

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
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**BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
IN AFRICA
1941 — 1947**

**BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
IN AFRICA**

DURING THE YEARS

1941 - 1947

BY

LORD RENNELL OF RODD, K.B.E., C.B.



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Preface

THIS record has been prepared by me, with the permission of the Army Council, to give the public some account of the British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa during the years 1941-1946, and the early part of 1947, in anticipation of any authoritative official history of the period that may be published at a later date. This volume is therefore not an official history in the strict sense of the term, and any conclusions, inferences and opinions contained in it are my sole responsibility.

The record is mainly geographical and chronological in form, but certain major subjects common to all the territories (as, for instance, finance) are dealt with in separate chapters. Insofar as the "geographical" and "subject" chapters have been treated as self-contained units, this arrangement involves some repetition: the underlying purpose is to enable the student of a particular subject to consider aspects of interest to himself without having to read much material of lesser import. As the British Military Administration of the Dodecanese became a responsibility of Middle East Command in the summer of 1943, the record of the work done in these islands, and in the Greek Aegean, is included as a separate, and concluding, chapter to this book.

Place names, regrettably, follow no purely consistent system of spelling. The transliteration of Italianised names into acceptable English form does not lend itself to uniformity: such uniformity is impossible when quotation from Italian and other documents is required, or when British maps do not consistently follow any one system. It must also be remembered that the Italian or native equivalent of place names would not be easy to follow for the uninitiated English reader. Examples of inconsistency are GIADO (Italian) and JADO (English), or GIMMA (Italian) and JIMMA (English). Certain Anglicised forms have, however, been adopted throughout, as MOGADISHU for MOGADISCIO, where the Italian version seemed particularly awkward in an English text: another example of awkward Italian transliteration is SCIASCIAMANNA in Galla Sidamo, which has been rendered SHASHIAMANNA.

The book commences with a summary of the military operations undertaken by Allied armies from 1940 to 1943; the story of British Military Administration thus follows in the wake of that of the operational troops. This is fitting, since to the world in general, Military Administration is the method of carrying out the international obligations which follow conquest.

The first Appendix contains the text of the Agreement and Military Convention between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia, signed on the 31st January, 1942.

The second Appendix contains an official description of the organisation of the Military Administration of Occupied Territories, issued under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, in 1943, for the guidance of formations under his command. The notes were issued in pamphlet form and in two parts, Part I only being reproduced in this Appendix.

The third Appendix is a Memorandum on the seizure and requisitioning of property in occupied enemy territory, compiled by the Chief Legal Adviser of Political Branch, East Africa Command, in 1942. This is a highly controversial and complex subject: the memorandum may be of some interest to those who will be charged—as I hope—with revising and clarifying the relevant articles in Chapter XIV of the (British) Manual of Military Law.

A brief Bibliography lists the principal authoritative works which have been consulted. References to unpublished departmental official documents have been omitted, but these and a fuller text have been deposited in the War Office in order that they may be available to any future writer who may be appointed to deal with the subject.

In addition, for the benefit of the student, a Chronology has been compiled so that reference to any particular event may be more easily discovered.

The Index to this book is in two parts, Part I being confined to references to persons, official departments, military units, etc., appearing in the text, and Part II to place names. In the latter, references to the main territories dealt with, i.e. Cyrenaica, Ethiopia, Eritrea, British Somaliland, Somalia, Madagascar, Tripolitania and the Dodecanese, are not included as such, since this would have entailed too frequent references and each is, in any case, dealt with in a separate chapter.

In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge my sincere thanks to the Army Council for giving me access to official documents, for assistance in editing the text and preparing the volume, and for arranging for its publication by H.M. Stationery Office. I have also to record my personal and particular thanks to my colleagues in the Administrations and in the War Office for their advice, their very generous assistance, and their ample contributions, in the compilation of this record. I am indebted to the Royal Geographical Society for the maps which have been specially prepared for this volume.

RENNELL OF RODD,
The Rodd, Herefordshire.

July, 1947.

PRÉCIS OF THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

1940 - 1943

CYRENAICA—ETHIOPIA—ERITREA—SOMALIA—BRITISH SOMALILAND—MADAGASCAR—TRIPOLITANIA

ON the 10th June, 1940, Italy declared war on Great Britain and France, aligning herself with Germany. With Tripolitania and Cyrenaica already part of the Fascist African Empire, only French Algeria, their Protectorate of Tunisia, and a narrow stretch of the Mediterranean broke the Axis line of supply between Germany and Egypt. France capitulated on the 17th June and the way to Cairo appeared to lie open. To the south the Italian Armies in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia numbered some 300,000. British interests and possessions in the Middle East and East Africa, together with her lines of communication to the Far East via the Suez Canal, were thus threatened from two directions. British forces available in the Middle East and East Africa were few and scattered thinly along the wide frontiers of Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland. An additional burden was the danger of a German attack from the north through Turkey. Such was the position that faced General Sir Archibald Wavell (Field Marshal Earl Wavell) in the summer of 1940, when European France was disintegrating and Great Britain was preparing for the onslaught that all knew must come, unable to provide the arms and men which the position in the Middle East demanded.

The threat soon changed from a probability to a reality. Marshal Graziani moved an Italian Army eastwards across the Egyptian frontier and took up a position 56 miles beyond the frontier post of Sollum. On the 4th July Kassala and Gallabat in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were attacked and taken by overwhelming forces from Eritrea; four days later the frontier was again crossed and Kurmuk fell. On the 4th August three strong Italian columns crossed into British Somaliland and in a fortnight the Protectorate was occupied. In July an Italian brigade attacked and took Moyale on the Kenya-Ethiopia border and advanced towards Buna and Lake Rudolf.

In spite of these set-backs and in the face of apparently insuperable odds, plans for a counter-offensive were being made. In Cairo

▲

General Wavell was building up the Army of the Nile into a hard-striking and swift-moving force. On the evening of the day on which Italy declared war eleven letters, printed in Amharic script and sealed by General Sir William Platt, left Gedaref in the Sudan by native runner for the Patriot Chiefs of the high plateaux of Ethiopia. On the 3rd July the Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia reached Khartoum where he made contact with Colonel Sandford (Brigadier Sandford) who had been chosen as head of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia, known as 101 Mission. On the 1st August Colonel Sandford and his small party crossed the Ethiopian frontier to join and build up the Patriot Forces. In the Aden Protectorate the Governor of British Somaliland, Mr. V. Glenday (Sir Vincent Glenday), entered into secret communications with certain trusted Somalis and the first foundations of a British return to the Protectorate were laid.

The three main British bases for the African Campaigns which ended with the complete defeat of the German and Italian armies were Cairo, Khartoum and Nairobi. While General Wavell prepared to attack Cyrenaica from Cairo, Lieut.-General W. Platt (General Sir William Platt) laid plans to strike south and east from Khartoum at Ethiopia and Eritrea and Lieut.-General Sir Alan Cunningham north from Nairobi at Somalia. While the Italian armies in East Africa rested on their easily won laurels awaiting Marshal Graziani's move into Egypt, the British Commanders struck locally, even though their preparations for invasion were still in embryo.

At the end of July the R.A.F. attacked Kassala, dropping 20 tons of bombs in two days. In August machine-gun companies attacked Adardeb, an Italian outpost north of Kassala. In November Gallabat was attacked and the areas around it turned into a no-man's land where the Italians were forced to concentrate large reserves unnecessarily. This attack gave great encouragement to the Patriot Forces under Colonel Sandford in the Gojjam area.

On the 9th December General Wavell launched an offensive against Marshal Graziani in Egypt and on the 15th General Cunningham moved against the Italian forces on the Kenya-Somalia border at El Wak. By nightfall on the 10th December the Army of the Nile had captured Sidi Barrani. Bardia, the first inhabited place in Cyrenaica, was taken on the 5th January, Tobruk by the 21st and Derna by the 30th. Benghazi fell on the 6th February and the following day General Bergonzoli surrendered unconditionally. Within the short space of time of two

months Cyrenaica had fallen into our hands. In the south, after razing El Wak, the Italians withdrew to the line of the Juba river. General Cunningham attacked north from Marsabit towards the Ethiopian Province of Galla-Sidamo. By the 30th January Dukana was taken and the Italians were cleared from Kenya soil. In the face of bitter opposition and great difficulties from weather and terrain El Gumu, Hobok, Gorai and Mega were captured. Moyale was entered on the 22nd February without a fight.

While this was going on General Cunningham's two divisions further south began their campaign against Jubaland and the Somali Coast. The 12th African Division left from Garissa, the 11th African Division from Bura. The plan was that the 12th should take the road junction at Afmadu, then divide into two columns, one to race ahead towards Jelib on the Juba river and the other to turn south, capture Gobwen and cut off the retreat of the garrison from Kismayu. This small port was to be attacked by surprise by the 11th Division in co-operation with the Royal Navy. The operation went according to plan. Haweina in Somalia was taken on the 27th January and Afmadu on the 11th February. Here the columns split, the north column reaching Bulo Erillo on the 13th February and halting by the bank of the Juba. The south column took Gobwen on the 14th and found before them the 580 feet wide Juba river, with the bridges destroyed and the enemy firmly ensconced on the farther bank. The Italians evacuated Kismayu on the 13th and the following day General Cunningham's troops took possession. Lower Jubaland was ours.

The forcing of the Juba line proved in the outcome to be the most decisive action in the campaign of the East African Force. The river was crossed at two points, at Yonte and north of Jelib, which was taken on the 22nd February. The 12th Division then turned north towards Bardera and the 11th swept along on the coast. Within three days they were in Mogadishu. The 12th Division took Bardera only a day later, Ischia Baidoa on the 28th February, Lugh Ferrandi on the 3rd March and Dolo on the 5th.

On the 1st March General Cunningham's forces moved out of Mogadishu and began the long pursuit of the enemy over Ogaden Somalia. By the 17th they had covered the 744 miles to Jiggiga on the fringe of Ethiopia. The Italians in British Somaliland, fearing that they would be cut off, began to retreat. But they were too late. On the 16th March a British force from Aden landed at Berbera and headed inland. Zeila was taken on the 18th. A column from the African forces turned to meet them, occupying

Tug Wajale on the 20th. Hargeisa was taken on the 24th and the two columns joined hands there. The Italian troops in British Somaliland and North-Eastern Somalia disintegrated.

Beyond Jiggiga rose the Abyssinian Highlands. There a stiff fight took place at the Marda Pass where the road enters the hills, but the Pass was won by the 21st March and the chase over the mountains began. Harar was surrendered on the 25th and Dire-dawa entered without opposition on the 29th. The Awash river was the next obstacle, faultlessly conquered on the 4th April. One day of swift advance brought a brigade of the African Division to the gates of Addis Ababa. On the 6th April the capital of Ethiopia was surrendered to Major-General Wetherall (Lieut.-General Sir Charles Wetherall), the Divisional Commander, by the Italian Military Governor.

At the same time as General Cunningham was preparing to begin operations from Kenya in the middle of January, General Platt was completing his plans to strike against Eritrea and Ethiopia from the Sudan. The plans were set forward by the evacuation of Kassala and Tessenei on the 17th January, which the British forces occupied two days later. At Sabderet, captured on the same day, the forces split, the 5th Division turning south towards Aicota (taken on the 21st January) and Barentu and the 4th Division heading towards Keru (taken on the 22nd). Stiff fighting which followed ended in the capture of Agordat on the 1st February and Barentu on the 2nd. Thereafter came the great battle of Keren, the climax of which came on the 26th March with white flags flying on the unscalable peaks. General Frusci was decisively beaten in the fiercest battle of the East African campaign and 4,000 prisoners dribbled back to our lines unguarded.

There was little heart left in the Italians to put up a stand at Taclesan, strongpoint though it was, stronger even than Keren. The 5th Division came through the Pass on the 31st and on the 1st April a car carrying a white flag came out from Asmara. General Frusci, with a mere handful of troops, raced south to muster what Italians he could from Dessie and Quoram at the mountain of Amba Alagi, and General Platt sent a mobile force after them down the two roads into the heart of Ethiopia as far as Adowa and Adigrat.

At Massawa were seven destroyers and 10,000 men. The destroyers were sent off on desperate missions against British vital points and were accounted for by the Royal Navy. After demolitions and scuttling and an attempt by the defenders to surrender,

which was countermanded by Rome, Massawa was attacked and taken on the 8th April.

In addition to attempting to stop General Platt's advance on Asmara and Massawa via Keren, the Italians had to cope with the column that was escorting the Emperor back along the road to his capital. Emperor Haile Selassie crossed the frontier of Ethiopia on the 20th January and reached the headquarters, which 101 Mission had prepared for him at Belaya, on the 6th February. This column, known as Gideon force, with its 450 fighting men, a mortar platoon, a propaganda unit, 700 camels and 200 horses and mules and 4 miles long on the march, reached Enjabara on the 23rd February. Major Wingate (Major-General Orde Wingate), who had landed by air in Ethiopia in November, engaged the Italians outside Burye on the 27th February and the town was captured on the 4th March. The Italians retired on Debra Marcos, their forces there numbering 12,000. The available troops to oppose them were 300 Sudanese of the Frontier Force, but the guerilla tactics involved proved too much for the shattered morale of the enemy. On the night of the 3rd/4th April, on orders from Addis Ababa, the enemy withdrew across the Blue Nile and on the 6th the Emperor raised his flag at Debra Marcos. He reached his capital on the 5th May, five years to a day after Marshal Badoglio had entered it. The remaining Italian forces were chased up the banks of the Blue Nile and cornered at Agibar, where on the 22nd May the Italian Commander surrendered. The haul was 7,000 infantry, 700 civil officials, 15,000 mules, and considerable artillery.

Before completing the detail of the mopping up of the remaining pockets of enemy resistance in East Africa, a less happy précis must be given of events in Libya. There the enemy had been strongly reinforced, while General Wavell's Army had been denuded by withdrawal of units for the Greek campaign. On the 31st March the enemy attacked in the coastal area of the Gulf of Sirte. The British Forces were overrun and by the end of the first week in April Benghazi was lost. Within a very short time the whole of Cyrenaica, with the exception of Tobruk, was in enemy hands.

But the British set-back came too late to rekindle the morale and necessary fighting spirit in the Italian forces in East Africa, and the territories still in Italian hands were occupied as soon as the forces available would permit. In North-East Somalia Obbia was taken over on the 13th April, Garda on the 30th, Kassim on the 5th May, Dante on the 14th and finally Ras Allula on the 21st. Assab was occupied without opposition by a British force from Aden on the 11th June.

In Ethiopia, after the almost simultaneous surrender of Massawa and Addis Ababa, General Platt's forces began to move south and General Cunningham's north. The South Africans from Addis Ababa took Dessie after hard fighting on the 20th April. The 5th Indian Division took Commando Hill, north of Amba Alagi, on the 1st May. On the 18th the Italian Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Aosta, surrendered on the peak of Amba Alagi.

When Addis Ababa was declared an open city part of the Italian forces withdrew southwards towards the Lakes. This force was again defeated by a pincer movement, executed by General Cunningham's forces. While part of the 11th African Division turned south from the capital in pursuit of the fleeing Italians, the 12th Division was heading north from Dolo, which, as has been mentioned, was taken on the 5th March. The 12th Division passed through Neghelli without a fight and then came up against the natural fortress of Wadara. Here for three weeks a bitter battle was fought, ending on the 10th May.

The Brigade from the 11th African Division first took the road to the east of Lake Zwai, taking Bocoggi on the 13th April. Retracing their steps to the main road, they next advanced west of the Lake. Fike was taken on the 29th April, Burissa on the 9th May, Shashiamanna on the 14th and Dalle entered by a patrol three days later. The fleeing Italians were chased through Soddu and the wide river Omo was reached on the 31st May. This was crossed with difficulty on the 5th June. Thereafter there was no serious fighting. Jimma surrendered, with 8,000 prisoners, and the remnants of the Italian forces were caught at Gambela, trapped between troops from the Sudan and Ethiopian Patriots on the north side and General Cunningham's hammer blow on the other. The southern campaign was won and there now only remained the few demoralised Italian brigades in Gondar and the surrounding forts north of Lake Tana. Thither General Nasi had retreated in January and February from Gallabat and Metemma, harried by the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade. After the fall of Asmara, General Platt sent mobile columns from Adowa towards Gondar and fierce fighting took place at Wolcheft Pass and Debarech. Yet another column threatened General Nasi from the south-east. Moving from Dessie this column took Debra Tabor on the 1st July, capturing over 4,000 prisoners. So, when the summer rains came, bringing with them a few weeks respite, General Nasi had three columns camped outside the area of his remaining strongpoints of Gondar, Chelgar, Wolcheft, Amba Giyorgis and Gorgora, containing in all 34,000 men.

Wolchefit was the first of the Italian points to fall, the surrender taking place on the 27th September. During the following two months the British columns edged in towards Gondar, the enemy forts being captured one by one. At dawn on the 27th November the final battle of the East African Campaign began. Before the day ended the last of the Italian Commanders had surrendered unconditionally. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia was at an end.

As one great campaign in Africa ended, another began. On the 18th November General Sir Claude Auchinleck threw the new Eighth Army at General (Field Marshal) Rommel's Afrika Corps across the border of Egypt. On the 20th November Sidi Rezegh was taken, only to be lost again shortly afterwards. The plan for the meeting at El Duda of XXX and XIII Corps and the column from Tobruk did not mature, but by the 9th December forces from Tobruk occupied El Adem and the enemy was in full retreat. On the 12th Rommel was on a line stretching south-west from Gazala. On the 17th a British force approached Derna and on Christmas Eve Benghazi was occupied and contact with the enemy made at Agedabia. Bardia surrendered on the 10th January, 1942, and Sollum and Halfaya ten days later. Rommel, learning that reinforcements had reached Tripoli, retreated to El Agheila on the 10th and strengthened himself. On the 21st he moved east again, seizing Antelat the next day. Thereafter the British withdrawal was swift. Benghazi was evacuated on the 21st and a line was formed at Gazala on the 4th February. Then came a lull until the 27th May.

Rommel's plan was to capture Tobruk in a 24-hour rush but his plan completely miscarried, his attack on Bir Hacheim being repulsed with a loss of 48 tanks. The enemy withdrew and, attacking again, aimed at liquidating Bir Hacheim. The attacks on the French-held strongpoint continued fiercely from the 2nd to the 11th June when the lack of supplies and physical exhaustion of the garrison dictated its withdrawal. During the next two days the enemy concentrated his forces in the Acroma-El Adem area and on the 14th June the British divisions at Gazala were ordered to withdraw. On the same day Knightsbridge had to be evacuated. On the 20th an attack was opened on the El Duda section of the Tobruk perimeter and the enemy tanks broke into Tobruk. That night General Klopper commanding the South Africans received an order, which he was unable to transmit to all units, to fight their way out if they could, or, if not, to resist to the last. The next morning units received the order to burn all transport and capitulate. It was decided that Matruh could not be held; General

Auchinleck decided to stand at the prepared line of El Alamein. On the 25th June he took over the conduct of the battle from General Ritchie. On the 26th Rommel's forces were at Matruh and the next day the New Zealanders there forced their way out eastwards, reaching El Alamein on the 29th. By the last day of June the Axis forces were facing the Eighth Army at El Alamein. On the 2nd a fierce enemy attack was launched and repulsed ; the next day Rommel made a similarly unsuccessful attempt to break through. Throughout July attacks and counter-attacks continued.

In August many things happened behind the Eighth Army lines. On the 5th a visit was paid by the Prime Minister, accompanied by Field Marshals Wavell and Smuts. Generals Alexander and Montgomery took charge. The Eighth Army was ready for Rommel's hurricane attack which came on the night of the 30th August. By the 3rd September it became clear that the attack would be unsuccessful and by the 7th the enemy withdrawal was complete. As a lull now took place in the north until the breakthrough at El Alamein, the scene changes to other military operations that took place in 1942 far south.

In April H.M.G. decided to seize Diego Suarez in Madagascar, if necessary by force of arms, in order to safeguard it from any possible activities of the Japanese. Operation "Ironclad" was mounted in England for this purpose. The convoy carrying 121 Force, under the command of Major-General Sturges, sailed from Durban and the landing at Diego Suarez was effected successfully on the 5th May.

As agreement could not be reached with the Vichy Authorities a further decision was taken to occupy the rest of Madagascar. A force under General Platt sailed from Mombasa and on the 10th September the assault on Majunga began. In the operation known as "Stream" the opposition of the French troops was rapidly overcome and the town was surrendered and occupied on the same day. After the occupation was complete further troops were landed and moved towards Tananarive on the operation known as "Line". The troops that had been used in the landing were re-embarked and landed with little opposition at Tamatave on the 18th September in the operation known as "Jane".

The French troops withdrew along the coast to Brickaville and up the railway to the capital, Tananarive, blowing railway bridges as they went. The capital, approached from two sides, was reached on the 23rd. Meanwhile a column from Diego Suarez moving south met with a column from Majunga moving north at Ambanga. Another detachment from Diego Suarez

occupied the island of Nossi Bé and a third column reached Vohemar and Antalaha. The pursuit of the retreating French forces to the south proceeded rapidly, Antisirabe being occupied on the 2nd October and Fianarantsoa on the 29th. The capitulation of the French troops took place on the 5th November at Fianarantsoa when the Governor-General surrendered himself.

The Eighth Army's offensive at El Alamein began on the 23rd/24th October. By the 2nd November destruction of Rommel's armour was complete and the pursuit of the Axis was on. Mersa Matruh was occupied without opposition on the 8th November and by the 11th the enemy had been cleared finally from Egypt. Thereafter the advance of General Montgomery's forces reads like a time-table. Tobruk was entered on the 13th November, Derna on the 15th and Benghazi, which became Corps headquarters, on the 20th. General Montgomery said:—

“ This time, having reached Benghazi and beyond, we shall not come back.”

On the last day of November Field Marshal Rommel received the order to hold El Agheila to the last man but by the 13th December he began to retreat again. By turning south and then north the New Zealanders attempted to cut off the Axis way of retreat. Prisoners, tanks and guns were taken and a similar action took place at Nofilia on the 17th. At Buerat Rommel stayed from the 26th December–14th January and from here he retired slowly under cover of strong rearguards. Misurata was occupied on the 18th January and Homs on the 20th. By the 22nd all attempts to defend Tripoli came to an end and the next morning the New Zealand Division and the 51st Division entered the town simultaneously. A fortnight later the last of the enemy units was cleared from what had been the Italian African Empire. As Mr. Churchill, speaking to the troops in Tripoli on the 3rd February, recorded:—

“ The achievements of the Eighth Army will gleam and glow in the annals of history.”

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN AND ORGANISATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN AFRICA IN 1941

The Opening Campaigns in Cyrenaica and East Africa — General Wavell's Plan for Military Government — Previous Occupation of Enemy Territory by Allied Forces — Why British Military Machine was unprepared for Military Government — The Work of Sir Percy Cox in Iraq, 1915-1917 — Experience from Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and Tanganyika — The Cabinet's Decision on Departmental Responsibility — The Creation of M.O. 11, F.5, and the Standing Interdepartmental Committee — Appointment of Sir Philip Mitchell as first Chief Political Officer — The Control of Finance and Accounts — The first Principles of Military Administrations — Prior Considerations — The Central Theme common to all Military Administrations.

CHAPTER I

The Origin and Organisation of Military Government in Africa in 1941

ON the 9th December, 1940, General Sir Archibald Wavell's (Field Marshal Earl Wavell) Middle East Forces attacked Marshal Graziani's Army, which was occupying the position east of and around Sidi Barrani, some 56 miles from the Egyptian frontier post of Sollum. By nightfall of the next day Sidi Barrani had been taken and the bulk of the enemy forces cut off from Cyrenaica and captured. At the end of the first week in February the Cyrenaican campaign was over. The first Italian colony in Africa had fallen into British hands in the brief space of two months and the first tract of enemy territory occupied became a British responsibility to administer.

While the swift conclusion of the campaign meant inevitable delays in setting up a complete administration, a nucleus of personnel for the purpose was in fact ready shortly before the surrender of Benghazi. That this occurred was due to the prescience of the Commander-in-Chief who, even before the attack on Sidi Barrani began, had telegraphed to the War Office on the 6th December, 1940, requesting that immediate attention should be given to the question of administration of enemy territory in Italian East Africa after occupation. He went on to ask for the appointment of an experienced administrator to his staff so that plans could be formulated and problems examined; he added that this administrator would require financial and possibly legal assistance. Such an appointment was urgent in order that other personnel might be earmarked to take over essential posts. General Wavell's communications on this subject not only envisaged a Military Government in Cyrenaica, but also in the Italian East African colonies, with local administrations in charge of qualified administrators working under an "experienced administrator" on his own staff. That preparations were not further advanced than, as will be seen, they were by the end of January was due to the unexpectedly rapid conclusion of the Cyrenaican campaign, a necessary precedent to active operations against the Italians in Eastern Africa.

The Italian troops in Italian East Africa, under the supreme command of the Viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, had occupied Kassala in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan on the 4/5th July, 1940, when they also attacked the British fort at Gallabat. Content with this the Italians sat down to await General Graziani's offensive against Egypt from Sidi Barrani. In the Northern Frontier District of Kenya the Italians had also entered British territory and occupied Moyale, El Wak and Buna. Here, too, they prudently sat down, to await the rains and military developments further north. But with the destruction of Marshal Graziani's expeditionary force at Sidi Barrani, the Duke of Aosta became convinced that an Italian offensive against the Nile Valley was now no longer possible and withdrew his troops from Kassala. A raid by Lieut.-General Sir Alan Cunningham's forces recaptured El Wak, which led to a withdrawal here of the Italian forces to the line of the Juba river, substantially east of the Anglo-Italian boundary, fixed after the cession to Italy of Jubaland in 1925.

Thus, by the opening days of 1941, certain Italian territory in Eastern Africa was already in our hands, while the campaigns of Lieut.-General (General) Sir William Platt from the Sudan and Lieut.-General Sir Alan Cunningham from Kenya were confidently expected, as General Wavell's telegram of the 6th December, 1940, shows, to produce further important administrative responsibilities. But in January, 1941, when the Sudan and Kenya operations were about to begin, it was not anticipated that there would be any substantial tracts of occupied enemy territory to be administered until after the summer rains of that year. Such parts as were occupied prior to the autumn could, it was felt, be administered from the neighbouring districts of Kenya and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The preparations were initially made with this in view; how in fact matters turned out will appear hereafter.

General Wavell's experience of the Middle East and his close study of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby's Command during the years 1917-1919 had made him familiar with the problems which arise when enemy territory, even if it should be inhabited by friendly or partially friendly people, is occupied as a result of military operations. As soon as the prospect of Cyrenaica falling into our hands was revealed, his mind had turned to Palestine and Syria in 1918-1919. The administration of these areas, including Transjordan, together with Iraq (or Mesopotamia as it was then called), and Tanganyika, indeed provided the only modern experience of military government of occupied enemy territories.

The occupation of the Rhineland and of Constantinople at the end of the Great War of 1914-1918 were different in form inasmuch as they were post-armistice occupations. The occupation of the Baltic States was a chapter *sui generis*. Moreover all those were metropolitan territories in whole or in part, while the very fact that an armistice had been signed with the government authority of an enemy connoted recognition of the existence of local government. Indeed neither in the Rhineland, in Bulgaria, nor in Austria was there, at the moment of occupation, any thought of the Allied and Associated Powers themselves taking over the local administration. The occupation of the Rhineland was in the first instance a purely military measure to safeguard the military position of the Allied and Associated Powers and to secure the fulfilment of the Peace Terms. The civil affairs of the Allied military forces there were largely confined to relations with the local authorities on subjects arising out of the fact of occupation. There was little question of re-educating enemy populations from pernicious political doctrines. Whatever feelings then existed in Allied circles, military and civil, about democratic principles in Germany, the attitude of the Allied Governments towards the German, Bulgarian and Austrian administrations, in so far as they survived, was governed by the principle of Self-Determination enunciated in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.

There was therefore in the Allied occupation of the Rhineland, and in later Allied interventions in European countries, no experience which could be of value to General Wavell in his prospective occupation of Italian Territories in Africa. In the changed circumstances of Europe during the years which elapsed since the Armistice of 1918, there was little to be gained from the experience of the occupation of the Rhineland ; or of the impact of the Armistice Commissions of the War of 1914-1918 in other countries, except perhaps on the subject of relief. The development of the Nazi system so altered the problem that little of more than passing interest can be found in the years 1919-1929 except the lesson of the continuity of German character and practices.

Had the Allies occupied the whole of Turkey some experience might have been gained which could have proved useful in 1941 ; as it was, developments attendant on the Greco-Turkish situation were so individual and specialised that they provided little material of interest, except the salutary warning of the consequences when Allies fall out with each other and pursue several and selfish objectives.

In 1940-1941 there was nothing then, except the experiences gained in Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Tanganyika, to guide the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, the officers whom he gathered round himself to advise him and to administer occupied territories, or the departments of H.M.G. in London. It was therefore mainly on Middle East experience that General Wavell and his officers proceeded to draw.

Unfortunately the experience of military government in these countries had nowhere been collected in readily accessible form. One might have supposed that the procedure, theory and practice of the administrations in these countries would have found place in reports published under official authority, or have been condensed into official handbooks or manuals for the future guidance of military and other authorities. But this had not happened. The available references to military government are scattered through official histories of campaigns, the introductory chapters of books by several authors on Palestine and Iraq, and the biographies or memoirs of men like Sir P. Z. Cox, Sir A. T. Wilson and Sir R. Storrs. The only published official work devoted exclusively to military government is Command Paper 1061 of 1920, "Mesopotamia—Review of the Civil Administration," the author of which was Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E.

Generally speaking, leading documents such as proclamations, orders and so forth are buried in the records of the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and the successor governments to the military régimes. On Tanganyika the information available is especially dispersed. In official British military literature the whole subject is dealt with only in the Manual of (British) Military Law 1929 (Stationery Office: reprint of 1939). Here, in Chapter XIV, on "The Law and Usages of War on Land" (Amendment No. 12 of 1936), are reproduced the Hague Rules of 1907. Chapter XIV deals with international practice and custom, and the rights and duties of military formations and commanders, but does not purport to lay down the formal practice of administration. Other British military handbooks and publications omit almost studiously reference to military government or what happens when an army has occupied a territory; almost the only reference to the subject at all is a somewhat misleading one in Field Service Regulations, Vol. I, Chapter II, Sections 5.1 and 7.1. The second of these is particularly unfortunate because it bears little relation to what in fact was done during the two World Wars. Nor are the references to requisitioning in Field Service Regulations, Vol. I, Chapter XIX, consistent with the direction and practice contained

in Chapter XIV of the British Manual of Military Law, in themselves, at points, particularly obscure ; the subject will be dealt with later as being too specialised for discussion in this introductory chapter. Some valuable guidance on international legal questions connected with occupied territory is available in standard works on International Law, notably Oppenheim's "International Laws", 2 Vols. (Lauterpacht), and Hall's "International Law". Some of the legal aspects of the subject will arise in detail in the course of this narrative. The practice and prescriptions of the U.S. Army and Authorities did not arise in the years 1941-1942. They arose only in other theatres where American participation in Civil Affairs Administration took place in 1943 and thereafter.

Not only is British military and other official literature thus conspicuously silent on the administration of occupied territory and military government, but so far as can be ascertained the subject was not currently dealt with either at Staff Colleges or similar establishments between the two wars, or during the first years of the latter. This singular absence of study, direction and material led the more cynical to conclude that the British Army was not designed, and never expected, to occupy enemy territory ! When, therefore, the institution of military government arose, urgently and really, in the first weeks of 1941, the military machine at home and overseas was wholly unprepared. With that capacity for improvisation which the British have, the outcome was not unsatisfactory, thanks to General Wavell's previous experience and that of the officers selected by him to conduct the administrations. The absence of any plans or thought on the subject, even in London, had one very happy result at the time in that it left the initiative to those responsible without any prior conceptions, or instructions, or political bias intervening to create delays or uncertainties. General Wavell's confidence in the men he had chosen, or confirmed in their appointments, left them as free a hand on the spot as they generally enjoyed at the hands of the War Office and other departments in London.

In a telegram of the 25th January, 1941, General Wavell intimated that he proposed, for the military governments which he required to set up, to follow the forms used in the Middle East during and towards the end of the 1914-1918 war. By the recognised rules of war the responsibility for government of enemy occupied territory must rest with the military commander until a settlement is made after the conclusion of the war ; the final decision on all matters of policy and form of government must be given by the military commander in order to ensure that policy does not conflict

with military exigencies. General Wavell proposed that the various Italian territories, as they were occupied, should have military governors appointed to them. In accordance with policy laid down by General Wavell, organisation and operation of the civil administration would become the responsibility of a Chief Political Officer on his staff, by delegation of his own authority.

This telegram replied to an enquiry from London in which the view had been expressed that, in the opinion of the War Office, the problems with which the proposed Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, would be dealing were essentially those of colonial government although he would be working under General Wavell and in line with local military requirements. It was therefore suggested that Sir Philip Mitchell should have the power to deal with the administration of occupied enemy territory, but subject to the general control of General Wavell.

On the 3rd February the Vice-Chief of the General Staff at the War Office was advised by the Director of Military Operations and Plans that:

“ General Wavell has proposed the form of military government as applied by Allenby in Palestine should be applied in the case of occupied territories in the Middle East ; i.e., government by the C.-in-C. through his political advisers.”

It is therefore pertinent to examine very briefly the forms used during the period 1914-1918, in order to ascertain how far these were in fact applicable in January, 1941, and thereafter, and in particular to try to find out whether any of the lessons learnt in the earlier period were applied ; or whether in the fashion of men, those responsible in 1941 elected to make the same mistakes and learn their own lessons without regard to the experience of their forebears.

The first beginning of military government during the War of 1914-1918 dates from the decision of the Viceroy of India, recorded in a telegram of the 5th October, 1914, to Lord Crewe at the India Office, to appoint Sir Percy Z. Cox, H.M. Resident in the Persian Gulf, “ to control all political matters ” arising out of the operations of the Indian Expeditionary Force “ D ”.¹ This force sailed on the 16th October from Bombay for the Shatt El Arab to occupy Abadan and to protect the Anglo-Persian oil pipe lines. On the 23rd November the British Forces entered Basra and, from being one among the political advisers to the commander of the expeditionary force in his relations with local sheikhs and notables, on that date

¹ Graves' “ Life of Sir Percy Cox ” (Hutchinson), p. 179.

Sir Percy Cox took charge of the administration of Basra under the authority of the military commander.¹ The procedure on this occasion, while analogous to that followed during the recent War, differed in certain essential respects. The local population was put on notice of what had happened and what was intended by what we should call an Announcement rather than a Proclamation in its narrower legal sense.² The announcement was issued, under the authority of the military commander, by Sir Percy Cox in his capacity of "Political Officer" and bore the latter's signature. The officer appointed by the Commander of the Indian Expeditionary Force "D" to deal with the administration of Basra itself under the directions of Sir Percy Cox as "Military Governor" was the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the 6th Division. He was not originally on the Chief Political Officer's own staff, largely because, in the very early stages, Sir Percy Cox had virtually no staff. The death in action of Sir Percy Cox's then principal and almost only assistant a few days before Basra was occupied accentuated his isolation. But these differences from modern practice were doubtless due to the local conditions. A more fundamental difference was that all offences against troops were brought to trial before courts martial under British military law and procedure instead of, as was the practice from 1941 onwards, before special military courts of the occupying authority instituted for the purpose.³

Nevertheless the guiding principles governing the administration of occupied enemy territory which we know and recognise today were present from the first. The administration was conducted in the name of, and under the authority of, the Military Commander of Indian Expeditionary Force "D", and was in accordance with the Customs and Laws of War as set forth in the Hague Rules of 1907.⁴ These two principles are continually mentioned in the accounts and records of events and are frequently referred to in Sir Percy Cox's own writings. The application of the first of these principles is worth following up in some detail because such developments in Iraq in 1915-1917 had their effect in the organisation of military government in 1941 and in subsequent years.

Sir Percy Cox, whose own military experience had naturally led him to the only conclusion possible, which is that the authority of the Military Commander in the field must be absolute,

¹ Sir A. T. Wilson, "Loyalties : Mesopotamia 1914-1917" (Oxford) p. 11.

² Cox : page 182.

³ Wilson : page 68.

⁴ cf. Wilson : page 67.

never had any doubts on the main issue. His local knowledge and his understanding of the policy which H.M.G. desired to see carried out in Iraq gave him, as they entitled him to have, an authority which no ordinary military officer could be expected to have without the special training and experience which he himself possessed. It was, after all, on account of that political and administrative experience that Sir Percy Cox was selected by the Viceroy for the post of Chief Political Officer. Moreover, Indian experience had already then for some years demonstrated the necessity of attaching to military commanders political officers to deal with administrative and political problems in Frontier troubles and similar circumstances. While the division of local responsibility has occasioned, and is always likely to occasion, some difficulty between military commanders and their political officers, these arrangements, generally speaking, worked well enough, not only to have been in force for some years prior to 1914, but also to have been continued since. The difficulties which have arisen, and will always arise, are in the main due to the same causes, namely, a clash of personalities coupled with one party not realising the requirements of the other ; or a feeling that one party can do the other man's work as well or even better than the specialist in his own line of country.

This problem did not arise in Iraq in the initial stages, when relations between the Chief Political Officer and the Military Commanders were excellent. Lieut.-General Sir A. Barratt, the Commander of Indian Expeditionary Force "D", and his successor, General Sir J. E. Nixon, deferred to Sir Percy Cox's knowledge and experience ; the latter, with his officers, fully accepted that they were acting under the authority of the Commander of the forces. They did their utmost to assist the military formations and services in securing their requirements as well as in carrying out the policy of H.M.G. towards the local population. The leading books on this period are particularly emphatic about the proportion of time spent by Sir Percy Cox and his staff in dealing with military requirements for labour, forage, housing and transport.¹ They had assumed the duties of intermediaries between the military organisation and the local inhabitants. In their policy towards the latter the senior military commanders and their subordinates were guided by Sir Percy Cox's advice. It was only at a later stage, early in 1917, under the régime of Lieut.-General Sir S. Maude, that matters became difficult and eventually, in May, 1917, reached a crisis.² For some months Sir Percy Cox had

¹ Cox : page 183. Wilson pp. 14, 15, etc.

² Wilson : page 263.

found not only a growing divergence of view between himself and his officers on the one hand and General Maude and his headquarters staff on the other, but divergencies which were not limited to local differences of opinion. They had taken the form of the Commander-in-Chief arriving at decisions and sending telegrams to the War Office on political and administrative matters without consulting or even communicating copies of such messages to his Chief Political Officer.¹

Feeling not only stultified but unable to implement the policy which he had been directed to pursue by H.M.G., while never failing to acknowledge the necessary supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Percy Cox on more than one occasion felt that he would do best to seek a replacement and withdraw altogether. He was apparently averse to seeking the solution which his own advisers and others suggested, namely, to secure his own appointment as Chief Commissioner to a position which would make him virtually independent of the Commander-in-Chief. Matters reached a climax when a full account of local difficulties prepared by Miss Gertrude Bell reached London. In a letter to Sir A. Hirtzel at the India Office, Lord Curzon, whose Indian experience of such disputes was considerable and whose knowledge of Sir Percy Cox himself and of Iraq affairs was as great, wrote on the 13th August, 1917:—

“ I am much obliged for a sight of Miss Gertrude Bell's letter. It confirms (a) my worst suspicions ; (b) all that our committee have done or tried to do. If there is any more nonsense I will bring the whole matter . . . before the War Cabinet . . . ”²

And so matters were eventually settled. On the 14th August it was laid down in a telegram to the Viceroy that, while the ultimate authority of the Commander-in-Chief was preserved, Sir P. Cox should “ assume the title of Chief Commissioner sending reports direct to H.M.G. and submitting a copy of them before despatch to General Maude to give his opinion if he thought necessary.” The dispute had ended, as all such disputes must, in the civil or political authority depending directly on London and in the military authority conforming, save where urgent local military necessity, of a nature of which departments in London could not at the moment be aware, required otherwise. The incident has been described with some emphasis because it had a direct bearing on the instructions issued to the Commanders-in-Chief and their

¹ Cox : pages 223-232. Wilson : pages 263-4.

² Cox : page 231.

Chief Political Officers in the Middle East and East Africa from 1941 onwards.

The second major principle adopted from the outset for the military government of Iraq was that, despite Turkey having by 1914 failed to sign the Hague Convention of 1907, H.M.G. decided to follow the Hague Rules relating to the administration of occupied territory. These provided *inter alia* that as far as possible existing laws were to be administered, unless or until the Commander of the occupying troops expressly ordered otherwise.¹ As a matter of fact at an early stage a departure was made from this principle in Iraq ; it was found inexpedient and impracticable to continue the operation of the Turkish courts or to maintain the Turkish Codes. But it was not accidental that the decision of H.M.G. to abide by the Hague Rules in the military administration of Iraq was subsequently extended to Palestine. Nevertheless the limitations imposed upon military governments by their obedience to these rules was early recognised in both Iraq and Palestine, where a historian notes that " Military Administration during the Spring and Summer of 1918 organised the government of the occupied territory, restoring the essential services, and, *subject to the limitations imposed by the Laws of War on Military occupants*, beginning the work of reconstruction and reform ".²

In Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, on his appointment as Chief Commissioner, was directed to pursue a policy designed to secure only the minimum of administrative efficiency necessary to preserve order and to meet the needs of the occupying force ; to amend laws and secure reforms only within the narrowest limits ; and to raise no large or controversial questions. But Sir Arnold Wilson, in recording these injunctions, goes on to add, as any good administrator must, that " neither Sir Percy Cox, nor, at a later stage, I myself, could subscribe to the view that we should aim only at the minimum administrative efficiency to preserve order."

It is well that the reader should realise right away that obedience to the Hague Rules in 1914 as in 1941 involved the necessary consequence that a military government was bound to administer the laws of the country as they were found, save where the Army Commander might otherwise direct. By international usage this means that only those laws may be altered or suspended as are, in the view of his government, contrary to dictates of humanity or, in his own discretion, prejudicial to the safety and

¹ Wilson : page 67.

² Norman Bentwich, " England in Palestine " (Kegan Paul) : pages 27-28.

well-being of his troops. By extension, military governments are not designed or intended to administer a country on much more than an intelligent care and maintenance basis consistent with needs of the occupying power. Finally it means—and this was accepted from the outset in 1941 as in 1914—that military government is a temporary régime which should give place to a civil administration as soon as military exigencies permit. This would normally occur upon some change of status of the occupied area arising out of an armistice agreement, treaty of peace, annexation or change of sovereignty. The provisional nature of military government, in the case of Italian territories in Africa, was recognised as early as January, 1941, by H.M.G., for in a telegram dated the 18th January to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, the War Office instructed General Wavell that the ultimate objective, namely that conquered territories should be handed over by military authorities for administration by the purely civil governments, should be borne in mind and attained as soon as possible.

The early stages in the organisation of the military governments of Iraq and Palestine had their parallels in 1941. In Iraq a small police force had immediately been created at Basra to replace the Turkish police, whose chief had decamped with the whole of his staff. In the first instance Indian Moslems and Somalis were recruited ; but this force eventually developed into a corps of 7,000 men exclusively Arab in composition. For this department, Sir Percy Cox secured the services of an officer of the Indian Police Department, who arrived within a week of the fall of Basra. The Indian Government took some exception to this police officer being called " Commissioner of Police", because this was a title reserved in India for the Chiefs of Police in Presidency towns. The matter was not, however, pursued any further when the Government of India were reminded, doubtless at Sir A. Wilson's instance, that the appointment was made by the G.O.C.-in-C. in his own creative discretion, and referred the Indian Government to Genesis ii. 19. Sanitary and veterinary measures in Basra were required and taken at an early date. By March, 1915, an officer was put in charge of civil courts to deal with all cases which did not concern the safety of British troops, and to prepare a code. Courts were instituted and in August, 1915, an Iraq provisional code was promulgated to replace the Turkish codes which had been found to be inoperable. A finance and revenue department was created under Sir Henry (then Mr. H. R. C.) Dobbs in January, 1914 ; in the following August an independent Customs administration was set up.

In the Egyptian theatre of war, Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert Clayton was appointed Chief Political Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force. After the campaign of autumn of 1917, which culminated in the surrender of Jerusalem on the 7th December, General Clayton took charge of the military administration of Palestine, and Military Governors were appointed to the larger towns. The terms of the occupation, which was designed to be only a step towards the permanent emancipation of Palestine from Turkish rule, were announced by the Commander-in-Chief, Viscount Allenby. During the spring and summer of 1918 the military government of the occupied territory was organised and General Sir Arthur Money, who had been chief of staff to General Maude in Iraq, became Chief Administrator. Departments of Finance, Justice, Health, Agriculture, Education and Public Works were established. "The Military Administration," writes Bentwich, who was later Attorney General to the Palestine Government, "was not entitled to change the system of taxation of the country, but they did achieve, at least, the improvement of abolishing corruption in the collection of tithes and land tax and the other Turkish imposts : and by substituting direct collection for the Ottoman system of farming and tithes, they saved the fellaheen from a measure of oppression. In the sphere of justice, greater changes were possible . . ."¹ An excellent though brief summary of the work of the organisation of the military administration of Palestine is contained in the third chapter of his book, "England in Palestine", which also gives an illuminating history of the development of the country under military control until civil administration was established there on the 30th June, 1920.

The occupation of Transjordan and Syria in 1918 involved the extension of military administration to these countries, but the organisation of the Enemy Occupied Territories Administrations in these areas was kept separate from that of Palestine. The political developments which followed the Armistice with Turkey complicated the military administration of Syria and brought it so rapidly to an end that it afforded few parallels which were of use in 1941. In Tanganyika the administration of the territory conquered from the Germans was undertaken by political officers drawn from the administrative staffs of neighbouring British Colonies. The officers were not given military rank, but it was made clear that their powers and authority were derived from General (later Field Marshal) J. Smuts as Commander-in-Chief of the British Imperial forces in enemy territory ; administrative responsibility in London

¹ Bentwich : pp. 27 and 28.

belonged to the Colonial Office on whose vote of credit the expenditure fell. The civil administration of Tanganyika was only set up in January, 1917, when, in fact, active hostilities in Tanganyika Territory had come to an end.

Such in brief was the experience on which the C.-in-C. and G.H.Q. Middle East had to draw in January, 1941, for the institution of Military Government in Cyrenaica, immediately, and for Italian East Africa, prospectively, and his telegram of the 26th January made it quite clear what he had in mind. In London a meeting, attended by representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office, was held on the 30th January at the War Office, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Under-Secretary, then Sir Frederick Bovenschen, who later became Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office. The outcome of this meeting, at which economic and financial matters in occupied territories administrations were also discussed, was agreement that a Cabinet decision was required concerning the departmental responsibility for the administration of occupied territories. This was sought by the Secretary of State for War on the 11th February and the War Cabinet decided on the 20th February that the War Office was the department which was to be responsible for the administration of occupied territories. This decision was communicated to General Wavell on the 23rd February. Contemporaneously there was created in the War Office a section of the Directorate of Military Operations, called M.O.11, to deal with Military Government affairs : this section assumed responsibility under the Director on the 1st March. Through him the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in close contact with the Permanent Under-Secretary, became the member of Army Council on whose advice the Secretary of State relied in matters of higher policy affecting other departments of H.M.G. On the financial side the War Cabinet decision of the 20th February involved responsibility for expenditure on the administration of occupied territory falling on the War Office vote. The work was at first carried out by F.1, a section of the financial branch of the War Office, but on the 20th July, 1942, a new section, F.5, was set up to deal with finance, currency and the economic side of these Administrations. In his telegram of the 26th January, 1941, General Wavell had already proposed that the "finance of Civil Administration should be kept separate from military accounts", and this was agreed to in London.

In a note for this meeting of the War Cabinet the Lord Privy Seal had written that various interested ministries, including the

Secretary of State for War, were "all agreed that one department should be responsible for the administration of the occupied territories and that the War Office is the right department to undertake the task. The Foreign Office is not suitably equipped to undertake the administration and, if the Colonial Office were in charge of any of the enemy territories, we should be suspected of seeking to incorporate them in our Empire. At the outset the administration of British Somaliland must have the same footing as that of the Italian territories taken over . . ."

On the 19th February the Lord Privy Seal wrote: "The War Office will need the active help and co-operation of several other government departments. The most effective way in which this can be given remains to be worked out in detail. It was considered that a Standing Inter-departmental Committee, on the lines of the Far Eastern Committee, with a Junior Member from the War Office in the Chair, would save much correspondence." On the 26th March the Army Council Secretariat proposed the formation of a committee composed of representatives of the interested departments "to consider questions of major importance affecting more than one department arising from the administration of Occupied Enemy Territory by the War Office". This Standing Inter-departmental Committee on the Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory met on the 26th March under the Chairmanship of Mr. Richard Law, M.P., then Finance Member of Army Council, and confirmed the proposed terms of reference. The skeleton for the administration of occupied enemy territories was thus sketched out and agreed in London and in the Middle East where, in the interval between the beginning of the year and the end of March, events had moved fast and furiously.

The first Chief Political Officer, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, with the approval of H.M.G., to advise him and to undertake the organisation of the administrations of Occupied Enemy Territory, was Sir Philip E. Mitchell, K.C.M.G., M.C., until the outbreak of the War, Governor of Uganda. Sir Philip Mitchell not only possessed the qualification of being an experienced Colonial administrator with an extensive knowledge of African affairs, but had in addition the particular asset of having had personal experience in the Tanganyika Military Administration. Here he had served during the East African campaign of the 1914-1918 War. He had also seen the transition of Tanganyika Territory from a military to a civil administration under Mandate. At the beginning of the War in 1939 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the East African Governors'

Conference and played a prominent part in the organisation of the East African War Supplies Board.

The decision, referred to in the preceding pages, to place the Administration of Occupied Territories wholly under the War Office involved staffing the administrative machine of military government with military officers ; it had been rightly considered that a mixed régime, owing allegiance to the War Office and Colonial Office and staffed by military and civil officers, was likely to prove unsatisfactory. The precedents in Iraq and Palestine were clear on this point and material difficulties stood in the way of using civil officers in war zones where a purely military régime was still in force. Moreover, if the authority of the Commander-in-Chief was to dominate the military administrations, his disciplinary powers, if needed to be exerted, might prove as complicated *vis-à-vis* civil servants in his administration, as it would have been impossible to subject military officers under the Army Act to the disciplinary control of a civil head of any such organisation, or branch of such organisation. Unquestionably the tidiest, and indeed probably the cheapest, form of organisation was a purely military one in which all the responsible personnel was commissioned in H.M. Armed Forces. In the case of Sir Philip Mitchell, whose services the Colonial Office agreed to make available for a period for the purpose in question, the honorary rank of Major-General was authorised, but he remained borne on the Consolidated Fund as a Colonial Governor. His first step towards setting up a central administrative control was to secure the services as Legal Adviser of Mr. R. Hone, M.C., at that time Attorney General of Uganda. Mr. R. Hone (subsequently Major-General Sir R. Hone, K.B.E., M.C.), who also had served in the last war in H.M. Forces, was recommissioned with the rank of Colonel in this appointment. This was later modified to that of Chief Legal Adviser, to distinguish it from that of the Legal Advisers of the several territorial administrations.

One of General Wavell's earliest demands had been for an officer qualified to take charge of the financial and economic affairs of the Administrations ; this demand had been coupled with the suggestion that the finances of these Administrations should be kept separate from Army finance and accounts. This separation of the administrative finances from those of the military machine was agreed to in London from the outset. In the course of a visit to London, Major The Hon. Francis Rodd (subsequently Major-General Lord Rennell of Rodd, K.B.E., C.B.) had been called to attend, with an officer of the Bank of England, the meeting

convened at the War Office on the 30th January to discuss the organisation of the administration of occupied enemy territories in general, as well as the currency and economic problems which Cyrenaica, and more especially Italian East Africa, would create. Major F. Rodd, who had had experience in the administration of Syria in 1918, had already been posted to Middle East for other duties ; on his arrival in Cairo in February he was directed by the Commander-in-Chief himself to assume the appointment of Controller of Finance and Accounts, with the rank of Colonel, in the administration which Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell was engaged in creating. Thus, with the addition of two senior staff officers drawn from the Colonial Service, Majors Arundell and R. Thorne-Thorne, a nucleus headquarter staff had, by mid-February, come into being in offices at G.H.Q., Middle East.

With this preliminary description of transactions in January, 1941, the way is open to consider in detail the growth and development of the Military Administration in Africa up to the end of 1942. The general plan which will be followed will be to take the history of the months of February and March in the next chapter ; thereafter to deal with the several administrations country by country ; and finally to discuss certain specific subjects in separate chapters.

Among these subjects, finance will be treated separately for the territories as a whole since, especially in the several East African countries concerned, events and developments in each territory interacted, and also affected, or were affected by, events in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Aden and Kenya. Moreover the Controller of Finance and Accounts, while acting as Financial Adviser to the Chief Political Officer and being under his direct authority for disciplinary purposes, was at the same time responsible to, and in direct communication with, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the War Office. Thus he was in a position analogous to that of the Financial Advisers of Army Commands, though with greater local authority and discretion than the latter possessed.

The existing system of financial control in the War Office required that the devolution of financial responsibility should be direct from the Permanent Under-Secretary, as the accounting officer of the War Office, to his own representative in the field ; at the same time the Chief Political Officer of the Commander-in-Chief required a financial adviser and could not himself properly become, in the matter of expenditure, his own authorising officer. To have provided two officers would have been ridiculous. The

combination of the two functions in one person outlasted the initial experiment, was satisfactory to all concerned, and remained unchanged in the British Military Administrations up to the time of writing.

This somewhat unusual position for the Controller of Finance and Accounts proposed by the War Office, differing as it did substantially from that occupied by Financial Secretaries in the Colonial Service, at the outset caused a little perturbation in the mind of Sir Philip Mitchell. In the outcome the relationship proved entirely satisfactory to all parties concerned. It posed the problem, so often occurring in public life and so readily settled by a reasonable attitude of mind rather than by rigid subservience to a frequently unattainable ideal, of one man having to serve two masters, and demonstrated that this can be both practicable and desirable.

The account of what happened in each territory is necessarily detailed, and this detail may well obscure in the reader's mind the thread of continuity and administrative policy which was present, even if sometimes latent, in the minds of the senior officers responsible at the headquarters of the grouped territories. While, in the early days, they received no specific instructions from London on procedure, method or policy, and indeed most of those instructions which they did receive were originally proposed to London by themselves, and while they were far too busy improvising administrations with little or no staff from first beginnings, there was undoubtedly a conscious sense of the order of things to be done.

It was first of all necessary to make clear to disorientated populations, which had lost their government, that another one was there, at hand and ready to take its place. Therefore it was necessary to create an administrative authority, however rudimentary, at once. It was equally necessary and equally urgent to secure that life should continue and, since people must eat, they had to be able to secure food, and the wherewithal to procure it, at once and without any interval ; this meant that money as well as food was a first consideration. Therefore, from the very first moment of occupation, the government of the occupying authority had to be proclaimed and currency given the authority which it has to have to enable food to be bought. Tribunals, law and personal status were of lesser importance. But beyond these two rudimentary requirements each country occupied and taken over in Africa, and elsewhere, differed from the other and required different treatment. Therefore every country had to be visited as

soon as possible by the officers in ultimate authority so that guidance could be given and policy established on the spot.

It was found that fears of crises and panics were unfounded, provided some firm and reasonably competent authority was established immediately, however slender or thin, with whatever human resources were available. People are much quieter and panic less, or not at all, as soon as they know that somewhere there is authority; nor do financial crises occur if people can immediately be brought to realise that someone is looking after the currency and supply questions. Fear may return and provoke a crisis if the handling seems weak or unsuccessful, but can be avoided at first at any rate by a show of authority and foresight. Everything, at first, had therefore to be sacrificed to these simple principles—even if bureaucratic control and a tidy looking system of departmental government had to go by the board and thus create difficulties later on in establishing or re-establishing them. Therefore the first administrative officers to go into a territory had to be capable of turning their hands to any problem and rather have character and quick decision than be good orderly departmental officers or specialists. At such times, any decision, even a wrong one, is better than none and, since each territory and problem differed from every other one, nothing except close attention to doing first things first could really be laid down as a directive. But when the first thing to be done had been done, there had to be no pause before undertaking the next step.

At this stage the setting up of an administration required the maximum of confidence being reposed by the ultimate authority in London, in the persons in charge at the top in the territory, or groups of territories, taken over. The ultimate authority must forego control and grant the greatest possible latitude. This happened in Africa; the reader can judge the results. Routine and control were always present in the mind at Political Branch G.H.Q., M.E., but could only be imposed later; yet mistakes, losses, and administrative incompetencies of the early days in each territory were small compared with the results achieved. When an administration has been established and is running, then financial control and a budgetary system can be imposed—but only gradually. To try to impose a budgetary system at once, or too early, leads to administrative disorder instead of the reverse; this was found in actual experience. The danger of over-planning and the attendant consequences were never experienced in the formation of these African administrations if alone owing to chronic lack of personnel and in 1941 by the speed at which events

moved. Experience of over-planning was had only later in the war: the results were to constrict and strangle initiative, and prevent, by over-regulation and over-staffing, the operation of the principle of "first things first".

After the imposition of financial control in the administrations, in the second stage, can come the utilisation and development of local resources for the needs both of the occupying power and the occupied people. To attempt this in the first stage is to court disintegrating yet more the economic edifice which of necessity must be severely shaken by a military occupation. It is essential to get the motor working first before hitching on a trailer or finding out whether the driver has a driving licence, or washing the bodywork of the vehicle and risking water getting into the carburettor.

Nowhere more than in the circumstances of a military occupation and the imposition of a foreign administration is the aphorism applicable that, the art of government is not in the making of laws but in knowing what laws can be made. To make laws, orders or rules which are disregarded and cannot be enforced is to discredit the authority of government. And this strikes at the very root of the first principle which has been enunciated, namely, the paramount necessity of establishing authority at once, which alone will prevent panic or crisis.

Finally, in a military administration it is a first principle that troops required by the Commander to fight must never be used to enforce the rule of his government in an occupied territory. For a military administrator, any call for troops to maintain his authority or to quell disturbances, represents failure—greater or smaller according to circumstances, but a failure all the same.

If these few general considerations are borne in mind the reader may see that a thread of continuity and administrative policy in fact runs through the story of these African Military Administrations.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Cyrenaica, Ancient and Modern — The “Tariqa” of Mohammed Ibn Ali el Senussi — Italian Administration and Colonisation Schemes — The Organisation of OETA for Cyrenaica, 1941 — Teething Troubles with Currency Regulations — Retreat to Egypt — The Growth of the Political Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East — Sir Philip Mitchell's Plan for the Administration of Italian Colonies — Text of C.P.O.'s Memorandum for Future Governments in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland — Advance into Ethiopia and Move of Political Branch to Nairobi.

CHAPTER II

The Beginning of Political Government and Administration

CYRENAICA (or Barce) forms the eastern part of the one-time Italian Colonial Government of Libia, or as we spell it—Libya. The western part is Tripolitania. Cyrenaica stretches from the western boundary of Egypt, just beyond Sollum, to a point in the Great Syrtis near the southernmost point of the gulf. The territory is a geographical and to a large extent a racial or ethnic entity; the western and the eastern boundaries are in desert country where such nomadic tribes as do inhabit these wastes are not much concerned with, or affected by, the boundaries. This was perhaps rather less the case so far as the eastern boundary is concerned since before the Italian war with Turkey in 1911 and 1912 certain tribes in this area lay athwart the boundary. They had been in the habit of moving for pasture and some agricultural purposes across what was later fixed as an international confine with its concomitant customs and other controls.

During the Fascist régime when, after a long period of fighting, Italian authority had finally been established, the transit of tribesmen across the boundary with Egypt was stopped. In the course of the next twenty years the tribes lost the habit of wandering to and fro between Cyrenaica and Egypt; those most affected by the prohibition very largely settled in the latter domain. It may therefore be said that by 1940 the eastern boundary of Cyrenaica had become an ethnic as well as a geographical and political boundary. Nevertheless for a number of reasons the Cyrenaican native population still tended to look east rather than towards Tripoli, in spite of the fact that their alien government and their trade were in the west. This attitude is accounted for in a Moslem population by the obvious magnetism of Cairo and the Holy Places of Islam: by some overland merchanting of diminishing importance: by the assistance which people of Cyrenaica had received from sympathisers and partisans in Egypt during their long fight against the Italians: and finally by the fact that the spiritual leader of the vast majority of the indigenous population, Sayed Idris el Senussi, was a refugee in Cairo with the surviving leaders of the struggle.

Cyrenaica is generally speaking an arid country. For the most part it is desert and sub-desert, but has a relatively well watered upland area in the north-west part called the Jebel Akhdhar, or Green Mountain. The country contains a small number of permanently inhabited places of which the only one of any size was Benghazi, for some time past the administrative centre. Cyrene was the classical capital of the country. Tolmetta (the ancient Ptolemaïs), Derna, Tobruk and a few other places are all old sites, now with but a small number of fixed inhabitants. In the course of their colonisation schemes the Italians created or resuscitated certain other centres, most of which will scarcely survive their departure. Bardia, the small natural port which used to be called Burdi Suleiman, was an entirely modern military creation on a site which in 1917 displayed only a single building. But for a small perennial stream at Derna there is no surface water anywhere in the country. Elsewhere than in the Jebel Akhdhar, the rainfall is too scarce and erratic to permit of more than extensive pastoral agriculture, except when the Italians, with great expenditure, have provided deep wells or other artificial sources of water supply. The 200,000 indigenous inhabitants are largely of pre-Arab Berber autochthonous stock with a considerable Arab admixture of several immigrations over a period of many centuries. Superficially the inhabitants are Arabised, Moslem in religion, frugal in their habits, and good fighters.

About the middle of the last century an Algerian Arab called Mohammed Ibn Ali el Senussi founded and preached a "tariqa", or way of life, of puritanical doctrine with much success in Cyrenaica, where the greater part of the population accepted his teaching. Since then the inhabitants have been said to be "Senussi", a term which by many is quite erroneously used as tribal or racial description. In the Moslem world a "tariqa" may be said to correspond in some sense with a sect; but here, as in other parts of the east, a religious sect or community acquired a social and political significance. Even under the Turkish régime, which preceded the Italian conquest of 1911-1912 the Senussiya had been a political and social element. Without rival and diffused throughout the country, this element had already by then assumed a nationalistic tinge. During the almost continuous fighting against the Italians from 1912-1930 this embryonic nationalism grew. By 1931, when the pacification of the country had been completed by the Italians at a great price in human life and suffering, the present head of the Senussiya, Sayed Idris el Senussi, a refugee in Egypt, had come to be regarded as a temporal leader,

a position he had acquired by the predominance of his family and followers in the resistance to the foreigner. It must, however, be borne in mind that, except as the leaders and mainspring of resistance, the Senussi family had never in fact been the emirs or princes of the nomad tribes who had adopted the tenets of the founder of the "tariqa", but whose independent tribal organisation remained.

After the pacification of the country the Fascist government proceeded to develop the more suitable parts of the coastal plain and the north-west of the country in the Jebel Akhdhar as colonisation areas for Italian peasant small-holders. By the outbreak of war the Italian Government had settled a considerable number of farmers and their dependents on small holdings grouped together in communities. For this purpose the native inhabitants were dispossessed or deprived of their grazing ranges. Benghazi had been developed into a modern and almost entirely artificial town of 65,000 inhabitants; 22,000 of these were Italians, for the most part living a parasitic existence on, or in, administrative and other official organisations. In addition to the 200,000-odd indigenous inhabitants, there were in all some 60,000-70,000 Italians in the country, including farmers and civil servants but excluding military personnel. The number of Italians was somewhat reduced by the beginning of 1941. Among the indigenous population were some Jews who had been settled mainly in Benghazi but also were to be found in certain country districts where they were virtually indistinguishable from the local population. The presence of these Jews dates from the Spanish dispersal, and even earlier.

In the interior deserts of Cyrenaica lie a number of oases, or groups of oases. Jarabub, west of Siwa, was a place of pilgrimage, revered by the Senussiya as the place of burial of the founder of the "tariqa". West again are the oases of Aujila and Jalo while due south is the group of the Kufra oases. These had become the headquarters of the Senussi family and leaders and, later, an advanced post of the Italian military occupation. From these oases the Nile Valley at Wadi Halfa is within easy bombing range.

The Italian Government, after many administrative changes, had placed both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania under one Governor-General and Council in Tripoli. Cyrenaica itself was divided into the two provinces of Benghazi and Derna; the southern oases and desert formed a Military Territory, with headquarters at Hon in Tripolitania, stretching from the Egyptian to the Algerian borders. The Italian civil administration was, as has invariably been found

to be the case in African territories, top heavy, too elaborate and monstrously over-staffed.

Native Affairs were dealt with by a Native Affairs Office, with local residents under the prefects of the provinces. Benghazi presented an elaborate municipal organisation with ambitious services and buildings. There were no railways except a short stretch from Benghazi north-east to Barce (seventy miles) and another short line south to Solluch (thirty-five miles) with one or two spur lines. Benghazi harbour, largely artificial, was a substantial undertaking. The principal main road was the coastal highway from Tripoli to Sollum, a fine work worthy of the Italian's well deserved reputation for road building.

The Italian colonisation schemes were of some interest and considerable complexity. They were social and economic experiments. It was anticipated that they would have to be studied with care and very probably maintained in existence to supply foodstuffs. This did not prove to be the case because, as will be related, when the final occupation of Cyrenaica by the British Forces from Middle East in the winter of 1942-1943 took place, the Italian population had all been removed or had fled. In consequence no further thought had to be given to the problems which these colonisation schemes might otherwise have presented. Nevertheless during the first occupation in the winter of 1940-1941 and the period of the first Military Government, which was set up in January, 1941, the numerous Italian families settled on their holdings gave much food for thought. The eventual disappearance of the Italians, together with all their administration, in 1943 simplified the eventual military government of Cyrenaica. It left the field clear for an organisation which was required to deal only with indigenous inhabitants in a state of development similar to that in many parts of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

In view of the evanescent nature of the military governments of 1941 and 1942 little need be said beyond recording, in rather summary form and as a matter of historical interest, what was done. The officer selected to take charge of the civil administration of Cyrenaica in 1941 was Brigadier S. H. Longrigg, O.B.E., whose experience in Iraq, Syria and Palestine and knowledge of Arabic qualified him particularly for the appointment. After being commissioned in 1915 and serving in various appointments in the Army, Brigadier Longrigg entered the Political Department in Iraq in 1918. He continued in the Iraq administration in various departments, including that of Finance, until 1931, when he received an appointment in the Iraq Petroleum Company to deal

with land and labour administration. In the course of his subsequent work with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the Middle Eastern countries he had considerable contact with the administrations and notables of most of the countries between Egypt and the Persian Gulf.

On the 29th January, General Wavell decided to make Cyrenaica a separate Military Command directly under G.H.Q. Middle East, with effect from the 1st February. It had become impossible for Headquarters, British Troops in Egypt, both to command troops in Egypt and to direct operations so far afield. He proposed, about the middle of February, to appoint Lieut.-General (Field Marshal) Sir H. Maitland Wilson to be Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Cyrenaica, responsible both for the administration of occupied territory and for conduct of operations, in place of General Sir R. O'Connor, who was to return to Egypt. To General Wilson, in his capacity of Military Governor, Brigadier Longrigg was to act as a Deputy Chief Political Officer, bearing relation to him analogous to that which General Sir Philip Mitchell bore to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in Cairo.

The organisation of an Occupied Enemy Territory Administration for Cyrenaica had been undertaken in Cairo in the course of January. On the 31st January General Wilson, accompanied by Brigadier Longrigg, visited various parts of the country with a view to seeing what resources in finance and personnel would be necessary in the future. On returning to Cairo Brigadier Longrigg devoted himself in the next fortnight to recruiting officers and clerical staff, and collecting office equipment and vehicles. His original plan entailed the provision of forty-five officers ; of these some thirty were obtained in the short time available. These officers, with some clerical staff mainly recruited from local personnel in Cairo and Alexandria, left Cairo in convoys at intervals from the 7th February onwards. As it was impossible at the time to find fully trained administrative or police officers, the staff recruited inevitably bore signs of improvisation, but a number of very capable officers, nearly all of whom had had previous experience of Arab affairs, was included in this preliminary establishment.

On the 18th February Brigadier Longrigg reached Benghazi for the second time. There he set up his headquarters and there it remained throughout the period of this first occupation of the country. The Headquarters of the Cyrenaica Military Command had been established at Barce where it also stayed under General Wilson, until his departure at the end of February for operations in Greece. In practice it was a mistake to separate the civil and

military commands in this way. The country was found generally to be in a condition of considerable disorder. The railways, main roads and telegraphs had suffered substantial damage. Banks, insurance offices and Italian commercial firms had abandoned their properties, as most of the Italian officials had their duties. While the agricultural settlements on the Cyrenaican highlands retained a substantial Italian population, the urban inhabitants of the provincial towns were reduced to a few score; of the twenty odd thousand Italians in Benghazi only some seven thousand were found in and around the town. The indigenous population showed marked good will to our forces, due mainly to the smouldering hatred of the Italian domination, but in part also to our propaganda. It was an early objective of the administration to turn this propaganda from the purpose of inflaming the local population against the Italians to one designed to reconcile the native inhabitants to the presence of the surviving Italians, in order to avoid reprisals and violence.

The general plan of administration was to retain the six main divisions of the country which, under the Italian régime, had been grouped in the two provinces of Benghazi and Derna. The two provincial administrations served no useful purpose from the British point of view and were not maintained. A political officer, with one assistant political officer, was appointed to each of the six divisions, with an additional assistant political officer for Benghazi. Many of the native *mudirs* were reappointed after scrutiny of their antecedents. The municipal organisation of the towns was generally left intact or continued with little alteration; exceptions were Tobruk, where the municipality could not be revived, and at Apollonia where municipal organisation had been in abeyance for some weeks prior to our occupation. There British officers were appointed Mayors, with nominated councils of Italian and Libyan advisers.

The lack of trained police officers and of a police force ready to take over police duties proved a serious difficulty. It was fortunate that conditions generally remained peaceful and that the indigenous population was on the whole well behaved and reasonable towards the Italians. The Italian carabinieri were retained for a period only in Benghazi and Barce mainly on traffic control duties. During the early days of the occupation a plan had been evolved for utilising the services of the Libyan Senussi battalions, which had been recruited in Egypt from among the refugees from Cyrenaica, as the nucleus of a police force. A start had already been made in drafting men and a training scheme was being

evolved. By the time the evacuation of Cyrenaica occurred certain of these detachments had already arrived at their appointed stations ; a beginning had been made of transforming them from soldiers to policemen. The main breaches of law and order occurred in the Jebel Akhdhar where certain elements among the local population invaded the Italian cultivated lands from which they had been expropriated by the colonisation schemes. The principal problem facing the police organisation was the protection of Italian families in these areas. There was also a large number of Italian prisoners of war and dispersed military personnel (some 17,000 in the Benghazi area alone) who had not been rounded up or evacuated when the enemy re-occupied the place.

One of the first and most important appointments made by the Deputy Chief Political Officer was that of a Controller of Supplies, who was charged with locating available supplies, formulating a scheme of rationing and ordering additional foodstuffs from Egypt. In spite of great difficulties of transport, a good beginning was made in distributing sugar, grain and tea ; the basis laid down from the very first was that no distribution without payment was to be made except in cases of acute distress. As it turned out none of the supplies ordered in Egypt arrived before the evacuation ; the stores sold for civilian use were drawn from Army Q services at the advanced bases.

Prior to leaving London the Controller of Finance and Accounts, in the course of the meeting held at the War Office on the 29th January, had learnt the intention of His Majesty's Government to establish a rate of exchange of something of the order of 500 lire to the £ sterling in all the Italian territories in Africa which might be occupied. A decision to fix the rate at 480 lire to the £ sterling was subsequently confirmed in a War Office telegram to Middle East on the 5th March. This rate had been arrived at on various data available in London, including certain indications of the open or black market rates of the lire in Addis Ababa in the spring of 1939. Unfortunately, prior to the receipt of these instructions, a proposal was made in Cairo to fix the rate of the lira for Cyrenaica at 200 lire to the £ Egyptian (= £1 os. 6d. Sterling). In view of the fact, however, that the decision on policy which had been reached in London some days later was going to affect not only Cyrenaica but also the whole of Italian East Africa, it was found necessary to alter by proclamation the rate to 492 lire = £1 Egyptian—the equivalent of 480 lire = £1 Sterling since £1 Egyptian = £1 os. 6d. Sterling. The rate initially fixed for Cyrenaica had unfortunately been announced in

that country and in Egypt : the change caused some confusion but there was not really time for much harm to be done. These events, however, showed the necessity, which was not thereafter forgotten, of reaching a decision on matters of exchange and financial policy generally prior to an occupation. The currency used during this brief first occupation of Cyrenaica was Egyptian, if only because no other stock of currency was available, except Palestinian which for political reasons was undesirable. Regulations were made to obviate the complete convertibility of Italian currency into Egyptian currency at 492. In view of the great importance which this provision assumed and the greater complexities which it involved in Italian East Africa, it will be dealt with in full in later chapters.

Had the occupation continued the major problem would undoubtedly have been that of the Italian colonisation schemes in North Western Cyrenaica. These were still in an early stage of development and, in spite of the relatively large numbers of Italians who had already been settled there, much of the house building and development of the centres were still in progress. Whilst some crops were being produced the colonies were by no means self-supporting and it would have taken at least two seasons to have made them so. It was realised from the first how important the potential food production of these colonies was and a decision was reached in principle to keep them in existence. A letter had been received by the British Commander from Marshal Graziani commending the colonisation organisation to the special consideration of the occupying authorities. Special consideration would in any event have had to have been given to so large a body of Italians, including many women and children. It was lucky, in view of the political complications involved, that when the final occupation of Cyrenaica took place all these Italians had departed.

During the first week in April the British Forces in Cyrenaica, denuded as they had been by the withdrawal of units for the Greek campaign, were attacked and overrun by the enemy in the coastal area of the Great Syrtis. By the end of the first week in April Benghazi had been evacuated and within a very short time the whole of Cyrenaica, with the exception of Tobruk, fell back into the hands of the enemy. The administrative staff of the first Military Government of Cyrenaica was successfully evacuated without losses together with its records, accounts and cash ; a police officer remained in Tobruk. The administration had lasted too short a time for more than the most preliminary work of establishing authority to have been accomplished. Had the

occupation of Italian East Africa not already been progressing very rapidly the experience gained in mounting the first military administration for an occupied territory would have served a more useful purpose than it did at the time. As it was, that experience came in useful only when Cyrenaica was reoccupied in 1942 and again in 1943. Time was nevertheless found to organise a scheme for licencing merchants in Egypt who wanted to trade with Cyrenaica, through the good offices of the British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria. An official of Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) Ltd., from Palestine, was kindly lent at the request of the Controller of Finance and Accounts to make an inspection of the Italian banking organisation in Cyrenaica. He reported that all archives and assets had been removed and that not enough remained to restart the banking system.

By the end of February General Sir P. Mitchell's headquarters in Cairo had achieved existence as the Political Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East. But up to the middle of April the branch consisted of no more than nine officers, three other ranks, and six stenographers or clerks. With so little staff there was no question of internal organisation during this early period. Every officer present had to be, and in fact was, ready to turn his hand to the next urgent job to be done, for vast tracts of Africa and millions of inhabitants were almost daily being showered on the back of the Political Branch. The absence of the Chief Political Officer and the Chief Legal Adviser on a tour of Cyrenaica left their work to be done by the Controller of Finance and Accounts. His departure for East Africa in March to try to set up some rudimentary financial administration and explain the currency and fiscal policy it was desired to follow, left his problems in the hands of those who remained at the head office. It was not in point of fact until the end of May that the Controller of Finance and Accounts received any assistance at all at headquarters, every officer he had been able to recruit locally having been required even more urgently in the territories where administrations were being set up.

The plan for the administration of the Italian Colonies, which had developed in Sir Philip Mitchell's mind during a visit to Khartoum and Nairobi at the end of January with General Wavell, was the creation of a sort of High Commission over a group of self-contained administrations. It was clear from the start that nothing more could be attempted at headquarters than to issue very general instructions and lay down the major lines of policy for execution on the spot under wide local discretionary powers. The local administrations would not only have to provide those services which were

necessary and common to all such organisations, but would have to cater for the more specialised requirements of the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief in East Africa and the Sudan. The latter, while under the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, were supreme in their own commands. The officers in charge of the administrations of the territories which their armies were occupying, or were to occupy, would thus come directly under their authority in all local matters. Moreover the Political Branch of General Headquarters in Cairo or in any other available alternative place could not, owing to distance and bad communications, hope to do more than guide and direct on general lines, without being able to deal with administrative detail. But the High Commission conception, under the authority of the Commanders-in-Chief, could ensure that there was uniformity of policy in all matters common to the various territories. In no field was this of more practical importance than in the financial and economic. Here action in one territory could not fail to affect contiguous territories and might, as it frequently did, affect even more remote countries. In addition in the financial field the control from Political Branch at General Headquarters had to be more rigid than in other departments, since the Controller of Finance and Accounts was the accounting officer of the War Office for the whole group of administrations. This involved all financial authority in the territories depending from that one appointment and all accounts being rendered to him for consolidation and reconciliation with his cash drawings from the War Office. In effect, less latitude was possible in financial matters in any given territory than was granted in other administrative fields. It followed in theory and in practice that the financial, economic and accounting machinery in all the territories, with the related services, was built on a single model.

But the general conception of the administration in January could not be carried into effect until well into the summer with any semblance of order or tidiness. In the early weeks most of the instructions on policy were worked out verbally by discussion on the spot or by *ad hoc* replies to particular requests for instructions on specific points. The three senior officers, the Chief Political Officer, the Controller of Finance and Accounts, and the Chief Legal Adviser, were constantly on tour and when in the territories were themselves frequently engaged in drafting proclamations, orders and instructions with whatever local staff was available. In March the Chief Political Officer visited Mogadishu and Harar from Cairo; the Controller of Finance and Accounts visited

Mogadishu ; and the Chief Legal Adviser visited Cyrenaica and Khartoum, all from Cairo.

A telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to the War Office dated the 25th January, 1941, threw interesting light as regards the proposed policy for occupied enemy territory in Italian East Africa and was compiled after discussions with Sir Philip Mitchell. In Somalia and Eritrea it was proposed that the general principles laid down in Chapter 14 of the Manual of Military Law should be followed, with the necessary modifications brought about by Colonial conditions. As regards Ethiopia, from the beginning it was to be assumed that the country was under British Military Occupation until such time as it was formally handed over to the Emperor, on terms to be agreed later. Meantime there existed obligations which could not be escaped. Law and order had to be ensured. Arrangements had to be made for the safe evacuation of the Italian population. Italian government and private property had to be safeguarded pending liquidation. The discharge of these responsibilities entailed the retention of the necessary powers. It was therefore thought most inadvisable to restore the Emperor's civil administration immediately although he would receive every consideration and be fully consulted. It was, however, proposed that the local Chiefs, where suitable, should be used for local administration if the Emperor consented. As far as possible the boundaries and machinery existing under the Italian administration would be retained, at least temporarily. In order that British ideas of justice should not be violated while British Military Administration remained in control British Military Courts might have to be set up. Finally, in view of these reasons General Wavell urged that full recognition should not be given to the Emperor until the end of hostilities.

In this summary the War Office and other departments concerned acquiesced, nor was any reply returned thereto. Such community of thought was there between London and the leaders in Egypt that, although the subject was fully discussed at the Cabinet Meeting of the 20th February, no reply was apparently considered necessary. The only visible outcome, so far as Middle East was concerned, was the telegram announcing that the War Office would be the department responsible for the Administration of Occupied Enemy Territories, as already recorded in the previous chapter. The general outline of the policy involved in the summary of the 25th January was however communicated to General (Field Marshal) Smuts, which elicited the reply that the Prime Minister of South Africa had no comments to offer on the proposals.

On the financial side general instructions regarding the financial responsibility of the C.F.A. were issued by the War Office in a letter of the 17th March to which more detailed reference will have to be made later. The effect of this was to give the C.F.A. complete local financial discretion, reserving to the War Office only those major subjects as rates of exchange, currency and banking.

In the course of a visit to Cairo the C.I.G.S. (then General Sir J. Dill) was informed by General Wavell on the 10th March that:—
“The important thing is that we must be given a free hand as regards procedure and establishments until things settle down. Rigid control, financial or administrative, from the United Kingdom is impossible, and to attempt it would mean inefficiency and waste.” On his return to London the C.I.G.S. made himself the advocate of this policy. No more helpful attitude has probably ever been displayed by any department in London than was shown by the War Office to this young administration in the throes of multiple birth. It was this considerable latitude that alone made the small staff of the Political Branch at General Headquarters able and free to do what it did in the time available.

For the future governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland a general memorandum of instructions was prepared by the Chief Political Officer on the basis of the acquiescence of H.M.G. in the summary of the 25th January, 1941. The memorandum was issued on the 8th February. So far as Cyrenaica was concerned, though much of this document would have been applicable, events had moved too rapidly and the administration, so long as it lasted, was established on verbal instructions given to Brigadier Longrigg on the spot in Cairo and in Benghazi. Since this was all the guidance that the Deputy Chief Political Officers had in the early days, until they were ready with a running administration to receive more formal and specific instructions, the document deserves to be quoted in full.

“NOTES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE IN RESPECT OF OCCUPATION OF ITALIAN EAST AFRICA

“ 1. The Policy of His Majesty’s Government for ITALIAN EAST AFRICA has been laid down as follows :

- (i) His Majesty’s Government would welcome the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian State and will recognise the claims of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the throne. The Emperor has intimated to His Majesty’s Government

that he will need outside assistance and guidance. His Majesty's Government agree with this view and consider that any such assistance and guidance in economic and political matters should be the subject of international arrangement at the conclusion of peace. . . .

In the meanwhile the conduct of military operations by Imperial forces in parts of Abyssinia will require temporary measures of military guidance and control. These will be carried out in consultation with the Emperor, and will be brought to an end as soon as the situation permits.

(Pronouncement made in Parliament on Tuesday, 4th February, 1941).

- (ii) The fate of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland must be reserved for determination at the Peace Conference after the war.

"2. At a later stage, the statement made in Parliament and quoted above will need clearer definition. For the present and as a working assumption, 'Ethiopian State' may be taken to mean ETHIOPIA as it was before the Italian conquest, subject to any minor boundary alterations the Italians may have made and which may conveniently await adjustment later.

"The first stage will be a period of active military operations under the guidance and control of British Officers acting in conjunction with Ethiopian Patriots organised and helped by British Officers, and associated in the friendliest possible way with the Emperor.

"3. It may therefore be assumed for local purposes by all Officers concerned that the Emperor is engaging in a joint enterprise with us for the restoration of the independence of Ethiopia and of himself as ruler of it. For practical purposes this assumption will suffice ; if there should be any request from the Emperor for anything more explicit, it should be referred to General Headquarters. Officers are not to understand from this that they are to express, or act with, any reserve *vis-à-vis* the Emperor and his restoration ; such is not the case. They are to act and to speak on the assumption stated above in respect of ETHIOPIA.

"4. As regards ERITREA and ITALIAN SOMALILAND, which are Colonies, occupation will follow the general principles laid down in the Manual of Military Law Ch. XIV, with the modifications inevitable on account of Colonial conditions. Some explanatory notes are included later in the Memorandum.

"5. Two forces are involved against I.E.A., (i) Lieut.-General PLATT's from the SUDAN and (ii) Lieut.-General CUNNINGHAM's from Kenya.

(i) Will occupy parts of ERITREA and ETHIOPIA and will have the Emperor and his sons and the greater part of the Ethiopian revolt in its area.

(ii) Will occupy parts of ITALIAN SOMALILAND and ETHIOPIA.

“ Each force will thus have at first a part of each side of the problem ; it is important to realise that there are these two sides, viz. (i) the Italian Colonies and (ii) ETHIOPIA.

“ Deputy Chief Political Officers for Eritrea and Ethiopia have been appointed to the Staff of G.O.C. Forces in the Sudan, and a similar appointment to the Headquarters of the G.O.C. East Africa is about to be made. As occupation proceeds, these officers will be required to arrange for the administration of the occupied areas as circumstances require. The following notes are intended as a general guide, and will be supplemented as may be necessary ; special instructions and information will be issued as far as possible at any time on request. Deputy Chief Political Officers may correspond on political or administrative questions with the Chief Political Officer at General Headquarters, to the extent that the G.O.C. to whom they are attached may authorise.

“ The Deputy Chief Political Officer of a Command is directly responsible to the G.O.C. to whom he is attached. Political and technical officers will be appointed as required, since it is impossible to estimate in advance the staff that may be necessary, until the extent of the occupation is known. Steps are being taken to compile a list of officers with suitable qualifications whose services can be made available at short notice.

“ It will be necessary as occupation proceeds to appoint Political Officers to districts or special areas either as advisers and guides to local authorities (chiefs or municipalities) or as direct administrators, especially in towns or where there is a considerable foreign population, or controversy between rival local chiefs.

“ It may be necessary to appoint Assistant Political Officers to work under the Political Officers or for special tasks.

“ Technical or specialist appointments will also be needed for Medical, Public Works and Police Services, Posts and Telegraphs, Transport and so on.

“ A G.O.C. is authorised to make such appointments himself in all cases of urgency and to select suitable officers for them. But where time permits, proposals should first be submitted for authority to General Headquarters.

“ The general rule should be to use only very carefully selected and experienced officers, *give them wide responsibility and keep their numbers small*, and, subject to the general qualifications as

set out above, to utilise as far as possible all local administrative authorities.

“A memorandum is being prepared and will be issued separately on establishments and appointments in the Political Branch at G.H.Q., M.E., and in Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations.

ETHIOPIA

“6. As His Majesty's Government have withdrawn their recognition of the Italian conquest, it may be correct to say that *de jure* any part of ETHIOPIA which is wholly cleared of the enemy comes *ipso facto* and at once under the rule of the Emperor, who will be present in person to claim it and to give it effective administration. It may also be claimed that a part at least of the country was never conquered at all by the Italians. But however this may be, in practice it will be necessary to act from the start on the assumption that the country is under British Military guidance and control until it is formally handed over—on terms to be agreed later—to the Emperor. Before that can be made, we have an obligation to do what lies in our power, within the limits of the military commitments entered into by His Majesty's Government and described in para. 1 above, to ensure law and order and the safe evacuation of the Italian population and such of their adherents as may wish to go with them ; and to arrange for the safeguarding of Italian private and Government property pending its liquidation. We must, moreover, be careful not to get into difficulties over the claims of neutrals (e.g. the Japanese) which we shall be prudent to expect.

“7. While, therefore, the Emperor is to be treated with every consideration and fully consulted as may be necessary his own civil administration cannot be restored at once ; that must await pacification and instructions from His Majesty's Government. This is not to say that with the consent and collaboration of the Emperor, his Chiefs may not be used for local administration ; on the contrary, where there are not strong reasons against it, this should naturally be done, but any such temporary administration must be under the guidance and control of the G.O.C. during the preliminary period.

“The Emperor is now inside Ethiopia and it has to be recognised that the situation is difficult and delicate. On the other hand, the Emperor himself is probably alive to the facts that it is in his own best interest that there should be a preliminary period of military

control by British Forces, and that his own administration will take a considerable time to organise. There seems no reason, therefore, why there should not be a complete understanding with him, and this will be greatly facilitated by the appointment, which is about to be made, of a senior and very experienced officer to be his principal personal adviser and liaison officer with the Commander-in-Chief, and the G.O.C. Sudan Forces, and the heads of the Military and Political staff working under him.

“8. All Political Officers employed in ETHIOPIA, whether with the Emperor or not, are under the authority of the Deputy Chief Political Officer in their Command through whom the G.O.C. will issue his instructions. When at a later date the two Commands make contact in the field further instructions will be issued. If special arrangements are needed in respect of staff attached personally to the Emperor instructions will be issued.

“9. The Italians divided ITALIAN EAST AFRICA into ‘governments’ as follows:—

Name of Area	Capital	Locality	Italian Estimate of Population
1. ERITREA	ASMARA	ERITREA and DANAKIL	1,500,000
2. AMHARA	GONDAR	AMHARA and GOJJAM	2,000,000
3. GALLA and SIDAMA	GIMMA	W. ETHIOPIA	4,000,000
4. HARAR	HARAR	HARAR, ARUSI and BALI	1,600,000
5. SOMALILAND	MOGADISHU	ITALIAN SOMALILAND	1,150,000
6. SHOA	ADDIS ABABA	NORTH and CENTRAL AREA	1,250,000
Total			11,500,000

“As His Majesty’s Government no longer recognises the Italian conquest of ETHIOPIA, there is no obligation on occupation to maintain these ‘governments’ and their boundaries in the cases which are in ETHIOPIA—that is 2, 3, 4 and 6; it will no doubt be found that there is some overlapping and confusion between Ethiopian and Italian Colonial boundaries, but this can probably be adjusted locally. On the other hand, administration for some years now has been based on these divisions and as a result, local jurisdiction, court records, police files, and much of the other routine machinery and practice of administration will be found divided in this way, and it will probably be as well to avoid change at first, especially as at the first sign of change there may well be a spate of quarrels, claims and counter-claims from local Chiefs and ex-Chiefs, deposed by the Italians or refugees from them. Such

things as post and telegraph and telephone services, and offices, police stations, trading centres and markets and so on. will be found to be designed to fit the Italian divisions, and to some extent this factor will compel us to maintain the *status quo*. In any case, it will probably make things easier for the Emperor when in due course we hand over to him, if we have left modifications of the Italian administrative divisions for him to make.

“ 10. The Italians had organised the economy of ITALIAN EAST AFRICA on their own lines through ‘ Commissions ’ which apparently took no account of the old boundaries, or even the new ; the adjustment or liquidation of these Commissions will be a complex business, and at first they must be maintained ; the same applies to the Italian Bank—Banca d’Italia.

“ As soon therefore, as the country is under our control it will be necessary to declare a Bank Moratorium for all transactions except small sums for personal expenses, and to put a controller in the bank. At the same time the ‘ Commissions ’ mentioned above will have to be vested in a ‘ Custodian of Enemy Property ’. Arrangements are being made for a suitably qualified officer to be held in readiness, with such subordinate staff, translators, etc., as may seem necessary at first. These ‘ Commissions ’ as far as is known now are:—

- (i) Technical Commission for the Control of Industrial Development.
- (ii) Technical Commission for the Control of Agricultural Development.
- (iii) Monopoly for Hotel Building.
- (iv) Monopoly for Hotel Ownership.
- (v) Monopolies for
 - (a) Matches.
 - (b) Tobacco.
 - (c) Salt.
 - (d) Petrol.
 - (e) Commercial Motor Transport.
 - (f) Building Materials.

“ 11. The railway is owned partly by French shareholders and partly by the Italian Government, and was under French management. Since FRENCH SOMALILAND has declared for VICHY delicate questions may arise, and instructions from His Majesty’s Government may be needed, but as a matter of military necessity the Railway in ETHIOPIA or ERITREAN territory may be taken over and run under military control ; the same applies, of course, to all

post offices and telegraph, telephone and W/T installations. The extent to which such facilities may be made available for civilians and the degree of censorship in the case of letters, telegrams, etc., will be decided by the G.O.C. when the time comes. The question of appropriate postage stamps for civilians is under examination.

“ 12. As a general rule, civil law and certain activities regulated by it, are suspended during military occupation of Colonial territory—for example, transfer of immovable property, and things of that kind. But in Ethiopia it may be possible to modify this general rule to the extent that Ethiopians only are parties, and that recognised customary law, or pre-Italian legislation, adequately meet the case. As a general rule, however, judicial machinery should be established only for criminal cases, which have to be dealt with and for the purpose of making interim orders or arrangements in civil cases where no other course is possible.

“ The courts to be established for criminal cases may make use of appropriate Ethiopian personnel, or may be Ethiopian Courts, if the G.O.C. approves, but it must not be forgotten that as long as British forces are in control, the responsibility for the administration of justice rests with the G.O.C. and ultimately with the Commander-in-Chief and a standard not incompatible with British ideas must be required of any courts or magistrates allowed to function.

“ If courts staffed by British officers are found to be necessary, they should be established and empowered by Proclamation and might consist of:—

Courts of the First Class. Powers to impose any sentence permitted under the Proclamation. Sentence of death should, however, be subject to confirmation by the C.-in-C. Sentences exceeding imprisonment for five years or a fine of £100 should be subject to confirmation by the Deputy Chief Political Officer. Courts of the first class should consist at first of three officers, sitting together, the senior (whenever possible a Senior Political Officer) presiding.

Courts of the Second Class. Power to impose any sentence not exceeding two years imprisonment or a fine of £50. Courts of this class should be held by all Political Officers and assistant Political Officers.

For petty cases, especially in towns, some suitable local (native) tribunal can generally be established.

“ Military personnel is dealt with by Court Martial and should normally be exempted from the jurisdiction of the Courts. If a

member of the forces is accused or complainant in a case with a civilian, the case may be taken to a Court Martial or Political Officer's Court as may be directed, generally or in special cases by the G.O.C.

“ A Political Officer should be empowered, in his discretion, (i) to report a case to the Deputy Chief Political Officer for orders or (ii) to ask the nearest Military Officer with power to do so to assemble a Court Martial for the trial of a particular case.

“ Courts in territory occupied in out-of-the-way parts of Ethiopia that will be occupied cannot be expected to make use of a full code of criminal procedure but must be guided by certain broad general rules and principles about which a circular will shortly be issued. As far as possible, Political Officers will be chosen from among those who have previous experience of administrative and judicial work in Africa, and will, therefore, not only be familiar with criminal procedure but also aware of the difficulties and pitfalls . . . our business while we are in control is . . . to provide only the day-to-day administration of justice necessary for the preservation of law and order, the enforcement of obedience to the G.O.C.'s orders and proclamations, and a reasonable protection of property and rights.

“ 13. As far as can be seen at present, the criminal law to be enforced in Ethiopia will be :—

- (i) The customary or statute law of the pre-Italian era, provided it is not in conflict with our conceptions of justice and humanity. Only rough and ready tests can be applied, of course, as to what is permissible ; as an illustration only, it may be said that mutilation or brutal flogging could never be allowed. No doubt the Emperor is as averse to these things as we are, but customary sanction for them could be claimed by a Chief who had recourse to them ; the claim is rendered valueless by the proviso recorded above.
- (ii) Proclamations issued by the G.O.C. ; these may apply legislation in force elsewhere.
- (iii) Regulations issued, under powers conferred upon them by Proclamation, by Political Officers, Municipal Authorities and the like.
- (iv) Lawful orders of duly recognised Ethiopian Chiefs.

“ 14. *Currency.* The currency to be used in Ethiopia will be the Maria Theresa dollar, for which a rate of exchange with

Sterling or Egyptian currency will be fixed as may be necessary from time to time. At present the official sterling rate is \$1 = rs. 8½d. Only the Maria Theresa dollar will be legal tender, but lira currency may be accepted at will by those who wish to do so, particularly, as subsidiary coinage, and a rate of exchange for this currency will also be fixed. Currency problems are of great complexity and will require a special note, to be circulated as soon as possible.

“ 15. *Revenue.* As soon as the country is pacified, all ordinary taxes, tributes, etc., should be collected. Political Officers must be given a wide discretion to grant exemptions in cases of hardship or difficulty. Accounting instructions will be issued as soon as possible; meantime each Deputy Chief Political Officer should take all steps practicable to ensure that the receipt, custody and expenditure of public money is placed under proper control.

A part of the settlement with the Emperor, when the period of control by us is brought to an end, will necessarily be financial; at the first stage, all that can be done is to see that accounts are kept as completely as possible so that there may be the material for settlement.

“ 16. *Expenditure.* The same general remarks apply. Accounting methods need not be elaborate but as effective a system of check and quittance as possible is needed for without it serious abuses by subordinates are certain to occur. Accounting methods in operation should be adhered to as closely as possible if they are found to be adequate. It will be necessary to use existing trained staffs to a considerable extent and a system to which they are accustomed will tend to accuracy.

“ In the early stages, funds for political and administrative purposes must be provided; it is not possible to budget in advance nor to prepare establishments and so on for unknown circumstances, but arrangements will be made as soon as possible so that the necessary expenses may be met on the authority of the G.O.C. or Deputy Chief Political Officer, as may be appropriate.

“ 17. *Police.* In Ethiopia, anyhow outside the towns and a few special areas, it will probably be possible to use the local authorities and their servants as police, but the British Authorities will certainly need a small trained police force for the towns, for special (e.g. security) work, and for railway property, Italian settlements, Internment Camps, and so on. It is impossible to foresee what may be needed in any detail in advance but an effort will be made

to make a few suitable police officers available on demand, and the rest will have to be improvised with the help of their advice.

“ 18. *Public Health.* Some interim arrangements for public health services must be put in force as early as possible, especially for the sanitation of towns and the detection and control of epidemics. Yellow Fever may be a special danger in Western Ethiopia.

“ In the first instance the problem must be left to the D.M.S. of each Command. If special civilian staff or services prove to be necessary, steps can be taken when the need is known and reported. If Yellow Fever proves to present special difficulties, it may be possible to obtain help and advice from the Rockefeller Yellow Fever Research Institute at Entebbe in Uganda.

“ 19. *Public Works.* Apart from repairs to roads, railways, bridges, telegraph lines, etc., as may be required for military purposes and be carried out by Military Services, Public Works during the period when British forces are in control will be concerned mainly with maintenance of public property, especially water supplies, buildings and lighting installations. If it is found that civilian personnel is needed for these purposes application should be made for it. Necessary expenditure for maintaining public property may be incurred as required. In the absence of adequate supervising staff, it will normally be more advantageous to carry out Public Works Services by contract rather than direct labour, and Political Officers should institute enquiries with a view to obtaining a list of reputable contractors.

“ There is an obligation on an occupying army to protect and maintain private property as far as possible. This will be the duty of the Custodian of Enemy Property and will, as far as possible, be covered from funds in his possession. Special instructions will be issued about this later.

ERITREA AND ITALIAN SOMALILAND

“ 20. Much of what has been written about Ethiopia applies equally to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, especially to their Native populations, but there is the basic difference that these territories are Colonies, and that each, especially the former, includes some large European towns and settlements which will present special problems.

“ 21. It will be necessary for security reasons to replace most senior Italian officials even if they should be willing to continue in

office, and subordinate personnel must be used with great reserve for the same reason.

“ On the other hand, Italian law and regulations, territorial and municipal, should be maintained as far as possible, and if Italian Judges and Magistrates are willing to remain in office they may be permitted to function with such safeguards as may appear desirable.

“ All necessary guidance in these respects can be got from the Manual of Military Law Ch. XIV ; attention is especially invited to Sections 347, 350, 352, 353, 355, 359, 363-365, 367, 368, 388, 421 and 425. Parts VIII and IX of Chapter XIV will be issued in printed form.

“ 22. Both Colonies have seaports and occupation will immediately involve harbour administration and questions affecting lights and buoys. These are matters upon which the Naval C.-in-C. must be consulted and this will be done by General Headquarters, but all officers should understand that in such matters they should comply with any requests or instructions from a Naval Commanding Officer to the extent that they are able to do so.

“ 23. A Customs and Preventive Service will have to be organised and it will form the subject of special instructions later. It should be noted that in British Somaliland there is an Imperial preference of 50% and that some approximation in tariffs with the Italian Colonies will have to be made to avoid the growth of an extensive smuggling trade. The Sudan and Kenya will be interested in this.

“ During occupation Customs Administration will have to proceed as if there were a Customs Union between the Colonies and Ethiopia and some working arrangement for a division of revenue will be necessary and will be devised later.

“ 24. *Currency.* Currency questions in the Italian Colonies, as opposed to Ethiopia, present special difficulties, the study of which will be pressed on as rapidly as possible. Meantime and until instructions can be issued, troops actually in Italian Colonial territory should use Egyptian, Indian or East African currency as may be convenient and Lira currency should only be accepted if it is necessary to do so for important reasons. It is hoped to announce a decision on this matter at an early date. It seems certain that the local population will accept our currencies at least in the very early days and it is hoped to devise means whereby Lire can be accepted later without danger to the exchange control, or the risk of saddling ourselves with large sums of valueless Lira currency. The present

instructions are therefore provisional and in refusing Lira currency no more should be said than that authority has not yet been received to accept it. In addition troops should be warned that the value of Lira currency in relation to sterling is low and depreciating ; it is not likely to be fixed much above 400 L to the £ sterling and may well fall far below that figure. If they take it before these questions are settled they do so at their own risk.

“ It may be found that some special local war currency has been issued by the Italian authorities. This will not in any case be accepted, either at once or later.

“ 25. Such information as is available suggests that Italian administrative methods involved the use of large numbers of subordinate officials presiding over subdivisions of country, much smaller than is usual in British Colonial practice. It is unnecessary to put British Political Officers in charge of small subdivisions and, to do so, will lead to an undesirable inflation of staff ; arrangements should accordingly be made with this in mind.

“ 26. At any rate in the towns and at trading centres and so on a regular police force will have to be established at once, and an effort will be made to have suitable officers ready for the purpose. It should be possible to use some at least of the Italian rank and file, and a nucleus may be obtainable by secondment from African regiments if a G.O.C. is able to spare the men. . . .

“ 27. If possible ordinary retail trade will be kept going. It will probably be necessary for the import of goods to be done through some officially controlled agency, but for internal distribution the existing trading system should be maintained as far as possible. In general, this may be said of all civilian occupations, for it is better and far less expensive to keep the civilian population occupied as nearly as may be about its usual business than to have the whole of it on the ration strength.

“ 28. The continuous production of food, including fish, milk, etc., and its sale to urban populations is important. It is recognised that this is closely linked to the currency question and that any currency in use must be such as the producer will accept and, as stated above, it is hoped to settle this matter shortly. Subject to that, everything possible should be done to maintain confidence among producers and to facilitate trading in essential foodstuffs, especially by organising well-controlled and orderly marketing arrangements for small producers.

“ 29. Produce for export presents a very difficult problem as the main products of Italian East Africa are believed to be those

which are, in present conditions, most difficult to sell. It is important to get export trade going as far as practicable in order that there may be a source of revenue to carry part at least of the expenses of occupation. Study of this problem will be greatly assisted if Deputy Chief Political Officers will furnish as early as possible any information they can obtain as to the kinds of produce and quantities available for shipment.

“ 30. It is likely to be found that in some areas there is a shortage of foodstuffs, or of the seed and tools necessary for planting the next harvest. The earliest possible information about this should be sent to General Headquarters and any immediate steps which are needed and practicable with local resources, should be put in hand at once. It may prove to be a matter of the greatest importance that steps should be taken to ensure the planting of crops in the next rains.

GENERAL

“ 31. The matters sketched briefly in this note, and many others which will arise in the course of occupation or military control, will involve some revenue and considerable and varied expenditure.

“ Arrangements to meet this situation are now in hand, and further instructions will be issued as soon as possible. It is hoped to establish a revenue account and an expenditure account in the nature of an imprest for the Deputy Chief Political Officer in each command ; and to give authority to approve, and provide funds for all necessary expenditure. In the meantime, funds must be drawn from field cashiers against responsible officers' personal signature, if it is necessary to meet expenditure at once. Great pressure will undoubtedly be exercised by subordinate staffs to secure increased wages following on the British Occupation. This must in all cases be resisted, or the inflationary results may be serious, but in case of real necessity some relief may have to be given.

“ 32. At various points along the frontier of the present Italian East Africa from Kismayu in the south to the Eritrean-Sudan frontier on the Red Sea there are local frontier problems which can best be handled by the Administrative officers on the British side of the border. When the authorities concerned are willing, an arrangement of this kind may be made, but it is important that there should be no misunderstanding. In Occupied Territory the authority remains the G.O.C. acting through his Deputy Chief

Political Officer and if use is to be made of officers of the Kenya or Sudan Administration they must be appointed to be Political Officers for Occupied Territory by the G.O.C. or with his authority, and for their acts in Occupied Territory they will be answerable to him. A note of arrangements proposed in the case of the Kenya-Italian East Africa frontier is attached.

“ 33. Finally, the temporary nature of a military occupation and the rights and responsibilities of the occupying forces must be kept in mind and arrangements made only for the functions which are required by the usages of war and international agreement. Staff must be kept to the smallest numbers compatible with what has to be done and expenditure controlled as strictly as possible. There is a natural inclination to go further than this, especially after an occupation has been in existence for some time, but it must be resisted unless, and until, further instructions are issued with the authority of the C.-in-C.

“ It is important to remember that such questions as frontier rectifications, major public works, or the constitutional position of a local ruler are not matters for a military occupation to take into account, except in so far as it may be necessary to do so in connection with ordinary day to day administration. Most of these questions are likely to be raised at the Peace Conference which must follow the war, and study of them now may be opportune ; but at this stage it is impracticable to go beyond study and preparation.

Political Branch,
8/2/41.

P. E. MITCHELL
Major-General
Chief Political Officer.”

It may here be observed that these preliminary general instructions were issued early in February before decisions on many of the points involved had been reached in London. This is notably the case on currency matters where in the outcome considerable changes were soon made. It is only remarkable in the light of after events how little needed changing in the tenor of these instructions, issued as they were under great pressure and with no time available to consult London before their preparation.

By the 31st March, 1941, the battle of Keren was won. The Italians, too shattered to stand at Taclesan, where they had a defensive position which was in some way even better than Keren, were in full retreat to the south. Asmara was entered by General Platt's troops on the 1st April. On the 21st March General Cunningham's troops cleared the Marda Pass ; Harar, the second

town of Ethiopia, was occupied on the 25th. On the 5th April the Italian civil authorities in Addis Ababa surrendered the town, which was occupied on the 6th.

At a conference in January General Cunningham had expected to take Kismayu in Jubaland in the period February–May, though the operation had been planned originally for the autumn of 1941: yet Addis Ababa had been occupied some eight months before the main operations in the south against Ethiopia were due to begin. At the same conferences the occupation of Northern Eritrea had been anticipated by General Platt “within a few months” of the time when he was speaking; in fact the East African campaign was really over when, on the 18th May, the Italian Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Aosta, surrendered at Amba Alagi.

Directly Asmara was occupied by General Platt’s troops the Chief Political Officer and the Controller of Finance and Accounts proceeded there to deal with the establishment of the Military Government under Brigadier B. Kennedy-Cooke, M.C., (See Chapter V) over the whole of Eritrea and such parts of Ethiopia as General Platt’s troops seemed likely to occupy from the north. Sir P. Mitchell there heard the unwelcome news of the fall of Benghazi and the reoccupation of a large part of Cyrenaica, as well as the more welcome information that General Cunningham’s troops seemed likely to enter Addis Ababa at any moment. With our commitments in Greece this news meant that the Political Branch in Cairo now had no, or virtually no, administrative responsibilities in North Africa, nor could have any there for some time, but instead most of Italian East Africa and British Somaliland would have to be administered. So far as the Chief Political Officer’s responsibilities were concerned, his centre of gravity had obviously moved from Cairo to some point much farther south, from which the vast area between the northern boundaries of Eritrea and the Juba River was accessible.

In 1941 aircraft were few and far between, but there was one regular service between Cairo and South Africa which passed through Khartoum and Kenya, calling at Lake Victoria and Mombasa. In practice there seemed to be three centres other than Cairo from which to supervise the administration of Italian East Africa, namely, Khartoum, Aden and Kenya. Aden was ruled out owing to lack of accommodation and difficulty of communications. Khartoum, while accessible to Eritrea, was inaccessible to the Somalilands, and even to Addis Ababa during the rainy seasons, when the weather on the high Ethiopian plateaux made

flying uncertain and, in the state of available aircraft, precarious. Kenya was accessible to the Somalilands and Ethiopia at almost all times of year by aircraft, and for many months of the year by road. Eritrea, while rather remote, would at least be accessible from Khartoum, which was itself only one day's flying from Kenya.

In view of the great shortage of headquarters staff at Political Branch, where every day's absence of one of the few responsible officers meant that his headquarter office work ceased, Kenya seemed to offer the least unsatisfactory solution, at any rate until Cyrenaica should be reoccupied. But since this could not be for many months, Sir P. Mitchell, on his return to Cairo from Asmara, sought and secured the consent of the Commander-in-Chief to remove the Political Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East, from Cairo to Nairobi. Here it would, however, continue to function as a branch of General Headquarters and not as part of the then subordinate East Africa Command.

On the 15th April Political Branch was transferred by air to Nairobi and opened there on the 18th April, maintaining only a liaison officer for contact with services in Cairo on supply matters affecting Cyrenaica and Eritrea. The transfer was less of an administrative undertaking than might have been supposed in view of the very small numbers of officers and clerks of which it then consisted. The transfer of the branch to Nairobi made it possible to secure them better accommodation, clerical assistance and telegraphic communications than were at that time available in Cairo. From that move may be dated the institution of the central control envisaged in General Sir P. Mitchell's proposal that Political Branch under the Chief Political Officer would act as a High Commission administering, under the authority of the Commanders-in-Chief, the Enemy Territories in Africa occupied by the British Forces.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER III

THE RESURRECTION OF ETHIOPIA

The Administrative Divisions — Population Estimates — Communications — The Emperor's Move from England to the Sudan — The Political Situation as regards Ethiopia — Primary Discussions between the Emperor and the D.C.P.O. — Cairo Talks — The *Modus Vivendi* Worked Out with the Emperor at Burye — London Policy — The Surrender of Addis Ababa — Return of the Emperor to his Capital — Security and Public Safety Measures — Currency Problems and Regulations — Parities Agreed — The Administrative Units of Ethiopia — The Appointment of Ethiopian Ministers — H.M.G.'s Detailed Instructions on Policy — Encouraging Trade Revival — The Submission of Ras Seyum — The Province of Tigray — Administration of the Ogaden — C.P.O.'s Talks in London and Cairo on Future Policy — Discussions with the Emperor at Addis Ababa — Unrest in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER III

The Resurrection of Ethiopia

THE surrender of the Duke of Aosta at Amba Alagi did not end all hostilities in Ethiopia, since General Nasi and a substantial detachment of Italian troops continued to hold out at Gondar during the summer rains, but in effect the country was cleared of Italian domination and therefore had to be administered as a whole.

Italian East Africa, which the Italians had combined in one general government under the Duke of Aosta as Viceroy in Addis Ababa, covered an area of some 720,000 square miles. The administrative divisions of this very large area created by the Italians were on the whole sensible, following, very roughly, ethnic and geographical boundaries. They did not, however, follow the boundaries of the previous Italian Colonies of Eritrea and Somalia (Italian Somaliland), nor consequently the international boundaries of Ethiopia as they existed before the Italian conquest.

The organisation of the Italian East African administration was only completed shortly before the outbreak of war in 1939. Italian East Africa was then divided into five "Governments" each under a "Governor" dependent on, and rigidly controlled by, the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council at Addis Ababa. The five Governments were:—

ERITREA	with its capital at ASMARA
AMARA (AMHARA)	with its capital at GONDAR
HARAR	with its capital at HARAR
GALLA-SIDAMO	with its capital at GIMMA
SOMALIA (ITALIAN SOMALILAND)	with its capital at MOGADISHU

In addition there was the small local "Government" of Shoa which included Addis Ababa and the neighbourhood. The whole territory of the old Kingdom of Tigray was included in the Government of Eritrea, as was the Red Sea Littoral which had formerly been part of the old Colony. The Somali Ogaden country was logically put into the Government of Somalia. Galla-Sidamo included all the non-Amharic people of South-Western Ethiopia, the Italians deciding to administer this area separately from the Amhara and Shoa country.

The population of Ethiopia proper is difficult to assess, since it depends so very much on what is and what is not Ethiopia in the various senses in which the name has been used. The former Colony of Somalia, within its original approximate boundaries, seems to have contained some 1,000,000 inhabitants, for the most part Somalis; Eritrea, within its former limits, appears to have held about 500,000 inhabitants. These figures leave about 8,500,000 as the number of the inhabitants of Ethiopia as it was, and some observers have put the figure rather lower. The Italian official figures of 1937, which are certainly on the low side for the five Governments with their new boundaries, were :—

ERITREA	1,000,000 inhabitants
AMHARA	2,000,000 „
HARAR	1,300,000 „
GALLA-SIDAMO	1,600,000 „
SOMALIA	1,300,000 „

The Addis Ababa district contained about 300,000 inhabitants.

These totals come to 7,500,000 to which, for the purposes of the British Military Administration, fell to be added about 400,000 inhabitants of British Somaliland. These figures amount in all to about 8,000,000 inhabitants. Some competent authorities have put the total as high as 12,000,000: in round figures 10,000,000 African inhabitants and 750,000 square miles may be taken as the scope of the problem. To this, however, was added the complication of nearly 120,000 Italians—men, women and children—who had come to, or had been more or less forcibly settled in, the new Empire. These were mainly in the urban centres of Asmara with 55,000; in Addis Ababa, with 25,000; and in and around Mogadishu, with 9,000. The figures are necessarily very approximate since the refugee problem had aggravated the concentration in urban centres; they do not include the armed forces except in so far as some of the able bodied males had been called up and incorporated in formations. This circumstance diminished by some thousands the net total of civilians with which the British Military Administration would have to deal.

The only communications which existed were those which followed the lines of advance of the British Forces, that is to say, from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan via Kassala and Asmara; from Nairobi via Mogadishu and across Italian Somaliland; and via Aden and British Somaliland. The French Somali Coast, with its natural outlet for Ethiopia and terminus of the Addis Ababa railway at Jibuti, was Vichy and closed. Not only could Jibuti

not be used for military operations, but the Italian Armistice Commission, which was in Jibuti, was still at liberty there under the Vichy régime, and harbouring Italians escaped from Ethiopia.

In June, 1940 the Emperor of Ethiopia was flown out from England to Khartoum to assist in raising the inhabitants of his kingdom against the Italians and to co-operate in a guerilla campaign which was being organised by Brigadier Sandford and Colonel Wingate (Major-General Orde Wingate) in Western Ethiopia. Arrangements were made for the Emperor to reside at Khartoum and here he stayed until the middle of January, 1941. He then entered Ethiopia from the west to join Brigadier Sandford who, with Colonel Wingate, had been in Gojjam since the previous August, organising patriot activities with the determination and gallantry which have since been recognised as having contributed notably to the campaigns of the British Armies under Generals Cunningham and Platt.

The military successes of the early months of 1941, including General Cunningham's advance northwards through Somalia into southern Ethiopia, General Platt's advance through northern Ethiopia into Eritrea and General Wavell's move across Cyrenaica, brought into prominence problems which necessarily had had to lie dormant in the earlier days of the war, when every effort was being concentrated on operational preparation. It is most important that this factor be borne in mind when the events that occurred in 1941 and 1942 in Ethiopia are studied. Fortunate as it was that the successes of British arms came about far quicker than was anticipated, the result was that certain political and administrative problems suddenly arose and had to be dealt with at very short notice. These problems included the setting up of British Military Administration and the new design for Ethiopia. The political situation between His Majesty's Government and the Emperor of Ethiopia was somewhat complicated. On the one hand the Emperor had never accepted or recognised the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. When he entered his country in January he regarded himself, very reasonably, as merely returning after an enforced absence and resuming the throne which he did not consider himself as ever having vacated. On the other hand His Majesty's Government recognised the Italian conquest and the annexation of Ethiopia to the Italian Crown on the 16th November, 1938. The recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia was withdrawn by His Majesty's Government in a public statement made in the House of Commons in December,

1940, but as the conquering forces now engaged were predominantly British, and under British command, His Majesty's Government inevitably became responsible for events that took place in Ethiopia. In fact the country, despite the very substantial contribution of the patriot activities, was being invaded and conquered by British troops. To anticipate events, by March British troops had scored such decisive defeats over the main Italian forces at Keren and in Italian Somaliland that, even without the contribution of the patriot guerilla fighting, the capitulation of the Italians was inevitable in the then near future. Though patriots participated in the actions at Amba Alagi and Gondar, Addis Ababa and Amba Alagi were surrendered to the British Commanders of British forces. Therefore, international problems in respect of the Italian population and private property in Ethiopia remained under International Law on the shoulders of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government were equally responsible before world opinion for feeding the Italians and looking after them until arrangements could be made for their eventual disposal.

The Emperor had declared that he wished to see a modern administration installed in his country, but one obstacle and some delay in this direction were anticipated in the continued existence of bodies of enemy troops in his territory. In the event, even after Amba Alagi, there remained a considerable body of armed Italian troops to be dealt with; they might indeed prove a serious problem in their retreat on Lake Tana, and there were some less-important remnants also in the extreme west of Ethiopia. Another obstacle in the way of setting up the modern administration as envisaged by the Emperor was the fact that there existed very few trained Ethiopian officials, many of the Ethiopians with the advantage of a western education having been deliberately exterminated under the Italian régime, especially during the governorship of General Graziani who had preceded the Duke of Aosta.

All these factors made it necessary to insist that, during the first phase at any rate, the country should be treated as under British Military guidance and control under the authority of the British Commanders-in-Chief. It was in pursuance of this policy, agreed to by all departments of His Majesty's Government concerned, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made the statement quoted at the beginning of the general instructions on policy issued by Sir P. Mitchell on the 8th February, and reproduced in the preceding chapter.

But no official discussions had been held with the Emperor

about future policy in Ethiopia prior to his departure from Khartoum in January. Nor were any arrangements made about the circumstances under which he should re-enter his country. As soon as possible after his appointment as Chief Political Officer, and while his O.E.T.A. organisation was still in embryo, Sir Philip Mitchell decided to make contact with the Emperor before the military situation developed any further. At the end of January, Mr. Maurice S. Lush, M.C., Governor of the Northern Province of the Sudan, had been designated as the Deputy Chief Political Officer for Ethiopia and had been instructed to set up his headquarters at Khartoum where some staff was being collected. Mr. Lush, who was re-commissioned with the rank of Brigadier for this purpose, had had a long and distinguished career in the Sudan Civil Service, in the course of which he had been attached to His Majesty's Legation in Addis Ababa from 1919 to 1922. During these years he had not only had the opportunity of personal acquaintance with Ethiopians in their own country, but had also travelled extensively there. He was directed by Sir Philip Mitchell to establish contact with the Emperor at his camp in the Gojjam and visit him about the middle of February to explain the British requirements and convey to him a copy of the Foreign Secretary's declaration. The discussion continued for several days and it became apparent that there was a considerable divergence between the British and Ethiopian attitudes. On the 24th February Brigadier Lush returned from his visit and reported to Cairo in person. The Emperor's points were discussed in detail with General Wavell, who directed that the Emperor's wishes were to be met as far as it was possible to do so, provided that the essential conditions of the policy of H.M.G. were fulfilled.

On the 21st February Sir Philip Mitchell saw the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, and General (Field Marshal) Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in Cairo, and had a brief discussion with them on the situation. A further discussion took place on the 20th March. The outcome of these discussions was the rejection of any idea of a protectorate, or the provision of a strong western administration in the country. Not only would such a policy be contrary to H.M.G.'s general line, and wholly unacceptable to the Emperor, but the military commitment involved was beyond British resources at a time when General Wavell needed every man and weapon in the Middle East for other purposes and proposed to withdraw all the British troops as soon as the Italians had been liquidated. In the event

the Fourth Indian Division was withdrawn to Egypt after the fall of Keren ; further important formations, including most of the South African troops, were sent north in the course of the summer, after the fall of Amba Alagi.

After his visit to Cairo Brigadier Lush returned to Ethiopia to meet the Emperor at Burye and to communicate to him the Commander-in-Chief's detailed and preliminary decisions taken in Cairo on the 24th February and following days. These decisions anticipated, as far as it was then possible to go, the final conclusions reached by the end of March. They were based on the general policy which General Wavell had laid down from the outset—that the Emperor's wishes were to be met as far as it was possible to do so, having regard to military requirements. It was agreed to recognise the Emperor's sole right to issue pronouncements, called "Awaj", the Amharic equivalent of "Proclamations". The British occupying authority would only issue "Public Notices" to make known temporary legislation which the British Administration felt compelled to enact. Ethiopian Courts would deal with cases arising among Ethiopians ; death sentences arising out of such cases would be confirmed by the Emperor. The British Authorities would, however, have to insist on war crimes being tried by British Military Courts, as well as cases in which foreigners were involved. The British Authorities undertook to consult the Emperor over the appointment of Chiefs, and agreed wherever possible to recognise those nominated by him, except in the case of local appointments when there was no time or possibility of consulting him. But it was made clear that the Deputy Chief Political Officer and Political Officers in the country derived their authority from the Commanders-in-Chief, under the juridical rights of an army of occupation ; and that military necessity required that advice, given at the centre to the Emperor and through our Political Officers locally, be accepted. After some modification had been made a *modus vivendi* was worked out with the Emperor at Burye.

This political background may be rounded off by returning to London for what took place after the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs came back from his visit to the Eastern Mediterranean. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on the 9th April, 1941, the Prime Minister had asked the Committee to consider what the policy should now be towards the Emperor. He thought it would be desirable to replace him formally on his throne in Addis Ababa at once. In the course of the discussion it was pointed out that H.M.G.'s policy was governed by the declaration

of the 4th February that it was proposed to restore the Emperor to his throne, but that, so long as military operations rendered it necessary, the Military Authority would have to administer the country. The outcome was a telegram to General Wavell dated the 10th April, in which it was recorded that H.M.G. felt that the Emperor should enter Addis Ababa as soon as possible, but, once there, it would be appreciated that during the time of occupation, mentioned in the Foreign Secretary's statement in Parliament on the 4th February, advice would be given by the British military authorities. This in fact reiterated General Wavell's instructions of February.

The first general telegram on policy, summarising the conclusions reached since the occupation of Italian East Africa began, was sent on the 19th April to General Wavell and contained points which were to be used for guidance in the administration of Ethiopia :—

(1) Italian East Africa to be under military control, with the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, as the sole authority, until such time as circumstances permitted a final understanding to be reached with the Emperor as head of the Ethiopian State.

(2) Eritrea and Italian Somaliland to be the subject of separate arrangements.

(3) The appointment to be made of a High Commissioner by, and answerable to, the Foreign Secretary. The High Commissioner's special responsibility would be to gain the confidence of, and consult with, the Emperor, thus ensuring the latter's collaboration in the Government of the country. No executive functions would be carried out by the High Commissioner but he would be in the position to put forward his views on political questions at all times to the Military Governor.

(4) The military authorities to retain, solely, the responsibility for administration, account being taken of native practice and devolution of powers, as suitable, being made to the Rases. Under the supervision of British Officers the Rases might be granted local powers.

The views of General Wavell and Sir Philip Mitchell on the above points were asked for so that they might be submitted to the War Cabinet and it was added finally that the need for a D.C.P.O. would not be eliminated by the appointment of a High Commissioner. In outcome, however, the proposal to appoint a High Commissioner in addition to the Deputy Chief Political Officer was not pursued. General Cunningham in the meanwhile had

come to the conclusion that, with the Emperor at Debra Marcos and accessible to Addis Ababa, the best course was now to expedite his return to the capital, especially in view of the very specific restrictions laid down by His Majesty's Government under which he was to function, and regarding his relation to the Military Government of the occupying forces.

In February, 1941, it had been assumed that such parts of Ethiopia as could be occupied before the rains would fall to General Platt's and the associated Patriot forces. In the event, when the Italians elected to fight their main battle at Keren, delaying General Platt's advance for a few weeks, General Cunningham's forces and the scope of his command took over the whole of Ethiopia, with the exception of the Tigrai and Gondar territories. It thus became necessary to transfer the Ethiopian Military Administration from the northern to the southern command. Brigadier Lush was accordingly despatched to report to General Cunningham as soon as he could at Harar and consult him about future plans. As things turned out Brigadier Lush reached Harar only just in time to concert arrangements for taking over Addis Ababa, nor was he able to return to Khartoum or Cairo before the surrender occurred.

The surrender of Addis Ababa by Italian authorities took place on the 6th April at the Palace of the Duke of Aosta. The act of surrender was made by General Mambrini, the Italian Military Governor, to Major-General Wetherall (Lieut.-General Sir Charles Wetherall, C.B.), the British Divisional Commander, accompanied by Brigadier Pienaar, commanding the 1st South African Brigade, and Brigadier (Major-General) Fowkes, commanding the 22nd East African Brigade. There was a Fascist Guard of Honour, but little sign of any British troops except for one armoured car, flying a home-made Union Jack, parked under a neighbouring tree. The short and business-like ceremony was slightly marred by the premature hauling down of the Italian flag, flying on a forty-foot mast in front of the Palace, before the surrender had formally been made. After the flag had been re-hoisted and duly saluted with ceremony, it was hauled down and the British flag was hoisted in its place. The Palace and neighbouring offices became the temporary headquarters for the British Military Administration of Ethiopia.

The Emperor in the meanwhile at Debra Marcos had raised the Ethiopian flag over the Italian fort on the 6th April. The important local chief, Ras Hailu, made his submission, which the Emperor accepted. General Cunningham gave orders

that the Emperor's journey to Addis Ababa was to be expedited, not only because it was fitting, but because it would be helpful to enlist his influence in stopping any excesses or violence, if such were meditated by his people in the capital against the large Italian population, which had been much increased by refugees from neighbouring country districts. For the Emperor to be in the country, at Debra Marcos, and not in his capital, could only create an embarrassing situation for all concerned. General Wavell accordingly informed London that General Cunningham was arranging to install the Emperor in Addis Ababa.

Means of transport were, in point of fact, a serious impediment. It was only on the 5th May, five years to a day after Marshal Badoglio had entered Addis Ababa, that the Emperor Haile Selassie returned to his capital. The streets were lined by 7,000 Patriots of Ras Abeba Aregai whom the Italians had never subdued; they had continued the struggle from the time of the Emperor's flight from his country until they joined the British forces under General Cunningham in the centre of the land. The Emperor was escorted by British armoured cars, the Sudanese Frontier Battalion, which had fought its way through from the Sudan, and the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion, which had distinguished itself in many actions, notably at Dambacha, since it had entered the country from the Sudan. The Emperor was received by General Cunningham and a guard of honour provided by British African troops; he was installed in his Palace formerly occupied by the Italian Viceroy, the Duke of Aosta. Here he took the submission and act of fealty of his leaders assembled to witness the great event. A body of British journalists accompanied the procession, riding, for want of another vehicle, in the municipal fire engine. After the ceremonies the 7,000 Patriots returned to their camp eight miles outside the town. They went in perfect order and without incident whatever, a striking testimony to the discipline which Ras Abeba Aregai had maintained.

Under the terms of surrender of the capital the Italians had left some 12,000 armed troops and police in the town, suburbs and perimeter defences, to protect the white population against the massacre which they feared. The advance guard of General Cunningham's troops had consisted of only one brigade which occupied the capital. The security position was thus extremely precarious, and there were over 20,000 Italian civilians in the town with an Ethiopian population estimated at 150,000.

Addis Ababa sprawls, without design or plan, over a spur of the Entotto Hills, covered with eucalyptus, and cut by streams

and gulleys, often with precipitous banks. The Italians were in a great state of alarm for their own safety and much confusion existed in what remained of their military and civil organisations. The Italian police, Carabinieri and others, were placed under British command for the first few days and assisted in maintaining order. A curfew was declared and rigidly enforced. Only one serious incident occurred. A group of Carabinieri, under their own Italian officer, opened fire to disperse a crowd of Ethiopians who were suspected of violent intentions. There were some fatal casualties. The Italian officer was arrested, tried by British Military Court and sentenced to death for causing the death of these Ethiopians. His sentence was, however, commuted by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief to one of imprisonment, on the grounds that he was acting under orders of a British superior officer. The sentence was eventually quashed on a revision of the proceedings instituted by the British officer originally detailed to prosecute, who felt that the action had been taken under legitimate orders and was *intra vires*.

On the whole the behaviour of the occupying troops was satisfactory and the Ethiopian population behaved with exemplary correctness. There were very few examples even of robbery and no signs whatever of any attempt or desire to perpetrate any violence in mass against the Italian civilian population—or even against the many dispersed Italian troops who were still wandering about the countryside. This lack of vindictiveness on the part of the Ethiopians was quite beyond praise.

Under Brigadier Lush's supervision, security and administrative arrangements were improvised in collaboration with the local British Military Commanders, the Ethiopians and the Italian authorities. Outstanding work was done by Lieut.-Colonel Dallas, a senior political officer formerly in the Tanganyika Service who had joined Brigadier Lush from Italian Somaliland, Lieut.-Colonel Laidlaw of the Sudan Service, who was in charge of police arrangements, and Colonel Hayton, the Provost Marshal of the East African Forces, in shepherding all the Italian civil population into four zones in the town which could be patrolled. House and shop properties in the evacuated zones were closed and safeguarded. The 12,000 armed Italians, who had been surrendered with the town, were disarmed and interned. 1,000 Ethiopians were enlisted and their training as policemen was begun. The posts and block-houses round the town were taken over by 15,000 irregular Ethiopian troops. Although there were some minor incidents, the crisis of the early days passed and by the end of

the month a really remarkable state of security and normal activity had been achieved. The enthusiasm of the Ethiopians under training for the Police Force and the invaluable patrol work of our troops, especially of the 1st South African Motor Cyclist Company, which had been lent for the purpose, were especially commendable. It was not before the 16th April that Brigadier Lush received a small but valuable accession of staff, flown in from the Sudan in a transport plane. With these officers was the Controller of Finance and Accounts and the Deputy Controller appointed to take charge of the financial and economic affairs of Ethiopia.

The currency situation was extremely complex and the silver dollar was reputed to be the medium of exchange. To finance the operations of the Patriots in western Ethiopia and to provide money for our own troops in the campaign, H.M.G. had had minted large quantities of Maria Theresa dollars in London and, later on, in India. This had been done from the dies which had, some years before the war, been purchased from Austria when the coin was still being minted for Ethiopia and the Red Sea trade. The silver content of the dollars minted by H.M.G. for war purposes was identical with that of the old coin. The stocks of which the Controller of Finance and Accounts took over from the Army Pay Branch were accumulated in Egypt, Khartoum and eventually at other points where they would be available and handy for use in Ethiopia. But one of the main difficulties of dealing with this form of money was that a mere £3,000 worth of Maria Theresa dollars at current prices of silver weighed one ton.

It was anticipated that the well-known reluctance of the Ethiopians to accept anything except silver in the country districts would be accentuated after the defeat of the Italians by a refusal to accept lira currency in towns as well. But feeding Addis Ababa, an urban concentration of 200,000 people, on local produce depended on satisfying the grower and merchant about the money he received in return for his goods ; and the Italian, as well as the native, population was possessed of nothing else but lira, which the British Authorities did not desire to guarantee.

The outcome of decisions in London and correspondence with the Controller of Finance and Accounts in Cairo, during February and March, was to fix parity rates between all the currencies concerned in the Italian East African campaigns. These parities had to be sufficiently simple to be workable in the field for the pay and expenditure of troops and yet to have regard to the value of the silver content of the Maria Theresa dollar in the silver markets of Cairo, Aden and Bombay. At that time the cost of minting

the Maria dollar was about 1/8d., to which had to be added freight and handling charges bringing the price to 1/10½d. Any price in Ethiopia substantially below this would have led to a flow of Maria Theresa dollars out of the country to East Africa, Aden and the Sudan for trading as bullion on the silver markets of the world; any price substantially higher would have made the coin a token and probably unacceptable in Ethiopia. Other world economic factors in the problem were the value of the Indian rupee and Egyptian currency in terms of sterling, and the absence of any divisionary coin of the M.T. dollar, which did not exist even in half or quarter dollars. But a coin of about 2/- denomination obviously needed divisionary coin if it was to be of any use in markets and bazaars, or even for the pay of troops. The true value in commodities of the lira inside Italian East Africa was an unknown quantity. It was suspected—and eventually substantiated—that such large quantities of lira had been issued in these countries that there could be no question of H.M.G. assuming responsibility, by an offer to exchange or otherwise, for the value of the Italian notes in circulation. Nevertheless there did not appear to be any other course open but to accept Italian coin and small denomination notes as the divisionary coin of the Maria Theresa dollar for day to day use, because there was no other small currency available in sufficient quantities.

These considerations led the Controller of Finance and Accounts to a decision to establish as legal tender for all purposes all the new currencies which the invading armies would use. The legal tender status of the Italian lira would be maintained for transactions between the European and African inhabitants of the country, but not between these and the occupying troops or authorities. The exception was that small denomination Italian notes and coin would be accepted as legal tender for all purposes as small change only. The parities were agreed to between London and the C.F.A. in Cairo in March, in terms to which allusion will be made in greater detail in Chapter XV when the financial situation of Ethiopia and the neighbouring districts is examined. These parities, which fulfilled the requirements referred to, were based on a value for the Italian lira at ½d. They worked out at

1 Maria Theresa dollar =	1/10½d.	=	45 lire
1 Rupee =	1/6d.	=	36 lire
1 shilling East African =	1/-	=	24 lire
100 piastres			
(£1 Egyptian) =	£1 os. 6d.	=	492 lire
£1 sterling		=	480 lire

With very small stocks of Maria Theresa dollars in the hands of the Army field cashiers and Brigadier Lush and his staff, the experiment had to be tried largely of using East African currency. The first pleasant surprise was the readiness with which the bazaars at Harar and Diredawa accepted East African currency in the form either of notes or alloy coin. The parity rates were proclaimed and a good bluff established of exchanging freely East African currency and M.T. dollars in the hands of the troops at the Army cashier's offices. But arrangements were nevertheless immediately made to bring in by car and lorry as many dollars as possible. As soon as the road to Asmara was open a lorry convoy of fifty vehicles brought in £100,000 of bullion in the form of dollars, under strong escort and without incident. But the bluff had already begun to work out by the end of April without this reserve supply. The market in Addis Ababa was functioning well under the new currency régime and produce was beginning to come in. The food situation was safe for the moment.

After a preliminary examination of the general picture in Ethiopia after the surrender of Addis Ababa, it was decided that the best method of establishing some form of administration which would meet British requirements and those of the Emperor within the limitations imposed by necessity was to divide the country into nine administrative units. These were to be as nearly as possible self-contained and consequently to include, for instance, medical, agricultural and financial services. These groups of officers would form Political Missions under the central direction of the Deputy Chief Political Officer at Addis Ababa, but decentralised and working within the local Ethiopian Chiefs and surviving Ethiopian administrative officials. The officers composing these "Missions" would not themselves administer—they would guide and direct the local authority whatever form it took; and it would probably take many forms in the different races of which Ethiopia is composed. The nine administrative areas in the first instance were:—

1. Gondar—with the Mission at Gondar.
2. Tigrai—at Axum and Adowa.
3. Gojjam—at Debra Marcos.
4. Wollo—at Dessie.
5. Shoa—at Addis Ababa.
6. Wollega—at Lekemti.
7. Sidamo—at Neghelli or Soddu.
8. Gimma—at Gimma.
9. Harar—at Harar.

It was subsequently decided to divide areas Nos. 7 and 8 into two, with headquarters at Mega and Maji respectively. The Italians were still at Gondar, so this area could not come into existence until they had surrendered, and there were still Italians in the west. It was an essential part of the scheme that these Missions could remain as units in the centres selected, from which the officers could tour their areas. They would not detach officers in numerous provincial centres, in order to economise personnel and prevent young and enthusiastic officers trying to play the part of district rulers or undertake direct administration.

Owing to the swift success of the British and Patriot forces in Ethiopia and the consequent lack of time to develop a policy for the country, certain difficulties and misunderstandings arose in the early days between the Ethiopian and British Authorities. On the 11th May the Emperor appointed seven Cabinet Ministers and a Governor of Shoa, which included Addis Ababa. The appointments meant little more than a formality, inasmuch as departments and staffs did not exist, and the Emperor, apart from gifts received and a grant towards a civil list from British funds, had no financial resources or means of collecting taxes. In order to overcome this misunderstanding and meet the Ethiopian authorities as far as possible, after the public announcement of these appointments it was decided to regard the newly chosen Ministers as advisers, in their respective branches, to the Staff of the Military Administrators charged with their subjects. In the outcome the advice of these Ministers proved of assistance to Brigadier Lush's officers, although the Ministers were hampered by the lack of Ethiopian departmental personnel. This misunderstanding regarding appointments accelerated the dispatch from London on the 17th May of a detailed instruction on the policy which was to be followed in Ethiopia. It was the outcome of the deliberations of the interested departments of H.M.G. during the weeks which followed the return of the Foreign Secretary from the Middle East and was designed to be the authoritative basis for the relationship of the Chief Political Officer with the Emperor Haile Selassie. It was made clear that, while the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian State was welcomed, the advice of the British military authorities must be strictly adhered to by the Emperor while the existing military situation continued. Pending further decision by H.M.G., Ethiopia was to remain under British military guidance and control. In areas occupied by British military forces, to be notified by the C.-in-C. and liable to alteration in accordance with

military exigencies, the Deputy Chief Political Officer was to be the political and administrative *executive* of the Commander-in-Chief. On behalf of H.M.G. and the War Office the Chief Political Officer would exercise departmental control and administrative supervision, British Military Administration thus being operative in these areas.

As the military operations drew to a close in various parts of the country and the surviving Italian armed forces surrendered, the Political Missions took shape in the centres from which they were to work. Their arrival and beginnings were as a rule marked by the peaceful restoration, or the institution from local resources, of an embryonic local administration.

Arrangements were made by the British Military Administration with the Sudan Government and with the Military Administrations of Eritrea, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland to collect custom revenues ; in the case of the Sudan this was done at the Sudan Frontier Posts for a small commission. Facilities were made available for the assumption of trade with neighbouring countries and more especially with Aden, the historic *entrepôt* for Ethiopia. In spite of Italian efforts to direct all Ethiopian trade to Italy, there remained a substantial merchanting connection between Addis Ababa and Aden in the hands of some Indian, Arab and Greek traders who had survived the Italian occupation. A money remittance system through the treasury organisation of the Military Administrations of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands was made available to traders until such time as a British bank could be established at Addis Ababa, which was contemplated at the earliest possible moment. The pegged rates for all the currencies in use in Ethiopia and the neighbouring countries enabled merchants to remit freely for the first time for years to Aden and India without exchange risk. Though the occupied territories were not formally admitted to the sterling group of countries, permission was granted for these to be treated in practice as if they were in the sterling area. Civil hospitals were reopened: a Friends' Ambulance Society unit arrived to help in civil medical work. Road repairs and bridge rebuilding were undertaken by military units.

Tigray had been detached from Ethiopia by the Italians and included in the " Government " of Eritrea. The Ras of Tigray, Ras Seyum, who had eventually made his submission to the Italians, was in Eritrea when Asmara was occupied. Ras Seyum, a grandson of the former Emperor John of Ethiopia, was then the most powerful Ras in Ethiopia. On the arrival of the Chief

Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, in Asmara on the 5th April, Ras Seyum immediately presented himself to tender his submission and to promise all the assistance he and his people could render to the British authorities. Ras Seyum discussed his situation and that of Ethiopia with moderation and good sense. Sir Philip Mitchell decided, in view of the occupation of Tigrai by General Platt's forces from the north, to deal administratively with Tigrai from Eritrea until the country between Axum and Addis Ababa should have been cleared of the enemy.

Ras Seyum and his armed men gave valuable assistance to General Platt's forces in the Amba Alagi operations and when these came to an end he went to Addis Ababa at the beginning of July with his wife and made his formal submission to the Emperor. With this submission, which took place on the 1st August, the province of Tigrai was handed over from the supervision of the Deputy Chief Political Officer in Eritrea, to Ethiopia, together with the British staff of the Political Mission there under Major C. de Bunsen, of the Sudan Civil Service.

