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REPORT NO. 39  
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

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Revised 31 Jan 51

Operations of 1 Cdn Corps in North-  
West Europe, 15 Mar - 5 May 45

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Operations of 1 Cdn Corps in  
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Reference Maps: G.S.G.S. 4414 Holland and Germany  
1/25,000 Sheets 4102, 4002, 3903,  
3803, 3703, 3902, 3802, 3702;  
G.S.G.S. 4427 Holland 5 N.W.,  
5 S.W., 5 S.E., 5 N.E., 6 S.W.,  
6 N.W., 388, 387, 379, 371, 364,  
378, 370, 363, 377, 369.

1. The following report deals with the activities of 1 Cdn Corps in North-West Europe from 15 Mar 45, when the Corps was operationally committed in this theatre of war, to 5 May 45, when hostilities ceased with the capitulation of the German forces. It concerns itself specifically with the operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Cdn Armd Div, 1 Cdn Armd Bde, and to a lesser extent with those of 49 (West Riding) Infantry Division, a British formation which came under command on the arrival of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps from Italy. It covers four operations: Operation "Destroyer", the expansion of the Nijmegen bridgehead to include the whole eastern part of the "island" between the Neder Rijn and the Waal Rivers by 49 (W.R.) Div and 11 Cdn Inf Bde; Operation "Cannonshot", the assault across the Ijssel north of Zutphen and the capture of Apeldoorn by 1 Cdn Inf Div, and the subsequent advance to Amersfoort; Operation "Anger", the assault across the upper reaches of the Ijssel River and the clearing of Arnhem by 49 (W.R.) Inf Div; and Operation "Cleanser", the drive north-west from Arnhem to the Ijsselmeer by 5 Cdn Armd Div. The code name "Faust" was given to the complete 1 Cdn Corps operation of clearing and administering Western Holland.\*\* ((H.S.) 222C1.(D43): G.O. 138, 1 Cdn Corps to 1 Cdn Inf Div etc, 16 Apr 45).

BACKGROUND TO 1 CDN CORPS' OPERATIONS

2. The German Armies never recovered from Hitler's last desperate gamble in the Ardennes. During the winter months of January and February the Allies pushed forward steadily and by the first week in March had driven the weakened enemy over the Rhine. This was the last great barrier left to the Germans in

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\*The following pages have been amended: 1, 2, 5, 9-19, 26-31, 34, 36, 43 and 51.

\*\*For the operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div when under command of 2 Cdn Corps, the reader should consult Hist Sec (A.H.Q.) Report No. 32, The Concluding Phase of Operations by First Canadian Army, 2 Apr - 5 May 45.

the west, and its crossing would open the way to the heart of industrial Germany. On 9 March Field Marshal Montgomery issued his directive for this operation to Ninth U.S. Army, Second British Army, and General H.D.G. Crerar's First Canadian Army. To the Canadians fell the task of holding the line of the Rhine and the Meuse from Emmerich to the sea, and ensuring the absolute security of the bridgehead over the Rhine at Nijmegen while the British and Americans were establishing the Rhine crossings. Once this had been accomplished First Canadian Army was to take over the Emmerich bridgehead and operate northwards. In the words of the Commander-in-Chief, these operations were designed to:

- (a) attack the Ijssel defences from the rear, i.e. from the east.
- (b) capture Deventer and Zutphen.
- (c) cross the Ijssel and capture Apeldoorn and the high ground between that place and Arnhem.
- (d) bridge the river at Arnhem and open up a good communication and supply route from Nijmegen, northwards through Arnhem, and thence to the north-east.

A secure flank will be formed facing west on some suitable line running northwards from the Neder Rijn about Renkum.

Operations will not be undertaken to the west of this flank into western Holland; having opened up a good supply route ... the axis of operations will be eastwards.

((H.S.) 215A21.016(D9): Op Directives, C.-in-C. 21 Army Group, Directive M 559, 9 Mar 45)

3. In his directive of 10 Mar General Crerar made Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds' 2 Cdn Corps responsible for the crossing of the Ijssel River from the Emmerich bridgehead, the capture of Deventer and Zutphen, and the capture of Apeldoorn with the high ground between there and Arnhem. While these operations were developing Lt-Gen Charles Foulkes' 1 Cdn Corps was to secure a bridgehead over the Neder Rijn and capture Arnhem. First Canadian Army was to be prepared to bridge the river at Arnhem and open up communications from Nijmegen through Arnhem and thence north-east. ((H.S.) 225C1.009(D13): G.O.C.'s personal file on Operations 1 Cdn Corps, General Crerar's Directive, 10 Mar 45)

4. At that time the formations of 1 Cdn Corps were in the process of assembling in Belgium following their arrival from Italy,\* and as yet had not been committed in an operational role in North-West Europe. They consisted of 5 Cdn Armd Div, 1 Cdn Armd Bde and 1 Cdn Inf Div, together with the usual complement of Corps Troops and attached formations from First Cdn Army. In order to conform to the current establishment in North-West Europe, various units of 1 Cdn Corps were, at this time, being regrouped and reorganized. On 13 Mar 12 Cdn Inf Bde, which had been formed some eight months before, was disbanded and its headquarters became the nucleus of 3 Cdn Base Reinforcement Group. The Order of Battle of the 12th Brigade was as follows:

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\*Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 181, Operation "Goldflake", The Move of 1 Cdn Corps from Italy to North-West Europe, February-March 1945.

4 P.L.D.G. (originally the reconnaissance unit of  
1 Cdn Inf Div)  
Westmr R. (Mot) (formerly of 5 Cdn Armd Bde)  
Lan & Ren Scot R.  
12 Cdn Indep M.G. Coy (P.L. Fus)  
8 Cdn Lt Fd Amb  
12 Cdn Inf Bde Coy R.C.A.S.C.  
12 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp R.C.E.M.E.

Under the new organization 4 P.L.D.G. was to become again 4 Cdn Recce Regt and assume its former role with the 1st Division upon completion of its change over from infantry. As before, Westmr R. (Mot) would go to 5 Cdn Armd Bde as the motor battalion. Lan & Ren Scot R. would again become a light anti-aircraft regiment (1 Cdn L.A.A. Regt) with 1 Cdn Corps, and 12 Cdn Indep M.G. Coy would reinforce the Princess Louise Fusiliers of the 11th Brigade (11 Cdn Indep M.G. Coy). The Field Ambulance unit was to be redesignated as 8 F.D.S. and become a part of Corps Troops. 12 Cdn Inf Bde Coy R.C.A.S.C. was to become a L. of C. company for use in the reinforcement groups, and the Brigade R.C.E.M.E. unit was to be a workshop unit with the 1st Echelon (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Base Reinf Gp, 12-31 Mar 45).

5. Not only the 12th Brigade was affected by the changes of theatres of war. In 1 Cdn Armd Bde the R.C.E.M.E. Tank Troop Workshop and the Heavy Recovery Section, which had been with the Brigade since the autumn of 1941, was transferred to the command of 1 Cdn Corps. The 1st Cdn Assault Troop, consisting of a troop headquarters and three sections per armoured regiment, was disbanded on 23 Mar. This unit had been organized in June 1944 after the Liri Valley Campaign and had given valuable aid to the Brigade during subsequent operations. Changes in vehicles and equipment were also made. A new War Establishment, current in North-West Europe, affected mainly the tank holdings of each armoured regiment and Brigade Headquarters. The War Diary of the Brigade states that each troop in the armoured regiments was to have four tanks - two 17-pounder Shermans and two 75-mm Shermans. Each squadron was to consist of four of these troops with two 105-mm Shermans and one 75-mm Sherman in squadron headquarters. This change left the regiments with thirty-one 75-mm Shermans and increased the 17-pounder holding to twenty-four. The eight 105-mm Shermans remained. The reconnaissance troops were re-equipped entirely with eleven 37-mm Stuart VI (Cadillac) light tanks. The previous tanks - the turretless Stuarts - were retained to be used as combat supply vehicles. Although these were not included in the establishment they were operated by the spare crews in the regiments, which included the extra co-driver from each of the 17-pounders, 24 in all. A total of sixty 17-pounder Shermans were allotted to the 1st Armoured Brigade (W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Armd Bde, 17-23 Mar 45). The allotment to each armoured regiment in 5 Cdn Armd Div appeared to be slightly different:

Sherman V (C) (17-pounder)	24
Sherman 105-mm	6
Sherman V	30
Stuart VI	11
Tanks Recce	<u>3</u>
Total	75

((H.S.)249C5.(D63): Org & Adm  
Notes re Eqpt 1 Cdn Corps,  
Appx 'A' to 5 Cdn Armd Div  
Letter 5-1/AQ, 5 Mar 45).

The 3rd Cdn Armd Recce Regt (G.G.H.G.) was to be re-equipped on this basis, although still retaining its identity as the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment (ibid; W.D., 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (G.G.H.G.), 20-25 Mar 45). An interesting comment appears in the War Diary of 5 Cdn Armd Bde:

The comd brought back word that in accordance with the gen practice in the theatre tks will be given the added protection of old track links welded on to the hull and turret. Approx one hundred and twenty links per tank will be used and the exact placing of the links will be left to the crew. Chief cause of the added armour is as a morale booster but it is reported as being an effective anti-bazooka measure.

(W.D., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde,  
22 Mar 45)

6. Sten Machine Carbines were issued to replace the Thompson, which had been withdrawn from the units on leaving Italy. In 8 Cdn Fd Regt (S.P.) the present guns were to be exchanged for 25-pounders on Ram chassis and in 4 Cdn Anti-Tank Regt the 15-cwt half-track was to be the towing vehicle for the 17-pounder. ((H.S.) 24905.(D63): Org and Adm, Notes re Eqpt, 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 'A' to 5 Cdn Armd Div Letter 5-1/AQ, 5 Mar 45) In the Westmr R. (Mot) the White scout cars were replaced by the White half-tracks, the wheeled gun-towers were exchanged for T16 carriers, and six Wasp and six Lifebuoy Manpack flame throwers were added to the unit's equipment holdings. (W.D., Westmr R. (Mot), 26 Mar 45) The Diary of the Westminsters states that the old 60-cwt G.S. trucks were much preferred to the new 60-cwt Mobile Kitchen Trucks and that the retention of the former, after much discussion, was finally arranged (ibid). The 98th Field Regiment (S.P.) was also affected by the new establishment: the 25-pounder Sexton replaced the 105-mm Priests. Apparently the condition of these new weapons left much to be desired:

The Sextons were found to be in much poorer condition than the 17-Pdr Sherman tanks which had been taken over by the Armoured Regiments. Several breech blocks and firing pins were utterly ruined due to rust and dirt - dial sights had been left open so that these were absolutely unserviceable. This caused considerable delay and trouble as the Brigade was attempting to reach the completion stage of re-equipping and readiness for battle in the minimum amount of time.

(W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Armd Bde,  
21 Mar 45)

The immediate result of all this was that a great deal of training had to be accomplished within a very short time. In the armoured regiments an almost complete change took place in the troop and squadron organization. Most of the gun crews were unfamiliar with the new weapons, and it was necessary, not only to train the crews in handling and maintenance, but also to "shoot in" the guns. The infantry had to become familiar with the "new" Stens, and considerable maintenance had to be done on the Sextons. By hard work this was accomplished; within eight days of receiving the new weapons 11 Cdn Armd Regt was ready to be committed and by the end of the month the majority of the units were fit for an operational role. (Ibid, 19 Mar 45)

7. The historic attempt to take Arnhem in September 1944 had failed, but the ultimate capture of that city and the bridging of the Neder Rijn had remained as a necessity for the success of the future operations of 21 Army Group. As a result of instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief in November, First Cdn Army had made an extremely detailed study of possible offensive measures to be taken in that sector ((H.S.) 215A21.016 (D9): Ops 21 Army Group, C.-in-C. Op Directive M534, 2 Nov 44, para 12). This study, issued on 21 Feb 45, gave the code name "Anger" to the Canadian thrust out of the Nijmegen bridgehead across the Neder Rijn aimed at assisting in opening the Emmerich crossing of the Rhine ((H.S.) 224C1.009(D13): Operation "Anger", A study of G Plans, Headquarters First Canadian Army, 21 Feb 45). Partly because of the extensive flood conditions which existed during February and March and the commitment of assault craft to Operation "Plunder"\*, this plan, as such, was never carried out. Nevertheless the fund of logistical and topographical information at hand was to prove of immense value when the time came for the clearing of the "island" and the capture of Arnhem.

8. On 15 Mar 1 Cdn Corps became responsible for the sector along the River Waal between 1 British Corps on the left and 2 Cdn Corps on the right i.e. from Heerwaarden (380608) to Leuth (794627) ((H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 15 Mar 45). Its headquarters were then at Wijchen, some seven miles south-west of Nijmegen. At the same time 49 (West Riding) Division, which had been guarding the Nijmegen bridgehead during the February operations of 2 Cdn Corps, passed from command of that formation to 1 Cdn Corps (*ibid*). The Nijmegen bridgehead, inherited from the battle for Arnhem, extended in an arc north from the Waal along a general line passing through Elst (6970) and comprised about one-third of the so-called "island" lying between the Waal and the Neder Rijn. ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Summ C.I.G.S./2/6: C.I.G.S. Summary No. 284, 16 Mar 45, Map A). In conferences between Lt-Gen Foulkes and Maj-Gen G.H.A. MacMillan, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., then commanding 49 (W.R.) Div,\*\* it was decided that before the Neder Rijn could be bridged and Arnhem captured preliminary operations to clear the "island" up to the left bank of that river had to be undertaken. The British Division was given the major role, no doubt because of its familiarity with the terrain, and, at the request of Maj-Gen MacMillan, an armoured regiment (11 Cdn Arm'd Regt (Ont R.)) was put under temporary command on 23 Mar ((H.S.) 235B49.011(D1): MacMillan to Foulkes, 7 Mar 45, and W.D., 11 Cdn Arm'd Regt, 23 Mar 45). Two days previously Westmr R. (Mot) on moving to Alphen (4360) had come under command of the 49th and had taken over the left flank of the Corps sector at Wamel (4367) and Drœumel (4163) (W.D., Westmr R. (Mot), 21 Mar 45). In order that 56, 146, and 147 Bdes of the 49th Division could regroup in the Oosterhout - Bemmel area, 11 Cdn Inf Bde relieved 56 Bde in the left sector of the bridgehead and came under temporary command of the British Division on 28 Mar. Ir R.C. relieved 2 S.W.B. at Zetten (613717), Perth R. relieved 2 Glosters south of Elst (699703), and The Cape Breton Highlanders took over from

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\*Hist Sec (A.H.Q.) Report No. 19, Operation "Plunder":  
The Canadian Participation in the Assault Across the Rhine and  
the Expansion of the Bridgehead 23/24 Mar - 1 Apr 45.

\*\*On 24 Mar Maj-Gen MacMillan took command of 51 (H) Div and was succeeded by Maj-Gen S.B. Rawlins, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.



2 Essex north of Valburg\* (660699) with Brigade Headquarters at Valburg (W.D., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Mar 45; (H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 28 Mar 45). On the following day 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt moved to the area of Andelst in order to support the Brigade (W.D., 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (G.G.H.G.), 29 Mar 45). It was planned that, with the exception of the 11th Brigade, Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeister's 5 Cdn Armd Div would have primarily a "holding role" during the clearing of the "island" ((H.S.) 24905.2(D3): Operations General R.C.A., 1 Cdn Corps Planning Notes No. 1, Op "Destroyer" 26 Mar 45). On 28 Mar Divisional Headquarters moved to Ewijk, west of Nijmegen, and on 31 Mar took under command the 11th Brigade, the Westminsters, and 49 Div Recce Regt, which had been guarding the Waal in the area of Leeuwen (4867) i.e. between Wamel (4367) and Druten (5368) (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 28-31 Mar 45). At this time the inter-divisional boundary was determined as running from De Hulk (629676) to the railway junction south of Elst, thence north-east to the hamlet of De Overmaat (722743) ((H.S.) 225C1.016(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 30 Mar 45).

9. On 24 Mar General Crerar issued instructions to elaborate his directive of 10 Mar. In part these were:

When 2 Canadian Corps has captured the STOKKAMMER BOSCH and HOCH-ELTEN features and is proceeding to secure the objective DOETINCHEM - PANNERDEN, 1 Canadian Corps will clear the enemy from the South-eastern portion of the NIJMEGEN "Island", and make contact with 2 Canadian Corps along the PANNERDENSCHÉ KANAAL. As 2 Canadian Corps develops its operation Northwards and secures its left flank to the line of the R IJSSEL between DOESBURG and WESTERVOORT, 1 Canadian Corps will clear the enemy from the Northern portion of the "Island" and gain control of the left bank of the NEDER RIJN as may be necessary to permit the subsequent launching of operations across the NEDER RIJN referred to ... below.

After 2 Canadian Corps had secured the general line DELDEN - HOLTEN - DEVENTER, its task will be to force the crossing of the R IJSSEL at selected sector, or sectors, between DEVENTER and DOESBURG, both inclusive, and secure the general line APELDOORN - OTTERLOO. 1 Canadian Corps will then be responsible for establishing a bridgehead North of the NEDER RIJN, to the West of ARNHEM, following which ARNHEM will be captured. This assault crossing by 1 Canadian Corps will be planned to take place at the same time as, or slightly subsequent to, the crossing of R IJSSEL by 2 Canadian Corps.

The boundary between 2 Canadian Corps and 1 Canadian Corps will be extended from E846642 to E847645 then all exclusive 2 Canadian Corps the R RHINE, PANNERDENSCHÉ KANAAL and NEDER RIJN to confluence of NEDER RIJN and R IJSSEL - ARNHEM.

((H.S.) 225C1.009(D13): Operations  
1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C's Personal File,  
Gen Crerar's Directive, 24 Mar 45)

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\*2 S.W.B. ----- 2 Bn South Wales Borderers  
2 Glosters ----- 2 Bn Gloucestershire Regiment  
2 Essex ----- 2 Bn Essex Regiment

10. The assault across the Rhine began on 24 Mar. It was a complete success, and by the 28th the Commander-in-Chief was able to announce that the "Battle of the Rhine" had been won. In his directive of that day he ordered First Canadian Army to operate in conformance with his previous instructions (see para 2). General Crerar's forces would then be prepared to clear north-east Holland, and the coastal belt to the north of the boundary of the Second Army (Hengelo - Nordhorn - Lingen - Haselunne - Bremen - Hamburg), and West Holland. This last task was the result of a meeting which the Army Commander had with Field Marshal Montgomery on 27 Mar. In General Crerar's words:

The C-in-C went on to say that recent intelligence indicated that the enemy might be intending to evacuate the western Netherlands, a likelihood which would be increased as the 2nd Canadian Corps pursued its northward advance. On the other hand, if the enemy did not withdraw and for high political reasons it became necessary to carry out military operations against him in that part of the country, these would require to be conducted under my direction. Field Marshal Montgomery hoped, and was inclined to believe, however, that such a diversion of forces would not be necessary as it would tend to detract from the effort to achieve the main object - which was the complete defeat of the main German armies in northwest Europe.

((H.S.) 215C1.013(D1 & 1a):  
Dispatch by Gen H.D.G. Crerar CB  
DSO covering Operations of First  
Canadian Army from 11th Mar -  
5th May 45 to the Minister of  
National Defence, 29 May 45,  
para 12)

On 2 Apr the G.O.C.-in-C. gave the tentative task of clearing West Holland to 1 Cdn Corps:

... it may become necessary for 1 Canadian Corps to advance westwards, north of R Maas, and clear West Holland, while 2 Canadian Corps is carrying out [its] responsibilities.... Decision as to this will be communicated at a later date.

Should it be decided that the clearing of West HOLLAND by 1 Canadian Corps is not to be undertaken, then First Canadian Army will regroup on a two Corps front, and advance into GERMANY between the inter-Army boundary on its Right, and the sea on its Left, destroying, or capturing, all enemy forces as it proceeds.

((H.S.) 225C1.009(D13): Operations  
1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C.'s Personal  
File, Gen Crerar's Directive,  
2 Apr 45)

It will be seen that as the operations of 2 Cdn Corps progressed and the Germans retreated westwards instead of to the east, the liberation of West Holland became a military and political necessity.

11. On 27 Mar Lt-Gen Foulkes issued his outline plan for the clearing of the "island", the capture of Arnhem, and the subsequent drive to the north to 49 (W.R.) Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div. It was originally planned that 5 (Brit) Inf Div was to be committed but at the last minute this formation was transferred to 2 Cdn Corps in order to add weight to the northward push. ((H.S.) 225Cl.009(D13): Operations 1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C.'s Personal File, Lt-Gen Foulkes' Directive, 27 Mar 45). In general, the plan was this: In the first phase of Operation "Destroyer" the 49th Division would expand the right sector of the salient to clear the south-eastern portion of the "island" between the River Maas and the Panterdensch Canal as far north as Huisson (7672). This would take place to coincide with the capture of the Doetinchem - Panterdem objective by 2 Cdn Corps. In the second phase 5 Cdn Armd Div would expand the western sector of the bridgehead to the left bank of the Neder Rijn and as far west as Heteren (6475). Once the "island" had been cleared a "scramble" crossing of the Neder Rijn at Oosterbeek (6977) would be made by the British, under the code name "Quick Anger". Operations would then be developed to capture Arnhem and to bridge the river. If the enemy continued to hold the right bank of the Neder Rijn after 2 Cdn Corps had bridged the IJssel north of Zutphen (Operation "Cannonshot"), 1 Cdn Corps would do a forced crossing of the Neder Rijn at Renkum (6276), secure a bridgehead west of Arnhem, capture Arnhem and the high ground north and west of the city, and build a bridge across the river (Operation "Anger"). On completion of the bridge at Arnhem 5 Cdn Armd Div would pass through 49 (W.R.) Div and expand the bridgehead north and west to the line Otterloo (6591) - Ede (5885) - Wageningen (5876), at the same time gaining contact with 2 Cdn Corps on the right. (Ibid). This was subsequently given the code name "Cleanser". It was decided that although 2 Cdn Corps would be responsible for the IJssel operation, 1 Cdn Inf Div would do the job, and be under temporary command of 2 Cdn Corps until the bridgehead was established. The tentative date for "Destroyer" was set for 2 Apr and was later confirmed.

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE NIJMEGEN "ISLAND"  
AND ENEMY SITUATION 1 APR 45

12. The "island" is bounded on the north by the Neder Rijn, on the south by the Waal and the east by the Panterdensch Canal. The term "island" is used because the two rivers, after diverging at Millingen (8364), nearly join again at Rheën (5175); thus forming an almost water-locked area between Nijmegen and Arnhem. This area generally consists of low ground, predominantly of clay, which slopes gradually to the west and is criss-crossed with ditches. Dykes on the river bound the area and the whole of the "island" is about even with the average river levels. The "island" itself is drained by the River Linge, which runs from east to west and is fed by the sloping ground from the northern and southern dykes. Roads travel the main dykes and, with the exception of the Nijmegen - Arnhem highway, are the only ones which are embanked. The railway line between Nijmegen and Arnhem neatly severs the eastern part of the "island" from the larger, western sector, and a spur of this line runs west from Nijmegen to Kesteren (5173) and thence north. It was known that if the river level reached more than 35 feet at Nijmegen the result of breaching the dyke in the vicinity of Doornenburg (8267) or Hulhuizen (8166) would be to inundate completely the "island" with the exception of a small area north of Nijmegen. As this would have the effect of making all roads impassable, any operation on the "island" depended on the river level being below this flood mark. ((H.S.) 224Cl.009(D13): Op "Anger", Outline Appreciation Operation "Anger", 24 Feb 45)

13. Before offensive operations began the enemy was believed to be in the process of strengthening his defences east of the Ijssel but thinning out elsewhere in Holland ((H.S.) 222C1, (D150); 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 255, 1 Apr 45). Information from prisoners taken on patrol indicated that the calibre of troops left on the "island" was not very high. For example, 46 Fortress (M.G.) Bn, said to be responsible for the defence of Driel and the northern sector, was described as follows:

The transportation system in 3 Coy is to say the least unique if not original. The amm comes forward in a baby carriage. The Bn is sometimes known as the Artificial Limb Bn, and our night-blind PW knows of several cripples and men with wooden legs in the unit.

