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HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

17 Aug 53

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MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY  
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

VOLUME ONE

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R E P O R T NO. 63  
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)  
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17 Aug 53

Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army  
During the Second World War

1. This Report attempts to describe how the Canadian Army made use of its share of the national manpower pool during the Second World War. First of all there was the question of whether men and women could serve their country best by joining the Armed Forces, taking jobs in rapidly expanding industries or remaining in agricultural production. Again, were the services of those who enlisted in the Canadian Army, or were enrolled under the authority of the National Resources Mobilization Act, employed to the best advantage? Or could their services have been used to better advantage in the R.C.A.F. or Navy? Many problems were common to all but since the R.C.A.F. and Navy, and the three Women's Services, accepted only volunteers their stories are reserved for separate studies, which it is hoped to do later.
2. Although conscription for overseas military service lurked in the wings as a bogey for the first five years of War and cast its shadow over every action attempted by the country's political and military leaders, too much importance can be attached to it. When a crisis did develop over conscription it was because of a temporary shortage of general duty infantrymen. Primarily this had resulted from adherence to British rates of wastage designed to meet global needs rather than the conditions to be found in only two European theatres of operations: but the question really went back to the incorrect lessons which had been drawn from the early German successes with blitzkrieg tactics. Recruiting posters had been too successful in urging young Canadians to become "Captains of the Clouds", "Guardians of the Deep", members of "Canada's Mechanized Army" or mere skilled tradesmen in one or the other. The "poor bloody infantry" had received little attention unless it was from C.E.F. veterans who advised their sons to join something that did not walk.
3. Furthermore, as the War progressed an increasing proportion of uniformed personnel became concerned with the maintenance of the physical well being and morale of the remainder. Reference will be made to this increase in administrative "tail" at the expense of the "teeth", or fighting component, but the narrator does not consider himself competent to discuss the internal organization of an Army at any length.
4. Although it may appear at times to some readers that mere expediency governed the conduct of the Canadian Army it should be remembered that Canada was only a "middle power" and that her voice was not often heard in the inner councils,



where the United Kingdom, United States and Russia settled questions of grand strategy to their own satisfaction. Royal Canadian Naval and Royal Canadian Air Force units and individuals serving with British Forces were not nearly so affected by this ignorance of operational planning as was the (almost) self-contained Canadian Army which was training and waiting in the United Kingdom for the time when it could come to grips with an enemy.

5. **Statistics produced by War Service** Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs have been used wherever applicable, but it has proved necessary to refer to many wartime projections and estimates to illustrate particular points, even though the adequacy of such figures is open to question. Shortage of administrative staff during the early months of the War kept many officers and men busy with what they considered to be more urgent work than the compilation of frequent statistical returns (undoubtedly many of them knew, for instance, that the mere fact of being rejected for enlistment would not stop men from trying medical boards elsewhere in the hope of eventual success). In other instances, officers failed to make sufficient allowance for variable factors when estimating future enlistments or trying to predict casualties from the supposed forecasts of activity. Then, again, units in action could be too busy with the enemy to prepare satisfactory war diaries.

6. Finally, attention is directed to the several Appendices, which discuss particular aspects of the Manpower problem in more detail than is possible in the body of the Report, and the statistical tables that follow them.



PART I - CREATION OF AN ARMY

(1) The Years Before

7. Although Canada is one of the world's largest countries geographically it has a correspondingly small population. A large proportion of its people always has been engaged in primary industries, although that percentage has been dwindling steadily as the Twentieth Century advanced, and a considerable number are required to maintain certain fixed services which are extensive in nature irrespective of the population in any particular area. Thus the number of men who could be withdrawn from civilian pursuits always has been limited.

8. The forces with which Montcalm attempted to hold New France in the last days of the French regime dwindled as militiamen sneaked home to harvest their crops and, in the years following, the needs of ploughing and harvesting continued to influence the effectiveness of the Canadian Militia. Canadians fought Americans in the War of 1812, repulsed incursions by the 'Hunters' and Fenians in the years that led to Confederation and put-down the North West Rebellion of 1885, but it was not until the South African War (1899-1902) that the Canadian Government raised volunteer troops for overseas service.

9. In 1914 Canada immediately ranged herself at the Mother Country's side and by the autumn of 1916 a Canadian Corps of four divisions was serving on the Western Front. Despite a continuous recruiting campaign, however, wastage no longer was being replaced by voluntary enlistments. Although by the end of May 1917 Canada had sent overseas 322,589 men the number recruited during the twelve months just completed was only slightly more than the casualties for the same period (74,005). On the other hand, the voluntary National Registration completed by 1,549,360 individuals during 1916-1917 disclosed that plenty of men still were available for military service, particularly since physical standards had been lowered and the enlistment ages extended. Other courses\* having failed, more and more groups within the country were brought to the realization that some form of military conscription, whether for overseas service or home defence only, would prove to be necessary. At the same time opposition stiffened within the ranks of organized labour and the Liberal Party, particularly amongst the latter's supporters from the province of Quebec. A Bill introduced into the House of Commons on 18 May by Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden to conscript single men and childless widowers aged 20-34 was passed and received Royal Assent on 29 Aug as the Military Service Act (1). One result was temporary disintegration of the Liberal opposition and formation of a National

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\* Reorganization within the Army itself to conserve manpower; arrangements to recruit Canadian citizens resident in the United States; formation of a Canadian Defence Force whose members would undergo part time training, including attendance at summer camp with personnel destined for the Canadian Expeditionary Force.



Government.

10. As a more immediate measure the 5th Canadian Division in England was disbanded during February 1918 to provide reinforcements for the Canadian Corps and only its artillery proceeded to France as formed units. At home so many claims for exemption were received that Orders in Council were passed on 20 Apr 18 cancelling exemption for all men aged 20, 21 and 22 and providing for the registration of 19-year olds. Total registration to 11 Nov 18 was 522,899 but 395,162 claims were made for exemption and only 83,355 men actually were conscripted for overseas service. Four mistakes in administering the Act were suggested by the Director of the Military Branch within the Department of Justice:

- (a) Those called or about to be called under the Act should not be allowed to volunteer. Registrars and Deputy Registrars had recommended this change.
- (b) Exemptions were too loosely and unscientifically allowed by Registrars.
- (c) Registrars should have been allowed jurisdiction over draftees until they were turned over in person to the Military.
- (d) Low category draftees should have been diverted to work of national importance (2).

Uncertainty in the mind of the general public due to the review and change of exemptions had complicated the question of employing young men: would they be conscripted or could they be employed with safety?

11. Statistically it might be noted that some 628,462 Canadians donned uniform during the war period, of whom 619,636 joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force. On 11 Nov 18, however, its total strength was only 362,774 all ranks, of whom 154,271 were serving in France, 123,024 in England and 86,491 in Canada (3).

12. Disturbances, and even rioting in Quebec, had been occasioned by the conscription issue and caused much bitterness and hard feeling, which did not end with the coming of peace. Many Canadians considered, and for more than one reason, that conscription for overseas service should never again be invoked.

13. The Committee established in 1919 under Major General Sir William Otter to study a post war reorganization of the Canadian Militia was of the opinion that, in a struggle for the very existence of the British Empire, Canada should be able to mobilize, transport and maintain an expeditionary force of six divisions, with a cavalry division, if necessary, and the necessary proportion of Corps, Army and Line of Communications Troops. In a war of self defence, fought on Canadian territory, the maximum force which the Dominion could raise and maintain for a period of two years' hostilities would not exceed 11 divisions and four cavalry divisions, with certain ancillary units and formations: the whole could not be greater than 300,000 all ranks (4).



14. When Defence Scheme No. 3\* was revised in 1937 increased emphasis was placed on local defence, including measures for internal security, but provision remained for the organization of a Mobile Force which might, should the Government so decide, be despatched overseas as an Expeditionary Force. This Mobile Force was to comprise a corps headquarters, two divisions, a cavalry division and quotas of corps, army and L. of C. (Line of Communication) troops, as well as the necessary base organization both in Canada and overseas. After the departure of this Force (in two echelons of roughly equal size) there would be a further expansion of four divisions to provide a total Force roughly equal to that contemplated by the Otter Committee (5).

15. Units for inclusion in the Mobile Force were to be selected for their efficiency by the Officers Commanding the several Military Districts but there were other problems to be considered: the Coastal Districts would have to be represented in the Field Force even though the requirements of coast and anti-aircraft defence would be heavy; because of quite different characteristics in the population across the country the territorial distribution of militia units was not in direct proportion to the population; few French-speaking N.P.A.M. units were really active during these years of peace; the possibility that only one division might be mobilized made it necessary to ensure that units for each of the two divisions should be drawn from every geographical section of the country (6). (The cavalry division was deleted from the proposed Mobile Force following a General Staff recommendation of May 1939.)

16. Although war clouds were threatening the democratic nations by the early thirties the peoples of the British Commonwealth had become imbued with the idea that any war would be fought by comparatively small numbers of specialists and that never again would more than a token expeditionary force be sent to Europe. What large armies might be necessary would be found by the French while the United Kingdom's main contribution would centre around the Royal Navy and the comparatively youthful Royal Air Force. The attitude of the Canadian Government towards rearmament was expressed in the following statement made to the House of Commons on 24 Mar 38 by the Minister of National Defence:

... A certain amount of priority has been established after deliberation: first for the air services; secondly, for naval defence; and thirdly, in regard to the repairing of deficiencies in equipment of militia services, permanent and non-permanent.... (7)

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\*During the years following the First World War the General Staff gave considerable attention to the preparation of three major Defence Schemes, each involving mobilization, concentration, and operations of large militia forces. The first two schemes had become unreal, in that they envisaged respectively war against the United States and a situation where Canada remained neutral from a Japanese-American war.



17. Politically, the Liberal Government of Mr W.L. Mackenzie King had refused to enter into any prior commitments regarding its action upon the outbreak of war: the most explicit statement was that of 30 Mar 39 when Mr King told the House of Commons that "...it is for the government to recommend and for parliament to decide upon the course to follow" (8). Again, during the course of this speech the Prime Minister declared:

... One strategic fact is clear: the days of great expeditionary forces of infantry crossing the oceans are not likely to recur. Two years ago, I expressed in this house the view that it was extremely doubtful if any of the British Dominions would ever send another expeditionary force to Europe.

... Profits could and would be rigidly controlled, and profiteering suppressed. But men's lives and men's wills cannot be put on the same basis as goods and profits. The present government believes that conscription of men for overseas service would not be a necessary or an effective step. Let me say that so long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted ....(9)

In the same vein the Conservative leader (Dr R.J. Manion) added that he had "reasons for thinking it is improbable that an expeditionary force on anything like the scale that existed in the last war will ever again be expected of Canada" (10). While adding his opposition to conscription for overseas military service Dr Manion was firm in his conviction that Canada should co-operate fully with the remainder of the British Commonwealth and Empire. In view of the fact that Canadians had comprised a goodly proportion of the flying personnel during the First World War, he suggested that air force units might be despatched in the event of hostilities.

18. A Defence Committee\* had been created within the Canadian Cabinet during August 1936 and a Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Co-ordination established in March 1938. By May 1939 the findings of the latter's sub-committees had been embodied in a draft War Book, but manpower was not allotted a separate chapter (11). Since the extent of Canada's participation in any war had not been defined by the Canadian Government the task of the Chiefs of Staff was made more difficult. In a memorandum of 29 Aug, entitled "Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the Early Stages of a Major War", the Chiefs of Staff set forth the courses open to the Canadian Government and the form in which the three Armed Forces might participate:

The Navy's part would be to organize an auxiliary force as rapidly as possible in order to give protection to shipping against mine and submarine attacks in Canadian waters, and at the same time to assist the British forces in keeping the sea communications clear of enemy vessels. This assistance to be progressively increased as the Naval resources of the Country are developed.

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\*Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance and Minister of National Defence.



Air Force assistance would, as in the case of the Navy, begin with the cooperation rendered in safeguarding trade routes adjacent to our territory. But in addition, we are in a position from the outset to provide direct intervention in the shape of personnel for an Army Cooperation Wing of three squadrons, but with no aircraft or equipment.

The Army's contribution would take the form of immediate raising of an Army Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops (roughly 60,000 men) in accordance with the Militia Service plan, and its despatch abroad as soon as arrangements can be made in consultation with the British Government to transport it and make good such deficiencies in its war equipment as cannot be supplied from Canadian sources (12).

19. When Germany attacked Poland on 1 Sep the Canadian Prime Minister issued a statement that Parliament would meet on 7 Sep and that, if the United Kingdom should become engaged in war, the Canadian Government would seek authority to undertake effective co-operation at her side: a state of "apprehended war" was proclaimed and declared to have existed since 25 Aug. Immediately following the United Kingdom's declaration of war on 3 September the Canadian Prime Minister despatched a telegram outlining what measures Canada was taking for local defence and requesting information as to the probable theatre and character of main British and Allied military operations so that Canadian policy might be developed (13). On 6 Sep the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs replied that the greatest need at the moment was additional Canadian dollars to finance war expenditure. He pointed out that:

Generally, so far as immediate steps are concerned, provision of naval vessels and facilities and of air force personnel would be of most assistance, and in particular at present time supply of any pilots and aircraft crews available is a capital requirement. As regards land forces, policy here is to avoid a rush of volunteers such as occurred in the last war and to expand by means of a controlled intake. The chief requirement is for certain technical personnel (14).

A complementary memorandum of the same day suggested what lines the military effort of Canada's Armed Forces might follow. These included, for the Army, the despatch overseas of a "token" unit to serve with the British Expeditionary Force, the provision of Canadian technical units (Engineers, Signals, Medical, Ordnance and Transportation) to serve with the British Army and assistance in enlisting technical personnel for service in the British Army (15). What appeared to be passing for Anglo-French strategy was reliance on the Maginot Line, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and the possibility of crushing Germany by destroying her economy.

20. Prime Minister Mackenzie King's address to the Canadian House of Commons on 8 Sep contained the following very significant paragraph:



I wish now to repeat the undertaking I gave in parliament on behalf of the government on March 30 last. The present government believe that conscription of men for overseas service will not be a necessary or an effective step. No such measure will be introduced by the present administration. We have full faith in the readiness of Canadian men and women to put forward every effort in their power to preserve and defend free institutions, and in particular to resist aggression on the part of a tyrannical regime which aims at the domination of the world by force. The government, as representing the people of Canada, will use their authority and power to the utmost in promoting the most effective organized effort toward these imperative ends (16).

21. Apart from the purely local defensive measures already being undertaken, the Canadian Government envisaged its war effort as planned co-operation with the United Kingdom, with military participation kept subordinate to assistance by agriculture and an expanding war industry. The United Kingdom Mission which arrived in Canada to make a survey of industrial potential had remained in Ottawa as a British Supply Board but placed relatively few orders, however, since British manufacturers were unwilling to release designs and specifications to Canadian firms which thus would become competitors in the post war world: and the British Government was loath to make available the necessary dollars from its limited supply. A Canadian delegation to London, headed by the Minister of Mines and Resources (Hon. T.A. Crerar), met with no better success (17). Thus the problem of utilizing Canada's manpower to best advantage was made difficult at the outset.

(ii) Mobilizing an Army

22. During the hungry thirties the trend towards urbanization had been slightly accelerated in Canada and, with the exception of British Columbia, farm communities proportionately lost population to the larger cities. Except for the exodus from Saskatchewan population generally tended to flow from areas with a high natural increase to those with a low natural increase (18). Thus Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec (which had retained most of its natural increase) possessed the greatest number of men and women available for the Armed Forces or employment in war industry\*. This shift in population had not yet been officially recorded or recognized, however, nor had it been adequately reflected in the 1936 reorganization of the Canadian Militia (i.e. the N.P.A.M. units).

23. At the same time, however, there still was considerable slack to be taken up in the Canadian economy which always had been subject to seasonal fluctuation, even apart from the

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\*A useful pamphlet is Changes in Population and In the Labour Force, Issued as a Supplement to The Labour Gazette, December, 1945 Research and Statistics Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1946.



fact that the 1930s had seen many men unemployed for long periods. Despite the fact that September generally was the busiest month of the year, the outbreak of war found seasonal employment at its lowest. There was an unemployed labour force of almost 600,000 as against an estimated working force of 3,000,000 in industries other than agriculture. The importance of this has been well summed up as follows:

The existence of unemployed labour and capital equipment is an important factor facilitating military and industrial mobilization for war. In so far as the mobilization can be carried out by utilizing men and machinery which were previously idle, there need be less disturbance in the remainder of the economic system (19).

24. During the precautionary period (26-31 Aug) certain units and details of other units of the N.P.A.M. were called out to man coastal and anti-aircraft defences and to guard vulnerable points in accordance with Defence Scheme No. 3 but it was not until 1 Sep that the Cabinet authorized the mobilization of a Canadian Active Service Force (i.e. Mobile Force) consisting of two divisions and the appropriate quota of corps, army and L. of C. units: this General Order No. 135 also retained units and details of the earlier mobilization as part of the C.A.S.F. (20).

25. On 11 Sep the possibility of using the Canadian Active Service Force overseas was mentioned in the House of Commons by the Minister of National Defence but a decision was not reached by the Cabinet until 16 Sep. One division would be despatched to join the B.E.F., together with a number of technical units as requested by the British Government ("with the proviso that they shall remain Canadian units and return to Canadian control, should they be required for a Canadian Expeditionary Force, should it later be decided to send one")(21). Such an eventuality had been foreseen and territorial representation had been achieved for the 1st Canadian Division by mobilizing Infantry units from Ontario for the 1st Brigade, from Western Canada for the 2nd Brigade and from Quebec and the Maritimes for the 3rd Brigade: units comprising the supporting arms and services similarly were drawn from those spread across the country and representation for Prince Edward Island was provided by two batteries of medium artillery slated for service as corps troops\*. Consequent upon the Government's decision, the remaining units authorized by General Order No. 135 as corps troops gradually dwindled away (see para 28).

26. A Cabinet re-shuffle of 19 Sep resulted in the transfer of Mr Norman McLeod Rogers from the portfolio of Labour to National Defence and the entrance into the Cabinet as Minister of Finance of Mr J.L. Ralston, a former Minister of National Defence. It should be emphasized that the Cabinet was continuing top priority for the R.C.A.F., even before the British request of 28 Sep that a British Commonwealth Air Training Plan be organized to train aircrew in Canada.

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\* Similarly the Infantry of the 2nd Division was drawn from Ontario (4th Brigade), Quebec (5th Brigade) and Western Canada (6th Brigade). Not until July 1939 had the plan for a French-speaking 5th Brigade been dropped so that the Royal 22e Régiment might be incorporated with other Permanent Force units in a first contingent for overseas service and avoid the opprobrium of the First World War when there had been no French-speaking unit in the First Division.



27. Enlistment problems, which included that of re-attesting for overseas service everyone in uniform, will be discussed at greater length in Volume I of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Numbers of men held back from enlistment due to the uncertain need\* and the policy of not accepting for service in the ranks university graduates with medical, engineering or other professional degrees, ex-cadets of the Royal Military College and the Canadian Officers Training Corps, bankers, accountants, youths under 18 years of age and men who had been dishonourably discharged earlier. With the exception of the last two groups, however, the above were eligible for appointment to commissioned ranks where vacancies existed. Aliens were not, however, eligible for enlistment (Appendix "B"). Recruiting Memorandum No. 1 also favoured the enlistment of men without dependents and included the proviso that "married men with four or more dependents should not be enlisted". This was variously interpreted, by some units to mean that married men should be rejected, and confusion was ended only on 14 Sep when the Minister of National Defence expressed a preference for not accepting married men with more than two children (the maximum number for which separation allowance could be paid); men already enlisted could either accept this limitation or be discharged (22). A goodly number of the prospective recruits (many of whom were veterans of the First World War) were

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\* This was to be an "economic war" and according to newspaper stories four or five civilian workers would be required to keep one man in uniform. In a news story of 21 Dec 39 The Ottawa Citizen went even further in discouraging men from giving up their jobs to enlist:

For active service in this war, however, manpower goes very much further than it did in the last war. By means of mechanism [sic] a smaller number of men can produce more "fire power" than a larger number could before.

Authorities say that 650 men with small machine guns can fire as many rounds now as 1,000 men using rifles could do before.

Consequently the requirements of manpower are correspondingly reduced. The faithful horse, for cavalry or mounted rifle units, is giving way to quicker and more efficient means of motive power. It is being replaced by armoured cars and light tanks. Mechanization is being extended all along the line.

The result is that, while the forces will be more effective than before, fewer men will be needed to bring about the same degree of efficiency.



rejected because of the high medical standards\* then demanded and a bottle neck was created by the inability of existing medical boards to handle the numbers of recruits applying (24). Furthermore, as was pointed out at a meeting of the Defence Council on 24 Oct, units had not been told there was any urgency to recruit to establishment and some were proceeding slowly until clothing, equipment and better accommodation became more readily available (25).

28. Three weeks had been the maximum time envisaged for mobilization under Defence Scheme No. 3 but the conclusion of this period found very few units at full strength. As early as 2 Sep modifications had been made to General Order No. 135, with steps being taken to delay the mobilization of certain ancillary units which would not be required until later. In all, recruiting was suspended for some 70 units involving establishments of more than 15,000 all ranks (26) and available men were channelled into those where the need was greatest (see para 25). On 24 Sep an order went out deferring further recruiting in all arms except the infantry of the Mobile Force. Finally, on 11 Oct, further instructions were issued to suspend all remaining recruiting for the 2nd Canadian Division in order that the 1st Canadian Division might be completed and equipped as far as possible for early despatch overseas (27). The Royal 22e Régiment's deficiency of 285 men on 1 Nov was made good only by enlarging its recruiting area to encompass the whole of Quebec province, where the air had been cleared by the victory of the Liberal Party in the election of 25 Oct (28). Within the 2nd Canadian Division (as of 20 Dec),

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\*Medical categories, as set forth in Physical Standards and Instructions for the Examination of Recruits, 1938, were:

"A" Fit for general service.

Men perfectly fit mentally and physically for all active service conditions of actual warfare in any climate, who are able to march, can see to shoot, and hear well.

"B" Fit for service abroad (but not for general service).

Men free from serious organic defects, able to stand active service conditions on lines of communication; who are able to march at least five miles, see to shoot with glasses and hear well.

"C" Fit for service in Canada only.

Men free from serious organic disease, who are able to stand home service conditions and undertake duties chiefly of a sedentary character, able to walk five miles.

"D" Temporarily unfit.

"E" Unfit for service in Categories "A", "B" and "C".

Almost as soon as recruiting began it was realized that the vision requirements for the several categories were too high. Medical Boards were instructed, with effect from 9 Sep 39, that prospective recruits in possession of glasses correcting their vision to the required standards were to be categorized "AV", "BV" or "CV", if in all other respects they fell into one of these acceptable categories. Such personnel became eligible for enlistment only to a limited extent, however, as they were specifically excluded from serving in field units (23).



Le Régiment de la Chaudière\* was 466 men under strength and The South Saskatchewan Regiment was lacking 334 other ranks (29).

29. By the end of the year virtually the whole of the 1st Canadian Division had reached the United Kingdom and a "third flight" of corps troops [or ancillary] units was being groomed to follow. The growth of the Canadian Active Service Force had been as follows (30):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Nursing Sisters</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total</u>
September	2943	81	54844	57868
October	243	1	4376	4620
November	387	4	3633	4024
December	<u>287</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>2049</u>	<u>2401</u>
	3860	151	64902	68913

Although recruiting for tradesmen was not re-opened until February 1940 and general recruiting until 18 Mar, there was a steady trickle during the winter to provide reinforcements for units overseas (see para 81). There were enough 'starry-eyed' idealists and men who had "got down on their luck" in the thirties to meet such demands.

30. From a financial point of view the Canadian Government was trying to fight the war on a stringent, peace-time type of budget and it was impossible, therefore, to enlist and equip more men than could be covered by the available financial appropriation (31). Furthermore, although the information did not get beyond the Cabinet War Committee, before signing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement on 17 Dec Prime Minister Mackenzie King received assurance from the British Government that air training should retain precedence over any other form of assistance sought from Canada. On 12 Feb 40 the Canadian Prime Minister admitted to the members of the Cabinet War Committee that the only reason he had told the House of Commons on 25 Jan that a 2nd Canadian Division would be sent overseas "as soon as may be possible" (32) had been to keep the question out of the forthcoming election campaign. The large majority obtained by the Liberal Party on 26 Mar would appear to have convinced the Government that a policy of moderate participation in the War was desired by the Canadian people (33). Indeed, as late as 20 Apr the view was expressed during the course of a meeting at Canada House attended by the Minister of National Defence, that "a balanced Canadian Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops might prove to be the maximum which Canada could maintain by voluntary recruiting in a war of long duration" (34). Generals McNaughton and Odlum had then emphasized that it would be more effective to keep such a formation at full strength than to have a larger establishment under strength by reason of insufficient reinforcements.

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\* La Régiment de la Chaudière had been mobilized as a machine gun battalion for the French-speaking brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division. Following a reorganization of the divisional order of battle it became surplus to requirements and with effect from 24 May 40 became part of the 3rd Canadian Division.



(iii) Advent of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940

31. The belief that the War could be won without putting large numbers of Canadians into uniform suffered a jolt on 10 May 40. As the Anglo-French forces fell back, and the myth of the Maginot Line was exploded, the people of the democracies were brought to the realization that this War no longer could be fought chiefly by economic means. The very existence of the British Commonwealth was soon at stake: if the United Kingdom was vanquished then the continent of North America might well be Hitler's next objective in his search for 'Lebensraum'. That the Germans had more immediate plans was beside the point. More and more Canadians began to clamour for active service.

32. Following his return to Canada the Minister of National Defence reported to his colleagues of the Cabinet War Committee on 17 May that the United Kingdom was completely unprepared for mobile warfare. The Prime Minister told his colleagues that the situation was acute and they must decide what must be done to help the common cause.\* (The telegram of 10 May offering assistance to the British Government had included the suggestion that the despatch overseas of the 2nd Canadian Division might be accelerated.) (35). The mobilization of a 3rd Canadian Division and creation of a Canadian Corps were approved but the latter's expansion to three divisions was left for later discussion. Once again units were selected so as to give appropriate representation to all parts of the country.

33. On 27 May authority was given to mobilize the Infantry battalions of a fourth division from the N.P.A.M. so that home defence forces would still be the equivalent of two divisions\*\* after the 2nd Canadian Division departed for overseas. (Contributions planned for the defence of the United Kingdom and the Atlantic area would leave Canada virtually undefended and prompted Prime Minister King to suggest to the Cabinet War Committee on 29 May that a Ministry of Home Defence should be established. The Minister of National Defence considered that a Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces would be more appropriate to deal with internal security problems.) The balance of a 4th Canadian Division was ordered to mobilize in early June and somewhat later further units were authorized: the most important of these were nine further infantry battalions, five motorcycle regiments, a Canadian Forestry Corps of 20 companies for overseas service and additional coast defence units. (The haste with which these mobilizations were ordered and carried through made it almost inevitable the principle of territorial representation should be relaxed at the expense of French-speaking units.) The Adjutant-General had been opposed to opening wide the doors for enlistment until there was sufficient accommodation and equipment but, because of public clamour for action, he was overruled (37). (More strenuous efforts were to be made, however, to obtain equipment and accommodation.) Permanent army recruiting offices were opened all across Canada to handle the influx of volunteers. Older veterans of the First World War could enlist in the Veterans Home Guard, authorized on 24 May for active service in Canada and subsequently re-named the Veterans Guard of Canada.

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\* Most immediate military assistance was the despatch of an infantry battalion to Newfoundland, a garrison battalion to relieve British troops in Jamaica and Bermuda and three infantry battalions ('Z' Force) to Iceland.

\*\* Pre-war planners had considered that two divisions, or their equivalent, should be retained in Canada to meet the needs of home defence and this thought had been continuously kept in mind (36).



34. Meantime, opposition members in the Canadian House of Commons were trying to prod the Prime Minister into doing far more. When the House opened on 23 May, the day following the institution of more strict manpower measures in the United Kingdom, Mr T.L. Church asked whether any national registration would be undertaken to determine fully the resources available for the war effort. Prime Minister Mackenzie King replied that this question "like all others that require a statement of government policy, will be answered as the policies of the government of Canada are announced" (39). At this time the C.C.F. (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) Party was urging the conscription of manpower, wealth and industry for a full prosecution of the war, as was the Dominion Executive Council of the Canadian Legion (40). Veterans organizations and newspapers inimical to the Government were urging further that General McNaughton should be brought back to Canada to direct the war effort (41). The question of a national registration was raised again on 14 Jun by Hon. R.B. Hanson, Parliamentary Leader of the Opposition, following the Prime Minister's statement pledging support to France in her hour of need. Once again, however, the latter merely intimated that the question was under consideration (42).

35. Only on 18 Jun, the day that the French Government sought armistice terms from Adolf Hitler, did Prime Minister Mackenzie King announce in the House of Commons that a bill

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\* Although conscription for military service had been introduced into the United Kingdom in the months preceding the war it was feared that organized labour would not accept industrial conscription and so no steps were taken, even after its outbreak, to enable the Government to control and transfer civilian labour according to national needs. Therefore, as late as April 1940 there still were 1,000,000 unemployed industrial workers while skilled artisans already were at a premium. With the appointment of a trade union leader, Mr Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour and National Service in Mr Churchill's National Government, however, it proved possible to take the necessary logical action.

While Prime Minister Churchill was conferring with Premier Paul Reynaud on 22 May the British House of Commons approved the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, in all its stages, in less than three hours. Regulations made under this Act enabled the Minister of Labour and National Service to direct any person to perform such service as might be directed. After the Trade Union Congress had given its blessing on 25 May, union restrictions could be relaxed for the duration of the war, skilled tasks split up and women employed to a greater extent in the engineering industry. The registration of men was speeded up, with the result that by the end of July all those aged 34 or under had been recorded.

During June, July and August 1940 the British Army received 275,000 men. Since this was far beyond the capacity of the training organization 120 infantry battalions were formed and subsequently organized into 'county' divisions for employment on coast defence. Later, as more equipment became available, part of this manpower was used to provide corps and army troops (38).



would be introduced at once "to confer upon the government special emergency powers to mobilize all our human and material resources for the defence of Canada" (43). The following paragraphs of Mr Mackenzie Kings's speech were very relevant:

So far as man-power is concerned, it will relate solely and exclusively to the defence of Canada on our own soil and in our own territorial waters. It will enable the government to make the most efficient use of our man-power for the varied needs of modern machine warfare. It is of the utmost importance to realize that success in war to-day depends upon the use of men for the kind of work for which they are best fitted. The armed forces are only a part of the essential equipment of war. The skilled worker in the factory, the transport worker and the farmer, to mention only a few, are as essential to the effective prosecution of war as the soldier, the sailor and the airman. The mobilization of our resources will not, however, be confined to requiring the services of men and women. The government will have power under the provisions of the bill equally to call property and wealth, material resources and industry to the defence of Canada.

The bill is intended to remove any doubt as to the power of the government and the will of parliament that the whole material resources of the country should be available whenever they are required to meet the needs of the war. The operation of the measure will be confined to the period of the war.

Recruitment for service overseas will be maintained on a voluntary basis. No difficulty has been experienced and no difficulty is anticipated in raising by the voluntary system all the men required for service outside Canada. The bill to be introduced to-day in no way affects the raising of men to serve in the armed forces overseas. Once again I wish to repeat my undertaking, frequently given, that no measure for the conscription of men for overseas service will be introduced by the present administration.

A complete inventory of Canada's man-power and other resources, properly classified, affords a necessary basis for some of the further essential measures of home security and defence, which I have announced. A national registration of Canada's man-power will accordingly be instituted at once. Let me emphasize the fact that this registration will have nothing to do with the recruitment of men for overseas service (44).

It was planned further to establish a new Department of National War Services to co-ordinate the activities of existing voluntary war services\* and to mobilize and direct the activities of Canadian citizens towards war ends.

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\*Orders in Council P.C. 2620 of 9 Sep and 2636 of 11 Sep 39 had established a Voluntary Service Registration Bureau to direct and have general control of the tabulation, organization and co-ordination of all offers of voluntary assistance for the war effort. A separate section was entrusted with the registration of all university graduates and undergraduates in technical fields. The results of a voluntary registration of women, undertaken a few months before the outbreak of War, were passed to this Bureau also (45).



36. The acting Minister of National Defence\* gave a more detailed statement of what the Government was trying to accomplish. It was felt that energies should be directed to:

- (a) The task of recruiting men for service in the Canadian active Service force;
- (b) The immediate training of certain non-permanent active militia units and home guard reserve;
- (c) The training of men who will be called up under the legislation to which the Prime Minister has referred (46).

According to Mr Power the Canadian Active Service Force was enlisting recruits at the rate of approximately 800 a day. Steps were being taken to replenish the N.P.A.M. which had provided units for the C.A.S.F. and authority had been given to all Infantry regiments not yet mobilized, as well as certain other N.P.A.M. units to recruit to establishment and carry on training, including attendance at summer camps. With regard to compulsory training he stated:

... Every able bodied man in Canada will be given an opportunity of training in the use of arms, so as to come to the defence of the home land if necessary. The procedure will be that men will in due course be called up for a period of training so as to be prepared for the active defence of this dominion. The training, after due consideration for the requirements of the naval and air forces, will be entrusted to units of the non-permanent active militia which will be recruited voluntarily or filled under the powers of the new legislation according as the facilities for training and accommodation permit.

The length of the period of training will be determined by regulation. Whether this will be for a continuous period of three months or for a lesser period depends: (a) on the advice of the technical officers of the department; (b) on the requirements of industrial and productive manpower as shown by a survey to be immediately undertaken (47).

37. The Prime Minister then moved the first reading of the Bill and asked that it might be allowed to pass all three readings that day, an action which had been accomplished at Westminster on 22 May (see para 34). Due to discussion by C.C.F. members of the elimination of the profit motive from war and the more general debate on the question of home defence as opposed to overseas service, the Bill had received only its second reading when the House rose at 11.35 p.m. It was not until 20 June,

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\*Hon. C.G. Power had been appointed Minister of National Defence for Air on 23 May and became acting Minister of National Defence following the death of Hon. Norman Rogers in an air crash on 10 Jun. After bringing down the budget Hon. J.L. Ralston vacated the Finance portfolio and became Minister of National Defence on 5 Jul. On 12 Jul Hon. Angus MacDonald became Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.



after considerable further debate, that it received third reading. The remaining procedure was accomplished quickly and the National Resources Mobilization Act became law on the following day (See Appendix "A" for text).

38. Not until 12 Jul, however, was a bill introduced into the House of Commons to create a Department of National War Services. Hon. James A. Gardiner assumed this portfolio in addition to that of Agriculture and Hon. Mr Justice T.C. Davis became an Associate Deputy Minister\*. Organized and directed by this new department, and locally conducted by voluntary workers, a National Registration of all males and females, 16 years of age and over, was held during the three days 19, 20 and 21 Aug. The cards then were passed to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Nearly 8,000,000 men and women registered, of whom 802,458 were found to be unmarried men, or childless widowers, between the ages of 21 and 45 (as of 15 Jul 40) (48). Issued as Order in Council P.C. 4185 (27 Aug 40) the National War Services Regulations (Recruits) 1940 specified that these unmarried men and childless widowers should be liable to undergo and perform military training within Canada and the territorial waters thereof as should be required of them by proclamation of the Governor in Council. The following persons were, however, excepted:

- (a) Judges of Superior, District or County Courts of Justice;
- (b) Members of the Clergy or Religious Orders;
- (c) Regular Clergymen or Ministers of religious denominations;
- (d) Members of the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada on Active Service and Cadets entered at the Royal Military College of Canada;
- (e) Permanently employed workers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and of Provincial Police Forces;
- (f) Permanently employed members of Police Forces and Fire Brigades of any incorporated city;
- (g) Permanently employed workers and officers of all penitentiaries, prisons and lunatic asylums, or mental hospitals (49).

39. Recruiting for the N.P.A.M. officially had come to an end on 15 Aug, after which entry was to be permitted only to men who had undergone 30-days compulsory military training. On 29 Jul there had been only 47,373 all ranks still serving in the N.P.A.M. but by the end of August the 91 units authorized to recruit to establishment (whether or not they had provided a C.A.S.F. unit) and the 29 reserve companies authorized for the Veterans Guard of Canada had a strength of 107,219 all ranks (50). Although a good part of this phenomenal increase must be attributed to the desire of older men "to do their bit" there can be little doubt that a considerable number of young men joined the N.P.A.M. to avoid the stigma of having to perform compulsory military training. Speaking of the men who would be used to replenish the N.P.A.M. the Minister of National Defence had told the House of Commons on 29 Jul that:

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\*The other appointment as Associate Deputy Minister was filled only on 17 Oct by Major-General L.R. LaFleche who had been, however, assisting with the preparations of the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits).



I should like to stress again that all these members of the non-permanent active militia, whether they have been enlisted or been called for training, are to be regarded on exactly the same basis. Training is being given in order that they may be ready and able to defend their country. The call for training is a summons to the highest service which any citizen can render. They are all Canadian soldiers. They go to the same kind of camps and belong to the same regiments, and there will be no distinction whatever between them.

It must be remembered that there are many young men in the country who have already offered themselves for active service in special branches and who have not been taken on because there were no vacancies in that particular branch. There will also be men who would have been ready to enlist in the non-permanent active militia but who, because of their being regarded as essential in industry, were convinced that they could better serve for the time being in helping produce essential war supplies. These men will be called for training as their age class is reached, and it would be unfortunate indeed if any line of distinction were drawn between them and those who had enlisted (51).

(iv) 30-Day Training

40. Meanwhile, the construction across Canada of 39 Militia Training Centres against an opening date of 9 Oct had been proceeding. Centres were located in the vicinity of the N.P.A.M. units for which they were to train reserves but localities where there would be a concentration of C.A.S.F. troops during the coming winter were avoided (52). The camps varied in size and, according to the density of population in the area encompassed, had one, two, three or four training companies. Notwithstanding the increase in relative cost of setting up small training centres Government policy was to maintain as much decentralization as possible: both business and local pride would benefit by having men trained in their home locality. Administrative and training staffs were provided by officers and other ranks from the local N.P.A.M. units called out for full time service. For example, the four-company Training Centre at Cornwall, Ontario (No. 31) had a staff drawn from, and would provide recruits for, Le Régiment de Hull, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, The Governor General's Foot Guards and The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders. This staff, and that for the Brockville and Peterborough Training Centres also in Military District No. 3 underwent special training at Petawawa Military Camp during the period 4 Sep - 2 Oct (53).

41. Order in Council P.C. 4671 of 11 Sep directed that unmarried men and childless widowers aged 21-24 should be called for 30 days military training. On 23 Sep Militia (Special) Regulations were issued. Canada was divided into 13 administrative divisions, corresponding to the Military Districts in most



instances\* with a Divisional Registrar made responsible to the Minister of National War Services in Ottawa. With a duplicate National Registration card of every designated man in his office the Registrar was responsible for selecting the men required by the Army for each training intake, plus a percentage to compensate for medical rejection. It was planned to hold eight 30-day training periods during each year. Thus, if the total accommodation of 30,000 were filled for each period a total of 240,000 young men would receive training annually. Men so selected were mailed an Order-Medical Examination (54). All medical practitioners in good standing had been authorized to examine such men, using a copy of Physical Standards and Instructions for the Examination of Recruits, 1938 as a guide, and were paid a fee of \$1.00 for each examination. The medical practitioner then forwarded the medical report, together with the Order-Medical Examination, to the Registrar, who was provided with a medical adviser to interpret borderline cases. If the Registrar was of the opinion that a man was unfit for training a certificate was issued to the effect that he had been medically examined but, because of his physical condition, would not be called for the time being. At this time it was considered that all those placed in a medical category as low as "C-1" would be acceptable for military training (55).

42. This procedure did not prove to be very satisfactory. Family-doctor relationships, failure to understand properly the physical requirements necessary for men engaged in modern warfare and the inability of overworked elderly physicians to devote sufficient time to such medical examinations (when their younger colleagues were in uniform) resulted in certain borderline cases being passed and acceptable men rejected. The extent to which borderline cases were weeded out during the subsequent R.C.A.M.C. medical examination at the Militia Training Centre may be gauged from the following statistics (56):

	<u>Men Reported</u>	<u>Men Rejected</u>	<u>Men Trained</u>	<u>Percentage Rejected</u>
1st Draft	27,599	2,092	25,507	7.58
2nd Draft	30,904	2,604	28,300	8.43
3rd Draft	<u>30,623</u>	<u>2,552</u>	<u>28,071</u>	<u>8.33</u>
Total	89,126	7,248	81,878	8.11 (average)

\* In most cases these administrative divisions were centred in the same city as the Military District Headquarters:

<u>Division</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Military District Headquarters</u>
A	London, Ont.	1
B	Toronto, Ont.	2
C	Kingston, Ont.	3
D	Port Arthur, Ont.	(in M.D. 10)
E	Montreal, P.Q.	4
F	Quebec, P.Q.	5
G	Halifax, N.S.	6
H	Saint John, N.B.	7
I	Charlottetown, P.E.I.	(in M.D. 6)
J	Winnipeg, Man.	10
K	Vancouver, B.C.	11
M	Regina, Sask.	12
N	Edmonton, Alta.	13 (Calgary)



43. Every man was advised at the time he received his Order-Medical Examination that he could apply for postponement of military training once he had been medically examined. Such applications, however, had to be made in writing to the Registrar within eight (later 14) days of the date on the Order. Applications for postponement were heard by a National War Services Board, one or more of which were established in each administrative division under a chairman who held an appointment as judge in that province. Although these Boards normally possessed more than three members this was the maximum number which could sit at any one meeting. Except for farmers who could be granted postponement until further notice, no postponement order could be issued in the first instance for more than six months. Extensions could be granted, although the Board always had the right to cancel an order at any time (57). Thus training might be postponed for the physically fit, but not avoided, and civilian jobs had to be retained for those undergoing training.

44. In the case of students, postponement might be granted for succeeding years provided that academic standing remained satisfactory. Most colleges and universities were planning to undertake a compulsory programme of 110 hours military training in each academic year, plus two weeks summer camp, for those who were physically fit, while training in the Canadian Officers Training Corps (C.O.T.C.) continued on a voluntary basis (58). (Such a programme was to continue, and indeed expand, as the War progressed but students continued on postponement only so long as their academic standing remained satisfactory. Such a principle came to apply later to older students still attending secondary schools.)

45. National War Services Boards also granted postponements to Doukhobors, Mennonites, members of certain other religious sects (59) and men whose conscientious objections to military service were recognized as being sincere (Appendix "N").

46. Two weeks before a training period was to begin either Orders-Military Training or a notification that they would not be called for the present was mailed to all men for whom satisfactory medical reports had been received so that employers might be notified and any necessary personal arrangements made before the date of reporting (60). A list of those called was supplied to the D.O.C.'s representative in each Military District. Penalties were set forth for failure to comply with this procedure.

47. All across Canada single men reported for training on 9 Oct. The diarist of the Militia Training Centre (No. 131) at Camrose, Alberta, noted that, although 933 men had reported as fit for training, some 55 were rejected by the camp R.C.A.M.C. staff as being medically unfit (61). The Militia Training Centre (No. 31) at Cornwall also reported itself under strength (62). The war diary of the latter noted on 11 Oct:

Training continues on a fine day as per syllabus. This Syllabus is in a very concentrated form and covers a very wide range of training for these young recruits. If anything it tries to cover too much in too short a time. It is therefore very exhausting on both recruits and instructors particularly for the junior sub-alterns.



Again on 22 Nov this diarist commented on the second class as follows:

On the whole, the recruits are a very fair type and of almost the same quality as the first group. There appear to be more farmers in this group. This was due to farmers having their service postponed for harvesting season.

48. The third class started to arrive on 9 Jan 41 and was composed largely of men who were aged 22-3; in only Military Districts 4 and 13 were 24-year olds called. After undergoing the same type of training, modified by winter conditions, this class departed on 7 Feb. The Minister of National Defence did admit in the House of Commons on 11 Mar that there could have been only 22 days of actual training in the 30-day period but he insisted that it had been the "most intensive and the best twenty-two days of practical training we have had in this country since confederation" (63). However, although each man was given an opportunity of expressing a preference for voluntary service in the Navy, Army, or Air Force\*, no provision was made for actually accepting enlistments and the 81,878 men trained merely became members of the Non Permanent Active Militia.

(v) General Crerar's More Realistic Programmes

49. When Major-General H.D.G. Crerar was brought back to Ottawa early in July 1940 to become Chief of the General Staff he found that "the pressure of public opinion to 'get on with the war' had developed to such a height that there was a tendency on the part of the Government in general, and this Department in particular [i.e. National Defence], to go in all directions at highest possible speed" (65). He was able, however, to convince the New Minister of National Defence, Hon. J.L. Ralston, of the need for adopting a rational policy which would lead towards a balanced and progressive development of the maximum military effort of which Canada was capable.

50. Co-ordination of the three Armed Forces was through the Defence Council as before, but there now were separate Ministers and Deputy Ministers for Air and Naval Services, and Mr Ralston's primary responsibility as Minister of National Defence was for the Army. Moreover, Mr Ralston had secured the services of (Lt.-Col.) A.A. Magee (President of Barclay's Bank (Canada)), (Lt.-Col.) G.S. Currie (prominent Montreal chartered accountant) and (Major) Victor Sifton (newspaper owner) as executive assistants. An editorial appearing in The Winnipeg Free Press of 6 Jul had spoken for the general public:

... Defence is now "Big Business", the biggest business Canada has and will have while this country remains in danger. Its direction and control must therefore lie in the hands of the very ablest men Canada has. War is no longer

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\*During the first two training periods the number of 30-day recruits who expressed a willingness to volunteer for "active service" was 19,805 (Navy 2667, Army 7269, and R.C.A.F. 9869) (64).



the manipulation of bodies of infantry. It is a technical profession dependent for its success in war on a score of skilled trades. The old days of drill ground and field manoeuvre are gone. Armies must be led and directed by specialists whose acquaintance with Field Service Regulations, necessary enough, is secondary to their organizing, administrative and technical knowledge, and who have the ability (which civil industry must have or perish) of rapid adjustment to ever changing conditions.

Newcomers therefore became Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Master-General of the Ordnance.

51. General Crerar considered that the Government's compulsory military training and service programme was a "very superficial scheme for training and utilizing the man-power so called up" but it was too late to change its basis (66). In his opinion, all that could be accomplished in such a limited time and with no weapons to train with, was to make such men "military minded". His own views were set forth in a memorandum prepared on 3 Sep for the Minister of National Defence:

The present war has shown that man-power armies cannot resist the German mechanized land and air forces. To do this we must have offensive arms, i.e. air and armoured forces, with the necessary defensive elements. This means that our forces may be relatively small but must be highly trained.

Individual training requires 4 months; collective training a further 6 months continuously, thus the programme contemplated under the Natural Resources Mobilization Scheme, and the N.P.A.M. Training Scheme, will be inadequate. We don't need the number of men for which those schemes cater, but we require longer and more thorough training for a smaller number of men.

We should assert the principle and put it into practice that men may be compelled to serve for the defence of Canada in this hemisphere. The only volunteers we should have are those who volunteer for overseas service, also those who are required to form permanent cadres of formations.

Once this principle is established, a detailed plan of organization for the Canadian Army can be built up, but if home defence and training for it are left mainly on the voluntary, part-time militia basis, no sound system of defence can be organized (67).

Lack of equipment now and shortage of volunteers later would limit the size of Canada's armed forces. General Crerar considered that a force of five to seven divisions, of which one or more should be armoured, might well be all that Canada could maintain overseas in a war of several years duration. Although national morale had required bolstering during the weeks following



the British evacuation from Dunkirk the N.P.A.M. was not suitable for assuming the home defence role. For one thing, many of its members were employed in industry or essential services; if these donned uniform there would be dislocation of the national economy. Home defence should, therefore, be left to men enrolled by conscription.

52. In this appreciation General Crerar dealt with three possibilities: defeat of the United Kingdom, peace by compromise and outright victory. In even the most favourable case, the world would be left in a troubled state. With the United States then attempting to expand its army by conscription under the Selective Training and Service Act Canada could not afford to take proportionately less action. Armies on the old model would not do, General Crerar believed:

... So our forces of the future must be based on mechanized power, which includes artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, and close-support aircraft. Man, on the battlefield, is only needed as eyes and brain for the machine-powered weapons; in the mass, he is merely a target inviting destruction. We need only mobilize a limited portion of our manpower for the actual fighting (but what we do select should be of high quality); on the other hand, all the resources of the nation should be mobilizable to produce the machines needed for success (68).

The second requirement for defence was the capacity to manufacture all essential kinds of war material. Manufacturing capacity should be built up in the knowledge that it would be vital to future security even if not ready in time for the existing war. Finally, armies must take the offensive to win and for this they would need a higher standard of training: "It is no longer reasonable to believe that the first-line defence of a country can be made up of voluntary, part-time militiamen, stiffened by a few professionals" (69).

53. The defence of Canada would require a minimum of two infantry divisions and an armoured brigade group, which would have to be maintained on a permanent basis (see para 33). He considered that the principle should be established of utilizing men called out under N.R.M.A. (i.e. National Resources Mobilization Act) to form or complete units (apart from a cadre of volunteers) designed for home defence only. If sufficient volunteers could be spared from the overseas reinforcement stream then certain units might be raised on a C.A.S.F. basis.

54. To be useful, compulsory training should last at least four months, which was the minimum period necessary for "individual training": 75,000 men with four months' training would be more use than 300,000 men who had undergone 30 days training. Should the situation require the despatch overseas during 1941 of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions and the Armoured Brigade\*, further 5th and 6th Divisions could be completed with N.R.M.A. personnel who had completed four months' training. Men not needed to complete such establishments might be dispersed to civilian life but remain subject to recall as reservists.

55. In a later Appreciation of 25 Sep General Crerar pointed out that 1941 should be devoted to building up

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\*Its units later were utilized in the formation of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap IX, paras 64-9).



resources. While he did not consider that a German invasion of the United Kingdom would be successful neither did he feel that the British would have the resources to undertake large scale operations on the continent of Europe during 1941. He reiterated what he had told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Jul--the front line was the British Isles--and the main effort should be developed to building up the Canadian Army Overseas in a "balanced and co-ordinated manner" (70). He recommended, therefore, that:

- (c) A Canadian Corps of three divisions should be completed by the early spring of 1941, and should be joined by an Armoured Brigade Group as soon as possible thereafter.
- (d) While the date the 4th Division would be required overseas cannot as yet be determined, we should be prepared for its despatch in the latter part of 1941.
- (e) Subsequent additions to the Canadian Forces overseas should be armoured forces rather than Infantry.
- (f) Provision should be made for replacing the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the Armoured Brigade Group by equivalent forces for home defence.
- (g) The unmobilized portion of the N.P.A.M. will become the Reserve units and formations of the Canadian Army, with as their principal functions, the holding of partially trained personnel and the completion of their training (71).

56. In a complementary memorandum, dated the previous day (24 Sep), General Crerar had elaborated his proposals for a Canadian Army Programme for 1941. These included definite recommendations that units should be selected at once so that additional formations could be raised to maintain the necessary mobile reserve in Canada after the departure of existing formations. With the expectation that compulsory training would be extended to four months he recommended that N.R.M.A. soldiers could be used to complete the strength of such home defence divisions. The importance placed by the C.G.S. on munitions production and technical training may be gauged from the following extract:

The power of the modern army resides in its arms and equipment--not in the number of men in its ranks. Our first objective in military organization must then be to produce the arms and equipment we need for our Army. In the unhappy event of the defeat of the United Kingdom, production of arms on this continent would be absolutely vital; we cannot defend Canada by masses of half-trained men with a variety of rifles in their hands. Therefore at this stage nothing in the way of military training should be allowed to interfere with production. Specifically, requests by war industries for exemption of key men from the training scheme should be granted. Later on



adjustments can be made so that no man will evade his proper responsibilities, but it is better now to risk some "draft-dodging" than to risk disorganizing production.

A machine-power army is primarily dependent on technicians to keep it in operation. Getting the requisite number of trained men, in competition with the services and with the demands of war industries is one of the most difficult problems with which we shall be faced, and it can only be solved by increasing facilities for technical training (72).

57. General Crerar further wanted the existing term "Militia" replaced by that of "Canadian Army", with "Active" and "Reserve" components, which would be more in line with Canada's status of independent nationhood\*. For the Canadian Army Overseas, however, military service should be voluntary:

What the war will demand of Canada in the way of military effort in the more distant future cannot be clearly foreseen, but it is presently the opinion of the General Staff that the most effective sort of action will be in the direction of raising and equipping of further armoured formations, rather than infantry. This, it may be expected, will keep the demands for man-power for overseas operations to what may be met by the voluntary system. Ten Armoured Divisions (the number the Germans had when they overthrew France) contain only 80,000 men, and Canada has already raised 162,664 men in the C.A.S.F.

While there are military grounds for preferring volunteers in an overseas army, which should be a corps d'elite, principally designed for offensive action, this does not affect the principle that service in the defence forces in Canada should be compulsory for all fit male Canadians (73).

58. The Army programme for 1941 was presented to the Cabinet War Committee on 1 Oct. After some discussion the Prime Minister pointed out that it had been agreed at the outset, and the British Government had concurred, that the development of air power was of paramount importance (see para 26). At subsequent meetings the possibility of effecting economies in the proposed Navy, Army and Air Force programmes was investigated and the question of increasing the compulsory military training period to four months was discussed. As it was the 30-day training period was causing dislocation to industry and the Cabinet War Committee decided (3 Oct) that letters should be sent to National War Services Mobilization Boards instructing that postponements should be given to key workers in war industry. Tentative approval for a four months compulsory

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\*This re-designation was approved by General Order 273 of 29 Nov 40.



military training scheme seems to have been given on 31 Oct\* but the possibility of men going to industry, the Navy or R.C.A.F. after completion of 30-days training still remained under consideration. At the meeting of 4 Dec Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated definitely that manpower should be directed primarily to war industry, R.C.A.F. and the Navy, where needs were the most urgent. All information continued to point to the vital importance of naval and air power. A large army would mean more equipment and thus more men in industry. Regarding the possibility that had been broached, during Mr Gardiner's\*\* recent visit to the United Kingdom, of Canadian troops being despatched to Egypt, the Prime Minister stated that he personally was opposed to any course which would result in the sacrifice of Canadian lives—unless this should be absolutely necessary. He was interested primarily in the total contribution which Canada could make to the war effort: despatch of troops to Egypt would prejudice this build up. Mr Lapointe agreed with him. At the further meeting of 18 Dec it was decided that no large army would be needed before 1942.

59. During this period the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff were visiting the United Kingdom and completing arrangements for the formation of a Canadian Corps. Prime Minister Churchill informed Mr Ralston that there had been no thought of sending Canadian troops to Egypt. Conversations with General McNaughton and the War Office did result, however, in agreement being reached for the despatch overseas of the 3rd Canadian Division, balance of Corps troops, and an army tank brigade during the first half of 1941 and an armoured division during the autumn (75). While no commitment was entered into with the War Office at this time regarding the 4th Canadian Division, Mr Ralston later told the members of the Cabinet War Committee (10 Jul 41) that a wish had been expressed for its despatch overseas by the summer of 1942 (see para 67).

60. On 28 Jan 41 Prime Minister King warned his Cabinet War Committee colleagues of the danger of undertaking a war programme beyond Canada's capacity. The Canadian Army's overseas programme was approved but the Committee members agreed that the Armed Forces' programmes for the coming fiscal year should be adjusted so as not to cost more than \$1,300,000,000. General Crerar subsequently recommended that the international situation had been sufficiently improved by General Wavell's initial successes in Libya to make it militarily sound to postpone the mobilization of the 5th and 6th Divisions, utilize certain 4th Division artillery, engineer, army service corps and ordnance units to complete the armoured division and delay the reconstitution of the 4th Canadian Division (76).

61. The question of extending the period of compulsory military training was again brought before the Cabinet War Committee on 27 Jan and it was suggested to the Minister of National Defence that, after two months military training, men might elect to enlist in the Navy or R.C.A.F. or be withdrawn

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\*Speaking in the House of Commons on 15 Nov 40 the Minister of National Defence had reminded the members that the 30-day training period "was never unchangeable or final". Later in this speech he added: "The war committee of the cabinet has had the matter of the length of the training period under review repeatedly in connection with the manpower problem, and we are now considering the further step of lengthening the training period to four months and reducing the aggregate number of men to be called from civil occupations in the year." Such a step would tend to prevent undue disturbances in industry, but would involve more extended postponements of training if war industry was to expand (74).

\*\*Held ministerial portfolios of Agriculture and National War Services.



to war industry if they were key personnel. The C.G.S. personally was in favour of total exemption from compulsory military training for key personnel in war industry but had agreed to such a compromise for political reasons and to avoid internal dissension. Any proposal, such as that advanced by Hon. James G. Gardiner, that compulsory training should end after two months was impracticable, however, since such men "would still have only one-half the training which has been proved by experience to be necessary to enable them to take their places, as effective fighting men, in the ranks of an operational unit" (77). On the following day the Cabinet War Committee accepted the recommendation for four months compulsory training, subject to the proviso inserted by Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, that this extension should not be accepted as a prelude for compulsory military service overseas (78). Not until 20 Feb was a proclamation issued: this introduced four months training for the 21-year olds but reduced the call on manpower somewhat by canceling the earlier proclamation of 11 Sep 40 designating those aged 21, 22, 23 and 24 as being liable for military training (see para 41). Not until 18 Mar were revised instructions issued as Reserve Army (Special) Regulations, 1941 by Order in Council (P.C. 1910).

62. Speaking to the House of Commons on 11 Mar, during the debate on the War Appropriation Bill, the Minister of National Defence made public the Canadian Army Programme for 1941. Following the example of both the British and United States Armies all training would be conducted by Training Centres. Since four months was the minimum time required to train both reinforcements for the Canadian Army (Active) and N.R.M.A. personnel for a possible home defence role it had been decided to train both types of recruits in the same Training Centres, utilizing the existing 39 Militia Training Centres and the 22 Training Centres then training reinforcements for the Canadian Army (Active). The men were to be referred to as 'A' and 'R' Recruits respectively. Approximately two-thirds of the existing Militia Training Centres would become Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centres: the remainder would become Advanced Training Centres (additional to those created from the existing corps training centres), (two) Officers Training Centres, N.C.Os. training schools and centres for specialist training. At the conclusion of two months basic training all recruits would move to Advanced Training Centres to receive a further two months instruction peculiar to the Corps with which they would serve. Available and projected accommodation would permit a regular monthly intake of 10,000 recruits (79).

63. Members of the Opposition expressed doubt as to whether the 21-year old single men and childless widowers would suffice to maintain this training programme and there was some quibbling in the answers given to the House of Commons. The Minister of National Defence did state, however, in reply to the Leader of the Opposition, that:

I am advised by officers in whom I have the fullest confidence that, having regard to everything we can foresee, this plan will take care of our needs for the defence of Canada provided recruiting—and in spite of what the hon. member who preceded me has suggested—keeps up to a reasonable degree. I have not the doubts and fears entertained by my hon. friend in that respect. If the call comes, I think the men of Canada will answer (80).



On 14 Mar Mr Gardiner further elaborated as follows:

Men are enlisting continuously, and it is just possible that if 25 per cent of the twenty-one year age group should enlist, there would not be enough men to fill the camps. They might enlist in the air force, the navy or somewhere else. As we go on with the war, it may become more and more necessary to take in the higher age groups in order to fill the camps if we are going to continue to have four months training. I should not like it to be understood that it is definitely decided that we are going to call for training only those in the twenty-one year age group. The intention is to start with that group and continue calling them as long as we need men for the camps (81).

64. Again, on 17 Mar, Mr Ralston repeated that the reason for the adoption of the 30-day training period had been shortage of equipment and the desirability of having as many men as possible get some sort of training. Continuing, he stated:

... The other point was the disturbing effect which the calling-up of these men had on industry; for 30,000 a month for ten months would have meant that 300,000 would have had to make arrangements to leave their civilian occupations for one month in the year. On this latter point I have repeatedly stated that the army has recognized the necessity for the maximum possible production in this country. But with the improvement in production and supply, the equipment situation is no longer a vital factor in preventing the adoption of a longer period.

In order to make allowance for industry, we want to consider whether it would be necessary to adopt a system of reserve occupations such as they have in England, or whether some other plan could be evolved which would cause a minimum of dislocation, without the complicated system of reserve occupations and the enormous amount of machinery necessary to administer it. We studied the situation overseas. We found, on examining the system of reserved occupations there, that it would be highly desirable, if it could be done and still supply our needs, to work out some plan which would avoid our having to set up machinery and prescribe arbitrary classifications and subclassifications to be excepted. On our return the present plan was worked out. It provides for four months' training—two months' basic training and two months' advance training. This means that future additions to the reserve will be completely trained in all weapons with which, as individuals, they may be called upon to fight. It avoids the system of reserved occupations by the simple expedient



of confining the calls to a very limited group **unless the** circumstances change materially or the numbers in this group should prove unexpectedly small. It also embodies this desirable feature, that young men at the time of **their** coming of age are reminded to recognize and prepare themselves for their responsibility for the defence of Canada (82).

65. On 24 Mar a first quota of 4668 'R' recruits reported (4690 had been requisitioned) to the new Basic Training Centres along with 'A' recruits (see para 83).

66. In a further Appreciation submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 18 May General Crerar recommended that the Government return to his original programme for 1941, since the general military situation abroad had deteriorated. This would involve, first of all, the reconstitution of the 4th Canadian Division. This would take some time, due to the dearth of trained Officers and N.C.Os. to serve as cadres for units which would have to be mobilized to replace those utilized in the armoured division. The Infantry brigades were in a satisfactory state of training, however, and eight further infantry battalions were available for a fifth division\* which would have to be mobilized before the anticipated departure overseas of the armoured division during the autumn. Therefore he recommended the mobilization of another division at once: further recommendations could be made later to cover the period when only two divisions should be available for home defence (83).

67. General Crerar's request to reconstitute the 4th Canadian Division found immediate acceptance. The question of mobilizing a fifth division had been discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 9 May but deferred, Prime Minister Mackenzie King being worried over the possibility of public pressure being exerted for the introduction of conscription for military service overseas\*\*. The question came up for discussion again and again but no decision was made. On 10 Jun the Minister of National Defence for Air (Hon. C.G. Power) pointed out that there was more manpower available than had been originally estimated; even though the R.C.A.F. now totalled the equivalent of four army divisions and the Navy's strength equalled another division and a half. On 10 Jul Mr Ralston stated that, in his opinion, Canada was committed to send five divisions overseas, even though there was no written commitment (85). Because of the absence of Hon. C.G. Power and Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe no decision was possible at the meeting of 15 Jul, but the Prime Minister did point out that the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air (Capt. H.H. Balfour) had mentioned (during his

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\*Due to the re-designation of the 1st Canadian Armoured Division to 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division the projected fifth division became the 6th Canadian Division when mobilized.

\*\*In a personal letter to General McNaughton, dated 19 May, General Crerar wrote: "I am constantly being pressed to mobilize further divisions but so far have succeeded in holding our Army expansion programme in some balance with the prospect of receiving equipment on which they can train and with which they can subsequently fight" (84).



recent visit to Ottawa) that the Government of the United Kingdom believed that the army role would be mainly police duty in Europe after victory had been made possible by air power. The matter was settled by the Cabinet War Committee on 29 Jul but only after a stormy debate during which Mr Ralston stated that, if necessary, he would support conscription for overseas service. Canada would make available four divisions and an army tank brigade for overseas service and retain two divisions at home. Although mobilization of a 6th Division was authorized, immediate authority was granted to complete only its three Infantry Brigade Groups. (These would be employed as an operational reserve at each of Nanaimo, Niagara and Valcartier.) Public announcement was not made until 9 Aug.

68. The Canadian Army programme for 1941 had been linked to the British Army's F.F.C. No. 35 (i.e. Field Force Conspectus) which had been drawn up during the autumn of 1940 to make the best possible use of available manpower\*. Although it became necessary to impose a 'manpower ceiling' of 2,195,000 all ranks during March 1941, a total force of 57 divisions (including those from the Dominions and Empire) was still planned (87). In accepting this 'ceiling' the British Army was given to understand that large numbers of women replacements would be made available through the A.T.S. (Auxiliary Territorial Service). By mid-summer 1941 it had proved necessary, however, to raise this 'manpower' to 2,374,800 all ranks: it was now considered that manpower should be treated as a bulk allotment and the Army be permitted to work out its own commitment in G.H.Q. and L. of C. troops rather than estimate the force purely on a specific number of divisions. The new plan was known as F.F.C. No. 36 and a draft was sent to C.M.H.Q. as early as 5 Aug 41 (88). The Canadian contribution to the new Field Force Contingent No. 36 (but distinct from the manpower allotted the British Army) was envisaged as three infantry divisions, one armoured division, one army tank brigade, an enlarged Forestry Corps and a proportion of corps and army troops units. It was against this background and the already mentioned activities of the Canadian Government that a Canadian Army Programme was planned for 1942.

69. General McNaughton's views as to further expansion of the Canadian Army Overseas were brought to Ottawa during early August by Brigadier G.R. Turner who had been sent back on a liaison visit\*\*. The Canadian Corps Commander felt that further additions should take the form of armoured formations (89). Replying to General McNaughton in a personal letter of 11 Aug the C.G.S. wrote:

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\*On 9 Dec 40 Prime Minister Churchill advised the Secretary of State for War that a more economical use would have to be made of the British Army's manpower. Over a million men were serving in the United Kingdom as corps, army or G.H.Q. troops, on A.D.G.B. (Air Defence of Great Britain) or at training establishments and depots while only 735,000 men actually were on the strength of fighting formations (86).

\*\*During June the Vice Chief of the General Staff (Brigadier K. Stuart) had visited the United Kingdom. The Adjutant-General and Master-General of the Ordnance also visited the Canadian Army Overseas during the summer.



... While the War Committee of the Cabinet has recently ruled that pending full examination of the man-power and financial situations no further increases will be authorized in the Canadian Army both overseas and here beyond the immediate organization of three Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division, it is inevitable that during the next few weeks the Cabinet will need to consider seriously what forces are to be despatched overseas in 1942. In preparation for this, the Chiefs of Staff Committee here is now engaged on the drafting of an Appreciation as to the course of the war during the next year and, following this, the several Service Programmes for expansion will be drawn up.

It is my intention to put forward the Army Programme as a tentative one only and subject to detailed discussion with yourself and the War Office before its recommendation is firm. It is my hope and expectation that this procedure will require me, and probably the Minister, to take another trip to the U.K. very early this autumn. In the meantime, while the thoughts expressed in the memorandum which Turner brought back to me...will be taken fully into account, I suggest that the following factors might be considered by you.

To commence with, our departmental studies of man-power available do not indicate that numbers will be a restrictive factor for some time yet in respect to an expansion of the Canadian Army. Perhaps the A.G. has already spoken to you on this subject but, if not, I might say that our departmental appreciation indicates that man-power is available to maintain a Canadian Army of eight divisions, of which two will be in Canada, for a period of over six years from now. An Inter-departmental Committee on Man-power has now been formed and is considering the calculations submitted by this and other departments such as Labour and Munitions and Supply\*. It may be that the results of this Committee's considerations will be somewhat at variance from the estimates we have separately reached. On the other hand, our own calculations certainly do not suffer from optimism and I believe that the numbers for the Army are there, without interfering with essential industry and other home activities, providing the Government takes the steps required to get those numbers into the Services.

All the above leads me to the conclusion that, providing the Government are prepared to face up to the financial and other strain, we should be able to reinforce the Corps during 1942 with not only the 4th Division but another Armoured Division as well. This would result

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\*See para 126.



in too large a Corps, but have you ever considered the pros and cons of a Canadian Army comprising two Corps each of 2 Divisions and an Armoured Division? I fully admit that this is a pretty ambitious proposal because the necessary increase in Corps, etc., troops will be fairly heavy. At the same time, I do not think that the picture is an impossible one (90).

70. According to the Chiefs of Staff Committee further "Appreciation of the Nature of the Canadian Military Effort as of:- 5th September 1941" the maximum military effort should be put forward in 1942 (91). Should Russia be able to continue in the War they considered it likely that there would be British offensive action on the continent of Europe. On the other hand, if the U.S.S.R. was crushed, Canada's maximum effort would be more than ever necessary to help stave off a victorious Germany. Therefore, Canada's Armed Forces should be expanded at once.

71. In a long memorandum dated 29 Sep General Crerar elaborated on the above and set forth the possible alternatives for a Canadian Army Programme in 1942:

... It is important that plans for the expansion of the Canadian Army overseas should be such as can be implemented with our present system of voluntary enlistment for overseas service. On the other hand, within whatever restrictions may be imposed upon army expansion by the availability of man-power and other limiting factors, it is essential, from the military point of view, that Canada should provide the maximum force overseas that it is possible to organize and maintain. It is certain that the land forces of the British Empire can never reach such numbers that we will become overinsured in that respect. And it is eminently desirable that we should now tentatively explore the various alternatives for providing a larger and more offensively effective Army overseas, in order that certain general conclusions may be reached in advance of any discussions with the War Office and the G.O.C., Canadian Corps (92).

Actually a mobile reserve of two divisions and an armoured brigade group had never existed in Canada on a properly equipped and trained basis and General Crerar was of the opinion, in view of the fact that the United States was steadily moving closer to actual belligerency, "that we are now justified" in reviewing the size of the mobile force held in Canada as a general reserve for home defence and that, as mobilization of the 6th Division proceeds, the despatch overseas of the 4th Canadian Division without its replacement in Canada may be considered".

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\*On 2 Oct the Minister of National Defence passed along this suggestion to the other members of the Cabinet War Committee. At the 10 Nov meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in Montreal the senior United States service member indicated that he did not think the War Department in Washington would view with disfavour a considerable reduction in the general reserve being maintained by the Canadian Government (93).







to be a well distributed programme it did not represent, according to General Crerar, the maximum effort which could be maintained, especially since there had been no battle casualties as yet. The C.G.S. again reiterated that the "maximum expansion" of the Canadian Army should take place during 1942 (96).

75. The Cabinet War Committee gave this proposed Army programme long thought. At a meeting of 3 Dec it received assurance from Maj-Gen. K. Stuart (recently appointed C.G.S.) that such a programme could be completed by voluntary enlistments and that, under foreseeable circumstance, there would be an adequate number of reinforcements. General Stuart considered, however, that this programme was the "visible ceiling" of army expansion. As late as 29 Dec Prime Minister Churchill was asked for his views on the wisdom of the proposed expansion of the Canadian Army Overseas, when he met with the Cabinet War Committee during his visit to Ottawa (from the midst of the "ARCADIA" Conference in Washington).

76. On 6 Jan 42 this Army Programme finally was given approval by the Cabinet War Committee but it was not until 26 Jan (while General McNaughton was en route to Canada by sea) that the Prime Minister made the following announcement in the House of Commons:

During 1942 ... it is proposed to create overseas a Canadian army of two army corps; one army corps to comprise three infantry divisions and two army tank brigades; the other to consist of two armoured divisions. In addition all ancillary units to serve these two corps will be provided ....

The 1942 army programme will create a thoroughly modern, well balanced and hard-hitting Canadian overseas army. This army will be complete and self-contained. It will be capable of operating in any theatre, and can be effectively maintained in respect to both manpower and equipment (97).

(cont'd from p. 33)

	Base Units and Organiza-		
	tions	9,943	
	Reinforcements	14,658	
	Canadian Forestry Corps	<u>4,305</u>	
	Total		121,332
(ii)	Newfoundland		3,734
(iii)	Jamaica		842
(iv)	Hong Kong		<u>1,982</u>
			127,890
	<u>Canada</u>		
(i)	Coastal Garrisons	12,529	
(ii)	4th Division	15,477	
(iii)	6th Division	7,673	
(iv)	Miscellaneous Units	628	
(v)	Reinforcements	28,722	
(vi)	Home War Establishments, Training Centre Staffs, Internment Camp Staffs and Other Detachments	42,182	
(vii)	Veterans' Guard of Canada	<u>6,429</u>	
		113,640	113,640
	GRAND TOTAL CANADIAN ACTIVE ARMY		<u>241,530</u>



77. If such a First Canadian Army was to become a self-contained force, as General McNaughton insisted it should, however, certain deficiencies in rearward units amounting to 22,172 all ranks would have to be made good (98). This was the difference between the Canadian manpower being provided for the "field force" and the estimated requirements for a self-contained force built around three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades (approximately 200,000 all ranks)\*. It was agreed at the War Office that the balance of this "administrative tail" (chiefly Engineers, Signals and Army Service Corps personnel) would have to be provided by the British Army if Canada was unable to do so (99).

78. Even before this, however, General Crerar had been able to realize his wish for a field command. With the military framework planned, it had been arranged during his trip overseas (see para 73) that he should replace Major-General V.W. Odlum in command of the 2nd Canadian Division (100). He had returned to Canada only to prepare the new programme for submission to the Cabinet and hand over to the V.C.G.S. who became his successor (see para 75). Due to the continued illness of the Canadian Corps Commander, General Crerar took over temporary command of the Canadian Corps in early December as the next senior officer, and remained as its commander when General McNaughton created a First Canadian Army.

(vi) Reinforcements and Recruiting, 1940-1941

79. Whereas Recruiting Memorandum No. 1 of 15 May 39 had concerned itself with recruiting men for the units which were subsequently mobilized (see para 27), Recruiting Memorandum No. 2 of 15 May 39 dealt with the problem of enlisting reinforcements for those units (101). Unlike the First World War, when Infantry battalions had to be disbanded following arrival in the United Kingdom to provide reinforcements for the Canadian Corps on the Western Front, each District Officer Commanding was made responsible for obtaining the quotas of recruits required to reinforce the units\*\*mobilized in his District (102).

80. The calculation of wastage rates was not possible until it was known whether the units mobilized would form part of an expeditionary force (see para 26) and even then those

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\*The planners used the following scales to compensate for the proportion of corps, army and G.H.Q. units required to maintain armies of any size in the field:

40,000 per infantry division  
35,000 per armoured division  
5,000 per army tank brigade

This was known as the 'divisional slice'.

\*\*It was assumed that Infantry and Cavalry units would establish regimental depots to handle reinforcements whereas those for other arms and services would be enlisted by District Depots. Regimental depots were not established by all the units entitled to do so, however, and a General Order of July 1940 directed that the recruiting of all reinforcements should henceforth become the business of the District Depots.



compiled at N.D.H.Q. were unrealistic, being based on experiences of the First World War. Not until 14 Dec was Brigadier Crerar (then C.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) able to forward to Canada by telegram the War Office rates of wastage: these were hypothetical, however, and were "to be considered as the highest degree of activity to be prepared for rather than the most probable degree anticipated" (103). These tables classified wastage according to periods of 'normal' and 'intense' activity; the percentages for other ranks varied from 5 to 6 per cent monthly in the case of armoured, infantry and machine gun units in the first instance to 20 per cent (infantry rifle), 14 per cent (armoured corps, heavy units) and 10 per cent (light armoured units and machine gun) in the second. The other arms and services—Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Medicals, Army Service Corps and Ordnance were estimated at 7, 6, 4, 4, 3 and 3 per cent respectively during 'intense' periods. Officer casualties were estimated as being similar to other ranks during 'normal' periods but approximately double, except for tanks and infantry, during periods of 'intense' fighting.

81. On 15 Jan 40 a first reinforcement quota of 4728 men was ordered into the Training Centres recently established for their training. This quota had been calculated as the number of reinforcements required to make good three months possible wastage of the Canadian units then overseas. Even though these men would not be completely trained by April they would be despatched overseas to complete the complement of the Reinforcement Depots to be established at that time in the United Kingdom. Thereafter monthly despatches\* of trained reinforcements would enable these overseas depots to be maintained at strength. A further month's wastage would be held at the Base Depot to be established in the theatre of operations (i.e. France). The "first reinforcements" then being carried by units (approximately 10 per cent of establishment) would be returned to the reinforcement pool. (104).

82. Circumstances were completely changed by the fall of France. It was felt that the British 'quiet' or 'normal' rate was too low in view of the fact that Canada was far away and that, in the event of invasion or heavy losses from enemy air activity, it would take longer to procure additional reinforcements. Following a conference at 7th Corps Headquarters on 8 Aug a revised schedule of wastage rates was prepared to meet the special needs of Canadian troops (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap VIII, paras 68-73). It was proposed that the new situation might be met by holding a pool of Infantry reinforcements equal to 30 per cent (three months at 10 per cent per month) of establishments. Basic percentages for arms and services were estimated accordingly (105):

<u>Arm of Service</u>	<u>Per cent per month</u>	<u>Per cent per 3 months</u>
Artillery	8	24
Engineers	6	18
Signals	6	18
Infantry (R)	10	30
Infantry (MG)	10	30
R.C.A.S.C.	6	18
R.C.A.M.C.	4	12
R.C.O.C.	4	12
Others	4	12

\*When the lowest age for enlistment was raised to 19 in November 1939 a number of 18-year olds were posted to District or Regimental Depots until they were old enough for despatch overseas as reinforcements. Subsequent reinforcement quotas were 1474 (1 Feb), 1575 (24 Feb), 1372 (22 Mar) and 1809 (17 May).



These figures were approximately midway between the British 'normal' and 'intense' rates. After consideration in Ottawa a telegram was despatched to C.M.H.Q. on 24 Aug signifying agreement; it was pointed out further that an additional reserve of four months reinforcements would be held in Canada (106). With the adoption of this policy the earlier plan of despatching overseas a monthly draft of reinforcements was dropped\*.

83. With the Canadian Army Programme for 1941 approved the next problem was recruiting sufficient men to make it a reality. Furthermore, the organization of the armoured division and the considerable reorganizations undertaken overseas by the Canadian Corps had dissipated a goodly number of the trained reinforcements available both in Canada and the United Kingdom. In an appreciation of 28 Jan 41 the Adjutant-General strongly recommended that the existing recruiting procedure whereby most men were obtained "off the street" should be stopped (107). Recruiting should be through the Reserve Army and its members should be given the four months training being planned for N.R.M.A. personnel, but as volunteers destined for overseas service. Replying to the Adjutant-General on 4 Feb General Crerar expressed agreement that recruiting "off the street" should be reduced to a minimum and men passed through Reserve units even if they did not do much training (since in most cases they would require four months training anyway) before they would be acceptable for the overseas reinforcement stream. He considered that manpower sources, in order of importance, should be the Reserve units, N.R.M.A. personnel and "men off the street". However, he added:

Until we have some experience of the working of the 4-months system of training men called up under the N.R.M.A. and find out how men volunteer, we should place no reliance on this source of recruits, though we may hope that it will be a substantial one. It is always possible to regard it as a reserve, for in case of necessity we could draft these trainees to fill Coast Defence and other units required for the Home Defence of Canada, thus releasing personnel who would volunteer for active service overseas (108).

In practice, therefore, N.R.M.A. personnel undergoing four months compulsory training were to be counted as part of the four months quota of reinforcements held in Canada (see para 81).

84. This was all very well but the recruiting shortages for the first three months of 1941 totalled 6900 men and (as the Minister of National Defence told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 23 Apr) only the French-speaking Reserve units had exceeded the quotas allotted to them. As the result of medical re-classification within the 3rd Canadian Division even more men were required to complete its establishments before

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\*As a result of this action, and the arrival overseas of the 2nd Canadian Division, it proved desirable to form three groups of holding units and provide an overall Headquarters, Canadian Base Units. "A" Group came to comprise three Infantry Holding Units; "B" Group consisted of an Engineer Holding Unit, a Signals Holding Unit, an Army Service Corps Holding Unit and a General Holding Unit; "C" Group had two Artillery Holding Units (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap VIII, para 74).



proceeding overseas\* Action was taken to comb out the coast defence units for men who wished to serve overseas and replace them with men whose medical categories had been lowered to 'B' but the number discovered was fewer than anticipated (109). There still were shortages in other active units to be remedied.\*\* Actually, by now the Armed Forces and expanding war industry had absorbed the majority of those who had been unemployed in September 1939.

85. As early as 8 Apr the three Defence Ministers had made separate appeals over the radio asking for a total of 116,000 men, 9000 for the Navy, 35,000 for the R.C.A.F. and between 5,000-6,000 per month for the Army during the balance of the year (110). Speaking to the House of Commons on the same theme Mr Ralston had suggested that there was room for everybody and the fact that pressure had not been applied as yet did not mean that men were not needed (111).

86. Parliament adjourned until 28 Apr but before it re-opened an important decision had been taken by the Cabinet War Committee. At the latter's meeting of 23 Apr Mr Ralston stated that it would be necessary to despatch overseas further men from coast defence units and replace them by N.R.M.A. personnel who should complete their four months compulsory training. This recommendation was approved, after the Prime Minister had once again cautioned against any commitment that might lead, directly or indirectly, to conscription for overseas service. Further agreement was reached on the desirability of conducting a definite nation-wide recruiting campaign.

87. On the morning of 26 Apr Mr Ralston announced at a press conference that the 5,000 odd "R" recruits who would be completing their four months training in July would be retained indefinitely for "coast defence, internal security guard in the interior" (112). This move was presented as "a natural development of government policy in the light of conditions and ~~not as a response~~ to any emergency". It was expected that the policy of retaining such N.R.M.A. personnel would not be continued indefinitely and that it would be confined to the two classes (9,830) graduating in July and August.\*\*\*The account in the Ottawa Journal stated, however:

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\*The 1939 medical standards were too high for a citizen army to be recruited from average healthy citizens and, therefore, they were lowered somewhat by Canadian Army Routine Order 543 of 29 Jun 40. Men of a minimum height of five feet, a minimum weight of 120 pounds and a minimum chest measurement of 32 inches became acceptable as category "A" soldiers.

\*\*It might be noted further that a considerable number of men recruited during the spring months were despatched directly to units destined for overseas, by-passing the newly re-organized Training Centres.

\*\*\*Such 'R' recruits became known as Members (H.D.) of the Canadian Army on being posted to such duties. The all embracing term N.R.M.A. soldier was not adopted until December 1942, when men came to be enrolled for the duration of the War rather than for military training.



In view of deferments of compulsory military training allowed to workers in agriculture and other occupations, the Minister said the 21-year-old class might be exhausted by the time the July call was made and that men of other classes would have to be called up to meet the deficiency (113).

88. As a corollary it was agreed, between the Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. on 3 May, that further "B" category men should not be enrolled as 'R' recruits and those already undergoing training should be posted to units other than Infantry or Artillery (114). Henceforth, 'R' recruits would be posted to coast defence units as Members (H.D.) of the Army to replace "A" category volunteers withdrawn for service overseas while volunteers in other "active" units whose categories had been lowered would be absorbed into the Home War Establishment (115). The Department of National War Services endeavoured to decrease the number of "B" category men due to report on 20 May and agreed that none should be sought on subsequent requisitions (116).

89. When the House of Commons re-assembled on Monday, 28 Apr the Leader of the Opposition charged that the problem of manpower needs had not been faced realistically. Unlike certain vociferous sections of the press the Conservative Party also was committed to a policy of no conscription for overseas service but Mr R.B. Hanson felt free to attack the Government's methods. Replying to his charges the Minister of National Defence pointed out that until now sufficient men had been obtained to occupy the available accommodation for training and meet the overseas reinforcement needs of a Canadian Corps without a national recruiting campaign. Although a definite recruiting campaign was going to be undertaken there was "no occasion for anyone to feel jittery with regard to the man-power situation" he continued, reiterating that "this matter ebbs and flows" (117).

90. During the budget debate on 12 May, Dr. H.A. Bruce brought the question of conscription for overseas service farther into the open. While conceding that the Government probably would get the men immediately being asked for, this Conservative member pointed out that it would become increasingly more difficult to meet quotas set for later recruiting drives. The time had come, he argued, to use manpower according to a "national service plan". The powers of the National Resources Mobilization Act should be used to ensure that there was an equality of service and sacrifice. Furthermore:

... Voluntary recruiting has reached the stage where it is slow, cumbersome and wasteful. I am certain that all parts of Canada will respond to the high patriotic call that the situation now requires. Selective compulsory service is the only fair and efficient way to meet the complex needs of Canada.... (118)

91. The Minister of National Defence replied that, although he knew Dr Bruce was "sincere in his remarks", his speech was "nothing less than a blow at our national unity and, whether he intends it or not, an attempt to undermine it" (119). Voluntary recruiting might not be the most economical way to secure men but Mr Ralston pointed out its analogy with the Victory Loan campaigns which were being conducted to help finance the War. He did not bother to elaborate, as well he might, the



steps which were being taken to ensure that both the Armed Forces and industry should have sufficient skilled men (see Appendix "O").

92. Actually Mr Ralston had opened "Canada's first recruiting campaign" with a radio broadcast on the preceding evening (11 May). He asked for 32,000 recruits for the Army in the next two months. The assistance of a professional advertising agency was obtained to put over this campaign, which was under the direction of a National Campaign Committee (120). (This National Campaign Committee had held its first meeting on 4 May under the chairmanship of the Adjutant-General.) On 15 May an appeal to unity was made over the French language radio stations of the C.B.C. by Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice) who was reported as saying that it was the duty of all physically fit men to volunteer for active service since "the war the Nazis are carrying on against us is a struggle to the death between Christianity and neopaganism, or rather nihilism; between freedom and slavery, between right and injustice of the most flagrant kind, between civilization and barbarism" (122). By this time large recruiting posters had appeared on some 890 billboards in 265 cities and towns across Canada: posters were affixed to buildings, cards placed in streetcars and busses, advertisements inserted in weekly and daily newspapers and, publicity inserted on radio programmes. The theme was immediate service in "Canada's Mechanized Army". Local committees of public spirited citizens were formed to work with recruiting officers to put over the campaign on a 'person to person' basis. It was hoped that the recruiting drive would reach its peak late in June: this would coincide with the end of the school year and, roughly, with the off-season between planting and harvest on the farms. In conjunction with the Victory Loan Drive, which opened on 2 Jun, a 'Victory Torch' was dedicated in Vancouver and then carried across Canada, stopping at 27 cities before reaching its ultimate destination—Prime Minister Churchill (123).

93. On 13 Jun Dr Bruce made a second attempt to urge the adoption of 'conscription' but was again countered by the Minister of National Defence who stated bluntly that such a suggestion was a blow against national unity and the recruiting campaign then being conducted (124). (Actually this subject had been discussed from time to time within the Cabinet War Committee. Indeed, on 20 May the Prime Minister had answered the suggestion that public apathy could be ended if Canadian troops could be involved even in small scale operations, with the remark that there was no justification for involving loss of life merely to arouse public sentiment.) Speaking at Calgary on 27 Jun the Prime Minister again made it clear that there would not be conscription for overseas service (125).

94. As suggested editorially by newspapers inimicable to the Liberal Government, the basic reason for the limited success of the recruiting campaign was the policy of no conscription for overseas service. Young men were waiting until they should be called, rather than volunteer while their neighbours remained in civilian jobs (126). In reply to suggestions that the Army should eliminate fit men from its own offices Mr Ralston stated on 17 Jun that enlisted men would not get "cushy" jobs at Headquarters. He admitted that there was a lack of glamour, compared to 1914-1918, and that one could walk through the streets of Ottawa without realizing that the country was at war. A considerable number of men contacted indicated that they were awaiting call by the R.C.A.F.: others considered they were contributing



more to winning the War by remaining on the farm or working in war plants (127). The Victory Loan was over-subscribed but the men for whom the tools of war had been designed were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers. Saturday, 28 Jun was set aside as 'Army Day', on which all camps and barracks across Canada were thrown open to public inspection, but the following telegram from Pacific Command probably can be taken as typical:

Camps and barracks opened to public all day and training activities given. Stop. Very well received by the public and particularly by veterans. Stop. Very few potential recruits amongst visitors everywhere. Stop. Total visitors all camps 13916. Stop. May possibly have some favourable effect on recruiting (128).

95. Only 59 per cent of the recruits required had been enlisted but Mr Ralston hoped that the remainder might be obtained by 12 Jul. In order to keep the Basic and Advanced Training Centres at capacity, however, larger N.R.M.A. quotas would have to be applied against the monthly intake. Thus, requisitions were made upon the Department of National War Services for 1300 21-year olds who had received 30-days training, another 1300 whose training had been postponed previously and 1400 youths who had reached the age of 21 since the inception of the scheme. (Only 1072 of the 1220 30-day recruits reporting could be accepted, however, and 2504 of the 2780 who reported from the other requisition.) (129)

96. Some space should be devoted to the attempts made to persuade 'R' recruits to volunteer for overseas service, a step which a man could take at any time. An Adjutant-General telegram of 5 Jul addressed to all District Officers Commanding stated: "Great opportunity to obtain R recruits for active service at this time when those completing four months training will otherwise be going to coast defence or other home service units" (130). The action taken locally varied and documentary evidence is incomplete. The following extracts from the war diary of No. 31 C.A. (B) T.C., Cornwall, Ontario are, however, of some interest:

3 Jun - ...At the O.C's parade in the morning Major Chambers W., the 2nd i/c in the absence of the commanding officer, Lt. Col. Larose, R., made a stirring appeal to the R.F. recruits to join the A.F. Amidst the cheers and applause of the A.F. recruits 102 members of the R.F. fell out of their ranks and formed up in front of the parade. They were attested during the morning. At the O.C's parade in the afternoon Lt. Col. Larose, R. made an appeal in French and English to the training R.F. recruits to join the A.F. Before making his appeal, he instructed the A.F. personnel to form sides of a hollow square which they did. Lt. Col. Larose stood in the centre of the fourth side. In a few, crisp words delivered both in French and English he stated the need of Canada for men and now. Sixteen men responded to his call and fell out in front of him. The total number of recruits for the day was 118 men. In the afternoon



the men had their pictures taken for the Cornwall Standard Freeholder. In the evening, the new A.F. recruits led by Capt. Crowe of the S.D.G. Highlanders and Lt. Desmarais of the Royal 22nd Regiment attended a complimentary entertainment at the Capitol Theatre... They marched to the theatre following the new guard for the next day... Music was supplied for them by the pipe band of the S.D.G. Highlanders. The enthusiasm of the new recruits (A.F.) was shown by the placards they carried...

1 Jul - Lt. Col. R. Larose...in a short address, called for men to join the Active Service, also **stating that if he could get a 100 per cent** to volunteer, he would give a long week-end from Thursday at 1700 3-7-41 until 0600 hrs. 7-7-41., asking the men to talk it over among themselves. Within a short space of time sixty-two men had volunteered....

2 Jul - ... On the morning Parade Lt. Col. R. Larose, again appealed for more recruits for Active Service and before noon that day 100 per cent had volunteered and were signed up.

Long week-end leave was granted but, on the surface, this is a poor reason for men to renounce their convictions. An interesting, but fictional, account of what may have happened in some training centres is given by Ralph Allen in his novel of Canadian Army life entitled Home-Made Banners (Toronto, 1946).

97. Less success was encountered generally and statistics supplied to the Adjutant-General showed that 64, 63, and 57 per cent of the first three quotas of 'R' recruits completed their training as such; a further 19, 14 and 18 per cent of these quotas were lost to the Navy and R.C.A.F., whose recruiting officers were permitted to visit basic training centres. The following trend was deduced: 60 per cent of 'R' recruits would remain in the Army as Members H.D., 20 per cent would volunteer for general service with the Army and the remaining 20 per cent would transfer to the R.C.A.F. or Navy (131).

98. Meanwhile, the special recruiting campaign had managed to pass its objective of 32,000. On 16 Jul Mr Ralston announced that up to 14 Jul 33,500 of the 48,000 odd applicants had been accepted (132). (During the same period the R.C.A.F. had enlisted over 12,000 and the R.C.N. about 3500.) In order to capitalize upon any remaining enthusiasm a Directorate of Army Recruiting was established within the Adjutant-General's Branch (133). Initially Lt.-Col. James Mess was employed as a civilian, as were his French-speaking Associate Director and certain other members of his staff. Although August enlistments dropped to almost half of those of July they were still close enough to the estimated 7,000 required monthly to maintain the Army's programme. Disillusion came, however, and by the first week in October the Director of Army Recruiting was willing to admit the the enlistment trend was declining (134). Something like 37,000 men were needed for the four months following the conclusion of the recruiting campaign but little better than 24,000 had been enlisted. Speaking in the House of Commons on 5 Nov the Minister of National Defence attributed this state of affairs to expansion of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the rapid growth of war industry and the difficulty of persuading many young men (and their families) that they were needed in khaki when the Canadian Corps was sitting inactive



in the United Kingdom (135). Mr Ralston might have added that by autumn many were established in occupations for the winter and unlikely to change their occupation until the warm weather returned. In any case, at its meeting of 26 Nov the Cabinet War Committee approved the use of volunteer personnel in Home Defence units and brigade groups of the 6th Division as overseas reinforcements and their replacement by further N.R.M.A. personnel (see para 84).

99. Misleading newspaper editorials, such as one appearing in The Toronto Evening Telegram of 20 Nov, attempted to demonstrate that certain sections of the country had not pulled their weight in the summer recruiting campaign. Actually, according to a statement made in the House of Commons by Hon. C.G. Power on 12 Nov, population had but little to do with the determination of the quota assigned monthly to each Military District (136). The public was further enlightened by Mr Grant Dexter, writing in The Winnipeg Free Press of 28 Nov as follows:

... The main factor is the existence in any given area of militia units. If there have been militia units in, say British Columbia, the men will be more military-minded, and recruiting should be better. Moreover, at the outbreak of war, our overseas army was created by calling militia units for active service. These are the units which require reinforcement and it is but natural that the department should seek to reinforce from the parent area. There were more militia units in some provinces than others and therefore some provinces are more highly represented overseas than others.

Only with the reorganization of the Training Centres in March 1941 had there developed a definite monthly demand for 10,000 recruits. The difference between the number of voluntary enlistments and 10,000 became the quota sought from N.R.M.A. enrolment. After December 1941, moreover, Military Districts were not given credit on their monthly quotas for the N.R.M.A. personnel who had volunteered for overseas service subsequent to enrolment (132).

100. There was the further point that a considerable number of men in British Columbia had enlisted in coast defence units: this would progressively lessen the number of men available for future enlistment, particularly when its industries—fishing, fruit farming, lumbering and shipbuilding—were booming. Even then, however, statistics bore out the fact that the provinces on both coasts and Manitoba had made a better showing in the summer recruiting campaign than Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec. The poor showing in Ontario was due partly to the growth

\*Results of the summer recruiting campaign by Military Districts were given:

Military District Headquarters	Reservoir of eligible men in District	Quota of District	Response by District
1. London	61,672	2,840	2,109
2. Toronto	170,562	6,631	7,615
3. Kingston	60,532	2,342	2,810
4. Montreal	194,430	4,367	3,454
5. Quebec	97,297	1,734	2,119
6. Halifax	57,342	2,118	2,885
7. St. John	36,649	1,478	2,477
10. Winnipeg	82,290	2,603	3,375
11. Victoria	65,998	3,105	1,900
12. Regina	87,293	2,711	3,156
13. Calgary	75,674	2,507	2,715



of war industry in that province. Saskatchewan's poor showing could be ascribed to the prevalence of so-called 'new Canadians' who were not interested in a continent from which their parents had emigrated and others who were more interested in either remaining on farms or seeking work outside the province in war industry. It was considered, by newspapers in other sections of Canada, that the reasons for Quebec's poor showing were "quite apparent".

101. Special appeals had been and still were, directed at the French-speaking portion of the population: The Montreal Daily Star of 16 Oct had headed a news story "Stirring Appeal made to French-Canadians, Brig. G. Vanier urges Quebec Mayors to encourage Enlistments" while the rival Gazette carried the caption, "Vanier Bids Canadians Volunteer Lest They Betray Men Overseas, Dominion Not Getting Enough Soldiers, He Warns, Urging Quebec Mayors To Go Home and Call Their Citizens To the Colours (138).

102. As early as 14 May General Crerar had directed the Director of Staff Duties to prepare an analytical study on "The Recruiting Problems of the Province of Quebec" (139). During June and early July this study (by Major W.W. Goforth) was sent to other directorates, the Adjutant-General and the District Officers Commanding in Montreal and Quebec for comment and the resulting opinions incorporated for action by the Minister of National Defence, after he had discussed the problem with Cabinet colleagues from the Province of Quebec (particularly Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe and Hon. C.G. Power). Misunderstanding had been fostered during the First World War by the failure to include a French-speaking battalion in the 1st Canadian Division and the subsequent "conscription" issue and had remained. Few French-speaking N.P.A.M. units had been active during the two decades of peace; there had been very few in proportion to the size of the population and even fewer technical units. Service in the last named was barred to many potential officers and men who were not bilingual and there was a popular belief that French-speaking soldiers could and would be employed only as infantrymen (140).

103. Agreement was obtained and it was left to Mr Lapointe to make the first public announcement of the new policy on 24 Sep (141). Brigadier Pope (A.C.G.S.) visited Montreal and Quebec to explain details of the plan to the respective District Officers Commanding and had an interview with Cardinal Villeneuve (26 Sep) to whom he explained the desirability of ensuring that French-speaking officers be bilingual so that their units might serve more satisfactorily with English-speaking units (142). Subsequently, civilian committees (143) were established in Military Districts 4 and 5 to assist in the work of providing sufficient French-speaking candidates for commissions and two wings of 44 C.A. (B) T.C. at St. Jerome\* were created to give sufficient

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\*On 27 Feb 42 courses got under way at St. Jérôme. Civilians were enlisted as privates (into either the Active or Reserve Army) and given four weeks accelerated basic training by bilingual instructors. If successful they became members of the Active Army and were transferred to the Cadet Wing of the same Training Centre for a further four weeks training (similar to the Pre-O.C.T.U. training in the United Kingdom). These courses had a capacity of 100 and could be made available to serving officers and other ranks suitable for officer training if it was felt that they would benefit from its bilingual aspects.



military (and bilingual) instruction for them to proceed to the Officers Training Centre at Brockville where a French-speaking wing was being organized (144). Eventually it was hoped that 30 per cent of the output from Brockville would be French-speaking\*. These officers would be required for the additional units being mobilized to correct the omission of French-speaking units from the 1940 mobilizations (see para 33), units which contained 30 to 50 per cent French-speaking personnel but no officers of their own race and the conversion of certain coast defence batteries from English-speaking to French-speaking. Further arrangements were made to provide French-speaking instructors at each of the Advanced Training Centres in or near the province of Quebec so that those who could not speak English should not be discriminated against\*\* and to increase the proportion of French instructors in the Basic Training Centres within the province of Quebec. A bilingual Junior Leaders School was established at Megantic to give three-week courses to N.C.Os.: beginning with August 1942 its intake (210 candidates) became entirely French-speaking. The situation with regard to French-speaking chaplains was reviewed and steps were taken to train more French-speaking officers for command and staff posts. More opportunities for trades training were opened in the province of Quebec. Last but not least, additional staff was engaged at N.D.H.Q. to accelerate the task commenced in August 1940 of translating instructional manuals into French: a French-speaking journalist was added to the Public Relations staff and eventually the greater number of publications became available in both languages.

104. It was hoped that this action would make army life sufficiently congenial for large numbers of 'R' recruits to volunteer for overseas service.

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\*Cardinal Villeneuve and the Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe had been among those favouring the establishment of a French-speaking Officers Training Centre but the C.G.S. and his bilingual A.C.G.S. (Brigadier M.A. Pope) considered that the mingling of the races would benefit both English and French. Lt-Col. E. Blais, who had been returned from overseas, was sent to Brockville during late August to organize a French-speaking Wing. During the summer of 1941 there had been a monthly intake of 40-50 French-speaking candidates but it had dropped to 17 for October, until special action was taken to increase it to 80. By the end of the year the desired monthly intake of 125 had been achieved.

\*\*In Quebec province itself there were Advanced Training Centres for Infantry (Rifle) at Valcartier and Farnham and Infantry (M.G.) at Three Rivers but these also catered to English-speaking recruits. Until such time as it was possible to provide French-speaking instructors, including a field officer, at the C.A.C.T.Cs. in Camp Borden, the C.A.T.Cs. and C.E.T.C. at Petawawa and the C.S.T.C. and C.O.C.T.C. at Barriefield it was realized that French-speaking recruits sent to Ontario for advanced training would have no one to listen to their complaints and problems. There is no doubt but that discrimination was practised on occasion against men who spoke French only (some men understood more English than they pretended). Other grievances turned out to be imaginary, resulting from a man's failure to understand the English language and his unsuitability on the grounds of both education and language to undertake the technical training he had been previously led to believe was possible (145).



105. Politically a new phase opened on 12 Nov when Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen announced that he had accepted the leadership of the Conservative Party. Resigning from the Senate to contest a vacancy (South York) in the House of Commons this veteran politician who had twice been Prime Minister of Canada now came out publicly for the formation of a non-party government and compulsory selective service for every phase of the nation's war effort (146). Although Mr Meighen's statement did not specifically refer to conscription, it was critical of the existing method of obtaining recruits and was issued just a few hours after the Prime Minister had re-affirmed in the House of Commons that "without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for overseas service" (147). By returning the Liberal Party to power in the general election of 1940 the Canadian people had shown themselves opposed to conscription for overseas service but, as Mr Mackenzie King went on to explain:

... So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied and how far it should be extended is a matter which the government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.

I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the principle of compulsory selective service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle. I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the house will learn as the government takes its decisions on that matter (148).

106. Although Mr King denied the truth of a newspaper story suggesting that he had told a recent Liberal Party caucus that the question of 'conscription' had been discussed with Prime Minister Churchill during his visit to the United Kingdom (20 Aug-7 Sep) it was true that this fact had been confided to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 10 Sep. According to Mr Mackenzie King, the British Prime Minister had told him that the most effective Canadian contribution would be in the field of supply and that there would be no need to introduce conscription for overseas military service.

107. On the following day, 13 Nov, prominent members of the two major parties expressed further views. While Hon Pierre Casgrain (Secretary of State) declared that the majority of the people of Canada, and the vast majority of those in Quebec, did not want compulsory military service, Hon. W. Earle Rowe (Conservative) stated that "I do not believe that to-day this government has a mandate from the people of Canada for many of the things it is doing" (149).

108. During the course of the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 2 Dec the Minister of National Defence expressed the



opinion that sufficient men could still be made available to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the dilution of the (home defence) 6th Division with N.R.M.A. personnel would release a considerable number of volunteers for overseas service. He felt, however, that Canada should be able to maintain two army corps overseas with a strength of 175,000 men: only 3 1/2 per cent of the population was in the Armed Forces as opposed to 8 per cent of that of the United Kingdom (see para 196). Mr Ralston refused, however, to give any guarantee that there would be no need for conscription for overseas service.



PART II - EXTENSION OF MANPOWER CONTROLS, 1942-1943

(1) Increased Home Defences

109. The War entered a new phase when the Japanese made surprise attacks against Hawaii, the Philippines and Hong Kong on 7 Dec 41. Hitherto Canada's war effort had centred around the training of Commonwealth aircrew for service in Europe, the creation of an unblooded military force in the United Kingdom, somewhat unfortunately referred to as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin", and the expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy into what was primarily a convoy escort force. Casualties had been small and the War seemed rather remote to those remaining at home where agricultural prices were high and expanding industry was paying high wages. Potentially, the United States would become a mighty ally but the crippling of its main battle fleet at Pearl Harbor sealed the doom of the "white" outposts in the Far East, including Hong Kong where a small Canadian force had gone to do garrison duty, and increased the possibility of Japanese raids against the west coast of North America.

110. On 15 Dec 41 the Minister of National Defence was advised that 3031 officers and 52,243 other ranks were available for defence against possible raids: these belonged to the 4th Canadian Division, corps and army troops units also destined for service with the Canadian Army Overseas, the three Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division, coast defence and anti-aircraft units, reinforcements undergoing advanced training and certain personnel on the strength of District Depots. A further 5812 officers and 60,278 other ranks were not available: these included men who had just commenced training, those at static headquarters, hospital patients, other low category personnel and members of miscellaneous details (1). Two days later (17 Dec), however, the Chiefs of Staff Committee advised the Cabinet War Committee that pressure to augment military strength on the west coast should be resisted, since Europe still was the decisive theatre of operations.

111. Assuming approval of the existing Army Programme for 1942\* the Chief of the General Staff suggested to the Minister of National Defence on 20 Dec that the 6th Division should be completed and a further four Infantry battalions mobilized for home defence (2). Territorial representation for this total of eight Infantry units had not yet been worked out but speedy mobilization of four or five French-speaking battalions would be easy, since about 30 per cent of N.R.M.A. personnel spoke that language (see para 102). General Stuart considered that men with 30-days training might be recalled as 'R' recruits and posted directly to new English-speaking Infantry units which would become, in effect, temporary Training Centres. Accommodation existing in Training Centres would be reserved for those proceeding to join the Canadian Army Overseas. A nucleus of Officers and N.C.Os. would be returned from overseas for all the new units; the remainder would be found from the Reserve units themselves and personnel serving with units already mobilized or on the staff of Training Centres.

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\*Essentially the Army Programme involved the conversion of the 4th Canadian Division into an armoured formation; the provision of a second army tank brigade, three medium artillery regiments, one reconnaissance battalion, one engineer battalion, a number of units to become Armoured Corps troops or additional corps troops and three tank transporter companies. In practice it proved desirable to utilize existing units made surplus by the conversion of the 4th Canadian Division or mobilized for the 6th Division.



112. General Stuart subsequently decided, however, that further mobilizations should be delayed until the existing Army Programme, approved only on 6 Jan 42 (see paras 75-6), had been implemented (3). To that end the Cabinet War Committee authorized the construction of six additional Basic Training Centres and two further Advanced Training Centres on 23 Jan and at the following meeting (28 Jan) approved a 50 per cent increase in training centre capacity to provide accommodation for an intake of 15,000 recruits per month (4).

113. With the whole of Malaya in Japanese hands, General Wavell's ABDA Command disintegrating and General MacArthur's troops merely prolonging a hopeless struggle in the Philippines, Prime Minister King expressed concern over Canada's west coast defences to the Cabinet War Committee on 18 Feb. It was agreed that the Chiefs of Staff should attend the next meeting.

114. On the following day (19 Feb) General Stuart advised the Minister of National Defence that, although the entrance of Japan into the conflict had materially increased the frequency and scale of possible attacks, the only additional form of attack envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff had been that by small underwater craft\*. In order to provide adequate home defences it would be necessary to complete the 6th Division, add five Infantry battalions and a number of A.A. batteries to the coast defences, maintain two battalions for internal security (Niagara area), strengthen the defences of Newfoundland and Labrador and, finally, mobilize three Infantry Brigade Groups for a 7th Division. Most of the Army's home defence requirements—2164 officers and 41,518 other ranks—could be found from N.R.M.A. personnel. However, he added:

...the increased rate of recruiting of active personnel, and the fact that I feel our wastage requirements for the Army abroad have been generously provided in our previous manpower tables in relation to the Army programme, might quite possibly make it necessary and advisable to complete our more urgent requirements from trained active reinforcements at least until it is necessary to replace them later for overseas service. (5)

115. Although the Prime Minister again accepted the Chiefs of Staff opinion that defeat of Germany was the primary object, he told the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 20 Feb that

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\*Scales of attack laid down by the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the west coast, including amendments of 23 Dec 41, were:

- (a) Bombardment by one capital ship; by two 8-inch cruisers; or by one merchant raider mounting maxim guns.
- (b) Attack by minelaying craft, submarines, small surface craft and small underwater craft.
- (c) Attack by small raiding parties, seaborne or airborne.
- (d) Light-to-medium scale bombing attack by ship-borne aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.
- (e) Slight risk of torpedo and gas attack from aircraft.



the envisaged scales of attack were not the only factor influencing the steps to be taken for home defence: popular apprehension on the west coast and the possibility of further deterioration in the strategic situation also had to be borne in mind.