South of British Somaliland and west of Italian Somaliland lies the Ogaden and over the arrangements for the administration of this territory care had to be exercised. Moslem opinion in the Somalilands, on the eastern Red Sea coast and even in Egypt, was alert; the Chief Political Officer received representations from the Azhar Mosque in Cairo, through His Majesty's Ambassador, on the subject. The Somalis are an independent people who resent intrusion in any form and they now ranged over a countryside which was full of Italian rifles and ammunition. The brief history of the Ogaden during the past fifty years was that the territory had been conquered by the Ethiopians under the régime of the Emperor Menelik, but had in fact never really been administered by Ethiopia. In the early years of this century there had been penetration by the Italians and after the war of 1935 the Italians had detached the Ogaden from Ethiopia and included it as a Somali country in the "Government" of Italian Somaliland. This led to the decision in 1941, and the Emperor Haile Selassie agreed, that the Ogaden should remain administered from, and together with, the rest of Italian Somaliland. The area was therefore placed under the administration of the Deputy Chief Political Officer at Mogadishu.

Considering the pace at which events had moved by the middle of May and that in a short time the whole of Ethiopia would be clear of the enemy, the time appeared to have come to develop the details of a policy to be followed in the administration of Italian

East Africa until the treaties of peace determined a formal settlement. What had been an improvised administration born of military necessity had become a responsibility for a longer period than that for which military administration was designed. The situation called for discussion with the departments of H.M. Government in London. A memorandum prepared by Sir Philip Mitchell, dated the 9th May and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, was therefore forwarded to the War Office by General Wavell. After discussions with the Emperor in Addis Ababa, after the receipt of H.M. Government's directions on policy dated the 17th May, Sir Philip Mitchell flew to England, where he arrived on the 31st May. Between that date and the 15th June when he left London, all aspects of the Ethiopian situation and of Italian East Africa and British Somaliland were discussed with the departments concerned. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on the 9th June, to which Sir Philip Mitchell was summoned, he was instructed on his return to open discussions with the Emperor in order to come to a definite understanding on the lines laid down, pending the conclusion of an agreement between H.M. Government and himself. This was to be either at the end of the War or at such earlier date as might be found desirable.

On his return to East Africa Sir Philip Mitchell attended a conference, at which Generals Wavell, Platt and Cunningham were present, to discuss the policy to be pursued in Ethiopia in the light of the wishes expressed by the War Cabinet. The outcome of this conference was recorded by Sir Philip Mitchell as follows:—

“ I reached Addis Ababa on my return on the 24th June and after a conference on the 25th and 26th at Asmara with General Wavell, General Cunningham and General Platt, made proposals to the Emperor for an understanding of which the following is a broad summary:—

- (i) The Emperor to agree to abide in all matters touching the Government of Ethiopia by the advice of His Majesty's Government.
- (ii) Taxation and expenditure to require the prior approval of His Majesty's Government.
- (iii) Jurisdiction over foreigners to be reserved to British courts.
- (iv) The Emperor to raise no objection if the Commander-in-Chief found it necessary to resume military control of any part of Ethiopia.

- (v) No armed forces to be raised or military operations undertaken except as agreed by His Majesty's Government's representative.

“ If the Emperor should agree to accept the above conditions I was instructed that His Majesty's Government would be willing:—

- (a) To provide funds to establish the armed forces, administrative and other services needed in Ethiopia ;
- (b) To provide expert advisers for the Emperor ;
- (c) To use their best endeavours to re-establish the Ethiopian Government ;
- (d) To operate the necessary communications ;
- (e) To examine proposals for a Treaty with the Emperor which would include a general financial settlement.”

With Lord Rennell, who had also attended the Asmara Conference and had been acting as Chief Political Officer during his absence in England, Sir Philip Mitchell then proceeded to Addis Ababa to open discussions with the Emperor. These were to range over the whole field of administration of the country, including the vital subjects of finance, financial control, economic policy, and assistance from H.M.G. From the outset negotiations were to some extent hampered and delayed by the material difficulties of language and lack of competent Ethiopian staff, the Emperor carrying on all the negotiations in person in Amharic through interpreters. The Emperor was fortunate, however, in having as his European Political Adviser Brigadier Sandford, and with him a legal adviser, Mr. Charles Mathew, formerly Judicial Adviser to the Native Government of Buganda, seconded at the suggestion of Sir Philip Mitchell by the Colonial Office to assist the new administration on the Ethiopian side as distinct from the British Military Administration side. The first reply to Sir Philip Mitchell's *aide memoire*, drawn on the lines recorded, came on the 12th July. It disclosed only differences which could apparently be bridged. From the end of July onwards the main discussions dealt with points of detail of a proposed agreement. Among these were the subsidiary convention or agreement laying down the rights of British troops and foreign persons in Ethiopia, including the judicial régime covering them, and the functions of a proposed British Military Mission which was to undertake the training and organisation of the Ethiopian Army—as the historical successor of the Military Mission which had trained and organised the Patriots for the campaign against the Italians.

About this time a certain number of serious incidents began to occur in certain parts of the country. At Gimma a clash took place between the Patriots and British troops, on account of a conflict of orders regarding Italian stocks, including weapons of war which General Wetherall's troops had captured from the Italians when they evacuated the place; happily only one man was wounded. In another case, at Alomata, armed Ethiopians, described as brigands, attacked a village when a British convoy was there; a British officer and an African follower were killed, and several other persons wounded. These incidents, and others, were in part due to insufficient central authority, the ample supply of Italian arms and ammunition available to a disorganised and unemployed population in the aftermath of war, and to the wish of local chiefs to return to the days of personal armies. The Ethiopian authorities were not in a position to prevent these incidents, although a greater reliance on an organised police body for the enforcement of order might have had a beneficial result.

In appraising the degree of friction that existed, beyond argument or doubt, in Ethiopia in 1941 the extraordinary circumstances under which the country found itself must be fully borne in mind. To all intents and purposes Ethiopia was freed of the conqueror's yoke within a period of four short months; it was only natural that its inhabitants should envisage an immediate return to the pre-1935 way of life. Furthermore, in a mere six years Ethiopia had twice been crossed by modern armies and in the intervening period an attempt, partly successful, had been made to stamp a new civilisation upon the face of the old. The swift Italian collapse made it impossible for gradual steps to be taken by the British and Ethiopian authorities to cope with the changed situation. Again, different viewpoints on the war, the Ethiopian local and the British global, have to be taken into consideration. It was, however, a matter of great regret to the Imperial Forces which liberated Ethiopia that so little gratitude, and cooperation in the prosecution of the war, should have been shown by the Ethiopians who had so suddenly and perhaps unexpectedly been returned to power.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER IV

THE ADOLESCENCE OF THE NEW ETHIOPIA

Conditions After Occupation — Feeding Arrangements — The Work of the Italian "Ente" Organisation — The Ethiopian Railway — The Position of the Italian Banks — The Opening of a British Bank in Addis Ababa — Currency Policy and Problems — Rebirth of Foreign Trade — The Fiscal System — Preparations for a Budget — Treatment of Enemy Property — Security and Public Safety — The Transitional Period in Addis Ababa — Sir Philip Mitchell's Autumn Talks in London — The Reserved Areas and Cantonments — The Grant-in-Aid — Status of British Staff — The Signature of the Agreement — Withdrawal of British Troops — Requisitioning of Military Material — The Closing of the British Bank in Addis Ababa — Provisions for the Administration of Justice.

CHAPTER IV

The Adolescence of the New Ethiopia

DURING the months that followed the defeat of the major part of the Italian forces in Ethiopia and the return of the Emperor to his capital, there was much work to be done by the small British Military Administration staff available. Its tasks covered the wide field of food and supplies ; relief and welfare ; public health and safety ; transport ; finance and currency ; banking and trade ; evacuation of Italians, both civil and military ; custody of enemy property ; and the formation of plans for a future policy.

Of distress in Addis Ababa during the weeks immediately succeeding the occupation there was little, except that occasioned by the concentration of the Italian population in four zones, with a good deal of consequent overcrowding, and the unpleasant weather of the early summer rains. The destitute Italians were fed in soup kitchens organised by the Italian Red Cross, under as much control as was possible with the very small British staff then available. There was happily no epidemic disease.

The feeding of the population of Addis Ababa, so far as the Ethiopians were concerned, largely took care of itself. The advent of the rains ensured the supply of vegetables and, a little later, of grain and meat. The traditional form of transport by pack donkey began again immediately ; produce began to flow into the market, which had never ceased to work. By July the main market at Addis Ababa seemed to be as active and as well stocked as ever before. Plentiful Italian bazaar supplies came out of hoard and even cloth, which had been alleged by the Italian authorities to be unobtainable, began to emerge in anticipation of a resumption of trade with the outside world.

The feeding of the Italian population not dependent on soup kitchens was undertaken by the Italian governmental body known as the " Ente per Approvvigionamenti ", under supervision of the British Military Administration supply officers. The Italian staff of this concern so far as retained in service proved a most loyal, devoted and competent body, and the " Ente " was later used to feed and supply all the Italian evacuation and transit camps. With usually not more than two British officers in charge the whole

Italian supply side was managed without hitch or break or any cost to the Administration. Thanks to stocks taken over from the "Ente" itself and from certain Italian military warehouses, but above all owing to skilful purchasing of local produce including large quantities of grain and other stores for British military units and the transporting of these in the "Ente's" own lorries, the "Ente" finally closed its books when the evacuation was completed with a cash surplus. They had fed the repatriates and refugees without any call on military supplies or other sources except for a few tons of tinned milk required for children and mothers. When the figure of Italians repatriated and evacuated came to be considered, as well as the many months during which they remained a charge on the Military Administration, the achievement of the Italian staff of the "Ente" and British supply officers was beyond praise. The cash surplus realised of over £55,000 was paid over to the British Military Administration Treasury as a miscellaneous, but unfortunately non-recurrent, receipt in 1943.

Three days after the entry of British troops into Addis Ababa, the first train, hauled by the only local locomotive left available east of the destroyed bridge over the Awash River, steamed from Diredawa as far as the broken bridge. A certain number of locomotives and some rolling stock were available west of the bridge. The technical military services, notably the South African railway units of General Cunningham's forces, arranged a trans-shipment service around the railway bridge over the happily undestroyed road bridge across the Awash. The South African railway engineers, in spite of the most pessimistic opinions expressed by some of the engineering staff, proceeded to set about building a new railway bridge over the Awash at a lower level than the one which had been demolished. By a most commendable effort they succeeded in restoring through traffic by the 3rd July. On the 22nd July the control and management of the railway was taken over from the South African railway units by the Transport Section of the British Military Administration. The Italian employees, who had been militarised and were considered for the purpose to be prisoners-of-war on "freedom of movement" passes, co-operated extremely well. By August there were 330 European (mostly Italian) employees at work, in addition to 2,800 natives, and in that month 8,600 tons of goods and 41,000 passengers were carried. The railway was operated with a minimum of British staff, which at no time exceeded eight officers, in addition to some twenty other ranks. The traffic was carried by only

twenty-four locomotives, eight of which had been partially damaged by the Italians during the operations, and repaired. Railway accounting was instituted and the railway was treated as a self-accounting unit within the C.F.A.'s administration, full financial responsibility being assumed from the 1st September, 1941. The track operated was 475 kilometres from Diredawa to the capital, out of the 728 kilometres from Jibuti. In September, October and November 3,800,000 gross ton-kilometres per month, including military traffic, were carried, which compared favourably with the average monthly total of 4,300,000 ton-kilometres operated by the French company in 1936. The total number of passengers carried from the 1st September, 1941, to the 31st January, 1942, was 228,900 and the total ton-kilometres 16,990,000.

The Italian banks in Ethiopia had been closed as each centre in which branches or agencies were situated was occupied. Two British Controllers of Banks were appointed, one undertaking the supervision of the Bank of Italy and its branches, and the other that of the remaining banks. Five Italian banks were represented in the country, the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Rome, the Bank of Naples, the National Labour Bank and the National Ethiopian Company, the last named being substantially a commercial trading concern with some banking attributes. A total of fifteen head offices and branches existed, holding a total in deposits at the closing dates of 416,000,000 lire in 50,000 accounts, with 82,600,000 lire in cash assets—a ratio of approximately 20%. The banks at Addis Ababa were reopened on the 1st July, by which date a considered scheme had been prepared under which depositors present in the country would be allowed to withdraw their funds within the ratio of the cash assets. New deposits paid in after the opening date were, however, segregated from the old deposits and were to be withdrawable in full. Each branch was treated as a self-contained unit. By the 31st August cash held had risen to 126,000,000 lire.

On the 1st July a branch of Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) Ltd. was opened in Addis Ababa and transacted business in East African currency and Maria Theresa dollars. By the middle of September over £250,000 worth of deposits had been received; deposits in Maria Theresa dollars and East African currency were in a ratio of about 2/5ths to 3/5ths. The Bank provided cheque books printed in Amharic with cheques denoted in either East African currency or dollars and the growth of the use of cheques by Indian, Somali, Greek and Arab traders was rapid and most satisfactory. The Bank established normal relations for

the remittance of money to neighbouring territories, especially India and Aden. Where required, the services of the Treasuries of the British Military Administrations in Ethiopia and neighbouring countries were placed at the disposal of the Bank to facilitate remittances where no British banks existed. The Bank agreed with the Controller of Finance and Accounts to transact remittance business in all the currencies which were legal tender, at the official rates, subject to a small "turn" and a commission not exceeding 1%. This cheap rate of business very quickly led to a substantial growth in turnover; for the first time in the history of Ethiopia traders were able to make remittances at fixed rates without any penal costs. The existence of Barclays Bank and the facilities which it was able to provide created from the very outset a remarkable stability in the East African and Maria Theresa dollar cross rate at the official parity. It undoubtedly led the commercial community, and the Ethiopians generally, to accept the East African currency in lieu of the cumbersome and weighty silver coinage. Further reference to this subject will be made in dealing with finance in the occupied territories generally in later chapters.

The currency policy and problems briefly outlined were a source of some anxiety lest they should have repercussions on prices in the open market and affect the means of sustenance of both the Italian and native populations of Addis Ababa. There, by the nature of local circumstances, neither price control nor effective rationing could be imposed or administered. The current trend of prices had therefore to be followed with great care and attention. After an initial rise directly after the occupation the trend of staple commodity prices turned definitely down in July and continued to fall until the end of the year, except for sugar which rose in the autumn only to fall again later. Like other staples, sugar had fallen by mid-December to a general level little above pre-occupation levels. It is an interesting fact to note that when in December it became known that the British Military Administration, and in practice British guidance, was to terminate on the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, prices turned sharply upward.

But perhaps the most remarkable development in Ethiopia during the summer and autumn of 1941, was the rebirth of foreign trade on the initiative of native merchants. Their historical connections with Aden, the Yemen and India had been severed by five years of Italian occupation during which their trade, when not taken over by state concerns or Italian bodies, had been directed to Italy by means of controls and tariffs. Nevertheless

in the last six months of 1941 over £500,000 worth of goods were imported into Ethiopia, mainly via British Somaliland, and for the most part in the form of piece goods. Exact figures were not available because of the difficulty, inevitable in the circumstances, of ascertaining how far imports through British Somaliland and Eritrea destined for Ethiopia actually went there and how much apparently imported for the use of these other two countries was retained by them. Some exports also took place. The development of trade was of course very much assisted by the British Military Administration's financial and currency policy and that of the British bank installed in Addis Ababa. The fear anticipated that the commercial community would seek to expatriate capital to India, which had been impossible under the Italian régime, proved largely unfounded. Some repatriation of Indian capital did take place and some family remittances were made, but a simple system of control by linking remittance drafts to import licences for essential imports and subsequent check of entries answered well enough.

As for the fiscal system, no attempt was made to continue that operated under the Italians, except in so far as this was involved by the maintenance of their customs tariffs. Ethiopia had no access to the sea except through the territories of Eritrea and the three Somalilands, and no modification of the tariffs in those territories could have been contemplated at that early stage. Nor was it possible with the lack of staff available even to consider special arrangements for Ethiopia involving transit in bond of goods imported through those territories. It was not even possible in the absence of inter-territorial frontier posts in the first months of the occupation to arrive at a rough estimate of the proportions of goods imported through those territories attributable to consumption in Ethiopia. It was therefore decided to continue the collections at the points of entry on the pre-occupation tariff rates and eventually to credit an Ethiopian budget with an estimated proportion of the monies due. It was recognised that under the new arrangements a wholly new fiscal system would be required in a country under indigenous rule and inhabited only by local populations; sources of revenue from the Italian population would cease to exist in view of the arrangements already being prepared for their evacuation from the country.

In spite of difficulties and lack of data the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts set about compiling a very tentative budget of expenditure of an Ethiopian administration. The expenditure estimates fell naturally into two broad categories,

namely, the Ethiopian budget proper and the budget to cover expenditure on the maintenance of the British Advisory Staff, Military Courts, etc. It was contemplated that the Ethiopian budget would be so drawn that expenditure could be covered by local revenue, including customs. The contribution of the British Government towards the organisation of a new Ethiopian State might appropriately take the form of a grant-in-aid to cover expenditure on the British side of that administration. This would include a substantial contribution to the police and to the armed forces which were to be organised and trained by the British Military Mission. Having regard to the fact that the major item of expenditure envisaged would be in respect of a standing army to be covered by the grant-in-aid, it was believed that sufficient revenue could be raised locally to cover the Ethiopian Budget of a westernised administration. The provisional budget expenditure for the year ending the 30th June, 1942, was established at £700,000 for the British charges under recurrent heads and £200,000 on special expenditure, with £1,980,000 recurrent normal administrative expenditure on the Ethiopian budget, with the addition of £310,000 special expenditure. This made totals under the respective heads of British and Ethiopian charges of £900,000 and £2,290,000. This budget did not include any provision for the evacuation of the Italian population which was to fall as a charge on British funds, but it did include expenditure amounting to £500,000 for the re-settlement of Patriots who had been engaged in assisting in the liberation of the country. On the revenue side it was felt that in the year in question a maximum of £1,000,000 might be attained, which might eventually rise under control by a centralised government to a figure of £2,000,000. This would leave about £1,000,000 of deficit, of which the major part would be represented by the contribution of His Majesty's Government in respect of the British side of the administration.

In the event the budget estimates were not used as such, but proved of use in later months in arriving at the figure which was eventually paid by His Majesty's Government as a grant-in-aid pursuant to the arrangements in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement for the year 1942. For the whole period up to the time of the evacuation of the country upon the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of the 31st January, 1942, the expenditure on the British Military Administration was borne by H.M.G. On the other hand no grants-in-aid were made during that period except to the Emperor himself in respect of his civil list, a relatively small expenditure in respect of road repairs, and the

cost of maintaining the Ethiopian part of the police force. These two last items were, however, administered by the British personnel then in the country. Two additional non-recurrent grants were also made to enable the Emperor to make payments to some of the more important notables and to recoup him for salaries to administrative staff prior to the signature of the Agreement.

In the treatment of enemy property certain difficulties arose. His Majesty's Government, as the occupying authority at the moment of defeat of the Italian forces, became in international law responsible for Italian property in the country. While Italian government property would become forfeit and could be disposed of by His Majesty's Government in any manner thought fit, including its passage to the Ethiopian Government, private property remained a British responsibility. It would be to the British Authority that an Italian proprietor would look for redress and compensation in the event of loss or damage subject to the provisions of an Anglo-Italian Peace instrument dealing with the ultimate liquidation of such claims. But until then it was the responsibility in international practice of the British, as the conquering power, to safeguard such property. The Emperor, on the other hand, regarded himself as the heir-at-law of the defeated Italian Government, not only as regards government property but also as regards private property. Yet even if the Ethiopian Authority were to safeguard Italian private property, this did not relieve H.M.G. of responsibility. The problem was particularly real in view of the imminent evacuation of the Italian civil population from Ethiopia. The officers of the British Custodian of Enemy Property in the Military Administration in Ethiopia were actively engaged, not only in taking over property deposited by Italians in anticipation of evacuation, but also in safeguarding abandoned Italian private property, including that in the zones in Addis Ababa from which the Italians had been evacuated soon after the arrival of the British. The work of this branch was complicated by possession being taken of private Italian premises and property by Ethiopians. Sometimes there was the strong reason that the property had formerly belonged to an Ethiopian; sometimes the justification that a new Italian house had been built on an empty plot of land formerly owned by an Ethiopian from whom it had been bought or seized. A compromise was eventually reached whereby a joint Anglo-Ethiopian Enemy Property Department should be set up to deal with the whole problem of property which could not be moved. This included

chattels, but not specie and valuables like jewellery, which the British Custodian had in his charge and which he had sent for safe custody to Nairobi.

As regards public safety, small parties of Italians from the armed forces remained at large and succeeded in retaining a few Ethiopian or Eritrean askaris with them for many months. One band retained some contact by a portable W/T set with General Nasi at Gondar and with Rome. Its members vaunted their continued resistance to British occupation ; but their boastings were as pathetic as were their military achievements. Even the one or two "tougher" officers who escaped from Prisoner of War camps proved no sort of a nuisance except in their own estimation. On the other hand it was observed that Italians were willing to work for Ethiopian masters and were sought after on account of their utility as mechanics, artisans, servants and technicians. On the whole, relations between the Italians and Ethiopians, especially among the working class families, were singularly good and it was not at all infrequent to see an Italian family sharing a hovel with Ethiopians. It was not so much that defeat had destroyed all sense of racial superiority so pompously preached by the Head of the Fascist State, as that the peasant or working-class Italian, frequently transported against his will to Ethiopia from conditions of squalor in Italy, readily relapsed into the same state when the political background of Fascism disappeared. On the Ethiopian side there was that singular lack of vindictiveness to which reference has been made.

The Italians in Ethiopia realised only too well that this was the end of all the blood and treasure which Mussolini had sacrificed, and of the Italian Empire, which few of the Italians, even in Ethiopia, really wanted. They did not seem to mind very much on the whole. Knowledge that they were to be evacuated produced a sense of relief in most ; in none was there any real antagonism to the plan. But since evacuation meant also the eventual termination of their employment, those who still had work to do stopped working whenever they could. The streets were crowded with dejected Italians, wandering aimlessly from house to café or trying to sell their goods and chattels, and in many cases themselves also, to any bidder. Shops began to close, cafes to be denuded of their remaining slender stocks. Clothing got drab and worn. The decaying Italian barracks, hutments and enclosures were filled with Italian prisoners of war. And all the time the rain fell in torrents: the grey-green eucalyptus trees dripped and dripped ; and the gullies carried off red storm water as thick as

soup, charged with the eroded earth of Abyssinia which has fertilised Egypt for millennia.

Undoubtedly the rains were a contributory factor to the general atmosphere of depression which began to pervade the British staff and troops as the elation of victory passed. Another cause was the general appearance of Addis Ababa. In this vast rambling capital of Ethiopia, founded by the Emperor Menelik, a grandiose town planning scheme had scarcely been begun; finished and unfinished European houses competed for frontage with Ethiopian huts along roads and avenues which ended suddenly in ballast heaps or refuse dumps. Of all old civilisations the Ethiopian has least developed style in architecture, even in the building of huts; those in Addis Ababa had even less than in the villages of the countryside. Flattened petrol tins and corrugated iron predominated in the roofing of these hovels, ungarnished with thatch or wrought woodwork. Italian Fascist architecture, rarely otherwise than shoddy and undistinguished even in Italy, had here run riot in the maximum of ostentation with the smallest element of craftsmanship, style or durability. In a few more years some showing might have been secured for the millions spent to demonstrate to the world that the Fascist régime could be an enlightened and progressive master of colonial problems. But April, 1941, found the work done at Addis Ababa like the pre-opening stage of a temporary exhibition. It was only between the rains, or when the deluges ceased, that Ethiopia became naturally beautiful again. Then the magnificent scenery of the whole country impressed all those whose acquaintance of Africa had been limited to the swamps, forest, deserts and the interminable bush of most of the rest of the continent. A great future seemed to lie open for the land, both in the agricultural and tourist industries.

On the 16th October, 1941, Sir Philip Mitchell was summoned to London to discuss the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, which had been under negotiation since the Chief Political Officer's visit to England in the summer. In London he was met by his C.F.A., Lord Rennell, who had arrived a few days previously. After some preliminary talks had taken place with the War Office and other interested departments of H.M.G., a Cabinet Committee, presided over by the then Lord President (the Rt. Hon. Sir John Anderson), was appointed and during the first ten days of November prepared material for a second submission on policy to the Cabinet. This submission was made on the 11th November and its directions were incorporated in the

revised texts of an Agreement and Military Convention, which showed differences from the original drafts in several particulars. These were mainly (a) in the degree and nature of budgetary control over revenue and expenditure in Ethiopia, (b) the amount and nature of the financial assistance to be granted by H.M.G., (c) in the status and responsibilities of the British advisers who were to assist the Emperor in setting up his administration, and (d) in the composition and duties of the personnel of the Ethiopian High Court. Furthermore, the material contained in the original drafts was rearranged so that all matters affecting military interests while British military occupation continued were, as far as possible, included in a Military Convention, while the Agreement proper was confined mainly to political relationships between the two parties.

Provision was made to retain administrative control in such reserved areas and cantonments as were required for military reasons: these remained substantially unchanged, though it had become apparent that if the administrative responsibility in Ethiopia was handed over wholly to the Emperor and his government no military cantonments would be required as soon as the British troops had evacuated the country, which could be effected as soon as the enemy had been liquidated or threats of hostile action eliminated. In point of fact the liquidation of the Italian forces remaining around Gondar under General Nasi took place in the autumn of 1941 which left as hostile, or potentially hostile, only French Somaliland, which was still in Vichy hands and which showed no signs of modifying its point of view. In consequence, from the military standpoint, only a belt of reserved territory around French Somaliland was required to enforce the blockade and prevent access to the liberated territory by hostile, including Italian, elements which were known to exist at Jibuti. These still included escaped Italian officers as well as the Italian Armistice Commission.

Certain reserved areas and cantonments would, nevertheless, be required temporarily pending the evacuation of the British troops in Ethiopia, their war material including captured stores, their prisoners of war, and the women, children and not mobilised male Italians who were to be removed. For these purposes a cantonment at Addis Ababa would be required for some time, though not the whole area hitherto occupied by troops; the railway between Addis Ababa and the French boundary would have to remain under control, together with such places as had been selected for civilian evacuation camps. These and certain other considerations also required the retention under British

control of territory giving access to the areas described in the previous paragraph. Both at this moment and later the question of retaining, as a reserved area of military interest, the main road from Addis Ababa to Asmara was considered and dismissed as having few advantages but involving disproportionate responsibilities once the enemy had been disposed of in the area around Lake Tana. As regards the Ogaden it was proposed that the area should remain under the British Somalia administration.

One of the differences between the original drafts on which Sir Philip Mitchell had been working in his negotiations with the Emperor during the summer months, and those now taken back by him to resume discussion, was, as has been said, connected with financial control. Effective financial control in return for a grant of financial assistance from H.M.G. had been regarded as probable by interested Political Branch Officers in Africa and it had been in anticipation of such a system being installed that the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts in Addis Ababa had begun to draw up his organisation of central and provincial treasuries, central accounting and a budgetary mechanism. In the November drafts, however, appeared the following formula (Article IV (c) of the Agreement):—" His Majesty the Emperor agrees that there shall be the closest co-operation between the Ethiopian authorities and his British Advisers, to be appointed in accordance with Article II (a), regarding public expenditure." Thus no effective control of expenditure was now envisaged. The Agreement provided moreover that the grants would be made by H.M.G. to the Emperor directly without passing them through the hands of any financial controller or adviser.

The size and nature of the grant-in-aid was the subject of considerable discussion in London. In the preparation of revenue estimates in the summer by the C.F.A. and his D.C.F.A. in Addis Ababa consideration had been given to the minimum expenditure on administrative service which it was felt by the C.P.O. and these, his financial advisers, was necessary to set up a modern civil administration. In addition to this the Emperor wished to have a modern army, trained and equipped on British lines. He represented, and those of his advisers best qualified to know agreed, that such an army was necessary to maintain his government's central authority. But a modern army of the minimum size necessary for this purpose involved a cost which was quite disproportionate to the revenues which the country was likely, at least in the near future, to produce. The military premise adopted

by East Africa Command Headquarters and the British Military Mission was that a standing force of ten battalion units with ancillary arms and services was needed. To these they proposed to add a territorial army organisation which, in one form or another, would absorb a large part of the Patriot troops.

On these bases the financial expenditure estimates had been drawn up, with in addition, as already recorded, provision for the settlement of Patriots on the land. But when the revenue estimates prepared in the summer were considered in London during the following autumn the total expenditure estimates, including the military heads, were considered far too high and beyond anything which the country could ever hope to carry without foreign financial assistance for an indefinite period; and this in spite of the fact that administrative expenditure estimates had been drastically cut from the earlier levels. One of the main difficulties in these discussions was the impossibility of arriving at an accurate estimate of the revenues of Ethiopia. In pre-Italian days the only available figures of any value were customs receipts. Internal revenues dissipated before they reached any central point in a system of feudal collection and disbursement had always been unascertainable and would be so for some time.

The departmental view in London, stated in the form of a principle, was that the grants-in-aid which H.M.G. might make must not exceed such a figure as could eventually be collected by the Ethiopian Government from all sources in addition to that which they might be expected to collect in the immediate future. In other words, the grant plus current revenues must together equal what the Ethiopian authorities could within measurable time hope to collect in total without a grant.

After protracted discussions the grants by H.M.G. were fixed on a descending scale to terminate at the end of the fourth year, with a period of validity for the Agreement of two years and a period of prolongation for a further period of two years, but with power on either side to break as six months' notice. The grants were on the following scale:—

For the first year (1942)	£1,500,000	} Payable quarterly in advance
For the second year (1943)	£1,000,000	
For the third year (1944)	£500,000	
For the fourth year (1945)	£250,000	

In addition to these annual payments a fund of £1,000,000 was to be placed at the disposal of H.M. Minister in Addis Ababa. From this, discretionary grants could be made, especially in

respect of non-recurrent items. These included items such as the proposed settlement of Patriots on land, as well as the Ethiopian share of certain administrative expenses which might be regarded as both military and civil in their object. In the latter category, for instance, was the expenditure on the Ethiopian Railway, if it worked at a deficit ; it would be necessary to continue working the railway for some time after the signature of the Agreement in order to evacuate the Italian civil population and military material, but much of the traffic demand would at the same time be purely for civil use. It was not reasonable that the proportion due in respect of the latter should be borne by army funds. The discretionary fund could, upon the discretion of a British Diplomatic Representative, be used to cover the appropriate part of such a deficit.

The conception on which the annual payments was based was that in the first year the Ethiopian Authorities might be able to raise from customs and internal revenues, say, £500,000 which should gradually increase to something over £1,000,000. For the first four years of renewed existence the Ethiopian Government could thus count on revenues from all sources of something under £2,000,000 per annum, with something more in the first year when preliminary and, it was hoped, non-recurrent expenses would be heaviest. This revenue was estimated to be just sufficient for the small standing army envisaged and for a beginning to be made of establishing a central administration on a modest scale. The principle of diminishing grants was clearly sound and put a definite term to the financial responsibility of H.M.G., while the discretionary "floating fund" placed some material power in the hands of H.M. Diplomatic Representative. The general arrangement was designed to bring to an end the British military responsibility for administration and finance as soon as the Agreement should be signed.

One point in the new drafts of the Agreement and Convention was not finally settled until the Agreement was signed, but since the principle was discussed in London in November it may be well to anticipate events. The Emperor, after his entry into Addis Ababa, had appointed Brigadier Sandford as his personal political adviser, with Mr. (then Major) Chapman Andrews, who in the subsequent interval returned to the Foreign Office, as his assistant. Under the original conception the Emperor was to have a number of British advisers to assist in setting up the internal administration. These, it was conceived, would depend from one or more senior advisers acting as heads of branches with their Ethiopian departmental chiefs : these senior British advisers would, it was

felt, have to depend for their ultimate authority and support upon the senior British Representative in the country, namely, H.M. Minister. The Emperor had, however, intimated that he desired such advisers as he had to depend severally upon himself, or at most upon his personal political adviser.

It was pointed out in London that with such insecurity of tenure it would be difficult to find advisers of suitable quality. The principle involved was, of course, a difficult one ; the question had arisen in the past in Egypt. It was rendered all the more difficult in time of war by the natural unwillingness of British officers and British civil servants to undertake service to a foreign state unless by doing so they could feel that they were directly securing the interests of their own country. The matter was, however, eventually settled that, if the Emperor so wished, the advisers should be directly dependent on him. But the consequences foreseen also happened. Scarcely any of the administrative officers in the country agreed to stay on. Only in the British Military Mission was it possible to retain a larger number since the Mission depended directly on a senior British officer who was under the direct command of the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa.

In brief the policy put forward in London was to cut short the responsibilities of H.M.G. in Ethiopia as quickly as possible, and this therefore was the setting in which the Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, returned to Ethiopia to resume negotiations on the drafts of the Agreement and Military Convention. The C.P.O. reached Addis Ababa on the 12th December, 1941, and, as soon as the necessary translations of the documents into Amharic had been prepared, negotiations were resumed. With unimportant amendments the texts were put into final form for signature.

The signature of the Agreement and Military Convention took place on 31st January, 1942, with as much pomp and ceremony as was possible in the circumstances. The Council Room of the Imperial Palace was chosen as the appropriate place for the signature of the instrument, which in fact restored the Emperor to the sovereignty of his country. Two guards of honour, consisting of a company each of the King's African Rifles and of the new Ethiopian Army trained by the British Military Mission, were drawn up in front of the steps of the Palace either side of the flagstaff which had flown the Italian flag until the surrender of the capital.

The British Representative, Sir Philip Mitchell, arrived first ; his staff and the British Commander of the Troops in Addis Ababa with his staff were on the steps of the Palace to receive him. The Emperor and his staff then arrived to find Sir Philip Mitchell and

the senior British officers drawn up in the Council Room to meet him. The signature and sealing of the various documents took nearly an hour and the proceedings were terminated by appropriate speeches. The Emperor then took the salute of the guard of honour as the Ethiopian flag was hoisted on the flagmast and the Ethiopian national anthem was played. From that moment the Palace, where the Emperor had been living since May, 1941, became the official residence of the Sovereign of Ethiopia; the offices of the D.C.P.O. were installed in the old Fascist Headquarters; the D.C.P.O. and the C.P.O., when in Addis Ababa, were transferred to the British Legation until such time as the British Diplomatic Representative should arrive to take up his functions.

In his semi-annual despatch to the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, for transmission to the Secretary of State for War, Sir Philip Mitchell, referring to the signature of the Agreement, wrote :—" There is no doubt that, at that time, the instruments gave genuine pleasure and were warmly welcomed by Ethiopian Ministers and Notables."

The process of withdrawal of British troops and material began immediately. The first stage was the withdrawal of all outlying garrisons and political officers, together with the Italian civil population. The latter were concentrated in Addis Ababa preparatory to their evacuation down the railway. British troops in Addis Ababa itself were reduced in number and quartered in a cantonment area at the airfield, which remained in British control under the Agreement and Convention so long as they were there. The police in Addis Ababa continued under the British Military Administration pending clearance of Italian civilians and war material. On the 6th August the British troops marched out of Addis Ababa after a farewell banquet spontaneously provided by the Emperor to all ranks, British and African. The railway alone remained a British administrative responsibility, together with the areas reserved under the Agreement.


The Italian banks had been finally closed by the British Military Administration on the 14th February, 1942, and in March the last convoy of bank assets, including Italian notes and coin, staff and families with their chattels, and bank books was despatched, in fifty 10-ton lorries, to Asmara in charge of the British Controller of Banks. The British Custodians of Enemy Property handed over their warehouses in the provinces to Ethiopian officials designated.

The Agreement had provided that military material and material necessary for the prosecution of the war would be

requisitioned, where not already in possession of the British military authorities, by the Ethiopian Government and placed at the disposal of East Africa Command. There was considerable demand for such material, not only for the use of East Africa Command, but from Eritrea and Middle East for the prosecution of the war effort there. Such demands included machine tools and equipment from the extensive engineering workshops which the Italians had installed, as well as industrial plant from certain secondary industries which the Italians had installed in various parts of the country as part of their colonial development schemes.

In the event very little material was taken out of Ethiopia under the conditions provided in the Agreement after the signature of that instrument, though some useful material was removed before the 31st January. In the autumn of 1942 the then Chief Political Officer in East Africa, Major-General Lord Rennell, recommended to all the claimants for material under the Agreement, with the full concurrence of the Minister of State in Cairo, to withdraw further representations, in deference to the obvious wishes of the Ethiopian authorities.

The first instalment of the first annual grant was paid on Foreign Office account through the Military Administration treasury under instructions from the Controller of Finance and Accounts to H.M. Minister in Addis Ababa for transmission to the Ethiopian Government on the signature of the Agreement. This channel of payment continued for so long as the British Military Administration retained a financial channel for the purpose through the Barclays Bank in Addis Ababa. This bank continued to act as agent for the C.F.A. and to hold the Military Currency Reserve for account of the C.F.A. The same channel was made available to provide for payments out of the "floating fund" available for certain payments at the discretion of H.M. Minister. The Emperor had, however, already decided to open an Ethiopian State Bank in the premises of the old Bank of Ethiopia, which had now been vacated by the Bank of Italy. He affirmed that he intended to use that bank and not any British Bank which, though popular among the commercial communities in Addis Ababa, had never been extensively patronised by the Ethiopian official world. Upon the departure of the last British troops from the capital the directors of the British Bank felt that the work of the Branch should end. This was consistent with the earlier decision of that institution that it would not be justified in continuing to retain custody of the Military Administration currency reserve when the British military guard was removed. As a first stage the currency



reserve was, therefore, removed in military custody to the Reserved Areas. The Bank was eventually closed, to the great regret of all concerned, on the 15th April, 1943.

A number of the British Military Administration staff was invited to stay as advisers to the Ethiopian Government under a separate contract in each case, the terms of which were discussed with H.M. Minister. The Emperor's British Legal Adviser, Mr. (Lieut.-Colonel) C. Mathew, who had been appointed some months prior to the signature of the Agreement, and Brigadier Sandford, agreed to remain in civil status. The Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts of the Military Administration, Colonel F. Stafford, O.B.E., also agreed to remain in civil status as Financial Adviser. The Assistant Chief Legal Adviser at Political Branch East Africa Command, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Willan, M.C., and two other officers, were invited to become President of the High Court and officers of the High Court of Ethiopia respectively; they accepted—but later Lieut.-Colonel Willan resigned. Most of the rest of those invited to serve the new Ethiopian Government, declined.

The provisions for the administration of justice in the form of a proclamation to be signed by the Emperor were incorporated in the Agreement as an annex. The High Court was to consist of such number of judges as the Emperor considered fit. These judges were to include such number of British judges also as he thought fit, without any restriction as to a minimum number. The Supreme Court was stipulated to consist of the Afa Negus as President and two judges of the High Court nominated by the President of that tribunal. But Article V of the Agreement provided that any foreigner party to the proceeding of any regional, communal or provincial Court could elect to have his case transferred to the High Court which, when hearing such a case, must include at least one British judge to be appointed like the advisers under contract. These provisions, together with those dealing with police and prisons in the Agreement, sought to safeguard that justice on western lines was due to foreign persons in Ethiopia, irrespective of their citizenship.

The developments which followed the signature of the Agreement and Military Convention in the Reserved Areas and the relations between the British Military Administration there and the Ethiopian Government, will be dealt with in a separate chapter, as will the subject of the evacuation of the Italian population from the country. The full text of the 1942 Agreement and Convention is reproduced in Appendix I.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF ERITREA

British Forces Enter Eritrea — From Agordat to Asmara — The Nucleus of a Political Administration — Eritrea, Geographical and Ethnical — Italian Influence and the Fascist Régime — Inefficiency in Asmara — Retention of Italian Officials — New Administrative Divisions — Feeding and Relief — Help from the American Red Cross — Indian Soldiers' Sacrifice — Currency Problems — Parley at Massawa and Surrender of Duke of Aosta — How the Water Supply was Maintained — Sanitation and Health at Massawa — The Formation of a Police Force — Dhow Control — Bettering the Prison Conditions — The Work of the Custodian of Enemy Property — Abandoned Cargoes — Prevention of Looting — Powers of the Military Administrator Defined — Sir P. Mitchell's Instructions on Military Administration—Staff Shortage.

CHAPTER V

The Military Government of Eritrea

THE last two chapters anticipated events by taking the story of Ethiopia up to the end of January, 1942. It will now be necessary to recount the history of the two territories from which the occupation of Ethiopia took place, namely, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, beginning with the first crossing of the Italian frontiers.

On the 17th January, 1941, the Italian troops withdrew from Kassala in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. On the 19th January Sabderat, in the Italian territory of Eritrea, was occupied by troops under the command of Lieut.-General Sir W. Platt, G.O.C.-in-C. Troops in the Sudan. Here, as occurred in the south in General Cunningham's Command, it was not expected that a very rapid advance could materialise, taking into consideration the preponderant numbers of the Italian forces available and our own very limited resources.

The Italians fully realised after their disaster at Sidi Barrani that additional troops might become available to General Platt from Egypt, not only to eject them from their slender foothold in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but for operations against Eritrea itself. The Italians, thanks to the skilful deceptions practised by General Platt, had always over-estimated British strength in the Sudan; the possible accession of reinforcements seemed to counsel even greater prudence. They decided to withdraw, not only from Kassala, but well behind their frontier to positions which they deemed able to hold in the foothills around Agordat and in the apparently impassable defile of Keren on the road up to the Asmara plateau. General Wavell had indeed decided to send reinforcements to General Platt in the shape of the 4th Indian Division, a squadron of "I" tanks and some 6" howitzers. The 4th Indian Division began to arrive in the Sudan on the 7th January and was followed by the other reinforcements. General Platt promptly assumed the offensive. The strong points of the Italian line, Agordat and Barentu, fell to his forces on the 1st and 2nd February respectively. Agordat, the capital of the Western Plain Province, was the first administrative centre in the Italian East African Empire to fall to British arms.

"Bassopiano" in Italian has no precise equivalent in English. The corresponding term "Altopiano," meaning the High Plateau as opposed to "Bassopiano" or "Low Plateau," refers to the high central table-land on which the capital, Asmara, stands. If this area, which is usually known as "the Plateau" in English, usurps that title, "Bassopiano" could be translated as the "Lowlands," though the Bassopiano Occidentale or Western Lowlands are in fact anything but "low" in physical features. The Eastern Lowlands or "Bassopiano Orientale," along the Red Sea coast beyond the eastern lip of the plateau, are, however, much more of a plain and these terms will therefore be used, subject to repeating that the Western Plain Province of Eritrea is in fact a very rugged piece of sub-desert country with substantial hills and valleys.

In preparation for the administration of western and perhaps northern Eritrea, a nucleus of administrative officers had been collected at Khartoum under a D.C.P.O. designate, Mr. B. Kennedy-Cooke, M.C., Governor of the Kassala Province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, with the rank of Brigadier. Brigadier Kennedy-Cooke, with Lieut.-Colonel D. C. Cumming, also a Sudan Civil Servant, as Secretary to the Administration, and twelve native police borrowed from Khartoum, set up the headquarters of the Eritrea Administration at Agordat on the 10th February, 1941. By this time General Platt was already hammering at Keren where the Italians had decided to hold the gateway to the plateau. There was no way round this gateway. The dramatic battle of Keren, a military classic in its own way, will fall to be described by another pen in the military history of the campaign. The gate of Keren was forced on the evening of the 26th March. In spite of another excellent position which could have been held at Taclesan, farther up the road to Asmara, the Italian resistance was broken and Asmara was surrendered. The capital of Eritrea was entered by British troops on the 1st April, 1941. On the 2nd April the headquarters of the Military Administration were moved to the capital where the Chief Political Officer, Major-General Sir P. Mitchell, and the Controller of Finance and Accounts arrived on the 4th April to investigate and discuss the position.

The Eritrea of the British Military Administration was the old Italian colony of Eritrea as it had been before the Italo-Abyssinian war, shorn of its accretions from Ethiopia under the Italian East African Empire. For a few weeks only, until after the main Italian force had surrendered at Amba Alagi on the 18th May, 1941, a part of what had been Ethiopia before the Italian conquest,

namely the province of Tigrai, was administered from Asmara. But with this exception, what is here called Eritrea is the old Italian colony of that name.

The Italian advent to this part of the world dated from 1869 when the Florio Rubattino shipping company leased the harbour of Assab on the Red Sea coast as a coaling station from the Egyptian Government and the local sultan. The project was soon abandoned as the place was too unhealthy and an alternative station was leased at Massawa. With the decline of Egyptian power and in the ensuing anarchy of the Mahdist wars Eritrea was progressively occupied by the Italians from Massawa. With some local setbacks here and there this expansion of Italian colonial territory went on until it received a final check in 1896 at Adowa where an Italian army was signally defeated by the Emperor Menelik. From then until Eritrea became one of the principal bases for the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, the effective boundaries of the Colony remained virtually unchanged, though in certain long stretches they were undemarcated. The southern boundary with Ethiopia ran more or less west and east north of Adowa, turning south-east parallel with the Red Sea coast to include the inhospitable Danakil Plain at the foot of the Ethiopian highlands as far as the Awash depression and the French Somali coast. This Red Sea plain cost the Italians the lives of numerous explorers—Assab being administered by them as an isolated port with access to the rest of Eritrea only by sea. After Ethiopia was taken, a great highway was built from Assab to Dessie on the Asmara-Addis Ababa trunk road to provide an alternative port of entry to Jibuti, but the coastal area from south of Massawa to Assab remained as it had been, unadministered and virtually untraversed. A coast road linking the two was contemplated but never completed. North of Ethiopia, Eritrea consists of the central plateau called Hamasein with Asmara lying 8,000 ft. above sea level, the western plain of very rugged foothills to the plateau, a narrow coastal plain containing Massawa lying under the Plateau along the Red Sea, and a confused and broken northern part between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Red Sea tapering to a point not very far from Suakin.

Detailed ascertainment of the Military Administration in 1942 and 1943 established a population figure of about 770,000 natives of Eritrea and 52,000 Italians, including refugees from Ethiopia but excluding the armed forces in captivity as prisoners of war. In addition there were several thousand miscellaneous Mediterranean and Red Sea people, such as Egyptians, Sudanese, Syrians and

Palestinians, Greeks, Yemeni and Hadramauti Arabs and Indians, who lived mainly in Massawa and Asmara. The native population includes a considerable diversity of races, but the western and northern tribes are akin to the population of parts of the Kassala and Red Sea provinces of the Sudan. The plateau contains Eritreans and Ethiopians, the latter especially from Tigrai. The eastern plain contains Eritreans, Danakil and related tribes, and people of Arabian origin. The Christian religion dominates the plateau; elsewhere Islam preponderates. Numerically Mohammedans approximately balance the Christians, who are mostly of the Ethiopian persuasion.

Both Asmara, with its satellite settlements such as Decamere, and Massawa owed their importance and their abnormally large Italian population to the Ethiopian war. This Italian population was almost wholly parasitic, depending on direct government employment or on work connected with the military requirements and colonial development of Ethiopia. Only a few Italian settlers were engaged in agriculture or in the production of secondary industries or local resources not directly associated with Fascist military and colonial enterprises. Denudation by wind and rain have created sub-desert conditions, except on the eastern slopes which catch the moisture of the monsoon season. The country is by nature poor. The few miserable mineral resources in the shape of gold mines, sea salt at Massawa and Assab and a potash deposit in the eastern plain were apparently, by an irony of fate, greater than the Italians had in five years succeeded in finding in Ethiopia itself, which was reputed in Italy to be so rich a prize in natural wealth. The torrid eastern and western plains and sub-desert country are capable of little more than semi-pastoral agriculture except by great effort of water conservation and irrigation, or canalised rainfall. A few favoured corners, like Keren, had enough water to make small European settlements possible for a hard-working Italian peasantry. The plateau itself, now almost treeless, has a somewhat erratic rainfall in July and August, a little in March and April, with none during the rest of the year. But the temperature is equable and, for those who can stand the altitude, Asmara is healthy, and free from malaria. Even in good years agriculture is only possible on a modest scale owing to soil erosion, which re-forestation might make good over generations, but which the Italians in their fifty years of sojourn had grossly neglected. Eritrea, as a colony under Italian rule, was a singularly artificial and uneconomic enterprise. It can never be self-supporting as a self-contained unit carrying the overheads of a colonial administration.

At Asmara the Fascist régime had built a large European town with a cathedral, opera house and all the outward trappings of civilisation. The Italians had also done something to create a modern native town. But appearances were deceptive, for the whole urban area lacked an adequate water supply. The water, such as there was, came from rain-filled storage reservoirs of inadequate capacity, pumped to the town by electric power generated at Massawa. Although most of the modern houses were piped there were in some cases no connections to any water mains and water was delivered by the tank lorries of an enterprise in which many senior Fascist officials were reputed to be financially interested. Owing to a poor rainy season in 1941 the water supply in the winter and early months of 1942 became a great source of anxiety. Of town sanitation there was none. The only sewer was an open drain running through the middle of the town, discharging into the fields and market gardens of a suburb ineptly named "Villaggio del Paradiso." Not a single public latrine appeared to exist even in the "model" native village.

Asmara was a perfect example of expenditure designed to produce the maximum possible effect on the façade with very little reality or worth behind. The same could be said of much of the Italian Legislation—a good deal of it looked quite good and even enlightened ; but little of it was carried into effect and much of it vitiated by Fascist doctrines and practices. The most outstanding features of the Italian Administration of Eritrea were two : the horde of Italian officials engaged in running a very small colony, and the singular lack of production of bare necessities of life even within the limits of what could be done in this arid country. As an example of the former may be quoted the General Post Office at Asmara which, while not including the telephone and telegraph services, had a European staff of over 250 ; as an instance of the latter was the very small local production of fresh vegetables and complete absence of milk, both of which commodities were imported from Italy more cheaply, owing to shipping bounties, than they could be produced in the country, though certain parts carry a large cattle population and there is enough land for market gardening.

The Military Administration set up in the Western Plain Province from the first moment of occupation presented few difficulties. It was of the "direct" type, without any Italian element. Most of the tribes had their own administrative structures analogous to those in the Sudan, with whom they were racially akin. The Italians had introduced native courts and

although these bore little resemblance to those provided for in the Italian Ordinances, it was possible to reorganise them on the Sudanese model. The Kunama tribe near Barentu had, however, little organisation, had never paid any taxes, and was primarily engaged in stealing camels from the Sudanese Beni Amer; they provided a source of trouble which continued sporadically throughout the period covered by this record. There was considerable shortage of food in the whole Western Plain area, merchants in the Sudan refusing to accept lira currency until some exchange régime had been fixed. In the absence of instructions from London this was established locally at 1 lira = 1 piastre, which served the purpose of starting up local trade, even though the rate, as will subsequently be related, had very quickly to be altered to conform with general policy elsewhere. No harm came of the change of rate because instructions had been issued that currency of higher denomination than the 50 lire was not to be accepted.

The pause between the two battles of Keren gave time to take thought for the rest of the country. A small staff was collected in readiness for the fall of Asmara and Massawa, but the speed of the campaign left the Administration grossly understaffed for some time. It was not until well into the summer that enough personnel was available to undertake real administrative problems instead of living on a purely day to day basis. No alternative was open when Asmara fell than to maintain as much of the Italian administration as remained and continue that machine at work under such control as could be imposed. The maintenance of the Italian machinery of government in the Italian Colonies had been discussed with the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Anthony Eden in Cairo in March, 1941, on the occasion of the latter's visit. It is relevant and of some interest to quote the pertinent passages of a memorandum of the views put forward at that time by the Controller of Finance and Accounts, Colonel Lord Rennell, on behalf of the Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, who was temporarily absent in Italian Somaliland :

“ The figures (of Italians) involved are difficult to ascertain but assuming that the combatant civilian element amounts to 70,000 (locally embodied) and that this number will be fed as prisoners of war whether in Italian East Africa or elsewhere, there still remain over 100,000 persons to be dealt with (in Italian East Africa as a whole). If H.M.G. are to become responsible for the direct administration of the native *and* Italian populations, of which a large number will be refugees with no means of livelihood, the cost will be onerous and the actual method of government difficult.

The problem of finding sufficient and suitable administrative personnel is obvious. . . . The alternative and cheaper method is to secure the co-operation of the Italian authorities to continue their administration under our control in Eritrea and Somaliland. If this could be achieved . . . then eventual release of prisoners of war could also be considered. The administrative economies of this course are obvious. . . . Of the three courses (discussed in the memorandum but not reproduced here) the most practical solution is probably the second, namely, to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Italian authorities in Italian East Africa before a complete collapse has occurred, or in other words, while there is still time to take over a running machine. In spite of the disadvantages concerned this would probably save us a great deal of money, and some hardship to the Italian civil population. . . . ”

This memorandum was taken to London by the C.I.G.S., who was also in Cairo at the time. In the absence of contrary instructions the policy involved in the recommendation was adopted in the early stages of administration of both Eritrea and Italian Somaliland until such time as circumstances and additions to the man power of the British Military Administrations made a change desirable and possible. It is perhaps worth reiterating that no alternative was possible at the beginning and that this policy did succeed in avoiding any administrative breakdown, as General Wavell recorded in his despatch of the 28th May, 1942.

When Asmara was surrendered as an open town the Governor, General Frusci, who was also the G.O.C. the Italian Troops, departed ; but he left behind the headquarters of his civil administration as well as the local administrations of all the provinces other than that of the Western Plain. Eritrea had been absorbed into the Italian East African Empire as one of the “ Governments ” under the Viceroy, with the territory of Tigray added to the area of the old colony ; as a colony with its own government dependent on Rome for two generations prior to the conquest of Ethiopia, the central administration at Asmara was more developed and more experienced than those of the newly formed “ Governments ” of Ethiopia such as Harar and Galla-Sidamo. But the Italian cadres, though more or less intact, were suffering from more than normal lethargy and the nervous prostration occasioned by events. In the absence of the Governor the titular head of the local administration was the Secretary-General who was directed by Brigadier Kennedy-Cooke, and agreed to carry on as head of an Italian administration under British control.

But the initial decision to maintain as much as possible of the

Italian administrative structure was not intended to apply to the provinces either in those districts like the Western Plains, where it had already broken down, or in any other purely native areas. In these areas it was felt to be both politically undesirable, and administratively impractical, to maintain the juridical authority of the Italian district officers after the defeat of the Italian Army in the field even as a temporary measure. The loss of prestige of the Italian colonial officials could only have been counteracted by injunctions from the British Occupying Authority to the local population to continue obeying their former Italian masters—a policy which would obviously have been impossible. So even in default of personnel it was felt to be better, until sufficient British officers could be assembled, to have in the provinces virtually no administration than to prop up a decaying Italian organisation. The policy of maintaining the Italian administration was therefore from the outset restricted to the central government, to the urban centres of Asmara and Massawa with their satellite settlements, and to the Hamasein Plateau which was so near and so closely involved with the capital as to constitute a suburban problem. Here the Italian district officers were to remain in office, under control. Nevertheless in the central administration the Bureaux of Political Affairs and of Native Affairs were closed down and taken over by the British Military Administration secretariat.

The maintenance of the Italian provincial machinery proved on experience to be impracticable even on the Hamasein Plateau and in the towns. Eritrea was therefore divided into seven British administrative divisions (capitals in brackets):—

ASMARA and HAMASEIN	(ASMARA)
ACCHELE GUZZI	(ADI CAIEH)
SERAE	(ADI UGRI)
WESTERN PLAINS	(AGORDAT)
EASTERN PLAINS	(MASSAWA)
KEREN	(KEREN)
ASSAB	(ASSAB)

Only in the Asmara, Serae and Assab divisions had by the end of 1943 any regular Italian administrative officials survived. Italian "extra-commissioners" continued in the Massawa, Keren and Acchele Guzzi divisions in municipal functions only. Native courts, begun in the Western Plain Province soon after occupation, were formally set up by a Proclamation of 1942 at Keren, Barentu, Agordat, Tessenei and Massawa. Qadhi's courts functioned where appropriate and were made in 1942 dependent on the local senior

Civil Affairs Officers in each province and not on the Legal Branch at the headquarters of the Administrations. The British Political Officers generally, in conformity with British colonial practice, were given judicial functions according to their seniority and responsibility. The police force, also organised on standard British colonial practice, was centrally controlled from the seat of Government and uniform throughout the country. Tax collection and local finance became part of the normal duties of the district officers and not the responsibility of a separate service. Immediate and future policy had been discussed at meetings between the Chief Political Officer, the Controller of Finance and Accounts, the D.C.P.O. and his staff in April at Asmara, within two days of its occupation. The agenda was, inevitably, mainly concerned with immediate problems, but these could not be tackled without some picture of the policy intended. The general lines referred to in the earlier part of this record were discussed in their practical application; the outcome of them only took final form in the following September.

The most immediate problems were food, currency and relief. At the moment of occupation of Asmara about six weeks foodstuffs were found available. Except for milk for infants there was enough to ensure that the population would not starve. The Italian rationing system was, in default of any practicable alternative, maintained and had to be left under Italian control until enough staff could be found to supervise it. It was expected that some foodstuffs could be made available through military channels from the Sudan and other sources open to G.H.Q., M.E., in Cairo to take care of future requirements. A supply branch of the Military Administration was immediately set up. A central store in Asmara was taken over and additional warehouses were requisitioned to centralise all distribution to wholesalers and retailers with Italian subordinate personnel and British officers in charge. This system, with proper records and book-keeping instituted from the outset, continued in force throughout the next three years.

But food was not the only problem. With the defeat of the Italian Army and a cessation of all economic life, large numbers of Italians had become destitute and had no sources from which to draw funds to purchase even what food was available. In the absence of staff and records, it was decided to pay relief in cash, as a more expeditious and simpler method than the alternative one of issuing relief in kind in soup kitchens or by vouchers on food suppliers. But this monetary relief had also to be handed over to the Italians to administer, as soon as it was ascertained that the Secretary-General and his staff would co-operate. Their

co-operation was valuable but abuses and speculation occurred. It was only in October, 1941, that enough British staff was available to take over the administration of relief from the Italian officials. From then on relief was administered in close association with the Labour office of the British Military Administration, relief being refused to those unwilling to accept available work. Later on, when owing to dearth of accommodation for reasons which will be shown civilians had to be evacuated from Asmara and other centres to accommodation camps, relief was refused to those who declined to go. For those who were transferred relief in the accommodation camps took the form largely of relief in kind.

In the period prior to the transfer of the relief organisation to wholly British control the Italian officials concerned in the administration were the subject of a special investigation, in the summer of 1941, by the Chief Accountant of Political Branch. He ascertained that about £125,000 had been paid out in relief in excess of agreed scales, unnecessarily or abusively over the period of six months from the time of occupation. Permission was sought from the War Office to write off this sum as an unavoidable expenditure due to the lack of staff and control in the early days, and this was granted. But a breakdown had been avoided and there had been no real distress. The monthly rates of relief fixed were in any event very modest and varied from time to time according to the cost of living. The abuses had largely taken the form of duplicated payments, or of payments to people who were also receiving wages. The rates initially fixed in 1941 when the British control became effective, and raised in November, 1942, again to conform with increased costs, were as follows:—

		<i>East Africa shillings per month</i>	
		<i>Initial rate</i>	<i>Nov. 1942 rate</i>
White families	1st Member	40	45
	2nd „	20	30
	3rd „	15	27
	4th „	10	24
	5th „	5	21
	6th „	5	18
Nuns		18	18
Orphans—White or Half-Caste		10	22·5

As soon as the C.P.O. and C.F.A. returned to Cairo from Asmara in April, 1941, they took steps to secure assistance from the American Red Cross to deal with destitution, especially among the women and children. The American Red Cross, thanks to the

intervention of the Foreign Office through H.M. Ambassador in Washington, was able to bring much needed help by diverting Middle East stocks of food which had been intended for Greece. In order to ensure proper distribution and control Political Branch G.H.Q. asked the American Red Cross itself to undertake the local distribution. This proved to be contrary to the principles of the American Red Cross administration which desired to limit its scope to handing over the supplies to the Administration on the spot. With the U.S.A. then still neutral, the British Military Administration might have laid itself open to criticism by dealing with the distribution itself. The services of a representative of the Red Cross of South Africa were therefore secured to take charge : Political Branch, by now removed to Nairobi, remained responsible through its Cairo agent and the Military Movement Services for shipping the goods to Eritrea. The whole organisation worked well and did everything that was expected of it, from the view points of both the American Red Cross and the Italian population. With the entry of the U.S.A. into the war this very welcome assistance came to an end, but by then the British Military Administration was itself sufficiently staffed and organised to deal with the relief problem which had also become more manageable in size. Under the more evolved administration of 1942 a means test was applied to applicants for relief, taking account as to 66·6% the earnings of minors and dependent persons in part time employment and as to 100% remittances received by dependants from prisoner-of-war separation allowances.

Before passing from the subject of immediate relief it should be recorded that when the occupying troops in Asmara, many of whom were Indian, discovered the shortage of milk and the distress which this was causing in the infant and child population, the men, of their own initiative, set aside part of their own milk ration for distribution until the American Red Cross supplies arrived. This generosity, especially coming from Indian troops to whom their milk ration meant so much, was deeply appreciated by the Italians.

The third urgent and important matter to be settled was that of the currency. The rates of exchange for the currencies likely to be used and the announcement of new legal tender currencies had to be settled as soon as possible. General Platt's troops from the Sudan carried, and were paid in, Egyptian currency which was therefore declared legal tender. It was not anticipated that Maria Theresa dollars would have to be used as in Ethiopia, but that East African currency would one day circulate when General Platt's

and General Cunningham's troops met. The Indian rupee was in some use on the Red Sea coast owing to commercial contracts with Aden. Here, as in other Italian territories, it was desired to avoid valorising or in anyway appearing to guarantee Italian currency at any rate of exchange. Provision was therefore made to use Egyptian currency as the main legal tender, with Italian currency acceptable for official purposes in the form of small change only, at the rate of 496 lire = £1 Egyptian, or 480 lire = £1 sterling. It was recognised that many persons, tribes and bodies having to make payment for taxes, food supplies, etc., to the Administration would only have large denomination Italian currency. The Administration was instructed to avoid wherever possible taking much currency and, when taken, not to pay it out again so as not to give the impression that the British Authority was prepared to use or recognise Italian currency generally. This policy eventually worked successfully, but during the early weeks the instructions were not fully adhered to either by the Administration or by the Army Paymasters, and in consequence Italian currency remained for some time more in vogue and more popular than had been intended. The rate in practice adopted in the markets of the towns was 25 lire = 1 shilling or 10 piastres, the equivalent of about 500 lire = £1 sterling.

The position straightened itself out, especially after the establishment in June of the branch of a British bank at Asmara. This bank was entrusted with the agency for exchange transactions and control by the Finance Branch of the Administration. Holders of currencies other than Egyptian and Italian could there obtain the former in exchange, at the official rates. Drafts in foreign currencies for trade remittances were also available to the public, subject to import licences from the Trade Branch of the Administration based on local necessary requirements. At Massawa an active trade in piece goods and certain foodstuffs from the Arabian coast, including Aden, and from the Persian Gulf sprang up as soon as dhow traffic was permitted. This trade was, in earlier days, largely transacted in Maria Theresa dollars for which supplies were made available in order to give encouragement to merchants. By the end of the summer of 1941 Egyptian currency as legal tender had in practice ousted Italian currency. The initial rate of 1 lira = 1 piastre fixed in the Western Plain Province prior to the occupation of Asmara was suspended by the new enactments and caused little or no hardship or speculation, thanks to the character of the nomads or semi-nomads who were more interested in barter than currency. The rate of 480 lire = £1 sterling caused more

consternation among the Italian official population than among the trading and banking communities in Asmara and Massawa which had few illusions about the real worth of Italian currency. The economic development and financial arrangements in Eritrea are discussed more fully in the chapters devoted to finance.

Perhaps the most immediate material problem at the moment of occupation was the supply of electric power. The power supply for Asmara, except for an emergency or stand-by plant, came from Massawa—and Massawa was still in enemy hands. More important than power for lighting was the power for pumping water from the Asmara catchment basins to the town. Happily the power line to Massawa was undamaged, as was the telephone line used to control and operate the power system. While the Royal Engineers were working with Italian help on the stand-by electric power plant, messages were telephoned to the enemy at Massawa pointing out the distress which would be caused to the civilian population if the power were cut off. The communications had the desired effect and power was maintained long enough to avoid a breakdown while the stand-by plant was being put into operation.

This telephonic link with the enemy was also utilised by the G.O.C.-in-C. to call on the Italian Admiral commanding in Massawa to surrender the town to avoid further bloodshed. The Admiral replied that he must first consult Rome by wireless, as he could not surrender without being attacked. He was apparently directed to resist since in due course he replied in that sense, but a combined attack from the Asmara direction and from a party including Free French troops advancing down the coast from the north quickly terminated resistance, and Massawa was entered on the 8th April, 1941. Within a few days the old colony of Eritrea was clear of the enemy except for Assab and the surrounding districts. The remnants of General Frusci's forces joined the remnants of the Ethiopian forces from Addis Ababa at Amba Alagi where the Italian Viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, took command in person. They held out until the 16th May when, after a combined attack by General Platt's forces which had been joined by a South African Brigade from General Cunningham, and by Ethiopian Patriot formations under Ras Seyum, Amba Alagi was surrendered by the Duke of Aosta to General Platt in person. On the 18th May the remnants of the Italian Army marched out of their positions with military honours.

Massawa presented almost as difficult an administrative problem as Asmara. The local population was very mixed, the climate bad and sanitary conditions appalling. In spite of demolitions and

blockships in the harbour, and numerous German and Italian vessels scuttled in the roads, Massawa was rapidly cleared sufficiently to be used as a base for the concluding phase of the East African campaign. In the course of 1941 and 1942 the remaining obstructions were finally cleared and Massawa became, in circumstances which will be related, an important Allied naval and military base. The Italian installations were serviceable and adapted to our own use. The depots and warehouses at Massawa were found well filled with valuable and miscellaneous cargo from the many German ships which had taken refuge there at the outbreak of war and from numerous Italian vessels immobilised there since May, 1940. But the sanitary and housing conditions, especially in the native town, were deplorable. Nothing had been done to cope with the large increase of native population consequent upon the development of Massawa as a great military base for the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, and subsequent colonial expansion. Most of the natives lived in unsanitary wooden hovels on the mainland behind the harbour. The island containing the harbour and the old Arab town, though dirty, was more solidly built. But the layout of the whole place made health conditions particularly difficult owing to the numerous creeks, inlets and salt pans which intersect the various parts of the settlement. Climatic conditions are among the worst in the world; they are mitigated only by the 7,000 ft. plateau behind the narrow coastal strip, where Europeans can go for fresher air and recuperation.

A serious conflagration in the Italian military supply and arms stores in the Campo di Marte destroyed a large part of the native town. The resultant open space was maintained, since rebuilding was impossible, but overcrowding became worse than ever, and it says a great deal for the Military Administration that no serious epidemic ever broke out in Massawa, in spite of the gloomiest forebodings. Luckily yellow fever, which had by this period spread to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, never reached the coast where the mosquito carrier is prevalent. As a precaution, mass inoculation of the population was undertaken by the Rockefeller Yellow Fever Research Centre of Entebbe (Uganda) as a result of a survey undertaken by that organisation at the request of Political Branch. Mass inoculation was also undertaken in the Barentu area of Western Plain Province.

The first and most immediate requirement of the Military Administration after the occupation of Eritrea was a police force. The D.C.P.O. had arrived with a dozen native police borrowed from the Sudan Government. The Italian police were directed to

carry on, but there was never any intention of relying on them. The Italian police force consisted in the main of the "Polizia Africa Italiana", a Fascist creation of doubtful antecedents and bad reputation among Italians and natives alike. It was considered undesirable and impracticable to maintain the P.A.I. or the native carabinieri under a British cadre owing to past associations and a totally different police outlook. There was also a corps of Carabinieri with Italian and native gendarmes. But the Italian Carabinieri, a military police corps under the Italian Ministry of War for organisation and discipline, and, in Italy, under the Ministry of the Interior for police duties, had fought against General Platt's forces as a military formation at Keren. A new Eritrean police force of native rank and file with British cadres had therefore to be recruited and trained. In the interval a few more policemen were borrowed from the Sudan and the new recruits to the force, with military patrols, undertook the police duties, together with a few carefully selected Italian police officers and non-commissioned officers. In the first period Italian white police were only used on clerical work, but in due course British police methods began to inspire so much confidence and admiration that even Italian personnel expressed the desire to receive our training, and in the end proved useful and apt. But the early days were not easy and Italian police as well as Italian prison personnel on more than one occasion connived at the escape of Italian malefactors, both offenders against our Proclamations as well as ordinary criminal offenders.

One of the first attempts of the Italian Secretary-General to exert sovereign authority was made in connection with the use of Italian police and military personnel in the new police force. He took the view that before such personnel could be used they must be provided with his permission individually to serve in the British Military Administration police force. He proceeded to issue such individual permits on the grounds that the men needed an indemnity to release them from their obligations to the Italian Government. This procedure was of course not countenanced and no difficulty was experienced in recruiting men without any such Italian intervention.

The final form taken by the Eritrean police consisted of three divisions ; a mixed force of foot police for the towns and settled places ; camel mounted formations for the south-west and south-eastern districts along the Ethiopian and Sudanese Frontiers ; and mule mounted units for the countryside generally and to form a striking force for the frontier raiding parties. To these were

added a marine detachment for Massawa port and dhow control, whose duties required considerable organisation in view of the age-old traffic across the Red Sea and as far afield as the Hadramaut coast and Persian Gulf. Control was all the more important in view of the Vichy administration on the French Somali coast, which for a period we were seeking to blockade, and some surviving Italian influence in Sana'a on the Arabian coast. Thither some of the more enthusiastic Fascists from Eritrea had escaped and were, in the early days, trying to conduct somewhat desultory intrigues in the rather unwilling and perfunctory sanctuary afforded them by the Iman. Although these intrigues were never very serious there was always a danger of leakage of military intelligence. In the precarious position in which we frequently were in 1941-1943 in the Middle East, the prevention of such leakage needed constant care and afforded anxiety to the security organisations of G.H.Q. in Cairo. A system of dhow registration and control was developed by the British Military Administration in Eritrea, even in advance of what was done in Aden. The police maritime patrols also provided the only communication which existed between Assab and the rest of Eritrea when that district was taken over by the Asmara administration.

Prison organisation in Eritrea proved a difficult subject. The Italian organisation suffered from almost every possible defect, including overcrowding, malnutrition and corruption. An example was the penal settlement on Nocra Island, off the Eritrean coast, which was cleared of its 465 inmates as soon as communication could be established and transport secured. The settlement was on a torrid island with no supply of water; this had to be brought from the mainland in water boats and was always insufficient. Nocra was mainly used for political prisoners and deserters and all but 133 of the prisoners were released immediately. The records of the remainder were investigated, as were those of all the other prison inmates on the mainland. The supervision of the five Italian prisons, each of which had been a separate self-contained unit with a prominent Fascist in charge, was transferred in August, 1941, from the Legal Adviser's department to that of the Commissioner of Police of the Military Administration, and a prison service was instituted with a British Superintendent and subordinate British staff in charge. An Italian concentration camp was taken over to mitigate overcrowding in the prisons and to permit of alterations and cleansing of the prison premises. By the middle of 1942 prison industries for the manufacture of clothes, footwear, cord, mats, etc., had been started, as well as a separate reformatory

for juveniles. At the end of 1942 the prison population consisted of 199 European males, 5 European females, 2,235 Native males and 67 Native females. During 1943, 612 European males, 4 European females, 10,936 Native males and 329 Native females were admitted to prison. The daily average prison population for December, 1943, was 2,144 males, 59 females and 216 juveniles.

The public health organisation consisted initially of two British officers who took charge of the Italian civil medical service. This consisted of 68 Italian officers, a number of nuns and hospital staff. The service was reorganised according to the recommendations of Dr. Kauntze, at that time Director of Medical Services in Uganda. The organisation included two principal hospitals, one of over 600 beds at Asmara and one of 400 beds at Massawa. An adequate supply of Italian medical stores was happily captured in addition to large quantities of military medical stores. Italian legislation on public health was satisfactory but its enforcement most inadequate. In 1942 the British Military Administration medical staff was increased by four officers from Palestine. The public health administration in due course took over health duties in the port of Massawa.

It was appreciated from the very outset that the duties of the department of the Custodian of Enemy Property would prove important and difficult. The initial staff proved not only far from adequate in numbers, but also unsatisfactory in that the senior officer concerned had insufficient experience. The problem which he and his successors had to face might well have daunted anyone. In addition to the normal duties of the department in taking over concerns which had no adequate or proper local management, abandoned property and State property not required by the military authorities, the Custodian found himself concerned with several million pounds worth of goods of all sorts at Massawa, and, as it later transpired, also at Assab. Some of them were perishable. The goods were stored in the Italian military depots and were largely unrecorded, or the records had been concealed or destroyed. In point of fact many of the bills of lading of these ships were later discovered at Addis Ababa. Some of these goods were owned by, or pledged to, British banking and commercial houses. During and immediately following the occupation of Massawa a considerable amount of looting took place by the local population, including Italians, and by troops both for private gain as well as for the official or unofficial requirements of units. In fact looting and pilfering, largely due to inadequate and unreliable guards, was not brought to an end until well into May, 1941.

During the first period the Custodian's department consisted of one British officer and a few Levantine clerks. A number of unauthorised sales and improper disposal of goods, including non-perishables, took place which led to a Court of Inquiry being held in July and eventually to the conviction and imprisonment of certain clerical personnel. The staff of the department was strengthened and eventually the Senior Custodian from Political Branch took up his residence in Asmara to keep better control. By the end of the year the position had been satisfactorily dealt with and adequate records were compiled of what was left of these stores after the fire at Massawa in August, 1941, and of their ultimate disposal. The goods required for military purposes during the years 1942 and 1943, both at Massawa and Assab, were duly requisitioned and recorded: other goods required for the economy of the country were sold under authority by public auction. The other principal activities of the department were the management of immovable property, and the collection of rents thereon, for absentee owners, and the temporary or more permanent management of concerns, including para-statal concerns with a preponderant Italian State interest. Included in the latter category was the hotel at Asmara which had been run by a semi-state concern. The bank accounts of absentee holders were vested in the Custodian, who also dealt with the monetary and other assets of the Italians who were repatriated from Eritrea in 1942. The funds of the Custodian were kept in the central treasury of the Administration; the accounts were supervised by the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts and audited by the Chief Accountant or Inspector-General or Accounts.

The other departments of Government were so closely concerned with local developments from the end of 1941 to the end of 1943 that they cannot be properly dealt with except in the context of those developments which there is space to record.

The British Military Administration of Eritrea came into legal existence with the crossing of the frontier between the Sudan and Italian Territory as a result of the No. 1 or Empowering Proclamation, signed by the G.O.C.-in-C., General Platt, on the 5th February, 1941, at Khartoum. This and all subsequent proclamations, apart from being posted in public places, were printed in the "Eritrea Gazette," which was published in English and Italian and endowed with appropriate legal authority by Proclamation No. 13 of the 14th May, 1941. The form of administration remained unchanged until the 1st August, 1941, when the first phase was considered to have come to an end and the title of the

D.C.P.O. was changed to that of Military Administrator by an appropriate instrument defining his new authority and powers. This instrument, Eritrea Proclamation No. 26 of the 20th July, 1941, signed by the C.-in-C., Middle East, then General Sir C. Auchinleck, vested in the Chief Political Officer (Major-General Sir P. Mitchell) "all the legislative, executive, political and administrative functions now vesting in the General Officer Commanding H.M. Forces in the said territory . . .," with effect from the 1st August, 1941. The Chief Political Officer in his turn delegated to Brigadier Kennedy-Cooke, the Military Administrator, the powers to sign proclamations and to carry on the administration subject to reference to himself on the reserved subjects mentioned in the authority. When in October, 1941, the territory of Eritrea was transferred from Middle East to East Africa Command, the transference of the powers of the C.-in-C., Middle East, to the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa, was effected by a formal instrument. The same process was followed when, on the 1st February, 1942, the territory was transferred back from East Africa Command to Middle East.

The change of the relative positions of the Military-Administrator and the senior military officer commanding the British troops in Eritrea consequent upon the proclamation of the 20th July, 1941, was justified by the cessation of operations in and near the territory. These relations between the two officers concerned were worked out in practice by close personal contact. The position gradually crystallised into the two parallel organisations of the Military Administration and the Area Command, with the technical staffs of each organisation separately responsible in the civil and military fields to their own senior officer but in close contact with each other at all levels. The guiding principle was that the Military Administrator with his staff was responsible for all government and for law and order; the Area Commander was responsible for defence and his troops were available to be called upon by the Military Administrator in the event of public disturbance of a major nature. In practice military patrols were occasionally called for and placed at the disposal of the Military Administration; these dealt with raids by tribes on the southern frontiers in incidents which, though troublesome, all proved to be of minor importance.

With the change of status of the Military Administrator on the 1st August, 1941, and the transfer of the territory from Middle East to East Africa Command, the time had also come to revise and formalise the instructions of the Chief Political Officer to the

Military Administrator. Since developments in Italian Somaliland had also moved as far as they had in Eritrea, the opportunity was taken to issue the same instructions to the Administrator of that territory. These instructions, which became the model for other territories and are themselves a model of what such instructions should be, can appropriately be reproduced here:—

“ INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

SOMALIA

ERITREA

“ 1. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

The Military Administrator is charged with full administrative power within the occupied territory, which shall be exercised in accordance with Section III of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land contained in an Annex to the Hague Convention, 1907. While carrying out his duties with firmness, he will, as far as possible, exercise forbearance towards the occupied territory and its inhabitants.

“ 2. LAWS GENERALLY TO CONTINUE IN FORCE

The Military Administrator shall recognise the civil and penal laws of the occupied territory as valid in so far as military exigencies shall permit and in so far as they are not deemed to be contrary to natural justice or equality.

“ 3. THE COURTS

In so far as it is practicable and desirable to do so, the Military Administrator shall authorise the courts which have hitherto administered the civil and criminal law of the occupied territory to continue to sit and when the functionaries of such courts are not willing or available to carry out their duties or if for any reason the Military Administrator considers that they should not be permitted to do so, he is hereby empowered, if he sees fit, to appoint other suitable persons in their stead.

“ 4. TRIAL OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES

For the trial of all criminal offences (other than those which the Military Administrator may deem suitable for trial by any existing courts of the occupied territory) and for the proper enforcement of proclamations, orders, regulations or the like, the Military Administrator shall establish such courts as may be approved by the Chief Political Officer, and such courts shall be empowered to hear cases and impose upon convicted persons the penalties prescribed.

“ 5. CONFIRMATION OF DEATH SENTENCES

A sentence of death imposed by any court in the occupied territory shall not be carried into execution unless and until the proceedings are confirmed by the Chief Political Officer or by any officer to whom the said power of confirmation is delegated by the Chief Political Officer.

“ 6. COLLECTION OF TAXES, ETC.

(a) In exercising his administrative powers the Military Administrator shall cause all state taxes to be collected. Such collection shall be made, as far as possible, in accordance with the laws and regulations in existence and the assessment in force. The Military Administrator shall not create any new taxes.

(b) The Military Administrator shall cause proper accounts to be kept of all monies and stores received and expended by him and shall forward such accounts at specified intervals to the Chief Political Officer in such form as he may require.

“ 7. CONTRIBUTIONS

If the needs of the army of occupation or the costs of administering the occupied territory warrants it, the Military Administrator, with the prior approval of the Chief Political Officer, may levy a contribution on the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

“ 8. RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES

Public worship shall be permitted and the religious convictions of the inhabitants of the occupied territory shall be respected. Full liberty shall be accorded to all clergy provided that they refrain from reference to politics and do not use their position to incite any of the inhabitants to resistance or revolt.

“ 9. EDUCATION

Schools and educational establishments shall be permitted to continue their ordinary activities, provided that the teachers refrain from reference to politics and submit to the inspection of their schools.

“ 10. MEDICAL AND SANITARY ORGANISATION

In so far as it is practicable and desirable to do so hospitals, asylums and sanitary institutions shall be kept open and all the sanitary measures shall be continued with such additional measures as the Military Administrator shall deem necessary.

“ 11. RULES UNDER WHICH PROCLAMATIONS ARE TO BE ENACTED

Subject to the provisions of Article 12 the Military Administrator may make laws for the administration of the occupied territory

and in the making of such laws shall observe, as far as practicable, the following rules:—

- (a) *Form of Enacting Proclamation* : All laws shall be styled 'Proclamations,' and the enacting words shall be 'Proclaimed by the Military Administrator of Somalia.'
Eritrea.'
- (b) *Proclamations to be Numbered and Methodically Arranged* : All Proclamations shall be distinguished by titles, and shall be divided into successive articles or paragraphs, consecutively numbered, and to every article shall be annexed in the margin a short summary of its contents. The Proclamations of each year shall be distinguished by consecutive numbers, commencing in each year with the number 'one.'
- (c) *Different subjects not to be mixed in same Proclamation* : No Article to be introduced foreign to what Title of Proclamation imports. Each different matter shall be provided for by a different Proclamation, without intermixing in one and the same Proclamation such things as have no proper relation to each other ; and no article is to be inserted in, or annexed to, a Proclamation which shall be foreign to what the title of such Proclamation imports, and no perpetual article shall be part of any temporary Proclamation.

" 12. DESCRIPTION OF PROCLAMATIONS NOT TO BE ENACTED

(1) The Military Administrator shall not (except in the cases hereunder mentioned) enact any Proclamation of any of the following classes, namely :

- (a) Any Proclamation relating to marriage or divorce.
- (b) Any Proclamation affecting rates of exchange, banking and the currency of the occupied territory.
- (c) Any Proclamation imposing taxation or a contribution.
- (d) Any Proclamation relating to postal matters.
- (e) Any Proclamation relating to telegraphs, telephones, wireless telegraphy, railways or ports.
- (f) Any Proclamation relating to immigration or emigration.
- (g) Any Proclamation relating to Courts.
- (h) Any Proclamation relating to the Press.
- (i) Any Proclamation relating to Monopolies.
- (j) Any Proclamation relating to other subject-matter which the Chief Political Officer may from time to time specify.

- (k) Any Proclamation relating to any matter which, in the opinion of the Military Administrator, is of an extraordinary nature and importance.
- (l) Any Proclamation containing measures to which the consent of the Chief Political Officer has been refused, or which have been disallowed by him.

PROVISION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY FOR THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF A PROCLAMATION

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article, the Military Administrator is authorised to enact any Proclamation of the classes therein numerated if :

- (a) the Military Administrator shall have previously obtained the instructions of the Chief Political Officer in regard thereto ; or
- (b) such Proclamation contains an article suspending its operation until the Chief Political Officer shall have signified his approval thereto by notice in the Gazette ; or
- (c) The Military Administrator shall have satisfied himself that an urgent necessity exists requiring that such Proclamations be brought into immediate operation,

but in any such case, the Military Administrator is to transmit to the Chief Political Officer by the earliest opportunity the Proclamation so enacted together with his reasons for enacting it.

PROCLAMATIONS TO BE SENT TO THE CHIEF POLITICAL OFFICER DULY AUTHENTICATED

(3) When any Proclamation shall have been enacted the Military Administrator shall transmit to the Chief Political Officer for his approval, disallowance, or other direction thereupon, a full and exact copy in triplicate of the same, together with a marginal summary of each provision, duly authenticated by his own signature. Such copy shall be accompanied by such explanatory observations as may be required to exhibit the reasons and occasions for making such Proclamation.

(4) The Chief Political Officer may disallow any Proclamation, wholly or in part, within sixty days from its enactment, and upon such disallowance being publicly notified, the provisions so disallowed shall thereupon cease to have effect, but without prejudice to anything lawfully done or suffered thereunder.

PROCLAMATIONS TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE GAZETTE

(5) All Proclamations, regulations, rules, orders, directions and the like shall be published in the Gazette.

“ 13. POWER OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION TO ENACT LEGISLATION UNDER ITALIAN LAW

Whenever by any Italian statute, ordinance or any other law whatsoever any jurisdiction, power or authority is vested in the Italian Governor, either individually or in Council, and such jurisdiction, power and authority has been vested in the Military Administrator by Proclamation, he may enact the necessary legislation for the purpose of exercising such jurisdiction, power and authority, having due regard to the provisions of Sub-Article 12 (1).

“ 14. GRANTING OF A PARDON, REMISSION OR COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE

Subject to the powers of confirmation and commutation vested by law in the Military Administrator, the power of

- (a) granting a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, to any convicted person ;
- (b) remission or commutation of a sentence passed on a convicted person, or any respite of the execution of such sentence ; and
- (c) remission of any fine, penalty or forfeiture ;

shall be reserved to the Chief Political Officer.

“ 15. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DURING TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

In the event of the Military Administrator having occasion at any time temporarily to be absent from the occupied territory or from the Headquarters thereof, or if he is otherwise prevented from exercising powers of his office, he may, by an instrument under his hand, appoint any fit person to be his Deputy within the territory for so long as it shall be necessary, and in that capacity to exercise, perform and execute for and on behalf of the Military Administrator by these instructions.

“ 16. GUIDING PRINCIPLES REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN OCCUPANT AND CIVILIAN POPULATION

In all relations between the occupant and the civil population, the guiding principles should be :

- (1) to watch against any attempt to endanger the occupation, or the safety, maintenance and requirements of the occupant, and subject to this,
- (2) to seek to institute and preserve a state of order, work and peace for the civil population.

Having regard to the close contact which must arise with the civil population, especially when occupation extends over a long period, it is essential that all officials of the administration of the occupied territory should avoid unnecessary friction with the members of such civil population, but, if occasion should arise, any infraction of essential obligations on the part of the population must be met with all necessary severity within the limits of the law which are applicable. Such officials should be acquainted with these definite objects and the Military Administrator shall instruct them specifically as to their correct behaviour towards local officials and civilians.

“ 17. PROGRESS REPORTS

As soon as possible after the 31st day of December, 1941, the Military Administrator shall transmit to the Chief Political Officer a report as to the progress and results of his administration of the occupied territory up to and including that date, and thereafter at the end of each half year. GIVEN under my hand at Nairobi this 2nd day of September, 1941.

(Signed) P. E. MITCHELL
Major-General,
Chief Political Officer.”

By the end of the summer of 1941 Eritrea and Ethiopia with their considerable urban populations and Italian Somaliland had been taken over and brought under administration. The total British staff available by September, 1941, including that in British Somaliland, was even then only 270. This was about the number of the European staff of Nyasaland which is one-twentieth the size and has one-eighth of the population of Italian East Africa and British Somaliland. The administration was necessarily somewhat perfunctory but nevertheless had that direction and policy which in 1942 and 1943 were to develop into more formal an administrative machine. Major questions had been tackled, ranging from currency problems of considerable complexity to political and diplomatic relations with the Ethiopian authorities. The staff, while still entirely inadequate, had been able to deal with every emergency which had arisen. Also there had been no breakdown anywhere of administration, law and order, or supply : neither had there been famine, epidemic or unrest.

The difficulties which were foreseen in administering and

feeding those large bodies of Italian civilians in the then state of our resources in the Middle East had been a real source of anxiety to the Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell, who accepted the problem as sufficiently real and imminent to be taken into careful consideration in his strategic plans. He had had confidence that the then embryonic organisation under Sir P. Mitchell was adequate to deal with the problems, and he so recorded his views. In his despatch of the 28th May, 1942, covering the despatches of Generals Platt and Cunningham on the East African Campaigns, General Wavell wrote:—

“ About the same time (as the fall of Keren) I had to decide whether to authorise General Cunningham to go on to Addis Ababa. I had originally intended to halt the operation after the capture of Dire Dawa and the reoccupation of British Somaliland, since I had urgent need . . . of certain units under General Cunningham's command. Also it seemed to me that the occupation of Addis Ababa would confront us with an embarrassment of very great numbers of Italian civilians . . . I found, however, General Cunningham was quite confident of capturing Addis Ababa and of dealing with the civilian population . . . I had begun preparations for the administration of every occupied territory in Italian East Africa as early as December, 1940, and a nucleus organisation was in existence at the time the occupation began. So rapidly, however, did the advance proceed, especially in the south, that it was almost impossible for administration to keep pace. In the circumstances it reflects the greatest credit on Sir Philip Mitchell, Brigadier Lush and Brigadier Hon. F. R. Rodd (Lord Rennell) and others that so much was accomplished and that there was no general breakdown of administration or of law and order.”

At the end of 1942, however, some difficulties arose on the appointment of a new Area Commander. This Commander took the view, with the concurrence of the G.O.C. Troops in the Sudan under whose command came the Eritrea Area, that he was also ultimately responsible for the Military Administration. The matter was referred to London and the Secretary of State for War transmitted his views to the C.-in-C., Middle East, through Major-General Lord Rennell, the Chief Political Officer, East Africa Command, who happened to be leaving London at the time on his return to Africa. But it was found that the C.-in-C., Middle East, General (Field Marshal Viscount) Alexander, had already settled the matter independently on the spot, in accordance with the views of the Secretary of State. The instructions which

General Alexander caused to be issued are of some historical interest ; they read as follows:—

“ GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MIDDLE EAST FORCES.

“ SUBJECT : *Administration of ERITREA.*
Major-General Commanding SUDAN.

1. In view of the development of the Military situation in ERITREA, as from 1st March the main responsibility for the Administration of the Territory will pass to the Military Administrator under the changed title of ‘ Chief Administrator ’.

The change of title is about to be announced by Proclamation over the signature of the Chief Political Officer (now ‘ Chief Civil Affairs Officer, M.E.F.’).

2. Concurrently, the role of the Area Commander becomes that of O.C. Troops, who remains responsible for the Command, training and administration of the troops and military establishments located in the area.

3. For the present at any rate there will be no reduction in the troops located in ERITREA and the purely military responsibilities of the Area Commander in respect of the Command and administration of these troops remain unchanged. He is, however, relieved of responsibility for the Military Administration of the occupied enemy territory.

4. In this latter connection his military responsibilities become those of ‘ Duties in Aid of the Civil Power ’ should the necessity arise.

5. As, however, the military authority, the composition of his staff, and financial authority of the Area Commander in respect of his purely military duties are governed by his title as ‘ Area Commander ’ that title must remain unchanged.

(Signed) W. G. LINDSELL

3rd March, 1943.

Lieut.-General i/c Administration.”

The tenor of this order followed the terms of Eritrea Proclamation No. 26 of the 20th July, 1941, which it really did no more than reaffirm ; but it had the effect of defining once and for all the status and responsibilities of an Area Commander and O.C. Troops in an occupied territory which has ceased to be an operational area. This status and responsibility were in fact defined as being analogous to those of an O.C. Troops in any British Dependency in peace time. The War Office instructions to the Commander-in-Chief on the functions of the Chief Political Officers concerned followed the same tendency and policy as those referred to in a subsequent chapter.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER VI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERITREA

British Retreat from Cyrenaica Starts Rush to Eritrea — Many Plans, but no Water — American Aid gets Priority — Eritrea is Transferred to E.A.C. — Events Leading to the Formation of the "Eritrea Development Commission" — Italian Labour and Wages — The Extermination of Fascism — Food Rationing and Supplies — Trade with the East Returns — Customs and Excise — Development of Local Industries — Eritrean Newspapers — British Relations with Italians — Ras Seyum and Tigrai — The Occupation of Assab — The First Evacuation of Italians — How French Somaliland was Blockaded — Military Administration Staff and Organisation at Assab — Danakil Co-operation with the British.

CHAPTER VI

The Development of Eritrea

THE evacuation of Cyrenaica, except for Tobruk, by the British forces in 1941 and the advent of Rommel's Afrika Korps constituted, with the German occupation of the Dodecanese and Crete, a threat to the security of the military base installations in the Delta of Egypt. Air attacks on the Suez Canal Area from the enemy's recently occupied strong points in Aegean waters, and in particular the menace to our air establishments in Egypt, demanded new sites farther afield. The promise of help from the U.S.A. added weight to the problem. We had in practice lost our freedom of passage through the Mediterranean. True, we had cleared the Red Sea of Italians, but we now had only the few and congested ports of the Canal Area of Egypt to maintain our armies and the vessels supplying them. It was not desirable to add to the burden of these ports the volume of American Aid which could be established elsewhere. Thus numerous technical branches found in Eritrea a convenient alternative to Egypt and Palestine.

Eritrea provided a fine natural harbour at Massawa with many serviceable Italian installations—if they could be rehabilitated, adapted and enlarged. The plateau with its railway, ropeway and well graded road from Massawa could provide sites for base hospitals in cooler temperatures than Egypt. The Italian artisan classes could be used for engineering work. In a few brief weeks G.H.Q. Cairo was seething with plans and schemes. Every week another branch produced a scheme to use Eritrea for some purpose. By the end of the summer there were enough schemes in contemplation to absorb more than the whole Italian and trained native labour force of Eritrea. Most of the available sites where there was water, and all the available Italian military and private establishments, were earmarked several times over. Many enterprising planners and technical branches started immediately and on more than one occasion without telling anyone in the Military Government or their colleagues in other branches. A rush for the few assets which Eritrea did possess looked like developing when the Minister of State in Cairo intervened to co-ordinate the plans.

After a great deal of sorting out it was decided that American Aid should have priority. Certain of the British schemes, as for instance that of the Army Ordnance Workshops which had already begun to install themselves at Asmara, were taken over by the Americans as what came to be known as the Arsenal. In addition the Americans undertook to provide an aircraft assembly plant in two parts, near Massawa and near Asmara, an aircraft engine repair establishment, and a naval base, also at Massawa. The Royal Navy installed a major ammunition store in the old Italian underground depot, adapted and extended by American Aid, and arranged to use the Naval Base at Massawa as an important station and repair base. Two British base hospitals were set up on the plateau. The British Overseas Airways Corporation erected a repair and maintenance establishment at Asmara itself. The Italian petroleum storage tanks and installations were taken over by the British petroleum organisations for general use.

Work on these projects began in the winter of 1941-1942; in the spring of 1942 it was in full swing. By the summer, when the British were forced to evacuate Cyrenaica a second time and fell back to the line at Alamein, the projects were ready to operate and looked like becoming, not only an addition to, but the main bases of the Allied effort in the Middle East. But by the end of the year the need had disappeared and work was suspended; in 1943 the American staffs were withdrawn and Eritrea returned to its inconspicuous status as one of several occupied enemy territories in Africa, with little further contact with the war and world events. But all this is anticipating the developments which occurred in Eritrea and the British Military Administration during the period 1941-1943.

The first intimation of these plans was given during a conference with the C.-in-C., General Wavell, attended by Generals Platt and Cunningham, the Chief Political Officer, Sir P. Mitchell, and the Controller of Finance and Accounts, Lord Rennell, in Asmara on the 27th June, 1941. This conference, after dealing with certain Ethiopian matters, considered the position of Eritrea in the territories allocated to the various military commands. Political Branch, G.H.Q., Middle East, as has been recorded, had already been transferred to Nairobi. General Wavell, who was withdrawing all the troops he could from Eritrea, planned to withdraw further units from Ethiopia now that the Italians had surrendered at Amba Alagi and that no further Italian resistance, except for the isolated force at Gondar under General Nasi, was possible.

The C.-in-C. decided that, as the trunk road to Addis Ababa was open, Eritrea would be transferred to East Africa Command for civil administration and for military control. The transfer was to take place in October, 1941. This decision meant that the occupied territories administered by Political Branch became coterminous with the territories for which the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, then General Cunningham, was responsible. The convenience of having the boundaries of civil administration and military control identical, so far as Political Branch in Nairobi and the local administrations were concerned, seemed clear at the time. East Africa Command was then still subordinate to G.H.Q. Middle East, but the separation of that command as a separate entity under the War Office was envisaged. The effect of transferring Eritrea to East Africa Command and the identity of the civil administration and military areas was that the provision of stores, including food, from military sources or through military channels for the civil needs of Eritrea, devolved on Headquarters, East Africa Command and not on Headquarters, Troops in the Sudan, or on G.H.Q., Middle East—save in so far as the latter remained in ultimate control of policy in Nairobi while the surviving subordination of East Africa Command to Cairo continued. At this conference at Asmara General Wavell also announced that he was to relinquish command in the Middle East and become Commander-in-Chief in India.

But the nature and magnitude of American Aid in the Middle East did not become clear for some weeks. The first form which it took was the provision of installations by an American contracting firm, Messrs. Johnson, Drake & Piper Inc., which worked for, and under the instruction of, the U.S. Government with U.S. military personnel and U.S. civil aviation and aircraft construction personnel supervising. The original plan provided that all requirements, including food, for the American civil and military personnel working in Eritrea would come from American sources, for it had been recognised from the outset that, with the exception of labour and some Italian military engineering plant and stores, there were no local resources available. In fact local food supplies were already insufficient to feed even the local population.

Water supplies were also very short: they were indeed insufficient for local needs without substantial additions to the very inadequate Italian plant, and then only provided the rainfall on the plateau was enough to fill the existing and extended catchment basins. In the early unco-ordinated planning of base installations in Eritrea each interested party took little account of the fact that

other installations were counting on using the supplies of water which each project estimated could be made sufficient for its own purposes. It was only because directly after the occupation of Asmara work was undertaken by the Royal Engineers of General Platt's troops in conjunction with the British Military Administration of the territory that a more critical situation did not develop, and that no crisis supervened while the later more extensive water developments of 1942 were being completed with pumping machinery collected from as far afield as South Africa.

With the entry of the U.S.A. into the war after the attack on Pearl Harbour the Eritrean American Aid projects were taken over by the U.S. Army and the American contracting agent disappeared; but the schemes which were well under way continued to develop rapidly. As time went on less American requirements came in from overseas, owing to the sinking of ships and shipping delays, and the initial policy was abandoned in favour of securing as much as possible locally. Happily more useful constructional stores were found in Eritrea and Ethiopia than had been anticipated. Nevertheless the rapid growth of American and British military populations inevitably still meant a severe drain on local resources.

American specifications for the accommodation and maintenance of American personnel in Eritrea were considerably more lavish than the standards to which British personnel in Middle East and Africa generally had been accustomed. American personal and official expenditure were also greater. The repercussion on the economy and administration of Eritrea can readily be imagined. That American Aid should have everything which it was possible to supply went without saying; but priorities of supply between the American projects, the by now reduced British projects, and local needs had to be established. These priority arrangements had to cover not only material resources but also labour, which by the beginning of 1942 was insufficient to meet all needs. The organisation of the British Military Administration needed adaptation to the changed circumstances.

In October, 1941, an "Executive Board for the Co-ordination of Eritrean Projects" was set up in Asmara, consisting essentially of the Chief Secretary of the Administration and a senior staff officer of Eritrean Military Area Headquarters. In March, 1942, this body, which was not endowed with sufficient authority, gave place to the "Eritrea Projects Board", which consisted of the Military Administrator, the Area Commander, the Senior U.S. Officer in Eritrea and the heads of all services affected. The Board was endowed with executive authority over all the services of the

Military Administration and the Area Command, without further reference to the head of either of these two organisations. It worked through three sub-committees on Engineering, Transport and Labour matters. These committees, as emanations of the Board, dealt with allocation of local resources ; transport facilities on the railway, ropeway and roads ; and labour, including priorities between various projects. The chairman and secretaries of the committees were officers of the Military Administration. The R.A.F., R.N. and B.O.A.C. were represented where appropriate. The Projects Board held 45 meetings during the first four months of its existence.

In March a supply committee was set up, under the chairmanship of the D.C.F.A., to deal with the import and export of commodities for civilian use and to regulate the requisition or purchase of local commodities for the projects. In July, 1942, to the Supply Committee was added a stronger body known as the " Eritrea Development Commission " which, in the latter part of the year, merged with the former to become the body controlling, under the Military Administrator, the economic and commercial policy of the territory as regards both internal and external trade. With the termination of the American Projects in Eritrea in 1943 the Projects Board ceased to exist ; but the Development Commission continued, to deal with the economic situation.

On the 1st February, 1942, a Political Branch was created at G.H.Q. Middle East, to take over the responsibility for the administration of Cyrenaica, re-occupied for the second time, and Eritrea was transferred from East Africa to that Command. This development, necessitated by the close military and administrative connection of Middle East with Eritrea on account of the American Projects and British base installations, made no difference to the tenor of development in Eritrea itself. It certainly simplified administrative control, for with the growing contact between Cairo and Asmara adequate air communications were established. On the other hand, since the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement on the 31st January, 1942, at Addis Ababa, poor communications had tended to cut off Eritrea from Nairobi.

The economic consequences of these developments in Eritrea were precisely those which might have been anticipated. The tendency towards a rapid rise in prices due to the amount of currency in the country, both Italian and British, manifested within the first few weeks of occupation, could have been held in check by the demonetisation of the lira on the lines originally conceived. This had involved sterilising Italian currency except for small

change for all administrative purposes and its eventual replacement by a British or British controlled currency issued on a modest scale, as compared with the Italian grandiose financial commitments, to meet British Administration and purely military expenditure. In spite of the initial mistake made by the Administration in paying out Italian currency and thus tending to valorise what was in circulation and what could flow into the country from Ethiopia, the position was being recovered by a variety of devices to which resort was had, as will be mentioned in later chapters dealing with finance.

But the expenditure on the British and American projects for labour and local purchase, in the absence of any adequate supply or prospect of supply of consumer goods or investment machinery, lifted the lid off the pot in which inflation had been simmering. The Administration attempted to secure the co-operation of the British and American authorities to control labour prices. In spite of all agreed schedules minima became maxima and many branches, in competing for labour, found devious methods, such as regrading labour into unduly high categories, overtime, etc., to secure their requirements at the expense of official regulations. To these difficulties was added that of payment for local purchases. Once a decision had been reached to use all local resources in preference to importing all requirements, the classical methods of requisitioning for settlement after the war instead of local purchase would not work. The Italians, faced with the prospect of requisitioning, concealed all stocks and all plant possible. Since time was of essence to the projects, it was quite rightly decided in the summer of 1942 to purchase on a basis of imported cost or estimated replacement instead of continuing to try to requisition stores and plant. The decision had the immediate effect of disclosing many more stocks of engineering goods than had been anticipated and from the military point of view the decision was right; but the economic consequence was a very large addition to the currency put into circulation, with, given the circumstances, the inevitable results.

On the other hand this open-handed financial policy contributed in great measure to the willingness of the Italian population to work on military projects, even during the two special periods in 1941 and 1942 when the military situation of the Axis was good and our own situation in the Middle East was apparently precarious. Even during the withdrawal from Cyrenaica to Alamein in 1942 very little trouble was experienced in securing Italian labour. There was practically nothing in the form of sabotage and only a

little "uppishness" on the part of the extreme Fascist element, which had little support. Large numbers of Italian prisoners of war were employed on military work, both in organised gangs and on conditional "freedom of movement" passes, which were liable to revocation in the event of unsatisfactory behaviour. Subversive or suspected elements were from time to time interned and released or re-interned, but no large scale arrests were necessary after the initial clean-up of some 5,000 in 1941. Fascist institutions were progressively broken up or taken over and by the end of 1942, and in spite of events in North Africa, it is true to say that the vast majority of Italians in Eritrea realised that certainly Italy, and probably Germany, had lost the war.

In December, 1942, the Italian Secretary-General, who had remained the titular head of the Italian administrative personnel, was, as a precaution, arrested and interned in Kenya. Though he had done a great deal of useful work in keeping the Italian administrative machine together and the Administration owed him a real debt of gratitude for the work and collaboration he proffered and gave in the early days, he remained a professed Fascist and unwilling to adjure his doctrines or forgo what he considered to be his position as head of the Colony in the place of the Governor. His departure made no difference to the willingness of the remaining Italian officials to continue working for the Administration which they had by now fully accepted. Developments in 1943 wrought the political consequences in Eritrea which can be imagined and the movement away from all semblance of Fascism became marked, the fall of Mussolini releasing many professed Fascists from the necessity of even formal allegiance. The conviction that Italy had lost the war, and her colonies also, led to the realisation that under a British Administration the Italians in Eritrea, with all the difficulties of supply, were enjoying a greater measure of well-being and security than most of their relations in Italy. In spite of homesickness, inevitable after years of confinement in an African territory, the mass of the Italian population had not only come to accept but to appreciate the improvements in administration and their way of life under British government as compared with the Italian régime. Many Italians expressed this personal admiration and preference for British methods even under a temporary and rapidly improvised military administration in the direction of which they could have and, it must be said, expected to have, no voice.

The main problem in Eritrea from the outset was the supply of essential foodstuffs for civil consumption, European as well as

native. In default of a better, or indeed any other available alternative, the Italian rationing system was adopted and later adapted to our needs and means. The scale of European rations by the beginning of 1942 and at subsequent selected dates was as follows:—

	<i>Per European Adult per month in Kilos</i>		
	<i>Middle 1942</i>	<i>End 1942</i>	<i>End 1943</i>
Bread or	8·0	9·0	6·0
Flour	7·25	—	—
Pasta	2·75	3·0	3·0
Edible Oil	1·0	1·0	1·0
Sugar	1·5	1·0	·8

The sugar ration had been higher in 1941 but was progressively reduced as other forms of food, notably potatoes and vegetables, became available. Meat was never rationed since an adequate stock of cattle and goats existed in the country; as transportation and market organisation improved sufficient supplies came into the markets. Milk, as available in the form of tinned or fresh supplies, was rationed to 1 pint a day for expectant mothers and invalids, 1½ pints a day for children under twelve months, and ½ pint a day for other children. Of organised local fresh milk production at the time of occupation there was little or none in spite of considerable local possibilities. The Italians had preferred to import cheap tinned milk from Italy under the prevailing shipping bounties, which had killed local initiative in this field as it had done the cultivation of fresh vegetables. Steps were taken immediately after occupation to organise a milk trade and by the end of 1941 adequate, though seasonally irregular, supplies were available. In 1942 the Military Administration Agricultural Departments collected and distributed 754,175 litres: in 1943, 799,850 litres were collected of which 66% was pasteurised. The retail selling price was fixed at 1 shilling per litre, to which it was raised from 60 cts. and 75 cts. in 1942, on account of increased cost of production and improved quality, especially of cleanliness.

At the outset a rationing system was imposed in Asmara on native consumption of dhurra, the staple grain consumed, by families under the control of district chiefs and committees in the town, supervised by the District Officer for native affairs. Quantities officially available necessitated fixing a scale which was manifestly below the minimum to sustain life. The conclusion that enough grain was in fact coming into the open market at higher

prices than the official rate fixed, since no one appeared to be starving, led the Administration to try the experiment, on the advice of the Controller of Finance and Accounts, of cutting the official ration and raising the official price. There was an initial outcry but apparently no distress, and eventually the price stabilised itself not far from the so-called black market price, which was really the open market price. It was then decided to stop issuing "official" dhurra altogether and thus remove the subsidy on the official price. This process not only led to a considerable economy on the subsidised price, which was not necessarily benefiting the ultimate consumer, but encouraged local commercial channels to seek supplies from neighbouring areas, notably the Sudan, Ethiopia and to some extent the Yemen by dhow via Massawa. At the same time the Administration, judiciously liquidating its own stocks and importing on official account in bulk through Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo as well as other authorities, kept control of open market prices by the threat of underselling and achieved some reduction on the so-called black market level. This process of price control not only proved efficacious but provided a very interesting experiment in applied economics.

The development of a transit trade with Ethiopia in 1942 and 1943 contributed a good deal to the supply of native foodstuffs from the south. But the traffic was mostly by mule and away from the main roads where statistical control was possible, which made it difficult to ascertain what quantities were being imported. The same considerations applied to camel-borne trade with the Sudan. But, writing at the end of 1943, the Military Administrator expressed himself as reasonably satisfied with future prospects and reserve stocks. His comment at the time is interesting:— "After the difficulties encountered in obtaining grain from North Ethiopia last season it is expected that supplies will (now) come forward in sufficient quantities to make it unnecessary to import grain from overseas. Prices of Ethiopian grain are excessive and in saving shipping space by importing grain from Ethiopia the Administration . . . is likely to incur financial losses on reserve stocks held against contingencies. The Ethiopian Government's policy through its Grain Monopoly, of fixing high minimum prices has had serious repercussions in Ethiopia. . . Destruction of Eritrean crops by locusts seemed likely to be serious in the second half of the year and made it necessary for supplies of dhurra, taff (an Ethiopian grain), wheat and barley to be held available from outside the territory. The danger abated but it was necessary to

hold last season's reserve stocks of grain longer than would be normally desirable." Supplies of Ethiopian grain stuffs in bulk consignments and a reserve of maize in 1942 secured against a possible deficiency of native grains were arranged through M.E.S.C. the Military Supply and Transport Branch of Middle East Command initially acting for the Administration. In 1943 the bulk supply arrangements were transferred to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation acting through M.E.S.C. This Corporation also took over the bulk purchasing in Ethiopia, but not in the petty transportation trade to which allusion has been made and which contributed much to local resources and commerce.

A detailed account of the vicissitudes of supply arrangements and organisation in Eritrea would take too long to recount. Resort had frequently to be made to ingenious devices to maintain supply. Often, especially in 1941 and 1942, there were only very narrow margins of consumable reserves of grain stuffs in hand in Asmara. These reserves on more than one occasion fell to a few days' supply for the town. Neither panic nor crisis ever in fact supervened, though once a critical situation was narrowly avoided by calling into being a reserve of several hundred tons of grain which was entirely unfit for human consumption—a reserve which could never be used except as a lever for forcing out of hoard some stocks of grain which tided over the interval while a bulk consignment of grain was arriving.

The very creditable work of the Supplies Branch was ably and fully seconded by that of the Agricultural Branch which from the first set itself, with all available Italian assistance, to developing local resources and utilising uncultivated land. The success of the milk production has already been mentioned. Beginning in 1941 small groups of Italian prisoners of war were settled on plots of domain or uncultivated European concession land to produce fresh vegetables. Experiments were also undertaken in producing new or useful crops not hitherto grown to any extent; among these were coffee, tobacco, cinchona and, above all, potatoes. The demand for potatoes by the American, British and Italian population in Eritrea, combined with a virtually unlimited demand for the Middle East generally, led to a rapid growth of potato farming. By the end of 1943 the agricultural production of Eritrea was considerably greater than it ever had been in the history of the colony. The following figures of the principal crops produced and acreage under cultivation give some idea of what was achieved:—

ERITREA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

In Acres at 2.5 acres per Hectare
and in Metric Tons

	1939	1941		1942		1943	
	Tons	Acres	Tons	Acres	Tons	Acres	Tons
WHEAT	600	15,000	1,600	30,000	6,000	8,400	2,455
BARLEY	8,200	30,000	7,200	49,250	10,000	62,400	20,000
DHURRA	10,800	44,375	10,000	123,000	26,800	90,000	17,350
MAIZE	1,300	20,500	4,700	45,300	14,600	25,320	7,550
DAGUSA	5,300	7,500	1,200	16,000	3,200	16,800	5,600
MILLET	1,200	14,700	3,650	10,100	4,000	25,560	4,050
POTATOES	—	750	600	1,750	1,500	984	2,000
TOTAL	27,400	134,825	28,950	275,400	56,100	229,470	58,995

The energy required to produce this increase of production by Italian and native cultivators alike needs no emphasising.

In the delta of the Gash river, not many miles inside the Sudan-Eritrean boundary, the Italian Government had instituted a cotton growing scheme, with flood irrigation works analogous to the Kas-sala and Gash cotton growing enterprises in the Sudan. As soon as this area was occupied at the outset of General Platt's campaign arrangements were made by Political Branch for the Gash Board of the Sudan Government to undertake the supervision and administration of the concession, the Military Administration providing the services of an agricultural officer. After harvesting and marketing the growing cotton crop of 1940-1941 the area was turned over to growing food crops, mainly dhurra. The arrangement with the Gash Board was terminated in 1943 when the accounts of the Italian Company were taken over and supervised by the Custodian of Enemy Property.

The most surprising development in any branch of the Administration was on the trade and commercial side. As soon as, and even before, official permission had been given for the resumption of dhow traffic on the coast of Eritrea, local Arab, Indian and other

merchants, resumed their age-long trade with the eastern shores of the Red Sea, Aden and the Hadramaut and even as far afield as the Persian Gulf. Local initiative stood the administration in good stead, not only by producing much needed imports of piece-goods, some foodstuffs and other trade goods from the *entrepôt* of Aden, but in contributing very effectively to revenues in the form of customs duties. It was this import of trade goods which stimulated the return traffic in foodstuffs from Ethiopia and the Sudan. Eritrea was probably throughout the period 1941-1943 better supplied with native goods, especially piece-goods, than the territory deserved and relatively better than many European countries. The success of this commerce was entirely due to the deliberate policy of leaving trade to private initiative, avoiding any unnecessary government intervention and reducing the machinery for import licensing to the simplest terms possible. Owing to the nature of the trade, which was primitive and only with other controlled countries under British supervision, the machinery required could, and was, the simplest possible. Trading with the enemy was practically out of the question and leakage of foreign exchange, if it occurred at all, was of negligible proportions.

Soon after the occupation instructions of a most detailed nature were received to institute elaborate contraband controls. These included injunctions to pay particular attention to trade with such remote and improbable neutral trade connections as Latvia, the Philippines and Switzerland. It may be officially regrettable that no attention was paid to this correspondence; but it had a happy outcome. The C.F.A., after pointing out in vain that the only local trade from Eritrea and British Somaliland was by dhows which did not extend their activities as far afield as the countries listed in the instructions, and that all other shipping traffic was military and already under strict naval control, received instructions to put these controls into operation. At that time the total staff in all Italian East Africa amounted to a few score officers collected where they were available. The C.F.A., in despair and perhaps somewhat fractiously, replied that the suggested controls would require a large staff of customs and control officers and clerks, naming a substantial figure of requirements. The War Office replied that his requisition for personnel appeared rather heavy but that they would do their best. There the matter appeared to rest and nothing more was heard for some time. The C.F.A., his D.C.F.A.'s, and everyone concerned breathed sighs of relief as the months passed without any enquiry from London about what was being done. When all the to-do had

been forgotten and the rest of the world, with few exceptions, had become belligerent, obviating any of the controls desired for Italian East Africa, a large contingent of Customs and Excise officers reported for duty without any further advice of their arrival having been received. They were very welcome, even if they did not play the parts for which they had been billed !

The Customs section of the Financial Branch in Eritrea proceeded from the first moment of occupation to restore customs control and collect dues, using the Italian staff available and the services of the Italian Finance Guards on preventive duties. The latter co-operated well and proved on the whole reliable and efficient. The Italian Customs tariffs were maintained but converted to a sterling basis at the rate of 480 lire = £1 sterling, *ad valorem* duties being substituted for specific duties where necessary. The conversion of excise and stamp duties to the new currencies and bases introduced was a much more complicated affair but was eventually also achieved. New stamps had to be printed for this and other territories in order to collect stamp duties both on documentary transactions, etc., and on excisable articles attracting duty at the moment of sale.

The customs and excise revenue from the first and throughout the years under review consistently exceeded estimates. The revenues collected in the early years were as follows :—

From Occupation to 30th June, 1941	£5,057
From 1st July, 1941, to 30th June, 1942	£217,772
From 1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943	£438,589

The trade returns for the calendar years 1941, 1942 and 1943 were as follows:—

IMPORTS BY VALUES

(£ sterling)

ERITREA

Calendar years	Part of 1941	1942	1943
Cereals	54,214	78,050	26,631
Other foodstuffs	77,599	189,129	451,440
Textiles and yarns	203,304	1,029,723	834,569
Other goods	28,246	260,985	247,584
Mineral oils and products	25,683	176,360	246,633
TOTAL	389,046*	1,734,247*	1,806,857*

*Excludes Imports from Ethiopia

EXPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS

(Values in £ sterling)

ERITREA

Calendar years	Part of 1941	1942	1943
Vegetable products, raw and semi-manufactured	14,915	75,546	117,037
Animal products, raw and semi-manufactured	94,282	3,087	38,780
Manufactured products	141,745	751,324	247,944
Mineral products, including salt	9,379	45,357	58,099
Sundries	10,369	163,887	193,868
TOTAL	270,690	1,039,201	655,728

The original British staff of the Customs and Excise Section consisted for many months of one officer, assisted by another at Massawa who also had other duties. It was only after the organisation was running that additional staff arrived. This contributed greatly to increased efficiency, but emphasised the first-class job done by the original head of this important section working virtually alone. The Trade Section, in close contact with the Customs, undertook the licensing of imports and exports and did all in its power to develop not only the external but also the internal trade. The external trade licences carried with them the automatic permit to remit funds and the obligation to pay over receipts to the exchange control centred at Barclays Bank in Asmara.

The dhow trade at Massawa required the use of silver currency which was in demand on the eastern shores of the Red Sea. In order to encourage trade, stocks of M.T. dollars were made available to the Senior Political Officer in charge of Massawa province for the purpose. Prior to Assab being formally incorporated in Eritrean Administration the Senior Political Officer there took parallel steps to encourage the dhow traffic and maintained a bank account at Aden to facilitate trade remittances. The practice of using silver dollars for such purposes continued under growingly effective control throughout the period. In 1943 nearly 1,000,000 M.T. dollars were used in the Arabian trade.

On the internal side the Trade Branch found the Italians ready to exercise their ingenuity and skill to produce more than they had done under the Fascist régime. In spite of the absorption of Italian labour in the Projects, enough talent was found to produce a surprisingly large range of goods for local consumption, and even for export. The existing small cement works at Massawa were operated and in part re-equipped under technical advice from Egypt, and by the end of 1943 were producing 2,500 tons a month. An existing factory at Keren producing buttons from vegetable ivory (the nut of the dum palm) produced 3,000,000 buttons a month in 1942 and 10,000,000 in 1943, mainly on Army contracts for export to the Middle East. A local distillery, which before the war was making synthetic liqueurs and wines, was turned over to beer production : with the help of an imported brewer, by 1943 the enterprise was producing 250,000 bottles a month. Surgical alcohol was distilled from waste sugar. Among the new industries started or adapted to new requirements were glass-making (75,000 pieces a month), oil seed crushing (45 tons a month—a sufficient quantity for local needs and of which a small quantity was converted into margarine), soap (60 tons a month), caustic soda and chloride of lime (10 tons a month), matches, paint and earth colours, pottery, boots and shoes, brushes, etc.

The decline in employment in 1943 due to the termination of the Eritrean Projects gave much needed incentive to local enterprises and by the end of the year the Italians, realising that their country was no longer at war, turned to local production with great enthusiasm. This was stimulated by an undertaking given that all those who were usefully and gainfully employed would not be compulsorily repatriated. In order to encourage local enterprise and initiative the Administration organised an industrial exhibition which opened on the 21st December, 1943. 231 enterprises exhibited their products on 214 positions or stands and 121 other firms engaged in auxiliary activities also took part. The exhibition served a very useful purpose by creating interest locally and improving the morale of a population which had been cut off from home for five years. It earned great praise from such foreign visitors as circumstances permitted to attend.

Some of the enterprises started up in Eritrea under the British Military Administration were not only useful in themselves, but provided an example of what can be done without embarking on grandiose schemes and where there is local ingenuity and drive which is not obstructed by bureaucratic obstruction and control. A case in point was the production of caustic soda by electrolysis

of saline solution. The only imported equipment was a parcel of electrodes. The local electric power was used and the remaining equipment was adapted from available resources. The hydrogen was recovered and used with oxygen produced in an existing plant for welding. This enterprise made Eritrea self-sufficient in soap, with a quota available for export to Ethiopia at a time when soap supplies were extremely scarce throughout the Middle East. Another example was the manufacture of crown corks in Eritrea for the local beer and mineral water trades and for export. These articles were produced with home-made tools out of salvaged scrap metal (mainly petrol cans) and the cork contained in salvaged lifebelts. A critical need which was holding up beer production was overcome by local enterprise and without any imported machinery.

In general the measures aimed at increasing the self-sufficiency of Eritrea and decreasing unemployment consequent upon the closing down of the Eritrean Projects were successful. The success may be measured by the fact that there were 5,800 unemployed adult male Italians at the end of 1942, and 2,770 at the end of 1943. The same trend is to be noted in the figures of Italians in receipt of public assistance at the end of the two years, namely, 2,627 and 1,250. The Military Administration's comment at the end of 1943 was that—" It speaks well for the industry and adaptability of the community that by the end of the year in spite of the big drop in the Service and Project pay rolls and in the purchases and private spending by these concerns there should have been less registered unemployment and fewer persons on relief than at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless . . . the total income of the community has decreased and as at the same time the cost of living has risen the great mass of the population dependent on private industry and employment is in a more precarious state. . . . A couple of hundred Italian artisans have volunteered and have been sent to work in neighbouring territories. . . . Labour Office records which have been scrupulously kept since shortly after the occupation are now sufficiently complete to give an accurate picture. . . . They show among other details each man's complete work record during this period ".

The other administrative services of the Eritrean Administration were those which might be expected of a growingly stable British colonial administration untrammelled by tradition and precedents. The post offices were re-opened for internal and eventually for external services ; the Italian stock of stamps found on occupation was destroyed and U.K. stamps overprinted

“ M.E.F.” (Mediterranean Expeditionary Force) were used. Educational services were slow in resuming owing to the difficulty of finding and selecting teachers, school books and teaching material. By the end of 1943 there were twenty-eight native primary schools open and working. One of them was a girls' school and eight were Moslem where instruction was given in Arabic. There were five non-governmental schools for the British, Jewish, Greek, Arab and Moslem communities in Asmara and Massawa, as well as three private native schools which, like the former, were assisted by the Education Branch of the Administration. Twenty-three Italian schools were re-opened, military subjects not being permitted in the curriculum and history up to 1918 only being taught. The projects of the British Council to open an Institute in Asmara fell through ; instead, the Education Branch opened one consisting of seven class rooms, two reading-rooms and a small library.

Directly after the occupation the need was felt for a newspaper and out of very small beginnings the “ Eritrean Daily News ” was established. It was printed in English and Italian and by the end of 1943 the daily circulation was 11,000 copies. The basis of the paper since its inception was that it carried only news without comment, in addition to official announcements and advertising matter. The policy succeeded in winning the confidence of the Italian population from the first and it kept this confidence even during the darkest days of 1942 and 1943. The “ Eritrean Daily News ”, as an enterprise of the Administration, adopted a new political attitude on Italian matters with the fall of Mussolini and the Italian Armistice. The “ Eritrean Weekly News ”, a four-page paper in the language of Tigrai was also published, as well as two Italian political ephemerals.

The whole period of occupation in Eritrea was marked by little unrest or political trouble among the Italian population and a considerable measure of co-operation in Allied war enterprises against the Axis powers, including, until September, 1943, Italy. This position was gained by securing at the outset the help of the Italian Civil Services and that of the Italian titular head of the administration, the Secretary-General of the Government. Subversive or outlaw elements among the Italians continued to exist until the collapse of the Fascist régime, but they were at no times dangerous. The number of “ outlaw ” Italians living under cover steadily diminished and would probably have ceased activity altogether but for certain contacts with surviving anti-British Italian elements in Ethiopia.

By the end of 1942 Italian confidence in a successful outcome of the war so far as Italy was concerned had sunk to a very low ebb. The non-Fascist or pseudo-Fascist element was becoming more and more openly critical of the régime in their homeland. But this element was not socially the most desirable. Among the more respectable and law-abiding citizens it was considered through 1942 that to be anti-Fascist at a time when Italy was obviously suffering reverses was unpatriotic. The reverses to our arms in the Western Desert in that year tended to upset the Italians by reason of a possible change in their way of life rather than by any conviction of the ultimate success of Italian arms. After the Battle of Alamein the expectation of an ultimate victory of the Axis disappeared completely. The Italian community drew away from Fascism, accepting as the months went by the certainty of a non-Fascist future for their country. The fall of Mussolini in July, the Italian Armistice in September and finally the acceptance of Italian co-belligerency in October released thousands of lukewarm Fascists from even outward allegiance to the régime. By the end of 1943 the main body of opinion had come to believe, more or less sincerely, that the only hope for Italy lay in close collaboration with Great Britain. The local political movements, which had existed in embryo before the collapse of Italy, assumed new forms and somewhat greater importance; their existence and complexion are nevertheless too ephemeral for this record.

British personal relations with Italians during the occupation were governed by instructions from the Commanders-in-Chief which prescribed that these should be correct and courteous, without social intercourse or fraternisation. The precise definition of relations in such cases is never easy and practice is usually even more difficult.

The Administration's efforts to reconcile conflicting tendencies and points of view, on which the various branches of G.H.Q. Middle East were by no means unanimous, proved successful in practice, though not free from criticism. These efforts were assisted by the creation, in December, 1941, of a joint military and civil affairs intelligence bureau, designed to keep the Military Administrator and the Area Commander in touch with local political opinion and movements. The bureau served a useful purpose in preventing the circulation of contradictory reports.

Among the Eritrean population, half a century of Italian rule had taught respect for the Italian master and in some measure even a liking for him. As a result the Italians had found no difficulty

in getting recruits for their Askari Battalions for service in North Africa and Ethiopia. The men had been well treated and, though many deserted during the campaign, there was not much enmity to the Italian among the tribes which supplied the recruits or among the returned soldiers. The British occupation brought in its wake considerable hardships to districts such as Acchele Guzzi Province, where the pensions and remittances of Askari represented a large contribution to the economic life of a poor area. Public Assistance, which had to be given in certain cases, did not compensate for the cessation of this large source of income. British propaganda among the Eritrean population before the campaign had led to expectations which were not fulfilled. The maintenance of Italian administration in the urban centres and on the Plateau and the mere existence of Italian administrative civilians in the provinces, even though they exercised no judicial functions, was not understood by the native inhabitants. When the occupation was complete they had expected something akin to, if not outright, British annexation. In addition the necessities of agriculture led to certain native lands being used by the British military authority and, though no alienation took place or was intended, fears and grievances were voiced. An Eritrean Council was formed in the early months of 1942 to keep contact and inquire into grievances ; but as time went on the realisation that Italian rule would not return mitigated the disappointments of the beginning. The extended powers of native courts were well received and reassuring in this respect.

During the régime of the Italian East African Empire, Tigrai in Ethiopia had been included in the " government " of Eritrea, the southern part of the old Italian Colony having been historically Tigrai territory with its old capital at Axum. The Ras of Tigrai was Ras Seyum, the most locally powerful of the Ethiopian Rases, being a grandson of the Emperor John. Ras Seyum, after fighting the Italians doughtily, eventually made his submission to the Italian Authority. When, in April, 1941, he came to visit Sir Philip Mitchell it was not only to offer his services and those of his numerous lieges to fight the Italians, but also to discuss his relations with Addis Ababa.

For administrative reasons, based on the inescapable fact that with the Italians at Amba Alagi there was no communication between Addis Ababa and Tigrai, that country was administered by the Military Administration of Eritrea, as it had been in Italian times. Owing to bad communications, this arrangement continued for some weeks after the surrender at Amba Alagi.

As soon as it was possible, namely, at the beginning of July, 1941, accompanied by his wife, Ras Seyum went to Addis Ababa, where he made full submission to the Emperor. Tigrai, south of the old boundary of the colony of Eritrea, was detached from Eritrea and handed over to Ethiopia on the 1st August, 1941.

The last remaining subject to be dealt with in this necessarily very general survey of the administration of Eritrea concerns the district of Assab. This was part of the old Italian colony of Eritrea but, owing to the circumstances of its position and occupation by our forces, was not incorporated in the Military Administration of Eritrea for some time.

Assab was occupied without opposition by a British force from Aden on the 11th June, 1941, some two months after the fall of Asmara. The commander of the force had been detached for this duty from East Africa Command, which Command formally assumed responsibility for the Assab area on the 12th July when a battalion of the King's African Rifles took charge as garrison. The area thus came at that moment under a different Military Command from that which controlled the rest of Eritrea. It was therefore decided by Sir Philip Mitchell, after consultation with the G.O.C.'s in the two zones, to consider Assab as a separate territory for the time being. The Senior Political Officer sent to take charge of the civil administration on the 18th June was accordingly instructed to report to Political Branch Headquarters direct.

The commander of the occupying force on arrival had duly issued a proclamation instituting British Administration, but in the absence of guidance had phrased the proclamation in the name of H.M. the King, which might have been interpreted as an instrument of annexation. For this proclamation an Empowering Proclamation in common form was substituted on the arrival of the Political Officer.

Large stores of motor transport, petroleum products, airfield equipment and engineering stores fell into British hands, but the town had been much damaged by bombing and municipal services seemed to have ceased working for some time past. There were several hundred Italian women and children, refugees from northern and central Ethiopia, in the town. They were in a sorry state owing to the detestable climate and lack of green food. A colony of lawless Sudanese labourers employed by the Italians was somewhat troublesome, while the Danakil tribes, ranging over all the zone between the Ethiopian mountains and the sea, from the French border to Eritrea proper, made the interior unsafe except for escorted convoys—even on the great highway from Assab to

Dessie. The Political Officer, assisted by one clerk and later one police officer, quickly got the situation in hand. The Sudanese labour was put on to repairing the highway where the Italians had damaged it. Dhow traffic with the east coast of the Red Sea was allowed to resume and with the assistance of the financial connections established by the Political Officer with Aden living conditions improved within a very few weeks. By the end of July arrangements were made to evacuate 383 women, children and invalids by steamer to Mombasa, whence they were sent to a refugee camp at Nyeri on the slopes of Mount Kenya. Their rapid improvement in health here was a real testimony to the administration of the Kenya Government, which took charge of these and other Italian evacuees and internees as they were delivered to that territory by the Military Administration. These women and children were the first of the many thousands of Italians to be evacuated to Kenya and other British East African territories.

The Red Sea trade at Aden, carried on in rupee currency, led to this form of money being declared legal tender. The economic isolation of Assab from Eritrea and Ethiopia made it possible to replace Italian currency rapidly. Except for goat milk and flesh, cattle and some fish Assab is wholly dependent on outside sources for food, which in these early days had to come from Arabia, especially Aden. In the course of time and despite the fact that in February, 1942, the Assab-Dessie road was officially closed even to military traffic on account of lawlessness among the Wajirat and Danakil, caravans began to move between Assab and Ethiopia, attracted mainly by the salt deposits on the coast. Food conditions improved steadily in consequence, as did the customs revenues from the trade goods which began to come in.

In Assab the same policy of using the Italian personnel who proved co-operative was followed as in Eritrea. Here also the Italian police force was disbanded and a new local police force of 75 men was recruited and trained. There was little local crime or lawlessness in the administered area, except among the Sudanese labourers. No attempt, however, was made to administer or collect taxes from the tribes of the interior. A Custodian of Enemy Property was appointed, in September, 1941, to deal with the large quantity of goods found at Assab. These had been landed from enemy ships which had taken refuge there, as had happened at Massawa. These goods, abandoned property and the equipment of the airfields and workshops were largely used in connection with American Aid Projects in Eritrea and the Middle East, as

well as for British military establishments at Aden. A large quantity of timber was especially welcome. The work of the Custodian at Assab was particularly heavy and difficult, but the results were creditable and satisfactory.

The most important role played by Assab during this period was in the blockade of the French Somaliland coast. To simplify the operation of the blockade on the landward side, the Chief Political Officer directed that the northern part of the belt round the French Somali coast, reserved in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of the 31st January, 1942, from Lake Abbé to the Red Sea coast, was to be placed under the control of the Senior Political Officer at Assab. Contact was made with the Sultan of Aussa, Mohammed Yayou, the only effective authority in this part of the world, and the British liaison officer appointed to the Sultan enlisted his assistance in imposing a very effective blockade. As an inducement to the Sultan's people to co-operate the Senior Political Officer, in accordance with directions of the Minister of State in Cairo, established markets where he purchased goats and cattle at a standard price of one M.T. dollar (say 2/6d.) per goat and 12 M.T. dollars (say 30/-) per head of cattle. When it was found that money was of no particular interest piece-goods were imported and sold, at a profit to the Administration, in the market when the meat on the hoof was purchased. The arrangements worked well and the flow of fresh food into French Somaliland virtually ceased along the border. During the period of intensive blockade some 2,500 cattle and over 10,000 goats were purchased; of these a limited number was traded to Aden but the only pastures were so far from Assab that no outlet could be found for the remainder. On the 24th March, 1942, the blockade of Jibuti was lifted since the sea blockade had proved ineffective; it was not possible to find enough craft to control the dhow traffic between the Bay of Tajura and the mainland of Arabia north of Aden at a time when every naval vessel was wanted for more important work in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean.

On the 14th June, 1942, Assab, with its British Administrative staff, was handed over to Middle East Command. It thereupon ceased to have independent existence and became a division of the Eritrean Administration. The British personnel at the time consisted of seven, including three police. The blockade of Jibuti having come to an end and the Custodian having completed his labours, the staff was consequently reduced. By the end of 1942 customs revenues were being collected at the rate of £2,000 a month. It was then estimated that trade through Assab was

running at the rate of £40,000 a month, about equally balanced and largely on Ethiopian account.

The most interesting feature of the administration was the good behaviour of the Danakil. The co-operation of the Sultan of Aussa with the British Military Administration, under the skilful handling of the Senior Political Officer, in spite of a long-standing reputation among his neighbours for being "difficult", earned him the gratitude of the Military Command, attested by the formal presentation to him of an engraved revolver. During 1943 Assab maintained a humdrum existence as a division of Eritrea, with which access was maintained by police coastal craft on preventive and dhow control duties. Trade with Ethiopia continued as an alternative port of entry of Jibuti, serving especially as a salt supply centre for the northern provinces.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER VII

THE PACIFICATION OF ITALIAN SOMALILAND

Somalia, Geographical and Ethnical — Occupation by British Forces — The Formation of a Police Force — Appalling Prison Conditions — The Division of Somalia into Administrative Areas — Inter-tribal Feuds — Trouble in the Ogaden and on the Kenya Border — The Problem of Stock Stealing — The Attitude of the Italian Population — Retention of the Useful Italians, and Internment and Evacuation of Others — The Fascist Farming Organisation — Food Supplies — Organisation of the Military Administration — Army Council's Directive on Policy — Education, Transport, Communications and Postal Services — Queries over Tariffs — Veterinary Work and the Fight against the Locusts — The Custody of Enemy Property.

CHAPTER VII

The Pacification of Italian Somaliland

ITALIAN Somaliland, known to the Italians as Somalia, consists of a wide strip of the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, from Cape Guardafui to the Juba river. Under the Italians the territory included the Jubaland district with the port and town of Kismayu, ceded by Great Britain under the Treaty of London of 1924 in execution of engagements entered into prior to the participation of Italy in the War of 1914-1918. After the conquest of Ethiopia the re-entrant of territory known as the Ogaden, lying between the southern boundary of British Somaliland and the western boundary of Italian Somaliland, was incorporated by the Italians in the "Government of Somalia" and administered from Mogadishu, the capital of the old colony.

The eastern coast of Italian Somaliland, also known as the Benadir coast, had been colonised, like Zanzibar, by Arabs, the small Sultanates of Obbia, Mogadishu, Brava and Kismayu depending more or less from the Sultanate of Zanzibar. When Jubaland with Kismayu was ceded to Italy it was a term of the cession that the Italians should make an annual payment of £1,000 to the Sultan of Zanzibar in respect of his rights on the coast. The Arab sultanates, and indeed the Arab population, had by the outbreak of war in 1939 diminished in importance and numbers, though dhow traffic with Arabia and the Persian Gulf, as well as with Lamu, Mombasa and Zanzibar, continued the historical connection. This was destined to serve the British Military Administration in good stead as a means of supplying the needs of the Somali coast with trade goods and such necessary foodstuffs as could not be grown in the country, without having recourse to deep-sea shipping.

The interior of Somalia is inhabited very largely by Somalis in the nomadic and semi-nomadic ways of life. Along the rivers there are a few centres of negroid African population, the result of slave settlements created by the Somalis or the remnants of pre-Somali autochthonous African peoples. The coastal settlements contain, in addition to the Arab communities, some sedentary Somalis who have become de-tribalised, some Indians and, on the southern part of the coast, Africans of recent Kenya extraction.

In the north-western part of the Ogaden there is an Arussi-Galla element which belongs ethnologically to the Ethiopian highlands. There are no Amhara or Shoa Ethiopians in all this Somali country except a few in the villages on the foothills of the Harar plateau. With the exception of the coastal settlements and a few sedentary Somali and African villages on the rivers, there is no permanent centre of inhabitation of any importance anywhere in Somalia. The reason is clear : nomadic people do not make, or live in, " places " and if in the coastal settlements the people are numerically predominately Somali these are de-tribalised elements which have adopted the life of cosmopolitan centres of foreign trade and exchange.

The former Italian Colony of Somalia and the Ogaden were together estimated to contain 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 inhabitants in an area of 703,000 sq. km. (279,000 sq. miles). The country and the population of Somalia, together with the Ogaden and British Somaliland, are more of a geographical and ethnographical whole than any other large area in Africa. The boundaries of British Somaliland with Somalia proper and with the Ogaden, and the boundary which formerly existed between Somalia and the Ogaden, are entirely artificial ; they bear no relation to geography or ethnology. The Somali tribes in the course of their seasonal migrations habitually range across these boundaries, which for the last fifty years have caused them political trouble and economic hardship. On the western and northern boundaries changes of physical feature and type of population come into play and, though the straight western boundary of Somalia with Kenya is obviously artificial, the Tana river does make a boundary of ethnic value where the Somali ranges give place to the lands and people of Kenya.

The Somali people for long have been, and will for long remain, a political problem for all their neighbours in as much as they are an ethnically dominant and expanding people probably of Asiatic origin and of fanatically Moslem persuasion. There is little doubt that during the last two or three generations the Somali people have been increasing numerically. This is partly due to greater internal peace and partly also to the fact that under such European supervision as they have endured their flocks have expanded probably beyond the feeding capacity of their arid ranges. If to these factors, which a transition from a pastoral to an agricultural way of life can for climatic reasons do little to mitigate, is added the high degree of intelligence, quickness to learn and intense pride of race possessed by the Somalis, the problems of Somali

expansion and the political difficulties occasioned by infiltration into neighbouring territories become well-nigh insoluble. Steady pressure of the Somali tribes towards Kenya has been countered by the British policy of deliberately forbidding Somali infiltration west of the Tana river. But no scheme for the future of the Somali people and the territories bordering on their ranges can hope for any measure of success unless the ethnic expansion of this race is taken into account.

Arrangements were made very early in 1941 to undertake the military administration of all that part of Somalia which then seemed likely to be occupied within the next six months. As has already been explained, the military plan of campaign for the early months of 1941 was to be no more than an advance into Somalia across the Juba river, the occupation of Kismayu and a thrust possibly as far as Mogadishu before the summer rains. For this purpose a small staff was collected under Mr. W. E. H. Scupham, C.M.G., M.C., then Administrative Secretary of the Government of Tanganyika. On the 11th February, 1941, Mr. Scupham was appointed Deputy Chief Political Officer for Somalia, with the rank of Brigadier, and on the 14th February he reported to the G.O.C. East Africa Force (as it was then called) at Jelib on the Juba river by which day the British forces had rather surprisingly quickly occupied Kismayu. Brigadier Scupham's staff had been collected to deal in fact with little more than the old British province of Jubaland. The headquarters of the administration for all larger questions of policy could, had the campaign developed as was expected, have remained with General Cunningham's rear headquarters at Nairobi with a provincial headquarters for local administration at Kismayu, where a Senior Political Officer was installed on the 20th February according to plan.

But by the 25th February Mogadishu itself was occupied, after surrender by the Italian authorities. The Italian Army of Somalia disintegrated into the "bush", with a main party retreating rapidly up the Italian "Strada Imperiale" towards the Harar Plateau of Ethiopia; other detachments fell back either up the Juba river or towards the north-east corner. These military developments required a reorganisation of the administrative plan and, as elsewhere, a hectic search for staff was instituted.