(Ibid, No. 242, 20 Mar 45)

#### THE PLAN FOR OPERATION "DESTROYER"

14. Briefly, the 49th Division's plan for Operation "Destroyer" was to clear the east sector of the Nijmegen "island" south of a line drawn from the confluence of the Ijssel and Neder Rijn through Rijkerswaard (7272) to Aam (7170). The attack was to be carried out in two phases. In Phase I 147 Inf Bde was to break out through Haalderen (7566) and push east through Doornenburg (8167) to the Neder Rijn. In Phase II 146 Inf Bde was to pass through 147 Bde eastward from Haalderen and south of Flieren (7867), then swing north to Angeren (7770) and Huissen (7672). 146 Bde had a second axis of advance from Bemmel (7367) through 'tZand (7571). 56 Inf Bde was to hold the existing line from Haalderen to Aam and support both phases. There was also to be bomber fighter support. Meanwhile reconnaissance elements of 2 Cdn Corps would advance east of the Neder Rijn towards the Ijssel and 11 Cdn Inf Bde would move forward on the left in conjunction with Phase II to secure the crossroads at De Gouden Klomp (711733) in order to link up with the West Riding. The composition of the assaulting brigades of 49 (W.R.) Inf Div was as follows:

##### 147 Inf Bde:

7 Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	(7 D.W.R.)
11 Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers	(11 R.S.F.)
1 Bn Leicestershire Regiment	(1 Leicesters)

##### 146 Inf Bde:

1/4 Bn King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	(1/4 K.O.Y.L.I.)
Hallamshire Battalion, York and Lancashire Regiment (T.A.)	(Hallams)
4 Bn Lincolnshire Regiment	(4 Lincolns)

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\*See Appx "A", 49 (W.R.) Inf Div O.O. No. 7, Operation "Destroyer". See also Map 1 of this Report.



road north of Driel (680758). In the meantime 146 Inf Bde had entered Itzand and Huissen, which had been bombed by two squadrons of Spitfires with good effect. ((H.S.) 225Cl.(D1): Ops-Log 1 Cdn Corps, 2-3 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 2-3 Apr 45; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 2-3 Apr 45; W.D., 11 Cdn Armd Regt, 2-3 Apr 45; 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, Int Summary No. 147, 2 Apr 45; ((H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 2-3 Apr 45). It is interesting to note that 11 Cdn Inf Bde became the first Canadian formation to have seen action in two theatres of war.

17. During 3 Apr the British Division moved forward to the line of the Pannerdensch Kanaal. Huissensche Waarden (758741) (north of Huissen), and Rijkerswaard were occupied, and late in the afternoon Elden (729755), Malburgen (759752) and Kronenburg (722746) fell. At 1530 hours 4 Lincolns reported crossing the Neder Rijn east of Huissen (7872). By means of landing-craft, a squadron of 49 Div Recce Regt immediately exploited this success, passing through the Lincolns and pushing on to occupy Westervoort (7875) without opposition. Having crossed the waterway west of Pannerden (8267), 1 Leicesters made contact with 7 Cdn Recce Regt near Herwen (871663) at 1700 hours and two hours later reported that Pannerden was clear, also that it had linked up with the Emmerich squadron of 49 Div Recce Regt. On the night of 3/4 Apr the Germans made their only aggressive move of the operation when a strong patrol unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate the positions of C.B. Highrs. To test the defences of the Arnhem area patrols from 2 Glosters and the Hallams crossed near Oosterbeek (713763) (just west of Arnhem) and Huissen (770744) and reported defended localities in both areas. (Ibid).

18. With the clearing of the causeway between Eldon (7375) and Praets (7377) (1700 yards north-east of Eldon) on the night of 4/5 Apr, the last of the enemy were flushed from the "island" and Operation "Destroyer" came to a close.\* Some 200 prisoners had been taken and the area along the Neder Rijn from Wageningen (5876) to the Waal (8265) was now in Allied hands. ((H.S.) 222Cl.(D150): 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 257, 3 Apr 45). Preparations were immediately begun for the assault crossing of the river west of Arnhem. On 5 Apr 5 Cdn Armd Div took command of the sector with the defence of the "island" area becoming the responsibility of the 11th Brigade. The previous night 1 Belgian Bde relieved Westmr R. (Mot) and 49 Div Recce Regt along the Waal, which allowed the former to take over the positions of the 49th Division on the Neder Rijn and the reconnaissance regiment to revert to its parent formation. The British Division was now free to regroup prior to the assault: 146 and 147 Inf Bdes moved respectively east and west of the Nijmegen - Arnhem railway south of Elst, while 56 Inf Bde concentrated in Nijmegen. The Canadians were ordered to carry out aggressive patrolling ((H.S.) 225Cl.016 (D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 4-6 Apr 45).

19. To screen the regrouping of the British from the enemy-held high ground north and west of Arnhem an extensive smoke-coverage programme was instituted on 5 Apr. Seven smoke generator points were set up stretching east from near Hermon (605729), 900 yards north-west of Zetten, to Rijkerswaard (7272). Operated by the smoke generator companies of First Cdn Army, for over a week they provided an extremely effective screen for the concentration of 49 (W.R.) Div ((H.S.) 225Cl.016(D2): Op Instructions 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 43, Smoking of the Neder Rijn, 4-5 Apr 45).

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\*For a more detailed account of this operation see Hist Sec (A.H.Q.) Report No. 32, Part I, paras 38-46.

PLANNING BY 21 ARMY GROUP AND FIRST CDN ARMY

20. Meanwhile east of the Ijssel 2 Cdn Corps was making a spectacular advance. By 5 Apr both 2 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Cdn Armd Div were across the Twente Canal and driving rapidly to the north. On the left flank 3 Cdn Inf Div was pushing along the east bank of the Ijssel preparatory to the clearing of Zutphen and Deventer. Despite this threat on their flank the enemy showed no intention of leaving West Holland and the C.-in-C. had no alternative but to issue orders to First Canadian Army for the liberation of this area. In part these were:

One Corps, of at least two divisions, will ... operate westwards to clear up western HOLLAND. This may take some time; it will proceed methodically until completed.

Simultaneously with the clearing of western HOLLAND, the remainder of Canadian Army will operate northwards to clear northeast HOLLAND, and then eastwards to clear the coastal belt and all enemy naval establishments up to the line of the WESER.

In the operations of Canadian Army the available resources in engineers, bridging equipment, etc, may not be sufficient for all purposes. In this case the operations [in northeast Holland] will take priority; the clearing of western HOLLAND will take second priority.

Canadian Army will be responsible for establishing civil control in western and northeast HOLLAND as these areas are cleared.

Canadian Army will have priority for all amphibious resources of 79 Armd Div e.g. buffaloes, etc. These will very probably be necessary in western HOLLAND and may serve to speed up the operations in that area.

((H.S.) 215A21.016(D9): Ops 21  
Army Gp, C.-in-C. Directive  
M.567, 5 Apr 45, pp 27-28).

1 Cdn Corps was given this task as planned. In summing up the situation General Crerar wrote:

I appreciated that the Germans could not now withdraw their forces from the western Netherlands where they appeared to have chosen to fight a separate battle, standing first along the Ijssel and then the Grebbe and New Water lines further to the west. For such a contest the Commander of the Twenty-fifth Army would have the combined resources of the troops still remaining in the country as a garrison, and the formations now falling back across the river as a result of my offensive to the north. It was to be assumed that his total forces would number about 100,000 men. Not all of his formations were experienced in battle, nor at full strength, but with varied water obstacles which they were evidently prepared to exploit without regard to the further devastation by flooding of large areas of the country at this stage of the war, they were capable of putting up a strong defence. At the same time I hold only a low priority on the special resources necessary to carry my operations westward to the North Sea.

(Crerar's Despatch,  
29 May 45, para 21)

21. The decision to liberate West Holland was not an easy one to take; both military and political aspects made this operation extremely delicate. On one hand any engagement in this area would of necessity detract from the main effort of 21 Army Group to the north-east. On the other hand the Dutch population was reported to be suffering from great privations under the German garrison. It was imperative that as quickly as possible aid be rendered to the starving civilians. The Germans, however, were strongly entrenched behind excellent defence lines which could be easily bolstered by an extensive flooding programme. Such measures would not only hamper the Canadian advance but would do irreparable damage to Dutch agriculture. This was particularly true of the extreme western sector where the waters if let in would be salt and more injurious to the land than the brackish waters of the IJsselmeer. Lastly there was always the desire to minimize among the Dutch civilians the loss of life and property which air and artillery bombardment would be bound to cause. ((H.S.) 225Cl.013(D9): Ops 1 Cdn Corps Apr/May 45; Draft Outline of Ops 1 Cdn Corps in Clearing West Holland, Apr 45, by Hist Offr, 1 Cdn Corps).

#### PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION "ANGER"

22. It will be recalled that during the winter alternative plans had been made for the capture of Arnhem, both calling for a left-flanking movement by crossing the Neder Rijn west of that city. Plans for Operation "Anger" envisaged a wide sweep in the vicinity of Renkun; those for Operation "Quick Anger" called for a scramble crossing near Oosterbeek and therefore much closer to Arnhem. When the floods receded in the spring, however, it was found that the roads on the "island" would not stand up to three or four days heavy traffic without continued fine weather and intense sapper work on road maintenance. Moreover, due to variability of wind direction and openness of terrain, the smoke screening had not been sufficient to hide the reconnaissance and dumping activities around Driel; enemy activity in the Oosterbeek area clearly indicated he was expecting an attack there. For these reasons Lt-Gen Foulkes made a radical change of plan, abandoned the idea of a left hook against Arnhem, and decided to use the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division in a right hook across the IJssel near Westervoort (7875). The engineer commitments of this plan were only about 50% those of the original, a covered concentration was possible, and surprise might be achieved. (Ibid: Crerar's Despatch, para 27; ((H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 7 Apr 45). The alternative plans for taking Arnhem were discussed at the Corps Commander's conference on 6 Apr and the following day the decision to assault in the Westervoort area became firm (W.D., C.E. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 6-7 Apr 45).

23. In accordance with the new plan for Operation "Anger", the West Riding and the Canadian Divisions regrouped east of the river on 11-12 Apr. 11 R.S.F. with one squadron of 49 Div Recce Regt relieved 7 Cdn A/Tk Regt at Westervoort. 5 Cdn Armd Div closed its headquarters at Ewijk and moved to Didan (8972) with H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde at Wehl (9574). 11th Brigade remained on the "island" under temporary command of Brigadier W.C. Murphy's 1 Cdn Armd Bde until 13 Apr, when it moved to Didan (8972). 1 Cdn Armd Bde, which became responsible for the Corps sector west of the Neder Rijn (Pannerdensche Canal), had under command, besides the infantry brigade and the Belgian troops, 7 Cdn A/Tk Regt, 5 Cdn L.A.A. Regt and 335 L.A.A. Bty acting as infantry ((H.S.) 225Cl.016(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 10-12 Apr 45; W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, H.Q. 1 Cdn Armd Bde, 10-12 Apr 45). By the morning of 12 Apr 49 (W.R.) Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div were in position for the assault on Arnhem and the breakthrough to the north.



24. The main tasks assigned by General Crerar to Lt-Gen Simonds were to force the Ijssel River from east to west and to develop an armoured thrust into north-east Holland. The northward thrust enjoyed priority but, due to the geographic location of his Corps, it was necessary to make the Ijssel crossing his responsibility also. For that specific purpose, therefore, 1 Cdn Inf Div on arrival from Italy was placed under temporary command of 2 Cdn Corps. In his directive of 7 Apr General Crerar outlined his intentions:

As the converging operations "CANNONSHOT" ... and "QUICK ANGER" ... reach an appropriate stage, it is intended that the Command of 1 Canadian Infantry Division, which is carrying out the former operation, will pass from 2 Canadian Corps to 1 Canadian Corps. Commander 1 Canadian Corps will then be responsible for the completion of the operations required to secure the area West of the R IJSSEL and North of the NEDER RIJN, all inclusive APELDOORN - OTTERLOO - RENKUM.

1 Canadian Corps will then operate Westwards, to clear up West HOLLAND. This may take some time. It will proceed methodically, until completed.

((H.S.) 225Cl.009(D13): Ops 1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C's Personal File, Gen Crerar's Directive, 7 Apr 45)

25. There is evidence that the two operations ("Cannonshot" and "Quick Anger") were originally scheduled for 6 Apr, but the difficulty 3 Cdn Inf Div encountered in taking Zutphen and Deventer and the delay caused by the switch in plans for the capture of Arnhem, made a postponement necessary. (ibid, 1 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 45, Op "Keystone", 6 Apr 45; (H.S.) 235Cl.013(D8): Ops Log, 1 Cdn Inf Div, 4 Apr 45). Thus, it was not until the afternoon of the 11th that the opening shots across the Ijssel were fired. For "Cannonshot" H hour was 1630 hrs 11 Apr; for "Anger" it was 2240 hrs 12 Apr 45.

#### TOPOGRAPHY OF THE ARNHEM - APELDOORN AREA

26. At this point it is necessary to describe the terrain over which the Canadians and British were to operate. The area extended from the Neder Rijn in the south to the Ijsselmeer in the north, and was bounded on the east by the Ijssel River and west by the Eem River and the Luntersche Beek. Nearly midway between Deventer and Zutphen the Ijssel River makes a two mile meander to the east near Gorssel (9401), before resuming its northward course. It was at the southern part of this "bulge"\* that the assault of 1 Cdn Inf Div was to take place. Approximately eight miles due west lay Apeldoorn, before the war a prosperous paper-manufacturing centre of 70,000 people, and the largest city of the "veluwe" area of west Holland. This "veluwe" extends west from Apeldoorn towards Amersfoort for nearly eight miles and stretches south to the Neder Rijn and north almost to the Ijsselmeer. It consists of heavily wooded sandy hills rising to over one hundred feet, and interlaced with innumerable paths

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\*The official name for this is the Nijenbeker on Wilpsche Klei but for convenience it will be referred to simply as the Gorssel bulge.

and cart tracks. Between Apeldoorn and the Ijssel the country is extremely flat, broken only by hedge-rows and occasional woods. Main railway lines, highly embanked, run south-west from Deventer and north-west from Zutphen to Apeldoorn. The Apeldoorn Canal begins at Dieren (seven miles south of Zutphen), carves its way through the eastern suburbs of Apeldoorn, and eventually links up with the Ijssel near Zwolle (Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series, Netherlands, October, 1944). The Canal, with the hills of the "veluwe" behind it, forms a natural barrier to any force approaching from the east.

27. Reconnaissance patrols reported that the Ijssel River at the Gorssel bulge was over 300 feet wide, with a fairly slow current. Approaches to the river were difficult, with steep 10-foot muddy banks on the southern side. On the enemy side of the river it was known that the Germans were in the habit of manning the 12-foot sandy banks at night and withdrawing to defended localities during the day, several hundred yards inland. The bulge itself was composed of turf and sand, characteristically dyked, and capable of supporting heavy vehicles ((H.S.) 235.013(D8): Ops Log, 1 Cdn Inf Div, 9 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 9 Apr 45).

28. The Neder Rijn flows past the front door of Arnhem and provides a natural obstacle to any force attacking from Nijmegen. Immediately north and behind the city the southern base of the "veluwe" rises sharply to dominate completely the approaches from the south. Some 2000 yards south-east of Arnhem the Ijssel diverges from the Neder Rijn and flows in a northerly direction through Zutphen, Deventer, and Zwolle. It was just north of the branch of the two rivers and across the Ijssel that the attack of 49 (W.R.) Inf Div was to be launched. To the west of Arnhem the ground slopes off sharply and is generally the same character as the "island", apart from a long narrow ridge running north-east of Rhenen (5175). Roads are plentiful north and west of Arnhem, the main ones being the Arnhem - Apeldoorn and the Arnhem - Amersfoort highways. The principal arteries east are from Arnhem to Emmerich and from Arnhem to Zutphen, with two double tracks joining the Arnhem - Apeldoorn and Arnhem - Zutphen roads ((H.S.) 224C1.009(D13): Op "Anger", Outline Appreciation Operation "Anger", 24 Feb 45).

#### THE ENEMY SITUATION IN WESTERN HOLLAND, 10 APR 45

29. The growing practice of cannibalizing the German units had made it almost impossible to produce an accurate order of battle, with the result that even now no clear picture of the enemy situation could be drawn ((H.S.) 222C1.(D150): 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 255, 1 Apr 45). It was known, however, that of the 10,000 troops estimated to be manning the defences of the Arnhem - Apeldoorn area, 700 to 1000 constituted the garrison force of Arnhem (*ibid*, No. 258, 3 Apr 45). Various units had contributed to this number but the majority came from 346 Inf Div, whose primary responsibility was believed to be the sector between Emmerich and Arnhem. Subsequent information was to prove that this division was unique in that it had undergone no major refit or reformation since its first action on 6 June, and by a combination of plain good luck and the skill of its commander, had managed even at this late date to retain its original identity ((H.S.) 215C1.009(D133): Interrogation Reports, 346 Inf Div, Special Interrogation of German Comds, Genlt Erich Diestal). Based on information received from civilians, it was

believed that a substantial number of paratroopers were in the process of reinforcing Arnhem and its adjacent defences on the Neder Rijn ((H.S.) 222Cl.(D.150): 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 242, 20 Mar 45).

30. To the north, the garrison of Apeldoorn was known to total some 1500 troops of 361 Volksgrenadier Division. This formation, like so many others, had been rebuilt from original remnants more than once. It had faced near annihilation in Poland in the summer of 1944, and in Alsace during the winter months of 1944-45, before being sent to West Holland. (Ibid, No. 234, 19 Feb 45; Order of Battle of the German Army, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington D.C., March 1945). From the interrogation of prisoners it was known that the "Volksgrenadiers" had been made responsible for the defence of the Ijssel north of Arnhem, and that they contained the increasingly familiar complement of very old and very young, inexperienced and untrained, in which were intermingled Luftwaffe and Naval personnel ((H.S.) 215Cl.98(D94): Interrogation Reports, 361 VG Division, 4 Apr 45).

31. Together with 346 and 361 Divisions it was believed that a new division - 6 Para Div - was also in the sector, and as it was well known that northern Holland had for long been the centre for Wehrmacht reinforcement and paratroop training, the main core of resistance was expected to come from these elements. Intelligence summaries of the period gave what proved to be an accurate forecast of the type of resistance met:

Wherever we have not determined resistance during the past few days the enemy's fighting qualities have belied any suggestion that recent disasters have diminished the German Armies will to fight. Although the terms "hodge-podge", "odds and sods", "scrapings", etc, are accepted, epithets for such an order of battle as he now discloses on our front, the skill and fighting spirit of individual units has often been to the standard of elite troops. Even though the soldiers are often youths from Training Centres, they are fanatical and brave. Officer instructors from Training Units have provided the highest standard of leadership.

((H.S.) 235Cl.123(D1): 1 Cdn Inf Div Int Summary No. 135, 7 Apr 45)

It was discovered later that the German garrison commanders were given explicit instructions to make all towns centres of resistance. An announcement by Himmler and Borman read over the German radio on 12 Apr stated:

Towns, which are usually important communications centres, must be defended at any price. The Battle Commanders appointed for each town are personally held responsible for compliance with this order. Neglect of this duty on the part of the Battle Commander, or the attempt on the part of any civil servant to induce such neglect, are punishable by death.

(Ibid, No. 138, 17 Apr 45)

OPERATION "CANNONSHOT"\* 11-12 APR 45

32. Let us now turn to 1 Cdn Inf Div. On arriving from Italy on 23 Mar the 1st Division had been stationed at Itegen outside Brussels. Here the battalions underwent changes of vehicles, equipment, and weapons similar to the infantry of the 5th Armoured Division. On 3 Apr it moved to the Reichswald Forest where upon arrival it came under command of 2 Cdn Corps. At this assembly area all formation signs, which had been removed when the Division left Italy, were replaced on battle dress, vehicles, and road markers (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 2-3 Apr 45). On 7 Apr the Division moved from the Reichswald, crossed the Rhine at Emmerich, and reached the intermediate area near Baak in Holland, four miles south of Zutphen. The contrast between Germany and Holland made a vivid impression:

No civilians are seen but as we near the Rhine a few are sighted here and there. They look grave, some are sullen, others venture a smile but we must not fraternize, so we try to look straight ahead! At the RHINE, a 1280 foot pontoon br takes us across and we come to EMMERICH, a shell torn, devastated city. Only CASSINO in Italy looks worse. At EMMERICH we turn NW and on an excellent but narrow rd we make our way through HUTHUM and ELTEN where we now drive NE and soon we are in Holland once more. In contrast to the devastation we have seen in the short while we were in Germany, the little Dutch villages we come to now have hardly been touched by war and the cottages and houses are very pretty and very clean, the villages neat.