116. Public alarm in British Columbia was growing to virtual frenzy, fanned by the removal of the Japanese population and the shelling of oil installations in California by a Japanese submarine (23 Feb). Finally, after considerable pressure had been placed upon the Government, both by Liberal members of Parliament from British Columbia and the Government of that province, Prime Minister King reached a decision. On 18 Mar he told the members of the Cabinet War Committee that the question of home defence had been discussed with General McNaughton (when in Ottawa) who had expressed the view that a large mobile force might be established within Pacific Command to allay public anxieties. Thereupon approval was given to the Minister of National Defence's recommendation that the 6th Division should be completed at once and three brigade groups of a 7th Division mobilized. Both Mr Macdonald and Mr Ralston pointed out, however, that the Atlantic area was still more vulnerable to enemy activity than the Pacific. Two days later (20 Mar) the Minister of National Defence was given authority to complete a 7th Division for the east coast and mobilize three infantry brigade groups for an 8th Division (6). These latter brigade groups were intended as an additional reserve.

117. By the end of 1942 home defence dispositions in Canada were as follows: the 6th Division in southern British Columbia; two brigade groups of the 8th Division stationed in northern British Columbia and the third at Valcartier (as a reserve under N.D.H.Q. control); the 7th Division in Atlantic Command as a general reserve; 10 "unallotted" Infantry battalions and one machine gun battalion on coast defence; two battalions on guard duty around Niagara; one Infantry battalion in Jamaica and four in Newfoundland (including Labrador); 25 coast batteries in Canada and 10,000 all ranks manning 93 heavy and 202 light A.A. guns in Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador; aerodrome defence companies guarding strategic airfields, and small garrisons in Bermuda, Bahamas and British Guiana (7). Even then, a good many of these units were not complete to establishment, as witness a shortage of 5000 gunners for authorized A.A. batteries and the following divisional breakdown (8):

<u>26 Dec 42</u>	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Deficiency</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
6th Division	647	11155	132	3820
7th Division	673	9683	136	6062
8th Division	352	5358	68	2355

118. The number of men employed on operational duties in Canada—3511 officers and 59,984 other ranks (including 25,424 N.R.M.A.)—was impressive, however, even though it did include 351 officers and 6753 other ranks of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade and ancillary units destined for service overseas with First Canadian Army. The above does not include the 402 officers and 6977 other ranks stationed in Newfoundland, Labrador, Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica and British Guiana. Thus there was a grand total of 3562 officers and 60,208 other ranks serving on operational duty in the North American Area. In the event



of emergency some 3731 officers and 48,174 other ranks (including 8734 N.R.M.A.) on the strength of Advanced Training Centres might be deployed in an operational role (9).

119. By this time also [end of 1942], the question of a wider utilization for N.R.M.A. personnel had been faced. As early as 23 Apr 41 the Cabinet War Committee had approved their being utilized to fill vacancies in coast defence and internal security units (see para 86). What could be done with such "Members H.D. of the Canadian Army" once these establishments had been filled had been the subject of discussion during the autumn. General Crerar had summarized the pros and cons for the Minister of National Defence in a memorandum of 29 Sep and had suggested that the problem would be less troublesome if Newfoundland and Labrador could be considered as part of Canada's home defence area or if the number of 'R' recruits enrolled monthly could be reduced or converted into volunteers (10). Again, on 6 Nov, General Crerar suggested that volunteers serving in Canada should be placed in the reinforcement stream for overseas service and replaced on home defence duties by N.R.M.A. personnel (11). Approval for this action was granted by the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Nov. The question of extending the sphere of "home defence" to cover service in Newfoundland and Labrador remained unsettled, however, though the Prime Minister told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 10 Dec that there was no reason why this area should not be extended, possibly even to include the whole hemisphere.

120. Undoubtedly such an extension of the N.R.M.A. area of service would have made it easier to implement the provisions of ABC-22 (12), (authorized 7 and 19 Dec 41, and there was much point in The Ottawa Journal's editorial of 19 Dec entitled "Could They Defend Canada in Alaska or Seattle?" Whereas the United States could send its troops into Canada to meet any emergency, Canadian units containing N.R.M.A. personnel could be employed only to "defend Canada in Canada". In a memorandum of 23 Dec the new V.C.G.S. (Maj-Gen M.A. Pope) informed Mr. H.L. Keenleyside (Assistant Under Secretary of State for Department of External Affairs and Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence) that the statements made by The Ottawa Journal had been correct: "as all units at present serving in Canada, other than the 4th Division, will progressively contain an increasing number of young men retained for service in Canada under the N.R.M. Act, the situation will become increasingly awkward" (13). In a memorandum of 20 Feb 42 addressed to the Minister of National Defence the C.G.S. pointed out that as a result of N.R.M.A. personnel being used to replace volunteers there was not a single Infantry battalion in Canada without a quota of conscripted men. The "active" battalions serving in Newfoundland and Jamaica would have to be relieved within a year and, furthermore, newly organized anti-aircraft artillery units would have to be filled with "active" gunners if they were to be moved even to Newfoundland for the defence of Gander airport (14). By this time, however, the Liberal Government was committed to holding a National Plebiscite to learn whether the people of Canada would release it from past commitments (see para 139).

121. Due to the heavy casualties sustained by the 2nd Canadian Division at Dieppe (19 Aug 42) permission was sought to withdraw 73 complete platoons from the 33 Infantry (rifle and machine gun) battalions serving in Canada and despatch them overseas as "formed" reinforcements. A total of nine platoons were taken from The Algonquin Regiment, The Lincoln and Welland



Regiment and The Prince Edward Island Highlanders which were serving in Newfoundland and the only available replacements were Members H.D. of the Canadian Army (15). On 14 Sep authority was granted by Order in Council P.C. 8347 for "home defence" soldiers to be despatched, from time to time as required, to join these three infantry battalions in Newfoundland (including Labrador)\*. Permission had been granted on 4 Sep (Order in Council P.C. 7995) to include N.R.M.A. personnel in three anti-aircraft batteries destined for duty on Annette Island (Alaska) as replacements for a unit slated for service overseas with the 2nd Canadian Corps (16).

122. Further Orders in Council permitting the despatch of N.R.M.A. personnel to Newfoundland and Labrador were: P.C. 11,159 of 8 Dec 42 providing for the reinforcement of artillery units; P.C. 11,346 of 16 Dec 42 permitting personnel on the strength of units to be despatched there; P.C. 362 of 19 Jan 43 dealing with R.C.A.M.C. personnel posted to hospitals and units; P.C. 907 of 5 Feb permitting the reinforcing of Engineer, Signals, Army Service Corps, Medical and Ordnance units; and P.C. 2003 of 12 Mar again dealt with infantry personnel. Service in Alaska was extended by Orders in Council P.C. 3238 of 20 Apr and P.C. 5011 of 18 Jun (expedition to Kiska). Order in Council P.C. 6296 of 11 Aug authorized N.R.M.A. personnel to serve with any "active" unit in Newfoundland (including Labrador), Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, British Guiana, Alaska and the United States of America; while P.C. 6901 of 31 Aug 43 permitted N.R.M.A. personnel to be sent to these locations, even if they were not on the strength of an Active Army unit. Thus N.R.M.A. soldiers became members of all Canadian Army garrisons in the North American Area.

#### (11) National Selective Service and a National Plebiscite

123. The extension of the Second World War into a conflict of global dimensions increased the popular demand for more equality of sacrifice. The new Leader of the Liberal-Conservative Party, supported most strongly in Toronto and the cities of the Pacific Coast, made National (or Coalition) Government the chief plank in his platform. Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen also committed the Conservative Party to "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war": in essence, this was generally taken to mean conscription for overseas military service (17). Even Premier J.B. MacNair of New Brunswick and certain federal Liberal Members of Parliament indicated readiness to support overseas conscription. It remained, however, for (Conservative) Premier John Bracken to carry such a resolution through the Manitoba legislature, whereas Ontario's Premier Mitchell Hepburn was content with redoubling his criticism of Prime Minister King's war policy.

124. Even though Mr Meighen's bid for parliamentary leadership was not thwarted until 9 Feb 42, when a C.C.F.

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\* Order in Council P.C. 4105 of 15 May 42 had permitted N.R.M.A. personnel to proceed on duty to the United States in connection with prisoners of war escorts. P.C. 10,300 of 3 Nov 42 provided for the inclusion of N.R.M.A. personnel in the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion which went to Fort Benning (Georgia) for training.



candidate won the South York by-election\* the Liberal Government had already decided to meet all criticism by making ready new policies. According to the Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament on 26 Jan:

The government's policy of national selective service will be extended, as generally and rapidly as may be necessary to effect the orderly and efficient employment of the men and women of Canada for the varied purposes of war. You will be advised of the means the government proposes to adopt, to effect as complete as possible a mobilization of the material resources and manpower of the country in direct furtherance of a total national effort.

My advisers believe that the magnitude and balanced nature of Canada's war effort is being obscured and impaired by controversy concerning commitments with respect to the methods of raising men for military service which were made prior to the spread of the war to all parts of the world.

The government is of the opinion that, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, the administration, subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should in this connection and irrespective of any previous commitments, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise.

My ministers accordingly will seek, from the people by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service (18).

The distinction between plebiscite and referendum was clearly drawn: electors would not be asked whether they were for or against conscription, but rather would they release the Government from engagements made before the War had spread all over the world and now allow it full freedom to use its own judgment

125. Addressing the House of Commons on 10 Feb the Minister of National Defence stated that between 173,000 and 193,000 men would be required for the Armed Forces during the

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\*Resigned as Leader of the Liberal-Conservative Party on 9 Dec 42 and was succeeded by Mr John Bracken. Mr Gordon Graydon acted as Party Leader in the House of Commons, however, until Mr Bracken was elected to Parliament in the 1945 general election.

**	<u>Enlistments to date</u>	<u>Programme for 1942</u>	<u>Prospective total enlistments up to March 31, 1943</u>
Air Force	100,000	70,000 - 80,000	170,000 - 180,000
Navy	27,000	13,000 - 13,000	40,000 - 40,000
Army	<u>295,000</u>	<u>90,000 - 100,000</u>	<u>385,000 - 395,000</u>
	422,000	173,000 - 193,000	595,000 - 615,000



coming fiscal year (1 Apr 42 to 31 Mar 43) to secure the required strengths and replace normal wastage which already was quite high. (By the end of 1941 a total of 44,458 all ranks had been discharged from the Canadian Army (Active).)

126. As early as the previous October a Labour Supply Investigation Committee, established by the Government's Committee on Labour Co-ordination, had submitted a lengthy Report. Among its findings:

The Committee was deeply impressed by the widespread failure to regard the man-power problem as a single problem. This country is engaged in a life and death struggle in which its entire resources, including its man-power, must be allocated to their most effective uses. While an individual responsible for the success of a given enterprise may be the best judge of the best uses to which labour may be put in the operations of that enterprise, he is not necessarily the best judge of whether labour should be available for this enterprise. Each man worth his salt will do everything he can to make his particular enterprise a success; but the success of this enterprise may be at the expense of another serving even more valuable national purposes.

Despite lip service to the contrary, the Committee thinks that many responsible persons are concerned primarily about the manpower supply for their own purposes and only secondarily, if at all, about the man-power available for others. This situation has produced a condition in which man-power resources are allocated on the basis of the competitive ability of various enterprises and less on the basis of national interest. Thus there is competition between the armed forces and industry, between war and non-war industries, and among industrial concerns generally. The Committee doubts that this situation results in the most effective use of the nation's man-power (20).

127. The Committee estimated that 550,000 men and 75,000 women were available for work in war industries and 2,387,500 men and 1,362,000 women for employment in non-war industries. Only 609,000 men between the ages of 17 and 40 years in August 1941 were potentially available for the Armed Forces, however, and "only if the most drastic measures [were] adopted". A continuation of existing recruiting methods would find man-power reserves in the Maritimes (49,340), Prairies (117,000) and British Columbia (40,340) barely adequate, while the reserve for Ontario (195,790) would probably be sufficient; Quebec was estimated as having 206,530 men still available. The problem therefore was to withdraw 437,000 for the Army, 132,000 for the R.C.A.F. and 40,000 for the Navy without disrupting the essential services in the less densely populated areas of Canada or over-drawing on the manpower pool in one place while leaving other pockets relatively untouched. In the Committee's opinion the required number of men could be found from: 23,000 proprietors and managers, 31,000 professional men, 18,000 in commercial occupations, 8000 in responsible and supervisory positions, 61,000 in clerical jobs, 37,000 skilled industrial workers, 70,000 intermediate skilled service workers, 61,000 semi-skilled



industrial workers, 16,000 low-skilled workers, 123,000 unskilled men, 38,000 farmers, 104,000 farm workers and 19,000 who had never worked (21).

128. When it came to recommendations the Report included the following:

The problem of providing for the man-power requirements of the armed forces and of industry necessitates considering the man-power pool as one on which both the armed forces and industry have claims, but on which neither has a necessary priority. The reason for adopting this general principle in the utilization of Canada's man-power is that both branches of the national war effort, namely, the military and the industrial, are equally vital to the success of the country's present effort. Priorities of the armed forces or of industry in particular fields may be subject to periodic revisions; but such revisions should be effected by assessing, from time to time, the relative degree of need in the armed forces and industry.

... policies be adopted which will increase the geographic, industrial and occupational mobility of workers to the end that they may be mobilized at the points of greatest need.

Where evidence in regard to particular areas indicates that workers will not move to centres of industrial activity, serious consideration should be given to the advisability of placing work in such areas in order that these reserves of labour may be more advantageously utilized.

... recognition of the acute or impending shortage of farm labour in certain parts of Quebec and Ontario, and that appropriate measures be adopted to conserve the labour force still remaining there by preventing unduly large future withdrawals.

... there should be a re-examination of the definition of "key man" as presently used in determining the essential or non-essential character of the civilian work being done by a man before he enlists or is drafted; and that this re-examination should take into account that a "key man" in a non-war industry may also be indispensable in furthering the war effort.

... there be a comprehensive study of the means of determining the allocation of man-power as between the armed forces and industry....

... in formulating any programme for large additional enlistment to the three armed services, there should be kept constantly in mind the number of men available in the various geographical regions from which it is assumed that these additional men would have to be drawn under a voluntary system of enlistment.



... employers be urged to take an active, rather than a passive, role in adding female workers to their plant force as rapidly as possible; and that immediate steps be taken to publicize the fact that large numbers of married and unmarried women will be needed in industry in the near future.

As a corollary ... it is urged also that appropriate steps be taken to popularize the idea that women, by entering industry, will make a great national contribution to the war effort.

... employers be urged to work more closely with the officials of the War Emergency Training organization. A changed attitude on the part of some employers respecting the War Emergency Training efforts would unquestionably aid in the solution of the labour supply problem.

... young men drafted into the Army, who have completed their basic military training, should not be barred from tradesman training pending their enlistment for overseas service. The high percentage of enlistments for overseas service among draftees, and the urgent need for tradesmen in the Canadian Army, emphasizes the importance of the foregoing recommendation\*.

The statement by Army officials that it is the intention of the Army to train all of the tradesmen that it requires is of great importance as indicating a possibility that the drain upon skilled workers in industry may be reduced. This programme adopted by the Army is of paramount importance, and it is recommended that it be promptly and vigorously executed, so as to reduce the necessity of drawing upon industry for the Army's tradesmen (22).

129. The British system of dealing with manpower, of which the Labour Supply Investigation Committee thought so highly, involved the conscription for service for all men between the ages of 18 and 41, subject to their being in Reserved Occupations. Reservation was by occupational groups, not 'key men', and those in a reserved Group could not volunteer for the Armed Forces without a release from the Ministry of Labour and National Service. Twice yearly the Armed Forces submitted their demands and the Ministry of Labour and National Service found the numbers agreed upon: as the manpower supply dwindled men from the younger age groups in each Reserved Occupation had to be called for military service. The highest medical categories were earmarked as potential aircrew; next in priority came the Royal Navy, followed by the Army. Women over the age of 20 (unless pregnant or caring for young children) were liable for some form of service and were encouraged to volunteer for one of the Auxiliaries to the Armed Forces, munitions work, nursing, the Women's Land Army or N.A.A.F.I.\*\* Requisitions were

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\*The increased needs of home defence coincident with the entry of Japan into the War made it necessary to permit N.R.M.A. personnel to fill tradesmen's vacancies; subsequently, they were used to replace volunteers despatched overseas.

\*\*Navy, Army and Air Force Institute.



considered as being equally for men and women, in a ratio of 4 to 5 with the responsibility left to each Service or industry to absorb them. Unemployment had ceased, except for those in transit between jobs, and an effort was being made to keep unemployables occupied. In a memorandum addressed to the Director of Staff Duties it was pointed out by Lt.-Col. W.W. Goforth of that Directorate, however, that application of such procedures to Canada would encounter the following problems:

- (a) The present Canadian voluntary system of enlistment for overseas service precludes the effective, unified controls over manpower and womanpower as exercised in U.K.
- (b) Whereas everyone in U.K. knows that he is "fighting for his life" and has visible reminders of the conflict around him, our deceptive remoteness from the present operational theatres renders Canadian public opinion unprepared, as yet, for the restrictive realities of total war.
- (c) Whereas U.K. is a compact economical unit, we hold an antithetical position, in which occupational mobility is much more difficult and expensive to accomplish (23).

130. With the above findings at its disposal the Cabinet Manpower Committee was busily engaged in drafting a plan for introducing National Selective Service. A plan was circulated and discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 4 Feb when three immediate steps were suggested: refusal to permit men eligible for military service to enter certain non-essential occupations; freezing of agricultural labour and the institution of government subsidies to control prices; placing under control a limited number of technical personnel required for war industry. A further report of the Manpower Committee was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Feb. This recommended the freezing of skilled and other workers in all essential industries and met strong opposition from Mr Ralston, who stated that voluntary recruiting for overseas service would be discouraged if industrial employment was so enhanced. The Committee agreed with Mr Ralston that any scheme of National Selective Service should cater to the requirements of the Armed Forces and that all able bodied men should be directed towards them. The Cabinet War Committee appears (24) to have approved an outline plan at its meeting of 6 Mar.

131. It was 24 Mar, however, before the Prime Minister outlined the National Selective Service programme to the House of Commons and tabled 13 Orders in Council designed to implement it. In his speech Mr Mackenzie King emphasized that:

... In order to be selective, national service does not necessarily need to be compulsory. The Army, for example, does not accept every man who offers to enlist. As a war measure, compulsion is only of value where it serves to ensure a greater total war effort (25).

National Selective Service was placed under the Department of Labour and Mr Elliott M. Little, a Canadian industrialist who had been serving as head of the Wartime Bureau of Technical



Personnel\* became its first director. Government departments represented on the National War Labour Board now were to supply representatives for a National Selective Service Advisory Board, which also would have employer and employee members.

132. According to the Prime Minister, National Selective Service would make extensive use of the facilities pertaining to the Employment Service of Canada. In each area possessing an Employment and Claims office of the Unemployment Insurance Commission there would be appointed a National Selective Service Officer. These would be advised by voluntary, unpaid citizen's committees. The mobilization of industrial manpower was to be effected through the Employment Offices, whereas the calling up of men for compulsory military training and service would continue to rest with the Department of National War Services. Since no hard and fast regulations could be devised which would not work hardship in individual cases considerable discretion was being left with the National War Service Boards in deciding appeals. Right of appeal would be enjoyed not only by employers, employees, farmers and farm labourers but also by interested government departments.

133. According to Prime Minister King, the only important reserve of unemployed employables was women and steps were being taken to attract them into industry, on a full or part time basis. Furthermore, any engineer or technician willing to transfer to work of a more essential nature could be removed from his current employment, with the right to reinstatement later. Employers who hired or released any such personnel were required to notify the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel. (This Order could be extended to certain categories of skilled workmen.)

134. The age limit for compulsory military service was extended to include all those single men and childless widowers (on 15 Jul 40) born in the years 1912 to 1921 inclusive. Hitherto, liability for military service had been confined to British subjects; now it was extended to all those resident in Canada and Registrars would make their selection over the entire group (see Appendix "B"). The sole exception was agricultural labour: farmers and farm labourers so engaged on 23 Mar 42 were "frozen" and were not to obtain other employment without the written permission of the nearest National Selective Service officer. Exceptions were open only to men who wished to enlist in the Armed Forces, those who legitimately combined off-season employment in other primary industries (lumbering, trapping, fishing etc.) and those who could not be classified as essential agricultural workers (i.e. unproductive farmers). Persons who returned to agriculture subsequent to 23 Mar, except from normal seasonal employment, would continue to be liable for military training. According to the Prime Minister:

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\*With the aid of the professional engineering societies, a Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel was established by the Department of Labour in 1941. Using the records of the National Registration of 1940 it worked under the guidance of an Advisory Board composed of representatives of the engineering, mining and chemical institutes, the universities and the Canadian Manufacturers Association. As time went on representatives were assigned to various industrial cities across Canada.



The policy of stabilizing employment in agriculture represents what, in effect, is a block allocation to agriculture of the persons best fitted for food production. It constitutes a form of large scale selection formational service which should go far to ensure the supply of man-power essential to the food production aspect of the national war effort (26).

135. In short, the basic idea behind National Selective Service was to exclude physically fit men of military age from non-essential industry and direct them into the Armed Forces, war industry or some other essential occupation. Therefore it was laid down that on and after 23 Mar 42 no physically fit man between the ages of 17 and 45 could be employed as follows:

... Bookkeepers, cashiers, stenographers, typists, clerks, office appliance operators, messengers, salesmen and sales clerks, taxicab drivers.

Any occupation in wholesale or retail trade, advertising, and real estate.

Any occupation in, or directly associated with, entertainment, recreational or personal service, including but not restricted to theatres; film agencies; motion picture companies; clubs; bowling alleys; pool rooms; sports; barbering and hairdressing; domestic service; dyeing; cleaning and pressing; laundering; hotels and lodging houses; baths; restaurants; cafes and taverns; shoe shining, guide service and funeral service.

Any occupation in the manufacture or production of:

1. Biscuits, confectionery, cocoa.
2. Bread and bakery products.
3. Aerated and mineral waters and other beverages.
4. Liquors, wines, beer.
5. Rubber products.
6. Tobacco, cigars, cigarettes.
7. Leather and fur products.
8. Textile products.
9. Furniture and upholstery.
10. Photography.
11. Printing, publishing and engraving.
12. Radios, refrigerators, washing machines, and vacuum cleaners.
13. Jewellery and watchmaking.
14. Pottery and china.
15. Soaps, and toilet preparations and articles.
16. Mattresses.
17. Musical instruments.
18. Barber and beauty shop equipment.
19. Cameras and films.
20. Sporting goods.
21. Games, toys and novelties.

Any occupation in the repair of clothing, boots and shoes, furniture and household equipment, jewellery or watches, musical instruments (27).

136. In his concluding paragraphs Prime Minister King managed to introduce the implication that willingness to serve



outweighed compulsion:

By applying the negative compulsion of restriction, where possible, in preference to the positive compulsion of allocation, the waste of man-power in unessential activities is prevented. At the same time, men and women are maintained in or directed into the form of service they prefer. It is obvious that the greater the measure of willingness that can be preserved, the more effective the service will be.

May I say, in conclusion, while the government has not hesitated to apply compulsion where compulsion will serve to increase the total war effort, the government has no desire to add unduly—which means wastefully—to governmental machinery. It is essential that at a time of war, the services of men and women should not be consumed in unnecessary tasks. It is imperative that the services of all should be directed into war-time tasks. In those aspects of our war effort in which voluntary methods are working satisfactorily, voluntary selection, including a measure of choice by the individual of the appropriate field of service, has been and will be continued. The more expensive and complicated methods of compulsion have been employed only where it is felt that compulsory selection is necessary in order to increase efficiency in the prosecution of the war. Compulsion, however, will be applied without fear or favour wherever in the opinion of the government its use will aid in the achievement of a maximum war effort (28).

137. In an editorial of 25 Mar, supporting the National Selective Service proposals, The Winnipeg Free Press did, however, inject a drop of cold water: "It may be predicted that Mr King's hope that a good part of the problem will be solved by voluntary action is likely to be disappointed, and that an ever-increasing use of compulsion will be required". Writing in the same newspaper on 27 Mar, in explanation of the extensions to the National Resources Mobilization Act, Mr Grant Dexter concluded:

In fairness to the Government and the officials who are tackling the job, it should be said that they believe the crisis in manpower to be about six months away. They will have time to work things out and gather an efficient organization together so, at least, they believe.

138. The creation of First Canadian Army on 6 Apr provided the next political ammunition. Drawing comparisons with the number of men required to keep a Canadian Corps of 100,000 in France during the First World War and the fact that there had been a wastage of 40,000 since 1939 without the Canadian Army Overseas being engaged in battle, The Vancouver Province (8 Apr) attacked the folly of "setting up a two-corps army when we have in sight little more than adequate reinforcements for one corps". That same day the Minister of National Defence denied such an implication and, according to The Toronto



Evening Telegram, told a press conference that "We gave reinforcements up to the full scale asked for by the Corps Commander (Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton)". The Globe and Mail (Toronto) carried five articles entitled "The Dagger's Point" endeavouring to disprove General McNaughton's earlier statement that "The Canadian Corps is the point of a dagger aimed at the heart of Berlin" (see para 109), however, and even newspapers supporting the Government continued critical. On 10 Apr The Ottawa Citizen suggested that a First Canadian Army could be maintained only by a selective draft. On the following day, an editorial in The Winnipeg Free Press commented that "When our army overseas gets into action and suffers losses, conscription will be necessary to fill the gaps".

139. Next came the National Plebiscite of 27 Apr to obtain an answer to the following question:

... Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service? (29)

The actual voting was preceded by a nation wide campaign. In the English-speaking provinces the Opposition parties and citizens' committees joined with Government spokesmen in urging people to vote "yes" (30). This, despite the fact that the Conservatives had charged the Government with seeking to evade its responsibilities by holding a Plebiscite and the Leader of the C.C.F. had demanded its broadening to embrace "the complete and effective conscription of war industries, accumulated wealth and financial institutions, at the same time and on the same basis of sacrifice as the suggested extension of the conscription of manpower" (31). The Social Credit supporters in the House of Commons had supported the C.C.F. position and its Government in Alberta had passed a similar resolution through its legislature (32). The leader of the Bloc Populaire had spoken out vigorously against the Plebiscite and the aged Henri Bourassa had come out of retirement to add his voice to the protest. In contrast, French-speaking members of the Cabinet had assured the electors that an affirmative vote merely would empower the Government, subject to its responsibility to Parliament, to introduce compulsory military service for overseas if, in its opinion, the need should arise.

140. The final tabulation was 2,945,514 "yes" votes and 1,643,006 in the negative (35). Roughly 64 per cent of those voting had answered in the affirmative\* and most of the opposition was from the province of Quebec (where 993,633 had voted "no" and only 376,188 recorded a "yes").

141. On 11 May the Prime Minister gave his interpretation of the Plebiscite results to the House of Commons as follows:

By their vote, the people have decisively expressed the view that the government should be released from any such obligation. In other words, there no longer remains any issue which the government or members of parliament, because of past promises or pledges are restricted from considering, discussing and deciding on its merits, in the light of what is best for Canada and for Canada's war effort....

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\* Personal reasons, such as the inactivity of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, had influenced Service voters to the extent that only 72 per cent of those voting overseas and 82 per cent of those in Canada had voted "yes".



In the plebiscite, the electors were not called upon to vote for or against the government. The result, therefore, is not to be construed as a vote for any political party. In fact, the plebiscite was selected by the government precisely because it afforded the best known means of obtaining an expression of the views of the people on a specific question, regardless of political parties, or party considerations.

As, in some quarters, an effort has been made since the plebiscite to interpret the result as a mandate for conscription for overseas service it is necessary for me to repeat that, in the plebiscite, conscription was not the issue. The government did not ask the people to say whether or not conscription for overseas service should be adopted. That was not the issue before the people. With respect to the issue of conscription, the result can only rightly be construed as leaving to the government and to parliament entire freedom to deal with that question on its merits (36).

142. Mr Mackenzie King followed this statement by the introduction of Bill No. 80\* which, by deleting Section 3 of the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 (see Appendix "A") would give the Government "the same freedom of decision and action with respect to the method of raising men for military service overseas which, in the recent plebiscite the government requested, and which the people of Canada have said they desire the government to possess" (37). In elaboration, he stated:

Section 3 contains the one remaining restriction on the government's freedom of decision and action in all aspects of Canada's war effort.

This section was included in the National Resources Mobilization Act, at the time the bill was passed, because of a commitment arising out of promises and pledges from which the government and members of parliament have now been released.

... By their vote on the plebiscite, the people have expressed their readiness to have the sole remaining restriction upon the government's freedom and decision of action removed.

The removal of section 3 of the National Resources Mobilization Act is, in other words, the logical consequence of the vote on the plebiscite. Since the people have indicated that they do not desire any restriction on the freedom of action of the government, there is the strongest of reasons why parliament should be asked to remove any shadow of restriction which remains.

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\*This decision had resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Public Works, Hon. P.J.A. Cardin, from the Government.



In the plebiscite, the people were asked to give full powers to the government, not to meet a then immediate situation, but to provide against a future emergency. The National Resources Mobilization Act is only enabling legislation. The extent of the use of such power as is conferred upon the government by its provisions is and has, from the outset, been a matter of government policy, to be decided in the light of all relevant circumstances. This will remain true of the unrestricted powers which the amendment, if enacted, would afford.

The government might have proceeded in this matter by order in council under the War Measures Act. Having regard, however, to its responsibilities to parliament, the government has felt that such action as is necessary to bring existing legislation into conformity with the will of the people expressed in the vote on the plebiscite should be taken, not by order in council under the War Measures Act, but by act of parliament. In this proceeding, the government is providing members of parliament, before any amendment to the National Resources Mobilization Act is made, with the fullest opportunity of considering the effect of every aspect of the amendment (37).

143. The Bill was given its first reading at once, as was customary, but during the debate on the second and third readings, and the intervening 'committee' stage, members of all parties took full opportunity of examining and exploring every possible aspect of the measure. Speaking during the debate on 23 Jun, the Minister of National Defence clearly stated his own position as follows:

... Speaking of men for overseas service, I stated in February that I preferred the voluntary system if it worked, and I gave my reasons: first, because it provided volunteers for a voluntary army; and second, because of the division in this country which conscription would produce. These, I think, were substantial reasons. I would always prefer to see our Canadian army overseas purely a volunteer army. But if to maintain and reinforce and strengthen it, it should become necessary to require men to serve overseas, then obviously so far as I am concerned there can be no alternative, because we cannot let the army down, and, what is even more important, we cannot let Canada down (38).

Subsequently Mr Ralston did offer to resign his portfolio because of a difference of opinion with the Prime Minister as to the procedure which would have to be followed should conscription become necessary at a later date. At the request of the Prime Minister, however, Mr Ralston "either withdrew his resignation or agreed not to press it" (39).

144. During these weeks four other events—the shelling of Estevan Point (Vancouver Island) by a Japanese submarine on 20 Jun, Japanese occupation of the Aleutians during the same month, the sinking of ships in the St. Lawrence and the controversy over the Royal Commission on the Canadian Expeditionary



Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong--were exploited by the Opposition Parties within the House of Commons in a further attempt to discredit the Government's manpower policy. These events provided plenty of political ammunition, even though they had but little bearing on the main theme. Bill 80 passed its final reading on 23 Jul by a vote of 141 to 45, with the C.C.F. members voting against it, and the Bill was then referred to the Senate where approval was obtained a week later. On 1 Aug Royal Assent was given to what became the National Resources Mobilization Act, Amendment Act 1942.

(iii) The Adoption of British Wastage Rates

145. On the assumption that, should there be a German invasion of the United Kingdom, intense fighting would not last more than a month the War Office had given Home Forces an activity rate of 11 months "inactivity" and one month "intense" when a new pamphlet was issued on Rates of Wastage of Materiel and Personnel during June 1941. General Montague decided, however, that the reasons which had prompted the adoption of arbitrary Canadian rates in August 1940 (see para 81) still persisted and that no change was necessary for the time being (40).

146. Implementation of the Army Programme for 1942 and the possibility of operations on the continent of Europe caused further consideration to be given the question of Canadian wastage rates. A C.M.H.Q. General Staff memorandum of 5 Jan 42 included a table comparing the Canadian and Home Forces rates for the coming 12 months(41):

<u>Arm</u>	<u>Canadian Percentages</u>		<u>Home Forces Percentages</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
Armd C. and Recce Regts	30	30	28 1/4	18 1/4
Armd Regts and Tank Regts	30	30	22 1/4	22 1/4
Artillery	24	24	18 1/4	13 1/4
Engineers	18	18	18 1/4	13 1/4
Signals	18	18	16 1/4	12 1/4
Infantry, rifle	30	30	28 1/4	28 1/4
Infantry, motor and M.G.	30	30	28 1/4	18 1/4
Army Service Corps*	12	12	11 1/4	11 1/4
Medical and Dental	12	12	12 1/4	12 1/4
Ordnance	12	12	11 1/4	11 1/4
Provost	12	12	14 1/4	14 1/4
All others	12	12	10 1/4	10 1/4

General McNaughton approved its recommendation that the existing somewhat higher rates (43) should be continued, since the following factors still were or had become applicable:

- (a) The distance separating Canada from the U.K., and the consequent time lag involved in shipping.
- (b) The necessity for completion of individual training of all Canadian soldiers, particularly tradesmen and specialists, owing to lack of training equipment in Canada.

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\* Had been reduced from 18 to 12 percent following adoption of a new R.A.S.C. field organization during the latter part of 1941.



- (c) The formation of larger pools for the specialist arms in relation to infantry than might be required during operations, because of the fact that mobilization of new units would require the provision of trained nuclei from the U.K. (44);

147. Notwithstanding this, however, at the direction of General McNaughton a study of the manpower (45) required for a well balanced First Canadian Army was undertaken during the late spring and early summer (see para 159). By late July General McNaughton had decided that the (British) F.F.C. estimate of wastage incurred as battle casualties during intensive operations should become the basis of providing reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas. The size of the reinforcement pool should equal four months wastage at "intense" rates and be distributed as follows:

- (a) One month's reserve trained and immediately available for shipment, to be held in Canada.
- (b) Two months' reserve to be held in England.
- (c) One month's reserve to be held as first reinforcements to accompany the army abroad and to be maintained as such in the theatre of operations, whenever personnel depots can be established (46).

The Army Commander considered that the policy of holding one month's reserve in Canada could be accepted in view of the expectation that 45 per cent of the total casualties would be returnable to duty after four months (see para 183).

148. Therefore, when the "Third Proposal—Composition of the Canadian Army Overseas" was produced on 5 Aug 42 (see para 170) reinforcement calculations followed the British figures (F.F.C. Sub 73c as amended to 21 Jul 42) for primary theatres:

	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
Armoured Car	20	10	3/4	3/4
Armoured Regts and tank regts	20	14	3/4	3/4
Artillery	15	8	4	3
Engineers, Div and Non-div	10	5	4	3
Engineers, L of C	3	3	2	2
Signals, Div	8	4	3	3
Signals, Non-div, L of C	4	4	3	2
Infantry (rifle)	20	20	6	6
Infantry (M.G.)	20	10	5	5
Infantry (Motor)	20	10	5	5
Recce	20	10	5	5
R.C.A.S.C.	3	3	2	2
R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C.	4	4	3	3
Pioneer Corps	3	3	2	2
R.C.O.C.	3	3	2	2
Provost	6	6	4	4
Any others	2	2	2	2

("No activity" was a uniform wastage rate of 3/4 per cent for both officers and other ranks.)



No separate rate being shown for headquarters, the General Staff at C.M.H.Q. selected Divisional Signals as the appropriate percentage to be applied to those of infantry and armoured brigades and divisions. Rates of wastage for C.M.H.Q. units were to be two per cent per month, plus the overall four per cent for non-effectives.

149. As early as 27 Jun 42 Lt.-Col. W.J. Megill (G.S.O. 1 (SD), C.M.H.Q.) had learned at the War Office that the existing F.F.C. rates of wastage might be revised (48) but it was 18 Dec before the Research Committee headed by Major-General J.F. Evetts submitted its findings to the Executive Committee of the Army Council (49). While certain points still required clarification or modification it was considered at C.M.H.Q. that the proposed percentages might be used for planning the completion of the Canadian Army Overseas. On 22 Dec a telegram to that effect was despatched to N.D.H.Q. (50).

150. General Evetts' Committee had recommended that any variations in the application of the three possible periods ("quiet", "normal" and "intense")\* to any theatre of operations should be met by adjusting its operational forecast, rather than establishing separate activity rates for secondary theatres and for India and Burma as heretofore. Periodically the General Staff at the War Office would prepare an operational forecast for each theatre and then obtain an annual average activity figure by calculating the number of divisional months for each of the three types of period and dividing by the number of divisions in the theatre (52). The following example was used by the Committee:

6 Divisions in the theatre.

G.S. activity forecast - 3/4 total force for 6 months Intense and 6 months Normal.

Average activity over 12 months for the whole force.

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\*F.F.C. definitions:

- "Intense" - The conditions of "battle" offensive or defensive against a first class enemy, of strength not greatly less than our own, with all forces land and air engaged. (The definition applies to a month's activity and allows for the "roulement" of reserves during the period.)
- "Normal" - Local land forces in close contact but no major engagement expected. Air action limited to close contact and periodic bombing and ground "strafing", which may be intense for short periods against specific limited objectives, e.g. ports, railheads, gun-positions.
- "Quiet" - Local land forces NOT in contact. No operations, other than minor air activity, expected. Training requirements and day to day wear and tear included in F.F.C. rate (51).



$$\frac{3/4 \times 6 \times 6}{6} = 4 \frac{1}{2} \text{ months Intense}$$

$$\frac{3/4 \times 6 \times 6}{6} = 4 \frac{1}{2} \text{ months Normal}$$

$$\frac{1/4 \times 6 \times 12}{6} = 3 \text{ months Quiet}$$

Although Canadian officers did not always appear cognizant of the fact, these War Office forecasts did not specify degrees of activity in the sequence they would necessarily occur.

151. It was 16 Apr 43, however, before the Executive Committee of the Army Council gave final consideration to the Committee's work. New casualty rates showing casualties (killed, died of wounds, wounded, prisoners of war and sick) as a monthly percentage of the war establishments and requiring replacement were approved and promulgated as F.F.C. Sub. 73D, dated May 1943 (53). As applicable to the Canadian Army these were as follows (54):

	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
1. C.A.C. (excl. Recce Regts and Armd Recce Regts)	25	14	5	4
2. R.C.A.	15	8	5	4
3. R.C.E. Field and Survey	10	5	4	3
4. R.C.E., L. of C. Transportation and Movement Control	3	3	2	2
5. R.C. Signals, Divisional and Army Tk Bde	8	4	4	3
6. R.C. Signals, Non-Divisional and L. of C.	3	3	2	2
7. Infantry (Rifle) and S.S. Bns., Corps and Army Def. Coys, Div Def and Empl Pls and Bde Def Pls.	25	20	7	6
8. Infantry (M.G.) and Sp. Bns	20	10	5	4
9. Infantry (Motor)	20	10	5	4
10. Recce Regts (incl Armd Recce Regts)	20	10	5	4
11. Parachute Bn	25	20	7	6
12. R.C.A.S.C.	5	4	4	3
13. R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C.	5	4	4	3
14. R.C.O.C.	3	3	2	2



15. C. Pro. C.	6	6	3	3
C. Pro. C.- Mil Prisons and Det. Bks	2	2	2	2
16. Pioneers	4	4	2	2

British Headquarters had the same rate as "any other units" [see below] but, as the result of agreement with N.D.H.Q. the following special rates were established at C.M.H.Q. (55):

H.Q. Units	"Intense"		"Normal"	
	<u>Offrs.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>	<u>Offrs.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
Inf Bde	25	20	7	6
Armd Bde	25	14	5	4
Inf Div (incl FS Sec)	8	4	4	3
Armd Div (incl FS Sec excl HQ Sqn)	8	4	4	3
Corps (excl Def Coy)	3	3	2	2
Army (excl Def Coy)	2	2	2	2
C.M.H.Q.	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
Misc Units in U.K.	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
Any Other Units	2	2	2	2

152. In every case, however, these "intense" and "normal" rates included, and were not additional to, the "quiet" rate [formerly "no activity"] which was 3/4 per cent for all corps. It was distinctly specified in F.F.C. Sub 73D, however, that no allowance had been made for wounded and sick returning to duty, or for any other factor which, while decreasing the total manpower required to maintain the forces, has no effect on the number of personnel to be immediately replaced in units (56).

153. (The War Office made only two minor amendments to F.F.C. Sub. 73D and only one of these affected a corps with a Canadian counterpart. As a result of further lessons from the North African campaign Amendment No. 1 of 10 Sep 43 subdivided Artillery and gave lower rates to anti-aircraft and coast units--4 and 3 per cent for "intense" and 2 and 1 1/2 per cent for "normal". N.D.H.Q. queried adherence to this lower rate since there would be no Canadian A.A. units in rear of Army and it was not until 25 Nov that acceptance was telegraphed to London.) (57)

154. Initially dead wastage had been reckoned as 55 per cent of total casualties, with the remainder recoverable within six months, and this was the figure used at C.M.H.Q. for planning purposes during the winter months. The Research Committee decided that there would be a higher proportion of recoverable wounded in future campaigns but the Executive Committee of the Army Council agreement of 16 Apr 43 that the "assessment of recoverable wounded be taken as 50 per cent of the total wounded" would seem to have been "inaccurately reported". Therefore, the D.C.I.G.S. managed to secure agreement that the proportion of recoverable wounded should be increased and the figure of dead wastage reduced from 55 to 50 per cent. This resulted in 50 per cent of all wastage, and not just wounded, being regarded as recoverable. The breakdown was as follows (59):



Killed	15 per cent
Missing and P.O.W.	15
Wounded (non-recoverable)	<u>20</u>
Total dead wastage	50
Wounded (recoverable within six months)	<u>50</u>
Total	100 per cent

155. The change from 45 to 50 per cent for recoverable casualties meant that the projections prepared at C.M.H.Q. would have to be altered. A far more serious matter, however, and one which was not appreciated for almost a year, was the fact that the War Office was not counting on all these recoverable casualties being fit to return to operational duty (see para 509).

(iv) Manpower Ceiling for the Canadian Army Overseas

156. On 18 Feb 42, Prime Minister King told the Cabinet War Committee that he wished it clearly understood that the presently authorized army programme should be recognized as comprising the maximum force which could be made available for service overseas. Stated briefly, this proposed contribution to the Field Force being planned by the British under F.F.C. 36 (see para 68) was:

- (a) Three divisions.
- (b) Two armoured divisions.
- (c) Two army tank brigades.
- (d) Corps troops for a corps of three divisions and two army tank brigades.
- (e) Corps troops for an armoured corps of two armoured divisions.
- (f) Army and G.H.Q. troops for a corps of three infantry divisions and two army tank brigades and a corps of two armoured divisions.
- (g) Some line of communication and base units (60).

Then, on 26 Feb the Cabinet War Committee rejected renewed request by the British Government for railway transportation units: the C.G.S. had advised rejection since it would involve an additional 3500 men and the railways already were short handed.

157. In reply to the Prime Minister's direct question as to whether, once the existing army programme was completed further increases would be sought apart from reinforcements, General McNaughton told the Cabinet War Committee on 6 Mar that the existing programme represented the top limit of the force which Canada could deploy and maintain in a war of long duration. While certain further ancillary units might be required, no major increases would or should be made.

158. Following General McNaughton's return to the United Kingdom a headquarters for the new First Canadian Army was established. An N.D.H.Q. telegram of 23 Mar authorized



General McNaughton to vary existing establishments by 5 per cent, or 10 per cent where they were being made to conform to new British establishments, and to establish new units on a temporary or experimental basis. The new units came to be referred to as "GSD 602 units" (after the "originator's number of the telegram") and their personnel were counted against reinforcement holdings (61).

159. Apparently the complete facts on the overseas manpower situation had never been consolidated. Therefore, when General Montague (Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.) was advised by his D.A.G. (Brigadier A.W. Beament) on 17 Jun that First Canadian Army would not be able to fight for any extended period without either "wasting" its formations or breaking up some in order to reinforce the remainder he directed that the facts should be summarized for despatch to N.D.H.Q. (62). The resultant memorandum despatched on 11 Jul by airmail\* (after General McNaughton's approval had been obtained), stressed the fact that the overseas manpower situation "appears to be definitely unsatisfactory" (63). As of 30 Jun only 8,432 officers and 138,379 other ranks actually were serving against the 9,136 officers and 148,966 other ranks required for war establishments, reinforcement quotas and an overall four per cent to offset the number of 'non-effectives\*\*' at any one time. And this did not take into account adjustments which would have to be made for the following: return to Canada of illiterates, over-age and low medical category personnel and the existing overseas shortage of specialists and tradesmen (some of whom had not completed basic training in Canada).

160. The following excerpts from General Montague's letter are self explanatory:

... It must be accepted that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Personnel must be of an appropriate physical and mental standard, and must have aptitudes for or be actually trained in the numerous trades and specialties which a modern Army requires. Furthermore, before being put into a zone which may become a battle zone, or before being treated as reinforcements, they must have completed the necessary training.

The mental standard of recent reinforcements arriving in this country makes worse, rather than improves, the situation... These considerations have led to my recent recommendation for the formation of General Pioneer Companies\*\*\* which recommendation has been approved by you. One of

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\*A copy was handed to Brigadier G.B. Chisholm who was visiting the Canadian Army Overseas. After serving as the first Director of Personnel Selection at A.H.Q. he had become a D.A.G.

\*\*Non-effectives were all those not actually available for duty on an authorized establishment or as reinforcements: e.g. those hospitalized, awaiting medical re-categorization, in detention or awaiting return to Canada.

\*\*\*No 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed in March 1942. It consisted of illiterates and others whose mental standard was considered to be too low for training as combatants. Eventually a total of six companies were formed in the United Kingdom (CMHQ Report 164).



the companies has been formed and the other is in the process of formation. In the general strength figures... these companies are treated as reinforcements and not as part of the authorized establishment.

I cannot stress too strongly the danger in permitting soldiers to be despatched as reinforcements without adequate medical inspection to ensure that they are of the proper categories. I have had occasion in the past to draw attention, in my reports on reinforcement drafts, to cases where soldiers have been despatched as category A and who have been placed directly into category E on arrival.

The conditions of present day warfare have clearly shown that soldiers must not only be fit to stand the strain, but also remain fit during protracted periods of intense activity. The necessity for resilience, to enable them to recuperate quickly during the short periods of repose, if any, which may be available in modern battle conditions, make it essential that soldiers be not only fit as to category and physical condition, but also of an age which will permit that resilience (64).

161. Personnel selection techniques had been introduced into the Canadian Army Overseas only late in 1941 and the process of 'screening' was still going on but it seemed likely that some 10,000 men would be found with too low a mental capacity to become adequately trained soldiers\*. Almost double that number were estimated as being over 35 years of age (with 8560 over 40 years of age) and therefore unsuited for service in field units. Although it had been possible to find employment at the Reinforcement Units for men with medical categories 'B-2' and 'C' it was believed that unless such men could be employed as specialists they would not continue to be satisfactory soldiers.

162. In short, the formations presently in the Order of Battle could not be maintained during "anything in the nature of continuous operations" and the situation would be aggravated, instead of improved, by further arrivals from Canada unless drastic action were taken to improve the physical and mental standards of men being despatched (65). Reference also was made to the fact that new wastage rates were being studied, in conjunction with the War Office (see paras 147-9).

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\*As a temporary measure 75 teams (one officer and two N.C.Os.) were given a one week course in personnel selection techniques and then assigned, during the winter and early spring of 1942, to eliminate misfits from Canadian Corps and Canadian Reinforcement Units. It was considered that those scoring under 50 out of a possible 211 on the 'M' Test of aptitudes could not be brought to a fair standard of training, even under special conditions, and that all those scoring less than 80 required special handling. By the time the field units had been screened there were sufficient trained Personnel Selection Officers available to carry on this work permanently at the several Reinforcement Units where "bad actors" and other undesirables had been congregated (CMHQ Report 164).



163. In his complementary telegram to the Adjutant-General of the same day (11 Jul) General McNaughton requested that, in future, reinforcements should all be under 35 years of age, medical category 'A', and sufficiently literate to reach the standard of intelligence already prescribed.\* In conclusion he stated:

As matters stand it seems probable that we still have the balance of this year to put matters right before incidence of large scale operations. This should be sufficient if the problem is tackled now (67).

164. An earlier message of 12 Jun from General McNaughton had requested information as to the total establishment that could be expected, for First Canadian Army, so that it might become the well balanced and self-contained Force he had been attempting to create (68). The British Army was experiencing manpower difficulties and was counting on the Canadians to supply their full quota of corps, army and L. of C. units\*\* for the new Field Force being planned. This telegram had been the subject of **considerable discussion by the Cabinet War Committee** on 8 Jul, and the possibility of recalling General McNaughton for consultation had been raised.

165. General Stuart's answer of 13 Jul to the effect that he was "seriously disturbed", now came, however, as something of a shock to those overseas. He wrote:

... It seems to me that it is open to a much wider and more far reaching interpretation than you may have intended. Obviously to cut down the age limit and to eliminate all categories below A makes a very much heavier demand on manpower. In fact it would call for a drastic recomputation by National Selective Service of the personnel available for Armed Service, vis-a-vis industry, agriculture, and essential civilian occupations. I am sure that you did not intend to have this four point specification put forward as decided on until there had been a necessary exploration and considered consultation...

Suggestion to restrict reinforcements to men under 35 is new and drastic and is being carefully studied in relation to its effect on the available supply of manpower. It is obvious however that the effect of adoption would be very considerable and might be serious. Especially in case of skilled tradesmen etc (70).

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\*General McNaughton suggested in July, however, that some hundreds should be re-assessed by properly qualified examiners since he wanted to "be certain that there is reality between this mark and the lowest standard that we can reasonably accept". He further observed that "there is room in certain units for a considerable number of personnel of the stolid, steady type who have sufficient intelligence to carry out the work required of them but at the same time are not sufficiently quick mentally to obtain a mark of 80 or more on the 'M' test" (66).

\*\*While General McNaughton recommended that the Canadian Army "should conform as closely as possible to War Office Unit W.Es. unless we have strong reasons to the contrary", it was his considered opinion that the new British divisional organization was a retrograde step and should not be followed. General Sir Bernard Paget, G-in-C. Designate of the Expeditionary Force, had agreed that there would be no difficulty on the divisional level in co-operating with British formations (69).



Furthermore, according to the medical standards established by Canadian Army Routine Order No 1350 of 4 Oct 41 category 'B-1' personnel could be employed in Base and L. of C. units and in certain other tasks (particularly as tradesmen) while category 'B-2' personnel were acceptable for the Canadian Forestry Corps.

166. Meeting on 15 Jul the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General should proceed to the United Kingdom to discuss manpower problems with the Army Commander. It was hoped that Generals Stuart and Letson would be able to find out:

- (a) The role which the Canadian Army will have in the proposed Expeditionary Force.
- (b) The necessity for additional units in order to permit the Army to perform its role.
- (c) The extent to which the British Army can provide rearward services (71).

167. Meanwhile, General Montague had forwarded General Stuart's telegram to the Army Commander, with an explanatory letter. Although it was possible to employ over-age and low category personnel overseas there already were enough such men serving in the United Kingdom to meet possible needs. Moreover:

... The comparison of the intelligence of the Canadian Army with the job analyses standards of the War Office indicates that we have a tendency to be very short in the middle intelligence brackets, and that in some cases we are trying to employ more low intelligence personnel than the job analyses indicate is desirable.

... the present method of producing personnel in Canada is not such as to permit an adequate supply of personnel of the proper type. If this be so, I suggest that the answer is not for us to amend our views and express willingness to accept a standard lower than that which is required, but rather for N.D.H.Q. to devise some other method of obtaining manpower which will provide the legitimate requirements of the Army Overseas (72).

The view held at C.M.H.Q. is best expressed by Brigadier Beament's memorandum of 19 Jul:

There is no doubt that the conclusions which must inevitably be drawn are of a nature greatly to embarrass the Government of Canada. I feel, however, that this is not a matter with which we can concern ourselves. We must content ourselves with pointing out the facts, indicating the result of these facts, and leaving it to the Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada to find a solution. Whether the solution will be the production of sufficient man power, and man power of sufficiently high quality to meet the present Army programme requirements, or whether it will be a reduction of their present programme to fit into the man power they can provide I can not say, but I feel that we would be doing less than our duty were we to give any false comfort by whistling



away the position we have already properly taken (73).

168. On 3 Aug the C.G.S. and General McNaughton visited the War Office and were advised by the V.C.I.G.S. that invasion of North West Europe ("ROUNDUP") would be possible in 1943 only should there be a visible crack in German morale (due to the strategic bombing offensive): in that event the question of battle reserves would have little significance and such a virtually unopposed operation could be conducted without the authorized quota of reinforcements. Thereupon Generals Stuart and McNaughton agreed that emphasis should be given to completing the units required for First Canadian Army and that the provision of the required scale of reinforcements could be left until later (74).

169. During the course of a meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, on 10 Aug the Army Commander spoke generally of the "important assignment tentatively allotted in combination with other Allied Forces" and stressed the necessity of completing the two corps army of three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades:

... any reduction from this composition would mean that the Cdn force proceeding abroad would, from necessity, be allotted a less important role and probably would be decentralized under British or other Allied cmd. This could only result in an acceptance by Canada of an inferior role in the total allied war effort, which would reflect adversely upon public opinion generally at home and abroad (75).

Further elaboration was given to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa when the C.G.S. reported on 19 Aug that for the first time General McNaughton was able to envisage First Canadian Army's prospective role—serving on the continent between British and American Armies.

170. As early as 5 Aug a "Third Proposal" for the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas had been prepared by the Planning Committee. Henceforth the corps headquarters would be interchangeable: increments for each infantry and armoured division under command would be added to the "basic corps troops". This would permit any grouping of divisions which the tactical situation might necessitate. Although the Canadian Army Overseas was still using the non-operational wastage rates concocted in August 1940 (see para 82) the Army Commander had secured approval for the Planning Committee to calculate reinforcement needs from the percentages set forth in the War Office's current F.F.C. rates, which themselves were under review (see para 149). This "Third Proposal" became the basis for future planning and therefore its manpower implications are summarized as follows (76):

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\*A Conference at C.M.H.Q. of 18 Jul had directed that plans be drawn up immediately for a well balanced force. A "First Proposal" was submitted as early as 25 Jul. Subsequently the work was formalized under a Canadian Army Planning Committee (CMHQ Report 168).



Present Fd Force W.E. (22 Jul 42)	136,746	
Approx. proposed increase to Fd Force	<u>41,345</u>	
Total Fd Force	178,091	178,091
C.M.H.Q. units W.E. (22 Jul 42)	20,032	
Approx. increase to C.M.H.Q. units (incl. B.O.W. and B.O.D.)	<u>11,797</u>	
Total C.M.H.Q. units	31,829	<u>31,829</u>
Total W.E.		209,920
Three months reinforcements in U.K. (Fd. and C.M.H.Q. units)	43,196	<u>43,196</u>
Total W.E., and reinforcements		253,116
Non-effectives, wastage, illiterates	27,624	
One month reinforcements in Canada	<u>13,762</u>	
Total	41,386	41,386
Total W.E., Reinforcements etc.		294,502
Less approx. provision (22 Jul 42)		<u>167,365</u>
Approx. net requirements (1 May 43)		127,137

Certain of the C.M.H.Q. units were slated for eventual service with the Lines of Communication of the Field Force while others would perform base functions.

171. Subsequently, the estimated number of reinforcements required for this programme was amended to read 42,646 all ranks in the United Kingdom and 13,579 in Canada (77). General McNaughton was prepared to accept a temporary reduction of reinforcement holdings: possibly two months' holdings in the United Kingdom and one month's in Canada. It would be necessary, however, to replace 2500 illiterates\* and a further 15,000 lost by normal wastage prior to 1 May 43: a further 10,112 all ranks would be required to compensate for the continuing 'non-effectives' shown against field and reinforcement units. It was further agreed that, until the commencement of active operations, the rate permitted for wastage from normal causes in the United Kingdom should be reduced from one per cent to three-quarters of one per cent (following British practice). The completion of this programme by 1 May 43 would require the monthly despatch overseas of 8,000 all ranks (3,000 in formed units and 5,000 reinforcements) for a total of 64,000 all ranks. At that time there would be a further 16,000 trained personnel available for despatch from units serving in the North American Area.

172. During a last meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army it was agreed that this programme should be initiated at once, even though General McNaughton would not be able to supply a reasonably firm statement of requirements

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\*The success in training illiterates to read and write, and to become satisfactory soldiers, is described in the Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap XVI, Appendix "B".



until the end of the year (78). General Stuart then returned to Canada, leaving the Adjutant-General to settle further details. After reporting on his trip to the Cabinet War Committee on 19 Aug the C.G.S. officially submitted these proposals on the following day:

In the light of the proposed offensive operations of the Army Overseas, it has also become necessary to review the provision of reinforcements. Up to the present, reinforcements have been provided on an arbitrary scale based upon the anti-invasion role of the Army. The rates presently in force were not predicated upon the assumption of an offensive role, and the Army Commander considers that reinforcements should be provided on the basis of

(a) In the United Kingdom

- i. Three months reinforcements for all arms and services of the Field Force calculated at "intense" rates. (Of this three months provision, one month will accompany the Field Force.)
- ii. Three months reinforcements for units remaining in the United Kingdom under CMHQ at existing rates.

(b) In Canada

One month's reinforcements for all arms and services of the Field Force at "intense" rates (79).

173. Manpower continued a vexing problem on the Cabinet War Committee's agenda during the ensuing weeks (see paras 191-199). At the meeting of 21 Oct the Minister of National Defence reported on his autumn visit to the Canadian Army Overseas: although he was considering the necessity of General McNaughton's request for additional units no commitments had been made. The impossibility of establishing a definite overseas programme before the end of 1942 had been accepted by General McNaughton as a corollary to the uncertainties of the manpower situation in Canada (see para 188) but agreement had been reached that the 'Third Proposal' of 5 Aug, as amended from time to time, should be the basis for planning and development. However, the target date was moved back from 1 May to 1 Oct 43 (80). Making use of the authority granted by telegram GSD 602, General McNaughton could form additional units on an ad hoc basis (see para 158) to train personnel as army troops but their continuance rested on the availability of manpower to reinforce the Canadian Army Overseas.

174. A further difficulty which now made itself felt was limitation of shipping. The shipping space allotted to the Canadian Army for the period ending 31 Apr 43 would suffice only to complete the authorized reinforcement pool in the United Kingdom and leave First Canadian Army without the rearward units necessary for participation in early operations as the



completely self-contained organization always envisaged by General McNaughton. Therefore, on 15 Nov the C.G.S. despatched the following telegram to General McNaughton:

1. Obviously our plans must be based on information presently available regarding governing factors of manpower and shipping to lead to a practical composition of the First Canadian Army having regard to a target date as early as possible in 1943.
11. The conclusion reached on this review (of manpower) is that we are not justified in making commitments for fresh capital in the form of new units beyond the limitations expressed in Para VI.
111. Consequently and without waiting to end of year we have to accept the conclusion that it is not feasible to plan for a composition of the first Canadian Army such that it could operate wholly independently with all Canadian Base L. of C. and Army troops which after all could seem to be envisaging the ideal.
- IV. As regards shipping....it must be accepted that there is little chance of any increase beyond the allotment now anticipated. If the rate of 5000 per month prevails throughout 1943 it will permit at most of provision of reinforcements for 1943 at battle casualty rate and transportation of units now authorized or their approximate equivalent in numbers. I would point out however that we shall accept any additional shipping space made available even if to fill it means a serious dislocation of our home defence units and formations.
- VI. Based upon above consideration I have recommended and A.G. agrees that our objective as to the strength of the First Canadian Army overseas should be limited first to presently authorized formed and forming units overseas. Second to presently authorized units designed for overseas service formed or forming in Canada. Third to personnel for establishment increase.... Fourth to units that we might be able to make available directly or by conversion from home defence formations. Fifth reinforcements at proposed new battle casualty rate. (81)

175. Following the receipt of this intelligence General McNaughton made a special trip to the War Office on 19 Nov in order to learn from the C.I.G.S. whether he considered the continuance of First Canadian Army to be worthwhile (82). In General Brooke's opinion the First Canadian Army should remain in being but consideration would have to be given to the increasing possibility of one or more divisions being detached to operate as a separate component with a British force (83). General Brooke desired to see the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade brought overseas and suggested that shipping should be easier in a few months.

176. It had already been decided to reorganize the two



armoured divisions on similar lines to those of the British but now General McNaughton was forced to the realization that British organization and establishments would have to be adopted throughout (except for a few minor variations). Only a small saving in manpower was achieved as a result of this reorganization, however, since the reduction in the number of armoured brigades (from four to two) was almost completely offset by the increased requirements for Infantry. The three surplus armoured regiments were utilized to form an ad hoc 3rd Canadian Army Tank Brigade and, following the arrival of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade from Canada, the final size of First Canadian Army was seen as three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and three army tank brigades (84).

177. General McNaughton had taken up the question of shipping space with the War Office and was able to report to the C.G.S. in a telegram of 21 Dec that plans were underway to give the Canadian Army an immediate priority for 10,000 men per month (85). Although a target date had been set for 1 Apr 43 and both the C.I.G.S. and C.-in-C., Home Forces were counting on the bulk of First Canadian Army then being available for an Expeditionary Force, there was no certainty as to when operations actually would begin (86). In view of the shortage of reinforcement holdings top priority was given, therefore, to their despatch from Canada (87).

178. Owing to uncertainty as to the future role of First Canadian Army (CMHQ Report 182 discusses this question in considerable detail) it was not possible at this time to plan in detail for the rearward units that might be required. Accordingly, it was proposed to carry through the reorganization of First Canadian Army in the following order (with effect from 11 Jan 43):

- I. The completion of the five divisions on an organization that would facilitate their employment with a British force.
- II. The completion of the two corps troops and divisional increments, also on British establishments so that they could be used individually in a British force.
- III. The provision of such army troops as would be needed for service with detached corps.
- IV. The provision of other units needed for army, L. of C., and base to the extent which Canada could supply (88).

The first three tasks could be completed with reasonable certainty but the only thing definite about rearward services was the undertaking given by War Office during December to supply up to 9,000 men per division\* for the "tail" (89). Units thus to be supplied by the British Army would mainly be anti-aircraft and heavy artillery\*, engineer and labour units. It was considered preferable to employ, in this manner, lower category British soldiers than to use the limited shipping space to send such men from Canada.

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\*The Canadian Army Overseas possessed no heavy artillery units. The British were planning to withdraw anti-aircraft artillery units from A.D.G.B. sites for service with the Field Force.



179. On 6 Jan 43 the Cabinet War Committee was asked to approve the reorganization outlined above, as well as certain changes at home. These were (90):

(a) Overseas

- (i) The organization of an Army of three Inf Divs (each of three Inf Bdes), two Armd Divs (each of an Armd Bde and an Inf Bde) and three Army Tk Bdes (each of three Army Tk Regts), together with Corps Troops, and a Canadian quota of Army and L. of C. units, within the figure mentioned in sub-para (iii) below, augmented by British troops on a scale of 9,000 per Division.
- (ii) The completion of the pool of reinforcements based upon three months overseas at the intense rate.
- (iii) This would involve the despatch of 64,000 during the first 8 months of 1943 which, taking into account normal wastage and the replacement of illiterates, would result in the completed force (including reinforcements overseas) totalling 226,500 less such battle casualties as occur in the meantime.
- (iv) On completion of the foregoing programme, the despatch abroad of 5,000 per month commencing 1 Sep 43 for the maintenance of this force, allowing for battle casualties on the scale of 6 month's intense, 3 months' normal and 3 months at the "no activity" rate.

(b) Canada

- (i) The completion of the already authorized 6, 7 and 8 Divs, Coast and A.A. units and Home War Establishments by 1 SEP 43.
- (ii) The provision in Training Centres of the necessary reinforcements to complete the requirements overseas and in Canada by 1 SEP 43.
- (iii) The provision of one month's reserve to be held in Canada for the Canadian Army overseas (available after 31 Mar 44).
- (iv) Following the provision of the requirements in sub paras (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the reduction in Training Centres of the reinforcements to a number adequate to provide an output of 6,500 per month as replacements for battle casualties for the Army overseas, and normal wastage for the Army in Canada. It will be noted that of the output, 5,000 are required for overseas. This will entail a continuing estimated intake into the Training Centre system of 8,000 per month from 1 SEP 43.
- (v) The following table is an estimate of the distribution of personnel in the Army in Canada in consequence of the above programme:-

	<u>31 Dec 42</u> (19 Dec)	<u>31 Aug 43</u>	<u>31 Mar 44</u>
In H.D. units and formations	64370	88000	88000
In H.W.Es.	73182	88000	88000
In Training, etc.	85512	79000	70500
Units still in Canada	7156	-	-
One month's reserve to be held in Canada for overseas.	-	-	<u>16500</u>
	<u>230220</u>	<u>255000</u>	<u>263000</u>



General Stuart stated that this programme should be adequate but adjustment could be made if casualties proved to be greater.

180. The Cabinet War Committee gave its approval at once. The completion of the overseas portion of this programme—the despatch of 64,000 men prior to 1 Sep 43—would permit a maximum force, including C.M.H.Q. units and reinforcements, of 226,000 all ranks. Further manipulation raised this total to 232,100\* which became the accepted 'manpower ceiling'. Within this 'ceiling' the Army Commander could form new units and alter existing establishments subject to the following limitations imposed by telegram C.G.S. 139 of 6 Mar 43:

First, confirming authority must be obtained from N.D.H.Q. as soon as establishments available; second, total strength plus 3 months' reinforcements at intense rate must come within above stated manpower ceiling; third, capital increases must be limited so that estimated reinforcement commitments for battle casualties and wastage over 12 month period subsequent 1 September 43 will not exceed monthly average of 5000.

This was complementary to telegram G.S.D. 602 of 23 Mar 42, which had authorized General McNaughton to create temporary units from reinforcement personnel, and provided for their conversion, where necessary, into C.G.S. 139 units (see para 77). It might be noted that the unfilled portion of the 'manpower ceiling' at any one time became known as the 'contingency reserve'. An additional reserve equal to four per cent of authorized establishments was to be held in the United Kingdom to offset the number of non-effectives at any one time (reduced to three per cent by C.M.H.Q. during March 1943).

181. During June the 'manpower ceiling' was raised to 233,200 all ranks in order to make provision for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion (1100 all ranks) which would be serving as part of the British 6th Airborne Division.

182. It was decided in Ottawa, however, (and communicated to Generals McNaughton and Montague in a telegram of 7 Oct 43) that members of the C.W.A.C. and male personnel not serving with units of the Canadian Army Overseas, such as Canadian Dental Corps detachments with the R.C.A.F. and personnel on loan to the British Army, should be included within the 'manpower ceiling' (93). The greatest complaint centred around the C.W.A.C. since, in the popular mind, they had been recruited to replace soldiers. British experience had shown that five (female) members of the A.T.S. (Auxiliary Territorial Service) were required to replace four soldiers and, therefore, according to those at C.M.H.Q., the Ottawa decision was unfair.\*\*\*

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\*The difference was made up largely by a decision to absorb overseas 4000 illiterates whom it had been intended to replace.

\*\*Nursing Sisters were members of the R.C.A.M.C. and, as such always had been accepted as counting against the 'manpower ceiling'.

\*\*\*During his visit overseas in July 1943 the C.G.S. expressed the opinion that the then 260 odd members of the C.W.A.C. in the United Kingdom should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling'.



183. Furthermore, back on 7 Jul 43 Colonel L.M. Chesley pointed out to the C.G.S. that the holding in Canada of one month's reinforcements for overseas, as approved by the Cabinet War Committee, no longer was included in the 'manpower ceilings'. In effect, however, this additional reserve existed in the N.R.M.A. personnel posted to operational units in Canada and available for despatch overseas if necessary. As Colonel Chesley pointed out, however:

We could not very easily keep a large group of 15,000 N.R.M.A. personnel indefinitely segregated for possible employment abroad at some future date, and I presume that the abandonment of the original intention was due to this factor (95).

v - Recruiting and National Selective Service, 1942

184. The revised 1942 Army manpower programme was based on an intake of 7,250 recruits for each of the 22 training periods, or 13,500 'A' and 'R' soldiers per month (96). Training wastage was high, and it was estimated that a monthly intake of 8,000 volunteers would be required to produce 5,000 trained reinforcements of "A" category, capable of proceeding overseas as such or as members of units destined for service with First Canadian Army. The balance would fall by the way-side as follows: 10 per cent discharged from the Basic Training Centres and a further 10 per cent with a lowered medical category absorbed into the Home War Establishment; of those continuing to Advanced Training Centres 10 per cent discharged on medical grounds and another 10 per cent absorbed into home defence operational units, as no longer acceptable for overseas service\*. Thus, only 64 per cent of those accepted from civilian life became available for overseas service.

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(cont'd from page 81)

This prompted the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. to obtain the following explanation from Brigadier Beament (D.A.G.):

... The existence of C.W.A.C. imposed a special CWAC overhead, which would not exist if soldiers were employed, thus, the number of individuals employed in London by reason of the employment of CWAC is greater than the number that would be necessary if men only were employed, the excess being the personnel required to administer and housekeep for the CWAC. This additional overhead is inherent in the nature of the Service.

It will be necessary, therefore, if CWAC are to be counted against the manpower ceiling, for a percentage to be based on the personnel which would be available to take the place of soldiers in the Order of Battle (94).

General Stuart remained determined, however, that one member of the C.W.A.C. would replace one soldier when employed within a unit.

\*The rather alarming fact was disclosed during September that the number of men actually being trained at Basic Training Centres was considerably less than the intake: only 14,784 of the 16,677 'A' recruits and 4,824 of the 5,947 'R' recruits (97).



185. Voluntary recruiting during the normally lean winter months had been stimulated by the entrance of Japan into the War. A certain amount of enthusiasm also had resulted from the trans-Canada tour of a 15-car "Army Train", visited by just over 800,000 people during the period of 3 Feb-10 May (98). The "Army Day" of the previous June (see para 94) became an "Army Week" (29 Jun-5 Jul) featuring "open house" at Training Centres and military parades by both Canadian and visiting American personnel: a good deal of advertising and publicity was contributed by private business firms (99).

186. Compulsory enrolment had dropped behind as deficiencies between the numbers called and the numbers reporting for military training increased. In June it was believed that the 6th Division could be completed by mid-July 1942 and the remainder of the home defence units by October (100). Even with the issuance of Supplementary Requisitions in July and September (and each succeeding month up to and including April 1943) and the lowering of the call up age from 21 to 20 (those born in 1920) by Orders in Council P.C. 5840 and 5841 of 7 Jul, however, insufficient men were actually enrolled (101). (In a further effort to obtain the maximum number of men from callable classes Order in Council P.C. 2229 of 23 Mar 42 had authorized District Registrars to offer free medical and dental treatment to men who otherwise would be rejected for hernia, defective teeth and other remedial conditions if they would consent to be enrolled (or enlist) in the Canadian Army later).

187. The following table gives the enlistments and enrolments during these months and should be studied with the above paragraphs in mind:

	<u>Voluntary Enlistments</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>N.R.M.A. Enrolments</u>
January	8594	1988	7331
February	6892	1591	4928
March	6792	1824	5292
April	9467	1791	6733
May	9581	2524	6385
June	9248	1649	4770

188. By mid-July the manpower situation had become a serious problem and the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General should proceed to the United Kingdom to hold personal discussions with General McNaughton (see para 166). On 17 Jul Mr Ralston told a special meeting that the time had now approached when the manpower needs of the army could be met only by curtailing non-essential industry and replacing physically fit workers elsewhere by women or men not physically fit for military service. He explained that demands were greater than originally anticipated because of the heavy wastage in training, lag in training schedules and the increased demands for home defence occasioned by the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The Minister of Munitions and Supply expressed the hope that the overall number of persons in essential war industry (910,000) would remain fairly constant while the Minister of Agriculture noted that the number of agricultural workers had decreased by 12 per cent during 1940-41 and that the present total was necessary to maintain the level of agricultural production. The Minister of National War Services pointed out that even though the age groups subject to military training had been extended to include all those single men aged 20-40 inclusive the majority now sought deferment when furnished with call-up notices. In the 35-40 age group not more than 7000-10,000 recruits could be anticipated from the 93,000 available; out of 140,000 in the age group 30-35 some 20,000-25,000 might be obtained; out of 100,000 in the 20 year group some 20,000 might be obtained



for the Army (in the face of active competition from the Navy and R.C.A.F.). In short, the numbers actually available were far less than the statistics would indicate. The Minister of Labour stated that the curtailment of non essential industry was the obvious step, but the Prime Minister decided that the problem should be referred to the Cabinet Manpower Committee for a further report.

189. At the meeting of the full Cabinet on 31 Jul it was agreed, upon the recommendation of Prime Minister King, that the Employment Service of the Unemployment Insurance Commission be transferred to the Department of Labour and strengthened in personnel so that it might handle National Selective Service. During the two or three months required for this reorganization the National War Service Boards would continue but thereafter their functions of selection and postponement would be transferred to the Employment Service (under the Director of National Selective Service) and the Boards become appellate tribunals, responsible to the Department of Justice for hearing appeals.

190. Agricultural and labour priorities divisions had been established but not until July were instructions issued for employers to hire individuals only through an Employment Office (except for agriculture and certain allied tasks) (102). The so-called "DRASTIC CONTROL OF CANADA'S MANPOWER" announced by the press for 1 Sep proved to be little more than the establishment of a schedule of labour priorities—very high, high, low or none—for industries as a whole and for certain selected firms (103). So-called labour "poaching" was to be checked by a regulation which forced both employers and employees in most trades to give seven days' notice of separation from employment. Canada was moving along the road of industrial and labour controls but, as was pointed out by The Ottawa Journal on 2 Sep, the general opinion was that there could not be a real mobilization of manpower without outright military conscription.

191. Army Manpower Memorandum No. 5 of 8 Aug was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 17 Sep, at which time the manpower requirements of the Navy, R.C.A.F. and industry also received attention. Mr Ralston emphasized that the reinforcement situation would be serious for the next few months and that it might prove necessary to withdraw "active" soldiers from Canada: no allowance had been made for casualties occurring before 1 Apr 43 but wastage during this period had been estimated as being 41,802 all ranks. Mr Elliott M. Little, Director of National Selective Service believed that there was still a substantial manpower pool (427,000 fit males) but that it would remain inaccessible unless drastic action were taken to curtail civilian employment. It was decided that Mr Little and Mr Donald Gordon, Chairman, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, should make detailed studies of the situation.

192. At the next meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 23 Sep both Mr Little and Mr Gordon submitted reports (104). Mr Little suggested that almost 50,000 men and women would be needed monthly for the Armed Forces and war industry until 30 Apr 43 and argued that the only way to obtain them was by curtailing employment in non-essential industry. In addition to the fact that the Navy, Army and R.C.A.F. were unable to fill their monthly quotas there were 100,000 unfilled jobs posted with the Employment Offices. The only untapped source of workers was women. Apart from the curtailment of non-essential industry there would have to be a more efficient utilization of the men already in uniform and in essential industry. Mr Little believed that it would be necessary to



release 11 per cent of the labour force in non-essential industry, or 27 per cent of its male labour force,\* as well as withdrawing workers from agriculture. The introduction into industry of part-time workers and the transfer of workers from one seasonal job to another were being studied (105).

193. Mr Gordon's study was based on the implications of the Little Memorandum and argued that the only way to get 50,000 more bodies per month would be by direct draft, irrespective of the dislocation caused to industry and commerce (106). Since many so-called civilian services and supplies were used both by industry and the Armed Forces, however, it would be difficult to plan their curtailment. Implementing Mr Little's programme would result in the withdrawal of practically every able-bodied man, aged 16-44, from all industries and services which could be regarded as non-essential and would leave Canada with a "Spartan-like" standard of living. The following situation was envisaged by Mr Gordon: widespread rationing (by coupon) of consumer goods; disappearance of certain goods from the market when the existing supply was exhausted; decline in the quality of goods; dislocation in supply due to production curtailment in certain areas; simplification and standardization of products; industry concentrated in those plants where manpower could most readily be made available; certain exports (newsprint, furs, rye whiskey) would be curtailed; increased domestic subsidies necessary to offset the increased costs resulting from lowered production; inequitable treatment of certain firms within an industry would be unavoidable. The administrative burden would be tremendous and industry would have to release top executives to serve as controllers. Such a system of regimentation could be made to work only if the co-operation of industry were secured and the Canadian people made to understand that drastic controls over their lives were necessary.

194. The Minister of Munitions and Supply protested that such action would create a crisis, while the Minister of Finance pointed out that the public's attitude would have to undergo changes. Two days later (25 Sep) the Cabinet instructed that National Selective Service should be empowered to make available to the Armed Forces and war industry the numbers of men required but without taking such drastic action as to dislocate the nation's economy. On 29 Sep the Cabinet agreed on the extent to which the Wartime Prices and Trade Board should exert control over civilian life and industry. For example, on 14 October the Cabinet War Committee agreed that action should be taken to curtail gold mining.

195. Following their return from the United Kingdom Mr Ralston and General Stuart were presented (on 19 Oct) with further manpower estimates by the Adjutant-General (107). Even though a definite decline had been noticeable since 29 Aug, voluntary enlistments still were adequate. Compulsory enrolment

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\*Men could be removed from subsistence and sub-marginal employment, chiefly on farms which produced only enough for a bare living or whose produce was non-essential (e.g. flower gardens), and reductions could be made in the following employments--gold mining (10,000), pulp and paper (9000), construction and maintenance (25,000), wholesale and retail trade (35,000), taxi drivers (9,000), personal services (11,000), and banking, investment insurance and real estate (15,000).



was insufficient, however, even though Order in Council P.C. 8919 of 30 Sep had made 19 year olds (born in 1923) subject to military training. In a further memorandum dated 21 Oct the Adjutant-General summarized the results of N.R.M.A. Requisitions from 20 Mar 41 (when the four months training programme commenced) to 9 Oct 42 as follows (108):

Requisitioned (including 30-day recruits recalled)		132,390
Reported	107,671	
Rejected (15.6% of number reported)	<u>16,836</u>	
Accepted (84.4% of number reported)		<u>90,835</u>
Deficiency (31.4% of number requisitioned)		41,555

According to the Adjutant-General "exactly 40,000" of the deficiency had resulted since May 1942. In addition to the fact that even Supplementary Requisitions were not producing the required number of men was the fact that the percentage of men rejected by the R.C.A.M.C. was now quite large\*.

196. Mr Ralston reiterated his worries over the reinforcement situation during the course of the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 4 Nov and urged that requisitioning of N.R.M.A. personnel should be accelerated. At the meeting of 18 Nov he read an Army memorandum which had been prepared by the Director of Requirements (Colonel J.A. deLalanne) (110). Whereas the Army planners had assumed that 159,750 men would be enlisted or enrolled into the Canadian Army between 8 Aug 42 and 30 Apr 43 to complete the Canadian Army Overseas (both establishments and reinforcements) and provide a total strength at home and abroad of 474,786 all ranks\*\* plus 4,949 members of the C.W.A.C., it now seemed likely that there would be a shortage of 30,000 men. This could be overcome only if an additional 5,000 men were obtained during each of the next six months. Any change in the situation would depend upon the speed with which National Selective Service could take over the complete administration from the Department of National War Services. During the year ending 30 Apr 44 some 90,000 men would be required to replace battle casualties and normal wastage, build up a reserve of 12,000 in Canada and provide for increases totalling 16,500. As a result of training and normal wastage, however, some 25,500 men would be returned to civilian life and decrease the net drain on manpower to approximately 64,500.

197. It was considered that total strength of the three Armed Forces on 30 Apr 43 should be 689,086 men; allowing for discharges during the three and a half years of war this would indicate that a total of 814,000 men had been enlisted or enrolled, or appointed to commissioned rank, since 1939. The cumulative total strength of the Armed Forces would have to reach 980,000 men to provide the required actual strength of

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\*The 21st N.R.M.A. Requisition of 4 Aug 42 called for 20,000 men to report during the period 14 Sep-9 Oct 42. Only 7982 men actually reported, however, and 2434 of these were rejected by the R.C.A.M.C., although passed as physically fit by civilian practitioners. Actual shortages, therefore, totalled 14,452 men (109).

\*\*Includes Nursing Sisters, R.C.A.M.C.



769,736 all ranks by 30 Apr 44. By that time cumulative enlistments and enrolments would have taken 8.7 per cent of the total population (projected actual strength would be only 6.82 per cent) as compared with 8 per cent in the United Kingdom and 7 per cent in the United States. Total enlistments and enrolments during the First World War had been 649,636\* but the population of military age had increased only by 25 per cent (against a general increase of 47 per cent) and, moreover, there had then been only 250,000 Canadians engaged in war industry whereas there now (1942) were 900,000 men and women so employed. Thus there already was almost a 30 per cent increase over 1918 in the relative numbers of those in the Armed Forces and war industry. A further, and different, complication was the fact that the availability of shipping space was limited. Therefore the following conclusions were drawn:

- (a) The present Army Programme cannot be increased.
- (b) The present manpower pool of single men, even with a generous increase of women serving in the Armed Forces, is insufficient to supply the needed men for the present Army programme.
- (c) The manpower pool must be enlarged by the introduction of the 18-year olds and married men.
- (d) Even with the above, a sufficient number of men will be difficult to obtain without a more rigid enforcement of the N.R.M.A.
- (e) Rigid economy in the use of manpower in Depots, Training Centres, and H.W.E's. must be exercised to release men for Overseas, and thus improve the reinforcement situation.
- (f) The maximum employment of civilians of non military age and category is necessary.
- (g) It is essential to formulate a policy which will preclude further capital commitments Overseas and in Canada; and while it might be the ideal to provide an Army with all the perquisites by way of Army, Corps and L. of C. Troops in order to fight independently and in any theatre of war without assistance of British or other troops, this cannot be provided for from the present apparent manpower pool and, therefore, it will be necessary to adjust the Army in such a way that it would fit into the manpower picture.
- (h) The control of the size of the Army must be so rigid that only in most extreme or urgent circumstances should requests be granted for new formations or units, or for increases in existing formations or units.

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\*This must include Canadians who enlisted in British and other Forces, since only 628,462 men served in the Canadian Forces during the First World War.



- (i) If from an operational standpoint, a new formation or unit is required, it should be restricted to a conversion of an existing formation or unit.
- (j) If conditions regarding the release of manpower from non essential industry are materially changed and in this way more manpower becomes available, or if by the exercise of greater enforcement of the N.R.M.A. additional men are found, further consideration might be given to further demands--not otherwise. On the other hand, if experience shows that the present estimates of available manpower are too optimistic, it may necessitate a downward adjustment of the present Army programme (111).

198. After reading this memorandum to the Cabinet War Committee (18 Nov) Mr Ralston went on to point out that unless units in Canada were completed with N.R.M.A. personnel it would not be possible to send sufficient "general service" men overseas. Present deficiencies in Canada, he continued, were 31 per cent of the 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions, 24 per cent in coast defence units, 19 per cent in Basic Training Centres and nine per cent in Advanced Training Centres. He argued that one of the major causes for the deficiencies was "non enforcement" against defaulters: others were the system of medical examination by local practitioners and incompleteness of the present registration which was getting so out of date that many notices could not be delivered.

199. Agreement was reached that vigorous action should be taken against defaulters and that blanket proclamations should be made, covering all those in the callable age groups who previously had escaped attention. The Army's willingness to accept a proportion of 'R' recruits in medical categories 'B-1' and 'B-2' was noted and it was agreed that henceforth the R.C.A.M.C. should conduct initial medical examinations\* It was further

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\*During the winter of 1942 the Minister of National War Services (now Maj.-Gen. L.R. LaFleche) had endeavoured to persuade the Army to enrol men for home defence with medical categories lower than "A". Seemingly, however, the issue had been closed by Mr Ralston's letter of 29 Apr that sufficient "B" and "C" category men were obtained from the training stream to meet requirements.

By autumn the manpower situation had deteriorated sufficiently for the Adjutant-General to suggest to Mr Ralston (5 Nov) that all men placed in category "B" by civilian practitioners should be recalled for examination by R.C.A.M.C. doctors. On 11 and 14 Nov 42 the Minister of National War Services was requested to include such men in forthcoming Requisitions.

Although N.D.H.Q. had wished to enrol men with medical categories "B-1" and "B-2" only until the immediate deficiency was met it proved necessary to accept it as a permanent arrangement. Henceforth, up to 15 per cent of those enrolled might be taken from those given a "B" category by R.C.A.M.C. boards. (As of 15 Dec 42 civilian medical revision boards had ceased to operate, except in isolated communities, and the whole work of medical examination devolved on the R.C.A.M.C.)

(cont'd on next page)



agreed that the existing authority to call aliens for military training should be exercised at once (see Appendix "B"). The question of conscripting married men aged 19-30 was referred to the Ministers of Labour and National War Services. Mr Ralston's other suggestion that 18-year olds should be conscripted was left unanswered.

200. That same day the Adjutant-General signed a circular letter stressing the necessity of making the very best use of the Army's manpower resources: "The goal to be aimed at is the releasing of all Active personnel, suitable for overseas service, from Home War Establishments as soon as it can be effected" but as an immediate step 25 per cent of such "A" category men were to be released from existing employment before 31 Dec (113). If necessary, such men would be sent to an appropriate Training Centre before being despatched overseas.

201. Seemingly the Government was taking appropriate action but the Director of National Selective Service did not think so and had submitted his resignation, effective 16 Nov. Mr Little stated:

As Director of National Selective Service, I find myself carrying grave responsibilities without commensurate authority. The present situation is one of ambiguous and divided authority, which has led progressively from confusion to friction and obstructionism. The result has been virtual paralysis in the organization (114).

This statement resulted in considerable editorial comment and unfavourable comparison with private business. Even though the Minister of Labour had risen from the ranks of organized labour the acting President of the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress stated that "Our organization has confidence in Mr Little but not in Mr Mitchell" (115). The President of the rival Canadian Congress of Labour placed the blame squarely on the Cabinet's lack of policy and stated in part:

Organized labour feels that Mr. Little has been trying under extremely difficult circumstances to do a good job in the field of selective service, and expressed confidence in his sincerity and ability. He has endeavoured to improve relationships between labour and management, through collective bargaining and labour-management production committees, in the interest of industrial efficiency, but he has had not had the support of other branches of government nor of more than a few employers in carrying out his plans (116).

202. Mr Little placed his own case before the public in a letter which The Financial Post (Toronto) printed in its

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(cont'd from page 87)

In practice both volunteers and N.R.M.A. call-ups came to be handled by the Army Reception Centres authorized in December 1942. The purpose of the Army Reception Centre was to replace heterogeneous establishments by one central organization in each Military District, where each recruit would be examined by groups of medical specialists and given a psychological examination by an Army Examiner; the balance of the recruiting procedures were handled by experienced personnel (112).



weekly issue of 28 Nov. He charged the Government with delays in implementing the agreed on policy of 30-31 Jul (see para 188): not until 26 Sep had an Order in Council been promulgated transferring the N.R.M.A. call-up machinery from the Department of National War Services to the Department of Labour with effect from 1 Dec 42; not until 16 Oct had the Cabinet agreed to make the new Director of Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance subordinate to him and even then such an Order in Council did not appear until 14 Nov--the week end of his resignation.

203. The crux of the whole matter seemed to be, however, that in his ultimatum of 15 Nov Mr Little had demanded that "the Director shall, under the Minister, have the exclusive management and direction of the National Selective Service Branch and shall, for that purpose, be the Deputy of the Minister" (117). Mr Little considered that, "if the government is really serious about implementing its professed desire to tackle the manpower problem, the very minimum powers which are needed by anyone selected to carry out that responsibility are at least commensurate to those of a deputy". Having been rebuffed Mr Little considered that he had no alternative but to resign. He was succeeded by Mr. Arthur James MacNamara who had been serving as both Chief Commissioner of the Unemployment Insurance Commission and Associate Deputy Minister of Labour. On 30 Nov The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix summed up the question as well as any:

Thus selective service, after six months of confusion, vacates the field so far as coordination of manpower is concerned. The four major contestants--army, munitions and supply, agriculture and essential civilian services--remain in the battle. Each of them is represented in the cabinet by a different minister.

Coordination of man-power, therefore, remains just where it was last March before Mr. Little was appointed--a problem for the government. The moral of the Little episode is that no one man can do this job. Only the government can coordinate its competing departments.

204. On 1 Dec the administration of the N.R.M.A. manpower functions passed to the Department of Labour and the National War Services Regulations were replaced: National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations dealt with the call-up of men for compulsory military service while National Selective Service Civilian Regulations were a consolidation of all the Orders in Council respecting civilian employment and the war effort (118). In order that there might be uniformity of interpretation by the several Mobilization Boards (see para 43) the Cabinet Manpower Committee gave the Department of Labour permission to circulate a series of "interpretative" letters.

205. Order in Council P.C. 11326 of 15 Dec authorized the drafting of all married men born in the years 1932-1917 inclusive but since those married after 15 Jul 40 already were classed as single men and subject to call if born in the years 1923-1902 it was not expected to add large numbers to the Canadian Army. It did show, however, as was pointed out by The Windsor Daily Star (17 Dec), that there were "virtually no single men left who are properly liable for service".

206. Although the Minister of Labour had told the Cabinet War Committee on 9 Dec that, apart from filling the



Army's needs, the manpower situation was not serious at the moment the Minister of Finance proceeded to point out that everything pointed to an acute shortage in the spring. Since there was no feeling of urgency or worry in the public mind, however, it had been considered expedient to avoid any immediate curtailment of non-essential industry. When the Deputy Minister of Labour (Dr Bryce Stewart) resigned at the end of the year he was succeeded by Mr MacNamara. Thus did the functions of Director of National Selective Service and Deputy Minister of Labour fall into the hands of one man.

(vi) The Home Front, 1943

207. Rising production during 1942 had virtually eliminated unemployment and lent credence to journalistic claims for Canada as both an "Arsenal of Democracy" and a "Granary of Democracy". From 1939 to early 1943 the numbers of persons engaged in manufacturing had increased from 658,114 to 1,241,068, with the number of women employed increasing from 144,461, to 349,535 (119). The labour which made this expanded production possible came from three sources:

- (1) A redistribution of manpower between industries, enabling employment in manufacturing firms especially to increase at the expense (relatively) of that in other occupations, and involving a large movement of workers from the farm to the city.
- (2) The absorption of practically all of the surplus of unemployed labour with which the economy was burdened in 1939.
- (3) The drawing into the labour force of large numbers of workers from classes not formerly gainfully employed, especially women (120).

The migratory trend from one province to another had been accelerated in favour of Ontario and British Columbia, with the Prairie Provinces being the principal losers. Nova Scotia gained slightly but this was more than offset by the loss in the other two Maritime Provinces. Quebec alone remained fairly constant, although supplying some labour to Ontario (121).

208. The greatest number of workers leaving one industry for another went into war production, being replaced by men and women who were entering industry for the first time. Apart from those who took advantage of wartime industrial training to learn skilled trades (see Appendix "O") the new entrants into industry predominated in the unskilled, semi-skilled, clerical and sales groups (122). War industry attracted 40 per cent of all incoming workers due to better wages, higher labour priority and consequent postponement from compulsory military training. As the pool of unemployed was dissipated, industries began to increase wages in order to tempt workers from existing jobs (123). In all non-war industries, except construction, mining and public utilities, the female substitute workers came to outnumber the males.

209. Readers will be aware that the Government had never indicated that the Armed Forces should have first priority for physically fit men and there were too many people who believed that there were other fields of endeavour just as important to the war effort. According to the Labour Survey of January 1943 there were 277,000 single men and 369,000 married men (aged 18-40) working in industries with a labour



priority\* of "A" or "B" and 115,000 single and 160,000 married men engaged in those with labour priorities "C" and "D" (124). Thus the **Director of Requirements** at N.D.H.Q. was convinced that the factor restricting the manpower pool available for the Army was not age or medical category but the requirements of war and non-war essential industries (125). The monthly enlistment of 8,000 volunteers was needed to produce 5,000 trained reinforcements for despatch overseas. Furthermore, an estimated N.R.M.A. intake of 28,500 during the first quarter of 1943 and 17,500 during the following five months would be necessary to complete units and establishments in Canada and replace physically fit G.S. soldiers who would then become available for overseas service (126).

210. As a further means of expanding the labour force the New National Selective Service Civilian Regulations (consolidated on 19 Jan 43) encouraged farmers to engage in another primary industry occupation during their seasonal lag without obtaining a permit from the nearest Employment Office (127). Moreover, they were given the special privileges, while seeking re-employment, of looking around for three months before becoming liable for compulsory military service. The first of the National Selective Service circular letters designed to help interpret the new Civilian regulations implied, however, that the onus rested with the Divisional Registrar to prove that a man was not employed in essential farm work, rather than for the man to demonstrate that he was actually an agricultural worker. Once this interpretation became known the drift from the farm to industrial work in nearby factories was accelerated and agriculture was forced to call increasingly for help from the Armed Forces in order to gather its harvests. (See Appendix "G").

211. Those officials of National Selective Service and other Government agencies interested in "controlling" the other basic industries—lumbering, fishing and mining—pressed for the same consideration but tended to ignore the fact that higher wages and better working conditions were prime reasons why men left these industries where all had not been happy in the "depressed" 1930s. Then again, many of those who had donned a uniform preferred life in the Armed Forces and there was little

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\*Representatives of the Department of Munitions and Supply, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the Department of Labour had worked out a labour priority schedule by the end of 1942 and issued an Industrial Classification Manual. Although industries might be transferred to a different category, as a result of interdepartmental agreement, the following breakdown existed during the summer of 1943:

- "A" - fuel, chemicals, aircraft lumber, shipbuilding, aircraft construction, base metals, munitions.
- "B" - logging, transportation, agriculture, processing foods, promotion of civilian health and safety, government promotion of munitions industries, etc.
- "C" - low priority but some essentiality; pulp and paper, civilian textiles, wholesale and retail services.
- "D" - no priority; non-essential production for civilian use and purely civilian enterprises.



reason why they should be forced to return to uncongenial employment when National Selective Service officials were unable to prevent existing workers from taking more attractive jobs.

212. Certain of these flaws in manpower administration had been freely admitted by Prime Minister King during the debate of 28 Jan 43 on the Speech from the Throne, when he spoke of the manpower problem as follows:

... Every country that is at war, indeed, for that matter even if it is not at war, has that problem to a greater or less degree. There certainly is no more difficult situation to handle than that of taking people out of occupations in which they have spent their lives and putting them into entirely different occupations. There is nothing more disruptive to good feeling than to be obliged, as the government is, in a time of war, to make restrictions which will prevent people carrying on the pursuits in which they have been engaged since their earliest days and to which they had hoped to devote their lives, and to tell them to do something else, to go somewhere else. There is nothing more distasteful than suddenly to be obliged to have an officer of the government go into the homes of citizens of our country and tell them that it is a part of government policy that not merely the men but in some cases the women as well in those homes must leave them in order to help in the war industries of the country or to take part in some other form of war service. This is the most difficult problem with which any country can be faced at any time, and the amazing thing to me is that we have been able to work out matters as smoothly as we have (128).

After attacking the Government's detractors, the Prime Minister continued:

Let me repeat that the government does not claim that it has been able to do everything perfectly or even as rapidly as might be desired. Perhaps I might direct the attention of hon. members to this fact, that there has not been a single phase of the war effort—I make no exception—in connection with which this government has not been charged from the very start that we are not going fast enough, that we were not getting the results that should be obtained. The very first year it was, Why didn't we have more troops overseas; why didn't we have more clothing; why didn't we have more equipment? My colleague the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) was continually taunted with not getting planes fast enough, not getting tanks, that we had no tanks and the like. So it has been all the way. Little if any account has been taken of the fact that unless there had been very careful planning at the outset, all the rest might likely have been a muddle. I claim for the present administration that we have planned carefully from the start. We have resisted the pressure to proceed at a rate which would sacrifice quality for quantity. As a result, what we have done stands in good stead for this country and for the united nations to-day (129).



213. As a result of the pending industrial changeover from the production of capital requirements to that of replacements Mr Howe indicated to the Cabinet War Committee on 5 May that about 30,000 workers would be released to other employment. Furthermore, on the previous day a first Compulsory Employment Transfer Order had been issued to move single and married men in the 19-25 age group, and certain others aged 26-40, from non-essential employment to essential industry or agriculture (130). (Should no work of higher priority be available when an individual reported to the nearest Employment Office, however, he was given a special permit to continue his previous employment on a temporary basis.)

214. A month later (4 Jun) Mr Ralston was prompted to despatch the following letter to the Minister of Labour:

There seems to be an ineradicable impression that these men must be transferred to some other industry. But it seems essential that the Army be recognized for what it is, namely an integral part of the national economy--the front line for the factories, farms, railroads, mines, etc. The system has been designed to transfer workers to the jobs where their efforts will count most, and the Army is the primary occupation for the young and strong who are released. The older men and women and the less physically fit should be the ones primarily to man the other components of the economy.

The army's needs can only be met if National Selective Service makes it clear that young men, physically fit, should go to the Army as soon as their jobs can be taken by older men or by women or by unfit men.

There is a prevailing impression that so-called key men in industry can be kept there indefinitely. I think the target should be that practically every man considered a key man can be relieved of his job by training someone else to do his work. There is nothing impossible about replacing key men if the necessity for it is recognized. There are key men in the Army as well as elsewhere and when they become casualties the Army does not stop functioning but other men are found to take their place. I am sure industry can do the same.

I know you agree with the above and I wanted to put it down in writing and ask that it be impressed on all concerned (131).

215. Mr Mitchell's reply was delayed until 22 Jun. On that date he wrote his colleagues that National Selective Service was doing its best to apportion available labour but was not being successful in convincing employers that production should taper off at the existing level, thus making additional men available for the Armed Forces. "The present difficulty", he pointed out, "is probably the fact that over 50% are being refused acceptance, and the general opinion of the public and, indeed, of our Registrars and Mobilization Boards, is that the Army is too particular" (132).

216. Whatever the reasons both enlistments and enrolments had dwindled to almost half the January figures:



	<u>Voluntary Enlistments</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>N.R.M.A. Enrolments</u>
January	10,489	1003	5834
February	7,872	761	3870
March	6,739	667	3825
April	5,462	599	3114
May	5,423	725	2835

The implications of this situation were made clear to the Minister of National Defence in a lengthy memorandum which the Adjutant-General submitted on 22 Jun (133). As the following table shows, the Army had been forced to modify successively its demands for the period 8 Aug 42 to 31 Mar 44 (see paras 190 and 195-6):

<u>Manpower Requirements</u>	<u>Gross Drain</u>	<u>Discharges to be returned to Pool</u>	<u>Net Drain</u>
Report 16 Sep 42	312,000	77,500	234,500
Report 14 Nov 42	242,000	65,000	177,000
Report 6 Jan 43	239,500	67,000	172,500
Current Plan	215,000	63,000	152,000

This reduction in requirements had been made possible by the imposition of 'manpower ceilings' for the Canadian Army overseas and in Canada (see paras 179-180 and 232). General Letson now believed that continuing demands could be met by an intake of 8000 per month, which would provide 5000 reinforcements for overseas, 1500 to make up wastage in Canada and 1500 for return to civilian life (see para 183). This was a net drain of 6500 men per month. Finally, General Letson conceded that demands could be met by a combined G.S.\* and N.R.M.A. intake of 8000 per month, by the expedient of making up the deficit between the General Service enlistments and the required 8000 by withdrawals of G.S. soldiers already serving in Canada.

217. This last had been made possible as a result of an agreement reached with National Selective Service on 19 May 43 that, beginning with July, the monthly Requisition should be approximately 8,000 per month and credit given for all such men who enlisted, since it had become accepted by this time that 80 per cent of voluntary enlistments resulted from men receiving an Order—Medical Examination or Order—Military Training (134). In a letter of 27 May the Minister of Labour had promised to instruct Divisional Registrars to bring under the Mobilization Regulations as quickly as possible all men remaining in the designated classes (135). Regarding the accompanying dispute as to whether all men aged 18-40 should be called for military service the Adjutant-General had pointed out to the Minister of National Defence that:

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\*Following the authorization of a General Service Badge for wear (except in the United Kingdom) by all other ranks who had enlisted for service anywhere (C.A.R.O. 2671 of 9 Dec 42) the term "G.S." gradually came into use to differentiate between volunteers and the new single class of N.R.M.A. soldiers.



... it is disturbing to think that such extension is largely necessitated by the failure of thousands in the presently designated classes to respond to calls, and the inability of N.S.S. to follow up effectively. The inadequacy of the enforcement machinery and the insistent demands of essential industry militate against any early correction of this inequity. (136).

218. Mr Ralston put forward this recommendation to the Cabinet War Committee at the next meeting of 24 Jun but no answer was reached. The seriousness of the manpower problem was realized, however, and the Committee agreed that the Prime Minister should discuss with Mr Mitchell the advisability of separating the post of Director of National Selective Service from that of Deputy Minister of Labour: in that way there would be a resultant strengthening of the administration of National Selective Service.

219. It became apparent at the next meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 28 Jun that the three Defence Ministers and Mr Howe were dissatisfied with the existing National Selective Service set-up and were not mollified by Mr Mitchell's suggestion that an Associate Director might be appointed to assist Mr MacNamara with National Selective Service and a certain amount of decentralization achieved by the creation of five regional directorates. No decision was reached and at the meeting of 2 Jul Mr Mitchell still voiced his opposition to separating Mr MacNamara from his two key jobs.

220. Mr MacNamara had been far from idle and on 5 Jul forwarded to the Vice Adjutant-General a proposal he wished to put before the Cabinet Manpower Committee. After suggesting that the Armed Forces get together to discuss their requirements so that "A" category men should not be enlisted for ground duty in the R.C.A.F. and that the Navy should not recruit more than its quota requirements\* Mr MacNamara advanced the following proposal:

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\*By early 1942 the cream had been skimmed off the manpower pool and it was becoming difficult for the R.C.A.F. to obtain sufficient aircrew trainees. The Army regarded men of such calibre as potential Officers or N.C.Os. and was unwilling to consider them as being of more use in aircraft. During January 1943 the Minister of National Defence for Air suggested to Mr Ralston that "washed out" aircrew candidates might be exchanged with the Army for potential aircrew then wearing khaki. The Director of National Selective Service urged that the R.C.A.F. should employ only low category personnel on ground duties. Conferences were held and an agreement was drafted whereby the Army would make available monthly 1000 potential aircrew and 500 low category men for ground duty in exchange for the R.C.A.F.'s "washed out" aircrew who were still physically fit for overseas service. Unfortunately, however, negotiations came to an end because each thought the other would get the better of the deal.

Due to the fact that most ground crew enlistments now were men who had received call-up notices for military service this was sheer waste but there was little the R.C.A.F. could do. During mid-summer Mr MacNamara brought this situation to the attention of the Cabinet Manpower Committee, however; a letter of 18 Aug from the Minister of Labour to the Prime Minister forced a solution. The result was an agreement between the R.C.A.F. and Army to institute a joint recruiting campaign during the autumn (137).



That the Home Defence Army situation be studied by a joint committee representative of National Defence and Selective Service in order to devise a plan whereby the services of men in the Home Defence Army can be made use of to aid in respect to the short labour supply in high priority industries. A plan which might be studied is briefly outlined hereunder:-

1. To convert the Home Defence Army into a Labour Corps and simply use the services of the men in Government owned or operated projects now under way or which could be readily developed such as cutting of fuel wood or operating strip process coal mines

or in the alternative

2. To give leave to men who have completed six months training provided they accept and carry out work to which they are assigned by Selective Service and providing they report in person once every sixty days to a National Service Officer and have an identification card stamped (138).

221. Commenting on this proposal, which of course did not meet with approval within the Department of National Defence, the Vice Adjutant-General noted in a letter of 6 Jul to the Director of Organization:

... This is extremely interesting, but also very dangerous from the Army standpoint. Note, please, how Mr. MacNamara is prepared to use the Army (both Active and Reserve) for his purposes because he is unable to fill his part of the bargain. His suggestion about the Home Defence Army... is intriguing and I think he does not appreciate just what he is proposing here. He certainly will have a hard time convincing our Minister that the Active Army in Canada should be used for this purpose. He might make some progress towards a still more generous outlook on leave. If, on the other hand, he proposes to use the Reserve Army, then he is suggesting that Mr. Howe's men, because the men in the Reserve are men in industry, be used in two ways at the same time (139).

222. On 12 Jul Mr MacNamara's proposals were submitted to the Clerk of the Privy Council by the Minister of Labour. Three days later the Vice Adjutant-General submitted his comments to the Minister of National Defence so that Mr Ralston could refute these proposals before the Cabinet War Committee (140). A military decision had been reached on the granting of agricultural leave for troops stationed in Canada but the Department of Labour's proposal to release men to industry following six months military training would completely dislocate the defence programme. There was no "Home Defence Army" but rather home defence soldiers in the Active Army. Continuing to attack the Department of Labour's arguments this memorandum stated that the Army was maintained in Canada:

- (1) The Direct Defence of Canada and obligations to U.S. for joint defence.



- (ii) To train and administer and service the Forces at Home and Abroad.
- (iii) To serve as a source of potential reinforcements for the Army overseas.
- (iv) To act as a strategic Reserve to be used if and when required. It must be remembered that the War in the Pacific has yet to be fought.

It is pointed out that H.D. personnel are enrolled to take the place of G.S. men released from Units in Canada to join the Army Overseas, (after further training where necessary). It must be remembered that the governing factor is that we must produce 5,000 G.S. men for the boat every month. Enlistments are going down and N.R.M.A. men are needed to replace G.S. men who are overseas. The provision of G.S. men in this matter imposes severe administrative burdens and training delays. (G.S. men in many cases have to be retrained to suit the Corps they are reinforcing and the N.R.M.A. men have to be trained to replace them.)

Men rejected on application for enlistment, certain men discharged for medical reasons and men rejected on call-ups would supply material from which a Labour Corps could be built and these men are all available now to National Selective Service. The Fuel Wood Administrator estimates that he could use 10,000 men cutting fuel wood—it should not be difficult to find 10,000 men from these sources (141).

To make matters worse, the nasty suspicion was beginning to grow that a considerable number of the 100,000 "A" category "general service" personnel serving in the North American Area were available as reinforcements only on paper, and, as a result of injuries or illness since original enlistment, would be placed in lower medical categories on re-examination (142).

223. An Ontario provincial election was in the Offing and the new Dominion leader of the Conservative Party (Mr John Bracken) was adding fuel to the fire. Speaking in Toronto on 2 Jul he had challenged the Liberal Government "to abandon its negative, partisan policy with regard to manpower" and adopt a "rational system of compulsory selective service for the farms, factories and armed forces". The Ottawa Journal (3 Jul) further reported:

He [Bracken] expressed criticism of the home defence army, cost of which he estimated at \$150,000,000 a year and said that in the face of labour shortage "the men are out of agriculture, out of the war and out of everything but the public treasury".

"It is my judgement that this home draftee army is not only an injustice to the men who are in it but it is the biggest hoax ever perpetrated on the nation."

He added: "I am not referring to the reserve army, which is a voluntary service. I am referring to the home army, composed of large



numbers of young men who are under no duty or legal obligation to serve outside Canada".

He said Canadians were asking: "Why is this double standard of military service being maintained? Why is this army not being made available for the tasks of the farm and the factory and the mine, if it is not to be used where the fighting must be done?".

224. Disagreement over the extension of the age groups for compulsory military service continued throughout the Cabinet War Committee's meeting of 14 Jul. Apparently the arrival in Ottawa on Saturday 17 Jul of the members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence after a two week tour of defence installations on the west coast of Canada and in Alaska resulted in a solution being found. Both the American and Canadian members were convinced that there had been an over-insurance against the dangers of Japanese attack on the mainland and that the scale of home defences now could be reduced (143). The report prepared by the Canadian members for the Prime Minister was "toned down" before being submitted at the end of the month but the following conclusion obviously must have been made known to Mr King at this time:

It is recognized that the stationing of approximately two divisions of the Canadian Army in British Columbia was necessitated only in part by strictly military considerations; that it was also motivated by the necessity of meeting the demands of public opinion in the area. Civilian morale in British Columbia has been greatly improved in recent months, and in the view of the Canadian members of the Board there is not any present or prospective military necessity for maintaining two divisions in defensive dispositions in the British Columbia area (144).

