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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

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REPORT NO. 67
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12
BY oee FOR DHIST NDHQ
DATE: **NOV 13 1988**

15 Jan 54

MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN
AIR FORCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Manpower Problems of the Royal
Canadian Air Force During the
Second World War

1. This Report discusses the Royal Canadian Air Force's requirements for and utilization of manpower during the Second World War. Since only volunteers served in the R.C.A.F., its problems were considerably less involved than those which faced the Canadian Army, and which have been discussed in Report No. 63. That Report should be read, however, in order to obtain an overall view of how the pool of Canadian manpower was divided between industry, agriculture and the three Armed Forces.
2. Always at the back of the R.C.A.F.'s manpower problems was the existence of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Canada's concentration on training inevitably meant a lesser effort overseas in the air war and was the basic factor contributing to almost chronic disputes over "Canadianization" of its overseas squadrons. Furthermore, since R.C.A.F. units were serving under the operational direction of the Air Ministry and other R.C.A.F. personnel were attached to the R.A.F., Canadian authorities were not concerned with the adequacy of the wastages rates for the war in the air. Their concern with training wastage under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan is discussed in a separate Appendix.
3. Unless otherwise specified, statistics are those furnished by the Air Statistical Officer, Air Force Headquarters. Unfortunately, a search of existing files in Central Registry (Air Division) has failed to provide as much information as was desired. It is not considered however, that the basic conclusions would have been altered by the availability of such documentary evidence.
 - (i) Between the Wars
4. Not until 1 Apr 24 did a Royal Canadian Air Force come into existence as a permanent component of Canada's defence forces. The tiny permanent force that then emerged, with an establishment of 68 officers and 307 airmen, was forced to spend most of its time working for purely civilian departments of the Canadian Government, with aerial photography and forestry patrols as major tasks (1). By 31 Mar 30 the R.C.A.F. had increased to 175 officers and 669 airmen and a programme was under way to train university science students as provisional pilot officers during their summer vacations (2). By the beginning of 1932 it was obvious, however, that the economic depression was not going to disappear rapidly. The Canadian Government slashed its defence expenditures and almost one-fifth of the R.C.A.F. — 78 officers,

100 airmen and 110 civilians had to be released. The concomitant major reorganization was to convert the R.C.A.F. into a military organization, however, and action finally was taken to form a Non-Permanent Active Air Force (3). In 1934 the tide began to turn and the R.C.A.F. began to expand once more. 12 officers and 98 airmen were added to the permanent strength of the R.C.A.F. and 10 obsolescent "service" aircraft (Atlas) were bought from the British Government. The existing three N.P.A.A.F. squadrons were each issued with five Moth aircraft and a further two squadrons were formed at Montreal. A permanent flying boat squadron was formed at Dartmouth (4).

5. War clouds already were looming over Europe when a general election was held during the autumn of 1935 and any new Government would have had to look to Canada's defences. A start was made in 1936 but progress was slow. For the fiscal year 1937-8 the R.C.A.F. received \$11,756,650, or upwards of 32 per cent of the total defence appropriation (5). When the Minister of National Defence introduced his estimates for the following year to the House of Commons on 24 Mar 38 he made public the fact that:

A certain amount of priority has been established after deliberation: first for the air services; secondly, for naval defence; and thirdly, in regard to the repairing of deficiencies in equipment of militia services, permanent and non-permanent. (6)

6. On 19 Nov 38 the Senior Air Officer became Chief of the Air Staff and responsible directly to the Minister of National Defence, instead of through the Chief of the General Staff, to place the R.C.A.F. on a par with the Navy and Militia. Western and Eastern Air Commands and an Air Training Command were established. The flying training syllabus was reorganized to conform with the R.A.F.'s three stages of training. Arrangements were made to have elementary flying training carried out, under contract, by eight civilian flying clubs;* intermediate and advanced training was to be carried out at Camp Borden and Trenton by the R.C.A.F. On 1 Dec 38 the Non-Permanent Active Air Force was renamed the Auxiliary Active Air Force (8).

7. February 1939 saw the first delivery of Hawker "Hurricanes" to replace the obsolete "Siskin" fighters. When the Minister of National Defence tabled his annual estimates in the House of Commons on 26 Apr he stated that:

...the immediate objective of the department is to build up for the defence of Canada an air force consisting, on a peace time basis, of eleven permanent and twelve non-permanent squadrons, which is considered the minimum for any effective defence plan. The policy is to provide permanent force squadrons with a full complement of first line service aircraft in squadrons, with a reserve, and to provide non-permanent squadrons with one-third of their complement, consisting of elementary

*Beginning in 1928, when 16 light aeroplane clubs were formed and issued with two light aircraft, a premium of \$100 had been paid for each pupil who received a private pilot's certificate. Courses for these private flying club instructors were given at Camp Borden (7).

and advanced training aircraft, and a reserve. Further, it is intended to provide schools with the number of aircraft required to train new entries and replace wastage (9).

8. Such a force would require the permanent employment of 525 officers and 4500 airmen and a non-permanent component of 220 officers and 2014 airmen. Of the total officers, 599 would be pilots. A small proportion of airmen were employed as pilots (10). The Minister of National Defence further stressed the "tremendous advantage" which the R.C.A.F. possessed over the other Services in the securing of trained personnel:

The inevitable growth of civil aviation in a natural flying country such as Canada has provided and will continue in greater degree to provide a reserve of experienced pilots. The accompanying growth of the aircraft industry and its recent expansion into the production of service type aircraft will complete the twin essential bases of an effective military air force, namely a reserve of experienced pilots, and the means of producing major types of equipment and armament within our own borders. (11)

9. Eventually it was planned to have 50 per cent of the permanent pilot strength serving on short service commissions, since only a limited number of administrative posts would be available for older and more senior officers (12). Applicants had to be unmarried, between the ages of 18 and 25, have completed junior matriculation, plus three or more subjects towards senior matriculation. Qualified pilots of the Auxiliary Active Air Force and commercial pilots could be accepted outside this age group. After four years active duty they would receive a cash gratuity and go on reserve status for a further six years, unless they received permission to do a further five years active duty or were given one of a limited number of permanent commissions. Ordinarily, permanent commissions were granted only to graduates of the Royal Military College or a recognized Canadian university.

10. This programme was passed without much adverse comment, since there was no suggestion of anything other than voluntary enlistment. Indeed, the Leader of the Opposition had urged earlier (30 Mar) that, in the event of war, Canada might co-operate fully with the British Commonwealth by the despatch of air force units, since a large proportion of flying personnel in the Great War 1914-1919* had been Canadian (14).

(ii) Outbreak of War, 1939

11. There was less than four months in which to implement this programme before the permanent squadrons began moving to their war stations on 26 Aug 39. On the eve of War the R.C.A.F. possessed a total strength of only 4061 all ranks: 298 officers and 2750 airmen were in permanent establishments and 112 officers and 901 airmen belonged to the Auxiliary Active Air Force. There were eight permanent

*In the neighbourhood of 22,000 Canadians had served in the Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Air Force and 1563 had given their lives (13).

squadrons and 12 Auxiliary squadrons, although five of the latter were only in the preliminary stages of organization and were soon disbanded (15). R.C.A.F. action in the event of War had been envisaged, by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 29 Aug, as co-operation with the Navy in the safeguarding of trade routes, defence of focal points and the provision of personnel for an Army Co-operation Wing of three squadrons to serve overseas (16). Neither aircraft nor equipment for an Army Co-operation Wing were available, however, and this information had to be included in the Canadian offer of assistance made to the British Government (17). In his reply of 6 Sep the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stressed that:

...so far as immediate steps are concerned, provision of naval vessels and facilities and of Air Force personnel would be of most assistance, and in particular at present time supply of any pilots and aircraft crews available is a capital requirement. (18)

However, on 17 Sep the Chief of the Air Staff recommended that Canada could best help the United Kingdom by concentrating her "entire efforts, after securing [her] home defence, upon the production of the greatest possible numbers of trained personnel in all categories" (19). Rather than despatch any personnel to the Royal Air Force, he urged that "we should absorb all resources of trained airmen available in Canada with the object of securing as many instructors as may be possible in the various trades and activities of the Air Force, as it is only by so doing that we can exert our fullest effort to the task of providing an adequate supply of trained personnel in the shortest possible time" (20). Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, A.F.C. suggested that the production of 1000 men per month, in all trades, should be the immediate goal.

13. On 1 Sep the R.C.A.F. had been placed on "active service" and on 14 Sep a Special Reserve was authorized. This latter got around the regulation whereby only British subjects could be enlisted or commissioned into the R.C.A.F.: any man of "pure European descent" could be commissioned into the Special Reserve and, after arrangements had been made with the Air Ministry, be acceptable for service overseas with the R.A.F. (21). On 15 Sep a Directorate of Air Force Manning was added to Air Force Headquarters, which shortly was reorganized into four divisions -- Air Staff, Personnel, Organization and Training, and Aeronautical Engineering and Supply. On 18 Sep a Manning Pool (later No. 1 Manning Depot) was opened in the Coliseum Building of the Canadian National Exhibition Grounds, Toronto (22). On 23 Oct a Technical Training School at St. Thomas, Ont. was taken over to train tradesmen, 400 of whom had been trade tested during the preceding week (23). The 20 recruiting offices opened across the country during September were temporarily understaffed, since only a limited number of permanent or auxiliary R.C.A.F. personnel were yet available; uniforms and equipment were in short supply and improvisation was the order of the day. Lack of accommodation also held back the expansion of the R.C.A.F. (24). Even worse complications resulted from the fact that the R.C.A.F. had no medical service of its own and had to rely largely on N.P.A.M. and civilian doctors who were not familiar with the physical standards required for enlistment.

(iii) British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

14. Since 1932 the R.C.A.F. had been handling enquiries by young Canadians for enlistment in the R.A.F. and nominating suitable candidates. Beginning in 1937, preliminary training was given to candidates seeking short service commissions under a "Trained in Canada Scheme" (25). During May and June 1938

exploratory conversations were held between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, as a result of a suggestion by the former that its Air Ministry might establish R.A.F. training schools in the wide open spaces of the Dominion. The Canadian Prime Minister refused, however, to entertain the idea of the British Government setting up and controlling its own training establishments in Canada. On 1 Jul 38 Mr King told critics in the House of Commons that Canada was "prepared to give in our own establishments the opportunity to British pilots to come over here and train, but they will do it in our own establishments, controlled by our own Minister of National Defence who is responsible to this Parliament" (26). Such an offer was made to the British Government and accepted.

15. Within a few weeks Air Commodore R. Leckie, D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C., a Canadian serving in the R.A.F., was sent out to make a survey of potential training facilities in Canada (27). Agreement was reached that 50 R.A.F. pilots should receive their intermediate and advanced training in Canada during each of the next three years along with the 75 short service officers being trained for the R.C.A.F. (see para 9).

16. On 26 Sep 39 the British Government proposed, however, that a greatly increased air training scheme be undertaken in Canada. Following a meeting of the Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy) of the Cabinet on 28 Sep, the Canadian Government agreed in principle. On 10 Oct Mr King made public the fact that such a scheme was being negotiated by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. On 15 Oct a United Kingdom Air Mission, headed by Lord Riverdale, arrived in Ottawa. He was subsequently joined by Capt. F.H. Balfour, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air. Canada was represented by a committee comprising the Prime Minister and Ministers of National Defence, Pensions and National Health, Finance and Transport (28). Australia and New Zealand were represented by smaller delegations.

17. It must be remembered that at this stage of the War there was a common desire not to disturb the civilian economy. There were sufficient men available in Canada to meet the immediate needs of the Armed Forces or replace those who had left civilian occupations to don a uniform (A.H.Q. Report No. 63). As yet the economic theories promoted by Lord Keynes had not found acceptance and both the Canadian Prime Minister and Minister of Finance were worried about financing Canada's contribution to winning the war. On 31 Oct they suggested to Lord Riverdale and Capt Balfour, who were meeting with the Emergency Council of the Canadian Cabinet, that the scheme proposed by the United Kingdom Air Mission was too grandiose. Then, as late as 22 Nov, the British delegation had to submit what was virtually an ultimatum on behalf of Australia, necessitating a further downward revision in the scheme since that country was also short of dollar currency.

18. By 27 Nov a draft agreement had been drawn up. The concurrence of the Governments concerned had to be obtained, however, and many details still remained to be worked out. Moreover, as Mr King had explained to his own colleagues before the delegations met with the Emergency Council of the Cabinet, Canada was not prepared to accept the air training scheme until the British Government had met two conditions: admission that air training should be given top priority in Canada's war effort; and the satisfactory outcome of financial and economic discussions then going on in London (29).

19. Among other questions still to be settled was the identification of Dominions aircrew in an operational role.

As early as 2 Nov Capt Balfour had suggested three alternatives:

- (a) R.C.A.F. identified as such and in which case Canada would pay the entire cost of maintenance.
- (b) Graduates of the Co-operative Training Scheme to be in the R.A.F. identified as Canadian, Australian or New Zealand Squadrons in the R.A.F. In this case the United Kingdom would bear the entire cost of maintenance.
- (c) The remainder of the graduates over and above those required in identified squadrons to be taken into regular R.A.F. squadrons and in this case the United Kingdom to bear the entire cost of maintenance.

Canada's Minister of National Defence had proposed a fourth course:

R.C.A.F. squadrons identified as such in the theatre of war to be maintained as to aircraft and equipment by the United Kingdom and as to other types of expense by Canada (30).

20. On 23 Nov the Chief of the Air Staff submitted his own ideas to the Minister of National Defence, pointing out that it was essential for the R.C.A.F. to participate in operations overseas. The proposed joint air training programme would require the services of 36,000 members of the R.C.A.F., but relegation to a training role was not in keeping with national temperament. He suggested two alternative methods of placing R.C.A.F. squadrons on active operations:

- (a) R.C.A.F. squadrons in which the flying personnel would be Canadian but the ground personnel R.A.F.
- (b) R.C.A.F. formations and units overseas in which all personnel would be R.C.A.F., the administrative and ground personnel being released from Training Stream duties in Canada by the exchange of R.A.F. personnel who had already had overseas service (31).

Since Canada's contribution to the air training plan would be equivalent to the maintenance of 50 squadrons on operations he did not consider it unreasonable to ask the Air Ministry to co-operate: the number of additional R.A.F. squadrons being formed could be reduced by the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons provided. Looking ahead, Air Vice Marshal Croil envisaged the progressive formation of an R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, then distinct Canadian Fighter and Bomber Groups. These to be additional to the Army Co-operation Wing already promised.

21. The Chief of the Air Staff was requested to investigate the implications of these proposals. Then, on the afternoon of 14 Dec, he accompanied the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence (Naval and Air) to a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr J.B. Abraham

of the United Kingdom Air Mission (32). Their proposal for the progressive formation of all-Canadian squadrons was turned down by the Canadian Cabinet that evening, however, since the number of overseas squadrons would be limited to those for which the R.C.A.F. could provide ground crews. The other suggestion, that the R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas should have R.A.F. ground personnel, was opposed by Lord Riverdale at the subsequent meeting with the newly instituted Cabinet War Committee. Lord Riverdale argued that such action would result in four-fifths of a squadron being R.A.F. but he agreed to cable the British Government for instructions. On 16 Dec Lord Riverdale advised the Minister of National Defence that the British Government would agree to R.C.A.F. squadrons being formed on such a basis (33).

22. Only on Sunday, 17 Dec, was a British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement signed at Ottawa. Prime Minister King's public announcement, over the radio, included the following:

In embarking upon the vast co-operative enterprise, envisaged by the Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the government had naturally to give the most careful consideration to the Plan in its relation to Canada's military effort as a whole. This aspect was, of course, very fully discussed with the Government of the United Kingdom. It is obviously all-important that our effort should be co-ordinated with the effort of our allies in a single strategic plan for carrying on the war. When the Plan, in its broad outlines, was proposed by the Government of the United Kingdom, it was stated that the immense influence which the development and realization of such a great project might have upon the whole course of the war, might even prove decisive....

The United Kingdom has...informed us that considering present and future requirements, it feels that participation in the Air Training Scheme would provide for more effective military assistance towards ultimate victory than any other form of military co-operation which Canada can give. At the same time the United Kingdom wishes it clearly to be understood that it would welcome no less heartily the presence of Canadian forces in the theatre of war at the earliest possible moment (34).

23. Mr King also mentioned that, since it would take time to get results from the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the Air Ministry would arrange for a squadron to be formed from Canadians already serving in the Royal Air Force. (No. 242 (Canadian) Squadron, R.A.F. later took part in the Battles of France and Britain.)

24. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement became effective at once and was to remain in force until 31 Mar 43, unless extended or terminated by joint agreement. Canada was to administer the B.C.A.T.P. and establish an organization which, at capacity, would produce the following aircrew graduates every four weeks (35):

Pilots (elementary flying training)	520
Pilots (service flying training)	544
Observers	340
Wireless operator-air gunners	580

Only Canadians would undergo initial and elementary flying training in the schools to be established in Canada. The other Dominions would supply the following quotas:

	<u>Australia</u>	<u>New Zealand</u>
Pilots (service flying training)	2/16	1/16
Observers	1/10	1/10
Wireless operator-air gunners	1/10	1/10

They would provide advanced training at home for the smaller proportion of aircrew required by home defence squadrons. Canada was to provide the remainder, less the 10 per cent or portion thereof supplied by the United Kingdom. The British quota could include pupils from Newfoundland. Provision was made, however, for the numbers and categories of pupils to be adjusted from time to time by inter-governmental arrangement (36).

25. Although Canada's air training programme was merged completely into the B.C.A.T.P., sufficient graduates would be retained to man its home defence squadrons, provided that this number should not exceed 136 pilots, 34 air observers and 58 wireless operator-air gunners annually.

26. The Government of Canada would bear the entire costs and expenses of the initial training and elementary flying training in Canada. The remaining costs and expenses would be apportioned in the following percentages (37):

Canada.....	80.64
Australia.....	11.28
New Zealand.....	8.08

The United Kingdom's share of the scheme was to be supplied in kind — service aircraft, engines for airframes manufactured in Canada, spare parts and other equipment. Whilst in Canada all British, Australian and New Zealand pupils would be "attached" to the R.C.A.F. and receive Canadian rates of pay and allowances. Upon the completion of training all pupils, except the R.C.A.F. aircrew retained for the home defence squadrons, would be placed at the "disposal" of the British Government. Upon their embarking for the United Kingdom pay and allowances at R.A.F. rates would become a charge against the British Government, with the provision that the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Governments could supplement such amounts if they so desired.

27. Article 15 of the B.C.A.T.P. was most significant as a key to later controversy:

The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate inter-governmental discussions to this end (38).

28. Meanwhile officials of the Department of Transport and R.C.A.F. officers had been looking for suitable

locations for training schools and awarding contracts for construction (39). The completed programme called for the establishment of three Initial Training Schools, 13 Elementary Flying Training Schools, 16 Service Flying Training Schools, 10 Air Observers Schools, 10 Bombing & Gunnery Schools, two Air Navigation Schools and four Wireless Schools; ancillary schools to train instructional and administrative personnel and depots also were required (40). The decision to have Elementary Flying Training Schools and Air Observers Schools operated by civilian firms under contract (although under R.C.A.F. supervision) reduced the demand for skilled personnel and the construction problems facing the R.C.A.F. (41). The existing Air Training Command at Toronto was redesignated No. 1 and Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were organized at Winnipeg, Montreal and Regina during the winter and early spring.

29. A Supervisory Board was established in Ottawa to handle B.C.A.T.P. matters. The original members were the Minister of National Defence (chairman), Minister of Finance, Minister of Transport, representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence (Naval and Air) and the Chief of the Air Staff.