(Ibid, 7 Apr 45)

On 8 Apr General Crerar, Lt-Gen Sinonds and Maj-Gen H.W. Foster, D.S.O., commanding 1 Cdn Inf Div, conferred at Divisional Headquarters, where plans for the forthcoming operation were discussed. On 9 Apr, the Division, after skirting Zutphen, which had fallen to 3 Cdn Inf Div the previous day, moved to its concentration area east of Gorssel (996998). Word was received that "Cannonshot" would take place the following day, but the difficulty in capturing Deventer by 7 Cdn Inf Bde made a delay necessary. With the fall of this centre on 10 Apr the stage was set for the Division's first action in North-West Europe. (Ibid, 8-10 Apr 45)

THE PLAN FOR "CANNONSHOT"

33. At a co-ordinating conference held at Divisional Headquarters on 10 Apr, Maj-Gen Foster issued his operation order for "Cannonshot". His intention was as follows: "1 Cdn Inf Div will est a brhd across River Ijssel in area 9204-9201 and will advance and capture Apeldoorn 7903" (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Appx 23, 1 Cdn Inf Div Op Order No.1, 10 Apr 45). The operation was to be carried out in four definite phases. In Phase I, Brigadier M.P. Bogert's 2 Cdn Inf Bde was to make an assault crossing of the Ijssel and establish a bridgehead in the Gorssel "bulge". In Phase II, 1 Cdn Inf Bde, commanded by Brigadier J.D.B. Smith, would pass through the

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\*See Appx "B", 1 Cdn Inf Div Op Order No. 1 Op "CANNONSHOT". See also Map 2.

bridgehead to the area of Twelloo; four miles north-west on the Apeldoorn-Deventer railway (8805). At the same time 2 Cdn Inf Bde would be ordered to exploit to the area of Appen, Gietel and Buslo, two miles south-west of the bridgehead, while responsibility of protecting the initial bridgehead was to fall on one battalion of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. In the third phase, on orders from H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Bde would be ordered to continue to advance along the railway to Teuge, two and one-half miles west of Twelloo (8405). Simultaneously Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez's 3 Cdn Inf Bde would pass through the bridgehead and consolidate two and one-half miles west on the Apen-Apeldoorn highway (8501). In the fourth and final phase, 1 Cdn Inf Bde would continue to advance west on Apeldoorn. (Ibid)

34. It was planned that 1 Cdn Inf Div would go into action complete except for 4 Cdn Recce Regt (P.L.D.G.) which was in the process of being converted from Infantry. Under divisional command the following units were to be available:

6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 Hussars) (under command from 2 Cdn Armd Bde)  
68 Med Regt  
4 R.T.R.  
H.Q. Flt 652 A.O.P. Sqn  
F Tp 1 Cdn Svy Regt  
Sec 9 Svy Regt R.A.  
B Tp S.L. Bty R.A.  
33 Bty 6 Cdn A. Tk Regt

In support there were to be:

Fd Arty 3 Cdn Inf Div  
7 Cdn Med Regt  
2 Cdn H.A.A. Regt  
2 Hy Bty R.A. (7.2)  
28 Hy Bty R.A. (7.2)

(Ibid)

35. The assaulting brigade was to be ferried across the Ijssel in two squadrons of L.V.Ts. (buffaloes)\* to be provided by 4 Royal Tank Regiment. Divisional engineers were to construct one Class 9 F.B.E.\*\* bridge, two close support rafts and two Class 40 rafts, the latter to be used for carrying the tanks of 6 Cdn Armd Regt across the river. (W.D., H.Q. R.C.E., 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Appx 7, "Appreciation of Ijssel Crossing by C.R.E.", 5 Apr 45). It was expected that the rafts and the bridge would be ready for use by H plus 5 hours and H plus 10 hours respectively. The bridge itself was to be constructed just upstream of the crossing point of the right assaulting battalion of the 2nd Brigade. (Ibid)

36. To screen the assault and to protect the bridging operations a "smoke box" was to be provided by smoke generators and artillery fire with the object of providing a "continuous haze" over the whole bridgehead. This would mark the first time that artillery and generator smoke had been used in such close cooperation by 2 Cdn Corps. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 9 Apr 45; (H.S.) 215Cl.013(D24): Chemical Warfare Reports, First Cdn Army, pp. 35-36). Fire support to cover the assault was to consist of high explosive fire on pre-arranged targets with subsequent support to be provided on call from the infantry. (Ibid, W.D., H.Q. R.C.A., 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Appx 5, Fire Plan "Cannonshot", 11 Apr 45). Air support was to consist of medium

\*Landing Vehicle Tracked.

\*\*Folding Boat Equipment, designed to carry only light traffic.

bombers to be available to engage enemy artillery areas and Typhoons to provide immediate support if needed. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Apr 45)

37. In conjunction with "Cannonshot", 1 Cdn Corps was to cross the Neder Rijn and exploit with 5 Cdn Armd Div to link up with 1 Cdn Inf Div. Operations to simulate crossings of the Ijssel were to be the task of 3 Cdn Inf Div in the form of smoke and "pepperpot" fire. This diversion was to take place north of Deventer and south of Zutphen, beginning 30 minutes before H hour and lasting for two hours. (Ibid). 7 Cdn Recce Regt was to be made responsible for ensuring that the east bank of the Ijssel between Deventer and Zutphen was clear of the enemy. Originally it was planned that S.A.S. troops would be dropped to remove bridges at Apeldoorn and to seize the airfield at Teuge, but this was found to be impracticable and was cancelled later. ((H.S.) 215Cl.013(D25): Report on Op "Amherst" and "Keystone", Report by No. 38 Group R.A.F., p. 9)

38. H hour was set at 1630 hrs, 11 Apr. (W.D., G.S.; H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Appx 23, 1 Cdn Inf Div Op Order No. 1, 10 Apr)

39. The plan for the 2nd Brigade called for a two battalion assault against the southern base of the Gorssel bulge (see para 26). P.P.C.L.I., commanded by Lt-Col R.P. Clark, D.S.O., would cross just north of the old footferry (944024), some 1300 yards north of Gorssel, while Lt-Col H.P. Bell-Irving, D.S.O., would take his Seaforth of C. across 1500 yards upstream (929013). Once over, P.P.C.L.I. would push north while Seaforth of C. moved west. It was planned that when all Phase I objectives had been taken, the bridgehead would extend from Huize de Poll at the south-east base of the bulge, along the dyke north to Wilp (917036), and thence north-east along the road to the river. When this was done, the 1st Brigade would be in a position to break out towards Hoven\* and Teuge to the north, prior to its westward advance on Apeldoorn. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 10 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. R.C.E. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 11 Apr 45)

#### THE ASSAULT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD, 11-12 APR 45

40. At 1430 hours 11 Apr, the assault battalions married up with the buffaloes of 4 R.T.R. in the wooded area due east of Gorssel (929700, 929791). At 1600 hours the artillery smoke barrage began and 20 minutes later high explosive fire commenced to pound the bridgehead thoroughly. Promptly at H hour the first L.V.Ts. slid into the water, carrying P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C. over at their appointed places. This was the first time that units of the 1st Division had used Buffaloes and the troops were much impressed with their performance. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Apr 45). From the first the operation went extremely well: the crossing was uneventful and in less than 15 minutes P.P.C.L.I. signalled that its leading company had gained its first objective, a group of houses 500 yards inland. By that time, Seaforth of C. had three companies across and had reached the houses opposite their

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\*This refers to the village across the river from Deventer and not the one opposite Zutphen.

landing point (925025), and the road junction 200 yards north (931022). Surprise had been achieved and with the aid of the very effective smoke screen, both battalions made rapid progress. By 1800 hours a sizable bridgehead had been established; prisoners began to arrive and P.P.C.L.I. reported knocking out a French tank by Plat fire. Although the infantry had met little opposition up to this time the engineers of 1, 3, and 4 Fd Coys, who had begun work on the bridge and rafts, came under heavy shell and mortar fire and fairly heavy casualties resulted. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Apr 45; W.D., P.P.C.L.I., 11 Apr 45; W.D., Seaforth of C., 11 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. R.C.E. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 11 Apr 45)

41. By 2100 hours both battalions were firm on their first objectives and had begun to move towards their second. Each battalion reported to have two anti-tank guns across and more prisoners were coming back through the brigade lines. At 2300 hours the engineers sent back word that the bridge was completed and that the work on the approaches by 4 Fd Coy was going well. By this time P.P.C.L.I. was approaching Wilp at 920036 and Seaforth of C. signalled that a company was firm on the Hoven-Wilp dyke at 913024 and that another company was at the south-west end of the bulge at 920015. At midnight Brigadier Bogert moved his Tac Headquarters across the river. (Ibid)

42. Between midnight and dawn opposition stiffened along the whole bridgehead. On the dyke Seaforth of C. repulsed a counter-attack at 913024 and had difficulty establishing their position 500 yards south at 910019, and at Huize de Poll (912015). Forward troops of P.P.C.L.I. were in Wilp by 0400 hours but an enemy attack of infantry supported by four tanks against the position east of Wilp prevented consolidation. (W.D., P.P.C.L.I., 12 Apr 45). This was repulsed and towards morning enemy shelling lessened and the battalions were able to secure their positions. The Germans had suffered heavy casualties since H hour. Over 200 F.Ws. were taken, three light French tanks and one German Mk III had been accounted for, plus two anti-tank guns and four vehicles. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Apr 45). During the afternoon of the 12th, the two assault battalions enlarged their positions slightly. The Seaforth, ably supported by Wasps, did a fine job of clearing the wooded area immediately west of the dyke while P.P.C.L.I. actively patrolled their area. (W.D., Seaforth of C., 12 Apr 45; W.D., P.P.C.L.I., 12 Apr 45)

43. Meanwhile, the engineers had worked feverishly, and often heroically, on the rafts, and at first light the leading tanks ("A" Squadron) of Lt-Col F.E. White's 6 Cdn Armd Regt moved across the river. By 0800 hours one troop was with each of the two battalions, which had by this time moved anti-tank guns into position. In the night L. Edmn R. commanded by Lt-Col J.R. Stone, D.S.O., M.C., had crossed the river and was occupying the first objectives of P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C. With Brigadier Bogert's brigade firmly established along the dyke from Huize de Poll north to Wilp, and from Wilp 900 yards north-east to the road junction (926039) the 1st Brigade was in a position to begin the second phase of "Cannonshot". (Ibid; W.D., 6 Cdn Armd Regt, 12 Apr 45).

#### THE ADVANCE TO THE APeldoORN CANAL 12-15 APR 45

44. Brigadier J.D.B. Smith's plan for 1 Cdn Inf Bde called for 48 Highrs to advance from Wilp to Hoven and the Deventer-Appeldoorn railway, using as its axis the Wilp-Hoven road. The battalion then would swing west and advance along

the axis of the railway. R.C.R. would conform with this advance by a parallel move 1500 yards south of the railway. Hast & P.E.R. would be in reserve for the first stage. Apeldoorn was to be the final objective. (W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Apr 45)

45. 48 Highrs, commanded by Lt-Col D.A. MacKenzie, D.S.O., and supported by "B" Squadron of 6 Cdn Armd Regt left the bridgehead at 1015 hours 12 Apr and advanced on Hoven and the railway. By 1400 hours, the first objectives had been taken, and two hours later the railway was reported cut and Hoven cleared. During this advance, the battalion lost its commanding officer when Lt-Col MacKenzie was killed by shellfire. Resistance on the whole was spotty, consisting mainly of small-arms and machine-gun fire, supported by self-propelled guns. The battalion then swung west to Twello,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Hoven, and by nightfall the leading companies were firm in the village. (W.D., 48 Highrs, 12 Apr 45). In the meantime, R.C.R., commanded by Lt-Col W.W. Reid, had made a more rapid advance and by dark were south of the railway at 860046, some 2000 yards beyond Twello. "C" Squadron of 6 Cdn Armd Regt gave able support in this advance. Prisoners came in steadily and due to their exposed positions on the flank, reserve and "F" echelon units found themselves accounting for as many as the forward troops. (W.D., R.C.R., 12 Apr 45). During the day excellent support was given by the tanks of 1st Hussars and the infantry were quick to acknowledge the fact. (Ibid)

46. Just before midnight word was received by 1 Cdn Inf Div that 49 (W.R.) Div had begun to cross the lower Ijssel preparatory to the assault on Arnhem. ((H.S.) 2501.013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log, 12 Apr 45). On the morning of the following day, the message was passed to all formations that 1 Cdn Inf Div had reverted to under command 1 Cdn Corps effective 0600 hours 13 Apr 45. (Ibid, 13 Apr 45)

47. 13 Apr saw a steady advance by the 1st Brigade. R.C.R., moving due west, crossed the railway 1500 yards west of Teuge and by dusk the leading company was less than one mile from Apeldoorn. During the day, one platoon distinguished itself by liberating the St. Joseph Hospital (822048) west of Teuge in which were found 800 patients, 37 of them British prisoners of war. (W.D., R.C.R., 13 Apr 45, Message by H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Apr 45)

48. Contact had been made with the Dutch underground in Apeldoorn, who reported that the main road bridge over the Apeldoorn Canal (793037) was intact. (1 Cdn Inf Div Message Log, 13 Apr 45). As a result, tanks and infantry made a determined effort to reach the approach in the early hours of 14 Apr. Road blocks covered by anti-tank fire cost 1st Hussars two tanks and prevented any penetration. (W.D., R.C.R., 14 Apr 45; W.D., 6 Cdn Armd Regt, 14 Apr 45)

49. On the right flank of the Brigade Hast & P.E.R., commanded by Lt-Col G.E.B. Renison, passed through 48 Highrs at first light on 13 Apr. After a steady if slow advance by mid-afternoon the battalion had passed through Teuge,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of Twello. From here it drove north-west to conform with the advance of R.C.R., with the object of crossing the canal 1300 yards north of the city (793057). By dawn the next day the leading troops were within 50 yards of the bridge when it was blown. (W.D., Hast & P.E.R., 13-14 Apr 45)



50. With these two attempts to cross the canal proving fruitless, Brigadier Smith issued orders for a two battalion attack on the eastern suburbs of Apeldoorn, with the intention of clearing the city up to the canal and seizing the two road bridges. ((H.S.) 225Cl.016(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 15 Apr 45). It was planned that at 2300 hours 14 Apr, 48 Highrs would attack the northern suburbs east of the canal while R.C.R. cleared the southern sector. From the start stiff opposition was encountered and the leading companies were pinned down by heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire. At first light the attack was again pressed, and with the aid of tanks both battalions moved forward doggedly. By evening 48 Highrs had cleared their area and were faced up to the canal in spite of increasing resistance. On the left R.C.R. managed to reach the main bridge over the canal (794037) and the secondary bridge 500 yards south of it (797031). These bridges and approaches were constantly harassed by heavy fire and no attempt could be made to cross the canal. (W.D., R.C.R., 15 Apr 45; W.D., 48 Highrs, 15 Apr 45). The intention now was that both battalions would continue to mop up east of the canal and be prepared to assault across the waterway at 0800 hours on the 16th. (1 Cdn Inf Bde Ops Log, 15 Apr 45). In view of the difficulty of clearing the area it was decided to postpone the assault until early on the morning of 17 Apr. (Ibid, 16 Apr 45)

51. Although no coordinated system of defence seemed to exist, the advance of 1 Cdn Inf Bde to Apeldoorn had met plenty of resistance. Vigorous and sometimes fanatical opposition by small units armed with panzerfaust and automatic weapons, and by snipers, had made a systematic mopping up process necessary. This type of resistance was to be characteristic of the whole operation. The enemy had suffered heavily, losing 1500 as prisoners alone. (W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 13-15 Apr 45)

52. In the meantime, rapid progress had been made by the 2nd Brigade. When 1 Cdn Inf Bde had passed through, it became Brigadier Bogert's responsibility to enlarge the bridgehead area to the south and west in order to protect the left flank of the division. Consequently on the afternoon of 12 Apr L. Edmn R. drove south, with the object of clearing the area between the Ijssel and Appen (8999) and pushing south as far as the bridge over the Boven Voorster (908991). Supported by tanks the battalion moved in good order and by evening it had cleared the area to a point just north of Slot Nijenbeek (922002). (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Apr 45; W.D., L. Edmn R., 12 Apr 45)

53. Carlt & York R. came temporarily under command of 2 Cdn Inf Bde on 12 Apr, and took over the bridgehead positions of Seaforth of C. and P.P.C.L.I. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Apr 45). It was decided that next day P.P.C.L.I. should attack south-west in the direction of Buslo (9001) and Gietel (8900) in conjunction with a similar advance on Appen (8999) by L. Edmn R. This would put the 2nd Brigade in a position to drive west. On 13 Apr both battalions made excellent progress, ably supported by "A" Squadron of 1 Hussars. P.P.C.L.I. pushed past Gietel to the cross roads 1200 yards beyond (886001) and within 2000 yards of the Zutphen-Apeldoorn railway; L. Edmn R. had equal success and reached Appen and the bridge (908991) against light opposition. Patrols were sent south and soon reported entering Voorst. By noon the railway crossing 1200 yards beyond had been reached when small-arms and anti-tank fire prevented

further advance. (W.D., L. Edmn R., 13 Apr 45) During the afternoon Sask L.I. (M.G.) and "Wasps" did a splendid job of clearing the Appensche Veld, a large tract of pine forest extending west of Appen to the railway. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Apr 45)

54. The Corps Commander now decided that part of 1 Cdn Inf Div should swing south and establish a bridgehead at Hoven (across the Ijssel from Zutphen) in order that a Class 40 bridge could be built. ((H.S.) 22501.016(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 13 Apr 45). Hoven was the junction of the Apeldoorn-Zutphen and Arnhem-Zutphen road and railway and its capture and subsequent bridging of the river would open the road to Apeldoorn. Accordingly Maj-Gen Foster gave 2 Cdn Inf Bde this task and placed emphasis on speed. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Apr 45)

55. Seaforth of C. were given the preparatory task of clearing the area between the left flank of L. Edmn R. and the Ijssel as far south as the Hoendervester Beek. Against light opposition this was accomplished by dusk on 13 Apr. On the right L. Edmn R. were less successful and could not clear the enemy from the railway track. (W.D., Seaforth of C., 13 Apr 45; W.D., L. Edmn R., 13 Apr 45)

56. Early on 14 Apr Seaforth of C. crossed the canal, and with the aid of flamethrowers, managed to clear the extensive trench system of the Over Marsch area. Resistance was very stubborn but by evening the battalion had reached Hoven. With the exception of the railway junction, which was being stoutly defended by youths of 3 Para Trg Regt, the bridgehead was reported clear. On the right L. Edmn R. had met equally strong opposition at the road and railway bridges over the Hoendervester Beek when the first attempts to force a crossing were pushed back. With the aid of flame-throwers the two bridges were taken intact and late that day the positions were finally consolidated. (Ibid, 14 Apr 45)

57. The 2nd Brigade was now instructed that once Hoven had been secured and the bridging operations underway it would clear the west bank of the Ijssel as far as Dieren and link up with a brigade of 49 (W.R.) Div which was pushing north from Arnhem (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 14 Apr 45). Early on 15 Apr, Hoven was reported completely cleared and the engineers had begun work on the bridge. With P.P.C.L.I. right and L. Edmn R. left, the brigade began to advance south, one battalion on each side of the railway. Seaforth of C. plus one company of P.P.C.L.I. were made responsible for the protection of the bridgehead. The advance south was rapid, especially on the left; by mid-afternoon L. Edmn R. had reached Brummen while P.P.C.L.I., operating in closer country, had gained Voorsttonden. By 1700 hours L. Edmn R. were within 900 yards of Spankeren and P.P.C.L.I. were in the area west of Rienderen. Subsequent patrol reports stated that the whole area north and east of the Apeldoorn Canal was clear of the enemy, with the exception of the road and railway bridges over the canal north of Dieren. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 15 Apr 45). Throughout the night battalion patrols continued to be active. (Ibid, 16 Apr 45; W.D., L. Edmn. R., 16 Apr 45)

58. 3 Cdn Inf Bde's part in the operation began when Carlt & York R., commanded by Lt-Col J.P. Ensor, D.S.O., M.B.E., moved across the Ijssel on the afternoon of 12 Apr and relieved Seaforth of C. and P.P.C.L.I. in their positions on the perimeter of the bridgehead. For this role, the battalion came

temporarily under command of 2 Cdn Inf Bde, reverting to its parent formation the following day. While the main body of 3rd Brigade crossed on the night of 12-13 Apr, Carlt & York R. patrolled west and by morning were holding a line 1000 yards beyond the dyke and south of the Wilp-Posterenk highway. (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 12-13 Apr; W.D., Carlt & York R., 12-13 Apr 45)

59. Brigadier Bernatchez's plan was for the 3rd Brigade to advance due west on a two battalion front with R. 22e R. in reserve. Carlt & York R. would move on the right along the axis Wilp-Achterhoek-Apeldoorn, and West N.S.R. on the left 1500 yards to the south. The advance was to conform with that of 1 Cdn Inf Bde in order to provide flank protection. If the latter had difficulty in taking Apeldoorn 3 Cdn Inf Bde was to be prepared to cross the Apeldoorn Canal south of the city and secure the high ground to the rear. "A" Squadron of 6 Cdn Armd Regt would be transferred from 2 Cdn Inf Bde on 14 Apr to give armoured support. (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1945: Appx 16, Battle Report; W.D., 6 Cdn Armd Regt, April 1945: Appx 5, "A" Squadron's Report on Operations, 11-16 Apr 45)

60. At 1100 hours 13 Apr, both battalions crossed the start line and made rapid progress against generally light resistance. The first objectives were the wooded area some 3000 yards east of Apeldoorn (8302) and the Zutphen-Apeldoorn railway south of the woods (8301). By midnight Carlt & York R. had reached the line of the Grootte Wetering Canal, with West N.S.R. slightly ahead and south (8401). Early next morning R. 22e R., commanded by Lt-Col G.A. Turcot, attacked with the object of clearing the wooded area (8302) but made slow progress against heavy small-arms and self-propelled gun fire. At the same time Lt-Col F.E. Hiltz's West N.S.R. encountered stiff resistance trying to cross the highly embanked railways and the leading companies had to withdraw under cover of artillery fire. (Ibid)

61. During the afternoon G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div ordered Brigadier Bernatchez to push forward with all possible speed and secure the near bank of the canal. Accordingly during the night 14-15 Apr, Carlt & York R. passed through West N.S.R. and with the aid of tanks, crossed the railway and consolidated on the far side. At first light the battalion moved forward towards the canal. Opposition consisted of considerable sniping fire but by last light the unit had closed up to the canal at the site of three drawbridges at Wormensche (801023), Kaijers (801012), and Bruggeler (808998). (W.D., Carlt & York R., April 1945: Appx 10, Account of Operations in N.W. Europe)

62. Meanwhile, R. 22e R., which by noon 15 Apr had finally cleared the woods by an assault from the rear, were ordered to close up to the canal on the left of Carlt & York R. Early on 16 Apr the battalion was in position south of Carlt & York R. with forward troops on the canal near the Veldwegg drawbridge (812986). (W.D., R. 22e R., April 1945: Appx 12, Battle Report)

63. Because 1 Cdn Inf Bde was having difficulty taking Apeldoorn, Brigadier Bernatchez ordered the two forward battalions to be prepared to assault across the river on the night of 16-17 Apr. Once a bridgehead had been established West N.S.R. would pass through and establish themselves on the high ground to the south of the city. Consequently during the night of the 15th the assault battalions explored the canal for

suitable crossing places. Patrols reported that the canal was approximately 60 feet wide, 15 feet deep, with banks five feet high, and that it was crossable in assault boats. Preparations were then made for the crossing. (W.D., Carlt & York R., 15 Apr 45; W.D., R. 22e R., 15-16 Apr 45). On the evening of the 16th, "C" Squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt (Three Riv R.) (Lt-Col F.E. Caron) moved up in support of the 3rd Brigade. (W.D., 12 Cdn Armd Regt, 16 Apr 45)

#### THE SITUATION AT 0800 HOURS 16 APR 45

64. Let us now examine the position of the 1st Division on the morning of 16 Apr. The triangle formed by the Deventer-Apeldoorn highway, the Apeldoorn canal, and the Ijssel River from Dieren to Deventer, had been cleared of all opposition and its western perimeter formed a divisional front of 20 miles. 2 Cdn L.A.A. Regt were guarding the northern flank between Deventer and Apeldoorn and had elements on the canal at Broeksbrug, one mile north of Apeldoorn. In the city itself, 48 Highrs and R.C.R. were at the two main road bridges over the canal. On the left, the 5000 yard front of the 3rd Brigade stretched along the canal from just south of the railway bridge in Apeldoorn to the Veldweg drawbridge, 1500 yards north of Oosterhuizen (8196). Here Carlt & York R. and R. 22e R. were faced right and left respectively. Brigadier Bogert's Brigade was extended, theoretically at least, even further, being responsible for the canal front from Oosterhuizen to Dieren. However, most of this area had been covered by patrols and P.P.C.L.I. and L. Edmn R. were still right and left of the Zutphen-Dieren railway, facing south. Seldom had the Division been so extended. Maj-Gen Foster, commenting on the operation afterwards, spoke of this situation:

I had always to be conscious of my northern flank since we did not know where the enemy had jumped. 2 Cdn Inf Bde had been my reserve in case anything went wrong in this northern flank. Now all three bdes were committed and fully extended. Had things not gone according to plan, there was no reserve in sight to restore a bad situation. Fortunately the enemy were equally extended and were not able to exploit our thinness on the ground.

