

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CANCELLED

REPORT NO. 29

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.) BY me FOR DHIST NDHQ

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

DATE: ~~NOV 10 1986~~

26 Oct 49

Canadian Public Opinion on the Employment
of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945

| | <u>CONTENTS</u> | <u>Paras</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|-------------|---|--------------|-------------|
| | Introduction | 1 - 3 | 1 |
| PART I: | Public Opinion Before the Outbreak of War | 4 - 8 | 2 |
| PART II: | The Reaction of Public Opinion at the Outbreak of War, September 1939 | 9 - 20 | 3 |
| PART III: | The Development of Public Opinion on the Employment of the Army, 1939-41 | 21 | 6 |
| | The War in the Doldrums | 22 - 33 | 6 |
| | Dunkirk | 34 - 44 | 10 |
| | The Canadian Corps on Guard, 1940-41 | 45 - 61 | 13 |
| PART IV: | The Growth of Public Demand for Action by the Canadian Army | | 18 |
| | Hitler Attacks Russia | 62 - 70 | 18 |
| | Spitsbergen and the "Dagger" State- ment | 71 - 83 | 22 |
| | Hong Kong | 84 - 89 | 25 |
| | Pressure for Increased Home Defences, 1942 | 90 - 115 | 27 |
| | Dieppe and Demands for a Second Front | 116 - 123 | 35 |
| | Operation "TORCH" | 124 - 129 | 37 |
| | Attachments to the British Army in Africa and Continued Pressure for Action | 130 - 135 | 39 |
| | The Changing Emphasis on Home Defence, 1943 | 136 - 139 | 41 |
| | The Growing Demand for Overseas Action, 1943 | 140 - 155 | 43 |
| | Canadians in Sicily | 156 - 162 | 50 |
| | Kiska | 163 - 171 | 51 |
| | Canadians in Italy - The Divided Army | 172 - 180 | 55 |
| PART V: | Public Attitude Towards Reunion of the Canadian Army | 181 - 195 | 59 |
| PART VI: | Public Pressure Regarding the Canadian Army Pacific Force | 196 - 209 | 64 |
| CONCLUSION: | Public Opinion on the Balance of Effort Between the Three Services | 210 - 214 | 68 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CANCELLED

R E P O R T N O . 29

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

HISTORICAL SECTION

BY Obe FOR DHIST NDHQ

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

DATE: NOV 10 1986

26 Oct 49

Canadian Public Opinion on the Employment
of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945

1. The object of the present report is to present an outline of the extent to which the pressure of public opinion and public agitation was an element with which the Canadian Government had to reckon in connection with the employment of the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

2. Even the most rapid survey makes it clear that in developing their plans the Government and service authorities of Canada were obliged to take into account many considerations which were not strictly military. In a country with a completely free press, public opinion has ample opportunities for expression, and no government can disregard it. The Canadian public and the Canadian press have never been particularly well informed on military matters, but this did not prevent discussion of these matters being carried on actively and noisily in 1939-45. The Government could not fail to be sensitive to public opinion and public pressure, and on several occasions its military policies were influenced in some degree by agitations carried on in the newspapers and elsewhere.

3. A complete study of this subject would involve the examination of a vast number of newspaper files, in addition to the records of the debates in Parliament and the correspondence files of ministers and government departments. It has of course not been practicable to examine all the sources for this report, but an attempt has been made to make a comprehensive survey and to summarize the main results very briefly. Quotations have been kept to a minimum, although references are given to enable the reader to follow the subject up in further detail if this should be desirable. A great mass of relevant material, in the form of newspaper clippings and files of summaries of newspaper comment, is available in the Historical Section.

These clippings were originally collected by the Directorate of Military Intelligence but after 23 Mar 43 the service was taken over by the Directorate of Public Relations, which has retained possession of all subsequent clippings. The Historical Section has, however, a complete index which gives their contents in summarized form. In this report the fact is noted in each case if the quotation or reference is drawn from the press index rather than the actual clipping or newspaper file. Considerable use has also been made of photostat copies of selected newspaper clippings marked "O.P.I." (Overseas Press Index), which were sent overseas during the period April 1943 to June 1944. Almost the complete series may be found in C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27, now retained by the Historical Section. In C.M.H.Q. files 4/Press Circ/1 and 4/Press Circ/26 and in personal files of General McNaughton, also held by the Historical Section, there are very useful summaries of newspaper comment marked "Minim Press", a term which meant "Ministry of Information Press Commentary." These refer to telegrams sent weekly by the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom in Ottawa to the Dominions Office in London, indicating the reaction of the Canadian press to various world events.

PART I: PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

4. During the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1939, Canadian public opinion concerning the increasingly perilous world situation was disturbed and confused. The Canadian public, like the people of other western countries, was very reluctant to face the prospect of a Second World War. The War of 1914-19 had been very costly for Canada and had occasioned a domestic controversy, over conscription, which had developed into a most serious threat to the unity of the country and had been a major element in political calculations since 1919. In these circumstances, political leaders were unlikely to advocate, or the public to support, a bold external policy. It is fair to say that isolationism in various forms was active and influential in Canada at this time.

5. Several schools of thought were identifiable during this period. One author wrote in 1938, "Certain fairly well defined groups of opinion can be discerned in Canada, centering around the three possible policies of non-intervention in foreign wars, imperialism or a British front policy, and collective security" (F.R. Scott, Canada Today: A Study of Her National Interests and Policy (Toronto, 1938) p.132). All these varieties of opinion were found within English-speaking Canada, and yet it must be said that the great mass of opinion was largely unformed and did not belong to any of these groups. At the same time, opinion in French-speaking Canada continued to be, as it always had been, strongly coloured with isolationism. Throughout the country, the most definite element in the situation at large was the fear of war. This was not accompanied by any general readiness to accept commitments designed to make war less likely.

6. In these circumstances, the Government adopted the policy of "maintaining national unity" by postponing decisions. The formula employed was that, when the crisis came, "Parliament would decide" what Canada should do.

7. As Hitler pursued his programme of aggression, Canadian opinion passed through a gradual process of hardening parallel to that which took place in the United Kingdom. By the spring of 1939 circumstances justified and supported a rather more definite stand on the part of the government. A series of ministerial statements now made it clear that it recognized that the feeling of the majority of the Canadian people made any neutral policy impracticable. At the same time, the policy of maintaining national unity reappeared in another form, in the declarations of both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition (March, 1939) against conscription for service abroad. These declarations were of course addressed primarily to French Canada, where the conscription issue inevitably arose whenever the possibility of war was mentioned. It may also be noted that on 30 Mar 39 both Government and Opposition leaders in the House of Commons expressed the view that expeditionary forces from the Dominions were unlikely to be required in any future war.

8. On the eve of war, then, the situation was this. The Government and the country may be said to have been resigned to the fact that if Great Britain became involved in war with Nazi Germany, Canada would participate at once. At the same time, both the chief political parties had committed themselves to placing a major limitation upon the Canadian war effort, in the form of a prohibition against conscription for service abroad. This policy, which was not seriously questioned at the

time by any large organized political group,² was adopted in the interest of maintaining the unity of the nation in the anticipated crisis, and whatever the strictly military objections that may be raised against it - and they are powerful - it served this purpose pretty effectively in September 1939.

PART II: THE REACTION OF PUBLIC OPINION AT
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, SEPTEMBER 1939

9. When war finally came, the first reaction of the country reflected to a very considerable extent the confusion of opinion and the controversies of recent years. The Government, true to its pledges, summoned Parliament, and Canada's declaration of war was postponed until the House of Commons had had an opportunity of expressing its opinion.

10. As might have been expected, in the light of the development which has been described above, the House supported the Government in its policy of "cooperation by Canada at the side of Great Britain". The Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, whose adoption the Government had said it would consider as constituting approval for that policy, was approved without a division, and only four members spoke against it. Of these four, one was the pacifist leader of the C.C.F. Party (whose group did not support him); the other three were all members for Quebec constituencies.

11. Although a large measure of unity had thus been maintained, perusal of the Debates of the Special Session of Parliament which lasted from 7 to 13 September clearly indicates that this unity would have been much less complete but for the reiteration of the pledges against overseas conscription. A potentially serious divergence in opinion on the issues of the war was in fact reflected even in the speeches of the two government members who moved and seconded the Address. The mover, Mr. H.S. Hamilton (Algoma West) made it clear that he was, in effect, in favour of an unrestricted and unlimited war effort. "If a certain type of assistance would be most advantageous now," he said, "changing to a different type of assistance later, then I am for that. And if the assistance which can effect that which I believe to be so vital can best be given on the Atlantic, on the North Sea, on the fields of Europe, I am also for that". The seconder, Mr. J.A. Blanchette (Compton), took a different line, reflecting what was undoubtedly a widespread view in French Canada; he declared himself in favour of "a reasonable and moderate cooperation, consistent with our interests and resources", and definitely not including conscription (Debates, House of Commons, Special War Session, 1939, pp 7, 12).

12. Many references in the Debates of this short session indicate the importance which French-speaking members attached to the avoidance of conscription for overseas service. Some were prepared to go further. At the very outset, Mr. Maxime Raymond (Beauharnois - Laprairie) sought to table "a petition signed by thousand of citizens against participation by Canada in any extra-territorial war" (ibid, p. 6). Mr. Raymond later argued for a policy of neutrality; it could be, he said, "a friendly neutrality toward Great Britain, France and Poland" (ibid, p. 63).

13. In the course of this session, the Government did not announce a definite policy on the employment of the forces.

² The Social Credit party did support conscription during the special session of September 1939.

The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 8 September, "The question of an expeditionary force or units of service overseas is particularly one of wide reaching significance which will require the fullest examination." The decision to dispatch a division overseas was not announced, and probably not taken, until after Parliament had risen.

14. In these circumstances, public opinion could scarcely crystallize firmly; the House and the country were awaiting the announcement of government policy. Nevertheless, the germ of serious disagreement on the employment of the military forces was apparent in the debates even of this session. Various French-speaking members argued against the dispatch of any expeditionary force; Mr. J.F. Pouliot (Témiscouata) presented a resolution of the municipal council of the parish of St. Hubert which included the statement, "Canada is not in a position, on account of her debt, to send expeditionary forces; the necessity of which, besides, is not obvious" (*ibid*, p. 155). The C.C.F. group, while, as already noted, not opposing the declaration of war, definitely opposed an expeditionary force. Mr. M.J. Coldwell, on behalf of this group, read a formal statement including this sentence: "Canada should be prepared to defend her own shores, but her assistance should be limited to economic aid and must not include conscription of man power or the sending of any expeditionary force." (*ibid*, p. 55). On the other hand, certain members of the Conservative opposition including Mr. H.C. Green (Vancouver South) and Mr. T.L. Church (Toronto - Broadview) demanded a more active policy, the latter inquiring, "Why don't you train and equip an expeditionary force here at once?" (*ibid*, pp 100-01, 122).

15. From the outset the French-Canadian press in no uncertain terms ranged itself against conscription, certain sections going so far as to advocate non-participation in the war. For example, L'Action Catholique (Quebec) of 6 Sep declared "Le Canada aurait pu adopter une neutralité mitigée très favorable à l'Angleterre" and on 11 Sep wrote "Même sans conscription, le Canada peut se tirer très mal de cette guerre". Closely watching the United States and arguing against active military co-operation with London, this paper on 13 Sep warned of the heavy taxation which would result "si on commet l'imprudence de lever des corps expéditionnaires qu'il faut ensuite maintenir au prix de la conscription ou d'un volontariat plus ou moins forcé". Similarly, Le Devoir (Montreal) on 4 Sep defined its position as "une politique d'exclusive défense territoriale et de bienveillante neutralité à l'endroit de l'Angleterre". Although professing no opposition to volunteers joining the British or French forces, on 11 Sep it sounded the warning "Mais le nom du corps expéditionnaire fait tout de suite lever le spectre de la conscription".

16. Although equally averse to conscription, other sections voiced complete approval of the moderate course adopted by the Government. Bitterly opposing Le Devoir on the grounds that neutrality was impossible, Le Canada (Montreal) of 9 Sep proclaimed that Mr. King had dispelled all doubts and felt assured that there would be neither conscription nor a contingent sent to Europe. Likewise, L'Événement Journal (Quebec) on 7 Sep stated "Jamais, croyons-nous, les chefs actuels du gouvernement n'ont annoncé qu'ils voulaient envoyer des troupes en Europe - volontaires ou conscrits". When the party positions were defined, this paper applauded both the Liberals and Conservatives for declaring themselves opposed to conscription and unreservedly condemned the Social Credit movement. Briefly, then, the French-Canadian press favoured at the best a moderate war effort, entirely

voluntary, and showed definite opposition during the first half of September 1939 to any form of expeditionary force which might lead to conscription.

17. Most English-speaking dailies, on the other hand, refrained from expressing strong opinions on military matters until Parliament had spoken. None of them advocated neutrality, although all appreciated the importance of home defence. Some registered protests at the delay in issuing the official proclamation of a state of war after hostilities had already commenced, but it was clearly recognized that constitutional formalities alone were being observed. Their predominant thought was that national unity must be preserved. Consequently, apart from the vigorous campaign for immediate conscription carried on by the Ottawa Citizen, the tendency was to defer this contentious point until convinced of its necessity. The Vancouver Daily Province of 6 Sep noted that the Canadian Corps Association was urging conscription but felt that it would be better to wait. Even the Globe and Mail (Toronto) of 19 Sep advised the same in answer to many letters calling for its adoption at once. This paper, together with the Gazette (Montreal), later placed tremendous pressure upon the Government to introduce conscription for overseas service.

18. When the Prime Minister first revealed the policy of his Government, however, press criticism was relatively mild. Major wartime issues between the Conservatives and Liberals had not yet appeared, while neither the C.C.F. nor the Social Credit parties controlled large newspapers. The Journal (Ottawa) of 9 Sep found no fault with the announcement except that it could have been made a week before with more effect. The Evening Telegram (Toronto) called for action, not words, while the Vancouver Province wished that Mr. King had given "a little more inspiration and future guidance". The Winnipeg Free Press, ardent western champion of Liberalism, remarked on the other hand that he had struck the very chord most noticeable among the people: "a sober, rational note entirely lacking in hysteria". Feeling that the mistake of sending raw levies overseas would not be repeated, this paper nevertheless assumed that a force would go in due course. The Vancouver Province stressed that there was no immediate need for an infantry contingent. Previously the Globe and Mail had written on 7 Sep "it was obvious that our most important early contribution will be in the air" and the Journal on 8 Sep had remarked "This war will probably be won in the air". All these newspapers heartily approved the policy of consultation with the British Government in order to provide the most effective co-operation.

19. There soon appeared, however, indications of general impatience with the confusion arising from the lack of positive action by Ottawa. The Winnipeg Free Press of 12 Sep took the lead in calling upon the Government to define its military plans and make it clear that there would be an all-out effort including the sending of men overseas if necessary. The Globe and Mail that same day spoke of dissatisfaction, even resentment against its attitude on enlistment and demanded that recruiting should go on. Nevertheless, it was not until after Parliament rose on 13 Sep without a clear-cut statement of policy that serious pressure for an expeditionary force developed. The Gazette of 16 Sep quoted from both the above-mentioned editorials and asked the Government to "provide without delay at least the framework of a force, one or perhaps two divisions, that could be rapidly filled in and dispatched overseas with little or no loss of time". All three papers continued to call for definite objectives in recruiting and Ottawa's Journal on 15 and 18 Sep joined in with forceful demands for the training of a potential expeditionary force. It

is important to note that these papers were not asking for troops to be sent overseas at once but merely that plans be announced and a force mobilized to train in readiness for future use abroad if required.

20. The foregoing is enough to make clear the fact that there was a serious division of opinion in the country from the beginning on the employment of Canadian military forces, and to indicate that the Government could expect to be subjected to severe pressure by advocates of the various points of view as the struggle proceeded.

PART III: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY, 1939-41

21. On 19 Sep 39 the public was informed of the decision to organize and train a division to be available as an expeditionary force, with a second division to be made ready. While the English-language newspapers greeted the news with enthusiasm, sections of the French-Canadian press gave it much less favourable publicity. L'Action Catholique that same day had just written "nous ne voyons pas même pour l'instant la nécessité des forces expéditionnaires volontaires". Le Canada of 21 Sep drew attention to the fact that the announcement was placed last in a series made by Mr. Ian Mackenzie before he handed over the portfolio of Minister of National Defence to Mr. Norman McLeod Rogers, and several editors attempted to connect it with Cabinet changes. Nevertheless, the new Minister confirmed on 28 Sep that it was intended to send certain technical units and one of these divisions overseas when required, the other to be kept ready. Two days later all newspapers published the names and home locations of units comprising the overseas division, the policy of basing them upon existing militia units meeting with general approval.

THE WAR IN THE DOLDRUMS

22. Although the point that Canada would send troops abroad had been firmly settled, the time of their dispatch was still unknown. Demanding more definite information, the Journal of 4 Oct enquired whether it was practicable to train the divisions in Canada, particularly under winter conditions and without complete motorized equipment. Its editorial went on to urge that the Government name the divisional commanders and indicate the period of training to be carried out in Canada. Two days later official announcement was made that Maj-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton had been appointed "Inspector-General of Units of the 1st Canadian Division", press reports indicating it was the intention he would assume command when they were assembled. There was also some speculation that if other divisions were sent overseas he probably would become Corps Commander. On 14 Oct the Journal predicted that the 1st Division would proceed overseas within 60 days to complete its training abroad in view of the lack of facilities in Canada. General McNaughton's tour across the country to inspect his units was followed with keen interest, but there was no noticeable pressure to hasten their departure nor to send them directly to a battle front.

23. The public at first could not understand the reason for the discharge or transfer to the Canadian Active Service Force of some 3,800 troops who in the first few weeks of the war had been used to protect vulnerable points such as canals and bridges. Militia units affected naturally felt keen disappointment and in a number of cases men had difficulty in regaining their civilian jobs. To combat murmurs that this was an obvious example

of changing policy, the Minister explained that these troops technically had not been mobilized but as a temporary measure had been placed on active service for this specific purpose until the R.C.M.P. were prepared to assume their task. (Montreal Star, 14 Oct, and Toronto Star, 16 Oct 39). In passing, it is interesting to note an earlier criticism of the Dominion Government by the Toronto Telegram of 21 Sep for refusing to supply guards for industrial plants and installations of provincial and municipal concern. The general principle agreed upon before the war, however, was to employ troops to guard only military establishments and exposed coastal areas. Once this became known, demands for Army assistance subsided noticeably.

24. Although the recruiting records of several of the French-Canadian regiments initially mobilized were remarkably good, all parts of the country showed concern when Premier Maurice Duplessis called an election in Quebec on the basis that the Federal Government was over-riding provincial rights in its war measures. This move was seen as a deliberate attempt to isolate French-Canadians at a critical time before the expeditionary force sailed. In the polling on 25 Oct, however, L'Action Nationale dropped from 76 seats to a mere 16 and the Liberals under Adelard Godbout swept to victory with 67 seats. Credit for this success was mainly attributed to Quebec's representatives in the Federal Cabinet, Messrs Ernest Lapointe and C.G. Power, who while campaigning vigorously reiterated that they would never remain in a Government which would impose conscription. Nevertheless, the Journal of 27 Oct went so far as to say that, because Mr. Duplessis had made the conscription issue his battle-cry, the voting had indicated that Quebec would if necessary give it support. Throughout Canada there were expressions of relief that national unity had been preserved.

25. In contrast to the mixed reception given to the modest Army programme, there was an enthusiastic welcome to the simultaneous announcement on 10 Oct 39 by the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Kingsley Wood) in London and Prime Minister King in Ottawa that Canada had been selected as the advanced training centre for airmen of all parts of the Commonwealth. It was estimated that the scheme would eventually produce 25,000 pilots annually, but there was some delay in getting started while Lord Riverdale's mission to instigate preparations in Ottawa spent several weeks quietly ironing out details. The public soon grew a little restive and, as in the case of the Army, called for further information. One Conservative newspaper, which in September had urged Parliament to adjourn in order to allow ministers to get on with their job, by December was saying "many people are beginning to believe that the business of running a war without Parliament being in session is not particularly good business" (Journal, 11 Sep and 16 Dec 39). On 18 December, however, the Prime Minister was able to announce very complete details of the scheme, which occupied the headlines that day. Meanwhile, in a broadcast that very afternoon, Mr. Winston Churchill (then First Lord of the Admiralty) had referred very briefly to the safe arrival of the 1st Canadian Division in Britain. All English and Canadian dailies of 19 Dec consequently featured the story of Canada's soldiers, who thus regained the favour of public attention.

26. This dramatic news of their arrival overseas was, of course, not at all unexpected. A month before the Montreal Star of 18 Nov had reminisced on the sailing of the 1914 contingent. General McNaughton on concluding his inspection tour had

told the press that his division was "being readied without haste but with thoroughness and all possible despatch" (Gazette and Globe and Mail, 20 Nov 39). At the risk of jeopardizing security, the New York Times on 20 Nov had even printed two pictures of tin-hatted troops aboard a transport vessel with the caption "Members of the Princess Patricia Light Infantry leaving Victoria, B.C., for Vancouver to entrain for an East Coast port, where they will sail for France". This may have been part of the "Marseilles rumour" which the War Office intentionally began to circulate but later stopped (See Preliminary Narrative, The History of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, 1939-1940, Chap 1, paras 89-90 and 97-100).

27. By 2 Jan 40 the entire 1st Canadian Division had been concentrated in England, but many sections of public opinion at home were far from being content. Insisting that one division of 16,000 partially trained troops was not enough, Ottawa's Conservative paper contended that, in proportion to Britain's three and a half million men who had taken up arms or stood ready to do so, Canada should have 800,000. At that time she actually had under 100,000 and was not even appealing for recruits.

And the Canadian people, The Journal suggests further, don't want to be in this war with limited liability. They realize the vital need of air fighters, and will provide them, but we think they realize as well that there is need for land forces, and would like to give their share of them. Above all, the Canadian people don't relish the role of being a sort of Allied Commissariat kitchen for British and Allied soldiers doing their fighting. That is not their tradition.

(Journal, 3 Jan 40)

28. Expecting to learn more of the Government's plans when Parliament reassembled on 25 Jan 40, members were astounded to hear that a general election would be held at once. This political bombshell had been precipitated by a vote of censure initiated by Premier M.F. Hepburn in the Ontario Legislature accusing the Federal Government of having made "so little effort to prosecute Canada's duty in the war in the vigorous manner which the Canadian people desire" (The Times (London), 14 Mar 40). In presenting reasons for hastening the dissolution, the Prime Minister explained that the life of Parliament had almost expired and, as there would probably be a great offensive on the western front in the spring, it was well to get the general election over before the war "began in earnest". (Debates, op cit, 1940, vol I, p. 7)

29. Although beginning in a spirited manner, this wartime election soon became almost apathetic in view of the absence of any real issue, the major contending parties all agreeing that the war must be prosecuted with determination and vigour (The Times (London), 28 Mar 40). The Liberals appealed to the country on the basis of national unity in support of a war policy designed to keep the country one. This programme the Conservatives claimed was half-hearted and could only be made effective by a National Government. Both these principal contenders reiterated opposition to conscription for service abroad on the basis that it would jeopardize national unity. The C.C.F. and New Democracy groups similarly maintained the party positions they had defined during the Special Session of 1939, while outright opposition to participation was confined to a sprinkling of Nationalist anti-war candidates in Quebec and an odd Communist.