30. Actually, the most pressing requirement was instructional staff, required against an opening date of 29 Apr 40. Each of the other partners was to supply what could be spared but these were few in number. The Air Ministry did its best, however, and on 29 Dec 39 the R.C.A.F. was advised that it was hoped to despatch 85 officers and 182 airmen* as "immediate" personnel to help staff the B.C.A.T.P. (45). Air Commodore Robert Leckie was attached to the R.C.A.F. to become Director of Training at A.F.H.Q.**

31. On 29 Apr 40 No. 1 Initial Training School (I.T.S.) received its first intake of 164 trainees to open the B.C.A.T.P. officially*** At the end of four weeks men proceeded to more specialized training: prospective pilots were to spend eight weeks at an Elementary Flying Training School and 16 weeks at a Service Flying Training School; observers were to spend 12 weeks at an Air Observers School, six weeks at a Bombing & Gunnery School and four weeks at an Air Navigation School; wireless operator-air gunners were to spend 16 weeks at a Wireless School and four weeks at a Bombing & Gunnery School; those last who failed their wireless course were remustered as air gunners before being sent on to a Bombing & Gunnery School. These courses were expanded or

*Only 67 officers and 182 airmen arrived in Canada before 31 Mar 40 (42).

**G/C R.W. Ryan was sent to Canada to advise on Medical matters in March 1940 and became the first D.M.S. (Air) after a distinct organization was established, completely separate from the R.C.A.M.C., on 19 Sep 40.

***On 27 May 40 the first Air Observer School was opened at Malton. On 24 Jun the first four Elementary Flying Training Schools received intakes of 24 pupils each. On 22 Jul the first class reported to No. 1 Service Flying Training School, Camp Borden.

contracted in length from time to time to concord with current needs (44). Wastage rates during training were estimated as follows: 29 per cent of original E.F.T.S. entry for pilots, 19 per cent for observers and 19 1/2 per cent for wireless operator-air gunners (45).

32. All aircrew candidates were enlisted in the grade of A.C. 2 (aircraftman, 2nd class), with pilots and observers becoming L.A.Cs. (leading aircraftmen) during the course of their training. On graduation 33 per cent of pilots and observers were commissioned as pilot officers and the remainder given the rank of sergeant. A further 17 per cent of pilots and observers could be commissioned for distinguished service, devotion to duty and display of ability in the field of operations. No provision was made originally for granting commissions to wireless operator-air gunners and air gunners (46).

33. On 10 May 40 when the Wehrmacht invaded France and the Low Countries, the B.C.A.T.P. Supervisory Board held an emergency meeting to discuss whether the programme should be accelerated or turned into a short term scheme temporarily by despatching instructors overseas to become operational pilots (47). On 20 May the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa officially replied that the British Government would like to see the B.C.A.T.P. continued and accelerated to the utmost (48). Reluctance to reduce its own defences further at this time, despite British assurances that Japan was unlikely to make an offensive move, contributed to the Cabinet decision that No. 1 Fighter Squadron (augmented by personnel of No. 115 (City of Montreal) Squadron) and No. 112 (A.C.) Squadron (originally slated for later despatch) were the only R.C.A.F. units that could be spared at this time.

34. On 23 May Hon. C.G. Power had been appointed Minister of National Defence for Air. On 29 May Air Vice Marshal L.S. Breadner, D.S.C. was appointed Chief of the Air Staff in succession to Air Vice Marshal Croil who became Inspector General.

35. As a result of continual Luftwaffe interference with R.A.F. training stations, the Air Ministry expressed a wish to transfer certain of its own schools to Canada, including their staffs(49). On 19 Jul the Cabinet War Committee agreed that such schools might be established in Canada. These were eight Service Flying Training Schools, two Air Navigation Schools, one Air Observer School, one Bombing & Gunnery School, one General Reconnaissance School and one Torpedo Training School (50). By the end of 1940 four of these R.A.F. Transferred Schools were in operation, at sites previously slated for B.C.A.T.P. Schools (51). Although these 14 R.A.F. Schools became attached to the B.C.A.T.P. organization for training, they retained their separate identity, as did their graduates.

36. By the end of 1940 there were 16 civilian controlled E.F. T.Ss. in operation, and the intake had been increased from 48 to 70 (class of 35 entering every four weeks) (52). There were also two Initial Training Schools, eight Service Flying Training Schools, four civilian managed Air Observer Schools, three Bombing & Gunnery Schools, two Wireless Schools and an Air Navigation School (53). Staff strength of the B.C.A.T.P. totalled 12,507 R.C.A.F. and 5708 civilians and there were 8183 in training to become instructional personnel (54). There were 996 pupils undergoing initial training, 1232 pupils on elementary flying training, 687 pupils at Service Flying Training Schools; 634 observers and 1138 wireless operator-air gunners were in various stages of training. A total of 3555 officers and airmen were undergoing technical training (55).

37. The first class of R.C.A.F. observers had graduated on 24 Oct 40 and a month later these 12 officers and 25 sergeants arrived at Liverpool as the first B.C.A.T.P. draft (56). Other courses began to graduate during the late autumn but only the following had completed their courses by the end of 1940 (57):

	<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>R.A.A.F.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Pilots	201	37	238
Observers	115		115
Wireless operator-air gunners	149		149
Air gunners	<u>19</u>	—	<u>19</u>
Total	484	37	521

(iv) First 16 Months Recruiting

38. From the outset recruiting quotas were allotted on the basis of population and geography. The immediate need, however, was for technical officers, instructors and tradesmen in order to ensure an orderly expansion. Top priority was given to applicants for commissions in the technical branches; secondly, to so-called "bush" pilots and other commercial pilots who might be employed as instructors. Up to 31 Mar 40 a total of 343 applicants were commissioned as non flying list officers and 157 civilian pilots accepted: however, only 54 of the latter were granted commissions. Some 139 provisional pilot officers were given elementary flying training at civilian flying clubs (58).

39. Recruiting officers were swamped with applications and, because of local pressures, there was a regrettable, though natural, tendency to over-enlist against authorized quotas. Therefore, during November 1939 it proved necessary to suspend recruiting temporarily (59). Even after recruiting was resumed on 10 Jan 40 there was a considerable backlog of applicants. Prospective recruits were required to produce proof of age and educational attainment and two letters as character reference, and it took time to check these (60). Owing to shortage of equipment and accommodation, there was nowhere to post men and recruiting was suspended again for a few weeks during February and March (61). Total strength of the R.C.A.F. on 31 Mar 40 was 1142 officers and 9152 airmen (62).

40. During this period age limits and medical standards were altered. Only those over 32 years of age — the top age for aircrew — became acceptable as officers for non-flying duties, except those with technical qualifications. Since applicants for aircrew training under the B.C.A.T.P. were to be enlisted in the grade of A.C.2, all those who previously had applied for commissions as provisional pilot officers were advised to seek enlistment at the nearest recruiting office. Preference was given to single men. Junior matriculation and ages 18 to 28 remained in force for pilots but the upper age for observers and wireless operator-air gunners was raised to 32. (Not until September 1940 was the age limit for prospective pilots increased to 31.) Quotas were issued by A.F.H.Q. but local recruiting offices made the selection. Age limits for ground personnel were 18-40, although skilled tradesmen could be as old as 50 and possess eyesight correctable by glasses. Intake for April was 85 officers and 1545 airmen. On 29 Apr a second Manning Depot was opened at Brandon, with a capacity for 500 recruits.

41. The end of the "phony war" brought increased enthusiasm across the country and, despite continually increasing training capacity, applicants still were kept waiting. On 20 Jun

a temporary Manning Depot was established at the Rockcliffe Air Station, Ottawa. During August the capacity of No. 2 Manning Depot, Brandon was increased to 1500 recruits and on 3 Sep a fourth Manning Depot was established at Quebec City with a capacity for 1015 trainees. This last was designed particularly to give French-speaking candidates a basic knowledge of the English language before commencing training. During November a further temporary Manning Depot was established at Picton (63).

42. Since intake was exceeding the existing training capacity of the B.C.A.T.P., however, the practice was instituted, after the R.C.A.F. took over guard duties at its non-operational stations from the Army on 9 Aug 40, of posting all recruits to guard or "tarmac duty" for a period of up to two months after leaving a Manning Depot. This ensured that a reservoir of pupils would always be on hand to meet aircrew training requirements and give employment to young men who were eager to serve (64). Total intake, for air and ground duties, during these months of 1940 was (65):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
May	153	1609
June	175	3700
July	131	2040
August	72	3137
September	272	3593
October	168	3967
November	174	3166
December	<u>231</u>	<u>3663</u>
	1376	24,875

(v) Expansion of B.C.A.T.P., 1942

43. With the Battle of Britain continuing Prime Minister King had cabled Prime Minister Churchill on 14 Nov 40 offering increased air training facilities (66). Although this offer had not been accepted the way had been left open for later reconsideration. During the winter months of 1941 the British Government arranged to obtain training facilities in the southern United States. Naturally the Canadian Government was annoyed, until the real reasons behind this move were explained to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 9 Apr: anticipation of obtaining American citizens as recruits, availability of training aircraft and possible diplomatic gains. Notwithstanding this, during May 1941 the Air Ministry sought permission to transfer 16 further R.A.F. Schools to Canada: six Elementary Flying Training Schools, six Service Flying Training Schools, three Operational Training Units and one General Reconnaissance School (67). Arrangements were initiated with the Department of Transport to secure sites, although the Cabinet War Committee did not give its approval until 30 Jul 41.

44. The outbreak of war with Japan created fresh problems at a time when increased emphasis was being placed on victory through air power (68). Marshal of the R.A.F. Arthur "Bomber" Harris relates that when he took over Bomber Command on 23 Feb 42 there were only 378 serviceable aircraft with crews, and only 69 were heavy bombers (69). Agreement was reached that preliminary discussions for increased training facilities should be held in Canada between British and Canadian officials, but as the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote the United Kingdom High Commissioner on 24 Mar 42:

The Canadian Government feel very strongly that there are a number of major questions of policy relating to the scope and continuation of the Joint Air Training Plan, the status and administration of transferred R.A.F. Schools in Canada, and the relationship between the Joint Air Training Plan and the air training programmes of the United Kingdom and the United States which are in need of early consideration and can most effectively be decided by a conference of governmental representatives. We should like to hold such a conference in Ottawa if possible early in May and if the United Kingdom Government is agreeable to the general proposal, we should like to invite the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States to participate in it. (70)

Not until 4 Apr was a favourable reply received. Even then, the British Government felt that it would not be desirable for American representatives to be present when purely Commonwealth matters were under discussion (71). During his visit to Washington Prime Minister King took up the matter with President Roosevelt (72).

45. The actual Ottawa conference was held from 19 to 22 May 42, with representatives of 14 nations in attendance. The U.S. delegation stood firm, however, against any commitments for a co-ordinated exchange of training capacity. The U.S. War Department, in particular, considered that any surplus B.C.A.T.P. capacity should be utilized to train Commonwealth aircrew, rather than send R.A.F. pupils elsewhere, such as to B.F.T.Ss. in the United States (73). The Conference did recommend the establishment of a Combined Committee on Air Training in North America, with advisory functions only. (Committee members were named but, due to the opposition of the U.S. War Department, no meetings were held prior to April 1943 and subsequent discussions were of only minor significance (74).

46. However, on 5 Jun 42 representatives of the B.C.A.T.P. partners signed a new Agreement on training policy and the subsequent service of trained aircrew. It amended and extended until 31 Mar 45 the original Agreement of 17 Dec 39. Under the new Agreement Canada took over the administration and control of the 27 transferred R.A.F. units (75). Henceforth the terms Combined Training Organization and Combined Training Establishment came to be used to cover all the schools and units which might exist in Canada for training purposes.

47. The United Kingdom now guaranteed to send sufficient pupils to Canada to fill "not less than 40 per cent of the training capacity provided in the combined training organization" (76). This quota could include trainees from the British Empire and the forces of Allied Nations. It might be varied by agreement with the Canadian Government. Yearly quotas assigned to the Dominions "down under" were (77):

	<u>Australia</u>	<u>New Zealand</u>
Pilots trained to E.F.T.S. standard	1300	450
Observers trained to I.T.S. standard	676	676
W.O.A.Gs. trained to I.T.S. standard	936	715

The balance was to be supplied by the R.C.A.F. and was estimated as being 30,611 pupils annually to produce 26,823 graduates (78).

48. It was agreed that the R.C.A.F. could grant commissions to all its own pilots, observers, navigators and air bombers considered suitable; 10 per cent of wireless operators (air gunner) could be commissioned on graduation and a further 10 per cent following exceptional service in the field; only five per cent of air gunners could be commissioned on graduation but 15 per cent could be commissioned during operational service.

49. When completed, the new B.C.A.T.P. training organization would comprise (79):

- 7 Initial Training Schools
- 16 Elementary Flying Training Schools (12 double)
- 20 Service Flying Training Schools
- 10 Air Observer and Air Navigation Schools (9 double)
- 10 Bombing and Gunnery Schools
- 1 General Reconnaissance School
- 4 Wireless Schools
- 4 Operational Training Units
- 3 Flying Instructors' Schools
- 1 Central Flying School
- 1 S.B.A. and Link Trainer School

When the Combined Training Organization reached its peak in January 1944 there were 73 B.C.A.T.P. flying schools and 24 R.A.F. transferred schools in operation, plus 184 supporting ancillary units and formations (80).

(vi) Recruiting and the B.C.A.T.P., 1941-1943

50. Until the beginning of 1941 the supply of aircrew candidates in Canada had far exceeded the demand and the R.C.A.F. had been able to pick and choose, and take its time about it, despite the clamour of would-be flyers to get into uniform. During 1941, however, R.C.A.F. manpower requirements were estimated as being 29,415 aircrew and 20,529 ground personnel (of whom 8000 might be unskilled) (81). Immediately a new recruiting policy was introduced (1 Feb 41), whereby aircrew applicants were enlisted and placed on leave without pay until such time as their training could be commenced (82). In this way a reserve of aircrew candidates could be built up.

51. The question of aircrew priority was discussed by the Personnel Heads of the three Services on 13 Feb. Aircrew requirements called for two-thirds of the total intake to have junior matriculation and the remainder to have completed two years of high school. Since the number of such physically fit young men was limited, the R.C.A.F. was envisaging a coming shortage (83). Agreement was reached that there should be liaison between the recruiting officers of the three Services and that the Navy and the R.C.A.F. should be allowed to enlist men who were undergoing 30-day military training or were otherwise members of the Reserve Army. This last was added since both the Navy and R.C.A.F. were counting on obtaining a considerable number of recruits from men who had become subject to compulsory military training. In return the Navy and Army should be permitted to approach "washed out" aircrew who were posted monthly to a Ceased Training Depot. Meeting on 24 Feb the Defence Council approved the recommendation that the R.C.A.F. should have first choice on applicants possessing junior matriculation or lesser high school education (84).

52. According to War Service Records a total of 3725 "R" recruits were permitted to transfer from the Army to the R.C.A.F. during 1941 (85). A further 824 volunteers changed from khaki to blue during the same year. (See Table 6)

53. In a more or less impromptu move the Ministers of National Defence had made radio appeals on 8 Apr for a total of 116,000 enlistments during the year, of whom 35,000 were required by the R.C.A.F. (86). A glance at the following recruiting statistics for the first six months of 1941 suggests that this appeal, plus the approach of summer, had some effect (87):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
January	158	4318
February	332	4448
March	240	3257
April	226	3972
May	180	5288
June	221	5722

However, the officers and a large proportion of the airmen were being employed on ground duties. The largest number of aircrew enlistments had been 1982 during March. For the three following months aircrew enlistments had averaged only 1600. Beginning with September it would be necessary to have 2500 recruits commence aircrew training and it was feared that supply would not equal demand (88).

54. The Army undertook its first recruiting campaign in May and the R.C.A.F. wished to follow suit (89). On 15 Jul the Cabinet War Committee was informed that the Army had enlisted 33,500 or 103 per cent of its objective, while the R.C.A.F. had enlisted 12,000 during the same period. The next day Mr Power, who was then visiting the United Kingdom, telegraphed his Deputy Minister that nothing should be done about a recruiting campaign until his return (90). By that time the recruiting situation had improved somewhat, due partly to the fact that more youths were enlisting, now that the school year was over. As the following statistics show, however, enlistments soon settled at a lower level (91).

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
July	289	8996
August	342	7718
September	273	4886
October	315	4933
November	296	5315
December	140	4604

55. Considerable changes in policy were made, however, during the balance of 1941. During the summer, and in line with the Army's changed policy (A.H.Q. Report No. 63), steps were taken to increase enlistments from the French-speaking population of Quebec, where there was a lower standard of education and general health, and some unwillingness to serve overseas. Schools and colleges were visited by bilingual officers, the Manning Depot at Quebec City began to specialize in English language classes, a separate training course for French-speaking mechanics was opened at the Cartierville Aircraft School, an additional recruiting office was opened in Montreal and the province toured by a mobile recruiting unit (92).

56. Another answer to dwindling numbers of aircrew candidates was better selection procedures to cut down training wastage (see Appendix "A"). Certain youths who had managed to secure junior matriculation were found to be mere plodders and less suitable for flying training than more self-reliant youngsters who had not completed high school. An "ability to learn" test would eliminate those with faulty "motivation", since such borderline cases were only able momentarily to work up sufficient enthusiasm to become flyers. Word had been received earlier from the United Kingdom that the type of fighter pilot considered most useful was under the age of 23,

unmarried and physically fit for the strain of high altitude flying (93).

57. Such a test for all recruits was developed, as well as tests for aircrew applicants stressing mathematics, physics and English. After a short course at the University of Toronto, 16 Manning Personnel Officers were attached to recruiting offices in November 1941 to introduce personnel selection procedures. Aircrew candidates finally had to pass before an Aircrew Selection Board, composed of the Manning Personnel Officer, the Medical Officer and the interviewing Officer. Effective 19 Dec 41 those enlisting as radio mechanics, qualified tradesmen and other special enlistments had to pass through the same machinery (94). Eventually all recruits were handled in this manner and it was possible to dispense with formal educational qualifications.

58. The resolved problem, already tackled in a makeshift manner, was to provide a satisfactory substitute for sufficient formal education. As early as November 1940 the Canadian Legion Educational Services had undertaken to provide evening classes in mathematics, physics and English for serving personnel who were desirous of transferring to aircrew or obtaining advancement as tradesmen (95). Such classes generally were held only at large centres, however, and it was soon realized that evening studies created hardship for the average man working all day. During October 1941 arrangements were made under the War Emergency Training Programme for pre-enlistment courses to be given to potential aircrew candidates who were lacking in formal education. Men aged 18 to 33 with two years high school education were eligible, but had to sign an undertaking that they would enlist for aircrew training following the completion of their course. By eliminating non-essentials the length of the course was soon cut from 18 to 12 weeks: pupils did not necessarily have to complete the full course but could be enlisted as soon as they were judged to have attained the minimum standard for aircrew training. Classes were established at Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec, Fredericton, Moncton and Truro (96).

59. As early as the spring of 1939 the Dominion Provincial Youth Training Programme had been conducting mechanics courses for potential R.C.A.F. recruits. During the autumn of 1940 these classes were merged into the War Emergency Training Programme: some 3281 men completed such courses during the fiscal year 1940-1941 and enlisted, proceeding to the Technical Training Centre at St. Thomas, Ontario* for more specialized instruction (97).

60. During 1942 the War Emergency Training Programme was recognized as a definite phase of R.C.A.F. training. Beginning in June men were enlisted and given leave without pay while attending such courses; effective 16 Aug candidates were placed on pay and allowances and attended classes in uniform, after first passing through a Manning Depot. By 15 Sep 42 the total enrolment in War Emergency Training Programme courses for both pre-aircrew and ground training had become (98):

*By 31 Aug 44 a total of 38,445 men had passed through the Technical Training School at St. Thomas, although approximately half of them had only been given refresher training.

Aircrew	1557
Aero engine mechanics	1335
Airframe mechanics	1019
Wireless operators (ground)	572
Radio mechanics	<u>185</u>
	4668

By the end of 1942 some 6884 uniformed trainees were taking War Emergency Training Plan courses; during the fiscal year 1942-43 a total of 25,329 received such training (99).