((H.S.) 23501.011(D6): Report on Operation "Cannonshot": Comments by Maj-Gen H.W. Foster to Hist Offr 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Jun 45)

At this time the locations of the respective Headquarters were as follows:

- H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div - in the Gorssel bulge (925024)
- H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde - 700 yards east of St. Joseph's Hospital (828047)
- H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde - at the Engelburge estate, 1200 yards west of Brummen (902893)
- H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde - one mile south-east of the Geneesil Hospital (831012)

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 16 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Apr 45)

65. Since the crossing of the Ijssel on 11 Apr, the Division had taken nearly 2800 prisoners while incurring relatively light casualties (*ibid*). In general resistance had been uncoordinated, but small groups, armed with automatic weapons and supported by self-propelled guns and the occasional tank, had put up a stiff and sometimes desperate fight. These groups had become less and less frequent, however, and it was obvious that the morale of the Germans was rapidly deteriorating. The Divisional War Diary of 15 Apr gives a good example of the general feeling that the end was not far off:

In ops all was quiet and peaceful. The usual number of visitors came, among them a Russian offr who had been a prisoner of the Germans and presumably had been kept in these parts. When he appeared, someone exclaimed; "What! Are the Russians here already?"

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 15 Apr 45)

With the flushing of the last pockets of resistance, the way was open for the capture of Apeldoorn and the advance westwards.

#### THE FINAL PLAN FOR OPERATION "ANGER"\*

66. Meanwhile good progress had been made by 49 (W.R.) Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div. On 9 Apr Maj-Gen Rawlins issued orders for the capture of Arnhem and described the task as "a preliminary to further offensive ops against the enemy in WEST HOLLAND". The operation was to be carried out in three phases. In Phase I 56 Inf Bde, by means of "Buffaloes" of 11 R. Tanks, was to cross the Ijssel west of the Arnhem-Westervoort railway bridge (779762) and capture a limited bridgehead. The Brigade would then secure the high ground from the railway junction on the eastern outskirts of the city (765773) to the banks of the Neder Rijn at Pont Veer (761764). It would then clear the north bank of the river to cover the construction of landing stages west of Malburgsche Sluis (754764) and clear the southern sector of Arnhem. In Phase 2, 146 Inf Bde would pass through the assault brigade to secure the high ground north of the Arnhem-Velp railway (7778), cover the right flank of the 56th Brigade, and exploit north and north-west to the general area of Valkenhuizen (7580) and Waterberg (7480). In Phase 3, 147 Inf Bde would pass through 56 Bde, secure the high ground west of Arnhem, deny the enemy observation of the bridge site at Praets (738774), and, according to the tactical situation, exploit in a north-west and westerly direction to take the enemy positions on the north bank of the Neder Rijn from the rear. Once Arnhem and its commanding heights had been secured 5 Cdn Armd Div would pass through to the north. ((H.S.)235B49.018(DI): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 7 Apr 45 and Appx "D", 49(W.R.) Inf Div O.O. No. 9 Op "Anger", dated 9 Apr 45)

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\*See Map 3 and Appx "C" to this Report. Note that the final plan to attack Arnhem from the east by crossing the Ijssel near Westervoort received the code name Operation "Anger". Formerly this had been applied to the projected plan to cross the Neder Rijn by a wide sweep to the west near Renkum. There are certain references to the operation under the name "Quick Anger", which described an alternative plan for a scramble crossing also west of Arnhem near Oosterbeek, but the evidence indicates that Operation "Anger" is the correct term for the plan which was finally adopted. It was detailed as such in 49(W.R.) Inf Div Operation Order No. 9 dated 9 Apr 45 and in the instructions issued by General Foulkes on 12 Apr with regard to the follow-up. ((H.S.) 225C1.009(DI3): Foulkes, "Op on completion of 'Anger' and 'Cannonshot'")

67. The British Division was to have the following units under command:

- 11 Cdn Armd Regt
- A Sqn I FF Yeo
- A Sqn 1 Lothians
- 11 Cdn Fd Regt
- 617 Assault Sqn RE
- 536 DUKW Coy RASC

The following were placed in support:

- 11 R Tanks
- 1 Cdn { 1 Cdn Med Regt 5.5
- AGRA { 2 Cdn Med Regt 4.5 } 2 med regts in direct
- { 5 Cdn Med Regt 7.5 } sp
- { 107 Med Regt 5.5
- { 51 Hy Regt (2 btys 7.2 in direct sp
- { (2 btys 155mm
- 5 Cdn { 17 Fd Regt
- Div Arty { 8 Cdn Fd Regt
- { 1 and 2 Cdn Rocket Btys (8 salvos each)
- { 422 S.L. Bty
- { 1 Cdn Corps tps RCE
- { 23 Fd Coy RE\*

11 Cdn Armd Regt was to have 98 Fd Regt (S.P.) in support and 664 Air O.P. Squadron would provide the necessary air observation. (Ibid)

68. As soon as possible after H hour the engineers were to construct a Class 40 bridge across the Ijssel in the assault crossing area at 776757 and operate a Class 40 ferry over the Neder Rijn at Huissen. West of this bridge they were to construct and operate a Class 40 ferry at 774755. They were also to be prepared to operate a Class 40 ferry over the Neder Rijn at 753763, just west of Malburgsche Sluis, and to construct a foot bridge over the Ijssel at 779762 alongside the railway bridge if possible. They also had road maintenance commitments. C.R.A. was to arrange a "pepperpot" for Phase I and also to screen by smoke the assault and ferry crossings from the high ground west of Velp (7978). The deception plan required 1 Cdn Corps to provide smoke along the south bank of the Neder Rijn near Driel and 5 Cdn Armd Div to simulate movement and build up operations there. Operation "Anger" was not to take place until 2 Cdn Corps had begun to cross the Ijssel in Operation "Cannonshot" and S.A.S. troops had been dropped. (Ibid)

68a Two airborne operations in Holland had been planned in conjunction with First Canadian Army. In Operation "Amherst" French troops parachuted north of Meppel and gave useful assistance to the advance of 2 Cdn Corps. Operation "Keystone", on the other hand, was intended to disorganize the enemy in the area immediately south of the Ijsselmeer, but the plan for 2 S.A.S. Regt to capture and hold certain bridges over the Apeldoornsche Canal never materialized. One recon party or Jedburgh team of less than twenty men parachuted into Dutch Resistance forces on the night of 11/12 April but due to a damaged wireless set its later messages were not received. The other recon party found no reception and did not drop. After two abortive attempts to parachute a jeep force, this aspect was cancelled and the S.A.S. were able to employ only a land-based jeep party. ((H.S.) 21501.013 (D25): Reports on Operations "Amherst" and "Keystone").

\*Should read 23 Fd Coy R.C.E.

THE CAPTURE OF ARNHEM, 12-14 APR 45

69. By the morning of 12 Apr there was no doubt that 1 Cdn Inf Div had successfully established a bridgehead in the Gorsseel bulge. Lt-Gen Foulkes immediately issued orders to launch the 49th Division across the Ijssel at 2240 hours that evening. During the day Typhoons flew 112 sorties aimed at enemy installations in and around Arnhem and the assault itself was preceded by one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet fired by 1 Cdn Corps. At 2315 hours the leading company of 2 Glosters touched down on the far bank of the river, closely followed by the remainder of the battalion. Darkness prevented a speedy advance, but by 0240 hours of the 13th the Glosters had fanned out to take the fortress (777764) and the factory (772760) near the landing point, and were clearing the Peilhuisje area (771745).

Opposition was relatively light but a great number of Schu mines encountered along the river bank made rapid advance impossible. The follow-up troops were slowed in reinforcing the Glosters when it was found that only two of the Buffaloes could be used. By 0300 hours, however, 2 S.W.B. had passed through the assault battalion and three hours later had cleared to the main railway junction (7677) east of the city. At 0630 hours the engineers had the Class 40 ferry operating and two companies of the reserve battalion (2 Essex) were across the river. By this time 2 Glosters had captured the power station between the two rivers (768759) and were advancing along the north bank of the Neder Rijn ((H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops Log 1 Cdn Corps, 12-13 Apr 45; W.D., 11 Cdn Arm'd Regt (Ont R.), April 1945: Appx 12, 49 (W.R.) Inf Div Int Summary No. 131, 13 Apr 45; (H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 12 Apr 45).

69a The engineering aspects of this operation are of particular interest to Canadians. 23 Fd Coy R.C.E. provided the stern boats for one company of the Glosters to cross in the assault, while 1 Cdn Corps Troops R.C.E. operated ferries, cleared roads, and built the bridge (W.D., 14 Fd Coy R.C.E., April 1945, Appx 4, R.E. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div O.C. No. 12, Op "Anger", issued 12 Apr 45). Assigned the task of placing the bridge over the Ijssel in the assault area, 12 Fd Coy R.C.E. moved to billets at Zevenaar (8571) to begin work on 9 April at a construction site upstream near Doornenburg on the Pannerdensch Canal at 808688. There they assembled a combined end floating bay and loading bay 151 feet long, another 141 feet long, each with ghost piers, a 43-foot sliding floating bay, and a full floating bay 42 feet long with necessary piers. About 0900 hours on 12 April these components were floated downstream with the aid of Royal Navy craft of Force "T" to remain for a time at a point opposite Huissen (7672). At 0015 hours 13 April C.R.E. 1 Cdn Corps Troops ordered them to be floated down to the bridge site at 774758; twenty minutes later the largest section arrived at the near bank of the Ijssel to be placed into position. The 141-foot unit had several mishaps, however, failing to take the turn at the entrance to the Ijssel and having to be towed back; eventually arriving at 0300 hours. Half an hour later a Class 40 raft used as a ferry upstream floated down out of control, smashed against both bridge units, and caused the errant 141-foot unit to break loose from the far bank. It promptly floated downstream and very nearly piled up on the demolished railway bridge at 779762 before being brought under control. Despite these delays, both sections were finally positioned by 0500 hours and anchored by flooding the ghost piers, the 42-foot floating bay being used to connect the two end floating bays. The bridge was opened to traffic at 1030 hours, approximately 12 hours after H hour. It was officially named "Evers" in honour of the O.C. 12 Fd Coy R.C.E., but Major Evers himself called it "Song and a Prayer" bridge. (W.D., 12 Fd Coy R.C.E., 9-12 Apr 45).

69b The rafts continued their ferrying service while heavy traffic poured across the bridge, which had to be supplemented by a Class 9 bridge (called "Navy") built by 14 Fd Coy R.C.E. at Huissen and floated into position across the Neder Rijn at Arnhem (753763) (W.D., 14 Fd Coy R.C.E., 13-16 Apr 45). The situation which developed when 5 Cdn Armd Div was assigned Evers bridge on 15 Apr has been described by one diarist as follows:

49 (W.R.) Div were denied the use of the Westervoort Cl 40 bridge by the Corps Comd because of their disobeying movement orders as laid down at Corps. They were given four hours on the bridge and were still pouring vehicles over at the end of seven hours. C.R.E. 49 (W.R.) Div most indignant.

(W.D., C.E. Branch,  
1 Cdn Corps, 15 Apr 45)

A diarist of 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, on the other hand, has explained that "all tps and A echs of Bdes were one side of the river and all B echs and adm units the other, with only two separate hours between 141600 hrs and 151200 hrs in which to pass very considerable traffic." (W.D., 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 14 Apr 45). Engineers of Army troops soon constructed more permanent bridges at Zutphen and Arnhem, however, and on 24 Apr both Evers and Navy bridges were lifted. (W.D., 14 Fd Coy R.C.E., 24 Apr 45).

70. By mid-morning of 13 April 2 S.W.B. were well within the factory area of the city. Here the enemy resistance stiffened and a small but determined counter-attack was beaten off at the junction of the main railway lines (760766). At 1030 hours the Class 40 bridge was opened for traffic and the tanks of the Ontarios moved across the river to the support of 56 Bde. At the same time 1 Leicesters of the follow-up brigade were on the far bank and moving north. During the afternoon of the 13th the advance continued to be slow, owing to the opposition provided by the many machine gun nests and snipers encountered in the built-up areas. The stiffest opposition occurred at the factory north of the railway junction (762780) where the 346 Replacement Bn was encountered. It was discovered later that this unit contained five full companies and had only arrived from Oosterbeek that morning. Consequently it had escaped the heavy bombardment of the previous night and was comparatively fresh to offer a stiff fight to the British. By early evening, however, 2 S.W.B. were well within the city, and the Lincolns had reached the high ground to the north (7579). At this time the armour supporting 49 Div was reported to be across and moving forward to the high ground north of the city (*ibid*). The Corps Intelligence Summary of 13 Apr summed up the situation:

With our thrust across the IJSSSEL well under way a second punch went in last night with our attack on ARNHEM. A certain amount of tactical surprise was achieved as the first reactions of the enemy came down on our former conc and built up areas on the NIJMEGEN Island ... fighting in built up areas has naturally made the going slow. A good deal of mining was encountered between the IJSSSEL and the outskirts of the town, and it was here that the fighting became more annoying.

((H.S.) 22201.(D150): 1 Cdn Corps  
Int Summary No. 267, 14 Apr 45)

71. By mid-day on the 14th the back of the resistance had been broken. The Borderers were in the western suburbs, elements of 146 Bde had reached their final objectives, and 147 Inf Bde, which had crossed the river during the night, was forming up to pass through 56 Bde. 49 Div Recce Regt had two squadrons with the 146th Brigade prepared to exploit to the north. That afternoon 2 S.W.B. reached the high ground north of Oosterbeek and 1 Leicesters were reported north of the main Arnhem-Apeldoorn highway. By late evening the Germans held only Velp,



most of the northern and western part of the town having been cleared. ((H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops Log 1 Cdn Corps, 14 Apr 45; W.D., 11 Cdn Armd Regt, 14 Apr 45; 49 (W.R.) Inf Div Int Summary No. 131, 14 Apr 45). To the north of the town the enemy had settled down to a strictly perimeter defence, and reconnaissance and probing efforts produced determined and fairly well tied-in defensive fire ((H.S.) 222C1.(D150): 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 268, 14 Apr 45). The time had now come for the tanks of the 5th Armoured Brigade (Brigadier I.H. Cumberland, O.B.E.; E.D.) to break through to the north and during the night of 14/15 Apr they moved into position on the high ground above Arnhem (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 14-15 Apr 45).

#### PLANNING AT 1 CDN CORPS, 12-15 APR 45

72. Originally it was planned that the operations of 1 Cdn Corps should eventually extend as far west as Rotterdam and Amsterdam ((H.S.) 225C1.009(D13): Ops 1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C.'s Personal File, Lt-Gen Foulkes' Directive, 12 Apr 45). On orders from Field Marshal Montgomery, however, General Crerar modified this role in order to devote the main effort of First Canadian Army to the north. ((H.S.) 215A21.016(D9): Op Directives C-in-C 21 Army Gp, Notes on Commander-in-Chief's Conference with Commander First Canadian Army at Grave on 12 April 1945). General Crerar wrote:

Present operations of 1 Canadian Corps will not be pressed beyond those necessary to complete its primary task, namely, to open up and secure for use the route ARNHEM-ZUTPHEN and to secure the left flank of the present 2 Canadian Corps area to the West of the R. IJssel and South of the ZUIDER ZEE. If 1 Canadian Corps, with the limited resources then at disposal, can then safely advance still further into West HOLLAND, this should be undertaken. Otherwise, no extension of present operations 1 Canadian Corps will be undertaken pending a change in this policy.

((H.S.) 225C1.009(D13): Ops 1 Cdn Corps, G.O.C.'s Personal File, Gen Crerar's Directive, 13 Apr 45)

73. On 15 Apr Lt-Gen Foulkes gave detailed instructions to conform to this policy. 5 Cdn Armd Div was to exploit the bridgehead at Arnhem on the line Arnhem-Otterloo-Barneveld-Ijsselmeer, after which it would pass to command of 2 Cdn Corps. 49 (W.R.) Div was to mop up the area between the Neder Rijn and 1 Cdn Inf Div, and open up the Arnhem-Zutphen road. The task of the 1st Division was given as follows:

- (a) Capture APELDOORN.
- (b) Clear up the area between IJssel and APELDOORN canal SOUTH of APELDOORN-DEVENTER rd.
- (c) Adv on axis: APELDOORN-VOORTHUIZEN clear the area SOUTH of rd APELDOORN-VOORTHUIZEN.
- (d) Relieve 5 Cdn Div on line BARNEVELD-VOORTHUIZEN.

(Ibid, Lt-Gen Foulkes' Directive, 15 Apr 45)

1 Cdn Inf Div was to be regrouped and have the following units under command:

- 6 Cdn Armd Regt (to be relieved as soon as possible)
- 12 Cdn Armd Regt
- 68 Med Regt R.A.
- 11 Cdn A. Fd Regt
- One bty-1 Cdn Med Regt
- 33 Bty 6 Cdn A. Tk Regt

(Ibid)

THE CAPTURE OF APELDOORN, 17 APR 45

74. Shortly after 0900 hours 16 Apr, carriers of L. Edmn R. entered Dieren and found the town clear of enemy. Civilians immediately began to work on the blown bridge over the canal (888849) and by noon it was open for traffic. At 1115 hours contact was made with the reconnaissance unit of 49 (W.R.) Div and information was received that elements of 5 Cdn Armd Div were approximately three miles south-west of Harskamp (689907). (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1945: Appx 1, Ops Log, 16 Apr 45). It was obvious that unless the enemy made an extremely fast withdrawal, he would be in grave danger of being cut off.

75. With Dieren in hand, L. Edmn R. was ordered to cross the canal and work up the far bank. By 1400 hours the battalion had reached the blown bridge east of Veldhuizen (839950) and was patrolling to the west. It was planned that Seaforth of C. and P.P.C.L.I., which had moved by T.C.Vs.\* to the area of Klärenbeek (8598) in the meantime, would cross the canal and push through L. Edmn R. to the high ground beyond. While a bridge was being constructed at 839950 to take the vehicles; personnel would cross by footbridge 600 yards south (841943). Late that evening the battalions moved across the canal, and by 0200 hours 17 Apr were established on the line Beekbergen-Loenen, with P.P.C.L.I. right (804953) and Seaforth of C. left (815940). A few hours previously "A" Squadron 12 Cdn Armd Regt had crossed the canal at Dieren to come under brigade command. (W.D., 12 Cdn Armd Regt, 16 Apr 45). This advance of the 2nd Brigade had been literally unopposed and there was abundant evidence that the Germans were making a hasty retreat to west of the canal:

During our enjoyable period of 'swarming around' the P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C. had been busy on our right capturing hundreds of wandering enemy with so much loot that most of the Patricia's were offering to resign their position as Privates and go home to live in a manner befitting their status as millionaires.

(W.D., L. Edmn. R., April 1945:  
Appx 5, Operations of Loyal  
Edmonton Regiment in Holland  
from 7-23 Apr, p. 5)

76. It was decided that, because of the successful crossing of the canal by the 2nd Brigade, Brigadier Bernatchez's troops should use the bridge already established, instead of making a separate assault across the canal farther north as previously planned (see para 63). Consequently, 3 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to move over the 2nd Brigade bridge, swing north and take Apeldoorn from the south. 2 Cdn Inf Bde would form a firm base for this advance while 1 Cdn Inf Bde would remain on its present positions along the canal. ((H.S.) 225C1.016(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 17 Apr 45). Early on 17 Apr West N.S.R. crossed the canal east of Veldhuizen (839950) and moved rapidly north against the city. At 0730 hours R. 22e R., using assault boats, crossed at the Bruggeler drawbridge (806997). Since the leading battalion had already passed by, R. 22e R. then moved west over the Arnhem-Apeldoorn highway in order to advance parallel to the West N.S.R. west of the road. By this time the

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\*Troop Carrying Vehicles.

latter was approaching the outskirts of Apeldoorn and the remainder of the brigade was preparing to cross the canal. (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 16-17 Apr 45; W.D., West N.S.R., April 1945: Appx 1, Report on Operations in Holland 1945; W.D., R. 22e R., 16-17 Apr 45)

77. In the meantime the 1st Brigade had spent 16 Apr in mopping up east of the canal in preparation for the assault across the waterway the next morning (see para 32). At 1745 hours, however, word was received from Divisional Headquarters cancelling this operation in view of the projected attack from the south by the 3rd Brigade. R.C.R. took over the positions of 48 Highrs on the canal in order that the latter could prepare to enter the city from the north. During the day the forward troops were treated to the sight of Typhoons attacking installations along the canal and afterwards it was noticeable that the enemy was much quieter in this sector. Suddenly, at 0300 hours 17 Apr, firing ceased altogether, and before a patrol could be organized two Partisans appeared to say that the Germans had withdrawn from the city. Two companies of R.C.R. immediately crossed the canal and found this to be true. By 0700 hours the remainder of the battalion was in Apeldoorn, collecting prisoners and collaborators. Fortunately the locks at 795041 had been taken intact and by 0930 hours two S.B.G.\* bridges were in operation. At this time Hast & P.E.R. crossed into the city closely followed by Carlt & York R. and supported by "B" Squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt, which had come under brigade command the previous day. (W.D., 12 Cdn Armd Regt, 16-17 Apr 45). The three units took up positions around the railway station and the Royal Palace of Het Loo (7705) and by 1130 hours the liberation of Apeldoorn was completed. (W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1945: Appx 17, Ops Log, 17 Apr 45; W.Ds., R.C.R. and Hast & P.E.R., 17 Apr 45)

78. The Dutch people received the Canadians amid scenes of wild and exuberant rejoicing and the warmth of their reception made a lasting impression on the men of the 1st Division. Let the War Diarist of Hast & P.E.R. describe that battalion's entrance to Apeldoorn:

The Bn crossed the bridge and got formed up on the west side of the Canal, a brief 'O' gp was held and we started through the city. It was tough going due to the cheering and crowding of the thousands of liberated Dutch people who crowded the streets and showered bouquets of flowers on the troops. A good looking soldier had to use his weapon to beat off the girls, and many a fair maiden's kiss was forced on the boys.

(W.D., Hast & P.E.R.,  
17 Apr 45)

And in the Divisional War Diary:

We also had a look at APELDOORN, and what a reception we got. It seemed as if the entire population was out waving flags, yelling, and of course some did ask for a cigaret! The city is very beautiful and clean and has hardly felt the terrible blows of war.

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn  
Inf Div, 17 Apr 45)

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\*Single box girder.

