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**HISTORY OF
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY SERIES
EDITED BY SIR JAMES BUTLER**

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CIVIL AFFAIRS AND
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
NORTH-WEST EUROPE

1944-1946

BY
F. S. V. DONNISON, C.B.E.

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
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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE present volume in the series devoted to the military administration of occupied territories describes, as its title implies, the dual task which faced the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in 1944. It was also an unprecedented task. Dr. C. R. S. Harris's volume on Italy was concerned with the administration of an enemy country which in the course of operations became co-belligerent. Mr. Donnison's own earlier volume on the Far East dealt with territories which had formerly been the dependencies of European Powers. General Eisenhower's plans had to provide both for the possibility of a temporary administration of friendly countries groaning under German occupation and also, at a later stage, for the assumption of the government of Germany and Austria themselves for what might be a considerable period. The former commitment was evidently a highly delicate one, not the less so that the political leaders of the friendly countries in England were suspicious of what their British and American allies had in mind; while the latter commitment would demand entirely different attitudes and methods on the part of the military governors.

There was a further complication, in the later stages, which had not existed in Italy. As in Italy, so in North-West Europe Military Government was a combined and integrated Anglo-American responsibility; but it had now, in the case of Germany and Austria, to reckon with a Russian partner with whom co-operation was far from easy.

It was realised of course that a time would come when military must be replaced by civil administration. The transfer however was gradual, and it was not obvious at what point this volume should end. Mr. Donnison explains why he has stopped where he has.

J.R.M.B.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

LEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MORGAN, who planned the Anglo-American invasion of Europe in 1944, has written: 'Of all the many and varied facets of C.O.S.S.A.C.'s¹ great task, the most vexatious and the least satisfactory was undoubtedly all that complex activity known collectively as Civil Affairs.'² And yet, in the event, the task of reviving administration in the generally friendly, but sometimes hypersensitive, liberated countries, and in a Germany shattered beyond previous experience, was done, as I hope this book will show, with remarkable success.

I have tried to tell the story of the assumption of military responsibility for civil administration in north-west Europe from the early fumbling days when two staff officers in the branch of the Major-General, Administration, at General Morgan's headquarters were set to planning for civil affairs, to the time when Major-General (now Field Marshal Sir Gerald) Templer, as Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government at 21 Army Group headquarters, and head of a service of some 5,000 persons, became virtually Prime Minister of the British zone of Germany, and more than any other man saved the zone from famine and anarchy through the desperate winter of 1945-46.

The account ends before the military government could show many results - before, also, it had got into the difficulties which later assailed it, within and without. Accordingly many matters arising in the early months after the surrender of Germany, of great historical interest and of vital importance to the people of Germany, have received scant mention, or none, in the present volume. This has resulted from the course followed in bringing the book to a close. It would have been inappropriate to cut it short at the termination of hostilities for in respect of its particular subject the military authorities continued to bear a heavy responsibility after this date. Indeed military government, at anything above the merely local level, did not come into existence, and did not begin to discharge its major functions until after the surrender of Germany. But equally clearly, since it is a history of the Second World War of which this volume forms a part, it would not have been appropriate to extend its scope to include any general account of the work of the Control Commission and of its British element, activities which extend far beyond anything that

¹ C.O.S.S.A.C. = Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, or the headquarters of the former.

² Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, London, 1950, p. 231.

could reasonably be considered the war period. Various dates suggested themselves, but the least unsatisfactory method of bringing the volume to a close seemed eventually to be that adopted and explained in chapters XV and XVI, under which the account has been gradually faded-out in step with the progressive transfer of responsibility, on various dates at the several levels of command, from the War Office and the military formations to the civil authorities. Reference to the activities of the British element of the Control Commission and to the problems encountered by it, has been included only to the extent necessary for an understanding of the work of the military authorities and of this gradual transfer of responsibility.

It is in line with this conception of the scope of the volume that there is little or no reference to the Potsdam Conference. For this was not so much the last of the great wartime conferences as the first act of the post-war period. Together with the Potsdam Conference there have had to be omitted many matters which raised political, economic and moral questions of the utmost difficulty and importance to Germany, but which did not in the event, fall to be dealt with by the military authorities. Among these were the extraction of reparations from Germany, the determination of the level to which the industry of the country should be allowed to revive, the re-education of the people of Germany, and the care and disposal of the hard core of refugees and displaced persons who could not or would not be repatriated. It was not possible to take these matters up within the period of military responsibility, either because no agreement had been reached as to the policy to be pursued, a difficulty that often persisted into the post-military period also, or because the handling of the immediate, first-aid, problem, e.g. the repatriation of the millions of displaced persons concerning whom no legal or political difficulties arose, was, in the disintegration and physical destruction of the military period, a task so great as to leave no time or resources for the initiation of longer-term measures.

A number of other matters are touched upon in this volume but not considered at length for a different reason: that they do not exclusively concern the north-west Europe theatre of operations. It is hoped that these may be dealt with at greater length in the remaining volume of these histories dealing with civil affairs and military government. This will be concerned with general principles and the planning and organization of civil affairs and military government activity at the levels of the War Office, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States. One such matter is the recruitment and training of civil affairs and military government officers. Another must clearly be the conflict between the A.M.G.O.T.¹ conception of the separate chain of command

¹ A.M.G.O.T. = Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories in Italy.

for military administration, and the conception adopted for north-west Europe under which civil affairs and military government was a normal function of command to be exercised by closely integrated staffs through normal command and staff channels. Civil affairs and military government staffs in the S.H.A.E.F.¹ theatre of operations were as certain of the necessity for this form of organization, as their opposite numbers in the Mediterranean theatre were convinced of the superiority of the A.M.G.O.T. conception. Some balancing must be attempted in the remaining volume of the respective merits of these two opposed forms of organization. Another matter of basic importance to the satisfactory discharge of civil affairs and military government responsibility in any theatre is the proper relationship of the commander's civil affairs and military government staff to the rest of his staff, 'G', 'A' and 'Q'.² Touched on in this book, it will be more fully discussed in the final volume. There also will be included an account of the organization and work of the combined Anglo-American machinery for the procurement and shipping of those relief supplies which reached the north-west Europe theatre under the 'Plan A' arrangements described in this volume. In this it has only been possible to recount their receipt and distribution within the European theatre.

An attempt to avoid altogether the use of initials was quickly frustrated by such mouthfuls as 'Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer', 'European Theatre of Operations United States Army', and the more familiar 'United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration'. D.C.C.A.O., E.T.O.U.S.A. and U.N.R.R.A. had obvious advantages over these, and, furthermore, were liable to appear in quotations from documents. I have explained such abbreviations on their first appearance and have also included a glossary of initials. In addition I have added a glossary of German administrative terms used.

As in other volumes of this series, no references are given to unpublished sources - which, in fact, represent by far the greater part of the material on which this book is based. Such references are printed, however, in a confidential edition.

I am indebted to so many for assistance that it would be individious, if not impossible, to make my acknowledgements to all. But to two persons I must express my thanks: Brigadier A. E. Hodgkin and Major-General G. D. G. Heyman. I have unremittingly and unrepentantly sought to pick their brains for recollections and ideas concerning civil affairs and military government, and without their help this book could scarcely have been written. And for the second

¹ S.H.A.E.F. = Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in north-west Europe.

² General Staff Branch, Adjutant-General's Branch and Quarter-Master-General's Branch.

time, and with that much more sense of indebtedness, I would like to thank Sir James Butler, the editor of the Military Histories for his advice and continuing support. But the responsibility for what I have written is mine.

GLOSSARY OF INITIALS AND OF GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE TERMS

A	Adjutant-General's Branch
A.F.H.Q.	Allied Force Headquarters.
A.M.G.O.T.	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories.
A.T.(E.)	Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee.
B.A.O.R.	British Army of the Rhine.
B.T.A.	British Troops, Austria.
C.A.	Civil Affairs.
C.A.I.D.	Civil Affairs Inland Depot
C.C.A.C.	Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
C.C.A.O.	Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
C.F.A.	Controller of Finance and Accounts.
C.O.S.S.A.C.	Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander.
D.C.C.A.O.	Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
D.I.D.	Detail Issue Depot.
D.P.	Displaced Person.
D.P.X.	Displaced Persons Executive.
E.T.O.U.S.A.	European Theatre of Operations, United States Army.
G.	General Staff Branch (British Army).
G-1, G-2, etc.	General Staff, Division 1, Division 2, etc. (U.S. Army).
L. of C.	Line(s) of Communication.
M.O.11	Section 11, Directorate of Military Operations.
N.M.A.	Netherlands Military Administration.
P.O.L.	Petrol, Oil and Lubricants.
Q.	Quarter-Master-General's Branch.
Q (Movement).	Movement Section of Quarter-Master-General's Branch.
R.M.	Reichsmark.
S.A.	<i>Sturmabteilung</i> (Nazi 'Storm Troops').
S.A.C.M.E.D.	Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.
S.C.A.E.F.	Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
S.C.A.O.	Senior Civil Affairs Officer.
S.D.	<i>Sicherheitsdienst</i> (Nazi Security Police, sub-division of S.S.).
S.H.A.E.F.	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
S.O.1	Staff Officer, 1st Grade.
S.O.2	Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.

xviii GLOSSARY OF INITIALS AND ABBREVIATIONS

S.S.	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> (Nazi Security Service).
S.S.O.C.A.	Senior Staff Officer, Civil Affairs.
U.K.	United Kingdom.
U.N.R.R.A.	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
U.S.	United States.
U.S.A.	United States of America.
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
V. 1	German pilotless aircraft.
V. 2	German long-range rocket.

<i>Reich</i>	The German State.
<i>Reichstag</i>	Parliament.
<i>Reichsgericht</i>	Supreme Court.
<i>Reichsbahn</i>	State Railway.
<i>Reichsbahnoberdirektion</i>	Central Railway Authority.
<i>Reichsbahndirektion</i>	Regional Railway Authority.
<i>Reichspost</i>	State Post.
<i>Reichspostoberdirektion</i>	Central Postal Authority.
<i>Provinz</i>	Province (of Prussia: twelve in all, including Berlin; four in British zone).
<i>Land (Länder)</i>	Constituent State(s) of the <i>Reich</i> .
<i>Reichsgau</i>	Administrative district annexed to the <i>Reich</i> after 1938.
<i>Regierungsbezirk</i>	County (or Region).
<i>Bezirk</i>	<i>Regierungsbezirk</i> or <i>Verwaltungsbezirk</i> .
<i>Verwaltungsbezirk</i>	Borough of Berlin.
<i>Kreis</i>	District (or County).
<i>Stadtkreis</i>	Urban District.
<i>Landkreis</i>	Rural District.
<i>Gemeinde</i>	Parish (or <i>Commune</i>).
<i>Stadtgemeinde</i>	Urban Parish.
<i>Landgemeinde</i>	Rural Parish.
<i>Oberpräsident</i>	Head of <i>Provinz</i> Administration.
<i>Regierungspräsident</i>	Head of <i>Regierungsbezirk</i> Administration.
<i>Oberbürgermeister</i>	Head of <i>Stadtkreis</i> Administration.
<i>Landrat</i>	Head of Berlin Administration.
<i>Bürgermeister</i>	Head of <i>Landkreis</i> Administration.
<i>Oberlandesgericht</i>	Head of <i>Stadtgemeinde</i> Administration.
<i>Landgericht</i>	Head of <i>Verwaltungsbezirk</i> Administration.
<i>Amtsgericht</i>	Court of appeal.
<i>Sondergericht</i>	Court of first instance and of appeal.
<i>Volksgerichtshof</i>	Court of first instance.
<i>Land (Austria)</i>	Special Court.
<i>Landeshauptmann (Austria)</i>	People's Court.
<i>Gau (Austria)</i>	Austrian Province.
	Head of Austrian <i>Land</i> Administration.
	Nazi administrative area of Greater Vienna.

CHAPTER I

THE PLANNERS

ON the 4th June 1940 at 2.23 p.m. the Admiralty ordered the ending of the great operation for the evacuation of British and French troops from the coast of Dunkirk. In all 366,162 men had been delivered from capture or death at the hands of the conquering German forces. Guns and vehicles were lost, but these men were saved. A great surge of thankfulness and resolution lifted the hearts of the people of England.

On the same day, the Prime Minister recorded the following minute:

'We are greatly concerned – and it is certainly wise to be so – with the dangers of the Germans landing in England in spite of our possessing command of the seas and having very strong defence by fighters in the air. Every creek, every beach, every harbour has become to us a source of anxiety. Besides this the parachutists might sweep over and take Liverpool or Ireland, and so forth. All this mood is very good if it engenders energy. But if it is so easy for the Germans to invade us, in spite of sea power, some may feel inclined to ask the question, why should it be thought impossible for us to do anything of the same kind to them. The completely defensive habit of mind which has ruined the French must not be allowed to ruin all our initiative. It is of the highest consequence to keep the largest number of German forces all along the coasts of the countries they have conquered, and we should immediately set to work to organize raiding forces on these coasts where the populations are friendly. Such forces might be composed of self-contained, thoroughly-equipped units of say one thousand and up to not more than ten thousand when combined. Surprise would be ensured by the fact that the destination would be concealed until the last moment. What we have seen at Dunkirk shows how quickly troops can be moved off (and I suppose on to) selected points if need be. How wonderful it would be if the Germans could be made to wonder where they were going to be struck next, instead of forcing us to try to wall in the Island and roof it over! An effort must be made to shake off the mental and moral prostration to the will and initiative of the enemy from which we suffer.'¹

From this time on planning began for raids upon the coast of Europe, and ever-widening study was undertaken of the possibility

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II, London, 1949, p. 214.

of establishing British forces once again on the Continent, in the hope that some day it might even become possible to invade the homeland of Germany. This book is concerned with a limited aspect of this planning and of the majestic operations that ensued, operations of which the very possibility was at this time still hidden in the threatening future. It is concerned with the conduct of the relations of the invading forces with the people, and the re-establishment of civil administration, in the countries invaded. Although it is primarily the British war effort with which the book is concerned it cannot confine its attention to the exclusively British formations. It is true that the great Anglo-American headquarters that was later to be set up for the conduct of the war against Germany in north-west Europe was in the event more American than British in character. It could hardly be otherwise in view of the comparative resources which the two countries would in the long run bring into the common pool. Nevertheless the British played an integral and decisive part in it, which cannot be considered in isolation. Nor for that matter could the work of the exclusively British subordinate formations be understood without reference to the functioning and the planning of the Anglo-American headquarters which was responsible for formulating or transmitting Allied policy for the benefit of the forces under its command. But the book will not refer to purely American activities further than is necessary to provide a setting for the main story.

It is the purpose of this first chapter to describe the organization responsible for the planning of the 'civil' aspects of the invasion of North-West Europe. But before doing this it is necessary to show, in the broadest outline, the framework into which 'civil' planning fitted.

The conduct of the war by the United Kingdom was in the hands of the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the general control of the War Cabinet. When Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940 he assumed the additional designation of Minister of Defence and with this the responsibility for '... the general direction of the war, subject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the House of Commons.'¹ This responsibility was discharged through and in the closest consultation with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The planning instrument of the Chiefs of Staff was a body known as the Joint Planning Staff. Through the rest of 1940 and the whole of 1941 this staff had under consideration a number of plans to meet different sets of circumstances which involved landing British forces in such widely separated places as Metropolitan Italy, Norway, the Iberian Peninsula, France and the Low Countries. All these were dropped, or pigeon-holed, or (more frequently) merged in later plans. During this period, however, the entry into the war, first of Russia, then of the United States, twice

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II, London, 1949, p. 15.

fundamentally changed the conditions of planning. On the second occasion it was not merely the balance of resources that had altered. There was the need also to unify planning and effort in the United States and the United Kingdom. To this end there was set up the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. This consisted of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, or more frequently the representatives of the latter, sitting together as a Combined Committee. This Committee was responsible neither to the American nor to the British Governments but to the President and Prime Minister acting jointly in historic and fruitful collaboration, within their constitutional limitations. After the entry of America into the war in December 1941 the invasion of Germany from the west slowly showed through the clouds as a feasible goal for which it was reasonable, nay urgent, to begin practical and detailed planning. Sustained study, and repeated selection and rejection of proposals by the Joint Planning Staff had already led to the formulation of a proposal for landing a British Expeditionary Force on the coast of France. This was known as 'Operation Round-up'. In December 1941 it was laid before the Commanders-in-Chief in the U.K. of the three services. The proposal received general approval and was remitted to the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget, for closer scrutiny and preparation of an outline plan. A special Round-up Planning Staff was then formed consisting mostly of members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces but with assistance from the staffs of the other services. By April–May 1942 the three Commanders-in-Chief, General Paget, Admiral Ramsay and Air Marshal Douglas, as a result of their close association in this planning, came to be known as the Combined Commanders. Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, also became a member of the group. A little later there was added also the newly-arrived Commanding General of the United States Army in the European Theatre of War, General D. D. Eisenhower, whose duty it was ' . . . to prepare for and carry on military operations in the European Theatre against the Axis Powers and their Allies' wherever it might ultimately be decided to launch the attack.¹ The Round-up Planning Staff, working under the control of the Combined Commanders, was charged with the duty of initiating planning for an invasion of North-West Europe in the Spring of 1943. In the course of 1942 however the invasion of North Africa was decided upon by the British and American Governments and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and it became clear that this would take priority over the invasion of Europe.

Then in mid-January 1943 the President of the United States and

¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 60.

the Prime Minister met, with their military advisers, at Casablanca in newly liberated North African territory, for one of those memorable conferences at which it was their habit to review the progress of the war and to pencil in the broad lines of strategy for the coming months. Here it was decided to set up at once, in the United Kingdom, an Allied inter-service staff under a British officer to prepare a definite plan for the invasion of the Continent as early as possible in 1944. Lieutenant-General F. E. Morgan, previously commanding I Corps, was appointed and designated Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander. It was the intention that the Supreme Allied Commander himself should be appointed later, nearer the date for the launching of the great enterprise he was to command. With the decision to appoint the Chief of Staff, detailed practical planning could begin.

* * *

The new Allied Inter-Service Staff was set up in March 1943 in Norfolk House, St. James's Square, London, and took over planning for the invasion of Europe. It took as its name the initials of the post to which its head had been appointed, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander – C.O.S.S.A.C.

Two points need to be noticed about this new staff.

First, it was what came to be known as an 'integrated' staff. And here we must notice the technical meaning attached to this term for it will recur from time to time in these pages. In an 'integrated' staff there was much closer fusion than in a 'combined' staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee may be cited as an example of a 'combined' organization. Here the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the U.K. Chiefs of Staff sat together but each of the two components retained its national identity and could, and did, continue to function independently. In an 'integrated' organization there was no such parallelism. The staff was built up by the selection of those officers considered most suitable and, except for the need to maintain a general balance between Allies, without regard to nationality. Such a staff was an organic entity and any attempt to shake out the national elements would involve a surgical operation that must prove fatal to the whole and to the parts.

In the second place the new integrated headquarters was responsible, neither to the War Department in Washington nor to the War Office in London, though it had dealings in plenty with both, but solely to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and beyond them to the President and Prime Minister. General Morgan has since described how it had to be brought home both to the British and to the American authorities ' . . . that C.O.S.S.A.C. was indeed international in character . . . ' and that if there should be anything that either of these

authorities did not wish the others to know, then they must not send it to C.O.S.S.A.C. He concludes:

'In particular, there was a very memorable transatlantic telephone conversation, listened to at both ends of course by several people, when the voice speaking from the Pentagon finished a long harangue with the words: "But for Christ's sake don't tell the British." When the speaker asked indignantly why this recommendation had been greeted with such merriment, he had to be told by the principal speaker in London, a senior American general, that every word had been keenly listened to by two British generals and one British admiral.'¹

Exceptional unity of planning and command was achieved in this Allied staff between the U.K. and the U.S. It would be wrong to describe it as unprecedented for the creation of Allied Force Headquarters for the invasion of North Africa had shown what could be done and had set the pattern for the subsequent invasion of Europe. Not least of the difficulties to be overcome was the difference between the American and the English languages. To quote General Morgan: 'I received a weighty document . . . which I read and re-read and studied until it dawned upon me that I did not understand one single word of it. Here was a vast assemblage of words each of which was undoubtedly English, but which in conjunction conveyed to me not one single thing, and I was eventually forced to call for skilled interpretation to have the order put out of the American military language into British military language.'² But this unity was a fact of the utmost significance and it had its full influence on the planning for Civil Affairs and for Military Government. It was rooted in a common purpose and in common ideals of political freedom. But it owed most perhaps to the determination of its Commanders.

General Morgan's resolve to ensure real unity underlay all his work and stands out from every page of his published account of this time.³ His American Deputy, Major-General Barker, said that ' . . . any division along national lines should be avoided . . .' General Eisenhower himself wrote – and though it was said of Allied Force Headquarters in Africa (A.F.H.Q.) it might as well have been said when he became Supreme Commander and took over C.O.S.S.A.C.:

'Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name a common foe, and "unity of command" has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high-ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of a different nationality or different service . . . I was determined from the

¹ Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, London, 1950, p. 80.

² *Ibid*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid*.

first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.'

In April General Morgan received his directive from the recently established Combined Chiefs of Staff. It read:

(1) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to appoint, in due course, a Supreme Commander over all United Nations forces for the invasion of the Continent of Europe from the United Kingdom.

The Supreme Commander will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for planning and executing such operations, and for the co-ordination of the training policy of forces to be employed in amphibious operations against the Continent in accordance with this Directive.

(2) Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander or his deputy, you will be responsible for carrying out the above planning duties of the Supreme Commander. You will report to the British Chiefs of Staff with whom will be associated the United States Commander of the European Theatre of Operations acting as the direct representative of the United States Chiefs of Staff in the United Kingdom.

OBJECT

(3) Our object is to defeat the German fighting forces in North-West Europe.

(4) To this end the Combined Chiefs of Staff will endeavour to assemble the strongest possible forces (subject to prior commitments in other theatres) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent if German resistance is weakened to the required extent in 1943. In the meantime the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be prepared to order such limited operations as may be practicable with the forces and material available.

PREPARATION OF PLANS

(5) You will accordingly prepare plans for:

(a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.

(b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(c) A full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

STAFF AND METHOD OF PLANNING

(6) You will be provided with a small permanent Combined Staff drawn from the British and United States Navies, Armies and Air Forces.

FURTHER GUIDANCE

(7) You should maintain close contact with the British Chiefs of Staff and their organisation, through whom you will be given such further guidance as you may require. You should also maintain close contact with Headquarters European Theatre of Operations of the United States Army.

ALLIED STAFFS

(8) The Allied Military Staffs (other than British and American) will not be brought into the planning at present. The British Chiefs of Staff will inform you at what stage these other Allied Staffs should be consulted.

CANCELLATION OF PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES

(9) This Directive cancels all previous directives issued to the Combined Commanders for amphibious operations launched from the United Kingdom against the Continent.

Clearly this was not intended to be an ordinary planning staff, denied the prospect of ultimate executive responsibility. This was the embryo headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander who would conduct the invasion of Europe, and it would in due course be called upon to put into operation the plans it had prepared.

General Morgan's conception of the C.O.S.S.A.C. staff, which indeed was that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed in paragraph 6 of their Directive, was that it should be kept down in numbers to the minimum required for dealing with broad issues. The detail of planning and the day to day conduct of operations should be left in the hands of Army Group Commanders. In line with this conception the British Army Group headquarters that was to serve under the Supreme Allied Commander was early called into existence in July, 1943. It was designated 21 Army Group, and General Sir Bernard Paget was transferred from the British Home Command to become Commander-in-Chief. It began work at once in St. Paul's School, at Hammer-smith, on plans for the deployment of the forces that would be placed under its command. The comparable American formation, First United States Army Group, was formed on 18th October 1943. General Omar Bradley, Commanding General of First United States Army was placed in charge also of planning at First U.S. Army Group. The ideal of a small supreme headquarters was soon lost, however, and there was great, some thought excessive, expansion of the

C.O.S.S.A.C. staff, particularly when it was transformed into the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

At the end of 1943 General Eisenhower was designated Supreme Commander. In January 1944 he assumed charge and C.O.S.S.A.C. became Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force or S.H.A.E.F. At the same time General Sir Bernard Montgomery was transferred from command of the British 8th Army in Italy to be Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group in place of General Paget.

On assuming responsibility for the execution of the plans prepared by C.O.S.S.A.C. for 'Overlord'¹, both these commanders insisted that if the assault was to have a chance of success it must be made in greater weight and on a broader front than had been planned. The planning staffs had been required to make do with what they were promised; only a commander could insist upon additional resources. In February 1944 the planning took its final shape with the issue of a document known as the 'Initial Joint Plan'.

Here we must turn our backs on operational planning and the ensuing conduct of operations, leaving them to be dealt with in greater detail elsewhere,² and narrow down our attention to the planning for Civil Affairs and Military Government, which alone are the concern of this book.

* * *

When the Round-up Planning Staff came into existence it was soon realized that the planning to be undertaken must include arrangements for relations with the civil populations and the restoration of civil administration in the countries to be occupied.

In May 1942 the Round-up Administrative Planning Staff was set up in addition to the operational planners. At its first meeting the new staff raised the question of the Department of State which should be responsible for policy in regard to Civil Affairs and for bringing into existence the organization required. The matter was laid before the Committee of the Principal Administrative Officers of the Combined Commanders, and referred by this committee to Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary to the Cabinet, and considered at a meeting convened by him.

More than a year before this, on 20th February 1941, it had been decided by the War Cabinet that, in regard to the Middle East, responsibility for the administration of all occupied enemy territories should rest upon the War Office. In the following month a new section (M.O.11) of the Directorate of Military Operations was created to discharge this responsibility, and an inter-departmental standing committee was set up for the administration of occupied

¹ Code name for invasion of the Continent.

² In a forthcoming volume of this series.

enemy territories. On 23rd June 1942, at Sir Edward Bridges' meeting it was conformably decided that, since it was essential that any scheme for the administration of occupied areas should be such as to meet military requirements, the War Office should be primarily responsible for the preparation of plans for the administration of occupied areas, whether in friendly or enemy territory, in Europe as well as in the Middle East. In preparing these plans, the War Office was required to keep in close touch with the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee, the 'Round-up' Planning Staff, the Civil Affairs Committee at the headquarters of the U.S. forces in the U.K., known as European Theatre of Operations, United States Army, or E.T.O.U.S.A. for short, and any other Government Departments concerned.

The wide ramifications of the subject made it desirable to create an inter-departmental organization to facilitate consultation, and at the end of June 1942 the Administration of Territories (Europe) or A.T.(E.) Committee was set up. This committee was required:

'to consider, in conjunction with Force Commanders concerned and with other Government Departments at the appropriate stages, the steps necessary on military grounds to ensure efficient civil administration of the territory liberated in Europe as the result of operations by forces of the United Nations.'

The Permanent Under-Secretary of the War Office, Sir Frederick Bovenschen, was chairman and the other members were representatives of the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Permanent Under-Secretary (Finance), and the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. The committee was required to establish and maintain the necessary contacts with the Allied Governments concerned, the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee, and the Civil Affairs Committee of the U.S. Forces headquarters in the U.K. Representatives of the Foreign Office and the U.S. forces were immediately co-opted and the section of the Round-up Administrative Planning Staff that had been responsible for dealing with the problems of civil administration was merged in the committee. Later there was representation also of other authorities, permanently, or as required. This was the effective starting point for all British planning for Civil Affairs and Military Government in north-west Europe.

The next step in the development of planning machinery in this connection was the appointment by the War Office in October 1942, at the suggestion of the A.T.(E.) Committee, of a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (D.C.C.A.O.) for North-West Europe, Brigadier S. S. Lee. This appointment assumed that when in due course a Commander-in-Chief was chosen for the invasion of Europe he would

have on his staff a Chief Civil Affairs Officer responsible for relations with the civil population and the restoration of civil administration. Meanwhile the D.C.C.A.O. would press on with planning and preparation precisely in the same way as General Morgan was required, a little later, to plan and make preparations in the capacity of Chief of Staff to a Supreme Commander yet to be appointed. Ultimately, therefore, the D.C.C.A.O. would become a part of the Civil Affairs staff of the commander responsible for operations in Europe. Meanwhile he would be housed in the War Office, although not becoming in any strict sense a part of M.O.11. The general lines of Civil Affairs planning would be laid down by the A.T.(E.) Committee: the D.C.C.A.O. would be required to translate these into detailed preparations for territories to be liberated or occupied in Europe. He was to work in close collaboration with the Round-up Planning Staff, who would be drawing up the operational plans into which his own planning must be fitted, and to maintain close liaison with Headquarters E.T.O.U.S.A. and the various relief organizations, initially through their representatives on the A.T.(E.) Committee. When authority for this could be obtained from the Foreign Office he was also to maintain liaison with the Allied Governments in London.

The A.T.(E.) Committee made preliminary examinations, or caused such examinations to be made by the D.C.C.A.O. or other appropriate agency, of the preparation that would require to be undertaken with regard to a very wide range of subjects.¹ In many of these matters broad principles were thrashed out that successfully stood the test of later re-examination and that found their place in the instructions ultimately issued for the guidance of Civil Affairs Officers in the field.

As a result of the steady increase of work in connection with Civil Affairs planning, the section in the War Office known as M.O.11 was expanded and elevated to the independent status of a directorate in July 1943, with Major-General S. W. Kirby as Director. The position of the D.C.C.A.O. for North-West Europe remained unchanged. He continued to work under the general direction of the A.T.(E.) Committee and the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces on Civil Affairs problems in connection with the invasion of Europe, reporting to the Director of Civil Affairs who had the overall responsibility for Civil Affairs policy and problems at the War Office level, that is, for all theatres of operations, not merely the European theatre. The D.C.C.A.O. North-West Europe would in due course be transferred to the staff of the commander responsible for the invasion of Europe. He would then leave behind in the Directorate of Civil Affairs a small section to act as link between him and the Director of Civil Affairs.

¹ e.g. The training of Civil Affairs Officers, Liaison with Allied Authorities, Finance and Currency, Food, Fuel, Public Health and Medical Stores, Law and Order, Relief and Relief Supplies, Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, Transportation.

Meanwhile his staff, divided into country sections, that came to be known colloquially as 'country houses', worked on the detailed problems involved in the re-occupation of France, Germany, Norway and the Low Countries.

Many felt that the 'country houses' later suffered from a certain hypertrophy. They did valuable work, but much of the paper distributed by them cannot possibly have been read by hard-pressed officers in the field.

* * *

Meanwhile, in the U.S.A. realization of the scope and importance that Civil Affairs must have in the conditions of modern warfare, also grew, if rather more slowly. The experience gained in the Allied operations in North Africa at the end of 1942, when the French Administration showed little disposition to co-operate, led to intensive study of the organization and methods required, and it was realised that there was a good deal of lee-way to make up. A paper prepared by a committee appointed for the purpose, under the auspices of the American Office of Strategic Services, reached E.T.O.U.S.A. early in March 1943. This paper began:

'Many of the difficulties which have since arisen in that area [North Africa] are directly traceable to inadequate consideration of the problem of occupation. The lesson to be learned is that step by step with all preparations for armed invasion must go preparation for Government, after conquest.'

After analysing the problem and describing the existing arrangements for dealing with it the paper went on to say:

'The basic defect, it seems to us, in the provision made for personnel training is that it is based on the unsafe assumption that existing native personnel in occupied areas will be available, or that it should be used if it is available. In hostile territories or territories long subject to Nazi rule, it may be necessary to replace administrators even at relatively low levels, if indeed they have not already been removed by domestic insurrection. The problem must be envisaged of supplying administrative personnel, not by the dozens but by the thousand, a personnel, moreover, which is made well acquainted with the problems likely to face them in the areas they are going to be called upon to govern. Among other things, they ought to be able to speak the language of the people they are to govern. It is unrealistic to assume that we can wisely control large parts of Germany with the handful of men now going through the school for Military Government at Charlottesville, many of whom know no German and most of

whom have no more training in the problem than they can absorb in sixteen weeks and no greater knowledge of contemporary Germany than can be supplied by a single military handbook.'

There was expressed here a viewpoint that was to lead to much argument and division of British and American opinion, and to considerable difficulties, before it was put into perspective and largely abandoned.¹

A few days later in March 1943 a Civil Affairs Division was established in the War Department in Washington, reporting directly to the Secretary of War. This was the counterpart of the British Directorate of Civil Affairs. The major activities of the Civil Affairs Division were laid down to be economic matters, civilian relief, and public administration. Major-General J. H. Hilldring was appointed Head of the Division. The U.S. Headquarters in the U.K. was required to set up also, at the appropriate time a Civil Affairs Staff Agency.

In fact a small Civil Affairs Section was in existence at this headquarters, E.T.O.U.S.A. as early as August 1942. It was at this time almost exclusively concerned with relations between the U.S. forces and the people of Britain and liaison with the U.K. administrative authorities. (It is, perhaps, salutary to remember that there was for a while Civil Affairs administration for, as well as by, the British). By January 1943 this staff had been slightly expanded and was able to undertake some planning work for future operations on the Continent. In July 1943 a very considerable development took place and Colonel Ryan arrived to take up the appointment of Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

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The decision taken at the Casablanca Conference that an Allied inter-service staff should be set up to prepare for the invasion of Europe required that these two streams of Civil Affairs planning, the British and the American, should be merged in the C.O.S.S.A.C. organization.

For the first months of its life this headquarters could spare little attention for Civil Affairs, but two officers, one British and one U.S. were appointed in the Branch of the Major-General, Administration. The main function of these officers and of the few technical advisers appointed to assist them, was to establish and maintain liaison with the British and U.S. organizations that were already working on the problems involved in the return to Europe. On 19th May 1943 General Morgan held a meeting with Major-General Lord Rennell of Rodd who had recently relinquished the appointment of Chief Civil Affairs

¹ cf. Ch. II.

Officer on the staff of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief East African Command in order to undertake planning and preparation for the administration of Sicily and Italy on occupation by the Allied forces in the Mediterranean. The Civil Affairs staff requirements of C.O.S.S.A.C. were reviewed and as a result, in August 1943 a Civil Affairs Division was formed at C.O.S.S.A.C. The nucleus of this division, or what might be described as the division proper, was headed by a Chief Staff Officer, who was conceived of as the Chief Staff Officer to a Chief Civil Affairs Officer yet to be appointed. This was of course the appointment for which the D.C.C.A.O. attached to the British War Office had been earmarked but in fact a fresh appointment was made and Sir Roger Lumley (at one time Governor of Bombay, later Earl of Scarbrough) became Chief Staff Officer with the rank of Major-General. The nucleus or central organization of his division consisted of thirty-four staff officers and was located in Norfolk House. A number of U.S. Civil Affairs Staff Officers were transferred to this from E.T.O.U.S.A. They were headed by Colonel Ryan who was early succeeded, until the advent of S.H.A.E.F., by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen. It was formally a part of C.O.S.S.A.C. Assisting this nucleus and under its general control but not formally or physically included in C.O.S.S.A.C., were four planning units or 'country houses', the French house of forty-four officers at Hyde Park Gate, the Belgian house of twenty-eight officers in Norfolk House, the Holland house of twenty-six officers at Devonshire House, and the Norway house of twenty-eight officers at Hyde Park Gate. The 'houses' were integrated Anglo-American organizations, formed, as to their British members, by the inclusion of the planning sections which had been built up by the D.C.C.A.O. North-West Europe, and as to their American members, by the transfer of Civil Affairs Staff from E.T.O.U.S.A. Brigadier S. S. Lee who had under earlier U.K. arrangements been D.C.C.A.O. with a general responsibility for the work of all the 'houses' and intended for appointment to the post filled by Sir Roger Lumley, became head of the French house with responsibility confined to this. The main task of the central nucleus at this stage was to build up its own organization and procedure, to plan and recruit the organization for work in the field, to lay down the general principles by which this should be guided, and to ensure if possible that supplies should be available in sufficient quantity and at the right time for the relief of Europe. The country sections or 'houses' were required on the other hand to gather factual information, and to examine the problems involved in the establishment of military control and the subsequent re-establishment of an indigenous administration, with regard to the particular countries for which they were responsible.

By November 1943 the number of 'houses' had been increased by the formation of a Danish section, and of a German section, to which

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By November 1943 the number of 'houses' had been increased by the formation of a Danish section, and of a German section, to which

an Austrian sub-section was appended. All the 'houses' were at this time brought formally into C.O.S.S.A.C. but this involved little or no practical change in their circumstances, and none in the nature of their work.