225. On the following Wednesday (21 Jul) the Cabinet War Committee decided that the Chiefs of Staff should re-examine the manpower required by the Armed Forces for the defence of Canada in the light of the changed strategical situation, bearing in mind the shortages of manpower for other needs. The Cabinet War Committee compromised on the other points of contention. The Ministers of Labour and National Defence were instructed to work out a method of organizing and employing a "works" battalion (see Appendix "G"). Order in Council P.C. 5708 of 9 Aug extended the liability for military service to youths born in 1925 (upon attaining the age of 18 years and six months) and married men born in the years 1913 to 1925. Order in Council P.C. 6387 of 10 Aug authorized a reorganization of National Selective Service. An Administration Board was established under the chairmanship of the Director of National Selective Service, with Associate Directors placed in charge of each of the following divisions (145):

Mobilization  
Labour Priorities  
Essential Civilian Services  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries  
War and Heavy Industry, including Mining  
Coal Mining and Transportation  
Employment of Women



Employment Service  
Industrial Mobilization Survey\*

Along with representatives of other Government departments or agencies, labour and industry they became members of a National Selective Service Advisory Board. A certain amount of decentralization was obtained by appointing Directors for each of the five Employment Regions. They, in turn, became members of Regional Selective Service Advisory Boards.

226. On 13 Aug The Ottawa Journal had the following rather pungent editorial comments to make, however:

Judging from what Mr. Mitchell has said, the reorganization smacks more of political expediency than practical change. It is evidence that the whip of public indignation has stung. But in a practical sense the most important feature of what Labour Minister Mitchell calls the "MacNamara plan" is the admission that the reorganization which followed Mr. E.M. Little's departure was a mistake. The emphasis which the Minister of Labour's announcement places on decentralization and the creation of regional controls can mean nothing else. From what the Minister was able to describe, it means a return to something akin to the original plan.

As National Selective Service was first organized, decentralization in the administration of policy and enforcement of regulations was its very core. Ottawa was to have been simply the co-ordinating and policy-making instrument. In this respect it was based on the British plan, and on British experience. That plan was submitted last August, and, although the Minister later professed to have never seen it, it was rejected by the Unemployment Commissioner, then and still in charge of the local offices.

When Mr. MacNamara took over the direction of Selective Service decentralization stopped. He followed a reverse procedure, with everything being drawn under centralized control of the Labour Department, until even the name National Selective Service itself had virtually disappeared. That it could not work was soon apparent. That it has not worked is tragically plain. That it will function any better after reorganization is asking a lot of a little. And nowhere is there any indication that the Government has yet screwed up its courage to make it work.

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\*On 17 Dec 42 representatives of the Department of National Defence, Department of Labour, Department of Munitions and Supply and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board had discussed the organization of Industrial Mobilization Survey Committees to study the possibility of withdrawing workers from essential industries for service in the Armed Forces with the least possible disturbance to production. After a trial survey had been conducted in the Toronto area steps were taken to establish committees in five of the 13 Administrative Divisions (London, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal and Quebec) to investigate the possibility of replacing physically fit men of military age by women or unfit men. Such surveys were subject to review every



227. Human nature is often able to defeat the purpose of regulations and this was a case in point. Employers neither wished to see their plants disorganized nor production taper off and thus often closed their eyes to the fact that 'key' employees were not always complying with either the Mobilization or Civilian Regulations of National Selective Service (147). Thus the Sixth Compulsory Employment Transfer Order of 25 Aug was a definite attempt to "get tough" with both industry and labour. Irrespective of whether they were married or single or covered by the Mobilization Regulations men between the ages of 16 and 40 inclusive in a lengthy list of employments had to register with an Employment Office and be available for transfer to higher priority work (148). A report on the transfer of labour under the first six Compulsory Employment Transfer Orders noted that (up to 14 Sep) a total of 75,878 men had been interviewed, 11,109 had been transferred to more essential industry, 11,722 had been given permits to return to their old jobs indefinitely, while 43,359 were given temporary permission to return to their old jobs; of the remainder 8,086 cases still were under review, 498 had joined the Armed Forces and 1060 had ceased employment. This report concluded:

The number of persons granted permits to return to previous employment appears, at first sight, to be very high in proportion to those transferred, but an attempt has been made where possible not to cause too great hardship to either employer or employee. Married men and single men supporting dependents are not directed to employment involving a change of residence, and married men are not compelled to accept a lower rate of remuneration. Moreover, although an attempt is made to persuade men who have been discharged from the Armed Forces to accept employment in high priority industries, they are not compelled to do so. Finally preferential treatment is given to certain key men in establishments subject to the transfer orders.... (149)

228. With the official adoption of the "PULHEMS" system of medical examination\* on 1 Oct 43 it was possible to

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(cont'd from page 99)

six months and any change in a worker's status was to be checked. By 31 Mar 44 there were 2,203 industrial plants operating on such surveys all across Canada and the number had increased to 4,335 (employing 826,333 male and 299,527 female workers) by VE-Day (146).

\*The new system showed the physical, mental and emotional capabilities of an individual as:

P. Physique - This included development, height and weight, his potential capacity to acquire physical stamina with training. It was his capacity for work. Under "P" was included the Cardio-Vascular System, Respiratory System, Digestive System, Neurological System (Organic), Integumentary System.

U. Upper Extremities - Functional use of hands, arms, shoulder girdle and upper spine.

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employ more adequately the personnel already serving within the Canadian Army. For example, men with flat feet could be employed in an operational area in many tasks which did not involve marching. With the introduction of the PULHEMS system a number of these could be graded fit for service in an operational theatre: drivers now could have a category as low as 3333321 (1 and 2 had become the same under the "S" factor). The pamphlet Physical Standards and Instructions - 1943 set forth the ages and PULHEMS profiles acceptable for overseas service. (Canadian Army Routine Order 4011 of 19 Jan 44 further stipulated that only in very exceptional circumstances should a soldier be despatched overseas after attaining his 44th birthday and that generally speaking the maximum age for despatch should be a year less than that specified for the particular employment.) It was decided at this time that the upper age limit for enlistment or enrolment should be the 38th birthday and that the minimum acceptable PULHEMS profile should be "2222222". As Mr Ralston pointed out in a letter of 20 Oct to the Minister of Labour it was not desired, however, to remove men aged 38 from the callable classes as it might later be necessary to raise the age limit again (150). As a result, therefore, Divisional Registrars merely were advised to discontinue sending call-up notices to men who already had passed their 38th birthday (151). It had been the practice to discharge N.R.M.A. soldiers when their medical categories fell below "B-1" but not to discharge volunteers if their services could be utilized unless they became totally unfit (category "E") (152). Men with a profile lower than 2222222 could be enlisted for service, as tradesmen in Canada, but only on the authority of a District Officer Commanding.

229. It was at this time also (25 Sep) that the R.C.A.F. and Army were able to resolve their earlier differences (see para 219) and agree upon a joint recruiting programme for the balance of the year 1943 (153). It was subsequently agreed that the much smaller needs of the Navy could be met also, since recruiting publicity would feature the "Fighting Services" and not build up one at the expense of the others (154). An Army representative would be attached to R.C.A.F. recruiting centres and vice-versa: the R.C.A.F. would enlist no ground personnel with an overseas medical profile; the Army would refer all prospective recruits interested in flying to the R.C.A.F., if physically fit for aircrew; the R.C.A.F. would permit the voluntary transfer to the Army of all non-flying personnel with a satisfactory PULHEMS profile; the Army would permit men to transfer to the R.C.A.F. if suitable for aircrew

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(cont'd from page 100)

- L. Lower Extremities - Functional use of feet, legs, pelvis and lower spine.
- H. Ears and Hearing.
- E. Eyes and Eyesight.
- M. Mental capacity - Intelligence.
- S. Stability - Emotional.

There were give grades under each factor, each grade being indicated by a number. A grade 1 under all factors indicated that a man was fit for duty in any theatre of operations but a grade 2 showed that his functional capabilities might be limited if subjected to prolonged stress in very difficult circumstances. A grade 3 indicated fitness on a job that did not call for excessive

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or for ground duties if their medical profile was too low for overseas military service (155). Not until 7 Feb 44, however, was the overall picture regularized by Order in Council. Then, on 24 Feb the Air Member for Air Personnel had to advise the Adjutant-General that curtailment of enlistments in the R.C.A.F. no longer made it necessary to participate in a joint recruiting programme (156).

230. Even a casual glance at the following statistics is convincing evidence that the Army's needs had not been met by enlistments and enrolments during the latter part of 1943:

	<u>Enlistments</u>	<u>Transfers from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>N.R.M.A. Enrolment</u>
June	4495	451	2549
July	3920	433	2430
August	4069	446	2079
September	4321	392	1862
October	3794	419	2028
November	3682	370	2211
December	2375	295	1634

What did ease the situation is discussed in the following section.

vii - Reduction of the Army in Canada, 1943

231. Following the Cabinet War Committee's approval of a Canadian Army Programme for 1943 (see para 179) steps were taken in Ottawa to study the extent to which the tentative 'manpower ceiling' suggested for the Army in Canada could be formalized by reductions in both the home war establishments and operational troops (157). In a memorandum addressed to the Minister of National Defence on 28 Mar 43 the Chief of the General Staff proposed reductions in both but explained that it would be impossible to create a 'ceiling' for the reinforcement training stream and the disposal wings of District Depots due to the variable nature of their intake and output (158). The actual strength of the Army in Canada on the previous day had been:

	Officers	Active	Other Ranks	
			N.R.M.A.	Total
Operational units	3840	35441	37113	72554
Home War Establishments	8341	62302	5588	67890
Reinforcements	4795	67548	21646	89194
C.W.A.C.	<u>327</u>	<u>9232</u>	-	<u>9232</u>
Total	17303	174523	64347	238870

In addition, there were 461 officers and 7592 other ranks (6472 G.S. and 1120 N.R.M.A.) serving elsewhere in the North American Area.

(cont'd from page 101)

or prolonged strain and where living conditions were favourable. Grade 4 indicated, as a rule, that an individual was fit for duties of a light and sedentary nature (home base profile). Grade 5 showed a man as being unfit for any kind of army duty.



232. Not until 7 May, however, was the Chief of the General Staff able to recommend that the number of operational troops serving throughout the North American Area could be reduced to 77,000 all ranks after 1 Sep 43 (159). After this date the Home War Establishment should not exceed 92,500 of whom not more than 80,000 could be soldiers (6194 would have to be civilians and the balance members of C.W.A.C.). This latter reduction would be achieved by paring 10 per cent from all establishments except those of the Veterans Guard of Canada and the permanent establishment of Training Centres. (Physically fit G.S. personnel could be withdrawn in greater numbers in order to complete the Canadian Army Overseas by 1 Sep 43.) As the Chief of the General Staff was careful to point out to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 13 May, however, it was really only a "paper" cut since the existing establishments were nothing near their authorized strength.

233. On 15 May General Stuart placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee a plan whereby the number of Infantry units engaged on operational duties in the North American Area might be reduced from 44 to 35 rifle battalions and from three to one machine gun battalions (160). He further recommended that No. 1 Garrison Battalion (composed of personnel who were "slow learners" or somewhat unstable) stationed at Niagara should be disbanded. The final recommendation submitted to the Cabinet War Committee and approved on 18 Jun called for the Despatch of three battalions overseas as "formed units" of reinforcements (so that they did not count against the overseas 'manpower ceiling'), the disbandment of six which would still have a "first" battalion on active service and the conversion of the others to airfield defence battalions (absorbing the independent companies hitherto employed as such)\*. Although the disbandment of these units would not do much to conserve manpower (except on paper, General Stuart pointed out that it would permit certain continuing units to be strengthened.

234. In practice, it had also been decided within N.D.H.Q. to eliminate from the 'manpower ceiling' the one month's reserve of reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas to be available in Canada after 31 Mar 44 (see para 182). Again, this was only a paper cut, although there is evidence to support the view that those at N.D.H.Q. considered that an equivalent number of N.R.M.A. soldiers could be made available should the contingency arise (162).

235. During April orders had been issued for the withdrawal of 600 G.S. soldiers from units in each of Atlantic and Pacific Commands for despatch overseas as reinforcements and an N.D.H.Q. telegram of 3 May had authorized the withdrawal of the remaining G.S. personnel suitable for overseas service from all Infantry battalions, except for a cadre of 80 men per unit. Although complying with this order Maj.-Gen. G.R. Pearkes (G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command) replied on 9 May that the failure to replace successive withdrawals was causing him "increased concern" since it was becoming difficult to meet commitments (163). (Infantry units were considerably below establishment and N.R.M.A.

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\*While agreeing that the Canadian garrison of Newfoundland might be decreased to two battalions of Infantry due to the improved strategical picture and the possibility of the American garrison being reduced, the United States War Department was insistent that, should it ever become necessary to increase the island's garrison, the Canadians would have to restore at least their original force before the United States commitment would be increased. Implementation was somewhat delayed (161).



personnel later had to be transferred from other brigades to the units selected for the expedition to Kiska.) Due to the change back from three to four rifle companies per battalion in the Canadian Army Overseas it proved necessary on 27 May to authorize a further withdrawal of infantrymen from units and establishments in Canada.

236. An A.G. Branch circular letter of 1 Jul instructed District Officers Commanding to put into effect the manpower reductions suggested by Brigadier R.G. Whitelaw's Committee on Reorganization of Home War Establishments (appointed 8 Mar 43) pending its Report and the issue of revised establishments (164). Surplus personnel were to be despatched overseas as reinforcements for their own corps if medically fit, employed in another corps or discharged to civilian life if no suitable employment was available in Canada. Representatives of the Directorate of Organization found, however, that misinterpretation of instructions in certain Military Districts had resulted in surplus men being retained, while some officers were unable to envisage having to work with drastically curtailed staffs. First withdrawals from the H.W.E. in M.D. No. 10 had produced approximately 174 men, of whom 83 were fully trained soldiers. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the Officer Commanding C.I.T.C. (A-15) at Shilo reported that he had received 70 applications for agricultural leave since the order decreasing establishments had become common knowledge (165).

237. The task of working out the further reductions consequent upon the decision taken by the Cabinet War Committee on 21 Jul that home defences should be reduced (see para 224) fell on Colonel J.H. Jenkins (Director of Military Operations and Plans and second Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence). In addition to curtailing the number of operational units in Canada Colonel Jenkins considered that the size and number of coast defence and A.A. units\* could be decreased (166). Approval had to await the return of the Chief of the General Staff from Europe and the conclusion of the "QUADRANT" Conference at Quebec (167). Furthermore, "in view of the obligations of Canada to co-operate with the United States in joint defence" it was considered desirable to obtain the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any reductions were authorized (168).

238. When Colonel Jenkins' memoranda were given approval by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 27 Aug General Stuart stressed the point that these reductions were "to be considered as a basic cut and that additional reductions would be considered from time to time in the light of the then current situation" (169). Establishments for operational troops (all ranks) were shown as follows:

	<u>Previously authorized</u>	<u>Reductions already made</u>	<u>Reductions under these proposals</u>	<u>Remaining operational troops</u>
Coast Defence	8,150	—	1,491	6,659
A.A. Defences	13,050	—	2,655	10,395
Other Ops Tps	<u>65,215</u>	<u>15,565</u>	<u>16,727</u>	<u>32,923</u>
	86,415	15,565	20,873	49,977

\*For example, he recommended that anti-aircraft artillery units should be withdrawn from Sault Ste Marie, Quebec City and Ile Maligne (Shipshaw power development).



239. When the proposals came before the Cabinet War Committee on 31 Aug General Stuart pointed out that the recommended "paper" decrease of 20,000 all ranks would mean an actual decrease of only 14,000 since the operational units were under strength\* "A" category G.S. soldiers would be made available for overseas service and their places taken in continuing home defence units by N.R.M.A. soldiers. Lower category personnel who could not be absorbed in continuing units would be returned to civilian life and the civilian labour force. In his submission to the Minister of National Defence on the previous day General Stuart had included the following warning:

The reductions proposed are of such magnitude that in my opinion it is necessary for the Government to be prepared to expect a major call on the machinery it has set up to give rehabilitation assistance to those returning to civil life.

I submit also that the Army in Canada when reduced by these and subsequent reductions should not be called upon to provide men whenever and wherever a manpower shortage exists elsewhere. In other words, I ask that the Army in Canada be regarded as an "essential industry". (171)

240. The recommendations approved by the Cabinet War Committee called for the disbandment of the 7th Division and the retention of merely one training brigade group on the East Coast to give a further four weeks advanced [i.e. unit] training to reinforcements before they proceeded overseas. On the West Coast, however, General Stuart considered that it would be necessary to retain a strategic reserve:

- (a) As a trained force for future offensive commitments in the Pacific Theatre of operations.
- (b) As a potential source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army overseas.
- (c) To meet any unexpected deterioration in the situation.

As a result of the favourable impression made by the Kiska Force on United States military and naval authorities, it is likely that Canada would be invited to co-operate with United States forces in further operations against the Japanese in the North Pacific Area. We would be placed in a difficult position if we were obliged to refuse because of lack of trained troops and it must be borne in mind that if present units were disbanded it would take from six to eight months to organize and train new units for such operations. It might reasonably be expected that Canada would be asked to contribute at least two tactical groups for a larger operation and it would be necessary to have a third such group trained and available

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\*The net reduction in strength of G.S. personnel serving in operational units in Canada between 8 Sep and 10 Nov 43 was only 4,198 other ranks and the V.C.G.S. advised the Adjutant-General on 1 Dec that only 25 per cent of these had been transferred to the reinforcement stream (170).



for reinforcement purposes. It must be remembered that the main sea and land forces of Japan are not as yet contained in specific theatres by comparable forces of the United Nations. As long as this condition remains we must retain the means to meet a possible deterioration in the Pacific. (172)

Therefore, three infantry brigade groups of four battalions each (equivalent to regimental combat teams) on the American tactical model were retained, along with a certain number of divisional troops as a continuing 6th Division. The 8th Division as such, including its 21st Brigade at Valcertier, was disbanded. Counting infantry units on coast defence duties there would still be 16 battalions in Pacific Command\* and nine in Atlantic Command when the reorganization was completed.

241. The timing of the public announcement was unfortunate: in addition to receiving a certain amount of unfavourable newspaper comment in Canada a very unfavourable impression was created by isolationist and anti-British newspapers in the United States, where Congress was debating a bill to conscript fathers and news of the setback at Salerno had just been made public (173).

242. Strangely enough, at this time senior Army officers considered that substantially all the N.R.M.A. personnel of the 13th Brigade presently in Kiska would volunteer for "general service" should further operations be undertaken in the Northern Pacific. Prime Minister King was not interested in this supposition, however, and had cautioned the members of the Cabinet War Committee at its second meeting of 31 Aug that substantial manpower commitments should not be made in Pacific Command merely to meet possible American requests for co-operation. Canada would find herself committed beyond her capacity should she invite requests of this kind. While agreeing generally with this proposition the Minister of National Defence pointed out that Canada would be expected to participate in the continuing war against Japan, which would necessitate the retention of trained soldiers on the west coast.

243. The disposal of over-age and low category personnel might be dealt with first since in most cases they were to leave the Army completely. In what was really a first step towards demobilization. In the case of the G.S. soldier return to civilian life might involve personal economic hardship and, in any event would give the general public the false impression that the Army no longer was interested in recruiting men for overseas service (174). For surplus Officers and N.C.Os. who had not reached retirement age there was, as yet, no way by which they could be retired or discharged and still receive rehabilitation benefits. Furthermore, they would then become liable for compulsory military service as privates if they were within the prescribed age group. Before the end of the year, however, arrangements were made with National Selective Service whereby officers and other ranks released from the Army would be called for compulsory military service only after a written request had been made by the Divisional Registrar to the D.O.C.'s Representative (175).

244. Five Officers Survey and Classification Boards were established to replace the existing Officers Selection, Promotion, Reclassification and Disposal Board in screening the

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\*One French-speaking battalion was retained for each of the 13th and 14th Brigades and two for the 15th Brigade.



18,694 officers serving in Canada and adjacent territories (176). Some 9,292 were presumed to be of an age and category acceptable for overseas service, even though they might have reached a rank not acceptable by the Canadian Army Overseas which had consented, however, to take one captain for every eight reinforcement lieutenants (177). In practice a number of officers already had dropped a rank in order to obtain overseas service. The Board working the Maritime Provinces found, for example, that better than 80 per cent of the officers serving with coast defence units were of an age and category acceptable for overseas service: in one location where morale was particularly low 97 officers had requested interviews in an effort to obtain an overseas posting (178).

245. In addition to the 5000 odd officers surplus to establishments there was the problem of dealing with the accumulated surplus of reinforcement officers. The sudden discovery early in August that there then were "sufficient potential officers under appraisal or in production and in reinforcement stream to provide estimated surplus by end of Apr 1944" had led to the drastic curtailment of such training (CMHQ Report 156 and AHQ Report 37). The loan of junior officers to the British Army had been discussed by the Adjutant-General whilst visiting the United Kingdom during October but it was not until the following March (1944) that the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval. The loan of 1500 officers was authorized but the maximum volunteers obtainable fell far short of that number and only 673 eventually saw service on the "Canloan" scheme (CMHQ Report 145).

246. The first step towards disposing of the "other ranks" surplus had been taken as early as 22 Jul 43 (179). The Adjutant-General's Branch had despatched a circular letter to all Districts and Commands stressing the urgency of withdrawing 10,000 trained soldiers, in addition to the number already being withdrawn each month for despatch overseas, in an effort to complete the Canadian Army Overseas to its authorized 'ceiling' by 1 Sep. Amended instructions issued on 17 Sep directed that category A-1 men waiting despatch overseas should be remustered to new corps, if necessary, to meet the following ratio: 47 per cent Infantry, 41 per cent Canadian Armoured Corps and the balance for Reconnaissance units of the latter. Men with medical category "A-2" were to be remustered to the R.C.A.M.C. (180). Where necessary conversion training was to be undertaken in eastern Canada. Due to the overall shortage of skilled personnel overseas, however, tradesmen would proceed in their original corps. In order that men who had earned promotion in Canada might proceed overseas as reinforcements without having to revert to the status of private soldier an arrangement was accepted by C.M.H.Q. whereby the following proportions might be despatched (181):

W.O. II	to 500 privates
S/Sgt	to 300 privates
Sgt	to 200 privates
Cpl	to 30 privates.

Only after the concurrence of C.M.H.Q. in each instance, however, could a Warrant Officer Class I be despatched overseas. Effective 1 Dec further difficulties were placed in the way of promotions for warrant and non commissioned officers in order to lessen the advantages of remaining in Canada.

247. On 10 Nov a further quota of tradesmen, specialists and general duty other ranks was sought: Military Districts which could not complete their quotas of tradesmen or specialists would make up the balance with general duty soldiers suitable for service with infantry or Armoured units. N.R.M.A.



personnel were to be trained to take the places of tradesmen despatched overseas but this would take time (182). There was the additional fact that many of the G.S. soldiers withdrawn from the Home War Establishment had never completed advanced, or even basic, training and would require varying amounts of instruction before being acceptable as reinforcements. Thereafter, remustering became a continuous programme and new grist was provided for the mill by the disbandment of the Airfield Defence Battalion on the west coast and further cuts in coast defence units.

248. Mention should also be made of the saving in manpower which had resulted from the introduction of the "Link" training plan during August. Under this scheme all men destined as reinforcements for the same corps proceeded from District Depot to a common Training Centre and continued to serve with the same group during the whole of their training. Stated simply:

- (a) Certain Basic Training Centres will be linked to specific Corps Training Centres. The corps concerned are C.A.C. (less Recce), Inf and R.C.A.M.C.
- (b) In the case of other Corps—C.A.C. (Recce), R.C.A., R.C.E., R.C. Sigs, R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C. and C. Pro C., it will be possible to carry out both basic and corps training in the respective Corps Training Centres. (183)

As a result of the introduction of this consolidated training organization it was possible to close 11 Training Centres and reduce the number of companies in a further 11 Basic Training Centres. Canadian Army Routine Order 3862 of 1 Dec decreed that henceforth all voluntary enlistments would be into a General Service Corps: this would enable training quotas for the several corps to be adjusted more quickly to meet changing needs.



PART III - PREPARING FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS

(1) Completing the Canadian Army Overseas

249. The adoption of British establishments and organization in January 1943 necessitated considerable changes within First Canadian Army. Two Infantry battalions had to be obtained from Canada to permit the reorganization of the two armoured divisions. Three armoured regiments made surplus (in practice those of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade sent over from Canada) were disbanded and their personnel counted as reinforcements. Both continuing Army Tank Brigades were reorganized into armoured brigades (minus the motor battalion), to facilitate possible interchange or replacement of the single armoured brigade remaining in each armoured division. The reduction of the number of rifle companies in an Infantry battalion from four to three was short lived (largely as a result of the personal intervention of Prime Minister Churchill) but the work of restoration was delayed by the shortage of reinforcements in the Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units (C.M.H.Q. Report 168). Although these had been depleted by the need to replace the casualties incurred at Dieppe (see para 121) and to despatch the 1st Canadian Infantry Division to the Mediterranean (see para 347), it must be remembered that the adoption of British rates of wastage (see paras 147-152) now made necessary the provision of a larger Infantry reinforcement pool. Effective 1 Feb 43, the Infantry Reinforcement Units had been reorganized on a territorial basis (C.M.H.Q. Report 133): personnel now belonged to a Canadian Infantry Corps (General Order 466 of 3 Dec 42) and could be posted to any unit of any division if necessary, although territorial affiliations, at least, would be maintained as far as possible (1). Therefore, on 7 May Brigadier R.B. Gibson (D.C.G.S. (A)) who was overseas on a liaison visit from N.D.H.Q. was induced to send back a personal telegram to the Chief of the General Staff urging that the provision of Infantry reinforcements should be given the highest priority and that all suitable men undergoing basic training for the next two months (unless earmarked for C.A.C. or R.C.A.M.C.) should be diverted to that Corps (2). In a further effort to ensure that the pool of Infantry reinforcements should be complete by 1 Sep 43, when the Canadian Army Overseas was supposed to reach its 'manpower ceiling', permission was sought and obtained for the despatch overseas as "formed reinforcements" of The Lincoln and Welland Regiment and The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, the only two Infantry units which did not contain N.R.M.A. personnel (because they had been on garrison duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica) (3). Subsequently The New Brunswick Rangers arrived overseas, also earmarked as reinforcements. There being no need for a further battalion of "lorried" Infantry, Les Voltigeurs de Québec was removed from the First Canadian Army order of battle in an effort to reduce by half the shortage of 2282 French-speaking Infantry reinforcements. Lesser changes were made in the other Arms and Services of First Canadian Army. Due to the depletion of "timber stands" in Scotland 10 of the 30 Canadian Forestry Corps companies were returned to Canada, minus those of their personnel who were of an age and medical category fit for service in the Field Force (C.M.H.Q. Report 117). This resulted in the 'manpower ceiling' being reduced to 232,736 all ranks. It was late autumn, however, before all these steps had been completed.

250. As General Stuart had taken care to point out to the Adjutant-General in a memorandum of 8 Apr 43, there were two plans:



... First, there is the plan to complete the Army as a whole and its reinforcement pools. Secondly, and of equal importance, we must ensure that the portions of the Army which may be operationally employed between now and the date of completion of the whole Army are fully provided and reinforced.

While the normal shortage return might tell us that we need 10,000 Infantry by 1 Sep, it may be a matter of high priority to supply say 3,000 Infantry reinforcements by a date which will fit in with the operational employment of a portion of the Army overseas prior to 1 Sep (4).

251. For some time it had been realized that the existing men overseas were not always being employed to the best advantage, even though personnel selection officers had removed the more obvious cases of square pegs from round holes. A "job analysis" had been worked out for the British Army so that if any unit was found to have a higher proportion of "high grade personnel" than was required to make it efficient the surplus was transferable to units which were short. When such standards were applied to Canadian units without modification, however, they showed too large a proportion of both high and low calibre personnel. Moreover, there was still an overall deficiency of tradesmen and specialists in the Canadian Army Overseas (5).

252. A survey had indicated that nearly 35,000 men would be found to be more than 35 years of age or possessing a medical category lower than "A": unlikely in either instance to be able to withstand the rigours of operational service (16). Since First Canadian Army was biased in favour of fighting formations, there were fewer places to put over-age, low category or illiterate personnel than in the British Army which, because of manpower and shipping limitations was committed to provide a proportion of the "tail" for First Canadian Army (see para 178). By early March 1943 Personnel Selection Officers, working under C.M.H.Q. direction, had recommended the transfer of better than 1300 other ranks to the General Pioneer Companies\* (1130 actually had been transferred), 383 young "A" category men from the Canadian Forestry Corps (187 transferred to combatant duties) and 457 men who were not suitably employed within the 5th Canadian Armoured Division (7). The solution envisaged by Brigadier A.W. Beament (D.A.G., C.M.H.Q.) was compulsory posting and transfer of men under the following headings:

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\*Towards the end of March 1942. No. 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed to absorb approximately 100 illiterates and men with a low mental standard who were unable to absorb the training necessary to produce efficient fighting soldiers. Over-age and low category officers and N.C.Os. were selected to administer and "mother" these men who had been "kicked around" and made to feel they were not wanted by their original units. The project was so successful that the formation of a second company was authorized on 2 Jun 42. Three further companies were authorized in November 1942 and in the following April an increment was added to Headquarters, C.R.U., to administer the five companies. A sixth company was added in May 1943. It should be noted that these men had a low "M" factor; whereas the men employed later in Special Employment Companies had been given a low "S" rating (C.M.H.Q. Report 164).



- (a) The withdrawal from units of surplus tradesmen and military specialists in cases where overall shortages exist in such trades and specialties.
- (b) The withdrawal of a proportion of personnel of superior intelligence from those units which have marked excesses of personnel of this calibre, and the withdrawal from units of personnel whose civilian background fits them for trades or specialties in which they are not at present employed, and the training of such personnel in the trades and specialties for which their natural ability or civilian background fits them (8).

253. General McNaughton gave his approval to this recommendation and issued a directive on 6 Apr 43 authorizing compulsory transfers and cross-postings to be carried out by 2nd Echelon of First Canadian Army and C.M.H.Q. Records. The directive stressed the "immediate necessity for adopting a policy designed to effect the employment of every individual in that capacity for which he is best suited by reason of his physical and mental capacity, his training and his natural aptitude"(9). Continuing, General McNaughton's directive stated:

I fully appreciate that this policy will to a degree cut across the lines of individual preference and will affect to some extent the control that an Officer Administering or an Officer Commanding has over personnel of his Corps or unit. It is inevitable that it will result in the removal from units of men whose loss will be felt. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, however, I am convinced that this action is necessary for the well-being of the Army as a whole, and I therefore expect all Commanders loyally to accept my decision and to do all things in their power to facilitate this necessary adjustment.

254. A meeting held at C.M.H.Q. on the following day (7 Apr) concluded that the majority of those selected for transfer would be acceptable to another corps only after training (10). As an initial step towards the adjustment of tradesmen and specialists in field units it was considered that 2nd Echelon should cross-post within each corps. In view of its greater surplus of personnel to requirements it was considered that the R.C.A.S.C. should be dealt with first. The Canadian Forestry Corps would be asked to furnish 150 men per month for transfer to Armoured Corps, Artillery or Infantry where the need was greatest. The problem of over-age and low category personnel could not be settled, however, until more information was available on the policy to be adopted towards functional categorization (see para 228). It was for this reason that Brigadier G.B. Chisholm (D.G.M.S.) and Colonel W. Line (Director of Personnel Selection) were then visiting the Canadian Army Overseas. They were told by Brigadier Beament (during the course of a further meeting on 20 Apr to decide what PULHEMS profile should be the minimum for each trade and type of employment in the Field Force) that, although a commanding officer would want every man in his unit to be completely fit in every way, such would not be possible due to the manpower shortage:

We are so short of manpower that we have to employ every man--what we are striving for is not perfection which is not obtainable, but



a profile which will allow us to employ as many men as possible (11).

255. During the summer the work of re-classification was carried out within the four divisions remaining in the United Kingdom and the other units of First Canadian Army. In the case of Field Artillery it was found that generally speaking there was a surplus of driver mechanics while the greatest deficiencies were surveyors and regimental signallers (12). R.C.E. Officers complained that certain Personnel Selection Officers were continuing to recommend the transfer of men for training in such overcrowded trades as mining (13). The situation as regards tradesmen still remained acute, even after allowance had been made for those who might qualify after re-mustering and training. In a memorandum addressed to the Minister of National Defence on 26 Jul the Adjutant-General complained that the Canadian Army Overseas was endeavouring to provide itself with a higher percentage of tradesmen than the British Army (14). Another factor complicating the despatch of tradesmen overseas was that, as a result of the earlier instructions which until 1942 had permitted only volunteers to be given trades training, many now had ranks too senior for absorption overseas (this condition was overcome during the autumn (see para 246)). It would appear, if the C.M.H.Q. requirements were justified, that almost one third of the annual volunteers enlisted should be trained as tradesmen; however, it took about nine months to change the output of the reinforcement training stream and even then the composition of First Canadian Army was not firm.

256. Actually, authority already had been given (3 Jul 43) for the establishment of a Canadian Army Standing Committee on Trade Qualifications and Entitlements under the chairmanship of Maj.-Gen. G.R. Turner (the Director of Trades Training was sent over from N.D.H.Q. to serve as the Canadian member) to explore the possibility of:

- (a) Eliminating certain tradesmen.
- (b) Substituting tradesmen of lower classification for tradesmen of higher classification in the same trade.
- (c) Substitution of prescribed trades by allied trades in cases where the latter are easier to obtain (15).

(On 14 Oct the Turner Committee reported to General McNaughton (a copy going direct to the Adjutant-General who was visiting the United Kingdom) but more urgent matters delayed consideration of its recommendations on a "Senior Staff level" until late December. Only on 5 Jan 44 did General Stuart direct that certain of its recommendations be implemented. These included the substitution of new establishments for tradesmen, the institution of new trades and the amendment of certain existing ones).

257. Officers at C.M.H.Q. had hoped that personnel who were over-age, of low medical category, illiterate or otherwise undesirable, might be returned to Canada and replaced. However, a request that the 'manpower ceiling' should be shown in two parts—those fit for service in the Field Force and those fit for limited service in the United Kingdom only—had resulted in the following reply being despatched from Ottawa on 4 Jun:



We realize that a gradual dilution of your force is being caused by personnel becoming over-age and lowered in category. In our projections... we allowed for the return to Canada of such personnel at the maximum rate of 1500 per month during the first 8 months of 1943. To date the rate of return has been less than half that amount.

The need for return of men is twofold (1) it allows you to replace where necessary considerable numbers lower category men with those of higher category and at the same time not exceed the ceiling. (2) It enables the return of these men to essential occupations in Canada thereby easing the net drain on manpower. We know you will appreciate this drain is assuming serious proportions (16).

258. On 3 Jul, during one of General Stuart's visits to the United Kingdom, General McNaughton reviewed the manpower situation in the light of two assumptions which had been made in a recent C.M.H.Q. telegram (26 Jun):

- (a) That the War Office was willing and able to provide the remainder of the units necessary to make a properly balanced force, including several previously considered as a Canadian commitment.
- (b) That N.D.H.Q. was willing and able to replace men overseas who by reason of age, medical category, or mental capacity could not be absorbed in the proposed composition (17).

General McNaughton pointed out that the decision made at the recent Washington Conference ("TRIDENT") to launch Operation "OVERLORD" with a target date of 1 May 44 would give the Canadian Army Overseas several months, following its completion to 233,200 all ranks, in which the casualties would be less than the 5,000 reinforcements to be despatched monthly (18). That time could be used for the replacement of unsuitable personnel. The question was raised again on 4 Aug, during the visit of the Minister of National Defence, but settlement was left until autumn when the Adjutant-General would be visiting the Canadian Army Overseas (19).

259. A telegram of 17 Sep from Ottawa emphasized the official view:

We are at one with you in wishing that the Canadian Army should be streamlined as to age, physical and mental category to the great extent our manpower resources will allow, but you will realize that after 4 years of war activities our resources of young fit men are not by any means inexhaustible (20).

During the course of his later visit to the Canadian Army Overseas the Adjutant-General told an "A" Branch Conference at C.M.H.Q. (28 Oct) that Canadian manpower was not unlimited and that industry and agriculture were increasing their demands upon it. He stressed the desirability of making the best use of all those then overseas for, "if a man is not suitable here to do a useful job, it is likely he will have to be discharged on return to Canada" (21). With 100,000 all ranks despatched overseas in the preceding 12 months the question presented



itself whether it would still be possible to get a replacement better than the man who was being sent back.

260. On 13 Sep 43 instructions had been issued for all units to compile nominal rolls of personnel who did not conform to the existing standards of age and medical category for service in the field; those who although physically fit were considered unsuitable because of low mentality, illiteracy or a disability which had not resulted in a lower medical category; and those who, while they did not conform to the standards established for age and medical category, were fit to be taken into battle. For those in the third category, the following certificate was to be signed by the unit commanding officer:

Notwithstanding that the above personnel do NOT qualify under the present age or medical standards, I consider them fit for active service and certify that I am prepared to take them into battle(22).

Personnel coming under the first two headings were to be posted to the newly authorized No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre where they would be interviewed and classified as: fit for employment in field units of their own corps; fit for employment in field units of another corps; fit for employment in a static unit; return to Canada.

261. No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Unit began to function at Algonquin Camp (6 C.I.R.U.) on 3 Oct with a staff of personnel selection and medical officers (including a psychiatrist). According to the directive given, personnel for return to Canada should be category 'C' or lower, over 45 years of age, or unsuitable because of instability or low mentality (or both) (23). A deciding factor was, however, not whether a man was performing his present duties acceptably but whether they could not be done as well or better by a man whose age and medical category would permit of utilization as a reinforcement.

262. Work proceeded slowly (50 per day), until authority was received on 30 Dec to carry out reallocation following merely an expression of opinion by a medical officer as to a man's probable PULHEMS profile (rather than a complete medical board)(24). At the beginning of 1944 it was estimated that the static and reinforcement units contained approximately 10,000 all ranks "unfit for the field" (25). Since it would be impossible for all these men to pass through the Reallocation Centre authority was granted for unit selection committees\*to despatch direct to No. 1 N.E.T.D.\*\* for return to Canada all those whom they considered unsuitable for further employment in the Canadian Army Overseas and who had, in addition, a PULHEMS profile containing one or more gradings as low as '4' (26). Until 31 Mar 44, when the policy was reviewed, only personnel for whom it was considered there might be available further employment overseas were despatched to No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre. By this time, some 8017 of the estimated 10,000 border-line types in the static and reinforcement units had been seen by unit selection committees (27).

#### (11) Operational Forecasts and Reinforcement Flow

263. "In view of the fact that the operational employment of the Cdn Army Overseas, which constitutes the largest part of the Canadian military forces, is dependent upon the

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\*Composed of the administrative officer, records officer, personnel selection officer and medical officer.

\*\*No. 1 Non-Effective Transit Depot.



strategic direction of the War Office, which will also govern the employment of British troops," Brigadier N.E. Rodger (B.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) informed the War Office on 11 Mar that it was considered "essential that the same forecast of activity should be used by the British and Canadian authorities for the purpose of long term calculations" (28) His letter emphasized that the War Office forecast of activity for North-West Europe should be made available for Canadian planners at an early date.

264. Unofficially, Brigadier Rodger had been advised as early as 6 Mar that the existing forecast for North-West Europe was as follows:

1943 - two months intense, two months normal, remainder "quiet".

1944 - three months intense, six months normal, remainder "quiet".

You are doubtless fully informed of the size of the Canadian forces likely to be available for operations. I must, however, sound a note of warning that experience in the Middle East and elsewhere has convinced us that it is unsound to apply such activity rates to the total forces in a theatre. For the purpose of estimating probable wastage I would hazard the suggestion that calculations might be based on three-fourths of the total forces available being involved in "intense" and "normal" activity for the above periods (29).

The War Office studies of wastage were still in the draft stage but Brigadier Rodger was advised on 20 Mar that the above forecast related to the activity anticipated for 10 divisions in 1943 and 15 divisions in 1944. Having regard to the projected operations in which the First Canadian Army might be involved, the War Office strongly recommended that the Canadian Army should consider three-quarters of its force engaged at these activity rates (30). In order to reduce this forecast to "round numbers" for First Canadian Army, however, C.M.H.Q. recommended, and N.D.H.Q. approved, the following (31):

1943 - one month "intense", two months "normal", nine months "quiet".

1944 - three months "intense", five months "normal", four months "quiet".

265. With the participation of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade in the conquest of Sicily General McNaughton's hopes for an all-Canadian Army received a setback. Planning proceeded during the summer of 1943 on the assumption that these troops would be returned to First Canadian Army in time to participate in the assault on North-West Europe, but even General McNaughton began to fear for a time that the 21st Army Group might be merely a "facade" and that the British Government had no intention of embarking upon a costly invasion of North-West Europe (32). The Canadian Government decided to gamble on the British view prevailing and managed to get the balance of a Canadian Corps despatched to Italy. (C.M.H.Q. Report 182) This shattered General McNaughton's dream of an all-Canadian Army: an additional administrative "tail" was necessary and the logistical problems of distance were introduced to confuse the manpower problem further.



266. British manpower was strictly limited and General McNaughton was able to advise N.D.H.Q. on 28 Oct that F.F.C. 36 had "ceased to have any validity as basis of plans" and that a new Field Force table, based on "realistic figures" was being prepared at the War Office (33). Plans for the forthcoming invasion of North-West Europe by an American-Anglo-Canadian Force were well advanced and General McNaughton considered that General Paget's proposal to place the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade under the command of 1st British Corps for the actual assault would have to be accepted. A C.M.H.Q. telegram of 5 Nov contained a new War Office activity forecast for 1944, revised as a result of the decisions reached at the "QUADRANT" Conference:

Mediterranean Theatre: First two and two thirds months intense. Next five months normal. Last four and one third months quiet.

North West Europe: First three months quiet. Next two and two third months intense. Next five months normal. Last month and one third quiet (34).

When this information was sent back to Ottawa on 5 Nov it was pointed out further that:

... intense period Mediterranean occurs first quarter year and for continental operations during second quarter with consequent high average monthly wastage over first half year. The figures for the overseas holdings of three months rfts at intense rates plus monthly flow of rft stream cover the estimated demands....

However having regard to the fact that above basis of operations in two theatres splits rfts allowing less flexibility than operations from single base I suggest you will not want to cut monthly rfts below present basis and recommend you plan to continue for 1944 at the rate of 5000 per month as heretofore (35).

Furthermore, War Office experience had now borne out the fact that 50 per cent of total casualties could be counted as "recoverable" after six months (see para 154).

267. Worried as to whether First Canadian Army could continue in the Order of Battle as a mixed Anglo-Canadian formation under command of a Canadian officer, the Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff proceeded to the United Kingdom by air to discuss matters with Generals Brooke and Paget. Agreement was reached that Headquarters, First Canadian Army might be retained: a British corps would be placed under command and a British staff element added. Although General McNaughton no longer was acceptable as an Army Commander agreement was reached that his successor should be appointed by the Canadian Government\* after consultation with the British Government (C.M.H.Q. Report 182).

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\*It was planned that General McNaughton should remain in Command of First Canadian Army until an acceptable successor was available [i.e. General Crerar who had gone to the Mediterranean to obtain operational experience commanding 1st Canadian Corps] but ill-health forced him to relinquish his post, effective



268. During this time reliability of the British rates of wastage also became subject to question. The Adjutant-General raised the first doubts in a memorandum of 18 Oct addressed to the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. (36). Thereupon, General Montague sent two officers to the War Office for the latest information. On 25 Oct they reported:

The reply was that the rates had proven to be reliable. He [Lt.-Col. H.L. Chesshyre, S.D. 4] produced charts and graphs which he keeps on this subject, which showed an extraordinary degree of accuracy in most respects. During the operations in Sicily and Italy, the infantry rate is shown to be extremely accurate. Artillery, including AA at the old (high) rates of wastage proved to be more than adequate. RAC casualties were also less than estimated.

On the whole the actual casualties related to estimated, average well. During the Sicily operations, they were over the peak, with a definite lag following, an approach of the two lines, following that with a further touch over the peak at time of Salerno.

Colonel Chesshyre would not comment on any higher degree of casualties from sickness in Mediterranean, as his figures did not sub-divide battle casualties from sickness (37).

(This information was included in a memorandum of 7 Nov answering several questions raised by the Adjutant-General (38).

269. On 1 Dec Brigadier A.W. Beament raised the question again, in a letter from Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 15th Army Group, suggesting that Infantry casualties had been higher than the calculated wastage rates (based on the North African campaign) and that the proportion of Officer casualties also was higher (39). On 15 Dec Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale (B.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) replied:

... Statistics show that for the British Forces in the Mediterranean from 1 Aug 43 to the present time the forecast of casualties as represented for all Arms combined closely approximate actual wastage. We have obtained from the War Office copies of charts and graphs, which are carefully checked and kept up to date. From these it is apparent that while the trend is closely followed there is, in fact, a substantial margin of safety as between forecasts and actual incidence of casualties. These charts also show a break-down by Arms and the same conclusion applies to each.

For example, in the case of Inf, estimated casualties as at 18 Nov 43 were approximately 20% greater than actual. Therefore, I feel that your fears ... may be allayed....

So far, there is, as you say, insufficient evidence or info upon which to build up an accurate forecast of a purely Cdn trend, but gradually as time goes on we will be able, by following the

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(cont'd from page 116)

26 Dec 43. General Stuart had remained in the United Kingdom and now temporarily assumed command of First Canadian Army in addition to a new appointment of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. The V.C.G.S. (Maj.-Gen. J.C. Murchie) continued the duties of acting C.G.S. in Ottawa.



methods adopted at the War Office, to draw upon our own experience in arriving at any future estimate of our own purely Cdn requirements. We have, in fact, already commenced to construct graphs based upon casualty returns and these, in time, will build up to show a reasonably good picture of events (40).

270. Due to the favourable shipping conditions expected during the last three months of 1943, it had been proposed to continue the reinforcement flow of 5,000 per month, in case shipping space might become limited later and in spite of the fact that the original agreement had contained a reservation that the despatch of reinforcements subsequent to September need not total 5,000 per month unless justified by battle wastage (41). As a result of the lowered operational forecast of activity now issued by the War Office and the delay in committing the balance of First Canadian Army to active operations, the Adjutant-General came to believe, however, following his own return to Canada from the United Kingdom, that the Canadian Army could be kept up to strength during 1944 by the monthly despatch overseas of only 4,000 reinforcements (42).

271. The C.M.H.Q. estimate of casualties for 1944 was 75,000 all ranks, of whom 50 per cent would be recoverable after six months, thus leaving only 37,500 to be found by replacement from Canada. After adding a further 2,000 to compensate for the 4,000 casualties expected during November and December 1943, and replacing 6,000 "unsuitables" to be returned to Canada, the total required for 14 months (the end of 1944) would be about 45,500. In a telegram of 3 Dec despatched to the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. who were still in the United Kingdom, the Adjutant-General and V.C.G.S. stated:

It is therefore evident that the despatch of 70,000 at the rate of 5,000 per month for 14 months would be greatly in excess of net requirements to 31 Dec 44 now projected.

... most intense casualties will be suffered during the months of April, May and June but even at the end of that time the immediately available pool would still be maintained at a minimum of 19,300 with an additional provision of 6,500 to cover normal non effective as well as a further 24,600 recoverable casualties in hospital or convalescence becoming available over a period of 6 months. You will note that by 31 Dec 44 the immediately available would be up to almost full strength with over 12,000 recoverable casualties still in hospital or convalescence plus 6,500 normal non effectives (43).

They suggested the despatch overseas of only 4,000 reinforcements per month for 14 months (i.e. 56,000) subject to a further reduction in the late months of 1944 "should actual casualties suffered be materially below present estimates".

272. In the opinion of those at C.M.H.Q. the adoption of such a policy would result in reinforcement holdings becoming dangerously low during the months of June, July and August 1944. In a memorandum of 11 Dec the B.G.S. (Brigadier Penhale) suggested to General Stuart that, with troops serving in two distinct theatres of operations, there would be less flexibility and more chance of the reinforcement flow being interrupted by sea communications (44). Brigadier Penhale believed that the reinforcement holdings in the United Kingdom should exceed the



allowable total by 7,000: in practice this would be offset by the actual number of non-effectives, for whom an allowance of 6655 was made under the "manpower ceiling" (7,000 further "unsuitables" being slated for return to Canada through No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre).

273. The proposal favoured by those at C.M.H.Q. was the provision of an uneven flow of reinforcements--5,000 during each of the first six months--so that at no time should the reinforcement pool fall below a figure equivalent to 50 per cent of the calculated reserve of three months' reinforcements at the "intense" rate of wastage--and 3,000 for each of the last six months. The total number despatched overseas would remain at 48,000--the figure recommended to Mr Ralston and the C.G.S. by the Adjutant-General. Such a solution would not greatly disorganize the Training Centre organization in Canada and would allow these establishments to "run down" during the last half of 1944, consequently freeing personnel from the permanent establishments for overseas service. (Once the training organization was so curtailed, however, it might be hard to increase the reinforcement flow during 1945.) Summing up, Brigadier Penhale had written:

... the General Staff have indicated that in their opinion "a safe level" of our total holdings could within reason be accepted as being a figure equivalent to 50% of total calculated wastage for 3 months at Intense rates. This figure of 50% has been arbitrarily arrived at, after due consideration of the size of the force, together with the normal incidence of casualties likely to be incurred by a formation in heavy fighting, or total loss of one or more transports. No exact data is available to support this view, but experience recalls that a formation such as a Division may lose anything up to 30% or 40% in a single operation extending over a period of a few days only. Nevertheless, I feel that a modification of present policy on this basis could safely be accepted with the reservation that it may become necessary later due to operational misfortunes to review the whole question.

Such a review, I feel, in any event should be made not later than Apr 1944, which would be in sufficient time to allow for any preliminary work involved in changing the basis of provision during the latter part of the year from 3,000 per month to some other figure.... (45).

274. On 26 Dec General Stuart assumed the appointments of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.\* and acting Army Commander (until General Crerar should have received some operational experience in Italy) but two periods of hospitalization, and an intervening trip to Italy prevented him from attending to this problem personally until 19 Jan 44. On that day he despatched the following answer to the V.C.G.S. in Ottawa:

... I am satisfied that our requirements will be covered by 48,000 at rate of 4,000 per month. Will review again in April.... (46).

Thus did the Canadian view prevail over that expressed by those who had been handling the problem overseas.

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\*Major-General P.J. Montague vacated his appointment as Senior Officer to become Major-General in charge of Administration (M.G.A.).



275. Lulled into a false sense of security the Minister of National Defence made the following statement to the House of Commons on 14 Feb:

With regard to reinforcements, I have a very brief statement which will put the matter clearly. I am glad to be able to say that notwithstanding the fact that a part of the army has been fighting since July, the reinforcement pool overseas is well up to the planned original full strength. This pool was that which was estimated to be adequate to meet battle casualties, and the supply can and will continue to be replenished by the despatch of further reinforcements from Canada as required.

There is one qualification to be made. It is very difficult to match supply with requirements of all different types of tradesmen. Thirty-five per cent of the army today are in the different trades, of which there are over 200, many of which are highly specialized. It is a constant battle to get from the population of this country, or for that matter of any country, so large a percentage of skilled men, particularly bearing in mind the needs of war industry. The adaptability of young men is such, and the presence of tradesmen throughout the army is so general that I think that we can be confident we shall always be able in time of emergency to meet the need (47).

276. There were a number of points which required clarification, however, even though it was not considered at this time that they had a really serious bearing on the reinforcement situation. As early as 19 Jan, the day General Stuart's telegram had approved the 1944 monthly reinforcement flow, General Montague (now Major-General in Charge of Administration, C.M.H.Q.) had written to General Sir Archibald Nye (V.C.I.G.S., War Office) explaining the Canadian Army's manpower difficulties in part as follows:

The situation as it exists in Canadian Forces Overseas is complicated to the extent that provision must now be made for Canadian participation in two theatres of operations. This development was not foreseen in deciding upon the detailed composition of the First Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, at which time a small contingency reserve of personnel was provided to ensure some degree of flexibility within the total ceiling imposed by the Canadian Government. You will also readily understand that this ceiling represents a maximum figure, which we may not exceed, and which, according to our direction, will not under any circumstance be increased (48).

The 'contingency reserve' (of 3200 men) had been dissipated by calls from the Canadian component with the Central Mediterranean



Force\* and C.M.H.Q. proposed its restoration by corresponding cuts from the Canadian component of the 21st Army Group: three Engineer battalions, two (of the four) R.C.A.S.C. general transport companies and one L.A.A. regiment. Such a reduction, plus the saving to be obtained from the reorganization of the divisional support battalions should restore a 'contingency reserve' of 3200 men—the minimum number considered feasible for an Army which would be operating in two distinct theatres of operations (50.

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\*Writing to General McNaughton on 27 Nov 43, the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. had pointed out his own understanding that... "the arrangements with the War Office under which Cdn tps were despatched to the Mediterranean theatre visualized that Cdn provision of L of C tps would be restricted to the provision of hosps, L of C provost and base rft units." General McNaughton agreed and an A.F.H.Q. request for the formation of Base Censor Sections to deal with Canadian mail was turned down. Then, on 18 Dec, General Montague despatched the following telegram to General Crerar in Italy:

- I. Must draw your attention to continued requests for increases to establishments Cdn Sec 1 Ech and other base and L. of C. details now being received from Beament. Realize many of these of small dimension but accumulative effects now achieving serious proportions. For your infm since base installations originally approved and set up in theatre total personnel involved in new demands received amount to 228 offr and 1342 O.Rs of which more than 60 percent are apparently required for base and L. of C. details for which the British are responsible.
- II. You will agree approved policy and imposed manpower ceiling does not allow large build up for base and L. of C. installations and that with small contingency reserve of manpower available we cannot approve additions without corresponding reductions elsewhere.
- III. Situation extremely complicated by necessity of providing for two theatres. Needs of both must be carefully weighed in balance before granting approval either in principle to many recommendations received. While doubtless general requirements discussed with you feel I must request that you with Beament exercise careful scrutiny upon all new and unforeseen demands already made and which in future may be requested.
- IV. Earnestly desire to provide you and your tps with best possible services but feel you must appreciate no present prospect of obtaining authority to increase overall manpower ceiling. Can assure you every effort being made here to increase working margin and availability of personnel by reduction static establishments, review of attachments and cutting out non essential units.

In reply, General Crerar protested that the only increases in the establishment of 1st Echelon, for which Brigadier Beament had sought his approval, had totalled 27 all ranks. He

(cont'd on next page)



277. As early as 31 Dec 43, however, the War Office had turned down a request from A.F.H.Q. that additional R.C.E. units should be provided as G.H.Q. troops in Italy, if this was to be done "at the expense of 21 Army Group" (51). Overriding priority had been given to North-West Europe and the Canadian attempts to reduce its commitment for that theatre were strongly opposed, particularly since the British Army was short of technical personnel. The final agreement was a compromise so far as manpower was concerned. The Canadian Army would still provide three Engineer battalions and the four general transport companies that General Montgomery deemed essential. The Canadian Army also would provide the large L. of C. Signals. The 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment (mobile) R.C.A. was retained (for service with a British A.A. Brigade), the balance of the Canadian A.A. Brigade (including three L.A.A. regiments) was disbanded and the personnel placed in the reinforcement pool, since the British had plenty of surplus A.A. units which had been employed on A.D.G.B. (Air Defence of Great Britain). The Royal Montreal Regiment also became surplus to requirements, as a reconnaissance regiment, but arrangements eventually were made to retain it in the order of battle as the First Canadian Army Headquarters Defence Company (C.M.H.Q. Report 168).

278. On 1 Feb 44 the War Office had advanced the suggestion that C.M.H.Q. should place a definite limit on expansions requested for the Canadian Force in the Mediterranean in view of the higher priority that must be accorded pending operations in North-West Europe (53). By 4 Feb the general outline of such a scheme had been worked out and General Stuart was able to send the following telegram to General Crerar and Brigadier Beament in Italy:

... Troopers [War Office] have represented strongly that we must on no account prejudice composition of Cdn component of 21 Army Group... Troopers meeting similar but more complex situation by imposition of manpower sub ceiling in respect of theatres within which comd concerned is given liberty of action to make use of personnel at his discretion. I suggest for your consideration we institute similar arrangement to govern Cdn allocations of personnel.

Proposal is to establish for each theatre a sub-ceiling based on summation of W.Es. of authorized units plus approved rfts which for C.M.F. is placed currently at two months holdings. Within this limit comd will be given liberty to utilize personnel in accordance with his appreciation of operational factors availability and nature of service to be added.

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(cont'd from page 121)

suggested that General Montague visit Italy for a personal discussion of that and other matters. General Crerar subsequently informed Brigadier Beament that he considered "CMHQ must remain responsible for organization of Cdn Sec 1 and 2 Echls, and all that comes under you. I shall indicate the 'Service' that I want, but I am not going to deal any more than I can help in the detailed ways and means this involves". (There was the further fact that Canadian units in the Mediterranean found it necessary to adopt the Middle East establishments favoured by the Eighth Army) (49).



Above would be combined with power to force comd within this approved ceiling to form temporary units on existing Cdn or Brit W.Es. or on provisional organizational tables. Personnel required for such units would count as rfts unless later authorization granted for conversion to permanent basis. All ranks and trades groupings to be temporary and surrendered on termination or disbandment.

To satisfy N.D.H.Q. requirements and in order to secure organizational uniformity and control in respect of theatre priorities full details would be advised this H.Q. and confirmation granted under G.S.D. 602. It will be understood that should priorities change or resources increase units and additions established on temporary basis could be reconstituted as permanent addition to theatre after full authorization by this H.Q. under C.G.S. 139 in which event appropriate transfer from contingency reserve to theatre sub-ceiling would be made (54).

279. General Montague went out to Italy to see for himself why there were so many demands to form additional units for the 'tail' and to explain further the implications of the proposed 'manpower sub-ceiling'. After looking over the situation he telegraphed General Stuart on 8 Feb that "experience of fighting here recently indicates disproportionately high casualties of infantry general duty personnel" (55). The British Adjutant-General (Sir Ronald Adam) having visited Italy and expressed similar views it was believed that steps were being taken at the War Office to amend wastage rates.

280. The overall question of wastage and the adequacy of the reinforcement pool grew even more acute (see paras 285 and 291) and on 19 Feb, four days before General Crerar's concurrence in the proposed 'manpower sub-ceiling' was sent from Italy (56), a further telegram was despatched from C.M.H.Q. pointing out that due to the higher priority of North-West Europe and the arrangement whereby only 4000 reinforcements per month would be despatched from Canada during 1944 (57) it would be necessary for Canadian troops in Italy to operate with "one month's holdings at intense rates from end of March" (when the latter theatre was expected to pass from "intense" to "normal" operations) (58). Henceforth, C.M.H.Q. would review the matter monthly and would "take into consideration your actual casualties and forecast of your activity and availability of reinforcements considering other theatre and other pertinent factors". It was pointed out that, even if the period of "intense" activity was extended, the units of 1st Canadian Corps could still be reinforced until the end of April. Sufficient reinforcements would be provided to make up the existing deficiency to one month's holdings at the "intense" rates of wastage.

281. General Crerar and Brigadier Beament protested this line of reasoning. The former had expressed the opinion that "it would be most dangerous to reduce reinforcement holding this theatre below two months intense" (59); the latter pointed out that convoys now sailed only at 36-day intervals, whereas originally they had been monthly, and argued that holdings should be the equivalent of two and a half months wastage at "intense" rates—a period equivalent to approximately twice the convoy interval (60).

282. The lack of reinforcements in the United Kingdom made acceptance of the C.M.H.Q. policy inevitable, however, and



on 13 Mar 44 a telegram was despatched to A.A.I. (Allied Armies in Italy had replaced the term Allied Central Mediterranean Force) setting forth the Canadian 'manpower sub-ceiling' for that theatre. Although the exact number could not be determined, the basis for the 'ceiling' was firm:

- (a) The WE requirements of all units currently or subsequently approved for inclusion in the composition of Cdn tps serving in Mediterranean Force.
- (b) One month's holdings for this force based on one mos wastage at intense activity calculated on the approved Cdn rates of wastage of personnel as applied to the approved current composition of the force both as to WEs and as to units (61).

For the time being it was estimated that the 'ceiling' should total approximately 61,483 all ranks (56,308 against W.Es. and 5,175 reinforcements). This telegram continued:

Further in order to enable the Comd of the Force to meet temporary or emergency conditions he is permitted to authorize as temporary provision within the approved manpower sub-ceiling W.Es. and units required subject to the following conditions:

- (a) Such authorizations if of a permanent nature to be referred to CMHQ where if concurred in as such will be ruled as an authorized addition to the force and covered by appropriate transfer of manpower from contingency reserve to the sub ceiling for the Force.
- (b) Such authorization if of a temporary nature only will be advised to CMHQ stating date of inception, purpose of formation, manpower involved, expected duration and subsequently the actual date of termination.
- (c) Personnel involved in such temporary authorizations are to be counted against rfts for the theatre until such time as authorized as a permanent provision within the force or termination of the temporary authorization (62).

In order to distinguish between these "temporary authorizations" and the similar GSD 602 units in the United Kingdom they became known as "GS 778 units", from the originator's number of this telegram.

283. On 24 Mar General Stuart followed this up with a letter to the Officer i/c Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon (then Brigadier E.G. Weeks), laying down the basis for calculating non-effectives. This question had been bandied about since 7 Jan but now the percentages which could be shown as non-effectives against the "X" List (see Appendix "J") were laid down (63):



<u>'X' List</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>% Chargeable Against Rfts</u>	<u>% Allowable as non-effectives</u>
1	P.O.W.	0	100
2	Detention and FP	100	0
3	Hospital	12	88
4	Unposted Rfts	100	0
5	Courses in theatre	100	0
6	Missing	0	100
7	Seconded	0	100
8	For return UK	0	100
9	Other non-available	50	50

Summarizing, the latter concluded:

... your reinforcement requirements, as from the end of March, will be based on one month's wastage rate, plus non-effectives, the total of which will be determined by applying the allowable percentages against component parts of the "X" list as shown above, plus estimated wastage between date of submission of bid and estimated arrival, and less estimated recoverable casualties in the same period (64).

284. Further objections from Italy were made but they were disregarded (65). In order to reassure the new Corps Commander\* however, the following C.M.H.Q. telegram was despatched on 30 Mar to Brigadier Weeks:

Inform Comd 1 Cdn Corps we will endeavour at all times to ensure that your rft holdings do not fall below equivalent of one month at intense rates approx. This policy will take into account convoy turnaround, actual strengths and other relevant factors such as recoverable casualties and will result frequently in your total exceeding two months' requirements. Our assessment of your bids will be based upon projection of these considerations in the light of our monthly review. You will appreciate however that with operational priority now accorded European theatre and arrivals from Canada at fixed monthly rate this policy may require modification from time to time (66).

285. The real reason for such action had been confirmation of the C.M.H.Q. fears, earlier ignored by General Stuart (see paras 272-4) that the reinforcement pool would reach a dangerous low during June 1944. According to a memorandum submitted by Brigadier Penhale as early as 3 Feb its size would be only 15,522 during June (67). The despatch of further reinforcements from Canada and an increased number of recoverable casualties would subsequently boost it but, during the months it remained below 40,762 both theatres would have to accept a reduction in holdings (see para 280).

286. As of 22 Feb officers in "A" Branch at C.M.H.Q. produced figures considerable at variance with those produced by the G.S. Branch for Brigadier Penhale (68). There were 3,165 officers and 23,951 other ranks available in the United Kingdom as "effective" reinforcements, plus 80 officers and 2723 other ranks who were unfit, although approximately half might be employed in static units. Should the reinforcement pool drop below a "safe" level it would still be possible to draw men from G.S.D. 602 units and increments to reinforcement

\*A/Lt.-Gen E.L.M. Burns had taken over command of 1st Canadian Corps on 20 Mar 44.



units to a total of approximately 650 officers and 6400 other ranks. By making the necessary adjustments on paper it was argued that 35,000 all ranks should be available by 1 Mar. On that day, the reinforcement holdings in Italy should total 13,000. Estimated casualties for the summer were:

	<u>N.W.E.</u>	<u>C.M.F.</u>	<u>Total</u>
May	8759	7628	16,387
June	8759	7628	16,387
July	7159	2075	9,234
August	3955	2075	6,030

Should the flow of reinforcements from Canada remain constant, the reinforcement pool would decrease from 38,782 in May to 26,395 in June, 21,161 in July and 19,131 in August.

287. That same day (22 Feb) General Stuart replied to an N.D.H.Q. suggestion to despatch only 10,000 reinforcements from Canada during the first quarter of 1944 with the information that:

My agreement that the 1944 replacements would total some 48,000 despatched at the average rate of 4,000 per month was based on the assumption that the actual strength of the Canadian Army Overseas at 31 Dec 43 would, after making due allowance for non-effectives included in the "X" List and some 6,000 estimated non-employables, approximately equal the approved manpower ceiling of 232,736 (69).

Out of a gross strength of 244,443 all ranks on 31 Dec 43, however, only 227,685 were found to be available for unrestricted employment against the current 'manpower ceiling' of 232,736 all ranks. General Stuart considered that officers at N.D.H.Q. had been calculating 'recoverable casualties' wrongly: only those of the first six months could be counted as recovered during the last six months of the year. Thus the 'recoverable casualties' from 1943 and the first six months of 1944 would be 24,548 all ranks. With 1944 casualties estimated at 75,115 it would be necessary to supply 50,567 reinforcements from Canada. Since the end of 1943 had seen an actual deficit of 5051 effectives, it would be necessary to supply 55,618 rather than the 45,500 estimated in Ottawa. There were the further problems of time lag and the fact that a considerable number of the reinforcements would need four to six weeks refresher training following their arrival from Canada.

288. The possibility of the War Office creating a "double intense" rate for the assault formations participating in Operation "OVERLORD" was mentioned and then General Stuart continued in explanation:

The situation as represented in this letter is based upon the best information obtainable and is in accordance with methods of calculation used by the War Office. In this regard, it is a matter of satisfaction to note that forecasts presently employed as compared with active overall casualties incurred in C.M.F. have been substantially accurate, with a satisfactory margin of safety. Viewing the problem according to arms of the services, the picture is still favourable although one possible exception arises in the case of the Corps of Infantry, in which most of



the casualties have been incurred. It is hoped that sufficient detailed information resulting from experience gained will soon permit the construction of graphs which will show clearly Canadian trends. It is proposed to construct these as soon as casualties for February are known.

In the foregoing calculations, some concern may arise at the over-all picture as it may appear in July 1944, when, if the worst case is considered, the reinforcement pool will have dropped to no more than one month's holdings for each theatre. However, this will depend on the timing of future operations, which cannot presently be stated, and any delays will be reflected in the improved figures which would result\*. Furthermore, with full knowledge of the manpower situation in Canada, and as far as can be foreseen at present, I am satisfied that a total of 48,000 reinforcements at the rate of 4,000 per month inclusive January to December 1944 will satisfy our requirements, subject to a monthly review of the situation which in view of changing circumstances I feel now to be necessary (70).

This letter was followed by the despatch of a similarly worded telegram of 25 Feb (71).

289. In his reply of the following day the V.C.G.S. promised that an additional 2,000 reinforcements would be despatched to bring the total to 12,000 for the first quarter of 1944, provided that shipping could be made available during March. In conclusion he reiterated:

We are planning to despatch total of 48,000 reinforcements during 1944. It must be appreciated however that the number despatched during each calendar month will depend on shipping available within that month (72).

290. It was only after considerable discussion, however, that the War Office took the necessary action to increase the Canadian Army's allocation of shipping space so that 12,910 all ranks could be despatched from Canada during the first quarter of the year (73).

(iii) - Last Minute Changes Before D-Day

291. Existing reinforcement holdings were disturbing when broken down on a corps basis. In the case of Infantry there was a deficiency of 24 officers and 9,057 other ranks against a surplus of 13 officers for Infantry (Motor) battalions and two officers and 57 other ranks employed in G.S.D. 602 units. When reinforcement holdings for all corps were added together there was a surplus of 329 officers and a deficit of 11,620 other ranks, against which it was possible to show 349 officers and 10,087 other ranks serving in the temporary G.S.D. 602 units. Brigadier W.N. Bostock (A.D.A.G. (A.), C.M.H.Q.)

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\*Although General Stuart was in the picture as regards the 21st Army Group "key" plan he explained to Mr Ralston in a telegram of 24 Feb 44 that tactical planning for the "follow-up" First Canadian Army could not be started until that of the assaulting armies had been completed (C.M.H.Q. Report 182).



argued, in a memorandum of 13 Mar 44 that, if it were possible to disband all the G.S.D. 602 units, the overall deficit could be reduced to some 1500 other ranks: against this it would be possible to count as reinforcements (on paper) a further 2000 men on the P.E. (Permanent Establishment) of Reinforcement Units(74)

292. Although the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., was willing to make drastic cuts in the G.S.D. 602 units and recommend the re-mustering of all surplus personnel to make up deficiencies in Infantry and R.C.A.S.C.\* he considered that a longer view should be taken of the situation and no action initiated unless justified by conditions applicable at a later time (i.e. 1 May 44). Furthermore he directed that:

... no communication concerning rfts is to be despatched out of CMHQ to Defensor [N.D.H.Q.], 21 Army Group or anywhere else without being seen by him. This restriction relates to policy aspect and overall position rather than any routine returns, etc., which may have to be despatched (75).

293. On 16 Mar a reinforcement estimate was supplied for General Montgomery in order that he might make an appreciation of the overall situation within 21 Army Group. On paper it was possible to show, by raiding G.S.D. 602 units and from the current re-organization of the Reinforcement Units that there were 890 officers and 1790 other ranks over and above requirements (76). Of course, however, this was permitting the reinforcement pool in Italy to dwindle to one month's wastage at "intense" rates.

294. The following extract from General Montgomery's reply of the following day is of considerable interest:

2. An analysis of the figures in this paper indicates that although the Canadian Reinforcement situation appears to be numerically satisfactory, it is evident that steps must be taken to make this reinforcement personnel more readily available in the arms in which requirement exists, than is at present the case. Three factors which prejudice the situation appear to be:-
  - (a) reinforcements attached away;
  - (b) reinforcements posted to establishments of "GSD 602 units"; and
  - (c) surpluses in some arms and deficiencies in other arms.
3. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) and (b), I hope that as many personnel as possible will be placed in the training stream at an early date, so that they may be available and battle-worthy when required.
4. Regarding sub-paragraph (c), I note that in ... your letter, you state that it is the intention to remuster surpluses into corps where deficiencies exist. As you point out, the largest of these deficiencies is in infantry, and in the light of proposed operations, this deficiency is most serious.

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\*Compare with the situation existing in April 1943 when it had been decided to start reallocation with the R.C.A.S.C. in view of its greater surplus of personnel to requirements (see para 254).



Considering the rigorous training which remustered personnel must undergo before they will be fit to take the field as reinforcements, I sincerely hope that everything possible will be done to expedite this remustering and re-training process (77).

295. General Stuart was again in hospital and not until 24 Mar was he able to despatch the following reply to General Montgomery:

I would point out that the condition you refer to is in active process of being rectified. The status of 602 units is under constant review and action is being taken regarding absorption of surpluses to assist in meeting deficiencies. Every effort will be made by this means and by direct shipment of reinforcements from Canada to make good deficiencies in the infantry arm by target date (78).

296. A telegram to Ottawa of Saturday 25 Mar suggested, however, that even after the current reinforcement draft arrived from Canada there would still be a shortage of 5,000 infantrymen:

Army Gp now estimate that casualties in Inf during initial phases will be higher than usual intense wastage rates and this has been brought out in the operations to date in Italy. Consider therefore that we must have available our full rft pool of gen duty Inf when action starts.

As far as possible propose to endeavour adjust by remustering general duty CAC and Arty of which we have a surplus but this will involve time due to conversion courses.

Observe your future despatches include 1750 CAC 820 Fd Arty and 800 Engrs. Request that where these are not... tradesmen being despatched to fill vacancies...[as requested] they be replaced and gen duty Inf other ranks sent instead (79).

297. Therefore, while awaiting a reply, authority was issued by the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q. on 28 Mar for 2000 general duty personnel (1000 R.C.A., 500 R.C.E. and 500 C.A.C.) to be remustered to Infantry and despatched to Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units for training (80).

298. Due to the delayed appointment of an Army Commander and the imminence of the long-awaited invasion of North-West Europe there already were a number of high level questions awaiting answers and the receipt of this telegram over the week end merely created more speculation in Ottawa. In his reply of Tuesday, 28 Mar the Adjutant-General expressed himself as being "very disturbed" and added that Mr. G.S. Currie (Deputy Minister) and Brigadier J.A. deLalanne (D.A.G. (A)) were leaving that day by air for London (81). The C.M.H.Q. proposal for remustering was accepted and it was suggested that the portion of the 1750 C.A.C., 820 R.C.A. and 800 R.C.E. personnel which would have to be sent forward due to the inability to replace them by general duty Infantrymen at this late date should be remustered also. Continuing, the telegram stated:



... Appreciate difficulties of remustering overseas but if pool to be at full strength when action starts this method appears to offer quickest means all circumstances considered.

Although I appreciate the prudence of proposal that pool should contain the full 3 months intense when continental action starts it must be pointed out that plans for reinforcing as agreed G.S. 1205\* made no such provision.

The first intimation that casualties in infantry during initial phases would be higher than intense rates was conveyed in para eleven of C.M.H.Q. letter 1/WASTAGE/2 (SD 1) dated 22 Feb 44 and received here 1 March.\*\*

In my memorandum to Senior Officer dated 18 Oct 43 I asked quote are the present War Office casualty rates considered satisfactory for estimating future battle casualties or has recent experience indicated that these should be revised unquote. His reply was as follows file 1/MANPOWER/2 (ADAG (A)) dated 17 Nov 43 quote This question has been checked with the War Office who have found the accuracy of the rates has been borne out most satisfactorily during recent operations in the Mediterranean. In a graph checking the casualties incurred against those estimated it is found that actual casualties exceeded the average estimated during the period of Sicilian operations, subsequently dropped off during the period prior to the Italian operation, then approached the estimated rate, exceeded it for a short period during the Salerno operation, and now is running close to the estimated rate. Analysed by arms at the War Office, their rates have proved very accurate in most cases. In artillery casualties were lighter than expected also in arm'd corps. One result has been to lower the rate on AA arty. It is proposed to investigate Canadian experience of casualty rates at 1 Jan 44 to see whether any discrepancy arises in our experience. unquote.

We are making every effort to speed up output from infantry training stream and in view of indicated higher rates of wastage will continue to make allocations to infantry but it is vitally important for future planning that we be given latest rates of anticipated wastage at earliest possible moment (82).

299. By this time General Stuart had turned over command of First Canadian Army to General Crerar and was able to give closer attention to his duties as Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., and endeavour to improve its co-ordination functions with N.D.H.Q. In other words, he hoped to introduce the Ottawa viewpoint to Officers who had been overseas long enough to get somewhat out of touch with the Canadian scene. A telegram of

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\*This refers to the telegram Generals Letson and Murchie despatched to the Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. on 3 Dec 43 estimating the overseas requirement for 1944 as 4,000 reinforcements per month rather than 5,000. This proposal had been accepted by General Stuart (see paras 271-4).

\*\*See paras 287-8.



1 Apr to General Murchie (V.C.G.S.) in Ottawa explained his views;

I must point out that there are two sides to this question. At CMHQ we are merely an advanced element of NDHQ. In the past CMHQ has not understood and has not been sufficiently sympathetic to the broad problems and repercussions other than military that face NDHQ. CMHQ has concentrated on a presentation of the administrative military problems confronting the CAO. In some cases this presentation has been unnecessarily alarming. NDHQ on the other hand has I think tended to emphasize the broader aspects of the problem at issue. Both of these are perfectly natural developments and both are perhaps aggravated by the fact that the two parts of NDHQ are 3000 miles apart. The problem is not only to reconcile the figures involved but of greater importance to reconcile the two points of view. Representatives from NDHQ are now here and are engaged in the process of attempting to broaden the viewpoint of CMHQ in order to bring it as close as possible to that of NDHQ. I am confident of success at this end provided there is some give and take at both ends. CMHQ has at times been unnecessarily alarming in its presentation of alleged facts and I suggest that NDHQ has perhaps been unnecessarily violent in its unexpressed but implied reactions (83).

300. About the manpower discussions held at C.M.H.Q. during early April Brigadier deLalanne later wrote:

Throughout my conversations I was cognizant of an attitude of not wishing to commit too much to writing—with which I was quite satisfied, provided we could agree verbally, but explained that I could not possibly make any intelligent report without having some general idea of what was expected of us. Further conversations brought out the point that while lack of definite information and question of Security were contributing factors—the most pertinent reason for hesitation to commit figures and facts to paper seems to be the feeling that they can only be estimates and hence would only open the door for criticism or blame later if they turned out in actual experience later to be far off the mark. I have tried to impress upon all concerned that naturally we consider all projections as estimates and fully appreciate all the contingencies, but pointed out that if C.M.H.Q. do not furnish the data on which to plan for the future—N.D.H.Q. must do so on less complete information (84).

301. Before he left for overseas the Adjutant-General had instructed Brigadier deLalanne (on 26 Mar) to:

... explore the possibility of now getting into effect the plan which was suggested by General Stuart almost a year ago, namely, that we should take some of the battalions now composed largely of N.R.M.A. personnel, ship them Overseas as a unit, and use them as battalions in reserve, or as reinforcement battalions. It would, of course, be necessary to tell them that they



eventually would be broken up but that an effort would be made at least to keep platoons together.

Let me have C. of S. reactions to this, as it is certainly one way in which we might get a lot of N.R.M.A. to go active (85).

This was followed by a telegram to General Stuart suggesting that a large proportion of the N.R.M.A. personnel of the four infantry battalions of the 13th Brigade, recently returned from Kiska, might volunteer for overseas service if they could be despatched from Canada in formed units. It was pointed out that "these units composed of well trained and seasoned soldiers would be most acceptable as immediate additions to Inf pool" (86). The following day, 29 Mar, General Stuart signalled his acceptance, on the same basis as the previous year (see para 249), adding that he would like the brigade headquarters as well (87).

302. The whole question of despatching these and additional formed units also to be used as reinforcements was discussed in Ottawa on Sunday 16 Apr, during the course of a conference on recruiting attended by all D.Os.C. and G.Os.C. A telegram despatched to General Stuart following the meeting included the following:

... It is realized that trained NRMA soldiers in units represent quick rft asset. Desire on part of all ranks in units to remain together makes it difficult to obtain individual volunteers for service overseas so long as unit remains in Canada. Considered opinion of all DOsC is that large groups of NRMA personnel would volunteer for overseas service if permitted to go as units. This applies particularly to French speaking units. Generals Renaud and LeClerc and Brig Blais have given assurance that substantial number French speaking volunteers can be made available if this course permitted and that this is only possible immediate method of tapping that source of reinforcements....(88).

303. Brigadier Penhale (D.C.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) urged acceptance, since it was important to obtain French-speaking reinforcements at once (see paras 443-4). While it would be difficult to absorb Officers and N.C.Os. and it would be more convenient to break up units immediately on arrival, there was the question of "maintaining faith" with these recent converts to general service. However, these units could be placed in additional camps, administered by their own officers, and exist as "draft finding" units for C.R.U. Carried to a "logical conclusion" such units, including those already accepted with the 13th Brigade, would constitute the nucleus of a collective training organization and C.R.U. at last could become merely a holding organization for preparing overseas drafts (89). The telegram of acceptance despatched to Ottawa on 18 Apr expressed the hope that some French-speaking units might be despatched before the latter part of May and that all officers and other ranks should be of an age and category for service in an operational theatre (90).

304. An earlier meeting at C.M.H.Q. on 14 Apr had produced the admission that one month's reinforcements were tied up in G.S.D. 602 units. Another month's reinforcements were attached to all units of First Canadian Army. Brigadier deLalanne pointed out that during the early days of Operation "OVERLORD" it would be hard to meet all demands from the Canadian



component of the 21st Army Group (91). Existing forecasts, taking no credit for recoveries from the "X" List, indicated a shortage of 6282 general duty Infantrymen: thus there really was a reserve equal to only 1.9 months wastage at "intense" rates, instead of three months. In his telegram to Ottawa reporting the meeting Brigadier deLalanne had stated:

Forecast of position by Arm and Service at end of each month to 31 December 1944 has now been made based as a first trial on shipment of rfts by Arms in proportion to average monthly wastage. Forecast deals with bodies only that is it does not deal with individual trades. On this basis it shows satisfactory overall picture in all major corps other than Inf Meds and Army Service. Not practicable to subdivide Arty by type in forecast overall: situation satisfactory and Arty Survey only type likely to show deficiencies.

Forecast made is being reviewed by offr here and when agreement reached will discuss extent to which shipping must be adjusted to correct situation revealed. Possibility of remustering will be taken into account.

Will then be able to advise you of required shipments by Arm to end December subject of course to review in light of actual casualties and possibility of change in composition of forces....

... Forecast indicates Inf OR position as at 29 February 1944 will remain more or less unchanged to end May. After that reserve in hand will drop to low point of 0.8 months intense wastage at end September and then increase to 1.9 months at end December. Recoverable casualties still in hospital will be in addition to these numbers. To extent adjustments of remustering mentioned above are carried out reserves in hand will be increased (92).

305. In order to care adequately for the continuing accommodation and maintenance problems facing C.M.H.Q. and to avoid sending home low category personnel who could be usefully employed in the United Kingdom as guards, artisans and pioneers, Mr Currie and General Stuart reached an understanding on 15 Apr that an addition of 2100 men should be added, provisionally, to the 'manpower ceiling' and that three Construction Companies might be retained on a temporary GSD 602 basis (93).

306. When it came time for the Deputy Minister to return to Canada Brigadier deLalanne, who was remaining behind to obtain the latest information on the reinforcement problem, furnished him with a memorandum (dated 18 Apr) outlining the progress made. Brigadier deLalanne believed that the detachment of 1st Canadian Corps from First Canadian Army had worried and confused the Officers dealing with the manpower overseas (94). With the approach of a "target date" after years of waiting they were concentrating their attention on the immediate problem of how many men would be on the spot ready to fight, and were ignoring such long term considerations as the return of "recoverable casualties" to action during the closing stages of the campaign, Brigadier deLalanne noted that:

While we have never anticipated that Rft Pools will at all times be at full strengths—Arm by



Arm and Trade by Trade—there seems to have been a growing tendency Overseas during the last few months, as indicated in cables and letters, to a feeling that Reserves presently available are insufficient to meet likely losses in future operations.

This feeling is, no doubt, due, in large part to the fact that, in round numbers, one month's reinforcements are employed in GSD 602 units or attached elsewhere for employment, instead of actually being at the Reinforcement Units. Representatives of Corps seem either to ignore the fact that such personnel are intended to be equally as available, if required, as if they were at Reinforcement Units, or to be dubious of their actual availability (95).

He also emphasized that statistics being compiled at both C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q. ignored "normal wastage", for which allowance would have to be made.

307. The high rate of illness in the Italian theatre of operations also had depleted the pool temporarily although such convalescence would be more rapid than that from wounds. Again, there had been a continual increase in the percentage of tradesmen within the Canadian Army Overseas, with the result that the present breakdown was:

Tradesmen	41.3 per cent
Specialists	21.3 per cent
General Duty	<u>37.4</u> per cent
	100.0 per cent

Casualties would not be heavy among tradesmen, but, since many of them belonged in the older age group, normal wastage would be higher than among general duty soldiers. Other points emphasized in the memorandum were:

Present output from the training stream in Canada is insufficient to meet our commitments for Overseas. Hence considerable portion of Drafts must consist of withdrawals from Army in Canada. The latter are not always in the arm, trade or specialty required and hence re-training and sometimes re-allocation is necessary.

Intake into the Army has been falling off during recent months. Many who offer themselves for enlistment are rejected by reason of the fact that they cannot make the rigid standards that have been set.

C.M.H.Q. advise that they have practically "scraped bottom" in finding suitable personnel for training in any of the trades (incl the newly created ones) in which there are still deficiencies. In this connection there seems to be a very mistaken view that we have an unlimited number of highly skilled or potential tradesmen in Canada or that they can easily be obtained from Industry—for the asking (96).

308. Brigadier deLalanne specified four problems as requiring action. First, the G.S.D. 602 units should either be disbanded or included within the authorized composition of the



Army. In round numbers the 'manpower ceiling' provided for 184,000 men in units and 42,000 reserves: in other words, one man in reserve for every  $4 \frac{1}{3}$  men in units (not counting the three per cent allowance for non-effectives). This ratio was upset by maintaining close to 15,000 men in G.S.D. 602 units. Secondly, a shipping programme should be adopted which, in conjunction with the remustering being carried on overseas, would even out the reserves as between corps. Thirdly, he considered that the shortage of French-speaking infantrymen might be overcome by the despatch overseas of Le Régiment de Hull of the 13th Brigade (see paras 329-337). Finally, there was the question of tradesmen but this was not a matter of grave concern. Most units' war establishments provided a more than adequate scale of tradesmen and units could function efficiently with fewer than the number authorized (see para 256). After all, the real need was fighting men. Naturally, he was not in a position to express an opinion upon the adequacy of the existing scales of activity and rates wastage but he was worried by a related point:

I am, however, concerned as to whether the rates of recovery used by the British and adopted by us are entirely applicable to our situation. It has been assumed up to date that 50% of our Gross Casualties will be recovered for service with the Canadian Army in the European Theatre, i.e. including static units in U.K. I have asked that inquiry be made as to whether the British include in the recoverable portion all those who would normally be re-employed (a) within their active theatres or, (b) within these and the U.K. From the reply received, it appears that the latter is the case and we are therefore, in all probability, counting on too high a rate of recovery for service overseas in view of the relatively small number of Canadian static units in U.K. as compared with British training and servicing establishments.

On the other hand, we do not take credit in our projection for any recoveries until six months after they have become casualties, although some recoveries may be expected earlier. Further, the despatch of 4,000 reinforcements per month represents provision of 64% of average gross casualties as against the 50% of gross casualties which have been assumed to be dead wastage in so far as future employment in the European Theatre is concerned (97).

309. Not until the beginning of June was this point clarified, and even then "formal confirmation" could not be obtained from the War Office. A telegram despatched to N.D.H.Q. on 3 Jun stated that the War Office had adopted the assumption that of the 50 per cent recoverable casualties one quarter would return in the fourth month, one half in the fifth and the balance in the sixth month. Although recoverable within six months for further military service this did not imply that all could return to operational duties (see para 155). It was considered at C.M.H.Q. that the 35 per cent "recoverable for operational employment" suggested by Brigadier deLalanne was as large a proportion as it might be possible to expect (98).

310. General Stuart took advantage of the Deputy Minister's return to Canada to send a memorandum to Mr Ralston, outlining the difficulties being encountered with the existing system of computing the 'manpower ceiling' (99). Originally the



system had been sound (when General Stuart was in Ottawa) and had allowed General McNaughton sufficient leeway to build an Army within clearly defined limits. Now, however, it was becoming too difficult to estimate accurately the number of men who would be passing through Reallocation Centres and the varying number of replacements who would be required to maintain the fighting formations at full strength during the coming months. General Stuart considered, therefore, that the 'manpower ceiling' should be revised so as to include only the war establishments of units serving with 21 Army Group, in Italy and under the command of C.M.H.Q. It had now become obvious that insufficient resources had been allowed for the maintenance services which would have to be performed by C.M.H.Q. troops after First Canadian Army left the United Kingdom (see paras 170 and 305). In other words, it would not be possible to do away with all the work being done by G.S.D. 602 units. Therefore Mr Currie's acquiescence had been obtained for an increase of 2100 men to the 'manpower ceiling'. Moreover, with a more extensive use of members of the C.W.A.C. as replacements for men General Stuart no longer believed that they should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling' (see para 181). Since they were, however, he suggested that the 'ceiling' might be raised another 2,000 to offset their employment. These proposals, he stressed, were "an adjustment only and do not mean one additional man being sent to the U.K. from Canada".

311. These views were expanded by Brigadier Penhale in a memorandum of 8 May for Brigadier deLalanne to take back to the Adjutant-General: only the Field Force, C.M.H.Q. and static units in the United Kingdom, miscellaneous units related to the administration of the Field Force and units formed to meet some temporary requirement (hitherto known as G.S.D. 602 units) should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling' while personnel in the reinforcement stream or returning from the field for disposal should not be so counted (100). Certain details had to be worked out, however, before General Stuart would be ready to make an official submission for such changes (101).

(iv) The Home Front, 1944

312. Unlike previous years there was no point in setting forth a definite Canadian Army Programme for 1944. Part of the Army was engaged in Italy and the remainder was preparing for the long awaited invasion of North-West Europe. Therefore, Mr Ralston's speech to the House of Commons on Friday, 11 Feb 44 was more a description of what Canadian troops were doing in Italy, based on observations made during his visit, and what they planned to do in North-West Europe, plus an explanation of the "McNaughton incident" which had raised quite a furore in the press. Speaking again on 14 Feb (Monday) Mr Ralston discussed the N.R.M.A. situation, the administrative 'tails' overseas and the reinforcement situation, which he considered to be satisfactory (see para 275). He hoped to have 60,000 men suitable for overseas service in the reinforcement training stream by the end of March and to send them overseas at the agreed rate of 4,000 per month. This would, Mr Ralston pointed out:

... deplete the number in the training stream. Therefore, to safeguard the future, we are budgeting for an intake of 48,000 general service plus 12,000 N.R.M.A. personnel to release general service personnel, or a total of 60,000 from the total Canadian manpower pool for 1944-45. If we achieved this intake of an average of 4,000 general service men per month it would see



us at the end of the fiscal year with reinforcement pool overseas maintained at adequate strength, and it would see us with sufficient men in training centres to fight on during 1945.

In the last three months our intake of general service men averaged a little over 3700. For January it was almost 4000. What the future will be I do not know, but certainly efforts will be steadily put forth to maintain this January rate. If recruiting should materially fall off it will begin to affect the numbers dispatched overseas in the later months of the fiscal year 1944-45 and should find us at the end of March, 1945 with the pool maintained overseas, but with the number of general service men reduced approximately by the amount of deficiency in that intake. As a further backlog we have in Canada well over 60,000 N.R.M.A. personnel, of which number perhaps 50,000 could be made available for overseas service if emergency arose and necessary action were taken (102).

313. Mr Ralston's letter of 6 Mar to the Minister of Labour was not quite so optimistic in tone. Although the Army programme for the fiscal year 1943-44 had called for the enlistment or enrolment of 8,500 per month nothing like that number had been obtained. The deficiency had grown larger as the year had progressed and only a drastic curtailment of home defences had made it possible to meet overseas commitments. The decline in peak industrial employment, started late in 1943, was gaining momentum but a considerable number of older men and women—the less efficient workers—were being laid off first and the real problem was to determine a method whereby physically fit young men could be made surplus to continuing employment and available for military service. Despite Mr MacNamara's (Deputy Minister of Labour and Director of National Selective Service) promise that sufficient men would be called to provide 5,000 recruits per month the Department of National Defence considered that a more definite commitment was necessary for the fiscal year 1944-5. Thus Mr Ralston's letter went on to point out:

When this was agreed on, I emphasized that we would want this number of 8,500 kept up but, as I have had to point out since then, there has been a very substantial deficiency. In fact we obtained only 75,000 instead of the 102,000 (8,500 per month for 12 months) which were called for in the earlier part of the year. I, on several occasions, pointed out this deficiency and asked for improvement. Increased numbers were not forthcoming but because of the fact that the intense activity which had been forecasted did not take place; and also due to the fact that it was possible to reduce the establishment of the Army in Canada I did not make an immediate issue of the matter.

This year our requirements, as we estimate them, will be 5,000 per month, making a total of 60,000 for the fiscal year 1944-45. I have been somewhat undecided as to whether to keep on requisitioning 8,500 per month with the idea that you would call up a larger number and thus be certain to get the 5,000 per month; or whether I should requisition the 5,000 per month, with an intimation that this is the minimum which we



must have and leave it to you to decide how many should be called up in order to fill that requisition.

I have decided for the present to requisition the net number of 5,000 per month. In doing this I want to point out that, with the prospect of all our forces overseas being engaged at an early date, it is most essential that our requirements of that number be met in full each month, in order to ensure that the activities of the Army are fully sustained.

This means that you will have full responsibility for deciding how many are to be called up in order to meet these monthly requisitions in full. I understand the matter has been talked over between Brigadier Nash and Mr. MacNamara, and that Brigadier Nash is assured that the cutting down of the requisition from 8,500 to 5,000 per month will in no way curtail your call-ups, but that the call-ups will be of sufficient number to make full allowance for all contingencies and give us a net of 5,000 enrolled and enlisted in the aggregate each month. I cannot impress upon you too strongly the necessity for this objective being attained each month, and I count on you to do everything to achieve that (103).

314. In his reply of 15 Mar Mr Mitchell admitted this failure but gave the following excuse:

During the last six months the Army, Navy and Air Force have obtained 65,021 men. During this period to obtain the foregoing result National Selective Service has sent Orders-Medical to 184,971 men. During this period the Army obtained 34,040 men. To attain 5,667 men per month for the Army we had to call 184,971 men (104).

In order to meet the 1944-5 requirements of 98,000 for the three Armed Forces it would be necessary to find approximately 8200 men per month and Mr Mitchell did not know how that could be done. Apart from the boys who would reach the age of 18 1/2 during the year it would be necessary to draw on men working in war and essential civilian industries, married men in Quebec who had not been called (because Reception Centres were not able to handle them\*) and delinquents produced by the checking system used by National Selective Service (see Appendix "E") Mr Mitchell added that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain certain essential civilian services, among which he listed the processing of cattle in meat packing plants, milling flour for British contract, lumbering, base metal mining and farming. He maintained that National Selective Service was doing a good job but that he was "not in a position to give you the unqualified assurance asked for in the last paragraph of your letter" (106).

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\*The D.G.M.S. office maintained that the major problem was providing sufficient French-speaking medical personnel. Whenever civilian doctors had been engaged there had been a tendency for the rejection rate to rise. It was hoped to increase the number passing through the Army Reception Centre for M.D. No. 5 from 3500 to 4000 per month (105).



315. Mr Ralston was annoyed by this answer and replied on 1 Apr as follows:

You say that "No stone has been left unturned to meet the demand". I, of course, have to accept that, but can I suggest that there are some stones that, while they may have been turned, have, perhaps, not been turned all the way over, under which there will be found quite a number of prospective recruits.

If the ratio of wastage, above mentioned, has to be accepted and cannot be reduced, then it follows logically that more men will have to be called to obtain the number required. (This is a proposition of mine with which you are familiar, and which I think still holds good.) This brings up the question of where these men are to be found.

First of all it seems to me that the number of defaulters is strikingly large. In the return you tabled in the House on March 27th, it was indicated that of 433,458 men who had been ordered for Military Training, only 220,765 had reported. The difference (212,693) presumably contains a large number of defaulters. I am informed that the figure some months ago was 125,000 but it may have been reduced or increased during the intervening months. This, I respectfully suggest, calls for even more aggressive measures of enforcement.

Secondly, postponements could now, I should think, be very materially decreased due to the change-over in Industry from production on capital account to production for replacements, which would result in a reduction in employment rolls.

It also seems that more stress might be placed on the opportunities in the Army to men who are being laid off from employment in industry. At the present time, when men are going out for a job, the burden is on your Department to find employment for them, and the reference is nearly always employment in some other industry. I suggest that those fit could profitably be required to consider, as prospective employment, a job in the Army.

There are still those in the designated classes who have not yet been called at all. Apparently the bulk of these are married men in the Province of Quebec. My information is that the Registrars in Montreal and Quebec have refrained from calling these men because the Boards automatically grant them postponements on compassionate grounds, for the reason that there are still some single men not called. You will probably have some information on this.

Finally, there are those who reach the age of 18 1/2 this coming year. On your own figures, these numbers gross 108,000 a year. You estimate a yield from this source of about 48,000. My information is that the yield in U.S. from 18 1/2 year olds is 60 to 65% after deducting hardship



cases, students, etc. I would suggest therefore that a yield figure of 60,000 or 55% of that part of the manpower pool would be a conservative estimate (107).

He suggested that at least 50,000 of those called had never reported and estimated that there should still be 459,702 men available for call, or 38,510 per month\*. He admitted that medical rejections did exceed acceptances but, except for Quebec, by only very small margins. The tremendous backlog in Quebec had been created as a result of "abnormal rejections" by civilian practitioners and the consequent number of revision medical examinations made necessary. It was, however, the National Selective Revision Boards (partially staffed by the R.C.A.M.C.) and not the Army Medical Boards which had been unable to handle this backlog. The Army was taking steps to expand its examining facilities. In conclusion he called for a more strenuous effort:

With regard to the point about manpower generally, I have comparative figures for U.K., U.S. and Canada. The percentage of population in the Armed Forces in Canada does not, to say the least, exceed in any particular the percentage in the U.K. and U.S. As a matter of fact, according to these figures, the U.S. percentages are somewhat higher even under current conditions and will be higher yet with their projected programme.

Impending events force me to stress once more the vital necessity of providing the Army requirements in full. If you feel that in the light of the above observations, you still feel yourself unable to give me the assurance of providing requirements for the current year in full, then I would request that the manpower question should be brought before the Manpower Committee in order to review policies and methods regarding manpower (109).

316. Mr Mitchell's reply of 15 Apr denied most of these accusations (110). He claimed that there were only 14,077 men unaccounted for and that men in industry were not transferred to other civilian employment, when laid off, unless they had some special skill and were needed in a high priority industry.

\*Recruiting procedures had been simplified by the establishment of Army Reception Centres (see para 199), but the following statistics, for the four week period ending 8 Apr 44, suggest that certain Divisional Registrars were not calling sufficient men to allow for medical rejections (108):

<u>Military District</u>	<u>Present Monthly Requisition</u>	<u>Total Examined</u>	<u>Total Intake</u>
1	290	641	391
2	810	1795	960
3	380	582	222
4	930	1704	534
5	525	832	201
6	285	414	205
7	240	387	132
10	405	644	259
Pac Comd	285	401	352
12	485	412	197
13	<u>365</u>	<u>430</u>	<u>307</u>
	5000	8242	3760



Apart from the 65,021 men accepted for the Armed Forces during the period 1 Sep 43-29 Feb 44, his Department showed the following disposition:

(a) Number of men found unfit by private physicians and Army doctors	83969
(b) Men excepted from Mobilization Regulations	8377
(c) Postponements granted	57332
(d) Not available, i.e. outside Canada, dead, in jail, etc.	9709
(e) Presumed delinquent cases created	<u>58626</u>
GRAND TOTAL	218013
(f) Delinquents located	<u>86222</u>
Net TOTAL	131791

A certain number of the 18 1/2 year old youths already had been enlisted into the R.C.A.F. and about half of those physically fit would become airmen. It had been estimated that about 38 per cent of this age class would be found to be medically unfit and a further 13 per cent would be granted postponement as agricultural workers and students.

317. Mr Mitchell blamed the situation in Quebec on poor management in the early days. Although the population was almost as large as that of Ontario there were only two Mobilization Boards against the latter's four. Latterly National Selective Service had been requisitioning more men than the R.C.A.M.C. could cope with: i.e. more than 700 per day in Montreal. Once again he suggested forming labour battalions: in addition to N.R.M.A. personnel, uniformed conscientious objectors, non-declarant aliens (see Appendix "B") and Japanese and Chinese could thus be employed on essential civilian work. In this way there would be no question of taking citizens out of industry and allowing aliens to remain. In conclusion, however, he assured Mr Ralston that "not only is the Labour Department doing its best but that everything within the bounds of possibility is being done" (111).

318. Although he refused to accept the Department of Labour argument that army organization in the province of Quebec was at fault, Mr Ralston seems to have been satisfied with Mr Mitchell's promise to provide the necessary men. The proposal to form labour battalions was another matter, however, and Mr Ralston's letter of 30 Apr reminded the Minister of Labour that:

... this possibility has been considered fully on several occasions. As I stated in the House, the H.D. personnel in Canada who are of suitable age and category are potential reinforcements should the need arise and the necessary action be taken. As such they must be kept in constant training. Our experience with the Forestry and Railway troops and Port Battalions has demonstrated the difficulties encountered with respect to labour relations, wages, hours and conditions of work. I mention these points, not with any desire to withhold co-operation, but as an illustration of the administrative difficulties which would be faced with this whole matter of labour battalions.... (112).



319. It might be mentioned that a more adequate utilization of the men being recruited, and those already in the Army, followed the action being taken to reduce still further the Training Centre organization. Moreover, the decision to increase the allocation of G.S. recruits to Infantry from 50 to 68 per cent (at the expense of Armoured Corps and Artillery) had made it necessary to alter the Link Training Plan system introduced only during August 1943 (see para 248). On 30 Mar General Murchie sent his proposals to the Minister of National Defence; for the next few months the training intake should consist of 7000 (4000 GS recruits, 2000 GS withdrawals from units in Canada and 1000 N.R.M.A. enrolments) which would produce 4000 GS trained reinforcements for despatch overseas and sufficient GS personnel with lowered medical category and N.R.M.A. soldiers to provide for the needs of home defence and the Home War Establishment (113). After minor details had been ironed out the Minister of National Defence gave his approval (114). Over the next few months five Basic Training Centres and one Advanced Training Centre were closed and the capacity of a further six Basic and three Advanced Training Centres was reduced (115). The capacity of the Officers' Training Centre (Brockville) already had been drastically reduced. All of this resulted in a considerable saving in administrative and training personnel.

320. Actual intake, by enlistment and enrolment, for the first three months of 1944 was:

	<u>Voluntary Enlistments</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>N.R.M.A. Enrolment</u>
January	3804	398	2145
February	3015	422	1916
March	2787	436	1858

For the week ending 1 Apr the Directorate of Army Recruiting estimated that voluntary male enlistments had decreased about 59 per cent from the same period in 1934 (116). The Adjutant-General already had decided that in order to maintain the required flow of reinforcements overseas, further withdrawals would have to be made from Atlantic and Pacific Commands in the numbers in which replacements (N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers) could be made available (117). Following a conference with the several D.Os.C. and G.Os.C. at Ottawa (11-15 Apr) he gave his approval for a "gloves off" recruiting campaign which would include a distinct effort to persuade N.R.M.A. soldiers to "go active" (118). Preparations got under way at once, even though the Army Commander had refused to provide a message to give weight to his campaign and had pointed out:

Firstly, it is not my opinion that the majority of the personnel forming the Canadian Army Overseas would support the view expressed.... Indeed if a vote were taken a reverse opinion might well be the majority's decision.

Secondly, the matter of a voluntary vs a conscripted Canadian Army has become a political issue in Canada. Whatever my personal views might be it is highly undesirable that the expression of them at this juncture and having regard to my position as Commander in Chief should become a matter for acrimonious debate at home or within the Canadian Army Overseas (119).



321. Although it had been common knowledge for some time\* not until 10 Apr was it disclosed publicly, by the Minister of Labour during a press conference, that the N.R.M.A. call-up machinery was inducing men to volunteer for "general service". According to The Ottawa Journal of that date:

"The call-up serves a double purpose," said Mr MacNamara. "When a man knows he is going to be called he usually tries to enlist in the Navy or Air Force. If he isn't taken by them he is available to the Army, if fit to meet medical requirements."

322. With the needs for home defence further reduced it was obvious that more vigorous attempts should be made to convince the N.R.M.A. members of the Canadian Army to volunteer for overseas service. That recruiting propaganda was being directed at these different groups was evident as the campaign proceeded, particularly from outbursts such as General Pearkes was reported to have made in British Columbia. One such was reported on 24 Apr 44 as follows:

"No man should wear 'that khaki uniform' unless he is willing to wear it anywhere", Major-General Pearkes, general officer commanding-in-chief of Pacific Command, said in an address here Saturday to a group of Pacific coast rangers.

"Many young soldiers are quite satisfied to say they are doing their duty by defending this coast," General Pearkes said. "That is not 100 per cent service."

"The appeal has gone out to every soldier to volunteer heart and soul to support his comrades who now are ready to launch the invasion." (121)

323. On the other hand, four days later (26 Apr) the Quebec Provincial legislative assembly approved the following resolution by a vote of 55 to 4:

... that this House reaffirms its unyielding disapproval of sending recruits overseas, following a recent speech by the Minister of National Defence, Mr Ralston, who declared that 'if it becomes necessary it could be done by taking appropriate measures' (122).

324. On 8 Jun The Ottawa Journal reported the previous night's radio address of Brigadier James Mess (D.A.G. (C) in charge of the recruiting campaign) as follows:

I want to appeal to several classes of young men in Canada who are still waiting—God knows what for. They are to be found in industry. They are pretending that their conscience is clear because they prefer to consider themselves as indispensable. They have been deferred for this or that reason, or are hiding away in the

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\*A study of 30 Nov 43 had indicated that of 196,681 G.S. personnel 38 per cent had enlisted entirely of their own volition: eight per cent had volunteered between the time of receiving an Order-Medical Examination and that examination, 10 per cent following medical categorization, 19 per cent before reporting to a Training Centre, while the remaining nine per cent was indeterminate (120).



bush and making themselves scarce.

I challenge each and every one of those men to stand before a mirror, look at himself and put the questions, 'Is my conscience clear?' 'Am I really indispensable?' 'Should I not take my proper place at the side of my brother Canadians and let some older man, some woman, do this job that may not, after all, be very intricate or very important?' 'What shall I answer when this war is over when I am asked where did I serve?' 'What shall I say—I didn't have to go, I wasn't needed, I was indispensable behind a plow or in a factory?'

... You are a man and you cannot hide behind a petticoat, whether it be your wife's or your mother's....

... Your decision to get into the King's uniform for general service to become trained, skilled and tough, is yours to make in this hour of dire emergency.

325. Ment'ion already has been made of the further withdrawals ordered from Pacific and Atlantic Commands (see para 320). As early as 2 Feb the Adjutant-General had instructed that all G.S. personnel, up to and including the rank of corporal, should be withdrawn from Pacific Command (it was believed that there should be upwards of 1200 in the 6th Division alone) and placed in the reinforcement stream for service overseas (123). Actual survey disclosed that 1764 men (including 780 tradesmen and 114 specialists) actually were available but, in his reply of 7 Feb, General Pearkes pointed out that if these soldiers were withdrawn all at once:

... the operational efficiency of the units will be adversely affected in a manner out of all proportion to the numbers withdrawn because nearly all the individuals concerned fill key positions such as signallers and other specialists, tradesmen and junior N.C.Os. (124).

326. Since such a step would be tampering with the operational efficiency of the 6th Division the question was placed before the Minister of National Defence on 21 Mar (125). The C.G.S. pointed out that this division's role, as defined on 31 Aug 43, was:

- (a) As a trained force for any future commitments which may be undertaken in the Pacific Theatre of operations.
- (b) As a potential source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas.
- (c) To meet any unexpected deterioration in the situation (126).

General Pearkes had been informed that the three roles had equal importance. Continuing, however, General Murchie wrote:

The 6th Division is composed largely of N.R.M.A. personnel and if a decision is eventually reached to employ such personnel on service outside of Canada, it seems logical that they should be used in the theatre where our main effort is



being made, and it is unlikely that they will be employed in a subsidiary theatre so long as the main effort still requires a continuous flow of reinforcements. On that basis the early employment of a Brigade Group or Groups of 6th Division, in offensive operations outside of Canada, appears unlikely and the withdrawal of the remaining General Service personnel in these units may be accepted.

On the understanding, therefore, that the deterioration in morale can be accepted and that we will not be called upon for commitments in the Pacific theatre until suitable replacements have been made available and trained, I am prepared to concur in the Adjutant-General's recommendation that this personnel be withdrawn and recommend accordingly.

Mr Ralston gave his approval, provided that N.R.M.A. soldiers were trained as replacements (127).