Happily the Colonial services of the British East African territories had not yet been wholly denuded of personnel who could ill, but just, be spared; others already in the East African forces were available near to hand. Thanks to the co-operation of the East African Governments and the rapid appreciation of the

position by General Cunningham rather more men became available to Brigadier Scupham during the first weeks of his task than had been the case in Eritrea and Ethiopia. An advance party of the Military Administration was sent to Mogadishu by air in charge of a D.C.F.A. borrowed from the Kenya administration. He was accompanied by two civilians, borrowed from a British bank in Nairobi and from one of the principal British commercial firms in Kenya, to deal with the financial and supply situations in Mogadishu. These were expected to be more serious than they proved in the outcome. The main party of the Administration, consisting of sixteen officers, followed by road reaching the capital of Somalia on the 14th March. General Cunningham directed Brigadier Scupham to assume the administration of the whole area as and when it was occupied. For administrative purposes the area was at first divided into the two divisions of Kismayu and Mogadishu. Early in April the whole of Somalia up to the Ethiopian border was under Brigadier Scupham's administration and the country was divided into four divisions, with the Mogadishu municipal area as a separate unit.

Within a week of the occupation of Mogadishu twelve Political Officers had been appointed and had taken up their stations in the country. Other Political Officers were attached to formations of General Cunningham's army sent to clear up the interior. Rocca Littorio was formally taken over from the Italian authorities on the 20th March, but the Political Officer was obliged to request the Italian district officer to carry on since he had to proceed further afield with the formation to which he was attached. Obbia was surrendered by a letter addressed to the Rocca Littorio force, but could only be taken over by the Administration on the 13th April. The north-eastern corner of Somalia was taken over by a Political Officer and six Tanganyika policemen landed from a transport aircraft on the 19th April at Gardo. After making arrangements with the Sultan of the Warsangeli clans this officer had to return to Mogadishu. Gardo and Garoe, in north-eastern Somalia, were taken over for reasons of administrative convenience by the administration of British Somaliland with Somaliland Camel Corps personnel on the 30th April. Bender Kassim was entered on the 5th May, Dante (Ras Hafun) on the 14th May, and finally Ras Allula on the 21st May.

General Cunningham in the meanwhile, after staying only a few days at Mogadishu, had moved his headquarters forward up the Strada Imperiale and occupied Harar in Ethiopia. As related elsewhere he was there joined by Brigadier Lush who was to take

over the administration of Ethiopia : Addis Ababa was entered on the 5th April. Owing to the extreme shortage of staff for Ethiopia until Brigadier Lush's officers could arrive from Khartoum, Brigadier Scupham provided a few officers to take over the Harar area of Ethiopia and also to accompany Brigadier Lush to Addis Ababa. A few weeks later these officers were returned and the Harar area was taken over by the Ethiopian Military Administration leaving the Somalia administration to take shape within the boundaries of the Italian " Government " of Somalia.

While the same difficulties encountered in Eritrea were also found in Somalia, the several problems had different weights. The European population, consisting of some 8,000 Italians, was concentrated very largely in and around Mogadishu. The population was not quite so parasitic as in Eritrea, but possessed much less equipment and resources which might make it useful to the Allied cause. The native population, except in the coastal settlements, was more homogeneous than in Eritrea, but much more warlike. To this source of anxiety to the Administration was added that of the existence of a very large number of Italian rifles the light automatic weapons, abandoned all over the country by the Italian Army in its precipitate dispersal. Not only did the Somali tribesmen see much coveted equipment lying around for the mere trouble of picking up, but what was an even greater boon from Heaven, they knew the locations of the vast ammunition dumps hidden in the bush by the Italians as reserve depots for their troops in case they had to fall back. The Italians had moreover recruited and partially trained many Somalis as irregulars and these men had thus learned to use modern automatic weapons and other implements of European devising. Unfortunately, as will appear, when these irregulars departed with their equipment to their own areas not all resumed their tribal mode of life ; many remained together to form independent raiding bands seeking whom they might devour.

The first task of the Administration was to create a police force of the type necessary, not only to maintain order in the coastal townships, but to disarm as soon as possible the tribes of the Somali bush and desert for which no regular troops would be available. The decision was taken to create a Gendarmerie Force. By the 1st April a Commandant of Police had been appointed and a training depot was established at Mogadishu. On the 16th April, 1941, the Italian police in Mogadishu were disbanded and made prisoners of war on account of their unreliability and bad discipline. Their places were taken by a detachment of some hundred

Tanganyika native police who formed the nucleus of the urban division of the new organisation. The 1st and 4th Irregular Companies of Somalis, recruited and trained under British officers for the campaign, were turned over to the Administration by General Cunningham to be transformed into policemen. The initial establishment, with these irregular companies as a nucleus, was for 1,500 men. By April these irregulars and some hastily gathered recruits already amounted to 1,300. But the need was so urgent that no preliminary police training proved possible for the irregular companies; they had to proceed immediately on patrols and detachment duty to disarm the tribesmen. In this they were supported by a few K.A.R. detachments on the line of communication to Harar for as long as they remained available. The shortage of British officers for police work was acute: on the 15th June they still only amounted to fifteen, including four Political Officers detached for special duty. It says much for all concerned that, by the end of August, 1941, 14,000 Italian rifles and 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition had been collected. British reinforcements began, however, to come in in July and August in the form of a large draft of young officers from the United Kingdom who had volunteered for the work, and a fine body of young trained police inspectors from the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia. Despite the fact that the irregular companies proved loyal to their own officers and British rule, it was a mistake born of sheer necessity to use them without any preliminary police training; in subsequent months the whole method of recruiting had to be seriously remodelled and revised.

By the end of 1943 the Somalia Gendarmerie establishment consisted of 3,070 Somali and African ranks, 120 British officers, some 200 riding and pack camels, 250 horses and mules and a squadron of armoured lorries. The police transport was provided from the Military Administration transport pool which, with a fleet of Italian lorries, undertook the supply and maintenance of police and administrative posts all over the interior, postal services, police patrols and public works transport. The urban branch of the Gendarmerie had its own C.I.D. which took over the Italian records. When Malaya and Burma fell and the Japanese menace in the Indian Ocean became a reality, the Somalia Gendarmerie also provided a defence force. The small garrison in Somalia was cut down to a minimum and all the available troops in the two Somalilands were maintained as a mobile field force in the event of a landing being attempted. In spite of being perpetually below strength in British officers and chronically short of motor

transport, the Somalia Gendarmerie developed an *esprit de corps* and an efficiency in dealing with internal and frontier troubles which was all the more remarkable as very few of the British staff had any experience of dealing with Somalis, and a large proportion was entirely new to Africa. Thanks to this hastily created force a degree of security prevailed throughout 1942 and 1943 which, though by no means perfect, had probably never been equalled in the history of the country in spite of the savage repression and punishments backed by large military and police establishments which were the rule under the Italian régime. It is a remarkable fact that throughout the period of British Military Administration of Somalia under review no British officer lost his life at the hands of a Somali, which speaks as much for the handling of the Somali by the British officers concerned as it does of the willingness of this turbulent race to be administered by them.

Prison conditions in Somalia were found to be deplorable in every way. Much evidence of brutality towards the native population was found, not only in the prisons, but by the Italian political and police officers all over the country. The central prison at Mogadishu was put under the Commandant of the Gendarmerie and the necessary reforms were instituted; the provincial prisons were taken over by the Political Officers with staff drawn from the Gendarmerie. In 1942, in order to relieve overcrowding in the central prison of the territory at Mogadishu, an older penal settlement was reopened at Danane. An "approved school" for juvenile offenders was instituted at Afgoi on the 1st February, 1942; the boy inmates were instructed in Kiswahili, Arabic and Roman writing, arithmetic and Islamic religious principles.

When the occupation was completed the territory was divided into the following administrative areas: N.W. Province with Political Officers at Gabredarre, Wardere, Daghabor and Callafo, and fourteen Gendarmerie platoons in support in these stations: N.E. Province with Political Officers at Gardo, Dante and Bender Kassim and six Gendarmerie platoons: Mudugh division with one Political Officer at Rocca Littorio and six Gendarmerie platoons distributed between that place and Obbia, El Bur and Dusa Mareb, the Gendarmerie officers acting as assistant Political Officers in the 40,000 square miles of this semi-desert independent division; S.W. Province with Political Officers at Belet Wen and Lugh Ferrandi and fifteen Gendarmerie platoons with Gendarmerie officers acting as assistant Political Officers at Ischia Baidoa, Bogol Magno and Oddur; S.E. Province with Political Officers at Kismayu, Afgoi, Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi, Merca and Brava

with Gendarmerie posts at Margherita, Afmadu and Genale : and finally Mogadishu township. The organisation was modified in 1942 by the division of the country into four provinces, the extra-provincial division of Mudugh and the incorporation of the Mogadishu township area in the S.E. Province to secure uniformity in the administration of all the Italian settlements in this one province. The Gendarmerie platoons were organised into groups conforming generally in area with the administrative boundaries, but with their own separate headquarters distinct from the provincial headquarters. A beginning was also made in recruiting and training tribal retainers as the executive organs of authority of the Political Administration. It is satisfactory to record that by the end of 1943 the Military Administrator was able to write that the " problems which confronted . . . Somalia during 1943 bore surprisingly little relation to its status as . . . an occupied enemy territory, and were mainly such as might be expected to confront a colonial government faced with the task of administering a semi-desert country, peopled by turbulent and independently minded nomads during a year of exceptional drought and locusts in a territory whose economic structure had been destroyed by war."

The form of native administration followed closely British Colonial practice applicable to nomads and semi-nomads, with recognition of tribal jurisdiction and custom, and the authority of the Islamic courts. A small beginning was made in native education by encouraging the opening and operation of Koranic schools, the Mogadishu school having been raised without friction in 1943 to the standard of an elementary school where, after a year of the Koranic course, pupils proceeded to instruction in English and a normal elementary syllabus.

The political condition of the native population was inevitably bound up with economic conditions and traditional inter-tribal feuds. After the initial disarming operations of 1941 further patrols and sweeps were instituted to carry disarmament a stage further. In one such operation, which continued for some weeks in the early part of 1942, a force of Somalia Gendarmerie in the Ogaden, in co-operation with a force of Somaliland Camel Corps and irregulars from British Somaliland with the Political Officer concerned from that administration, collected 2 light machine-guns, 2 automatic rifles, over 4,000 other rifles, 29 pistols and a large quantity of ammunition including hand grenades. A similar sweep by the Somaliland Camel Corps in eastern British Somaliland and the N.W. Province of Somalia took place in October, 1942, with only partially successful results ; but 2 light machine-guns

and 296 rifles were collected. Another campaign at the end of 1942 conducted through the intermediary of tribal retainers succeeded in bringing in a further 142 rifles out of an estimated total of 500 then still unsundered. Some raiding by Ogaden tribes in the S.W. Province in 1941 was duly settled in the following year by the customary restitution payment, consisting of 387 camels, arranged by the Political Officers of the district with the tribes concerned. Similar restitution payments for raiding, especially during the period of the Italian occupation of British Somaliland and the collapse of Italian authority in Somalia, were arranged for British Somali tribes, by inter-territorial meetings in the case of the Issa and Omar tribes of the N.E. Province of Somalia. A feud in the Mudugh between the Omar Mohamed and the Habr Ghidir Saad which broke out near Obbia at the end of 1942 was not finally composed until the autumn of 1943, after the Somalia Gendarmerie and Illaloes (tribal police) had had to picket the wells.

The fact that Somalia and British Somaliland were both under military administration depending upon the same headquarters organisation made reasonable inter-territorial arrangements possible for the first time for many decades. As regards grazing rights satisfactory arrangements were made ; whereas formerly British Somaliland tribes on moving into the Ogaden grazing grounds continued to be administered by their own British Political Officers, it was laid down that they would in future come under the administration of the British Political Officer of the Somalia administration of the area in which they were grazing, and that he would ensure that everyone's rights and interests were safeguarded.

The Italian settlements in Somalia were not without their problems, but these were fewer than in Eritrea. Moreover a larger proportion of the families was theoretically gainfully employed than in Eritrea ; the military establishments created during the Italo-Ethiopian War were on a smaller scale in Mogadishu than in Asmara ; and Somalia generally had not been a base for the colonial development of Ethiopia during the years which followed the Ethiopian War. One of the advantages of this state of affairs was that there much was less inflation in Somalia than in other parts of the Italian East African Empire ; and the control of prices was made much easier both for this and for other reasons. Apart from a lesser proportion of parasitic population, there was here also a much larger proportion of the population employed on farming enterprises. The bureaucracy,

though excessive, was more manageable than in Asmara. The initial experiment of maintaining the Italian departmental services of the Government under supervision, financed by block departmental grants, was found to be too complex and expensive in so small an organisation ; it gave place to direct budgeting and the employment of the Italian departmental staffs in the appropriate branches of the Military Administration.

The whole of the Italian provincial administration had disappeared, collapsed or been swept away during 1941. But the same general line was followed in Mogadishu as in Eritrea of maintaining in employ as much as usefully could be kept of the Italian civil services. It was however impossible to employ all. The men who were retained were paid, as in Eritrea where the same system was adopted, on a formula which came to be known as the "Rodd formula" : the total emoluments of the employee paid at the time of occupation in lire was taken at a sterling figure at the rate of 480 lire = £1 and augmented by a cost of living bonus which was varied periodically according to an index figure heavily weighted in respect of foodstuffs. But the total sterling emolument was limited in the first instance to £200 per annum for any employed person and £250 per annum for a head of department. This ceiling was subsequently raised, but in Somalia neither the ceiling nor the cost of living bonus ever rose to the same levels as in Ethiopia or Eritrea. The Italian municipal organisations of Mogadishu remained in being under the control of a district officer. The Podestà, or head of the municipality, though an avowed Fascist, was maintained for some time under supervision and generally speaking proved helpful. In common with several civil servants in the higher posts of the former Italian Government he was removed in due course and replaced by an Italian Special Commissioner.

In May, 1942, a marked change was made in the policy of the Administration towards the Italian Government machinery. For security reasons connected more with the war situation in the Indian Ocean than with North Africa, the Secretary-General of the Italian Government in Somalia, who had been kept as the titular head of the Italian Civil Service personnel, was interned in company with twenty-eight other senior officials. The reaction on the Italian population was mixed. One element welcomed the event as emphasising the disappearance of Fascism : a larger element was disturbed and critical on the grounds that from the occupation to that date the Italian administrative officers had apparently been acceptable, even if only in Mogadishu and in the

areas where there was an Italian population, to the British military authorities, and that no local developments had taken place to justify a change. The most serious aspect of any trouble, had it occurred, would have been in the management of municipal affairs where the administration was warned that strikes or obstructiveness might occur in sanitary, public utility and food rationing services which depended largely on Italian subordinate staff and could not for lack of staff be taken over by British or native employees. The Secretary-General, however, departing under arrest, enjoined on the Italian Special Commissioner of the Municipality the necessity of carrying on services, and trouble was avoided. After the initial internments a consistent policy was pursued of arresting all Italians who by their activities had engendered suspicions or by their positions as ex-Residents or Police officers might have become centres of hostile influence in the event of Japanese activities on the western side of the Indian Ocean. In all some 140 Italians were interned during the last nine months of 1942, but the fact that during November and December only seven Italians were interned is evidence both of the generally satisfactory state of the country and of the effect of developments in other theatres of war at that time. By the end of the year the political outlook of the Italians in Somalia was one of thankful resignation to be under British rule in an area so remote from war. The political outlook in 1943 was inevitably coloured by developments in Europe; the fall of the Fascist Government in Italy and the subsequent Armistice were marked with general relief associated with the belief that the war in Italy would soon be over. The later slow progress of the Allies led to much disappointment in Italian Liberal circles in Somalia and to some recrudescence of nominal Fascism, which, however, created no political problems nor led to any anti-British manifestations.

During 1941 Intelligence and Security duties in Somalia were undertaken by the Somalia Gendarmerie in close co-operation and contact with the military intelligence organisation of the British troops in the Somalilands. To the Somalia Gendarmerie branch concerned there was added, in March, 1943, a Political Officer of the Military Administration for political intelligence duties. By June, however, it was found here, as in Eritrea, that even closer contact was needed and a joint Intelligence and Security office was instituted and made responsible for the collection of all intelligence and its distribution, both to the Military Administration and such purely military organisations as might be interested.

In spite of the number of Italian officers who had been closely

associated with, and were believed to have enjoyed some esteem and influence among, the Somali tribes and had provided the personnel of the Italian Somali "Bande" (irregular formations), few of them made any attempt to wage guerilla warfare or lead parties of Somalis. Such parties might have caused a great deal of trouble during the active military phase of the occupation in so vast a country where our political and police officers were few and far between. The early period of the occupation was full of rumours and stories of such bands and of Italians who had "taken to the bush". As time went on most of the potential Italian guerilla leaders were accounted for as captured or killed, with only a few in hiding under assumed names. The alleged Somali loyalty to the Italian irregular leaders was as evanescent as a summer mist. Of sabotage in the inhabited areas there was none. One group of Italians, led by the Chief of Staff of one of the Italian commanders, came in for attention in 1942, but by November he was contacted by the Intelligence organisation and surrendered with his lieutenants. He expressed profound disillusion with events in Italy which he hoped would be brought to a head by the King and Marshal Badoglio, as in due course they were.

The problem of the Italian population in a country unsuitable for permanent European colonisation and without any hill station or convalescent area when the Harar Plateau was no longer available, was more one of morale than of political or even economic conditions. The unemployed male, and more especially the female and child population in the families whose male elements were interned as civil or military prisoners, presented greater difficulties than in Eritrea, where a good deal of occupation and distraction and a congenial climate had made exile from the homeland supportable. In Somalia there was no known method of providing employment for everyone or a healthy climate for the sick and stale. There was in consequence a good deal of neurosis in all classes. It was decided to evacuate as many women and children and invalid men as possible in the third flight of Italian ships sent to fetch the balance of evacuees from Ethiopia in 1943. In July, 1943, some 2,300 persons were evacuated from and through Mogadishu by Italian steamers without mishap in spite of the fact that embarkation took place during the monsoon season. A total Italian population of some 4,500 remained and as a consequence of the evacuation the number in receipt of public assistance at the end of 1943 fell to below 400. In addition to this major evacuation several other minor movements of population took place from

the very outset. The surplus population of Somalis, which had congregated in Mogadishu for labour under the Italian régime, was gradually dispersed to the tribal areas to which it belonged. Some 900 Ethiopian political prisoners, interned by the Italians prior to March, 1941, in a beastly penal settlement at Danane, were sent home by motor transport convoys. One such convoy of 350 Ethiopians was conducted by a single British officer and a few Gendarmerie ranks and handed over for dispersal to the British Political Officer at Diredawa.

During the last thirty years of Italian occupation considerable attempts had been made by the Italians, at first very largely on the initiative of H.R.H. The Duke of Abruzzi, a member of the Italian Royal Family, to develop modern agriculture by utilising the perennial waters of the Juba and Webi Shebeli rivers. This initiative was strongly supported and extended under the Fascist Government in conformity with the policy of rendering Italy with her colonial possessions economically self-sufficient. Irrigated agriculture in several forms had been developed along the Webi Shebeli at Afgoi, Genale and Vittoria, on the lower Juba and in a substantial enterprise some forty miles from Mogadishu named after its founder, Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi. But all these agricultural enterprises were run by, and for the benefit of, Italians and depended on native labour being available to the Italian concessionaires. They were not essentially of the type of family farm-holdings which the Fascist Government had set up in extensive areas in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and, later, Ethiopia, where the Italian family was intended to be the sole labour unit working a peasant holding. The Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi property was a concession managed and administered by the Italian employees of the company—the Italo-Somali Agricultural Company. In addition to some 16,000 acres under potential cultivation, the company owned quite extensive housing and mechanical equipment, including irrigation and pumping machinery, agricultural machinery, Decauville railway plant and a sugar mill with a theoretical capacity of several thousand tons a year. The Genale-Vittoria farm area was on the other hand a pump irrigation enterprise, with Italian colonists settled on plots and employing forced native labour on a minimum basic wage and with compulsory domicile. The Juba irrigated lands, depending on pump and gravity irrigation, were likewise settler colonist enterprises dependent on native labour. During recent years these Italian agricultural enterprises had been turned over to producing crops, which were generally speaking uneconomic in world markets, but

desirable from the point of view of an Italian metropolitan régime which was involved in heavy military and other expenditure for which insufficient foreign exchange was available. The Somalia enterprises had been devoted to growing many sorts of crops for which they and the climate were not necessarily well suited and which contributed little or nothing to a local balance in food production, either for the Italian or the native population. Much emphasis had, for instance, been placed on the production of cotton, oilseed, bananas, etc., and little on local grains and edible oils. Moreover nothing much was done to stimulate native agricultural production. This was presumably because the large majority of the population was well content with a pastoral existence which produced a fair quantity of skins, hides, gum, incense, etc., from the vegetation of the country and the remainder was conscripted to work on Italian farms.

The conception of these agricultural enterprises as "exploitation concessions" engendered under the Fascist régime a labour policy of considerable severity in theory and actual brutality in practice. It was in fact indistinguishable from slavery. With the defeat of the Italians and the commencement of the British occupation all the native labour employed on the farms, except at Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi, disappeared and in the latter was so drastically reduced that the acreage which could be cultivated had to be severely curtailed. Since it was obviously desirable to maintain as much cultivation as possible the Military Administrator himself took over at once a large tract of land at Afgoi as a market garden to produce vegetables for the British community in Mogadishu, while at Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi a British Political Officer took charge and with proper control of the company's activities secured at last some continuity of cultivation; the production of sugar cane for the refinery was on a scale which from the outset nearly sufficed for local needs. In 1942, 3,650 acres under cultivation of the Società Agricola Italo-Somala estates were as to 88% under sugar cane. In the later period of occupation sugar production was in fact stepped up to take care of all local needs. But the disappearance of native labour, the flight of Italian settlers to the nearest inhabited centres and a scarcity of petroleum products for the pumping machinery led to the initial abandonment of the whole Genale-Vittoria enterprise and most of the Juba farms.

In 1942 such steps as were possible were taken to reclaim at least some of the farms which had gone derelict. This involved not only inducing the Italian settlers to return to work, but also

securing native labourers to work, under new conditions, for their old employers—an exceedingly difficult undertaking in any event, and more particularly so in dealing with Somalis. By 1942, 8,000 acres were, however, under cultivation as to 80% by natives as tenants of the Italian settlers. But it was not until 1943 that any real rehabilitation of the Italian agricultural enterprises other than at Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi became possible. 1942 had seen growing scarcity in East Africa of primary agricultural products, including maize on which Somalia might have to depend for the normal deficiency in local production of the settled communities. At the beginning of 1943 the food shortage in East Africa generally had become really serious. It was therefore of paramount importance to make Somalia self-supporting. The Administration was accordingly directed to assume the financial risks involved in agricultural development, even when this was uneconomic. A policy of agricultural re-settlement, begun on the Juba in May, 1942, was extended to the Genale area. But whereas the Juba farmers had welcomed the agricultural policy of the Military Administration those from Genale raised considerable objections, mainly on the grounds of inadequacy of capital and the derelict condition of the enterprises. The Administration intervened to assist in canal clearance and the provision of fuel oil for tractors and pumps. Cash advances were made for strictly farming activities. The chief of the dominant local tribe was persuaded to provide native labour on the understanding that his people were permitted to cultivate with the Administration's assistance a large area of land which had been alienated from them. 90% of the native cultivation was in maize and the remainder in sesame. The tribesmen were also persuaded to agree to hand over to the Administration a portion of the yield from their cultivation in return for assistance in ploughing. On the Juba native cultivation was also successfully encouraged in some areas on former Italian land which had been abandoned or could not be worked by Italians.

At the end of 1942 only 1,120 acres out of a possible 4,000 were being worked. But by the end of 1943 most of the reasonably fertile Italian farms were in cultivation under food crops, mainly maize, either by Italians or Somalis. The yield was much below expectations, mainly owing to the abnormal behaviour of the two rivers. Nevertheless advances not recovered but largely recoverable amounted to only £29,000. The cost of production of food-stuffs under European cultivation was high and, in world markets, uneconomic, mainly owing to the high cost of petroleum products ;

but the country, in spite of poor climatic conditions and a locust plague, proved self-supporting in primary foodstuffs both in 1942 and 1943. Light imports of foodstuffs by coastwise dhow traffic and food parcels from further afield were more than offset by exports of some parcels of analogous foodstuffs to Aden and British Somaliland in 1942 and by quite extensive export of meat on the hoof (cattle, goats and camels) to Kenya along the coast and as well as overland to the more northern districts of the Kenya eastern border. There is no doubt that native cultivation of rain grown grain, even by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in Somalia, increased a great deal. This was especially so in the western district which was under pressure from the administrative officers, but the result was achieved with no friction. The native-held unconsumed reserves at the end of 1942 would probably have sufficed to meet deficiencies outside the settled places, even without the increased European production of 1942.

To this generally satisfactory position there was one exception, the sparsely populated N.E. Province where famine conditions obtained. This was occasioned by the generally disappointing climatic conditions and difficult transport conditions to the North-East which normally and traditionally draws its deficiencies from Aden, but from which no supplies were available for the area that year. The fact that British Somaliland, supplied through Aden, was in the Middle East Supply Centre group but Somalia was in the East African group made it impossible bureaucratically for the former to provide quotas for the N.E. Province of Somalia, in spite of the traditional connections.

The achievement of the Military Administration in making Somalia, including the European element in the country, substantially self-supporting in food in 1942 and 1943 was very commendable. The circumstance did not fail to pass unnoticed in Kenya where a maize famine had taken place and the emergency had required sudden provision to be made for the import of grain at a moment when both shipping and supplies for the Indian Ocean were urgently needed elsewhere. The trade figures, to which reference is made later, showed that for the two years 1942 and 1943 Somalia imported only 551 and 258 tons of cereals and exported somewhat larger amounts, in addition to meat on the hoof for Kenya. Other foodstuffs, imported into Somalia in 1942 and 1943, amounting to 1,700 and 1,900 tons respectively, were largely commodities such as coffee and coffee bean products, beverages, spices and condiments and a few articles of necessity for the European population.

In addition to rehabilitating the Italian farms and farm equipment, in 1943 the Administration was able to spare eighty-six tractors from Somalia for military and civil (agricultural) use in Kenya to make good deficiencies or save imports into that country from overseas. Arrangements were also made in that year to ship a few additional tractors and some other agricultural machinery in 1944. The emphasis placed on agricultural development not only accorded with the obvious policy followed by everyone locally concerned, but was hallowed by the instructions received from the War Office in October, 1942, to which further reference is made below.

The establishment of the British Military Administration in Somalia followed the general policy and practice described in the case of Eritrea. The preliminary and subsequent instructions to the D.C.P.O. and later to him in his capacity of Military Administrator were the same as those issued to the head of the Eritrean Administration and have been recorded in Chapter V. The initial, or empowering, proclamation was signed by Lieut.-General Sir Alan Cunningham, G.O.C.-in-C. East African Forces, who for tactical purposes was under C.-in-C. Middle East from before the beginning of the Somalia campaign. On the 1st May, 1941, East Africa Command also came under C.-in-C. Middle East for administrative purposes. This did not materially affect the military procurement for Somalia having regard to the arrangement whereby the area, as soon as the first phase was terminated, came for all purposes under the Chief Political Officer. The C.P.O. was, during the whole period of the subordination of East Africa Command to G.H.Q. Middle East, himself an officer depending directly on the C.-in-C. Middle East. In practice local day-to-day supply arrangements for the civil population, in so far as commodities were required, were thus arranged with the local administrative services of East Africa Command. By the time a longer view required to be taken East Africa Command had, in the autumn of 1941, ceased to be subordinated to C.-in-C. Middle East, and in consequence there was no necessity to consult the latter or the M.E.S.C. in Cairo for Somalia supplies except in so far as inter-territorial questions arose. In point of fact even in the initial stages of the occupation of Somalia little was required in the way of imported foodstuffs and no more than could be spared from purely military resources. An attempt by shopkeepers and small merchants to hold up local stocks of sugar to create a rise in price was met by the British Military Administration selling sugar procured through S. & T. service retail to the public which,

in spite of the few tons so utilised, successfully broke the market.

The encouragement given to the dhow masters to resume trade along the coast between Somalia and Kenya and an initial very free and easy policy of permitting such imports without any formalities, made it clear that Kenya could supply the modest requirements of Somalia, provided that the Kenya authorities allowed these exports to take place. The Kenya Government was most co-operative, in spite of the fact that the commodities so exported were themselves imported into Kenya for local consumption, no provision having at that time been made in the import quota of the latter country for any additional market such as Somalia. With the exception of the cotton goods, which constituted the bulk of this modest traffic, most of the goods imported from Kenya were local produce. The necessity, if such re-exports from Kenya were to continue, of providing for them in the Kenya programme led to the agreement of the East African Governors to the inclusion of Somalia for such purposes in the East African group of territories. It was logical that a representative, provided by Political Headquarters at Nairobi, should, after the separation of the East Africa and Middle East military commands took place, therefore work with the East Africa Civil Supply organisation, and this was accordingly arranged.

The separation of the two military commands involved the transfer of ultimate authority from C.-in-C. Middle East to the G.O.C.-in-C. East Africa, who had during this earlier period acted by delegation from the former. This act was promulgated in Somalia Proclamation No. 15 of 1941 dated the 15th September, which continued in effect all the proclamations previously issued under the delegated authority of the C.-in-C. Middle East. The proclamation of 1941 followed the normal course of such enactments and calls for no particular comment except in the case of those dealing with real estate. The normal proclamation, No. 4 of 1941, had suspended all dealings in real estate for the protection of property in the initial stages of occupation and the institution of military administration. It was found desirable and possible in 1941 to suspend this prohibition and permit transactions. The safeguard, however, was that each transaction had to be approved by the Military Administrator after inspection by an Italian judge and advisers to ensure that the consideration proposed to be paid did not involve undue hardship on the vendor or improper practices.

The internal organisation of the Somalia Government followed the familiar British Colonial form of a Secretariat with a Chief

Secretary who, however, was not concerned directly with the Financial and Economic sides. These were the provinces of the D.C.F.A. in direct contact with the C.F.A. but through the person of the Military Administrator. A local supply committee, known as the Somalia Supply Board, was set up by the Military Administrator to co-ordinate the requirements and interests of the various departments and the military and civil demands. The opposite end of the Board was the supply organisation in Nairobi, to which reference has been made. The Board supervised the imports by coastwise trade, the issue of import and export licences, and the rationing of the population in the settled communities.

The need for a somewhat more far-sighted policy soon became evident in Somalia as in Eritrea, both to deal with local problems and also to meet any criticism of British Administration in regard to the native population. This took the form of a directive by the Army Council, dated the 19th October, 1942, which, as stating the policy of H.M.G. on the administration of these territories at that time, is reproduced in full :—

“I am commanded by the Army Council to state that in regard to the services enumerated below your Chief Political Officer will be guided by the directions contained under the several headings :—

PUBLIC WORKS

- (a) In regard to both capital and maintenance expenditure, account must be taken of the scarcity of materials.
- (b) Capital expenditure will not be incurred except with specific authority, and then only on improvements which can be shown to be directly or indirectly beneficial to the Allied war effort, or the maintenance of a reasonable standard of hygiene.

MAINTENANCE

- (c) Public buildings and the like should be maintained in a sanitary condition, and decorations and repairs should be carried out on such a scale as will reasonably maintain the prestige of the Occupying Power. Maintenance work on essential roads should be carried on to such an extent as to keep them in a reasonable condition and to avoid unduly heavy capital expenditure within the next ten years.

MEDICAL AND VETERINARY SERVICES

“Day to day services of this nature should be maintained at the pre-war level so far as the present needs of the population demand it. A limited extension of such services to natives, over the

pre-war level, will be permissible so far as present resources of personnel and drugs permit, and subject to specific approval.

“ Research work under the above-mentioned heads should be reviewed and carried on at pre-war level in so far as it is known to be beneficial. In particular it must be a condition precedent to the carrying on of research work that results already obtained, and those achieved during our occupation, shall be at the disposal of the British Colonial Office. In order to avoid duplication, there should also be co-ordination between research work being carried out in occupied territories and that in British Colonial dependencies. Wherever possible, experiments already in progress should not be stopped, especially if it can be shown that a serious set-back to science will result from such a course.

AGRICULTURE

“ Every effort should be made to stimulate local production in occupied territories, and any expenditure on work which will produce commodities urgently required for the war effort, or reduce imports, will be regarded as fully justified. Expenditure on agricultural research and the maintenance of experimental farms and plantations will be governed by the same principles as enumerated in the above paragraphs in connection with medical and veterinary services and public works.

FORESTRY

“ Expenditure which will provide fuel for the needs of the local inhabitants and the occupying Army within (say) the next five years should be incurred. Long-term reforestation should not be undertaken, but the growing and planting out of seedlings and the weeding of existing young plantations made under the Italian pre-war plan may be continued, if the Chief Political Officer considers it desirable.

EDUCATION

“ The pre-war system of providing for education from State funds should be operated in so far as the present needs demand for Italians as well as natives. Proposals for a reasonable extension of educational facilities among natives will be considered if efficient teachers are available. The curricula and text-books should be examined with a view to the elimination from them of any Fascist doctrine or principles. Further, the inculcation of Fascist principles by teachers who are ardent Fascists, and likely to use the schools as a medium of propaganda, should be prevented by their dismissal or internment. An adequate system of inspection of the schools must be maintained. This includes the inspection of

schools (whether whole or half-time) which receive no Government financial assistance. Primary education is considered most important ; secondary and technical education should generally not be restricted to Italians and other Europeans, provided that there are natives qualified to receive such education in existing institutions."

In conformity with these instructions a beginning was made in education, but even by the end of 1943 little had been achieved owing to lack of staff. A District Officer took over supervision of what schools and education existed in 1942 after they had been re-opened. In the second half of 1942 a government elementary school for some 100 boys and girls, a secondary school for 200 pupils (12-18 years), and a kindergarten and elementary school were working in Mogadishu, with smaller schools for Italian children in Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi and Merca. Roman Catholic Mission schools for native children were assisted to operate at Mogadishu, Ischia Baidoa, Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi, Brava, Kismayu and Yonde. The teaching of Italian was discontinued and supervision to prevent the dissemination of Fascist doctrines was imposed. By the beginning of 1943 Italian education was being provided in the Administration and mission schools for 780 pupils ; the number by the end of the year had fallen considerably as a consequence of the repatriation of women and children to Italy. The Koranic schools were upgraded to elementary standard and two English periods a week were introduced into the curriculum. A more forward policy was envisaged for 1944 when the Director of Education from Kenya visited the territory to make recommendations.

In the field of public works the policy was confined to maintaining and repairing roads and buildings including those damaged by warlike action. In 1942-1943, however, certain special works were undertaken by the military side in conjunction with the Administration to improve road communications in central Somalia so as to give easier access to British Somaliland overland. A Public Works organisation was set up on the 1st June, 1942, and this took over the Italian Public Works staff. In that year the principal work done consisted in the rehabilitation of fourteen operational airfields and the dismantling of material not essential to the country, but required in other theatres of war. This included the dismantling and removal of oil storage plant and an oilseed crushing plant at Mogadishu, the removal of 4,500 tons of Decauville material and the dismantling and removal of seventy miles of narrow gauge railway track, five Diesel locomotives, railcars,

coaches, etc., for use in Middle East. In the following year machinery of all sorts, including electric generating plant, lighters and cable, were dismantled and removed from the elaborate salt works at Dante (Ras Hafun) near Cape Guardafui—also for military use in other theatres in connection with the South Arabian long distance air route to India. A number of existing airfields were improved and new ones constructed by the joint efforts of the U.S. Army and the Public Works Department.

Communications with the outside world were maintained by a regular mail convoy service three times a month between Mogadishu and Nairobi and later twice a month onwards, when the roads permitted, between Mogadishu and Hargeisa in British Somaliland. It says a great deal for the security of this country that the Somalia Mail, in charge of a British officer and an escort of two or three Somalia Gendarmes, was never once attacked or molested. It became the nucleus around which travellers gathered on their journeys between Kenya and Somalia. In the spring of 1943 the wife and children of the newly appointed Military Governor of British Somaliland travelled from Kenya to Hargeisa by this mail service with no more than the usual escort and precautions.

With the decline in military importance of the Somalilands at the end of 1941 maritime communications with the Somalia coast became extremely irregular and more and more difficult. While dhows could be used for some cargoes they were wholly unsuitable for passenger traffic and valuable or urgent stores. Moreover, during the monsoon season dhows cannot navigate the coast at all. Steps were therefore taken to procure a steamer suitable for this coast to maintain and supply coastal posts and carry some trade goods in both directions. A relatively suitable steamer, s.s. *Homeford*, was eventually found by an officer from Political Headquarters at Nairobi, who had been sent to South Africa for the purpose. She was a small vessel of 629 tons register and was put into commission in October, 1942. This ship, while not powerful enough to circumnavigate Cape Guardafui against the monsoon winds and sea, served the Somalia coast well. She made voyages to British Somaliland, and on one occasion even to Madagascar, on Civil Affairs business. The management of the vessel was undertaken by a British firm of shipping agents in Kenya appointed by the Ministry of War Transport.

Postal services were resumed in Somalia in April, 1942. Prior to this a skeleton service with Nairobi had been in operation for prisoners of war, in addition to the military and official mail

service by the Somali Mail convoy, U.K. stamps over-printed "M.E.F." being used. In July, 1942, an airmail service to all countries served by British Airways services was introduced. But the volume of civil mail did not justify maintaining open all the post offices designated at the outset and all except Kismayu were closed. In September, 1943, the Administration took over from the military organisation responsibility for telegraph communications. African and Somali operators trained in Somalia and Kenya during the previous twelve months were used in all posts having W/T installations. In spite of some initial difficulties the saving in cost and personnel amply justified the experiment.

The customs administration was re-opened under British control with Italian and native employees by Proclamation No. 11 of 1941. From September, 1941, onwards additional offices under the supervision of the local British district officers were re-opened at Kismayu, Merca and Brava on the coast, and one at Lugh Ferrandi to tap the overland route to Kenya. The tariff introduced was the Italian one converted to an *ad valorem* basis. But the position was one of some complication owing to the fact that under the terms of the Convention of St. Germain en Laye two customs tariffs operated in Italian Somaliland, the one supposed to conform to the Congo Basin Treaty requirements covered the the entry of goods up to Latitude 5° north, the other north of that line conforming to the Italian policy in force in other parts of Italian East Africa. No attempt was made until the latter half of 1942 to collect duties on imports north of Latitude 5° north, and even thereafter it was not found practical or worth attempting to collect the duties on the few dhow cargoes landed on the coasts of the N.E. Province.

1942 saw a modest beginning of veterinary work in Somalia under a British veterinary officer assisted by an Italian veterinary surgeon and a farrier, and some native assistants. The four major veterinary problems in Somalia were, surrah (trypanosomiasis) in camels and to some extent in equines, contagious bovine and caprine pleuro-pneumonia, and rinderpest. Supplies of the drug antrypol were made available in the Upper and Lower Webi-Shebeli areas, the Mudugh and the Ogaden. A charge of 5.30 Shilling E.A. currency per inoculation was made and readily paid by the Somalis. Bovine pleuro-pneumonia was gradually spreading and constituted a major problem since the necessity of preventing the infection spreading to Kenya restricted the purchase of live meat which was much wanted. Caprine pleuro-pneumonia was also spreading, but in both diseases the vast area of the

country and the difficulty of quarantine made veterinary work, except by a modest amount of inoculation, very difficult. A proclamation issued in November, 1942, gave the Administration statutory powers to control animals and to deal with disease within the limitations of personnel.

The major work in this category of activities undertaken by the Somalia Administration in 1942 and intensified in 1943 was in locust control. Reports from Cairo and the United Kingdom of the probability of serious and widespread cyclical locust infestation in the Middle East led to concerted measures being taken through all the countries involved, including those under B.M.A. and nowhere more urgently than in the two Somalilands. Somalia was fortunate in securing not only advice from the Kenya authorities, but also bait to deal with hoppers. The operations in the early months of the campaign would have been more effective in East Africa had similar steps been taken in Ethiopia, especially in the areas favourable to locust breeding adjoining Kenya and Somalia. Reports of locust infestation in the N.E. Province of Somalia began to come in in September, 1942, and in the subsequent months from most of the country. Eggs were laid over large areas and exposed where possible, but hoppers developed. The bait used was not wholly successful; resort was also had to burning, trenching and spraying with Diesel oil. Most of the large swarms were destroyed, but many small ones remained.

In March, 1943, urgent danger from locusts was signalled from London for all East African territories and a locust conference met at Nairobi as well as an international meeting in Teheran. It was decided to use troops to combat the menace in Turkana and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya as well as in the two Somalilands if this proved necessary to supplement local resources. In Kenya the brunt of the campaign was borne by troops; in British Somaliland and the Reserved Areas the native population and the administrations received assistance from the Somaliland Camel Corps and King's African Rifles, but in Somalia the work was done by the Somalia Gendarmerie and provincial police and retainers. The principal problem lay in the supply and transport of bait and material. Somalia took 1,650 tons of bait in 1943 alone; transport would have made this impossible without the provision and control exercised by headquarters at Nairobi over s.s. *Homeford*. At the end of January, 1943, there were no reports of locust infestation in either of the Somalilands. But locusts entered Kenya from Ethiopia and then Somalia from the Harar direction. By March considerable egg laying had taken place. The

subsequent hopper campaign was most successful. A second infestation in the autumn was also successfully dealt with. The principal source of infestation was the Awash Valley, and this remained the centre for infection of the Military Territories and Kenya. In Somalia, apart from outside advice, the control and campaign was undertaken by the Administration under a Locust Officer, with a considerable number of Italian and native assistants and two Sudanese assistants borrowed from British Somaliland. The Somalia Administration, after arranging to buy the whole output of a bait factory set up at Mombasa for the purpose and renting storage accommodation, made provision for the manufacture of bait at Mogadishu for forthcoming work. The cost of the locust campaigns in 1942 and 1943 was borne by the Administration, though out of all proportion to the danger to or value of local crops.

The work of the branch of the Custodian of Enemy Property in Somalia was both less complicated and less arduous than in most of the former Italian territories. In 1943 a new Enemy Property Proclamation was issued in order to bring practice into closer line with that of Middle East Territories. Apart from some farms in the hand of the Custodian the larger enterprises were regarded either as state or semi-state concerns or were being managed by their own staffs. The Italian para-statal oil storage concern and the three Italian social insurance concerns were wound up as their maintenance was not financially or economically possible. Some abandoned goods, notably jute at Kismayu and Mogadishu, were gradually disposed of. The Italian Colonial Company, a state owned enterprise, was sold by tender to local merchants. The property of absentees, deportees, and evacuees was taken over and the assets liable to deterioration sold.

SYNOPSIS
OF CHAPTER VIII

THE RE-BIRTH OF BRITISH SOMALILAND

The Ejection of the Italians — Military or Civil Administration? — The Appointment of a Military Governor — The Order in Council — Somali Welcome for the British — The Damage Caused by War — Disarming and Grazing Problems — Transfrontier Arrangements — The Working of the Courts — A New Governor, and the Separation of Duties — Agriculture, Education and Medical Services — The Undertaking of Public Works by R.E.'s — Police and Prisons — The Evacuation of Italians — Trade and Trade Figures of the Protectorate — Transport Difficulties — Banking and Revenue.

CHAPTER VIII

The Re-Birth of British Somaliland

ON the 4th August, 1940, powerful Italian forces from Ethiopia invaded British Somaliland, their main attack being directed along the Harar-Jiggiga axis. The evacuation of the civil government from Berbera was completed on the 17th August, 1940. On the 16th March, 1941, a British expeditionary force sailed to Berbera from Aden and re-occupied the capital with very little opposition. This operation, planned to take place in conjunction with General Cunningham's operations in Italian Somaliland, had naturally led the Commander-in-Chief in Cairo to consider, in consultation with his Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, the re-institution of civil administration in the Protectorate and, in February, Sir P. Mitchell had taken steps to ascertain the whereabouts of such former officials as could be secured to restore a government. It was not possible, however, at that time to know or even forecast whether the re-occupation would take place, or even be begun, with a sea-borne expedition from Aden or by formations of General Cunningham's East African forces from Italian Somaliland. It was therefore impossible to concentrate in advance a party of these, and other, officers for the administration for the purpose of accompanying one or other enterprise. Indeed, the campaign in Italian Somaliland developed so rapidly that the Chief Political Officer only received the warning telegram on the subject while he was at Nairobi on the 8th March. The landing of the Aden Force at Berbera only anticipated the advent in Protectorate territory of General Cunningham's troops from Jiggiga by a few days.

The ejection of the Italians from British Somaliland by British troops brought about the re-occupation of a British territory under the Crown. It was obviously not an occupation of enemy territory. The event restored British sovereignty which, under those same doctrines of international law which H.M.G. were applying to the Italian colonial territories, had been latent during the Italian occupation. The whole question of jurisdiction in the Protectorate had been raised in Cairo late in February, as soon as it began to appear possible that General Cunningham's campaign might lead to an early re-occupation. Doubts about the wisdom of reinstating

a civil administration had arisen in Cairo and almost simultaneously in London. On the 16th February General Wavell informed the War Office that the situation which would arise in British Somaliland, either if the territory were re-occupied by military operations or if the Italians were to evacuate as a result of general surrender, had been considered by himself and the Chief Political Officer. It was the opinion of both that the administration, in either event, should be a military one for some time at least, and follow the lines of O.E.T.A.

But, meantime, on the 15th, the War Office had sent instructions which crossed with the foregoing. This telegram said that the matter of the early re-occupation of British Somaliland, in view of the recent military successes, had been discussed with the other interested departments. The most important question that had emerged was that of making provisional arrangements for the taking over of the Protectorate administration. The War Office went on to say that the impossibility was fully recognised of immediately restoring civil government on the completion of re-occupation and that military administration, possibly for a period of considerable duration, would be likely, during which time General Wavell would be in supreme control. The C.-in-C. was asked whether he would contemplate the appointment of a Military Governor, under his control, during this intervening period.

To this, General Wavell replied on the 21st that he advised the setting up, on the general lines of O.E.T.A., of a military administration for British Somaliland under the control of his headquarters: until military administration was ended in Italian territory he saw strong reasons for maintaining it. Some of the various reasons adduced were of passing importance, like the existence of a Vichy administration in Jibuti; but some were, and remained, of more lasting relevance. General Wavell saw no difficulty in having Political Officers of the former civil administration ready to accompany any forces, whether from Aden or from the west, which might enter the Protectorate, and for this purpose he wished to have as many of them as possible available but in uniform. In conclusion he intimated that he would report when conditions appeared such that normal colonial administration could be resumed. Whether a change was then desirable before these territories as a whole were reviewed in connection with peace terms, could then be considered. General Wavell's proposals were approved, after examination of the situation in London, on the 20th February and he was so told on the 26th.

The outcome of the decisions made in London was the appointment of a Military Governor in the person of Brigadier A. R. Chater, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., Royal Marines, who was thoroughly familiar with British Somaliland, where he had commanded the Somaliland Camel Corps. The Aden Force which landed at Berbera was accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Smith, O.B.E., of the former Protectorate Administration, as Senior Political Officer. The Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell, after the warning telegram he received on the 8th March while he was in Nairobi, collected all other available personnel in Kenya and despatched them from Mombasa via Aden. The Mombasa party reached Berbera on the 23rd March. The Military Administration of British Somaliland was proclaimed by General Cunningham, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the Commander-in-Chief, when he visited Berbera on the 21st March.

The proclamation, drafted in Cairo in anticipation of the re-occupation, restored the laws and administration of the Protectorate as they had been prior to the Italian occupation—save that the new Governor was a Military Governor. Brigadier Chater reached Cairo on the 28th March and, after receiving his instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, assumed his duties as Military Governor of British Somaliland on the 10th April, establishing his headquarters at Hargeisa on the 15th. This step was taken in view of the damage done to buildings at Berbera, the former capital seat of government, during the evacuation and re-occupation. Owing to the better climate of Hargeisa the seat of government remained there. Brigadier Chater was also appointed Officer Commanding the troops in Somaliland. Under the Commander-in-Chief's instructions and in conformity with General Wavell's advice to H.M.G., he communicated with the Chief Political Officer of the Commander-in-Chief for the Civil Administration of British Somaliland, but was responsible directly to the G.O.C.-in-C. East African Force (General Cunningham, under whom the Aden Force was placed as soon as it landed) for military matters. This dual role continued during the whole of Brigadier Chater's tenure of office, which terminated on the 3rd March, 1943.

While a Military Governor had been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief under his authority as the superior military commander of the occupying, or rather re-occupying troops, it was nevertheless considered advisable to differentiate this régime from that instituted in the occupied Italian Colonies. It was also considered desirable overtly to ensure the restoration of the laws

and form of the British administration which had temporarily been terminated by the Italian occupation, by a formal document emanating from the Crown. The necessity of this procedure was questioned by the Chief Political Officer when put forward by London, where it was also specifically proposed that it would be understood that the Military Governor would be responsible to the War Office and the powers of the Secretary of State for the Colonies under the former Orders in Council would be exercised by the Secretary of State for War. While appreciating the arguments put forward by the Chief Political Officer, H.M.G. decided nevertheless to proceed by means of an Order in Council, which, with the proviso mentioned, in fact met the Commander-in-Chief's views and advice. The Order in Council was issued, dated the 9th May, 1941, in the following terms :—

“ STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS 1941 No. 678
FOREIGN JURISDICTION

THE SOMALILAND (MILITARY ADMINISTRATION) ORDER IN
COUNCIL, 1941.

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 9th day of May, 1941.
Present,

The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas by the Somaliland Orders in Council, 1929 to 1938, the office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Somaliland Protectorate (hereinafter referred to as 'the Protectorate') is constituted, and provision is made for the administration of His Majesty's jurisdiction in the Protectorate and generally for the peace, order and good government thereof :

And whereas in consequence of military operations now being conducted in the vicinity of the Protectorate, it is expedient to make special provision as hereinafter contained for the administration of the Protectorate :

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows :—

53 and 54
Vict. c. 37.

1. This Order may be cited as the Somaliland (Military Administration) Order in Council, 1941, and shall be read as one with the Somaliland Orders in Council, 1929 to 1938. Short title and construction.
Succession to Government.
2. So long as this Order shall remain in force, paragraph (iv) of Article 7 of the Somaliland Order in Council, 1929, as enacted in the Somaliland Order in Council, 1935, shall have no effect ; and whenever the office of Governor is vacant, or in the event of the death, incapacity, removal or absence from the Protectorate of the Governor for the time being, such person as shall, under the authority of the Secretary of State, be appointed Military Governor of the Protectorate shall administer the Government thereof and shall have all the powers and authorities of the Governor ; paragraph (iii) of the said Article 7 shall not apply to a person so appointed.
3. This Order shall come into operation forthwith. Commencement.

RUPERT B. HOWARTH."

The effect of this Order in Council was to invest the Military Governor with administrative authority derived directly from the Crown instead of authority derived through the Commander-in-Chief by virtue of conquest, or *vi et armis*. In practice little change in what had already been done was needed or occurred. The Military Governor continued to be subordinated as O.C. Troops to his local Superior Commander and continued to report to the Chief Political Officer, through, and from, whom he received those directions of policy which in former times the Governor received directly from the Colonial Office. Legally one important change was involved, namely that Orders were issued by the Military Governor under the authority with which he had been invested by the Order in Council instead of by means of proclamations or orders issued under a delegation of powers from the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief Political Officer. The death penalty and the prerogative of mercy were equally vested in him instead of in the Commander-in-Chief's person or in that of his delegate.

The welcome accorded to Lieut.-Colonel Smith by the local Somalis from the moment of his landing with the Aden force left no doubt that the people were genuinely pleased at the return of

a British Administration. A number of incidents confirmed the initial impression. At Zeila, which the Italians evacuated on the 18th March, a retired Somali police inspector on his own initiative assumed control, hoisted a British flag which he had concealed, and began to collect Italian arms and ammunition. On the 23rd March an officer of the Somaliland Police landed at Berbera and made arrangements to recall dispersed members of the force. It was possible to start police work in Berbera by the 2nd April and by the 31st May, 1941, 540 out of 551 former members of the force had reported for duty. Another example was provided by the Somaliland Camel Corps. The officer who had landed at Berbera on the 23rd March had been unable to go to Burao, the headquarters of the Corps which by then had been disbanded for several months, until the 18th April. By this date, however, 80 per cent of the Somali ranks had already reported for duty at Berbera. On the 4th May one company of the Somaliland Camel Corps set off to deal with Mijjertein raiders and the whole formation, with only 50 per cent of its officer establishment and 15 per cent of its establishment of British N.C.O.'s, was in active employment, armed with Italian weapons and a miscellaneous collection of equipment.

The first task undertaken by the Military Government in British Somaliland was the disarmament of the Somalis who, as in Somalia, had helped themselves plentifully to Italian weapons and munitions. This was carried out with great energy and very few forces. In April, May and June a few skirmishes and local disorders took place between the police and military forces and the Habr Awal, the Habr Yunis and the Rer Adan Hagar septs of the Dolbahanta. The last of these three affairs was by far the most serious and involved the withdrawal of the tribesmen over the border into Somalia; but under the Military Administration, common to both areas, inter-territorial action was possible without diplomatic exchanges. A large collective fine was imposed on the tribes for the death of ten Illaloes (district police) during the affrays; 1,700 camels were duly collected, the individual offenders punished and a collective fine imposed. The incident was an early illustration of the advantages of a common administration for the two Somalilands. It was directly the fruitful result of an inter-territorial meeting held at Burao as soon as the 11th May between Brigadiers Chater and Scupham, under the aegis of Lieut.-General Cunningham in person, to discuss inter-territorial problems.

A small administrative point of some interest to the historian

was the discovery soon after the publication of the Order in Council that the Seal of the Protectorate of British Somaliland was missing. It had not apparently been removed at the time of the evacuation of the civil administration in 1940 and was perhaps taken by some Italian as a "souvenir". The issue of the Order in Council reinstating the laws and practices of the Protectorate required use of a Seal and the preparation of a new one without delay was imperative. Authority was therefore granted by H.M.G. on the 30th May to use a locally made Seal and a Royal Warrant was issued authorising the use in the Somaliland Protectorate, as should be necessary, of a Public Seal which had the approval of the Governor and of Officers Administering the Government. The new Seal, embodying the badge of the Protectorate, was designed by the Kenya Survey Department and made by Indian craftsmen in Nairobi to the order of the Chief Political Officer.

The situation in British Somaliland on re-occupation presented numerous difficulties. Berbera had suffered considerable damage in the course of the operations ; between a quarter and a half of the buildings were damaged or unsafe. Apart from Hargeisa most government stations had suffered damage in one form or another. The inmates of the lunatic asylum and leper settlement at Berbera were abroad in the land. All civil wireless equipment and telegraph lines were destroyed : official communication was restored by Army Signals which carried administration traffic, but no civil traffic could be restored for some time, nor could arrangements be made for civil postal services. Trade in the whole Protectorate was at a standstill and stocks of food very low ; regular communications with Aden and Arabia did not exist and suitable shipping other than dhows was not available. Happily the basic economic condition of the country was not too bad since the Italians had taken little toll of livestock, which had increased and multiplied since 1939. Some trade with hidden stocks was resumed as soon as the population realised, with the fall of Addis Ababa, that the Italian forces were defeated : the export of hides and skins had begun by the autumn of 1941.

In March General Cunningham transferred the lines of communication and the supply machinery of his forces from Mogadishu and across Italian Somaliland, to Berbera and along the Boramo-Harar-Diredawa route. This development led to considerable employment of civilian labour generally for all sorts of purposes. The expenditure on wages and, where necessary, the rations distributed to the native labour force employed, amply provided the public assistance which might otherwise have been

needed. The economic effect was an immediate stimulus to trade and activity generally. The arrival of dhows and some goods by military shipping provided the wherewithal which the keen Somali and other traders were not slow to use. By the end of 1941 considerable progress had already been made towards normal conditions. The exceptions to this general rule were at Berbera itself, where the military base required the use of nearly all government buildings, jetties and the beach ; and on the French Somali coast border where a blockade of the Vichy French colony was instituted and maintained with some dislocation to the normal life of Zeila and Boramo. Disarming operations proceeded rapidly and with little trouble, in spite of considerable reluctance on the part of the tribes to hand in their arms before they were satisfied that their cousins in Somalia had also been disarmed. On the eastern frontier a round-up of the Mijjertein, among whom numerous ex-Italian native irregulars had gone to ground, was quite successful : during February and March, 1942, 4,000 rifles were recovered. A joint operation with the Somalia Gendarmerie, to which reference has been made, produced 700 rifles from the Gadabursi : the force provided by British Somaliland for this operation consisted of 3 officers, 50 police, and 200 Illaloes.

The first formal arrangement for trans-frontier grazing, made in the course of the meeting at Burao on the 11th May, 1941, provided that British Somali tribes transgressing the frontier at the appropriate season should be administered in Somalia by their own Political Officers accompanied by British Somali Illaloes. This arrangement lasted until the beginning of 1943, but was not wholly satisfactory. It was found that the British Somali tribes were over-grazing and exhausting the Ogaden grounds and wells to the detriment of the Ogaden Somalis, who were dependent on them for their existence all the year round and not only during the periods immediately after the rains when the British Isaak and Dolbahanta tribes had been using the Haud grazing. Eventually a new agreement was reached in June, 1943, which left the administration of the immigrant tribes in the hands of their own Political Officers but control of the wells and the grazing periods was undertaken by the Somalia Administration. The real and practical solution was found in the co-operation engendered by these meetings and the single control under the Chief Political Officer in Nairobi of both Administrations.

The atmosphere of the Protectorate on the whole remained peaceful. The troubles which were successfully met and overcome were not essentially serious and were largely the residuum

of former international difficulties. The internal situation and political atmosphere were surprisingly good ; in certain districts the Political Officers reported that public security was actually better than before the evacuation. One very interesting and satisfactory development was a spontaneous approach made in September and October, 1941, by a number of Somalis at Berbera and Hargeisa to their Political Officers to raise a fund to contribute to the cost of the war. The Military Governor made it clear in reply that he would not countenance any form of compulsion or pressure to contribute to such a fund and that any offers must be spontaneous and freely made. After some discussion the Somalis decided to create a Spitfire Fund which, by the end of April, 1942, amounted to over £4,000, collected in small sums in a poor land which had suffered two campaigns and an invasion.

During the Italian occupation the Qadis Courts continued working throughout the Protectorate, except at Erigavo where the court was re-established in May, 1941, after the re-occupation. District Courts were re-established in each district. Akils Courts (tribal headmen's courts) were reopened in all districts except in the first instance at Burao and Erigavo, where it was felt that owing to unsettled conditions it would be better for the Akils to be with their people than collected at District Headquarters. The Protectorate Court was reopened. By January, 1942, the Protectorate Court had dealt with 73 cases, District Courts with 1,183 cases, Qadis Courts with 864 cases and Akils Courts with 825 cases. In 1942 as a whole the figures were respectively 87, 1,468 and 1,800 for the Qadis and Akils Courts together ; convictions were recorded in two murder, two attempted murder and five manslaughter charges. In 1943 the courts as a whole dealt with 3,366 criminal cases with 2,907 convictions : this large increase over the figures for 1942 was due to better police work and prosecution. An ordinance was prepared to deal with the organisation of a complete system of Native Courts to administer both Moslem and Customary Law and to replace the Akils Courts, a development which had been contemplated for some years. There remained for settlement the question of the best distribution of original and appellate jurisdiction and how far, and to what court, appeal could be provided for, apart from the normal and constitutional appeal to the Privy Council. Appeal to the Privy Council had already in the past given rise to some difficulties. These were enhanced by bad war-time communications.

District administration proceeded on normal lines but with as much encouragement as possible of tribal authority fostered by

means of tribal assemblies. As a matter of policy this means of contact between the Political Officers and the people was preferred to that of the older method of using Akils or paid headmen. These were continued but vacancies were in certain cases not filled where tribal assemblies looked like being successful. A beginning was also made in associating the people with their government by the creation of township committees in the principal places.

A substantial change in administrative organisation and policy took place in 1943. In the winter of 1942-1943 Brigadier Chater, who was still combining the functions of Military Governor and O.C. Troops in British Somaliland, asked to be allowed, when circumstances permitted, to return to more active service. The subject was discussed by the Chief Political Officer, then Major-General Lord Rennell, in the course of a visit to London, when the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, intimated that he was now prepared to release Brigadier Chater. He proposed that when a new appointment was made to the Governorship, whether in the Military or Civil form, that function should be separated from the Command of the Troops which for convenience would and should henceforward include the troops in the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia. A successor to Brigadier Chater was found in Mr. G. T. Fisher, C.S.I., C.I.E., Indian Political Service. He reached Kenya direct from India with his wife and children in February, and, on the 3rd March, 1943, took over from Brigadier Chater, with the rank of Colonel, subsequently raised to that of Brigadier. Brigadier Fisher's wife and two children followed him to Hargeisa by the Somalia Overland Mail Service via Mogadishu with no more escort than that usually provided for these mail convoys, namely, a British officer and a section of Somalia Gendarmerie. The separation of Brigadier Chater's former functions and the decision by H.M.G., reached at the time of Brigadier Fisher's appointment, to continue the Military Governorship and existing régime in British Somaliland *sine die* pending the cessation of hostilities and the ultimate disposal of the Somali question generally, enabled him to concentrate on the reorganisation of the administration of the Protectorate and the establishment of a longer term policy than had been possible during his predecessor's régime, which had had to deal with the restoration of law and order and a civil administration in the country after the Italian invasion. But the fruits of Brigadier Chater's wise régime had already matured in the form of a good state of internal security. The few perennial troubles arising out of the age-long feud between the Isaak and Dolbahanta, and between the latter and

the Warsangeli, were unimportant and soothed by the removal of the Chief of the Habr Awal from Burao to Zeila.

Despite the failure of the 1942-1943 and 1943 rains, a beginning was made on future plans. A start was made in an ambitious survey of the whole Protectorate to collect tribal, topographical, meteorological, botanical and geological data. The policy, instituted in 1942, of the seasonal closure of one grazing area in each of the most over-grazed districts was continued. Investigation into grazing resources and grazing control, also begun in 1943 by an officer from the Kenya Agricultural Department, was continued and the Veterinary and Agricultural branches, hitherto conducted by one officer, were separated, with a special Agricultural officer posted to the latter from Somalia. The shortage of rice had already imposed on the country a maize and millet diet to which the population had taken more kindly than had been anticipated. The extension of agriculture directed already in 1942 to the production of maize, millet, grain, peas and ground-nuts met with a good response, in spite of the predominantly pastoral proclivities of the population.

In other fields plans were made in close consultation with the Colonial Office as the residuary legatee of the Protectorate. During 1942 elementary schools were opened at Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao, providing a four-year course in Arabic, reading, writing and arithmetic. The Hargeisa school was a success: those at Burao and Berbera were less so owing to religious antagonism, but the disturbances of 1939 which attended the opening of a school at Burao were not repeated. One boy was sent to the Sudan, and twelve were sent to Aden for secondary education. By 1943 active opposition to the schools had ceased but still only eighty pupils were attending the three schools. Government grants were being made to fourteen Koranic schools. In October, 1943, the Kenya Director of Education visited the country and his report was discussed in Nairobi with the Colonial Office Adviser on Education. The Military Authorities in East Africa transferred an officer of the Army Education Corps to the Protectorate staff and on his recommendation a comprehensive and long-term scheme of education, including provision for advanced education, was agreed in the course of the following year.

Responsibility for the provision of medical services for civil and military patients was undertaken from the outset of the re-occupation by the Army. The hospital buildings at Berbera, Hargeisa, Burao, Boramo and Zeila were taken over as military establishments, but with provision for civil patients. Small hospitals

or dispensaries were opened at Erigavo, Sheikh and Las Anod. The Military Government undertook financial responsibility for the Somali and Asian subordinate medical staff, paying a capitation fee of 2/- a day for Somalis and 4/- a day for Asians to the Army Medical Services for work among the civil population. By the end of 1941 civilian in-patients averaged 250 a month and a medical training unit for civil subordinate personnel was opened at Burao under military control in October. In 1942 an outbreak of smallpox in Eastern Ethiopia spread to British Somaliland, but only 17 cases were reported : 3,500 civilians were vaccinated. A welfare clinic for women and children was opened at Burao under the supervision of the wife of one of the officers of the Administration. The health of the Protectorate was good throughout the period covered by this summary.

Public Works were initially placed under the Royal Engineers of General Cunningham's command. This arrangement was inevitable and economic during the early stages when British Somaliland was the base and traversed by the lines of communication of the troops in Ethiopia and later by the line of evacuation of troops and civilians therefrom. During 1943 the arrangement, though economic only in as much as it obviated the creation of separate Public Works Staff, was less satisfactory. The withdrawal of military engineer personnel and resources involved some neglect of those public works which were necessary from the civil point of view but less so or not from the standpoint of defence. The principal task in the field of public works was road maintenance and improvement throughout the Protectorate, and especially on the main roads from Berbera and Zeila to Ethiopia, and to Somalia. The minor building works undertaken were in the main the reconstruction and repair of war damaged buildings, particularly at Berbera. Extensive improvements to water supplies, notably at Berbera and Hargeisa, owed their inception to the military population in the country in 1941 and 1942, and will remain of lasting benefit. Berbera was re-equipped with electric power plant on a more extensive scale than before the war by the installation of Diesel generators, producing enough current at 220 volts A.C. to provide for refrigerator plant as well as lighting and small local power requirements. The cost of public works undertaken under these arrangements for civil account was borne in the administration accounts under the head of "Army services received".

The restoration of the police organisation and forces, together with the Somaliland Camel Corps, within a very short time of the

re-occupation has already been mentioned. In December, 1941, Police Headquarters and the Police Training School were moved from Sheikh to Hargeisa. A new police commissioner from Kenya embarked on remodelling the police into more of a civil than a military body. Police patrols were used in the districts instead of confining their work to the townships as heretofore. By the end of 1942 the strength of the force had been raised to eight British officers and inspectors and 600-800 Somali ranks: recruiting and discipline among the Somalis presented no difficulties. In the course of 1943, under the reorganisation of the administration described, a proposal to dispense with the Somaliland Camel Corps for internal security and quasi-police duties arose mainly in connection with the possibility of its use outside British Somaliland. While no decision had been reached by the close of that year it was felt that, by some increase in the police force, the addition of a small striking force of armoured vehicles and the increase of the Illalo force from 400 to the former strength of 600, the Police Department could undertake responsibility for all the internal security of the territory. This decision was eventually carried into effect after the close of the period covered by this chapter.

The prison organisation under the Police Department was overhauled and conditions of overcrowding mitigated by reconstruction and the provision of additional places of detention. One serious prison riot occurred in 1942 involving casualties from the use of firearms for protection by the British police personnel who had intervened to restore order. Prison industries were organised, covering chairmaking, brick and lime burning and the training of carpenters and bricklayers. The police administration effectively undertook immigration, passport and identification duties, as well as the licensing of motor vehicles and drivers.

The whole of the evacuation of Italian civilians from Ethiopia in 1942 and 1943 took place through British Somaliland via Berbera where three convoys of Italian ships called to repatriate the women, children and male invalids and aged to Italy. The able-bodied civilians, who were also embarked at Berbera, were sent to various British East African territories for internment. These large bodies of evacuated persons were housed for long periods, pending the arrival of ships, in standing camps in Ethiopia, in the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia and in British Somaliland, notably at Mandera. Their transport from railhead at Diredawa to the standing camps and transit camps along this 250 mile route was effected by motor buses and lorries. One of the complications

of the evacuation of women and children was that the climate of Berbera did not allow of their staying on the coast at or near the point of embarkation for more than the briefest interval. Arrangements had in consequence to be made to transport the parties from Manderla and other camps (the nearest of which was 45 miles from the coast) to Berbera and embark them on the same day in such numbers as could be handled daily by the ships. In practice it was found that the rate of reception of these repatriates on the ships, namely, 700 a day, was lower than the transportation capacity organised by the British military authorities in the Civil Administration and Military Transport Services in the camps, on the road and over the beaches by lighters to the ships. The organisation worked perfectly on each of the three flights and no casualties were recorded during the embarkations. It may be added that the repatriates were allowed to take heavy as well as hand baggage which was embarked with each party, which constituted no small administrative and labour problem, since all baggage was searched and recorded in transit. The total figures of embarkations over the beaches at Berbera were as follows :—

1st Flight repatriates :	
Women, children and aged males	9,376
2nd Flight repatriates :	
Women, children and aged males	5,035
Able-bodied males evacuated to	
East Africa, 1942	12,500
	<hr/>
	say 26,900
	<hr/>

(Plus a few hundred more in small parties in 1943)

These figures are of course in addition to the Italian prisoners of war evacuated under purely military conditions from the territory as a result of General Cunningham's operations.

The financial and economic situation of British Somaliland was essentially simpler than that of any other territory under British Military Administration, mainly because the economic and commercial development of the Protectorate was essentially primitive. British Somaliland depended for its import and export trade almost entirely on Aden, with the addition of a little dhow trade with other more distant parts of Arabia and a certain amount of overland traffic of uncertain dimensions with Somalia and Ethiopia. But the Protectorate had no harbours. The more ancient transit trade to Ethiopia from Berbera and Zeila had been

largely killed by the construction of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway, and the absence of adequate roads in the Protectorate mitigated against any great resumption of transit trade even to the Harar area during the Italian régime in Ethiopia. An excellent heavy-duty motor road to Jiggiga could have been extended to the sea at Zeila or Berbera to encourage competition in trade with the Jibuti railway, in the same way as the Italians had planned to develop Assab and the highway to Dessie. The strategic argument that a good road from Berbera to Jiggiga would help an Italian incursion proved fallacious. The absence of good roads in the Protectorate did nothing to hinder the Italian advance through British Somaliland to the coast in 1940.

British Somaliland trade before the war consisted of a substantial export of hides and skins, especially the latter, some other products such as gum and incense and a modicum of remittances from emigrated Somalis. The import trade consisted of food-stuffs, notably rice, which was the staple grain diet of all those who could afford a grain diet, tea, coffee, sugar, cotton goods, simple hardware and petroleum products. There was no bank : the merchants on the coast with their connections at Aden transacted the bulk of the remittance business.

Directly after the re-occupation there was an early revival of exports of hides and skins from accumulated stocks. The trade figures are instructive ; they include transit trade with Ethiopia, of which there was an increasing amount from the summer of 1941 onwards, but the bulk of the exports, especially those under the heading "Animal products", was from British Somaliland itself ; it will be noted that the recovery after re-occupation was rapid since in the first six months the value and number of skins exported was nearly as great as in each of the subsequent two years.

EXPORT IN VALUE AND WEIGHT OR NUMBERS

	1941 July-Dec.		1942		1943	
	£	tons	No.'s	£	tons	No.'s
Vegetable products	1,981	41		4,337	116	
Animal products	87,132	31		117,131	144	
Animal skins in '000's			1,062			1,181
Animals alive in '000's			44			112
Manufactured products	283	5		639	16	
Miscellaneous	24,838			8,176		
						792
						33
Total (£ only)	114,234			130,283		118,981

IMPORTS IN VALUE AND TONS METRIC

	1941 July-Dec.		1942		1943	
	£	tons	£	tons	£	tons
Cereals	40,437	2,171	78,902	3,459	60,736	1,598
Other foods	77,063	4,270	191,983	11,932	177,494	6,436
Textiles and Grain	70,833	147	174,080	2,893	221,729	266
Mineral Oil (gallons) '000's	16,121	116	32,797	361	29,435	382
Other goods	75,500		103,397		69,628	
Total (£ only)	280,014		581,759		559,022	

Even a brief analysis of the figures is interesting. The great apparent adverse balance was largely accounted for by the heavy expenditure of the Army on wages to local labour; to a lesser extent it was due to the uncontrolled and invisible export of goods to Ethiopia and Somalia across the land frontier by camel or even lorry away from roads and tracks: to a lesser extent still it was represented by Somali earnings as carriers all along the roads to Ethiopia. The decline in foodstuffs imported, which of necessity continued, was due primarily to the decline of rice, sugar and tea imports as the first of these commodities disappeared from the market and the others became difficult to obtain. The decline in cereal imports was offset by local cultivation which received serious impulse under Military Government. By and large the trade figures, considering the difficulties of supply and of communications with this coast, were very satisfactory. Everything possible was, of course, done here, as in Somalia, to encourage dhow traffic.

The supply machinery was complicated. Owing to the traditional connection of the coast with Aden, British Somaliland had to come into the Middle East Supply group, which included Aden, and not into the East African Supply group, in which Somalia was placed. This involved not only Political Branch Headquarters dealing with Cairo, but the maintenance of an O.T.A. Agent at Aden to cope locally with supply problems. The quotas for British Somaliland had to be included in the Aden quotas and, though the Protectorate remained under the Political Branch at Nairobi, Political Branch in Cairo, when the repatriation was effected early in 1942, was also closely concerned with the territory in relation with M.E.S.C. The O.T.A. Agent at Aden, working with the Secretariat of that Government, not only dealt with local supply arrangements, but also with shipping for the coast, with financial remittances on Government and commercial account in addition to his duties connected with currency and other matters of concern to the Nairobi headquarters affecting other territories.

The blockade of the French Somali coast throughout the Vichy régime put the coast of British Somaliland in the position of being the principal entry for, and exit of, Southern Ethiopia to the outside world and the transit trade proved a source of revenue. Arrangements were made from the outset to collect customs duties at Berbera and Zeila on goods for Ethiopia at the stipulated *ad valorem* rate imposed by the British Military Administration in substitution of the Italian tariff for that country. The British Somaliland Administration collected these duties for a commission,

as had been done during the Italian régime before the war. This system was continued when Ethiopia was handed back to the Emperor's Government. Trade goods consigned to the Reserved Areas were treated as Ethiopian goods. The tariff on goods destined for British Somaliland in force before the war was restored.

In order to facilitate Ethiopian trade it was decided in the early months of 1942 to hand over to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation a large number of heavy Italian Diesel lorries captured during the campaign to operate a road transport service between Diredawa and Zeila and Berbera. Staffed by Italian civilian and prisoner of war drivers and mechanics and Somalis trained for the work, the U.K.C.C. transport organisation contributed very considerably to the transit trade. In order to develop Zeila, and relieve congestion at Berbera, lower dues were imposed on certain goods entered at the former place, and road improvements were effected. The development was sufficiently successful for the remittance of dues to be suspended on the 10th October, 1942, when Zeila was handling more goods than ever before in its history ; in the month of November, 1942, a record weight of 8,000 tons was handled, under the most primitive conditions, at the beach. With the eventual agreement with the Vichy French at Jibuti the Ethiopian transit trade diminished very considerably and the U.K.C.C. transport organisation on the British Somaliland roads was brought to an end.

The financial situation of the Protectorate was simple. The prosperity due to the Ethiopian transit trade and military expenditure on wages reflected itself in the revenues of the Administration. The currency initially used as legal tender was the Indian rupee, which did not require to be so proclaimed as it had been in use before the war. The advent of troops and contact with Somalia, East Africa and Ethiopia, involved in practice the use of East African currency on such a scale that it was found necessary and desirable to proclaim that currency as additional legal tender : the rate fixed for this currency was the same as in other occupied territories with the rupee at 1s. 6d. sterling. It was not found necessary to introduce the Maria Theresa dollar or Egyptian currency as legal tender, nor did the Administration accept or redeem any Italian currency which remained in the territory.

No banks existed, but remittances on commercial account were facilitated by the Military Administration through inter-territorial treasury drafts and the official banking connections with Aden. The use of these official facilities and the cheap remittance rates

provided by the British Bank at Addis Ababa during the period under review, reduced the traditional currency transactions in Maria Theresa dollars of the British Somali coast with Aden to a minimum.

The principal revenue of the British Somaliland Administration was from Customs Duties and Transit fees; the total revenues and those from these sources, for the financial years 1st July–30th June, were :—

	1941-1942	1942-1943
Total Revenue	£222,180	£249,030
Customs, etc.	£134,511	£94,503

The other sources of revenue included zariba and market dues, licences, etc.

The rise in prices of staple commodities, due to scarcity, difficulty of supply and the plethora of money in the settled communities, led to the institution of a rationing scheme and price control. Rationing was not possible outside the settled areas and was applied after, and in addition to, price control instituted in December, 1941. On the whole during the years 1941-1943 the financial position of British Somaliland was more prosperous than it had been at any time in the history of the Protectorate. It was a matter of no little satisfaction to the Military Administration that this should have occurred in such difficult circumstances and under War Office administration.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER IX

THE RESERVED AREAS OF ETHIOPIA

The Necessity of Reserved Areas — The Legal Distinction in the Status of the Ogaden — The Unauthorised Retention of Italian Males by the Ethiopian Authorities — British Withdrawal from Ethiopia — Problems of Enemy Property — The Emperor Queries Reserved Areas Administration — The "Reserved Areas Notice" — Police and Law — Revenue and Expenditure — Tribal Disturbances — The Attack on Goggjar — British Withdrawal from Harar — Staff Organisation — French Occupation of a Post in the 25-Mile Reserved Belt — The Running of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway — Negotiations with the French.

CHAPTER IX

The Reserved Areas of Ethiopia

THE circumstances attending the close of the British Administration in Ethiopia have been described in Chapter IV. With the evacuation of the British Garrison British responsibilities in Ethiopian territory were restricted to the areas specified in Article IX of the Agreement of the 31st January, 1942, and Articles 3, 5 and 7 of the Military Convention, signed on the same date. The Cantonments and Reserved Areas were in practice restricted in number and scope to a greater extent than was at one time anticipated.

The evacuation of the Italian civil population from Addis Ababa and other urban centres had proceeded so rapidly that it was found possible to limit the British Cantonments within a few weeks to an area including and adjoining the Addis Ababa airfield, to the European part of Diredawa including the airfield, railway station and repair shops and sundry industrial plants, and to a cantonment at Harar. The airfield at Diredawa was in fact used as the main staging camp for Italian civilians in the process of evacuation pending embarkation on the arrival of the Italian ships.

The Reserved Areas were those described in the schedule to the Military Convention and the area known as the Ogaden, the immediate disposal of which was defined in Article 5 of the Military Convention in the following terms: "His Majesty the Emperor agrees that the part of the territory of the Ogaden which was included in the former Italian Colonial Government of Somalia shall, during the currency of this Convention, remain under the British Military Administration of Somalia." A distinction was implied, and indeed made, between the Ogaden, and the Reserved Areas proper dealt with by Article 3 of the Convention. The latter were "the areas specified in the Schedule attached (to the Convention), and such other areas and places as may be agreed" from time to time as ought, in the view of the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, to be retained under British Military Administration. The maintenance of the Ogaden under the British Military Administration of Somalia during the currency of the Convention was however not subject to any agreement between the Emperor and the G.O.C.-in-C. Such maintenance did not

require any justification from military necessity even if, as in practice was the case, military considerations did exist. The underlying thought at the time was that the extent of the areas reserved under Article 3 and specified initially in the Schedule might be varied by diminution or extension just as the number of cantonments occupied initially might be increased or decreased, for military reasons. The French Somaliland coast was at that time still in Vichy hands and subject to a blockade. But in theory, even if all the Reserved Areas and cantonments were handed back to the Emperor's sole administration, the Ogaden territory would nevertheless remain under the Somalia administration "during the currency of the Convention".

The Schedule to the Military Convention described the Reserved Areas, that is those additional to any cantonments and the Ogaden, as :—

" 1. A continuous belt of Ethiopian territory 25 miles wide contiguous to the frontier of French Somaliland running from the frontier of Eritrea " (*i.e.* south of the Assab-Dessie road) " to the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. Thence south-west along the railway to the bridge at Harau. Thence south and south-east, excluding Gildessa, to the north-eastern extremity of the Garais Mountains and along the crest and ridge of these mountains to their intersection with the frontier of the former Italian colony of Somalia. Thence along the frontier to its junction with British Somaliland.

" 2. All the land within Ethiopia occupied by the Franco-Ethiopian Railway and its appurtenances."

Immediately after the signing of the Agreement and Convention steps had been taken by the British Military Commander to transfer the majority of British troops from Addis Ababa to the Reserved Areas and the cantonments of Diredawa and Harar. Troops were also withdrawn from Gondar and Gimma and all other places in Northern Abyssinia with the exception of Dessie, where salvage work was still in progress ; moreover, Dessie was a strategic point on the Addis Ababa-Asmara road which it was then essential to keep open.

Pending a liquidation of affairs, the officers of the British Military Administration were withdrawn to the Reserved Areas and work in Ethiopia proper was conducted from there. On the 28th February, 1942, the Headquarters of the Reserved Areas moved from the capital to Harar where the Headquarters of the 12th (African) Division was also located. Colonel T. R. Blackley was placed in charge and in turn was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel

G. D. Pitcairn on the 1st December when the post of Senior Political Officer, Reserved Areas, was regraded to that rank. A Political Officer for liaison duties remained at Addis Ababa until the withdrawal of the British troops was complete. An officer of the department of the Custodian of Enemy Property also stayed behind to deal with the handing over of property to the Ethiopian Custodian. The British troops remaining in Addis Ababa until affairs there were wound up were concentrated in a cantonment area in and around the aerodrome. The responsibility of the guarding of the aerodrome would be theirs, in the event of it being required for use either by the Royal Air Force or commercial craft. With them in the capital was an evacuation staff, responsible for the collection of the Italians who had not already been sent down the line, and the forwarding of them to transit and collection camps in Diredawa, Harar, Jiggiga and British Somaliland.

A problem arose over the evacuation owing to the decision of the Ethiopian Ministers that it was necessary for the industrial development of the country that at least 4,000 Italians should be retained. The Minister of State in Cairo, the Foreign Office and other authorities were informed that an important contribution to the war effort could be made by Ethiopia if these Italians were retained. The Italian civilian population in Ethiopia in September, 1941, was approximately 35,000. The Agreement and Convention were based on the assumption that this number would be evacuated, and that when this was achieved British forces would retire to the Cantonments and Reserved Areas. But in order that the essential public utility services could be maintained H.M.G. decided that 500 Italian men could be retained, on the understanding that they were replaced as soon as possible by Allied or neutral personnel. By the end of May most of the Italians had left Addis Ababa ; it was estimated that there were then 1,500 Italian males left in the country, and with them a considerable number of dependants. From the end of May to the close of the year approximately 700 more Italians were sent down the railway for repatriation or evacuation as the case might be. On further concessions being made to allow additional Italians to remain, General Platt raised the ceiling from 500 to 700. The Italians who were officially to be retained were required to sign a declaration, as a condition of their staying in Ethiopia, absolving the British authorities from responsibility for their protection. In the Reserved Areas there were several hundred useful Italian males working under the supervision of British troops. There were also a number of lorry drivers and mechanics operating the transport service between Diredawa and

the British Somaliland coast for the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. But all Italians remaining in the Reserved Areas were to be evacuated as and when their services were no longer required.

By the end of June sufficient progress had been made in the winding up of affairs in Addis Ababa to allow of the withdrawal of the British troops remaining in the cantonment area in and around the aerodrome. Arrangements were made for the protection of the landing field to be handed over to the British Military Mission and our troops left on the 6th August. The Emperor held a formal leave-taking which included a luncheon to which he invited all ranks. With the withdrawal from Addis Ababa the only cantonment areas remaining were Dire-dawa and Harar.

The position as regards enemy property in Ethiopia at the 1st February, 1942, was that there were five offices conducted by British Assistant Custodians in the country, at Addis Ababa, Gimma, Dessie, Dire-dawa and Harar. All other outstations had been closed and the remaining enemy property handed over to the representatives of the Ethiopian Government. Upon the signing of the Agreement with the Emperor, Assistant Custodians were directed to hand over the property in their charge as soon as Ethiopian Custodians were appointed. The offices at Gimma were closed in February and those at Dessie in May. All enemy private property then held at these two places was handed over to the representatives of the Ethiopian Government for safe custody on behalf of the British Custodian until an Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy Property was appointed. Mr. C. H. Collier, formerly of the National Bank of Ethiopia, took over this position on the 28th May, 1942, and began taking over from the British Custodians on the 1st June.

Immovables and movables were handed over against receipts supported by inventories and any available documents, while Italian State property was handed over unconditionally. A question arose over the terms of an indemnity to be given by the Ethiopian Government to the British Government on the subject of custodian fees. In the early months of 1942 the offices of the British Custodians were severely strained as a result of the accelerated rate of evacuation of Italians. For example, for several months between 200 and 400 people were being evacuated daily from Addis Ababa and the British Custodian was employing upwards of 20 ten-ton lorries a day in the removing of their furniture and miscellaneous possessions to stores. The total value of the turnover in cash deposits, refunds and liquidation of

stocks for the whole of Ethiopia exceeded £400,000 including lire 70,000, converted at the rate of lire 480 to the pound sterling. But the total value of the property, immovable and movable, handled by the British Custodian was far more difficult to assess.

In the course of June it was apparent that the form of the British Military Administration in the Reserved Areas would be called into question by the Emperor. A subsidiary cause for this was that the wording of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement did not clearly define the nature of the British Military Administration or its relation to Ethiopian administration, if any. Article 3 of the Convention provided that in the Reserved Areas, which included British cantonments, the British Military Administration should remain in force to such an extent and for so long as the G.O.C.-in-C. East Africa, in consultation with the Emperor, should consider necessary. So long as British cantonments were "reserved areas" they were, under International Law, occupied enemy territory. In consequence all legislative, executive, administrative and judicial powers remain vested in the G.O.C.-in-C. and outside the sovereignty of the Emperor. Prior to the signing of the Agreement the G.O.C.-in-C. had legislated, by virtue of his powers, for the whole of Ethiopia by means of "Notices". The effect of the Agreement was that the G.O.C.-in-C. retained the same powers of legislation, but in respect only of the Reserved Areas and British cantonments. In these the legislation enacted prior to the Agreement remained in full force and effect. The G.O.C.-in-C. had never delegated his powers to the Chief Political Officer in respect of Ethiopia as he had done in the case of both Eritrea and Somalia, but, with the creation of the Reserved Areas, this he now did, in the "Reserved Areas Notice, 1942", which read as follows :—

" RESERVED AREAS NOTICE

1. This Notice may be cited as the Reserved Areas Notice, 1942, and shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the thirty-first day of January, 1942. Short Title and Commencement.
2. In the Reserved Areas and places specified in the Schedule hereto all British Military legislation enacted prior to the coming into force of this Notice shall continue in full force and effect unless and until it is revoked or amended by the Chief Political Officer or any officer acting under his authority, and all British Continuance of British Military Legislation in the Reserved Areas and places.

Military legislation enacted subsequent to the coming into force of this Notice shall apply only to such Reserved Areas and places.

Delegation of powers to the Chief Political Officer.

3. All legislative, executive, political and administrative functions now vesting in the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa Command, in respect of the said Reserved Areas and places shall from the date of the signing of this Notice vest in, and shall be exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war by, the Military Officer for the time being holding the appointment of Chief Political Officer in respect of the said Reserved Areas and places.

Publication of legislation.

4. Legislation promulgated by the Chief Political Officer or by any officer acting under his authority shall be published within the said Reserved Areas and places in such manner as the Chief Political Officer may from time to time direct.

Power to vary Schedule.

5. The Chief Political Officer may from time to time vary the Schedule hereto.

SCHEDULE

1. A continuous belt of Ethiopian territory 25 miles wide contiguous to the frontier of French Somaliland running from the frontier of Eritrea to the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. Thence south-west along the railway to the bridge at Harau. Thence south and south-east, excluding Gildessa, to the north-eastern extremity of the Garais Mountains and along the crest of the ridge of these mountains to their intersection with the frontier of the former Italian colony of Somalia. Thence along that frontier to its junction with British Somaliland.

2. All land within Ethiopia occupied by the Franco-Ethiopian Railway and its appurtenances.

3. Addis Ababa, Adama, Gimma, Awash, Gondar, Diredawa, Debat, Harar, Adi Arcai, Adowa, Dalle, Adigrat, Neghelli, Quiha, Yavello, Combolcia, Mega, Sardo, Moggio.

SIGNED at NAIROBI this 25th day of February, 1942

W. PLATT

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
East Africa Command "

On the return of Lord Rennell, the Chief Political Officer, from Madagascar at the end of October, the Emperor sent the President of the Ethiopian High Court, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Willan, to Nairobi to discuss the question of jurisdiction in the Reserved Areas. The discussions were also attended by the then Legal Adviser of Political Branch, Nairobi, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Charles Belcher. Lord Rennell then took with him to London the opinions of Sir Charles Belcher and the President of the High Court, and the problem was examined there.

From a practical point of view there was no objection to the Emperor's legislation being applicable in the Reserved Areas. But such legislation could not, of course, involve the sanction of force exercised by Ethiopian police or military so long as the British G.O.C.-in-C. was responsible for the areas. It was equally immaterial whether Ethiopian civil courts were set up. It was, however, most important for the sake of public order that no attempt should be made by the Ethiopians to collect taxes from the Somalis. The practical outcome was less difficult in the end than appeared likely would be the case. The Emperor sent a representative to Jiggiga who conducted a court to which those resorted who so desired. The Military Administration district officers and police in fact governed the country, maintained order and dispensed justice with concomitant fines and punishments. No Ethiopian police or armed forces entered the Reserved Areas.

On the signing of the Agreement and the withdrawal of the British Political Officers from the provinces, such organised central and provincial police personnel as had been employed was withdrawn or disbanded. All surplus native ranks of the Ethiopian police were given the chance of serving in the Emperor's police forces, at his discretion. The remainder of the Occupied Territory police controlled, in addition to Addis Ababa, the former European quarters of Diredawa and Harar, the railway line from the capital to Aiscia, the 25-mile belt following the line of the French Somaliland border, and two small cantonments in Galla Sidamo. The Addis Ababa force continued under British Military Administration officers until such time as the Emperor could find officers willing to serve in his administration. The commanding officer was not willing to continue his work, but it was not until September, 1942, that a successor was found; other officers agreed to stay and were engaged for service under contract with the Ethiopian Government. On taking over his duties the new commanding officer expressed his admiration of the standard and

training of the men, achieved in so short a time by the British Military Administration.

In June, 1942, it was discovered that the native O.T.A. police in the cantonments at Diredawa and Harar were being subjected to intimidation. This led to consideration of replacing them by military askaris, with powers as special constables. They would retain their military status and not otherwise be subject to British military legislation governing the police force. But the G.O.C. disapproved of the plan, and it was abandoned. Later in the year the G.O.C. thought of another way out of the difficulty. To economise in troops he decided to form a "corps" of Zabanyas, or guards, to protect W.D. stores and supplies. It was proposed to make them "followers" under the King's African Rifles Ordinance of Kenya, and engage them in Eritrea, Somalia and British Somaliland.

The number of cases heard by the British Military Courts in the Reserved and Cantonment Areas from May to December, 1942, was as follows :—

HARAR	120
DIREDAWA	193
JIGGIGA	170
AISCIA	26

The administration of the Aiscia area was conducted by a Political Officer. The railway runs through this territory to the French Somaliland frontier, and much of his time was occupied with the blockade. Law and order in the Jiggiga district was maintained by a British Military Court, presided over by a Political Officer, assisted by the Reserved Areas police and the Illaloes. Somali cases were dealt with by the Akils Court, members of which were Somali chiefs with authority in the country round. A British appointed *qadi* administered Sharia law in the town.

At the end of December, 1942, the administrative staff in the Reserved Areas consisted of ten officers, in addition to three police officers, a legal adviser, a custodian, a second custodian and an information officer at Addis Ababa. The non-commissioned staff consisted of five British N.C.O.'s and seven Inspectors of Police. The administration of the Reserved Areas inevitably involved expenditure. The only sources of income were from court fines and fees, custodian receipts and hospital fees, amounting to some £3,000 during the last six months of 1942. The Ethiopian authorities collected what taxes they could in the Harar area and in the native towns of Harar and Diredawa. In a discussion between Lieut.-Colonel Sir Charles Belcher and Colonel Blackley,

Senior Political Officer for the Reserved Areas, at Nairobi on the 8th December, it was agreed that power to levy income taxes on the Greek, Armenian and other merchants at Harar and Diredawa could be accorded to the Emperor without affecting military authority or security. The same applied to the functioning of his Criminal Courts presided over by European judges, and also to the continued operation of Ethiopian Danyas' and Akils' Courts.

There was obviously very little means of finding income to offset expenditure. No customs levy could be made for entry into the Reserved Areas. The revenue on goods used was collected either on goods imported into British Somaliland and exported to the Reserved Areas, or on goods imported into Ethiopia through British Somaliland, when the customs collected were remitted to the Ethiopian Government without any deduction in respect of goods consumed in the Reserved Areas.

The estimate of cash expenditure for the Reserved Areas for the period 1st May–31st December, 1942, excluding the emoluments of the administrative staff and such Army stores and equipment as was required, was £96,000. The actual expenditure amounted to £79,000, made up as follows:—

Administration	£
Police	7,284
Grants for relief (including evacuation) ..	10,644
Other expenditure	46,732
	14,434

By the end of June the relief of destitute Italians had been reduced to almost negligible proportions. Only 400 were receiving free rations, while 1,800 bought on ration cards through authorised sources of supply. By October this relief came to a close with the evacuation of the last destitutes, or by their inclusion in transit camps. By the close of the year the number of Italians buying rations on cards had been reduced to 800.

In June, 1942, the Controller of Finance and Accounts decided that the Maria Theresa dollar must be unpegged from the statutory rate in the Reserved Areas, as had been done in other parts of East Africa under British Administration and for the same reasons described in a later chapter. The Ethiopian authorities decided to maintain through the other parts of Ethiopia a fixed parity between this currency and sterling. From midnight on the 30th June, 1942, Egyptian currency and the Indian rupee ceased to be legal tender in the Reserved Areas by the Reserved Areas Currency Notice No. 10 of 1942. Payments by the Administration were effected in East African currency and lire currency of not exceeding 10 lire

denomination. Local rates of exchange fluctuated considerably. At the end of December the Maria Theresa dollar was worth 2s. 3d. and the lire 420/480, having been as low as 400 due to demand for Italian currency by evacuees. Before the withdrawal of the British troops from Addis Ababa the currency stock of Maria Theresa dollars, the property of the British Government, was moved to Harar, where the East African currency reserve in Ethiopia was already stored.

Commercial goods imported or exported and carried by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation transport service were included in the British Somaliland customs return. With a large portion of the Ethiopian railway running through Vichy French territory, transport difficulties in the Reserved Areas, and Ethiopia generally, were great. In the early summer of 1942 the U.K.C.C. transport service was organised as described in the preceding chapter, operating with heavy Italian Diesel-engined lorries and Italian drivers held back temporarily from evacuation until Allied or native drivers could be found. The main routes were Zeila-Diredawa and Berbera-Diredawa, the greater part of the lorries being engaged in transporting military salvage and other stocks from Diredawa to the coast. The original object of the organisation had been to export grain and other commodities required by the M.E.S.C., but the quantity of these exports did not prove to be as large as had been expected. But the service nevertheless did perform a very useful task in removing the stores which the military authorities had requisitioned and concentrated at Diredawa, and a large quantity of military salvage.

When in December, 1942, it had become apparent that the Vichy régime in Jibuti would not hold out much longer, the War Office began considering how it would be possible to modify the boundaries of the land still under the British Military Administration in Ethiopia. The Agreement by which French Somaliland came into line with the United Nations was signed on the 28th December, 1942. On the 21st March, 1943, the Emperor was informed that H.M.G. was prepared to vacate the cantonment of Harar and the northern part of the 25-mile Reserved Area belt, from the Ethiopian frontier to the southern shores of Lake Abbé. When Lord Moyne, Deputy Minister of State, visited Addis Ababa with Major-General Fowkes, the Emperor expressed his disappointment that Diredawa and Jiggiga had not also been handed back. In a note dated the 12th April the Emperor suggested that the boundaries of the Diredawa cantonment be altered and asked what military reasons made the retention of the

remainder of the 25-mile Reserved Area belt necessary. In reply, in a note dated the 26th May, General Sir W. Platt informed him that the reasons were :—

- “(a) the necessity of maintaining British troops in a potentially troublesome area in order to deal with disturbances involving British tribesmen of the kind which took place in 1942,
- (b) the necessity of maintaining British troops in the area in order to safeguard the interests of all parties concerned in the Jibuti-Addis Ababa Railway.”

The cantonment of Harar was handed over on the 24th April, 1943, and relations between Major-General Fowkes and the Vice-Governor and other Ethiopian officials were good. In the preceding three weeks 320 buildings were handed over, of which 139 were Italian state-owned. The Ethiopian Police took over the police and prisons organisation complete with buildings, uniforms, rifles, stores and equipment. Some of the prisoners, whose offences had been trivial, were released and others turned over by agreement to the Ethiopian Authorities. The main civil hospital, the Principale, changed hands as a complete working unit, and the same procedure was followed for the health and other subsidiary municipal services.

On the completion of the withdrawal from Harar, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer removed his headquarters to Diredawa. Though in some ways not as suitable as Jiggiga, Diredawa was the place where political questions requiring immediate attention were most likely to arise. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer in the Reserved Areas was Lieut.-Colonel G. D. Pitcairn. He was responsible to the G.O.C.-in-C., through the Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer, for the government of the civil population, but consulted the Commander, Northern Sub-area of East Africa Command (*i.e.* the Somalilands area), on all matters of importance. In May he handed over to Lieut.-Colonel D. K. Daniels.

The administration of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway proved to be one of the major tasks of the British Reserved Areas Administration. When the evacuation of the Italian civil population was being planned it had been hoped that the end of the Vichy régime would have come in time for at any rate part of the evacuation to be effected through Jibuti; but in the outcome all the civil population was evacuated from Ethiopia via Berbera in British Somaliland. The railway itself, with all its appurtenances, remained a “Reserved Area” throughout the period, except for the part between the French boundary and Jibuti which was

administered by the French when through traffic was resumed after the fall of the Vichy régime in December, 1942. The administration of the railway by the British Military Civil Affairs staff covered the 475 kilometres of line (out of a total of 678 kilometres) between the French frontier and Addis Ababa. In spite of an acute shortage of locomotives, most of which were in the Jibuti area and so not available during the heavy traffic of 1941-1942, peak loads for passengers and freight, mainly salvage and military material, were carried for January, 1942. 6,584 Italian civilian evacuees alone were carried. With the evacuation of British troops from Addis Ababa traffic began to decline, but civil traffic in both directions of passengers (other than evacuees) and freight increased considerably.

The difficulties of material and spares were very great and resort had to be had to "cannibalising" a few of the locomotives to produce boiler tubes, etc. The whole British administrative staff of the railway consisted of only four officers and two non-commissioned officers with a loyal and hard-working nucleus of Italian personnel in addition to the local labour force. The accounts of the railway, which made no provision for depreciation or capital remuneration, were drawn to cover working expenses, repairs and minor capital works. The railway was a self-accounting unit in the Political Branch accounts, and up to the end of the 1942-1943 financial year showed a small profit. The published accounts are shown overleaf (page 206).

A strike among the railway workers occurred in July, but after negotiations and assistance by the Ethiopian Minister of Communications, the strikers resumed work; certain increases of pay were subsequently approved. In December, 1942, the general manager of the railway reported a series of raids by Danakil tribesmen on labour gangs working on the track. In the course of these raids a number of workmen and members of their families were murdered. The Ethiopian Government, being responsible for the administration of the area north of the line, offered protection for the affected portion.

About this time the Ethiopian Authorities took up the question of the future of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. On the 10th January, 1943, the Emperor sent a Note to Major-General Fowkes, commanding 12th (African) Division, in which he expressed his opinion "that it would be in the best interest of the Allied war effort if the railway from Addis Ababa to Jibuti remains under British Military control and management until the end of the war, and hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government

ETHIOPIAN RAILWAYS

	Revenue				Expenditure				Net Surplus
	Cash Account	Recorded value of Stores and Services for Army, etc.	Total	Cash Account	Recorded value of Army Emoluments	Recorded value of Stores and Services by Army, etc.	Total	Net Deficit	
1st July, 1941, to 30th June, 1942	£ 83,928	£ 58,686	£ 142,614	£ 101,783	£ 10,598	£ 17,769	£ 130,150	£ —	£ 12,464
1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943	220,986	21,973	242,959	123,844	5,826	15,964	145,634	—	97,325

will order the matter accordingly." Early in the following year Lieut.-Colonel Adeane, in charge of transportation at Political Branch, was sent to Jibuti to discuss with the French Authorities and the Company how the railway should now be run. Although it was obviously uneconomic to run the railway in two parts, neither the Emperor nor the French could agree to any other plan. It was therefore agreed that, until a more satisfactory solution was found, the French Company should run the line from Jibuti to Aiscia and that the rest of the line to Addis Ababa should continue under British Military Administration. Shortly afterwards a new plan was proposed whereby the French section would be militarised and the Company's employees under military control would operate the whole line.

On the 24th June the War Office informed General Sir W. Platt that the French Committee of National Liberation were anxious that the French Company should be given an opportunity of resuming its concession. It had therefore been agreed that the General Manager should open negotiations with the Emperor on the understanding that :—

- (a) Military traffic should continue to have priority.
- (b) Rates were to be agreed by the G.O.C.-in-C.
- (c) Traffic priorities committee should be the final authority for fixing priority.
- (d) A British Military Controller would have unfettered supervision over both the operation and maintenance of the line.

Negotiations continued, but by the end of the year there was still no acceptable compromise. So the French continued to run the line from Jibuti to Aiscia, and the British Military Administration the line onwards to Addis Ababa. The British operated section was over four times the length of the French. Rolling stock was scarce and in poor condition, and spare parts were hard to come by. Despite this the Administration was faced with a tonnage to be moved far in excess of the railway's carrying power in its most efficient days. Much credit was due to the small British staff that was equal to the great task asked of it at so difficult a period in the railway's history.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER X

THE OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR

The Objective of 121 Force—The Landing at Diego Suarez — The Administrative Set-up, and the French Attitude — Opposition by the Governor-General — Conference at Pretoria and M. Annet Plays for Time — Transfer of Diego Suarez to E.A.C. — Decision to Proceed with Military Operations — Madagascar and the Free French — Problems regarding Administration Staff — Assault on Majunga and Tamatave — Surrender Terms — Other Military Operations — The Madagascar Proclamations — Operation "Line" — The Administration Moves to the Capital — Relations with the French — M. Bech Carries on — Administrative Co-operation — Financial Complications — Cessation of Hostilities — The Anglo-French Agreement — The Formal Handing Over to General Legentilhomme — General Platt's Final Proclamation — British Withdrawal — Madagascar's Contribution to the Allied Cause.

CHAPTER X

The Occupation of Madagascar

IN April, 1942, the Chief Political Officer at Nairobi, Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, was informed by G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, General Sir W. Platt, of the decision of H.M.G. to seize Diego Suarez in Madagascar, if necessary by force of arms. Under instructions from the War Office Sir Philip Mitchell was called upon to provide a Chief Political Officer for Madagascar, who was to join the forces, then on the high seas, at Durban. The new C.P.O. was to accompany the General Officer Commanding the expedition, which was known as 121 Force. Sir Philip Mitchell selected Brigadier M. S. Lush, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., who had been Deputy Chief Political Officer, Ethiopia. Brigadier Lush was not only qualified by his experience to set up a British Military Administration in this part of Madagascar, but, with the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement on the 31st January, had become available for other duties. With Brigadier Lush were sent two other officers to assist him; the party made contact with 121 Force at Durban and accompanied the G.O.C. 121 Force, Major-General R. G. Sturges, C.B., D.S.O., to Madagascar.

The main objective of 121 Force was to occupy Diego Suarez in order to deny the harbour and naval base to the Japanese, to whom this point would have afforded a valuable means of threatening our maritime communications along East Africa with the Middle East. The French Government of Madagascar was at this time under the control of the Vichy Government and conducted by a Governor-General (Monsieur Annet) and a Secretary-General, both of whom were ill-disposed to us. Whatever were the grounds for assuming contact between the Vichy Authorities in Madagascar and the Japanese, the experience of what had happened in French Indo-China and the small number and poor equipment of the French military forces in the Island, should they attempt to resist, made a Japanese landing at Diego Suarez far from impossible or improbable.

In spite of inauspicious circumstances it was hoped that the Vichy Authorities in Madagascar might not resist our troops; orders were therefore issued that on landing near Diego Suarez the first French officer encountered was to be released and sent to the French Military Headquarters there to seek a peaceable

outcome for the operation. The landing was effected successfully early on the morning of the 5th May, 1942, and was a surprise to the French, both as regards time and the precise point of landing, though suspicions of our intentions had been sufficiently aroused to cause the bulk of the French forces in the Island to be moved to Diego Suarez during the weeks which preceded the operations. But the French did not respond to the overtures made and 121 Force had quite a hard fight for Diego Suarez during the hours which followed the landing.

On the surrender of Diego Suarez a local administration was set up under Brigadier Lush, who used such of the French administrative staff on the spot as were willing to co-operate or displayed pro-Ally sentiments; of these there was a sufficient number for the purpose. Diego Suarez is so remote and inaccessible from the rest of Madagascar, except by coastwise shipping, that all idea of further operations from that base was abandoned from the outset. All but one brigade of 121 Force was withdrawn for service in the theatre of operation, namely India, for which these troops had eventually been destined when the expedition sailed from England. While the administration contemplated and set up at Diego Suarez was only local in character it was hoped, even if most of the troops forming the major part of 121 Force was withdrawn, that by negotiation or agreement it might prove possible to induce the French in Madagascar to agree to a *modus vivendi* which would enable us to secure the whole of the Island against the Japanese. Brigadier Lush's functions from the outset were therefore likely to be as much political as administrative, which accounted for the selection, as C.P.O. to G.O.C. 121 Force, of so senior an officer.

Neither the operations at Diego Suarez nor the garrison left there after the capitulation came under G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, until the 1st July, 1942. Brigadier Lush's administrative and political functions therefore depended on London, with which he maintained direct communication during this period. He was provided with certain additional Civil Affairs officers from East Africa Political Headquarters for trade and financial duties, and maintained contact with Nairobi as well on these subjects. An inspection of the local financial situation was made by the Controller of Finance and Accounts, East Africa Political Headquarters, soon after the occupation of Diego Suarez. He recommended that local French currency be continued in use at the rate of exchange of 178 $\frac{5}{8}$ Frs. = £1 sterling, the rate adopted for the French currency in French Equatorial Africa which was in

Free French hands. He also made arrangements for local supplies for the civil population which was now cut off from the rest of the island.

One of the principal sources of anxiety revealed by the Controller of Finance and Accounts' inspection was the local supply of currency. The British force had been provided with only 3,000,000 French Francs of the issue in use in Metropolitan France : Madagascar used a local Madagascar Franc currency issued by the Bank of Madagascar, but maintained at par with the Metropolitan Franc. The banking institutions at Diego Suarez held only 13,000,000 Francs of unissued currency in reserve. The sole other currency with which 121 Force had been provided was a supply of British Military Administration sterling notes specially printed for such eventualities ; this it was felt should not, for political reasons, be used in Madagascar to avoid offending French susceptibilities or providing material for hostile propaganda on British imperial and economic ambitions. In consequence this reserve supply of currency had been left at Durban.

The Controller of Finance and Accounts recommended that local orders be issued to restrict the holding of cash by private individuals and firms to a small nominal amount, to restrict withdrawals from the banks for any except essential day to day purposes, and to order all holders of amounts beyond the permitted minima to be paid into the banks. The policy was successfully adopted and enforced. The banks' reserves were in a short time raised to 26,000,000 Francs on which the cashiers of the occupying troops were able to draw to meet current expenses.

The Vichy Governor-General, M. Annet, adopted an entirely intransigent attitude about the Diego Suarez operation. He protested strongly against the "uncalled-for aggression", asserting that Madagascar could have been defended against the Japanese and would be defended against Japanese and British alike. Nevertheless it proved possible to establish contact by means of emissaries between Diego Suarez and the capital at Tananarive (Antananarivo), in the first place through Red Cross personnel, and subsequently by other intermediaries. The objective of the negotiations was avowedly to seek an accommodation which would avoid further bloodshed and secure the rest of the island from Japanese aggression. But M. Annet was determined to allow no British troops on the island if he could help it and at the same time overtly declared both his loyalty to Marshal Petain and his uncompromising hostility to General de Gaulle.

The contact with M. Annet's Government at the capital

had originally been made by Brigadier Lush as the Chief Political Officer to the G.O.C., 121 Force, but the highly political nature of French relations at the time with H.M.G. and a vague prospect of reaching a *modus vivendi* with the French on the island, led to the dispatch to Diego Suarez of Mr. L. B. Graftey-Smith, of H.M. Levant Consular Service, from H.M. Embassy in Cairo. He was to take over the political direction of affairs for the Foreign Office at Diego Suarez, as distinct from the more administrative functions which Brigadier Lush was from then on supposed to conduct, in so far as the political and administrative functions could be distinguished. During May and June it became clear that no real progress was in fact being made with M. Annet. Moreover quite considerable difficulties were arising out of the respective roles of Brigadier Lush as General Sturges's political and administrative officer in contact with the War Office, and Mr. Graftey-Smith in direct contact with the Foreign Office. By the end of June it had become apparent that the negotiations conducted from Diego Suarez with M. Annet through intermediaries on the island were not going to lead anywhere. The disquieting situation created by a military occupation of Diego Suarez and a potential, if not actively, hostile French Government in the rest of the island, was one which could not be allowed to continue. It had, moreover, already been decided in principle, upon the withdrawal of a substantial part of the troops which had taken part in the Diego Suarez operation to India, that the remaining troops of 121 Force should be reinforced by South African and East African units. This decision, added to the political deadlock which had arisen on the island, led to a conference being held at Pretoria on the 20th June, attended by General Sir W. Platt, Major-General R. Sturges, commanding 121 Force at Diego Suarez, and Brigadier M. S. Lush, as the officer-in-charge of the local administration.

The object of the Pretoria Conference was to formulate a plan in the event of the negotiations in Madagascar failing and to take stock of the position. The rainy season in the centre of the island is usually reckoned to start at the beginning of October and would reach an intensity precluding active military operations with the resources then available by the beginning of December. The last period in which it would be safe, having regard to the rains, to initiate operations was therefore the beginning of September. The outcome of the Pretoria Conference was a recommendation to proceed with the occupation of the rest of Madagascar by force if negotiations were unsuccessful, and in spite of the little time

available to make preparations for this to be done before the rains. H.M.G. decided to proceed in accordance with the recommendations of the Pretoria meeting and General (Field Marshal) Smuts promised to give all the assistance that he could from South African military resources. But little time remained for the preparation and completion of the operations between the end of June and the beginning of September. If the military operations were not completed before the peak of the rains, they would most probably have to be suspended, with very unfortunate political result, not only on our own situation but on the whole Free French movement, which could not afford another military set-back after the Dakar failure.

So soon as the decision to proceed with military operations in Madagascar was taken, the conduct of the negotiations with M. Annet assumed a definite military bearing. If, as was beginning to be apparent in Nairobi, M. Annet was only playing for time in order to protract the discussions sufficiently to make it impossible to initiate military operations before the rains, it was essential, without neglecting the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement, to ensure that our commitments in the talks did not expose us to accusations of bad faith that in fact we had been never prepared to reach a settlement at all. It was equally important to ensure that discussions did not reach a point which, to escape such accusations of bad faith, would involve a postponement of the operations until it was too late for them to be undertaken before the rains. The right and proper desire of the parties conducting the negotiations at Diego Suarez to arrive at an amicable settlement without bloodshed, and the hope or expectation that these might succeed, inevitably became somewhat opposed to the view which was growing in Nairobi that the negotiations were deliberately designed by M. Annet to lead nowhere and should consequently be broken off. That the latter view was right was proved by information received in Tananarive after the occupation. Therefore the decision in Nairobi not to become involved too deeply in negotiations was certainly as right as the hope and expectation in Diego Suarez that negotiations might succeed were vain.

On the 1st July, 1942, Diego Suarez was transferred from direct dependence upon the War Office to that of the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command. From this date the administrative and political responsibility for that place and for Madagascar generally was also attributed to General Platt and his Chief Political Officer in Nairobi. Already in May the latter had begun to be concerned

with Madagascan affairs; correspondence dealing with the negotiations in progress was already passing through Nairobi and such economic, financial and commercial matters as were arising in Diego Suarez had to be dealt with by Political Branch there from the moment when shipping contact with the occupied area at Diego Suarez ceased to be from Durban and was transferred to Mombasa.

At the beginning of August Mr. Roger Makins, of the Foreign Office, attached to the staff of the Resident Minister in West Africa, reached Nairobi to discuss the relative positions of Mr. Grafftey-Smith and Brigadier Lush and to advise on the negotiations with M. Annet. But between the time Mr. Makins left London and his arrival in Nairobi *en route* for Madagascar, the decision of H.M.G. to proceed with further operations in Madagascar had been reached. As a result, the administrative arrangements proposed by the Foreign Office were held in abeyance and both Mr. Grafftey-Smith, depending from the Secretaries of State for War and Foreign Affairs, and Brigadier M. S. Lush, in charge of administrative matters under Major-General Lord Rennell, remained at Diego Suarez.

Upon Mr. Makins's return from Madagascar plans were submitted to the War Office regarding the future administration of Madagascar should the military occupation of the whole island result from the operations envisaged. Certain proposals were also made on the policy to be pursued in the event of an approach being made by the French Authorities for the cessation of hostilities after their initiation. Finally a recommendation was specifically put forward to London to set up a Free French Administration at the earliest possible date after the occupation of the major part of the island in accordance with what Mr. Makins advised was the policy of His Majesty's Government. This recommendation went so far as to suggest that a Free French Governor-General should be made available immediately in the person of General Legentilhomme, who would be installed as soon as practicable and in any event as soon as the capital of Madagascar had been occupied. Under these proposals, not only would no British military administration have been required in Madagascar after the occupation, but certain of the officers in the island, notably Brigadier Lush, could have been withdrawn as soon as military operations had come to an end.

These proposals were accepted in principle in London, but no date could be fixed for the initiation of discussions with the Free French Committee about Madagascar. A settlement of the Syrian

question was under active discussion and no other subject could be dealt with until that had been settled. It was moreover desired not to associate the Free French with the Madagascar operations in any way, so as to obviate any political repercussions resulting from Frenchmen engaged in hostilities with other Frenchmen. Nevertheless, in conformity with the declaration of His Majesty's Government made at the time of the occupation of Diego Suarez, the principle of setting up a Free French Administration was accepted and the French Sovereignty of the island was assumed as fundamental. Any British Military Administration set up would therefore only be local and likely to last a very short time until a friendly French Administration could be substituted. Arrangements were thus made in the first instance to do no more than to have Political Officers available to accompany the officers commanding the operations at Majunga and Tamatave and to concert with Major-General R. Sturges, C.B., and Brigadier (Major-General) F. Festing, C.B.E., D.S.O., commanding 121 Force and 29th Independent Brigade respectively, on the procedure, on the type of officer they wanted, and on the orders to be given to them.

Prior to these consultations with General Sturges and Brigadier Festing an administrative establishment for Diego Suarez had been set up but not disclosed. A certain number of additional officers, borne on other occupied territory establishments and borrowed, was despatched to Diego Suarez against a possible extension of the occupation in order to have them available on the spot. Since at this time it was hoped that General Legentilhomme or another senior Free French officer would be available immediately, it was considered sufficient by General Sturges and Brigadier Festing for them to be accompanied each by one senior and one junior officer.

The operations in Madagascar were planned to begin in the first week in September, which just allowed the minimum time estimated to be necessary to bring them to an end before the rains became too severe. While military preparations were going actively forward and the correspondence on policy between London and Nairobi was in progress, time was passing. But the official desire to install a Free French Government and the assumption that negotiations between H.M.G. and General de Gaulle would eventually take place remained unchanged ; nor was any alternative envisaged. By the middle of August, however, it had become clear to General Platt and his staff that the difficulties of making the necessary political arrangements in time were considerable. It was difficult to assess the real strength of

the Free French supporters in the island in the light of so many conflicting reports from different sources. Some at least of these reports suggested that more real support would be gained for our cause from certain non-Free French elements if, at any rate in the initial stages, we were not too openly associated with the latter to the exclusion of the former.

H.M.G. had hoped to arrive at an agreement with General de Gaulle in time for his representative, if not to arrive directly the landing was made, at any rate to be available there within a few days. But the political situation was so obscure that the Chief Political Officer, Nairobi, decided to increase the number of officers to be made available in order to make provision for the establishment of a temporary British Military Administration, at any rate in the provinces of Tamatave and Majunga, as well as to provide a nucleus for an administration in the capital in case a Free French Governor-General and staff were not available. In the light of subsequent developments it was very fortunate that provision for an embryonic British Military Administration was made. In point of fact it was only after the landing at Majunga had been effected that General Platt was directed to set up a British Military Administration, since negotiations with General de Gaulle had not advanced far enough to hand over Madagascar to him. Had the preparations made been confined to the minimum number of liaison officers originally provided for General Sturges and Brigadier Festing and matters left at that, chaos would have resulted since it would have been humanly impossible to send a British Political and Administrative staff to the island in time to prevent it. As a matter of historical interest the expedition embarked at Mombasa with no definite policy or instructions on this issue. The first landing took place at Majunga on the 10th September. On the same day news was received from London that it would not be possible after all to set up a Free French Administration for some time. But it was only on the 16th September, six days after the occupation of Majunga, that formal instructions were received to set up a British Military Administration, which in the interval had already been done.

By denuding certain occupied territories, by recruiting a certain number of officers from the territories under the administration of the Chief Political Officer, Middle East, and by obtaining the services of one or two officers in East Africa itself, Political Branch, Nairobi, had been able to despatch with the troop convoys, or within a few days of the landings, a group of about forty officers besides those already in Diego Suarez.

Brigadier Lush and three other Political Officers were attached to the Majunga operation while Lieut.-Colonel (Brigadier) P. Smith-Dorrien and two officers were attached to the Tamatave operation. In addition to these officers provision was made for police liaison staff in the persons of the Inspector-General of Police at Political Branch, Nairobi, and two other senior Occupied Territory Administration police officers, a group of finance officers including accountants, trade officers, a Deputy Controller of Banks, and Lieut.-Colonel Adeane (Lieut.-Colonel R. P. W. Adeane, O.B.E.), Controller of Transport, Occupied Territories, to assist in the reorganisation of the Madagascar Railways. General Platt, in all the circumstances described, decided to accompany the expedition to Madagascar himself and to take with him his Chief Political Officer, Major-General Lord Rennell: they embarked in H.M.S. *Birmingham*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral W. Tennant, commanding the convoy and escort flotilla. The convoy proceeded without incident and in the early morning of the 10th September, 1942, operation "Stream", the assault on Majunga, began. The opposition of the French troops was rapidly overcome and by noon the town had surrendered and was occupied.

The assault troops were accompanied ashore by their Political Officers and by Lieut.-Colonel Adeane and Lieut.-Colonel Smith-Dorrien. On landing these officers took immediate steps to make contact with the civil administration; one of them took charge of the Power Station and as a result of his efforts electric power was quickly restored to the town. The Political Officer made contact with the French civil authorities and in due course assisted, in company with the French officer commanding, to make known the cessation of hostilities. Within a few hours of landing, Brigadier Lush and one of his officers had arranged with the French Chef de Region (Provincial Commissioner) to continue the administration of the town so that there was in fact no break in the continuity of public services or administration. The two officers who had landed with the assault troops at Majunga then re-embarked with 29th Independent Brigade and proceeded; as arranged, to Tamatave as part of Brigadier Festing's staff, together with the other two officers so detailed.

On the 15th September indications were received that M. Annet, the Governor-General of Madagascar, wished to ask for the terms on which hostilities could be brought to an end. On the 16th a wireless message was received asking the British Commander-in-Chief to receive two plenipotentiaries. These

were brought from Tananarive to Majunga by British aircraft on the 17th. The two plenipotentiaries, M. Brunet, head of the Bureau des Affaires Politiques and Captain Fauche, M. Annet's Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp, were met at Majunga aerodrome and conducted to the residence of the Chef de Region. As soon as the intimation was received that M. Annet desired to send plenipotentiaries, Mr. Grafftey-Smith, who under instructions from London had up to that time remained in Diego Suarez, was brought by aircraft to Majunga to take part in the negotiations. The terms for the cessation of hostilities were presented by Mr. Grafftey-Smith, who was also to conduct negotiations with the two delegates. As soon as he had presented the terms he was informed by the delegates that they were not acceptable and, as a consequence, the two plenipotentiaries were sent back to the capital by air on the 18th September. The terms of surrender, which had been approved by H.M.G., required the immediate cessation of hostilities and the surrender of all French troops with the honours of war and the occupation by British troops of such points and areas in Madagascar as were considered necessary for the defence of the island against the Japanese. Diego Suarez was to remain under direct British control, together with any other points required for defence, but the remainder of the island was to continue under French administration. The French Authorities were required to have no communications with the outside world except by permission of the occupying authorities and to safeguard all installations, assets, archives and foreign property. They were further required to furnish lists of all persons who had been placed under detention or sentenced by local courts on account of their dealings with the United Nations or the French National Committee, and to release all those persons whom the occupying authority might designate.

The terms were stated by the French representatives of the Governor-General to be unacceptable because they involved a capitulation of the Vichy administration and a breach with Marshal Pétain's régime. M. Annet had apparently still hoped to arrive at a compromise which would ensure a continuation of his office and some sort of an arrangement between H.M.G. and what in fact was a definite part of the Vichy Government. The senior French delegate, head of the Bureau des Affaires Politiques, was obviously more in sympathy with our cause than with the Governor-General's attitude and eventually proved a loyal co-adjutor with the new régime which was installed in the capital. Before leaving the two delegates were informed that the attitude

of the Governor-General could only lead to further bloodshed, more especially as other operations were impending ; in point of fact the landing at Tamatave took place the following morning.

The 29th Independent Brigade, having been re-embarked at Majunga, landed with little opposition at Tamatave on the 18th September in the operation known as " Jane ". The local administrator having been called upon by the senior naval officer of the British flotilla accompanying the convoy to surrender declined to do so ; but after a slight show of resistance the place capitulated. The French troops defending the place withdrew along the coast and up the railway to Tananarive, after blowing up two railway bridges where the line turns inland, but happily, and probably purposely, not the big railway bridge over the river at Brickaville. The troops landing at Tamatave were accompanied by the same two Political Officers who had landed in the assault on Majunga, but in accordance with the specific instructions of the G.O.C.-in-C. they did not land in the first wave. They were, however, ashore very soon after. The senior Political Officer, with two assistants, made contact with the civil administration and, as at Majunga, persuaded the officials to carry on their duties. The Chef de Region (Provincial Commissioner) proved difficult ; he had to be removed and interned for his hostile and obstructive attitude. This remained consistent with his futile refusal to surrender, which caused some quite unnecessary and regrettable loss of civilian life. The other senior officer from Political Branch, Lieut.-Colonel Adeane, was directed by General Platt before leaving Majunga to occupy himself under the O.C. Troops with restoring and organizing the railway communications between Tamatave and the capital. In spite of the two blown bridges and an acute shortage of rolling stock between Tamatave and the break, this was successfully accomplished by the Royal Engineers, the transportation branch of the expedition, and the assistance of the French railway officials whose co-operation here and throughout the island Lieut.-Colonel R. Adeane was able to secure expeditiously from the outset.

The advance from Majunga up the main road to Tananarive by the 22nd East African Brigade (operation " Line ") began within a few hours of the landing. The Brigade Commander was accompanied by Brigadier Lush and two Political Officers, leaving a District Officer and staff in Majunga to direct the administration of that province by the Chef de Region, who had promised his co-operation. In spite of fighting and a succession of road blocks all the way up the road, the advance went well. When the outskirts of the capital were reached, word was received from the

local authorities that the place would be surrendered as an open city. The British troops entered the capital on the 23rd September. They were cordially received by most of the French and all the Malgache population. The G.O.C.-in-C., with the departure of the Naval contingent from Majunga for Tamatave except for a guardship and auxiliary craft, had set up his headquarters ashore, with his Chief Political Officer and Mr. Grafftey-Smith at a place near Majunga called Ambagativano. On the 16th September the War Office instructed that the appointment of Mr. Grafftey-Smith as the Foreign Office representative in Madagascar was in abeyance in view of current developments. Mr. Grafftey-Smith nevertheless stayed and worked throughout this early period in close co-operation with the Chief Political Officer (Major-General Lord Rennell) as part of his staff in charge of political, economic and propaganda matters. While this arrangement was not one which had been envisaged when he was appointed to Madagascar, it proved entirely successful. The position in which he found himself from the date of his arrival in Diego Suarez until the end of the Military Administration in Madagascar was not always easy; he nevertheless entirely appreciated the change of position which had taken place since the abortive Diego Suarez negotiations with M. Annet. Mr. Grafftey-Smith not only fell entirely into line with the new situation created by the War Office telegram of the 16th September, but provided most valuable assistance to the whole of the Military Civil Affairs staff in the island. The way in which the rather awkward position which had arisen with a senior civil and a senior military representative representing the Foreign Office and War Office respectively at Diego Suarez and continuing into the phase of a British Military Administration in Madagascar was dealt with will be described hereafter. The satisfactory outcome of the episode was more a tribute to the common sense and zeal of servants of the Crown on the spot in accommodating themselves to difficult personal conditions than it was to the inter-departmental position which had arisen in London during the months preceding the main Madagascar operations.

While the Majunga and Tamatave operations were in progress a column, also accompanied by a Political Officer, had left Diego Suarez in the direction of Ambanga on the west coast, where a junction was effected with a detachment from Majunga. This Political Officer, a Belgian officer in the British Army, then joined the 22nd East African Brigade and remained attached to the Commander until the conclusion of hostilities in the island when he took part in the capitulation of the French troops at Fianarantsoa.

Another detachment from Diego Suarez occupied the island of Nossi Bé on the north-western corner of Madagascar ; yet another column operating down the east coast reached Vohémar and Antalaha : Political Officers in each case accompanied the troops and took over control of the civil administration in the areas occupied.

While the War Office had approved the terms for the cessation of hostilities as related, there was still no definite indication of the outcome of negotiations with General de Gaulle on the future of the island. Still less was there any news of any French officer having been designated as future Governor-General in the place of M. Annet. It was decided that the latter, whether he accepted our terms or no, would have to be removed in view of his attitude in the past. This decision was amply justified by his refusal even to consider the terms presented to his delegates at Majunga. When General Platt and Lord Rennell embarked at Mombasa they were able to receive signals through the Naval W/T net, but the convoy was sailing under W/T silence and from the moment they left Africa they were unable to reply to any messages until Majunga had been occupied. It was only as a matter of fact on the 9th September that the War Office advised East Africa Command that it was not likely, at any rate for some time, that it would be possible to hand over the government of Madagascar to the Free French. Preparations should therefore be made by military authorities to undertake, at least temporarily, responsibility for the administration. Further instructions would be telegraphed as soon as possible on this point, together with the text of the proclamation to be made by the Force Commander after the surrender of the French Forces was a fact.

This telegram only reached General Platt while he was at sea and long after the latest date on which staff could have been collected to undertake any form of administration or even the control of an existing French Administration had provision not been made to embark many more political and administrative officers than were required under the policy which had been agreed early in August—namely to hand over at once to the Free French. This instruction was followed, but only on the 16th September, by another to set up a British Military Administration in the island, about a week after the landing and about the same time after General Platt had in fact already assumed responsibility through his political staff for the administration of what had been occupied.

When 121 Force sailed from England for the Diego Suarez

operation, the General Officer Commanding had been provided with a pro-forma proclamation for the occupation of enemy territory as a result of conquest by force of arms. This pro-forma proclamation, in order to preserve the secrecy of the operation, was drawn in blank specifying no particular area. The General Officer Commanding and his legal adviser had, prior to their departure, been referred to the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, without, however, any regard to the practice and experience obtained in the course of the occupation of Italian East Africa. It had moreover been concluded in London that territory occupied by force of arms, in the course of which our troops came into open conflict with other troops, must constitute an occupation of *enemy* territory. Whether this was entirely the right view to have taken, even about the Diego Suarez operation, or not, is immaterial. In point of fact the Diego Suarez territory was treated as "enemy", which seems to have been at variance with the declared attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the French generally and in particular to the avowed intention of His Majesty's Government to preserve French sovereignty throughout Madagascar. From the correspondence which had taken place, prior to the departure of the convoys from Mombasa for the operations against the rest of the island, it had become clear to all concerned that, even if fighting ensued in the course of the forthcoming operations, the occupation of Madagascar as a whole could in no circumstances be considered as an occupation of *enemy* territory. Not only did this follow as a matter of common sense in view of the declaration of His Majesty's Government, but it followed quite inevitably from the course of the negotiations with the French Governor-General during July and August.

In the absence of guidance from London on the subject, the provisional proclamations for publication at Majunga and Tamatave after the landings were therefore redrafted at Nairobi so as to eliminate all reference to "enemy". This change of policy was explained in detail to the Political Officers, who were to accompany the commanders of the troops for the "Stream" and "Jane" operations. It was objected that this policy was different to that which had been followed at Diego Suarez, but in spite of the absence of guidance from London the Chief Political Officer felt that no other course was possible, more especially if the support of the French population in Madagascar was to be enlisted against the Vichy Governor-General. The position caused some difficulty since the legal adviser who had accompanied 121 Force from England contended, in opposition to legal advisers of Political

Branch at Nairobi, that in International Law there was no conception intermediate between " enemy " and " friendly " territory. Happily the views of the Chief Political Officer proved to be in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government and were vindicated by a telegram of guidance from London, which, however, was only received several days after the issue of the provisional proclamations at Majunga, which had been drafted in Nairobi. That the same conclusions had been reached in London as locally further became quite clear from the texts of two proclamations for Madagascar which were prepared in London and despatched, but only on the 11th September.

The texts of these two proclamations, and the French texts which had also been prepared in London, were received in Madagascar too late to be used at Majunga and Tamatave, where the provisional proclamations were issued over the name of the Force Commander, Major-General Sturges, directly the landings had been effected. The texts of the London proclamation, while conforming to the practice evolved in Africa but modified to suit French territory, were acceptable with only slight modifications to General Platt and his Chief Political Officer. The London draft of No. 1 Proclamation read as follows :—

" Whereas the necessity of securing the Island of Madagascar and its dependencies from occupation by the forces of the Axis and of preventing the use of these territories by the Axis as a base of operations against the United Nations has necessitated the occupation of the Island by the forces of H.M. the King of Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, (name of G.O.C., British forces in Madagascar) therefore, hereby proclaim :

(1) Military jurisdiction is hereby established in Madagascar and its dependencies for as long as military necessity shall demand. I have, therefore, from the hour and date of this notice assumed full administrative responsibility for the administration of all territories in the occupation of the forces under my command and exclusive military jurisdiction over all persons and property therein.

(2) I will take all steps to establish and maintain public order and safety in such territories and in so doing will as far as military exigencies permit respect all existing laws, customs, rights and properties in the said territories. All requisitioning of service or of (property other than munitions of war) which may be necessitated by military exigencies will be the subject of reasonable compensation.

(3) All existing law courts, municipalities, councils, commissioners, civil officials and other judicial or administrative authorities are hereby required until otherwise ordered to continue the punctual discharge of their duties subject only to my proclamations and orders and to such general or special directions as may from time to time be given by any officer authorised by me in that behalf.

(4) Military courts will be established to try the offences specified

in my following proclamation. All acts or attempts not so specified and which may involve criminal proceedings under the law ordinarily in force in these territories shall be dealt with by the ordinary criminal courts.

(5) Civil judicial proceeding shall remain subject to the jurisdiction and procedure of the civil courts; the sittings of such courts shall, however, be suspended until I shall authorise them to resume their functions.

(6) I hereby call upon the inhabitants of the territories to preserve order and tranquility and to go about their normal avocations in goodwill and without fear.

(7) Nothing in this Proclamation or in the jurisdiction hereby provisionally established for the period of the present military emergency in any way affects or diminishes the sovereignty of France in Madagascar and its dependencies. The French Flag will continue to be flown at all appropriate points in the territories."

The two proclamations drafted in London, though delayed in transmission, arrived in time to be published in the capital. It was therefore decided to leave the local proclamations over Major-General Sturges's signature valid in the provinces of Majunga and Tamatave, but to supersede them by the London Proclamations for the whole island to come into effect in each province occupied as soon as they were posted in any part of a province. This device obviated cancelling Major-General Sturges's proclamations and appropriately transferred administrative responsibility for the whole island to General Platt, in whose name the London Proclamations were duly published as "Madagascar Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2". It was a trifle untidy to have had to resort to local proclamations, but inevitable owing to the lateness of the decision reached in London when it had become apparent that negotiations to install a de Gaulle administration from the outset of the operations had been too long delayed.

Operation "Line", in spite of road blocks and fighting, reached the outskirts of the capital on the 23rd September. Tananarive was surrendered as an open city by the local authorities. The texts of "Madagascar Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2" were flown to Brigadier Lush two days later; they were printed in Tananarive and published on the same day. As soon as the Chief Political Officer reached the capital, he arranged, in connection with the settlement reached with the French Authorities, to publish "Madagascar Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2" in the Official Gazette of the Government of Madagascar in an edition consecutive in number to that of the last Official Gazette, which had contained legislation over the signature of M. Annet, the Governor-General. This publication in the Official Gazette had the effect of incorporating General Platt's Proclamations directly into the corpus of jurisdiction

of Madagascar and of making them mandatory on all the inhabitants. By reason of that legalistic attitude of mind which prevails in all French official circles, this simple device also made them acceptable to the French officials.

On the 28th September General Platt, accompanied by the Chief Political Officer, transferred his headquarters from Majunga to Tananarive, Mr. Grafftey-Smith having preceded the party by road as soon as the capital was surrendered. On arrival in Tananarive Brigadier Lush found the Secretary-General, M. Ponvienne, administering the government. M. Ponvienne informed him that M. Annet, the Governor-General, had left for the southern part of the island with the French troops to continue resistance against our occupation ; and that prior to his departure the Governor-General had authorised him to administer the government in his place. Brigadier Lush communicated the texts of "Madagascar Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2" to M. Ponvienne, who informed him that, in spite of the declarations of His Majesty's Government about maintaining the French sovereignty of the island, he felt unable to carry on the administration of any government, in view of the fact that in Proclamation No. 1 the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces had assumed military jurisdiction and final administrative responsibility. M. Ponvienne, who had already been reported to be a convinced supporter of Marshal Pétain, was therefore removed from his office by Brigadier Lush and placed under arrest. In the absence of an adequate British staff to undertake the direct administration of the island and also in view of the generally friendly attitude of most of the French population hitherto encountered, it became necessary to seek an alternative to the Governor-General and Secretary-General without breaking up the whole of the French administrative machine. It is relevant to point out that in a telegram dated the 16th September, His Majesty's Government expressed the view that, although Clause 1 of Proclamation No. 1 had substituted General Platt's authority over that of the French Governor-General, this did not preclude him from delegating any part of his authority to a French head of the Administration other than M. Annet, but that they did not wish him to be appointed "Governor-General" since it was doubtful whether any British authority had the right to make such an appointment so long as French sovereignty prevailed in Madagascar. Resort would therefore have to be had to a French "Officer Adminstrating the Government", namely an acting Secretary-General or similar appointment. The telegram went on to suggest that Major-General Lord Rennell should be appointed Chief Military

Administrator, at any rate for the time being, and that Mr. Grafftey-Smith's political functions should be suspended. On the 21st September General Platt informed the War Office that he had appointed Lord Rennell as Chief Administrator and that the latter had requested both Mr. Grafftey-Smith and Brigadier Lush to remain for political and administrative work until some official settlement had been reached.

As soon as the Chief Political Officer reached the capital he made contact with M. Reallon, a former Secretary-General, who had in the past frequently acted as Governor-General in the absence of the head of the French Government. Lord Rennell also made contact with the French Controller of Finance, a senior official of the Ministry of Finance in Paris detached for duty in Madagascar, as well as with M. Brunet, who had been a plenipotentiary at Majunga, and M. Bech who was head of the Bureau des Affaires Economiques and the senior administrative official in the capital. After consultations lasting two days the Chief Political Officer recommended General Platt to invite M. Bech to act as Secretary-General in the absence of M. Ponviene. He felt able to accept the invitation. Both he and the other senior French administrative officials had assured the Chief Political Officer that, in view of the declarations made by His Majesty's Government, they not only felt able to carry on their duties but felt it incumbent on them to do so. Lord Rennell therefore arranged for a meeting of the Conseil d'Administration to be called by M. Bech on Monday, 24th September. The council supported M. Bech's nomination as Secretary-General. By the night of the 24th there was therefore assured, at least temporarily, a continuity of administration, if not of co-operation, by the French administrative machine. In spite of some anticipations to the contrary the unanimous support which M. Bech received and the esteem in which he was personally held by his colleagues contributed, with the tactful handling of administrative matters by Brigadier Lush and Mr. Grafftey-Smith, to the establishment, or rather maintenance, of a practically intact French administration. A circumstance which contributed a good deal to the friendly reception of the new arrangements was that General Platt had refused to make his headquarters in the Palace of the Governor-General. Instead he took over the house of the French Officer Commanding the French troops in Madagascar. He also gave instructions that the French flag was to continue to be flown over the empty Governor-General's residence as a symbol of the continuation of French authority.

It had now become clear that the British administrative staff which had been provided could, by reason of their small numbers, be more properly and profitably used as liaison officers with French departments, exercising such control and supervision as they might, rather than being in direct responsible charge. The number of officers which it had been possible to provide, though considerably more than it was originally anticipated would be available, and the lack of administrative experience of many of them, would in fact have rendered direct administration impossible. The Chief Political Officer therefore gave orders that, outside the Diego Suarez area, all British officers belonging to Political Branch would avoid direct control or giving of orders to French administrative officers, who would receive their instructions, as heretofore, from the heads of their own departments under the authority of the acting Secretary-General. Not only would this system provide an economy of staff, but, if the provincial administrators agreed to carry on under M. Bech, as they nearly all did, it would not be necessary to maintain outside the capital more than, say, one officer in each province, except perhaps at the larger harbours or where numerous British troops were stationed. It was thus possible to cut down the British provincial staff and to remove the officers who had been left in administrative functions on lines of communication Majunga-Tananarive and Tamatave-Tananarive and south of Diego Suarez. This made it possible to reinforce the Political Officers, who were moving south with the 22nd East African Brigade, by posting other Political Officers to Antsirabe as Brigade Headquarters moved on and also send a Political Officer to Tuléar. The same policy of using the British staff for liaison duties instead of direct administration was followed in the police, trade, finance and banking branches, where the same close co-operation, and in certain cases even greater co-operation, was encountered than on the purely administrative side. This was notably the case in the railway administration.

A superficial examination of trade and economic conditions and of some of the legal difficulties arising out of the occupation of a territory which was not an enemy territory, produced a variety of complicated problems. After considering a number of them General Platt decided that Lord Rennell should visit London in person for discussion, with the necessary data which had been collected as soon as the local government departments had agreed to collaborate. When, therefore, the time came for General Platt to return to Nairobi and for the command of operations in the field to pass to the General Officer Commanding the Area,

who moved his headquarters to Tananarive from Diego Suarez, it was clear that no useful purpose would be served by Lord Rennell remaining Chief Military Administrator in Madagascar for so short a period as he could spare before leaving for London. He therefore recommended that as a provisional measure the duties of Chief Military Administrator should be assumed by the General Officer Commanding Islands Area, which had been formed to take over military control of Madagascar and other Indian Ocean Islands, from the date upon which he should take over military command from General Platt.