In February 1944 after the transformation of C.O.S.S.A.C. into S.H.A.E.F., the Civil Affairs Division was re-organized. The central portion of the division became a General Staff Division, an integral part of S.H.A.E.F. which would remain permanently with that headquarters. It was known as G-5 in accordance with American practice. The Chief Staff Officer of the Civil Affairs Division became Assistant Chief of Staff G-5. Brigadier-General Julius C. Holmes of the U.S. forces became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-5. The rest of the Civil Affairs Division, including the 'country houses' and the training establishments at Eastbourne and Shrivenham (which will be more fully described in the next chapter) was designated, in accordance with American practice, as the Special Staff. Under British terminology it would have been a 'Service'. This was placed under the command of a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Brigadier-General Frank N. McSherry of the U.S. forces being selected for the appointment. The Special Staff was not formally a part of S.H.A.E.F. so that the 'houses' resumed the status that had been theirs until three months before. It was intended that they should be sent out into the field on occupation of the countries with which they were concerned, where they would be employed as S.H.A.E.F. Missions (which also will be more fully described in the next chapter), or on the task of military government in Germany or Austria. The strong personality of Brigadier-General McSherry and his predilection for what came to be known as the A.M.G.O.T. theory of Civil Affairs led to a cleavage between the G-5 General and Special Staffs that seriously hindered agreement or decision on important issues. It was largely owing to Lieutenant-General F. E. Morgan and to Lieutenant-General A. E. Grasett, who relieved Sir Roger Lumley in April 1944 that these clashes were ultimately resolved.

To complete this picture of the planners for the revival of civil administration on the re-occupation of north-west Europe, it should be added that, in accordance with the plans drawn up and approved at C.O.S.S.A.C. for the provision of Civil Affairs staffs at Army Groups and lower formations, plans which will be more fully discussed in the following chapter, a Civil Affairs staff was formed about October 1943 at the headquarters of the British 21 Army Group. In November so much of the C.A. Staff at Headquarters E.T.O.U.S.A. as had not already been assigned to C.O.S.S.A.C. was transferred to First United States Army Group to form a G-5 Staff there. By December 1943 these staffs had begun work on the detailed plans on the lines of the broader C.O.S.S.A.C. planning. As the date of the invasion drew

nearer the approved Civil Affairs staffs were formed also at the Headquarters of Armies, Corps, and other formations, in order to complete the detailed plans for their respective charges.

It has been said that C.O.S.S.A.C. itself was responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In civil affairs matters this responsibility ran through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (C.C.A.C.) set up in Washington, in July 1943, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION EVOLVED

THE C.O.S.S.A.C. staff was set up in March-April 1943. At first the organization for Civil Affairs within this staff was no more elaborate than a small group of liaison officers charged with responsibility for keeping in touch with Civil Affairs planning being done elsewhere, notably by the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer for North-West Europe, and in the Directorate of Civil Affairs. Serious planning did not start until September. It then resulted from the circulation of a report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff the theme of which was that conditions in Germany in the late summer of 1943 were identical with those which had obtained immediately before the surrender of Germany in 1918 – except only for one factor. This factor was the not unimportant one of the existence of Hitler and the Nazi organization. It was not possible to say what influence this would exert upon the development of events, but the report suggested that the possibility of a collapse by Germany in 1943 or early in 1944 could not be ruled out. The Civil Affairs Division had just been set up under Major-General Sir Roger Lumley as Chief Staff Officer. It was rapidly expanded in order to plan against the possible collapse of Germany.

The early trend of Civil Affairs thinking was influenced by current conceptions in the War Office and by experience in Africa and preparations for Italy, discussed between General Morgan and Major-General Lord Rennell on 19th May 1943. Lord Rennell had been closely associated with military administration for some time. After more than a year as Controller of Finance and Accounts in the Political Branch at General Headquarters Middle East he was, on 1st July 1942, appointed Chief Political Officer at the headquarters of East African Command in Nairobi. In this capacity he ultimately became responsible for the military administration of Madagascar. On 30th March 1943 he was recalled to London in order to assume charge of planning and preparation for the establishment of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (A.M.G.O.T.) in Sicily and South Italy. This he did on 6th April in Algiers.¹ In all the African territories with which he had been concerned there had been a proclamation of assumption of authority by the military commander followed by its exercise through a formally established military administration. The

¹ Rennell, *British Military Administration in Africa 1941-1947*, H.M.S.O., 1948.

plans for Sicily and Southern Italy were drawn up on similar lines. It was not surprising, therefore, that first thoughts about Civil Affairs at C.O.S.S.A.C. assumed the establishment of formal military administration, however temporary, in the territories to be invaded in north-west Europe. The case of 'King's Italy' had not yet arisen. In this, after the conclusion of the armistice with the Italian Government, the Allies, without yielding anything of the ultimate paramountcy of military needs, refrained from any direct assumption of authority and from establishing any formal military administration, and left the Italian Government to administer under general Allied control those parts of Italy that were liberated without military operations.

Nor, in the second place, was it surprising that the form of organization contemplated for the establishment of this administration in north-west Europe was, in essentials, that planned for the military government that was to be set up in Sicily and Italy. The organization for north-west Europe was initially to take the form of a planning unit for each country to be invaded. These units would be required to make preparations for the establishment of a formal military administration in the countries for which they were responsible. The attention of the planners would be directed towards the administrative requirements of their territories rather than to the detailed needs of the military operations. In fact their planning could proceed very largely without reference to operational planning. When military administration was established, each unit, under its own Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (C.C.A.O.), would become the military government of the country concerned. It would indeed be required to hand over responsibility to an indigenous government as soon as such a government could safely be trusted with authority, but until that time it would itself be the government of the country. The several C.C.A.O.'s would be placed under the command of the highest accessible military formation. Each C.C.A.O. would arrange for the introduction of advanced parties of his field organization with, or on the heels of, the forces invading his territory. These advanced parties would, if possible, be attached to the lower formations or units undertaking the invasion, but it was not intended that they should form a part of the staff of these formations or units. It was realized that it might become necessary to attach temporarily to some of the highest formations, advanced elements of the C.C.A.O.'s headquarters to exercise command of parties in the field. In the case of Sicily such advanced elements had been temporarily attached to the 7th U.S. Army Headquarters and to the 8th British Army Headquarters. As operations advanced it was planned that the C.C.A.O. would arrange for the introduction of further field parties and in due course for the introduction of the main body of his own headquarters. Gradually the field parties would pass from the control of the forward formations and units to that of the

C.C.A.O., and at the same time the advanced elements of the C.C.A.O.'s own staff would return from the formations to which they had been temporarily attached and be re-incorporated in the C.C.A.O.'s headquarters. After the early operational period, during which Civil Affairs officers of the advanced parties must obviously come under the control of the local military commanders, it was contemplated that there should be established a completely separate Civil Affairs channel of communication and chain of command, depending from the Supreme Commander or perhaps, if Supreme headquarters had not yet moved from the U.K. to the Continent, from the appropriate Army Group Commander. The emphasis under this conception of Civil Affairs was placed decisively on the territorial organization rather than upon the military formations. A small Civil Affairs staff would be required at Supreme Headquarters for co-ordination and to act as the mouthpiece of the Supreme Commander in Civil Affairs matters. Little or no permanent Civil Affairs staff would be required at the headquarters of subordinate formations, for the territorial administrations would carry the weight of responsibility. This conception of military administration as an organism standing on its own feet and divorced from military command except at the highest level was often referred to as the A.M.G.O.T. theory of Civil Affairs – which indeed it was.

* * *

This early planning for Civil Affairs came under strong criticism, both on political and on military grounds.

The political objections proceeded from realization, as soon as serious planning got into its stride, of the fact that in the forthcoming operations invasion would be, not of enemy territory, but of friendly or Allied territories, and that a policy that might have been appropriate to the circumstances of the Middle East, and probably of Italy, would be quite inappropriate to the circumstances of an invasion of north-west Europe. These objections were pressed mainly by the Foreign Office in London which was naturally conscious of the probable views of the Allied governments in London on any proposal involving the establishment of military administration, and the consequent infringement of their sovereignty. They were also pressed by the British element of the Civil Affairs staff at C.O.S.S.A.C. It was easier for the British to appreciate the different attitudes, and to understand the particular prides and loyalties of the several peoples concerned. To the Americans they tended to be just Europeans not very easily distinguishable the one from the other. If there had been any danger of the British authorities overlooking these considerations this was rendered impossible by the negotiations that were being conducted

throughout 1943 by the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee, through its legal sub-committee, with representatives of the Allied governments in London.¹ These negotiations were directed towards reaching agreements, on a basis acceptable to both parties, to govern the re-establishment of civil administration on the invasion of Europe. They clearly showed, if it had not already been appreciated, what attitude was to be expected of the Allied and friendly governments. This was compounded of a strong desire to assist in the expulsion and defeat of the Germans, and of a nervous jealousy of any real or fancied encroachment upon their, in some cases somewhat uncertain, authority. The establishment of military administrations, however temporarily, on the lines hitherto contemplated, would trench upon their sovereignty and must be expected to inflame this jealousy and to undermine the will to assist the Allied cause. Instead, the object should be to enlist the active loyalty and build up the prestige of these governments by refraining wherever possible from the assumption of direct military responsibility for administration, and by giving to them from the earliest possible moment after active military operations had swept on, the fullest responsibility for the government of their own countries. There was little reason to suppose that, if they were so encouraged and assisted, any of them would be lacking in determination to do all in their power to expel the German invaders as early as possible. If the reverse policy were to be followed this full co-operation might well be denied.

A further consideration was the increased scale of the task in north-west Europe and the greater complexity of the administrative and economic systems that would be encountered. It needed a brassy confidence in the competence of officers with no more than a few weeks' training for the work of military administration, to suppose that the task which they would be called upon to discharge would not be done a great deal better by the indigenous administrators, provided always that the latter were willing and were afforded some physical assistance by the invading forces in coping with their problems.

For these reasons it was decided, not only that there should, if possible, be no formal establishment of military administration, however temporary, in the friendly or Allied territories to be occupied in north-west Europe, but that even during the early operational stages, when some degree of initiative and direct control would inevitably have to be assumed by Civil Affairs officers, this should be kept to a minimum and every attempt should be made to establish administrative control by indirect methods.

Accordingly, on 28th October 1943, a different conception was adopted of the Civil Affairs organization required for north-west

¹ cf. Ch. 3.

Europe. There were to be no private armies for the government of each of the territories entered. Instead Civil Affairs was to become a function of military command at all levels and the Civil Affairs service was to become an integral part of the organization at the disposal of the military commanders. In Allied or friendly countries the prime objective was to be to help the indigenous administration to revive and function instead of to set up a military administration. In operational areas it would, of course, be necessary for the Civil Affairs staff to assume temporary responsibility and to undertake first-aid measures. From the earliest days, however, the local administration was to be encouraged and aided to assume responsibility in order to avoid the disadvantages inseparable from the imposition of formal military government. Under this conception the emphasis shifted decisively from the 'country houses' to the Civil Affairs staffs attached to, or at the disposal of, formations. In September it had been planned that the Civil Affairs staffs at Army Groups should number sixteen, at Armies twelve, at Corps four, and at Divisions three. Under the October conception Army Group were to have a staff of eight-five officers, Armies thirty-three, and Corps ten. And these staffs were to control and direct numerous mobile teams of Civil Affairs officers whose size, composition and numbers would vary according to the needs of the formations at any given time. The 'country houses', which had previously been intended for expansion into military administrations for their respective territories, were now instead to become, or to provide from within their ranks, the Civil Affairs element in Military Missions that would be attached to the revived indigenous governments in order to act as the mouthpiece of the Supreme Commander in his relations with these. On technical matters a separate Civil Affairs channel of communication was to be permitted. On all other matters, particularly matters which might affect military operations, the chain of command from the Supreme Commander to the Civil Affairs teams in the field would run through normal military channels, that is, through the military commanders down to the level of the formation under whose immediate command a particular team was working.

The military objections to the initial Civil Affairs planning at C.O.S.S.A.C. may be summed up in the determination, often repeated in 21 Army Group circles, some months later, that 'we must at all costs avoid the mistakes made by A.M.G.O.T.'. According to this view the root of these mistakes was that the military government organization in Italy had not been integrated into the ordinary military organization, and that the separate Civil Affairs chain of command and channel of communication had been brought into existence. This was felt, in the first place, to endanger the unity of command necessary to the successful conduct of operations. It meant that, except for a while in operational areas, military commanders below the Supreme

Commander could exercise no control over Civil Affairs policy and the activities of Civil Affairs officers unless by the cumbrous procedure of addressing the Supreme Commander. This view was probably reinforced by some unexpressed resentment at the largely autonomous position which had been accorded to the upstart Civil Affairs organization, and some apprehension lest another personality should emerge as experienced, independent, and robust as Lord Rennell.

Secondly, the critics held, with a great deal of justification, that the exclusion of the Civil Affairs organization from the normal chain of command must inevitably operate to starve that organization of a fair share in military resources, for example, in the matter of the allocation of relief supplies, of engineering material, or of the support of the engineering services. Military resources were in practice largely controlled at the headquarters of formations and of the line of communication organization, below the level of the Supreme Commander, or even of the Army Group Commander. If, as in Sicily and Italy, formation and other subordinate commanders bore no responsibility for military government it was idle to expect them to be ready to part with badly needed resources to meet the requirements of a plan in the forming of which, and in the correlation of which to military plans, they had had no share – a plan, moreover, for the failure of which they would bear no direct responsibility. The only way to ensure a fair share in military resources for the Civil Affairs organization was to place responsibility for Civil Affairs upon formation commanders right down the line. Responsibility would then also lie upon them for any failure to apply a fair share of available resources to the needs of military government. The Civil Affairs organization would become a part of the military commanders' staffs and in this capacity could bid for its share of resources as a right instead of begging for them as a stranger outside the real military organization. Supply, in particular, is a matter of sharing facilities and bidding for them with other military users. It is largely a matter of close day-to-day contact. An isolationist organization such as that for military government in Sicily and Italy, would be at a disadvantage in such competition. If Civil Affairs wanted to get the best out of the military machine it must be prepared to 'muck in' and take the rough with the smooth.

Thirdly, it was felt that early experience in Sicily, information concerning which was now beginning to flow in and to be digested, had shown that the organization adopted had in fact, for the reasons contained in the previous paragraph, led to many practical difficulties in such matters as the provision of rations, of transport, of petrol, oil and lubricants (P.O.L.), and of means of communication. Without these, Civil Affairs could achieve nothing.

For all these reasons it was accepted by the Civil Affairs planners, that the Civil Affairs organization must at all costs be assimilated to,

and fully integrated in, the normal military organization of staffs and services, and not remain a kind of political service, or a mere honorary member of the club.

* * *

Early in 1944 the possibility arose of yet another complete reversal of Civil Affairs policy. When General Eisenhower was transferred from A.F.H.Q. to become Supreme Allied Commander of the European expeditionary force he brought a number of his officers with him. Included among these was Brigadier-General Julius C. Holmes, who had been chief of the staff branch responsible for Civil Affairs at A.F.H.Q., and now became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 under Sir Roger Lumley. There came also Brigadier-General F. J. McSherry. He had been Deputy C.C.A.O. under Major-Gen. Lord Rennell and was now to become Deputy C.C.A.O. of the G-5 Special Staff at S.H.A.E.F. These officers of the U.S. Army, fresh from Italian preparations, vigorously urged a return to the A.M.G.O.T. conception of Civil Affairs. The core of their case was expressed by Brigadier-General McSherry, in the following passage:

'The basic Civil Affairs organization contained in S.P. and P¹ provides Civil Affairs Staff sections on all levels of military organizations. This, in effect makes each Commander of a tactical unit, Military Governor of the area in which he is operating. This basic organization is suitable during periods of actual operations. It is similar to the Civil Affairs officers attached to the 5th and 8th Armies in Italy. This proposed organization does not provide for the carrying on of civil administration except by the Commanding officers of military units. Hence, when a unit moves forward, the key personnel in the civil administration must be changed as a new Commanding Officer comes into the area. Hence either the military disposition is inflexible or we have frequent changes of key personnel in civil administration. A single organization for civil administration should be established as soon as practicable after operations cease in order that there will be uniformity in the application of the Proclamations and Policies of the Military Governor, namely S.C.A.E.F. This would be impossible in the case of a military set-up outlined in S.P. and P. Further, the transfer of Civil administration to an A.C.C.² or other central body would be materially aided by the control organization.'

And, indeed, there was some weight in this contention though there would have been more if it had been true that Civil Affairs staff sections were provided 'on all levels of military organization'. Within

¹ Standard Policy and Procedure for Civil Affairs—a S.H.A.E.F. Manual.

² Allied Control Commission.

21 Army Group such sections were not provided, and control of Civil Affairs or Military Government policy, on the ground, did not go below, Corps headquarters. In American formations it went one step further down, to Divisions. There was never any intention of allowing such control to be exercised by Brigades or Battalions. Later, particularly during the advance into Germany, and mostly within the American sphere of operations, it was a constant complaint of Military Government officers that tactical units and formations controlling an area moved on so frequently and that every time a new formation arrived, the application of policy and procedure changed, or that, alternatively, the same first aid procedure, the time for which had long since passed, was put into force again from the beginning. Only by the establishment of the separate organization proposed by Brigadier-General McSherry could uniformity of policy be ensured. With Brigadier-General Holmes and Brigadier-General McSherry there was imported another idea. We have seen how, in the U.S., a Committee on Military Government had felt that one of the important lessons of the campaign in North Africa was that it was unsafe to assume 'that existing native personnel in occupied areas will be available, or that it should be used if it is . . . it may be necessary to replace administrators even at relatively low levels . . . the problem must be envisaged of supplying administrative personnel, not by the dozens, but by the thousands . . .' During the planning for the military government of Sicily and Italy, British and American views were all along sharply opposed. The Americans, who had espoused the recommendations of the committee referred to above, pressed the desirability of direct administration in order the more effectively to eliminate Fascism. The British opposed it on both military and political grounds, and for economy in manpower. The controversy was never resolved at A.F.H.Q., until events forced the adoption of indirect methods, and was now renewed at S.H.A.E.F.

It was as a result of Brigadier-General McSherry's advocacy of these conceptions that the 'country houses' were all transferred in March 1944 to the Civil Affairs Centre at Shrivenham. The intention appears to have been to mobilise them there as embryo military governments for their respective territories, under the supra-national control of the D.C.C.A.O. G-5 Special Staff at the head of a single Civil Affairs organization for western Europe, separate from, but under the control of S.H.A.E.F. and no other formation. It was of this period and of these civil affairs contentions that General Morgan recorded the comment ' . . . there were plenty of affairs but the difficulty was to keep them civil'.¹

But adoption of the view urged by Brigadier-General McSherry with

¹ Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, London, 1950, p. 213.

its disadvantages would have entailed rejection of the concept of Civil Affairs as an integral function of command at all levels and loss of the counter-balancing advantages which this concept was designed to secure. It would have meant divorce, as under A.M.G.O.T., of the Civil Affairs from the normal chain of command. And although Brigadier-General McSherry in the letter quoted above did not, in fact, advocate a system of direct administration, his views seemed nevertheless to assume a degree of interference with the indigenous administration, which the C.O.S.S.A.C. planners had not judged feasible or politic. Even as the exodus to Shrivenham began, however, good sense triumphed. Lieutenant-General W. Bedell Smith and Lieutenant-General H. M. Gale, Chief of Staff and Chief Administrative Officer at S.H.A.E.F., to whom the matter had been referred, finally rejected the A.M.G.O.T. system in favour of the C.O.S.S.A.C. conception of 28th October. The S.H.A.E.F. country houses all trooped back to London to resume preparations for transformation into the Civil Affairs elements of the S.H.A.E.F. Missions to the Allied and friendly countries.

* * *

The October conception, accordingly, was the organization that was planned and built up in the succeeding months. With unimportant modifications, it was the organization that eventually went into the field. Under this conception the emphasis was transferred from the territorial to the formation staffs, from civil administration to military requirements.

At the head of these formations was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. With the appointment of an American Supreme Commander this had been reorganized on the lines of American as opposed to British staff practice. Direction and control of the General Staff at this headquarters were in the hands of the Chief of Staff, responsible for presentation of the staff view to the Supreme Commander. The several divisions of the General Staff were each headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff and were known as G-1, G-2, G-3, and so on. The Civil Affairs staff on the recommendation of General Morgan, and in accordance with what appeared to be crystallizing as American practice, was treated as one of the accepted divisions of the General Staff, with standing equal to that of the other General Staff Divisions. The British practice in these matters was different and will be described and discussed later in connection with 21 Army Group the senior British, as opposed to combined formation.

The C.O.S.S.A.C. Civil Affairs Division was accordingly renamed the G-5 Division of S.H.A.E.F. It was headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff. The Division consisted of nine Branches, known as the Public

Relations, Operations, Administrative, Legal, Fiscal, Supply, Public Health, Displaced Persons, and Economics Branches. The strength of the Divisions was 325 in all, including 116 officers. To the extent that this was possible, the staff was recruited equally from British and U.S. sources and was completely 'integrated'. Its loyalty was to the Supreme Commander and the recently created Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, not to the British War Office and Chiefs of Staff on the one hand, or to the U.S. War Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. It was a policy-making organization and its chief functions were the drafting of directives and instructions on matters of Civil Affairs policy, the preparation of outline plans for operations, and the subsequent co-ordination of Civil Affairs activity at the highest level. Clearly the G-5 Division, like the rest of S.H.A.E.F., swelled to a size that had never been contemplated by the C.O.S.S.A.C. planners. Clearly, also, there was much duplication of Civil Affairs work at S.H.A.E.F. and at Army Groups, which inevitably creates the impression that the expansion of S.H.A.E.F. was excessive. This is not the place for any general examination of the question whether this was so. Probably both expansion and duplication were necessary because of General Eisenhower's conception of his task, that he should command his forces and not merely preside over his Army Groups. Of the vastness of the responsibilities carried by the Supreme Commander there can be no doubt.

The 'country houses' remained loosely attached to, but not formally a part of, S.H.A.E.F. Whereas the S.H.A.E.F. G-5 Division proper was designated the G-5 General Staff, the 'country houses' were known as the G-5 Special Staff. Except for the German section and the Austrian sub-section, which were ultimately absorbed into the Control Commissions for these countries, they were now denied the prospect of expanding into the Military Administrations of their respective countries. Their task was in the first place to gather information about their countries and make this available in appropriate form, whether as reports, studies or handbooks. When indigenous governments had been set up or recognized in the friendly territories it was planned that S.C.A.E.F. should attach, to each of these, Military Missions which would act as his mouthpiece. It was intended that a strong Civil Affairs element in these Missions should be formed by, or selected from, the 'country houses'. Their planned strengths were considerable, the Norwegian house consisting of eight-three including twenty-five officers, the Belgian house of 127 including thirty-nine officers, the Denmark house of 102 including forty-three officers, the French house of 240 including ninety officers, the Dutch house of 112 including fifty-one officers, and the German Section (without the Austrian Sub-Section) of 269 including 109 officers. By the 25th February 1944 the

numbers of these officers actually assigned to duty were Norway twenty, Belgium twelve, Denmark thirteen, France forty-one, Holland fourteen, and Germany forty-two. Provision was also made for the reciprocal attachment to S.H.A.E.F. of Military Missions, representing the indigenous governmental authorities, which would make available to the Supreme Commander and to the Army Group Commanders concerned advice on all questions concerning their respective countries while these were under Allied military control.

* * *

Initially there were two Army Group headquarters staffs under the command of S.C.A.E.F. The British 21 Army Group was formed in July 1943 and it was planned that this should take direct control of all operations on the Continent, both British and American, until the scale and nature of these required the introduction of the First United States Army Group, which was formed in the United Kingdom in October 1943. Thereafter the Supreme Commander would assume direct control. No more need be said regarding the Civil Affairs staff at the headquarters of First United States Army Group, than that it reproduced on a smaller scale the Civil Affairs organization at S.H.A.E.F. But 21 Army Group was a British formation and, although it included a proportion of American staff officers, its staff was organized on British lines which were somewhat different. In British as in American theory a military commander's Chief Civil Affairs Officer was his principal staff officer for Civil Affairs as well as the head of the Civil Affairs Branch or Service. But British practice never accepted the head of the Civil Affairs Branch as a Staff Officer with a standing comparable to that of the senior Staff Officer of the General Staff (G), the Adjutant-General's Branch (A) or the Quartermaster-General's Branch (Q) at the same headquarters, or at least not until Major-General Templer was appointed Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government in March 1945. The position intended to be accorded to the head of the Civil Affairs Branch at the headquarters of British formations was described in the S.H.A.E.F. publication 'Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in North West Europe' which said that he was treated as holding '... a position analogous to that of Chief Engineer ... He will not issue orders to the Commanders of subordinate formations or Heads of Services: such orders will be issued through the appropriate Branch of the Staff, i.e. "G", "A" or "Q"'. It was intended that the Civil Affairs staff should be accorded the position not of a 'Staff', but of a 'Service'. The distinction involved is definite and important. Americans recognize it by the use of the more self-explanatory terms 'General Staff' and 'Special Staff'. The British 'Staff' (American

'General Staff') is concerned with the formulation of policy, the conduct and coordination of operations, the balancing of conflicting requirements in the light of the broadest considerations, rather than with the technicalities of execution. It is an extension of the commander's mind and his mouthpiece for the issue of orders. The principal staff officer of any branch of this staff accordingly enjoys direct access to the commander and speaks on his behalf, particularly in the issue of orders to the Services (or Special Staffs) or to subordinate formations. The 'Services' (American 'Special Staffs') on the other hand are specialists, experts in engineering, signals, medicine, and other technical subjects. They are concerned with execution in their own fields rather than with the formulation of policy, although, clearly, their technical advice must often be a dominant factor in respect of the latter also. They enjoy no formal right of direct access to the commander, however frequent informal conference may be, and receive their orders through the appropriate branch of the staff. The Staff, in short, is required to take a wider view and enjoys greater authority and power than the Services.

But whatever may have been intended, in actual fact the Civil Affairs staff at 21 Army Group and subordinate British formations was not, at least until the final advance into Germany began, effectively accorded even the standing of a Service. It was not fully accepted into the military hierarchy, but was treated instead as a quasi-civil poor relation. In this respect (as possibly in other respects also) 21 Army Group practice did not conform to War Office theory.

One reason for this was, undoubtedly the quality of the Civil Affairs staff. There were extremely able officers among them, with a sprinkling of regular soldiers. But many tended to be eccentrics, skilled in some little-known or faintly ludicrous employment, but hopelessly unmilitary, and some even anti-military. Or else, somewhat naturally, they were the weaker members rejected from more active units. All Civil Affairs officers were likely to be a little elderly. A General Officer delivering an inaugural address at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre, seemed to see seated before him all those officers whom he had, over the past months, been at pains to weed out from units under his command.

But there were other reasons. Notwithstanding the fact that '... the object of military government is to further present and future military operations ...' it is sometimes hard for a commander to see Civil Affairs officers in this light. At a time when he is bending all energy and resources to the overcoming of his enemy, Civil Affairs staffs can easily appear as impediments rather than aids to his operations. On the short view they frequently are, demanding 'lift' for relief supplies, protesting against requisitioning (or looting), standing up for the minimum rights and amenities of the civil population. In fact, these

activities are intended to facilitate longer term military operations. But for the commander there may be no long term operations if he fails in the immediate battle.

And in other theatres during the Second World War the Civil Affairs staff had always claimed and secured some measure of independence from military command. In Burma and Malaya the C.C.A.O.'s were invested with a dual responsibility, to the military authorities for the bare prevention of disease and unrest, to the Burma Office or to the Colonial Office to raise standards above this level, since the people of these countries were British subjects, and it was felt they should be treated more generously than enemies. In Italy the A.M.G.O.T. conception of military government involved a chain of command separate from the normal military chain and so prevented commanders other than the Supreme Allied Commander exercising any control over Civil Affairs except by representation to the Supreme Commander. These dispensations gave the Civil Affairs staff a privileged position, withdrawn in greater or less degree from military control. It is understandable that they should have engendered a certain jealousy and prejudice. These would easily accompany or precede Civil Affairs staffs to a new theatre.

However, the 21 Army Group Civil Affairs staff came into being in October 1943 under a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer. This was Brigadier T. Robbins, previously head of the Civil Affairs Staff Centre at Wimbledon, which will be referred to again later in this chapter. His staff was organized in six Divisions known as the Headquarters Staff, Finance, Legal, Public Safety, Economic, and Technical Divisions. These were divided into varying numbers of Branches. Some of these were further divided into Sections. The strength of the Staff was 248 of whom eighty-four were officers. It included both British and some Americans, but it was intended that Civil Affairs staff at formations below S.H.A.E.F. should be 'predominantly of the nationality of the Commander'. At 21 Army Group the part played by the Americans in Civil Affairs matters was inconsiderable.

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Further in the background still, so far as British recruits were concerned, lay the Civil Affairs Staff Centre set up at Wimbledon early in 1943 under Brigadier T. Robbins as Commandant where a course of general training in Civil Affairs was given.¹ 'C' wing of the Staff Centre was Peel House, at one time the Metropolitan Police Training College, which was used primarily for the training of police recruits. Comparable training establishments in the U.S.A. were the School of Military Government at Charlottesville set up in the Summer of 1942 and the Provost Marshal School Centre at Fort Custer, Michigan, which trained military police for service in military government. There was also a Naval Civil Affairs School but this was training recruits for the Pacific, not for Europe. From December 1943 Civil Affairs staff courses were held at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, training some 130 officers. A feeling at C.O.S.S.A.C. and S.H.A.E.F. that training at these centres was somewhat academic was among the reasons for the establishment of the Eastbourne and Shrivenham centres and the decision that Civil Affairs training of a more practical and detailed kind should be given there. These centres were able to relate their training to operational planning in a way that naturally had not been possible for the Wimbledon and Charlottesville Schools. But of the value of the basic training given at Wimbledon there can be no doubt. It is frequently mentioned in Civil Affairs diaries and reports of the time. And if the evidence of a less closely-involved witness is desired, there is the following comment by Lord Strang, then Sir William Strang and Political Adviser to the

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And indeed, having regard to the scope of the subjects taught, to the varied backgrounds of the students, to the largely unpredictable circumstances in which these would have to act, and above all to the shortness of the courses, it was altogether remarkable what a grasp of essentials, what balance of judgment, and what professional standards and integrity were displayed by those who had passed through the centre.

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The conception of Civil Affairs described in this chapter was set out by S.H.A.E.F. in a Manual entitled 'Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in North-West Europe.' This manual went through a number of editions. That issued on 1st May 1944 had reached a considerable degree of finality and is the one which the writer of this book has used. The manual was divided into three parts, the first dealing with the general objects and manner of functioning of the Civil Affairs and Military Government organisation. The second part considered these in greater detail in relation to operations to be conducted in Allied or friendly territory i.e. the conduct of Civil Affairs, the third part in relation to operations to be conducted in enemy territory i.e. the establishment of military government. An important provision of the manual was contained in paragraph 1(e) of the introductory first part. This ran:

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Manual 27-5 issued by the United States War Department the provisions here set forth will apply for Combined Civil Affairs operations in North-West Europe.'

As has already been pointed out, S.H.A.E.F. was a Combined Command responsible neither to the British nor to the U.S. Governments, but to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who were responsible to the Prime Minister and the President acting jointly.

Standard Policy and Procedure was to be reinforced by the issue from S.H.A.E.F. of directives dealing with political, economic, legal, financial and other matters, and of Civil Affairs Instructions, Country Manuals and Staff Studies as required. A host of these did in fact come into existence. Some of them will be referred to in greater detail in later chapters of this book. The conception of a small headquarters at S.H.A.E.F., dealing only with questions of broad policy, had been left a long way behind.

At this stage, when the Allied armies had not yet set foot in Europe the invasion and occupation of Germany still lay a long way ahead. Detailed planning could not begin for some time. It will be dealt with in later chapters.¹

¹ cf. Ch. XI., XIV.

CHAPTER III

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS

THE expression 'martial law' is used to describe a situation in which responsibility for the government of a given area either has been transferred by the civil to the military authority, whether under provisions of the constitution or by means of special legislation, or has been assumed by the military authorities of their own motion on grounds of military necessity. The instrument through which the military authorities discharge the responsibility so assumed or laid upon them is a military government.

Within British territory the common law recognises the right of the Crown, in time of invasion, insurrection, or riot, through its military forces, to assume exceptional powers and take exceptional measures of the kind that are described as martial law. It is usual nevertheless to insure against such arbitrary acts being called in question by subsequent judicial proceedings under the ordinary law and before the ordinary courts, through the passing of an Act of Indemnity.

In occupied enemy territory international law and usage recognize the temporary passing of sovereignty to the invading forces and the right of these to establish military government. They place certain responsibilities upon the Commander of the occupying forces as well as certain restrictions upon his temporary sovereignty.

In the case of forces operating in friendly territory the legal position is not so clear. There is a conflict between two principles, the one, the continuance or the revival, if the territory has been recovered from enemy occupation, of the sovereignty of the friendly government concerned, the other, the principle of military necessity under which the military commander is entitled to take any measures necessary to the success of his operations. There is not the same body of international law and usage to regulate such a situation as there is in the case of operations in enemy territory.

When the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee was set up in July, 1942 it included, from the time of its first meeting, among the subjects that would require to be investigated ' . . . the question of the maintenance of law and order, especially in relation to the extent and duration of martial law . . .' A paper was prepared and discussed by the committee on 23rd July, 1942. It confined itself to

'General Staff') is concerned with the formulation of policy, the conduct and coordination of operations, the balancing of conflicting requirements in the light of the broadest considerations, rather than with the technicalities of execution. It is an extension of the commander's mind and his mouthpiece for the issue of orders. The principal staff officer of any branch of this staff accordingly enjoys direct access to the commander and speaks on his behalf, particularly in the issue of orders to the Services (or Special Staffs) or to subordinate formations. The 'Services' (American 'Special Staffs') on the other hand are specialists, experts in engineering, signals, medicine, and other technical subjects. They are concerned with execution in their own fields rather than with the formulation of policy, although, clearly, their technical advice must often be a dominant factor in respect of the latter also. They enjoy no formal right of direct access to the commander, however frequent informal conference may be, and receive their orders through the appropriate branch of the staff. The Staff, in short, is required to take a wider view and enjoys greater authority and power than the Services.

But whatever may have been intended, in actual fact the Civil Affairs staff at 21 Army Group and subordinate British formations was not, at least until the final advance into Germany began, effectively accorded even the standing of a Service. It was not fully accepted into the military hierarchy, but was treated instead as a quasi-civil poor relation. In this respect (as possibly in other respects also) 21 Army Group practice did not conform to War Office theory.

One reason for this was, undoubtedly the quality of the Civil Affairs staff. There were extremely able officers among them, with a sprinkling of regular soldiers. But many tended to be eccentrics, skilled in some little-known or faintly ludicrous employment, but hopelessly unmilitary, and some even anti-military. Or else, somewhat naturally, they were the weaker members rejected from more active units. All Civil Affairs officers were likely to be a little elderly. A General Officer delivering an inaugural address at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre, seemed to see seated before him all those officers whom he had, over the past months, been at pains to weed out from units under his command.

But there were other reasons. Notwithstanding the fact that '... the object of military government is to further present and future military operations ...' it is sometimes hard for a commander to see Civil Affairs officers in this light. At a time when he is bending all energy and resources to the overcoming of his enemy, Civil Affairs staffs can easily appear as impediments rather than aids to his operations. On the short view they frequently are, demanding 'lift' for relief supplies, protesting against requisitioning (or looting), standing up for the minimum rights and amenities of the civil population. In fact, these

activities are intended to facilitate longer term military operations. But for the commander there may be no long term operations if he fails in the immediate battle.

And in other theatres during the Second World War the Civil Affairs staff had always claimed and secured some measure of independence from military command. In Burma and Malaya the C.C.A.O.'s were invested with a dual responsibility, to the military authorities for the bare prevention of disease and unrest, to the Burma Office or to the Colonial Office to raise standards above this level, since the people of these countries were British subjects, and it was felt they should be treated more generously than enemies. In Italy the A.M.G.O.T. conception of military government involved a chain of command separate from the normal military chain and so prevented commanders other than the Supreme Allied Commander exercising any control over Civil Affairs except by representation to the Supreme Commander. These dispensations gave the Civil Affairs staff a privileged position, withdrawn in greater or less degree from military control. It is understandable that they should have engendered a certain jealousy and prejudice. These would easily accompany or precede Civil Affairs staffs to a new theatre.

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Manual 27-5 issued by the United States War Department the provisions here set forth will apply for Combined Civil Affairs operations in North-West Europe.'

As has already been pointed out, S.H.A.E.F. was a Combined Command responsible neither to the British nor to the U.S. Governments, but to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who were responsible to the Prime Minister and the President acting jointly.

Standard Policy and Procedure was to be reinforced by the issue from S.H.A.E.F. of directives dealing with political, economic, legal, financial and other matters, and of Civil Affairs Instructions, Country Manuals and Staff Studies as required. A host of these did in fact come into existence. Some of them will be referred to in greater detail in later chapters of this book. The conception of a small headquarters at S.H.A.E.F., dealing only with questions of broad policy, had been left a long way behind.

At this stage, when the Allied armies had not yet set foot in Europe the invasion and occupation of Germany still lay a long way ahead. Detailed planning could not begin for some time. It will be dealt with in later chapters.¹

¹ cf. Ch. XI., XIV.

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CHAPTER III

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS

AGREEMENTS

THE expression 'martial law' is used to describe a situation in which responsibility for the government of a given area either has been transferred by the civil to the military authority, whether under provisions of the constitution or by means of special legislation, or has been assumed by the military authorities of their own motion on grounds of military necessity. The instrument through which the military authorities discharge the responsibility so assumed or laid upon them is a military government.