30. Early in the election campaign there was a great outcry that inadequate equipment had been sent with the Canadian troops overseas (Journal, 19 and 21 Feb 40). To these charges Col J.L. Ralston (then Minister of Finance) ably replied that the 1st Division had sailed with its full complement of machine guns and field artillery in addition to rifles and personal equipment, that it would have practically all its motor transport before reaching France, and that more modern weapons would be substituted as soon as possible (Gazette, 9 Mar 40). Before the end of February the 110th Army Co-operation Squadron R.C.A.F. reached England, the advanced guard of thousands of airmen to proceed overseas. National Defence Headquarters would not disclose total strengths there, but it was estimated that 6,000 ancillary troops had also been dispatched. Government supporters such as the Winnipeg Free Press (23 Mar 40) were therefore able to contrast very favourably what had been done in the first six months with a similar period in 1914. On the whole the public was satisfied to know that the Canadian division was being thoroughly prepared before being assigned a front-line position.

31. Polling results on 26 Mar gave a sweeping majority to the Liberals, who won 178 seats out of a total of 245, leaving the Conservatives with barely 40 and the C.C.F. and New Democracy with less than ten apiece. According to The Times (London) of 28 Mar the decisive factor probably was that Canadians preferred to continue the war under a Cabinet of men they knew and had seen at work than turn to an anonymous Administration. It was a mandate given at a stage in the so-called "phony war" before the fever had begun to rage and a mild tonic seemed an adequate prescription.

32. The election excitement had barely subsided, however, when the spring military offensive predicted by the Prime Minister burst forth, initiated not by the Allies in France but by the northward thrust of the Germans through Denmark and into Norway on 9 Apr 40. Early rumours that Canadian troops were being sent to oppose them there were mildly discredited by sources in Ottawa, who still foresaw the 1st Division going to France and the 2nd training in Canada (Montreal Star, 16 Apr 40). The Ottawa Journal of 25 Apr, on the other hand, maintained "the enemy could never be beaten at the ca' canny pace of Canada's war effort" and openly asserted there could be no better spearhead than the Canadian division against Germany's occupation army in Norway. In the face of official silence overseas, the London newspapers, the Canadian Press Association, Reuters news agency, and even the B.B.C. repeatedly insisted that at least some Canadians had entered the battle there, despite the denial of Mr. Power (Acting Minister of National Defence). Not until 21 May did Canada learn how near her troops had been to sailing for Trondhjem, the full story being cabled later by the Canadian Press on 12 Jun telling of the chain of mishaps to the designated force commanders.

33. During these momentous days Mr. Rogers was on a visit to Britain and France for consultation regarding the administration and employment of Canadian forces. Appreciating the need for a constant supply of reinforcements if Canada put "three or four divisions into the front line", the Globe and Mail of 29 Apr speculated that before victory came half a million Canadians might go overseas. On the eve of his departure for home, Mr. Rogers failed to indicate whether Canadian troops were destined for France but said they had always served where they could make the greatest possible contribution (Gazette, 9 May 40). Whatever plans he had formulated, however, a drastic change became necessary with the violent ending of the period of the doldrums.

DUNKIRK

34. Hitler's blitzkrieg launched upon the Low Countries on 10 May 40 caused most nations of the world to look with dismay upon their home defences. Canada was not alone in speeding up her war effort and contemplating probable invasion if France and Britain fell. While the battle of Flanders raged, the Ottawa Citizen of 15 May emphasized the might of the German military machine and charged that through a weak armament and munitions programme in the past Canada was "unready to hold any substantial part of the defence lines". Immediately the new Parliament met on 16 May the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. R.B. Hanson (York-Sunbury), criticized both the equipment and the recruiting policy for the forces (Debates, 1940, p. 34). In announcing Government policy, Mr. King stated that a Canadian Corps would be formed in the field, also that the 2nd Division was to be sent overseas and a third division raised for service at home or abroad (ibid, pp 42-47). These measures had in most part been anticipated by the press and met with general approval. Describing them in greater detail during discussion of the War Appropriation Bill, Mr. Rogers on 26 May said that the formation of a Canadian Corps had been under consideration for some time and "was not prompted only by the events of recent weeks" (ibid, p. 97).

35. Among critics who followed him, Major Alan Cockeram (York South) demanded that "neither the first nor the second division should be allowed to enter any zone of battle until the Canadian people and the Department of National Defence are satisfied that sufficient trained reserves are on hand to reinforce them" (ibid, p. 106). Mr. T.L. Church called for mobilization of "all the militia in Canada for all military districts from coast to coast" and the formation of a home guard of returned men (ibid, p. 135). Messrs H.C. Green and G.S. White (Hastings-Peterborough) supported his request, while Mr. J.R. MacNicol (Davenport) said he was far from being satisfied, after eight and a half months of war, with not having a battalion in France, an air squadron at the front. On the other hand, Mr. L. Lacombe (Laval-Two Mountains) still maintained that a financial effort was sufficient, and Mr. J.S. Roy (Gaspé) held that materials rather than men should be sent into battle. Mr. A.R. Adamson (York West) felt that recruiting of a third division was completely inadequate, and he suggested that the special aptitudes of Canadians called for a railway corps and tank corps as well as opportunities to employ hardrock miners and mountain ski troops. During the debate, several speakers requested an extension of the protection offered by the armed forces: Mr. D.G. Ross (St. Paul's) to guard the hydro-electric system in Ontario; Mr. N.J.M. Lockhart (Lincoln) the Welland Canal; Mr. C.E. Johnston (Bow River) the Turner Valley oil fields.

36. On 23 May Mr. Rogers announced that it had been decided to establish a force to be known as "Veterans Home Guards", which would consist initially of 12 companies and be concerned mainly with the protection of military property. The following day the Germans reached Calais and the fighting abroad increased in intensity. Further emergency measures for the immediate expansion of Canada's military and air forces were told to the Commons on 27 May. In addition to the 3rd Division and corps troops, it was proposed to recruit all the rifle battalions of a fourth division. Dr. H.A. Bruce (Parkdale) asked for six divisions instead of four, while Mr. Adamson and Major Cockeram emphasized the importance of tanks. Mr. Rogers explained to the House, however, that Canada had not sent tank battalions overseas because according to the existing establishment, they were neither div-

isional nor corps troops but army troops, and therefore were to be supplied by the British, at least until problems of production in Canada could be worked out. The Canadian Commons passed its \$700,000,000 War Appropriation Bill on 29 May, at the time when the situation abroad looked extremely black. As the Germans hammered the British and French retreating through Dunkirk, the world at large saw, perhaps for the first time, in its true perspective the plight of Britain.

37. Through these days of crisis there was considerable pressure placed upon the Government to recall General McNaughton to take charge of Canada's war effort. The proposal was instigated by the Rev A.H. McGreor, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Bishop's College, whose school General McNaughton had attended (Gazette, 25 and 28 May 40). Dr. Bruce was the chief spokesman in Parliament, while the sportsman Connie Smythe met with an enthusiastic response from the Canadian Corps Association when he forcefully renewed the demand at a mass meeting in Toronto. At this time the Canadian Legion was also active in urging conscription of men, wealth and industry under energetic federal leadership.

38. The Canadian public recognized, however, that there was a big task for General McNaughton in the United Kingdom, where some 335,000 Allied troops rescued through Dunkirk had to be re-equipped and reorganized to defend the motherland. Meanwhile the Canadians were almost the only formed unit there ready to fight, Mr. King disclosing to the House on 4 Jun that they had "on more than one occasion" been under orders to join the B.E.F. and French armies in the battle of Flanders. He went on to say that Canadian troops had already been sent to the West Indies and to hint of "other dispositions requested and being met" (Debates, 1940, vol I, p. 483). Somewhat mystified by the failure of Canadians to reach the front, the general public nevertheless was relieved to learn that no lives had been sacrificed.

39. Evidence of strong public feeling during the critical days of June 1940 was given to Parliament by Mr. J.H. Harris (Danforth), who presented on 6 Jun a petition endorsed by a meeting of upwards of 11,000 Toronto citizens protesting "Canada has not exerted her full strength in man power or material resources" and urging the Government to put forth every possible effort. Among those attending the meeting were aldermen and school trustees, members of the legislature, representatives of Liberal and Conservative associations, service clubs, business men's and ratepayers associations, and certain east end churches. (Ibid, pp 555-56). The following day Mr. Rogers announced recruits would be sought for four forestry companies and four railway construction companies for service overseas, whereupon Mr. Hanson commented, "That is good; we are getting action at last" (ibid, p. 611).

40. Immediately upon learning that Signor Mussolini had openly allied himself against Britain and France, Canada acted promptly in proclaiming a state of war against Italy as from 10 Jun 40. All parties united in passing the Prime Minister's motion to that effect, Mr. Hanson seconding it and Messrs Coldwell and Blackmore speaking in support. Mr. Church alone voiced a protest on the grounds that it savoured of separationism. The House adjourned immediately afterward due to the death that morning of Mr. Rogers in a flying accident. The country as a whole greeted with approval the announcement by the Prime Minister in the Commons on 13 Jun that Col. J.L. Ralston would be the new Minister of National Defence.

41. The new turn the war had taken caused certain members of Parliament to become very apprehensive of attacks by Germans or Italians from across the United States border. Mr. Church on 12 Jun asked not only that the militia be called out to guard public utilities but that there be national service and an immediate national register. He stated that the Canadian Corps Association meeting in Toronto[#] had demanded these steps, and he also made reference to Italian race riots in Toronto.

42. It soon became obvious to all that France was rapidly disintegrating between the blows of the Germans and the Italian menaces. On 14 Jun Mr. King pledged to her Canada's unwavering support by endorsing Mr. Churchill's message to M. Reynaud, but three days later he announced that it had become necessary to withdraw those troops of the 1st Canadian Division which had actually landed in France. On 18 Jun he warned that the British Isles were threatened with invasion "not as a remote possibility but as an impending actuality", and he stated that "additional measures both for the assistance of Britain and for the defence of Canada" were essential. In that connection, he announced, Canadian armed forces were already in Newfoundland, the West Indies and Iceland; recruiting would be intensified; there would be a national registration of man power; and the Government would seek at once "special emergency powers to mobilize all our human and material resources for the defence of Canada". (*Ibid*, p. 854). These proposals were immediately welcomed by the leaders of the Conservative, C.C.F. and Social Credit parties.

43. The debate on the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, lasted for three days; discussion centred very largely about clause 3, which prohibited powers to effect compulsory military service from being exercised "outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof". From the beginning Mr. Church assailed the measure on the grounds that it was inadequate and provided only for home defence; he claimed that Canada should already have an army of 600,000 and should not be waiting for the enemy to strike at her. Mr. Pouliot, on the other hand, said he had consulted his electors and found them in favour of enlistment, some even of conscription, only if for home defence. A strong stand in favour of limited participation was taken by Messrs W. Lacroix (Quebec-Montmorency), Pierre Gauthier (Portneuf), and J.S. Roy. In contrast, full mobilization was demanded by Mr. W.A. Fraser (Northumberland, Ont). The Ministers of Justice and of Public Works, Messrs E. Lapointe and P.J.A. Cardin, both spoke in support of the bill, while the Prime Minister repeatedly emphasized the gravity of the situation abroad. Further opposition was encountered, nevertheless, from Messrs M. Raymond, L. LaCombe, and A.A. Lapointe (Matapedia-Matano), while there was also considerable criticism on economic grounds from C.C.F. and Social Credit members. When Mr. Church objected that recruiting would not be helped by sending contingents to Iceland or Greenland, the Prime Minister replied that he anticipated no difficulty in getting volunteers for Iceland or any other territories adjacent to Canada.

44. The Bill passed on 20 Jun; one day later France accepted the German peace terms and the British Commonwealth was left to fight on alone. At this timely moment Australian and New Zealand troops arrived in Britain and the defenders there were further encouraged by the arrival of the fourth Canadian contingent. No one expected that they would remain there over two years without clashing with the enemy.

See para 37 above.

THE CANADIAN CORPS ON GUARD, 1940-41

45. The press of Canada were greatly pleased with the announcement on 15 Jul 40 that General McNaughton had been promoted to command a new corps consisting of the 1st Canadian Division with its ancillaries and certain British formations. Among other newspapers, the Montreal Star of 15 Jul expressed the hope that when a sufficient number of Canadians reached England they would "relieve British units now in General McNaughton's command, and eventually form a wholly Canadian Corps". Public opinion at that particular time, however, was uncertain whether the overseas force or home defence should have priority.

46. On assuming his new portfolio on 5 Jul, Col Ralston had at once announced a number of sweeping changes at N.D.H.Q. declared by the Winnipeg Free Press of 6 Jul to have been demanded by the public for months. The most important was the return of Maj-Gen H.D.G. Crerar and his appointment almost immediately as Chief of the General Staff, a move which the Leader of the Opposition said had been expected although not quite so soon. General Crerar the next month wrote to General McNaughton as follows:

I found, as I had expected, that the pressure of public opinion to 'get on with the war' had developed to such a height that there was a tendency on the part of the Government in general, and this Department in particular, to go in all directions at highest possible speed. While I am very anxious to put every ounce we can into the prosecution of this war, I am equally keen to see that effort developed in a balanced and co-ordinated manner.

((H.S.) CC7/Crerar/6: Crerar to McNaughton, 8 Aug 40)

47. In Parliament both Messrs Hanson and Coldwell asked for a general discussion of the Government's war effort, particularly how many divisions were to go overseas and what was being done about the defence of the Atlantic coast. The Minister replied by a lengthy statement to the House on 29 Jul in which he announced the formation of an Atlantic Command to include the Canadian forces in Newfoundland and predicted that Canada would shortly have overseas a corps of two complete divisions with ancillary troops. Stating that the 3rd and 4th Divisions would continue to train and be equipped at home, he foresaw no further immediate mobilization of C.A.S.F. units. This speech directly embodied the policy advocated by General Crerar, who remarked in his letter to General McNaughton: "It has been widely acclaimed editorially and, as a result, it would seem that public confidence in the Department is now being created" (*ibid*). Among Conservative papers, The Victoria Colonist of 31 Jul strongly endorsed the promise of offensive action but urged that more than two divisions should be prepared to take part. The Ottawa Journal of 30 Jul also found the plan right in principle but considered it weak in conception because it would not provide more men for the front line overseas. The Vancouver Province that same day emphasized on the other hand that more men should not be called up until equipment became available.

48. After Headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Division had arrived in England early in August 1940, the press in the next few

months gave many hints that the two divisions there would soon be united in a Canadian Corps. The Gazette on 28 Aug spoke of this taking place before the big offensive against Germany and Italy forecast by Mr. Churchill for 1941 or 1942. The Globe and Mail during September repeatedly mentioned the desire for a Canadian Corps abroad to show that the nation was wholly in the war. Continuing his letter to General McNaughton, the C.G.S. wrote on 9 Sep:

On my return, I found that as a result of a rather panicky outlook, the tendency here was to look inward and think in terms of strictly 'continental' defence. I believe that I have been able to correct that defeatist attitude to a considerable extent both in the War Cabinet and publicly and, as a result, during the last month or so the accent has been placed on the 'fortress Island' being our first line of defence rather than the Atlantic seaboard.

(Ibid)

Subsequently, in addressing the Canadian Club of Ottawa on 23 Oct, General Crerar gave public expression to his view that "The major issue confronting Canada in particular and North America in general is to win this war in Europe and so prevent any possibility of this continent finding itself in an isolated and exposed situation" (File CC7/Crerar/6 contains a copy of this address).

49. Establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in August 1940 had created a much more confident feeling among the Canadian public. The Gazette of 21 Aug linked it with the lease of Atlantic bases to the United States and spoke of "a broad co-operative marshalling of forces against the common enemy"; a week later the same paper under the caption "Defence Board Means Business" wrote that "great expectations" had been created. Closer relations between Japan and Germany having brought fears for the safety of the Pacific Coast as well as the Atlantic, the formation of a Pacific Command was similarly welcomed.

50. Meanwhile, a great deal of reliance was placed upon the Commonwealth Air Training Scheme, Mr. Power having told the Commons on 28 Jul that the United Kingdom stated it regarded this as Canada's greatest contribution. In a broadcast several months later, Mr. Vincent Massey (Canadian High Commissioner in London) said that nothing was more impressive nor likely to be more effective (The Times (London), 19 Nov 40). The Army seemed destined to play a waiting role, although there were numerous hints that consideration was being given to sending Canadians to the Near East and the Toronto Telegram of 2 Nov reported "Canadian troops are said to be straining on the leash".

51. When Parliament reassembled in November 1940, Mr. Hanson enquired what was Canada's attitude towards Mr. Churchill's proposal for an offensive campaign in 1942 or 1943 to free France and the Low Countries and whether there would be sufficient reinforcements and new units to implement this. The Prime Minister replied that at various pre-war conferences it had been agreed that the primary duty of each part of the Commonwealth was to provide for its own defence. Col Ralston suggested that the danger of Britain being invaded was thought to be at an end for the year but might be renewed in the spring; he stated that land operations in the Mediterranean could be expected but his own forecast was that the year 1941 would continue to be largely defensive.

Warning that troops must be thoroughly equipped and have "a very great reserve" before being sent to the Mediterranean, Mr. A.R. Adamson therefore urged Canada to send overseas "a large, well-prepared striking force" (Debates, 1941, vol 1, pp 160 and 162).

52. The news was not at all unexpected when the formation of the Canadian Corps was announced in Canada on Christmas Eve 1940. It was a source of considerable satisfaction, however, to know that the 2nd Division had progressed so far in its training and to learn that with the arrival overseas of the eighth contingent on 25 Dec it was up to strength. Although no foreign assignment had been allotted to the Canadians other than the detachment of Royal Canadian Engineers tunnelling at Gibraltar, it was confidently anticipated that the Corps as a whole would be given a most important role if an invasion of England should be attempted.

53. In a broadcast on 2 Feb the Prime Minister first made public the Army programme for 1941, which called for the dispatch overseas of another infantry division, an armoured division, an army tank brigade and large numbers of corps troops. Together with simultaneous Navy and Air Force expansion, it was praised as an "all-out effort" by Grant Dexter in the Winnipeg Free Press of 12 Feb. An editorial in the same issue, however, criticized the "big army" plan if it meant diverting funds from air training and industrial production. The Gazette of 4 Feb, then campaigning strongly for a coalition government, termed the plans for increased production and simultaneous expansion of the forces "a sprawling programme rather than a planned programme", adding "Incidentally, we are to have a military establishment which we were told not so long ago would not be needed". The announcement nevertheless provided additional arguments to refute charges made against Canada at that time by certain United States newspapers protesting against lend-lease (Globe and Mail, 14 Feb, and Journal, 15 Feb 41). In the Canadian press generally, however, it was somewhat overshadowed by the statement made on 3 Feb concerning the change in compulsory military training from the 30-day basis to four months. Both the Montreal Star of 4 Feb and the Ottawa Journal of 5 Feb hailed this as a wise and courageous step.

54. When Parliament reassembled on 17 Feb the Prime Minister expressed his agreement with Mr. Churchill that it would be a "waiting year" and intimated that it would very unlikely witness a major attack upon enemy-occupied Europe. Conservative newspapers that ~~with~~ were most outspoken in criticizing the Federal Government for a lack of drive in the national war effort[¶]. In speaking on the War Appropriation Bill for \$1,300,000,000, the Leader of the Opposition remarked, "The fact is that Australia is on the field of battle, and Canada is not" (Debates, 1941, p. 838). On that statement being denied by the Prime Minister, Mr. Hanson pointed to Libya and the few men training in England. A few days later, in acclaiming victories of General Wavell's British and Australian forces based in Egypt, he said: "I have no doubt that the personnel of the Canadian divisions in England would have welcomed an opportunity to participate" (Ibid, p. 942).

55. When the Army programme came to be discussed in the Commons during March, Col Ralston emphasized that it had been

¶ Toronto Telegram 5 and 6 Feb; Journal, 6 Feb; Globe and Mail 7 Feb; Gazette, 17 Feb; and The Financial Post, 22 Feb 41.

worked out in agreement with British authorities. Mr. Hanson, referring to the four-month training plan, asked:

Why, then, has the government not had the courage to go the whole way and retain the absolute right to utilize the services of these men for the defence of Canada over there, after giving them four months' training and spending the huge sums of money that have been spent on their military education?

(Debates, 1941, vol II, p. 1558)

The Gazette of 15 Mar termed these words "guarded language" advocating conscription for overseas. Before the War Appropriation was finally approved on 25 Mar, the Minister was subjected to a barrage of criticism from the Conservatives, who continued their attack when a supplementary bill was introduced the following day. Raising the question of the position of the Canadian Army overseas with reference to the British Army, Mr. Grote Stirling (Yale) asked pointedly, "Is the decision with regard to where the Canadian forces may be used entirely at the discretion of this Government?" (Ibid, p. 2004). Col Ralston replied by reading and explaining passages from the Canadian Order-in-Council of 3 Apr 40 whereby Canadian forces were serving together with British forces and under certain conditions were or could be detailed to act in combination. In answer to queries, he stated definitely that "the decision as to the employment of troops outside the United Kingdom is a matter for the Canadian Government", also that its approval had been given with regard to Norway and France in 1940 and would be required for Northern Ireland or Iceland (ibid, p. 2049).

56. That month there were many rumours that Canadians had accompanied British troops sent to bolster the defences of Greece (Globe and Mail, 19 Mar, and Citizen, 2 Apr 41). Ottawa declined to comment on these or to confirm a report by the Associated Press from Spain that Canadian troops were expected to arrive in Gibraltar about the middle of March en route possibly to Libya (Gazette, 15 Mar 41). The first official denial of these rumours that Canadians were going to the Near East was implied in Col Ralston's statement to the House on 1 Apr that they had been sent only to Gibraltar.

57. A momentous change in the situation abroad occurred, however, when on 6 Apr the German Army attacked both Yugoslavia and Greece. Foreseeing that this onslaught marked "the opening in earnest of the 1941 campaign", Mr. King predicted that the Balkan campaign may well be the prelude to a great battle for the whole Mediterranean basin" (Debates, 1941, vol III, pp 2196-97). Mr. Hanson at once asked "whether any consideration has been given to Canadian participation in the battle in the near east?", but the Prime Minister replied that "the disposition of troops is a matter which come pretty much exclusively within the purview of the high command of Great Britain" (ibid).

58. Events did not go well and expressions of concern soon arose in the newspapers, Toronto's Liberal organ writing:

Reverses in Greece and North Africa and the intensified spring blitzkrieg over Britain have been followed in Ontario by renewed demands for conscription for overseas service. These demands are voiced by a section of the press, and no doubt reflect public sentiment to at least some substantial degree.

(Toronto Star, 21 Apr 41)

The editorial went on to observe that the presence of Australian and New Zealand troops in Africa and Greece had given rise to speculation "whether Canada should have a greater force overseas, serving in Great Britain if they are needed there, or in other parts of the world if they can so be of use to Britain's cause". It noted that Canada's programme was said to be meeting Britain's requirements "to the letter", but added:

If, however, as a result of developments, Britain at a later date needs more men from Canada than those Canada has now arranged to send, public opinion will justify the securing and dispatch of these additional troops. The method of securing them, if they are not secured by voluntary enlistment, will then become an issue.

(Ibid)

The Globe and Mail on 22 Apr voiced a definite demand for more recruits and "a much larger striking force than at present contemplated". Col Ralston replied by announcing on 26 Apr that there was still no need for conscription for service overseas but that the trainees completing their four-months period would be retained for service in Canada. At the same time he denied a published report that Canada had asked for United States troops to be sent here to allow Canadians to proceed overseas. (New York Times, 27 Apr 41). The following day the first representative group of the Canadian Armoured Corps reached England.

59. Immediately Parliament reassembled on 28 Apr, Mr. Hanson charged that the campaign for recruits had failed. This Col Ralston vigorously denied, at the same time announcing that there would be a three-months drive with assistance to be sought from committees of citizens. During the debate on the budget, however, Dr. H.A. Bruce made a direct demand on 12 May for "selective compulsory enlistment" for service "wherever the need is urgent" (Debates, 1941, p. 2729). The Minister of National Defence at once intervened to say that this was a distinct blow against the call he had formally issued just the day before for 32,000 volunteers. Several speakers joined in before the main topic was resumed.