While it was unusual in African practice for a General Officer Commanding himself to assume the functions of Chief Military Administrator, in addition to his purely military duties, after the initial phase of active operations in any territory, or part of a territory, had come to an end, the presence of both Brigadier Lush and Mr. Grafftey-Smith made it invidious as well as impracticable to nominate one of these to be Chief Military Administrator with the other under his direct orders. It would in any event, as was appreciated in War Office telegram of the 16th September, have been impossible to appoint Mr. Grafftey-Smith to be *Military Administrator*, or to place him in command of military officers in a *Military Administration*. Having regard to the plan under which Mr. Grafftey-Smith was originally appointed, which envisaged that he would ultimately become His Majesty's Consul-General in Madagascar when a French Administration should have been set up, it was equally impossible to subordinate Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Brigadier Lush. The only solution to these difficulties, therefore, appeared to be the one referred to, namely to appoint the General Officer Commanding, Major-General G. R. Smallwood, D.S.O., M.C., to be Chief Military Administrator with Mr. Grafftey-Smith and Brigadier Lush on his administrative staff.

As a consequence, the British Military Administration in Madagascar took a bicephalous form in which the two main spheres of activity were distributed between Mr. Grafftey-Smith and Brigadier Lush. These two officers, with a G.S.O.1 (Political), or Chief Secretary, in the person of Lieut.-Colonel P. Smith-Dorrien, grouped under their supervision all the departments of the French administration for liaison and direction, with the exception of the railways, public works, and road transport, which remained under Lieut.-Colonel Adeane, with direct access to the Chief Military Administrator through his G.S.O.1 (Political). The channel of communication between the Chief Military Administrator and Mr. Grafftey-Smith, Brigadier Lush and

Lieut.-Colonel Adeane was therefore through the G.S.O.1 (Political), in the same way as unit commanders fall under the command of their senior formation commander, whose orders are issued through his staff, but under his authority. To Mr. Graftey-Smith were allotted the departments and activities dealing with trade, industry, shipping, press and propaganda, foreign nationals, economic affairs generally and political affairs, notably those concerned with the Free French movement in the island. To Brigadier Lush were allocated the administrative departments, the police, tribunals, public health, agriculture and similar specialised sections.

On the financial side no Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts had been appointed, but a senior Finance Officer was posted with that title to assist Mr. Graftey-Smith on financial matters. He was answerable as the senior Finance Officer in Madagascar to the Controller of Finance and Accounts at Nairobi for expenditure by the British Military Administration, but not by the French financial administration, as was the usual practice in occupied territories. The Deputy Controller of Banks was answerable, as in other territories, to the Controller of Finance and Accounts in Nairobi under War Office instructions, but both these officers had instructions to assist Mr. Graftey-Smith in his economic problems. Such trade officers as were provided in the headquarters of the British Military Administration as well as in the provinces fell, so far as their trade activities were concerned, under Mr. Graftey-Smith's control, though for disciplinary purposes as military officers they were under Brigadier Lush. The senior Finance Officer was replaced in November by a Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts from Nairobi in the person of Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel) L. Waight, subsequently Controller of Finance and Accounts in Cairo, and later Financial Adviser to the Governor of Burma.

The occupation of the capital by British troops was marked by many expressions of goodwill on the part of the French and Malgache populations. Within a few days of his arrival and after the political situation had been settled, the G.O.C.-in-C. held a review of the troops which had participated in the "Stream", "Line" and "Jane" operations, in the great garden square near the station. Immense crowds attended, including large numbers of French. Many of the senior officials who had co-operated in the settlement felt unable to attend "officially" while hostilities were still in progress south of the capital, but were nevertheless present "unofficially" as spectators. On the following days

"Retreat" by the British battalions of the 29th Independent Brigade was also attended by large crowds. The political situation was not marred by incidents except for one or two mild demonstrations by a few of the more politically-minded French. These were dispersed with the injunction to all concerned that political manifestations would not be countenanced whatever the complexion of the parties concerned. Only a few followers of Vichy gave sufficient trouble to be arrested and interned. One senior official, who was in any event about to retire on account of age, insisted so strongly on being arrested that his wishes were met lest he found himself driven to some silly act. The Administration was directed to concern itself with administration only and the staff in the capital certainly did so.

A complicated situation arose out of the financial position. It had been decided to maintain the Madagascar Franc as the only legal tender in the island and to refrain from using any British or special currency for which provision had been made, in other words the same course which had been followed at Diego Suarez where British Military expenditure was met by current advances from the local branch of the Bank of Madagascar under requisition. These advances were in due course centralised at the head office of the Bank of Madagascar in Tananarive. They were liquidated against sterling credits to Madagascar in London at the rate of 178 $\frac{5}{8}$ Frs. = £1, which had been proclaimed for the island. The financial complications arose from the desire of the French and British alike in Madagascar to continue to conduct the Administration within the legalistic conceptions of French bureaucracy. Under French colonial practice all revenue receipts in Madagascar were credited to Paris directly received, through the Bank of Madagascar. Expenditure was made available at periodic and short intervals to the Treasury paymaster, an officer of the Metropolitan Government, by notes of credit. Directly after the landing at Majunga, the Governor-General, to guard against an interruption of communication with Vichy, had procured a large vote of credit which was sufficient to carry on the administration for some time. Disbursements under this vote of credit could continue to be made by the authorised official without any infraction of French bureaucratic regulations, provided the French administration continued in existence. The appointment of so senior a regular officer as Monsieur Bech satisfied the Treasury officials' requirements regarding continuity and legality, more especially as "Madagascar Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2" had appeared in the Official Gazette and so had the force of law. The

device adopted satisfied all concerned and the French Administration of Madagascar continued to be paid for by French funds in proper form without recourse to British Military Administration funds. Similarly all local orders by the new Secretary-General, as titular head of the new régime, continued to be published in the Official Gazette reposing where necessary on British Proclamations, which took the place of the Decrees of the French Minister of Colonies on which the former Governor-Generals had relied for their authority.

The British Military Administration collected no taxes and disbursed few funds other than in payment of British Staff emoluments and the like. Some necessary civil stores of primary importance were imported and sold at a profit in sterling at reasonable local prices. The outcome of the financial transactions of the British Military Administration of Madagascar by the time it came to an end, as it virtually had done by the end of the budget year on the 30th June, 1943, was a net surplus of receipts over payments of £33,479, after cross debits and credits with purely military branches and debits in respect of the emoluments of all B.M.A. staff. The French banks in each place occupied were closed at the outset and a moratorium was duly proclaimed. But economic and financial conditions proved so favourable that the banks were re-opened and the moratorium lifted within a few days in each case, including Tananarive. All the banks, and most particularly the Bank of Madagascar, proved very co-operative.

So for that matter were nearly all the departments of the French Administration ; most signally co-operative was the railway administration management by Lieut.-Colonel Adeane. This co-operation materially assisted the advance of General Platt's troops south of the capital, where roads were already becoming difficult owing to some demolition and the beginning of the rains. One of the outstanding examples of this help by the railway administration was in the first-class work done by the Chief Mechanical Engineer's branch in clearing a tunnel not far from Tananarive where the French Vichy troops had demolished a small locomotive and blocked the track quite effectively. The picturesque and quite irreproducible language of the Chief Engineer on the subject of the ancestry and mental equipment of " les militaires " who had performed this act of wanton destruction on " his " locomotive in " his " tunnel was a subject of comment and admiration by all who heard it.

While these developments took place in the capital where life

rapidly settled down to normal, the pursuit of the retreating French forces to the south proceeded rapidly. Antsirabe was occupied on the 2nd October and Fianarantsoa on the 29th October. After some alarms and excursions on the possible evacuation of M. Annet by special plane to Jibuti, the capitulation of the French troops was accepted by the Commander of our Troops on the 5th November at Fianarantsoa. M. Annet handed himself over; he was removed for internment to South Africa.

On the 22nd October the Chief Political Officer left Madagascar for Nairobi *en route* for London, with a mass of financial and economic data, to discuss the future of the island. The British Administration was left in the form described. It cannot be claimed that the set-up was ideal or could have lasted. It was unnecessary and probably undesirable for both Brigadier Lush and Mr. Grafftey-Smith to remain in Madagascar; but the reasons which led to their dividing the administrative work between them were sufficiently obvious to justify the experiment. It is, moreover, necessary to point out that when this bicephalous organisation was set up under the General Officer Commanding and up to the time of Major-General Lord Rennell's departure from Madagascar, there still had been no advice from London about General de Gaulle taking over the island or of the progress of negotiations between His Majesty's Government and General de Gaulle or what the ultimate policy of His Majesty's Government was to be. Whatever machinery of British Administration had to be created had therefore to provide for the two eventualities, namely that the island would come under a Free French Administration with a Consul-General to represent His Majesty's Government, or alternatively that it would remain under a British Military Administration. Lord Rennell reached London by way of West Africa in the middle of November to find that a preliminary draft of an agreement with the French National Committee in London had been prepared. In certain respects this draft did not meet General Platt's requirements on military grounds. In the course of ten days' inter-departmental meetings and negotiations with the French National Committee, a modification of the agreement was agreed to by all parties. Provision was made in separate annexes for jurisdiction over British troops in the island and for a special régime in the district of Diego Suarez. The final form of the agreement, as printed below, was signed at the Foreign Office on the 17th December by the Right Honourable Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and General de Gaulle, in the presence of General Legentilhomme and Major-General Lord Rennell.

“AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENCE OF THE ISLAND OF MADAGASCAR AND ITS DEPENDENCIES AND THE ISLAND OF REUNION

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French National Committee,

Desiring to take by mutual agreement the measures necessary to re-establish as soon as possible the exercise of French sovereignty over Madagascar and its dependencies ;

Having regard to the necessity of assuring together the defences of Madagascar and its dependencies and Reunion against external attack by or on behalf of the Axis Powers ;

Have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE I

The present agreement supplies to the island of Madagascar and its dependencies and to the island of Reunion, hereinafter together called (the said territories).

ARTICLE II

As from the date fixed for the entry in force of the present agreement, the High Commissioner appointed by and responsible to the French National Committee shall assume all the powers which, under French law, devolve upon the Governor-General of Madagascar and its dependencies, as well as the functions of Commander of the French Forces. He shall also exercise his authority in the island of Reunion.

ARTICLE III

For the time being the said territories form for military purposes part of the strategic command of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, for naval purposes part of the strategic command of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and for air purposes part of the strategic command of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East.

ARTICLE IV

(i) The High Commissioner will proceed as rapidly as possible with the reorganisation of the French military forces in the said territories, in order that they may take as large a share as possible in their defence and, if required, play their part in operations in external theatres of war.

(ii) Until such time as the High Commissioner has the means to ensure the defence of the said territories and until other arrangements are made by mutual agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the French National Committee, the General Officer Commanding shall be assigned the duty of ensuring the defence of the said territories.

(iii) The powers granted to the General Officer Commanding or his representatives in the interest of the defence of the territories are defined in Annexes A and B which constitute integral parts of the present agreement.

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ARTICLE V

Questions of jurisdiction arising out of the presence of British forces in the said territories shall be governed by the provisions of Annex C, which constitutes an integral part of the present agreement, except in so far as they are covered by the provisions of Annexes A and B.

ARTICLE VI

Liaison between the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding shall be maintained by French and British Liaison Officers, attached respectively to the General Officer Commanding and the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding shall keep one another informed of all decisions taken which affect the defence of the said territories.

ARTICLE VII

(i) The French civil and military authorities in the said territories shall give every assistance to the British forces operating or stationed in the said territories.

(ii) The French troops stationed in the said territories shall be placed under the command of the General Officer Commanding, if he so requires, by delegation of the powers of General de Gaulle, Commander-in-Chief of the Free French Forces, and in accordance with Article II, paragraph 6, of the Churchill-de Gaulle agreement of the 7th August, 1940.

(iii) In order to facilitate the carrying out of the plan of defence of the said territories, the British and French military authorities shall consult together in regard to movements of French units into or out of the said territories.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the United Kingdoms shall appoint a Consul-General, who will reside at Tananarive, and such other Consular representatives as may be necessary. The names of these representatives shall be submitted for the approval of the National Committee.

ARTICLE IX

Within the said territories, the following provisions shall govern the position of the British Forces in regard to local taxation:—

(i) The British Forces and their cantonments and other establishments, as well as individual members of those Forces as defined in Article I of Annex C to the present agreement, together with their families, shall be exempt from all forms of direct taxation.

(ii) All forms of equipment and supplies imported for the use of the British Forces as such, or re-exported by those Forces, shall be exempt from customs import or export duty.

(iii) All other questions concerning taxation of the British Forces and their cantonments and other establishments, as well as the individual members of those Forces and their families, shall be settled by mutual agreement between the General Officer Commanding and the High Commissioner.

(iv) In the event of any Allied Forces other than French Forces being stationed in the said territories, the provisions of this article shall apply to the said Allied Forces and the members thereof.

ARTICLE X

The Government of the United Kingdom and the National Committee shall consult together as soon as possible regarding all financial and economic measures which need to be taken jointly in order to re-establish and maintain the internal economy of the said territories and to further the war effort of the United Nations. The conclusions reached shall be embodied in a separate agreement.

ARTICLE XI

The High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding shall consult together with a view to settling all questions that may arise which affect the former as the representative of French sovereignty and the latter as the authority entrusted for the time being with the defence of the said territories. If the General Officer Commanding and the High Commissioner cannot settle any question between them, they shall refer the one to the Government of the United Kingdom and the other to the French National Committee, who shall decide the said question by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE XII

The present agreement has been drawn up in two copies in the English and French languages, both texts having equal validity. It shall enter into force on the date of the arrival of the High Commissioner in the said territories and shall remain in force until the end of the war between the United Kingdom and Fighting France on the one hand, and the last of the enemy Powers with whom they are at present at war on the other hand, or until such earlier date as may be agreed upon by the contracting parties.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London the 14th day of December, 1942.

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.

(L.S.) C. DE GAULLE."

Annex A which followed dealt with the military arrangements and is not reproduced. The special régime covering Diego Suarez was dealt with in Annex B, which read as follows :—

"ANNEX B

ANNEX CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY AREA OF DIEGO SUAREZ.

ARTICLE 1

The military area of Diego Suarez shall consist of the Administrative District of Diego Suarez subject to any modifications to the boundary of that district which may be agreed by the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding.

ARTICLE 2

Within the military area of Diego Suarez the French civil and military authorities shall be required to conform with all requests made by the General Officer Commanding or his representatives in the interests of defence, internal security and the well-being of the British forces as

defined in Article I of Annex C. The High Commissioner shall give such directions to the central administration and to the authorities of the District of Diego Suarez as will ensure appropriate action by the administration and the public services in the said district.

ARTICLE 3

Subject to the provisions of this Annex the French administration shall continue to carry out its normal administrative functions, subject to such directions as the General Officer Commanding or his authorised representative may give in all matters affecting the security, well-being and maintenance of the British forces.

ARTICLE 4

A separate account of the cost of the administration of the District of Diego Suarez shall be prepared at the end of each financial year, or at such other periods as may be agreed. This account shall be examined by the representatives of the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding in order that they may make recommendations regarding the division between the Government-General of Madagascar and the British military authorities of any financial deficit incurred in the administration of the District of Diego Suarez as a result of measures undertaken in the district at the request of the British military authorities. The amount payable by the British military authorities in respect of such deficit shall be settled by agreement between the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding in the light of all relevant considerations.

ARTICLE 5

The General Officer Commanding may, for any proper reason, request the High Commissioner to replace by another any officer of the administration of the District of Diego Suarez.

ARTICLE 6

Access to, or departure from, the military area of Diego Suarez shall be free for all inhabitants of Madagascar, subject to military considerations. The General Officer Commanding shall, however, have the right to prohibit the entry of any persons considered undesirable from the point of view of internal security or the well-being of the British forces.

ARTICLE 7

The censorship of postal matter and telecommunications in the District of Diego Suarez shall be under the direction of the General Officer Commanding. This will not exclude the right of the French authorities to examine terminal and internal correspondence and messages passing through the French postal and telegraph system, after British censorship requirements have been met.

ARTICLE 8

Within the District of Diego Suarez, jurisdiction over persons other than members of the British forces shall be exercised as follows :—

(i) Having regard to present military requirements, all offences committed against proclamations or orders issued by the General Officer Commanding or under his authority shall be tried by British Military Courts, which shall, unless the General Officer Commanding otherwise

directs, apply such provisions of British law as he may consider appropriate.

(ii) Offences committed against the law in force in the district other than those provided for in paragraph (i) above shall be tried by the French military or ordinary courts; if, however, the persons accused, not being French citizens or subjects, were not domiciled within the said territories prior to the 1st May, 1942, they shall be tried by British Military Courts, which shall apply the British law appropriate for such offences, unless the General Officer Commanding otherwise directs.

(iii) All civil claims and proceedings shall be tried by the French civil courts in accordance with French law.

ARTICLE 9

The right of arrest in respect of cases in which the French courts have jurisdiction shall lie with the French police authorities, but the right of arrest of persons coming within the jurisdiction of the British Military Courts shall lie with the British military authorities, unless the General Officer Commanding otherwise directs."

The Agreement and Annexes do not call for any particular comment except perhaps on two points arising out of the Diego Suarez annex, which made the General Officer Commanding Islands Area paramount within the Fortress Area of Diego Suarez. It was provided (Article 8) that the jurisdiction of British Military Courts in the Diego Suarez area would extend, unless the General Officer Commanding Fortress Area otherwise directed, to all persons not being French subjects or French protected persons, living in Diego Suarez subsequent to the 1st May, 1942. The object of this clause was to subject to British Military Courts British and other nationals in Diego Suarez, notably dockyard hands, artisans and seamen off ships in harbour. It was felt that for political reasons it would be difficult to subject some of these civil persons to the jurisdiction of a French court without raising political complications in other countries. Another clause in the Diego Suarez annex provided for financial adjustments between the French and British authorities for expenses and works arising out of the occupation of Diego Suarez as a fortress for the period of the war. General Legentilhomme reached Africa at the close of 1942 and after a visit to Jibuti assumed the office of French High Commissioner for Madagascar and its Dependencies and for the island of Reunion on the 8th January, 1943.

Since upon the signature of the Agreement it was evident that the British Military Administration in the island would come to an end and that the responsibility for British representation and negotiations with the Free French Authorities would be dealt with by Mr. Grafftey-Smith, whom it had been decided to appoint

His Majesty's Consul-General, the military aspect of the Administration declined and the responsibilities of Mr. Grafftey-Smith increased. It was thus found possible in December to allow Brigadier M. S. Lush to be withdrawn from the island, at the instance of the Chief Political Officer, Middle East, who had asked for his services to take charge of the administration of Tripoli, which it was anticipated would shortly be entered by the British Eighth Army. The remaining officers of the British Military Administration remained behind as a Liaison Branch and to assist Mr. Grafftey-Smith until such time as the handing over to General Legentilhomme should have been accomplished.

During Major-General Smallwood's régime, as Military Administrator, his main political pre-occupation was to ensure that the change over to the Free French Administration should be accomplished as smoothly as possible. To this end he endeavoured to interfere as little as possible with the existing French administrative machine, and made every effort to compose the differences which existed between the various French factions in the island. This policy probably resulted in less official recognition of the local Free French party than its adherents desired and to a greater tolerance towards Vichy supporters than many expected. That it was the correct policy in the circumstances was however proved by the fact that the High Commissioner himself adopted it when he took over and found it necessary neither to change materially the personnel of the administrative machine nor to make any extensive political arrests. Indeed certain Vichy officials who had been interned were released and reinstated on probation.

The formal handing over to General Legentilhomme on the 8th January was made by General Platt in person. The closing act of the British Military Administration in the island was the issue over General Platt's signature of a notice and proclamation reading as follows :—

“ ANNOUNCEMENT

By G.O.C.-in-C. East Africa Command and Commanding British Forces
in Madagascar.

It gives me pleasure to announce the arrival of His Excellency General Paul Legentilhomme as High Commissioner of Madagascar and its Dependencies. In welcoming His Excellency I wish at the same time to express my appreciation of the assistance given to me and to the British Forces in the Island by the Administration and population during the past months. I look forward with confidence to co-operation with

His Excellency towards fulfilment of our common object. My Proclamation now issued marks the assumption by him of the powers and responsibilities of his office.

(Signed) WILLIAM PLATT,
Lieutenant-General,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
East Africa Command.

BRITISH MILITARY JURISDICTION IN MADAGASCAR AND ITS DEPENDENCIES MADAGASCAR

PROCLAMATION No. 3

WHEREAS the need for securing Madagascar and its Dependencies (hereinafter referred to as Madagascar) from seizure by enemy forces and its use by them as a base for operations against the United Nations has occasioned the recent occupation thereof by the Forces of His Britannic Majesty AND WHEREAS consequent upon such occupation British Military Jurisdiction was by my Proclamation No. 1, dated the 23rd day of September, 1942, established in Madagascar but without intent to affect the sovereignty of France in Madagascar AND WHEREAS with a view to the re-establishment of the exercise of such sovereignty it has been agreed by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the one part and the French National Committee of the other that a High Commissioner to be appointed by and responsible to the French National Committee should simultaneously with the issue of this present Proclamation assume all the powers which under French law devolve upon the Governor-General of Madagascar as well as the functions of Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in Madagascar AND WHEREAS HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL DE DIVISION PAUL LEGENTILHOMME has been appointed by the French National Committee as such High Commissioner and has arrived in Madagascar NOW THEREFORE I William Platt, Lieutenant-General, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief East Africa Command and commanding the British Forces in Madagascar DO HEREBY PROCLAIM as follows :—

1. British Military Jurisdiction as established as aforesaid and all Proclamations and orders heretofore made in the exercise thereof and still in force shall as from the date and hour hereof cease to operate in Madagascar except so far as is set forth in the next ensuing paragraph hereof and without prejudice to the validity of anything done in the exercise of such British Military Jurisdiction.
2. Without French sovereignty being further or otherwise affected, British Military Jurisdiction shall until further order continue to be exercised within the Administrative District of Diego Suarez and in such other places as may hereafter be agreed upon between the High Commissioner and myself and declared as Military Areas

and also in such places without the said Administrative Districts and Military Areas as shall be agreed upon between us as British Cantonments.

3. Proclamations and orders now in force in Diego Suarez and in existing British Cantonments shall continue to operate there respectively until otherwise ordered by me.
4. This Proclamation is made in pursuance of the hereinbefore recited agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French National Committee.

(Signed) WILLIAM PLATT,


Lieutenant-General,

Dated at Tamatave at 0800
hours this seventh day of
January, 1943.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
East Africa Command."

This document effected a continuity of government and jurisdiction between the British Military Administration and the administration under General Legentilhomme, as General Platt's opening Madagascar Proclamation No. 1 had effected the transition from M. Annet's government to the administration under British military authority. The observance of the legal forms described in preceding paragraphs and the closing Proclamation completely satisfied the French population and enabled the British Military Administration to come into being and close its days without breach of continuity or disturbance. This is the more remarkable in that the French population of the island as a whole was not at all de Gaullist in sympathy at the outset. Yet in spite of a complete absence of propaganda or partisan spirit by the British Military Administration and a prohibition on all forms of political demonstration, there were no ill feelings when the island was handed over to the administration of General de Gaulle's representative. It is pleasant to be able to record that the choice of M. Bech as acting Secretary-General was vindicated by General Legentilhomme's decision to continue M. Bech in office and by the latter's acceptance of this responsibility.

The economic contribution to the Allied cause by Madagascar in the shape of certain products which were much needed in the United States and the United Kingdom was organised largely by Mr. Grafftey-Smith and civil personnel sent for the purpose, but the beginning was made under British Military Administration. The whole of the Madagascar episode, so far as the British Military Administration was concerned and despite the initial divergence of views about departmental responsibilities in London culminating in the curious and unsatisfactory positions of Brigadier Lush and Mr. Grafftey-Smith, was a highly satisfactory example of local



initiative and adaptation. The conclusion was tidy and pleasant to all concerned.

While Diego Suarez remained for some time a special area in accordance with the London agreement of December, none of the difficulties which might have been anticipated arose. A small British staff was left in Diego Suarez after the British troops were progressively withdrawn from the rest of the island. By May all personnel of the British Military Administration had departed and by the end of 1943 practically the only duty in respect of Madagascar which continued to fall upon Nairobi was a contingent liability to investigate expenditure on military works in Diego Suarez in the event of the French seeking reimbursement for such works from British funds. The only factor which might have proved difficult on the island as a whole, namely, a recrudescence of anti-French or pro-British feeling among the Malgache, never proved real. The former British associations, largely missionary, with the population of the island were never allowed to become prominent. The British Military Administration staff was instructed to avoid direct contact with the native population and to act in such matters only through the French administrative officials. The small number of British administrative officers outside the capital gave no support to whatever ideas may have existed in certain native elements that a British Administration was likely to be prolonged. The total number of British officers on the administrative side, including the economic, legal and financial branches, never exceeded fifty and most of these were in the capital, with only a few in Tamatave, Majunga and other seaboard points. Scarcely any were kept in the southern part of the island even after the initial occupation.

The economic position in the island at the beginning of the occupation was not really bad, though certain "basic luxuries" for the European population and clothing for all the population were in short supply. The re-organisation of contact with the outside world began as soon as the British Military Administration was established and contributed fairly quickly to an improvement in conditions in an area which had not ever been severely touched by the war and which soon returned to its former remote and somnolent existence.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND AND THIRD OCCUPATIONS OF CYRENAICA

Italian Propaganda about the First British Occupation — The Breaking Up and Recall of O.E.T.A. — General Auchinleck's Offensive — The Second Occupation and Retreat — The Refugee Problem — Planning for the Third Occupation — Liaison with the Sayed — Instructions for Administrative Officers — El Alamein and After — General Montgomery's Letter to the People of Cyrenaica — The Arabs and International Law — The Tribal System — The Question of the Title of the Sayed — The Development and Duties of the Libyan Arab Force — Internal Security — Supplies and Trade — Education and Health — Agriculture — Financial Estimates and Taxation — Currency — Custody of Enemy Property — General Policy of the Administration.

CHAPTER XI

The Second and Third Occupations of Cyrenaica

THE first occupation of Cyrenaica, which began with General Wavell's advance in December, 1940, presented great difficulties from the civilian administrative point of view due to the disorganisation of the administrative machine and the hostility between the Arabs and the Italians. On the other hand there were fairly adequate food supplies available and no serious damage had been done to public services. Yet the Administration was only beginning to find its feet when the enemy counter-attack forced the withdrawal of the British troops. Before Benghazi and the other urban centres were evacuated extensive demolitions were carried out by General Wavell's forces in the towns to military installations and public utilities, while in rural areas, particularly on the Benghazi plain, wells were destroyed or damaged. The Italian Government, as well as the Axis forces, was therefore presented with the same problem which confronted each of three subsequent British and enemy administrations. This inspired an Italian propagandist publication entitled "Che cosa hanno fatto gli Inglesi in Cirenaica," which was widely circulated in neutral countries. It gave a most mendacious account of the occupation in which the inevitable hardships of the war they had brought upon themselves were used as a reproach against their opponents. Photographs of the antiquities department workshops in Cyrene were used to represent the destruction of a museum and war damage generally as evidence of deliberate demolitions of civilian property.

After the withdrawal from Cyrenaica at the beginning of April, 1941, the organisation of Military Administration of Cyrenaica lapsed and its personnel was dispersed, some being posted to the occupied territories administered from Nairobi and some returning to other branches of the Army. In Cairo an Occupied Territories Administration agency of Political Branch at Nairobi with a small staff was maintained. In the early autumn preliminary preparations were made for the administration of the territory which it was soon intended to occupy again. On the 14th October, 1941, G.H.Q. M.E.F. informed the War Office of its intention to re-create immediately a skeleton Military Administration for Cyrenaica. Brigadier S. H. Longrigg, C.B.E., was

recalled to Cairo and designated to be the head of the administration; during the following weeks a nucleus of administrative officers was collected. For reasons of security the name of the organisation was kept secret and newly commissioned officers, many of whom with linguistic qualifications were drawn from the ranks of the Field Security Wing of the Intelligence Corps, were posted to No. 102 Military Mission which had been responsible for the formation and training of the "British Senussi Army", later known as the Libyan Arab Force. Proclamations to be issued by the G.O.C. Eighth Army were drafted and printed, stores and equipment were collected and packed, and courses of lectures on Cyrenaica were arranged. A revised war establishment was drawn up and approved by the War Office, but was not actually implemented until the 19th December, the day on which Derna fell.

On the 17th November General Auchinleck's attack began. On the 12th Brigadier Longrigg informed the Eighth Army Commander that, under instructions from the G.O.C.-in-C., he intended to despatch Political Officers to Army H.Q. and to Tobruk, which was then still under siege. On the 17th two officers left Cairo to embark for Tobruk and three days later the Secretary to the Administration, Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Walker, and an assistant left for Army H.Q. A week later Political Officers, destined for Derna, Cyrene and Jalo Oasis, left for Mersa Matruh to be ready to go forward when required.

The military situation on the frontier of Egypt remained somewhat doubtful and it was not until Tobruk was relieved on the 10th December that further progress was possible. The Political Officer and his assistant, who had been present in the last weeks of the siege, immediately went out to make contact with the tribes. As has been said, Derna was occupied on the 19th and the Secretary to the Administration and the Assistant Political Officer of Derna arrived on the following day. Barce fell on the 23rd and Political Officers were established there and at Cyrene on the 24th. On the same day Brigadier Longrigg arrived at Advanced H.Q. Eighth Army, then at Tmimi, and the next day proceeded to Derna. Benghazi had fallen on Christmas Eve and on the 27th the Secretary to the Administration and other officers arrived, to be followed next day by Brigadier Longrigg. The Senior Political Officer, Lieut.-Colonel P. L. O. Guy, arrived with his staff on the 30th. Agedabia was captured on the 7th January, but, since the town and most of the district were in an area of active operations, no Political Officer was installed.

This time the Administration found a very different state of affairs from the Cyrenaica comparatively untouched by war which it had known in the previous April. The Italian civil administration and police had been almost entirely withdrawn, except for the *Polizia Africa Italiana*, whom however it was found necessary to treat as P.O.W. Bomb damage was extensive in Benghazi and in a small part of Derna but, except in the case of military installations, was little in evidence elsewhere. Many of the inhabitants of Benghazi had fled to avoid air raids and bombs were dropped sporadically on Benghazi and Derna during the whole occupation. Considerable looting had taken place both in the towns and rural districts, which led the D.C.P.O. to report to the Minister of State at Cairo—"It is to be indicated that the very serious losses thus sustained by absent Italian nationals and concerns are attributable to the Italian failure to take steps to safeguard them during the period prior to our effective occupation." In the Jebel the colonists had for the most part remained, although they had abandoned the outlying farms and had concentrated in village centres, fearing, with a measure of justification, the reprisals of the Arabs. Much of the activity of the Political Officers of these districts was to encourage the Italians to return to their farms and keep up cultivation, work which only began to be effective when we were forced to withdraw. The Italians had left certain stocks for the civil population in the towns, and these were carefully rationed to tide over the period before fresh supplies could be imported. In Benghazi a communal feeding centre for Italians and other Christians was organised while a committee of leading Moslem citizens was formed to take over the distribution for the Moslem population and a similar committee was formed for the Jewish community. The difficulty of supply, which was in the main responsible for the failure to hold the enemy's counter-attack, precluded any help from military sources, and it was only when the Administration was retreating down Halfaya Pass at the beginning of February that the first Civil Administration food lorries arrived in the territory from the Delta. In order to fill the gap caused by the withdrawal of the Italian Police, a provisional police force had to be created. The Acting Commandant, Major R. S. Johnson, arrived in Derna on the 26th December. Police officers were posted to the Districts and on the 2nd January the Headquarters of the Cyrenaica Police Force were established in Benghazi.

In the middle of January changes at G.H.Q. caused some modifications in the administrative organisation. After the withdrawal

from Cyrenaica in April, 1941, Political Branch at G.H.Q. had moved from Cairo to Nairobi, which was a more convenient centre for the territories under its charge. But with the separation of East Africa Command from Middle East, the re-occupation of Cyrenaica and the prospective occupation of Tripolitania and other territories by forces of M.E. Command, a new Political Branch was established in Cairo under a Chief Political Officer, to whose control Eritrea was transferred a few weeks later. Thereupon Brigadier Longrigg, who had been C.P.O. for Cyrenaica only and directly dependent on the War Office, became once more D.C.P.O. and the titles of his heads of departments were similarly modified. The subject is treated at greater length in subsequent chapters.

Events of more immediate importance soon claimed the attention of the Administration. After a period of relative quiet, fighting flared up in the west and Rommel made what was described as "a reconnaissance in force". For three days the issue was doubtful, but on the 25th January orders were received that Benghazi Sub-area and the officers of the Occupied Territories Administration should withdraw. Steps were taken to put into immediate effect the arrangements made for a possible evacuation of refugees. Maltese, and Jews who were British subjects, were taken to Alexandria by the Royal Navy; inhabitants who had compromised themselves by close association with the Administration were despatched by road, while others were allowed to make their own arrangements to go to Egypt. The headquarters staff left during the afternoon; at 18.30 hrs. the Senior Political Officer and the Acting Commandant of Police, with their staffs, departed, travelling through the night to the Jebel east of Barce, which was evacuated in the early hours of the 26th January. The Political Officer at Cyrene left on the same day. Members of the Administration and the refugees eventually collected at Bardia where they remained for nearly three days. On the 28th January the D.C.P.O. received instructions to return a Political Officer and skeleton staff to Benghazi, but the party got no further than Tobruk where the order was cancelled, for Benghazi had already fallen to the enemy on the 29th. Derna was evacuated on the 1st February and on the following day the D.C.P.O. was instructed by G.O.C. Eighth Army to return to Cairo.

The immediate problem which arose was the accommodation and employment of the refugees. A reception centre was set up at Burg el Arab, near Alexandria. Of the able-bodied youth, some were drafted to the Libyan Arab Force or the Palestine Regiment,

but the majority was selected to attend the Cyrenaica Police School which was established at Mareopolis, near El Amriya, to provide a nucleus of a Police Force for the next re-occupation of Cyrenaica. Those of the refugees who had connections in Egypt were eventually allowed to make their own arrangements to join them, but there was left a considerable number who had to be maintained in a Refugee Camp set up near the Police Training School.

The German-Italian advance was halted west of Tobruk and a line was established from Ain el Ghazala to Bir el Hakim ; a Political Officer, with an assistant, remained in Tobruk to control the tribes and deal with civilian supplies. On the orders of the Eighth Army Commander, their encampments were moved from the forward positions and from the triangle of No Man's Land between the opposing lines. At first the tribes were moved east of a line through El Adem ; later they were brought north of the Tobruk-Bardia road. At the beginning of May, H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester, who was visiting units of the Eighth Army, attended, in company with the Army Commander and other senior officers, a tribal festival organised by the Political Officer at Zanzur. Towards the end of the month the G.O.C.-in-C. ordered plans to be prepared for bringing all the tribes back to Sidi Barrani, but before the scheme could be put into effect the Axis advance, which ended at El Alamein, had begun. On the day that Rommel sent out his first columns Eighth Army H.Q., where the Political Officer and his staff were then installed, were attacked by German aircraft, the Political Officer's N.C.O. clerk being severely wounded and dying next day. The Assistant Political Officer was also slightly wounded. When Army H.Q. were forced to withdraw the Political Officer accompanied them, after making arrangements to evacuate some of the tribesmen who had been compromised. Again the refugee problem became acute : arrangements had been made to send the recent Cyrenaican refugees in Egypt to the Sudan, but some feared that they would be caught before the scheme could be put into effect. Accordingly a number broke out of the camp at Mareopolis and made their way to Cairo, hoping to lose themselves in the backstreets of the capital should the Axis occupy Egypt. They were rounded up and sent to the Sudan.

In May, 1942, Brigadier Longrigg was appointed Military Administrator in Eritrea and Lieut.-Colonel Cumming (Major-General D. C. Cumming, C.B.E.), formerly of the Sudan Political Service, was transferred from the post of Secretary to the Administration in Eritrea to that of Deputy Chief Political Officer, Cyrenaica. He was able to spend six months in planning for the

third occupation, with the assurance that the problem of the Italian residents of Cyrenaica had been settled in a manner which would not at once confront his Administration with a continued threat of internal disturbance. A small headquarters was maintained in Cairo in anticipation of future activities and this also administered the refugee camp as well as the training depot for the future civil police force of Cyrenaica. Residence in Cairo made it possible to establish cordial relations with El Sayed Mohammed Idris el Senussi and the other leaders of the fraternity who had been driven out of Cyrenaica during the Italian régime. The rest of the officers of the second Cyrenaican administration was either returned to their units or posted temporarily to work for which they were well qualified, such as the Office des Céréales Panifiables which had been set up to provide bread for the Levant States of Syria.

As the battle of El Alamein approached it became evident that, for reasons of security, it would not be possible to assemble the personnel of the Administration in advance. Nevertheless Brigadier Cumming was able to settle a number of questions of principle with H.Q. Eighth Army—particularly with regard to military security in relation to civilians—which proved to be important when the occupation began. On the other hand Brigadier Cumming had to join H.Q. Eighth Army on the 16th November, 1942, without having had the opportunity of briefing more than a handful of the officers who were to serve under him. He was obliged to do this by demi-official letter dated the 11th November. This letter, quoted below, may be said to set the standards by which Cyrenaica was administered during the third and final occupation.

“Cyrenaica presents some peculiarities of its own, for although the British and other governments recognise Italian sovereignty there, the Arab inhabitants are not our enemies. Individuals among them are and they will be treated as such, but in general they have done all within their meagre means to help our side, often at considerable risk to themselves, by deserting from the enemy and joining our army and by hiding our agents and British prisoners who escaped. . . . Moreover, they have been thanked by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons and have been given an assurance that they will never again be subjected to Italian rule. Bearing in mind that the military government must ensure that the civilian population does not hinder operations or endanger the safety of our army, it is our duty to provide a good government and to look after the people. But the military

government—whether in its original form under the local administration of the army or in its later and more permanent form under a Military Administrator—is temporary and is only required until the future of the country is settled in the Peace Treaties. Consequently it enjoys a number of privileges denied to other governments, particularly in a colonial territory. For instance, there is no question about its right to rule ; it can legislate with maximum ease and it can avoid becoming involved in politics even though it must be keenly alive to the political atmosphere.

“ It is, however, this easy exercise of absolutism that provides the greatest danger to good government. We shall not aim at good government in any theoretical sense but as the best practical solution to the rather complicated problem that Cyrenaica presents. By so doing, we are most likely to achieve our object of keeping the country quiet and preventing it from becoming a diversion from the main object of defeating the enemy. Abuse of exceptional power must be avoided not only by Political Officers but by all officers or other ranks of the occupying army, and the pursuit of this is likely to be the main test of your tact and good judgment . . . ”

The method adopted in establishing the Third Administration differed somewhat from the previous occupations when the presence of Italians necessitated the early posting of officers in the places previously staffed by Italian administrative officials. News was received within a few days of the D.C.P.O.'s arrival at H.Q. Eighth Army that the Italian Government had withdrawn all its nationals. The D.C.P.O. therefore remained at Army H.Q. with one staff officer and awaited the arrival of the rest of his personnel. He was able to make a rapid tour of the Jebel Akhdar area where he made contact with as many Arabs as he could find—they were mostly camping close enough to the roads to sell eggs to the troops but far enough away to be out of sight—and told them to spread the news that the British were in full accord with El Sayed Idris el Senussi ; that they must keep out of the way of the troops until the Army had moved forward ; that for the time being the requirements of the Eighth Army would monopolise all transport and prevent the importation of food supplies for the civilian population ; and that if they wished to help the Army they must keep quiet, protect the abandoned Italian farms and do as much ploughing as possible.

General Sir Bernard (Field-Marshal Viscount) Montgomery, signed the proclamation as G.O.C. Eighth Army, proclaiming the fact of British military occupation on the 11th November, 1942,

together with the other basic proclamations dealing with war crimes, enemy property, currency, etc. On the 21st November, the Political Officers, as they were then called, began to arrive. One was posted to XXX Corps and went forward with Lieut.-General Leese's Headquarters to Benghazi, remaining with it until he was attached to No. 83 Sub-area in Benghazi. Others were attached to No. 86 Sub-area and the various Town Majors responsible for local Army administration. By the end of November the Administration was represented in all the main centres of population. These Political Officers were still not acting independently, but held the status of specialist officers attached to formations and orders to the population were signed by the Eighth Army Staff, Area Commanders and Town Majors. Relations with these formations and units were excellent. There is no doubt that the tactful care taken by all officers to familiarise their colleagues with the role of the Military Administration—this was in the days before any training in the subject had begun—was amply rewarded. The D.C.P.O. obtained the authority of General Montgomery to call the administration the "Military Government of Cyrenaica", a title which did much to remove speculation which had attached itself to the letters "O.T.A." used in previous occupations. General Montgomery also published the following message to the people:—

" MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MONTGOMERY TO THE
PEOPLE OF BARQA

" Barqa has been conquered from the Italians by force of British arms in the course of the defeat of their army, and will be administered until the end of the war by a British military government. The end of the war means the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Powers at war and does not mean the cessation of hostilities in Barqa or in North Africa only.

" The military government will not enter into questions relating to political affairs of the future but will endeavour to rule with firmness, justice and consideration for the interests of the people of the country.

" The population is called upon to behave peacefully and to obey my orders and the orders of my officers. Intrigue and discord between individuals or sections of the people will not be countenanced, and anyone making false accusations against others, will be punished as a person likely to disturb the peace.

" The British Army, during its period of rule in Barqa, wishes to see the people enjoy the benefits of peace that have been denied

to them for many years. It does not wish to be obliged to take disciplinary action against them, since many individuals have helped British soldiers, and many have served in the British Army. But it will not hesitate to take such action, if its laws and orders are disregarded.

“The object of the British Army is to pursue and defeat the enemy. The population must be patient and not make requests that will in any way hinder its operations. No supplies are available at present but they will be brought as soon as the requirements of the army permit. The British Government has thanked Sayed Mohammed Idris el Senussi for the assistance he has given to the Allied cause and has promised that the Senussis will not again be subject to Italian rule. While the British Army rules the country, it wishes to establish friendly and cordial relations with the people.”

On the 23rd December the D.C.P.O. left H.Q. Eighth Army and opened his own H.Q. at Barce. Benghazi was at that time congested by military operations and, being badly damaged, lacked the necessary accommodation ; moreover any headquarters at Benghazi would have inevitably become almost completely involved with the affairs of the troops instead of those of the civilian population. The move threw a heavy burden on the Political Officer at Benghazi, though it enabled the D.C.P.O. to keep in touch with the affairs of the country as a whole.

The scene was very dismal, for this third occupation represented the fifth military invasion or counter-invasion of the country within two years. The problem before the Military Administration in Cyrenaica—the title “Government” was changed in March, 1943—was unusual and produced a number of interesting problems. Although Cyrenaica was “Occupied Enemy Territory” there were virtually no Italians in the country and all but a handful of its inhabitants could now claim to be friendly. This necessitated some adjustments of rules. The enemy sovereign Government had withdrawn completely, leaving behind a population which, with truly Arab pride and imagination, counted itself as a nation. But the Arab had never enjoyed independence. Although the country was well endowed with modern towns, roads, water systems and other modern refinements, there was hardly a civilian left capable of maintaining them and much less of repairing them after a succession of “scorched earth” retreats.

The means available for lightening the direct responsibility of the Administration were negligible and in sharp contrast to Eritrea and Tripolitania which, by British colonial standards, had

an excess of skilled Europeans and much equipment and conveniences. Clearly, all that could be done was keep the country quiet, avoid added stresses, and muster what Arab resources were available. With this end in view the D.C.P.O. made proposals for starting a temporary government on Arab lines which would awaken local patriotism behind the Military Administration and set up an administrative framework into which indigenous agencies could be fitted. The plan was, however, not approved on the grounds that, under the Hague Convention, Italian law must persist. It was explained that the relevant passages in the convention aimed at ensuring that the indigenous laws cherished by the people of an occupied territory should not be swept away by the invader, but in Cyrenaica Italian law was foreign and was certainly not cherished by the Arabs. On the contrary they stated emphatically that they did not wish to hear of it again and, since H.M. Government had declared their determination of freeing them from Italian rule, they could not see why they should. It was nevertheless held that the Administration must follow International Law as far as possible and that existing laws should be applied with modifications as required for the provision of a decent administration following the disappearance of the Italian machine. In practice the Administration was able to carry on its work with a minimum of new legislation.

The difficulty over the continuation of a latent Italian sovereignty was one of the main stumbling-blocks in the path of the Administration. It preserved a sense of uncertainty about the future which, unless carefully handled, might turn into a cynical distrust of British intentions. Moreover it had a stultifying effect on private enterprise, for no one knew whether his efforts would not, in the end, be undone. It was too much to expect the Administration to administer Italian Law in full: hardly a legal book remained and the number of officers capable of interpreting it was necessarily small, particularly in a sparsely populated country in which local administrative officers had to deal with almost every aspect of government without legal advice. The solution of bringing back Italian civil servants was out of the question. The arrival of a few Italian truck-drivers in Benghazi caused immediate protests and there was every reason to believe that, with the experiences of the war so fresh in their minds, the pastoral Arabs would give summary treatment to unguarded Italians.

The legal position was, however, immutable and the Administration was at pains to stress it on the Arabs. In practice the Arabs came to treat "International Law" as a poor joke which

they could not understand but which, for the purpose of day to day life, did not seem to do them much harm: the "Peace Treaty" assumed a mystical attribute. Nevertheless relations generally between the Arabs and the Administration were most cordial. A high proportion of the Political Officers had a good knowledge of Arabic and previous experience in Arab countries, which was greatly appreciated. The Arabs of Cyrenaica are typical of their race, but the countrymen have an unusual robustness which never leaves anyone in doubt about their opinions. Sympathetically managed they proved to be very friendly and, if they were lacking in technical skill—or rather if they over-estimated their skill—they got along exceptionally well with their British administrators.

The tribal system, which is the basis of the social order of most of the country, had been very much complicated by the Italians. On the final occupation it was still as strong an influence in their lives as ever, but much of the patriarchal authority had been lost through the playing off of one sheikh against another during long years of rebellion against Italian rule. The higher tribal hierarchy was super-abundant, for the Italians, at one stage, had appointed a sheikh for every fifteen men. The remedy was not as simple as it might seem, for a tribal sheikh was almost entirely dependent on public support and often singularly inept in dealing with his critics. Among the tribes of Cyrenaica many people acquired such an interest in sheikhly offices that the efforts of the few legitimate sheikhs to establish their authority were full of difficulties. The only remedy was seen to be time, and a government which combined consistency with a regard for human failings, particularly injured pride. By the end of 1943 little perceptible progress had been made, but what progress there had been was in the right direction.

The part the educated Arabs could play in the Administration was small. A fair number had received secondary education at Constantinople under the Turks and a few from the Italians, but nearly all who had served the Italians were distrusted, usually without substantial reason. Again it was obvious that it would take time to re-establish confidence and, in the meantime, it was the object of the Administration to avoid adding to their unpopularity by giving them unpopular orders to fulfil. The British element could bear any odium which it might be necessary to incur. Gathering together these loose ends into a coherent whole with common loyalties was obviously not a matter in which a temporary Military Administration could give a convincing lead.

That Cyrenaica was a recognisable entity was due to the Senussi confraternity, which began a hundred years ago to consolidate the anarchical tribes. There had never been a Cyrenaican State in the accepted sense of the term, although between 1917 and 1922 El Sayed Mohammed Idris el Senussi established an autonomous authority of crude design in the rural and desert areas. But the loyalties of the people were entirely centred on him both as their religious leader and as the only person from the country itself who had ever exercised some semblance of temporal authority. It would have been an obvious advantage in these circumstances for the local administration if the Sayed had returned to use his influence for the settlement of the disputes which lay beneath the surface of an otherwise peaceful community. The Sayed decided, however, that until the future of the country had been settled his own authority was questionable and he preferred to remain in the voluntary exile in Cairo into which he had entered in 1922. He was invited to visit the territory and accordingly made preparations, but ill-health prevented his journey at the last moment.

Two other matters of interest regarding the Senussi family must be mentioned. The Sayed was known to all the Arabs as "His Highness the Amir", or Prince. He was given this title by the Pact of Rejima, 1920, under which the Italians recognised him as the autonomous ruler of the southern oases. It was impossible to stop the people from using this title, even if there had been any reason for doing so, and Brigadier Cumming recommended that it should be given general currency as an honorific title to which the Sayed had a good claim, even though the Italians had unilaterally renounced the Pact of Rejima after he had left the country. It was, however, decided that to avoid any suspicion that Great Britain was making unwarranted changes in the status of this Italian colony in advance of a peace settlement, the Administration should always address him as "His Eminence" while the people called him "The Amir". Naturally this led them to call him "The Amir" more vociferously than ever. The disappointment felt over the failure of the Sayed to return to his country and the controversy over his title combined to build up remarkable public enthusiasm when six other members of the Senussi family toured the country in November, 1943. At the same time it gave evidence of the very friendly relations which existed between the Senussi family and the British Authorities and the visit was a success. Not least was the opportunity it afforded for people to meet and enjoy themselves. In spite of these disappointments the Sayed was of great assistance to the Administration and on the friendliest terms

with its officers. Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel) J. N. D. Anderson, M.B.E., at what had now become Civil Affairs Branch G.H.Q., M.E.F., had been his chief contact since the beginning of the war with Italy. He continued to act as an intermediary in Cairo and ensured that the Sayed was kept closely informed of events in Cyrenaica. As a result the problems of the translation of the Libyan Arab Force into a gendarmerie for ordinary police functions and of a moratorium on tribal feuds were overcome more easily than might have been expected.

The Libyan Arab Force had originally been raised in 1940, at the suggestion of the Sayed. After receiving substantial reinforcements from the prisoners of war captured at the battle of Sidi Barrani, it reached a maximum strength of five infantry battalions. But the highly mechanised warfare which developed in the western desert of Egypt and in Cyrenaica precluded their full use and, with few exceptions, they were employed on the lines of communications. The revival of Senussi hopes found its expression in this Force which wore the Senussi emblem, a white crescent and star on a black field, as its badge. There was an establishment of Arab officers, many of them men who had fought in the rebellion against the Italians. During both the first and second occupations battalions of the Libyan Arab Force performed internal security duties in Cyrenaica, but remained virtually independent of the military administration. There was a danger that the main rallying point of patriotic ideas, headed by the Sayed, would be at cross-purposes with the *de facto* government, in the form of the Military Administration, and indeed there was some evidence to support this, particularly when the Administration began to raise a police force with a less patriotic background than the Libyan Arab Force. It was with this in mind that Brigadier Cumming proposed that the Force, which had the status of a unit in the British Army, should be the agency which, after an appropriate adjustment in its organisation and personnel, should be given executive tasks in the Military Administration. The proposal was not adopted in full but, when active operations in Cyrenaica ceased, all but two of the Libyan Arab Force battalions were disbanded. The remainder were gradually converted into an armed gendarmerie, absorbing the Cyrenaica Police Force under the new name of Cyrenaica Defence Force and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Doyle. A school was instituted for training in police duties and by the end of 1943 steady progress was being made. There was still some feeling, however, that the wearer of the Senussi emblem wielded more authority than those

who had executive posts, but who were included in this patriotic force. The War Establishment of the new force provided for 73 British and 1,374 Arab ranks.

Internal security during the third occupation proved to be unexpectedly good. This may have been due, in the main, to the departure of the Italian civilian population which, once the strong hold of the Italian Police had been shaken, was in obvious danger. On the other hand the thirty years of Italian occupation and their efforts to suppress resistance to their rule created many disputes, the settlement of which was beyond the scope of customary law. The Military Administration therefore asked El Sayed Mohammed Idris el Senussi to issue a notice calling on everyone to keep the peace and to leave their disputes until the period of Military Administration had ended. This the Sayed did and his wishes were observed with remarkable fidelity. Only 60 killings and attempted killings and 482 cases of theft were reported through the territory. No effort to disarm the population was made: weapons and ammunition were lying about in the desert and no policy of disarmament could be effectively enforced among the nomadic population under such conditions. General Montgomery and the Commander of the Cyrenaica Military District approved of this policy and in fact the Arabs used their weapons on British behalf by forming a force similar to the British Home Guard for the purpose of watching the coast. These Arabs played a decisive part in rounding up two groups of enemy *saboteurs* who were landed from aircraft and submarines.

The supply situation was not a problem of immediate gravity on a subsistence level. A population living in a country of uncertain rainfall has so often experienced privation that its first reaction to unsettled conditions is to set aside reserves of grain. But all kinds of shop goods, particularly clothing, were in short supply and, as in the rest of North Africa, sweetened tea had become in Cyrenaica a recognised part of the people's diet. A family rationing scheme for flour, sugar, tea, rice and edible oil was instituted and these commodities were obtained in bulk from the Supplies and Transport Branch of the Cyrenaica Military District. The Administration purchased 5,000 tons of grain (mostly barley) from the people at £E.12½ a ton. The ration scale per month was 4,000 grams of flour, 200 grams of tea, 1,000 grams of rice, 400 grams of oil and 800 grams of sugar.

Throughout 1943 trade was virtually at a standstill. No shipping was available for exports of meat on the hoof, grain or wool and no imports of manufactured goods were obtainable. This was

naturally the main source of complaint from both merchants and producers who had to live on what they could sell to the occupying army—which was not far short of the amount they could supply—and on capital. There was an acute shortage of transport, though, before the end of the year, a few local mechanics were already showing great gifts for operating abandoned vehicles which more refined technicians had declined to tackle.

A sharp decline in the standard of living in the towns was the inevitable result of the campaigns and was prolonged by the difficulty of restoring normal trade; the country folk had easily adjustable standards and suffered less. Under the Italians the urban Arab population became accustomed to many modern conveniences such as electricity and piped water, but the installations had everywhere been either totally destroyed or badly damaged. Bardia and Tobruk were completely destroyed and throughout 1943 remained closed areas for operational reasons. In Benghazi damage to Arab property was very severe, three-quarters of the houses being razed or damaged. In fact it was found necessary to wire off the main residential area for sanitary reasons and the displaced population was either crowded into the less damaged parts of the town or moved into temporary accommodation in the suburbs. Cyrenaica was almost completely lacking in indigenous artisans and, since no Public Works Department was approved for the Administration, little progress with repairs could be made. Nevertheless a great deal of debris was removed and the town cleaned up generally so that, by the end of the year, the scene of devastation found at the beginning of the occupation was beginning to fade. This was not, however, much comfort for those who wanted to use the remaining buildings which, as buildings, showed no commensurate improvement.

The schools of the country also suffered badly during the war and progress in re-opening them was necessarily slow. In June, 1943, an official of the Sudan Government Education Department was invited to visit the territory and, as a result of his report, by the end of the year 48 teachers were employed in teaching 2,300 pupils. The provision of teaching material was the chief handicap as was also the weather-proofing of the buildings against the wet and cold winter. The first was overcome by co-operation from the Egyptian Government but the schools, like all other buildings, presented a problem which could not be solved during 1943.

Hospitals and dispensaries were found to be in a distressing state. Apart from war damage the whole of the Italian staff, with

the exception of 37 Italian nursing nuns, had disappeared. There were naturally many cases of civilians who had been injured during the fighting and there was a steady stream of people who needed treatment for wounds, severe and slight, mostly caused by misadventures with land-mines and explosives generally. The task of establishing a medical service fell to Lieut.-Colonel F. Hennessey, M.C., M.B., assisted by two R.A.M.C. officers and two civilian doctors from Egypt. Both the R.A.M.C. and the R.A.F. medical service gave whole-hearted assistance and by the end of the year the outline of a civilian medical service had been created. This consisted of three hospitals with 283 beds and 31 dispensaries in rural areas. The Italian nursing nuns deserved special praise for their unremitting and selfless work under very trying conditions. It was anticipated, on the evidence of Italian experiences during the war, that the summer would bring typhoid and typhus epidemics to the towns. That they did not occur was mainly due to the efforts of both military and civilian hygiene personnel. A threatened epidemic of smallpox was arrested by 119,129 vaccinations which the Medical Department gave, at short notice, throughout the country. In general health was good, in the sense that there was fewer emergencies than anticipated, but it was clear that the populace suffered from a high incidence of eye, pulmonary and venereal infections.

An outstanding exception to this dismal picture of the towns, and of the trials of various branches of the Administration, was the general contentment of the bulk of the agricultural and pastoral elements of the population. Their mode of life had been changed in that military operations had restricted their movements, destroyed or emptied their wells and closed their normal markets. But they just had sufficient resources to enable them to survive even if their herds were much depleted. It is worth recording that, as a result of Fascist colonial policy, both the human and animal population in Cyrenaica was less in 1939 than before the Italian occupation of the country. Moreover, there was the legacy of the abandoned Italian farms which the Administration could not do other than invite them to occupy under short leases from the Custodian of Enemy Property, although only a small proportion of the 1,700 farm units had been sufficiently developed to be worth taking over for resettlement. The erstwhile Italian colonist owners had not progressed beyond the stage in which they were being supported by the *Ente par la Colonizzazione della Libia*. Many of these farms had been abandoned since the first occupation and, lacking vineyards and orchards, they differed in no way

from other land cleared for cereal cultivation with the exception that houses had been built.

The work of the Agricultural Department of the British Military Administration fell into three main divisions. The first of these was the Barce Plain Scheme. The second was the several fine experimental gardens and nurseries established by the Italians in Derna, Barce, Benghazi and other places, which were placed on a care and maintenance basis ; the work at Benghazi was, however, seriously handicapped by the destruction of the electric power station on which the gardens depended for their water supply. The third, which it was decided to attempt to save, was the best of the Ente colonists' farms in Jebel el Akhdar. The 1,700 small holdings of the Ente Scheme, each with a house, some arable land, a vineyard, and often a small orchard, were grouped in the four older settlements of Luigi Razza, Beda Littoria, Luigi Savoia and Giovanni Berta. Outside these four places the farms had only been established immediately before the war, and little development had been done except for the building of a house and the clearing of the land. A " Hill Farms Scheme " was instituted by the Military Administration in June, 1943, with the object of maintaining the farms in the four established settlements by means of Arab tenants working under the close control and advice of a British officer. This experiment can be claimed to have been a success. The farms were well cultivated, and the grape crop harvested and made into wine at the Beda factory, which was put into working order by the Administration and leased to a local contractor for the purpose.

The most important sphere of agricultural activity was on the Barce plain. As part of a general plan to increase food production in the Middle East, either to provide a reserve for Cyrenaica or a surplus for export, the Administration undertook direct responsibility for the cultivation of the Domain areas, as well as for some private estates. The plain itself is an expanse of almost uninterrupted cultivable ground some 30,000 acres in extent, well suited to mechanised farming methods. It had been entirely expropriated by the Italians from its original owners, in favour of the Ente, a private company known as I.C.L.E. and some individual concessionaires. A tentative start was made in March, 1943, when lack of staff and farming machinery made the prospects of large scale cultivation appear unattainable. By mid-April, however, two representatives of the Middle East Supply Centre submitted a report recommending the cultivation of 12,000 acres of wheat and barley on the Barce plain and by June 4th, the approval of the

War Office had been given to the project. One of the Middle East Supply Centre Officers, Lieut.-Colonel G. J. Fleming, was entrusted with its management under the general direction of the Administration. Four officers, seven British O.Rs. and a working company of prisoners of war were made available ; Italian farming machinery was collected and repaired. The work then developed momentum, and not only was the Italian sown wheat and barley harvested during July and August, but, by the end of the year, 10,863 acres had been ploughed and sown, mostly with wheat. The War Office, before the end of the year, approved the extension of the scheme to include 20,000 acres in the 1944-1945 season.

It was decided that no financial Estimates should be introduced into Cyrenaica until the beginning of the financial year 1943-1944. For the first six months, therefore, expenditure was restricted to immediate and essential needs of a routine nature. The total expenditure for this period of six months was £119,509, of which £92,760 was " non-recoverable ". The approved Estimates for the financial year provided for " non-recoverable " expenditure of approximately £650,000 for the general services of government, and approximately £1,000,000 of " recoverable " expenditure on foodstuffs, clothing, cigarettes and the growing of grain. The largest votes in the first category was £130,631 for general administration (including municipal services), £100,000 (provisionally) for police, and £67,038 for medical services. It should be noted that, while the Administrations in Eritrea and Tripolitania inherited large quantities of Italian transport, government stores of all sorts, medical and educational equipment and intact buildings, the Administration in Cyrenaica had to obtain, and was charged for, all these things from outside sources.

The revenue potentialities of the territory were small at best, and during the early stages of the occupation the collection of revenue had to give way to more pressing tasks. The Italians had never found it either possible or desirable to collect direct taxation from the rural population, so that there was no established routine of assessment and collection. The revenue, therefore, from direct taxation and miscellaneous sources during the year was very small indeed, amounting to only about £35,000. Certain of the former Italian municipal taxes were re-imposed for the benefit of the Administration and there was a small amount of revenue from Court fines and Customs duty. In the autumn the selling prices of some of the principal foodstuffs were raised so as to show a net profit to the Administration, but this was only sufficient before

the end of the year to help to offset losses made on foodstuffs in the early months due to inaccurate information about prices. Revenue from tobacco goods, which had been confidently expected, proved disappointing owing to the practical impossibility of obtaining supplies from outside the Territory. In December information was received that the War Office viewed with concern the size of the grant-in-aid required by the Territory and the preparation of revised Estimates was put in hand. These were not completed by the end of the year, but it was then clear that the true cost, instead of being £462,422 as shown in the approved Estimates, would probably be under £200,000 after allowance had been made for a generally lower level of expenditure than authorised and for the accumulation of stocks of foodstuffs and the value of standing crops.

During the first nine months of 1943, the policy adopted was to accept Italian lire for the purchase of foodstuffs, that is for the majority of the payments made to the Administration. The measure helped the local population and at that time Italian lire were required by other branches of the Army for special purposes ; the amounts collected in the Territory were thus readily disposed of by the Administration. In September the percentage of lire accepted for foodstuffs was reduced to 75% in some districts, the remainder being payable in Egyptian currency. Towards the end of the year payment in Egyptian currency became general all over the Territory and the time was near when lire would become entirely unacceptable to the Administration. Throughout the year, in order to relieve the shortage of small-denomination Egyptian currency, Italian lire in denominations of Lit. 50 and less were authorised to be used for any purposes ; in December, 1943, only Lit. 10 and Lit. 5 notes were accepted by the Administration. All payments by the Administration were in Egyptian currency or in Lit. 10 and Lit. 5 notes. Unfortunately it was not possible to compile any figures of the currency circulation of the Territory. The Italian figures of lire circulation were not available and in any case related to the whole colony of Libya and not only to Cyrenaica. It was known that the total of Egyptian currency paid out by the British Forces was of the order of £E.1,500,000, but since troops moved currency across the Egyptian frontier without interference and as the civil population was likewise known to do so on occasion in defiance of orders, the total amount of currency issued was little guide to the amount in circulation. The total amount of Italian lire taken in by the Administration during 1943 was approximately Lit. 227 millions,

and of these Lit. 51 millions remained on hand at the 31st December.

The system of accounting employed was the modified form of British Colonial Government accounting on a purely cash basis used in other territories. The two principal "trading" activities of the Administration, the Civil Supplies Department and the Barce Plain Unit, were accounting units with commercial accounts designed to bring out costs of production and merchanting.

Although the second occupation of Cyrenaica was of such short duration that the duties of the Custodian of Enemy Property were cut short at birth, the problems facing his Department on the final occupation were immense. In the early stages the Custodian was hampered by an acute shortage of staff and it is in the early stages of an occupation that the most important work of a Custodian is done. In the towns and villages the small staff was faced with chaotic conditions owing to ravages of war, the movement of the armies back and forth and bombardment from the air and from the sea. The devastation was worst in Benghazi where a large part of the most valuable property had been razed to the ground. Stores and shops were open to looting and the buildings and machinery of private and stataal concerns were neglected and often damaged beyond repair. The position was exaggerated by the fact that practically all property in Cyrenaica of any value was Italian owned and virtually no Italians had remained in the Territory. In very few cases could legal representatives be found to take responsibility for captured property. Other factors which impeded the work of the Custodian and his assistants were the lack of police force and machinery of government. Cyrenaica District Headquarters published in Routine Orders a description of the duties and work of the Custodian's Department and laid down rules of procedure for British military units for obtaining the use of enemy property. Movable property had been scattered far and wide and it was often impossible to find the real owner. In such cases the property was sold and the proceeds credited to a fund which was held against the day when compensation should be claimed. Abandoned immovable property throughout Cyrenaica was valued at £E,1,270,000, most of it in or around Benghazi. Some 540 of the more valuable properties were taken into custody and put to the use of the Services or let to civilian tenants. A great deal of the valuable immovable property belonged to the Ente per la Colonizzazione. The Barce Plain area of the Ente cultivated by the Administration was assumed to be a "military hiring". Other abandoned farms were let to Arab

tenants at low rents. The private estates, most of which were in the Barce area, were initially operated by the Custodian, then let to civilian tenants and later became "military hirings" under the Barce Plain scheme.

The year 1943 ended with a petition from the Benghazi Municipal Council which, while expressing appreciation for the general policy and the way it was being applied, protested at the complete stagnation of trade, the lack of public utility services, and the small scale of the medical and educational services. The protest was understandable since the mandate given to the Administration was that it should operate on a "care and maintenance" basis and International Law precluded the introduction of a complete, and more economical, system of administration suitable to the simple needs of the indigenous population after the departure of the Italians. Lack of funds, material, skilled workmen and a Works Department precluded the restoration of the worst of the war damage; and the provision of imports and shipping were at the end of 1943 not only outside the Administration's control, but virtually unattainable in the then state of the world in Allied hands.

Nevertheless some goods seeped into the country, both from Tripolitania and Egypt. Administrative price control was virtually impossible, but devices frequently proved quite as effective. One commendable piece of initiative by the Political Officer in charge was shown at Benghazi when word was received through official channels that a small consignment of piece goods and trade commodities was on its way to the place by road from Tripolitania. Although the import was strictly unauthorised, it was decided to let the consignment in and allow it to be marketed in ordinary commercial channels. But the consignment was held up for a day outside the town while the Political Officer hired a Town Crier, who announced *vivissima voce* that the merchants who were bringing the goods in would certainly ask exorbitant prices which the population would be well advised not to pay as they were unauthorised. When the goods arrived next day the merchants were very disappointed to find a "stand-offish" and rather hostile population which refused to buy. The merchants thought this was a most unfair way of proceeding, but they dropped their prices. It was perhaps the first instance for many centuries of the use of a Town Crier for Price Control.

Cyrenaica had suffered more than other Italian occupied territories: Eritrea and Tripolitania were better endowed materially than their economic capacity warranted and an Italian system of

government was allowed and able to continue without interruption under British military control. Cyrenaica, as a wholly native country, was the only one of the three likely, under normal circumstances, to be able to support itself, but inherited practically no benefits from the Italians, and the Administration had the task of starting up a completely new, though temporary, government with virtually no assets and no chance of getting any. The position was almost unique in either this war or the last, for the various provinces of the Turkish Empire occupied in 1914-1918 had at least a system of government which the people were prepared to continue and, in most cases, there were indigenous officials who could operate it. None the less, the people of Cyrenaica were on the whole not only content but happier than they had been for many years. Their immediate difficulties were annoying and even alarming, for the Italians had tampered with the country's economic structure and the future looked as if it must bring about yet another change, but they had confidence in that future and fast began to regain their balance, lost after so many years of instability.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XII

TRIPOLITANIA AND THE END OF ITALY'S AFRICAN EMPIRE

The Geography and Ethnology of the Territory—
Beginnings of the British Military Administration—The
Move from Cairo—War Damage in Tripoli—Labour
and Food Problems—Police and Courts—Finance and
Currency—Requisitioning of Property—The Agricultural
Situation Surveyed—BMA and other Currency—
The Enrolment of a Native Police Force—The Supply
Board—The Collection of Grain and the Agricultural
Taxes—Rationing of Foodstuffs—Trade with Cyrenaica
—Difficulties Regarding Boundaries—Institution of
MAL Currency—Internal Relations between Italians,
Arabs and Jews—The Opening of the Postal Services
—The Arab Problem and the Advisory Council—
Education and the Opening of Schools—Review of
Progress during 1943—The French Administration in
the Fezzan.

CHAPTER XII

Tripolitania and the End of Italy's African Empire

THE history of the Civil Affairs Administration in Tripolitania up to the end of 1943 can be divided into three parts. The first deals with certain aspects of the planning and covers the movement of the convoys from Maadi to Tripoli, and the tasks of individuals and small groups of personnel in the territory during the early months of 1943; the second is marked by the beginnings of co-ordination and runs up to the end of May, 1943; the third, of seven months, produced several major problems and saw the beginnings of cultural and political patterns with some attempt to plan for 1944 and even farther ahead.

Tripolitania, the western half of Italian Libya, may be broadly divided into three regions. The lines of demarcation run approximately from N.W. to S.E. :—

1. **COASTAL BELT**, of which the southern boundary is the Gebel Nefusa in the west, narrows to nothing in the neighbourhood of Nofilia in the east.
2. **THE PRE-DESERT BELT**, inland, is bounded on the south by the southern ends of the Hammada el Hamra, the Gebel Soda and the Harug el Iswid.
3. **THE DESERT OR SAHARAN BELT** reaches down to the highlands of the Tassili and Tummo and the mountains of Tibesti.

The original population was Berber, and Berber-speaking communities are found in the Gebel Nefusa between Nalut and Jefren and also at Sokna in the Jofra, where their ancestors were driven by the Arab invasions of the Seventh and Tenth Centuries. The Berbers were converted to Islam, but the Arabs occupied the more fertile northern parts of the territory. The two races intermingled to a great degree and many persons claim Arab descent, although of Berber origin. The Berber element is, however, of great numerical and considerable political importance, which really makes it undesirable to use the term "Arab" for the whole population of Tripolitania. Where, in the following pages, the word "Arab" has been used it must be construed to mean "Arabic speaking", and covering both these as well as other fragments of indigenous population, other than Jews, and those of European origin. As a result of the Turkish occupation a mixed minority, the Cologhli, developed, the progeny of Turkish

Janissaries and Arab, Berber and even Christian women ; they were employed by the Turks as government servants. They exist as large groups in Zavia, Tripoli and Misurata, and as small groups on the northern fringe of the Gebel Nefusa. Considerable numbers of negroes, descendants of slaves brought up from Equatorial Africa, have intermarried with the population and are to be found as communities in Tauorga, near Misurata, and in the Fezzan. The Jews, 26,400 in all, form one of the oldest elements of the population and are found in the coastal towns and also at Jefren and at Tigrinna (a troglodytic community near Garian). They are reputed to have settled in the country, first to escape the Roman persecutions in Palestine and, later, during the Spanish dispersal.

The Italians acquired Tripolitania from the Turks in 1911 by conquest, penetrated to the Fezzan from Sirte, but were unable to hold the south. When Italy joined the Allies in the Great War in 1915, the Central European Powers and Turkey incited the population to re-open the struggle. As a result the Italians found themselves holding Tripoli, Homs and practically nothing else. Some ground was recovered by 1926 and large concessions, to be worked by native labour, were granted to Italian citizens and companies. Under Fascism the whole country was re-conquered, Murzuch on Lat. 25° N. being reached in 1930, and mass colonisation by Italian families began. Large agricultural communities were established in the coastal area and the Northern Jefara, or Coastal Plain.

Under the Italian administrative system the territory was divided into two provinces, with headquarters at Tripoli and Misurata, and a Southern Military Zone comprising the Jofra and the Saharan areas. The two provinces were subdivided into Commissariati, Circondarii and Residenze. Italian courts were situated at Tripoli, Misurata and Garian. There was a variety of police forces ; the Carabinieri Reali and native carabinieri, the Polizia Africa Italiana, the Guardie di Finanza and the Municipal Police Forces. Of these the Polizia Africa Italiana was the political force and appeared to perform most of the functions undertaken by the OVRA, or political police, on the mainland. The whole administration was backed by very considerable garrisons of troops spread throughout the territory. So numerous were they that their removal was likely to destroy a considerable volume of the territory's commerce and diminish its spending power to a dangerous level. The country was dependent upon Italy for the bulk of its needs in both raw materials and finished

articles. Full scale colonisation had begun only three or four years before Italy's entry into the war in 1940; consequently Italian agriculture was still in the teething stage and there was little to export. The resources of the country are few, consisting of cereals, dates, vegetable oils, esparto grass, tunny fish, salt, sponges and hides.

Towards the end of 1942 a Military Government establishment was drawn up and a staff of officers, O.Rs. and civilian interpreters began to assemble under Brigadier M. S. Lush, C.B.E., M.C., at Maadi, in Egypt, where language classes and lectures were arranged. Personnel was divided into various "flights" and received further tuition from their "flight commanders"; these "flights" contained departmental and police officers as well as administrative officers. It was decided to break up the three Italian administrative divisions into six, to secure more direct control. The Provincial Headquarters were to be at Tripoli, Zuara, Garian, Homs, Misurata and Hon. The Tripolitanian administration was to work under the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his branch at G.H.Q., Middle East, like the military administrations of Eritrea and Cyrenaica. Both in the territories and at G.H.Q. the nomenclature "Civil Affairs Administration" and corresponding titles of Chief Civil Affairs Officer (C.C.A.O.), Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (D.C.C.A.O.) at the head of the territorial administrations, Senior Civil Affairs Officer (S.C.A.O.), and Civil Affairs Officer (C.A.O.) had by this time been adopted to conform with British and American practice in Algiers where preparations for the Civil Administration under the U.S. and British Armies in Italy were in progress. In the following pages however the more familiar terminology used in the earlier chapters, as was the practice in 1941 and 1942, is used since the change-over and organisation of the headquarters of what had been the Political Branches in Cairo and Nairobi will only fall to be described in later chapters of this volume.

The formal beginning of the Administration dated from the 15th December, 1942, when the Army Commander of the Eighth Army signed the first eleven proclamations, of which the first one announced the occupation of Tripolitania. Army H.Q. was then at Agedabia, but it was uncertain at the time whether Tripolitania would in fact all be taken by the Eighth Army or by the First Army from the west. Complications therefore seemed likely in providing a unified series of proclamations and a unified currency system. A further complicating factor was the assistance to be provided by General Leclerc's Free French column which

was to move against the desert garrisons of the south and provide at least a diversion, at most a penetration, to force a more rapid withdrawal of the Axis forces in the middle hinterland.

Currency threatened to provide serious problems. In Cyrenaica, Egyptian and Italian Metropolitan monies were in use. In French North Africa, British military authority £ and lesser denominations were to be used for military purposes and could be changed at the banks into French francs. There were several species of "francs", of which those acceptable to the Allied Forces and their administrations were (1) notes of the Banque de France, (2) coin of the French Republic, (3) notes of the Banque D'Algerie, (4) similar notes overprinted "Tunisia," and (5) notes of the Banque d'Etat du Maroc. General Leclerc's column were likely to be carrying French African franc currency in place of, or in addition to, these. Tripolitania Proclamation No. 7, however, had laid down special B.M.A. notes, now introduced for the first time, and Italian lire as the currencies to be used by the Administration, so nothing more could be done except to wait and see what happened.

The first "flight" of the Administration personnel left Maadi on the 23rd December, 1942, and reached Sirte on the 10th January, 1943. The second "flight" did not reach there before the Eighth Army began its final thrust towards Tripoli, so the team on the spot was divided into two, one party accompanying the main body of XXX Corps across country via Beni Ulid, and the other joining the 51st (Highland) Division and following the coast road. Sirte itself had been so thoroughly mined and sown with booby traps that it was impossible to enter; the Civil Affairs Officer at Sirte spent several months under canvas seven kilometres to the west of the town and even there he had to walk warily.

The 51st (Highland) Division party, while moving up to Misurata during the night of the 17th-18th January, became detached from the divisional advance and fell in with a German rearguard at Crispi. Enemy small arms and mortar fire poured into the column in the light of a burning ammunition lorry and produced heavy casualties, including the Senior Political Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Lowth. Meanwhile a party, far away to the south, reached Zella, whence it pushed on to Hon to set up the British Administration over the Southern Military Zone. General Leclerc's column, which had made a rapid advance from Tibesti, occupied the Fezzan as far as Sebha and Brach. The French troops reached Hon twenty-four hours after the British Long-Range Desert Group had taken it. By the time the Eighth Army

entered Tripoli on the 23rd January the French had occupied Mizda, Ghadames, Sinauen and Derg, and had reconnoitred as far as Garian. In the meanwhile successive "flights" of British personnel arrived and were posted in all the centres of population, the final "flight" arriving on the 29th January. Out of eighty-nine vehicles which left Cairo, three were lost, two by enemy action and one abandoned after striking a mine at Sollum.

In the rural areas, where agricultural colonies existed, the Italian families had concentrated themselves near the centres, abandoning the perimeter farms; some looting by the native population took place. In certain places the Italians attempted to form a Civil Guard for defence against the local inhabitants. There was considerable apprehension in the minds of the Italians and rumours, entirely without foundation, of massacres by the natives, circulated. The police force left by the Italians was wholly inadequate and incompetent to deal with large-scale looting; Sudan Defence Force troops were made available to take over police duties.

Tripoli had suffered little damage from bombs and gunfire by comparison with Tobruk and Benghazi. The harbour, however, had been blocked and the principal military need was to re-open it, equip it and defend it as a base for further advance west; the efforts of the Administration during the first few months were all centred round this paramount military requirement. It was necessary to relieve the L. of C. as much as possible of the need to transport civil supplies, and it was necessary to provide labour for the services engaged on the work of the harbour base. Preliminary reconnaissance by the Medical Department revealed the presence of typhus in many parts of the territory, particularly in a Jewish concentration camp at Giado and in Tripoli City where it was aggravated by a breakdown in the water supply. Last of the immediate problems had to be food for the population; it was said that there was enough for two months, but, as the Italians had distributed much of it to their nationals and the remainder had mostly been looted by Arabs, there was little certainty of enough being available.

The objectives of the Administration followed the text-book. The resources of the port and the city's workshops would have to be made free to the forces, public utilities would have to be restored or maintained to provide for military and civilian needs, and all available supplies would have to be marshalled so as to relieve the army of all possible responsibility towards the civilian population. A survey of the staff left behind by the Italian

Government to run the territory showed that numerically it was just sufficient for the maintenance of administrative offices, but consisted mainly of inferior officials; there had recently been a general switch of personnel from one department to another, possibly in order to confuse and hamper the incoming administration. Some of the Italian staff, notably the medical branch, gave their services without stint. It was found possible and desirable to retain the services of many Italian employees, nearly all of whom had received pay for two months, and some even for four months, in advance. Although unpopular with certain parties among the Arabs, this decision was accepted by the majority of the population as a necessary immediate measure to ensure continuity of routine administration; it also represented a considerable economy in British personnel.

Tripoli harbour was reopened with commendable speed and ships began to unload, at first partially into lighters outside the port, after which they made their way inside to complete. German aircraft made their appearance, but the Tripoli A.A. barrage was formidable and took a steady toll. During the period in which air-raids continued civilian casualties were few, 101 killed and 20 injured in all; 57 buildings were affected. The Labour Officer found that skilled labour was in short supply, since under the previous régime skilled work was almost entirely in the hands of Italians, a large number of whom had either retired to Tunis with the troops or had sailed to Italy. Local labour was to be found in quantity, but it was unskilled and seasonal, the exodus to rural areas at the times of sowing and harvest being of paramount importance to the workers. Initial wage rates fixed under the Military Pioneer and Labour scale in February did not produce an adequate supply of labour, for some skilled workers were receiving less than in 1942, taking into account the devaluation of the Lira. Unskilled labour, in spite of a rise during March from 34 lire to 38 lire a day, proved generally unwilling to accept employment unless rations could be supplied. On the 15th February a scheme was initiated by which those working directly for the services received a loaf of bread daily on payment. The initial ration of 50 grammes continued with variations till September.

In view of the lack of stocks of foodstuffs in the territory the Controller of Civil Supplies called for an immediate declaration of stocks by merchants. The result, from about 250 firms, was: flour $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons, sugar 5 tons, soup materials 46 tons, oil 30 tons. In addition the Farmers' Co-operative held 100 tons of wheat flour

and 280 tons of wheat grain ; a stock of Government edible oil was also discovered. Stocks were impounded and provision was made for hospitals, orphanages, prisons, etc., after which a ration of a daily loaf of 50 grammes was made to Tripoli City. The Italian Department of Wartime Supplies and Economics had destroyed all its records, but the official in charge of ration books and distribution to wholesalers remained. It was decided to give the above ration to all holders of ration books in the city. Since the Administration had been warned prior to leaving Egypt that no supplies could be expected before mid-April, this was the most that could be done at the time. In the Provinces the food situation was easier, as garden produce and barley were available to supplement the tenuous stocks remaining in official stores.

As has already been noted, at the time of the entry of the Eighth Army into Tripolitania typhus fever was prevalent, particularly in Tripoli City and among the 2,000 Jews in the Italian concentration camp at Giado. Although documents captured during the second occupation of Cyrenaica provided the necessary data regarding the Italian medical services in Tripolitania for the purposes of planning the destruction of buildings, the consequent loss of medical stores and the failure of water supplies presented unforeseen problems requiring immediate solution if the spread of typhus was to be prevented and Eighth Army interests were to be safeguarded.

These problems were solved and the early restoration of the formerly efficient civil medical services was possible largely owing to the willing co-operation and help of the Italian doctors and nurses who had almost all remained after the Axis retreat. Within a few months the hospitals and dispensaries had been restored, the provincial medical services organised, a school medical service instituted, adequate Italian medical stores salvaged and a health department established ; all of these were open to, and working for, the benefit of Arab, Berber and Jew, as well as the Italian population for which the former Italian services had exclusively been designed. By July, 1943, the last traces of typhus had disappeared.

Mention has been made of the small police force left behind by the Italians, which was still further reduced by the internment of the 72 *Polizia Africa Italiana* who remained. In order to provide a stop-gap police force, Sudan Defence Force detachments were used in most places. But Tripoli City suffered from a spate of house thefts and burglaries, especially during air raid alerts when the inhabitants retired to the shelters. A body of

watchmen was enlisted as a temporary measure and close collaboration between the British police officers, the Carabinieri, military police, Field Security personnel and the Sudan Defence Force prevented crime from reaching serious dimensions. In the provinces police work was in the main confined to recovering looted government and Italian agriculturists' property, and dealing with thefts of military stores from units.

British Military Courts were set up in all districts and the Italian Courts at Tripoli and Misurata were re-opened. The Tripoli court had large arrears of work, but a careful vetting of pending cases, together with the release of prisoners against whom there was little or no evidence, reduced the number of cases to manageable dimensions. There were at first considerable delays in the British courts owing in part to over-zealousness of the police, and in part to the difficulties of interpretation.

The Finance and Accounts Department of the Tripolitania Administration came into existence early in December, 1942, when a few officers commenced operations and opened their books in the offices of Political Headquarters in Cairo. As officers became available they were posted to the various "flights" as they left Cairo. On the 27th December the Department moved to Maadi where it remained until Tripolitania was taken over. The various sections of the Department arrived in Tripoli during the latter part of January and work was in full swing by the end of the month. Lieut.-Colonel M. J. Stewart, formerly in the same capacity in Somalia, was appointed Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts; he also took control of the Trade and Supplies, and Customs and Excise Departments. Immediately on arrival in Tripoli the banks were closed; it was found that they had, just prior to the occupation, paid over all their cash to various institutions in accordance with the orders of the then Vice-Governor. Strict exchange control was applied from the beginning, but owing to the difficulty of controlling the frontiers, very considerable currency movements took place and there was inevitably much evasion. A large drain of Italian lire took place to Cyrenaica, and Algerian francs were imported in quantities both by returning Eighth Army personnel and by civilians arriving from Tunisia.

During the first month of occupation the Controller of Finance and Accounts at Political Branch in Cairo visited the territory to discuss economic and currency problems. Prior to the occupation it had been decided that, as no more Egyptian currency could be made available for Tripolitania for political and economic reasons,

a special British Military Administration currency would have to be used. Although such a currency had been prepared for the Madagascar operation it was never required there, and Tripolitania was the first occupied area in which these new specially printed currency notes were used. Divisionary coin was however not available and it was therefore proposed and agreed to use Italian small lira notes and coin for current market change. The visit of the Controller of Finance and Accounts coincided with the discussion which had been going on between Cairo and London on the relation of currency including lira currency in Tripolitania with other currencies including the lira in Metropolitan Italy and the other Italian occupied territories in Africa. On the 21st February the War Office informed Cairo that the Treasury had represented that there was no necessity and that it was indeed undesirable to link the lira currency of Libya with the Metropolitan lira. To avoid movement of the special B.M.A. currency or Italian lire outside North Africa and in order to maintain the B.M.A. £ and the lira at the same rate if Italian currency foundered, it was therefore proposed that the current B.M.A. notes as well as lire of denominations of fifty and upwards be withdrawn and substituted by a new B.M.A. issue, either sterling or lira, overprinted "Libya." In Cyrenaica, however, Egyptian currency would continue to be used side by side with the new issue.

On the 22nd February, 1943, it was represented from Cairo that: "constant changes in currency were calculated to discredit B.M.A. and military administration finance, especially in the labour markets". Six such changes were instanced, some of which had already been made and others which would have to be carried out if the proposed withdrawal of B.M.A. sterling and lira took place. A united currency for the whole of Libya was not approved and the overprinting of the new notes with such a title would raise difficulties on the Tunisian border. For these reasons if any special issue were essential it was suggested that a note with dual wording in English and Arabic, but which did not specify a country, should be used. Such a note could then be used elsewhere in North Africa. The alternative was a specifically Tripolitanian currency. The warning was uttered that a B.M.A. lira currency would tend to follow the Italian lira unless formally tied to sterling with a promise of redemption or exchange.

The Controller of Finance and Accounts in Cairo, commenting on the proposals at the end of February, noted that the existing B.M.A. currency could not be said to be linked with the European

or any lira, since Proclamation 7 made no stipulation against dealings at any rate other than 480 to the £; it merely laid down that "*for purpose of payment to or by the Administration the B.M.A. pound shall be taken as equal to 480 lire*". Since fixed taxes and monies due to the Italian Government were to be paid in lire, an accumulation of lire which could be withdrawn later would take place. But a provision could be added to Proclamation No. 7 to the effect that the rate of the B.M.A. pound would "equal 480 lire or such other rate as may from time to time be advertised". The subject was dropped for a time and the B.M.A. pound and Italian lire remained side by side in current use until replaced under Proclamation 46 in September by a unified currency of "British Military Authority Lire", as described later.

By the end of February the Administration had found its feet and it was possible for departmental as well as for administrative officers to look further ahead. In the interval of the few weeks which had elapsed their knowledge of the country and its peoples had grown sufficient to be able to plan the co-ordination of the limited resources of the territory. At this stage, too, the varied systems and devices adopted by individuals in their efforts to meet immediate problems in diverse and separated localities with little inter-communication in the first days of occupation were brought into line. The period fittingly came to an end with the promulgation of Proclamation 18 of the 22nd February, by which General Montgomery delegated his legislative function to the General Officer Commanding the Tripolitania Base, Major-General (Lieut.-General) Sir B. H. Robertson.

During this first period Tripoli had become the base of the Eighth Army's final advance against Tunisia and, later, a resting place for the returning troops re-equipping for the Sicilian expedition. Consequently Army requirements continued to be paramount for a further three months. But Army units became more settled: requisitioning of buildings for accommodation and workshops, and of machinery and materials for their work, was tidied up in close liaison between the Administration and the service authorities. Tripoli Military District remained the centre for all these activities, for which purpose a liaison officer was appointed from Tripoli Province. Carelessness in, or ignorance of, the procedure for requisitioning had resulted in a spate of claims against the forces. There was not a great quantity of machinery available for service use, for the retreating Germans and Italians had removed the best of what had existed and had damaged much of the remainder, but the territory's dependence

upon the Italian mainland for current supplies was never so forcibly demonstrated as in the case of spares for machinery and transport, the reserves of which were found to be so low that the most careful economies by all were needed and resort had to be had to systematic "cannibalising" of plant.

In view of a shortage of foodstuffs in the country the Administration set about trying to provide vegetables and other supplies for the services. The country was rapidly surveyed by Agricultural Officers already attached to the provinces. The investigation revealed a disquieting situation. Italian agriculture was very dependent upon power and machinery, not only in the areas near Tripoli served by the electric distribution system, but also further afield, and serviceable tractors were by now virtually non-existent. The provision of water, even for domestic purposes, was largely dependent upon petrol or diesel motors and pumps, for which spares were difficult to find and for which in any case fuel and lubricants were at that stage almost unobtainable. Quite a number of farms drew water by windpumps, but these had broken down and again spares were in short supply. Many farms were unoccupied and, even in those which were being worked, there was often a shortage of labour owing to the call-up of men for the Italian forces. The campaign had left in its wake broken irrigation channels, to repair which cement had to be provided. Local supplies of meat for the forces was unobtainable as there was an acute shortage of livestock. In 1941 large quantities had been slaughtered to provide leather for the Axis Powers. The figures were :—

Cattle	55,000	representing	75%	of the total in the areas administered
Sheep	150,000	"	60%	" " " " " " "
Goats	150,000	"	58%	" " " " " " "
Camels	15,000	"	48%	" " " " " " "

The cattle that remained, if slaughtered, would only have sufficed Tripoli City for nine months. Having done what was possible to provide for the needs of the Army, the Administration turned to remedy the shortage of cereals. It was decided that as much of the crop as possible should be gathered into the hands of the Administration, and legislation was drafted to effect this. The outcome of the harvest could not at that stage be foreseen, since climatic conditions always made native crops an unknown factor until just prior to the harvest, but Political Officers were called upon to tour for checking the work of local taxation committees. It had been decided as a matter of principle that agricultural taxes

should be collected, although the Italians had remitted them for several years, but payment in kind in the case of cereals was provided for to foster centralised collection.

Early in March, 1943, an important currency development took place. On the 4th March the Chief Political Officer asked for the dispatch to Cairo of 20 million lire of denominations of 1,000 and 500 lire notes for use in connection with the Italian campaign. At that time stocks, including 100 lire notes, were about $1\frac{3}{4}$ million lire short of the amount asked for. These currency requirements made it clear by mid-May that B.M.A. currency with denominations of Italian lira notes for change would have to become the sole currency, and that the Italian lira currency in use would be insufficient and would have to be abandoned as a medium for trade. On the 29th May 36,700,000 lire were dispatched by sea to Cairo; throughout the next months the collection of metropolitan lire for purposes outside the territory continued. On the 3rd February the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts recovered 18 millions of lire from the hospital and 5 million from the Municipality of Tripoli to which they had been issued just before the occupation. He also reported that there was no black market rate for B.M.A. currency, but that there were difficulties for untutored minds in calculating in pounds, shillings and pence, especially when combined with the normal simpler decimal system.

The most important feature of the second period of administration was the enrolment of a native police force and the opening of a police training school at Tarhuna in March. Recruiting for the Tripolitania Police Force was open to Arabs and Jews alike. Although recruiting centres were established in all parts of the country and it was hoped that the better type of Arabs, such as the sons of Sheikhs and notables, would be encouraged to join, the response both in respect of numbers and quality was not at first up to expectation. The reasons could be traced to the low rates of pay offered to the rank and file. It was not till the initial rate of £2 3s. od. a month was supplemented by a cost of living allowance of 18s. that an improvement in the rate of enlistment occurred. Although it was found necessary to increase the preliminary training of two months to three, the results in turnout, drill and general *esprit de corps* were very creditable. Of 2,295 recruits who entered the school, 598 were struck off for various reasons, which left the strength of the rank and file of the force only 137 under establishment by the end of the year. The Police Force came into being in time to meet an increase in serious crime,

among which possession of arms and explosives began to be conspicuous. This was not attributable to any unfriendliness towards the Administration or the occupying troops ; it was solely due to the innate desire of the native population to collect and hoard arms and ammunition, which were to be found in quantity everywhere.

Security offences such as sabotage or espionage were few ; the former consisted of the cutting and removing of telephone wires along the coast road, mainly for domestic and agricultural purposes, but deterrent sentences on offenders who were apprehended, or threat of communal punishment in areas where it occurred, kept the nuisance within bounds. Espionage was never a menace, though in Western Province a woman agent, whose voice had been picked up on a British radio wavelength, was found to have been directing enemy artillery fire upon British troops in the neighbourhood of her home. Throughout the early months of the occupation restriction of movement was imposed on the population, which was enforced on everyone, though more rigorously in the case of Italians.

But if trade were to be encouraged and built up within the territory and with neighbouring territories such restriction could not continue. An increasing quantity of civilian supplies would have to be distributed by the civilian population. The Army authorities had undertaken a review of the transport situation immediately upon arrival in Tripoli. Under Order No. 3 concerning motor vehicles, owners of mechanically propelled vehicles were required to hand over serviceable vehicles at named assembly points. Owners of unserviceable vehicles were required to produce registration books which were checked against the Italian Royal Automobile Club records. These records showed that 1,325 private vehicles and 1,578 commercial vehicles had been circulating in Tripolitania, but the majority had been carried away to Tunisia or Italy. In view of the limited resources of the country and the continuation or even possible increase of Army requirements, it became plain that to secure a just balance in relation to the economic needs of the country, regular consultation was necessary between Army services and the Administration. Some control and policy on the use of local resources would be also required, especially when the North African coast became the springboard for the attack on Europe. Although there was no sign of unemployment there could not be said to be a superfluity of labour ; adjustments were necessary between military and civilian requirements, as well as the closing down of civilian work

which did not contribute to the war effort. Finally, to avoid competition in the labour market, wages and prices needed consideration by both parties. In May, therefore, a Supply Board, under the chairmanship of Brigadier Lush, was set up by the G.O.C., Tripoli Base, on which all services were represented. The whole field of resources was divided between four committees representing Supplies, Transport, Engineering and Labour. These committees continued to work till the autumn when, with the transfer of Tripoli Base to Sicily, it was found necessary to retain only one of them.

With the fall of Tunis on the 12th May and the promulgation of Proclamation 29, by which the Commander-in-Chief delegated legislative power to the Military Administrator, the second period was brought to a close.

During the late spring and throughout the summer the interest of every branch of the Administration became focused on grain. Preliminary legislation for the control of grain had been published earlier in the year. By the terms of Essential Supplies Notice No. 1, under Proclamation 16 of the 22nd March, quantities of wheat and barley over 100 kilogrammes had to be declared ; but the order met with little success. By Order No. 21 movement of grain from the harvest areas without permit was forbidden, and producers were required to hold all grain at the disposal of the Director of Agriculture who was to decide what proportion should be retained and arrange for the Administration to purchase the rest. Agricultural Notice No. 1 of the 24th April ordered the removal to named centres of all wheat and barley or the flour therefrom before the 31st August. Allowances for retention were, in the case of wheat, 10% for seed and, in the case of Italian and Jewish farmers only, 180 kilos for each person normally resident on the farm for annual rations. Local Political Officers were authorised in the case of Moslems to decide the quantity of barley which could be retained. For Italians and Jews an allowance of 50% of the 1943 harvest was stipulated in the Notice. The prices to be paid by the Administration were announced in Price Notice No. 1 of 4th June as £22 for wheat per metric ton and £20 per metric ton for barley. The customary commissions of assessment for the tithe were appointed. Officers were instructed to check the work of commissions, not only to ensure just assessment for taxation purposes, but to make estimates of the crops which could only be calculated from the figures of commissions. In spite of the inexperience of most officers in this sort of work, the tours proved to be of great value ; the arrival of officers in distant harvesting

areas was appreciated by the Arabs, who had never seen Italian administrative officers taking any interest in their crops. It was not to be expected, however, that they would be as enthusiastic in the matter of paying in their tithe or surrendering all the grain considered by the Government to be surplus to their needs.

Whatever hopes and plans the Agricultural Department had, they could not appreciably influence the living conditions of the urban population until the spring of 1944, and conditions during the summer and autumn of 1943 gave cause for great concern. Apart from the rationed goods distributed by the Administration, commodity prices rose to high levels. Price controls were imposed where possible, but these tended in the main to result in the disappearance of the goods from the markets. Owing to an acute shortage of motor transport and the consequent recourse to native animal transport for supplying markets in Tripoli, distribution from producer to consumer could not be controlled quantitatively and price controls were consequently in practice not effective. Clandestine slaughter and sale of meat, and the disposal of catches of fish, provided classical examples of evasion. In spite of controls in the slaughter of cattle because of the shortage of stock, meat found its way at high prices to the tables of those who could afford it in Tripoli. Possibly only the police and others who were engaged in checking secret movements of cattle while foot and mouth disease restrictions were in force in 1945 and who patrolled the lanes and gardens of the Tripoli oasis, which surrounds the capital, realised the many avenues, literal and metaphorical, which existed for this trade. Numerous and rather impatient criticisms of the Administration were vouchsafed by military formations whose own activities were frequently in part responsible for aggravating the situation.

The following figures for necessities give an indication of the current cost of living during the summer and autumn of 1943 (July to November) with the lira fairly steady at 480/500 = £1 :—

	Unit	Controlled Price lira	Black Market Prices in lire	
			Minimum	Maximum
1. Bread	Kg.	16.65	50	80
2. Flour	Kg.	21	60	110
3. Rice	Kg.	18	60	95
4. C.S. Oil	Kg.	25.67	140	200
5. Sugar	Kg.	18	300	550
6. Tea	Kg.	113.87	450	900

	Unit	Controlled	Black Market	
		Price	Prices in lire	
		lira	Minimum	Maximum
7. Meat	Kg.	130-240	135	280
8. Fish	Kg.	200	300	400
9. Cigarettes	Pckt. 20	10-16	40	45
10. Charcoal	Kg.	12	18	30
11. Shirts	each	144-600	300	1000
12. Shoes	pair	500-800	2000	4000
13. Washing soap	Kg.	35	150	250

Trade with other countries did not begin in 1943, with the exception of a limited wool and date trade with Cyrenaica. The latter area needed "barracani", the long toga-like woollen blankets worn by the natives in both territories. Tripolitania required a quota equivalent to 40% of the wool sold by Cyrenaica, in the form of finished goods from Misurata. Merchants were encouraged to spend additional money in Tripolitania on dates, to reduce the amount of currency exported.

On the 16th March, 1943, the Cyrenaica Administration recommended the adoption of a customs union between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, in which the same customs tariffs would be applied at all points of entry in both countries, but without any collection at the land frontier between them where a statistical check, either at Agedabia or Sirte, should be sufficient. In the case of goods passing through either territory for delivery to the other, a *pro rata* transfer of customs duties could be arranged.

After representatives of the two territories had met, the proposal was generally agreed. Records of traffic were to be compiled from the movement permits of the Trade and Supplies Departments of the two territories. It was suggested that a post should be set up at El Agheila, through which an appropriate order would direct all traffic. But, to ensure this, border patrols would be necessary, and it was a matter of some difficulty to supply the personnel from the nearest Tripolitanian administrative or police centre, namely, Sirte. Moreover the terrain itself around El Agheila made avoidance of the post a simple matter. The post was established, but later it was clear that it would have to be moved to a better site to enforce control. There were only two possible places in Tripolitania; at a point inland from Ras El Ali, where the coast road passed through marshes which had formed a part of the Axis defence against the thrust from Agheila, and, as was finally settled in September, at a post about thirty miles

eastwards of what was described as "a well-mined position at Mersa Brega roadhouse." Although this made the solution of the policing problem easier, it brought other and new difficulties, and the establishment of a currency control and exchange office under a British officer had to be set up. The end of 1943 saw the matter still under review in Tripoli from which a proposal came to abandon the idea of a special customs control post for both territories and to set up a post at Sirte where there was a resident Chief Political Officer who could deal with both court cases and currency exchanges.

The southern frontier with the Fezzan was long and impossible to patrol. It also seemed possible that the two southern administrative districts of Hon and Mizda might be relieved of their resident British officers, so that no currency exchanges could be made or even statistical records kept there. But this left an uncontrolled route of access between the two territories, though the volume of traffic was likely to be small and quite insufficient to warrant the maintenance of a customs post. The western boundary with Tunisia produced much the same difficulties of length coupled with considerably more normal tribal movement to and fro than in the case of the eastern boundary. A control post was however established on the coast road at Zuara where customs duties were collected, and every effort was made to regularise tribal movement and the movements of repatriates and traders.

As early as the end of February, as has been recorded, there had been a proposal to replace B.M.A. sterling and Italian lire by a new currency. Towards the end of July it was decided to introduce, as sole legal currency in Tripolitania, Military Authority Lire notes engraved in English and Arabic, and bearing the name of Tripolitania. A high degree of secrecy was enforced right up to the date of the promulgation of Proclamation No. 46 on the 16th September, 1943, which instituted the new currency. The proclamation and explanatory leaflets were printed in Cairo, and other stationery connected with the exchange was rushed through the presses immediately after the proclamation was made public. In February, when the first proposal had been made, the Controller of Finance and Accounts, who was in the territory, estimated that the withdrawal of B.M.A. sterling would take one month, and that two months would be required for Italian Lire. Proclamation No. 46 stipulated a period of a month and a half for the exchange to be made, i.e. from the 15th September till the 31st October. In the event so much business accumulated towards the

end of the period that it was clear that if the period ended on the 31st October many persons *bona fide* would suffer grave losses. By Proclamation No. 50 the period of exchange was therefore extended to the 30th November, and circulation of B.M.A. currency and Italian lire was permitted till the latter date. A staff of about thirty officers, together with Italian bank clerks and cashiers to help them, was required to effect the exchange of currencies. Less than half the promised number of Exchange Officers had, however, arrived from Cairo by the opening date. To complete the number recourse was had to the Tripoli Transit Camp, and assistant Currency Officers from the Administration were attached to all Provincial Headquarters to issue and receive currency from the Exchange Officers.

Reports were received from one quarter that, before the extension became generally known, some Jews had bought the old currencies at a discount from the more ignorant holders, alleging that it would be impossible to exchange them. Apart from this, however, the exchange went very smoothly and the net total of discovered losses was only £374, which was remarkably low with so many untrained and inexperienced persons carrying out the exchange, often under makeshift conditions. The total amount of M.A.L. involved was 987,494,866 (sterling equivalent £2,057,280 19s. 5d.), in exchange for 285,284,230 Italian lire and £1,462,938 16s. 6d. in B.M.A. currency. The Currency Officer reported that the new money "was well received and was popular (a) on account of its being in denominations of lire and (b) because of the quality of the paper on which the notes were printed. The omission of any reference to British in the wording of the notes tended to be unpopular."

Almost immediately upon the occupation of the territory it became obvious that the vast majority of the population accepted the British Military Administration at least without hostility, at most with real enthusiasm. The co-operation of all communities was enlisted and was given from the start; this continued without open signs of change of heart throughout the year, surviving the shocks that came from the various episodes in Italian politics and the course of the war in 1943. Practically all the Italians were Fascists, if carrying a party card meant anything, but those who had remained after the withdrawal of the Axis forces were principally agricultural families, whether rich concession owners or poor peasants, and their devotion to Fascism rapidly evaporated. Farming on poor land which could only produce results by constant hard work, shortages of food and commodities, and

lack of time for any other occupation than merely keeping alive, acted as good political sedatives. The scorching south wind called "ghibli" and the locust, both of which came in unpredictable waves, gave the farmer who had to keep alive without political subsidies little time to consider politics. Families had been disrupted; from some the women and children had been evacuated to Italy where they would be safe from the war; from others the menfolk had been taken for the army and the women had to keep the farms going against their return. It seemed wiser to keep a silent tongue, for no one knew what repressive measures the new Administration might have to take against would-be politicians. In any case the Italians realised that they were far outnumbered by the Arabs, and feared that the latter might vent private spites by denouncing practising Fascists to the Administration, or that, if the British were weak, the Arabs might set upon them in the farms.

The British Military Administration from the outset made it clear that it was a war-time administration, that it was a military body, and that as such its duties were concerned only with care and maintenance of the territory in accordance with international law. It was frequently stressed that all thought must be in terms of war-time economics and the security of the Allied forces. Their needs must be catered for, in so far as the country could supply them without complete exploitation at the expense of the civil population. The natives, after taking some advantage of the short interregnum, welcomed the British Administration, expecting that it would mean a rapid end of war and the return of normal conditions, including the repatriation of local prisoners of war. Like the Italians the majority of the Arabs were farmers or market-gardeners and had the same incentives to return to work. The rains which marked the early months of 1943 were regarded as a good omen and as the Almighty favouring the new Administration.

The apparent Italian belief that the Libyan population would resist the British occupation, or at least hamper it by show of force, involved a truly surprising ignorance of the effects of their administrative policy from the outset. Much of their original conquest of Tripolitania had been achieved, not by force of arms, but by taking advantage of an obvious political weakness among traditionally and innately rival factions. Parties, alliances, tribes, Berbers and Arabs, Christians and Jews were played off one against the other. During the years of Italian administration the disrupting process had carried far. *Cabilas* (tribes) were split up on topographical, economic or political excuses as suited the Italian plan of the moment best. Except for some nomad or semi-nomad

tribes, one of which might contain 3,000-4,000 persons, there remained few of any consequence numerically. It was not to be expected that, in such a tribal system or disintegration of a system, any unanimity would be forthcoming or any persons of consequence found to take a lead. However undesirable it might be to continue to employ natives who had served the Italians, there were few alternative candidates, and complaints against sheikhs of *cabilas* or against Mudirs had to be examined with this background to history in mind.

Of all the sections of the population the Jews expressed themselves most clamorously pro-British. They had been made the subject of racial discrimination by the Italian Government, but they had not been very actively persecuted, though a number had been interned in a concentration camp in the Giado basin. Their religion was stricter than in many parts of the world. They lived, none the less, in a manner similar to, and in amity with, the Arabs and with the exception of certain agricultural settlements of great antiquity were concerned mainly with commerce and artisan trades. They realised that under a British occupation they would enjoy more freedom and they welcomed it.

From January to May all three sections, Italian, Moslem and Jew, of the population were really waiting to see whether the Allied drive was going to clear North Africa of the Axis forces or whether it was merely one more of those punches followed by a retirement that had occurred in earlier years. After the fall of Tunis the Arabs and Jews rejoiced and celebrated. The Italians became more anti-Fascist in their outlook and open criticism of Fascist leaders was heard. The majority of them could see that Tunis was not the end of the war, though probably it was the beginning of the end as far as Italy was concerned. To mark the removal of Fascism from the territory, the Vice-Governor, his Secretary and the two Prefects of Tripoli and Misurata were arrested and interned. Registration of Italians was proceeding at the time and a number of ex-military personnel without papers was discovered. In some cases the men were doing useful agricultural work and, with the agreement of the Security Officer and the Agricultural Department, certain of these were allowed to continue in their employment.

Italian morale, which had declined even lower after the capture of Pantellaria, rose again towards the middle of June, when rumours of an impending visit of importance to the territory were discussed. Two rumours were circulating; first that His Majesty King George VI was visiting the territory, which

was true ; the other, that high Fascist personalities were coming to discuss peace terms. His Majesty King George VI arrived in Tripoli on the 19th June and a big military review was arranged. He returned to Tripoli on the 22nd June after a visit to Malta. The visit was a purely military one and the Army Commander imposed a curfew on the whole population of Tripoli and the environs which were involved in the tour. All races were genuinely sorry that, although they had been allowed to see Mr. Winston Churchill early in February, they were not allowed to see the King.

The re-opening of the postal services on the 1st June, with the consequent hope of news, by way of the International Red Cross and Vatican City organisations, of members of their families in the homeland had a considerable effect on Italian morale. They still did not believe that the Allies would invade Italy and hoped that something would happen to accelerate reunion of families without a campaign on Italian soil. In April deputations said to represent two anti-Fascist parties in the territory approached the British Military Administration with a request for official recognition, naïvely denying knowledge of each other's existence, although they both alleged that they had been in being since before the British occupation. The calibre of the leaders was such that they were given no encouragement.

The invasion of Sicily and, later, of the mainland made the Italians realise that the Allies were not prepared to wait upon any possible half-developed change of heart on the part of Italy. Sicilians, of whom there were many in Tripolitania, welcomed the landing as opening the possibility of being reunited with their families. Mussolini's fall from power caused bewilderment ; Fascist teaching over twenty years had built up a feeling of the Duce's indispensability. Overt signs of anti-Fascist feeling immediately began, with stories of graft and corruption among all ranks of the party when it was in power, with special reference to Tripolitania. Lack of political coherence did not, however, mean that the Arabs or Berbers had no common desires or sentiments of a political nature, but merely implied that it would require much time before leaders or organisations for their expression came to light. The country had been conquered by force of arms and exploited by taking advantage of internal dissensions. That might have happened in any country which was being exploited for the benefit of a European Power, but, as a negative result, quiet hatred of the Italians followed. Forced sales and expropriations of large tracts of land for private

concessions and agricultural colonisation struck deep in the heart of the Libyan population, to whom possession of land means so much and where sedentary social organisation predominated to a far greater extent than in Cyrenaica. Mass migrations were difficult, if not impossible. Although most of the land taken by the Italians was in the coastal belt, the tribes which held the areas to the south contested trespassers from other parts on their ranges. The people of Tarhuna found that they could not move across the Gebel because of the powerful Orfella of the Beni Ulid area, nor could they move eastwards on account of the Nomad Burcat, Maadan and Sirte tribes. North and west towards Tripoli and the sea all the good land was held by the Italians.

Nevertheless the people were well aware that in other countries Arabs held responsible positions in many branches of civic life and that education opened the door to the professions. The Tripolitarians for all their lack of coherent ambitions in the political world felt somewhat bitter against an Administration which followed a policy of keeping them in the status of unskilled labourers or conscripting them into the army. But the territory at the time of the British occupation contained no native doctors, lawyers or judges. The school teachers had taught only Arabic in the schools, with Italian teachers responsible for all other subjects. Though Italians might point with pride to the number of schools in existence, Arab children finished their studies with a good grounding neither in their own language nor in Italian. That the schools had mostly been closed since 1940 aggravated the position. Almost the only minor posts allowed to natives by the Italians had been those of local medical orderlies and qualified midwives, and, in fairness to the Italian instruction, it must be admitted that their training seems to have been good, for in the absence of qualified doctors they often successfully treated complicated cases.

Any manifestation, therefore, of reaction against the former régime was likely to be made only within the framework of the following demands: firstly, the return of expropriated lands; secondly, the provision of suitable education to enable the people to take a fuller part in the territory's life; thirdly, the removal of all Italians from positions in the Military Administration. And this proved to be the case as soon as the first stages had been passed.

Individual petitions for the return of lands, complaints about rations, grievances against officials of the old régime still employed by B.M.A., began to be received by administrative officers. It was largely due to their patience in explaining to each petitioner and to the sheikhs the position of the British Military Administration

under international law, together with an insistence that the war was still going on and, in fact, increasing in scale, that political questions remained in the background throughout the whole of 1943. Visits at the time of harvest or of sowing encouraged the native to feel that he was playing a part which was appreciated by the Administration. In return he paid his taxes, which had not been demanded for several years; he accepted without undue complaint the few supplies which the acute shipping conditions allowed to be imported; he undertook to provide relief for his own poor and destitute; and, above all, he largely avoided politics.

By August, 1943, economic conditions in the capital were very difficult and a petition was framed for presentation to Brigadier Lush. News of the petition spread and a crowd collected, rather to see what was going on than to lend support to the promoters, who were not men of any importance in the territory but so-called intelligentsia from the Arab Club. The promoters were directed to present their petition through the correct channels, so that their complaints might be discussed by the Senior Political Officer in Tripoli and his Arab Advisory Council. This was done and the petition was found to contain so much that was reasonable that the Arab Advisory Council was able to associate itself with the requests while disassociating itself from the manner of the first presentation. The petition lamented the fact that Tripolitania was still treated as an enemy territory and that high Italian officials were working in departments dealing with native affairs: it asked for the employment of more native officials and equal salaries for them and Italians. It went on to ask for wider concessions of a peacetime nature, such as commerce with neighbouring countries, the provision of transport and the granting of permission for pilgrims to go to Mecca, and the opening of primary schools for Moslems. Lastly the petition pointed out that certain taxation was a burden in that, whereas the lire had been devalued five times and direct taxes had been increased by the same amount, wages had not undergone equivalent change.

The points raised were not difficult to answer and the replies given proved to be acceptable to the petitioners. Steps had already been taken to place capable native officers where they would be useful and the question of salaries had been gone into when the first estimates were being prepared; approval of those estimates was awaited. Tripolitania had still to be considered enemy-occupied territory under international law, but the name of the Administration had been changed from Occupied Enemy Territory Administration to British Military Administration. The

Administration had tried to win the confidence of the local populations in a way that gave the lie to the imputation that they were treated as enemies. As a war-time administration B.M.A. had to prevent an undue burden falling upon the British taxpayer and the deflection to the territory of British funds which should be employed in making a more direct contribution to the war : that was why taxes were collected in 1943. Modification of certain taxes would provide the relief asked for, and the Revenue Department was taking the necessary action.

A second petition signed by the qadi and the two Arab Advisers at Garian on the 19th August was presented to the Senior Political Officer there. Its demands were in the main similar to the Tripoli petition, but went beyond it in a few instances, notably in a request for an Arab Council with legislative power. In October, 1943, schools were opened all over the country, and although teachers had to be enlisted from among other trades and professions, the enthusiasm of the first term's work made up for their lack of experience. In November 300 pilgrims left for Mecca amid great rejoicing. A fall in prices in December contributed to improvement of conditions. It was not till late in the following year that political questions came again to the front.

The bald statement that the schools were opened in October gives no indication of the enormous amount of preparatory work involved and carried out with a minute staff. The varying fortunes of the campaign in North Africa had been reflected most strongly in the Italian educational policy. Prior to the declaration of war in 1940 the schools had been closed and large numbers of Italian children accompanied by teachers evacuated to Italy. An attempt was made to re-open schools in the autumn of that year, but when the forces of General Wavell advanced to Benghazi, a further exodus took place. In 1941 and 1942, when the campaign seemed to be going well for the Axis, a limited re-opening of schools was projected, but was abandoned at the first sign of Allied success. So to all intents and purposes there had been no education in the country since 1940. Suffice it to say that of 474 trained Italian teachers in the country in 1940, only 75 were found when the Eighth Army reached Tripoli.

In March, 1943, educational estimates from the provinces were called for and a policy was outlined. In Tripoli Italian education was to be organised by the Bishop of Tripoli, who had the nucleus of a teaching staff in the Catholic fathers and nuns and a suitable building at the Instituto Umberto di Savoia. Elsewhere

the Italians themselves were to make arrangements for children to be taught at the centres of agricultural colonies where all available teachers were pooled. Native education involved a wider issue. The Italian system had limited the native teachers to the one subject of their own language and there were in existence many Kuttab schools, whose curriculum consisted only of the teaching of the Koran. They were not housed in modern buildings, the standard of teaching was low, and pupils of all ages and standards were usually dealt with by one teacher. The question was whether the geographical position of Tripolitania and its traditional connection with European civilisation demanded that education should be based upon a European system, including the teaching of a second language in addition to Arabic, or whether it should be founded upon the traditional Arab schools, of which the curriculum might be enlarged to include other subjects such as arithmetic.

An Education Committee, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Secretary and consisting of the officers responsible for Native, Italian and Jewish affairs together with the Administrative Officer for Tripoli District, was set up in June to examine and report on the principles to be followed, the numbers of schools to be opened and the syllabus and estimates of expenditure. The Committee found itself unable to cope with the mass of detailed work. Accordingly authority was sought from Civil Affairs Branch in Cairo for the appointment of a full-time Education Officer under the general guidance and direction of the Committee and Military Administrator. In the directive given to the Education Officer upon his appointment an immediate programme was envisaged which, however, involved some change of early policy, as these extracts show :—

- “(1) The Target date for restarting elementary education in this country is October 1st, 1943. It is proposed to restore as far as possible elementary education to the same standard of efficiency as that obtaining in this country before the closing down of the schools.
- “(2) The only B.M.A. supported schools will be schools providing a curriculum in Italian and Arabic, open to all races. Sectarian or religious schools limited to one community will not receive assistance from B.M.A. and even they must conform to the curriculum decided upon. An exception is made in the case of a small school for British subjects.”

Registration began and by the 15th September a total of 6,632 children had been enrolled. When the schools were opened,

however, the figure had increased to 10,337; the Education Officer's original estimate of 10,000 had proved to be correct. When the lists were closed on the 15th October a waiting list was established for admission in October, 1944. In all 106 schools were opened and a general elementary syllabus, including physical training, hygiene and arts, was laid down. Available textbooks were suitably expurgated and quantities of new books were imported, amounting to about 60% of requirements. Training of teachers was continuous, classes being held in methods of teaching, hygiene and physical training.

The emphasis of the Administration's work in 1943 was co-operation with the Forces, and secondly achieving as much economic self-sufficiency for the country as was possible with war-time restrictions upon transport and equipment. Nature was kind and helpful with good rains at the beginning of the year; the gift was repeated in the autumn at the time of sowing when a much larger acreage was put under the plough than in the previous autumn. The people appeared to have confidence in the Administration and that in turn made it easier for it to take over further commitments from the Army, as, for instance, the road system and later the port of Tripoli, early in 1944. Politically, there was likely to be little or no trouble at least until the end of the war in Europe. The Senussiya had far fewer adherents than was at first thought; there was little to indicate that the native population would call for union with Cyrenaica, whose future was rather clearer. If cereal production could be increased and livestock, for meat and leather, gradually restored to pre-war level, some exports could be made. Every year would see an increase in the olive crop. Eggs, dates, fish and vegetables could be produced in sufficient quantities to export. If markets could not be found in liberated Europe, there was a certain demand from neighbouring countries. The extent to which the economic policy of the British Military Administration was successful may be judged by the fact that whereas, between the 23rd January and the 30th June, 1943, out of a total expenditure of £758,399, no less than £549,582 had to be met by a Grant-in-Aid, the budget for the period the 1st July, 1943-30th June, 1944, showed that after expenditure of £2,714,733 only £376,477 was not covered by revenue.


The year 1943 saw the complete transition from military operations to the establishment of peace-time conditions and administration upon normal British colonial lines. Signs of war damage disappeared and Tripoli by the end of the year presented a clean and tidy appearance which contrasted favourably with

many Middle East cities which had enjoyed peace-time conditions uninterruptedly. Two instances of the confidence shown in the Administration and by the Administration in the people may be quoted. The administrative district of Hon, which had previously employed two or three British officers, was at the end of the year entrusted to the qadi, who was made responsible to Eastern Province Headquarters, 250 miles to the north. Secondly, there appeared along the roadsides healthy flocks of sheep and goats which had not been requisitioned by the Germans, as had been supposed, but which the cautious owners had kept well inland until they were tempted by the autumn rains and the return of peace to go back to their usual pastures, without fear of seizure.

In the foregoing record of the establishment of British Military Government in Tripolitania a great deal of what was common ground in the organisations of military administration in other occupied territories has been omitted to avoid repetition. In general the lines followed were similar, and the results achieved as satisfactory. The period covered by this chapter, namely 1943, was too brief to provide any statistical material of value, beyond those few figures which have been given.

The area covered by this record was not, however, the Tripolitania of the Italian administration since, as mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, the French troops, under General Leclerc, coming from the Tibesti region of the Territories du Tchad in French Equatorial Africa, not only occupied militarily the inhabited places of the Fezzan, but proclaimed French Military Government in the whole area which they traversed with their columns. Although General Leclerc was a subordinate commander under the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General Sir Harold (Field-Marshal Viscount) Alexander, as regards military administration, he acted independently. The French officers who took over the southern regions acted as a French and not as an Allied authority.

It was agreed on the 26th January, at a meeting between General Montgomery and General Leclerc, that the territory as far south as the northern boundary of the old Fezzan Military Province should be administered by the British, limiting the French zone of administration to the Tripolitanian Sahara, including the Fezzan as far north as Lat. 28° N. Three days later General Leclerc signalled General Alexander that French forces had occupied Ghadames and Derg and that he had instructed these forces to take over the civil administration. A modified line was subsequently agreed whereby the French retained some of the



western oases in their area of administration. Finally the British Military Administration settled down to administer Tripolitania, less the oases of Ghadames, Derg and Sinauen on the Tunisian border, which continued to be under French administration as did the Fezzan. In their zone French administrative activities followed the lines adopted in the Southern Algerian Saharan administration. This consisted largely of a direct military administration with the officers commanding garrison detachments acting as political and administrative officers.

The division of Tripolitania between two occupying and administering authorities differed from the practice which had been followed in other Italian colonial territories. In one other important respect also Tripolitania differed from the practices followed in the other Italian territories administered under the War Office. Instead of in the second phase the authority for administration being delegated by the Force Commander to a Military Administrator, that is to say as soon as active military operations had ceased, the delegation was made to the Military Commander of Tripoli Base, who became the Force Commander's representative at second remove from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. It was only in the third stage, when Tripolitania ceased to be the base for the Eighth Army's operations in Sicily, that the Military Administrator became the titular administrative officer of the Commander-in-Chief and issued proclamations over his own signature by delegation directly from the latter. The importance of Tripolitania as a base for operations against Italy of course warranted and required this procedure, but it was also these circumstances with the attendant priorities and scarcity of shipping and transport which made the recovery to more normal conditions slower in Tripolitania than in other occupied areas within a year of the cessation of active operations. The results which were achieved were proportionately creditable.

Finally one other circumstance marked the institution of the Tripolitanian administration which had not obtained in any of the other areas with which this record deals. An adequate staff with sufficient transport had been made available from the outset to set up a real administration with all its necessary branches without having to suffer an acute shortage of essential staff in the early and important stages. This had at least one curious and unexpected result in a very early and unsuccessful attempt to draw up a budget and institute financial controls before the administrative machinery was ready for them.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XIII

THE ORGANISATION OF POLITICAL BRANCH HEADQUARTERS

The Original Staff — Sir Philip Mitchell's "High Commission Principle" — Division of Subjects Among Branches — The Executive Council of Government — The Formation of M.O.11 and F.5 — The Delegation of Administrative Powers from the C.-in-C. to the C.P.O. — Lack of Contact with War Office — The C.F.A.'s Reports — The Appointment of C.P.O.'s North and South — The Success of the Police Organisation — Services Common to both Political Branches — The Territory Groups at the end of 1943 — Preparations for Eastern Europe — Lord Rennell's Report on Headquarters Work and Administration — Proposal of the Appointment of an Inspector-General of Occupied Territories — Establishments and Staff — Accounting and Costing — Discipline — The Change-over from "Political Branch" to "Civil Affairs."

CHAPTER XIII

The Organisation of Political Branch Headquarters

As has already been recorded Political Branch Headquarters was set up in Cairo by Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell at the end of January, 1941. Previous experience and a study of the probable development of affairs in Italian East Africa led Sir Philip Mitchell to the conclusion that it was necessary from the outset to create the organisation for the administration of Occupied Enemy Territories on the lines of a High Commission over a group of self-contained administrations. Such a headquarters organisation was originally designed to be located in Cairo as the Political Branch of the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Archibald Wavell (Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell). The headquarters, however, was moved to Nairobi in the circumstances related in Chapter II in the middle of April, 1941.

By the end of February the Chief Political Officer's staff, which had consisted up till then of himself, one staff officer and a clerk, had been augmented by the arrival of Colonel The Hon. F. Rodd (Major-General Lord Rennell) as Controller of Finance and Accounts; a Legal Adviser, Colonel H. R. Hone (Major-General Sir Ralph Hone); and two other officers: there were in addition three clerks. An administration had been set up in Cyrenaica, and the arrangements described in previous chapters were in progress for setting up similar administrations in those parts of the Italian East African Colonies which it was then expected would be occupied by British troops in the course of the spring of 1941. Up to the middle of April the headquarters staff had only increased to nine officers, three other ranks and six clerks.

It will readily be understood that in the circumstances which obtained it was necessary for all the principal officers to travel widely through the territories and to transact the greater part of their business verbally and by personal contact with the Deputy Chief Political Officers and such limited staffs as the latter had collected. The prolonged absences of the Chief Political Officer, the Legal Adviser and the Controller of Finance and Accounts naturally interfered with the organisation of headquarters and it was not in fact until June, 1941, that enough staff was available

to permit of detailed attention being given to this important question. The principal shortage of staff was on the financial side, with its related subjects of supply, currency and economics. The general shortage was as great in the territories as at headquarters, but nearly all accessions of staff were sent to the former, even if headquarters was bare, so as to avoid a local administrative breakdown. The first important addition of staff from England for Political Branch came in the arrival of Lieut.-Colonel M. J. Babington-Smith (Brigadier Babington-Smith) with three finance officers in June, together with certain other finance, currency, supply and legal officers recruited from the armed forces and colonial services in Africa.

The original conception of the organisation of Political Branch Headquarters was contained in a proposal dated the 6th December, 1940, from Sir Philip Mitchell to the War Office, but as staff was collected and the responsibilities of the Chief Political Officer and his staff at headquarters increased, a new scheme of organisation began to take shape following more closely the lines of the High Commission which had always been in Sir Philip Mitchell's mind. By the end of September, 1941, an organisation had been proposed and the establishment approved for a headquarters divided into four departments, headed by a Controller of Finance and Accounts, a Legal Adviser, a Controller of Medical and Social Services, and a G.S.O.1 in charge of the Secretariat. This scheme for various reasons was not fully carried into practice, since the Controller of Medical and Social Services was not appointed for some time and was then for various reasons not able to carry out in full the duties which were to have been allotted to him. Moreover, the officer who was appointed was not, as it turned out, able to remain with the Administration of Occupied Territories for more than a limited period.

The division of subjects among the departments was made very largely on the basis that all branches involving substantial expenditure, in addition to finance pure and simple, fell to the responsibility of the Controller of Finance and Accounts. These branches were finance proper, including banking and currency, accountancy, trade and supplies, transport including railways, road transport, ports and lighthouses, posts and telegraphs and public works. The last of these was placed for convenience under the officer in charge of transport until such time as a senior and competent officer could be found to take charge. This in practice never occurred and from the summer of 1941 until the end of 1942 the supervision at headquarters of public works in the territories

remained the responsibility of the officer in charge of transport matters, Lieut.-Colonel R. Adeane. In addition the Controller of Finance and Accounts took any matters arising out of mining, local resources, local production and antiquities.

The work of the Legal Adviser's department included the giving of legal advice to the Chief Political Officer on all matters in the territories, the supervision of the courts both military and civil, the branch of the Custodian of Enemy Property, ecclesiastical matters, prisoners-of-war dependants and protected personnel, and the police organisation. To this last named organisation an Inspector-General of Police at headquarters was appointed to supervise the organisation and development of the police forces in all the territories. The local police forces were subject to the direct control of the local Deputy Chief Political Officer or Military Administrator, to whom the advice and directions of the Inspector-General were made available through the Chief Political Officer.

The proposed department of the Controller of Medical and Social Services was to have taken the branches covering public health, education, agriculture, veterinary services and prisons. In practice the officer in charge of this department, Dr. W. H. Kauntze, seconded from the post of Director of Public Health in Uganda and subsequently Deputy (later Chief) Medical Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was only able to occupy himself during his work at Political Headquarters with medical services. The other branches for which he would have become responsible had he stayed were taken over by, and remained with, the Controller of Finance and Accounts. On Dr. Kauntze's departure the Controller of Finance and Accounts also dealt with most of the problems of medical services in the territories, other than major questions of administrative policy, which were taken by the Chief Political Officer himself.

The Secretariat, under a G.S.O.I, dealt with personnel and establishments, the correspondence of Political Branch Headquarters, the Registry, and supplies and equipment for the administrative personnel of all branches both at headquarters and in the territories. The supplies and equipment required for the civilian population of the territories came under the Supply Branch of the Controller of Finance and Accounts. When a decision had been reached to evacuate the Italian colonial population from Ethiopia, an Evacuation Branch was set up under the charge of this G.S.O.I, Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel) R. Thorne Thorne.

The Chief Political Officer himself took all political matters,

including the relations of the occupied territories with each other and with neighbouring territories. He also dealt directly with all administrative organisation and higher appointments, receiving the papers on the subject directly from the Secretariat. All correspondence falling within the responsibilities of the departments of the Controller of Finance and Accounts and of the Legal Adviser passed directly from the Secretariat through the interested branches to these two officers, and from them to the Chief Political Officer when occasion demanded. It is important to realise that this organisation involved, as was intended, the subordination of the G.S.O.1 in charge of the Secretariat to secretarial duties and that he thus did not assume the role of a Colonial Secretary in British Colonial Administrations. The responsibilities and powers attributed to the Controller of Finance and Accounts and of the Legal Adviser partook rather more of the Indian than the Colonial system. This conception was carried from Nairobi to Cairo when a political branch was re-opened there in February, 1942.

In practice the Chief Political Officer, with his two senior officers, constituted an Executive Council of Government which indeed in the early days met as such whenever these officers were all present at headquarters together, an event which was comparatively rare. On these occasions the G.S.O.1 acted as secretary to the Council and the collective decisions of the Council were recorded as such. The practice of holding meetings as a Council did not, however, develop and was not followed in Cairo when a similar headquarters was re-opened there. In the absence of the Chief Political Officer the Controller of Finance and Accounts acted in his place; in the absence of both of them the Legal Adviser, or as he later became known, the Chief Legal Adviser, did so.

It follows from what has been said that the three principal officers at Political Branch Headquarters at Nairobi, and later in Cairo until the latter part of 1943, were all executive officers in the fullest sense of the word and continuously dealt with general administrative matters outside their technical qualifications.

While the headquarters organisation of the Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa was somewhat slowly being brought into being, a rudimentary machine had been set up in the War Office in London by February, 1941. It assumed the simplest possible form. As soon as it had become apparent to the Directorate of Military Operations that the administration of territories by the Army involved special functions and duties which fell outside the branches for which both the Army staff

organisation and the organisation at the War Office normally catered, a special section of M.O., denominated M.O.II, came into existence under the charge of Lieut.-Colonel French (Brigadier F. G. French, C.B.E.) and one other officer. This section, while nominally responsible to the Director of Military Operations, had direct access to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff and, insofar as he was at that stage concerned, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War (then Sir James Grigg). On all operational matters M.O.II dealt with the sections of the Directorate of Military Operations concerned.

There was, however, one large exception in the administrative subjects which were covered by M.O.II and that was finance, which, under the War Office financial organisation, fell to be dealt with by the civil finance sections, F.1 and to some extent F.2. As the complexity and range of the subjects dealt with in Africa by the Controller of Finance and Accounts developed, it became necessary to create a special finance section for all matters relating to the administration of occupied territories, not only in Africa but also elsewhere. This section, F.5, under Mr. Charles Key, C.B.E., of the War Office civil staff, took all those subjects which can roughly be grouped under the headings of Finance and Economics in Occupied Territories. The relations of the Controllers of Finance and Accounts with the War Office are described in detail in Chapter XV.

It was not until the summer of 1943, in fact with the occupation of Sicily and South Italy, that a separate Directorate of Civil Affairs was created in the War Office and the responsibility on the Army Council for the administration of all occupied and liberated territories formally passed from the Director of Military Operations and the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Permanent Under-Secretary.

The very small establishment provided both for M.O.II, as well as for the Finance Section, throughout 1941-1942 and a large part of 1943 meant in practice that there was virtually complete devolution of responsibility to Sir Philip Mitchell and his senior officers. These two sections at the War Office acted more in the nature of post offices or liaison groups with other Departments of H.M.G. in London than as the parent organisation for the Administration of Occupied Territories, such as the Colonial Office provides for British Colonies. This was, of course, only possible owing to the grouping of the several territories in Africa under one, and later under two, Political Branches at General Headquarters. The two sections had neither the staff, nor

initially the detailed experience, to deal with a number of territories separately as the Political Headquarters were soon designed and equipped to do. The immediate result of this grouping, or in other words the "High Commission principle" adopted by Sir Philip Mitchell, was that only matters of higher policy were referred by the headquarters in Africa to London, where they were dealt with at a high bureaucratic level.

Political Branch at General Headquarters in practice evolved, almost from its inception, from being an advisory political centre required during the operational period, to become a centre of government which in fact took over the functions of the former Italian Viceroyalty of Italian East Africa and the government of Libya. But it had the addition of many duties which those governments did not undertake. These included control of banking and the organisation of trade, the custody of enemy property, and the supply and evacuation of civilians. Further, in the early summer of 1941 the political position which arose in Ethiopia threw on Political Branch a number of diplomatic functions unusual even in a fully fledged colonial administration or group of administrations. These developments involved so great a modification in the scope and functions of the Chief Political Officer that, by direction of the War Cabinet, Sir Philip Mitchell, after a conference with General Wavell, returned to London to discuss, not only the Ethiopian situation, but the whole conception of his work. When he returned to Italian East Africa in June, after a meeting with Generals Wavell, Platt and Cunningham at Asmara, he received, on instructions from London, on the 1st August, 1941, the full delegation of powers by formal proclamation to carry out the legislative, judicial, administrative and financial authority of the Commander-in-Chief in all the then occupied territories. His additional function of supervising the Military Government of British Somaliland has already been dealt with.

As a result of Sir Philip Mitchell's visit to London later in the year, namely in November, 1941, the delegation of authority by the Commanders-in-Chief concerned for all the territories except Ethiopia was confirmed; while in Ethiopia itself it was decided by the War Cabinet that the Chief Political Officer should become the "British Representative" pending the development of normal diplomatic relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government and Emperor of Ethiopia.

The delegation of powers in respect of the administration of territories originally granted by the formal proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was confirmed when the

occupied territories of Italian East Africa were transferred from the Middle East Command to East Africa Command on the 18th April, 1941. The final form of the relevant part of these instructions by the War Office to the Commander-in-Chief, modified in 1942 to cover the functions of the Minister of State in Cairo, read as follows :—

“ Political, administrative and legislative authority in occupied enemy territory within your command is vested in you by international law. You should, however, delegate this authority in full to your Chief Political Officer.

“ You will consult His Majesty’s Minister of State, where appropriate, on all political questions affecting your Command.”

Equivalent instructions to G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa Command, were issued by the War Office in 1941 and in subsequent years, modified only in the specific references to Ethiopia.

The Commander-in-Chief’s delegation of powers to the Chief Political Officer, on the Secretary of State’s instructions, was modified from time to time as changes in the scope of the commands took place and as circumstances required ; but it continued in effect throughout the period covered by this review of the British Military Administrations in Africa. The policy involved in this delegation of power is of considerable importance if only because a different policy was later pursued in the Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Europe. The effect of the policy adopted in Africa was to make all the Military Administrations, together with their headquarters in Political Branches at the General Headquarters, self-contained ; in each territory the staffs were under the direct control, for all administrative purposes as well as for discipline and internal arrangements, of the Deputy Chief Political Officer or Military Administrator and, through them, of the Chief Political Officer at Political Branch at General Headquarters. There was no delegation of administrative powers along the military chain of command from General Headquarters to subordinate military commanders and from them to the Civil Affairs staff. The latter were not at any time staff officers of the military commands ; they were executive officers in all their several branches of the Deputy Chief Political Officers or Military Administrators and of the Chief Political Officer who derived his authority by delegation from the Commander-in-Chief. In other words, the Military Administration of the population in these territories was strictly analogous to the administrations by the Civil Services of colonies or territories, with the strictly military chain of command and staffs in those territories in parallel.

While for some time the Military Commanders of territories such as Eritrea or Somalia remained the superior local commanders and ultimate authority, this was transferred, as has already been recorded, at the earliest possible date when the military situation permitted it to the senior Civil Affairs officer, namely the D.C.P.O., who upon this happening became the Military Administrator directly responsible to the C.P.O. From this moment the Military Commander of a territory bore the same relation to the Military Administrator as the Officer Commanding troops in a Colony normally bears to a Governor of that Colony. When difficulties arose in Eritrea in 1943 on the relative position of the Military Commander and Military Administrator the position was made clear beyond doubt in an instruction issued under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to the Officer Commanding Troops in Eritrea, quoted in full in Chapter V.

The organisation described had one curious development. The delegation of administrative powers to the C.P.O. by his Commander-in-Chief still left the latter as the supreme authority and the former as his subordinate. The C.P.O. therefore had no direct contact with the War Office except through, and as a member of, the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. In practice, especially when in 1941 and 1942 communications except by telegram were virtually non-existent, or at any rate very difficult, the C.P.O. communicated with the War Office through G.H.Q. signal channels with a branch prefix and only consulted the Commander-in-Chief or other senior staff officers on matters of the highest importance. He had, on the other hand, no written communication with the War Office and when written documents occasionally did pass, especially from the War Office outwards, these were addressed to the Commander-in-Chief in formal terms from the Army Council and passed by him to his C.P.O. In practice during the whole period covered by this record, except for brief telegraphic situation reports in the initial stages of occupation, the only lengthy communications made by the C.P.O. for the information of the War Office consisted of semi-annual reports, to which were added lengthy and detailed reports by the C.F.A. and C.L.A. These semi-annual reports, which in 1943 were replaced by annual reports, were addressed to the responsible Commander-in-Chief and not to the War Office. Unless matters arose which required guidance or decision from London the War Office in fact had little general material dealing with current affairs until the semi-annual reports arrived. This had the advantage of preventing the small M.O.11 section in the War

Office from being swamped with correspondence and left it free to deal with the urgent matters of the territories contained in cables, and more especially the ever-present difficulties of finding personnel.

The C.F.A. on the other hand, as will be described in detail in Chapter XV, was the direct personal representative of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War in his financial attributions as accounting officer of the War Office. In his instructions from the P.U.S., the C.F.A. was required to report regularly on any matters arising out of his financial control and supervision. These reports, in the shape of formal despatches to the P.U.S., in practice proved the main source of information of M.O.11 and the War Office generally on what was going on in the territories. Though they dealt in the main with financial and economic matters, they covered the general situation without which background they would have been unintelligible. These despatches were invariably seen and agreed by the C.P.O. before despatch by the C.F.A., but the latter under the terms of his appointment was free to communicate direct : this might, but for the personal relations which existed between the officers locally, have given rise to difficulties : in point of fact the system proved most useful to all concerned and met with the approval of the Commanders-in-Chief.

The independence of the C.F.A. at both Cairo and Nairobi from the rest of the military financial machine, as well as the attributions of the appointment in economic, banking and currency matters, had the effect of making these officers in practice the advisers of the Financial Advisers and Chief Paymasters in the Commands concerned. The fact alone that the headquarters of the Occupied Territory Administrations were in charge of the currency reserves for these territories brought them into close contact with the civil financial organisations of Egypt, the Sudan, Aden and East Africa. In dealing with complex financial problems affecting both military and civil organisations they were able to proffer advice and help in matters which were not always strictly within their real ambit.

When Cyrenaica was re-occupied for the second time in December, 1941, there was no Political Branch at G.H.Q. Middle East, since there had been no necessity for such an organisation with all the Italian East African Territories administered within the boundaries of East Africa Command. To save setting up a Political Branch to deal only with Cyrenaica in Cairo it was thought possible to make this area an administration dealing, without any local branch, directly with the War Office. The

general political and administrative direction which the C.P.O. for Cyrenaica would require was to have been provided by the Minister of State in Cairo who, however, would have had no administrative responsibility, which remained with the War Office. It is very doubtful whether this arrangement ever could have proved satisfactory. The divorce of political direction from administrative responsibility is not one which ever has much to recommend it and certainly did not commend itself to the Secretary of State for War.

The difficulties which would inevitably have arisen did not, however, come to a head since, in the circumstances described in Chapter VI, Eritrea was transferred from East Africa Command to Middle East on the 1st February, 1942, and in connection with this transfer it was decided to set up a new Political Branch at G.H.Q. Middle East. Brigadier H. R. Hone was transferred from the post of Chief Legal Adviser to that of the Chief Political Officer at Nairobi to take charge of the Political Branch in Cairo, and within a short time Brigadier Lord Rennell also proceeded to Cairo as Controller of Finance and Accounts there. He was succeeded as Controller of Finance and Accounts in Nairobi by Colonel M. Babington-Smith. With the reopening of a Political Branch in Cairo it was obvious that a territory directly dependent on the War Office was no longer practicable or desirable, and in the circumstances Cyrenaica was placed under Political Branch, G.H.Q. Middle East, from the date of the creation of this office, and the Chief Political Officer for Cyrenaica became a Deputy Chief Political Officer as before.