79. Thus Apeldoorn fell without the necessity of a full scale attack and in so doing became one of the few enemy-held cities of comparable size that had not been subjected to heavy air or artillery bombardment. Maj-Gen Foster, in his review of the operations said:

It had never been my intention to assault APELDOORN frontally. It was a friendly city, filled with refugees, and I was not prepared to use arty on it. The plot was to isolate the city, by having 1 Cdn Inf Bde face up to it and thus keep the enemy garrison there occupied, and by putting 3 Cdn Inf Bde across the canal SOUTH of APELDOORN, thus coming in from the rear. This plan was modified because 2 Cdn Inf Bde had as usual, done a fine job in the SOUTH, and were able to get across the canal at DIEREN 8784. Thus it was not necessary for 3 Cdn Inf Bde to do an opposed crossing farther north.

((H.S.) 23501.011(D6): Op  
"Cannonshot": Comments given by  
Maj-Gen H.W. Foster to Hist  
Offr 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Jun 45)

In retrospect, this statement would seem to contradict the events of the preceding two days, for as we know, the 1st Brigade was making preparations to launch an attack on Apeldoorn early on the 16th, and when this was postponed, to assault on the following morning (see para 32). It would appear from this that the intention was to attack the city if the enemy persisted in remaining, and then only as a last resort.

80. On the evening of the 16th the 1st Hussars stood down prior to passing to command of 2 Cdn Corps. Since the crossing of the Ijssel River the tanks and infantry had worked together with the closest co-operation. Brigadier J.D.B. Smith, commanding 1 Cdn Inf Bde, expressed his appreciation in a letter to the commander of 2 Cdn Armd Bde:

On behalf of all ranks 1 Cdn Inf Bde I wish to express our sincere thanks for the wonderful co-operation which has been shown us by all ranks of 1 Hussars.

We in this Bde have fought in many actions in which we have been supported by various armoured units. In all our battles we have always received very excellent sp. However in this last action which has brought us into APELDOORN the sp and the willing co-operation which we have received from the 1 Hussars has been outstanding. Never was any task, however exacting, questioned by the tk comds. Throughout the op both offrs and men showed the greatest spirit of determination and gallantry. 1 Cdn Inf Bde congratulates all ranks of 1 Hussars on the wonderful show which they have put up and on behalf of the Bde I again extend my sincere thanks for all the excellent sp we have received.

(W.D., 6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 H),  
April 1945: Appx 8, Letter to  
Comd 2 Cdn Armd Bde from Comd  
1 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Apr 45)

81. The sudden withdrawal of the enemy from Apeldoorn was no doubt due to the extremely rapid advance north from Arnhem by 5 Cdn Armd Div on 16 Apr. By 0830 hours 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.) had passed through Otterloo and were advancing rapidly on Barneveld. Late that afternoon the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort railway was cut by 9 Cdn Armd Regt and by 2359 hours the Dragoons signalled that they were firm in Voorthuizen, astride the main Apeldoorn-Amersfoort highway ((H.S.) 23501. 013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log, 16 Apr 45; 1 Cdn Inf Div Message Log, 16 Apr 45). General Crerar, in his Despatch summarizes this phase of the operation:

This operation, launched on 15 Apr, soon rendered the enemy's positions at Apeldoorn and to the north untenable. Two days later, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division occupied the town itself and by 18 Apr the 1st Canadian Corps was firm on a line between the IJssel Meer and the Neder Rijn through Harderwijk, Barneveld, Ede and Renkum. It remained to round up the enemy who had thus been caught in the triangle between Deventer, Harderwijk and Kampen, and with the 1st Canadian and 49th (West Riding) Infantry Divisions to close up to the defenses running northwest and southeast through Amersfoort on which the enemy had now withdrawn. Taken at a sudden disadvantage by the speed of our armoured thrust to the north, the Germans had lost over 7,000 prisoners, including a large part of the 346th and 361st Infantry Divisions. In the course of this operation an attempt by the enemy on the night of 16/17 Apr to break through the exposed right flank of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division from the direction of Apeldoorn threatened to overrun Maj-Gen Hoffmeister's Headquarters at Otterloo and the nearby gun positions of the 17th Field Regiment. In the spirited action which ensued the enemy were beaten off with severe casualties, many prisoners and important effect on the situation as a whole.

(Crerar's Despatch, 29  
May 45, para 31)

1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary of 17 Apr gave this interesting report:

PW taken today from APELDOORN, which is in our hands said that last night the garrison staff appreciated we threatened to isolate the town and to cut all the routes back to AMERSFOORT. The main route had already been cut. So the original plan of remaining in town was abandoned and the garrison started Westward, and NORTH Westward towards PUTTEN (V5409) and NIJKERK (V4605). Those formations that were considered capable of doing so moved towards OTTERLOO with the hope of fighting their way through our spearhead.

((H.S.) 22201.(D150): 1 Cdn  
Corps Int Summary No. 271,  
17 Apr 45)

82. It appeared that the bulk of the German forces in Apeldoorn and along the line of the canal had already withdrawn to prepared positions farther west and that the troops that remained in the city had formed the rearguard for this operation. Based on information received from the Dutch

underground in Apeldoorn on 13 Apr it was known that the German High Command had issued an order to the effect that all troops east of the line Barneveld-Ede-Arnhem would withdraw to that line. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Appx 67, Message Log, 13 Apr 45). This seemed to confirm Intelligence Summary No. 136, issued on 9 Apr:

Once the IJssel RIVER or the NEDER RIJN has been crossed, a force attacking in a Westerly direction is faced with overcoming two major defence lines before the coastal belt of fortifications can be reached. These lines, the GREBBE and the NEW WATER, are based mainly on the possibilities of flooding, and the actual fd works are only supplementary to the water obstacles. The Germans have improved both these lines which the Dutch used in 1940; the main changes, apart from the additional pill boxes etc, being that the New Water line is now situated more to the West and faces WEST NOT EAST, as does the GREBBE line. Both lines, based as they are on easily inundatable river valleys can be quite effective against attack from the SOUTH-EAST, although they were first adapted by the Germans as a def against attack from the WEST.

((H.S.) 235Cl. 23(D1): 1 Cdn Inf  
Div Int Summary No. 136, 9 Apr 45,  
Appx "A")

83. The Grebbe Line was based on the river valleys of the Grebbe in the south and the Eem River in the north, together with the marshy polderland bordering the Ijsselmeer. It stretched from the Ijsselmeer to Nijkerk, south-west to Amersfoort, south-east to Veenendaal and thence to meet the east-west defence line along the Neder Rijn at Wageningen and Grebbe. The New Water Line was more easily subject to inundation than the one farther east, and it was believed that less effort had been spent on its defences, although the Germans considered it to be their main defence in this sector. It extended from Gorinchem in the south via the Merwede Canal to the Lek River, thence north to Utrecht, north-west and north along the Merwede Canal to the Ijsselmeer, ending near the perimeter defences of Amsterdam. (Ibid). Although 1 Cdn Corps had taken many prisoners since the crossing of the Ijssel and the Neder Rijn, no one doubted that the remainder of the Twenty-Fifth Army could put up a stubborn resistance along these natural barriers.

5 CDN ARMD DIV'S DRIVE TO THE IJSELMEER\*  
15-17 APR 45

84. With the fall of Arnhem before Apeldoorn, the Corps Commander ordered Maj-Gen Hoffmeister's 5 Cdn Armd Div to pass through 49 (W.R.) Inf Div rather than 1 Cdn Inf Div in order to exploit in strength to the north-west with his armour and capture in turn the high ground near Terlet (7686), Otterloo (6591), and Barneveld (5295). The Division would then cut the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort highway east of Terschuur (5099), and drive to the Ijsselmeer north of Nijkerk (4488). The axis used would be Arnhem-Otterloo-Barneveld-Nijkerk ((H.S.) 225Cl. 16(D3): Intentions 1 Cdn Corps, 15 Apr 45). This bold stroke was

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\*See Appx "D", Op "CLEANSER" (Notes of G.O.C.'s "O" Gp Held 141200B hrs). See also Map 3.

designed to sever the escape routes of the enemy east of this line, and particularly those of 361 V.G. Division which was stubbornly resisting the 1st Division at Apeldoorn. At the same time Maj-Gen Rawlins was instructed to push his troops west to Ede (5885) and Wageningen (5876), and north-east to open the Arnhem-Zutphen road. The boundary between the 49th Division and 1 Cdn Inf Div was defined as being roughly the line Apeldoorn Canal-Eerbeek (8591)-Loenen (8292)-Hoenderloo (7392)-Wekerom (6191) (ibid, 13 Apr 45).

85. 9 Cdn Armd Regt of the 5th Armoured Brigade was given the task of spearheading the attack in the initial stages, followed closely by 5 Cdn Armd Regt (8 N.B. Hussars), the Westmr R. (Mot), and 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.). 3 Cdn Armd Car Regt, supporting arms, and Brigadier I.S. Johnson's 11th Brigade would bring up the rear. The infantry would be prepared to take over from the armour at any stage of the operation. Artillery support would consist of 8 Fd Regt R.C.A., 4 A/Tk Regt R.C.A., with the addition of 3 Med Regt R.A. under command. Engineer services would be provided by 1 and 10 Field Squadrons R.C.E. (Ibid).

86. At first light on the 15th the tanks of the B.C. Dragoons (Lt-Col H. Angle, D.S.O.) and the 8th Hussars (Lt-Col J.W. Eaton) rolled through the forward positions of the British in a twin advance aimed at Terlet (7786) and Deelen (7386). With the armour came the lorried infantry of "B" and "C" Companies of the Westmr R. (Mot). Road blocks and scattered anti-tank guns caused a momentary delay, but by 1000 hours the 9th Armoured had taken Terlet and shortly after 1100 hours Deelen fell to the New Brunswick Regiment. Numerous enemy positions had been by-passed by the fast moving tanks and the job of clearing these pockets and the woods north of Arnhem fell to "A" Company of the Westminster. From Deelen and Terlet the advance swung north-west towards Otterloo and Harskamp. By mid-afternoon 8 N.B.H. had reached the road junction of Kompanieberg (698869), 3500 yards west of Deelen, and were pushing on to the high ground of the Mosselsche Zand (6583), some 5000 yards to the north-west. At this time 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.) (Lt-Col J.M. McKivty, M.B.E.) were driving north of the junction towards Otterloo, meeting only slight resistance and hampered mainly by the closeness of the country. "A" Company of the Westminster finished clearing the woods after a sharp tangle with 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, and moved up to establish a firm base at Kompanieberg. By 1900 hours the Strathconas were approaching Otterloo with "C" Company of the motor battalion moving up in support. By this time the 8th Hussars had reached the high ground of the Mosselsche Zand and were consolidating with "B" Company of the Westminster. Perth R. and C.B. Highrs of the 11th Brigade took over Deelen and Terlet, supported by two squadrons of 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt. Late that evening the two remaining companies of the Westminster and Brigade Headquarters, moved up to the road junction (W.Ds., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, 15 Apr 45; H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 15 Apr 45; 2 Cdn Armd Regt, 5 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Cdn Armd Regt and 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt, 15 Apr 45).

87. There was no doubt that the armoured thrust of the 5th Division had achieved a great tactical surprise and that the unexpectedness and vigour of its drive had caught the enemy unawares. As a result a complete breakthrough was made in the German lines and 300 prisoners were taken. Two days later, Lt-Col Leiss, officer commanding 858 Grenadier Regiment, was captured at Otterloo and subsequently interrogated. His unit had been made responsible for the defence of Arnhem and his report brought to light some interesting facts:

He complained bitterly that he had insufficient troops to deal with the infantry attack on ARNHEM, let alone the totally unexpected armoured thrust. Although he had been told that there were a few tks SOUTH of the IJSSEL, he had no suspicions regarding an armoured push NORTH from the city. He was staggered by the speed of the armoured advance, and by the overwhelming numbers of tanks that flowed on both sides and through his HQ site at E7411866....

When asked where he thought the tks came from, he believed we had formed a task force in the rear areas. He was surprised to learn they were Canadian Tanks and amazed to learn it was an experienced Armoured Division at that. He had NO clues as to its identity.

His appreciation of our intentions before we attacked was a trifle muddled. He expected the attack would originate from the island and that our thrust would be NE through VELP in order to join up with the bridgehead over the IJSSEL opposite APELDOORN. Consequently he placed his II Bn in VELP to meet our attack, and for some time we chose to ignore it. He tried to move his I Bn to meet our advances but it was too late, and both his bns were cut down to such an extent that they now operate as one company, 160 strong. They withdrew from VELP leaving behind stragglers and deserters.

((H.S.) 22201.(D150): 1 Cdn Corps  
Int Summary No. 270, 17 Apr 45)

88. The advance was to be pressed without delay. Brigadier I.H. Cumberland ordered the Strathconas to capture Otterloo, push on to take Barneveld, by-pass it if held in strength, and to strike north and cut the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort highway where it crosses the Barneveld-Nijkerk road (509994). At the same time the 8th Hussars would push forward on the left and firm up on the high ground of the Lunterensche Heide (5790), thereby protecting 5th Brigade's left flank and dominating the Ede-Barneveld road and rail communications. B.C. Dragoons would be prepared to pass through on the right and capture Voorthuizen (5401), cutting the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort highway and closing the escape route of the enemy forces retreating from Apeldoorn (ibid; (H.S.) 27505.011(D1): 5 Cdn Armd Bde, Summary of Ops, Op "Cleanser")

89. Opposition on the 16th became much heavier and enemy infantry supported by anti-tank weapons fought stubbornly to contain the Canadians. The Strathconas quickly overran Otterloo and by 0830 hours were clear of the town, leaving the mopping up to B.C. Dragoons and the 11th Brigade. Stiff resistance was experienced beyond Otterloo and it took some time before "C" Company of the Westminsters dealt with the numerous pockets of infantry. Meanwhile, on the left, 5 Cdn Armd Regt reached the high ground of the Lunterensche Heide and were consolidating with "B" Company of the motor battalion. By this time the 9th Armoured were relieved by the Ir R.C. in Otterloo and began to drive towards Voorthuizen. (Ibid).

90. A mile east of Barneveld the loss of three tanks by the 2nd Armoured Regiment was proof enough that the Gormans were in strength, and after picqueting the town, the remainder



of the armour and the supporting infantry proceeded to by-pass it to the north. Two thousand yards beyond, anti-tank and machine-gun fire halted any further advance. A heavy artillery barrage was laid down on the enemy positions, and with the approach of darkness, the troops consolidated for the night east of the railway junction between Barneveld and Voorthuizen (5398). Meanwhile on the right, the Dragoons were making good progress despite poor ground conditions. By 1600 hours they had moved to within one mile of Kootwijkerbroek (583969) against very little resistance. Turning west they contacted the Strathconas north of Barneveld (535971) and pushed north along the road to Voorthuizen. At 2000 hours the town was reached and by last light the Dragoons were in full possession, although the final clearing remained to be done. The 8th Hussars had, by this time, cleared the wooded area of the Wekeronsche Zand of 300 Dutch S.S. troops and were preparing to pass through Barneveld, where the C.B. Highrs waited for first light of the 17th to mop up (ibid).

91. The night of 16/17 Apr saw the most determined enemy reaction of the operation. That evening the road between Brigade and Divisional Headquarters was cut, and the B.C. Dragoons at Voorthuizen repulsed a strong counter-attack by elements of 6 Para Div. But it was at Otterloo that the most severe encounter took place. Here between 500 and 600 troops of 361 V.G. and 346 Divisions, desperately trying to break the rapidly closing cordon, ran full tilt into Maj-Gen Hoffmeister's Divisional Headquarters. The attack, launched shortly before midnight from the north, south, and east, quickly overran the forward gun positions of 17 Fd Regt, penetrated the lines of the Irish Regiment, and stormed Divisional Headquarters itself. Hand to hand fighting ensued (one Battery Serjeant-Major throttled a German with his bare hands) and the 25-pounders were fired over open sights at a range of 150 yards. Only the very able defence of the gunners, the infantry, and the staff of the headquarters prevented a very serious threat to the advance, and with the appearance of Churchill tanks in the morning the enemy retired, leaving their dead and wounded behind. Over 150 Germans were taken prisoner, 75 to 100 were killed and an undetermined number wounded. From the interrogation of prisoners it was learned that the Germans had come west from the neighbourhood of Apeldoorn via Hoenderloo with the object of securing Otterloo and pushing south-west to Ede. They had strict orders to take all transport and heavy equipment with them, and officers attributed the failure of the attack to this and the fact that little preparation had been given to the plan. They had no idea that a divisional headquarters was in the vicinity and believed that only Lines of Communication troops were in their path (W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 17 Fd Regt, Ir R.C., 17 Apr 45; (H.S.) 24505.011(D1): Ops 5 Cdn Armd Div, Account given to Hist Offr by Lieut. J. Hobson, Divisional Interrogator, 23 Apr 45).

92. Meanwhile to the north, C.B. Highrs entered Barneveld on the heels of the retreating garrison. The road between Divisional and Brigade Headquarters still remained cut, so tanks and infantry of the 8th Hussars and the Cape Bretons swept the road between Barneveld and Otterloo to restore communications. During the morning the Strathconas firmed up to the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort highway at the cross-roads (509993) and immediately came under very accurate shell-fire. "All tks were ordered to shoot down every windmill and tower in sight, and our arty was brought to bear on several suspected OPs, but still the observed shelling continued" (W.D., 2 Cdn Armd Regt

(Ld S.H.), April 1945: Appx 44, Account of Operations, 12-19 Apr 45). At this time the B.C. Dragoons were flushing out the last of the enemy in the woods around Voorthuizen while the 8th Hussars were concentrating south of the town, prior to passing through to Putten (5408), some 10,000 yards to the north. At noon orders were received for the Strathconas and the New Brunswick Regiment to begin the advance to Nijkerk and Putten and the road connecting the two towns (ibid; W.Ds., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Cdn Armd Regt (8 N.B. Hussars), and 9 Cdn Armd Regt (B.C.D.), 17 Apr 45).

93. At first both units and particularly the Strathconas ran into heavy shelling and a strong anti-tank screen supported by infantry. Five foot high road blocks of heavy green logs, securely braced, had to be bulldozed before any progress could be made. By 1645 hours the leading squadrons had made an advance to nearly one and one-half miles and appeared to have broken through the defences. However at 1700 hours both drives were stopped when a second screen was encountered. With the aid of the Westminsters the 8th Hussars shook loose the opposition and pushed on. The Strathconas however were meeting increasing resistance, and in view of the good advance on the right, were ordered to disengage to the east and push through Putten as soon as it was captured. By last light the 8th Hussars were some 1500 yards short of Putten and with the assistance of "A" Company of the Westminsters attempted to force the town. An ambush of 50 bazookas supported by self-propelled guns caught the column on the outskirts; six tanks were knocked out and the force was able to withdraw only after a heavy fight. On the left the advance of the Strathconas was delayed when the leading squadron was strafed by the Royal Air Force, fortunately with only one casualty. Shortly after midnight R. 22e R. and L. Edmn R. entered Barneveld and contacted C.B. Highrs. The link-up was now complete (Ibid; W.Ds., R. 22e R., and L. Edmn R., 17/18 Apr 45).

94. Early on 18 Apr "A" and "B" Companies of the Westminsters moved forward with the intention of cutting the road west of Putten and working into the town. Progress was hampered by a dense ground fog, but by 1030 hours "A" Company had reached the highway 1000 yards to the east (533087) with "B" Company moving directly into Putten. By 1130 hours the few remaining Germans had been cleared amid the cheers of the populace. The armoured regiment (8th Hussars) immediately passed through to the north and by noon the reconnaissance troop had reached the sea near Nulde (5010). Meanwhile the Strathconas, which had by this time concentrated south of Putten, were ordered to push through to Harderwijk (5619), some six miles to the north. Progress was rapid; Ermelo (5613), half way between Putten and Harderwijk, was reached without opposition and the tanks pushed on to their objective. After calling on the garrison to surrender through the medium of an N.B.S. officer (Dutch Underground), the Strathconas moved into the town at 1700 hours, took 20 prisoners, and shot the rest, who were attempting to escape by boat (W.D., 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.), April 1945: Appx 44, Account of Operations, 12-19 Apr 45). Meanwhile 9 Cdn Armd Regt and Perth R. moved up to finish clearing Ermelo. This was done without difficulty and Perth R. proceeded to Harderwijk in order to consolidate the town. At the same

time the B.C. Dragoons swung west of Ermelo and harboured near Telgt (530120) while the Ir R.C. took over Ermelo, and 5 Cdn Armd Regt and the Westminsters cleared the enemy from in and around Putten. On the left flank an advance of two miles was made towards Nijkerk by the 82 A/Tk Bty Combat Group (W.Ds., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Cdn Armd Regt, 18 Apr 45).

95. The next day a squadron of the Strathcoons swept north along the coast to Nunspeet, and early in the afternoon reported Nunspeet clear and that a link up had been made with 49 Div Recce Regt (see para 110). The rest of the Division were occupied with flushing the last remaining Germans from their areas and getting a well needed rest and clean-up. At 2100 hours the command of the sector passed to Maj-Gen Foster's 1 Cdn Inf Div and on 20 Apr word was received that next day 5 Cdn Armd Div would relieve the 3rd Division in the Emden area. Preparations were immediately made for the move.\* (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 20 Apr 45)

THE ADVANCE TO THE EEM RIVER BY 1 CDN INF DIV  
17 - 27 APR 45\*\*

96. Now that Apeldoorn had been taken Lt-Gen Foulkes ordered 1 Cdn Inf Div to advance and relieve elements of 5 Cdn Armd Div in the Barneveld-Voorthuizen area, prior to the latter's transfer to 2 Cdn Corps. The plan was for the 1st Division to move on a three-brigade front: 1st Brigade to advance along the main highway to Voorthuizen, 3rd Brigade to parallel this by pushing south of the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort railway, and 2nd Brigade to move to Barneveld along the Veldhuizen-Harskamp axis, clearing to the 93 Northing. Units would move by troop carrying vehicles as much as possible, tanks and self-propelled guns were to give close support, and emphasis was placed on speed. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 17 Apr 45; (H.S.) 235C1.013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log, 17 Apr 45). At this time the following instructions were also given by the Corps Commander:

Comds will preserve enemy war material as far as possible consistent with the safety of their tps and role allotted to them. Material which constitutes a threat and cannot be guarded or controlled will be destroyed. This will apply particularly to small arms, amn and explosives scattered and in small dumps found during fluid ops and for which gds cannot readily be found. Attention of subordinate comds will be drawn to the necessity for destruction of arms and amn of these types which cannot adequately be guarded.

(Ibid, 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log,  
17 Apr 45).

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\*The subsequent operations of 5 Cdn Armd Div are covered in A.H.Q. Report No. 32, Part III, paras 659-717.