61. On 6 Jan 42 the R.C.A.F. programme for the coming year had been approved by the Cabinet War Committee, along with those of the other Services, even though the Department of Finance believed that it was impossible of accomplishment within the period and would need downward revision. R.C.A.F. aircrew requirements were envisaged as being 23,516 in order to produce the following graduates (100):

Pilots	8019
Air Observers	3964
Wireless Operators (Air Gunner)	4035
Air Gunners	<u>1404</u>
Total Aircrew	17422

On 18 Mar the Cabinet War Committee approved, in principle, greatly increased home defence programmes for the Army and R.C.A.F. During the balance of the calendar year nine squadrons were added on the West Coast and 10 to the East Coast, where the U-boat menace was becoming more acute. The total of R.C.A.F. squadrons at home was now 36 (101).

62. By midsummer 1942 manpower had become a national problem, however, and a special meeting of the Cabinet War Committee was called for 17 Jul. In particular, the new B.C.A.T.P. Agreement of 5 Jun necessitated the enlistment of 30,611 R.C.A.F. aircrew pupils annually (see para 47). Mr Power stressed that maintaining quality, not quantity, was the main recruiting problem, even though enlistments were falling off. Since training wastage was as high as 30 per cent, 37,950 pupils were required to produce the annual aircrew requirement of 26,500. (See Appendix "A".) A further 16,971 aircrew pupils would be needed before 31 Dec 42. For the remainder of 1942 it would be necessary to enlist 11,427 for ground duties. For the coming calendar year 1943 it would be necessary to enlist a total of 69,995 for all purposes (including women), or 5775 per month.

63. With effect from 1 Oct 42 all applicants for aircrew training were enlisted in a common category of "standard aircrew" and classified for training by the Selection Boards working at the Manning Depots (see para 57). Initially these Boards were to determine whether a recruit needed further educational training or might be posted directly to guard or tarmac duty until there was a course vacancy. No breakdown between pilot, navigator and bomber was made until candidates had finished Initial Training School and quotas were determined by current requirements. Wireless operator-air gunners and air gunners were selected at Manning Depot and went their separate way (102). Recruiting statistics for 1942 were (103):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
January	164	5052
February	107	2556
March	103	3497
April	101	3683
May	216	4456
June	210	8495
July	121	5450
August	169	6187
September	162	5067
October	111	6172
November	195	7182
December	<u>54</u>	<u>6964</u>
	1713	64761

The R.C.A.F. provided 16,261 of the 27,778 graduates of the B.C.A.T.P. during the calendar year (104).

64. The R.C.A.F.'s manpower needs for the period 1 Jan 43 - 31 Mar 44 were well within the estimate which had been submitted to the Cabinet War Committee during September 1942. On 27 Jan 43 Mr Power asked for 70,116 men and 15,267 women although, allowing for training wastage and return to civilian life for other reasons, the net drain on the nation's manpower would be only 66,663 men and women.

65. Plans to co-ordinate Army and R.C.A.F. requirements and recruiting had not, however, materialized. Negotiations had been held during the winter of 1941, and again during May 1942, but nothing had been accomplished towards exchanging "washed out" aircrew with the Army for potential aircrew pupils. During January 1943 Mr Arthur MacNamara, the Director of National Selective Service and Deputy Minister of Labour, began to urge that only men with low medical categories be enlisted for ground duties. This would prevent physically fit men escaping compulsory military service by joining the R.C.A.F. and make for a more equitable distribution of manpower. Mr Power's earlier suggestion to trade "washed out" aircrew for potential aircrew candidates serving in the Army was revived. No agreement having been reached by May, however, the R.C.A.F. was forced to go ahead and meet its requirements for ground duty by starting to enlist some 6000 "A" category men (105).

66. The manpower situation became critical during July, however, and was the subject of considerable study by the Cabinet War Committee. At its meeting of 21 Jul the Cabinet War Committee instructed the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the manpower requirements for the defence of Canada, keeping the existing manpower shortages in mind, and submit a report not later than 7 Aug (106). As regards the R.C.A.F., enlistments for the first seven months of 1943 had been only (107):

January	4951
February	3836
March	3694
April	3136
May	3940
June	4413
July	4092

On 31 Jul only 7745 potential R.C.A.F. aircrew were waiting to enter training schools (108):

On leave without pay	234
Manning Depots	2166
W.E.T.P. schools	4338
Pre-aircrew Educational Detachment	871
Undergoing Flight Testing	136

There was a further monthly quota of 750 airmen remustering from ground duties.

67. This problem was among those discussed by the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff at Quebec on 11 Aug, prior to the opening of the "QUADRANT" Conference (109). Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal expressed concern over the reduced Canadian intake into the Combined Training Establishment (110), which now had an estimated requirement for (111):

	<u>Fleet Air Arm</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
Canada	-	34,600	34,600
United Kingdom	5096	23,302	28,398
Australia	-	2,912	2,912
New Zealand	-	2,509	2,509
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	5096	63,323	68,419

The other partners could not increase their quotas; indeed, Australia had advised the United Kingdom that existing intake was insufficient to meet R.A.A.F. needs in the Pacific and the number of pupils despatched to Canada must diminish, and cease altogether, unless the recruiting trend could be reversed. Air Marshal Breadner told Sir Charles Portal that the R.C.A.F. "was alive to this situation" (112).

68. In a submission of 26 Aug 43, Air Marshal Breadner pointed out to Mr Power that Canada's commitment of 34,600 aircrew candidates could be obtained by enlisting 30,543 (approximately 3000 less than the earlier estimated requirement) and remustering the remainder from ground trades (113). However, while aircrew enlistment requirements were 587 per week, actual enlistments had averaged only 300 per week during 1943. Therefore, the number then in W.E.T.P. classes and those who would be available for direct entry into aircrew training would maintain intake requirements only until early October. New recruiting measures were being explored but the only "near term" solution was the large-scale transfer of military personnel who wished to become aircrew. In a further submission to the Minister of National Defence for Air, dated 17 Sep 43, Air Marshal Breadner summed up as follows:

Aside from any question of strict legal obligation, it is considered that Canada's most important contribution to the war effort has been the Air Training Plan and that Canada has recognized moral commitments with respect to the same which Canada is obligated to carry out. Any action at this time which would affect or reduce Canada's contribution under the Plan would have a most adverse effect upon the contribution being made by this Service to the war effort and should not be taken. It is considered, therefore, that the present obligation of the Government of Canada under the Agreement of 5th June, 1942 and the interpretation placed upon it by all of the parties thereto is to supply annually 34,600

pupils for training under the B.C.A.T.P. Plan. (114)

69. Negotiations between the Army and R.C.A.F. over the exchange of personnel had been revived in May but were making little headway until the Minister of Labour set forth his own ideas to the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet Manpower Committee in a letter of 18 Aug (115). On 31 Aug the Adjutant-General met with the Air Member for Personnel and by 25 Sep agreement was reached. Until the end of the year the two Services would conduct an experiment in joint recruiting. The Army would refer all applicants interested in flying to the R.C.A.F. and permit existing personnel to transfer to the R.C.A.F. if suitable for aircrew or with too low a "PULHEMS" medical profile for overseas service. The R.C.A.F. would enlist no ground personnel with a medical category acceptable for overseas service with the Army and would permit any non-flying personnel of this category to transfer. Circular letters were issued to facilitate the transfer of Army personnel to aircrew training, pending the promulgation of an Order in Council (P.C. 741 of 7 Feb 44).

70. Possibly due to increased recruiting tempo and critical newspaper comment, aircrew enlistments had increased from an average of 330 to 450 per week during August (116). At the same time authority had been given to remuster ground crew at the rate of 1000 per month during August, September and October, instead of the 750 during June and July (117). (During 1943 a total of 6192 men were remustered to aircrew.) (118) On 13 Sep the Air Member for Personnel advised Air Marshal Breadner that this immediate action would permit aircrew training quotas to be maintained until the end of the year. Continued enlistments and remusterings would postpone the evil day even longer (119). On the following day Air Marshal Breadner sent this information to Sir Charles Portal, with the rider that he would watch the situation closely and endeavour to give two months' notice should it be necessary to call upon the R.A.F. for supplementary drafts (120). In his letter of the same day to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, however, Air Marshal Breadner admitted that:

Our prospects for the future are somewhat precarious as enlistments may slump at any time and there is a limit to the numbers of ground crew we can safely remuster....(121)

(vii) Reduction in B.C.A.T.P.

71. Change of another kind was not, however, long in appearing. On 10 Nov 43 Air Vice Marshal R. Leckie advised the Minister of National Defence for Air that he had received private information from the Air Ministry that, in the very near future, Canada would be asked to lengthen aircrew courses and thus reduce output (122). Actually, it had become time to plan the training organization which would be necessary to provide the smaller forces required after the defeat of Germany, for the continuation of the War against Japan and the policing of Europe. British manpower was in very short supply and there was the additional fact that at least 18 months elapsed from the time a man commenced aircrew training until he was accepted by a squadron (123).

72. All that could be done immediately by the R.C.A.F. was to arrange for a reduction in the intake at each recruiting centre so as to keep the Manning Depots to an absolute minimum until 15 Jan 44. The excuse offered was the holiday season. Aircrew candidates were still sought after, however, and given leave without pay (124).

73. On 15 Jan 44 Mr Power suggested, in a letter to Sir Patrick Duff of the United Kingdom High Commissioner's staff, that Canada should take the initiative and proceed with an immediate reduction of training facilities up to, but not exceeding, 25 per cent (125). The Supervisory Board of the B.C.A.T.P. had already recommended that an Air Training Conference should be held during the winter to discuss major problems (126). Capt H.H. Balfour, Air Marshal Sir Peter Drummond (Air Member for Training) and Mr M.S. Laing of the Air Ministry were despatched to Canada early in February for these discussions (127).

74. Instead of expanding to 540 squadrons for Phase I as envisaged earlier, the Air Ministry now had cut its programme to 427: only 93 would be Canadian (including "Nominated" for the reception of R.C.A.F. personnel), instead of the 137 squadrons estimated earlier. For planning purposes, the Air Ministry had assumed that the Australian and New Zealand contributions to the B.C.A.T.P. would "fade out" by the end of 1944 (128). In addition to curtailing its training facilities in the United States (eliminating one of the five B.F.T.Ss. and the S.F.T.S. operated by the U.S. Navy)*, the Air Ministry wanted to have the R.A.F. Schools in Canada closed first. This would make it possible to return R.A.F. ground crew to the United Kingdom for other duties before 1 Apr 44. The R.C.A.F. representatives at the preliminary discussions agreed to replace such R.A.F. ground personnel, where necessary (see para 132).

75. The (Balfour-Power) Agreement signed on 16 Feb 44 provided for a 40 per cent overall reduction in the output of the B.C.A.T.P. by 1 Mar 45 (129). The R.C.A.F. would supply 53 per cent of the total intake until 1 Jan 45 and subsequently 46 per cent of the total (130). Henceforth Australian and New Zealand drafts would count against the R.A.F. quota. The R.C.A.F. decided that reductions in the B.C.A.T.P. should be effected by closing schools, rather than reducing the size of all and thereby running them less efficiently. In answer to a question tabled in the House of Commons on 13 Mar, Mr Power stated that it was planned to have 29 schools (including nine R.A.F.) closed by the end of 1944 (131).

76. On 16 Feb Mr Power made a statement in the House of Commons, outlining in general terms what had been agreed upon. As he saw it, the reductions in the B.C.A.T.P. would permit the despatch of additional R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. personnel overseas:

This concentration of man-power in the United Kingdom will provide close to the front line more backing to the squadrons now actively engaged or required for forthcoming operations and renders more effective the impact of both the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. on the enemy during this critical year of the war (132).

He also mentioned the discussions on length of service with the R.A.F., operational and non-operational tours, leave to Canada, commissioning, promotions and the transfer from the

*It should be remembered that the Air Ministry had an interest in the following schools in the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: 11 pairs of E.F.T.Ss. and S.F.T.Ss. and nine Combined Air Observer Schools and Bombing & Gunnery Schools. It was planned to cut this training programme by 40-50 per cent.

R.A.F. to the R.C.A.F. of Canadians who had joined before or during the early stages of the Second World War. There was no complete record of the number of Canadians serving in the R.A.F. but there were believed to be about 2000 men and women. After upwards of a year of negotiations with the Air Ministry arrangements had been made for their voluntary transfer to the R.C.A.F. (133).

77. It was not until 29 Feb, when he was submitting his annual estimates, that Mr Power gave a more detailed statement to the House of Commons. He emphasized that the expansion period was over and that only 26,000 men and women would be required during the coming fiscal year. A similar situation existed in the United States, where the United States Army Air Forces had recently closed 70 air training establishments (134).

78. On 6 Mar, during further debate on the appropriation for air services, Mr Power tabled the following reconciliation of existing R.C.A.F. strength to the total number who had seen service during the War (135):

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
Total names recorded.....	33639	214270
Less duplication-number commissioned from the ranks....	-	25392
Total who have served.....	33639	188878
Less:		
Loss by casualty.....	3495	7976
Final discharge.....	-	14933
Retirements.....	1399	-
Resignations.....	312	-
Deserters-		
Americans (discharge action pending).....	6	433
Other deserters.....	12	198
*Leave - definite.....	-	1372
- indefinite.....	23	895
Taken on strength - not yet entered on records.....	-	32
Total.....	5247	25839
Present strength R.C.A.F.....	28392	163039

79. On 16 Feb 44 there had been a temporary curtailment of enlistments, in order to allow for a decreased intake into the continuing B.C.A.T.P. schools. Authorized R.C.A.F. requirement of aircrew for the first three months of 1944 had been set at 3478 men; estimated requirements for the fiscal year 1944-45 were set at (136):

*Personnel on definite leave were aircrew recruits, and occasionally a very small number of ground tradesmen, enlisted and ordered to report on a definite date in the near future. Personnel on indefinite leave comprised aircrew and groundcrew employed by civilian operated R.C.A.F. schools and W.E.T.P. schools, and a few personnel released temporarily to private industry.

April 1944	-	1657
May	-	1593
June	-	1582
July	-	2473
August	-	1582
September	-	1375
October	-	1168
November	-	1168
December	-	1168
January 1945	-	1168
February	-	1168
March	-	<u>1168</u>

17270

Allowance had been made for continued remustering from ground duties. However, actual enlistment quotas for April and May were only 1200 and 1550 respectively (137).

80. On 20 Apr 44 more disturbing news was sent back from London and was confirmed officially on 26 Apr, in a letter from the United Kingdom High Commissioner to Mr Power (138). There was a large surplus of trained aircrew. Early emphasis on pilot training had now resulted in a considerable surplus, at a time when the greater demand was to crew up mixed categories for bomber aircraft. Fewer casualties meant that more experienced aircrew were available to undertake a second tour on operations. Furthermore, expansion of Bomber Command had been delayed. No pupils were now being held back as instructors and the closing down of training schools in Canada had released 500 instructors into the aircrew stream for overseas. There were sufficient aircrew graduates in the Personnel Reception Centres in the United Kingdom to offset any shipping delays over the next few months and it seemed possible that this surplus might not be dissipated. The Air Ministry considered, however, that further pilot surplus could be eliminated by lengthening the S.F.T.S. course to 28 weeks (equivalent to stopping the flow completely for two months).

81. After considerable discussion Mr Power gave his approval on 18 May. On 22 May the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission was advised by A.F.H.Q. that further R.A.F. drafts to Canada for S.F.T.S. training should be suspended until the middle of May 1945: R.A.A.F. and R.N.Z.A.F. drafts for S.F.T.S. training would be cancelled until 1 Mar 45, since their existing 3205 E.F.T.S. graduates in Canada would fill all vacancies until then. Initial Training Schools would remain open, however, since other categories of aircrew still would need to be trained (140).

82. In a personal letter to Air Marshal Leckie, dated 20 May 44, Air Marshal Sir Peter R.M. Drummond gave a clearer picture of the unsatisfactory aircrew situation. In order that the R.A.F. should be ready for a bombing offensive in April, to start the Second Front in North-West Europe, every squadron was "bulging with" crews and Operational Training Units and Advanced Flying Units were stocked with reserves. However, as soon as it became apparent that the opening of the Second Front would be delayed, an investigation of the Personnel Reception Centres had been undertaken and a large surplus uncovered. Furthermore, he wrote:

My great anxiety is that even when Second Front operations do start we shall not experience anything like the high wastage rates for which we have provisioned, so that the picture later in the year will be even worse than that shown in this appreciation....

Nobody knows what the Air Forces might not have to do should "Overlord" fail!!

Another manpower crisis is in the offing.

Both these possibilities are fraught with potential repercussions on our training plans (141).

83. On 27 Jun Sir Peter Drummond wrote Air Marshal Leckie that the Air Ministry had agreed to raise its wastage rate for training and eliminate borderline cases, as the R.C.A.F. had done the previous November (see Appendix "A"). The following paragraphs of this letter were most relevant:

I think you will agree that we have gone as far as possible in extending courses and arranging special courses and that if further surpluses occur, due to one reason or another, then we can no longer afford to hold the surplus but must transfer it to those categories where it can be readily used, or even to ground duties in or outside the air forces....

The casualty rate in 'OVERLORD' continues to be low and the manpower situation here continues to become more acute. I am, therefore, in process now of making a complete stock taking of all the aircrew we have in the training pipeline in case we shall be told that we have to live on our fat for some time. This is only an insurance policy and we have not yet been told to stop intakes. I will keep in close touch with you as new developments occur (142).

84. As early as 19 Jun the Chief of the Air Staff had told the heads of divisions at A.F.H.Q. of Mr Power's orders that recruiting was to cease until 1 Oct 44. Recruiting of ground personnel already had been suspended and now recruiting offices were closed. Transfers from the Army to the R.C.A.F. were suspended. July enlistments were only those already committed — 161 aircrew and 37 tradesmen (143). Subsequent enlistments included air cadets to meet existing minimum requirements for wireless operator-air gunners and air gunners, staff pilots from civilian schools of the B.C.A.T.P. and Canadians transferring from the R.A.F.

85. The uncertainty about training further R.C.A.F. aircrew was soon brought to an end. As of 6 Oct 44 Canada had approximately 40,000 trained aircrew of all categories, to which had to be added 3500 in post-graduate training and nearly 13,000 anticipated graduates from current courses. After allowing for estimated future casualties in Europe, the continuing Japanese war and replacement of 18,000 tour-expired airmen, the R.C.A.F. would have 10,500 trained aircrew surplus to all needs (144). Since New Zealand and Australia were in the process of withdrawing from the B.C.A.T.P., and the R.A.F. also was faced with a surplus, there seemed no point in continuing the B.C.A.T.P. after 31 Mar 45. Therefore, the Canadian Government decided on 19 Oct to cancel all R.C.A.F. aircrew intakes for courses which would not be completed before 31 Mar 45 and wind up the B.C.A.T.P. on that date, despite the Balfour-Power Agreement of February 1944 (145). Canadian intakes to I.T.S. and E.F.T.S. were cancelled and 4200 pre-entry aircrew were slated for discharge and subsequent voluntary enlistment or compulsory enrolment

in the Army (146). Those already undergoing training were allowed to complete their courses. As of 31 Mar 45 some 3290 officers and 4996 other ranks had been transferred to a Special Aircrew Reserve (147).

86. The B.C.A.T.P. was wound up on 31 Mar 45, after graduating 131,553 of the 159,340 pupils who had commenced training. R.C.A.F. graduates numbered 72,835 aircrew of its 91,166 entrants (148). An arrangement was made, however, whereby the R.C.A.F. would still continue to train small numbers of aircrew for the British Government. As of early April 1945 there were still 28 schools in operation or on a "shadow" basis (149):

- 10 training for the R.A.F.
- 6 on refresher training for the R.C.A.F.
- 3 on sundry training for the R.C.A.F.
- 9 on a "shadow" maintenance basis.

(viii) Article 15 Squadrons and Canadianization

87. With effect from 1 Jan 40 an R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters was established in London. It was to maintain close liaison with, but be in no way subordinate to the Air Ministry (150). Unlike the graduates of the B.C.A.T.P. who were to be placed at the "disposal" of the Air Ministry, the three R.C.A.F. Squadrons which proceeded overseas during 1940 were merely "serving together" with the Royal Air Force, by orders made under the respective Visiting Forces Acts. As the Canadian High Commissioner had advised the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 22 Apr 40:

The control of the organization and administration of the Royal Canadian Air Force serving overseas will be exercised by the Minister of National Defence of Canada, and the normal channel of communication between him and Commanders, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, will be through the Chief of the Air Staff (Canada) (151).