60. The newspapers gave generous support to the drive, and the Minister remained optimistic regarding its success. Speaking for Liberals of the Pacific coast, however, The Vancouver Sun of 12 Jun bemoaned the fact that British Columbia, the province where there was the widest demand for conscription, was the worst failure. It warned, "Thus, by relying on the ultimate effect of conscription, we are probably damaging the voluntary recruiting campaign". That same day Major Cockeran charged in the House that there was unsatisfactory training, headquarters inefficiency, and a lack of essential equipment for forces in Canada. Col Ralston and the Prime Minister replied that the struggle centred on Britain and Canada was every month sending her more defenders. The latter added, "We have made known to all the world that our forces overseas are ready to go, and that we are equally ready to have them go wherever their services may count for most" (Debates, 1941, p. 3932). General satisfaction with this was expressed by Montreal's Conservative daily in an editorial entitled "To Fight Wherever Needed", which contended that "it has been more or less a secret up till now, and the inaction of these troops has been a source of public worry". To this paper it was now perfectly clear that no "constitutional or statutory impediments stood in the way of the British High Command in the event of a desire to use this force in some other

theatre of war". Moreover, it could now be taken for granted that, when all four divisions had been assembled and sufficiently trained in England, all four would be available "wherever service may be needed for the safety of the Empire" (Gazette, 14 Jun 41). Another Conservative paper, The Daily Colonist (Victoria) of 20 Jun, complained that the Government seemed to have no definite plans for the 4th Division, which had been organized for over a year as the result of "the pressure of public opinion because of the gravity of affairs in Europe".

61. The previous month the C.G.S. had written to the Corps Commander in England that equipment continued to be the limiting factor with regard to the size of the Army. Mentioning Brens, rifles, tanks and guns, he said:

I am constantly being pressed to mobilize further divisions but so far have succeeded in holding our Army expansion programme in some balance with the prospect of receiving equipment on which they can train and with which they can subsequently fight.

(CC7/Creerar/6: Creerar to McNaughton,
19 May 41)

Continuing, he advised General McNaughton that he felt it would be "in the interests of the Corps, and indeed of the country, if you can arrange to secure Canadian representation" in some of the Commando raids. His argument was as follows:

Although the public here realize the vitally important role the Canadian Corps is playing in the United Kingdom, there is a not unnatural desire to see the Canadians in the headlines these days by some demonstration of their fighting abilities.

(Ibid)

Whereas the autumn and winter had provided airmen with plenty of action, giving added impetus to the Commonwealth Air Training Scheme, for soldiers it was mainly a case of constantly guarding against an attack which never came. Even by spring 1941 the Canadian public was beginning to show a certain impatience with this unspectacular role for their Army.

PART IV: THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC DEMAND FOR ACTION BY THE CANADIAN ARMY

HITLER ATTACKS RUSSIA

62. Land warfare received renewed emphasis, however, when Germany attacked Russia on 22 Jun 41. Within a week Col Ralston told the press that provision would be made for women to serve in the forces and for the recall of men who had completed their 30 days' training (Montreal Star, 27 Jun 41). Nevertheless, the Prime Minister on a speaking tour of the West emphasized that his Government had no intention of adopting conscription for overseas, basing his stand directly on the issue of national unity. The Toronto Star of 28 Jun pointed out the

danger to the recruiting drive from various newspapers aligning themselves for or against conscription, although its own editorial included the sentence "The Star believes that conscription is the fairest way of raising men for overseas service". Premier Godbout of Quebec was insistent that conscription would smash national unity (Montreal Star, 21 Jul 41). On the other hand, the Canadian Corps Association at a meeting of 2000 in Toronto pressed for decisive action, its president (Lt-Col C.E. Reynolds) openly accusing the Prime Minister of seeking before the war an assurance from Mr. Neville Chamberlain that no Canadian expeditionary force was expected by Britain (Ottawa Citizen, 30 Jul 41). In view of the many charges and counter-charges at a very critical stage of the war, the Minister of National Defence was happy to be able to announce early in July that the recruiting campaign had netted 107 per cent of its objective.

63. The Army policy was being subjected to severe attack at this time in a series of highly inflammatory articles published by the Globe and Mail beginning 21 Jun 41 under the title "War Problems Affecting Canada".²² Based upon the theme that Canada's military methods were woefully outmoded, they called for abandonment of plans to train large bodies of infantry and heavy field artillery and for concentration upon light, compact mechanized units to be trained by realistic mass-manoeuvres in Canada. Over a period of two months beginning 21 Jun, there were in all 18 articles said to have been prepared "with aid of consultations with recognized students of military science". Identifying Lt-Col George Drow (then Leader of the Conservative Opposition in Ontario) as their author, General Crerar wrote to General McNaughton of his difficulties from this external pressure.

In recent weeks, mainly for political reasons, and inspired to some extent by speeches and articles of certain people who should, or do, know better, there has developed a degree of public impatience with the unspectacular, but most necessary, activities of our Basic, Advanced, Trades and Officers Training Centres, and of my insistence on thorough section, platoon and Company, etc training being carried out before the more spectacular unit and formation tactical exercises are undertaken. There have been suggestions that Training Centres are ineffective and unnecessary...

((H.S.) CC7/Crerar/6: Crerar to McNaughton, 26 Jun 41. See also Crerar to the Minister, 27 Jun, and dictated notes by Crerar on articles of 15 and 16 Jul 41)

The Corps Commander replied with a cable (intended for publication) emphasizing the importance of individual training to the soldier and the value of "schools", also stressing the co-operation existing between Corps H.Q. and N.D.H.Q. (ibid: Tel GS 1410, McNaughton to Crerar, 18 Jul 41). In expressing his appreciation, General Crerar wrote:

As you, of course, realize the Canadian Army is more vulnerable to political attack than the other two Services for the simple reason that owing to factors which none of us can control the Canadian Corps has been tied down to a passive defensive role in the

* (H.S.) 000.5(D1) contains articles 1,2,3,4,5,10,11,12,15,16, 17 and 18 of this series.

United Kingdom and has thus been unable to satisfy the public in its demand for sensational action.

(Ibid: Crerar to McNaughton, 11 Aug 41)

Meanwhile, the Financial Post of 2 Aug endorsed those articles in renewing its demand for General McNaughton to take charge at home while the Edmonton Journal joined in the criticism of army training.*

64. In the face of these attacks, the arrival overseas on 2 Jul of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade, a formation unheard of six months before and then not even in the Army programme, was hailed by the Defence Department as a "spectacular achievement" (Citizen, 3 Jul 41). When a month later units of the 3rd Division began to arrive also, The Times (London) of 6 Aug noted that in his speech of welcome General McNaughton "said that the time was drawing near when the Canadian forces now assembled in Great Britain would be usefully employed, and he emphasized the word 'usefully'". Indicating that home defence was not being neglected, Col Ralston that week announced that three brigade groups of the 6th Division would be mobilized for active service and trained with the 4th Division. He added that "all necessary defence precautions" were being taken on Canada's Pacific Coast "because of the situation in the Orient". (Montreal Star, 8 Aug 41). Proclaiming this as encouraging news, the Gazette of 9 Aug wrote, "Facing both ways, Canada needs all the strength she can muster". The series of articles on "War Problems Affecting Canada" concluded on 16 Aug with the statement that many obstacles had been removed.

65. All sections of the press approved the action of Prime Minister King in flying to England late in August 1941, just after Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt had held their Atlantic conference. With the Russians then being pushed back in the Ukraine, there were many reports of a British invasion of the continent. It was generally believed this would come about the following year, with the Canadian troops playing a part, although newspapers such as the Ottawa Journal of 21 Aug queried whether the existing voluntary system would provide adequate forces trained and ready as reinforcements. The United States had that summer aided in garrisoning Iceland, yet for the Canadian Army there seemed to be no objective other than building up the Corps in Britain for an indefinite task at an unknown date.

66. Such conditions undoubtedly were largely responsible for the wide prominence given to the incident at the Aldershot Sports Meet of 23 Aug. The Canadian Press despatch by R.K. Carnegie describing the interruptions which occurred there said "mixed cheers and boos" greeted Prime Minister King and offered this comment:

Some of the boos seemed to have been the Canadian troops' way of indicating that they are a bit weary of 'watchful waiting' in Britain and over-anxious to get into the field of battle.

(Gazette, 25 Aug 41)

* The latter's editorial was reprinted by the Ottawa Citizen, 2 Aug 41.

The point was driven further home by the following account of the reaction to Mr. King's words when he spoke of taking back to Canada his impression of the spirit of the men.

These remarks were the signal for a sharp outburst of boos, and Mr. King countered after a moment's hesitation with: 'I gather from the applause that many of you are impatient and would rather be engaged in more active operations than you are today'.

The response to this was unmistakable. There were loud cheers, whistling and applause, and the Prime Minister shouted into the microphone: 'That is the spirit to which I was referring'.

(Ibid)

It was also said that a "warm reception" had been planned by some soldiers, who argued that the Canadians should have been given a place alongside the Australians in the Eastern campaign and that conscription for overseas should be introduced.

67. No mention of any unpleasantries was made in the English papers except the Evening Standard of 25 Aug, which carried a Montreal despatch stressing that the booing was a lark but pointing out that "what may be interpreted as a gesture of disrespect is probably a sign that the men are weary of inactivity because some of them have now been overseas for almost two years without seeing any action". Two days later The Daily Telegraph reported that in Canberra a Labour member, Mr. Conclan, had asked the Australian Army Minister why Canadian troops were not employed in the Middle East, adding "Our troops are always in action".

68. Mr. King's subsequent addresses to the troops on 26 Aug were reported by the Globe and Mail of 28 Aug to have "effectively disposed" of rumours that the Canadian Government had refused consent for its Army to fight in the Mediterranean. Publicity was given through The Times (London) of 27 Aug to Mr. Churchill's assurance to Mr. King that Canadians had been kept deliberately in the United Kingdom because the British Government regarded it as the citadel of liberty. This was re-emphasized by Mr. Churchill's luncheon speech at the Mansion House on 4 Sep when, in expressing heartfelt sympathy with the Canadian Corps for having to remain as guardians of Britain, he praised the part it had played as "second to none".

69. Public attention was directed back to the Aldershot incident by a speech in the Canadian House of Commons on 11 Nov 41 when Mr. J.F. Pouliot remarked that "the young fools" that made some noise when the Prime Minister visited then ignored the fact that if they were still alive, if they had not been killed in the Dunkirk retreat, it was because of the very wise and patriotic recommendation" of Prime Minister King to General McNaughton (Debates, 1941-42, vol IV, p. 4133). On later denying the implications of this statement, Mr. King said that it was General McNaughton who had given the assurance that lives would not be needlessly wasted and for that reason had not taken his men across to Dunkirk in 1940. With regard to the Aldershot demonstration, the Prime Minister went on to explain that even before he reached England there was being spread among the Canadian troops a rumour that he was responsible for keeping them

* Mr. Pouliot later explained that he meant "fool" as the translation of "gamin", a French word he claimed meant a noisy person (Montreal Star, 12 Nov 41)

in Britain. Mr. King felt that Mr. Churchill had effectively answered that rumour and that he himself had removed the impression that his Government had placed restrictions upon the movement of Canadians from Britain. In conclusion, he rebuked the Canadian Press for sending out the story when the British newspapers and other news services did not feel it necessary to do so. (Ibid, p. 4430). The management of the Canadian Press replied with a statement asserting it was satisfied that its report of the occurrence was accurate and fair, and the matter rested there.

70. The whole incident had a significant part in the rising public pressure of 1941 seeking action by the Canadian troops overseas to aid Russia and the occupied countries of Europe or the British Army in Africa by participation in some offensive blow. This pressure was answered by a brief venture undertaken with the Royal Navy and a definite assurance that full-scale action would eventually result.

SPITSBERGEN AND THE "DAGGER" STATEMENT

71. In September 1941 news of the raid on Spitsbergen caused among the press in Canada a certain "smacking of the lips", moderated somewhat by reflections that once again Canadians had been denied a chance to do actual fighting. The Montreal Star of 8 Sep spoke of "their appetites whetted by this adventure", while the Globe and Mail on 10 Sep wrote that it "may well be the curtain-raiser to a more ambitious adventure". The latter speculated that Canadians would certainly be included if a British expeditionary force were sent to Petsamo or Murmansk to establish with the Russians there a northern front to draw off the Germans from Moscow or the oil fields of the Caucasus. On the other hand, the Toronto Telegram of 11 Sep said: "The boys are back in Britain, for which their friends will be glad, for while none would grudge them a little action after their two years of tedium, none would wish them a lengthy exile on the lonely islands near the Pole".

72. Shortly afterwards, a group of correspondents received from General McNaughton a significant declaration regarding the role of the Canadian Corps^{*}. Without ruling out the possibility of an invasion of Britain, he said to them:

There will have to be an invasion of the Continent. I don't think you can bring a proud and well-organized nation to her knees with missiles alone. The Canadian Corps is a dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin - make no mistake about this...

(Globe and Mail, 29 Sep 41)

Strossing "fundamental training in Canada" before troops were sent overseas, he remarked that "The possibility of forming an army of two corps cannot be considered until it is known precisely how many men are available" (ibid).

73. Throughout Canada the phrase "a dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin" was echoed by the press in editorials seeking to spur on the country to greater effort. One Western Ontario newspaper wrote:

* The paragraph and the succeeding two are based upon clippings contained in General McNaughton's file PA 3-7, now in possession of the Historical Section.

... it is obvious the Russo-German war has completely changed our plans. Before that conflict broke out there was no sign of an opportunity of attacking Germany from the west. That opportunity has now come in the opinion of those on the scene. Canadian troops will take their place in any such invasion scheme. Present indications are that this hour and action will not be long delayed.

(The Free Press (London, Ont)
27 Sep 41)

This paper along with The Canadian Observer (Sarnia) of 27 Sep even suggested that United States troops might augment the British and Canadians in the drive.

74. On a visit to Britain at this time, Lt-Col George Drew in a B.B.C. broadcast the same day that General McNaughton interviewed the press declared that the shock troops for invasion should be trained in Canada (The St. Catherines Standard, 27 Sep 41). In the flood of editorials linking the two pronouncements, The Kingston Whig-Standard of 29 Sep suggested "it would be something of a land counterpart of the Commonwealth Air Training Scheme". Noting that "no suggestion has been made in this country that a second corps be recruited", the Globe and Mail also of 29 Sep asked, "How soon will it be known whether or not men are available for a second corps if this further strength proves necessary?" The Winnipeg Free Press requested a survey in view of "demands for a larger army" and called for "our best support, with abundance of necessary equipment and with reinforcements for the present, or a larger, corps". The Toronto Star wrote: "There is much to be said for bringing troops to a high state of efficiency in Canada although there are finishing touches which must await their arrival in Britain"; it then went on to encourage "a release of man-power from the non-essential services to the war-machine-producing or fighting services".

75. General McNaughton had described Britain as well situated strategically for an offensive along the European coastline from Gibraltar to Spitsbergen, but several editors speculated that other routes might be chosen with men and materials from Canada and the United States being sent westward as well as across the Atlantic. There were many predictions of crucial battles in the Mediterranean area and particularly in the Middle East, with frequent mention of a possible thrust at Italy or through the Caucasian isthmus to aid the Russians. The Ottawa Journal stood almost alone at that time in contending that "missiles from the air may do more than merely help win the war". Several days later, however, The Beacon-Herald (Stratford) of 6 Oct endorsed its editorial calling for severe bombing as a prelude to, and accompaniment of, invasion. The Toronto Telegram of 30 Sep meanwhile contented itself with delivering a sharp reminder that the danger of invasion to Britain still remained.

76. It is interesting to note how a number of Ontario newspapers linked the remarks of General McNaughton and Col Drew to an unofficial (and quite unfounded) story from occupied France via New York telling of a raid by Canadian soldiers on the French Channel coast in which some 28 German staff officers were captured^{###}.

[#] Edmonton Journal, Brantford Expositor, and The Ontario Intelligencer (Belleville), all of 29 Sep 41.

^{###} Identical editorials in this regard were carried by Sarnia's Canadian Observer, The Galt Reporter, and the Welland-Port Colborne Tribune, all of 30 Sep, and by the Woodstock Sentinel-Review, 2 Oct 41.

The "dagger" theme was again used by the Globe and Mail of 7 Oct to stress the need for mechanization to provide a highly mobile striking force. For a Canadian Press report of small groups of Canadian officers being selected for commando training, the Toronto Star of 11 Oct used the caption "Picked Canadians Trained as Invasion Shock Troops". Similarly, a despatch by Ross Munro telling of Exercise "BUMPER" appeared in the Ottawa Citizen of 20 Oct under the heading "Big Manoeuvres Held Training for 'Invasion'".

77. The size of the force Canada should provide again came into question. In commenting upon the recent arrival of "another huge flotilla of troopships", Saskatoon's Liberal Star-Phoenix on 22 Oct speculated that "possibly before long the Canadian force in Britain will provide two corps with General McNaughton in command of an army". To the Empire Club of Toronto Mr. P.J. Philip, Ottawa correspondent of the New York Times gave a warning that Hitler might be preparing to invade Britain in the spring with parachute and gas attacks and perhaps a Channel tunnel for tanks, yet he urged attack as the best defence and suggested the benefits of a tremendous drive "to make Africa securely ours" (Toronto Telegram, 23 Oct 41). Also speaking in Toronto, Mr. Hanson on his return from a visit to England declared the threat of invasion there had not passed and he called for "total enlistment at once of all available manpower, whatever system may be required to enlist them" (Gazette, 29 Oct 41).

78. When Parliament reassembled early in November, Mr. Hanson referred to the "full recognition in Britain that the war cannot be brought to a decisive conclusion without the invasion of enemy territory" but declared that "to ask Britain to start a campaign in western Europe to-day is to ask the impossible... It can be attained only by the combined efforts of Britain, the Dominions, our great neighbour to the south". He made mention of Canada's six divisions, "not all overseas, and a home defence army composed of drafted men", and said:

My own view is - and I am giving it only as my own view - that if the invasion of the continent is to be successfully accomplished Canada must provide more than six divisions, must provide an ever-increasing volume of man-power adequately trained and equipped for the offensive.

(Debates, 1941-42, vol IV, p. 4064)

Heading a list of specific questions he put was one asking for "The ultimate objective in man-power which it is hoped Canada may contribute" (ibid, p. 4069).

79. Col Ralston replied that Canada was determined to contribute "to the utmost of her ability". He stated that the drive for recruits had produced 34,000 enlistments for the Army from about 48,000 who had actually volunteered, but that the four succeeding months had seen a definite falling off as 37,000 odd had been asked for and only 24,000 plus enlisted. (Ibid, pp 4112-20) In commenting on these figures, the Toronto Star of 7 Nov wrote: "We believe that if the Canadian troops were in action and suffering casualties, many more volunteers would flock to the colours, their patriotism stirred by the sacrifices being made by their fellow-Canadians".

80. On 6 Nov 41 the same two speakers had a brief exchange with regard to control of the Canadian forces overseas during which the Minister, speaking off-hand, said: "If they go out of England for service the Government of Canada would be asked to give its consent" (Debates, 1941-42, p. 4133). This drew

criticism at once from Mr. Church, who pointed out that "sooner or later there must be another Peninsular war on the continent" and complained that Canada had not been represented as New Zealand and Australia had been in Africa, Greece, Syria and other countries (ibid, p. 4175). Dr. Bruce thereupon sounded a definite call for "compulsory selective service", supporting his demand with quotations from prominent Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy. The cry was taken up on 10 and 11 Nov by numerous Opposition members.

81. On 12 Nov 41 Senator Arthur Meighen accepted the leadership of the Conservative party and at once declared for "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war" (Ottawa Citizen, 13 Nov 41). That very afternoon the Prime Minister told the House that his Government stood by the policy of compulsory service for home defence, but that "without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas" (Debates, 1941-42, p. 4321). The divergence between the two major political parties on this issue stood clearly defined when Mr. P.F. Casgrain (Secretary of State) maintained that the great majority of the people of Canada and of Quebec did not want conscription for overseas while Mr. W.E. Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe) upheld that it was necessary.

82. Without relating in detail how the controversy over conscription grew in intensity during the Parliamentary recess of 1941-42, mention must be made of certain influencing factors. A severe loss was suffered in the death on 26 Nov of Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe, who had vigorously championed a full war policy short of conscription for overseas. Two French-Canadian District Officers Commanding, Brigadiers E. deB. Panet of M.D. 4 and Georges Vanier of M.D. 5, both stressed the need for recruits in outspoken addresses which received wide publicity. The Toronto Star of 28 Nov carried a report indicating that up to 30,000 women would be recruited to release men for overseas. After a survey of Canada's war effort, Mr. Joseph Driscoll in the New York Herald-Tribune of 5 Dec wrote that general opinion seemed to be that the Canadian expeditionary force at this stage did not possess "the necessary reserves to carry on an all-out drive to Berlin".

83. Meanwhile, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division arrived in Britain in November 1941. The same day the news was released, the surprise announcement was made that Maj-Gen Crerar would command the 2nd Canadian Division with Maj-Gen K. Stuart becoming Chief of the General Staff. At once an article in Toronto's Liberal organ prophesied that Canada might soon have a full-fledged army overseas of six divisions forming two corps, with General McNaughton as Army Commander and General Crerar commanding the 1st Canadian Corps (H.R. Armstrong in the Toronto Star, 27 Nov 41). The Montreal Star of 27 Nov speculated that to achieve this the 4th Division might be sent overseas, or another division might be formed from reinforcements already there, or another Empire division might be added. It was generally expected, however, that the first overseas would be the first to see action.

HONG KONG

84. Earlier in this report brief mention has been made of the fears created when Japan and Germany were seen to be drawing closer together in 1940*. There was obvious public concern

* See paragraph 49 above.

not only over the defensive arrangements on the Pacific Coast but with regard to the loyalty of Asiatics residing there. These factors considerably influenced the Canadian Government in retaining as much as possible of the 2nd Division in Canada that summer (H.Q.S. 20-1-27: External Affairs to High Commissioner, 11 Jul 40).

85. The following winter anti-Japanese feelings, which had for many years been prevalent in British Columbia, rose to such a pitch that the Federal Government appointed a committee of investigation. This Sparling Committee recommended re-registration of Japanese in that province, also that they should not be called up for military service (not a unanimous decision) and that an appeal should be made to citizens and the press to diminish the ill-feeling. These suggestions were put into effect by another committee headed by Mayor F.J. Hume of New Westminster and the R.C.M.P. conducted the registration on a voluntary basis in March 1941. Press agitation thereafter subsided, although several British Columbia members of Parliament urged that a firm hand be shown.

86. Uneasiness returned upon Premier Tojo forming his war-like cabinet in October 1941, and newspapers across Canada hailed Mr. King's announcement on 16 Nov that Canadian troops had arrived at Hong Kong. Among many forecasts of imminent action was the following:

Canada's soldiers have had little active service so far, have been straining at the leash by all accounts. The raid on Spitzbergen's coal mines and oil depot was a welcome diversion for some. The Hong Kong development may be more momentous than that Arctic adventure.