Within British territory the common law recognises the right of the Crown, in time of invasion, insurrection, or riot, through its military forces, to assume exceptional powers and take exceptional measures of the kind that are described as martial law. It is usual nevertheless to insure against such arbitrary acts being called in question by subsequent judicial proceedings under the ordinary law and before the ordinary courts, through the passing of an Act of Indemnity.

In occupied enemy territory international law and usage recognize the temporary passing of sovereignty to the invading forces and the right of these to establish military government. They place certain responsibilities upon the Commander of the occupying forces as well as certain restrictions upon his temporary sovereignty.

In the case of forces operating in friendly territory the legal position is not so clear. There is a conflict between two principles, the one, the continuance or the revival, if the territory has been recovered from enemy occupation, of the sovereignty of the friendly government concerned, the other, the principle of military necessity under which the military commander is entitled to take any measures necessary to the success of his operations. There is not the same body of international law and usage to regulate such a situation as there is in the case of operations in enemy territory.

When the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee was set up in July, 1942 it included, from the time of its first meeting, among the subjects that would require to be investigated '... the question of the maintenance of law and order, especially in relation to the extent and duration of martial law...' A paper was prepared and discussed by the committee on 23rd July, 1942. It confined itself to

studying the problem posed by entry into Allied or friendly territories and drew attention to the fact that these fell into at least three categories.

There was first the case of Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg. These countries were Allies of the United Kingdom. When invaded by the German forces their governments had escaped to England, and continued in existence in London. In Norway a well-organized resistance movement was in touch with the London government and not unready to accept its guidance; a vigorous movement in Holland was less closely in communication with its government. Secondly, there was the case of Belgium. Here the sovereign remained in Belgium and fell under German control, but the members of the recognized government escaped to London and purported to re-assemble and carry on the government there. It was not clear whether they would be accepted or recognized by Belgians on return. Thirdly, there was the case of France, where there was no central government recognized by the United Kingdom at all.

The committee proceeded from the assumption that however quickly the governments of these countries succeeded in establishing themselves and re-asserting their authority in the rear of invading armies, there would inevitably be an initial period during which none but the invading forces would be in a position to exercise any authority and it would be necessary on grounds of military necessity to establish a form, however temporary, of martial law or military government. This would need to continue until such time as the military commander judged that he could safely transfer his authority to the restored civil government, subject, if necessary, to reservations on the grounds of military necessity. It was recognized that different procedures might require to be adopted for the establishment of martial law in the different categories of countries. Whatever procedure might ultimately be adopted the committee emphatically recognised the importance, politically and psychologically, of obtaining the agreement and support of the governments concerned in the steps to be taken to establish martial law within their countries. For these governments were, in fact, to be called upon to make a temporary surrender of sovereignty to the Allied military commander. The case of France presented peculiar difficulties, and continued to do so for most of the time with which we shall be concerned.

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The French difficulties will be more fully considered later in this chapter, but their main effect at this point was to postpone consultation with the governments of Norway, Holland and Belgium. It was felt that the time was not ripe for consultation with the Fighting

French organization, but that to consult the Norwegians, the Dutch and the Belgians without consulting the French would give offence. A further reason for the postponement of consultations was the danger that the opening of these and any other discussions on military matters, might compromise the secrecy of Allied plans and preparations. The abortive expedition to Dakar in 1940 had given the British a taste of the results of leakages of information and undermined their confidence in the discretion and discipline of the Free French forces.

By the end of 1942 the military authorities in London, both British and American, were feeling the need to enter into consultation with the Allied governments and the Fighting French authorities. In January 1943 the U.S. Government relaxed its objection to the opening of discussions with the Allied governments in London provided these were confined to 'administrative problems likely to arise when planning on a hypothetical basis possible operations for landings in one or another of the enemy occupied countries'. The U.S. Government still felt, and the U.K. Government agreed, that the time was inopportune for the opening of discussions with the French.

Discussions began with the Norwegians in the following month. They were conducted by a Legal Sub-Committee of the A.T.(E.) Committee, under the chairmanship of the Judge Advocate General, Sir Henry MacGeagh, with representatives of the Norwegian Government in London. As far back as July 1942 the Foreign Office had received a proposal from the Norwegian Government that an agreement should be drawn up between the two governments to regulate the position of British troops if they landed in Norway. It was suggested that the agreement should be in similar terms to that governing the Norwegian forces then in the U.K. The Foreign Office drew attention to certain fundamental differences between the situation of Norwegian troops in the U.K. and the probable situation of British troops operating in Norway and referred to the necessity for recognizing a first phase of re-occupation during which British forces would need to be under exclusively military jurisdiction and during which the Norwegian civil courts, would probably be unable to function at all.

The negotiations between the Legal Sub-Committee and the Norwegian representatives ranged over a far wider field than the original proposal of the Norwegian Government, involving questions of the exercise of sovereignty and of jurisdiction by an Allied commander not only over his own troops, but over the civil population of occupied territory. Two principles guided the course of the negotiations. On the one hand there was the necessity of ensuring the absolute paramountcy of military over any other considerations, especially where operations were in progress. On the other there was the desire to usurp as little of Norwegian sovereignty as was compatible with the

satisfaction of military needs and to restore its full exercise at the earliest possible date. It was agreed that during the early stages of occupation supreme authority, scarcely distinguishable from sovereignty, must be assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander and that martial law must, in effect, be declared, whether under this name or otherwise. As soon as the civil administration of the Norwegian Government was functioning sufficiently effectively for the Supreme Commander to feel that it could maintain law and order and meet his demands upon it for assistance, he would transfer responsibility to the Norwegian Government. He would retain the power however to resume direct control of the civil population in a military emergency or if the civil administration proved unequal to its responsibilities, particularly along his lines of communication or within the bases and ports upon which he would depend. On the other hand the Supreme Allied Commander would be required, and would undoubtedly wish, to transfer supreme responsibility to the Norwegian Government at the earliest possible date.

By 8th June 1943 the negotiations had produced a draft of a Civil Affairs Agreement to be executed by the British and the Norwegian Governments. After further negotiations and considerable delay in order to obtain the concurrence of the Government of the U.S.S.R. and to permit the simultaneous execution of a similar agreement with that government also, agreements, identical in all essential respects were finally executed by the U.K., U.S. and Norwegian Governments simultaneously on 16th May 1944.¹

The agreement between the U.K. and Norwegian Governments became the model for agreements later entered into with the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg Governments. It also served as the starting point for the negotiations that, still later, led to the conclusion of agreements with the French Committee of National Liberation.

Having completed its work on the draft agreement for Norway, the Legal Sub-Committee entered into negotiations with representatives of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments which resulted in the drafting of essentially similar agreements for Holland and Belgium. The U.S. Government followed suit. The agreements between the British and Netherlands Governments and the British and Belgian Governments were executed in mid-May. Apart from certain minor modifications arising from the different circumstances prevailing in the three countries, all the agreements were identical. A similar agreement was concluded some months later with the Government of Luxembourg which also had joined the Allies and sought refuge in London. The Grand Duchy had been annexed by the Germans in August 1942.

¹ cf. Appendix I.

Another country in which Allied forces were likely to operate was the Kingdom of Denmark. The Government of this country had remained within its territories and with its people. On 29th August 1943 the Germans declared martial law in Denmark and the Government resigned. There was therefore no Danish Government in operation and no representative of this Government in London with whom agreements could be negotiated for the establishment of military government or the conduct of Civil Affairs. It was not certain what government would be found by the Allied forces on arrival, and what attitude would be adopted by it, but there was every reason to hope that it would be co-operative. It was contemplated that on occupation by Allied forces military government would be established and that the question of negotiating a civil affairs agreement should be taken up as soon as a government in Denmark showed itself willing and able to negotiate such an agreement and to assume responsibility for the discharge of the resulting obligations.

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The case of France was altogether more difficult, so difficult in fact that no agreement was ever concluded until the British forces had virtually completed their operations in France and were advancing into Belgium. In order to understand the obstacles that needed to be overcome it is necessary to go back to the time of the collapse of France in 1940, and briefly to summarize events thereafter.

On the evening of 16th June 1940 Marshal Petain had formed a Government which decided against withdrawal to North Africa and continuation of the fight against Germany from overseas. On the following day the Marshal sought and obtained an armistice from the Germans. The existence of the Marshal's Government was recognized and, in theory at least, its administration of all metropolitan French territory. In practice, however, the control allowed to the Government over the administration varied in different parts of France and was nowhere that of a sovereign authority. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine inevitably became once more Elsass and Lothringen, and although the armistice terms gave no authority for such a procedure, they were virtually annexed to Germany. The departments of Nord and Pas de Calais were placed, on strategic and economic grounds, under the German Military Administration of Belgium. Although in theory the French Administration of these departments was responsible to the Government of Marshal Petain, it was in fact closely supervised and controlled by a German Military Administration Staff. Later, on 13th July 1944, the Military Governor, General von Falkenhausen, was superseded by a civilian *Reichskommissar*, so

bringing the administration under the close control of the Nazi Party instead of the Army. So much of the rest of France as had been occupied by the Germans before the armistice, was placed under a separate but similar administration, the head of which was General von Stülpnagel in Paris. In the French Alps an Italian zone of occupation was established.

In 'unoccupied' France, i.e. in the centre and the south, the Marshal's Government, which had moved from Bordeaux to Vichy on 1st July 1940, was not interfered with so obviously. Even when the Germans entered this territory after the Allied invasion of North Africa, the occupation was intended to be purely military, without the establishment of a parallel, supervisory, German administration such as had been set up in the north. But if control was not obvious it was little less effective. Political and military pressure took the place of direct administrative interference. And although Marshal Petain enjoyed three assets – the French fleet, French North Africa, and his considerable personal popularity in France – the bargaining value of these disappeared as it gradually became clear that he was not prepared, in opposing German demands, to go to the length of resignation and the extinction of his Vichy regime.

After the events of the French surrender the British Government announced that it could no longer recognize the Bordeaux Government as the Government of an independent country. As a result of this announcement and of the recognition simultaneously accorded by the British to the leadership of General de Gaulle, the Vichy Government broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the United Kingdom. The Government of the United States, did not withdraw its recognition of the Vichy Government, and diplomatic relations continued between the two Governments, and even survived the entry of the United States into the war. It was not until after the invasion of North Africa that the Vichy Government broke off relations with America. From this time on the influence of Marshal Petain's Government waned in France, partly as a result of the German occupation of hitherto unoccupied France and of the increasingly tight and obvious German control of the Vichy Government, partly as a result of the growing realization of the possibility of ultimate Allied victory. The influence lost by Vichy passed surreptitiously to the Resistance organizations that by now honeycombed French society.

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On the same day as Marshal Petain had approached the Germans for an armistice, the French Under-Secretary of State for National Defence, General de Gaulle, who had resolved to carry on the fight against Germany, escaped, with British assistance, by air from

Bordeaux to England.¹ The British policy of aiding anyone who would fight the Germans, reinforced by feelings of loyalty towards an Allied leader who was ready to leave his homeland rather than surrender, resulted from that day, in a long and sometimes stormy association throughout which, however, the British Government supported, encouraged, and at the same time attempted to control, this Frenchman who had emerged as the representative of those of his countrymen who refused to submit to the Nazi domination.

On the 22nd June 1940, five days after his escape from France, General de Gaulle formed in London the *Comité de la France Libre* in the hope of focusing the French will to continue the fight.² A few days later the British Government accorded their recognition of General de Gaulle as 'leader of all Free Frenchmen wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause'. General de Gaulle's organization gradually expanded and enhanced its standing, though not always its popularity, with the British Government. On 27th October 1940 the *Conseil de Défense de l'Empire*, or Council of Empire, was formed to mark the adherence to the Free French cause of a number of the French colonies, and to assume control of the French forces which already existed in those colonies, or were being raised in British territories or Egypt.³ This Council was recognized a few weeks later by the British Government. On 24th September, 1941 the French National Committee was formed,⁴ still in London. Whereas the Council had been purely a military organization, the Committee clearly aspired to the status of a provisional government of France. It was recognized as such by many of the French colonies and it declared war on the Japanese on the outbreak of war in the Far East. On 14th July 1942 the French National Committee resolved, that the expression 'Free France', hitherto employed, should be discarded and that there should be substituted on relevant occasions, the expression 'Fighting France'. It was intended by this change to mark the liaison that was increasingly being built up between the Resistance organizations inside France and the National Committee in London, and the measure of control exercised by the latter. The British Government took cognizance of this change of designation and of its implications – the liaison with the Resistance was, indeed, largely of its own contriving – and at the same time gave long delayed recognition of the French National Committee as the representative of all *Free* French and as the organization with which it would deal in all matters concerning collaboration with the Free French movement and with the overseas territories which had recognized the authority of the movement: it

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II., London, 1949, p. 192.

² Flory, *Le Statut International des Gouvernements Réfugiés*, Paris, 1952, p. 272.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

refused any recognition of the committee as the head of a sovereign state or as a potential government of France in the future.¹

When the United States entered the war in December 1941 this at first caused no interruption in the relations between the United States and France. The Vichy Government had been, and still was, a neutral government. Its collaboration with the Germans might not be popular with Americans but did not, for them, take on the appearance of a stab in the back, as it almost inevitably did for the British. A flavour of legitimacy still hung around the Vichy Government. Above all there were many practical advantages in retaining contact with the Marshal's Government. Professor Langer has summarized the policy of the U.S. Government in this respect as follows:

'[The Vichy] policy had been formulated long before and was adhered to unswervingly until the time of the invasion of North Africa. It never was and never became a policy that we thought we could rely on.

Quite the contrary, it was a day-by-day, hand to mouth policy all the way through. No one in the State Department liked the Vichy regime or had any desire to appease it. We kept up the connection with Vichy simply because it provided us with valuable intelligence sources and because it was felt that American influence might prevail to the extent of deterring Darlan and his associates from selling out completely to the Germans.'²

General de Gaulle in contrast could claim no constitutional inheritance of authority and could only assert his belief that he would receive popular support if he succeeded in returning to France. Many Americans doubted that he was dis-interested. For these and other reasons, which will be discussed later in the chapter, the U.S. Government was strongly averse to finding itself drawn into any recognition of the French National Committee.

Nevertheless, the whole of this period was marked by a steady growth in the personal prestige and influence of General de Gaulle among non-Vichy French and the British, and in the extent and efficacy of his organization which indeed succeeded in focusing the loyalties of most Frenchmen willing to fight against the Nazis.

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The Anglo-American landings of 8th November 1942 on French territory in North Africa greatly changed this position. This unusual operation involved a surprise descent upon the territory of a neutral power. The Allies hoped that the French military forces and civil

¹ Flory, *Le Statut International des Gouvernements Refugiés*, Paris, 1952, pp. 272 and 65.

² Quoted by Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, pp. 486-487.

administration in North Africa, would understand that the invaders entertained no hostile intentions and were concerned only to carry the war against Germany to success, would remember also that they had themselves, not so long ago, formed part of the alliance, until the Germans had forced them to a humiliating surrender, and that they would therefore receive the Allies with gratitude and neighbourly co-operation. Accordingly no preparation was made for the establishment of any military government or any regime of Civil Affairs beyond arranging that General Giraud should land with the Allies in North Africa at the earliest possible moment. It was expected that the French forces and Administration would respond to his appeals and place themselves under him and at the disposal of the Allies. In fact the reaction of the French was altogether different.¹ It quickly became clear that many of them resented the Allied invasion, and that loyalty to the established government at Vichy would prevent all but a few from joining General Giraud. It is well known how chance had brought to North Africa at this time Admiral Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces and the only person, short of Marshal Petain, whose authority might suffice to absolve the French from their loyalty and bring them to co-operate with the Allies. Military needs overcame political reluctance and a deal was made between the Supreme Allied Commander and Admiral Darlan under which the latter was recognized by the Supreme Allied Commander as the *de facto* head of the existing French Administration in North Africa.² Admiral Darlan on his side agreed to accord to the Supreme Allied Commander the facilities the latter required for the conduct of operations against the Germans and Italians, and to appoint General Giraud to command all French forces in North Africa. There was no political recognition of his authority.

These developments very greatly changed the position of General de Gaulle. Neither he nor Admiral Darlan had been accorded recognition as head of a potential government of France, but each was conscious that he had a case for aspiring to receive such recognition one day. Such a situation was obviously undesirable and early efforts were made by the British and U.S. Governments to bring about an amalgamation of the rival French groups, and by General de Gaulle to bring the North African potentialities under his own control. The task was undoubtedly facilitated by the assassination of Admiral Darlan, by the succession of General Giraud as High Commissioner, and by the subsequent action of General Giraud in breaking off relations with the Vichy Government. On 3rd June 1943 the French Committee of National Liberation was formed in Algiers, uneasily

¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 116.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 120. Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, 1952, Vol. V., Chap. XXXV.

combining the two groups. On 26th August 1943 the U.K. and the U.S. Governments gave a carefully limited recognition to the committee, as the body administering those French overseas territories which had accepted its authority and as the body qualified to conduct the French war effort 'within the framework of Inter-Allied Co-operation'. With regard to the committee's aspiration to become a provisional government of France, the United Kingdom Government took note with sympathy 'of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to give effect to this request as far as possible, while reserving the right to consider, in consultation with the Committee, the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.'¹ The recognition by the U.S. Government followed similar lines but provided explicitly that 'This statement does not constitute recognition of a Government of France or of the French Empire by the United States'.

The struggle for dominance between the factions of de Gaulle and of Giraud continued within the committee, but it soon appeared that Giraud was politically no match for the former who, in any case, enjoyed the decisive advantage of the support of the recently formed *Conseil Nationale de la Résistance* within France. By the end of 1943 Giraud had retired from the committee.

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Immediately after its limited recognition by the British and Americans, the committee, in September 1943, asked the U.K. and the U.S. Governments that it should be consulted regarding the form of administration to be set up in France on re-occupation.

As far back as January 1943 the U.K. and U.S. Governments had decided that discussions regarding Civil Affairs arrangements might be opened with the Allied governments. In the following month negotiations had begun with the Norwegian representatives. No discussions were opened with the French however although it was likely that their country would be the first to be invaded. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly it was felt that the negotiations upon which the Legal Sub-Committee was about to embark would range over unexplored ground and that it might be better to undertake them successively rather than simultaneously, beginning with the case of Norway which was likely to present the least difficulty. In this way the sub-committee could learn as it went. Secondly, it was clearly desirable to postpone the opening of negotiations with the French until fusion had taken place of the de Gaulle group and the North African group so that there might be one authority with which to negotiate instead of two – the one of these tending to look to the

¹ Keesing, 1943-1946, p. 5971 A.

Americans, the other to the British, for support. The third and most important reason was that the U.S. and British Governments and their advisers were quite unable to reach an agreed view as to the use they should make of such French organization as might emerge from the negotiations between de Gaulle and Giraud.

The first two reasons against opening discussions with the French had disappeared by the time the French Committee of National Liberation had come into existence on 3rd June 1943 and had been recognized by the British and United States Governments on 26th August 1943. Unfortunately the third remained.

It was common ground between the British and Americans both that the French committee should be recognized only for what it was (although assessments varied of what this might in fact be), and that it must not be recognized as a provisional government of France. It was on the question of opening negotiations with the committee concerning the arrangements to be made for the civil administration of France on invasion by the Allied forces that difference of view began. American opinion, strongly influenced by the views of the President, was at first opposed to the opening of any such discussion. The President's attitude proceeded from two main considerations. Others which influenced the American approach have already been indicated earlier in this chapter. In the first place the President was convinced that it would be both politically wrong and psychologically inexpedient for the Allies, or for the U.S. Government, to adopt any course that might appear to force a particular future government, or form of government, upon the French people or that might even suggest that a particular government would be more acceptable than others to the Allies. It must be for the French people to decide freely for themselves at a general election what should be their future government. No group or organization pretending to the sovereign authority of France should be accorded any degree of recognition until its claim had been endorsed at such an election. A memorandum of 24th December 1942 found among the Hopkins papers, unsigned but apparently drafted by the President, and certainly expressive of his attitude, runs:

'The sovereignty of France rests with the French people. Only its expression was suspended by German occupation. The indispensable element for the restoration of France is the assurance of conditions making that expression possible when the time comes.

No French political authority can exist or be allowed to attempt to create itself outside of France. It is the duty of the United States and Great Britain to preserve for the people of France the right and opportunity to determine for themselves what government they will have, and the French people as well as the world must receive that solemn assurance.

The present dissensions are due to the concealed competition for future political power. De Gaulle seeks recognition by England and the United States on the basis of suppressed but assumed endorsement by the French people. Darlan will attempt to build a regime on the basis that he represents Petain, the regularly constituted regime of France.

The sympathy of the French that expressed itself for de Gaulle, reflects not a choice of de Gaulle as the future head of the French government, but the French anxiety to continue to *fight* Germany alongside of England and the United States. They would, however, certainly resist a government, even if provisional, which would owe its initial authority to foreign recognition. The basis of legitimacy which permitted Darlan to effectively bring North Africa alongside the Allies, is due to the fact that he represented what was then the existing constituted authority of Vichy. He was thus able to give orders which were followed by the local military commanders and the local administration. Indeed, while as it has been proved since, most responsible officials wanted at heart to co-operate with America and Great Britain, their action had to be determined by an order from the regular central authority. Men entrusted with authority in an orderly society are not revolutionaries, and it is to be revolutionary to act contrary to the orders of the central accepted authority. Admiral Darlan gave the order that was wished for – but the order had to be given. He alone could give it, not General Giraud at that time.

But now that this has been done, and that the various local commanders have sided with the Allies, it is important to prevent the use which Darlan made of Petain's authority from being developed into a legitimacy recognized or fostered by the Allies. Such a development in North Africa would be a denial of those conditions which alone will enable the French people to give free expression to their sovereignty.¹

The second consideration that weighed with the President was the conviction that the great majority of the people of France would, in fact, be found hostile to General de Gaulle. In this view he may well have been confirmed not only by the fiasco at Dakar in 1940, and by the reception accorded to Giraud in Algiers, but by the information laid before him as a result of the continuance until the end of 1942 of diplomatic relations between the U.S. Government and the French Government at Vichy, as well as by the unconcealed opinion of Marshal Stalin, that it was Vichy, not de Gaulle, that would count in French affairs.²

The British were no more desirous than the Americans to impose a

¹ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, pp. 680-681.

² Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, p. 777.

government upon the people of France, and were quite as anxious not to be caught backing the wrong horse. The Foreign Office and the War Office did not see, however, how the people of France could continue their daily life, or, for that matter, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force set up even a temporary administration to function until the holding of a general election, without the emergence of some sort of provisional government. It might be months before conditions would permit the making of the necessary preparations, and the holding of an election. They took a more favourable and, as events were to show, a more just view of the probable popularity of General de Gaulle with the people of France. If there was to be a provisional government it seemed to them that there was no conceivable alternative to the French Committee of National Liberation. In these circumstances they felt that the military necessity for opening discussions with representatives of the committee must be held to outweigh the political dangers of the degree of recognition that this would inevitably involve. Only by such discussion could the Allies hope to gain co-operation from the French civil administration, support from the people of France, and control over the Resistance organizations which were increasingly in touch with, and under the influence of, General de Gaulle and his movement.

But if this was the view taken by the Departments mainly concerned, the Prime Minister did not feel so confident regarding the reception that might be in store for General de Gaulle in France, and feared that the French committee might be more concerned with revenge and the consolidation of their own power than with the winning of the battle. He did not feel there was sure enough ground for him to try to persuade the President to abandon his position and agree to enter into negotiations with the committee.

The approach of the tripartite conference of Foreign Ministers to be held in Moscow in October 1943, led to an attempt at the formulation of an agreed policy and a 'basic scheme' was approved by the President and Prime Minister. This provided for an initial period of military control, as brief as practicable, during which, however, the Supreme Commander would conduct the administration through a French Director of Civil Affairs and French officials. He was to have no dealings with Vichy, and was 'to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.' Unfortunately the scheme did nothing at all to resolve the crucial differences of view regarding utilization of the French committee. At one time it seemed that the President might be prevailed upon to accept an arrangement under which the French committee should be given a certain amount of general information regarding the matters to be discussed while the actual negotiations were conducted with the French Military Mission in London. The British felt that the French would be unlikely to agree

to such a procedure, particularly after the Fighting French forces had all been placed under the control of the committee in the autumn of 1943. Hopes of the President agreeing were dashed, in any case, by his reaction to the events of November 1943 in Syria and the Lebanon, when the French committee attempted by force to suppress anti-French nationalism, notwithstanding the formal grant two years earlier of independence to these two countries.

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Then on 15th January 1944 General Eisenhower arrived in London to assume responsibility as Supreme Commander for the invasion of Europe. Four days later he cabled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it was essential for the proper planning and preparation of his operations that he should be allowed to enter into discussions with the French regarding his arrangements for civil administration. In order to avoid embroilment in French politics, it was his view that these should involve utilization of French authorities rather than the establishment of Allied military government. The only authority with which he could deal was the French Committee of National Liberation. He therefore requested that General de Gaulle should be asked to designate an individual or group of individuals for the purpose. The War Department and the State Department were by now in accord with the British War Office and Foreign Office as to the military urgency of opening such negotiations. A directive had previously been agreed to in principle by the President and was under preparation in Washington that would have accorded to General Eisenhower the authority to enter into the negotiations he required. The President's distrust of General de Gaulle had been revived, however, by events in Syria and the Lebanon and he withdrew his approval of the directive. In the middle of March he produced a new draft. Under this the Supreme Commander was to be authorized to negotiate with the French committee. But it was proposed to instruct him that he was 'not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgement you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable'. It was not altogether clear whether the Supreme Commander was to be allowed to negotiate before, or only after, the invasion of France. The draft was not favourably received either by the British authorities or by S.H.A.E.F. The former felt that the authority to enter into dealings with other elements of the French people encountered in France besides the French committee would only lead to confusion and might well result in the committee refusing to negotiate. The latter felt that the Supreme Commander ought not to be saddled with the heavy political responsibility of deciding with which elements he should

negotiate. As for the Prime Minister he was still unhappy regarding the fitness of the French committee to act as a provisional administration and was not willing to press the President to modify the draft directive.

This deadlock was broken, or seemed at first to be broken, by a broadcast statement from Washington on 9th April, 1944 by Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. The following passages occurred in this:

'It is of the utmost importance that civil authority in France should be exercised by Frenchmen, should be swiftly established, and should operate in accordance with advanced planning as fully as military operations will permit. It is essential that the material foundations of the life of the French people be at once restored or resumed. Only in this way can stability be achieved. It has always been our thought in planning for this end that we should look to Frenchmen to undertake civil administration and assist them in that task without compromising in any way the right of the Government which they may wish to establish. That must be left to the free and untrammelled choice of the French people.

The President and I are clear, therefore, as to the need, from the outset, of French civil administration -- and democratic French administration -- in France. We are disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Committee has given public assurance that it does not propose to perpetuate its authority. On the contrary, it has given assurance that it wishes, at the earliest possible date, to have the French people exercise their own Sovereign will in accordance with French constitutional processes.

The Committee is, of course, not the Government of France, and we cannot recognize it as such. In accordance with this understanding of mutual purposes the Committee will have every opportunity to undertake the civil administration, and our co-operation and help in every practicable way in making it successful. It has been a symbol of the spirit of France and of French resistance. We have fully cooperated with it in all the military phases of the war effort, including the furnishing of arms and equipment to the French armed forces. Our central and abiding purpose is to aid the French people, our oldest friends, in providing a democratic, competent, and French administration of liberated French territory.¹

But the Supreme Commander was still without a reply to his request of 19th January to be allowed to enter into negotiations with

¹ *The Times*, 10 April, 1944.

the French committee. However, the Secretary of State's broadcast appeared to General Koenig, recently appointed commander of the French forces in Britain and Head of the French Military Mission to S.H.A.E.F., to offer a basis for consultation. In the hope of accelerating the issue of a directive, and against the background of the Secretary of State's broadcast, General Eisenhower proposed to General Koenig, that discussions should be opened between Supreme Headquarters and the French Mission regarding 'the collaboration and assistance of the French authorities, both Civil and Military'. The talks were to be 'on a military basis', participation by the civil delegate in London of the French committee and his staff being excluded, as such. It was not excluded, however, that the civilian experts should in fact be called in to assist the Military Mission. Talks on this basis began shortly after.

When reporting this development General Eisenhower asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to allow him to take the further step of opening negotiations directly with the civilian representatives of the French committee. He pointed out that in fact consultations had already taken place between American authorities and the committee in connection with a 'Civilian Supply Programme' for France and with the application of lend-lease principles to French colonial territories and to planning for metropolitan France. If negotiations with civilian representatives were authorized he undertook to keep within the terms of the draft directive still under discussion and of the broadcast by the Secretary of State.

* * *

But now it was the turn of the French to make difficulties,¹ suffering the sensitivity of the insecure. Resentment had grown as they increasingly felt themselves excluded from information concerning forthcoming operations. The continuing refusal to accord recognition of the French committee as a provisional government, notwithstanding the adherence to it of many of the French colonies and of North Africa, which was, constitutionally at least, a part of metropolitan France, and the resultant failure to open negotiations over Civil Affairs matters, disappointed and piqued the committee. They were suspicious too, that it was intended to establish another A.M.G.O.T. in France. We have seen in the previous chapter that there were phases of planning when this suspicion was not unjustified. When, at last, negotiations began they were pointedly confined to a military basis. And just before they began the United Kingdom Government had decided, in view of

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, 1952, Vol. V. Ch. XXXV. Duff Cooper, *Old Men Forget*, London, 1953, Ch. 20.

the approaching operations, that it was essential to tighten up all security regulations. The measures taken included the prohibition of all cipher communication with England, except for the British and Americans. General de Gaulle, at the eleventh hour, found himself still excluded, the sovereignty he had sought to build up, and had in fact not unsuccessfully created for his movement, still unrecognized. He and the French committee protested vigorously that the arrangements for the civil administration of France were political matters which could not possibly be discussed with profit merely between military representatives. The negotiations with General Koenig, which had begun on 25th April came to an abrupt stop, except in so far as they concerned the French military forces placed at the disposal of General Eisenhower.

To break the deadlock it was resolved to invite General de Gaulle to London – it had in any case been planned to do this very shortly before D-Day so that he could be told about the invasion of France. It was hoped he would broadcast to France and that discussions might be opened on Civil Affairs matters. If so, it was proposed that they should take place between the French and the British only. The President was ready to acquiesce in such talks but still adamant in his determination that the Americans themselves should not be drawn into negotiations between representatives of the civil, as opposed to the military, authorities. The refusal of the Americans to take part, and the lateness of the invitation (which was in fact due to security considerations – but this was no palliative), further exasperated the French committee. This reacted by voting on 15th May that it should henceforth be styled the Provisional Government of the French Republic – so making it more difficult than ever for the Americans to be brought in. Eventually General de Gaulle was prevailed upon to come to London. Relations were even less cordial than usual and at first he utterly refused to broadcast or to discuss Civil Affairs matters. He raised yet another difficulty, taking strong exception to the intention of the Allies to issue their own francs on arrival in France. He asserted that this constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of his Provisional Government.¹

But a visit to Normandy, a week after the Allied landings, where he was enthusiastically received, reassured the General as to his standing with the people of France. His reception also reconciled, or began to reconcile, the Allies to some form of recognition. There had, in fact, been entirely informal talks in London for some months between representatives of the French committee and of the British Government. A thaw now set in, and these talks were allowed to be raised to the level of formal negotiations at an official level with the object of

¹ This matter will be more fully discussed in Ch. IV, V., and XXIV.

drafting agreements to govern the arrangements for the establishment of civil administration in France.

Agreement was soon reached in London in the shape of four draft memoranda dealing with Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions, Currency, Property in Continental France, and Publicity Arrangements, together with one Agreed Minute regarding the distribution of Relief Supplies. On 1st July 1944 these were sent to Washington for consideration. There followed a visit by General de Gaulle to Washington in the course of which he made a more favourable impression upon the President than might have been expected. The shape of future events in France was becoming clearer. As territory was liberated, Vichy officials disappeared, or were apprehended by the forces of the Resistance, and their places were taken by members of the Resistance. These already owed allegiance to General de Gaulle, who thus found himself automatically, if somewhat remotely, in control of the improvised administration. The President was at last prevailed upon to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the *de facto* authority for the civil administration of France. The drafts, which had been approved by the British Government through a statement in the House of Commons on 12th July, were discussed in Washington between the French and Americans. In due course British representatives also were drawn into these talks and essentially similar agreements, in the form of five memoranda, were drawn up between the American, the French and the British representatives.¹ Some ten days later, in the last week of August, 1944, the agreements were brought into effect. As between the British Government and the French committee this was done by act of the Foreign Secretary, as between the United States Government and the committee, by act of General Eisenhower. This course was adopted by the Americans so as to minimize the degree of governmental recognition involved. By this time much of northern France, including Paris, was already in the hands of the Allies. But at last there was an agreed formal basis for civil affairs operations in the country.

* * *

It remains only to consider the matters which the civil affairs agreements regulated.

The early and most important clauses of all the agreements governed the exercise of sovereign authority. These differed somewhat in the French and in the other agreements as might be expected, but two principles underlay the provisions of all the agreements. First, the paramountcy of military requirements in connection with the conduct

¹ cf. Appendix II.

of operations must be absolutely safeguarded. Second, the indigenous civil government should resume the exercise of full sovereignty as soon as might be compatible with the paramountcy of military needs.

In the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian agreements these objects were attained by broad and generous arrangements between friendly governments that contrast somewhat with the more meticulous provisions of the agreement with the adolescent French committee, less sure of its standing and authority. In the former agreements a 'first or military phase' was contemplated during which the Allied Commander would be endowed with supreme authority. During this phase the returning civil government undertook to assist the Supreme Allied Commander to the best of its ability by placing liaison officers at his disposal and by early resuscitating the civil administration. The Supreme Commander undertook to work through the liaison officers and the local administration as much as possible. As soon as the military situation permitted and the civil administration was sufficiently re-established he would transfer responsibility to the civil government. Along lines of communication, at airfields, bases, and other places of importance in the territory handed over, the Supreme Commander might reserve certain over-riding powers to himself. The civil government would continue to accord facilities to the Supreme Commander for the control of his operations.

As was perhaps to be expected, in view of the background of events concerning General de Gaulle and the growth of his movement, the French agreement was less easy-going. Administrative authority throughout liberated France was to be exercised by a Delegate on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, which had by the date of the agreement proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of the French Republic but had not yet been recognized as such by the U.K. and U.S. Governments. Expression was given to the two principles underlying all the agreements through the conception put forward by the French, of two zones, a Forward Zone and an Interior Zone, into one or other of which the whole of liberated France was to fall. The Delegate had power to delimit from time to time the boundary of the Forward Zone, which was to consist of areas 'affected by active military operations'. But he was required under the agreement to do so 'in such a manner as to meet the requirements stated by the Supreme Allied Commander'. And within the Forward Zone he was required to take all measures which in the Supreme Commander's judgment were 'essential for the successful conduct of his operations'. In emergency the Supreme Commander had the authority to take such measures himself 'as a temporary and exceptional measure'. Although care was taken to exclude all reference to the exercise of 'supreme responsibility and authority' by the Supreme Commander this was nevertheless effectively guaranteed to him in the Forward

Zone to the extent that the needs of his military operations might require. No agreement would have been acceptable to the Allies that did not clearly safeguard the paramountcy of military requirements. Expressed in this fashion it was tolerable also to the French committee which felt unable to accept the plainer speaking employed between the recognized governments. It is true, of course, that by the time the agreement was signed British military operations had passed through, and almost out of, France into Belgium and Holland. But American operations were to be conducted in France for some time to come, and the need remained to regulate the relations between military and civil authorities in the vast areas left behind by operations. In the Interior Zone it was agreed that 'the conduct of the administration . . . will be entirely a matter for the French authorities' subject only to the latter affording the Supreme Commander all facilities for his operations, and to the creation of 'Military Zones', consisting of airfields, ports, bases and other installations, in which the paramount authority of the Supreme Commander was recognized.

The remaining clauses for all agreements were broadly speaking similar although once again the French agreement differed from the others on certain points. They provided for the exemption of members of the Allied forces and of accompanying organizations from indigenous taxation and from the jurisdiction of indigenous courts of justice. They provided also for the establishment of Claims Commissions to hear and adjudicate upon claims for compensation for damage or injury caused by the Allied forces. They provided finally for the power of the Supreme Commander to requisition, or cause to be requisitioned, accommodation, supplies, and services necessary for his military operations.

CHAPTER IV

PLANS FOR THE RETURN TO FRANCE

ONCE the terms of the Civil Affairs agreements or their general nature were settled it became possible to instruct the Supreme Allied Commander as to the measure of responsibility he should assume and to communicate to him the policy he was to follow. This was done in a series of directives on Civil Affairs approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Directives for Norway, Holland, and Belgium were approved on 21st April 1944 and sent to the Supreme Commander. Directives for Denmark and Luxembourg were communicated in June. The directives established the Civil Affairs agreements as the basis for all Civil Affairs planning. They added instructions on political, financial, relief, and economic matters. In the case of Denmark it had not been possible to negotiate an agreement since there was no government available. Instead the directive provided that Denmark should be treated, as far as possible, as a friendly state, in recognition of the friendly attitude shown by the great majority of the people, and their resistance to German occupation. The Supreme Commander in his turn issued directives to the Force Commanders likely to be concerned with the several countries. For France, the first country to be re-occupied, and the country with which this chapter is concerned, no directive could be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander, since, for the reasons in the previous chapter, it had not proved possible to negotiate an agreement.