When in June, 1942, Cyrenaica was evacuated for the second time, Political Branch, Cairo, found itself with only Eritrea to administer from headquarters. Nevertheless both preparations for the re-occupation of Cyrenaica and matters arising out of civil problems and refugees from Cyrenaica, continued to provide a considerable amount of work. So much was this the case that Political Branch, Cairo, was added a special officer for Senussi Affairs in the political section under the Chief Political Officer.

The headquarters administration of the occupied territories in Africa from February, 1942, until the end of the period covered by this chapter was therefore divided into two groups. The heads of the two Political Branches were in practice known as C.P.O. North and C.P.O. South. The necessity of following the same line so far as the Italians were concerned in each Italian Colony was accepted by all concerned; a common policy between the two Political Branches was readily and easily carried into effect by

reason of the fact that all the higher staff at Political Branch, G.H.Q. Middle East, was in fact drawn from Political Branch in Nairobi where the senior officers of both branches had been working intimately with each other since the inception of the administrations. The maintenance of common policy was further assisted by active correspondence between the two branches and by frequent meetings between the two Chief Political Officers and the two Controllers of Finance and Accounts.

When a new Minister of State was appointed in March, 1942, his Directive reflected this arrangement in the following terms :—

“As regards the administration of occupied territory, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, have delegated their powers to the Chief Political Officers at Cairo and Nairobi respectively. These two officers will keep the Minister of State generally informed. With the concurrence of their respective Commanders-in-Chief they have discretion to refer matters to him and take his instructions when reference to London is unnecessary or would entail unacceptable delay. The Minister of State for his part will be entitled to give directions to the Chief Political Officers, with the agreement of the Commanders-in-Chief, on matters which seem to him to require such directions.”

While the Minister of State's instructions contained a mandate to exercise general supervision over policy in all the territories in Middle East Command and therefore also Eritrea and Cyrenaica, it was clearly laid down as soon as Political Branch in Cairo was re-opened that the officer responsible for policy as well as administration in these territories was the Chief Political Officer under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and no one else. For as much as the Minister of State was concerned with what was taking place in Eritrea and Cyrenaica, personal contact between C.P.O. North and the Minister of State and his staff was sufficient to overcome any difficulties which might have arisen by reason of the apparent overlap of the provinces of the Minister of State and the Commander-in-Chief with his Political Officer on higher political direction and responsibility in the two territories.

When the division of the occupied territories into the two groups thus took place it was recommended both from Cairo and Nairobi and agreed by the War Office that certain services should remain common to both Political Branches and both groups of territories. The object was to economise personnel, which was as usual very short, and to secure uniformity of treatment in certain

very detailed and complicated services which were closely supervised by Political Branch Headquarters. These common services were first and foremost the Accounting and Internal Audit Branches, which remained at Nairobi and undertook the compilation of the accounts of all the territories in order to save staff. It had some time since been decided to do all the compilation and reconciliation of accounts at headquarters instead of in the territories which sent their accounts in detail with all supporting documents to Nairobi for the purpose. The centralisation continued until the end of 1943 when accounting and financial administration had become such a routine matter in the territories that it was found possible to decentralise detailed accounting. From this point the only service common to all the territories was that of inspection and audit, in the hands of the Inspector-General of Accounts, Colonel P. W. Adshead, who had been the Chief Accountant as well as the Inspector of Accounts for all the territories since the spring of 1941.

The branch of the Inspector-General of Police under Colonel M. O'Rorke was also retained in common to both groups of territories. But with the very substantial increase in the amount of work required by the institution of new police forces in Cyrenaica when it was re-occupied for the third time at the end of 1942 and for Tripolitania in the spring of the following year, he was obliged to abandon supervision of the southern territories police forces. The police work of the southern group had as a matter of fact by then become routine and was limited to British Somaliland and Somalia; it was found possible to close down the work of the Inspector-General so far as the southern territories were concerned.

The creation and organisation of police forces in Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia including the Reserved Areas, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were the work of Colonel O'Rorke from first to last. Coming originally from the Palestine Police for comparatively modest duties, Colonel O'Rorke proved his aptitude at organisation and training in a very short time and when the need for an Inspector-General was felt, to secure uniformity of method and over-all supervision, he was the obvious candidate. It must be rare for one man to have had to organise so many police forces in such different circumstances as, for instance, those prevailing in Somalia and Tripoli City, within the short space of three years. The very short initial period available to start a police force in each territory and the extreme shortage of British personnel of all sorts, let alone trained police personnel, makes the work which he

accomplished quite outstanding. The measure of his success, together with that of the Commandants in the territories, many of whom, but not all, were chosen by him, is in the small amount of violent crime and the steadily increasing number of convictions secured, in all the territories where public safety was probably higher, with fewer means to enforce it, than ever before in the history of the territories, even in times of peace.

Colonel R. Adeane was retained in charge of transportation and public works for a time for all the territories irrespective of the group in which they were. This appointment also came to an end in 1943 when a special officer at either headquarters with so large a responsibility as that which Colonel Adeane had had was found to be unnecessary. There is no doubt that these common services in 1942 and part of 1943 not only proved very economical from the financial point of view but also made for close contact between the two groups of territories.

In June, 1942, Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell was recalled to the Colonial Service to assume the appointment of Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Brigadier Lord Rennell was appointed Chief Political Officer, Political Branch Headquarters, East Africa Command, with the rank of Major-General and with effect from the 23rd June. The vacant post of Controller of Finance and Accounts (North) was combined with that of Controller of Finance and Accounts (South) in the person of Colonel M. Babington-Smith, with the rank of Brigadier. Thus was unified once more the financial administration, with all the matters included under that head, in addition to the common accounting and audit services to which reference has already been made. In the summer and autumn of 1942 the responsibilities of the Chief Political Officer (South) were increased by the addition of Madagascar and its troublesome political situation. At the end of 1943 the two groups of territories therefore comprised : in the north Eritrea, and what was left of Cyrenaican affairs, including the Kufra oases which had remained in our hands ; in the south British Somaliland, Somalia, the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia, the liquidation of the Ethiopian military administration including the tiresome political situation as it affected East Africa Command, and Madagascar.

When Major-General Lord Rennell was appointed to replace Sir Philip Mitchell as C.P.O. (South) he was released from the work of C.F.A. in Cairo on the understanding with the Minister of State in Cairo that he should also occupy himself with civil supply matters in East Africa. He was to become a channel of

contact between the East African Supply Group and the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, where he had had considerable work arising, in the first instance, out of Eritrea. While this was agreed in principle with the East African Governors' Conference and the G.O.C.-in-C. East Africa Command, the plan never came formally into being. The close contact between the two supply centres, which it had been hoped to develop, never really came into existence. The main reason for this was the inability of the East African Maize Control to deliver any of the consignments earmarked for the Middle East, owing to the acute shortage of supplies in the East African territories. Nevertheless the C.P.O. (South) was involved in the very close relations necessary with the Government of Kenya over the Ethiopian border question and with East African civil matters to a far greater extent than had ever been the case with the C.P.O. (North) in relation to local civil and political matters in the Middle East. In fact the functions of the C.P.O. (South) partook much more of the politics and economics, in matters affecting the G.O.C.-in-C., East African Command, and the various East African Governments, than was the case in the north, and his work justified this title rather than "Chief Civil Affairs Officer" which he assumed to conform with practice elsewhere.

In the spring of 1943 the extensive domain of the C.P.O. (South) diminished rapidly. Madagascar was handed back to the French and only the special area of Diego Suarez remained until the end of 1943. The Ethiopian situation, though not without troubles for the Government of Kenya and the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa, as the ultimate authority for the security of these territories, was causing less work. The Somalia and British Somaliland Administrations were getting on to a routine basis. Jibuti had come into the Allied camp under General de Gaulle's authority and without an interregnum of British rule. When therefore in March, 1943, Major-General Lord Rennell was recalled to London to prepare for the occupation and administration of Sicily and Southern Italy, the post of Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Nairobi was abolished and a Senior Civil Affairs Staff Officer was appointed, with the rank of Colonel, to assist the G.O.C.-in-C., who resumed the direct authority over the occupied areas which had been delegated to Lord Rennell and his predecessor.

In the north, on the other hand, the responsibilities of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Brigadier Hone, increased rapidly. Cyrenaica was re-occupied at the end of 1942: Benghazi was

entered on the 20th November. Plans were made for the extension of military operations to Tripolitania and Tripoli was occupied on the 23rd January, 1943. Plans were also germinating for operations in the Dodecanese, the administration of which was also to fall within the scope of the Civil Affairs Branch at G.H.Q., Middle East.

In addition to the Dodecanese operation, which eventually did take place with unhappy results, operations were envisaged in the summer of 1943 in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania where military administrations would be as necessary as that which had been planned and carried into being in Italy. A beginning was made in collecting staff, drawing tentative plans after studying the problems involved, and training personnel. Courses and training establishments in Civil Affairs were brought into being. The growth of responsibilities attaching to Brigadier Hone's appointment led to his being regraded as Major-General, but the activities outside the African continent were gradually sloughed off when it became clear in the latter part of the summer of 1943 that military government enterprises in South-Eastern Europe would not be needed, at any rate in the near future. What in fact would be required, having regard to the existence of local governments whether in exile or otherwise, was relief and rehabilitation and not administration in the sense of government. This side of Civil Affairs in Middle East was therefore reorganised in a separate organisation which depended upon a separate London machine in the form of an *ad hoc* inter-departmental committee; affairs in the Dodecanese are dealt with in a later chapter.

Major-General R. Hone was succeeded as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Middle East, by Major-General Sir Arthur Parsons in order to set the former free for work on plans to deal with the administration of Malaya when it should be re-occupied. Major-General Parsons was succeeded in August, 1944, by Brigadier R. D. H. Arundell, O.B.E.

At the time of writing the functions of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in Cairo, with the closing down of the Minister of State's office, has again come to partake of many duties fulfilled by Sir Philip Mitchell in the early days when his counsel was sought by the Commander-in-Chief on local political affairs not always directly concerned with the government of occupied territories.

By the latter part of 1943 the headquarters work and administration of the two Civil Affairs Branches, North and South, had begun to assume a standard pattern. This had come earlier in Nairobi than in Cairo, but what was written in Lord Rennell's despatch to the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa, covering the latter part

of 1942 remained true of both groups of administrations. The paragraphs can appropriately be quoted in full :—

“Having been associated with both the Northern and Southern groups of territories, I claim the right to make certain general comments.

“The British Military Administrations of British and Italian Somaliland, of Ethiopia so long as it lasted, and of Eritrea, Cyrenaica and more lately Tripolitania have all been set up on the general lines laid down by Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell in February and March of 1941. While the then rudimentary administrations have developed in form and in scope along the lines appropriate to each of the countries concerned, they have done so substantially on the lines originally planned. That the general plan was practical, appropriate and flexible is proved by the development which has subsequently taken place. In Italian Somaliland a direct administration of the Colonial type, with an Italian urban municipal administration in Mogadishu alone, has assumed a standard form and is working satisfactorily. In Eritrea, a more elaborate administration covering a native territory as well as a dense and large urban agglomeration of Europeans was required. Here such administrative machinery as rationing, social insurance, means tests for relief, a harbour authority, and a banking and exchange control system was required. Much was adapted from Italian times but much more was devised to fill current needs. By the end of the two years proper budgets and financial control have been instituted in Eritrea, Somalia and of course British Somaliland, and taxes are being collected on a scale which I for one never believed would prove possible when the Administrations were first set up, or within the time. The primary obligation of Administrations, to provide food and necessities, has in the case of every one of these Administrations been fulfilled.

“The local administrations, as I am well aware, have been far from perfect and have been staffed with heterogenous personnel recruited in the early days wherever it was available, and never by the most rudimentary standards of Colonial administration in sufficient quantity, or in many cases with much experience. The principle underlying the separate administrations has been to leave all local authority with the head of the local administration subject to reserving certain matters for control from headquarters. These matters were therefore excepted in the general warrants of authority issued by the Chief Political Officers to the local administrators. The reserved subjects comprised in the main financial policy, currency, banking, the personal status of the

inhabitants of the territories, relations with neighbouring territories and other governments, religious matters, and the modification of principles underlying existing laws in force at the time of occupation. Justice has been administered locally with no machinery for appeal outside each territory. Education, agriculture, forestry and technical services in the first instance conducted on a care-and-maintenance basis have latterly been allowed to develop according to local needs. Circumstances made it necessary to organise new police forces on British lines at the outset and from first beginnings, since it was found neither practical nor desirable to continue the Italian police system in existence. A common direction in the organisation of the police forces of the territories has been preserved by the supervision of an Inspector-General of Police common to both Commands and all territories. But these police forces have also developed according to local needs ; in the case of Italian Somaliland development has been in the direction of a quasi military Gendarmerie to deal with local conditions in the interior of the country and to take the place of military garrisons. The administration of medical services in co-operation with military personnel and organisations has also varied from territory to territory. But the general direction of currency and banking has been entirely centralised at headquarters where economic data collected in the territories are also digested and applied by the Controller of Finance and Accounts. The situation, unusual in colonial administration, whereby the Controller of Finance and Accounts while acting as Financial Adviser to the Chief Political Officers is himself directly responsible to, and is the Accounting Officer of, the Permanent Under-Secretary (Finance) in the War Office, in spite of some misgivings on the part of Sir Philip Mitchell at the outset, has worked throughout two years without friction or difficulty as Sir Philip Mitchell himself has been the first to admit.

“ While the local territorial organisations in their substantial form may be said to resemble Colonial governments, the existence of a Political Branch and later of two Political Branches has no analogy elsewhere in the administration of government. These Political Branches have in fact acted for their respective territories as the Colonial Office does for Colonies. Administrative matters which normally would be referred by a Colonial Governor to the Colonial Office have been referred to, and dealt with, by the Chief Political Officers concerned, under the authority of their Commanders-in-Chief, but with a virtually complete delegation of powers to them by the latter. The interposition of Political

Branches, or in other words local administrative headquarters of groups of Colonial administrations between the latter and London, has relieved the appropriate departments in London of an enormous volume of work and enabled the administration of many millions of African people and several hundred thousands of Europeans to be conducted in London by two small sections in the Directorate of Military Operations and the Financial Branch of the War Office. In fact, these sections in the War Office have only dealt with matters of principle, the administrative application of which has been the function of the Political Branches in Cairo and Nairobi. The nearest analogy to the Political Branches in Cairo and Nairobi which might be found, would be in the creation of a High Commissioner with a small staff directing a group of Colonial governments.

“I am here bound to record a personal opinion that the division of central direction into two Political Branches in Cairo and in Nairobi in February, 1942, was a mistake. This division only did not lead to confusion and divergent administrative policy being pursued in former Italian territories, because of the close personal relations and contact between the senior officers of the two Political Branches, by their determination to follow the lines originally laid down by Sir Philip Mitchell when he had unified control, and by the gradual re-emerging of the two administrative centres. These personal relations and the general development from the small nucleus of three officers who had for the first time met in Cairo in the early days of February, 1941, are due to the direction and capacity of Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell. That his administrative organisation has been successful is, I think, borne out by the fact that in spite of the stress of war, the breakdown of external trade in all the territories when they were occupied, and the very small amount of British staff available to conduct the administration, none of these has experienced revolution, famine, distress, epidemics or civil disturbances except for a few cases of local riot and violence in two years of British military government with small or almost non-existent garrisons. Certain substantial objectives have been attained in local food production and supply, the development of trade with an aggregate turnover of several million pounds, the organisation of satisfactory police forces, the administration of justice in new constituted courts, and finally in such achievements as the mass movement of about 40,000 Italians out of Ethiopia, and the institution and administration of currencies and currency reserves formerly foreign to the territories concerned.

“This Despatch concludes, so far as the southern part of Italian East Africa is concerned, the history of two years of British military administration which was initiated by Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, Brigadier H. R. Hone, now Chief Political Officer, Middle East, and myself in February, 1941, in Cairo. Since both Brigadier Hone and I are likely soon to end our direct association with these administrations, we think it proper to place on record that this very considerable undertaking was initiated and carried into execution by Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, whose general policy we have done no more than follow.”

A tentative proposal to restore the unity of administration of all the Italian territories agreed to by the War Office and by the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa, was made in January, 1943, but it did not commend itself to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. This proposal consisted in appointing an Inspector-General of Occupied Territories for all the African Territories, which would in effect have involved the transfer of the two groups of territories to the direct control of the War Office and away from that of the Commanders-in-Chief. By this time the Commanders-in-Chief no longer had any substantial military interest in the territories, except in Tripolitania for as long as that territory remained a base for the Sicilian operations. This policy would have meant some simplification of the administrative channels and responsibilities and some economy of effort and personnel. The military personnel of the administration in the territories and at the headquarters had grown by the 31st January, 1942, to an establishment of 671, with 478 actually on strength, excluding police. There was in addition a number of locally employed personnel. This establishment increased with the occupation of Madagascar and preparations for the setting up of Administrations in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, but decreased in the latter part of 1943. Contact with War Office Records was maintained by monthly returns of personnel employed in accordance with the constantly changing War Establishments. “Casualties,” Postings and Part II orders for the Administrations were published in the Part II Orders of the Commands concerned. Promotions and postings were made locally and by the two headquarters without reference to the War Office. War Establishments received provisional approval by the local Command War Establishments Committees within the limits of the man-power allocations to the Commands. These were appropriately fixed with consideration for the requirements of these administrations in addition to the primary military requirements of fighting and ancillary formations.

The only restriction placed by the War Office on local discretion in the matter of War Establishments was that appointments to gradings of Lieutenant-Colonel and upwards had to have specific War Office approval.

Local labour, European, Asian and African, was employed on contract both in the territories and at the two headquarters on terms related to local conditions of emolument and cost of living. This secured uniformity of treatment and emolument for each grade irrespective of racial origin. There were broadly three grades of employment corresponding to non-commissioned status and a special grade corresponding to commissioned rank. The latter included British women welfare workers, especially in the evacuation camps, as well as some medical and technical appointments of civilian Palestinians and Europeans who happened to be available. The employment and remuneration of Italians are dealt with in a later chapter on economic matters. British personnel recruited in Africa, other than that which was secured from military formations, included police inspectors and officers from Southern Rhodesia, Colonial civil servants from nearly all the British African Territories and British civilians, mainly specialists, from the British civil communities in Kenya and Egypt. Nearly all these were commissioned or attested into the Army and drew their emoluments from Army funds.

For the purpose of simplifying the accounting and costing of the Administrations all officers of a given rank were reputed to receive a standard emolument in pay and allowances, irrespective of their actual receipts fixed in accordance with their commission or attestation into the British, Indian, South African, etc., forces. The cost of their emoluments, paid through regular military channels, was brought to account as a credit to the War Office and a debit to the Administrations in the monthly accounts of the latter in accordance with the "standard scales" fixed for the purpose. The system of accounting is more specifically dealt with in the financial chapters which follow.

At both headquarters the records and correspondence of the Administration were kept separately from the records of the Command Headquarters branches, but telegrams to and from London carried the serial numbers of the Commands with the prefix, first O.T.A., then C.A.

The intention to make the personnel of the Administration subject for discipline to the Military Administrator in each territory for all purposes was not carried into effect: it was found simpler to refer cases to the Area or Formation commander for

disciplinary courts of enquiry and courts martial. But domestic courts of enquiry, especially in financial matters, were conducted in accordance with the standard Army practice within the organisation and requests to write off losses, etc., were referred direct to the War Office by the Controller of Finance and Accounts concerned.

The nomenclature of the organisations described, and that of those serving in them, has not unnaturally, owing to the numerous changes made, caused some confusion. The territorial administration began in February, 1941, with the name "Occupied Enemy Territory Administration(s)" (O.E.T.A.) following the precedent of the last War when this name was used for the governments set up in Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Syria. Within a few months, and mainly because Ethiopia and British Somaliland were included as units in the organisation as a whole, the word "Enemy" was dropped as inappropriate to these two territories; and so the organisation as a whole became known as O.T.A.—"Occupied Territories Administrations". The several territories were called by their own geographical names. This nomenclature, which was quite satisfactory inasmuch as it described what the organisation was and carried with it an implication of the temporary, continued until the beginning of 1943.

During all this period of over two years the headquarters organisations in Cairo and Nairobi were called the "Political Branches" of G.H.Q., following Indian and other precedents where the use of the term "Political Officer" in relation to civil administration and the military organisation was quite familiar to British troops and staff organisation. The Indian precedent of using white staff insignia, i.e. cap bands and gorget patches for officers holding the rank of Colonel and above, was also followed. This practice had, however, some disadvantages in that this distinguishing mark was unfamiliar to British Metropolitan Formations, though quite well known to the Indian Army. Since, however, officer cadets wore white cap bands some confusion and a few awkward incidents occurred when cadets found themselves slapping a Major-General or Brigadier from Political Branch on the back. Moreover, the staff at the Political Branches at G.H.Q. were in fact staff officers of the Commander-in-Chief doing very much the same work as other staff officers on the administrative side of the Army. Indeed the matter went farther because all personnel in the organisation of O.T.A., whether at headquarters or in the field, were graded as staff officers, except police officers who were deemed to be doing the equivalent of

regimental duty, the junior ranks being in point of fact graded as police officers as in the Colonial police services. The then Commander-in-Chief and Chief Political Officer were particularly anxious to ensure complete integration of this side of the head-quarter organisation with other branches and considered that the white insignia tended to create a sense of separation which was unwise and might be deleterious. The argument was in fact sound and accepted by the authorities in London from whom Sir Philip Mitchell in the summer secured direction for all his senior personnel to wear the red cap bands and gorget patches of staff officers. The change did in fact produce the result anticipated and made relations with other military staff branches considerably easier.

A proposal was discussed in 1941 and 1942 to create a corps of political and administrative officers on the analogy of the Indian Political Service, but was dropped as too complicated on account of the separate Records organisation which would have been required and the difficulties of transferring officers in and out of the corps if more or fewer were required. It was at that time impossible to foresee what the future held in store.

During the period when the organisation was known as "O.T.A." the senior officer at the head was called the Chief Political Officer and the heads of the territorial administrations were called Deputy Chief Political Officers until such time as they received their delegations of administrative powers in the later phases when military operations had ceased and the local military commander was divested of the responsibility for government. The D.C.P.O. then assumed the title of Military Administrator, except in the case of British Somaliland where the appointment was a "Military Governor" under the Order-in Council described in Chapter VIII. The second-in-command of the Military Administrator was called the Chief Secretary, following Colonial precedent, the senior finance officer Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts, and the senior legal officer Legal Adviser, who combined advisory functions with judicial work and judicial administration. The heads of technical branches took their titles from the work which they were doing.

The administrative officers in the field in charge of provinces, districts, etc., were, again on the Indian analogy, called Senior Political Officers and Political Officers according to rank. This nomenclature did have certain disadvantages since among the uninitiated the word "Political" seemed to imply political functions whereas in fact the duties of these officers were really

administrative : " residents " or " provincial commissioners ", and " district commissioners " (or) " officers " would have been preferable and would have avoided the objections which were made, notably among the uninitiated civilian element in Middle East and East Africa, to military officers under a War Office organisation dealing with political matters. To avoid such misunderstandings, both at home and locally, all use of the word " political " was eschewed in the nomenclature of the small administrative staff which accompanied the troops in their conquest of Madagascar.

Unfortunately the word " administrative " could not be incorporated in the nomenclature of the officers other than the senior officer in charge of a territory for fear of causing confusion with the administration of military formations and in other branches of headquarters where the word was in current use for staff officers and their work on the " A " and " Q " sides.

At the end of 1942, and especially at the beginning of 1943 when plans for carrying the war into Europe were being worked out, the American attitude and practice in these matters came into the picture. A uniform system of nomenclature which could be used by both Armies was considered desirable. Although the African Military Administrations were and remained wholly British, contact between the two military organisations had begun even in the Middle East by the summer of 1943 and by the winter contact had been made in Tunisia between the British Eighth Army and General Eisenhower's Armies in French North Africa. Although there was no compelling reason to alter the nomenclature of O.T.A. in Africa it was obviously desirable to have a uniform British nomenclature.

The term " Civil Affairs " was therefore adopted for the service generally and the titles of the officers were worked out on the basis of that term by the then C.P.O., Lord Rennell, in London with the War Office in the early weeks of 1943. As a result the " Political Branches " became " Civil Affairs Branches ", the " Chief Political Officer " the " Chief Civil Affairs Officer ", and so on down the line. The following table, with abbreviations, may clarify the reader's mind and serve as a guide to nomenclature in other theatres of war where " Civil Affairs " were organised :—

Chief Political Officer (C.P.O.)

became Chief Civil Affairs Officer (C.C.A.O.).

Army Rank : Brigadier or above

Deputy Chief Political Officer (D.C.P.O.)

became Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (D.C.C.A.O.).

Army Rank : Brigadier or Colonel

Senior Political Officer (S.P.O.)

became Senior Civil Affairs Officer (S.C.A.O.).

Army Rank : Lieut.-Colonel or Major

Political Officer (P.O.) or District Officer (D.O.).

became Civil Affairs Officer (C.A.O.).

Army Rank : Major or below

The term " Civil Affairs " proved in practice not to be satisfactory. It was difficult to explain to foreigners, did not convey the functions of government or even administration, and imported the word " Civil " into a military function and hierarchy—which was neither appropriate nor logical.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XIV

LAW : INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL

First Legal Adviser Appointed — The Formation of a Legal Staff — Difficulties Experienced in Obtaining Text Books — Initial Proclamations — Powers of the Military Administrators Defined — The Status of Ethiopia under International Law — Memorandum by Chief Legal Adviser — The Doctrine of *Post Liminium* — Negotiations for an Agreement in Ethiopia — The Four Divisions of Eritrea — Lawlessness in Somalia — Problems of Administration in British Somaliland — The Status of the Reserved Areas — The Issuing of Proclamations and Gazettes — The Italian Penal Code — The First Courts in O.E.T. — Justice in Ethiopia — Military, Civil and Native Courts in Eritrea and Somalia, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania — Requisitioning and Indemnity — Banking Notices — General Legal Considerations.

CHAPTER XIV

Law : International and Internal

THE legal problems which confronted those responsible for setting up the Military Administrations in Cyrenaica, Eritrea, British Somaliland, Somalia and Ethiopia were very considerable, and the time available for the solving of them was short. On the 15th February Mr. H. R. Hone, M.C., K.C., Attorney-General of Uganda (Major-General Sir Ralph Hone, C.B.E., M.C.), reported to General Headquarters, Middle East, as Legal Adviser; he was re-commissioned as Lieut.-Colonel and shortly afterwards promoted to Colonel.

One of Colonel Hone's duties was to select Deputy Legal Advisers for each Administration, and he found that the field of choice was very restricted. There were in the East African forces a few commissioned officers who, before the war, had held appointments in the Colonial Legal Service, but for the most part these were young men with insufficient legal standing and experience to become the principal legal advisers to the Deputy Chief Political Officers though, in some cases, such officers were instructed to carry on until a more experienced incumbent could be found. In the case of Eritrea a practising barrister from Uganda was selected, his appointment dating from the 9th February. In the case of Cyrenaica the services were secured of an experienced lawyer practising in the mixed Courts of Egypt, who had previously served in the Colonial Legal Service in Iraq; when Cyrenaica was overrun by Axis forces in April, 1941, this officer became the Legal Adviser to the Military Administration in Ethiopia. There was some delay in finding a suitable Deputy Legal Adviser for Somalia, but in June a South African solicitor, who had been Legal Adviser to the Cape Town City Council, was appointed. For British Somaliland an officer of the Colonial Legal Service was secured from the King's African Rifles. At the end of May Mr. H. C. Willan, M.C., of the Colonial Legal Service, was appointed Deputy Legal Adviser at Political Headquarters with the rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

Intricate legal problems of setting up Administrations and carrying out their daily work were energetically tackled by this inadequate staff, which was only slowly augmented by a body of lawyers with little previous experience of the task. Most of the

legal questions which came into issue involved a sound knowledge of International Law, Military Law and Colonial Administration, and none of the officers charged with the duties assigned to them could claim any special knowledge in all these difficult branches, while the legal staff as a whole had no text-books to which to refer and certainly had no cases on International Law. The Chief Legal Adviser himself reported to Cairo with no better technical equipment than a Manual of Military Law and a copy of Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II. This situation was not remedied for many months and, even then, satisfactory law libraries were not procurable, since the main stocks of legal text-books in England had been destroyed by enemy action during the autumn of 1940. The urgent indents for books sent to the War Office in London could not, with the best will in the world, be fulfilled until the end of 1941.

Very early enquiries were made for a copy of an English version of the Italian Penal Code. After failing to locate a translation in Egypt, Palestine or Cyrenaica, a telegraphic request was despatched to London on the 21st February ; this brought no result except a suggestion that application might be made to Malta. This was done, but also proved fruitless, and a further telegram was sent to London suggesting a reference to the Foreign Office. On the 26th April a cable was received to the effect that thirty copies of the required book had been despatched. Meanwhile the situation had become serious. Upon the evacuation of Cyrenaica the Chief Legal Adviser asked the then Deputy Legal Adviser of the Cyrenaica Administration to undertake the work of translating the Italian Penal Code. This he did in the remarkably short space of fourteen days. The printing was undertaken by the Palestine Government. Distribution of the work was effected to all Administrations early in May, just at the time that information was received that an English translation of the Italian Penal Code had been located in the British Legation Library at Addis Ababa. A good library of Italian law books was found intact at Mogadishu and in Ethiopia many useful volumes were discovered at Jimma. At Asmara the Italian law library was destroyed by a British bomb. In British Somaliland all the volumes on British law and the text-books of the Legal Secretary were taken away by the Italian Army and not recovered.

A knowledge of Italian law in force in the occupied territories was indispensable to a proper regulation of their legal and judicial affairs, but much trouble was caused by the difficulty of securing the services of interpreters fitted to translate legal phraseology.

Only three members of the legal staff in the various territories had knowledge of Italian and very useful work was done by them, but it soon became obvious that the establishment, at headquarters, of a section to investigate and translate Italian laws was important if the work of the Legal Department was to be satisfactorily carried on. This step was taken on the 1st August.

The rapid setting up of the Military Administrations and the carrying out of their executive responsibilities demanded quick legal action. The surprising thing is that more mistakes were not made. In the course of time all the legal officers engaged in work connected with the Military Administration acquired a unique knowledge of their subject, but those same officers freely admitted that they were far from expert in the subjects which dominated their daily life and would be the first to recognise that the solutions adopted of the legal problems posed might well be open to question and argument by the more learned members of their profession. The following pages will reveal some of the more difficult of the legal problems which were encountered in the early days of the setting up of the Military Administrations ; in all these problems considerable guidance on matters of general principle was, of course, found in the leading text-books on International Law as and when they became available, but, without casting aspersions on the authors of these learned works, it became increasingly apparent to the legal staff that the nature of the problems with which they were faced found no practical and simple solutions in the text-books. It will perhaps only be when an International lawyer is himself called upon to take part in the legal affairs of a Military Administration as an Army officer that he will truly appreciate the multifarious difficulties which can arise and seek to provide an answer to them in a text-book which one may hope that he will write.

The Chief Legal Adviser derived particular assistance from Dr. Spaight's "War Rights on Land", Oppenheim, and Fauchille's "Traite de Droit International Public". No copy of Professor Ariga's book, "La Guerre Russo Japonaise", was available to the legal staff of the Political Branch at any time. It may be repeated that those responsible for inaugurating the Military Administrations had no access to any records relating to the Occupied Enemy Territories Administrations which were set up and operated during and after the War of 1914-1918, from which valuable experience and guidance might have been gained.

As has been recorded, the occupation of Cyrenaica began on the 9th December, 1940, that of Eritrea on the 19th January, 1941,

and that of Italian Somaliland on the 27th January, 1941. On reporting for duty at G.H.Q., Cairo, the Chief Legal Adviser found that the Deputy Judge Advocate-General, G.H.Q., Cairo, (Wing-Commander A. G. C. Somerhough, R.A.F.), had been called upon to prepare two initial proclamations for Lieut.-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding the British Forces entering Cyrenaica, to sign and issue. The first proclamation announced the fact of the establishment of occupation in accordance with the advice tendered in paragraph 347 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, and was short and straightforward. Having stated that all territories occupied by forces under command of the General Officer Commanding would be under his exclusive military jurisdiction and would so remain as long as military considerations demanded, the proclamation went on to warn the population against acts that would disturb the peace or aid the enemy; and that any contravention of the directions would be punishable with death or such lesser punishment as the G.O.C. might direct. The term "Military Authorities" was then explained as "including all such tribunals, officers or other persons as I (the G.O.C.) may from time to time appoint to administer my military jurisdiction in any part of the said territories. No other persons or tribunals of any kind will hold or exercise administrative or judicial powers in the said territories." It was made clear that all existing laws, customs, rights and properties would be respected as far as possible and that requisitions of property and services would be the subject of compensation. The proclamation ended with an assurance that as long as the inhabitants remained peaceful and obeyed orders they would suffer no more interference than the G.O.C. considered essential, and that they need have no fear. The second proclamation enumerated hostile acts which would be treated by the invading army as war crimes. This proclamation was issued in accordance with paragraph 447 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law and the acts enumerated were principally those war crimes classified as "Espionage and War Treason" in paragraphs 442-445 of the Chapter referred to above. This proclamation was directed towards the suppression or punishment of acts against the British forces committed by private individuals or those enemy soldiers who might discard their uniforms or other distinguishing badges and so cease to enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces regularly operating against an enemy.

Copies of these two proclamations had been transmitted to General Platt's headquarters at Khartoum for use in Eritrea and they were in fact signed and issued by him on the 5th and 9th

February respectively. Copies had also been despatched to General Cunningham's headquarters at Nairobi, where the texts were slightly revised by the D.J.A.G. of the East African forces with the assistance of the Attorney-General of Kenya (the Hon. Walter Harrigan, K.C.). These proclamations were signed and issued in Somalia by General Cunningham on the 1st and 21st February respectively. Proclamations were posted on all the principal public buildings in the various towns and villages in the occupied enemy territory as the armies advanced, and were displayed in the Italian and Arabic languages as well as in English.

In addition to the preparation of the two proclamations the D.J.A.G., G.H.Q., Cairo, had prepared some instructions and rules of procedure for Military Courts. In general, the instructions so prepared were based on British court-martial procedure. It was intended to set up two types of Military Courts, one to exercise summary jurisdiction, comprising three Army officers, and the other a Superior Court, comprising five presiding officers; the officers to sit in these Courts were to be appointed for the purpose by the local Military Commander wherever his troops were operating. These proposals underwent some modification before they were put into practice.

The Chief Legal Adviser had had an opportunity of discussing certain aspects of the legal and judicial arrangements for the Occupied Enemy Territories Administrations with the Chief Political Officer at Entebbe in Uganda during the middle of January when Sir Philip Mitchell was on his way to Cairo to take up his appointment. In the course of the discussions then held general arrangements regarding the establishment of Military Courts and the law which should prevail in the occupied territories were discussed and the substance of these conclusions were contained in paragraphs 12, 13, 20 and 21 of the C.P.O.'s "Notes on Policy and Practice in respect of Occupation of Italian East Africa", reproduced in Chapter II. This memorandum was issued on the 8th February, 1941, that is prior to the arrival of the Chief Legal Adviser in Cairo. The arrangements which were eventually made for the setting up of Military Courts in occupied enemy territories and the course of their history are recorded later in this chapter.

The unexpected turn taken in the progress of military operations in the conquest of Italian East Africa led to some legal difficulties which had to be adjusted. It was believed, as has been related, that the conquest of the bulk of Ethiopia would be accomplished by the troops under the command of General Platt

and the early plans laid and instructions issued by the Political Branch were based on this assumption. In the event, the greater part of Ethiopia fell to the troops of General Cunningham and some legal difficulties arose as a result of his rapid advance, since in some areas the courts, the police and the political staff were uncertain whether they should enforce the proclamations of one General or the other. The confusion became worse when changes in the command of various units and areas occurred from time to time as the military exigencies of the situation demanded, especially when they took place without notice to those most concerned in the legal aspect. The changes made were often, for the moment, a matter of military secrecy and there was a feeling that the officers of Political Branch did not need to know of them. Legislation had therefore to be prepared to resolve these legal difficulties with retrospective effect and, having regard to developments, to declare that for the future all legislation hitherto issued by or under the authority of General Cunningham or his successors should apply throughout Ethiopia.

When the Chief Political Officer assumed full jurisdiction in all administrative, political, executive and legislative matters in Eritrea and Somalia with effect from the 1st August, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, signed proclamations giving legal effect to the change in these two territories and providing for the future exercise of the new powers conferred on the Chief Political Officer. It was necessary to give fairly wide delegated powers to the Military Administrators of Eritrea and Somalia for the prompt despatch of public affairs of the territories and it was decided to specify their powers in Instructions, which were drawn up by the Legal Department on the lines of the Royal Instructions to a Colonial Governor. These instructions consisted of paragraphs under the following heads :—

Administrative Power—Laws Generally to Continue in Force—The Courts—Trial of Criminal Offences—Confirmation of Death Sentences—Collection of Taxes, etc.—Contributions—Religious Observances—Education—Medical and Sanitary Organisation—Rules under which Proclamations are to be enacted—Description of Proclamations *Not* to be enacted—Provision in Case of Emergency for the immediate Operation of a Proclamation—Proclamations to be sent to the Chief Political Officer duly Authenticated—Proclamations to be Published in the Gazette—Power of Military Administrator to Enact Legislation under Italian Law—Granting of a Pardon, Remission or Commutation of Sentence—Appointment of Deputy during Temporary Absence

of Military Administrator—Guiding Principles Regarding Relations between Occupant and Civilian Population—Progress Reports.

In the new arrangements the Chief Political Officer stood in a relationship to the Military Administrators in some respects resembling that of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Colonial Governors.

The territorial extent of British military jurisdiction in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia had come into question on political grounds from the date of occupation and received consideration from the legal aspect. It was decided that the province of Tigrai, initially administered with Eritrea, should be administered as an integral part of Ethiopia as soon as practicable, but that the Ogaden should remain as a part of the administrative unit of Somalia. These decisions were incorporated in the proclamations issued for the purpose of conferring new powers on the Chief Political Officer. No change of control, in fact, took place in Somalia since, under the general principles of international law, the Ogaden had passed into the charge of the Deputy Chief Political Officer, Somalia, under General Cunningham's authority, from the date of occupation of that country by his troops. The transfer of Tigrai involved a change from General Platt's to General Cunningham's authority. It was decided at the same time to make it clear in law that Italian Somaliland should be referred to as "Somalia", the correct Italian title of the area.

Ethiopia presented the most complicated legal problems with which the Legal Department had to deal throughout the period covered by this record. The foregoing chapters have given in some detail the sequence of events which ended with the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement in January, 1942, but there are several outstanding points that must again be stressed in order that the position from both sides may be fully comprehended.

Prior to 1935 Ethiopia was a completely independent country : it had achieved full international status by joining the League of Nations. The Emperor proclaimed that he left Addis Ababa in 1936 so that he might place himself in a better position to make plans for the recovery of his land by pleading his cause with the prominent European nations in the League Assembly. The Emperor also pointed out that a number of his Rases had continued to oppose the Italians and that neither the Emperor nor any of his Rases had concluded a Peace Treaty. *De jure* recognition was accorded by H.M.G. by Treaty in 1938 to the Italian annexation of Ethiopia and therefore from the British standpoint the Emperor's

sovereignty was ended. But in law this could not be regarded as binding on the Ethiopian Government. On the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Italy, military operations were commenced against Italian East Africa. In Ethiopia the operations initially consisted of stirring up revolt against Italian rule, British officers co-operating in this effort with the Ethiopian Patriot movement. In June the Emperor was flown from England to Khartoum. In December, 1940, a statement was made in the British Parliament to the effect that H.M.G. reserved to itself complete liberty of action regarding any commitment entered into in the past with the Italian Government relating to East Africa, and it was added that this declaration extended to the *de jure* recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia given in 1938. By a further declaration on the 4th February, 1941, H.M.G. recognised the claim of the Emperor, Haile Selassie I, to the throne of Abyssinia, and stated that the re-appearance of an independent Ethiopia would be welcomed.

While the Emperor was in Khartoum the issue was how the Italians should be defeated rather than what should happen after they were defeated. As there was no Political Branch at that time at General Platt's headquarters in Khartoum there were no official discussions with the Emperor about future policy in Ethiopia ; and there was no one to make arrangements in advance to deal with the situation which would arise when the time came for him to re-enter his country. When the Emperor crossed the frontier of Ethiopia, he did so as a ruler returning to his country after an enforced absence. Placing himself at the head of the Patriot forces he advanced towards Addis Ababa to resume the throne which he did not consider he had at any time vacated. To him the military operations were a joint Anglo-Ethiopian campaign, and in part the Patriot forces were of great assistance in the liberation of the country.

The first legal discussions with the Emperor occurred on the 19th February when Brigadier Lush, the D.C.P.O. for Ethiopia, visited him in his camp in the Gojjam area. As recorded the C.-in-C. was prepared to meet the Emperor's views as far as possible and his sole right to issue "Awaj", the Amharic for proclamation, was recognised. "Public Notices", to make known regulations or temporary jurisdiction, were instead to be issued by the British military authorities.

On the 5th May, 1941, the Emperor Haile Selassie re-entered his capital, mounted the Throne in the Throne-room of his Palace and was greeted with a salute of 21 British guns. He received

messages of congratulation from the Prime Minister in London and General (Field-Marshal) Smuts. The legal position in international law became very intricate.

The considerations which were present in the mind of the Chief Legal Adviser, Colonel Hone, at the time were set forth in a memorandum entitled "Juridical Position in Ethiopia upon Reconquest". This document is of interest as reflecting the views on the situation of those who were called upon to deal with it on the spot in the early summer of 1941. The views therein expressed were neither those expressed by H.M.G. at the time, nor are they those which might have been held at a later date even by those concerned with these matters in Africa: but they do represent the view which was expressed locally at the time and which not only guided the Chief Political Officer, Sir P. Mitchell, in his transactions, but which was taken into account in London during the meetings which took place then in the summer and autumn of 1941. As such they are relevant to this record, and read as follows:—

"The doctrine applicable to the case is that of *postliminium* which is discussed at no great length in the text-books. Stated in its simplest terms, the principle establishes that when a territory of a state has been occupied by a hostile force and it comes again into the control of the military forces of its own state during the progress of a war, the legal state of things existing prior to the hostile occupation is immediately re-established. The doctrine is also extended to cases where the inhabitants of a subjugated territory by a *levée en masse* succeed in throwing off the hostile yoke or the territory is reconquered by the armies of an ally of the state to which it belongs. Since the rights of a state in hostile occupation of territory derive only from military necessity and not from any *de jure* or *de facto* sovereignty, the ejection of the occupying state immediately terminates those rights. If, however, occupation subsists till the conclusion of hostilities, full and complete appropriation of an occupied territory to the conqueror can be effected in conformity with the rules of international law. When this has occurred, it is said that the doctrine of *postliminium* no longer operates, if subsequently the territory is regained by the original owner state or by its allies. The dicta of the text-book writers in regard to this proposition are not very satisfactory, and it is clear that differences of opinion are rife. For example, much discussion has arisen as to (a) the juridical position when the state is re-occupied by a Power not in formal alliance with its original owner and (b) at what point the appropriation of

sovereignty can be said to be complete and perfected when hostilities are not terminated by any treaty of peace. Both these points arise for consideration in regard to Ethiopia.

“As to the first, it cannot be alleged that any formal alliance between the Emperor and His Majesty’s Government exists; nevertheless the trend of events has been such that the British public and the Emperor alike have been led to the belief that the two countries are acting in conjunction in the pursuance of their war aims and the military co-operation which has, in fact, taken place precludes, in my opinion, any suggestion at this stage that no alliance of which jurists can take notice exists.

“The second point gives rise to greater doubt. From the Italian point of view it can be asserted with some confidence that the conquest of Ethiopia was completed several years ago in law and, in fact, their occupation and administration were effective throughout a great deal of the territory and though their juridical position was acquired by an unilateral act of annexation, their *de jure* title to the dominion over Ethiopia was formally recognised by many European countries. As against this on the facts already quoted, the Emperor can advance a number of arguments which to him, at least, are equally cogent and which the international jurist cannot ignore. The facts of the Genoa case in 1815 to which full reference is made at pages 580–583 of Hall’s International Law (Eighth Edition) are not sufficiently in point to warrant full discussion in this memorandum, but they well illustrate the room for conflicting views which can arise in regard to the application of the doctrine of *postliminium* notwithstanding the conclusion of a treaty of peace at the close of hostilities. The views of Sir James Mackintosh expressed in the House of Commons condemning the terms of the Congress of Vienna have received much support from text-book writers on the grounds of their equity and common sense. One writer (Bluntschli) advances, in this connection, the very reasonable theory that ‘in settling the future of a liberated country, the interests and wishes of both it and the liberator ought to be considered.’

“I venture to suggest that, in a case such as the present, for which there is no precedent in the books, the position must be approached with an open mind and not decided by a rigid application of some general doctrine of international law which may lead to a conclusion that will be regarded by the Emperor and his people as patently unreasonable and inequitable. Such a conclusion, in my opinion, would be one that held that Ethiopia is and must remain occupied enemy territory until the sovereignty

of Italy is formally terminated by the treaty of peace at the end of the war, and the independence of Ethiopia is established by the same instrument. It need hardly be said that the Emperor holds an entirely contrary opinion.

“ If the Emperor’s view is rejected, it follows that the rules of International Law regarding the occupation of enemy territory must apply in their full force and vigour. Some of the consequences are as follows. The Emperor has no executive, legislative or administrative authority whatsoever over his people, except in so far as we may confer such powers upon him—not in his capacity as Emperor but as an official of the British Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. The Italian form of Government must be retained in so far as the military exigencies of the case permit ; Italian laws continue to be valid ; all Italian functionaries must be permitted to remain in office if they are willing to act without impairing the safety of our armed forces. Only Italian taxes will be collected and neither the British commander nor the Emperor has any right to impose new taxes. The proposed issue of postage stamps bearing the Emperor’s head must not be put on sale. All Italian state property remains in the ownership of Italy and in the custody of the British Army, and the Emperor can have no title to any of this until the Peace Conference, even though prior to his flight from Ethiopia, he may have spent several millions of pounds sterling on the erection of wireless stations and government buildings, including his own palace of the Little Ghebbi furnished at his expense by Messrs. Waring and Gillow.

“ It is difficult to imagine with all the facts in mind His Majesty’s Government can seriously expect the Emperor to accept the above view as being either equitable or a proper interpretation of the principles of international law to which we pay homage. He would perhaps be tempted to translate the above principles into an imaginary picture and ask us whether we ourselves would accept such a view in different circumstances. Imagine the overrunning of Great Britain by the German nation. His Majesty the King has to take refuge in Canada. Hostilities cease, but the British nation neither recognises the conquest nor concludes a treaty of peace. A period of five years elapses during which time the American nation recognises by treaty with Germany the *de jure* conquest of Great Britain. Then war is declared by America upon Germany over some international dispute in which British interests are not concerned. In the course of that war, the American nation invades the shores of Britain, having first prepared

the way by promoting a local insurrection of the British people. The King lands at Liverpool and the American forces in a short space of time reconquer the whole of the Island and then proceed to attack Germany in other theatres of war. In these circumstances could it be that the British nation might be told that until the conclusion of peace between America and Germany, Great Britain is occupied enemy territory ; that the British laws and constitution have not revived and that German laws enacted during military operations are to remain in full force and vigour, and that the German officials and the German system remains in force. That the only tax exigible for the administration of the country are those based on German law ; that title to Buckingham Palace and the House of Parliament remains in the German nation until the peace conference ? ”

As the weeks after the capture of Addis Ababa passed the complexity of the legal position brought an ever increasing number of problems, the solutions of which were difficult to find. One example among many was regarding the criminal law to be applied to foreigners. If Ethiopia was to be regarded as Occupied Enemy Territory, it was clear under international law that Italian law should be administered. The Emperor, very naturally, took definite objection to this and, in addition, this course would have brought many difficulties to the British officers who were to exercise judicial functions. The Chief Legal Adviser therefore advised that English criminal law should be applied and, after discussion with the D.C.P.O., it was arranged that the Sudan Penal and Procedure Codes should be temporarily adopted, the Political Officers being more familiar with them than any other system. Another cause of trouble came over the special measures that had to be brought in to deal with disaffected persons who could not be made prisoners of war under the appropriate international convention. A Notice was therefore issued which provided full powers to detain suspected persons, with adequate safeguards for the impartial review of their cases by a specially constituted tribunal. It was hoped that this would be the only machinery by which suspect persons could be deprived of their liberty, but the hope did not materialise, for it soon became obvious that the British were dealing with suspect persons in one way and the Ethiopians in another. It was learned that the Emperor and his Provincial Governors were detaining certain persons in their official or private residences, while later demands were even made to the British Authorities for the surrender to the Emperor of suspects held under power of the British Notice.

These, and other legal problems arising over a wide field of subjects, including requisitioning, courts, custody of enemy property, evacuation and banking, combined to make it clear that an agreement must be signed as soon as possible between H.M.G. and the Emperor.

In London, in June, 1941, Sir Philip Mitchell discussed the Ethiopian position widely and from all angles, including the legal one. At a meeting of the War Cabinet he was instructed to open negotiations with the Emperor immediately on his return with a view to coming to an understanding to cover the period until a treaty could be negotiated, either at the end of the war or earlier date if desirable. The first proposals for an agreement with the Emperor covered the following points :—

- (i) The Emperor to agree to abide in all matters touching the Government of Ethiopia by the advice of H.M.G.
- (ii) Taxation and expenditure to require the prior approval of H.M.G.
- (iii) Jurisdiction over foreigners to be reserved to British courts.
- (iv) The Emperor to raise no objection if the Commander-in-Chief found it necessary to resume military control of any part of Ethiopia.
- (v) No armed forces to be raised or military operations undertaken except as agreed by H.M.G. representative.

If the Emperor should agree to accept the above conditions the Chief Political Officer was instructed that H.M.G. would be willing :—

- (a) to provide funds to establish the armed forces, administrative and other services needed in Ethiopia ;
- (b) to provide expert advisers for the Emperor ;
- (c) to use their best endeavours to re-establish the Ethiopian Government ;
- (d) to operate the necessary communications ;
- (e) to examine proposals for a Treaty with the Emperor, which would include a general financial settlement.

It was, however, not until 31st January, 1942, after the C.P.O. had paid another visit to London, that an agreement in modified form was completed.

Compared with the complicated state of affairs which the Legal Department of the Political Branch met with in Ethiopia, the position of Eritrea was comparatively simple. One special problem presented itself and that was concerned with the subdivision of the country. The legal-administrative position of

Eritrea, at the time of the occupation of Massawa, was that it was divided into four parts : (1) Tigrai, (2) Assab, (3) the low country west of the plateau and east of the Sudan border, and (4) the populated districts round Asmara, Massawa and on the coastal plain. Of these, Tigrai reverted to Ethiopia on the 1st August. Assab, cut off from the capital by the hostile tribes of the Danakil Plain and the line of retreat of the Italians, was occupied by a force from Aden and became a separate enclave under a Political Officer answering direct to headquarters at Nairobi. The low west country was administered direct by British Political Officers, making use of local native chiefs, and from this area the Italian influence was entirely removed. In the Asmara-Massawa area the Italian administrative machine was retained under British guidance and control and Italian officials remained at their posts. Despite this divergence in administration comparatively few legal problems arose.

If Eritrea was the most live and favoured of the territories of the Fascist African Empire to be taken over by the British, with " U.S. Projects " bringing prosperity to the Italians remaining in Eritrea as it also brought easier terms for requisitioning, the reverse was the case in the administration of Somalia where the Italian system of Government had broken down and a full direct Administration, including a judicial system, had to be established from first principles. Complete disorganisation reigned in the country, largely caused by the hatred of the Somali for the Italian. The Legal Department's work was not so much concerned with international law or wide issues, as with efforts to reinstitute internal law and order. Apart from the inherent lawlessness of the Somali and the ineffectiveness of the Italian administration, the wholesale desertion of " bande " and Colonial Infantry from the Italian forces, complete with rifles, automatic rifles and pistols, hand grenades, and in some cases even machine guns, together with large quantities of ammunition, resulted in the whole countryside from Kismayu to Dante and from Jiggiga to Kismayu being in a potential state of turmoil and feudal warfare. There was grave danger of the rise of one or more Mullahs and the outbreak of a Jihad which would inevitably create a military commitment of some magnitude. That the danger was averted was in part due to the onset of an exceptionally heavy rainy season, which caused the attention of tribal leaders to be diverted from tribal feuds and wells to their grazing grounds which for once seemed to be sufficient. It was immediately clear that the first necessity in Somalia was a strong and well organised police

force, upon which the institution of courts and judicial machinery could wait.

The re-occupation of British Somaliland posed a new question in international law. So far the legal position covering the occupation of *enemy* territory only had been dealt with, but now, with the occupation of a British Protectorate, a position arose not unlike that in Ethiopia—with British authority in the position of the Ethiopian. Under the doctrine of *postliminium*, British sovereignty over the Protectorate revived as soon as reconquest was an accomplished fact and the legal state of affairs immediately prior to the hostile occupation was, *ipso facto*, re-established. The distinction between the juridical position in the re-occupied British territory and occupied enemy territory was impressed upon the political staff. But owing to the swiftness of General Cunningham's advance and the uncertainty of from what direction British forces would retake Somaliland, it was impossible to decide precisely the form of administration which would be set up on reconquest. In February General Wavell and Sir Philip Mitchell had discussed the matter and had come to the conclusion that it would in the best interests of the Protectorate if an Administration on the lines of those in Eritrea and Somalia was set up. The War Office was telegraphed to this effect, crossing a message from the War Office making a very similar suggestion, and so Brigadier Chater assumed the duties of Military Governor of British Somaliland on the 10th April and was also appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Somaliland. He held this dual role during his tenure of office, which terminated on the 3rd March, 1943. But the authority of the Military Governor raised a number of points in law, which had to be covered by an Order-in-Council creating and empowering the Office of the Military Governor to replace that of the Governor constituted under preceding Somaliland Orders-in-Council. In the interim period it had been proposed that martial law should be declared under the former powers of the Officer administering the Protectorate, but this resulted in objections that the term "martial law" would be misunderstood by the local population. The term "military administration" was therefore used, but the change was only a matter of words. In fact, British Somaliland was ruled by the will of the British Commander which was, in law, a régime of martial law, on which the Manual of Military Law is quite clear:—

"It should be noted that by British practice martial law is proclaimed in British territory, military government in an enemy's country. The regulations of the United States provide for martial law in an enemy's country.

“In the Great War, 1914–1918, in Palestine, after the capture of Jerusalem by the British forces, a military administration was established to govern the territory under British occupation.

“In 1918, after the final advance, the occupied enemy territory was divided into three administrative areas, each in charge of a chief administrator directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.

“The system of administration was in accordance with the Laws and Usages of War as laid down in the Manual of Military Law, and no departure from the principles laid down was permitted.

“In the occupied parts of Turkey, as far as possible the Turkish system of Government was continued.”¹

Though some of the legal problems that had been passed to the Legal Department for solution were ended with the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement on the 31st January, 1942, new ones were born out of the retention of parts of Ethiopia as Reserved Areas. One of the first questions to be raised was over the difference in status of the Ogaden and the Reserved Areas. Although a distinction was sought to be made in the Convention, the two being dealt with in separate Articles, the legal difference was very slender. The matter is discussed in detail in Chapter IX and need not be repeated here. But the wording of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement on the subject of Reserved Areas left much to be desired from a legal standpoint. Contradictions in points of administration soon cropped up between the two territories, an example being the fact that the dollar was unpegged in the Reserved Areas while the Emperor maintained a fixed parity between this currency and sterling.

The system to be adopted in issuing orders for the local inhabitants by the occupying armies of Generals Wavell, Platt and Cunningham were early given earnest consideration by the Legal Department. In international law the fount of all authority is the Commander of the Army, but much of his authority must be exercised on his behalf in different parts of the occupied territory by officers acting under his general or specific authority. Thus there was danger of conflicting instructions and the assumption of too much authority by subordinate commanders. Some of the orders and instructions that had to be given would be in the nature of legislation applicable to larger or smaller areas as circumstances might demand, while others might be given by any officer for military or executive reasons to an individual inhabitant or a named or identifiable group of inhabitants. It was therefore decided that

¹ Footnote 1 to para. 361, Ch. 14, Manual of Military Law.

all orders of a legislative character intended to apply to the whole of a territory, or to a specified portion of it, should be issued by means of proclamations to be published to the inhabitants by posting in conspicuous places in the areas to which they related. In any such proclamation it would be competent to confer powers on the Deputy Chief Political Officer, Political Officers or Area Commanders and generally to apply the proclamation by the issue of subsidiary legislation in the form of rules, regulations, orders or notices, which, in their turn, should be given similar publicity. But it was decided that no officer should issue any orders of a legislative nature unless specifically empowered to do so by some proclamation or order. Where, on the other hand, it was necessary for any officer to issue orders to individuals, it was decided that they must be conveyed to the persons affected verbally, in his presence, or in writing, and that disobedience of any such orders should be dealt with under the general proclamation relating to war crimes which, *inter alia*, made it an offence to disobey the lawful commands of any officer acting under authority. While in the early stages the position which it was intended to create was not fully understood by all concerned, the system adopted soon proved its success and was strictly followed in later years in all territories, including Italy.

Pursuant to these arrangements, in each occupied territory an omnibus proclamation was issued containing a variety of emergency powers of regulation and prohibition to be exercised by the making of rules as occasion might arise. The multiplicity of proclamations, regulations and orders, etc., which became necessary as the Military Government of the territories settled down to closer administration, made it evident that the publication of legislation by the posting up of notices in public places could not continue indefinitely. In May, 1941, the Administrations were therefore advised to establish immediately Official Gazettes. Accordingly the first issue of the "Eritrean Gazette" appeared on the 31st May, and that of the "Somalia Gazette" on the 4th July: the Ethiopian Administration decided to postpone the issue of a Gazette until the recognition of the Emperor, but a reprint of all legislation issued up to the end of June was published in August. It may be noted that, though provision was made by proclamation that all legislation in Eritrea and Somalia depended for its validity on publication in the local Gazette, as a matter of practice any legislation which vitally affected the inhabitants was conspicuously posted up in public places as well.

The first experience that the Legal Department had of setting

up courts in occupied territory was in Cyrenaica in 1941. A complete system of criminal courts was established and styled "British Courts", as it was considered that the term "Military Courts" was undesirable and would lead to confusion with Courts Martial. The courts were staffed by officers of the O.E.T.A., and, though generally based on those in a British Colonial dependency, they remained "Military Courts" in law since they derived their jurisdiction under international law from the fact of military occupation of enemy territory. The substantive Italian criminal law was administered despite the language difficulty and the courts were given jurisdiction in offences against the ordinary criminal law of the land as well as jurisdiction over war crimes, according to the recognised laws and usages of war, and the offences created by the initial proclamation. The terms of the model proclamation dealing with courts followed the system of administrative practice familiar in the British African Colonial dependencies, except that the court of the highest jurisdiction was to be composed of three officers sitting together, which is the minimum constitution of a military court empowered to impose death sentences usually accepted as desirable by text-book writers on international law. It was anticipated, and, as it proved, correctly, that the court of the higher class could not be constituted with three officers in all cases owing to the shortage of staff, and power was therefore given to constitute the court with one officer only if the necessity arose. An administrative direction, however, was given to the Deputy Chief Political Officers that in any case where there was a likelihood of a death penalty being imposed, a higher court must be constituted with three officers; and only in cases of absolute necessity, owing to the paucity of officers available, was an officer authorised to sit alone in the highest class court, when wide powers of revision were vested in Deputy Chief Political Officers. The confirmation of death sentences was reserved to the Commander-in-Chief and later by delegation to the Chief Political Officer: but it was never delegated by him even to Military Administrators. It was not practicable to constitute any court of appeal, but aggrieved persons were to be entitled to prefer their pleas by way of petition—a right that was freely exercised in practice.

As soon as comparative administrative order had been restored, Italian courts resumed their functions in those districts where some sort of an Italian administration had survived; notably in certain parts of Eritrea, in the urban area of Mogadishu in Somalia and in Tripolitania. In theory, if Italian administration had

generally been continued, Italian penal courts would also have continued to function under supervision. But apart from whether or not this might have been desirable in African territories, with the complete loss of prestige of the Italian administrations almost everywhere, it would obviously have been impossible where the Italian administrations had departed off the face of the earth, as was the case in the western provinces of Eritrea, in the whole of Somalia outside the urban district of Mogadishu, and in Cyrenaica. The appropriate British military courts, provided for, in the case of Eritrea, by Proclamation No. 4 of 1941, were set up as soon as administrative arrangements were possible, and these, in consequence, functioned side by side with the Italian penal courts where these were allowed to resume operations.

While in theory these Italian penal courts could try all persons other than members of the occupying forces for all offences, whether under Italian law or under proclamations which, of course, had become law in the territories occupied, it was in practice provided that Italian courts should only try cases involving petty crime, and that persons indicted before them should only be local inhabitants and Italian persons. This, in effect, excluded from the jurisdiction of the Italian courts all war crimes as defined by the proclamations. But in permitting them to continue to deal with petty larceny, traffic offences, etc., and in general, offences which could have no political connotation, they relieved the under-staffed British courts from being overwhelmed by a mass of minor cases.

The Italian penal courts were placed under the supervision of the Legal Officers of the territories in which they continued to function, and it was also open to these Legal Officers to transfer any cases from the Italian penal courts for hearing before British military courts, as might seem appropriate. In the chapter dealing with the administration of Tripolitania reference is made to the continuation in their functions of Italian legal officers who continued to apply the Italian penal code and procedure, the latter modified in accordance with directions from the legal department of the administrations concerned. In practice there was some difference in procedure between British military courts and Italian courts covering the same type of offence, but it was not apparent that this led to either injustice or to a feeling of injustice.

Since reference has been made in various chapters dealing with the territories to the jurisdiction of Italian civil courts, no further remarks on this subject need be made here except to point out that with the suspension of the moratoria proclaimed at the time

of occupation, the reinstatement of civil courts and civil procedure became necessary. Where Italian surviving personnel was able to function in this respect Italian civil courts were reopened, but where Italian jurisdiction had disappeared an *ad hoc* procedure for British military courts had to be devised, which led to some complication—notably in Cyrenaica, to which, in particular, reference is made in a later chapter.

In February, 1941, it was agreed with the Emperor that ordinary criminal and civil cases in which Ethiopians alone were parties would be tried by the customary courts of the Ethiopian State. This was in line with the policy of the Italian régime, which had recognised customary native tribunals for native cases and had empowered them to administer the Ethiopian Penal Code. Death sentences had to have the Emperor's confirmation and in this he was enjoined to seek the advice of the D.C.P.O. The Emperor was also invited to comment on the proceedings of a British military court in cases of the death penalty being imposed upon Ethiopians. A British barrister from the Colonial Legal Service was appointed to the post of Judicial Adviser to the Emperor and was charged with the primary duty of advising upon the re-inauguration of the Ethiopian judicial system. On the 25th June, 1941, the Emperor signed an *Awaj* constituting an Ethiopian tribunal of criminal justice for Addis Ababa, comprising three judges (in accordance with tradition), of whom one was to be a British officer appointed by the Emperor to preside. Two divisions of the court were set up and proceeded to deal with arrears according to the Ethiopian Code of 1941, which was reprinted in English.

The British courts established in Eritrea carried out their functions admirably. Difficulties arose over differences between the local and Foreign Office translations of the Italian Penal Code 1930, and it was decided that the Foreign Office version should prevail. In view of the fact that there was no legal sanction for the adoption of English criminal procedure, that the British courts had been instructed to ignore the provisions of the Italian Penal Code prescribing minimum sentences, that the provisions of that Code relating to criminal lunatics did not accord with English ideas of substantial justice, and also in order to regularise the use of the translation of that Code, a Proclamation was drafted and promulgated to deal with all these matters.

With regard to the administration of civil justice, it was seen from the beginning that the existence of a moratorium, the blocking of bank accounts, the embargo on transactions in real estate and

the re-opening of the civil courts were inter-related problems. For instance, it was useless to re-open the civil courts if a defendant could plead the moratorium, or if a plaintiff, having secured judgment, could not, in pursuance of such judgment, proceed to execution against the property, real or personal, of the judgment debtor. After a suitable interval in each territory to take stock, the moratorium was therefore modified by proclamation so that it did not apply to certain types of debts, examples of which were debts incurred after the British occupation, debts incurred prior to the British occupation not exceeding 5,000 lire, wages and salaries, endowments and insurance benefits on policies issued by certain organisations, trade debts due to public utility companies or debts to the Italian government, and the like.

The proclamation establishing the regular system of courts was not published in Somalia until the 26th July, 1941; *ad hoc* military courts operated in the interim, the Political and Gendarmerie Officers being very much helped in their work by the issue by the Legal Adviser of Judicial Instructions covering all angles of law. In addition to these courts Qadis Courts sat daily to try petty criminal cases concerned with offences against Mohammedan law and custom committed by Mohammedans. The discovery and translation of the Italian organic law relating to Somalia were considerably delayed and it was found that there were many points of difference between this system and that in Eritrea. Despite many difficulties an Italian civil court was re-opened, under the presidency of the only Italian judge remaining in Somalia, in the Palace of Justice, Mogadishu, in the autumn of 1941.

The first occupation of Cyrenaica at the beginning of 1941, being as it were the cradle of Military Administration, brought to light interesting legal data. But the occupation did not last long enough to create problems of any gravity. The second occupation, carried out by forces under General Auchinleck, was also of such short duration that Military Administration was scarcely able to come into being. But in October, 1942, the organisation for the final occupation of Cyrenaica was completed and on the 1st January, 1943, the outline of an administration took shape throughout the country. Compared with those in Italian East Africa the problems were somewhat different. Instead of the taking over of a territory more or less undamaged by war, with an Italian administration still capable of operation and, above all, with an Italian population, here was one vast battlefield, with towns a mass of rubble from aerial bombardment, ports littered with damaged and scuttled shipping, the countryside as a whole covered with abandoned and

ruined equipment of war ; in addition, the whole of the population was composed of Arab and Berber Moslems, most of whom were in pastoral or primitive agricultural social organisations, without any surviving urban amenities. The face of Cyrenaica had been changed by the Italians ; but the Italians were no more in Cyrenaica and all their organisation had disappeared with their going.

The legal staff of the B.M.A. consisted of the Deputy Legal Adviser, a President of the Courts and four assistant Legal Officers. Cyrenaica Proclamation No. 2 dealt with war crimes, defining a few offences and being similar to that already described. Proclamation No. 3 covered the powers of Military Courts, dealing with their extent of jurisdiction over persons and territory, summary and competence of general courts, advocates appeal and review, the death sentence, fines, publication of proclamations, prisoners of war, etc. In the absence of Italian Criminal Courts the only Criminal Courts in operation were the Military Courts which, in addition to war crimes, tried under proclamation a large number of civil crimes. The most numerous cases tried were those of unlawful possession of military stores and equipment and of being in prohibited areas or being out of doors during curfew. Proclamation No. 8 forbade the transfer of land unless the Deputy Legal Adviser first approved ; the re-opening of the registry was delayed by the Italians having taken the records to Tripoli and the D.L.A. being reluctant to act until the records were recovered. Proclamation No. 9 concerned the moratorium, forbidding persons to enforce certain debts at all, on the lines of the legislation previously introduced in Eritrea. Proclamation No. 14 dealt with the unlawful possession of military stores or equipment and the penalties attached thereto. As regards other courts in Cyrenaica a proclamation to restore the Civil Courts was in preparation at the end of 1943. The Mohammedan Sharia Law Courts continued to function after the evacuation of the Italians and at the 31st December, 1943, there were a Grand Qadi, nine Senior Qadi and thirteen Junior Qadi. As the Italians had held the Sharia Court of Appeal in Tripoli, with the separation of the territories a Court of Appeal was set up in Benghazi. There, too, the Rabbinical Court was re-opened. The principal international legal problem in Cyrenaica was that of title to land ; this has been referred to in Chapter XI, which also dealt with the reactions of the local population to the theory of the survival of Italian sovereignty in British Military Administration pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

Preparations for setting up the legal machinery in Tripolitania were also completed by the time that General Montgomery's forces reached the territory. British Military Courts were set up at Misurata as early as the 28th January and at Tripoli on the 2nd February. Law officers were appointed in five provinces and visited the centres of population under a circuit system. In Tripolitania the Italian judges had remained and, with the exception of one who had to be interned for Fascist tendencies, were willing, and permitted, to co-operate. The respective jurisdictions of the Military and Italian Courts were defined to prevent overlapping. The Italian Courts in Tripoli began functioning very soon after the occupation, but the gap between sittings of between one to three months meant that a great accumulation of arrears of work had to be cleared away. In the case of the higher Criminal Courts documents of proceedings in existence were examined by the Legal Adviser before permission was given to proceed. An investigation of the records of all prisoners was undertaken and it was found that a number of persons had been detained with only the vaguest charges formulated against them. As a result the prisons were holding persons who had been waiting for trial for as much as three months, but the matter was quickly dealt with and over 150 cases disposed of. The Italian courts effectively stamped out, by the imposition of severe sentences, the serious wave of housebreaking crimes by organised bands which broke out in the early days of occupation. The work done by the courts was generally excellent; their co-operation helped considerably to the establishment and maintenance of good order.

The Sharia and Rabbinical Courts carried on with the minimum of interference, their jurisdiction being limited to matters of religion, personal status and family law and, in the case of Sharia courts, inheritance and notarial functions. The work of the British military courts on war crimes was much the same as in Cyrenaica, being mostly concerned with offences under the proclamations. Disobedience of the orders of the Army Commander was treated seriously and the tendency at the beginning was for severe sentences to be imposed. A large majority of convicted persons took advantage of their right to petition, especially after several sentences had been reduced and in some cases quashed, which entailed a considerable amount of work for the Department, but provided a useful indication of the manner in which the courts were being conducted.

Justice generally was helped by a weekly conference between the Italian prosecutor, the police prosecutor and members of the

Legal Department. This was found the most effective way of dealing with problems in which a variety of different Penal Codes and procedures were involved. The legal aspect of certain major subjects, such as the custody of enemy property and parastatal concerns, is covered in Chapter XVII. The difficult problems of law on requisitioning are also covered in the same chapter, and here was another breeding ground for thorny disputes on policy. In passing it may not be inappropriate to observe that little guidance was obtained and much confusion caused by Articles 405-434 of the Manual of Military Law, which urgently requires reconsideration and redrafting in the light of modern requirements and practice, both from the points of view of the branches of the military staffs, formation commanders and those responsible for the civil administration of occupied territories or metropolitan territories of friendly governments where military operations are in progress.

In many fields the departments of Finance and Law were of course closely connected, as is obvious in the following chapters. Reference may here be made to the issue of Banks Orders and Notices which naturally involved both departments. Briefly, these were formulated by the "minutes" of the Controller of Finance and Accounts, which explained the course that he wished to take in dealing with the bank finance in an occupied territory ; the Legal Adviser confirmed that the C.F.A. was justified in what he proposed to draft into the documents. But here again international law and cases do not adequately deal with such a wide divergence of conditions as come to pass in occupied territories to-day. The results attained in Africa were nevertheless satisfactory to both departments, and successful as can be seen by an examination of the financial history of the occupied territories. One particular example may be cited, the British Military Jurisdiction Bank Accounts Notice No. 1 of 1942. This notice made possible the control of monetary matters in Ethiopia in all details which were found to be essential. By it the Deputy Controller of Banks could "block" any account and control the extent of withdrawals. He was in a position to forbid the banks to conduct new business in any currencies which he named and to keep accounts opened for new business separate from old accounts. The Deputy Controller of Banks was empowered to direct officials to comply with his instructions in any banking operations and furnish him with any information he might require. No transactions in securities could be carried out without prior permission in writing and no securities or valuables could be removed from a bank without

similar permission. This Notice also gave the Deputy Controller of Banks powers to transfer the Ethiopian branches of Italian banks to Asmara, and to dispense with the services of any bank officials if he so thought fit. The bank managers were held responsible for the conduct of their branches as laid out in the Notice, regardless of any inconsistencies with Italian law. But the Legal Adviser of the British Military Administration in Ethiopia took the line that the actions of the Controller of Finance and Accounts and his Deputy Controllers of Banks could not be justified by military necessity and that it was insufficient to plead that they were necessary to correct something which had been contrary to humanity and conscience, however desirable or necessary the actions were from the financial, economic or political standpoints. The Chief Legal Adviser at Political Branch, while admitting the force of the argument, if no military necessity, as such, was present, held that the Controller of Finance and Accounts was nevertheless right in proceeding as he had done, or was doing. The Legal Adviser in Ethiopia continued to contend that in that country, as in other countries, only military necessity could justify any legislation or executive action by a Military Administration otherwise than in accordance with the laws of the country occupied in force at the time of the occupation. For his part the Controller of Finance and Accounts held the view strongly that he need not and would not plead military necessity in this or any other case where economic reasons justified a certain course of action in the interests of good government of the territory. This doctrine was implicit in the Hague Convention. And in any event it was clear that a prolonged occupation, in conditions never contemplated in the Hague Convention, required legislation and executive action in many fields beyond, or in contradiction to, pre-existing laws, which could never be justified by "military necessity". In other words an Occupying Authority might have, and ought, to legislate for the good government of the country in the prevailing circumstances, as well as for its own military requirements.

The matter was fully discussed in December, 1941, by the Controller of Finance and Accounts in London, with, *inter alia*, the late Sir William Malkin, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office. Sir William Malkin very strongly supported the C.F.A. in his view that his actions did not necessarily require to be justified by military necessity or the plea that they sought to correct something which was contrary to humanity and conscience.

It was of the utmost importance that this doctrine should be

accepted, as it was, at an early date, since on it depended the measures in the interests of good government which the British Military Administrations were able to carry into effect, within the limits of the policy of H.M.G., to administer the occupied territories on the care and maintenance basis of a temporary régime.

During the period of British Military Administration under consideration, the Legal Advisers were confronted with the serious problem of being supplied, at long last, with text-books on international law, which, compiled by learned writers, dealt with the interpretation and application of a Convention which was inadequate to the existing circumstances. The observations in these learned works dealt with a state of affairs which might have arisen in the territory of a sovereign state in Europe a quarter of a century ago, where homogeneous nations were concerned and where existing law and judicial and executive arrangements were inadequate for the needs of a civilised people. Such was not the picture in the Italian African Empire in 1940 and the ensuing years.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XV

FINANCE : REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE AND CURRENCY

The Appointment of the First Controller of Finance and Accounts — The Letter of Instruction — Divergence of Views on Methods of Accounting — Lack of Qualified Personnel — The Submission of Accounts — Controls — The Drafting of Budgets — The £ s. d. of the African Administration — Currency Puzzles — The Minting of Maria Theresa Dollars — Meeting at War Office on Finance in Italian Colonial Territories — Allied Troops and the Rate of Exchange — Currency Reserves — Movements of the Maria Theresa Dollar — The Transfer of Eritrea from Egyptian to East African Currency Basis — The Introduction of British Military Authority Currency in Tripolitania — The Problems of the Lire and Note Circulation — The Effects of Currency Policy in the Occupied Territories on Neighbouring Territories — The Black Market and Bazaars — Relations between Controllers of Finance and Accounts and the War Office.

CHAPTER XV

Finance : Revenue and Expenditure and Currency

THE financial side of the organisation dealing with the Administration of Occupied Enemy Territories in Africa includes so many technical subjects ranging over the whole field of finance proper and economics that only a cursory record of some of the financial subjects can be attempted in the compass of this volume. The details and statistical data exist in the Semi-Annual and Special Reports of the Controllers of Finance and Accounts for the student of administration and economics ; they are more voluminous than might be expected, considering the circumstances under which the organisation came into being.

In January, 1941, the Chief Political Officer at G.H.Q., Middle East, Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, anticipating the complexities of the finance and economy of the territories which he expected would be occupied in the course of that year, asked the War Office to supply a qualified officer from London ; the subject fell without the scope of the Military Financial Adviser at G.H.Q., who was concerned with normal army pay and administrative matters. Major the Hon. F. Rodd (later Lord Rennell), who had recently been in London, arrived in Cairo in the course of February, 1941, on posting for certain operations in the Sahara, which were to have a connection with the advance of General Wavell's forces westwards of Cyrenaica, had these not had to give place to the Greek campaign. Major Rodd was instead diverted to the appointment envisaged in Sir Philip Mitchell's request for help. He was posted on the 24th February, with the rank of Colonel, as Controller of Finance and Accounts, a title chosen to mark the difference in the functions of this office as compared with that of the Financial Adviser at G.H.Q. In the autumn of 1941 the grading of the appointment was raised to that of Brigadier, but when later the functions of the C.F.A. were divided between two Controllers in Cairo and Nairobi respectively, the grading was once more reduced to that of Colonel for those who followed Colonel Rodd in his appointment.

The functions of the Controller of Finance and Accounts were set out in a letter of instruction from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the War Office dated the 17th March, 1941. This was slightly modified in the autumn of that year to conform

with the changed conditions of the summer when the whole of Italian East Africa had been occupied in addition to British Somaliland, but Cyrenaica had been evacuated as a result of the German offensive of the spring of 1941. The amended letter of instruction is worth quoting in full since it remained the authority for the work of successive Controllers of Finance and Accounts in Cairo and Nairobi and established from the beginning the direct dependence of that office on the Permanent Under-Secretary of the War Office.

“ Sir,

“ 1. You have been appointed Financial Officer for British Somaliland and Italian East Africa so long and insofar as they are occupied and administered by British forces. Your title will be Controller of Finance and Accounts, O.T.A., East Africa.

“ 2. For reasons of policy the administration of these territories will be a military one, and will be under the direction of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, under whom officers will be appointed to carry on the administration.

“ 3. Owing to the fact that this is a Military administration, the financial responsibility to Parliament will rest under the Secretary of State for War on the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War (the Accounting Officer for the War Office) whose representative you will be. The normal channel of communication regarding Italian East Africa and British Somaliland on financial and economic matters will be as heretofore *directly* with the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War by despatch or telegram to the War Office, but you will normally submit such communications as you make to the Chief Political Officer before despatch for any comments he may see fit to make. The Chief Political Officer will ensure that any communications which may affect G.H.Q., East Africa Command, are brought to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief.

“ 4. You will give the Chief Political Officer (representing the Commander-in-Chief) financial advice in connection with the administration of the territories, but such advice will not bind him nor relieve him of responsibility for any administrative action taken by him as the result of such advice. The advice of the Deputy Controllers of Finance and Accounts to the Military Governors in the separate administrations will be given on the same basis and you should inform them accordingly. It is understood that for local and practical reasons the Chief Political Officer has asked you, on personal grounds, to undertake certain

administrative duties in the Occupied Territories Administration in addition to the financial duties specifically described in these letters. Your financial duties and responsibilities will nevertheless remain paramount and will not be regarded as restricted by any such local and personal arrangements whether these are temporary or continuing.

“5. You will in conjunction with the Chief Political Officer be responsible through the medium of the subordinate finance officers in the separate administrative areas, for securing the revenue, for the general financial control and administration and for the accounting in those areas. Financial matters connected with the troops will fall outside your province.

“6. The general policy to be followed in the administration of occupied territories will be in accordance with Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, and such further instructions as the Army Council may, from time to time, issue. It is assumed that the Military Governors will retain where possible the machinery of existing administrations and that this will include the collection of taxes, etc., due to the State and the methods of dealing with and accounting for the expenditure on the administration. The position in regard to Ethiopia is of course special and the general administrative policy, and in consequence your financial responsibilities, will be governed by any decision of His Majesty's Government as to the nature of the administration in Ethiopia and on which department the responsibility for carrying out the decisions rests.

“7. While it is necessary during such time as the administration is under military control to bring to account in the books of the War Office the net surplus or deficit on the various administrations it is nevertheless desired to keep the finances of the Occupied Territories distinct locally from the ordinary Army Accounts. Your account will not, therefore, be rendered like Army Accounts through the Command Paymaster and Financial Adviser, East Africa.

“8. You should consider and work out with the Chief Political Officer an accounting system which will show (1) the whole of the receipts of each administration from all sources—cash supplies and stores, including cash, stores and services obtained from any source and (2) how these are disposed of. The system should be such that while it will enable a budget for future requirements to be drawn up it will also lend itself to show at any time the financial position of any administration.

“9. A report outlining the proposed scheme of financial administration including the proposed framework of the Accounts

should be rendered to this office as early as possible. Further reports regarding the working of the scheme and other important financial matters should be sent thereafter on 30th September and at six monthly intervals after that date.

“ 10. There will be no financial adjustment between Army Funds on the one hand and the various Occupied Territory Administrations on the other for issues and services rendered by the one to the other, except that all agency cash payments will be the subject of adjustment (see paragraph 11 below). But it is necessary to know what is the cost of the various Occupied Territory Administrations both in cash and in kind. Records will be maintained of all issues and services rendered by Occupied Territory Administrations to the Army; similarly all issues and services rendered by the Army to the Occupied Territory Administrations should be noted by you. A statement agreed between you and the Director of Military Audit, East Africa Command, should be sent to the War Office quarterly showing in the case of each Occupied Territory Administration the value in sterling (including Departmental expenses and freight) of all issues and services made to that Administration from Army sources and the value of any reciprocal issues and services rendered by the Occupied Territory Administration to the Army. The provisions of this paragraph will also apply to the Royal Air Force, and the required statement should be agreed with the local financial representative of the Air Ministry. The local financial representative of the Air Ministry referred to is the Deputy Financial Adviser and Chief Auditor, Air Forces in East Africa.

“ 11. The pay, etc., of Occupied Territory Administrations personnel, both military and civil, will form a charge against the Occupied Territory Administration concerned. As regards military personnel (while pay will continue to be issued under Army arrangements), the War Office will calculate what amounts in respect of pay and allowances of officers and other ranks should be added by the War Office (as additional debits against Occupied Territory Administrations) to the statements rendered under paragraph 10. For this purpose you should forward to the War Office each month, a list showing the numbers of all Army personnel by paid ranks serving in Headquarters Occupied Territory Administration and each of the various administrations separately.

“ Pay and allowances issued from Army sources to civil personnel will be recovered from the funds of the Occupied Territory Administration concerned. Similarly, any other agency cash payments made by Army Paymaster on behalf of Occupied

Territory Administration, will be subject to recovery from the Administration concerned and vice versa.

“ 12. Any funds which you or the Deputy Controllers of Finance and Accounts require in addition to revenue, should be drawn from the Army Command Paymaster. Similarly, any surplus of revenue over expenditure should be handed over periodically to the Army Command Paymaster. The sums so issued or received by the Army Command Paymaster will be charged or credited to the administration concerned in the War Office books, and will be cleared on receipt of your accounts. You will not render any accounts to the Army Command Paymasters.

“ 13. A monthly cash account should be produced for each administration showing cash receipts brought to account from the various sources (e.g. judicial fines and fees, revenue and sums received from the Army Paymaster) and expenditure brought to account (e.g. payments to Administrative staff, on administration (ordinary and special services) and sums handed over to the Army Paymaster). As stated in paragraph 9, you should submit your proposals for the framework of the account, but no doubt that framework will provide for the credits and charges in this account to be classified according to the department of administrative service concerned, e.g. Law and Justice, Police, Agriculture, etc.

“ 14. The monthly cash accounts of Headquarters Occupied Territory Administration and all separate administrations for which you are the financial officer will be collected by you, stated in sterling and set out in a comprehensive statement which you will certify and pass monthly in triplicate to the British Exchequer and Audit Department in Cairo. (The accounts should be converted into sterling at the official rates of exchange agreed with you from time to time.) That Department will retain the triplicate copy and pass the original and duplicate to this office where the necessary postings in War Office books will be made.

“ 15. Instructions will be issued, in due course, to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, regarding the extent of his financial powers in dealing with Occupied Territory Administration expenditure. Proposals involving expenditure beyond his powers will be referred to the War Office for decision.

“ 16. As regards currency, rates of exchange, and banking, your attention is drawn to War Office telegram of 27th February, 1941, in which you are asked to consult the Council in advance unless immediate local action is imperative. The general policy on these matters will be notified to you from time to time by cable.

“ 17. The details of your accounts will be subject to audit by

the Exchequer and Audit Department in the Middle East with the head of which you should make contact at an early date and make arrangements to meet his requirements.

" 18. Copies of the letters dated 17th March, 1941, and 25th November, 1941, are being sent to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, for the information of himself and the Chief Political Officer.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) P. J. GRIGG."

Successive amending instructions re-included Libya and covered the division of the territories between Political Branches North and South (see Chapter XIII). The tenor of all the letters followed the one quoted above.

The subjects referred to in Section 16 of this letter of instruction became known as "reserved subjects", on which local discretion in matters of policy was removed from the C.-in-C. and his C.P.O. since they affected international commitments and the policy of H.M.G. at the highest financial level.

The letter of instruction not only gave the C.F.A. very wide powers and direct contact with the War Office, but departed from the general principle of military finance and accounting in time of war by providing for the maintenance of administrative accounts designed to reflect the actual cost of administering the occupied territories. This was much more on Colonial lines than is the practice in accounting for Army expenditure of troops in the field, where the cost of emoluments and equipment are not recorded area by area. Although it is anticipating matters somewhat it may be desirable here to draw attention to the provision in Section 10 of the letter of instruction. This instruction involved a great deal of complicated work in the areas administered and at headquarters when the accounts were compiled, but was successfully accomplished despite the protests of the Military Financial Advisers that their own records and machinery did not allow of the issues of equipment and stores to the Occupied Territory Administrations to be brought to account in values. In point of fact, owing to War Office accounting methods which made a strict reconciliation between these entries in the Occupied Territories Administration accounts and the books in London impossible, in 1942 the responsible Finance Branch at the War Office in London proposed to the C.F.A. that this original instruction should be suspended as involving too much labour. The original justification had been the somewhat theoretical

conception of ascertaining the total cost of administration with a view to recovering this from Italy or the successor state responsible for the areas occupied after the war : it was conceded by all parties in 1942-43 that the point was an academic one. The C.F.A. and his chief accountant, however, having succeeded in installing a system of accounting which did comply with the original instruction, protested against the proposed relaxation and continued to maintain their preference for a system which gave a very fair approximation of total cost. The curious position had thus developed of a dependent financial administration and control insisting on a stricter system of accounting than the cash issue system which the War Office was prepared to accept as sufficient. In the outcome the stricter system was maintained throughout the period under review and passed with flying colours the scrutiny of the Public Accounts Committee and a Select Committee on National Expenditure in later years. The final method adopted by the Accountant General to simplify the task of issuing branches of the Army, and of control within the administration of Political Branches in the several territories, was to replace priced vouchers issued by the supply depots with receivable orders, copies of which passed into the two sides of the Army machine for reconciliation purposes, by numbers, quantities or bulk, but which were only brought to account in values as well on the O.T.A. side.

The other point of interest in the letter of instruction to the C.F.A. was that he was placed in the position of being the controller of expenditure of the C.P.O. with direct reference to London. This was a position familiar in Army practice so far as Military Financial Advisers were concerned, but quite novel to any Colonial administrator who, like Sir Philip Mitchell, had held gubernatorial appointments. In spite of some misgivings about how this system would work out in practice, Sir Philip Mitchell was as ready as ever to try anything new and in later months and years admitted that the whole organisation had been happy and successful. The effect of the terms of the appointment of the C.F.A. was that he combined the function of controller and accounting officer for the Administration with that of financial adviser to the C.P.O. The latter was also relieved of a great deal of other work as an executive officer at the headquarters of the organisation, but the P.U.S. stipulated that these functions should be personal to the holder of the appointment and not included in any letter of instructions.

The financial machinery proved very difficult to start mainly on account of shortage of qualified personnel, not only on the

specialised sides of economics, banking and currency control, but even in the regular financial sections of the Deputy Controllers of Finance and Accounts and of the Accounting Branch. The services of a Chief Accountant were only secured on the 19th April, 1941, in the person of Mr. (Colonel) P. W. Adshead (Palestine Service) and adequate accounting officers in the territories and at headquarters were not available even in reasonable numbers before 1942. The C.F.A., up to the 26th May when Lieut.-Colonel (Brigadier) M. Babington-Smith arrived from England, had no assistant except an administrative officer from the Nigerian Service, and even by the end of the year 1941 the posts of Deputy Controllers of Finance and Accounts and their subordinates were not finally or adequately staffed. The first appointments of D.C.F.A.'s in Somalia and Eritrea did not prove suitable and had to be changed. By January, 1942, however, the monthly accounts of the various administrations up to the end of October, 1941, had been completed and submitted to the War Office through H.M. Exchequer and Audit Office in Cairo. From then on the monthly accounts went forward with reasonable regularity from three to four months after the month which they covered. Nevertheless the early accounts contained a large number of items, in aggregate of considerable amount, which were in suspense as uncleared with the local territorial accounts or unreconciled with the parties from which drawings, or to which payments, had been made. It was the shortage and inexperience of local accounting staffs everywhere which determined the decision of the C.F.A. to concentrate what accounting staff there was at his headquarters and compile all accounts there for an indeterminate future period. The decision involved some additional delay since communications were difficult at all times and the growing volume of vouchers and receipts frequently precluded the use of air transport for the paper involved. The outcome was, however, more satisfactory than would have been the case had local accounting been installed from the first, and saved the slender staffs of the territories a great deal of routine work in the early days, enabling them to deal with important administration matters more efficiently.

The form of accounts is too technical a subject to be treated at any length in this record beyond stating that each territory was accounted for separately and even certain enterprises within each territory were treated as self-accounting units. This was notably the case with the railways in Eritrea and Ethiopia whose receipts and disbursements were not included in the revenue and expenditure accounts of the territories. The accountants of each

territory and the headquarters kept cash accounts and " below the line " accounts of debit and credit items, against each other and third parties reflecting costs and offsets when no cash passed. It was in these items that were eventually reflected the expenditure of the administration arising out of stores and equipment issued for the use of the administrations in the territories and drawn from Army depots.

The first control instituted was in the drawing and disposal of funds from the Chief or Command Paymasters who, in accordance with the instructions from the War Office, supplied the cash resources in the first place to pay for the administrative expenses in the territories beyond what could be collected from revenues. Drawings were made only on the authority of the C.F.A. and controlled by two signatures. The disbursements to the territories, which were not allowed to draw on their own authority from local Army field cashiers or paymasters, were then made by the C.F.A. Wherever possible these drawings were made by the C.F.A. from the Army source most convenient and paid into Barclays Bank in Cairo or Nairobi, whence they were remitted through Barclays Bank branches when these were available. When branches of this bank were not available the territories were financed in the first instance, until administrative treasuries and currency reserves were set up, by local Army Paymasters or Field Cashiers, but only on the authority of the Command Paymaster concerned acting on the instructions of the C.F.A. himself. The Command Paymasters recorded in their accounts to the War Office only the issues, leaving the justification and disposal of the drawings to be brought to account by the C.F.A. in his monthly accounts. Where local treasuries and currency reserves were set up, as will be recorded, the process was reversed and the C.F.A. became the source of local currency supply for the Army Paymasters and Field Cashiers and the ultimate accounting responsibility was reversed insofar as ordinary Army expenditure was affected.

The second financial control which was imposed took shape at the end of 1941 : this was the drawing up of budgets of revenue and expenditure in each separate territory. The first rudimentary budget was drawn up for Ethiopia under main heads of expenditure only, in order to arrive at an estimate of what should be the magnitude of a proposed grant-in-aid to the Emperor's Government by H.M.G. in connection with the negotiations then in course for an agreement between the two Governments. The estimate was *ad hoc* to the peculiar circumstances of the country and bore little resemblance to what would be needed for the other

territories. But a start having been made here, the C.F.A. gave instructions to the D.C.F.A. in each territory to prepare a budget on orthodox British lines for his area. The financial year fixed for all the territories was the 1st July-30th June, which corresponded with the climate and crop years of the East African territories, and also suited North African conditions.

Prior to the drafting of budgets, expenditure in the territories was authorised by the C.F.A. in accordance with day to day requirements on a care and maintenance basis and without regard to amounts. The D.C.P.Os. and their D.C.F.As. acting as the financial watch-dogs of the C.F.A., who was the sole responsible accounting officer for them all, were authorised to expend in the early days any monies required for any purpose to set up and maintain an administration. This authority provided that no monies were spent on capital works, other than necessary repairs and rehabilitation of war damage necessary for the administration, without the authority of the C.F.A. who in those early days gave such authority in most cases without reference to the War Office. This discretion proved most successful and in fact was never abused, though some mistakes were made. Policy in regard to current expenditure was discussed by the C.F.A. in each territory in the course of his visits: for instance it was necessary at the outset of the occupation of Asmara to provide for destitution among the large numbers of Italians thrown out of employment by the cessation of all Italian military and commercial activity which followed the defeat of the Italian Army at Keren. The lack of staff and supplies precluded administering relief to the destitute Italian population in kind either directly or through what remained of their own administration. The C.F.A. in consequence authorised the D.C.P.O., after discussion with the C.P.O. on the spot, to issue relief in cash to the destitute. Lack of British staff obliged the British Military Administration to use the Italian administrative machine to a larger extent than was desirable to distribute this relief in cash to allegedly destitute persons. Some abuses did take place and it was only possible with more British staff in the course of the late summer of 1941 to provide proper controls and checks: but the policy, even if it did cost more than it should, saved an administrative breakdown and tided over the transition until a full British administration could be brought into existence.

It is a remarkable tribute to the relations between the financial administration in Africa and the Finance Branch of the War Office that the discretionary powers of the C.F.A. were never closely defined or limited in terms of amounts of money throughout the

period ; nor were the local administrations ever restricted in amounts in any urgent cases until the financial administration became more cut and dried by means of budgetary controls. Even then the C.F.A. had, and allowed, far greater discretion than that enjoyed by Colonial Governors. In his relations with the C.P.O. the C.F.A. took the line that any expenditure beyond the broad principle of care and maintenance required a certificate in the form of a "minute" that the expenditure was politically or militarily necessary. The C.F.A. reserved the right, to which his appointment entitled him, of referring, in the event of his disagreeing with the C.P.O., to the War Office. No such reference was ever needed or made, though for larger items when time permitted the matter was usually, but not invariably, referred in advance of expenditure to the War Office for sanction.

The first very tentative budgets for the partial financial year 1941-1942 served little more purpose than to introduce the budgetary system and control of expenditure which took shape in the year 1942-1943. When in the second financial year real budgetary control had been instituted, the practice was that the War Office sanctioned immediately all expenditure on recurrent items and later sanctioned, after due consideration, non-recurrent proposals. This sanction was translated into local control by the issue, on a certificate of the C.F.A., by the C.P.O. to each Military Administrator of a territory of a provisional warrant of expenditure. This was followed either by special expenditure warrants or a general warrant covering the whole budget, subject to any modifications imposed by London. The budgets took the usual British form of heads and sub-heads of expenditure, each divided into recurrent and non-recurrent items. The personnel items corresponded to the establishment of British officers and other ranks and locally recruited personnel ; in the case of the former group the expenditure was not of course met from local resources since the staff was paid through Army channels. This expenditure was brought to account "below the line" as debits to the territory and credits to the War Office. The usual British financial provisions of the non-transferability of items unexpended between heads of expenditure and of centralisation of all revenue without any allocation of special revenue to special expenditure were adhered to. In the territories, control involved the use of vote books by expending officers and the submission of expenditure and revenue accounts by budget heads and sub-heads. In the early days, and especially pending the circulation of approved budgets, the allocation of doubtful or unclarified items was made

at the Headquarters Accounts Branch of the C.F.A. under the authority of the Accountant-General, duly empowered by the former. Territories and self-accounting units were not permitted to accumulate reserves from economies or unspent votes, even if their total revenue exceeded total expenditure at the end of each year, as began to take place in 1943.

The machinery of accounting was laid down by general accounting instructions drawn up by the Accountant-General, and circulated to all officers in the organisation, and modified or added to by subsequent accounting instructions. This corpus of rules, together with the appropriate forms, was designed *ab origine* by the Accountant-General out of governmental and commercial accounting experience; it followed no one model of British official accounting practice, though it approximated most nearly to the British Crown Colony usages in African territories. The same system was used in all the territories and at both headquarters when these were separated. The system and the form of budgets adopted commended themselves both to the War Office and to the Treasury in London, in spite of the considerable differences involved as compared with standard British practices.

The monthly accounts grew in volume and complexity as the administrations developed, but the uniformity of system and local resistance to any changes enabled consolidated accounts to be drawn up for each financial year, which were comparable *inter se*. The heavy "below the line" accounts were eventually cleared as routine established itself. In order to make a reconciliation between the administrative accounts and the regular Army accounts possible, to each monthly set of accounts was appended a "ledger account" of the groups of administration "in account with H.M.G.", which showed the actual cash drawings from and to Army Paymasters and other official sources including Colonial Governments and similarly drawings from and to the currency reserves, to which reference is made hereafter. At the War Office end the deficits on the Administrations as a whole were borne on a sub-head of Vote XI of the Army Vote. The consolidated accounts of the African Administration for the financial years, part of 1941, 1941-42, 1942-43, 1943-44, 1944-45 (of which the first three were published in Cmd. 6589 of 1945) are as follows:—

I Summary of Combined Statements of Cash Revenue and Expenditure and Recorded Values of Army Issues, Services and Emoluments for Occupied Territories Administration for the Period from commencement of Occupation to 30th June, 1941

Schedule No.	Territory	REVENUE		EXPENDITURE				Net Deficit	
		Cash Account	Recorded Value of Stores and Services for Army, etc.	Total	Cash Account	Recorded Value of Army Emoluments	Recorded Value of Stores and Services by Army, etc.		Total
1	Eritrea
2	Ethiopia
3	Somalia
4	British Somaliland
5	Cyrenacia
6	Headquarters and Agencies
		£ 31,392	No 31,392	£ 44,505	£ 51,206	£ 8,743	£ 46,608	£ 106,557	£ 75,165
		4,257	recorded 4,257	8,032	32,918	11,458	23,815	68,191	63,934
		8,032	charges 8,032	691	15,372	12,934	12,162	40,468	32,436
		691	during 691	132	14,787	3,563	2,775	21,125	20,434
		132	this 132	1	6,243	3,632	114	9,989	9,857
		1	period 1		2,101	5,514	1,373	8,988	8,987
		44,505		44,505	122,627	45,844	86,847	255,318	210,813

II Summary of Combined Statements of Cash Revenue and Expenditure and Recorded Values of Army Issues, Services and Emoluments for Occupied Territories Administration for the Financial Year from 1st July, 1941, to 30th June, 1942

Schedule No.	Territory	REVENUE		EXPENDITURE						Net Deficit	Net Surplus
		Cash Account	Recorded Value of Stores and Services for Army, etc.	Total	Cash Account	Recorded Value of Army Emoluments	Recorded Value of Stores and Services by Army, etc.	Total			
									£		
1	Eritrea (including Assab)	748,835	20,239	769,074	1,059,798	61,159	416,736	1,537,693	768,619	—	
2	Ethiopia	149,224	2,222	151,446	638,936	54,243	151,940	845,119	693,673	—	
3	Somalia	144,313	4,958	149,271	394,578	76,842	231,339	612,759	463,488	—	
4	British Somaliland ..	220,602	1,579	222,181	122,787	20,845	69,599	213,231	—	8,950	
5	Cyrenaica	7,832	—	7,832	20,639	14,901	17,839	53,379	45,547	—	
6	Ethiopia Railways .. *	83,928	58,686	142,614	101,783	10,598	17,769	130,150	—	12,464	
7	Eritrea Railways .. *	28,530	76,908	105,438	166,843	7,750	19,463	188,056	82,618	—	
8	Headquarters and Agencies	1,701	43,896	45,597	83,360	42,829	21,926	148,115	102,518	—	
		1,384,965	208,488	1,593,453	2,492,724	289,167	946,611	3,728,502	2,156,463	21,414	
										2,135,049	

* Includes passenger and freight receipts in respect of O.T.A. traffic carried

III Summary of Combined Statements of Cash Revenue and Expenditure and Recorded Values of Army Issues, Services and Emoluments for Occupied Territories Administration for the Financial Year from 1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943

Schedule No.	Territory	REVENUE		EXPENDITURE					Net Deficit	Net Surplus
		Cash Account	Recorded Value of Stores and Services for Army, etc.	Total	Cash Account	Recorded Value of Army Emoluments	Recorded Value of Stores and Services by Army, etc.	Total		
		£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1	Eritrea (including Railways)	1,869,933	286,535	2,156,468	1,769,563	125,698	523,074	2,418,335	261,867	—
4	Ethiopia Railways ..	220,986	21,973	242,959	123,844	5,826	15,964	145,634	—	97,325
5	Reserved Areas (Ethiopia)	22,256	—	22,256	113,043	10,745	24,744	148,532	126,276	—
6	Somalia	223,144	—	223,144	462,671	112,659	172,987	748,317	525,173	—
7	British Somaliland	243,875	5,157	249,032	92,142	21,439	24,233	137,834	—	111,198
8	Cyrenaica	231,254	1,868	233,062	145,161	41,957	419,854	666,072	373,010	—
9	Tripolitania	230,359	—	230,359	221,912	71,543	487,386	779,941	549,582	—
11	Madagascar	125,454	2,061	127,515	53,783	13,235	27,018	94,036	—	33,479
12	Headquarters and Agencies	627,204	8,093	635,297	54,567	100,655	3,795	159,017	—	476,280
		3,794,465	325,627	4,120,092	3,035,786	502,877	1,699,055	5,237,718	1,835,908	718,282
										1,117,626

Note : The total Net Deficit of £1,117,626 includes cash debits of £81,245 on account of Evacuation

IV Summary of Combined Statements of Cash Revenue and Expenditure and Recorded Values of Army Issues, Services and Emoluments for Occupied Territories Administration for the Financial Year from 1st July, 1943, to 30th June, 1944

Schedule No.	Territory	Total Revenue	Total Expenditure	Net Deficit	Net Surplus
1	Eritrea	£ 2,201,090	£ 2,129,684	£ —	£ 71,406
4	Ethiopia Railway	469,222	286,946	—	182,276
5	Reserved Areas (Ethiopia up to 1942)	7,762	49,133	41,371	—
6	Somalia	532,842	1,116,569	583,727	—
7	British Somaliland	218,276	317,146	98,870	—
8	Cyrenaica	816,177	1,174,442	358,265	—
9	Tripolitania	2,359,437	2,726,915	376,478	—
10	Dodecanese	1,062	154,681	153,079	—
12	Headquarters	464,296	293,257	—	171,039
		7,061,704	8,248,773	1,611,790	424,721
				<u>1,187,069</u>	

V Summary of Combined Statements of Cash Revenue and Expenditure and Recorded Values of Army Issues, Services and Enrolments for Occupied Territories Administration for the Financial Year from 1st July, 1944, to 30th June, 1945

Schedule No.	Territory	Total Revenue	Total Expenditure	Net Deficit	Net Surplus
1	Eritrea	£ 2,336,564	£ 2,427,973	£ 91,409	£ —
4	Ethiopia Railway ..	438,171	281,455	—	156,716
5	Reserved Areas (Ethiopia up to 1942)	25,675	86,759	61,084	—
6	Somalia	782,378	1,265,473	483,095	—
7	British Somaliland ..	282,949	535,158	252,209	—
8	Cyrenaica	1,259,250	1,658,227	398,977	—
9	Tripolitania	3,557,459	3,549,811	—	7,648
10	Dodecanese	149,356	465,346	315,990	—
12	Headquarters	20,871	511,457	490,586	—
		8,852,673	10,781,659	2,093,350	164,364
				<u>1,928,986</u>	

The early, but not too early, control of expenditure described gave latitude when it was needed: this latitude gave rise to commendably small losses by defalcations and thefts, inseparable from the shortage of staff and the dishonesty of local employees. The War Office authorised the C.F.A. to exercise discretion in writing off cash losses and losses of equipment, on the lines provided for in King's Regulations for the Army, but in larger amounts than therein laid down. But it was the practice of the C.F.A. in every case to report by despatch to the P.U.S. at the War Office on such matters as soon as they were discovered and to seek authority, when required, to write off the amounts involved insofar as they were irrecoverable. Whether the writing off of such items was within or without his discretion, the C.F.A., with the authority of the C.P.O. and under the procedure of Courts of Inquiry in every case, recovered whatever was possible from the officers responsible whenever it was felt by the Court that carelessness or other circumstances justified such action. The aggregates of cash losses, in spite of the very considerable movements of money involved, were infinitesimal; the losses due to over-expenditure or misdirected expenditure were equally small.

One of the first major problems confronting the War Office and their Controller of Finance and Accounts in 1941 was the currency to be used in the territories occupied or to be occupied. Prior to the invasion of the Italian territories the position in those territories and in contiguous territories was as follows. Tripoli and Cyrenaica used Italian metropolitan lira currency. The Italian East African Empire also used Italian metropolitan currency, but it was known that plans had been made, if not brought into being, to create an Italian East African currency either in the form of a special series of notes and coin or in the form of metropolitan currency in some way specially distinguished. In the event it was discovered that under special powers the Italian Government in East Africa did issue a limited quantity of Italian East African notes in the form of metropolitan notes with a red overprint "Africa Orientale Italiana". These were not legal tender in Italy, and this issue represented only a small proportion of the Italian metropolitan note circulation in East Africa. The amount of the note circulation in the Italian North and East African Colonies was not known. Italian coin in all the colonies was metropolitan divisionary coin, of which the silver coinage, in spite of its relatively low silver content, was already in process of being withdrawn from circulation in Italy and overseas as a measure of exchange precaution and economy. The official rate of exchange

of the Italian lira under a strict exchange control régime was : 83.65 lire = £1 sterling on the 1st September, 1939, when £1 sterling was equal to \$4.20 U.S. In January, 1940, the sterling—U.S. \$ rate was officially pegged at \$4.03 = £1, which, on a theoretical parity basis, would have made £1 = 76.57 lire. On the outbreak of war with Italy the lira rate was nominally pegged on the theoretical gold value of the pound in terms of U.S. \$ at 71.25 lire = £1. It was, however, known before the outbreak of war that the Italian official rate was fictitious and that black market transactions in Switzerland showed a considerable depreciation of Italian currency against sterling before ever Italy entered the war. Information from travellers in Ethiopia also showed that there was considerable distrust of Italian currency in the bazaars of Aden, Kenya and Italian East Africa itself, which had brought the rate of £1 sterling to over 300 lire in not infrequent transactions, even by Italians themselves.

In Ethiopia prior to the Italo-Abyssinian War the currency of the country was the Maria Theresa dollar, a silver coin 833 parts fine equal to something of the order of 2/- sterling, but fluctuating according to the world market price of silver and not in fixed relationship with any other currency. This currency had no divisionary coin, though traditional smaller Ethiopian coin did exist without ever being used to any extent even in the larger centres. Attempts by the Ethiopian Governments on more than one occasion to introduce notes had never met with any popular support. Barter carried a great deal of the internal trade. Bars of salt and cartridges had provided additional media of exchange and the divisionary coin which the Maria Theresa dollar currency did not have.

In Egypt the currency was, and is, the Egyptian pound linked with sterling at £E1 = £1 os. 6d. sterling and divided into 100 Piastres : 5 Piastres were thus worth approximately 1/- sterling. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Egyptian currency was legal tender with the addition of a limited amount of U.K. 1/- and 2/- silver coin reputed to be equivalent to 5 and 10 Piastres respectively. Kenya had, and has, sterling currency in shilling form divided in 100 cents, but on a parity with U.K. currency. Aden and British Somaliland used the Indian Rupee currency in notes and coin with the Rupee pegged at 1/6 sterling. The Maria Theresa dollar had currency in the bazaars of Aden and Berbera, and on the Arabian coast. It was known that Italians were continuing to use the Maria Theresa dollar in Ethiopia to some extent, in certain areas and for certain purposes when the local population was particularly averse to Italian currency notes.

The problem of what currency to use and what rates of exchange to fix in order to secure uniformity throughout the sphere of operations in 1941 was obviously fairly complicated, especially if regard were had to the fact that allied troops would operate from separate currency areas, namely, Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and Aden.

The problem was not simplified by the interchangeability of the Italian notes circulating in Africa with those in Italy itself, the known existence of a volume of indeterminate size of Italian notes in Egypt, the Levant and Arabia, and the possibility of exchange transactions being conducted by all sorts and conditions of men throughout the Levant, including the neutral territory of Turkey. Moreover the total volume of notes outstanding in the Italian colonies, though known to be considerable, was an entirely uncertain factor. The problem was to relate the currency or currencies which the troops would have and use when they entered enemy country with the local currency and at the same time to avoid at all costs standing behind or guaranteeing the Italian money in terms of any of the British military currencies. The alternative of using local, namely, Italian, currency from the outset was not possible since the C.F.A. possessed no stocks of lira notes and could not be certain of securing any at an early date. There was no time to create an *ad hoc* currency before operations began, as was done in anticipation of the invasion of Italy in July, 1943, and of France in June, 1944. There was therefore no alternative but to use local British currencies, at any rate to begin with, which involved relating these currencies to the Italian lira but without guaranteeing the latter.

To this general statement that the British had no currencies except their own (including for this purpose Egyptian currency which the British troops in Middle East were using) there was one exception. When it was decided to promote the Ethiopian guerilla campaign, currency necessary to finance the activities was created in the form of Maria Theresa dollars. These were minted first in London, where the Royal Mint had purchased the dies from Austria some years previously, and later in India. It was decided to use Maria Theresa dollars because, apart from Italian currency, this coin was the only one in vogue and familiar within the borders of old Ethiopia: it was believed that the traditional repugnance of the population to all paper money would have caused difficulties if the Patriot Movement had to use Egyptian or other sterling currency. But the decision to use Maria Theresa dollars was an expensive and onerous one. Minting the coin, with its

very high silver content, used up the bulk of British silver stocks. For its unitary value, the coin is very heavy ; one ton of coin was only worth about £3,000 excluding packing. The cost of the Patriot Movement in a prolonged campaign would obviously be considerable. Actually the Patriot Movement only absorbed a fraction of the whole stock of coin minted, largely on account of the speed of events leading to the rapid termination of the Ethiopian campaign. . But when plans were laid for the operations provision had also to be made for financing British regular military commitments for which it was expected Maria Theresa dollars would be needed. Similarly when an administration was set up it was anticipated that this currency also would have to be used for most current expenditure. In all nearly £3,000,000 worth of Maria Theresa dollars were minted and brought to Eastern Africa, all of the traditional tenor of 833 fine and struck from the old dies.

In considering rates of exchange to be used in this part of the world, H.M.G. decided in principle to attribute a value to the Maria Theresa dollar representing the market price of silver, which had been officially pegged in London and Bombay, plus the cost of minting. The initial price fixed was $1/10\frac{1}{2}$ sterling which, though subsequently raised to $2/6$, had a bearing on the whole complex of currency rates fixed for British currencies *vis-a-vis* Italian lire. The principle adopted by H.M.G. was that no profit (or loss) on currency was politically desirable in financing the Patriot Movement with Maria Theresa dollars.

Prior to his departure from London for Cairo in the early weeks of 1941 Lord Rennell was called, together with a representative of the Bank of England, to an interdepartmental meeting held at the War Office to consider currency and financial matters in the Italian colonial territories. At the meeting such information as was available on the value of Italian currency in the black markets of Europe and the Levant was considered in the light of the probable true value of the lira in terms of prices in Cyrenaica and Italian East Africa. Expert advice tendered went to show that the lira could not be expected, having regard to known inflationary tendencies and practices in metropolitan Italy, to have a value of much more than between 350 and 400 lire = £1 sterling and possibly a figure of well over 400 would prove to be true. In the meanwhile Cairo had proposed to adopt a value for the lira in Cyrenaica of 200 lire = £1 Egyptian = 100 Piastres, partly as a matter of convenience and partly on the grounds that any worse rate for the lira would react hardly on the native population of North Africa which it was desirable to conciliate. This argument

actually had little value in Cyrenaica, where the native population was largely nomadic or semi-nomadic and in any event had little trust in anything Italian, including the currency. This rate, not only in itself too favourable to the lira and thus politically undesirable, would have been impossible in East Africa where it was felt that the same lira rate should obtain as in North Africa, since very much lower rates had already become current in the bazaars. It was obviously essential to avoid giving the impression that H.M.G. was supporting or attributing a higher value to Italian currency in a vast area containing an entirely unknown quantity of Italian currency than had already been established in the bazaars. Moreover, the possibility of a leakage of currency via Constantinople and the Levant or over the Tripolitania-Cyrenaica border, might easily have enabled the Italian Government to secure foreign exchange by selling its currency in these markets if a market rate, more favourable than even the Italian financial authorities could have hoped for, became in practice fixed by any action taken by the British military authorities. These considerations advanced at the War Office conference led H.M.G. to take the view that a rate of about 400 lire = £1 sterling was appropriate, and Middle East was instructed accordingly by the War Office.

Had only Cyrenaica and Egypt been concerned in the problem, a rate of 400 lire = 100 Piastres = £1 os. 6d. sterling might have been adopted, but when Lord Rennell reached Cairo he found that the East African campaigns had begun and that Rupees, East African currency and Maria Theresa dollars had also to be brought into the picture. To facilitate the work of the Army paymasters and to make things as simple as possible for the troops themselves, in large part native troops, it was essential to have a series of rates for all the currencies concerned which would avoid elaborate and complicated calculations and which could be applied to the whole area from Nairobi to Benghazi. All the currencies except the Maria Theresa dollar were calculable in whole pennies, but this coin was fixed with a value of $1/10\frac{1}{2}$ d. Therefore the only common denomination of the sterling currencies was a $\frac{1}{2}$ d. of which the Maria Theresa dollar contained 45, the Rupee 36, the Egyptian Pound 492, the East African shilling 24 and the Pound sterling 480. After some exchange of telegrams between Lord Rennell, by that time C.F.A. in Cairo, and the War Office the rate for the Italian lira was fixed in March, 1941, at 480 = £1 sterling, or, one to a $\frac{1}{2}$ d., which made it readily calculable in terms of all the currencies used. This rate was therefore promulgated but not

without some outcry by the officers who were already engaged in setting up administrations in Cyrenaica and Western Eritrea, where other rates had been provisionally adopted. The officers concerned complained that the new rate would react very hardly on their newly acquired native constituents whom they were seeking to conciliate and propitiate, and for whom *more Anglorum* they became the advocates and protectors directly they set foot on Italian soil. In practice a rate of 400 lire = £1 would probably have been economically somewhat more satisfactory; a rate of 492 = £1 Egyptian or 100 Piastres (or 480 lire = £1 sterling) inevitably involved some accounting difficulties and was bound to become in practice one of 500 lire = 100 Piastres whenever Egyptian currency was used, as in Eritrea. But the convenience and political advantages of a rate of 1 lira = ½d. outweighed all else and was imposed as a matter of policy everywhere in the course of March, 1941. The Italian Government, when apprised of the rate fixed, took much exception to the propaganda effect of the decision and tried to counteract this blow at the prestige of Italian currency and credit over the Rome radio. The effect of the decision in the bazaar markets of Cairo and the Levant, where there had been some hoarding of Italian currency when Allied fortunes in the war were not very bright, was most satisfactory. The decision was a good piece of political and economic warfare, though it had not in any way been prompted by any of the departments of H.M.G. concerned with such activities.

The currency situation during the period under review throughout the Middle East and Africa was one of great complexity and some difficulty if only because of shortage of banknote paper, insufficient security printing establishments and acute supply and transport problems. Economic developments added to the difficulties, but most of these problems must fall outside the scope of this work.

The problem of currency supply affected the financial side of the Occupied Territories Administrations from the outset. It was a piece of supply machinery to which everyone had given insufficient attention. In the summer of 1941 there was a great shortage of all Egyptian currency media and especially small change, due to the large and growing body of British troops in Egypt and a lack of foresight on the part of the Egyptian Government and the British Authorities in making adequate provision in time. Shortage of Egyptian currency supplies made the use of that currency in Cyrenaica and Eritrea, whatever might have been the political implications, of doubtful wisdom, but it was equally

inevitable that that currency should be used since troops from Egypt, paid in piastres and £E, were entering Cyrenaica with that money in their pockets ; the same was true of Eritrea, with troops entering from the Sudan. Moreover, there just was not any other currency to hand in Middle East in sufficient quantities. This difficulty, as well as the financial and economic implications of allowing a sterling currency to pass into the enemy occupied territory, the ultimate fate of which was unknown, was fully appreciated in London, but the currency supply position was realized too late both there and in Cairo.

A proposal to create an *ad hoc* Army of Occupation currency was mooted by the War Office as early as March, 1941. Since, however, such currency had not been available when operations against Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland began, and could not be made available for many months, and since there was some doubt about the native population of Italian colonies being willing to accept any but a known and recognised existing currency, or indeed in Ethiopia any paper currency at all, the C.F.A. advised strongly against the proposal, which was dropped. Had a special currency such as was later used by the Allied Armies in Italy and France been ready *before* the troops had entered the Italian African territories, the plan would probably have been more satisfactory and easier to execute. But by and large the original decision to use all the currencies to which reference has been made turned out well, though an elaborate currency control, reserve and supply machinery had to be instituted. It fell to the C.F.A. and his assistants to undertake this responsibility, which was outside the provision of any hitherto conceived military organisation.

The first consignments of Maria Theresa dollars received in Africa were despatched to, and taken on charge by, the Chief Paymaster, Middle East, who made the issues required to the organisation dealing with the Patriot Movement in Ethiopia. When it became apparent, in circumstances to be described, that the demands from this quarter, and indeed from regular military formations in General Platt's and General Cunningham's Commands, would not be so large as was anticipated, but on the other hand the demands of the Military Administration would probably be the most important, the Maria Theresa dollar reserve was, with the exception of a small amount for current use, handed over by the Chief Paymaster to the C.F.A. for custody and issue, for military and civil purposes alike. In other words, the military formations requiring Maria Theresa dollars would henceforward

draw through their own channels on the C.F.A. The arrangements for this transfer began in August, 1941, but were only completed in January, 1942. The sum involved amounted to 18,963,219 Maria Theresa dollars, or, at $1/10\frac{1}{2}$ d. per coin, £1,777,800, in addition to a further reserve then held by the Bombay Mint at the disposal of the C.F.A. amounting to 3,864,537 Maria Theresa dollars. The reserves taken over were held in various places and had to be redistributed between the Sudan, Eritrea, East Africa, Ethiopia and the Somalilands in suitable amounts for immediate use. The initial redistribution by ship, lorry, train and aircraft involved the movement of 9,000,000 dollars, or 270 deadweight tons, in primitive means of transport which can better be imagined than described.

The use of rupees at Berbera led to the creation of a rupee currency reserve which amounted, in February, 1942, to Rs. 1,673,800, the balance unexpended of a consignment of about £500,000 of Indian currency ordered early in 1941 for use in British Somaliland. A reserve of Egyptian currency was also taken over and supplemented by the withdrawal of Egyptian currency in Eritrea when it was replaced by East African currency, the supply of which was deemed likely to be easier. It proved to be easier, since the British Authorities only had to depend on themselves to create this currency, without having to deal with a friendly but separate Government, as was the case with Egyptian currency. But the responsibility for ordering and estimating future demands of East African currency for the occupied territories fell on the C.F.A. and his staff, and added not a little to his anxieties. The first consignment received was for £2,000,000 worth of East African currency notes and coin, in addition to amounts withdrawn from East African reserves held locally by the East African Currency Board. At the end of March, 1942, the C.F.A. held £4,343,720 worth of currencies on charge, distributed in appropriate amounts available for local use or for rapid shipment into occupied areas from suitable transport centres—at Nairobi, Mombasa, Addis Ababa, Harar, Asmara, Aden, Assab, Mogadishu, Berbera, Khartoum and Port Sudan. The physical custody was entrusted where possible to banks or government treasuries outside the Occupied Territories or in treasuries of the Military Administration adapted or constructed for the purpose. By the end of 1942 the total currency reserves held on charge had risen to £6,000,000 in East African currency alone, in addition to the Maria Theresa dollar reserve which had not substantially decreased and the other smaller reserves in other currencies.

The decision to make the Controller of Finance and Accounts the currency authority for the occupied territories involved the creation at his headquarters of a currency accounting and supply machinery, and brought in its train the consequence that thenceforward he became the banker to the military organisation instead of, as initially conceived, Army paymasters financing the civil administrations.

The accounting system adopted was to keep the currency reserves accounts entirely separate from the administrative accounts. Local currency reserves, as for instance at Asmara, were held by two specially appointed currency officers who held them for account of the C.F.A. and only issued to the D.C.F.A. or local military formations, etc., on the authority of the former. Such issues were brought to account in the C.F.A.'s "H.M.G. Account" as issues to be accounted for by the responsible party. Unissued currency in the reserves, whether in local or main depots, were accounted for as unissued currency in the main Currency Reserve accounts. These transactions and the appropriate accounts are not included in the Administrative accounts shown on pages 359 to 363.

Although the work and responsibility involved were considerable and supply and transport frequently precarious the system worked very well and earned the congratulations of the War Office in a well-deserved telegram to all concerned when the main redistribution of reserves had been accomplished. The problems of currency may be judged by the various ways taken by the consignments once they had reached Africa. The first convoy of Maria Theresa dollars, sent from Asmara to Addis Ababa soon after the occupation of the capital when the road was still infested with stray Italian formations and guerilla bands, involved a convoy of 26 lorries with an escort of 2 officers, 47 other ranks and 2 machine guns. Another consignment, this time of £500,000 East African currency, was dispatched by passenger steamer from Mombasa to Aden, where it was transhipped on to a 2,000-ton tramp collier, in charge of a British Lieut.-Colonel and a sergeant and two African other ranks: the cases were buried under the coal to prevent pilfering *en route* to Massawa and arrived safely in spite of one of the holds containing coal catching fire—happily not the hold containing the currency. Aircraft were also used, but the weight even of currency notes limited consignments, none of which happily ever came to grief in spite of being flown at all seasons of the year in obsolete machines all over the continent of Africa.

The introduction of currencies was effected separately in each territory by a proclamation applicable to that territory. Initially in British Somaliland, in deference to local and Colonial Office views, only rupees were declared to be legal tender, as they had always been, but it was found desirable later also to legalise East African currency which was being dealt in actively in the bazaars on the military lines of communication to Ethiopia and Kenya. In Ethiopia only Maria Theresa dollars and East African currency were proclaimed legal tender, but in Eritrea Egyptian and East African currency were brought into use. The prospect of having to use Maria Theresa dollars on a considerable scale in Ethiopia, and a possible consequent shortage of supplies, led to the decision that this currency would be accepted as legal tender by the Administration, but would not be paid out when received. An exception was made at Massawa to encourage dhow traffic with Arabia when it was found that dhow masters and traders on the Yemen coast were unwilling to take any other currency, or only take them at rates which were not consistent with those established in Eritrea and other parts of Italian East Africa. Under these special arrangements a fund of Maria Theresa dollars was placed at the disposal of the District Officer in charge of Massawa who granted licences to export Maria Theresa dollars to dhow masters importing foodstuffs and necessary goods. This policy proved very successful in stimulating this trade and in the first six months of its operation only cost some 600,000 dollars, against which there was some inflow in other districts where this cumbersome medium of exchange was not appreciated : Maria Theresa dollars sold by the population in the Sudan to the Government were also taken over by the C.F.A. from the Sudan Treasury.

In Ethiopia, rather to the surprise of everyone concerned, the native population in all the urban centres began to accept British East African currency from the first arrival of British troops. The steps which had been taken to provision Addis Ababa with a substantial Maria Theresa dollar reserve, in addition to what was brought in by the Army paymasters (and scarcely used by them) and an avowed willingness on the part of the British Military Administration to exchange East African currency for Maria Theresa dollars and *vice versa*, led to a marked preference on the part of merchants for the former. Several other factors contributed to this. As soon as a branch of Barclays Bank was opened at Addis Ababa, at the beginning of July, 1941, instructions were given to exchange East African currency freely for Maria Theresa dollars for anyone who wanted them. After an initial outflow the trend

reversed itself and by the end of July the bank was swamped with Maria Theresa dollars. The explanation of this unexpected preference among the people of Addis Ababa for paper money as compared with hard silver coin, so contrary to traditions and anticipations, was that the bank, in conjunction with the British Military Administration, had instituted a system of drafts for remittances to other neighbouring and remote territories which was not only cheaper than merchants had ever before experienced, but in fact obviated the physical transport of Maria Theresa dollars, which local circumstances made difficult. Confidence in a British currency hitherto unknown in any quantity in Ethiopia no doubt contributed. During the first six months of the bank's operations in Addis Ababa no less than £500,000 of drafts was sold in Aden, Bombay and other neighbouring territories, a figure which corresponded remarkably closely to the value of imports into Ethiopia during the same period. In spite of continuing to use Maria Theresa dollars for certain payments to patriots and the police, and for other special payments, the inflow of Maria Theresa dollars into the Currency Reserve was considerably greater than the total outflow, and minting of additional supplies was brought to an end.

In January, 1942, a beginning was made in transferring Eritrea from an Egyptian currency basis to East African currency. The exchange was completed without difficulties, though with several prolongations of the permitted period of exchange, by the 1st May, up to which date £300,000 Egyptian was taken in against East African currency at £1 os. 6d. sterling per 100 Piastres; it was estimated that military and administrative expenses had led to a disbursement of £700,000 Egyptian; the balance, unaccounted for, probably seeped out mainly into the Sudan in exchange for goods or remained in hoard. Thereafter Egyptian currency ceased to be legal tender anywhere in Italian East Africa, which was substantially on an East African currency basis throughout, with British Somaliland using that currency and the Rupee. The decision to replace Egyptian currency was taken both because of the difficulty experienced in securing adequate supplies of Egyptian notes and small change as well as because of a desire to have a uniform currency system throughout occupied territories in Italian East Africa.

Cyrenaica, during the first, second and third occupations, was placed on a legal tender basis of Egyptian currency and so remained during the whole period.

When Tripolitania was invaded and occupied, a new departure

in currency policy was made. From the first moment when British troops entered the territory all payments were made in a currency created for the purpose and termed British Military Authority currency. This currency in sterling form was proclaimed legal tender by Tripolitania Proclamation No. 7 and given the value of 480 lire = £1 sterling B.M.A. The lowest denomination note issued was of 1/-, it having been intended to use Italian small change to supplement the small B.M.A. notes. But the supply of Italian small change here as elsewhere proved insufficient and as a result the 1/- note tended to become the minimum price unit for transactions, with unsatisfactory repercussions on the local price level. Apart from this the B.M.A. currency proved satisfactory and acceptable. Inevitably B.M.A. currency, however, tended to drift to Cyrenaica, Egypt and eventually even Tunisia, either through trade or in the hands of troops : arrangements were made to purchase this currency outside Tripolitania, though its export was prohibited and it was proclaimed to have no official value outside the territory. The decision in the spring of 1943 to use B.M.A. currency in Italy as well, and at the rate of 400 lire = £1 sterling, required a change of policy in Tripolitania if the danger of trafficking between Italy and Tripoli by troops in the same currency with two different exchange values in terms of lire was to be avoided. It was consequently decided to create a new Military Authority Lira currency for Tripolitania and maintain the local sterling-lira rate at 480. B.M.A. currency was consequently called in for exchange against M.A.L. notes between the 15th September and the 30th November, 1943, as described in Chapter XII.

This operation was one of considerable complexity : it involved among other things the prohibition on currency transactions between the local inhabitants and allied troops as well as on the export of all B.M.A. and M.A.L. currency. £3,340,000 B.M.A. notes were withdrawn against M.A.L. notes : it was estimated that £4,400,000 B.M.A. notes had been issued and that £1,000,000 left the country in the hands of troops. The exchange was a major operation since at the same time it was decided to withdraw all the remaining Italian Metropolitan currency remaining in the country, of which £728,000 was collected (at 480 lire = £1, or = 480 lire M.A.L.). The reason for this exchange was to prevent currency smuggling and to secure a uniform currency throughout the country, but no obligation was placed on the holders of metropolitan lire to make the exchange and indeed Italian 5 lire notes and under and Italian coin continued to remain

legal tender. The balance of metropolitan lire remaining in the hands of the public after this exchange could not be ascertained, but some 300,000,000 lire was a fair estimate at the time. This currency ceased to be legal tender when the exchange was completed, but since it remained in current use in Cyrenaica and East Africa and had a market in the Levant it is probable that the surviving amount progressively diminished to vanishing point in Tripolitania.

As a result of these transactions in North Africa the currency reserves under the control of the British military authorities at the end of 1943 included, in addition to the East African supplies to which reference has been made, £1,500,000 worth of Military Administrative lire currency, £3,600,000 British Military Administrative currency and 360,000,000 Italian metropolitan lire, besides the Italian lire held in the East African currency reserve, of which more hereafter.

It was said earlier in this chapter that the problem which presented itself in the initial occupation of Italian territories was how to introduce the new currencies as legal tender and retain the Italian currency in use without guaranteeing it but without at the same time rendering it worthless. Since Italian currency was legal tender in all the occupied territories care was taken to proclaim the new currencies legal tender without making any reference to the status of Italian currency generally, save to say that the Administrations would only accept Italian currency in payment for taxes, supplies, etc., in denominations of 5 lire and under in notes and coin, at the stipulated rate of 480 lire = £1 sterling in any of the sterling currencies listed. The Administrations officially declined to accept payments in any denominations of lire higher than 5 lire. In practice higher denominations were fairly widely accepted, but instructions were given by the C.F.A. that such notes were not to be paid out by the agents or officers of the British Army so as to avoid attributing to these notes a legal tender value *vis-à-vis* H.M.G. or assuming a tacit obligation by use of them officially by the Administrations. The implied guarantee covering acceptance and payment of small denomination lire was too small in amount to create a dangerous serious financial commitment. Among the local inhabitants the introduced currencies, as well as the Italian lira currency, remained legal tender, since the latter had never been proclaimed to have lost its legal tender status, though the Administrations declined to use it for their own purposes. The policy was successful and the populations of all the territories continued to use lire, but on a diminishing scale, for their transactions, which

was not forbidden, at approximately the official rate of 480 lire proclaimed for small currency. The régime which caused some anxiety and obscurity in its initial stages, especially among military formations and troops, put an effective stop to the latter buying lire at depreciated prices from the local inhabitants when they found the Field Cashiers and Paymasters refusing to exchange them.

In Eritrea the Administration, largely out of kindness of heart, accepted higher denomination lire rather too freely and in certain cases also paid them out until the practice was stopped, thereby prolonging unduly the effective life of the lira which, however, by the end of 1942 had effectively ceased to circulate as it had in Italian Somaliland some months earlier, having been replaced by East African currency in all commercial and administrative transactions. Accumulations of Italian lire in the hands of the Administrations, from taxes paid when no other currency was available or in the sale of supplies before enough British currency had been put into circulation by military formations and the Administration itself, were taken over by the C.F.A. and shipped out of the country. These sums, together with other lire collected, including those collected in Tripolitania and from evacuees from Italian East Africa, were disbursed by H.M.G. for special purposes in other theatres. The result was that no burden fell on the British public in respect of any Italian lire in any Italian territory either through guarantee or unutilisable cash holdings.

Throughout 1941-1943 the Italian lire rate remained at or around 500 lire = £1, with the result that the Italian purchasing power in the hands of the native and European inhabitants did not suffer greater loss than that involved in fixing the rate of 480 which was not inconsistent with the true purchasing power of the currency at that time. The régime governing small lira currency kept it stable with the sterling currencies and produced a premium thereon *vis-à-vis* larger denomination lira currency. This did not have any serious consequences. The first tendency for large notes to fall to a discount on the official rate was replaced in 1942, first in Ethiopia and then in Eritrea, by a tendency for them to rise to a premium owing to the demand for the larger unit by repatriates who were allowed to take any quantities they desired home to Italy. This permission, of which repatriates availed themselves freely, had the dual effect of relieving the territories which they left of currency which was no longer needed and of creating some embarrassment to the Italian authorities at home who proceeded to relieve their people of their money against a receipt, thus

occasioning considerable dissatisfaction. The evacuees proceeding to internment, and indeed any others who so desired, were also afforded the opportunity of depositing their lira currency with the Custodian of Enemy Property, a further device for decreasing the supply of payment media in the country.

One of the difficulties which had been anticipated in dealing with currency matters in these territories, and which led to the policy described being adopted, was the volume of local currency in existence. It was known that the note circulation under the Italian régime had been very large. But its magnitude was unknown, and the financial officers could not be certain how much would be found in the banks and treasuries on their arrival. In point of fact, under orders from Rome, the Italian banks and treasuries had received orders in the event of occupation to destroy all stocks of unissued notes, and of notes in the tills and treasuries of the banks in excess of 15% of the public's deposits in each branch. This instruction was carried out with greater or less efficiency in all the Italian Colonies. It had no other embarrassing effect than to make it impossible for the banks when they came under British control to pay out more than a small proportion of their then existing deposits in any of the branches of which the records survived in working order. Had the Administrations depended, as the Italians apparently anticipated that they would, on using Italian currency this policy might have proved a nuisance, but as the financial officers were not caught unprepared the only nuisance was that felt by their own people.

In East Africa were captured, or later secured, fairly complete returns of notes issued into circulation during the five years preceding the war with Italy. These figures, after deducting currency known to have been destroyed, known to have been handed in or removed by evacuees and estimated to have flowed out of the country before 1941, still left a prodigious total which would have involved a liability out of all reason for H.M.G. to have assumed had there been any question of taking over and guaranteeing the currency in the hands of the population. Whether this theoretical total in fact remained in the country, or had been seeping out for many years on a much larger scale than was estimated by the Italian experts, whose opinion was asked and sincerely given, will never be known.

The small amount of Italian currency overprinted as valid only in Italian East Africa proved a source of embarrassment again only to the Italians who had it and obtained it. Since it was not legal tender in Italy it was not sought after by the repatriates

and went to a discount compared with other Italian currency. Its existence tended to disparage Italian currency generally. It is, however, worth noting that, in spite of anticipations and contrary information, the native population of all the Italian Colonies, including Ethiopia, had in practice accepted the use of this paper currency quite rapidly and freely and later accepted even more rapidly and readily any British currency to which they were introduced. The days of "hard" currency like the Maria Theresa dollar and the silver rupee were evidently already numbered in 1941.

Complex as they were, the stability of the so-called "British" currencies in use in the occupied territories and the administration of the currency reserves were by no means the only sources of worry to the Controllers of Finance and Accounts in the years 1941-1945. The effects of currency policy in the occupied territories or neighbouring territories, and even as far afield as the silver and gold markets of Bombay and Baghdad were, as they had to be, closely followed by the Controllers and their staffs. Their wide range of territory and their freedom of movement gave them a view of the currency position in a large part of the Middle East which few other officers concerned with these matters possessed in those years. In consequence they were able to make suggestions and were asked for advice on matters and in circumstances which were far removed from those envisaged in their letters of instruction from the War Office. This became particularly noticeable with the growth in importance and range of the Middle East Supply Centre and the office of the Minister of State in Cairo. Though the functions of the Controllers of Finance and Accounts were under the War Office, they covered a range and had a scope which had never before been conceived of in Army Financial Administration. That this was possible, and done, was largely due to the complete understanding which prevailed between them and the responsible Financial Section in the War Office. Strange as it may appear, it is indeed true to say that, during those years, the principal source of information on currency matters in the Middle East open to the Treasury was the War Office and its military staff in the Occupied Territories Administrations, in Africa.

While it may seem invidious to single out two of the many authorities in the Middle East and in Africa generally who contributed to the working of the department of the Controllers of Finance and Accounts, the assistance given by the then Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, Mr. C. N. Nixon (Sir Norman

Nixon), and the then Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government, the late Sir Francis Dudley Rugman, K.C.M.G., M.C., was so great and so valuable that reference to them must be made. The advice and help of these two experts went far beyond the normal courtesies of officers in the same general branch of administration. The contribution of the Sudan Government in this sphere, as in every other, helped a great deal toward the successful outcome of the early problems of the Controller in both Commands.

In the light of what has happened in Europe since those days it is perhaps permissible to add that one of the considerations ever present in the minds of the Controllers of Finance and Accounts was the prevention of currency trafficking as far as possible, including trafficking by troops. To achieve this it was of primary importance to maintain all the currencies involved stable *inter se*, even Italian currency *vis-à-vis* the British currencies. The watch kept on the black and bazaar markets of the Middle East, and notably those in the occupied territories, was close and continuous; within the limits of what could be done administratively, and by devices which cannot here be described, trafficking was very considerably checked. There was, of natural course, some trafficking by all ranks, but this never took the form, or assumed the volume, of a major scandal. The object of all the counter-measures remained the same: not to operate so much by repressions as by making the traffic unprofitable. Thus, when it became known that Italian currency was being brought back from Cyrenaica to Cairo for sale in the bazaars, steps were taken, frequently quite unofficially, to kill or break the market there, with a view to discouraging others from trying the same operation another time. It would be an exaggeration to pretend that the objective was always attained, but the fact that watch was kept the whole time maintained illicit currency transactions by troops well within bounds and no authority of H.M.G., to the best of the writer's belief, ever found itself landed with a mass of worthless currency; nor were the Administrations of the occupied territories ever involved in exchange losses of anything except very small amounts. Indeed the currency transactions of these Administrations on balance showed exchange profits, of some magnitude in certain instances. This result, and the general policy in this connection, were the consequence of the great discretion accorded to successive Controllers of Finance and Accounts by the War Office and the happy relations which subsisted between them and the Financial Sections in the War Office. How the War Office

organisation came to be the currency authority of several countries and how military officers found themselves in charge of currency control and currency reserves amounting to many millions of pounds, without any rules, regulations or precedents to guide them, is a romantic and unique episode in the history of the British Army.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XVI

FINANCE : BANKING AND TRADE

Early Discussions on Banking Policy in Occupied Territories — The Deserted Banks of Cyrenaica — Italian Banks in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia — Fascist Regulations for Disposal of Currency and Valuables — Closing of the Italian Banks — Italian Staff — Conditions in Ethiopia — Transfer of the Italian Banking Business from Ethiopia to Eritrea — Examination of Banks in Eritrea and Assab — Weak Financial Position in Somalia — Breakdown of Tripolitania's ornate Banking Machinery — The Work of Barclays (D.C. & O.) Ltd. — Barclays' Addis Ababa Branch — Trade and Supply — Trading Channels under the Fascist Régime — Italian Imports and Exports — How B.M.A. watched Price Levels — Re-opening of old Trade Connections — Machinery of Civil Supply — Food Supplies — Status of the various Supply Organisations — Assistance to Local Trading — Deliberate lack of Controls — The Salt Trade — Import and Export Tables for 1941-1945 — The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation — Supplies in Madagascar — Trading with the Enemy Orders.

CHAPTER XVI

Finance : Banking and Trade

BANKING policy was one of the "reserved subjects" mentioned in the C.F.A.'s instructions. It was also one of the most important and complex subjects dealt with by the Controllers of Finance and Accounts in the Occupied Territories. The policy was discussed in a considerable number of telegrams, the outcome of which was a decision to continue in existence all those Italian banks serving a real need for the local population and so indirectly of the occupying authority, without however using any of them for official British business, which was to be transacted whenever possible through the branches of Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial & Overseas) Ltd., wherever these were or would become available, since that bank was already acting for the military paymasters in the Middle East. The Italian banks were to be closed at the outset of the occupation of each territory ; they would, if re-opened, only be allowed to carry on under their own resources and would, of course, enjoy neither the backing nor support of the British Military Administration. In the first instance all financial transactions would be covered by a moratorium and a prohibition was to be placed on all transactions in real estate, both in order to protect property holders as well as to prevent fraudulent conveyance of assets. These measures were to be enacted by appropriate proclamations.