However, as a satisfactory working arrangement, the R.A.F. would handle supply, accommodation, and medical, technical and like auxiliary services for the R.C.A.F. Squadrons which would be transferred overseas. When R.C.A.F. Squadrons were "acting in combination" in the United Kingdom with the R.A.F. they would be under the Commander of the Combined Force for training and operational control. Nevertheless:

In all matters relating to Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations, and the personnel thereof, which are the responsibility of the Canadian Government, the Senior Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force, in Great Britain, will report to and receive instructions from the Chief of the Air Staff (Canada).

In all circumstances a Royal Canadian Air Force Officer Commanding has the right to communicate with his immediately superior Officer of the Royal Canadian Air Force with regard to any matters which he may wish to bring to attention, notwithstanding that these may relate to matters wherein authority is exercisable by the Royal Air Force. (152)

88. On the understanding that graduates of the B.C.A.T.P. despatched overseas would be absorbed into the R.A.F.* and that the R.C.A.F. would not increase the number of its squadrons in the United Kingdom, the Chief of the Air Staff supported a recommendation, emanating from the High Commissioner in London during September 1940, that the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters should be replaced by the former Canadian Liaison Office at the Air Ministry (153). However, at its meeting of 9 Oct the Cabinet War Committee rejected this proposal. The Prime Minister stated that the identification of Canadian personnel was important and referred to the letter Lord Riverdale had written to the late Norman McLeod Rogers on 16 Dec 39 (see para 21). He suggested that the whole question should be discussed with the British Government by Mr Ralston during his forthcoming visit to the United Kingdom. On 5 Nov the Cabinet War Committee decided to request the formation of R.C.A.F. squadrons (with R.A.F. ground personnel) in accordance with Article 15 of the B.C.A.T.P. Agreement.

89. Although Mr Ralston's visit to the United Kingdom was primarily concerned with problems of the Canadian Army Overseas, he discussed R.C.A.F. matters with Prime Minister Churchill and the Secretary of State for Air. On 26 Dec the Cabinet War Committee approved the Agreement negotiated by Mr Ralston, provided that the R.A.F. would send ground personnel to Canada to replace the R.C.A.F. personnel withdrawn from the B.C.A.T.P. for overseas service.

90. Dated at London on 7 Jan 41 this so-called Sinclair-Ralston Supplementary Agreement arranged for Canadian aircrew to be identified as follows, in accordance with Article 15 of the B.C.A.T.P. Agreement and Lord Riverdale's letter of 16 Dec 39:

These pilots and air crews will be incorporated into squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force up to the number of twenty-five, in addition to the three already serving in the United Kingdom (154).

The exact rate of formation could not be guaranteed since it depended on the rate at which the projected Air Force expansion could be achieved, but the target was three squadrons by the end of March, 17 by the end of 1941 and the remainder by April or May 1942. The following articles of this Supplementary Agreement are worth quoting:

6. Under the Air Training Plan and at the request of the United Kingdom Government, the Royal Canadian Air Force has concentrated on the production of pilots and air crews. This has necessitated the provision and employment in Canada of ground personnel who would otherwise have been available for service with Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons

*However, since the Australian and New Zealand Governments and the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission in Ottawa had interpreted the B.C.A.T.P. Agreement to mean that Dominions' graduates would merely be "attached" to the R.A.F. in accordance with the respective Visiting Forces Acts, when they embarked for service in the United Kingdom, this part of the problem being debated in Ottawa was redundant.

overseas. It is recognized, however, as desirable, so far as it may mutually be considered practicable, that the United Kingdom ground personnel who, for the reason stated above will be required for the Canadian squadrons...should gradually be exchanged for Royal Canadian Air Force ground personnel employed on the Air Training Plan, with a view to achieving homogeneity of personnel in these squadrons.

7. The concentration of the Royal Canadian Air Force, on the Air Training Plan may also, at the outset, result in a shortage of Royal Canadian Air Force officers with the necessary qualifications to fill posts as Squadron Commanders, Station Commanders, etc. It is recognized that, if enough Royal Canadian Air Force officers with these qualifications are not immediately available some of these posts may require to be filled by Royal Air Force officers. The replacement of these Royal Air Force officers will be effected progressively as soon as qualified Royal Canadian Air Force officers become available for that purpose.
9. The Air Officer Commanding the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas, or a senior officer designated by the Canadian Government for the purpose, will at all times have access to Commanders of Stations and Groups and to Commanders-in-Chief of Commands in which Royal Canadian Air Force personnel are serving, and will be furnished by them with such information as he may desire. He will also have access to the Chief of the Air Staff. He will be furnished with advance information about any major questions which arise from time to time affecting the employment of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and squadrons. He will be at liberty to make representations to the Air Ministry on any of the above matters. (155)

91. The Air Ministry's suggestion that the 25 proposed Article 15 Squadrons should consist of one flying boat squadron, two general reconnaissance squadrons, 15 bomber squadrons and seven fighter squadrons found acceptance in Ottawa (156). During 1941 the following 18 squadrons were actually formed (157).

No. 403 (Fighter).....	1 Mar
No. 404 (Coastal Fighter).....	15 Apr
No. 405 (Bomber).....	23 Apr
No. 407 (Coastal).....	8 May
No. 406 (Night Fighter).....	10 May
No. 411 (Fighter).....	16 Jun
No. 409 (Night Fighter).....	17 Jun
No. 408 (Bomber).....	24 Jun
No. 410 (Night Fighter).....	30 Jun
No. 412 (Fighter).....	30 Jun
No. 413 (Coastal).....	1 Jul

No. 414 (Army Co-operation).....	12 Aug
No. 415 (Coastal).....	20 Aug
No. 418 (Intruder).....	15 Nov
No. 416 (Fighter).....	18 Nov
No. 417 (Fighter).....	27 Nov
No. 419 (Bomber).....	7 Dec
No. 420 (Bomber).....	19 Dec

On 29 Apr 41 the Air Ministry had issued instructions that R.A.F. Station, Digby, would become the first parent station for R.C.A.F. squadrons (in Fighter Command) and that R.C.A.F. personnel would be posted there as they became available (158).

92. Following Air Commodore G.O. Johnson's liaison visit to the United Kingdom during May-June 1941 agreement was reached that the cost of operating R.C.A.F. squadrons and units in the United Kingdom or other overseas theatres of war, the R.C. A.F. Overseas Headquarters excepted, would be paid by the British Government, except that R.C.A.F. personnel would receive supplementary pay, allowances and non-effective benefits from the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government would reimburse the British Government in respect of the costs of Nos. 400, 401 and 402 Squadrons. However, since all R.C.A.F. Squadrons and personnel would be administered by the Air Ministry, through the appropriate R.A.F. Commands, in practice the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters would become little more than a "liaison office" (159).

93. The Minister of National Defence for Air was dissatisfied with the conduct of these negotiations and expressed his worries to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 24 Jun. It was agreed, therefore, that he should visit the United Kingdom.

94. On 8 Jul, therefore, Mr Power and the Chief of the Air Staff accompanied the High Commissioner to the Air Ministry for a discussion of the "Canadianization" problem. Mr Power stated that Canadian servicemen were "well educated citizens": Canada had an obligation to look after their welfare while serving with the R.A.F. and this would have to be more than a gesture (160). Already there were 5000 aircrew and 1000 radio personnel of the R.C.A.F. in the United Kingdom and this number would be increased to 16,000 by the beginning of 1942. He suggested that other ranks, including radio mechanics, should not be widely dispersed: unless they were kept together as much as possible there would be an adverse effect on recruiting in Canada. Parents wanted to know what their sons were doing. Capt Balfour replied that close affiliation of R.C.A.F. personnel was made difficult under existing war conditions.

95. Mr Power then confirmed that R.C.A.F. ground personnel would be provided for "Article 15" squadrons, possibly 1000 airmen before the end of the year. The Air Ministry representatives pointed out that only 80-90 ground personnel moved with a squadron and that the remainder remained part of the Station headquarters organization. It was hoped that the R.C.A.F. would provide both types of personnel. Mr Power replied that the R.C.A.F. would do its best to supply squadron maintenance personnel now and the servicing echelon personnel for Canadian Stations later.

96. Mr Power then asked whether R.C.A.F. personnel could not be congregated on more "Canadianized" stations like Digby. Capt Balfour replied that there would be difficulties about forming R.C.A.F. Fighter Groups but suggested that it would be relatively easy to form Canadian Bomber Groups when the bomber squadrons became available. Whereas Fighter and Coastal Commands had to shift squadrons to meet changing commitments the location of units within

Bomber Command was fairly stable. Because of the shortage of airfields and the decision to increase existing squadrons from 16 to 24 aircraft, however, no action towards forming an R.C.A.F. Bomber Group could be expected in the near future.

97. Agreement was reached that Canadian "Article 15" squadrons might be formed for service in the Middle East, provided the Canadian Government was consulted in every instance. Arrangements were made whereby an increasing number of more senior R.C.A.F. officers would be accepted for service in the United Kingdom, being replaced in Canada by R.A.F. officers who had seen operational service. The Air Ministry was insistent, however, that officers of the rank of Wing Commander and lower, if pilots, should first take the normal O.T.U. (operational training unit) course before flying on operations.

98. Within the next few days Capt Balfour paid a short visit to Ottawa to settle arrangements for the transfer of 16 further R.A.F. schools to Canada. (See para 4L) During his visit he told Mr King that the British Government considered that the Army's function would be largely that of a police force, occupying Europe after air power had made German ~~defeat possible~~. During his own visit to the United Kingdom (20 Aug - 7 Sep 41) Mr King was advised that the British Government considered the War could not be won without American intervention. Meantime, the air offensive would be maintained on the heaviest possible scale.

99. Despite Mr Power's endeavours, however, the policy of "Canadianization" had not got very far. Although each of the 16 R.C.A.F. squadrons in existence in early October had Canadian adjutants, seven had R.A.F. commanding officers and the aircrew position was as follows (161):

Sqn	W.E.	R.C.A.F.	Cdn in			
			R.A.F.	R.A.F.	R.A.A.F.	R.N.Z.A.F.
400	16	45				
401	23	35				
402	23	28				
403	23	16		12		1
404	68	13	19			1
405	121	73	4	66	3	7
406	47	16	1	33		
407	94	41		14	2	
408	82	18	5	49		6
409	47	26	1	31		2
410	46	10		37	1	
411	23	28		4		
412	23	29	1	1		
413	86	14	5	51		
414	11	11	1	2		
415	94	4	2	5		

A telegram of 23 Nov from the Air Ministry was self-explanatory:

- (1) When a new RCAF squadron forms all available qualified RCAF personnel firstly and Canadians secondly are posted thereto and the balance completed with RAF personnel.
- (2) As RAF personnel become casualties or are posted away in normal course that [sic] vacancies are filled with RCAF personnel.
- (3) RCAF aircrew for whom there is no vacancy in RCAF squadrons are posted to RAF squadrons to fill vacancies wherever they occur.
- (4) Both RCAF and RAF officers commanding RCAF squadrons as

well as the aircrew themselves who have trained and crewed with RCAF squadrons have objected strenuously to the ruthless posting away of RAF aircrews to make way for Canadian aircrew to achieve one hundred per cent. Canadian contact. The process described in para (2) is more practical and equally effective (162).

100. The situation was rendered even more difficult by the Air Ministry's recent decision to decentralize posting machinery to Commands and Groups. In practice, this circumvented the efforts of the R.C.A.F. posting officers attached to the Air Ministry. The R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters instituted remedial action, however, and on 31 Dec 41 Group Captain W.A. Curtis wrote to Ottawa that he had arranged with the Air Ministry for an R.C.A.F. liaison officer to be attached to each of the five R.A.F. Commands to check on the posting of R.C.A.F. personnel (163).

161. However, it had been decided in Ottawa that Air Vice Marshal Harold Edwards, Air Member for Personnel, should be appointed Air Officer-in-Chief of the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters to ensure implementation of "Canadianization". Previously he had written to thank the Air Member for Personnel at the Air Ministry for his efforts to keep R.C.A.F. aircrew together, and particularly their assignment to R.C.A.F. squadrons (164). Once overseas, however, Air Vice Marshal Edwards soon changed his views.

102. The first outburst to alarm the Minister of National Defence for Air occurred in mid-January 1942, when Air Vice Marshal Edwards was reported as having told a group of R.C.A.F. aircrew arriving from Canada about his recent visit to "eight so-called Canadian squadrons" in which he found Canadian representation "disappointingly low" (165). Edwards claimed that he had been misquoted by the press, and later conceded that he had been misinformed on a couple of matters, but insisted that many R.C.A.F. squadrons had less Canadian personnel than four months previously (166). At the same time, it was true that there were far more than enough R.C.A.F. aircrew overseas to man the "Article 15" squadrons (167):

	<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>Total R.C.A.F.</u>
	<u>Establishments</u>	<u>Aircrew Overseas</u>
Pilots	813	3630
Air Observers	322	1159
W.O.A.Gs. and A.Gs.	<u>972</u>	<u>2349</u>
Total	2107	7138

103. Admittedly ground personnel were another matter; the following statistics for the 25 "Article 15" squadrons and the so-called "Canadianized" R.A.F. Station at Digby showed (168):

Tentative establishments	6125
Strength, including those in transit	<u>3244</u>
Deficiency	2881

The average R.C.A.F. ground strength of the "Article 15" squadrons was only 18 per cent.

104. On 28 Jan 42 the new Air Member for Personnel at A.F.H.Q. (Air Commodore J.A. Sully) signalled, however, that it was proposed to despatch sufficient ground personnel to complete the authorized "Article 15" squadrons as follows (169):

January	1145
February	831
March	1060
April	180
May	185
June	<u>193</u>

3614

105. Supposing the press reports of Air Vice Marshal Edwards' speech to be true the Chief of the Air Staff had signalled him to take a strong stand over Canadianization. On 29 Jan Air Vice Marshal Edwards reported the steps he had already taken:

...I have impressed on the Air Ministry the necessity of pursuing a Canadianization policy and am having a further meeting tomorrow. I have issued instructions that no further Canadians are to be posted out of England or to other than Canadian squadrons without my authority. I have stopped a number of Canadians from going to R.A.F. squadrons in the Middle East. It is obvious that though our policy was communicated from Canada to England for the assembly of Canadians in Canadian squadrons this has not been done but pressing to this end. Two days ago command of No. 401 squadron was handed over to an RAF officer...I am fully aware of policy of Canadianization and I and my staff are pursuing it with all the vigour we possess. One of the difficulties is that postings have been decentralized... to Groups....(170)

106. With these items of information at his disposal Mr Power suggested to the Chief of the Air Staff on 30 Jan that "Air Ministry be informed that I shall advise the House of Commons and Press of exact numbers of Canadian aircrew and numbers of R.C.A.F. in our own Canadian squadrons unless steps are taken to remedy present intolerable situation" (171). A telegram of 3 Feb instructed Air Vice Marshal Edwards to convey this ultimatum to the Air Ministry (172).

107. In his reply of 5 Feb Air Vice Marshal Edwards pointed out that it would be difficult to make any immediate drastic change because once aircrews were "made up" at operational training units and had trained together it was unwise to alter them. Casualties during operations would be a further complication. However, he had warned the Air Ministry that, unless the policy of "Canadianization" was carried through, he would refuse to post further R.C.A.F. personnel to R.A.F. squadrons. As a result of this threat Coastal Command was posting 50 R.C.A.F. aircrew to Canadian squadrons immediately. An R.C.A.F. officer was being posted to each Group Headquarters in the United Kingdom to watch over the postings of R.C.A.F. personnel. Air Vice Marshal Edwards considered that responsible officers at the Air Ministry were willing to co-operate but those belonging to Commands and Groups either were not willing or did not realize the necessity of adhering to such a policy, despite firmly worded letters emanating from above. In conclusion he wrote:

...If I cannot make a more satisfactory report by March 1st I shall be prepared to recommend that the RCAF be withdrawn from Air Ministry Control and that we organize our own Air Force the Joint Air Training Plan Agreement notwithstanding (173).

108. On 19 Feb Air Vice Marshal Edwards signalled, however, that the disposition of R.C.A.F. ground crew in the United Kingdom, excluding radar personnel (see Appendix "C"), was "most satisfactory" -- 2583 were in R.C.A.F. units and there were no vacancies for the remaining 191 who were serving with R.A.F. units (174).

109. The Minister of National Defence for Air then wanted to know why Canadians could not be trained together at O.T.Us. and "made up" into R.C.A.F. crews there. "This, he signalled Air Vice Marshal Edwards, "would surely be a sound development of the keep pals together policy" (175). In a telegram of 21 Feb, Air Vice Marshal Edwards replied that it had not been possible to find out who was responsible for forming mixed crews at O.T.Us. but that he had insisted upon Canadian crews being formed in future. That day he had seen both the Air Member for Personnel at the Air Ministry and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas of Fighter Command and the situation seemed to be improving. However, should there not be a marked improvement by the end of the week, Air Vice Marshal Edwards proposed to hand definite terms to the Secretary of State for Air (176).

110. Apparently these interviews had the desired effect for on 10 Mar 42 the Director of Postings at the Air Ministry wrote to each R.A.F. Command regarding the "urgent necessity" of ensuring that the "Article 15" squadrons under their control should be built up to full establishment with appropriate Dominion aircrew personnel (177). The R.C.A.F. was advised that aircrews would be reformed, wherever possible, and following the completion of an operational tour Dominions aircrew would be sent back to O.T.Us. training their own countrymen.

111. A certain amount of information soon found its way into the Canadian press and became the subject of discussion in the House of Commons. On 13 May Mr Power stated that nothing in his whole department was "more dear to my heart than the Canadianization of the Royal Canadian Air Force" and that he did not know when he had experienced a "greater sense of frustration." (178) He pointed out that the Air Ministry, and particularly senior officers of the R.A.F., had been far from enthusiastic about implementing the terms of the Sinclair-Ralston Agreement of 7 Jan 41 (see paras 89-90). This reluctance also extended to certain senior members of the R.C.A.F. who had their roots firmly bedded in the R.A.F. as a result of service during the Great War 1914-19 and close contacts during the following two decades of peace. They felt that Canadians would have a better chance for promotion if they were scattered throughout the R.A.F. rather than concentrated in a few squadrons (179).

112. When the Leader of the Opposition contended that there was a need for unity of operations, Mr Power replied that that was one answer he had had to contend with all along. However, the United States Army Air Forces already possessed an independent command in the United Kingdom, even though actual operations were co-ordinated with the R.A.F. All Mr Power wanted for the R.C.A.F. was a similar relationship:

...As a matter of fact, what we have been aiming at as our first objective is a bomber group for Canadians. Then you can send a whole group together. Of course the objection to that is that if the group gets into trouble, then you have a very large number of Canadian casualties, whereas, interspersed as they are now with others, the casualty list becomes less glaring. But I am hoping to attain pretty well the same status that the Americans have obtained with respect to internal operations, always of course under the command of some supreme British authority with regard to operations generally. I am speaking now probably out of turn, not knowing very much about the tactical end of the matter, but I doubt if we could ever achieve a completely independent command in the sense that the Canadian Army is an independent command. Our international relationships with groups, commands, and so on are so close that it would be almost impossible to have what might almost be called an independent air force, but it would be possible to have a better grouping and a greater grouping of Canadian squadrons working together (180).

113. Another member raised the point about adequate publicity, citing the fact that although the personnel might be 90 per cent Canadian, official communiques referred to R.A.F. squadrons bombing Germany. This, replied Mr Power, was still another argument for Canadianization (181).

114. During that same month representatives of 14 Nations met in Ottawa to establish a Combined Committee on Air Training in North America and the partners in the B.C.A.T.P. negotiated a new Agreement to replace the original one which was due to expire on 31 Mar 43 (see paras 43-8). At its meeting of 22 May the Cabinet War Committee agreed that, although there was no point pressing for a separate Canadian Air Force, the policy of "Canadianization" should be pursued. Although the new B.C.A.T.P. Agreement was not signed until 5 Jun, the Canadian Cabinet agreed on 28 May to accept the compromise worked out with Capt H.H. Balfour on the question of control of R.C.A.F. personnel overseas.