But this, needless to say, did not prevent detailed tactical planning which had, in fact, begun long before. The directive of 26th April 1943 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Morgan had required him to prepare plans for:

- '(a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectations of large scale cross Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.
- (b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegra-

tion at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(c) A full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

The group of plans under clause (a) was given the code-name of 'Cockade', Plans under (b) were known as 'Rankin' and under (c) as 'Overlord'. For 'Cockade', Civil Affairs planning was, obviously, not necessary since there was no intention of occupying any territory on the Continent. For 'Rankin', Civil Affairs plans had to be prepared, and quickly, in view of the appreciation that Germany might possibly collapse at any time after the Autumn of 1943. The main Civil Affairs task, however, was to plan for 'Overlord', the full scale assault against the Continent as early as possible in 1944, whether German resistance had disintegrated or not. This involved landings in the area of Caen, Bayeux, and Carentan, and expansion south and south-west to seize the Cotentin peninsula and Cherbourg. Simultaneously the bridgehead was to be extended south to enable airfields to be established beyond Caen. Later developments would be largely dictated by the enemy's reactions. In the most favourable conditions an immediate advance might be possible on Le Havre and Rouen. More probably it would be necessary to push southwards first to seize and bring into use the Brittany ports - Nantes, St. Nazaire, Brest, and others. When a line of communication organization had been built up and sufficient resources accumulated in the lodgment area and when air forces could operate from within the bridgehead, an advance was to be made on Paris and the Seine ports, with subsidiary operations to clear and bring into use the Biscay ports. When a sudden collapse of Germany did not take place, and as it was realized that the likelihood of this had receded (if in fact, it had ever existed), planning for 'Rankin' was more and more assimilated to that for 'Overlord'. This alone will be considered in the present history.

* * *

Until the end of July 1943 responsibility for the detailed planning of land operations for the invasion of the Continent rested upon the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. On 31st July a new British headquarters was formed to take over this responsibility. This was 21 Army Group, established at St. Paul's School in London.

Civil Affairs planning began here, towards the end of 1943 and proceeded concurrently with the operational planning. The latter took definite shape in the 'Initial Joint Plan' of 1st February 1944, and a complementary 'Administrative Plan.' These plans covered preparations for the invasion and also the actual landings in France and summarized the Civil Affairs task. Civil Affairs staff officers were to be

attached to Army and subordinate headquarters and form an integral part of the staff. Civil Affairs detachments would be allotted to Armies as needed. Armies were to undertake Civil Affairs planning and to include in their normal stores programme such Civil Affairs supplies as they considered necessary. The Civil Affairs task would be to purge the local administration, ensure the maintenance of law and order, prevent the civil population from impeding troop movements, arrange for local labour and transport and maximum use of other resources, and distribute relief to the 'minimum essential to prevent the civilian population embarrassing the conduct of operations.' Finally it was provided that 'the method adopted will be to set up military government within the limits and to the extent laid down by the C-in-C . . .'

Planning by the Civil Affairs staff took form in the 21 Army Group Civil Affairs Plan of 15th March 1944 and 21 Army Group Standing Operation Instruction No. 20 – Civil Affairs, of 6th May 1944, which were intended to provide for the landings in France and for operations during the first ninety days of the invasion. The plan of 15th March was supported and expanded by some twelve Civil Affairs Administrative Instructions.

The initial difficulty faced by the Civil Affairs staffs planning for France was that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, no civil affairs agreement had been concluded with any authority, and that it was to be many months before one could be negotiated. This difficulty was met by making certain assumptions, which were that the French Committee of National Liberation would in fact be recognized at some time as a provisional national authority, that an agreement would be concluded with it, probably on the lines of the other Civil Affairs agreements, under which military government would be limited to zones of operations and communications, while the committee assumed responsibility for the administration of other liberated areas, and finally, that as soon as the Supreme Commander felt it safe to do so he would hand over control to the committee or its successors in all areas.

Against the background of these assumptions it was planned that military government should be established, the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group becoming Military Governor under the policy control of the Supreme Commander. His powers were from the outset delegated, within their respective areas, to the commanders of the three armies that would for these initial operations be placed under his control, namely, the Second British Army, the First Canadian Army, and the First United States Army. The British and Canadian Army Commanders were empowered to make further delegation of their powers to Corps Commanders: the American Army Commander down to both Corps and Divisional Commanders. The staffs of all these Commanders included a Civil Affairs element. It was provided that

'the Command and Staff channel for Civil Affairs is the normal military one' although a direct Civil Affairs channel was permitted for technical Civil Affairs matters not involving policy. It was contemplated that S.H.A.E.F. would, at some stage, relieve 21 Army Group of responsibility behind Army areas. Transfer of responsibility would eventually be made to a French administration if such had come into being, in accordance with the intentions of the agreement assumed to exist. It was recognized, of course, that the exercise of military government in an Allied country would be a delicate matter, particularly if it should still be the case at the time of the invasion that no Civil Affairs agreement had been negotiated to authorize and regulate its establishment. It was intended, therefore, to refrain from any proclamation or overt establishment of military government, to interfere as little as possible with any French administration that might be set up to replace the Vichy organization, and, if it did become necessary to interfere, to do so, whenever possible, by indirect methods, through the existing French local administration, rather than directly through Civil Affairs officers in person.

It was planned to place one Civil Affairs Group under the command of Second British Army and one under First United States Army, the formations responsible for making the initial landings. Two more groups were to be in reserve, at the disposal of 21 Army Group for allocation to First Canadian Army or Third United States Army, when these arrived in France, or for use otherwise as needed. Yet two more groups, or the equivalent strength, were to be placed at the disposal of First United States Army Group. The groups under command of Second British Army and First United States Army were to be fed in gradually as the lodgment area expanded.

For planning purposes only, an assumption was made that within sixty days of the first landings, this area would include roughly so much of the north-west of France as was enclosed by the Seine and the Loire. On this basis it was expected that the British zone would include the Departments of Calvados, Eure, Seine Inférieure, Orne, Eure et Loire, Seine et Oise, Sarthe, Loire et Cher, Loiret, Maine et Loire, and Indre et Loire. The American zone was expected to include the Departments of Manche, Mayenne, Ille et Vilaine, Côtes du Nord, Finisterre, Morbihan, and Loire Inférieure. It was planned to deploy within this area a little more than four groups. Detachments were to be sent to the prefectures of each of these eighteen departments, and to eighty-two communes besides. To each of the ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest and St. Nazaire, three detachments were to be allotted. Ten detachments were to be allotted specifically for work with refugees and displaced persons. In addition, three Civil Affairs Inland Depots were to be established for the storage and distribution of supplies brought in over the beaches, a Type B Depot at Caen, a

Type A Depot at Argentan, and a Type C Depot at Le Mans. These Depots were to meet the needs of the British zone only. Separate arrangements were made for the American zone. For although operational command of the whole of the invading forces was exercised during the first weeks by the Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group, a British formation, it had early been decided that the British and American administrative systems were so different that any attempt to integrate them could only create confusion.¹ Other depots would be held in readiness for entry as soon as possible. This represented a force of over 2,500 Civil Affairs Officers and other ranks, or enlisted men, not including the American Civil Affairs Supply Depots. The formation staffs of 21 Army Group, the two Armies and, their subordinate formations represented another four hundred officers and over seven hundred men – a total Civil Affairs strength of some 3,600 at the end of sixty days.

Once a Civil Affairs Detachment had been established on the ground it was to remain in the same locality and not move forward with the formation to which it had originally been subordinated. But when local administration had been satisfactorily re-established, and the need for Civil Affairs staff grew less, it was intended to thin down detachments. The officers and men thus set free were to come under the control of 21 Army Group and be regrouped into fresh detachments for redeployment in forward areas as the advance progressed.

* * *

There was Civil Affairs planning also at Army level and at Corps, and, with American forces, at Division level as well. In its main lines this planning conformed to that at 21 Army Group. The landings were to be made by five divisions on five beaches, three on the Second British Army front to the east, two on the First United States Army front, to the west. The British sector was divided between 1 Corps which, with 3rd British Division, 3rd Canadian Division, 51st Highland Division, and two Commando Brigades was responsible for the two easternmost beaches known as 'Sword' and 'Juno', and XXX Corps which, with 50th British Division, 7th British Armoured Division, and 49th British Division. was responsible for the next beach to the west, known as 'Gold'. Civil Affairs Detachments were to land on D-Day with each of these Corps, with instructions to establish themselves as early as possible in Caen and Bayeux the two towns on the Second Army front. For the rest, the planning at these levels was concerned with more detail than it is possible to deal with in this history.

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¹ These matters will be discussed in greater detail in Ch. XVII

The most important, perhaps, of the Civil Affairs specialist functions was that concerned with public safety, for without the maintenance of order there could be no administration and no prospect of discharging the responsibilities laid upon the Civil Affairs organization. It is, indeed, misleading to think of public safety officers as technical specialists, for their work was at the basis of all Civil Affairs activities. This was recognized in the composition of the basic detachment, which normally consisted of four officers, two general administrative officers, and two public safety officers. These were the essential ingredients, to which the truly specialist functions were optional additions. Most public safety officers, whether their detachments were allotted to British or American formations, were recruited from Chief Constables and from the rank and file of the civil police forces of the United Kingdom. Some five hundred of the latter, sergeants, inspectors, superintendents, served in Civil Affairs and there is testimony from all sides as to the excellence of the work of these officers. The poor quality of many recruits to Civil Affairs and the reasons for this have been mentioned in an earlier chapter. Some came unwillingly, discarded by their units. Others were willing enough but only because they had no satisfactory niche elsewhere. Police recruits, in contrast, were picked men released by the Home Office from an exacting and honourable service, eager to serve, but with good employment to which they could ultimately return.

The functions of Public Safety officers included the establishment and control of prisons. Their principal task was to ensure 'the maintenance of law and order, and so to supervise, or if the need arises and direct action is required, reorganize the indigenous civil police forces so that they function efficiently and willingly.' They were enjoined to assist the indigenous authorities in removing Nazi influences and methods but were warned against attempting, or giving the appearance of attempting, to impose a British or United States police system. In other parts of this book there will be found separate chapters devoted to some of the more important special functions of Civil Affairs. There is none on Public Safety. This springs from no underestimate of the importance of the work of Public Safety officers – quite the reverse. Their part was of such fundamental importance that it has seemed better to set out to do justice to it in the general narrative chapters. In the matter of Public Monuments and Fine Arts responsibility was initially laid upon Public Safety officers but was later transferred to specialists. It was laid down that 'in pursuance of the declared policy of British and United States Governments, Commanders will be directly responsible for the avoidance, so far as military operations permit, of damage or of accusations of damage, to historical monuments, antiquities, museums, libraries, churches and cultural objects in general. At this stage the emphasis was on

preventing looting and damage by the Allied forces. Later, on arrival in Germany, there was in addition the task of recovering looted works of art from German possession. Fire fighting and civil defence were also technically functions of Public Safety but were in fact in the hands of specialists.

General financial arrangements for Civil Affairs and military government will be considered in greater detail in a separate chapter. But the arrangements for the provision of currency for the use of the Allied forces in France, both for their own military and personal needs and for Civil Affairs purposes, need to be mentioned here, at least briefly, for they were to give rise to considerable difficulties by no means confined to the field of finance. These, and the manner in which they were resolved will be recounted in the following chapter. Here only the plan will be set out. It was to be the responsibility of Supreme Headquarters to make the necessary currency available. This was to consist in the first place of French *francs* of the type already circulating in metropolitan France. This, by definition, included the French territories in Northern Africa. Although genuine metropolitan *franc* notes could be provided in substantial quantities from Algiers, and in other ways, the amounts required were so large that it would have been unsafe to rely solely upon these to last out until the French reserves in France became available. Further, there was the overriding danger that the Germans in carrying out a 'scorched earth' policy might destroy all reserves of metropolitan *francs* as the Italians had destroyed reserves in Ethiopia. Such action would quickly have produced great civil as well as military difficulties unless an alternative reserve was available. To meet these dangers supplemental French *franc* notes were printed in large quantities and held under the control of S.H.A.E.F. The notes were printed in America. It was planned that 'the French authorities', whoever these might ultimately prove to be, should in due course be requested to declare them legal tender. Should there be any reluctance or inability to do this, it was intended that the Supreme Commander should himself proclaim them legal tender. For emergency, if French *francs* were not available in sufficient quantity, or if supplemental *francs* proved unacceptable to the people of France, American 'Yellow Seal' dollars and regular United States coin could be available, and British Military Administration notes and regular British coin. This arrangement was understood and apparently accepted by representatives of the French National Committee. It was when the issue of a proclamation of the supplemental *francs* as legal tender by the French committee was proposed to General de Gaulle that difficulties arose, as might be expected.

It was considered that the greatest single problem to confront the Civil Affairs organization would probably be the control and care of

refugees and displaced persons. This also will be dealt with in a separate chapter.¹ The full impact was not expected until the Allies entered upon Germany territory. But local problems would arise even during the early stages of the invasion of France. The overriding need was to keep refugees from obstructing the movement of the Allied armies. Heavily mechanized as these were this meant keeping clear the main roads required for operations. Plans were prepared for canalizing the movement of displaced persons along routes other than those expected to be required for military operations, and for the establishment of transit and reception areas. Whenever possible the arrangements for camps in these areas were to be entrusted to indigenous local authorities or voluntary organizations. It was planned also to set up information bureaux for the help of those who had become separated from their families in the upheaval of war. Arrangements for the relief of other persons included the provision of supplies and stores and the disbursement of cash payments to needy persons. Liaison officers of appropriate nationality were to be attached to the Allied forces to assist the Civil Affairs detachments in dealing with refugees and displaced persons.

The need to be in a position to distribute supplies raised a separate and formidable problem, which will be more fully discussed in a later chapter.² It was known that in France under the German occupation there were shortages of food, certainly local, probably general. The first effects of the Allied invasion would be greatly to worsen this position. It was obviously desirable, from all points of view, that the Allies should be able to combat this situation. In the early stages this could be done only by importing supplies, whatever it might prove possible to do later by better distribution of indigenous resources. But every ton of food brought in over the beaches for civilians set the Allies back one ton in the build-up of military strength. All their hopes of victory depended upon outstripping the Germans in this race. And to the extent that food supplies were procured from the United Kingdom (and in the early stages this was considerable), every ton for the French meant one ton less for the British civilian whose diet, if not deficient, was already austere. Any further cuts in this would be reflected in a weakening of the war effort. Clearly, therefore, there was no room for generosity in the early stages. No more supplies could be brought in for the people of France than were necessary to prevent such shortages as might result in sickness, starvation or disorder, of such a degree as would hamper military operations. It had been decided that every effort must be made to guarantee to the liberated populations a diet with a nutritional value of two thousand calories a day. This was

¹ cf. Ch. XIX.

² cf. Ch. XVII.

considered the minimum necessary to avoid disease over a period of a few months, provided that no hard manual labour was undertaken.¹ Compared with the British wartime rations which, after declining in 1940 and 1941 to an overall average calorie value of little more than 2,800, were by 1944 back to the pre-war level of three thousand,² this was indeed meagre. But the Allies could accept no greater handicap in the crucial race of the build-up.

The information available when the Civil Affairs plan was being drawn up was that the two thousand calories level was at that time attainable without foreign assistance for the whole of the people of France excepting only those resident in towns with a population of ten thousand and more. In these larger towns only seventy-nine per cent of the population could attain this level in the absence of imports. For the remaining twenty-one per cent of the urban population it would be necessary to import food. In battle areas many more would require relief. There was also the uncertain commitment of feeding refugees and displaced persons. To cover these additional responsibilities it was decided to aim at the provision during the first thirty days of 'hard' rations (biscuits, tinned meat, pulses, and tinned milk) yielding the requisite calories for half *the whole* of the liberated population. In addition there was to be an issue of vitaminized chocolate to expectant and nursing mothers and to children. No more could be attempted, and whether this would be achieved would depend upon the battle. For the second period of thirty days there would be no imports of food for the rural population or the population of the smaller towns. For towns with a population of ten thousand or more imports would continue on a scale to provide a two thousand calorie ration, not to twenty-one per cent but to fifty per cent of the population liberated. Half the imports would be of 'hard' rations as before, half of 'bulk' rations (flour, fats, meat and vegetable stew, soups, pulses, cheese, milk and coffee). The issue of vitaminized chocolate was to continue. During the third period of thirty days there would be no change in the scale of imports but the composition would be different, only one-quarter being 'hard' rations, the remaining three-quarters consisting of 'bulk' rations. Over the whole period of ninety days soap was to be imported for the whole population liberated, on the scale of six ounces a month for every person. Clothing and blankets would be brought in for one-tenth of the whole population liberated, on the scale of eight pounds of clothing and one blanket for each person. Medical supplies were also to be imported. In due course, as the situation became stabilized and better known, and it became possible to build up reserves against unexpected demands it was hoped that it would become unnecessary to make normal provision of relief supplies for more than

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

² *How Britain was Fed in War Time*, H.M.S.O. 1946, p. 49.

the twenty-one per cent of the population of large towns originally estimated to be in need of relief.

On the beaches all this meant that daily imports of relief supplies were planned to begin on the first day after D-day with a token consignment of ten tons of food. By the tenth day the planned daily amount had risen to twenty tons and by the twentieth day, to 144 tons, at which level it remained for the following thirty days. By the fifty-third day it had become 166 tons and by the sixty-first day 285 tons. In addition medical stores were planned to begin arriving on the fourth day and soap on the seventh. On the thirty-first day the import of clothing and blankets was to start. A special allocation of petrol, oil and lubricants was included for Civil Affairs needs. The daily total of imports of all kinds of Civil Affairs relief supplies was planned to rise from ten tons on D + 1 to 458 tons on D + 90. In round figures it was hoped to land 2,500 tons within the British sector by D + 30, 10,000 tons by D + 60, and 20,000 by D + 90. Over the period D + 21 to D + 90, 10,000 tons of coal was to be released for Civil Affairs purposes in both the British and U.S. sectors from stocks imported for military needs in general.

* * *

Under the Civil Affairs agreements negotiated with the governments of the countries to be liberated there was provision for the creation of a body of Liaison Officers to advise and assist the Allied commanders and to act as intermediaries between them and the civil authorities in the countries concerned. These Liaison Officers were an important part of the machinery for the re-establishment of civil administration. It was planned that they should be attached to S.H.A.E.F. by their respective governments but should then be placed at the disposal of the Civil Affairs staffs at the headquarters of formations or of the Civil Affairs detachments.

Although at the time of invasion no Civil Affairs agreement had been reached for France, there was none the less need for a body of French Liaison Officers for Civil Affairs purposes, and, in fact, much had already been done to build up the necessary organization in readiness for use under whatever arrangements it might prove possible to reach. The French had started planning in London for the re-establishment of civil administration in France, even before the Committee of National Liberation was formed in Algiers in June 1943, and before C.O.S.S.A.C. or S.H.A.E.F. had begun on their plans. A *Commission de Débarquement* was set up. This included an intelligence and planning organization, the *Service Militaire d'Etudes Administratives*, and was planned to include also in due course a field organization of liaison officers to be known as the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative*.

Owing to the ban on negotiations, the French plans could not, at least officially, be linked with C.O.S.S.A.C. and S.H.A.E.F. planning, until the end of April 1944, when, on the initiative of General Eisenhower and General Koenig, and following the broadcast by Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, discussions were opened. One of the first matters taken up was that of the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative*. There were at this time 187 French officers undergoing Civil Affairs training in the U.K. and available for the Mission. Another fifty-three were ready in North Africa if they could be transported to Europe. It was proposed that these 240 officers should be shared equally between 21 Army Group and First U.S. Army Group. There was a request by 21 Army Group for an additional forty medical officers. This could not be met at once, but the French hoped to make available ten medical officers and twenty-eight fully trained nurses.

These negotiations petered out when the Allied authorities imposed a ban on cipher communication. Then followed the visit of General de Gaulle. Already resentful because of his exclusion from Allied councils and the refusal of the Allies to recognize his provisional government, he was exasperated to discover the Allied plans for proclaiming Allied franc notes legal tender. He forbade the officers of the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative* to accompany the Allied forces. He was later prevailed upon to allow twenty to go with the invading troops. It was not until after his visit to Normandy, which will be recounted in the next chapter, that he could be prevailed upon to allow the rest of the Mission to be deployed, and take its planned part in Allied Civil Affairs arrangements.

* * *

As the date for the invasion of France drew near there was still no Civil Affairs agreement. At last, on 25th May, Supreme Headquarters, still without a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, could wait no longer. The Supreme Commander issued a letter to 21 Army group and First United States Army Group, setting out in eighteen annexed directives, and in accordance with the best information then available, the policy that was to govern Civil Affairs planning and operations in France in support of 'Overlord'. It was only ten days to the beginning of the battle. The eighteen directives annexed to the Supreme Commander's letter were 'statements of principle and basic policies which will be followed in their broad lines unless special circumstances dictate otherwise.' In general they reinforced the more concrete and detailed instructions already in the 21 Army Group plans by stating or re-stating the principles on which they were in fact founded. Only in the appendices to the legal directive was there much detail. In these were contained the Supreme Commander's

instructions in case subordinate commanders found themselves compelled to establish Military Government Courts notwithstanding their efforts to revive and work through indigenous courts. These instructions took the form of an Allied Military Courts Proclamation and of a Crimes Proclamation for issue if necessary, of rules for the issue of enactments, of rules for Allied Military Courts, of a Guide to Procedure, and of sample forms.

But there was one major change of policy. There was to be no military government in France. This resulted in part, presumably, from the final victory within S.H.A.E.F. at this period of the anti-A.M.G.O.T. school. In fact, however, the military government which it had been proposed to set up under the plan of 15th March was already a very different thing from that established in Italy, if only for the reason that it was to be virtually confined to areas affected by military operations. A far stronger reason for the change was the course that had been taken by the, so far abortive, negotiations for the conclusion of a Civil Affairs agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation, and a growing realization of the attitude of the French towards the establishment of any military government in their country, even if this was kept out of the news by remaining unproclaimed.

That top level directives should be late and should have had to be anticipated by military commanders was a distressingly common experience in all civil affairs and military government preparation. It was due, not so much to procedural defects or bureaucratic delays, although demands for relief supplies may have been subject to excessively detailed scrutiny, as to the difficulty of reconciling American schools of thought, and then of reaching an agreed Anglo-American view.

Last moment revision of the 21 Army Group plan was undertaken. The revised plan, 21 Army Group Instruction No. 6 – Civil Affairs, could not issue until 7th June, the day after D-day when the first Civil Affairs officers had already landed in France. This, however, was not such a serious matter as might at first appear. The great body of detailed, practical instruction under the plan of 15th March had been contained, in the supporting Administrative Instructions: it had been summarized only in the plan. All this remained unaffected by the decision not to establish military government. The validity of the Administrative Instructions was re-affirmed by Operation Instruction No. 6 and the Administrative Instructions were reinforced by a fresh series of Technical Instructions, seventeen in number, most of which had in fact been issued during the preceding month. These went into even greater and more technical detail than the Administrative Instructions. The Operation Instruction dealt only with the general policy and principles that were to govern Civil Affairs operations. The

paragraphs dealing with political considerations were brought closely into accord with the Political and General Directive annexed to the Supreme Commander's letter of 25th May, so reflecting the views of President Roosevelt and, to a slightly lesser degree, of the Prime Minister, in regard to the recognition of a national authority in France. Where the earlier plan had provided for the establishment (however discreetly) of military government and the exercise and delegation of the powers of a Military Governor by Army Group and Army Commanders, the revised plan laid down that 'Military Government will *not* be established in liberated France', that '... the French themselves will conduct all aspects of civil administration of their country', even in areas of operations, and provided for the exercise and delegation on similar lines of 'de facto supreme responsibility'. The French Liaison Officers who were previously to be responsible for advice on all matters concerning the civil administration and to be 'employed wherever possible as the means of actual contact with local authorities' were now to be used by Civil Affairs staffs 'as the direct channel of approach to the civil authorities in order to secure appropriate action as desired by commanders in the discharge of their Civil Affairs responsibilities' - subject of course to the exercise of the Supreme Commander's overriding authority in case of military necessity. Upon the French civil authorities was laid the responsibility for 're-organizing or re-establishing French administration and judicial services in so far as it may be necessary to accomplish the Civil Affairs object ...' This provision was based on that contained in the Civil Affairs agreements executed earlier with other Allied governments.

Although the new arrangements required that the French civil authorities should play a prominent part it was still *not* possible, in view of the reluctance of the President and Prime Minister, to say who these would be 'except that there would be no dealings with Vichy'. But matters had moved since March. Then it was 'a matter of high policy as to how far the National Committee of Liberation can be regarded as a substitute' for a properly constituted government, and the best that could be done was to assume arbitrarily, 'for the purpose of the Plan', that the National Committee would in fact be reconstituted. Now it was 'expected that the French National Committee of Liberation will command the allegiance of the local government authorities who will act in its name', and although 'the utmost care will be taken that no impression is given which might be construed as favouring the interests of any particular group', there can have been little doubt in the minds of the planners that it would be the French Committee of National Liberation that would take on the part of the French civil authorities.

There was *imminent* speaking of change in the number of Civil

Zone to the extent that the needs of his military operations might require. No agreement would have been acceptable to the Allies that did not clearly safeguard the paramountcy of military requirements. Expressed in this fashion it was tolerable also to the French committee which felt unable to accept the plainer speaking employed between the recognized governments. It is true, of course, that by the time the agreement was signed British military operations had passed through, and almost out of, France into Belgium and Holland. But American operations were to be conducted in France for some time to come, and the need remained to regulate the relations between military and civil authorities in the vast areas left behind by operations. In the Interior Zone it was agreed that 'the conduct of the administration . . . will be entirely a matter for the French authorities' subject only to the latter affording the Supreme Commander all facilities for his operations, and to the creation of 'Military Zones', consisting of airfields, ports, bases and other installations, in which the paramount authority of the Supreme Commander was recognized.

The remaining clauses for all agreements were broadly speaking similar although once again the French agreement differed from the others on certain points. They provided for the exemption of members of the Allied forces and of accompanying organizations from indigenous taxation and from the jurisdiction of indigenous courts of justice. They provided also for the establishment of Claims Commissions to hear and adjudicate upon claims for compensation for damage or injury caused by the Allied forces. They provided finally for the power of the Supreme Commander to requisition, or cause to be requisitioned, accommodation, supplies, and services necessary for his military operations.



CHAPTER IV

PLANS FOR THE RETURN TO FRANCE

ONCE the terms of the Civil Affairs agreements or their general nature were settled it became possible to instruct the Supreme Allied Commander as to the measure of responsibility he should assume and to communicate to him the policy he was to follow. This was done in a series of directives on Civil Affairs approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Directives for Norway, Holland, and Belgium were approved on 21st April 1944 and sent to the Supreme Commander. Directives for Denmark and Luxembourg were communicated in June. The directives established the Civil Affairs agreements as the basis for all Civil Affairs planning. They added instructions on political, financial, relief, and economic matters. In the case of Denmark it had not been possible to negotiate an agreement since there was no government available. Instead the directive provided that Denmark should be treated, as far as possible, as a friendly state, in recognition of the friendly attitude shown by the great majority of the people, and their resistance to German occupation. The Supreme Commander in his turn issued directives to the Force Commanders likely to be concerned with the several countries. For France, the first country to be re-occupied, and the country with which this chapter is concerned, no directive could be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander, since, for the reasons in the previous chapter, it had not proved possible to negotiate an agreement.

But this, needless to say, did not prevent detailed tactical planning which had, in fact, begun long before. The directive of 26th April 1943 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Morgan had required him to prepare plans for:

- (a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectations of large scale cross Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.
- (b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegra-

tion at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(c) A full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

The group of plans under clause (a) was given the code-name of 'Cockade', Plans under (b) were known as 'Rankin' and under (c) as 'Overlord'. For 'Cockade', Civil Affairs planning was, obviously, not necessary since there was no intention of occupying any territory on the Continent. For 'Rankin', Civil Affairs plans had to be prepared, and quickly, in view of the appreciation that Germany might possibly collapse at any time after the Autumn of 1943. The main Civil Affairs task, however, was to plan for 'Overlord', the full scale assault against the Continent as early as possible in 1944, whether German resistance had disintegrated or not. This involved landings in the area of Caen, Bayeux, and Carentan, and expansion south and south-west to seize the Cotentin peninsula and Cherbourg. Simultaneously the bridgehead was to be extended south to enable airfields to be established beyond Caen. Later developments would be largely dictated by the enemy's reactions. In the most favourable conditions an immediate advance might be possible on Le Havre and Rouen. More probably it would be necessary to push southwards first to seize and bring into use the Brittany ports - Nantes, St. Nazaire, Brest, and others. When a line of communication organization had been built up and sufficient resources accumulated in the lodgment area and when air forces could operate from within the bridgehead, an advance was to be made on Paris and the Seine ports, with subsidiary operations to clear and bring into use the Biscay ports. When a sudden collapse of Germany did not take place, and as it was realized that the likelihood of this had receded (if in fact, it had ever existed), planning for 'Rankin' was more and more assimilated to that for 'Overlord'. This alone will be considered in the present history.

* * *

Until the end of July 1943 responsibility for the detailed planning of land operations for the invasion of the Continent rested upon the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces. On 31st July a new British headquarters was formed to take over this responsibility. This was 21 Army Group, established at St. Paul's School in London.

Civil Affairs planning began here, towards the end of 1943 and proceeded concurrently with the operational planning. The latter took definite shape in the 'Initial Joint Plan' of 1st February 1944, and a complementary 'Administrative Plan.' These plans covered preparations for the invasion and also the actual landings in France and summarized the Civil Affairs task. Civil Affairs staff officers were to be

attached to Army and subordinate headquarters and form an integral part of the staff. Civil Affairs detachments would be allotted to Armies as needed. Armies were to undertake Civil Affairs planning and to include in their normal stores programme such Civil Affairs supplies as they considered necessary. The Civil Affairs task would be to purge the local administration, ensure the maintenance of law and order, prevent the civil population from impeding troop movements, arrange for local labour and transport and maximum use of other resources, and distribute relief to the 'minimum essential to prevent the civilian population embarrassing the conduct of operations.' Finally it was provided that 'the method adopted will be to set up military government within the limits and to the extent laid down by the C-in-C . . .'

Planning by the Civil Affairs staff took form in the 21 Army Group Civil Affairs Plan of 15th March 1944 and 21 Army Group Standing Operation Instruction No. 20 – Civil Affairs, of 6th May 1944, which were intended to provide for the landings in France and for operations during the first ninety days of the invasion. The plan of 15th March was supported and expanded by some twelve Civil Affairs Administrative Instructions.

The initial difficulty faced by the Civil Affairs staffs planning for France was that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, no civil affairs agreement had been concluded with any authority, and that it was to be many months before one could be negotiated. This difficulty was met by making certain assumptions, which were that the French Committee of National Liberation would in fact be recognized at some time as a provisional national authority, that an agreement would be concluded with it, probably on the lines of the other Civil Affairs agreements, under which military government would be limited to zones of operations and communications, while the committee assumed responsibility for the administration of other liberated areas, and finally, that as soon as the Supreme Commander felt it safe to do so he would hand over control to the committee or its successors in all areas.

Against the background of these assumptions it was planned that military government should be established, the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group becoming Military Governor under the policy control of the Supreme Commander. His powers were from the outset delegated, within their respective areas, to the commanders of the three armies that would for these initial operations be placed under his control, namely, the Second British Army, the First Canadian Army, and the First United States Army. The British and Canadian Army Commanders were empowered to make further delegation of their powers to Corps Commanders: the American Army Commander down to both Corps and Divisional Commanders. The staffs of all these Commanders included a Civil Affairs element. It was provided that

'the Command and Staff channel for Civil Affairs is the normal military one' although a direct Civil Affairs channel was permitted for technical Civil Affairs matters not involving policy. It was contemplated that S.H.A.E.F. would, at some stage, relieve 21 Army Group of responsibility behind Army areas. Transfer of responsibility would eventually be made to a French administration if such had come into being, in accordance with the intentions of the agreement assumed to exist. It was recognized, of course, that the exercise of military government in an Allied country would be a delicate matter, particularly if it should still be the case at the time of the invasion that no Civil Affairs agreement had been negotiated to authorize and regulate its establishment. It was intended, therefore, to refrain from any proclamation or overt establishment of military government, to interfere as little as possible with any French administration that might be set up to replace the Vichy organization, and, if it did become necessary to interfere, to do so, whenever possible, by indirect methods, through the existing French local administration, rather than directly through Civil Affairs officers in person.

It was planned to place one Civil Affairs Group under the command of Second British Army and one under First United States Army, the formations responsible for making the initial landings. Two more groups were to be in reserve, at the disposal of 21 Army Group for allocation to First Canadian Army or Third United States Army, when these arrived in France, or for use otherwise as needed. Yet two more groups, or the equivalent strength, were to be placed at the disposal of First United States Army Group. The groups under command of Second British Army and First United States Army were to be fed in gradually as the lodgment area expanded.

For planning purposes only, an assumption was made that within sixty days of the first landings, this area would include roughly so much of the north-west of France as was enclosed by the Seine and the Loire. On this basis it was expected that the British zone would include the Departments of Calvados, Eure, Seine Inférieure, Orne, Eure et Loire, Seine et Oise, Sarthe, Loire et Cher, Loiret, Maine et Loire, and Indre et Loire. The American zone was expected to include the Departments of Manche, Mayenne, Ille et Vilaine, Côtes du Nord, Finisterre, Morbihan, and Loire Inférieure. It was planned to deploy within this area a little more than four groups. Detachments were to be sent to the prefectures of each of these eighteen departments, and to eighty-two communes besides. To each of the ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest and St. Nazaire, three detachments were to be allotted. Ten detachments were to be allotted specifically for work with refugees and displaced persons. In addition, three Civil Affairs Inland Depots were to be established for the storage and distribution of supplies brought in over the beaches, a Type B Depot at Caen, a

Type A Depot at Argentan, and a Type C Depot at Le Mans. These Depots were to meet the needs of the British zone only. Separate arrangements were made for the American zone. For although operational command of the whole of the invading forces was exercised during the first weeks by the Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group, a British formation, it had early been decided that the British and American administrative systems were so different that any attempt to integrate them could only create confusion.¹ Other depots would be held in readiness for entry as soon as possible. This represented a force of over 2,500 Civil Affairs Officers and other ranks, or enlisted men, not including the American Civil Affairs Supply Depots. The formation staffs of 21 Army Group, the two Armies and, their subordinate formations represented another four hundred officers and over seven hundred men – a total Civil Affairs strength of some 3,600 at the end of sixty days.

Once a Civil Affairs Detachment had been established on the ground it was to remain in the same locality and not move forward with the formation to which it had originally been subordinated. But when local administration had been satisfactorily re-established, and the need for Civil Affairs staff grew less, it was intended to thin down detachments. The officers and men thus set free were to come under the control of 21 Army Group and be regrouped into fresh detachments for redeployment in forward areas as the advance progressed.

* * *

There was Civil Affairs planning also at Army level and at Corps, and, with American forces, at Division level as well. In its main lines this planning conformed to that at 21 Army Group. The landings were to be made by five divisions on five beaches, three on the Second British Army front to the east, two on the First United States Army front, to the west. The British sector was divided between 1 Corps which, with 3rd British Division, 3rd Canadian Division, 51st Highland Division, and two Commando Brigades was responsible for the two easternmost beaches known as 'Sword' and 'Juno', and XXX Corps which, with 50th British Division, 7th British Armoured Division, and 49th British Division, was responsible for the next beach to the west, known as 'Gold'. Civil Affairs Detachments were to land on D-Day with each of these Corps, with instructions to establish themselves as early as possible in Caen and Bayeux the two towns on the Second Army front. For the rest, the planning at these levels was concerned with more detail than it is possible to deal with in this history.

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¹ These matters will be discussed in greater detail in Ch. XVII

The most important, perhaps, of the Civil Affairs specialist functions was that concerned with public safety, for without the maintenance of order there could be no administration and no prospect of discharging the responsibilities laid upon the Civil Affairs organization. It is, indeed, misleading to think of public safety officers as technical specialists, for their work was at the basis of all Civil Affairs activities. This was recognized in the composition of the basic detachment, which normally consisted of four officers, two general administrative officers, and two public safety officers. These were the essential ingredients, to which the truly specialist functions were optional additions. Most public safety officers, whether their detachments were allotted to British or American formations, were recruited from Chief Constables and from the rank and file of the civil police forces of the United Kingdom. Some five hundred of the latter, sergeants, inspectors, superintendents, served in Civil Affairs and there is testimony from all sides as to the excellence of the work of these officers. The poor quality of many recruits to Civil Affairs and the reasons for this have been mentioned in an earlier chapter. Some came unwillingly, discarded by their units. Others were willing enough but only because they had no satisfactory niche elsewhere. Police recruits, in contrast, were picked men released by the Home Office from an exacting and honourable service, eager to serve, but with good employment to which they could ultimately return.