(Gazette, 17 Nov 41)

87. Japan's shattering attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec immediately caused widespread consternation along the whole Pacific Coast of North America. Canada's official declaration of war against Japan that day preceded by a few hours similar action by the United States and the United Kingdom. On 9 Dec Pensions Minister Mackenzie announced that the Government now considered that the entire Atlantic Coast south of Labrador and the entire Pacific Coast south of Alaska were subject to the risk of enemy attack. The following day the sinking of H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse off Malaya caused serious alarm to be felt in British Columbia. Although not reported in the press, rumours of inadequate defences there spread rapidly and before long were being repeated in the eastern cities. According to a survey made since, these rumours were not merely vague and general but named specific military installations, described the equipment available, and referred to the inadequacy of fire fighting apparatus in the larger cities (La Violette, Professor F.E., The Canadian Japanese and World War II, University of Toronto Press, 1948, p. 35). The Chief of the General Staff at once made a personal inspection of coastal defences there and declared in Vancouver that they were "capable of coping with any probable attacks that we may have to face". Continuing he said:

One of the objectives of the enemy is to create confusion in Canada and bring about a diversion to home defence of troops that would otherwise be sent overseas. We must not forget that this war will be won outside Canada and we must send our main forces to the place where they will be needed most.

(Montreal Star, 19 Dec 41)

This brought some measure of reassurance to the general public and helped to stem growing murmurs against sending further troops abroad (See the Gazette and Globe and Mail of 20 Dec 41).

88. By 20 December most newspapers were conceding the loss of Hong Kong and directing criticism to the lightness of the forces assigned to hold it. The Windsor Star spoke of Canada's "suicide squad" in bewailing the fact that instead of a token force "we hadn't a hundred thousand troops ready to throw into the defence of this vital Empire stronghold". The Vancouver Sun in asking for combined strategic planning and unified command demanded "no more sacrifice garrisons". There was universal praise, however, for the courage of the troops fighting on against odds. It is impossible here to portray adequately the feeling of Canada when news was received of the tragic fall of Hong Kong on Christmas Day 1941. One quotation may suffice:

The bitter cup drunk by Australia and New Zealand in Greece and Crete has now, in lesser measure, become that of Canada too... Now, alas, in the grim phrase of John Bright: the Angel of Death is abroad in the land. You can almost hear the flutter of his wings.

(Winnipeg Free Press, 26 Dec 41)

89. At this time when faith in fleets and fortresses had been badly shaken, Mr. Churchill did much to restore public confidence by addressing the Canadian parliament on 31 Dec 41. Saying that "the Canadian army now stationed in England has chafed not to find itself in contact with the enemy", he warned that invasion might yet come although their presence there might deter the enemy. After a tribute to the Canadian stand at Hong Kong, he referred to the Air Training Scheme as "another major contribution" and emphasized the importance of battles abroad (Debates, 1941-42, vol IV, pp 4478-82). There were many Canadians who had become convinced, nevertheless, that home defence should now be placed foremost.

PRESSURE FOR INCREASED HOME DEFENCES, 1942

90. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, even before Japan's sweeping successes on sea and land increased the tension, letters to the editor appeared in leading dailies of British Columbia pointing out the possibility of subversive acts by resident Japanese. In the same papers editorials urged that the people keep calm, but by the end of December the agitation had been taken up by local Members of Parliament, Conservative and Liberal Associations, and municipal bodies. Fearing that public demonstrations and street parades might provoke inter-racial clashes, the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command (Maj-Gen R.O. Alexander) promptly informed Ottawa:

Public feeling is becoming very insistent, especially in Vancouver, that local Japanese should be either interned or removed from the coast. Letters are being written continually to the press and I am being bombarded by individuals, both calm and hysterical, demanding that something be done.

((H.S.) H.Q. 6-0-7: Alexander to C.G.S., 30 Dec 41)

An article by R.H. Hague in Saturday Night (Toronto) of 3 Jan 42 emphasized that considerable political pressure for evacuation was going to be applied from British Columbia.

91. On 14 Jan 42 the Prime Minister announced a moderate policy designed to relieve the tension, yet not go so far as to cause reprisals by Japan against prisoners taken at Hong Kong. It deprived Japanese nationals of certain privileges, notably that of fishing, and provided for partial evacuation only. The immediate public reaction was one of approval, but anxiety soon returned over the apparent inaction of Ottawa officials in implementing the programme. Local politicians continued their agitation, spurred on now by resolutions from various service clubs, fraternal and patriotic societies, and veterans organizations. Immediately after Parliament met on 21 Jan numerous members from British Columbia, aided by several from Ontario, demanded drastic action at once. Although police officials and the Services were equally confident they could control internal trouble, public agitation increased to such an extent that on 26 Feb the Prime Minister announced there would be complete evacuation by compulsion.^{*} Economic interests may have had some influence, but public opinion with regard to defence was undoubtedly the leading factor in bringing about this evacuation. It was an outstanding example of public pressure overcoming military and governmental policy^{***}.

92. The Canadian Legion in particular stressed the military danger from the Japanese, and spoke of considerable uneasiness among the people of Vancouver and Victoria in formal¹¹ asking that "sufficient equipment be placed at the disposal of all local forces" (H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol 2: J.C.D. Herwig to Col Ralston, 13 Jan 42). Simultaneously many ships were being sunk off the Atlantic Coast and Mayor LaGuardia of New York issued a warning that air raids on coastal towns were imminent.

93. In the House of Commons Mr. Hanson on 24 Jan agreed that Canada's seaports were in grave danger, yet he declared that her first line of defence still lay overseas and he even proposed that she should send a division to Australia. "If we haven't a division of trained men in Canada", he said, "then send one of our trained divisions now in England and replace it with men from Canada. Those men over there would welcome the opportunity for active service." (Debates, 1942, vol 1, p. 22). Several French-speaking members, however, pointed to the precarious position in which Australia found herself after sending her troops abroad. One of the principal speakers campaigning on behalf of the government candidate in a Quebec by-election was said to have used these words:

There are events happening in Australia at present which more than ever would not only justify Prime Minister King's non-enforcement of conscription for overseas service but which might even oblige him to recall troops now stationed in England.^{***}

(Ibid, p. 335)

^{*} Although slower in gathering momentum, similar demands in California led to a Presidential Order of 21 Feb regarding evacuation of 136,000 nationals compared to Canada's 24,000.

^{***} See La Violette, op cit, chapters I and II. See also Historical Section file H.Q. 6-0-7: Evacuation of Japanese.

^{***} These words were read to the House by a Conservative, Mr. N.J.M. Lockhart (Lincoln), who attributed them to Mr. Taschereau of Quebec. The reference might have been to the Australians fighting in Malaya and particularly to those besieged in Singapore.

Among the numerous members demanding increased defences on the Pacific Coast, Mr. R.W. Mayhew (a government member) on 9 Feb expressed considerable concern over the protection of what he termed "vital spots". Although admitting that defences had been improved and feeling that there was not much danger of cities being bombed, he said, in part:

We have a little time to spare. I urge the minister and the government to make use of that time to the utmost of their ability and to see that the west coast of British Columbia is supplied with everything with which it is possible to supply it - with guns and tanks, and not with a company of men, but with divisions of men.

The minister said he would have them ready to move. I should like to see them move at least west of the Great Divide where we know we can get them when we want them.

(Ibid, p. 435)

This sort of pressure from its own supporters in Parliament was something which the Government could not overlook. No doubt still stronger pressure was being exerted privately.

94. Previously on 26 Jan the Prime Minister had warned against too great an emphasis on home defence. After declaring that "more important today than the size of an army is its striking force", he referred to the Air Training Plan as "the greatest and most vital of all Canadian military commitments in this war" (ibid, pp 33-34). Col Ralston on 10 Feb made a similar reference before proceeding to outline the army programme for 1942, which required a further 90,000 to 100,000 enlistments and the sending overseas of the 4th Division as an armoured division. He reaffirmed his preference for the voluntary system but suggested that if it failed he would feel it his duty "to advocate the adoption of the other method". (Ibid, p. 451). This provoked lively newspaper discussion and parliamentary debate on the issue of conscription for overseas.

95. When Singapore fell on 15 Feb, Mr. H.C. Green led an immediate demand in Parliament for a secret session on national defence. After referring to a resolution passed unanimously by the British Columbia legislature urging stronger Pacific defences, Mr. A.W. Neill (Comox-Alberni) read the following quotation from the Vancouver Sun:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast... That is the plan which must be reconsidered... we do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards. No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

(Ibid, pp 717-18)

The Prime Minister later agreed to a secret sitting which was held on 24 Feb.

96. On 23 Feb a Japanese submarine fired some 25 shells at oil installations near Santa Barbara, California. All the shells but one fell harmlessly on the shore and that one did only slight damage to a derrick. The shelling lasted 20 minutes or more, and the audacity of the attack was most alarming.

97. As part of the agitation for greater protection, sections of the press called loudly for an inspection of coastal defences by General McNaughton, who then was visiting America. In his Washington press interviews, however, he warned against sporadic attacks on the west coast drawing away attention from more important objectives. Although agreeing that the enemy might at least attempt to strike at the Panama Canal or Alaska, he made it clear that he himself had no intention of staying in Canada to organize and command the defences against possible nuisance raids by either Japanese or Germans.*

98. On 18 Mar the Prime Minister announced that steps would be taken to establish unity of command between the three Canadian Services on the east and west coast and in Newfoundland. Secret instructions to the designated commanders pointed out that such a system had actually been in effect for some time but added that publicity was necessary for "reasons of State" ((H.S.) 955.003(D1), J.S.S.C.-6: Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to Secretary Joint Services Committee Atlantic Coast 19 Mar 42). La Presse of 19 Mar commented that Canadian defences would thereby become "plus serré, plus compacte et plus souple en même temps".

99. Meanwhile the Vancouver Sun undertook to force the pace by publishing from 13 to 16 Mar a series of articles entitled "The Derelict Defence". These contended that the General Staff was directing nine-tenths of its energy and thought to training forces for use in Europe, or elsewhere, and only one-tenth to the defence of the Pacific Coast. They complained of outmoded methods and shortages of effective equipment, of lack of co-operation and a failure to adopt an aggressive spirit. The censor felt that they were so damaging to public morale that he felt compelled to stop them and legal action by the Crown brought a fine of \$300.00 to the newspaper. A subsequent editorial in the Sun of 23 Apr asserted that "within a matter of days after we had published the offending articles the government (completely altering the whole military policy by the way) [sic] had decided to do virtually everything we asked" (H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol 3: G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command to C.G.S., 17 Mar and 24 Apr 42, with attached newspaper clippings).

100. On 16 Mar Premier Hart of British Columbia discussed these articles with the senior officers of the three Services stationed in his province. He appreciated the fact that they had to be prepared to meet "nuisance raids", but he went on to state that the people were definitely alarmed and "were obsessed with the necessity of the adequate protection of British Columbia from any possible eventuality and until this can be assured did not appreciate the necessity of sending weapons and equipment abroad" (Ibid: Alexander to C.G.S., 17 Mar 42). On 18 Mar these same officers met his Provincial Cabinet to reassure its members that defence measures were adequate, but the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command rather gloomily reported to Ottawa that "The morale of the public in British Columbia is undoubtedly at a very low ebb and the wildest statements and rumours are being made" (ibid: 19 Mar 42).

101. Despite public apprehensions over home defence, Mr. Green again asked Parliament to consider sending at least a token force to aid Australia, both for the sake of Commonwealth ties and as a protective measure. On the basis of Canada's commitments to

* See J.F. Sanderson in the Windsor Star, 9 Mar; L.S.B. Shapiro in the Gazette, 10 Mar; Gregory Clark in the Toronto Star, 11 Mar; Chester Bloom and R.P. Elson in the Regina Leader-Post, 12 Mar. See also the Edmonton Journal, 3 Mar, and the Vancouver Province, 11 Mar 42)

send troops to Britain, the Prime Minister immediately rejected the proposal. On 25 Mar, however, he spoke at length on the manner in which his Government was being torn between two dangerous extremes; those who would send all trained men and available weapons overseas and those who would keep them at home. He summed up the pressure as follows:

Before the Japanese attacks were made on British and American territories in the Pacific, the insistence of the government upon the maintenance of a foundation for the actual physical defence of Canadian territory aroused in some quarters a good deal of impatience. The opposite tendency has been more in evidence since December 7.

(Ibid, p. 1630)

Continuing, he announced the mobilization of the 7th and 8th Divisions, which he stated would be given the role of mobile reserves with special reference to the east and west coasts. Although most newspapers voiced approval, the St. Catherines Standard of 26 Mar sought an assurance that if and when the war situation improved regarding home defence these divisions could be used "as part of the striking force which must certainly be employed before the enemy is brought to his knees".

102. The action taken by the Government at this time of exceptional pressure from British Columbia should be noted in slightly more detail. The Cabinet War Committee on 18 Mar 42 approved the completion of 6 Cdn Div and the mobilization of the three brigade groups of 7 Cdn Div; on 20 Mar 42 it approved the completion of 7 Cdn Div and the mobilization of the brigade groups of 8 Cdn Div. On the former date it also approved a very large increase in the Home War Establishment of the R.C.A.F., estimated to cost \$206 million (later increased to \$216 million). The actual strength of the R.C.A.F. in Canada increased during 1942 from 16 squadrons to 36 (R.C.A.F. Logbook, Ottawa, 1949, pp 67, 70). Such was the influence of public pressure at this juncture.

103. While it might not be accurate to say that the Government was ahead of its military advisers in these home defence measures of 1942, it certainly kept well abreast of them. The final submission made by the C.G.S. (General Crerar) covering the Army Programme for 1942 (H.Q.S. 20-1-9, vol 3, 18 Nov 41) noted that there were no military factors in the existing situation warranting the mobilization of an additional division, but added that if conditions changed for the worse he might be obliged to recommend the completion of the 6th Division and the mobilization of the brigade groups of a 7th Division. Conditions did change for the worse with the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 Dec 41, but the action thus forecast was not actually taken until 16 Mar 42, when the new C.G.S. (General Stuart) recommended to the Minister the completion of 6 Cdn Div and mobilization of the brigade groups of 7 Cdn Div (H.Q.S. 20-1-5, vol 2).^{*} As already noted, the War Committee gave approval two days later. The first recommendation for the completion of the 7th Division and formation of the brigade groups of the 8th was made by the C.G.S. on 20 Mar 42 (H.Q.S. 20-1-25). The War Committee approved this action the same evening.

* This action had however been referred to as necessary at a meeting of Directors on 27 Feb 42 (H.Q.S. 20-1-6, vol 1, Minutes of meeting).

104. In a press interview on returning to England General McNaughton once more emphasized the offensive theme, although warning against undue haste or "a blow struck casually". Stressing that the General still thought an attack would be premature, the Gazette of 30 Mar concluded: "If McNaughton says 'wait', we shall wait content". The Winnipeg Free Press of 30 Mar recognized the force of the argument that he should be given a high position at home but declared that "It remains an undoubted public demand that he continue to lead the corps which now nears the day when the long period of preparation will be transformed into action".

105. When the announcement was made on 6 Apr regarding the formation of HQ First Canadian Army, newspapers almost without exception spoke of it as a preparatory step towards assuring the offensive.²² Nevertheless a statement at this time by Mr. W.D. Herridge (former Canadian Minister to Washington) to the effect that there were not sufficient reinforcements on hand for sustained action led to considerable controversy. The Minister of National Defence at once contended they were up to the full scale asked for by General McNaughton. Although supporting his stand, the Winnipeg Free Press of 11 Apr remarked that "when our army overseas gets into action and suffers losses, conscription will be necessary to fill the gaps". Among others expressing doubt that Canada could maintain a two-corps army, the Vancouver Province of 8 Apr said: "We have the organization, with brass hats galore. Have we the men?"

106. That month a series of highly critical articles entitled "The Dagger Point" appeared in the Globe and Mail. Objecting that expansion of the Canadian Corps into an army meant "multiplying our military responsibilities on the eve of action", these articles complained:

The present indications are that the training, equipment and organization of the Canadian Corps is not such that it could effect a successful landing on the Continent and sustain an offensive action. Artillery, engineers, armoured cars and infantry are organized separately and associated only in brigade groups, instead of working intimately in the smaller formations. There is an obvious lack of experience in the use of aircraft, and no large-scale training of parachute troops and specially trained airborne shock troops.

(Globe and Mail, April 1942)

Most of the arguments were based on German practices in the battle for Crete, but in the opinion of General McNaughton they indicated a lack of real knowledge of the subject. Discussing them with his staff officers on 23 May, he stated that he did not consider they would receive much support in Canada nor that they represented any considerable weight of public opinion (File (H.S.) P.A. 3-7 contains a note to this effect).

107. Canadian public attention meanwhile was very largely fixed upon the plebiscite of 27 Apr on the question of releasing the Government from its pledge regarding conscription for overseas service. Except in Quebec the result was overwhelmingly in favour of allowing Canadian troops to be sent abroad, with the Service percentage of "Yes" votes much higher than the civilian.

²² See Montreal Gazette and Star, also Ottawa Journal and Citizen, all of 8 Apr 42.

108. The Cabinet subsequently decided on 8 May 42 to amend the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 by seeking repeal of Section 3, which had caused prolonged discussion when originally adopted (see paragraph 43 above). This reversal of policy brought about the immediate resignation of Mr. P.J.A. Cardin from the Cabinet. Before debate on the amending bill took place, however, public fears for the safety of both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts came very much to the fore.

109. On 13 May 42 the Minister for Naval Services (Mr. A.L. Macdonald) confirmed the sinking of two ships in the St. Lawrence river by enemy submarine action. Pointing out that German broadcasters were saying that they had produced tremendous consternation in Canada, he declared that information of such incidents must be released only in such a way as to convey no benefit to the enemy. Mr. Church at once intimated that German submarines had been using the base and inland creeks of St. Pierre and Miquelon as hiding places for over a year and had received signals from the shore. The Minister was extremely skeptical of this and rejected the suggestion by Mr. Hanson that for the sake of morale there should be periodic announcements like those of Britain and the United States regarding shipping losses.

110. Soon afterwards Mr. J.S. Roy (Gaspé) startled the country by asking for an immediate secret session to discuss submarine activity "By reasons of particulars I possess and desire to share with the House, but which it would not be wise to disclose publicly" (*ibid*, p. 2470). The Prime Minister suggested instead that he give the information to the Minister for Naval Services, which he did in writing. On receiving the information the Cabinet declined to grant his request, although newspapers played up the issue at length.

111. Early in June the Japanese threw the entire Pacific Coast into a state of alarm by raiding Dutch Harbor. Col Ralston at once assured the Commons that Canadian and United States commanders were taking action in accordance with the joint plans previously laid, and he also disclosed that the Chief of the General Staff had been for some days on the West Coast "supervising dispositions on the ground" (*Debates*, 1942, p. 3045). Mr. H. Mitchell (Minister of Labour) also assisted in re-establishing confidence by announcing that some 12,000 Japanese had already been evacuated from the British Columbian coastal area. A few days later Japanese submarines shelled Sydney and Newcastle, Australia, causing several members to express concern over defensive preparations. Mr. A.G. Slight (Parry Sound) requested barrage balloons at Halifax, Esquimalt, and Patricia Bay; Mr. Pouliot stressed the need for military highways; while Mr. J.L. O'Brien (Northumberland, N.B.) asked for an anti-submarine net to protect bridges of the Miramichi River.

112. Amid such tension the War Appropriation Bill finally passed and the Prime Minister on 10 Jun 42 opened the debate amending the National Resources Mobilization Act. Two days later rumours of Japanese landings in the Aleutians were confirmed. Soon it was announced that R.C.A.F. squadrons and Canadian anti-aircraft units were cooperating with the Americans in Alaska, and army leaders admitted that the situation was serious. In parliament Mr. J.G. Turgeon (Caribou) contended that the move into Alaska was Japan's first step in attacking Russia. Urging offensive action against Japan he said:

If we can secure the consent of Russia, or if Russia and Japan become embroiled, as I feel certain they

will, then we shall have to send our armies into Siberia. If we cannot get the consent of Russia, then we shall have to go across the Bering Sea or directly across the northern Pacific from Prince Rupert.

(Ibid, p. 3448)

Among speakers who followed, Mrs. Dorise W. Nielsen (North Battleford) hailed the interchange of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Soviet and declared that the people were expressing the need for offensive action and the opening of a second front. She felt that Col Ralston was correctly voicing the opinion of the Canadian people when he told the Rotary Club of Montreal that "the people are calling for action and so are the Canadian troops in Britain". (Ibid, pp 3459-60)

113. Public concern for the safety of Canada probably reached its climax after 20 Jun 42 when a Japanese submarine shelled the lighthouse at Estevan Point, Vancouver Island. "It was the first attack on Canadian soil that has been made since Confederation", Mr. King told the Commons (ibid, p. 3507). Mr. Green enumerated the disasters making that day "one of the grim days of a very grim war": the fall of Tobruk, the wedge driven by the Germans into Sebastopol, the Japanese seizure of Kiska, and the shelling of Estevan Point. Complaining that the policy of the Canadian Government seemed to focus the attention of their troops on defence when it should be on attack, he once more advocated that Canada should be building "an army for the purpose of eventually striking out in the Pacific, perhaps into Alaska, perhaps to Siberia or Australia, and finally into Japan". (Ibid, p. 3516). Mr. Clarence Gillis (Cape Breton South) on the other hand said that the people should be organizing means of defence in every section of the country and Mr. T.A. Fontaine (St. Hyacinthe-Bagot) gave him support by quoting at length reports broadcast from Tokyo regarding the shelling of Vancouver Island. Mr. Maurice Bourget (Lévis) also agreed and warned that "once our men are overseas, it is almost certain that in case of an attack against Canada, it will be impossible to recall them to this country" (ibid, p. 3549).

114. Newspapers carried full reports of the shelling together with a similar occurrence at Seaside, Oregon during the night 21/22 Jun. Many editors, however, immediately attempted to minimize public anxiety. The Ottawa Journal reported that Mayor McGavin of Victoria had said that the people's interest in the raid was due to curiosity, not "jitters", while the Citizen stated that "the shelling caused little excitement among British Columbia residents". Without actually invading beyond the Aleutians, nevertheless, the Japanese through these shelling incidents produced the same feeling on the Pacific Coast as sinkings by German submarines in the St. Lawrence caused on the Atlantic Coast.

115. By a decisive vote in the Commons on 7 Jul 42, legal restrictions against sending Canadian forces overseas by compulsion were removed. It is interesting to note that, whereas the prohibitory clause had originally been adopted at the time when affairs in Europe were at their blackest, its repeal took place when threats to Canada herself seemed most serious. Although removal of the legal bars increased the popular clamour to send N.R.M.A. troops overseas, the Government refrained from exercising its right until military necessity made such a course essential late in 1944. Long before then, however, all danger of attacks on Canadian soil had been removed.

DIEPPE AND DEMANDS FOR A SECOND FRONT

116. Without a doubt the Dieppe raid of 19 Aug 42 marked one of the most significant turning points in Canadian public opinion. It was like a safety-valve releasing many pent-up emotions. But for Dieppe, the Japanese landings on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, both occurring within the following week, might have intensified the mania for defence on the Pacific. Similarly, it served to relieve the nervous tension over sinkings in the St. Lawrence. By directing attention forcibly to the European front, Dieppe placed the offensive foremost and home defence assumed a more moderate perspective in public thought. Although the clamour for full-scale invasion continued, Dieppe brought a sombre realization of the many difficulties as Canada counted her casualties and the Allies surveyed the barriers to an assault on Hitler's domain.

117. Raised morale was evident throughout the Army and definitely reflected in the press, which carried many stories of volunteers "rushing to fill up the ranks" of units which had lost heavily. An examination of recruiting figures for all Canada, however, reveals only a very slight increase and in the succeeding weeks even a retrogression (See Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., Report No. 109, Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Part III: Some Special Aspects). Slogans similar to "avenge Hong Kong" were not noticeable. Rather, there was an evident desire on the part of the Army to profit by the lessons and prepare even more intensively for the next encounter. Reports of Canadian troops being overwhelmingly impatient for action were discredited by senior officers, who pointed out to the press that their men were fully conscious of the need for training for the offensive and were settling down to it earnestly.

