even the most unlikely contingency." The Englishman may come even in full daylight in the afternoon, even at low tide. He has far more modern landing equipment and weapons at his disposal than we previously anticipated.

2. Smoke:

The enemy used much smoke during the landing. Ships and landing craft were concealed quickly and effectively. Smoke was laid either by warships or aircraft. At a number of places, only smoke made possible the approach and landing. The smoke which drifted towards land reduced the effectiveness of weapons.

Lesson:

- (a) Exercises of every kind carried out at night or under fog condition improve training.
- (b) G.H.Q. West has suggested to the High Command of the Armed Forces the desirability of having chemists search for or invent a method of dispersing smoke.

3. Counter-attacks:

Quick counter-attacks of local and corps reserves have proved very effective, even decisive. However, there must also be artillery.

Lesson:

Again check forward assembly areas of local and corps reserves and see whether they fulfil their purpose. Reserves must be committed in time. If these are strong forces, they must also have artillery with them. It is wrong to employ all divisional artillery forward.

4. Coastal Batteries:

There are still many coastal troops with their guns wrongly sited, so that they cannot withstand a close attack by well-led infantry. The reason is that these guns were mounted in concrete mostly in 1940 and 41, when our assumptions were different. (They were, then, of a more offensive character, involving fire on distant sea targets. Now, we think of coastal defence and self-defence against landings, and support

of the battle in the main line of defence (H.K.L.)).

Lesson:

Fortification-construction plans for the winter must and will eliminate these shortcomings. A solution must and will be found to prevent such batteries from being isolated without support.

5. Ammunition Expenditure:

Troops unaccustomed to battle use much ammunition. G.H.Q. West has referred to that fact in Individual Order No. 20. Nevertheless, an inexperienced troop occasionally loses its nerve. For instance, one troop fired 1300 rounds in the half-day's fighting at Dieppe. There was also a shortage of ammunition for the rapid-firing machine guns. One company used up all its ammunition in the forenoon.

Lesson:

Instruct the troops frequently in the tactical use of ammunition. Restrict firing on fixed lines. But also see to it that there is ample ammunition; for a landing operation does offer many rewarding targets.

6. Storage of Ammunition:

English fighters firing tracer, during a low-level attack set fire to the cartridges of a troop. Thus the gunners were forced to put out the fire. The enemy then attacked the troop in a ground attack.

Lesson:

Again check the storage of ammunition and especially of cartridges and store securely.

7. Landing of tanks:

In a landing area of 1,000 m, four or at the most **five landing craft** landed 29 tanks. 24 tanks were immobilized by fire and bogged on the beach in the deep gravel. 5 just reached the beach promenade. The gravel on the beach proved a very good tank obstacle. The tanks sink in easily. The blocking by walls of the beach exits from the road parallel to the beach, also proved effective. The tanks could not immediately enter the town but, instead, they moved up and down the beach road undecidedly and thus became victims of defensive weapons.

Lesson:

- (a) Make greater use of the ground by making it as marshy as possible and use deep gravel as a natural obstacle to armoured vehicles. In the various resorts and seaside towns ruthlessly block with thick walls the streets leading to the beach. Where streets must necessarily be left open keep the means of blocking them in readiness.
- (b) G.H.Q. West is going to make experiments to find out whether and by what means tanks can be moved on beach shingle.

8. Characteristics of English tanks:

The following types have been identified:

- (a) Tank, Churchill, Mk I - each with 1 x 4 cm and 1 x 7.5 cm cannon.
- (b) Tank, Churchill, Mk II - with 1 x 4 cm cannon.
- (c) Tank, Churchill, Mk III - with 1 x 5.5 cm cannon.

All tanks of the newest make. They had the following armour: front 76 mm, at flanks 64 mm, rear 51 mm. Double-walled armour with a 5-mm

interval: outer armour thicker than inner.

Lesson:

The majority of tanks showed hits of all calibres up to 7.5 cm, but only two penetrations with medium calibre. Strong effect on the tracks, which seemed of very brittle material and broke easily. Do not fire at too great ranges. The 3.7 cm guns had hardly any effect.

9. Steep shores:

The enemy managed to climb to the top of the bluffs by the use of various aids in areas which had been considered inaccessible; in climbing up the mined gorges, he used flanks for approach.

Lesson:

There is no "safe" locality; one must reckon with every contingency.

10. Maps:

The English had good maps showing nearly all our defences and minefields as of June 42.

Lesson:

Construct more dummy positions than heretofore, sited in our field of fire. Be more alert than heretofore to espionage. Another order about this will follow.

The Commander in Chief West  
Sgt Von Rundstedt  
Field Marshal.

24 Aug 42: The 121-page English operation order for the landing at Dieppe (Operation "Jubilee"), after rapid page by page translation, was mimeographed and sent to all commands down to and including divisions as well as to the other armed services. This order resulted in the following:

Basic Observations of the Commander-in-Chief West,  
No. 9  
(The English landing order for Dieppe.)

I have had the captured English operation order for Dieppe translated and mimeographed.

According to German ideas this order is not an order, but an aide-memoire or a scheme worked out for a map exercise. Nevertheless, it does contain many points of value to us.

First, how much the enemy knows about us.

Second, the peculiarities in his method of landing and fighting. For that reason, this order is to be thoroughly studied by all staffs, to collect lessons for our coastal defence and for the training and education of our troops.

But it would be an error to believe that the enemy will mount his next operation in the same manner. He will draw his lessons from his mistakes

in planning and from his failure and next time he will do things differently.

In spite of that, single details from his order remain of instructional value to us.

The Commander-in-Chief West  
Sgd. Von Rundstedt  
Field Marshal.

25 Aug 42: C.G.S. G.H.Q West reports to Gen of Arty Jodl, Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff (K.R. - F.S.) the following:  
"G.H.Q. West is about to evaluate the enemy attack at Dieppe as follows:  
1. First lessons (See Basic Observations No. 8).  
2. Lessons learned from the English operation order for the landings (See Basic Observations No. 9).  
3. Lessons of lower level commander and troops (Work has started. They will be collated in Basic Observations No. 10).  
4. Practical examination and testing of captured equipment (to begin with firing at tanks on 27 Aug. Results will be published in Basic Observations No. 11).  
5. Examination and study of questions of coastal artillery as a result of the operation. The result to be directed to High Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Operations Staff in the form of a proposal.  
6. Accurate battle reports (directions have been issued) to serve as a basis for the collation of lessons and experience.  
Note: The Basic Observations of the C.-in-C. West have been sent or will be sent to the other Armed Forces Commanders and commands responsible for coastal defence, etc.

Chief of the General Staff G.H.Q. West  
Zeitler  
Major-General.

Note: Basic Observations of C.-in-C. West Nos. 10 and 11 will both reach all addressees on the special distribution list "Defence West" and all other recipients of the battle reports of G.H.Q. West about the enemy landing at and on both flanks of Dieppe (19 Aug 42).

They contain, apart from lessons and experiences, also a criticism of the reports by G.H.Q. West (wherever that may be necessary).

#### X. Losses:

Own losses of the three armed services including the sea battle of the Navy, and including ground personnel of the Flak Arty and Air Force Signals amount to: 591 men.

<u>Army:</u>	Killed	115
	Wounded	187
	Missing (of these according to English radio at most 4 in enemy hands)	14

<u>Navy:</u>	Killed and Missing (missing from the sunk sub-chaser)	78
	Wounded	35
<u>Air Force:</u>	Killed and Missing (missing through being shot down!)	104
	Wounded	58

For that part of the heavy enemy casualties which can be confirmed, i.e. his losses in prisoners and equipment, see Appendix 1, pages 9 and 10.

Note: Total losses as in the battle reports of 302 Div or 81 Corps have not at the time of writing been examined for final results.

For the Commander-in-Chief West  
(G.H.Q. Army Group D)  
The Chief of the General Staff  
(Sgd) ZEITZLER  
Major-General.

APPENDIX "B"

REPORT OF 302 GERMAN INF DIV  
(OPERATIONS SECTION - Ia)  
ON THE DIEPPE RAID

(302 Infanterie-Division, Abt. Ia,  
Tgb. Nr. 1105/42 g, 25 Aug 42)

(Original in War Diary No. 3, H.Q. 302 Inf Div,  
volume "Dieppe I", Serial No. 24353-8)

Translated by  
Army Translation Bureau  
Army Headquarters, Ottawa,  
1946.

Secret

302 Infantry Division  
Operations Section W.D. No. 1105/42 G

Div. H.Q. 25.8.42

REPORT ON THE BRITISH ATTACK  
ON BOTH SIDES OF DIEPPE ON 19.8.1942

The Report is divided up as follows:

- I. The attacked coastal sector
  - A. Terrain and fortifications
  - B. Strengths and dispositions
- II. Timetable of operations
  - A. Approach of the enemy
  - B. Attack on troop strong point Berneval (2 TP 770 Army Coast Arty Bty and point of resistance Gleiwitz)
  - C. Attack on strong point group Dieppe
  - D. Attack on point of resistance Quiberville-East, 813 Arty Troop strong point and point of resistance lighthouse.
- III. Description of the entire operation
- IV. Information collected about the enemy
- V. P.W. and captured equipment
- VI. Own losses
- VII. Lessons

Weather Conditions on 19.8.1942

High tide at Dieppe	0503 hours
Low " " "	1150 hours
Moon, first quarter, rising on 18.8 at 1453 hours	setting " 19.8 at 0056 hours
Sunrise	0655 hours
Dawn	0616 hours
Morning haze on the sea, otherwise visibility clear	
Lightly overcast, high ceiling	
Light wind from the sea	



## I. The attacked Coastal Sector

### A. Terrain

The whole coastal sector (see map 1) attacked on 19.8.1942 consisted of a line of steep cliffs with a stony beach. The sector was 20 kilometres wide.

This line of cliffs is broken up by 3 wide cut in valleys:

The Valley of the Argues opening into Dieppe port.  
The Valley of the Scie at Pourville.  
The Valley of the Saane at Quiberville.

The last two watercourses were dammed by the division immediately in front of their opening into the sea so that both valley, to a depth of 2 to 3 km. and a width of approximately 80 metres were turned into a flooded marshy area and formed an expanse of water providing anti-tank protection for the area.

The steep cliffs contained numerous gorges which descending in part to the beach and in part only to a steep declivity of calcareous rocks 8 to 30 metres high. All these gorges were covered with wire entanglements and booby traps to the depth to which, judging from the beach, an ascent by a landing enemy would have been feasible.

The valleys of Dieppe, Pourville and Quiberville are lined on both banks with dominating heights on which were installed defence works and heavy infantry weapons, including beach defence guns. Stretches of the beach between the heights on both sides of the valleys are protected against tanks as follows: near Dieppe in conjunction with the port entrance, and at the other two valleys in conjunction with the flooded area, by means of anti-tank obstacles, dragon's teeth, anti-tank walls, anti-tank minefields, anti-tank ditches. Especially in Dieppe all approaches from the beach to the interior of the city are sealed off by strong concrete walls.

The port of Dieppe, navigable at high tide for vessels up to 5000 tons, is protected by two piers of massive stones forming an entrance approximately 100 metres wide and 300 metres long. In front of the east pier, the wreckage of a ship submerged for some time protrudes partially at low tide, forcing large ships to follow a northwesterly course hard by the west pier.

The strong point of Puy (on maps designated also as Puits) is situated on the western spur of the Camp de César in a deep narrow valley running from east to west, approximately 2 kilometres to the east of the east pier. From this strong point fire may be effectively directed against the beach at the foot of the cliffs in the direction of the east Dieppe pier and its eastern side.

The ground behind the cliffs between Berneval and the Scie Valley is open, being thickly wooded only around villages and watercourses. Between the Scie and the Saane the terrain is very rugged and hidden from view by copses and numerous large localities abounding with gardens. The lighthouse Phare d'Ailly, the highest point of the coast, is situated there, but/does it allow extensive observation. (only towards the sea)

The centre of gravity of the coastal defence in the attacked sector is formed by the strong point group Dieppe which comprises the heights on both sides of the Argues valley and those east of the Scie valley to a depth of approximately 2½ km. from the sea.

The strong point group is protected by all-round obstacles, gun positions and concrete command posts. About 60% of the planned fortifications of first priority have been completed.

Near Berneval is a troop strong point for the 2 Tp 770 Army Coast Arty and a point of resistance for the protection of air force equipment "Gleiwitz" (Radar). Furthermore, a field piquet is posted every night on the height west of Petit Berneval. The beach of Petit Berneval and the gorges leading to Berneval and southeast were intensively wired in and stacked with booby traps while anti-personnel mines were planted in the central gorge.

Due to the width of its sector the Division was not in a position to turn Petit Berneval into a strong point with a permanent infantry garrison. According to instructions, 2 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty and Equipment "Gleiwitz" (Radar) maintained constant communication with I Bn 570 Inf. Regt. (divisional reserve) one company of which was billeted in Assigny.

The coastal sector between Pourville and point of resistance Quiberville - East (on the heights between St. Marguerite and the Saane) was for the same reason, save for wire entanglements in gorges, protected only by patrols. In this sector there were also: Troop strong point of 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp and the point of resistance near the lighthouse, 813 Tp observation post, navy special equipment (Radar), navy signal station and aircraft reporting section. Arrangements had been made for the shifting of 813 Arty Tp, which, on orders of the Navy, had been established in concrete positions there in the summer of 1941 and its inclusion in strong point group Dieppe. Reconnaissance had been completed and the construction contract awarded for the concrete works in the new position near Neuville-Dieppe. One gorge (Sea-gull gorge) was covered by an infantry section.

The point of resistance Quiberville-East was provided with all-around defence and fortifications of the field type.

#### B. Strengths and Dispositions

at the coast from Criel to St. Aubin (both localities included) prior to the commencement of the attack.

#### I. Western Part of the Sector of 572 Inf. Regt.

##### 1. Criel:

###### a) Divisional Units:

1 Coy            570 Inf. Regt.

one

platoon 4 Coy        570 Inf. Regt.

###### b) Army Coastal Arty:

3 Tp 778 Bty, at Mesnil Val east of Criel

4 x 15 cm. guns type K 16 Czech

4 x 10.5 cm. guns type K 35 Czech

Bty command post of 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty,  
also at Mesnil Val

##### 2. Berneval:

###### a) Divisional Units:

One Field Piquet of 1 Coy 570 Inf. Regt; strengths:  
1 NCO, 9 men

b) Army Coastal Arty:

2 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty, with

4 x 10.5 cm. guns type K 35 Czech )alto-  
3 x 17 cm. guns type K in How. carriage)gether  
2 x 2 cm. A.A. guns ) 127  
~~XXXXXXXX~~ ) men

c) Air Force:

Air Force Equipment (Radar) Gleiwitz, strength including local defence troops: 1 officer, 16 NCO, 97 men One section 2 cm. A.A. guns of A.A. sub-formation Dieppe.