115. Henceforth, R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters was to have direct access to the officers commanding R.A.F. Stations, Groups and Commands in which R.C.A.F. personnel were serving and maintain a general supervision over all personnel placed at the "disposal" of the British Government and "attached" to the R.A.F. under the provisions of the Visiting Forces Acts. Courts-martial proceedings involving R.C.A.F. personnel would be subject to review. A separate Personnel Reception Centre and Disposal Centre were to be established for R.C.A.F. personnel in the United Kingdom. It was further agreed that the Air Ministry would issue instructions to the effect that, "so far as operational exigencies permit, R.C.A.F. personnel are to be posted to squadrons in which Canadians are already serving." Although operational requirements made it necessary that fighter squadrons remain under the control of Fighter Command, instructions were to be issued that Canadian squadrons should be transferred only to other R.C.A.F. stations, the number of which was to be increased (182).

116. The key to the new Agreement was Article 23, stating that the "Government of the United Kingdom undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, after training is completed, shall, so far as practicable, be identified with their respective Dominions...." (183). Further amplification was provided in Appendix IV:

- (a) In pursuance of the provision of Article 23 of the Agreement a number of R.C.A.F. squadrons will be formed, to which air-crew of the Royal Canadian Air Force will be posted. The aim will be to form thirty-five such squadrons, in addition to the three R.C.A.F. squadrons originally transferred from Canada. This objective will be subject to review at short intervals, the first review being made not later than September, 1942.
- (b) R.C.A.F. personnel serving with the Royal Air Force...will, on posting to an R.C.A.F. squadron, cease to be so serving with the Royal Air Force. R.A.F. personnel serving with R.C.A.F. squadrons will be attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force while so serving (184).

117. It was further agreed that an R.C.A.F. Bomber Group should be formed just as soon as there were sufficient R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons. As an initial step existing R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons would be concentrated in a single R.A.F. Group and located at stations commanded by R.C.A.F. officers (as these should become available). As far as possible further R.C.A.F. squadrons would be bomber units.

118. Actually the seven R.C.A.F. squadrons formed during the balance of 1942 became bomber units (one fighter and two coastal squadrons had been formed in the spring). The end of the year saw 31 R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. Since the outbreak of War the following had been posted overseas (185):

	<u>Aircrew</u>	<u>Groundcrew</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	3592	853	4445
Airmen	<u>12716</u>	<u>11378</u>	<u>24094</u>
Total	16308	12231	28539

On 1 Jan 43 No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Bomber Group became operational, with eight R.C.A.F. squadrons taken from No. 4 Group. By the end of 1943 it had grown to 13 R.C.A.F. heavy bomber squadrons.

119. An entirely new point had been raised in a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the Air Staff on 10 Dec 42 by the Air Member for Accounts and Finance. Although Canada was bearing the major expense of the B.C.A.T.P. it did not assume the cost of training and maintaining R.C.A.F. aircrew once they embarked for the United Kingdom: even the expenses incurred by R.C.A.F. squadrons, including aircraft and technical equipment, devolved on the British Government. Due to the increasing financial burden accruing to the British Government in respect to the R.C.A.F. overseas and payment for R.A.F. aircrew trained in Canada under the Agreement of 1942 (see para 46), it seemed desirable that Canada should do more than merely supply the R.A.F. with trained men. Moreover, questions of promotion, welfare services, deferred pay and administration generally could be handled more easily if the Canadian Government assumed complete financial responsibility (186).

120. The matter was raised by Mr Power in the Cabinet War Committee on 16 Dec but it was agreed that the financial aspects required detailed study by the Minister of Finance (187). Not until 13 Jan 43 did the Cabinet War Committee approve a submission whereby the Canadian Government would assume responsibility, from 1 Apr 43, for equipping and maintaining 35 "Article 15" squadrons overseas and the pay, allowances, clothing and other prerequisites for the maintenance of all other R.C.A.F. personnel overseas (188). The cost was estimated as being \$287,000,000, plus miscellaneous amounts totalling possibly \$60,000,000. The Speech from the Throne on 28 Jan referred to the assumption of "increased responsibilities" (189).

121. Actually these changes necessitated the conclusion of a further Agreement, amending that signed in Ottawa on 5 Jun 42. On 7 Apr the Cabinet War Committee approved a draft but the actual signing in London took place only on 20 Apr (190). That same day Mr Power tabled the Agreement in the House of Commons and gave the following summary (191):

1. Under the new Agreement, Canada assumes financial responsibility for the following:
 - (a) Full cost of the 35 Canadian squadrons formed under the 1942 agreement. In addition Canada will bear the cost, as formerly, of the 3 original Canadian squadrons, which were not related to the air training agreements.
 - (b) Full cost of certain ancillary units overseas, formed for the control, administration and maintenance of the Canadian squadrons.
 - (c) R.C.A.F. pay and dependents' allowances and cost of clothing for R.C.A.F. personnel attached to the R.A.F. and not serving in R.C.A.F. units.
 - (d) Pension benefits to the extent of the difference between R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. rates in respect of the personnel referred to at (c).
 - (e) The cost of transportation for all R.C.A.F. personnel to the United Kingdom and upon repatriation to Canada.
2. The new commitments entered into by Canada, by reason of the supplementary agreement, which previously were the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, are:
 - (a) In respect of the 35 squadrons and formations referred to at 1 (b) above
 - (i) R.A.F. rates of pay.
 - (ii) R.A.F. rates of pensions and non-effective benefits.
 - (iii) All other operating costs.
 - (iv) Capital costs.
 - (b) In respect of R.C.A.F. personnel serving in R.A.F. units and formations
 - (i) R.A.F. rates of pay.

(ii) Clothing of personnel.

(c) In respect of R.C.A.F. personnel proceeding for duty with or in conjunction with the R.A.F.

(i) The costs of transportation to the United Kingdom and on repatriation.

122. The R.C.A.F. now became completely responsible for its "Article 15" squadrons, the Personnel Depot at Bournemouth, the "R" Depot at Warrington, No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Bomber Group Headquarters and communication flight, No. 39 (A.C.) Wing Headquarters, R.C.A.F. and the R.C.A.F. stations at Digby, Redhill, Fairwood Common, Topcliffe, Middleton St. George, Dunsfold, East Moor, Linton-on-Ouse and Leeming. (The R.C.A.F. remained responsible for its Overseas Headquarters in London and the much smaller District Headquarters at London, Exeter, Peterborough, Birmingham, Clifton, Edinburgh, Inverness, Cairo, Algiers, Freetown and Bombay.) (192) To conform with changed operational needs, other units and stations were subsequently added or relinquished (see Appendix "E"). By the end of 1943 there were 35 squadrons overseas. In the United Kingdom there were 14 bomber, 14 fighter and 5 coastal squadrons; one fighter squadron was in Italy and a coastal squadron was based in Ceylon (193).

123. As a result of the Cabinet War Committee's direction to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 21 Jul 43 to effect economies in home defence (see para 65) six squadrons, with a complement of approximately 150 officers and 1000 airmen, were made available for despatch overseas. These six squadrons arrived overseas during the winter of 1943-4 and were formed into one fighter and one fighter-bomber wing for service with No. 83 Composite Group (194). The R.C.A.F. assigned a total of 17 squadrons for service with this No. 83 Group of the Second Tactical Air Force, which had been formed to support 21st Army Group in the coming invasion of North-West Europe.

124. Another innovation during 1943 was acceptance by the Air Ministry of a proposal whereby a number of squadrons would be "nominated" for manning by R.C.A.F. aircrew. These would be in addition to the "Article 15" Squadrons. The Air Ministry agreed that 71 squadrons should be "nominated" for manning by R.C.A.F. aircrew before the end of 1943 and 93 before the end of 1944 (195).

125. However, the beginning of 1943 had found the R.C.A.F. short approximately 10,000 ground personnel, including airwomen, to complete its overseas programme for 38 squadrons. On 2 Jan 43 a message from the Secretary of State for Air was forwarded to Mr Power, stressing the manpower shortages being experienced by the R.A.F. and expressing the hope that the Dominions would replace the British personnel then being employed with Article 15 squadrons (196). It had been hoped in Ottawa that the Air Ministry would continue to supply the quota of airwomen required for the Canadian squadrons but Air Vice Marshal Edwards signalled from London on 8 Jan 43 that not to furnish the Canadian personnel requested would defeat the whole purpose of Canadianization and present "just one more façade" (197). It was decided at A.F.H.Q., therefore, to withdraw trained men from establishments in Canada for overseas, replacing them with newly trained personnel enlisted for the purpose. Despatches overseas would be made to meet existing and future shortages as follows (198):

<u>Embarkation</u>	<u>Groundcrew</u>	<u>Aircrew</u>
Before 31 Jan	1000	
Between Feb 1-14	1250	1550
Between Feb 15-28	1250	1550
Between Mar 1-15	1250	1550
Between Mar 16-31	1250	1550
Between Apr 1-15	1000	1550
Between Apr 16-30	1000	1550
Between May 1-15	1000	1550
Between May 16-31	<u>1000</u>	<u>1550</u>
	10000	12400

The balance to complete establishments would be forwarded during June. The telegram conveying this information to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters pointed out, however:

...The above drafting will complete your known requirements other than Womens Division and is only being arranged at a great sacrifice to Home War and CTE*. It will be impossible to fill your Womens Division requirements from RCAF Womens Division. However 201 additional Womens Division personnel for [No. 6 Bomber] Group Headquarters will be posted within the next month and it will be necessary for you to fill the remaining Womens Division positions by obtaining WAAF personnel (199).

Actual ground crew despatches during the first six months of 1943 were, however, only 337 officers and 9581 airmen.

126. On 2 Oct 43 the United Kingdom High Commissioner wrote the Minister of National Defence for Air that the Air Ministry was still worried by manpower shortages and was "anxious to know whether the Canadian Government would be able to provide R.C.A.F. personnel to complete existing establishments of the R.C.A.F. squadrons and units and the ancillary formations on which they depend" (200). Reference was made to the informal conversations held at Quebec on 11 Aug between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff, when Air Marshal Breadner had advised Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal that the Canadian Government would give sympathetic consideration to any "reasonable" request that might be made for Canadian ground crew to replace R.A.F. personnel serving with the R.C.A.F.

127. It was not until 23 Nov that Mr Power was able to answer this letter. He regretted that manpower limitations would make it impossible to meet the Air Ministry's request for 11,620 replacements. However, arrangements were being made to complete the establishments of No. 6 Bomber Group Headquarters, squadrons, bases and stations by 2760 R.C.A.F. airmen, which action should be completed by the end of March 1944; 5180 further ground personnel would be supplied for No. 83 Composite Group. (2498 other ground crew had been earmarked for the eight squadrons already serving with 83 Composite Group.) Although sufficient airwomen would be supplied for Headquarters, No. 6 Bomber Group, it would not be possible to despatch sufficient airwomen or airmen to replace the remainder of the 4304 members of the W.A.A.F. serving with the R.C.A.F. (201).

*Combined Training Establishment.

128. The question of obtaining Mr Power's approval for an overseas manpower ceiling for ground crew was left in abeyance until March 1944 and the figures cited in his letter of 23 Nov 43 were used for planning purposes until that time (202).

129. By that time, and with the War soon due to reach a climax, Air Marshal Breadner had become A.O.C.-in-C., R.C.A.F. Overseas and had been replaced as Chief of the Air Staff by Air Marshal R. Leckie (now a member of the R.C.A.F.). Air Vice Marshal Edwards, who had struggled with the "Canadianization" policy for better than two years was retired. During the course of a visit to Ottawa in April 1944 the new A.O.C.-in-C., R.C.A.F. Overseas was authorized to create overseas establishments and new trades within a manpower ceiling of 37,000 ground personnel (203). On 13 May Air Marshal Breadner advised Mr Power that the following was his planned establishment (204):

	<u>Establishment</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Deficiency</u>
Present commitments	22682	21842	840
Present Women's Division	1400	893	507
Radar Mechanics	<u>4400</u>	<u>4400*</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	28482	27135	
10 per cent	<u>2260</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2260</u>
	30742	27135	3607

130. Furthermore, Air Marshal Breadner suggested, once No. 415 Squadron was transferred to Bomber Command the 14 squadrons of No. 6 (Canadian) Bomber Group would total as large a bomber element as any R.A.F. Group. (Another bomber squadron was in No. 8 Group, R.A.F.) Because casualties were highest in bombing operations, Air Marshal Breadner's telegram continued, "I feel 15 squadrons represents our full share of the bombing effort." (205) His only recommendation for Bomber Command was that the two Heavy Conversion Units training R.C.A.F. crews for No. 6 Group should be "Canadianized". It was finally decided that the three Article 15 squadrons remaining to be formed for the R.C.A.F. overseas commitment should be medium range transport squadrons (206).

131. No. 664 Air Observation Post Squadron, R.C.A.F., was formed at Andover on 9 Dec 44 and Nos. 665 and 666 A.O.P. Squadrons in February and March 1945 respectively, with their flying personnel coming from the Royal Canadian Artillery after being trained by the R.A.F. (207). During January 1944 No. 162 (Bomber Reconnaissance) Squadron had been transferred to Iceland to serve under the direction of Coastal Command: however, this was not an additional Article 15 Squadron but merely an Eastern Air Command unit temporarily diverted to Coastal Command, for operational control only (208). This brought the number of squadrons serving overseas to 48.

132. On 13 May 44, however, the United Kingdom High Commissioner forwarded the following communication from the Air Ministry to Mr Power:

I believe that the time has arrived when it would be to the benefit of both our countries to increase the number of so-called Article XV squadrons of the RACF serving alongside the RAF in the various theatres of war.

*Held against establishment ceiling.

It has long been your desire, I know, that the RCAF should provide a large number of complete RCAF squadrons in active theatres of operations and but for the heavy demands of the B.C.A.T.P. this would, I am sure, have been fulfilled.

The situation is now changing and with the gradual reduction of the training plan you may be able to make more R.C.A.F. ground personnel available. If so, this would enable some of the "nominated" R.A.F. squadrons, in which we have been endeavouring to concentrate R.C.A.F. aircrew personnel, to be fully manned with Canadian personnel and transferred from the R.A.F. into R.C.A.F. squadrons.

Such a step would facilitate the process of regrouping R.C.A.F. personnel into Canadian units which, as you explained in the aide memoire you handed to Balfour last February, it is your wish to effect.

It would also be of substantial benefit to the R.A.F. by helping to reduce the manpower deficiency under which we are still labouring and which is impeding the full realization of our air effort. (209)

133. In his reply of 19 May Mr Power stated that 7420 R.C.A.F. airmen ground personnel had been sent to the United Kingdom during the period 1 Sep 43 - 30 Apr 44 and that it was hoped to despatch a further 7826 during the period 1 May - 31 Dec 44 (210). This should complete all establishments and provide a replacement pool of 5000 all ranks ground personnel. While it was true that the reduction of the B.C.A.T.P. had resulted in a number of R.C.A.F. schools being closed down (see para 74), the saving of personnel had been more than offset by Canada taking over O.T.Us. formerly staffed by the R.A.F. This had permitted the return of 10,277 R.A.F. personnel to the United Kingdom during the period 1 Sep 43 - 30 Apr 44. It was hoped that a further 10,050 R.A.F. airmen could be returned before the end of 1944.

134. The question of the Dominions participating in Phase II of the War was discussed by the several Prime Ministers meeting in London during May: the Air Ministry suggested that the R.C.A.F. provide 47 of the 265 squadrons proposed for Phase II, or the continuing War against Japan, and 11 of the 194 squadrons for the occupation of Europe, United Kingdom and lines of communication (211). It was not until 14 Jun, however, that the Cabinet War Committee gave tentative approval for this commitment of 58 squadrons "as a basis for planning and subject to review in relation to the whole Canadian contribution at that time." (212) Air Marshal Breadner was empowered to discuss with the Air Ministry the numbers and classes of squadrons required. It was considered that 14 "nominated" squadrons might be converted into Article 15 squadrons and approximately 4485 additional ground crew provided for their maintenance.

135. When Capt Balfour raised the question of more R.C.A.F. ground crew for service overseas, during the course of his visit to Ottawa in August 1944, Mr Power explained that the possibility of the R.C.A.F. providing ground personnel for (14) Nominated Squadrons was contingent upon 58 R.C.A.F. squadrons participating in Phase II.

Mr Power said that 30,300 R.C.A.F. ground crew would be overseas by the middle of October and that Canada would try to have the balance of the ceiling commitment (6300) overseas by the end of the year. Mr Power said it would be impossible to supply more than 1000 W.Ds. but added that it was proposed to replace the balance of W.A.A.Fs. by R.C.A.F. airmen from Canada (213).

136. However, as a result of the Second Quebec ("OCTAGON") Conference the Cabinet War Committee agreed on 20 Sep that the R.C.A.F. commitment for Phase II should be only 32 squadrons, involving 32,000-33,000 personnel or roughly half the number then overseas (214). On 2 Oct Air Marshal Breadner signalled from London that there was no point sending further ground crew personnel overseas: the R.C.A.F. then had 44 operational squadrons with R.C.A.F. ground crew and would require personnel for only 32 squadrons during Phase II. Men already in transit could be used to replace long service personnel but no more need be sent (215).

137. The situation regarding "Canadianization" in operational squadrons of the R.C.A.F. at the beginning of 1945 may be summarized as follows (216):

Squadron	Location	Percentage	
		Aircrew	Ground Duties
400(PR)	Netherlands	100.	100.
401(F)	Netherlands	100.	86.66
402(F)	Netherlands	100.	100.
403(F)	Belgium	100.	88.23
404(CF)	U.K.	85.40	83.82
405(B-PFF)	U.K.	71.71	97.60
406(NF)	U.K.	94.33	100.
407(GR)	U.K.	94.05	85.79
408(B)	U.K.	85.51	100.
409(NF)	France	89.13	100.
410(NF)	France	87.03	100.
411(F)	Netherlands	100.	87.50
412(F)	Netherlands	100.	94.11
413(GR-FB)	Ceylon	59.66	98.18
414(FR)	Netherlands	100.	100.
415(B)	U.K.	90.22	100.
416(F)	Belgium	100.	88.23
417(F)	Italy	100.	98.09
418(Int)	U.K.	57.40	100.
419(B)	U.K.	87.54	100.
420(B)	U.K.	85.62	100.
421(F)	Belgium	100.	100.
422(GR-FB)	U.K.	75.25	95.81
423(GR-FB)	U.K.	76.47	99.40
424(B)	U.K.	86.59	100.
425(B)	U.K.	86.88	100.
426(B)	U.K.	91.41	100.
427(B)	U.K.	83.65	100.
428(B)	U.K.	87.68	100.
429(B)	U.K.	87.92	100.
430(FR)	Netherlands	100.	89.28
431(B)	U.K.	85.66	100.
432(B)	U.K.	86.02	100.
433(B)	U.K.	84.08	100.
434(B)	U.K.	86.	100.
435(T)	India	96.11	96.
436(T)	India	89.41	97.27
437(T)	U.K.	99.41	99.63
438(FB)	Netherlands	100.	93.93
439(FB)	Netherlands	100.	100.
440(FB)	Netherlands	100.	100.
441(F)	U.K.	100.	100.
442(F)	Netherlands	96.15	88.20
443(F)	Belgium	96.42	86.66

(ix) Phase II and Repatriation

138. Following the second Quebec Conference ("OCTAGON") of September 1944, which had disclosed that the Americans were not anxious to have the British Commonwealth participate in the continuing Pacific War, the Cabinet War Committee decided to drastically pare Canada's proposed commitments. However, planning continued on the basis that the War in the Pacific would last for 18 months after victory had been attained in Europe. On 20 Oct the R.C.A.F. overseas commitment was reduced to 23,000 men for Phase II, which would have to provide 22 squadrons for the British Commonwealth Very Long Range Bomber Force ("Tiger" Force) in the Pacific and 11 squadrons for occupation duty in Europe (217).