\*\*See Map 4 for this advance

97. 1 Cdn Inf Bde began to advance at 1000 hours 17 Apr with Hast & P.E.R. leading, mounted on the tanks of "B" Squadron 12 Cdn Armd Regt. Progress was rapid at first and little difficulty was experienced through the greater part of the heavily wooded hilly area to the west of Apeldoorn. At the woods at Nieuw Milligen (6604), some six miles from Apeldoorn, the battalion ran into stiff resistance from heavy mortars and anti-tank guns fired at short range, and it took the remainder of the day to oust the enemy from their positions. By 0400 hours the unit was firm in the Cavalry Depot, 500 yards west of Nieuw Milligen. The next day (18 Apr) the battalion pushed on until a solid road block at the bend in the road 3000 yards west of the Cavalry Depot (626044) prevented further advance. Here the battalion was ordered to halt and patrols were sent out to scour the surrounding woods. (W.D., Hast & P.E.R., 17-18 Apr 45). In the afternoon R.C.R., who were in brigade reserve, passed through and took up positions at Garderen (6105). Early that morning 48 Highrs were ordered to swing south of the highway at 695045, and move in a south-westerly direction to the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort railway at Stroe (6000). This village was reached early in the evening. (W.D., 48 Highrs, 18 Apr 45)

98. On the morning of the 19th Apr, the 1st Brigade received orders to sweep to the north in "flying columns" and contact 5 Cdn Armd Div. Consequently Hast & P.E.R. were instructed to go to Elspeet, 48 Highrs to Harderwijk, and R.C.R. to Nunspeet. One company was to be left at each base to form a brigade reserve. The three moves were without incident and all formations were back at their bases by early evening. Orders were then received that the brigade would remain in its present position for the time being with the exception of Hast & P.E.R., which would move to Elspeet. This was done on 23 Apr. (W.Ds., Hast & P.E.R., 48 Highrs, and R.C.R., 19 Apr 45)

99. As 1 Cdn Inf Bde moved off from Apeldoorn West N.S.R. contacted the R.C.R. and learned that the city was clear. (W.D., West N.S.R., April 1945; Appx I, Report on Operations in Holland). Brigadier Bernatchez immediately ordered the 3rd Brigade to advance with all possible speed to Barneveld on a two-axis line of advance between the 00 and 97 Northings. West N.S.R. and Carlt & York R. would be right while R. 22e R., Brigade Headquarters, and supporting arms would be left. Armoured support would be provided by "C" Squadron of Three Riv R. The advance, begun at 1300 hours, was extremely rapid and after slight opposition on the left flank in the early stages had been overcome it was estimated that the columns were averaging almost 30 miles per hour. West N.S.R. were forced to halt twice because their supporting tanks ran out of petrol. R. 22e R. reached Barneveld shortly after dusk, some two hours before L. Edmn R. of the 2nd Brigade. Carlt & York R. reached the town at midnight and were joined by West N.S.R. at 0500 hours the next morning (18 Apr). (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1945; Appx 16, Battle Report of the Offensive from the IJssel to the Eem)

100. On the morning of the 18th 3 Cdn Inf Bde received orders to relieve elements of 5 Cdn Armd Div in the area of Voorthuizen, Appel, Kruishaar, and Putten and to be responsible for protecting the axis of the armoured division's northern advance. By 1800 hours the move had

been completed without incident: R. 22e R. were in Voorthuizen, Carlt & York R. were in Appel and Kruishaar, and West N.S.R. were firm in Putten. The next day all battalions patrolled west as far as the 43 grid line (to within 3000 yards of Amersfoort), met very little opposition and brought in a considerable number of prisoners. Following this, West N.S.R. moved to the area south of the Olden Aller Castle (4807, 4907) and Carlt & York R. positioned one company in Driedorp. At first light on 20 Apr, Carlt & York R. and West N.S.R. set out for Nijkerk and by 1030 hours this town had been liberated to a cheering and enthusiastic populace. At noon orders were received for the brigade to remain in their present positions until further notice. During the remainder of the day the mobile patrols of Carlt & York R. made deep thrusts to within 3000 yards of the Eem River, clearing Nieuwland (3902), Nieuwenburg (3502), Sluisdijk (3502), and Ham (3800), and reported that the enemy was in strength on this barrier and that most of the bridges had been blown. Later that day a carrier patrol from R.C.R. reported that it had been fired on from Amersfoort. (Ibid, 18-20 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 18-20 Apr 45; (H.S.) 235C1.013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log, 20 Apr 45)

101. It is interesting to note the composition of the "mobile patrols", "battle groups", and "flying columns" which were used to a great extent during this phase of the operation. In the absence of the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment it fell to the individual battalion commanders to form these forces in the best way that they saw fit. The War Diary of the 2nd Brigade describes such a group as being composed of "carriers, M.M.Gs on carriers, a tp of tks, a tp of S.P. guns, a coy of inf, pnrs and 3" Mortars." (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 Apr 45). In the Battle Report of the 3rd Brigade the mobile patrols were described as consisting of "unit carriers, a section of M.M.Gs, two WASPS, a platoon of infantry, a Forward Observation Officer and Despatch Riders". (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1945: Appx 16, Battle Report of the Offensive from the IJssel to the Eem). These ad hoc units were in fairly constant use and on the whole gave extremely satisfactory performances.

102. In the meantime the Division's remaining brigade had also taken up the advance. On the morning of 17 Apr P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C., supported by "A" Squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt, pushed forward to the area north-west of Hoenderloo (7194, 7195) in order to form a firm base for the 3rd Brigade's advance on Apeldoorn. At noon orders were received for the brigade to move on Barneveld and L. Edmn R. was instructed to push through the two forward battalions as soon as the latter had cleared up its front. At 1900 hours the advance began and one hour later the village of Harskamp was reported clear. The advance became so rapid that communications with the forward battalions became extremely difficult and, for a time, contact could not be made with the 3rd Brigade on the right flank. Prisoners were so plentiful that a special prisoner of war cage had to be established at Hoenderloo in order to handle the rapid influx of Germans. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 17 Apr 45). At 0300 hours 18 Apr word was received that L. Edmn R. had entered Barneveld, some two hours after R. 22e R. During the morning L. Edmn R. moved to a position between Terschuur and Harselaar (5099) while P.P.C.L.I. advanced to south-west of Barneveld (5295) and Seaforth of C. moved north-east of the town (5397). Immediately patrols were sent out and P.P.C.L.I. reported the village of Achterveld clear. (Ibid)

103. Active patrolling was continued during 19 Apr. A battle group from L. Edmn R. quickly passed Terschuur but ran into a heavily defended road block near Hoevelaken (437000) which it was unable to penetrate. Air support was laid on and Typhoons very effectively strafed the woods west of the town (4300, 4301, 4302). At first light on the 20th a forward observation officer and his party was established in Achterveld under protection of infantry from P.P.C.L.I. During the day patrols probed west towards the river and south-west as far as De Glindhorst (473937) and Veenschoten (477914). On the 21st Brigade Headquarters took over billets of H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div in Barneveld and Seaforth of C. occupied Walderveen, where contact was made with patrols of 147 Bde of 49 (W.R.) Div. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 21 Apr 45; W.Ds., P.P.C.L.I., and L. Edmn R., 19-21 Apr 45)

104. When one considers the extremely close country in which the three brigades had to operate, and the lack of information concerning the intentions of the enemy\*, the advance from Apeldoorn Canal becomes a feat of no mean proportions. This certainly was the opinion of the Divisional Commander:

When the enemy resistance crumbled on the WEST bk of the APELDOORN CANAL, all three bdes did an excellent pursuit job, considering the distance covered and the thickness of the country, all of which had to be searched. The speed with which it had been done was remarkable.

((H.S.) 23501.011(D6): Op  
"Cannonshot", Comments by Maj-  
Gen H.W. Foster to Hist Offr  
1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Jun 45)

On 19 Apr, General Crerar sent the following message of congratulation to Maj-Gen Foster:

The 1 Cdn Inf Div have proved again in NW Europe the very HIGH reputation it gained and held in the MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS. My sincere congratulations to all ranks on a difficult operation executed with great success.

((H.S.) 23001.(D80): Ops Generally  
N.W.E., Foster from Crerar,  
19 Apr 45)

It was apparent that the enemy had no intentions of attempting to prevent the advance of the Canadians between Apeldoorn and the Grebbe Line; indeed, many were only too anxious to seek asylum as prisoners of war. The following incident, related in the Divisional War Diary, probably illustrates better than any narrative the conditions which existed during this period:

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\*This general lack of information affected the Canadian units as well as those of the enemy forces. The writer recently had occasion to discuss this operation with Brigadier M.P. Bogert, who stated that his Headquarters not only lost contact with Brigadier Bernatchez' 3rd Brigade on the right but had no indication that elements of 5 Cdn Armd Div were near Barneveld when L. Edmn R. arrived there in the early morning of 18 Apr.

The Corps Comd (Lt-Gen C. Foulkes, C.B.E., D.S.O.) on his way to this HQ during the morning, was stopped by a character who asked for a lift. It turned out that he was a German soldier who "demanded" that he be made a prisoner! The General brought him to our HQ and presented him to our GOC dryly remarking as he did so, 'Your area has obviously not been completely deloused!'

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn  
Inf. Div, 18 Apr 45)

105. By 22 Apr organized resistance of the German forces facing the British, American, and French Armies in the north, east, and south was collapsing on all fronts. On the front facing 1 Cdn Corps, however, the enemy could still muster 120,000 men behind his prepared defences of the Grebbe Line, and it was hardly practicable for a two-division Corps to assault. It was obvious that it was only a matter of days before a general capitulation would take place, and in order to save Western Holland from further acts of enemy despoilation, Field Marshal Montgomery issued the following instructions on 22 Apr:

In western HOLLAND, the [Canadian] army will not for the present operate further westwards than the general line now held east of AMERSFOORT. Further instructions will be issued if it should become necessary, later on, to attack the Germans in western HOLLAND and to liberate that area.

((H.S.) 215A21.016(D9): Op  
Directives, C-in-C 21 Army  
Group, Directive M574, 22 Apr  
45, para 15)

In view of this 1 Cdn Inf Div was instructed to continue active patrolling in order to maintain contact with the enemy and to exploit in strength to the Eem River and Canal. The object was two-fold: first, to free and protect the Dutch civilians living in the No-Man's area east of the water barrier, and second, to gain necessary ground from which to launch a bridgehead attack across the canal should the latter prove necessary. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, April 1945: Message Log, 23 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Apr 45). The 2nd and 3rd Brigades were given this task while the 1st Brigade was to remain in divisional reserve in its present positions Garderen-Stroe-Elspeet.

#### FINAL OPERATIONS IN WEST HOLLAND, 22-27 APR 45

106. On 22 Apr 3 Cdn Inf Bde began to move in easy stages up to the River Eem, north of Amersfoort. One company of West N.S.R. entered Spakenburg on the Ijsselmeer and Bunschoten (3807) which had been found clear of the enemy by a mobile patrol the previous day. The wooded area north-west of Hoevelaken (4302) was cleared without difficulty by one company of Carlt & York R, but a "battle group" from R. 22e R. ran into fairly heavy opposition in the woods west of the village (431001). Further efforts on the 23rd to clear this strong point were to no avail and it was decided to wait until

A.Vs.R.E.\* could be brought up in support. The next morning a combined attack was launched with complete success. This was the first time the brigade had had the opportunity of using these armoured vehicles and all ranks were much impressed with their effectiveness. On the night of 24/25 Apr R. 22e R. patrolled to the bank of the Eem Canal and reported both the railway bridge (397993) and the road bridge (401990) blown. In the evening of the 24th a company of Dutch troops, under command of West N.S.R., took over the positions in Bunschoten and Spakenburg. The next day the forward companies of Carlt & York R. moved forward, one company entering Ham (3800) and the other establishing itself 1500 yards west of Langenoord (375019). The battalion experienced considerable enemy artillery fire the remainder of the day, but this lessened on the 25th. Meanwhile R. 22e R. continued to patrol forward of their positions. On the evening of 26 Apr West N.S.R. switched positions with Carlt & York R., the latter going into brigade reserve in the area of Nijkerk. (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 22-26 Apr 45; W.D., R. 22e R., 22-26 Apr 45; W.D., West N.S.R., April 1945: Appx 1, Report on Operations in Holland 1945; W.D., Carlt & York R., 22-26 Apr 45)

107. In the meantime, 2 Cdn Inf Bde was conforming to the advance of the 3rd Brigade by pushing forward slowly to the line of the Eem, the Assachatter Beek, and the Lunterensche Beek. During 22 Apr, L. Edmn R. pushed two companies forward to occupy positions 1500 yards west of Terschuur (470990, 471981) and P.F.C.L.I. made similar dispositions at Achterveld and Jannendorp. That night a reconnaissance patrol from L. Edmn R. reached the canal junction of the Modder Beek south-west of Musschendorp (432962) where enemy movement was reported on the far bank. On the 23rd L. Edmn R. moved three companies some 2000 yards ahead of their former positions (453986, 458979, 4597) while P.F.C.L.I. pushed one company west of Jannendorp (457962). During the night the Patricias inflicted casualties on three enemy patrols which tried to infiltrate the positions. The next day L. Edmn R. launched a company attack on the woods and buildings at Groot Stoutenburg (4397) and succeeded in clearing the area with few casualties. Later one company was sent to relieve a company of the R. 22e R. east of Hoevelaken (430002). Meanwhile a patrol from Seaforth of C. were forced to withdraw from the woods north-east of Voskuilen (440930) and plans were made to attack in strength the next day. A company attack was successful in clearing this area. That night patrols of P.F.C.L.I. made an uninterrupted reconnaissance for suitable crossing places over the Modder Beek. During that day and the following night all battalions continued active patrolling and on the morning of the 27th P.F.C.L.I. were successful in two ambush patrols. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 22-26 Apr 45; W.Ds., P.F.C.L.I., L. Edmn R., and Seaforth of C., 22-26 Apr 45). The Intelligence Summary of 26 Apr gave an accurate synopsis of enemy's reactions up to that date:

The local intentions of the enemy show no change over the past few days. They are to retire slowly fighting all the way, the only variation being the occasional commander who, realizing the hopelessness

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\*Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers, commonly referred to as a tank equipped with a petard for breaching fortified strong points.



of the struggle, uses the opportunity offered by receiving the orders to counter attack to make his way with comparative ease into the PW cage at the double.

These instances are, alas, still infrequent....

((H.S.) 235C1.023(D1): 1 Cdn  
Inf Div Int Summary No. 143,  
26 Apr 45)

108. At this point mention should be made of 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 P.L.D.G.). On the morning of the 21st, this unit, which had undergone conversion from infantry (see para 16), became responsible for the area from Kampen to Voorthuizen, and took over from 11 Cdn Inf Bde and 49 (W.R.) Div Recce Regt. Between 21-28 Apr the troops patrolled north of Nunspeet (6721) and as far west as Epe (8081), and literally combed the heavily wooded district north of the Apeldoorn-Amersfoort line. During this period a company of the Dutch Forces of the Interior (N.B.S.) gave invaluable service to the 1st Division by assisting 4 Cdn Recce Regt on many of their extended sweeps. One of these was conducted on 28 Apr when the woods bounded by Putten, Garderen, and Voorthuizen was systematically searched for enemy. Canadian officers reported that "DFI men were well disciplined, and that their troop commanders were very capable, and that, due mainly to the work of interpreters, co-operation was extremely good". (W.D., 4 Cdn Recce Regt, 21-28 Apr 45; ibid: Appx 8, Report on Exercise "Beagle", 28 Apr 45). It was unfortunate that for this period 4 P.L.D.G. did not become operational five days earlier. If it had, it would have been able to fulfil its role in reconnaissance during the rapid dash west from the Apeldoorn Canal. As we have seen, this task had of necessity to be performed by the infantry and its hastily constituted nobile "battle groups" (see para 101).

#### OPERATIONS OF 49 (W.R.) INF DIV 16-27 APR 45\*

109. With the final clearing of Arnhem on 15 Apr the British Division was free to effect a link-up with 1 Cdn Inf Div west of the Ijssel and provide a firm base for the latter's westward advance. It was planned that once 56 Bde had cleared Velp (7879) and its environs 146 Bde should pass through to open the Velp-Dieren road and secure a crossing over the Apeldoorn Canal and make contact with 1 Cdn Inf Div. At the same time 147 Bde would begin to move north-west and west on Ede and Wageningen ((H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 14 Apr 45). The drive along the Ijssel began early on 16 Apr. Ably supported by the tanks of the Ontarios (11 Cdn Armd Regt) 56 and 146 Bdes made a rapid advance; by 0745 hours Velp (7879) was taken and one hour later De Steegh had fallen to the Hallans. In the meantime 49 Div Recce Regt, advancing in a wide northward sweep from the vicinity of Terlet (7786), had made a deep penetration of the wooded Inbosch area, and late that morning linked up with 2 Cdn Inf Bde at Dieren (see para 73), and reached the Canal farther north near Veldhuizen (8394). Shortly afterwards, the Velp-Dieren road was cleared when the Ontarios, with the infantry of 146 Bde riding on the back of the tanks, entered Dieren. The two brigades immediately regrouped and swung west. ((H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 15-16 Apr 45; W.D., 11 Cdn Armd Regt (Ont R.), 16 Apr 45)

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\*See Map 3 for these operations.

110. The twin drives on Ede and Wageningen began on the evening of 16 Apr. 11 R.S.F., with "A" and "C" Squadrons of 14 Cdn Armd Regt in support moved along the Arnhem-Ede highway and by last light had made an advance of some 5000 yards. On the 18th the push continued; Ede was reached at 0800 hours, and after a stiff fight and with the use of flame-throwers, the Calgaries managed to clear it by noon. 11 R.S.F. proceeded to consolidate while the armoured squadrons prepared to return to command of 1 Cdn Armd Bde on the "island". The other two battalions of the brigade made equally good progress; by 0830 hours on 17 Apr 1 Leicesters had taken Wolfhezen (6679), Bennekom (5980) fell to 7 D.W.R. at 1200 hours, and early that evening they entered Wageningen (5776) against little opposition. The advance of 56 Bde was somewhat slower owing to the built up areas through which the infantry had to move but by early evening of 17 Apr Oosterbeek (7077), Heveadorp (6777), Heelsum (6477) and Renkum (6276) had fallen to the British (W.D., 14 Cdn Armd Regt (Calg R.), 16-17 Apr 45; (H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops Log 1 Cdn Corps, 17-18 Apr 45; (H.S.) 235B49.018(D1): W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Inf Div, 16-17 Apr 45). The War Diary of the Calgaries lists these three interesting observations of this operation:

1. The bulldozer mounted on Sherman hull proved an invaluable friend, sweeping heavy built up or demolished road blocks aside in a matter of minutes.
2. The policy of welding track links as an outer armour to Shermans, saved lives and wounds. When hits were scored in two cases, the welded links scaled off, causing rounds to deflect off the tank.
3. The soundness of sand-table tactics in fighting ants was re-affirmed. In three cases the enemy gun was defeated by an encircling movement on the part of our tanks. In two of these cases encirclement was made possible by the simple expedient of laying down smoke.

(W.D., 14 Cdn Armd Regt  
(Calg R.), 17 Apr 45)

111. On the evening of 17 Apr General Foulkes sent the following message to the commander of the British Division:

The Army Commander wishes to congratulate all ranks of 49 (WR) Inf Div on their splendid performance on capturing ARNHEM and the final objectives EDE BENNEKOM and WAGENINGEN. The Corps Commander wishes to add his congratulations for the efficient and enthusiastic manner in which all ranks carried out this difficult operation.

((H.S.) 225C1.015(D1): Ops  
Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 17 Apr 45)

112. With the taking of Ede and Wageningen the operations of 49 (W.R.) Inf Div to all intents and purposes came to an end. Between 18-28 Apr the British kept pace with 2 Cdn Inf Bde on their right so that by 28 Apr they held the general line Renswoude (4988)-De Klomp (5185)-Wageningen (5776) just short of the Grebbe River. The Recce Regt, which had been harbouring in the area of Lunteren (5589), moved north of Apeldoorn on 19 Apr to sweep the area of Heerde (8422),

Vesen (8721), Kampen (7641), Nunspeet (6721), and Harderwijk (5519) (ibid); (H.S.) 235B49.018(D1); W.D., G.S., H.Q. 49 (W.R.) Div, 18-28 Apr).

OPERATIONS OF 1 CDN ARMD BDE, 18-27 APR 45

113. As we have seen, Brigadier W.C. Murphy's 1 Cdn Armd Bde, with Belgian troops under command, had been responsible for the "island" sector of the Corps front during Operation "Anger" (see para 23). On the night 12/13 Apr 12 and 14 Cdn Armd Regts gave valuable support to the operation by firing "pepperpots" at defended localities in Arnhem from the "island" side of the Neder Rijn. Between 14-18 Apr the Belgian troops actively patrolled the area. With the return of "A" and "C" Squadrons from 49 (W.R.) Inf Div (see para 110) on the 18th ("B" Squadron had remained to support the Belgian troops), operations to clear the area west of the line Randwijk (6074)-Hemmen (5972) began. Opheusden (5572) quickly fell and the infantry and tanks advanced to the waterway between Ochten (5070) and De Spees (5373). On the evening of 19 Apr word was received from Headquarters 1 Cdn Corps that all offensive action would cease in view of the impending truce. Apparently the Germans were not informed of this, and between 20 Apr and 1 May they made several aggressive 50-man counter-attacks against the forward positions of the brigade. These were successfully beaten off and on 1 May 1 Cdn Corps signalled that suspension of hostilities was in effect on the 1st Brigade's sector. The Brigade remained in this area until the 7th when it moved to Culenborg (2776) to administer the surrender of 361 V.G. Div (W.Ds., H.Q. 1 Cdn Armd Bde, 14 Cdn Armd Regt (Calg R.), 14 Apr - 7 May 45). The War Diary of the Calg R. gives a very accurate description of the Brigade's operations during April:

The Regt's shoot on Arnhem was interesting as a new experience; the quick advance and seizure of Ede brought back, for the pathetically brief period of 48 hours, some of the adventure of rapid advance and warfare: the remaining two weeks were a replica of siege warfare on the Senio. We were condemned to sit before a canal, amid Italian like orchards and soggy ground while even Italy rose to life and overthrew... the German armies of the Po.

(W.D., 14 Cdn Armd Regt  
(Calg R.), 30 Apr 45)

TRUCE AND SURRENDER, 28 APR - 5 MAY 45

114. On the morning of the 27th events took a dramatic turn. For the past two days wireless communication had been maintained with the enemy, and arrangements were now completed whereby a German delegation, under a flag of truce, would be prepared to discuss the United Nations feeding of the starving people of Holland still under Nazi occupation.\* That evening instructions were passed to all commands that effective 0800 hours 28 Apr a state of truce would exist and that until further notice there would be no firing except in retaliation. As in the case of 1 Cdn Armd Bde word of this local armistice was not received by all enemy formations, for next day the forward troops of 1 Cdn Inf Div were sporadically shelled, mortared, and sniped. One soldier of the West N.S.R. was killed and this fatality proved to be the last that the 1st Division suffered.

\*A full account of the surrender is given in a subsequent report.