327. Similarly, it was planned to withdraw 3000 G.S. soldiers from units and establishments in Atlantic Command (1400 by 22 Apr and 1600 by 7 May) (128). (During late April the United States War Department agreed to the Canadian garrison of Newfoundland being reduced by a further infantry battalion) (129)

328. Modification had followed almost at once. The C.M.H.Q. agreement of 29 Mar to accept the 13th Brigade as a formation, introduced another phase in the campaign to obtain trained volunteers for overseas service (see para 301). The Adjutant-General proceeded to Pacific Command at once to ascertain whether sufficient N.R.M.A. soldiers would volunteer (since the idea had been discussed only with General Pearkes and not with unit commanders). On 31 Mar the Adjutant-General telegraphed General Murchie to the effect that all G.S. personnel in the 6th Division should be posted to this brigade, rather than proceed overseas on individual drafts (130). Agreement was despatched the following day (131).

329. Steps were taken at once to encourage N.R.M.A. personnel to volunteer for "general service". If this should prove successful it was planned to extend the offer to other home defence units. As the case for conversion was supposed to stand or fall on the attitude taken by members of the 13th Brigade, however, several paragraphs are devoted to this story. They are based on a lengthy report of 2 May submitted by Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, then commanding the 13th Brigade, to General Pearkes.

330. Brigadier Macklin wrote that when he had visited the 13th Brigade at Kiska in Mid-December 1943 it had appeared to be "a well trained Bde Gp with high morale, and the men were in fine physical condition and excellent health" (132). Complete staff changes had been made following their return to British Columbia. Leave had been granted to all ranks and a considerable number (eight per cent of Le Régiment de Hull) had failed to return. The lowering of morale was attributed to a deep-rooted belief among the men that they would never be sent to fight, and an "intense desire" to return to the factory or farm, instead of the more usual type of complaints about bad food, bad quarters, bad clothing and lack of amusements. The request for 140 'Canloan' officers strengthened this belief, and officers did not know whether to go or stay. The reinforcements eventually received had gained the same listless attitude as a result of sitting around District Depots or Training Centres.



One of the unit padres went so far as to claim that there was a complete absence of any spiritual or moral driving force among the men.

331. When the recruiting campaign got under way on 30 Mar the several commanding officers had seemed confident of obtaining sufficient voluntary enlistments to ensure success. In addition, "Active" personnel from the remaining units of the division were to be allotted to units of the 13th Brigade as follows: The Prince Edward Island Highlanders and The Royal Regiment of Canada (3rd Battalion) to The Rocky Mountain Rangers; The Oxford Rifles and The Prince of Wales Rangers to The Canadian Fusiliers, The Winnipeg Light Infantry and The Prince Albert Volunteers to The Winnipeg Grenadiers (3rd Battalion), and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent and Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke to Le Régiment de Hull; those of the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment, R.C.A. and R.C.E. units would go to any of the four battalions as needed.

332. Brigadier Macklin noted that when he spoke to the men of The Canadian Fusiliers and The Rocky Mountain Rangers on 31 Mar he got a good reception from the few G.S. soldiers but:

On the other hand the response of the NRMA men, and of a large proportion of the NRMA NCOs was very disappointing. There was no great rush to enlist, and although officers at once began to interview their companies and platoons, by evening less than 100 men had volunteered from each of the two English-speaking battalions in Vernon. Figures received from the Winnipeg Grenadiers indicated about the same result.

In the Le Régiment de Hull matters were even worse. This unit had, to begin with, no more than a mere handful of active personnel, probably not more than a dozen among its other ranks. Practically all the NCOs, and even two acting CSMS, were NRMA men. These Warrant Officers and NCOs gave little or no support of any kind to their Commanding Officer, and not more than a handful of soldiers enlisted after the Commanding Officer's appeal (133).

The Command (Roman Catholic) Chaplain (H/Lt.-Col. A.J. Schimnowski) visited the Brigade on 4 Apr but had to confess that the resistance of the men was "amazingly strong" and that he had reduced more than one man to tears without persuading him to enlist for overseas service. Other Chaplains worked diligently but with little success. Major Paul Triquet, V.C., was sent to harangue Le Régiment de Hull on 11 Apr but persuaded only a couple of dozen men to enlist.

333. Enlistments continued at a rate of 10-15 per day in the English-speaking units while 40-50 vociferous obstructionists from each were sent away ("anti-recruiting influences") and placed in a camp by themselves; there they were subjected to a rigorous training schedule "but nothing resembling persecution". In Le Régiment de Hull two acting C.S.Ms. were sent back to depots in their permanent ranks and a number of N.C.Os\* reduced because they would not volunteer. (Brigadier Macklin

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\*Although N.R.M.A. personnel could enlist for general service only as private soldiers, Routine Order 3631 of 18 Sep 43 provided that they could be given back their acting rank immediately (but not confirmed) at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.



considered that the practice of promoting N.R.M.A. soldiers to be N.C.Os. had been detrimental). With the arrival of drafts from other units of the 6th Canadian Division a number of men became convinced that the Brigade actually was going overseas and changed their minds about enlisting. When the special recruiting effort came to an end on 19 Apr the total active strength of the Brigade was 1973, made up as follows: Brigade Headquarters 37, Brigade Signals 77, Defence Platoon 24, The Canadian Fusiliers 477, The Rocky Mountain Rangers 579, The Winnipeg Grenadiers 484 and Le Régiment de Hull 295. On 1 Apr there had been only 370 G.S. soldiers in the Brigade: 676 had been induced to "go active" and 927 had been transferred from elsewhere. On 24 Apr a further 100 'bad actors' were transferred away. By 1 May some 800 members of the Brigade had enlisted and enough additional G.S. soldiers were transferred to raise the total "active" strength to 2432.

334. Apart from actual combat the 13th Brigade had experienced all the rigours of active service and no other formation in Canada stood as good a chance to "go active". The following paragraphs from Brigadier Macklin's Report are his considered reasons why this attempt met with such limited success:

... If there ever had been outward distinction between the volunteer and the N.R.M.A. soldier in these units it had long since disappeared. I had hoped that it would not re-appear but this hope was not fulfilled. The instant the announcement was made that 13 Infantry Brigade would mobilize on a volunteer basis the active personnel mentally ranged themselves in a body on one side and the N.R.M.A. ranged themselves on the other, and the gulf between them widened and deepened daily.

On the other hand we started with a cadre of officers and N.C.Os. and a few men whose highest ambition was to get to grips with the enemy in the shortest possible time. The disappointment of this group at the obvious reluctance, not to say outright refusal, of the N.R.M.A. soldiers to enlist was intense. The feeling rapidly changed from disappointment to scorn, and even to anger, mingled with incredulity.

I feel sure that this feeling is strongest among the rank and file of the men themselves. It is not too much to say that the volunteer soldier in many cases literally despises the N.R.M.A. soldier. And it is an interesting psychological fact that when an N.R.M.A. man enlists he frequently changes his own attitude to his former comrades with startling and even amusing suddenness and completeness.

The volunteer feels himself a man quite apart from the N.R.M.A. man. He regards himself as a free man who had the courage to make a decision. He seldom takes the trouble to analyze the manifold reasons put forward by those who won't enlist. He lumps them all together as no more than feeble excuses masking cowardice, selfishness and bad citizenship. In many cases no doubt he is right. In others he may be wrong, but the fact remains that the antipathy between these two classes of soldiers starts right in the barrack room. The rift is there all the time.



In 13 Infantry Brigade it had healed over at Kiska but the moment the pressure was put on, it opened up instantly, and widened progressively. It can be detected with ease in the attitude of the men. The volunteer is conscious of his position. He is proud of it. He is anxious to work. He salutes his officers and speaks to them with self confidence. The N.R.M.A. soldier slouches at his work. He tends to become sullen. He nurses his fancied grudge against "the Army". He hates "the Army". He has little self respect and therefore little respect for his officers.

I have seen this feeling developed to an amazing degree in 13 Infantry Brigade during the month of April, as men enlisted and new drafts of volunteers arrived. On 1 April the 13 Brigade was a unified formation even though Esprit-de-Corps and morale were none too high for the reasons given as above. But three weeks later 13 Brigade was rent into two distinct bodies of men poles apart in feeling and outlook. By 1 May there were 2600 active personnel of high morale, fine bearing and excellent spirit, and on the other hand there were about 1600 or 1700 N.R.M.A. soldiers discontented and unhappy; a solid mass of men who had resisted successfully every appeal to their manhood and citizenship, despised by their former comrades, and finally rejected even by their officers as hopeless material out of which to make a fighting force. These men take pride in only one thing they have beaten "the Army"; they have beaten "the government" (134).

335. The Officer Commanding Le Régiment de Hull did not think that any large number of French-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers could ever be induced to volunteer for overseas service. As regards the English-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers who refused to volunteer Brigadier Macklin wrote as follows:

... they vary all the way from a large number who have no patriotism or national feeling whatever, to a few intelligent men, who, I believe, honestly think that by holding out they will some day force the Government to adopt conscription which they feel is the only fair system.

The great majority are of non-British origin—Germanic, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin predominating. Moreover, most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with a passionate attachment to the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist. Here again the process of converting these men into free citizens of a free country willing to volunteer and die for their country will be a matter of education, and I think it will be slow. At present there is a negligible national pride or patriotism among them. They are not like Cromwell's "Good Soldier" who "knows what he fights for and loves what he knows". They do not know what they are fighting for and they love



nothing but themselves and their land. This fact must be recognized (135).

336. There was the further widespread feeling that the Government's manpower policy was unfair. With thousands of deserters on the loose and "nothing" done about them there was no incentive for these men "to soldier". The policy of granting extended leave to agricultural and other workers had resulted in such a barrage of applications that it was impossible to determine which were deserving. Brigadier Macklin was personally convinced that men would never volunteer as long as there was a possibility of being released to civilian life on extended leave. The whole campaign was a disappointment since the Brigade had been able to provide only 800 G.S. soldiers.

337. On 6 May personnel proceeded on embarkation leave, and, as their homes were mainly in the east, they were allowed to report back at various staging centres.\* Writing from Debert on 25 May the diarist of Le Régiment de Hull noted:

Some seven other ranks left camp last night and have not yet reported back. They are considered A.W.L. It had been noticed that these men had received money by telegram the previous day; should men proceeding overseas be permitted to receive money by telegram previous to embarkation?

The Rocky Mountain Rangers reported 14 absentees on 21 May, although two of the men appear to have been delayed by normal causes on the way east. The Brigade sailed from Halifax on 26 May. Following arrival at Gourock the 13th Brigade was concentrated in Yorkshire, retaining its identity.

338. Here it was joined on 30 Jul by Le Régiment de Montmagny, which had been able to take over 484 all ranks to further help the situation as regards French-speaking infantry reinforcements (136). Actually an offer similar to that extended the 13th Brigade had been made in Atlantic Command. Two French-speaking units, Le Régiment de Montmagny in Newfoundland and Le Régiment de Joliette at Rimouski, and The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, from Ontario but stationed at Sussex, N.B., were told that they might proceed overseas as formed units if at least 500 of their personnel would volunteer for general service (137). Despite harangues by Major-General P.E. Leclerc (G.O.C., Canadian Troops, Newfoundland) and the employment of recruiting tactics similar to those resorted to in Pacific Command it was not possible for Le Régiment de Montmagny to obtain 500 volunteers, even after personnel had been exchanged with the nearby Régiment de St. Hyacinthe. Nevertheless, Le Régiment de Montmagny returned to Canada to continue recruiting. In practice it was allowed to sail after receiving the volunteers available in Le Régiment de Joliette which had made a very bad showing in its abortive recruiting campaign (138).

339. The following extracts from the war diary of Le Régiment de Joliette help to explain why this unit could not obtain sufficient volunteers for overseas service:

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\*War Diary of The Winnipeg Grenadiers for 17 May recounts ... "At 1150 hrs Montreal was reached and the party changed to a troop train for Debert, N.S. Discontent was evidenced by the men when it was discovered that a party of NRMA ptes on draft from a district depot to a basic training camp were travelling in style in a Pullman Coach complete with sheets and a porter while Grenadiers up to and including the rank of WO II were sharing the hard wooden accommodations of a Colonists Car."



- 1 May - The Coy Comds and their Offrs announce the news to our men that our Unit was chosen for Overseas. The news does not strike the recruits as we had expected it would. It left them quite indifferent. Of course, we expected something like that but not quite as much.
- 5 May - Lieut.Col. J. Lafontaine M.C. arrives in camp and starts interviewing each Offr individually as to the reason why the men are not signing active and also interviews the odd man.
- 10 May - All the Offrs are assembled in the Orderly Room and are introduced to Lieuts. Col. Jean Tellier, Dansereau, Boivin, Capt. Lemont P.R.O. M.D. 5 and Mr Leon Trepannier. These Offrs were sent here in order to interview the Offrs and find out what was wrong with the recruiting. They all addressed the Offrs and afterwards we had a friendly discussion as to what should be done. We all told them that the boys were not interested in signing active, but that they would gladly go overseas if they did not have to sign, also that the parents of these boys had made them promise not to sign and if they did some of them could never go back home. Also they are under the impression that the Government does not require their services and if they did would conscript them. From the Offrs point of view sending these Res. Offrs to pep them up was not the wisest move for they more or less told us that we were slackers and are to blame for our men not signing active and if they were in our position maybe they would not have the same attitude. We would like to know on what ground they stand to speak that way to Active Offrs who have repeatedly offered their services to go overseas and have served in areas where their services have been requested, whereas these Res. Offrs have nothing to show for the last war and very little for this war. The only thing their visit did was make the Offrs sore and nothing was gained by it for we are sore enough the way things are turning out without having it rubbed in.

340. Earlier calls for reinforcements had taken the greater part of the (still physically fit) personnel mobilized with the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles in 1940 and the N.R.M.A. replacements now refused to volunteer, stating that the Government could send them overseas as conscripts if it so desired (139). This unit also did not obtain sufficient volunteers to proceed overseas.

341. On 9 Aug 44 a similar offer was made to The Victoria Rifles of Canada and the same difficulty was experienced. The offer was held open, however, and, after its continuing N.R.M.A. personnel had been replaced by G.S. soldiers remustered



from elsewhere, the unit sailed from Halifax on 21 Nov (140). En route to Canada from garrison duty in Jamaica the same proposition had been handed to the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) on 26 Jul: even though the time limit was similarly extended this unit was able to raise its volunteer strength to only 301 other ranks\*.

342. As early as 14 Jun 44 the Cabinet Manpower Committee had discussed the future availability of men for the Army, in view of General Stuart's telegram of 6 Jun that the latest War Office activity forecast envisaged an operational situation where Canadian reinforcement requirements for the remainder of 1944 and first six months of 1945 would exceed the number which had been requested from Canada (see para 387). Therefore, the Ministers of National Defence for Air and Naval Services were requested to explore the possibility of curtailing their own needs. On 28 Jun the last named Minister reported that the Navy would not recruit beyond minimum requirements: 2000 men would be required for July and August but thenceforth the intake could drop to 500 per month. The Minister of National Defence for Air had already expressed his willingness to allow those surplus to the R.C.A.F.'s training needs to volunteer for the Army. The original intention was that the Army Recruiting Campaign should run during June and July only, although it might be extended into August if real progress was being made. During the course of a National Campaign Committee meeting on 25 Jul Brigadier Mess stated that:

... Whilst the Districts had got going fairly well by 5 Jun it was felt that the general publicity only commenced to make an impression during the past three weeks. Feeling in the Districts was that the best period for recruiting was from September to November and that a further two months of intensification would be highly desirable now that momentum is under way and publicity ensuing... (142).

343. By mid-August the Government realized, however, that the type of newspaper advertising carried in this "gloves off" campaign was resulting in a storm of protest across the country. Since N.R.M.A. personnel provided a ready source of trained soldiers much of the advertising had been aimed at the man's family, suggesting that its members do nothing to discourage him from enlisting for general service. In order to avoid further criticism, therefore, the Deputy Minister of National Defence instructed that all further recruiting publicity should be cleared through the Wartime Information Board (143). The tone of the recruiting campaign which had been attempted may be gathered from the following advertisements submitted, but not approved, for distribution (144):

Gratuities for G.S. Soldiers  
Black Market  
In this Final Hour the Heart of Business Will  
Not Fail.

In a further effort to improve the co-operation between the Departments of National Defence and Labour (National Selective

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\*The C.G.S. decided to move this unit to Debert Camp anyway, complete it with G.S. personnel and despatch it overseas. Actually the decision to send N.R.M.A. infantrymen overseas was made while the Irish Fusiliers still were at Debert so, when this unit finally did depart, it was with a mixed flight of G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements (141).



Service) which had been handled through the Directorate of Organization (R), Lt-Col. A.L. Tosland was appointed Liaison Officer to National Selective Service. As such the recruiting campaign was brought to a close on 30 Sep. Comparison of the following statistics with those for the same months of 1943 (see para 230) indicates the enlistments were higher for the months of July, August and September 1944:

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	3908	1736	5644
May	3593	1025	4618
June	4207	3259	7466
July	4324	1308	5632
August	5163	1595	7758
September	4774	1164	6938

This increase was due largely to conversions from N.R.M.A. however, since after five years of War the recruiting staffs were having to scrape the bottom of the manpower pool where physical and mental specimens were poorest.

344. Again, as in the previous summer, steps were taken to pare further segments from the home defences, as reduced forms and scales of attack were approved by the Cabinet War Committee and notified to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Since operational infantry units were coming to consist more and more of N.R.M.A. soldiers it was necessary to direct attention to further coast defence installations and the larger home war establishments, such as Ordnance Depots and Training Centres. General Murchie's submission to the Minister of National Defence of 19 Jul was far reaching and proposed the elimination of all coast defence installations which would have no post-war requirement: that is, coast and anti-aircraft artillery defences were to be retained only at Halifax, Sydney and Saint John on the east coast and Esquimalt, Vancouver (and Yorke Island) and Prince Rupert on the west coast (145); the protection of industrial areas in Ontario and Quebec (146) was to become the responsibility of the Reserve Army (see Appendix "H"). In addition, all 9.2-in. gun batteries and the third gun of all 6-in. gun batteries at the continuing forts were to be placed in maintenance. As submitted to the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Jul and approved, the number of troops on operational duties and proposed reductions were (147):

TROOPS ON OPERATIONAL DUTIES

CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

(Ecl HQ Defence Areas, etc.)

<u>EAST COAST</u>	<u>Prior to Reductions</u>		<u>Subsequent to Reductions</u>	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
(incl Arvida)				
Saint John	81	1638	11	342
Gaspé	10	324		
Shelburne & Yarmouth	15	468		
Halifax	145	2975	139	2798
Sydney	116	2569	112	2429
Arvida	36	622		
Quebec, PQ	2	66	2	66
	<u>405</u>	<u>8662</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>5635</u>



"W" FORCE

St John's (incl Torbay)	158	2725	149	2498
Gander	52	912	46	748
Botwood	32	398	32	398
Lewisporte	14	242	14	242
Goose	<u>50</u>	<u>1019</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>1019</u>
	<u>306</u>	<u>5296</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>4905</u>

WEST COAST

Vancouver (incl Bella Bella)	91	1977	75	1561
Victoria (incl Tofino- Ucluelet)	209	4457	188	4085
Prince Rupert (incl Alliford Bay)	<u>107</u>	<u>2144</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>2084</u>
	<u>407</u>	<u>8578</u>	<u>368</u>	<u>7730</u>

TOTALS (Excl HQ Defences  
Areas Services, etc.)

	<u>1118</u>	<u>22536</u>	<u>923</u>	<u>18270</u>
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Difference

	195	4266		
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Less Misc Services &  
Maint Personnel

	<u>7</u>	<u>204</u>		
	<u>188</u>	<u>4062</u>		

Add estimated reductions  
in Staffs, Services etc.

	<u>15</u>	<u>200</u>		
	203	4262		

Total Estimated Reductions (say 200 Offrs, 4250 ORs.)

345. Further reductions proposed by D.M.O. & P. during September, and subsequently approved, by the Cabinet War Committee (27 Sep), called for the garrison at Goose Bay to be reduced to 31 officers and 588 other ranks before the freeze-up and the Canadian troops in Newfoundland to be reduced to 3700 all ranks before the end of the year (in line with the United States Army's proposed reduction to 3300 men) (148).

346. During the ensuing conscription crisis it was possible to eliminate the battery of 8-in. railway guns at Prince Rupert, for a saving of two officers and 126 other ranks, and remove anti-aircraft artillery equipments from Sydney and the Vancouver-Sea Island area for a saving of 109 officers and 1959 other ranks. The C.G.S. told a conference of D.Os.C. on 14 Nov that temporary reductions in the strengths of continuing batteries would have to be accepted so that personnel suitable for remustering to Infantry could be withdrawn (149). As of 20 Nov, however, the following troops were employed on operational duty in the North American Area (150):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
Atlantic Coast	404	4,959
Newfoundland	256	3,861
Labrador	35	608
Pacific Coast	747	10,581
Eastern Canada	67	946
Bermuda	6	187
Jamaica	38	761
Nassau	6	159



British Guiana	<u>2</u>	<u>24</u>
	1,561	22,086
Field Units:		
unbrigaded	138	2,780
Brigades-	585	11,128
Pacific Command		
Exercise Eskimo	<u>43</u>	<u>913</u>
Total	2,327	36,907

The strength of non-operational troops on 29 Nov was 8317 officers (and 893 Nursing Sisters) and 54,935 G.S. and 16,277 N.R.M.A. other ranks; members of the C.W.A.C. totalled 492 officers and 8690 other ranks; there were 8833 civilians. Further curtailments of operational troops did not become an actuality until early 1945.



PART IV - ACTIVE OPERATIONS

(1) - Canadians In Italy - Their First Year

347. During the course of early discussions consequent upon the decision to have Canadian troops participate in the invasion of Sicily agreement was reached that reinforcements should be provided against two months' wastage at "intense" rates—396 officers and 5732 other ranks. Although proportionately higher than the authorized British holdings for the Eighth Army this figure had been set deliberately by General McNaughton "in order that battle casualties may be returned to the United Kingdom to educate other Canadian troops in battle craft" (2). The General Officer Commanding, 1st Canadian Infantry Division was unwilling to accept the view that his formation should be a "battle school" through which the "maximum number of untried reinforcements" should be passed but he was assured that a proper proportion of recoverable casualties\*\* would be returned to his command (3).

348. Since Canadian troops in the Mediterranean would be placed "in combination with" British troops under the command of General Sir Harold Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, 15th Army Group, arrangements were made to attach Canadian Sections to its 1st and 2nd Echelons (C.M.H.Q. Report 178). The Officer in Charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was made responsible for carrying out the policies of the Canadian Force Commander and of Canadian military authorities in the United Kingdom. The Officer in Charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was to represent Canadian problems to what was really the Adjutant-General's office at the base (4). The latter was also responsible for ensuring that unit deficiencies in personnel were replenished and the forward stock of reinforcements replaced. Reinforcement deficiencies at the base would be made good from the United Kingdom. Since this involved matters of policy the actual demands went forward from the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon to C.M.H.Q. which would have available men despatched from Canadian Reinforcement Units.

349. In order to adhere to current (but not yet officially approved) British practice, No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot of four battalions was authorized to accompany

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\*Due to the current reorganization of the infantry battalions back to four rifle companies and changes within the reinforcement units it proved necessary to withdraw 1563 other ranks from other formations of First Canadian Army to complete this pool. Because of security reasons units were not informed of the reasons for such transfers and took the opportunity of unloading a number of their worst soldiers (1).

\*\*General McNaughton was aware of the COSSAC recommendation, approved by the "TRIDENT" Conference in Washington, that seven battle experienced formations should be returned to the United Kingdom to stiffen the untried formations being assembled there. Therefore, there was an understanding with the War Office that the Canadian troops should be returned to the United Kingdom during the autumn so that the whole of First Canadian Army could participate in the 1944 invasion of North-West Europe (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 182).



the Force: Nos. 1 and 2 Battalions to hold infantry reinforcements, No. 3 those of all other corps, while No. 4 Battalion was to hold a proportion of reinforcements for all corps (117 officers and 1338 other ranks) in order to be able immediately to supply replacements to the Field units (5). In spite of initial objections from both the War Office and A.F.H.Q. against reinforcements being landed so close behind the assaulting formations agreement was reached that No. 4 Battalion might be landed in Sicily on D plus 3. Heavy casualties did not occur during the early stages of this operation but it was possible to employ the reinforcement personnel on beach maintenance duties (6). The remainder of No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot was established in and around Philippeville, North Africa, where British base installations for the Eighth Army were located.

350. On 22 Jul the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was ready to send forward from North Africa a number of drivers for replacement vehicles and on the following day instructed the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to prepare a general draft against a demand for 600 reinforcements. No priority having been given this demand, however, shipping space could not be obtained and continued delays prevented Canadian reinforcements from sailing until 5 Aug, only one day before the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was withdrawn into Army reserve (7). On 29 Aug the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was informed that henceforth 5000 reinforcements would be despatched fortnightly from Philippeville for the Eighth Army's three infantry divisions (including the 1st Canadian Infantry Division) (8).

351. Further change proved necessary as a result of the agreement reached early in October that the balance of 1st Canadian Corps might be despatched to Italy. Although early plans called for the provision of only one month's reinforcements at "intense" rates of wastage to accompany the "TIMBERWOLF" Force the availability of shipping space made it appear desirable to collect further reinforcements (9). Finding the additional men proved even more difficult this time and a number had to be taken from G.S.D. 602 units and the permanent establishment (P.E.) of Reinforcement Units. In the end a total of 806 officers and 8160 other ranks were despatched as reinforcements with the first two "TIMBERWOLF" convoys, leaving 77 officers and 733 other ranks to follow in December to complete the pool for 1st Canadian Corps to two months' wastage at "intense" rates (10). On 6 Nov, however, Brigadier A.W. Beament, who had reached Naples where he was to assume the appointment of Officer i/c Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon (15th Army Group), despatched a telegram back to C.M.H.Q. pointing out that the number of reinforcements on the "TIMBERWOLF" sailings had created a sufficient pool in the Mediterranean, making it unnecessary to provide further replacements until he had had time to assess the whole situation (11). Therefore, only 10 officers and 329 tradesmen were collected for the December sailing of convoy KMF 27 from the United Kingdom (12).

352. A second Base Reinforcement Depot of four battalions had been authorized, along with a No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group to command the two depots and a number of small miscellaneous units (13). Brigadier Beament's telegram of 6 Nov also pointed out that it had been decided to land the base units and reinforcements on the first "TIMBERWOLF" convoy (KMF 25A) on the Italian mainland and do the same with Nos. 7 and 8 Reinforcement Battalions. This action, the telegram had



continued, would start the "highly desirable change of base area from North Africa" (14).

353. There was no doubt in Brigadier Beament's own mind that the Canadian reinforcement situation had been "greatly embarrassed by the failure of British staff to meet our reasonable demands for movements from North Africa to Italy" (15). Only 350 reinforcements had been forwarded during November instead of the 1250 requested and Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes was alarmed lest future operations of his 1st Canadian Infantry Division should be jeopardized: on the eve of current operations General Vokes had been advised that there were insufficient reinforcements to meet existing deficiencies, let alone replace the inevitable battle casualties (16). He managed to have the matter drawn to the personal attention of General Montgomery (G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army), as well as requesting action by Brigadier Beament to do something at G.H.Q. 1st Echelon. After a talk with the D.A. & Q.M.G. at Headquarters, Eighth Army on 11 Dec, however, Brigadier Beament concluded that General Vokes had taken "entirely too gloomy a view" (17). According to Brigadier Beament's subsequent report:

Although, admittedly, 1 Cdn Inf Div was slightly below fighting scales, they really had no perturbation about it. Their concern about the situation was largely due the fact that they did not know:-

- (a) The presence of 5 and 6 Rft Bns in Italy.
- (b) The recovery and despatch to 4 Rft Bn of approximately 400 personnel from the rest centre at Catania.
- (c) The fact that approximately 1600 infantry reinforcements for 1 Div were due to arrive in Naples 20 Dec (18).

Later in the day General Montgomery told Brigadier Beament that all Canadian reinforcements should be moved from North Africa at the earliest possible date. The Eighth Army Commander already had "pressed 15 Army Group to speed up priorities of movement of Canadian reinforcements" and action was taken on 13 Dec to begin moving the base (19).

354. It was 31 Dec 43, however, before the Base Reinforcement Battalions of No. 1 C.B.R.D. reached Naples and were sent on to Avellino, which was being developed as a Canadian base area. Henceforth, the actual method of reinforcing the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, as described by Brigadier Beament, was to be as follows:

- (a) 4 Bn is now established at LUCERA and will be moved later on to TERMOLI as accommodation and railway facilities permit.
- (b) At the present time there is a Transit Camp at railhead at TERMOLI and railway facilities exist between LUCERA and TERMOLI.
- (c) 4 Bn will provide a company in the DMA\* 1 Cdn Inf Div and a company in the FMC\*\*

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\*Divisional Maintenance Area.

\*\*"The Field Maintenance Centre, a sort of administrative township with a headquarters to control it, comprised those installations which were necessary for the support of a Corps" - Montgomery, El Alamein to the River Sangro, Germany, 1945, p. 78.



5 Corps. These companies will be respectively under the Commanders of the DMA and FMC for local administration but the control of personnel flowing through them will be maintained by the O2E LO\* at 1 Div and O2E LO at 4 Bn respectively.

- (d) Each of the two forward companies will hold approximately 300 reinforcements of which approximately 75% will be infantry. The balance of 4 Bn will hold approximately 600 reinforcements of which approximately 2/3 will be infantry.
- (e) The DMA and FMC holdings will be comprised largely of non-tradesmen and non-specialists. Small numbers of the more common type of tradesmen and specialists, eg. Cooks, Drivers I.C., will be held forward. A small pool of tradesmen will be held at 4 Bn but fundamentally, highly skilled personnel will be obtained specially from the main base at AVELLINO. The previously existing practice of trying to keep a complete cross section at reinforcing echelons has resulted in skilled tradesmen being tied up for long periods without any opportunity of being refreshed in their trades.
- (f) The Canadian element of the Transit Camp at railhead will be operated by 1 Cdn Inf Div Section of the Corps Reinforcement Camp (less its increment).
- (g) The policy will be to keep forward echelons filled up in the same manner as is done in the case of ammunition. By adopting the system outlined above two advantages emerge:
  - (i) The forward reinforcing echelons are under a definite commander who is responsible for calling for them at all times and moving them when the DMA or FMC moves.
  - (ii) Personnel to replenish forward echelons can normally be forwarded on supply and ammunition lorries without difficulty.
- (h) 4 Bn at LUCERA will be kept filled by a milk run from AVELLINO about 3 times a week. The lift of one run being approximately 240 all ranks .... (20).

355. On 6 Nov Brigadier Beament had assured General Crerar (in Sicily with Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps) that effort would be made to assure that units possessing a territorial affiliation would be reinforced on that basis, "bearing in mind the resources available" (21). Brigadier Beament did not think that such action would place an undue burden on 2nd Echelon. In his letter of 18 Dec (see para 354) he wrote:

I was almost placed in the position yesterday of having to send forward to 1 Cdn Div the reinforcements held at AVELLINO with the 11 Inf Bde.

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\*Liaison officer from 2nd Echelon.



Before doing so I informed General Robertson [Chief Administrative Officer at Headquarters, 15th Army Group] of your view regarding territorial reinforcements and told him I was not prepared to send them forward unless he informed me in writing that Eighth Army regarded it an operational necessity. He took the matter up with Eighth Army and they, particularly in view of the provision of infantry mentioned above [see para 353], were not prepared to so certify. Consequently, these reinforcements are not being moved (22).

356. British practice was to hold reinforcements in Italy for only 21 days wastage at "intense" rates, exclusive of the "X" List (see Appendix "J") and during November there was a suggestion by Brigadier E.G. Weeks (A.D.A.G.(A) at C.M.H.Q.) that the Canadian reinforcement holding should be reduced from the equivalent of two months at "intense" rates to either six weeks at "intense" rates or one month at "intense" rates exclusive of the "X" List (23). Brigadier Penhale (B.G.S.) successfully argued, however, that no change should be made at the moment since:

Decision to hold two months' rfts in the Med theatre was based upon factors such as the long sea voyage from UK to North Africa and Sicily and the uncertainty of shipping allotment. Movement of our rft pools from North Africa to the Italian mainland will not alter the importance of this consideration. The water gap still exists and the journey from the standpoint of distance still equals the passage of the Atlantic. Although the submarine menace has been reduced both in the Atlantic and Med it still exists, and the hazards involved have increased due to adoption by the enemy of the glider and radio controlled torpedo dropped from aircraft (24).

Furthermore, while a large force might be able to subsist on a smaller proportion of reinforcements because all formations and portions of a front are seldom equally engaged at once the situation was different for a small Canadian force which might be decimated in a single engagement. He further argued that it would take time for reinforcements to become acclimatized to the change from the United Kingdom and they should not be rushed into action too quickly. In any event General Montague decided on 30 Nov that there should be no change for the present (25).

357. As yet Canadian casualties had been far from heavy. The month 5 Dec 43-4 Jan 44 now brought severe fighting (from the crossing of the Moro river to the capture of Ortona) and the following casualties\*:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fatal	55	754	809
Wounded	158	1895	2053
Prisoners of War	<u>10</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>100</u>
Total	223	2739	2962


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\*Casualty figures throughout are based on statistics supplied by War Service Records.



APPENDIX "A" to  
1 Cdn Corps Adm Instr No 32  
dated 13 May 44

DEMAND & SUPPLY OF REINFORCEMENTS OTHER THAN CAC




LEGEND

- Flow of Rfts
- AFsW 3008-3009
- Demands
- + - AFsW 3006-3007



DEMAND & SUPPLY OF CAC REINFORCEMENTS





In comparison, casualties for the four months' old Italian campaign totalled only 307 officers and 3940 other ranks. This change did something to reinforce Brigadier Penhale's opinion. There was the additional fact that a total of 81 days could elapse from the time the original bid for troop space on a convoy was submitted by Brigadier Beament at 1st Echelon and the date the reinforcements actually reached Italy. Thus it was that reinforcement needs until 15 May had to be considered on 23 Feb in making a bid for space on convoy KMF 30 (26).

358. Due to the higher priority accorded the coming operations in North-West Europe it proved necessary to establish a 'manpower sub-ceiling' of approximately 61,483 all ranks for Canadian troops in Italy, including only 5175 reinforcements or one month's wastage at "intense" rates. As already noted, this was in spite of General Crerar's opinion that "it would be most dangerous to reduce reinforcement holding ... below two month's intense" (see paras 280 and 282). A fair proportion of general duty infantry originally had been provided for draft KMF 29 and, as had been urgently requested by Brigadier Beament on 30 Jan, 1900 infantrymen were added to provide a cushion against forthcoming operations in the Liri Valley, bring units to full strength in accordance with Eighth Army policy (instead of "light scales") and restore the shortage of French-speaking reinforcements for the Royal 22e Régiment and the two English-speaking battalions from the Maritime Provinces (27). This increased the Canadian component sailing with KMF 29 to approximately 7200 all ranks and resulted in only 2200 men being despatched on the succeeding draft (KMF 30) (28). (It might be noted that, in order to provide the additional 1900 general duty infantrymen ahead of time it had been necessary both to depart from the principle of reinforcement on a territorial basis and also to despatch men who had not completed one month's refresher training in the United Kingdom) (29). Some 1648 other ranks (including 1189 English-speaking and 122 French-speaking infantrymen) left the United Kingdom on 5 May with convoy KMF 31.

359. By this time General Crerar and Brigadier Beament had left Italy and their places had been taken by A/Lt-Gen E.L.M. Burns and Brigadier E.G. Weeks. A new reinforcement organization was instituted, re-establishing the divisional and corps reinforcement camps and (temporarily) returning the advanced 4th Reinforcement Battalion to Avellino\*. The British system of holding and training other than infantry reinforcements was adopted in order to obtain the benefit of their equipment and instructional facilities (31). For example, No. 6 Battalion holding artillery reinforcements was placed alongside a R.A.T.D. (Royal Artillery Training Depot). In the case of Armoured Corps reinforcements basic training was to be carried out at No. 5 Battalion at Avellino, individual special training at an R.A.C.T.D. (Royal Armoured Corps Training Depot) and collective training at a C.A.C. Training Unit\*\* attached to a British

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\*During May 1944 it once again became a "forward" reinforcement battalion to comply with Eighth Army policy, before pending operations, of holding five officers and 50 other ranks for each Infantry battalion, and a proportionate number for R.C.A. and R.C.E. units, in a forward location. C.A.C. reinforcements were never, however, held by this battalion (30).

\*\*The sole deviation from British practice was the holding of complete tank crews of five, instead of merely three men, for each of the 29 cruiser and five light tanks maintained by a forward squadron.



Armoured Reinforcement Regiment. From there these C.A.C. reinforcements proceeded direct to units as crews for replacement tanks being forwarded from the tank delivery squadron (32).

360. An added complication had arisen because of the decision that the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force, which had sustained considerable casualties as part of the United States Fifth Army, should be reinforced from the pool of general duty infantry reinforcements within No. 1 C.B.R.G. (33). Some 52 officers and 728 other ranks volunteered to join the First Special Service Force but only a proportion were able to meet the rigid physical standards demanded for parachutists (34). It was then necessary to undergo three weeks training in American tactics and weapons. Therefore, it was 27 Apr before a draft of 15 officers and 240 other ranks reached the First Special Service Force at Anzio\*.

361. On 5 May General Burns had a serious talk with Brigadier Weeks regarding the reinforcement situation which was complicated by the fact that the reinforcement bid for June arrivals (KMF 32) had been cut to 250 other ranks. In his own diary he noted that if operations "continue throughout Jun and into Jul, so that wastage rates are intense, we shall be at the end of rfts before further drafts can arrive" (36). On 10 May they decided that general duty reinforcements for other corps would have to be remustered to Infantry (37): a week later H.Q., 1 C.B.R.G. received orders to remuster 800 general duty other ranks\*\*.

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\*When the First Special Service Force sailed for the Mediterranean in November 1943 as a 'task force' of highly trained specialists it was decided at N.D.H.Q. that no steps should be taken to train and provide further reinforcements: the output from the Canadian Parachute Training Centre (A-35) was earmarked as reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion of the British 6th Airborne Division. As a result of heavy casualties suffered during December it was feared that the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force might wither away. General Stuart's recommendation to disband this component was rejected in Ottawa and, after General Eisenhower had recommended its retention, it was decided to follow the American example and provide reinforcements from the general infantry pool. Ministerial approval was given to this recommendation on 14 Feb 44.

The First Special Service Force fought as shock troops at Anzio and during the advance to Rome. Further Canadian reinforcements were supplied from No. 1 C.B.R.G. as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
June	4	206
July	1	36
August	8	62

On 15 Aug the First Special Service Force landed in Southern France (Operation "ANVIL") and remained in an operational role for 107 days without receiving further Canadian reinforcements. The Force was disbanded early in December 1944 (35).

\*\*Only those having had less than three months' service in a field unit were selected for remustering. Drivers I.C. were classified as general duty privates for purposes of remustering (38).



362. The Eighth Army already had been forced to begin remustering personnel to Infantry. During April 1944 it had received 13,000 Infantry reinforcements from the United Kingdom and a War Office statement that no more would be forthcoming. Realizing that this number would be exhausted by the end of July General Alexander instituted a vigorous remustering programme: by disbanding a number of light anti-aircraft and armoured units he was able to collect some 17,000 reinforcements, of whom roughly 9000 were sent to infantry units (39). (During August a further 5000 gunners were remustered to Infantry.)

363. The work of remustering\* at No. 1 C.B.R.G. was delayed by bottlenecks and the fact that a considerable part of the "paper" surplus of general duty personnel actually was serving in temporary G.S. 778 units (see para 282): although theoretically available as reinforcements many of the so-called temporary tasks (V.D. and malarial control, special employment companies) were continuing liabilities (40). Then again, the state of training of a number of the reinforcements received from the United Kingdom left much to be desired. According to the entry made in the war diary of Headquarters, 1 C.B.R.G. for 20 May the personnel of a recent draft would require further **trainings as follows:** one week refresher for 10 per cent, two or three weeks for 70 per cent and up to six weeks for the remainder. As its commander was informed by Brigadier Weeks on 24 May, however, no untrained reinforcements were to be sent forward and cross-posting was to be resorted to only as a last resort (41). Three days later the diarist complained that so many infantry officers had had to be sent forward that there were not enough remaining to train the other ranks then being held (42).

364. On 31 May the Corps Commander's desire for an additional 100 general duty infantrymen per battalion to be added to the reinforcement draft about to sail from the United Kingdom on KMF 32 (43) was forwarded to C.M.H.Q. (see Table 6). The above mentioned delays in remustering were explained and it was stressed that, in view of the heavy fighting expected in June, there would not be sufficient infantry reinforcements to last until the arrival of convoy KMF 33 in July. Experience to date, according to the telegram, had shown that actual Infantry wastage over a three months' period of "intense" fighting was 32 per cent for the officers and 25 per cent for other ranks, plus an overall allowance of one and a half per cent to offset malaria and dysentery (44).

365. A few quick calculations at C.M.H.Q. disclosed that, even after the anticipated arrival of the 13th Brigade from Canada, there would be insufficient reinforcements in the United Kingdom to provide replacements for two months' wastage at "intense" rates for the infantry battalions with First Canadian Army\*\* and an additional 17 days' wastage for those of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division taking part in the actual assault (see paras 304-8). It was considered that the existing reinforcement pool in Italy must be equivalent to six weeks' wastage at "intense" rates and therefore the answer sent to

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\*With effect from 25 Feb 44 No. 2 Canadian Reallocation Centre was authorized under No. 1 C.B.R.G. to re-assign personnel, particularly neuro-psychiatric casualties.

\*\*Total of 21 infantry (rifle) battalions, two infantry (machine gun) battalions, one infantry (motor) battalion, an Independent machine gun company, an Army Headquarters defence company, a corps defence company and defence and employment platoons for each divisional and brigade headquarters.



Italy was no. This telegram of 2 Jun further stated:

You will appreciate that availability here considered in relation to highest operational priority accorded this theatre will inevitably limit flow of personnel to AAI. Cannot therefore reinforce against casualty forecasts nor can we afford accumulation of surplus in your theatre (45).

Only 50 officers and 160 other ranks (including 127 infantrymen) eventually sailed with convoy KMF 32. A further telegram (of 2 Jun) pointed out that, as no further tradesmen would be available for six months, surplus tradesmen in kindred trades would have to be remustered and given ad hoc training in Italy (46).

366. The fight through the Liri Valley for Rome was the first occasion during which 1st Canadian Corps attached as such (even though the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade continued to be detached) and casualties during this period 11 May-4 Jun were (47):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>All Ranks</u>
Fatal	63	784	847
Wounded	181	2555	2736
Prisoner of War	<u>11</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>130</u>
	255	3458	3713

The holdings of No. 4 Reinforcement Battalion had been increased for this offensive but even then urgency had necessitated 56 officers and 1764 other ranks being despatched direct to field units from the base. A total of 255 officers and 5989 other ranks were despatched to field units during the period 12 May-7 Jun, of whom 150 officers and 3118 other ranks were infantrymen.

367. With the exception of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, which continued to fight its way north under the command of the British 13th Corps, Canadian troops experienced no further action until the battle for the Gothic Line opened on 25 Aug 44 (Operation "OLIVE"). During the intervening period remustering to infantry continued, recoverable wounded returned to the reinforcement stream and a draft of 1039 other ranks (including 827 general duty infantrymen) arrived on convoy KMF 33.

368. Even before the fight for Rome was completed, however, General Burns had queried General Stuart at C.M.H.Q. as to the feasibility of adding an infantry brigade and an engineer field company (or squadron) to the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. General Burns' telegram of 3 Jun stated that the existing armoured division was too weak in infantry to operate for more than two or three days in the Italian terrain and cited the experiences of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in its drive to the Melfa River—the breakout phase of the assault through the Hitler Line (48). The Eighth Army had provided additional infantry\* for the British 6th Armoured Division

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\*The 1st and 24th Independent Guards Brigades were added to the 6th Armoured Division and the South African 6th Armoured Division respectively. For a short time the 43rd Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade served with the 1st Armoured Division, before that formation itself was broken up. On 16 Sep the 1st Guards Brigade left the 6th Armoured Division, then serving with the Fifth Army, and returned to Eighth Army control. During the winter of 1945 the South Africans were provided with a further (13th) infantry brigade of their own.



and the South African 6th Armoured Division and General Alexander asked the C.I.G.S. to support this request. The C.I.G.S. ruled however, that no "diversions" from 'OVERLORD' could be agreed to and informed General Alexander accordingly (49). In a letter of 13 Jun the D.C.I.G.S. requested General Stuart to make a similar reply to General Burns. Generals Crerar and Stuart already had refused, in a telegram despatched to General Burns on 5 Jun: in addition to the inadvisability of increasing the number of infantry reinforcements required by 1st Canadian Corps there would be difficulties in restoring formations to their original composition should they be withdrawn from the Italian theatre to rejoin First Canadian Army\*.

369. The next proposal from Italy (2 Jul) was that an additional Infantry brigade should be formed from Canadian units already there: the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, R.C.A., the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) and the Westminster Regiment (Motor). The latter two could become effective Infantry battalions quite quickly whereas the conversion of the corps L.A.A. regiment (being eliminated from British formations) would require the transfer of officers and key personnel from the Infantry reinforcement pool and a longer period of training. According to the telegram despatched to C.M.H.Q. on 2 Jul a brigade headquarters, a signal section and other supporting units could be provided locally (51).

370. Before proceeding by air to Italy, in order to see for himself, General Stuart visited the War Office and then sent a telegram to the C.G.S. in Ottawa (52). Since General Alexander was endeavouring to obtain more troops it did not seem likely that there was much likelihood of 1st Canadian Corps re-joining First Canadian Army. On the other hand, General Stuart's telegram of 5 Jul asked, could an additional Infantry brigade be adequately reinforced? While conceding that the manpower implications of converting these three units into Infantry rifle battalions would be a decrease of 14 officers and an increase of only 15 other ranks those at N.D.H.Q. were quick to point out that the Infantry reinforcement pool would have to be increased by 90 officers and 1578 other ranks (53). While reinforcement holdings for other corps would be reduced there would be an actual increase in the number of men being held. On the following day, therefore, the C.G.S. replied that such a proposal was unlikely to gain acceptance, unless militarily necessary (54).

371. On 15 Jul, however, General Stuart cabled from Italy, where he had discussed the problem with Generals Alexander and Leese, that such a step was operationally necessary. Therefore, he had given General Burns permission to go ahead with the necessary reorganization, subject to reversion to original status if approval was withheld in Ottawa. His telegram went on to explain:

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\*Instructions telegraphed to the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army from N.D.H.Q. on 25 May 44 had noted that ... "the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable that as soon as military considerations permit such formations serving in the Mediterranean Theatre ... should be grouped under unified Canadian Command". This fact had been communicated to the C.I.G.S. who replied on 17 Jun, in connection with the question of the relationship between Generals Montgomery and Crerar, that steps would be taken to re-unite all Canadian formations under the command of First Canadian Army "as soon as military and shipping conditions make it possible" (50).



... Have informed Alexander and Leese that Cdn reinforcements to this theatre cannot be increased over present figure and that reinforcements on present basis will have to be spread thinner and cover the extra bde. Both willing to accept under these terms ....

Reinforcement situation here is good. Units all up to strength and two months supply at intense rates are available in reinforcement units. This situation will improve as result of whole corps being held in general reserve for period about two months (55).

372. Following his return from the Mediterranean General Stuart spent part of a day with the Army Commander in France and then flew back to Ottawa to discuss manpower accounting (see paras 396-7). On 3 Aug the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval to this reorganization of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Work of reorganization\* already had got under way and the new 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade was able to undergo slightly better than a month's training before being plunged into the attack on the Gothic Line on 25 Aug.

(ii) Reinforcement Organization in North-West Europe

373. Because of the comparative nearness of the 21st Army Group's scene of operations to the United Kingdom it was decided at C.M.H.Q. on 15 Mar 44 that a base reinforcement organization similar to that existing in Italy would be unnecessarily large (57). The deciding factor appears to have been the views expressed by Brigadier A.W. Beament, who had recently vacated the appointment of Officer in charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, A.A.I. in order to assume the similar appointment for 21 Army Group. As later given in writing Brigadier Beament's argument was that such an organization was:

... capable of holding in excess of one month's wastage for the force calculated at intense rates. It is my view that it is always desirable to hold rfts as far back as possible consistent with the primary liability to keep units constantly at full str. It is unquestionable that the trg of rfts deteriorates the further fwd they get. Consequently they should be retained in rft units as long as possible so that their stay in fwd holdings will be reduced to a minimum period. The cushion that must be held fwd bears a direct relationship to the interval at which it can be expected rft drafts will arrive. In the proposed op there will be a constant ferry service so it should be possible to count on replacement drafts weekly. It should therefore be possible to carry on safely with a fwd holding of between two and

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\*One of the three troops in each battery of the 2nd and 5th L.A.A. Regiments also was disbanded in line with British practice. After the "key" Artillery personnel had been posted to No. 1 C.B.R.G. to become reinforcements the general duty personnel who were physically fit for service as infantrymen joined their fellows in the 1st L.A.A. Regiment, which had received a quota of battle experienced Infantry Officers and N.C.Os. This unit was soon to be redesignated The Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment (56).



three weeks' rfts. Precise holdings will have to be determined later in the light of certain factors, the most important of which is the operational emp of the Cdn force. If, or while, the Cdn force is split the flexibility of emp of rfts will decrease. Consequently it will be advisable to hold slightly more than a minimum cushion. Further, at such a period the commitment for fwd rft units will be disproportionately large (58).

On 24 Mar, therefore, the newly appointed Army Commander gave his approval to the establishment of Headquarters, No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group and five Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalions\*. In selecting staff for the Headquarters of 14 officers and 50 other ranks and the five battalions (each of 13 officers and 101 other ranks) preference was given to those who had given "long and faithful service" at the several Reinforcement Units in the United Kingdom but who, because of age or physical disability, were unlikely to have any opportunity for service with a field force other than in the base area (60).

374. With effect from 1 Apr 44 the Canadian Sections, G.H.Q. 1st and 2nd Echelons and the whole of No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group came under command of 21st Army Group, although it was not possible to introduce immediately the desired procedure for demanding reinforcements (61). Normally the five Base Reinforcement Battalions would hold in the neighbourhood of 7000 reinforcements, a number slightly in excess of two weeks wastage at 'intense' rates. It was considered by the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon that, during the period from D-Day to D plus 17, a total of 7900 all ranks should be available to meet possible replacement needs of the assaulting 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. A letter of 23 May to C.M.H.Q. mentioned further that:

Up to date no demands have been submitted for rft holdings for units of the Cdn fd force other than units within 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 CAB. For the rest of the army, we have demanded only sufficient personnel to fill existing deficiencies in fd units, and to provide a small pool of holdings composed of gen duty and less skilled tradesmen, to be readily available to fill emergency demands. It is expected that demands will be submitted in the very near future to build up the rft holdings of some 4500 all ranks for 11, 12 and 13 Cdn Rft Bns (62).

375. The 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion was selected to follow up the assault formations with reinforcement holdings equal to seven days wastage at "intense" rates. One of its companies landed on each of the first three days of operations and all its reinforcement holdings were ashore by 9 Jun. On 13 Jun it was joined by No. 9 Battalion and the two units began to phase their reinforcements through "forward" companies attached to the British 1st Corps Reception Camp. The number of "forward" companies was increased during late July in order to cater to the needs of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and Corps Troops. When the last (13th) Base Reinforcement Battalion reached France on 3 Aug it became a "forward"

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\*Since the battalions of No. 1 C.B.R.G. were numbered 1 to 8, and the companies 1 to 40 the battalions authorized for No. 2 C.B.R.G. were given the numbers 9 to 13 and the companies 41 to 65 (59).



battalion, controlling from army roadhead companies in corps and divisional areas as was done in Italy (see para 354). Headquarters, No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group and the other four battalions remained in the base area where the final finishing touches could be given to reinforcement training. It should be noted, however, that Armoured Corps reinforcements moved forward from the base through the 25th Armoured Delivery Regiment, C.A.C. (The Elgin Regiment) whose forward delivery squadrons moved tanks and crews to units.

376. For a time it looked as though General Crerar's instruction of 6 Jun on reinforcement policy (see para 355) might be carried out in the main:

While on active service, a flow of reinforcements from Canada from the "home station", or its vicinity, to the unit in the field means a lot to the reinforcements (who find mutual friends) to the officers and men in the unit (who obtain news of family or friends) and to the locality (which maintains an active, practical interest in the unit which largely represents it). These are "morale building" factors and every effort should be made to retain them.

When the war comes to its victorious end--as one of these days it will--the movement back to Canada, and the subsequent demobilization, of a territorially-composed unit is an "administrative dream". It can be a tidy show from start to finish. Everything under control and everybody happy, an organized welcome and efficient arrangements for reception and demobilization at the appropriate locality. Every officer and man finishing his Army job, or going on leave, with great, and good, feeling.

Finally, after demobilization, there can be no more stabilising influence in any community than the presence of "all ranks" of a unit which represented that locality overseas, who have returned to civil life in that locality. Incidentally--though quite an important matter to those who do return--regimental re-unions can be arranged in after years with a minimum of travelling, or other difficulties.

Cdn Sec GHQ 2 Ech has been fully apprised by Brig Beament, OIC Cdn Sec GHQ 1 Ech 21 Army Group, of the importance which I attach to the maintenance of territorial reinforcement, and also to the return to their own units of recovered casualties. There are emergent situations when this is not possible and when unit requirements in special trades interfere. These should be exceptional, however, and even in such cases, reinforcements on a basis of Provincial domicile should almost always be feasible (63).

D-Day casualties had been considerably less than the planners had feared (64)--335 dead, 550 wounded and 61 missing--and for the whole month of June battle casualties were only 301 officers and 3142 other ranks (of whom 10 officers and 26 other ranks



remained on duty) instead of the "planners" (May) estimate of 481 officers and 7092 other ranks for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade during the first 17 days of fighting. Only on the night 11/12 Jul did the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division move into the line. (Headquarters, 2nd Canadian Corps had become operational on the previous afternoon.) And not until 31 Jul did the 4th Canadian Armoured Division relieve the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (until then continuously in a forward role) and First Canadian Army assume command of the left flank in the bridgehead. This was D plus 55, whereas the "planners" had envisaged such activity any time after D plus 17. Battle casualties for July were higher—605 officers and 7213 other ranks (including 28 officers and 139 other ranks who remained on duty)—but the delay in committing the balance of First Canadian Army did put back the date when wastage might reach a peak (65).

377. Even so, however, the losses suffered by the rifle companies were considerable. The war diary of The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders records on 26 Jul that, due to the rapid turnover of men, its rifle companies were only 40 to 50 per cent as efficient as on D-Day. On 31 Jul the war diary of The Queens's Own Rifles of Canada reported its cumulative casualties as seven officers and 162 other ranks killed or died of wounds, 17 officers and 278 other ranks wounded and 39 other ranks sent back as "battle exhaustion" cases\* Again on 4 Aug, this diary records that only five of the original sergeants remained with the rifle companies. When the North Nova Scotia Highlanders received four officers and 209 other ranks on 1 Aug the diarist recorded that this return to full strength was "very gratifying. We will soon be able to start training again, with a full battalion".

378. With casualties thus mounting the leaven of battle experienced men remaining with units was becoming dangerously small and 1st Echelon, G.H.Q. 21 Army Group began to stress the necessity for (slightly wounded) 'recoverable casualties' to be returned to their units as soon as possible instead of being kept hanging around reinforcement units and battalions "until their turn" came to go forward. As early as 7 Aug Brigadier Beament advised C.M.H.Q. that 50 per cent of each reinforcement draft should consist of recoverable casualties, even though the morale of "green men" would suffer as a result of being kept hanging around indefinitely (66). This situation did not apply to general duty infantrymen, of course, since they were in demand as quickly as they became available. Then, on 4 Sep the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon recommended that at least 50 per cent of the officers going forward to units from No. 2 C.B.R.G. should have had previous battle experience: due to the particularly heavy casualties of the preceding three weeks all such captains and above should be sent forward at once, together with sufficient experienced subalterns to make up 50 per cent of each draft (67).

379. Special mention should be made of the difficulty experienced in restoring The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada to full fighting efficiency after 324 casualties had been suffered on 25 Jul during the course of Operation "SPRING"


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\*War Service Records show fatal casualties as nine officers and 175 other ranks, non fatal casualties as 17 Officers and 296 other ranks.



(Crerar file GOC-in-C 6-2)

2 CDN BASE RPT GP





(C.M.H.Q. Report No. 150). Of the four rifle companies committed to the attack only 15 all ranks returned safe and sound. These, and the "left out of battle" parties (L.O.Bs.), were available to reform the fighting component but there were not sufficient "allocated"\* reinforcements available within the base reinforcement battalions to bring it up to strength immediately. On 1 Aug the unit diarist wrote that reinforcements were still arriving and that the battalion was "slowly approaching fighting strength. The day was spent once more in reorganizing and re-equipping and the men were occupied in cleaning up the new weapons". On the following day the companies commenced training but 4 Aug found The Black Watch taking over the positions of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal in St. André-sur-Orne. The unit came under fire when it advanced into May-sur-Orne on 5 Aug, following up a retiring enemy, and the diarist noted that "some of the new lads whom we have recently received as replacements are taking this action quite hard, for most of them are fresh from Canada".

380. On the other hand, even though the 28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment) was decimated in its first real action replacement had not been as great a problem. On 9 Aug this unit lost its commanding officer, adjutant, all squadron commanders and rear link captains, six subalterns and 101 other ranks, 47 tanks and one scout car. Only 12 tanks remained (including those left out of battle) but on the following day 26 tanks with crews arrived from the Armoured Delivery Squadron to begin the task of rebuilding the unit\*\*

381. Although the worsening reinforcement situation is described elsewhere (see paras 412 and 413) mention should be made of General Stuart's decision of 26 Aug that the policy of despatching weekly reinforcement drafts from the United Kingdom should be relaxed temporarily and general duty infantrymen sent forward in lots of 100, as often as that minimum number could be collected (68).

382. At the same time the practice of sending reinforcements from the base to the forward Base Reinforcement Battalion only to meet specified demands became less satisfactory. During the advance up the Falaise Road it had taken only a few hours to transfer reinforcements to field units (see Chart). The interval began to grow progressively longer, however, since men and supplies still had to be landed over the Normandy beaches and taken forward by road. Pending the opening of another port this journey to Belgium came to consume three or four days and tax overworked transport which could not always be made available to move unexpected drafts (69).

383. By early September the situation had become acute and General Crerar authorized the formation of a temporary transport unit of 72 sections (70): 1500 lorries were made available but on 9 Sep he was forced to request C.M.H.Q. to despatch 1200 drivers immediately (71). On 1 Oct Brigadier Beament explained in a telegram to General Stuart how seven days elapsed from the time a reinforcement reached Headquarters, 2 C.B.R.G. until he could be shown on a unit strength return: the first day was spent in documentation, the next four in travelling to the forward battalion, the sixth in reaching a field unit which would not show a changed strength for another 24 hours (72). All Infantry reinforcements were concentrated in the forward battalion but had to remain there until

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\*Allocated personnel were those who had served previously, either in the United Kingdom or the theatre of operations, with a unit then in North-West Europe. Unallocated reinforcements were those going forward to units for the first time.

\*\*Based on both the unit war diary and (its regimental history) The Story of The British Columbia Regiment, 1939-1945 (n.p.).



further transport was available. During that past week, Brigadier Beament pointed out, 2000 infantrymen had been bogged down there for as long as five days: on 28 Sep sufficient vehicles had been withdrawn from other commitments to move 1700 of them to field units. With the port of Dieppe open, however, the base could be moved there to shorten the journey by road to two days. With the port of Antwerp available it should be possible to return the 1200 drivers temporarily loaned by C.M.H.Q. In practice they could then be used as reinforcements for their own corps (73). Ostend fell on 9 Sep but, due to serious damage to its harbour installations, could not be utilized for some time. Although the port of Antwerp was captured undamaged it could not be used until the Canadians had cleared the Germans from both banks of the Scheldt down to the sea. Severe fighting and a large number of casualties resulted before this was accomplished. Meanwhile, Canadian reinforcements landed at Dieppe and Ostend had to be trucked overland to units of No. 2 C.B.R.G. which had moved forward to Ghent.

384. Regarding the absorption of "green" reinforcements by field units one can not do better than quote from a letter the acting army Commander (Lt -Gen G.G. Simonds) sent to all his formation Commanders on 28 Oct:

1. Occasionally I have had instances reported to me purporting to prove that the training of reinforcement officers and soldiers on joining their units in the field, has been wrong, or inadequate I am satisfied that most of the officers now responsible for training and testing remustered personnel, or drafts arriving from Canada, are officers who have had considerable infantry fighting experience in this war, know what is required and all are conscientious in their duty. I have discussed this problem with some commanding officers and senior formation commanders and I believe that the way in which reinforcements are posted within units has much to do with their unsatisfactory performance in cases where they have fallen short of expectations. I do not believe that commanding officers have given enough consideration to the human aspects of the problem.
2. Commanders and commanding officers must realize that when the reinforcement officer or soldier joins the unit with which he is going to fight, it is one of great moments of his life—comparable with birth, marriage or death. The position of a new reinforcement joining a unit is quite different from that of a soldier who has served with a unit for a considerable time and goes into battle beside officers and N.C.O.'s who have trained him and with men whom he knows. The reinforcement (unless he is a recovered casualty returned to his own unit) comes as a stranger. Regardless of how thorough his preliminary training may be, in the stress of his first battle, he may react in a way contrary to his training unless steps have been taken to win his confidence. It is well known, and only human, that the experienced fighting soldier is inclined to "lay it on a bit thick" in describing his battle experiences to the new arrival. This adds to the tension under which the inexperienced soldier goes into his first engagement. He may do things in the stress of the moment which afterwards he may well realize were contrary to what he had been taught.
3. Unless proper steps are taken within a unit, the reinforcement officer, or soldier, goes into action as an individual rather than as a member of a unit team.



4. Commanding officers will take steps to ensure that their unit arrangements for the reception and absorption of reinforcement officers and soldiers are properly organized. Reinforcement personnel arriving at a unit must:
  - (a) be made to feel that they are part of the unit and no longer just individuals. A responsible officer who has served with the unit for some time must interview them and explain the practical side of soldiering in the field and make the new arrival feel that he belongs there. If this matter is properly handled, confidence is won from the outset and each man feels that he has become a part of a unit which takes an interest in him.
  - (b) have a final check over of their individual weapon training and be given a few talks from experienced officers and N.C.O.'s, on practical pointers.
  - (c) be given time to adjust themselves to their new surroundings before they are faced with action itself.
5. I have previously issued instructions that every infantry battalion and armoured regiment shall have a strong "left out of battle" party, including TIC's and selected officers, N.C.O.'s and men. From this "left out of battle" party can be formed the "unit reception school" to deal with arriving reinforcements. If properly organized within the unit, this party should be able to provide just the type of officer and N.C.O. needed to test and initiate the new soldier. I am satisfied that the means to handle this problem are there, if there is proper organization within the unit.
6. Except in extreme emergency, i.e. when it is a question of winning, or losing, a battle, reinforcements will NOT be posted into fighting echelons in infantry battalions, or armoured regiments until they have spent a minimum of forty-eight hours in the LOB "school". I stress forty-eight hours as the minimum. Four or five days is preferable, whenever operational circumstances allow.
7. Whilst during prolonged active periods, the urge may be very strong to bring up to strength depleted fighting echelons as soon as a draft of reinforcements arrives, I am convinced that if the steps are taken, which I have outlined above, a far greater fighting value will accrue to the unit and casualties will be fewer.
8. I fully appreciate that during the period of intense activities through which we have been going that commanding officers have had little time to think about things other than the battle in which they are engaged. But, once proper arrangements have been made for reinforcement absorption, and a "unit reception



school" formed, the senior LOB officer can command it (74).

385. With the port of Antwerp available for landing reinforcements and First Canadian Army engaged in a static role on the Maas the Army Commander considered it desirable early in January 1945 to effect a further reorganization of No. 2 C.B.R.G. (75). He considered that it was preferable to hold all reinforcements in one large pool at Ghent since it would now be possible to deliver them to divisional maintenance areas in less than 48 hours. By holding all C.A.C. reinforcements, except C.A.C. (Recce), in the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), it was possible to disband all but one company of the 12th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion. Henceforth, Nos. 10 and 11 Battalions were to hold Infantry Reinforcements only while No. 9 Battalion would hold reinforcements for all other corps. The forward No. 13 Battalion was reorganized into four companies on the basis of one per each division and one for corps and army troops and small Transit Camps established in each of these maintenance areas, through which reinforcements would pass to units. As explained by Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns (then General Officer in charge of the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon 21st Army Group) in a letter to C.M.H.Q. of 19 Jan 45 the method of operation would be as follows:

... all rfts for First Cdn Army will pass through 13 Bn and will be delivered to the appropriate transit camps. All rfts for Cdn base and L. of C. units will be delivered direct from the bn in which they are held direct to the unit concerned. 13 Bn may thus send one or more coys fwd, or the whole bn may move fwd as required, without disturbing the normal procedure.

Due to a serious lack of accn and trg facilities it is not proposed, during normal times, to demand CIC rfts above a three weeks', at intense rates of wastage, holding (approx 4400 all ranks). When, however, anticipated cas are such that it is desired to hold the full theatre authorization (approx 6000 all ranks) the two res coys (one found from the re-org of 13 Bn and one retained from 12 Bn) will be called upon to hold these additional personnel who will be demanded as soon as the requirement is known. This additional personnel will not necessarily be all CIC rfts (76).

386. The reinforcement holdings at No. 2 C.B.R.G. were built up in anticipation of the casualties predicted from Operation "VERITABLE". A considerable backlog which had been detained in the United Kingdom by bad weather was flown to nearby landing strips by the R.A.F. during the four days 9-12 Feb while larger parties proceeded by sea (77).

387. With the transfer of 1st Canadian Corps to North-West Europe it became desirable to make further changes. While Headquarters, No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group remained in Italy to handle recoverable casualties and wind up its administrative functions a No. 3 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group was formed from the Headquarters of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which was being disbanded to conform to the divisional organization within 21st Army Group. The result was two Base Reinforcement Groups of three reinforcement battalions each plus other units under command) and organized as follows (78):



2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group

10 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)  
11 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)  
13 Cdn Base Rft Bn (Fwd Bn)

3 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group

2 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC)  
4 Cdn Base Rft Bn (CIC and CAC (Recce))  
9 Cdn Base Rft Bn (Others)

Henceforth, drafts of general duty infantrymen were so organized before they left the United Kingdom that men should reach the Base Reinforcement Battalion of the correct territorial affiliation.

(iii) Revising the Wastage Rates, 1944

388. General Stuart had been able to give almost undivided attention to the reinforcement question following General Crerar's assumption of the command of First Canadian Army on 20 Mar 44, although delegating certain of the work to subordinates through Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale (D.C.G.S.) and Brigadier W. N. Bostock (A.D.A.G.(A)). While well aware of the problems involved and of the necessity of remustering and training as general duty infantrymen all those surplus to three months wastage at "intense" rates for other corps, these officers considered that the situation was under control. This view was conveyed to the Chief of the General Staff in a telegram of 2 Jun. General Stuart did concede that, according to the latest War Office activity forecast for 1944 and the first six months of 1945, the number of reinforcements requested from Canada would be less than the monthly requirement. He did not think, however, that it would be necessary either "to cut our cloth in accordance with our ability to reinforce or to press for an extension of compulsory military service". His reasons were:

- (a) Fighting in the next three or four months I am convinced will indicate whether or not the war with Germany will continue to 1945.
- (b) With our present reserves and a continuation of present flow from Canada I am confident that we can meet demands during next four months giving priority of course to 21 Army Group over AAI.
- (c) Must not eliminate a formation from our order of battle. At present time it just cannot be done. It would not be understood either here or in the US or in Canada and would be detrimental to morale of whole Canadian Army.
- (d) It would be most unwise to advocate an extension of compulsory military service now when there is an excellent chance of our being able to finish the war with Germany on a voluntary basis (79).

His recommendations were:

- (a) Do everything possible in Canada without departing from voluntary system to increase the flow of reinforcements particularly infantry.



- (b) Do everything possible in Canadian Army Overseas to deflect the greatest possible number of fit men in static units and establishments into the reinforcement stream.
- (c) CMHQ to re-examine reinforcement situation at end of June and at end of each subsequent month and to forward results of each examination together with recommendations to NDHQ.

389. In a memorandum of 7 Jun the Adjutant-General advised the Minister of National Defence as follows:

I concur in Gen. Stuart's opinion . . . . that we can meet demands during the next four months from present available sources, and therefore see no necessity to contemplate elimination of any formations at the present time.

On account of the many variables involved, it is both difficult and inadvisable to predict with confidence the number of G.S. personnel that can be made available up to the end of 1945. However, I can state with confidence that from our present resources, we will meet our commitments for the year 1944. Also if recruiting remains at the present level, there will be a continuing output from Training Stream available for Overseas of approximately 2,500 per month during 1945. This can be supplemented by continuing withdrawals from G.S. personnel in Operational and Non-operational Units. It is estimated that this source will, by the end of 1944, have shrunk to below 20,000 and will be approaching the point where further withdrawals may not be feasible (80).

390. On 13 Jun the Adjutant-General reiterated how 23,000 all ranks had been despatched overseas since the beginning of the year and 28,000 more were earmarked to go (including 2000 on the strength of seven general hospitals). After making allowance for training injuries General Letson estimated that 35,000 of the 50,000 men in the training stream and a further 10,000 to be withdrawn from units in Canada should provide sufficient reinforcements for the balance of 1944 and contribute 17,000 for despatch overseas during early 1945. Future recruiting alone could determine how many reinforcements would be available for further despatch during 1945. If it remained at the same level it should be possible to produce about 2500 trained reinforcements every month (81).

391. Although plans called for action similar to that already initiated in Italy (see para 282) not until 27 Jun was General Stuart able to advise the Army Commander officially that the 'manpower sub-ceiling' for Canadian troops within 21st Army Group, would be the total personnel required to meet:

- (a) The war establishment of all units currently or subsequently approved for inclusion in the composition of Cdn troops serving within 21 Army Gp.
- (b) One month's rft holdings for this force based on one month's wastage at intense activity calculated on the approved Cdn rates of wastage of personnel as applied to the approved current composition of the force



both as to war establishments and as to units (82).

In accordance with the proposed composition of the Canadian Army Overseas, revised to 15 May 44, this 'manpower sub-ceiling' would total 108,043 all ranks, of which 99,717 represented war establishments and 8326 reinforcements. General Crerar would be permitted to form temporary units from reinforcements (similar to the G.S.D. 602 and the G.S. 778 units). Where such authorizations should be approved on a permanent basis (C.G.S. 139 unit), however, the personnel would be counted against the 'contingency reserve' and transferred to the 'manpower sub-ceiling' for North-West Europe.

392. The only flaw, as General Stuart had pointed out to the Army Commander in an earlier letter of 15 Jun, was that a 'contingency reserve' no longer existed to meet urgent operational requirements or to follow British changes in organization (83). The special increment of 2100 authorized by the Deputy Minister in April (see para 305) had been dissipated by 15 May, as had a further 1100 authorized to cover further commitments. General Stuart had then considered it imperative that no further increases should be permitted without corresponding decreases to other establishments (except those conforming to approved British changes). While the Army Commander could promise nothing, his reply of 17 Jun had indicated that he did not anticipate any need for changes and no request would be submitted unless there were the "strongest operational reasons" (84).

393. General Stuart now proposed to recreate the 'contingency reserve' from the three per cent allowed for non-effectives against the overall 'manpower ceiling'. Generals Murchie and Letson in Ottawa were favourably disposed to deleting non-effectives from the 'manpower ceiling', since the increasing number of battle casualties had made the three per cent allowance "unrealistic" (85).

394. On 5 Jul General Stuart's detailed proposals for a changed system of manpower accounting were mailed to N.D.H.Q. (see para 311). He considered that the 'manpower ceiling' now had served its purpose and should be replaced by a system of accounting which would reflect more readily the manpower requirements of the Canadian Army Overseas. He recommended that capital (Field Force establishments, C.M.H.Q. and static units in the United Kingdom and miscellaneous units required to administer the Field Force) and reinforcement requirements (three months at 'intense' rates for capital requirements, temporary G.S.D. 602 units and a three per cent reserve for non-effectives in the reinforcement pool for the Field Force only) should be shown separately. The provisional increase of 2100 granted by the Deputy Minister on 15 Apr (see para 305) had raised the actual 'manpower ceiling' to 234,836; acceptance of the current proposals, including allowance of 3000 for 'contingency reserve', would raise the total to 246,877 all ranks. General Stuart added that the Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Mr. J. Pembroke) had been put "thoroughly in the picture" during his visit to C.M.H.Q. and was in a position to supply any further details (86).

395. At this stage General Stuart proceeded to Italy to investigate the position of 1st Canadian Corps and the request made by General Burns for an additional infantry brigade (see paras 369-371). Following his return from the Mediterranean General Stuart spent part of a day with the Army Commander in France and then flew back to Ottawa to discuss the question of manpower accounting.

396. As a result of discussions at N.D.H.Q. the submission made to the Minister of National Defence on 2 Aug



varied somewhat from General Stuart's previous proposals. This submission called for a new 'manpower ceiling' of 234,500 all ranks (increase of 1764) in which the capital commitment was "limited to an extent which will allow for provision within the ceiling of a reinforcement pool of three months at the intense rate". These would be utilized as follows:

(a) <u>Field Force</u>	
Canadian Troops, A.A.I.	74938
Canadian Troops, 21 Army Group	127185
(b) Canadian Troops, United Kingdom	30449
(c) Contingency Reserve	<u>1928</u>
<u>Total</u>	234500

Such action was justified since:

According to strength returns as at 30 Jun 44 as reported to CMHQ, the effective overall strength of the Canadian Army Overseas is in excess of the numbers required to meet the resulting proposed composition (including a small contingency reserve) plus an overall reinforcement pool equal to three months at the intense rate. The situation following the formation of the new units will, in consequence, still leave our establishments full and the overall reinforcement pool in a condition which the Chief of Staff CMHQ considers entirely satisfactory (87).

The system of reinforcing the Field Force during actual operations rendered unnecessary the maintenance of a three per cent reserve to offset the number of non-effectives. This saving of 6856 all ranks was utilized to form the additional units considered necessary (including Dental Companies serving the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. and the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force) and re-establish a small contingency reserve of 1928 all ranks. It was considered, however, that the Chief of Staff, C.M. H.Q. should still possess authority to continue and form temporary units on the basis of telegram G.S.D. 602 of 21 Mar 42. Henceforth, however, such G.S.D. ~~602 units would be~~ manned, so far as possible, by men who were unfit for more active service as reinforcements (88).

397. On the following day (3 Aug) the Cabinet War Committee approved these recommendations (to raise the 'manpower ceiling' to 234,500 all ranks and add a second infantry brigade to the 5th Canadian Armoured Division) on the understanding that the new requirements could be met without any change in the projected supply of men from Canada.

398. In putting up the submission for a revised 'manpower ceiling' it had been pointed out that such action was possible because 5000 reinforcements had been shipped from Canada every month instead of the 4000 agreed upon (89). There was the further fact that the delay in breaking out of the Normandy bridge-head had delayed the commitment of First Canadian Army with the result that casualties were less than had been anticipated (see para 376). General Stuart wrote:

On 30 Jul 44, after over twelve months fighting in the Middle East and two months in France we have a reinforcement pool overseas with a strength in excess of three months reinforcement requirements at intense rates. This is a most satisfactory



situation and will enable my requirements as put forward in two separate memoranda to be met and still leave at 31 Jul a reinforcement pool overseas comprising over three months reinforcement requirements at intense rates.

Estimated casualties for the remaining five months in 1944 are about equal to our reinforcement holdings at 31 Jul. Our pool at end of Dec 44 should therefore comprise reinforcements sent from Canada at previously agreed rates in last five months of 1944, plus casualties recovered from hospital during this period. This should represent a figure of about 25,000 or about one and a half months at intense rates.

A further projection up to the end of Mar 45 gives us an estimated pool of about 17,000 or over one month's reinforcements at intense rates.

The above forecasts, as you know, are based on scales of wastage adjusted in the light of battle experience and on forecasts of activity provided by the War Office. Up to date our casualties have been less than anticipated and although our estimates may be exceeded for short periods I do not anticipate an increase of casualties over our estimates in any period of six months or over.

I am satisfied therefore, with the general reinforcement situation. It is in a healthy position today because our casualties have been less than the number anticipated and because the agreed flow of reinforcements from Canada has not only been maintained but has been exceeded. I congratulate those responsible and hope that the agreed flow will be maintained in future months.

The only part of the reinforcement problem that is worrying me at the moment is the finding of reinforcements for our French-Canadian Infantry Battalions. I am withdrawing French-Canadians from English speaking units overseas for this purpose but unless I can get additional French-Canadian Infantry reinforcements from Canada I shall be faced with the alternative of disbanding units to provide reinforcements. I do not relish either alternative and consequently I hope every effort will be made to increase the flow of French speaking reinforcements (90).

399. In actual fact all was not well, however, since by far the greatest proportion of battle casualties were occurring to general duty infantrymen and reinforcements for other corps were piled up at No. 2 C.B.R.G. Signs, ominous enough for many to read correctly, already had begun to appear. On 14 Jul Brigadier Beament told General Montague that, in his opinion, all was not well. On the following day he put his views on paper. Even when the overall picture had been described as satisfactory to General Montgomery on 16 Mar (see para 293) there had been deficiencies in some corps ("The Arm having the greatest deficiency was Infantry"). Continuing, his letter of 15 Jul pointed out that (91):

The recent operations in Normandy prove, beyond all shadow of doubt, that the prediction that the proportion of Infantry casualties, vis-a-vis other



Corps, would be much greater than indicated by FFC rates was sound. During the five-week period, commencing 6 Jun 44 and ending 10 Jul 44, the actual Canadian battle casualties appear to have been

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
CIC	220	3885
All other Arms	<u>123</u>	<u>994</u>
Total	343	4879

The casualties for the same force, for the same period, calculated at FFC rates, work out at: -

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
CIC	132	2150
All other Arms	<u>120</u>	<u>1211</u>
Total	252	3361

Instead of being 63 per cent of the whole force as estimated, 78.6 per cent of the battle casualties actually had been infantrymen. Even non-battle casualties were higher among infantrymen, due to the more dangerous conditions under which they lived. Unlike the British Army which was fighting campaigns all over the world and could offset deficiencies in one theatre by surpluses in another the Canadian Army was fighting only in North-West Europe and Italy. Casualties were so great among general duty infantrymen that already some hundreds of infantry specialists (e.g. Drivers, I.C.) were being temporarily employed as general duty reinforcements. Then again, now that the Allies possessed air superiority little in way of casualties need be expected among anti-aircraft units and rear area troops: therefore, what in fact were surplus reinforcement holdings could be remustered to Infantry.

400. The Chief of Staff being in Italy (see para 371), General Montague sent Brigadier Beament's letter to the D.C.G.S. with the following covering note:

It goes without saying that we must face the reality of which he informs me, namely that the demands for GD Infantry prevent sufficient numbers being kept in the Depot, and we must do everything possible to better the situation. The utmost possible remustering and conversions in all Corps ... is to be ensured. Please give this matter top priority consideration and action.

Immediately upon the return of the C of S we must put him in the picture as other action by him may be required (92).

401. On 24 Jul Lt-Col E.G. Pullen (S.D. (O) at C.M.H.Q.) produced an analysis of the casualty figures, broken down into two main groups--battle casualties and sickness and accident cases. He found:

That sickness & accident casualties fluctuate widely and sometimes are three and four times the number of battle casualties.



That for Infantry, the ratio is usually much lower than for other arms and services and for these is higher the farther they are removed from battle.

That sickness & accident casualties have little effect on the number of reinforcement required to support the force once it is well established in the theatre (93).

Thus, although some 36,207 casualty returns had been reported in Italy for the period 1 Jan-30 Jun 44 only 7681 all ranks had been required to replace them, which figure was close to the total battle casualty figure of 8221 for that period. An analysis of the sickness and accident casualties for this period (including several months of inclement weather) indicated that an average of five per cent of the officers and seven per cent of the other ranks in Italy had come under this heading. Lt-Col Pullen deduced, therefore, that:

- (a) battle casualties reported are the most realistic indication of reinforcement requirements, and
- (b) an initial provision of reinforcements, representing 7 to 8% of the total strength of the force, is required to off-set the build-up of the floating population of sickness & accident casualties. The net loss from these sickness & accident casualties being covered by FFC rates of wastage, possibly 3/4% per month.

402. As between corps Lt-Col Pullen's study indicated the following trends and requirements:

- (a) Total battle casualties are 65-75% forecasts. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that future casualties will not exceed 75% of forecasted casualties.
- (b) Infantry OR casualties are approximately 75% of total battle casualties. Therefore 75% of intake should be infantry.
- (c) RCA OR casualties were 34% of forecast for 21 Army Gp and 52% for AAI. Therefore 60% of forecast should be a reasonable assumption for future artillery casualties. This applied to current forecasts for both theatres means we will have approximately 4448 artillery casualties up to Dec 44, against which we now have in X4 lists 6,366 artillery reinforcements.
- (d) CAC OR casualties were 44% of forecast for 21 Army Gp and 38% for AAI. However CAC has not yet had adequate experience under ideal tank battle to accept a cut in forecasts, but it may later be possible to reduce this forecast. Current forecasts are 6,012 against which we have in X4 lists, 6,664 reinforcements. Therefore future intakes could be reduced by 50% and its reinforcement pool may be susceptible to re-mustering in light of later experience.



- (e) RCASC OR casualties were 20% of forecast for 21 Army Gp and 13% of AAI. Therefore 20% of forecast should be a reasonable assumption for future RCASC casualties. This applied to current casualty forecasts for both theatres means we will have approximately 697 RCASC casualties up to Dec 44 against which we now have in X4 lists, 4,038 reinforcements.

His recommendation was that 75 per cent of future intake in Canada should be trained as general duty infantrymen and that up to 25 per cent artillery and 60 per cent R.C.A.S.C. reinforcements on the "X-4" list (reinforcements allotted to a theatre of operations) should be remustered to Infantry.

403. Before leaving for Ottawa General Stuart gave his approval to the remustering of R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. personnel surplus to the revised holdings which were set at six and three weeks 'intense' respectively (94). (A subsequent revision increased R.C.A.S.C. holdings to equal six weeks at the "intense" rate of wastage.) C.R.U. could not be used for this remustering programme until certain of its units had moved back to Surrey—Hampshire (where accommodation had had to be relinquished prior to D-Day), and General Montague decided on 1 Aug that, rather than delay the conversion programme, the 13th Brigade\* (in Yorkshire) should be used (95). Apart from 132 all ranks of each battalion required for permanent administrative and training duties all fit personnel of the Brigade (to which had been attached the recently-arrived Régiment de Montmagny) had been posted to the reinforcement stream in accordance with C.M.H.Q. Administrative Instructions (96). It was 5 Aug, however, before the Commander, C.R.U. was actually ordered to post surplus R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. personnel to Infantry and despatch them to units of the 13th Brigade, subject to the following provisos (97):

- (a) All personnel must conform to the minimum physical standards for CIC General Duty, i.e. category "A" or PULHEMS 1111221, maximum age 40.
- (b) Personnel in receipt of trades pay under present quotas and confirmed WOs or NCOs will not be transferred.
- (c) Personnel with the necessary aptitude and designated for qualification in the following trades or Non-Trade Specialties will not be transferred -

<u>RCA</u>	<u>RCASC</u>
Driver Ops	Drivers IC
Surveyors	Mechanists
	Motorcyclists
	Clerks
	Clerks TMT
	Cooks Hosp

While it was not desired to change the authorized reinforcement holdings for other corps any personnel surplus to the authorized pool were to be turned into general duty infantrymen, except for tradesmen and those already designated for training in certain trades.

404. As early as 3 Aug Brigadier Beament at Advanced Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group had been

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\*See para 337.



notified that such remustering would be begun and that the conversion of 5000-6000 such reinforcements might produce 2000-3000 general duty infantrymen after six weeks conversion training (98). This letter must have crossed the following telegram despatched by the Army Commander to General Montague on 4 Aug (99):

Am concerned about Infantry general duty deficiencies which approximate 1900. Our ability to continue severe fighting or to exploit a break out would be seriously restricted through lack of replacement personnel. After forwarding all available reinforcements from 2 CBRG deficiencies exceeding five per cent of unit strength were:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Deficiency</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Deficiency</u>
RHC	370	S Sask R	87
R de Mais	245	S D and G Highrs	78
Essex Scots	171	Regina R	72
Fus MR	139	Calg Highrs	78
Cameron's of C	100	N Shore R	68
QOR of C	99	RHLI	54
R Regt C	91	Toronto Scot (MG)	52
		R de Chaud	47

Other bns have deficiencies but of less than five per cent. I consider this the most serious problem of Cdn Army at the moment and to require most energetic handling.

405. On the following day (5 Aug) General Montague replied that 15 officers and 656 other ranks were en route to North-West Europe; a further 260 officers and 3420 other ranks would be despatched on 10 Aug. Some 2500 Infantry all ranks were completing training and would be ready for despatch to North-West Europe by 19 Aug; a further 2000 infantrymen (including 450 French-speaking personnel) should be ready to join them by the end of the month. An additional 840 infantrymen were then on their way overseas from Canada. It was considered that these last could be sent forward 7-15 Sep. Reference was again made to the R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. personnel being remustered. It was pointed out that the only way to hasten the despatch of general duty infantrymen would be to send men who had not completed their training: this, it was understood, was not favoured by the Army Commander. Continuing, General Montague's telegram stated:

... according to operational forecasts 21 Army Gp for period described total numbers given above should be in excess of requirements by approx 1500 CIC. This without taking into account any personnel obtainable from conversion trg ... or making any credit allowance for recoverable casualties which should come in progressively from late September onward. This should indicate favourable margin from which to balance requirements for both theatres.

Appreciate your concern and assure you everything being done here to expedite trg to accelerate provision from which to meet your demands. Would appreciate confirmation of policy under which we propose to withhold despatch of any personnel considered insufficiently trained to minimum acceptable standard and we consider 3 to 4 weeks after arrival CRU essential to meet this requirement (100).



406. General Crerar telegraphed again on 8 Aug that the problem was confined to general duty infantrymen and that the supply of officers and tradesmen could be ignored for the moment (101). Apart from D-Day itself, General Crerar stated that wastage for each infantry battalion had been approximately nine per day up to 31 Jul. For the previous seven days, during which there had been no large scale operations Infantry wastage had been five per day per battalion throughout the 2nd Canadian Corps. For August he estimated that the wastage of general duty infantrymen would be 3,000 to 5,000 for 2nd Canadian Corps, with the higher estimate more likely in view of pending operations (breakthrough down the Falaise road). Continuing, his telegram read:

It is quite clear that only solution lies in vigorous remustering and strenuous conversion training. Request careful study of possibility of shortening conversion training by grading on entry and so securing a proportion in four weeks.

Organization changes in LAA Arty ... will yield from remustering about 15 Aug approx 500 from Fd Units and other probable changes in near future further approx 800. In meantime remustering in Arty and RCASC can be based on maintaining only six weeks intense as total holdings.

In view distinct possibility that operations of next four weeks may prove turning point remustering policy should be based on short view. It is vital that our offensive power be maintained and long term futures must be risked to produce early (102).

407. Once again the uncertainty of the overall strategic picture was complicating the maintenance of the Canadian Army. After much worry lest the War come to an end before Canadian formations might get to grips with the enemy there was now a "high level" belief that German resistance might come to an end with eviction from France (103). Temporarily, therefore, opportunism replaced long-term planning.

408. Upon his return to London, General Stuart found that the reinforcement situation had grown worse. After reading the Army Commander's telegrams General Stuart despatched his D.C.G.S. by air to Army Headquarters on 10 Aug in order to obtain first hand information. Brigadier Penhale spent only one day there but reported on his return that the Army Commander had "stressed the political importance at this time of maintaining units at full strength, in particular Inf, where shortages are apparent" (104). General Crerar had impressed upon Brigadier Penhale that "the next few weeks represent the most critical period and that, having regard to this, we would be justified in taking most energetic and drastic measures to ensure that the operational effectiveness of Canadian units is maintained to the fullest possible extent". The actual composition of reinforcement drafts was discussed with Brigadiers A.W. Beament and A.E. Walford (D.A. & Q.M.G., First Canadian Army). It was pointed out that certain of the reinforcements held in No. 2 C.B.R.G. would be transferred to Infantry, after screening at No. 3 Canadian Reallocation Centre which was just about ready to start work: a number of these, particularly R.C.A. reinforcements then might have to be returned to the United Kingdom to undergo conversion training. Existing Infantry deficiencies within Canadian units totalled 1651 all ranks. Even then, General Crerar had told Brigadier Penhale that there had been fewer casualties during the recent advance down the Falaise Road



than originally estimated.

409. Following Brigadier Penhale's departure from Army Headquarters the question of accepting Infantry reinforcements with a lower standard of training was debated. A certain amount of refresher training was necessary for reinforcements just over from Canada (where instruction in the latest weapons and techniques could not be given) and it had been the practice to provide such instruction at the several Reinforcement Units: nine to 11 weeks for C.A.C., seven weeks for R.C.A., R.C.E. and R.C. Signals and four weeks for others (105). The Army Commander approved the recommendation of his staff that no lowering of standard should be accepted for general duty infantrymen (106). His wishes were accepted by C.M.H.Q., with the proviso that infantrymen who could complete refresher training more quickly would be despatched in fulfilment of outstanding demands for reinforcements.

410. In a letter of 16 Aug Brigadier Walford reiterated the matters upon which agreement had been reached during Brigadier Penhale's visit:

- (a) That when the "float" of approximately 8% of the force strength, covering illness, accident and other sources of ineffectives, had been built up in the theatre, the holding for Corps may be reduced to the following provision at intense rates of wastage:
  - (i) RCA (Fd, Med, A Tk and Sy - 7 weeks
  - (ii) RCA (AA) - 6 weeks
  - (iii) RCASC - 5 weeks
- (b) That in the case of CAC the present scale of three months holdings at intense rate plus 3% for non-effectives, is to remain unaltered, but remustering may be done on the basis that this is a maximum requirement which may be "shaded" as a temporary measure, if necessary to produce the requirements of Infantry General Duty by remustering. It is recognized that CAC personnel represent the type most easily and quickly convertible to Infantry (107).

After deducting the reinforcements despatched to North-West Europe on 14 Aug, there was the following deficiency of general duty infantrymen on the morning of 15 Aug:

In 2 Cdn Inf Div.	1674
In 3 Cdn Inf Div.	461
In 4 Cdn Armd Div.	<u>509</u>
Total	2644

It is again stressed that all available Infantry General Duty, whether returned from hospital or otherwise provided, should be despatched as soon as available. Reinforcing is now on a day to day basis, and every additional man produced adds to the "bayonet" strength of some unit during this decisive phase of operations.

411. Two days prior to this (14 Aug) a total of 2045 other ranks (including 65 French-speaking soldiers) remustered from the several Reinforcement Units in the United Kingdom were to have commenced infantry training with the 13th Brigade in



Yorkshire, even though only 1923 men\* actually turned up (108). A second intake numbering 1077 was due on 25 Aug and, as Brigadier Penhale pointed out to General Stuart: "It is our intention to authorize further intakes from surplus personnel whenever the number undergoing this conversion trg falls below 3000 either as a result of natural wastage or outgoing drafts." (109). [This was the maximum number which could be trained by the 13th Brigade and even to do this it had been necessary to borrow 100 N.C.O. instructors from Nos. 3 and 4 C.I.R.Us.]

412. In response to a call for additional reinforcements (before the "Falaise Gap" was closed) the D.A.G. at C.M.H.Q. instructed C.R.U., on 17 Aug, to send forward as general duty infantry reinforcements all infantry tradesmen not in receipt of trades pay\*\* and non-tradesmen specialists (111). Enemy resistance in the Falaise pocket having been eliminated on 23 Aug, after heavy fighting, the Canadian formations immediately pushed towards the Seine valley where they again encountered heavy opposition. In a telegram of 26 Aug General Stuart endeavoured to give General Crerar the impression that everyone at C.M.H.Q. was aware of the "vital importance" of the next three weeks and that all available infantrymen would be sent forward as quickly as possible: the policy of weekly drafts would be abandoned temporarily in favour of despatching men in lots of 100, as soon as that minimum number was collected (see para 381). He assured General Crerar that the War Office was "playing ball" and would meet any request on 48 hours' notice (112).

413. Earlier that day (26 Aug) General Stuart had despatched the following telegram\*\*\* to the C.G.S. in Ottawa:

I We will have the infantry reinforcement situation in a satisfactory condition in from three weeks to one month's time when remustered personnel will begin to come out of the stream in reasonable numbers. At present time because of recent heavy casualties in general duty infantry I am unable to keep inf units up to strength in general duty personnel although we have a considerable surplus of inf tradesmen and inf specialists. At present time we show a shortage of about 3000 general duty infantry in our 21 battalions in 21 Army Group. By utilizing general duty infantry now under training at CRU for tradesmen and non tradesmen specialists plus general duty inf available I shall be able to find drafts totalling about 2000 within the next six days.

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\*Due to sudden sickness and absenteeism brought on by over-indulgence in liquor, apprehended crime or compassionate grounds there generally was a last minute wastage from drafts of soldiers about to be despatched anywhere. In this instance, it would not have been possible to remuster sufficient additional men at the last moment to remedy the deficiency.

\*\*Only those tradesmen actually counted against the authorized reinforcement holding, based on three months' wastage at "intense" rates, were entitled to receive trades pay. A surplus in some trades had come about because it was not possible to plan future needs exactly (110).

\*\*\*Later, and following his resignation, Mr. Ralston admitted that he had initialled this telegram but had not considered it necessary to take any action (see para 394).



II I would like to be able to use at my discretion a proportion of qualified and paid inf tradesmen in a vital and I feel decisive period of next three weeks. It is ridiculous to have surplus inf tradesmen who are trained also as general duty infantry available and not be able to use them simply because under present regulations if we use them as general duty personnel they will lose their trades pay. I consider we would be breaking faith with them if we cut their trades pay. I recommend therefore that I be authorized at my discretion and in an emergency only to use as general duty inf a proportion of infantry tradesmen in receipt of trades pay and that these men shall continue to receive their former trades pay. It being understood that these men will be tagged as tradesmen and will be absorbed as such in the infantry as and when the supply of general duty inf permits.

III The present situation is not a manpower problem in the true sense. We have the men. It is not a problem of general supply. It is a problem of detailed distribution. We have taken British FFC rates as a guide. Experience of particular conditions of war in France has shown that FFC rates for infantry are too low and for practically all other arms are too high. In addition we did not anticipate that practically all inf casualties would be in general duty personnel. We are now going through a period of adjustment. In three weeks to a month we will be alright [sic]. I need assistance to bridge this intervening period. My recommendations in para II represent the only way you can help me to bridge this gap....(113)

414. On the following day concurrence was cabled by the Adjutant-General who wondered, however, whether it might not be better to permit a 25 per cent surplus to tradesmen establishments rather than settle particular cases on their merits (114). After informing the Army Commander that authority had been granted to use infantry tradesmen for general duty (115). General Stuart replied to the Adjutant-General, setting forth his objections to this suggestion. This telegram of 29 Aug pointed out that "no increase in cost is involved" and that, as the situation was temporary in nature, it would merely be necessary to make unposted tradesmen eligible to continue receiving trades pay after being posted to other than tradesmen's vacancies in unit establishments (116). Furthermore, operational demands might necessitate large numbers of tradesmen being posted to a unit that had suffered heavy casualties while other units received few or none. The Army Commander seemed satisfied with General Stuart's proposal but, in a telegram of 31 Aug, emphasized the "urgency" of its adoption (117), since the battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had been short an average of 300 men on the preceding day, chiefly riflemen\*

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\*The diarist of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion recorded on 30 Aug that, in addition to sending forward the infantry reinforcements earmarked for battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division orders had been received to send 225 "unallocated" reinforcements of an incoming draft to that division. Since a good number of these men came from the Maritime Provinces which were not represented in the infantry of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division only 173 actually went forward.



415. The greatest obstacle to remustering tradesmen from other corps to Infantry was the men's fear of losing trades pay. This point was emphasized in a telegram from 1st Canadian Corps where there had been an Infantry shortage of 52 officers and 4888 other ranks (5 Sep) (118). It was 29 Sep, however, before C.M.H.Q. was able to find a solution: acceptance of the British practice (A.C.I. 1096 of 10 Aug 44) whereby tradesmen remustered to Infantry from other corps would be permitted to retain their trades pay\* "for a period of not more than six months" (119). Although approval was not forwarded until 6 Nov action had been taken at C.M.H.Q. as early as 23 Sep to have tradesmen surplus to the revised reinforcement holdings (see para 418) remustered as general duty infantrymen within C.R.U. (120).

416. Since the F.F.C. rates of wastage obviously were not applicable to conditions within the Canadian forces in either Italy or North-West Europe this question had been made the subject of further study by Lt-Col Pullen (slated to return to N.D.H.Q. as Director of Staff Duties) whose earlier memorandum (see para 401) had not stood up to the realities of the campaign in Normandy after the first month. Signed by Brigadier Penhale this memorandum of 23 Aug advised:

It is obvious that our forecasts of activity (or the way we apply them to all arms and services) or the FFC rates of wastage (as applied to comparatively small forces in only two theatres) are out of balance. However, to determine which is at fault and to what extent would require a comprehensive study of factors, many of which are not available, and would require so much time as to make the information obtained of little use for present operations (121).

It had been found possible to make adjustments in the F.F.C. rates of wastage so that they would coincide with actual Canadian battle casualties by corps. It was necessary to emphasize, however, that such amended rates would hold good only so long as the relationship of the total establishment for each arm and service to the total force in each theatre remained approximately what it then was, and the conditions of battle remained similar to those experienced in preceding months (i.e. Allied superiority in aircraft, armour and artillery).

417. Lt-Col Pullen's study had been confined to other ranks casualties, since it was here that adherence to the F.F.C. rates had let down the Canadian Army badly. General Stuart was ready to accept revised figures provided the Army Commander would agree (122). Therefore, Lt-Col Pullen spent 25-26 Aug at Army Headquarters and, after certain minor modifications had been made, agreement was obtained (123). According to Lt-Col Pullen's report, however;

... while the method of calculating the new rates was accepted as logical and the resultant reduced rft holding were accepted as a result of experience,

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\*On 30 Sep the diarist of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion wrote:

Our rfts continue to contain very poor quality troops. Many of them, for example, badly blistered their feet in the 3 1/2 mile march from DIEPPE. Very large numbers are tradesmen who have had very little inf training of any kind.



it is quite clear that the only reason Army will accept the risk of reduced holdings in the arms and services is because of the imperative need for more Inf. On the other hand, I gathered the impression that the peak of the losses in Inf is passed.

I made it quite clear to Brig Walford that these new rates will require careful watching in the light of subsequent experience and stated that this would be done at CMHQ (124).

On 29 Aug General Stuart authorized the adoption of these new wastage rates and directed that the task of remustering personnel surplus to the new rates should get under way at once (125).

418. By 31 Aug revised wastage rates for officers also had been calculated and approved. Thereupon, the following table of monthly percentages was issued (126):

	<u>Intense</u>		<u>Normal</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>ORs</u>
1. C.A.C. (incl Recce and Armd Recce Regts)	20	7	7	2 1/2
2. R.C.A. (Fd, Med, ATK and Svy)	12	5	5	2 1/2
3. R.C.A. (AA and CA)	3	1 1/2	2	1
4. R.C.E. (Fd and Svy)	9	3 1/2	3 1/2	1 1/2
5. R.C.E. (L of C, Tn and MC)	3	2	1 1/2	1
6. R.C. Sigs (Div incl Armd Bde Sigs)	4	3	1 1/2	1 1/2
7. R.C. Sigs (Non-Div and L of C)	2	2	3/4	3/4
8. Inf, S.S., and Para Bns and Army Air Corps	45	30	13	13
9. Inf MG, Mot, Sp Bns and Bde, Div, Corps and Army Def Units	35	15	8	8
10. R.C.A.S.C.	2	3/4	3/4	3/4
11. RCAMC, CDC, C Ch S and RCAPC	2	2	3/4	3/4
12. RCOC and RCEME	1	3/4	3/4	3/4
13. C. Pro C. (less Mil Prisons and Det Bks)	5	5	1 1/2	1 1/2
14. C. Pro C. (Mil Prisons and Det Bks)	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
15. Pioneer and Employment Units	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4



16. H.Q. Units				
Inf Bde	35	15	8	8
Armd Bde	20	7	7	2 1/2
Inf Div (incl FS Sec)	2 1/2	1 1/2	3/4	3/4
Armd Div (incl FS Sec)	2 1/2	1 1/2	3/4	3/4
Corps (excl Def Coy)	1 1/2	1 1/2	3/4	3/4
Army (excl Def Coy)	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
C.M.H.Q.	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
17. All C.M.H.Q. Units	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
18. Any other Units	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4

("Quiet" rate remained 3/4 per cent throughout.)

It was officially recognized, moreover, that only 35 per cent of the 50 per cent "recoverable" casualties would be available for further operational employment.

419. This information was forwarded to N.D.H.Q. the same day, with the request that formal approval be granted (see para 438). It was pointed out that, for the present, the Army Commander did not want remustering carried too far: therefore, a reinforcement pool of approximately four months at the new 'intense' rates would be retained for the following corps—C.A.C., R.C.E., R.C. Signals, R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C., R.C.E.M.E. and C. Pro C. (127).

420. Canadian battle casualties for August had been 693 officers and 8108 other ranks; although injured or wounded, 39 officers and 225 other ranks of this total had remained on duty. In addition, of course, there had been non-battle casualties and other wastage. However, the Army Commander had been assured by General Stuart on 31 Aug that there would be sufficient Infantry reinforcements either at No. 2 C.B.R.G. or in transit by 2 Sep (2205 plus 565 other ranks) to bring Canadian field units "practically" up to strength. Furthermore, General Stuart had confidently ended his telegram with this sentence: "Once up to strength we'll keep you there." (128).

(iv) Autumn 1944 Losses in Italy

421. The opening days of September 1944 found the 1st Canadian Corps strenuously engaged in Operation "OLIVE", by which the Eighth Army hoped to break through the Gothic Line and debouch into the valley of the Po. Once again Canadians found themselves opposed by the redoubtable 1st German Parachute Division. Following the capture of San Fortunato on 20 Sep the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was sent into reserve for a three weeks rest. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division took up the offensive but premature rains soon turned the offensive into a purely infantry battle, destroying all hope of getting armour into the valley of the Po.

422. On 20 Sep the Corps Commander had informed General Stuart by telegram that battle casualties during the period 21 Aug-18 Sep had been 150 officers and 2700 other ranks, not including those incapacitated by sickness (129). After making good unit deficiencies there were only 18 officers and 688 other ranks left in the Infantry reinforcement pool. With further Infantry casualties during this Operation then estimated as being 267 officers and 3676 other ranks the middle of October might find 1st Cdn Corps short some 219 officers and 2640 other



ranks of authorized holdings. Reinforcements for other Corps were still being remustered to Infantry if considered suitable and G.S. 778 unit establishments (see para 282) were being reduced but General Burns did not expect to gain many general duty infantrymen by these means. Furthermore, it was considered that certain of the newly-approved wastage rates (see para 418) did not agree with experience in the Italian theatre. Both General Burns and Brigadier Weeks were afraid that the future employment of 1st Canadian Corps would be jeopardized unless a greater number of general duty infantrymen could be despatched with the October draft (KMF 35) from the United Kingdom.

423. Due to the difficulty of meeting the priority needs of First Canadian Army it was not possible, however, to provide more general duty infantrymen for despatch on KMF 35 than the 70 officers and 450 other ranks already authorized. A C.M.H.Q. telegram of 22 Sep informed General Burns, however, that an additional 500 other ranks would be despatched: they would mainly be R.C.O.C. personnel then surplus to the requirements of No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot and would have to be remustered and trained as general duty infantrymen following their arrival in Italy. Continuing, this telegram read:

... To facilitate such retraining we will send by bomber mail the standard four week syllabus of remustering training which is designed to produce general duty inf soldiers trained to minimum standards.

I would request you pay particular attention to weapon trg and range practices on all platoon weapons because time will not permit assessment of this draft in respect of trg before despatch and many may be unfamiliar with some platoon weapons or in need of refresher trg\*. Hardening trg will also need special stress (130).

424. In a further telegram of 24 Sep General Stuart pointed out that "at present stage of war" it was "vitally important to keep infantry in First Cdn Army up to strength plus small reserve even if it means under insurance for you for a limited period" (131). In addition to remustering further available reinforcements to infantry General Stuart suggested that the continuing 2nd and 5th L.A.A. (Light Anti-Aircraft) Regiments, R.C.A. and other less essential units might be further reduced in personnel (see para 372): if necessary, and as a temporary expedient only, general duty infantrymen might be removed from one infantry brigade of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. He hoped, however, to bring the reinforcement pool back to strength with the draft reaching Italy in November on K.M.F. 36.

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\*In addition to the fact that all soldiers were supposed to have taken two months basic training, or its equivalent, personnel of R.C.O.C. and other supporting arms in the United Kingdom had been subjected to a few hours of "military training" every week to fit them for a possible all-round defence role against enemy parachutists or motorized troops (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap XI, para 197). On 12 Dec 44 the war diary of Headquarters, No. 1 C.B.R.G. noted that the infantry training of the 496 remustered R.C.O.C. and R.C.E.M.E. personnel had been completed on the previous day. Of this number 30 had been re-boarded as medically unfit for service as infantrymen and a further 21 would have to repeat the course, having missed too much instruction through hospitalization, detention or other reasons.



425. In his telegram to the C.G.S. of the same date General Stuart pointed out that one trouble with the system of troop convoys to the Mediterranean was that they sailed only once a month: not until the next convoy (K.M.F. 36) was made up in October would the reinforcement situation have improved sufficiently for a larger allocation to be made from the pool in the United Kingdom (132). Therefore he suggested that the C.G.S. approach Washington to obtain a direct sailing from North America to Italy during October for 1000 general duty infantrymen. (General Burns was advised that this proposal was being made.)

426. On 30 Sep a negative reply was despatched from Ottawa. The British Army Staff in Washington considered that there was "little possibility" of obtaining shipping space direct to Italy: moreover, Canada could send men direct to the Mediterranean only by reducing the numbers planned for despatch to the United Kingdom during October. Furthermore, this telegram went on to point out that:

In view of difficulties of opening new channel for administrative and supply purposes consider that there would be little advantage in changing present arrangements and ... it is unlikely that any time would be saved.

Proposal considered on staff level only. You will appreciate there are other reasons why change in method of despatch at this stage might be considered undesirable (133).

427. Meanwhile information of another colour had reached C.M.H.Q. On 18 Sep Brigadier Weeks had addressed a personal letter to Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, newly appointed D.C.G.S. at C.M.H.Q.: on 27 Sep the latter passed extracts to General Stuart:

The rft situation out here is causing some concern to the Corps Comd, but not to me. From what Gilbride\* told me on his arrival out here, I can see little hope of us getting a considerable number of C.I.C. rfts from the U.K. Personally I think we can live off our fat for a reasonable period. If the present intense fighting extends over a period of two weeks, we will be in the position of having to rely on rfts from those discharged from the Convalescent Depot. This is not so bad, as personnel are experienced and can go forward almost immediately. They do require a little freshening, especially on the physical side at the Base Rft Bns.

The tradesmen situation remains a headache, but we are slowly re-mustering, and keeping the situation well in hand. The tradesmen problem does not cause me very much concern, principally because the forward Commanding Offrs have no serious grouses in this respect. For example, there is a paper deficiency of Drivers I.C., but all units succeed in moving their vehicles without any difficulty (134).

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\*Brigadier W.P. Gilbride had returned to Italy to take up the appointment of D.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Canadian Corps, with effect from 19 Sep 44.



These views were more in accord with those held by General Stuart and may have helped to convince him that all would yet be well.