The functions of Public Safety officers included the establishment and control of prisons. Their principal task was to ensure 'the maintenance of law and order, and so to supervise, or if the need arises and direct action is required, reorganize the indigenous civil police forces so that they function efficiently and willingly.' They were enjoined to assist the indigenous authorities in removing Nazi influences and methods but were warned against attempting, or giving the appearance of attempting, to impose a British or United States police system. In other parts of this book there will be found separate chapters devoted to some of the more important special functions of Civil Affairs. There is none on Public Safety. This springs from no underestimate of the importance of the work of Public Safety officers – quite the reverse. Their part was of such fundamental importance that it has seemed better to set out to do justice to it in the general narrative chapters. In the matter of Public Monuments and Fine Arts responsibility was initially laid upon Public Safety officers but was later transferred to specialists. It was laid down that 'in pursuance of the declared policy of British and United States Governments, Commanders will be directly responsible for the avoidance, so far as military operations permit, of damage or of accusations of damage, to historical monuments, antiquities, museums, libraries, churches and cultural objects in general. At this stage the emphasis was on

preventing looting and damage by the Allied forces. Later, on arrival in Germany, there was in addition the task of recovering looted works of art from German possession. Fire fighting and civil defence were also technically functions of Public Safety but were in fact in the hands of specialists.

General financial arrangements for Civil Affairs and military government will be considered in greater detail in a separate chapter. But the arrangements for the provision of currency for the use of the Allied forces in France, both for their own military and personal needs and for Civil Affairs purposes, need to be mentioned here, at least briefly, for they were to give rise to considerable difficulties by no means confined to the field of finance. These, and the manner in which they were resolved will be recounted in the following chapter. Here only the plan will be set out. It was to be the responsibility of Supreme Headquarters to make the necessary currency available. This was to consist in the first place of French *francs* of the type already circulating in metropolitan France. This, by definition, included the French territories in Northern Africa. Although genuine metropolitan *franc* notes could be provided in substantial quantities from Algiers, and in other ways, the amounts required were so large that it would have been unsafe to rely solely upon these to last out until the French reserves in France became available. Further, there was the overriding danger that the Germans in carrying out a 'scorched earth' policy might destroy all reserves of metropolitan *francs* as the Italians had destroyed reserves in Ethiopia. Such action would quickly have produced great civil as well as military difficulties unless an alternative reserve was available. To meet these dangers supplemental French *franc* notes were printed in large quantities and held under the control of S.H.A.E.F. The notes were printed in America. It was planned that 'the French authorities', whoever these might ultimately prove to be, should in due course be requested to declare them legal tender. Should there be any reluctance or inability to do this, it was intended that the Supreme Commander should himself proclaim them legal tender. For emergency, if French *francs* were not available in sufficient quantity, or if supplemental *francs* proved unacceptable to the people of France, American 'Yellow Seal' dollars and regular United States coin could be available, and British Military Administration notes and regular British coin. This arrangement was understood and apparently accepted by representatives of the French National Committee. It was when the issue of a proclamation of the supplemental *francs* as legal tender by the French committee was proposed to General de Gaulle that difficulties arose, as might be expected.

It was considered that the greatest single problem to confront the Civil Affairs organization would probably be the control and care of

refugees and displaced persons. This also will be dealt with in a separate chapter.¹ The full impact was not expected until the Allies entered upon Germany territory. But local problems would arise even during the early stages of the invasion of France. The overriding need was to keep refugees from obstructing the movement of the Allied armies. Heavily mechanized as these were this meant keeping clear the main roads required for operations. Plans were prepared for canalizing the movement of displaced persons along routes other than those expected to be required for military operations, and for the establishment of transit and reception areas. Whenever possible the arrangements for camps in these areas were to be entrusted to indigenous local authorities or voluntary organizations. It was planned also to set up information bureaux for the help of those who had become separated from their families in the upheaval of war. Arrangements for the relief of other persons included the provision of supplies and stores and the disbursal of cash payments to needy persons. Liaison officers of appropriate nationality were to be attached to the Allied forces to assist the Civil Affairs detachments in dealing with refugees and displaced persons.

The need to be in a position to distribute supplies raised a separate and formidable problem, which will be more fully discussed in a later chapter.² It was known that in France under the German occupation there were shortages of food, certainly local, probably general. The first effects of the Allied invasion would be greatly to worsen this position. It was obviously desirable, from all points of view, that the Allies should be able to combat this situation. In the early stages this could be done only by importing supplies, whatever it might prove possible to do later by better distribution of indigenous resources. But every ton of food brought in over the beaches for civilians set the Allies back one ton in the build-up of military strength. All their hopes of victory depended upon outstripping the Germans in this race. And to the extent that food supplies were procured from the United Kingdom (and in the early stages this was considerable), every ton for the French meant one ton less for the British civilian whose diet, if not deficient, was already austere. Any further cuts in this would be reflected in a weakening of the war effort. Clearly, therefore, there was no room for generosity in the early stages. No more supplies could be brought in for the people of France than were necessary to prevent such shortages as might result in sickness, starvation or disorder, of such a degree as would hamper military operations. It had been decided that every effort must be made to guarantee to the liberated populations a diet with a nutritional value of two thousand calories a day. This was

¹ cf. Ch. XIX.

² cf. Ch. XVII.

considered the minimum necessary to avoid disease over a period of a few months, provided that no hard manual labour was undertaken.¹ Compared with the British wartime rations which, after declining in 1940 and 1941 to an overall average calorie value of little more than 2,800, were by 1944 back to the pre-war level of three thousand,² this was indeed meagre. But the Allies could accept no greater handicap in the crucial race of the build-up.

The information available when the Civil Affairs plan was being drawn up was that the two thousand calories level was at that time attainable without foreign assistance for the whole of the people of France excepting only those resident in towns with a population of ten thousand and more. In these larger towns only seventy-nine per cent of the population could attain this level in the absence of imports. For the remaining twenty-one per cent of the urban population it would be necessary to import food. In battle areas many more would require relief. There was also the uncertain commitment of feeding refugees and displaced persons. To cover these additional responsibilities it was decided to aim at the provision during the first thirty days of 'hard' rations (biscuits, tinned meat, pulses, and tinned milk) yielding the requisite calories for half *the whole* of the liberated population. In addition there was to be an issue of vitaminized chocolate to expectant and nursing mothers and to children. No more could be attempted, and whether this would be achieved would depend upon the battle. For the second period of thirty days there would be no imports of food for the rural population or the population of the smaller towns. For towns with a population of ten thousand or more imports would continue on a scale to provide a two thousand calorie ration, not to twenty-one per cent but to fifty per cent of the population liberated. Half the imports would be of 'hard' rations as before, half of 'bulk' rations (flour, fats, meat and vegetable stew, soups, pulses, cheese, milk and coffee). The issue of vitaminized chocolate was to continue. During the third period of thirty days there would be no change in the scale of imports but the composition would be different, only one-quarter being 'hard' rations, the remaining three-quarters consisting of 'bulk' rations. Over the whole period of ninety days soap was to be imported for the whole population liberated, on the scale of six ounces a month for every person. Clothing and blankets would be brought in for one-tenth of the whole population liberated, on the scale of eight pounds of clothing and one blanket for each person. Medical supplies were also to be imported. In due course, as the situation became stabilized and better known, and it became possible to build up reserves against unexpected demands it was hoped that it would become unnecessary to make normal provision of relief supplies for more than

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

² *How Britain was Fed in War Time*, H.M.S.O. 1946, p. 49.

the twenty-one per cent of the population of large towns originally estimated to be in need of relief.

On the beaches all this meant that daily imports of relief supplies were planned to begin on the first day after D-day with a token consignment of ten tons of food. By the tenth day the planned daily amount had risen to twenty tons and by the twentieth day, to 144 tons, at which level it remained for the following thirty days. By the fifty-third day it had become 166 tons and by the sixty-first day 285 tons. In addition medical stores were planned to begin arriving on the fourth day and soap on the seventh. On the thirty-first day the import of clothing and blankets was to start. A special allocation of petrol, oil and lubricants was included for Civil Affairs needs. The daily total of imports of all kinds of Civil Affairs relief supplies was planned to rise from ten tons on D + 1 to 458 tons on D + 90. In round figures it was hoped to land 2,500 tons within the British sector by D + 30, 10,000 tons by D + 60, and 20,000 by D + 90. Over the period D + 21 to D + 90, 10,000 tons of coal was to be released for Civil Affairs purposes in both the British and U.S. sectors from stocks imported for military needs in general.

* * *

Under the Civil Affairs agreements negotiated with the governments of the countries to be liberated there was provision for the creation of a body of Liaison Officers to advise and assist the Allied commanders and to act as intermediaries between them and the civil authorities in the countries concerned. These Liaison Officers were an important part of the machinery for the re-establishment of civil administration. It was planned that they should be attached to S.H.A.E.F. by their respective governments but should then be placed at the disposal of the Civil Affairs staffs at the headquarters of formations or of the Civil Affairs detachments.

Although at the time of invasion no Civil Affairs agreement had been reached for France, there was none the less need for a body of French Liaison Officers for Civil Affairs purposes, and, in fact, much had already been done to build up the necessary organization in readiness for use under whatever arrangements it might prove possible to reach. The French had started planning in London for the re-establishment of civil administration in France, even before the Committee of National Liberation was formed in Algiers in June 1943, and before C.O.S.S.A.C. or S.H.A.E.F. had begun on their plans. A *Commission* ntelligence and planning *Administratives*, and was d organization of liaison *de Liaison Administrative*.

Owing to the ban on negotiations, the French plans could not, at least officially, be linked with C.O.S.S.A.C. and S.H.A.E.F. planning, until the end of April 1944, when, on the initiative of General Eisenhower and General Koenig, and following the broadcast by Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, discussions were opened. One of the first matters taken up was that of the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative*. There were at this time 187 French officers undergoing Civil Affairs training in the U.K. and available for the Mission. Another fifty-three were ready in North Africa if they could be transported to Europe. It was proposed that these 240 officers should be shared equally between 21 Army Group and First U.S. Army Group. There was a request by 21 Army Group for an additional forty medical officers. This could not be met at once, but the French hoped to make available ten medical officers and twenty-eight fully trained nurses.

These negotiations petered out when the Allied authorities imposed a ban on cipher communication. Then followed the visit of General de Gaulle. Already resentful because of his exclusion from Allied councils and the refusal of the Allies to recognize his provisional government, he was exasperated to discover the Allied plans for proclaiming Allied *franc* notes legal tender. He forbade the officers of the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative* to accompany the Allied forces. He was later prevailed upon to allow twenty to go with the invading troops. It was not until after his visit to Normandy, which will be recounted in the next chapter, that he could be prevailed upon to allow the rest of the Mission to be deployed, and take its planned part in Allied Civil Affairs arrangements.

* * *

As the date for the invasion of France drew near there was still no Civil Affairs agreement. At last, on 25th May, Supreme Headquarters, still without a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, could wait no longer. The Supreme Commander issued a letter to 21 Army group and First United States Army Group, setting out in eighteen annexed directives, and in accordance with the best information then available, the policy that was to govern Civil Affairs planning and operations in France in support of 'Overlord'. It was only ten days to the beginning of the battle. The eighteen directives annexed to the Supreme Commander's letter were 'statements of principle and basic policies which will be followed in their broad lines unless special circumstances dictate otherwise.' In general they reinforced the more concrete and detailed instructions already in the 21 Army Group plans by stating or re-stating the principles on which they were in fact founded. Only in the appendices to the legal directive was there much detail. In these were contained the Supreme Commander's

instructions in case subordinate commanders found themselves compelled to establish Military Government Courts notwithstanding their efforts to revive and work through indigenous courts. These instructions took the form of an Allied Military Courts Proclamation and of a Crimes Proclamation for issue if necessary, of rules for the issue of enactments, of rules for Allied Military Courts, of a Guide to Procedure, and of sample forms.

But there was one major change of policy. There was to be no military government in France. This resulted in part, presumably, from the final victory within S.H.A.E.F. at this period of the anti-A.M.G.O.T. school. In fact, however, the military government which it had been proposed to set up under the plan of 15th March was already a very different thing from that established in Italy, if only for the reason that it was to be virtually confined to areas affected by military operations. A far stronger reason for the change was the course that had been taken by the, so far abortive, negotiations for the conclusion of a Civil Affairs agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation, and a growing realization of the attitude of the French towards the establishment of any military government in their country, even if this was kept out of the news by remaining unproclaimed.

That top level directives should be late and should have had to be anticipated by military commanders was a distressingly common experience in all civil affairs and military government preparation. It was due, not so much to procedural defects or bureaucratic delays, although demands for relief supplies may have been subject to excessively detailed scrutiny, as to the difficulty of reconciling American schools of thought, and then of reaching an agreed Anglo-American view.

Last moment revision of the 21 Army Group plan was undertaken. The revised plan, 21 Army Group Instruction No. 6 – Civil Affairs, could not issue until 7th June, the day after D-day when the first Civil Affairs officers had already landed in France. This, however, was not such a serious matter as might at first appear. The great body of detailed, practical instruction under the plan of 15th March had been contained, in the supporting Administrative Instructions: it had been summarized only in the plan. All this remained unaffected by the decision not to establish military government. The validity of the Administrative Instructions was re-affirmed by Operation Instruction No. 6 and the Administrative Instructions were reinforced by a fresh series of Technical Instructions, seventeen in number, most of which had in fact been issued during the preceding month. These went into even greater and more technical detail than the Administrative Instructions. The Operation Instruction dealt only with the general policy and principles that were to govern Civil Affairs operations. The

paragraphs dealing with political considerations were brought closely into accord with the Political and General Directive annexed to the Supreme Commander's letter of 25th May, so reflecting the views of President Roosevelt and, to a slightly lesser degree, of the Prime Minister, in regard to the recognition of a national authority in France. Where the earlier plan had provided for the establishment (however discreetly) of military government and the exercise and delegation of the powers of a Military Governor by Army Group and Army Commanders, the revised plan laid down that 'Military Government will *not* be established in liberated France', that '. . . the French themselves will conduct all aspects of civil administration of their country', even in areas of operations, and provided for the exercise and delegation on similar lines of '*de facto* supreme responsibility'. The French Liaison Officers who were previously to be responsible for advice on all matters concerning the civil administration and to be 'employed wherever possible as the means of actual contact with local authorities' were now to be used by Civil Affairs staffs 'as the direct channel of approach to the civil authorities in order to secure appropriate action as desired by commanders in the discharge of their Civil Affairs responsibilities' – subject of course to the exercise of the Supreme Commander's overriding authority in case of military necessity. Upon the French civil authorities was laid the responsibility for 're-organizing or re-establishing French administration and judicial services in so far as it may be necessary to accomplish the Civil Affairs object . . .' This provision was based on that contained in the Civil Affairs agreements executed earlier with other Allied governments.

Although the new arrangements required that the French civil authorities should play a prominent part it was still not possible, in view of the reluctance of the President and Prime Minister, to say who these would be (except that there would be no dealings with Vichy). But matters had moved since March. Then it was 'a matter of high policy as to how far the National Committee of Liberation can be regarded as a substitute' for a properly constituted government, and the best that could be done was to assume arbitrarily, 'for the purpose of the Plan', that the National Committee would in fact be recognized. Now it was 'expected that the French National Committee of Liberation will command the allegiance of the local government authorities who will act in its name', and although 'the utmost care will be taken that no impression is given which might be construed as forwarding the interests of any particular group', there can have been little doubt in the minds of the planners that it would be the French Committee of National Liberation that would take on the part of the 'French civil authorities'.

There was, broadly speaking, no change in the numbers or dis-

tribution of Civil Affairs detachments but in the American zone detachments were now organized as companies not groups, and four of these were allotted to First United States Army and another four to First United States Army Group. The strength of these companies was approximately one-third that of a British group. The three British Civil Affairs groups, together with two other groups already formed, were for certain purposes constituted into No. 1 Civil Affairs Pool.

* * *

All this Civil Affairs planning required to be dovetailed into the larger operational and administrative arrangements. The stupendous scale of these cannot fail to impress even the cursory reader of the plans. On D-day itself there were landed on the British front alone 59,000 men, 8,900 vehicles, and 1,900 tons of stores. By the end of July these numbers had grown to 631,000 men, 153,000 vehicles and 757,000 tons of stores, of which 68,000 tons consisted of P.O.L. in bulk. The figures for the American front at the same time were 903,061 persons, 176,620 vehicles, and 858,436 tons of stores. The total number of men transported to France in those first seven weeks was over one and a half million – equivalent to the combined populations of Birmingham and Manchester.

But it was not only the numbers of men involved in this operation. There were the rations, the vehicles, and the ammunition, to feed them, move them, and enable them to fight. There was the equipment for the artificial harbours and for the airfields. There were coastal and inland water barges and tugs. There were the spare parts and the workshops for repair of vehicles and boats. There were engineering stores for the making of roads, bridges, airfields, installations for the storage of petrol in bulk. There was wireless equipment and the delicate replacements needed for this. There were laundry and bath units, industrial gas units to provide the workshops with oxygen and acetylene, and fire fighting units. There was coal, there was stationery, there were printing presses. There were dogs for police work and for the detection of mines. There were cinema units. And of course there were hospitals and the whole of the medical equipment and stores required for the battle. There was currency for the forces and for the individual to spend. And on top of all this there were the Civil Affairs relief supplies for the civil population. In quantity they were inconsiderable – they had to be, lest they should take too large a share of the ever scarce shipping. But in strangeness and variety they out-did the rest. For it was not only necessary to help feed and clothe the people of France, it was necessary to help them do this for themselves. And this meant the provision of raw materials, of machinery, of spare parts, of scarce ingredients in little known processes. These could not be brought in during the

earliest stages, but the sooner some of them could begin to be imported, the sooner would France cease to be dependent on military imports, and the sooner would she be able to make her contribution to Allied war resources. All these varied commodities had to be brought in at the right time, at the right place, and in the right order, fit for immediate use. All this had to be done at first over the beaches, under shelling and bombing, and, as it turned out, in the most unexpectedly rough weather. And they had to be made available despite world shortages of raw and manufactured materials, despite shortages of shipping, despite conflicts and differences of view over priorities, despite the refusal of General de Gaulle to cooperate in the preparation of the plans – though later even he paid tribute:

‘Je constate que dans cette affaire très risquée et très complexe, l’aptitude des Anglo-Saxons à établir ce qu’ils appellent le “planning” s’est déployée au maximum.’¹

It is nothing short of a miracle that the invasion was launched and succeeded in establishing itself on the continent. It would have been so easy for it not to do so.

¹ De Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre, L’Unité*, 1942-44. Paris, 1956, p. 225.

CHAPTER V

FRANCE—THE INVASION

EARLY on 6th June 1944 the Allied forces, launched from every available port in the south of England, began landing on the beaches of Normandy, north of Carentan, Bayeux and Caen. A few hours earlier airborne forces had been dropped north-north-west of Carentan and north-east of Caen, on either flank of the fifty mile front. While the linking up of the five beachheads and the air landings proceeded, the Second British Army on the left was to press southwards, over the ridge connecting Bayeux and Caen, seize these two towns, and gain elbow-room. The First U.S. Army on the right, was to strike westwards, through hills and woods, across the Cotentin Peninsula in order to isolate and then capture the port of Cherbourg. The enemy were completely surprised and the landings prospered generally, although the American forces encountered stubborn opposition on one of their beaches, and the British were unable to take Caen as planned. Nevertheless a footing had been gained on the Continent, at far less cost than had been feared, a footing which it was to prove possible to expand and from which the subsequent great advances could be launched.

The Second British Army landings were made by troops under the command of I Corps and XXX Corps, on beaches between the mouth of the River Orne on the east and the little harbour of Port en Bessin on the west.

* * *

The leading Civil Affairs detachments embarked on various dates before D-day at Felixstowe, Tilbury, Portsmouth, Gosport and Southampton. On 3rd June the Prime Minister, together with Field Marshal Smuts and Mr. Bevin, cruised down the Solent in a launch, boarding many of the waiting ships. A part of 219 C.A. Detachment was on one of the landing ships visited. On 6th June ships carrying advanced parties of I and XXX Corps Civil Affairs staffs, and of 201, 219 and 222 Detachments, anchored off the coast of Normandy. Bad weather and congestion on the beaches prevented any of these landing that day, except for a part of 201 Detachment. This got ashore at 2.30 p.m. on 'Sword' beach at Ouistreham. On the following day the

two Corps advanced parties, 202, 203, 204, 205, 222 Detachments, the rest of 201 Detachment, and part of 219 Detachment got ashore. On 8th June the rest of 219 Detachment landed and also 207 and 220 Detachments. On 9th June the Second Army Civil Affairs advanced party got ashore. Of these Detachments, 201, 203, 204, 207 and 219 were initially under command of I Corps; 202 and 205 were under XXX Corps; 220 under 11 L of C Area and 222 under Second Army.

Two of these Detachments, 201 and 202 under I Corps and XXX Corps respectively, were destined for Caen and Bayeux. Their experiences were very different. Enemy resistance opposite the eastern landings, in front of Caen, was very determined and stubborn fighting developed, with the result that 201 Detachment had to wait a whole month before it could enter Caen. Meanwhile it made its headquarters at Colleville-sur-Orne, two miles west of Ouistreham and took over Civil Affairs responsibility for this small town and a number of villages. There was little elbow-room in this part of the bridgehead and a great deal of bombing and shelling. On 8th June 207 Detachment also landed at Ouistreham. The War Diary of the Detachment for this and the following days runs:

- '8 June. 0710 hrs. Arrived Q/R¹ Beach.
1215 hrs. Landed – wet.
1600 hrs. Captured 67 Germans. 2 machine guns.
Bombed to hell.
Slept in wet trench.
- 9 June. Raining, bombing and strafing – Nobody loves us.
- 10 June. Bombing, shelling. Settled down in Ouistreham.
C.A. headaches galore.'

Then on 12th June there is an entry that unfortunately is echoed in many War Diaries, 'Looting by troops pretty general. British prestige has fallen here today'. Entries for 25th–29th June ran:

- '25 June. Enemy shell fire too accurate for comfort. Battle raging across canal all day.
- 26 June. Sounds of battle across the canal and in direction of Caen continued unabated.
- 27 June. Quiet day, noisy night. Boys coming back from front dirty and tired.
- 28 June. Captain Evans brought in some Jerry petrol and guns.
- 29 June. Cleaning out latrines in the Blockhouse is a slow job. Jerry strafed the blockhouse area.'

¹ Queen/Red Beach.

For the present we turn away from this cramped, close-quarter, fighting which was to continue for some weeks on the eastern sector of the British front. On the west of the British zone the invading forces were able to penetrate inland rapidly to a depth of some miles and things went a great deal more easily for Civil Affairs. The Detachment earmarked for Bayeux, No. 202, landed at 10.30 a.m. on 7th June near Arromanches. By 5.30 p.m. it was already in Bayeux six miles inland. The old town with its cathedral, its gracious houses, its trees and quiet squares, was quite undamaged. Everywhere the tricolour was hung out. Food, wine, Normandy cider, were pressed on the troops. (A few days later, however, 'business instincts are beginning to reassert themselves' is a comment in the Second Army War Diary.) That evening the unit established its headquarters, perhaps not altogether felicitously, at Rue-des-Terres, in the building which had been occupied by the German *Feldkommandantur*. The Commander of the detachment interviewed the *Maire* and made contact with the local Resistance leader. Five alleged collaborators were arrested and enquiries set on foot regarding the state of the police and the fire and civil defence services. The front line was still only a quarter of a mile away and snipers active in the town. On the following day the snipers were caught, movement about the town became easier, and the never-ending interviews began, concerning the endless and various problems of the inhabitants.

A healthy respect was paid to the principle of first things first: the unit's war diary runs 'Discussed problems of major policy such as distribution of twenty-eight thousand cheeses, increase in rationing of butter, disposal of eighteen pigs, coal shortage for pumping water and availability of fuel oil for local flour mills which requires 650 litres per day'. A Free French officer held a meeting in the open space opposite the unit's headquarters. Various notices were made over to the *Maire* for posting. Gradually the front line was pushed farther back from Bayeux. It became possible to move about the environs of the town and in the following days stocks of P.O.L., of agricultural equipment, and of building materials were located and controlled. A contractor was found willing to supply food to the military hospital in Bayeux. There was a civil hospital in the town and on 11th June a hundred wounded civilians were moved thither from the battle area. Refugees were also brought from a refugee centre at Amblie into the town. On the 14th June the banks re-opened. Some medical supplies arrived and were distributed by the detachment. A bad case of looting was reported. It was coming to be realized that the chief problem in Bayeux would be the shortage of wheat and flour that might be expected to develop in three weeks' time, as a result of the isolation of the bridgehead from its normal reserves of food. In all this the Civil Affairs task was to find out if the shoe pinched, and where, and then

to ease it if possible; and to stiffen and support the local authorities where necessary in their attempts to deal with the situation.

Three detachments, 204, 205 and 219, were primarily intended for the control and relief of refugees. The first of these, after landing on 7th, reached Cresserons on 9th and there established a I Corps Refugee Transit Camp. The second, 205 Detachment, landed at Versur-Mer. At first there were no refugees and the detachment made itself generally useful. However, on 15th, 120 refugees arrived, and a XXX Corps Refugee Transit Camp was set up at Ellon four miles south of Bayeux. The third, 219 Detachment, set up another I Corps Refugee Transit Camp, in the Chateau d'Amblic and the Colonie la Marguerite, a school at Amblic. A feeding centre was established in a storehouse adjoining the school. A total of ninety rations was served during 10th. A small enclosed orchard opposite the feeding centre was used as an assembly point for refugees requiring food or shelter. Twenty-nine civilian sick and casualties were treated and with the aid of a Field Surgical Team twenty major operations were undertaken during the night.

Shortly after, 206 Detachment arrived at Amblic and took over responsibility, the camp passing from Corps to Army command, and becoming an Army Refugee Assembly Area. Refugees were passing back to this from the transit camps if it proved impossible to disperse them locally. On 12th June a child was born in the camp and fifty hospital cases were moved by the civil authorities and the French Red Cross to the civil hospital at Bayeux. There were 533 refugees in the camp on this day. A committee of refugees drew up rules for conduct in the camp. On the 14th and 15th, four hundred refugees were moved back to communes able to accommodate them. Food was being requisitioned from neighbouring villages. On 18th June arrangements were made with a naval gunfire correction team near by to hear B.B.C. French news broadcasts on the team's radio receiver. On the 24th a first issue was received of Bulletin No. 3 *La Voix des Alliés*.

Meanwhile the other detachments established themselves in their respective communes. They were received by the inhabitants everywhere with friendliness, if not with enthusiasm, and the local administrative officials were in every case co-operative' 'No signs of resistance movement' commented a Corps Civil Affairs staff officer, and then, added, apparently with some surprise, '. . . and at first sight impossible to differentiate between pro-Nazis, Vichy and Patriot Frenchmen'. Here at the very start was one of the difficulties that inevitably dogged Civil Affairs and Military Government officers throughout.

In the communes the first task was to find the *Maire* and require him to post the Supreme Commander's proclamation, and to sign, publish, and enforce notices imposing a curfew, blackout, and restrictions of movement, prohibiting the use of cameras and field

glasses, and requiring the surrender of firearms and carrier pigeons. A rapid survey had then to be conducted, generally through the agency of the *Maire*, of food, water and health conditions, of the numbers of refugees, of the accommodation that could be made available for these and of the local police arrangements. Supplementary voluntary police were enrolled, if necessary, generally from the ranks of the Resistance. There were complaints to be dealt with of pilfering of potatoes, vegetables, milk and bread by Allied troops, and of looting of factory premises. Action was taken in conjunction with the military police by placing danger spots out of bounds. There was also an allegation of the theft or looting of valuable jewellery which the military police were called in to investigate. The most irksome restriction placed upon the civil population, and one that it was largely impossible to enforce, both in France and later in other countries, was that against movement, without a permit, farther than six kilometres from the commune of residence. A problem was presented by a number of workers left behind by the German Todt Organization for the provision of forced labour. Many of these were the riff-raff of the population of Marseilles or Paris. The British quickly rounded them up again, partly in their own interests, but partly also at the request of the local authorities, anxious for the civil population. Surplus stocks of farm produce, hoarded stocks of petrol, food and other commodities, were sought out, brought under control, and distributed in the public interest. Stocks of furniture, bedding and clothing required for hospitals, were located. It soon became clear that in the rural areas as well as in Bayeux the main difficulty was going to be shortage of wheat and flour which would make itself felt in three weeks time. Many requests were received for news of the war and of events in the world from which the people of France had so long been cut off, and arrangements were early made for the compilation of bulletins and their posting at the *Mairies* or other centres. On 23rd June the first number was printed in Bayeux, by the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Dept., of *Renaissance du Bessin*.

Having instructed the *Maires*, Civil Affairs officers hastened to the next village to repeat their performance there. Some days later would begin a second round of visits when the work of the local authorities already visited would be inspected and the next steps explained on the way back to normal conditions.

Meanwhile, Civil Affairs detachments with First U.S. Army were undergoing similar experiences and had established themselves on 'Utah' and 'Omaha' beaches, at Carentan, Hiesville, St. Mère Eglise, St. Laurent-sur-Mer, Grandcamp, Trevières, Isigny, Colleville-sur-Mer and Balleroy.

The British formations early realized that Civil Affairs officers could and should work farther forward than had been planned. Both the

British Corps decided that permanent 'spearhead' detachments should accompany divisions, the detachments which were to be dropped for static administration following after. This, although it did not in any way delegate Civil Affairs authority to divisional commanders, brought British practice more into line with that already adopted by the American Civil Affairs planners. Otherwise the planned organization had proved satisfactory. Already the contribution that the Civil Affairs service could make towards the success of military operations was being better appreciated.

* * *

As the lodgment area expanded the need was felt for a civil administrative authority with jurisdiction above that of the commune. With Caen, the administrative centre of Calvados, still in the hands of the enemy, the best prospect was to enlist the co-operation of the *Sous-Préfet* at Bayeux in improvising a departmental administration. This task fell to the Second Army Civil Affairs staff, an advanced element of which had arrived in Normandy on 9th June. M. Rochat was found holding office. His authority did not normally extend beyond the *arrondissement* of Bayeux, and with the records and administrative staff for the Department of Calvados not as yet uncovered, he could hardly be expected to be well-informed regarding the problems of the lodgment area beyond the *arrondissement* of Bayeux. But he was the senior administrative officer available and Bayeux the only town so far liberated. It was natural that recourse should be had to him, and that Bayeux should become, temporarily at least, the centre of the reviving departmental administration. Through the cooperation of M. Rochat and the existing administrative and judicial staffs, law and order were well maintained from the start, and a very good beginning was made with the gigantic task of tidying up.

* * *

Then on the 14th June, a week after the first landings in Normandy, General de Gaulle, head of the self-styled Provisional Government, arrived on a tour of the lodgment area and visited Bayeux. There was little warning or preparation for his visit. He entered the Place du Château, since re-named the Place du Général de Gaulle, on foot and was welcomed with tears and cheers. At the Sub-Prefecture looking out on to the Place he received the principal citizens, including the leader of the local Resistance group. Coming out again he spoke to a crowd of several thousand under the regimented lime trees. There were more cheers, and singing of the Marseillaise.¹ A Second Army report ran: 'General de Gaulle's visit came as something of a surprise

¹ *The Times*, 16 June 1944.

to the inhabitants of Bayeux. His speech emphasized particularly the magnificent work of the Resistance Groups and the enthusiasm aroused in the audience who sang the Marseillaise was considerable in view of the reserved disposition of the Normans'.

The reception accorded to General de Gaulle by the people of Bayeux was a decisive moment in French history. It enabled the General to appoint on the soil of France civil and military representatives of his Provisional Government. It must largely have set at rest the doubts of the President and Prime Minister whether the de Gaulle organization would be able to gain the acceptance of the people of France as a *de facto* government pending the establishment of a more constitutional authority. It led in due course to the recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the *de facto* government, to the conclusion of the Civil Affairs agreements with the committee, and ultimately to the recognition of the latter by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on 23rd October 1944 as the Provisional Government of France. The Second Army report continued:

'People were obviously excited and curious to see him and seemed to accept him as the head of the only available French Government. All shades of political opinion in Bayeux were in varying degrees enthusiastic and emphatic that de Gaulle and no one else, could solve the existing deadlock.' And although 'The opinion was expressed among certain conservative elements that it would be well if for the present representatives of the Provisional Government concentrated on pure administration rather than politics', it was clear that even those who did not see eye to eye, politically, with the General were willing to give him their support for the sake of French unity and prestige.

* * *

The two representatives appointed by General de Gaulle were M. François Coulet and Colonel de Chevigné. It was the intention of the Provisional Government to group four or five departments into a region and to appoint Regional Commissioners and Military Commanders to act on behalf of the Provisional Government for each region. M. Coulet was designated Provisional Commissioner for the Rouen Region which was to consist of the Departments of Calvados, Manche, Orne, Eure, and Seine Inférieure. The appointment was provisional because a permanent commissioner had already been designated by the Provisional Government but had not yet been uncovered by the Allied advance. Colonel de Chevigné was appointed Military Commander, for the same area. Under the *état de siège* or martial law régime proclaimed in 1939, and never rescinded, the administration of the liberated area vested in these two.

instructions in case subordinate commanders found themselves compelled to establish Military Government Courts notwithstanding their efforts to revive and work through indigenous courts. These instructions took the form of an Allied Military Courts Proclamation and of a Crimes Proclamation for issue if necessary, of rules for the issue of enactments, of rules for Allied Military Courts, of a Guide to Procedure, and of sample forms.

But there was one major change of policy. There was to be no military government in France. This resulted in part, presumably, from the final victory within S.H.A.E.F. at this period of the anti-A.M.G.O.T. school. In fact, however, the military government which it had been proposed to set up under the plan of 15th March was already a very different thing from that established in Italy, if only for the reason that it was to be virtually confined to areas affected by military operations. A far stronger reason for the change was the course that had been taken by the, so far abortive, negotiations for the conclusion of a Civil Affairs agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation, and a growing realization of the attitude of the French towards the establishment of any military government in their country, even if this was kept out of the news by remaining unproclaimed.

That top level directives should be late and should have had to be anticipated by military commanders was a distressingly common experience in all civil affairs and military government preparation. It was due, not so much to procedural defects or bureaucratic delays, although demands for relief supplies may have been subject to excessively detailed scrutiny, as to the difficulty of reconciling American schools of thought, and then of reaching an agreed Anglo-American view.

Last moment revision of the 21 Army Group plan was undertaken. The revised plan, 21 Army Group Instruction No. 6 – Civil Affairs, could not issue until 7th June, the day after D-day when the first Civil Affairs officers had already landed in France. This, however, was not such a serious matter as might at first appear. The great body of detailed, practical instruction under the plan of 15th March had been contained, in the supporting Administrative Instructions: it had been summarized only in the plan. All this remained unaffected by the decision not to establish military government. The validity of the Administrative Instructions was re-affirmed by Operation Instruction No. 6 and the Administrative Instructions were reinforced by a fresh series of Technical Instructions, seventeen in number, most of which had in fact been issued during the preceding month. These went into even greater and more technical detail than the Administrative Instructions. The Operation Instruction dealt only with the general policy and principles that were to govern Civil Affairs operations. The

paragraphs dealing with political considerations were brought closely into accord with the Political and General Directive annexed to the Supreme Commander's letter of 25th May, so reflecting the views of President Roosevelt and, to a slightly lesser degree, of the Prime Minister, in regard to the recognition of a national authority in France. Where the earlier plan had provided for the establishment (however discreetly) of military government and the exercise and delegation of the powers of a Military Governor by Army Group and Army Commanders, the revised plan laid down that 'Military Government will *not* be established in liberated France', that '... the French themselves will conduct all aspects of civil administration of their country', even in areas of operations, and provided for the exercise and delegation on similar lines of '*de facto* supreme responsibility'. The French Liaison Officers who were previously to be responsible for advice on all matters concerning the civil administration and to be 'employed wherever possible as the means of actual contact with local authorities' were now to be used by Civil Affairs staffs 'as the direct channel of approach to the civil authorities in order to secure appropriate action as desired by commanders in the discharge of their Civil Affairs responsibilities' – subject of course to the exercise of the Supreme Commander's overriding authority in case of military necessity. Upon the French civil authorities was laid the responsibility for 're-organizing or re-establishing French administration and judicial services in so far as it may be necessary to accomplish the Civil Affairs object . . .' This provision was based on that contained in the Civil Affairs agreements executed earlier with other Allied governments.