II. Sector of 571 Inf. Regt:

1. Strong Point Group Dieppe:

a) Divisional Units:

Regt HQ 571 Inf Regt  
II Bn 571 Inf Regt  
III Bn 571 Inf Regt

III Bty 302 Arty Regt  
with 7 and 8 troops,  
Troops A and B (each comprising  
4 x 10 cm. field howitzers model 14/19 Czech)  
265 positional arty troop (coast)  
HQ 302 Engr Bn  
with 1 and 2 Coys

b) Army Coastal Arty:

none

c) Air Force:

Dieppe airfield protection commandant with air-  
field protection coy and reserve coy  
23 (heavy) aircraft (A.C.) reporting coy A.A.  
sub-formation Dieppe with one troop 3.7 cm.  
guns (with three sections x 3.7 guns and one  
section x 5 cm. guns

Two Sections x 2 cm. guns  
One Troop 7.5. cm. guns French (each section  
containing 6 guns and 2 x 2 cm. guns

d) Municipal police: 60 men

e) Navy:

Post Commandant with guard coy and ) about  
port M.O. ) 72 men

Port protection craft )  
Port control station )  
Navy exchange )  
Air-sea rescue service ) about  
4/6 manning unit of the navy ) 200 men  
Navy signal station )  
3 Experimental Bn (1 offr, 15 NCO, )  
43 men) )

2. Troop Strong Point 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp

with 6 x 15 cm. guns type K 16 Krupp ) altogether  
1 tank gun ) 93 men

3. Point of Resistance Lighthouse Phare d'Ailly:

Navy signal station and	)	
Navy special equipment (Rad#A)	)	
A/C reporting section of 23 (heavy)	)	77 men
A.C. reporting Coy	)	
Observation post 813 Tp	)	

4. Point of Resistance Quiberville:

3 Coy 571 Inf. Regt (less one platoon  
One heavy MG section of 4 Coy 571 Inf. Regt.

5. Point of Resistance St. Aubin:

One platoon of 3 Coy 571 Inf. Regt  
One heavy MG section of 4 Coy 571 Inf. Regt.

6. Regimental Reserve in the Ouville area:

1 Bn 571 Inf. Regt (less 3 Coy and one  
platoon of 4 Coy 571 Inf Regt)  
Inf A tk Coy ) at Offranville  
Inf gun platoon) (in process of formation  
mobile to a limited extent)

III. Divisional Reserves:

1. 570 Inf Regt at Eu

with I Bn 570 Inf Regt  
II Bn 570 Inf Regt  
Inf A tk Coy ) in process of formation,  
Inf gun pl ) mobile to a limited extent

III Bn 570 Regt in Corps Reserve in  
Bacqueville area

2. 302 A tk and recce Bn in St. Nicolas d'Aliermont and Notre Dame

with A tk Coy Cyclist squadron

3. 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn, motorized by division in makeshift manner, in Argues-la-Bataille

3 Coy 302 Arty Regt in Friaucourt	)	in process of
6 Coy 302 Arty Regt in St. Quentin-Lamotte	)	formation;
9 Coy 302 Arty Regt in Anneville	)	mobile to a
		limited extent

5. Supply and transport columns:

I/T Column, at Argues-la-Bataille  
II/T " , at Boscrocourt  
V " , at Argues-la-Bataille

(Column I/T comprises vehicles of the Todt Organization  
" II/T comprises vehicles assembled from division  
" V comprises vehicles of the Todt Organization)

Columns are under the command of 1 officer and 2 sergeants.  
The majority of drivers were supplied by the Division.

6. Reserve coy made up of slightly wounded from St. Aubin Hospital:

1 officer and 116 men

II. Timetable of the Operation

A. Approach of the Enemy

(See Division's Order of Battle on map, Encl.1)

- 0445 B hrs Field piquet Berneval hears naval battles.
- 0457 B hrs Crew of air force special equipment (Radar) at east edge of Berneval mans point of resistance.
- 0505 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reports major naval battle at approximate distance of 20 km. from Dieppe.
- 0510 B hrs 572 Inf Regt reports naval battle at approximate distance of 15 km. from Criel beach.
- 0525 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reports: Since 0445 hours own convoy attacked by enemy naval forces in front of Dieppe at a distance of 14 to 16 km.
- 0530 B hrs Division reports on naval battle to Corps HQ.
- 0530 B hrs Observation posts of divisional arty observe enemy S-boats in front of Puys.  
III Bty 302 Arty Regt lays down defensive fire in front of Puys.
- 0535 B hrs III Bty 302 Arty Regt observes large number of S-boats heading for Pourville. Defensive fire by two Tps directed to that area; fire order transmitted by wireless as telephone lines disrupted. No report to Division as lines destroyed. Bomb raids against strong point group Dieppe.
- 0550 B hrs Field piquet Berneval (1 NCO and 9 men) and observation post of 2 Tp Army coastal arty Bty near Berneval observe approach of 4 small boats and 1 freighter which answers recognition signal. Simultaneously 4 assault landing craft emerge from behind freighter and sail swiftly towards Petit Berneval. Arty troop is unable to reach them with fire, but field piquet opens rifle and MG fire.
- 0558 B hrs Division inquires from A/C reporting centre Dieppe about naval battle and receives confirmation that own convoy en route. At this time A/C reporting centre hears infantry fire from direction of Pourville.
- 0600 B hrs 571 Inf. Regt reports British landing attempts near Pourville. Order for action stations issued to Regt. Enemy naval arty fire at Dieppe and heights on both sides of city.
- 0601 B hrs Division orders action stations and alarm Scale II for all HQ and troops committed to action in the coastal defence sector of the division. Ever since sunrise units committed to action had been on increased vigilance on strength of div. order No. 105 for the coastal defence which also included special measures for: employment of officers with the infantry and artillery, strength increase of gun detachments during the period of alarm, checking on the serviceability of searchlights and flamethrowers, on the working order of mechanism of heavy weapons and on personnel in accordance with nominal rolls, sealing off of traffic

openings in obstacles, wireless readiness, hourly tests of telephone lines, damming up the water to the highest level, holding in readiness message dispatch facilities of all sorts, holding in readiness all improvised M.T. and recce patrols, manning orderly rooms and command posts of all H.Q.

B. Attack of Arty Troop Strong Point Berneval and Point of Resistance Gleiwitz (see map encl.3)

- 0555 B hrs 2 larger barges firing broadside at field piquet Berneval. Under this covering fire enemy lands on dead ground of steep cliffs and scales them, advances in the direction of the (mined) east gorge.
- 0600 B hrs 2 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty after calling by telephone field piquet Berneval is no longer able to establish connection, despatches an assault detachment (1 NCO, 3 men) with a MG towards the gorge of Petit Berneval. Simultaneous report to Bty and request for infantry reinforcements. Assault detachment immediately upon arrival covered by MG and rifle fire from direction of east gorge: NCO wounded but remains in charge for the time being. Assault detachment from point of resistance Gleiwitz (1 NCO, 7 men) en route to gorge. Order to crew (15 men) of Direction Finding Station at east side of west gorge: Withdraw to strong point.
- 0605 B hrs Bomber aircraft attack with MG firing at point of resistance Gleiwitz: Defence firing with 3 x 2 cm. AA guns (one section of 3 Tp 237 AA Bty), AA. MG and rifles.
- 0615 B hrs Dropping of several smoke-bombs (for 20 minutes thick smoke) and 3 phosphorus canisters, which set on fire an ammunition dump and a dwelling hut of point of resistance Gleiwitz. Detonation of about 10,000 rifle rounds, French egg-shaped hand grenades and flares. 2 <sup>men</sup> wounded from bomb-dropping. One Hampton brought down by AA fire (one section 3 Tp 237 AA Bty), crashing about 6 km. south of Berneval. Assault detachment Gleiwitz joins up with D.F. Crew.
- from 0615 to 1000 B hrs Frequent air-raids.
- 0622 B hrs 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty reports to Division: Enemy landing near Berneval.
- 0625 B hrs Division informs Regt HQ 570 Inf Regt of landing attempts near Berneval, Pourville and Quiberville; issues order: battalions to concentrate as follows:  
I Bn 570 Inf Regt near Assigny  
II Bn 570 Inf Regt near St. Remy except 7 Coy which remains on bicycles in Eu ready to start  
Battle recce with a strong officer's recce party to Berneval.

- 0625 B hrs Assault detachment Gleiwitz encounters assault detachment of 2 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty in west gorge. Opening of fire against enemy in east gorge. As field piquet Berneval of 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt unable to prevent enemy from scaling centre and right gorges, evades action and withdraws to height west of gorge, offers resistance there and engages in fire fight with enemy who meanwhile is attacking from gorge from a south-easterly direction.
- 0630 B hrs Field piquet has 3 wounded, of whom 2 later died at regimental aid post. Corporal Dally informs 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt Company had ordered action stations already at 0620 B hours. Local defence troops of the air force from Gleiwitz join successfully defence in front, losses - 5 killed. Meanwhile, the British have scaled the gorge and conduct battle from buildings where they endeavour to cover themselves with mines. A.A. fire open sights directed thereto. 2 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty dispatches a second officer's assault detachment (1 offr., 1 NCO, 5 men) which at 0655 B hours encounters first assault detachment and assault detachment Gleiwitz at bridge over west gorge.
- 0630 B hrs Corps HQ informed of enemy landing near Berneval.
- 0643 B hrs Enemy bomber aircraft attacking Eu.
- 0645 B hrs Report from 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty: New attack by enemy S-boats against Berneval. 3 Tp 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty directs harassing fire thereto.
- 0650 B hrs Order to 570 Inf Regt: 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt to proceed to St. Martin, reconnoitering from there towards Berneval.
- 0705 B hrs New approach of 3 small boats under covering fire of a gunboat. A small boat, set afire by 3 Tp 778 Army Coastal Arty Bty, stranded on beach.
- 0705 B hrs 572 Inf Regt issues order to 1 Coy I Bn 570 Inf Regt at Criel: Establish connection with Field Piquet Berneval. Cover gorges between Criel and Berneval.
- 0705 B hrs Corps HQ is given particulars about situation near Berneval. Order to Major von Bluecher: Cyclist squadron and 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn form Composite Force Bluecher. They will immediately proceed to Graincourt. Task: To overthrow enemy landed near Berneval. A tk coy to be moved up to St. Nicolas. Company commander to maintain, from HQ of A tk and recce Bn there, telephone contact with division Bluecher; takes along his wireless squad.
- 0710 B hrs 2 troop 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty firing over open sights on enemy attacking troop position.
- 0715 B hrs Wireless message to comp. force Bluecher: 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt moved up to St. Martin, is subordinated to commander Bluecher.

- 0740 B hrs 570 Inf Regt reports: Enemy advancing from Berneval along foot of cliffs in direction Criel. Approximate strength - 150 to 200 men.  
Against them are committed:  
from 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt: an independent detachment of 1 NCO and 20 men (subordinated to 572 Inf of Regt)  
from 570 Inf Regt: an officer's assault detachment (formed from 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt) which at 0750 B hrs established contact with enemy and fights its way to south slope of Hill 101 south of Berneval.
- 0810 B hrs 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn encounters enemy at Berneval.
- 0815 B hrs 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt has reached St. Martin.
- 0830 B hrs Officer's assault detachment of 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt makes contact with 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn which advances towards Berneval from southeast.
- 0845 B hrs Comp. force Bluecher receives report about new enemy landing near Petit Berneval, and that area and gorge west of Berneval clear of the enemy up to coast.  
Cyclist squadron is committed eastwards to a thrust against Petit Berneval, by-passing Grand Berneval.
- 0845 B hrs 572 Inf Regt reinforces patrol advancing from Criel beach southwestwards along beach to the strength of 1 officer and 40 OR.
- 0930 B hrs Comp. force Bluecher with cyclist squadron from SW, with reinforced 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt and one light AA battle team from SE, attacks enemy near Petit Berneval. Enemy conceals himself by smoke.
- 0945 B hrs 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn has pushed through up to Arty Tp Berneval and is pursuing enemy units withdrawing to gorge northwest of Berneval.  
Frequent enemy low-level attacks.
- 1020 B hrs Cyclist squadron has captured locality of Petit Berneval and reached coast, receives orders to pursue enemy towards northeast. In Petit Berneval squadron joins up with elements of 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt.
- 1026 B hrs Wireless message from division to Bluecher: When enemy defeated it is intended to withdraw comp. force Bluecher - task of pursuit to be assigned to 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt.
- 1100 B hrs Remnants of enemy are being captured in gorge northeast of Belleville and on Hill 101 east of Petit Berneval.
- 1120 B hrs Comp. force Bluecher reports that situation near Berneval and Hill 101 completely cleaned up.  
Division orders: Withdrawal of cyclist squadron with Bluecher's HQ to Graincourt at disposal of division. Engr Coy to rebuild obstacles near Berneval and thereupon to proceed to Graincourt as well.  
3 Coy 570 Inf Regt takes over protection of Petit Berneval.



- 1200 B hrs Division communicated to 570th Inf Regt its intention: Regimental HQ of 570 Inf Regt to take over from 572 Inf Regt coastal sector from Criel inclusive up to Belleville inclusive. Order to this effect to be issued at 1236 hours.
- 1220 B hrs Officer's reconnaissance patrol which pushed forward from Criel beach to Berneval joins up with elements of 3 Coy 571 Inf Regt which advanced from Berneval along coast towards the northeast.
- 1240 B hrs Cyclist squadron and 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn are under Bluecher's HQ at disposal of division near Graincourt.
- 1801 B hrs Comp. force Bluecher is ordered by wireless to proceed for combat rest to St. Nicolas at disposal of division.

C. Attack on Strong Point Group Dieppe

(Bringing up of Reserves see on map tracing encl. 2)

0610 B hrs            Enemy craft land near Pourville, fired on by 7 and 8 Tps 302 Arty Regt.  
                           Enemy air attacks with MG, cannon and naval arty fire against Dieppe and heights on both sides of Dieppe since 0600 B hrs.

0610 B hrs            Enemy craft land near Puy. One boat destroyed by Atk gun. Attack fails because of our fire.

0612 B hrs            First report from division to LXXXI Army Corps HQ.

0617 B hrs            Enemy has broken into Pourville - West.

0620 B hrs            Enemy boats prepare to land on Dieppe west beach and endeavour to penetrate port entrance. Enemy fails to enter port as result of fire of A tk, AA - and beach defence guns.

0621 B hrs            Engr Pl 571 Inf Regt at Petit Appeville dispatches recon patrols in area of Hautot water tower and on road to Ouville.

0630 B hrs            Cyclist Platoon is assigned to occupy west slope of Hill on Ferme aux 4 Vents (four winds farm) in conjunction with left flank of 6 Coy 57 Inf Regt.

0630 B hrs            Div reports to Corps HQ on landing attempts near Pourville, Quiberville and approach of boats to Dieppe.

0632 B hrs            Only wireless communications still functioning between Div and 571 Inf Regt.

0635 B hrs            Approximately 20 landing craft approach beach in front of strong point Pourville - East. Larger boats approximately 4 km. away at sea.