428. The Minister of National Defence did not think so, however, as a result of his visit to Italy 26 Sep-3 Oct. The Eighth Army Commander had told him that, although it was not considered advantageous to attack an enemy without a superiority of three to one, in reality the Germans were as strong or stronger than the 15th Army Group (135). Thus there would be heavy fighting before the Eighth Army could make any appreciable advance. Brigadier Weeks later explained that, should 1st Canadian Corps continue to be actively engaged, all the general duty infantry reinforcements would be committed by 10 Oct (136). Although there was a constant daily flow of 60 to 100 all ranks from the convalescent depots back into the reinforcement stream the number of daily casualties might run as high as 300 all ranks when there was fighting. Moreover, experience had shown that casualties from sickness and accident might equal the numbers of those killed, wounded and missing during the inclement months of the year. Therefore, something like 500-600 reinforcements might be required daily to maintain 1st Canadian Corps. It would seem that the earlier optimism about debouching into the valley of the Po without further serious fighting had been washed away with the coming of the rains.

429. Speaking to the House of Commons considerably later about this trip to Italy the Minister of National Defence summarized his findings as follows:

In Italy I visited the reinforcement unit and most of the infantry battalions. I talked with the men themselves, and time and again I got the same story—about having to go back to the line repeatedly, or not having leave, or being short-handed, when trained N.R.M.A. men could be made available to give them relief.

At the end of September, just before I left Italy, the pool of trained infantry reinforcements was down to between ten and fifteen per cent of what had been planned, and infantry reinforcements were so scarce in the United Kingdom that the only addition they were getting was the monthly convoy to arrive in about two weeks, bringing not even enough trained infantry men to meet the casualties which would have been incurred in those two weeks.

The corps commander in Italy pressed strongly that the pool be established in the area sufficiently strong to relieve the tight situation and ensure prompt replacement of day-to-day casualties (137).

430. On 11 Oct the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which had been in reserve since the capture of San Fortunato on 21 Sep, returned to the line and the Armoured Division retired into corps reserve. A slow advance continued across water-laced ground but all initiative had passed to the weather man and on 28 Oct the Canadian divisions were withdrawn. The casualties suffered by the ad hoc "Porterforce" and the detached 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade continued slight and could be replaced without undue difficulty. The draft arriving in late November on convoy KMF 36 included 867 English-speaking infantrymen and 316 reinforcements for other corps. No French-speaking general duty infantrymen had been available, however, and the



problem of reinforcing the under-strength Royal 22e Régiment was acute, being relieved only slightly by the return of "recoverable casualties" and men from other sections of the X-List (see para 452).

431. Unlike the British component of the Eighth Army which had had to disband the 1st Armoured Division, reduce one brigade of the 56th (London) Division to a cadre basis and decrease all its Infantry battalions from four to three rifle companies, 1st Canadian Corps was able to continue with unaltered establishments (138). It next saw action on 2 Dec in the Eighth Army's unsuccessful attempt to reach the line of the Santerno before halting for the winter.

(v) Remustering Reinforcements for North-West Europe

432. The opening days of September 1944 saw Canadian armour joining in the pursuit across France and Belgium while the two infantry divisions remained behind to invest the Channel ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. On 7 Sep Brigadier C. Lloyd (D.A.G., Rear Headquarters, 21 Army Group) informed Brigadier Beament that he was worried by the extent of the deficiencies in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. He wished to be informed of the Canadian situation since, should there be continued heavy casualties, the situation might become acute (139). On the other hand, by energetic action it was going to be possible to bring British infantry units up to establishment: on 16 Aug the decision had been taken to disband the 59th Infantry Division and one brigade of the 49th (West Riding) Division and use their personnel as reinforcements (140). (During the same month it had been decided to transfer some 11,000 men from the Royal Navy and R.A.F. to the Army, two-thirds of whom would become infantrymen.) (141)

433. In the reply despatched to Brigadier Beament from C.M.H.Q. on 15 Sep it was pointed out that there were sufficient Canadian reinforcements then in transit to make up the First Canadian Army's 3351 Infantry deficiencies as of 12 Sep (142). Further reinforcements equalling seven weeks wastage for all Infantry units at the new 'intense' rates were already in view. Some adjustment would have to be made for infantry 'specialists' and tradesmen employed as general duty infantrymen to be returned to their proper role eventually. Reinforcements also would have to be sent to Italy. On the other hand, no allowance was being made for 'recoverable wounded'.

434. On the day following the commencement of Operation "MARKET GARDEN", by which the First Allied Airborne Army hoped to seize the approaches to the North German plain, General Crerar despatched the following message to General Stuart:

Reinforcement situation as regards general duty infantry shows no general improvement over that which obtained a month ago. Matter concerns me greatly and requires your personal and urgent investigation (143).

With the failure of the British Second Army to link up with the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem it became obvious that there would be considerable heavy fighting before the Wehrmacht was forced to capitulate.

435. Immediately on receipt of this message General Stuart ordered his A.D.A.G.(A) to prepare another statement. Brigadier Bostock replied that since 16 Aug when the Chief of Staff had ordered top priority to be given to the despatch of



Infantry reinforcements (and that infantry tradesmen not in receipt of trades pay and specialists were to be employed on general duty) some 233 officers and 4779 other ranks had been despatched to No. 2 C.B.R.G. (144). A further Infantry draft of 31 officers and 977 other ranks was being prepared for despatch on 22 Sep, while 450 infantrymen were earmarked for Italy (see para 422). The fact that the Infantry holdings of No. 2 C.B.R.G. on 14 Sep had been listed as 312 officers and 1781 other ranks against a deficiency of 3075 other ranks in field units might or might not be an adequate picture of the situation, since investigation disclosed that reinforcements remained on the strength of No. 2 C.B.R.G. during the four or more days travelling by road to catch up with the forward battalion and the field units (see para 382). As long as transportation difficulties persisted there always would be delays in getting reinforcements forward (145). In what started out to be a telegram to the Army Commander and finished as a letter on 25 Sep General Stuart pointed out the alleviating factors, as well as saying:

I can assure you that the question of reinforcements generally and in particular infantry reinforcements has been subject to my personal attention for some time. I am fairly hard to please but I am satisfied with what has been done this end. We have a minimum of 15000 infantry reinforcements in sight for the balance of 1944, not including those returned from hospitals. This is practically the equivalent of three months at intense rates for your First Cdn Army or two months including 1 Cdn Corps. This I am satisfied will be sufficient to look after our infantry requirements until the collapse of Germany (146).

Since North-West Europe was the decisive theatre of operations he was prepared to let 1st Canadian Corps go short until the middle of November.

436. After outlining the steps taken to alleviate the shortage of general duty infantrymen, in a letter of 20 Sep to Ottawa, General Stuart proposed that, for the time being, the training of infantry reinforcements in Canada might be terminated at the end of the 13 1/2 weeks common-to-arms training syllabus, apart from six per cent who should receive additional training as Drivers, I.C. (M.V.). By extending the existing basic refresher-training course in the United Kingdom from two to three weeks (for a total of five weeks training) it would be possible to cover the instruction eliminated in Canada. This would save time and permit more infantry reinforcements to be sent overseas (including instructional personnel made surplus) at an earlier date (147).

437. In a telegram of 4 Oct the C.G.S. replied that this proposal had been turned down, since it would be "undesirable to despatch reinforcements from Canada with less than 4 months service in Army" (148). He doubted whether the proposed three weeks training in the United Kingdom would both make up for the month's collective training at No. 1 Training Brigade Group (Debert) and provide adequate refresher training to men whose training had deteriorated whilst in transit. Considering that the result would be the earlier despatch of reinforcements into battle with a correspondingly lower standard of training, he continued:

It is questionable whether any reduction in present training time should be accepted at this stage. Present program in Canada with not less



than two weeks refresher in UK is considered minimum requirement to produce physically fit and efficient infantry soldier ....

As period of training is important question of policy suggest you discuss with Minister informing him of our views .... (149)

438. The C.G.S. already (23 Sep) had telegraphed concurrence in the revised wastage rates issued by C.M.H.Q. on 31 Aug (see para 418). However, he stipulated that they should be under constant review and appropriately revised from time to time as necessary in the light of future experience of battle casualties and changes in the composition of the Army. That telegram also had stated:

We note that an initial infantry pool based on three months intense at the proposed rates would have been approximately 27400 instead of 17800. We assume that these will be available by your continuing remustering of surplus in other corps now overseas who are surplus under your proposals (150).

Claiming N.D.H.Q. had anticipated that the F.F.C. wastage rates were too low for Infantry the C.G.S. pointed out that since mid-April some 68 per cent of the intake into the Training Centres had been allocated to that Arm. It was now proposed to increase this to 75 per cent, although it would not be easy to maintain the desired quality. Furthermore, rather than convert personnel then completing corps training in Canada into infantrymen, it was suggested that they be despatched overseas for remustering and conversion training. This would make for speed. Men undergoing basic training or still in the early weeks of corps training would, however, be sent from Canada only as trained infantrymen. The following provision was added:

You will appreciate that your proposed new rates will not be used to apply to Forces whose composition by corps differs from that of our Forces now in Europe as the basis of calculation is only upon the ratio which the casualties of each corps bear to the total battle casualties of our Forces as now constituted (151).

439. Any belief in Ottawa that remustering overseas would produce the difference of 9600 infantrymen between three months 'intense' wastage at the new Canadian and the older F.F.C. rates was doomed to disappointment. As of 15 Sep some 4720 had been converted to Infantry and another 500 (from R.C.O.C.) despatched to Italy but the opinion was held within 'A' Branch at C.M.H.Q. that 7850 was the maximum number of men who might be remustered to Infantry before the end of the year (152). In a memorandum passed to D.C.G.S. on 27 Sep Brigadier Bostock wrote that:

Bearing in mind that the surpluses in the rft holdings of other corps created by these new rates were not all personnel physically fit for Gen Duty Inf, and that certain types could not be remustered to Inf but to other corps where trades etc shortages still existed, this figure of 7500 is, I consider, a very creditable achievement by AAG (Req) (153).

440. The transfer of surplus reinforcement officers



to Infantry had been discussed at C.M.H.Q. during August and it had been decided that valuable time would be saved by soliciting volunteers rather than working through the lists of R.C.A., R.C.E. and R.C.A.S.C. officers, where the chief surpluses existed, and selecting potential candidates (154). Since it did not prove possible to obtain 140 R.C.A. officers for the second six weeks conversion course scheduled to open at the Canadian Training School on 16 Sep approval was given for the compulsory transfer of that number (155).

441. In addition to continuing the remustering of officers Canada was asked to supply 100 "aggressive" young subalterns in each of October and November to offset a deficiency of 450 English-speaking and 10 French-speaking Infantry officers (156). An N.D.H.Q. telegram of 13 Oct stated that 90 Infantry reinforcement officers could be despatched during October, 100 during November and 100 in December (157). Since this would not completely meet requirements, however, authority was sought to continue remustering overseas (158). It was 20 Oct, however, before authority was granted to effect the compulsory transfer of further surplus C.A.C. and R.C.A. officers (159). Subsequently it was decided that the surplus of officers in technical corps was too small to bother with and that a disproportionately large number of the surplus R.C.A.S.C. were over-age for service with Infantry units (160). Moreover, from early November on officers from Canada would require most of the vacancies on the C.T.S. courses (161). The final C.M.H.Q. ruling on compulsory transfer appears to have been issued on 24 Nov:

Until further instruction, surplus rft officers of RCA and CAC will be remustered, either voluntarily or compulsorily as necessary, to complete the normal intake of 105 candidates per course at No. 3 Wing CTS.

The numbers so remustered will be dictated by the requirements for course vacancies of 13 CITB\*. It is understood that the number of Inf rft officers directed to this Course by 13 CITB will be kept to the minimum required by the state of training of officers arriving in the UK from Canada as assessed by Os. C. CITRs (162).

442. Beginning in September only five overseas candidates were accepted monthly for commissions in the R.C.A. and C.A.C., and one in Royal Canadian Signals; other O.C.T.U. candidates would have to transfer to Infantry if they wished to become officers. An Officers Survey and Classification Board was established, under the chairmanship of the President of the O.C.T.U. Selection Board, to determine whether useful employment could be found for existing officers who were surplus to existing needs due to age, medical category or temperament. A second such Board commenced hearings on 23 Oct (C.M.H.Q. Report 156).

(vi) Shortage of French-Speaking Infantrymen

443. Although the internal composition of units is bound to change over a period as the result of illness, accident,

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\*During early November Infantry refresher training was concentrated in a new 13th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade and the Infantry Reinforcement Units disappeared as a training organization. The new formation comprised four (later five) Training Regiments, each consisting of one depot and two training battalions (C.M.H.Q. Report 133).



death, transfer and promotion the following units were still classified as French-speaking during the spring of 1944 (163):

First Canadian Army

4th Medium Regiment, R.C.A.  
No. 3 Battalion, R.C.E.  
4th Medium Regiment Signal Section  
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal  
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve  
Le Régiment de la Chaudière  
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, R.C.A.S.C.  
4th Medium Regiment Platoon, R.C.A.S.C.  
No. 6 Field Dressing Station, R.C.A.M.C.  
No. 18 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C.  
No. 104 Light Aid Detachment, R.C.E.M.E.

Canadian Troops, A.A.I.

82nd Anti-tank Battery, R.C.A.  
Royal 22e Régiment  
No. 5 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C.  
No. 1 Convalescent Depot, R.C.A.M.C.

C.M.H.Q. Units

No. 17 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C.  
No. 9 Canadian Provost Company.

Naturally enough, it was considered most important that the four Infantry battalions with total establishments of 136 officers and 3148 other ranks should remain French-speaking. A memorandum of 13 Apr 44 noted, however, that there were 201 officers but only 348 other ranks against French-speaking Infantry reinforcement requirements of 90 officers and 1563 other ranks (164). Furthermore, there were current demands for six officers and 124 other ranks for the Royal 22e Régiment's share of the reinforcement pool in Italy and for 11 officers and 327 other ranks for Le Régiment de la Chaudière which would be participating in the D-Day assault.

444. On the following day General Stuart directed that the reinforcements requested for the Royal 22e Régiment (the senior French-speaking unit) should be despatched to Italy and that C.R.U. should be searched for French-speaking personnel suitable for remustering to Infantry (165). Brigadier deLalanne queried N.D.H.Q. by telegram as to what might be expected in the way of French-speaking general duty infantrymen (166) and was advised of the action being taken in Pacific and Atlantic Commands to enlist the N.R.M.A. personnel of French-speaking personnel for overseas service with their own battalions (see paras 328-340).

445. Personnel Selection Officers at C.M.H.Q. reported a total of 3601 (2653 general duty and 948 drivers) French-speaking Canadians serving with English-speaking units (167). Many of these were of too low intelligence to post away from existing employment, however, while some 800 were serving as infantrymen in English-speaking units. Regarding these latter, Brigadier Bostock uttered the following caution:

With regard to the remustering of French-speaking personnel, it will be more difficult than the normal remustering of General Duty from one arm to another, as experience has shown that French-speaking individuals in English-speaking units are very loth to leave



the English units and transfer to a French-speaking unit. Therefore, if the remustering programme is to be put into effect, special care will have to be taken that the individuals are approached by their C.Os, and that it is explained to them that it is their duty to accept this remustering for the good of the Army as a whole. If this is not done, I am afraid the results of the remustering will not be satisfactory (168).

Actually it was possible to transfer 233 such soldiers from units of First Canadian Army and 256 from within C.R.U. by 24 Jun, the latter going to Le Régiment de la Chaudière which was the only French-speaking unit participating in the Normandy assault (169). Some of those reported had been posted elsewhere while others turned out not to be French-speaking at all (even though they may have possessed a French name\*).

446. Meanwhile, Brigadier Beament had raised a more serious issue in a letter of 8 May. From GHQ 1st Echelon 21st Army Group he wrote General Stuart as follows:

I do not need to dilate on the extremely serious situation which exists regarding reinforcements for French speaking infantry units. It has always been difficult to maintain the Royal 22e Regiment in the Italian theatre and this has been done at the expense of reserves behind the other three French speaking infantry battalions. At the present time the available reserves behind the Regiment de la Chaudiere are inadequate to meet the demands of the first eight days for an infantry battalion in an assault role, and it is my impression that every available French speaking Canadian has been diverted to this battalion, thus leaving the two French speaking battalions of the 2 Canadian Division without any reserves whatsoever.

Several possible alternatives present themselves, such as:

- (a) Cannibalization.
- (b) An extension of the re-mustering policy.
- (c) Reinforcing French Canadian units with English speaking personnel.

All these courses have obvious disadvantages and strong political implications. The matter, however, is of such pressing urgency that I request that I be furnished at the earliest possible date with a directive regarding the policy to be followed in reinforcing these units (170).

447. On 12 May Brigadier Bostock visited First Canadian Army Headquarters and discussed the problem with Brigadier Walford (D.A. & Q.M.G.). On 21 May General Crerar

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\*Just as there were English-speaking personnel who had inherited French names there were French-speaking personnel named Robinson and Macdonald. To confuse Records personnel still more the name Martin might denote either an English-speaking or French-speaking Canadian.



instructed that French-speaking infantryman be withdrawn from English-speaking Infantry battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. A sufficient number of French-speaking reinforcements should then be obtained from other sources to provide the unfilled balance of 60 days wastage, at "intense" rates, for the three Quebec Infantry battalions of the 21st Army Group (171). On 23 May Brigadier Bostock was able to tell General Stuart that, from remustered personnel (including the 120 French-speaking A.A. gunners previously allotted to the 4th Canadian Medium Regiment) and arrivals expected from Canada that month, it would be possible to produce 1221 reinforcements: slightly better than the 1126 required to provide 60 days reinforcements for the two French-speaking battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and replace the casualties expected by Le Régiment de la Chaudière in the first 17 days of fighting (172). Although this provided for the immediate future there was no reserve in the United Kingdom for the Royal 22e Régiment. Actually a further month's wastage for each of the Royal 22e Régiment, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal and two months' wastage for Le Régiment de la Chaudière—totalling 1570—should be provided. Some 1290 French-speaking reinforcements were expected from Canada before the end of July but Brigadier Bostock considered it wise to add a caution:

... although we may be able to make up the immediate requirements, the situation regarding French-speaking Infantry is by no means secure, and if any of the four bns should suffer unexpected casualties, it will be essential to adopt either the system of reinforcing with English-speaking personnel, or of cannibalization (173).

On the following day the Army Commander was advised of the steps being taken, together with the decision that French-speaking units within 21st Army Group other than Infantry would have to accept English-speaking reinforcements and lose their distinct identity, if no French-speaking personnel of the right category and trade were available (174).

448. In a secret and personal letter of 29 May General Stuart advised the Army Commander that there was no guarantee that the flow of French-speaking general duty infantrymen from Canada could be maintained in sufficient numbers to make good continuing wastage. General Stuart suggested that the only course might be the cannibalization of one or more French-speaking units to reinforce the others, and replacement with other units (175).

449. On 4 Jun General Crerar replied that the seriousness of the problem depended upon the actual casualties suffered by Le Régiment de la Chaudière up to D plus 18. He considered [rightly as it turned out] that the estimated casualties were too high: if so, the situation would not become acute for some months, probably 1 Oct (176). In the event that cannibalization should then become necessary the Army Commander favoured replacement by an English-speaking battalion of the 13th Brigade, strengthened by a proportion of battle experienced Officers and N.C.Os.

450. The summer passed without incident, even though General Stuart did include a note of warning during the course of his visit to Ottawa to obtain changes in the 'manpower ceiling' (see paras 395-7). His appreciation of the reinforcement situation, dated 2 Aug, concluded as follows:

The only part of the reinforcement problem that



is worrying me at the moment is the finding of reinforcements for our French-Canadian Infantry Battalions. I am withdrawing French-Canadians from English speaking units overseas for this purpose but unless I can get additional French-Canadian Infantry reinforcements from Canada I shall be faced with the alternative of disbanding units to provide reinforcements or reinforce with English speaking personnel. I do not relish either alternative and consequently I hope every effort will be made to increase the flow of French-speaking Infantry reinforcements (177).

451. General Stuart's fears were realized. Apparently Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had never been at full strength since the first day they went into action (12 Jul) and by 1 Sep they were deficient 276 and 333 other ranks respectively (178). From 1 Sep to 8 Oct the least number of deficiencies was 148 other ranks for Le Régiment de Maisonneuve on 27 Sep and 202 other ranks for Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal on 8 Oct. On that last date Le Régiment de Maisonneuve had 38 officers and 600 other ranks (75 per cent) and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal had 38 officers and 585 other ranks (72 per cent). Since casualties were concentrated in the rifle companies this meant that the fighting strength was reduced by 50 per cent. Before taking up the matter with the acting Corps Commander (Maj-Gen C. Foulkes) on 8 Oct the acting Divisional Commander (Brigadier R.H. Keebler) secured agreement from the two battalion commanders that English-speaking companies might be added to their units. In fact, Brigadier Keebler had gone ahead and ordered that one such company should be formed from the reinforcements which had arrived for the division.

452. The seriousness of the situation had been realized at C.M.H.Q., where it was pointed out that on 23 Sep Le Régiment de la Chaudière had been short two officers and 86 other ranks and the Royal 22e Régiment two officers and 102 other ranks, although there were believed to be French-speaking holding of 21 officers and 270 other ranks for the latter in Italy. Brigadier Bostock considered that the Royal 22e Régiment should have priority, if any of the French-speaking battalions were to be maintained at full strength, and recommended on 9 Oct that authority be given the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon 21st Army Group to post English-speaking personnel to its three Infantry battalions from the province of Quebec (179). General Stuart replied that the immediate problem was to despatch as many French-speaking infantrymen as possible on the next draft to North-West Europe (180). Brigadier Bostock then managed to increase this draft (UKAG 11) to eight officers and 126 other ranks. By "greatest endeavours of re-training, and replacing fits with unfits" it was hoped to provide the following reinforcements from Le Régiment de Hull (Le Régiment de Montmagny had been disbanded) and No. 6 Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit (181):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
20 Oct 44	25	142
27 Oct 44	14	89
3 Nov 44	<u>29</u>	<u>188</u>
	68	419

However, only a further 178 French-speaking general duty infantrymen were expected to arrive from Canada in time for despatch to an operational theatre during 1944.



453. In reply to a C.M.H.Q. query, the Canadian Section at 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group replied on 21 Oct that existing facilities did not permit conversion training being carried on in North-West Europe: furthermore:

Rft situation will not permit withdrawal French speaking soldiers from English speaking Inf Bns. Numbers French speaking soldiers in non CIC units physically fit and suitable for emp in Inf Bns negligible (182).

The situation regarding French-speaking Infantry officers was not serious, however, and despatches would be required only in accordance with weekly demands submitted.

454. General Stuart was in Ottawa and the Acting Army Commander's (Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds) letter of 23 Oct went to General Crerar (in hospital at Taplow) and General Montague (M.G.A.). With inclement weather about to boost the sickness rate General Simonds estimated that the deficiency of French-speaking general duty infantrymen would increase from the present (20 Oct) 340 other ranks to 605 by 1 Dec. The previously mentioned letters, written by Brigadier Keebler and General Foulkes were attached (see para 451) and General Simonds went on to suggest:

3. The reinforcing of French speaking regiments has been a problem for some time and it would appear that one of the following courses is open:
  - (a) That sufficient French speaking infantry reinforcements be made available to maintain the required fighting strengths.
  - (b) That one of the regiments be absorbed by the other and that the surplus personnel be used as reinforcements. This would require the formation of an English speaking unit to take the place of the regiment so absorbed.
  - (c) That English speaking reinforcements be used in French speaking regiments in which case complete companies could be sent into the line with English speaking officers and non-commissioned officers.

Of the above courses it is obvious for many reasons that (b) would not be acceptable. It would appear therefore that if (a) is not possible then (c) is the course to adopt and this is strongly recommended.

4. It has been found necessary already to give special battle tasks to these regiments because of their dwindling strengths. The undesirability of having to follow this course of action is obvious. Failure to bear a full share of the battle will become increasingly noticeable to other units and formations and resentment will develop against the regiments concerned. This in turn will prejudice the national interest.
5. In conclusion it is recommended that a policy be adopted of accepting one complete English



speaking rifle company to each battalion. This in turn will allow the French speaking portion of the unit to be kept up to strength if the reinforcements indicated ... arrive in the theatre (183).

After considering every angle General Crerar decided that, unless adequate French-speaking Infantry reinforcements were forthcoming very shortly, it would be necessary to concur in General Simonds' recommendation. This information was forwarded to General Stuart in Ottawa on 28 Oct by Brigadier Macklin (D.C.G.S., C.M.H.Q.), who pointed out that if casualties continued at the same rate it might be necessary to form two English-speaking rifle companies for each of the French-speaking Infantry battalions (184).

455. During the following days General Stuart resigned over the "conscription" issue (see paras 458-545) and was succeeded by General Montague. General Crerar resumed command of First Canadian Army and raised the special problem of French-speaking Infantry reinforcements in a letter of 12 Nov. Present deficiencies and anticipated further wastage until 31 Dec was 1242 other ranks, against which there would be 794 replacements. He informed General Montague that one of the three courses advocated by General Simonds in his letter of 23 Oct was necessary: this was a "matter of national importance and ... the decision must be made at National Defence Headquarters after the fullest investigation and discussion of the problem and treated as a matter of urgency" (185).

456. Le Régiment de la Chaudière was not in quite as bad a condition as the other French-speaking Infantry battalions since its initial "recoverable" casualties already were returning. November was forecast as a "quiet" month but "intense" activity was expected during December and Brigadier Bostock admitted to General Montague on 14 Nov that "on the present estimates we cannot maintain these bns up to strength to 31 Dec 44" (186). Furthermore, the discussion to date had ignored the existence of the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment: although up to strength, a draft would have to be provided in December for its future maintenance. This information was passed back to the C.G.S. in Ottawa, by telegram on 15 Nov (187).

457. By this time the "conscription" issue was approaching its crisis in Ottawa and no answer was possible until the overall problem had been settled. Once that decision had been reached the problem of despatching overseas sufficient French-speaking general duty infantrymen seemed possible of solution



PART V - CONSCRIPTION CRISIS

(1) Mr Ralston's Resignation

458. The Minister of National Defence had been shaken as a result of his visit to Canadian troops in Italy (see paras 428-9). Following his return to London he instructed that projections should be made, showing the existing and estimated future, manpower situation within the Canadian Army Overseas and information obtained from Canada as to the numbers that could be made available as reinforcements (1). On 4 Oct a preliminary study of the situation overseas was presented to him, although Brigadier Bostock later found it necessary to qualify certain of his conclusions (2). That same day Mr Ralston visited General Crerar at No. 7 Canadian General Hospital, Taplow, where the latter was a patient (3).

459. On 8 Oct the Minister of National Defence flew to Brussels and went on by road to visit the Acting Army Commander (Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds) and Brigadier Beament. General Simonds stressed the desirability of having sufficient replacements so that casualties could be replaced promptly and units not allowed to run down so that they had to be refilled with large numbers of "green" reinforcements. The fact that the rifle strength of an Infantry battalion was only about 60 per cent of the unit establishment did much to conceal the fact that a large proportion of the fighting component might be lost in a single engagement (Appendix "L") even though casualties might have been only a small proportion of the total strength. Mr Ralston later told the House of Commons:

I found that on account of the heavy infantry casualties, the infantry reinforcement pool which had been established in France on D-Day had been completely exhausted, and that at one time there had been aggregate shortages in the units themselves of over 3,000. This had been gradually overcome in aggregate numbers, but not in individual units, by vigorous efforts to retrain men from other units as infantry. No pool had been built up. The week I was there, there would be sufficient infantry in aggregate numbers available in the area to bring the units up to strength. To do so would leave only about ten per cent of what should have been on hand to provide the pool for which the acting army commander had asked. Some people have the idea that striving to keep units up to strength means trying to achieve an ideal condition. They think of experience in the last war when units held the line with strength substantially reduced. Experience in the last war is no guide. In the last war battles were short, the objectives were limited and long static periods intervened. In this war a battle is a series of continuous offensive operations, or, to put it the other way, a battle is a continuous series of offensive operations. That makes it most necessary that units, while they are in the battle, be reinforced on the move to keep up the momentum of the operation and each unit's fighting efficiency. That does not mean that units are kept in the line a longer time than they should be. They are withdrawn and replaced constantly by other units. It only means that, while they are there, the activity is more intense, and to support men and the success of the operation



the ranks should be filled up promptly (4).

Mr Ralston also saw Field Marshal Montgomery. During the next two days he visited No. 2 C.B.R.G., two general hospitals and the headquarters of other Canadian formations. He flew to Paris for an interview with General Eisenhower and returned to London on 12 Oct (5).

460. By then Brigadier Bostock had a more comprehensive manpower projection ready for his inspection. Based on the actual situation of 23 Sep Brigadier Bostock's memorandum of 11 Oct presented the reinforcement position as follows (6):

Detail	Infantry		Other Arms		Total	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
Authorized holding at 3 mos Int Rates	2039	28424	1487	10999	3526	39423
Available on 23 Sep after allowing for deficiency in Fd units ex UK	<u>711</u>	<u>7407</u>	<u>2432</u>	<u>14513</u>	<u>3143</u>	<u>21920</u>
Surplus or deficiency	-1328	-21017	945	3514	-383	-17503

The N.D.H.Q. undertaking to despatch 4000 reinforcements per month during 1944 had been more than fulfilled—42,313 in the first nine months of the year for a monthly average of approximately 4700, with greater numbers despatched after April. Further other rank arrivals from Canada before the end of 1944 were estimated as 6197 infantrymen and 6312 for other corps.

461. Brigadier Bostock then totalled the number of all ranks which it was estimated would be available in each operational theatre, including "recoverable casualties", and set these against the generous allowance for casualties during the balance of the year:

	Infantry		Other Arms		Total	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
Casualties all theatres	1404	18975	1207	7401	2611	26376
Rfts available all sources	<u>1318</u>	<u>17023</u>	<u>2558</u>	<u>21523</u>	<u>3876</u>	<u>38546</u>
Surplus or deficiency	-86	-1952	1351	14122	1265	12170

In other words, there was an overall surplus of approximately 13000 all ranks but a deficiency of some 2000 infantrymen. Actually the situation would be even less favourable, however, since the men despatched from Canada during December would require a period of refresher training in the United Kingdom; a proportion of the recoverable casualties would not be sufficiently hardened by 31 Dec; distance would not permit any men despatched to Italy after 30 Nov getting into action before



the end of the year.

462. According to Brigadier Bostock's memorandum, the 34,000 casualties suffered to the end of September and this generous estimate of 29,000 further casualties for the balance of the year presented a pessimistic total of 63,000, instead of the 40,000 originally estimated. If this should turn out to be true then the Canadian Army Overseas would have eaten into its "income" to the extent of 23,000 and reduced its reinforcement pool by that much. His conclusion was that

... we can on a basis of available reinforcements now in sight maintain the present Cdn Army to 31 Dec. In about 2 months time the position for the future will need reassessment in the light of circumstances.

463. After perusing Brigadier Bostock's figures of 15 Oct\* the D.C.G.S. estimated that the end of the year would find the Infantry reinforcement pool exhausted (7). Restoring it to the level of approximately two months' wastage at "intense" rates would require the bulk provision of 15,000 general duty infantrymen before 31 Dec 44. As a basis of calculation he had taken the activity forecast and battle wastage for the first six months of 1945 to be:

	<u>Other Ranks</u>
3 months "intense"	28424
2 months "normal"	8212
1 month "quiet"	<u>239</u>
Total	36875

for both theatres, although not necessarily in that order. Subtracting an estimated 11,000 men recovered from hospital during that period it would be necessary to provide a further 25,875 men from Canada, on an average of 4313 per month to continue the reinforcement pool.

464. After digesting the memorandum of 11 Oct Mr Ralston had indicated his apprehensions in a telegram to the Prime Minister. This telegram of 13 Oct stated that he was returning to Canada almost at once. On 14 Oct Mr Ralston had another talk with General Crerar, who was still receiving medical treatment and then, after examining further manpower projections, left for Canada on 16 Oct (by air), taking General Stuart with him. Arriving in Ottawa on 18 Oct Mr Ralston had a preliminary discussion with the Prime Minister that evening (8).

465. During the time Mr Ralston had been overseas the press had capitalized on an earlier (18 Sep) statement from

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\*Due to the changing situation, misconceptions and minor inaccuracies, and the desire of the Minister of National Defence for up-to-date information, slightly different figures were produced almost daily during this period.



Major Connie Smythe, M.C.\* who was convalescing in Christie Street Military Hospital (Toronto) from a wound received in France while commanding the 30th L.A.A. Battery, R.C.A. He charged that the reinforcements being sent overseas were "green, inexperienced and poorly trained" and that the result was unnecessary casualties. An Editorial in The Ottawa Journal of 20 Sep gave Major Smythe's statement in part:

During my time in France and in the hospitals of France and England, I talked with officers from far eastern Canada, French Canada, Ontario and all the western provinces. They agreed that the reinforcements received now are green, inexperienced and poorly trained.

Besides this general statement, specific charges are that many have never thrown a grenade. Practically all have little or no knowledge of the Bren gun and, finally, most of them have never seen a Piat anti-tank gun, let alone fired one.\*\*

These officers are unanimous in stating that large numbers of unnecessary casualties result from this greenness, both to the rookie and to the older soldiers, who have the added task of trying to look after the newcomers as well as themselves.

I give these true facts in the hopes that:

- (1) Col. Ralston, if he has other information will know that his facts are out of date or that he has been misinformed;
- (2) The taxpayer will insist that no money will be spent on well-trained soldiers in this country except to send them to the battlefronts;
- (3) The people who voted these men should be used overseas should insist on the Government carrying out the will of the people; and
- (4) The relatives of the lads in the fighting zones should ensure no further casualties are caused to their own flesh and blood by the failure to send overseas reinforcements now available in large numbers in Canada.

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\*A well known Canadian figure in the world of sport—manager of the Toronto Maple Leafs Hockey Club and promoter of Maple Leaf Gardens, he had served in the Canadian Field Artillery and Royal Flying Corps during the First World War and mobilized a so-called "Sportmen's Battery" in 1942.

\*\*It should be obvious to those who have read thus far that such instances existed. Certain infantry officers questioned while preparing this work have hinted, however, that reinforcements may have concealed knowledge of weapons such as the P.I.A.T. and Bren light machine gun in the hope of drawing a less dangerous assignment.



466. The Ottawa Journal editorial pointed out that this couldn't be "dismissed as the complaint of an irresponsible junior officer" and argued:

No official brush-off can dispose of these charges by Major Smythe. They are true or they are not true. If they are not true, the public has a right to expect of the Government that it prove they aren't true; to show where, why, and how they are false. If they are true, with the Government unable to produce facts to the contrary, then the country has a right to feel that our men overseas and the whole war effort are being betrayed and to demand that those responsible for the betrayal be punished.

The Canadian people, by an overwhelming majority, voted the Government a mandate to draft and send reinforcements overseas when they were needed. If it be true that the Government is flaunting that mandate, refusing to send overseas the right reinforcements when the right reinforcements are vital, the while keeping in Canada more than 50,000 trained men who refuse to go overseas voluntarily, then the position is disgraceful. So disgraceful—if that be a strong enough word—that those responsible for it deserve severe condemnation.

During the ensuing month editorials of a similar vein appeared in all newspapers opposed to the Government's manpower policy and did much to fan the fire lighted by Mr Ralston on his arrival in Ottawa.

467. In a memorandum written for Mr Ralston to present to the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet War Committee on Thursday, 19 Oct (and enclosing a more detailed memorandum prepared at C.M.H.Q. on 15 Oct) General Stuart wrote:

...Until about two months ago, I was satisfied with the general reinforcement position both in respect to First Canadian Army and 1 Cdn Corps in Italy.

There were three main reasons for my optimism: the general strategic situation, our overall reinforcement holdings and my expectation, based on 21 Army Group forecast of activity, that casualties for balance of 1944 would be intense and normal in alternative months.

In early August every indication pointed to an early collapse of Germany. I felt very strongly, as did the Army Commander and many senior British Commanders and Staff Officers, that the German Army was in the process of being decisively defeated and would probably collapse before December 1944. Today, largely because of the successful German strategy of denying the Channel Ports to us, a German collapse cannot be regarded as imminent. We cannot deploy our superior strength against Germany simply because lack of suitable port facilities will not permit of an "all out" offensive on all sections of the front for some time to



come. Intelligent planning demands, therefore, that we must prepare for the prolongation of the war against Germany into 1945 (9).

468. General Stuart estimated that by the end of the year there would be a deficiency of about 2000 infantrymen but a holding of about 15,000 reinforcements for other Corps. He went on to point out that "nothing is certain" in war and that the position might very likely be much worse:

I say this because of what has actually happened in the last two months. Our casualties in infantry have been greater than was anticipated for two main reasons. The first was that we anticipated infantry casualties at 45% of total casualties; they proved to be 75% of casualties. The second was that forecasts must also be based on an anticipated scale of activity. We used 21 Army Group scale of activity with intense and normal casualties alternating monthly. Actually since "D" day our casualties in 21 Army Group have been at an intense rate continuously.

Whereas he would have liked to send 2000 or 3000 infantrymen to Italy at the end of September he had been able to release only 500. At the end of October it would be possible to send only 1000 instead of "several thousand" with the result that considerable shortages would have to be accepted in Italy. As it was, the despatch of even 1000 in October might further complicate the situation in North-West Europe. Due to the importance attached to this memorandum it has been considered advisable to quote the remainder:

It is important to note that our infantry reinforcement situation, as a result of our aggressive remustering programme, has been improving progressively since 2 Sep 44. We have reduced the overall infantry deficiency in A.E.F. from 3299 on that date to an overall surplus of 590 on 11 Oct. Our position in Italy on 14 Oct shows an overall deficiency of about 100 infantry.

... We are carrying on an aggressive remustering campaign and will continue to do so. It must be appreciated, however, that there is a definite limit to what can be done. We have now remustered to infantry practically all surplus other arms that meet infantry age and physical standards and who are not highly skilled tradesmen in the other arms. Further numbers will be remustered from the 6312 other ranks expected to reach this country from Canada before 31 December and I have issued instructions that further other arms tradesmen shall be remustered for general duty infantry. This will help the infantry situation and I hope will result in changing our minus holding of infantry at 31 Dec 44 to a small surplus holding. This, however, does not alter the main picture of having at 31 Dec 44 a total holding of trained reinforcements in U.K., in N.W. Europe and in Italy of less than 10,000 reinforcements in all arms with little or no infantry.

Other factors that are causing me considerable



concern are the shortage of French speaking infantry reinforcements and the question of leave, particularly in the case of troops serving in Italy. We have reached the "bottom of the barrel" in respect to French speaking infantry reinforcements. For the balance of this year there are less than 600 other ranks in sight. This figure, of course, does not include the number of wounded who in due course will return to their units. It is, nevertheless, a distressing condition and I am afraid there is only one solution to this problem.

The question of leave is already beginning to affect morale in Italy. It may soon do likewise in Europe. Winter conditions in both theatres will aggravate the situation. All concerned know that the absence of a generous leave policy is due to shortage of replacements. The men cannot understand why they, who have volunteered, must keep on going into battle and living constantly in the greatest danger and discomfort when trained replacements are available in Canada living in comparative safety and luxury.

The only solution that I can see is to find an additional 15,000 infantry to add to our reinforcement pool on or before 31 Dec 44, and to ask that replacements sent monthly from Canada in 1945 shall be increased to 5300, of whom 4300 should be infantry. The above addition to the pool will give us one month's holding in each theatre and one month in the U.K. for each theatre.

It is apparent, of course, that I am leading up to a recommendation that the future effective maintenance of our Canadian forces in two theatres requires that additional personnel be made available from Canada for service overseas. Actually such is my belief today.

I can assure you that I am not anxious to make the recommendation implied above. On the other hand, I consider that, as Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., one of my major responsibilities is to ensure that formations in the field are supplied with adequate and well trained reinforcements. I am satisfied that the reinforcements being sent to both theatres have been well trained. I am satisfied that, up to the present time, reinforcements have been adequate in respect to overall numbers but, for a series of military reasons beyond my control, I must admit that reinforcements have been inadequate as to numbers in respect to the infantry arm. I am not satisfied, and I have attempted to express my reasons in this letter, that anticipated reinforcements will be adequate to meet future requirements of this war against Germany.

I recommend, therefore, if the numbers required cannot be found from General Service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include



overseas service in any theatre.

469. After Mr Ralston had made his report to those members of the Cabinet War Committee available in Ottawa the Prime Minister reiterated his strong opposition to the institution of "conscription for overseas service" and referred to the national issues involved. Mr Ralston agreed as to the gravity of the situation and the necessity for the fullest discussion before a decision was reached. (General Stuart was in attendance.) It was agreed that the question would be deferred to a meeting of the full Cabinet on the following Tuesday (24 Oct).

470. The reinforcement situation was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee again on Friday, 20 Oct and military appreciations of the most favourable and unfavourable eventualities were prepared at N.D.H.Q., based in part upon the telegrams that passed back and forth daily between General Stuart and Brigadier Bostock who was digesting the latest data at C.M.H.Q. On Monday 23 Oct the acting Adjutant-General, Brigadier A.C. Spencer, compiled a memorandum answering Mr Ralston's questions on the availability of G.S. reinforcements: the Chief of the General Staff also submitted his views (10).

471. The C.G.S. concurred in General Stuart's opinion that the war would continue into 1945 and estimated that the maintenance of the reinforcement pool would require the despatch overseas of an additional 15,000 infantrymen before the end of the year and a continuing monthly despatch of 4000 reinforcements, of which 3000 should be infantry. N.D.H.Q. already was committed to the despatch of 12,000 reinforcements during the last quarter of 1944 (approximately 6000 infantrymen) but these had been included in General Stuart's calculations before seeking the additional commitment (11).

472. The Adjutant-General's memorandum\* had estimated that an additional 5500 G.S. soldiers could be withdrawn for despatch overseas—1500 from the Infantry training stream, 1500 by remustering from other corps, 500 from young soldiers if the minimum age were lowered from 19 to 18 1/2 (not recommended by General Murchie), 750 from N.C.Os. reduced to privates (although allowed to continue existing rates of pay for six months) (see para 407), 750 tradesmen on a similar basis and 500 men with a PULHEMS profile as low as 2212221 (instead of the existing 1111221 for general duty infantrymen) (12).

473. General Murchie noted that as a result of an extensive recruiting campaign some 9000 N.R.M.A. soldiers had been converted to 'general service' in the face of demands for labour to work on farms and other projects of an essential nature. These non-military demands and the campaign being carried on in the press for further employment of N.R.M.A. personnel on such projects had, however, built up a resistance against volunteering. The number of conversions had dwindled in the past few weeks and General Murchie considered that a further recruiting campaign might merely increase this resistance. In any case, it was clear that the available assets were considerably short of the overseas requirements (13).

474. Further possibilities were the reduction in the strength of Infantry battalions overseas from four to three rifle companies, with a corresponding reduction in the

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\* Although Major-General A.E. Walford had returned to Canada to assume the appointment of Adjutant-General this memorandum was signed by Brigadier A.C. Spencer (V.A.G.) who was carrying on in an acting capacity.



strength of other Arms, or the disbandment of an Infantry division. Either of these courses would reduce the effectiveness of the Canadian Army, even though the reductions would provide replacements for continuing needs and reduce the overall Infantry reinforcement requirements by reducing the number of casualties. General Murchie concluded that the adoption of either of these courses was "a matter of Government policy" but before a decision was reached "it would be essential" to consult the field commanders. A third alternative was to extend the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to permit their despatch overseas. In this manner sufficient reinforcements could be provided to restore the required pool overseas and meet continuing monthly requirements. "Based on purely military considerations", General Murchie advised that the adoption of this step would meet requirements without disrupting the organization and fighting efficiency of the Canadian Army (14).

475. Speaking later (29 Nov) in the House of Commons Mr Ralston related how he had agreed with the objections of the C.G.S. to either of the other courses and considered that "when trained N.R.M.A. men were available, Canada's duty at this crucial period of the war was to support our men in the line, and that our obligation to them, to ourselves and to our allies was not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war" (15). There were 8000 N.R.M.A. infantrymen who might be despatched almost at once and a further 8000 who might be got ready in a month's time. There were an additional 26,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers who might be remustered and trained as general duty infantrymen (16).

476. At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 24 Oct, prior to the meeting of the full Cabinet, Mr Ralston advised his colleagues of the contents of these Memoranda. He pointed out further that it would be necessary to make provision for the replacement of 500 men per month on rotation leave\*

477. Although the affirmative answer given to the 1942 Plebiscite seeking release from the Government's previous commitments had been followed by amendment to the National Resources Mobilization Act (see para 144) the Prime Minister did not consider that the emergency was serious enough to make such implementation necessary. Mr King believed that the

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\*Early proposals had come to naught but following his return to London from visiting Canadian troops in Italy, where the question had been raised wherever he talked with the troops, Mr Ralston had directed officers at C.M.H.Q. to provide him with the essential details of a leave to Canada scheme for men who had spent four years overseas, six months of which had been spent in a theatre of operations. The C.M.H.Q. study, produced on 14 Oct, showed that there were 2066 officers and 28,006 other ranks with not less than four years service overseas of whom 679 officers and 12,778 other ranks were serving in Italy. It was obvious, however, that only a token number of men could be given leave initially. Such a scheme was worked out at N.D.H.Q., approved by the Military Members of the Army Council on 29 Oct and submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 1 Nov. Mr Ralston having resigned, however, it was left to his successor to announce the policy whereby officers and men with not less than five years continuous service overseas became eligible for 30 days leave at home (AHQ Report 23).



introduction of compulsory military service overseas would split the country wide open, with the people of Quebec and other minority groups forced to take up a position diametrically opposed to the views of the remainder. He considered that time meant everything, when the unity of the country was at stake, and if he could delay long enough any positive action might become unnecessary. Although circumstances had placed him in a position which his two great predecessors, Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier had been spared, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was determined to follow their policy of procrastination in order to maintain national unity (17).

478. It is with this in mind that the Prime Minister's suggestions to the Cabinet War Committee should be studied. His Objective was to obtain as many volunteers as possible for overseas service and liquidate the balance of the Home Defence Army which he considered was sitting around doing nothing while there were jobs begging in industry (Appendix "G"). He suggested financial inducements--the application of War Service gratuities to the whole of a man's N.R.M.A. service and additional "fighting pay" for general duty infantry actually in a theatre of operations. He himself would participate in a nation-wide recruiting campaign.

479. The meeting of the full Cabinet failed to produce agreement. Although nothing official was known various newspapers reported rumours that the Cabinet was split, with Hon. T.A. Crerar (Minister of Mines and Resources), Hon. Angus L. Macdonald (Minister of National Defence for Naval Services) backing Mr Ralston while the Ministers from Quebec, lead by Hon. C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air and Associate Minister of National Defence), were just as firmly committed to the volunteer principle. Hon. James Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), Hon. Humphrey Mitchell (Minister of Labour) and Hon. Ian Mackenzie (Minister of Veterans Affairs) supported the Prime Minister; Hon. J.L. Ilsley (Minister of Justice) and Hon. Colin Gibson (Minister of National Revenue) favoured conscription for overseas service; and other Ministers seemed capable of being swayed one way or the other (18).

480. The Cabinet War Committee got nowhere on 26 Oct but it was agreed, on the Prime Minister's suggestion, that Mr Power and Mr Macdonald should assist Mr Ralston with a further review of the Army's figures (19). The three Ministers met with the Military heads as suggested but subsequent discussions were conducted in the absence of Mr Ralston, so that his known views should not influence the proceedings. A few more bodies were found here and there but not nearly sufficient to tip the scales. On the following morning (27 Oct) Mr Power reported back that not more than 15,000 of the 120,000 G.S. personnel serving in the North American Area could be despatched overseas before 1 Jun 45. Unless medical standards were lowered there was little likelihood of the necessary reinforcements being found from existing G.S. personnel. While infantry units overseas should be at full strength on 1 Jan 45 there would be no reinforcements to replace casualties occurring that month.

481. On 28 Oct the Commanders of First Canadian Army and 1st Canadian Corps reported that the latest activity forecast for their respective theatres until the end of the year had been confirmed by the 21st Army Group and Eighth Army (20). Presuming that the Germans would decide to fight a decisive battle west of the Rhine, the acting Army Commander furnished an estimate of three and a half weeks "normal" fighting followed by six weeks "intense". The forecast from



1st Canadian Corps in Italy was four weeks "quiet" followed by five weeks "intense" activity.

482. In a further and corrective memorandum of 30 Oct General Stuart pointed out that, although casualties in 21st Army Group had been continuously above "normal", they had not been continuously at the "intense" rate as previously estimated. The overall picture was not improved, however, as he explained:

The additional 15500 infantry that Canada will despatch to the U.K. between Nov 44 and May 45 will just suffice to meet the monthly increment until May 45. About 2500 of this additional infantry will become available in theatres in January and February. The increment will not meet anticipated casualties and starting at 31 Dec we shall be faced with an increased inf deficiency each subsequent month. A pool of inf reinforcements is required to meet these deficiencies; to meet casualties when our estimated rate is exceeded and to assist in meeting deficiencies in late Dec 44.

I consider, as stated in my memorandum of 15 Oct, that this pool should be 15000 which represents 6 weeks supply of inf reinforcements at intense rates (21).

483. Although a continuous campaign had been waged to induce N.R.M.A. personnel to volunteer for overseas service the political leaders now suggested that one more effort should be made. Army officers were far from optimistic, as they knew from experience that once an N.R.M.A. soldier advanced beyond the recruit stage of training he no longer was receptive to the usual enlistment propaganda. The response from the 13th Brigade had been poor--769 conversions from 2432 men [compare with para 333]--and even though some 10,016 N.R.M.A. soldiers "went active" during the period April-October 1944 the number of monthly conversions had begun to dwindle as summer turned into autumn; and not all of these were suitable for overseas service as general duty infantrymen anyway (21). Notwithstanding these facts Maj.-Gen. G.R. Pearkes (G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command) was asked what he thought were the chances for a fresh recruiting campaign, in which the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers would take a leading part instead of leaving the onus on the local military officers as heretofore. Mr Ralston suggested a 10-day campaign but General Pearkes considered that such a short period would be next to useless. The latter thought that a campaign of three weeks' duration, aided by every conceivable means, might produce up to 1500 trained infantrymen: however, he was not sufficiently convinced to make any definite promise (23).

484. When the Cabinet met on Wednesday, 1 Nov Mr Ralston demanded action. In the hope of gaining his point, and well aware that two months was the minimum period which must elapse from the time it was decided to despatch these men until they could reach battle areas, the Minister of National Defence had made tentative arrangements for a special sailing late in November (24). This would provide a cushion against the shortages anticipated at the end of the year. Mr Ralston's proposals were (25):

N.R.M.A. Nov shipment	8000	
N.R.M.A. Dec shipment	<u>7000</u>	15000



Available monthly inf  
rfts all sources 1945

Jan	3000	
Feb	3000	
Mar	3000	
Apr	3000	
May	<u>3000</u>	15000

Estimated returned  
casualties

Jan	1400	
Feb	1400	
Mar	1400	
Apr	1400	
May	<u>1400</u>	<u>7000</u>

37000

Although agreeing to give the volunteer principle one more try (a special recruiting appeal to the Home Defence army, extending over two or three weeks) Mr Ralston had wanted to know what would be done if this appeal should fail (26). He wanted a definite time limit set and Cabinet agreement that, in the event of failure, conscription for overseas service would be instituted at once. However, Mr Ralston could get no assurance on this point. Indeed, he found that, with certain exceptions, the members of the Cabinet did not consider that the Prime Minister's speeches in 1942 (see para 142) bound the Government to take such action (27).

485. According to the version given by the Prime Minister during a subsequent debate in the House of Commons:

... until I knew that it was only a matter of hours, at the most one or two days possibly, though I believe it was more nearly a matter of hours, that the Minister of National Defence would tender his resignation because we had not been able to agree... it was not until then that I asked myself: Is there any way of helping to save the appalling situation that may arise if the minister resigns... It was then and only then that I thought there was one man in this country who might help to save that situation. Could I find as minister of national defence someone who the country had reason to believe had a knowledge of military affairs and knew the need of the army, a man who understood relations between the state and the army which also would have to be considered. Until I thought of the one I did, I can tell hon. members that I had well nigh begun to despair of what could be done to save the situation.

It was then that I called in General McNaughton and told him the plight I was in, and the position of the government as I saw it, and asked whether he felt that by a voluntary appeal, which there was still time to make, we could find the necessary men. He told me he believed that they could be found, the numbers not being large, as my hon. friend the former minister of national defence for air has just said, and that an appeal launched in the proper way and carried on in the right



spirit would bring forward the men. I asked him on the following day, or the same day, I have forgotten which, I had only two conversations with him, whether he would assume that responsibility himself if a crisis arose, whether he would come into the government and take on his shoulders the burden of making an appeal, with faith in it, believing that it might be successful.

I did not know then, and I do not know yet, what General McNaughton's politics are. I do not think he has been identified with any political party. I know him as a man of fine liberal outlook, of rare scientific ability and of great military experience, and I felt I owed it to the people of the country never to let this country get into the position, if it were possible to avoid it, where at a time of war Canada would be left without a minister of national defence, and possibly without several of the members of the cabinet who had carried on so large a part of this war effort.

It was when I told the cabinet that General McNaughton was prepared to assume this responsibility, that I thought that if we were going to make a public appeal we should lose no time because time was rapidly going by, that the minister said that if that was the case he thought he ought to tender his resignation at once, and it was tendered in the presence of my colleagues and myself. I received the written communication the next morning and I arranged to have the new minister sworn in on that morning as well (28).

486. Mr. H. Reginald Hardy's biographical volume, Mackenzie King of Canada (Toronto, 1949), suggests that Mr Ralston had been "pressing" the Prime Minister during these days and holding over his head "like a cudgel" a resignation offered during the summer of 1942 (but which had never been accepted) (29). These and other allegations showing the late Mr Ralston in an unfavourable light were quickly denied by Premier Angus L. Macdonald of Nova Scotia who issued a lengthy statement to the Canadian Press defending the memory of his war-time colleague (30). Writing in The Winnipeg Free Press and also in defence of Mr Ralston's memory, Mr Grant Dexter produced the following version of what happened at this critical Cabinet meeting:

Mr. King opposed making any commitments of this kind. He said that he had decided on a different course. He recalled that Col. Ralston had put in a resignation in 1942 (when Bill 80 was under debate) that this resignation had neither been accepted nor withdrawn; that he had now decided to accept the resignation: that he had discussed the problem with General McNaughton who believed that the voluntary system could still produce adequate reinforcements; that General McNaughton was prepared to take over the portfolio from Col. Ralston; and that he had decided that the change should be made at once.

Col. Ralston thereupon rose from his seat,



shook hands with those present, and left the room, saying that he would send Mr. King a further letter of resignation on the following day (31).

Among the jobs held by Mr Dexter before becoming editor of The Winnipeg Free Press had been that of its political correspondent in Ottawa. Therefore the strongly Conservative Ottawa Journal suggested that Mr Dexter was not "guessing" and that "somebody who knew precisely what went on in the Cabinet in 1944 was not far from his elbow when he set out to vindicate Col. Ralston" (32).

487. As a result of the conflicting views presented over the radio by Mr King on 8 Nov and to the press by Mr Ralston on 12 Nov, the former obtained the Governor-General's permission to table the resulting correspondence in the House of Commons (33). A good bit of it is reproduced here as documentary evidence in the light of what had happened and was to happen shortly.

488. Mr Ralston's letter of resignation, dated 1 Nov, was as follows:

When I returned on October 18 from a visit to the Canadian troops in Italy, in north-western Europe and the United Kingdom, I felt compelled to recommend as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and advice received from my officers, that due to infantry casualties being much greater than had been forecasted on the best information available, it had become necessary to secure substantial numbers of additional trained infantry personnel in order to make reasonable provision for the reinforcement of our troops overseas.

Since it appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need, I considered that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfill our pledges to our fighting men.

The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the cabinet and of the war committee of the cabinet. My recommendation was not accepted.

Alternatives were suggested such as reducing our commitments or breaking up units or formations. I felt I could not concur in this when these trained N.R.M.A. men were available; and that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line, and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war and speed the victory.

It was suggested that, if a further appeal were made to trained N.R.M.A. personnel by ministers of the crown and others, such personnel might volunteer for general service in sufficient numbers to meet the need. This suggestion involved delays which I considered would be serious if the appeal was not successful.



Consequently I wished to be assured that it was government policy that if, after the appeal, the need for reinforcements overseas still existed and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was the course which I and some other colleagues had understood would follow from your speech in 1942. It was in effect what I, as minister, have repeatedly said in the house since then.

No such assurance was forthcoming. On the contrary it has developed in the discussions that the government as a whole (certain colleagues excepted) do not consider that your speech committed the government to this course.

I consider myself bound by what I have said in the house. Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops and consequently and as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas army.

I wish every success to the distinguished citizen who I understand will take up the duties of this department, and at the same time I want to express to you my very sincere appreciation of the opportunity I have had of serving Canada's war activities (34).

489. In his reply of 3 Nov the Prime Minister insisted that Mr Ralston's statement to the Cabinet War Committee on 19 Oct was the "first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern" (35). He reminded Mr Ralston of the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week in August that "additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position" (see para 396). Again, at the time of the second Quebec Conference ("OCTAGON"), when future plans for the employment of Canada's Armed Forces were being discussed, "no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian Army". Mr King contended that the Government had always regarded the reinforcement problem as "vital" and that, from the outset he had

... never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

Mr King protested that he had always striven for a maximum war effort and for that reason did not now want to adopt a course of action which, "while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war—and this on the eve of certain victory". Therefore, his letter continued:



I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort—to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come—than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an order in council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

490. Since Mr Ralston had intimated on several occasions that he would resign if the report of the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. was not accepted, the Prime Minister had taken the precaution of sounding out General McNaughton. He discovered that General McNaughton "was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas". General McNaughton had indicated that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, it should be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means: should Mr Ralston resign the General had expressed willingness to assume this responsibility as Minister of National Defence.

491. Mr Ralston's letter of 6 Nov attempted to refute a number of points made by the Prime Minister. The major consideration was that Mr Ralston had received information which led him to believe that the needs of the Infantry reinforcement situation could not be met by departmental action alone. He had cabled the gist of his fears from London on 13 Oct. The casualties suffered by the additional Infantry brigade of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division had not been greater than these units would have suffered anyway. The plans for continuing the war against Japan had no real bearing on the reinforcement problem. The fundamental difference of opinion was whether or not the time had come to send N.R.M.A. soldiers overseas. Mr King had not mentioned the possibility of a general election when the passage of Bill 80 had been debated during the spring and early summer of 1942 (see paras 142-4). Mr Ralston's letter continued:

You mention that you always received assurances that additional commitments would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. I recall that I have repeatedly said that I could not undertake that reinforcements would always be available wholly from volunteers. My point now is that due to an unexpectedly heavy proportion of infantry casualties and the developments of the war we need trained reinforcements, which I consider on the best examination I can make of the



situation are not available from volunteers. And we have unused man-power resources in the trained N. R.M.A. personnel, which I think we are bound to use.

In this connection I should remind you that all the formations which we are seeking to support to-day are formations which had been authorized by the government and approved by parliament previous to your speeches in 1942.

This brings me to your point about disunity in Canada. My speeches in the house make it clear, I think, that I have realized, from the first time the question was raised, the grave possibilities of division. That is why from the beginning to the end of my association with the Department of National Defence I have done everything I could to avoid it, and to maintain a wholly volunteer army overseas. I have had regretfully to come to the conclusion that to make reasonable provision for reinforcements it was necessary to recommend action to make N.R.M.A. men available. It seemed obvious that some measure of difference or disunity could not be avoided whichever course were taken. What weighed so heavily with me in the stand I have taken were our pledges to our fighting men and indirectly to their families (36).

492. The Prime Minister sought to clarify his views still further in a letter of 10 Nov. Dwelling upon the phraseology used earlier he explained that he had meant that a general election would be the inevitable consequence of any such attempt to impose conscription for overseas service rather than being a condition of it. Furthermore:

In your letter you recognize the grave possibilities of division resulting from the course you recommended. It is because I took so grave a view of the probable division which would result, and of the possibility that disunity and division in the country might seriously weaken our support for the army, as well as for other phases of our war effort, that I believed it was preferable to redouble our efforts to secure the required results by voluntary means, including a special appeal to the N.R.M.A. personnel and a review of the employment of the very considerable number of general service personnel serving in Canada and the United Kingdom (37).

493. In his reply of the same date Mr Ralston again disclaimed the Prime Minister's interpretation of events. Regarding the Quebec Conference and subsequent events, he wrote:

You speak as if "any possibility" of having to resort to conscription for overseas service had not been in mind. May I point out that your speeches in 1942 envisage that very possibility, and the initiation and passing of Bill 80 was in the light of that possibility.

You will recall also that I went to you at Quebec, regarding certain reports I had heard as to your expressed attitude on this matter;



and the fact that I asked you, and you gave me, your assurance then that you would stand by your speeches in 1942, indicates that, at least in my mind, the possibility still existed; although I must say that at the time I had no expectation of the developments which have since occurred.

As a matter of fact, it was, I think, at the next meeting of war committee following the Quebec conference that I did indicate, as a result of further information received in the meantime, the possibility of difficulties regarding infantry reinforcements and the necessity, in my view, for keeping N.R.M.A. personnel available in the light of the uncertainties.

May I again come back to the real crux of this matter, which is the actual and urgent situation which I reported instantly on my return from overseas, and which I considered left me no alternative but to recommend as I did (38).

494. It was not until 29 Nov that Mr Ralston admitted in the House of Commons that he had not drawn attention to General Stuart's telegram of 26 Aug requesting authority to use Infantry tradesmen as general duty infantrymen until the existing shortage had been made good (see para 412). That telegram had indicated, however, that two-thirds of the serious shortage within Infantry units could be made good in six days and the balance in about two weeks as a result of the remustering programme undertaken in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, he continued:

... If I remember correctly it was a Sunday morning, and I simply initialled the telegram and handed it back to the chief of the general staff. The telegram concluded by stating that everything would be all right in three weeks. As a matter of fact, if I had known as much then as I know now I would have realized that this meant that it would be unlikely that the pools would be built up, although if it had come to my mind at all I would have thought that the men who were being trained in England would be coming in again in three weeks, and that this was simply a situation to be tided over at that time. I say quite frankly that I did not tell the cabinet about it. There was no possible reason for my withholding it ... I did bring it to the attention of the cabinet when it was brought to my attention again, but that was after I had come back. As a matter of fact I brought it to the attention of the cabinet when I asked for approval of the paying of infantry tradesmen (39).

495. Meanwhile, press comment was voluminous, but varied with the politics of each newspaper. The Ottawa correspondent of The Gazette (Montreal) reported a local rumour on the evening of 1 Nov that the Prime Minister's plan involved reducing the size of the Canadian divisions in Italy and North-West Europe, pulling the troops out of the line and giving them a much needed rest. Editorials in The Toronto Evening Telegram of 3 Nov were headed "A Piece of Government Hypocrisy Blown Sky-High by Events", "Window-Dressing Appointment in Ministry of Defense" and "Canadian People Hoodwinked Too Long By W.L. Mackenzie King". The second of these editorials pointed



out that:

... It is unfortunate that General McNaughton who did a good job in training the Canadian forces in Britain, should be utilized as window dressing in this fashion by the most adept of political window dressers.

It is nonsense to talk of inspiring confidence by any appointment to take the place of a Minister of Defense who has resigned because, after a study of conditions on the ground, he is convinced that the reinforcement set-up is faulty. The men who are fighting overseas know what conditions are, and will not be inspired with confidence in the Government which is responsible for those conditions by the mere addition to the cabinet of a man who is favourably known to them. They will not necessarily be convinced that a man who has been out of touch with the army through all the developments since D-day is cognizant of conditions as they have been since that event.

If Hon. Mr. McNaughton's conduct of his department is to place the interests of overseas men foremost and to maintain the war effort in the best manner possible he can pay no less regard than paid by Mr. Ralston to the necessity for adequate and fully trained reinforcements. In that event all that Mr. King gains by letting Mr. Ralston go is delay. However convenient to Mr. King it may be to delay the issue and however favourable to his political ambitions, it is something the people of Canada will not condone.

496. Supporting the Government's policy, on the other hand, The Ottawa Citizen (4 Oct) stated that war correspondent Ross Munro had found Canadian troops fighting on the Scheldt "astonished and delighted" to hear that General McNaughton had been appointed Minister of National Defence. The Ottawa Citizen also praised the Prime Minister's efforts to maintain national unity and avoid the dangers which had troubled the Union Government of 1917.

#### (ii) Conscription Comes

497. Any doubts that may have existed as to General McNaughton's stand on the question of conscription for overseas service were soon removed. On 4 Nov certain newspapers inimical to the Government carried news stories of the reaction of the troops at the front, as soon as it became apparent that the so-called "Zombies" were not going to be sent overseas. According to war correspondent **Lionel Shapiro**:

What has shocked Canadian troops ... is that Gen. McNaughton, beloved of all ranks in the Army appears, at least from this distance, to have thrown his influence and popularity to the side of the anti-conscriptionists.

Hope persists here that Gen. McNaughton will come overseas almost immediately to examine the situation and return home with recommendations similar to those made by Col. Ralston.



Such a move, carrying Gen. McNaughton's stamp of authority would make any future reversal of policy by Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King a great deal less embarrassing politically than immediate action on the recommendation of Col. Ralston, who is a civilian politician (40).

As The Ottawa Journal pointed out in a subsequent editorial, however, there "was no means" by which correspondents "could know that what they were writing was true" (41). Any single correspondent could speak to only relatively few soldiers and, of necessity, had to accept the views expressed.

498. Speaking at Arnprior on 5 Nov General McNaughton made his position very clear. The next morning the Montreal Gazette reported as follows:

"I am firmly convinced," he said, "that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service." He claimed that available information on reinforcements indicated "some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute." He voiced confidence that now the need was known, "our men and women will rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas."

On its editorial page The Gazette commented as follows:

But now General McNaughton, with complete candour and no double talk, had made it perfectly clear where he, and obviously the Government, stand in the matter. There is no denial that the need is acute for men or that the situation may become acute in a "short period". But on the ground that conscription came too late in the last war to be of any use and because it has been avoided so far in this war, they are going to stick to it, come what may.

It is a help for Canadians now to know definitely how the Government and its new Defence Minister view the problem, but there will be many who will hardly be reassured to learn it. If trained draftees will get overseas too late to be of any use, how much longer will it take to recruit and train the volunteers who, it is admitted are now urgently required.

499. That evening (6 Nov) General McNaughton spoke to the Ottawa Branch (No. 16) of the Canadian Legion but was given a stormy reception. During the course of a speech that was interrupted frequently by heckling General McNaughton made the first public announcement of a scheme for providing leave in Canada for men with a long period of service overseas: he hoped that the first group of such men could be brought home in time for Christmas (42). Meeting in Ottawa at this time the Dominion Executive Council of the Canadian Legion issued a strongly worded statement demanding that N.R.M.A. soldiers should be sent overseas (43): on 9 Nov a brief was presented to the Prime Minister. Opposition newspapers developed a more bitter tone during succeeding days and fuel was added to the fire by Mr Ralston's statement of 12 Nov, informing newspapermen why he had considered "conscription for overseas service to be necessary at this time" (44).

500. Meanwhile, behind the scenes all had been busy. On 3 Nov the Cabinet had decided to appoint a Committee on



Recruiting, comprising General McNaughton, Hon. Ian Mackenzie (Veterans Affairs), Hon. James G. Gardiner (Agriculture), Hon. W.P. Mulock (Postmaster General), Hon. Colin Gibson (National Revenue), Maj.-Gen. L.R. LaFlèche (National War Services) and Hon. Brooke Claxton (National Health and Welfare). This committee held a first meeting on 6 Nov and prepared a report for submission to the Cabinet meeting of the following day (45). According to the information supplied by the Army, some 150,000 men had been enrolled under the authority of the National Resources Mobilization Act since March 1941: of these, 42,000 had "gone active", 6000 had enlisted in the Navy or R.C.A.F., 33,500 had been discharged and 8676 were on extended leave for agricultural or industrial work (Appendix "G"). A "hardened core" of only 59,679 actually were serving on military duty—men who had resisted all previous appeals to volunteer for overseas military service.

501. According to an analysis made, with effect from 11 Oct, the marital status and previous civilian occupation of these 59,679 N.R.M.A. soldiers had been (46):

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Married</u>	<u>Single</u>	<u>Widower</u>	<u>Separated</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agriculture	1236	9870	5	3	11114
Bldg trades	1084	3184	3	5	4276
Clerical	377	1935	1	5	2318
Manufacturing	3163	9178	6	13	12360
Forestry	345	1704	2	-	2051
Mercantile	778	1939	3	8	2728
Mining	288	739	-	2	1029
Professional	128	489	1	2	620
Transport	1921	4659	11	6	6597
Misc (chiefly unskilled)	<u>2867</u>	<u>13692</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>16586</u>
	12187	47389	48	55	59679

Of the 42,000 considered to be suitable as infantry reinforcements, with or without conversion training, some 15,700 were stationed in Pacific Command. Their home provinces had been given on enlistment as (47):

Ontario	-	10250
Quebec	-	16300
Maritimes	-	2600
Prairies	-	10000
British Columbia	-	2850

It appeared that not more than 37 per cent were of French racial origin: 17,000 spoke English only, 12,000 spoke only French, 14,000 spoke English and French and the remainder had other racial backgrounds. For a long time the military had realized that these men had a "group loyalty" to their N.R.M.A. comrades and did not see any need for proceeding overseas. Many of these men also were subjected to pressure from home and had assumed an attitude of self-styled importance—even martyrdom. Such an attitude had been encouraged by the benefits, financial and otherwise, that had been extended to N.R.M.A. personnel.

502. The Cabinet Committee on Recruiting had agreed that the best line of approach would be simply to state the facts, rather than continue "skating around the problem". Its members considered that the "situation should and can be met by the voluntary co-operation of the Canadian people". After all some 900,000 men had volunteered for the Armed Forces since the outbreak of War and now that the Navy and R.C.A.F. no longer



were in the market for recruits it was hoped that the men remaining in the manpower pool would volunteer for general service with the Army. Radio appeals of a non-political nature were to be made by General McNaughton and the Prime Minister and church dignitaries were to be asked to suggest that parents put the pressure on their sons to volunteer. Newspaper publishers and veterans organizations were to be contacted but a nationwide publicity campaign, in the press and over the radio, was not recommended because:

- (a) it would not reach the people for whom it was intended;
- (b) it would arouse opposition; and
- (c) it would over-emphasize the importance of the N.R.M.A.

Instead, recruiting efforts on the civilian front should be designed:

- (a) to create a favourable atmosphere for the government's policy; and
- (b) to persuade people to do their utmost to urge others to volunteer (48).

503. Since the men really wanted in this emergency already were in the Army as N.R.M.A. soldiers it was considered that the task of persuading them to "go active" really should fall on their officers. Instead of being harangued in large groups as heretofore, N.R.M.A. soldiers were to be canvassed individually: discrimination was not to be practised and they were to be made to feel that, as individuals, they were soldiers who were being well treated and well trained for possible employment overseas (49).

504. General approval was given to this programme at the Cabinet meeting on the following day (7 Nov). In addition, the following proposals were discussed: formation of a pioneer company to replace the N.R.M.A. personnel presently working on Sunnybrook Hospital (Toronto), the desirability of granting discharge or extended leave to men who had been improperly enrolled under N.R.M.A. and the (already approved) scheme for 30-days' leave at home for personnel who had been serving overseas for a considerable period (50). After special consultation with the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, General La Flèche was given the special task of finding reinforcements for the four French-speaking infantry battalions serving overseas (51), since they were in a considerably worse position than the English-speaking units (see paras 451-4).

505. The above might well be compared with the rumour carried in The Ottawa Citizen of 6 Nov that General McNaughton was working on the following three-point policy regarding N.R.M.A. soldiers:

1. A strongly renewed direct appeal to the men in the home defence army to go active and volunteer for overseas service.
2. Use of Order-in-Council 7429 of Oct. 3 to put draftees to work on essential projects while still holding them under army jurisdiction and control subject to recall at any time.
3. Use of the home defence army, in due course, for duty as troops of occupation after the



defeat of Germany, and later of Japan.

506. In his radio address of 8 Nov, the Prime Minister outlined the policy which would be used to support the Canadian Army Overseas. The following extracts from this speech highlight what the Government was attempting to do:

... Since 1939, nearly a million men have served in Canada's three armed forces. The present strength of the three services is about three-quarters of a million. All but 68,000 are volunteers. These figures represent a stupendous achievement in raising fighting men for a nation of less than twelve millions, particularly when account is taken of the manpower required for war production and vital civilian services.

The problem of reinforcements concerns only one of the three armed services. The navy and air force have no such problem. The navy, with 85,000 men in the service, has reached the peak of its manpower needs. The air force with 190,000 men in its ranks, has passed the peak of its manpower requirements. For that, we should all be thankful. The reason is that air force casualties, though costly, have been very much lighter than were anticipated.

The present strength of the army including the draftees is over 455,000 men. Of this number, about 390,000 are volunteers. Over 45,000 men have volunteered for general service since January 1st of the present year. Most of the men now in the army have been in its ranks for one, two, three or four years. All but recent recruits have received long, rigorous and varied training.

... Is there an adequate reserve of reinforcements for the army? In the opinion of the military authorities, no difficulty is likely to arise except in relation to reinforcements for the infantry. Infantry reinforcements have been adequate to meet requirements to date. But, during his recent visit to the army overseas, Colonel Ralston learned that to provide replacements for future casualties at present rates, the flow of infantry reinforcements from Canada should be accelerated. One fact needs to be emphasized. There is not an overall shortage of potential reinforcements. Many thousands of men are in training now and enlistments are continuing at an encouraging rate. Because we cannot tell how long the war may last, we must, as long as a possible need may arise, continue to recruit men for the army to keep up the supply of reinforcements. But recent recruits and those who enlist from now on will not be available until they are trained.

Colonel Ralston's report to the government disclosed an immediate problem which has to be faced. That problem is to find the means of speeding up the flow of fully trained infantry reinforcements to meet, not an actual shortage of reinforcements now, but a possible shortage in the next few months.



The question many of you will ask at once, is: why not send overseas some of the draftees who are fully trained in Canada under the National Resources Mobilization Act?

That will seem to many of you the easiest way of meeting the problem. It is not, however, in accord with the policy of keeping our army overseas a 100 per cent voluntary army if we possibly can. The voluntary system of raising our overseas forces has produced splendid results during five years of war. We have always believed that Canada's forces, having begun as voluntary forces, would be more effective, and that the country would be more united in the support, if we continued to rely upon the voluntary system for reinforcements as long as the voluntary system continued to be effective....

From a purely military standpoint, there is no argument that it is preferable to reinforce a voluntary army with volunteers. The military authorities report that enlisting gives the draftees a new outlook, new self-respect, and a determination that comes from having made a great decision. That is bound to make them better soldiers. This is very important, because we are as much concerned with the quality as with the numbers of men sent overseas as reinforcements.

We must remember that if draftees are sent overseas before they volunteer, they will not be going to reinforce an army of drafted men. Over and over again it has been said that conscripted men would be received without enthusiasm by the volunteers they were sent to join. It is also said that the presence of conscripts would constitute a source of division, and possible dissension, in the fighting units. That is nevertheless a risk the government would have to take, if it was necessary to enable Canada to bear her just share of the load in the winning of the war.

But that is not the situation. There are some thousands of trained volunteers already overseas or about to be despatched overseas as reinforcements. Others are being re-mustered. There are in addition, many thousands of volunteers in training in the army in Canada. Every day draftees are volunteering for overseas service. We believe their number can be increased by emphasizing anew the need and the opportunity for overseas service.

We had to ask ourselves one other question: How many additional men would be immediately available if compulsion were resorted to in order to send draftees overseas? I have told you that the present effective total of draftees in the army is under 60,000. Of that number only about 42,000 are considered suitable material for infantry reinforcements. Some 16,000 of these men are trained as infantry. It is estimated that about 8,000 of them are sufficiently trained so they could be ready for combat at an early



date.

Without any compulsion or intensification of present methods a considerable number of these draftees would volunteer. We believe many more can be secured by a special appeal. The actual difference in numbers secured by the two methods might be very small indeed. The voluntary system has not broken down. At the moment, it is subject to an added strain which calls for an intensified effort at home, in the period immediately ahead, particularly to provide personnel in an advanced stage of training.

How great the difficulties would be in substituting conscription for overseas service for the voluntary system no one knows. But everyone who is honest with himself knows that there would be **genuine** difficulties and that they might be very grave. Instead, we are redoubling our efforts to meet the existing situation by the voluntary method. In these efforts, I appeal for the patriotic co-operation of all Canadians (52).

507. On 10 Nov it was revealed in the press that the release from the Home War Establishment of all soldiers fit for overseas service was being accelerated and would be completed just as soon as members of the C.W.A.C. and low category males could be substituted (53). Indeed, it was believed that nearly 100 soldiers would be released from N.D.H.Q. itself. For the present no further commitments would be made to make personnel available for work on essential civilian projects, although low category personnel might be made available later (Appendix "G"). Provision had been made for N.C.Os. to continue in receipt of existing rates of pay for a period of six months following transfer to Infantry on the assumption that by the end of that period they should be acceptable in their rank (54). (Even though an N.C.O. did not qualify for his existing rank in the Infantry and was reduced arrangements were made for him to receive his former rate of pay until the six month period was completed.) On 11 Nov The Winnipeg Tribune carried a news item suggesting, however, that not very many reinforcements would be obtained by combing out Headquarters, M.D. No. 10:

'This has been going on here for the last 18 months,' one officer said this morning. 'I think returns from M.D. 10 will be very small. I know of only a handful of suitable men, but they are on highly technical jobs and are of more value here.'

Another officer said: 'All headquarters staffs are being given tests of elementary training to see how they rate in military education.' He added: 'There may be a number of replacements once there are sufficient C.W.A.C.'s on hand.'

Major M.H. Garton, district recruiting officer, said this morning that N.R.M.A. 'Zombies' had made no special effort to go active after Gen. McNaughton's appeal last week.

'I believe 12 N.R.M.A. men have volunteered for active service since the 8th of the month. That's just about a normal figure.'



508. On 10 Nov the Cabinet Recruiting Committee approved General McNaughton's request for the formation of a civilian organization to assist recruiting. A sub-committee was formed and plans made to enlist the help of Senators, Members of Parliament, labour and farm leaders and to appoint civilian canvassers to interview parents and other dependents of N.R.M.A. soldiers (55).

509. General LaFlèche had been considering ways of making good his undertaking to supply reinforcements for the four French-speaking infantry battalions overseas and now (10 Nov) suggested to the Adjutant-General that men volunteering for general service should immediately be identified with overseas units. That is, they should be allowed to proceed to the unit of their choice and meanwhile wear its badges and shoulder titles. This was agreed to, in spite of the practical difficulty overseas of ensuring that reinforcements arrived at even a battalion of the same territorial regiment. (That same evening virtually the same request had been made by another Montreal Cabinet Minister, Hon. Brooke Claxton, who was telephoning from his own constituency.) (56)

510. On Monday, 13 Nov General LaFlèche publicized this plan during the course of a speech in Montreal. He claimed that the officers commanding four French-speaking battalions (3rd Battalion, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal; 3rd Battalion, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve; Le Régiment de Chateauguay and Le Régiment de Joliette) had given him formal offers to supply recruits and he was waiting to hear from a fifth commanding officer (57). The Adjutant-General spent 17 and 18 Nov in Montreal discussing the problem and on the following day a special liaison officer was appointed at N.D.H.Q. to facilitate matters. Special authorization was given so that all (N.R.M.A.) Warrant and Non Commissioned Officers might retain their rank on conversion to general service and acting ranks might be confirmed.\*\* As a further inducement,\*\* N.R.M.A. soldiers

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\*General Order No. 466, effective 2 Sep 42, had established a Canadian Infantry Corps. Subsequently officers and other ranks were members of this C.I.C. and might be posted to any regiment, although the principle of reinforcing on a territorial basis was still the ideal. Unposted Infantry reinforcements wore the badges and shoulder title of the Canadian Infantry Corps.

\*\*Hitherto men had had to revert to the status of private soldier upon enlisting for overseas service, although C.A.R.O. 3631 of 18 Sep 43 had made it possible for a Commanding Officer to restore rank immediately if a vacancy existed in the unit war establishment. Actually a number of G.S. soldiers had been making a practice of voluntarily relinquishing both acting and confirmed ranks in order to proceed overseas.

\*\*\*On 1 Dec the war diary of Headquarters, Petawawa Military Camp stated:

The Commander inspected an outgoing draft of French-speaking G.S. soldiers, recently converted from N.R.M.A., from A-2 CATC and A-5 CETC at 1600 hours. He presented their berets and G.S. badges to them.

At this time berets were being taken into wear in Canada only by personnel about to proceed overseas. On the other hand, the "G.S." badges worn on the right forearm by other ranks who had volunteered for general service had to be removed before proceeding overseas.



volunteering for overseas service might be given 96 hours leave in order that they might return home and personally acquaint their families with their decision (58). On 21 Nov it was announced that depot battalions would be formed into which N.R.M.A. personnel would be posted after volunteering for overseas service:

M.D. No. 5 - Royal 22e Régiment  
Régiment de la Chaudière

M.D. No. 4 - Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal  
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve  
Le Régiment de Joliette  
Le Régiment de Chateauguay

It was hoped to obtain the services of two well-known officers from overseas, Major Paul Triquet, V.C. and Major Hugues Lapointe (son of the late Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe) to command the depot battalions for M.D. No. 5. Actually, depot battalions of two officers and three other ranks were organized only for the four regiments serving in the operational theatres and Major Triquet managed to return overseas. Personnel were segregated into separate platoons which remained together for the whole training period and proceeded overseas as sub-units under the original subaltern. It was proposed, if possible, to keep such platoons together until the actual theatre of operations was reached\*.

511. In the meantime the several D.Os.C. and G.Os.C. had been called to Ottawa and on 14 Nov General McNaughton spoke to them of his hopes. He emphasized that the deficiency

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\*The scheme of enticing French-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers to enlist into the depot battalion of their choice and proceed overseas as members of distinct platoons had not been communicated to C.M.H.Q., where officers learned of it only during casual conversation with Brigadier deLalanne in January. After being supplied with the details in a telegram of 24 Jan 45 General Montague replied that he was shocked to learn of the "unqualified undertaking" given these men. General Crerar was in thorough agreement and, in a telegram of 2 Feb to C.M.H.Q., emphasized that:

... As Cdn Army Comd I am unable to accept any such specific undertaking. The maximum that I can reasonably ensure is that French-speaking inf reinforcements reaching this theatre are posted to one of the three French-speaking bns. I can not and will not guarantee that they will be posted to bn of own choice though I would expect 2 Ech automatically to arrange this when such disposition would not adversely affect French speaking reinforcement situation as a whole.

In the meantime, however, one such platoon had arrived overseas, its officer carrying a letter certifying that it had become known in Canada as the "Wolves Pl", and two more were en route. Pending the arrival of the Adjutant-General instructions were issued that such platoons were to be kept intact. The Adjutant-General brought tidings that a scheme was afoot in Ottawa whereby all future G.S. general duty Infantry reinforcements would be despatched in similar platoons. This never materialized, however, and no action appears to have been taken by C.M.H.Q. to break up the complete French-speaking platoons which did arrive (59).



of Infantry reinforcements was a short term problem and would be solved in time by the diversion of 75 per cent of recruits to Infantry and continued remustering from other corps. In the meantime, however, drastic action was required to meet overseas needs. Apart from "recoverable casualties" the only immediate source of general duty infantrymen was the 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers in Canada. According to the minutes of this conference, General McNaughton then

... stressed the need for persuasion and careful explanation to NRMA of the national necessity. Draftees should be made to realize how great a contribution to the state they would be rendering by volunteering for general service (60).

512. The policy of the Government, according to General McNaughton, "was to use the volunteer method, not compulsion, and to this end every means should be taken to enlist the support of the public and to emphasize to N.R.M.A. personnel the opportunity and public responsibility which is theirs in this time of national emergency". The latest recruiting statistics would be published weekly so that the man in the street would know the facts and could lend moral support. Within Pacific Command were 8000 trained N.R.M.A. infantry and a further 8000 N.R.M.A. soldiers undergoing advanced training for that Corps. A programme for converting the remainder into general duty infantrymen was to be accelerated but there was to be no lowering of training standards.

513. At the conclusion of the Minister's statement the several Commanders reported on the preceding year's recruiting efforts. They emphasized that future prospects were not good since only the "hardened cases" remained. (The Army in Canada also contained a number of aliens and naturalized subjects of enemy origin who could not be despatched overseas) (Appendix "B"). Factors militating against volunteering were: home influence was opposed to sons going overseas (e.g. Mother would simulate a heart attack when son mentioned the subject); attractions such as farm leave, or duty, which were not available to G.S. personnel; higher rates of remuneration in civilian life; the anomalous situation that, whereas men would not volunteer for overseas service they would willingly accept compulsory service overseas. General McNaughton promised that the existing farm duty scheme would not be continued for men who were suitable for employment as infantrymen; men employed on civilian works projects should not receive more than their army pay and allowances and no one suitable for overseas service would be so employed (Appendix "G").

514. After the Minister of National Defence had left the meeting the Chief of the General Staff stated that "it was not for them to discuss the Government's policy... but rather to apply themselves to implement the policy" (61). This he summarized as:

- (a) Reduction in Home War Establishments.
- (b) Reduction in operational troops.
- (c) **Inducement** to N.R.M.A. to convert.

515. That evening General McNaughton issued a statement to the Press (62). The following day he issued an even more controversial statement, in the course of which he felt it necessary to deny that he had reversed his views on the adequacy of volunteer reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas (63). He was reported in newspapers across Canada as saying that



"after talking matters over with the Officers Commanding the Military Districts he was more than ever convinced the continuation of the voluntary system will provide the reinforcements" and that "his conference with his District Commanders had only confirmed his original view" (64).

516. Immediately the D.Os.C. of M.D. Nos. 1, 2, 10 and 13 and the G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command sent telegrams of protest to the Chief of the General Staff (65). Brigadier F.M.W. Harvey, V.C., M.C. telegraphed from Calgary that General McNaughton's statement had placed "those present in an entirely wrong position as at no time did we in any way give the Minister any encouragement to think along these lines in fact at the very last we asked you to inform him that our opinions were quite to the contrary" (66). General Pearkes followed up his telegram with a letter, which in part read as follows:

You will remember that the conference closed after I had asked you if a resolution should be adopted to the effect that after considering plans to implement General McNaughton's policy, we were of the opinion that sufficient men could NOT be produced. At the time I suggested that such a resolution might protect the D.O.Cs. You, however, considered it undesirable that any formal resolutions should be passed and agreed to inform General McNaughton of the opinion we had expressed. This I believe you did.

It is my intention to do everything in my power to endeavour to obtain the volunteers required. But having expressed quite frankly at the conference my grave doubts as to the effectiveness of the methods proposed, I must record a protest against these statements alleged to have been made by the Minister implying that those of us who had been at the conference had said anything that might reasonably be interpreted as giving the Minister any encouragement or any data that would increase his confidence in the ability to produce the required numbers by voluntary enlistment.

It would be very much appreciated if a press release could be made from N.D.H.Q. which would correct the erroneous impression which has been given.

My opinion is valued by a great many people in British Columbia and for this reason alone I have responsibilities beyond those of a purely military nature. Other General Officers Commanding are in similar position in their own Districts. We are, however, denied the privilege of correcting in the press such damaging statements ... and can only appeal through the authorized channels to have our position clarified (67).

517. On 20 Nov the Minister of National Defence issued a revised statement which read in part:

From their completely frank statement, given from their intimate contact with the problem, I was able to confirm the existence of a number of factors which had operated to deter or prevent men in the N.R.M.A. from coming forward to



volunteer for overseas service. I informed the officers gathered at the conference of the action already initiated to correct these adverse factors.

I was given assurance that the officers concerned would, on return to their stations, make every endeavour to provide the numbers of men required by voluntary conversion from the N.R.M.A., or by enlistments, or by freeing men from home defence and other local establishments who had already undertaken the obligation of general service overseas.

Despite the very serious difficulties which were frankly stated, but having this assurance of full support in another endeavour to solve the problem, I express my own belief that the problem will be solved (68).

518. That same day, however, further ammunition for the press was provided by Pacific Command. Before attending a conference called by General Pearkes certain senior officers were unwise enough to attempt to answer questions put by reporters and create the impression that they believed the reinforcement of the Canadian Army Overseas by voluntary means was doomed to failure. In an effort to counteract the resulting misleading statements in the press General Pearkes issued an official statement on the following day (21 Nov). According to this statement he had told his officers that:

... no coercion is to be used and that all will be told of the need of their services and the practical benefits to their own future by becoming volunteers and enjoying the full opportunities of successful re-establishment in civil life.

The men will be approached individually by their own officers and no attempt will be made to appeal to large gatherings .... (69)

He had failed, however, to give sufficient consideration to the state of public opinion over the conscription issue. Therefore, Lt.-Gen. W.E. Sansom was recalled from retirement leave and sent to Vancouver to investigate. General Sansom was able to explode the newspaper myth of "the open revolt of B.C. officers" and exonerate those involved from any motives of disloyalty to the Government (70). Certain officers had, however, been guilty of poor judgment.

519. Members of Parliament arriving in Ottawa, in response to the Prime Minister's decision that Parliament should meet on 22 Nov\* reported that there was a feeling throughout the country that the N.R.M.A. soldiers appeared to be willing to go overseas if sent but not to volunteer. Members were deluged with telegrams and letters from their constituents, as well as from organizations such as the Canadian Legion and Imperial Order of Daughters of the Empire urging conscription for overseas service. Others supported the stand taken by the Prime Minister (71).

520. When the Cabinet met on Monday, 20 Nov it

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\*Publicly announced on 13 Nov 44.



learned that the appeal for volunteers was failing.\* General McNaughton's proposals would yield only sufficient Infantry reinforcements to provide nine weeks wastage at "intense" rates, and none of the men would get to field units before the beginning of 1945. General McNaughton's figures could be summarized as follows (72):

G.S. personnel available to leave Canada in  
Nov and Dec

Present Inf	1500	
Remustered	<u>3500</u>	5000

Available monthly rfts 1945

Jan	2000	
Feb	2000	
Mar	2000	
Apr	2000	
May	<u>2000</u>	10000

Estimated returned casualties

Jan	1400	
Feb	1400	
Mar	1400	
Apr	1400	
May	<u>1400</u>	<u>7000</u>

22000

By the despatch of 15,000 trained N.R.M.A. infantrymen during November and December Mr Ralston would have provided a total of 37,000 such reinforcements, or 15 weeks wastage at 'intense' rates (see para 484). Even though the situation appeared hopeless a majority of the Cabinet members still opposed the introduction of conscription for overseas service. At the following day's meeting (21 Nov), however, some Ministers "took the position that they would not be placed in the position of meeting Parliament as members of a cabinet which supported the voluntary system" (73). They insisted upon making their position clear at a party caucus, to be held on Wednesday afternoon (22 Nov) following the opening debate in the House of Commons.

521. The situation was now complicated by what author Bruce Hutchison has erroneously termed a "revolt" by the Army (The Incredible Canadian, Toronto, 1952). On 21 Nov General Pearkes had advised the Chief of the General Staff that the commanding officers within Pacific Command were of the "opinion that few draftees would volunteer as men have apparently made up their minds to await conscription for overseas service and state freely that they consider it up to the government" (74).

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\*The diarist of The Dufferin & Haldimand Rifles wrote as follows on 17 Nov: "Lieut-Col. S.C. Clegg gave the boys a talk on the general situation in regard to overseas reinforcements, outlining the hardships that the boys over there are up against and the reasons why we ought to volunteer for General Service. Following his speech each man was interviewed individually by his Coy Comd in regard to going G.S." Only 24 men did volunteer for general service, however, and they were despatched to C.I.T.C. (A-29), Ipperwash for reinforcement training. The diarist also stated, on 18 Nov, that the unit had sent 68 officers and 1367 other ranks overseas during the Second World War.



While these commanding officers would do all they could to obtain volunteers they considered that large numbers of the N.R.M.A. soldiers would welcome compulsory despatch overseas as a means of avoiding individual responsibility. The situation was little better elsewhere. On the following morning (22 Nov) the Military Members of the Army Council met and agreed that the Chief of the General Staff should put their opinion in writing for the Minister of National Defence. After reminding General McNaughton of the recommendation made to Mr Ralston on 23 Oct that "the extension of the Terms of Service of N.R.M.A. personnel to permit their despatch overseas would most readily meet the immediate requirements of the Army Overseas and maintain its fighting efficiency" and his statement of the problem when General McNaughton assumed office, General Murchie wrote:

Careful examination of the problem has continued and every effort within our power has been made to meet this problem by the voluntary system.

After a careful review of all the factors including the latest expression of their views by the District Officers Commanding, I must now advise you that in my considered opinion the voluntary system of recruiting through Army channels cannot meet the immediate problem.

The Military Members concur in this advice (75).

One copy bore the additional signatures of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Quartermaster-General, Adjutant-General and Vice Chief of the General Staff (76). According to Bruce Hutchison's account, General McNaughton immediately telephoned the Prime Minister who was able to convince Hon. Louis St. Laurent that support of limited conscription for overseas military service was now essential (77).

522. Later in the day, following further discussion with the Adjutant-General, General Murchie advised the Minister of National Defence that, in their opinion, the shortage of Infantry reinforcements could be met by the despatch of 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers in addition to what G.S. soldiers were available. In his opinion 5000 N.R.M.A. soldiers could be despatched in each of December and January and the remainder in February (78).

523. Very little of a constructive nature materialized when the House of Commons convened on the Wednesday afternoon. The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Gordon Graydon) attempted to move that the full provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act should be implemented forthwith but the Speaker ruled him out of order since, according to the rules of the House of Commons, 48 hours' notice of motion had to be given. The only constructive result of the debate was agreement that General McNaughton should be permitted to make a statement on the following day, even though he was not yet a member of the House of Commons.\*

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\*Individuals and newspapers not well versed in Canadian constitutional history suggested from time to time that General McNaughton should be made a member of the Senate in order to obviate the necessity of his contesting a seat in the House of Commons. Such a practice is still in vogue in the United



524. The expected discussion did not materialize at the Liberal Party's caucus. The Prime Minister entered and stated that he did not want discussion at this stage but would prefer to have another meeting of his Cabinet that evening and report back to caucus in the morning (80).

525. When the Cabinet met that evening the Prime Minister "executed a complete somersault" (81). He informed his colleagues that he had been advised by General McNaughton that the appeal for volunteers was a failure and that it would be necessary to invoke a measure of conscription for overseas service. Mr King added that, "with reluctance he had decided to accept this recommendation". The morning edition of The Ottawa Citizen (23 Nov) carried the bannerline "Understanding is Reported Reached in Cabinet After Night of Grave Tension". The news story below intimated that the Cabinet would present a united front.

526. When the House of Commons met that afternoon three Members expressed a wish to present petitions from their constituents advocating the institution of conscription for overseas military service and one of them, Dr. H.A. Bruce, inquired what the Prime Minister had meant in his 1942 speeches by the phrase "conscription if necessary" (82). Thereupon the Prime Minister proceeded to dumbfound his opponents by tabling an Order in Council, P.C. 8891, which the Governor-General had been requested to approve that morning. Under its provisions the Minister of National Defence was authorized and directed:

... to dispatch to the following localities of service, namely: The United Kingdom and/or to European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres such personnel, in such numbers as may be approved by the governor in council (the number hereby approved being sixteen thousand) who are serving by reason of their having been called out for training, service or duty pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, as are or may from time to time hereafter required, in the opinion of the said minister, for training, service or duty within said localities of service; such personnel to be detailed from such units, depots and establishments as may be designated by the said minister; and the Minister of National Defence is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be

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(cont'd from page 253)

Kingdom and Mr Churchill relates in his memoirs how a peerage was conferred upon Mr. Frederick Leathers in the spring of 1941 so that he might become Minister of War Transport without having to face the House of Commons. In Canada, however, Sir Robert Borden had initiated a policy of reducing the number of Senators in the Cabinet when he formed his first Government in 1911. The process was completed in 1921 when Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that, "except for very special reasons, Ministers of the Crown holding portfolios will hereafter be selected from Members of Parliament occupying seats in the House of Commons." Subsequently this rule had suffered only one major infraction and on that occasion Prime Minister R.B. Bennet had pleaded that the appointment was not expected to be permanent. Thus, Prime Minister King considered himself bound to find a seat in the House of Commons for General McNaughton "within a reasonable time". On 11 Dec 44 General McNaughton accepted an invitation to become Liberal candidate in the North Grey by-election of 5 Feb 45 (79).



issued all orders and to take all steps necessary to give effect to this authorization and direction; and all personnel so dispatched or to be dispatched are respectively hereby required (in addition to all other obligations for training, service or duty) to perform while in the said localities of service such training, service or duty as may be ordered by any superior officer.

Further, all personnel so dispatched or who may at any time be dispatched are, pursuant to section 64 of the Militia Act, hereby placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof (83).

527. Upon hearing this Mr. R.B. Hanson (former Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons) exclaimed "Surrender" (84). Mr. Gordon Graydon referred to the Government's "partial reversal" of policy from what had become an "untenable position" but intimated that the Conservative Party was still going to press for the immediate application of the full provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act and move a motion of want of confidence in the Government (85). For, clearing away the verbiage, the Government had taken the minimum action—the despatch of up to 16,000 N.R.M.A. infantrymen to meet only the immediate shortage overseas.

528. General McNaughton was then permitted to address the Members on the subject of reinforcements. After giving a résumé of how the crisis had arisen he added the caution that his figures were only estimates, and definitely on the safe side (86). The particularly acute problem of French-speaking Infantry reinforcements was being given separate attention (see para 410). He admitted that there might be some delay in getting **initial** sailings away but pointed out that it would be possible to arrange accommodation for even larger drafts in December if the Army could get the additional men to the ships. Continuing, he said:

... quite definitely, that all anxiety would be removed if we were able to find in December a total, above the number now arranged, of 5,000 infantry fully trained or in an advanced stage of training, a similar number in January and a further 6,000 in the succeeding months.

Every possible economy in the employment of fit general service personnel in home establishments has now been made or is in process, and the men so made available are included in the figures of planned dispatches.

In consequence the only source from which this additional 16,000 can be secured is from the N.R.M.A.

If we are to dispatch any considerable body of these men in time to ease the anxieties in the situation, arrangements for shipping must be **initiated** forthwith (87).

529. Discussing the trend of forthcoming operations General McNaughton suggested that there might be a return to the "siege warfare" conditions of the First World War as the advancing Allied armies ran up against strongly defended positions constructed beforehand. If such turned out to be



the case then wastage might become more evenly spread among all the troops in forward areas. Fortunately there were adequate reserves for all corps other than Infantry. Such a situation, however, would necessitate increased production of munitions and the return of more workers to essential war industries.

530. General McNaughton went over the steps taken to ensure that N.R.M.A. soldiers would not be discharged until after the volunteers had been brought back from overseas: if not physically fit for service overseas they would be employed on work of national importance as members of Employment Companies. In conclusion he stressed that:

The lives of our men in the fighting lines must be guarded in every way that is dependent upon action which can be taken from here. The numbers required to make up the reserve that is necessary are larger than could be provided in time by the volunteer conversion of trained and fit personnel of our N.R.M.A. men to general service.

I have said that except for some 16,000 men we are able to meet all requirements from men who have come forward voluntarily. I have said that it is our purpose to maintain the voluntary system to the limit. I have stated that 5,000 additional trained infantry must be available early in December to safeguard the position at the end of January; that another 5,000 must be found in January, and some 6,000 in the succeeding months.

I have brought these facts before my colleagues in the cabinet. An order in council has been passed extending the service of this number of men to the European theatres of operations.

This power will be used only to the extent necessary to make up the numbers of reinforcements required (88).

531. General McNaughton had been given what Mr Ralston had sought in vain and the latter now could have made it very difficult for the Government if he had so desired. Since Canadian troops were going to receive sufficient reinforcements, however, he contented himself with cross-examining the new Minister of National Defence on matters of detail. He obtained an admission that apart from the designated 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers the only trained Infantry reinforcements were the 4500 G.S. personnel\* rounded up during Mr Ralston's tenure of office (89). The question of how many N.R.M.A. soldiers actually would go overseas depended on how many would still sign a general service attestation form (M.F.M. 2) to avoid the stigma of "Zombie" and how many would prefer to retain their conscript

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\*Arrived at by accelerating despatch of 1500 infantrymen; sending overseas 1500 of other corps for remustering to Infantry; demoting 750 N.C.Os. to private but continuing their previous rates of pay for a period of six months; despatching 750 tradesmen as general duty infantrymen but continuing their trades pay for six months (see para 472). Both Mr Ralston and General McNaughton had refused to lower medical standards for general duty infantrymen in order to obtain additional reinforcements.



status to the bitter end (90). In an exchange with Mr. Howard Green (Conservative—Vancouver South) the Minister of National Defence agreed that compulsion would be used only to meet deficiency: if sufficient men volunteered there would be no need to send any N.R.M.A. soldiers overseas. (91).

532. The next problem raised by the Opposition was whether the conversion training being given to both G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers was sufficient to produce properly trained general duty infantrymen. General McNaughton argued that the six weeks' Infantry syllabus developed in the United Kingdom (where most of the conversion training had been carried on) was adequate, while the Opposition claimed, but without any actual evidence, that in practice there were many exceptions (92). General McNaughton admitted that there always would be instances of men who were not of the standards laid down—either of physique or infantry training—being sent forward; but the last possible check was made when the man went to the "left out of battle" component of an infantry battalion (Appendix "L"). Thereupon he read a copy of a letter General Simonds had sent (28 Oct) to all his commanders on the subject of absorbing reinforcements (see para 384). Himself a veteran of the First World War, Mr. Howard Green fastened on the circumstances where mere boys would have to be rushed into a battle at once should a battalion become decimated (93).

533. The Minister of National Defence further agreed that the call-up system would remain unchanged and men would continue to be enrolled as N.R.M.A. soldiers to the numbers requisitioned monthly from National Selective Service (94).

534. At the risk of belabouring the topic, it should be emphasized that Mr Ralston successfully made the point during the evening that the Government was "counting on N.R.M.A. personnel who volunteer as going in the regular monthly dispatches and not as part of the 16,000." (96). In fact, he pointed out, there was "not one word from start to finish" in General McNaughton's statement to indicate that "one of these men is going; it is all hypothetical" (97). The Government was only going to invoke the terms of its Order in Council whenever successive drafts could not be filled with the 5000 additional volunteers. General McNaughton did state, however, that N.R.M.A. soldiers would be included among the 5000 additional men to be despatched during December.

535. That same evening (23 Nov) a crowd of some 700 youths paraded through the streets of Quebec City carrying banners with the legend "Down With Conscription" but were dispersed by the police when they tried to enter a recruiting office (98). Abortive demonstrations were held elsewhere but only in Pacific Command were there real disorders. (See paras 551-6) In Ottawa itself 100 N.R.M.A. soldiers attempted to march up Bank Street toward Parliament Hill on Monday night, 27 Nov (99) but were dispersed by G.S. soldiers, sailors and

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\*Speaking in the House of Commons on 27 Nov to obtain a vote of confidence in his Government the Prime Minister was even more emphatic:

... The order in council authorizes the Minister of National Defence to dispatch overseas a maximum of 16,000 N.R.M.A. personnel. In calculating the number of N.R.M.A. personnel so dispatched as reinforcements men will be counted as N.R.M.A. personnel only if they have embarked on board ship without converting to general service. All N.R.M.A. personnel who convert to

(cont'd on next page)



airmen who started fist fights along the street\* In Montreal that ~~same~~ night some 700 youths paraded the streets in protest (101). Later in the week an editorial in The Ottawa Citizen had this to say of the outbursts in Montreal:

... Mob violence at this time in Canada, when so many of the free-born youth are away on active service overseas, is obviously instigated by cunning instructors.

This country cannot afford to be indulgent with something like the Fascist brand of blackshirts or the Hitlerite youth. They are allowed to put on mob parades and demonstrations only because of the absence of Canada's true young manhood, on active service in the firing line against the forces of darkness overseas (102).

536. Four members from Quebec constituencies quit the ranks of the Liberal Party over this issue and Hon. C.G. Power resigned his portfolio as Minister of National Defence for Air. In his letter to the Prime Minister he wrote:

... I do not believe such a policy to be necessary at this time, nor will it save one single Canadian casualty.

I parted company with Colonel Ralston after the most mature consideration largely on the grounds that the number of troops which he reported as being required was comparatively so small, the means to remedy the situation without placing undue strain on the men at the front so readily available, and the end of the war so imminent that weighing everything in the balance we were not justified in provoking a national scission.

I cannot accept now from a new minister General McNaughton a recommendation which I reluctantly felt obliged to reject when made by an old comrade and tried associate Layton Ralston (103).

Fortunately, Hon. Louis St. Laurent and other Ministers representing Quebec constituencies had remained in the Cabinet (104).

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(cont'd from page 257)

general service before embarkation will go overseas as volunteers. The additional numbers estimated to be required total 16,000, regard, less of their status on leaving Canada (95).

\*On Saturday night, 2 Dec, there was a three hour free-for-all at Fort Frances, Ontario when servicemen home on leave and veterans of both World Wars tangled with about 100 French-speaking N.R.M.A. personnel who had been employed in that area on railroad maintenance (see Appendix "G"). During the fracas six persons were injured (100).



537. Mention should be made of the resignation of Brigadier James Mess (D.A.G. (C), and in charge of recruiting since 1941) who had not returned from a liaison visit overseas until 24 Nov. Upon being ordered to continue with his drive to obtain volunteers he tendered his resignation on 26 Nov, pointing out to the Adjutant-General that to do so

... would be to contravene the commitment I have repeatedly made to the public--the Press--my own associates--viz. that should the time ever come when recruiting on the voluntary basis was not equal to the demands of the Army, I would at once recommend to my superiors the abandonment of the voluntary system and a recourse to full and unconditional conscription. That time has now unmistakably come. The present crisis has been precipitated by the fact that the demands from overseas could not be met by the response which has been made or which might yet be expected from the voluntary system. My conviction stands that the only alternative is to resort to immediate and unlimited conscription (105).

There had been much to complain of the recruiting propaganda issued during 1944 and as late as 11 Nov General McNaughton had been advised by a Cabinet colleague (Hon. Brooke Claxton) that, although Brigadier Mess had lots of life and drive, he was "stupid and opinionated and that his work was badly directed." (106) After considerable behind-the-scenes consultation Brigadier Mess was retired (107).

538. When the House of Commons convened on Monday, 27 Nov, and Hon. C.G. Power had stated the reasons for his resignation from the Government, but not the Liberal Party, the Prime Minister moved that after the completion of its existing business the House should adjourn until 31 Jan 45. As moved by the Prime Minister this was a request for a vote of confidence: "That this house will aid the government in its policy of maintaining a vigorous war effort." (108) Mr King pointed out that Mr Power had resigned for reasons "diametrically opposed" to those of Mr Ralston and proceeded to trace the Government's stand from the pre-war pledge of "no conscription for overseas service" to the present limited measure. Although the Government had possessed the legal power to introduce any measure of conscription needed there had been a moral obligation. In his opinion, therefore, the 1942 Plebiscite and subsequent amendment of the National Resources Mobilization Act had merely released the Government from its pledge and given it a free hand. The Prime Minister denied the newspaper allegation that the conscription issue had been a personal King-Ralston conflict and argued that after conducting the War for five years under a voluntary system of enlistment for overseas service, the Cabinet had been justified in considering whether, on the eve of victory, it might not still be possible to continue under that system. The members of the Cabinet had been convinced of the need to send more men overseas: the only question had been the method. He went on to say that a partial measure of conscription for overseas service had been agreed upon only because of the realization that:

... unless this House of Commons can unite in reasonable measure to support an administration that can carry on at this stage of war we shall have to face the possibility of anarchy in Canada while our men are fighting overseas,



giving their lives that we may maintain our free institutions and that we may have peace and concord through the years to come....(109)

He claimed that the Government had successfully surmounted two crises which might have forced it to resign. The Canadian Army could not wait two or three months for its reinforcements while the country was in the throes of a general election. Members either could support the existing Government or force the formation of a new administration which would still have to enforce a measure of conscription (110).