139. As early as 10 Feb 44 the Canadian Government had advised the British Government that it wanted a fully integrated Canadian Air Force for Phase II (218). Its reasons were summed up in a subsequent R.C.A.F. Aide Memoire as follows:

From the experience gained in the United Kingdom, it is apparent that, unless the R.C.A.F. component is organized as an integral formation, the effort of the Canadians becomes clouded by the activities of the air forces of our larger allies, such as the USAAF and RAF. This is apparent by the fact that Canadian participation in the air war over Germany never received due recognition until such time as No. 6 RCAF Bomber Group was formed and commenced operations as a wholly Canadian component. Therefore, it is considered necessary that our air force, which will operate against Japan, should be organized into a Canadian formation, and... commanded by a Canadian Air Officer Commanding (219).

Following the defeat of Germany there no longer would be any "Nominated" squadrons and R.C.A.F. personnel would be "unscrambled" from the R.A.F.

140. Plans had to be revised downwards during the spring of 1945, as it became apparent that the United States would have more than sufficient air strength to defeat Japan unaided and that "Tiger" Force was not militarily essential (220). On 14 Jun 45 the Cabinet was advised that the United States had reduced British Commonwealth air participation to a V.L.R. force of only 10 bomber squadrons, which would operate under overall American Command. It was proposed that the R.C.A.F. contribute two bomber and three transport squadrons. Approval was given at once (221). It was subsequently agreed (12 Jul) that the R.C.A.F. might contribute six further squadrons to a second echelon of "Tiger" Force to be formed in 1946. However, since 23,000 men must remain the maximum commitment, the projected R.C.A.F. Occupation Force for Europe was reduced from 11 to nine squadrons, with a strength of 8000 men (222).

141. Following the Japanese collapse, plans for "Tiger" Force were abandoned. No increase was made in the R.C.A.F.'s continuing commitment in Europe (223). That consisted of a Fighter Wing of four squadrons, an air observation post squadron and a Disarmament Wing with the British Air Forces of Occupation in Germany, four squadrons in Bomber Command as part of the R.A.F.'s "Striking Force". A Transport Wing of three "Dakota" squadrons remained in the United Kingdom.

142. Following VE-Day all personnel overseas had been given the opportunity of volunteering for service in the Pacific or for occupation duty in Europe, or of awaiting repatriation to Canada and return to civilian life in accordance with a priority based on length of service in Canada and overseas (224). A similar offer was made in Canada and a point score established for demobilization (225). As of 20 Jun the number of volunteers for service in the Pacific from among those stationed overseas and in Canada totalled 8679 aircrew, 1552 officers on the non flying list and 15,084 ground crew (226).

143. Release of personnel surplus to requirements had been initiated in Canada on 1 Nov 44 and by the week ending 4 May 45 some 8040 officers and 12,913 airmen who were aircrew and 1183 officers and 8383 airmen engaged on ground duties had been separated from the R.C.A.F. (227). On 12 Jul the Cabinet directed the Minister of National Defence for Air to accelerate the rate of demobilization to 10,000 per month, beginning with August and continuing to 31 Mar 46 (228).

144. Approximately 16,000 volunteers for the Pacific Force had returned to Canada with top priority during the summer of 1945, along with released prisoners of war and special compassionate cases. This left approximately 40,000 personnel overseas, of whom 10,000 were required for Occupation duty. Due to shipping shortages it was not possible to return the remainder to Canada with despatch and the fact that many men remained in the United Kingdom for a considerable period without employment was the occasion of complaint (229). Not until February 1946 had all but the volunteers for the Occupation Force been sent back to Canada (230).

145. Since the Canadian Government had not been given a share in the political control of Germany it had already decided to withdraw its occupation forces (231). On 15 Mar 46 the R.C.A.F. Fighter Wing in the British Air Forces of Occupation was disbanded. On 22 Jun the last squadron remaining overseas was disbanded. On 1 Oct 46 the Royal Canadian Air Force returned to a peace-time basis (232).

146. This report was compiled by J.M. Hitsman. It was read in draft by W/C F.H. Hitchens, Air Historian, A.F.H.Q.

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Training Wastage

1. Prior to the outbreak of the War the R.A.F. wastage rate in training pilots had been 26 per cent. Then the B.C.A.T.P. Agreement of 17 Dec 39 set forth training wastage rates as 29 per cent for pilots, 19 per cent for observers and 19 1/2 per cent for wireless operators (air gunner). On 12 Aug 40 Air Commodore R. Leckie (Director of Training A.F.H.Q.) wrote the four Training Commands stressing the necessity of eliminating unreliable or unsatisfactory pilots in the training stage. "Manpower must be used economically," Air Commodore Leckie's letter continued, and:

...if through some psychological defect of which we have as yet very little definite knowledge the student fails to qualify as a pilot, he should be encouraged to consider Service as an Air Observer or Wireless Operator (Air Gunner) in spite of his disappointment at his failure to become a pilot. Similarly Observers who fail, if suitable for training as Wireless Operator (Air Gunner) should be encouraged to do so and those who fail to qualify as Wireless Operator (Air Gunner) should be considered as Air Gunners(233).

2. On 19 Sep 40 he advised the same Commands that the latest R.A.F. figures on training wastage were(234):

(a) Pilots			
E.F.T.S.	20-25	per cent	
S.F.T.S.	10-12	1/2 per cent	
(b) Observers	20	" "	
(c) Bombing and Gunnery Schools	5	" "	
(d) Wireless Operator (Air Gunner)	30	" "	
(e) Wireless Operator (Air Gunner) (Bombing & Gunnery Schools)	5	" "	

3. After summarizing wastage rates at the several E.F.T.Ss., Air Commodore Leckie advised the Training Commands on 20 Jan 41 that unsatisfactory material was being passed to S.F.T.Ss. where it had to be rejected. One S.F.T.S. had recently had an intake of 65 instead of the normal 56. He emphasized that the yardstick was not "Can the individual be taught to fly Elementary type aircraft", but rather, "Will the individual become an efficient Service pilot". On no account was a pilot to be continued "because he is such a nice fellow", since it was possible to remuster to other aircrew trades(235). Actual wastage at E.F.T.Ss. to 31 Dec 40 had averaged 19 per cent which, Air Commodore Leckie later conceded, was not so disquietening as earlier reports had seemed to indicate(236). The following are given as typical examples of failures at an Elementary Flying Training School:

This pupil received 16 hours dual and was not considered safe for solo. It is thought that his eagerness to learn to fly was partially the reason he could not relax, and would concentrate on only one thing at a time. Consequently, his flying was very inconsistent from being satisfactory one moment and dangerous the next. This Command Headquarters granted the additional flying time above the number 14 hours prior to solo in an effort to assist the school in preventing the elimination of potential pilots.

This pupil failed on his 50-hour or final test due to not showing any noticeable improvement since his 20-hour test. He was found lacking in judgment of height and distance, rough and erratic on controls and his aerobatics were very poor.

This pupil's training was discontinued on being progress tested after receiving 14 hours and 45 minutes dual and 3 hours and 55 minutes solo. He was of a low average and his progress was not satisfactory which was attributable to nervousness(237).

4. A more elaborate breakdown of wastage rates during training was subsequently devised. At the time the B.C.A.T.P. Agreement was amended (June 1942) the existing and future percentages for training wastage were set forth as follows(238):

	<u>Present</u>	<u>Future</u>
<u>I.T.S.</u>	15	15
<u>Pilots</u>		
E.F.T.S.	25	25
S.F.T.S.	12 1/2	12 1/2
<u>Air Observers</u>		
A.O.S.	15	15
B. & G.	Nil	Nil
A.N.S.	Nil	-
<u>Air Navigators</u>	-	15
<u>Air Bombers</u>	-	5
<u>Wireless Operators (Air Gunner)</u>		
W/S	20	20
B. & G.	3	3
<u>Standard Air Gunners</u>	10	10

5. By 1943 there were too many men coming forward for aircrew training with faulty motivation. The greatest demand was still for pilots, and, as far as possible, aircrew were selected for such training. And this appeared to be the reason for the progressively higher "ceased training" rate(239). Manpower was becoming scarce by midsummer and the only answer to rising wastage seemed to be even better selection, and reselection to another trade for those who had failed their courses. Reselection rates had increased during the spring and early summer of 1943. For the period 1 Apr-6 Aug 43 they were(240):

	Percentage	
	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>
<u>Pilots (R.C.A.F.)</u>		
E.F.T.S.	25	32.5
S.F.T.S.	12 1/2	13.5
<u>Pilots (R.A.F.)</u>		
E.F.T.S.	10	24.6
S.F.T.S.	10	18.4
<u>Navigators (All categories)</u>		
At A.O.S.	15	18.8
<u>Air Bombers</u>		
At B. & G.S	5	5.3
At A.O.S.	Nil.	2.6
<u>W.O.A.Gs.</u>		
At W/S	25	27.1
At B. & G.S.	3	1.5
<u>Air Gunners</u>	20	18.1
<u>Flight Engineers</u>	10	10

6. The Air Ministry sought and obtained agreement on 17 Aug 43 that only 10 per cent of the R.A.F. pilot pupils would be allowed to waste at E.F.T.Ss. and S.F.T.Ss. but the R.C.A.F. policy remained more flexible(241). Apart from the fact that the quality of pupils had declined, it was considered that insufficient attention had been paid to the more backward pupils, too many of whom had been ruthlessly rejected. In future, according to a training instruction issued on 28 Aug 43, the training of pupils could be discontinued only up to the "reselection" percentages given above(242). Furthermore, no pupil was to be "washed out" until he had had the benefit of 12 hours' dual instruction at an E.F.T.S. or six hours' dual instruction at an S.F.T.S.(243).

7. The situation changed by the end of 1943, however; the reduction in the number of B.C.A.T.P. schools created a situation where there was a surplus of 4000 awaiting entry into the remainder. Therefore, on 26 Feb 44 instructions were issued cancelling restrictions on the rate of training wastage. Henceforth, quality of graduates was once again to be stressed and borderline pupils eliminated(244). This reversal of policy was not, however, applied to R.A.F. trainees(245).

8. Exact figures are hard to come by but better than 50 per cent of aircrew failures appearing before Reselection Boards were salvaged and re-entered the aircrew training stream(246). A total of 91,166 R.C.A.F. aircrew commenced training under the B.C.A.T.P. and 72,835 graduated. The total loss to aircrew of 18,014 was broken down as follows(247):

Remustered to Staff Duties - Flying	321
Remustered to Ground Trade	10826
Discharged or returned to source	5678
Released to U.S.A. Forces	661
Casualties during Training	469
Transferred to Army	57
Transferred to Navy	2

Clayton Knight Committee

1. Without the services of American commercial and ex-service pilots it would have been difficult to staff the B.C.A.T.P. As early as 9 Sep 39 the Air Ministry had been queried as to whether Americans commissioned into the R.C.A.F. would be acceptable later for service overseas with R.A.F. squadrons(248). An affirmative answer was received on 14 Sep and then, on 26 Oct, it was suggested that the R.C.A.F. should arrange to enlist American pilots, observers and maintenance personnel, rather than have them make their way to the United Kingdom and then possibly have to be returned to Canada for training(249).

2. Due to the strength of isolationist sentiment in the neutral United States, however, extreme care had to be exercised by both the British Embassy and Canadian Legation in Washington. During the late spring of 1940 the British Embassy was planning to place advertisements in a number of newspapers requesting British subjects with over 250 flying hours to visit the nearest consulate if they were interested in joining the R.A.F.: it was hoped that interested Americans would snap at this bait. Since applicants had to pay their own expenses to a recruiting office in Canada, it was realized that more experienced pilots could be obtained if a method could be found to circumvent the Neutrality Act and despatch selected candidates with expenses paid(250).

3. On 18 May 40 the Canadian Minister in Washington was requested to pass along a message from President Roosevelt that the United States would not be embarrassed by the enlistment of its citizens in Canada's armed forces, provided that they proceeded there for that purpose and took only an Oath of Obedience rather than of Allegiance(251). The answer was the establishment, by Wing Commander Homer Smith and Mr Clayton Knight, of an undercover organization known as the Clayton Knight Committee to screen applicants as to suitability for flying and arrange for preliminary medical examinations and transportation to Canada(252).

4. On 1 Jun 40 the new Chief of the Air Staff informed the Deputy Minister that it was essential to obtain at least 100 additional experienced American pilots as instructors for the accelerated B.C.A.T.P.: 58 for duty at Bombing & Gunnery Schools and the balance for Air Observer courses. Age limits were 18 to 40, (preferably 20-35) and applicants should be graduates of United States Army or Navy Schools and holders of civil pilot certificates. It would be advisable to have applicants examined by a civilian doctor in accordance with R.C.A.F. medical standards before they were sent to Canada. Air Vice Marshal Breadner explained the need for the Clayton Knight Committee as follows:

The American pilots at present attending the Air Observers' School are anything but the best type obtainable from that source and, in order to eliminate any further intake of this category, it would seem essential that the foregoing arrangement should be taken in hand immediately.(253)

5. As soon as the Minister of National Defence for Air had approved Air Vice Marshal Breadner's request, on 4 Jun, action was taken to assist this organization officially.(254) Credit accounts were opened in Toronto and at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City so that applicants could be reimbursed for their trip to Canada. In a short space of time the Clayton Knight Committee had spread its network all across the United States, opening branches and credit accounts in hotels in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Kansas City, Chicago, Cleveland, Atlanta, and (later) Memphis(255). By 21 Sep some 101 Americans had been commissioned into the R.C.A.F. In order to leave no loophole for complaint by isolationists a Dominion Aeronautical Association was established by Order in Council P.C. 739 of 31 Jan 41 and henceforth pilots secured by the Clayton Knight Committee theoretically were hired to work for this organization.(256)

6. The Clayton Knight Committee also supplied recruits for the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, despatching them to Ottawa where they were interviewed by the United Kingdom Air Liaison Office. Qualifications were somewhat different than for the R.C.A.F.* but many were retained in Canada as instructors or were posted to the R.A.F. Ferry Command.(257)

7. Since the emphasis was on obtaining experienced pilots to serve as B.C.A.T.P. instructors, the Minister of National Defence for Air issued instructions during March 1941 that all Americans enlisting in the R.C.A.F. were to be exempt from guard duty and posted directly from Manning Depot to training (or refresher training)(258). This exemption was subsequently (14 May 41) limited to American pilots with over 300 hours solo: they were to be posted to the Refresher Flight at Picton, while all others would undergo Manning Depot and Guard Duty before being posted to an Initial Training School.(259)

* Could be accepted to the age of 48 for instructional or ferrying duties.

8. Renewed efforts by the Clayton Knight Committee, were made following President Roosevelt's statement of 24 Jun 41 supporting a British scheme to recruit 15,000-30,000 Americans (particularly 8000 skilled radio mechanics) into a Civilian Technical Corps for service in the United Kingdom.(260) According to The New York Times of 25 Jun 41:

At the same time the President emphasized that the Neutrality Act did not prevent American youths going to Canada, or other points outside the United States, and enlisting for British military service, providing the enlistees did not take an oath of allegiance to Britain. Neither, he conceded, was there any legal ban on going outside the United States and enlisting for service in China, also without swearing allegiance. Such an oath, he stressed, is not required.

Recruiting agents were still obliged to tread carefully, however, since the U.S. State Department was forced to protest officially when complaints were registered by parents or isolationists.(261) The names and addresses of 55,000 students who had taken Civilian Pilot Training Plan primary courses were secured so that they might be circularized by the Clayton Knight Committee.(262) It was hoped that 2500 graduates might be obtained before 1 Sep 41.

9. On 8 Dec approval was given to a policy of a repatriating American citizens, if they so desired, so that they might serve in the armed forces of the United States.* Records officers at A.F.H.Q. believed that there then were 6129 Americans serving in the R.C.A.F.(264) During May and June 1942 some 1444 chose to transfer to the U.S.A.A.F., of whom 665 were pilots; as a result of subsequent negotiations, a further 463 transferred to the U.S.A.A.F. during March 1944.(265)

*An understanding had been reached earlier that the R.C.A.F. would release its American personnel to the United States, should that country become a belligerent.(263)

Radar Personnel for Overseas Service

1. Behind the scenes correspondence had been going on for some weeks when the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa made a confidential request on 26 Jun 40 for Canadian civilians to become radio officers, radio mechanics and operators for radio direction finding work (R.D.F. but subsequently renamed Radar) against enemy aircraft, submarines and surface craft.(266)
2. It was 15 Aug, however, before the Minister of National Defence for Air replied to an actual request for 300 wireless operators for R.D.F. work to the effect that these airmen were "to be considered in all respects as trainees from the Commonwealth Air Training Plan....(267)" Instead of enlisting and despatching 300 recruits overseas Mr Power suggested that they be supplied from pupils of No. 1 Wireless School of the B.C.A.T.P. On 4 Oct 40 the United Kingdom High Commissioner made a further request, this time for radio officers and radio mechanics.(268) On 10 and 11 Oct instructions were issued to recruit an unlimited number of experienced personnel for service overseas as radio mechanics and a limited number of radio officers.(269) After a month's basic training they would be attached to the R.A.F. under the same arrangements as B.C.A.T.P. graduates. Eventually 988 wireless electrical mechanics (radio) and 100 radio officers were posted overseas against these commitments.(270) For purposes of distinction only, these mechanics were divided into those who worked on airborne equipment and ground equipment.
3. However, since the supply of technically trained men was limited, the question soon arose of meeting further needs. A plan was evolved whereby small numbers of inexperienced men would be trained in technical schools under the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Plan (soon to be renamed War Emergency Training Programme).(271) Then, during January 1941 another British request for radio officers and mechanics was received. There was no overseas demand for radio operators, however, since any intelligent and alert man or woman, with a minimum of education, could be trained in one month to operate R.D.F. equipment.(272) A conference of university representatives, meeting at Ottawa on 24 Feb 41, unanimously agreed to train 2500 "green" men as radio mechanics between 28 May and 20 Sep 41.(273) The Air Ministry later agreed that all personnel should remain members of the R.C.A.F. even though they might be attached for duty to military or naval units in the United Kingdom.(274) Age limits were 18 to 45, with a preference for men between 20 and 27; the minimum academic standard was junior matriculation or equivalent; medical standards were lower than for aircrew.(275) The Air Ministry agreed that 10 per cent of the 2500 radio mechanics being trained might be commissioned after completing the university training course.(276)
4. A small administrative staff was placed at each of the participating universities and colleges - Dalhousie, Mount Allison, New Brunswick, McGill, Ecole Polytechnique, Queen's, Toronto, McMaster, Royal Military College, Ontario Agricultural College, Western Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia - where courses of 13 weeks duration were conducted.(277)

Advanced training was given to graduates at No. 31 Radio School, Clinton, Ontario* the expense of which was borne by the British Government on the same basis as the R.A.F. transferred schools, except in so far as facilities should be used to train pupils for Canada's home requirements.(279)

5. In view of the fact that there would be "holdover" personnel requiring additional instruction and that many more potential radio mechanics would have to be enlisted in Canada, agreement was reached at another conference with university representatives on 23 Jul 41 that further courses should be conducted, coincident with the coming academic year.(280) However, commitments to train personnel for the Navy and Army resulted in Dalhousie, Manitoba and Alberta dropping out.(281)

6. Even though the Air Ministry had advised that aircrew applicants should have precedence,(282) the Air Member for Personnel's staff at A.F.H.Q. considered that it would be possible to supply 300 men per month with junior matriculation standard. In a memorandum of 18 Aug 41, which received Mr Power's approval, the sources for radio mechanics were given as follows(283):

- (a) Applicants over aircrew age limits.
- (b) Applicants within aircrew age limits, but medically unfit for flying duties.
- (c) Ceased training aircrew qualified for training as Radio Mechanics.
- (d) Applicants qualified for aircrew duties who definitely do not wish to fly.