0640 B hrs            Report from 571 Inf Regt to Division: Dieppe concealed by smoke caused by smoke-bombs fired from naval guns.

0641 B hrs            Division dispatches staff officer to 571 Inf Regt to establish whether 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt is committed to immediate counter-attack and if so, where.

0645 B hrs            Enemy has landed on west beach at Dieppe.

0645 B hrs            Adjacent division on the right informed about situation.

0645 B hrs            7 Tp 302 Arty Regt fires, on call of infantry, at enemy who landed on Pourville beach, similar action taken by AA section north of Ferme aux 4 Vents.

0646 B hrs 5 Coy 571 Inf Regt, sector reserve at Dieppe, assembles at garrison commandant's HQ for an immediate counter-attack.

0649 B hrs Adjacent division on the left informed about situation.

0650 B hrs 14 Coy 571 Inf Regt (in process of formation, supplied with improvised horse-drawn vehicles) being pulled up from Offranville to Janval, is subjected to low-level air attack, suffers losses.

0650 B hrs Enemy is landing tanks on west beach.

0650 B hrs Division informs Corps HQ about situation in and on both sides of Dieppe.

0655 B hrs NCO class is instructed to advance via Petit Appeville along west side of the Scie Valley to Pourville and to establish contact with platoon of 6 Coy 571 Inf Regt operating there. NCO class dispatches recon patrol ahead. Air-raids continue.

0700 B hrs More ships approach Dieppe, are fired at by A troop, 7 Tp 302 Arty Regt, 265 positional arty Tp and AA Arty.

0700 B hrs Recon patrol of Engr Pl 571 Inf Regt dispatched to Hautot reports that enemy in area of Hautot water tower in strength of approximately one platoon. Losses of patrol: 1 killed, 1 wounded.

0710 B hrs Fresh wave of landing craft prepare to land west of pier near Dieppe.

0710 B hrs 571 Inf Regt orders I Bn 571 Inf Regt to assemble in south section of Hautot for attack against Pourville.  
Order can be transmitted only by motorcycle. This commitment has not been reported to division.

0714 B hrs A/C reporting centre reports larger ships, lowering about 60 landing craft.

0716 B hrs Corps HQ is informed about situation.

0725 B hrs Report from recon patrol of NCO class en route to Pourville. Enemy has occupied garage of Grand Hotel, approximately 600 m. south of Pourville. Recon patrol fires at enemy who is on east bank about 800 m. south of Pourville; enemy strength approximately two platoons. This enemy turns against patrol which is simultaneously fired at from direction of Hautot.

0725 B hrs Bomb raids against Hill 102 and the Arques valley.

- 0726 B hrs                    Message from Corps HQ that III Bn 570 Inf Regt is placed under command of division and is moved to Ouville.  
Corps Reserve - Klemm Regt - will be moved up to Bacqueville.
- 0730 B hrs                    Hautot recce patrol (from 571 Engr Pl) is attacked; its commander is wounded and drops out.
- 0741 B hrs                    Staff officer from division returns from 571 Inf Regt, submits full report about situation.
- 0750 B hrs                    Second wave of landing craft lands near Puy.
- 0750 B hrs  
to 0800 B hrs                All troops of III Bty - 302 Arty Regt less B troop fire at major formation of approaching landing craft.
- 0800 B hrs                    Between Puy and Dieppe about 20 men scale steep cliffs: an additional 25 men suffering losses scramble through wire entanglements reinforced with mine charges; they are annihilated at 0815 B hours by assault detachment of 23 (heavy) A/C reporting Coy.
- 0800 B hrs                    Near Pourville - East position of 4.7 cm A tk guns is overrun by enemy, A tk guns unable to continue fire due to jamming in loophole, crew is killed. Enemy advances on height up to orderly room of 6 Coy 571 Inf Regt, is held here.  
1 beach defence gun and 1 heavy MG put out of commission.  
  
1 section of 3.7 cm guns and 1 section of 2 cm AA guns supporting infantry.
- 0809 B hrs                    First interrogation of P.W. at divisional H.Q.
- 0811 B hrs                    Corps HQ advises that bomber aircraft will be committed to action.  
The troops are ordered to lay out ground panels.
- 0814 B hrs                    Division orders I Bn 571 Inf Regt to establish contact with III Bn 570 Inf Regt, coming to Ouville.
- 0814 B hrs                    Division issues by telephone the following order to the commander I Bn 571 Inf Regt: Should the 813 Arty Tp be endangered, to move up thereto a reinforced infantry company for an immediate counter-attack.  
III Bn 570 Inf Regt is expected to arrive soon. If no contact with it, such to be established immediately by motorcycle. Division desires information as soon as possible about the situation of the 813 Arty Tp. Telephone conversation

broken off. - Order was not executed as previous instructions had been already received from 571 Inf. Regt. for action stations for attack on Pourville.

- 0817 B hrs Commander of AA regt is on divisional Command Post, he is informed about situation, and reports that AA engages targets at sea in front of Dieppe.
- 0830 B hrs Enemy bombers over divisional command post are fired at by HQ troop.
- 0830 B hrs Recce Patrol Hautot from 751 Engr Pl launches immediate counter-attack against enemy near Hautot water tower captures 1 officer and 9 men.
- 0835 B hrs Division issues order to III Bn 570 Inf Regt: Bn to proceed immediately to Offranville via Bertreville - Auppegard - Colmesnil. Staff Officer to proceed ahead to divisional command post immediately.
- 0835 B hrs Enemy tanks roam about Dieppe Beach and fire.
- 0840 B hrs Division orders: II Bn 570 Inf Regt, on MT of II T column, with HQ, 5,6, and 8 Coys, and 7 Coys on bicycles, to proceed immediately to western edge of the Arques woods, at disposal of the division. Transport column to remain with Bn. Bn commander to proceed ahead to divisional command post.
- 0845 B hrs Corps HQ advises that HQ of Klemm Regt, I Bn 676 Inf Regt, I Bty 332 Arty Regt, 81 Tank squadron are moving to Tourville at disposal of the division.
- 0845 B hrs British assault detachment is captured by 5 Coy near Dieppe city hall.
- 0851 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reports by telephone to division about situation. Enemy has broken into Dieppe. Tanks on west beach.
- 0855 B hrs A/C reporting centre reports S-boats heading for Somme estuary. Division transmits this report to 572, 570 Inf Regts and 321 Inf Div. Report proved false later on.
- 0900 B hrs 302 A tk Coy is to be placed, by division, at disposal of 571 Inf Regt and moved to Dieppe. Officers to proceed ahead to regimental HQ.
- 0900 B hrs Recce patrol dispatched by I Bn 571 Inf Regt reports that enemy is in Varengeville.

0900 B hrs

Commander of II Bn 570 Inf Regt (divisional reserve) arrives at divisional command post to obtain information, part of I T transport column is placed at his disposal in replacement of MTV of II T Column put out of commission. Entire II T Transport column to move from Arques-la-Bataille into the Arques woods and remain there in order to insure transport of entire Bn including 7 Coy.

0900 B hrs

III Bn 302 Arty Regt occupies flanking observation posts for A troop and 7 Tp 302 Arty Regt in order to cover with fire the Scie valley and the slope of strong point Pourville - East and the Ferme aux 4 Vents.

0915 B hrs

Report to Corps HQ: Composite Force Bluecher is attacking Enemy landed near Berneval.

Puys was attacked, result not known as yet. It is reported that tanks have broken into Dieppe. East height and west heights firmly in our hands.

On the west side of the Scie valley enemy is on the heights. 813 Arty Tp captured by enemy. Guns are blown up.

II Bn 570 Inf Regt will arrive at the d'Arques Woods at approximately 0945 B hours. Attack near Quiberville beaten off. Everything quiet at St. Aubin and in remainder of divisional sector.

0916 B hrs

The Experimental Coy of the Navy committed to action with 8 A tk guns on the west beach at Dieppe has suffered heavy losses, 1 A tk gun put out of commission, the Coy has thrown the enemy back from the port railroad station (100 metres from the beach). City of Dieppe up to garrison command HQ clear of the enemy.

0930 B hrs

Division requests Corps HQ to send promised ground "strafers" against boats still landing in front of Dieppe

and Pourville, "strafers" not to operate against the Dieppe beach, but against west sector in the locality of Pourville, and in particular against buildings on mountainsides west of the flooded area of the Scie.

0930 B hrs

Division dispatches a staff officer to I Bn 571 Inf Regt to clarify the situation, to arrange for support of 813 Arty Tp and to establish whereabouts of III Bn 570 Inf. Regt.

0930 B hrs

Navy signal station reports to 571 Inf Regt: New landing craft heading for Pourville. 10 boats.

0935 B hrs

Message from Corps HQ: 10 Panzer Division leaving Amiens at 1000 B hours for commitment at Dieppe.

0935 B hrs

571 Inf Regt reports: Puy firmly in our hands. Enemy lost about 500 P.W. and killed.

0935 B hrs

571 Inf. Regt. receives report that Varengeville is in enemy hands. 813 Arty Tp put out of action. Enemy is also in Hautot. Order to Engr Bn transmitted by runner: Hold strongly west edge of Hill 102.

0940 B hrs

770 Army Coastal Arty Bty reports to Division: 3 larger naval units at sea off Pourville firing at Dieppe; same also observed by II Bn 571 Inf Regt.

0948 B hrs

II Bn 571 Inf Regt details reserve platoon of 8 Coy to cover golf road towards west.

0950 B hrs

571 Inf Regt to AA sub-formation: Take under fire 1 transport heading for Dieppe Casino.

0951 B hrs

Port commandant at Dieppe reports to 571 Inf Regt: 6 craft landing on beach in front of Dieppe citadel.

0955 B hrs

6 landing craft approach Pourville, 1 craft already on beach, 4 others prepare to land, 1 at sea.

0955 B hrs

Report from A/C reporting centre: 1 light transport attempts to reach Dieppe beach under cover of fire. 10 smaller landing craft also observed; at a 2 km. interval 3 light cruisers, 30 smaller units conceal themselves by smoke at a distance of 5 km. from coast.

1000 B hrs

571 Inf Regt commits 302 A tk Coy to action as follows: 1 section at Dieppe East, 1 section at pivot bridge in Dieppe port, 1 section on west height. III Reserve Coy 571 Inf Regt is shifted from eastern section of Dieppe to section west of port at disposal of 571 Inf Regt. Report about this reaches division at

- 1010 B hours. Beach and Dieppe concealed by thick smoke.
- 1013 B hrs  
A/C reporting centre reports to 571 Inf Regt: The boat which entered Pourville is putting again to sea.  
At a distance of approximately 10 km., small units are drawing up in formation in direction of Dieppe.
- 1012 B hrs  
Report from I Bn 571 Inf Regt to Div: 815 Arty troop encircled by enemy. Bn has dispatched recce patrol thereto.
- 1016 B hrs  
Own fighters attack transport ships in front of Dieppe and Pourville. 571 Inf Regt reports additional landings.
- 1020 B hrs  
III Bn 571 Inf Regt observes 6 landing craft in direction of Puys.
- 1022 B hrs  
Reserve Coy of the Division (composed daily from hospital patients fit for action in accordance with nominal roll) in strength of 1 officer and 116 men is placed at disposal of 571 Inf Regt in order to release one Engr Coy from the Dieppe-South defences and is moved on MT to Janval to 302 Engr Bn HQ.
- 1025 B hrs  
A/C reporting centre reports to 571 Inf Regt: one auxiliary cruiser turns Northwards. All other units concealed by smoke at a distance of approximately 8 km. from Dieppe.
- 1028 B hrs  
II Bn 571 Inf Regt reports to 571 Inf Regt: no further enemy landings at Pourville.
- 1030 B hrs  
Corps HQ advises that German ground "Strafers" are expected to go into action at 1030 and 1145 B hours.
- 1034 B hrs  
In order to seek information staff officer of division dispatched to III Bn 570 Inf Regt which remains at disposal of division.
- 1036 B hrs  
By order of Corps HQ reinforced Klemm Regt (less one battalion of the Corps Reserve to assemble near Pourville at disposal of division.  
Division Commander drives thereto in order to commit regt to action against enemy landed near Pourville. Div Arty commander proceeds along.
- 1037 B hrs  
Col. Klemm telephones Division from Bacqueville, is informed, that div. commander awaits him near Pourville church to confer about attack.
- 1040 B hrs  
Arty commander of 332 Inf Div. discusses with 302 Inf Div the movement of I Bty 332 Arty Regt from St. Helene east of Pecamp by MT and requests to direct Corps Transport Columns thereto in lieu of locality designated by Col. Klemm. Division has informed Col. Klemm accordingly.



1045 B hrs AA sub-formation Dieppe informs 571 Inf Regt that AA battle team expected to arrive at approximately 1130 hours.

1055 B hrs Divisional staff officer who was dispatched to I Bn 571 Inf Regt, returns and reports: Bn was ordered by Regt to assemble at Hautot for attack against Pourville; encountered enemy thereby. Bn commander will attack with two companies.

1055 B hrs 5 Coy 571 Inf Regt and 2 and 3 Coys 302 Engr Bn receive order to push forward to Dieppe beach in order to roll up enemy who is still firing there.

1055 B hrs 6 Coy 571 Inf Regt reports to Regt that at Pourville beach combat activities just feeble. Situation at Varengeville not clear.

1058 B hrs Observation from Hill at Ferme aux 4 vents. Enemy in strength of one company is retreating from Hautot to Pourville.

1100 B hrs Report from 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty to Division: 813 Arty troop again clear of the enemy.  
Division orders crew of arty troop to establish contact with I Bn 571 Inf Regt in western section of Hautot.

1101 B hrs II Bn 571 Inf Regt observes approach of 3 landing craft towards Dieppe beach, under cover of cliffs.

1105 B hrs 6 Coy 571 Inf Regt, Pourville-East, reports to 571 Inf Regt that position is held with 25 men, all heavy weapons, except 1 beach defence are gun out of commission.

1126 B hrs 9 Tp 302 Arty Regt in fire position with improvised horse-drawn vehicles has been assigned task to support attack of I Bn 571 Inf Regt.