539. Following him the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Gordon Graydon) emphasized that there was no guarantee that 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers would be sufficient and that there might not be another crisis later. He also spoke of the many men who would be spending their sixth Christmas away from home and wondered whether the long servicemen would be expected to volunteer for further fighting in the Pacific (111). Mr Graydon claimed that total war was needed and went on to quote from an editorial in that morning's Ottawa Journal:

If Mr. King and General McNaughton still don't believe in the compulsion principle, then are they the people to be carrying out this order in council? Here we have a minister of defence coming to parliament and saying to it in effect: "I am going to carry out this policy, but I don't believe in it-- am against its principle". We say as plainly as we can that General McNaughton would show more of integrity, certainly more of logic, if he said instead: "I don't believe in the principle of this policy; you had better get somebody to carry it out who does believe in it." And that goes for Mr. King (112).

540. Mr. M.J. Coldwell, leader of the C.C.F. Party, emphasized that the question before the House was reinforcement, not conscription, as there already was an N.R.M.A. army (113). Like Mr Graydon he moved an amendment to the motion made by the Prime Minister.

541. On Tuesday (28 Nov) the House of Commons met for six hours in secret session to hear General McNaughton further.

542. Mr Ralston's eagerly awaited speech, delivered on Wednesday evening (29 Nov) went over the old familiar ground and endeavoured to correct certain impressions as to what his stand had been. He stated that he was far from satisfied with the "piecemeal method that had been adopted or the halting attitude" it indicated, but he was supporting the Government's motion for a vote of confidence because the Canadian Army Overseas would thus get the necessary reinforcements (114). Personally he considered that the time had come to make all N.R.M.A. soldiers subject to overseas service but he would not support any motion which was an expression of lack of confidence in the Government. In short, although he did not think that General McNaughton's timetable for shipments would get the men there quickly enough, support of the Government was the only way to ensure that sufficient reinforcements were sent.

543. The debate was continued on Thursday and Friday and resumed on Monday (4 Dec) by which time a number of side issues had developed, such as the fact that remustered men



were being sent into action with insufficient training as infantrymen and casualties were being returned to their units before completely recovering from wounds. Letters were read and additional evidence cited by succeeding speakers. By 5 Dec five amendments to the Prime Minister's motion for confidence had been brought before the House of Commons. On that day Mr. J.G. Diefenbaker (Conservative) referred to the Government's policy as "rationed conscription" (115). During the exchange with the Prime Minister the latter refused to answer whether he would, if necessary, produce further orders in council to permit the despatch of more than 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers: Mr King merely said that he had "made no promise to anyone" (116).

544. Recognizing that the House of Commons was not going to take any action requiring its concurrence the Senate adjourned on 5 Dec. The debate in the House of Commons closed on 7 Dec, with the Prime Minister summing up. The 11 o'clock closing was waived and the motion was put to a vote at one o'clock in the morning (the various amendments having been defeated beforehand). The Government was sustained by a vote of 143 to 70. The House then adjourned until 31 Jan 45 (117).

545. The Cabinet War Committee and the Department of National Defence remained just as busy as ever. It was factors completely beyond their control, however, that permitted General McNaughton to inform his Cabinet colleagues on 22 Dec that by reason of revision in forecasts of activity for Canadian Forces in North-West Europe and Italy the statistical reinforcement position was some 4,400 more favourable than previously calculated. Provided there were no shipping delays the number of men despatched overseas by 10 Jan 45 should be 1500 more than the figure communicated to the House of Commons.

### (iii) Sending N.R.M.A. Soldiers Overseas

546. During question time in the House of Commons on 24 Nov General McNaughton stated that the units supplying the 10,000 additional reinforcements to be despatched in December and January had been selected that morning and would shortly be moving to concentration areas in Eastern Canada. He further added that:

... The men who wish to volunteer will be given every opportunity to do so. The others, the whole units including those men, will be despatched on the dates which at the present time are being arranged (118).

These drafts would comprise 7500 fully trained infantrymen and 2500 who were well advanced with Infantry training (119). Since this movement had just been ordered Mr Ralston suggested that the plan had been prepared three weeks previously. General McNaughton admitted that this suggestion might be true (120).

547. Members of the Opposition parties questioned General McNaughton and Hon Ian Mackenzie (Minister of Veterans Affairs) as to whether commanding officers had been instructed to explain to N.R.M.A. soldiers of their units that they would not be entitled to rehabilitation benefits unless they volunteered for overseas service (121). After some heated discussion Mr Mackenzie explained that N.R.M.A. soldiers were not entitled to a war service gratuity if they remained in Canada but, if they proceeded overseas either voluntarily or



as a result of compulsion, they would receive the same benefits as anyone else (122). Later in the afternoon it also was explained that conversion training was getting under way for the remaining 26,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers considered suitable for remustering to Infantry (123).

548. On the following day (25 Nov) Pacific Command was informed that Infantry units of the 6th Division were to be relieved of operational duties in preparation for movement overseas and grouped under two existing brigade headquarters: Headquarters, 14th Infantry Brigade, with The Oxford Rifles, The Winnipeg Light Infantry, The Saint John Fusiliers, The Royal Rifles of Canada and Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke, and the 15th Brigade of The Prince Edward Island Highlanders, The Midland Regiment, The Prince of Wales Rangers and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent (124). Suitable personnel from Infantry battalions remaining on coast defence and other Corps would be posted to the above-mentioned units in order to increase their strength to 1100 other ranks each.

549. In a special effort to convert more French-speaking personnel into G.S. reinforcements orders were issued for the immediate return of the 20th Field Regiment, R.C.A., Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent to Quebec province (125). Instructions were subsequently issued for the 15th Field Company, R.C.E. and the 19th Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C. to follow. The detached companies of Le Régiment de Chateauguay, serving on aerodrome defence duties in Atlantic Command, Le Régiment de Joliette which had been harvesting and French-speaking personnel of disbanding anti-aircraft batteries also were returned to their native province (126).

550. Other English-speaking units slated for later despatch overseas were the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment (Pacific Command), the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) already at Debert but under strength, and The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles (Niagara-on-the-Lake). Existing personnel of The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles were to be used to complete to establishment units proceeding with the "first" and "second" flights and the unit rebuilt later (127).

551. On Friday evening, 24 Nov, however, trouble had broken out in Pacific Command where the largest number of N.R.M.A. soldiers were then stationed. According to the report later submitted by General Pearkes there had been a satisfactory acceptance of the first news that N.R.M.A. soldiers were going to be sent overseas, but the men began to express dissatisfaction as soon as it became apparent that only "partial conscription" was implied in the despatch of 16,000 infantrymen (128).

552. According to newspaper accounts 1000 N.R.M.A. soldiers marched through the streets of Vernon, B.C. shouting "Down with Conscription" and "Conscript Money as Well". General Pearkes' account mentioned only 200 men but both versions mention two officers who were knocked down when they attempted to stop the proceedings. The demonstration was of short duration and there was no damage to property. General Pearkes emphasized that:

Indiscreet handling of news releases by the Press had a decided contributory effect. The first news story of the Vernon demonstration stated that 1000 men took part, whereas less than 200 were actually involved. Such exaggeration was obvious encouragement to malcontents in other camps, who were led thereby to believe that the



movement was much stronger than reality. Arrangements were made later with Press agencies to refer questions of fact to this Headquarters for verification before publication (129).

553. At Terrace on the Saturday morning (25 Nov) personnel of Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent refused to go on parade and persuaded approximately two companies of The Prince Edward Island Highlanders and 30 members of The Prince Albert Volunteers to join them. The dissidents opened a unit magazine and armed everyone, issuing about 100 rounds per man. As all commanding officers had left for Vancouver to attend the investigation proceedings being conducted by General Sansom (see para 418), command of the troops at Terrace was assumed by Lt.-Col. W.B. Hendrie, Mountain Warfare and Jungle Fighting Wing of the Canadian School of Infantry (S-17). However, control already had been lost by the junior officers, so that the best he could do was order them to guard key buildings. General Pearkes later placed the blame largely on the temporary absence of senior officers, the lack of sufficient officers of middle seniority and earlier withdrawal of "active" N.C.Os. for service overseas\*. In any event, the dissidents drew into their ranks practically all the N.R.M.A. strength of Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent, The Prince Edward Island Highlanders, The Prince Albert Volunteers and the 19th Field Ambulance. Only the first and last-named units, however, comprised French-speaking personnel.

554. The rioters mounted 6-pr anti-tank guns on the terrace overlooking the town and on the following day some 1600 armed men surrounded the camp of The Prince Albert Volunteers to prevent their scheduled move to Tofino. An advance party did get away on Monday (27 Nov), by which time senior officers had begun to return. These officers became convinced that about 75 per cent of the 1600 rioters were being intimidated by the remaining minority. Arrangements were made to have the local Liquor Store and Beer Parlours kept closed on 28 Nov and N.D.H.Q. was advised that conditions now could be described only as those of mutiny: Section 7 of the Army Act already had been read to the men. Conditions gradually reverted to normalcy, however, under the direction of the senior officers of the several units. Personnel of the 19th Field Ambulance and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent returned to duty and began packing for their return to Quebec province. During the night 28/29 Nov a few men picketed the lines of The Prince Albert Volunteers but the action was half-hearted and this unit entrained the following noon.

555. At Prince George a parade of 200 demonstrators from the 20th Field Regiment had marched through the lines of The Saint John Fusiliers and anti-aircraft units on the Saturday night (25 Nov) and, after gathering a crowd of approximately 500, made a noisy progress through the town. At Courtenay a crowd of 150 men from The Winnipeg Light Infantry were dispersed after only one incident. At Chilliwack two provost personnel were injured while attempting to disperse a small parade of dissidents. On Sunday afternoon 150 N.R.M.A. members of The Oxford Rifles marched through the streets of Nanaimo but there was no violence and prompt disciplinary action was taken. Only a 15 minute parade was held at Alberni, staged by a group from Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke. A rumoured demonstration at Prince Rupert on the Monday was squelched

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\*A total of 375 sergeants, 87 corporals and 200 former N.C.Os. who had reverted to the status of private in order to become reinforcements.



before it had a chance to get under way.

556. General Pearkes deduced that the situation at Terrace had grown serious because the garrison of this isolated area was under the impression that similar large scale demonstrations were occurring all across Canada (130). As has already been indicated this was far from the case.

557. The disturbances in British Columbia had, however, had the effect of worrying many people and had resulted in some rather unusual correspondence on the subject of internal security. One anxious writer, worried by a report that a Reserve Army field battery at Quebec City had been ordered to return to Ordnance its ammunition, breechblocks and gunsights, pointed out in a letter to the Minister of National Defence that:

With the Home Army men being returned to this province en masse the only unit that could be depended upon in case of trouble is apparently being made powerless to deal with it (131).

Upon investigation, however, the Minister of National Defence learned (6 Dec) that this unit had a strength of only five officers and 24 other ranks: even if there should be an emergency it could not be employed in an artillery role (132).

558. Internal security was also stressed at N.D.H.Q. when the question of returning overseas men who should have completed their 30-day rotation leave in Canada was discussed. In a telegram of 17 Dec to C.M.H.Q. the Adjutant-General pointed out:

View held here shared by Minister that as many as possible of personnel dispatched on rotation leave be retained here for period of six months or longer and posted to HWES to release GS and NRMA personnel into rft stream. Will also have desirable effect of partially staffing Army in Canada with overseas personnel and be an ultimate aid in demobilization. Numbers retained will of course be governed by volume forward flow of reinforcements (133).

This was emphasized even more strongly in a telegram received at C.M.H.Q. on 9 Mar 45 which settled definitely\* that personnel despatched to Canada on rotation leave normally would be retained there:

While our primary problem is release fit NRMA and GS for overseas service it is of vital importance that with operational troops now being reduced to barest necessities we should have in Canada as potential aid to civil power maximum possible number overseas personnel. Maintenance present rate of withdrawals for reinforcements will within a few months develop a situation where all future withdrawals must be met by equivalent replacements (134).

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\*Despite objections from C.M.H.Q. only 53 of the 1992 all ranks brought back to Canada on the first three leave quotas returned overseas after their leave was completed. On 27 Feb 45 a telegram was despatched to C.M.H.Q. to the effect that personnel returned to Canada on rotation leave normally would be retained there. A further telegram of 9 Mar informed C.M.H.Q. that all future returns of personnel to Canada would be under the headings of rotational duty for at least six months long service leave for men still physically fit to return overseas compassionate leave and men unfit for operational service (AHQ Report No. 2).



559. Meanwhile, since the excitement had quietened down, the first groups of French-speaking personnel left Pacific Command (1 and 3 Dec 44) without incident, with the men excited at the thought of returning home to the **Province** of Quebec. In all some 114 officers and 2801 other ranks moved east with these French-speaking units (135).

560. The case of the 20th Field Regiment, R.C.A., which was slated for disbandment following its arrival at Valcartier and its personnel for remustering to Infantry is of some interest. At Winnipeg the second of its two troop trains was boarded by a recruiting party, including two officers who had seen service in Normandy. Its report follows:

The men were very cheerful about being back in the Province of Quebec but bad feeling existed because of unwarranted criticisms of B.C. newspapers regarding their conduct and status.

These men are wary of being suddenly transformed into infantrymen without a chance of using their arty and special trg and also losing trades pay in certain cases. They were told that infantry had need of gun crews in A/Tk pls, etc.

They have always been treated on the same terms as the active members of their unit and this has been going on for so long that they take it for granted that they have done the smart thing in remaining N.R.M.A's.

They respond quite well to the argument that rfts are badly needed overseas but they find it hard to take the next step. They are used to being coaxed like children every three months or so and hope for this to go on forever.

They say that they have been promised all sorts of things that never materialized, and when their trip started they were sure they were on their way overseas until they were met on the train.

There are some ring leaders to be weeded out and also certain N.C.O's. all known to their superiors who, if thoroughly sold on becoming G.S. would bring many followers.

It is felt that men should be separated from their officers whose enthusiasm in most cases, has waned [sic] away.

Local newspapers could help a great deal in taking an optimistic view of **a very favourable response** in the recruiting. The clergy could do a great deal in the same direction (136).

Following the unit's arrival at Valcartier on 5 Dec a definite recruiting campaign was instituted to persuade men to enlist voluntarily for overseas service. On 12 Dec all the gunners physically fit to serve as general duty infantrymen were transferred to Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent while the N.C.Os. were sent to C.I.T.C. (A-13), for refresher and conversion training (137). On 20 Dec some of the low category gunners were transferred to the 26th ~~Anti-Aircraft~~ Regiment, R.C.A. in Newfoundland and on the last day of the year the unit ceased to exist (138).



561. Grounds for complaint arose over the reception accorded a draft of 505 remustered French-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers despatched from Petawawa to rebuild Le Régiment de Chateauguay, which was reorganizing at Sorel. No transport had met this draft at 1800 hours on Saturday, 16 Dec and the men had had to march from the station, carrying their complete equipment, through snow drifts to the camp, where they were kept waiting around outside because no preparations had been made. After their return to Petawawa the conducting party complained that the officers of Le Régiment de Chateauguay had been thinking only of a coming mess party and had even refused them meals and accommodation until they could get a train back to Petawawa. Thereupon the Commander of Petawawa Military Camp despatched the following complaint to Ottawa:

Everything possible was done in this Camp to despatch the men in a contented state of mind. They appeared to sense the reason for their move, but there was not a single discordant note in the whole draft.

However, the reception which they received at Sorel... had a very disturbing influence among the men and undermined the good will that has been created in this Camp.

It is a regrettable incident when a Commanding Officer on receiving five hundred men, who are to make up a major part of his Battalion, fails to ensure their welcome. A personal contact with the men on arrival or as immediately following same by the C.O. or his Senior Officer at least was indicated under the circumstances, in order to let the men know that some interest was being taken in their welfare. Apparently the Commanding Officer considered that the dance, which was being held that evening, was more important than the interest and welfare of his men, which conduct is certainly reprehensible (139).

562. With little time to digest the 232 men received on 15 Dec, and 42 on the following day, Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent were given a further 376 gunners on 18 Dec (140). The men were given leave over Christmas but the unit war diary records on 27 Dec that only 107 other ranks had returned. During the next two days small groups drifted back but there still were approximately 800 absentees on 3 Jan (141). Similarly, Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke received large reinforcement drafts and were plagued by men overstaying their Christmas leave. A number tried the "sick at home" dodge but were instructed where to "report sick" by return telegram. The greater number of men did return, however, and plans were made to leave behind a major and 10 other ranks to collect the stragglers (142).

563. The seven English-speaking infantry battalions of the 14th and 15th Brigades had completed their reorganization in Pacific Command, receiving drafts of varying sizes from all arms and services, while those of their personnel unfit for overseas service as infantrymen were reposted to units remaining there in an "operational" role. For example, The Oxford Rifles received 300 gunners from the 28th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 125 from the 22nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery and 48 men from 1st Field Ambulance: in return it sent 76 of its low category men to The Kent Regiment which was remaining (143).



564. In order to reduce administrative problems Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke had been replaced by The Prince of Wales Rangers in the "first flight" for overseas which left Pacific Command on 11, 12 and 13 Dec with the following strengths (144):

H.Q. 14th Infantry Brigade	58
The Winnipeg Light Infantry	1120
The Oxford Rifles	1113
The Royal Rifles of Canada	1108
The Prince of Wales Rangers	1113
The Saint John Fusiliers	<u>1112</u>

5624

Officers in Pacific Command estimated that roughly 50 per cent of the above were trained infantrymen and that a further 15-20 per cent had completed individual training.

565. The fact that very few of the original personnel remained in these units created a concentration problem after men had been given embarkation leave. Men dropped off at their home stations as the trains sped eastward across the continent, after receiving instructions where to report so that they would arrive in groups at Debert. For example, The Royal Rifles of Canada, mobilized in Quebec City, instructed personnel with homes west of Toronto to report to No. 2 District Depot; those resident as far east as Montreal were to report there and travel as another group; those living east of Montreal were to travel independently to Debert (145). The Oxford Rifles, mobilized in Western Ontario but subsequently replenished with personnel from all across the western half of the continent (M.D. Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13), was to concentrate at London, Ontario.

566. Only about 50 per cent of The Oxford Rifles congregated at London, Ontario (146). On 30 Dec a draft of 300 other ranks arrived from The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada at Niagara-on-the-Lake, but more trouble developed just before the unit was scheduled to move to the east coast (147). According to stories later appearing the press (see para 581) some 100 N.R.M.A. soldiers clambered over a six foot fence surrounding the barracks and went "whooping" along the city's streets congregating in pool rooms, restaurants and theatre lobbies until rounded up by members of the Canadian Provost Corps (148). All-in-all, some 650 men became absentees and were transferred "on paper" to the District Depot (149). Describing the actual train journey to Halifax the unit diarist wrote:

It was a quiet New Year's Day aboard the two troops trains. The weather was murky with a stormy wind and a heavy rain. Orderly rooms were set up on both trains to enable the troops to go active but very few availed themselves of the opportunity (150).

567. Similarly, The Prince of Wales Rangers received a draft of 141 other ranks on 1 Jan 45 to make good wastage through absenteeism (151).

568. The story of N.R.M.A. soldiers throwing their rifles overboard and causing disturbances on shipboard resulted from the conduct of one man, who had thrown his rifle and two kitbags into Halifax harbour and then refused to land when the S.S. Nieuw Amsterdam reached the United Kingdom. According to the official announcement made on 4 Mar, in answer to



charges made by Progressive-Conservative politicians during the North Grey by-election campaign (of a month before), K574552 Pte William Harold Smith\* of The Prince of Wales Rangers had stated during Court Martial proceedings:

On January 2, 1945, as I was crossing the gang-plank embarking on the ship for overseas, I deliberately threw my rifle and two kitbags overboard. I figured the military police would take me off the boat when I did this. I do not know the number of the rifle, as I had just received it the night before. The following day I received my kitbags on board ship (153).

The floating kitbags had been recovered but the rifle had sunk to the bottom. He does not appear to have been placed in confinement for he was able to hide before the ship reached port and only after considerable search was found and taken ashore.

569. Two other men had refused to go on board the Nieuw Amsterdam and seven sets of web equipments and rifles were discovered in trains arriving at Halifax, their owners obviously having jumped off (154).

570. In addition to this "first flight" of 4265 mixed personnel (A.T. 178) there were approximately 1600 all ranks in ordinary G.S. reinforcement drafts. Due to the number of absentees at the last moment and their replacement by other personnel it was impossible to obtain accurate information

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\*A perusal of this soldier's personal file discloses a situation far different from the one portrayed by opposition newspapers. William Harold Smith had been born in Prince Rupert on 10 Mar 19, had attended Chilliwack High School for one year and subsequently worked as a rodman for a civil engineer. On 22 Nov 40 he had been enrolled for 30 days' military training and was not recalled for continuous military service until 13 Jul 42 (Medical category A-1, 'M' Test score 162). He was posted to the 3rd battalion, Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) for training but went absent when he was posted to the 1st battalion of this unit before its departure for Jamaica in April 1943. After serving the 90 days detention awarded by a court martial for attempted desertion he was posted to The Prince of Wales Rangers (10 Aug 43). On 23 Dec 44, he went absent from this unit which had been selected for inclusion in the first overseas flight of N.R.M.A. personnel. On 31 Dec Pte. Smith was struck off strength to No. 6 District Depot as an absentee but must have been picked up as this entry was cancelled. On 2 Jan, while mounting the gangway of the S.S. Nieuw Amsterdam as already noted, he threw his rifle and kitbags overboard. He was tried by Court Martial, found guilty under two charges (A.A. 24 (1) and 40) and sentenced to 18 months detention. A summary of a psychiatric report dated 5 Mar 45 stated that:

This man is of a solitary, recessive, seclusive nature, who has utterly failed to adjust himself to army life. Has absorbed practically no trg, due to obstinate refusal to soldier, & not to lack of mental ability. Has resisted all attempts to induce him to serve usefully. He is an early case of split personality, who will probably progress. Is of no use to army in any capacity. Graded M-1, S-5.

Thus this man's behaviour might be attributed to the fact that he was a psychopathic personality. Unfortunately it was not possible for medical officers to spot and reject all such men during the course of a normal medical examination (152).



concerning their state of training (155).

571. No effort was made on shipboard to have N.M.R.A. soldiers attested for general service and in two cases the actual signing of documents (M.Fs.M. 2) was postponed: the total number of men volunteering since the units had left Pacific Command was 50 (156). In the case of the succeeding flight with mixed personnel (A.T. 182) men were encouraged to volunteer for general service until they actually disembarked in the United Kingdom. A circular letter of 13 Jan, issued while this flight was at sea, made it possible for N.R.M.A. soldiers to change their minds at any time and actually volunteer while overseas. The letter stressed, however, that:

It is of importance that as many conversions as possible are obtained before NRMA soldiers proceed overseas and efforts to that end must be energetic and continuous (157).

572. Considerable changes had been made in this "second flight", however, before the 15th Brigade was assembled in Nova Scotia early in January. Before leaving Pacific Command on 20 Dec 44 The Midland Regiment and The Prince Edward Island Highlanders had been reinforced to a strength of approximately 1100 all ranks each but, again, a large number of men failed to report after embarkation leave. On 5 Jan 45 the war diary of The Prince Edward Island Highlanders noted that only about 400 of its men had reported to the Transit Camp at Debert. Two days later the unit received a draft of 547 men who had been rounded up as replacements (158). The Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) had been at Debert since early November (see para 341) but was now brought up to strength.

573. The balance of the revised "second flight" comprised the four French-speaking Infantry battalions previously mentioned (see para 449) and separate drafts totalling 170 officers and 525 G.S. other ranks (159). The widespread absenteeism in Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent already has been mentioned (see para 462) and only 243 other ranks boarded the ship at Halifax on 11 Jan (160). Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke ran into difficulties just before their train was due to leave for Halifax on 8 Jan. The unit war diary records that 'C' company began a sit-down strike at 1100 hours and that by 1300 hours it had spread to all personnel, except those of battalion headquarters. The men listened to their commanding officer politely but refused to obey orders (161). During the afternoon Maj.-Gen. E.J. Renaud (D.O.C., M.D. No. 4) arrived and also harangued the men. Some 17 men of the support company capitulated first but it was not until 2330 hours that all of the 427 other ranks were aboard the train (a further 48 other ranks had gone ahead with the advance party). Without further serious incident the men boarded the S.S. Mauretania at Halifax on 10 Jan. That day 12 men volunteered for general service and while the ship was at sea a further 39 men, including three sergeants, became volunteers (162).

574. Le Régiment de Chateauguay neglected to submit a war diary for this period. A perusal of that kept by Le Régiment de Joliette suggests that very little trouble was experienced (despite the fact that only 257 other ranks were embarked), in spite of the following:

Our Padre made a very nice sermon this morning and scared everyone stiff. As usual he was quite a diplomat in his own way and just used the wrong time to say the things he said. Too bad that he felt he had to speak the way he did



for instead of trying to encourage the boys and to tell them that the crossing was nothing at all, that no troopship was ever lost, etc., he warned them of the dangers to come, that the coming trip was a very perilous one, etc. Too bad there is not a CARO to oblige the Padres to show their sermon to the Officer Commanding on certain occasions for we are quite sure that it would save a lot of trouble (163).

575. Although subject to slight correction later the embarkation strength of the 15th Brigade was given as (164):

	Officers	Other Ranks		Total
		G.S.	N.R.M.A.	
15 Bde HQ	13	5	30	35
PEI Highrs	34	145	883	1028
Fus de Sher	23	72	361	433
R. de Jol	24	108	149	257
Fus du St. L.	25	59	184	243
R. de Chat	25	228	271	499
Mid R.	41	140	635	775
Ir Fus	32	306	283	589
	217	1063	2796	3859

There also were 170 officers and 525 G.S. other ranks on other drafts, bringing the total sailing to approximately 4770 all ranks. During the voyage some 158 N.R.M.A. soldiers volunteered for general service. It was believed that more men would have volunteered but for the prevalence of a shipboard rumour that N.R.M.A. soldiers would remain in the United Kingdom on fatigue duties and only G.S. soldiers would be sent to fight (165).

576. Statistics on these two troop shipments (A.T. 178 and 182) indicated that slightly better than the publicized 10,000 men had been despatched. However, as the Adjutant-General had pointed out to the Minister of National Defence on 18 Jan, only slightly better than 8000 had been N.R.M.A. soldiers and fewer than the urgently required 7500 were trained infantrymen (166).

577. The "third flight" consisted of the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment, the 19th Field Ambulance\* and normal

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\*In a telegram of 29 Nov the Adjutant-General suggested that the 15th Field Company, R.C.E. and 19th Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C. should be sent overseas and their personnel used to reinforce primarily French-speaking Engineer and Medical units (see para 442) instead of disbanding them in Canada. In his reply General Montague pointed out that such action would give these men preferential treatment over those voluntarily remustered and sent to the United Kingdom as unallocated infantry reinforcements. Consequent upon this rejection the 15th Field Company was disbanded and all potential infantrymen transferred to Le Régiment de Joliette. Plans to disband the 19th Field Ambulance were cancelled, however, as the Adjutant-General was still desirous of using its personnel to reinforce the five predominantly French-speaking medical units overseas. Since success did not follow the offer to despatch this unit overseas if 90 per cent of the men volunteered for general service disbandment was on and off again more than once before it was sent overseas in February and disbanded (167).



G.S. reinforcement drafts and totalled 286 officers and 4843 other ranks (including 1968 N.R.M.A. soldiers) (168). Before leaving Pacific Command the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment was increased in strength from 750 to 1787 other ranks (from 35 separate units) but only 1112 of the men reported at Debert following embarkation leave. Records were in a chaotic state and the confusion was heightened by attaching approximately 1100 stragglers from the previous sailings. The worst confusion attended the loading of these men into trains at Debert, especially the group that had been foisted on the unit the day before. A subsequent report stated in part:

At one stage of the loading the men were actually loaded and despatched to the Rly Station while a previous train was still being loaded which meant practically an hour's wait on the platform. These men were loaded and despatched to the Station without the slightest knowledge of the officers of the Regiment responsible for the loading of the unit. These personnel marshalled in the third drill hall were of course the worst of the entire draft. The men of one serial had knocked out the windows and took out the electric light bulbs from their hut the night before, men of another serial refused to parade in the morning and still others refused to get on the train but when left standing on the platform cold persuaded them otherwise. There was actually no discipline and no organization in this jumble of men. There was available to DEBERT a total of 25 additional officers representing 6 of the serials of previous flights, but lack of control and non-interest of most of their officers was evident even though they were handling their own men and spoke, in the case of the French Speaking serials, their own language. This, together with the fact that there were practically no NCOs in this group of 1100 (being AWL they had been reverted if there were any), placed an almost impossible task on the officers and NCOs of the Regiment. It was necessary to distribute throughout the 2276 other ranks the 38 Regimental Officers and some NCOs in order to maintain some semblance of order—a further hardship being caused by having to leave 8 Regimental officers at DEBERT to handle any stragglers (169).

578. The troops went aboard on 31 Jan. No attempt was subsequently made to induce N.R.M.A. soldiers to volunteer for general service. Apart from the conduct of the stragglers (a meeting had to be broken up by the ship's police) the discipline of the two formed units was satisfactory during the voyage (170). Following arrival the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment was split into three groups, the original C.A.C. personnel going to No. 1 C.A.C.R.U. (171).

579. The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles were refilled during January and moved from Niagara-on-the-Lake to Camp Sussex, from where it was possible to utilize training facilities at C.I.T.C. (A-34), Utopia. Small drafts (some of surplus N.C.Os.) continued to arrive during February (172). On 15 Feb the unit diarist recorded that:

... A draft of 7 men from the Edmonton Fusiliers arrived today. These men are not much of an addition to us as they all suffer from Atlantic Fever. All have a stretch of detention to



complete, before absorbing any of the training we are doing at present....

Four days later a draft of 214 other ranks was received from Utopia, 68 of whom were either staff sergeants or sergeants from all arms of the service (173). On 26 Feb the unit moved to Halifax. In addition to its 45 officers and 1235 other ranks this "fourth flight" included stragglers from the previous flights and ordinary reinforcement drafts to a total of 258 officers, 3283 G.S. and 1554 N.R.M.A. other ranks (174). There were no incidents aboard ship and 21 N.R.M.A. soldiers were converted to general service.

580. In accordance with an earlier decision to reduce the garrison of Newfoundland further (see para 345). Le Régiment de Québec was withdrawn during March and concentrated at Valcartier for movement overseas as a formed unit (28 officers, 12 G.S. and 602 N.R.M.A. other ranks) any time after 1 May. The approaching end of the War in Europe resulted, however, in the cancellation of such a move (175).

581. Until 19 Jan any mention of widespread absenteeism had been kept out of the Press. On 2 Jan the Chief Censor confidentially had advised newspapers, news associations, special correspondents and radio stations that, although a "very substantial number of men [were] overdue from embarkation leave", there could be no news release until the troop convoys had arrived safely in the United Kingdom (176). Thus the staff of The London Free Press, which had the best story of all (see para 566), had worked for 24 hours over New Year's to complete a feature they could not publish (177).

582. On 16 Jan, however, the District Officer Commanding at London, Ontario, telegraphed the Chief of the General Staff that The Globe and Mail of Toronto suspected that censorship was being imposed for political reasons (until after the North Grey by-election of 5 Feb) and was therefore likely to publish the story of the disorders as a "scoop" but in such a way that North Atlantic troopship movements would not be endangered (178). The Adjutant-General advised the Minister of National Defence that some sort of statement would have to be issued about 20 Jan, when the "second flight" should have reached the United Kingdom (179). As the Adjutant-General suggested, however, more than 2000 men were still on embarkation leave and if they learned that 50 per cent of the N.R.M.A. personnel from previous drafts for overseas had gone A.W.L. (absent without leave) they would be encouraged to do likewise. Furthermore, such publicity would be disheartening to the troops overseas and most certainly would be played up by the Germans. On the instructions of the Cabinet an Order in Council forbidding any public reference to troop movements and statements prejudicial to recruiting was drawn up and held in readiness but never issued (180).

583. In its issue of 18 Jan, however, The Globe and Mail carried an editorial denying that there were security reasons for withholding from the Canadian people stories of disorders among N.R.M.A. troops (181). Therefore, as soon as word was received late on the evening of 19 Jan that convoy A.T. 182 had reached the United Kingdom safely the waiting press release (embodying points raised by the Adjutant-General on 16 Jan) was issued (182).

584. Once the ban had been removed stories of absenteeism materialized from centres all across Canada. Press reports from Pacific Command indicated that 20 per cent of the men given home leave in British Columbia still were absent.



The Calgary Herald estimated that 400 failed to report back to Military District No. 13. A rather surprising feature of the situation in Pacific Command was the announcement of 22 Jan that over 200 of the 482 absentees were G.S. soldiers (184): seemingly, however, these largely would be men who had volunteered as the result of social pressure.

585. In an editorial which had a lot to commend it, despite the political implications directed at the pending by-election in North Grey which General McNaughton was contesting, the Montreal Gazette of 22 Jan stated:

The statement issued by Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, Minister of National Defence, discloses a situation among the Home Defence troops that is far worse even than what was suspected or feared. It is now a matter of official admission that of the 15,600 Home Defence troops advised that they were to be sent overseas, 7,800 or precisely one half, were at one time overdue or absent without leave. To the present time, only 1,500 of these have returned or have been returned by police action. There are still 6,300 or 40 per cent., whose whereabouts are unknown.

... the position of the men now fighting overseas is again placed in grave uncertainty. For these 15,600 Home Defence troops constitute the trained reinforcements which are essential for maintaining the overseas pools. Gen. McNaughton announces that "the special program arranged for use of N.R.M.A. personnel overseas is also progressing according to schedule". It is difficult to see how the program for the use of N.R.M.A. personnel overseas can be progressing according to schedule when 40 per cent of the trained men are not accounted for.

The conduct of the Home Defence troops has shown a flagrant disregard for the authority of the Government because the Government has failed to inspire in these troops a respect for its authority. An authority strong and determined is not violated in this manner. The men feel under a weak and wavering discipline because the will that directs it is so obviously hesitating. There is the conspicuous fact that the Government was driven into a conscription policy by the force of an irresistible public opinion, that it adopted this policy with an undignified haste; that it became a conscriptionist government under protest and with intricate compromise. When it now approaches the men and demands of them a prompt and unwavering response, its words fail to evoke respect and its orders fail to exact obedience.

To understand how deep lies this widespread disregard for the Government, it must be borne in mind that these Home Defence men are not raw recruits, unused to army life or ignorant of the necessary consequences of insubordination. Most of them have been long in the service, some of them as long as two or three years. Indeed, before they were granted their



leaves, they were solemnly warned of the consequences of not returning. So it is that these men know well what they do. When military discipline is broken by so large a number of men, so deliberately, and with such composure, it is the discipline rather than the men, that has lost moral vitality.

If the Government has shown any determination towards these men in recent years it has consisted mainly in trying to break their spirit. The very act of creating such an army involved the creation of an invidious distinction and an anti-social mentality. But these reactions were steadily consolidated. The general recruiting campaigns consisted in great measure of exhortations to men as yet out of army service not to become as these men were. Even such campaigns for overseas enlistment as were conducted among the Home Defence troops themselves consisted often of efforts to humiliate them into a higher view of their responsibilities.

Such treatment as this could have, and has had, only one result. Gradually the men hardened under this abuse, and developed their own esprit de corps. At first resenting these imputations, they came at length to take pride in them. Such was the reaction of the troops who had been so long under a government weak in resolution and strong in abuse. Now that the Government feels itself impelled by a will not its own timidly to play a more positive role, it finds that it is dealing with men whose disrespect it has itself earned.

In the present mounting crisis only one policy is open to the Government. It must quickly and with all the moral resources at its disposal, rehabilitate itself—not only in the eyes of the Home Defence troops, but in the eyes of the troops overseas, and of the nation at home. It must lay aside all its many evasions and compromises, and show some spirit by shouldering its responsibilities. As a first stage, it must show the courage to promptly abolish all distinctions within the Army, and to create one army for one purpose.

But the present amazing failure of discipline in the Home Defence troops cannot be considered as a difficulty in itself, as something that can be dealt with as a separate problem. It is inseparable from the moral quality which the Government itself has impressed upon the whole country. For there can be nothing more behind military discipline than the prestige of the Government which is its ultimate source and administrator. The defect with which we are now faced is not a failure of discipline in the Army but of moral fibre in the Government. The cure lies with the Government itself, and it is essentially a matter of self discipline.

Certain it is that the present collapse has



proved that ~~it~~ is no longer possible to follow the traditional policy of seeking political strength by displaying strategic weakness. The Government has been steadily lowering itself. Indeed, it is now extremely doubtful whether it retains a sufficient power for self-recovery. This is a question that the people of the country will soon have to decide.

586. The Toronto Evening Telegram agreed with the Prime Minister that there was nothing new about conscription, but insisted that the present mass evasion of duty was something entirely new (185). The Ottawa Citizen wondered "what deep moral issue" lay behind the decision of so many men to seek severe punishment rather than actually go forth to war (186). In its "Shocking Truth" editorial of 22 Jan The Globe and Mail already had pointed out that any idea the Government had entertained of persuading enough N.R.M.A. soldiers to volunteer for overseas had been fallacious: instead of a "just and equitable conscription" the Government had singled out 16,000 men to be the "victims of expediency".

587. General McNaughton's own statement, or what he was purported to have said in the midst of his election campaign, did not make matters any easier. For example he was reported to have stated during the course of a campaign speech:

It is all right...for 6,300 of those designated for overseas service to desert. 'It served to screen out the good from the bad'.

... I had a feeling that a proportion of them (the draftees) were all right, but a good high proportion were neither good to God nor to man (187).

His Conservative opponent, Air Vice Marshal A.E. Godfrey, already had declared that General McNaughton either should insist on a new policy or resign, while his C.C.F. adversary prophesied that, as a result of the way the Government was handling the problem, there would be no reinforcements available overseas when May came along (188). (Air Vice Marshal Godfrey won the election and General McNaughton subsequently announced that he would contest the constituency of Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan, in the forthcoming federal election.)

588. All this created an unfavourable impression in the United States, reinforcing the earlier view that Canada was not doing her share to win the war. Just as the reduction in Canada's home defences in 1943 had been badly timed for American public opinion (see para 241), these news stories came right after Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had given his war review to Congress and had indicated the need to reclassify men previously placed in category 4-F in order to provide replacements against the heavy casualties sustained (189). The Philadelphia Inquirer headed its news story "7,800 Canadians Vanish to Avoid Duty Abroad" while The Kansas City Star carried the caption "Canadians Go A.W.O.L." (190). The Associated Press accounts did go on to explain that the trouble revolved around N.R.M.A. personnel but the average reader was prone to accept the first reports at face value. Other newspapers attempted to neutralize their effect by publicizing the A.W.O.L. and black market activities of American troops in Europe. A despatch of 26 Jan in The New York Times stated that between 12,000 and 13,000 American soldiers were absent without leave, as a daily



average, and that a large percentage drifted towards Paris which was the centre of nefarious activities.

589. The gravity of their position was gradually impressed upon a number of these N.R.M.A. soldiers and they began to give themselves up. Civilian as well as military police began checking leave passes (191). Montreal newspapers warned (24 Jan) that the R.C.M.P. would begin checking National Registration cards and citizens were asked to carry them at all times (192). Anonymous telephone calls and tips, mostly from women, enabled the police to round up others in British Columbia (193). A Government sponsored advertisement appearing in the daily press of 26 Jan warned relatives and friends that harbouring deserters was a civil offence: after 21 days absence any soldier would be classed as a deserter and subject, after apprehension, to trial by court-martial (194). No indication had been given to the press as late as 1 Feb, however, as to whether any of these absentees actually had been classed as deserters (195).

590. The procedure put into effect at No. 1 District Depot (London, Ont), which was entrusted with the recovery of the 650 men from The Oxford Rifles alone, was for absentees to be held under open arrest until a group of 20 had been formed (196). Then, such a party\* was despatched under escort to No. 2 Transit Camp, Debart for inclusion in an overseas draft (198). Summary sentences, usually involving the forfeiture of 28 days pay (and the pay automatically lost during absence) were levied by the Officers Commanding District Depots before sending the men forward (199). Even though it had been possible to announce on 1 Feb that the number of so-called "absentees" had been reduced from 6300 to 4631 (200) the situation did not improve as rapidly as the politicians hoped, since fresh men disappeared each time a draft was being prepared for despatch overseas.

591. A Canadian Press story of 14 Feb told of absentees being sought in the "remote sections of Canada's snow-clad bushland" and how 12 such soldiers were caught in a shanty hideaway 12 miles from Sault Ste Marie, Ontario. One of these was a G.S. soldier named Edward Zaffini: the 11 N.R.M.A. soldiers were identified as Albert Sarlo, Hugo Sarlo, Guido Sarlo, Mario Albanese, Gino Gerardi, Frank Madonna, Etio Fasanello, Enzo Antonello, Achille Albanese, Frederick Digasparro and John Fasanelli (201).

592. Fireworks were really touched off at Drummondville in the Eastern Townships (of Quebec) on the Saturday night, 24 Feb, however, when a party of approximately 50 R.C.M.P. and the same number of Canadian Provost Corps personnel began raiding public places after eleven o'clock in search of absentees and draft dodgers. The police were attacked by a mob, their vehicles overturned and smashed. Fighting raged up and down the business section for three and a half hours. Scores of civilians suffered more or less severe cuts and bruises; two members of the R.C.M.P. required hospitalization while others, including personnel of the Canadian Provost Corps, required medical attention. The police managed to retain their prisoners, however, and get them back to Montreal without having to call on the nearby Sherbrooke Basic

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\*On 9 Jan 45 this Depot despatched a second such draft to Debart, five of the men leaving in handcuffs. On 26 Jan the Montreal Gazette reported that 20 or 30 draftees wearing handcuffs had been seen at the Windsor Station (187).



Training Centre for help (202). The Globe and Mail (Toronto) declared that "Mob Rule Must Stop" (203) while The Ottawa Journal's editorial tried to assess the blame as follows:

The blame? Let no one say it is solely with those young men themselves. Because it isn't. What took place at Drummondville was the consequence of years in this country when too many of our leaders preached isolationism, made an anti-conscription cry a political principle, declared over and over again that never must Canadians be again called upon to fight outside their own country. For more than twenty years the youth of Quebec were told that—were taught a doctrine of isolationism and cynicism which, looking back on it now, must make all of us feel ashamed that politics in this country could fall to such a level.

These young deserters and mobsters in Drummondville were never taught the implications of citizenship, nor the meaning of Canada's place in the world; were never told what is involved in the unity of this country and in the maintenance of freedom and democracy. They were told instead that isolationism was the thing, that our membership in the British Commonwealth and in the comity of free nations meant only privileges and entailed no duties—that if there was fighting to be done it could be done by others (204).

593. The more irresponsible elements in other parts of the country had their prejudices fanned by incidents and remarks such as the following chit-chat which appeared in The Windsor Star of 28 Feb:

One of the yellow-bellies picked up by military police in Quebec and escorted to headquarters complains piteously that he was "cold during the trip". That, as the boys fighting their way into Germany will say, is too blinkin' bad.

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Sullen feeling in Quebec reminds oldtime reporters of the famous Easter Sunday frolicsomeness of 1918, when people woke up to find machine guns had been placed in front of post offices and all Federal buildings, and soldiers with fixed bayonets were patrolling the streets. The sooner we go back to 1918, it seems, the better\*.

594. Raids continued in the Montreal area but workers took care to have their papers in order and no further serious incidents took place. Incidents continued to occur elsewhere, however, such as that at St. Philippe de Neri, about 100 miles east of Quebec City on the south shore of the St.

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\*An interesting account of these disturbances which culminated in rioting, shooting, the proclamation of martial law and the despatch of a battalion from Toronto to help restore order is given by Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-18, New York, 1937.



Lawrence. On Saturday, 24 Mar about 30 persons gathered in front of a hotel where five members of the Canadian Provost Corps were detaining a soldier who had failed to report back to his unit. When they refused to surrender their prisoner missiles were hurled at the hotel and windows broken. No one was injured but several revolver shots were fired before assistance arrived from nearby Rivière du Loup (205).

595. A meeting of the District Officers Commanding Military Districts, 3, 4 and 5 with Commissioner S.T. Wood of the R.C.M.P. in Ottawa on the previous day (23 Mar), had revealed the seriousness of the overall situation (206). Although General McNaughton had told the press on 12 Mar that the number of absentees had been reduced to 24 per cent of the N.R.M.A. strength, he had been referring only to those men who had absented themselves from overseas drafts. Actually there had been 18,843 absentees and deserters in Canada on 8 Mar, with 64 per cent hailing from Eastern Ontario and Quebec. These last were broken down as follows:

M.D. No. 3	-	602
M.D. No. 4	-	7800
M.D. No. 5	-	<u>3715</u>

12117

During the course of the meeting it was revealed that, whereas in Ontario the Provincial Police co-operated with the military in the search for deserters and draft dodgers, neither the provincial nor municipal police in Quebec were helpful and in many cases the use of civilian gaols was refused (Appendix "E"). Local policemen often warned offenders in advance and magistrates tried to avoid issuing warrants requested by members of the R.C.M.P. According to the minutes of this meeting:

It is dangerous for Mounted Police or Provost to go far from large centres unless they are in sufficiently numbers to defend themselves. Numerous instances prove this. On the other hand, if they go in sufficient large numbers to be able to defend themselves, riots are likely to ensue.

- (a) In larger centres where mass raids are made on restaurants, pool rooms, etc., the necessity of sorting out and identifying suspected deserters resulted in sufficient time elapsing to enable trouble to brew and riots and disorders often followed.
- (b) Some legal means authorizing the apprehension of those suspected without delay and later checking them in custody would avert trouble.

There is evidence that certain Municipal and Provincial authorities appear themselves to tolerate disorderly conduct, placing the blame on the Provost and the RCMP.

The presence of large bodies of Police and Provost in any community is immediately known and if there are any deserters in that community they very soon get warning and take to hiding so that the result of large raids is



not encouraging.

The problem is really one of policy. In the final analysis the Army can go into any community in sufficient numbers to impose its will on the civilian population. The question is, what degree of force should be used? Serious disorders can probably best be avoided by agreeing that force shall only be used in self defence (207).

This last both summed up the problem and provided the answer: The Government wished to maintain national unity, not hopelessly split the country into factions, and knew that the end of the war in Europe could not be long delayed.

(iv) N.R.M.A. Soldiers in the Canadian Army Overseas

597. In preparation for the arrival of the "first" and "second" flights containing N.R.M.A. soldiers the Infantry training organization of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom was further expanded. During the late autumn the training facilities of the 13th Brigade and Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units had been amalgamated into a 13th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade of five regiments (each consisting of a depot and two training battalions) so that reinforcements could be given training under conditions more akin to those they would meet in the field (see paras 435-6). A 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade of four more training regiments was now formed (as G.S.D. 602 units). (C.M.H.Q. Report 133) With effect from 10 and 18-19 Jan 45, respectively, the Headquarters and units of the two brigades brought over from Canada were disbanded.

598. Information emanating from Ottawa made gloomy reading, however, with a telegram of 12 Jan 45 admitting that:

Due to incidence AWL unable to give close estimate of state of training these units but most gloomy overall picture (208).

Another N.D.H.Q. telegram of the same date asked whether, in view of the added training problems which would be created by the disordered state of the "first" and "second" flights containing N.R.M.A. soldiers, C.M.H.Q. would be prepared to accept a further draft in January with 3500 N.R.M.A. soldiers (209).

599. On 15 Jan General Montague (Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. \*) despatched a telegram of acceptance. Except for the shipping consideration, men could be more readily trained in Canada. Fog hampered training in the winter and it was difficult to provide accommodation and adequate training areas in southern England for the larger population which would remain longer within C.R.U. (210). Just how many potential

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\*General Stuart had ceased being Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. on 11 Nov 44. It was not until 22 Nov however, that Major-General P.J. Montague officially became Chief of Staff and a lieutenant-general. Brigadier E.G. Weeks was brought back from Italy to become Major-General in Charge of Administration with the rank of major-general, with effect from 30 Nov 44.



reinforcements already in the United Kingdom would have to be retained as instructors would not be known until the state of training of the arrivals had been ascertained (211). Particularly to meet the needs of French-speaking personnel, a good number of whom had not even completed basic training, it was necessary to call on the operational theatres to provide instructors (212). A point which does not seem to have aroused much comment was the fact that there was an estimated wastage of roughly 10 per cent of Infantry reinforcements as a result of the refresher and conditioning training conducted in the United Kingdom (213).

600. Both G.S. and N.R.M.A. Infantry reinforcements\* proceeded to units of the 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade where they were screened and, depending on the standard of their previous training, were given two or four weeks further instruction before being posted to a unit of the 13th Brigade. (During this time the 13th Brigade was continuing remustering and refresher training for other G.S. reinforcements and holding those trained until they were required) Until early March all drafts were held there for one or two weeks' further training before despatch to North-West Europe (215). After that, regiments of the 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade conducted the full three or six weeks refresher courses themselves, but it was April before the first such draft found its way to the continent (216).

601. It had been on 23 Feb, however, that a first group of 58 French-speaking and 186 English-speaking N.R.M.A. soldiers left the United Kingdom as part of a normal reinforcement draft for North-West Europe (217). Four days later seven N.R.M.A. soldiers were taken on the strength of The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (218). A report circulated somewhat later around the press gallery in Ottawa to the effect that certain N.R.M.A. soldiers had refused to proceed to the front was investigated and denied by C.M.H.Q. (219). Pains had been taken to ensure that any reference to a man's N.R.M.A. status did not appear in his pay book and his regimental number was changed to conform with those of other men from the same Military District in Canada. Thus, although many soldiers may have guessed that certain of their new comrades were so-called "Zombies" there was no manner of knowing and unit war diaries generally did not mention their presence. The following extract from the war diary of The Loyal Edmonton Regiment is one of the few exceptions:

... During the month our Bn has TOS eight officers and 167 OR's among the latter are approx 40 NRMA personnel. These men have in no way been treated differently than any other rft, in fact the majority of the Bn is not

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\*On 26 Nov 44 General Crerar had written General Montague stressing the importance of mixing N.R.M.A. and G.S. personnel during refresher training in the United Kingdom in order to avoid any feeling of segregation and trouble after men went to field units as reinforcements. On 6 Jan 45, General Montague advised the Adjutant-General that N.R.M.A. soldiers would not be acceptable in the United Kingdom as N.C.Os. since trouble would result should they try to give orders to "active" personnel. The Adjutant-General agreed that such N.C.Os. should be reduced upon being posted to a training unit in the United Kingdom but that they would be required for administrative purposes while the units were at sea. Fortunately most of them possessed only acting rank (214).



even aware of their presence here, and in the few small actions they have engaged in so far they have generally shown up as well as all new rfts do....(220)

602. By this time other reinforcements were youngsters just old enough for overseas service or those who had been remustered from other corps and given a minimum of training as general duty infantrymen. For example, the war diary of The Algonquin Regiment speaks of recently arrived reinforcements as follows:

... By this time our newcomers are beginning to fit nicely into the family and from the interest they have shown to date they have erased any poor impression they may have given a few days ago and our ofrs and NCOs are now firmly convinced that we have the makings of a fighting team worthy of upholding the name Algonquin (221).

In an interview with war correspondent Frederick Griffin the officer commanding The Algonquin Regiment was reported to have stated that his N.R.M.A. soldiers

... were just as good as any reinforcements we have had. Actually nobody in the regiment knows who is a draftee and who is not, and after the boys have been in action, nobody cares (222).

On 15 Mar The Globe and Mail (Toronto) carried a despatch from its correspondent, Ralph Allen,\* containing the following passage:

Overseas conscripts from Canada's Home Defense Army received a savage baptism of fire during the last month's fighting in the Rhine-Maas wedge and acquitted themselves well on all counts, according to the veterans who fought beside them. Only a tiny percentage of Defense Minister McNaughton's 16,000 draftee reinforcements have been in contact with the enemy, and frequently their draftee status hasn't been known to the battalions with which they went into action. But in the few cases where home defense soldiers have been introduced to combat at the side of the men who knew them to be home defense soldiers, they have been given high marks for courage, training and discipline both by their officers and by their comrades in the ranks.

603. The Government's continued campaign to induce N.R.M.A. soldiers to convert to "G.S. status" had resulted in the following conversions, a goodly proportion of whom must have been included in overseas drafts:

December	1878
January	1692
February	2164
March	2131

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\*Ralph Allen's subsequent novel, Home-Made Banners, Toronto, 1946, makes some rather interesting statements in this connection.



and made it unnecessary to seek authority to despatch more than the already authorized 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers. Actually, due to the larger sailings of G.S. personnel during February and March (to replace the N.R.M.A. personnel who were absentees) only 12,908 N.R.M.A. soldiers proceeded overseas (223). Of these, only 2,463 had been taken on strength of units of First Canadian Army up to and including 8 May 45, when hostilities ceased. Their disposition was as follows (224):

C.A.C.	1
R.C.A.	21
R.C.E.	14
R.C.A.S.C.	71
R.C.A.M.C.	38
R.C.O.C.	2
R.C.E.M.E.	33
C.F.C.	1
Infantry (Def)	3
Infantry (Rifle)	2139
Infantry (Motor)	132
Infantry (MG)	1
Miscellaneous	<u>7</u>
	2463

Of these, 69 were killed, 232 were wounded and 13 became prisoners of war (225). Surely a rather strange conclusion to the conscription episode, even though it must be conceded that the situation would have been far different if hostilities had continued into the summer months.



PART VI - THE FINAL STAGES

(1) Overseas Needs, 1945

604. With 2nd Canadian Corps engaged in the "watch on the Maas" from 9 Nov 44 onward and General Crerar's Army Headquarters planning future operations, Infantry units were given a breathing space in which they could absorb reinforcements and brush up training. Accordingly, anti-tank and light anti-aircraft artillery regiments took over quiet sectors of the front. The Battle of the Bulge caused considerable flurry and confusion during the latter half of December and delayed preparations for the coming offensive in which First Canadian Army was to participate. During this three month period, from 9 Nov 44 to the commencement of Operation "VERITABLE" on 8 Feb 45, Canadian battle casualties totalled only 573 killed and 1159 wounded.

605. In Italy the Eighth Army had launched an offensive on the morning of 2 Dec to reach the Santerno River. Canadians captured Ravenna on 4 Dec but opposition stiffened and despite continuous fighting for the next month it was possible only to reach the near bank of the Senio (5 Jan 45). Casualties totalled 2581 all ranks but these were considerably less than the 4511 casualties suffered during the battle for the Gothic Line. American failure to capture Bologna and the need to despatch troops to maintain order in liberated Greece also contributed to the decision to abandon the winter offensive. Fixed positions along a winter line were held by a minimum of troops, therefore, while the Eighth Army commenced preparations for a spring offensive, aimed once more at the River Po.

606. According to records maintained at C.M.H.Q. actual casualties during 1944 had been only 3606 officers and 46,159 other ranks\* instead of the estimated 75,000 all ranks (1). Making allowance for "recoverable casualties" (Actually 8918 had returned to units during the year) it had been estimated that 37,500 all ranks would be required from Canada to maintain the reinforcement pool. It had been planned to despatch 48,000 from Canada (see para 274) but in actual fact a total of 5131 officers and 56,685 other ranks had joined the Canadian Army Overseas\*\*. Due to the fact that, on a corps basis, casualties had not occurred in the percentages estimated, however, it had proved necessary to re-muster the following to Infantry, either in the United Kingdom or Italy (3):

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\*According to War Service Records, actual casualties were only 47,172 all ranks.

\*\*Reinforcements received from Canada during 1944 (2):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
January	425	2118
February	582	2933
March	180	1152
April	426	5194
May	429	5896
June	780	5506
July	699	10099
August	243	2208
September	244	2393
October	311	5173
November	279	3358
December	<u>533</u>	<u>10655</u>
Total	5131	56685



	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
C.A.C.	46	3292
R.C.A.	231	4085
R.C.E.	39	1288
R.C.C.S.	nil	195
R.C.A.S.C.	7	1672
R.C.A.M.C.	nil	716
R.C.O.C.	nil	555
R.C.E.M.E.	nil	607
Misc	<u>nil</u>	<u>126</u>
Total	323	12536

607. Brigadier deLalanne, on another visit to C.M.H.Q. (3 Jan-12 Mar 45), considered that the situation might temporarily become worse since despatches of further reinforcements from Canada were falling behind (due to absenteeism) and the refresher training period in the United Kingdom had had to be extended (see para 600) to cope with the large numbers of men who had received little or no training in Canada as general duty infantrymen (4).

608. Brigadier deLalanne's visit to the Canadian Army Overseas had been authorized by the Minister of National Defence in an effort to clear up the following major questions (5):

- (a) Method of accounting for personnel overseas.
- (b) Confirmation of Wastage Rates now in effect, and basis of comparing actual experience with projections.
- (c) Rfts (number and type) which will be required from Canada during the year 1945.

609. Although the activity forecast supplied by the Army Commander as far back as late November 1944 had emphasized the fact that the sickness rate was higher during winter months, it had proved difficult for the "planners" to adjust their calculations (6). Early in January, 1945, therefore, the Army Commander sought a definite answer as to the average time sick and wounded men required for hospitalization and convalescence (7). Since Canadian experience was limited, the C.M.H.Q. reply was based on the British Army's global experiences. Although 50 per cent of casualties were recoverable, 15 per cent would be employable only in base and static units. Medical authorities advised that three per cent of a field force was in hospital "at all times" but that three-quarters of these were able to return to duty within 21 days (8). When telegraphing this view to the Adjutant-General on 25 Jan 45 Brigadier deLalanne added that he had held similar views since his overseas visits of autumn 1943 (see para 268) and spring 1944 (see para 309) and was convinced that N.D.H.Q. should continue to plan on having to replace 65 per cent of gross casualties with reinforcements from Canada (9). (Although the F.F.C. rates included losses from sickness and other normal wastage the Canadian rates adopted on 31 Aug 44 were an estimate of battle casualties only.) Even if such calculations should prove too conservative, Brigadier deLalanne pointed out that no harm would have been done -- reserves merely would be greater.

610. Based on the activity forecasts, made available by the War Office and the Commanders of First Canadian Army and 1st Canadian Corps, estimates of the number of casualties and available replacements during 1945 had been made both at C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q. These forecasts had been as follows:

A.A.I.

December 1944

1 month intense







Gross casualties (Jan-Jun incl)	49,120	
Less casualties to be recovered during period	<u>12,182</u>	
Net replacement required		36,938
Net loss due to rotation leave		<u>4,220</u>
		41,158
Less seasonal decreases in sickness anticipated during period		1,297
Net total requirements		39,861

613. Furthermore, this figure of 45,048 other ranks was the greatest number of physically fit reinforcements it was believed could be provided. The Adjutant-General considered that this provision would provide somewhat better than a two months' pool of reinforcements overseas at "intense rates" of wastage. Provided that there was a continuous flow of men from Canada, and that the return of "recoverable casualties" had been estimated correctly, it was felt that such a reinforcement pool could be accepted. Although earlier programmes had called for a reinforcement pool overseas equivalent to three months' wastage at "intense" rates, replenished from Canada by numbers equivalent to the "non-recoverable" wastage, such had never existed in practice (14). (These calculations had been made without any reference to Brigadier deLalanne and the information he had been requested to obtain.) (15)

614. Although there was a possibility that intensive fighting might continue throughout the summer of 1945 General Murchie felt justified in recommending acceptance of this overseas pool of two months' reinforcements, after weighing the pros and cons, provided:

... it is a pool of effective reinforcements and that there can be a continuing flow from Canada of reinforcements, augmented by recoverable casualties, sufficient to ensure that the total pool is maintained with fit and available reinforcements at not less than the two months figure for each corps. As, however, it is not anticipated that the reinforcements in the pool would all be required at one time, it can be accepted that a portion of the pool retained by the UK may be in training.

... I consider that it [the programme] can be implemented from the numbers the Adjutant-General states are now serving in Canada. It will however be necessary to ensure that the proper numbers are made available for despatch as they are required. I expect many difficulties in carrying it to a successful conclusion. The results anticipated will be reduced to the extent that NRMA personnel selected for despatch do not, in fact, reach the boats, but I consider that the plan has a substantial measure of safety to offset such losses (16)

Since implementation of this programme did not necessitate any alteration to the authorized "manpower ceiling" for the Canadian Army Overseas there was no need to seek approval from the Cabinet War Committee; General McNaughton merely initialled the submission on 1 Feb 45 (17).

615. During his visit to C.M.H.Q. Brigadier deLalanne learned that a statement of the former Chief of Staff (General Stuart) had been misconstrued in Ottawa. General Stuart had written that he would be quite satisfied to accept the wasting down of the reinforcement pool of general duty infantrymen until



it equalled only two months wastage by the end of June 1945 provided that it had been built up to a satisfactory figure by the end of 1944 (18). Further confusion had resulted from the receipt of Brigadier Bostock's memorandum of 8 Nov, showing the following disposition of the two months' reserve of reinforcements actually available (19):

		<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Others</u>
21st Army Group:	In theatre	4 weeks	2 weeks
	In U.K.	<u>4 weeks</u>	<u>6 weeks</u>
	Total	8 weeks	8 weeks
Cdn Tps Italy:	In theatre	6 weeks	6 weeks
	In U.K.	<u>2 weeks</u>	<u>2 weeks</u>
	Total	8 weeks	8 weeks

Brigadier Bostock had explained to Brigadier deLalanne, however, "that this was not intended to indicate any change in policy but was merely for purpose of comparison as it had never been expected that there would be maintained a full 3 months pool of effective personnel readily available for the field" (20).

616. After considerable discussion at C.M.H.Q it was considered that the maintenance of First Canadian Army Overseas would require the despatch of 7300 reinforcements per month from Canada and that Ottawa should be informed accordingly. The whole subject of reinforcements was discussed with the Adjutant-General, following his arrival overseas, but no action was taken to modify the programme approved for 1945 or to amend the "manpower ceiling" (in order to show separately the increasing number of non-effectives). (21)

617. At this time there occurred another of those events that eased the Infantry reinforcement problem for the Canadian Army Overseas. Among the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when they met at Malta during the last week of January en route to the Tripartite Conference at Yalta, was that up to five divisions might be transferred from Italy to assist General Eisenhower's final offensive in North-West Europe. The Canadian Government had been long hoping to re-unite its Army and now 1st Canadian Corps was selected to lead the way (22).

618. During January 1945 a draft of 10 officers and 1549 other ranks had been despatched from the United Kingdom to make good the shortages of general duty infantrymen within 1st Canadian Corps, along with 95 officers and 423 other ranks for other corps. A further 1000 general duty infantrymen had been earmarked for despatch in February to restore the reinforcement pool which on 27 Jan was reported to contain only 236 general duty infantrymen, while units had actual deficiencies of 683 other ranks (23). The February sailing of the draft was cancelled and the men, with the exception of those who had served previously with units of 1st Canadian Corps, were despatched to No 2 C.B.R.G. in North-West Europe (24).

619. It was 8 Feb, therefore, before General Montague could reply to General Murchie's telegram of 26 Jan (for information on the changing operational forecast) to the effect that, due to the pending move of 1st Canadian Corps (Operation "GOLDFLAKE"), it would not be possible to obtain any accurate forecast from its Commander. On the other hand, General Crerar had advised him as follows:

As a rough rule while I may be able approximately to translate effect of own operational intentions into terms of Cdn fm activities for next couple of months I am not in a position to assess for such a period the results of enemy intentions against forces under my comd or the longer term course of



war. The best I can do is to give you end of each month the Cdn activity situation as far as I can reasonably see it perhaps two months and you can apply factors obtained from Troopers to estimate the balance. For a working rule one half six months period intense one half normal should be on safe side (25).

620. As suggested earlier by both the C.G.S. and the Army Commander General Montague had sought assistance from the War Office in compiling the first of a series of monthly projections for the ensuing six month periods (26). The British practice, he had found, was to produce a six month forecast and renew it approximately two months before it was due to expire. Such a forecast stated merely the number of months at each degree of activity but not the sequence in which they would occur. The sole exception was when any arm or service was found to be deficient in reinforcement reserves and remustering was necessary: then the Director of Staff Duties would obtain a detailed forecast from the Commander in the theatre concerned. The current British forecast for First Canadian Army was four months "intense" and two months "normal": higher than General Crerar's estimate, but then the War Office customarily estimated on the safe side. While the War Office estimated that 1st Canadian Corps might be operationally employed by 1 Apr, General Montague considered that this would be a bit soon for the whole of that formation. He decided to strike a happy medium and sent back the following forecast (27):

- (A) For present Cdn element of First Cdn Army  
one intense, one normal, three intense,  
one normal.
- (B) For 1 Cdn Corps two quiet, three intense,  
one normal.

Thenceforth, activity forecasts were supplied monthly by C.M.H.Q., with that of 7 Apr estimating activity to the end of September (28).

621. During the month's heavy fighting to clear the west bank of the Rhine (8 Feb-9 Mar) the Canadian troops of General Crerar's command\* had 457 officers and 4948 other ranks killed or wounded (38 officers and 140 other ranks of the wounded remained on duty). Canadian formations then went into reserve and only the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion participated in the actual land and airborne crossing of the Rhine. 2nd Canadian Corps did not see heavy action again until early April, when it was assigned the role of clearing the enemy out of north-east Holland and north-west Germany. 1st Canadian Corps, by then re-united with First Canadian Army, was given the task of clearing the enemy out of western Holland. Altogether this was less intensive activity than had been predicted by the "planners" late in 1944.

622. A survey compiled at C.M.H.Q. on 9 Apr deduced that with field units up to strength the following reinforcements would be available within Nos 2 and 3 C.B.R.Gs or C.R.U. on the dates shown (30):

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\*The direction of Operation "VERITABLE" was entrusted to Headquarters, First Canadian Army but the Canadian component became only about one-quarter of the total force engaged. Although this fact was carefully explained to war correspondents a storm was raised in the London newspapers by military commentators who complained that British formations were not obtaining sufficient publicity for their efforts. For security reasons it was not possible to make a satisfactory, official reply. Canadian newspapers took up the cry but used it as an excuse to attack the Government's manpower policy — Canada could not reinforce a whole army of her own (29).



	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
C.A.C.	2397	1066	777	333
R.C.A.	1235	773	774	532
R.C.E.	645	364	328	403
R.C. Signals	920	436	252	125
Infantry (English-speaking)	12702	5881	8720	3616
Infantry (French-speaking)	2124	870	1441	974
R.C.A.S.C.	986	449	250	106
R.C.A.M.C.	696	43	101	92
R.C.O.C.	454	157	55	16
R.C.E.M.E.	765	498	133	56
Others	805	132	140	43

These estimates made provision for increased numbers of long service personnel to be returned to Canada on rotation leave and duty (AHQ Report 23).

623. As early as 29 Mar the Minister of National Defence had instructed the Chief of the General Staff to report whether there was any need to despatch reinforcement drafts on 13 Apr and 5 May (31). Since men were needed in Canada as a possible "aid to the civil power", in the event of post war industrial unrest\*, and most certainly as workers in industry and agriculture it would be undesirable to send reinforcements overseas in excess of actual requirements. Later that day, and on the basis of the favourable Report submitted by General Sansom (see para 657), the Minister of National Defence told the Cabinet War Committee that the reinforcement situation overseas was 50 to 75 per cent better than in November 1944. For that reason, he had declined an offer of shipping space for 10,000 men to be despatched overseas during April and May. As of 31 Mar the strength of the Canadian Army Overseas (including non-effectives) was 18,654 officers, 2031 nursing sisters and 265,517 other ranks. In his reply to the Minister of National Defence of 4 Apr General Murchie pointed out that the more sensible course would be to reduce the May intake from civilian life. Men already trained as soldiers should be despatched overseas since there might be considerable casualties during the "mopping up" period of indeterminate length; it would be necessary to continue replacing men with a long period of overseas service; morale would decline in the Canadian Army Overseas if all reinforcement was curtailed; it might be necessary to retain personnel overseas if there should not be sufficient volunteers for the Canadian Army Occupation Force (33). There had been more than enough criticism of the Army's reinforcement policy. General Murchie recommended that, since only 2600 all ranks were due to sail on 13 Apr, this draft should proceed anyway. General McNaughton gave his approval but directed the C.G.S. to look into the matter further before making a recommendation regarding the following draft (34). General Murchie already had been told to submit an opinion as to the number of recruits who should be sought from civil life in May (35).

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\*Soldiers returning to Canada after the First World War had introduced an influenza epidemic. Industrial unrest had followed, consequent upon the unemployment accompanying demobilization, and had culminated in the Winnipeg Strike of 1919. One of the factors governing the retention of the Reserve Army during the Second World War had been the possible need for "Aid to the Civil Power" (see Appendix "H"). By an Instruction of 12 May 45 the Infantry units remaining in Canada were disposed so as best to provide assistance to the civilian authorities in the event of internal unrest and disturbances. Subsequent to the Japanese surrender it was decided that only four battalions need be retained for internal security purposes. Fortunately the nation's economy remained prosperous and there were no disorders (32).



624. According to the telegram which the C.G.S. despatched to General Montague (at C.M.H.Q.) on 7 Apr the fact that casualties had been "considerably less than forecasted", together with the satisfactory progress of operations, had caused the Cabinet War Committee to inquire whether activity forecasts might not now be revised downwards. The C.G.S. went on to point out that reinforcements could now be despatched from Canada at the rate of 6000 per month for each of the next three months and then 4000 for each of the following three months; 2000 for each of the two months that then followed. Until the end of hostilities it was essential that First Canadian Army be maintained at full strength and that sufficient additional reinforcements be provided to permit the return to Canada on rotation leave of personnel with a long period of service overseas. Concluding, he wrote:

Essential, however, at this stage to ensure that withdrawals from civilian manpower pool are confined only to extent necessary to meet military requirements. It is highly desirable that at conclusion of hostilities we should have minimum of unused manpower in Army. It seems to us that you should now be in a position to forecast requirements to end of hostilities in Europe (36).

625. This request was answered by a telegram of 17 Apr giving General Crerar's appreciation of possible activity during the period 9 Apr - 8 Jul 45. He had written:

It appears now that the enemy facing allies in west will not capitulate as a whole but will continue to resist strongly in places where he is favoured by natural obstacles providing of course he has necessary supplies to establish fortresses or has line of supply still open to him. A number of these places face First Cdn Army. These are West Holland, North Sea ports of Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Bremerhaven, and Cuxhaven. First Cdn Army will probably have some quite stiff fighting before final reduction of enemy in Army sector. Tasks allotted to Army are

One...To open up Arnhem-Zutphen route.

Two...To clear North East Holland.

Three...To clear North West Germany to line of R. Weser.

Four...To take over Bremen from Second Brit Army and advance eastward to R. Elbe clearing Cuxhaven peninsula.

Five...Simultaneously with Two to operate westward to clear West Holland (37).

626. Depending on how long German resistance continued fighting would be stiff. (Actually, the British Chiefs of Staff had concurred in a Joint Planning Staff appreciation of 12 Apr that main German resistance would be over by early June, even though fighting still might continue in Norway and a "Southern Redoubt")(38). General Crerar's forecast of week by week activity was as follows (39):

1 Cdn Inf Div.	One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.
2 Cdn Inf Div.	One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.
3 Cdn Inf Div.	One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.



4 Cdn Armd Div.	One normal, one intense, one normal, three intense, two normal, five quiet.
5 Cdn Armd Div.	One normal, one intense, one normal, two intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn Armd Bde.	One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn Armd Bde.	One intense, one normal, three intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn AGRA.	One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn AGRA.	Five intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn Corps Tps.	One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn Corps Tps.	One intense, one normal, three intense, three normal, five quiet.
First Cdn Army Tps.	Three normal, ten quiet.

627. The Army Commander refused to attempt to forecast the end of hostilities but he did calculate his reinforcement needs (40). A revised calculation made at C.M.H.Q. had increased this estimate somewhat but a further telegram of 27 Apr indicated that sufficient reinforcements were available overseas to meet all estimated requirements until Germany collapsed, except for a possible continuation of fighting in Norway, the so-called "Southern Redoubt" and other isolated pockets of resistance (41).

628. General Murchie recommended that the reinforcement drafts scheduled to sail on 1 and 9 May (1419 and 2769 men) should go forward to complete the promised April quota (42). This was approved by the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 19 Apr. (43).

#### (ii) Finding Men for the Canadian Army, 1945

629. On 26 Jan 45 the Adjutant-General submitted his proposals for providing reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas (44), including the despatch of 45,048 other ranks during the first six months of 1945 (see para 612). Although an intake of only 5000 men per month from civilian life had been guaranteed by National Selective Service for the fiscal year 1944-1945, enlistments and enrolments had been better than that minimum to date and it had been estimated that 21,000 G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers would be obtained for the last quarter (January, February, March 1945)(45). Thereafter, however, it would be necessary to requisition 7500 men per month from National Selective Service.

630. The C.G.S. concurred in the Adjutant-General's submission and recommended acceptance in a memorandum of 29 Jan 45 (46). He advised the Minister of National Defence that an intake of 7500 men with a PULHEMS profile of 2222222 or better would be required monthly to replace anticipated battle casualties. Monthly training wastage would relegate 1500 men to civilian life, provide 1200 men for limited service in Canada and 4800 for overseas service. The balance of the 6000 required for



monthly despatch overseas (1200) could be found from among the men with an overseas age and medical category still serving in Canada. Should hostilities continue throughout 1945 this would involve a maximum drain of 90,000 men, although those enlisted or enrolled after 1 Aug 45 would not be available for overseas service until the winter of 1946. Once hostilities ceased recruits would no longer be required and further N.R.M.A. requisitions need be made.

631. In order to forestall objections from National Selective Service officials of the Department of Labour, the Adjutant-General's Branch had prepared charts showing that although total intake for the three Armed Forces had been 84,000 in 1944, the total number discharged to civil life had been in the neighborhood of 68,000 (47). The Army had put 60,000 in uniform but had made a net gain of only 6000 (plus 5000 inter-service transfers). In anticipation of receiving 15,000 men discharged from the R.C.A.F. (see paras 637-644) the Army's requirement from the civilian manpower pool during 1945 was placed at 75,000; the R.C.A.F. had stopped recruiting but the Navy would require 6000 recruits to offset wastage. It was estimated that sufficient physically fit recruits could be made available from the following civilian sources: 54,000 from those reaching the age of 18 1/2; 60 per cent of the 165,759 postponements in agriculture and other primary occupations; 50 per cent of the other 82,425 postponements and a small percentage of married men over 30 years of age. Offsetting this the three Armed Forces expected to return 111,000 men to civilian life.

632. The reliability of the statistics used at this time must be considered open to question, but the several projections were agreed that the most valuable pool consisted of the boys who reached 18 1/2 years of age each month. Moreover, since 18 1/2 year olds had not had time to get themselves settled into the declining labour market, it would be easy to cancel any postponements from military training.

633. Since Parliament was prorogued immediately upon assembly on 31 Jan the conduct of the War continued in the hands of the Cabinet, without any possibility of interference, until the next session opened on 19 Mar. As a means of offsetting the existing deficiency the Minister of Labour had accepted a March requisition for 7500 but expressed the view that it would not be possible to secure more than 5000 men per month during the next fiscal year (48). In his reply of 15 Mar General McNaughton pointed out that an intake of 7500 was necessary if 6000 reinforcements were to be despatched monthly: although reinforcements could be provided from other sources for the next six months he emphasized that:

...To accept now an intake lower than that figure is to invite a shortage of reinforcements should the war in Europe continue beyond August 1945. I assure you that, should circumstances warrant it, my requisitions will be reduced as far as prudence permits (49).

There was the additional point that extra reinforcements would be needed to replace the long service men who would be returning to Canada in increasing numbers on rotation leave or duty (see para 558).

634. Eventually General McNaughton's request found acceptance and an N.R.M.A. requisition for 7500 men was placed for each of the months of April and May. Due to a favourable turn of events in North-West Europe, however doubts began to form during the first week of April as to whether 7500 men really should be requisitioned in May (50).



635. General Order 548 of 22 Dec 44 had again amended Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Serving Soldiers and Recruits for the Canadian Army, Active and Reserve, 1943 so that men with considerably lower medical standards might be acceptable for overseas service. In a letter of 31 Jan 45 the Minister of Labour had suggested that a further source of possible recruits was the 600,000 men previously rejected on medical grounds, referring specially to those turned down for "mental instability" (see Appendix "E"). Although steps had been taken in the past to recall numbers of these men for examination by the R.C.A.M.C. (see paras 199 and 315), Mr Mitchell admitted that the necessary medical boards had never been available to do the work properly. Thus he could not be "too sure that the number of men found would warrant the effort" (51). On 9 Feb the Minister of National Defence replied that instructions had been drafted requesting Divisional Registrars to recall all men previously rejected with a grading of 3 or 4 under "E" or "S". The purpose, according to this letter, was

...to up-grade many who have been previously rejected. This will be accomplished by revising the standards so that the elimination will not be so fine. For instance, it has been decided that all who were previously grade E3 will now automatically be graded E1. "S" standards have also been revised so that many who were previously graded 3 or 4 will now find themselves graded 1 (52).

There was some doubt in the Military Districts as to the scope of the instructions issued until a telegram of 20 Feb from the Adjutant-General ruled that a medical recheck was to be carried out for "all rejects whether NRMA or volunteers\*" within the designated classes" (53). The only exceptions were to be unteachable illiterates and those who were unable to speak or understand sufficient English or French to undergo training (54). Thus, General McNaughton was able to conclude his letter of 15 Mar to the Minister of Labour (see para 633) with the following paragraph:

With respect to the numbers called up for examination and rejected by the Army, I note that during the period January to June 1944 59.4% of those examined were not accepted. During recent months, however, the percentage of rejections has been steadily and substantially reduced. In December 1944 46.5% of those examined were rejected, and this figure was further reduced to 37.0% during January of this year. Every effort is being, and will be, made to reduce the ratio of rejections, and lower category men are being employed wherever possible (55)

636. Once the War obviously seemed to be nearing an end, however, Brigadier deLalanne decided that there would be enough 18 1/2 year olds to meet continuing needs. After prior consultation with the Director of National Selective Service, he suggested to the Adjutant-General on 26 Apr that the maximum enlistment or enrolment age should be lowered from 37 to 25. This would eliminate the existing problem of dealing with young married men in their late twenties or early thirties. Furthermore, the search for defaulters in this age group could be dropped (56). The question became redundant, however, when the Germans surrendered. Action already had been taken to hold in abeyance the N.R.M.A. requisition for the month of May, which still earlier had been reduced to 3000 men, and the Cabinet now decided to suspend further call-ups, although the regulations remained on the statute books until 15 Aug 46 (57).

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\*Action had already been taken, under the amended medical standards, to revise the "E" and "S" categories of serving personnel where possible.



637. The other hoped for source of recruits was those retired or discharged from the Royal Canadian Navy and R.C.A.F. Since the Navy made a practice of retiring or discharging personnel only on medical or disciplinary grounds, its former members did not prove much of a source for Army recruits (58). On the other hand, the reductions in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, initiated in February 1944 and accelerated in October so as to wind up the programme by 31 Mar 45, had been expected to make surplus members of the R.C.A.F available for military service (59).

638. Approximately 10,000 men undergoing aircrew training during the autumn of 1944 were allowed to graduate. Along with certain instructional personnel they were to be posted to a special Aircrew Reserve (Class E, General Reserve, R.C.A.F.), enabling them to resume civilian life unless, or until, they were required for active duty. The 4200 pre-aircrew trainees then awaiting posting to initial training were to be released, however, along with R.C.A.F. personnel made surplus to requirements by the reduction in the number of training schools (60). (Arrangements already existed for "washed out" aircrew to transfer to the Army if they desired, or for them to be served with "Orders-Military Training" if they did not.)

639. Members of this new Reserve of Graduate Aircrew were exempt from the provisions of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations but they, and other aircrew released by the R.C.A.F., could voluntarily transfer to the Army (officers as provisional second lieutenants). As early as 12 Feb 45, however, the Cabinet War Committee was advised that increased demands from the Air Ministry for reinforcements had made it necessary to begin recalling to active duty some members of this Reserve. More and more of these reservists were recalled until it became necessary, on 28 Mar, for N.D.H.Q. to issue instructions curtailing the voluntary enlistment of further personnel without prior reference to Ottawa (62).

640. Despite criticism from certain sections of the press and general public, and bitterness among these mere boys themselves at being unable to become flyers, arrangements had been completed during the late autumn of 1944 for the 4200 pre-aircrew trainees to be discharged from the R.C.A.F. and immediately called for compulsory military service if they would not volunteer for the Army (63). By the time the last of these trainees had been discharged from the R.C.A.F. in late January some 560 had volunteered for general service with the Army and the remainder, apart from a few who were medically unfit or under-age, became liable for compulsory military service (64).

641. As early as 29 Jun 44, following agreement between officers of the Armed Forces and National Selective Service officials, it had been agreed that ex-Naval and ex-R.C.A.F. personnel with service limited to less than two years in Canada or its territorial waters, or who had been released because of inefficiency or misconduct, should be liable for compulsory military service. Effective 1 Dec 44 this policy had been extended to permit the recall of personnel who had seen less than three years' service in Canada. After 15 Jan 45 it became applicable to anyone who had seen service only in Canada (65). (Non-flying officers were made exempt from compulsory military service with effect from 23 Jan, but the way was left open for them to accept commissions in the Army.)

642. Beyond personal motives there was no incentive for surplus airmen to transfer voluntarily to the Army. The R.C.A.F. had provided better uniforms and accommodation, more opportunities for promotion and trades pay: now rehabilitation grants, opportunities to obtain further education and good offers from the labour market turned the faces of most towards "civvy street" (66). In practice, moreover, the R.C.A.F. tended to cut loose its recently enlisted general duty personnel with low medical categories first (see para 229), and retain its longer service personnel (a large number of whom were N.C.Os. and tradesmen) to await possible future needs. It was to offset this that Order in Council P.C. 1529



was promulgated on 6 Mar 45, permitting airmen to retain their previous rates of pay for a maximum of 10 months after voluntary transfer to the Army.

643. So that there should be no loophole for escape to civil life a procedure was devised, with effect from 12 Mar 45, whereby men being discharged from the R.C.A.F. would be medically examined by R.C.A.M.C. officers and, if found fit for military service and falling within the prescribed age groups, would be ordered to report for compulsory military service the day following the effective date of their R.C.A.F. discharge (67). With effect from 20 Mar a somewhat similar procedure was adopted for the Navy.

644. Effective 5 May 45, however, the recall of ex-Naval and ex-R.C.A.F. personnel for compulsory military service was discontinued. It would appear that a total of 6034 "Orders-Military Training" had been issued to ex-R.C.A.F. personnel and that 3171 men had either been enlisted or enrolled in the Army (68). Similar statistics for ex-Naval personnel are incomplete but it would appear that as early as 12 Feb 45 Orders-Military Training had been issued to at least 699 of the 1499 men whose names had been reported to the several Military District Headquarters as probably being suitable for recall (69).

645. According to War Service Records the sum total of all efforts to enlist and enrol men during 1945 was:

	Voluntary Enlistments		N.R.M.A.
	From Civilian Life	Conversions from N.R.M.A.	Enrolments
January	7987	1692	1082
February	7230	2164	778
March	7280	2131	712
April	5966	1287	650
May	2461	328	259
June	847	242	32
July	773	154	17
August	349	66	6
	<u>32893</u>	<u>8064</u>	<u>3536</u>

During the duration of the Second World War a total of 581,348 males voluntarily enlisted into the Canadian Army: however, 58248 of these were men who had volunteered for general service following compulsory enrolment and, therefore, should be subtracted from the total of 157,868 N.R.M.A. soldiers. Another 22,322 males received initial appointments to commissioned rank, while 3654 nursing sisters were appointed to the R.C.A.M.C.

(111) General Sansom's Report

646. At the time of his appointment as Minister of National Defence (2 Nov 44) General McNaughton had been away from the Canadian Army Overseas for 11 months and was somewhat out of touch with confidential developments. There was too much to be done in Canada to permit him visiting the Canadian Army Overseas, himself, so he informed the Cabinet War Committee on 22 Dec that he was recalling a former subordinate, Lt-Gen E.W. Sansom, C.B., D.S.O., from retirement leave a second time\* to become an Inspector-General (70). According to General Sansom's terms of reference (dated 15 Jan) he was to report to the Minister of National Defence on the availability and training of reinforcements in the United Kingdom, the standard of physical fitness and

\*From 22 Nov to 2 Dec 44 General Sansom had been employed investigating the much-publicized press interviews which had been given by senior officers of Pacific Command on 20 Nov (see paras 518).



training of reinforcements reaching units in North-West Europe and Italy, their availability there, and the effectiveness of the remustering programme (71). On 20 Jan he arrived by air in the United Kingdom, accompanied by Lt-Cols F.B. West and N.C.K. Wills who were to perform most of the "spade work". Since it would take a few days for those at C.M.H.Q. to prepare answers to his initial questions he continued by air to North-West Europe for cursory talks with General Crerar and his divisional commanders. Units were reported at full strength, except for day to day wastage, which was being promptly replaced from the reinforcement pool (72).

647. In his first telegram to the Minister of National Defence, dated 25 Jan, General Sansom reported that he had visited C.R.U. and the 13th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade and that he thought morale was better within the new training organization, helped by the fact that a proportion of battle experienced officers and N.C.Os. had been obtained as instructors (73). In his second telegram of 27 Jan he noted that the 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade was experiencing no trouble with its N.R.M.A. personnel, who were being impressed by the fact they would not be sent forward to units until their battle experienced instructors considered that they were properly trained (74).

648. On 27 Jan General Sansom returned to North-West Europe for a two day visit to First Canadian Army before visiting Italy. General Crerar told him that the Infantry reinforcement pool was smaller than he would like. The three French-speaking Infantry battalions had been brought up to strength but there were only 34 officers and 57 other ranks available as replacements in the theatre. Desertion and absence without leave was far too prevalent: only 10 per cent of his troops were French-speaking but they had contributed 50 per cent of the desertions\*. Part of the trouble was attributed to the common belief that the War would soon be over and that, even if apprehended and convicted, soldiers would never have to serve out their sentences (75).

649. General Sansom and his staff then visited Italy where problems were discussed with the Canadian Corps and divisional commanders and with the officers commanding the Canadian sections of G.H.Q. 1st and 2nd Echelons and No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (76). He found a feeling at 2nd Echelon that not enough consideration was being given at C.M.H.Q. to the special problems in Italy which had necessitated the formation of additional G.S.D. 602 units\*\*. In view of the fact that 1st Canadian Corps had only one brigade in the line, occupying a quiet sector of the front, and that no active operations were in prospect for at least two months, he considered that the available reserves were sufficient (see para 617 re "GOLDFLAKE" move).

650. Upon his return to C.M.H.Q. General Sansom recommended, in a telegram of 16 Feb to the Minister of National Defence, that it would be desirable to have a backlog of reinforcements, equivalent to not less than three months wastage at

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\*It must be remembered that it was far easier for French-speaking personnel to remain lost to the Army in Western Europe than for men whose mother tongue was English--Narrator.

\*\*On 27 Jan 45 there was an authorized entitlement of 2,347 all ranks tied up in "ad hoc" units, as against authorized reductions in C.G.S. 139 units of 1507 all ranks. The reinforcements tied up in any of these G.S.D. 602 units were R.C.A.M.C. and R.C.A.S.C. personnel required to man medical installations made necessary by the nature of the campaign and country, e.g. malaria and V.D. incidence.



"intense" rates in the United Kingdom itself, to guarantee against any future shortage resulting from protracted operations and guarantee the Army complete freedom of action (77). General McNaughton replied on 2 Mar that the creation of such a reserve would be far beyond Canada's manpower capacity. He then requested that General Sansom "sound out" the War Office regarding the quantity of reserves held behind the British divisions in North-West Europe and develop a comparison between the British and Canadian reinforcement holdings for that theatre of operations (78).

651. By this time General Sansom was again in North-West Europe but General Montague obtained the necessary information from the War Office and drew comparisons. On 10 Mar General Sansom embodied these findings in a telegram and letter to the Minister of National Defence (79). Comparing resources in Armoured Corps (exclusive of Reconnaissance), Artillery (anti-tank and field) and Infantry (rifle) for the six month period ending 31 Aug 45 the Canadian Army possessed reserves of 5,499 in the theatre against unit establishments of 31,783 (17.3 per cent) while the British Army had reserves of only 12,092 against establishments of 150,685 (8 per cent). This telegram deduced:

On the forecast of activity the British will be unable to maintain the overall reserve of 8 per cent in the theatre. With the exception of the Royal Armcd Corps they have fewer rfts becoming available than they would expect to require over that period to maintain formations in 21 Army Gp alone.

On the same basis...the Canadian position would be as follows: Infantry rifle. Units in the field would be at full strength. The pool of reinforcements in the theatre would be reduced slightly below the authorized rft holding and would amount to a little less than three weeks intense wastage. In the UK there would be 4250 inf rifle rfts, but these could not be classified as fit, trained and available. They would be in various stages of trg. CAC (excl inf recce). Units would be at full strength. The authorized rft holding in the theatre would be at full strength. The holding in the UK would be reduced to 1165 which is approximately seven weeks wastage at intense rates. Of these some 888 would be fully trained, fit and available and the remainder would be in various stages of training. RCA (Fd and ATk). The units would be at full strength. The authorized rft holding in the theatre would be at full strength. In the UK there would be 345 which amounts to approximately three wks wastage at intense rates and these last would likewise be in various stages of trg (80).

General Sansom's letter went into somewhat greater detail. The British holdings for Infantry were 12.7 per cent of establishments while the Canadians' reserves were equivalent to 29.7 per cent of their Infantry establishments. On the other hand, the British holdings were proportionately greater for Armoured Corps and Artillery (81).

652. On 14 Mar General Sansom rendered an interim report by telegram (82). Due to General Crerar's comment that there had been instances of Infantry battalions remaining at much reduced strength for weeks, with reinforcements not available in the theatre, it proved necessary for General Sansom to amend one paragraph of this report by a further telegram of 21 Mar (83). Back in Ottawa General McNaughton submitted this Report to the Cabinet War Committee on the following day. It was referred for study by Generals Murchie and Walford.



653. Meanwhile, the Inspector-General was drafting his final report, which was shown to Generals Montague and Crerar before he returned to Canada at the end of the month. Dated 29 Mar, this was a more detailed document and was accompanied by 18 explanatory appendices. From the graphs comparing the estimated with the actual casualties for the period 1 Apr 44 to 28 Feb 45, General Sansom and his staff deduced that actual Canadian casualties in 21st Army Group had exceeded the estimated gross casualties\* only during August, September and October, while in Italy they were much less than had been estimated. Therefore, the following conclusions were drawn:

- (a) Reinforcements were despatched from Canada in excess of the numbers required to meet the estimated gross casualties during 1944.
- (b) That a holding of reinforcements existed in the U.K. and forward, from month to month, which was more than sufficient to meet the month to month field requirements, but that they were not in the proper proportion of the arms in which the casualties occurred. Also surpluses in one theatre could not be used to meet deficiencies in the other theatre.
- (c) That a shortage of Infantry reinforcements existed in N.W. Europe during the period August to early October, 1944. There were times when the numbers of reinforcements immediately available in the theatre were not sufficient to meet the actual deficiencies in the units. There were even occasions when the numbers available, both in the theatre and in the U.K. together, would not have sufficed to correct unit deficiencies of English Speaking Infantry. This occurred during the period while the surpluses in other arms were being remustered to Infantry and retrained. In spite of all efforts, this remustering programme could not be accelerated sufficiently to meet field demands for this period. As regards French Speaking Infantry, the situation was worse, inasmuch as an overall deficiency of French Speaking Infantry reinforcements persisted from about 1 August 44 right to the end of the year, and could not be fully corrected until the arrival of drafts of NRMA French Speaking Infantry in January, 1945....(84)

654. The Report contended that the situation described in (c) above had been aggravated by two factors which had tended to confuse the overseas reinforcement picture throughout:

- (a) The formation of temporary units from personnel held as reinforcements in the United Kingdom.
- (b) The formation of temporary units from personnel held as reinforcements in the theatres of war, chiefly the Italian theatre (85).

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\*Battle casualties and accidents only, since there was no ready means of determining what had been the actual wastage from normal causes such as sickness, compassionate leave and rotational duty.



These were the so-called G.S.D. 602 and G.S. 778 units (see paras 158 and 283). Many of these had had a long existence and General Sansom believed there was a tendency for them to increase, with the result that the "manpower ceiling" was exceeded and physically fit reinforcements were made unavailable in practice. While not questioning the essential nature of the duties they performed, General Sansom considered that it would have been preferable to have established them on a permanent basis in the order of battle of the Canadian Army Overseas. By this time, G.S.D. 602 units and increments in the United Kingdom included a large number of personnel then physically unfit for service as reinforcements (see para 396). As a result of the "comb out", the majority of the remainder were instructional personnel who could be released for service in the field only when the number of reinforcements actually in the training establishments decreased.

655. General Sansom's Report went on to describe the steps which had been taken in the United Kingdom and both theatres of operations to ensure that reinforcements were adequately trained before reaching a field unit. Battle experienced Officers and N.C.Os. had been sent back to take charge of such training with the result that morale, as well as instruction, had improved. In conclusion it was stated that the general reinforcement situation then was satisfactory, except in respect of English-speaking Infantry officers\*. The only dark cloud, one which never did get across the horizon, was the possibility that

If...future casualties are incurred at a rate in excess of that which was experienced during the past three months, the rate of output of the training stream will not suffice to increase the reserves of trained reinforcements held available (87).

656. Certain of General Sansom's conclusions required modification in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. and the Army Commander. In particular, exception was taken to General Sansom's remarks about G.S.D. 602 units. Generals Crerar and Montague did not agree that the shortage of infantry reinforcements was aggravated by the formation of such units. Actually, they wrote:

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\*Of the 399 officers who underwent conversion training overseas during the autumn some 327 had qualified as Infantry sub-alterns by the middle of January. A further 554 officers were still undergoing training, made up as follows: 194 C.A.C., 243 R.C.A., 93 R.C.E. and 24 R.C.A.S.C. Despite the number of junior officers despatched overseas with formed units there still were insufficient English-speaking Infantry reinforcement officers and therefore N.D.H.Q. was queried by telegram on 8 Feb as to how many still remained in Canada, born in the years 1909, 1910 and 1911 and with an operational PULHEMS medical category. The reply of 24 Feb estimated that, apart from retaining an adequate number for the training establishments, the following Infantry officers could be despatched overseas: during March some 130 who had taken conversion training at O.T.C. (Brockville) and spent two weeks with No. 1 Training Brigade Group; during April-May 175 officers who had undergone conversion training at S-17 (Canadian School of Infantry, Vernon) and spent some time with No. 1 Training Brigade Group and 150 officers from Training Centres with perhaps a month's training at the Brigade Group; in June 175 officers who had taken five weeks advanced tactical training at the Canadian School of Infantry (86).



The shortage of Inf Rfts manifestly came about primarily because too many men had been allocated to other Arms and not enough to Inf in the period prior to 6 Jun 1944....We cannot accept any implication that we expended or misused manpower Overseas in temporary units thereby bringing about a shortage of Inf Rfts....(88)

The withdrawal of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy was now making possible the disbandment of a number of G.S. 778 units and the return of their personnel to the reinforcement pool. General Montague insisted that C.M.H.Q. always had been fully aware of the actual reinforcement situation in Italy and that the reinforcements despatched monthly had been all that could be spared from the more pressing needs of First Canadian Army in North-West Europe. Generals Crerar and Montague argued that the addition of increments to training units was the most economical method of adjusting the number of instructors to the size of the available reinforcement pool: such increments could be formed or disbanded to enable reinforcement units to expand or contract as drafts arrived from Canada or departed for the continent.

657. On 6 Apr General Murchie informed the Minister of National Defence that both the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General generally agreed with the statements made in General Sansom's final Report (89). It was not until 11 Apr, however, that it was possible for the Minister of National Defence to submit this final Report to the Cabinet War Committee. General Sansom, who was present for part of the meeting, stated that he had no recommendations to make. His Report was approved, but due to Parliament being prorogued on 16 Apr there was no need to table an abridged version in the House of Commons.

(iv) The Infantry Shortage Met

658. Justification for the establishment of peculiarly Canadian rates of wastage on 31 Aug 44 had been the type of campaigns then being fought in North-West Europe and Italy. At his morning conference of 20 Nov, however, while the conscription issue was still without a solution, General McNaughton brought up the possibility of operations developing into siege warfare (90). Should this come to pass during the winter months there would be a higher incidence of casualties in Arms other than Infantry and the Canadian rates would no longer hold true. The Adjutant-General suggested that this possibility would be offset by the existence of surplus reinforcement personnel who, although they possessed too low a PULHEMS profile for conversion into general duty infantrymen could be employed with their own corps in a theatre of operations. General McNaughton was not altogether reassured, however, and at the conclusion of his morning conference he requested that the situation be explored. On 28 Nov a General Staff — Adjutant-General inter-branch study was submitted to the C.G.S., comparing the estimated wastage for the period 1 Jan-30 Jun 45 (based on an activity forecast of three months "intense", two months "normal" and one month "quiet") at Canadian rates with a table which substituted F.W.C. rates for the two months forecast as likely to be "normal". The difference was a decrease of 4,558 infantrymen and paratroopers but an increase of 3,710 for all other corps, made up as follows (91):

	<u>A.A.I.</u>	<u>A.E.F.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
C.A.C.	178	226	404
R.C.A.	252	360	612
R.C.E.	82	264	346
R.C. Sigs	76	162	238
R.C.A.S.C.	392	726	1118
R.C.A.M.C.	112	184	296
R.C.O.C.	32	94	126
R.C.E.M.E.	86	168	254
C. Pro C.	16	30	46
All Other Corps	<u>92</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>270</u>
	1318	2392	3710



In the event that "siege warfare" should materialize the availability of such reinforcements for these corps would depend, however, on the extent to which C.M.H.Q. continued its programme of remustering men to Infantry (92).

659. Since the C.G.S. wanted to be quite sure that these corps would continue to possess an adequate reserve of reinforcements overseas (93) Brigadier deLalanne prepared a further statement on 2 Dec, pointing out that, until it was known what reallocations and remustering had been carried out by C.M.H.Q. subsequent to 30 Sep, it would be impossible to make a "reasonably accurate" projection (94). Brigadier deLalanne considered, however, that:

...in the latest return all Corps showed substantial reserves even after the remusterings to Infantry to 30 Sep 4, and it had always been contended by those in charge overseas that should there be a trend in the opposite direction, personnel remustered to Infantry from other Corps could, and would, be returned to their former Arm or Service if the circumstances warranted or permitted (95).

660. In a further memorandum of 7 Dec, the Adjutant-General advised General Murchie that it was "virtually impossible" to guarantee that remustering would not be carried to an extreme, although the special despatch of 16,000 N.R.M.A. other ranks would restore the Infantry pool overseas and lessen the pressure to continue remustering in the United Kingdom. In order to insure against this risk, the Adjutant-General proposed to take the following steps:

- (a) to co-ordinate more closely the form of reporting from the U.K. to Canada so that we can really compute our reserves in terms of the overall resources, and
- (b) Arrange for the prompt receipt and careful analysis of casualty figures from month to month so that any change in the trend of incidence between arms can be quickly reflected in adjustment of intakes to our advanced training centres in Canada (96).

It would take four to five months, however, before the effect of such changes could be felt.

661. Following his arrival in the United Kingdom Brigadier deLalanne telegraphed the Adjutant-General on 16 Jan 50 that over the next few months all reinforcement drafts from Canada should include substantial numbers of R.C.A. as well as some C.A.C., R.C.E. and R.C. Signals personnel. Furthermore, he recommended that:

Pending availability of more accurate figures than can be compiled at present recommend that GS and NRMA soldiers of these corps now in training stream as well as any of Training Centre Staffs who may be released should not ... be remustered to infantry but designated as rfts for own Corps (97).

In reply, General Walford's telegram of 18 Jan stated that no personnel in the training stream had been reallocated to Infantry since the previous October and that they would be despatched in their existing corps when trained (98). The only personnel Canada being remustered at this time belonged to R.C.A.S.C., R.C.A.M.C. and R.C.O.C. General Walford suggested that the personnel on convoys A.T. 178 and 182 be screened for fully trained artillery



personnel (see paras 564-576).

662. On 30 Jan a telegram was despatched to C.M.H.Q. to the effect that, effective with the sailing of convoy A.T. 194 (which left Halifax on 25 Feb), both G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements for C.A.C., R.C.A., R.C.E., R.C. Signals and Infantry would be despatched with PULHEMS profiles suitable for operational service in their own corps. For this, and possibly one later sailing, only G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements for R.C.A.S.C., R.C.A.M.C., R.C.O.C. and R.C.E.M.E. (but with Infantry PULHEMS profiles) would be sent from Canada. N.R.M.A. soldiers from operational units in Canada, however, would be sent as general duty infantrymen only (99).

663. Furthermore, during February action was taken at N.D.H.Q. to substantially alter the training intake as follows:

C.A.C. increased from 5 to 9.5 per cent  
R.C.A. increased from 7 to 9 per cent  
R.C.E. increased from 2 to 3 per cent

Substantial numbers of men previously withdrawn from units were despatched to C.A.C. and R.C.A. Training Centres so that they could become reinforcements for those corps (100).

664. Rather than draw all the required reinforcements for such corps from Canada, however, the Adjutant-General agreed during the course of his visit to the United Kingdom that 1050 confirmed N.C.Os. (corporal and up) might be sent forward as reinforcements for their original corps (101). Upon despatch to No. 2 C.B.R.G. they would revert to the status of private soldier, although they could continue to draw their confirmed N.C.O. rate of pay for six months (just as though they were going to an Infantry unit)(see para 414). The Army Commander's concurrence was sought, in a letter of 24 Feb, but it was 27 Mar before a favourable answer reached C.M.H.Q. (102). A further group of 427 N.C.Os. who already had been in a theatre of operations also were available for despatch but, having held N.C.O. rank in a field unit before becoming casualties, they were to be acceptable as such.

665. Following his return to Ottawa Brigadier deLalanne reported to the Adjutant-General that the "basis of computing pools for arms other than Inf may not provide an adequate number of rfts if hostilities continue for any considerable time" and that he had stressed:

... to responsible officers in the UK and in the theatre, the necessity of salvaging for the other arms as many as possible of those whose category does not permit their continuing to serve in the Inf. While there seems to be a feeling overseas that some of the services can be maintained from such wastage, I doubt whether such would be the case as regards various types of skilled trades (103).

Under the existing arrangement officers at C.M.H.Q. were continually watching the output of the reinforcement and training units and comparing it with anticipated requirements. Being much closer to the "user" they were in a much better position to make adjustments. Brigadier deLalanne believed that a considerable number of those despatched overseas for service as infantrymen actually would be used in other corps (104). The Adjutant-General agreed and noted that, although it would take several months to get an altered output from the reinforcement training stream, a small reserve had been built up in Canada, over and above the numbers requested by the Canadian Army Overseas, and this could be drawn upon to fill any unexpected demands.

666. Brigadier deLalannes's suspicion turned out to be correct. With the end of the War in Europe at hand, General



Montague despatched a telegram to the C.G.S. on 3 May estimating the future reinforcement position for all corps except Infantry. At 31 Jul there would be a substantial reserve for C.A.C., small surpluses for R.C.A., R.C. Signals and R.C.E.M.E., possible deficiencies for R.C.E., R.C.A.M.C. and R.C.O.C. and a substantial deficiency for R.C.A.S.C. (105). In an effort to offset this, C.M.H.Q. was going to remuster from Infantry back to their original corps 500 R.C.A.M.C., 150 R.C.E., 600 R.C.A. and 300 Provost personnel. It was also hoped to provide some R.C.E. tradesmen from members of the Canadian Forestry Corps (see para 669).

(v) Victory in Europe

667. On 27 Apr General Montague telegraphed the C.G.S. that no further Infantry other ranks need be despatched overseas (106). There were sufficient reinforcements to replace any wastage which might be incurred until main German resistance collapsed: of course, should there be prolonged further fighting in Norway, the "Southern Redoubt" or other pockets of resistance it might be necessary to modify this conclusion later. All available accommodation in the United Kingdom was filled with reinforcements and the immediate need was the organization of a second Repatriation Depot to handle the increased flow back to Canada of personnel with a long period of overseas service. Infantry reinforcements would be arriving on 13 May\* but, if it were not too late, General Montague suggested that infantrymen be removed from all subsequent drafts (i.e. 21 May and 3 Jun). On the other hand, the Army Commander believed that, in order to meet the needs of the Occupation Force (25,000 all ranks) and ensure that long service men were despatched home within a reasonable period, it would not be sound to cut off completely the flow of reinforcements overseas, even after victory was won (108).

668. This intelligence caused the Minister of National Defence to cancel the departure of further Infantry reinforcements. Only sufficient personnel of other corps would continue to be sent overseas, to maintain a reinforcement pool equal to two months wastage at "intense" rates (109). This action, of course, required the official approval of the Prime Minister who was then at the San Francisco Conference, which was engaged in drawing up a World Security Charter and creating a United Nations Organization. Before leaving for Saskatchewan (27 Apr) to begin his election campaign in Qu'Appelle, General McNaughton also recommended that the May requisition should be cut from 5,000 to 3,000 men and that no requisition need be submitted for June. When the Cabinet met on the afternoon of 1 May General McNaughton's recommendations were given formal approval but it was considered that the May call-ups might be postponed for 8-10 days, pending developments in Europe (110). It was an easy matter to delay the actual mailing of call-up notices. This information was telegraphed to Prime Minister Mackenzie King who agreed: in a return telegram of 4 May Mr King pointed out that resentment might be caused later if any other course were followed and men whose services were never going to be needed were enrolled in the Army (111).

669. The issue really had been settled by a telegram despatched from C.M.H.Q. on the previous day (3 May). Even though it would be difficult to predict when resistance would come to an end, General Montague was "reasonably confident" that the manpower resources needed to finish the campaign already were available (112). Apart from the reinforcement drafts already scheduled to reach the United Kingdom on 13 May, no further quotas need be prepared for despatch overseas. Any tradesmen, specialists or other key men would be asked for specifically (see paras 628 and 666).

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\*On the following day the C.G.S. replied by telegram that infantrymen were being deleted from the draft due to arrive in the United Kingdom on 13 May (107).



670. Although the press was informed on 1 May that there would be an easing of the restrictions on granting postponements it was not until 7 May that the Canadian Government suspended the call-up indefinitely. It remained in force until 15 Aug 46 but, with the German surrender, there was no longer any need to enrol men.

671. The Canadian Army Pacific Force was to have been composed of volunteers only, according to the announcement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons as early as 4 Apr 45, despite the misgivings of General Crerar that insufficient men then serving overseas would volunteer to go to the Far East (113). As soon as possible after the German surrender all officers and other ranks serving in the Canadian Army Overseas were required to complete a Reallocation Questionnaire expressing his or her preference for (114):

- (a) Volunteering for the Canadian Far East Force\*;
- (b) Service with the Canadian Army Occupation Force;
- (c) Reallocation in accordance with individual priorities and the requirements of the service.

By 30 May the following members of the Canadian Army Overseas had volunteered for service in the Far East (115):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
From North-West Europe	1404	14,809
From the United Kingdom	1136	6,955

By 28 Jul the number of those volunteering for service with the Canadian Army Pacific Force had risen to 36,025 all ranks (116). A number of those desiring to make the Army a permanent career had preferred to volunteer for the Canadian Army Occupation Force.

672. The immediate problem was to secure sufficient shipping in order to despatch these C.A.P.F. volunteers to Canada and yet continue the return of men with high personal point scores for repatriation (i.e. men who had been away from their wives and families for periods of five years or more). By 4 Aug a total of 55,485 all ranks (C.A.P.F. volunteers and men with high point scores) had been despatched to Canada (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 177). A week later (11 Aug) General Montague asked for, and received, the consent of N.D.H.Q. to discontinue granting top priority to C.A.P.F. volunteers and to concentrate on the return to Canada of those with the highest point scores, except for "key" personnel such as cooks who were "frozen" in their jobs. Exclusive of this, units now began their return to Canada intact, beginning with those of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.