7. On 17 Nov 41 the United Kingdom High Commissioner requested that the training of radio mechanics for overseas service should be continued to a total of 6000 (including the existing commitment for 2500), on a monthly intake of 500 per month.(284) However, meeting on 10 Dec the Cabinet War Committee authorized only a further 1500, leaving the remainder of Mr Power's recommendation for later consideration.(285) It was not until 23 Jan 42 that the Cabinet War Committee approved the training of a further 1000 radio mechanics, to increase the total commitment for overseas service to 5000.(286)

*Instead of despatching the university trained radio mechanics to an advanced school which the Air Ministry had been thinking of building in Northern Ireland the British Government decided to establish a school in Canada where there was no danger from enemy bombing.(278)

8. The entrance of Japan into the War changed the home defence picture. On 17 Jan 42 the Chief of the Air Staff suggested to Mr Power that, since R.D.F. equipment was shortly to be delivered for home defence requirements, sufficient mechanics to maintain it should be diverted from those graduating from No. 31 Radio School, Clinton.(287) It was only on 12 Feb, however, that the Cabinet War Committee approved Mr Power's recommendation that 470 radio mechanics undergoing training should be diverted to home defence.(288) It was subsequently decided that this additional commitment should be met from radio mechanics who had received their ab initio training in W.E.T.P. classes.(289)

9. Wastage in training had been expected but the fact that 706 of the first class of 2500 at universities had failed completely (including 254 on re-examination) disclosed a serious situation.(290) Part of the trouble could be attributed to the fact that Recruiting Centres had been concerned primarily with meeting their enlistment quotas and had accepted men who had neither the desire nor ability to become radio mechanics but merely wished to join the R.C.A.F.(291) On 30 Dec 41 the Minister of National Defence for Air approved the enlistment of 5652 men in order to obtain the then authorized 4000 graduates.(292) On the following day Recruiting Centres were instructed that greater attention must be paid to selection: all applicants were to be screened by the recently authorized Selection Boards.(293)

10. As of 28 Feb 42 a total of 5741 men had been enlisted for training as radio mechanics. It was estimated on 2 Apr, however, that 8800 men would have to be enlisted to meet existing commitments - 5000 trained radio mechanics for overseas service and 470 for home defence needs.(294)

11. On 5 Jun 42 the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters sought confirmation from the Air Ministry as to whether the continued posting overseas of R.C.A.F. radio mechanics was necessary, in view of the fact that there was serious discontent among the 2273 already serving in the United Kingdom. Cases had come to light where men had been in the United Kingdom for upwards of a year without being employed as radio mechanics. Despite (unauthorized) hopes held out in Canada, the following breakdown indicated that promotions had been given to very few R.C.A.F. personnel.(295)

Sergeants	25
Corporals	140
Aircraftmen	2108

It was further pointed out that the 2273 radio mechanics formed 32 per cent of the total R.C.A.F. ground personnel serving in the United Kingdom.

12. Since the normal tour of overseas service for ground personnel had been established as two years by the B.C.A.T.P. Agreements, subject to exigencies of the service or the desire of individuals to remain away for a longer period, the Air Member for Air Staff suggested to the Air Member for Personnel on 23 Jul 42 that home defence requirements (apart from immediate urgency) might be met in considerable part from repatriated personnel.(296) After further study it was decided on 16 Sep, however, that the majority of R.D.F. personnel would wish to remain overseas longer than two years. Those who wished to return to Canada would be given six weeks' leave and then returned overseas for a second tour of duty, apart from a small nucleus who would be retained and replaced by later graduates from No. 31 Radio School, Clinton.(297)

13. The actual situation, as presented to the Chief of the Air Staff on 6 Aug 42, was as follows(298):

	R.A.F. <u>Overseas</u>	R.C.A.F. <u>Home War</u>
Requirements	5000	1280
Supplied to date	<u>2653</u>	<u>105</u>
Balance to be supplied	2347	1175

Some 3892 men were in training, or on pre-enlistment leave but, since training wastage was estimated as being 1358, this number could produce only the balance required for service overseas and 187 for home war establishments. A further 1646 men would have to be enlisted to produce the remaining 988 radio mechanics required for home defence. After admitting that the training wastage had been approximately 40 per cent, this memorandum explained that:

...Although this wastage appears high in view of the careful personnel selection, it should be realized that this course of training is extremely intensive and exacting, and a number of training failures have been absorbed into other Air Force trades, both air and ground.(299)

14. University training would be completed during March 1943,* at which time the commitment of 5000

*The training of radio mechanics at the University of Toronto was completed on 16 Jan 43: 1098 of the 1732 pupils successfully completed the courses. Professor E.F. Burton considered that this wastage of 35 per cent was not large "when one takes into consideration that in the earlier Courses many were admitted without the necessary background to enable them to handle the work, and the percentage wastage in the later classes was not nearly as high as the earlier ones."(300)

radio mechanics for the Air Ministry and the original Canadian requirement for 470 would have been met. This would keep No. 31 Radio School, Clinton in operation until September 1943. The additional 810 radio mechanics required by the R.C.A.F. could be obtained by continuing the smaller W.E.T.P. programme in operation until the end of 1943.(301)

15. During his visit to the United Kingdom, August-September 1942, Mr Power took up the question of radio mechanics being wrongly employed. Agreement was reached with the Air Ministry that its Air Member for Personnel should conduct a joint investigation with Air Vice Marshal Harold Edwards.(302) During December 1942 an R.C.A.F. Trade Test Board was formed to give all eligible Canadian personnel a chance to qualify for "A" group trades pay. Additional promotions to N.C.O. rank were made on an R.C.A.F. "shadow" roster and R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters attempted to maintain a watchful eye over detached personnel.(303) On 22 Oct 43 it reported that radio mechanics had "become as satisfied in their trade as airmen in other ground trades".(304)

16. As of 31 Mar 43 a total of 4726 radio mechanics had been posted overseas. There had been 47 casualties and 188 had been repatriated to reduce the actual strength overseas to 444 officers and 4046 airmen.(305) As of 30 Jun 43 there were 661 R.D.F. mechanics in the Home War Commands of the R.C.A.F.(306)

17. Subsequent reductions in the home war establishment created a surplus during the autumn of 1943 when the Air Ministry again made a request for radar personnel. Moreover, it was discovered during December that there was still a shortage of 29 officers and 262 other ranks against the commitment of 5000 radio mechanics for overseas service.(307) It was decided that the despatch of this 291 all ranks should be given priority, after conversion training at Clinton, which had been taken over by the R.C.A.F. and re-designated No. 5 Radio School on 31 Jul 43.(308)

18. The remaining surplus of 311 radio mechanics in the home war establishment were given the opportunity to remuster to aircrew or go overseas in their present trade.(309) The situation in regard to radio officers was much easier, since a surplus had been built up in the United Kingdom by the summer of 1944, and it was possible to repatriate 107 officers during the autumn without replacement.(310)

19. As early as 25 Oct 44 the Minister of National Defence for Air instructed Air Marshal Breadner in London to advise the Air Ministry that all radar mechanics attached to the R.A.F. would be recalled to R.C.A.F. control on the conclusion of the war in Europe so that they might be repatriated on the same basis as other Canadian personnel.(311) At the end of April 1945

some 3850 of the 4550 radar personnel overseas were attached to the R.A.F. (312) A telegram of 12 May 45 was more emphatic: all personnel not required for service with R.C.A.F. units during Phase II should be withdrawn for repatriation "as rapidly as possible". (313) Although, in practice, there were instances of Canadian radar mechanics being retained unduly on isolated R.A.F. stations, R.C.A.F. personnel were "unscrambled" before the end of 1945 for subsequent return to Canada. (314)

Training Reselection Rates and Periods.(315)

M E M O R A N D U M

S45-9-24(DTPR)
S15-1-392 "

15th April, 1944.

A.M.O./D.N.P.

Training Reselection Rates and Periods

1. Herewith are periods in weeks and reselection rates for various trades and aircrew categories, in accordance with your request of April 6th.
2. It is emphasized that the reselection rate (wastage) fluctuates considerably with the quality of candidates and syllabus, and moreover that no recent figures are available for certain courses that have been non-active for some time. The rate quoted represents at best an educated guess (based on experience and cumulative records) of the number that may drop out of a given hundred trainees in any category during the period between Manning Depot and graduation, and too much reliance should not be placed on the figures as being necessarily a guide for the future.

Copy for D.M./S.C.B.

Sgd. JGI
(J.G. Ireland) G/C
D.T.P.R.

EMH/EP

DMA

DMA/SCB
DTPR (2)
TPR4
CIR

<u>Category</u>	Period in weeks* from Manning Depot to <u>Graduation</u>	Reselection Rate (Percent)		
		<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>W.D.</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>AIRCREW</u>				
Pilot	40	44		
Navigator	30	30		
Nav. B.	38	30		
Nav. W.	58	15(after W/S)		
W.O.A.G.	42	25		
Air Gunner	12	20		
Air Bomber	28	20		
Flight Engineer (till Conversion Trng.)	30	10		

Note: Instructors' Courses for each of the above categories average about 6 weeks more, and average 5% reselection.

OFFICERS NFL

Accountant	8	1		
Administrative	4	5		
Armament	16	12		
Chaplain	4	0		
Engineer	22	3		
Equipment	6	2		
Photographer	12	0		
P.T. Drill	8	5		
Provost & Security	4	11		
Signals	24	6		

TRADESMEN & TRADESWOMEN

Aero Engine Mechanic	30	4		
Aerodrome Foreman Electrician (W & B)				
Aircraft Recognition Instructor				
Airframe Mechanic	12	4		

* Does not include time awaiting posting between schools.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Period in weeks from Manning Depot to Graduation</u>	<u>Reselection Rate (Percent)</u>		
		<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>W.D.</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>TRADESMEN & TRADESWOMEN Cont'd</u>				
Armourers	12	8		
Armourers (Bombs)	5	2		
Armourers (Guns)	7	3		
Baker				
Bandsman				
Bandsman (Trumpet and Drum)				
Butcher				
Canteen Steward				
Carpenter	18	0		
Carpenter (W. & B.)				
Clerk (Accounting)	11	4	12	
Clerk (Administrative)	8	4	7	
Clerk (Code and Cypher)	8	7		
Clerk (Educational)				
Clerk (Engineering W. & B.)				
Clerk (General)	4	8	12	
Clerk (Medical)	4		0	
Clerk (Library)				
Clerk Operations (B.R.)	4			
Clerk Operations Fighters	4			
Clerk Operations Filter	3			
Clerk Operations Flying Control				
Clerks (Postal)	2		7	
Clerk (Stenographer)	4	5	7	
Construction Hand				
Chef	8			12 Air- men & W.D.'s
Chef (Hospital)	8	0		
Dental Assistant (W.D.)	2		10	

<u>Category</u>	<u>Period in weeks from Manning Depot to Graduation</u>	<u>Reselection Rate (Percent)</u>		
		<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>W.D.</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>TRADESMEN & TRADESWOMEN Cont'd</u>				
Dispenser				
Draughtsman (AE)				
Draughtsman (W. & B.)				
Driver (Transport)	5	6	18	
Electrician	24	8		
Electrician (W. & B.)				
Engineer, Stationery				
Entertainer				
Equipment Assistant	6	7	9	
Fabric Worker	6	5		
Fire Fighter	4	7		
Fireman				
Fitter Diesel				
Fitter General (W. & B.)				
Flying Control	4	12		
Foreman of Works (W. & B.)				
Hairdresser	3		8	
Hospital Assistant	4	27	17	
Inspector (A.I.D.)	10	11		
Instrument Mechanic	11	6		
Interpreter				
Laboratory Assistant				
Laundryman				
Link Instructor (Celestial)				
Link Trainer Instructor	6	3		
Machinist				
Masseur				
Master Mechanic (W. & B.)				
Metal Worker	14	3		
Meteorological Observer	5		9	

<u>Category</u>	<u>Period in weeks from Manning Depot to Graduation</u>	<u>Reeselection Rate (Percent)</u>		
		<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>W.D.</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>TRADESMEN & TRADESWOMEN Cont'd</u>				
Motor Mechanic (Marine)				
Motor Mechanic (M.T.)	6	5		
Officer Cadet	5	2	3	
Operator Telephone	2		17	
Operator, Mechanical Audit				
Operator Tractor				
Optometrist				
Osteopath				
Painter (W. & B.)				
Parachute Rigger	3	0	4	
Photographer	12			5 Airmen & W.D.'s
Physical Training and Drill Instructor	8	13	20	
Pigeon Loftman				
Pump Man (W. & B.)				
Radar Mechanic (Air)	22	35		
Radar Mechanic (Ground)	30	35		
Radiographer	9	0		
Radio Telephone Operator	10			11 Airmen & W.D.'s
Radar Operator (Ground)				
Safety Equipment Worker				
Seamen				
Service Patrol (W.D.)	4		8	
Service Police	5	18		
Shoemaker				
Specialist Miscellaneous				
Tailor				
Technical Assistant (Medical)				

<u>Category</u>	<u>Period in weeks from Manning Depot to Graduation</u>	<u>Reselection Rate (Percent)</u>		
		<u>R.C.A.F.</u>	<u>W.D.</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>TRADESMEN & TRADESWOMEN Cont'd</u>				
Telephone Man (Cable)				
Telephone Man (Combination)				
Telephone Man (Construction)				
Telephone Man (Switchboard)				
Telephone Man (Teletype)				
Telephone Man (Toll)				
Teleprinter Operator	3			13 Airmen & W.D.'s
Wardmaster				
Welder	12	3		
Wireless Mechanics	24	4		
Wireless Mechanics (Air Gunner)				
Wireless Operator (Ground)	12	14	10	
General Duties				
General Duties Steward				
General Duties Batman				
Tradesman (U.A.T.C.)				
Airmen (U.A.T.C.)				

APPENDIX "E"
to Report No. 67

R.C.A.F. UNITS OVERSEAS
(Other than Squadrons)(316)

R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters	- throughout the war
R.C.A.F. Overseas Record Office	9 Feb 40 - 21 Aug 41
U.K. Base Accounts Unit	22 Mar 43-
R.C.A.F. Base Accounts Office, London,	1 May 43-
R.C.A.F. Base Accounts Office, Cairo	1 May 43-
R.C.A.F. Base Accounts Office, Bombay	1 May 43 - 31 Dec 45
R.C.A.F. Accounts Liaison Office, Freetown	1 May 43-
R.C.A.F. Accounts Liaison Office, Algiers	1 May 43 -
No. 2 District Headquarters, Exeter	4 Nov 42 - 31 Jul 45
No. 3 District Headquarters, Peterborough	4 Nov 42 - 31 Jul 45
No. 4 District Headquarters, Birmingham	8 Oct 42 - 31 Jul 45
No. 5 District Headquarters, York	23 Sep 42 - 31 Dec 45
No. 6 District Headquarters, Edinburgh	14 Sep 42 - 31 Jul 45
No. 7 District Headquarters, Inverness	9 Dec 42 - 30 Jun 44
District Headquarters, North Africa	1 Sep 43 - 10 Jan 44
District Headquarters, Italy	15 Jan 44 - 28 Feb 45
District Headquarters, India	16 Jun 43 - 1 Dec 45
District Headquarters, Middle East	27 May 42 - 21 Oct 45
R.C.A.F. Staff Officer at H.Q. 2nd T.A.F.	(Sep 43) - May 45
R.C.A.F. Staff Officer at H.Q. B.A.F.O.	(Jun 45) - May 46
R.C.A.F. Liaison Office, Brussels	(1 Apr 45) - 30 Sep 45
R.C.A.F. Staff Officer, H.Q. Air Command, South East Asia	11 Jul 44 - 10 Oct 45
84 Group Disarmament H.Q. Unit	25 May 45 - 31 May 46
No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group	25 Oct 42 - 1 Nov 45
Topcliffe Base	5 Apr 43 - Aug 43 (to No. 61)
Linton-on-Ouse Base	18 Jun 43 - Sep 43 (to No. 62)
No. 61 Base	Sep 43 - 9 Nov 44 (to No. 76)
No. 62 Base	17 Sep 43 - 1 Sep 45
No. 63 Base	1 May 44 - 30 Aug 45
No. 64 Base	1 May 44 - Jul 45
No. 76 Base	9 Nov 44 - 31 Aug 45

Station Topcliffe	1 Jan 43 - 28 Feb 46
Station Dishforth	1 Jan 43 - 28 Sep 45
Station Leeming	1 Jan 43 - 30 Aug 45
Station Skipton-on-Swale	1 Jan 43 - 30 Aug 45
Station Middleton-St.-George	1 Jan 43 - Jun 45
Station Croft	1 Jan 43 - Jul 45
Station East Moor	1 Apr 43 - 31 Oct 45
Station Dalton	23 Apr 43 - 14 Sep 45
Station Linton-on-Ouse	18 Jun 43 - 20 Oct 45
Station Tholthorpe	18 Jun 43 - 31 Oct 45
Station Wombledon	10 Aug 43 - 20 Sep 45
Station Digby	(Fall 41) - 7 May 45
Station Dunsfold	(Dec 42) - 7 Sep 43
Station Down Ampney	12 Nov 45 - 21 Apr 46
Station Rufforth	4 Jun 45 - 30 Sep 45
Station Odiham	7 Oct 45 - 2 Jul 46
17 Sector H.Q.	(Sep 43?) - 13 Jul 44
22 Sector H.Q.	9 Jan 44 - 13 Jul 44
39 (R) Wing H.Q.	(Feb 43) - 7 Aug 45
120 (T) Wing H.Q.	12 Nov 45 - 30 Jun 46
126 Wing H.Q. (1)	6 Jul 43 - 31 Mar 46
127 Wing H.Q. (1)	11 Jul 43 - 7 Jul 45
128 Airfield H.Q.	21 Jul 43 - 2 Jul 44
129 Airfield H.Q.	9 Jul 43 - 14 Jul 44
143 Wing H.Q. (1)	10 Jan 44 - 26 Aug 45
144 Airfield H.Q.	(1 Feb 44) - 14 Jul 44
331 Wing H.Q.	7 May 43 - 18 Dec 43
8402 Disarmament Wing	17 Mar 45 - 15 Apr 46
1659 Heavy Conversion Unit	6 Nov 42 - 10 Sep 45
1664 Heavy Conversion Unit	10 May 43 - (Apr 45)
1666 Heavy Conversion Unit	5 Jun 43 - 3 Aug 45
1679 Heavy Conversion Flight	22 May 43 - 31 Jan 44
1512 Beam Approach Training Flight	(1 Jan 43) - 25 May 43
1535 Beam Approach Training Flight	15 Dec 42 - 30 Aug 43
1691 (Bomber) Gunnery Flight	Aug 43 - 15 Feb 44
1695 (Bomber) Defence Training Flight	16 Feb 44 - 28 Jul 45
No. 6 (RCAF) Group Battle School	1 Sep 43 - became
No. 6 (RCAF) Group Aircrew School	26 Jul 44 - became
No. 6 Aircrew School	9 Nov 44 - Aug 45
No. 6 (RCAF) Group Communication Flight	1 Dec 42 - (Jun 45)
R.C.A.F. Flight Engineers Training Unit	Jun 44 - 12 Aug 45
R.C.A.F. "R" Depot (2)	15 Sep 42 - 28 Feb 46
No. 3 Personnel Reception Centre (3)	24 Jun 41 - (31 Jan 46)

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1. Originally called Airfield, renamed Wing in Jul 44.
 2. Although R.C.A.F. records open on 24 June 41, it was not designated as R.C.A.F. until 25 Oct 43 when R.A.F. Station Bournemouth became No. 3 (R.C.A.F.) P.R.C. Located at Bournemouth except for the period 1 May 44 - 25 Aug 44 when it was moved to Innsworth.
 3. Originally R.C.A.F. P.D.C. (Personnel Despatch Centre), redesignated "R" Depot about Dec 42; located at Warrington until Jun 45 when it moved to Torquay.