Cyrenaica presented few banking problems. After General Wavell's first occupation the Italian banks in Cyrenaica were found deserted, with the strong-room doors open : the staffs had disappeared, complete with all available cash and records. An official of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd. in Palestine was borrowed by Political Branch, G.H.Q., Middle East, to inspect. He reported that so little of the Italian banking structure in Cyrenaica was left that it was not feasible to restart an Italian banking organisation in the country at all. The same proved to be true on the second and third occupations of Cyrenaica. The position in Tripoli will be dealt with, chronologically, after reviewing events in Italian East Africa.

Before the British occupation of the Italian East African Empire the following branches of Italian banks were operating in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia :—

Banca d'Italia :

Somalia	Mogadishu, Merca, Kiismayu.
Eritrea	Asmara, Assab, Massawa.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, Dessie, Dire- dawa, Jimma, Gondar, Harar.

Banco di Napoli :

Somalia	Mogadishu.
Eritrea	Asmara, Decamere, Massawa.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa.

Banco di Roma :

Somalia	Mogadishu.
Eritrea	Asmara, Assab, Massawa.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa, with an Agency, and another Agency at Lekempti. Dessie. Jimma, with Agencies at Gore and Dembidolo. Gondar. Harar, with Agencies at Dire- dawa and Jiggiga.

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro :

Eritrea	Asmara, Decamere, Massawa.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa.

Societa Nazionale di Ethiopia :

Ethiopia	Addis Ababa.
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By every standard, Italian East Africa was "overbanked". Asmara, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu transacted the bulk of what business there was; the outlying branches were in all cases very small. The vast number of employees and the turnover figures in lire gave an entirely illusory picture of their actual business worth. Once again one was reminded of the imposing façades of Italian State buildings: façades with little behind them, except a multitude of minor officials with credit in pomp and debit in duties.

The Fascist authorities in Rome had apparently no intention of allowing large quantities of currency, valuables and banking records to fall into the hands of the British, but, as in the case of

the British Authorities themselves, they did not anticipate that Generals Platt and Cunningham could move as rapidly as actually occurred. The break-up of the Italian banking system by the Italian Authorities was therefore only partially complete by the time the British Military Administration officers took charge. Head offices had sent detailed instructions to their branches on the procedure to be followed before they were overwhelmed by the British forces. Most of the assets held by the banks were to be destroyed ; valuables were to be burned ; credit balances in official accounts were to be drawn by transfer to Relief Committees, etc. In general these instructions were carried out only in so far as time permitted. The British Administration officers were supposed to find on arrival that the Italian banks held only about 15% cash cover in lire for their deposit liabilities to the public. But in many cases much more was found. Of the many instructions issued to the banks the following paragraphs, dated the 15th March, 1941, from the Government of Italian East Africa, are quoted as an example of the procedure laid down :—

“ Only when, owing to pressure of events, it is not possible to arrange for sending to the rear, either in whole or in part, the valuables in question, the banks will proceed to the destruction of the paper valuables, after drawing up the prescribed report on the basis of the lists previously prepared and shall leave a copy of the report and of the lists with the local Catholic Mission, if any, or with the Apostolic Vicariate in the offices of the principal town.

“ Metallic valuables. Communications may be made, following on the present negotiations for an agreement on the point, as to whether it may be possible to entrust to the aforesaid religious bodies the metallic valuables which cannot be sent to the rear. If this is not possible such valuables should be suitably buried . . .

“ . . . In the case of towns where a proportion of the civil population remains after enemy occupation, all State securities, bank valuables, all deposits in the name of government administrations or bodies controlled in any way by the State and blocked accounts in the names of enemy citizens or subjects, shall be sent to the rear or destroyed.”

Banca d'Italia had acted as government bankers. The approximate number of accounts held by the Banca d'Italia branches was 120,000, but 100,000 were private savings accounts. As a whole the branches did not hold large balances even of official accounts, if only for the reason that the expenditure in the territories always exceeded the revenue. Deficits were met by the issue of cheques drawn upon the Banca d'Italia in Italy in

round sums of 100,000 lire which were encashed from time to time against local currency reserves, the Banca d'Italia branches debiting their head office in Rome with the corresponding amounts.

After the occupation of each territory the first step, in theory, was to order the closing of the Italian banks; this did not in practice always prove feasible. As soon as possible after the closing, strong rooms were taken over and checked, available cash was brought under British control and valuables were inventoried. The accounts of the banks were then examined and those of a suspicious nature were formally blocked. Suspicious accounts included any Italian Government accounts, the accounts of any parastatal institutions (see Chapter XVII), the accounts of military formations, the accounts of all persons known to be dangerous Fascists or otherwise objectionable, and all accounts operated directly from Italy. This preliminary action was usually taken by Political Officers, but as soon as possible after occupation the Controller of Finance and Accounts made arrangements for officers with previous experience of banking to take over such work as Bank Controllers.

When it became apparent that conditions were sufficiently stable to enable the Italian banks to be re-opened and to relax the moratorium in their regard, measures were still required to ensure that withdrawals would not exceed cash availabilities. For this purpose each branch was treated as a separate entity. The reason for this was that cash resources varied from place to place as the rules issued by the Italian authorities had been fully, partially, or not at all complied with. British rules dealing with the subject perforce varied somewhat from territory to territory owing to difficulties in communication. At Mogadishu, for instance, the banks were prematurely re-opened on the day following occupation; in order to avoid undue hardship or creating alarm and despondency by closing them again a local rule was imposed a few days later by the C.F.A. which permitted depositors to withdraw up to 1,000 lire a day. This was subsequently modified with the full co-operation of the Italian managers to withdrawals up to any amount subject to the sanction of the Administration where it was found that the available cash ratio was higher than had been anticipated or that in-payments began to exceed withdrawals. The banks in Addis Ababa were re-opened on the 1st July, 1941, subject to limited withdrawals, and at Asmara on the 12th May subject to a limitation on withdrawals up to 10% of the credit balances. But in all cases it was found, somewhat surprisingly,

that money which had been withdrawn or paid out prior to our occupation began to flow back as soon as the banks re-opened. The working cash ratio of the active accounts, even where available assets were limited to the 15% cash which the banks were supposed to have retained after destroying their assets, was of course improved by blocking the accounts to which reference has been made and by further blocking the accounts of absentees, ascertained by requiring all account holders to register their existence in person within a prescribed period.

As has already been mentioned, Italian banks were grossly over-staffed. The Controller of Finance and Accounts and his advisers soon came to the conclusion that more than half the employees were redundant and these were accordingly discharged. In accordance with the practice adopted by the Italian Authorities towards their own government employees, the banks had paid or advanced to their staffs cash equal to their wages for periods varying from four months to a year. But since many of the staff had transferred most of their money to Italy before British occupation, they actually found themselves with very little means on which to live, a difficulty which had to be met by the Administration, by relief and unemployment measures. Apart from this and some difficulties over the terms of employment of those kept on, few troubles came from the Italian employees who generally worked well and were helpful once they understood the régime under which they were directed to operate by the Controllers of Banks.

The following is a summary of the position of Italian banks in Italian East Africa at the dates stated :—

	No. of Accounts	Deposits Lit.	Cash at Occupation Lit.	Approx. Cash at as 31/8/41 Lit.
Eritrea	56,000	339,590,000	47,534,000	52,000,000
Ethiopia	50,000	416,658,000	82,609,000	126,000,000
Somalia	12,400	93,258,000	20,384,000	81,500,000
Total Five Banks in Italian East Africa	118,400	849,506,000	150,527,000	259,500,000

During the winter of 1941-42 the Italian banks in Eritrea and Somalia provided quite useful banking functions for Italians and others in those territories, and the number of new accounts and the total of new deposits steadily increased.

In Ethiopia, of course, the Italian banking business rapidly became moribund for obvious reasons. There, the sole interest of the Italians lay in salvaging what was immediately realisable from the liquidation of their affairs. They had not the spirit for, nor were encouraged to contemplate, new enterprise; they rightly expected that such enterprise would not be welcome. Trade thus soon drifted into the hands of the Arabs, Indians and Greeks and, if these merchants had banking accounts at all, they entrusted their business to Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., at Addis Ababa, as soon as it opened. The Italians who had accounts with Italian banks confined themselves to the withdrawal of cash up to the amounts to which they were entitled under the scheme of arrangement applicable to Italian banks in Ethiopia. Free balances declined until November, 1941, when a reversal of the trend took place. The British Military Authority had announced that repatriates to Italy would be allowed to take Italian lire (but not of course sterling cash or valuables) with them. The effect of this was to accelerate the liquidation of assets for cash, not all of which, however, was retained in cash form for repatriation to Italy by the women and children; a substantial part was redeposited in Italian banks by the male evacuees who, not being allowed to take more than very limited sterling quotas and no lire with them to British East Africa on internment, seemed to prefer to deposit such proceeds of liquidation in Italian banks instead of handing them over to the British Custodians of Enemy Property, on the assumption apparently, which proved justified, that the British Military Administration would safeguard private bank assets in Italian banks. How this was done will appear hereafter. The net effect of this phase was an increase of lire deposits in the banks and at the same time a substantial repatriation of lira cash assets to Italy, both of which had the effect of withdrawing payment media from active use, which was precisely what the C.F.A. desired for economic reasons.

In the political situation which had developed the future of the Italian banks in Ethiopia became one of the Administration's chief worries. In certain quarters it was urged that the banks should be closed and officially liquidated, but legal and other considerations made this difficult. An answer was found in the suggestion of the Controller of Finance and Accounts that the Ethiopian branches of the Italian banks should be transferred to Eritrea. While in London the C.F.A. put this suggestion before the War Office and at the end of November received instructions that provincial branches in Ethiopia were to be closed. Their

accounts and cash were, as a first stage, transferred to the Addis Ababa office of each bank, but without aggregation. When this had been done arrangements were made for the transfer of all Italian banks in Ethiopia to corresponding branches of the same banks in Asmara. After all depositors in Ethiopia had had a chance of withdrawing their permitted balances, by the 31st December, 1941, the Custodian of Enemy Property in Ethiopia proceeded to take over the accounts of all those who had not registered themselves with the banks as "live" account holders and the control of these accounts was transferred to the Custodian of Enemy Property at Asmara. A public notice was then issued stating that the Addis Ababa branches would be closed on the 14th February, 1942, and arrangements were put in hand for one of the strangest monetary migrations in the history of finance. In March the records, books, cash and a considerable staff were made ready for transfer by road to Eritrea. It says a lot for the organisation that by the 25th March the Italian banking system of Ethiopia had been moved by stages in lorry convoys and successfully installed at Asmara under the supervision of the two Deputy Controllers of Banks in Ethiopia, who accompanied the convoys. The transfer was effected without loss or hitches and the "live" accounts were re-opened in Asmara in the branches of the same banks which had conducted them in Ethiopia.

Banking conditions in Eritrea were very different from those which had existed in Ethiopia. There was naturally, as only could have been expected, an upset after this, the first occupation by British forces, but it did not last or produce serious consequences. The community did not know what conditions of life would be imposed on them by the occupying authority and had played for safety by collecting what cash and possessions they could in the time. But they very soon decided that occupation by the British was a more fortunate state than that of their brothers who were fighting in the Western Desert or of their relations suffering political oppression in the homeland. The number of banking accounts began to increase almost at once. The formidable task of classifying and examining 53,000 bank accounts commenced at an early stage. While this was going on accounts which had not been blocked were permitted to be drawn upon to the extent of 10% of the balance outstanding on the day of occupation. Exceptions were made in favour of account holders whose balances were Lit. 5,000 or under. With the exception of one official, a second senior officer of the Banco di Roma, the retained members of the Italian bank staff proved trustworthy and carried out their duties

well. It was found here also that employees were unable to live on the balances of the lire salaries which they retained and it was therefore decided that bank employees also should be paid on the "Rodd formula" which was in operation for Italian civilians in other occupations, with the exception that the revised salaries would be paid only in lire and from banks' sources without any charge on official revenues.

The banks operating in Eritrea excluding the Assab area were the Banca d'Italia, in Asmara and Massawa; and the Banco di Roma, the Banco di Napoli and the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, all in Asmara. The two last named had small agencies at Decamere. After the occupation the principal business of all the branches was with new deposit accounts, repayments of pre-occupation advances, and the provision of advances for current business. Useful work was done by the Italian banks in connection with repatriates and the lire cash taken out of the country by those persons. Customers' new accounts rose from Lit. 63,000,000 in January, 1941, to Lit. 74,000,000 in May, dropped to Lit. 44,000,000 in July owing to withdrawals by those who expected to be repatriated, and rose steadily to Lit. 57,000,000 at the end of 1941.

The Administration was anxious that the banks in Eritrea should run on their own resources without jeopardising the funds of Italians who had opened new accounts. The hope of being able to pay more than a modest dividend on old accounts was remote and to this the majority of creditors were resigned. But the current expenses of the banks were considerably greater than the revenue received and it was therefore decided not to allow cash resources held against new accounts to be used for paying general expenses. As the exhaustion of "old" cash would lead to the closure of the banks, the Administration sought means by which the banks could earn a little extra to support themselves. A turnover charge of 2 per mille was instituted on current accounts. Managers could find their own borrowers and were free to charge what the public would pay. By the end of 1943 the reserves of the banks were healthy enough to allow of business proceeding throughout the following year. The only exception was the Banco di Napoli, whose "old" resources were nearing exhaustion. Its life was prolonged by reduction of staff, restriction of business and a transfer to more economical premises.

Owing to the difficulties of communication and shortage of staff, it was not possible to complete the investigation of the position of the Assab banks until August, 1942. The amounts

involved were small and no measurable harm resulted from the delay, the general policy pursued in Assab differed in some respects from that laid down for the banks elsewhere in occupied territories. Thus, before any examination of assets and liabilities had taken place the two banks—the Banca d'Italia and the Banco di Roma—were reopened in August, 1941, to permit the first wave of evacuees to Kenya to withdraw their deposits. A maximum per person had been fixed ; under the scheme operated Lire 83,000 were withdrawn from the Banca d'Italia and Lire 30,150 from the Banco di Roma. The evacuation of all but 150 Italians from Assab removed the justification for continuing banking facilities, and it was therefore decided in September, 1942, that both branches should be completely closed. Account holders were warned that this would be done, and advised to withdraw their credit balances. Those not withdrawn, together with all records, etc., of both banks, were transferred to Asmara and taken over by their respective main branches.

Banking in Somalia presented different local problems again to those in either Ethiopia or Eritrea, for the Italian community was small and internal communications for the Italians difficult. Very few restrictions were found necessary beyond the blocking of certain accounts. Nevertheless, under the conditions imposed, banking business improved and many new accounts were opened. But despite what had appeared at first to be a fairly healthy revival the banks were running at a loss and by the end of 1941 it was clear that they could not continue ; it was estimated that the loss was Lit. 3,600,000 per annum. During the early part of 1942 further steps were therefore taken to clean up the position of the banks by again calling upon all account holders to register their presence, and as a result some 7,000 accounts out of a total of 20,000 were deemed absentee. By the end of 1942 the costs of continuing to operate in all cases exceeded receipts. The cash position, particularly of the Banco di Roma and the Banco di Napoli, had been falling steadily and it was decided to dismiss all but three of the staff of each of these banks and to close the banks for all business except withdrawals from free balances and collection of outstanding debts. The Banca d'Italia alone, with over 2,000,000 lire cash surplus to admitted liabilities, was in a reasonably sound position. In the autumn of 1943, however, the lira ceased to be an acceptable medium of exchange ; the policy of non-valorisation in terms of the East African shilling had proved successful, and as a consequence the business of the Italian banks came to a standstill since they had not been allowed to do business

in any but lira currency. Representations were made to the Controller of Finance and Accounts that no useful purpose was being served by maintaining the banks open, and that it would be in the best interests of depositors if they were ordered to close. The sole function which they performed of collecting debts due to them could equally as well be done by the Custodian of Enemy Property at much smaller cost. It was also pointed out that each bank would be able to meet its commitments in full, with the exception of the Banco di Roma, and even this might be able to do so if sufficient of its customers elected to receive drafts on Rome for eventual settlement. In any case the Deputy Controller of Banks had the power to compel other banks to assist the Banco di Roma. In due course the War Office gave the Controller of Finance and Accounts directions to close the banks.

The break-up of the banking organisation in Tripolitania was not so complete as in Cyrenaica, partly because the banking staffs were not so experienced in disappearing before the British forces and partly because their retreat was cut off by the sea. Up to the time of the British occupation there were six Italian banks in Tripoli city and six branches in the provincial centres. The metropolitan banks were represented by the Banca d'Italia, Banco di Roma, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia. The Cassa di Risparmio and the Banca Popolare were local concerns. As the British forces approached and occupation of Tripolitania became a certainty, the Italian authorities ordered the same procedure to be followed as in Italian East Africa. The cash holdings in banks were paid over to various institutions, such as the Italian Red Cross, and normal business ceased. After the position had been examined by officers of the Administration it was decided that there was little point in re-opening the banks and their doors remained closed to the public. Most of the bank buildings were taken over by the British Military Services and Administration; the offices of the Banco di Roma became those of the branch of Barclays (D.C. & O.) Ltd. In order that loan repayments might be collected and outstanding matters cleared up, managers and skeleton staffs were allowed to carry on in various parts of their premises and to pay themselves out of such funds as came in. The possibility of declaring a dividend to creditors out of loan repayments was considered, but the volume of repayments was so small that this was found impossible; the whole position was made more complex by the very large number of creditors and debtors who had fled the country before the British occupation. The wheels of Tripolitania's ornate banking machinery had

ceased to turn and the Controller of Banks sent to Tripoli, after a preliminary survey, busied himself with other duties.

As already recorded (in Chapter XV) the branches of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., in Cairo, Khartoum and Nairobi were utilised by the C.F.A. for the reception and dispersal of funds required by the Administrations of the several territories. As soon as it was possible to complete arrangements Barclays (D.C. & O.) opened branches in Asmara and Addis Ababa, not only to facilitate the work of the army paymasters for purely military work, but also to assist the C.F.A. and his D.C.F.A.'s in the financial administration of the territories. The Addis Ababa branch, which it was hoped would also serve the commercial needs of the country, required the preparation of cheque forms and documents in Amharic script: these were printed in Cairo and delivered via Aden and Berbera within so commendably a short space of time that the branch of the bank was able to open on the 1st July, 1941. The Asmara branch was opened on the 2nd June, 1941, a simpler matter both as regards language, documents and accessibility. The branch in Mogadishu was not opened, largely on account of shortage of banking staff, until March, 1943, the necessity for such an institution not having been found particularly urgent in the early days in a far more primitive commercial community. The following full list of the branches opened and closed in the Italian territories is a worthy record of the great contribution of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd. to the financial organisation of the territories under British Military Administration.

ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa Branch	Opened 1st July, 1941.
				Closed 15th April, 1943.

ERITREA

Asmara Branch	Opened 2nd June, 1941.
Gura (Agency to Asmara)	Opened 3rd April, 1942.
				Closed 31st August, 1943
Massawa Branch	Opened 20th April, 1942.

Reduced to a Sub-Branch under
Asmara, 1st January, 1944.

Massawa, U.S. Naval Base (Agency to Massawa Branch)	} Opened prior to September, 1942.
Ghinda (Agency to Massawa Branch)	
				Closed 31st August, 1943.

SOMALIA

Mogadishu Branch	Opened 8th March, 1943.
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LIBYA

Tripoli Branch	Opened 5th April, 1943.
Benghazi Branch	Opened 15th July, 1943.

The branches and agencies opened in Eritrea elsewhere than at

Asmara were initially opened to meet the convenience of the " U.S. Projects " in that territory.

The most interesting of these operations was the opening of Barclays at Addis Ababa in the premises of the Fascist Banca del Lavoro (inevitably known to our troops as the " Lavatory Bank ") whose records and surviving activities, until it was closed, were transferred elsewhere to make room. By arrangement with the C.F.A. this branch of Barclays transacted local business indiscriminately in Maria Theresa dollars and East African currency. The opening ceremony, accompanied by a suitable libation of excellent dry (French) champagne, miraculously discovered in the town by the enterprising manager, interrupted banking operations in the latter part of the morning of the opening of the bank for business, but gave the British staff and C.F.A. time to take stock of the situation. Outside the bank queues of local inhabitants of all shades of colour and most nationalities had formed up when it had become known that Maria Theresa dollars would be exchanged for East African currency, and vice versa, at par. The outflow of Maria Theresa dollars proved smaller than had been anticipated. As soon as the commercial public discovered that this exchange business really was free and was being carried on with the usual British lack of formality in banking practice, the trend quickly reversed itself and the bank was inundated by depositors and merchants trying to get rid of the unwieldy silver currency for East African currency notes and drafts on Aden, Bombay, Nairobi, Khartoum and Cairo. Following good commercial practice, in which the manager required little encouragement from the C.F.A., the bank charged a commission of only 1% on drafts against any of the recognised currencies presented (except lire in which no dealings were permitted other than for small change) with only a very small " turn " or difference between the buying and selling rates of the currencies involved. It was not until the Military Administration was withdrawn that the Ethiopian Authorities used Barclays Bank as a banking institution, and then only to receive the payment from H.M. Legation of the subsidy paid by H.M.G. under the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.

The branches of Barclays Bank in all the territories, as soon as accommodation was made available or constructed for the purpose, became the repositories of the Administration's local currency reserves in addition to acting as the bankers of the Administration for all purposes, including the receipt of revenues collected. For these services the bank made no charges, but the Military Administration undertook to supply and deliver to, or relieve the branch

of, currency in all forms except Italian lire, in which the branches were not permitted to deal at all (except as regards small change). The Italian banks which continued to operate in Asmara were eventually also permitted to deal in "British" currencies for their customers but they were obliged to use Barclays branch as a "banker's bank," and no Italian bank or anyone else was officially allowed to do any exchange transactions which were centralised in Barclays acting as the exchange regulating authority for the C.F.A. The branches of Barclays throughout the territories also undertook the reconciliation of import and export permits with exchange transactions. This machinery was neither elaborate nor was elaboration required in the somewhat primitive conditions of external trade existing in all the territories during the relevant period. Experience however proved statistically that broadly speaking remittances to other centres by drafts in aggregate corresponded closely with the value of goods imported through commercial channels. Under arrangements made by the War Office with the appropriate authorities in London the Italian occupied territories were treated as within the sterling area for the purposes of sterling remittances even before the appropriate statutory orders were issued, a decision which not only much facilitated local inter-territorial trade but added greatly to the local stability of the British currencies used at the official rates laid down.

It is relevant here to record that in order to facilitate inter-territorial as well as intra-territorial remittance of funds the Accountant-General of the Administration of Occupied Territories already in 1941 had worked out and set in operation a system of treasury drafts by which any merchant or other person could purchase a draft from any British Military Administration treasury, or sub-treasury, in outlying districts, in order to send money to a special person in any other place with a sub-treasury at an inclusive cost of 1%. These facilities were made available to the branches of Barclays Bank, when required, at a lower rate than to the public so as to maintain low the cost of remittances, and discourage private currency operations and traffic. The combination of the official and commercial banking machine was so successful that in the course of an early visit of the C.F.A. to Addis Ababa he was assailed by an irate merchant, who had for many years been concerned in trade with Aden, with the complaint that his business in Maria Theresa dollars between Arabia and Ethiopia had been ruined by a rate with which no one could compete ; he was told that that was precisely what had been hoped

for, and further advised that low rates of remittance such as were thus instituted would in the expectation of the authorities lead to a corresponding reduction in the cost of imported goods !

In Eritrea the branches of Barclays did excellent work in connection with the " U.S. Projects " ; American nationals were permitted to open ordinary and registered accounts and on the latter had the facility of remitting to U.S.A. Steamers from overseas carrying U.S. personnel were met by U.S. officers and British personnel to do currency business on arrival and explain local currency regulations and practices. The branches of Barclays also collected dollar currency for disposal as directed with the result that little unauthorised dealing in dollars took place in the open market.

With the evacuation of British military personnel, including the Administration officers, from Ethiopia, the Directors of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd. were unwilling to continue to operate in Addis Ababa without any guarantee of tenure but with full financial and exchange risk on Maria Theresa dollars and other currencies when currency control passed from the British Military Administration into Ethiopian hands. Moreover the Emperor was known to be planning the institution of a State Bank : this he eventually did. Barclays branch at Addis Ababa closed, to the regret of all the local British officials concerned, on the 15th April, 1943, after the military authorities had removed their currency reserve, which was the property of H.M.G., to an area over which they still had security control. So long as this currency reserve remained in Ethiopia in the Reserved Areas the military financial organisation continued to supply the currency required to pay the sterling subsidy under the Agreement. When the military organisation was eventually cut down in the Reserved Areas also, the financial arrangements for paying the subsidy passed entirely out of the War Office hands. Thus ended a singular and successful, if short, episode in British banking, much to the regret of all who had been associated with the enterprise at the beginning, in Africa as well as in London.

In Italian North Africa branches of Barclays were opened at Benghazi and Tripoli and have continued to perform their function up to the time of writing. In the latter territory the branch contributed no small part to the complicated currency arrangements described in the preceding chapter.

Trade and supply in occupied enemy territories generally proved to be closely connected and must so be treated. Both, insofar as they flow through commercial channels, are dependent

on currency and financial policies. If they are to be stimulated, if normal channels of supply and trade are to be restored and the official administrative machinery is to be relieved of the burden of dealing with trade and supply for the civil population, even if only in part, the currency and machinery of exchange of money and goods needs priority of attention. This includes in any but the most primitive communities where barter obtains, attention to, and regulation of, the machinery of banking for the custody and transfer of funds internally and externally. It was the realisation of this which, in setting up the Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa, led to so much attention, as has been described, being paid from the outset to currency and finance.

With the great shortages of food and trade goods in Middle Eastern countries during the war and the official control of shipping, it was, however, obvious that official intervention in trade and supply arrangements would also be inevitable and necessary. But it was hoped that the re-establishment of normal commercial channels would result in at any rate some of the merchanting being done by organisations other than the Administrations of the Occupied Territories themselves. Alternatively, if the administrations had to intervene, it was hoped that they would only have to do so at a high level and not all the way down the channels of trade as far as the retailer. This was to a great extent achieved, but a happy contributing cause was the fact that controls in the Middle Eastern countries and the Indian Ocean basin were not so rigid in 1941 as they necessarily had to become in later years, by when, however, a number of commercial channels in Italian East Africa had been re-established and were already working when the tighter conditions supervened.

One of the major difficulties foreseen and encountered in the early stages of the administration of occupied territories was that under the Italian Fascist régime all trade had been diverted to Italy and all trading channels and mechanisms were in Italian hands. Even in Ethiopia, with its centuries' old native trading connections with Aden, Arabia and the Indian Ocean basin, the Italians had, in five years, succeeded in diverting all such trade as survived their policy into their own hands. The Indian, Greek and Arab traders were virtually eliminated by deliberate boycott or by controls which brought all but a minimum of their commerce to a standstill. The consequence was first the diversion of trade to Italian merchants and "consortia", but then a total cessation of trade, at any rate so far as the exports were concerned. The author remembers in Rome, after the outbreak

of war with Germany but before Italy came in, listening to a bitter complaint from a competent Italian civil servant that the Fascist régime had succeeded in killing even the export of coffee, and of hides and skins from Ethiopia, formerly two traditional staple exports of local production, of which Italy was at that time in particular need.

What was true of Ethiopia was equally true of the other Italian colonies under the latter phase of Italian Fascist Government. In spite of profligate development expenditure and capitalisation on irrigated plantation farming in Somalia imports were consistently higher than exports: the figures of the Governor's report for 1940 are an illustration:—

		Imports	Exports
1937	Lire 378,817,000	40,676,000
1938	Lire 337,906,000	68,000,000
1939, January–October		Lire 151,261,000	62,625,000

Shipping bounties on exports from Italy succeeded in killing even the production of local staple foodstuffs, like milk and vegetables. In Eritrea and Somalia, the two oldest Italian colonies, which in former times used to produce at any rate enough of such fresh foods to supply the local European population, had by 1939 come to be dependent on tinned milk and fresh vegetables imported from Italy, at a lower landed cost owing to freight and export bounties than the cost of production on the spot. This had not been fully realised before the British occupation, the circumstances of which materially aggravated the problem. In this field a start had to be made from first beginnings if the European population was to be made self-supporting in fresh foods, which, under war conditions, could not be imported at all even if they had been available.

What was true of Italian East Africa was equally true of Libya. The inhabitants of Cyrenaica, who had for centuries relied on the overland caravan trade with Egypt, found this cut off for political and economic reasons by the patrolled barbed-wire barrier running north and south along the Sollum escarpment. They were obliged to look to Italy for their trade goods and so became dependent on Italian merchants and parastatal organisations. Their barley production ceased with the confiscation of their best land for the purpose of settling on it Italian peasants in a "demographic basis". By 1939 these colonisation schemes were, however, not producing themselves a surplus. Tripolitania, after twenty-five years of, more or less, occupation and administration by Italy,

depended on Europe for food and commodities which were being produced for export in Tunisia. Yet Tripolitania became reasonably self-supporting after only three years of British Military Administration, in the latter part of the greatest war in history.

Trade in the Italian African Empire resembled, as has been said, the ornate façades of the buildings it left in Addis Ababa and Asmara. There was nothing behind the show of development which was intended to impress the world, but which in fact did little except depress Italian standards of life. Native standards of living were, perhaps fortunately, already so low that the disruption of war and conquest did little to depress them further, except perhaps to some extent in the larger urban centres for the first year or so after the occupation.

A positive achievement in the five years during which the Italian East African Empire existed was the creation of a large measure of inflation, which varied in intensity from north to south. The purchasing power of the lira in 1939 was certainly least in Asmara and greatest in Mogadishu, with Addis Ababa, surprisingly, at an intermediate stage. The heavy expenditure on public works in Ethiopia might, one would have thought, have tended to produce greater inflation there than in Eritrea; that this was not the case was probably due to the greater local supply of primary consumer goods, especially foodstuffs, in Ethiopia than in the north, coupled with a lower velocity of circulation owing to the more primitive trading conditions, still partly in the barter stage, of the native population of this larger and more populated country. The greater measure of inflation in Eritrea than in Somalia was due to that country having been the primary military and development base of the Italians during and after the Ethiopian war. Somalia was also used, but the absence of harbours on the Somali coast concentrated the influx of goods and personnel in both the military and development phases at Massawa. Asmara increased more rapidly in population than any other place, though housing and public works development was greater in Ethiopia, both absolutely and *per capita* of European population, than in Eritrea. The social consequences in Eritrea, evidenced by shack building and the high proportion of parasitic population, were obvious even before the occupation.

One of the first tasks of the British Military Administration was to take stock of the price and commodity positions in the several parts of the Italian East African Administration, in order to control inflation insofar as this was possible. It was, moreover, desirable to try to distinguish between rises in prices due to excess purchasing

power and a general deficiency of consumer goods, on the one hand, and particular rises in prices of commodities due to famine conditions or absolute deficiencies, on the other. This involved establishing as soon as possible price indexes, primitive in their first inception, and watching the course of price levels generally where possible in relation to the outflow of purchasing power in the form of "British" currencies (see Chapter XV). All administrative officers, not only those in the Trade and Supply branches, and many others in Army services (Supply and Transport, Q, and Pay, Labour, etc.) were tapped for information from the earliest moment of occupation on the subject of prices, wage levels, deficiencies, etc. From these sources adequate, if unscientific, data were obtained of sufficient value to enable developments to be forecast. Attention was in the main paid to the "black market" prices of commodities, currencies, etc., as providing more accurate indication than any which could be obtained from "official" price and wage levels, whether of British or Italian origin. On this picture was based the financial policy of controls adopted. In retrospect the picture thus obtained from this variety of sources proved remarkably accurate. Every means and device in the economist's armoury of remedies was resorted to, including a number of correctives designed to reduce the velocity of circulation and utilisation of currency media by means which cannot always be used in countries otherwise administered. The two worst periods of potential inflationary danger were in Eritrea during the development of the "American Projects" and in Tripolitania in the first part of 1943. In neither case was it wholly possible to avoid the consequences of heavy local military expenditure in areas to which consumer goods could not be brought in adequate quantity; but in neither area did prices get out of hand, nor did British or local currencies lose their standing and purchasing power. In both areas the removal of currency media from circulation, in Eritrea by the repatriation of lire to Italy with the evacuees, in Tripolitania by the changes of currency referred to in the previous chapter, contributed greatly to the results achieved. In both areas slowing down the velocity of circulation by banking and exchange regulations, briefly adumbrated, also helped considerably. It is important, before leaving a fascinating subject which cannot be treated in detail for lack of space, to record the inescapable importance attaching to "black market" or open market prices rather than to any official price levels, however tightly these may seem to be administered. As an instance of the value attached to such unofficial transactions may

be noted the directions given to Administrative and Police Officers in Ethiopia in 1941 and in Somalia throughout the first three years, to ascertain and watch the prices paid by the local inhabitants for the rifles and cartridges which they were not supposed to possess. A fall in price might not represent the discovery of a hitherto unknown cache, but it might indicate an acute shortage of food or an impending political development.

The restoration of local productivity in Italian colonies was not only a matter of restoring existing enterprises and equipment, when these were not needed for military purposes, to the uses for which they had been designed. Fascist dreams of economic self-sufficiency had perverted production to things which were not required. The Italian farming enterprises in Somalia, for instance, had been devoted to exotic, new and unnecessary products, such as bananas and castor oil for lubricant. In Eritrea farming had been neglected but the mining of some poor deposits of gold encouraged. The encouragement of productivity therefore involved the abandonment of certain types of production and the development of others, mainly foodstuffs. Figures are given in other chapters of the achievements in Eritrea and Cyrenaica. Similarly the restoration of trade channels did not involve restoring Italian merchant concerns to their former activities since, as "enemy concerns", they could neither be encouraged nor permitted to trade outside the territory in which they were situated. The re-establishment of trade channels involved restoring native traders to the work which they were doing in foreign and internal trade before the Fascist régime. Happily the remnants of this type of trading had survived sufficiently to develop rapidly as soon as it was allowed to become known that this would not only be welcome but indeed assisted.

On the occupation of Cyrenaica for the first time, steps were taken by the Controller of Finance and Accounts in Cairo to re-open trade with Egypt and the assistance of the British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria was sought and obtained. A panel of merchants ready to import goods into Cyrenaica, especially foodstuffs, was created and goods were earmarked to supplement those which were to be provided from Army Q sources for first immediate needs. These goods were to be shipped to Cyrenaica by sea with military stores under arrangements made by the Alexandria group with the Military Supply and Transport branches and were in addition to military stores sent forward overland for distribution by the Administration through military depots. In point of fact the commodities made ready in Alexandria for

despatch in March, 1941, were never sent owing to the evacuation of Cyrenaica in the early days of April, but the policy involving the use of commercial channels at the earliest possible moment was established from the very outset. An analogous arrangement was envisaged in East Africa for Somalia. Unfortunately the arrangement entered into by the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts with a single British firm was undesirable, onerous and liable to create difficulty as a monopoly concession. It was terminated by the C.F.A. before it had time to be put into operation. Local trade by Indian and native traders using dhows was, however, encouraged and developed rapidly.

The underlying theory was that the feeding of the civilian population of any occupied territory, being a responsibility of the Military Administration, had to be provided for through military channels, but only till commercial concerns could take over. Therefore, in the first instance, and especially until the situation could be examined, arrangements to supply essential foodstuffs had to be laid down, even before occupation, between the Military Government officers concerned and the main supply organisation of the troops undertaking the operation. In the case of Somalia this was the S. and T. branch of East Africa Command: in the case of Eritrea S. and T. troops in the Sudan. In the case of Libya, G.H.Q. Middle East and S. and T. Eighth Army, were involved. The burden of providing food for the civil population, in addition to feeding troops, can be imagined. These civil requirements came as an unexpected, unwelcome and additional last moment task. Moreover to coordinate transport, which the Military Government organisation in any event did not possess, the transport of civilian foodstuffs to certain points in the case of Italian East Africa, via Massawa, Asmara, Mogadishu and Berbera, had also to be undertaken by the Army Transport branches. That in the little time available the food supplies were found and shipped was most satisfactory, but it would be an understatement to say that these additional burdens placed on them evoked little enthusiasm in the Military Supply and Transport branches of General Platt's and General Cunningham's Commands.

Although considerable stocks of certain foodstuffs were available in the overrun territories it was estimated that the annual requirements of grain, dates, sugar and sundries in the future would be of the order of:—

ERITREA	ETHIOPIA	BRITISH SOMALILAND	SOMALIA	TOTAL IN TONS
40,000	10,000	15,500	2,500	68,000

It was thought that the stocks of civilian supplies, other than food imported by Italians, would suffice until the end of 1941, although certain items were running short by the summer. Annual requirements of items such as sacks, rope, cotton fabrics, metal goods, soap, chemicals, matches, etc., were estimated in the same report as 5,500 tons for Ethiopia and 2,750 tons for the other territories. In certain cases the sources of supply seemed clear. Somalia and the Borana and Galla Sidamo territories of Ethiopia ought to be supplied via Kenya ; Western Eritrea and Western Ethiopia ought to be supplied via the Sudan. But these districts represented only a small part of the problem. 90% of the supplies were required for Central Eritrea and Central Ethiopia. The sources of supply for these areas were principally India, secondarily South Africa and, for " lease and lend " goods, U.S.A., mainly via Aden. Thus the entrepôt centres were theoretically Port Sudan, Aden and Mombasa. But it was clearly uneconomical and, from a military point of view, undesirable to use Port Sudan, and Kenya did not wish to use Mombasa since the local government took the view that such an entrepôt trade would only be temporary and was at the time inconvenient. Aden however proved very ready to help. It therefore appeared that the entrepôt would again have to be at Aden for the major part of the whole area, as in the past it always had been. There were considerable advantages in concentrating the entrepôt trade there. There were some old merchanting connections which could be re-developed and the Aden merchants understood the trade. They had connections with India, their natural source of supply, and more than 50% of the goods required were fabrics, thread, etc., which normally were made there. Aden was also central for reshipment and had the shortest sea routes which dhows could use to occupied territories.

For foodstuffs military sources would suffice for the first period only ; most of the non-food commodities, as for instance piece goods, were outside the normal range of army supplies. Moreover all the S. and T. organisations concerned were anxious at the earliest possible moment to be quit of the responsibility, both for purchase and transport. If State trading was to be avoided the liaison necessary between distributors in occupied territories and the merchants in Aden involved concomitant arrangements with India for the release of the supplies required and the reservation of the necessary shipping space. This was accordingly set in train.

Already by the summer of 1941 it was obvious that clarification was needed on the status of the various supply organisations and

departments and as to who was responsible for which supplies. In his report for the period ended the 15th September, 1941, the C.F.A. included the following paragraphs :—

“ The deficiencies of food can be fairly easily supplied provided the administration is given a free hand to draw on the adjacent territories which can supply all the deficiencies except for a small quantity of manufactured goods which can be obtained from South Africa.

“ The deficiencies in other civilian supplies are much more difficult to meet and too important and too urgent to be left to commercial enterprise alone, as it is necessary that export licences should be obtained and shipping provided and the flow of goods co-ordinated with the general arrangements made by Eastern Group Supply Council, the East African War Supply Board, Middle East Supply Centre and other war supply authorities. Certain conversations have already taken place with these authorities but it is desirable that the department of Political Headquarters dealing with these problems should be given a status suitable for the negotiations involved. It is suggested therefore that :—

- (i) The branch of Political Headquarters, East Africa Command, which is now charged with responsibility for essential civilian supplies, should be officially recognised as a supply authority and that its existence and functions should be notified to the various supply authorities, including the shipping controllers, with whom it would communicate direct . . . ”

This was then done.

Political Branch proceeded in close touch with the various Military S. and T. organisations to secure bulk consignments of foodstuffs from Cairo and from local governments. As the M.E.S.C. developed the demands were concentrated in that centre except for those which could be procured from the East African Supply Centre in Nairobi, notably dhurra for native consumption in Eritrea, and some supplies of rice and sugar for British Somaliland, which came direct from Aden by arrangement with the local authorities there. But the handling and transport of these commodities remained the responsibility of the Military Movement authorities until 1943. It was they who arranged for delivery to the Military Government supply depots in the occupied territories which generally were kept distinct from military supply depots. At the civil supply depots the stores taken over by the Military Government officers were brought to account in the civil administration books. Here the wholesalers nominated by the

Military Government took delivery for re-sale to retailers, etc., at officially fixed prices. After the first stage military depots continued only to supply small consignments from the stores as they normally dealt in, such as tinned milk and the like.

Concurrently with this organisation normal trade channels began to operate and consignments of foodstuffs to arrive by dhow and overland, sometimes without the official consent of the authorities of neighbouring territories from which the supplies were drawn. In most cases, however, neighbouring authorities facilitated this normal native trade, even though export prohibitions were nominally in force covering the commodities transported. From the Sudan, for instance, quite substantial quantities of dhurra came into Eritrea by camel in spite of export prohibitions, but with the friendly connivance of the Civil Secretariat at Khar-toum, to whose helpful attitude in the difficult task of feeding Eritrea the Military Government authorities owed a very great deal. Dhurra and other foodstuffs also came into Eritrea by dhow from the Arabian coast. Various foodstuffs entered Somalia from Kenya, also by dhow.

It had early become apparent how substantial a contribution to trade the native dhow traffic could make all along the coast. Instructions were accordingly given that such traffic should be facilitated by the granting of open import licences for certain classes of goods. Assistance in special currency and exchange transactions was also afforded. Dhow masters were granted access to Massawa and Assab and the Somali coast, subject only to registration and a trading licence but without subjecting them to any other obstacles, even for security control. In the autumn of 1941, some months after it had begun, the Minister of State in Cairo formally agreed that dhow traffic should be encouraged as much as possible. The non-food merchandise brought by these dhows was an equally welcome addition to the resources of Eritrea and the Somalilands and without it severe hardship would have occurred. But unfortunately the dhow trade both on the Somali coast and in the Red Sea is seasonal. The north-east monsoon blows from January to February and the south-east from May to September, the former bringing trade from the Persian Gulf and the latter trade from East Africa.

Success in developing this local trade may be put down to the fact that the Military Administrations had the picture clear from the outset. Their officers understood that the Indian, Arab, Somali and Greek traders were more than anxious to revive the traditional trade connections. They also realised that trade would prosper

best if not shackled by Government supervision and the chains of a complicated import licensing machinery. Risks were involved and some smuggling took place. But connections only existed with countries controlled by British Authorities ; there was little serious danger therefore of dealings taking place with the enemy and little practical likelihood of leakage of currency or intelligence. Another great advantage from the point of view of the Military Administrations was that dhows, camel trains and an odd assortment of locally owned lorries would and did do the work that otherwise would have to have been done by British shipping and military transport, at a time when both were urgently needed elsewhere. Finally, the Military Administration was not financially involved. So, untrammelled, the dhows sped before the trade winds to ports as far afield as Mombasa, Lamu, Zanzibar, Dar-es-Salaam, Karachi, the Hadramaut and the Persian Gulf, bringing back to Mogadishu imports to the value of £15,000 a month and making Eritrea relatively better off for piece goods than many other Middle Eastern areas. When the outbreak of war with Japan strained Allied shipping resources to the utmost, the trade was already established, unhampered by red tape. But many departments in London would have been horrified at the deliberate laxity of control.

As things turned out by the end of 1943 it was found that deficiencies in foodstuffs in Ethiopia had been over-estimated and those in Eritrea under-estimated. The latter always remained a critical supply problem. On the other hand the supply of piece goods to Ethiopia by the native channels which developed imposed an undue drain on the resources of Aden, even when a quota for Ethiopia had been fixed for the Aden entrepôt trade, since goods intended for Arabia were frequently re-exported to Italian East Africa in excess of the intended quotas.

In 1941 and for the first six months of 1942 it was decided to treat all the territories in Italian East Africa as one economic unit, with no inter-territorial customs or controls. Customs statistical posts were set up on roads between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and British Somaliland, but only for the purpose of ascertaining how much trade was moving. Even so no controls or supervision could be exercised over cross country traffic, which was probably considerable. Moreover all trade between the territories, including trade in foodstuffs, was allowed to go into the open market and a few misguided attempts in Eritrea to divert native carried dhurra, etc., from the Sudan and Ethiopia into the official supply machine were stopped. It was soon

discovered that native foodstuffs, notably dhurra, supplied from official depots were manifestly insufficient to feed the native population of Asmara, and although the official price of grain so distributed was considerably lower than the open market price, there did not seem to be undue distress or deficiencies. The experiment was therefore tried of cutting the already meagre official ration without untoward results and as a consequence of this experiment the official ration was suspended altogether in 1942. The native trade had evidently grown sufficiently large to take care of supplies. Later stringencies required other measures, but the existence of a reserve of food grains in official hands, even when not used, served to check undesirable price developments in native markets. The controls and methods used were many ; they are unfortunately too detailed to describe, but the results were successful over the whole period. They depended essentially on close observation of open market prices and the maintenance of as much freedom as possible in native trade. In 1942 the decision of the Ethiopian Authorities to set up their own customs posts on the borders of Eritrea and the Somalilands did much to impede trade, to the detriment of all concerned.

In the months which preceded the signature of the Agreement with the Emperor the Military Administration had taken control of the salt trade in Ethiopia, to ensure supplies and remove the Italian personnel from intervention in this vital supply. Under arrangements with the Sudan Government salt was supplied at reasonable prices to Western Ethiopia. The Military Administration's part in the salt trade was brought to an end with a profit. At the Massawa salt works enough was found in stock to supply all needs of the country and of Northern Ethiopia without having to restart the works. It was the Eritrean salt supply, of vital importance for Ethiopia, which enabled the Military Administration to secure the export of foodstuffs from the south after the middle of 1942.

Throughout the period of occupation Ethiopia was self-supporting in foodstuffs, including those required for the Italian population. The only exception consisted of a few cases of milk and 100 tons of oilseeds. No burden was placed on the British Government or on the military services in this respect. The development of local food sources and their distribution for Italian and native consumption reflected great credit on the small administrative staff responsible. A particularly noteworthy achievement was the development of local milk supplies to cater for the urban areas of Addis Ababa, Diredawa and Harar. The

entire evacuation of the Italian population was moreover carried out without recourse to military services for supplies of food. This is the more astonishing when the difficulty of the journey from Addis Ababa to Berbera, with the necessary waits in the transit camps at Diredawa and Harar, are considered. The work was carried out by the small evacuation staff of the Military Administration, assisted by an Italian food organisation which the Military Government took over.

The two administrative centres at Nairobi and Cairo controlled areas which did not fit in to the supply area of M.E.S.C. and E.A.S.C. Thus at one moment Eritrea was in East Africa Command, but naturally depended for its supplies on Egypt and the Sudan, which were in the M.E.S.C. group of countries. British Somaliland, which was and remained under East Africa, depended for its trade of all sorts on Aden, which was also in the Middle East group. But the neighbouring Somalia depended mainly on Kenya. Any difficulties which might have arisen were overcome by very close personal contact between the Political Branches in Cairo and Nairobi.

By the second half of 1942 the burden on army branches of handling, and to some extent also of purchasing, civilian needs became altogether too great for the reduced establishments of the East African Command and of Headquarters Troops in the Sudan. Ethiopia had taken over control of its own affairs; trade between Ethiopia and the other territories of what had been Italian East Africa was becoming impossible to deal with in either of the two Political Branches. But Ethiopia as a producer of food and primary products was not a country which could be neglected as a source of supply. The Minister of State therefore persuaded the Emperor to use the services of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation to extract what could be got of the foodstuffs, which the Emperor gladly promised but which his administration was unable to produce. So, by the end of 1942 it seemed logical to hand over supply arrangements in Eritrea also to the U.K.C.C. This was not finally achieved until well into 1943, but the change, which relieved the Military Administration of a great deal of anxiety and responsibility, brought to a close a period during which, from very first beginnings and principles, trade in normal commercial channels had been developed with surprising success. Statistics of trade from 1941-1945 afford interesting reading:—

IMPORTS (Values in £ sterling)

(a) Grain (b) Other Foodstuffs (c) Other Goods

	1941			1942			1943			1944			1945		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Tripolitania								4,204	38,406		273,398	275,990		699,071	1,004,345
Cyrenaica								103	48,039		124,166	159,145		533,009	412,052
Eritrea	54,214	77,509	231,550	78,050	189,120	1,296,708	26,631	451,440	1,082,153		1,913,975	1,092,285		1,801,162	1,314,174
Ethiopia	2,611	22,110	573,474												
Br. Somaliland	49,437	77,063	146,393	78,962	191,983	278,677	60,736	177,494	291,357	60,222	139,168	551,857	99,225	183,094	475,113
Somalia	7,788	19,843	97,097	12,125	26,073	201,144	12,927	77,833	349,472	30,889	120,172	468,844	137,193	127,108	366,445

(1) July-December, 1943, only.

(2) Part of 1941 only.

(3) 1941 figures are for July-December only.

(4) Excludes Imports from Ethiopia.

IMPORTS (in Metric Tons)

(a) Grain (b) Other Foodstuffs (c) Other Goods

	1941			1942			1943			1944			1945		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
(1) Tripolitania							.	23	317		3,944	18,834		18,251	46,592
(2) Cyrenaica								15	26		11,690	1,397		37,010	2,388
(2) Eritrea	7,829	3,607	4,021	15,489	11,427	10,718	12,881	14,517	8,660		44,459	38,817		47,481	51,259
(3) Ethiopia	151	n.a.	n.a.												
(3) Br. Somaliland	2,171	4,270	147	3,459	11,932	2,893	1,598	6,436	266	1,334	5,760	268(4)	2,047	6,029	(Value only) 5
(3) Somalia	555	1,374	848	551	1,696	1,380	258	1,884	565	944	2,814	1,537	3,529	4,071	1,548

(1) July-December, 1943, only.

(2) Part of 1941 only.

(3) 1941 figures are for July-December only.

(4) Plus 5,424,094 yards of textiles.

(5) Plus 4,492,136 yards of textiles.

EXPORTS (in Metric Tons)

(a) Vegetable and Animal Products (b) Manufactured Products (c) Mineral and other Products

	1941			1942			1943			1944			1945		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Tripolitania							95	84		17,302	423	565	26,380	410	486
Cyrenaica							107	2		7,358	66	864	19,808	174	1,793
(1) Eritrea	2,261	634	848	1,420	17,091	12,237	2,732	2,534	15,590	12,778	2,304	14,933 ⁽¹¹⁾	11,728	2,344	20,868 ⁽¹¹⁾
(3) Ethiopia	3,562	n.a.	n.a.												
(3) Br. Somaliland	72 ⁽¹⁾	5	n.a.	260 ⁽⁵⁾	16	n.a.	290 ⁽³⁾	33	n.a.	422 ⁽⁷⁾	23		526 ⁽⁸⁾	(Value only)	
(3) Somalia	737	12	296	2,888	613	24	2,651	657	639	2,815 ⁽⁴⁾	273	613	4,644 ⁽¹⁰⁾	218	430

(1) July-December, 1943, only.

(2) Part of 1941 only.

(3) 1941 figures are for July-December only.

(4) Plus 43,993 Animals live; 1,062,245 Skins.

(5) Plus 111,788 Animals live; 1,181,000 Skins.

(6) Plus 104,954 Animals live; 1,885,302 Skins.

(7) Plus 1,741,979 Skins; 107,600 Animals live.

(8) Plus 2,649,919 Skins; 134,270 Animals live.

(9) Plus 9,183 Animals live.

(10) Plus 13,261 Animals live.

(11) Eritrea re-exports 1944, 8,482; 1945, 14,214.

EXPORTS (Value in £ sterling)

(a) Vegetable and Animal Products (b) Manufactured Products (c) Mineral and Other Products

	1941			1942			1943			1944			1945		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
Tripolitania							23,044	16,060		522,151	45,736	109,885	806,995	123,496 ⁽⁴⁾	39,151
Cyrenaica							14,280	3,767		99,255	52,270	52,006	270,699	12,018	158,817
Eritrea	109,197	141,745	19,748	78,633	751,324	209,244	155,817	247,944	251,967	156,974	63,672	626,915 ⁽⁵⁾	498,691	99,404	1,080,295 ⁽⁶⁾
Ethiopia	96,004	79,477	27,311												
Br. Somaliland	88,133	283	24,838	121,468	639		115,193	792	2,996	225,986	527	4,642	276,516	56	5,603
Somalia	10,232	319	1,739	114,611 ⁽⁷⁾	8,163		118,375 ⁽⁸⁾	22,267	12,113	142,079	24,274	9,445	230,880	22,419	8,640

(1) July-December, 1943, only.

(2) Part of 1941 only.

(3) 1941 figures are for July-December only.

(4) Of which 392,204 were official exports of barley.

(5) Total for re-exports 563,222.

(6) Total for re-exports 784,766.

(7) Includes £39,000 for Ivory.

(8) Includes £10,000 for Ivory.

The U.K.C.C.'s first activity in Italian East Africa was in Eastern Ethiopia. With the closing down of British military establishments, the Corporation undertook a transport service from Diredawa, on the Addis Ababa railway, to the sea at Berbera. In the first instance the service was intended to facilitate the export of the grain supplies which the Ethiopian authorities had promised, to help out supplies from further afield for the M.E.S.C. The export of grain proved disappointing, but the transport service moved a great deal of Italian war material for the army, using Italian 10-ton diesel lorries, with Italian and native drivers. The service was of great help to British Somaliland, accounting for a large part of the transit trade of the Protectorate in 1942, which reached the substantial figure of £1,900,000. In Eritrea, even before assuming full responsibility for supplies in the summer of 1943, the U.K.C.C. had in the earlier stages contributed greatly to breaking the black market in textiles by supplying and distributing consignments, with the help of a British firm, at economic prices.

In June-July, 1943, the U.K.C.C. were invited to set up a branch in Benghazi for the purpose of importing the bulk of Cyrenaica's trade requirements. This they agreed to do but again months elapsed before they could set up the necessary organisation. Meanwhile the Administration, in conjunction with Civil Affairs Branch, Cairo, arranged with the M.E.S.C. for a quota of textiles, hardware, footwear, etc., to be made available from world stocks up to the last quarter of 1943. Orders were accepted from merchants by trade and supply officers and these were forwarded to U.K.C.C., Cairo, for implementation. In due course a U.K.C.C. representative was posted to Benghazi and he took over orders already placed and began to collect orders against 1944 quotas. Many difficulties arose but at the end of 1943 the position had cleared and deliveries were well under way. In August, 1943, the U.K.C.C. was asked to open a branch in Tripoli and to import consumer goods for the territory. When towards the end of the year Military Supply and Transport branches asked to be relieved of their duties in the civil sphere in Tripolitania, U.K.C.C. again stepped in, in February, 1944, and in fact undertook the whole business of procurement, shipment to Tripoli, warehousing and distribution of essential food on lines similar to those in Eritrea.

Although the Administration tried to get British commercial firms in adjacent countries interested in trade with the Occupied Territories, British firms ready to do this work were few and far

between and those few, in the face of supply and shipping difficulties, were rightly more concerned with maintaining their trade with those countries with which they were more familiar. It was however possible to secure a great deal of help from one well-known British commercial firm which set up and maintained branches at Massawa and in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, to transact shipping and merchanting business.

The supply and trade situation in Madagascar fell into two parts, that which concerned Diego Suarez with no hinterland and cut off in any event so far as communications were concerned from the rest of the island, and the main part of the island which came under British control for a few months between the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943. The first part of the problem followed the usual form familiar in other parts of Africa under British Military Administration, but in size proved manageable if difficult on account of lack of shipping. A few odd lots of merchandise found at Diego Suarez, which could be of service to the Allied cause, were exported by the Military Administration.

The main part of the island itself had suffered the consequences of Allied blockade measures ever since it had become apparent that the local government was wedded to Vichy. Nevertheless some trading contact with the U.S.A. had been maintained and a U.S. Consul-General had remained at Tananarive throughout the Vichy period preceding the Majunga and Tamatave operations. But the European population lacked what came to be known as "basic luxuries" of civilised life. The European and native population alike lacked clothing to such an extent that in the highlands during the cold weather of 1941-1942 20,000 persons are estimated to have died as a consequence of exposure. Madagascar, however, though self-supporting in essential foodstuffs, had certain mineral as well as vegetable resources which could be exported and were in certain cases sorely needed by the Allies. The list of materials required, received by the Military Administration from departments of H.M.G., included graphite, mica, certain rare minerals, meat products from the several slaughtering and canning plants in the island, tapioca, raffia, spices, beeswax, etc.

Small consignments of European "basic luxuries" were sent in with the operational troops for propaganda purposes. The supply department of the Military Administration, later in conjunction with the U.S. and British Consulates and representatives of the British and Allied Supply and Food organisations, drew up detailed lists of import requirements, allocated supply quotas, and issued import licences covering in the period October,

1942, to March, 1943, 2,000 tons of essential commodities from the Indian, South African, U.K. and U.S.A. supply organisations, totalling in value 115,000,000 Frs. The principal constituent elements were textiles and bags, and wines, etc., for the European population.

The principal difficulty in all this was, as usual, shipping, which was aggravated by the removal by the naval authorities of the few surviving coastal vessels which were found; without these, in the absence of adequate internal and external communications, both import and export trade came to a standstill. So difficult was this problem that it proved for weeks impossible to move sugar in stock at the north end of the island to where it was needed at other points or to cope adequately with the supply of salt, stocks of which also were available. The seizure of coastal craft by the naval authorities, and delay in returning them, retarded very considerably the export of goods which the Allied war effort needed. Another analogous and unsatisfactory feature was the lack of liaison between the maritime sea transport authorities with the British Military and Supply authorities, which led to a large number of vessels leaving Madagascar empty after discharging military personnel and material, when several thousand tons of goods were lying at quayside awaiting shipment.

The export of required commodities was undertaken in the first instance by the British Military Administration and later by British military personnel working with the British Consulate to which they had been attached. The form of occupation required the use of commercial channels and machinery of a very different order and type to those which had been used in Italian Colonies. Lack of contact between Madagascar under Vichy administration and any Allied financial organisation necessitated the institution of financial machinery for the trade purposes described. This was set up by the Finance Department of the B.M.A. within a few days of the occupation of the capital by placing the head office of the Bank of Madagascar in touch with the Bank of England and one of the large London clearing banks. Within a short time credits were opened in London in sterling for the purchase of Madagascar exports for account of the Ministries of Food and Supply, with destinations which included the U.K., the U.S.A., Canada, South Africa and East Africa. The value of commodities exported, which included graphite, tapioca, beeswax and meat products, during the period October, 1942, and March, 1943, when the British military organisation came to an end, exceeded £330,000 and \$760,000. The London credits opened through

the British Military Administration were under the local control of the representative of the Controller of Finance and Accounts, as were the supply officers who arranged the shipments through local French trade associations until the whole machinery was eventually handed over to the civil side of the consulate. The military supply staff, and the civilian representatives sent from London and Washington, worked together in harmony throughout the transitional period, during which the British Consul-General, Mr. L. Grafftey Smith, took over from the Military Administration in which he had himself been serving.

The question of what measures should be taken under the Trading with the Enemy Orders in an occupied territory was the subject of correspondence in the winter of 1941-42 between the Chief Legal Adviser and the War Office. The outcome was a Trading with the Enemy Proclamation for use in occupied territories, in which the inhabitants of an occupied territory trading for that territory were not considered enemy traders so long as they did not trade with the enemy elsewhere. A Proclamation empowered the Military Administrator to appoint an inspector to supervise a business suspected of trading with the enemy and also empowered the Military Administrator to close down a business if it was adversely reported upon by the inspector. A copy of the Proclamation was sent to the Emperor in case he should wish to enact similar legislation in Ethiopia. The provisions did not however preclude a former enemy in an occupied territory from trading with an Allied national. In British Somaliland there was already in force a Trading with the Enemy Ordinance on the lines of the United Kingdom legislation. The Custodians of Enemy Property held lists of persons residing in neutral countries with whom it was forbidden to trade.

This necessarily brief review of supply and trade conditions in the Occupied Territories in Africa does less than justice to the work of the officers directly concerned with the frequently critical situations which arose. That these were overcome without a breakdown, and sometimes with marked success, as is shown by the trade and customs revenue figures, was mainly due to the ingenuity and keenness of the officers concerned. While many of the officers were men with economic training, they were required, and in this needed little encouragement, to display practical initiative in finding solutions for the situations and conditions which they encountered. If some of them were at first inclined to propound theoretical advice they were bidden to put it into practical effect and in no case did they fail to do so. One such

officer, having discovered a difficult local black market position in sugar, himself cured it by fetching a lorry load of sugar and setting up a selling organisation in the bazaar beside the native merchants who were profiteering—until they came to terms. Such initiative and the close co-operation achieved with the Military Supply and Transport and Q branches provide the explanation of the success recorded, in what was necessarily for some years a very primitive and improvised mechanism prepared and put into service hurriedly and with inadequate staff.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XVII

THE CUSTODY OF ENEMY PROPERTY EVACUATION AND REPATRIATION

Duties of a Custodian of Enemy Property — The Hague Convention — The Rights of an Occupying Power — Types of Italian Property — Parastatal Concerns — Requisitioning of War Material — Financial Responsibilities — Legal Responsibilities — The Position in Eritrea — The Registration of Eritrea's Active Companies and Organisations — Abandoned Cargoes at Massawa — Reorganisation of the Custodian's Department at Asmara — Problems at Assab — Abandoned Cargoes at Somalia Ports — Agricultural Problems in Somalia — Work of the British Custodians in Ethiopia — The Question of Duplication of Custodian Fees — Staff in Ethiopia — War Material in Ethiopia — Enemy Property in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania — The Excellent Work of the Custodians — EVACUATION — Early Plans for the Removal of Italians from Italian East Africa — The Problem placed in the hands of Sir Philip Mitchell — Formation of the Evacuation Branch — Plans for the Reception of Evacuees in Southern Territories — Ports of Embarkation — Priority for Evacuation and Repatriation — Registration — The Overland Route and Transit Camps — Embarkation of the First Flight of Repatriates for Italy — Discontent among the Italians prior to the Second Flight — Divergent Conditions between Ethiopia and Eritrea — Transport Problems — Sinking of an Evacuee Ship by Enemy Action — Repatriation from Somalia — The Third Flight — Summary of Total Figures of Evacuees and Repatriates.

CHAPTER XVII

The Custody of Enemy Property : Evacuation and Repatriation

THE functions falling within the scope of a Custodian of Enemy Property in occupied territories are those required to be fulfilled under the Laws and Usages of War and in particular under those referred to in Articles 46, 52, 53 and 55 of the Hague Convention. Nevertheless the appointment of a Custodian of Enemy Property in occupied territory is not based on any legal status and has no official recognition in legal textbooks. In Africa in 1941, when Political Branch was formed, the creation of such a post was considered essential for the orderly control and protection of enemy and Allied property in occupied enemy territory and in liberated areas in Africa. Similar posts were subsequently included in the establishments laid down for other Civil Affairs administrations. The post must not be confused in any way with that of the Custodian of Enemy Property in Great Britain, who is concerned only with the control and administration of enemy assets in that country and with executive action arising out of Trading with the Enemy Acts by firms having an enemy connection. In an occupied enemy territory all concerns are "enemy", but not all fall under the purview of the Custodian of Enemy Property in such territories.

In practice the Hague Convention and the Usages of International Law applicable to property were neither satisfactory nor adequate for dealing with many of the problems which were met in Africa, or indeed elsewhere, for two reasons. In the first place, they were framed long ago and were not designed to meet conditions which apply to modern warfare. Secondly, like many international juridical concepts, they are based on false premises, one of the principal of which was that belligerent parties are generally prepared to conduct themselves in the way expected of a modern civilised nation. This unfortunately did not apply to the type of warfare practised by the Nazi Government of Germany and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by Fascist Italy.

It will perhaps be simplest to proceed by a brief description of what were the Custodians' functions and what they actually did in Italian African possessions. The Custodian in occupied territories in Africa operated roughly in three capacities :—

- (a) as a representative of his Government, and (if unrepresented) his country's Allies, to ensure that all national or quasi-national enemy property and assets in occupied territory were used to the best advantages of the war effort, and any transfers of such property which took place did so under the control and approval of the governing power ;
- (b) to act as trustee for all types of property belonging to absentee enemy or other owners, not represented by a properly constituted attorney, and to provide adequate protection for such property ;
- (c) finally, in the case of industrial concerns, if it was desired by the Military Administration, to maintain and manage property in such conditions as would enable it to serve the economic life of the country, and to ensure that this was done in a regular manner and that the legitimate rights of the absentee owner were safeguarded.

It may well be wondered why an occupying power, fighting a relentless enemy, should *ab initio* have bothered about the re-establishment of economic life and considered itself bound to re-establish the economy of occupied territory ; but enough has been said elsewhere for no elaboration to be required here. The alternative of not doing so was to risk having a population largely unemployed and in distress, unable to produce either essential foodstuffs or the other necessities of life, and which, since the responsibility for the life of the inhabitants rests with the occupying Power, would have had to be supported by relief or subsidy, without being able to contribute to its own maintenance or the occupying Power's effort, to an even greater extent than the disruption of conquest inevitably entailed. While the maintenance and development of the economy of an occupied territory are general functions of military administration as conceived in 1941, the functions of the Custodian of Enemy Property, as here described, are a particular aspect of the general policy.

Although it is true that any expense incurred in the course of administration and occupation constitutes a theoretical claim against the enemy government at a peace conference, it has always been problematical whether such claims can be satisfactorily established or met. Furthermore, the political and social atmosphere engendered by any other than the course of action adopted in Africa in 1941 and subsequent years in the occupied territories involved the risk of engendering underground disloyalty, political movements and passive resistance which in turn might involve the active or extended use of garrison troops.

In actual fact it was found in Italian East Africa, as in other countries, that the wisest and most humane method was to ensure that property was not only legally protected but utilised to the best advantage, and wherever possible to retain in office the personnel of municipalities and public services, and the managing staff and labour of industrial concerns, subject to the elimination of responsible persons only, who were undesirable from the security or political standpoints.

The occupation of enemy territory in Italian Africa can be divided into three distinct phases, (a) the stage of active operations, (b) the stage when active operations were at least locally over, but for purpose of communications and security, military control was still maintained, and (c) the stage, usually not attained for a considerable period, when the territory reverted almost completely to Civil Affairs control. The first two stages, from the Custodian of Enemy Property's point of view, were telescoped into each other and it was precisely on this account that the successful prosecution of his duties became so difficult. In the heat of battle, however knowledgeable the staff of a fighting command might be, it was not reasonable to expect that, on occupying enemy territory, staffs and formations would have either the will, the time or the opportunity to ensure that the various units forming the fighting force dealt with property in a legal manner, and would take care not to go outside the accepted tenets of international law.

A tabular statement of the rights of an occupying Power over property in enemy territory was drawn up by the Chief Legal Adviser for the guidance of all concerned :—

“ THE RIGHTS OF AN OCCUPYING POWER OVER PROPERTY IN ENEMY TERRITORY

“ Numeral references are to paragraphs in Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law 1929.

“ Upon the occupation of enemy territory by our forces, the Crown acquires certain legal rights over property therein which may only be exercised by officers if specially authorised : where such authority is given, the right may be one of the following according to the nature and ownership of the property :—

Confiscated (i.e. booty of war)	..	C
Sequestration	S
Requisition	R
Usufruct	U

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS OVER PROPERTY UNDER THE ABOVE HEADINGS

Nature of Property	Public	Private
MOVABLES :		
(1) <i>Cash</i> , i.e. coin, bullion, notes and realisable securities (430)	C	No rights at all.
(2) <i>Property Directly Susceptible of Military Use</i> , i.e. weapons, munitions, equipment, war materials of all descriptions, appliances for communications of news, all kinds of transport (except ambulance aircraft) etc. (430 and 415)	C	Weapons and munitions C; remainder S.
(3) <i>Property not Directly Susceptible of Military Use</i> but necessary for the needs of the army, i.e. food, forage, fuel, liquor, tobacco, cloth for uniforms, leather for boots, etc. (431 and 416)	C	R
IMMOVABLES :		
(4) <i>Real property of a military character</i> i.e. forts, arsenals, barracks, stores, magazines, railway tracks, signals and stations, piers, wharves, etc. (426)	Absolute use and no liability at all.	S
(5) <i>Real property of a non-military character</i> , i.e. buildings, lands, forests, mines, agricultural undertakings, etc., <i>except</i> item 6 below (427, 428, 410 and 411)	U	(i) Directly for military use, S. (ii) Indirectly for military use, R.
(6) <i>Institutions</i> : i.e. buildings and lands devoted to religion of any nature, charity, education, arts or sciences (429, 410 and 411) ..	No rights at all except in grave military necessity.	
(7) <i>Municipal Property</i> : i.e. town halls, water works, gas works, police stations, etc. (410 and 429) ..	For exclusive military use, R. For use of common benefit of military and local inhabitants, S."	

A further memorandum, "The Seizure and Requisitioning of Property in Occupied Enemy Territory," by Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Willan (Brigadier H. C. Willan, M.C.), Chief Legal Adviser, East African Command, was issued in the winter of 1941-1942 for the guidance of officers. Divided into four parts the memorandum dealt with public property, immovable and movable, private property likewise, and the procedure to be followed when dealing with private factories. This memorandum proved helpful

and clarified the problem which of necessity could not be finally settled until the end of the war. While it is too long to quote here *in extenso*, it is reproduced as Appendix III for the use of students of this very complicated subject in its bearing on Articles 429 and 430 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law.

But it was obvious that a fighting force could not be expected to carry out this detailed procedure. When the second stage of the administration was definitely reached and the actual fighting had moved some way farther on, the Custodian of Enemy Property was able to begin, but only begin, to explain to the military authority where it had gone wrong and to endeavour, by co-operation and understanding, to rectify as much as possible of that which had been wrongly done. There were early cases in point in Eritrea where in such towns as Asmara, Decamere, Massawa and Keren many big Italian engineering firms had factories and agencies containing machinery and equipment which could be turned to extremely good use by the Allied armies. Whereas in actual fact the interested engineering and mechanical branches of the Army were fully entitled to use this machinery for the re-establishment of transport and weapons of war, or for the protection of essential war needs, they were not entitled to strip machinery from the factories concerned or to take away spare parts and essential fittings. But this, in fact, occurred. The result was that, when at a later stage these factories were required to re-establish the economic life of the country and eventually work for the Allied military authorities themselves, a great deal of the missing machinery could not be replaced and the process of recovery was rendered very much slower.

In the Italian East African Empire the Legal Department and the Custodians of Enemy Property dealt with several distinct categories of property, one of them of a peculiar type. Firstly there was the Italian State property, both movable and immovable; secondly there was the property of Italian State and parastatal companies, which occupied a very special position in Italian economy and law; and thirdly there was private property. The first category was simple. In close touch with the "Q" officers, the Custodian took charge when the property was not required by the Army or the Military Administration for administrative purposes. The third category presented familiar but complex problems of ownership. It was the second type which presented a novel problem in international law for an occupying Power.

The actual standing of these parastatal concerns was a source of trouble to the Military Administration for some years and proved

very difficult to clarify. There was no help to be obtained from the Hague Convention and the Regulations made thereunder, because these were drafted before the conception of parastatal concerns existed. The War Office gave instructions in September, 1941, that the property of parastatal institutions was to be looked upon as belonging to the Italian State unless definite proof was forthcoming to the contrary. The onus of producing the proof was to fall on the person making the claim that the property was private, or largely private. Local investigation by the Legal Department confirmed that there were a number of parastatal companies, interest in which was shared between the Italian State and private companies or individuals in varying proportions. From a translation of pages 341 *et seq* of Volume V of the "Nuovo Digesto Italiano" it appeared that Italian jurists considered that parastatal institutions were identifiable by the following characteristics, only some of which might be present in any particular case :—

- (a) close connection between the aims of the organisation and the social and economic activities of the State as a whole ;
- (b) governmental intervention in the creation, formation, administration and the financing of the organisation ;
- (c) field of activities of the organisation extending to the entire territory of the State ;
- (d) supervision and control of the organisation on the part of the Central Government, often amounting to a species of tutelage ;
- (e) nomination and appointment of all or the majority of the officials of the organisation by the Central Government ;
- (f) designation of the organisation as parastatal either in the law instituting it or in official communications from the Central Government.

On the 14th March, 1942, the War Office directed that all parastatal institutions were to be placed in the hands of the Custodian of Enemy Property and where necessary operated by him, with due safeguards, for the benefit and interest of the Army and the territory. Where the business was not required to be operated it was to be either liquidated or kept up on a care and maintenance basis. The property was to be treated as State property and liable to seizure without payment, but with proper maintenance of records. It was the responsibility of the Legal Department to decide what was parastatal and what was not. Where there was more or less complete State control by the Fascist Government, even though on the face of it the concern

appeared to be a private company, the Legal Department as a rule advised that, if it was wanted for the Army and the war effort, it should be taken, nothing paid, but an exact record maintained. The conception behind this was that, if private interests were later found to exist, they could be made the subject of compensation and, if unwittingly a principle of international law had been infringed, cover for the action could be taken in the peace treaty. As time went on efforts to define "parastatality" precisely were abandoned. The following paragraphs in the Report of the Chief Legal Adviser, East Africa Command, Lieut.-Colonel Sir C. F. Belcher, for the period 1st May to 31st December, 1942, throw light on the problem :—

"The existence of what are called 'Enti Parastatali' in Italy appears to date from after the beginning of the Fascist régime, and has added to the difficulty of answering the constantly recurring practical question : 'Can we seize such-and-such property as booty, or must we regard it as private property, and according to its kind pay for it sooner or later ? How is one to interpret the provisions of the Hague Rules as embodied in Chapter XIV, Section 9, of the Manual of Military Law where they deal with the subject ?' The word 'parastatal' does not occur in Italian laws before 1924. From the available writings of Italian jurists it must be concluded that they confine the use of the word, which had a lay origin, to what we should call a semi-independent Department of Government, comparable to the Railways of Kenya, or any other public organisation working under a Commission. In the judgment of the Council of State concerning C.I.T.A.O. (a Transport Corporation in Italian East Africa) delivered in January, 1940, it was laid down that this concern was not parastatal, since to be parastatal it would have to be *persona giuridica pubblica*, whereas in fact it was a Joint Stock Company and therefore must be regarded by the law as a private individual. Actually, we know that C.I.T.A.O. is in all essentials a State agency, and we suspect complete State ownership of its assets.

"Unless in the course of our endeavours to carry out the laws of war as regards the property of our enemies we realise that a private person, individual or company, may hold wholly or in part for the State, our war effort will *pro tanto* be stultified. We cannot, therefore, simply take the Italian definition and work on it by rule of thumb, more particularly when the majority of Italian companies have bearer shares and the registers are in Italy. The usual thing is for the 'A' shares, as they are called, to be subject to name registration as with us, while the 'B'

shares are bearer shares. The proportions of each to the whole differ with each company. It is obvious that the registered shares may not be owned beneficially by those in whose names they stand, while it is impossible to find out anything at all about the ownership at any given time of the ' B ' class, or bearer shares.

" The guidance we have at present, besides the provisions of the Manual of Military Law, is the War Office memorandum dated 14th March, 1942, which states that all parastatal institutions are to be placed in the hands of the Custodian of Enemy Property, and where necessary operated by him for the benefit of the interests of the Army and of the territory, with due safeguards. Where the business is not required to be operated, it is to be either liquidated or kept up on a care and maintenance basis. Meanwhile the property will be treated as State property and liable to seizure without payment but with due maintenance of records. We have to decide for ourselves what is parastatal and what is not. Were we to take the narrow Italian definition the matter would be easy, but such a definition will work to the frustration of our war effort as regards the acquisition of property in which, though the form of the nominal owner may be that of a juridical private person, the beneficial ownership is in whole or in part in the Italian State."

As regards Italian private property, it was obviously beneficial to the Allied war effort to maintain as much trade possible. It was therefore decided that enemy businesses which were in a position to operate should continue to do so, subject to legislation necessary to protect our interests but otherwise without interference from the Custodian of Enemy Property. In cases on the other hand where private property was abandoned by its owners, the Custodian was to take charge and give it every reasonable care. Buildings were to be secured as far as possible from pillage and looting and if necessary movables of considerable intrinsic value were to be removed to a place of safety. In the case of abandoned businesses the Custodian was empowered to re-open them under his own arrangement if this was necessary for the needs of the Army or the local populace.

Property control, therefore, had a special meaning denoting the custodianship or supervision as well as the management of property, closely connected with the financial and economic organisation of military government. It of course included such activities as the administration of frozen bank accounts and bearer securities and blocked foreign exchange assets. In Italian Africa the following sorts of property were, in particular, subject to control :—

1. Utility undertakings, public corporations and monopolies under control of the Fascist party or of parastatal status.
2. All Fascist party organisations and agencies and the property of any leading supporters or members of the party specified by name.
3. The property of all organisations, clubs or associations prohibited or dissolved by Military Government.
4. The property of absentee owners, including United Nations Governments and internationals, unless represented under a legally constituted power of attorney.
5. The control, regardless of present ownership, of property which had been subject to duress, wrongful confiscation, or spoliation whether nominally legalised or not.

Other functions of Custodians included the taking over of personal property of absentee owners or of prisoners of war. These they only took into safe custody and where possible found suitable storage. In many cases, however, the destruction of war prevented such accommodation being available ; if necessary the Custodians were entitled to demand military guards over the property, if and when these were available. They could also detail civil police for this purpose, if reliable personnel could be found.

At the end of his tour of duty a Custodian of Enemy Property should have been roughly in the following position :—

- a. The holder in blocked accounts of considerable funds realised by the sale of ex-enemy goods and property, and from fees received in his official capacity, which were laid down by the Chief Political Officer on a percentage basis. He should also have been the controller of private balances which were taken over in blocked accounts in various banks operating in the territory, more especially of absentee account holders.
- b. He should have been in control of movable and immovable property, goods, tangible assets, and stocks in trade of concerns for which he had acted as manager during his term of office. In order to protect H.M.G. against subsequent claims, his records, registers, and particularly all classes of accounts, should have been kept in clear and concise form, and show that they have been regularly audited by qualified personnel.

The control envisaged may appear pedantic considering the complete lack of scruples displayed by the enemy under similar circumstances. But there were two strong reasons why such control should be exercised—one material and the other moral.

The moral ground was the recognised fact that, however reprehensible were the methods of the enemy, it was desired to observe scrupulously the civilised doctrines for the preservation of which the war was being fought. The material reason was that the more occupied territory could be made self-supporting by proper control and utilisation of property within legal limits and the population brought round to a more enlightened and human frame of mind, the more successful the administration would become and the less the British taxpayer would eventually have to pay if, as seemed more than likely, reimbursement by the defeated Government proved impossible.

The Custodian was not concerned with the running of municipal undertakings ; but he did become directly responsible for seeing that the financial side of certain industrial undertakings was properly controlled and that proper accounts were maintained, regular wages paid, and suitable attention given to the maintenance of plant. What this aspect of the work meant may be gauged by recording that the Custodians of Enemy Property in Eritrea and Ethiopia at one time or another had control of a group of hotels, two cinemas and a theatre, six different motor or engineering firms, a salt monopoly, a gum concession, an establishment for the manufacture of orthopaedic instruments and artificial limbs, a milk pasteurisation plant, a large factory for making buttons and other ornaments out of vegetable nuts, and a mineral water monopoly. It was quite obvious that such a variety of responsibilities could only be shouldered if the administration and labour of the activities concerned were allowed to remain as much as possible undisturbed and in practised hands.

The administrative responsibilities of Custodians may therefore be divided, by and large, into (a) Financial, and (b) Legal administration. The financial responsibilities have again to be subdivided. In the first instance the Custodians probably took over, and from time to time received, funds which accrued from enemy Government sources. These were returned in Administration budgets. Once they had collected the funds and handed them over to the Controller of Finance and Accounts, either in specie or in the shape of blocked accounts, their responsibility as Custodians ended and the C.F.A. became repository of these funds. This, however, did not apply to monies connected with the administration of the property of private absentee owners. Here Custodians were responsible for the collection and disposal of such funds. These included, for instance, rents from property for which they were responsible, which was either let or had been

requisitioned, the ordinary business turnover of factories, industrial plant or retail shops, credit balances found lying dormant in the various banks, cash received from sales of goods, and fees. The C.F.A. was available for consultation on the manner in which such assets should be handled and was asked by Custodians to make arrangements for a periodical audit of this portion of their responsibilities. Custodians had attached to them Accountant Officers, suitably qualified to compile accounts and registers ; the duties of Custodians were so manifold that, once these accounts had been set up, it was necessary for them to be decentralised almost entirely to the Accountant Officers.

Registers of title, property registers, and business registers of Commerce and Trade were naturally of great value to the Custodians and on the occupation of a centre of any size were the first thing on which they endeavoured to lay their hands, not always with success. In more than one instance troops were quartered in premises containing such archives, which, their value not being appreciated, were bundled out and even burned : months were then spent in recovering what survived.

The Custodian's legal responsibilities imposed many restrictions. In, for instance, selling goods which they had taken over on behalf of absentee owners, it was laid down that they were only entitled to sell without direct instructions goods of a perishable or semi-perishable nature ; they were required to determine to the best of their ability what did, and what did not, come under such definition. This was by no means an easy task. In Africa large dumps of miscellaneous stores were taken over by the Custodians, representing goods warehoused by owners, untraceable stores, or cargoes ex enemy ships which had been disembarked and concealed by order of the local Italian authority. One dump for which a Custodian was responsible contained a wide variety of goods including stock piles of soya beans and grain lying in the open, heavy electrical machinery consigned to a State Government in India, crates of aniline dye powders, photographic paper and material, leather goods, toys, and Japanese lanterns and paper umbrellas. It was frequently difficult for the Custodians to decide for themselves what they were and were not entitled to sell, and their first inclination was to consult the Legal Adviser. In borderline cases this nearly always resulted in the latter taking the precaution of advising against the sale rather than in favour of it. One instance of delay of this sort culminated in a fire due to the fermentation of perishable goods, which made it obvious to the

Senior Custodian in question that he could only carry on satisfactorily if he assumed responsibility himself.

In the light of the preliminary experience gained in Cyrenaica on the first occupation, instructions had been formulated for issue to the Custodians of Enemy Property in Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia prior to entering the countries. The War Office was also informed of the general lines on which it had been decided locally that the Custodians should work. Early steps were taken to prepare a proclamation in which wide general powers were conferred upon the Custodian in each area, and in which his duties were rather generally defined. The organisation of the Department of the Custodian of Enemy Property within the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration as a whole required adjustment in the light of experience. At the outset at Political Branch the Controller of Finance and Accounts directed the activities of the Custodians, asking the advice of the Legal Department when necessary. When it became obvious, in April, 1941, that the legal problems outweighed the financial, the Legal Adviser became responsible for the Custodians. It was later agreed by the War Office that a Chief Custodian of Enemy Property should be appointed to the headquarter staff to supervise and co-ordinate the work of the Custodians in the territories, an appointment which was filled in the late summer of 1941 by Lieut.-Colonel E. Waley, O.B.E. The Custodian officers on the legal side of the Military Administration in September, 1941, consisted of the Chief Custodian of Enemy Property, a Senior Custodian at Political Branch Headquarters, and Custodians in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

In Eritrea the Custodian was faced with an unexpectedly heavy task. A large number of businesses had to be restarted and the same applied to the public utility undertakings. An even greater task was the enormous mass of stores found in the port of Massawa, which had been landed by the Italians from German ships, that had taken refuge on the outbreak of war, to a value estimated to exceed £5,000,000 sterling. Vexed questions in connection with the legal ownership and disposal of the cargoes soon arose. In these early months the Eritrea Custodian was single-handed except for a small staff of inferior clerks who, as it transpired later, were dishonest. When at the end of the summer of 1941 it had been decided that Eritrea was to become one of the principal Allied supply bases in the Middle East, the consequential boom in military business in Eritrea meant even more work for the Custodian. As described previously, it was soon decided that

local resources were to be used in preference to importing. The usual method of requisitioning for settlement after the war were found unworkable, for the Italians, having no faith in compensation from their own Government, concealed all stocks and plant possible. Accordingly in the summer of 1942 the military authority decided to purchase machinery and equipment on a basis of imported cost or estimated replacement. While the decision produced a greater stock of engineering goods than it had been thought existed in the country, the work thrown on the Custodian's department can be more readily imagined than described. But there is no doubt that, by allowing freedom of action, affording protection to Italian business men, and by re-opening trade organisations, the Custodian of Enemy Property contributed not only to the development of Eritrea as a military base, but also a great deal to the favourable developments in finance and trade described in Chapter VI.

At an early stage the Assistant Legal Adviser in Eritrea set about preparing a list of companies and organisations active in Eritrea. In May, 1942, the Chief Legal Adviser also sent his assistant to Asmara to confer and report how best a line of demarcation could be drawn between parastatal and private property. The report was completed on the 11th July, 1942, and was followed by a questionnaire sent to the Italian companies in question seeking information regarding their ownership. The replies came back, but were not satisfactory. The Italians quickly divined the object of the inquiry and, after putting their heads together, framed their replies so that little useful information was forthcoming from the British standpoint. In August, 1942, a conference was held at Political Headquarters, Nairobi, at which the Chief Legal Advisers, North and South, were present. A joint recommendation was prepared in which it was agreed that day-to-day needs only of the Army in occupation (such as in former times were paid for out of contributions levied) should be the subject of requisition (and payment made as soon as possible to owners present under the decision referred to above), while producer goods, surplus supplies, and goods intended for removal from the territories where found, should when needed be seized as booty of war or war material, with *ex gratia* payments only where economically or politically desirable. As to immovables, rent would be paid to avoid hardship. After discussions with Brigadier Hone (Sir Ralph Hone) in November the War Office preferred not to lay down any general principle of the kind indicated and asked for a draft of proposed amendments to be

submitted, which was still *nil judice* at the end of 1943. The events are noted as a further instance of the unsatisfactory state of law and policy on the subject of requisitioning.

The most difficult task, as regards deciding ownership, that faced the Custodian was concerning the cargoes abandoned at Massawa port. While most of these cargoes belonged to German and Italian nationals, a certain proportion also belonged to, or were pledged to, British nationals and neutrals. Prior to and following Italy's entry into the war the Italian Government had requisitioned a part of the off-loaded cargoes; a further part of the cargoes was disposed of by the Italian Government authorities, just prior to the occupation, to avoid seizure.

Under various decrees issued by the Government of Italian East Africa, portions of cargoes were requisitioned by two Italian State bodies, the "Azienda Speciale Approvvigionamento" ("A.S.A." for short) and "Ente Approvvigionamento" ("Ente" for short). It was discovered that "A.S.A." and "Ente" had made large sales of goods thus requisitioned and had moreover distributed or sold at fictitiously low prices just prior to the British occupation. Instances of the distribution of portions of these cargoes amongst private individuals were disclosed in some instructions issued by the Italian Government and unearthed by the Custodian's staff. For instance, a secret circular was found to have been issued by the Italian Government on the 27th March, 1941, to all Institutions, Officials of Dependent Services, the Fascist Federation, the Apostolic Vicar and others, giving instructions, if it should become necessary, to transfer to "private ownership" goods which were destined to a Government Department or were already in the possession of a Government Department. The "private ownership" described included not only that of private persons and businesses, but also church organisations, including the Apostolic Vicariate. The following Italian signal message was also discovered:—

"To : Chief Supply Officer, Asmara. 29.3.41.
FROM : Asmara. 2400 hours.

"Instructions in case of emergency. Situation developing Taclesan front shows possibility of an immediate collapse. In such case Asmara will be open to enemy. . . . Supply stores must be passed to private firms with proviso already established by High Commissioner so as to be useful for civilians."

In a few instances it was possible to trace parts of the cargoes to private ownership and in such cases the private individual or company concerned was made to return the goods or, if that was

not practicable, to pay to the Custodian the balance of the estimated value above the fictitious purchase price. With the collapse of the Italian military forces, pillaging at Massawa took place by the local inhabitants. When to all this was then added damage by the great fire at Massawa and the depreciation of perishable goods, the jigsaw puzzle facing the Custodian and the Legal Department was wellnigh insoluble. The only way by which the original owners of cargoes at the time of off-loading could properly be traced was by means of the shipping marks and manifests and the checking of these with such bills of lading and other documents as could be recovered, although there were few to be found in Asmara or Massawa. Considerable progress under very difficult conditions was nevertheless made from the start, but the real solution, insofar as one was possible, came when most of the original shipping documents and inventories of the goods, together with their shipping marks, were discovered at Addis Ababa. After examination at Asmara they were eventually forwarded to the War Office. It says a great deal for the efficiency of the Administration, and of the Custodian's officers in particular, that technical documents of this nature were unearthed and recognised in the complex political and administrative tangle which Addis Ababa presented at that time. It is not the least romantic part of this record that such shipping documents, in the midst of war, should eventually meet their counterpart bills of lading and insurance cover in London, where a part of the goods in question, even if they had been lost or used for Allied war purposes, had been pledged and financed or were actually owned.

So difficult a task as that which faced the Custodian's Department in Eritrea, under-staffed as it was at the beginning, could not have been carried out without a certain quota of trouble. A Court of Inquiry, appointed in August, 1941, inquired into the affairs of the Department and at this inquiry it was established that a more experienced officer was required as local Custodian and that a larger staff was essential. As a part of the re-organisation introduced, the Chief Custodian at Political Headquarters took up his residence at Asmara from July to September and thoroughly overhauled the Department. Additional and suitable staff was brought in in the autumn. On the 1st February, 1942, Eritrea, with the exception of Assab, was transferred to Middle East Command and about this time it also became obvious that the work of the Custodian's Department was now more concerned with the financial side than with legal aspects. After consultation with the C.P.O., East Africa Command, in July the Chief

Custodian of Enemy Property relinquished his departmental connection with the Legal Section, and became responsible as a departmental head direct to the C.P.O. himself. The administrative work was transferred to the Finance Department. When subsequently the post of Chief Controller of Enemy Property was abolished, his work was performed by an accountant in the Finance Section under the direct orders of the C.F.A.

During 1943 the work of the Custodian's Department in Eritrea lightened and the time had come to consolidate a position which had hitherto been very fluid and uncertain. Less consideration than formerly was required for questions of principle; problems could now be decided by precedent. An attempt was made to codify the rules for the management of the Department. A scheme was devised for recording different types of debits for liquidation after the war. The accounts of 27 companies and firms and 30 other undertakings were audited. As a result of the survey, however, little more information came to light concerning the real relation of parastatal concerns in the country to the State, and it remained difficult to discover whether the local representatives really had not got the information or were still suppressing facts.

Property at Assab, which was occupied in June, 1941, came under the control of the Custodian's Department in September when an Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property arrived. He found a big task ahead of him. Apart from the usual problems connected with the sorting out of the property of Italians, absent and otherwise, he found here also a harbour packed with cargoes which needed checking. Here too a number of enemy ships with cargoes intended for India and South Africa had taken refuge on the outbreak of war, and the Italian Authorities had helped themselves to the merchandise which these ships carried with scant regard for ownership or record of action. Inventories were made by the Custodian of Enemy Property which might be of military use. He found Assab remarkably well supplied with useful goods and equipment, outstanding among which were a well-stocked timber yard, a wide range of building and other materials in a hardware and engineering depot, power producing units, machines and machine tools. This valuable contribution to the Allied war effort was eventually divided between "U.S. Projects" in Eritrea and British military establishments in Aden. Considering the isolation and lack of facilities in Assab the records obtained by the Custodian were particularly creditable and satisfactory. By 1943 registers had been completed showing how the cargoes of

the enemy ships had been disposed of; by the end of the year most of the property needed had been seized or requisitioned and it was found possible to dispense with an officer on whole time Custodian duties.

Although there was much work for the Custodian of Enemy Property in Somalia, it was mostly of local importance, not having the political significance of the issues raised in Ethiopia or the military urgency of the Projects in Eritrea. The military staff in 1942 in Mogadishu consisted of a Custodian, an Assistant Custodian and three clerks and interpreters. In the outlying districts the local Political Officers carried out the duties of Custodian. It was difficult owing to shortage of staff to obtain full details of property in the more inaccessible parts of the territory, but by the end of 1942 4,060 cases had been registered. Some enemy ships had also taken refuge at Mogadishu and Kismayu and certain cargoes had been unloaded by the Italians prior to the British occupation. Part of these cargoes were housed in sheds belonging to the Societa Coloniale Italiana and it was some months before it became clear that this concern was a state-owned institution. The Custodian was instructed to take charge of all these cargoes and submit a report for transmission to the War Office. Roughly unloaded, looted and pillaged, deteriorating and rotting, other cargoes were found in large part lying dismally by the water's edge. At Mogadishu there were quantities of jute, myrobalan, sisal, ginned cotton and cotton thread. At Kismayu it was estimated that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 tons of jute. In May, 1942, instructions were received to dispose of the commodities ex enemy ships, but it was a big task and only gradually did the piles of derelict jute grow smaller—after months of not very successful efforts to find purchasers anywhere between Cairo and Madagascar.

The main problems of the Custodian in Somalia were agricultural. The East African campaign had led to an almost complete dislocation of the Italian irrigated farms. At Villaggio Duca degli Abbruzzi the S.A.I.S. Company continued cultivation on a reduced scale, but elsewhere, with a few exceptions, the farmers abandoned their farms and took shelter in Kismayu, Brava, Merca and Mogadishu. The local natives, tasting an unaccustomed freedom from the heavy thrall of the Italian labour régime, thereupon grazed their herds over the deserted farms and helped themselves to any unguarded stores of crops, foodstuffs, or other material. Flourishing plantations of bananas, coco-nuts and vegetables were either trampled upon, looted or died from lack of

care. In the Genale area in particular the irrigation of canals silted up and the sluices were broken.

An inspection of the farms in the Genale district by an Italian employed by the Military Administration disclosed that, out of 130 farms, 58 were owned by absentees. Of these 58, 31 had been completely abandoned. But out of this chaos around Genale the Somalia Supply Board salvaged much useful material for military use. 86 much needed tractors were collected in, as well as valuable mechanical and electrical equipment. In other parts of Somalia steps were taken to remove all surplus machinery from the idle and abandoned tunny fisheries and canneries and from the salt works and Italian Naval Station at Dante in the North-Eastern Province. As a result of co-operation between all branches of the Command and of careful co-ordination of dismantling activities with the sailing programme of the O.T.A. coastal vessel, s.s. *Homeford*, and other shipping, several hundred tons of valuable war material were brought to Mombasa from isolated ports. The Tosi-Marelli power plants from Hordio near Dante were put into use in Kenya. Numerous workshops were equipped with the electric motor and power-driven tools from the salt works ; speed boats, a tug and surplus oil and cargo-lighters were distributed among the R.A.F. installations, squadrons, the Royal Navy and harbour construction works at Kilindini. 1,000 tons of diesel fuel were removed for naval use and the oil storage installations at Mogadishu were dismantled for re-erection as forward operational storage in the Middle East.

In 1943 a new Enemy Property Proclamation was issued for Somalia, replacing the former one and bringing the law closer into line with Middle East practice. Under this Proclamation a Fees Regulation was made which substituted a flat rate of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ for the old rates, with effect from the 11th March, 1941. A further change in the organisation of the Custodian's Department in this year was the establishment of a system of accounting uniform with that adopted at Political Headquarters and in Ethiopia.

Very divergent tasks faced the Custodian of Enemy Property in Ethiopia. It was obvious that the evacuation of the Italian non-combatants would involve the Custodian in a great deal of work and, as a preliminary, forms were prepared for completion by prospective evacuees setting out the details of property which they intended to leave behind them. In addition it was obvious that very many other difficult problems would arise on the eventual disposal of Italian property. From the outset divergent views were held by the British and Ethiopian Authorities on the treatment

and handling of enemy property. On the 1st May, 1941, a claims office was set up in Addis Ababa under the Legal Department of the Administration and to this office was directed the large number of Ethiopians who preferred claims against the Italians or the Italian Government. Each claimant's case was heard and he was then given a card informing him that his claim had been registered against the time when his allegations could be investigated and settled. Negotiations followed between the British and Ethiopian Authorities which resulted in the setting up of a joint Anglo-Ethiopian Enemy Property Department. This department dealt with all property which could not be moved, including chattels, but excluding specie and valuables, such as jewellery, which the British Custodian had sent to Nairobi for safe custody. In the first week of February, 1942, the five British Assistant Custodians, at Addis Ababa, Jimma, Dessie, Diredawa and Harar, were informed that, upon the signature of the agreement with the Emperor, they were to hand over the warehouses in their charge to representatives of the Ethiopian Government for safe custody on behalf of the British Custodian. The offices at Jimma were closed in February and those at Dessie in May. Mr. C. H. Collier, formerly of the National Bank of Ethiopia, was appointed Ethiopian Custodian on the 28th May and began taking over on the 1st June. The hand-over was completed at Addis Ababa in February, 1943, and at Harar in April, when all records were then sent to Nairobi. After the closing of the offices at Harar the British Custodian went with the rest of the Administration to Diredawa in the Reserved Areas, where some work remained to be done.

The question of fees was complicated by the publication of a Fees Order by the Ethiopian Government, under which the Ethiopian Custodian proposed to charge fees at the same rate and in addition to those charged by the British Custodian. As this was felt to be too heavy a burden on the many small private owners of the property, with the agreement of the War Office, it was decided that the British Custodian should charge fees only on property retained by him. In practice the task of assessing the total value of the property handled by the British Custodian proved quite insuperable; a fleet of twenty 10-ton lorries was engaged in moving a most miscellaneous collection of goods to twenty-four storage sheds for months on end.

The main offices of the Custodians at Addis Ababa, Jimma, Dessie, Diredawa and Harar, while they functioned, were divided into two departments, one receiving all cases that came in and the other dealing with cases of estate and real property. During the

early part of 1942 the military staff consisted of the Custodian, six Assistant Custodians and one accountant. The civilian clerical staff was composed chiefly of Italians and a number of Greeks ; in addition, a considerable number of Ethiopians were trained and employed as guards, porters and drivers. At one time the total number of civilians employed exceeded 1,000. The appointment of an Accountant Officer had made it possible to begin the compilation of a register of all property deposited with or taken over by the Custodians. A consolidated cash account for the whole territory, insofar as data was available, was prepared as at the 30th June, 1942. The recorded liability to Italian nationals at that date in respect of cash deposited and for proceeds of sales amounted to £162,000.

In 1941 the requisitioning of immovable property for the accommodation of troops or for office or storage use in Ethiopia, and the compensation to be paid therefore, was settled in consultation with the Hirings Branch and the Chief Paymaster and Financial Adviser of East Africa Command. It was agreed that all applications for accommodation, rental agreements and requisitions should be made through the Hirings Officer, whether such accommodation was required by the military or by the Occupied Territories Administration. It was further agreed that, although there was no objection to a negotiated agreement being entered into as to the rent payable, in every case the accommodation should be acquired by requisition. Similar instructions were issued for the other territories. In Ethiopia the question of payment of compensation for accommodation which had been requisitioned was complicated because, on account of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the subsequent re-occupation of the country by British and Ethiopian forces, it was, in many cases, difficult to decide who in fact was the rightful owner of the property requisitioned. In order to get over this difficulty a " Claims to Property Notice " was promulgated, which established a Board to ascertain the ownership of requisitioned immovable property ; when such ownership had been established by the Board, the matter was transferred to a Compensation Board which decided on the amount of compensation to be paid.

The general considerations at the beginning of this chapter apply equally to conditions in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but circumstances were different in both countries. Such work of the Custodians in these territories as is necessary to record is referred to in the chapters dealing with the administrations.

By the time Cyrenaica had been re-occupied for the third

time and the Administration for Tripolitania set up, the experience gained in East Africa enabled the necessary steps to be carried into effect with less trouble and more immediate success. In Cyrenaica there were no Italians to concern the Administration, and all their abandoned property, such as survived, will fall to be dealt with wholesale in the eventual settlement with Italy and the disposal of the territory. In Tripolitania the Italian population remained largely in physical possession of their property, which was dealt with generally on the lines followed in Eritrea. But within a few months of Tripolitania being occupied Italy was invaded and the Fascist Government capitulated, with the consequence that the Italian population co-operated even more willingly with the British Authorities. The Custodian's work in Tripolitania became in the event more that of a trustee than of an administrator.

In Madagascar the circumstances of the occupation, together with the local conditions, made the setting up of a Custodian of Enemy Property Department unnecessary.

In conclusion it may be said that the conception of a Custodian of Enemy Property for an occupied enemy territory, conceived by those who set up Political Branch at G.H.Q., Middle East, in February, 1941, and born with much labour in the following months in Italian East Africa, justified its existence. In the light of after events the function was necessary and indeed in certain aspects indispensable. The value of such an organisation was recognised in subsequent Military Governments. But the duties involved, which were voluntarily assumed, proved in Africa at all times so numerous and heavy that they were out of proportion to the limited staff available, and probably greater than public policy demanded. The work which the Custodians did in Ethiopia was indeed remarkable : it represented high administrative capacity and ideal.

Administratively, the conception of the Custodianship of Enemy Property in Africa, as a duty combining many of the activities of a Public Trustee, Administrator of Properties and Commercial Manager for the Military Government, was an experiment of great interest. It ranks high amongst those many experiments which were attempted by British Military Government for the first time during the years covered by this record.

A department of the British Military Administration, the work of which was very closely allied to that of the Custodian's, was the Evacuation Branch, whose task it was to evacuate Italian nationals from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. The Custodians were

closely affected because the goods and chattels of these Italians were left in their care, in addition to financial matters which were handled in co-operation with the Controller of Finance and Accounts. It is therefore fitting that the work of the Evacuation Branch should be covered in this chapter. The subject was recorded in detail in the " Report on the Evacuation of Italian Civil Populations from Abyssinia (Ethiopia)-Eritrea-Somalia, June, 1940, to October, 1943 " by the Chief Evacuation Officer, East Africa Command, and issued by Civil Affairs (late Political) Branch, Nairobi, on the 15th September, 1943. What follows is in part a summary of this report.

Even before the British forces entered Addis Ababa on the 6th April, 1941, it was realised that the disposal of the Italian civil population of Ethiopia would represent a difficult problem and one on which early decisions would have to be made. The obvious reason why the Italians should be quickly removed was the supposed need to safeguard them against the Ethiopians, who had suffered severely at Italian hands, both during the Italo-Abyssinian war and in the following occupation, and whose historic methods of reprisals were apprehended ; and to circumvent the danger, from a military security point of view, of having many thousands of enemy aliens at large in the country, representing both a menace and a liability to the Allied war effort in a critical and strategic area. Thus it was that as early as the 3rd April, 1941, the G.O.C., East Africa, informed Middle East Command that the evacuation of Italians from Ethiopia was a problem of great urgency and that there was no suitable area in Italian East Africa, as then occupied by British forces, where such evacuees could be accommodated. He therefore strongly recommended their repatriation to Italy. On the 18th April the War Office in London was informed of the position and four days later agreed in principle to the total evacuation of Italians and stated that the Italian Government was being approached regarding the repatriation of women and children. As a result the G.O.C., East Africa, placed the whole evacuation operation in the hands of his Chief Political Officer, Sir Philip Mitchell.

Political Branch was faced with no mean task. At the time it was estimated that a total of some 45,000 persons would have to be evacuated, approximately a third to a half of whom were destitute and, as no such task had hitherto been attempted by British military authorities, there was no precedent on which the C.P.O. could base his organisation. By the 14th May, however, an initial survey of the problem had been made and certain general

principles laid down for guidance. The C.P.O. ordered the establishment of a Branch at Headquarters in Nairobi to deal with evacuation and repatriation, under his own direction ; this branch was to deal with such general policy as the destinations of evacuees, finance, correspondence with Governments, personal records of evacuees, returns of casualties, purchasing authority and sea transport. In Addis Ababa a forward Evacuation Office was set up, under the direction of the Deputy C.P.O., to deal with other aspects of the problem, such as the registration of civilians and the issue of ration cards ; the selection of evacuees ; land transportation to ports, including questions of rations, supplies and equipment ; medical precautions and the care of evacuees along the lines of communication ; the provision of Transit and Holding Camps ; embarkation at the ports in collaboration with Army and Navy Movement Controls ; and the provision of escorts and guards in collaboration with the local Army Commander.

Registration forms and identity cards were drawn up and printed in Addis Ababa, but the securing of an adequate British staff presented difficulties which were less easily overcome. In the event, not only was insufficient staff available at the inception, but at no time throughout the following two years was sufficient evacuation personnel available to cope with all of the problems that arose ; nor could the Branch have operated efficiently without the assistance of other branches and the Italians themselves. A Chief Evacuation Officer (Lieut.-Colonel) was appointed to Nairobi and a Senior Evacuation Officer (Major, subsequently Lieut.-Colonel) to the staff of the D.C.P.O. at Addis Ababa ; not the least of their tasks was the constant effort to obtain officers and N.C.O.'s in sufficient quantity, and with suitable qualifications, to carry out the directions laid down by the C.P.O. In addition to registration and the multitudinous duties of the evacuation preparations themselves, the Evacuation staff had to deal with a large number of matters pertaining to the administration of the Italian civil population. Relief, child welfare, movement control and transport from outlying districts, housing, education, and classification of claimants for retention in Ethiopia for essential services, were only some of the problems which they were called upon to handle.

But able-bodied males could not be sent to Italy, so the Governments of the East African Dependencies and the Union of South Africa were approached and agreement was eventually reached to send the men there in the following proportions :—

Kenya	2,500	able-bodied males, subsequently increased to	5,500
Uganda	2,500	" " " reduced	1,000
Tanganyika	5,000	" " " "	3,000
S. Rhodesia	5,000	" " " "	5,000
N. Rhodesia	1,500	" " " cancelled	
Nyassaland	1,000	" " " "	
	<u>17,500</u>		<u>14,500</u>

The port of Jibuti was the only really suitable point of embarkation but, as has been recorded, this port did not become available until July, 1943; Berbera, in British Somaliland, with its disadvantages of an open roadstead, no quayside facilities and dangerous conditions reigning during the monsoon periods, was the only alternative. It was therefore decided that the main Holding Camps should be sited at, and in the neighbourhood of, Diredawa, the temporary terminus of the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway and roadhead for the 300 mile road link with Berbera. Plans were put into operation without delay for the preparation of camps there to hold approximately 5,000 persons, assistance in the work being given by Army services and prisoners of war; at the same time camp sites were picked at Mandera, 45 miles from Berbera, for use as an embarkation transit camp, and at Harar and Jiggiga.

At this stage in the proceedings the question of priorities of embarkation as between prisoners of war and civilians arose; the G.O.C.-in-C. ruled that the former must have shipping priority. As there were some 100,000 prisoners of war to be disposed of it became obvious that the embarkation of civilians would have to be held in abeyance for some months. But the question of priority for civilians was agreed as follows: (1) all ardent and obstructive Fascists (for security reasons), (2) women and children, and old and infirm males, (3) able-bodied males not required for essential services, and (4) males required for essential services. Political Branch, Nairobi; proposed, and the War Office agreed, that all expenditure on the evacuation of the Italian civil population should, in the first instance, be a charge against H.M.G., recorded under evacuation expenditure with a view to a possible recovery from the Italian Government at a later date, and that none of the cost should fall as a charge against any territorial administration. This decision necessitated the setting up of an Evacuation Branch accounting staff both in Ethiopia and at Nairobi.

By July the first steps of the evacuation plan had been put into operation. Civilians were being brought in from outlying districts to Addis Ababa where disinfection and inoculation stations and a transit camp had been prepared. Financial and other

regulations for the main move had been completed, cash advances for evacuees in camps being fixed at ten shillings per adult per month. Baggage allowance was fixed at 100 lbs. per adult, plus bedding. In the first instance the amount of cash allowed to be carried by each evacuee was restricted to £1 per head, plus £10 evacuation receipts, negotiable on arrival at final reception camps.

Registration started in June in Dessie, where the unsettled conditions prevailing in the Tigrai area necessitated an early move for the women and children. As registration progressed it became very apparent that no card ought to have been issued unless a photograph was attached to it, as otherwise the card became a "marketable" document. This amendment was put into force in the autumn and the presence of the photograph largely eliminated such traffic. At first all kinds of devices were resorted to by the Italians to procure registration forms and high priority for evacuation, but as the summer passed and it became apparent that the Ethiopians were not so anxious to be rid of Italians as it had at first been anticipated, their enthusiasm to return to Italy waned. By November registration, though not completed, had reached a stage where a nearer estimate could be made of the number of civilians to be handled, the figures now being put down as 20,000 men and 13,000 women and children. Meantime the decision had finally been taken to use Berbera for both male evacuees destined for East Africa and Southern Territories and repatriates destined for Italy, and already the bulk of the prisoners of war had been embarked there for various destinations. It was estimated that between three and four months would be needed to complete the removal of the Italian population.

Plans became more concrete on the 14th November when the War Office indicated that Italy was co-operating over the shipping question. Four days later the War Office were informed of the suggested embarkation plan. This was that 8,000 males could be shipped to East Africa by the 21st December and the first 10,000 repatriates on Italian ships by the 7th March, 1942. The moving of a further 5,500 repatriates to the camp at Mandera to await the second voyage of Italian ships could be completed by the end of March, 1942, and the shipping of 8,500 males to East Africa by the end of April. The limiting factor that had to be borne in mind was the carrying capacity of the rolling stock on the railway between Addis Ababa and Diredawa. On the 22nd November the War Office agreed in principle to the plan and expressed the hope that Italian ships would arrive at Berbera about the middle of February.

A wave of difficulties now came the way of the Evacuation staff. A sudden tendency among Italians to have themselves retained as essential personnel became noticeable, a tendency which was encouraged, surprisingly enough, by the Ethiopians. Many went to ground and remained hidden with the connivance of the Ethiopians. Difficulties arose over inoculation, cleansing arrangements in the camps, the treatment of priests and nuns, and the fear of the Italians that the British would confiscate their goods, chattels and currency left behind in the care of the Custodian of Enemy Property. Despite adequate notice and repeated instructions the Italians failed to understand how they could best help the Custodian and therefore help themselves, the majority only depositing their property with him on the day before their departure. Unwilling to trust the Custodian's Department, less willing to trust the Ethiopians, these Italians muddled through their preparations for departure in a maze of indecisiveness. Frequently the Custodian was not even notified that premises with their contents had been evacuated.

The able-bodied men who were evacuated to internment camps in Eastern Africa were obliged to surrender their currency assets to the Custodian, who placed them in envelopes bearing the internees' names and registrations; these envelopes were then cased and sent to Nairobi for custody, together with any papers which the men wished so to safeguard. But the women and children and invalid men who were evacuated were encouraged to take lira currency with them in any quantities they wished. For statistical purposes the Custodians attached to the evacuation staff recorded the amounts declared and also took charge and removed to Nairobi for custody any article of jewellery, etc., which these evacuees deposited. The work involved was considerable, but it was economically justified and desirable in that the process removed a large quantity of payment media from the commodity markets. It had the interesting economic consequence of raising the open market exchange level of large Italian currency notes to the same level as, or even to a premium on, small lira currency in use as small change owing to the difficulty of transporting small denomination notes. The British military authorities were later delighted to learn that, on arrival on board the Italian evacuation ships, the Fascist authorities obliged the evacuees to surrender all their lira currency, which provided admirable, if unconscious, propaganda for British treatment.

By the middle of December the first move of 800 males from Addis Ababa to Manderla was complete and the first batch of 300

male registered evacuees left Berbera for Kenya. By the end of the year the second move, that of 10,000 women and children, began. By the end of January, 1942, 10,000 male evacuees had been transferred to camps in the Southern Territories, while 7,000 women and children had been placed in the holding camps at Diredawa and Harar awaiting the arrival of Italian ships, the actual date of the departure of which from Italy was still uncertain. On the 31st January the War Office signalled that the Italian Government proposed to sail two ships from Italy in February and two more in March, the total carrying capacity to be 9,500. Yet week after week passed without the arrival of more definite news and the morale of the thousands of women and children who waited in British Somaliland was seriously affected, until at last the British Authorities had difficulty in keeping alive the belief that the ships would eventually arrive. But on the 11th April information was at last received that the first two ships had passed Gibraltar and that British Naval and Army guards had been placed on them. The first two ships reached Berbera on the 5th May and ten days later the two further vessels arrived; loading of repatriates began on the 7th and the embarkation rate of 700 a day was adhered to. A point of interest concerning these ships, discovered on their arrival, was that extensive medical and disinfection arrangements were in readiness upon them to deal with what was obviously expected to be a verminous, starving and diseased population: after the first day of embarkation the disinfection plants on board were dismantled as unnecessary.

The loading of the first two ships was completed by the 13th, the number of repatriates on this first flight totalling 9,376, the majority of whom were women and children; all existing hospital cases were taken. The transportation of this multitude over 300 miles of road from Diredawa to Berbera, their searching and checking at night stops and at the beach piers, and their final embarkation had been completed in sixteen days, this without a major hitch or single casualty. The Italian Royal Commissioner in charge of the ships expressed himself fully satisfied with all the arrangements made during the embarkation and indicated that it was the intention of the Italian Government to return the same ships so that further flights of repatriates might be made. The ships sailed for Italy via South Africa on the 14th and 24th May respectively and on the latter date the Chief Political Officer sent the following message to the G.O.C., 12th Division:—

“ On the successful conclusion of embarkation of repatriates, please accept my most grateful thanks and appreciation for the

assistance and co-operation you and the officers and O.R.'s under your command have extended to my evacuation staff in the carrying out of a most difficult and anxious task, particularly those members of S. and T., Q Movements and Berbera Sub-Area."

On the completion of the embarkation of this first flight the War Office asked for details of the full number of Italians remaining to be dealt with by repatriation or evacuation. The reply was that there were remaining in Ethiopia : for repatriation some 5,400 ; for evacuation 4,000 males for the Eastern and Southern African Territories ; and 2,000 males for transfer to Eritrea. The figures for evacuation from Eritrea were : 6,300 women, children and aged and infirm men. In Somalia the B.M.A. authorities reported that 250 women and children were awaiting repatriation to their homeland and the total was completed by the 250 women and children who had been sent earlier to Kenya from Assab. To ease transport difficulties the Naval authorities agreed to the use of Mogadishu and Massawa as evacuation ports provided that the ships did not enter the inner anchorages.

In September, 1942, the War Office signalled that the same four ships were scheduled to sail for East Africa in the middle of October and the evacuation staff accordingly hurried on plans for the collection of personnel for the second flight. The delay caused of necessity by the lack of information regarding the arrival dates of the ships, coupled with the difficulties of overland transport, brought about longer stays at transit camps for the repatriates than had been intended. The maximum stay for any person at Mandera had been anticipated as three to four weeks ; in practice some were there for three or four months. During the first flight Mandera had been used in the main for prisoners of war and male evacuees, but in the interval that elapsed before the second flight climatic and other reasons made it necessary to convert it into a holding camp for repatriates. The control of a large camp of this nature, containing male evacuees and prisoners of war, as well as women and children, totalling in all 6,000 persons, was in the hands of five British officers and four N.C.O's. This necessitated the use of the services of Italians in every department and the immediate consequence was that the most important positions in the camp organisation were quickly seized by the most active Fascists. Fascist tribunals were surreptitiously organised within the camp for the purpose of trying and punishing anyone accused of pro-British sympathies and thirteen cases were reported of such tribunals taking action. As the weeks passed the discontent among the evacuees became more and more

apparent, a discontent that was fostered by the close proximity of the sexes without facilities for conjugal life. Bad feeling, in addition, grew between the male evacuees and the prisoners of war and it was found that the carabinieri were of little use as guards, being frightened of their own people, and therefore unwilling to support the British camp authorities. Arrangements were therefore made for men of the King's African Rifles to take over these duties and thereafter matters improved.

On the 19th November, 1942, the first two of the Italian vessels again reached Berbera and embarkation commenced the following day. On the 23rd the third ship arrived and, after the loading of 600 repatriates, left for Massawa to fill up to capacity with Italians ex-Eritrea. The fourth ship proceeded direct to Massawa for the same purpose. The two ships remaining at Berbera sailed on the 1st December, loaded with 4,531 repatriates. The Italian Royal Commissioner again expressed his satisfaction with the arrangements made for embarkation and stated that, providing the ships could be filled, he would arrange for yet a third flight, subject to the approval of the Italian Government. He was informed by the British Authorities that the four ships could be filled to capacity again, with Italian personnel from Eritrea and Somalia.

Although repatriation and evacuation in Eritrea lacked many of the problems that faced the Evacuation Branch in Ethiopia, transport arrangements being easier and administration unhampered by the return of the territory to an independent status, there was one administrative problem to be solved; by the time the registration of the Eritrean and Italian population began in July, 1942, Eritrea had become part of Middle East Command, which had been divorced from the East African Command. Under these circumstances it was agreed between the C.P.O. South and the C.P.O. North that the Chief Evacuation Officer in Nairobi should continue to be responsible for the evacuation machinery in Eritrea; that the required evacuation staffs should be supplied by the East African Evacuation Branch, under whose instructions this staff would operate; and that all records of both evacuees and repatriates ex-Eritrea should be maintained by the East Africa Command Evacuation Branch. But it soon became evident that the full responsibility for registration and selection and the consequent evacuation and repatriation could not be maintained by the Chief Evacuation Officer, East Africa Command, due to local conditions and certain difficulties that arose. These, the Chief Administrator, Eritrea, considered, must be

dealt with and determined by the Eritrean Military Administration. Therefore, beyond supply of staff and the keeping of the records, etc., the Chief Evacuation Officer, East Africa Command, was absolved from responsibility for registration, selection, collection, and final embarkation in Eritrea, while he retained control over repatriation, shipping arrangements and liaison with the War Office and other authorities concerned.

To the Italians themselves the subject of evacuation and repatriation was in marked contrast between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the latter country the Italians were living as recent conquerors of an indigenous population. On the re-conquest of the country by British and Patriot forces it was clear to all that the Italian régime there was finally over, bringing with it the prospect of reprisals, firm control by the British forces, and the possible loss of goods and chattels. In Eritrea, however, the Italian population had to a very great extent been allowed to remain in *status quo* after the British occupation, the only persons who had been placed under any form of close control being those in receipt of relief or in hospital, and some undesirables. Thus when the time came for embarkation the majority of the Italians were living comparatively peacefully in domestic environments. Another contrast between the two territories was that, while in Ethiopia the evacuation and subsequent repatriation was carried out under compulsory powers, the voluntary principle was to a large extent to be adopted in Eritrea, as was the case at a later stage in Somalia. At the commencement of the registration and repatriation in Eritrea some 8,000 persons volunteered to return to their homeland, of which 5,500 were selected. This figure was far in excess of the 3,700 allotment granted to Eritrea for the second flight, but it was realised by the evacuation authorities that the enthusiasm for the voyage to Italy ebbed and flowed with the tide of battle in Libya. While the seriousness was realised of uprooting more Italians from their homes than could be accommodated on the boats, it was essential that an adequate margin should be allowed to ensure that the allotment was fully taken up.

As in Ethiopia and British Somaliland transport resources were limited and the movement arrangements had to be most carefully co-ordinated. The carrying capacity of the Asmara-Massawa railway was only about 350 per day and eleven buses that were pressed into service gave approximately the same capacity. Loading facilities at Massawa were limited to 700 per day, all embarkation having to be carried by lighter to the outer anchorage, as the Italian ships were not allowed for security

reasons to enter the harbour. Again the organisation was hampered by the lack of trained evacuation staff, of whom there were at no time more than nine British officers and three N.C.O's, who had to be augmented by inexperienced members of the local administration. But due to the foresight of the Senior Evacuation Officer and the strong support he received from his small trained staff, the evacuation plan worked smoothly. Co-operation was given where necessary by other organisations, among which special mention should be made of the American Q Branch, who loaned equipment for the transit camps, and to the small party of American officers and army nurses whose contribution was both admirable and strenuous.

The Italian ship, which had called at Berbera to take up 600 repatriates ex-Ethiopia, reached Massawa on the 26th November. Two days later a second and empty ship anchored off the port. The two ships left on the 7th December carrying in all a total of 4,236 repatriates, including the 600 mentioned above; the total was made up of 1,800 children, 500 sick of both sexes and the balance of women. They took back with them to Italy 206,000,000 lire, while the cost of the whole repatriation worked out at less than forty shillings (E.A.) per head from house to ship, twelve shillings of which represented interdepartmental payments. The embarkation here also worked out without any instance worthy of note and without casualties.

Simultaneously with this repatriation, 765 male evacuees destined for internment in Southern Rhodesia were embarked at Massawa. But only one of this large number was destined to reach the intended reception camp, for the ship was sunk off the Portuguese East African coast by enemy action. The sole Italian was picked up on a Natal beach over a week after the sinking occurred; apart from exhaustion he was otherwise unhurt. 117 Italian survivors were picked up by a Portuguese sloop and taken to Lourenço Marques where, being in neutral territory, they were retained. Two Italians were taken aboard the enemy submarine responsible for the action and, apart from the 120 thus accounted for, the remainder were "presumed drowned".

By the end of 1942 the figures as regards evacuees and repatriates were evidence of the sterling work that had been accomplished under most difficult geographical conditions and in the midst of war. From Ethiopia 12,500 male evacuees had been transferred to Southern Territories and 1,500 males to Eritrea for essential work purposes; 14,500 repatriates had sailed for Italy, thus completing the repatriation task for this country. At the

Emperor's request some 500 Italian males had been retained for essential services and in the Reserved Areas 700 were working with Army units. Only 500 male evacuees were awaiting shipment to Southern Territories, while 1,800 civilian males had been reclassified as civilian "P.O.W." for security reasons. Of the total estimated Italian population of 60,000 in Eritrea 1,000 males had been evacuated to Southern British Territories, although, owing to the sinking referred to above, fewer reached their destination. 3,600 repatriations had been made to Italy, some 7,000 still awaited a further flight and 1,000 males were available for evacuation. The figure for Somalia for repatriates to take part in the third flight was estimated to be 3,000.

From the commencement of the Repatriation Scheme the War Office had visualised the possibility of the removal of certain unwanted civilians from Somalia in addition to those from Eritrea and Ethiopia. A representative of the International Red Cross, who visited Mogadishu in June, 1942, urged Geneva to arrange the repatriation of approximately 1,500 women, children and infirm from the bad climate of Somalia on humanitarian grounds. The Military Administrator, Somalia, independently inquired into the position and agreed that the removal of some 1,700 to 2,000 of these people was desirable, from both health and security points of view. Therefore, immediately following the departure of the second flight of Italian ships, arrangements were made to send a small team of trained British Evacuation Officers and N.C.O.'s to Mogadishu to undertake compulsory registration of the whole Italian population. At the same time arrangements were put in hand for all evacuee camps in Southern Territories to be visited by a Board of British Medical Officers for the purpose of examining all Italian males, regardless of age, considered to be sufficiently medically or mentally unfit as not to be of any use to the enemy war effort, with a view to these being included in the third flight, should this materialise. Arrangements were also put in hand for further repatriation from Eritrea and by the 8th May, 1943, 2,115 repatriates had been collected at Sembal camp, near Asmara, and 1,100 at Ghinda, half way between Asmara and Massawa.

The first indications that the third flight would materialise had come on the 29th March when the War Office signalled that the same four ships would leave Italy about mid-April, and that one ship would load at Mogadishu and the other three at Massawa. The provision of a new collection camp at Mogadishu was avoided by the improvisation of a portion of the De Martino hospital and

this was ready for the reception of repatriates by the middle of June. In Somalia there were four groups of repatriates to be handled, the batch from East Africa, those in Mogadishu town, those from the country areas, and the hospital cases. By the end of April 160 infirms and invalids and ten women and children had been collected near Nairobi from Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika evacuee camps and these were embarked on a British ship for Mogadishu, where they arrived in good time and without incident. On the 13th May the War Office confirmed that the repatriation ships had sailed from Italy and between the 27th June and 4th July they arrived at Mogadishu and Massawa. The Mogadishu ship was loaded quickly despite adverse weather conditions and left for Port Elizabeth on the evening of the 4th July, carrying 2,298 invalid men, women and children. At Port Elizabeth the passenger list was increased by the embarkation of 139 infirm and lunatic repatriates ex-Southern Rhodesia and a few Italians ex-Belgian Congo, making the total load 2,437. By the 13th July the loadings at Massawa were complete, the three ships carrying in all 7,198, this figure including 55 repatriates from Ethiopia who were picked up at Jibuti. At the conclusion of this successful operation the Chief Political Officer received letters of appreciation from the senior Italian officials concerned in Somalia and Eritrea and also from the Senior British Naval Officer on board the repatriation ships.

The summary of the figures of evacuees and repatriates handled by the Evacuation Branch, East Africa Command, in over two years of work is as follows :—

	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Somalia	Total
First flight	9,376	—	—	9,376
Second flight	5,115	3,652	—	8,767
Third flight	194	7,143	2,298	9,635
Grand Total	<u>14,685</u>	<u>10,795</u>	<u>2,298</u>	<u>27,778</u>

The above figures include a total of 83 Germans and other non-Italian Enemy Aliens, but do not include male evacuees to African territories to a total of some 17,000.

Looking back on the removal of those populations from their colonial homes one can but realise what a soul-destroying experience it must have been for them. At the same time it must be said that their lot could have been bettered by a more helpful attitude and a greater effort to help themselves in the unfortunate

position in which they found themselves. In startling contrast to the egotistical attitude adopted by most of the Italian women was the high quality of the work performed by the British women welfare workers, who slaved morning, noon and night among the Italian families. They helped to carry out the overriding policy laid down by H.M.G. that there should be created as far as possible a lasting good impression of British rule and intentions. Insofar as the British evacuation staff were concerned this policy called for endless reserves of patience and forbearance. Despite the trying climatic conditions, language difficulties and a constant shortage of personnel, a real team spirit was evolved and the evacuation staff stayed the course to the end, tired but triumphant. The value of their work was recognised in later years in Italy itself, both by the Italians who had passed through their hands as well as by the Italian Authorities, who realised what had been done and the difficulties which had been overcome.

It is a matter of some comment that this team of evacuation officers and women welfare workers, who had become specialists and had handled so successfully the first mass civilian movement dealt with by British military authorities, was not retained or used as a team in Europe to deal with displaced persons. The few who were posted to this work in 1944-1945 were not continued in such duties to cope with the much greater problems of later years in spite of their training in, and enthusiasm for, their work: the rest were never even asked to do such work, which nearly all wanted to do.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XVIII

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1944-1946

Economic Depression of 1944 — Loss of B.M.A. Staff — Waning Arab and Eritrean Belief in European Intentions — Similarity of the Administrations to Colonial Governments — ERITREA : B.M.A. Staff — Educational Improvements — Consolidation of Eritrea's Legislation — Custody of Enemy Property and "Parastatal" Problems — Improvements in the Eritrean Police Force — The Medical and Veterinary Departments — Campaigns against the Locusts — Communications — Repatriation and Unemployment — Enterprise in Minor Industries and Agricultural Schemes — Apprehensiveness about the Political Future — Trouble with Bandits — TRIPOLITANIA : Tripolitania balances its Budget — Social Services and Education — Trade and Commerce — Political Consciousness — The November Riots in Tripoli City — Tripolitania Police Force — Illegal Immigration — Custody of Enemy Property — CYRENAICA : Visit to Cyrenaica of El Sayed Idris el Senussi — The Good Relationship established by B.M.A. with the Cyrenaican Arabs — The Formation of a Public Works Department — The Police and Civil Services — Education and Medical Services — Direct Farming on the Barce Plain — Large Scale Wheat Growing — Custody of Enemy Property — The Care of Antiquities in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica — The Return of Statuary to Cyrene — The Skill of Italian Workmen — Valuable Finds of the Antiquities Department — The Added Responsibility of the Dodecanese Islands to Middle East Command — Negotiations for the Disposal of Ex-Italian Territories in 1946 — Visit of the C.C.A.O. to the Second Plenary Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris — The Position in October, 1946.

CHAPTER XVIII

British Military Administrations in the Middle East, 1944—1946

BY the beginning of 1944 military operations had moved from Africa into Europe. On the mainland of Italy the British Eighth and the American Fifth Armies were hammering against the German Winter Line, and the combatant troops and air forces which had been concentrated in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been moved to this and other theatres. Only a few squadrons of aircraft of the Royal Air Force remained in North Africa to protect the convoys in the Mediterranean and, on Cyrenaican airfields, for offensive action over the Aegean. Thus the ex-Italian colonies had ceased altogether to be theatres of military operations and the Occupied Territories had lost their importance as lines of communication, shorter and easier routes having become available. Remote from the activity which continued in the supply bases in Egypt and Palestine, outwardly at least, peace had returned to Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Eritrea. It was these outward appearances which their inhabitants were eager to accept ; for the Military Administrations conditions were far from normal.

War-time industries, created and fostered in the years when the production of any article of military use, regardless of cost, was an asset to the Allied war effort, showed signs of decline. In Eritrea the liquidation of the United States base, which had brought with it money and employment, was completed. Even those industries which had produced consumer goods for the civilian market and had found encouragement to do so both in the high prices obtainable for their products and in assistance given officially, had begun to feel the chill wind of depression by 1946. For the mushroom industries of Eritrea, where remarkable ingenuity had been shown in utilising the waste products of war and in adopting or improvising machinery to do so, were meeting keen competition from imitators elsewhere, notably in Egypt and Palestine. And with the ending of hostilities consumer goods began to flow to the Middle East.

The deflationary movement was felt most heavily in Eritrea, for there war-time industrial development had been much greater than in Tripolitania or Cyrenaica. But the latter territories

suffered more in another way—and sooner. While the garrison of Eritrea had been reduced to very small proportions soon after the conquest of the country in 1941, considerable forces had been maintained in Tripolitania and Cyrenica throughout 1943; their reduction was a steady process during that and following years. As the troops left, the flow of money into the territories diminished, prices of agricultural products fell and in some cases supply began to exceed demand at prices which would yield any profit to the, usually, high cost producer.

With economic depression as the background to administration it was inevitable that the task of those entrusted with the government of the Italian colonies should grow more onerous. It was not possible to offset the shrinkage in returns from ephemeral enterprises by initiating long-term projects: this was precluded by the general policy of care and maintenance which had to be observed. Financial control became increasingly rigid, and this during years when postings to the Home Establishment and the demobilisation of trained financial and accounting staff were subjecting the administrations to a wastage of experienced personnel which was offset only by an exiguous trickle of new arrivals from the U.K. and elsewhere. In Cyrenaica, for example, during an eight-month period in 1945-1946, ten officers of the Finance, Accounts, Trade and Supplies Sections were lost by releases and postings, and only one officer replacement was received. Efforts to fill the gaps were made by recruiting civilian personnel in the Middle East, but these substitutes, few of whom had English for their mother tongue or British methods as the basis of their technical knowledge, could only be assimilated gradually into British Military Administrations. In Eritrea, between the end of hostilities in Europe and September, 1946, there was a 100% change in heads of departments and an 82% change in total staff. Almost equally heavy losses were suffered elsewhere.

While economic activities dwindled interest in political questions grew. For the peoples of Eritrea and of Libya the war ended in 1941 and 1943 respectively. They retained a lively and, thanks largely to the B.B.C., usually well-informed interest in the European campaigns. But it was the interest of spectators, not participants; their main concern was with the future of their own countries. Although the reinstatement of the Emperor of Ethiopia had convinced Arab and Eritrean alike that Great Britain could, if she wished, settle the future of their countries in advance of Peace Treaties, the native peoples of the Italian colonies accepted,

without understanding, the plea of the British Military Administrations that political advance must await the signing of a treaty with Italy. They expected this to take place soon after the end of the war in Europe and believed that the conclusion of the pact involved no more than the dictation by Great Britain of terms to the prostrate enemy. These terms, they trusted, would implement every promise of hope made or held out by British propaganda during the years of struggle. It was a great shock to them to discover that the future of the Italian colonies could not be settled by Great Britain alone and that other Powers, some of which had not been supposed to have an interest in African politics, could, by opposing satisfaction of demands for independence or advancing claims to share in the tutelage of African peoples, secure indefinite postponement of a decision.

The administrations had now become very similar to colonial governments and were military only in form. But their authority was still founded on the fact of conquest. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, was still the supreme authority. The staffs of the various administrations were drawn from military cadres and, as such, continued to be under the Area Commanders for purposes of discipline. However the changed circumstances were reflected in revised warrants to each Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer in charge of an Administration. In December, 1944, their titles were changed to Chief Administrator, and Area Commanders were finally relieved of all responsibility for civil government, although this had seldom been exercised except when the interests of the troops had been directly concerned.

The criteria by which the administrations could be judged also began to change. The emergencies which followed military operations were no longer the absorbing test of administrative ingenuity and the inhabitants began to recall more peaceful times and to expect an early return to peace-time administrative standards. Technical officers in the administrations, having overcome the early difficulties, began to seek improvements in the administrative efficiency of their departments. Inevitably both experienced some frustration. For, although the Military Administrations had reached a close resemblance to colonial governments, they suffered, in comparison to Crown Colonies, from a number of disadvantages. For instance, there was little sense of administrative continuity. Behind them was an exotic Fascist colonial era and, in front, only the certainty that yet another change would be necessary when the future of the territories was settled. Naturally this had an unsettling effect.

Secondly, the serious lack of continuity of staff brought its consequences. Officers were withdrawn for service in Italy and the Far East, and, after July, 1945, large numbers left on demobilization and posting to the Home Establishment. It was unfortunately not considered possible to offer reasonably long term contracts nor to arrange that even a proportion of the officers would be engaged for future employment under the Colonial Office. A number of administrative districts had as many as six different officers in charge of them in two years. The major part of the task of administration fell on officers who were previously inexperienced; it is tribute to their character and enthusiasm that good government persisted.

In spite of the disruption caused by these continual changes of staff, the activities of the administrations in all the territories increased, a number of services being taken over from the Royal Navy and the Army. In Eritrea these included Signals, R.E.M.E. and Engineer services for the Royal Navy at Massawa; in Tripolitania, Works, R.E.M.E. and the management of Tripoli harbour; in Cyrenaica, Works, Ports and Lights, Hygiene and Fire Services. In addition the Administration of the Dodecanese Islands became the responsibility of Civil Affairs, Middle East, in May, 1945.

Major-General Sir Arthur Parsons, K.C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O., who, as has been recorded, succeeded Major-General Hone (Sir Ralph Hone) as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in July, 1943, retired in August, 1944, the post being then filled by Brigadier R. D. H. Arundell, O.B.E. Brigadier D. C. Cumming, O.B.E. (Major-General Cumming, C.B.E.), became C.C.A.O., on transfer from Cyrenaica, in September, 1945. Eritrea had three Chief Administrators since 1944. Brigadier S. H. Longrigg, O.B.E., who was mainly responsible for consolidating the administration, was succeeded as Chief Administrator by Brigadier C. D. McCarthy, O.B.E., in November, 1944. Brigadier J. M. Benoy, C.B.E., took over the duties of Chief Administrator in August, 1945. The administrative machine in Eritrea continued to work smoothly, with steady improvements in the social services. Between 1943 and 1946 eight new schools for Italian children were opened and the number of pupils increased by some 900. Half-breeds were given the same educational opportunities as Italians. A popular Trade School was organised and a pre-university course begun in 1944. Unfortunately the medical course had to be stopped because it was not given recognition by Rome. The progress made in native education was striking;

from 1943 to 1946 twenty-three new schools were opened, with an increased attendance of 1,671. An encouraging feature of education in Eritrea was the willingness of town and village communities to do their share in the provision of educational facilities. Throughout the highlands a keen desire for education was apparent and the education officer received continual applications for schools to be opened. The reply invariably given was that, if the community would provide a building, the Education Department would furnish staff and supervise the instruction. In the majority of cases—and despite the scarcity of building materials in many districts—the community leaders organised the construction of a schoolhouse, often primitive but usually adequate in so benign a climate. Very few were the cases in which a school, once opened, had to be closed because of poor attendance. New textbooks were introduced and there was a constant demand for instruction in English. Apart from the instruction given in the schools there were ten English institutes attended by 525 Italian and 440 Eritrean students. There would have been more of these institutes but for the difficulty of supplying teachers. The institutes were not a charge on the Administration: they made a small profit.

1944 saw a co-ordination of legal policy in Eritrea, largely brought about by a meeting held in Cairo, under the chairmanship of the Chief Legal Adviser, of Legal Advisers and others from all the occupied territories in the Middle East. Such an attempt at consolidation was necessary, for, at the end of 1943, after nearly three years of occupation, 440 legislative enactments had been promulgated and the greater part was still in force in Eritrea. This number was very considerably reduced by such enactments as "The Revocation Proclamation No. 16" of 1944 which repealed fifty-four legal notices. In 1945 the revision and consolidation of all the legislation enacted by the occupying authorities from the 1st April, 1941, to the middle of 1945 was brought to a successful climax by the promulgation, on the 3rd July, 1945, of Proclamation No. 13 which, with certain specified exceptions, made a clean sweep of the mass of intricate and repeatedly amended enactments in force at the time and substituted therefore 74 Proclamations (Nos. 13 to 86). These, with 54 new Regulations (Nos. 56 to 109) and 38 new General Notices (Nos. 175 to 212) were published in a bound volume, with such of the old enactments as were allowed to survive included as an Appendix, for ease of reference. The Legal Department of Eritrea was the first in the occupied territories of the Middle East to tackle and

complete the onerous task of revision and consolidation of its legislation, and to reproduce the results in a more compact form.

The Legal Department also made progress in other directions. The poorer elements from amongst the Italian judicial officials were eliminated and replaced by a number of able judges especially brought to Eritrea from prisoner-of-war camps in East Africa. An appreciable increase in salary was given to Italian magistrates and the principle accepted that judicial officials might be recommended for increments from time to time within their respective grades. This last decision did a great deal to remove one of the main subject-matters of complaint on the part of the Italian judiciary. This body had co-operated energetically and loyally with the Legal Department in return for salaries which, in most cases, were considerably lower than those paid to second grade clerks and interpreters employed by the Administration. In addition, the Courts of Justice in Asmara, both British and Italian, were transferred to larger and more suitable premises, thus removing one of the chief difficulties under which the Italian courts had laboured.

During 1944 the Department of the Custodian of Enemy Property ceased to function as a separate entity and became part of the Legal Department. Encouragement was given to absentee owners to appoint legal representatives in order that their property might be handed back against a complete discharge, thus decreasing the liability to claims of the occupying Power. But in November a directive was received from G.H.Q. to the effect that the Custodian was not in any way to encourage persons either to obtain a Power of Attorney or to seek appointment by the Italian courts as a representative of absent persons. The number of cases in which the Custodian could hand back properties and so lessen the responsibilities of the occupying Power was therefore diminished. In November, 1945, the policy of the department was again radically altered by Proclamation No. 95 which amended Proclamation No. 16 of 1945. The former Proclamation had stated that, "It shall be the *duty* of the Custodian to take into his custody *all* private property . . ."; this was amended to, "The Custodian *may* take into his custody *any* private property . . ."

As for the problem of parastatal property, which, as has been shown in previous chapters, had been a constant source of difficulty since the occupation of the Italian colonies, considerable assistance was given by the issue, by G.H.Q., Middle East, in April, 1944, of a list of firms which were definitely classified as "Property Partly Statal and Partly Private", together with a list

of "Doubtful Parastatal Institutions". These lists proved most useful guides in deciding how to treat various companies. The work in this connection still proved to be considerable, the total number of immovable properties directly controlled by the Custodian's Department at the end of 1944 being thirty-seven with 135 tenants, and the total rents during the year amounting to East African shillings, 85,038.38.