118. Proud of the fact that the majority of the troops participating were Canadians, the press at first almost unanimously hailed the success of the raid as a vital invasion test. Due publicity was given to Mr. Churchill's pronouncement on 8 Sep that Dieppe was "an indispensable preliminary to full-scale invasion" and to Ross Munro's description of it as "a reconnaissance in force". Col Ralston's official statement issued from Ottawa on 19 Sep after his return from Britain drew many comments on his declaration that it was part of "the agreed offensive policy" of the Allies. Despite the high proportion of casualties, there seems to have been no desire to draw back from whatever future operations might be in prospect; on the contrary, speculation was rife on the probable fields for a Second Front. It was still assumed that Canadians would spearhead the attack in this. There were renewed proposals that General McNaughton be Supreme Commander, although Saturday Night suggested Stalin and later assailed "scientific" generals (Press Indices Nos. 289, 294 and 332; 3 and 9 Sep and 23 Oct 42; items 2716, Windsor Star, 2958 and 4819, Saturday Night).

119. Before the end of August, however, severe criticism of the methods employed at Dieppe appeared in the Globe and Mail (Press Indices Nos. 280 and 284, 23 and 28 Aug 42, items 2221 and 2417). Other newspapers followed suit, and many began to enquire whether the price paid in storming such strong ramparts had been worth it all. Doubts were expressed, also, regarding Canada's ability to withstand such excessive battle-wastage. The Gazette, for example, had entitled its first editorial on the raid "The Dagger is Whetted" but by 17 Sep it was asking if the dagger was to be blunted at its first thrust, implying that conscription was necessary to keep it sharp. With growing criticism

of the planning and leadership, much of the confidence the raid had inspired was seriously undermined as the winter passed without further action by the Canadian Army Overseas.

120. Early in September 1942 the arrival overseas of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division was greeted by numerous articles extolling the amazing extent of the nation's war effort. Nevertheless, the Winnipeg Free Press of 10 Sep deplored the fact that as Canada entered her fourth year of war there were so many newspapers and public men still urging that her contribution should remain moderate. Loud cries for conscription still continued, but they were now countered by emphasis upon National Selective Service to meet requirements of industry and agriculture rather than by demands to direct man-power into home defence. The public appears to have been generally pleased with measures taken to counteract direct threats to both coasts. Satisfaction over the appointment of Maj-Gen G.R. Pearkes, V.C., as G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command was expressed by the Vancouver Province while the Sun reported Maj-Gen H.N. Ganong as saying that morale of his 8th Division was excellent (Press Index No. 303, 19 Sep 42, items 3434 and 3436). Few papers from other parts of the country, however, seemed to be paying much attention to the West Coast. As for submarines in the St. Lawrence, when another sinking off Métis caused Mr. J.S. Roy to ask for a special session of Parliament, the Montreal Star said the matter was well in hand and termed his demand "silly". (Press Index No. 327, 17 Oct 42, item 4557). Mr. J.F. Pouliot and the Minister for Naval Services clashed over the matter, and Toronto's Telegram of 23 Oct endorsed the complaints of L'Action Catholique in requesting investigation by the Minister for Air. Nevertheless, although the torpedoing of the Newfoundland ferry S.S. Caribou created consternation, headlines indicated that problems of home defence had been crowded out by keen interest in far-off battlefronts.

121. During the summer attention had definitely shifted from Libya to Russia, whose defence of Stalingrad during September commanded universal admiration. After Stalin issued on 4 Oct a clear call for help, the Canadian papers linked together Mr. Churchill's remarks on expanding Allied strength and President Roosevelt's fireside chat hinting at new offensive to aid both Russia and China. Columnists such as Major Eliot and John Collingwood Reade at once mentioned Africa, and numerous American dailies wrote of Dakar. There was a hint of future joint operations in Col Ralston's statement that Canadian, British and American forces in Britain were exchanging a certain number of officers to increase cooperation (Montreal Star, 21 Oct 42). Canadian newspapers agreed, however, that no second front should be opened at the expense of Britain abandoning Egypt and the Middle East.

122. During mid-October interest in the second front waned considerably. The Gazette on 15 Oct ran a headline about Wendell Willkie repeating the call on behalf of Russia, but comments in many newspapers revealed much adverse opinion and the topic was soon dropped. When the German drive on Stalingrad stalled, Le Soleil on 17 Oct claimed that further discussion was pointless since the urgency had disappeared. ((H.S.) P.A. 3-7: Minim Preco [#] No. 109, 20 Oct 42). The Montreal Star of 22 Oct reported that a McGill professor had suggested that loud vocal demands for action might only be part of the war of nerves against the Nazis. Speeches made by Tim Buck at this time did little to

* See footnote to paragraph 3 for an explanation of this term.

meant that they were reserved for a cross-Channel drive - "and that attack is not many months away" (Press Index No. 350, 13 Nov 42, item 3857, Gillis Purcell in the Gazette). Speaking to the Canadian Corps Association in Vancouver, General Clark¹ said:

It strikes me as one of the supreme tragedies of this war that the U.S., following one year in the struggle, has already placed men in battle engagements in Africa, while Canadian soldiers are sitting idle in England. This constitutes the greatest disgrace of the present war.

(Ibid, No. 363, 8 Nov 42, item 6559, the Vancouver Sun)

127. Writing from England, L.S.B. Shapiro contended that the Canadians there had grown indignant, irritated by the fact that American troops who had been in England less than six months and British divisions which had only been in the blueprint stage when certain Canadian divisions were fully mustered, had gone into action ahead of them. With some Canadians feeling they were "a sort of adjunct to the British Home Guard", said Shapiro, they were beginning to ask whether it was military strategy, government policy, or lack of reinforcements that was keeping them out of action. This theme he expanded in a series of articles on morale, which he felt remained high in the expectation that "a most spectacular and dramatic task" was being reserved for them. He maintained, however, that complexities expanded with each passing day the Army was not in action. Continuing, the writer pointed out that the Canadian soldier was highly sensitive about his inaction, that he was afraid people at home thought of him as a member of "a forgotten army" or of "the county constabulary in the English countryside". Shapiro summarized his point by saying "The whole problem of morale may disappear tomorrow, next week or next month - whenever the Canadians go into action". (Ibid, Nos 361, 369, and 379, 26 Nov, 5 and 16 Dec 42, items 6470, 6866 and 7334, Gazette).² In a broadcast of 15 Nov Shapiro had suggested that the Canadian Army would not be deflected from its original purpose - to invade France ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/PRESS/3/3: Extract from C.B.C. Broadcast of 15 Nov 42).

128. Taking advantage of a demonstration held on the third anniversary of the arrival of the first Canadian contingent in the United Kingdom, General McNaughton told the press "We never know that perhaps in a matter of days we may launch into something that will lead to a clash with the enemy" (Gazette, 18 Dec 42). Shapiro later commented that by this review and press conference the General had demonstrated the compactness of the Canadian Army as a striking force and had replied to critics who wanted it broken up to join the British in North Africa or the Middle East. Criticism had taken the form of a broad hint that General McNaughton was keeping the Canadians together because he did not want to diminish his command and also an unsubstantiated rumour that the Canadians had declined an invitation, accepted by the Americans in their stead, to send a division to join the First Army. Agreeing with Hannen Swaffer, outstanding British newspaperman, that the Canadian Army was most valuable when kept together as a bridgehead,

¹ ~~Formerly~~ Col (Hon Brig-Gen) J.A. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., of Vancouver. He was noted as an ardent advocate of conscription.

² The quotations are from Shapiro's article of 10 Dec 42 (delayed) entitled "Morale of the Army". A copy is filed in (H.S.) 000.5(D2).

help, many editors referring to what he had said before Germany attacked Russia. At this time there were signs in several papers of a softening towards Italy, with Mr. A.W. Roebuck and the Winnipeg Free Press conducting a campaign to remove the stigma from her nationals in Canada.

123. By October 1942 a major controversy over air versus land warfare was developing in the United States and Canada. In the Winnipeg Free Press of 2 Oct the concluding article of a series of three entitled "The Air Advocate's View" by B.T. Richardson called for abandonment of the idea of the Canadian Army as "the dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin". It was claimed that, if the country were ruined by bombing, a Canadian expeditionary force landed on the Baltic could make its way to Berlin rather than fighting laboriously through 800 miles of German land fortifications. (Press Index No. 318, 7 Oct 42, item 4088, Winnipeg Free Press). Despite the emphasis upon mass bomber raids during the succeeding months, however, there was continual pressure by the public for action by land forces.

OPERATION "TORCH"

124. On 21 Oct 42 Field Marshal Smuts delivered a widely-publicized speech which many interpreted as a definite announcement of a Second Front. Public attention in consequence veered towards Africa, although the Canadian press was very cautious in its initial comments on the opening of the Eighth Army drive from Egypt. The fact that almost all major members of the Commonwealth except Canada contributed its divisions was not overlooked, but not until later was stress laid upon the Canadian manufacture of most of its mechanized equipment (Press Index No. 374, 11 Dec 42, Item 7110, Chester Bloom in the Winnipeg Free Press). Immediately the Americans landed in French North Africa, on the other hand, numerous commentators predicted a major offensive through Italy or the Balkans. At this stage, however, wishful thinking that the Canadians might participate in such an operation was expressed more by implication than by outright suggestion.

125. Just prior to Operation "Torch" there had been certain complaints about the need for action by the Canadian Army Overseas. An editorial in the Winnipeg Free Press said that it would be "a sensible thing to send a full division to some theatre of war or next best at least our senior officers", adding that "an opportunity like Egypt to get actual fighting experience for officers and men should not be allowed to slip by complacently" (ibid., No. 341, 3 Nov 42, Item 5337. See also No. 352, 16 Nov 42, Item 6001, Vancouver Sun). Speaking in Toronto, Lord Bennett said he could find no reason why the Canadian Army should have to spend its fourth Christmas in England without firing a shot, nor why a second corps was to be formed on the basis of a single division (ibid., No. 342, 4 Nov 42, item 3593, Citizen). Even statistics of No. 1 Neurological Hospital were presented under the headline "Mental Illness in Overseas Army Laid to Inactivity and Anxiety" (ibid., No. 343, 5 Nov 42, item 5468, Gazette).

126. Immediately after the American landings of 8 Nov the President of the Canadian Legion called for the army overseas to be bolstered at once because "at the most we have until next spring before it is our turn" (Montreal Star, 10 Nov 42). Expressing the opinion that Canadians could have been selected for the North African push and undoubtedly were considered, one overseas correspondent said the fact that they were not nominated

Shapiro said it was a reasonable deduction that it would remain in England until the opening of a western European land front. (Ibid, 6 and 12 Jan 43).

129. Praise for the patience of the Canadian Army, despite its "story of disappointment and frustrated hopes", was given freely by London papers and echoed in many Canadian dailies commenting on the anniversary²⁵. In the publication of "human interest" stories, however, journalists hampered by tightened censorship regulations regarding the Army gave most space to exploits of the Air Force. Heavy raids over Germany caused Winston Mills in the Ottawa Citizen of 16 Nov 42 to praise again the Air Training Plan as perhaps the greatest single contributing factor towards the eventual defeat of the Axis. (P/O George Beurling's feats over Malta also made popular reading against which stories of troops training in England could not compete).

ATTACHMENTS TO THE BRITISH ARMY IN AFRICA
AND CONTINUED PRESSURE FOR ACTION

130. Press reports of 5 Jan 43 were the first to reveal that officers and non-commissioned officers from the Canadian Army in England had landed in North Africa to gain battle experience with the British First Army. This provided the press with another opportunity to comment on the main issue of getting the Canadians into action. A despatch by Ross Munro pointed out that it was the fourth²⁶ foreign assignment for the troops whereas Canadian airmen had fought "in virtually every theatre of war from Alaska to Ceylon" (Journal, 6 Jan 43). The Ottawa Journal of 7 Jan recalled that months before it had suggested such a policy upon reading in Lord Gort's despatches that during the fighting in France British detachments had always served with the French. The Montreal Star interpreted the news at once as a promise of action (Press Index No. 396, 9 Jan 43, item 236). The Winnipeg Free Press, which had just complained that army appointments were being made "without the ordeal of trial by battle", expressed the hope that not only permanent but non-permanent force officers were included (Press Indices Nos. 390 and 399, 4 and 13 Jan 43, items 4 and 343).

131. Strong criticism was voiced by a leading Conservative paper of the West, the Vancouver Province, which scornfully asked if Canadians were so backward, so unresourceful that they must have months of special training for special conditions while others learn as they fight.

And Canada, which is as vitally interested in the outcome as any people on earth, and which has been telling herself, proudly, that she has the world's best shock troops, sends to the epic contest - a little contingent of observers... It is an affront to the Canadian army that it should be so. It is an affront to the Canadian people.

(Province, 6 Jan 43)

²⁵ Press Index, No. 380, 18 Dec 42, item 7385, Gazette. See also the Globe and Mail, 19 Dec 42, editorial entitled "Three Long Years".

²⁶ It may be observed that since Munro listed Northern France, Gibraltar, Spitsbergen, and Dieppe, Canadians in Britain had been involved already in four assignments excluding the Norwegian episode.

The columnist W.R. Plewman replied "On the contrary, the move, which presumably had the support of General McNaughton and the British War Office, appears to be calculated to improve the Allies war-winning effort". In his opinion these detachments were not necessarily an advanced guard for the main Canadian forces to be sent to Africa; rather, "By keeping the enemy guessing as to the real intentions of the Canadians, an important surprise may be sprung on him a few months hence". (Toronto Star, 9 Jan 43).

132. Shapiro held the same opinion, although he would not rule out the possibility of the main body going to Africa. The Canadian Army was ready for action at any time, he said, but was part of an invasion plan which could not be put into effect until British and American units also involved were properly trained and equipped. Meanwhile, the Canadian high command was proceeding on the assumption that events would make it possible to carry through the original intention of hitting at Europe directly from embarkation points in Britain. He was firmly convinced that without action the existing high morale could be kept at operational level during the spring and part of the summer - but no longer.

After that our men may take it for granted they are destined to remain the British home guard for the duration and they will instinctively let down to a corresponding level.

There will be no mutiny; merely a general release of the mental tension which now makes them bright and eager troops. They will have become old men in the military sense.

(Gazette, 22 Jan 43)

Canada's Army, he felt, was too valuable a cog in the Allied plan for either the Canadian or the British high command to allow this to happen. He therefore predicted that, if there were no decisive changes in the Russian or Mediterranean fronts and if shipping and the political situation did not measure up to invasion standards, "it is a fair deduction that our troops will see action somewhere in the southern sector of the European theatre". (Ibid).

133. The arrival of the second group of Canadians in Africa caused little comment, although considerable publicity was given to individuals who distinguished themselves in action while attached to British units. Meanwhile many papers referred to the growing embarrassment of Canadians who remained in England, fed up with "paper exercises" and writing home of insults from lads and lasses of London asking why they were not in Africa (Press Indices Nos 402 and 413, 16 and 29 Jan 43, items 468 and 822, Windsor Star and Gazette). Some wondered whether in view of their battle inexperience the high command might not entrust them in the end with a vital role but might employ them merely as support troops (Press Index No. 403, 18 Jan 43, item 504, Gazette). There was renewed criticism that the Americans had preceded the Canadians into battle; the arrival of Newfoundland troops to join the British First Army on the other hand received publicity but no such comments (Press Indices Nos 418 and 422, 3 and 8 Feb 43, items 1086 and 1230, Winnipeg Free Press and Gazette).

134. Early in January the Gazette claimed that specula-

tion in England on the possible appointment of General McNaughton as leader of the United Nations forces had died down because of a growing suspicion that instead of one major assault against the enemy in Western Europe there might be two or even three independent thrusts (Press Index No. 397, 11 Jan 43, item 261). Even so staunch a Liberal champion as the Winnipeg Free Press on 18 Feb wrote, "There is too much reason to believe that the gateway now held by the Canadian army is one which will either never be opened or will not be opened until a still distant stage in the war has been reached". The main purport of its editorial entitled "Canadian Dagger" was to urge "at least fragmentary use of the great striking force" which Canada had raised and equipped.

The theatres of war are many; surely in one or more of them, one or two or even three Canadian divisions could play a useful role...

Does the pride of our commanders, the desire to lead their men all together, play a part in the maintenance of a policy of continued training while the armies of other nations learn their trade in battle? We do not know, but it is certain that disquiet is arising, and the Government should remember that the hand which holds the poised dagger can become palsied through lack of use.

(Gazette, 26 Feb 43, reprinted from Free Press of 18 Feb)

135. This argument seemingly lent support to the viewpoint expressed earlier by the Vancouver Province to the effect that Canadians, like others, could learn as they fought. At this time, however, the Americans had just suffered certain reverses which the Ottawa Journal of 23 Feb attributed largely to inexperience, coupled with a certain degree of overconfidence. In speculating whether the Canadians might not fare similarly after such a lengthy period in the United Kingdom, the Winnipeg Free Press of 24 Feb under the heading "Need of battle practice" enquired, "Is it not possible to find some way whereby substantial numbers of Canadian officers can learn their trade before they involve their own Canadian commands in disproportionate losses as a result of their own lack of experience?" ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/PRESS/26: Minim Press No. 9, 3 Mar 43). It would appear therefore, that the pressure for action was coupled with a strong desire to ensure that experienced leaders were in command.*

THE CHANGING EMPHASIS ON HOME DEFENCE, 1943

136. Conjectures regarding the employment of the Overseas Army brought kindred suggestions for more active use of troops stationed at home. Towards the end of January 1943 the columnist Grant Dexter accused the General Staff of "exceptional rigidity of mind" in failing to review the need for Pacific Coast defences since setting up the 7th and 8th Divisions in the previous March. "The fact to remember", he said, "is that our manpower resources are being strained not for overseas service, but

* It is probably not fanciful to see a direct connection between this strong agitation in the early months of 1943 and the pressure brought upon the British Government by the Canadian Government during March, to find a place for some Canadian troops in offensive operations. The result was the decision taken in April to include 1 Cdn Inf Div in the Sicilian assault.

for home defence" (Winnipeg Free Press, 20 Jan 43). Over the radio Chicago's Col McGornick charged that, although Canada was more liable to Japanese attack than the U.S. coast, she had sent no troops to fight them in the Pacific. In reply, the Vancouver Sun of 19 Jan 43 pointed to Hong Kong and Alaska and upheld that dispositions had been made according to plans of the United Nations. Several Canadian newspapers nevertheless voiced objections when Mr. T.C. Davis, speaking in Australia on taking up his appointment as High Commissioner, referred to Japan as Canada's principal enemy ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press Circ/1: Minim Press No. 3, 19 Jan 43).

137. In Parliament Mr. H.C. Green maintained that the despatch of detachments to Africa should be followed by the sending of units from Britain and Canada abroad for experience; he favoured sending at least officers and N.C.Os. from the Pacific Army to learn to fight the Japanese and referred to General Odlum's suggestion at Toronto the previous November that Canadian troops should be sent to aid General McArthur. Mr. G.A. Cruikshank (Fraser Valley) objected on the grounds that even five divisions overseas were too many for Canada to handle adequately; he remarked that at the Canadian Corps Association meeting there had been protests against soldiers going to Africa to gain experience and he could not see the logic of wanting to send some to the jungle. (Debates, 1943, vol 1, pp 500 and 531). The Prime Minister, however, praised Commonwealth troops who were fighting far from home and strongly castigated his former follower, Mr. P.J.A. Cardin (Richelieu-Vercheres), for advocating Isolationism (ibid, pp 550-51 and 556-68).

138. In the Quebec Legislature, Mr. Onésime Gagnon renewed his charges of the previous November that Ottawa was utterly careless about defence of the St. Lawrence, where he claimed 20 ships had been sunk. Despite vigorous denials by all three Defence Ministers, Mr. J.S. Roy (Gaspé) carried the issue to the House of Commons and made out that the total number of ships sunk was 37⁺. Although criticism was directed mainly against the Navy and Air Force, the Army did not escape; the prominence given to the issue reflects the insistence by certain elements in Quebec that home defence ought not to be neglected. While the Montreal Star and the Edmonton Bulletin led the majority of English-language papers in scoffing at the suggestion that the Navy be recalled, others, including the Globe and Mail and the Journal supported Le Soleil and L'Événement-Journal in urging co-operation by military and civilian authorities in Quebec to form a spotting service and a St. Lawrence Patrol akin to the Dover Patrol (Press Indices Nos. 452, 10 and 15; 15 Mar, 3 and 9 Apr 43; items 2574, 2575, 3315 and 3856). Weeks later the Prime Minister on 8 Jun announced the appointment of Squadron-Leader J.P.J. Desloges, R.C.A.F., as defence co-ordination officer in the Gaspé and lower St. Lawrence to link civilian organizations with all three branches of the armed services.

139. In Parliament Mr. M.J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Digger) on 5 Apr 43 asked for full information, in open or closed session, regarding Canada's war situation. In particular, he asked about coastal defence, the submarine menace, protection on the Pacific, Labrador and Hudson Bay, the Athabaska region and the North generally. He received support from Messrs Gordon Graydon (Leader

* Press Indices Nos. 446, 447, 449 and 452; 8, 9, 11 and 15 Mar 43; items 2313, 2322, 2323, 2451, and 2575; Journal and Gazette. See also Debates, 1943, vol II, pp 1130-31, 1267-71 and 1337-44.

of the Opposition) and T.C. Douglas (Weyburn), the latter pressing for a statement before the spring offensive overseas, but the Prime Minister maintained that discussion of such affairs must await presentation of the War Appropriation Bill. (Debates, 1943, pp 1842-50). There were many other instances of the Government refusing to be drawn into premature debate on Army matters during the spring of 1943. By this time, however, the defensive role of the Army at home no longer received emphasis. Public pressure favoured offensive action and looked for active employment of the Army abroad.

THE GROWING DEMAND FOR OVERSEAS ACTION, 1943ⁱⁱ

140. As the winter of 1942-43 ended there were many hints that the Canadian Army Overseas would soon be in action. For example, in referring to Canadians "irked" at waiting so long to be engaged "in bulk" against the enemy, Sir James Grigg (Secretary of State for War) said in the British House of Commons on 25 Feb, "We trust that they will not have to wait much longer" (Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Vol 387, (British) House of Commons, p. 340). Political parties were alert to apply such remarks to the conscription issue, of course. In March Mr. W.E. Rowe was reported to have told a Progressive-Conservative meeting that "We have the humiliation of listening to rumours that many military officers wanted our forces to enter the African battles, but it was not possible because there were not sufficient reinforcements over there" - a suggestion which Col Ralston refuted as "without foundation in fact" (Gazette, 16 Mar 43). According to one political observer, the possibility of a sudden collapse in Germany was causing very real concern to the Canadian High Command in March; what was termed "the McNaughton Policy" of keeping the Army intact for use as a spearhead, he said, had resulted in opportunities to send Canadians into other parts of the world being spurned ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27: O.P.I. 5, "The Man with a Notebook", Maclean's Magazine, 15 Mar 43).ⁱⁱⁱ

141. Newspapers hailed Exercise "SPARTAN" as a gigantic pre-invasion test and prominently publicized General McNaughton's statement to the press afterwards that his army was fit and ready for action, noting that when questioned he reaffirmed the hope he had expressed in December that it would soon be engagedⁱⁱⁱⁱ. In a series of three articles, Ross Munro described how British, American and European forces were training to invade alongside the Canadians (O.P.I. 27, 28 and 29, Toronto Telegram). Several Allied observers similarly reported in April that Canada along with Britain and the United States was massing huge invasion forces; they predicted main landings in Norway and Greece with diversionary thrusts across the English Channel and North Sea into France, Belgium and Holland, and across the Mediterranean into Italy (Press Index No. 11, 5 Apr 43, item 3571, Montreal Star). Berlin reported invasion barges at Gibraltar while the recognized official spokesman of the German High Command, Captain Sertorius, again claimed Canadians were being used in Tunisian

ⁱⁱ See footnote to paragraph 135.