- 1130 B hrs I Bn 571 Inf Regt orders attack on Pourville; zero hour not as yet fixed. The battalion which at this time is severely attacked by enemy low-level aircraft has sustained losses. When GSM Proegler who had been detailed as observation NCO of the battalion advances with 4 men on his own initiative and brings in 200 P.W., the companies of I Bn 571 Inf Regt advance in the direction of Pourville-West not waiting for the order fixing zero hour. No report on this action received by division.
- 1130 B hrs Order through divisional commander: Corps Reserve - Regt Col. Klemm - to assemble in Offranville together with I Bn 676 Inf Regt and III Bn 570 Inf Regt for attack on Pourville. Pourville and beach near Pourville to be captured. The Regt is expected to arrive towards 1300 hours. Position of readiness to be reported to division. Time of attack will then be set. 9 Tp 302 Arty Regt is placed at command of Col. Klemm and takes up fire position in Offranville area.
- 1132 B hrs II Bn 571 Inf Regt reports to Regt: 23 landing craft in front of Dieppe seem to turn seawards. Fire from III Bty 302 Arty Regt concentrated on enemy tanks on Dieppe beach, fire from 7 Tp 302 Arty Regt concentrated from time to time on boats approaching beach between Varengeville and St. Marguerite.
- 1140 B hrs Pourville completely concealed by smoke.
- 1140 B hrs Commander 10 Panzer Div informed at command post of 302 Inf Div about situation.
- 1145 B hrs According to report from Klemm Regt, I Bn 676 Inf Regt, 81 Tank Squadron, one A tk section now arriving in Pourville. III Bn 676 Inf Regt resting at Bacqueville.
- 1145 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reports by telephone to division about situation.
- 1145 B hrs Point of resistance Puy firing at boats attempting to embark landed units. 2 boats destroyed.
- 1150 B hrs Naval signal station reports to 571 Inf Regt: 5 transport ships 5 km. seawards from Casino et Dieppe turn northward.
- 1150 B hrs Division issues order to Klemm Regt: III Bn 676 Inf Regt to be moved up to southern edge of Offranville.

1155 B hrs

Corps commander coming from 571 Inf Regt HQ arrives at Div HQ and communicates to Commander 10 Panzer Div and operations officer 302 Inf Div, both being present there, his intentions to commit 10 Panzer Div to action. 10 Panzer Div to be employed only west of the Scie, 302. Inf Div to retain command in entire sector until 10 Panzer Div with Vanguard arrive in the Torcy area, 16 km. south of Dieppe. Anticipated time table of arrivals:

Van guard at about 1500 B hours  
Inf Regt of armoured div at about 1700 B hours

Tanks at about 1800 B hours

Subsequent unit boundary between 302 Inf Div on the right and 10 Panzer Div on the left: Lower course of the Scie and south of it in accordance with map tracing.

1155 B hrs

Report from Dieppe port commandant: Several ships approaching again 3 km. in front of Dieppe, arty firing at them.

1200 B hrs

A/C reporting centre reports to 571 Inf Regt: 20 small boats heading for Pourville, at a distance of 500 to 1000 metres. All AA guns again ready for action.

1205 B hrs

30 Naval units, apparently transport ships, at 10 km. range proceed from southwest to northeast, fired at by 3 Tp 778 Arty Bty with 10 cm. cannon (15 cm. guns of 3 Tp 778 Arty Bty out of commission, as platforms prepared in makeshift manner became unserviceable when ground giving way on one side).

1220 B hrs

Smoke-bombs dropped by enemy aircraft on height at Ferme aux 4 Vents.

1225 B hrs

German ground "strafers" dropping bombs on west beach Dieppe, especially in Casino area, and on Pourville-West.

1230 B hrs

7 Tp 302 Arty Regt and 265 Arty Troop firing with lateral observer at Pourville-East in support of infantry attack. Other troops fire on Dieppe beach and in conjunction herewith on departing boats.

1235 B hrs

571 Inf Regt issues order: II Bn 571 Inf Regt to reconnoitre with 6 Coy, to which a platoon of 11 Coy has been subordinated for this purpose, from Pourville-East to Pourville-West. Contact to be established with I Bn 571 Inf Regt which is attacking Pourville-West from direction of Hautot.

1236 B hrs  
 Division orders: 570 Inf Regt HQ assumes command of coastal sector from Criel inclusive up to Belleville inclusive. In addition to I Bn 570 Inf Regt, there are at Regt's disposal 14 Coy 570 Inf Regt., 570 Inf gun section and regimental cyclist and the engr platoon, 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn (motorized in makeshift manner) for the rebuilding of wire obstacles near Berneval. However, it is expected that this company will be soon recalled.

1238 B hrs  
 A/C reporting centre reports to 571 Inf Regt: 4 enemy naval units firing on Pourville.

1238 B hrs  
 Division advises 571 Inf Regt that it is intended to clean up situation near Varengeville by III Bn 676 Inf Regt operating from Offranville. Battalion will be able to attack towards 1400 hours.

1240 B hrs  
 HQ of v. Bluecher and cyclist squadron are at Graincourt at disposal of division.

1240 B hrs  
 Commander 302 Inf Div returns from Klemm Regt HQ. Reinforced Klemm Regt ordered to attack Pourville advancing on west bank of the Scie. Klemm Regt comprises at this time III Bn 570 Inf Regt again subordinated to it, furthermore I Bn 676 Inf Regt, 81 Tank Squadron, and the subordinated 9 Tp 302 Arty Regt. It has been instructed to establish contact with I Bn 571 Inf Regt.  
 Klemm Regt presumably will be able to attack at about 1430 hours.

1250 B hrs  
 The following divisional order is forwarded to Col. Klemm by staff officer:  
 III Bn 676 Inf Regt arriving at south edge of Offranville will immediately launch attack in direction of Chau, Varengeville, Hill 74 near Le Haut le Mesnil; it will push through to the coast and establish contact with 3 Coy 571 Inf Regt at point of resistance St. Marguerite - Quiberville-East and 813 Arty Troop near Hill 74.  
 Telephone station in point of resistance Quiberville is to be used for the transmission of reports to division.

1256 B hrs  
 Corps HQ is informed about the forthcoming commitment of Klemm Regt.

1320 B hrs  
 II Bn 571 Inf Regt reports to 571 Inf Regt: Bomb raid on Pourville-East (Cau de Cotes) and Hill at Ferme aux 4 Vents. British embark at Pourville.

1330 B hrs  
 571 Inf Regt reports the capture of about 1000 P.W. In front of Dieppe, thick smoke under protection of which enemy apparently intends to withdraw.

1333 B hrs Division reports to Corps HQ accordingly.

1340 B hrs Order from the Corps Commander: Panzer division is not to proceed, for the time being, beyond designated area near Torcy.  
Navy reports new British convoy proceeding from England in direction of Dieppe.

1345 B hrs Following order is received from C-in-C West:  
"Enemy landed in area of division is withdrawing. It is a matter of great concern to me, that all landed forces are completely annihilated; therefore all elements of the Panzer division (tanks and arty) fit for combat must be thrown forward immediately. Every available gun barrel must now be employed for the complete annihilation of the landed enemy. The entire front on which he is landing must be mopped up forthwith.  
v. Rundstedt"

1345 B hrs Division instructs 571 Inf Regt to inform point of resistance Quiberville about attack by Klemm Regt on Pourville, on Chau, on Varengeville, and on 813 Tp gun position and Lighthouse.

1410 B hrs On Dieppe beach, mopping up is progressing satisfactorily.

1420 B hrs Operations officers of 10 Panzer Div. and 302 Inf Div confer on situation at Command Post of 302 Inf Div. Support by 10 Panzer Div is not required. 302 Inf Div retains command in entire divisional sector.

1437 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reports to Div: Dieppe beach cleaned up. 6 Coy 571 Inf Regt has pushed down to Pourville-West, no more landings there. General impression that enemy is pulling out from land on entire front. Pourville firmly in our hands.

1445 B hrs Division reports to Corps HQ: Enemy attack is as good as repulsed on entire front. It is now only a matter of mopping up.

1447 B hrs Division informs Commander 2 Fighter Formation about present situation and thanks him for his support. Bombers to be employed only against landing or departing boats.

1455 B hrs II Bn 571 Inf Regt reports that Dieppe beach cleared of the enemy.

1509 B hrs Division has 302 Signal Bn reestablish direct telephone communication with Klemm Regt HQ via Arques-la-Bataille to supplement already functioning wireless communication.

1530 B hrs Air force intercepts enemy wireless message to the effect that strong aircraft units will be launched against Dieppe after 1530 B hours. This information transmitted by telephone and wireless to all troops including 10 Panzer Div.

1545 B hrs Day's communique submitted to Corps HQ with conclusion: All attacks repulsed by Division itself with comparatively insignificant losses.  
Over 1100 P.W. captured, several tanks destroyed. Enemy sustained heavy losses.

The following occurred during the afternoon of 19.8: Putting units in order, combing through the broken terrain between Pourville and Quiberville by I Bn 571 Inf Regt and elements of 10 Panzer Div.

Sector Pourville-West - St. Aubin including subordinated to Klemm Regt HQ.

I Bn 571 Inf Regt (less 3 Coy, in Quiberville-East) is being concentrated in Ouville as divisional reserve.

II Bn 570 Inf Regt is being moved to St. Remy west of Eu as divisional reserve. A tk and recce Bn HQ together with cyclist squadron and 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn are in St. Nicolas as divisional reserve.

- D. Attack on Point of Resistance Quiberville-East, Arty Troop Strong Point Varengeville (813 Army Coastal Arty Tp), Point of Resistance Lighthouse  
(see map, encl. 6)

0545 B hrs 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp reports to point of resistance Quiberville-East: Enemy ships approach coast.

0550 B hrs 3 Coy 571 Inf Regt (less one platoon) at point of resistance Quiberville-East, one platoon at point of resistance St. Aubin ready for action.

0600 B hrs Point of resistance Quiberville-East exchanges fire with 6 landing craft disembarking troops: 20 others approach beach.  
Point of resistance fired at with guns on board landing craft and mortars set up on beach. 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp firing at sea targets.

0610 B hrs 571 Inf Regt reporting landing attempt near Quiberville.

0610 B hrs Report from 3 Coy 571 Inf Regt to I Bn 571 Inf Regt: Enemy landed in part, main force repelled. Enemy continues landing attempts.

0612 B hrs

571 Inf Regt orders to I Bn 571 Inf Regt action stations for immediate counter-attack on Quiberville. Battalion arranges reconnaissance towards Quiberville and St. Aubin. Division reports to Corps landing attempt near Quiberville.

0615 B hrs

813 Army Coastal Arty Tp mans 3 gun crews in their positions, for close-range combat.

Tp commander has ordered "paratroop" alert.

Tp lays down harassing fire in front of Pourville.

0625 B hrs

I Bn 571 Inf Regt reconnoitres in compliance with order by 571 Inf Regt with one platoon towards Varengeville-Pourville.

0625 B hrs

813 Arty Tp fires with 3 gun crews at sea targets. Strong attacks with MG and cannon fire by low-flying aircraft. Cartridges lying in dugouts adjoining gun emplacements catch fire as result of attack. Wooden frame in positions burns. Guns remain serviceable.

0644 B hrs

Division informs 332 Inf Div about situation and requests that contact with St. Aubin and Quiberville be maintained. 332 Inf Div dispatches recce patrols thereto.

0655 B hrs

Landing attempt near Quiberville is beaten off. Landing boats depart towards northwest. No landing attempt near St. Aubin.

Approximately at

0720 B hrs

813 Arty Tp attacked by enemy infantry from east, south and north, fires with one gun at closest range to combat enemy M.G. detachments. Division has no report about this as yet.

3 Coy 571 Inf Regt in point of resistance Quiberville dispatches recce patrol (1 NCO, 5 men) to 813 Arty Tp.

0735 B hrs

Recce patrol from 3 Coy 571 Inf Regt reconnoitres Quiberville beach.

0745 B hrs

3 Coy 571 Inf Regt reports to I Bn 571 Inf Regt: Heights between St. Marguerite and 813 Arty Tp clear of enemy; 3 ships fire from sea at 813 Tp which does not return fire:

This message received by Division at 0802 B hours.

0750 B hrs

813 Arty Tp reports to 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty: Enemy broke into Tp position. Gun crews defended individual gun emplacements which were captured from left flank by enemy. Tank gun of Tp put out of commission by direct hit.

Five guns made unserviceable by enemy with explosive and incendiary charges.

Tp commander moves up with assault detachment from observation post to troop, troop suffers considerable losses, Tp commander himself is wounded.

0802 B hrs

Division receives following message as first report about close-range attack on 813 Tp:

770 Army Coastal Arty Bty reports: 813 Tp engaged in heavy close-range combat, Tp commander seriously wounded, Vareneville under heavy attack.

0814 B hrs

Division issues order by telephone to Commander I Bn 571 Inf Regt:

In the event that 813 Arty Tp be endangered, proceed immediately thereto with a reinforced infantry company for an immediate counter-attack. III Bn 570 Inf Regt expected to arrive soon. If no contact with it, such to be established immediately by motorcycle. Division desires earliest advice on outcome regarding 813 Arty Tp. Conversation breaks off. Order was not carried out, as another operational order from 571 Inf Regt had been received.

until 0900 B hrs

I Bn 571 Inf Regt receives advice from dispersed gunners of 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp that guns were blown up, and Troop almost wiped out.

0930 B hrs

Division dispatches staff officer to I Bn 571 Inf Regt to clarify situation. Battalion to arrange for support of 813 Arty Tp and to establish whereabouts of III Bn 570 Inf Regt of the Corps Reserve which originally was to move to Ouville and subsequently was ordered to proceed directly to Offranville.

1000 B hrs

Contact between 813 Arty Tp and I Bn 571 Inf Regt (at forming up positions in Hautot for an immediate counter-attack on Pourville) is established. Troop position cleared of the enemy by recon patrol from 1 Coy 571 Inf Regt and remainder of troop crew.

Enemy still at Vareneville, in strength of approximately 300 Britishers, according to information supplied by local inhabitants.

1100 B hrs

Division receives report that 813 Arty Tp clear of the enemy.

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### III Description of the entire operation

on 19.8.1942

At 0505 and 0510(B) hrs Division was informed by 571 and 572 Inf Regt that a naval engagement was taking place 15 to 20 km from the coast. The Navy had reported the convoy to Division during the night. Increased vigilance had been ordered units of the Division on forward positions (See Timetable A: 0601(B) hrs). At 0530(B) hrs Division reported the naval engagement to LXXXI Army Corps H.Q. Up to this time, naval engagement could be observed only through tracer ammunition and gun flashes. See Strengths and Dispositions Appx 1.

At 0535-0540(B) hrs several heavy detonations were heard from a northwesterly direction at divisional command post. At 0558(B) hrs Division established telephone communication with aircraft reporting centre Dieppe. In answer to its inquiry Division was informed that a German convoy was attacked by enemy naval craft. At the end of the conversation the aircraft reporting centre stated that infantry fire could be heard from the direction of Pourville. At the same time (0600(B) hrs) 571 Inf Regt reported a British landing attempt at Pourville. The regiment had independently ordered action stations. At 0601(B) hrs the Division issued a telephone order for action stations and alarm scale II for HQ and troops committed to action in the divisional coastal defence area.

#### First reports to Division about landing attempts:

The rumble of battle in the direction of Dieppe had been increasing since 0600(B) hrs. Loud detonations were heard. At 0610(B) hrs, 571 Inf Regt reported landing attempts at Quiberville as well as bombs dropping on Dieppe. At 0622(B) hrs, the 770 Army coastal Arty Bty reported that

Berneval was being attacked from the sea. Telephone communications were disrupted in the Dieppe sector only.

From the remainder of the divisional sector reports indicated that it was not possible to confirm enemy approaches.