In 1944 further progress was made in the investigation of the fate of cargoes ex-enemy ships, the complete archives relating to Italian requisitions and sale being discovered at Mogadishu. A decision was reached concerning the charging of Custodian's fees on sales of these cargoes, so that proceeds might be remitted to the Procurator General in London, and in 1945 the bulk of the proceeds of sales were disposed of as under:—

(a) Ships ex-Massawa :

Remitted to London ..	107,420	9	7
Custodian's Fees and Costs	15,348	11	8
Customs Dues paid ..	4,565	1	9

£127,334 3 0

(b) Ships ex Assab :

Remitted to London ..	5,965	2	11
Custodian's Fees and Costs	853	1	10
Customs Dues paid ..	551	3	10

£7,369 8 7

TOTAL .. £134,703 11 7

With the exception of petty larceny and housebreaking there was a general decrease in crime in 1944-1945. A high standard of police supervision was achieved by better selection of Eritrean Police recruits, the discharge of undesirable elements from the Force, improved training of personnel, improved pay and conditions for serving members and a better appreciation of personnel, population and circumstances by the British officers and inspectors. The Italian Police carried out their duties satisfactorily in spite of the concern felt regarding their future. As for the Native Police, the standard of work and discipline was high, and there was no evidence of discontent.

The Administration continued to be responsible for Civil Medical Services throughout Eritrea, and became responsible for both military and civil hygiene services. In 1945 the B.M.A. staff consisted of 6 R.A.M.C. officers, 4 staff sergeants R.A.M.C.,

4 sanitary inspectors, 52 Italian doctors, 294 European assistants and 963 native workers, this strength being slightly reduced at the end of the year for reasons of economy. In 1945 the Administration was maintaining 16 hospitals and infirmaries and 66 dispensaries, 9 new dispensaries being opened during the year. While this organisation provided sufficient beds, the problem of effecting an economic distribution of them throughout the territory was hard of solution. Separate accommodation was instituted for seven different classes in each hospital: European and native men and women; V.D.; infectious cases; and prostitutes. The Central Medical Store continued to meet the needs of the civil medical services and to supply local retailers with certain controlled drugs.

A Veterinary Department was established as a separate entity in May, 1945, and work was carried on in both the disease control and public health spheres. The annual rinderpest inoculation campaign opened in October and over 80,000 beasts were immunised during the first two months, a worthy example of the work carried out by this department.

In both 1944 and 1945 the Eritrean Locust Section fought two full campaigns. Good results were obtained during the two 1944 campaigns: practically no crops suffered destruction from hoppers and very few scattered individuals succeeded in acquiring wings. But these results were offset by damage caused by swarms entering Eritrea in May, June, August, September and October. In 1945 infestation in both campaigns was very heavy. Control was exercised by poisoning hoppers with arsenical bait, supplemented on occasion by the use of flame-throwers, trenching and other means. In the winter campaign 18,311 bags of bait were used against a total of 394 consumed the year previously, and in the summer campaign 54,456 were used in comparison with 15,904 the year before. The damage caused by flying swarms which entered the territory in great numbers just before harvest, or which bred and escaped within the territory, was estimated at 34% of all grain crops. Dhurra, taff and bultuk suffered the most heavily: other crops were little damaged. The total loss was computed at approximately £830,000.

In 1944, partly owing to the general depression and more particularly to the closing of the Ethiopian frontier, there was a considerable decrease in the autumn in the work available for road transport. It therefore became necessary to overhaul completely the Civil Transport Group organisation with the object of distributing fairly throughout the industry any work offered.

On the 1st October, 1945, the Civil Motor Transport Group was abolished and the control of the movement of all civil freight and transport was taken over by the Controller of Traffic. It was this officer's duty to fix maximum rates and route all traffic by the most suitable, and most economical, means available. His control was extended to sea coastal transport between the ports of Assab and Massawa, and included B.M.A. and private motor vessels, and native dhows, in the distribution of freight available. By this means the traffic of the Dessie area of Ethiopia was distributed equitably between the modern all-land route, Dessie-Asmara, and the ancient land and sea trade route, Assab-Massawa.

The other departments and services in Eritrea—public works, railways, posts and telegraphs, etc.—all maintained a good standard of efficiency. Unfortunately there was no corresponding progress in the economic situation and a return to more normal conditions only tended to prove the normal weakness of Eritrea's economy.

The alarming economic situation found in Eritrea at the time of British occupation was alleviated by timely expenditure on the construction of United States military installations in 1942. Throughout 1944 and 1945 all this expenditure decreased to vanishing point and the consequent unemployment among Italian skilled workmen increased. This was not offset by the rate of repatriation to Italy. Destitute persons were accommodated in camps and others received relief in cash, averaging in 1945 some £7,000 a month. Large-scale repatriation was the only satisfactory solution and this was continually hampered by lack of shipping and the reluctance of the Italian Government to increase the population at home and denude its former colony. It even proved to be impossible for nearly a year to send 450 serviceable lorries and their crews to Italy, although they were urgently needed there. At the end of 1944 the Arabian-American Oil Company, operating oil concessions from the Government of Sa'udi Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, recruited some 1,200 Italian artisans in Eritrea.

Unemployment among native Eritreans similarly increased. During the latter part of the Italian régime many Eritreans were employed as unskilled labourers and had become accustomed to an urban existence. The large numbers of Eritreans enlisted in the Italian colonial forces were also thrown out of employment when their units were disbanded and many preferred to live in poverty in Asmara rather than return to the land. In spite of its relatively small population, there is a shortage of land in Eritrea.

This proved especially to be the case in the central (Hamasiën) administrative division. There the population is the most dense and all the land suitable for cultivation has been taken up for many years. Cultivation rights are usually held communally, either by villages or by *endas* (family groups) within villages. Large villages may contain four or five *endas*. While the individual's enjoyment of a share in the cultivation rights of the *enda* is usually established by the elders of the family group and is seldom a concern of the Administration, the claims of rival *endas*, or of neighbouring villages, remained a continual source of friction and of preoccupation to Civil Affairs officers. The ultimate authority in such disputes was the Senior Civil Affairs officer of the division, who had to base his decision on the testimony given before him of the customary law of the area concerned. This law varies widely in different districts and very conflicting evidence has often been tendered to the S.C.A.O. His decisions have little chance of being permanently operative, although they usually effect temporary settlements and ease situations which, in the absence of an authority recognised by the contending parties and ready to impose its rulings by force, might lead to bloodshed. There is, indeed, no apparent solution to the agrarian problems of the Hamasiën (and of parts of some other divisions) which arise from the needs of an increasing population seeking to live off a cultivable land which erosion has permanently limited in area.

The situation would have been worse if the Italians, encouraged and supported by the Administration, had not shown considerable enterprise in the operation of minor industries and agricultural schemes. The manufacture of beer and spirits, buttons, glass, matches, pottery, boots and shoes, all provided useful exports. The value of exports in 1945 showed an increase of nearly a £1,000,000 over those for 1944 and was far in excess of the exports in any year under Italian rule. Agricultural production also continued to increase. The total production of seven main crops, barley, maize, wheat beans and three varieties of millet, in 1939 was 27,400 tons; in 1945 it was 66,110 tons. Indeed in the financial year 1943-1944 Eritrea reached a prosperity it has never experienced before and is unlikely to see again. For the first time in its history the budget was balanced, with a surplus of £71,406. The financial year 1944-1945 produced a deficit of £91,409, but against an estimated deficit of £351,058.

To the majority of Italians the end of the war brought with it hopes of repatriation and an end of a long period of uncertainty.

Minor setbacks in the victorious advance of the Allied armies into Germany provoked a small Fascist revival early in 1945; the show of black ties, as a sign of mourning for the death of Mussolini, was the last flicker of overt Fascism. Subsequently exponents of democratic political doctrines, both of the Left and Right, lost no time in entering the lists, and two Italian newspapers became the organs of their political views. But the majority of Italians continued to be little concerned with politics and far more with the high cost of living and the threat of unemployment. By the end of 1944 a fifth of the adult male Italian population was either unemployed or of no known occupation. A fund, known as the the Italian Charity Fund, was instituted and administered by a representative committee under the presidency of the Bishop of Asmara.

Outside Asmara the administration went along smoothly and in general people seemed anxious for the British Administration to remain. Agricultural production increased and there was a fairly general sense of contentment which was only disturbed in the western part of the country where a Beni Amer discharged soldier carried on a career of banditry in which he fought several actions with frontier tribes of the Sudan and with the Sudan Defence Force. His mobility led to widely spread operations by the Sudan Defence Force. Early in 1946 contact was made with him by a Civil Affairs officer of the Division and he and his men surrendered after an amnesty had been offered him. The operations during 1945 leading up to this success had resulted in 44 bandits being killed, 207 surrendering or being captured, and 692 rifles being brought in. Subsequently a blood-money settlement was made with the Sudan tribes and peace was maintained thereafter.

In Tripolitania steady progress was made throughout 1944 in establishing administration. The results were apparent in the fact that in the financial year 1944-1945 the budget was balanced for the first time in the history of the country and agricultural production increased beyond the best figures shown under the Italian régime. The main difficulty was economic stringency, chiefly due to the obstacles in the way of export trade and difficulties of transport and travel and the necessity for some reconstruction became increasingly apparent. The damages caused by the war and the gradual deterioration of buildings and industrial and agricultural installations grew more obvious. The population of Tripoli far exceeds the requirements of the town and is a legacy from the time when the Italian programme of expansion attracted hordes of

unskilled labour to the town. Uncertainty about the future of the territory and the official policy of care and maintenance precluded any large scale capital expenditure to carry out reconstruction.

Nevertheless social services for Italians were gradually restored to something like pre-war standard. An increase in the number of Italian schools and teachers in the period provided for all Italian children of school age, while the territory was fortunate in having good hospitals and the majority of the pre-war Italian medical staffs. A limited extension of education for Arabs was made possible and in 1944-1945 thirty new Arab schools were opened and the Arab teaching staff and school population doubled. The training of the former was a special care of the Administration, yet the demand for education still far exceeded the provision that was possible, catering as it did for only 2% of the Arab population. Special provision was made for the Jewish and Maltese communities.

From the 1st January, 1944, the Army ceased to be primarily responsible for the provision of supplies for civil consumption in Tripolitania and from this date onwards imports were made through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. In 1946 the U.K.C.C. handed over to the British commercial company which had, as has been recorded, established a branch there and which was the successful tenderer for the supply of rationed goods. The country is chiefly agricultural and supports itself in grain and vegetables. Severe restriction of imports coupled with an unusually good crop of barley in 1944-1945 reduced the adverse balance of trade below the figure which might otherwise have been expected. Under the Italian administration the territory looked mainly to Italy to provide an outlet for its exports and for this reason, together with difficulties arising from war-time restrictions, and also the departure of Italian traders, the restarting of normal trading activities was not easy. The Administration gave every encouragement to local industries, but these were limited in scope. Arrangements were made with Cyrenaica to import raw wool for the cottage weaving industry, part of the products being re-exported to Cyrenaica. A similar arrangement was also made for importing hides, for re-export to Cyrenaica either as leather or as footwear. The tunny fisheries, which cater for the export market, were assisted by obtaining crews and experts from Sicily. Negotiations were successfully concluded with Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Limited for the provision of short-term credit to farmers, and the Administration subsidised the three State-aided land settlements established by the Italians. Efforts were made

to stimulate trade with French North Africa and in 1944 11,000 tons of grain were exported there. Cereal purchases and export were handled by the Administration which purchased 20,300 tons of the 1944 crop; this, with the balance of the crop from the previous year, provided a total export of 25,200 tons valued at £650,000. In 1945 a further 24,235 tons were exported at £814,000. It was more difficult to export other articles and the territory continued to show an adverse balance of trade.

Political consciousness was clearly expressed in Tripolitania from 1944, by which time many of the exiled Arabs who had formerly resisted the Italian occupation had returned to the country. They found the Italian administrative system still in operation and this fact, although very few Italians were employed in executive posts, was a source of irritation. In particular, complaints were made against the presence of Italian judges. A Nationalist Party was formed which put forward the claims for full independence of the country in conjunction with Cyrenaica. The free expression of these opinions was permitted, but the Arabs showed little success in stabilising their own political organisation. At the end of the war this agitation was renewed and the political temperature steadily rose. It reached a peak at the time of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, 1945, when the Arabs thought that the future of their country might be settled. The Administration was apprehensive about the safety of the Italian colonists, but for various reasons expression of all this pent up feeling was directed rather against the Jewish population of Tripoli. At the beginning of November, 1945, some minor incidents led to full-scale rioting in Tripoli city and other centres, during which 120 Jews were killed. The Italian population showed no great interest in politics and, although their life was considerably harder than in Fascist times, they were certainly better off than their kinsmen in Italy.

Until the outbreak of the November riots the Tripolitania police had acquitted itself well, but had had no major troubles to quell. In the riots it was apparent that, partly owing to the great Arab preponderance in the ranks and partly to their short existence as a body, they were not reliable unless under the actual supervision of British officers and they were inclined to be passively pro-Arab. The garrison troops, consisting of three battalions, were fully deployed in assisting the police. Apart from these riots, law and order was rarely infringed, and then only petty crimes committed. Courts continued to function smoothly.

Another problem which caused the Administration much

trouble in 1946 was illegal immigration from Italy. During the war years many Italian residents of Tripolitania, fearing the country might become a battlefield, had sent their families to Italy, the exodus including that of numerous officials. In 1943, after the Allied occupation of Sicily and part of Italy, the emigrants began to return, though only in very small numbers because of the difficulties and risks of travelling clandestinely across the Mediterranean in time of war. But early in 1946 the movement assumed the character of an organised traffic: this could hardly have been carried on without the knowledge of the Italian Authorities, since nearly all the boats came from Syracuse, leaving that port in daylight, with up to 250 persons aboard each craft. The boats reached the Tripolitanian coast under cover of darkness, unloaded their passengers and endeavoured to be away again and out of sight of land before daybreak. No two landings were made at the same place. The arrivals had all formerly lived in Tripolitania and most were women and children seeking to rejoin their family breadwinners.

In principle the Administration was not strongly opposed to the return of these families: indeed, for humanitarian reasons, it would have wished to facilitate the movement. But since there was in Tripolitania a large number of workless Italians without permanent ties in the country and whom it was desirable to repatriate to Italy, B.M.A. insisted that for every Italian allowed to return to the colony the Italian Government must accept an Italian from Tripolitania. Eventually, through diplomatic channels, an agreement to this effect was made. Meanwhile Arab opinion had become excited by the illegal entry of Italians, about whom exaggerated stories were circulated, and protests were made to the Arab League and other quarters, while one Arab political party attempted to organise a country-wide one day general strike as a protest. Despite the seizure of a number of the boats engaged in the traffic and the sentencing to prison and fines of the captains and crews, the movement continued until the Administration announced that all illegal immigrants, even those of categories whose entry was in principle approved, would be sent back to Italy and not allowed to return to Tripolitania until their applications to do so had been approved under the head-for-head two-way repatriation plan.

But the repatriation of prisoners of war, refugees and others, many of whom owned property in Tripolitania, entailed much extra work for the Department of the Custodian of Enemy Property. This burden was to a certain extent offset by the fact

that, early in 1944, a State Property Department, under the control of the Finance Department, was formed and took over the State property previously administered by the Custodian. During 1945, in the Estates Section, 66 estates, representing 381 properties, were restored to owners or their representatives and in the same period only 27 properties were taken into custody. As regards the Moveables Section, much work was done towards sorting out the mass of furniture taken over in the early days of the occupation. 33 estates, representing movable property valued at nearly 2,000,000 (Military Administration) lire, were restored during the year and it was calculated that about 40% of the total moveable property taken into custody had thus been restored.

Brigadier T. R. Blackley continued to be Chief Administrator throughout this period, but the Tripolitanian Administration, as was the case in the other territories, suffered continual losses in staff due to demobilisation.

In the meantime Cyrenaica was slowly recovering from the devastating years of war. By the end of 1944 the majority of refugees had returned and among them were many of the leaders of the rebellion against Italian rule. El Sayed Idris el Senussi visited Cyrenaica in 1944 and was given a most enthusiastic reception, but after a tour of the country he returned to Cairo and subsequently paid only brief visits. He was given a residence at Beda Littoria, but considered that until his position was more clearly defined it would be derogatory to him, and possibly embarrassing to the Military Administration, if he took up permanent residence in the country. In October, 1946, the British Government agreed to official use of the title "Amir" in addressing Sayed Idris.

The good relations established with the people of the country continued and it is probable that the Cyrenaican Arabs had never been happier in a generation. Like the other Italian colonies Cyrenaica was developed by the Italians to a higher degree than the economy of the country warranted: while it was possible to maintain what the Italians bestowed in the other territories, it was a much larger task to rebuild it in Cyrenaica. But funds were not readily available and it was only after much insistence that the Administration was able to form a Public Works Department and obtain for it the votes necessary for it to begin work. This department had to start from the beginning with the minimum of staff and material. Nevertheless £62,000 was spent in the financial year 1944-1945, during which much clearance of bomb damage was done in Benghazi and sufficient buildings were repaired to

enable the headquarters of the Administration to move there from Barce. The Public Utilities Service at Benghazi remained, however, sufficient only to provide for the garrison. The urban water system was only provisionally restored and the people had to draw their supplies from a few stand-pipes. No electricity was available and the telephone system had disappeared.

An Arab Civil Service, formed in March, 1943, soon began to take an increasing share in the work of the Administration. At the end of 1945 there were approximately 350 native officials in the districts and 100 in the towns of Benghazi, Derna and Barce holding responsible posts, while a number of officials in outstations carried considerable responsibility with little British supervision. The police and gendarmerie, consisting of 50 British and about 900 Arabs mostly recruited from the former Libyan Arab force, was responsible for maintaining law and order, emphasis being laid on training the Arab ranks to accept responsibility, with excellent results. The Arab officers and N.C.O.'s proved both capable and conscientious. There were, however, no major breaches of law and order to test the force, and, although a watch was kept for anti-Jewish rioting in sympathy with the Tripolitanian Arabs, no disturbances in fact occurred.

The reopening of the Civil Court at the end of 1944 marked an important step forward in the administration of justice. The withdrawal of the Italian judges and consequent closing of the Italian courts had left Cyrenaica without any authoritative tribunal for the settlement of disputes other than the Sharia and Rabbinical courts which had only a very limited jurisdiction, confined to matters of religion, family law, personal status and inheritance. The applicable law was largely Italian law and local custom and the problem was to constitute a competent court in the absence of qualified Italian lawyers and judges. This was achieved by adopting the Italian civil court system and appointing a qualified lawyer to act as President of the Court with unlimited jurisdiction, and arbitrators selected from senior administrative officials and local notables with jurisdiction in cases where the amount claimed or the value of the matter in dispute was not more than £E.10. The Administration was fortunate in securing the services of Colonel H. J. M. Flaxman, a former Chief Justice of the Sudan Government, to be President. The arbitrators and the staff of the Court, with the exception of the Chief Clerk, were all recruited locally.

In 1945 the Legal Department carried out a consolidation and

revision of legislation on the same lines as had previously been done in Eritrea. Revision and Interpretation Proclamation, No. 81, revoked all previous legislative enactments and brought into force on the 1st February, 1946, 42 new Proclamations (Nos. 83 to 123) and 5 new Regulations (Nos. 3 to 8).

The curriculum of Egyptian Government elementary schools was adopted and soon proved popular with the Arabs, backward even in the Arabic language, but eager that their children should benefit by the facilities provided by the Administration. At the end of 1945 there were eight primary, twenty elementary and twenty-two Koranic schools, with an approximate attendance of 3,500 children. Special schools were also provided by the Administration for Jewish children as the result of pressure from the Jewish community.

Progress was made in building up the medical services. The hospitals and dispensaries, which formerly existed for Italian needs, while handicapped by lack of staff, accommodation and equipment, were kept working to capacity. Progress was also made in the Public Health Services.

The direct farming by the Administration's Agricultural Department of the Barce Plain, which had given disappointing results in 1943-1944 when the yield from 8,000 acres sown to wheat was only 1,000 tons, was much more successful in the two following years. In the 1945 harvest 17,750 acres of wheat yielded 3,500 tons. Instructions were received in that year that the acreage cultivated in the following autumn was to be reduced to 10,000. From this area 2,500 tons of wheat were harvested in June and July, 1946. It had by then become apparent that a world cereal shortage was to be expected and the War Office approved the maximum possible sowing of wheat on the Barce Plain in the autumn of 1946. This, with the equipment available, was about 18,500 acres.

Wheat growing on a large scale in Cyrenaica in peace time will probably not be economically justifiable if world supplies of cereals overtake consumption. The best yields achieved, a quarter of a ton to the acre, cannot be expected as an average over a period of years, for they can only be attained in a season when rainfall is well spaced out for the growing crop, a favourable circumstance that cannot be relied upon. The fact that much of the land sown to wheat had been untilled for years, during which it had been grazed, meant also that reserves of fertility were stored in the soil. Repeated croppings without manuring would lead to reduced yields and the permanent impoverishment of the land. But as a

war-time measure the direct exploitation of the Barce Plain was justified. For two years it made the country self supporting in wheat and flour and to that extent relieved demands on shipping space. Yet Cyrenaica still needed a grant-in-aid and the Administration got most of its revenue from indirect taxation. The revival in trade continued to be slow. The Administration purchased 10,000 tons of barley in 1944 and exported half this amount, the rest going for local milling and consumption. A further 11,080 was purchased in 1945 and a total of 14,280 tons exported during 1945. Otherwise considerable difficulty was experienced in arranging for exports.

For the Custodian of Enemy Property's Department the third year of the occupation was one of consolidation, and by its close nearly all abandoned immovable properties of value had been taken into custody. A feature of the Custodian's work was the increasing number of letters received from Italians regarding their properties in Cyrenaica ; in accordance with instructions the Department sent replies to private owners, giving descriptions of these properties and details of their size.

A minor, but none the less interesting, responsibility of B.M.A. was concerned with antiquities, and the preservation of the known antiquities and the supervision of the many sites in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania has been carried on with great keenness, but in the very restricted fashion which alone is possible in a temporary military administration. The staff position in 1945 was that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica shared the services of one Antiquities Officer, who utilised a number of locally engaged masons, bricklayers and watchmen. Despite these conditions useful work was accomplished in both territories. Most of the statuary which had been removed from Cyrene to Tripoli during the war was returned to its home ; steps were taken to bring back other objects removed to Rome ; and the preservation of antiquities was stimulated by the introduction of a party of skilled Italian workers who showed great talent for working in stone. Much shoring up of walls and cliff faces was done at various sites, notably Cyrene, where the most important single task carried out was the roofing over of the Mosaic of the Seasons in the house of Jason Magnus. This beautiful flooring, the best preserved mosaic in Cyrenaica, was sheltered from the rapid deterioration which had begun. The absence of an illustrated guide to Cyrene was filled by the production of a well-illustrated booklet which made a ready demand. Visitors who signed the book at the Cyrene Museum during 1945 totalled 2,500, while Tocra, Tolmeta,

Apollonia and other places of archeological importance were visited by many parties of British and Allied service personnel. An exhibition arranged by the Antiquities Officer in Tripoli attracted 7,000 visitors during 1945, exhibits being varied by drawing on the reserves of Leptis Magna and Sabratha.

While the routine work of the Antiquities Department did not include archeological excavation, some interesting finds were made. A gold ring of the first century B.C., showing the head of Isis and in good preservation, was unearthed near the Hellenistic Palace at Tocra; at Cyrene two previously unknown mosaic pavements, one of the second century A.D., with a fine head of Medusa, the other showing late Roman, probably Christian, figures, were exposed; and near the same spot the head of a second century male statue came to light.

Brigadier D. C. Cumming, who had been Chief Administrator of Cyrenaica from the setting up of a military administration there at the end of 1942, was succeeded, on his appointment as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Middle East, in October, 1945, by Brigadier P. B. E. Acland, M.C. who was in turn succeeded after his demobilisation in June, 1946, by Brigadier (Major-General) J. W. N. Haugh, C.B.E., D.S.O.

The Civil Affairs Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East, took over a new responsibility in the autumn of 1943 when plans were developed for the military administration of the Dodecanese Islands. Although a share was taken in the unsuccessful operations in the Dodecanese in November, 1943, and in the running of food supplies to various islands in the winter of 1944-1945, the British Military Administration did not begin its real functions until the 8th May, 1945, when the islands were surrendered by the German Commander to the Officer Commanding the British Occupying Force. Being a Middle East responsibility an account of the work of the B.M.A. in the Dodecanese comes within the purviews of this record: this account is therefore included as a separate, and concluding, chapter.

Throughout 1946 the Chief Civil Affairs Officer was closely concerned with the negotiations for the disposal of the ex-Italian territories. Civil Affairs Branch was called upon to provide, not only the actual information required by the Foreign Office, but also to deal with the political repercussions in the occupied territories created by the prolonged deliberations of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Brigadier Cumming was called to London on three occasions for consultation with H.M.G., and spent the month of May in Paris as a member of the United Kingdom



Delegation to the second Plenary Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Indeed both the administrative and political commitment of Civil Affairs in Africa greatly increased during 1946. Political uncertainty created a succession of problems in Libya and in Eritrea, and, after agreement had been reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers for the return of the Dodecanese to Greece, negotiations were begun with the Greek Government for the transfer of the islands.

In October, 1946, it became apparent that no agreement would be reached on the disposal of other colonies. In the absence of such agreement a clause was accepted in the Peace Treaty with Italy providing for the renunciation of Italian sovereignty and the continuance of the existing British Administrations for a year after the signing of the treaty.

SYNOPSIS
OF CHAPTER XIX

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATIONS IN
EAST AFRICA, 1944-1946

Administrative Arrangements for the Government of British Somaliland, Somalia and the Reserved Areas — Senior Appointments — Staff Position — Changes in British Somaliland — The Survey of the Protectorate — Public Health, Education, Agriculture and Public Works in British Somaliland — Influence of the Mullahs — Tribal Disturbances — First Session of the Advisory Council for the Somaliland Protectorate — Items on the Agenda — Somali Reactions — The Military Governor's Speech at the Closing of the Shir — Grazing in the Haud — The Rights of the British and Ogaden Tribes — Durbar at Harardighet — Speech of the Chief Administrator and the Military Governor — Affairs in Somalia — Public Health, Education and Public Works in Somalia — Somalia Gendarmerie — The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and the Reserved Areas — Negotiations Prior to the 1944 Ethiopian Agreement — Articles Affecting the Reserved Areas — Relations with Ethiopia — Handing Over of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway — Danger of Locusts to East African Production — Campaigns Undertaken — East African Anti-Locust Directorate — The Work of the Evacuation Section in Nairobi — Evacuation and Repatriation Figures — Effect of the Decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers on East Africa — Conclusions.

CHAPTER XIX

British Military Administrations in East Africa, 1944—1946

AT the beginning of 1944 the territories that remained under British Military Administrations of the East Africa Command consisted of the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia ; Somalia, together with the Ogaden ; and British Somaliland. The work of government in the three territories as a whole proceeded quietly and smoothly, the outstanding problem being the release of personnel from the forces, which reduced the Administrations dangerously near to the line which marked the margin of safety ; the loss of experienced administrators and specialists was particularly serious since no replacements could be found for them.

The administrative arrangements for the government of British Somaliland, Somalia and the Reserved Areas, re-organised in May, 1943, underwent no further change up to the end of the period under review. The re-organisation had come into force with the issue of the following Order, dated the 17th May, 1943 :—

“ THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

“ 1. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa Command, is responsible under international law for the military government of the occupied territories in his command. He is also responsible for the administration of British Somaliland so long as this Protectorate remains under a military government. The manner in which he discharges his responsibilities in respect of these territories is described below.

“ 2. With effect from the publication of this Order the Political Branch of Headquarters East Africa Command will be known as the Civil Affairs Branch and will be in charge of a Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer (Colonel) who is a Staff Officer to the G.O.C.-in-C. The C.C.A.S.O. will have direct access to the G.O.C.-in-C. and will deal direct with him except on matters requiring co-ordination by different branches of the staff in which case the subjects will be submitted by C.C.A.S.O. through B.G.S. or Brigadier Administration as the case may be.

“ 3. Somalia is no longer a scene of active operations and a British Military Administration, which occupies the place of the previous civil Government, is in existence. Subject to certain

reservations the G.O.C.-in-C. has delegated his authority over the occupied territory of Somalia to the Chief Administrator, hitherto called Military Administrator, who is responsible to the G.O.C.-in-C., through the C.C.A.S.O., for the government of the civil population.

"4. In British Somaliland the Military Governor has been vested by Order in Council with all the powers and responsibilities of the Colonial Governor and is in the position of H.M. Representative in the Protectorate. The Military Governor is responsible to the G.O.C.-in-C., through the C.C.A.S.O., for the government of the civil population. For purposes of civil affairs and social functions the Military Governor will take precedence within the Protectorate over the Commander, Northern Sub-Area.

"5. In the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia the Senior Civil Affairs Officer is responsible to the G.O.C.-in-C., through the C.C.A.S.O., for the government of the civil population, but he will consult the Commander, Northern Sub-Area, on all matters of importance."

From the political point of view this period of B.M.A. was dominated by uncertainty about the future of the Somalilands and by the negotiations for the renewal of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement or of a Treaty to succeed it. This uncertainty inevitably increased the difficulties of administration. Nevertheless even in the autumn of 1946 there remained in the territories a nucleus of officers whose invaluable experience continued to be available. The Administrations were fortunate indeed in that there were few changes in the holders of the more senior appointments. Colonel (Brigadier) F. R. W. Jameson, D.S.O., M.C., held the appointment of C.C.A.S.O. without interruption from June, 1943, until the spring of 1947. Also still serving at this time were Brigadier G. T. Fisher, C.S.I., C.I.E., Military Governor of British Somaliland since March, 1943, and Brigadier D. H. Wickham, C.B.E., Chief Administrator of Somalia since March, 1943. Lieut.-Colonel D. K. Daniels, O.B.E., held the appointment of S.C.A.O. Reserved Areas from May, 1943, to April, 1945, when he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel G. H. W. Kitson on transfer from British Somaliland: Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel) R. H. Smith, O.B.E., succeeded Lieut.-Colonel Kitson as S.C.A.O. Reserved Areas in February, 1946. The post of Controller of Finance and Accounts at Civil Affairs Branch was filled successively by Colonel M. J. Stewart, O.B.E., from November, 1943, to September, 1945; Colonel W. J. C. Ainslie from September, 1945, to February, 1946; and Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Goldie from February, 1946.

While the general staff position at the beginning of 1944 had been reasonably satisfactory, and had in fact in the case of British Somaliland been substantially improved by the end of the year, repatriation and leave schemes were already beginning to take their toll. By 1945 the position had so deteriorated as to give cause for serious anxiety. This anxiety was increased by the uncertainty which existed concerning the policy that His Majesty's Government proposed to adopt in respect of Colonial Servants holding key positions in the territories, in cases where Colonial Governments were clamouring for their return, and the absence of any information as to the extent to which the Command would be called upon to send experienced Civil Affairs officers to the Far East. At the beginning of 1945 it was estimated that 190 Civil Affairs officers would be eligible for repatriation during the year, of whom only twenty-three were expected either to postpone repatriation or elect to proceed on two months' leave. Any reinforcements which could be provided from outside the Command would have no experience of African conditions, and would be of little or no value until they had acquired some knowledge of the territory and the people whom they would be called upon to administer. It was essential to offer every possible inducement to persuade experienced personnel to volunteer to remain on in the territories as long as possible.

To this end, certain concessions were made. The publication of an Army Council Instruction in October, 1945, provided that officers who were prepared to remain on in Africa for a further two years could have their families with them where suitable accommodation was available; and a suggestion that suitable officers should be given some offer of future employment was to some extent met by arranging for a Colonial Office representative to visit the territories to interview candidates for permanent appointments in the Colonial Service. The effect of these concessions and a call for volunteers for Civil Affairs in Europe and Africa alleviated the position; a welcome draft of reinforcements from the United Kingdom at the end of 1945 considerably reduced deficiencies. Furthermore, the Colonial Office, while reserving its right to apply for the release of individual officers, offered no objection to Colonial Service personnel volunteering to defer their releases if they so desired. Nevertheless, with the assumption of additional responsibilities by British Military Administrations following the reduction of Army services during 1945-1946, it became clear that recourse would have to be made to civilian recruitment. Some uncertainty existed on the conditions of

service to be offered and the final draft conditions for civilians in Somalia were not approved by the War Office until July, 1946. In the case of British Somaliland the Colonial Office agreed to accept responsibility for filling future vacancies in appointments which would be retained in any resumption of colonial civil government.

1944 was the beginning of a change of life for the people of British Somaliland. As the war continued, the Protectorate found itself affected more and more by world events, but, economically and culturally, its people were not ready for the experiences which came their way. With an outlook that had not changed much in hundreds of years, and in many cases influenced by elders and chiefs who were against the spread of "western" or modern educational methods, the people saw that the Government was planning great changes in the development of their barren country. War, brought by the Italians, had destroyed much of such fabric as had been built up in the pre-war years. Much harm had been done by the hordes of disbanded native troops of the Italian forces. The looting of camels, often on a great scale, during and directly after the Italian occupation, had laid the foundations of new tribal feuds which were to smoulder on, until settled by the patience and tenacity of the British officers whose job was to make each side see both sides of the question. Disarmament had been the first priority; gradually, as arms were collected, a situation which might have developed into a dangerous state of armed tribal warfare was brought under control. So, in the later years of B.M.A. in British Somaliland, attention could be focused on more constructive and social problems, such as exhausted pastures, medical and educational services, and the re-organisation of native administration.

The first subject in the development programme in view for British Somaliland was a general survey of the country, for which a preliminary grant of £1,000 was approved. The ambitious object of this survey was to collect information of a tribal, topographical, meteorological, botanical and geological nature, so as to enable the future development of the territory to be conducted on ascertained facts. As the programme developed during 1944 it became necessary to provide for important changes in organisation. These changes included the creation of an extra district and the formation of regular Medical and Public Works Departments. This expansion resulted in the addition of 52 British personnel to the Administration during the year and provision being made in the estimates for 145 clerks as against 97 in the previous year.

Recognised as one of the first essentials to the progress of the Protectorate, public health received particular attention. The existing hospitals at Zeila and at each of the district headquarters were maintained, the average number of beds occupied in these seven hospitals being 625. The women's and children's clinics at Hargeisa and Burao were considerably developed; the Hargeisa clinic, which owed its success largely to the energy of the wife of the Military Governor, rapidly won the confidence of the local Somali women and resulted in nearly 30,000 attendances during the first ten months and over 50,000 the following year. Hygiene services were maintained in Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao and the training of a staff of sanitary assistants was also undertaken. A training school for native nurses was started by the Medical Department in March, 1945.

One of the most outstanding changes which the war brought to British Somaliland was in the attitude of the indigenous population towards education. In the Protectorate, as elsewhere, the Somali is by nature independent, quarrelsome but intelligent; his nomadic way of life makes it difficult to influence him through normal administrative methods: the majority are illiterate and Somali is an unwritten language. Before 1939 the introduction of education was opposed and in 1938 the Director of Education was stoned out of the one existing Government school. Yet, in 1944, a full educational programme was initiated and increasingly welcomed. Expansion was only limited by the training of adequate Somali staff and the construction of further schools under the Colonial Development and Welfare grant. To illustrate the modern methods adopted, a large part was played in educational development by the use of wireless programmes relayed to public places in the towns and by the use of mobile cinemas and vans. The trend of popularity for education went so far that public opinion even began to favour the introduction of female education. A B.M.A. report of October, 1946, contained the following:—

“Elementary schools have been set up at Burao, Berbera, Hargeisa, Las Anod and Boramo, and an elementary boarding wing of the Sheikh school offers facilities for boys from the interior. In July, 1944, a primary boarding school was opened and the department also undertook the education of 30 adults selected by departments of Government. In 1945 a new elementary school was opened at Erigavo which brought the total of elementary schools up to seven and provided education for 410 boys. The appreciation of the community is indicated by the fact that the attendance rarely fell below 90% and any vacancies were

rapidly filled. While these projects were being pursued, and pending the training of the necessary staff, efforts were made to improve the standard of education in the Koranic schools, which are mainly financed by private subscription, with grants-in-aid from Government funds. There were 19 of these schools in existence, attended by 400 boys. On the technical side, the primary school at Sheikh (where new buildings to accommodate 220 boys, of whom 140 are boarders, have been erected) is now functioning. There is also a workshop block and an information room providing courses in carpentry, sign writing and tailoring; gardening is also encouraged. A successful course was instituted here to teach English to Somalis in the public services."

On the agricultural side first steps were taken in 1944 to carry out a policy of development and pasture preservation: two officers were employed on reconnaissance of pastures in both 1944 and 1945. In combating locust visitations great demands were made upon the Agricultural Department, this work being part of a general scheme for the preservation of crops in the territories under B.M.A. and for a defence of the East African territories farther south against this pest. Vegetables were produced successfully by the Army. New production methods were tried. The experimental cultivation of dates was begun near Zeila: Boramo gardens were terraced for agricultural work and use as an experimental area; the Halaya area was set aside for experiments in grazing and soil conservation.

In the early days of the B.M.A. of the Protectorate material development in building was hampered by the shortage of Public Works staff; in 1944 this shortage was overcome and by the end of the year there existed a self-contained unit capable of undertaking purely civil works without the assistance of the Royal Engineers. The new Department completed the Radio Somali wireless station at Hargeisa, the school buildings at Sheikh and the women's and children's clinic at Hargeisa before the welcome news came, at the beginning of 1945, that the territory had been allotted grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which included provision for an extensive, but very necessary, building programme. Plans for the erection of essential buildings connected with the Administration, Police Services, Health and Education were rapidly put under way. In addition to this work roads were maintained by the same Department: the Army agreed to spend £13,800 in repairing the Hargeisa-Erigavo road before handing over its maintenance to the Military Administration.

The Somali mentality, one of the most difficult for a European

to understand, is shaped by many things. To appreciate his peculiar temperament it is necessary to see the savage and arid landscape of the Somalilands, where water is more precious than any other single possession, and where the Somalis spend their lives seeking pastures for the camels that sustain their restless and precarious existence. By 1945 the influence of the old men, whose fanatical outlook was at variance with the general will for social progress, was on the wane. One remarkable incident emphasised this, although it must be added that the serious depletion of the administrative staff by demobilisation, home leave and reversion to home establishment after six years of war was no doubt a contributory factor.

In June, 1945, the seeds of what promised to become a widespread revolt were sown in the centre of the Protectorate, incidents at Boramo and Hargeisa being suppressed by the police, who had to open fire on unruly and excited mobs. The spreading of locust bait during one of the severest infestations ever recorded was utilised by the *mullahs* as a weapon with which to challenge the authority of the Government and, at the same time, enhance their own prestige which, with the development of education, they had judged, and rightly, to be dwindling. The sparks of trouble spread and violent demonstrations were staged throughout the Protectorate. They culminated in an attack on district headquarters at Burao by a gang of fanatical members of the Habr Toljaala tribe under the leadership of Haji Bashir, a nephew of the "Mad Mullah". On the night of the 2nd-3rd July the gang opened fire on the police guard mounted over the administrative offices, including the prison, at that time overcrowded with prisoners arrested for previous demonstrations: one prisoner was killed. Almost simultaneously a move was made against the District Commissioner's house, where both he and his wife were in residence. Armed with rifles and judged to be about twenty strong there can be no doubt that it was the intention of the band to kill the District Commissioner; in the event a watchman was killed on the front veranda of the house. The attack was made suddenly and swiftly and the whole gang succeeded in making good its escape. A party of thirty police was immediately got together and despatched in pursuit. Haji Bashir, with a section of his followers, was located in the scrub-covered Bur Dab hills north of Ainabo containing many of the strongholds once used by the "Mad Mullah". A brisk action followed, and, in a running fight, Haji Bashir and his second-in-command were shot dead and a third member of the gang wounded and captured.

The next step was to carry out instructions issued to the District Commissioner to seize 6,000 camels of the Habr Toljaala tribe and to hold them against the surrender of eighteen other members of Haji Bashir's party who were known to have participated in incidents at Burao. This order, supported by police action, resulted in the arrest of all the wanted men: the camels were then returned. But in the meantime the revolt had spread to Erigavo. False news had been sent by Haji Bashir to the Warsangeli tribe that the District Commissioner and other officers at Burao had been killed; exhortations were made that the time was ripe for a general uprising and for the re-establishment of religious rule on *mullah* lines. Police reinforcements and armoured cars were at once sent to the area, where a general attack on the district headquarters was reported to be imminent. After one or two local actions, in which fire was opened on fanatical mobs armed with rifles and spears, arrests of minor religious leaders were made. Thereafter trouble rapidly subsided throughout the Protectorate. Detention arrangements were made on Saad-ud-Din Island, off Zeila, and nine *mullahs*, who had been particularly involved in most of the districts, were detained there for six months until the Military Governor was satisfied that their return to the districts would not involve risk of further disturbances.

The quelling of the revolt, the death of Haji Bashir and arrest of so many ringleaders, brought, surprisingly enough, a sudden revulsion of feeling throughout the tribes. Not only was contrition formally and voluntarily expressed, but the tribes themselves asked to be assessed for compensation to cover the cost of the operations, the loss of Government stores, and considerable expenditure on transport. The total amount handed over, with no pressure exerted, amounted to about £8,000, which was applied to the purpose for which it was intended, including the cost of the detention of the *mullahs* on Saad-ud-Din.

That Somalis can, and do, express sincere regret for actions they know to have been wrong is a surprising trait of their character. They are not notorious for their eagerness to relinquish money or stock for public purposes, though they cannot be said to be ungenerous when subscriptions are invited from them for specific objects. Their sincerity on this occasion can be judged from the fact that they so readily made their contributions. Similarly, in the preceding year, they accepted as just, penal action taken against them for the recovery of arms and Government property stolen during the Camel Corps disturbances.

These troubles of the summer of 1945 came at a time when there were only five administrative officers in the six districts. Of these five officers only one could speak Somali and only one had held charge of a district for a period longer than two months. At Las Anod an officer from the police was transferred to take charge as District Commissioner, and the same action had to be adopted later for the Boramo-Zeila district. But for the fact that the G.O.C.-in-C. sent by air to the affected areas six young officers from recently disbanded Somali battalions it is doubtful whether order could have been restored without recourse to military aid and the proclamation of martial law. The temporary attachment of these officers proved extremely useful. But the main factor responsible for the suppression of the trouble was the efficiency and loyalty of the police force, qualities which previously had been demonstrated during the Camel Corps disturbances. One member of the police force earned the King's Police Medal for Gallantry in the round-up of the Haji Bashir gang, other awards including three Colonial Police medals for meritorious service. The officers of the force were largely recruited from the British South African Police of Southern Rhodesia, who were not immediately affected by demobilisation orders or the leave scheme that had to be applied to other officers of the Administration. They were consequently approximately up to strength and to this fact more than any other must be ascribed the maintenance of the authority of the Military Administration. Considerable extra work had also to be undertaken by the District Commissioners owing to the disbandment of the two Somali battalions. This involved the task of resettling the discharged soldiers and in dealing with their pay and gratuity problems. Numbers of them were reluctant to be re-absorbed into tribal life and applications for Government employment and trading licences were many.

In July, 1946, in marked contrast to the Haji Bashir incident of 1945, the Advisory Council for the Somaliland Protectorate held its first session at Sheikh. It was a historic meeting, for there chiefs and Akils from every district in Somaliland met for the first time under the presidency of the Military Governor. The Vice-Presidents were the Secretary to the Government, the Legal Secretary, the Commissioner for Native Affairs and the Principal Medical Officer. In addition to tribal representatives, four sheikhs represented the religious community. There were also four experienced Somali officials, and an Arab and an Indian representing their respective communities.

In his opening address the Military Governor warned his

audience against mischief makers who purposely imputed wrong motives to those who had called the gathering. In fact, he said, the meeting had been called as a first step in the progress of associating the Somalis with the government of the country, which was warranted by the spread of education and the widening knowledge of affairs. In drawing attention to the Agenda, the Military Governor pointed out that it was confined to social problems which, while they were not controversial, closely affected the life and progress of the Somali race. "Do not think," he added, "that because the matters before you are of a simple nature, that they are unimportant. They are in themselves of the greatest moment; and we shall learn by your sincerity and ability in dealing with these matters, and by your perseverance in carrying out the policy that you recommend, and which is approved, how far you are fitted to help the Government in assuming yourselves greater responsibility in the management of your affairs."

Seven items on the Agenda were open for discussion :—

ITEM 1. What is your attitude towards the extension of agriculture throughout the Protectorate? Have you any suggestions to make as to how this could be increased without interfering with the pastoral population?

ITEM 2. The Government is very concerned at the number of aged destitutes in the towns who are unable to work, and, still more, the number of boys with no honest means of support who live in the towns and learn bad habits and become criminals.

- (i) Do you not think that it would be a good thing and in accordance with Moslem law to have a poor rate in all towns to help and support the aged poor?
- (ii) The merchants of the towns give alms to these destitutes on Friday. Do you not think it would be better if such alms were paid into a fund to be administered by the township committee, so that the money would be distributed to the deserving after investigation?
- (iii) What do you suggest be done with the masterless boys? Should not their tribes support them in the interior? If they refuse to stay with their tribe in the interior what then should be done with them?

ITEM 3. Do you think that the use of subordinate courts, like those of Berbera and Odweina, should be extended?

ITEM 4. Do you not think that dispensaries in charge of a dresser are needed in the interior?

The Government at present proposes to establish five. What

contribution are the tribes prepared to make towards their establishment and cost of upkeep ?

ITEM 5. One of the most important matters in this Protectorate is the preservation of pasture.

It is natural for people to look after what belongs to them more carefully than what does not belong to them. Do you think that it would be a good thing if certain areas were recognised as belonging to particular tribes, who would thus be responsible for the preservation of grazing in those areas ? If so, what would be the rights and obligations of those tribes which are held to possess such areas, according to Somali custom and opinion ; and what would be the rights and obligations of members of other tribes watering and grazing in such areas during their migrations ?

ITEM 6. An explanation of the present position in the Haud grazing area and a restatement of Government policy in this area.

ITEM 7. An explanation of the proposed fishing enterprise and of the Government's attitude towards it.

Gearad Mohamed Ali Shirreh of the Warsangeli was the first to express an opinion. He said :—

“The Somali people are nomadic and animals are the main wealth of the country. I suggest that when it is proposed to start agriculture in any place, there should be consultation between the elders of the area and an agricultural officer. I object to the practice of making enclosures to preserve grazing for private purposes only. I do not raise any objection to the proposal in principle, but advocate complete consultation as stated above.”

Sheikh Isman Nur, a religious notable of the Habr Awal, Musa Jabril, said :—

“Every man in this Shir has his own opinion. I wish to express mine. There have always been poor in the towns. They always lived as they do now. I see no reason to interfere with them. God feeds them until they are dead, and when they are dead, their people bury them. *Zakat* is payable to the needy and the poor. According to the *Sheriat* the poor are not entitled to any payments unless they observe the daily prayers. It is not allowed to transfer a portion of the *Zakat* of one town for the benefit of the poor in another town. I think it would be better to leave things as they are, but if they wish to do so, the people and Government may also help the poor.

“All the Somalis are poor, and very few have enough to eat themselves. If camps are built for the poor, the number of destitutes will increase beyond the ability of the people or Government to cope with.

“MASTERLESS BOYS : I say ‘leave them as they are’. I was myself, in my youth, one of them, until I grew up and began to learn the Koran, when I was over fifteen years old. I used to accompany the thieves and to say to them, ‘Unless you give me my share, I shall betray you’. We were three brothers and, on his death, our father left us only two she-camels. We went to the town, and there, after a long time, learnt the Koran. All the men in this Shir were like that in their youth, even the Sultans. Many of them had mothers who were water-sellers and who brought them up. Those who have anything to-day in the towns were masterless boys in their youth. These boys will learn nothing bad. Leave them as they are.”

Akil Mah Duksiyeh of the Gadabursi, Rer Farah Nur, struck an interesting note when he commented :—

“I wish to join with those who expressed their gratitude to the Government for holding this Shir. We have been given the chance to know each other, and I see here many notables of the country whom I have never met before.”

Sheikh Ahmed Musa of the Habr Yunis, Rer Abokr, in contrast to Sheikh Isman Nur, said :—

“Camps should be built for aged destitute persons, and they should be sent there after each case has been properly investigated. We should all help in feeding them as an act of charity, and something should be paid towards the cost of this by merchants and Government servants. *Zakat* rates should be collected for them in the towns under the supervision of the Kadis, but people should be asked to help the poor voluntarily, and charity boxes might be opened in the big towns.

“MASTERLESS BOYS : These are the men of the future and we should help them. In many cases they are boys who have disobediently abandoned their own parents in the *karias*, and, in some cases, the police do not help parents who wish to take their children away from the towns. I suggest that in all cases where parents apply for the help of the police, they should be helped to take these masterless boys away from the towns. There are many among these boys who have some sort of a job, and I think that they should be left in their jobs. In any case, I think it will be necessary to establish a reformatory school in the country, and that the relations of boys admitted into this school should be called upon to assist in their upkeep.”

The session lasted seven days and all those present were able to voice their opinions. The closing address was made by the Military Governor and in this he expressed his pleasure at the

conscientiousness that had been shown and the co-operation given. It was intended, he said, to hold further Shiras at six-monthly intervals and before the time came round for another to be held both he and his officers would carefully study the recommendations made during the previous week. He explained that at this first Shir, as it was impossible to judge how successful the outcome would be, it had been thought better to confine discussions to simple subjects ; however, in the future he hoped that they would be able to arrange that those who attended would be able to make suggestions as to what was to be discussed. After declaring the Shir formally closed he ended : " I wish you all comfortable journeys to your homes where I hope you will find all well with your families and your stock." The Military Administration had begun a new, historic chapter in the history of British Somaliland.

Before leaving the subject of British Military Administration in the Protectorate and recording the progress made in Somalia from 1944-1946, it is fitting that the problem, common to both territories, of the political frontier in its relation to pasture and water should be dealt with. Here at last, after the success of British arms, rights and customs, complicated by three types of governmental approach, Ethiopian, British and Italian, came under the direction of what was virtually one government, the British Military Administration.

An example of how this unified control helped the Somalis was the case of grazing in the Haud, as the northern part of the Ogaden is known. The position there was admirably summarised half a century ago by Captain E. J. E. Swayne, who made two journeys in Somaliland from December, 1896 to May, 1897 :—

" In the rains the British tribes from the north and the Ogaden tribes from the south and south-west with their flocks and herds push into the centre of the Haud, meeting along a line, which, for all practical purposes, may be drawn through Kheidub Ayeyu on the Hargeisa-Milmil road, southward through Daror to Alabla. . . . As the dry season sets in the livestock requires to be watered and the tribes collect round the larger of the pools which are, however, rapidly exhausted. After that the tribes are compelled to withdraw to their permanent wells, the British tribes to the north of the Haud, and the Ogaden to the south and south-west."

The right of access to this area by the British Somaliland tribes thus had long been recognised. It was re-stated in a report prepared in 1943 on the grazing areas of British Somaliland, where it was asserted that no improvement in the pastures of

the Protectorate was possible unless the Haud was available to the British tribes. Certain sections of the Ogaden Somalis also have rights to grazing in the Haud.

Early in 1943 the Chief Administrator of Somalia had drawn attention to the fact that, while in the past it had been the habit of the Isaak and Dolbahanta to migrate to the Haud during and after the two main rains when standing pools enabled their herds to enjoy the rich pastures, and to return to British Somaliland when these pools dried up, there had in recent seasons, since the British occupation of Somalia, been a marked tendency for the British tribes to remain in the Haud after the pools had dried up in the vicinity of the wells in the Wal Wal-Wardair area. This tendency was in his opinion to be deprecated, because it placed undue strain on the wells; furthermore, it involved overgrazing the area in the vicinity of the wells. To overcome these difficulties and to avoid increasing the anxiety of the Ogaden tribes, the Chief Administrator proposed to cancel the agreement come to between the two administrations in Burao in 1941, whereby the British Somaliland Administration was accorded permission to establish Illalo (tribal police) posts in the Haud and to be generally responsible for the administration of the British tribes during their sojourn there. The Chief Administrator now proposed to assume full administrative responsibility for all the Somalis in the Haud, whether they were British or Ogaden tribesmen. This proposal had to be modified, mainly because it seemed undesirable to deprive the British Somaliland Government of its right to administer a large proportion of its male population for approximately half the year.

The arrangements, finally agreed to at a meeting between the heads of the two Administrations at Hargeisa in June, 1943, maintained the rights of the British Somaliland authorities to administer their tribes while in the Haud, but left the control of the wells in the hands of the Somalia Administration. It was also agreed, in the interests of all, that pressure should be applied to the British tribes to leave the Haud when the pools were drying up so as to conserve the grazing in the vicinity. The arrangement, thanks to the co-operation of the officers of both Administrations, on the whole worked well and was thought to provide the best solution possible.

Few incidents took place in the Haud during 1944-1945, but in March, 1946, the situation in the grazing areas again became complicated when a party of Isaak tribesmen from British Somaliland crossed the Aware-Wardair road, defying patrols of Somalia

Gendarmerie and Illaloes. On the 23rd April the Chief Administrator of Somalia and the Military Governor of British Somaliland, with their respective advisers, again met, at Mogadishu. After a preliminary discussion it was decided to hold a joint Durbar at Harardighet in the Ogaden Haud in the middle of June, at which representatives of both Ogaden and Isaak tribes were to be present. This was to be treated as a joint Durbar convened by the Military Administrator, in which the Military Governor was invited to participate so as to emphasise ceremonially the fact that the political and administrative policy, followed in the Haud, was one that was agreed to and approved by both Administrations. The Durbar took place on the 14th June, twenty-two officers being present, including the Commander of the Somalilands Sub-Area and the Commanding Officers of the Somalia Gendarmerie and of the Somaliland Scouts, whose units provided a combined guard of honour for the two principal officers. Representatives attended from all the Isaak and Ogaden Septs concerned.

A joint speech, drawn up by the Chief Administrator and the Military Governor, was read :—

“Over fifty years ago the British Queen Victoria made a Treaty with the Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia under which the tribes on both sides of the frontier were allowed to graze their herds and flocks unrestricted and were permitted free access to the nearest wells on either side of the border. It was agreed, however, that the tribesmen, when they crossed the border, should obey the laws of the country in which they happened to be grazing their herds.

“Ten years ago the Ogaden was ravaged by war between the Italians and the Ethiopians, and as the result of this war the Ogaden and Ethiopia came under Italian rule. Nevertheless the Treaty between Queen Victoria and the Emperor Menelik was recognised by the Italians.

“In 1940 the Italians declared war upon Great Britain and in 1941 the British Army advanced and drove the Italians out of Ethiopia, restoring the Emperor Haile Selassie to his rightful throne. This war was fought against the Italians and not in any way against the Somali tribes residing in Ethiopia.

“Since 1941 the Ogaden Province has been administered by the British Military Administration by agreement with the Emperor of Ethiopia. The British Military Administration of Somalia considers itself still bound by the Treaty between Queen Victoria and the Emperor of Ethiopia in the same way as if the country were actually administered by the Ethiopian Government.

“ During the last few years there have been many instances of fighting and lawlessness amongst the tribes grazing in the Haud.

“ The Military Governor of British Somaliland and the Chief Administrator of Somalia have called you all together to explain to you that this Treaty exists to-day unchanged and that the British Government expects you to abide by its terms in peace and friendliness.

“ You are all reminded that under this Treaty all tribesmen must obey the laws of the country in which they are grazing. They must therefore obey all the instructions they receive from the British officers of either Administration. The Military Governor and the Chief Administrator take this opportunity of assuring them that the two Administrations are working in the closest harmony and that any instructions which they receive from any British officer have the authority of both Administrations.

“ The Military Governor and the Chief Administrator hope that the ensuing year will be one of peace and prosperity for them all.”

On the whole 1944 was a peaceful year for Somalia, the main task of the Administration being, as in the preceding year of occupation, the maintenance of law and order and the fight against drought and locusts. In general, the Italian population co-operated freely with the Administration and adjusted itself to the economic and political circumstances of the time. While relatively few professing Fascists remained, every shade of anti-Fascist political opinion, from Communist to Christian Democrat, had its representative.

The evacuation of 1943 had reduced the Italian population in Somalia to some 4,500, confined to the South-Eastern (Benadir) Province, including the coastal towns of Mogadishu, Merca, Brava and Kismayu and the farming areas of Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi, Afgoi, Genale and on the Juba. In 1944 the number was increased by the return from East Africa of some 500 evacuees and prisoners of war for work on agricultural schemes and in local industries in the general interest of the economy of the territory. This policy was well justified, for the Italians soon showed great progress in their local industries. The successful Somalia Exhibition, which opened in Mogadishu on the 8th April, 1944, provided yet another example of the Italian aptitude for improvisation and invention. Following this Exhibition a Somalia Chamber of Commerce was formed, which included Italian, Somali and Asian representatives.

The end of the war brought about a decline in political activity

as well as a slight decline shown in the figure of Italians in receipt of relief. On account of their vital contribution to the territory's food supplies Government assistance was continued for the Italian irrigated areas at Genale and on the Juba.

The handicap of shortage of staff existed in Somalia as in other territories. In 1943 the total officer strength of the Administration, including the Somalia Gendarmerie, was 177 ; in 1944 matters improved somewhat and the figure rose to 219 ; but by the end of 1945 the staff position had again become most serious, but was relieved by the timely arrival of a draft of reinforcements.

As a result of the gradual reduction of troops within the Command following the end of hostilities the Administration took over garrison duties which had formally been entrusted to the Military Command, assumed responsibility for the working of the port of Mogadishu, and provided medical facilities for all troops remaining in the territory. Plans had been formulated as early as the beginning of 1944 for taking over all civilian medical services from the Army and for the formation of a Medical Department of the Military Administration. This entailed setting up hospitals and dispensaries in each province, which were placed in charge of Italian doctors working under the supervision of British medical and Civil Affairs officers. The Piedmonte and Martino hospitals in Mogadishu were amalgamated to form a general hospital, which was completely re-organised on British lines. Aedes and malarial mosquito control services were established in Mogadishu, Kismayu and Merca. By 1945 the Medical Department had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of 72 hospitals, dispensaries or clinics in the territory, with 1,274 beds for the civil population ; of these, 750 beds were in the General Hospital and the Rava Annex in Mogadishu. The Medical Department also undertook the medical examination of all pupils in the native schools and medical history sheets were maintained for each pupil. Four women's health clinics were opened in Mogadishu and proved extremely popular.

In July, 1944, a qualified and experienced British officer was appointed as Superintendent of Education and six Zanzibar instructors were later seconded from the East Africa Army Education Corps for duty with the Somalia Education Department. It was apparent that here too the Somalis had a real desire for educational facilities. During the year 290 Arabs and 190 Somalis attended the two Arab and Somali schools in Mogadishu, where some English was taught. As time went on, the provision of teachers became a serious problem ; in 1945 a

nine months teachers' course was started to help overcome this difficulty. A new native school was built at Galkayu ; buildings at Merca, Afgoi and Lugh were adapted. Girls were admitted to the Hamarwein school for the first time. Two Indian schools functioned at Mogadishu and Merca. So far as Italian education was concerned, there were 276 Italian students in the primary and secondary schools, which were controlled by the Education Department. English classes for adult Italians were started in November, 1944, and were satisfactorily attended. In the following year the Italian secondary school headmaster was removed on political grounds, when the school was brought under the direct supervision of the Superintendent of Education, with English as a compulsory subject. The number of Italian children attending the school had by then risen to 305.

The Public Works Department, in addition to being responsible for all civil works, also assumed responsibility for works on behalf of the Services. In 1944, 429 miles of road were constructed, 559 miles were improved, and maintenance was carried out on 6,017 miles. Two new bridges and two new ferries were constructed. In the following year the Public Works Department also assumed responsibility for the management of the port of Mogadishu. Major works included 364 miles of road construction, the reinstallation of four ferries, numerous building works and the rehabilitation, at a cost of £55,000, of the port of Mogadishu. The staff employed in the Department averaged 6 British officers, 1 British N.C.O., 340 Italians and 5,000 Africans.

To the Somalis, the early months of 1944 brought hardship, for a continuation of drought conditions resulted in serious food shortages, notably in the Mijertein Province where famine relief had to be provided, and in Mogadishu where soup kitchens were set up and grain rationing was introduced. The position in the Mijertein was complicated by the difficulties of communication and by the effects of the war on normal trade between the Mijertein and Aden ; by the end of 1944 nearly 1,400 persons in the area were being supported by the Government. Although trade relations with Aden were re-established before the year was out, no solution could be found to compensate the Mijertein people for other losses of income under the Italian régime, when many families had depended largely on remittances from the younger men serving in the Italian colonial forces and on the money circulated by lavish, but uneconomic, enterprises. To safeguard the position in the rest of the country, and particularly in Mogadishu with its large native population, the Administration

formed a grain reserve of approximately 100,000 bags. A good rainy season and a record non-native maize crop enabled this to be done, and by December the food position was once more satisfactory. Later, improved conditions were achieved by the introduction of more efficient distribution methods. In the early months of 1945, apart from the Mijertein where destitution continued to confront the Administration and despite poor rains which led to extensive losses of stock, conditions for the Somalia tribesmen gradually improved. By the end of August the previous figure of 1,400 persons in receipt of Government relief had been reduced to 381, and of this total an attempt had been made to make 280 dependent on their own means by providing stock. A plan to obtain revenue from the urbanised Somali by the re-imposition of direct taxation in the form of a tax on dwellings was successfully instituted.

In public safety, the year 1944 was on the whole peaceful and there was little inter-tribal strife despite the severe shortage of grazing. The signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement in December, 1944, caused some uneasiness amongst the Ogaden tribesmen and made it undesirable to undertake any new administrative enterprise in the area. When it was found that the Agreement brought about no change in the area of territory administered by the British Military Administration, a marked improvement in internal security on the Ethiopian frontier followed.

The Somalia Gendarmerie, at the time of writing still under the command of Colonel P. R. M. Mundy, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., included a Field Force and a Police Wing, assisted by the Tribal Police under the control of the Provincial Administration. After three difficult years, short of staff and equipped with captured Italian weapons using ammunition dating from the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1936, the Gendarmerie in 1944 was at last equipped with a British scale of weapons, including Bren light machine-guns, Mark IV .303 rifles, and type 36 grenades. From 1941 to 1945 the Gendarmerie collected a total of 12,169 rifles and over 118,000 rounds of ammunition. The absence of serious inter-tribal raiding within Somalia during 1945 was mainly due to the efficiency of the Gendarmerie, working with the assistance of the Somaliland Scouts.

In Chapter IX some details were given of the areas in Ethiopia which remained under the effective control of the B.M.A. of the Reserved Areas at the end of 1943. The British Military Administration of the Reserved Area, having divested itself of responsibility, remained unconcerned with any matter affecting the

Danakil area. The Ethiopians, on the other hand, arrested the Sultan of Aussa, whose Sultanate was included in the area, thus asserting the re-institution of their administration there. The cessation of British administrative responsibility for the area was confirmed by the new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. The Sultan of Aussa had always been a loyal friend of the B.M.A.

The negotiations regarding a renewal of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement began on the 6th January, 1944, when H.M. Minister conveyed a suggestion to the Emperor Haile Selassie that he should invite the British Government to send a Mission to Ethiopia to review the working of the 1942 Agreement and consider whether it should be now amended, replaced or allowed to remain in force. On the 25th May the Emperor gave three months' notice of the termination of the 1942 Agreement; the Ethiopian Government expressed the hope that the old Agreement would be replaced by a new one before the three months terminated. Certain discussions followed, and on the 31st August the Ethiopian Government replied to the note which formally announced H.M.G.'s intention to send a special representative to negotiate the new Agreement, and which had requested the suspension of the notice terminating the 1942 Agreement. While a proposal to send a British delegation was welcomed, the Ethiopian Government was unwilling to suspend the notice of termination. The Emperor undertook, however, to do nothing for a further period of two months.

The special representative of H.M.G., Earl De La Warr, accompanied by Sir Bernard Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., Mr. W. M. Doll, C.M.G., and Colonel C. W. G. Walker, C.M.G. (Secretary) arrived in Nairobi on the 21st September, where they were joined by Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Deverell (Colonel Deverell, O.B.E.), G.S.O.I, Civil Affairs Branch, who was to be one of the two military representatives. The other military representative, Major-General A. E. Cottam, D.S.O., O.B.E., head of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia, joined the delegation at Addis Ababa, which was reached on the 24th September.

The new Agreement, which was signed on the 19th December, was essentially an arrangement for the continuance of the *status quo* in respect of the Reserved Area, the Ogaden, and the British Military Mission. The special position of Great Britain under the old Agreement was surrendered; H.M. Minister no longer took diplomatic precedence *ex officio*; the Emperor no longer was required to appoint British advisers or advisers approved by the British Government; the Reserved Area from Jigiga to the

railway, and the Ogaden, remained under British Military Administration without prejudice to British recognition of the Emperor's sovereignty; recognition of this sovereignty was further symbolised by an agreement that the Ethiopian flag would fly alongside the British flag on British and, where they existed, on Ethiopian Government buildings in the Reserved Area and the Ogaden. On the other hand the Agreement and letters annexed thereto were designed to ensure within the areas full judicial and legislative powers to the British Military Administration. The Agreement provided for the withdrawal of British control of the Ethiopian Railway within three months of the receipt of a formal assurance from the Ethiopian Government that satisfactory arrangements had been made for its management. Within the same period the British undertook to withdraw from Diredawa and the area north-west of the railway. The Ethiopians undertook on their part to grant priority on the railway for goods as requested by the British Government and to permit access to military convoys along the line of communication between Jigiga and Diredawa for the purpose of collecting military stores.

Article VII of the new Agreement dealt with the future position in the Reserved Area and the Ogaden in the following terms :—

“ In order as an Ally to contribute to the effective prosecution of the war, and without prejudice to their underlying sovereignty the Imperial Ethiopian Government hereby agree that, for the duration of this Agreement, the territories designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden, as set forth in the attached schedule, shall be under British Military Administration.

SCHEDULE

“ 1. Reserved Area.

“ A continuous belt of Ethiopian territory bounded by a line starting at the point where the French Somaliland and British Somaliland boundaries meet, thence in a westerly direction along the French Somaliland boundary to the point where it cuts the Franco-Ethiopian Railway, thence along the eastern limit of the railway zone in a south-westerly direction as far as the railway bridge at Haraua, thence in a south-easterly direction to the gorge of the Hullo river, thence following the Hullo river bed to a point at Haramakale where it is crossed by the Diredawa-Jibuti motor road at km. 45 from Diredawa, thence in a south-easterly direction to the summit of Burta Amare, thence to the south-western summit of Gara Okhaya, thence to the north-eastern summit of Dagale,

thence to the summit of Gara Digli, thence in a direct line to the summit of Mt. Goreis, thence along the crest of the Goreis range to the top of the Marda Pass, thence following along the crest of the Goreis range over the following summits: Burfik, Boledit, Burkulul, Dibba, Hagogani, Nig Niga, Kabalkabat, Dandi, Karabedi, Konya and Adadi, until it intercepts the ninth parallel of latitude at a point approximately three miles south of Burta Adadi, thence due eastwards along the ninth parallel of latitude to the point where it meets the British Somaliland boundary, thence following the British Somaliland boundary in a north-westerly direction to the starting point.

“NOTE: Map Reference; East Africa 1:500,000 (EAF. No. 552).
“ 2. Ogaden.

“The area of Ethiopia which is at present being administered by the British Military Administration of Somalia.”

Letters were exchanged between Lord De La Warr and the Ethiopian Prime Minister in connection with administrative points in the territory and these were reproduced, together with the full terms of the Agreement, in Command Paper No. 6584 of 1945.

Undue optimism prevailed in Ethiopia regarding the programme for handing over the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. In the event, the formal undertaking required was not forthcoming until 1946. There were accordingly no alterations in the boundaries of the Reserved Areas during 1945 and no changes in the organisation of the Administration were necessary. The railway remained under British control throughout that year. During 1944 the total of civil and military goods traffic booked amounted to 178,081 tons, of which 56,380 tons represented imports, 51,771 tons exports and 67,930 tons internal traffic. Military traffic only amounted to 22,853 tons. Total traffic carried reflected an increase of 19,404 tons over the year 1943. There was an operating surplus of £162,344, but no provision was made for renewals, improvements, or capital charges. From the 1st July, 1944, to the 31st March, 1945, the revenue figure of the railway was £331,082 against an expenditure of £214,642, being a net surplus of £116,440.

The year 1944 produced few major events in the administration of the Reserved Areas themselves. The rains were generally above normal and, perhaps on account of this, inter-tribal difficulties were not of a serious nature. In Jigiga the Ethiopian Government maintained a Governor, an Ethiopian Regional Court, a Customs checking post, a small school and a postmaster.

The British Administration courts functioned satisfactorily within the scope of their authority.

As a result of the new Agreement legislation was promoted in the new year to confer the necessary jurisdiction on the Administration's courts. On the 1st February, 1945, the S.C.A.O., in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, established subordinate courts in Jigjigga for the trial of cases arising in the Reserved Areas. A Subordinate Courts Notice provided for the establishment of Akils', Danyas' and Kadis' courts and set forth the jurisdiction of each court : all of these courts had in fact functioned unofficially since 1941, the new legislation merely giving them more formal title and precise jurisdiction.

On the 4th May, 1946, the long awaited agreement regarding the future management of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway was signed in Addis Ababa by representatives of the Ethiopian Government and the French Railway Company. On that day the Ethiopian Government officially conveyed to H.M. Minister, for transmission to H.M.G., the formal assurance required under Article V of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, 1944, and requested that control of the Ethiopian section of the railway should be transferred to the Franco-Ethiopian Company within three months. The Emperor's Government also asked that the British should hand over to the Ethiopian Authorities within that period the administration of the cantonment of Diredawa, the Railway Reserve and the area north-west of the railway. The hand-over was completed by the 31st July and took place in a spirit of friendliness and co-operation which augured well for the future of Anglo-Ethiopian relations.

The assumption of control of the railway by the French Company on the 1st July was marred by a strike of all native employees for higher wages. Some minor disturbances occurred, during which three of the senior Greek employees received injuries. The strikers returned to work during the afternoon of the same day, after a promise had been made by officials of the Company to examine their claims by the 15th July. Although it was feared that a repetition of the disturbances might occur the terms finally offered were found acceptable by the strikers and they gave no further trouble. On the whole the period was remarkably free from incidents. The Ethiopian decision to take over intact the entire British trained police force in Diredawa prevented any undesirable break in continuity during the change-over from British to Ethiopian control.

Two subjects common to all the three territories under British

Military Administration in East Africa, namely locust control and the repatriation of Italians, remain to be dealt with.

Early in 1943 warning had been given that the danger to East African production from the next generation of locusts in Kenya, Ethiopia and the Somali Territories could only be averted by destroying the maximum number, irrespective of whether they were likely to cause local damage or not. Steps were taken to set up an East African Anti-Locust Directorate, with headquarters in Nairobi, generally to co-ordinate activities in East Africa and the Somalilands. Throughout the years 1944-1946, war against locusts was continued intensively. The chief difficulty experienced was the delivery of adequate quantities of bait at the right places at the right time, a problem which was accentuated by the extremely rough nature of the roads or tracks serving the areas infested, the absence of water, and the unreliability of much of the transport available. Despite these difficulties and the unprecedented intensity of egg-laying, particularly in Somalia, the campaigns waged met with much success and undoubtedly prevented tremendous damage being done to cultivation in East Africa. This factor, as well as local benefit derived by Somali territories from anti-locust measures, justified the very heavy expenditure of approximately £360,000 during the financial year 1944-1945. An important advance in organisation during 1944 was the setting up of factories for the manufacture of bait at Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi in Somalia and at Diredawa in the Reserved Areas. Previously all bait had been imported from Kenya, an expensive procedure having the added disadvantage of the bait deteriorating *en route*. By 1945 the territories were almost, if not completely, self-supporting in locust bait.

In 1944 all the three territories under British Military Administration carried out campaigns during both the long and short rains, the Administrations receiving advice and assistance from the Locust Directorate. In Somalia the campaigns were conducted by a locust officer assisted by ten specially seconded British officers and seventy-four Italians. In the second campaign casual labour employed at one time amounted to no less than 11,000. The first campaign was extremely successful and, although four times as heavy an infestation was encountered as in 1943, it was estimated that 90% of the hoppers were killed. The second campaign was again three or four times as heavy as the first and was of an unprecedented severity. Although no less than 2,985 tons of bait were made available, this quantity proved in the event

to be inadequate and recourse had also to be made to burning and trenching.

In British Somaliland locust destruction was under the direction of the Director of Agriculture, who was assisted by eight British officers or British N.C.O.'s seconded from Army units and seven trained Sudanese. Control was at first carried out independently by districts, but was subsequently, on the advice of the Anti-Locust Directorate, centralised at headquarters. The degree of infestation was more severe than hitherto and considerable escapes took place.

In the Reserved Areas campaigns lasted from April until the last week in September, under the general direction of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who received great assistance from the East African Brigade at Jigiga. With the agreement of the Ethiopian Government, the campaign was extended to areas in Ethiopia proper, north of Diredawa and in the neighbourhood of Harar.

Anti-locust measures again continued on a large scale during 1945 and 1946. In British Somaliland, despite early opposition of the people to the spreading of bait, some 40,000 bags were used during 1945 alone. In Somalia infestations were on the whole smaller than during 1944 and the organisation reached a higher degree of efficiency. Large quantities of bait were available at strategic points throughout the territory and period, and the advance information of hoppers supplied by scouts was unusually accurate. The main lessons of the campaigns were the importance of maintaining adequate European supervision and the need for an efficient system of transporting bait to infected areas. It was estimated that in the latest Somalia campaign over 90% of the hoppers were killed. In the Reserved Areas the bait factory at Diredawa continued to prove satisfactory until it was closed on the evacuation of the cantonment. It produced 1,955 tons during 1945, of which 1,535 tons were despatched to British Somaliland. In October, 1946, the East African Anti-Locust Directorate was re-organised so that all territories requiring funds for their anti-locust campaigns could apply direct to a central fund, while the Directorate was responsible for technical advice.

The work of the Evacuation Section of Civil Affairs Branch, Nairobi, up to the end of 1943, was recorded in Chapter XVII. In the following years the section continued to deal with all matters connected with evacuees, including those evacuated from Eritrea and Somalia to camps everywhere in the East Africa Command and in Southern Rhodesia. At the request of the Army authorities the responsibility for the administration of these camps was

accepted by the civil governments concerned, but the responsibility for the maintenance of records, inter-territorial movements and ultimate repatriation of these people remained with Civil Affairs Branch at Nairobi.

The long delay in the movement of these Italians from the evacuee camps to their homeland resulted, naturally enough, in morale sinking to a low ebb and in a certain amount of bitterness, not only against the British Authorities but also against the Italian Government, for failure to provide shipping. The number of evacuees still held in detention at the end of 1945 was approximately 15,500 and it was not until April, 1946, that a hospital ship was made available to lift some 460 chronic sick. Except for a small batch of 120, who had been asked for by the Italian Government and for whom special shipping arrangements were made locally, there was no further shipping space for civilian evacuees till July when 900 were embarked for Italy from Kenya. In September a further lift of 900 was made on the same vessel, also from Kenya. Some hundreds were allowed to return to Somalia as already recorded. Nearly 100 Italians, not classified as evacuees, were repatriated from Somalia to Italy at their own expense, and in September, 1946, a draft of 1,000 men, women and children left Mogadishu on the Italian ship *Toscana*, which brought in exchange some 200 members of the families of Italians resident in Somalia, most of whom were employed by the B.M.A., and a few technicians. On the evacuation of Diredawa and withdrawal of headquarters of the British Military Administration of the Reserved Area to Jigiga all Italians employed in Diredawa were given the option of being evacuated to Kenya, for eventual repatriation to Italy, or of remaining under the Ethiopian Government. The majority of the Italians elected to remain and only a small draft of some sixty-five was taken to Kenya.

During 1945-1946 temporary employment was found for approximately 4,000 civilian Italians with Service units, Government departments and private employers. These Italian civilians, and the many thousands of prisoners of war similarly employed, undoubtedly proved of great value to the territories concerned.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER XX

THE DODECANESE ISLANDS

The Invasion of Italy and the Formation of AT(B)₁ — The Dodecanese Islands, Geographical and Ethnological — Allied Operations in the Dodecanese and Aegean Area in the Autumn of 1943 — Duties of the Civil Affairs Parties with the Occupying Forces — Main Problems Handled by C.A.Os. — Rationing and Finance — Occupation of the Greek Island of Samos — C.A. Expenditure Attributable to the 1943 Operations — AT(B)₁ at Maadi and Cyprus — Training During Spring and Summer of 1944 — Operational Plans for the Dodecanese, Autumn 1944 — The Provision of Interim Relief to the Islands — Work of Force 281 and Force 142 — C.A. Personnel for Carpathos and Casos — Occupation of Symi — Food Running by B.M.A. Relief Detachments — Food Problems in the Early Months of 1945 — Surrender of the German Forces — Setting up of B.M.A. — Immediate Plans for Food Distribution — B.M.A. Administrative Districts — Story of Castellorizo — Enemy Naval Works on Leros — B.M.A. Personnel — The Italian Question — Currency and Banks — Economic Position and Local Industries — Revenue — Courts — Custody of Enemy Property — Police and Prisons — Public Health — Education: Greek, Turkish and Italian — Monuments and Fine Arts — Refugees and Relief — Supplies and Distribution of Essential Foodstuffs — Assumption of Responsibility by U.N.R.R.A. — The Hand-Over of the Dodecanese Islands — Decisions of the Foreign Ministers — The Cost of B.M.A. — Outstanding Events of 1947 — Conclusions.

CHAPTER XX

The Dodecanese Islands

EARLY on the morning of the 3rd September, 1943, the attack on the toe of Italy began, British and Canadian troops of the Eighth Army crossing the narrow stretch of water separating Sicily from the south-west coast of Calabria. On the afternoon of the same day King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy and his Government, under Marshal Badoglio, agreed to accept the armistice terms offered by the United Nations; the relevant signatures were appended to the "short" armistice terms near Syracuse in Sicily. On the evening of the 8th General Eisenhower broadcast to the world the news of the Italian armistice. By the morning of the 9th September the leading brigades of the British and U.S. formations were established on the Salerno beaches. On the same day ships of the Royal Navy, with British troops on board, steamed into Taranto, passing, as they did so, the Taranto division of the Italian Navy on its way out to surrender.

With the success of Allied arms in North Africa in the opening months of 1943 it had been envisaged that certain territories in the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans would be liberated by the Allies in the near future and Civil Affairs Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East, undertook plans for the creation of the necessary administrations. The British Military Administration for the Dodecanese Islands was born in the late summer of 1943, being christened AT(B)1 (Administration: Territories: (Balkans) 1): the original strength of the unit on establishment was 66 officers and 171 other ranks. As a result of the developments in Italy in September, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was instructed to exploit the Italian capitulation by seizing certain islands in the Dodecanese group and elsewhere in the Aegean Sea.

The Dodecanese, a group of some twenty rocky and generally infertile islands, are geographically included in the Southern Sporades and form extensions of the physical configuration of South-Western Anatolia. The islands were occupied by Italy during the Italo-Turkish war in 1912; the Treaty of London in 1915 recognised Italian sovereignty over the islands. The Dodecanese group includes Rhodes, Cos, Patmos, Lipsos, Leros, Calymnos, Nisyros, Telos, Carpathos, Arki, Symi, Astypalea,

Casos, Pserimo, Castellorizo, Gaidaro, Farmaco, Levinthos and Calchi. The combined land area of the islands is some 1,000 square miles, of which Rhodes, the principal island, accounts for over half. The population of the Dodecanese in 1945 totalled rather more than 110,000, overwhelmingly of ancient or medieval Greek descent. Included in the total figure were some 8,000 Turks and 4,000 Italians. In 1939 there was a small Jewish community of some 2,000, but this was decimated by the Germans and by the end of hostilities only a handful remained.

The people of the Dodecanese reflect the influence of their own geographical environments in their mental outlook, an outlook similar to that maintained by the people of small islands in many parts of the world. They are sturdy and of independent character, interested mainly in the affairs of their own island, even to the exclusion of other islands in the same group, except where the affairs of these latter impinge upon their own. Their politics are mainly local and they are capable of strong feeling and difference of opinion regarding the management of the affairs of their own island community, such differences sometimes arising between different villages in the same island. The islands are far from self-sufficient. Before 1940 the inadequacy of agriculture to support the population was offset by Italian Government expenditure, tourist traffic, sponge fishing, and remittances from America, Australia, Egypt and other countries to which the people of the Dodecanese had emigrated. These remittances constituted an important item in the economy of the islands; with the other sources of income named they ceased with the entry of Italy into the war.

The Allied operations in the Dodecanese and elsewhere in the Aegean area began on the night of the 9th–10th September, 1943. At this date the majority of the islands were garrisoned by Italian troops, exceptions being Crete and Rhodes where the garrisons were in part German. As soon as the Allied armistice with the Italians was an accomplished fact the Germans seized full control of Crete and Rhodes and by the 20th September had succeeded in extending that control to most of the islands in the central Aegean and to Carpathos in the Dodecanese. In the eastern Aegean German moves were forestalled by swift Allied action, light forces from the Middle East occupying the Dodecanese islands of Castellorizo on the 9th, Cos on the 12th, Leros on the 14th, Symi on the 17th and Astypalea on the 21st; Samos, in the Greek Aegean, was occupied on the 11th, here, as on other islands, the Italian garrison proving co-operative.

At dawn on the 3rd October the enemy attacked Cos and by the following day organised resistance there was at an end. The Germans followed up this success by occupying Calymnos on the 7th and on the same day, after heavy dive-bombing attacks, the Allied garrison on Symi was evacuated. On the 12th the Germans occupied Naxos, but the expected attack on Leros did not materialise and the defences of this island and that of Samos were strengthened. Early in November General Maitland Wilson insisted that a more forceful Italian Commander be placed in charge of the 6,000 Italian troops on Leros and that this new Commander come directly under the orders of the British Commander. Garrisons on other islands were increased, that in Samos being reinforced by the Greek Sacred Heart Squadron. On the 30th October a patrol of the Long-Range Desert Group established itself in Naxos, but had to be evacuated on the 5th November. In the meantime the threat to Leros grew. An enemy attack was eventually launched on the 12th November, organised British resistance ceasing on the night of the 16th-17th: the garrison totalled approximately 4,000 at the time of the capitulation. With the loss of Leros it became obvious that Samos must be evacuated, which was completed on the 22nd. Most of the garrison on Castellorizo was also withdrawn on the 28th November.

Civil Affairs parties were engaged with the occupying forces from the initial landings to the final evacuation of the islands. In the Dodecanese, C.A. personnel was landed at Castellorizo on the 10th September and evacuated on the 21st November; Cos on the 16th September and evacuated on the 13th October; Leros on the 20th September and evacuated on the 16th November; Symi on the 30th September and evacuated on the 9th October; and Calymnos on the 25th September and evacuated on the 5th October. In the Greek Aegean, parties were landed on Samos on the 22nd September and evacuated on the 17th November; and Ikaria on the 26th September and evacuated on the 19th November. The evacuations unfortunately resulted in some loss of personnel.

British Military Administrations were not set up on any of the islands occupied, the necessity of ensuring the military co-operation of the Italian armed forces outweighing all other considerations. Consequently AT(B)1 had to act mainly in an advisory capacity to the British Military Commanders and in liaison with Italian military and administrative officers. The main problems handled by British Civil Affairs Officers were

connected with rationing and finance. In Castellorizo rationing control was in the hands of an Italian municipality which continued to function under the supervision of the C.A.O., using existing Italian civilian supplies until these became exhausted, when recourse was had to the Italian military supplies on the island. The problem was simplified by the early evacuation of the small Italian garrison. Civilian rations were sold at the prices ruling before British occupation and relief was paid in cash where necessary. The fact that many of the inhabitants had, before the war, depended on remittances from abroad contributed to the number eligible for relief, but the total expended under this head was only Lit. 28,900. Since all the civilian food supplies were in the hands of local shopkeepers and the one wholesaler in the island, the C.A.O. had no transactions in those supplies, but he did collect a sum of Lit. 19,247 in respect of sale of rations from Italian military stocks. The currency of the island was Italian lire and this continued in use as the only currency. No sterling-lire rate of exchange was published, but a rate of 400 to £1 was used for book-keeping purposes.

In Cos approximately two months' civilian rations were found on occupation and no civil supplies were delivered. The extent of O.T.A. liability here was limited to the loss of B.M.A. notes which were intentionally destroyed to prevent their falling into enemy hands. Relations with the Italian Authorities on Leros being somewhat delicate, the D.C.C.A.O. did not consider it advisable to seize their funds, which amounted to about 12,000,000 lire at the date of occupation. This money was largely held by the Italian services ; the balance held by the sole bank, the Banco di Roma, amounted to only about 2,000,000 lire. Certain quantities of food, estimated at between two and three months' supply of most commodities, were found in Leros on occupation, the handling of which was left to the Italian Administration. A shipment of fourteen tons represented the only civil food supplies drawn from British Army sources, and practically none of this consignment had been issued at the time of evacuation. There was no loss of Civil Affairs cash, and total cash expenditure amounted to a few pounds only. The situation on the small islands dependent on Leros, including Patmos, Lipsos and Arki, was less satisfactory, and one caique load of provisions, roughly one month's unbalanced rations, was sent from Samos.

Outside the Dodecanese, the occupation of the Greek island of Samos was fraught with difficulties, both political and economic. The British Military Attaché at Ankara had set up a

Greek Provisional Council when the armistice was concluded with Italy and this was entrusted with all matters of civil government ; a British Military Governor was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. Civil Affairs Officers accordingly assumed the functions of either advisers or staff officers to the British Military Governor. The main economic difficulty was currency. The instruction from the War Office was that drachma currency should be used so long as there was sufficient available. The Bank of Greece, which held the reserves of the other eight banks operating on the island and in Ikaria, showed total cash holdings at the date of occupation of approximately one thousand million drachmae : on the basis of estimated requirements for troops pay and public services this should have sufficed for roughly three months. It was expected that, when rations became available against payment, some of the hoarded drachmae, estimated at between five and ten thousand millions, would come to the surface. These expectations did not materialise ; within one month the cash reserve held by the Bank of Greece was reduced from 1,000 to 297 million drachmae. This state of affairs was in no way due to lack of rations, 483 tons of foodstuffs for civil requirements being landed in Samos from Army sources during the period of British occupation. It was thought proper to shift to the Greek Council the onus of collecting payment from the recipients of rations, and it was hoped this might induce that body to set up the necessary machinery for dealing with relief. Accordingly the Civil Affairs Finance Officer arranged that the Greek Council should pay for all civil supplies by transfer from its account at the Bank of Greece and, on the 16th November, the amount so credited to the British Military Governor's Food Supplies Account had reached the total of Dr. 853,265,800. But, of this total, the Council had collected for its own account in cash from rationed consumers barely one-seventh. This was one of the major factors in the deterioration of the currency position ; a further element was provided by the lavish spending upon which the Council embarked, partly no doubt with the idea of maintaining prestige. Among other measures which depleted the available currency stocks and aggravated the inflationary tendency, may be instanced the payment of 65,000,000 drachmae to the Andartes (guerillas) by way of family allowances, and the increase by 150% of the original 167,000,000 drachmae payable as salaries to government officials. The Council, despite repeated warnings by the Civil Affairs Finance Officer, showed remarkable insensibility to the crisis through which the

drachma was passing. To alleviate the cash situation and check expenditure in the open market, the Civil Affairs Finance Officer, on behalf of the British military authorities, took over from the Italian military authorities the funds remaining in their possession, which amounted to 214,000,000 drachmae. This sum was paid into a special account in the Bank of Greece and raised the total cash reserves of all banks in Samos and Ikaria to 701,000,000 drachmae, which included 122,000,000 collected from the sale of rations and 33,000,000 from sales of petroleum products.

Civilian food supplies in Samos were drawn in the form of military rations, as no balanced civilian rations were received: they were distributed according to a daily scale improvised to meet the special conditions. Rations were charged at Middle East prices plus a small addition, and items in the military ration, surplus to the civilian ration, were treated as luxury goods and sold through retailers at prices in excess of Middle East prices but below those current in the open market. The existing civilian relief organisation handled distribution and the proceeds of sales were in the first instance collected by districts for remittance to the civilian in charge—a Greek Red Cross official. The question of poor relief then arose and it was decided to grant free rations to destitute persons, whereupon all payments ceased. An arrangement was then made whereby the Greek Administration passed full credit to the British supplies account at the Bank of Greece for the invoiced price of supplies on delivery at Greek Government stores. Thenceforth the Greek Administration collected for its own account the cost of rations distributed, and profit derived from the sales of "luxury" goods accrued in reduction of the cost of relief.

The following table shows, in column (A), the Civil Affairs expenditure directly attributable to the operations; in column (B) the provisional cost of AT(B)₁ as recorded in the Administration accounts for the period 4th August to 31st December, 1943, covering the Dodecanese and Aegean operations:—

Cash	£ sterling	(A)	(B)
General Administration	5 2 5	5 2 5
Police and Prisons	—	1417 13 5
B.M.A. Police School, Cyprus	—	5898 11 8
Miscellaneous	834 11 10	315 8 8
Relief	73 5 0	73 5 0
Army Services			
Personal Emoluments	3404 8 7	25132 17 3
Supplies	45769 2 10	62262 2 4
TOTAL ..		<u>£50086 10 8</u>	<u>95105 0 9</u>

The second phase of Civil Affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean began on the 30th December, 1943, when AT(B)1 ceased to be attached to Headquarters Lines of Communication, Aegean, and was transferred to the command of III Corps. Headquarters were set up at Maadi on the 26th January, 1944, and on the 28th February reverted once more to the command of Civil Affairs Branch, G.H.Q., Middle East. In April the unit was transferred to Cyprus. The interim period following the alarms and excursions of the Aegean campaign was spent in very varied training, training that eventually resulted in B.M.A., Dodecanese, becoming perhaps initially the most efficient and homogeneous British Military Administration that had ever taken over an Italian territory. This training period lasted until September, 1944, when the unit passed out of the "doldrums" into a turgid time of many plans and moves. On the 31st August the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer left for Cairo to meet Brigadier Moffatt, newly appointed Commander of the Force known as 281, and to initiate detailed planning. He called forward a planning staff to assist him, consisting of, amongst others, the Deputy Controller of Finance and Accounts, the Chief Accountant, the Controller of Civil Supplies and the Director of Public Works.

The position then envisaged was occupation following upon a German evacuation from, or surrender in, the Dodecanese, and elsewhere in the Aegean. The outline plan was first to occupy and consolidate Rhodes. This was to be followed by the occupation of Cos, Calymnos and Leros, and subsequently the minor islands. The operational plan depended on shipping being available, which varied according to frequent re-allocations. The concentration of Force 281 at Haifa was to be completed by the 20th September, 1944, but the British Military Administration element was to be called forward from Cyprus to join up with the Force at Castellorizo. On the 17th September the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer formulated and discussed with the Force Royal Naval Officer an outline plan for food-running to the Dodecanese islands evacuated by the Germans. This was based on the assumption that the Germans would evacuate the Dodecanese, except for small garrisons in Rhodes and Leros, and that General Headquarters intended to feed the Greek Aegean islands. It was expected that Force 281 would not go in for about two months, and that the islanders' food situation would become desperate and lead to large refugee problems. Interim food-running was envisaged to obviate or reduce these, both for the

sake of the islanders' morale and for British prestige and to facilitate the eventual occupation of the islands. By the end of the month, however, the prospect of an immediate occupation of the Dodecanese appeared to be steadily dwindling and a food-running project, without military occupation but using Turkish dumps, seemed more realistic. The proposition, promoted by the Military Attaché at Ankara and "Headquarters Raiding Forces", was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief, the Force Commander and the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

On the 22nd October General Headquarters, Middle East, sent out instructions for the occupation of Carpathos and the setting up of a British Military Administration there. The history of this is dealt with separately below.

The Force Commander and Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer again went to Cairo on the 28th October and from then onwards the prospect of an immediate occupation of the islands definitely receded. With the fall of Salonika the German escape route from the Dodecanese was cut, and the Germans, who had previously concentrated in Leros for evacuation northwards by stages, were now redistributed with a view to holding Rhodes and Leros in some force as "last stand" garrisons. But by this time General Headquarters, Middle East, regarded the Dodecanese as operationally sterile and saw no point in wasting men on an isolated German outpost which was strategically ineffective, could be easily contained and would be costly to assault. In the immediate future only an expansion of food-running and the possible occupation of some islands unoccupied by the Germans was to be anticipated, supplemented by raiding by special units. This policy was laid down officially when General Headquarters stated that, with the special exception of Carpathos, British Military Administration would not be established in the Dodecanese until the islands had been occupied by military forces. Until such time activities would be limited to providing interim relief through Force 142 to each island when evacuated by the Germans.

As far as Carpathos and Casos were concerned, Middle East instructions were that an infantry company was to proceed from Haifa in specially allocated craft to occupy them, and that a British Military Administration was to be set up there, all maintenance to be arranged from the Middle East, and the entire plan to be dependent on the Royal Navy undertaking to dominate the straits towards Rhodes and Crete. Normally the British Military Administration officer personnel for these islands would have been a Civil Affairs Officer, an Assistant Civil Affairs Officer and

a Supplies Officer, but in view of the exceptional circumstances, Legal, Psychological Warfare and Finance Officers were posted in addition. The party sailed from Haifa on the 27th October, landing at Pegadia on the following day. British Military Administration was well received. The main difficulty encountered was that the island's economy had depended on remittances, so that it could not be expected to be self-supporting: there was also a grave shortage of small change. The minimum wage rate was, in the first instance, fixed at 30 lire per day and subsequently raised to 40 lire. Most of the municipalities appeared to have been running on past reserves.

On the 26th September, 1944, the Germans evacuated Symi, leaving five days supply of foodstuffs, which they sold to the Italian mayor: a Force 133 party found him selling these at "black-market" prices. A Company Sergeant-Major was left to administer the island, which he did with considerable initiative and success; on the 1st October a patrol of the Greek Sacred Heart Regiment arrived. The most urgent problem was shortage of food, and an emergency shipment was obtained from Castellorizo. The Municipal Council, which had been formed during the Allied occupation of 1943, was re-constituted, but the Italian military doctor was retained as he was the only qualified man available to deal with the menace of typhoid which was already prevalent, and because he was universally respected. The inhabitants were wildly enthusiastic at the Allied occupation and confidently expected union with Greece: there were no political troubles despite some small-scale, but ineffective, agitation. From the 24th October the Civil Affairs Officer designate for Symi, with a small party of British Military Administration police, supervised the distribution of food on the island, under the arrangements of the British Military Administration Relief Detachment which had been placed under the command of Force 142. He also, in fact, directed the interim provisional administration of the island. Civilian morale was low, the population taking to the hills whenever a strange craft was sighted, since German raids were expected. The whole situation was governed by the feeling of insecurity owing to lack of a garrison and to the liability to enemy attack, this being offset as far as possible by the institution of a system of coast watching.

On the General Headquarters' decision in December to pursue a more forward policy in support of food-running the Commander and headquarters of Force 281 moved to Symi, accompanied by the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and part of an Advanced

British Military Administration Headquarters. The British Military Administration officer element comprised the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and an officer from each of the Supplies, Legal, Finance and Psychological Warfare branches. A British Military Administration was proclaimed and proclamations posted on the 25th December, after addresses had been made by the Force Commander and the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

Of the Relief Detachment of British Military Administration personnel with Force 142, to which reference has been made, a party of officers and other ranks left Haifa on the 9th October for Khios in order to provide food relief to those of the islands of the Dodecanese which had been freed of the enemy, namely Symi (already dealt with), Patmos, Lipsos, Arki, Gaidaro, Levinthos, Astypalea, Farmaco and Nisyros. These islands, although known to be clear of enemy troops, were not in every case considered safe from future raiding or re-occupation. It was therefore decided that, with the exception of Symi and Patmos, no personnel would be left permanently on these islands. Within a week of the arrival of the Detachment at Khios the two teams, one based on Kusadasas and the other on Bodrum, on the Turkish mainland, set out and took over their respective caiques. On the 24th October the first three supply caiques arrived at Symi, bringing the first British Military Administration supplies to this island. A month's supply was quickly built up and distribution started, the Civil Affairs Officer designate being instructed to remain on the island, supervise the distribution and assist in local affairs generally. The islands of Patmos, Lipsos, Arki and Gaidaro were also supplied at the same time and one officer was left on Patmos to supervise distribution. Nisyros and Astypalea were not included in the first delivery owing to uncertainty as to whether German troops had been eradicated or, on the other hand, the islands were being visited by enemy patrols. At the beginning of November, however, owing to the appeals from the mayors of Nisyros and Astypalea, it was decided to feed these islands in spite of the risk involved.

The beginning of November showed the first signs of a refugee movement away from the islands still occupied by the enemy, namely, Leros, Rhodes and Calymnos. This was aggravated by the German Commanders issuing a manifesto stating that, owing to a shortage of food, they would no longer feed the local populations. Arrangements were therefore made to receive refugees on Patmos (3,000) and Lipsos (500), mainly from Leros and Calymnos : Symi was able to take up to 200. Refugees also found their

way to many other Greek islands as well as to various Turkish ports.

The supply of food to the islands free of the enemy continued from month to month, although from the middle of November onwards the weather was bad and in some cases delayed sailings. It was found that the islanders, though in need of food, were by no means starving, but that clothing for children, especially footwear, was in very short supply. Each island had a satisfactory form of local government based on a popularly elected committee, which controlled all activities, including rationing, in the several communities. Towards the end of December, when Force 281, including the advance headquarters of the British Military Administration, had occupied Symi, it was decided that all further *ad hoc* relief to the unoccupied islands would devolve upon Force 281. In consequence the British Military Administration Detachment under Force 142 was recalled and reported to Advance Headquarters, Symi.

1944 proved as disappointing as 1943 to AT(B)1 in that high hopes and patient preparation came to no fruition within that year, though by the end of this period there was more promise for the immediate future. Despite all discouragements the morale and discipline of the unit had remained high, particular praise being due to those engaged on food-running during the autumn and winter. In rough weather, in caiques with no accommodation, under conditions always of discomfort and often of danger, they delivered the much needed supplies, although only a small proportion had any previous experience of the sea.

During the early months of 1945 many patrols and reconnaissances from Symi were carried out to the other islands to ensure that the remaining German elements were kept constantly on the alert. Outstanding amongst these raids was the one which took place on the 4th March when a raiding party was sent to Telos to ascertain the position regarding the food situation there, the general health of the inhabitants and the number of cattle, pigs, sheep, etc., remaining. In February the plight of the population of the German-occupied islands became so bad that, as a result of direct negotiation with the German Commander, it was agreed that supplies would be sent in for the civilians. The first consignment of 76 tons of supplies was shipped from Symi to Rhodes in the custody of a B.M.A. Supplies Officer, who remained in Rhodes long enough to ensure that a fair and correct distribution was being carried out. The situation in Rhodes town was particularly dire : the death rate was 10 per day during January, 17 per day during

February and March and 20 per day during April. To avoid widespread starvation, the International Red Cross was called upon to organise the distribution of food and arrangements were made for the monthly shipment of supplies to these German occupied islands from stocks held in Turkey.

The islands in British occupation were supplied by B.M.A. in the normal way, with a proper rationing scheme in force and goods sold to the public at fixed prices. In the case of the islands of Telos, Calchi, Nisyros, Patmos, Lipsos, Astypalea and the others which were neither in British nor enemy occupation, and where the inhabitants were in danger of starving, foodstuffs for free distribution, run in by B.M.A. Supplies Officers, were distributed under a rationing scheme operated by a local committee set up for this purpose on each island ; but to prevent food falling into the hands of enemy raiding parties, immediate distribution was always insisted upon.

For AT(B)1 the end of the war in Europe meant the beginning of the role for which the unit had been originally planned nearly two years before—namely, the British Military Administration of the Dodecanese Islands. On the 8th May, 1945, General Wagener, the German Commander, landed on the island of Symi and surrendered all the German forces in the Dodecanese to Brigadier Moffatt, C.B.E., Commander of Force 281. The following day Commissions, which included B.M.A. staff, sailed to Rhodes, Cos and Leros to ensure that the Force Commander's preliminary requirements were carried out, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer being at the head of the Rhodes Commission. They reported that in all cases the Germans maintained a correct attitude, obeyed orders and co-operated to the full.

The official date for the commencement of B.M.A. was the 10th May when the first proclamations were published in Rhodes : publication of proclamations and orders on the other principal islands followed within the next ten days. Brigadier Moffatt reached Rhodes on the 11th May. Four days later the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, arrived by air in anticipation of a visit by the Regent of Greece, who reached the island on the 15th May.

The Greek population throughout the islands, already enthusiastic over their liberation, became even more so on the arrival of the Regent and the desire for union with Greece was manifested increasingly. Everywhere they were keen to take over the Administration and to oust all vestiges of Italian domination. It was obvious that the occupation was regarded as one of short

duration only, although the population generally settled down contentedly and quickly under the British administration. As for persons of other nationalities, the Turkish population was small and only Rhodes and Cos were affected in any numbers. Their behaviour was orderly, their leaders sensible and dignified. The Germans had practically destroyed the Jewish population, only twelve remaining in Rhodes town. The Italians, some 6,000 of whom were found in Rhodes, Cos and Leros, were in a state of abject fear. They had been bullied by the Germans, were frightened of the Greeks and were in doubt as to what treatment they would receive from the British. Despite the fact that many of the Italians were local government officials, B.M.A. officers found much difficulty in obtaining any accurate facts or figures from them. It was noticeable that there was less anti-German feeling in the islands than anti-Italian, German soldiers employed by the Allied forces being able to walk in the streets unarmed, a condition which did not apply to the Italians.

The most immediate problem that faced B.M.A. in the early days was that of bringing food to a population which was well on the way to starvation. So serious had the position become in Rhodes that there were no dogs or cats left on the island and livestock was most seriously depleted. A tragic result of these conditions was that in Rhodes town, immediately prior to the arrival of B.M.A., the wild scenes of enthusiasm displayed by the people on liberation proved too much for their weakened systems and the death rate rocketed from 17 up to 70 per day. In the first three weeks of occupation considerable help was given by the International Red Cross which attended to the distribution of its own food supplies.

Under planning arrangements a stockpile had been constituted which provided for essential foodstuffs for six months at the rate of some 1,700 tons per month. The first consignments of these stores were quickly put into Rhodes and Leros and the Controller of Civil Supplies was in a position to start full distribution of foodstuffs on a ration basis by the 2nd June, the ration system in force under the Italian régime being used initially. Distribution of Red Cross supplies in the first weeks was free, but as from the 2nd June official rations were issued against repayment. Fortunately there was an abundance of vegetables and fruit, the season being at its height. But apart from these goods there was nothing for sale in Rhodes: trade was moribund and shops empty and desolate.

In contrast to conditions in other occupied territories, money

was found to be comparatively plentiful in the country districts but short in the towns. This was accounted for by the fact that, during the months preceding occupation, the extreme shortage of food had resulted in large amounts of cash and specie going out from the towns into the countryside in payment, at exorbitant prices, for the relatively small stocks of foodstuffs produced locally.

The British Military Administration of the Dodecanese was divided into six Administrative Districts, or Island Groups. In order to clarify the geographical layout, a description of these groups is necessary, together with a summary of the B.M.A. organisation and staff. Rhodes Administrative District was laid down as covering the islands of Rhodes, Calchi, Alimnia and Castellorizo. Rhodes Island, 424 square miles in area, lies fifteen miles from the coast of Turkey : Rhodes town is the capital of the Dodecanese and was chosen as the site for the headquarters of B.M.A. The small islands of Calchi and Alimnia lie, respectively, ten and four miles west of Rhodes and their small Greek populations rely on fishing and goats for a livelihood. The fourth island in the group, Castellorizo, lying 75 miles east of Rhodes, had been under British occupation in some form or another since the autumn of 1943, and during this time had had a chequered history. As has been described, it was occupied by British forces on the 9th September, 1943 ; after it had suffered seriously from bombing the population was voluntarily evacuated in October, one third to Turkey and the remainder to Palestine. B.M.A. was not officially proclaimed and in November the C.A.O. was withdrawn since he no longer had a population to administer. At the end of November G.H.Q., Middle East, decided that Castellorizo was to be totally evacuated, but the decision was reversed before the operation was complete. A skeleton garrison was left behind, and there remained, the island coming under the command of XXV Corps and thus under 9th Army, Palestine. In April, 1944, the B.M.A. staff of the Dodecanese went to Cyprus for training, and during this period AT(B)1 officers were loaned to XXV Corps and carried out certain work on the island. In February, 1945, Castellorizo was taken over by Force 281, thus leading up to the re-establishment of B.M.A. In 1944 a fire took place which burned down approximately a third of the town, and this damage, added to that of the bombing, caused Castellorizo to be harder hit by the war than any other island in the Dodecanese.

In the Leros District were included Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Gaidaro, Arki, Farmaco and Levinthos, the two last-named being

of little consequence since their population totalled only thirteen persons. Leros is provided, by its natural features, with an unusual variety of sea approaches, and two, Portolago and Partheni Bay, were converted by the Italians into fortified bases for naval vessels, submarines, and seaplanes, with naval repair and re-fuelling facilities. Facing the village of Portolago were constructed underground machine shops for the manufacture and repair of ship and submarine parts. These the Germans, since their occupation in 1943, had improved. Lepitha Bay, an integral part of Portolago Bay, became the home of seaplanes and flying boats. Patmos, although of interest historically, had little administrative importance. In this rugged setting St. John the Evangelist wrote his Apocalypse and in the 11th century a monastery was founded which attained world-wide fame. The monastery possesses many estates in other Greek islands and has a library and treasures of great value, fortunately left untouched by the Italians and Germans during their occupation. The population live by agriculture and fishing, as do their neighbours on the equally rugged islands of Lipsos, Gaidaro and Arki.

Cos and Nisyros were coupled into one Administrative District; Cos was occupied on the 9th May while Nisyros had been free from German occupation since June, 1944. Nisyros presented no problem as the islanders, all racially Greek, had been managing their own affairs for some months, receiving only free shipments of food at monthly intervals. The position in Cos was different. In addition to the garrison of German and Italian troops there was a mixed population of Greeks, Turks and Italians. In both islands the Administration was set up without incident, the Greeks welcoming the British with great enthusiasm as liberators and the Italian and Turkish minorities accepting the situation philosophically and calmly. In Cos town the municipality had appointed a Greek mayor and council to receive the British and work under their orders. In Nisyros and the five villages of Cos, mayors and committees had been appointed by the villages prior to the arrival of the British and these, with few exceptions, were retained.

The Calymnos group of islands comprised three of consequence, Calymnos, Astypalea and Pserimo, and a few others, some totally unpopulated, being barren and rocky. Apart from small agricultural activities the mainstay of the people of Calymnos in pre-war days was the sponge fishing industry; the grading and preparation of the sponges occupied the women, girls and old men, while the young men carried out the fishing. Astypalea and

Pserimo were found to be of minor importance, Astypalea following pastoral pursuits and Pserimo being almost entirely dependent on Calymnos.

Casos was coupled with Carpathos to make one Administrative unit and these two islands were the first of the Dodecanese to be occupied by British forces. For administration purposes there were ten villages on Carpathos and one on Casas; the total population amounted to some 8,500. In 1912 the figures had been 18,000; the large emigration figure made those left behind dependent on remittances from abroad. Consequently hardships were imposed by the war conditions. It is necessary to emphasise the vital part played in the economic life of these two islands by such remittances for, even in normal peacetime conditions, the people cannot fend for themselves and are dependent on food imports and the cash to pay for them.

The story of Symi, with which was coupled Telos, has already been told in part. Military Administration was set up there on Christmas Day, 1944: Telos was taken over in March, 1945. The chief industry of Symi also is sponge fishing, while for meal supplies the islanders depend on neighbouring Telos which raises goats, sheep, cows and pigs. Symi's history dates back to the time of the Knights of Rhodes, and has many places of interest from the archeological point of view: the Panormiti Monastery church was founded in the early 18th century and contains many valuable things.

The districts of Leros, Cos, Calymnos, Carpathos and Symi were each administered by one C.A.O., while Rhodes, with its far larger responsibilities, came under a S.C.A.O. with two C.A.O.'s to assist. On the B.M.A. headquarters at Rhodes town were the Chief Administrator, Chief Secretary and five staff officers. Other departments of the Administration were Legal; Finance; Accounts; Revenue; Customs and Excise; Trade and Supplies; Public Works; Medical; Veterinary; Agriculture and Fisheries; Custody of Enemy Property; Education; Postal; Printing; Antiquities; and Schooner Control. The Dodecanese Police Force contained an H.Q.; Training School; Port and Marine Section; Prison Service; Police District Administration and British Inspectorate. The British officer personnel on the strength of B.M.A. Dodecanese as at December, 1945, totalled 75.

Tranquil conditions following the general occupation allowed a speedy development of military government into Phase Three which is, in the words of the handbook on Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory, the "Period in which government

can be established on a permanent basis under the control of a Chief Administrator, the operational problem having disappeared." The Administration entered Phase Three in July, 1945. Up till that time the office of Military Governor had been vested in the Commander of Force 281 (later Area Commander), Brigadier Moffatt, C.B.E., while the Administration was under the control of the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Colonel (Brigadier) P. B. E. Acland, M.C. The latter became Chief Administrator in July and, on his transfer to Cyrenaica in October, was succeeded by Brigadier C. H. Gormley, O.B.E. Colonel (Brigadier) A. S. Parker, O.B.E., was appointed Chief Administrator in October, 1946.

This young Administration had no sooner commenced its work than it began to be affected by demobilisation in the United Kingdom and by the posting of personnel to home establishment on grounds of long overseas service. Experienced officers and other ranks, many of whom had received training in Military Government schools, left the unit on one or other of these grounds. In many cases no reliefs were supplied for a long time and the position grew steadily worse towards the end of the year, until it became problematical how long essential services could be maintained. Considerable strain was imposed upon those who remained; it was fortunate that losses from postings away were not increased by losses due to sickness. The Administration was fortunate also in having a friendly population to control.

The personnel at Rhodes connected with the Administration was increased in August by the attachment of a Greek Military Liaison Officer, Colonel (Brigadier) Tsigantes, and a staff of Greek officers. Relations between the Administration and the Liaison Mission were most cordial. The duties of the Liaison Mission included the consular representation of Greek nationals and the care and supervision of discharged Greek Service personnel.

It was found that the Dodecanese group differed widely from the other territories under B.M.A. in Africa in that it had an entirely European population which was, to a considerable extent, capable of administering its own affairs. The population had always been organised in various administrative and financial entities on lines of municipalities, which were responsible for the collection of numerous revenues of their own and for paying for many of the essential public services of the various districts. Under the B.M.A. as full use as possible was made of these organisations, an obvious advantage which also brought about an economy in personnel. But in view of the fact that the Italians

had systematically refused the Greeks positions of responsibility, it was difficult to find capable leaders with the necessary administrative experience. In Rhodes the cumbersome municipal staff, typical of the Italian administration, with its horde of petty officials, was immediately reduced, on the arrival of B.M.A., by over 60%, and Italians were replaced by Greeks. Although the mayor and councillors had had no previous administrative experience the new organisation functioned satisfactorily. There were, surprisingly enough, very few incidents between Greeks and Italians and after the deportation of the leading Fascists anti-Italian feeling waned. In point of fact signs were very soon noticed that the Greeks were prepared to work in harmony with the remaining Italians, collaboration in business and technical fields being closely inter-connected with the future prosperity of the Dodecanese. The Italians, in their turn, lost their fear while remaining unsettled over the problem of their future. Unemployment figures grew smaller month by month, helped in June by the formation of an Italian committee to act as a co-ordinating body. At the end of the year it was reported that the Italians had worked most efficiently and that the behaviour of the Italian community as a whole had been most correct throughout.

In all the islands the currencies in circulation were British Military Authority notes, Italian Metropolitan lire and lire notes issued by the Governo delle Isole Italiane dell' Egeo, the B.M.A. notes being similar to those printed in other occupied territories and in various denominations, ranging from £1 to 6d. The official rates of exchange were fixed at 400 lire to £1 : in the early stages of the occupation there was a tendency to hoard B.M.A. money, but this decreased as the continuing purchasing power of the lire became apparent. Up to the end of September all cash payments by the Administration were made by means of B.M.A. notes. In October out-payments in Metropolitan lire were introduced on a gradual scale and after two months payments in B.M.A. currency were made to Service personnel only. By the end of December, 1945, £189,000 was in circulation in the Dodecanese issue B.M.A. notes. Prior to the British occupation, drafts drawn on the Banca d'Italia, Banco di Roma and Banco di Sicilia had been circulating as legal tender under a Governor's decree, this being a measure introduced to swell the currency to meet the requirements of inflated prices. They were not accepted by the Administration and consequently fell into disuse almost immediately. Remittances to the territory from abroad totalled £52,000 from May to December. These were directed through

Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Cairo from U.S.A., Egypt, Sudan, United Kingdom and Australia (mainly from the first two), and were made payable in the Dodecansee through the Administration.

The banks found to be operating on occupation were the Banca d'Italia in Rhodes, Banco di Sicilia in Rhodes and Cos, and the Banco di Roma in Rhodes and Leros. They were closed on the 11th May and so remained throughout the year. The position of these branches was not liquid, sight liabilities being Lit. 186,000,000 against cash holdings of only lire 16,000,000. Subsequent payment of salaries and expenses further reduced the cash by Lit. 2,260,000. The closing of the banks by B.M.A. caused considerable adverse comment, although it was generally appreciated that, in the event of a run, the cash would not be sufficient to meet the demands. The banks' position was however such that it was impossible to allow them to re-open.

So far as trade was concerned, the islands were in an un-economic condition, their natural resources being totally inadequate to meet the needs of the population. As has already been made clear, before the war the Dodecanesians had relied on purchasing their essential imports by receipts from tourist traffic, the sponge trade, remittances from abroad, and Italian expenditure, both civil and military. The war had closed down all four sources. With the end of the war one source was ended for ever and time had to pass before the remaining three regained strength. In the early days of the occupation, private trading was on a barter basis, merchants from Greece, the Aegean islands and Cyprus bringing foodstuffs and urgently needed commodities which they exchanged for such surplus goods as the Dodecanese had. The Administration supported this trade to the full. Efforts to establish trade relations with the Turkish mainland met with little success owing to currency regulations, bans on export and unfavourable prices. In the case of Greece the position was more successful. Imports consisted of cement, glass, olive oil and cereals and in exchange the ships carried back to Greece surplus material left behind by the Germans and Italians, and sulphur.

The resuscitation of local industries was given high priority : amongst these industries the most important was sponge fishing. It was estimated in May that the sponge merchants of Symi and Calymnos were holding stocks of some twenty-two tons. During the war years the sponge beds had not been touched and were reputed to be well stocked ; the industry was eager to recommence work, stressing the importance of obtaining diving equipment. Manufacturers in both the United Kingdom and the United

States were approached, but the equipment was slow in forthcoming. Difficulties also arose over settlement questions with the merchants. It was only towards the end of the year that the Ministry of Supply began to issue to agents in the United Kingdom the necessary import licence, it being agreed that 75% of the proceeds could be kept in sterling balances and the remaining 25% paid out in local currency. Signs then appeared of the industry moving towards its pre-war prosperity. A brisk barter trade was carried on between Greece and Nisyros in the export of sulphur. The production of carpets, wines and pottery, and other local industries, although hampered by the unsettled state of affairs, was encouraged.

Revenue collection had begun in Carpathos, Casos and Symi at the beginning of 1945 and after May the organisation for collection spread throughout the islands. The obstacle in this connection again proved to be lack of suitable staff as the trained personnel was Italian and, for political reasons, most of them had to be replaced. By the end of the year however revenue collections were, in general, very satisfactory. Under the Italian Administration the collection of direct taxes was farmed out to a private company. On British occupation of the Dodecanese, steps were taken to alter this and from the 1st July, 1945, the Administration took over the collection of taxes on the island of Rhodes and arrangements were made on other islands for the collection of taxes by the local municipalities on behalf of the Administration. By the end of the year the collection of taxes was progressing so satisfactorily that already more than half the estimated direct taxation revenue for the Financial Year 1945-1946 had been collected. Other Administration revenues were also coming in satisfactorily by the end of the year and it was hoped that total actual receipts during the Financial Year 1945-1946 would appreciably exceed the estimate. In addition, by the end of 1945, customs offices had been established on Rhodes, Cos, Calymnos, Leros, Patmos, Nisyros, Carpathos, Casos and Symi and arrangements were in hand for covering Astypalea and Castellorizo. As in the case of direct taxes, from the 1st July responsibility for the collection of customs revenue on behalf of the Administration on islands other than Rhodes was handed over to the municipalities and thereafter the Customs Department exercised general supervision only on these islands.

On the legal side B.M.A. in the Dodecanese was run on the simplest lines possible. Between May and December, 1945, only thirty-four proclamations were published, the first ten of which

had been drafted in the planning stage : subsidiary enactments were kept down to a minimum. In Rhodes, the seat of the principal court of the territory, the Italians judges were suspended by B.M.A. on arrival. These judges proved co-operative in handing over and in helping to sort out the cases of prisoners awaiting trial : they were repatriated to Italy in June. Arrangements were immediately made for the setting up of a summary court in Rhodes to be presided over by an officer with legal qualifications ; cases in the other islands were to be tried by C.A.Os., their findings in each case being subject to review by the President of the Courts. The Rhodes summary court opened on the 17th May and before the end of the month had disposed of thirty-eight cases. This figure rose to a total of 362 by the end of the year ; the figure for December showed a most satisfactory decline. To meet the growing demands of the population Civil Courts were set up by proclamation and the first sitting took place on the 12th November. The islands were divided into two groups, the courts sitting at Rhodes and Cos, the court procedure followed being a simplified reproduction of the form used prior to the British occupation.

The work of the Custodian of Enemy Property was mainly concerned with taking into custody and subsequent letting of shops and houses belonging to absent Jews, the compilation of inventories and the disposal of trading stocks of deported Jewish shopkeepers, and the general sorting out of the personal effects of the former Jewish population. Most of the Jewish immovable property in Rhodes was situated in the old city and had suffered considerable damage through war action. It was only natural during the period of confusion which preceded the German surrender that Jewish shops and houses should have been occupied by homeless Dodecanesians, in many cases refugees from remote villages. The Custodian had therefore to take all such properties under his control and arrange tenancy agreements with the new occupiers. That part of the Jewish trading stocks which had not been looted or disposed of by the Germans had been placed in a large store in Rhodes : on taking over this store the Custodian found the contents in complete disorder, making the problem of deciding ownership of individual items most difficult. Yet all that could be done was done and when the ownership of an article was established such article was labelled and put in safe keeping. The remaining stocks were sold and the proceeds put into a special fund in safe custody until such a time as claims could be settled. Very little Italian owned property came under the control

of the Custodian owing to the fact that few Italians left the islands before the British occupation and those who were later repatriated either disposed of their property before leaving or nominated an agent. A procedure was adopted whereby a person who had an interest in the affairs or property of an absentee could, under the provision of an article of the Italian Civil Code, apply to the local courts to be appointed curator.

The police force for the Dodecanese saw its origin in August, 1943, when a number of police officers and inspectors from the occupied territories in Africa reported for training to the Civil Affairs Staff School at Mena, near Cairo. In the same month AT(B)1 was born and the police party moved, together with the administrative officers, to Haifa in Palestine. During the autumn occupation of various of the islands the police personnel took over duties of liaison officers with the military forces and after the evacuation were withdrawn to Cairo for re-organisation ; thereafter a police training school was started in Cyprus. In the autumn of 1944 posts were established at Castellorizo, Symi and Carpathos and food runs were made to the islands in caïques. Prior to the occupation of the islands in May, 1945, the force was assembled in Symi. The final organisation for the police force was for seven divisions, two on Rhodes, urban and rural, and others on Carpathos, Symi, Cos, Calymnos and Leros. In conformity with instructions issued by G.H.Q., Middle East, the Italian Carabinieri Reali were treated as prisoners of war and one of the first tasks of the police on occupation was the internment of all those of Italian metropolitan origin, the discharge of all Italians of Dodecanese origin, and the enlistment into the new police force of all Carabinieri of Greek or other origin. This step unavoidably decreased the value of the criminal records, which had been maintained by the Italian police. Although the divisions remained well below establishment, recruiting improved towards the end of the year. As at the 31st December, 1945, the force had on strength twenty-eight British officers and inspectors and 372 others—Cypriot British and Dodecanesian.

Owing to the intense anti-Italian feeling at the time of occupation, the police had fears of reprisals by the Greeks and Dodecanesians. However, only a few minor cases of assault and slight damage to Italian owned property occurred in these early days. There was, in fact, very little real crime in the island throughout 1945 and after the force got into its stride in August the number of cases was reduced to very small proportions. The central prison being in Rhodes, with police lock-ups on the other

islands, the policy was laid down that sentences in excess of one month were to be served in the central prison ; this system functioned smoothly. In the early days of occupation particularly, contraband activities played a large part in the life of the islanders and, to counteract this, close co-operation was achieved between the police and the Royal Navy. Although the Navy took over control of all the ports and harbours throughout the Dodecanese as from the 10th May the force had a special section trained as Port and Marine Police which was responsible for manning and running five patrol vessels. It was realised that eventually B.M.A. would have to take over the entire running of the ports and the maintenance of the harbours and with this object in view a policy of building up a suitable fleet of vessels was embarked upon. A new department, termed the Schooner Control Department, was formed for the purpose. This department took over from the Public Works Department the direct control and management of all sea-going vessels. Notice that the B.M.A. would be required to take over the management of the ports and harbours from the Royal Navy was given in December and to undertake this new responsibility a further department, Port and Marine, was established.

From a medical viewpoint the Dodecanese presented many problems. On certain of the islands there had been considerable war damage, which led to bad housing conditions ; in Rhodes, as has been chronicled, a state of semi-starvation had existed for some five months prior to the occupation, resulting in many cases of malnutrition. To add to the trouble the Italian Civil Medical Administration had practically ceased to function and the local inhabitants showed apathy in taking steps to remedy matters. The B.M.A. medical services therefore concentrated on improving the diet, establishing hospital services and re-organising civil medical services, distributing medical supplies and supervising the sanitary control. The medical and welfare re-organisation was greatly assisted by the help of Ambulance Units and by the end of the summer a great improvement was visible. The islands being blessed with a very favourable climate, the Medical Department realised that the population would regain their health more quickly if they could be imbued with the importance of sanitation. To this end medical officers were appointed to the districts and school teachers were given instruction in hygiene. Milk clinics were established for the distribution of free milk and, for necessitous cases, additional supplies of food were obtained from the International Red Cross and the Greek Government. B.M.A.

undertook free medical treatment of all paupers and those on relief, a step which, in the early stages, involved considerable numbers. Mental cases were transferred to Athens and leprosy cases to Samos.

Hand in hand with medical problems went those of education ; in this field the B.M.A. was hampered by the fact that no educational staff was included among the personnel which commenced the general administration of the Dodecanese in May. It was not in fact until the 12th November that a British educational officer arrived. In 1937 the Italian Governor had prohibited the teaching of Greek in schools and therefore, after their liberation, one of the first priorities in the minds of the Greeks was the re-introduction of a school system of their own. To this end local education committees were formed and worked energetically. While the condition of the schools which were opened, coupled with the standard of the teachers, in many cases left much to be desired, the Dodecanesians were proud indeed of what they had accomplished through their own efforts : in some areas schools were opened irrespective of whether or not equipment or teachers were available.

A further educational problem was that the three groups of schools—Greek, Turkish and Italian—were operated by separate committees and as such no stable line of education had been followed. Great difficulty was experienced in co-ordinating and operating an educational programme which could be followed by all the groups. To conduct the Greek schools a Central Education Committee was elected in Rhodes in September and assumed responsibility for all the schools on the island. A scale of salaries was drawn up and the appointment of teachers confirmed. By the autumn four large schools were operating in Rhodes town and the importance with which education was regarded in the villages was shown by the fact that each opened its own school, these being very quickly repaired and repainted in the Greek national colours. In 1945, out of the Greek population of 110,180, the school attendance was 16,300, this high figure being partly accounted for by the fact that many children over fourteen still attended school ; this was their first opportunity to go to classes where Greek, their mother tongue, was the medium of instruction. British medical officers, visiting the schools at regular intervals, reported that the recovery from the hardships of the German occupation was more rapid than had been expected and that the children had largely overcome the bad effects of the period of malnutrition.

The Turkish and Italian school attendance was small in

comparison with the Greek. Run by the Committee of the Turkish community, with the Mufti as president, the Turkish schools were able to use textbooks printed in their own language. Six schools were operating in 1945, five in Rhodes and one in Cos, with a total attendance of some 750. Under trained Italian teachers belonging to religious orders, four Italian schools were opened in Rhodes town, four in the villages on Rhodes island and one in Leros, the school population being approximately the same as that of the Turkish.

During the Italian régime in the Dodecanese a vast sum of money was lavished on building up and maintaining a comprehensive Archeological Service. The Director had his main headquarters in the Fert Historical and Archeological Institute at Rhodes, and a subsidiary office at Cos. Custodians were appointed for all the principal sites in the islands, and a large number of workmen were controlled by a small staff of highly-skilled excavators and architects. The Italians undertook numerous excavations, mainly on Rhodes, Cos and Calymnos and, where possible, carried out extensive restorations. Two very important museum collections were built up, one in Rhodes in the Hospital of the Knights, and the other in Cos in the Castle. In 1937 a modern museum building was erected in Cos, but was never taken fully into use owing to the war. A fine archaeological library was also set up in the Fert Institute, containing upwards of 7,000 books and pamphlets.

When the British Military Administration took over, it had no Antiquities Department and the antiquities were therefore made the responsibility of the Public Works Department. They took into employment the Italian ex-Director of Antiquities and 21 other members of the Italian Archaeological Service, 15 on Rhodes and 6 on Cos. The Italian ex-Director brought back to the Fert Institute the archaeological library, which had been stored during the war, and paid a short visit to Cos, where he found that the contents of the museum had suffered considerably at the hands of the Germans. The Castle, which previously housed the museum and where many of the exhibits had been stored, had been used by the Germans as a strongpoint and many of the rooms had been emptied and looted. On the formation of the Antiquities Department, in September, 1945, a survey of the medieval Walled City of Rhodes was carried out; damage, mostly from the British bombardment of 1944, was found to be extensive. The St. Paul's Gate, the Refectory in the Hospital of the Knights, the Byzantine Church of Demirli Djami, the small Chapel near the Hospital of

St. Catherine, the lodge Yeni Sheri and several medieval houses had been destroyed. The St. Catherine and Coschino Gates were damaged, as were several sections of the walls, the church of Abdul Gelil, the Piosasco Chapel, the Lodge of France and numerous houses. Of these, the St. Catherine Gate and the Lodge of France, the two finest examples of knightly architecture in Rhodes, Yeni Sheri and several houses were pronounced by the municipal engineer to be in a dangerous condition. The sections of the walls were damaged, some by bombardment and some by the Germans, who pulled down the top courses in several places to build shelters and machine-gun platforms. Elsewhere on Rhodes Island visits were paid to Lindos, Camiros and Fileremo. Lindos, with its mixture of classical, Byzantine and medieval antiquities, was found to be undamaged, and two guardians were employed to look after the building and sites. Generally, work carried out was of a first-aid nature; lack of funds prevented any large-scale repairs, even to the most seriously damaged buildings. No attempt was made to re-open the museum owing to the damage to the building, the destruction of the former electric lighting system, and the breakage of all glass in the windows and showcases.

The question of the care and disposal of refugees has been referred to earlier in this chapter: owing to the fluidity of the Dodecanese operations the position is now dealt with as a whole. Refugees first became a problem for the Administration early in October, 1944, when only Patmos, Symi, Carpathos and Casos were occupied. Thousands had fled, or were fleeing, from the islands owing to starvation or fear of the occupying Germans. Many had found their way to Cyprus and the Middle East between October, 1943, and the end of 1944, and here they were well housed and looked after in Middle East Refugee and Repatriation Administration camps. Large numbers, however, were stranded on the Turkish coast and living under very bad conditions. Early in 1945 the Turkish Government requested that Greeks and Italians be removed from Turkey, and in February a staging camp was established at the Panormiti Convent on Symi where, between April and June, a total of 7,000 refugees were handled. At this camp refugees were registered, medically examined, disinfected, issued with blankets and fed: on arrival they were in a pitiful condition, suffering from sores, rickets, and general starvation. In addition, three refugee camps were prepared on Casos to accommodate 1,000 Greeks and 900 Italians and one large camp was built on Carpathos to cater for 4,000 Greeks; these, however, were eventually all overcrowded. At times the

staging camp at Panormiti, with a maximum capacity of 600, had to cope with over 1,000 refugees. All the work was admirably carried out under most adverse circumstances by a small B.M.A. staff and a Friends Ambulance Unit Relief Detachment.

Early in June repatriation of refugees commenced. Great difficulty was experienced in preparing correct nominal rolls for each island, as a large proportion of the refugees considered they had no hope of earning a livelihood on the smaller islands and practically without exception registered themselves as Rhodeans, anticipating greater prosperity there. The effect of this influx on the economy of Rhodes town was distressing, producing a surplus population of over 1,000, without houses, money or work; this problem came at a time of maximum Administrative difficulties. Many were sent back to their own islands and on arrival were received by local committees. All Italian refugees were returned from Casos to Rhodes and non-Rhodeans were subsequently repatriated to Italy. Over 2,000 Turkish refugees arrived in Rhodes from Turkey, with little money, no food and few personal belongings. The local Turkish community was, however, most co-operative and there were few complaints, despite shortage of houses owing to bomb damage in the Turkish quarter.

In August, 1945, the return of refugees from the Middle East, Cyprus and Greece commenced. Many were shipped direct to their home islands, while others were sent to Rhodes for transshipment. This necessitated the establishment of a transit camp in Rhodes town which, by the end of the year, had dealt with 1,750 persons for the other islands. All refugees returning from the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus were well clothed and in good health. In all, Rhodes received 5,550 refugees between January, 1945, and the end of the year—2,500 from the Middle East, 450 from Cyprus, 600 from Greece and 2,000 from Turkey. The other island groups, Cos, Calymnos, Carpathos, Leros and Symi, received in all a total of 12,145 refugees.

Throughout 1945 the Administration remained responsible for the supply and distribution of essential foodstuffs and other goods to the population of the Dodecanese Islands: these supplies, with the exception of salt, were all imported and obtained through British military channels. The hope that U.N.R.R.A. would be providing essentials by the end of the year did not, in fact, materialise. Negotiations to this end had been continuing for some time, the War Office having informed the C.-in-C., Middle East, in October, 1944, that the Council of U.N.R.R.A. had passed a resolution that their help might be

extended to the Dodecanese despite the fact that the islands were technically ex-enemy territory and therefore would normally be excluded from their scope. But the C.-in-C. was not in favour of this proposal. His views were, in substance, that the Dodecanese Islands were a British commitment and that B.M.A. must remain fully responsible for their administration. Such responsibility, until regular trade channels were re-opened, included the procurement of essential supplies for purchase by the local population : there would be no advantage and some disadvantages in inviting U.N.R.R.A. to participate in this business, or in fact to take any direct action in the Dodecanese, beyond the provision of a hygiene unit and in connection with displaced persons, as they were doing at the time. In view, however, of the fact that the funds at the disposal of U.N.R.R.A. had been contributed by all the United Nations, mainly for relief purposes, the view was put forward strongly in London that U.N.R.R.A. should be invited to meet the ascertained cost of direct relief expenditure in the islands. In May, 1945, the C.-in-C. informed the War Office that he was prepared to waive objections to the assumption by U.N.R.R.A. of responsibility for the procurement of civil supplies in view of the financial advantages which would thus accrue to H.M.G. Accordingly an agreement was signed by the Director of Civil Affairs (Major-General A. V. Anderson, C.B., M.B.E.), at the War Office, and the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. in which was laid down that U.N.R.R.A. should provide essential supplies to the Dodecanese as from the 1st August, 1945. Financial responsibility was taken over on that date, but the first U.N.R.R.A. personnel did not reach Rhodes until the 20th October. By the end of the year no supplies had been provided by U.N.R.R.A. and little were expected in the near future : fortunately, however, it was possible to arrange for the continuance of supply through British Army channels. These channels continued to meet demands until U.N.R.R.A. supplies began to arrive in the early summer of 1946. By September, 1946, U.N.R.R.A. was preparing to close down and the responsibility for feeding the population once again fell upon the British Army, through the British Military Administration, this responsibility to continue until the Greek Government could take over the islands.

The initial announcement that the Dodecanese Islands would be united with Greece, resulting from the decision reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Paris, made in June, 1946, and plans for the transfer were begun without delay.

The first concrete step was a conference which assembled at

Rhodes on the 19th July. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the Chief Legal Adviser and the Assistant Controller of Finance and Accounts attended from the Civil Affairs Branch, Cairo ; from Athens came the First Secretary of the British Embassy, the Deputy Chief of the British Police and Prisons Mission to Greece, a member of the Anglo-Greek Currency Committee and representatives of the British Treasury and the British Economic Mission to Greece ; representatives of the British Land Forces, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and U.N.R.R.A. were also present. The principal decisions taken at this conference were that : (a) the transfer of responsibility should be to a Greek Military Administration ; (b) the Greek Government should be asked to confirm that the Head of the Greek Military Liaison Mission in Rhodes, Colonel (Brigadier) Tsigantes, would—in view of his knowledge of the islands and of B.M.A.—be the Head of the Greek Administration to take over from B.M.A. ; (c) the Greek Government should be asked to augment the Greek Military Liaison Mission in Rhodes by officers or civilians chosen to hold senior posts in the administration after the hand-over ; (d) certain Departments, such as Education, Public Health, Agriculture and, possibly, Public Works, might be manned by Greek staff before the hand-over, provided they were servants of B.M.A., responsible to the Chief Administrator and required to conform to the approved financial estimates of B.M.A. ; (e) on an agreed date, preferably one month before the day fixed for the hand-over, Greek officials should be attached to C.A.Os. and heads of Departments of B.M.A. to get fully acquainted with the duties to be performed on taking over ; and (f) following the recommendation made by the C.-in-C. to the War Office that the islands should be handed over as a going concern, the conference agreed on proposals to be made on the categories of equipment, stores, etc., to be transferred.

The decisions taken at Rhodes were never modified, not only owing to their intrinsic soundness, but also to the wide field of interests represented. Furthermore, a plan was made sufficiently long before the transfer to permit of it being fully explained to the Greek Authorities and for the latter to make their arrangements accordingly. During the months following the Rhodes conference the Greek Military Liaison Mission was built up with officers and officials earmarked for duties in each branch of administration. These men were attached on arrival to the departments in which they would eventually serve, so that they might study the duties of their British "opposite numbers". In

some cases they had acquired in a few weeks all the knowledge that could usefully be gained at that stage and reverted to the Greek Military Liaison Mission for general duties; others remained attached to B.M.A. for the whole period before the transfer and in several instances proved useful assistants to the British heads of Departments.

When the Rhodes conference was held it was anticipated that the transfer might take place within two months, but by September the prospect had become less definite. Provisional agreement was reached for a target date of 30th November, 1946, but by October, no Peace Treaty having been signed, it became obvious that this date also would not be achieved. From then until the end of the year uncertainty prevailed and the delay brought subsequent, and unavoidable, difficulties, particularly on questions of supplies. In November the islands were visited by Major-General A. V. Anderson, who was accompanied by the Controller of Finance and Accounts, and all efforts were made to ensure that the flow of supplies continued. The next step towards the hand-over came in December, when, on the prompting of the British Ambassador in Athens, who was anxious that as soon as political obstacles to the transfer had been surmounted there should be no delay for administrative reasons, a conference for the detailed planning of the transfer was held in the Greek capital. The conference was attended by the Greek Minister of Co-ordination and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, senior Greek officials, a representative of the British Embassy, senior members of the various British missions and representatives of the British Fighting Services. Civil Affairs Branch was represented by the Chief Administrator, who was accompanied by Brigadier Tsigantes. The task of the conference was twofold: to obtain the Greek Government's acceptance of the decisions taken by the all-British conference, which had taken place at Rhodes in the previous July, and to plan in detail the procedure of transfer. Complete success was attained on both issues. It was agreed that thirty days before the date of hand-over each British officer holding an important executive post should have attached to him the Greek officer or official designated as his successor, and that during the thirty-day period the fullest information should be given, and the greatest opportunities for studying the methods of B.M.A. should be afforded the Greek prospective incumbents of office. An echeloned programme for the arrival at Rhodes and deployment to the islands of the Greek Gendarmerie, preparatory to taking over from the B.M.A. Police, was also worked out.

Thus the Athens conference made real progress towards the transfer. In fact it set the stage as completely as was possible, so that the action could begin as soon as higher authority gave the signal. This signal did not come for nearly three months, namely, at the end of February. Once the order was received to proceed with the hand-over arrangements, with the 31st March in view as the date of effective transfer, plans made months before were immediately put into operation and proved sound. Brigadier Tsiganes, Head of the Greek Military Liaison Mission, was unfortunately absent in Athens and did not return; he was replaced by Vice-Admiral Ioannides. The two Chief Secretaries of the British Military Administration and the Greek Military Liaison Mission met daily to report progress and settle any problems that might have arisen. This precaution assisted in the smooth working of the plan and one of the very few difficulties that arose was the extra pressure of work at the end of the thirty-day hand-over period, owing to lack of precise instructions as to what stores and equipment were to be handed over and what back-loaded to Egypt.

At noon on the 31st March, 1947, responsibility for the government of the Dodecanese Islands was transferred from the British Military Administration to a Greek Military Administration. The hand-over was recorded in a document of few words and was signed by the outgoing Administrator, Brigadier A. S. Parker, and his successor, Vice-Admiral P. Ioannides. On the same day there took place in Athens between the British Ambassador and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs an exchange of notes in which the Greek Government recognised that no transfer of sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands could take place until the date of the entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy; that until that date the Greek Government would maintain a military administration in the islands in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention of 1907; and that the Greek Government would be ready to conclude further agreements with the British Government concerning matters of detail arising out of the transfer of military administration. In further notes exchanged on the 7th April the two Governments agreed to negotiate later regarding responsibility for the cost of administration during the British occupation of the Islands; fixed the rate of conversion (20,000 drachmae to the £) at which B.M.A. currency in circulation in the Islands was to be redeemed by the 12th April; allotted to the Greek Government, without payment, all ex-enemy war material remaining in the Islands on the

1st April, 1947; and provided for payment by the Greeks for stocks of food and supplies left at their request by B.M.A.

So ended British Military Administration of the Dodecanese Islands. The Note of the Greek Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Athens on the handing over of the Dodecanese contained the following passage :—

“ On this occasion I would ask Your Excellency to be good enough to convey to His Majesty’s Government the expression of the deepest gratitude of the Royal Hellenic Government and their sincere appreciation of the way in which the British Military Administration has been carried on since the liberation of the Islands.”

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But if finality for the purposes of this record was reached in the Dodecanese in April, 1947, and had been reached in Ethiopia in January, 1942 and in Madagascar in January, 1943, the same can unfortunately not be said of the older Italian Colonies. So far as these are concerned the record must end in the air, since up to the time of going to press no decision had been reached by the Allied Powers on their ultimate disposal.