ⁱⁱⁱ All references marked O.P.I. (Overseas Press Index) relate to photostat copies of clippings which may be found in C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27, now in possession of the Historical Section.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Press Index No. 1, 24 Mar 43, items 3000 and 3002, Globe and Mail and Gazette. See also (H.S.) 4/Press/27: O.P.I. 7, editorial "Ready to Go", Windsor Star, and O.P.I. 9, editorial "We are Ready", The Canteen (Montreal),

battles (Ibid, item 3579, Toronto Star, and O.P.I. 33, Gazette, 15 Apr 43). Remarking that General McNaughton was emerging again as a possible commander-in-chief of the Allied invasion, Shapiro pointed to the fact that the General was "politically a favourite choice to lead a striking force made up largely of British and Canadian troops with a comparatively small representation of Americans" (O.P.I. 3, The Vancouver News-Herald, 9 Apr 43. See also O.P.I. 6, editorial in Windsor Star, 25 Mar 43).

142. The prospect of action on the continent emphasized the fact that the threat of invasion of the United Kingdom had ended. Shapiro did not fail to draw attention to this significant change which had taken place. He wrote pithily:

In September, 1942, General McNaughton said invasion possible, and this view later echoed by Mr. Churchill. On Oct 31, General McNaughton said invasion unlikely. On April 20 Mr. Churchill releases church bells from their emergency retirement. Sometime between these dates the Allied situation in European zone so improved that the danger of invasion became unlikely.

(Press Index No. 36, 4 May 43, item 5347, Gazette)

143. With the prospect of action much more promising, press concern over favourable conditions became much in evidence. Symptomatic of nervousness after so long a wait, there were renewed warnings that due to lack of battle experience Canadians might expect initial setbacks. (Press Index No. 18, 13 Apr 43, item 4100, Ottawa Citizen reprinted from The Western Producer). The Windsor Star wondered whether sufficient intelligence of the enemy had been collected to risk a desperate frontal attack (Ibid, No. 21, 16 Apr 43, item 4309). Also reflecting the tension was the bitter military-political controversy which raged in the press and Parliament during April 1943 over General Roberts' transfer to command the reinforcement units. John Fisher connected it with the appointment of several younger officers to combat posts and wrote, "Some believe that it amounts to a shake-up in the High Command of the Canadian Army preparatory to the fighting which is looked for this year" (O.P.I. 1, Toronto Telegram, 15 Apr 43). Shapiro gave the following concise comment on the appointment:

What disturbs about the Roberts case is that it shows our Army still groping after three years. We lack battle experience, and in its inactivity our Army aging. We face the danger of becoming militarily old without having applied our youthful zest to the task for which our men rushed forward to recruiting depots.

(O.P.I. 49, Gazette, 28 Apr 43)

A Western paper observed, "It is rather startling that none of the battalion commanders who led their units into action at Dieppe are among the lieutenant-colonels now made brigadiers in the Canadian Army Overseas" (O.P.I. 49, Edmonton Journal, 16 Apr 43). The editor neglected to take into account the fact that, of the seven major Canadian units engaged, only one C.O. (Lt-Col D. Monard, D.S.O., who was severely wounded) returned from the raid.

144. "The McNaughton plan" was questioned severely in the press after Maj-Gen G.G. Simonds on his return to England from Africa declared that Tunisia had ruled out "blitz" warfare, armour having declined as an assault arm and infantry having increased in importance. One Ottawa correspondent saw these changing views as a shift from the concept of loading the Army with armour and keeping it from participating partially in field operations; at the same time he pointed out Gen McNaughton was near the retiring age. (O.P.I. 50, B.T. Richardson in Winnipeg Free Press, 29 Apr 43). The Gazette observed that Tunis did not bear out some of the comments on Operation "SPARTAN" (Press Index No. 32, 29 Apr 43, item 5013). The Windsor Star on the other hand asked the Government to promote Gen McNaughton to full General before the time came for him to lead his men toward Berlin (Press Index No. 49, 19 May 43, item 7232).

145. Explaining the reasons for keeping the Canadian forces in Britain, Mr. King in an address to the Canadian Club of Toronto on 19 Apr said:

If our forces overseas have remained so largely and for so long within the British Isles, if Canadian forces have not been broken up for service in other theatres, this has been due entirely to the considered judgment and advice of those concerned with the strategical direction of the war. It has not been because of any restriction imposed by the Government of Canada.

(The Times (London) 20 Apr 43,
with accompanying editorial)

The very day Parliament resumed after the Easter recess (6 May 43), nevertheless Mr. R.B. Hanson queried the inactivity of the Canadian Army, saying how unpleasant it was for men who had been overseas since 1939 "to have it thrown in their faces that while Australia and New Zealand are fighting gallantly on the sands of Africa personnel of the Canadian army are not there". Mr. Power in the absence of Col Ralston replied "Because they are doing something else which is considered important, by the high command" and in the spirited exchange which followed he stated definitely that they were being kept in England as the result of British not Canadian action. (Debates, 1943, vol III, pp 2451-52). Mr. P.J.A. Cardin later that day said he hoped the war would be won without Canada's sons being forced "for the vanity of glory to be butchered as a number of our sons were butchered on the shores of Dieppe" (Ibid, p. 2465).

146. Among press comments, Le Soleil (Quebec) took Mr. Hanson to task for asking "this absurd question" (O.P.I. 60, Le Soleil, 14 May 43). The Montreal Star asked him not to make the Army "a political football"; the Toronto Star referred him to answers which had been given again and again (O.P.I. 43, 7 and 11 May 43). The Citizen stressed the bottlenecks in shipping revealed by the Truman Report and said: "Naturally the Canadian Army alone cannot storn the Hitlerite 'West Wall'" (ibid, 10 May 43). On the other hand, the Globe and Mail of 14 May used the occasion to deliver a bitter attack upon the policy of denying the troops battle experience and to demand that the Canadian divisions be allowed to fight with those of the other Allied nations. To this the Toronto Star again replied that it was the policy of "the highest United Nations strategists" while the Journal of 14 May expressed itself as content if the decision really were

British but not if made at Canada's request. The latter's editorial concluded:

All other Empire troops have had battle experience in this war...The British have been everywhere. Only Canadians, among all the Allied combatants, have not been tried.

This, we confess, seems strange. To a great many it is disturbing.

(O.P.I. 43. All these articles were reproduced by Gazette, 15 May 43)

Defending its argument in a further editorial dated 15 May, the Globe and Mail wrote:

Now that the North African campaign is finished and a new phase of the war is opening up, the honest course would be to admit frankly, even at the expense of personal pride, that the creation of a cumbrous military establishment overseas was an error of judgment and to permit the utilization of Canadian divisions in any formation where they can be effectively employed. The experience of present-day warfare which they would gain could be communicated to the rest of the Canadian Army and the result would be to strengthen its striking power and diminish the casualties, which could scarcely fail to be very heavy if the army went into action without containing any battle-tested elements.

(Ibid)

147. Meanwhile Col Ralston denied in the Commons on 13 May that the role of units and formations of Canada's Army was rigid and stated that he had impressed upon British leaders the fact that "the Canadian troops were in England to be used either in whole or in part in any way in which they could best help to win the war". Summing up, he declared:

...let me say that any idea that the Government or Gen McNaughton or anyone in authority representing Canada has or ever had any notion of insisting or even desiring to maintain the Canadian Army intact, if its components can better serve separately, is wholly unfounded.

(Debates, 1943, p. 2668)

At first this statement was unintentionally overlooked by The Canadian Press, but later some of the Conservative newspapers printed it with brief comments of acceptance (O.P.I. 43 and 45, Gazette and Journal, 15 and 18 May 43). The Globe and Mail, on the other hand, interpreted the Minister's statement as a complete reversal of policy and called on him to "admit the blunders of the past and get on with the job of moving Canadian divisions into combat side by side with our battle-tested British comrades (O.P.I. 44; Globe and Mail, 15 May 43).

148. Just when and where the invasion would fall was of course the vital question. One correspondent predicted in April that the Canadians might shift to the Mediterranean, if, as

was suggested in England, the Western front could not be opened for some time; on the other hand they might remain where they were until a strong hold had been gained in the South (Press Index No. 25, 21 Apr 43, item 4562, J.F. Sanderson in the Windsor Star). Fourth Victory Loan speakers stressed the theme that the hour of crisis was at hand. For example, Prime Minister King at Toronto intimated that before long the Canadian Army would be in battle and invasion was not far distant, while Munitions Minister Howe at Port Arthur definitely asserted that the Canadians were being kept for "the big show" (O.P.I. 47, Windsor Star, 28 Apr 43). Mayor Stanley Lewis of Ottawa, on the other hand, claimed that General McNaughton had assured him "Canadian troops will not be used to put on a show for the uninformed who clamor for a second front, or another front" (Ibid, Gazette, 27 Apr 43). In England, stories of an interview with High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald carried such headlines as "Canadians to lead assault" and "Canadians for invasion" (Ibid, Journal, 30 Apr 43). Meanwhile, in paying tribute to the high morale which existed after a "never-before-heard-of wait for action", Conservative publisher George McCullagh on returning from a visit to England said prospects of Canadians getting to Africa were not bright. (Press Index No. 35, 3 May 43, Globe and Mail).

149. On 18 May 43 Col Ralston in the course of a lengthy statement to the House predicted a year of action with the Canadians in the thick of it and declared "They may fight as an army or in separate formations" (Debates, 1943, p. 2778). Mr. H.C. Green promptly asked why the Canadians had not had battle experience and asserted:

If battle experience is desirable for our Canadian divisions and troops before the Canadians fight as an army, it is the duty of the Canadian government - it is not a matter to be left necessarily to the British - to see to it that our units get that battle experience before the Canadian army goes into action as an army.

(Ibid, p. 2781)

He also remarked that Canada was apparently turning its back on the Pacific war and had sent no troops either for battle training against the Japanese^{*} or as a token force to help the Australians. "The United States could send troops to Australia", he pointed out, "but Canada, so far as I know, has not sent a man" (ibid, p. 2782). Mr. T.C. Douglas (Weyburn) on the other hand expressed considerable opposition to demands to have the army broken up and sent to various theatres of war; he contended that it should go into battle as a Canadian unit under a Canadian commander (ibid, pp 2791-92). Mr. J.A. Ross (Souris) remarked that the army had been overexpanded and overorganized probably more for political purposes than as an active force for operations (ibid, p. 2798).

150. Press articles following this debate dealt mainly with the man-power issue but there were many signs of impatience with mere manoeuvres (Press Index No. 51, 21 May 43, item 7391, St. Catharines Standard). From Britain at this time came a report that the first detachment of Canadians had returned from Tunisia.

* Col Ralston soon after announced that Canadian officers were in Alaska to study defences, and the Vancouver Province reported that some had been sent to Attu to act as observers with the U.S. forces, collecting information for use in the training programme of Pacific Command (Press Index No. 60, 1 Jun 43, item 8115, Gazette).

Cook in the Winnipeg Free Press later remarked on the reluctance of these troops to discuss their adventure, although General McNaughton stated that their experience had proven invaluable. Cook also pointed out that until the Tunisian campaign it had been impractical to send Canadians to Africa due to the long voyage around the Cape but victories there had opened the Mediterranean for them to join British formations in the Middle East (Ibid, No. 69, 11 Jun 43, item 8378).

151. It was generally felt that the presence of Prime Minister King at the Washington conference of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt indicated that offensive strategy involving the Canadians in the near future was being planned there. The Journal wrote with conviction "Our hour has come" (Ibid, No. 52, 25 May 43, item 7586). Correspondents Flaherty and Richardson both believed that the Canadian Army and Air Force would spearhead the attack (Ibid, No. 57, 28 May 43, items 2822 and 2823, Windsor Star and Winnipeg Free Press). Lacking a statement by the Prime Minister, the Winnipeg Free Press the next month appraised the possibilities of Canadian action and narrowed them down to the Mediterranean (Ibid, No. 78, 22 Jun 43, item 9718).

152. On 25 May 43 the Commons witnessed a sharp clash over the question of Army policy when Dr. H.A. Bruce contended that one or two divisions should have been sent to Africa. Col Ralston interjected:

I can say to my hon. friend that last fall, when I was over in England, I discussed the sending of a division of Canadian troops to North Africa, and I was given what I considered to be good and sufficient reasons, by those who were best qualified to know, that the suggestion could not be accepted.

(Debates, 1943, p. 3002)

A very disorderly debate later resulted when the Minister interpreted as a sneer the following remarks by Dr. Bruce:

I want to say just a word about the Canadian army's battle honours. After nearly four years of war they are represented by two tragic failures, Hong Kong and Dieppe. They were not failures to fight courageously to the death on the part of the rank and file and the officers in charge of the attacks, but were due to incompetent leadership in the high command.

(Ibid, pp 3004 and 3008)

Two days later another heated argument developed between them over Dieppe (ibid, p. 3101).

153. Sharp outbursts immediately occurred in newspapers right across Canada. The Journal asked who were those "best qualified to know" and remarked "There's too much heat in all this, not enough light" (O.P.I. 63, Journal, 29 May 43). Toronto's newspapers as might be expected took opposite sides, with the Globe and Mail praising Dr. Bruce for exposing the sham and the Toronto Star supporting Col Ralston's statements (Press Indices Nos 58 and 60, 29 May and 1 Jun 43, items 7924, 8089 and 8090). Closer agreement took place on the West Coast. The Vancouver Province wrote that it did not make sense to say that an

army which had been conspicuously denied battle experience was to be conspicuously chosen to lead the attack (Press Index No. 62, 3 Jun 43, item 8261). In its rival newspaper Elnore Philpott wrote:

The reasons for keeping the Canadians where they still are were sound. But that would not long hold good for the future.

If for any reason the Second Front is not to be opened this year in north-western Europe the Canadians should be allowed to do their stuff somewhere else.

(O.P.I. 63, Vancouver Sun, 29 May 43)

In the Maritimes several newspapers deplored this "barracking" of the Minister, and across the country many leading dailies soon expressed themselves as tired of continual wrangling over Dieppe*. Publication at this time of Mr. H.A. St. G. Saunders' report "Combined Operations", however, kept Dieppe very much to the fore.

154. Analyzing the arguments from reports of the Ottawa debate which reached him in England, Shapiro drew attention to Col Ralston's statement that "General McNaughton had made it clear to the War Office in Britain that if it was at any time advantageous to supply individual formations to separate theatres of war he was prepared to recommend it". On this Shapiro commented:

But a distinction must be drawn between negative and positive direction of the Canadian army's activity. For Gen McNaughton, to be 'prepared to recommend' a suggestion from the War Office on the activity of the Canadian Army is a very different thing from making a strong recommendation to the War Office that the Canadian Army should be used on this or that specific front in order to gain battle experience.

(O.P.I. 63, Gazette, 10 Jun 43)

155. In June 1943 the Canadian press definitely reflected the enthusiasm for invasion shown in the United Kingdom, although with diminishing interest toward the middle of the month. Great prominence to Allied air assaults in the Mediterranean contrasted with speculation regarding the lull in the bombing of Germany. The Winnipeg Free Press, Journal and the Globe and Mail all sounded notes of caution with regard to optimistic invasion prospects. The press were thrown somewhat off balance when Madame Chiang Kai-shok stated to the combined Houses of Parliament "Like that of China, the contribution which Canada has made to our common cause has not been of the spectacular"; the Gazette, however, termed it a graceful compliment. On the eve of the Canadian entry into action in the Mediterranean, editorials generally seemed to relish the war of nerves being waged against the enemy. ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Press Nos 23-27 8 Jun - 3 Jul 43).

* Press Index No. 63, 4 Jun 43, item 8551, The Halifax Chronicle. See also O.P.I. 63, The Moncton Transcript, The Telegraph-Journal (St. John), Winnipeg Free Press, Vancouver Sun, Globe and Mail, Windsor Star, The Lethbridge Herald.

CANADIANS IN SICILY

156. Prime Minister King's Dominion Day address to the Commons was interpreted generally as an attempt to prepare the public for big events involving action and perhaps severe casualties for Canadian forces (Press Index No. 91, 8 Jul 43, item 1862 Flaherty in the Windsor Star). In discussing forthcoming operations, the Ottawa Citizen stated "it is evidently anticipated that Canada's land forces will be in the next Allied offensive" and "It is reasonable to assume that there will be landing operations across the Mediterranean" ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Preco No. 28, 10 Jul 43). In general, however, almost complete silence seems to have reigned until on 9 Jul Mr. King intimated that aerial and commando assaults on Italy and Sicily, Sardinia and Crete were "parts of a single strategy which the immediate future may be expected rapidly to unfold" (Debates, 1943, vol V, p. 4557).

157. The first communiqué from Algiers announcing the Sicilian invasion used only the term "Allied forces", but a supplementary communiqué from Washington also dated 10 Jul 43 spoke of "Anglo-American-Canadian armed forces". Mr. King in a broadcast that morning made it quite clear that Canadian soldiers were included, and on 12 Jul he told the House that Canada would be justifiably proud of the fact that "units of the Canadian army were at the spear-head of the attack" (Ibid, p. 4618).

158. Such pride was enthusiastically proclaimed in the press across Canada. The Allied offensive eclipsed all other news and Canadian participation was universally welcomed. There was general praise for the superb planning of the operation, which all correspondents assumed would be successful. Lacking definite information, several papers speculated at first on the strength of the Canadian forces and the suggestion was made that General McNaughton might be in command. Considerable irritation was expressed at the secrecy surrounding the Canadian forces, particularly until the name of their commander was revealed, but there was general satisfaction that they were serving under General Montgomery and with the Eighth Army. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Preco No. 29, 16 Jul 43).

159. Much discussion centred about the future of the balance of the Canadian Army. In England there was a feeling that Canadian divisions might be used to supplement task forces as the Australians and New Zealanders had done in Africa (Press Index No. 96, 14 Jul 43, item 2229, Globe and Mail). Col Ralston assured Parliament on 13 Jul, however, that the Mediterranean operations did not mean that the Canadian army had been broken up (Debates, 1943 Vol V, pp 4688-89). The Toronto Star stressed that the use of Canadians in Sicily finally disposed of oft-repeated rumours that Canada would consent only to the use of her army as a self-contained unit (Press Index No. 99, 17 Jul 43, item 2460). One political observer maintained that Canadians were quite content with the arrangement whereby a large part of their army had been separated from the parent body and banded with the British (Ibid, No. 102, 21 Jul 43, item 2703, Harrison in Windsor Star). Numerous papers spoke of the opportunities to be gained under a baptism of fire. The Prince Albert Daily Herald, for example, remarked that if the Canadian army had had to wait for the march on Berlin the privilege of leading it would have gone to other troops experienced in battle (Ibid, No. 110, 30 Jul 43, item 3298). Col Ralston's trip to England and the

visit of Generals McNaughton and Stuart to the Mediterranean were seen as indications of larger activities for Canadians (Press Indices Nos 110 and 122, 30 Jul and 13 Aug 43, items 3320 and 4139, Journal and Saskatoon Star-Phoenix).

160. Press opinion was divided, but in general supported the action of the Prime Minister in insisting upon equal recognition being given to the fact that Canadians were in action, although there were some complaints at undue publicity before fighting ability had been proven. Other protests developed after the relative size of the force became apparent.

161. The fact that Quebec was chosen for the conference of the Allied leaders in August provided full scope for suppositions that Canadians would henceforth play a major part in planned offensives. Simultaneous withdrawal of the 1st Canadian Division from the front line lent strength to conjectures that under the new strategy Canadian troops might be employed as an army. A Canadian Press despatch stated it was believed in London that such action had been due to disagreement between the Canadian Government and the War Office over employment of the army as an entirety or in part, the abrupt return home of Col Ralston being linked to the story. The Windsor Star contended it was inconceivable that the withdrawal had been the result of bickering but remarked that if an army had to be broken up the Canadians would find it hard to understand why it should be theirs - rather than the armies of the United States or Britain. (Press Index No. 126, 18 Aug 43, items 4407, 4410, and 4411, Toronto Star, Telegram, and Windsor Star). On returning from Sicily, however, General McNaughton said quite definitely that his troops were ready for use "in whole or in part" as the High Command desired. Newspapers of both political faiths accepted this as scotching the rumours completely. (Press Index No. 138, 1 Sep 43, items 5326 and 5328, Gazette and Windsor Star).

162. Tense excitement in the newspaper world about the Quebec Conference subsided somewhat when official reticence left papers with too much space to fill. Most forecasters believed at the beginning that the conference would plan new landings in Europe, but the Gazette printed an article by a leading New York correspondent suggesting that it would be concerned primarily with Pacific strategy. When the meetings ended without any real information being divulged other than the appointment of Lord Mountbatten, the Gazette reiterated this theme. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco Nos 34, 35 and 36, 19 and 25 Aug and 3 Sep 43). During the conference, moreover, the conquest of Sicily had been completed and public attention in Canada had been focussed upon the Pacific through the landings of 15 Aug on Kiska, which climaxed a growing agitation for action in that region.

KISKA

163. Before Sicily dominated public attention to the exclusion of practically everything else, there was a growing amount of speculation in North America about the possibility of driving the Japanese out of the Aleutians. Declaring that Kiska had tied down many Canadian and American troops and aeroplanes in a comparatively quiet battle-zone, the Globe and Mail early in May 1943 called for an amphibious force to dislodge the Japanese (Press Index No. 35, 3 May 43, item 5267). That month it was thought in Washington, although without official confirmation,

that the Canadians were likely to join in an assault on Kiska (Ibid, No. 53, 24 May 43, item 7476, Gazette). After the Americans landed on Attu on 11 May capital correspondents freely speculated on rumours that Canadians would join them there, the morale of Pacific Command units rising noticeably as a result. Harrison claimed that many of these had a greater morale problem than units overseas but marching orders for the Aleutians would change all that (Ibid, No. 55, 26 May 43, item 7681, Windsor Star). On the other hand, many Canadian newspapers published a misleading dispatch to the effect that Canada had a large force "pinned down" in Alaska with the implication that it could now be released. Denial of this was given wide publicity by the Washington correspondent Chester Bloom, who urged that Canada put her troops into action with U.S. forces when they came to attack Kiska, as he felt that Attu had been a "golden opportunity lost to get battle training, and to earn esteem, publicity and political advantage in the United States." (Press Indices Nos 57 and 61, 28 May and 2 Jun 43, items 7821, 7824, and 8185, Toronto Telegram and Winnipeg Free Press). He argued that if Canada did not take part in the Aleutian campaign she could have little to say when the war ended and international air routes came under discussion (Press Index No. 69, 11 Jun 43, item 8881, Edmonton Journal).

164. A veritable storm arose, however, when in the House of Commons on 24 May 43, Mr. W.R. MacDonald (Brantford City) said the following:

...I suggest to the Minister that draftees who will not volunteer to serve abroad should be sent in ever-increasing numbers to Alaska to defend Canada from that corner of the country... If Canada sent her draftees there, the United States soldiers could be relieved to fight in other parts of the world, and we would be co-operating with them in the best interests of the cause for which we fight.

(Debates, 1943, vol III, p. 2942)

Mr. A.R. Adanson (York West) vigorously protested that "if that suggestion should be adopted there would be more Canadian casualties in the bar rooms of the world than we ever suffered in war... To suggest that we allow somebody else, another nation, to do our fighting for us is the most fantastic thing ever to have been said in this house" (Ibid, p. 2961). The following day Mr. MacDonald defended his remarks by explaining that there were decisive battles being fought in Alaska at that very moment and Canadians should be in the thick of the operations, relieving the Americans if they wished or fighting side by side with them (Ibid, p. 2987). The press, meanwhile, treated his original proposal with scorn, Harrison maintaining that to send "our coddled Zombies" to Alaska would not enhance Canada's relations with her Allies (Press Indices Nos 58 and 62, 29 May and 3 Jun 43, items 7926, 7927 and 8259, St. Catherines Standard and Windsor Star). In answer to further questions from Mr. Adanson, Col Ralston stated in the House that the governor-in-council had the authority to send draftees to Attu and Kiska but that only a general order dealing with Alaska had been passed (Debates, 1943, p. 3021).