R.C.A.F. Personnel Depot, Topcliffe	1 Feb 46 - 21 Jul 46
8 Air Crew Holding Unit	4 Jun 45 - 30 Sep 45
406 Air Stores Park	20 Jan 44 - 25 Apr 46
410 Repair and Salvage Unit	Feb 44 - 11 Aug 45
419 Repair and Salvage Unit	24 Jan 44 - 28 Aug 45
52 Mobile Field Hospital	16 Aug 43 - 11 Aug 45
6 Casualty Air Evacuation Unit	24 May 44 - 23 Aug 44
5 Mobile Field Photographic Section	(Jul 44) - 20 Sep 45
6 Mobile Field Photographic Section	(Dec 43) - 7 Aug 45

RCAF Groundcrew Deficiencies Overseas
Against Which RAF Provided Personnel(317)

(Compiled from Establishment--Strength Figures as at
15th February, 1944)

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Fitter Armourer	224	Generally speaking, the R.C.A.F. were not able to provide any airmen in the Fitter Armourer trades, and in the trade of Armourer the R.C.A.F. did provide some but relatively few. The R.A.F., therefore, made up the deficiencies in these four trades, even though the R.C.A.F. strength of Armourer (Bombs) and Armourer (Guns) were held against those Fitter Armourer positions which the R.A.F. could not fill completely. It should be noted that the establishments called for Fitters Armourer, Fitters Armourer (Bombs), Fitters Armourer (Guns) and Armourers in all ranks (including ACs). For instance in the trade of Armourer as at this date (15.2.44) the deficiency of 114 consisted of 1 FS, 26 Sgts. and 87 ACs. R.C.A.F. personnel in the trades of Armourer (Guns) and Armourer (Bombs) could not satisfactorily fill either Fitter Armourer (Guns) or (Bombs) or Armourer vacancies due to a lack of training in the opposite trades. They did not possess the necessary knowledge of tools, machine shop practice, metals or metal treatments to fill a Fitter vacancy. R.C.A.F. Armourers (Bombs) did not receive sufficient training in equipment that was being used on operations, i.e. bomb gears, bombs and bomb components. Armourer (Guns) were able to successfully cope with the ordinary servicing requirements of the .303 and 50 calibre machine guns and 20 mm cannon.
Fitter Armourer (Bombs)	63	
Fitter Armourer (Guns)	171	
Armourer	114	

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Hairdresser	42	Throughout practically all the war, R.A.F. Hairdressers had to be provided, due to the fact that a sufficient quantity of R.C.A.F. Hairdressers was not available overseas.
Carpenter	164	This deficiency consisted of 9 Sgts., 65 Cpls. and 90 ACs, and in a large number of cases consisted of Carpenters who had to have considerable training on wood manufactured aircraft. R.C.A.F. Carpenters were called upon to fill R.A.F. Carpenter I vacancies. This could not be done satisfactorily as they were extremely weak on aircraft hydraulics, airframe construction and components, daily inspections and periodic checks on airframes. It was therefore necessary to keep a surplus of R.C.A.F. Airframe Mechanics on each Unit whose establishment called for R.A.F. Carpenter I.
Clerk Accountant		As at 15.2.44 there was an overall surplus, but there was also a large number of W.A.A.F. positions against which W.A.A.F. were provided. In the R.C.A.F. airman strength there was throughout the war a general deficiency of personnel trained and experienced in equipment accounting and non-public funds, possibly due to a lack of sufficient training in these branches of the trade.
Clerk Administrative	100	In addition to this deficiency in the airman establishment, there was a large W.A.A.F. establishment against which W.A.A.F. were provided. In the number of R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. provided, there was always a deficiency of Clerk Stenographers.
Clerk Operations		Against the airman establishment there was an

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
		overall surplus of R.C.A.F. airmen, but here again there was a large W.A.A.F. commitment filled by W.A.A.F. personnel.
Chef	177	R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. cooks were employed on R.C.A.F. Units to meet this deficiency. In addition, there was a large number of W.A.A.F. establishment positions against which W.A.A.F. were also provided. There was a continuing shortage of Warrant Officers to fill the W.O. (Messing) positions and R.A.F. as far as available were provided. R.C.A.F. Chefs lacked sufficient training in field kitchens and equipment and indenting procedure for rations. This necessary experience was quickly picked up on contact.
Compass Adjuster	37	There was almost a 100% R.C.A.F. deficiency in this trade until late in the war when R.C.A.F. Instrument Mechanics trained in Canada as Compass Adjusters were posted overseas to fill the establishments. In the first instance R.A.F. were provided to meet all deficiencies.
Chemical Warfare Fighter	96	This deficiency was in the first instance almost 100% filled by R.A.F. Progressively, over a period of time, R.C.A.F. Firefighters provided from Canada were trained in the U.K. and also other personnel such as G.D.s, Security Guards, etc., were trained in the U.K. to fill this deficiency.
Driver Transport	420	This deficiency was actually lowered by a surplus of 118 M.M.M.T. who were employed against Driver Transport positions. However, there still was a deficiency which was met by R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. both of which were employed against airmen and W.A.A.F. positions. The general comment on R.C.A.F.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
		Drivers Transport throughout the war was that they lacked experience on convoy duties and knowledge of map reading.
Electrician		As at this date (15.2.44) there was an overall surplus in this trade, but six weeks prior to this a deficiency of 121 existed which was filled by R.A.F. personnel. R.C.A.F. personnel in this trade did not receive sufficient training on basic electrical theory. They required constant supervision by Senior N.C.O.s who usually had to locate unserviceabilities themselves and give directions for repair. Evidently there was little training given on Alternating Current theory which is becoming increasingly important as far as modern aircraft electrical circuits are concerned.
Equipment Assistant	51	This airman deficiency was met by R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. in addition to a large W.A.A.F. establishment which was filled by W.A.A.F. personnel.
Flying Control	60	This deficiency was filled by R.A.F. personnel trained and mustered as Airfield Controllers. The qualifications for the R.C.A.F. trade of Flying Control did not meet the need overseas.
Instrument Mechanic	39	Six weeks prior to this date (15.2.44) there was a deficiency of 218 which was met with R.A.F. personnel. Throughout the war, there was a serious lack of R.C.A.F. airmen qualified to fill the R.A.F. positions of Instrument Repairers. It should be noted that of the 39 deficiency 12 were FS and 9 Sgts.-- a preponderance of the shortage in senior ranks. R.C.A.F. Instrument Mechanics, in the main, did not have sufficient knowledge of basic instrument construction and

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
		operation either of flight or engine instruments. R.C.A.F. personnel in this trade were required to take R.A.F. or manufacturers courses on the D.R. Compass or Mark XIV Bomb Sight to enable them to carry out satisfactory daily inspections.
Machinist	27	A deficiency of 27 against an establishment of 35 (consisting of 9 FS, deficiency 9; 8 Cpls., deficiency 6; 18 ACs, deficiency 12). The deficiency was met as far as possible with R.A.F. personnel who were very highly trained on lathes, bench work, etc.
Master Mechanics	326	In this trade the establishment was 338. The deficiency consisting of 10 WO, 136 FS, 1 Cpl. and 179 ACs was filled with R.A.F. airmen trained as Fitters I. Please note that airmen with qualifications of a Master Mechanic were required in all ranks and classifications. R.C.A.F. personnel in the trades of Aero Engine Mechanic and Airframe Mechanic had not the required knowledge of their opposite trades to satisfactorily fill R.A.F. establishments calling for Fitter I.
Motorcyclist	69	This deficiency was filled by R.A.F. until the R.C.A.F., very late in the war, provided R.C.A.F. personnel trained in the U.K. Some, however, did come from Canada, but much contact training was required due to changes in local conditions, road rules and English type machines.
Nursing Orderly	112	A large number of R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. were employed against this airman deficiency as well as W.A.A.F. being employed against W.A.A.F. positions.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Operator Telephone	33	A number of R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. were employed against this airman deficiency as well as W.A.A.F. being employed against W.A.A.F. positions.
Safety Equipment Worker	57	A number of R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. were employed against this airman deficiency as well as W.A.A.F. being employed against W.A.A.F. positions. An attempt was made to remuster Fabric Workers and Parachute Riggers to this trade in order to offset the deficiency. However, without benefit of a conversion course, it was found that they did not possess sufficient knowledge of dinghies, dinghy repairs or the testing of equipment for operational use designed for rescuing crews forced down on water.
Photographer	121	R.A.F. were employed against this deficiency.
Radio Telephone Operator	88	R.A.F. were provided against this deficiency until sufficient R.C.A.F. personnel were trained in the U.K. Canadian trained personnel in this trade were extremely weak on equipment in use operationally, radio theory, morse code and R.T.O. procedure used in the U.K.
Service Police	84	Particularly on stations, R.A.F. police were employed against this deficiency.
Standard (General Duties)		To quote a specific deficiency figure on this trade would give a wrong impression. There was a serious deficiency during the whole of the war necessitating the employment of R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. against R.C.A.F. airmen and W.A.A.F. establishments. The establishments against which G.D.s (W.A.A.F. and R.A.F.) were employed were Batmen, Batwomen, Mess Stewards, Orderlies (Messengers), Waitresses and ACH/GDs.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Maintenance Assistants Armament Assistants		As the source of supply for these trades as well as the trade of Chef Assistant was derived from Standard (General Duties) personnel, it follows that a serious deficiency existed. This was filled to approximately 80% of establishment by R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel.
Tailor	13	This deficiency was met from R.A.F. sources, but there was a large W.A.A.F. establishment at each of the Station Headquarters against which W.A.A.F. were employed.
Telephone Operators		An airman surplus of 13 existed at this date (15.2.44), but there was a large W.A.A.F. establishment filled by W.A.A.F. while the 13 airmen supplemented our needs which could not be met entirely from R.A.F. sources.
Wireless Mechanics	225	This deficiency was met from R.A.F. sources. R.C.A.F. personnel mustered in this trade had not had sufficient training on either R.A.F. or American equipment which was being used operationally.
Wireless Operators		This trade showed a surplus of 101 as at 15.2.44, but many were employed on R.A.F. Units. It will be recalled that Wireless Operators were trained for the R.A.F. early in the war. There was generally throughout the war a R.C.A.F. deficiency of Wireless Operators trained on D/F.
Wireless Operators Mechanic	24	R.A.F. airmen were employed against this deficiency which existed in varying degrees throughout the war. R.C.A.F. personnel mustered in this trade had not had sufficient training on either R.A.F. or American equipment which was being used operationally.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Aircraft Finishers	75	R.C.A.F. A.F.M.s were employed against this deficiency, but numerous R.A.F., trained in the R.A.F. Aircraft Finishing School, were employed until R.C.A.F. airmen were given the same training in the U.K.
Welder	18	R.C.A.F. Welders along with R.A.F. Blacksmiths and Welders met the needs of this trade.

Table 1

RCAF Appointments and Enlistments

(298 officers and 2750 airmen on 31 Aug 39)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
1939		
Sep	107	1042
Oct	134	996
Nov	133	1097
Dec	140	79
<u>Total 1939</u>	<u>514</u>	<u>3214</u>
1940		
Jan	129	928
Feb	41	606
Mar	58	338
Apr	85	1545
May	153	1609
Jun	175	3700
Jul	131	2040
Aug	72	3137
Sep	272	3593
Oct	168	3967
Nov	174	3166
Dec	231	3663
<u>Total 1940</u>	<u>1689</u>	<u>28292</u>
1941		
Jan	158	4318
Feb	332	4448
Mar	240	3257
Apr	226	3972
May	180	5288
Jun	221	5722
Jul	289	8996
Aug	342	7718
Sep	273	4886
Oct	315	4933
Nov	296	5315
Dec	140	4604
<u>Total 1941</u>	<u>3012</u>	<u>63457</u>
1942		
Jan	164	5052
Feb	107	2556
Mar	103	3497
Apr	101	3683
May	216	4456
Jun	210	8495
Jul	121	5450
Aug	169	6187
Sep	162	5067
Oct	111	6172
Nov	195	7182
Dec	54	6964
<u>Total 1942</u>	<u>1713</u>	<u>64761</u>

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Date	Officers	Airmen
1943		
Jan	58	4951
Feb	78	3836
Mar	106	3694
Apr	64	3136
May	79	3940
Jun	53	4413
Jul	52	4092
Aug	28	5242
Sep	21	6876
Oct	19	4330
Nov	33	3283
Dec	29	1798
Total 1943	620	49591
1944		
Jan	22	2099
Feb	15	886
Mar	7	731
Apr	4	805
May	35	974
Jun	23	734
Jul	47	198
Aug	12	45
Sep	22	45
Oct	18	10
Nov	7	22
Dec	9	9
Total 1944	221	6558
1945		
Jan	17	38
Feb	18	51
Mar	32	28
Apr	35	48
May	26	39
Total 1945	128	204
Cumulative Total	7897	216077

Table 2

R.C.A.F. Personnel who proceeded Overseas

	Aircrew		Groundcrew	
	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
1939				
September	-	-	-	-
October	-	-	-	2
November	-	-	-	6
December	-	-	-	3
<u>Total 1939</u>	-	-	-	<u>11</u>
1940				
January	-	1	6	3
February	10	11	11	294
March	-	-	2	1
April	-	-	-	1
May	2	3	3	63
June	7	7	10	333
July	1	-	-	11
August	4	6	2	113
September	4	-	8	56
October	-	-	7	5
November	13	25	5	174
December	26	33	2	73
<u>Total 1940</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>1127</u>
1941				
January	26	88	27	191
February	51	181	39	22
March	67	244	10	7
April	135	501	50	580
May	111	291	15	60
June	118	437	8	77
July	127	323	7	126
August	124	726	45	176
September	165	580	44	333
October	130	556	145	747
November	193	590	44	659
December	191	679	25	889
<u>Total 1941</u>	<u>1438</u>	<u>5196</u>	<u>459</u>	<u>3867</u>
1942				
January	273	1131	30	839
February	96	453	28	1250
March	154	763	70	328
April	123	839	26	627
May	101	413	16	440
June	31	176	17	352
July	40	246	45	358
August	110	418	29	287
September	29	228	33	473
October	472	1510	42	664
November	260	612	2	124
December	398	645	-	631
<u>Total 1942</u>	<u>2087</u>	<u>7434</u>	<u>338</u>	<u>6373</u>

Table 2 (Cont'd)

	Aircrew		Groundcrew	
	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
<u>1943</u>				
January	228	982	76	819
February	362	68	60	1113
March	684	1221	91	4118
April	268	200	9	706
May	543	1261	68	1933
June	708	932	33	892
July	383	451	46	206
August	498	989	20	204
September	312	530	76	154
October	1113	1261	17	391
November	880	910	50	447
December	126	328	39	1743
<u>Total 1943</u>	<u>6103</u>	<u>9133</u>	<u>583</u>	<u>12726</u>
<u>1944</u>				
January	401	444	64	1275
February	407	147	28	933
March	624	2219	73	931
April	1105	599	48	1256
May	663	675	117	760
June	455	1061	68	1584
July	243	890	59	446
August	910	1326	126	824
September	327	5	52	8
October	489	725	69	4548
November	157	65	76	238
December	192	156	100	265
<u>Total 1944</u>	<u>5973</u>	<u>8312</u>	<u>880</u>	<u>13068</u>
<u>1945</u>				
January	44	9	14	-
February	193	200	115	563
March	285	294	72	627
April	670	695	218	1626
May	802	157	54	60
June	216	283	49	1242
July	6	4	13	3
August	5	-	2	2
<u>Total 1945</u>	<u>2221</u>	<u>1642</u>	<u>537</u>	<u>4123</u>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>17891</u>	<u>31803</u>	<u>2855</u>	<u>41295</u>

Table 3

Repatriation from Overseas

	Aircraft		Groundcrew	
	Officers	O.Rs.	Officers	O.Rs.
1 Sep 39 to 31 Dec 43 1944	804	1165	294	1491
January	82	39	14	54
February	63	79	15	75
March	91	51	6	44
April	168	81	30	55
May	133	88	13	123
June	69	12	12	20
July	174	180	35	212
August	176	77	21	77
September	356	171	76	255
October	433	211	50	185
November	802	293	41	300
December	1066	355	85	942
Total 1944	3613	1637	405	2405
1945				
January	701	181	78	504
February	933	340	68	428
March	584	238	102	723
April	728	288	74	576
May	982	516	42	543
June	3518	2168	198	5257
July	4547	2075	196	2161
August	2970	920	259	4255
September	1332	342	317	3501
October	479	173	289	1578
November	190	31	179	1356
December	629	255	272	4029
Total 1945	17593	7527	2074	24911
1946				
January	910	926	117	1568
February	507	945	99	2123
March	241	76	112	1623
April	236	52	142	2460
May	202	35	87	1077
June	303	28	96	1689
July	104	14	75	1454
August	20	1	38	175
September	5	-	7	38
October	8	-	8	38
November	-	-	-	-
December	1	-	5	7
Total 1946	2537	2113	786	12252
1947				
January	1	-	3	17
February	3	-	2	7
March	1	-	-	1
April	3	-	2	2
May	8	-	-	11
Total 1947	16	-	7	38
Grand Total	24563	12442	3566	41097

Table 4

Phase II Volunteers
RCAF Personnel Cumulative
as at 15 June/45*

	<u>Western Hemisphere</u>			<u>Overseas</u>			<u>Totals</u>		
	<u>Flying</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Flying</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Flying</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Officers</u>									
Canvassed	6452	3737	10189	4744	948	5692	11196	4685	15881
Volunteered	2504	1471	3975	1098	183	1281	3602	1654	5256
Percent	38.5	39.7	38.9	23.1	19.3	22.5	32.1	35.2	33.0
<u>Other Ranks</u>									
Canvassed	2730	53200	55930	2841	20491	23332	5571	73691	79262
Volunteered	1369	9523	10892	779	1534	2313	2148	11057	13205
Percent	50.7	17.8	19.6	27.4	7.4	9.9	38.3	15.0	16.6
<u>Officers W.D.</u>									
Canvassed		485	485					485	485
Volunteered		258	258					258	258
Percent		51.6	51.6					51.6	51.6
<u>Airwomen</u>									
Canvassed		7774	7774					7774	7774
Volunteered		3579	3579					3579	3579
Percent		46.4	46.4					46.4	46.4
<u>Total</u>									
Canvassed	9182	65196	74738	7585	21439	29024	16767	86635	103402
Volunteered	3873	14831	18704	1877	1717	3594	5750	16548	22298
Percent	42.1	22.7	25.0	24.7	8.0	12.4	34.2	19.0	21.5

*Taken from H.Q.S. 85-1-2, vol. 3.

Table 5

Retirements and Discharges

		R.C.A.F.	
		<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
End of 1939		37	248
1940		72	707
1941		162	3213
1942		761	5970
1943		733	5023
1944		2540	12856
End of May	1945	9522	17082

Table 6

Transfers from Canadian Army to R.C.A.F. (All Ranks)

	<u>General Service</u>	<u>N.R.M.A.</u>
1939		
September	11	
October	5	
November	2	
December	2	
<u>Total 1939</u>	<u>20</u>	
1940		
January	4	
February	2	
March	3	
April	10	
May	8	
June	20	
July	86	
August	19	
September	20	
October	59	
November	612	
December	51	
<u>Total 1940</u>	<u>894</u>	
1941		
January	39	
February	40	
March	64	1
April	50	19
May	82	101
June	65	220
July	74	854
August	93	809
September	85	363
October	89	480
November	103	510
December	40	368
<u>Total 1941</u>	<u>824</u>	<u>3725</u>
1942		
January	55	305
February	43	180
March	50	168
April	60	168
May	56	158
June	39	38
July	44	17
August	35	5
September	65	6
October	102	11
November	95	10
December	60	8
<u>Total 1942</u>	<u>704</u>	<u>1074</u>

Table 6 (Cont'd)

	<u>General Service</u>	<u>N.R.M.A.</u>
1943		
January	77	9
February	76	4
March	64	8
April	77	8
May	73	12
June	58	12
July	49	11
August	66	11
September	90	12
October	202	20
November	327	46
December	406	54
<u>Total 1943</u>	<u>1565</u>	<u>207</u>
1944		
January	483	48
February	293	11
March	103	9
April	19	2
May	86	
June	64	2
July	64	
August	9	
September	6	
October	1	
November		
December		
<u>Total 1944</u>	<u>1128</u>	<u>72</u>
1945		
January		
February		
March	8	
April	3	
May	14	
June	2	
July	1	1
August		
<u>Total 1945</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>5163</u>	<u>5079</u>

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