673. In the meantime, action had been taken in Canada to organize the Canadian Army Pacific Force, even though the response was disappointing. Adventure and extra pay induced a number to offer their services and an indeterminable number of overseas veterans volunteered for the sole purpose of returning home more quickly. With the mobilization of the new 6th Division about to take place, as of 17 Jul, the total number of C.A.P.F. volunteers, in Canada and still overseas, stood at 9943 officers and 68,256 other ranks. Of these, however, only 2796 officers

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\*Title standardized as Canadian Army Pacific Force only on 11 Jun 45.



and 36,386 other ranks were males in the "most select Group" -- suitable for service with an Infantry division. This was more than enough to meet immediate requirements -- 1513 officers and 27,435 other ranks (790 officers and 15,058 other ranks in divisional establishments, 390 officers and 2761 other ranks elsewhere with the force, a small "contingency reserve", and three months reinforcements at American wastage rates). However, estimated requirements for a further eight months of operations totalled 1665 officers and 28,735 other ranks. As had been feared there was a grave deficiency of infantrymen -- 836 officers and 20,775 other ranks out of a total estimated requirement of 1831 officers and 39,114 other ranks (118).

674. With the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Canadian Government decided that its Force would not be needed in the Pacific. It was not until 31 Aug, however, that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed that, since the situation was now "clarified", it was proposed to disband the Canadian Army Pacific Force (119). It only remained to dispose of the 1,963 officers and 22,058 other ranks (1,536 officers and 20,238 other ranks returned from Overseas) who actually had been posted to units of the Canadian Army Pacific Force (120). Having already undertaken a commitment for the first stage of the occupation of Germany a Special Cabinet Committee had recommended (14 Aug) that Canada should not participate in the occupation of Japan.

675. A few individuals managed to work their way back overseas to join the Canadian Army Occupation Force, which had commenced its duties on 11 Jul. Although the requirements of this Force had been estimated as 25,000 all ranks there had been only 6,000 odd volunteers and it always remained considerably less. For example, on 25 Aug the strength of this Force was:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
Volunteers	565	5,595
Detailed to serve	<u>631</u>	<u>13,280</u>
	1196	18,875

Those "detailed to serve" included both personnel with low point scores for repatriation and "key" men who had been compulsorily posted into specialist vacancies even though they had a high enough point score for early repatriation to Canada (see para 672). Over the course of the next few months these last-mentioned personnel were withdrawn from the Force. Since the Canadian Government was not offered a share in the political control of Germany it decided shortly to remove its occupation Army and Air Forces (122). It was not until 15 May 46, however, that command of the Canadian area could be turned over the British Army (123).

676. By this time there remained in the United Kingdom only such Repatriation Depots and units as were required to carry out essential services as long as there were any Canadian troops overseas. On 21 Jan 47 the last large group of Canadian servicemen, about 900 strong, reached Halifax on the S.S. Acquitania which had taken the Headquarters, 1st Canadian Division to the United Kingdom in 1939. On 21 Feb No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot ceased to exist. The job was done.

677. In Canada the Cabinet had decided on the eve of Japanese surrender (10 Aug 45) that there should be the "maximum possible acceleration" of demobilization once hostilities actually came to an end (125). At a meeting on 29 Aug the Defence Committee of the Cabinet decided, however, that personnel of the three Armed Forces could continue to serve anywhere required until 30 Sep 47, on existing pay and allowances pending the formation of permanent forces (126). Those intending to make the Army a career became members of an Interim Force on a probationary basis pending acceptance into a new Canadian Army (Active Force). Not until 30 Sep 47, however, did the Canadian Army



cease being on "active service" and the last of the war time personnel return to civilian life.



CONCLUSION

678. Victory had been achieved. But before that First Canadian Army had been re-united and, because of the vigorous action taken to remedy the shortage of general duty infantrymen in 1944, it had not been necessary to disband any of its divisions. Other Allies had not been so fortunate.

679. Three other belligerent Dominions -- South Africa, New Zealand and Australia -- also possessed dual systems of recruitment: men who had volunteered for service anywhere, including sizable Naval and Air components, and those who had been conscripted into the army for home defence. With only a small European population, including many of Boer descent who were opposed to the conflict, South Africa experienced great difficulty in maintaining troops overseas: after three years of fighting in other parts of Africa it was possible to maintain only the 6th South African Armoured Division in Italy. By the end of 1943 New Zealand was over-extended, with a corps built around the 2nd New Zealand Division in Italy and two brigade groups of a 3rd New Zealand Division engaged in the Solomons. During 1944 the latter were withdrawn and all but cadre personnel despatched as reinforcements to Italy, together with officers and men released from reduced home defences. The volunteer Australian Imperial Forces had lost a division at Singapore and the three divisions in the Middle East had suffered considerable casualties before being brought home. In the South-West Pacific Area they were joined by units of the Australian Military Forces, which contained both volunteers and men who had been conscripted for home defence. The boundaries of Australian home defence had been extended following the entrance of Japan into the war. Even then, manpower shortages forced reorganization downwards, helped by the fact that jungle warfare required divisions with a lower establishment than those which had served in the Middle East.

680. Even with men conscripted for military service anywhere in the world the British and American Armies had to face the fact that manpower was not unlimited and that insufficient soldiers had been trained as general duty infantrymen. Men were remustered from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to the British Army and divisions were disbanded at home and abroad in order to meet the demands for reinforcements. During 1944 infantrymen were taken from units still training in the United States to become overseas replacements and a vigorous remustering programme was carried on both there and in overseas theatres.

681. In every case there also had been the conflicting claims of Navy, Army, Air Force, industry and agriculture for a larger slice of the nation's manpower, creating situations similar to those Canadian problems dealt with already and in the following appendices.

682. This report was compiled by J.M. Hitsman.



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17 Aug 53

MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY  
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

VOLUME TWO

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~~SECRET~~

MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY  
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

APPENDICES



APPENDIX "A" - THE NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT, 1940.

4 GEORGE VI.

CHAP. 13.

An Act to confer certain powers upon the Governor in Council for the mobilization of national resources in the present war.

[Assented to 21st June, 1940.]

WHEREAS by reason of developments since the outbreak of the present war a special emergency has arisen and the national safety of Canada has become endangered; and

Preamble

Whereas it is, therefore, expedient to confer upon the Governor in Council special emergency powers to permit of the mobilization of all of the effective resources of the nation, both human and material, for the purpose of the defence and security of Canada, and

Whereas it is expedient that the said powers should be conferred upon the Governor in Council during the continuation of the state of war now existing:

Therefore His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows:-

1. This Act may be cited as The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940.

Short title.

2. Subject to the provisions of section three hereof, the Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

Special powers of the Governor in Council.

3. The powers conferred by the next preceding section may not be exercised for the purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval or air forces outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof.

Limitation in respect of service overseas.

4. The powers conferred by this Act shall remain in force only during the continuation of the state of war now existing.

Limitation.

5. Every order or regulation passed under the authority of this Act shall be tabled in Parliament forthwith if Parliament is in Session and a copy thereof sent to every member of the House of Commons and of the Senate and if Parliament is not in Session then every such order or regulation shall be forthwith published in the Canada Gazette and copies thereof sent to every Member of the House of Commons and of the Senate forthwith; provided that any of the steps specified in this section may be omitted or deferred if the Governor in Council considers such omission or deferment

Tabling of orders and regulations



necessary in the national interest having regard to the special circumstances.

6. The Governor in Council may prescribe the penalties that may be imposed for violations of orders and regulations made under this Act, and may also prescribe whether such penalties shall be imposed upon summary conviction or upon indictment, but no such penalty shall exceed a fine of five thousand dollars or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five years, or both fine and imprisonment.

Imposing penalties.



APPENDIX "B" - ENLISTMENT AND ENROLMENT OF ALIENS

1. Among the conditions of enlistment in the Canadian Active Service Force in September 1939 was one whereby men who were not British subjects by birth were required to produce evidence that they had become so by naturalization (1). Inquiries, and attempts to enlist, by citizens of the United States of America, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and others, but resident in North America, having become numerous, a small Interdepartmental Committee was set up to study the question (2). On 10 Nov this Committee recommended that the ban on the enlistment of Aliens into the C.A.S.F. should be removed (with adequate safeguards) (3). Approval having been obtained from the Minister of National Defence steps were taken to amend King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (4). It was not until 13 Dec, however, that the Adjutant-General was able to issue the following change of policy regarding the enlistment of aliens:

... vide amendments to K.R. (Can) 145 (I) and 287, promulgated by G.O. 239 of 1939, the appointment to commissions or enlistment of personnel of other than British nationality is authorized with the proviso that this privilege is confined to aliens of nationalities other than enemy who were resident of Canada on the 1st September, 1939.

In view of the above ... applicants for enlistment who fall in the above category may now be accepted in the C.A.S.F. but it will be necessary to establish the bona fides of each applicant prior to appointment or enlistment (5).

2. On 18 May 40, the Canadian Minister in Washington advised Prime Minister King by telegram that (according to a message from the "highest quarter") the United States Government would not be embarrassed by the enlistment in Canada, of its citizens who had proceeded there for such a purpose, if it was understood that United States citizens would be required to take merely an Oath of Obedience and not that of Allegiance (6). This led to a further formal change in Canadian policy. Order in Council P.C. 3294 of 20 Jul 40 authorized the enlistment of Aliens other than enemy without taking the oath of allegiance "if, by so doing, that person would, under the laws of the country in question, forfeit his citizenship therein". Until this time such foreign nationals had lost their citizenship upon joining the Canadian Armed Forces.

3. The serious course taken by the War during the late spring and early summer of 1940 resulted in a decision that Canadian citizens of German and Italian racial origin, naturalized subsequent to 1 Sep 29, should not be permitted to enlist in the C.A.S.F. or N.P.A.M. unless they were in possession of a Certificate of Exemption issued by the R.C.M.P. This policy was set forth in a circular letter, signed by the Adjutant-General on 11 Jul 40 (7).

4. Although it had been specifically laid down in Section 4(1) of the National War Services Regulations, 1940, (Recruits) that only British subjects should be called for compulsory military training, it was discovered later that a number of Aliens had been ordered to report during 1941 and were serving either as 'R' recruits or Members (H.D.) of the Canadian Army (8). It would appear that Divisional Registrars had been presuming that all young men who reported for military training



were British subjects (9). However, on 22 Jan 42 the Adjutant-General issued a circular letter directing that such Enemy Aliens\* should be discharged when found, since "quite apart from the fact that such persons are ineligible for compulsory military training, the inherent danger resulting from their presence in the Armed Forces is obvious" (11). Although not eligible for enlistment in the Canadian Army (Active or Reserve) unless they possessed a Certificate of Exemption issued by the R.C.M.P. British subjects of Italian or German origin naturalized subsequent to 1 Sep 29 were liable for compulsory military training. It could be assumed that the majority were loyal to the country of their adoption, but they were to be closely watched by their Commanding Officers and any evidence of subversive activities reported to N.D.F.C. On completion of training such men were not to be posted to coast defence units and were to be employed on duties which gave little opportunity for subversive activities.

5. Mention should be made of the organization of contingents by certain Allied Nations which had set up Military Missions in Canada. The Interdepartmental Committee set up in October 1939 to study the question of enlisting Aliens had recommended that the French, Polish and Czechoslovakian authorities should be permitted to recruit their own Nationals, resident in Canada or elsewhere, as long as there was no interference with enlisting men for the C.A.S.F.; it was recommended, however, that any such Military Missions in Canada should take no action to recruit within the United States of America (12). During the winter months of 1940 the Polish Consul-General in Ottawa carried on negotiations with the Canadian Government departments concerned in an effort to obtain permission for the enlistment nationals in Canada and their concentration at an eastern port, prior to despatch to join the Polish Army then in France (13). Decision was delayed as a result of the uncertain military situation during May - June 1940. Subsequently it was realized that, if men were enlisted, they would have to be given basic military training in Canada as the troops already in the United Kingdom were busy preparing to face a possible invasion (14). In addition to finding a suitable permanent camp for the Polish Army there was the question of releasing additional funds for use by the Polish Military authorities, since the Canadian Government had no intention of assuming any responsibility, financial or otherwise, for any Foreign Force which might recruit in Canada.

6. On 22 Aug 40 the Canadian Government granted approval to a Netherlands' request that its nationals resident in Canada, of an age and category fit for military service, might be enlisted into the Dutch forces. On 28 Oct 40 a similar request from the Belgian Minister to Canada was granted (15). Nationals of these countries (born between 1900 and 1920) were requested to register with their Military Mission. Most European Governments adhered to the view that their nationals could be conscripted for military service irrespective of their place of residence. On the other hand, the Canadian Government considered that residence should determine liability to military service, although at this time only British subjects were liable for compulsory military training. Thus, in practice, foreign nationals had to volunteer for military service before they could be enlisted by the Military Mission of their country of birth. Since the Belgian and Netherlands Governments-in-Exile retained control of their overseas possessions, and resulting revenue, they were in a better financial position than other Military Missions in Canada to begin recruiting and training.

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\*It should be mentioned that all Enemy Aliens resident in Canada had been required to register with the R.C.M.P., be fingerprinted and report monthly to the nearest Registrar of Enemy Aliens, unless granted a Certificate of Exemption or interned (10).



7. The Foreign Forces Order, 1941, issued as Order in Council P.C. 2546 of 15 Apr 41, legalized the activities of the Military Missions of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Republic, The Netherlands, Norway and Poland. Subsequently the Free French Government, Yugoslavia and the United States were added to the list. Although the U.S.S.R. had become an unwilling belligerent and ally in June 1941 it was some time before a Military Mission was established in Canada and no attempt was made to have its nationals serve in the Soviet Armed Forces.

8. On 7 Apr 41 instructions had been issued that nationals of these countries would not be allowed to volunteer for service in the Canadian Army once they had received a notice instructing them to report for service in the Military Force of their native land (16). This was modified, however, by Canadian Army Routine Order 1341 of 1 Oct 41, which specified that Nationals of such countries mentioned above were not to be enlisted in the Canadian Army until their cases had been considered by the authorities of the respective Military Mission in Canada. This was further amended by Routine Order 1976 of 20 May 42 which specified that Nationals of the countries mentioned above were not to be enlisted in the Canadian Army without prior reference to N.D.H.Q., in order that the approval of the particular Military Mission might, or might not, be obtained. Conditions of service in Foreign Forces were set out in this order as follows:

- (a) Canadian nationals and British subjects are permitted to enlist in the armed forces of the countries mentioned only when such nationals are by reason of their racial origin or their defective knowledge of the English or French language likely to make more efficient soldiers in the common cause in the ranks of the forces of those countries than in the Canadian Army.
- (b) Canadian nationals, British subjects or foreign persons residing in Canada cannot be compelled to join the Armed Forces of the countries in question.
- (c) The Canadian Government accepts no responsibility for pay, allowances, transportation, quarters, hospitalization, medical treatment, while the men are so serving in the armed forces of the countries mentioned, or for such pensions or other similar indemnity to those who may join such forces.
- (d) Discharges to the effect of enlisting in the aforementioned foreign forces shall only be granted so long as such discharges will not adversely affect the Canadian military effort.

Routine Order 1976 was cancelled and replaced, on 20 Apr 43, by a similar Routine Order No. 3120. A further minor amendment of 2 Oct 43 (R.O. 3683) enabled Canadian Nationals and British subjects of dual nationality or former Nationals of a country maintaining a Military Mission in Canada to join the Armed Forces of that country if they so desired. Recruiting for the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Armed Forces was cancelled by Routine Order 4812 of 23 Aug 44.

9. Apart from recruiting Nationals who were residents



of Canada these Military Missions enlisted a considerable number of men who were residents of the United States of America, islands of the West Indies and Latin America. The following table of total enlistments in Foreign Forces to the beginning of 1944 shows (17):

	<u>Residents of Canada</u>	<u>Total Recruited</u>
Belgium	160	416
Poland	203	1097
Norway	93	117
France	72	161
Czechoslovakia	155	197
Yugoslavia	12	13
The Netherlands	416	1175

Unfortunately, since these men did not belong to the Canadian Army, a complete record of the total enlistments in such Foreign Forces is not available. By early 1944, however, the majority of those who were to serve in 21st Army Group with the 1st Polish Armoured Division, 1st Belgian Infantry Brigade, Royal Netherlands Brigade (Princess Irene's) and the Czech Independent Armoured Brigade Group already had been despatched to the United Kingdom. Subsequent enlistments for these Foreign Forces were handled through Canadian Army District Depots and the individuals despatched overseas after training. Unlike the First World War, the United States did not permit the enlistment of foreign Nationals by their own Military Missions but insisted that they come under Selective Service regulations. (Although all males had to register, only those Aliens who declared their intention of becoming citizens of the United States were liable for military service under the original provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 16 Sep 40.) (18) This dissipated the hopes of Military Missions in Canada that large forces might be raised and trained there.

10. Once the United States became an active belligerent it was pointless for American citizens to enlist in the Canadian Forces. Early negotiations to arrange for the voluntary transfer of the 10,000 odd Americans believed to be wearing Canadian uniforms (roughly half in the R.C.A.F.) to the United States Army, Navy or Marine Corps were followed by a conference at Ottawa, 24-25 Feb 42 (19). Agreement was reached, and formalized, by an exchange of notes between the two governments on 18 and 20 Mar 42 (20). During the period 6 May - 2 Jun 42 a Joint Canadian and United States Board travelled across Canada by special train interviewing those Americans who had applied, before a closing date of 31 Mar, for transfer to the Armed Forces of their own nation. The American members interviewed 316 applicants, rejecting 46; a further 37 had withdrawn their applications and 49 had been unable to appear at that time (21). Those Americans serving with the Canadian Army Overseas were given until 6 May to apply for similar repatriation (22). That the number was not larger at this time may be attributed to the fact that many had become attached to their Canadian units; others found that the financial benefits offered by the U.S. Government for dependents were less than those already being received (23).

11. On 1 Aug 42 a consolidated instruction regarding the enlistment of Aliens into the Canadian Army was sent to all District Officers Commanding. Exceptions to previous regulations included the following:

- (a) Alien nationals of allied or neutral countries who took up residence in Canada after September 1st, 1939, in special cases may be enlisted after due investigation, recommendation by the D.O.C., and authorization by N.D.H.Q.



- (b) Citizens of the U.S.A. resident in the United States will not be enlisted except with the consent of the United States Army, Navy, or Selective Service Administrator.
- (c) Nationals of such of the United Nations as have Military Missions carrying on recruiting in Canada will not be accepted for enlistment without reference to N.D.H.Q. for consultation with the Foreign Missions concerned (24).

Citizens of the United States of America resident in Canada could, however, still be enlisted in the Canadian Forces. Former Nationals of Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and any other nation with which Canada later might be at War, naturalized in Canada subsequent to 1 Sep 29, would not be enlisted in the Canadian Army without an individual Certificate of Exemption from the R.C.M.P. and approval from N.D.P.Q. Persons sent to Canada by the British Government for maintenance or surveillance in Refugee Camps would not be enlisted. Persons of Japanese racial origin would not be enlisted without prior approval of N.D.H.Q.\* In conclusion it was pointed out that:

... Nationals of some countries, with which we are now at war, have been enlisted in the Canadian Army prior to the beginning of the state of war existing with those countries. Where it is undesirable that these Nationals, or any other Aliens or persons of Alien origin, should be retained in the Army, a report and recommendation by the District Officer Commanding concerning discharge in each individual case will be forwarded to National Defence Headquarters for decision (26).

12. The Canadian Government's naturalization policy underwent a change with the promulgation of Order in Council P.C. 5842 of 9 Jul 42. Henceforth Aliens then serving, or who might thereafter serve, with the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada could become naturalized by supplying the Secretary of State with documentary evidence that they were "fit and proper" persons to be naturalized in Canada as British subjects. Such Aliens were required to make a Declaration of Intention to become a British subject at least one year, and not more than seven years, prior to his applying for naturalization. The Order in Council pointed out, however, that:

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\*The Cabinet War Committee had agreed during the autumn of 1940 that Canadians of Asiatic racial origin should not be liable for compulsory military training but should be asked to make their contribution in some other way. There was nothing to prevent Canadians of Asiatic origin (except Japanese) from enlisting for general service. Until 22 Nov 41, however, the Government of British Columbia objected to voluntary enlistment of Japanese on the grounds that such might prejudice the question of enfranchisement after the War. Japan's subsequent entry into the War re-affirmed the view that men of Japanese racial origin should not be enlisted in the Canadian Army. Order in Council P.C. 1348 of 19 Feb 42 authorized the establishment of work camps for male enemy Aliens, including Japanese nationals, who had been removed from their homes in British Columbia. This took the place of the original proposal that the Department of National Defence should administer Labour battalions composed of Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin (25).



Any Alien who applies for exemption from military training, service or duty, on the ground that he is a citizen or subject of another country shall be barred from applying for or receiving a certificate of naturalization under the Naturalization Act or under these regulations.

In this connection it might be well to note that a Declarant Alien was one who either had filed an application for Naturalization or had as yet merely made a Declaration of Intention to do so; a Non-Declarant Alien was one who had expressed no desire to become a Canadian citizen.

13. With the appearance of National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) (Consolidation 1942) on 16 Sep 42 all Declarant Aliens became liable legally for compulsory military training (27). Hitherto, questions of military security had made the Canadian Army reluctant to absorb any Aliens who might engage in subversive activities and there was the further need to adhere to British policy since the Canadian Army Overseas was stationed in the United Kingdom (28). Originally the British Army had accepted Aliens of neutral countries into any corps, whereas citizens of enemy states could be enlisted only into the Pioneer Corps for home service, even though they were political refugees. As time went on the restrictions against the latter were relaxed somewhat, after close screening, and doctors and technicians were enabled to serve in their proper roles (29).

14. The matter was brought to a head on 24 Nov 42, when the Minister of Labour wrote the Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee requesting that the existing authority to call up Aliens for military training should be exercised (30). He suggested that Labour units might be formed within the Canadian Army, or, if N.D.P.Q. balked at handling such a project, they could be formed directly under the administration of the Department of Labour.

15. On the same day a meeting of Army and National War Services representatives was held to discuss certain practical aspects of the call-up of Aliens for compulsory military training. It was estimated that there were in the neighborhood of 26,000 unmarried Aliens of call-up age residing in Canada. After subtracting the Germans, Finns, Hungarians, Italians, Roumanians and Asiatics, whom it was not desired to call up, and the citizens of the United States already subject to Selective Service in their own country, it was considered that there would be only approximately 14,000 available. Wastage from enlistment, declaration of Alienship and medical rejection would further reduce this number to 3000-4000. After postponements had been granted to men in essential civilian occupations there would be only about 2500 men available for military service (31).

16. Most of the Allied Governments governed by the Foreign Forces Order, 1941 had objected to such a step, when queried by the Canadian Government but the Cabinet War Committee decided to go ahead anyway (32). It was pointed out that Nationals of such Allied countries would have the right to opt for service in their own Forces, or volunteer for general service in the Canadian Army, and be encouraged to do so.

17. In the case of the United States of America a special agreement had been effected, on 30 Sep 42, by the two governments so that American citizens who had expressed no desire or intention of becoming Canadians could enlist in the United States Army; upon being called for medical examination in Canada they were given the option of returning home to enlist (33). Details of the procedure employed are outlined in National Selective Service Memoranda 42 and 43, dated 8 and 15 Apr respectively (34). Since the spring of 1942 Army Enlistment Centres in



American cities had carried on liaison with state and local Draft Boards so that Canadian citizens, resident in the United States and liable for Selective Service, could opt for volunteer or N.R.M.A. service in the Canadian Army. At one time or another Canadian Army Enlistment Centres existed in Detroit, Seattle, St. Paul, Boston, Bangor, Buffalo and New York; as of 25 May 44 some 439 non-declarant Canadians resident in the United States had been enlisted in the Canadian Army while others had been passed on to recruiting authorities in Canada for attestation (35).

18. A C.M.H.Q. telegram of 6 Feb 43 pointed out that "any further despatch of enemy Aliens overseas would be undesirable" and requested information as to future policy. Those already overseas had been screened and, if considered unsatisfactory, reposted to general pioneer companies or reinforcement units for return to Canada (36). Reply from N.D.H.Q. was delayed until 12 Mar at which time C.M.H.Q. was informed that no further enemy Aliens were being enlisted and that those already in the Army would be retained in Canada (37).

19. It was not until 12 Jul 43, however, that the Adjutant-General issued a further letter on the enlistment or enrolment of Aliens and British subjects of foreign origin in the Canadian Army (cancelling the previous instruction of 1 Aug 42). Nationals of enemy countries would not be enlisted in the Active or Reserve Army or called up for service under N.R.M.A. unless they had made a Declaration of Intention, as provided by Order in Council P.C. 5842 of 9 Jul 42, and had been reported upon favourably (38). Anyone born in an enemy country or of former enemy nationality (except Japanese) but naturalized at any time prior to enlistment or enrolment was eligible for service as a volunteer or liable for service as an N.R.M.A. soldier. They were subject to investigation on security grounds, however, and, if considered undesirable, would be discharged. Personnel of Japanese racial origin were not to be enrolled for service under N.R.M.A.: they might be enlisted into the Active Army only where required for special employment, e.g. interpreters. Refugees, whether released from Refugee Camps or still inmates, were not eligible for service in any form.

20. Aliens of countries which remained neutral could avoid military service by making a statutory declaration, when called for medical examination, that they were nationals of a neutral country and not British subjects. If they did so, however, it was in the full knowledge that they could never hope to become naturalized British subjects in Canada and that they would become liable for deportation whenever that became possible. Those who did not complete such a Declaration within a specified time were subject to call-up, with the exception of Chinese and other Asiatics (40). These latter were mainly rice eaters, or nourished by diets other than that fed to the Canadian Army. Differences in dress, resulting from religious practices, was a further reason for excepting East Indians, Sikhs and Hindus. There was nothing, however, to prevent such Aliens from volunteering for general service in the Canadian Army, even though their names had to be referred to N.D.H.Q. first (41). In the case of Mexico, the two governments concluded a bilateral agreement whereby Nationals of one, resident in the other, would be given two months warning in which to wind up their business affairs, obtain an exit permit and return to their own country for military service (42).

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\*The desire of young Japanese-Canadians to enlist for active service, and repeated requests by the Deputy Minister of Labour that they should be enrolled under N.R.M.A. or formed into Labour units, led to the problem being thoroughly investigated at N.D.H.Q. during the spring and summer of 1943. Due to the comparatively small numbers involved, which would complicate training, and raise additional problems of morale and security, it was decided that there could be no general enlistment; a few individuals might continue to be enlisted on the authority of N.D.H.Q. to to serve as interpreters or other specialists (39).



21. A further instruction of 23 Jul 43 related to the employment of all Aliens, Allied, Neutral or Enemy, and Naturalized Subjects of enemy origin. When enlisted, or enrolled, Allied Aliens (except citizens of the United States of America) would be vetted and, if found suitable from a security standpoint, allowed to serve in any location, including overseas, with the exception of "Most Secret" assignments such as Radar, cipher and other confidential headquarters' jobs and "sensitive" units which were classified as Signals, paratroops, Experimental Station at Suffield, chemical warfare, coast and anti-aircraft artillery, camouflage and R.C.O.C. sub-units handling ammunition and secret equipment (43). Neutral Aliens and naturalized British subjects of enemy origin would be vetted, when called up or enlisted, and would be allowed to serve anywhere in "non-sensitive" units. When called up, all enemy Aliens (Declarant) would be vetted: they would be restricted to service in Canada in non-sensitive units and, in no circumstances, would they be permitted to proceed overseas. Instructions already had been issued as to how the documents of all Aliens should be marked (44):

- I "NON-SENSITIVE"  
Anywhere including overseas.
- II "NON-SENSITIVE"  
Canada only.
- III "NON-SENSITIVE"  
Canada exclusive of Atlantic  
and Pacific Commands
- IV "NON-SENSITIVE"  
Canada exclusive of Atlantic  
Command.
- V "NON-SENSITIVE"  
Canada exclusive of Pacific  
Command.

Soldiers suspected of disloyal tendencies, but against whom there was insufficient evidence for internment, were restricted to service in Works Companies.

22. The above instructions (12 and 23 Jul) were replaced by a consolidated letter dated 30 Nov, including certain minor amendments of policy made necessary by changing war conditions (45). Nationals of Russia, Greece and any other of the United Nations not maintaining a Military Mission in Canada were acceptable for enlistment or enrolment in the Canadian Army. Nationals of Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — overrun without a fight — were to be classified with Neutral Aliens for purposes of enlistment. All Allied Aliens, with the exception of male citizens of the United States of America, were to be subject to investigation and fingerprinting (by the R.C.M.P.) following enlistment or enrolment. A new classification "RESTRICTED" — Not to serve in the "Most Secret" duties — was added. Service in Canada was now specified as including duty in all parts of the North American Area where N.R.M.A. personnel might be despatched: e.g. Newfoundland (including Labrador), Bermuda, Bahamas (B.W.I.), Jamaica (B.W.I.), British Guiana and the United States of America (including Alaska).

23. Among amendments made during 1944 was one whereby persons of Chinese racial origin, other than Chinese nationals, might be enrolled under the provisions of N.R.M.A. (46).

24. Although no further major change in policy was made the Canadian Government's decision of 23 Nov 44 to despatch overseas up to 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers as infantry reinforcements did affect the Alien question. In order to save time it was agreed on 13 Dec that the Military Missions should merely be



informed from time to time that certain of their Nationals had been despatched to join the Canadian Army Overseas (47).

25. On 4 Dec the D.C.G.S.(C) had agreed to a suggestion by D.M.I. that restrictions upon the service of Enemy Aliens in the Canadian Army might be relaxed if the various authorities concerned were agreeable (48). The Immigration Branches of the Department of Mines and Resources and of the Secretary of State's Department raised no objection and a C.M.H.Q. telegram of 6 Jan 45 stated that the War Office had agreed to Enemy Aliens being sent overseas as reinforcements for the Canadian Army, provided that each case was individually investigated and cleared and that they should serve only in a "non-sensitive" unit" (49). The D.D.M.I. considered that there should be between 400 and 500 Enemy Aliens and Refugees who might be despatched overseas after their records had been individually checked (50). As groups of individuals were re-vetted in Canada their names were despatched to C.M.H.Q. so that a further check could be made overseas before the men actually were allowed to sail. Policy was not officially amended, however, since it might be desired to retain certain Enemy Aliens in Canada because they merely were suspected of being disloyal or had close relatives living in enemy territory<sup>61</sup>

26. Department of Labour statistics show that, during the time the Mobilization Regulations were in effect, some 6709 non-declarant Enemy Aliens and 156 declarant neutral Aliens were excepted from compulsory military training; 38 employees in Canada of foreign governments also were excepted (52).

27. Records compiled by the Department of National Defence show that 618,354 of the 730,625 personnel who served at one time or another in the Canadian Army were born in Canada (53). This figure includes men and women, officers and other ranks, volunteers and N.R.M.A. soldiers. Of the remainder 71,276 were British subjects born in other parts of the British Empire. Another 19,068 had been born in the United States of America, while 220 came from other American republics. The following personnel were born in countries which were fighting against the United Nations during the Second World War:

Germany.....	938
Austria.....	574
Finland.....	485
Rumania.....	839
Bulgaria.....	32
Hungary.....	1229
Japan.....	55
Italy.....	1003

28. Since the following list of countries carried on recruiting for their own Armed Forces in Canada it is very likely that the majority of the following individuals had either become nationalized citizens or very firmly attached to their surroundings; or they may have considered that rates of pay or conditions of service would be better in the Canadian Army:

Belgium.....	421
Czechoslovakia.....	1378
The Netherlands.....	574
Norway.....	1098
Poland.....	5144
Yugoslavia.....	(not shown)

Of the other large groups claiming Europe as a birth place there were 2580 from the U.S.S.R. and 1150 from Denmark. Of the 354 members of the Canadian Army born in Asiatic countries there were 225 Chinese, 10 from Siberia, 55 Japs and 64 others. A further 29 were born in African countries (other than British) while 1474 individuals did not state their place of birth.



29. The manpower situation had changed greatly since the First Great War when only 318,728 of the 619,636 men who enlisted in the C.E.F. had been born in Canada. The era of mass immigration had drawn to an end in the early twenties and a Canadian people had emerged.



APPENDIX "C" - TABLE SHOWING CHANGES IN QUOTA FOR % OF NEW INTAKE  
(Enlistments for General Service to be Allocated to Infantry)

JUN 1942 to OCT 1944

<u>Effective Dates</u>	<u>%</u>
18 JUN 42	19
31 AUG 42	21
19 SEP 42	40
17 APR 43	45
31 MAY 43	(a) 40 (b) 55
26 AUG 43	(aa) 40 (b) 50
26 JAN 44	(c) 50
28 APR 44	(c) 68
23 SEP 44	(c) 78

(a) - Pacific Comd, Petawawa, Borden, MD's 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13.

(aa) - Pacific Comd, MD's 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13.

(b) - MD's 4, 5, 6, 7.

(c) - Includes provision for PARA.

NOTES: In addition to the above intake quotas, the following changes were effected with regard to Infantry situation:

- 1 - Commencing AUG 42, withdrawals of General Service personnel from Infantry Units in Canada and despatch of certain Infantry Units Overseas.
- 2 - Commencing OCT 43, remustering of General Service personnel in Artillery to Infantry.
- 3 - Conversion of personnel from NRMA to General Service Infantry, wherever feasible.
- 4 - Where available, PARA also being taken from other Corps.

H.Q.S. 9011-15-1 (DAG (A))

19 NOV 44



APPENDIX "D" - ORDERS IN COUNCIL

EMPLOYMENT OF NRMA PERSONNEL

<u>Order</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
PC 4105	15 May 42	For service and duty in the United States in connection with receiving, guarding and escorting to Internment Camps in Canada of prisoners of war.
PC 7995	4 Sep 42	LA Defence of the Territory of Alaska.
PC 8347	14 Sep 42	For duty with Regiments stationed in Newfoundland (including Labrador).
PC 10003	3 Nov 42	Duty, etc in the United States.
PC 11159	8 Dec 42	Posting to Artillery Units serving in Newfoundland and Labrador.
PC 11346	16 Dec 42	On strength regiments being despatched to Newfoundland (including Labrador).
PC 362	19 Jan 43	Posting for duty with hospitals and units of the RCAMC in Newfoundland (including Labrador).
PC 907	5 Feb 43	Reinforcing formations and units of the RC Sigs, RCE, RCASC, RCAMC and RCOG serving in Newfoundland and Labrador.
PC 2003	12 Mar 43	Permits despatch to Newfoundland (including Labrador) personnel who are, or may be on the strength of, or attached to, or may from time to time be required for training, service or duty with Infantry Units serving in, or which may be despatched to, Newfoundland (including Labrador).
PC 3238	20 Apr 43	Despatch to Alaska for duty with Artillery and Infantry units.
PC 5011	18 Jun 43	Despatch to Alaska (including Aleutian Islands and other US islands adjacent thereto).
PC 6296	11 Aug 43	Service with any Active Units serving in Newfoundland (including Labrador) Bermuda, Bahamas (B.W.I.), Jamaica (B.W.I.), British Guiana, Alaska and the U.S.A.
PC 6901	31 Aug 43	May be sent to Newfoundland (including Labrador), Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, British Guiana, Alaska and U.S.A. even if not on strength of an Active Army Unit.
PC 8891	23 Nov 44	Authorizes despatch to the UK, European and Mediterranean theatres of War.



APPENDIX "E" - N.R.M.A. DRAFT DODGERS  
AND DESERTERS

1. From the outset penalties had been prescribed for failure to comply with National War Service Regulations concerning liability for 30-day compulsory training. For example, failure to report within a specified time for medical examination, for further medical examination, or for training, carried with it the penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than \$25 and not exceeding \$200, or to both such imprisonment and fine (54). Penalties also were prescribed for those who tried to render themselves medically unfit or to influence an examining physician with a view to obtaining a low medical category, physicians who knowingly made inaccurate statements in connection with medical examinations and those who impeded or nullified the operation of these regulations. The general practice, however, was for Registrars to exhort or persuade those apprehended to report voluntarily as previously instructed. If the men reported immediately they became in good standing: only if they still refused were they taken to court (55).

2. Offsetting this was the liberal policy of granting postponements. According to a statement later made by the Minister of National War Services to the House of Commons some 49,103 men had sought postponement from the inception of the four months training plan to 12 Mar 42 and 36,111 applications had been granted (56). Those granted postponement included university students, essential industrial workers, farmers, fishermen, lumbermen and conscientious objectors.

3. Moreover, a chart compiled at N.D.H.Q. for the period 20 Mar 41 - 16 Apr 43 (see page 304) showed that only 126,963 of the 988,475 men ordered to report for medical examination had actually donned a uniform as N.R.M.A. soldiers. Less than two-thirds of those sent Orders-Medical Examination (608,642) actually were examined and, due to general practitioners misinterpreting the Army's medical standards, a number of fit and borderline cases were rejected; 190,550 were granted postponement and Orders-Military Training sent to 289,544; 160,662 reported for military training and only 126,963 were found acceptable by R.C.A.M.C. doctors. About 12 per cent of the men called had been enrolled in the Canadian Army (57).

4. In a further effort to find additional men in the classes already subject to compulsory military training a proclamation of 15 Dec 42 required the compulsory re-registration of men who, although designated by proclamation, had not yet been served with an Order-Medical Examination. Such men were to complete a form known as "Schedule C" and deliver it either to the Divisional Registrar or local postmaster. Re-registration proved to be slow and was extended, from 1 Feb 43 to 15 Mar 43 and finally to 10 Jan 44. A total of 146,100 registrations was received (139,517 by 15 Mar 43) but one of the unexpected results was the large number of men in "good standing" who completed the form unnecessarily (58). Whereas a considerable number of men had managed to avoid running foul of the law previously by merely failing to register, such neglect now became a punishable offence.

5. In practice, however, it still remained comparatively easy to avoid, or at least delay, compulsory military service by the simple expedient of changing one's place of residence without notifying the Divisional Registrar of the new address.

6. The following two letters help to explain the situation. The first, written by the Adjutant-General to Mr Ralston on 22 Jun 43, described the Divisional Registrars then meeting in Ottawa as being, with very few exceptions, elderly men



SUMMARY OF MOBILIZATION STATISTICS.  
 March 20, 1941 through April 16, 1943 (the 4th  
 through the 23rd Regular Military Training Periods  
 including the first eight Supplementary Requisitions).

Administrative Divisions	MEDICAL EXAMINATION		POSTPONEMENT		MILITARY TRAINING		
	Number Called	Number Examined	Number Requested	Number Granted	Number Called	Number Reported	Number Accepted
"A" London, Ont.	74,578	43,479	16,522	16,241	18,636	12,466	9,436
"B" Toronto, Ont.	189,205	100,747	40,677	30,616	54,460	30,013	22,658
"C" Kingston, Ont.	60,008	38,594	20,735	19,351	17,096	7,766	6,238
"D" Port Arthur, Ont.	12,189	7,479	1,974	1,759	4,271	3,159	2,297
"E" Montreal, P.Q.	210,245	140,508	47,499	39,178	69,450	32,116	25,934
"F" Quebec, P.Q.	107,883	63,346	25,248	17,732	20,524	13,225	10,846
"G" Halifax, N.S.	43,113	29,172	9,780	7,496	14,826	10,830	7,662
"H" Saint John, N.B.	33,303	21,743	5,465	5,173	10,666	7,909	5,825
"I" Charlottetown, P.E.I.	8,167	5,061	3,107	2,668	2,891	1,733	1,255
"J" Winnipeg, Man.	67,394	43,754	14,303	11,772	15,340	9,904	7,916
"K" Vancouver, B.C.	72,147	46,394	20,938	18,408	23,741	10,856	9,222
"M" Regina, Sask.	69,000	38,956	18,126	11,829	20,729	11,396	9,975
"N" Edmonton, Alta.	<u>41,243</u>	<u>29,409</u>	<u>8,850</u>	<u>8,327</u>	<u>16,914</u>	<u>9,194</u>	<u>7,699</u>
Total	988,475	608,642	233,224	190,550	289,544	160,662	126,963



who were:

... not very alive, yet exhibiting a co-operative and friendly disposition throughout the conference.... A large number ... were ex-servicemen....

From discussions it was evident that the registrars needed guidance, and although willing and anxious to help they lacked drive, initiative, and direction.

It is apparent that the executive administration at National Selective Service Headquarters is weak. Otherwise there would be supervision and inspection to ensure that each registrar thoroughly understands the rules and regulations covering procedure (59).

The second, written by the Minister of Labour to Mr Ralston on 12 Nov 43, pointed out:

In the earlier period sufficient importance was not given by Registrars to the need of having an adequate staff to keep their records up to date.

In 1942-43 it was found necessary to do a lot of work which should have been done in 1940-41. In the meantime a back-log of work in the matter of tracing had accumulated which has made the work of 1943 very difficult (60).

7. Even though it had not yet been officially admitted there were a goodly number of men who waited until they received their Order-Medical Examination or Order-Military Training before they rushed to enlist in the Service of their choice, which was very often the R.C.A.F. or Navy, without notifying the District Registrar. Beginning with January 1942 Recruiting Officers (of each of the Armed Forces) supplied the D.O.C's. representative with a list of those who enlisted: these were passed to Divisional Registrars so that their records, compiled after the National Registration of 1940, could be amended (61). In cases where a man already was in uniform when he received an Order-Medical Examination the onus was on him to inform the District Registrar of that fact, or have his unit orderly room do so. When such notices were ignored, however, the man's name remained on the Registrar's list, occasionally leading to unfortunate incidents. One such case brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defence involved bereaved parents who had received a call-up notice some months after their son, an R.C.A.F. sergeant, had been killed in action. This man had enlisted in September 1940, following the National Registration, and proceeded overseas a year later (62).

8. On 23 Jun 42, a chart had been tabled in the House of Commons, showing the number of men who had not received Orders-Medical Examination, those already prosecuted and those under investigation during the period 1 Jan-15 Mar 43 (63):



Adminis- trative Divisions	Number of men not having received Notice- Medical	Cases prose- cuted for non- compli- ance			Number of cases police are tracing
		Won	Lost	Total	
"A" London	6,174	44	5	49	1,200
"B" Toronto	24,994	61	3	64	1,215
"C" Kingston	4,399	17	0	17	733
"D" Port Arthur	4,373	9	0	9	10
"E" Montreal	23,741	570	4	574	2,613
"F" Quebec	13,507	219	1	220	5,200
"G" Halifax	9,575	15	3	18	485
"H" Saint John	1,302	25	1	26	1,148
"I" Charlottetown	593	0	0	0	27
"J" Winnipeg	10,181	141	1	142	504
"K" Vancouver	12,566	67	3	70	64
"M" Regina	24,281	61	0	61	233
"N" Edmonton	9,287	97	4	101	1,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>144,973</b>	<b>1,326</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>1,351</b>	<b>14,932</b>

As well as the small number of prosecutions for evading either military service or alternate work service (open to conscientious objectors), there was the question of uneven penalties being handed out to those successfully prosecuted. During the House of Commons debate on "War Appropriation - Labour" (29 Jun) the Member for Red Deer, Alberta (Mr. F.D. Shaw) spoke of such prosecutions as follows:

... During the course of my investigations I examined the records with respect to those who have been apprehended and prosecuted for failure to report for military service or alternate work service, and I am utterly appalled when I consider what has taken place in the various divisions with respect to these prosecutions. The absolute leniency shown in some divisions - for example, a one dollar fine - leads me to the conclusion that it is no wonder the individual does not care what may happen to him if he fails to report (64).

9. As pointed out to Mr Ralston in an earlier memorandum the enforcement of N.R.M.A. regulations had been good in the provinces where the R.C.M.P. served as provincial police. Certain other police forces did not have the personnel to deal adequately with draft-dodgers and in Quebec neither the provincial nor municipal police had been helpful (65).

10. Unless an Order-Medical Examination or an Order Military Training was returned, marked undelivered, it was presumed to have been received. According to National Selective Service Regulations it then became the responsibility of the individual to establish that he had complied with the several provisions of the Mobilization Regulations before he could be given a permit for civilian work. Furthermore:

Every Selective Service Officer, Inspector, etc., authorized by the Minister to act for the purpose of enforcing the Civilian Regulations may enter any premises where he has reasonable grounds for supposing that any person is employed, investigate such premises and person and every person who



contravenes any of the provisions is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of \$500. or twelve months, or both if an individual, and to a fine of \$2500. if a corporation (66).

Each Administrative Division had a tracing department which turned over to the R.C.M.P. the names of all men who did not reply to the Orders which had been delivered. In the event that the Post Office\* was unable to trace the individual's current address the Registrar might turn his name over to the Hooper-Holmes Bureau of Toronto, which had been authorized by Order in Council P.C. 2278 of 22 Mar 43 to locate missing men for a fee of \$2.50 per case when found (68). The names of men who could not be traced by this means, or were found to be delinquents during the course of investigation, were turned over to the police (69).

11. One particular case of delinquency, reported from Regina, involved a man named Etienne George Sicotte who had been dodging around the country to avoid compulsory military service. The following extract is an account of what transpired when the District Recruiting Officer caught up with him in November 1943:

In the course of discussion with him he stated that he had an exemption from military training till the end of November; when asked to produce this he could not do so. Upon further examination it appears that he is 21 years of age; born on the 27th of August, 1922. He received two calls for preliminary medical examination, numbers as follows B.02478 and B.R.R.2478, the latter he still has in his possession. The calls were issued from Toronto, and this man was living in Welland, Ont. at that time. After having had the medical examination this man left Ontario and came back to his father's farm at South Makwa. From his conversation it is evident that he is only interested in evading military service. It has been reported that this man boasted of having received his first call and then moving away quickly before the second call could reach him (70).

Although the Mobilization Board in Regina did not grant this man a postponement the National Selective Service official in North Battleford gave him a work permit, valid to the end of May 1944, and he went to work at Copper Cliff, Ontario (71).

12. The R.C.M.P. were fighting a losing battle in Quebec province and on 19 May 43, the Minister of Labour suggested borrowing about 75 soldiers who had returned from overseas for officer training to help with enforcement and eight or 10 officers with overseas service to conduct an educational campaign (72). The first proposal was turned

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\*On 16 Apr 43 the Minister of Labour informed the Minister of National Defence that all Orders-Military Training were going to be sent by registered post and, if a signature was not obtained, a special post card would be completed by the postman with the reasons for non-delivery (67).



down since soldiers were not "peace officers" and would not be protected should they use force to apprehend or detain civilian defaulters (73). Arrangements were made, however, whereby men being discharged from the Army might be interviewed with a view to becoming R.C.M.P. special constables but, because of the higher wages paid by war industry, not many recruits were obtained (74). Since there still were many people in the backwoods communities of Quebec ignorant of the fact that the Active Army comprised both volunteers and N.R.M.A. soldiers the second request was met (75). Six civilians with a military background spent the summer with (Captain) P.E. Rodier of National Selective Service (Mobilization) in the back districts where "the appearance of any one in uniform is very suspiciously regarded" and their efforts were considered to have had a certain amount of success (76).

13. A glance at the following figures will show that the number of investigations made by the R.C.M.P. in connection with the enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations was on the increase as 1943 came to an end (77):

	October	November	December
New cases opened	5127	6333	7523
Cases concluded	3840	5179	5903
Still under investigation	13291	14445	16065

14. There was also the problem of apprehending deserters. Prior to July 1942 this had been the responsibility of the R.C.M.P., assisted by other police forces, but from then onward it devolved mainly on the expanding Canadian Provost Corps (78). That this problem was becoming more acute during 1943 is obvious from the following statistics on deserters compiled at N.D.H.Q. (79):

Month	General Service			N.R.M.A.		
	New	Appre- hended	Balance end of Month	New	Appre- hended	Balance end of Month
Jun	419	526	5236	188	28	3752
Jul	546	390	5392	205	138	3819
Aug	526	310	5608	268	150	3937
Sep	790	549	5849	198	133	4002
Oct	456	293	6012	237	126	4113
Nov	625	634	6003	258	151	4220
Dec	366	184	6185	411	116	4515

According to War Service Records, 3071 G.S. and 2170 N.R.M.A. deserters never were apprehended (80).

15. During October 1943 the R.C.M.P. initiated a special campaign to round up these deserters and delinquents who had not complied with National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. The following description may be taken as typical of these raids:

In Ottawa and Hull raids were conducted on Monday night, November 1st. Eighteen resorts were visited and, as a result, 120 persons were detained for questioning. Following this interrogation, six were charged with infractions of the N.S.S.M. Regulations and a deserter from the army was turned over to the Canadian Provost Corps. In the performance of these raids we had the full cooperation of both the Ottawa and Hull City Police and, in addition, augmented our detailed strength of 27 by utilizing 36 of our Reserve Constables, a total of 63 members of the force in all (81).



16. On 14 Dec The Ottawa Journal reported Commissioner S.T. Wood of the R.C.M.P. as stating that the value of such raids was partly psychological since, apart from a few culprits apprehended, there were usually a number of guilty individuals who rushed to give themselves up, for fear of being caught in the next raid. Some 1659 resorts had been raided by 30 Nov and a check made on 39,973 men. Of the 2701 men detained for questioning, 344 were charged under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations for failure to report for military service, 164 had failed to notify National Selective Service of their change of address and 105 were found to be deserters. Since 662 persons without gainful employment had been discovered by the raids, Commissioner Wood suggested to Mr MacNamara that there must be a large number of men in Canada who were not working. Personnel employed on these raids had totalled 999 R.C.M.P., 292 other policemen and 222 soldiers (82).

17. Only in the Montreal area had members of the Canadian Provost Corps assisted the R.C.M.P. (during the period 19 Oct-13 Nov) in raids on 22 pool rooms, four dance halls, six bowling alleys, 10 restaurants and two gambling houses (83). Since members of the Canadian Provost Corps were not police officers and could not interfere with civilians legally, Headquarters M.D. No. 4 put an end to such co-operation (84). In addition to the fact that the R.C.M.P. were not strong enough to continue such raids in the province of Quebec alone, Commissioner Wood argued that:

The purpose of the co-operation of the Provost Corps was that during these round ups it was found that actual deserters from the Army were being likewise located, which facilitated the work of the Provost Corps considerably and at the same time strengthened our hands in the work of the raids referred to (85).

18. National Selective Service officials also were keen to have the Canadian Provost Corps co-operate with the R.C.M.P. in further raids across Canada and raised the question to the ministerial level after being rebuffed by the military (86). On his return from overseas Mr Ralston instructed that further consideration be given and, in the meantime, replied to the Minister of Labour on 15 Jan 44 that:

Everything will be quite all right until some violence occurs and it turns out that a member of the Provost Corps has interfered with a civilian, then it will be charged that the country is Army ridden and that the Army had better attend to its own business. I am sure you know the implication as well as I (87).

19. The solution was that previously suggested by the Judge Advocate-General — extension of the powers of military personnel, rather than their becoming R.C.M.P. special constables (88). Not until 9 Jun 44, however, did Order in Council P.C. 3205 authorize action. The explanatory letter issued by the Adjutant-General's Branch on 25 Jul 44 stated that this Order in Council:

... gives members of such corps, units, detachments or commands or the naval, military or air forces, as may be designated by the Minister, authority to require any person to produce his registration certificate and to question him as to whether he has or has not registered and whether he is or has been a member of the armed forces. If, upon questioning a person, a member in uniform of a designated corps reasonably suspects, that such a person is a deserter or absentee from the armed forces, he may apprehend such



person and, if no peace officer is immediately available, bring him before a justice of the peace to be dealt with according to law (89).

This letter also cautioned that the R.C.M.P. was still responsible for dealing with those who had failed to comply with National Selective Service Regulations and that they were not to be apprehended by members of the Canadian Provost Corps. Action across the country was not to be taken until everyone was in the picture and there was to be no "general sweep of civilians in certain places at certain times" (90). When conducted, the questioning of civilians was to be carried out in a manner not to cause resentment. Procedure already had been simplified by the new National Resources Mobilization Act (Army) Regulations, 1943, and National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, 1944. Under section 28 of the latter following conviction by a magistrate, an apprehended delinquent was taken to the nearest "designated" Military Centre under military or police escort, whereupon he became subject to military law (91).

20. Nevertheless, the situation at the end of December 1944 was even worse in connection with the enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. The R.C.M.P. were continuing the investigation of 16,988 cases brought forward from the previous month: 4841 cases had been concluded but 5184 new cases opened (92). There were 12,650 absentees and deserters from the Canadian Army being sought across Canada (93).

21. On the other hand, however, unknown to the general public there were sound objections to enrolling certain men. In response to a question from the Associate Director of National Selective Service (Mobilization) as to why only a small number of the 1000 men with police records\* in the City of Toronto had been enrolled Brigadier G.B. Chisholm (D.G.M.S.) pointed out:

... The cause for rejection is not the fact that the individual has been in jail or has a police record, but the fact that the police record is visible evidence of a deep-seated personality defect of the psychopathic type (95).

Such men had shown from their case histories that they were unable to profit by experience. Their whole life consisted of a series of anti-social activities that had not improved under the discipline of the community. Furthermore:

These men with police records with a long history of an inability to support themselves by a lawful means, with a history of vagrancy, alcoholism, etc., are not wanted in the Army. The Army is not primarily a disciplinary organization nor a substitute for a jail or penitentiary. A number of men of this type enlisted in the early days before adequate screening was in force. The detention barracks in the Canadian Army Overseas contains a high percentage of men of this type who are being returned to Canada and being discharged from the Service. Recent surveys of soldiers under sentence in detention barracks in Canada reveals that 20-30% of those in the detention barracks are of psychopathic type with a long record of crimes in civilian life, frequent

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\*Three of the sample cases had been graded as follows (94):

Butch, Steve - 182 Queen St., W. Toronto Ont  
B-178313  
Arrested May 14/43

(cont'd on page 311)



A.W.L's, drunkenness and insubordination in the Army. When the documents of these men are carefully examined it becomes apparent in many cases that the soldier has spent more time in detention than in training. Occasionally one finds men who have been in the Army for two years but who have not yet completed Basic Training.

These men are a liability in the Army and not an asset. For the occasional man of this type who does settle down and serves with distinction there are several who have proven themselves entirely valueless. Experience has proven in every war that the best soldiers come from those individuals who have been the best citizens and that a first class army can only be made from the best men in the community (96).

22. Despite this clear cut exposition there was reason to believe that physically fit men were escaping military service on spurious psychiatric grounds, as may be gathered from the following letter despatched to the Deputy Minister of Labour on 30 Jan 45 by the Deputy Chairman of the National Selective Service Mobilization Board in Toronto:

It may be that it is just a coincidence but I regret to report that several Law Students who graduated from Osgoode Hall last year were turned down on account of Mental Instability and only one of those who was turned down on this ground had any other disability. When these cases were called to my attention the situation seemed so remarkable that it looked to me almost as though the thing had been planned by those who were examined, but we took no further steps in connection with the matter because all had had Army examinations.

Curiously enough we find that many prominent athletes suffer from the same disability. On the

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(cont'd from Page 310)

File shows rejected "Epilepsy. Was unconscious while under custody of Military Authorities". Has boasted since to his associates and police authorities that he faked same (Constantly in trouble with police).

Cortese, Dominic - 243 Roxton Rd., Toronto, Ont  
B-178991

Arrested 3/1/43

File shows rejected by Psychiatrist with the following comments: "A smart-aleck who thinks everyone but himself has the wrong slant on things. Is a gambler by profession - has never worked. Has been arrested a number of times for stealing. No social conscience or ambition to mend his ways." Therefore, rejected as Psychopathic.

Hull, Steve - no permanent address  
B-172393

Arrested 2/3/43

File shows rejected by Psychiatrist with the following comments: "In jails and reformatories most of the time since 14 years of age. Psychopathic personality." Therefore rejected.



Maple Leaf Hockey Team there are perhaps four or five otherwise physically fit young men who have been turned down on the ground of Mental Instability. One very prominent football player\* who had graduated from Western University a year or so ago has also been turned down on the ground of Mental Instability and a certain well known golfer who also plays hockey in the winter was turned down for similar reasons. On his first examination he was marked S-5 and we had him recalled and he was marked S-4. This man complained of the usual symptoms of dizziness and tremulous hands and so forth and even said he got dizzy when he bent over. Just how he can play golf with this disability is beyond my comprehension but he was good enough to get into the finals of one of our big competitions last summer.

I am mentioning these things to you because I understand that some attempt is to be made in the near future to have men of this type re-examined and if it could possibly be arranged, it would, in my opinion, be a very wise thing to do as I have repeatedly heard people say that they are at a loss to understand why young people who are capable of starring in various athletic procedures can be physically unfit for the Armed Services. Very few of the public are, of course, aware that many of these men have been turned down on account of Mental Instability and that they have no physical disabilities whatsoever (97).

23. Then again, once in a while, anonymous letters and tip-offs to the authorities such as the following produced results other than expected:

To Whom it may Concern:

Mr. Bernard Millman who has been called up in May 31, 1944 under No. E306396, has obtained extension without medical examination as a student. He has never been a student.

There is no excuse for him to evade the draft while my two sons are fighting at the front.

He may be found at 10 St. Catherine East, Montreal (98).

Actually this man had been medically examined, categorized PULHEMS 5 and rejected (99). He may have been unwilling to admit to his neighbours that he was not a healthy specimen or mere personal malice may have been behind this letter.

24. This subject should not be dismissed without some reference to the stories circulated of how men were able to avoid military service with the connivance of medical practitioners or those in authority. There seems little doubt that a number of men were able to render themselves unfit by taking drugs immediately prior to a medical examination but it must be remembered that experienced doctors soon became wise to

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\*Although past his prime, Joe Krol was still playing professional football with Toronto Argos as late as 1952.



the more common dodges and often detained individuals for further examination (after the ill effects had worn off).

25. For what it is worth, however, the following account in The Ottawa Journal of 13 Mar 42, reproduced from Quebec's Le Soleil of the previous day, is given:

... persons, ... for a fee, make knee injections for men who wish to gain exemption. These injections numb the senses. Permanent injury may be caused by the injections. Soldiers and sailors who receive such injections invariably obtain release from military service. Many cases have been reported to the police.

Three days later (16 Mar) The Ottawa Journal carried a report that police in Quebec City were holding two men:

Authorities declared they believed one of the pair detained was the head of a scheme to enable men to avoid serving in the armed forces.

Six men and boys have been reported in hospital as a result of injections taken in the hope they would be able to avoid army service.

Again, on 16 Mar 45 The Gazette (Montreal) carried a story of R.C.M.P. investigations into the activities of a self-styled psychiatrist and graphologist, alleged to have supplied drugs to upward of 600 men so that they might be made physically unfit for military service. In a number of instances, however, the drugs were reported not to have had the desired effect, after payment had been made, and disgruntled soldiers had talked.

26. One case investigated by the R.C.M.P. during October 1942 had come to naught. According to a Montreal waitress, a Private E. Cote (D-126430) working at the Recruiting Centre had boasted that he could provide pills which would render a man unfit to pass a medical examination. He further offered to provide a discharge certificate for her boy friend. On interrogation this soldier suggested that Pte. Cote was a "great boaster or bluffer who liked to brag about fantastic feats he had accomplished". He agreed to co-operate with the R.C.M.P. but Pte. Cote could not be trapped into making good any of his claims (100).

27. When officers in M.D. No. 4 investigated a complaint of 23 Aug 43 from a member of the "Women's Reserve Volunteer Corps to the effect that a Montreal doctor was being visited by men who had received their Orders-Medical Examination and that money was being paid to an intermediary it was discovered that the woman's evidence was entirely "hearsay". When interviewed, her informant had been under the influence of liquor and was considered to be an "irresponsible person" (101).

28. Much had been made of the irregularities discovered in medical examinations at Quebec City and the resultant courts martial of five officers and four other ranks of the R.C.A.M.C. (25 Nov 42 to 8 Jan 43). The first newspaper headlines had been "Army Medical Board Irregularities Bared Here" (The Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3 Nov 42) and "Quebec Medical Officers Held; Bribery in Discharges Alleged" (The Gazette, Montreal, 4 Nov 42) but the press across Canada adopted a more sensational tone as the proceedings continued. The irregularities were serious, even though a thorough investigation by the R.C.M.P. disclosed that there had been no instances of improper medical categorization. Rather, men who believed that they were unfit for military service but who required a Certificate of Medical Rejection in order to obtain steady civilian employment had arranged, through an intermediary (sergeant), for an unofficial medical examination by a medical officer to discover



whether they would be rejected upon application for voluntary enlistment. When such turned out to be the case they paid varying sums of money to their intermediary who would appear to have shared it with the officers implicated. One officer was dismissed from the Army, three were reprimanded and returned to duty, and the fifth was acquitted: the four other ranks were sentenced to periods of detention ranging from 45 days to nine months (102).

29. As the result of a later suggestion to the Deputy Minister of National Defence that there was a "racket" going on in M.D. No. 4 the Consultant in Surgery, Colonel L.H. McKim spent 4-8 Jul 44 watching the call-up procedure at the Reception Centre in Montreal. After carefully observing the work of two medical examiners under suspicion he reported that he was convinced of "their honesty and the sincerity of their work" (103). His conclusion was that the specialists were over-worked, with more than 600 men often passing through the Centre daily: he had no doubt that they were asked to express too many opinions in the time at their disposal and wrote that "if some mistakes do not occur, I will be very greatly surprised." In conclusion, he reported that:

... during my entire week at the Reception Centre, I saw nothing that would lead me to believe that any of our medical examiners, either Army or civilian, were anything but most conscientious in the carrying out of their duties. It is again pointed out that differences of opinion as to the various gradings allotted are bound to occur (104).

He was somewhat surprised, however, at the number of call-ups producing certificates of disability from certain civilian practitioners. He also remarked upon the fact that only 20 out of 60 civilian doctors called recently for medical examination had been found acceptable and that 26 had been given a grading of S-4 or S-5 by a Psychiatrist (105). The fact that only three of the 60 had possessed a PULHEMS profile of llllllll makes it evident, however, that the better type of young doctor already was in uniform.

30. Too many men who sought to evade military service by bribery were victimized, their money taken in the knowledge that rejection was certain or further sums demanded as a form of blackmail. In this respect, The Ottawa Journal of 16 Mar 42 carried the following despatch from Montreal:

Jean L. Tarte, 36, former lawyer, pleaded guilty today to charges of conspiring to help prospective trainees escape compulsory military training and of offering to get them exemptions for sums ranging up to \$400. During his trial Tarte said he would like to enlist in the army to repay "the wrong I have done".

Although he had been disbarred from the further practice of law by the Montreal District Bar, sentence was remitted since he wished to enlist in the Canadian Army. The situation was rendered even more peculiar by the fact that Tarte had been commissioned in Le Régiment de Joliette in 1923 and had been on the Corps Reserve of Officers (since 14 Dec 36) at the



time he was found guilty of conspiracy\*.

31. More strict enforcement of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, plugging loopholes, and the despatch of N.R.M.A. soldiers overseas as reinforcements in January 1945, brought a change in tactics. Habeas Corpus proceedings were instituted with a view to releasing N.R.M.A. soldiers, the argument being that they had been wrongfully enrolled since they had been physically unfit for military service (107). On 24 Feb instructions were issued by the Judge Advocate-General regarding the handling of such cases (108). The complementary supplementary letter issued by the Adjutant-General's Branch directed that, until a Writ of Habeas Corpus was actually issued, the movements of the soldier would be governed solely by service considerations and were not to be affected in any manner by the proceedings which had been instituted. As a result, several applications had been dropped and the rate at which such petitions were being sought had fallen off substantially (109). On 15 Mar The Gazette reported that 14 such petitions for writs of Habeas Corpus had been summarily dismissed in the Montreal Superior Court when representatives of the petitioners failed to appear. A barrister named Paul Levesque had acted for these petitioners, and for most of the men protesting enrolment in the Montreal area (110). Medical collaboration was supplied by one of three civilian practitioners, their certificates dealing with "hidden structural defects, that are not in themselves actual disabilities, but that once drawn to the soldier's or "call-up's" attention, are enough to justify the man in his own mind, to start to complain or to continue to complain" (111). Acting on the Judge Advocate-General's opinion, however, the Department of Labour decided to go ahead and enrol men who had instituted legal proceedings on the grounds of physical unfitness, since it might be some months before a judgement was delivered in what was really a test case (112).

32. In an effort to catch up with draft dodgers who were being well paid for their industrial efforts an Order in Council (P.C. 9919) had been approved on 31 Dec 43 requiring every employer to report on each of his employees who was not in good standing under the provisions of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. According to a (Department of Labour) Ministerial Order of 28 Jan 44 all employers were required to submit such a report (Schedule 9) before 1 May 44. One of the following types of certificate would be acceptable as evidence of "good standing": discharge from one of the Armed Forces, rejection from enlistment by the Army, refection by the Army after having reported for enrolment as an N.R.M.A. soldier, excepted from service and postponement. An Employer's Guide was available for use in doubtful instances (113).

33. A further Ministerial Order of 15 Aug 44 applied this policy to men who had accepted employment subsequent to 1 May 44; those obtaining employment after 22 Aug had to be

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\*As a corporal and sergeant, latterly with the Canadian Intelligence Corps, this man saw service in Canada, Newfoundland, the United Kingdom and North West Europe. Because of his age and the publicity given his misdemeanour, attempts to obtain a commission for this N.C.O. proved unavailing until 4 Mar 46. As a lieutenant he served with the War Crimes Investigation Unit at N.D.H.Q. from 11 Mar 46 to 25 Mar 47. His suspension by the Bar of the Province of Quebec had been lifted on 27 May 46 (106).



reported on within seven days (114). The number of schedules received for the period 28 Jan 44 to 31 Aug 45 totalled 49,548. Of these 39,250 had been found to be in good standing, 258 presumed to be deserters or absentees from the Armed Forces and 10,040 were not in good standing (115).

34. According to National Selective Service records, on 7 May 45 there were 20,591 men not accounted for by Divisional Registrars (116). According to War Service Records a total of 7236 N.R.M.A. soldiers were struck off strength as deserters — that is, they were never apprehended (117).



APPENDIX "F" - CASE HISTORY OF EVADING MILITARY SERVICE (118)

R.1-1-23-2 (NRMA)  
DR 66828

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
- Army -

REGINA, Sask., June 13, 1944.

The Secretary,  
Department of National Defence,  
OTTAWA, Ontario.

M.66828 - Ivan FARDEN  
PRINCE, Saskatchewan.

The following is a record of the handling of this man by the Mobilization Board in this Division:

He was sent Notice-Medical January 4th, 1943,  
"A" category;  
Applied for postponement February 9th, 1943;  
R.C.M.P. report received dated February 27th,  
1943, opposed to postponement;  
April 16th, 1943, Board postponed for 30 days,  
referred to Supervisor, Farm Labour Require-  
ments for essential employment;  
May 6th, 1943, man wrote to the Registrar that  
he was needed at home. He did not take other  
essential work as instructed by the Board;  
Under date of June 5th, Win-the-War Committee  
advised the Board that FARDEN should be called  
for Military Training, as there were 5 brothers,  
none of whom were in the Army;  
June 14th, 1943, Mr. G.R. Bickerton, member of the  
Board instructed that this man be called for  
Military Training;  
FARDEN was called for July 20, 1943, and failed to  
report;  
July 7th, 1943, man asked for postponement as a  
farmer;  
July 19th, Registrar wired he must report as ordered;  
July 21st, wrote again to the Registrar "too busy on  
farm, cannot report";  
August 9th, Board again ruled the marginally named be  
called October 15th, 1943;  
August 10th, postponement was granted to October 15th;  
September 13th, FARDEN wrote for further postponement  
to complete threshing and then work in saw mill;  
September 30th, Board member, Mr. J.S. Palmer, request-  
ed a special report by the Supervisor, Farm Labour  
Requirements;  
October 28th, District Inspector, Department of  
Agriculture, reported to the Board that the father  
was able bodied, that Ivan rented 90 acres of land  
from the father, after being called for Military  
Training and lives with the father, that there are  
other brothers at home and postponement should not  
be granted;  
November 13th, the Board again ruled that FARDEN should  
be called for Military Training;  
November 30th, called to report December 15th, 1943;  
December 6th, call papers returned and asked for further  
postponement;  
January 6th, 1944, two members of the Board, J.S. Palmer  
and C.W. McCool, extended Call to January 25th;  
January 10th, FARDEN was advised he must report on  
January 25th;  
January 10th, Supervisor, Farm Labour Requirements,



advised that FARDEN had been referred to Mr. C.G. Gadsby, Robinhood, for winter employment;  
January 18th, Supervisor, Farm Labour Requirements, advised man had reported;  
February 11th, cancelled Call and postponed to April 15th, referred to Supervisor, Farm Labour Requirements, for essential employment for summer and fall;  
March 29th, Mr. W.W. Dawson, Supervisor, Farm Labour Requirements, advised the Board that he had communicated with FAROEN, February 23rd and March 17th, but had no information that would indicate he had complied with requirements of the Board; in view of adverse reports, recommended Call for **Military Training**;  
April 3rd, before Messrs. McCool & Palmer, the Mobilization Board instructed Registrar to call;  
April 13th, FARDEN called for Military Training to report April 28th, 1944;  
March 30th, the man said he had not got previous letters, had been working in lumber camp since November 10th;  
April 10th, returned Call Papers, saying he was now working for George Iverson of Prince, Saskatchewan;  
April 18th, Mr. McCool instructed Registrar that Call was to stand;  
April 19th, the marginally named was advised to report;  
April 28th, Mr. Iverson wired seeking further postponement, as FARDEN was then working for him;  
April 29th, Registrar wired Mr. Iverson would refer case again to the Board and to wait further instructions;  
April 29th, Board ruled Call was to be cancelled and asked for another report from Mr. W.W. Dawson;  
May 25th, Mr. Dawson's Inspector reported that FARDEN was needed on the Iverson farm until July 15th;  
May 31st, Board postponed Call to July 15th, 1944, and to ask employer if man was essential after that date; also amount of wages paid.

2. The above is submitted as an illustration of the handling of many such cases and to indicate the amount of work involved by both the Board and Representatives of this Department. It will be seen that a man may defer his actual Call, almost indefinitely, simply by returning his Call Papers as often as they are received.

Sgd (A.S. Redford).  
Lt.-Col.  
for (G.A.H. TRUDEAU),  
Brigadier,  
D.O.C., M.D. No 12.



APPENDIX "G" - MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY

1. Even before the pre-war pool of unemployed was absorbed by Canada's expanding economy, agriculture and industry had experienced difficulty in meeting production goals and sought assistance from the Armed Forces. The Navy and the R.C.A.F. were composed entirely of volunteers who, in the opinion of their political Ministers, should never have enlisted if they wished periodic leave to return to civilian employment (119), but the Army was in a more vulnerable position since it came to contain more and more N.R.M.A. personnel who had been enrolled for compulsory military training and home defence. The Navy and R.C.A.F. did make certain personnel available during the later years of the War but the Army bore the brunt of the varied demands. The assistance it gave is discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

(1) Assistance to Agriculture

2. The summer of 1940 brought the first requests from soldiers for leave to return home to harvest their own, or their parents, crops. It was agreed that such leave, not to exceed eight weeks, might be given to men who had been working on their home farms before enlistment in either of the 4th Canadian Division or the eight Infantry battalions mobilized for internal security duties, but not to men of the 3rd Canadian Division, coast defence and ancillary units. The Adjutant-General's letter of 30 Jul further specified that D.Os.C. should ensure that the strength of units be not unduly depleted and that the basis for such leaves was to be compassionate grounds. Whilst on leave a soldier would forego his pay and allowances, right to medical and dental treatment and eligibility for disability pension resulting from any accident (120). A supplementary instruction of 15 Aug extended such leave to members of the Veterans Guard of Canada (121).

3. For 1941 the harvest leave policy was basically the same, although reduced to a maximum of four weeks and open only to personnel of the 4th Canadian Division, the 13th Brigade and three unallotted Infantry battalions, Veterans Guard of Canada and those men at District Depots awaiting training (122). On 10 Sep, however, General Crerar informed the Adjutant-General that harvest leave should not be granted to men serving within Pacific Command or "A" recruits for any corps where shortages existed (123).

4. Spring leave for seeding, and other seasonal work, was authorized by an instruction of 20 Mar 42 but was to be granted to experienced farm workers only; it could not exceed six weeks or be given to men undergoing training or serving with operational units (124). Canadian Army Routine Order 1935 of 6 May 42 provided for the granting of leave for longer periods on "compassionate" grounds. Provision was again made for harvest leave (125). Considerable pressure was exerted on the Minister of National Defence to ease leave restrictions further during the harvest but he refused, since the training of both units and men would suffer (126).

5. Another side of the picture had emerged more clearly, however, with the action taken in March 1942 to freeze farmers and farm labourers on the land. This attempt to stabilize agricultural production virtually made farmers immune from compulsory military training (127). Moreover, National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations (1 Dec 42) permitted farmers to engage in other employment, outside of urban areas, for 30 days during their seasonal lag without



obtaining a permit from the nearest employment office; this was extended to 60 days when new National Selective Service Civilian Regulations were issued early in 1943 (128). This, it was hoped, would do something to expand the labour force. In the first of the National Selective Service circular letters designed to help interpret the new regulations Mr MacNamara (Deputy Minister of Labour and Director of National Selective Service) implied (3 Feb 42) that the onus rested with Divisional Registrars to prove that a man was not engaged in essential agricultural work, rather than for the man to prove that he was an essential agricultural worker (129). Once this interpretation became known, it was realized by the military that recruiting would come to a virtual end in rural areas (130). Furthermore, in practice there was nothing to prevent farmers from leaving the land for better paid jobs in factories. For example, the following letter, despatched by the District Recruiting Officer in Saskatchewan (M.D. No. 12) to Ottawa on 11 Feb 43 reported:

I have travelled this province from north to south and from east to west and I am personally very definitely convinced that the calling of men under N.R.M.A. or the enlistment of men in the Canadian Army (Active) from the farms has not, as a whole, seriously interfered with farming operations. Any shortage of farm labour that has been created in this province cannot be laid on the doorstep of the Armed Forces but rather on the fact that industry is offering such attractive wages and that men have left the province of Saskatchewan, literally, in the thousands to accept these well paying jobs.

If the Selective Service people are going to be limited in the calls that they can make for farm personnel then it seems to me that there should be some way of the Board being assured that these men, who are exempt from call because of their association with farm work, be compelled to remain on farms and it might be necessary to go farther than that. Some form of regimentation would have to be put into effect to distribute the present farm labour over the entire province. We have literally hundreds of cases of one farmer having three or four sons to operate a small farm while another farmer just across the road whose sons are in the forces is carrying on, in all probability, greater activities with no help at all to speak of (131).

6, During the debate on his estimates in the House of Commons on 21 May, the Minister of Agriculture stated that the agricultural labour force had declined from 1,080,000 male family workers and 285,000 hired men in March 1939 to 880,000 male family members and 140,000 hired men in March 1943. Mr Gardiner also conceded that only 175,000 of the 250,000 farmers who had left their homes in the autumn for the lumber camps and mines were expected to return for spring planting (132). Then followed an exchange with the Member from Bow River (Alberta):

Mr Johnston (Bow River): Did those who left the farm and went into lumbering or some other industry have to get permission of selective service to leave the farm?

Mr Gardiner: They were compelled to get permits to go and to give undertakings that they would come back in the spring.



Mr Johnston (Bow River): Then, would not selective service have some check on those who did come back and those who refused to come back?

Mr Gardiner: There will be some check, but men who left the farm and entered the armed forces, for instance, will not be compelled to come back, and some were given permission to remain longer at the new work they undertook, provided they would return to the farm when required.

Mr Perley: Can the Minister give us an idea of the number of men who left the farm after the farm freezing order? I should like to get the effect of that order.

Mr Gardiner: I have not the figures to enable me to reply. They can be produced only by the Minister of Labour when he has his estimates before the committee. I have not those figures (133).

The exchange continued but it seemed to the Opposition at any rate, that, although Mr Gardiner was responsible for agricultural production, he assumed no responsibility for the number of men so engaged and had no idea of their number (134). During the debate of 23 Jun on the Department of Labour's estimates Hon. Humphrey Mitchell stated that 175,000 men had left farms during the previous winter to work elsewhere but only 104,819 had secured temporary permits from local Employment Offices. Mr Mitchell argued that the remainder had been otherwise engaged for periods of less than 60 days (135).

7. Spring leave had been extended from four to six weeks and 1604 soldiers had availed themselves of the opportunity, with 168 of them receiving extensions. During the period 17 Mar-3 Jun 43 a further 2847 men were on "compassionate" farm leave (136). Representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Labour and National Defence held several meetings before agreement on "harvest leave" was reached on 19 Jul (137): an Order in Council was promulgated on 24 Jul and detailed instructions issued as Canadian Army Routine Order 3456, effective 31 Jul 43. Under this scheme, which was closely linked with the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Programme\*, Compassionate Farm Leave might be given for periods up to six months, without pay and allowances or other benefits:

... to men for the purpose of working on farms owned by members of their immediate family where there would be undue hardship if the leave were not granted. This leave is applicable where the relative working the farm is, because of old age or disability, incapable of continuing to do so and, by reason of their enlistment or enrolment, there is no other member of the family available to assist.

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\*During the summer of 1942 the Dominion Government had made arrangements with all but three of the Provinces to share expenses in the organization, recruitment and placing of temporary farm labour to help with the harvest. Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Committees were formed, with local committees of farmers who worked with the Provincial agricultural representatives on harvest problems. Students were recruited for harvesting. Order in Council 3620 of 4 May 43 set forth the conditions under which the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Programme should be extended to all provinces (138).



Provision also was made whereby other experienced farm workers (not claimable by relatives) might be detailed for Farm Duty, if they were neither undergoing training nor G.S. personnel of an age and category suitable for overseas service. The respective D.O.C. (or G.O.C.) and the Director of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Plan would have to be satisfied, however, that all farmers requesting assistance were substantial producers of foodstuffs and that the release of such men would not interfere with essential military duties. A maximum of 10 per cent of the strength of operational units but any number of men on home war establishment, might be made available for Farm Leave and Farm Duty.

8. Thus the harvest was collected with the help of approximately 16,000 members of the Armed Forces (139). Approximately 400 soldiers on compassionate farm leave, 2,000 soldiers on harvest leave and 516 soldiers on Farm duty assisted with the harvest in Saskatchewan. Of the last category, 393 came from Pacific Command and 65 from Eastern Canada. Very little use was made of the farm duty plan in British Columbia and Ontario but considerable assistance was given by members of the Armed Forces on weekend or other short leave. Farmers in western Canada paid \$4.00 for each day actually worked, plus room and board. Replying to one letter protesting against having to pay soldiers this sum for picking fruit in British Columbia, Mr Ralston wrote that such matters really were the concern of the Department of Labour but added:

I fear sometimes that there is a mistaken idea that the manpower from agriculture has all gone to the Fighting Services, but I find, and I think you will find it also, that men have gone from the farm in even greater numbers to take up civilian employment. I do feel that this source from which farmers could be repatriated should not be lost sight of instead of instinctively turning attention to the Armed Forces when men are needed (140).

9. Mr MacNamara's solution for dealing with farm workers who sought employment elsewhere was greater control through local Employment Offices (141). The Vice Adjutant-General was favourable (142) but the Deputy Minister of Agriculture for New Brunswick (who also had been queried) raised the following objection:

Due to the distance a great many of our farmers live from your employment office and the reluctance of our farmers to write letters we question the wisdom of applying a permit system between farm employment and employees (143).

10. An answer in similar vein was reported by the Director of Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance after an autumn visit to the south shore of the St. Lawrence. On 11 Oct he reported to Mr MacNamara that no compulsory transfers were made unless initiated by regional head office: more outside officials were needed since "the local officers simply will not ship out of their territory their old school mates and friends of long standing, and for the most part there are no high priority jobs into which these persons may be moved locally (144)." Furthermore;

Our Managers stated quite frankly that the farm labour would not come into the offices. The reason for this is that they are afraid that the offices will, in some manner, cancel their deferments as farmers and hand them over to the military authorities. For instance, when asking the Victoriaville Placement Officer if there was any objection when he checked the mobilization status of every applicant, he replied, "No, none at all, because I simply



make notes on my pad when I am talking to them and have the form made up afterwards by the girl; they do not know that their mobilization status is being checked (145).

Farmers refused to accept jobs in the bush. After being refused permits to work in Sorel or Montreal, one party of eight farmers' sons had replied to this question, as follows: "We know what will happen to us when we get 80 miles into the bush -- a bunch of Mounties will jump on us and we will lose our deferments (146)." Instead, they returned to their fathers' farms to do a bit of cutting on the family wood lot and then loaf.

11. Following the Cabinet War Committee's decision of 6 Dec 43 that the Departments of Labour and Agriculture should endeavour to increase the supply of farm labour, Mr Gardiner suggested the time had come to amend the call-up regulations for home defence so that essential farm workers might be returned to the farm after completing four months' military training (147). This resulted in the admission, within the Department of National Defence that there were 26,747 N.R.M.A. and 13,056 G.S. soldiers performing no useful function. Apart from that portion of the G.S. surplus acceptable as overseas reinforcements there were 30,000 men who might be better employed in civilian life. The release of farmers from "home defence" duties would create a favoured class, however, and would have an unfavourable effect on future voluntary enlistments (148). The Military favoured the return of all surplus over-age and low category personnel to civil life (149) but the members of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference, meeting at Ottawa 6-9 Dec, felt that:

... it would be more advisable from the standpoint of insuring farm labour supply to keep the men in the army rather than discharge them, and that extended farm leaves could be granted and those still employed on Farm Duty should continue on that basis (150).

12. The real answer was to force farmers who were earning high wages in industry to return to the land but this was not easy. The Army view was expressed in the following memorandum of 10 Feb 44:

The only other field in which experienced farm workers may be found is industry, but the thinking appears to be that the farm worker who secured early employment in industry must not be restricted in his choice of further employment if laid off, whereas the farm worker who did not get into war industry before being called for the Army must not be permitted any choice of employment, if discharged from the Army. The farm worker under mandatory postponement must also remain in agriculture or forfeit his postponement (151).

The civilian view was expressed by the Minister of Labour in a letter of the same date to the Minister of National Defence:

... Even if authority was taken to direct these men to farm work or other occupations it is a fact that enforcement of direction would be most difficult. The great difficulty would be that of differential rates of pay. As one member of the Board expressed



it: "discharged soldiers will not be happy about accepting farm work at \$1.00 per day when they see men in war plants who have never been in the Army getting \$1.00 per hour."

It was the unanimous opinion of the National Selective Service Advisory Board that it would be much more effective and much more in the interests of the national effort to give men leave of absence rather than discharge them.

The suggestion specifically is that it be made known to any man in the Army who is not in line for service overseas that he may obtain leave of absence on condition that he go to a farm and remain there during the period of his leave. It is the belief of the members of the National Selective Service Advisory Board that 10,000 or 15,000 men would be obtained in this way for farms and that there would be a definite control which would mean that they would have to stay on the farms or be called back in the Army (152).

13. The matter was closed by Mr Ralston's reply of 24 Feb to the Minister of Labour, pointing out that military policy would be to discharge all those of a non-operational medical category who could not be usefully employed. He added:

This policy has the double object of streamlining the Army and of releasing to the national manpower pool all men who are not or cannot be usefully employed on military duties.

I realize fully your difficulties in the matter of obtaining men for farm work, but I feel sure that you will appreciate the fact that the retention in the Army of a large number of men on extended farm leave who are not physically fit for military service not only creates a false picture of the strength of the Army, and entails a very considerable amount of avoidable administrative detail, but defeats the implementation of the policy outlined above (153).

14. Canadian Army Routine Order 3456 was amended by Routine Order 4259 of 22 Mar 44 so that Farm Leave and Farm Duty might be given for spring planting as well as during the harvest. As of 31 May approximately 6000 soldiers were on "compassionate" farm leave and 500 on agricultural spring leave (154).

15. Once again members of the Armed Forces made a substantial contribution to the task of harvesting. The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles were transferred from Halifax to the Prairies and 600 gunners from the (disbanding) anti-aircraft defences at Arvida were sent to the Brandon area (155). The King's Own Rifles were moved from Pacific Command to Saskatchewan. Le Régiment de Joliette was moved to western Ontario to participate in the tobacco harvest. Mr Ralston informed the Minister of Labour on 21 Aug that approximately 2350 soldiers had been made available for farm duty. He further expected that 3000 men in Pacific Command would be on Harvest Leave by the end of the month and that a further 2000-3000 of its men would be given annual furlough (156). As late as 30 Sep there still were 337 G.S. and 3000 N.R.M.A.



soldiers detailed for farm duty and 3825 G.S. and 7536 N.R.M.A. soldiers on harvest leave or compassionate farm leave (157).

16. Consequent to the conscription crisis of November 1944 it became necessary to review the whole policy of extended leave. In some Military Districts all men were being recalled and there was considerable confusion until a temporary ruling was issued by telegram on 29 Nov. For the moment only those whose permits were about to expire would be recalled. Those obviously unfit for overseas service could be returned to civilian life while the remainder would be given temporary 60-day extensions until a firm decision was possible on future policy (158).

17. On 7 Dec, Brigadier deLalanne told the delegates to the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference in Ottawa that, although no change would be made in basic policy, it would be necessary to provide sufficient reinforcements for overseas until the end of hostilities. In future, Farm Duty would be performed only by low category personnel belonging to Employment Companies, since it had been found that men did better work under the supervision of officers and N.C.Os. (159).

18. On 4 Apr the Army's policy on leave was amended by Routine Order 5529 to provide for the granting of "Hog, Dairy and Beef Production Leave" to low category personnel (without pay and allowances) in an effort to ensure that Canada met her food commitment to the United Nations. Routine Order 5590 of 20 Apr consolidated the instructions concerning all forms of leave without pay and allowances.

19. The War in Europe came to an end before it was time for the harvest and serving soldiers were given agricultural leave pending discharge, which could not be justified until the troops had been repatriated from Overseas.

#### (ii) Combatting Fuel Shortages

20. As a result of the industrial expansion and increased prosperity within the country consumption of coal had increased greatly during the first two years of war. Coal mining did not keep pace and the continuance of increased imports from the United States became uncertain after 7 Dec 41. The decline in wood cutting operations further increased the consumption of coal for domestic purposes. When the question of fuel shortages was debated in the House of Commons on 16 Mar 43 most of the attention was directed to shortages of fuel wood, with members pointing out how some inhabitants of small localities had been compelled to move in with their neighbours and others forced to burn fences, doors and flooring in their stoves. A press release issued by the Minister of Munitions and Supply was quoted to show that the situation might become:

... no less serious for those who have been burning wood in furnaces and stoves in which either coal or wood may be consumed, for the shortage of coal has been critical this winter, and there is every likelihood that it may become more critical in the coming winter. Because less coal may be available, the demand for wood fuel is likely to rise (160).

21. During November 1942 instructions had been sent to Divisional Registrars across Canada to grant postponements to all coal miners and loggers but a number of the latter appear to have gone ahead and enlisted anyway (161). On 24 Nov 42 the Adjutant-General issued instructions permitting ex-coal miners in the Army to return to the mines of western Canada on six months leave (renewable for three month periods) and similar action for eastern Canada was taken during January



1943 (162). Although leave was arranged for upwards of 1200 of the 3000 ex-miners serving with the Army in Canada, 100 of these soon returned to military duty at their own request (163).

22. During the course of a meeting in Mr MacNamara's office on 15 Apr 43 the Coal Controller stated that some 2748 coal miners had enlisted during the 12 months ending 31 Mar 43. In Nova Scotia alone some 1700 had enlisted and the industry was short 1600. Whereas Maj-Gen H.J. Riley, Joint Associate Director of National Selective Service wanted to have the enlistment of coal miners prohibited, the Coal Controller admitted that some of the men who had returned to the mines on leave from the Army had been dissatisfied and left again; there also was trouble about miners taking other employment where wages were higher. National Selective Service had allotted some 3000 men to coal mining during the year but, as the industry across Canada had shrunk by 2000, there had been a total loss of 2250 (164).

23. Both Mr Ralston and Mr Power stood firm in the Cabinet War Committee against Mr Powe's request that coal miners should not be permitted to enlist and that those already in uniform should be returned to the mines. It was agreed on 5 May, however, that coal mining should be granted a higher priority than gold mining and that action should be taken to prevent coal miners from taking other jobs. Order in Council P.C. 4092 of 17 May 43 froze all coal miners in their jobs and declared that all ex-coal miners should vacate existing jobs by 1 Jun to return to mining. Until 1 Feb 44 coal miners would not be conscripted for military service and would be discouraged from enlisting. This was extended by further Orders in Council until 1 Aug 45 (165).

24. According to Department of Labour statistics, as of 9 Sep 43 there were 970 soldiers actually working on coal mining leave and a further 430 awaiting allocation. A total of 2200 men had been granted leave since the inception of the scheme but 700 had withdrawn their applications or proceeded overseas and 100 had returned to military duty after giving it a try (166). The number of soldiers employed in the coal mining industry continued to increase, however, until by 20 Feb 44 there were 1481 G.S. and 548 N.R.M.A. soldiers so employed (167). Despite the mildness of the winter and a lessened demand for coal, with consequent lay-offs at some Alberta mines, there still were 1992 soldiers on coal mining leave on 31 May 44, all but a dozen of whom were on the strength of District Depots (168).

25. Throughout the "conscription crisis" coal mining was still considered work of sufficient national importance to have the soldiers then working in the mines retained there, instead of being recalled for military duty (169). Approximately 1900 soldiers were on coal mining leave at the end of March 1945 (170).

#### (iii) Logging

26. Both firewood to combat the fuel crisis and lumber to meet the needs of war industry and the civilian economy were in short supply by early 1943. On 5 Mar, therefore, the Cabinet War Committee decided that lumbering should be treated as an essential industry. National Selective Service was to use every means to induce loggers to return from other industries and was to work out satisfactory arrangements with the Armed Forces to permit experienced personnel to return to the bush, just as arrangements had been made for ex-coal miners (171).



27. During the course of a conference held on 18 Mar to arrange details Mr MacNamara told Brigadier Nash that some 2000 loggers were required in British Columbia: 680 already were registered with Selective Service offices there and it was hoped to obtain a further 650 from among the 2000 odd lumbermen then employed in Vancouver shipyards (172). Although a list had been obtained of 2930 soldiers who had given their previous occupation as the lumbering industry, a considerable number were either serving with the Canadian Army Overseas or of an age and medical category acceptable for the reinforcement stream. It was finally agreed that leave should be sought only for those who had experience in logging and lumbering in British Columbia. It was 30 Mar, however, before the Adjutant-General's Branch issued a circular letter. The applications of both G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers were to be referred to the Registrar of Division "Y" (Vancouver) for screening by the National Selective Service Mobilization Board: if found acceptable for placement with a logging camp, three months' leave without pay would be granted by the soldier's unit, subject to military exigencies (173). The R.C.A.F. had agreed to adopt a similar policy but the Navy decided to discharge any applicants, since it was already carrying a number of men who would never return to duty (174).

28. A return of 19 Jul noted that 585 applications for leave had been made; 220 had been rejected by the National Selective Service authorities, 66 were still pending and 290 had been approved; 266 of the last had been assigned to logging camps but only 221 had as yet been released by the Army (175). A further Adjutant-General Branch letter of 23 Jul provided for extensions of such leave (176).

29. Order in Council P.C. 4861 of 17 Jul added wood cutting to the list of occupations to which men might be directed by National Selective Service. Arrangements also were made for Japanese-Canadians, Doukhobors and Indians to be employed cutting wood (177). An earlier proposal that Engineer Works Companies should be so employed had been rejected by the C.G.S., who pointed out to Mr Ralston on 18 Apr that they were needed to assist contractors where civilian labour was short and that the pulp and paper companies possessed an organization that might be used for cutting wood (178). The subject was raised again in July, however, and, after a number of inter-departmental conferences, it was agreed that the personnel of the 10 Canadian Forestry Corps companies being returned from Scotland could be utilized to cut fire wood for the coming winter. Rather than place them in competition with civilian labour and incur trade union hostility, however, it was agreed that they should be given leave without pay in order to accept employment as individuals or groups (179). Many of the men actually returned, however, were those whose services no longer could be utilized overseas for medical reasons or who may not have been loggers in the first place (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 117). On 31 Dec 43 there were only 129 G.S. and 144 N.R.M.A. soldiers on logging leave (180).

30. By this time the lumbering industry was not in nearly as bad a position as had been made out, increased costs now limiting production in British Columbia. Therefore, N.D.H.Q. rejected a request that logging leave be extended to include operations in other parts of Canada (181). Yet the Vice Adjutant-General informed National Selective Service officials on 14 Apr 44 that sympathetic consideration would be given to requests that a limited number of N.R.M.A. soldiers who were skilled loggers might be returned to the lumbering industry from time to time, either as "key men" under the provisions of Routine Order 1935 (see below) or by discharge on medical grounds. At the end of July 445 G.S. and 149 N.R.M.A. soldiers were working as loggers (182). The month of January 1945 found 333 men still employed on logging leave: however, 112 completed their leave and, with only six new applications approved, the total number working during February dropped to 227 (183).



(iv) Port Companies, R.C.A.S.C.

31. In another attempt to ease the labour situation but ignoring completely the reason for a "home defence army", the Deputy Minister of Labour revived his earlier scheme for a Labour Corps. In a memorandum of 5 Jul 43 he suggested two courses: convert what he termed the "home defence army" into a labour corps for employment on civilian projects essential to the prosecution of the War; give N.R.M.A. personnel a form of industrial leave once they had completed six months military training, provided they accepted the work assigned by National Selective Service officials and reported every 60 days (184).

32. These suggestions were discussed at Cabinet level, at the instance of the Minister of Labour, during the July days when it was obvious that the remaining manpower pool was not big enough for all and that compromise would be necessary (185). Thus, as well as directing the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the size of home defence commitments, the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 21 Jul instructed the Ministers of National Defence and Labour to work out a method of organizing and employing a "works" battalion (186).

33. Although a Port Battalion R.C.A.S.C. was authorized only two Port Companies actually were formed to meet emergencies created by dock strikes and temporary labour shortages on the east coast. Initial organization was undertaken at No. 2 District Depot (Toronto), with men supplied by the several District Depots across the country. On 16 Oct training got under way at Camp Niagara-on-the-Lake and the companies were completed with personnel from the recently disbanded No. 1 Garrison Battalion. The early winter was spent training at Owen Sound: during this period a number of men enlisted for general service and left, while others were found to be unsuitable for long-shoremen's duties and had to be replaced. From early March until the end of November 1944, No. 2 Port Company was stationed at Debert Military Camp, sending out work parties for specific tasks. On 1 Dec 44 this unit commenced longshoremen's operations at Saint John and remained there until 14 Nov 45, when it was disbanded. No. 1 Port Company arrived in Halifax on 27 Mar 44 and remained there until the end of Jun 1946, when it was disbanded. Unloading ships had been the principal work of these units, although their personnel had been employed as harvesters and casual labour locally (187).

(v) Railway Maintenance

34. Due to the need to maintain essential services Mobilization Boards had granted postponement of military service to 2739 of the 2807 railwaymen who had made application during the last six months of 1943 (188). The maintenance of railway track was falling behind badly and, following an appeal from the President of the Canadian National Railways, the Ministers of Labour and National Defence were instructed to provide assistance. Some 528 N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers were provided during the late autumn, split equally between the C.N.R. and C.P.R. They were paid civilian wages and provided with lodgings by the railway companies. After the project came to an end on 26 Dec the low category personnel were discharged from the Army. A number eventually returned to this type of maintenance work as civilians (189).

35. This request was repeated during the spring of 1944, it being hoped that the Army would provide 1000 soldiers for track maintenance work during the coming summer and autumn (190). However, with the invasion of North-West Europe pending nothing was done until 3 Oct when Order in Council P.C.



7429 authorized the employment of soldiers on Industrial Duty (see below). Le Régiment de Joliette, then supplied 100 men for maintenance work on each of the C.N.R. and C.P.R. railway lines between Toronto and Windsor until the freeze up (191). Similarly the 24th Anti-Aircraft Regiment which had gone to Manitoba for the harvest provided 150 men for track maintenance on each of the C.N.R. and C.P.R. lines in Northwestern Ontario (192). Similar assistance was given to the railways during the summer of 1945.

(vi) Industrial Leave

36. In the case of workers in the so-called essential industries a fairly liberal policy of postponement of compulsory military training had been adopted in 1940 and continued after the training period was lengthened to four months and its members retained for indefinite service on home defence. It was the need to increase the production of the weapons of war that had induced the C.G.S. to agree to members of the C.A.S.F. stationed in Canada being permitted to return to industry during the winter of 1940-1941, without pay or medical benefits (193). According to the instruction issued on 27 Nov 40 requests for such leave (and its probable length) were to be initiated by previous employers; and opinion as to whether such an industry was essential would be sought from the Department of Munitions and Supply; military authorities reserved the right to refuse or grant such leave and to cancel it on 24 hours notice (194).

37. From the outset, recruiting officers had been cautioned not to enlist tradesmen in excess of actual requirements but the increased demand occasioned by the rapid expansion in 1940 had resulted in these instructions being honoured more often in the breach (see Appendix "O"). Although the National Labour Supply Council's study of reserved occupations and "key men"\* was primarily concerned with ensuring that war industry should not be impaired by withdrawals for compulsory military training, consideration was given to the case of skilled workers who wished to volunteer for active service. Arrangements were concluded with the Department of National Defence but only on 17 May were instructions issued that men in such categories were to be given leave without pay following medical examination until such time as the District Recruiting Officer should have discovered their status and the previous employer been given a chance to protect the individual's loss. The nearest National War Services Board would judge cases where the employer was not reconciled to the loss of a skilled man, who then might be continued on leave to industry until a replacement could be trained (196). All such leaves of absence were subject to the willingness of the recruit; if he wished to soldier he was at perfect liberty to do so and it would seem likely that most men voluntarily seeking enlistment in the Army did so from a desire to put civilian life behind them for the moment.

38. Clarification was given on 6 May 42 with the promulgation of Canadian Army Routine Order 1935. In addition to defining more clearly the procedure to be adopted when enlisting "key men" this Order made provision for soldiers of the Active Army (including N.R.M.A. members serving as Members of the Canadian Army (H.D.)) to return temporarily to war

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\*Key Man means any man employed by a war industry whose occupation, in the opinion of the National War Services Board, may not be interrupted without causing serious loss of effectiveness to his employer's activity (195).



industry on leave without pay or public liability. Once again applications were to be initiated by the previous employer and the District Officer Commanding was made responsible that such applications should be forwarded to the Divisional Registrar for hearing by the National War Services Board, together with the commanding officer's recommendation as to whether or not the soldier's retention was "operationally vital to the efficiency of the unit". Soldiers granted such leave were subject to recall on 48 hours notice. Although amended from time to time this Routine Order remained the basis for granting industrial leave to serving personnel.

39. With industrial employment reaching a peak during the early autumn of 1943 more urgent requests for assistance were forwarded by Mr MacNamara to the Vice Adjutant-General. The urgency of the request of 9 Sep from the International Nickel Company of Canada for the return of 32 former employees on industrial leave was strongly supported by the Metals Controller of the Department of Munitions and Supply (197). Investigation disclosed that four of the 32 men sought were serving in the R.C.A.F., three were at Goose Bay and one had been struck off strength as a deserter (198). Military Districts were instructed to grant six months leave to the remainder, with the following result: two soldiers had gone overseas, four did not wish leave, two were in medical hands pending discharge, one had been discharged and 15 took leave (199). The whereabouts of a second list of 20 former employees who had all written that they would like to return to civilian employment was checked. However, a letter from the Minister of Labour, dated 15 Oct and suggesting that since 3562 of the 12600 labour force employed by International Nickel had volunteered, or been enrolled, it would be desirable to grant six months industrial leave to all "B" men [i.e. "key men"] who so desired, brought an angry retort from Mr Ralston (200). The latter's reply of 19 Oct suggested that probably several times 12,600 had passed through International Nickel plants in the previous three and a half years and that a list of those who had left for other civilian employment during that period should be compiled: as it was the Army had got 1502, the Navy 280, the R.C.A.F. 814, the Corps of (civilian) Canadian Fire Fighters nine and the remaining 957 could not be traced\*. Mr Ralston's letter further stated:

I am obviously not prepared to offer "every B man" who desires to take six months' leave the privilege of doing so to go back to International Nickel and I would anticipate that my Colleagues of the Navy and Air Force would not be prepared to do so either (202).

40. Attempts were made to assist the meat packing industry during the same autumn, but the request was dropped in 1944 when only 25 soldiers out of the 226 former employees supposedly serving were found to be available for leave (203). On 26 Jun 44 the Deputy Minister of Labour was informed of the disposition of 24 ex-linemen that the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission was anxious to have returned: seven were serving overseas, 11 were of an age and category suitable for overseas service, four might be ineligible for overseas service because of age and category but still required by the Army in Canada and two had been discharged (204).

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\*Actually, the industrial Mobilization Survey Committees established during the preceding winter had established the fact that there was a large migration and wastage of industrial manpower. In order to maintain a labour force of 12,000 some 60,000 men had passed through the Aluminium Company of Canada's plants at Arvida, Quebec in the space of a single year. Workers became dissatisfied with the high cost of living and lack of recreational facilities and moved on, but without notifying the local National Selective Service officials. This was a problem common to all large companies operating plants in isolated communities (201).



41. By this time industrial employment had passed its peak and both National Selective Service and the Army were endeavouring to ensure that the first employees to be discharged should be physically fit younger men suitable for military service. However, the need for additional munitions for the Second Front had started an upward trend in the shell filling industry and necessitated the re-opening of plants which had been but recently closed down (205).

42. On 30 Jun 44 the Minister of Labour appealed to the Minister of National Defence for further assistance, pointing out that International Nickel would have to shut down one of its furnaces, producing 500 tons a month (the amount of nickel being shipped to Russia), because of a shortage of 1900 underground and 200 process workers. He requested that there should be no further enlistment of such miners and suggested that 500 ex-miners then in uniform should be given extended leave. According to Mr Mitchell's letter:

I do not think there is any single item vitally connected with the war effort for which Canada is solely responsible unless it be nickel. You may be assured that we have been working on a supply of labour for this employer by every method within the limits of our existing manpower controls over the past year without success in supplying the kind of labour that can do this job. These miners have been working thirteen out of fourteen days, and the problem is more than one of quality of manpower (206).

On 11 Jul Mr Ralston replied that the number of enlistments was not great enough to justify refusal to anyone: furthermore, it had never been the practice to detail soldiers for work of a civilian nature unless they volunteered. Of the 1502 former employees of International Nickel who had been found to be in the Army late in 1943 a spot check had revealed that, after deducting those that were overseas, discharged or otherwise unavailable, there would be only 450 from which to draw, even if these could be spared or wished to return to Sudbury (207).

43. Convincing industrialists, trade union officials and others that the provision of trained reinforcements was even more important at this time than worrying about production figures was an uphill battle and on 19 Jun the Deputy Minister of Labour sought Brigadier deLalanne's assistance before replying to the arguments being put forward by the National Selective Service Advisory Board in Toronto. As he pointed out in his request for help:

It is extremely important to us that we convince our Boards and Officials that the shortage of manpower is no easy solution such as "take the men needed out of the Home Defence Army" (208).

Brigadier deLalanne's reply of 29 Jun explained that:

Up to the present, we have been in the fortunate position of being able to meet reinforcement demands from overseas with voluntary enlistments. However, whether we continue to maintain the Army overseas on this basis depends on the unknown factors of recruiting and the casualties which we may suffer.

The NRMA soldiers are a strategic reserve against a fall in voluntary recruitment and against very severe casualties. Up to the present it has been considered advisable to conserve their numbers as much as possible and to keep them in a state of active training. Furthermore, there is a steady



turnover from NRMA to General Service status, which, although not large, would probably cease altogether were these men not kept in training. Such of these men who do "go active" after being fully trained are available almost immediately for overseas service, and it has been felt that the advantages, from the standpoint of morale, of maintaining the Army overseas entirely on a voluntary basis are such as for the present to override other considerations.

With reference to the argument put forward by the Toronto Advisory Board that "The need for a Home Defence Army no longer exists", you might point out that the defence of this continent and the adjacent territories is not a matter which affects Canada alone, but is considered jointly with the U.S. It is doubtful whether the persons advancing the argument referred to above could care to accept the responsibility of dismantling and disbanding all our Coast and Anti-Aircraft defences. G.S. personnel are being withdrawn from these units as quickly as is feasible and will be replaced by N.R.M.A. soldiers. The number of N.R.M.A. soldiers already is greatly in excess of G.S. so employed.

In the meantime, the approved policy of the Minister of National Defence is to discharge all men who are unable to meet the required standards of operational duty and who cannot be adequately employed within an approved establishment, or who are not required in the Army because of their technical, military or trades qualifications....

The policy which I have cited in the foregoing is that which has been in effect to date, but as you know, the whole question of size and composition of the Army in Canada and the employment of N.R.M.A. personnel is receiving serious consideration by our Minister and his advisors (209).

44. With the harvest nearing completion further demands were made that soldiers be employed on work "in the national interest". At the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 20 Sep Mr Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) proposed that surplus military personnel in Canada should be made available for civilian projects when the industrial conversion programme got under way. At the meeting of 22 Sep he stressed that men would have to be made available to get conversion started and make it possible to hire larger numbers later. The question was still under discussion on the following day when the Prime Minister ruled that, even though overseas personnel would have to be assured of rapid demobilization, there would be shipping delays and it would be necessary to release personnel in Canada in order to create conditions for post war full employment. After all, he argued, the country would not continue large numbers of N.R.M.A. soldiers in idleness when the need for home defence was past and their services were required by the civilian economy. The Minister of National Defence insisted that physically fit N.R.M.A. soldiers constituted an additional reserve of reinforcements for use overseas, if the need arose, and should not be discharged. The Committee agreed, however, that N.R.M.A. personnel might be given leave and directed to civilian employment depending on the military situation.

45. During Mr Ralston's visit to the Canadian Army Overseas, Order in Council (P.C. 7429) was passed, authorizing



the employment of soldiers in industry where recommended by the Minister of Labour and approved by the Minister of National Defence (210). Such approved places of work included brickyards, flour and feed mills, cold storage plants, sugar refineries, food processing plants and hospitals (operated by the Department of Pensions and National Health). In his letter of 2 Oct, however, Mr C.G. Power, Associate Minister of National Defence, cautioned the Minister of Labour that it was very unlikely that other than N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers ever would be detailed for such employment. Furthermore:

While every effort will be made by this department to meet demands for men who may be detailed for duty under the provisions of this Order, you will appreciate I am sure that the provision of men of any category or classification will be subject to the prior needs of the Army.

I would also suggest that it is extremely desirable that the provisions of this Order should be used as sparingly as possible, at any rate to start with, as demands for assistance will undoubtedly be heavy and widespread as soon as the plan starts to operate (211).

46. Arrangements were completed to send 351 French-speaking soldiers to No. 2 District Depot for industrial duty in the Toronto area and the balance of the 24th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (not detailed for railway maintenance) was held in Military District No. 10 for possible employment in Winnipeg meat packing plants (212). By the end of October 20 requests for soldiers to be employed on industrial duty had been forwarded by the Department of Labour to N.D.H.Q. (213). However, on 17 Oct Mr Power had further advised the Minister of Labour as follows:

I cannot emphasize too strongly the fact that contrary to the popular conception of the Army in Canada, the number of men available for duty in industry is strictly limited. A large proportion of the Army in Canada is employed on Service and Administrative duties and cannot be used otherwise, whilst many others have operational duties from which they can be spared only for short periods and for duties of extreme importance and urgency. It must be realized, therefore, that the inclusion of an industry on the approved list is no guarantee that men will be available for it (214).