Appreciation of the situation at 0630(B) hrs:

The attack, for the time being, was confined to Berneval, Puy, Dieppe, Pourville and Quiberville. From the numerical view point, Berneval and Quiberville were weak points; on the other hand, Dieppe, with Puy and Pourville-East flanking it, was definitely capable of carrying on without reinforcements. Only a picket composed of 1 NCO and 9 ORs was stationed at Petit Berneval. At that point, the gorges leading to the interior were heavily wired and strewn with booby traps; the central gorge was covered with mine fields (anti-personnel mines). It was unlikely that enemy tanks would be able to come up due to the fact that the natural anti-tank defences near the approaches to the beach had been strengthened. Near Berneval le Grand were located an Army coastal Arty Troop, a Radar station Gleiwitz (which is of great importance to the enemy) and a Light AA section.

Division ordered 1 Bn, 570 Inf Regt - in divisional reserve, Touffreville - Auquemesnil - Assigny area, to assemble in Assigny and despatch a strong officer's patrol to reconnoitre vicinity Berneval. At 0650(B) hrs one company from Assigny near Berneval was moved up to St-Martin en Campagne to carry on further reconnaissance. At 0705(B) hrs Division decided to give Major von Bücher, O.C. 302 A tk recce Bn (divisional reserve) command of all troops to be engaged against the enemy near Berneval and place under command for this purpose: 302 Cyclist

Squadron, 3 Coy, 302 Engr Bn (with improvised MT). 302 A tk Coy, which had moved up to St-Nicolas, remained as divisional reserve (See map tracing, appx 2).

The attack near Quiberville encountered a defended locality on the high ground EAST of the Saane which was manned by two thirds of an infantry company, one half of a heavy MG platoon and 2 beach defence guns. An enemy break-through towards the SOUTH would run into 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt in the Ouville area. Danger from tanks was insignificant due to the damming up of the Saane and anti-tank obstacles on both sides. It would appear that for the time being no reinforcements were required near Quiberville.

Division assembled 2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt (divisional reserve) near St-Remy; it was ready to be moved in makeshift II T transport; 7 Coy (on bicycles) remained in Eu. The Bn and Regimental HQ, 570 Inf Regt which were not permanently committed to action were not as yet moved up to Dieppe, as Division did not consider the attacks launched up to now as the enemy's sole undertaking and anticipated attacks on other parts of the 75 km. wide divisional front.

Development of the situation up to 0800(B) hrs:

Berneval: Second wave of boats landed despite harassing fire by Army Coastal Arty Troop. Personnel of Tp and Radar Gleiwitz engaged the enemy.

The Officer's Recce Patrol from 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt joined in the battle.

The following units were arriving: HQ of v. Blucher's composite force, Cyclist Squadron, 3 Coy, 302 Engr Bn (with improvised MT) and 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt.

Puys: Second wave had landed; only insignificant elements succeeded in reaching land. Puys firmly in our hands.

Dieppe: Several waves of infantry and tanks had landed. The high ground on both sides of the port was subjected to attacks from enemy aircraft dropping bombs and strafing with MG and cannon fire, and also to fire from the sea, including smoke shells and smoke-bombs. The city and port were firmly in our hands, the enemy occupied only the west beach.

Pourville: The enemy had broken into Pourville-West. Enemy elements, advancing on the slopes west of the flooded area of the Scie in the direction of Petit Appeville, were being checked by recon patrols of the Regimental Engr Platoon and of the NCO class <sup>on bicycles from</sup> (of the Regimental cyclist platoon).

4,7 A tk guns and forward sections in point of resistance Quiberville-East had been put out of action; 2 enemy platoons were advancing on the EAST bank of the flooded area towards the SOUTH in the dead ground of Hill Perme aux Quatre-Vents. This hill was firmly in our hands.

Quiberville and Troop Strong Point Varengeville (813):

The attack had been beaten off. The high ground between Ste-Marguerite and 813 Army coastal Arty Tp was reported by recon patrol of 3 Coy, 571 Inf Regt clear of the enemy (See appx 6).

813 Army Coastal Arty Tp had been attacked by enemy (Commandos), who landed at the foot of the steep cliffs between Pourville and Ste-Marguerite

and scaled them with the aid of mountain-climbing equipment. This sector was protected on the cliffs only at Sea-gull gorge, about 500 metres WEST of Fourville, by a piquet composed of a section of infantry and at Phare d'Ailly by defended locality Lighthouse (Observation Post of 813 Arty Troop, Navy Signal Station, Radar and aircraft reporting team). Gorges that extend upwards either directly from the beach or from small elevations were heavily wired and strewn with booby traps. (See part I Terrain and Fortifications). With the exception of a nightly patrol service, the Division was unable to provide a permanent covering force due to lack of personnel. Such a force could have been arranged only at the expense of the Regimental Reserve Battalion which was already weakened by having to detail a reinforced infantry company stationed at Quiberville and St-Aubin. 813 Army Coastal Arty Troop was stationed behind this coastal sector, at approximately 1 km from the coast, near point 74, 1.5 km S.E. of Phare D'Ailly. This troop became an independent troop strong point on 19.3.1942 and as such was responsible for its own defence against land and air attacks. As regards the selection of this Arty Troop position and its improvement with concrete gun emplacements built close to each other, with command post and dugouts, Division had no say during the period of construction (fall of 1941) due to lack of tactical subordination.

The construction was carried out exclusively under the guidance of naval authorities. The concrete structures had been completed when the control over the reinforced program for field

constructions for all branches of the armed forces was transferred to Division in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive No. 40.

Since then Division had repeatedly called the attention of Army Coastal Arty Commanders to the fact that it was not in a position to provide infantry protection for this arty troop.

Division was informed at 0802(B) hrs by a telephone call from commander 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty that 813 Tp was engaged in close-range combat.

At this time it was aware that 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt, regimental reserve, had dispatched a platoon from 2 Coy, 571 Inf Regt for purposes of reconnaissance to Varengville-Pourville, and that a landing attempt near Quiberville had been repelled. At 0814(B) hrs, Division issued the following order to commander 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt at Ouville: "Should 813 Arty Tp be endangered, proceed immediately thereto with a reinforced infantry company for immediate counter-attack". 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt, which had been in Corps Reserve and was made available by Corps HQ at 0726(B) hrs, was expected to arrive in Ouville soon. Then 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt would no longer be required as Regimental Reserve and could be replaced for immediate counter-attack towards the Scie, Saane or Dun valleys by 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt. At the same time, Commander 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt was ordered to establish contact with 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt Division desired earliest information on 813 Arty Tp.

Companies of 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt had been occupying their forming-up positions NORTH and WEST of Ouville since 0619(B) hrs in order to launch an immediate counter-attack and were moving to the assembly area

as ordered by 0710(B) hrs for a counter-attack against a strong enemy near Pourville. Commander 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt did not immediately call Division's attention to this re-grouping of his battalion; the conversation was broken off after the transmission of the order.

1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt received a report from dispersed gunners of 813 Tp that their guns were blown up and the troop almost wiped out. The recce patrol detailed to reconnoitre towards Varengville-Pourville reported that the enemy was in Varengville.

1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt carried out the order issued by 571 Inf Regt to assemble in the southern sector of Hautot. When this was reported to Division the latter concurred as the point of enemy penetration near Pourville was at this time the most dangerous point in the divisional sector, pending the arrival of 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt which, was moved to Offranville in lieu of Ouville but had not arrived as yet (See appx 6).

3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt, placed under command of Division by Corps, lost time while waiting to be moved by Transport Sandkühler instead of moving off at once from the Bacqueville area to Ouville and sending the commander or an officer ahead either thereto or to Division.

Development of the situation up to 1030(B) hrs

Berneval: At 0930(B) hrs Composite Force von Blücher attacked enemy (See sketch). At 0945(B) hrs, 3 Coy, 302 Engr Bn had pierced through Berneval le Grand to Troop Strong Point Berneval (2 Tp, 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty) and was pursuing the enemy who was withdrawing towards the gorge N.W. of Berneval. The enemy near

Berneval was concealed by smoke and was relieved from pressure by low-level air attacks.

At 1020(B) hrs Cyclist Squadron together with elements of 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt had thrown the enemy out of Petit Berneval. Enemy on Hill 101 N.E. of this locality was being encircled by 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt. Meanwhile two recon patrols from 1 Coy, 570 Inf Regt, the latter consisting of 1 offr and 40 ORs, had advanced along the foot of the cliffs up to Petit Berneval.

By 1030(B) hrs, Division considered the situation near Berneval as cleaned up although final report to that effect had not as yet been received.

Division issued the following order: "When enemy defeated, composite force will be withdrawn and task of pursuit assigned to 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt.

Puys:

At 0935(B) hrs, 571 Inf Regt reported to Division that Puys was firmly in our hands. Enemy casualties approximately 500 killed and taken prisoners.

Division was now assured that there was no danger here even if further enemy landings should take place. No stoppages or losses of heavy weapons had been reported.

Dieppe:

Reports from 571 Inf Regt about landing of heavy tanks against which our 2.5 and 3.7 anti-tank guns were ineffective, forced Division to place under command of the Regt at 0900(B) hrs the 302 A tk Coy (with improvised MT) with 7.5 cm A tk guns.

These may arrive at Dieppe about 1000(B) hrs. The battle against enemy tanks was rendered difficult by the fact that high ground on both sides of Dieppe and the beach were concealed by smoke. Anti-tank walls sealing off the streets running to the beach prevented tanks from breaking



through into the city, but at the same time prevented our 7.5 cm A tk guns from taking up positions at close range. Only enemy recce patrols had succeeded in penetrating the city through buildings near the beach.

At 1010(B) hrs 571 Inf Regt reported that the breach at the beach had been sealed off. The Reserve Coy of 3 Bn had been moved from the east side to the west side of the port.

571 Inf Regt had one Reserve Coy on the east and west banks of the port. All Troops of 3 Bty, 302 Arty Regt were firing. Telephone communications with Regt HQ, 571 Inf Regt, functioned only from time to time but wireless communication was maintained uninterruptedly. Visual signal communication between the Regt and its 3 Bn on the eastern height was impossible due to smoke; telephone communication was interrupted, it was impossible to establish wireless communication, the only effective means of communication was by runner.

Division appreciated the situation and concluded that the garrison would be able to hold out without reinforcements despite the continuous enemy landings with the support of naval arty. At 1022(B) hrs Division moved up to 571 Inf Regt a Reserve Coy <sup>(hospital patients fit for action)</sup> with improvised MT in order to release an Engr Coy which was permanently engaged at the southern front of Dieppe in order to enable Regt to launch an immediate counter-attack near the beach. Corps HQ had arranged for the transfer of the Corps Reserve (reinforced Klemm Regt less one battalion, 81 A tk Coy and 1 Bty, 332 Arty Regt) to Pourville under command of Division; the Corps Reserve was expected to arrive

soon. Division did not intend for the time being to switch any units of the Corps Reserve to Dieppe, but the entire reinforced Klemm Regt was to be committed against the enemy who had broken into the Scie valley near Pourville. 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt was stationed at the western edge of the d'Arques Woods with I/T and II/T Transport Columns (sufficient to move all companies including the MG Coy) at the disposal of Division. This battalion constituted at the same time a reserve in the event of enemy airborne landings.

It was intended to withdraw composite force v. Blücher from Berneval, in accordance with wireless message to Blücher dispatched at 1026(B) hrs.

At 1036(B) hrs, Div commander proceeded to Pourville to commit the Corps Reserve Regt which was being moved up for an attack on Pourville and personally clarify the situation.

Pourville:

In accordance with information received by Division, several landings had been effected in Pourville despite resistance offered by 3 Bty, 302 Arty Regt and AA Arty. The enemy had penetrated into Pourville. Division had not as yet heard that in the Scie valley the enemy had made advances over dead ground of Hill Ferme aux Quatre-Vents EAST of the Scie and on the high ground WEST of the Scie in the direction of Hautot.

Division asked that ground "strafers" offered by Corps HQ be committed against landing craft in front of Dieppe and Pourville, not against the Dieppe beach, but against the western section of Pourville, and especially against buildings on hillsides WEST of the flooded area of the Scie.

Division considered Pourville and the Scie valley as the points of greatest danger in the divisional sector and intended to launch its prepared counter-attack with the Corps Reserve Regiment. Neither this regiment nor 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt, which was ordered to Offranville, had arrived as yet.

A divisional staff officer was looking for the whereabouts of the Bn.

Quiberville and 813 Arty Troop:

No other landing was attempted at Quiberville. Division had through the flanking division on the left, which maintained constant communication with Quiberville and St-Aubin, the assurance that no more surprises would occur here.

As regards the situation near 813 Arty Troop, at 1010(B) hrs Division received a report from defended locality Quiberville-East, that a recce patrol dispatched from there had returned stating that the arty troop was encircled.

At this time (1010(B) hrs), the fighting there had in fact come to an end and the enemy had withdrawn. This was reported to Division at 1100(B) hrs by phone from 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty. Thereupon Division ordered the crew to establish contact with a company from 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt which was to advance on Varengeville in accordance with instructions. It was only at 1055(B) hrs that Division was informed that the entire 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt (less reinforced 3 Coy in Quiberville and St-Aubin), has assembled far to the EAST of 813 Arty Tp, with its left flank N.E. of the Chateau de Varengeville.

No reports were received from defended locality Lighthouse with its garrison of 3 offrs, 8 NCOs and

66 ORs made up of personnel from the Air Force, Navy, Army Coastal Arty Troop, observation and computing centre. However, Division felt it could assume that everything there was under control, as otherwise it would have received calls for help by wireless from aircraft reporting centre Dieppe, which maintained wireless communication with the aircraft observation post near the Lighthouse, or from the Army Coastal Arty Bty, which should also have had wireless communication with the computing centre.

Division appreciated the general situation and decided that an all-out effort was to be made to clean up the enemy near Pourville and that relief for 813 Army Coastal Arty Troop was of lesser importance.

Development of the situation up to 1130(B) hrs:

Berneval: At 1120(B) hrs, Major von Blücher reported as follows: "Situation near Berneval and Hill 101 to the N.E. has been completely cleaned up." Division ordered withdrawal of Blücher HQ and cyclist Squadron to Graincourt; Engr Coy to rebuild obstacles near Berneval and then proceed to Graincourt. 3 Coy, 570 Inf Regt was to protect Petit Berneval.

Puys: All attacks had been completely beaten off.

Dieppe: Situation on the beach, on which enemy tanks were still cruising, had not yet been cleaned up. The city of Dieppe was clear of enemy. The heights on both sides of Dieppe were firmly in our hands. 2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt with complete improvised MT was in divisional reserve in d'Arques Woods, SOUTH of Dieppe.

Pourville: On the Cau de C6te (EAST of the Scie), the enemy advanced after the 4.7 cm A tk gun position and one beach defence gun were put out of action, but he had been thrown back. The hill was being held. No report about the enemy who advanced on the EAST bank of the flooded area of the Scie over dead ground of Hill Ferme aux Quatre-Vents.