Although the new arrangements required that the French civil authorities should play a prominent part it was still not possible, in view of the reluctance of the President and Prime Minister, to say who these would be (except that there would be no dealings with Vichy). But matters had moved since March. Then it was 'a matter of high policy as to how far the National Committee of Liberation can be regarded as a substitute' for a properly constituted government, and the best that could be done was to assume arbitrarily, 'for the purpose of the Plan', that the National Committee would in fact be recognized. Now it was 'expected that the French National Committee of Liberation will command the allegiance of the local government authorities who will act in its name', and although 'the utmost care will be taken that no impression is given which might be construed as forwarding the interests of any particular group', there can have been little doubt in the minds of the planners that it would be the French Committee of National Liberation that would take on the part of the 'French civil authorities'.

There was, broadly speaking, no change in the numbers or dis-

tribution of Civil Affairs detachments but in the American zone detachments were now organized as companies not groups, and four of these were allotted to First United States Army and another four to First United States Army Group. The strength of these companies was approximately one-third that of a British group. The three British Civil Affairs groups, together with two other groups already formed, were for certain purposes constituted into No. 1 Civil Affairs Pool.

* * *

All this Civil Affairs planning required to be dovetailed into the larger operational and administrative arrangements. The stupendous scale of these cannot fail to impress even the cursory reader of the plans. On D-day itself there were landed on the British front alone 59,000 men, 8,900 vehicles, and 1,900 tons of stores. By the end of July these numbers had grown to 631,000 men, 153,000 vehicles and 757,000 tons of stores, of which 68,000 tons consisted of P.O.L. in bulk. The figures for the American front at the same time were 903,061 persons, 176,620 vehicles, and 858,436 tons of stores. The total number of men transported to France in those first seven weeks was over one and a half million – equivalent to the combined populations of Birmingham and Manchester.

But it was not only the numbers of men involved in this operation. There were the rations, the vehicles, and the ammunition, to feed them, move them, and enable them to fight. There was the equipment for the artificial harbours and for the airfields. There were coastal and inland water barges and tugs. There were the spare parts and the workshops for repair of vehicles and boats. There were engineering stores for the making of roads, bridges, airfields, installations for the storage of petrol in bulk. There was wireless equipment and the delicate replacements needed for this. There were laundry and bath units, industrial gas units to provide the workshops with oxygen and acetylene, and fire fighting units. There was coal, there was stationery, there were printing presses. There were dogs for police work and for the detection of mines. There were cinema units. And of course there were hospitals and the whole of the medical equipment and stores required for the battle. There was currency for the forces and for the individual to spend. And on top of all this there were the Civil Affairs relief supplies for the civil population. In quantity they were inconsiderable – they had to be, lest they should take too large a share of the ever scarce shipping. But in strangeness and variety they out-did the rest. For it was not only necessary to help feed and clothe the people of France, it was necessary to help them do this for themselves. And this meant the provision of raw materials, of machinery, of spare parts, of scarce ingredients in little known processes. These could not be brought in during the

earliest stages, but the sooner some of them could begin to be imported, the sooner would France cease to be dependent on military imports, and the sooner would she be able to make her contribution to Allied war resources. All these varied commodities had to be brought in at the right time, at the right place, and in the right order, fit for immediate use. All this had to be done at first over the beaches, under shelling and bombing, and, as it turned out, in the most unexpectedly rough weather. And they had to be made available despite world shortages of raw and manufactured materials, despite shortages of shipping, despite conflicts and differences of view over priorities, despite the refusal of General de Gaulle to cooperate in the preparation of the plans – though later even he paid tribute:

‘Je constate que dans cette affaire très risquée et très complexe, l’aptitude des Anglo-Saxons à établir ce qu’ils appellent le “planning” s’est déployée au maximum.’¹

It is nothing short of a miracle that the invasion was launched and succeeded in establishing itself on the continent. It would have been so easy for it not to do so.

¹ De Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre, L'Unité*, 1942-44. Paris, 1956, p. 225.

CHAPTER V

FRANCE—THE INVASION

EARLY on 6th June 1944 the Allied forces, launched from every available port in the south of England, began landing on the beaches of Normandy, north of Carentan, Bayeux and Caen. A few hours earlier airborne forces had been dropped north-north-west of Carentan and north-east of Caen, on either flank of the fifty mile front. While the linking up of the five beachheads and the air landings proceeded, the Second British Army on the left was to press southwards, over the ridge connecting Bayeux and Caen, seize these two towns, and gain elbow-room. The First U.S. Army on the right, was to strike westwards, through hills and woods, across the Cotentin Peninsula in order to isolate and then capture the port of Cherbourg. The enemy were completely surprised and the landings prospered generally, although the American forces encountered stubborn opposition on one of their beaches, and the British were unable to take Caen as planned. Nevertheless a footing had been gained on the Continent, at far less cost than had been feared, a footing which it was to prove possible to expand and from which the subsequent great advances could be launched.

The Second British Army landings were made by troops under the command of I Corps and XXX Corps, on beaches between the mouth of the River Orne on the east and the little harbour of Port en Bessin on the west.

* * *

The leading Civil Affairs detachments embarked on various dates before D-day at Felixstowe, Tilbury, Portsmouth, Gosport and Southampton. On 3rd June the Prime Minister, together with Field Marshal Smuts and Mr. Bevin, cruised down the Solent in a launch, boarding many of the waiting ships. A part of 219 C.A. Detachment was on one of the landing ships visited. On 6th June ships carrying advanced parties of I and XXX Corps Civil Affairs staffs, and of 201, 219 and 222 Detachments, anchored off the coast of Normandy. Bad weather and congestion on the beaches prevented any of these landing that day, except for a part of 201 Detachment. This got ashore at 2.30 p.m. on 'Sword' beach at Ouistreham. On the following day the

two Corps advanced parties, 202, 203, 204, 205, 222 Detachments, the rest of 201 Detachment, and part of 219 Detachment got ashore. On 8th June the rest of 219 Detachment landed and also 207 and 220 Detachments. On 9th June the Second Army Civil Affairs advanced party got ashore. Of these Detachments, 201, 203, 204, 207 and 219 were initially under command of I Corps; 202 and 205 were under XXX Corps; 220 under 11 L of C Area and 222 under Second Army.

Two of these Detachments, 201 and 202 under I Corps and XXX Corps respectively, were destined for Caen and Bayeux. Their experiences were very different. Enemy resistance opposite the eastern landings, in front of Caen, was very determined and stubborn fighting developed, with the result that 201 Detachment had to wait a whole month before it could enter Caen. Meanwhile it made its headquarters at Colleville-sur-Orne, two miles west of Ouistreham and took over Civil Affairs responsibility for this small town and a number of villages. There was little elbow-room in this part of the bridgehead and a great deal of bombing and shelling. On 8th June 207 Detachment also landed at Ouistreham. The War Diary of the Detachment for this and the following days runs:

- '8 June. 0710 hrs. Arrived Q/R¹ Beach.
1215 hrs. Landed - wet.
1600 hrs. Captured 67 Germans. 2 machine guns.
Bombed to hell.
Slept in wet trench.
- 9 June. Raining, bombing and strafing - Nobody loves us.
- 10 June. Bombing, shelling. Settled down in Ouistreham.
C.A. headaches galore.'

Then on 12th June there is an entry that unfortunately is echoed in many War Diaries, 'Looting by troops pretty general. British prestige has fallen here today'. Entries for 25th-29th June ran:

- '25 June. Enemy shell fire too accurate for comfort. Battle raging across canal all day.
- 26 June. Sounds of battle across the canal and in direction of Caen continued unabated.
- 27 June. Quiet day, noisy night. Boys coming back from front dirty and tired.
- 28 June. Captain Evans brought in some Jerry petrol and guns.
- 29 June. Cleaning out latrines in the Blockhouse is a slow job. Jerry strafed the blockhouse area.'

¹ Queen/Red Beach.

For the present we turn away from this cramped, close-quarter, fighting which was to continue for some weeks on the eastern sector of the British front. On the west of the British zone the invading forces were able to penetrate inland rapidly to a depth of some miles and things went a great deal more easily for Civil Affairs. The Detachment earmarked for Bayeux, No. 202, landed at 10.30 a.m. on 7th June near Arromanches. By 5.30 p.m. it was already in Bayeux six miles inland. The old town with its cathedral, its gracious houses, its trees and quiet squares, was quite undamaged. Everywhere the tricolour was hung out. Food, wine, Normandy cider, were pressed on the troops. (A few days later, however, 'business instincts are beginning to reassert themselves' is a comment in the Second Army War Diary.) That evening the unit established its headquarters, perhaps not altogether felicitously, at Rue-des-Terres, in the building which had been occupied by the German *Feldkommandantur*. The Commander of the detachment interviewed the *Maire* and made contact with the local Resistance leader. Five alleged collaborators were arrested and enquiries set on foot regarding the state of the police and the fire and civil defence services. The front line was still only a quarter of a mile away and snipers active in the town. On the following day the snipers were caught, movement about the town became easier, and the never-ending interviews began, concerning the endless and various problems of the inhabitants.

A healthy respect was paid to the principle of first things first: the unit's war diary runs 'Discussed problems of major policy such as distribution of twenty-eight thousand cheeses, increase in rationing of butter, disposal of eighteen pigs, coal shortage for pumping water and availability of fuel oil for local flour mills which requires 650 litres per day'. A Free French officer held a meeting in the open space opposite the unit's headquarters. Various notices were made over to the *Maire* for posting. Gradually the front line was pushed farther back from Bayeux. It became possible to move about the environs of the town and in the following days stocks of P.O.L., of agricultural equipment, and of building materials were located and controlled. A contractor was found willing to supply food to the military hospital in Bayeux. There was a civil hospital in the town and on 11th June a hundred wounded civilians were moved thither from the battle area. Refugees were also brought from a refugee centre at Amblie into the town. On the 14th June the banks re-opened. Some medical supplies arrived and were distributed by the detachment. A bad case of looting was reported. It was coming to be realized that the chief problem in Bayeux would be the shortage of wheat and flour that might be expected to develop in three weeks' time, as a result of the isolation of the bridgehead from its normal reserves of food. In all this the Civil Affairs task was to find out if the shoe pinched, and where, and then

to ease it if possible; and to stiffen and support the local authorities where necessary in their attempts to deal with the situation.

Three detachments, 204, 205 and 219, were primarily intended for the control and relief of refugees. The first of these, after landing on 7th, reached Cresserons on 9th and there established a I Corps Refugee Transit Camp. The second, 205 Detachment, landed at Ver-sur-Mer. At first there were no refugees and the detachment made itself generally useful. However, on 15th, 120 refugees arrived, and a XXX Corps Refugee Transit Camp was set up at Ellon four miles south of Bayeux. The third, 219 Detachment, set up another I Corps Refugee Transit Camp, in the Chateau d'Amblic and the Colonie la Marguerite, a school at Amblic. A feeding centre was established in a storehouse adjoining the school. A total of ninety rations was served during 10th. A small enclosed orchard opposite the feeding centre was used as an assembly point for refugees requiring food or shelter. Twenty-nine civilian sick and casualties were treated and with the aid of a Field Surgical Team twenty major operations were undertaken during the night.

Shortly after, 206 Detachment arrived at Amblic and took over responsibility, the camp passing from Corps to Army command, and becoming an Army Refugee Assembly Area. Refugees were passing back to this from the transit camps if it proved impossible to disperse them locally. On 12th June a child was born in the camp and fifty hospital cases were moved by the civil authorities and the French Red Cross to the civil hospital at Bayeux. There were 533 refugees in the camp on this day. A committee of refugees drew up rules for conduct in the camp. On the 14th and 15th, four hundred refugees were moved back to communes able to accommodate them. Food was being requisitioned from neighbouring villages. On 18th June arrangements were made with a naval gunfire correction team near by to hear B.B.C. French news broadcasts on the team's radio receiver. On the 24th a first issue was received of Bulletin No. 3 *La Voix des Alliés*.

Meanwhile the other detachments established themselves in their respective communes. They were received by the inhabitants everywhere with friendliness, if not with enthusiasm, and the local administrative officials were in every case co-operative' 'No signs of resistance movement' commented a Corps Civil Affairs staff officer, and then, added, apparently with some surprise, '... and at first sight impossible to differentiate between pro-Nazis, Vichy and Patriot Frenchmen'. Here at the very start was one of the difficulties that inevitably dogged Civil Affairs and Military Government officers throughout.

In the communes the first task was to find the *Maire* and require him to post the Supreme Commander's proclamation, and to sign, publish, and enforce notices imposing a curfew, blackout, and restrictions of movement, prohibiting the use of cameras and field

glasses, and requiring the surrender of firearms and carrier pigeons. A rapid survey had then to be conducted, generally through the agency of the *Maire*, of food, water and health conditions, of the numbers of refugees, of the accommodation that could be made available for these and of the local police arrangements. Supplementary voluntary police were enrolled, if necessary, generally from the ranks of the Resistance. There were complaints to be dealt with of pilfering of potatoes, vegetables, milk and bread by Allied troops, and of looting of factory premises. Action was taken in conjunction with the military police by placing danger spots out of bounds. There was also an allegation of the theft or looting of valuable jewellery which the military police were called in to investigate. The most irksome restriction placed upon the civil population, and one that it was largely impossible to enforce, both in France and later in other countries, was that against movement, without a permit, farther than six kilometres from the commune of residence. A problem was presented by a number of workers left behind by the German Todt Organization for the provision of forced labour. Many of these were the riff-raff of the population of Marseilles or Paris. The British quickly rounded them up again, partly in their own interests, but partly also at the request of the local authorities, anxious for the civil population. Surplus stocks of farm produce, hoarded stocks of petrol, food and other commodities, were sought out, brought under control, and distributed in the public interest. Stocks of furniture, bedding and clothing required for hospitals, were located. It soon became clear that in the rural areas as well as in Bayeux the main difficulty was going to be shortage of wheat and flour which would make itself felt in three weeks time. Many requests were received for news of the war and of events in the world from which the people of France had so long been cut off, and arrangements were early made for the compilation of bulletins and their posting at the *Mairies* or other centres. On 23rd June the first number was printed in Bayeux, by the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Dept., of *Renaissance du Bessin*.

Having instructed the *Maires*, Civil Affairs officers hastened to the next village to repeat their performance there. Some days later would begin a second round of visits when the work of the local authorities already visited would be inspected and the next steps explained on the way back to normal conditions.

Meanwhile, Civil Affairs detachments with First U.S. Army were undergoing similar experiences and had established themselves on 'Utah' and 'Omaha' beaches, at Carentan, Hiesville, St. Mère Eglise, St. Laurent-sur-Mer, Grandcamp, Trevières, Isigny, Colleville-sur-Mer and Balleroy.

The British formations early realized that Civil Affairs officers could and should work farther forward than had been planned. Both the

British Corps decided that permanent 'spearhead' detachments should accompany divisions, the detachments which were to be dropped for static administration following after. This, although it did not in any way delegate Civil Affairs authority to divisional commanders, brought British practice more into line with that already adopted by the American Civil Affairs planners. Otherwise the planned organization had proved satisfactory. Already the contribution that the Civil Affairs service could make towards the success of military operations was being better appreciated.

* * *

As the lodgment area expanded the need was felt for a civil administrative authority with jurisdiction above that of the commune. With Caen, the administrative centre of Calvados, still in the hands of the enemy, the best prospect was to enlist the co-operation of the *Sous-Préfet* at Bayeux in improvising a departmental administration. This task fell to the Second Army Civil Affairs staff, an advanced element of which had arrived in Normandy on 9th June. M. Rochat was found holding office. His authority did not normally extend beyond the *arrondissement* of Bayeux, and with the records and administrative staff for the Department of Calvados not as yet uncovered, he could hardly be expected to be well-informed regarding the problems of the lodgment area beyond the *arrondissement* of Bayeux. But he was the senior administrative officer available and Bayeux the only town so far liberated. It was natural that recourse should be had to him, and that Bayeux should become, temporarily at least, the centre of the reviving departmental administration. Through the cooperation of M. Rochat and the existing administrative and judicial staffs, law and order were well maintained from the start, and a very good beginning was made with the gigantic task of tidying up.

* * *

Then on the 14th June, a week after the first landings in Normandy, General de Gaulle, head of the self-styled Provisional Government, arrived on a tour of the lodgment area and visited Bayeux. There was little warning or preparation for his visit. He entered the Place du Château, since re-named the Place du Général de Gaulle, on foot and was welcomed with tears and cheers. At the Sub-Prefecture looking out on to the Place he received the principal citizens, including the leader of the local Resistance group. Coming out again he spoke to a crowd of several thousand under the regimented lime trees. There were more cheers, and singing of the Marseillaise.¹ A Second Army report ran: 'General de Gaulle's visit came as something of a surprise

¹ *The Times*, 16 June 1944.

to the inhabitants of Bayeux. His speech emphasized particularly the magnificent work of the Resistance Groups and the enthusiasm aroused in the audience who sang the Marseillaise was considerable in view of the reserved disposition of the Normans'.

The reception accorded to General de Gaulle by the people of Bayeux was a decisive moment in French history. It enabled the General to appoint on the soil of France civil and military representatives of his Provisional Government. It must largely have set at rest the doubts of the President and Prime Minister whether the de Gaulle organization would be able to gain the acceptance of the people of France as a *de facto* government pending the establishment of a more constitutional authority. It led in due course to the recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the *de facto* government, to the conclusion of the Civil Affairs agreements with the committee, and ultimately to the recognition of the latter by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on 23rd October 1944 as the Provisional Government of France. The Second Army report continued:

'People were obviously excited and curious to see him and seemed to accept him as the head of the only available French Government. All shades of political opinion in Bayeux were in varying degrees enthusiastic and emphatic that de Gaulle and no one else, could solve the existing deadlock.' And although 'The opinion was expressed among certain conservative elements that it would be well if for the present representatives of the Provisional Government concentrated on pure administration rather than politics', it was clear that even those who did not see eye to eye, politically, with the General were willing to give him their support for the sake of French unity and prestige.

* * *

The two representatives appointed by General de Gaulle were M. François Coulet and Colonel de Chevigné. It was the intention of the Provisional Government to group four or five departments into a region and to appoint Regional Commissioners and Military Commanders to act on behalf of the Provisional Government for each region. M. Coulet was designated Provisional Commissioner for the Rouen Region which was to consist of the Departments of Calvados, Manche, Orne, Eure, and Seine Inférieure. The appointment was provisional because a permanent commissioner had already been designated by the Provisional Government but had not yet been uncovered by the Allied advance. Colonel de Chevigné was appointed Military Commander, for the same area. Under the *état de siège* or martial law régime proclaimed in 1939, and never rescinded, the administration of the liberated area vested in these two.

Their first act posed a question for the Civil Affairs staff and the Allied Command. Before coming to this, however, let us for a moment see what things looked like from the other side. M. Triboulet, owner of a property between Caen and Bayeux, trained also as a lawyer, had become a leader of the Resistance organization in the Caen area under the German occupation. His predecessor in this task had been arrested by the Germans. M. Triboulet was in secret communication with the Provisional Government in Algiers, and in the course of 1944 was instructed that on liberation he was to set up a civil administration at once and get in touch with the French Liaison Officers who would be accompanying the Allied forces. On 6th June M. Triboulet was at his home and heard the D-day bombardment. On 7th morning he saw Allied soldiers near his house. That evening he cycled down to Courseulles, and after a good deal of difficulty managed to have himself taken to a British Intelligence officer. He enquired for the French Liaison Officers but no one knew anything about them. M. Triboulet explained who and what he was but the Intelligence officer was cautious and non-committal, and M. Triboulet returned home.

Two days later he went again to Courseulles and this time was taken to a Civil Affairs officer. He offered to establish an administration to give all possible assistance to Civil Affairs, under the Algiers Government. The Civil Affairs officer remained as non-committal as the Intelligence officer had been.

Two days later again, on 11th June, M. Triboulet heard a B.B.C. broadcast in which his friend M. Maurice Schumann gave an eyewitness account of the fighting around Bayeux. At once he set off on his cycle to Bayeux. There he met M. Schumann and the Resistance leaders. Still there was no news of French Liaison Officers. In fact, as we know, General de Gaulle had at a very late stage forbidden these to accompany the Allied forces. M. Triboulet prepared plans for a committee for the administration of the *arrondissement* of Bayeux and for requesting the British to remove M. Rochat, the Petainist *Sous-Préfet*, who had been recognized in office by the British. Before anything could come of these plans, however, General de Gaulle paid his visit to Bayeux, and appointed M. Coulet, Regional Commissioner. The day after this appointment M. Triboulet once more cycled to Bayeux, met M. Coulet, and explained the situation to him. That afternoon the Regional Commissioner dismissed M. Rochat, the *Sous-Préfet* of Bayeux and head of the improvised departmental administration, and appointed in his place M. Triboulet, despite the latter's protests that he was entirely inexperienced in administrative matters.

It was this dismissal that posed the problem for the Civil Affairs staff. M. Rochat had been accepted as the senior administrative officer and had been competent and cooperative – though, as we have seen, it had proved ‘at first sight impossible to differentiate between pro-Nazis,

Vichy and patriot Frenchmen'. Should the British acquiesce in his deposition? Should they dispute the authority of the Regional Commissioner? It was decided not to interfere so long as the new administration proved cooperative and willing to meet the army's inevitable demands. The authority of M. Coulet and Colonel de Chevigné, and of their appointee, M. Triboulet, was accepted. At first this was not an altogether unmixed blessing for the new men lacked administrative experience and were awkwardly dedicated to the assertion of French sovereignty and standing. The lesson was already being learnt that work for the Resistance, or detention in a concentration camp, were not, of themselves, qualifications for administration.

The appointment of M. Coulet, and the acceptance, in varying degrees, of his *de facto* authority, both by the people of Normandy and by the Allied Command was a turning point in Civil Affairs for France. Henceforth, except in battle or emergency, civil administration became the responsibility of the French themselves. In fact the acceptance of the authority of the as yet unrecognized provisional government, by the people and the local administration in Normandy, came about simply and with the minimum of revolutionary dislocation. The French Committee of National Liberation had established contacts with the resistance organization during the German occupation, and enjoyed in great measure the loyalty of its leaders. In most places, unlike Bayeux, the Petainist officials disappeared as the Germans departed. As they went their place was taken by administrations clandestinely planned and already pledged to support of the Provisional Government. As for the Allied commanders, they were willing, nay anxious, to accept any administration other than that of Vichy, which was found by them in existence and which they judged able to administer the country. The emergence of a local administration favourable to General de Gaulle was soon clear. Aware of the Allies' readiness to be presented with a *fait accompli* in this respect, M. Triboulet, on appointment as *Sous-Préfet*, put all his effort into ensuring that the Allies should find a French administration *in being*, to which they could give responsibility. Among other measures, he despatched youths on motor cycles, closely behind the battle to appoint the first suitable person as *Maire*. He early issued a number of circulars. One called for a return of the number of dead horses. His interest in the horses was of the slightest: but he *was* interested to establish that reports had been called for and returns made. That would constitute evidence for the British that there was an administration in being.

We have taken a close view of Civil Affairs during these early days, because it was at first far from clear that the Civil Affairs organization might not find itself committed to a much more direct form of administration than in fact became necessary, and because we needed to know what it was that the Civil Affairs officer in the field was required

to do. For this purpose perhaps these first uncertain, exciting days were the best. From now on, however, the Civil Affairs task in France was mainly one of liaison with the French. In describing this we must stand back further from the picture – remembering however, that first aid, ‘spearhead’ work was being done all the time in the battle areas, as these moved northwards and eastwards out of France. We may pause to notice problems of special magnitude or interest, tackled directly by the Civil Affairs detachments, but mainly it will be the establishment of relations with the French that will concern us, both at the level of the local authorities, and at the centre.

* * *

M. Coulet’s jealousy for French prestige immediately led to difficulty over two matters. The first of these was an attempt by M. Coulet to assert French sovereignty by refusing to accept supplemental *francs* in payment of taxes. The plan for the issue of these involved the issue of a proclamation that they were legal tender.¹ Here the difficulties began. It had originally been intended by British and U.S. planners that this proclamation should be issued by the ‘French authorities’. This came to the notice of President Roosevelt. He took the view that the issue of currency was an attribute of sovereignty, and that to ask the French Committee of National Liberation to declare the supplemental *francs* legal tender would be to accord to the committee just that recognition of sovereignty which it had been his whole policy to withhold until such time as it had become possible to ascertain the wishes of the people of France. He insisted that the proclamation should be issued by the Supreme Commander. The British Treasury feared that the supplemental *francs* might not prove acceptable unless a proclamation by the ‘French authority’, that is by the committee, supported that of the Supreme Commander. They also feared that the British and U.S. governments might find themselves committed to redeeming this currency if the French did not accept responsibility for doing so. General de Gaulle objected to a proclamation by the Supreme Commander because he claimed just as strongly as President Roosevelt that the issue of currency was an attribute of sovereignty. He had no objection to issuing a proclamation himself but only on condition that this was expressed to be a proclamation of the Provisional Government of France. This, however, would involve recognition of the sovereignty of the committee. The President refused to countenance this. He did not share the fears of the Treasury regarding acceptability of the supplemental *francs* if there was no supporting proclamation by the French. So there was no proclamation by General de Gaulle. In

¹ cf. p. 63.

order to spare the feelings of the French, a proclamation by the Supreme Commander was given inconspicuous publication – it is said that the few copies posted were generally pinned up in the lavatories of *Mairies*. Whether they were seen or not by the French population, few difficulties arose until it was discovered in the last week of June that in the absence of a French proclamation M. Coulet was proposing to instruct tax-collectors not to accept supplemental *francs* in payment of taxes. M. Coulet was induced to withhold these instructions pending reference to S.H.A.E.F., on receiving an undertaking from the Civil Affairs authorities that they would redeem any supplemental *francs* collected up to the end of June. The S.H.A.E.F. orders were that tax-collectors must continue to accept supplemental *francs* in discharge of liabilities of tax-payers, but that they were to keep the *francs* so received in a separate account which would be dealt with in due course in such a way that the tax-collectors would not suffer. This protected the tax-payers and collectors and so made it difficult for M. Coulet to protest. He let the matter drop and the *francs* were then accepted without distinction by the authorities. At no time does there seem to have been more than a very slight reluctance on the part of the public to use them. Nor was it necessary to put large numbers into circulation.

The second difficulty with M. Coulet arose over the manner in which payment should be made by the French authorities for relief supplies provided by the Allied forces.¹ The intention was that payment should be made by the local administrative authorities to the military forces concerned. M. Coulet sought to insist that settlement should be made at governmental level. He explained that French plans for *ravitaillement* involved distribution by a central governmental agency. It was essential that this agency should establish a firm control over relief supplies coming forward and that these should not be made over at lower levels to commercial firms. This, he said, was happening in the American zone. In the British zone supplies were normally handed over to *Maires*. Perhaps here also M. Coulet was activated by a desire to build up recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France. It was decided that payment must continue to be made at the level of the Regional Commissioner. It was not long, however, before the general principle was modified to provide for the maintenance of running accounts and the ultimate settlement of these claims at governmental level.

But, these questions of prestige apart, M. Coulet was friendly and cooperative, and on 6th July, he issued a circular letter to all *Maires* within his charge. After referring to some of the measures which the Allied commanders would need to request the civil authorities to take,

¹ For a full account of procedure for procurement and distribution of relief supplies, cf. Ch. XVII.

and to the desire of these commanders to act through the civil authorities in order to respect French sovereignty, he went on to say:

'Il va de soi que le devoir de tous les Français est d'aider au maximum les Armées Alliées dans leur lutte contre l'ennemi commun et pour la libération de la France. Vous devez donc sans hésiter déférer aux demandes qui vous seraient faites par le Commandement en vue de l'intervention de l'une ou de l'autre des mesures indiquées plus haut.'

It was agreed that in future, when Civil Affairs officers called upon *Maires* to sign and post notices, they should at the same time deliver to them a copy of M. Coulet's letter, in place of the letter from the military authorities which had previously been used. The terms of the notices were modified to meet French objections. Most important of all, the French agreed that the notices should be deemed to have been issued in virtue of the *état de siège*. Disobedience accordingly became punishable in the French courts. Previously it had not been clear what sanction, if any, existed for the enforcement of the notices. The Allies could ask for nothing better than this; and if there had ever been any doubt of the co-operation of the local authorities this was now set at rest.

On 8th July the D.C.C.A.O. 21 Army Group established an advanced headquarters at Le Manoir, five miles east of Bayeux, in order to co-ordinate the activities of Second British Army, First U.S. Army, and the French Regional Commissioner. He progressively relieved the Second Army Civil Affairs staff of responsibility for relations with the French at regional level. By the end of July much of the jealousy and suspicion of Civil Affairs had subsided and the foundations had been securely laid for the excellent cooperation that was to develop during the coming months.

* * *

Throughout this period the progress of operations was less rapid than had been expected. More Civil Affairs detachments were fed into the lodgment area than the territory actually brought under administration required and there was a good deal of congestion.

At the very last moment General de Gaulle was prevailed upon to rescind his prohibition of the attachment of French Liaison Officers to the Allied forces so far at least as to allow twenty to go overseas. This decision was so belated that there were no Liaison Officers for the earliest stages of the landings. By 16th June, however, two had reached First U.S. Army Headquarters. On 17th June one reached the headquarters of the British XXX Corps, on the 18th one reached British I Corps. Others followed later. These officers were all employed

with military formations, not posted to Civil Affairs detachments. After General de Gaulle's visit to Bayeux, permission was given for the remaining officers of the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative* to join the Allied forces. There was a change of plan in regard to such of these officers as were not to be attached to formations. It had been intended that they should be attached to Civil Affairs detachments and be under the control of the detachment commander. Now they were to be attached to, and under the control of, the French civil authorities. Their function, as previously contemplated, was to act as intermediaries between Civil Affairs detachments and the civil authorities. It was hoped that their function would remain essentially the same, but it was clear that this change of allegiance might lead to a dangerous division of responsibility for the execution of Civil Affairs measures, between the military and the civil authorities. In fact, however, it became possible to transfer full responsibility for civil administration to the French so much earlier than had been expected that no serious difficulties arose.

Towards the end of June the medical officers and nurses, assembled by General Koenig's Mission in response to 21 Army Group requests, began to move overseas, in readiness for the fall of Caen, now imminent. By this time the greater number of the 240 officers to be provided by the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative* were in the field.

By 26th June Cherbourg had been captured by VII U.S. Corps and the Germans cleared from all but the extreme north west of the Cotentin peninsula. Here there was far less destruction and less disorder than had been expected. Most officials of the civil administration and most of the police were found at work. An engineer of the *Ponts et Chaussées* acted as *Sous-Préfet*. An American unit was responsible for aiding the revival of administration in this town. Work began at once on clearing the port.

On 9th July Caen fell at last. At 2 p.m. that day the commander of 201 Civil Affairs Detachment arrived in the grievously devastated town. The *Mairie* was gutted, the Prefecture was still under enemy fire, the streets were so choked with masonry and rubble that it was difficult for tanks to enter, there was no water and no sanitation. The inhabitants left were not alone in questioning whether such an obliterating bombardment had been necessary. The number of civilians killed was reported to have been two thousand. Some seven hundred corpses were believed to be buried under the ruins, though it later seemed that both these figures were over-estimates. In *Bon Sauveur* and other hospitals were thirteen hundred civilian wounded. Some six thousand refugees were huddled in the *Lycée Malherbe*, the *Abbaye aux Hommes*, and the *Hôtel Dieu* – the number later increased. The normal population of the town had been fifty-five thousand. The Germans still held suburbs

to the south and east of the River Orne. The town was in many parts still under enemy observation and frequently suffered shelling and mortar fire. Here was by far the most formidable Civil Affairs task yet encountered.

The commander of 201 Detachment found the acting *Maire* of Caen and the Petainist *Préfet* of Calvados. He met the members of the Resistance organization. He also visited the refugees and the wounded and did all he could by his actions and example to calm the people of the town.

There appeared at this time M. Daure who had been Rector of Caen University but had early been retired because of his outspoken hostility to the Germans. Some weeks before the landings in Normandy he had been selected, in Resistance circles, for appointment as *Préfet* of Calvados and this decision had been accepted by the Algiers Government. M. Daure was swiftly conveyed to Bayeux to the Regional Commissioner.

On the following day, three more detachments and the rest of 201 Detachment arrived. There arrived also Colonel Usher, who was to take over Civil Affairs control of the town. 'At a moving ceremony outside the *Lycée Malherbe* and William the Conqueror's *Abbaye aux Hommes* the Tricolour was hoisted by the son of a French officer. The parade was commanded by the local Resistance leader and a small party of tired British troops scarcely out of the battle took part. Cheers were given for the Resistance, General de Gaulle, and the Allies, and the Marseillaise was sung.'

A little later M. Daure returned from Bayeux with the Regional Commissioner and was installed as *Préfet* of Calvados. Joint Civil Affairs and French committees were formed to deal with immediate needs. On the next day, 11th, a first-aid convoy manned by French arrived from Bayeux. The members of this, including nurses of the *Corps Féminin*, worked devotedly, often close to the front line and under constant shell and mortar fire.

A difficult fortnight followed. Shelling and mortar fire continued. Meetings for news had to be discouraged. In any case plans for relieving enemy pressure could not be revealed. According to a Second Army report, for the prevention of panic among the remaining inhabitants,

'Much credit must be given to Col. Usher who was in C.A. charge in the town, and who was here, there and everywhere in his kilt.'

Meanwhile some 9,700 persons were evacuated, including eight hundred wounded and many sick and infirm. The reception of these people within the bridgehead raised acute difficulties. Accommodation at the Army Refugee Camp at Amblie was increased by two thousand.

A tented camp for 1,500 was set up at Bussy. Arrangements were made, not without opposition from the military authorities there, to evacuate 1,350 to the U.S. zone. For the rest, a committee in Bayeux with French, British and American membership, did what it could. By 23rd July running water and fire hydrants were available in the south of the town. There had been no epidemics or starvation. Second Army reported that 'the back of the immediate Caen problem has been broken.'

This was the first experience of combined action with the French. The Second Army report continued:

'French cooperation was whole hearted and enthusiastic. The bearing of the French authorities and population under fire was beyond praise.

Enthusiasm at times outran discretion and numerous French authorities felt called upon to infiltrate and upset the applecart with unauthorized and unco-ordinated orders. One of the principal lessons learnt is the necessity for rigid control of French co-operation in a forward area. The French realize this themselves and are fully cooperative in the matter, but enthusiastic individuals will always be inclined to run out.'

But the behaviour of the authorities and population was 'beyond praise'.

Administrative questions were all a matter of first-aid and improvisation. For M. Daure, the newly appointed *Préfet* these were important; but far more important still was the political problem of obtaining recognition for the Provisional Government and administration of General de Gaulle. In his view this was essential because the Petain Government was tainted with collaboration and exceedingly unpopular, and if it continued in power there would inevitably be an explosion – the French, he argued, are an excitable and explosive people. There was a considerable Communist element in the country. In his view any attempt to keep the Petain Government in power would have played straight into Communist hands. The only alternative, like it or not, was to recognize and support the de Gaulle Government which was already showing itself popular with so much of the country as had been liberated. M. Daure appreciated the correctness of the policy of neutrality followed by the British, that the people of France much choose for themselves. But he was determined to miss no opportunity of gaining recognition, whether by ready co-operation with Colonel Usher, for whom, and for whose Scottish ways, he conceived a warm affection, or by establishing contact with visiting political personages. Unsuccessful in meeting Mr. Attlee or Mr. Churchill when these visited Normandy, he and M. François Coulet were able a little later to meet Mr. Eden when the latter paid an

official visit to the Regional Commissioner at Bayeux. 'Ce geste dont je lui suis très reconnaissant, a été le point de départ de la reconnaissance du Gouvernement du Général de Gaulle, qui était alors désiré par la majorité des Français.' Throughout these early days M. Daure worked in close collaboration with the Civil Affairs authorities and with the utmost intrepidity and disregard for his personal safety, to re-establish order and authority. British recognition of his services was later conferred by the award of a C.B.E.

At Caen the Civil Affairs organization of the British zone of operations successfully surmounted its first great test. And in doing so it laid the foundations for increasing Anglo-French cooperation. In writing to the author M. Daure, the first *Préfet*, said 'Je pourrais vous donner mes impressions et souvenirs, excellents d'ailleurs, de mes relations de Préfet avec le Civil Affairs, relations qui ont eu en conséquence la formation d'une solide amitié avec le Représentant de l'Armée Britannique, le Colonel Usher . . .' And Colonel Usher was in due course honoured by being made a *citoyen d'honneur* of the town of Caen.

* * *

Towards the end of July the nature of operations changed altogether, with the breakout of the American forces from the west of the lodgment area. Operations, which had hitherto lagged behind plans, were soon to overtake and anticipate the schedule.

The break-out began on 25th July when VII Corps of First U.S. Army breached the German front just west of St. Lô. By 28th July the U.S. forces driving southwards had captured Coutances and on 31st their leading columns had reached Avranches. Meanwhile, on the left of the Allied front, First Canadian Army and Second British Army attacked south of Caen and near Caumont in the direction of Falaise and Vire. These attacks encountered fierce opposition and did not gain much ground but they kept the weight of the German forces pinned to the eastern half of the front and so contributed to the success of the break-out on the west. On 1st August the U.S. forces had increased in number to the point at which they were reorganized into two armies, the First and Third U.S. Armies, and placed under 12th U.S. Army Group. Overall direction of the battle remained with the Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group for another month, after which the Supreme Commander assumed direct control of the two Army Groups. On 1st August, Third U.S. Army, in the lead, sent one Corps westwards from Avranches into Brittany. Two other Corps were directed south and south-east. By 4th August the westward drive was nearing Brest, and the south-eastward drive had reached Rennes. Meanwhile First U.S. Army had swung left-handed towards Vire, upon which the advance of Second British Army was also directed.