165. Among newspapers carrying editorials advocating Canadian troops joining the Americans in the Aleutian campaign

were The Calgary Herald, London Free Press and St. Catherines Standard (Press Index No. 63, 4 Jun 43, item 8355). The Nelson News noted a rising demand that Canada prepare to take the offensive from her Pacific bases and observed that "the demand is timely and its aggressive public expression will be just as necessary to stimulate Ottawa to action as it was to bring about the strengthening of our Coast defences" (Ibid, No. 75, 18 Jun 43, item 9420).

166. During July very little mention was made of the subject, although some attention was given to the visit of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to Alaska and the Aleutians (Press Indices Nos 89 and 100, 6 and 19 Jul 43, items 1669 and 2534, Gazette). The Winnipeg Tribune followed this up by praising the harmony wrought by the Board as witnessed by Canadians and Americans standing side by side on guard defending Alaska and Newfoundland (Ibid, No. 118, 9 Aug 43, item 3797). Encouraging Canadians to show a watchful interest in the Aleutians, the Stratford Beacon-Herald of 26 Jul spoke of the grim task of naval and air arms there without mentioning a possible role for the Army (Ibid, No. 124, 16 Aug 43, item 4226).

167. Meanwhile there had been growing complaints against the policy of keeping large numbers of troops idle in Canada, particularly after Mr. Bracken charged in a Toronto address on 2 Jul that maintaining the "draftee home defence army" was a "hoax" and a waste of man-power (Press Index No. 89, 6 Jul 43, items 1664 and 1665, Journal and Gazette). The Winnipeg Free Press felt that it would have been much more to the point to criticize the keeping of nearly 200,000 active service troops at home (Press Indices Nos 90 and 92, 7 and 9 Jul 43, items 1748 and 1921). Even after the landings in Sicily pressure continued in Parliament for the granting of extended leave to aid the shortage of man-power in industry and agriculture. Col Ralston met this by stating on 21 Jul that there was no such thing as a Home Defence Army, all troops including those known as home defence personnel were part of the Active Army and were essential to units which had to be kept ready to meet eventualities (Debates, 1943, vol IV, p. 5161). The Journal commented that these personnel might be in the Active Army but were definitely not of it because they would not fight nor could they be made to fight where the fighting was being done (Press Index No. 108, 28 Jul 43, item 3205). The Leader-Post (Regina) on the other hand maintained that it would not be wise to heed the great political outcry in Ontario against maintaining a considerable body of armed troops in Canada, all of them potential reinforcements for overseas (Ibid, No. 113, 3 Aug 43, item 3506). It is interesting to note that the Prince Albert Herald conceded it might be possible to relax defences on the Atlantic but asserted it was still too early to do so on the Pacific (Ibid, No. 121, 12 Aug 43, item 4024). Speaking for British Columbia, the Vancouver Sun seemed quite satisfied that danger to the West Coast had passed and that the land forces for defensive purposes there could be reduced considerably (Press Index No. 119, 10 Aug 43, item 3874). The Gazette on 7 Aug put the question directly "Are the Zombies going to Kiska?", and said with irony, "The boys who wouldn't volunteer to chase Italians beside the balmy Mediterranean would find themselves fighting a stubborn, entrenched Jap in the chilly Arctic" (Ibid, No. 121, 12 Aug 43, item 4025).

168. When Prime Minister King announced in a broadcast of 21 Aug that Canadians had joined with Americans in seizing Kiska on 15 Aug, the Gazette immediately wrote that the last

vestige of the threat to Canada had been removed and asked "What now - do we still need a garrison of 80,000?" (Ibid, No. 131, 24 Aug 43, items 4688-92 inclusive). There was general delight that no Japanese had been found there, although some remarks were passed about Canadians again being robbed of an opportunity to distinguish themselves.* The use of N.R.M.A. troops some 2500 miles from Canada's coast at once suggested to many papers that conscription would or could be widened to European fields**². While the Moncton Transcript intimated that Canadian units would likely form part of the Aleutian Defence system, the Ottawa Citizen outspokenly contended that there was no further need to maintain Canadian divisions where they were never likely to encounter the enemy and advocated their active employment with Americans, Australians and New Zealanders in the Pacific (Ibid, Nos 135 and 137, 28 and 31 Aug 43, items 5097 and 5212). The Journal very pointedly asked whether the Canadian call-up troops would move on with the Americans when they left Kiska (Press Index No. 140, 3 Sep 43, item 5445). Vancouver papers were satisfied that British Columbia's fears of attack from the Aleutians had been removed (Ibid, No. 147, 11 Sep 43, item 5964, Vancouver Sun and News-Herald).

169. Returning from a visit to the Pacific, Bowman of the C.B.C. stated that General MacArthur had told him he looked forward to the day when Canadian soldiers would join him in the South Pacific and that General Blamey hoped there would be joint Canadian-Australian action with the U.S. forces (Press Index No. 143, 7 Sep 43, item 5655, Vancouver Province). As Canada entered her fifth year of war, Flaherty saw prospects for action by the Canadian Army in both the Pacific theatre and Europe, suggesting that the next step might be Japanese territory (Ibid, item 5715, Globe and Mail). The Winnipeg Free Press, however, said every eye in Canada was fixed upon Italy (where operation "Daytown" had been launched the week before) (Ibid, 15 Sep 43, item 6149). The Montreal Standard at this time reported a growing feeling that Canadians would be sent from the Italian theatre via the Mediterranean to the Asiatic theatre for possible employment under Lord Louis Mountbatten, and expressed the opinion that the Australians would like such a move (Ibid, No. 156, 22 Sep 43, item 6646).

170. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians, Allied successes in Europe, and a lessening of the submarine menace were the three reasons given by Col Ralston for a major reduction in the strength of the army in Canada, an action which the Gazette immediately praised as a step towards a realistic military policy (Ibid, No. 150, 15 Sep 43, items 6147 and 6148). The Minister's announcement said the 7th and 8th and part of the 6th Divisions were to be disbanded, their place to be taken by three brigade groups, and that a "substantial" number of men would be discharged and returned to civilian life. The Globe and Mail saw this at once as a tacit admission of overexpansion and wrote that the grandiose plan of putting a Canadian army in the field had been abandoned (Ibid, No. 151, 16 Sep 43, item 6222). The Journal said that the excuse it could not be done so long as the Japanese held the Aleutians was nonsense (Ibid, item 6223).

* The Windsor Star noted that General Pearkes had sent out both this expedition and the one to Spitsbergen and in neither case had a shot been fired (Ibid, No. 133, 26 Aug 43, item 4892).

** Press Indices 132, 133, 134, 135 and 137, 25-28 and 31 Aug 43, items 4863, 4897, 5008, 5010, 5094 and 5213, Ottawa Citizen, Windsor Star, Toronto Telegram, Halifax Chronicle, Ottawa Journal.

171. The announcement caused a terrific outburst in the United States, where isolationists and opponents of Roosevelt such as John O'Donnell writing in the New York Daily News and the Washington Times-Herald made it appear that Canada was sending her men home from the Army (Ibid, item 6224, Ottawa Citizen). The timing was most unfortunate, as news of the set-back at Salerno had just arrived and Congress was debating the bill to draft fathers. Most Canadian papers, however, laid the blame for the furore upon the wording of the announcement and for days their critical editorials employed such phrases as "King Government exports trouble", "a blundering announcement", "statement from Ottawa on disbanding divisions misleads even Roosevelt", "W.I.B. failed to prevent this black eye for Canada", "use of 'disband' was unfortunate", "'dynamite' for Washington". (Press Indices 152-163 inclusive, 17 Sep - 2 Oct 43, items 6301, 6304, 6533, 6624 and 7096, Gazette, Ottawa Journal, Telegram, Toronto Star, Edmonton Journal). The Winnipeg Free Press termed it "addled English" but declared that the reason for confusion lay beyond the clumsy wording - namely, the delay in effecting changes in the home defence establishments in keeping with the needs of the time (Press Indices Nos 155 and 158, 21 and 24 Sep 43, items 6527 and 6794). The Edmonton Bulletin felt that there might still be nuisance raids on Canadian coastal communities by carrier-based planes but that neither Germany nor Japan had ships for an invasion army (Press Index No. 165, 2 Oct 43, item 7232). In general, however, Canadian newspapers evaluated the reasons for the changed policy in accordance with their stand regarding conscription for service overseas.

CANADIANS IN ITALY - THE DIVIDED ARMY

172. Meanwhile the public remained very much in the dark regarding the probable use of the two corps of the Canadian Army still in England. General McNaughton's visit to Sicily in August had stimulated hopes, however, that the next assignment would involve more than a single division and its ancillaries, his name again being mentioned as possible commander of the Allied invasion forces (Press Indices Nos. 136 and 138, 30 Aug and 1 Sep 43, items 5180 and 5330, Windsor Star and Montreal Star). There was a sense of relief when the battle for Sicily ended with fewer casualties than expected, and there was a feeling of pride that the Canadians had acquitted themselves well in their first sustained action. La Presse (Montreal) asserted that the Canadians were now ready for bigger operations, while The Telegraph-Journal (St. John) hinted at the prestige which would result from an army in action (Press Index No. 144, 8 Sep 43, items 5749 and 5748). On the West Coast Philpott wrote that Canadians hoped their army would fight "as a single team, not spare parts". (Ibid, item 5747, Vancouver Sun)

173. After wavering for some time the press assumed that the Italian Government had finally decided not to surrender immediately. Its abrupt capitulation was therefore not altogether expected, although the Allied landings in Italy on 3 Sep occasioned no surprise. Considerable prominence was given to the part played by Canadians in these landing operations. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 37, 10 Sep 43). Flaherty remarked that in two months Canadian troops had thrice invaded enemy territory. Although Washington speculated that failure to mention American troops in the reports meant they were poised for another landing in Italy, it appears to have been taken for granted that Canadians would continue to fight alongside the British. (Press Index No. 141, 4 Sep 43, items 5501, 5504 and 5505, Journal).

174. Later that autumn there were vague rumours that Canadians might participate in a blow aimed at the Balkans. The Toronto Telegram reported that Canadian sympathy with Greece gave prospect of co-operation in opening up this new front. (*ibid*, No. 182, 23 Oct 43, item 8246). When it became known that the Canadians were on the Adriatic, the Edmonton Journal on 11 Dec wrote "It is just possible, of course, that the whole army may be assembled and operate as a unit in Italy or the Balkans" (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 195).

175. As the Italian campaign developed, the fortunes of the Canadian units involved were followed step by step with great interest. There was no marked tendency to repeat the criticism made elsewhere of the slowness of the advance in October and November, although during apparent lulls press comments fell off noticeably (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco Nos. 42 and 45, 15 Oct and 4 Nov 43). The general opinion was that slow progress in Italy presaged Allied pre-occupation with the opening of a Second Front elsewhere (*ibid*: Minim Preco No. 47, 19 Nov 43). The Winnipeg Free Press of 27 Sep interpreted the inclusion of Lord Beaverbrook in Mr. Churchill's Cabinet as an indication that the main assault from the West was about to be launched, but to this paper it no longer mattered whether or not the Canadian Army formed the sole spearhead. In an earlier editorial of 31 Aug this same Liberal organ had written:

It may be hoped that to the experience now won by the 1st Canadian Division will be added battle experience by other formations. Whether these fight side by side or not is, relatively speaking, unimportant now. But their separate entry into theatres of war does not wholly eliminate an ultimate hope that before the war is over, they will be brought together, just as the old Canadian Corps was united in the last war. But whether they are or not, the nation will ring to the tale of their achievements and their gallantry and once more the Canadian Army will play its great unifying role as a point around which our national pride can gather fresh strength and honour. No one can exaggerate the feeling of relief that this course is to be followed. Nobody demands unnecessary bloodshed for the sake of prestige at home or abroad. But it is a fact that the long inaction of the Canadian Army was the cause of criticism and dissension at home. Its gradual going into action now under conditions admirably adapted to minimize losses is something which far outweighs the possible advantage to the nation of any insistence that our army should be used altogether or not at all.

(Press Index, unnumbered and undated but presumably 1 Oct 43, items 7157 and 7161, Free Press)

176. General satisfaction greeted the announcement towards the end of November 1943 that a large body of Canadian reinforcements, including armoured units, had landed in Italy and would be merged with formations already fighting there to form a Canadian Corps under a Canadian commander. Although information was scanty, it was at once interpreted to mean that there had arrived another Canadian division, probably armoured, thus reducing the number left in England to such proportions that the necessity for an army headquarters came into question^{*}.

* Press Indices Nos 209 and 211, 24 and 26 Nov 43, items 3159, 3161, 3338 and 3341, Gazette, Toronto Telegram and Montreal Star.

The Windsor Star commented that "Dreams of an army in the field were evanescent and impractical in the first place - now have come down to realities" (Press Index No. 212, 27 Nov 43, item 3404). Numerous editors asserted that the announcement definitely marked the final abandonment of the plan to maintain a full army establishment overseas*.

177. The question of employment of the remainder of the forces at once came to the fore.

Now we are to have in action a corps of two divisions; in the last war we had four...No doubt the other three divisions will be used elsewhere when the right time comes, and will equally distinguish themselves. But what of our army headquarters? What of our lines of communication and base troops?...Scores of officers have been promoted to high rank to fill places in the army organization. What of them? Are they to cool their heels in England for the balance of the war, frustrated and disappointed?

(Ibid, Winnipeg Free Press, 30 Nov 43)

Saying that the Canadian Government would now have to decide whether the maintenance of an army staff was going to be necessary, a prairie newspaper hinted that British units might be grouped under Canadian command (Ibid; Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 24 Nov 43). A French-language daily on the contrary wrote that "1 Canadiens, en général, préféreraient voir combattre leurs troupes en un corps d'armée distinct que fondues dans des unités anglaises" (Ibid: Le Droit, 23 Nov 43).

178. Rumours of the retirement of General McNaughton began at once (Press Index No. 210, 25 Nov 43, item 3260, Gazette). One correspondent said it seemed "unlikely the army overseas would operate as a complete unit for some time, if ever" (Ibid, No. 212, 27 Nov 43, item 7406, Marshall in the Windsor Star). The Toronto Star felt that the necessity for an army commander had been reduced, if not eliminated, and it was probable no new army chief would be named (Ibid, item 3407). According to the Vancouver Province, a report was already circulating in Pacific Command that the army overseas would be reorganized (Ibid, item 3408, Ottawa Citizen). Ross Munro was still of the opinion that the Canadian Army was not going to confine itself to one field and he predicted "it may make even greater commitments in a second-front campaign in Western Europe than in the Mediterranean theatre" (Ibid, No. 211, 26 Nov 43, item 3343, Montreal Star).

179. When the announcement of General McNaughton's retirement was made on 26 Dec, it was officially disclosed for the first time that General Crerar was in command of the Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 196, Citizen, 27 Dec 43). The Winnipeg Free Press had assumed this appointment in an editorial of 30 Nov, apparently based upon a report by Munro printed by the same paper on 24 Nov (Ibid: Free Press, 30 Nov 43). The Ottawa Citizen promptly

* C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 193, The Moncton Daily Times, 26 Nov, The Standard (Montreal), 27 Nov, and The Guardian of the Gulf (Charlottetown), 1 Dec 43.

hinted that he might return to England to take over the post of Army Commander (Press Index No. 237, 28 Dec 43, item 4736). Back in Ottawa, Col Ralston without specifying names predicted that a permanent successor to General McNaughton would be appointed and he told newspapermen that the fact that one corps was in Italy was no reason for the Canadian Army not operating as such (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 204, Citizen, 27 Dec 43). The Minister's announcement that it would function as an army under General Eisenhower strengthened the belief that a number of British divisions would be added, giving it a composite character for the European invasion. Cables from London suggested that without them the Canadian Army could scarcely function as an army - it required either a complete British corps or a composite Canadian-British corps to operate with the other Canadian corps as a proper army formation. It was also forecast that General Montgomery's Army Group would include one British Army and the Canadian Army. (Ibid: Gazette, 29 Dec 43).

180. The most bitter condemnation of past policies was contained in a Globe and Mail editorial entitled "The Battle for the Stripes". This contended that "the Defense Minister, aided and abetted by the permanent force", had set out to create an all-Canadian Army of eight divisions plus at least two army tank brigades and necessary ancillaries. It argued that the plan had failed because Canada could not provide the reinforcements to maintain it in action, and the dispatch of the division to Sicily was described as "the breaking point for the stubborn insistence of a Canadian army, self-sufficient and sovereign". Finding further proof in disbandment of the "operational" divisions in Canada, the editorial asked:

What does it matter where and with whom the second corps fights so long as it fights well, with the same skill and tenacity the first corps has displayed in Italy? What can it add to the prestige they are winning for Canada to have a composite Allied force go into battle under the title of the First Canadian Army? General McNaughton's resignation and the reorganization it entails give the opportunity to break with the past and clear away the debris.

(C.M.H.Q. 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 201, Globe and Mail, 28 Dec 43)

Commenting on the reinforcements sent to Italy and the severe casualties suffered there, a politically independent New Brunswick paper said:

Probably the Canadians will be continued in service in Italy and perhaps the units now in England may join them there...It is possible that they may be drawn out of Italy and become part of the spearhead directed against the Nazi fortifications in western Europe.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3: O.P.I. 221, St. John Telegraph-Journal, 29 Dec 43)

The idea of the corps in Italy returning to fill the gap in the Canadian Army, however, was treated very lightly by Manitoba's leading paper, which remarked in parenthesis that it was "an unlikely proceeding under present circumstances" (Ibid: Winnipeg Free Press, 29 Dec 43).

PART V: PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS
REUNION OF THE CANADIAN ARMY

181. The retirement of General McNaughton created at the beginning of 1944 the utmost confusion in public opinion regarding the future of Canada's military forces overseas. There had been no newspaper calls for his dismissal and most editors who praised the important services he had rendered were far from content to accept the official explanation of ill-health. In general it was seen to be connected with the collapse of the original plan for a separate Canadian Army and there was a great deal of outspoken comment on stories of disagreement with General Montgomery on that point (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 43, 6 Jan 44). Obviously, the Opposition was going to press the Government for further information. Meanwhile the country had no clear idea of the part its Army was intended to play in the forthcoming assault upon Europe. It seemed ironic that at the very time when the Allies were announcing their invasion chiefs the Canadian Army lost its founder and was placed under a temporary commander who admittedly would not be its leader in battle. Underlying such queries as who would eventually command, what would be the size and composition of his forces, when and where would they be used, was the basic question whether they would operate in the invasion as a distinct Canadian army.

182. Indicative of the growing confusion in public thought about these issues, one Conservative paper in commenting on the appointment of Lt-Gen Simonds to command a Canadian corps wrote:

If, as seems probable, one Canadian Corps is to operate in Italy and the other in the western offensive, it may be that no permanent successor to General McNaughton will be named. There is little need for an army commander if the army does not fight as such.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3:
O.P.I. 238, Victoria Colonist,
2 Feb 44)

One Ottawa newspaper in asking why the army had been divided even went so far as to assume that three Canadian divisions had been sent to Italy (ibid: O.P.I. 233, Citizen, February 1944)

183. Many of these misunderstandings were clarified by Col Ralston when he gave Parliament on 11 Feb a very detailed explanation of the army organization overseas. He did not say whether or not the Canadians in Italy might be brought back as formations to rejoin those left in England, but he made it quite clear that there was no intention of disbanding the army headquarters there. (Debates, 1944, vol I, pp 411-416). Later, when Mr. T.C. Douglas (Weyburn) twice asked him why the entire Canadian Army had not been sent to Italy, Col Ralston stated that such a step would not have been possible under existing conditions and again defended the policy of battle inoculation by degrees (ibid, pp 514, 516-519).

184. As a result of these ministerial statements, press excitement over General McNaughton's retirement to some extent subsided (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 515, 17 Feb 44). The Vancouver Sun, for example, wrote that Col Ralston had disposed of "the hysterical cry of certain Canadian newspapers"

that the Canadian army was not an army at all but a "myth", as the Ottawa Journal put it*. Cabling from London on 16 Feb, however, Shapiro attributed General McNaughton's illness directly to chagrin and disappointment over the break-up of the Army. He saw the winter of 1942-43 as the crisis in the General's plans when the Government at home was being prodded about its military policy at Hong Kong and Dieppe and about the absence of Canadian formations in Africa. Describing how Ottawa pressed to send troops to the Mediterranean until eventually a corps was built up there, Shapiro wrote:

In England Gen McNaughton's famous dagger has become more of a handle than a blade...

No spearhead would be these Canadian troops. The general's brave words of 1941 were a hollow laugh in 1944.

(Ibid: O.P.I. 229, Gazette, 17 Feb 44)

185. Finally, on 20 Mar 44, Col Ralston announced in the Commons the appointment of Lt-Gen Crerar to command the First Canadian Army (Debates, 1944, vol II, p. 1625). The press gave instant approval in numerous reviews of his career. Saying that it removed "the political dynamite lurking beneath the recent retirement", Shapiro wrote from London that the fate of the Canadian Army organization had hung in the balance while his ability as a corps commander was being tested by British superiors in Italy.

An adverse report would probably have meant dissolution of the Canadian Army and re-organization of the Dominion's second-front troops under British Army command. Such an eventuality coming in the wake of General McNaughton's retirement and coincidental with the elevation to general rank of three British-born Canadians - Simonds, Foulkes and Kitching - might have caused a first-class political explosion in Canada.

Early this month a favourable report was received on Gen Crerar's capacity as a field commander. Ottawa's dilemma was resolved and direction of the Canadian Army was established at last on a permanent basis.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/6:
O.P.I. 252, Gazette, 21 Mar
44)

186. An editorial in the Gazette of 21 Mar said that the only uncertain factor remaining was just what troops would form the other corps necessary for him to take a two-Corps Canadian Army into action. Alternatives were either to bring back the 1st Canadian Corps or add a corps of British or United Nations troops. From repeated statements by Col Ralston that the Canadian divisions would be used when and where they were most needed, the editorial concluded that the Allied High Command would probably decide upon the disposition of the 1st Canadian Corps.

* C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/6: O.P.I. 272, Vancouver Sun, 18 Feb 44. Further examples are found in C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3: O.P.I. 233, The Leader-Post (Regina), 14 Feb and O.P.I. 214, Gazette, 16 Feb 44. See also C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/4: O.P.I. 249, Citizen, Vancouver Province and Toronto Telegram, all of 17 Feb 44.

An Ontario paper agreed but added the comment that no immediate decision was expected. (Ibid: O.P.I. 255, Gazette, 21 Mar, and The Peterborough Examiner, 23 Mar 44). Toronto's morning paper, on the other hand, concentrated upon the second alternative.

Explanatory comments on the changes make the comforting assurance that the policy of keeping the Canadian overseas army in a segregated compartment has been finally abandoned. Apparently in the approaching operations Lt-Gen Crerar will command an army which in addition to the three Canadian divisions of our 2nd Corps will contain at least two British divisions.

(Ibid: Globe and Mail, 22 Mar 44)

187. As D Day drew near it became obvious that the 1st Corps was not going to return to England to take part in the assault. By May reports of rumours among the troops in Italy suggested that some might go to southern France and some to Burma, but one of the most common was that a division might be sent to Australia (Press Clipping No. 9690, The Sudbury Star, 3 May 44). To one of his invasion units in Britain General Crerar suggested that "it would be happier" if all Canadian troops were together instead of being "spread about a bit"; but, he added, "it would be very unhappy indeed if by any insistence that we fight only together the war ended without an opportunity on our part of contributing in an important degree to the military victory" (ibid: No. 2606, Toronto Star, 18 May 44).