115. It was decided that the commander of 2 Cdn Inf Bde, Brigadier M.P. Bogert, accompanied by his Brigade Major, should meet the German parlementaire at the village of Vinkenhoef (427997), prior to conducting it back to Achterveld where the discussion was to take place. Late that morning the German delegation, conspicuous by an enormous white flag on a very large pole, and headed by Reichsrichter Schwebel, Judge Advocate of Occupied Holland, met Brigadier Bogert, who conducted the party to Achterveld. Here in the schoolhouse were assembled the Allied delegation: Col J. Lawrence from SHAEF, Prince Bernhardt of the Netherland Forces, Maj-Gen Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, Brigadier C.C. Mann, Chief of Staff, First Cdn Army, Brigadier G. Kitching, Chief of Staff, 1 Cdn Corps, and Maj-Gen H.W. Foster, commanding 1 Cdn Inf Div, together with Naval, Air Force, and service branch personnel. As the Reichsrichter had not sufficient authority to conclude the negotiations it was decided that a further meeting should be held on 30 Apr and that Lt-Gen Foulkes and his German counterpart should meet the next day (the 29th) to make the necessary arrangements. Accordingly the following morning the Corps Commander and Generalleutnant Plucher, commander of 6 Para Div, met at Vinkenhoef, where the demands made by the United Nations were discussed and the "No Firing" order was reaffirmed. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 28-29 Apr 45). Shortly after 1200 hours on the 30th, Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart, accompanied by Reichsrichter Schwebel, Generalleutnant Plucher and various staff officers, arrived at Achterveld under escort. This time the Allied delegation was augmented by Lt-Gen W. Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, SHAEF, and Gen Suseleparov, head of the Russian Military Mission to SHAEF. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 28-29 Apr 45). Arrangements were completed for the feeding of the Dutch civilians, and the "No Firing" period was extended to an indefinite date. ((H.S.) 225Cl.013(D9): Ops 1 Cdn Corps, Apr-May 45: Appx 6, Some Notes on Negotiations with German Higher Command in Holland 27 Apr to 5 May 1945 by Hist Offr, 1 Cdn Corps). Of these conferences General Crerar wrote to the Minister of National Defence:

As a result of a series of conferences held on 28 and 30 Apr and 1 May between representatives of the Allies and the German military and civil authorities in the Netherlands agreement was reached to enable food for the starving civilians to be introduced into the occupied territory by air, sea, road and inland waterway. ... Lt-Gen Foulkes was to be responsible for arranging the boundaries limiting the neutral area through which the supplies were to pass. As a result, the necessary steps were immediately taken to ensure that the convoys of food moved in for distribution under the auspices of the Dutch civil authorities with the least possible delay. It was made clear, however, that the existing lull in our operations had nothing whatsoever to do with an armistice and that offensive operations might again be undertaken to destroy or capture the enemy forces still prepared to resist in the west Netherlands.

(Crerar, Despatch, 29 May 45, para 39)

116. The next four days were ones of uneasy truce on the 1st Division's front. Messages were periodically received that the enemy was about to resume offensive operations, and all formations were instructed to be prepared to counter any last desperate action. However, at 2100 hours on 4 May the

B.B.C. broadcast the news that all German and German controlled troops in North-West Germany, Holland, and Denmark had surrendered unconditionally to Field Marshal Montgomery. One hour later 1 Cdn Corps ordered that "all offensive action will cease forthwith" and that "No firing of any type of weapon will take place from 050800B hrs" (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, May 1945; Appx 67, Message Log, 4 May 45). This news was received quietly and gratefully by all ranks. There was no effort made to celebrate; indeed the German troops appeared, outwardly at least, more moved than the Canadians: West N.S.R. reported that the enemy opposite its lines were letting off flares and firing tracers into the air (W.D., West N.S.R., 4 May 45). Three hours before the surrender went into effect a German patrol tried to rush one of the company positions of this battalion. Small arms fire forced the raiders to flee but not before wounding a sentry. This was the last casualty of the war in 1 Cdn Inf Div (Ibid, 5 May 45; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 May 45).

117. Let us now consider the tactical dispositions of 1 Cdn Inf Div as it existed on the morning of 28 Apr and which remained the same except for minor changes\* until the Division moved across the Eem River to handle the surrender of the German troops. Roughly the divisional boundary consisted of the IJsselmeer in the north, the Eem River and Canal in the west, and the 92nd Northing in the south (the line Eschoten (6491)-Voskuilen (4392)) where the 49 (W.R.) Div was on the left flank. Although the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were not, in actual fact, faced up to the line of the Eem and its tributary, the Modder Beek, the intervening territory had been extensively patrolled and was under control. 3 Cdn Inf Bde had the company of Dutch Forces of the Interior stationed at Spakenburg and Bunschoten. To the south, West N.S.R. was in the vicinity of Langenoord (3902) with headquarters at Bosterdijk (386013). R. 22e R. was located south and east astride the Amersfoort-Harderwijk railway with headquarters 1800 yards east of Brand (420016). Carlt & York R. was in brigade reserve north-east of Nijkerk at Salentijn (472067) with Brigade Headquarters located east of Slichtenhorst at 479031. On R. 22e R. left and 3000 yards due west of Amersfoort was L. Edmn R. extending from Huis Hoevelaken (430998) to the vicinity of Kl Vinkseleer (459977) with battalion headquarters some 500 yards north-west of the latter position (452983). P.P.C.L.I. held the centre of the 2nd Brigade's front at Lichterveld (472953) with Seaforth of C. on the left flank at De Glindhorst (473936). Barneveld was the site of the 2nd Brigade Headquarters (529957). In Divisional Reserve was 1 Cdn Inf Bde with Headquarters at Staverden (637116), Hast & P.E.R. at Elspeet (671124), R.C.R. at Garderen (618059), and 48 Highrs at Stroe (602007). 4 P.L.D.G. were located at Putten (550091), 12 Cdn Armd Regt south of Stroe (605996), and 2 Cdn L.A.A. Regt south of Kootwijk (648996). Headquarters 1 Cdn Inf Div was located approximately midway between Barneveld and Stroe north of Kootwijkerbroek (593979). ((H.S.) 235C1.013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Log; 27 Feb 45; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 28 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 26-28 Apr 45; W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 26-28 Apr 45; W.D., 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 26-28 Apr 45)

#### CONCLUSION

118. On 29 Apr Lt-Gen Simonds, G.O.C. 2 Cdn Corps, sent the following message to G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div:

\*On 1 May Carlt & York R. changed positions with R. 22e R. and on 2 May H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div moved to a position 1500 yards east of Voorthuizen at 559014.

Would you please tell all ranks of 1 Cdn Inf Div what a great thrill it was for me to have the privilege of launching them into their first battle in this theatre as I did in the MEDITERRANEAN. I had never any doubts that the Op would go extremely well and I hope you will pass my congratulations to all ranks....

((H.S.) 235C1.013(D8): 1 Cdn Inf  
Div Ops Log, 29 Apr 45)

That the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had distinguished itself in North-West Europe and had upheld the fine reputation which it had earned in Italy was self-evident. It had liberated approximately 300 square miles of enemy held territory and had taken over 5000 prisoners in a campaign of less than three weeks. Fifty one officers, 4259 other ranks, and 35 civilians had passed through the prison cages; 165 of the enemy had been evacuated through medical channels, and 876 hospitalized personnel had been taken in overrun hospitals. ((H.S.) 235C1.011(D6): "Cannonshot" Report, para 30). Maj-Gen Foster, in reviewing the operation from the Ijssel to the Eem, commended this performance.

The offrs and men did a first class job in a very professional and businesslike manner. They carried out successfully a series of difficult ops, and certainly showed that they were no "bush leaguers". This fact was commented on by British units who were working under our cmd.

(Ibid, Comments by Maj-Gen Foster, 5 Jun 45)

119. Casualties were, in turn, relatively light: 11 officers and 91 other ranks had been killed, 24 officers and 430 other ranks wounded, and 14 other ranks had been reported missing (W.D., A.A. & Q.M.G., H.Q. First Cdn Army, Consolidated Casualty and Strength Sheets, April 1945, Appx 8; May 1945, Appx 6). These figures are interesting, first because of the high ratio of killed to wounded (one in five where before it had been one in ten), second because of the high percentage of officer casualties, and third because of the small number of missing personnel. They are indicative of the small-group, "sniping" type of opposition which was met, and the lack of a generally organized resistance, with the exception of the defence of Apeldoorn, that was characteristic of the whole campaign. In his report on the operation, Lt-Col G.A. Turcot, Commanding Officer of R. 22e R., summarized his views thus:

We had learnt again of the enemy method of siting strongly defended outposts in woods and villages, but without affording them strong flank protection. It followed then that our successes were derived more from encircling moves and flank attacks rather than from frontal assaults.

We had learnt - if indeed the lesson were needed - of the great success an infantry cum tank attack can achieve. On the other hand, we had learnt, sadly, that infantry alone cannot advance against enemy machine guns sited around enemy tanks. This applies in wooded as well as open country.

(W.D., R. 22e R., April 1945:  
Appx 12, Battle Report of the  
Offensive from the Ijssel to the  
Eem, by Lt-Col G.A. Turcot, 30 Apr)

120. The total casualties of 1 Cdn Corps from 24 Mar to 5 May, including those of the 1st Division, amounted to 98 officers and 1191 other ranks killed, wounded and missing. Of this total 5 Cdn Armd Div, while under command of 1 Cdn Corps, had incurred 23 officer and 169 other rank casualties. Those in 49 (W.R.) Inf Div had been more severe, 30 officers and 376 other ranks, while 1 Cdn Armd Bde had received the extremely light loss of only 14 other ranks killed, wounded and missing (W.D., A.A. & Q.M.G., H.Q. First Cdn Army, Consolidated Casualty and Strength Sheets, April 1945, Appx 8; May 1945, Appx 6). On the morning of 5 May, General Crerar sent the following message to all ranks of First Cdn Army:

From Sicily to the R. Senio, from the Beaches of Dieppe to those of Normandy and from thence through Northern France, Belgium, Holland and NW Germany the Canadians and their allied comrades in this army have carried out their responsibilities in the high traditions which they inherited. The official order that offensive ops of all tps of First Cdn Army will cease forthwith and that all fire will cease from 0800B hrs tomorrow the Fifth of May has been issued. Crushing and complete victory over the German enemy has been secured. In rejoicing at this supreme accomplishment we shall remember the friends who have paid the full price for the belief they also held that no sacrifice in the interests of the principles for which we fought could be too great.

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf  
Div, May 1945: Appx 6,  
Message O. 30, 5 May)

121. This report was prepared by Lt G.D. Corry, Historical Section (G.S.) and was amended by Major R.B. Oglesby.

*R. B. Oglesby Major*  
(C.P. Stacey) Colonel,  
Director Historical Section.

TOP SECRET

49 (WR) Inf Div OO No 7

Op "DESTROYER"

GS 7

Copy No 51

(DRAFT ORDER GS 7 dated 25 Mar will be destroyed except for Traces 'P', 'Q', and 'R', which will be transferred to this order)

31 Mar 45

Ref maps: HOLLAND, 1/100,000 Sheet 5  
1/25,000 Sheets 6 NW  
6 SW  
4102  
4002

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INFM

1. Enemy

As in 49 (WR) Inf Div Int Summaries, def overprints and airphs.

2. Own tps

(a) 5 Cdn Armd Div under comd 1 Cdn Corps has relieved 49 (WR) Inf Div on the ISLAND WEST of rly NIJMEGEN - ELST 7070 - ARNHEM and of all commitments SOUTH of R WAAL and WEST of NIJMEGEN excl BROCKFORCE. 49 (WR) Recce Regt and two btys SUFFOLK YEO remain under comd 5 Cdn Armd Div.

(b) 5 (Brit) Inf Div comes under comd 1 Cdn Corps and is moving up into the Corps area as soon as it is equipped.

(c) 1 Cdn Inf Div is under comd 2 Cdn Corps for op "PLUNDER".

(d) Recce elements of 2 Cdn Corps will probably be advancing EAST of NEDER RIJN towards R IJSSEL at the same time as Op "DESTROYER" takes place.

(e) 11 Cdn Inf Bde will be moving fwd in conjunction with Phase II and will be securing X rds 711733 in order to link up with 49 (WR) Inf Div

(f) Additional tps

(i) Under comd:-

11 Cdn Armd Regt  
A Sqn 1 FF YEO (Crocodiles)  
A Sqn 1 LOTHIAN (Flails)  
11 Cdn Fd Regt  
one tp 42 Aslt Sqn RE (incl two aslt brs)  
2 Belg Fus Bn less one coy (in present posns under comd SUFFOLK YEO)



NOTE: 42 Aslt Sqn RE less one tp on call from  
1 Cdn Corps if required.

(ii) In sp:-

1 Cdn AGRA (1 Cdn Mod Regt 5.5 in direct  
sp and two Med Regts for CB)  
two HAA Regts 74 AA Bde (one bty 115 HAA  
Regt in direct  
sp)

Arty Rocket Projector (two salvoes)  
C tp 6 SL Bty (mov lt)  
six LCA from 552 Flotilla RN

3. Preliminary Moves

- (a) Conc areas for 147 and 146 Inf Bde Gps are shown in Trace 'P'. Gun areas are also shown.
- (b) Timings for mov 147 Inf Bde Gp into conc area will be issued by HQ 49 (WR) Inf Div.

INTENTION

4. 49 (WR) Inf Div will destroy or capture all enemy in the ISLAND SOUTH of the line NEDER RIJN 773740 - thence all incl rd junc 758742 - rd junc 738739 - RIJKERSWAARD 7272 - AAM 7170.

METHOD

5. Gen Outline

The attack will be carried out in two phases:

PHASE I - 147 Inf Bde Gp

PHASE II - 146 Inf Bde Gp will pass through 147  
Inf Bde Gp on orders  
Div Comd.

Areas to be cleared are given in Trace 'Q'.

PHASE I

6. Grouping

147 Inf Bde with in sp:-

11 Cdn Armd Regt less one sqn  
A Sqn 1 FF YEO less one tp (Crocodiles)  
A Sqn 1 LOTHIANs less one tp (Flails)  
All arty  
756 Fd Coy  
2 KENSINGTONS  
det 49 (WR) Recce Regt (for TC)  
six LCA 552 Flotilla RN

7. Axis of adv  
HAALDEREN 7566 - DOORNENBURG 8167 (See Trace 'Q').
8. Report Lines  
See Trace 'Q'.

PHASE II

9. Grouping  
146 Inf Bde with
  - (a) in sp:-
    - one sqn 11 Cdn Armd Regt
    - one tp A Sqn 1 FF YEO (Crocodiles)
    - one tp A Sqn 1 LOTHIAN (Flails)
    - all arty
    - 294 Fd Coy
    - 2 KENSINGTONS (A Coy in direct sp)
  - (b) in sp on conclusion of Phase I:-
    - one tp A Sqn 1 LOTHIAN (Flails)
    - two tps 11 Cdn Armd Regt

10. Axes of adv
  - (a) HAALDEREN - X rds 791676 - ANGEREN 7770 - HUISSEN 7672.
  - (b) BEMMEL 7367 - t'ZAND 7571.  
See Trace 'Q'.
11. Report Lines  
See Trace 'Q'.
12. Mov to Assembly Areas  
Timings for moves to Assembly Areas will be issued by HQ 49 (WR) Inf Div.

PHASES I and II

13. Arty
  - (a) All available arty will be in sp both Phases.
  - (b) There will be no shooting EAST of NEDER RIJN without ref to 1 Cdn Corps.

14. RE
- (a) Task - to open fwd routes in both Phases.
  - (b) One tp 42 Aslt Regt RE will be under comd CRE and will be available for assisting fwd mov of armour in both Phases.
15. MMGs and Mortars
- 2 KENSINGTONS will be in sp both Phases.  
Fire plan will be issued separately.
16. Res
- 56 Inf Bde will sp both Phases, as required by 147 and 146 Inf Bdes.
17. Air
- (a) Fighter bomber sp will be available for both Phases. Pre-arranged targets and certain other targets available on call are shown at Trace 'S'.
  - (b) Other targets will be demanded as required.
18. Regrouping on completion Phase II
- (a) On completion Phase II Bdes will regp on order of Div Comd in the areas shown in Trace 'R'.
  - (b) Bdy between 49 (WR) Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div all incl 5 Cdn Armd Div - rd junc DE HULK 629676 - rly junc 698688 thence line of rly to rly junc 706693 - rd junc 711705 - rd junc 719732 - houses 722743.
  - (c) 146 Inf Bde will make contact with 11 Cdn Inf Bde WEST of RIJKERSWAARD 7272.
19. TC
- (a) TC in areas HAALDEREN and BEMMEL 7367 will initially be responsibility 147 Inf Bde. Div control will be est on orders Div HQ, det 49 (WR) Recce Regt coming under direct comd 49 (WR) Inf Div.
  - (b) Tfc circuit is given at Trace 'T'.
  - (c) TCP will be est in BEMMEL under arrangements APM.
  - (d) All civ mov on the ISLAND will be stopped on orders Div HQ at least 24 hrs before H hr.
20. TCVs
- (a) One tpt pl RA is allotted to each 147 and 146 Inf Bdes for preliminary moves and moves to Assembly Areas.
  - (b) When released by Bdes pls will return to normal harbour areas.

ADM

21. See 49 (WR) Inf Div Op "DESTROYER" Adm Order No. 351 dated 30 Mar 45 and Draft Adm Order No. 351 dated 25 Mar 45.

INTERCOMN

22. Div HQ

- (a) Main HQ 49 (WR) Inf Div remains 666623.  
(b) Tac HQ 49 (WR) Inf Div opens at 724655 D-1.

23. LOs

- (a) Div HQ will send LO to flank Div EAST OF NEDER RIJN.  
(b) RA will send LO to be with leading unit of flank Div for each Phase. For Phase I he will be netted to 147 Inf Bde and for Phase II to 146 Inf Bde.  
(c) 56 Inf Bde will be prepared to send senior rep with leading Bde of flank Div if required.

24. Line comn will be est with TCP in BEMMEL.

25. Tcls

One tcl with Div HQ and each 146 and 147 Inf Bdes.

26. Code words are given in Appx "A".

27. Cable Dump will be est at HQ 56 Inf Bde ORCHARD 722654.

28. D Day will be notified later, but will NOT be before 2 Apr.

ACK

Time of Signature 1430 hrs

Method of Issue SDR

MAC/KNO

(sgd) C.E. Welby-Everard  
Lt-Col  
GS 49 (WR) Inf Div

APPENDIX "A"to49 (WR) Inf Div OO No. 7CODEWORDS - OP "DESTROYER"

	<u>CODEWORD</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	
147 Inf Bde	PEPPER	- houses 769667	
	KIDNEY	- houses 769661	
	SUGAR	- rd fork 764657	
	CUTLET	- rd junc 769656	
	CAULIFLOWER	- rd junc 769650	
	COCOA	- X rds 775661	
	BOVRIL	- rd from X rds 775661 - 769674	
	NUTMEG	- rd from rd junc 774649 - X rds 775661	
	TOFFEE	- factory 783636	
	SAUCE	- factory 792650	
	SAUSAGE	- rd square 778677 - 779674 - 775672 - 772675	
	MILK	- X rds 791675	
	SWEETBREAD	- rd circuit 789692 - 791690 - 787689 - 787692	
	RHUBARD	- X rds 785664	
	TOAST	- X rds 785662	
	JELLY	- rd square 785658 - 787657 - 786656 - 785657	
	CINNAMON	- rd triangle 796664 - 797662 - 795663	
	VERMICELLI	- rd from 807667 - 807672 - 801673 - 802679	
	VENISON	- rd junc 804689	
	CUCUMBER	- bund from 821671 - 821679	
	LIVER	- fort 823662	
	RIB	- rd junc 796657	
	AITCHBONE	- DOORNENBURG 8067	
	MULLIGATAWNY	- FILEREN 7867	
	OXTAIL	- GENT EN KAPEL 7865	
	CONSOMME	- KOMMERDIJK 7765	
	SAGO	- Time fwd tps cross SL in Phase I	
	SWEDE	- Time fwd tps cross SL in Phase II	
	146 Inf Bde	CHICORY	- ANGEREN
		SALT	- factory 791701
		CABBAGE	- br 747697
		SPROUTS	- WEERTSBURG 751698
MUSTARD		- KUILENBURG 763697	

146 Inf Bde  
(Cont'd)

CAVIARE	-	787692
EGG	-	X rds 762761
STEAK	-	X tracks 749711
CHOP	-	rd junc 759718
HAM	-	756708
BUTTER	-	763715
POTATO	-	HUISSEN
VINEGAR	-	X rds 761728
BACON	-	br 741702
OMELETTE	-	rd junc 738722
BEANS	-	RIJKERSWAARD
ASPARAGUS	-	bund junc 758741
SIRLOIN	-	bund junc 743737
TEA	-	bund junc 734743
GRUEL	-	rd junc 767692
POLONY	-	houses 784694
SALAD	-	rd junc 782697
MUTTON	-	146 Bde Phase I - (time fwd tps leave assembly area)
PORK	-	146 Bde Phase II) 146 Bde Phase III)(time fwd tps 146 Bde Phase IV) cross SL)

HQ 49 (WR)  
Inf Div

DIANA )  
DAPHNE )  
DIDO )  
VENUS )  
EROS )  
CUPID )

Report Lines  
(See Trace 'Q')

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1 CDN INF DIV OP ORDER NO. 1

OP CANNONSHOT

SECRET

- (i) Ref Maps: EASTERN HOLLAND (GSGS 4414)  
Scale - 1/25,000  
Sheets - 3702, 3703, 3802, 3803
- (ii) Ref Maps: Scale 1/100,000  
HOLLAND (GSGS 2541) Sheet 2  
CENTRAL EUROPE (GSGS 4416) Sheets N.1, P.1

1 Cd/1/G

10 Apr 45

Copy No. 31

1. INFM

1. Enemy - See Int Summary No. 153

2. Own Tps -

(a) Dets SAS are being dropped in conjunction with op CANNONSHOT with a view to removing demolitions on brs in area APeldoorn and seizing Airfd at TEUGE. Details have been issued to all concerned.

(b) 1 Cdn Corps is to cross NEDER RIJN in area EAST of ARNHEM and to exploit with 5 Cdn Armd Div to link up with 1 Cdn Inf Div.

(c) 3 Cdn Inf Div is carrying out ops to simulate crossings of River IJssel in areas NORTH of DEVENTER and SOUTH of ZUTPHEN. These ops will incl smoke and "Pepperpot" fire. Times conform with 1 Cdn Inf Div crossing.

(d) Elts 7 Cdn Recce Regt are being placed under comd 1 Cdn Inf Div prior to ops and will be responsible for ensuring EAST bank of River IJssel from excl DEVENTER to excl ZUTPHEN is clear of enemy.

3. Additional Tps -

(a) Under Comd

6 CAR (1 H)	F Tp 1 Cdn Svy Regt
68 Med Regt	Sec 9 Svy Regt RA
4 RTR	B Tp SL Bty RA
HQ Flt 652 AOP Sqdn	33 Bty 6 Cdn A Tk Regt

(b) In Sp

Fd Arty 3 Cdn Inf Div  
7 Cdn Med Regt  
2 Cdn HAA Regt  
3 Hy Bty RA (7.2)  
28 Hy Bty RA (7.2)

INTENTION

4. 1 Cdn Inf Div will est a brhd across River IJSSEL in area 9204 - 9201 and will advance and capture APELDOORN 7903.

METHOD

5. The op will be carried out in four Phases as follows:

- (a) PHASE I - 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp will make an assault crossing of River IJSSEL and will est brhd.
- (b) PHASE II - On orders from HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Cdn Inf Bde will pass through brhd to area TWELLO 8805. 2 Cdn Inf Bde will then be ordered to exploit to area 9000, one inf bn of 3 Cdn Inf Bde assuming responsibility for protection of immediate brhd.
- (c) PHASE III - On orders HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Cdn Inf Bde will continue advance to area TEUGE 8405. 3 Cdn Inf Bde will pass through brhd and est area 8501.
- (d) PHASE IV - On orders HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Cdn Inf Bde will continue advance to APELDOORN.