Late on 6th August the Germans counter-attacked fiercely at Mortain in the direction of Avranches to cut the thinly stretched U.S. line of communication. While defending their life-line against this threat it was decided that the American forces should put their main effort into a left wheel of the Third Army columns heading for Laval and Angers with the object of encircling the Germans against First U.S. Army, Second British Army, and First Canadian Army, all of which intensified their attacks. As the jaws of this pincer movement closed upon Falaise from the north and Argentan from the south, the Germans called off their counter-attack about the 11th August and turned to extricate their endangered forces. Extremely fierce fighting followed and it was not until 19th August that the jaws could be closed, trapping great numbers of Germans. While mopping up of this pocket continued, the whole of the Allied forces turned towards the River Seine. Notwithstanding the resultant entanglement of lines of communication, by 27th August these forces stood on the south-west bank of the Seine and in several places had already secured crossings. By the end of the month they were well across and on their way to Belgium. By mid-September they had reached and in places crossed the Dutch border, and the German border as far south as the Saar.

In this phase of fast-moving open operations the spearhead Civil Affairs detachments could do little beyond discover the *Maire*, explain the plan for the administration, push a parcel of proclamations and notices into his hands and move on, although they brought with them also small quantities of rations for refugees. In due course the static detachments and the representatives of the Provisional Government arrived. There was now more elbow room for detachments but even so their resources were not, generally speaking, fully extended, for the French civil administration was able to assume far more responsibility than had been expected. In September the policy was developed of leaving detachments at the regional level only and of rolling up the detachments in the communes in order to have them ready to spread out again behind the ever-advancing spearhead detachments. As the Allied sweep through France continued regional commissioners were appointed in the British zone at Laon and Lille, both these towns having been constituted headquarters of regions by the French authorities. The new regional commissioners followed the example of M. Coulet and issued orders to the *Maires* in their regions calling upon them to afford all assistance to the Allied commanders, and everywhere, with few exceptions, this assistance was willingly given.

* * *

The Allies intended to avoid fighting in Paris if possible, hoping that the capital would fall into their hands as the result of pressure on

either side. Notwithstanding the suspicions of General de Gaulle¹ there seems no need to look further for the reasons why this course was followed than to a desire to spare Paris the destruction of fighting and a wish to postpone as long as possible assumption of the logistical commitment of feeding the city. It had not been expected that the city would fall until three or four months after the first landings. The break-out at the end of July and the rapid advance that followed made it clear that this might happen some six weeks earlier. On 19th August, the day the gap was closed between Falaise and Argentan, matters were precipitated by the action of the Resistance forces in Paris. They rose against the Germans and seized the Ministries and Prefectures, as the Allied forces turned their backs on Falaise and approached the Seine. The German forces in Paris were not great and it was decided to take advantage of the embarrassment caused to them by the rising to push into the city the French 2nd Armoured Division under General Le Clerc and the U.S. 4th Division in order both to liberate the city and to protect the Resistance forces from German retaliation.² On the morning of the 25th August, as the Allied forces were reaching the Seine – some had already gained crossings – these two divisions entered the city. Later in the day the German garrison surrendered to General Le Clerc.

General de Gaulle entered Paris on the evening of the same day. He had already designated General Koenig Military Governor of the capital. Many important Vichy officials had left with the Germans. Others had been removed by the Resistance forces when they seized the Ministries, and replaced by members of the Resistance. General de Gaulle recognized a provisional head in each Ministry under the title of Secretary-General. He announced the composition of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, with himself as President of the Council, the official title assumed by the Premiers of the Republic. The other members of the government were designated Commissioners, but it was some days before any of these were able to fly from Algiers.

Close on the heels of the armed forces there entered into Paris twenty two Civil Affairs detachments, one for each of the *arrondissements* of the city. A detachment in command of the whole party was itself under the Paris Area Commander, Brigadier-General P. Rogers of the U.S. Army. The Civil Affairs team was an integrated Anglo-American force, the American element predominating, however, since the team was to operate in the U.S. zone. It was responsible for establishing liaison with the French local authorities in Paris, and for according all possible assistance to them. At governmental level these

¹ De Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre, L'Unité*, 1942-44, Paris, 1956, p. 297.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 325.

functions were to be performed by the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France, whose activities will be more fully described in the following chapter.

* * *

It had always been clear that the first Civil Affairs task on entering Paris would be to safeguard the food of the people. The import of relief supplies for the city was not planned to begin until the period D + 121 to D + 150.¹ After the break-out at the end of July it became clear that the call to feed Paris might come six weeks earlier than had been expected.

S.H.A.E.F. speeded the flow of planned relief supplies, and a stock of ten days hard rations and medical stores, for the people of Paris, was collected near Southampton and Bristol. Of these supplies 3,000 tons were to be of kinds suitable for transport by air. For the second ten days further stocks of hard rations were made ready. Thereafter it was planned to begin the import of bulk rations to Paris.

In France responsibility for relief operations lay primarily upon U.S. 12th Army Group, since Paris fell within its zone, and upon the U.S. Communications Zone. But the Civil Affairs team for Paris was part British, and there was a strong British desire, for both humanitarian and propaganda reasons, to share in the relief of Paris. Accordingly 21 Army Group, whose Commander-in-Chief was in any case at this time still in overall control of operations in France, and the War Office, undertook to give what assistance they could, although Paris lay outside the British zone of operations. Plans contemplated the movement of 1,500 tons of relief supplies daily to Paris, 500 tons by 12th Army Group, 500 tons by 21 Army Group, and 500 tons by indigenous transport. For the 12th Army Group contribution there were allocated by S.H.A.E.F. from stocks of British vehicles in the United Kingdom, 1,500 fifteen-cwt. trucks, each with a one-ton trailer, and 185 three-ton trucks. These were to be shipped to France, loaded with flour and meat, and driven to Paris. Thereafter they were to be used for local distribution or for the fetching of further supplies from the Normandy bases. Pending the arrival of supplies in sufficient quantity by this route, the 12th Army Group contribution would be brought in by air from the stocks assembled in the U.K. The 21 Army Group contribution would be carried by road from Civil Affairs stocks at Sommervieu, near Bayeux.

The German garrison surrendered on 25th August. There was an immediate and critical shortage of flour. Other food stocks were believed to be sufficient for a week. Coal stocks permitted only very limited electric lighting and water and sewage pumping. The gas

¹ For the general supply arrangements which formed the background to this particular relief operation, cf. Ch. XVII.

plant had been closed since 20th August for lack of fuel: it was estimated that eighty per cent of the inhabitants of Paris depended upon gas for cooking. There were surplus food stocks in other liberated areas but little or no means of moving them into Paris. The most urgent needs, therefore, were flour and fuel for the city and transport for the movement of surplus stocks from neighbouring areas.

On the day of the surrender the first 21 Army Group convoys were being loaded at Sommervieu, in No. 1 Civil Affairs Base Port Depot. It was planned to send 5,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies to Paris. These were to be carried mostly in military vehicles, at the expense of military requirements, but also in a number of three-ton trucks allocated to Civil Affairs and loaned to the French authorities for the Paris operation. It was hoped to achieve a rate of 500 tons a day. On 26th August the first convoy moved off in a blaze of undifferentiated Allied publicity carrying 600 tons. By the next morning, mysteriously, every vehicle was carrying a small Union Jack, and most bore a chalked legend - 'Churchill keeps his promises'. On 27th the convoy passed through Chartres, but does not seem to have been able to complete the rest of the journey to Paris that day, having been held up by military movement on the road. Further convoys set off on the succeeding days. By 1st September they had delivered 2,800 tons in Paris. By 7th September deliveries had risen to 4,605 tons, by 8th to 5,051 tons, and by 9th to 5,077 tons.

On 27th August the 12th Army Group contribution began, with the lifting of 500 tons by air. This was delivered to Orleans, as no airfields were available nearer, and needed to be taken to Paris by road. The rate of delivery rapidly fell off during the next few days, one reason being the banking up of stocks at Orleans owing to the difficulty of transporting them onwards to Paris. However by 30th August 700 tons had reached the city by this channel. By 2nd September the total was 1,400 tons, and by 6th September 2,336 tons. By this time 15-cwt. truck convoys were arriving and there was no longer the same need for air deliveries. It was decided to complete the 3,000 tons airlift for which preparation had been made but plans for a second 3,000-ton lift lost urgency.

The first 15-cwt. trucks and trailers were shipped at Southampton on 27th August also and began to arrive in France on 29th. The first convoy, loaded with flour and meat, set out on 1st September and reached Paris on 3rd. Other convoys followed. By 9th September these had delivered 1,574 tons.

It had taken a little while for these combined measures of relief to become effective. By the night of 30th August the quantities actually delivered in Paris were reported to be 700 tons by airlift, 50 tons by the British road columns, and 88 tons by First U.S. Army. Clearly deliveries were falling behind the scale planned. However, by the

night of 1st September the figures had considerably improved to 1,400 tons by airlift, 2,800 tons by 21 Army Group, and 88 tons by First U.S. Army. The capture of 3,000 tons of enemy food stocks which were made over for civilian use helped out. By 8th September the Allied effort had delivered almost 10,000 tons to Paris. This included 5,051 tons by 21 Army Group, 2,236 tons by the 12th Army Group airlift, 1,574 tons by the 15-cwt. trucks loaned to the French by the U.S. Communications Zone, 1,000 tons of diesel oil sent by rail by Communications Zone and 88 tons delivered by First U.S. Army during the early days of liberation. Over the first ten days, the original objective, that 1,000 tons of relief supplies should be delivered daily by the Allies to Paris, 500 by the Americans, 500 by the British, had been almost exactly achieved. But the main cause of improvement was the results achieved by the French themselves with indigenous transport supplemented by vehicles lent to them by the Allies. Supplies of beef were reaching Paris from the earliest stages – some being driven in by elements of General le Clerc's division. The original assumption had been that the French would be able to move 500 tons a day into Paris. By the 8th September it was believed that they were in fact maintaining a daily lift of 1,800 tons of wheat, potatoes, cabbages, meat and other supplies, and that in addition 100,000 litres of milk were being brought in daily. If they could be given 4,000 tyres, petrol, diesel oil, and a share of traffic on the railways, they were confident of being able to feed Paris themselves. By this stage French arrangements inspired such confidence that it was decided that the bulk of the relief supplies which had been destined for Paris could safely be treated as a reserve available for use elsewhere in north-west Europe, wherever the need arose. Very little coal had been brought to Paris yet. This was one of the major problems with which the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was to find itself concerned.

In fact the food brought to Paris would have fed the city for less than five days. The contribution was valuable but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that it was largely a by-product of competing U.K. and U.S. propaganda to the French.

* * *

Ten days before the Germans surrendered in Paris, Allied forces from Italy and North Africa, under the command of Allied Force Headquarters, had landed in the south of France. This invasion was complementary to the 'Overlord' operations, but no part of them. No account will be given in this volume of the Civil Affairs operations involved for they were conducted by American and French forces under American command. There was little participation and no assumption of responsibility by the British. Furthermore there was at

no time established in the south of France anything comparable to the 'regime of Civil Affairs' set up within the S.H.A.E.F. theatre. In the south so much responsibility was placed upon the French that the Civil Affairs organization found itself discharging what were properly liaison and intelligence, rather than Civil Affairs functions, as these were understood within the S.H.A.E.F. theatre. It was intended by S.H.A.E.F. that Civil Affairs administration within liberated territories should, wherever possible, be indirect. In the south it became so indirect that it really ceased to be administration at all. In Normandy S.H.A.E.F. had planned to deploy a Civil Affairs force of 3,600 in the eighteen departments which were expected to come under control within the first sixty days. In the south A.F.H.Q. proposed to employ 594 in an area that was expected ultimately to comprise thirty-one departments. Clearly something quite different was contemplated.

It was planned that the command of Allied operations in France should pass from A.F.H.Q. to S.H.A.E.F. when forces from the two theatres had linked up. In the case of Civil Affairs the transfer of responsibility eventually took place on 1st November 1944, eleven weeks after the first landings on the riviera coast. Civil Affairs developments in the south then joined the main stream of events in France. The story of these is told in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

FRANCE—THE GOVERNMENT

WHEN General de Gaulle entered Paris on the evening of 25th August, 1944, he came, and notwithstanding the hesitations of the Allied leaders was generally accepted by the people, as the representative of the Provisional Government of the Republic of France. In the first announcements of the composition of his governments he was styled President of the Council. This was the official title of the Premiers of the Republic. Yet another phase had opened in the history of France.

The process of superimposing the governmental tier over the local and the regional administrations had, in fact, begun earlier in the month with the appointment of M. de Courcelles as a roving commissioner representing the Provisional Government in the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations. In Paris itself preparations had also been made, even before liberation, for nominees or sympathisers of the Provisional Government to be in readiness to step into key positions before these could be seized, whether by Communists or turn-coat politicians of Vichy. M. Alexandre Parodi, representative of de Gaulle and his Government, was already clandestinely in Paris, and was on 14th August nominated Delegate of the Government for those parts of France not yet liberated.¹ Accordingly when the forces of the Resistance rose against the Germans in Paris on 19th August key posts were quickly seized and effectively held for the Provisional Government.

On entering Paris, General de Gaulle discussed with the leaders of the Resistance how to enlarge the composition of his Provisional Government which was to follow him from Algiers as soon as possible. M. Georges Bidault, President of the National Council of Resistance, announced that these leaders would accept and support the Provisional Government. By 8th September six Ministers (which style was adopted by the Commissioners on 4th September 1944) had arrived in Paris.² Others arrived in the succeeding days. By the evening of 9th September the Government was reconstructed and enlarged to include representatives of most parties, a good half of whom had been involved in some way or other in the Resistance.

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¹ de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre, L'Unité*, 1942-44, Paris, 1956, p. 293.

² They were: M. Le Trocquer (Liberated Areas), M. Pleven (Colonies), M. Diethelm (War), M. Massigli (Foreign Affairs), M. D'Astier de la Vigèrie (Interior), and M. Alexandre Parodi (Occupied Territories).

It was not as yet a very great or prosperous estate that the Provisional Government inherited. As General de Gaulle was being acclaimed in Paris, the Allied advance from Normandy had spread southwards to the River Loire and eastwards to the far bank of the River Seine. Paris was scarcely out of the battle. Perhaps one fifth of the whole of France was recovered from the Germans. The capital itself was little damaged but elsewhere there had been crippling destruction of towns, of public services, of bridges, of railways, and of ports. The port of Cherbourg captured on 26th June, was only coming into large scale operation by the middle of August. But it was entirely monopolized for Allied military purposes. There were no other ports available of any consequence, for the Germans still held Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire. Working of the railways was being improvised from Cherbourg and Granville forward in the direction of the front, but capacity was entirely monopolized for military purposes. The coal-fields and industrial areas of northern France had not yet been uncovered.

Three hundred miles away to the south the Allied landings on the Riviera were prospering, but the advance had as yet reached only to Avignon and Grenoble. In this bridgehead there was acute and early danger of famine unless the invaders could import food. It was far from certain yet, whether the authority of the Provisional Government would be accepted at all in the south, where it was known that there were many Communists. Between these two footholds in the north and the south lay the rest of France, still occupied by German forces.

Three weeks later the thrusts from Normandy and from the Mediterranean met, near Dijon, and the German forces cut off south of the Loire and west of the Rhone began disintegrating. The Germans had been expelled from the industrial areas of the north. The Provisional Government had few facilities for communication with this vast area and no forces with which to assert its authority in the vacuum left by the departure of the Germans and the crumbling of the Vichy administration. It was the forces of the Resistance that took over. Here again there was great political uncertainty. There were strong Communist elements, particularly in the south, which might prefer to set up their own government.

Little by little, however, the authority of the Provisional Government extended. Little by little the transport system, the communications, the industries of the north revived. But they had suffered heavy damage and were still largely monopolized for military purposes. When later a few small ports became available for civil working, the French had no ships to bring into them, since all their accessible shipping had been swept into the Allied pool under combined Anglo-American control. As gradually the French regained control of what remained of the material resources of their country, they were in-

creasingly brought face to face with their other crippling loss. Some two million of their able-bodied workers had been removed to Germany, whether as prisoners of war, or as civilians deported for forced labour.¹

A final handicap to the Provisional Government was the withholding of political recognition by the Allies. Without this it was unsure of its international standing and was, or believed itself to be, at a disadvantage in the competition for shipping and other resources.

* * *

As the advance of 21 Army Group carried its forces into Belgium and Holland, which were to become the British and Canadian area of military responsibility, British commitments in France rapidly passed to the American forces into whose sphere the country was to fall. More particularly Civil Affairs responsibility passed, except in operational areas, to Headquarters Communication Zone, for the U.S. Armies in the European Theatre of Operations. A peculiarity of this headquarters needs to be noticed for it was to cause difficulty later. In the British zone responsibility for civil affairs passed back from Corps to Armies, and from Armies to Headquarters Lines of Communication (L. of C.), the whole remaining under the command of 21 Army Group. In the U.S. zone responsibility passed from Divisions to Corps, to Armies, and to Army Groups. From these it passed to Headquarters, Communications Zone. But whereas Army Groups, whether British or American, were under the command of S.H.A.E.F., Communications Zone was not, being responsible to the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces in the European Theatre and through him to the United States War Department direct. It followed, paradoxically, that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force enjoyed complete jurisdiction throughout the whole of the British area, including the L. of C. Command, but that he did not do so in any part of the U.S. Communications Zone. The inability of General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, to issue an order to the U.S. Communications Zone was only partly offset by the fact that he could do so in his other capacity of Commanding General, U.S. Forces. In the words of the U.S. official history:

“The exact responsibility of the G-1 and G-4 at S.H.A.E.F. and their counterparts at U.S. supply headquarters was never thoroughly defined. While it was natural for the Supreme Commander to turn to the U.S. staff officers nearest at hand for advice on purely U.S. questions, the G-1 and G-4 at theatre headquarters were more closely in touch with the War Depart-

¹ Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, London, 1957, p. 80.

ment and had closer control of U.S. men and supplies coming to the United Kingdom and the Continent. Staff officers at S.H.A.E.F. were never completely successful in their efforts to control supply and personnel policy relating solely to U.S. forces.¹

This division and blurring of responsibility was to lead to difficulties in the Civil Affairs field also.

The G-5 staff at Headquarters, Communications Zone was designed to undertake all the normal functions of Civil Affairs. But the French Administration at all levels had revived so rapidly that, although no Civil Affairs agreement regulating the formal transfer of responsibility from military to civil had yet been concluded, *de facto* authority behind operational areas informally passed to them from a very early stage. Only in regard to the import of supplies did the French remain dependent upon the military authorities. The provision of these therefore became the preponderant function of the Civil Affairs staff at Headquarters, Communication Zone until, some months later, the French programme of imports was able to come into play.

As for the other Civil Affairs functions, these, with a French Government in being, became a matter of liaison rather than of administration. For this the Supreme Commander planned to accredit a S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the French governmental authorities as soon as it had become clear who these were. As the people of France, or at least the people of Normandy, showed themselves ready to accept General de Gaulle's provisional government, if not on its own merits, at least until they were offered some other alternative to Vichy, negotiations were opened for the conclusion of Civil Affairs agreements with the provisional government. In the course of these negotiations recognition was accorded to the French Committee of National Liberation, for the provisional government was not yet recognized as being more than this by the British and Americans, as the *de facto* authority in France. This recognition, the conclusion of the Civil Affairs agreements, and the establishment of the provisional government in Paris, opened the way for the establishment of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France. Accordingly on 31st August the Mission began to form, under the command of Major-General John T. Lewis of the

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matters it was to '... endeavour to bring the French authorities to comply with such Civil Affairs policies as the Supreme Commander may formulate or with such requests as he may from time to time address to the French authorities through the Mission'. It was also to '... serve as the intermediary on all matters which may arise between G-5 S.H.A.E.F. and the French National authorities.'

It had been planned that the Civil Affairs element of the Mission should be constituted at the appropriate time by adding to the Mission the French country unit. Under the agreements just negotiated for France the functions of the Civil Affairs element would be considerably less than had been intended. For the discharge of these an organization of the size of the French country unit would be unnecessary and would only be likely to revive French fears that the Allies intended to establish an A.M.G.O.T. Early in August, therefore, the country unit was divided into a 'Mission', a 'Port and Supply Headquarters', and a number of 'Survey Teams'. The Mission would undertake liaison with the French central authorities. The Port and Supply Headquarters was intended to afford liaison in the matter of importing relief supplies to those parts of France which might have been by-passed by active operations. The Survey Teams, under the control of the Port and Supply Headquarters, were intended to act as the eyes and ears of the Mission. In the event no use was found for this Headquarters and the Survey Teams and soon after reaching France they were reduced in strength and eventually dissolved.

An advance part of the Civil Affairs element of the Mission reached Paris and established itself in the Hotel Raphael in the Avenue Kleber. On 6th September General Lewis arrived and set up his headquarters in the Hotel Crillon. Other officers of the Mission followed and by 16th September the Civil Affairs component was complete in Paris. A few days later the Mission moved into permanent accommodation in the Chase National Bank building in the Rue Cambon, and its activities began in earnest. Members of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, released from their work in connection with the French underground movement, were a welcome addition to the strength of the Mission. They protected its officers from never-ending enquiries – the answer to which had inevitably so often to be in the negative. They were able to give this answer charmingly – and in faultless French.

The Civil Affairs element of the Mission initially found itself concerned with no less than twelve different Ministries of the newly-formed Provisional Government. At an early stage, however, the French established a *Délégation aux Affaires inter-Alliées* through which were to be canalized all communications on Civil Affairs matters between the Mission and the Ministries. There was placed at the head of this M. François Coulet, previously Provisional Regional Commissioner for the Rouen area. At the same time the French Military Mission to

S.H.A.E.F. was disbanded. Its Head, General Koenig, had become Military Governor of Paris, and the establishment of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, and of M. Coulet's Delegation, rendered the existence of the French Mission superfluous.

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During the 'first or military phase' of operations Civil Affairs responsibility had been discharged by 'spearhead' detachments working under the command of the appropriate formation headquarters. At this stage a history of Civil Affairs scarcely needs to embrace more than the activities of the detachments and of the Civil Affairs staffs at formation headquarters. Other staffs at these headquarters were little concerned with Civil Affairs matters. They might be involved in movement of the exceedingly small tonnages of relief supplies that it was possible to handle on the military L. of C. and they were planning and preparing for the occupation of Germany. But their main concern was with the battle. By the time that a S.H.A.E.F. Mission to a liberated country had assumed responsibility, the position had changed. The battle had moved on and the Mission commanded no troops. The Mission as a whole was acting as the Supreme Commander's representative in dealing with the governmental authorities, that is to say the whole Mission discharged what was fundamentally a Civil Affairs function. Much of the work of the staff, other than the Civil Affairs or G-5 staff, was concerned with, or had a strong bearing on, Civil Affairs matters. In the case of the S.H.A.E.F. Missions therefore a history of Civil Affairs is extensively concerned with the work of the Mission as a whole and can no longer seek to confine itself exclusively to the work of the G-5 Division. Viewed broadly the work of the Mission to France consisted of two contradictory tasks. On the one hand it was required to bring relief to the French people and to revive the economy of France. This needed above all things food, clothing, industrial equipment, raw materials, and the revival of the transport system. Since this was already the main function of Headquarters, Communication Zone, and since this headquarters was not under the command of S.H.A.E.F., it will not be surprising if some overlapping and friction are revealed. On the other hand the Mission was required to ensure that indigenous resources and effort should make the greatest contribution to the prosecution of the war. This involved the extensive monopolization of the transport system, the appropriation of coal stocks, the requisition of accommodation, and the placing of other demands upon the French economy. Inevitably the G-5 Division of the Mission, whose main function was to assist the French, tended to find itself in a tug-of-war with the other divisions – particularly the G-4 Division – which were more concerned to extract

from the French the requirements of the Supreme Commander. But conflict, in the last resort, there could not be, in the adjustment of these two contradictory requirements, for the programme of aid to the French was, in truth, conceived, not in tenderness for them, but so that they should be able to assist, or at least not to obstruct, the Allied war effort. If the restoratives available could be better utilized elsewhere there was no doubt where they must be applied.

Much was done for the French by the Allies, but the French could not help realizing that the latter were really interested in France only for what they could get out of the country. The French were to be allowed little or no more say, at first, in the use of their own resources than they had been by the Germans. It was not so difficult to bear such treatment as part of the natural lot of a vanquished people: it was hard when it followed 'liberation' by its friends. It is probable that the French never tasted the full bitterness of defeat until they had been 'liberated'.

* * *

The first positive steps to enable the new Government to function were to bring its officials from Algiers to Paris and to make available to it telegraph and telephone communication both in and out of France. Pressing demands for the transfer of some 3,000 officials and for the necessary communications facilities were among the earliest requests received from the Provisional Government. The difference in objectives of the Provisional Government and the Allied Commanders was reflected in the different views they naturally took of priorities. It was perhaps inevitable that the handling of these requests should have resulted in considerable friction. However, arrangements were made to fly in a hundred of the officials, beginning on 27th September, and to bring the rest by sea as soon as possible. In the matter of communications, military needs had to come first, but the case of the civil authorities for a share in facilities was indefeasible. Priorities were established and administered by a S.H.A.E.F. Long Lines Control organization which had been set up in Paris before the arrival of the Mission.

In trying to convey an impression of the further activities of the Mission one is brought up against the difficulty that the Mission was a channel of communication, not an executive organ. Its task was to keep the Supreme Commander informed, to help him formulate his views, and then to convey and interpret his policies to the French Government, rather than to take direct action. It is difficult therefore to point to particular and positive achievements of the Mission. The best that can be done is to give a brief summary of the main developments in which the Mission found itself called upon to take a part,


sometimes greater, sometimes less, and upon which it may be assumed to have exercised an influence.

* * *

With the lifting of the occupation and the arrival in Paris of the Provisional Government the political life of France revived in all its accustomed turmoil. With this we shall not be concerned except to note that the Mission reported more than once that it was unable, so long as the general election lay ahead, to persuade Ministers to apply themselves to the formidable administrative problems that beset them on all sides. There seems little doubt that the struggle for office held back the administrative revival of the country, and may even have handicapped its economic rehabilitation. With the central feature of General de Gaulle's foreign policy, however, his determination to miss no opportunity, in or out of season, to demand recognition of his government and to re-assert the standing of France as a great power, we cannot help being concerned.

It was, of course, a continuation of the struggle, described in an earlier chapter, which had resulted in the recognition by the Allies in mid-July of his Provisional Government, still only the Committee of National Liberation to them, as the *de facto* authority in France, and the negotiation of the Civil Affairs agreements. But this was not enough. Already on 15th May the French Committee of National Liberation had constituted itself the Provisional Government of the Republic of France. It could not rest until the Allies had been induced to accord their recognition of this act. After the completion on 10th September of the new Council of Ministers the U.S. Political Officer at S.H.A.E.F. reported to Washington that he expected there would be an early request for the establishment of a Zone of the Interior. He recommended that recognition of the Provisional Government should not be deferred until the holding of general elections. These could not take place for a considerable time. Meanwhile, he said, the Government undoubtedly commanded wide support and was demonstrating the greatest respect possible in the circumstances for the laws and the constitution. To withhold recognition would imperil the measure of stability so far achieved and at the same time alienate French opinion. The Supreme Commander and official opinion in both the U.K. and the U.S. favoured recognition. The President and Prime Minister still held back. Then on 6th October the Foreign Office suggested that the occasion of the first meeting of the enlarged consultative assembly, which was to take place towards the end of October, could afford an appropriate opportunity for recognition and pressed that this should not be missed. At about the same time the State Department was pressing the President to accord recognition on

Map 1



INVASION OF FRANCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 1944-45

Miles
0 50 100

Legend

Boundary of France
Areas of progressive transfer of responsibility from
Military authority to French Government and dates
of transfer.

- 24 OCT 44 [diagonal hatching]
- 24 APR 45 [stippled pattern]
- 14 JULY 45 [solid grey]

the occasion of the proclamation of the Zone of the Interior, which was also expected to happen towards the end of October. A few days later the facts of the situation finally asserted themselves, with the French press building up an expectation of early recognition, together with a suggestion that it was the British Government that was the cause of delay. On 22nd October the Prime Minister cabled to the President that he felt it was no longer possible to delay the limited recognition of the committee as the Provisional Government of France. The President agreed and formal recognition was accorded on 23rd October. A few days later the seal was set upon this recognition by the invitation extended to the Provisional Government by the Governments of the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on 11th November 1944, to become a member of the European Advisory Commission.¹

At the same time as the Provisional Government was recognized, on 23rd October, by the U.S. and U.K. Governments, the Supreme Commander formally proclaimed three quarters of France to be a Zone of the Interior. This proclamation was of political rather than of administrative significance, and important to the French because it marked a step in the restoration of the prestige of France. For in administrative fact, as we have already seen, the greater part of France had for most purposes been treated as if it had been declared a Zone of the Interior, from the earliest days of liberation. On first arrival in Paris General de Gaulle had preferred that the whole of liberated France should remain, theoretically, an operational zone. But after the completion of the new Council of Ministers it was not long before a request was put forward for the delimitation of a Zone of the Interior. In the circumstances there could be no possible military objection to recognition of the already existing administrative position: and if this were to result in stimulating the morale and raising the prestige of the provisional government, it would have psychological and political advantages. Discussions between S.H.A.E.F. and the French authorities ended in agreement that the Zone should consist initially of the whole of France lying to the south and west of the eastern boundaries of the Departments of Seine Inférieure, Oise, Seine et Marne, Yonne, Nièvre, Saône et Loire, Rhône, Ardèche, and Gard. The Zone was formally decreed by the French authorities on 24th October, one day after their recognition by the Allies as the Provisional Government of France. Some alarm was caused in Allied circles by the inclusion in the decree of a clause 'Toutes dispositions antérieures concernant la zone des armées sont abrogées'. The Government was able to reassure the S.H.A.E.F. authorities however that this was not intended to repudiate any of the arrangements made in virtue of the Civil Affairs agreements with the Allies. In April 1945 the Zone was extended by

¹ Reference to the work of the European Advisory Commission will be made in Ch. XIV. and XVI.

the incorporation of another 11 Departments. On 14th July, with the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., the Allied military authorities relinquished their paramount interest in the remainder of France and the whole country passed to the full control of the French Government.

* * *

On reaching Paris the Provisional Government lost no time in making clear its desire to reconstitute the French army as early as possible. It soon transpired that this military matter, was really being pressed not for military but for political reasons and on grounds of prestige. In its strictly military aspect it is no concern of this book. In its political aspects it cannot be entirely omitted.

At the time of the Casablanca Conference the U.S. Government had undertaken to equip eleven French divisions under General Giraud, three armoured and eight infantry. At the Quebec Conference, in August 1943, this was altered to four armoured and seven infantry divisions. Meanwhile the British had equipped another French division under General Koenig. These forces made a gallant contribution to the Allied war effort in Italy and they were to be employed again in the invasion of the south of France. General Leclerc's division was brought round from the Mediterranean so that it could take part in the liberation of Paris.

It was far from clear however whether any forces raised after the return of the Provisional Government to Paris could hope to be equipped and trained for active operations in the field in time to take part in the war against Germany. It seemed to the Allied commanders that French manpower could make its most telling contribution in the form of labour battalions and of internal security battalions. These would need little training and a much lower scale of equipment. Nor would they require the elaborate supporting organization of staffs and services without which the modern army cannot fight. They could be brought into operation with little delay so as to set free more experienced and more highly trained British and American troops for the battle against Germany. This rôle, it need hardly be said, satisfied neither the temperament of the French people nor the aspirations of their Government. The latter already envisaged the raising of five new divisions for the reconstitution of the French metropolitan army, in addition to those provided for under the arrangements reached at Casablanca and Quebec.

In October, responsibility for rearmament of the French, which had hitherto lain upon A.F.H.Q. in North Africa, was transferred to S.H.A.E.F. A Re-armament Division was formed within the Mission to France and there were posted to it a number of the more senior officers who had previously handled the matter in North Africa. In

the following month discussions were held between the Mission and the French regarding the raising and organization of the internal security and labour battalions. These offered a pretext for formal requests by the provisional government for the reconstitution of the metropolitan army, and definite proposals were put forward by the French for the constitution and equipment of eight additional divisions, together with the necessary staffs and services. In January 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the new programme of French re-armament and arrangements were made for the equipment of the new forces from U.S. and U.K. sources and by the transfer to the French of captured enemy equipment. In March and April 1945, however, S.H.A.E.F. felt compelled to call a halt in the provision of this equipment on the grounds that combatant units were being raised out of all proportion to the supporting troops that would be required to enable these to go into action. It was at this stage that the Allies came to the conclusion that the re-armament programme was being executed more for reasons of national prestige than for the contribution it might make to the war effort. The German surrender followed shortly and with this any operational reasons for re-arming the French forces disappeared – and also the constitutional authority of the Americans to do so. Shortly before the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. and the final relinquishment of the right of the Allied military authorities to interfere in the government of France, the French authorities were strongly pressing their claims to a share in captured enemy equipment to enable them to continue with re-armament until French industry was once more in a position to supply their requirements.

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Towards the end of November the S.H.A.E.F. Mission became aware of a further manifestation of the desire of the French Government to re-assert the standing of France as a great power. General de Gaulle formed a French Military Mission for German Affairs under General Koeltz. The Head of this Mission assured the Allies that his brief was to ensure military co-ordination between the French and the Allied forces and that he was not primarily concerned with post-hostilities planning and the problems arising out of the establishment of a Control Commission in Germany. Nevertheless the S.H.A.E.F. Mission observed that 'The terms of reference of this Mission appear to be extremely wide, and would seem to cover French participation in the planning and the co-ordination of the military government of Germany, the safeguarding and exercise of French rights in Germany, and French interests in the surrender terms and post-hostilities plans.' In fact there is no doubt that these matters were in the minds of the French Government. A few days earlier the British Prime Minister

had made his first visit to Paris since liberation, and the French authorities 'pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany, not merely as sub-participation under British or American command, but as a French command.'¹ To this request the Prime Minister had been sympathetic, pointing out however that it could be granted only after consultation with the Americans and the Russians. This consultation took place at Yalta in February 1945 and it was there decided that the French should be invited to occupy a zone of Germany, parts of the British and American zones being handed over to them. The announcement of this decision ended the equivocal relationship that had hitherto existed between General Koeltz's Mission and the S.H.A.E.F. authorities in Paris. During March and April General Koeltz entered into discussions first with the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany and then with the U.S. Group, Control Council, to concert arrangements for a French zone to be taken over in due course.

Meanwhile, two further attempts to assert national prestige occurred in the course of April. Forces of the French First Army engaged in the advance into Germany from the south of France under the command of 6th Army Group occupied the city of Stuttgart. This fell within the zone of operations of the U.S. Seventh Army which claimed that the city was vital to it as a centre of communications. The French military authorities refused to vacate the captured city in spite of peremptory orders from the Commander of 6th Army Group, and were supported in their refusal by the French Government in spite of what the Supreme Commander described as 'a sharply worded message' from the President of the United States.² It was only the threat to discontinue the supply of military equipment that brought about compliance.

The other incident occurred at about the same time on the frontier between France and Italy. Here French forces penetrated a considerable distance into Italian territory which fell within the theatre of operations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (S.A.C.M.E.D.). Their occupation spread over much of the Val d'Aosta and reached Ivrea, Rivoli and Savona, before the forces of S.A.C.M.E.D. could reach the area to establish Allied military government. The French forces refused to obey the orders of S.C.A.E.F. to withdraw and placed every difficulty in the way of the establishment of Allied military government. It almost looked as if force would have to be used against them until the President of the United States threatened to withdraw all supplies, other than rations, from the

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI., London, 1954, p. 220.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, pp. 450-1.

French forces. The French at once evacuated that part of Italy into which they had trespassed.¹

Eventually, during the first ten days of July, the French forces moved into what was to be the French zone of Germany, consisting, very roughly, of the southern portion of the Rhineland and the southwest of Baden and Württemberg. The French Commander-in-Chief was to become a member of the Allied Control Commission as soon as possible. These events will be more fully discussed in later chapters dealing with military government in Germany. They are mentioned here merely as the culmination, within the period with which this volume is concerned, of the French campaign for recognition as a great power.