188. When the main assault upon Europe finally took place the exact extent to which Canadian forces were involved was not disclosed for some time, but there was unconcealed pride that they formed part of the spearhead. It was all-important that they were being used where most effective, and to the Gazette of 8 Jun it seemed of small account whether Canadian soldiers were fighting as an army, as a corps, or as separate divisions. (Press Clipping No. 3671). Nevertheless, there was universal acclaim when early in August it became known that the First Canadian Army under General Crerar had taken up an operational role in France. At the same time, several papers pointed out that although commanded by a Canadian and with a Canadian headquarters it could by no means be considered all-Canadian. The Gazette of 9 Aug called it "a new composite army" and observed that only two Canadian divisions were known to be in France (Press Clipping No. 5692). Shapiro and Munro both stressed in their dispatches that British units were included, causing the Ottawa Journal of 10 Aug to venture to suggest that there were not more Canadian troops there than General Currie had in the First World War (ibid, No. 5763). Detailing the probable composition of the army, the Edmonton Journal of that same date hinted that British divisions had already fought in the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy and concluded that "once all gain battle experience...no British corps or division could ever regret service in the First Canadian Army" (ibid, No. 6057). In an editorial dated 16 Aug, the Toronto Telegram complained that the pattern of official information seemed intended to magnify the character of Canadian participation by impressing the fact that there was a Canadian Army in the field and to show reluctance to admit that British and Polish troops were part of it (ibid). When it later learned that troops of the Netherlands and Belgium had also been placed under command, this same Conservative organ wrote with sarcasm:

The Dutch, Belgians, Poles and British will doubtless provide their own reinforcements. If our own reinforcements fall down perhaps some French, American or Brazilian units can be added to make up the strength.

(Press Clipping No. 6146,
Telegram, 21 Aug 44)

There seems to have been no press agitation to bring about re-union of the 1st Canadian Corps with the 2nd, however, and there is little newspaper evidence to suggest that the public showed very much active interest.

189. The cosmopolitan nature of the First Canadian Army, on the other hand, repeatedly became the subject of comment. When it became known that a Czechoslovakian group and American troops had been added, the Ottawa Citizen wrote of "Our Polyglot Army". Ross Munro termed it "the most international army of this war". Shapiro likened it to the French Foreign Legion and remarked that "Canadian troops certainly do not possess a voting majority in their own army". (Press Clipping No. 8026, Citizen, 1 Nov 44). Following many stories and cartoons which dubbed the First Canadian Army as "Crerar's International Brigade", Defence Headquarters issued on 14 Nov a brief statement on the disposition of Canadian forces which explained the integration of Allied arms (Press Clipping No. 8349, Gazette, 15 Nov 44).

190. During October the papers gave full attention to the controversy over the charges laid by Major Connie Smythe the previous month that Canadian reinforcements were "green, inexperienced and poorly trained" (Press Index No. 463, 22 Sep 44, item 6867, Journal). Col Ralston's visit to the troops overseas was known to be connected with the reinforcement question, and the dramatic news of his resignation on 1 Nov overshadowed all else. Among the many articles which resulted, one by F.C. Mears from Ottawa contained the following paragraph:

It was credibly reported that the plan contemplated by the Prime Minister is to reduce, in effect, Canada's military participation in the decisive operations in the Low Countries and in Italy by reducing the size of Canada's divisions, pulling the men out of the line and giving these hard pressed troops a rest. This is to be the alternative to providing adequate reinforcements...

(Press Clipping No. 8016,
Gazette, 2 Nov 44)

Without vouching for their accuracy, the Journal on 6 Nov also made reference to these "disturbing tales" about fighting a "softer" war - a solution to the reinforcement problem by seeing to it that there were fewer men in action to be reinforced (Press Clipping No. 8123).

191. In spite of these rumours, the possibility of a complete withdrawal of Canadians from Italy does not appear to have been given any attention by the press during the winter months that followed. No one seems to have advocated such a proposal even in the heated debates on reinforcements during the special parliamentary session of November. Assigned by The

Canadian Press to write a story on what the Canadian troops thought of remaining in the Italian theatre, Douglas How said that they were "resigned to tolerate another winter in Italy" (Press Clipping No. 8550, Journal, 2 Jan 45).

192. In March the composition of the First Canadian Army again came under discussion when Sir James Grigg declared in the British House of Commons that "at the present time" two-thirds were United Kingdom troops. Simultaneously, the Daily Telegraph (London) claimed there should be a change of name to ensure British troops their fair share of publicity (Press Clipping No. 4225, Gazette, 7 Mar 45). The Toronto Telegram of 7 May at once agreed and pointed to Mr. King's insistence upon the term "Anglo-American-Canadian" with reference to Sicily (ibid, No. 4729). Although Defence Headquarters issued a 150-word statement saying the First Canadian Army was necessarily flexible, newspapers forcibly expressed themselves on the question for the balance of the month. Among them one said:

...it is the fault of those 'in high places' who did not follow the Canadian pattern of the last war and see to it that we had a compact, distinctively Canadian force designed to fit in with Canada's ability to supply troops for such a force. Not with the Canadians who are fighting in Italy would we have on the Western Front sufficient men and sufficient reserves and reinforcements to maintain a full-scale army in the field.

(Press Clipping No. 4458, Editorial of The Halifax Herald reproduced by the Ottawa Citizen, 17 Mar 45)

193. On 3 Apr Ross Munro began a despatch with the words "Together once more as an army" and in it wrote that "All Canadian infantry and armoured formations again are under Gen Crerar's command, as well as some British troops, but the latter are in the minority" (Press Clipping No. 4807, Gazette, 4 Apr 45). This caused the Ottawa Citizen of 5 Apr to ask for information about the 1st Canadian Division - "until recently understood to be in Italy" (ibid, No. 4834). That same day in Parliament, Mr. J.G. Diefenbaker (Lake Centre) expressed the hope "that in the near future Canada's overseas forces will be in truth a Canadian Army, and that the men of Canada will be united together in one corps" (Debates, 1945, vol I, p. 579). To this speech the Journal of 6 Apr gave the caption "Wants Canadians in Europe, Italy Fight as One Force" (Press Clipping No. 4870).

194. These rather obvious hints following so much public concern over the varied composition of the Canadian Army suggest that, although the question of reunion had received practically no press attention since early in 1944, there was a latent desire to see it accomplished. The popularity of the movement was amply demonstrated by numerous reports and editorials in various newspapers when the arrival of the 1st Canadian Corps in Holland was finally announced on 23 Apr 45 (See Press Clippings Nos 5286 and 5296, Ottawa Citizen and No. 5391, Toronto Telegram, 24 Apr 45). With regard to the timing of the release of information, one Liberal paper remarked that "It would have been disturbing to the Canadian public to have been told that it had been arranged to transfer the 1st Canadian Corps to the West front at the time when many people were concerned over the reported shortage of reinforcements" (Press Clipping No. 5373, Citizen, 25 Apr 45).

195. In discussing the matter during a political broadcast delivered shortly after VE Day, Maj-Gen Pearkes made the following charge:

The stark truth is thus revealed that the veterans of the campaign in Sicily and Italy were transferred to northwest Europe to make up the deficiencies in the trained men in the home defence army that might have been sent from Canada.

(Press Clipping No. 5857,
Gazette, 12 May 45)

Prompt denial came from General McNaughton in his Regina speech of 15 May (ibid, No. 5899, Journal, 16 May 45). By that time, however, popular interest in the Canadian forces overseas had shifted to the problem of bringing them home and preparations for the defeat of Japan were becoming the dominant issue.

PART VI: PUBLIC PRESSURE REGARDING THE CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

196. Long before the capitulation of Germany there had been periodic demands in the press and Parliament for more active participation by Canada in the war against Japan. Until the Kiska expedition the main concern in this respect was defence, but reorganization of the 6th Division thereafter into brigades similar to "task forces" or "combat teams" was taken as a shift to the offensive spirit. This was the theme of an article by Flaherty entitled "Canadian Troops Tailored for Specific Job in Pacific" (Press Clipping No. 4562, Vancouver Province, 11 Dec 43). Norman MacLeod of the British United Press also began a series of articles on the important role Canada would play in new offensives against Japan (ibid, No. 8808, The Hamilton Spectator, 25 Oct 43).

197. When Parliament met Mr. H.C. Green on 10 Feb 44 urged the Government to send N.R.M.A. troops to fight "either beside the Australians and New Zealanders in the South Pacific or beside Americans in the Central Pacific" (Debates, 1944, vol I, p. 350). Later, news that twenty Canadian officers had been attached to Empire and United States forces in the Southwest Pacific was taken as a very definite indication that Canada would play her part in the final defeat of Japan (Press Clipping No. 8230, The Canadian Observer (Sarnia), 1 Apr 44). There apparently was little agitation to discover the form and extent of her intended contribution, however, until the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. Charles Bishop then wrote from Ottawa, "It is taken for granted here that Canadian participation in the Japanese war will be confined, very largely, to Air Force and Naval units, with a minimum of Army units" (Press Clipping No. 6842, Winnipeg Tribune, 14 Sep 44).

198. Much speculation arose from President Roosevelt's statement at the end of the conference that Canadians would fight alongside United States troops all the way across the Pacific. Soon afterwards the Canadian High Commissioner to Australia (Mr. T.C. Davis) in welcoming the Canadian Radar Detachment addressed them as "the first Canadian soldiers to set foot on Australian soil" - words which some commentators interpreted

¶ See paragraphs 93, 101, 112, 137, 149 and 163 to 169.

as a hint that they were the vanguard of a Canadian Pacific Army. Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that no large scale movement of troops to the Pacific would take place until the war in Europe ended. The Gazette on 28 Sep remarked "When that time comes, it is believed Canada will put into the Pacific theatre a corps composed, perhaps, of two or three divisions" (Press Clippings Nos. 7059 and 7068, Windsor Star and Gazette, 28 Sep 44). A more accurate estimate was made by Kenneth Cragg, who wrote on 7 Oct that army forces would approximate a division with ancillaries, the whole totalling about 30,000 troops (Press Clipping No. 7420, Globe and Mail, 7 Oct 44).

199. Of greater interest than the size of the force was the method of selection. Would N.R.M.A. troops be sent from Canada or, as charged by Mr. W.E. Rowe at a political meeting in Toronto, would the war against Japan be waged "only to the last Canadian now fighting in the European war?" (ibid, No. 7295, 5 Oct 44). From the indefinite answers given by Col Ralston to such questions by the troops in Italy during his tour there, it was assumed that government policy had not yet been determined, but his remarks on demobilization implied that N.R.M.A. troops would not be used (Press Clippings Nos. 7277 and 7772, Toronto Telegram, 3 and 30 Oct 44). J.A. Hume reported from Ottawa a suggestion that these men could be used as Canadian army of occupation troops in Germany and Japan, thus allowing overseas men to be demobilized first (ibid, Nos. 7934 and 7935, Citizen, 27 and 28 Oct 44).

200. The main desire of the press at the time seems to have been to get the Government to make an announcement regarding the Army, particularly after plans for the Navy and Air Force were made known. A survey by the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs indicated that no strong views were held on the disposition of Canada's Pacific Forces; older people tended to favour co-operation under British command but percentages for the total interviewed were as follows:

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| With British..... | 27% |
| With Americans..... | 26% |
| With both..... | 39% |
| Undecided..... | 8% |

(Press Clipping No. 8262, Citizen, 9 Nov 44)

According to Peter Stursberg of the C.B.C., by the end of 1944 troops in Italy were demanding a Government statement as to whether they would be turned against Japan before being given a chance to get home (Press Clipping No. 9632, Vancouver Province, 23 Dec 44).

201. The arrival in Australia of No. 1 Canadian Special Wireless Group, R.C. Sigs, brought renewed speculations in February 1945 together with hints that a Commander of Canada's Pacific Force should be announced. Lt-Gen Simonds and Maj-Gen Keller were most frequently mentioned for this post. By then the size of the force generally was considered to be two divisions (Press Clipping No. 3929, Gazette, 24 Feb 45). Once again the main concern of the press was to try to obtain a definite statement regarding policy, particularly with regard to the conscription issue.

202. When the Prime Minister finally announced in the House on 4 Apr 45 the policy Canada intended to follow with respect to the Pacific, English language papers generally, with the exception of the Montreal Star, expressed the opinion that the voluntary principle was unfair as it would mean that men who had fought in Europe would be the ones who would volunteer for the Pacific War. On the other hand, his speech was warmly welcomed by the French-speaking press.^x A lively scene resulted in the Commons when Mr. H.C. Green charged that the Government was keeping silent for election purposes and Government speakers replied that the size of the force could not be announced until after final consultation with Britain and the United States (Debates, 1945, vol I, pp 615-17). The Ottawa Citizen continued to protest against the "hush hush" policy being pursued, observing that the editor of the Sydney Herald contended that there was a feeling of disappointment in Australia over Canada's attitude to the Pacific war^{xx} (Press Clipping No. 5348, Citizen, 24 Apr 45). Other papers contrasted Canada's indefinite programme with the serious steps taken by the United States (ibid, Nelson News, 14 Apr, and an editorial of the Calgary Herald reproduced in the Ottawa Citizen of 24 Apr 45). After referring to an article by Quentin Reynolds which anticipated that American troops would be sent directly from Europe to the Pacific without leave at home, the Conservative Journal stressed the unfortunate reaction produced in the United States by the Prime Minister's bare statement that no Canadian would be sent against Japan unless he so elected (Press Clippings Nos. 5415 and 5590, Journal, 26 Apr and 4 May 45).

203. As peace came to Europe there were many reminders that war for Canada was far from being at an end and there was obvious impatience at the lack of definite information about plans for aiding in the defeat of Japan. After referring to demands that those to go to the Pacific should be taken from men who had not been in action, F.C. Mears pointed out that how many and who should go rested with the military leaders who had yet to confer on the increased scale of operations against the Japanese (Press Clipping No. 5737, Gazette, 8 May 45). With an election campaign then in progress, however, most official announcements were preceded and followed by vigorous political speeches.

204. While repeatedly calling upon the Government to make its policy known, Mr. Bracken announced in Ottawa on 16 May that his party stood for conscription against Japan. Defence Department sources were at once reported to have said that there were insufficient trained N.R.M.A. men in Canada to meet the need. (Press Clipping No. 5941, Citizen, 17 May 45). Before the size of the force had officially been disclosed, General McNaughton stated at Moosomin on 11 May that Canada did not intend to send huge numbers of men to the Pacific "to slug it out hand-to-hand with a foe perhaps better fitted than we to survive in jungle warfare" (Press Clipping No. 5903, Journal, 16 May 45). There was an immediate outburst at this, particularly when it became known over the following week-end that the Army component would number only 30,000. Speaking at Indian Head, Mr. Bracken said that no one expected Canada to send support beyond "our just share to the

^x C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26/2: Minim Proco No. 856, 13 Apr 45, cites Globe and Mail, Gazette, Ottawa Journal, Winnipeg Free Press, La Presse and La Patrie (Independent)

^{xx} Mr. Thomas Dunbabin, Australian press attaché in Ottawa, at once wrote the editor of the Ottawa Citizen refuting this allegation.

Pacific war, but no one expects us to run out on our Allies either" (Press Clipping No. 6257, Windsor Star, 24 May 45). The Secretary of the Canadian Corps Association immediately prepared an address calling upon Canada to "do no less" than Britain, Australia and the United States "in turning the whole weight of their power, with avenging fury, towards the Pacific" (Press Clipping No. 6227, Toronto Telegraph, 23 May 45). In an editorial entitled "To Let Our Allies Whip Japan", one Ontario paper wrote:

The Dominion that demanded status as a leader among the 'middle-sized Powers' at San Francisco is to be all but a mere by-stander in the second - and maybe harder - half of the World War!

...Not only is the size of Canada's contribution a cause for shame at home and angry scorn across the border, but the effort is to be so slow that it will be several months before any Canadians can be in the scrap. And when this Dominion's soldiers do go across the Pacific they are destined to be a sort of bob-tail American outfit, equipped, trained and fed in U.S. style and probably wearing United States uniforms.

(Press Clipping No. 6190, Stratford Beacon-Herald, 22 May 45)

Mr. Maxine Raymond, national leader of the Bloc Populaire, on the one hand charged that Mr. King had engaged Canada to fight against Japan "to the last man and to the last cent" to serve only the interests of Great Britain. (Press Clipping No. 6115, Citizen, 25 May 45). Mr. M.J. Coldwell, national C.C.F. leader, on the other hand said that the Canadian role had been decided by the Americans, who regarded the war with Japan as "their own private quarrel" and therefore wanted the Canadians to fight as part of their Army rather than as a separate formation (Press Clipping No. 6259, Journal, 25 May 45).

205. It is impossible to follow here the various charges and counter-charges with respect to the C.A.P.F. policy which were leveled during the election campaign. For example, many editors foresaw that extra leave and campaign pay would be granted to the volunteers, yet immediately the official announcements were made there were cries of "bribery" from Mr. E.E. Perley, Progressive-Conservative candidate opposing General McNaughton (Press Clippings Nos. 5892 and 6082, Journal, 15 and 22 May 45). Two months later, when it was found necessary to reduce the number of days' leave in some cases, the Conservative Gazette accused the Defence Department of "welshing on full payment of the bribe" (Press Clipping No. 7375).

206. Newspapers which supported the Government were fully confident that sufficient volunteers would be obtained: those in opposition with equal assurance emphasized that there was little enthusiasm while draftees remained at home (Press Clippings Nos. 6279 and 6391, Toronto Star, 25 May, and Calgary Herald, 23 May 45). Presenting a non-partisan view, the official organ of the Canadian Legion contended that both volunteers and N.R.M.A. men should compose the force, which should be twice as large and in action much sooner or else the war might end before Canada could do her part (Press Clipping No. 6626, editorial from The Legionary reproduced by the Stratford Beacon-Herald, 7 Jun 45).

207. Outstanding among criticisms were continued references to reports from the United States that Canada's attitude was being misunderstood there. By the Conservative press the impression that Canada was fighting "a soft war" was attributed to some extent to the size of the force, but mainly to insistence upon the volunteer principle (Press Clipping No. 6664, Globe and Mail, 9 Jun 45). In officially welcoming Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeister to Ottawa on 14 June, however, the Prime Minister said in effect that Canada was sending all the soldiers that the United States had asked for at the Quebec Conference (Press Clipping No. 6744, Citizen, 15 Jun 45). Opposition papers at once asked why such an announcement had been delayed until after the election and the number of volunteers had been estimated (Press Clipping No. 7044, editorial of the Toronto Telegram, reproduced by the Gazette, 28 Jun 45). It was even suggested that perhaps the "conspicuously moderate commitments" had not been due to insistence by the Allies but "the result of the political adroitness with which the Canadian delegation managed the discussion" (Press Clipping No. 7636, Gazette, 23 Jul 45).

208. Criticism of the policy of the Government with regard to the Japanese war also expressed itself in protests against the retention of General McNaughton as Minister after his two political defeats (Press Clippings Nos. 7563 and 7729, Globe and Mail, 18 and 23 Jul 45). He remained in office, nevertheless, until hostilities had definitely ceased.

209. Immediately following the surrender of Japan there was much speculation regarding the fate of the C.A.P.F. and the possibility of Canada sharing in an occupational role. In an editorial entitled "The Wallflower of the Pacific", the Gazette pointed out that Canada's policy there had not been impressive to date, the Hong Kong force being her most significant contribution, and asked if the "same strategic silences" were to continue (Press Index No. 743, 23 Aug 45, item 8487, Gazette). The Prime Minister, however, before the end of August stated that the C.A.P.F. would be disbanded and that no occupation force was contemplated. Such pronouncements effectively ended further conjecture and little discussion of this question followed. With public attention fixed upon the repatriation of Hong Kong prisoners of war, the tendency was to withdraw all Canadians from the Orient rather than attempt to send troops there for garrison duty.

CONCLUSION: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE BALANCE
OF EFFORT BETWEEN THE THREE SERVICES

210. Frequent reference has been made in this report to statements concerning the importance of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan[#]. Mr. King and members of his Cabinet often spoke of it as a major contribution of Canada, an opinion which Mr. Churchill publicly proclaimed while in Ottawa^{**}. It would appear that whenever public impatience with the original static role of the Canadian Army reached a high pitch, a prominent speaker would issue a reminder that the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force were actively engaged and in particular that the Air Training Plan was of enormous value to the war effort.

211. It is questionable, however, how far Canadian public

See paragraphs 25, 50, 53, 63, 74, 94 and 129

** See paragraph 89.

opinion was prepared to accept this in itself as a satisfactory contribution to victory. Although recognizing the value of inter-service cooperation and the vital role of industry in modern warfare, the man on the street continued to think very largely in traditional terms of fighting by land forces. There were some who advocated increased naval strength and many who urged an all-out air effort, but the popular mind still recalled the exploits of the Canadian Corps in the First World War and recognized that the Army would again play a decisive role. The Ottawa Journal of 3 Jan 40, for example, in declaring that the Canadian people wanted many more troops to follow the 1st Division overseas, wrote: "They realize the vital need for air fighters, and will provide them, but we think they realize as well that there is need for land forces, and would like to give their share of them." Some two years later, when the New York Times published an editorial entitled "This is an Air War", the Globe and Mail of 10 Feb 42 countered that the need for shipping was then most pressing and went on to say: "When, however, the United Nations are able to assume the offensive, men, tanks and guns, no less than aircraft, will become the paramount consideration".

212. Such insistence upon a tri-service war effort, of course, meant exceedingly heavy demands upon Canada's limited resources of man power. It was on these grounds, rather than with respect to the high financial expenditure involved, that the most bitter political attacks were delivered. For example, in July 1943 the Financial Post alleged that the Canadian air ministry had been battling with army authorities to get priority to enlist category A men for aircrew. Mr. Graydon (then Leader of the Opposition) promptly asked on 24 Jul for a statement by the Minister. Although denying that there was any battle between the two Services, Mr. Power in his reply nevertheless made the following admission with regard to the Air Force:

We must state frankly that we are seriously alarmed at the lack of recruits coming forward in a constant stream sufficient to meet our current requirements. In other words, at the present time we are 'eating our fat' and not building up any reserve strength.

(Debates, 1943, vol V, p. 5359)

Referring to the article in the Post and to this Ministerial statement, the Conservative Vancouver Province of 30 Jul asked Col Ralston (who was then about to visit the Mediterranean theatre) to make certain not only that the Canadian Army had sufficient reinforcements but "that Canada's war policies will enable her to keep her commitments under the Commonwealth Air Training plan". The same article in the Post was used by the Vancouver Sun of 30 Jul to attack the Conservative party for charging that the Government had failed to enlist enough soldiers to maintain the Army overseas. Saying that this was the real basis of the original conscription issue, the Sun declared that "On the contrary, it is seen now that the government, undoubtedly under conscriptionist pressure, may have enlisted too many soldiers and thus endangered not only industrial production but also the vital progress of the Air Training Plan".

213. The foregoing will serve to illustrate that political leaders had constantly to be alert to public opinion regarding the balance of effort between the three Services. When attention turned to Japan, the Canadian public quite definitely again insisted that the initial emphasis upon the roles of the Navy and Air Force be expanded to a tri-service basis.* The part to be played by the Army was rapidly receiving wider emphasis when hostilities abruptly ceased.

214. It is to the credit of the people of Canada that, in a lengthy war introducing many unforeseen complexities, the ideal of a balanced effort remained uppermost. Proud of the achievements by which the Navy and Air Force were gaining distinction, Canadian public opinion was determined to see the Army also play an aggressive part when opportunities for active employment became available.

215. This report was written by Major R.B. Oglesby.

R. B. Oglesby Maj
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

* See Part VI of this report.