The enemy was still in Pourville-West and on the heights to the SOUTH and to the WEST of the Scie valley. It must be assumed that 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt was engaging this enemy. A staff officer from Div HQ, who returned at 1055(B) hrs, reported the Bn forming-up area for the attack (see sketch). As a matter of fact this Bn, which had already been under fire near Hautot and was facing the enemy at Varengenville as well, launched its attack from its forming-up position only after 1130(B) hrs (see encl. 6).

Div comd arriving near Hautot ordered the comd of the reinforced Klemm Regt, to assemble in the Offranville area with 1 Bn, 676 Inf Regt, 3 Bn, 570 Inf Regt and 81 Tank Squadron for an attack on Pourville and seize the beach near Pourville. Position of readiness to be reported to Div by wireless or telephone in Offranville. 9 Troop, 302 Arty Regt, was placed under command of Col. Klemm and moved into position near Offranville. 3 Bn, 676 Inf Regt was committed to a thrust in the direction of Phare d'Ailly via Varengenville. 1 Bty, 332 Arty Regt was still on the move and was

not expected to arrive before 1400(B) hrs as Col. Klemm had been forced to change its movement order.

Our own ground "strafers" had attacked Pourville-West; another attack had been promised for 1145(B) hrs.

Quiberville and 813 Arty Troop:

At 1100(B) hrs it was reported to Div from defended locality Quiberville-East that enemy ships were concealing themselves behind a smoke screen. A number had turned eastwards, and a number northeastwards. 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty reported at 1100(B) hrs that 813 Arty Troop was clear of the enemy. The situation had thus been cleaned up here as well.

Development of the situation up to 1230(B) hrs:

Berneval: Completely clear of enemy since 1120(B) hrs.

Puys: Completely clear since 0935(B) hrs.

Dieppe: Reported to 571 Inf Regt by its 2 Bn, that landing crafts seemed to turn off towards the sea and by Naval signal Station that 5 Transport ships were turning away some 5 km from shore. Troops of 3 Bty, 302 Arty Regt, A tk guns of the A tk coy and of 571 Inf Regt, and also AA guns fired at enemy tanks on the beach. The attack by 5 Coy, 571 Inf Regt and two thirds of 2 Coy, 302 Engr Bn ordered by 571 Inf Regt to mop up the beach was in progress since approximately 1200(B) hrs. On the west beach, on its extreme western edge, one beach defence gun manned by a gun detachment from 302 Arty Regt was still firing. On the west mole, the A tk gun position had suffered a direct hit;

1 officer and 2 men were still holding out together with 2 men near the captured tank at the tip of the mole.

German bombers attacked the Casino on the Dieppe beach and boats in front of the beach.

2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt, in divisional reserve, was still standing to at the western edge of the d'Arques Woods with its transport columns.

Reports from 572 Inf Regt indicated that a convoy comprising approximately 30 ships has been observed on the high seas in front of Dieppe and that it was being constantly attacked by German bombers.

Pourville:

Pourville-East was being held. The enemy had concealed himself in Pourville-West under cover of smoke. 2 Coy, 571 Inf Regt was instructed to reconnoitre in that direction. On Hill Perme aux Quatre-Vents it was observed that the attack by 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt on western heights of the Scie Valley was progressing. The Regt reported this to Division at 1145(B) hrs.

At 1140(B) hrs Commander of 10 Panzer Div. arrived with his staff officer at div command post and after obtaining information about the situation had proceeded to Pourville to confer with Div Commander.

At 1155(B) hrs the Corps Commander arrived from Dieppe and told the operations officer of his observations in Dieppe; he gave the Scie brook as boundary between 302 Inf Div. on the right and 10 Panzer Div on the left in the event that 10 Panzer Div should join in the battle. Until then, the Commander of 302 Inf Div was to remain in command.

Reinforced Klemm Regt was advancing to Offranville to form up in preparation for an attack on Pourville and 3 Bn, 676 Inf Regt for an attack on Varengeville.

By 1100(B) hrs, Quiberville and Arty Tp 813 were clear of the enemy:

Development of the situation up to 1445(B) hrs:

Dieppe: On the beach, infantry fighting; enemy tanks still fired but had largely been immobilized. By 1230(B) hrs the impression was that the enemy wished to embark under cover of his tanks and smoke. Naval guns fired on Dieppe.

At 1437(B) hrs 571 Inf Regt reported to Division that Dieppe beach had been cleared and 600 P.W. taken.

Pourville: Cau de Côte (Pourville-East) had been cleared of the enemy by 1336(B) hrs through a thrust by one platoon from 6 Coy, and one platoon from 11 Coy, 571 Inf Regt. One platoon of the Dieppe municipal police had joined this thrust. Pourville-West was concealed by thick smoke. From Pourville-East the approach of boats was observed at 1253(B) hrs but at first it was not clear whether they intend to land or take on troops; hence the report by 571 Inf Regt to Division about new enemy landings near Pourville. By 1358(B) hrs no further noise of battle was heard in Pourville.

1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt had made good progress in the course of its attack on Pourville and reached the beach by 1400(B) hrs.

Reserves: Reinforced Klemm Regt was in forming-up position for an attack on Pourville, with 3 Bn, 676 Inf Regt for an attack on Varengeville. This commitment



became superfluous after 1400(B) hrs. It was now only a matter of combing through the terrain between Pourville and the Lighthouse.

From 10 Tank Div only the commander with a staff officer had arrived in Offranville.

Divisional Reserve - 2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt - was still stationed in the d'Arques Woods ready for action; HQ A tk and recce Bn, together with cyclist Squadron and 3 Coy, 302 Engr Coy, were in Graincourt.

General situation:

At 1445(B) hrs Division reported to Corps that the enemy attack was as good as beaten off all along the line. It was now only a matter of mopping up.

Further events of the day:

At 1445(B) hrs 2 Bn, 571 Inf Regt reported Dieppe beach clear of the enemy.

At 1600(B) hrs: 10 Panzer Div had instructed 10 motor-cyclist rifle Bn to comb through orchards, copses and gorges between Pourville and Quiberville as civilians had reported Britishers still hiding in this area.

10 Panzer Div did not join the battle. No Britishers were located during the combing through.

Division detached from the sector of 571 Inf Regt the area west of the Scie. The Klemm Regt was put in command of this local sector. See the final disposition of troops on the sketch.

Divisional Reserves were returned to their former billeting areas; they went into bivouacs but remained concentrated.

IV. Information collected about the enemy

A. Intentions of the Enemy

1. Objectives

Capture of the port of Dieppe by the first attacking wave by means of a frontal attack on the beach and port entrance; capture of the eastern heights from Puy and the western heights from Pourville by means of an enveloping attack. A thrust into the Arques valley to capture a landing zone for airborne troops (the Dieppe racecourse was intended for this purpose).

A thrust into the Scie valley to seize the Dieppe-St-Aubin airfield, and wipe out the 265 positional arty troop near Calmont and the divisional command post in Arques-la-Bataille.

Should the operation be a success, the convoy of the 2nd echelon which had already left England on the morning of 19 Aug was to land with the tide at 1729(B) hrs. In the event of failure a detailed plan of withdrawal had been drawn up with points of withdrawal to be reached at set times, "in accordance with the hour for withdrawal". The hour for withdrawal had not been set in advance, but was to be set later on.

In accordance with statements made by P.W., it was intended to use the Dieppe railroad station for "supplies and reinforcements". The station had not been attacked with bombs. The P.W. expected the arrival of a second wave "with Britishers" not with Canadians.

2. Flanking operations

The main attack against Dieppe was supported by the following flanking operations: Operation Berneval; objective: Annihilation of 2 Tp, 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty and air force equipment (Radar).

Operation Caiberville - Objective: Annihilation of 813 Army Coastal Arty Tp.

The elimination of these two coastal arty troops covering the area up to the port entrance of Dieppe was an absolute necessity to enable larger transport ships to enter the harbour or to effect disembarcations in the Dieppe roadstead.

3. Attack on Dieppe:

Vide plan of attack according to captured documents and sketch maps (appx 4 and 5).

B. Strength of first wave:

Against Dieppe with Puy and Pourville - the 2 Canadian Division with

4250 men  
58 tanks  
10 Bren gun carriers  
7 destroyers

These figures were arrived at as a result of a detailed tabulation made with the aid of port experts from information contained in captured documents.

Against Berneval: 3 Commandos with 330 men.

Against 813 Arty Tp: 4 Commandos with 225 men.

These figures were obtained from statements made by P.W. Particulars are being reported by the intelligence officer via official channels.

C. Evaluation of the Enemy

The main attack near Dieppe, Puy and Pourville was launched by 2 Canadian Division in a very energetic fashion. The fact that the enemy did not gain any ground at all in Puy and in Dieppe captured for a brief period only sections of the beach with the exception of the western mole and the western

edge was not caused by lack of courage, but by the concentrated defensive fire of our divisional arty and the heavy weapons of our infantry. Enemy tank crews did not lack in determination. They were unable to overcome the anti-tank walls blocking the way to the city of Dieppe (a large blasting charge failed to explode) and make headway on the rolling beach pebbles and over the sea wall. In Puy's their efforts to surmount the wire obstacles studded with booby traps on the first beach terrace despite heavy German MG fire were signs of a fine aggressive spirit. The large number of P.W. near Puy's was the result of a hopeless situation on a beach subjected to heavy German MG and mortar fire and offering no protective cover between the cliffs and the sea.

Near Pourville the enemy, immediately upon landing, made a thrust into the interior without paying attention to flank protection.

The 2 Canadian Division which carried out this attack consisted predominantly of French Canadians, about 90% of the names of a captured company nominal roll being clearly of French origin.

The attacks against the coastal arty troops was conducted by the Commandos with great pluck and skill. With technical devices of all sorts they succeeded in scrambling up the steep cliffs at points which seemed inaccessible.

The British High Command rather seriously underestimated the quantity of weapons of all sorts required for such an attack. The strength of air and naval forces was entirely insufficient to suppress the defenders during the landings and destroy their signal communications. It is incomprehensible that the British High Command thought that one Canadian Division would be able to overrun a German infantry regiment reinforced with artillery.

The British Command at Brigade and Regimental levels had drawn up the plan of the attack in a mediocre way, while the timetable for the tentative withdrawal after "the hour for withdrawal" was too rigid.

The employment of tanks against Dieppe only was wrong even if they counted on destroying the anti-tank walls.

Very little information on the exertion of the British Command at lower levels is available.

#### V. P.W. and captured Equipment

Altogether 95 offrs and 2122 ORs were captured; of this number 660 offrs and OR had been wounded.

Among the P.W. was a general of the 2 Canadian Division and 3 colonels.

Number of British killed and buried up to the night of 23 Aug 1942: 475.

This number will be increased.

The following equipment has been found so far:

21 tanks; 7 others are lying in the sea.

6 Bren gun carriers.

1 jeep.

1242 rifles

165 light MGs

22 heavy mortars

58 light mortars

60 A tk rifles

58 machine carbines

Ammunition, smoke equipment and explosives of all sorts.

5 extension assault ladders.

3 motor landing craft armed with two 4.5 cm and

two 2.3 cm AA guns for the landing of tanks.

Numerous assault landing craft, armoured.

Principal types of tanks:

Churchill I, 28 tons, 1 x 4.7 cm gun, 1 x 4 cm smoke  
discharger, 1 MG

Churchill II, 30 tons, 1 x 5.5 cm gun, 1 x 4 cm smoke  
discharger, 2 MG

Churchill III, 32 tons, 1 x 7.5 cm gun, 1 x 4 cm smoke  
discharger, 2 MG

VI. Own losses

A. Divisional troops:

	Killed	Wounded	Missing
Officers	5	5	---
NCOs	14	27	1
Men	74	136	6
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	93	168	7

The number of missing will be reduced by 6 killed who have not be identified as yet.

<u>Army Coastal</u> <u>Arty:</u>	28	33 (1 offr)	4
<u>Navy:</u>	28	27	
<u>Totl Organ-</u> <u>ization:</u>	3	7	

VII. Lessons

A. Strengths and dispositions in the divisional sector

The allotment of reserves (complete battalions) as strong as possible and the abandonment of the idea of having each landing point which could be the object of a minor undertaking permanently occupied has proved effective. The Division had at all times sufficient reserves at its disposal to be able to counter successfully landings at other points of its sector and landings of airborne troops (up to at least one regiment).

This could not have been achieved if, for instance, stretches of cliffs between Criel and Puy and between Pourville and Quiberville had been provided with strong

points or points of resistance, and neither would this have been achieved if infantry units had been permanently allotted to the two Army Coastal Arty Troops (2 Tp, 770 Bty at Berneval and 813 Tp at Varengeville) for their protection in the event of close-range fighting. These arty troops which had been designated as independent strong points and assigned defensive tasks should be able to conduct their own defence, the more so since in front of them were the cliffs and in their vicinity defended localities as follows: near Berneval in addition to the picket, the radar crew Gleiwitz composed of 1 offr, 16 NCOs and 97 men and 1 section of 2 cm AA guns, and near 813 Arty Tp defended locality Lighthouse with 77 men.

The strength of the artillery employed at Dieppe (4 light field howitzer troops of 302 Arty Regt and 1 heavy field howitzer positional Bty - all of them captured weapons) proved sufficient for the conduct of defensive fire. For the participation in counter-attacks, staged simultaneously with the frontal defence of enemy landings, the artillery available at Dieppe would have been insufficient due to lack of mobile arty reserves. 1 Bty, 332 Arty Regt, which was placed under command of 302 Inf Div in the morning by Corps, had been employed with the 332 Inf Div in the Fécamp area in accordance with general orders due to the fact that the divisional sector had been too scantily provided with light arty. The 1 Bty had to be withdrawn from there and could only arrive during the late afternoon of the day of the attack. Thus the launching of a counter-attack with arty support against an enemy of unknown strength who landed near Pourville and penetrated the broken terrain at some points up to a depth of 1.5 km, had to be delayed for a longer period than would have been necessary without awaiting the arrival of the arty bty.

It is desirable to have in each Corps area, in the reserve at least, one light arty bty (with improvised MT) which can be shifted swiftly. This is necessary when the enemy employs airborne troops armed with their own arty. It must be borne in mind that the arty of an attacked division will be fully required for the warding off of enemy landings and the closing <sup>of</sup> local breaches. The divisional sector was 75 km wide; the divisional arty consisted of six light troops and will comprise nine after projected reorganization is completed, to which must be added 2 captured arty troops not on the establishment. There are furthermore in the sector four Army Coastal Arty Troops and one positional arty troop<sup>s</sup>, coast.

The retention of the Anti-tank Coy in divisional reserve for employment against enemy tank attacks proved effective.

The employment of the Engr Bn less 3 Coy (with improvised MT) for the manning of the southern sector of strong point group Dieppe did not correspond by itself to the special tasks of this unit. However, despite objections from ordnance engineering, this arrangement was sustained and quite correctly so, as otherwise the reserve bn of the regt (I Bn, 571 Inf Regt) could not have been held in readiness outside the strong point group for mobile commitment. The 3 Engr Coy with fully improvised MT constituted the divisional reserve and could be swiftly moved to Berneval, first of all for infantry commitment and subsequently for rebuilding of obstacles.