At the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris in June, 1946, the only decisions reached were that the Governments of Russia, Great Britain, America and France would, within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, jointly determine the final disposal of Italy’s territorial possessions in Africa, to which Italy renounced all right and title; that the final disposal of the territories concerned and the appropriate adjustment of their boundaries should be made by the Four Powers in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of other interested Governments; that if the Four Powers were unable to agree upon the disposal of these territories within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace the matter should be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation, and the Four Powers agreed to accept the recommendation and to take appropriate

measures for giving effect to it ; and, finally, that the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers should continue the consideration of the question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies with a view to submitting to the Council of Foreign Ministers their recommendations on this matter, and that they should also send out commissions of investigation to any of the former Italian Colonies in order to supply the Deputies with the necessary data and to ascertain the views of the local population.

The failure for so long to reach a final decision had certain serious consequences for the Military Administrations in all the territories. The shortage of administrative staff due to demobilisation and repatriation has been described and, although the morale of the personnel remained high, there was an inevitable sense of frustration and temporariness which militated against creative administration. It is a matter of regret that no arrangement could have been reached to ensure continuity of service under the Crown in other territories by arranging for all unestablished personnel, who so desired it, to be given security of employment by the promise of transfer to established services at home or overseas.

From the point of view of H.M.G. the failure to reach a decision involved a financial commitment overseas which the economic situation of the United Kingdom did not justify, and which the taxpayer ought not properly have been required to bear for, and during, an admittedly transitional period. While the financial results of the British Military Administrations in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Somalia may in all the circumstances be considered to have been most satisfactory, and brilliant compared with the cost of the administration of these territories to the Italian economy, they represented in aggregate a net deficit or loss to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. It is true that for certain periods some of the territories showed a surplus of revenues over expenditure ; but this was never the case over all, nor ever could be, given the intrinsic poverty of the territories themselves and the impossibility of even considering long term development programmes on account of the temporary nature of any Military Administration, coupled with complete uncertainty regarding ultimate disposal, or even of the type of régime which would follow disposal. The net deficits for the first four complete years of administration, to the 30th June, 1945, alone amounted to some £6,500,000. To the middle of 1947 the cost cannot be put at less than £10,000,000. Moreover, in these territories, as in the rest of the Western European world, trade

during 1946 and 1947 became progressively more difficult, and foodstuffs throughout the world more scarce. The policy of maximum food production had happily been instituted as early as 1943 in all the territories, even if the costs were uneconomic ; no new policy in this respect had, therefore, to be instituted in 1946-47. But by the spring of 1947 equipment of all sorts inherited by the administration from the Italian régime was on its last legs and progressively diminishing in quantity as a result of the process known to the Army as "cannibalisation". Nor were resources available to renew equipment, of which the United Kingdom itself was in need.

Finally, the populations themselves of the territories, faced with month after month of uncertainty, were disinclined to display initiative or imagination. Indeed, it is only due to that genius which the Italian race has for improvisation that the European element in the territories kept the fabric of things together as much as it did.

Nevertheless, during those months of 1947 covered by this record a number of happenings took place which were of the liveliest interest both to the native populations and to B.M.A. personnel. Of major concern was the decision of H.M.G. to withdraw British forces from the major part of Egypt and the subsequent setting up of G.H.Q., Middle East Land Forces, at Fayid in the Canal Area. Following this decision came that of subordinating East Africa Command to G.H.Q., M.E.L.F., with effect from the 1st April. After discussions in Cairo between General Sir Miles Dempsey, C.-in-C., M.E.L.F., Major-General A. V. Anderson, Director of Civil Affairs at the War Office, and Major-General Cumming, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, it was decided that Civil Affairs Branches at Cairo and Nairobi should be amalgamated and re-established at Fayid and that Civil Affairs Agencies should be set up in Cairo and Nairobi, both under direct control of Civil Affairs Branch at Fayid. Brigadier Jameson, formerly Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer, East Africa Command, became Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer at G.H.Q., M.E.L.F.

In Cyrenaica, both Sayed Idris and the Cyrenaican population had been growing increasingly restive at the lack of measures to rehabilitate their devastated country so long after the end of hostilities, and at the continued postponement of any final settlement. It was therefore decided to despatch a Working Party under the aegis of the War Office and with the approval of the British Cabinet, to Cyrenaica to consult with the Administration

and to recommend necessary measures. As a first mark of British goodwill towards the Sayed Idris, and in recognition of the loyal services which both he and his Senussi followers rendered to the Allied cause during the war, H.M.G. bestowed on him in January, 1947, the honorific title of " Amir " and awarded him the K.B.E. The Working Party, under the presidency of Lieut.-Colonel Sir Bernard Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., reached Cyrenaica the same month and submitted to H.M.G. detailed recommendations of necessary steps which should be taken in the territory, recommendations which received the endorsement of the Cabinet. The Working Party, under the same presidency but with varying members, then proceeded to visit Tripolitania, Eritrea and Somalia, rendering informative and constructive recommendations on each territory visited, in consultation with the Administrations.

The Peace Treaty with Italy was signed in Paris in February, 1947, but, although by Article 23 Italy renounced all right and title to her territorial possessions in Africa, its terms brought little change to the peoples of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Somalia. The 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, under the terms of which either party had right to give notice of termination in December, 1946, was still in force at the time of going to press.

It will be recalled that the method of accounting introduced in the African territories in 1941 was designed to enable H.M.G. to reach an assessment of the cost of administration of the occupied territories. But in the light of what has already happened it is quite problematical how far this country will be able to recoup itself for direct expenditure in connection with the ultimate disposal of the territories. The expenditure of manpower in the administration of the territories during the war and since the conclusion of hostilities in any event represents a net loss of some magnitude.

On the credit side there remains the achievement. For some six years these African territories have experienced British administration, started from first beginnings with the most rudimentary resources and carried on by men in whom worldly ambition by the very nature of things could play little or no part. All ranks knew that they were doing their work on a temporary basis which must terminate sooner or later, probably sooner. And many of them also knew that, when that period of service came to an end, there would not be another job ready for them. The achievement in these circumstances has not only been notable but also indicative of an administrative and political competence

far greater than could reasonably be expected. It is encouraging to find that Great Britain's resources in men capable of exercising authority with skill and intelligence are still adequate to meet her requirements.

It will be for the people of these territories, who have on the whole enjoyed stability and who have had British justice, to judge of their experience hereafter, when their perspective is adjusted to the changes which the British Military Administrations brought and which will follow when they have departed. However unhappy or distressful the lot of some of these people may have seemed, they have been considerably better off than the inhabitants of some European countries which suffered from invasion during the war. There will undoubtedly be many who will regret the end of our administrations when it comes.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This account of the administration of the occupied territories in Africa would be incomplete without reference to the part played by the Information Services, which came under the Ministry of Information and, on the closing of that Ministry, the Foreign Office.

The Ministry of Information (and later the Foreign Office) posted Public Information Officers to each of the occupied territories and supplied them with guidance and directions. These officers were responsible for reading rooms, cinemas (static and mobile), poster displays and producing, or advising on, locally printed newspapers and magazines. Through them came the information used in the World Press for local broadcast programmes, and also by the British Broadcasting Corporation in their wider programmes to the Middle East and East Africa. The Ministry of Information also published a popular account of the activities of the Administrations in a booklet, "The First to be Freed," by Mr. K. C. Gandar Dower.

In addition to their responsibilities to the Ministry of Information, which bore the expense of the service, the Information Officers played their part in the day to day administration and maintenance of law and order. They were subject to the guidance of the Chief Administrators of the territories. A series of able and active Information Officers made an undoubted contribution to the work of B.M.A. in general.

In British Somaliland the functions of the Information and Public Relations Officer were recognised, in 1944, as so essential to the long-term development of the Protectorate that he was given a permanent position in the Administration. Through Radio Kudu (later Radio Somali) and poster displays, he overcame the difficulties of spreading information to a race whose language is unwritten and managed to explain the Government's policy widely among the Somalis, particularly in educational and medical spheres.

Mention must also be made of the work of the British Red Crescent Society in Cyrenaica. The Society, with headquarters in London, was founded during the Turko-Italian war of 1912 as a mark of sympathy by the British public and Moslems of India with the sufferings of Moslems of North Africa. In January, 1943, the Red Crescent Society began sending financial contributions to the Chief Administrator, Cyrenaica, for the relief of distressed Moslems who had suffered special hardship as a result of the war. In 1946 the Society sent a fully trained nursing Sister to Benghazi to help with problems of midwifery and child welfare.

APPENDIX I

AGREEMENT AND MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa, January 31, 1942.

WHEREAS His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty the Emperor), wishes to put on record His gratitude and that of His people for the overwhelming and generous aid He has received from the Forces of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty The King), which has enabled Him and His people to recover their national territory ; and

Whereas His Majesty the Emperor, true to His coronation pledges not to surrender His sovereignty or the independence of His people, but conscious of the needs of His country, has intimated to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the Government of the United Kingdom) that He is eager to receive advice and financial assistance in the difficult task of reconstruction and reform ; and

Whereas the Government of the United Kingdom recognise that Ethiopia is now a free and independent State and His Majesty the Emperor, Hailé Sellassié I, is its lawful Ruler, and, the reconquest of Ethiopia being now complete, wish to help His Majesty the Emperor to re-establish His Government and to assist in providing for the immediate needs of the country :

Now, therefore, His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia in person, and

Major-General Sir Philip Euen Mitchell, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, upon whom has been conferred the decoration of the Military Cross, Chief Political Officer, on the Staff of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa, being duly authorised for this purpose by the Government of the United Kingdom,

Have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE I.

Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia shall be re-established and conducted through a British Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to His Majesty the Emperor and an Ethiopian Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to His Majesty the King, who shall be appointed as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Agreement. His Majesty the Emperor agrees that the Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King shall take precedence over any other foreign Representative accredited to His Imperial Majesty.

ARTICLE II.

(a) His Majesty the Emperor having requested the Government of the United Kingdom to assist him in obtaining the services of British subjects (i) as advisers to himself and his administration ; (ii) as Commissioner of Police, Police officers and inspectors ; and (iii) as judges and magistrates, the Government of the United Kingdom will use their best endeavours to assist His Majesty the Emperor in this matter. The number of such British subjects, their salaries, privileges, duties and powers, and the appointments they are to fill, shall be the subject of separate agreements between the Contracting Parties.

(b) His Majesty the Emperor agrees not to appoint advisers additional to those referred to in paragraph (a) above except after consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE III.

Subject to the provisions of the Military Convention concluded this day, and of Article VII of this Agreement, the jurisdiction and administration exercised by British military tribunals and authorities shall terminate as soon as they can be replaced by effective Ethiopian civilian administration and jurisdiction, which His Majesty the Emperor will set up as soon as possible. Nevertheless, British military tribunals shall finish any cases then pending before them. The Ethiopian authorities will recognise and, where necessary, enforce decisions previously given by British military tribunals.

ARTICLE IV.

(a) His Majesty the Emperor, having intimated to the Government of the United Kingdom that he will require financial aid in order to re-establish his administration, the Government of the

United Kingdom will grant to His Majesty the sum of Pounds Sterling one million five hundred thousand during the first year and Pounds Sterling one million during the second year of the currency of this Agreement. If this Agreement remains in force for a third year, the Government of the United Kingdom agree to pay to His Majesty the Emperor the sum of Pounds Sterling five hundred thousand in respect of such third year, and if for a fourth year, then the sum of Pounds Sterling two hundred and fifty thousand shall be paid in respect of that year. Payments will be made in quarterly instalments in advance.

(b) His Majesty the Emperor agrees for his part that this grant shall absolve the Government of the United Kingdom from any payments in respect of the use of immovable property of the Ethiopian State which may be required by the British forces in Ethiopia during the war.

(c) His Majesty the Emperor agrees that there shall be the closest co-operation between the Ethiopian authorities and his British Advisers, to be appointed in accordance with Article II (a), regarding public expenditure.

(d) In order to facilitate the absorption into Ethiopian economy of the funds to be provided under paragraph (a) above, and to promote the early resumption of trade between Ethiopia and the surrounding territories, His Majesty the Emperor agrees that in all matters relating to currency in Ethiopia the Government of the United Kingdom shall be consulted and that arrangements concerning it shall be made only with the concurrence of that Government.

ARTICLE V.

(a) Jurisdiction over foreigners shall be exercised by the Ethiopian Courts constituted according to the draft Statute attached hereto as an Annex, which His Majesty the Emperor will promulgate forthwith and will maintain in force during the continuance of this Agreement, except in so far as it may require amendment in any manner agreed upon by the parties to this Agreement.

(b) Any foreigner who is a party to any proceedings, civil or criminal, within the jurisdiction of a Regional, Communal or Provincial Court, may elect to have the case transferred without additional fee or charge to the High Court for trial. Provisions to this effect shall be included in the Rules of Court.

(c) In the hearing by the High Court of any matter to which a foreigner is a party at least one of the British Judges mentioned in Article II (a) shall sit as a member of the Court.

(d) His Majesty the Emperor agrees to direct that foreigners shall be incarcerated only in prisons approved for the purpose by the Commissioner of Police appointed in accordance with Article II (a).

ARTICLE VI.

(a) His Majesty the Emperor agrees to enact laws against trading with the enemy in terms proposed to him by the Government of the United Kingdom.

(b) His Majesty the Emperor accepts full responsibility for seeing that private enemy property is dealt with in accordance with international law. His Majesty agrees to consult with the British Diplomatic Representative as to the measures to be taken to this end.

ARTICLE VII.

His Majesty the Emperor agrees—

(a) That all prisoners of war shall be handed over to the custody of the British Military Authorities, who will evacuate them from Ethiopia as soon as possible, and

(b) That he will enact such legislation as may be required to enable the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the British forces in East Africa and officers acting under his authority to exercise such temporary local powers as may be necessary for the administration, control and evacuation of Italian civilians in Ethiopia.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Government of the United Kingdom will use their best endeavours—

(a) To secure the return of Ethiopians in Italian hands, and

(b) To secure the return of artistic works, religious property and the like removed to Italy and belonging to His Majesty the Emperor, the Ethiopian State, or local or religious bodies.

ARTICLE IX.

In areas in which the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the British forces in East Africa may find it necessary to conduct military operations against the common enemy in future, His Majesty the Emperor will, at the request of the said General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, declare a state of emergency and will confer on the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the powers resulting from such declaration. Any legislation necessary to secure these powers will be promulgated by His Majesty the

Emperor. The Ethiopian Government and local authorities will give such aid and concurrence to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief as may be needed.

ARTICLE X.

His Majesty the Emperor agrees not to conduct any external military operation which, in the opinion of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the British forces in East Africa is contrary to the joint interests of Ethiopia and the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE XI.

(a) His Majesty the Emperor will accord freedom of passage to, in and over Ethiopia to duly registered British civil aircraft, provided that such regulations governing air navigation as may be in force in Ethiopia are observed.

(b) His Majesty the Emperor will permit a British Air Transport organisation or organisations, to be designated by the Government of the United Kingdom, to operate regular Air Services to, in and over Ethiopia for the carriage of passengers, mails and freight. For this purpose the said organisations shall be permitted to use such aerodromes, ground equipment and facilities as are available, and to provide such other aerodromes, ground equipment and facilities as may be necessary.

(c) His Majesty the Emperor will not permit foreign aircraft other than British to fly to, in or over Ethiopia without the concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE XII.

The present Agreement shall enter in force as from this day's date. It shall remain in force until replaced by a Treaty for which His Majesty the Emperor may wish to make proposals. If it is not so replaced within two years from this date, it may thereafter be terminated at any time by either Party giving three months' notice to the other to this effect.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Done this thirty-first day of January 1942 in the English and Amharic languages, both of which shall be equally authoritative except in case of doubt, when the English text shall prevail.

(L.S.) HAILE SELASSIE I. (L.S.) P. E. MITCHELL

ANNEX.

DRAFT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROCLAMATION

Part I.—*Preliminary.*

1. This Proclamation may be cited as the Administration of Justice Proclamation.

2. The following Courts shall be established in Our Empire and shall be constituted in the manner hereinafter described and shall exercise the powers conferred on them by this Proclamation over all persons in Ethiopia :—

- (a) The Supreme Imperial Court.
- (b) The High Court.
- (c) The Provincial Courts.
- (d) Regional and Communal Courts.

Part II.—*The Supreme Imperial Court.*

3. The Supreme Imperial Court shall comprise the Afa Negus as President, together with two judges of the High Court, who shall be nominated by the President of the High Court for the hearing of any appeal from the High Court. No judge shall be nominated by the President of the High Court to hear any appeal in any case upon which he adjudicated as a member of the High Court. When in any matter the members of the Supreme Imperial Court are not unanimous, the opinion of the majority shall prevail.

Part III.—*The High Court.*

4. The High Court of Ethiopia shall comprise such number of judges as We may from time to time think necessary, of whom one shall be designated the President. The High Court shall contain such number of judges of British nationality as We shall consider to be desirable.

5. No person shall be appointed by Us to the office of Judge of Our High Court unless he is a regularly qualified legal practitioner or is certified to Us by Our Minister of Justice to be qualified for such office by reason of long judicial experience or sound knowledge of law.

6. We may also appoint from time to time fit persons as additional judges of the High Court for the trial of particular cases or for a specified period or while holding any specified office.

7. The High Court shall have full criminal and civil jurisdiction in Ethiopia according to law.

8. The High Court shall be deemed to be fully constituted for the hearing of any matter when it comprises three judges, and

where in any matter the members of the Court are not unanimous, the opinion of the majority shall prevail.

9. The High Court may sit at any place within Our Empire as may be convenient for the despatch of business.

10. An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Imperial Court from any decision of the High Court when acting as a court of first instance, in the manner laid down in Rules of Court.

11. No sentence of death shall be carried into execution unless confirmed by Us.

Part IV.—*Provincial Courts.*

12. In each of the Provinces of Our Empire there shall be established a Provincial Court, which shall comprise such number of provincial judges appointed by Us as We may from time to time think necessary. One judge of each Provincial Court shall be designated the President.

13. We may also appoint from time to time fit persons as additional provincial judges for the trial of particular cases or for a specified period or while holding any specified office.

14. A Provincial Court shall be deemed to be fully constituted for the hearing of any matter when it comprises three members and where in regard to any matter the members of the Court are not unanimous, the opinion of the majority shall prevail.

15. A Provincial Court may sit at any place within the Province for which it is constituted as may be convenient for the despatch of business.

16.—(1) The jurisdiction of a Provincial Court in its original jurisdiction shall be limited :—

(a) In criminal matters to—

(i) imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.

(ii) fine not exceeding 2,000 M.T. dollars.

(iii) corporal punishment not exceeding 20 lashes, and shall extend to any combination of the above punishments.

(b) In civil matters to cases, the subject-matter of which does not exceed 2,000 M.T. dollars.

(2) A Provincial Court shall have such jurisdiction to hear appeals from Courts established under Article 18 of the Proclamation as may be prescribed by the warrant of any such court and any decision of a Provincial Court on appeal shall be final.

17. An appeal shall lie from any Provincial Court as a Court of First Instance to the High Court in the manner laid down by

Rules of Court and any decision of the High Court on such appeal shall be final.

Part V.—Regional and Communal Courts.

18. Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Provincial Courts it shall be lawful for Us to establish by warrant under Our hand other courts of criminal and civil jurisdiction which shall be subordinate to the Provincial Courts. Such warrant shall define the Constitution of the Court, the area within which the court exercises jurisdiction, the law to be administered and shall impose such limitations upon the jurisdiction and powers of the court as may appear necessary. Appeals shall lie from courts established under this article to such court or courts as may be specified in the warrant establishing a Court.

Part VI.—Assessors.

19. Any Court constituted under this Proclamation may, if it sees fit, sit with two or more suitable persons in the capacity of Assessors. Assessors shall be entitled to put any relevant question to any witness and, at the conclusion of the case, shall give their opinions on the facts in issue, but the Court shall not be bound by the opinions of the Assessors.

Part VII.—Rules of Court.

20. Rules of Court may be made, with the approval of Our Minister of Justice, by the Afa Negus in respect of the Supreme Imperial Court and by the President of the High Court in respect of any other Courts established by this Proclamation for the purposes of—

- (a) Regulating the administration of the Court, and the institution, conduct and hearing of proceedings therein.
- (b) Regulating the admission, conduct and discipline of legal practitioners.
- (c) Regulating the selection and duties of assessors.
- (d) Regulating the committal of criminal cases from lower courts to higher courts.
- (e) Regulating the imposition and recovery of fines, the award of imprisonment in default of payment and the procedure relating to execution and attachment.
- (f) Prescribing forms.
- (g) Fixing fees.
- (h) Regulating the general administration of justice.

Part VIII.—*General.*

21. For the better examination of laws submitted to Us for enactment there is hereby established a Consultative Committee for legislation, which shall comprise Our Judicial Adviser, the President of the High Court, and three persons having recognised legal qualifications or being qualified by reason of long judicial experience and sound knowledge of law to be especially appointed by Us. The duty of such Committee shall be to draft laws upon Our directions or to review the draft of any proposed law. No law shall be submitted to Us for enactment unless it is accompanied by a certificate signed by a majority of the members of the said Committee certifying that the law to which the certificate relates is not repugnant to natural justice and humanity and is a fit and proper law to be applied without discrimination to Ethiopians and foreigners alike.

22. When any law has been enacted by Us it shall be published in the *Official Gazette* of Ethiopia in the Amharic and English languages, and shall come into force from the date of publication in the *Gazette* or from any other date which may be specified in the law.

23. Nothing contained in this Proclamation shall prevent the hearing and settlement of minor disputes in any manner traditionally recognised by Ethiopian law until such time as regular courts can be established for the hearing of such disputes by judges duly appointed by Us on the recommendation of Our Minister of Justice.

24. It is hereby declared that no court shall give effect to any existing law which is contrary to natural justice or humanity, or which makes any harsh or inequitable differentiation between Our subjects and foreigners.

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA

WHEREAS His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty the Emperor), and the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the Government of the United Kingdom) desire to provide for certain matters relating to mutual assistance as Allies in the struggle against the common enemy, and have decided to conclude a Military Convention for this purpose.

Now, therefore,
 His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia in person and
 Major-General Sir Philip Euen Mitchell, Knight Commander
 of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and
 Saint George, upon whom has been conferred the decoration
 of the Military Cross, Chief Political Officer, on the
 Staff of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East
 Africa, being duly authorised for this purpose by the
 Government of the United Kingdom,

Have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE I.

- (a) In this Convention the expression " British Forces " includes :—
- (i) every person subject to the Naval Discipline Act, the Army Act or the Air Force Act of the United Kingdom, or the corresponding enactments of other parts of the dominions of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty The King), who is stationed with, or attached to, the British Forces which are present in Ethiopia in accordance with the provisions of this Convention ;
 - (ii) every civilian official of British nationality accompanying or serving with the said forces in Ethiopia, or the Expeditionary Forces Institutes, who is either granted relative status as an officer, or holds a pass designating his civil official status, issued by the Appropriate British Authority as hereinafter defined, and is paid from the funds of any part of the dominions of His Majesty The King or the Expeditionary Forces Institutes ; and
 - (iii) wives and children under 21 years of age, of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above.
 - (iv) members of any Allied Forces serving in Ethiopia under the British High Command.
- (b) The expression " Appropriate British Authority " means :
- (i) in the case of members of the British Naval Forces, the Senior British Naval officer for the time being within Ethiopia, or if there be no British Naval officer within Ethiopia, a General or other officer for the time being commanding the British Troops in Ethiopia ;
 - (ii) in the case of members of the British Land Forces, a

General or other officer for the time being commanding the British Troops in Ethiopia ;

(iii) in the case of members of the British Air Forces, an Air or other officer for the time being commanding the Royal Air Force in Ethiopia.

(c) Any authority given to, or any act or thing to be done by, to or for, any Appropriate British Authority, may be exercised by, or done by, to or for, any other person for the time being authorised in that behalf according to the custom of the particular service of His Majesty The King.

(d) The expression " British Cantonment " means all the areas and places allocated to the British Forces, and includes any temporary camps and bivouacs established by the British Forces for their use, and also camps established for prisoners of war or for Italian civilians pending evacuation.

ARTICLE 2.

(a) The Government of the United Kingdom will provide, at their own cost, a Military Mission for the purpose of raising, organising and training, the Ethiopian Army. The duties and privileges of the Military Mission shall be the subject of instructions from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, to the Head of the Military Mission, which shall be agreed upon between His Majesty the Emperor and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

(b) The Military Mission will be retained in Ethiopia until His Majesty the Emperor no longer requires its services, or until the British forces in Ethiopia mentioned in Article 6 below are withdrawn, whichever is the earlier. When the Government of the United Kingdom cease to provide the Military Mission at their own cost, they will use their best endeavours to assist His Majesty the Emperor to obtain suitable officers to take the place of any members of the original Mission who do not remain in Ethiopia.

(c) The Ethiopian Army mentioned in paragraph (a) above shall be armed and equipped so far as possible from booty taken from the Italian forces in the course of the campaign in Ethiopia.

ARTICLE 3.

The areas specified in the Schedule attached hereto, and such other areas and places as may be agreed upon between the Parties either in addition to or in substitution for the said areas and places, shall remain under British military administration to the extent which, and so long as, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,

the British Forces in East Africa, in consultation with His Majesty the Emperor, considers necessary.

ARTICLE 4.

(a) The Government of the United Kingdom will maintain, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, will have under his command, such Police Force as in the opinion of the said General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, is necessary in respect of the areas specified in Article 3.

(b) Having regard to the special circumstances existing in Addis Ababa and of the responsibilities undertaken by the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of Italian civilians, the Government of the United Kingdom will maintain, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, will command such Police Force as he considers necessary for the safety and good order of the town of Addis Ababa until such time as the Police Force to be raised by His Majesty the Emperor is able to assume these duties. His Majesty the Emperor will enact such legislation as may be necessary to confer upon this Police Force the powers and status which it requires.

(c) Until the British Forces are withdrawn from Ethiopia, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, or the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Ethiopia as his representative, shall have the right of direct access to His Majesty the Emperor, and shall take precedence immediately after the Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty the Emperor agrees that the part of the territory of the Ogaden which was included in the former Italian Colonial Government of Somalia shall, during the currency of this Convention, remain under the British Military Administration of Somalia.

ARTICLE 6.

The Government of the United Kingdom shall have the right to keep such military forces in Ethiopia as they think necessary. The rights and immunities in Ethiopia of these forces and of the Military Mission referred to in Article 2 are as defined in this Convention.

ARTICLE 7.

Without prejudice to the fact that British cantonments are upon Ethiopian territory, the said cantonments shall be inviolable and shall be subject to the exclusive control and authority of the appropriate British Authority.

ARTICLE 8.

His Majesty the Emperor consents to the enjoyment by the British Forces of—

(a) complete freedom of movement of personnel, vehicles, animals and materials between British cantonments, and generally such freedom of movement elsewhere as such forces enjoy in the United Kingdom*;

(b) the same rights as to camping, billeting and security as the rights which such Forces enjoy in the United Kingdom ;

(c) the right to generate light and power, and to search and bore for or collect water for use in British cantonments, and to transmit and distribute such light, power and water between the place of generation or collection and any British cantonment or between British cantonments by means of cables, pipes or in any other way whatsoever ;

(d) entry into and departure from Ethiopia of members of the British Forces at all times without let or hindrance, subject only to the production of a certificate showing membership of the British Forces in cases when such members do not arrive or leave by a service aircraft, service transport or as a formed body under command of an Officer, Warrant Officer, or Non-Commissioned Officer ;

(e) the use of roads, streams, lakes, waterways and other bodies of water for personnel, vehicles, animals, materials or waterborne craft on the service of His Majesty The King, without payment of any dues, tolls or charges whatsoever ;

(f) the same immunity regarding the official correspondence of the British Forces and their couriers as is enjoyed in international law by the Diplomatic Representatives of foreign States ;

(g) the right to establish and carry on Army postal services for the handling and conveyance of all correspondence of the British Forces.

ARTICLE 9.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, may, for as long as he deems necessary :—

(a) Continue to use and occupy without payment any immovable property formerly belonging to the Italian State which he still requires. His Majesty the Emperor will also make available to the Government of the United Kingdom any other such property which is needed by the British Forces.

(b) Construct and maintain such additional buildings, defences,

roads, railways, water supplies, wireless transmitting stations, telephones and telegraphs as he considers necessary for military purposes.

- (c) Continue the British military operation, management and maintenance of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway.
- (d) Continue the operation, management and maintenance of the high-power beam wireless transmitting station situated at Addis Ababa, together with the remote control stations, receiving terminal stations and all apparatus belonging thereto, and such existing telegraph and telephone installations as are required for the British Forces.
- (e) Continue to control and operate, whether by requisition, contract or other means, such privately-owned vehicles as he may need for military purposes and for the maintenance and evacuation of the Italian civilian population.

ARTICLE 10.

Subject to the provisions of Article 2 (c), booty taken by the British Forces in the course of the campaign in Ethiopia will be retained by them.

ARTICLE 11.

(a) In view of the fact that the speed and range of modern aircraft necessitate the use of wide areas, the Emperor will accord permission to the British Air Forces and the Air Forces of the Allies to fly in Ethiopia wherever they consider it necessary.

(b) In view of the fact that the safety of flying is dependent upon provision of a large number of places where aircraft can alight, His Majesty the Emperor will secure the constant maintenance and availability of adequate landing grounds in Ethiopian territory, in addition to those subject to Article 3 of this Convention. His Majesty the Emperor will accede to any request from the Appropriate British Authority for the construction, at the cost of the Government of the United Kingdom, of such additional landing grounds or the extension of existing landing grounds as experience may show to be necessary.

(c) His Majesty the Emperor will accord permission for the British Air Forces and the Air Forces of the Allies to use the said landing grounds, and, in case of urgency, will, at the request of the Appropriate British Authority, cause the Appropriate Ethiopian Authority to undertake such work at the cost of the Government of the United Kingdom, as may be necessary for the safety or

repair of aircraft, or will agree to such work being carried out by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa.

(d) His Majesty the Emperor will give all necessary facilities for the passage of the personnel of the British Forces, aircraft and stores to and from the said landing grounds.

(e) His Majesty the Emperor freely offers every assistance to British or Allied aircraft in distress.

ARTICLE 12.

His Majesty the Emperor will provide for the continued operation of so much of the legislation enacted by the British Military Authorities as is considered by the Government of the United Kingdom to be necessary for the security of the British Forces in Ethiopia. His Majesty will also at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom enact and enforce such further legislation as may be required for the security of the said Forces.

ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty the Emperor will at the request of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in East Africa, requisition and hand over to the British Forces any private property outside the areas referred to in Article 3 which may be required by these forces, subject to the reasonable needs of Ethiopia.

ARTICLE 14.

(a) Save as hereinafter provided, no member of the British Forces referred to in paragraphs (a) (i) and (a) (iv) of Article 1 shall be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Ethiopia, and no member of the British Forces referred to in paragraphs (a) (ii) and (a) (iii) of Article 1 shall be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Ethiopia in respect of any criminal offence committed in any of the areas referred to in Article 3.

(b) No member of the British Forces shall be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the Courts of Ethiopia in respect of any matter arising out of his official duties. If any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of the British Forces before any Ethiopian Court notification of the proceedings shall forthwith be given to the Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King, and no further steps shall be taken in such proceedings until sixty days have elapsed from the date of notification. This period shall be extended for a further term of one hundred and twenty days if the

Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King states in writing to the Court that it has not been possible to conclude the necessary investigations in the above time.

(c) A statement in writing to an Ethiopian Court by the Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King that the civil proceedings in respect of which notice has been given arise out of the official duties of a member of the British Forces shall be taken as conclusive evidence by the Court of that fact.

(d) No member of the British Forces shall be committed to prison in default of satisfaction of any judgement or order of any Ethiopian Court or tribunal, until the sanction in writing of the Appropriate British Authority has been obtained.

ARTICLE 15.

Any claims in respect of reparation for damage or injury caused or alleged to have been caused, by any person or persons forming part of the British Forces, in any matter arising out of his or their official duties, shall be referred in the first instance to the Appropriate British Authority. Any difference of opinion shall be referred to a Joint Claims Commission, to be set up in case of need by the Appropriate British and Ethiopian Authorities. Any claim in respect of which the Joint Claims Commission fails to reach agreement shall be settled by the parties to this Convention.

ARTICLE 16.

(a) The Appropriate British Authority will, on receipt of an application signed by the appropriate official of the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, surrender any person not being a member of the British Forces and who is within any British cantonment or reserved area, and against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued in respect of any offence triable by an Ethiopian Court.

(b) Every application for the surrender of an offender under this Article shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the warrant of arrest and by such information as is available regarding the identity and whereabouts of the person whose surrender is desired.

ARTICLE 17.

The appropriate Ethiopian Authority will take all possible steps—

(a) to search for, apprehend and hand over, any member of the British Forces who is claimed as a deserter or absentee without leave, upon request made in writing by the Appropriate British Authority ;

- (b) to prosecute any person not being a member of the British Forces who is accused of an offence in relation to such Forces which, if committed in relation to the Ethiopian Army, would have rendered him liable to prosecution, if such an offence is not within the jurisdiction of any British Military Court ;
- (c) to detain and hand over to the Appropriate British Authority any member of the British Forces in Ethiopia who is notified by the Appropriate British Authority as having committed an offence or who has come into conflict with the Ethiopian Authorities in any manner.

ARTICLE 18.

(a) Members of the British Forces shall be liable to arrest by the Ethiopian Authorities only in such circumstances as are specified in paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 17.

(b) When any member of the British Forces is arrested, the following procedure will be adopted :—

- (i) notification of the arrest, giving the name and other particulars of the person arrested, together with information as to the nature of the offence for which the said person was arrested and the evidence in support of the charge, will be sent forthwith to the Appropriate British Authority ;
- (ii) the alleged offender will be handed over on demand to the Appropriate British Authority.

(c) When it is alleged that a member of the British Forces has committed an offence for which he has not been arrested, particulars of such alleged offence, together with the statements of any witnesses, will be sent with all convenient speed to the Appropriate British Authority.

(d) Where a member of the British Forces is charged with the commission of an offence and evidence is available which appears to substantiate the charge, the Appropriate British Authority will cause such member to be tried for the offence by an appropriate tribunal of the British Forces, and will in due course arrange for the Appropriate Ethiopian Authority to be informed, through the Diplomatic Representative of His Majesty The King, of the result of the trial.

Where, however, the Appropriate British Authority considers that for any reason it is desirable for a member of the British Forces to be tried for a criminal offence by an Ethiopian Court, he may give a certificate in writing to that effect, and thereupon such

Court shall have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14.

ARTICLE 19.

The British Forces shall be entitled to send an armed escort to any part of Ethiopia for the purpose of taking over and escorting to British cantonments or reserved areas any member of the British Forces arrested under the provisions of paragraph (a) or (c) of Article 17.

ARTICLE 20.

(a) The appropriate Ethiopian Authority shall, at the request in writing of the Appropriate British Authority, take all reasonable steps to secure the attendance of persons amenable to its jurisdiction as witnesses before any of the tribunals of the British Forces in Ethiopia convened and assembled by the Appropriate British Authority.

(b) The Government of the United Kingdom will take all reasonable steps to secure the attendance of any member of the British Forces as a witness in any proceedings before any Ethiopian tribunal, upon application being made to the Appropriate British Authority signed by an authorised official of the Ministry of Justice or the President of the tribunal concerned.

ARTICLE 21.

(a) His Majesty the Emperor agrees that where any person not being a member of the British Forces, who has been ordered to attend a tribunal of the British Forces under Article 20 (a), is accused of any of the following offences, such person will be prosecuted before the appropriate Ethiopian Court, that is to say:—

- (i) being duly summoned makes default in attending ; or
- (ii) refuses to take oath or make a solemn declaration legally required to be taken or made ; or
- (iii) refuses to produce any document in his power or control legally required to be produced by him ; or
- (iv) refuses when a witness to answer any question to which the tribunal may legally require an answer ; or
- (v) is guilty of contempt of the tribunal by using insulting or threatening language or by causing interruption or disturbance in the proceedings of such tribunal ; or
- (vi) when examined on oath or solemn declaration before the tribunal wilfully gives false evidence.

(b) Similarly, the Government of the United Kingdom agrees that—

- (i) any member of the British Forces referred to in paragraphs (a) (i) and (a) (iv) of Article 1 ; and
- (ii) any member of the British Forces referred to in paragraphs (a) (ii) and (a) (iii) of Article 1 residing in any British cantonment or reserved area ;

who is ordered to attend an Ethiopian tribunal under Article 20 (b) and who commits any of the offences above specified, shall be prosecuted before the appropriate tribunal of the British Forces.

ARTICLE 22.

(a) Members of the British Forces who are owners by Ethiopian Law of real property in Ethiopia shall pay the same taxes, registration and transfer fees as do Ethiopian subjects, in respect of such property and its produce.

(b) Members of the British Forces shall pay any taxes or registration fees for the time being in force for any privately-owned vehicles used on any public road in Ethiopia which are paid by Ethiopian subjects.

(c) The British Forces, the Expeditionary Forces Institutes and all other official canteens of the British Forces shall pay at most favoured rates for all services rendered by departments of the Ethiopian Government or any municipal or local authority.

(d) Save as above provided, British cantonments or Reserved Areas, the British Forces and the individual members thereof shall be immune from all direct taxation, import and export duties and all registration fees or similar charges, unless there shall be an agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the Emperor to the contrary in regard to any particular tax or charge.

(e) The Government of the United Kingdom shall have complete freedom to import, export or move within Ethiopia any vehicles, goods, stores or materials of any kind belonging to the Government of the United Kingdom or any Government of the dominions of His Majesty The King.

(f) Where any vehicles, goods, stores or materials upon which import duty has been paid on entry into Ethiopia are purchased in Ethiopia in bulk at wholesale rates by the Government of the United Kingdom, or by any Government of the dominions of His Majesty The King or by the Expeditionary Forces Institutes or any recognised Military, Naval or Air Force mess, club or institute, a rebate of any import duty paid thereon shall be payable by the Emperor.

ARTICLE 23.

This Convention shall come into effect with the Agreement signed this day between the Government of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the Emperor, and shall, subject to any other agreement between the Parties, continue in force so long as the said Agreement continues in force.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Done this thirty-first day of January 1942, in the English and Amharic languages, both of which shall be equally authoritative except in cases of doubt, when the English text shall prevail.

(L.S.) HAILE SELASSIÉ I. (L.S.) P. E. MITCHELL

SCHEDULE

1. A continuous belt of Ethiopian territory 25 miles wide contiguous to the frontier of French Somaliland running from the frontier of Eritrea to the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. Thence south-west along the railway to the bridge at Haraua. Thence south and south-east, excluding Gildessa, to the north-eastern extremity of the Garais Mountains and along the crest of the ridge of these mountains to their intersection with the frontier of the former Italian colony of Somalia. Thence along the frontier to its junction with British Somaliland.

2. All land within Ethiopia occupied by the Franco-Ethiopian Railway and its appurtenances.

APPENDIX II

[In 1942, in the absence of an authoritative military manual on the subject of the military government of occupied enemy territory, it was decided to issue, under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, the following notes based on practical experience gained in the administration of conquered Italian colonies in Africa in 1941-1942. The notes were issued in pamphlet form and in two Parts, Part I being reproduced below. This Part was intended primarily for the use of officers of the General Staff and of combatant units engaged in operations directed to the occupation of enemy territory. Part II was intended primarily for the use of personnel employed in British Military Administration and was of considerably greater length.]

Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF THE NOTES

1. These notes are intended for the guidance of officers of H.M. Forces belonging to an army occupying or about to occupy enemy territory. It should be clearly understood that the notes deal with conditions arising from a true occupation of enemy territory. In the course of a war, situations arise in which British forces are fighting or are stationed in non-British territories belonging to allied, or even neutral, powers. In these countries the part to be played by the British forces in the government of the country occupied, and the relations which are established between the British Army and the local government and population, will be peculiar, and may be prescribed by treaties and agreements or laid down *ad hoc* by H.M.G. or the army commander. Whether the task of administering the occupied country falls to the British commander on the spot will depend on the circumstances of the case, and, if it does, some of the material contained in these notes will provide useful guidance.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT DEFINED

2. The administration of occupied enemy territory is technically called "military government", and is defined as "the

government by military authority exercised by the C.-in-C. in the place of, or supplementary to, the civil government in occupied enemy territory." (See F.S.R., Vol. I, p. xvii).

TERRITORY OCCUPIED MAY BE METROPOLITAN OR COLONIAL

3. The territory occupied by an invading army may be a metropolitan country of the hostile State or a portion of its colonial empire. Though the general principles of international law apply with equal force in both cases, the practical application of them must, from the nature of the case, vary considerably.

These notes are largely based on experience gained during the present war in the Middle East and East Africa Commands; the enemy territories occupied by the forces in these Commands up to date have been enemy colonies, as distinct from metropolitan territories, and in consequence the notes have particular reference to colonial conditions (especially in matters of detail) and should be read with this fact in mind.

COLONIAL TERRITORY

4. In any enemy colonial dependency, the fundamental factor is that the enemy rule has at some time been imposed upon an indigenous alien populace and has probably been maintained by force in one form or another. When this element of force is overthrown, it is not possible to forecast the reactions of the local population which will normally comprise two main elements. Among the conquered population there will probably be a European community largely comprising the subjects of the enemy State, which, though small in numbers, may be influential and highly organised. Many will be State officials well trusted by their own government, and others will be traders, shopkeepers, technicians and colonists who are dependent on the territory for their livelihood. On the other hand, there will probably be a large native population of whom only a small portion are literate or politically minded, the majority being poor agriculturists or herdsmen of little education and limited outlook. The native population may harbour an intense hatred of their former European overlords, or equally well may have for them a strong loyalty and respect. In any event the local population may be hostile to the invading nation. In such circumstances the imposition of a military government by the invading army presents very grave difficulties, and relatively heavy demands on the personnel resources of the occupying army for administrative purposes may well result. To impose a military government in colonial territory

it will probably be necessary for the occupying power to undertake the direct administration of the country with little assistance from the government machine of the former administration or from the chiefs and notables of the indigenous population.

METROPOLITAN TERRITORY

5. In metropolitan territory, the invading army will probably be faced by a uniformly hostile population, though the degree of active hostility may be reduced by the mental effect of a crushing military defeat. The machinery of government of the hostile State will largely remain intact, and beyond the maintenance of a substantial garrison and the establishment of Military Courts, it will probably only be necessary to superimpose a military government by the placing of a number of British officers in charge of each of the departments of State to ensure that they carry out their administrative duties satisfactorily and without danger to the safety of the occupying army.

LEGAL SOURCES

6. The rights and responsibilities of an army of occupation in enemy territory derived from the Laws and Usages of War contained in Section III of the Annex to the Hague Convention, 1907 (pages 382 to 385 of the Manual of Military Law). The terms of this Convention are explained and discussed in Sections VIII and IX of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law (Amendment No. 12 issued in January, 1936).

LEGAL POSITION SUMMARISED

7. The legal position arising from the Laws and Usages of War may briefly be summarised as follows :—

- (i) Occupation of enemy territory is not annexation. The sovereignty of the enemy is only temporarily latent and does not pass to the occupier. The occupier must not treat the occupied territory as part of his own territory or one of his dependencies, nor may he consider the inhabitants as his subjects.
- (ii) Since the occupier's rights are transitory he may only exercise such power in the occupied territory as is necessary for :—
 - (a) The purposes of war ;
 - (b) The safety of the occupying army ;
 - (c) The maintenance of peace and good order ;
 - (d) The government of the occupied territory on a care and maintenance basis.

- (iii) Subject to the exigencies of war, the occupier may not alter the existing form of government, upset the constitution, destroy the domestic laws of the inhabitants or ignore their legal rights.
- (iv) In general, the pre-occupation laws of the occupied country remain in force, but it is competent to the occupying power to suspend, amend or supplement them for the following purposes :—
 - (a) To ensure the safety and well being of its troops ;
 - (b) To maintain peace and good order ;
 - (c) To alleviate the lot of the civil inhabitants, and generally to adjust the administration to the peculiar circumstances of a hostile occupation.

APPLICATION TO CIVILISED NATIONS ONLY

8. The " laws and usages " apply only to warfare between civilised nations, where both parties understand them and are prepared to carry them out. They do not apply in wars with uncivilised states and tribes, where their place is taken by the discretion of the commander, and " such rules of justice and humanity as recommend themselves in the particular circumstances of the case." While there can be no question of flouting rules to which H.M.G. have formally subscribed, the interpretation of these must often be left to the officers on the spot, who alone can decide how far the vital security or advantage of the forces is concerned ; but it is desirable, wherever possible, that officers who consider it necessary to over-ride a provision of international law to gain an immediate advantage, should first seek authority of a superior officer.

SECTION II

THE NATURE OF MILITARY OCCUPATION

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPANT AND POPULATION

9. The occupation of enemy territory initiates a special relationship between the occupant and the population, involving on each side certain rights and duties. Such occupation is at once distinguishable from mere invasion, or from the temporary presence of reconnoitring or raiding parties ; it must be actual and effective, and although it is usual and desirable for the victorious commander to make known by Proclamation the fact that occupation is established, this, in itself, does not constitute

“ occupation ”. Two conditions should be satisfied : firstly, that the legitimate government should be rendered incapable of exercising its authority, and secondly that the invader should be in a position to substitute his own. But this does not imply that the army has no control over the inhabitants in the zone of operations until the setting up of a military government is proclaimed, for the authority which any commander may exercise depends solely, in the last resort, upon the strength of the military force he has under his control.

INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON POWERS OF OCCUPANT

10. The commander of the occupying army derives all his power for the military government of the occupied territory from the fact of military conquest. The military government depends for its force and validity upon the will of the commander. Nevertheless, the comment by the Duke of Wellington that “ in an occupied country the sole law is the will of the commander ”, is no longer strictly true, since most civilised nations have subscribed to the Hague Convention, which restricts in certain ways the unlimited powers which the military commander of an occupying power might otherwise wield.

POWER OF COMMANDER ABSOLUTE

11. The power of the commander is absolute, and if in exercising his military government he transgresses the rules of international law, the inhabitants of the territory are not relieved of their liability to comply with the commander's orders. The commander himself is, of course, answerable for all his acts to his own Government, who will normally expect him to observe the rules of international law to which that Government has adhered and if his conduct does not meet with their approval in this or any other respect, he may be removed from his office or have other disciplinary action taken against him. But so long as he remains in office, his power in the occupied territory is unlimited and the only remedy which lies open to those who deem themselves aggrieved by the commander's acts is the formulation of claims for monetary compensation which they, or their Government on their behalf, can lodge against the occupying power at the peace conference upon the conclusion of hostilities. Since the Government of the occupying power may be mulcted in damages after the war in this manner, it is in their interest that the commander of the occupying army shall generally conform to the principles of international law in carrying out his military government in the conquered territory.

TERMINATION OF OCCUPATION

12. An occupation may be terminated by the withdrawal of the occupying forces (as in Cyrenaica in 1941 and 1942), or by the setting up of a local government empowered and competent to take over the administration (as in Iraq in 1920-1921), or by the act of handing over control to a third party, such as a former ruler of the territory (as in Ethiopia in 1942). Failing these or similar changes, the normal termination of an occupation is brought about by dispositions made by Treaty at the conclusion of the war, when the territory is assigned to some permanent Government.

SECTION III

AIMS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

AIMS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

13. In general, the military government of an occupied enemy territory will endeavour to ensure :—

- (i) the security of the occupying forces ;
- (ii) the preservation of peace and good order ;
- (iii) the exploitation of the economic resources of occupied territory ;
- (iv) the release of fighting troops for active operations ;
- (v) good government in accordance with the rules of international law.

SECTION IV

ORGANISATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SETTING UP OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

14. Military government is a régime of martial law and commences in occupied enemy territory as soon as any part of it is effectively occupied. The responsibility for this form of government exercised over civilians rests on the C.-in-C. and a special staff is necessary for the purpose.

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ARMY

15. The staff which undertakes the duties of military government in any occupied enemy territory consists primarily of a number of military personnel who are specially qualified for this work ; that they are an integral part of the Army is implicit in the

legal situation. It will be understood that for the efficient working of a military government, a number of civilians will also be employed ; some will be brought into the occupied territory and others will be either recruited from the local population or will be officials of the enemy State who have been retained in their employment.

CHIEF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH AT G.H.Q.

16. The head of the Service required for the organisation of a military government of occupied enemy territories at G.H.Q. is designated the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (C.C.A.O.), who ranks as the head of a Service within the meaning of Chapter XII, Sections 61 and 62 of F.S.R. Vol. I. This Service is controlled by the Chief of the General Staff. In the Middle East Command, the C.C.A.O. has a right of direct access to the C.-in-C. and the Minister of State. The C.C.A.O. obtains guidance and directions on political matters from the Minister of State. The C.C.A.O.'s H.Q. staff includes, besides the usual staff officers, a Legal Adviser, an Inspector General of Police, and a financial section under the Controller of Finance and Accounts, who is the Accounting Officer to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the War Office for military government affairs in both the Middle East and East Africa Commands. In all matters connected with the administration of occupied enemy territories, the C.C.A.O. is the adviser to the C.-in-C. and in giving directions he acts with his authority. The duties of the C.C.A.O. are to organise, supervise and control the military government set up in each enemy territory which is occupied by the forces under the command of the C.-in-C.

The organisation of the C.C.A.O. at G.H.Q. is known as the " Civil Affairs Branch," and in each occupied territory he appoints a staff to carry on the local military government ; this local organisation is known as a British Military Administration (B.M.A.).

DEPUTY CHIEF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND THE ORGANISATION OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

17. The officer responsible for the military government in an occupied enemy territory is designated the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (D.C.C.A.O.). He has on his staff a number of Civil Affairs Officers who are responsible to the D.C.C.A.O. for the military government of the various areas allotted to their control. An occupied territory will be divided into administrative

provinces, and subdivided into districts. In charge of each such province will normally be posted a Senior Civil Affairs Officer (S.C.A.O.) of the rank of Lieut.-Colonel or Major, and in each district this officer will post a number of Civil Affairs Officers and Assistant Civil Affairs Officers (C.A.Os. and A.C.A.Os.) of the rank of Major, Captain or Lieutenant (according to the importance of the area to which they are posted), who will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the country, subject to the general directions on policy which they may receive from higher authority.

The D.C.C.A.O. will also have on his staff a number of technical officers covering the fields of finance, law, medicine, police, agriculture, etc., each of whom will have departmental officers undertaking duties in their respective spheres in various parts of the occupied territory. The D.C.C.A.O.'s senior staff officer will normally be a G.S.O. I, who acts as Secretary to the Administration.

THREE PHASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE

18. Experience shows that the institution of a military government in an occupied enemy territory passes through three distinct phases, each of which calls for special arrangements to be made to meet the circumstances of the case.

These phases are :—

- (a) Phase One.—Period of active military operations.
- (b) Phase Two.—Period of defence against aggression, internal or external.
- (c) Phase Three.—Period in which government can be established on a permanent basis under the control of a Chief Administrator, the operational problem having disappeared.

FUNCTIONS OF THE B.M.A. IN PHASE ONE

19. In Phase One the personnel of the B.M.A. are attached to Army Headquarters as specialist officers for the purpose of advising the military commanders on all matters concerning the regulation of the civil population, and of carrying out his directions in regard to their treatment. The energies of the Civil Affairs Officers in this phase are primarily directed to facilitating in every possible way the military operations which are in progress ; they will take measures to ensure that the civil population do not interfere with the military operations, and that their services and the resources of their country are fully turned to the benefit of the

invading army within the limitations prescribed by international law. In order that these liaison duties with the civil populace may be most effective, the Civil Affairs Officers must take such measures of military government as the occasion requires. In this they act for and in the name of the local military commander to whose command they are attached, and the ultimate responsibility for their actions rests with him. Such Civil Affairs Officers will have been given preliminary instructions by the D.C.C.A.O. before the commencement of the operations, but for the rest they must act on their own initiative, taking their instructions from, and consulting, the military commander and his staff officers when prudence demands that they should. As the columns advance deeper into occupied territory, Civil Affairs Officers will be detached to the back areas to take charge of the embryo military government, and the number of Civil Affairs Officers to be attached to any headquarters will be fixed in relation to the operational plan with this fact in mind.

During Phase One, the D.C.C.A.O. will remain attached to the headquarters of the commander of the whole operation, and will move forward with him. He will be available for advice on all political and administrative matters which arise during the advance and the subsequent cleaning up, but at first he will not be able to effect co-ordination in the work of the various Civil Affairs Officers on detached duties with the various units, groups and formations, nor be in a position to treat the military government being inaugurated as a coherent whole, at least until the closing stages of Phase One. If communications are good, the D.C.C.A.O. will keep in touch with his Civil Affairs Officers by signal, telephone and personal visits, in order to keep himself posted in the situation, to give advice on difficulties as they arise, and to direct the disposal of his Civil Affairs Officers in reserve to the best advantage.

In Phase One, internal security measures are the principal concern of the Civil Affairs staff acting in close co-operation with the "I" staff. Every assistance must be given to military units in rounding up personnel of the defeated army, in disarming the civil population and in locating and seizing dumps of weapons, ammunition, food stocks and other stores. Adequate armed assistance must be sought where the inhabitants are openly hostile and resentful, and every measure must be taken to reduce panic and apprehensiveness. A number of laws must be enacted and obedience to them throughout the territory occupied must be secured by efficient policing and the activities of courts which

dispense justice expeditiously with fairness and firmness. More details of the steps to be taken are described in the succeeding paragraphs of these notes.

RELATIONSHIP OF D.C.C.A.O. AND ARMY COMMANDER

PHASE ONE

20. When the occupation of a territory begins the D.C.C.A.O. will be appointed to Army Headquarters as a member of the military commander's staff. In this phase, the military commander is responsible directly to the C.-in-C. for the military government of the territory conquered, but his staff officer responsible for the actual carrying out of the military government is the D.C.C.A.O., whose duties are as follows :—

- (a) To advise the military commander on all matters concerning the military government of the territory. Proclamations applicable to the civilian population as a whole will be signed by the military commander.
- (b) To issue to the population any subsidiary orders of a general nature within the powers conferred on him by the proclamation of the military commander.
- (c) To supervise the military government of civilians throughout the occupied territory.
- (d) To take executive command of all military and civilian personnel directly employed by the military government.
- (e) As representative at Army Headquarters of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, to be responsible for giving effect to the political, administrative and financial policy issued by the C.C.A.O. for the military government of the territory.
- (f) To co-ordinate the work of the military government with the requirements of the operational and lines of communication units. Instructions to subordinate formations necessary to give effect to the policy of the military government will be issued by the D.C.C.A.O. through or on behalf of the General Staff.
- (g) To institute and supervise military courts.

Should the military commander call upon the D.C.C.A.O. to take any action exceeding his instructions from the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, and the emergency does not permit of prior reference to G.H.Q., the written instructions of the military commander are sufficient authority for the D.C.C.A.O. (see Chapter XII, Section 63 (2), F.S.R., Vol. I).

RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS : PHASE ONE

21. Civil Affairs Officers attached to headquarters will have duties and responsibilities similar to those of the D.C.C.A.O. in relation to the military commander. Orders to the civilian population within the local jurisdiction of the commander of a formation or area will be signed by the commander when they relate to matters which affect the army directly. The Civil Affairs Officer will be consulted before any orders affecting the civilian population are issued, and the orders should be prepared by a legal officer if one is available. Subordinate officers should be instructed not to issue general orders to the inhabitants without express authority. The Civil Affairs Officer may also issue to the population orders on matters which do not affect their relation with the army and are within the powers conferred on him by the proclamation of the military commander.

22. Military courts should be set up at an early stage for the purpose of enforcing the proclamations of the military commander and the orders of the D.C.C.A.O., as well as the local orders of area commanders and Civil Affairs Officers. These courts should be presided over by officers who either have legal qualifications or have undergone a course of instruction in the conduct of judicial proceedings. The military courts should be under the control of the D.C.C.A.O. For this purpose, he is provided with a legal adviser.

23. In order to carry out the obligation imposed by international law to respect private property Custodians of Enemy Property (C.E.P.) are appointed by the D.C.C.A.O. to take into their custody all property of absent owners and also all state property not for the time being required by the army. All ranks are required to assist the C.E.Ps. in the performance of their duties. Salvage officers, requisitioning officers and others charged with the utilisation of local resources should co-operate closely with the C.E.P. of their district.

FUNCTIONS OF THE B.M.A. IN PHASE TWO

24. In Phase Two the military government emerges from its embryonic state and commences to function as a co-ordinated whole under the immediate direction and active control of the D.C.C.A.O. The B.M.A. staff as a whole ceases to have merely advisory functions, but becomes executive, thus relieving local unit commanders of all responsibilities for the military government of the civil population. All the activities of government are

brought fully into operation. The laws of the country, as modified or supplemented by proclamation, are enforced; the civil police force becomes primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order; judicial machinery for the decision of both civil and criminal matters is provided; imports and exports are controlled; taxes, customs, excise duties and municipal rates are collected; trade and industry are encouraged and directed into channels beneficial to the occupant; exchange dealings are regulated; transport services are restored; public utility undertakings are re-opened; financial control is exercised on a budgetary basis; civilian medical services are resumed; special attention is devoted to the administration of the native inhabitants, and control and supervision is exercised over the tribal organisation; native customs and law are studied, recorded, enforced and respected. The carrying on of a successful government thus is a highly technical matter, and for this reason the machinery necessary to carry it on is modified as described in paragraphs 25 and 26. Nevertheless, during this phase military considerations remain paramount, and in every direction the D.C.C.A.O. and his staff must carry on their activities with this fact in mind. The policy of the military government will therefore be shaped primarily to secure every advantage for the occupying army in order that its safety may be preserved, and its needs satisfied within the limits imposed by international law. Accordingly the D.C.C.A.O. must consult the Area Commander or O.C. Troops in all measures which he proposes to take which may effect security.

RELATIONSHIP OF D.C.C.A.O. AND MILITARY COMMANDER : PHASE TWO

25. In this phase the military commander of the occupied territory remains responsible to the C.-in-C. for the military government, but with the increase of the activities of the government as the situation of the civilian populace returns to normal it is necessary to relieve the commander, as far as possible, of many of the duties connected with the carrying on of the administration. The D.C.C.A.O., therefore, becomes the executive head of the military government, by virtue of a warrant issued to him under the C.-in-C.'s authority. The D.C.C.A.O. is authorised to sign all proclamations and to exercise on the military commander's behalf all the administrative, executive and judicial functions necessary for the proper government of the civil population of the occupied territory, subject only to the general directions of the military commander and the technical and financial directions issued to

him by the Head of his Service, the C.C.A.O. (F.S.R. Chapter XII, Sections 61-63, applies to the Civil Affairs Service). The D.C.C.A.O. and the personnel posted to the B.M.A. are under the military command of the military commander for all purposes of discipline and administration.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATE MILITARY COMMANDERS : PHASE TWO

26. The Civil Affairs Officers in this phase cease to be under the command of local military commanders and fall under the immediate control and command of the D.C.C.A.O. exercising all necessary executive functions to carry on the military government in local areas under his authority and guidance. The closest liaison will, nevertheless, be maintained between all officers of the military governments and local military commanders in the territory.

FUNCTIONS OF B.M.A. IN PHASE THREE

27. In this phase the military problem becomes subordinate to civilian needs, the garrison being reduced to the minimum necessary to support the civil administration in every way. The military officer holding the post of D.C.C.A.O. (who is selected for his experience in civil government methods) is therefore entrusted with full local responsibility for the military government of the country. To mark this change, the D.C.C.A.O. assumes the title of "Chief Administrator", while the role of the senior combatant officer becomes that of O.C. Troops. This follows the arrangement which is normally in force in a British colonial dependency where the governmental machine works as a necessary adjunct to the ordering of the daily lives of the inhabitants, and the combatant military authorities do not control or interfere with the affairs of government except in the case of grave internal disorder. Though this phase may be distinguished by the fact that civic affairs have gained an ascendancy over military considerations, the government of the occupied territory nevertheless remains a military one, deriving its force and legal validity from conquest by force of arms.

The rights of the Occupant continue to be transitory; the legislative, executive and administrative functions of the National Government are only suspended. The object of the Military Government in the Third Phase should be to restore the country to a state of settled government on as normal a basis as is consistent with the exercise of powers limited to the purposes of the war,

the maintenance of order and safety and the proper administration of the territory.

**RELATIONSHIP OF CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR AND O.C. TROOPS :
PHASE THREE**

28. Although the civil and military responsibilities connected with the military government are in this phase separated, close collaboration will be maintained between the Chief Administrator and the O.C. Troops ; in particular the Chief Administrator will consult with the O.C. Troops before he takes any action which may affect Service interests, internal security or the welfare of the troops. Similarly, the O.C. Troops will keep the Chief Administrator informed regarding local routine and garrison orders which he intends to issue, in so far as they may affect the military personnel of the B.M.A. It is only when a military emergency arises in the territory (i.e. internal disorder or external aggression) that the O.C. Troops is authorised to intervene in the military government of the territory.

Any such intervention will normally be at the request or with the consent of the Chief Administrator, but in case of grave emergency the O.C. Troops may take over control upon his own responsibility. Whenever military control is assumed under the foregoing instructions, an immediate report by telegram will be made to G.H.Q.

The O.C. Troops and the Chief Administrator will severally be responsible for military discipline of personnel serving under their respective commands.

F.G.C's.M. will not be convened for the trial of Civil Affairs personnel without prior reference to the Chief Administrator.

Where reference to a superior military authority is required on a disciplinary matter instructions will be issued from G.H.Q. as to the action to be taken.

**RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATE
MILITARY COMMANDERS : PHASE THREE**

29. The relationship in ordinary civil government affairs will be as described in Phase Two. In the case of grave military emergency arising in a local area, the local military commander will take over control with the consent or at the request of the local Civil Affairs Officer, or, if necessary, upon his own responsibility. Such local action should only be taken when time does not permit of a reference to the Chief Administrator or O.C. Troops, in which case a telegraphic report should be sent to them without delay.

SECTION V

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ENEMY TERRITORY BEFORE OCCUPATION

IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING

30. If the military government of an enemy territory is to be successfully inaugurated and firmly established, proper planning before the military operations commence must be undertaken. The responsibility for planning arrangements for the B.M.A. in the enemy territory will fall upon the C.C.A.O. and the D.C.C.A.O. designate. In so far as matters of major policy are concerned, the C.C.A.O. may find it necessary to seek directions from the C.-in-C., the Minister of State or the War Office.

PRELIMINARY STUDY

31. The administration problems which it may be expected will face the military government in the occupied territory can only be anticipated and methods devised for meeting them after a full study of every aspect of the territory to be occupied. The following matters in relation to the territory to be occupied must be examined in particular :—

- (a) Geography and history.
- (b) Ethnological data and system of government.
- (c) Legislation and judicial system.
- (d) Agricultural and mineral resources.
- (e) Industries and industrial equipment.
- (f) Economics and trade.
- (g) System of land tenure.
- (h) Currency and banking systems.
- (i) Communications.
- (j) Principal officials and inhabitants.
- (k) Diseases, vital statistics, water supply, sanitation, medical and veterinary services.

Information of the above nature will be collected from standard books of reference, captured enemy documents and intelligence sources.

Finally, the officers responsible for planning must make themselves conversant with such aspects of the military plan as the commander of the invading army may be able to communicate to them. The results of this preliminary study must be summarised and communicated to all officers who are to take part in the military government of the territory when it is occupied.

QUESTIONS OF POLICY

32. Prior to the occupation it should be possible to formulate the policy to be followed by the military government in regard to a number of major questions, and for suitable directives to be drawn up and issued to the officers concerned. Such matters of major policy may include the following :—

- (a) The general policy to be pursued towards the populace of the occupied territory, will be determined by the political considerations of the moment, having regard to the general course of the war and the future of the occupant with regard to the territory occupied. Policy may be one of firmness, directed to securing by all available means the complete subservience of the people, or one of appeasement for the purpose of winning their allegiance to the cause of the invader and securing their ready co-operation and assistance in the conduct of the war. Between these two limits a variety of courses may be deemed expedient.
- (b) The attitude to be adopted towards foreign minorities and the political aspirations of groups hostile to the policy of the former enemy government.
- (c) The extent and nature of propaganda, both internal and external.
- (d) The degree to which the enemy populace is to be prevented from contact with the outside world by radio, telephone, telegraphs and postal communications.
- (e) Currency policy to be adopted.
- (f) Restriction and control of banking.
- (g) Relations to be adopted by the occupant with the local religious and charitable organisations and the clergy.
- (h) The desirability of declaring a moratorium and the nature of transactions to which it should be applied.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN BEFORE INVASION COMMENCES

33. The following are among the matters in regard to which action must be taken before the invading columns enter the enemy territory :—

- (a) The general plan of the administration (including the division of the territory into administrative districts) to be inaugurated must be drawn up and circulated to all officers concerned. The number of Civil Affairs Officers to be attached to each column must be decided and the ultimate stations to which Civil Affairs and other officers of the

administration will be posted when the whole territory is conquered will be fixed.

- (b) A War Establishment of the B.M.A. for the territory will be drawn up and approved.
- (c) Steps will be taken to fill the War Establishments by officers transferred from other units or recruited from civil life.
- (d) Enemy legislation essential for the immediate use of officers will be translated into English and printed.
- (e) Proclamations to be issued in the early days of the occupation will be drafted, approved, translated into the vernacular and printed. The following proclamations in particular should be considered :—
 - (i) Proclamation announcing the fact of British occupation and calling upon the inhabitants to remain tranquil and to obey orders issued.
 - (ii) War crimes.
 - (iii) British Military Courts.
 - (iv) Currency.
 - (v) Enemy property.
 - (vi) Police.
 - (vii) Delegation of powers.
- (f) Black lists will be prepared of persons to be apprehended as soon as possible after the entry of the troops.
- (g) Arrangements between the B.M.A., F.S.W. and G.S.I. will be made for concerted action in regard to the apprehension of enemy civilians.
- (h) Code of procedure for the use of military courts will be drawn up and printed.
- (i) Pamphlets of instructions for army officers and the personnel of the B.M.A. regarding the occupation of enemy territory and the rules of conduct therein will be printed and circulated.
- (j) Arrangements will be made and instructions issued to the officers concerned in regard to the following matters :—
 - (i) Central food supplies for civilians and rationing arrangements.
 - (ii) Medical treatment for civilians.
 - (iii) Declaration and safe-guarding of protected or restricted areas in the occupied territory.
 - (iv) Guarding arrangements for banks, treasuries, post offices, telegraph offices, telephone exchanges and

- public utilities in the various centres in the occupied territory.
- (v) Allotment of public buildings as between the B.M.A. and the military in centres in the occupied territory.
 - (vi) Seizure and control of state papers, records and booty.
 - (vii) Operation of essential public utilities.
- (k) M.T., according to the approved War Establishment, will be issued to the B.M.A.
 - (l) Necessary stores and equipment will be obtained, including text books, account books, forms, strong boxes and safes, stationery and printed ration and identity cards.
 - (m) So much of the arrangements made for the military government of the territory as may be deemed necessary will be communicated to the higher commanders of the invading army in order that they may fully understand the general scheme.

SECTION VI

EARLY STAGES OF ADMINISTRATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY

34. In view of the diverse circumstances that may prevail in the places occupied, it is not possible to give a full description of the action that Civil Affairs Officers should take on their arrival in enemy territory. If there has been time to make a proper plan in advance the situation will be greatly simplified. Subject to the implementation of the various points of policy, action on the lines mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs will be necessary in all circumstances, although it will not always be possible to give it full effect.

POSTING OF COMMANDER'S PROCLAMATIONS

35. When a town or village is entered, a Civil Affairs Officer will proceed to the town hall, or similar building, and have the commander's proclamations posted.

INSTRUCTIONS TO LEADING CITIZENS

36. The Civil Affairs Officer will summon the principal civic dignitary and other leading citizens and inform them that it is the duty of the population to give prompt and complete obedience to the orders that may be issued by the military government. It

should be made plain to the local inhabitants that the enemy officials formerly authorised to deal with the affairs of the people have been replaced by officers exercising similar authority on behalf of the commander of the invading army, and that such officials as remain in office exercise their authority subject to and within the limits permitted by the occupying army. The Civil Affairs Officers will be responsible for the further distribution and posting of the commander's proclamations and for the warning of the population, through their leaders, of the war crimes set out in these proclamations and of the penalties prescribed for harbouring enemy soldiers, damaging military stores and otherwise doing acts likely to be of assistance to the enemy.

ACCOMMODATION FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICES

37. The Civil Affairs Officer will normally be allotted the principal civic office of the area for which he takes over responsibility. The allotment of accommodation is in the hands of the town major, and as a general rule military personnel will be accommodated, in any occupied town, in the quarters allotted to the military forces of the enemy. Civil Affairs Officers will normally live in the officer's mess of the military garrison or area headquarters quartered in the town.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

38. The Civil Affairs Officer will ensure his signal communication with his D.C.C.A.O. at Army Headquarters.

GUARDING OF TREASURIES, ETC.

39. In conjunction with the commander of the fighting troops in the vicinity, the Civil Affairs Officer will arrange for guards, if they are available, to be posted on treasuries, banks, post offices, customs warehouses, essential public services (such as water and electric light works), railway stations, government stores, telegraph and telephone exchanges, printing presses, official records and the like. Where the local police are considered to be sufficiently reliable, their services should be utilised for these purposes, but if the local police is an armed force, it may be desirable to disarm it. All State funds will be seized and held by the Civil Affairs Officer.

CURFEW AND MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS

40. Orders will be given with regard to curfew, restrictions of movement, restrictions on the use of motor transport and the specifying of prohibited areas. Care should be taken to avoid

publishing local orders accompanied by heavy penalties for non-compliance, unless reasonable means for enforcing obedience to them are available.

USE OF ENEMY OFFICIALS

41. The Civil Affairs Officer will consider at an early stage, and in the light of the approved policy, which of the local enemy officials should be retained in office to work under his direction and control.

POLICE ARRANGEMENTS

42. The policing arrangements for the town should be examined with regard to their adequacy and reliability. The imposition of a curfew will greatly facilitate policing arrangements. It is particularly important that enemy police records should be preserved.

ARREST OF SUSPECTS, ETC.

43. In conjunction with G.S.I.(b) and F.S.W., action should be taken to assist in the speedy arrest of enemy subjects on the black list. Enquiries should be made about enemy political parties and their officials and clubs; these should be dissolved, arrests made if necessary and records seized.

CONTACT WITH TRIBES

44. In colonial territory the headmen of the local tribes should be contacted and the implications of military government explained to them.

CONTROL OF FOOD SUPPLIES

45. An examination should be made of the supply situation. Local food supplies belonging to the enemy government should be seized, a rationing and distribution system arranged, and prices of essential foodstuffs fixed. Early action should be taken for obtaining declarations of essential stocks from local merchants.

46. The local hospitals should be visited to examine the extent to which civil hospital facilities can be taken over by the forces, while at the same time ensuring adequate treatment and care for the civil population.

47. The local prisons should be visited and enquiries made about the presence of political prisoners or persons who have committed war crimes. If the policy towards them has not already been settled, their presence should be reported to the D.C.C.A.O. as soon as possible.

REQUISITIONING AND LOCAL PURCHASE

48. In conjunction with the Q Branch, arrangements should be made for the control of requisitioning and local purchase. It is particularly important to ensure the minimum of uncontrolled seizure and requisitioning, since this is likely to be prejudicial to the best interests of the army supply situation.

LABOUR RATES

49. Labour rates should be fixed in consultation with P. and L. representative.

SECTION VII**TREATMENT OF THE POPULATION IN
OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY****OBLIGATIONS OF OCCUPANTS AND POPULATION**

50. While the population remains under the latent sovereignty of its own former government and cannot be asked to swear allegiance to the occupier, it is "the duty of the occupant to see that the lives of the inhabitants are respected, that their domestic peace and honour are not disturbed, that their religious convictions are not interfered with, and generally that duress, unlawful and criminal attacks on their persons, and felonious actions as regards their property, are just as punishable as in times of peace." The corresponding obligation on the part of the population, in return for such treatment, is to behave peacefully, to take no part in hostilities, to refrain from all forms of acts prejudicial to the occupying troops, and to obey the orders given to them.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS INHABITANTS

51. Legal considerations apart, a just and reasonable treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territory is desirable. Such a treatment—which should not be confused with weakness, nor need lead to accusations of "pro-enemy" sympathy—may be directly advantageous by producing an atmosphere immediately favourable to the production of labour, supplies and services; by influencing the present and future attitude of the people of the territory towards H.M.G.; and by providing valuable propaganda in adjacent or other territories. Reasonable help and indulgence to a conquered populace given by the military authorities may, if intelligent and timely, be abundantly repaid. The degree of such assistance is a matter of policy depending on the reaction of the people themselves and the ability of the military authorities to provide it.

RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMY PERSONNEL AND THE INHABITANTS

52. The presence of a subject and powerless population is a temptation to acts of indiscipline and abuse. Looting, personal violence, or mere bullying are in the highest degree to be deplored both by the army itself and the population which suffers it. The necessity for good behaviour by personnel of the occupying army will be impressed emphatically upon all concerned that stringent disciplinary action must be taken against anyone guilty of the offences mentioned. It is also necessary to remind all military personnel that a state of war between the enemy country and ourselves persists despite the occupation and that officers and men should not set themselves up as judges as to which of the enemy inhabitants is or is not favourably disposed to us. One cannot safely rely on political faith or protestations of close ties of friendship with the British nation before hostilities. As a nation we are often too ready to extend the hand of friendship to enemies in adversity and all ranks must be warned against excessive fraternisation. Social and personal relations with enemy subjects must be strictly limited to what is necessary to obtain co-operation in the maintenance of such services as we require of them. They will be treated with courtesy, but anything in the nature of friendship or intimacy will be avoided. This refers particularly to intimacy with enemy women, which may well lead to the divulgence of military information.

DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST THE INHABITANTS

53. Disciplinary action by force against sections or individuals of the enemy population can be taken at any time, if the situation demands it. Such action should be taken only in co-operation with B.M.A. on adequate information, by proper authority, and in a regular manner. Nothing but harm is done by unco-ordinated or unjustified action of this kind.

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENTS

54. Under the Laws and Usages of War, the commander of the occupying army may impose collective punishments by way of fine on the local inhabitants, but this may only be resorted to where the collective responsibility of the whole of a section of the populace for some hostile act against the occupying army is clearly established. This form of punishment is suited to the case of tribal and primitive communities who customarily recognise the communal responsibility of a village or tribe, but no subordinate commander is empowered to impose a collective punishment,

which can only be sanctioned by the commander of the occupying army.

REPRISALS

55. International law recognises the right of a belligerent to take reprisals against local inhabitants for hostile acts against the occupant, but again no act of reprisal should be taken on the responsibility of any officer but the commander of the army of occupation. Enemy subjects acting *bona fide* in the interests of the enemy are not excused.

SECTION VIII

PROPERTY IN ENEMY TERRITORY

PLUNDERING NO LONGER PERMISSIBLE

56. The ancient right of plundering property in enemy territory by an invading army no longer exists, and strict rules regarding rights over property in enemy territory have been laid down by the Hague Convention.

PROPERTY OF THE ENEMY STATE

57. The invading army has extensive rights over property of the enemy State ; thus all real property belonging to the enemy State remains absolutely in the hands of the occupant until the end of the war. He becomes the administrator and the usufructuary of all buildings, lands, railways, roads, canals, bridges, forests, parks, farms, mines, etc., and in so far as military exigencies require, such property may be damaged or destroyed. Similarly, he may confiscate all movable property of the enemy State which is susceptible of military use, but articles of no military value, such as crown jewels, pictures, collections of art, libraries, etc., cannot be appropriated and must be respected and preserved.

PRIVATELY OWNED PROPERTY

58. In regard to private property, the general rule is that it may not be confiscated or pillaged even if found in a town or place taken by assault. Theft and robbery are as punishable in war as in peace ; nothing is more demoralising to troops or more subversive of discipline than plundering, and a soldier in an enemy country must observe the same respect for property as in his garrison at home. The rule that private property must be respected has, however, certain exceptions which are justifiable upon the grounds of military necessity. Private premises may be

used for the accommodation of troops, vehicles, animals and stores of the invading army, and it is fully admitted that an army has the right to make use of and requisition certain movable and immovable property for its needs. What is forbidden is such damage, destruction, improper seizure, or taking of property as is not required in the interests of the army, and as would, therefore, increase the sufferings of the population. Where private property is used or taken on the grounds of military necessity, in accordance with the rules of international law the occupying army is in most cases required to pay for the facilities it gets. In some cases immediate payment is to be made, and in other instances the property must be restored or compensation paid at the conclusion of hostilities.

APPENDIX III

Memorandum on the Seizure and Requisitioning of Property in Occupied Enemy Territory

1. The arrangement of this Memorandum is as follows:—

PART I. INTRODUCTORY

PART II. PUBLIC PROPERTY

SUB-PART A : DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

SUB-PART B : IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

SUB-PART C : MOVABLE PROPERTY

PART III. PRIVATE PROPERTY

SUB-PART A : IMMOVABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

SUB-PART B : MOVABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

PART IV. PRIVATE FACTORIES

PART I. INTRODUCTION

Introductory.

2. The seizure and requisitioning of property in Occupied Enemy Territory is proving a difficult question, especially as regards factories, and this Memorandum is an attempt to solve as many of those difficulties as possible. It is not feasible to cover every particular case, but this memorandum sets out the essential principles when property may be seized and when it must be requisitioned and should help to solve most of the problems on this subject. Any cases involving special difficulties or on which guidance is required should be reported, with full facts, to Political Branch, Nairobi.

This memorandum has been seen and agreed to by the Deputy Judge Advocate General, East Africa Command.

¹ Annexure No. 7 to the report of the Chief Legal Adviser, East Africa Command, from 16th September, 1941, to 31st January, 1942.

Private
factories.

3. Private factories are dealt with separately in Part IV because, although the premises themselves are immovable property, the machinery inside such premises may be immovable or movable property, according to the circumstances of each particular case.

Difference
between
seizure and
requisitioning
of property.

4. In reading this memorandum it is essential to bear in mind the difference between *seizing* and *requisitioning* property. Seizing property means that the property passes absolutely under the control of the occupying power, who may use it in any manner it pleases, but at the end of the war the property must be handed back to its owner, if this is possible, or, if it is not possible, compensation must then be paid to the owner by one or other of the belligerents, as may be decided by the Treaty of Peace. Requisitioning property means that the military authorities purchase the property requisitioned and thus become the absolute owner of it. Requisitioned property must always be paid for and, moreover, paid for at the time or as soon as possible after it is requisitioned. Thus for all practical purposes the difference between seizing and requisitioning property lies in the time at which compensation must be paid.

PART II. PUBLIC PROPERTY

SUB-PART A : DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

Care in ensur-
ing what is
public pro-
perty.

5. The whole crux of the matter is care in ensuring that there are no private claims to the property seized and that it is absolute Government or Public property. In cases where any doubt exists as to whether the property

is public property or private property then the aid of paragraph 432 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law may be invoked which lays down that in case of doubt as to whether certain property is public or private, such property should be considered to be public property unless and until its private character is distinctly proved. Officers should be on their guard against cases of Government property being transferred to private ownership to avoid seizure.

M.M.L.
Cap. XIV,
para. 432.

What is public property.

6. Public property includes the following categories :—

- (i) State owned buildings.
- (ii) Machinery, equipment, real estate and stores, the property of the State.
- (iii) Assets of any nature belonging to a public or private company of which the whole capital and shareholding belongs to the State.
- (iv) The position of property belonging to a parastatal company or a company in which both the State and private individuals are interested as shareholders has yet to be decided by a higher authority, even though the State may hold the controlling interest.

SUB-PART B : IMMOVABLE STATE PROPERTY

Restriction against selling or alienating State property.

7. During our military occupation (as in our present position) in enemy territory, including the Reserved Areas in Ethiopia, we may not sell or alienate public enemy land and buildings but may only appropriate their produce. We, the occupying power, are regarded

Oppenheim
6th Ed. Vol. II,
pp. 307 and
308, and
M.M.L. Cap.
XIV, para.
427.

only as Administrator and Usufructuary of the public buildings, real property, forests and agricultural works belonging to the hostile State. We may sell crops from public land, cut and sell timber from public forests, let public land and buildings for the time of our occupation. But we must not be wasteful or negligent so as to unduly decrease the value of the immovable property.

State owned factories.

8. State owned factories can be used on the spot but must not be moved without prior reference to, and the consent of, Political Branch, Nairobi. Any such reference must be accompanied by full reasons for the suggested move.

Municipal property.

9. The produce of municipal public utility concerns such as gas, water, electricity, etc., should be treated as private property. The same applies to institutions used for religious, charitable or educational purposes or for the advancement of art or science.

Oppenheim
6th Ed. Vol. II,
p. 308.

Use of enemy buildings in case of necessity.

10. So far as the necessities of war demand a belligerent may make use of public enemy buildings, including municipal premises, churches, schools, etc., as hospitals, barracks or stables and no compensation is payable unless wilful damage is caused, as for instance the utilisation of the premises of a valuable picture gallery as a stable. In this category buildings which are private property can also be included. In such cases the military authorities should decide which buildings are required for occupation.

Oppenheim
6th Ed. Vol. II,
pp. 307-8,
M.M.L. Cap.
XIV, para. 429.

SUB-PART C : MOVABLE PUBLIC PROPERTY

Confiscation of certain enemy State movable property.

11. Any movable property belonging to the hostile State which can be used directly or indirectly for military purposes can be confiscated as booty of war and no compensation or indemnity is due. Examples are cash, realisable securities, arms, means of transport, apparatus for transmission of news, the rolling stock of public railways, stores and supplies.

Oppenheim 6th Ed. Vol. II, p. 309. M.M.L. Cap. XIV, para. 430.

Property of municipalities, etc.

12. The movable property of municipalities, churches, hospitals, schools, museums, picture galleries (even when belonging to the hostile State) cannot lawfully be seized by a belligerent. Public movable enemy property found on the battle field can be seized as booty but not private enemy property except military papers, arms, transport and the like. Private cash, jewellery or securities and other private articles of value cannot be seized.

Oppenheim 6th Ed. Vol. II, pp. 310-311, and M.M.L. Cap. XIV, paras. 431 and 433.

PART III. PRIVATE PROPERTY

SUB-PART A : IMMOVABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

Use of private immovable property.

13. The strict legal position with regard to private immovable property is that :—

- (i) It cannot be appropriated or permanently alienated or used for profit.
- (ii) The temporary use is justified by the wants of the army.
- (iii) When so used no rent or compensation is payable at the time but a note must be kept of such use and any damage caused so that such note will be available at the time of the Peace Treaty

M.M.L. Cap. XIV, paras. 407-415 and F.S.R. para. 179 (3).

when it will be decided by which belligerent the rent and compensation is payable.

Payment to owners of immovable property still present.

14. With regard to the contents of paragraph 13 it has been decided as a matter of policy that in order not to increase economic difficulties and to lessen the chances of unrest in occupied territories rents should normally be paid in respect of private immovable property, *when the owners of such property are still present.*

Maximum payment for use of private immovable property.

15. (i) The ruling in paragraph 14 as to payment is restricted to accommodation for the forces such as billets, office accommodation, storage or military stores, material and equipment and the stabling of animals.

(ii) The amount of such payment, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, has been agreed between C.P. and F.A., East Africa Command, and the C.F. and A. Political Branch at a maximum of £3 per week.

(iii) It should be noted that the policy of making payment for accommodation in order not to increase economic difficulties in occupied territories does not apply to the cases of private factories being taken over. This subject is dealt with in Part IV of this memorandum.

When owners are said to be present.

16. It has been agreed by Political Branch, Nairobi, that with regard to the expression quoted in paragraph 14 above "when the owners of such property are still present," the following conditions shall apply:—

"No payment will in any circumstances be made to an owner who, being an individual, is not physically present and at large in the territory where the property is situate or, being

a company, corporation or firm is not carrying on business in that territory either directly or by means of a duly authorised and responsible agent or manager who is physically present and at large in the territory."

SUB-PART B: MOVABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

Movable private property.

17. Paragraph 415 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law deals with movable private property which can be seized and paragraph 416 with movable private property which *must* be requisitioned. The distinction between property which can be seized under paragraph 415 and property which must be requisitioned under 416 is not clearly defined in these two paragraphs. On this matter two main questions require consideration :—

(i) What property *may legally be seized* under paragraph 415 and what property *must be requisitioned* under paragraph 416.

(ii) Whether movable property can be taken out of occupied territory for use by the army elsewhere.

What movable private property may be seized.

18. (1) With regard to the first question, that is, what articles may be seized and what articles must be requisitioned, paragraph 415 lays down a list of articles which can be seized and states that this category is confined to articles which are susceptible of direct military use. This description is in contradiction with the articles mentioned in paragraph 416 which are merely necessary for the maintenance of the army. Articles which are susceptible of direct military use mean war material, i.e. articles which can be used for offence and defence and also articles necessary to maintain communications.

(2) *It has been agreed with the D.A. and Q.M.G. East Africa Command that such articles are arms, ammunition, explosives, transport (but not private cars owned by individuals which, if required, must be requisitioned. This is on account of the policy laid down by the War Office that private cars should be paid for on the ground that it is not good policy to increase economic difficulties in occupied enemy territory and also because, as there is no prospect of*

returning these cars at the conclusion of peace, non-payment therefore would be a hardship where the owners are still present), *signal stores (including wireless equipment), medical stores and engineer stores such as machine tools, wire bridging and construction material and the like*. It must be appreciated that this list may not be complete and that there may be other articles susceptible of direct military use which are not included. In cases of doubt regarding articles over and above this list reference should be made to these Headquarters.

When private movable property may be taken out of occupied enemy territory.

19. With regard to the question of whether private movable property can be taken out of occupied territory for use by the army elsewhere, from an examination of the Hague Regulations, Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law and Legal textbooks, the position is as follows:—

- (i) Article 416 of Chapter XIV, Manual of Military Law, uses the expression “for the maintenance of the army” as opposed to the expression “susceptible of direct military use” which is used in Article 415.
- (ii) Article 416 of Chapter XIV, Manual of Military Law, is based on Article 52 of The Hague Regulations which lays down (*inter alia*) that “requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded *except for the needs of the army of occupation*.”
- (iii) At p. 317 of Oppenheim, 6th Edition, Vol. II, the author states that requisitions may be made from the inhabitants *but only so far as THEY ARE REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION and such requisitions must not be made in order to supply the belligerents' general needs*. In a footnote to this the learned author goes on to say that Article 52 of the Hague Regulations, which deals with requisitions, was entirely ignored by the Germans while they occupied Belgium and part of France during the 1914–18 War, because they, the Germans, made requisitions, not only for the needs of the army of

occupation, but for the needs of Germany in general.

- (iv) On page 314 of Oppenheim, 6th Edition, Vol. II, the learned author condemns the action of the Germans during the 1914-18 War in carrying off private property to Germany from Belgium and France, particularly cattle, machinery and materials from dismantled factories and workshops.

From the above it is clear that the test whether private movable property can be taken away from occupied territory and used by the military elsewhere is whether such property can be seized or whether it must be requisitioned. If it can be seized legally, that is, if it is susceptible of direct military use as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, it can be taken away, but if it must be requisitioned, that is if it comes under paragraph 416 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, then it can only be requisitioned for the use of the army of occupation in occupied territories in such quantities as are necessary for that army and such requisitioning must be proportionate to the resources of the occupied territory.

Departure
from legal
principles.

20. The two immediately preceding paragraphs are written from the strict legal standpoint and do not take into account any question of policy. If, therefore, it is considered by the military authorities that it is essential to take out of occupied enemy territory articles which may not legally be seized in accordance with the foregoing legal opinion and if the military authorities do take out such property then Political Branch, Nairobi, should be informed of their action so that cover for such action can be obtained in the Peace Treaty.

Spare parts.

21. With regard to spare parts, those required for the articles which may be seized—see paragraph 18 (2)—may be seized, but spare parts for articles other than those mentioned in paragraph 18 (2) must be requisitioned and paid for. Spare parts for the articles mentioned in paragraph 18 (2) may only be seized in such quantities as are reasonable to keep those articles in going order.

Petrol.

22. With regard to petrol, on the strict legal construction of paragraphs 415 and 416 of Chapter XIV, Manual of Military Law, petrol must be requisitioned. The reason for this is that petrol cannot be brought within the scope of the expression "means of transport" used in paragraph 415 and since the army requisition and pay for fodder for horses it would appear that petrol must also be requisitioned and paid for. On the other hand international law changes with every war and in a war such as this, when petrol is such a vital military necessity, it appears unreasonable that payment should be made for petrol.

In effect under the Italian régime A.G.I.P. controlled the distribution and sale of practically all petrol in Italian Africa East, and the questions of whether A.G.I.P. is a parastatal concern and the treatment of parastatal concerns generally has not yet been settled. Until these complicated questions are settled the following policy should be followed:—

(a) *A.G.I.P. Installations and Petrol.*

No rent should be paid for the use of such installations and no payments should be made for petrol taken for military necessity, i.e. for use by army transport, etc. But full records should be kept regarding the use of such installations and of the amount of petrol taken in case it is held later that rent for the use of such installations and payment for the petrol taken must be made.

(b) *Petrol Installations and Petrol belonging to Firms or Individuals, other than A.G.I.P.*

- (i) If the firm or individual is in a big way of business the policy to be followed is the same as in sub-paragraph (a) above.
- (ii) If the firm or individual is not in a big way of business and the petrol taken is small, then it should be paid for but no rent should be paid for the use of any installation : full records should be kept regarding the use of any such installation in case it is held later that we must pay rent for such use.

PART IV. PRIVATE FACTORIES

Private
factories.

23. There are important questions with regard to private factories in occupied enemy territory, namely :—

- (a) Whether such factories can be taken over lock, stock and barrel by the military authorities and run by the military authorities themselves.
- (b) Whether, when a factory has been taken over lock, stock and barrel by the military authorities, such military authorities may undertake work for civilian requirements in occupied enemy territory.
- (c) Whether machinery in factories in occupied enemy territory can be dismantled and taken out of the occupied enemy territory for use by the military authorities elsewhere.

Running of
factories by
military.

24. With regard to paragraph 23(a), Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law and the textbooks on international law are of little assistance. A factory consists of premises, which are immovable property and machinery, which may be immovable or movable property. For the purpose of deciding whether factories can be taken over lock, stock and barrel and run by the military authorities it is immaterial whether the machinery is immovable or movable property.

Paragraph 410 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law empowers the temporary use of immovable property to supply the wants of the army, and when such immovable property is so used, legally no rent or compensation is payable—see paragraph 13 (iii) of this memorandum. So much for the legal position regarding the actual premises of a factory. With regard to the machinery inside the factory, if such machinery can be used for manufacturing articles which are susceptible of direct military use, then in my view such machinery itself is susceptible of direct military use and may be seized under paragraph 415 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law if it is movable property. If such machinery is immovable property, then it

forms part of the premises of the factory and comes within paragraph 410 previously quoted, and can be used without rent or compensation.

As to the articles which can be termed articles susceptible of direct military use, see paragraph 18 (2) of this memorandum.

Therefore in any case envisaged in this paragraph the factory could be taken over lock, stock and barrel by the army and run by the appropriate army department, e.g. Transport, Ordnance, Royal Engineers, etc. All wages, renovation, running expenses, etc., will be payable by the army, and if any profit or loss results from the activities of such a concern, such profit will accrue to, or such loss will be borne by, the army.

As to whether the strict legal position that no rent or compensation is payable should be modified on the policy as quoted in paragraph 14 of this memorandum, the same policy should be followed, i.e. that we should pay for the use of accommodation of the premises if the owner is still present, in just the same way and at the same rate that we pay for accommodation for billeting troops, office accommodation, etc. But as the payment for accommodation is purely an *ex gratia* payment made to lessen economic difficulties in occupied enemy territory I see no reason why we should pay for using this machinery. The only persons affected by our taking over the machinery are the workmen. Some of them may continue working under the army authorities, in which case they will be paid. Those who do not continue working, or are thrown out of work, automatically receive assistance from the O.T.A. We are under no legal obligation to pay for using the machinery; if it is immovable property we can use it without payment under paragraphs 410 and 411 of Chapter XIV, Manual of Military Law and if it is movable property no payment is necessary until the conclusion of peace (see paragraph 415).

When
machinery is
immovable.

25. The contents of paragraph 24 at once raise the question of whether machinery in factories is movable or immovable property. This is a question which can only be decided on the facts of each individual case.

The law applicable to immovable property is the *lex loci rei sitae* and therefore we should look to Italian law. By Article 414 of the Italian Civil Code :—

“ Real estate includes all movable objects fixed by the proprietor to the floor of the building in order that they shall not be removed. These are objects fixed with lead, plaster, lime, stucco, etc., which cannot be removed from their original place without breakage or deterioration, or without breaking or spoiling the place to which they are fixed.”

This Italian law follows English law closely and therefore the question to be considered in each individual case is whether the machinery is fixed to the floor or ground in such a way that it becomes immovable property. If, for instance, the machinery is attached to the ground solely by bolts or screws which can be easily loosened, then I should say that machinery is not permanently attached to the ground and is movable property. If, on the other hand, the machinery is embedded in concrete (say), and could not be separated from the ground without breaking up the concrete, or doing excavation work in order to loosen it, the machinery would form part of the premises and would be immovable property. On this test, a further question must be considered as to whether portions of such machinery, which are removable but which are essential parts of it, should be considered as movable or immovable property. The answer to this further question is that if the piece of machinery itself is considered as immovable property on the test stated above, then each and every portion of it which is removable, but which is an essential part of the piece of machinery, must also be considered as immovable property.

Whether
factory taken
over by
military may
undertake
civilian work.

26. As to question in paragraph 23 (b), i.e. whether a factory which has been taken over lock, stock and barrel by the military authorities may undertake work for civil requirements, I see no reason why it should not do so provided it is essential in the opinion of the military administrator in the territory that such requirements should be fulfilled,

and that the military authorities running the factory can undertake the fulfilling of such requirements without detriment to our military effort. No law is involved in this question—it is purely one of common sense, and the question of keeping the economic life of the occupied territory going as satisfactorily as possible. If such work is undertaken with the consent of the military administrator and the army authorities, then the civilians for whom the work is done or to whom the articles are supplied, should pay for such work and such supplies on a fair commercial basis. Since I have suggested that as a matter of policy a fair rental for the premises and the machinery should be paid to owners present, then any payment accruing for work done for, or for articles supplied to, civilians, should accrue to the army.

Requisitioning of factories not manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military use.

27. With regard to factories, the machinery of which cannot be used for manufacturing articles which are susceptible of direct military use, but which produce articles which are necessary for the maintenance of the army, then following the rule in paragraph 416 of Chapter XIV of the Manual of Military Law, the machinery in such factories could be requisitioned, but only in order to supply the needs of the army of occupation, i.e. the army stationed in occupied enemy territory. In such a case, of course, it would be preferable to requisition the output of the factory rather than requisition the machinery itself. It would be still more preferable to endeavour to come to an arrangement with the management or owner of the factory to supply the requirements for the army of occupation on a contract basis instead of requisitioning such output. This should not be difficult as it is probable that the raw material used in manufacturing the finished article could only be obtained with the assistance of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. If such raw material is obtained by the O.E.T.A. then it should be possible to make an arrangement with the management or owner that the value of the raw material supplied should be deducted from the price of the finished article.

If the machinery in the factory does not produce articles which are :—

- (a) susceptible of direct military use,
- (b) necessary for the maintenance of the army of occupation,

but produces articles which supply civilian needs, then, if in the interests of the population it is necessary to control the output and sale of such output, special legislation on the lines of Defence Regulations enacted in the United Kingdom and the Colonies would be necessary in the occupied territory concerned.

Removal of
factory
machinery out
of occupied
territory.

28. With regard to the question in paragraph 23 (c) i.e. whether machinery in factories in occupied territory can be dismantled and moved elsewhere, this is the most difficult question of all.

It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule, but what is stated below is an attempt to be as precise as possible.

It has already been stated in paragraph 19 of this memorandum that the test whether *private movable property* can be taken away from occupied territories and used by the army, is whether the articles can legally be seized or whether they must be requisitioned.

If, therefore, the machinery is movable property, according to the test laid down in paragraph 25 of this memorandum, then if such machinery is used for manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military necessity (see paragraph 18 (2) of this memorandum) such machinery can be seized and removed from the occupied territory.

If the machinery is immovable property on the test laid down in paragraph 25 of this memorandum then *legally* such machinery, even though capable of manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military use, cannot be removed.

In Oppenheim on International Law, Vol. II, 6th Edition, page 314, the learned author condemns the Germans in the 1914-1918 War for dismantling factories and workshops in Belgium and the occupied parts of France and taking the machinery to Germany. The author goes on to state that the French and

Belgian authorities, whilst occupying the left bank of the Rhine after the Armistice, instituted criminal proceedings against German manufacturers who had previously bought the machinery and plant carried away by the German military administrators. At page 318 the author also condemns the Germans for requisitioning for the general needs of Germany.

This is the legal position regarding the removal of immovable machinery capable of manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military use. If the military authorities decide that in spite of the legal position it is absolutely essential for our military effort that such immovable machinery should be removed then full particulars must be reported to the Political Branch, Nairobi, so that cover may be obtained in the Peace Treaty.

Deal between
willing seller
and willing
buyer.

29. What has been said above is subject, of course, to any deal being effected between a willing buyer and a willing seller. If the owner of a private factory, in which is situated movable or immovable machinery, is a willing seller there, unless the military administrator considers that the machinery should not be moved because it is essential to the economic life of the military or because in Ethiopia there are political reasons against removing it, the machinery can be bought by the military authorities and removed.

This raises the question of what procedure should be adopted when machinery is capable of both manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military use and also articles which are essential for civilian use. Further cases may arise in which machinery can be adapted to manufacture articles which are susceptible of direct military use and other cases may arise in which parts of machinery can be used to add to existing machinery and so establish plant capable of manufacturing articles susceptible of direct military use. Each and everyone of these cases should be referred to the military administrator.

Conclusion.

30. I realise that this memorandum, lengthy though it is, will not have covered all cases, but I hope it will afford considerable help and guidance.

(Signed) H. C. WILLAN,
Lieut.-Colonel,
Acting Chief Legal Adviser.

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CHRONOLOGY 1941-1945

1941 JANUARY

- 5th. Bardia captured.
- 17th. Italian troops withdrew from Kassala.
- 19th. Sabderet occupied.
- 19th. Kassala occupied.
- 20th. Emperor Haile Selassie crossed the frontier of Ethiopia.
- 21st. Tobruk captured.
- 26th. C.P.O. (Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell) met General Wavell at Khartoum.
- 30th. Derna captured.
- 30th. Italians cleared from Kenya.

FEBRUARY

- 1st. Agordat captured.
- 1st. Brigadier Lush appointed D.C.P.O., Ethiopia.
- 2nd. Barentu captured.
- 4th. Mr. Eden's statement on Ethiopia in Parliament.
- 5th. "Proclamation on B.M.A., Eritrea," issued.
- 6th. Benghazi captured.
- 6th. Emperor at Belaya.
- 7th. O.E.T.A. set up at Derna.
- 7th. Surrender of General Bergonzoli.
- 8th. "C.P.O.'s Notes on Policy and Practice in respect of Occupation of I.E.A." issued.
- 10th. O.E.T.A. H.Q., Eritrea, set up at Agordat.
- 11th. Brigadier Scupham appointed D.C.P.O. to East Africa Force.
- 11th. Afmadu captured.
- 14th. Kismayu occupied.
- 15th. Colonel Hone appointed Legal Adviser, Cairo.
- 18th. O.E.T.A. set up at Benghazi under Brigadier Longrigg.
- 20th. Cabinet's decision on O.E.T.A. Interdepartmental committee set up.
- 21st. Meeting of the C.P.O. with Mr. Eden and General Sir John Dill in Cairo.
- 21st. "Directions to Military Governor, Cyrenaica," issued.
- 22nd. Moyale entered.
- 22nd. Jelib captured.
- 23rd. Emperor at Enjabara.
- 24th. Colonel the Hon. F. Rodd appointed C.F.A.
- 25th. Mogadishu occupied.
- 28th. Ischia Baidoa captured.
- 29th. General Wavell decided to make Cyrenaica a separate Military Command.

MARCH

- 3rd. Lugh Ferrandi captured.
- 3rd. Brigadier Lush joined East African Force at Jigiga.

1941
MARCH

- 4th. Burye captured.
 5th. Dolo entered.
 14th. Main party, Somalia Military Administration, reached Mogadishu.
 16th. Aden forces for re-occupation of British Somaliland landed at Berbera.
 17th. Jigiga occupied.
 18th. Zeila evacuated by Italians.
 20th. Rocca Littorio surrendered.
 21st. Lieut.-General Cunningham announced re-occupation of British Somaliland.
 21st. Lieut.-General Cunningham's Proclamation on British Somaliland issued.
 21st. Lieut.-General Cunningham visited Berbera.
 21st. Marda Pass cleared.
 24th. Hargeisa occupied.
 26th. Keren occupied.
 27th. Harar entered.
 28th. Burao occupied.
 29th. Diredawa entered.
 31st. Enemy attack from El Agheila began.
 31st. Kufra Oasis handed over to O.E.T.A.
 31st. Formation of M.O. 11, War Office.

APRIL

- 1st. Asmara entered.
 2nd. O.E.T.A. H.Q., Eritrea, moved to Asmara.
 3rd. Ras Seyum made submission.
 3rd. G.O.C., East Africa, informed Middle East Command of urgency of evacuation of Italians from Ethiopia.
 5th. Awash entered.
 5th. Addis Ababa reached.
 6th. Addis Ababa surrendered.
 6th. Emperor Haile Selassie at Debra Marcos.
 6th. Benghazi occupied by enemy.
 8th. Massawa captured.
 13th. Obbia occupied.
 13th. Bocoggio occupied.
 15th. Brigadier Chater established B.M.A. H.Q. at Hargeisa, British Somaliland.
 15th. Political Branch transferred to Nairobi.
 16th. British Political staff arrived at Addis Ababa.
 16th. Italian Police Force, Mogadishu, disbanded.
 18th. Italian East Africa transferred from Middle East to East Africa Command.
 19th. Gardo occupied.
 19th. Lieut.-Colonel Adshead appointed Accountant-General.
 19th. O.E.T.A. began work in Massawa.
 19th. Fire at Carabinieri Barracks, Massawa.
 20th. Dessie occupied.

1941
APRIL

- 22nd. War Office agreed to plans for evacuation of Italians from Ethiopia.
- 27th. Surrender of the Nocra Islands.
- 30th. Gardo and Garoe taken over by B.M.A.
- 30th. Egyptian currency replaced by East African currency.

MAY

- 1st. East Africa Command came under C.-in-C., Middle East, for administrative purposes.
- 5th. Kassim occupied.
- 5th. Emperor Haile Selassie reached Addis Ababa.
- 9th. Somaliland (Military Administration) Order in Council issued.
- 11th. Emperor appointed seven Ministers of State.
- 11th. Transfrontier Grazing Conference, Burao.
- 12th. Italian banks opened in Asmara.
- 14th. Dante occupied.
- 14th. Shashiamanna occupied.
- 17th. Dalle entered.
- 18th. Duke of Aosta surrendered at Amba Alagi.
- 21st. Ras Allula occupied.
- 22nd. Agibar surrendered.
- 23rd. Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell interviewed Emperor Haile Selassie.
- 26th. Lieut.-Colonel Babington Smith appointed Controller of Banking and Finance.
- 28th. Lieut.-Colonel Willan appointed Deputy Legal Adviser, Political H.Q., Middle East.
- 31st. First issue of "Eritrean Gazette" published.

JUNE

- 2nd. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened branch at Asmara.
- 5th. River Omo crossed.
- 9th. Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell attended meeting of the War Cabinet, London.
- 11th. Assab occupied.
- 15th. Lieut.-Colonel Mathew appointed Judicial Adviser to the Emperor of Ethiopia.
- 18th. Senior Political Officer reached Assab.
- 21st. Gimma occupied.
- 25th. C.P.O., C.F.A. and C.L.A. at Conference with Generals Wavell, Cunningham and Platt at Asmara.
- 25th. Emperor Haile Selassie signed Awaj on Criminal Justice.
- 26th. French Agreement on maintaining troops at Kufra signed.

JULY

- 1st. Surrender of Italians at Debra Tabor.
- 1st. Italian banks opened in Addis Ababa.
- 1st. Major-General Butler arrived at Addis Ababa as head of British Military Mission.
- 1st. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened branch at Addis Ababa.

1941
JULY

- 3rd. Railway connection re-established with Addis Ababa.
 12th. Assab taken over by E.A.C.
 22nd. Control of Franco-Ethiopian Railway taken over by Transport Section, O.T.A.
 26th. Courts Proclamation published in Somalia.

AUGUST

- 1st. Title of D.C.P.O. changed to Military Administrator.
 1st. C.P.O. assumed full jurisdiction in Eritrea and Somalia.
 1st. Control of Tigray passed to the D.C.P.O., Ethiopia.
 1st. Sir Charles Belcher joined Legal Staff, H.Q., Cairo.
 5th. Emperor Haile Selassie signed Proclamation on Superior Courts.
 9th. Control of Prisons removed from Legal Adviser to Inspector-General of Police.
 26th. Lieut.-Colonel Arundell assumed office as Secretary to the Government, British Somaliland.
 26th. Italian Banks in Assab re-opened.

SEPTEMBER

- 1st. Railways in Ethiopia and Eritrea passed to O.T.A.
 2nd. Instructions to the Military Administrators, Somalia and Eritrea, issued.
 10th. Lieut.-Colonel Waley appointed Chief Custodian of Enemy Property, Political H.Q., Middle East.
 15th. Transfer of all Occupied Territory to E.A.C.
 15th. Somalia Proclamation No. 15 issued.
 15th. Creation of the new East Africa Command.
 16th. "British Military Jurisdiction, Assab," issued.
 27th. Wolchehit surrendered.
 27th. Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property appointed to Assab.

OCTOBER

- 1st. Court of Italian Civil Judge, Somalia, re-opened.
 1st. First official "Gazette" published in British Somaliland.
 16th. C.P.O. and C.F.A. discussed Ethiopian Agreement and Convention with War Office.
 16th. "Executive Board for the Co-ordination of Eritrea Projects" set up in Asmara.

NOVEMBER

- 11th. Second submission of Ethiopian Agreement to Cabinet.
 18th. General Auchinleck's offensive in Libya began.
 20th. Sidi Rezegh taken.
 21st. Sollum captured.
 22nd. War Office agreed to C.P.O.'s plan for evacuation of Italians from Ethiopia.
 26th. El Duda captured.
 27th. Surrender of Italians in Gondar.

1941
DECEMBER

- 4th. Tobruk relieved.
- 12th. Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell visited Addis Ababa.
- 17th. Derna entered.
- 24th. Benghazi occupied.
- 31st. Provincial branches of Italian banks in Ethiopia closed.

1942
JANUARY

- 5th. Appeal Court established in Eritrea.
- 6th. Brigadier Hone appointed acting C.P.O., Cairo.
- 8th. "Bank Accounts Notice, 1942" issued.
- 10th. Bardia surrendered.
- 22nd. Antelat occupied by enemy.
- 27th. Benghazi evacuated by Allies.
- 31st. Signing of the Agreement and Military Convention by the Emperor of Ethiopia.

FEBRUARY

- 1st. Eritrea (less Assab) re-transferred to Middle East Command.
- 1st. Brigadier Hone appointed C.P.O. North
- 1st. Brigadier Lord Rennell appointed C.F.A. North.
- 1st. Lieut.-Colonel Babington Smith appointed C.F.A. South.
- 1st. Lieut.-Colonel Willan appointed C.L.A. South.
- 4th. British defence line formed at Gazala.
- 14th. Addis Ababa branches of Italian banks closed.
- 25th. "Reserved Areas Notice" issued.
- 28th. H.Q. Administration of the Reserved Area moved to Harar.
- 28th. Closing of Custodian Offices at Gimma.

MARCH

- 14th. War Office Memorandum on "Parastatal Institutions" issued.
- 24th. Blockade of French Somaliland ended.
- 25th. Transfer of Italian banks to Eritrea completed.
- 25th. "Eritrea Projects Board" formed.

APRIL

- 3rd. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened at Gura.
- 13th. Postal Services resumed in Somalia.
- 16th. Colonel Willan appointed President of Ethiopian High Court.
- 20th. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened branch at Massawa.
- 21st. Mr. W. Keir and three policemen killed by raiding tribesmen, Kenya-Ethiopia border.
- 25th. "Bank Accounts Proclamation, 1942," issued.

MAY

- 1st. Claims Office of Custodian of Enemy Property set up in Addis Ababa.
- 5th. Occupation of Diego Suarez.

1942
MAY

- 5th. First Italian repatriation ships reached Berbera.
 6th. Goggjar reported attacked by Gheri Somalis.
 23rd. Lieut.-Colonel Cumming appointed D.C.P.O. Designate for Cyrenaica.
 24th. First flight repatriates left Italian East Africa.
 26th. Axis attack in Cyrenaica began.
 27th. Axis attack at Gazala.
 28th. Mr. C. H. Collier appointed Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy Property.
 28th. Mr. Graftey-Smith appointed as Foreign Office representative to Madagascar.
 28th. Closing of Custodian Offices at Dessie.

JUNE

- 11th. Bir Hacheim evacuated by Allies.
 14th. Assab handed over to Middle East Command.
 14th. Withdrawal by Allies from Gazala.
 20th. Pretoria Conference on Madagascar.
 21st. Tobruk surrendered by Allies.
 23rd. Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell ceased to be Chief Political Officer, South, on appointment as Governor of Fiji and Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
 25th. General Auchinleck took over from General Ritchie.
 27th. Mersa Matruh evacuated.
 30th. Axis forces reached El Alamein.
 30th. "Reserved Areas Currency Notice No. 10" issued.

JULY

- 1st. Major-General Lord Rennell appointed C.P.O. South.
 1st. Colonel Babington Smith appointed C.F.A. North and South.
 1st. Occupied territory in Madagascar came under E.A.C.
 7th. Air Mail Service introduced into Somalia.
 7th. Eritrea Development Commission formed.
 7th. Formation of F.5, War Office.

AUGUST

- 5th. Visit of Mr. Winston Churchill and Field-Marshal Wavell and Smuts to Egypt.
 6th. Withdrawal of British troops from Addis Ababa.
 30th. Axis attack at El Alamein.

SEPTEMBER

- 7th. "Proclamation on Price Control in Eritrea" issued.
 10th. Landing at Majunga.
 16th. Formal instructions received to set up B.M.A. in Madagascar.
 17th. Negotiations with Vichy French, Majunga.
 18th. Landing at Tamatave.
 23rd. Tananarive occupied.

1942

SEPTEMBER

- 23rd. "Madagascar Proclamation No. 1", issued.
- 24th. "Madagascar Proclamation No. 2", issued.
- 24th. Meeting of the Conseil d'Administration, Tananarive.
- 25th. Major Rowe proceeded to Madagascar as Judicial Adviser.
- 28th. B.M.A. H.Q. set up at Tananarive.

OCTOBER

- 2nd. Antisirabe occupied.
- 9th. "Proclamation on Wage Control in Eritrea" issued.
- 19th. Directions by Army Council stating policy of H.M.G. on Administration of Occupied Territories issued.
- 22nd. Major-General Lord Rennell left Madagascar for London.
- 23rd. Battle of El Alamein began.
- 26th. Visit of Lord Moyne, Sir A. Rucker and Brigadier Hone to Eritrea.
- 29th. Fianarantsoa occupied.
- 29th. Major-General Smallwood appointed Chief Military Administrator, Madagascar.

NOVEMBER

- 5th. Capitulation of French troops in Madagascar.
- 8th. American troops and British First Army land in French North Africa.
- 8th. Mersa Matruh occupied.
- 11th. Egypt cleared of enemy.
- 11th. "Proclamation of British Military Occupation in Cyrenaica," issued.
- 13th. Tobruk entered.
- 15th. Derna occupied.
- 19th. Italian repatriation vessels reached Berbera for Second Flight.
- 20th. Benghazi occupied.
- 21st. Political officers took control of Derna.
- 23rd. Political officers took control of Cyrene.
- 24th. Political officers took control of Barce.
- 28th. Political officers took control of Benghazi.
- 30th. Military authority lira became only legal tender in Libya.

DECEMBER

- 1st. Second Flight of Italian repatriates left Italian East Africa.
- 1st. Lieut.-Colonel Pitcairn appointed Senior Political Officer, Reserved Areas.
- 7th. Two Italian repatriation ships left Eritrea.
- 12th. El Agheila occupied.
- 13th. Political officers took control of Agedabia.
- 13th. Axis forces began to retreat from El Agheila.
- 15th. Proclamation on British occupation of Tripolitania signed.
- B.M.A. formed. Brigadier Lush appointed D.C.C.A.O.
- 17th. Signature in London of the Anglo-French Agreement on Madagascar.
- 23rd. H.Q. Military Government of Cyrenaica opened at Barce.

1942

DECEMBER

- 28th. Agreement signed with French Somaliland.
- 28th. Italian Secretary-General, Eritrea, arrested.

1943

JANUARY

- 1st. Visit of the Duke of Gloucester to Eritrea.
- 1st. Port of Massawa came under B.M.A.
- 5th. New American Army formed in North Africa under command of Lieut.-General Mark Clark.
- 6th. Enemy counter-attacks dislodged Allied troops from positions won in North Tunisia.
- 7th. "Madagascar Proclamation No. 3", issued.
- 7th. General Leclerc's Fighting French forces from the Chad occupied main Axis outpost in Fezzan, Oum-el-Araneb.
- 7th. General Legentilhomme, newly appointed High Commissioner for Madagascar, arrived in the island.
- 13th. General Leclerc's Chad force completed conquest of Fezzan by occupation of Murzuk and Sebha.
- 14th. Axis began to retreat from Buerat.
- 14th. President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, together with Chiefs of Staff, met near Casablanca.
- 15th. Eighth Army opened new offensive against Rommel's forces.
- 18th. Misurata occupied.
- 20th. Homs occupied.
- 21st. Approval given to employment of British officers with Ethiopian troops to destroy the Shifta in Borana.
- 22nd. German thrust against French troops in central Tunisia stopped with British reinforcements.
- 23rd. Tripoli occupied.
- 29th. Forward elements of Eighth Army crossed Tunisian border.
- 31st. Eighth Army occupied Zuara in Tunisia.

FEBRUARY

- 1st. Headquarters Military Government set up at Beda Littoria (Cyrenaica).
- 2nd. Announced that Mr. Churchill had visited Cyprus and been enthusiastically welcomed.
- 2nd. Eighth Army occupied Zelten.
- 3rd. Mr. Winston Churchill visited Tripoli.
- 5th. Mussolini dismissed Ciano and took over his post as Foreign Minister.
- 6th. Lieut.-General Dwight Eisenhower appointed to command of North African theatre of operations.
- 15th. American troops evacuated Gafsa as result of German thrusts in Tunisia.
- 18th. French forces in central Tunisia fell back.
- 20th. Formation of 18th Army Group, consisting of the British First and Eighth, American and French Armies.
- 20th. Germans in Tunisia captured pass north-west of Kasserine.
- 20th. Eighth Army occupied Medenine.

1943
FEBRUARY

- 25th. Allies in possession of Kasserine Pass.
- 25th. Hand-over of Enemy Property completed at Addis Ababa.
- 25th. H.Q. Cyrenaica District established at Barce.

MARCH

- 3rd. Brigadier Chater handed over as Military Governor of the Somaliland Protectorate to Colonel Fisher.
- 8th. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened at Mogadishu.
- 10th. Name of British Military Government changed to British Military Administration (Cyrenaica).
- 17th. American forces in southern Tunisia advanced thirty miles and captured Gafsa.
- 20th. Eighth Army attacked Mareth positions.
- 22nd. American troops occupied Maknassi.
- 23rd. Eighth Army broke into Mareth Line.
- 28th. Eighth Army occupied Mareth, Toujane and Matmata.
- 29th. Eighth Army occupied El Hamma and Gabes.
- 30th. Eighth Army occupied Metouia and Oudref.
- 30th. Lord Moyne visited Addis Ababa and Nairobi.
- 30th. Major-General Lord Rennell recalled to London to prepare for Administration of Sicily and southern Italy.

APRIL

- 1st. Patrols of Eighth Army and United States Fifth Army joined forces east of El Guettar.
- 5th. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., opened at Tripoli.
- 10th. Eighth Army occupied Sfax.
- 12th. Eighth Army captured Souse.
- 15th. Closing of Barclays Bank, Addis Ababa.
- 23rd. Eighth Army captured Jebel Terhouna.
- 24th. Cantonment of Hara evacuated.
- 26th. Colonel Arundell appointed Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer, Middle East.
- 26th. Withdrawal of Major-General Sir R. Hone to London to prepare for Military Administration in Malaya.
- 26th. British troops cleared Longstop Hill.
- 26th. The appointment of Chief Political Officer relinquished by Major-General Lord Rennell of Rodd.
- 26th. Political Branch assumed new title of Civil Affairs Branch.
- 26th. Appointment of Chief Political Officer abolished and replaced in East Africa Command by the appointment of a Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer.
- 26th. C.C.A.O. charged with the responsibility of planning for A.T. (Balkans).
- 26th. Hand-over of enemy property completed at Harar.

MAY

- 3rd. Brigadier Scupham handed over as Military Administrator, Somalia, to Brigadier Wickham.
- 3rd. American troops captured Mateur.

1943
MAY

- 6th. Delegates from fifteen Middle East countries met in Cairo for annual Conference of Middle East Supply Council.
- 7th. Tunis and Bizerta captured and occupation completed.
- 7th. The Directorate of Movement and Transportation, East Africa Command, assumed responsibility for the management and operation of the Ethiopian railway.
- 8th. Island of Pantellaria heavily bombed.
- 12th. Organised resistance ceased throughout Tunisia.
- 20th. A party of Amharic and Boran levies crossed the Kenya frontier and pillaged twenty-two Durreh villages.
- 20th. Lieut.-Colonel Pitcairn handed over as S.C.A.O., Reserved Areas, to Lieut.-Colonel Daniels.

JUNE

- 1st. Custodian of Enemy Property, Ethiopia Offices, opened at Nairobi.
- 3rd. Generals de Gaulle and Giraud reached agreement on constitution of the French Committee for National Liberation.
- 4th. War Office approval given to the Barce Plain project.
- 11th. Pantellaria surrendered.
- 12th. Lampedusa surrendered.
- 20th. H.M. the King visited Malta.
- 20th. Civil Affairs Staff School set up at Mena.
- 20th. Colonel Jameson appointed Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer, East Africa.
- 20th. Formation of Civil Affairs Directorate, War Office : Major-General S. W. Kirby, Director.

JULY

- 1st. Appointment of separate C.F.A.'s for North and South.
- 1st. Responsibility for statal property taken over by C.E.P., Eritrea.
- 4th. Third Flight of repatriates sailed from Mogadishu.
- 10th. Invasion of Sicily.
- 13th. Italian repatriation ships left Massawa.
- 15th. Opening of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd., in Benghazi.
- 17th. Announcement that Amgot (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory) had been set up in Sicily; General Alexander Military Governor; Lord Rennell of Rodd Chief Civil Administrator.
- 17th. General Alexander, Military Governor of Sicily, issued proclamation dissolving Fascist Party, and deputed administrative powers to Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (Amgot).
- 22nd. American troops entered Palermo.
- 23rd. Seventh Army captured Marsala.
- 25th. Mussolini resigned and King of Italy assumed supreme command with Marshal Badoglio as Prime Minister.
- 25th. Major-General Hone succeeded by Major-General Sir A. Parsons, as C.C.A.O., Cairo.

1943
JULY

- 25th. 300 Greek refugees arrived in the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia from the Middle East.

AUGUST

- 5th. Eighth Army entered Catania.
17th. Enemy resistance in Sicily ended.
19th. Conference in London to consider the desirability of employing British troops to pacify Borana.
26th. Emperor Haile Selassie ordered troops to proceed to Tigrai.
28th. Colonel Babington Smith succeeded by Colonel Porters as C.F.A. North.
31st. Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) Ltd. sub-branches closed at Gura and Ghinda.
31st. Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie to Diredawa.

SEPTEMBER

- 3rd. British and Canadian troops of Eighth Army landed on the mainland of Italy.
3rd. Armistice signed with Italy.
8th. General Eisenhower announced unconditional surrender of Italy.
9th. Allied landing at Salerno.
10th. Germans seized Rome.
10th. C.A. Party landed Castellorizo.
16th. C.A. Party landed Cos.
18th. Lieut.-Colonel Black, with three armoured fighting vehicles and a company of the 5th Ethiopian Regular Battalion, ambushed near Amba Alagi.
20th. C.A. Party landed Leros.
21st. Eighth Army occupied Potenza.
22nd. C.A. Party landed Samos.
25th. C.A. Party landed Calymnos.
26th. C.A. Party landed Ikaria.
27th. Eighth Army captured Foggia.
27th. H.M.G.'s Minister's note to Emperor Haile Selassie on affairs in Borana.
30th. C.A. Party landed Symi.
30th. Cyrenaica Defence Force Gendarmerie constituted.

OCTOBER

- 1st. Naples occupied.
1st. Airgraph service for civilians begun between Eritrea and U.K.
5th. C.A. Party evacuated Calymnos.
7th. Lieut.-Colonel Pierson's force attacked north of Amba Alagi by 6,000 men under Haile Mariam.
9th. C.A. Party evacuated Symi.
12th. Colonel Waight appointed C.F.A. North.
13th. King of Italy declared war on Germany.
13th. C.A. Party evacuated Cos.
14th. Quiha and Makalle occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Pierson's forces.

1943

OCTOBER

- 21st. Admiral Sir John Cunningham appointed Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean.
31st. Postal Order service introduced to Cyrenaica.

NOVEMBER

- 10th. Statement by General Eisenhower on Allied control in Italy, under three Allied organisations: an Allied Control Commission, an Allied Military Government of enemy territory (A.M.G.), and an Advisory Council for Italy.
10th. U.K.C.C. agreed to take over supplies for Tripolitania.
16th. C.A. Party evacuated Leros.
17th. C.A. Party evacuated Samos.
18th. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson made statement on Aegean fighting and loss of Leros.
19th. C.A. Party evacuated Ikaria.
21st. C.A. Party evacuated Castelorizo.
21st. Brigadier Lush appointed D.C.C.A.O., 15th Army Group.
22nd. Conference at Cairo between President Roosevelt, General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Churchill.
23rd. Eighth Army crossed River Sangro in strength.
28th. First plenary session of conference between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill held at Teheran.
28th. A new Directive on the form of B.M.A. Gazettes issued by G.H.Q., M.E.F.

DECEMBER

- 1st. German "winter line" in Italy shattered.
3rd. Mr. Churchill conferred with British Chiefs of Staff in Cairo.
6th. Post of V.C.F.A. abolished. Lieut.-Colonel Dickson appointed A.C.F.A.
7th. Brigadier Lush took over command of A.M.G., 15th Army Group, as Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
8th. President Roosevelt visited Malta.
16th. Major-General Lord Rennell left Italy for London, via Algiers.
19th. Brigadier H. R. Hall assumed command of Cyrenaica Area.
21st. Eritrea Industrial Exhibition opened.
23rd. Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister Resident in Middle East, appointed Governor of Bengal.
30th. Announced that Mr. Herbert Lehmann had invited Sir Arthur Salter to assist him during organisational period of U.N.R.R.A.
30th. AT(B)1 ceased to be attached to H.Q. Lines of Communication, and transferred to command of III Corps.
30th. Re-organisation of military command, Cyrenaica.
30th. Visit of Sir Cosmo Parkinson to Somaliland Protectorate.

1944
JANUARY

- 1st. The British Army ceased to be responsible for the provision of supplies for Tripolitania ; from this date imports made through the U.K.C.C.
- 1st. Allied air forces based on the Middle East were active against shipping in the Aegean.
- 3rd. War Office announced that General Montgomery had arrived in U.K. to take over duties as C.-in-C. British group of invasion armies.
- 5th. Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese appointed Commander of Eighth Army.
- 6th. Negotiations regarding a new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement began.
- 8th. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson and General Devers assumed commands in Mediterranean.
- 10th. Allied Advisory Council on Italy met in Naples for discussions with Marshal Badoglio and members of Italian Government.
- 15th. Northern and eastern provinces of Tripolitania amalgamated under the title of Eastern Province.
- 15th. Red Cross message service opened from Tripolitania to Italy and Sicily.
- 16th. General Eisenhower assumed duties as C.-in-C. Allied Expeditionary Force.
- 20th. H.Q. B.M.A. set up at Barce.
- 20th. Debate on U.S. participation in U.N.R.R.A. opened in House of Representatives.
- 22nd. Troops of Fifth Army made landing at Anzio, south of Rome.
- 25th. Resolution passed appropriating £337,500,000 to U.N.R.R.A.
- 26th. AT(B)₁ H.Q. set up at Maadi.
- 27th. New command, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, formed.
- 29th. Emperor Haile Selassie replied to H.M. Minister's note on Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.
- 30th. Fifth Army troops in Italy broke through "Gustav Line" north of Cassino.

FEBRUARY

- 1st. Main coastal road, Tripolitania, handed over to B.M.A.
- 5th. Strike of Eritrean police in Asmara.
- 7th. Middle East agricultural conference opened in Cairo.
- 10th. Announced that, from 11th February, Italian peninsula south of northern boundaries of Salerno and Potenza provinces and Sicily and Sardinia would be restored to jurisdiction of Italian Government.
- 14th. Major-General Lord Rennell relinquished appointment of Chief Civil Affairs Officer, A.M.G., Italy.
- 15th. Cassino Abbey bombed and bombarded.
- 28th. AT(B)₁ reverted to the command of C.A. Branch, G.H.Q., Middle East.
- 29th. Nahas Pasha, in Egyptian Senate, spoke of Arab unity and position of Arabs in Morocco, Tunisia and other parts of North Africa.

1944
MARCH

- 1st. Assab Division placed under Massawa.
24th. Major-General O. C. Wingate killed in airplane crash in Burma.

APRIL

- 1st. Allied Advisory Council for Italy met in Naples.
1st. Shipping and other targets in the Aegean were attacked by Middle East bombers.
8th. Somalia Exhibition opened at Mogadishu.
11th. King George of the Hellenes arrived in Cairo.
12th. King Victor Emmanuel announced intention to abdicate in favour of Prince of Piedmont when Allies entered Rome.
24th. Middle East financial conference opened in Cairo.
24th. AT(B)1 transferred to Cyprus.

MAY

- 3rd. B.M.A. began to take over Ports and Lights of Tripolitania from Royal Navy.
11th-12th. Fifth and Eighth Armies opened offensive against Gustav Line in Italy.
18th. Cassino and the monastery captured.
22nd. Official statement issued on work of Italian patriots in enemy-occupied territory.
25th. Emperor Haile Selassie gave three months' notice of the termination of the 1942 Agreement.
30th. B.M.A. Liaison Officer attached to military staff dealing with disposal of Greek troops in Cyrenaica.

JUNE

- 4th. Fifth Army entered Rome.
6th. Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies on north coast of France.
14th. Galla-Arussi tribesmen crossed the Webi Shebelli river and laid waste twenty-five Ogaden villages.

JULY

- 1st. Bombers from the Middle East attacked shipping in the Aegean.
3rd. French troops in Italy took Siena.
19th. Lord Gort appointed High Commissioner for Palestine.
23rd. News given of successful raid by British and Greek troops on Symi Island in Dodecanese.
23rd. H.M. the King arrived in Italy to visit Allied forces.
23rd. Sharia courts, Tripolitania, taken over by Legal Adviser.
23rd. Visit of Sayed Idris el Senussi to Cyrenaica.

AUGUST

- 11th. Mr. Winston Churchill arrived in Italy.
16th. The Ethiopian Government announced that it expected to assume control of the Reserved Areas, the Ogaden and the Franco-Ethiopian Railway on the 25th August.

1944
AUGUST

- 17th. General Sir William Platt drew the attention of the War Office to the situation regarding the expiry of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.
- 18th. President Roosevelt stated that general understanding had been reached between U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. on military occupation of Germany.
- 22nd. Major-General A. V. Anderson appointed Director of Civil Affairs, War Office.
- 26th. Nahas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, spoke in Alexandria on Egypt's post-war aims.
- 31st. D.C.C.A.O., Dodecanese, met Brigadier Moffatt, Commander 281 Force, in Cairo for planning talks.
- 31st. The Ethiopian Government welcomed the proposal to send a British delegation to Ethiopia.
- 31st. Major-General Sir A. Parsons succeeded as the C.C.A.O., Middle East, by Brigadier R. D. H. Arundell.

SEPTEMBER

- 2nd. New police disciplinary regulations published in Eritrea.
- 12th. Announced that seat of Greek Government had moved from Cairo to Caserta, near Naples.
- 12th. Germans evacuated Mytilene in Greek Aegean islands.
- 16th. Germans began evacuation of Samos in the Aegean.
- 17th. D.C.C.A.O., Dodecanese, formulated outline plan for food-running to the Dodecanese.
- 18th. U.N.R.R.A. Council began meeting in Montreal ; inaugural address by Mr. H. H. Lehmann.
- 21st. British delegation to Ethiopia arrived in Nairobi.
- 24th. British delegation reached Addis Ababa.
- 26th. Germans evacuated Symi.
- 27th. Announced that " Land Forces, Adriatic " were operating on a wide front, including Albania and Dalmatian islands.
- 28th. Announced that conference on liberation of Greece had been recently held, with General Maitland Wilson, General Scobie, G.O.C. for Greece, M. Papandreou and members of Government and two Greek guerrilla leaders.
- 29th. Yugoslav National Committee declined assistance offered by U.N.R.R.A.

OCTOBER

- 1st. A patrol of the Greek Sacred Heart Regiment reached Symi.
- 7th. Arab demonstration outside B.M.A. H.Q., Tripolitania.
- 8th. Corinth reached by Land Forces, Adriatic ; Samos captured.
- 9th. B.M.A. Relief Party, with Force 142, left Haifa for Khios.
- 15th. Appointments of Senior Naval Officer, Cyrenaica, and Naval Officer-in-Charge at Benghazi, lapsed.
- 17th. Lemnos occupied.
- 18th. Island of Carpathos occupied by British naval party.
- 22nd. G.H.Q., Middle East, issued instructions for the occupation of Carpathos and the setting up of B.M.A. there.

1944

OCTOBER

- 23rd. Allies recognized General de Gaulle's Administration as the Provisional Government of France.
- 24th. C.A.O., Symi, began supervision of distribution of food on Symi.
- 24th. First three B.M.A. caiques reached Symi.
- 25th. Announced in London that relations between Great Britain and Italy would be on a more formal footing, with a British Ambassador in Rome and Italian representative in London.
- 27th. B.M.A. Party left Haifa for Carpathos.
- 28th. Commander 281 Force and D.C.C.A.O., Dodecanese, met in Cairo.
- 29th. War Office informed C.-in-C., Middle East, that U.N.R.R.A. had passed a resolution extending their benefits to the Dodecanese.

NOVEMBER

- 4th. Officially stated at Allied H.Q., Mediterranean, that Greece was clear of German troops, except for small individual groups.
- 5th. Lord Moyne, British Minister Resident in Middle East, assassinated in Cairo.
- 6th. C.-in-C., Middle East, informed War Office that no advantages were to be seen in inviting U.N.R.R.A. help in the Dodecanese.
- 7th. Announced that the Aegean Sea was practically free from enemy shipping.
- 7th. Mr. Roosevelt elected President of U.S.A. for fourth term.
- 9th. Brigadier S. H. Longrigg succeeded as Chief Administrator, Eritrea, by Brigadier C. D. McCarthy.
- 20th. British 2nd Army reached the Maas. U.S. 3rd Army captured Dieuze. French 1st Army captured Belfort.
- 21st. Sir Edward Grigg appointed Minister Resident in Middle East.
- 25th. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson appointed head of British Joint Staff in Washington.
- 25th. General Sir Harold Alexander appointed Field-Marshal and to become Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean area.

DECEMBER

- 1st. Cyrenaica Defence Force took over control of immigration and emigration.
- 1st. Announced that the whole of Crete was free, except for Suda Bay, Canac, and the Maleme air base.
- 19th. Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement signed.
- 19th. Civil Court opened in Benghazi.
- 21st. Terms of Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement published.
- 25th. B.M.A. proclaimed on Symi.
- 25th. Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden arrived in Athens.
- 31st. King George of the Hellenes appointed Archbishop Damaskinos Regent of Greece.

1945
JANUARY

- 12th. Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement issued as White Paper.
- 13th. Private trade between U.S.A. and French North and West Africa resumed.
- 21st. Mr. Roosevelt began fourth term as President of U.S.A.
- 31st. The Colonial Development and Welfare Bill, presented to House of Commons by Mr. Oliver Stanley, asked for £120,000,000 for development schemes and research work in the colonies during next ten years.

FEBRUARY

- 1st. S.C.A.O., Reserved Areas, took legislative steps to establish subordinate courts in Jigiga.
- 7th. Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt, and M. Stalin met in Crimea.
- 11th. Final destruction of the German 19th Army announced.
- 16th. Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden visited Cairo and talked with Emperor Haile Selassie.
- 23rd. Turkey declared war on the Axis Powers.
- 24th. Egypt declared war on Germany and Japan.
- 26th. Syria declared war on Germany and Japan.

MARCH

- 1st. An agreement signed between Greek Government and U.N.R.R.A. for delivery of supplies in every part of the country, mainland and islands.
- 1st. Iran declared war on Japan.
- 1st. Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany and Japan.
- 2nd. International Red Cross delegate reported that there were 62,000 starving civilians in the Dodecanese Islands.
- 4th. B.M.A. personnel landed on Telos.
- 9th. An agreement signed between the Italian Government and U.N.R.R.A. for provision of free relief to a total of 50,000,000 dollars.
- 22nd. A Pact of Union of the Arab States signed in Cairo by representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Lebanon, and the Yemen.

APRIL

- 12th. Death of President Roosevelt.
- 28th. Mussolini captured and shot by partisans.
- 29th. Eighth Army captured Venice.
- 30th. U.S. 1st Army joined up with Russian troops.
- 30th. In Italy General Clark announced that the German armies were virtually eliminated as a military force.
- 30th. Lieut.-Colonel D. K. Daniels, S.C.A.O., Reserved Areas, succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel G. H. W. Kitson.

MAY

- 1st. Greek raiding forces landed on Rhodes and Alimnia.
- 2nd. The German armies in Italy made complete surrender.

v*

1945
MAY

- 7th. Unconditional surrender of Germany to Western Allies and Russia.
- 8th. VE Day.
- 8th. All German Forces in the Dodecanese surrendered to Commander, Force 281, by German Commander.
- 9th. Military Parties, including B.M.A. staff, sailed to Rhodes, Cos and Leros.
- 10th. Official date for the commencement of B.M.A. in the Dodecanese.
- 11th. Brigadier Moffatt reached Rhodes.
- 11th. Italian banks closed in the Dodecanese.
- 14th. C.-in-C., Middle East, arrived in Rhodes.
- 14th. C.-in-C., Middle East, agreed to U.N.R.R.A. assuming responsibility for procurement of civil supplies for Dodecanese.
- 15th. Visit of the Regent of Greece to the Dodecanese began.
- 16th. Eighth Army forces made contact with Russian forces across Austria from north to south.
- 17th. Rhodes Summary Court opened.
- 20th. The Operations and Planning Department of the British Military Government issued statement announcing the decentralisation of Germany, the political and administrative powers hitherto concentrated in Berlin to be taken over by the industrial, maritime, and agricultural provinces.
- 22nd. Field-Marshal Montgomery appointed C.-in-C. of the British Forces of Occupation in Germany, and British Member of the Allied Control Council.

JUNE

- 2nd. Issue of official rations against repayment began in the Dodecanese.
- 8th. An agreement setting up the provisional régime in Venezia Giulia signed in Belgrade by the British and American Governments and the Yugoslav Government.
- 26th. The World Security Charter signed at San Francisco by fifty nations.

JULY

- 1st. B.M.A. took over the collection of taxes in Rhodes.
- 2nd. Attack on the district headquarters at Burao.
- 3rd. Promulgation of Eritrea Proclamation No. 13.
- 5th. General Election in United Kingdom.
- 14th. Announced that Italy was at war with Japan.
- 26th. Mr. Winston Churchill resigned Premiership.
- 30th. The Allied Control Council held its first meeting in Berlin.
- 31st. Field-Marshal Alexander appointed Governor-General of Canada.

1945
JULY
31st.

Brigadier P. B. E. Acland became Chief Administrator, Dodecanese.

AUGUST

- 1st. U.N.R.R.A. assumed responsibility for provision of essential supplies to the Dodecanese.
- 7th. Mr. Lehmann, Director-General of U.N.R.R.A., stated that at least £375,000,000 worth of additional resources would be needed to meet the requirements of Europe that winter.
- 8th. Russia declared herself at war with Japan.
- 9th. An atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
- 14th. Mr. Attlee announced that Japan had accepted the Allied demand for unconditional surrender.
- 14th. Brigadier C. D. McCarthy succeeded as Chief Administrator, Eritrea, by Brigadier J. M. Benoy.

SEPTEMBER

- 6th. Learnt that the Emperor of Ethiopia had granted an exclusive oil concession to the Sinclair Oil Corporation, part of it under a fifty-year lease.
- 11th. The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened in London.
- 14th. The Council of Foreign Ministers began discussions on terms for peace with Italy.
- 20th. The Foreign Office announced that H.M.G. would give Greece all the assistance possible, and was contributing to U.N.R.R.A. to the utmost of Britain's resources.
- 20th. Brigadier R. D. H. Arundell succeeded as C.C.A.O., Middle East, by Brigadier D. C. Cumming.
- 20th. Formation of the Antiquities Department, B.M.A., Dodecanese.

OCTOBER

- 1st. Civil Motor Transport Group, Eritrea, abolished.
- 2nd. United Nations Council of Foreign Ministers decided to terminate session ; Mr. Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State, issued statement on breakdown of talks.
- 5th. Mohamed Riadh Bey, Chairman of Egyptian Foreign Affairs Committee, made statement on Anglo-Egyptian relations and defence of Suez Canal.
- 9th. Military Government in Burma gave place to civil administration.
- 20th. First U.N.R.R.A. personnel arrived in the Dodecanese.
- 30th. General Smuts, at Cape Town, proposed international peace conference if Council of Foreign Ministers could not reach agreement.
- 30th. Brigadier P. B. E. Acland transferred to Cyrenaica ; succeeded by Brigadier C. H. Gormley.
- 30th. Brigadier D. C. Cumming succeeded as Chief Administrator, Cyrenaica, by Brigadier P. B. E. Acland.

1945
NOVEMBER

- 1st. U.S. Congress voted \$550,000,000 to U.N.R.R.A.
- 1st. Mr. Bevin, at Anglo-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce, spoke on Egyptian and British roles in Middle East.
- 4th. Anti-Jewish rioting in Tripoli.
- 6th. White Paper (Cmd. 6693) issued on Italian armistice terms.
- 12th. King Farouk, at opening of new Parliamentary session, spoke on Anglo-Egyptian relations and the unity of the Nile Valley.
- 12th. First sitting took place of the Civil Courts in the Dodecanese.
- 12th. B.M.A. Educational Officer arrived in the Dodecanese.

DECEMBER

- 9th. Signor de Gasperi formed new Italian Government.
- 21st. Egyptian Ambassador in London presented note requesting revision of 1936 treaty.
- 21st. B.M.A., Dodecanese, notified that they would be required to take over managements of ports and harbours from the Royal Navy.

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
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
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