On 19 Nov there were 925 soldiers on Industrial Duty, including 500 men engaged in railway maintenance which would cease with the coming of winter. Termination of employment by the remainder was visualized as (215):

1 Jan 45	- 55 men
1 Mar 45	- 15 men
15 Apr 45	- 20 men
1 Nov 45	-100 men
Indefinite	-235 men
	<u>425 men</u>

47. During the course of General McNaughton's initial appearance in the House of Commons on 23 Nov he announced that G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers who were not of an age and medical category acceptable for overseas service would either be discharged to civilian life or engaged on work of national importance as members of General Employment Companies (216). The



organization of such companies had been contemplated for some time as a means of finding employment for up to 3000 low category men who could not be absorbed in the Home War Establishment (217). There was the further point that N.R.M.A. soldiers should not be allowed to return to civilian life and have a pick of jobs while volunteers were still fighting overseas.

48. On 29 Nov 44 the Adjutant-General's Branch issued an instruction authorizing the formation of 13 such General Employment Companies, one for each Military District and Camps Borden and Petawawa (218). As of 8 Dec only 260 soldiers were employed on Industrial Duty; all in the Toronto area and they were absorbed in No. 2 General Employment Company which had an authorized establishment of eight officers and 439 other ranks, whereas the other companies were limited to a platoon of two officers and 92 other ranks (219). On 16 Dec the Adjutant-General reported to the Minister of National Defence that outstanding requisitions from the Department of Labour totalled just under 600 men but that many were in abeyance because of difficulties with local trade unions or the lack of accommodation (220). Furthermore, since there was little to indicate that the existing pioneer sections (R.C.E.) were not capable of handling military works projects, the Adjutant-General considered that there was no need to press the Military Districts to complete their General Employment Companies to authorized establishments (221).

49. On 7 Mar 45 there were General Employment Companies in nine of the Military Districts and Camp Borden, with an actual strength of 19 officers and 803 other ranks (329 G.S., 468 N.R.M.A. and six C.W.A.C.). No. 2 General Employment Company of 6 officers and 252 other ranks in the Toronto area had men working on hospital construction, in brickyards and malleable iron foundries. The other companies were engaged on such duties as maintenance of temporarily unoccupied military camps, unloading and distributing coal, transferring and loading Ordnance and Medical stores (222).

50. As time passed it became necessary to withdraw soldiers from such employment in order to supply reinforcements for overseas service and make good deficiencies in units which had been depleted for that purpose (223). On 23 Mar, therefore, instructions were issued to reduce all the General Employment Companies to nil strength by 15 Apr (224). An exception was made in the case of No. 2 General Employment Company, which was continued with a reduced establishment so that soldiers could continue to be employed on industrial projects (225). No. 10 Company was re-formed during May and a No. 3 Company was organized at Kinston to employ men on essential work until their turn came for demobilization (226).



APPENDIX "H" - THE FUNCTION OF THE RESERVE ARMY

1. During the winter of 1939-1940 the Non-Permanent Active Militia units which had not supplied a C.A.S.F. unit carried on much as before, although considerably greater enthusiasm was engendered and the ranks swollen by men considering the possibility of active service should the War take a more serious turn. During May and June further N.P.A.M. units were called upon to supply C.A.S.F. components but it was not until 18 Jun that the acting Minister of National Defence made a definite reference to a role for the Non-Permanent Active Militia and appealed to ex-soldiers to come forward and swell its ranks. Authority had been given to all N.P.A.M. Infantry units not yet mobilized, and certain units of other corps, to recruit to establishment and subsequently this authority was extended to permit those Infantry units which had contributed to the C.A.S.F. to form a "second" battalion. The creation of 26 reserve companies for the Veterans' Guard of Canada also was authorized. On 29 Jul the Minister of National Defence told the House of Commons that the 91 N.P.A.M. Infantry units had a total establishment of 88,000 but only 47,373 men actually enrolled. He went on to explain that recruiting would come to an end on 15 Aug and that after that the only entry into the N.P.A.M. would be through the 30-day compulsory military training scheme, which would be operated by members of the N.P.A.M. employed full time (227).

2. After recruiting had ceased, and all returns may be presumed to have been received at Ottawa (31 Aug), the strength of the N.P.A.M. stood at 107,219 all ranks (228). Although a good part of this increase may be credited to the desire of older men to "do their bit" there can be little doubt that a considerable number of young men enlisted to avoid the social stigma of being enrolled for compulsory military training. Actually these trainees merely were posted to N.P.A.M. units as supernumeraries unless they expressed a desire to participate in the local training programme. (As of 28 Mar 41 a total of 73,515 men of the three classes of 30-day recruits had been posted to the supernumerary strength of Reserve units but only 1193 were undergoing training). In November the Non-Permanent Active Militia became the Canadian Army(Reserve). The functions of its units were considered to be training for home defence, for active service if mobilized, and the provision of Officers, N.C.Os. and specialists as reinforcements for units already mobilized (229).

3. However, Major-General Hon. W.A. Griesbach (Inspector-General, Western Canada) summed up the actual position in a memorandum of 16 Jan 41, a good part of which is reproduced below:

I fear that the word "reserve" is misleading in that men are joining that service with no intention whatever of volunteering for overseas service; that our so called Reserve Army may degenerate into a sort of glorified funk hole where men get into a unit and lead themselves, and others, to think that they are doing their whole duty in the present emergency at little cost to themselves....

The evidence before me is that when recruits are called for the Active Force very few volunteers come from Reserve Army formations and that the few recruits that are being called for are being picked-up on the streets.



I have talked with a number of unit commanders of Reserve Army formations, most of whom are hopeful that their units will be called up as a whole. When I ask them how many of their present membership will volunteer in the circumstances they are vague. They think that all their junior officers would volunteer and that most of their older fit officers would do so, but as for the rest they can only guess what would happen.

I asked one of these unit commanders to put his views in writing. The following points emerged:-

- (a) He thinks that at least 75% of his men definitely enlisted for home defence only, and a good proportion of these only expect to be called out in case of a national emergency in Canada.
- (b) He notes reluctance on the part of men (with which he is inclined to agree) to go in driplets, on short notice, to an Active Force unit. He thinks that while his men might be willing to go in the Reserve Army unit to which they belong in some numbers they dislike the idea of going in small numbers amongst strangers. He also thinks that men in good employment are justified in examining the whole matter from all points of view.
- (c) He thinks that the younger men who refrain from volunteering for active service are not to be described as "yellow" but are doing a good deal of talking amongst themselves and consider the voluntary system unfair. They see no reason why they should volunteer for active service and another young man of their own age step into their shoes in civilian life or some foreigner establish himself in the position they formerly occupied. Mothers of sons who have enlisted and mothers of sons who have not enlisted take the same view.
- (d) This officer points out that there is no steady call for recruits, no policy of orderly steady recruitment, no suggestion of urgency, no popular clamour, no social pressure, in short no apparent real need for men at all.

This officer commands a battery of artillery which has no guns and has a strength of 150 all ranks. This battery and another battery of the same strength were asked recently for 50 volunteers for the Active Service Force. One man from each battery only volunteered and both were found to be in category "E". The 50 volunteers necessary were ultimately found without the frame work of the Reserve Army or any other military organization, in short they came in off the street.

I am told that when the South Alberta Regiment was raised the commanders of four units in



Reserve Army were asked to say how many men their units could contribute to this battalion. In reply they gave various estimates of from 400 to 600 men, each, from their then membership. Actually the four commanders produced about 200 men amongst them from their existing membership and the rest of the battalion (now up to strength) was brought in off the street.

Recently a draft of 28 men was called for from the 2nd Petrol Park Coy., R.C.A.S.C. (R.A.) which is at a strength of 430 all ranks. 33 men volunteered and 8 finally passed the medical examination. 2 more men came from the 2nd Reserve Bn. Edmonton Regiment and passed the medical board. The remaining 18 men were recruited off the street.

This raises the question of the medical examination for admission into the Reserve Army, the value of the same and the physical condition of the men in the Reserve Army. I am informed that recruits for the Reserve Army are examined by one medical officer who receives a dollar a head for the job. If a substantial number of these men are medically unfit, then it seems to me, we are wasting money and equipment, to say nothing of time and space on a number of men who would be no use to us upon mobilization for the defence of Canada and upon others who would ultimately appear in large numbers upon the pension rolls.

When I was inspecting the 2nd Bn. Irish Fusiliers (R.A.) I commented upon the good looking faces of the men in the ranks. I noticed also their maturity. Lieut.-Colonel K.A. McLennan, the O.C., assured me that they were indeed a fine body of men and that everyone of them had a job. In the light of subsequent experience I am now inclined to the view that scarcely any of them would volunteer for active service. There is nothing remarkable about this. In the whole history of raising armies upon a voluntary basis the economic condition of the individual has played a part, both for and against enlistment. This economic deterrent will only be swept aside in the face of a great patriotic urge, artificially produced or resulting from some terrible misadventure of military disaster (always a possibility) which, like a flash of lightning discloses the reality or by a form of social pressure that closely approximates compulsion. This, so far, has been completely absent in the raising of troops in this war in Canada.

The Reserve Army at the moment is partially clothed, without personal equipment and armed with American rifles for which no ammunition is issued. In the year ending December 31st, 1940, the units had achieved what was said to be approximately the equivalent of 30 days training, partly in camp and partly at local headquarters. A maximum of 30 rounds had been fired in musketry. In point of fact very little more had been accomplished than some arms drill, platoon and company drill.

The senior officers, in many instances, served in



the last war and while a bit rusty in their work should be steady and reliable. The junior officers are young men for the most part without any training except such as they were able to pick up in various ways in the latter part of 1940.

At the end of 1940 this force was unfit to take the field or to perform the simplest duties of an armed force. Not only was this so because of lack of equipment but also because of lack of training. The training actually given merely brought the troops within measurable distance of further training which would or might have fitted them to perform useful military service if called upon. At the moment these troops have not been trained to march, to provide for their own protection by day and by night at the halt or on the move. They have not been taught to advance under fire and to attack or fall back under mutually protecting fire. In other words they have not been trained at all in the principles and practice of fire and movement. For these reasons they could not be used usefully in action except as last ditch troops (230).

General Griesbach considered that, unless an alert and definite policy were adopted at once, the whole Reserve Army would be just so much wasted money and effort.

4. The C.G.S. still held the view, however, that "active" recruiting "off the street" should be kept to the smallest proportions and men passed through Reserve units even though they did not do much actual training. In a memorandum of 4 Feb he suggested to the Adjutant-General that D.Os.C. should be prodded to obtain their monthly quotas from local Reserve units (231). On 8 Feb a new policy for the Reserve Army was issued by the Adjutant-General:

- (a) As a general principle, Reserve units which have furnished an active component (2nd Battalions, etc.) will not be mobilized for Active Service overseas unless all other qualified and suitable organized Reserve units of the arm and type concerned and required, have provided an Active component.
- (b) It follows that the present primary responsibility of 2nd Battalions, etc. is the provision of reinforcements for their Active components. With this responsibility in mind it will be necessary for a high proportion of personnel of such units to be of proper medical category.
- (c) The primary responsibility of Reserve units that have not yet furnished an Active component is to prepare for subsequent mobilization. With this possibility in view, it will be incumbent on Commanding Officers to see to it that the officer and other rank personnel of their establishment are of such medical category that the change of the unit from Reserve to Active standing can take place with a minimum displacement of personnel. These units should also be prepared to find such reinforcement quotas as may be called for from time to time.



- (d) All Reserve units that have been authorized to organize are liable to be mobilized for home defence (including Aid to Civil Power) in the event of the situation overseas undergoing a sudden change. In addition, certain Reserve units in the Atlantic and Pacific Commands have been, or will be given a definite operational role in the defence of Canada plan (232).

As an initial step, Reserve units were authorized to resume recruiting in order to replace personnel recruited for active service.

5. On 25 Jul 41 the C.G.S. sought the comments of all D.Os.C. and G.Os.C.-in-C. before a further memorandum was issued on Reserve Army policy (233). He particularly wished them to discuss with representative Reserve unit commanding officers the advisability of raising the age limit and lowering the medical category for enlistment, training policy and the employment of other than Infantry units. Their comments and a copy of the draft memorandum were submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 20 Aug, together with an explanatory note from General Crerar emphasizing the increased importance which had been accorded since May to the possibility of "Aid to the Civil Power":

... The indications of possible unrest during the next few months are fairly ominous and should such circumstances arise, it would be very undesirable to allow active units to be diverted from their primary role of Home Defence or of fitting themselves to proceed overseas. Yet the probability of calls being made on the Army for such internal duties has recently been much increased by the passage on 28th July of P.C. Order No. 58304

Moreover, no matter how we may fare internally during the further course of this war, it seems certain that post-war conditions are more than likely to be even more critical than those we experienced in 1919. I should not be surprised if the Winnipeg strike of that year were to be repeated, and with more serious consequences, in a number of localities. We must therefore have a healthy and vigorous Reserve Army in being at that time, into which the best elements of the demobilized Active Army can be enrolled to assist in the maintenance of the civil authority (235).

6. Mr Ralston required certain changes (236), however, and it was 17 Sep before a revised policy could be issued, together with a covering letter signed by the Minister of National Defence (237). The role of the Reserve Army was now envisaged as follows:

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\*Order in Council authorizing active militia to be called out to suppress riots, etc., on request of Minister of Munitions and Supply. The need for such an Order would seem to have been precipitated by an illegal strike which began among the potmen at Arvida, Quebec on 24 Jul 41 and had embraced about 7800 employees working for the Aluminum Company of Canada. The situation having got out of hand, the Quebec Attorney-General took steps to have troops sent to the scene; they arrived on the morning of 27 Jul and at noon, the following day, the Riot Act was read. By the afternoon of 29 Jul, however, the Syndicate had regained control over its members, who went back to work after an absence of five days. The troops were withdrawn on 31 Jul (234).



- (a) Defence of Canada in Canada  
Operational defence role wherever such may be required.
- (b) Aid of the Civil Power  
Duty in Aid of the Civil Power in the event of subversive or other disturbances. Included in this duty will be aid to the civil authorities in the event of municipal disorganization, resulting from air or other attacks, of a nature beyond the power of local authorities and Air Raid Precaution Services effectively to deal with.
- (c) Reinforcement of the Active Army  
The continued supply of reinforcements to Active counterparts must always be regarded as an important role of Reserve Army units (238).

None of the roles was given priority but, with the recognition that certain older men who were not available for overseas service might wish to participate in (a) and (b), the maximum age limit was raised to 50 years and the medical category for enlistment lowered to "C". It was suggested, however, that in order to meet (c) up to 60 per cent of the personnel should be aged 19-45 and in medical category "A"; moreover, 18 year old boys should be encouraged to enlist for preliminary training before they were old enough to volunteer for general service.

7. During the course of his statement of 6 Nov to the House of Commons on National Defence Mr Ralston pointed out that:

... the reserve army constitutes an important factor in the defence of Canada and in maintaining our active army overseas. In order to meet the situations as they arise in an ever-changing war it is essential that we have the reserve army well organized, well trained and, as far as possible consistent with other requirements, well armed. Present plans do not contemplate any extensive additional mobilization of reserve units, but that possibility must be kept in mind....

What they are doing is paying special attention to training, both basic and advanced and specialized. There will also be increased issue and distribution of equipment with regard to the reserve army, taking into account, of course, the needs of the active units. It is no lip-service I am paying when I point out what a valuable contribution the reserve army of Canada and its officers have made to this war effort through at first being the backbone of the active army, being in their places and endeavouring in every possible way to train men to make them ready to enlist in active units, and doing their best to induce them to understand what their duty is when the call comes.

... To some extent the reserve consists of men who because of financial or domestic or personal reasons are unable to take their places in the active army. In the reserve they are trying to do their part as best they can, so that we may release all the men possible for active duty (239).



8. The paper strength of the Reserve Army at this time (8 Nov) was 146,611 all ranks: however, 63,322 were N.R.M.A. 30-day recruits still carried on paper as supernumeraries (only 6144 had been absorbed into establishments) and 3151 were employed on full time duty with training centres under authority of General Order 13<sup>o</sup> of 1940 (240).

9. The entrance of Japan into the Second World War resulted in a further change in policy. Further Reserve units were mobilized, including "second" battalions for a number of Infantry regiments, to complete the 6th and 7th Divisions, form three brigade groups of an 8th Division and provide additional units for coast defence. Effective 2 Feb 42, Maj-Gen B.W. Browne vacated the appointment of Adjutant-General to become Director General of the Reserve Army. Acting upon the recommendation of the several District Officers Commanding, units were selected for inclusion in a reserve brigade group to be formed in each Military District. A full time commander and nucleus staff were provided and sufficient equipment to enable these units to receive accelerated training. The remaining Reserve units either were to continue their existing training or become dormant, depending on their strength and efficiency. Since action was going to be taken to end the immunity from compulsory military training enjoyed by members of the Reserve Army, the units slated for the reserve brigade groups were directed to retain only men between the ages of 19 and 35, who either were medically unfit for active service (Medical category lower than "B") or postponed because of employment in essential occupations, and those who were either younger or older (241).

10. In an effort to ape the exploits of guerrilla fighters of other nations and satisfy public opinion the Canadian Government authorized the formation of Coast Defence Guards on both coasts lated in February. Units of what were to become the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were organized in 17 coastal areas from among trappers, loggers and fishermen who were supplied with sporting rifles, steel helmets and armbands, but not uniforms (242). By the end of 1942, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, which had become a corps of the Reserve Army, had a total strength of approximately 11,500 in its 130 authorized companies (243).

11. Instead of creating a similar organization within Atlantic Command, as originally intended, the situation was met by adding supernumerary companies to the existing Reserve units which were spread more evenly throughout the Maritime Provinces than had been the case in British Columbia(244). Nearly every village along the shoreline came to have either a platoon or coast watching detachment (245). Steps also were taken to organize a second reserve brigade group in Military District No. 6.

12. As a result of U-Boat activities in the St. Lawrence steps were taken during September and October 1942 to enlist the inhabitants of small coastal communities along the Gaspé peninsula into sub-units of Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent. The scheme grew sufficiently, with 56 communities participating, for the creation of an additional reserve battalion for Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent (246). By February 1943 the 2nd battalion had a strength of 22 officers and 1001 other ranks, while the 3rd battalion comprised 18 officers and 1604 other ranks (A.F.Q. Report No. 30).

13. The Reserve Army's recruiting campaign and the extension of the age limits brought results. Despite the number of units mobilized for active service during 1942 the strength of the Reserve Army increased to 100,045 all ranks. Although 35,941 non-effectives were not training there were



27,670 active members in the coastal Military Districts and 25,170 men who might be withdrawn from the interior as an operational reserve without disrupting essential civilian services and war industry (247). Training was increased from 30 to 40 days (15 days in camp, 10 days at week end schemes and 15 days (i.e. 45 evenings) at local armouries). An additional 15 days training was available for Officers, N.C.Os. and specialists (248).

14. By degrees the provisions of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations were extended so that other ranks of the Reserve Army (excluding warrant officers) were no longer exempt from compulsory military service if they fell within the callable ages. (Postponement of such service was still possible, however, for those engaged in essential occupations.) After 26 Nov 42 all enlistments in the Reserve Army were for the duration of the War and authority was given subsequently to extend for a further 12 months all three year engagements that should expire subsequent to 22 Oct 44. As the younger members reached the age of 18 1/2 years, however, they were encouraged to volunteer for general service. During the period 31 Mar-31 Dec 43 some 4682 men volunteered for general service. At the latter date the strength of the Reserve Army was 6033 officers and 82,324 other ranks (249). Apart from the re-location of certain units and sub-units during the year a number of the least effectual were permitted to become dormant (250).

15. With Germany and Japan definitely on the defensive by mid-summer 1943 and Canada's home defences being reduced so that more reinforcements could be despatched overseas public interest in the Reserve Army began to slump. Consequent upon a discussion with D.Os.C. on the future of the Reserve Army the C.G.S. advised the Minister of National Defence on 21 Oct that the role of the Reserve Army should again be defined. While there was no need to continue a Reserve Army of approximately six divisions, trained and equipped to participate in home defence, General Stuart considered that a post-war Army (Active and Reserve) probably would be based on a force of six divisions and four armoured brigades, with the necessary complement of corps troops and coast and anti-aircraft defences (251). The Minister of National Defence had proceeded on his autumn visit to the Canadian Army Overseas, however, before approving a revised role (252).

16. The new Director General of the Reserve Army (Maj-Gen F.R. Phelan) proceeded to visit each Military District in Canada, as directed by Mr Ralston, to attempt to restore interest in the Reserve Army. According to the report made to the C.G.S. on 28 Dec, however, he had found a general note of discouragement: recruiting had fallen off, there was only 50-60 per cent attendance at mid-week drills and there was a general air of complacency and belief that the War was nearly over. Such a view had been strengthened by the unguarded utterances of certain prominent public men and the opinions circulated to business men by certain "Market Letters". The latter suggested there no longer was a need for the Reserve Army and that a good deal of money could be saved by its curtailment. Unless something constructive were undertaken, General Phelan believed that the keen personnel would become discouraged (253). General Phelan's recommendations were incorporated in a press release issued on 10 Feb 44 at which time the role of the Reserve Army was stated as follows:

- (a) To maintain throughout the country continued interest in the Canadian Army and its activities and to set an example to all citizens of preparedness at all times.



- (b) To provide a continuing flow of reinforcements for the forces overseas by training young men of pre-enlistment age.
- (c) To back up the civil authority responsible for the enforcement of law and order if required.
- (d) As a trained reserve to support the Active forces available for the defence of Canada if the Military situation should deteriorate.
- (e) As a basis for expansion of the Active Army should the necessity arise (254).

17. Speaking to the House of Commons on the following day, Mr Ralston referred to the Reserve Army as "insurance against the uncertainties of War". He described its role as:

... maintaining throughout the country continued interest in the Canadian Army and its activities, and to set to all citizens an example of preparedness at all times. This is what they have done right through, and I do not think it was needed at any time more than it is now. Many of these men are perhaps working at work benches during the day in munition factories or in stores or offices or on the farm, but in the evenings they give their time to training, and to fitting themselves for a possible emergency, should the time come. They serve in two ways. I do not know any better example of "preparedness" than is found in the Reserve Army (255).

18. Due to the improved military situation, however, the period of training was being shortened from 40 to 30 days and the numbers of officers and other ranks employed on full time training reduced. This Reserve Army policy statement also had stated:

While no general change in the structure of the Reserve Army is contemplated, it is proposed that some measure of "streamlining" will take place to ensure that all units maintain a satisfactory standard of efficiency. Units unable to maintain a satisfactory strength and efficiency will become dormant for the duration of the war (256).

The several D.Os.C. were asked for recommendations as to whether weak units should become dormant or be continued on a reduced establishment, where local sentiment was strong (257). In the majority of cases they became dormant. The Reserve brigade groups in M.D. Nos. 7 and 12 were broken up (258).

19. Although considerable interest was displayed in the units which had been converted to an anti-aircraft role with a view to providing defence for certain industrial areas in Ontario and Quebec and the coastal regions (259), generally speaking there was decreased attendance at summer camps. Apart from the C.O.T.C., the strength of the Reserve Army dwindled. On 31 Mar 45 the total strength of the Reserve Army stood at 5535 officers and 77,729 other ranks (260).



APPENDIX "J" - "X" LIST

1. Retention of Canadian troops in the United Kingdom for a long period during the Second World War made it unnecessary to follow the procedure outlined in Field Service Regulations, Part I (1930) whereby an "X" List was to be maintained for every corps in order to account for all officers and other ranks who were not regimentally employed. According to the System of Providing and Maintaining C.A.S.F. Personnel in the United Kingdom, issued 8 Aug 40, an "X" List was continued only to show personnel posted to a headquarters or extra regimental unit and those who might become prisoners of war. This in turn was superseded by a pamphlet entitled System of Providing and Maintaining Personnel for the Canadian Army Overseas, 1942. However, a trial pamphlet entitled Canadian Unit Guide to Documentation in a Theatre of War (Overseas), 1943 and introduced during Exercise "SPARTAN", became the basis for the "X" List procedure introduced for the original Canadian Force which proceeded to Sicily (261). The Canadian Section, G.F.S. 2nd Echelon was instructed to maintain an "X" List for each corps\* or battalion under the following headings:

- X-1 Verified Prisoners of War.
- X-2 All ranks under sentence of detention or imprisonment except in cases where the sentence is suspended.
- X-3 All ranks evacuated on Medical Grounds beyond Regimental Aid Posts.
- X-4 Unposted reinforcements in the theatre of war belonging to the Corps.
- X-5 All ranks on courses of three months or over in a theatre of war.
- X-6 All ranks posted as missing.

When reinforcements first arrived in a theatre of operations they were posted to the X-4 List: from that they could be moved to other Lists prior to being posted to an authorized war establishment.

2. During October 1943 this organization was modified by Part III of a new System of Providing and Maintaining Personnel for the Canadian Army Overseas. In practice, as the Canadian Force in the Mediterranean grew larger and expanded its activities it became necessary to increase the number of categories into which the "X" List was divided, although the tenth classification was added only with a further revision of this pamphlet in May 1944:

- X-7 All ranks seconded from the Canadian Army to other Allied Forces in the theatre of war.
- X-8 All non-effectives held at Base Reinforcement Units whose return to the U.K. has been authorized.
- X-9 All personnel held at Base Reinforcement Units, who, for one reason or another, are

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\*Later became branch in the case of C.A.C and R.C.A.



not available as reinforcements and whose disposition is still to be decided.

X-10 All reinforcement personnel attached away from reinforcement units under appropriate authority.

Henceforth, however, all ranks posted from units to fill vacancies in a headquarters or extra-regimental unit were to be carried on a special Corps List, NOT to be confused with the "X" List.

3. With effect from 15 Jan 44 the "X" List procedure had been adopted for the personnel of units remaining in the United Kingdom as part of First Canadian Army. Although only the breakdown given above was ever authorized, special conditions pertaining to North-West Europe resulted in the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, 21st Army Group introducing certain additional classifications.

4. In order to simplify the handling of reinforcements only those officers and other ranks who were attached out from the Base Reinforcement Group and those staff officers who were attached out for special employment and could not be recalled on short notice were left permanently on the X-10 List. The remainder were shown on an expanded X-4 List:

X-4 All unposted reinforcements who are physically present in 2 C.B.R.G.

X-4(a) All reinforcements who, under agreed policy, are not held in 2 C.B.R.G. but are attached out to units or formations in order that they may maintain their skill at their trade or specialty. This includes nursing sisters, officer reinforcements for C Int C, reinforcements for meteorological, survey and dental units. These personnel, although attached out, can be used at any time to fill vacancies as they arise in field units and will be replaced by additional reinforcements demanded from the U.K.

X-4(b) All reinforcements who are physically present in 2 C.B.R.G. but who are attached out temporarily, i.e., casual attachments such as working parties who can be recalled at short notice and used to refill reinforcement demands.

X-4(Staff) All reinforcement staff officers who are being held in 2 C.B.R.G.

X-4(a)(Staff) All reinforcement staff officers who are attached out for employment at various formation headquarters but who can be posted on short notice to vacancies in W.E.

5. Similarly, a new division was made under X-3 to handle:

X-3(a) All ranks who, by virtue of PULHEMS grading or medical grounds, are not suitable as X-4 personnel but who are not of sufficiently low category to warrant return to U.K. [Authorized to account for personnel held in Special Employment Companies in A.A.I. on 28 Jan 45].

6. A final classification, X-11, was employed to



account for military personnel employed with Civil Affairs Groups  
and the Canadian Red Cross.



APPENDIX "K" - AVOIDABLE WASTAGE IN THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

1. The existence of a volunteer Army for Overseas service made it more difficult, particularly in the early months of the War when there were no adequate "screening" procedures, to refuse undesirable individuals who sought enlistment and too many men in the following classifications managed to get overseas:

- (a) Chronic alcoholics.
- (b) Drug addicts.
- (c) Persons having history of treatment in any mental institution.
- (d) Persons known to have repeated convictions for civil offences.
- (e) Incurable soldiers, i.e. those who have repeatedly undergone detention, either with their units or in special detention barracks.
- (f) Soldiers who are obviously much older or much younger than military age, even though of apparently good type (262).

According to the Clinical Volume of the Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945 there were enough such soldiers serving long sentences of imprisonment or detention in the United Kingdom, during the last two years of War, to more than equal the strength of an Infantry Battalion (263).

2. The 42 months of waiting in the United Kingdom were rather boring and undoubtedly led a number of men to go absent without leave, during which periods they obtained civilian jobs or became involved in petty rackets. Such absences were the most prevalent military offence, being better than 50 per cent of the total (264). Only 58 men were struck off strength during this period as deserters (265). It had been estimated at C.M.H.Q. that between four and five per cent of the Canadian troops in the United Kingdom became involved in military offences per month, with 60 per cent of the cases going to courts martial (266).

3. Documentary material is not readily available and "avoidable wastage" must be a subject for medical and sociological study. However, the following paragraphs will set forth the problems faced in actual theatres of war for the benefit of those who are reading this report.

(a) Battle Exhaustion.

4. The Canadian Medical History of the Second World War suggests that psychiatric disabilities account for approximately 30 per cent of all casualties invalided out of the Army: over 80 per cent of these showed "definite evidence of constitutional predisposition to psychotic or neurotic breakdown," or "had constitutional defects such as mental deficiency or psychopathic personality" (267). The problem had been met and faced in Italy. As early as 22 Jun 44 the war diarist of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforcement Battalion in Normandy reported:

... We now have considerable numbers of men returned from the front labelled "Battle



Exhaustion" cases. When the shells came over, the majority of these men sat in bomb craters and cried.

5. The question of who should be evacuated as a "battle exhaustion" case and who was faking the symptoms was never settled satisfactorily. The problem was summarized, however, in a memorandum on "Views on management of Exhaustion in a Forward Area":

In practice the policy both in holding cases and in returning convalescents to duty is one of compromise. There is no possibility of distinguishing "genuine" cases. The definitely unwilling man readily develops symptoms which are genuine even though they are a consequence of his lack of morale or moral fibre. While, for the sake of discipline, this man may be dealt with by immediate disciplinary measures, there is little hope of reclaiming him once he has been evacuated through medical channels or has gone through the formality of a F.G.C.M. [Field General Court Martial]. On the other hand the man of neurotic constitution may give a fair performance as long as his morale is bolstered up by a degree of external pressure and encouragement. The policy which we advocate for M.Os. and other officers is to judge a man by his record. If he has given good service and is now breaking, give him the benefit of the doubt and evacuate him. If he is new and jittery, encourage him but hold him to his job. If he is merely a useless type compel him to do his duty as long as it is possible to do so. (The exceptions to this rule are officers and N.C.Os. who, because of their responsibility for other men, must be relieved of their duties when instability becomes evident.) The cases which benefit most by treatment are the acutely fatigued, and those that benefit most by discipline are the young, scared, and uninitiated reinforcements, as well as the great borderline group which will be swayed by the general trend of morale in the unit (268).

Even apart from the fact that "battle exhaustion" cases represented a considerable loss of manpower, there was the fact that a considerable number of Medical and other personnel were required to look after them, rather than perform other duties.

6. Strong disciplinary measures had been adopted by General Crerar before he left Italy and these were repeated in North-West Europe to discourage self inflicted wounds and faking symptoms of battle exhaustion (269). On 29 Aug 44 General Simonds wrote his divisional commanders of 2nd Canadian Corps that commanding officers would have to adopt more stern measures to combat what was no longer considered a disgrace (270).

7. During April 1944 an ad hoc Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed in Italy to provide employment as far forward as possible for neuropsychiatric casualties whom it was considered might be salvaged by treatment (271). Seeking authority for a more permanent organization the Corps Commander requested, and C.M.H.Q. agreed, that it was "most essential that so called neuropsychiatric cases be not allowed [to] leave this theatre as any outward flow to U.K. would encourage slackers to feign psychiatric symptoms in hope of escape from theatre" (272). Genuine cases, of course, would be



treated on their merits. During June this ad hoc unit was replaced by three Special Employment Companies and provision was made for three similar units to serve in North-West Europe. Subsequently a fourth company was added for service with the 21st Army Group (273). Those who could not be rehabilitated for return to their original units were still able to perform useful service, loading and unloading lorries and railroad freight cars, repairing roads and as casual labour.

(b) Venereal Disease

8. The scourge of V.D. has plagued armies down through the centuries and would seem to be a continuing evil. More reliable treatments, of shorter duration, came into use but increasingly large staffs were required to combat the greater incidence of such diseases as the War progressed and a tremendous number of man-days were wasted by the men undergoing treatment.

9. The long months of waiting in the United Kingdom had demonstrated that the greater number of cases of V.D. had been contracted in the larger cities while men were on leave (274). Once Canadian troops became engaged in actual operations the venereal disease rate fluctuated in inverse ratio to the fighting. According to the Medical History:

While engaged in active operations, there was little opportunity, and probably less inclination, for exposure to venereal disease. Between operations, relaxation, fatalism, and "liberated" alcohol, accelerated the exposure rate with a resultant flare-up of venereal disease. Educational measures in such circumstances were difficult, and at best influenced only a small number (275).

10. This point is well illustrated by what befell 1st Canadian Corps. Following the completion of the Liri Valley offensive (11 May-4 Jun) it was withdrawn into Eighth Army reserve so that an opportunity might be given to train new reinforcements and give a much needed rest to the fighting troops in preparation for the attack on the Gothic Line (25 Aug) (276):

<u>Month</u>	<u>New Cases</u>	<u>Incidence per Thousand</u>
April	283	45.5
May	403	64.6
June	423	68.8
July	882	145.8
August	463	76.8

What the A.D.M.S. of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division very aptly termed "this deplorable offspring of the union of Venus and Bacchus" (277) had reached a peak during the first week of July and prompted Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps to adopt rigid control measures (278).

11. While First Canadian Army was cooped up in the Normandy bridgehead the incidence of V.D. was low and remained so during the period of the break-out and dash across France. The following statistics show, however, that as soon as the troops settled down to autumn campaigning and Belgium cities could be visited on 48 hour pass the V.D. rate climbed sharply (279):



The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment	21
The North Nova Scotia Highlanders	10
Le Régiment de la Chaudière	70
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve	9
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	23
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada	13
The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor)	10

Apparently there was not very much that could be done about it, however, for on 27 Jan 45 the Army Commander confided to General Sansom that the increased number of deserters and absentees was a worry. Only 10 per cent of the Canadian troops were French-speaking but they were contributing 50 per cent of the desertions (287). (This, of course, could be partly explained by the greater ease with which personnel speaking French could "hide out" in Liberated Europe, living off civilians or from the proceeds of a thriving "black market").

16. According to statistics compiled later the following apprehended culprits were tried by court martial for all types of offences during 1944 (288):

	<u>General Courts Martial</u>	<u>Field General Courts Martial</u>
United Kingdom	97	3162
France	6	391
Belgium	8	453
The Netherlands	5	492
Mediterranean	36	2118

It must be remembered, however, that Canadian troops served in the Mediterranean during the whole 12 months of 1944. Available statistics for 1945 are not broken down to show only the period leading up to VE-Day and it would seem likely that many of the following courts martial were for offences that occurred subsequent to the cessation of hostilities (289):

<u>1945</u>	<u>General Courts Martial</u>	<u>Field General Courts Martial</u>
United Kingdom	63	1585
France	1	54
Belgium	34	1339
The Netherlands	30	1332
Germany	11	322
Italy	15	937

In addition to the time and energy spent with courts martial, those subsequently held in detention in a theatre of war were rather unfairly classed as available reinforcements (100 per cent of the X-2 List).

17. In the months following the end of hostilities a considerable number of deserters were rounded up, due to the difficulties of avoiding police surveillance in countries where an identity card and ration cards were of prime importance. When a general amnesty was proclaimed in Canada by Order in Council PC 3264 of 14 Aug 46, however, there still were 199 listed as deserters from the Canadian Army Overseas: 10 in the Mediterranean, 47 in North-West Europe and 142 in the United Kingdom (290).



APPENDIX "L" -- FIGHTING STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION

Practically all success in war, which is won by the proper co-operation of all arms, must in the end be confirmed by infantry, which, by closing with the enemy, compels his withdrawal or surrender, and holds the objectives which have been secured or the points of importance which have to be protected, as a base for further action. It is the most adaptable and the most generally useful of all arms, since it is capable of operating over almost any ground either by day or by night and can find or make cover for itself more readily than the other arms.

1. Despite this dictum, so clearly stated in Field Service Regulations, Volume II, 1935, the successes achieved by the Wehrmacht in the early campaigns of the Second World War seemed to justify the claims advanced by the advocates of mechanized warfare. Undue importance was given to the creation of armoured and other specialized forces and the strength of the supporting services was increased, not only in the administrative "tail" proper but as far forward as the Infantry division. Much effort was expended to ensure that the personnel of all units, no matter how far to the rear, should be capable of defending themselves against attack by enemy parachutists or panzer columns. Such personnel came to believe that their role was just as important as that of the rifleman and, indeed, as long as the enemy possessed air superiority, casualties in the L. of C. and rear areas were high enough, justifying the provision of large pools of reinforcements.

2. As the War progressed, however, the need for more Infantry was realized, even within the armoured division. The 1942-43 operations in Libya and Tunisia resulted in repeated calls for more Infantry and these became even more urgent once the fighting was transferred to the mountainous terrain of southern Italy. Since the reinforcement training stream at home could not be quickly altered to produce the greater proportion of general duty infantrymen then required from the men available as recruits, it became necessary during the closing stages of the conflict to remuster and retrain reinforcements who had been intended for other corps.

3. Whereas two-thirds of the 1914 British division's 18,179 all ranks had served in its 12 Infantry battalions, the 1939 equivalent formation of 14,476 all ranks possessed greater firepower, even though it had only nine Infantry battalions of 662 all ranks each (A.H.Q. Report No. 57). Wartime experience soon demonstrated, however, that this organization was far from adequate and brought increases for all Arms and Services. By 30 Nov 44 the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division's authorized strength was as follows (291):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
Headquarters Units	40	126
Reconnaissance Regiment, CAC	43	777
Artillery	198	3230
Engineers	33	926
Signals	29	714
Infantry	434	8354
Army Service Corps	46	1250
Medical	50	895
Ordnance	2	78
R.E.M.E.	35	749
Postal	1	24
Provost	3	112
Intelligence	1	12
	<u>915</u>	<u>17,247</u>



Even here, the Infantry total included 55 officers and 315 other ranks belonging to the three brigade headquarters, the three brigade ground defence platoons and the divisional defence and employment platoon; another 37 officers and 707 other ranks of The Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.) provided close support for the division's nine Infantry battalions, where the heaviest casualties occurred and the replacement needs were greatest.

4. The Canadian Infantry Battalion (Cdn II/233/4) of the same period comprised 38 officers and 812 other ranks (plus six pipers for Highland Regiments) (292). Apart from the actual battalion headquarters of six officers and 54 other ranks there was a headquarters company of five officers and 94 other ranks to handle signals and administrative tasks. The support company with its 3-in. mortar, (universal) carrier, anti-tank and pioneer platoons accounted for a further seven officers and 184 other ranks. Each of the four rifle companies consisted of five officers and 120 other ranks, organized into a headquarters and three platoons, each of which was similarly divided into a headquarters and three sections (corporal, lance corporal and eight men).

5. Personnel of the support company normally were deployed across the battalion front, 3-in mortar-men and anti-tank gunners to provide close support and pioneers for laying or clearing barbed wire and mines. During offensive operations the carrier platoon also would be in an exposed position. Unit signallers of headquarters company serving forward and the 20 stretcher bearers attached to battalion headquarters would come under direct enemy fire on occasion but administrative personnel spent most of their time in the rear echelons, where they could become casualties only from enemy mines, bombing or longer range artillery fire.

6. It was the four rifle companies which took the brunt of the casualties, when dug in on the defensive as well as when attacking. Even here, however, it must be remembered that not all of each company's five officers and 120 other ranks were actually forward. Normally the C.Q.M.S., company storeman, two cooks and three drivers I.C. remained farther back. Then there was the "left out of battle" party of 15 all ranks per company, a nucleus of experienced personnel around which the fighting component would be rebuilt in the event of heavy casualties. Usually this L.O.B. group comprised the second in command, one platoon commander and one sergeant, three corporals and nine privates. Theoretically, therefore, a rifle company's attacking strength was three officers and 100 other ranks.

7. This was the ideal situation, existing at the beginning of a campaign, but due to delays and difficulties in replacing casualties among the general duty infantrymen the normal strength of a rifle company became considerable less. Indeed, 1st Canadian Corps reported from Italy late in November 1944 that:

72 men is the average strength for an infantry rifle company going into battle. There are only 110 fighting men in a coy and the rft situation as it is at present this number is almost never available except on the first day of an operation. Many times companies have gone into action with strength of 50 and on more than one occasion it has been necessary to reorganize on a three company basis of very often not over 50 fighting men per company (293).



A further telegram of 10 Mar 45, from General Foulkes, in response to a request from Ottawa for further information regarding reinforcement shortages, included a statement that:

... Bns during a battle have from time to time had to reorganize on a three coy basis since otherwise the rifle coys might have been insufficiently strong for the dictates of the tactical situation. The majority of casualties during action are in the rifle coys and may on occasions be largely from one coy. Therefore when a bn is deficient a hundred or so riflemen which is roughly one quarter its effective fighting strength it follows that some reorganization is necessary. Whether the bn is reorganized on a three coy basis or not is decided by the bn comd on the basis of the existing tactical situation. Since this would be a local bn arrangement no record is available. There is no knowledge at this Hq of any bns in this corps reorganizing on a two coy basis but owing to Goldflake further investigation at this time is impracticable (294).

8. The Army Commander had replied somewhat earlier that there had been several cases of battalions being reduced to three rifle companies, or even two companies in a couple of instances, due to heavy casualties in a single operation (295). An example of the latter appears in the war diary of The South Saskatchewan Regiment of 29 Aug 44, when this battalion was trying to advance under constant mortar and artillery fire through the Forêt de la Londe towards Rouen:

... The section of D Coy which was approx half D Coys strength of 19 men, moved up to take an outpost posn at 091042. The men never got that far as they came under heavy SA fire and the Germans then threw in a counter attack on D Coys front which drove the sec back to its original posn, where, with the help of B Coy and tanks, they beat off the counter attack. Word then came through that the planned attack by Fus MR and the Cam of C was postponed. At 1400 hrs the fighting strength of the bn was approx 60 ORs with Major E.W. Thomas as Commanding Officer, Capt. H.P. Williams in charge A Coy, Lt N.A. Sharpe in charge B Coy, CSM Smith in charge C Coy, Lt F. Lee in charge D Coy and Sgt Fisher S.E. acting as bn IO. Word was then sent to F Ech to send up carrier pl, less vehs, as reinforcements. The carrier pl of 20 men arrived at 1430 hrs and was despatched to coys.

During the afternoon two officers and 15 other ranks arrived as further reinforcements. After a withdrawal, night found the remnants of the rifle companies organized into two groups and concentrated about a monastery on some high ground. The enemy having pulled back during the night in accordance with his overall plan, after breakfast The South Saskatchewan Regiment once again reformed four rifle companies — 23 men in "A" Company, 21 in "B" Company, nine in "C" Company and 12 in "D" Company (296).

9. The official history of the Algonquin Regiment has this to say of the brief rest period experienced after the Falaise Gap was closed:

... Of the original 800 or so officers and men who had landed at Courseulles, we had already lost eleven officers and 234 other ranks killed,



wounded and taken prisoner ... It had been a costly campaign so far, and doubly so in that we had not as yet received any reinforcements. A sweep through the echelons to release all but the most necessary key personnel did something to relieve the situation, but the sad fact remained we were still operating with only three rifle companies instead of four, and these companies were averaging only about sixty-five men in total strength. To take up the slack, the carrier platoon was called upon on many occasions to do yeoman's work, and they performed every task with a dash and gallantry that savoured of the old cavalry spirit....

The mortar platoon had not had a great deal of employment after we left Hubert Folie, except for the splendid, but short-lived, task of the two detachments on the fatal hill, and on one other occasion on Hill 240. From now on, however, they were to take a larger and more important part in the battalion's operation. Our pioneers had periodically been called upon for mine-sweeping tasks and for assistance in maintaining bridge-sites, but again their full resources had not been called into play. The anti-tank lads had had a few good shoots, and had performed a strong part in our defensive perimeters. Unlike the other specialist platoons, their work was to go into virtual eclipse for a time during the pursuit phase, and while the fighting over the polders was in progress, but their day too was to return. All in all, Support Coy was to prove a reliable mainstay for the weakened rifle companies in the month or so ahead (297).



APPENDIX "M" - THE CANADIAN GENERAL STAFF

The following two articles by Mr. Grant Dexter appeared in The Winnipeg Free Press of 7 and 8 Dec 44 and are reproduced as an example of how one well-informed newspaperman looked at the "conscription crisis" which was being weathered by the Canadian Government.

RESPONSIBILITY AND FAILURE

OTTAWA: If the present sitting of Parliament was more than a special conscription session much would be heard about what is commonly spoken of on Parliament Hill as 'the breakdown of the General Staff.'

Public interest has been focussed first on the conscription issue and, second, upon the fate of the Government. While these points remained in doubt, the members of all parties appear to have decided against raising other and, by contrast, much less important issues. There has been a feeling that nothing should be done to distract or confuse the public mind.

But now that conscription has been adopted and the Government is reasonably assured of a good majority, there is a strong tendency to sort out the information laid before Parliament since November 22, and to attempt to bring about administrative changes which, on the evidence, are long overdue. Among these lesser questions, the most important has to do with the efficiency of the general staff.

The evidence as it now stands in Hansard — chiefly in the Ralston resignation correspondence and the speeches of Mr. King and Mr. Ralston — clearly indicates that there was a breakdown or failure in the general staff in 1944. As a result of this failure this country was plunged without warning into the conscription crisis. The crisis not only caught the Government entirely unprepared — indeed convinced that all was well with the army — but was so urgent that there was not time for remedial measures. And as everyone concedes the sincerity of the generals, the only possible conclusion is that although it was their job to administer the Canadian army, at home and overseas, they were profoundly ignorant of vital facts.

The key to this aspect of the conscription crisis will be found in Mr. King's letter to Mr. Ralston on November 3 (the resignation correspondence). Mr. King plainly could not grasp the urgency of the need of reinforcements. He was dubious of Mr. Ralston's case. In this letter he explained why. The war committee of the cabinet, of which Mr. King is the chairman, had invariably summoned the chiefs of the general staff to discuss all important increases in the size of the army. On every occasion the general staff had asserted, without qualification, that the army could be supported by the voluntary system. Mr. King said assurances were given to the Government by the general staff in the first week of August, 1944, that additional military commitments then under consideration would not adversely affect the reinforcement position.



'I have never agreed,' Mr. King wrote, 'to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking, and receiving, assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements.'

\* \* \*

In his reply, Mr. Ralston pointed out that whatever the general staff had said, he, personally, had never excluded conscription. Both in public and in cabinet he had always said that conscription might be necessary. Mr. King, later on, agreed that this was true of Mr. Ralston. But the Prime Minister over and over again drove home the point that the general staff had always been positive and dogmatic in its opinion that the voluntary system would suffice. In his letter of November 10, Mr. King said assurances had been specifically given at the time (August) by the chief of the general staff to the war committee of the cabinet that the reinforcement position was satisfactory. 'The assurance sought and given had direct reference to the state of the reinforcement pool.' Mr. King went on to point out that at the Quebec conference in September the cabinet had conferred with the general staff and not a word had been said about a shortage of reinforcements.

Mr. Ralston countered this point by saying that the Quebec conference was concerned only with the Pacific war. But Mr. King returned to his point. Was it not common sense that if there was a critical shortage of reinforcements, the general staff would tell the Government about it — whether or no there was an item of this kind on the conference agenda? Why keep the Government in the dark? Was this not a matter of the most vital importance — far transcending the plans of a future campaign in the Pacific — not only to the Government but to the country? Why would the generals bottle up within their own breasts a problem which would plunge the country into the most serious political crisis? Why do so when they were powerless to solve it?

\* \* \*

In his speech of November 27, Mr. King returned to this point. He retold the facts as to the war cabinet consultation with the general staff on August 7. 'The Government,' he said, 'was given the most direct assurance at that time by the chief of staff that there was no need for considering the question of additional reinforcements for overseas by compulsion.' Mr. King repeated his earlier statement that the Government had always consulted the military experts with respect to reinforcements. The general staff invariably had declared there was no danger of a failure of the voluntary system. 'Along with the rest of my colleagues, I have accepted these representations in the best of faith.'



Mr. Ralston, who followed Mr. King in the debate, did his best to defend the general staff. But, as will be shown in a later article, Mr. Ralston's speech was the most damning indictment of the generals. Indeed, it was Mr. Ralston's speech, rather than Mr. King's, which shocked members of the House of Commons, irrespective of party. For, while Mr. Ralston sought only to defend the general staff, his narrative of events from August onward proved that the critical shortage in reinforcements was discovered not by the generals but by himself — the minister, and a civilian. Mr. Ralston sincerely regretted that he had not found out the facts much earlier than he did.

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#### FRUITS OF INCOMPETENCE

OTTAWA: In his speech in the House of Commons on November 29, Mr. Ralston sought to defend the general staff. But he also gave a detailed account of how the conscription crisis arose. At particular points he met Mr. King's criticisms of the generals but, on balance, his own story was not helpful but conclusively and finally critical. It is fair to say, however, that Mr. Ralston appeared to be unconscious of the effect his words produced on the House.

Mr. Ralston disagreed with Mr. King on the nature of the advice given by the general staff on August 7, but (page 6823, unrevised Hansard) said that on August 3 the chief of staff had reported 'the over-all reinforcement position as entirely satisfactory.'

Mr. Ralston recalled advice that had been given to the cabinet in June, indicating a possible shortage of infantry in October. But he overlooked his own statement to Parliament on July 10 (page 4751) in which he said: '... We have overseas a large reinforcement pool, and that pool is calculated on a scale to provide reinforcements for a certain number of months of intense operations.' He believed there were already on hand sufficient volunteers to maintain the overseas armies 'right up to the calendar year end.' Present recruiting — that is, June, July and later months — was for 1945. The reinforcement position, according to his officers, was better than called for in the plans. There were many qualifications in his speech — because Mr. Ralston never made the error of his general staff in this regard — but the impression left on the House was that the voluntary system was working well.

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As the story unfolded, it became clearer that Mr. Ralston, in looking back over August and September, came to realize that, because of the advice given to him by the generals, he had been living in a fool's paradise. There had been a cable in August saying that the infantry situation was serious. The general staff reported, however, that two-thirds of the shortage could be made up in six days and the balance



in two weeks. Everything would be fixed up in three weeks.

Recollection of this cable evidently rankled in Mr. Ralston's mind. As put before him by the general staff, it was just a minor matter. He said that he merely initialed the cable and handed it back to the chief of staff. He didn't even report it to cabinet. He did report it, however, in October.

But later on he realized that he had had no conception of how serious the situation was. 'As a matter of fact,' he said, 'if I had known as much then (in August) as I know now, I would have realized that this meant it would be unlikely that the pools would be built up.' The experts who should have known -- the general staff -- either were in ignorance of the facts or withheld the information.

In September, Mr. Ralston became concerned over the reinforcement situation. A report had come in from overseas on the infantry position. But, apparently, Mr. Ralston could not find out from the general staff what the position was. The headquarters of the army -- the National Defence department -- was incapable of supplying this basic information.

\* \* \*  
No statement made in the House of Commons has caused greater astonishment and dismay among members than the passage in Mr. Ralston's speech which follows: 'I should pause here to say that we in Canada do not keep records of the pools (reinforcement pools) in the United Kingdom and Italy.' In a word, no one at defence headquarters knew about, or was responsible for, the most important feature of the army -- how it stood with regard to support.

Because he was concerned, Mr. Ralston flew to Europe on September 23. He was shocked by what he found.

'I cut a trip which would have taken six or seven weeks, at least, down to three and a half weeks. When I got back to London from the continent I stayed only three days, in order that I might come home immediately.' He continued: 'I wish to say to you that it came as a shock to me, too, when I went to the battle areas. And when I came back to CMHQ (London) and went over the figures there with the officers, and found what I believed was a situation requiring radical measures, I came home and so reported.'

That this report to cabinet would have been justified much earlier is not disputed by anyone. That the delay in making the report exposed the overseas army to a serious lack of reinforcements, is demonstrated by the facts of the crisis. This delay explains why the shortage could only be met by the few thousand N.R.M.A. men who, of all those in uniform, were trained and ready to go into battle. If the shortage had been detected in August, there would have been two months of additional leeway.



No one regretted the delay in realizing the seriousness of the shortage more than Mr. Ralston.

'... I admit quite frankly,' he said (page 6825) 'that had the situation been as I discovered since, and as I reported it to the cabinet after I came back, certainly I would have reported it at once. All I can say is that the fact that I did not know it and did not report it sooner means that I did not sooner recommend the action that I did. I would have done it just that much quicker had I known what was the situation.'

What shocked the members of the House of Commons is that the general staff, in this crisis, failed to keep the minister advised with respect to the position of the overseas army. In the end, as Mr. Ralston made clear, a civilian minister, an amateur in military matters, had a hunch that things were amiss. He acted on his hunch and the moment he came into contact with the situation overseas, realized the gravity of it, flew home and brought the facts to the cabinet table. To all intents and purposes, there might just as well have been no general staff at all. In this matter, they were asleep on the beat. Their incompetence prejudiced the purpose they existed to serve.

These facts, no doubt, explain in part the announcement on November 18 of the retirement of Lt.-Gen. Kenneth Stuart, the chief of staff. There will, however, be disappointment on Parliament Hill if the shake-up stops there.

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APPENDIX "N" - CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

1. Neither the National War Service Regulations, nor the National Selective Service Regulations which replaced them, required Doukhobors, Mennonites and other Conscientious Objectors to undergo compulsory military training. Mobilization Boards might grant postponement until further notice to such men:

- (a) If upon application for a postponement order, the Board was satisfied that the applicant was a member of the denomination of Christians called Mennonites or a member of the community of Doukhobors.
- (b) If membership in the above organization had been continuous or without interruption.
- (c) If the applicant who claimed to be a Doukhobor or Mennonite resided in Canada without interruption.
- (d) If upon application for a postponement order the Board was satisfied that the applicant conscientiously objected, by reason of religious training or belief, to war in any form or to the taking of human life (298).

2. On 3 Apr 41, however, the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval to a scheme for Alternative Service, in National Parks. Later, the scheme was extended to agriculture and lumbering projects sponsored either by the federal Department of Mines and Resources or the British Columbia Department of Lands and Forests. Work camps were provided for those directed to the latter and the men received \$25.00 a month and board, the remainder of their wages going to the Red Cross (299). Effective 1 May 43 the whole Alternative Service scheme was transferred from National Selective Service's Mobilization Regulations to its Civilian Regulations.

3. As of 25 May 43 Mobilization Boards had postponed 4747 men as Mennonites, Doukhobors and Conscientious Objectors. The number of men employed in work camps had been reduced to a minimum, until there were only 500 engaged in Pacific coastal protection work and 400 located in seven interior camps from British Columbia to Ontario. The bulk of the men were engaged in agricultural production under the direction of National Selective Service officials, at local employment offices (300).

4. With every source of manpower for the Armed Forces, industry and agriculture being investigated during the summer of 1943, the Minister of National Defence directed that a special committee should be established to study the employment of conscientious objectors (301). An announcement was made in the House of Commons on 14 Jul that they would be employed in hospitals in Canada (302). However, letters exchanged between National Selective Service and the D.G.M.S. on 21 and 22 Jul indicated a readiness by Medical Services to employ conscientious objectors in non-combatant duties, such as was being done in the United Kingdom and United States (303). A number of conscientious objectors had volunteered for general service, and a small number had been enlisted but had not always had an easy time of it. Most of the members of the Committee, meeting on 23 Jul, were opposed to the enlistment of conscientious objectors but the D.D.G.M.S. (A) pointed out that the R.C.A.M.C. was experiencing difficulty finding a good type of man, after the needs of the fighting arms had been met, and considered



that this might be an answer. Agreement was finally reached that conscientious objectors should be enlisted for non-combatant duties, but only by the R.C.A.M.C. and C.D.C. (304). An undertaking to serve anywhere would go a long way towards neutralizing any demoralizing effect that their privileged position might have on other soldiers, and on civilians who were clamouring for N.R.M.A. soldiers to be returned to civilian employment. Authority for such action was Order in Council P.C. 7251 of 16 Sep 43. On 27 Sep a circular letter was despatched to G.Os.C.-in-C. and D.Os.C. setting forth the conditions under which men were to be accepted for restricted enlistment (not transferable to other corps). Among these was the following:

Conscientious objectors accepted for service as such are to be treated as ordinary soldiers in every respect, except that they will not be required to bear arms under any circumstances. Training will be carried out under special arrangements at the R.C.A.M.C. training centre (305).

5. As a trial measure arrangements were made to enlist a group of 200 from among those men who should volunteer (306). Details of this plan were circularized among the 7000 odd men who had received postponements as conscientious objectors (307). A total of 227 conscientious objectors served in the Canadian Army under this scheme, probably 70 per cent of them having undergone Alternative Service prior to enlistment (308).

6. So that any conscientious objectors who volunteered for service with the R.C.A.M.C. and then failed to pass the medical examination should not be absolved from returning to Alternative Service a supplementary instruction was issued on 21 Jan 44 that they should not be issued with Rejection Certificates; instead they were to be referred back to the appropriate National Selective Service official (309).

7. Another problem was the "self-styled conscientious objector" who had been enrolled in the Army and then refused to "soldier" in the hope of obtaining a discharge (310). The facts were, however, that either Mobilization Boards had rejected the claim of such men to be conscientious objectors or no such claim had been advanced prior to enrolment. Representatives of the National Selective Service meeting with Brigadier deLalanne on 30 Jun 44 reached an agreement that

When a soldier who is a self-styled conscientious objector is discharged from the Army under C.A.R.O. 1029 (12) "Services no longer required", the Registrar shall be so advised by letter of the date and place of his discharge in sufficient time, should he so desire, to have the man served with an Order Medical Examination immediately his discharge is carried out (311).

If the discharged soldier then applied for postponement on the grounds of being a conscientious objector, and was recognized as such by a Mobilization Board, he would be ordered to perform Alternative Service. If he did not so apply, or if his application was rejected, the Army would again accept him for enrolment, provided that he was not otherwise unacceptable. The procedure to be followed was set forth in the Department of Labour's Circular Memorandum No. 1051 of 18 Aug 44, designed to interpret National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations (312). Since the number of men involved was quite small it was decided within the Adjutant-General's Branch to settle each case on its merits rather than issue a general instruction (313).



APPENDIX "O" - PROVISION OF TRADESMEN

1. Sooner or later every nation participating in a modern war is faced with the problems of whether skilled tradesmen may best be employed in uniform or essential industry, what proportion may be withdrawn from the civilian economy without endangering essential services and how many unskilled men will have to be trained by the Armed Forces. The fact that the Canadian Army initially was composed of volunteers was merely an added complication.

2. At the outset Army requirements were met from skilled tradesmen who volunteered for overseas service and had merely to be instructed in the military aspects of their new employment. In a number of cases, local arrangements were made to have this instruction given in the workshops maintained by commercial and industrial firms for their own requirements. In an effort to avoid complaints from industry and conserve a proper balance in the national economy, the recruiting instructions issued from time to time directed that recruiting officers should not enlist tradesmen in excess of the numbers actually required by units (314). However, the whole picture was changed by the rapid expansion during the summer of 1940. With the exception of the Canadian Signals Training Centre, which was able to attract skilled men from the Bell Telephone Company and the several electrical companies, C.A.S.F. training centres and units were soon faced with a shortage of tradesmen(315).

3. The high wages now paid by industry and the indefiniteness of Army requirements were major contributing factors, which might have been remedied by an appeal to patriotic motives but for General Crerar's conviction that the man producing equipment was contributing just as much to the war effort at the moment as the man in uniform (316). Even though a number of semi-silled men were still enlisting it seemed obvious that the Army would soon have to arrange for the complete training of the tradesmen it required.

4. During the summer of 1940 the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Programme had been broadened into a War Emergency Training Programme. In addition to continuing its youth training centres, the Federal Government made arrangements with the educational authorities of all the provinces, except tiny Prince Edward Island, whereby skilled workers might be trained in the vocational shops of local technical schools (317). During the late autumn arrangements were concluded between N.D.H.Q. and the Department of Labour for sufficient vacancies on these trades courses to be reserved for soldiers (318). More specialized training would be continued at the R.C.O.C. Training Centre at Barriefield, which was being expanded, and a new Canadian Army Trades School slated for Hamilton (319). Army trades training was envisaged as having four distinct phases:

- I - Following enlistment, one or two months basic military training in a unit or training centre.
- II - Three or four months course at a Vocational School in classes conducted under the War Emergency Training Plan.
- III - Advanced trades training for artificers, electricians, fitters, motor mechanics, instrument mechanics and the like at the Canadian Army Trades School.



IV - Return from Phase III in the case of the trades enumerated above, and from Phase II for the others, for employment if a unit vacancy exists.

Otherwise the new tradesman would be posted to an Advanced Training Centre to further the army application of his trade and become a potential reinforcement for the Canadian Army Overseas (320).

During December agreement was reached with the interested corps and the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance at N.D.H.Q. that trades training should be a General Staff responsibility. A separate section (M.T.4) was established within the Directorate of Military Training (321).

5. In order that a first quota might be provided for the enlarged War Emergency Training Programme, Military Districts were instructed on 6 Dec 40 to screen personnel already in uniform, in order to discover soldiers not working at their trade and those who had concealed skilled ability on enlistment (322). Applicants were interviewed by a board of three officers, one of whom was in charge of all trades training in the Military District. Wherever possible, soldiers selected for Phase II training were accommodated in barracks. As of 22 Feb 41 subsistence allowance was being paid to only 457 of the 2374 men then on W.E.T.P. courses (323). Broken down by trades at 6 Mar, there were 136 prospective blacksmiths, 420 carpenters and joiners, 57 coopersmiths and tinsmiths, 45 draughtsmen, 337 electricians, 71 engine artificers, five fitter machinists, 19 fitters M.V., 27 instrument mechanics, 793 motor mechanics, 57 plumbers, 50 welders, 17 wireless mechanics, 239 fitters, 88 artificers R.C.A., 57 tinsmiths, seven driver mechanics, one riveter, one hammerman, two turners, three wheelers, 29 concretors and one fitter A.A. (324). Actually it was 17 May 41 before the Canadian Army Trades School was ready for its first class of 189 students for Phase III training (325).

6. A second quota of potential tradesmen was assembled for Phase II training during late April. At that time it was considered, that in future an even flow of 1000 students should be fed into the Technical Schools monthly (326). Commands and Military Districts were further advised on 5 May that the MacQuarrie Test of Mechanical Ability would soon be given to all applicants admitted to tradesmen classes, except clerks: permission had been received from the United States Army to use this aptitude test (327). During July the responsibility for trade testing those completing trades training was assigned to M.T.4 and a Trade Testing Board established in each Military District (328).

7. Demand and supply exceeded the immediate capacity of the Canadian Army Trades School, however, and other outlets had to be found for Phase III and other specialized training. In July 1941 a Mechanics Training Centre was established at London, Ontario (staffed by the Anderson organization of Los Angeles) to handle an intake of 500 motor mechanics for the R.C.O.C. During September an Advanced Driving and Maintenance School was opened at Woodstock, Ont. During the summer of 1940 the Ford Motor Company of Canada had started instructing small classes of motor mechanics on army vehicles of its own manufacture and during the following winter both General Motors and Chrysler of Canada followed suit. Small groups of automotive tradesmen, N.C.Os. and Officers were given specialized training by the International Harvester Company of Canada in its garages at Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, London, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Regina, Calgary, Lethbridge and Vancouver. The John Labatt Garage in London took groups of 20 mechanics; Carter Tire Company Limited of Hamilton continued



to train groups of six vulcanizers; Canadian Westinghouse and General Electric each provided instruction for a group of 14 artificers, and the C.P.R. Angus Shops in Montreal handled five tradesmen at a time (329).

8. During the fiscal year ending 31 Mar 42 the following tradesmen completed training in Canada: approximately 300 artificers R.C.A., 500 blacksmiths, 1200 carpenters, 800 clerks, 2000 cooks, 125 concretors, 50 bricklayers, 300 copper-smiths and tinsmiths, 3000 driver mechanics, 30 mechanical draughtsmen, 30 architectural draughtsmen, 1200 electricians, 50 engine artificers, 1600 fitters, 150 instrument mechanics, 4000 motor mechanics, 800 signals operators, 90 plumbers, 50 operators of engineering equipment, 75 turners, 200 radio and wireless mechanics, 300 welders and 1000 others (330).

9. With the introduction of Personnel Selection techniques and procedures at the beginning of 1942 it had become possible to tag all recruits with an aptitude for trades training while they still were at a Basic Training Centre (331). As a next step administrative procedure was reorganized and a new policy set forth in Canadian Army Routine Order 1903 of 25 Apr 42. After being earmarked as a potential trades trainee at a Basic Training Centre a recruit would continue to an Advanced Training Centre to complete his corps military training before final selection for trades training. As far as possible it was hoped to complete trades training in one establishment. There would be exceptions, but soldiers should not have to attend more than two schools. Separate Vocational Training School establishments were authorized to ensure that the soldier's contact with military training was not broken while attending a technical school. Following completion of courses at a technical school, an army trades school or an industrial school soldiers were returned to their appropriate Advanced Training Centre or unit for further practical trades training and the military application of their trades. On 20 Apr a separate Directorate of Trades Training was established to control this programme. The Directorate of Mobilization and Recruiting became responsible for establishing monthly quotas, both the numbers to be selected by Army Examiners at Basic Training Centres and those to be sent forward from Advanced Training Centres for actual trades training. Initial quotas had to be greater than the numbers actually required, to allow for wastage and the withdrawal of potential N.C.Os. The application of Personnel Selection methods drastically reduced the number of those failing to pass trade tests and the revised administrative procedure reduced the number of days wasted at each step in training.

10. At this time the trades training programme possessed the following capacity: Canadian Army Trades School 2000, Mechanics Training Centre 750, Advanced Driving and Maintenance School 520 and technical schools 3010; small groups totalling 260 attended courses conducted by industrial organizations (332). The various courses were listed in an Appendix to Canadian Army Routine Order 2402 of 30 Sep 42; superseded by C.A.R.O. 3020 of 27 Mar 43, C.A.R.O. 3610 of 15 Sep 43, C.A.R.O. 4501 of 22 May 44 and C.A.R.O. 5320 of 1 Feb 45.

11. The reductions made in the Army in Canada during the autumn of 1943 resulted in a gradual decrease in trades training facilities. Some 50 War Emergency Training Plan classes, with accommodation for 1255 soldiers were given up (333). Classes still continued in 45 army installations (including Advanced Training Centres), 24 technical schools and 21 industrial plants but emphasis was directed towards training N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers to replace tradesmen withdrawn from the Home War Establishment and North American Area for



overseas service (334). By 1 Mar 44 establishments for tradesmen in Canada and the North American Area had been reduced to 50,467 other ranks (335). As of 6 Mar 44 there were 8245 undergoing training (70 per cent of capacity) and broken down as follows (336).

G.S.	63.4 per cent
N.R.M.A.	22.7
C.W.A.C.	5.0
C.T.T.C.	8.9

12. The last named Canadian Technical Training Corps comprised 17 and 18 year old boys enlisted under a scheme commenced in January 1943. Following a three months orientation course at one of six Basic Training Centres, they were given 10 months training in one of the more skilled trades (337). On 19 Jun 44 the first groups were appraised for advanced trades training; by which time, however, the demand was for infantrymen not tradesmen. On 31 Dec 44 the 2082 members of this corps were disposed as follows (338):

Pre-orientation	530
Orientation	568
Technical courses	683
Appraisal	193
<u>Trade courses</u>	<u>108</u>

Total 2082

13. Strangely enough, on the surface, 58,699 were trade tested during 1944, compared with 55,784 during 1943. This brought the cumulative total from the inception of the trade testing procedure to 114,483 (339). During January 1945 only 71 G.S. and 187 N.R.M.A. soldiers were allotted to trades training courses (340). On 31 May 45 the Directorate of Trades Training ceased to exist and its functions were re-absorbed by the Directorate of Military Training (341).

14. Within the Canadian Army Overseas the re-organization effected during the early months of 1941 similarly had accentuated the immediate shortage of tradesmen. Circular letters were issued by Headquarters, Canadian Corps directing that qualified tradesmen not employed as such be given employment and threatening compulsion against those who would not transfer to the R.C.O.C. when requested. In addition to providing initial training for those selected as potential tradesmen from within the Canadian Army Overseas there was the task of providing more specialized training, both of a technical and military nature, to those reinforcements who had been given the minimum classification (group "C") in Canada (342). Training became centred in an Instructional Wing at No. 1 Canadian Ordnance Reinforcement Unit, although technical training also was carried out at the R.C.E., R.C. Signals and R.C.A.S.C. reinforcement units. (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap XI, paras 144-5 and Chap XVI, paras 117-8). In conjunction with local educational institutions courses were arranged for clerks. Vacancies were obtained on courses in the more highly skilled trades being given by civilian and military training establishments under the War Office, where the limited demand did not warrant separate Canadian courses being instituted (343). Although the shortage overseas early in 1942 was estimated as being 11,836 only 4000 were in the trades covered by Phase II and Phase III training in Canada; it was considered that the remainder could be made good from men recruited as tradesmen or trained by the corps concerned (344). Due to continued expansion, the Canadian Army Overseas was still short 10,956 tradesmen as of 14 May 43 (345). Except for a few special trades it was possible, however, to close the gap within the next year (28 Feb 44), providing for both war establishment



vacancies of 64,572 and reinforcements based on three months' wastage at "intense" rates (346). Due to the fact that casualties among Infantry tradesmen were considerably less than had been estimated it was possible, as a temporary expedient, to employ a number as general duty infantrymen during the autumn of 1944.



APPENDIX "P" - CORPS OF (CIVILIAN) CANADIAN FIRE FIGHTERS FOR SERVICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Proposals to send Canadian fire fighters to help fight the London Blitz of 1940 had emanated from several points across Canada but until the beginning of 1941 no official approach was made by the British Government (347). Negotiations were begun between the two Governments in January but it was not until 29 Jul that the War Committee of the Cabinet decided that an initial unit of 400 to 500 should be formed under the aegis of the Department of National War Services, rather than of the Department of National Defence (348). Organization was commenced in the autumn but various difficulties arose. Finally F/L Gordon E. Huff, M.M., Fire Prevention Officer of the Winnipeg Command R.C.A.F., was appointed commanding officer by P.C. 1/778 of 30 Jan 42. Regulations for this civilian unit were approved by Order-in-Council P.C. 76/1656 of 3 Mar.

2. Recruiting opened on 11 Mar 42 but due to the response from professional fire-fighters it was feared that municipal fire brigades might become seriously depleted; therefore consideration was given to taking personnel of part-time and voluntary fire brigades in smaller towns and rural districts. Men were accepted in medical categories of "B.1" or higher; final medical examination was conducted in Ottawa. The initial strength of the Corps was 422, drawn from 107 municipalities across Canada but only 406 actually served overseas. Recruiting came to an end on 21 Sep 42. Of the 411 men who remained on strength only 143 were professional fire fighters (35 per cent); another 30 per cent came from voluntary fire brigades and 35 per cent had no previous experience in fire fighting (349). Since this was a non-combatant organization some 20 conscientious objectors enlisted and served overseas. They were given no encouragement to enlist; neither were they listed as "conscientious objectors". Being inexperienced they were given the rank of Junior Firemen but were promoted as they became efficient (350).

3. Preliminary training was carried out in co-operation with the Ottawa City Fire Department. The first of the eight groups left for the United Kingdom on 13 Jun 42 and the last on 10 Dec 42. Upon arrival in the United Kingdom the drafts were sent for four weeks further training at Testwood Training Ground under the control of the National Fire Service, following which they were posted to six fire stations -- Southampton (2), Portsmouth (2), Plymouth and Bristol -- while headquarters went to London. As soon as the Canadians became familiar with their duties the British personnel were withdrawn and these stations became completely Canadian.

4. The worst of the bombing was over by the time the Canadian Fire Fighters had arrived; thus they did not have many opportunities to fight fires. This prompted Mr. T.L. Church (Toronto, Broadview) to question the need for the further existence of such a corps. In his reply the Minister of National War Services (General Lafleche) said:

... Some time ago inquiry was made of the proper authorities in Great Britain to survey the situation with a view to our possibly being able to employ their services otherwise in view of our limited man-power. I do not mean to say that we are necessarily going to disband this corps, but I think it is proper to say in reply to the hon. gentleman that should the fire fighting services of Great Britain advise the Canadian authorities that the probabilities of action of



the kind that existed when this corps was formed and sent over have greatly diminished, it may be necessary to consider taking some action with respect to the members of this corps. But may I say that Canada will never forget the fact that these men volunteered for a service considered then to be as dangerous as that performed by any human being in the British Isles, whether in uniform or not. Most of the members of the corps were members of city fire brigades, and with the experience they have gained in Great Britain I have always thought that when they returned they would make splendid fire chiefs in a great many of our cities in the future. A total of 107 municipalities supplied the 400 members of the corps (351).

5. In conjunction with the coming invasion of North-West Europe a contingent of volunteers was being supplied by the National Fire Service and the opportunity of furnishing a section was offered to the Canadian Fire Fighters. Permission having been obtained from Ottawa and the whole Corps having volunteered arrangements were made to have the Canadian component increased to the size of a company of 102 all ranks. However, this Company never was despatched to the continent.

6. Meantime, it was ascertained that enemy air activity was still greater than was reported in the press back in Canada and that the National Fire Service would have to provide replacements if the Canadians were withdrawn. From a manpower standpoint it was subsequently learned that very few of the men would agree to enlist in the Canadian Army Overseas, rather than go back to Canada, should it be decided to disband the Corps. No further action was taken to recall the Corps at this time although its Commanding Officer was requested to encourage his men to volunteer for Army service (352).

7. At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 5 Jan 44 it had been decided to recall the Canadian Fire Fighters. With invasion plans under way, however, there was an increased danger of enemy air raids against dock areas and dumps so that the British Government requested that the carrying out of this decision should be postponed (353). This request was acceded to and it was not until 5 Oct that the Cabinet War Committee again agreed that the Corps should be returned to Canada (354). By this time the strength of the Corps was down to 342 all ranks. Withdrawal took even longer than the despatch and it was not until 19 Aug 45 that the last of 328 men reached Canada. Only five men\* had enlisted in the Canadian Armed Forces but 19 more applied for discharge overseas in order to take up employment or continue their studies (355). The Corps was well disciplined, efficient and a credit to Canada in every respect, but the fact cannot be ignored that its total strength was 400 odd as compared with the 150,000 members of the National Fire Service and that it experienced a very small number of air attacks.

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\*Only 200 members of the Corps were of military age at this time.



APPENDIX "Q" - LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING UNITS AS AT 1 MAR 44

Canada

Artillery

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Unit</u>	
883	12 AA Bty (Type 2L)	RCA
882	17 AA Bty (Type 2H)	RCA
779	41 AA Bty (Type 2F)	RCA
791	52 AA Bty (Type 4L)	RCA
1128	60 AA Bty (Type H)	RCA
1129	61 AA Bty (Type 2L)	RCA
1338	63 AA Bty (Type 3L)	RCA
533	HQ 24 AA Regt	RCA
<del>537</del>	HQ 26 AA Regt	RCA
1344	4 AA GOR	RCA
1343	3 AA GOR	RCA
747	29 AA Tp LS	RCA
322	59 Coast Bty	RCA
811	20 Fd Regt	RCA

Engineers

817	15 Fd Coy	RCE
1356	22 Gen Pnr Coy	RCE

Infantry

1067	Fus Sher	
1047	Fus St L	
1036	R de Hull	
1045	R de Jol	
1064	R de Monty	
1065	R de Q	
1046	R de St H	
1071	R de Chat (Airfd Def Bn)	
371	B Coy St John Fus (MG)	

RCASC

553	1 Bakery Sec (Mech)	
5205	5 Coy RCASC	

RCAMC

1466	19 Fd Amb	RCAMC
3006	5 Coy RCAMC	

C Pro C

2015	36 Pro Coy	C Pro C
2025	46 Pro Coy	C Pro C

V G of C

16 Coy - 75% FS  
12, 13, 14 & 15 Coys - 50% FS

Miscellaneous

2945	No 5 Dist Dep	
3505	25 Coy CDC	
3306	5 Ord Dep	
	105 Dep Coy CWAC	
2409	9 Coy CWAC	
1328	8 Spec Empl Coy	
323	Quebec Arsenal Protective Coy	
3830	5 Dist Recruiting Coy	
2066	66 Mil Det Bks	
3647	Quebec Mil Hosp	
3648	Valcartier Mil Hosp	



OVERSEAS (a)

Artillery

458B	57 Lt AA Bty	RCA
908D	62 A Tk Bty	RCA
1051	4 Med Regt	RCA

Engineers

984	3 Bn RCE	RCE
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Signals

1056	4 Med Regt Sig Sec	RCCS
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Infantry

187	Fus MR	
188	R de Mais	
41	R 22e R	
743	R de Chaud	

RCASC

196	4 Coy	RCASC
1058	4 Med Regt Pl	RCASC

RCAMC

285	1 Convalescent Depot	RCAMC
866	6 FDS	RCAMC
200	18 Fd Amb	RCAMC
218	5 Fd Hyg Sec	RCAMC
282D	17 Gen Hosp (600 beds)	RCAMC

RCOC

1114	104 LAD	RCOC
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C Pro C

833	9 Pro Coy	C Pro C
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Note (a) All the undermentioned units were formed in Canada and sent overseas as French speaking units. They are believed to be still composed predominantly of French speaking personnel. However it is not known whether, with the exception of the 4 Inf Bns they are still French speaking units.



Table No. 1

APPOINTMENTS AND ENLISTMENTS  
FOR GENERAL SERVICE,  
1939-1945\*

Month and Year	APPOINTMENTS			ENLISTMENTS -- OTHER RANKS	
	Officers Direct	From Ranks	Nursing Service	Volunteers Direct	Transfers from N.R.M.A.
<b>1939</b>					
September	2943	55	81	54844	
October	243	12	1	4376	
November	387	11	4	3633	
December	287	12	65	2049	
Total 1939	3860	90	151	64902	
<b>1940</b>					
January	479	63	8	6412	
February	198	14	2	3810	
March	181	13	2	4924	
April	198	14	5	4475	
May	375	23	48	6909	
June	1213	55	54	29319	
July	1305	54	10	29171	
August	744	99	20	15934	
September	659	77	29	9677	
October	335	68	89	4966	
November	221	86	57	3202	
December	240	45	45	3024	
Total 1940	6148	611	369	121823	
<b>1941</b>					
January	302	89	39	5863	
February	684	58	35	6318	
March	416	104	21	4885	5
April	509	125	12	6009	93
May	442	63	17	7703	305
June	510	73	83	13193	1023
July	570	71	39	10643	1259
August	261	193	6	4647	858
September	445	281	14	7362	1260
October	577	225	50	5439	1097
November	301	192	25	6479	937
December	238	79	39	5895	1031
Total 1941	5255	1553	380	84436	7868
<b>1942</b>					
January	359	222	59	8594	1988
February	332	279	37	6892	1591
March	299	361	29	6792	1824
April	451	350	27	9467	1791
May	546	380	82	9581	2524
June	420	402	65	9348	1649
July	491	487	63	11316	1584
August	478	567	97	12328	1498
September	427	444	78	8744	1056
October	327	504	55	7941	1089
November	282	632	30	9204	939
December	185	595	37	4495	740
Total 1942	4597	5223	659	104702	18273

\*Based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.



APPOINTMENTS				ENLISTMENTS - OTHER RANKS	
Month and Year	Officers Direct	From Ranks	Nursing Service	Volunteers Direct	Transfers from N.R.M.A.
1943					
January	224	634	63	10489	1003
February	155	1105	58	7872	761
March	194	632	71	6739	667
April	172	755	41	5462	599
May	369	956	30	5423	725
June	211	695	35	4495	451
July	146	712	35	3920	433
August	83	685	151	4069	446
September	71	800	113	4321	392
October	51	716	29	3794	419
November	49	448	38	3682	370
December	34	395	23	2375	295
Total 1943	1759	8533	687	62641	6561
1944					
January	36	69	156	3804	398
February	26	291	257	3015	422
March	25	75	151	2787	436
April	19	239	178	3908	1736
May	180	397	159	3593	1025
June	50	212	97	6207	3259
July	31	338	60	4324	1308
August	41	248	24	5163	1595
September	37	235	29	4774	1164
October	27	152	12	4522	967
November	8	172	10	6901	3294
December	19	148	7	4743	1878
Total 1944	499	2576	1140	53741	17482
1945					
January	19	159	10	7987	1692
February	24	254	47	7230	2164
March	54	163	76	7280	2131
April	18	93	57	5966	1287
May	63	206	51	2461	328
June	10	124	20	847	242
July	3	141	5	773	154
August	13	78	2	349	66
Total 1945	204	1218	268	32893	8064



Table No. 2

GENERAL SERVICE DISCHARGES (ALL RANKS)  
1939-1945\*

QUARTER AND YEAR	Medically Unfit	Other Forces**	Adminis- trative	Deaths	Deserters***	Total
1939 (Sep)	421	12	654	8	1	1096
Fourth	1350	18	2233	27	66	3694
Total 1939	1771	30	2887	35	67	4790
1940						
First	2458	20	1115	31	43	3667
Second	1812	49	612	46	80	2599
Third	2823	153	1577	119	147	4819
Fourth	3439	766	2330	139	144	6818
Total 1940	10532	988	5634	335	414	17903
1941						
First	3492	215	1111	108	111	5037
Second	4981	288	587	201	141	6198
Third	3602	368	750	140	377	5237
Fourth	3342	331	824	416	380	5293
Total 1941	15417	1202	3272	865	1009	21765
1942						
First	3483	253	1127	162	259	5284
Second	5103	632	1030	173	270	7208
Third	6079	535	893	1108	241	8856
Fourth	6196	329	770	279	174	7748
Total 1942	20861	1749	3820	1722	944	29096
1943						
First	4388	446	624	171	117	5746
Second	5192	337	789	236	170	6724
Third	5002	353	957	822	287	7421
Fourth	4938	1022	2838	1277	158	10233
Total 1943	19520	2158	5208	2506	732	30124
1944						
First	6344	947	4375	728	135	12529
Second	8085	341	3877	2446	181	14930
Third	6818	154	2705	6693	291	16661
Fourth	5605	32	2906	2825	223	11591
Total 1944	26852	1474	13863	12692	830	55711
1945						
First	5520	50	2606	2231	357	10764
Second	6969	30	11632	1546	298	20475
Third	6607	25	58530	268	244	65674
Fourth	3637	14	89028	151	118	92948
Total 1945	22733	119	161796	4196	1017	189861

\*This Table is based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.

\*\*Those going to the R.C.N. numbered 1009; those going to the R.C.A.F. numbered 5166.

\*\*\*Only includes those deserters actually struck off strength as never having been apprehended. This is not a guide to the number of men who actually deserted during any one month, or quarter, of the year.



Table No. 3

N.R.M.A. ENROLMENTS

BY MONTH AND YEAR OF ENROLMENT\*

MONTH	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	TOTAL
January		7331	5834	2145	1082	
February		4928	3870	1916	778	
March	4668	5292	3325	1353	712	
April	4373	6733	3114	1582	650	
May	3791	6385	2835	1996	259	
June	2712	4770	2549	1528	32	
July	3290	6832	2430	1321	17	
August	4140	6752	2079	1262	6	
September	153	5073	1862	982		
October	4322	4163	2028	1119		
November	228	6234	2211	1244		
December	3812	5863	1634	758		
TOTAL	31994	70356	34271	17711	7226	157868

\*Based on information received from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51.



Table No. 4

N.R.M.A. DISCHARGES

REASON	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	Total Decrease
Medically Unfit	1254	5223	7007	7212	2722	254	1	23673
To R.C.N.	376	240	55	72	4			747
To R.C.A.F.	3725	1074	207	72	1			5079
To Other Forces	1	7	8	15	5			36
To General Service	7868	18273	6561	17482	8067	165	20	58436
Administrative	405	870	2558	4258	12461	41310	435	62297
Deaths	9	26	96	96	126	9	1	363
Deserters	286	1104	794	1235	3702	107	9	7237
Total	13924	26817	17286	30442	27088	41845	466	157868

\*Based on information obtained from War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, 22 Nov 51



Table No. 5

SECRET

## Growth of Infantry Gdn Army Overseas 1942 - 44

## Part I - Before Reorg of Armd Divs - 1942

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			MG Bn			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	999	21114	3	90	2133	-	-	-	30	1089	23247
2 Armd Divs	2	74	1564	-	-	-	4	140	3236	6	214	4800
Army Tps	-	-	-	1	37	711	-	-	-	1	37	711
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1073</b>	<b>22678</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>2844</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>3236</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>1340</b>	<b>28758</b>

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 37 Offrs - 782 OR (1 Sp and 3 Rifle Coys)  
 (b) WE of MG Bn 30 Offrs - 711 OR  
 (c) WE of Mot Bn 35 Offrs - 809 OR

## Part II - After Reorg of Armd Divs - 1943

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			Sp Bn			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	999	21897	3	213	3342	-	-	-	30	1212	25239
2 Armd Divs	6	222	4866	2 coys	44	708	2	70	1618	8 + 2 coys	334	7192
Army Tps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>1221</b>	<b>26763</b>	<b>3 + 2 coys</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>4050</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>1618</b>	<b>38 + 2 coys</b>	<b>1548</b>	<b>32431</b>

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 37 Offrs - 911 OR (Increased to 4 Rifle Coys)  
 (b) WE of Sp Bn 71 Offrs - 1114 OR (MG Bn converted to Sp Bn)  
 (c) WE of Sp Coy 22 Offrs - 354 OR (Allotted to Inf Bd of Armd Div)  
 (d) WE of Mot Bn 35 Offrs - 809 OR

## Part III - After Formation of 12 Inf Bde - 1944

No and Type of Fms	Rifle Bn			MG Bn & Indep MG Coys			Mot Bn			Total		
	No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE		No of Bns	WE		No of Bns or Coys	WE	
		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR		Offrs	OR
3 Inf Divs	27	1026	21928	3	111	2121	-	-	-	30	1137	24049
4th Armd Div	3	114	2448	1 coy	9	202	1	36	815	4 + 1 coy	159	3465
5th Armd Div	5	190	4080	2 coy	18	404	1	36	815	6 + 2 coys	244	4299
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>1330</b>	<b>28456</b>	<b>3 + 3 coys</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>2727</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>1630</b>	<b>40 + 3 coys</b>	<b>1540</b>	<b>32813</b>

Notes: (a) WE of Rifle Bn 38 Offrs - 812 OR (4 OR additional for Armd Div)  
 (b) WE of MG Bn 37 Offrs - 707 OR (Sp Bn converted to MG Bn)  
 (c) WE of Indep MG Coy 9 Offrs - 202 OR (Sp Coy converted to Indep MG Coy)  
 (d) WE of Mot Bn 36 Offrs - 815 OR (Mot Bn in 5th Armd Div employed as Rifle Bn in 12 Ind Bde)



Table No. 6

OTHER RANK RFTS A A I.

T C P S E C R E T  
44/AAI/1/5

DEMANDED AND DESPATCHED MAY 44 - JAN 45

CONVOY DRAFT DATE OF EMBARKATION	KMF 31 "WARD" 5 May 44	KMF 32 "UKIT/1" 8-9 Jun 44	KMF 33 "UKIT/2" 16-18 Jul 44	KMF 34 "UKIT/3" 20-21 Aug 44	KMF 35 "UKIT/4" 26-28 Sep 44	KMF 36 "UKIT/5" 1-5 Nov 44	KMF 37 "UKIT/6" 10 Dec 44	KMF 38 "UKIT/7" 5 Jan 45	KMF 39 "UKIT/8" 28 Jan 45	KMF 40 "UKIT/9"	KMF 41 "UKIT/10"
AAI Bulk Bid											
CIC Eng							6135		4825		1781
CIC Fr							350		310		250
Other Arms							950		1096		730
Total	4340(a)	5395(a)	8439 (a)	3700 (a)	6296 (a)	7593 (a)	7435		6231		2761
Bid Reduced by CMHQ to											
CIC Eng						{ 1250 (a)	{ 1050 (a)				
CIC Fr											
Other Arms						750 (a)	1050 (a)				
Total	2250(b)	150(c)	1500			2000	2100 (a)				
AAI Demand											
CIC Eng	1324	250(d)	{ 1052	{ 2338		{ 1044	775				
CIC Fr	124		{	{		{	65				
Other Arms	560	167	1039	1299		662	964				
Total	2008	417	2091	3637		1706	1804				
Demand Reduced by CMHQ to											
CIC Eng			{ 800			{ 950 (e)	900		1500	1000	1781
CIC Fr			{			{	65		50	50	250
Other Arms			239	60		446	964	255 (g)	576	362	667
Total		160	1039	60		1396	1929	255	2126	1412	2698
Despatched											
CIC Eng	1189	127	752			{ 947 (f)	{ 867		1499		
CIC Fr	122		75						50		
Other Arms	337	33	212	60		384	316	297	106	315	
Total	1648	160	1039	60		1331	1183	1063	109	1864	

(a) incl offr.

(b) incl 250 for SS Bn

(c) Misc Tradesmen

(d) for SS Bn

(e) incl 500 RCOG & RCEME for remuster in AAI

(f) incl 496 RCOG & RCEME for remuster in AAI

(g) demand settled at CMHQ as other arms deficiencies on KMF 37



Table No. 7

CANADIAN REINFORCEMENT DRAFTS TO NORTH-WEST EUROPE

Draft No.	Date	Total		Infantry	
		Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
UKAG/1	5 Aug 44	25	825	15	656
UKAG/2	11 Aug 44	244	1285	226	813
*UKAG/3	17 Aug 44	83	1198	27	682
UKAG/4	25 Aug 44	168	1543	100	697
*UKAG/5	31 Aug 44	98	2497	43	1906
*UKAG/6	8 Sep 44	127	1054	17	562
*UKAG/7	15 Sep 44	72	1016	25	692
*UKAG/8	23 Sep 44	67	1597	37	973
*UKAG/9	30 Sep 44	112	1585	35	1132
*UKAG/10	10 Oct 44	84	1553	39	1139
*UKAG/11	11 Oct 44	103	1843	59	1443
*UKAG/12	24 Oct 44	49	281	6	1
UKAG/13	27 Oct 44	41	605	14	280
UKAG/14	3 Nov 44	186	1371	98	919
*UKAG/15	9 Nov 44	174	1608	62	980
*UKAG/16	19 Nov 44	71	1338	32	1005
*UKAG/17	24 Nov 44	104	906	13	437
*UKAG/18	2 Dec 44	101	503	3	233
*UKAG/19	12 Dec 44	70	353	5	41
UKAG/20	15 Dec 44	63	515	19	353
*UKAG/21	27 Dec 44	58	538	11	292
*UKAG/22	1 Jan 45	55	874	19	678
*UKAG/23	6 Jan 45	32	490	10	403
*UKAG/24	12 Jan 45	74	577	41	191
*UKAG/25	25 Jan 45	82	680	23	557
*UKAG/26	3 Feb 45	71	586	35	434
*UKAG/27	9 Feb 45	97	997	28	747
*UKAG/28	13 Feb 45	50	791	9	210
*UKAG/29A	14 Feb 45 (air)	50	1039	50	1089
*UKAG/29	17 Feb 45	177	1778	49	1031
*UKAG/30	23 Feb 45	194	2093	88	1283
UKAG/31A	1 Mar 45 (air)	22	267	0	0
*UKAG/31	2 Mar 45	128	632	77	270
UKAG/32A	6 Mar 45 (air)	6	208	6	208
*UKAG/32	9 Mar 45	71	793	10	329
UKAG/33A	15 Mar 45	1	40	0	0
*UKAG/33	18 Mar 45	92	1111	30	501
UKAG/34B	20 Mar 45	1	110	0	0
UKAG/34A	22 Mar 45	40	188	0	0
*UKAG/34	26 Mar 45	205	2424	70	1765
UKAG/35B	29 Mar 45	26	0	0	0
UKAG/35C	29 Mar 45	11	0	0	0
UKAG/35A	4 Apr 45	0	9	0	0
UKAG/35D	4 Apr 45	0	19	0	0
UKAG/36A	4 Apr 45	5	99	5	99*
*UKAG/35	4 Apr 45	209	963	154	290
UKAG/36B	9 Apr 45	2	58	0	0
UKAG/37A	9 Apr 45	12	91	0	0
*UKAG/36	10 Apr 45	101	1727	53	1149
UKAG/37B	12 Apr 45	1	20	1	20
*UKAG/37	15 Apr 45	172	1094	40	349
*UKAG/38	21 Apr 45	101	1832	47	1304
UKAG/38B	24 Apr 45	0	25	0	25
*UKAG/39	1 May 45	111	2228	51	1634
*UKAG/40	9 May 45	104	1416	46	780

\*Departure of serials comprising draft was spread over more than one day.

\*\*Paratroopers.



The above statistics were taken from a Movement Control compilation turned over to Director, Historical Section by Director, Supplies and Transport, Army Headquarters. In order to obtain as complete a picture as possible from the information available, however, it is necessary to include the following drafts included in a compilation made by A.G. (Stats), C.M.H.Q.:

Date	Draft No.	Reinforcements		Miscellaneous		Total	
		Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
8 Jun 44		61	1084	-	-	61	1084
11 Jun 44		-	70	-	-	-	70
15 Jun 44		68	754	-	-	68	754
16 Jun 44		102	882	1	23	103	905
22 Jun 44		14	826	1	17	15	843
29 Jun 44		7	596	2	9	9	605
6 Jul 44		3	293	-	5	3	298
13 Jul 44		92	1732	-	-	92	1732
20 Jul 44		20	965	-	6	20	971
21 Jul 44		68	320	-	-	68	320
27 Jul 44		78	1038	-	2	78	1040
						517	8622
27 Aug 44	Sp Inf 1	4	100	-	-	4	100
28 Aug 44	Sp Inf 2	1	100	-	-	1	100
29 Aug 44	Sp Inf 3	8	399	-	-	8	399
2 Sep 44	Sp Inf 4	91	562	-	-	91	562
5 Sep 44	Sp Inf 5	35	333	1	-	36	333
7 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	7	867	-	5	7	872
9 Sep 44	Sp Inf 6	22	426	-	-	22	426
11 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	6	186	-	-	6	186
12 Sep 44	Sp Dvrs	-	200	-	-	-	200
1 Oct 44	Sp Arty	5	12	-	-	5	12
						180	3190



Table No. 8

Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks  
North-West Europe 27 Aug - 14 Nov 44

Date	Unit Deficiencies			Total	Holdings at 2 C.B.R.G.
	2 Cdn Inf Div	3 Cdn I Inf Div	4 Cdn Armd Div		
27 Aug	1999	604	522	3125	1726
29 Aug	2495	836	846	4177	1306
30 Aug	2522	878	846	4246	1231
31 Aug	2612	875	831	4318	1354
3 Sep	2645	752	761	4158	876
4 Sep	1960	736	755	3451	731
5 Sep	1960	737	761	3458	1785
6 Sep	1450	630	706	2786	954
7 Sep	1478	666	706	2850	882
8 Sep	1478	770	715	2963	987
11 Sep	1794	741	872	3407	1841
12 Sep	1727	759	865	3351	1317
13 Sep	1727	788	729	3244	1141
14 Sep	1550	806	719	3075	1781
16 Sep	1495	733	713	2941	1829
18 Sep	1482	814	641	2937	1710
19 Sep	1553	783	641	2977	2746
20 Sep	1523	711	707	2941	2227
22 Sep	1464	621	624	2709	2492
23 Sep	1299	602	629	2530	1535
26 Sep	1408	673	282	2363	2363
27 Sep	1452	802	318	2572	2363
28 Sep	1442	809	324	2575	2288
29 Sep	1470	761	180	2411	2053
2 Oct	1267	816	125	2208	2814
5 Oct	1165	552	106	1823	2028
7 Oct	1224	540	112	1876	1889
10 Oct	1058	464	161	1683	1160
11 Oct	973	624	182	1779	2124
12 Oct	934	646	179	1759	3053
13 Oct	979	749	150	1878	2181
14 Oct	869	851	94	1814	2234
16 Oct	753	747	119	1619	1947
17 Oct	820	793	103	1716	1858
18 Oct	852	548	119	1519	3512
19 Oct	681	566	131	1378	1985
20 Oct	652	415	141	1208	2735
23 Oct	478	410	288	1176	2419
24 Oct	474	385	274	1133	2352
25 Oct	548	426	294	1268	2476
26 Oct	657	533	285	1475	2042
30 Oct	679	670	554	1903	1921
31 Oct	679	724	557	1960	1949
1 Nov	755	768	571	2094	2064
2 Nov	815	787	635	2237	2070
3 Nov	858	776	615	2249	2358
4 Nov	798	805	697	2300	2398
6 Nov	803	678	635	2116	2748
7 Nov	803	519	639	1961	2754
8 Nov	803	424	127	1354	2000
9 Nov	632	424	227	1283	2153
10 Nov	530	278	262	1070	1325
11 Nov	579	278	188	1045	1456
13 Nov	424	90	134	648	2323
14 Nov	463	95	147	705	2301

(HQS 20-6, vol. 81)

Compiled at C.M.H.Q. from details reported by cable from Headquarters, First Canadian Army and Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group. It must be remembered, however, that not all of the reinforcement holdings shown under No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group were physically available for posting to units.



Table No. 9

Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks  
A.A.I., 2 Sep - 4 Nov 44

Date	Unit Deficiencies			Total	Holdings at 1 C.B.R.G.
	1 Cdn Inf Div	5 Cdn Armd Div	1 Cdn Corps Tps		
2 Sep	156	nil	42	198	3757
9 Sep	338	355	23	716	3124
16 Sep	298	230	24	552	2620
23 Sep	681	145	20	846	2240
30 Sep	612	327	21	960	1642
7 Oct	591	283	32	906	1247
14 Oct	363	368	33	764	1048
21 Oct	382	255	36	673	1836
28 Oct	761	269	22	1052	1977
4 Nov	840	340	29	1209	2013

(HQS 20-6, vol. 81)

Compiled from weekly strength states available at C.M.H.Q. It must be remembered that not all of the reinforcements shown within No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group were trained or available for posting to units.



Table No. 10

TOTAL STRENGTH - CANADIAN ARMY

<u>OVERSEAS</u>	<u>30 Sep 44</u>	<u>30 Nov 44</u>	<u>INCREASE OR (DECREASE)</u>
Effectives (a) 21 Army Gp	108,429	109,679	1,250
(b) AAI	64,560	63,110	(1,450)
(c) UK	52,895	50,700	(2,195)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total effectives	225,884	223,489	(2,395)
Non-effectives	35,631	42,744	7,113
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total overseas	261,515	266,233	4,718
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>CANADA AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES</u>			
	<u>27 Sep 44</u>	<u>3 Jan 45</u>	
(a) Officers	17,682	17,118	( 564)
(b) Other Ranks GS	120,604	117,491	(3,113)
(c) " " NRMA	59,746	53,539	(6,207)
(d) " " CWAC	11,591	11,452	( 139)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	209,623	199,600	(10,023)
Missing & POW - Hong Kong	1,628	1,624	(4)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Extended Leave (or Duty) from Depots			
Officers	13	11	(2)
GS	5,857	3,182	(2,675)
NRMA	8,743	6,846	(1,897)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	14,613	10,039	(4,574)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Canada and adjacent	225,864	211,263	(14,601)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
In transit - not included above	1,304	15,017	13,713
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
GRAND TOTAL	488,683	492,513	3,830
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

HQS 9011-7-4 (DAG(A))  
9011-7-8  
9011-8-4

16 JAN 45



Table No. 11

CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

Statement of Reinforcements Authorized (3 Mths @ intense rates)  
and Actual Strength of Reinforcements only (incl G.C.D. 602  
Units) as at dates stated

**CANCELLED**  
RECEIVED  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RESEARCH AND SURVEY BR TS/1  
G. (Stats)  
31 Jan 45.

	ALL ARMS				C.I.C.				OTHER ARMS			
	Auth Holdings Offrs	ORs	Act. Strength Offrs	O.Rs	Auth Holdings Offrs	O.Rs	Act. Strength Offrs	O.Rs	Auth Holdings Offrs	O.Rs	Act. Strength Offrs	O.Rs
31 Dec 43	3,431	44,231	4,255	47,769	1,254	19,995	1,123	15,725	2,177	24,236	3,132	32,044
31 Jan 44	3,052	38,150	4,248	40,497	1,160	18,423	1,262	13,122	1,892	19,727	2,986	27,375
28 Feb 44	3,045	37,715	4,938	39,902	1,164	18,376	1,239	9,378	1,981	19,339	3,699	30,524
31 Mar 44	3,018	37,696	4,819	48,614	1,109	18,080	1,392	11,419	1,909	19,616	3,427	37,195
30 Apr 44	3,041	37,915	4,895	43,994	1,125	18,272	1,477	14,680	1,916	19,643	3,418	29,314
31 May 44	3,158	38,386	5,282	48,176	1,119	18,265	1,363	15,014	2,039	20,121	3,919	33,162
30 Jun 44	3,220	38,579	5,631	49,264	1,121	18,264	1,590	16,689	2,099	20,315	4,041	32,575
31 Jul 44	3,252	38,682	5,544	51,534	1,128	18,255	1,627	16,290	2,124	20,427	3,917	35,244
31 Aug 44	3,507	39,039	5,334	50,443	2,027	28,060	1,443	17,955	1,480	10,979	3,891	32,488
30 Sep 44	3,526	39,423	4,581	41,503	2,039	28,424	1,233	15,784	1,487	10,900	3,348	25,719
31 Oct 44	3,588	39,933	4,741	41,862	2,103	28,948	1,268	16,252	1,485	10,085	3,473	25,610
30 Nov 44	3,691	40,118	4,242	38,454	2,153	28,950	1,080	16,825	1,538	11,168	3,153	21,620
31 Dec 44	3,619	39,543	4,415	45,775	2,089	28,416	1,354	21,764	1,530	11,127	3,061	24,011



OTHER RANK REINFORCEMENTS REMUSTERED IN THE UK  
FROM OTHER ARMS TO CIC  
19 Apr 44 - 6 Jan 45

- 385 -

Table No. 12

Date	CAC	RCA	RCE	RC Sigs	RCASC	RCEME	RCOC	RCAMC	GDC	G Pro C	Pnr Coys	G Int C	Misc	Total
19 Apr 44	489	680	142	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1311
1 May	320	229	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	564
12 Aug	421	800	519	88	121	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1949
25 Aug	54	300	130	9	576	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1077
31 Aug	156	333	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	489
1 Sep	254	113	92	14	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	573
8 Sep	60	150	28	-	5	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	293
8 Sep	145	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	145
15 Sep	145	-	18	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	184
24 Sep	30	-	5	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44
29 Sep	95	61	15	21	16	145	55	113	-	-	-	-	-	521
6 Oct	84	49	16	6	7	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	172
13 Oct	210	66	45	42	37	129	88	26	-	-	-	-	-	643
20 Oct	11	-	125	11	138	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	335
27 Oct	59	159	67	-	9	55	14	55	-	-	-	-	-	418
3 Nov	215	350	56	-	14	4	4	61	1	3	4	-	-	712
10 Nov	284	208	12	-	232	33	28	22	-	-	20	-	-	839
17 Nov	60	295	10	-	29	15	5	60	-	5	35	1	-	515
24 Nov	-	4	4	-	14	7	28	19	-	-	-	-	-	76
1 Dec	100	72	4	-	38	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	6	230
8 Dec	100	146	-	-	177	-	-	74	-	-	-	-	22	519
15 Dec	-	51	-	-	116	19	29	142	-	-	-	-	12	369
30 Dec	-	19	-	-	2	-	-	24	1	3	-	-	13	62
6 Jan 45	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	94	-	-	-	-	7	102
<u>Despatched to AAI</u> <u>for remuster to CIC</u>														
30 Sep	-	-	-	-	-	200	296	-	-	-	-	-	-	496
<hr/>														
	3292	4085	1289	195	1672	607	555	810	2	11	59	1	60	12,638

OFFICER REINFORCEMENTS REMUSTERED IN THE UK FROM OTHER ARMS TO CIC  
19 Apr 44 - 6 Jan 45

Date	CAC	RCA	RCE	RCASC	Total
14 Oct 44	8	58	29	1	96
22 Oct	1	103	1	4	109
2 Dec	13	18	8	1	40
18 Dec	24	52	1	1	78
22 Jan 45	23	50	-	-	73
	69	281	39	7	396



REFERENCE NOTES

Reference notes are numbered separately for each of the six Parts into which this Report is divided and the Appendices. Except where otherwise specified, the files referred to are those of Central Registry (Army Division) of the Department of National Defence. Principal exceptions are those of the one-time Canadian Military Headquarters, London, England, distinguished by the abbreviation (CMHQ) and miscellaneous files in the possession of the Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, and marked (H.S.) War Diaries are referred to by the letters "W.D."

PART I

1. (H.S.) 990 (D4): The Military Service Act, 1917: Its Background, Preliminaries, Terms and Reaction on Opinion, Historical Section (GS), DND, 19 Nov 44.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Documents on HQS. 5902, vol. 1. See also Preliminary Narrative, History of Canadian Military Policy and of Canadian Military Forces in Canada and Adjacent Regions, 1939-1945, Chap I and Report No. 22, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters.
5. Stacey, Colonel C.P., Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1, The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific; Training and Operations (Fourth Draft), pp 48-49.
6. Ibid.
7. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1938, pp 1647-8.
8. Ibid., 1939, p. 2423.
9. Ibid., p. 2426.
10. Ibid., p. 2441.
11. Stacey, op. cit., pp 50-51.
12. Copy of Memorandum of HQS 5199-S, vol. 1.
13. (H.S.) 111.13 (D1), vol. 1: Tel 63, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 3 Sep 39.
14. Ibid.: Tel 59, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 Sep 39.
15. Ibid.: Campbell to Skelton, 6 Sep 39.
16. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, Second Session, 1939, p. 36.
17. Dawson, Robert MacGregor, Canada in World Affairs, Two Years of War 1939-1941, Toronto, 1943, pp 15-17 and 19.



18. "Changes in Population and In the Labour Force", Issued as a Supplement to The Labour Gazette, December, 1945 (Research and Statistics Branch, Department of Labour), Ottawa, 1946. See also "Effects of the War on Canada's Labour Force", Canadian Labour Market, September, 1947. (Research and Statistics Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa).
19. A.F.W. Plumptre, Mobilizing Canada's Resources for War, Toronto, 1941, pp 1 and 13.
20. Stacey, pp 65-9.
21. HQS 5199-S, vol. 1: "Memorandum on Suggestions of the British Government for Co-operation by the Canadian Army".
22. Minutes of an Informal Meeting of Defence Council ... September 14th, 1939. See also Stacey, p. 83.
23. Feasby, W.R. (ed), Official History of the Canadian Medical Services 1939-1945, Volume One - Organization and Campaigns, (typed draft revised as of 1 May 52), p. 82.
24. Ibid., pp 78-82 and 599-603.
25. Minutes of a Meeting of the Defence Council ... October 24th, 1939.
26. Documents on HQS 20-4-1.
27. Ibid. See also HQS 20-4-2-E: Tel Org 282, A.G. to D.Os. C., 11 Oct. 39.
28. Minutes of a Meeting of Defence Council ... November 1st, 1939.
29. Minutes of a Meeting of Defence Council ... December 20th, 1939.
30. Statistics supplied by War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs.
31. Stacey, pp 109-113, discusses "Paying for the Military Effort, 1939" in sufficient detail for the present purpose.
32. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1940, p. 7.
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Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 29 Dec 49) and Grant Dexter of The Winnipeg Free Press wrote a book review (The Ottawa Citizen, 6 Jan 50) to defend the reputation of the late Hon. J.L. Ralston. The latest contribution is Bruce Hutchison's biography, The Incredible Canadian, Toronto, 1952.

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PART VI

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