B. Strengths and dispositions in single strong points and strong point groups

Every strong point and strong point group should have a reserve capable of carrying out a thrust due to the



possibility of the enemy effecting a local breach at some point or other after the infantry garrison is out of action. This was illustrated at the Cau de Côte, east of Pourville. Here, after losses were incurred and the 4.7 cm anti-tank Czech guns and one beach defence gun, which were emplaced in a concrete gun position were put out of action, the enemy made a local breach. The breach was swiftly sealed off by very few men under determinate leadership and cleaned out by an immediate counter-attack launched by a reserve platoon.

It is not permissible to emplace all heavy weapons in the forward infantry line or immediately behind it; on the contrary, they must be set up in depth within the strong point with due regard for their field of fire and all-around effect.

C. Exertion of Command

Notwithstanding the repeated disruption of the line system, Division was constantly informed of the situation on the coast through reports coming in at brief intervals and was thus in a position to direct its reserves accordingly. Division never interfered with the exertion of command in its units and was itself given full freedom.

The system of control within the Division functioned smoothly and there was no friction with the Army Coastal Arty. Nevertheless, one of the lessons gained in this attack is the abandonment of the subordination of the Army Coastal Arty to the Navy. The Army Coastal Arty is being emplaced by the Navy naturally in the first line from the point of view of the necessity of engaging mobile sea targets. Thus the Army Coastal Arty Troops will not be able to cope with the task of repelling a landing or landed enemy. It is true that, since the Fuehrer issued directive No. 40, the competent commander on land has a certain

influence on the selection of positions and the preparation for defence. However, the final decision on the employment of Army Coastal Arty Troops is the prerogative of the Navy Commander out of regard for the necessity of engaging sea targets. The divisional Commander is only entitled to indicate the places on which he does or does not want the Arty Troops sited. The fact that the right to decide has been vested in two authorities has, for instance, brought about delays with regard to the shifting of 813 Arty Troop planned for quite some time, contributing factors being the large area of the command and the great remoteness of naval HQ. Further disadvantages of the subordination of Army Coastal Arty under Navy HQ may be pointed out only briefly, for instance: ammunition supply, training for close-range combat, equipping with close-range combat weapons, threefold routing of messages and orders (Navy, Artillery and Division). In any event, even if nothing can be changed in the system of subordination, it is necessary to put in the foreground the point of view, that the Army Coastal Arty at the Channel coast must adjust itself in the first line to the defence against a landing or landed enemy and only in the second line to the fight against units of the enemy navy. The strength with which the arty will conduct its defensive fire should the enemy navy at some time or other fire at our coast has no bearing on the course of the war, but the effectiveness of the defence against an enemy penetration on land may well decide the outcome of the war. For this purpose Army Coastal Arty Troops should be able to remain in action as long as possible. Therefore they must not be sited at points liable to be overrun by enemy infantry. The infantry will in most cases not be able to allot to endangered Arty Troop positions a special infantry protective force du

to the lack of personnel. Otherwise the infantry will not have at its disposal the required tactical reserves in complete units.

D. The Mobilization of Reserves

The reserves were made mobile as follows:

1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt on bicycles

1 Bn, 572 Inf Regt on bicycles (it was not necessary to bring it up)

1 Bn, 570 Inf Regt on bicycles

2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt on improvised MT

3 Coy, 302 Engr Coy on MT of the Engr Bn.

The move of 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt on bicycles was not entirely satisfactory. A large number of bicycles broke down during the ride as their construction was not strong enough. On account of these breakdowns (up to 60%) the companies were stretched out so that a certain time was required before they could be committed to action. It is difficult to take along the signal section and MG and especially sufficient MG ammunition. The battalion was able to move ammunition on one MT vehicle earmarked for the fight against parachutists.

The move by means of improvised MT columns has proved effective. The completely motorized 2 Bn, 570 Inf Regt proved a very effective instrument in the hands of Division since it could be rapidly employed in any direction. Transport Column I/T was made up every evening from MT of the Todt Organization under the supervision of an officer; drivers were provided by Division. The MTV are assigned to this task permanently and marked accordingly. Transport Column II/T was made up from almost all MTV of the L. of C. troops of the Division which has received in its stead Transport Column I/V made up from Todt-vehicles.

This setup was of a temporary nature due to the fact that Division had not been provided with sufficient MTV suitable for the movement of troops. A considerable number of MT vehicles from Column II/T broke down so that it became necessary to replace them with vehicles from Column I/T. The regular small MT column can not be used for the movement of reserves as it is the only means by which Division is able to rush ammunition to any place whatsoever. It would be very desirable to have a second MT column for the mobilization of reserves.

E. Composition of personnel and its fighting efficiency

Two drafts of untrained replacements numbering 1353 and 1150 men reached Division on 20 Jul 1942 and between 10 and 12 Aug 42 respectively. Division had no vacancies on the establishment.

The training of replacements into fighters capable of using several weapons and performing special functions, such as wireless teams with the infantry and arty, could not have been completed as yet.

On the whole, the troops have passed their test with flying colours. Notwithstanding numerous low-level attacks by aircraft dropping bombs and strafing with MG and cannon fire and attacks from the sea, the troops serviced their weapons and moved from dugouts into open fire positions.

F. Equipment of troops

1. Weapons

The lavish equipping with captured weapons has fully justified itself. However, as heretofore, it is still desirable that servicing crews for beach defence guns be consolidated into arty troops on the establishment, in order that places of men detached for this purpose from the troops be filled by replacements.

2. Other Equipment

It was regrettable that 14 Coy, 571 Inf Regt, which was in process of formation, could be mobilized only in makeshift manner for want of harnesses and therefore could be employed much later than if it had been provided with normal equipment. The same applies to 302 A tk Coy as no tractors had arrived for its 7.5 cm A tk guns. However, the hauling of the 7.5 cm gun by trucks practiced in advance, while reducing the speed, served the purpose.

3. Ammunition

There was never any shortage of ammunition as three scales of issue and even five scales of issue of MG ammunition were stored in the strong point group. The filling of MG belts with tracer ammunition between heavy ordinary bullets has proved effective during the warding off of the first landings which took place when visibility was poor (due to morning haze).

Expenditure of ammunition by Arty Troops occupying strong point group Dieppe was as follows (according to first returns):

7 Tp, 302 Arty Regt	987 Rounds
8 Tp, 302 " "	725 "
A Tp, (light field how. model 14/19 Czech)	946 "
B Tp " "	1163 "
265 Positional Tp, Coast, (heavy field how. model 25 Czech)	439 "
813 Army Coastal Arty Tp about	120 "
2 Tp, 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty with	
10.5 cm guns	558 "
17 cm guns	47 "
3 Tp, 778 Army Coastal Arty Bty	215 "

From non-attacked sectors fire was conducted as follows:

1 Tp, 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty 2 Rounds

1 Tp, 799 " " " " 16 "

Beach defence guns fired up to 300 rounds per barrel.

G. Signals

The line system of the division functioned well. Lines destroyed through air attacks were quickly repaired. After brief interruptions Division was always able to reestablish communication with Regt HQ. 571 Inf Regt, 1 Bn, 571 Inf Regt, 770 Army Coastal Arty Bty, and maintained constant communication with 570 Inf Regt and 571 Inf Regt and flanking divisions and Corps HQ.

Telephone communications of 571 Inf Regt and 3 Bty, 302 Arty Regt with their subordinate units, the AA and aircraft reporting centre were frequently disrupted and linemen were continually on the go. Army telephone exchange Dieppe was not put out of commission; the auxiliary telephone exchange had been made ready for service. The buried cable Neufchatel-St.Vaast-repeater station Arques-la-Bataille - auxiliary telephone exchange Dieppe-Army, telephone exchange Dieppe, had not been disrupted. As unfortunately no pairs from this cable had been hooked up to Division, Division had, of its own initiative, opened the cable and made use of two unused pairs in order to have a reliable connection to Dieppe. This connection with Army telephone exchange Dieppe must now be established. It is urgently desired that coast cable II, the laying of which has been completed, be connected to divisional telephone exchange in Eu and that the fortress cable net at Dieppe be enlarged.

Wireless communications of the operations section of Division functioned without a hitch.

Wireless communication between 571 Inf Regt and its 3 and 1 Bns did not function smoothly. It has been found that wireless teams of the Infantry (Dora set) composed of two men are not satisfactory. A third man is required when, as happens frequently, the wireless station cannot be set up near Bn HQ. Divisional arty felt the absence of a third set (Friedrich) when it became necessary to use flanking observation posts during the battle for Pourville. For want of a third set flanking observers could be provided only with telephone connections.

The connection through visual signal equipment could not operate due to the concealment of Dieppe heights by smoke.

The request for defensive fire by means of green Verey signals during the enemy's approach was made first from Pourville, and thereto 7 Tp, 302 Arty Regt directed its defensive fire. The alarm signal rocket fired by port protection craft stationed in front of the port of Dieppe was observed by arty. However, arty had already been alerted through its own observation of the enemy's approach.

Wireless intelligence by means of special equipment (Radar) did not recognize soon enough the enemy's intention of effecting a landing, due to the fact that a German convoy on the sea became involved in the battle. Subsequent observations were reported by the aircraft reporting centre only to 571 Inf Regt and the latter transmitted them to Division. Wireless data was exchanged between Division and the aircraft reporting centre. However, the latter was not on the wireless hook-up of Division.

#### H. Port protection

The port of Dieppe was protected by three boats which took up their positions at night. They fired alarm signal rockets, opened fire on approaching ships and thus made their contribution to the quick alerting of troops.

The anti-submarine net of the port could not prove its effectiveness as no enemy craft succeeded in making its way through the moles and the port entrance.

J. AA

AA sub-formation Dieppe gave excellent support during the landing near Dieppe. The AA section on the high ground between Cau de Côte and Ferme aux Quatre-Vents likewise participated successfully in engaging the enemy near Pourville; both managed to accomplish this in addition to their numerous other tasks.

K. Air Force

The attack by ground "strafers" on Pourville-West produced the desired effect, in the opinion of the ground troops, and contributed its share to the success of the counter-attack.

The 23 (heavy) aircraft reporting Coy proved highly effective during the defence of Puy.

L. Navy

The detailing of available navy personnel in Dieppe for purposes of defence into combat teams with definite tasks proved effective. Unfortunately the Navy suffered heavy casualties during its valorous defence of the large concrete gun-position east of the Casino which had been improperly sited and was poorly fitted out for defence. Division would like to blow up this dugout. The experimental company of the navy rendered very valuable assistance to 571 Inf Regt with its anti-tank guns. Enemy tanks caused the coy heavy casualties.

M. Fortifications of the terrain

The anti-tank walls in Dieppe and the dammed up areas of the Scie and Saane were especially effective. Anti-tank walls prevented enemy tanks from entering the town. They were able to withstand arty fire. The enemy did not succeed in blowing up even one of the numerous anti-tank walls that



were all traced on his maps.

The flooded areas of the Scie and Saane, together with the anti-tank walls constructed on their shores, provided the Division, right from the start, with the assurance that enemy tanks would not be able to break through quickly. Consequently the operations section of the Division was able to use its anti-tank units in reserve at the decisive point where enemy tanks operated. The flooded area of the Scie near Pourville forced the enemy to advance in two separate columns on the eastern and western banks without any liaison between them.

Concrete command posts fully withstood fire due to their solid construction by II/21 Sector group of fortification engineers and its German foremen of the Todt organization who also became involved in the battle for Pourville.

In the attacked sector there were only two mine-fields strewn with anti-personnel mines; six of these mines located in the central gorge of Berneval inflicted losses on the enemy; all other mine-fields, provided with warning signposts facing inward, consisted only of wire entanglements and booby traps. In the gorges leading to the sea enemy commandos used to some extent the wire on the outer boundaries of mine-fields to pass along them (swinging along the slope) in order to reach terrain clear of the wire. These obstacles could not be constantly guarded due to lack of men; they were only guarded by patrols. It follows from the above that mine-fields and obstacles strewn with booby traps which are not trodden daily by our own troop should not be provided with fences.

It would appear that we are paying too much attention to the possibility of accidents to individuals; they should be taken into the bargain in order to provide better obstacles during enemy attacks and thus avoid a greater danger. The army must proceed in ruthless fashion as regards the cleaning

fields fire by blasting without exception all buildings on the beach which obstruct same. Unfortunately only a portion of the very large Casino had been blown up by Division. The rest of the building will be blasted as soon as the large quantities of explosives required for this purpose are delivered.

The razing of buildings on the tip of the western mole has proven its value. Plans had been made in Pourville and Quiberville as well for the blasting of additional buildings and the mining of debris, and the reconnaissance had already been completed. Unfortunately the attack was launched somewhat prematurely with regard to the above.

The British are familiar with our dummy installations having learned about them from local inhabitants. They are indicated on their maps as "dummy". Concrete positions of the Army Coastal Arty and 262 positional Arty Troop, together with the light Arty Troop position near Neuville, which have been constructed in field fashion quite some time ago, were also shown on British maps. However, they failed to identify the position of 7 Troop, 302 Arty Regt manned since early July and which had been camouflaged but had no structures.

Dugouts for small arms ammunition of the Army Coastal Arty Troops should be protected against low-level attacks launched by aircraft armed with MG and cannon. If the gun emplacements had been sited ~~a~~ farther from each other the blaze that broke out near one gun where ammunition caught fire would not have spread to the guns on either side. The following rule applies to arty troop positions as well as to all other strong points: "The field of fire must be ruthlessly cleared, all buildings, trees, hedges, copses, in which the enemy could conceal himself for close-range combat must be razed." It is imperative to form a glacis regardless of the so-called "destruction of values" at the expense of the French civilian population. The lives of German soldiers exceed all these considerations.

N. Assessment of enemy weapons

Enemy landing craft are armoured in such a fashion that rifle and MG fire does not affect them in the least unless it is possible to aim at the rear section of the boats from a *T*owering position. The only way to strike at these boats is by means of lively arty fire. The ammunition expended for this purpose will always pay dividends. Even the moral effect caused by the impression of superior strength at the time of landing would justify it. As a result of the fire of beach defence guns near Quiberville single enemy boats turned away immediately after the first impact of shells was registered. Mortar and AA fire conducted from landing craft was effective. The anti-tank gun position on the western Dieppe mole received a direct hit at the very beginning of the engagement.

The concealment of enemy craft by chemical smoke, of the high ground near Dieppe by smoke-bombs, and of the starting points of enemy remnants was very effective. Concealment was effected very rapidly. The fog caused by chemical smoke could be noticed in the valleys leading towards Dieppe for 15 km. The concealment of starting points of enemy craft resulted in a larger expenditure of arty ammunition as it was impossible to conduct aimed arty fire while everything was being done to allow the escape of as few Britishers as possible.