6. Arty

- (a) Fire plan will be issued by CRA to all concerned.
- (b) Smoke - Static smoke will be provided on the flanks to provide a continuous haze over the br site during the hrs of daylight. Arty smoke will be provided in the brhd area lifting to conform with the advance of assaulting inf.
- (c) SL - During hrs of darkness, half diffused will be provided over the gen area with full focus on br site.
- (d) Δ TK - Each inf bde will have under comd one Δ tk bty - No divisional reserve is available.
- (e) LAA - One tp LAA will protect br site.

7. RCE

- (a) RCE will be responsible for constructing one Cl 9 FBE br and two Cl 40 Rafts.
- (b) RCE 1 Cdn Inf Div will assume responsibility for rd clearance up to rd immediately WEST of dyke wall in brhd.
- (c) CRE will allot available Engineer resources to inf bdes on completion of the above tasks.



8. Armour - Initial allotment will be as follows:  
one sqn 6 CAR under comd 2 Cdn Inf Bde  
6 CAR less one sqn under comd 1 Cdn Inf Bde  
Ferrying of tanks will commence as soon as Cl 40 Rafts are available. Route for tks to Raft site will be signed "TANK TRACK".
9. MMG - MMG resources 1 Cdn Inf Bde will sp initial crossing of 2 Cdn Inf Bde. OC SASK LI will coordinate.
10. LVTs - 4 RTR will provide LVTs for assault crossing of 2 Cdn Inf Bde and personnel and veh Ferry Service for "build-up" in accordance with priorities already laid down. Details of LVT Ferry Plan have been issued under HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div letter 1 CD/1/G dated 9 Apr 45.
11. Priorities - Priority of crossing by Cl 9 br and Cl 40 Rafts will be controlled by G HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div. Tentative priority programme is att as Appx "A".
12. Air - Cab Rank will be available on call through G Air HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div or by tentacle if available.  
Armd Recce is being provided over the area of ops.  
Med Bombers are being provided to engage known enemy arty areas from H hr.
13. H hr - 1630 hrs
14. D day - will be notified separately

INTERCOMN

15. All telephone cables across river IJSSEL will be sunk and marked in order to avoid damage by Rafts or LVTs.  
Signal plan will be issued by 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs to all concerned.
16. HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div remains present locn.
17. Wireless silence will be broken 3 hrs prior to H.
18. ACK

TIME OF SIGNATURE 1800 hrs

METHOD OF DESPATCH ELS

DISTRIBUTION

(signed)  
(W.S. Murdoch)  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Cdn Inf Div

Overleaf

SECRET

49 (WR) Inf Div OO No 9

GS 5

Op "ANGER"

Copy No. 57

(49 (WR) Inf Div OO No 8 is  
cancelled)

9 Apr 45

Ref Maps: - HOLLAND 1/100,000 Sheet 5  
1/25,000 Sheets 6 SW (E and W)  
6 NW (E and W)  
388 (E and W)  
4102  
4022

INFM

1. Enemy - As in 49 (WR) Inf Div Int Summaries, def overprints and air phs.
2. Own Tps
  - (a) 2 Cdn Corps is to force a crossing of the R IJSSEL in the area NORTH of ZUTPHEN 9495 and is securing the high ground NORTH of ARNHEM. 1 Cdn Inf Div is reverting to 1 Cdn Corps after the crossing.
  - (b) 5 Cdn Armd Div is to hold the "ISLAND" and is supporting Op "ANGER" with fire, particularly in EASTERN Sector. Later it will pass through the ZUTPHEN brhead.
  - (c) SAS tps are being dropped NORTH of ARNHEM and will be disrupting comms.
  - (d) 7 Cdn A Tk Regt is holding the SOUTHERN bank of R IJSSEL EAST of ARNHEM.
  - (e) Op "ANGER" will NOT take place until 2 Cdn Corps have begun to cross the R IJSSEL and SAS tps have been dropped.
3. Additional tps
  - (a) Under comd:-

11 Cdn Armd Regt  
A Sqn 1 FF YEO  
A Sqn 1 LOTHIAN (one SP tp 15 Cdn  
A Tk Bty under comd)

11 Cdn Fd Regt  
617 Aslt Sqn RE  
536 DUKW Coy RASC
  - (b) In sp:-

1 Cdn AGRA 11 R Tks  
(1 Cdn Med Regt 5.5)  
(2 Cdn Med Regt 4.5) two Med Regts  
(5 Cdn Med Regt 4.5) in direct sp  
(107 Med Regt 5.5)  
(51 Hy Regt (two btys 7.2 in direct sp.  
(two btys 155 mm

5 Cdn Div Arty (17 Fd Regt  
( 8 Cdn Fd Regt

1 and 2 Cdn Rocket Btys  
(8 Salvos each)  
422 SL Bty  
1 Cdn Corps tps RCE  
23 Fd Coy RE \*

4. Preliminary Moves

- (a) Conc areas are shown in Trace "P".  
(b) Orders for moves to conc areas will be issued separately.

INTENTION

5. 49(WR) Inf Div will force a crossing of the R IJSSEL and will secure ARNHEM as a preliminary to further offensive ops against the enemy in WEST HOLLAND.

METHOD

6. Gen Outline

The op will be carried out in three phases:-

Phase I - Capture of a limited brhead by 56 Inf Bde Gp.

Phase II - Passing through of 146 Inf Bde Gp and enlargement of brhead to the NORTH.

Phase III - Passing through of 147 Inf Bde Gp and enlargement of brhead to the NW.

NOTE: Timings depend on the tactical situation and will be as ordered by Div Comd.

7. Grouping

56 Inf Bde

With under comd:-

one tp A Sqn 11 Cdn Armd Regt  
757 Fd Coy  
one tp 617 Aslt Sqn RE  
one pl C MMG Coy 2 KENSINGTONS  
CCP 187 Fd Amb  
one sec 49(WR) Inf Div Pro Coy

in sp:- 11 R Tks (for initial aslt only)  
A Sqn 1 LOTHIAN  
A Sqn 1 FF YEO  
All Arty  
one tp 617 Aslt Sqn RE  
2 KENSINGTONS less one pl C Coy  
6 LCA Force "T"

146 Inf Bde

With under comd:-

SP tp 218 A Tk Bty  
294 Fd Coy  
A MMG Coy 2 KENSINGTONS  
one pl D Coy 2 KENSINGTONS  
CCP 146 Fd Amb  
one sec 49 (WR) Inf Div Pro Coy

in sp:-

11 Cdn Armd Regt less one tp  
all available arty  
one tp 617 Aslt Sqn RE  
2 KENSINGTONS less A Coy and one pl  
C Coy (as available)

147 Inf Bde

With under comd:-

SP tp 219 A Tk Bty  
B MMG Coy 2 KENSINGTONS  
one pl D Coy 2 KENSINGTONS  
CCP 160 Fd Amb  
one sec 49 (WR) Inf Div Pro Coy

in sp:-

$\frac{1}{2}$  Sqn A Sqn 1 FF YEO (from 56 Inf Bde)  
all available arty  
756 Fd Coy  
All available LCA and LCM Force "T".

PHASE I

8. 56 Inf Bde Gp will force a crossing of the R IJSSEL WEST of rly br 779762, and will complete the following tasks:
  - (a) Destroy or capture all enemy on the promontory 772745 and in factory 776767.
  - (b) Secure the high ground on gen line rly junc 765773 to GIER PONT 761764.
  - (c) Clear the NORTHERN bank of NEDER RIJN to cover constr landing stages at 754764.
  - (d) Clear the SOUTHERN sector of ARNHEM and complete Phase I - see Trace 'Q'.
  - (e) Tp 617 Aslt Sqn in sp will be used to open route for 146 Inf Bde up to incl rly br 773769.
9. Final Objective - see Trace 'Q'.
10. Assembly Area - Personnel and vehs for the aslt will be preloaded in LVT conc area 7875 (see Trace 'P').
11. Ferry Service - Remaining vehs required during Phase I will be ferried over R IJSSEL under arrangements Div HQ.

PHASE II

12. 146 Inf Bde Gp will, on orders Div Comd, pass through 56 Inf Bde Gp and:
- (a) Secure the high ground NORTH of rly 7778.
  - (b) Cover RIGHT flank of 56 Inf Bde Gp.
  - (c) Exploit NORTH and NW (see Trace 'Q').
  - (d) Make contact with SAS and 1 Cdn Inf Div if situation permits.
  - (e) Will be prepared on orders Div Comd to exploit further to NORTH.
13. Objectives and Axes of adv - See Trace 'Q'.
14. Crossing of R IJSSEL - By use of aslt boats and ferry service which will be op under arrangements Div HQ.

PHASE III

15. 147 Inf Bde Gp will, according to the tactical situation and on orders Div Comd, pass through 56 Inf Bde Gp and:-
- (a) Secure high ground WEST of ARNHEM (see Trace 'Q').
  - (b) Deny observation of br site at 738774 to the enemy.
  - (c) According to the tactical situation exploit in a NW and WESTERLY direction and take enemy posns on NORTH bank of NEDER RIJN in the rear.
16. Objectives - See Trace 'Q'.
17. Crossing to NORTH bank
- 147 Inf Bde Gp will be prepared either:-
- (a) To pass through initial brhead over R IJSSEL by use of naval craft, ferries and Class 40 br when completed.
  - (b) To land on NORTH bank of NEDER RIJN and est a ferry service at 754764.

ALL PHASES

18. Arty
- (a) All available arty will be in sp all phases.
  - (b) CRA will arrange "PEPPERPOT" for Phase I with all available resources.

19. Bdy - Following shooting bdy with 2 Cdn Corps has been arranged: Line of autobahn to R IJSSEL 801766 thence R IJSSEL to 889849 thence CANAL NORTHWARDS.
20. LAA - Task - to protect aslt and ferry crossings over R IJSSEL and NEDER RIJN.
21. RE - Tasks -
- (a) To open and maintain class 9 route from BEMMEL 7367 to WESTERVOORT 7875 through PANNERDEN 8367.
  - (b) To constr Class 40 br at 776757 as early as possible after H hr.
  - (c) To operate a Class 40 ferry at HUISSEN as soon as possible after H hr.
  - (d) To constr and op a Class 40 ferry at 774755.
  - (e) To be prepared to op a Class 40 ferry at 753763.
  - (f) To constr foot br at 779762 if found possible.
  - (g) To maint LVT approaches and exits at ferry site until the Class 40 br is completed at 776757. 8 LVTs are allotted for this task for preloading.
  - (h) To op and maint ferry service for personnel and vehs.
  - (j) To open fwd routes NORTH of R IJSSEL.
22. 2 KENSINGTONS - will sp all phases. Fire plan will be coord by CRA.
23. Mov lt - CRA will arrange to provide maximum mov lt for fwd routes from GROESSEN 8272 and for aslt and ferry areas.
24. Smoke - CRA will arrange following tasks:-
- (a) From first lt D+1 to screen aslt and ferry crossings from high ground WEST of VELD 7978.
  - (b) Before completion Phase III by 147 Inf Bde to be prepared to deny observation of br site at 738774 by screening high ground in area DEN BRINK 7177.
25. Air
- Air Plan is given at Appx 'A' and Trace 'R' and incl both HE and fragmentation bombing.

26. Res

(a) Div res consists of:-

49 (WR) Recce Regt  
220 Bty SUFFOLK YEO  
536 DUKW Coy (RASC)

(b) 49 (WR) Recce Regt will move to area DIDAM 8972 on D Day. Timings and route will be issued separately.

(c) 49 (WR) Recce Regt less two squns will be at two hrs notice to move from first lt Dfl.

Possible tasks: To pass through brhead and recce fwd NORTH or NW.

27. Deception Plan

(a) Smoke screen as provided by 1 Cdn Corps along SOUTH bank of NEDER RIJN between 76 and 60 EASTINGS to cover approaches to DRIEL is to continue.

(b) 5 Cdn Armd Div is to simulate mov and build up in DRIEL area and will have the use of Sonic Deception.

(c) In order to preserve security it is essential that all mov during daylight NORTH of 73 NORTHING and EAST of NEDER RIJN is restricted to the absolute minimum necessary for recce. SOUTH of 73 NORTHING every precaution will be taken to prevent enemy observation from high ground NORTH of R IJSSEL.

28. Ferry Control

(a) Composition

Comd - Lt Col B.S. GOOCH

Tps - Det Div Sigs ) as required  
Dets 49 (WR) Recce Regt ) by comd  
49 (WR) Inf Div Pro ) Ferry Control  
Services )

(b) Tasks

After completion initial aslt in preloaded amphibians by 56 Inf Bde Gp, SUFFOLK YEO will be responsible for:-

(i) Control of all fwd and return mov both of personnel and vehs over R IJSSEL from Bde conc areas to fwd assembly area NORTH of river.

(ii) Control and org of:-

one LVT ferry  
one class 40 ferry  
Personnel ferries

- (iii) Marking and lighting all fwd routes from Bde conc areas to fwd assembly area NORTH of river. This incls taping of LVT routes where necessary.
- (c) Vehs will be called fwd and ferried in accordance with Div priorities at Appx 'B'. These are liable to alteration on orders Div HQ owing to the tactical situation.
- (d) The fwd waiting areas in WESTERVOORT 7875 will be kept full at all times. Bdes will ensure that there is NO delay when serials are called up from conc areas.
- (e) Layout of Ferry Control and t/c circuit are shown at Trace 'S'.
- (f) Main Ferry Control will be est in WESTERVOORT. Fwd Ferry Control will be est on NORTH bank as soon as possible. Dvrs of all vehs arriving on NORTH bank will be directed by Ferry Control to assembly area.
- (g) EVERY VEH WILL HAVE ITS CORRECT SERIAL NUMBER IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIV PRIORITIES LIST AT APPX 'B' CLEARLY DISPLAYED ON THE WINDSCREEN.
- (h) MCs are NOT incl in Appx 'B' and will be ferried fwd as they arrive.

ADM

29. See 49 (WR) Inf Div Adm Order No. 369.

INTERCOMN

30. Div HQ will be est at 749677 on 10 Apr 45.

31. Sigs

- (a) CR Sigs will est the necessary comms for ferry control in conjunction with OC SUFFOLK YEO.
- (b) Adv Div Sig Centre will be est at HQ Ferry Control.
- (c) Cable and sig stores dump will be est at Main HQ Ferry Control.

32. HQ Ferry Control will be est in WESTERVOORT by first lt D Day.

33. Line comn will be est with Naval Force T in HUISSEN 7672.

34. Liaison - Div HQ will be prepared to send LO to 1 Cdn Inf Div.

35. Recognition of own tps

- (a) SAS personnel dropping NORTH of ARNHEM will wear jumping jackets, battle dress trousers and either steel helmets, red berets or cap comforters.

(b) All fwd tps will be infm of above.

36. Wrls silence will be enforced EAST of NEDER RIJN until H-4 hrs.



37. Codewords - See Appx 'C'

38. D Day will NOT be before 12 Apr. Date will be confirmed later. H hr will be after last lt on D Day - time will be notified later.

ACK

<u>Time of signature</u>	2230	(sgd) C.E. Welby-Everard
		Lt Col
<u>Method of issue</u>	SDR	GS 49 (WR) Inf Div

NOTE: Trace 'P' already issued (incl for non-recipients)  
Appendices 'B' and 'C' and Trace 'S' to follow.

S E C R E T  
14 Apr 45

OP CLEANSER

(Notes of GOC "O" Gp Held 141200 B Hrs)

INFM

1. Enemy - Ref 5 Cdn Armd Div Special Int Summary of 141200B Hrs.

2. Own Tps

(a) Refer Gen Sitrep G0156 of 141415B Hrs.

(b) It is the intention of 1 Cdn Corps to mop up WESTERN HOLLAND with

RIGHT	-	1 Cdn Inf Div
CENTRE	-	5 Cdn Armd Div
LEFT	-	49 (WR) Inf Div

and face up to the GREBBE LINE (roughly extending NORTH and SOUTH of AMERSFOORT 3997) with the RIGHT flank resting on the ZUIDERZEE.

(c) Additional Tps Under Comd -

3 Med Regt RA  
Elements 79 Div (further details later)

INTENTION

3. 5 Cdn Armd Div will capture in succession

(a) The high ground NORTH of ARNHEM area 7686

(b) OTTERLO 6591

(c) BARNEVELD 5295

(d) Cut the APELDOORN - AMERSFOORT rd in area 5099.

(e) Exploit in a NW direction to the ZUIDERZEE.

METHOD

4. The attack will be carried out in four phases. It will consist of an armd thrust with the inf bde prepared to take cover from the armour at any stage of the op.

5. If the situation permits all phases will be carried out by 5 Cdn Armd Bde Gp consisting of

5 Cdn Armd Bde  
with under comd  
8 Fd Regt RCA (one bty 3 Med Regt RA to  
move with 8 Fd Regt RCA)  
Elements 79 Div (details later)  
in sp  
5 Cdn Armd Div RCA less 8 Fd Regt RCA  
3 Med Regt RA  
RCE 5 Cdn Armd Div

METHOD (Cont'd)

6. PHASE I - Capture of high ground NORTH of ARNHEM area 7387 - 7687.
7. PHASE II - Capture of OTTERLO 6591 and high ground to the WEST.
8. PHASE III - Capture of BARNEVELD 5295 and cut the APELDOORN - AMERSFOORT rd in the vicinity of 5099.
9. PHASE IV - Capture NIJKERK 4605 and exploit to the ZUIDERZEE.
10. RCA
  - (a) There will be no prepared fire plan. During Phase I CRA will arrange sp from guns presently deployed.
  - (b) One bty 3 Med Regt RA will move with 8 Fd Regt RCA.
  - (c) Gun area will be est in the vicinity 7481 - 7582 as early as possible.
11. RCE - Tasks
  - (a) Open one way UP aslt and maint route.
  - (b) Open DOWN route.
  - (c) 10 Fd Sqn RCE will be in close sp of 5 Cdn Armd Bde with the task of opening up a battle route.
12. CL - CL "TIME" to BARNEVELD then rd BARNEVELD - Xrd 5099 - NIJKERK- rd junc 449088.
13. Report Lines and Bounds - As shown on Planning Trace Op CLEANSER.
14. SL - Line of rd 768808 - 743805 - 734803.
15. H Hr - First tk lt morning 15 Apr (exact time to be named by 5 Cdn Armd Bde and will be approx 0630 hrs).

ADM

16. (a) Pet and Sups - 5 Cdn Armd Bde Gp will carry sufficient pet and sups to reach the ZUIDERZEE.
- (b) Rec - there will be no rec on CLs during the op.
- (c) Further adm details will be issued by A&Q.
17. TC
  - (a) TC to conc area will be by HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div.
  - (b) Br over the IJSSEL at 776756 will come under control 5 Cdn Armd Div at 141600B hrs.
  - (c) Fwd routes will be marked with 5 Cdn Armd Div CL signs.

18. Order of March

5 Cdn Armd Bde Gp  
in order  
9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD)  
5 Cdn Armd Regt (8NBH)  
Bde HQ  
Westmr R (M)  
8 Fd Regt RCA  
2 Cdn Armd Regt (LdSH)  
10 Fd Sqn RCE  
Rear Bde  
  
1 Fd Sqn RCE  
Div HQ  
3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)  
4 A Tk Regt RCA  
Balance of RCA 5 Cdn Armd Div  
11 Cdn Inf Bde

INTERCOMN

19. (a) Div HQ will move night 14/15 Apr to the gen area 7678.  
(b) All moves Div HQ will be along the Div CL.  
(c) Wrls - normal.  
(d) Codes - Codewords as issued with Appxs A and B to Planning Instrs Op CLEANSER will be taken into effect. The following codeword will be added:

BRAZIL - CL rd BARNEVELD 5295 - Xrd 5099 -  
NIJKERK 4605 - rd junc 449088.

ACK

(W C Dick) Lt-col,  
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

Method of Issue: SDR  
Time of Signature 141415 B Hrs

DISTRIBUTION: List "A" plus 1 Cdn Corps, 49 (WR) Inf Div, 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Cdn Armd Bde.


CITATIONS

Operations - Western Holland - April 1945  
(only immediate awards included)

Lt J.P. Best	1 Cdn Armd C. Regt (R.C.D.) 12-14 Apr 45	MC
Lt-Col F.L. Caron	12 Cdn Armd Regt (Three Riv R.) 12 Apr 45	DSO
Maj A.B. Conron	6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 H.) 11-14 Apr 45	DSO
Capt E.M. Evans	8 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) 15 Apr 45	MC
Lt H.R. Everett	6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 H.) 14 Apr 45	MC
Capt (A/Maj) D.H. Evers	12 Cdn Fd Coy RCE 12/13 Apr 45	DSO
Lt Edward Nicholson	Sask L.I. (M.G.) 13/14 Apr 45	MC
Lt-Col A. Powis	2 Cdn Med Regt 13 Apr 45	DSO
Lt A.M. Ross	17 Cdn Fd Regt 16/17 Apr 45	MC
Capt R.K. Swinton	Seaforth of C. 11 Apr 45	MC
Lt G.O. Tambllyn	Carl't & York R. 13 Apr 45	MC
Capt W.T. Thompson	2 Cdn Fd Regt 23 Apr 45	MC
Lt J.A. York	12 Cdn Fd Coy RCE 12/13 Apr 45	MC

NETHERLANDS AWARDS

Lt-Col J.R.O. Counsell	48 Highrs	Bronze Lion
Lt-Col L.H.C. Payne	Ir R.C.	Bronze Lion
Lt G.G. Pitt	5 Cdn Armd Regt (8 N.B.H.)	Bronze Lion
Maj P.N. Ritchie MC	14 Cdn Armd Regt (Calg R.)	Bronze Cross
Maj G.R.H. Ross	5 Cdn Armd Regt (8 N.B.H.)	Bronze Cross
Lt C.M. Sullivan	11 Cdn Armd Regt (Ont R.)	Bronze Cross




1ST CANADIAN CORPS OPERATIONS  
**OPERATION "DESTROYER"**  
 BY 49 (W.R.) INF DIV  
 WITH  
 II CDN INF BDE  
 2-4 APR 45


CANADIAN UNITS .....  
 BRITISH UNITS .....  
 PATROL ACTION .....

RANDWIJK  
 I CDN ARMD BDE  
 AND  
 BELGIAN TROOPS  
 DE SPEES  
 OPHEUSDEN  
 HEMMEN  
**OPERATIONS**  
**I CDN ARMD BDE**  
**18-27 APR 45**  
 OCHTEN

CONTACT WITH  
 7 CDN RECCE REGT  
 AND 49 RECCE REGT



**OPERATION  
"CANNESHOT"**  
1ST CDN INF DIV  
THE ASSAULT ACROSS THE IJSSEL  
AND CAPTURE OF APELDOORN  
11-17 APR 45



# OPERATIONS 5 CDN ARMD DIV 49 (W.R.) INF DIV CLEARING OF ARNHEM & ADVANCE TO ISSELMEER & GREBBE LINE

12-28 APR 45

MILE 0 2 3 4 5 MILES




OPERATION "ANGER"  
CAPTURE OF ARNHEM  
12-14 APRIL  
49 (W.R.) INF DIV

1000 0 1000  
YARDS









**OPERATIONS 1<sup>ST</sup> CDN CORPS  
WESTERN NETHERLANDS  
2-28 APR 45**

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 MILES