The large number of casualties and wounded P.W. shows that the enemy put up a valiant fight; that in addition to the above whole units were captured is explained by the hopelessness of further resistance in view of the powerful infantry and arty defences.

It is noted from statements made by P.W. that the assault on Dieppe was a matter of a "two tide attack", i.e., should the attack have succeeded a second wave would have landed.

Therefore on the evening of the attack and again the next morning the captured Canadians expressed their disappointment that the follow-up by British troops, which had been promised, did not materialize.


0. Over-all appraisal

The Division believes it has performed its duty during a potentially significant local phase of the war thanks to the bravery of troops of all branches of the service placed under its command and leadership.

(Signed) Haase

Anlage 3 zu 302. Inf. Div. Ia, Tgb Nr. 1105/42g.


# Landeunternehmen bei BERNEVAL am 19.8.42



TRACED FROM GERMAN ORIGINAL BY-  
SP. 10178 Sgt. H.S. NICHOL.  
NOVEMBER, 1946.

Anlage 5 zu 302. Inf. Div. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 1105/42 g.


 *Tatsächlich vom Feind  
erreichte Räume*



TRACED FROM GERMAN ORIGINAL BY—  
S.P. 10178 Sgt. H.S. NICHOL,  
NOVEMBER, 1946.

Anlage 6 zu 302. Inf. Div. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 1105/42g.

Lage: Quiberville  
Batterie 813  
Pourville



ARTILLERY EXPERIENCES DURING  
THE BRITISH ATTACK ON DIEPPE

(Questionnaire completed by  
the 302nd Artillery Regiment,  
tables compiled by the firing  
batteries.)



SECRET

302 Artillery Regiment  
Ops No. 900/42g.

Regimental Headquarters, 2.9.1942

Reference: 302 I.D. Ops 29.8.42

Subject: Artillery Lessons from the British Attack on Dieppe

To: 302 Infantry Division

Further to the above reference, the Regiment submits the attached questionnaires filled out in duplicate, a summary of ammunition expenditure on 19.8.42 with map tracing; also questionnaires completed by the batteries that were in action.

14 Appendices

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Note: The only appendices attached to the War Diary copy (H.Q. 302 Inf Div No. 3, "Dieppe I", Serial No. 24353-8) are those translated herewith.

1. What influence did the group and regiment exert on the fire control?

The group commander of the entire artillery employed at Dieppe directed more than 20 fire concentrations of most of his batteries, and then released fire control as the enemy situation on sea and on land changed frequently and rapidly to such an extent that the batteries on their own initiative subjected the moving targets or landing troops to destructive fire. Thus the influence of the group commander on the fire control was exercised systematically at all times.

It was not possible at any given moment to obtain as clear a picture of the combat activities from the regimental command post (battle HQ) as from the group. The exercise of the regiment's influence on the fire control, which was quite feasible with minor exceptions, would have brought about unfavourable results, as the various phases of the battle unfolded themselves very quickly and the regiment's orders would have arrived in each instance too late.

On the other hand the group supplied the regiment from time to time with situation reports. On one occasion only did it become necessary to send a staff officer to Group HQ as all communications had been disrupted for a brief period. Moreover the group commander was continually fully occupied with the effects of enemy fire, enemy activities and his own fire control.

2. What periods of time elapsed between transmission of fire orders and actual firing?

The time factor for the transmission of fire orders was kept within that established during fire control practices and may be considered as normal. From conversations between the regiment and the group, it was noted that, even had the regiment been switched into the fire control, no essential delays beyond normal ones would have resulted.

3. What experiences were gained with reference to cooperation between the Div Arty Regt and the Army Coastal Artillery and what suggestions put forth to eliminate deficiencies which possibly may have occurred?

The Div Artillery Commander held several conferences with the Commander, 527th Arty Regt. Cooperation was assured at all times. But as the Army Coastal Batteries in the Dieppe Sector were used to engage targets at sea and at close range, coordinated action between the Army Coastal Artillery and the Divisional Artillery was not achieved the more so since Army Coastal Batteries could not direct their fire against the Dieppe beaches.

As much as it is gratifying on one hand, that a Regimental Commander is available for the training of the Army Coastal Artillery, on the other hand, however, it has been noted, in the course of battle, that the switching in of the Commander, 527th Arty Regt between the Div Arty Commander and the 770th Army Coastal Arty Battalion is of no advantage, since time is lost thereby and communications overloaded unnecessarily.

A direct connection between Div Arty HQ and Army Coastal Artillery Battalion, would bring about better results. It is necessary to assign a new radio channel to:

- a) The Commander, 527th Arty Regt at present in charge, or
- b) The 770th Army Coastal Artillery Battalion.

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Time	Targets: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	Fire on Call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
0545	Defensive Fire C 6000	Defensive Fire	On Call	24 Rounds	Could not be observed
0555	Defensive Fire A 1200	Defensive Fire	On own initiative on the basis of own observations. 15 landing craft sighted through ground haze	96 "	Could be observed only in part due to very heavy fog
0615	Approaching, departing and cruising landing craft in front of Puy 1200 - 2000	Observed Defensive Fire	On own initiative. Enemy tried repeatedly to give assistance to troops already landed	550 "	Landing craft were forced to turn away. One boat sunk at 0750
1000	English Casino. Target registration Nos. 134, 135	Firing by the Map	Call of the Group	150 "	Could not be observed
1135	Landing craft approach- ing the Dieppe beaches 2600 - 3200	Rough ranging. Fire for effect	Call of the Group	150 "	Shells landed on target, ships lay smoke screens. Transport sinks.
1145	Ships in front of Dieppe 3200 - 3800	Rough ranging. Fire for effect	Call of the Group	100 "	Shells landed well on target, ships forced to lay smoke screens and turn away.
1320	Ship turning away 4000 - 5800	Rough ranging. Fire for effect	Own initiative	50 "	Salvos landed on the target area. Sighting frequently impeded.
1420	Landing craft turning away 2850	Accurate ranging and firing with one gun until destruction	Own initiative	50 "	Ship sunk at 1440 hours.

(Signature illegible)  
 Lieutenant, Battery Commander.

## Establishment Battery A

- 4 -

Time	Targets: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	Fire on Call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
0545	Defensive Fire C 3300	Firing by the Map	On call of Group	24 Rounds	Unobserved
0555	Defensive Fire B 3400	Firing by the Map	On call of Group	24 "	Unobserved
0615 0745	Landings on Dieppe beaches 2800/3000	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative. Numerous British ships approach the coast	150 "	Hits scored on landing craft, troops, tanks and other vehicles
0750 0820	Wave of Landing Craft 3600/3800 4000/4200	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative. New wave of S-Boats identified at a great distance	120 "	Dispersal of landing craft which were forced to seek shelter of rugged shore line unsuitable for landings
0820 1020	Dieppe Beach 2600/2800	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative Concentration of tanks and troops on the beach identified	120 "	Numerous hits on tanks; crippling of the enemy infantry's offensive spirit
1030 1100	Landing craft again approach the beaches 4000/4400	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative and on call from group. Approach of additional ships identified	120 "	Various hits, 3 landing craft badly hit - sink. Majority give up landing operation
1100 1145	Alternate beach and ship targets 2800/3000 4000/4600 5200/5400	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative. Ships shelling. <sup>x)</sup> Sagging resistance on beach	130 "	Ships shelling shore forced to turn back. Last enemy resist- ance on beach smashed.

x) - Guns of ships firing.

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	Fire on call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
1145 1215	Beach and ships alternately 2800/3000 4000/4600 5200/5400	Observed fire from main observation post	On call of group	50 Rounds	Ships firing forced to turn back. Enemy resistance on beach smashed.
1305	Ships 4200/8000	Observed fire from main observation post	On own initiative. Numerous enemy ships retreating	143 "	Various hits and denial of orderly retreat. Sinking of two more ships -

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On Call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
0555	Defensive Fire B 5950	Defensive Fire	On Call of Group	48 Rounds	Landing craft turn away
0615	Target registration No. 134 and beach to left and right 4800 - 4950	Firing by the Map improved by observation	"	52 "	Direct hits scored on landing troops - tanks hit and immobilized
0645	Ships in front of Dieppe 6000 - 9000	Firing at will against naval targets	"	100 "	Two transports aground in front of beach two landing craft sunk
0750	Assault boats 6000 - 5400	Firing at will against naval targets	"	44 "	Ships disperse, either turn away, or seek cover of cliffs
0820	Tank and troop concentrations on the Dieppe beach No 2 and 3 guns only (staggered order) 4700 - 4900	Firing data taken over from the shooting at 0615; shooting by map improved by observation	"	24 "	Direct hits scored on troop concentrations, tanks damaged
after 0840	Enemy took cover behind smoke screen	No possibility of observation			
1000	Dieppe beach; No 2 and 3 guns only 4700 - 4900	Observed fire for effect	On call of Group	22 "	Hits scored on troop concentrations
1030	Landing craft again approaching 8000 - 7000	Firing at will against naval targets	"	48 "	Salvos landing on target, ships turn away

Time	Targets Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
1100	Immobilized tanks still firing on beach 4950 - 5000	Fire for effect. Firing data from 0820 hours	On call of Group	16 Rounds	One tank aflame
1115	Immobilized transports 6600 - 6800	Firing at will. Fire data from 0645 hours	"	20 "	Point of impact directly on target.
1135	Landing craft approaching Dieppe emerge from fog 6800 - 6000	Firing at will	"	48 "	Ships are forced to turn away
1145	Dieppe beach 4800 - 5000	Fire for effect	On call of the Group	36 "	Hits scored on troop concentrations
approximately after 1200 h.	Heavy smoke screen off the coast				
1320	Defensive Fire C 7000	Defensive Fire	On call of the Group	40 "	Assault craft turn away
1330	Transport emerging from fog 6000 - 6400	Firing at will	On own initiative Fleeting target. This transport was presumably to embark troops	16 "	Transport bracketed, incoming fog prevented further observation
1345	Destroyer shelling coast 7000 - 7400	Firing at will	On call of Group	20 "	Hit amidships
1445	Destroyer 9000 - 11000	Firing at will	"	20 "	A hit was observed. Sunk shortly thereafter by bomb.

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Time	Targets Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On Call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
0545	6500	Defensive Fire C	On call by Verey light signal	40 Rounds	Could not be observed from observation post
0555	4200	Defensive Fire B	On own initiative. Ships and landing craft drawing nearer	20 "	In front of post entrance enemy turns off towards the beach (Casino)
0600	4000 - 4400	Fire for effect (target area) without ranging. Targets were between target registration numbers	On own initiative. Landings in front of the Dieppe beach	60 "	Shells landed on target (ships, infantry on the beach, dis- embarkation greatly impeded).
0615 0750 0820	3850 - 4000	Fire for effect (target area) without ranging. Targets were in the area of target registration numbers 134 - 135	On own initiative and order of group. Landing of troops and tanks	150 "	Shells landed on target. Boats, tanks, infantry hit. Landing operations constantly harrassed.
0930	4200 - 4400	Defensive Fire B	On call of group as naval units steer in fog towards harbour	40 "	Ships veer towards northeast
1000	3900 - 4000	Observed fire (zone fire) in front of target No. 135 with- out ranging	On call of the infantry. The fire to be shifted to a point in front of the Casino on the beach as main enemy attack was there	60 "	Shots observed on target.
1030	3900 - 4000	Fire for effect (target area) between target Nos. 134 and 135	On own initiative Tanks moving and firing in front of anti-tank obstacle	48 "	1 direct hit, tanks turn away

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
1045	3850	Accurate ranging	On own initiative. A stranded ammunition transport which still continued to shell the northern heights	7 Rounds	Direct hit made during ranging. Enemy ceased firing and hoisted white flag, 10 minutes later heavy detonations observed.
1100	4000	Correction for line, and elevation	On own initiative, further landing manoeuvres	30 "	Landings seriously hampered,
1145	4250	Defensive Fire B	On call of group. Assault boats in front of port entrance concealed by artificial smoke screens	24 "	Ships turn away
1200	Dieppe beach 3850 - 4000	Fire for effect (target area) without ranging between targets Nos. 134 - 135	On call of group Tanks and infantry	56 "	Shells landed on target
1300	Special transport 4200	Sighting shot for line then Salvos with corrections	On call of group	18 "	Hit observed. Troops abandoning ship which later sinks.
1320	Departing ships in artificial smoke screen 4000 - 4500	Fire for effect (target areas)	On own initiative, to interfere with withdrawal	60 "	Observation greatly impeded by fog
1345	5000	A major warship, shelling heavily in front of the harbour entrance: range for line, then Salvos with corrections.	On own initiative	36 "	Warship was forced to turn away

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
1445	Departing ships 7000	Zone fire	Ships steaming in direction of Puy	52 Rounds	Rounds landed on target

(signed) Scholz,  
Lt. and acting Bty Commander

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On call or on own Initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
0541	Defensive Fire C 2250	----	On call by Verey light signal	96 Rounds	Could not be observed due to darkness. According to statements made by Infantry, tanks and ships set afire.
0550	Defensive Fire B 2800	----	On call of Group	96 "	Observation impossible due to darkness.
until 0800	Engaging ships in front of Pourville- Dieppe 2200 - 2000	Defensive fire, rough ranging with entire battery	On own initiative	120 "	Interfering with landings. Turning away of individual major ships.
0800- 0820	Troops ashore and landing craft in front of Pourville 1800 - 2200	Target registration -No. 141, rough ranging with entire battery	On own initiative	50 "	Visible effect amidst dis- embarked troops and landing craft.
until 0900	Observed fire against tanks and landing troops on the Dieppe beaches 2500	Target registration No. 134 discontinued in distance?	"	90 "	Destruction of tank tracks, shelled enemy infantry heavily.
0930	Landing craft making straight for "D" 3200	Starting from defensive fire B. Boats ran into line of fire	On call of Group	40 "	Could not be observed as completely concealed by smoke.
1000	Dieppe beaches 2500	Gun ranging. Fire for effect with entire battery	On own initiative. Tanks fired; enemy infantry took cover against own infantry	120 "	Strong effect on enemy infantry.

Time	Target: Range:	Observation Post Method of Fire	On call or on own initiative	Ammunition Expenditure	Effect
1030	Fire against departing ships between Varangeville and St. Magerit 6200	Target registration No. 146, rough ranging by entire battery	On own initiative under impression of new landing, fog clearing away	60 Rounds	Rounds landed between ships which dispersed.
1200	Tactical formation of landing craft making for Pourville-Dieppe 3200	Target registration No. 133	On call of Group	60 "	Ships turn away
1300	Empty ships approaching in order to evacuate enemy troops 1800 - 2000	Target registration No. 141	On own initiative	50 "	Ships turned back without taking on troops
1330	Defensive Fire C 2200	----	On call of Group	48 "	Could not be observed due to fog
1400	Embarkation in front of Pourville 1800 - 2000	Target registration No. 141	On own initiative	120 "	Hits on destroyers and landing craft, strong effect on embarking enemy troops
1420	Ships emerging from smoke screen 5600	Rough ranging by entire battery	On own initiative	80 "	Difficult to observe