* * *

There were throughout this period many heavy strains upon the relations of the Allies with the French. Not the least was that caused by the demands of the Allies for accommodation in Paris. Notwithstanding the clearly stated policy of the Supreme Commander that the establishment of Allied staffs in Paris should be kept to the minimum, there was an ever growing influx into the capital and ever increasing demands upon the French for accommodation, as a result of the movement into Paris of the U.S. Communications Zone Headquarters and many of its subordinate organizations. It may have been practically convenient but was psychologically unfortunate that this headquarters should have been set up in the Hotel Majestic which had previously been occupied by a German headquarters. The citizens of Paris found sentries posted, roads barred, just as they had been under the Germans. The flags were different – and so was the fact that the citizens were now much shorter of food. In December the French protested against this monopolization of accommodation. After an investigation by Communications Zone Headquarters, S.H.A.E.F. issued a directive in March 1945 which was intended to reduce the numbers requiring to be accommodated in Paris, but Communications Zone was not under the control of S.H.A.E.F. and the results were quite insignificant. With the surrender of Germany French demands for the return of housing not unnaturally grew more pressing. They were particularly anxious to have released to them hospital buildings which they would need for returning prisoners and displaced persons. Unfortunately another result of the surrender was the inauguration of plans for local leave for Allied troops, which did nothing to reduce the pressure of military demands for quarters in Paris. At the beginning of June a Combined Accommodation Committee was set up to deal with the requisitioning and derequisitioning of accommodation throughout

¹ Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 1943-45, H.M.S.O., 1957, pp. 318-328.

S.H.A.E.F. was disbanded. Its Head, General Koenig, had become Military Governor of Paris, and the establishment of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, and of M. Coulet's Delegation, rendered the existence of the French Mission superfluous.

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The first positive steps to enable the new Government to function were to bring its officials from Algiers to Paris and to make available to it telegraph and telephone communication both in and out of France. Pressing demands for the transfer of some 3,000 officials and for the necessary communications facilities were among the earliest requests received from the Provisional Government. The difference in objectives of the Provisional Government and the Allied Commanders was reflected in the different views they naturally took of priorities. It was perhaps inevitable that the handling of these requests should have resulted in considerable friction. However, arrangements were made to fly in a hundred of the officials, beginning on 27th September, and to bring the rest by sea as soon as possible. In the matter of communications, military needs had to come first, but the case of the civil authorities for a share in facilities was indefeasible. Priorities were established and administered by a S.H.A.E.F. Long Lines Control organization which had been set up in Paris before the arrival of the Mission.

In trying to convey an impression of the further activities of the Mission one is brought up against the difficulty that the Mission was a channel of communication, not an executive organ. Its task was to keep the Supreme Commander informed, to help him formulate his views, and then to convey and interpret his policies to the French Government, rather than to take direct action. It is difficult therefore to point to particular and positive achievements of the Mission. The best that can be done is to give a brief summary of the main developments in which the Mission found itself called upon to take a part,

S.H.A.E.F. was disbanded. Its Head, General Koenig, had become Military Governor of Paris, and the establishment of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, and of M. Coulet's Delegation, rendered the existence of the French Mission superfluous.

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During the 'first or military phase' of operations Civil Affairs responsibility had been discharged by 'spearhead' detachments working under the command of the appropriate formation headquarters. At this stage a history of Civil Affairs scarcely needs to embrace more than the activities of the detachments and of the Civil Affairs staffs at formation headquarters. Other staffs at these headquarters were little concerned with Civil Affairs matters. They might be involved in movement of the exceedingly small tonnages of relief supplies that it was possible to handle on the military L. of C. and they were planning and preparing for the occupation of Germany. But their main concern was with the battle. By the time that a S.H.A.E.F. Mission to a liberated country had assumed responsibility, the position had changed. The battle had moved on and the Mission commanded no troops. The Mission as a whole was acting as the Supreme Commander's representative in dealing with the governmental authorities, that is to say the whole Mission discharged what was fundamentally a Civil Affairs function. Much of the work of the staff, other than the Civil Affairs or G-5 staff, was concerned with, or had a strong bearing on, Civil Affairs matters. In the case of the S.H.A.E.F. Missions therefore a history of Civil Affairs is extensively concerned with the work of the Mission as a whole and can no longer seek to confine itself exclusively to the work of the G-5 Division. Viewed broadly the work of the Mission to France consisted of two contradictory tasks. On the one hand it was required to bring relief to the French people and to revive the economy of France. This needed above all things food, clothing, industrial equipment, raw materials, and the revival of the transport system. Since this was already the main function of Headquarters, Communication Zone, and since this headquarters was not under the command of S.H.A.E.F., it will not be surprising if some overlapping and friction are revealed. On the other hand the Mission was required to ensure that indigenous resources and effort should make the greatest contribution to the prosecution of the war. This involved the extensive monopolization of the transport system, the appropriation of coal stocks, the requisition of accommodation, and the placing of other demands upon the French economy. Inevitably the G-5 Division of the Mission, whose main function was to assist the French, tended to find itself in a tug-of-war with the other divisions – particularly the G-4 Division – which were more concerned to extract

from the French the requirements of the Supreme Commander. But conflict, in the last resort, there could not be, in the adjustment of these two contradictory requirements, for the programme of aid to the French was, in truth, conceived, not in tenderness for them, but so that they should be able to assist, or at least not to obstruct, the Allied war effort. If the restoratives available could be better utilized elsewhere there was no doubt where they must be applied.

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
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Miles
0 50 100

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On reaching Paris the Provisional Government lost no time in making clear its desire to reconstitute the French army as early as possible. It soon transpired that this military matter, was really being pressed not for military but for political reasons and on grounds of prestige. In its strictly military aspect it is no concern of this book. In its political aspects it cannot be entirely omitted.

At the time of the Casablanca Conference the U.S. Government had undertaken to equip eleven French divisions under General Giraud, three armoured and eight infantry. At the Quebec Conference, in August 1943, this was altered to four armoured and seven infantry divisions. Meanwhile the British had equipped another French division under General Koenig. These forces made a gallant contribution to the Allied war effort in Italy and they were to be employed again in the invasion of the south of France. General Leclerc's division was brought round from the Mediterranean so that it could take part in the liberation of Paris.

It was far from clear however whether any forces raised after the return of the Provisional Government to Paris could hope to be equipped and trained for active operations in the field in time to take part in the war against Germany. It seemed to the Allied commanders that French manpower could make its most telling contribution in the form of labour battalions and of internal security battalions. These would need little training and a much lower scale of equipment. Nor would they require the elaborate supporting organization of staffs and services without which the modern army cannot fight. They could be brought into operation with little delay so as to set free more experienced and more highly trained British and American troops for the battle against Germany. This rôle, it need hardly be said, satisfied neither the temperament of the French people nor the aspirations of their Government. The latter already envisaged the raising of five new divisions for the reconstitution of the French metropolitan army, in addition to those provided for under the arrangements reached at Casablanca and Quebec.

In October, responsibility for rearmament of the French, which had hitherto lain upon A.F.H.Q. in North Africa, was transferred to S.H.A.E.F. A Re-armament Division was formed within the Mission to France and there were posted to it a number of the more senior officers who had previously handled the matter in North Africa. In

the following month discussions were held between the Mission and the French regarding the raising and organization of the internal security and labour battalions. These offered a pretext for formal requests by the provisional government for the reconstitution of the metropolitan army, and definite proposals were put forward by the French for the constitution and equipment of eight additional divisions, together with the necessary staffs and services. In January 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the new programme of French re-armament and arrangements were made for the equipment of the new forces from U.S. and U.K. sources and by the transfer to the French of captured enemy equipment. In March and April 1945, however, S.H.A.E.F. felt compelled to call a halt in the provision of this equipment on the grounds that combatant units were being raised out of all proportion to the supporting troops that would be required to enable these to go into action. It was at this stage that the Allies came to the conclusion that the re-armament programme was being executed more for reasons of national prestige than for the contribution it might make to the war effort. The German surrender followed shortly and with this any operational reasons for re-arming the French forces disappeared – and also the constitutional authority of the Americans to do so. Shortly before the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. and the final relinquishment of the right of the Allied military authorities to interfere in the government of France, the French authorities were strongly pressing their claims to a share in captured enemy equipment to enable them to continue with re-armament until French industry was once more in a position to supply their requirements.

* * *

Towards the end of November the S.H.A.E.F. Mission became aware of a further manifestation of the desire of the French Government to re-assert the standing of France as a great power. General de Gaulle formed a French Military Mission for German Affairs under General Koeltz. The Head of this Mission assured the Allies that his brief was to ensure military co-ordination between the French and the Allied forces and that he was not primarily concerned with post-hostilities planning and the problems arising out of the establishment of a Control Commission in Germany. Nevertheless the S.H.A.E.F. Mission observed that 'The terms of reference of this Mission appear to be extremely wide, and would seem to cover French participation in the planning and the co-ordination of the military government of Germany, the safeguarding and exercise of French rights in Germany, and French interests in the surrender terms and post-hostilities plans.' In fact there is no doubt that these matters were in the minds of the French Government. A few days earlier the British Prime Minister

had made his first visit to Paris since liberation, and the French authorities 'pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany, not merely as sub-participation under British or American command, but as a French command.'¹ To this request the Prime Minister had been sympathetic, pointing out however that it could be granted only after consultation with the Americans and the Russians. This consultation took place at Yalta in February 1945 and it was there decided that the French should be invited to occupy a zone of Germany, parts of the British and American zones being handed over to them. The announcement of this decision ended the equivocal relationship that had hitherto existed between General Koeltz's Mission and the S.H.A.E.F. authorities in Paris. During March and April General Koeltz entered into discussions first with the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany and then with the U.S. Group, Control Council, to concert arrangements for a French zone to be taken over in due course.

Meanwhile, two further attempts to assert national prestige occurred in the course of April. Forces of the French First Army engaged in the advance into Germany from the south of France under the command of 6th Army Group occupied the city of Stuttgart. This fell within the zone of operations of the U.S. Seventh Army which claimed that the city was vital to it as a centre of communications. The French military authorities refused to vacate the captured city in spite of peremptory orders from the Commander of 6th Army Group, and were supported in their refusal by the French Government in spite of what the Supreme Commander described as 'a sharply worded message' from the President of the United States.² It was only the threat to discontinue the supply of military equipment that brought about compliance.

The other incident occurred at about the same time on the frontier between France and Italy. Here French forces penetrated a considerable distance into Italian territory which fell within the theatre of operations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (S.A.C.M.E.D.). Their occupation spread over much of the Val d'Aosta and reached Ivrea, Rivoli and Savona, before the forces of S.A.C.M.E.D. could reach the area to establish Allied military government. The French forces refused to obey the orders of S.C.A.E.F. to withdraw and placed every difficulty in the way of the establishment of Allied military government. It almost looked as if force would have to be used against them until the President of the United States threatened to withdraw all supplies, other than rations, from the

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI., London, 1954, p. 220.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, pp. 450-1.

French forces. The French at once evacuated that part of Italy into which they had trespassed.¹

Eventually, during the first ten days of July, the French forces moved into what was to be the French zone of Germany, consisting, very roughly, of the southern portion of the Rhineland and the southwest of Baden and Württemberg. The French Commander-in-Chief was to become a member of the Allied Control Commission as soon as possible. These events will be more fully discussed in later chapters dealing with military government in Germany. They are mentioned here merely as the culmination, within the period with which this volume is concerned, of the French campaign for recognition as a great power.

* * *

There were throughout this period many heavy strains upon the relations of the Allies with the French. Not the least was that caused by the demands of the Allies for accommodation in Paris. Notwithstanding the clearly stated policy of the Supreme Commander that the establishment of Allied staffs in Paris should be kept to the minimum, there was an ever growing influx into the capital and ever increasing demands upon the French for accommodation, as a result of the movement into Paris of the U.S. Communications Zone Headquarters and many of its subordinate organizations. It may have been practically convenient but was psychologically unfortunate that this headquarters should have been set up in the Hotel Majestic which had previously been occupied by a German headquarters. The citizens of Paris found sentries posted, roads barred, just as they had been under the Germans. The flags were different – and so was the fact that the citizens were now much shorter of food. In December the French protested against this monopolization of accommodation. After an investigation by Communications Zone Headquarters, S.H.A.E.F. issued a directive in March 1945 which was intended to reduce the numbers requiring to be accommodated in Paris, but Communications Zone was not under the control of S.H.A.E.F. and the results were quite insignificant. With the surrender of Germany French demands for the return of housing not unnaturally grew more pressing. They were particularly anxious to have released to them hospital buildings which they would need for returning prisoners and displaced persons. Unfortunately another result of the surrender was the inauguration of plans for local leave for Allied troops, which did nothing to reduce the pressure of military demands for quarters in Paris. At the beginning of June a Combined Accommodation Committee was set up to deal with the requisitioning and derequisitioning of accommodation throughout

¹ Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 1943-45, H.M.S.O., 1957, pp. 318-328.

France. But when S.H.A.E.F. was wound up the Allied hold on housing in Paris was still a major irritant in relations with the French.

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A great deal of the Mission's most important work was performed by its specialists whose doings are recounted in later, separate, chapters. It had originally been intended that the main responsibility of the Mission should be in connection with the provision of relief supplies. Ultimately this was so. But before that there were many months of frustration. The difficulties and the results achieved are set out in a chapter on relief supplies.¹ The Mission was also concerned to stimulate the revival of the coal industry and to a lesser extent of the transport system. Then there were periods when the French arrangements for the reception of displaced persons caused the Mission acute anxiety. These matters also are touched upon in separate chapters.² No complete picture of the work of the Mission can be gained without reference to these. But as the French proved increasingly able to dispense with the aid of the Mission so the scope of the latter's activities contracted. In April the Delegacy for Inter-Allied Relations was disbanded. After the German surrender the process of contraction was greatly accelerated. On 14th July, with the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., the Mission ceased to exist, and was replaced by separate U.S. and British Military Missions.

It is clear that the Mission, or at least the G-5 Division thereof, had throughout its life suffered from a sense of frustration, particularly in matters connected with relief supplies. In this last respect the difficulty was caused, possibly by insufficient clarity of the Mission's directive, but to a far greater extent by the refusal of Communications Zone to accept the clearly expressed intentions of the Supreme Commander.³ More generally, however, one is left with the feeling that the frustrations experienced by the Civil Affairs element of the Mission were due rather to the fact that the terms of the directive fell so far short of the functions which the Mission had looked forward to undertaking before it had become known how much of the responsibility for civil administration would be shouldered by the French, and that these terms did not allow the Mission to help the French as much as they would have liked. A further reason almost certainly lay in the fact that S.H.A.E.F. Forward Headquarters was established at Versailles as early as 20th September 1944. With this headquarters and the French Provisional Government so near to each other it was perhaps inevitable that much of the most important business should have been transacted

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

² cf. Ch. XXII., XXIII., XIX.

³ cf. Ch. XVII.

between these two and not through the Mission. The French Government, avid at all times to assert its standing, doubtless saw political advantage in using the direct channel whenever possible. If there was any resort to this, the responsibility of the Mission might be blurred and undermined. The Mission to Belgium received an essentially similar directive and there were no demands from the Head of this Mission for the issue of clearer instructions. Partly this was a matter of personalities, but in Belgium there was not the same opportunity or temptation to go behind the back of the Mission. Nor was there the same background of political bickering which in France had made the S.H.A.E.F. Mission an object of suspicion.

From the French there was not active criticism of the Mission. But there was continual presentation and pressing of demands and many of these the Mission was forced by circumstances to refuse. Although relations were basically good, it was inevitable that there should from time to time be friction. And when the French were not hoping for aid from the Mission they could scarcely avoid some feeling of resentment at its presence and functions.

But considering the difficulties of the time it seems that the Mission discharged a task of immense difficulty and delicacy with a high degree of success, and that it succeeded, particularly on the British side, in drawing into its ranks a remarkably high proportion of officers who enjoyed a special knowledge of France and of its language. That the Civil Affairs element of the Mission was not felt by the French to have been incompetent or unsympathetic may be concluded from the fact that when the Mission was disbanded, Brigadier S. S. Lee, Head of the G-5 Division, was offered, and accepted, employment under the French authorities.


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It was far from clear however whether any forces raised after the return of the Provisional Government to Paris could hope to be equipped and trained for active operations in the field in time to take part in the war against Germany. It seemed to the Allied commanders that French manpower could make its most telling contribution in the form of labour battalions and of internal security battalions. These would need little training and a much lower scale of equipment. Nor would they require the elaborate supporting organization of staffs and services without which the modern army cannot fight. They could be brought into operation with little delay so as to set free more experienced and more highly trained British and American troops for the battle against Germany. This rôle, it need hardly be said, satisfied neither the temperament of the French people nor the aspirations of their Government. The latter already envisaged the raising of five new divisions for the reconstitution of the French metropolitan army, in addition to those provided for under the arrangements reached at Casablanca and Quebec.

In October, responsibility for rearmament of the French, which had hitherto lain upon A.F.H.Q. in North Africa, was transferred to S.H.A.E.F. A Re-armament Division was formed within the Mission to France and there were posted to it a number of the more senior officers who had previously handled the matter in North Africa. In

the following month discussions were held between the Mission and the French regarding the raising and organization of the internal security and labour battalions. These offered a pretext for formal requests by the provisional government for the reconstitution of the metropolitan army, and definite proposals were put forward by the French for the constitution and equipment of eight additional divisions, together with the necessary staffs and services. In January 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the new programme of French re-armament and arrangements were made for the equipment of the new forces from U.S. and U.K. sources and by the transfer to the French of captured enemy equipment. In March and April 1945, however, S.H.A.E.F. felt compelled to call a halt in the provision of this equipment on the grounds that combatant units were being raised out of all proportion to the supporting troops that would be required to enable these to go into action. It was at this stage that the Allies came to the conclusion that the re-armament programme was being executed more for reasons of national prestige than for the contribution it might make to the war effort. The German surrender followed shortly and with this any operational reasons for re-arming the French forces disappeared – and also the constitutional authority of the Americans to do so. Shortly before the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. and the final relinquishment of the right of the Allied military authorities to interfere in the government of France, the French authorities were strongly pressing their claims to a share in captured enemy equipment to enable them to continue with re-armament until French industry was once more in a position to supply their requirements.

* * *

Towards the end of November the S.H.A.E.F. Mission became aware of a further manifestation of the desire of the French Government to re-assert the standing of France as a great power. General de Gaulle formed a French Military Mission for German Affairs under General Koeltz. The Head of this Mission assured the Allies that his brief was to ensure military co-ordination between the French and the Allied forces and that he was not primarily concerned with post-hostilities planning and the problems arising out of the establishment of a Control Commission in Germany. Nevertheless the S.H.A.E.F. Mission observed that 'The terms of reference of this Mission appear to be extremely wide, and would seem to cover French participation in the planning and the co-ordination of the military government of Germany, the safeguarding and exercise of French rights in Germany, and French interests in the surrender terms and post-hostilities plans.' In fact there is no doubt that these matters were in the minds of the French Government. A few days earlier the British Prime Minister

had made his first visit to Paris since liberation, and the French authorities 'pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany, not merely as sub-participation under British or American command, but as a French command.'¹ To this request the Prime Minister had been sympathetic, pointing out however that it could be granted only after consultation with the Americans and the Russians. This consultation took place at Yalta in February 1945 and it was there decided that the French should be invited to occupy a zone of Germany, parts of the British and American zones being handed over to them. The announcement of this decision ended the equivocal relationship that had hitherto existed between General Koeltz's Mission and the S.H.A.E.F. authorities in Paris. During March and April General Koeltz entered into discussions first with the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany and then with the U.S. Group, Control Council, to concert arrangements for a French zone to be taken over in due course.

Meanwhile, two further attempts to assert national prestige occurred in the course of April. Forces of the French First Army engaged in the advance into Germany from the south of France under the command of 6th Army Group occupied the city of Stuttgart. This fell within the zone of operations of the U.S. Seventh Army which claimed that the city was vital to it as a centre of communications. The French military authorities refused to vacate the captured city in spite of peremptory orders from the Commander of 6th Army Group, and were supported in their refusal by the French Government in spite of what the Supreme Commander described as 'a sharply worded message' from the President of the United States.² It was only the threat to discontinue the supply of military equipment that brought about compliance.

The other incident occurred at about the same time on the frontier between France and Italy. Here French forces penetrated a considerable distance into Italian territory which fell within the theatre of operations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (S.A.C.M.E.D.). Their occupation spread over much of the Val d'Aosta and reached Ivrea, Rivoli and Savona, before the forces of S.A.C.M.E.D. could reach the area to establish Allied military government. The French forces refused to obey the orders of S.C.A.E.F. to withdraw and placed every difficulty in the way of the establishment of Allied military government. It almost looked as if force would have to be used against them until the President of the United States threatened to withdraw all supplies, other than rations, from the

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI., London, 1954, p. 220.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, pp. 450-1.

French forces. The French at once evacuated that part of Italy into which they had trespassed.¹

Eventually, during the first ten days of July, the French forces moved into what was to be the French zone of Germany, consisting, very roughly, of the southern portion of the Rhineland and the southwest of Baden and Württemberg. The French Commander-in-Chief was to become a member of the Allied Control Commission as soon as possible. These events will be more fully discussed in later chapters dealing with military government in Germany. They are mentioned here merely as the culmination, within the period with which this volume is concerned, of the French campaign for recognition as a great power.

* * *

There were throughout this period many heavy strains upon the relations of the Allies with the French. Not the least was that caused by the demands of the Allies for accommodation in Paris. Notwithstanding the clearly stated policy of the Supreme Commander that the establishment of Allied staffs in Paris should be kept to the minimum, there was an ever growing influx into the capital and ever increasing demands upon the French for accommodation, as a result of the movement into Paris of the U.S. Communications Zone Headquarters and many of its subordinate organizations. It may have been practically convenient but was psychologically unfortunate that this headquarters should have been set up in the Hotel Majestic which had previously been occupied by a German headquarters. The citizens of Paris found sentries posted, roads barred, just as they had been under the Germans. The flags were different – and so was the fact that the citizens were now much shorter of food. In December the French protested against this monopolization of accommodation. After an investigation by Communications Zone Headquarters, S.H.A.E.F. issued a directive in March 1945 which was intended to reduce the numbers requiring to be accommodated in Paris, but Communications Zone was not under the control of S.H.A.E.F. and the results were quite insignificant. With the surrender of Germany French demands for the return of housing not unnaturally grew more pressing. They were particularly anxious to have released to them hospital buildings which they would need for returning prisoners and displaced persons. Unfortunately another result of the surrender was the inauguration of plans for local leave for Allied troops, which did nothing to reduce the pressure of military demands for quarters in Paris. At the beginning of June a Combined Accommodation Committee was set up to deal with the requisitioning and derequisitioning of accommodation throughout

¹ Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 1943-45, H.M.S.O., 1957, pp. 318-328.

France. But when S.H.A.E.F. was wound up the Allied hold on housing in Paris was still a major irritant in relations with the French.

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A great deal of the Mission's most important work was performed by its specialists whose doings are recounted in later, separate, chapters. It had originally been intended that the main responsibility of the Mission should be in connection with the provision of relief supplies. Ultimately this was so. But before that there were many months of frustration. The difficulties and the results achieved are set out in a chapter on relief supplies.¹ The Mission was also concerned to stimulate the revival of the coal industry and to a lesser extent of the transport system. Then there were periods when the French arrangements for the reception of displaced persons caused the Mission acute anxiety. These matters also are touched upon in separate chapters.² No complete picture of the work of the Mission can be gained without reference to these. But as the French proved increasingly able to dispense with the aid of the Mission so the scope of the latter's activities contracted. In April the Delegacy for Inter-Allied Relations was disbanded. After the German surrender the process of contraction was greatly accelerated. On 14th July, with the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., the Mission ceased to exist, and was replaced by separate U.S. and British Military Missions.

It is clear that the Mission, or at least the G-5 Division thereof, had throughout its life suffered from a sense of frustration, particularly in matters connected with relief supplies. In this last respect the difficulty was caused, possibly by insufficient clarity of the Mission's directive, but to a far greater extent by the refusal of Communications Zone to accept the clearly expressed intentions of the Supreme Commander.³ More generally, however, one is left with the feeling that the frustrations experienced by the Civil Affairs element of the Mission were due rather to the fact that the terms of the directive fell so far short of the functions which the Mission had looked forward to undertaking before it had become known how much of the responsibility for civil administration would be shouldered by the French, and that these terms did not allow the Mission to help the French as much as they would have liked. A further reason almost certainly lay in the fact that S.H.A.E.F. Forward Headquarters was established at Versailles as early as 20th September 1944. With this headquarters and the French Provisional Government so near to each other it was perhaps inevitable that much of the most important business should have been transacted

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

² cf. Ch. XXII., XXIII., XIX.

³ cf. Ch. XVII.

between these two and not through the Mission. The French Government, avid at all times to assert its standing, doubtless saw political advantage in using the direct channel whenever possible. If there was any resort to this, the responsibility of the Mission might be blurred and undermined. The Mission to Belgium received an essentially similar directive and there were no demands from the Head of this Mission for the issue of clearer instructions. Partly this was a matter of personalities, but in Belgium there was not the same opportunity or temptation to go behind the back of the Mission. Nor was there the same background of political bickering which in France had made the S.H.A.E.F. Mission an object of suspicion.

From the French there was not active criticism of the Mission. But there was continual presentation and pressing of demands and many of these the Mission was forced by circumstances to refuse. Although relations were basically good, it was inevitable that there should from time to time be friction. And when the French were not hoping for aid from the Mission they could scarcely avoid some feeling of resentment at its presence and functions.

But considering the difficulties of the time it seems that the Mission discharged a task of immense difficulty and delicacy with a high degree of success, and that it succeeded, particularly on the British side, in drawing into its ranks a remarkably high proportion of officers who enjoyed a special knowledge of France and of its language. That the Civil Affairs element of the Mission was not felt by the French to have been incompetent or unsympathetic may be concluded from the fact that when the Mission was disbanded, Brigadier S. S. Lee, Head of the G-5 Division, was offered, and accepted, employment under the French authorities.

CHAPTER VII

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

ON the evening of 2nd September 1944 the Guards Armoured Division, and the 11th Armoured Division, the spearheads of the British forces, lay near Douai and Béthune, ten miles short of the Belgian frontier. On the following morning they entered Belgium and the same evening the whole of the Guards Armoured Division was in Brussels, fifty miles away. On 4th September, 11th Armoured Division continued its advance and by the afternoon was reported in Antwerp. Tanks entered the all important dock area. There was no resistance and little damage. In six days these two divisions had covered 250 miles from the Seine to the Scheldt at Antwerp. Breathtaking enthusiasm greeted them as they passed through the villages and towns and entered the capital of Belgium. A fortnight later the airborne attempt to cross the Rhine was launched and the Dutch frontier was crossed by the supporting armoured column. Most of Belgium had been liberated. Meanwhile, on the left, the Canadian forces were penning the enemy into the Channel ports and preparing to loosen their stranglehold on the mouth of the Scheldt. Dieppe was entered on 1st September; Dunkirk fell on 3rd October; the other ports passed into Allied control on various dates between. At Boulogne, at Calais, where a twenty-four-hour truce was arranged to allow some twelve thousand civilians to leave the town, and at Dunkirk, where a sixty-hour truce enabled some 17,500 to be evacuated and so to escape the battle, Canadian Civil Affairs detachments assisted in the care of refugees. Meanwhile, on the right, the forces of U.S. Twelfth Army Group were fanning out vigorously towards the Meuse and Moselle from Namur to Epinal.

* * *

The Civil Affairs problem in Belgium was very different from that encountered in France.

In May 1940, in the growing agony that was to culminate in Dunkirk, King Leopold III of the Belgians, as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, surrendered his forces to the Germans. The Belgian Cabinet dissociated itself from the King's action, escaped to London, and announced its determination to continue in the war against Germany. The King remained in Belgium with his people and

was believed by the Cabinet and by many of the people of Belgium to have fallen much under German influence. Belgium was strategically and economically of such importance to the Germans that they assumed direct control through a military administration under General von Falkenhausen. On 13th July 1944 the Military Governor was superseded by a civilian Reichskommissar with the object of intensifying the Nazi hold over the country. When German authority collapsed and Belgium was liberated there was therefore one lawful government surviving in London, although without its constitutional head, and this was recognized by the Allies. It may have wondered whether it would find that it had retained the loyalty of the people of Belgium through an absence of four years. It may have felt uneasy lest the men of the Resistance might jump into authority before it could return. But it had no competitor in the field, and need fear none, with any semblance of a legal or constitutional claim. In France, there had been two governments, neither of them recognized by the Allies, and all the bitterness of a situation not far removed from civil war. As the new French government followed up the Allied forces it dismissed the officials of the old, if discretion had not already prompted these to disappear or they had not already been removed or arrested by the men of the Resistance. The recognized legitimacy of the Belgian Government, perhaps also the fact that it was unsupported by 'Free' Belgian Forces which had fought their way across the world to return in vengeful bitterness to their homeland, resulted in a more tolerant approach than in France. Above all the swiftness of the Allied advance was such that in most cases there was no interruption at all in the administration conducted by local authorities, and consequently less occasion for the making of changes. The greater continuity of administration in Belgium resulting from these various causes was a notable advantage for those charged with Civil Affairs responsibility.

The existence of a recognized Belgian Government had also led to the timely and amicable negotiation with its representatives in London of a Civil Affairs agreement to regulate the establishment and conduct of civil administration in a liberated Belgium. Under this a Belgian Military Mission, representing the Belgian Government, was to be attached to the Supreme Commander to advise and assist him during this first phase, and to pave the way for the formal return of the Government as soon as the military situation permitted. This Mission was to be a governmental organ, operating at a national level, not an administrative cadre responsible for local administration. Nor had it under its command any Civil Affairs organization comparable to the Netherlands Military Administration planned for Holland.¹ Its object

¹ cf. Ch. VIII.

was not to displace the local administration but to assume leadership and control thereof as early as possible.

* * *

The Guards Armoured Division was accompanied by two Civil Affairs detachments at the disposal of XXX Corps for 'spearhead' work, Nos. 213 and 222 under Major Macrea. On the evening of 1st September No. 213 Detachment was with a party ambushed at Duisans near Arras. The detachment suffered one fatal casualty. One officer was wounded and taken prisoner but escaped the same day. Two other members of the detachment were captured but one of these escaped three days later. The other was seriously wounded. The division reached Brussels in the course of 3rd September. The two detachments crossed the Belgian frontier that day. On 4th No. 213 Detachment entered Brussels about 11 a.m. and took over Civil Affairs responsibility for the city; No. 222 Detachment reached the outskirts of Antwerp that evening and assumed Civil Affairs charge the following day.

Meanwhile, on 3rd September, No. 229 Detachment under Colonel I. R. H. M. Bruce, with the increments necessary to enable it to take Civil Affairs charge of a Department or Province, was on the move from Evreux to Arras. On reaching Amiens Colonel Bruce was told to make straight for Brussels with his detachment and to take charge of the Province of Brabant within which lay the capital. Early on the following morning, 4th September, he joined Colonel Lambert, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer (S.C.A.O.) of XXX Corps under which his detachment had been placed, and these two officers reached Brussels by 11.20 a.m. 'Collaborators were being collected in the streets on our arrival and the whole town was *en fête* and we were received with open arms and expressions of gratitude' reported Colonel Bruce. He and Colonel Lambert at once called on the Burgomaster of Brussels and the civil and military Governors of the Province of Brabant. They ascertained that there was no fear of immediate food shortage. They also arranged for the imposition of a curfew in the city. They found already in existence a self-constituted Belgian Military Mission under the command of General Nyssens. This was not the Mission provided for under the Civil Affairs agreement, but one drawn from the ranks of the Resistance. It was extremely co-operative and at once attached Belgian Liaison Officers to Colonels Bruce and Lambert. King Leopold III had fled with the Germans, whether of his own choice or under compulsion was not clear. The central administrative machinery was intact. In the absence as yet of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium or of any other Civil Affairs authority charged with responsibility for the purpose, it was decided by XXX Corps that Colonel Bruce should

be temporarily in charge of the handling of Civil Affairs matters at the national, as well as at the provincial level. In the course of the day Brigadier Lewis, the S.C.A.O. Second Army, also arrived in Brussels. By 8.30 p.m. the main body of No. 229 Detachment reached the capital. They reported that it had been 'flowers, fruits, drinks and kisses everywhere'.

A slight comedy of overlapping followed. A little earlier in the evening Colonel Bruce had discovered that an improvised force, known as R. Force, of which he had no previous knowledge, had arrived during the day and that its commander, who claimed to have been instructed by the D.C.C.A.O. 21 Army Group to take Civil Affairs charge of Brussels, was giving the Burgomaster orders that contradicted those already issued by himself and Colonel Lambert. On the following day, 5th, No. 210 Detachment arrived and its commander also had orders that he was to take Civil Affairs command of Brussels. Yet another candidate appeared at this time for the charge of the city. This was the commander of No. 10 Garrison. The confusion was resolved by the Corps Commander deciding that Colonel Bruce, commanding No. 229 Detachment, should be in charge both of the province of Brabant and of the city of Brussels, and that the various detachments in the city should all be placed under his command.

No sooner had these uncertainties been cleared up on the 5th than, on the 6th, a part of what was to become the Civil Affairs staff of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium arrived under the command of Colonel J. F. Bygott. It was agreed that this should relieve Colonel Bruce and No. 229 Detachment as soon as possible of the conduct of affairs at the governmental level. In fact it did so three days later on the 9th. For the time being it was placed under the command of Second Army. On 6th September No. 325 Detachment reached Antwerp and assumed Civil Affairs charge of the city and province of Antwerp. On 8th September, as pursuit of the Germans was resumed, control of No. 229 Detachment in Brussels and of No. 325 Detachment in Antwerp passed from XXX Corps to Second Army. On 9th September tidying up continued and it was provided that Civil Affairs responsibility for the whole of Belgium within Second Army boundaries should be divided between No. 229 Detachment in Brussels, controlling the provinces of Brabant, Hainaut and Limbourg, No. 325 Detachment in Antwerp, controlling the Province of Antwerp, and No. 320 Detachment in Ghent, controlling Western and Eastern Flanders. The remaining Provinces of Liège, Namur and Luxembourg were for the most part still under German occupation. It was on this day also that the embryo S.H.A.E.F. Mission took over the conduct of affairs at the national level. On 10th, Major-General G. W. E. J. Erskine reached Brussels, formally established the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium, at 24A Boulevard du Régent, under the direct command

of Supreme Headquarters, and took over the Civil Affairs staff under Colonel Bygott. For some time he had no other staff whatsoever. In this first week the general lines of the Civil Affairs organization had been rapidly sketched in.

The speed of this great advance and the absence of serious opposition by the enemy meant that, in most parts, the local administration was still functioning when the Allies arrived, and that where it had temporarily ceased, there was even less difficulty in reviving it than there had been in France. It meant also that the capital was reached and contact was established with the central administrative authorities on the first day after the arrival of British troops in Belgium and that it took little longer to liberate the greater part of the rest of the country. There was consequently no period, such as had been experienced in France, during which it was impossible to effect liaison above the local or provincial level. Further, the whole country was so small that any problem of importance tended to be national in scope rather than merely local. It was therefore the case in Belgium, far more than in France during the early stages, that significant Civil Affairs action was taken at national rather than provincial or local level. The main functions of the provincial and local detachments were to establish good relations with, and to encourage, the local administration; to try to co-ordinate its efforts with those of the Allied forces; to act as the eyes and ears of the latter; and to aid the Belgians wherever possible by providing transport, food and medical supplies. The more important problems were mainly handled by the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium. In the case of France it seemed best to build up the picture by accounts of what was done at successive levels and in successive periods, at the level of the *commune* in the first few days and weeks, at the levels of the *arrondissement*, the department, and the region for the first months, at the level, after the fall of Paris, of the central government. In the case of Belgium it is easier to adopt a unitary treatment and to tell the whole story at once, mainly from the national level, but using material from all levels.

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Major-General G. W. E. J. Erskine of the British Army had been appointed head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium. His directives bore the same dates, 31st August and 15th September, 1944, as did those to the Head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France. In substance the two Civil Affairs directives were almost identical. In form there was some difference, the Belgian directive being somewhat fuller. A few differences arose from the fact that the liberation of Belgium, although imminent, had not yet begun, whereas the liberation of France was three parts complete, when the directives were issued. The

only difference of substance appears to have been the provision in the Belgian directive regarding the calling forward of relief supplies. If a military port only was in use, this would be done by the military commander. If a port was in use for civil affairs supplies only, it would be done by the head of the Mission. The French directive did not recognize the possibility of the existence of ports 'in use for C.A. supplies only' and made no provision for the head of the Mission to call forward such supplies. Initially every available port in liberated France was in use as a military port and it was not possible to confer such authority. Had it been possible to do so this might have gone some way towards meeting the complaints of the French Mission that it had no power to call forward supplies and its consequent demand to be allowed certain functions of command over Civil Affairs troops in France.¹ In the event, however, it never proved possible to allow a Belgian port either, for the exclusive handling of Civil Affairs supplies, although it was at one time hoped to make use of the port of Bruges in this manner. The provision for the calling forward of supplies by the Head of the Mission was therefore inoperative. This responsibility lay throughout upon 21 Army Group Headquarters.

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Three major physical problems pressingly demanded a solution – food, coal, and transportation. These are more fully dealt with in later separate chapters.² But there was an even more urgent political problem. Before the physical problems could be tackled by the Belgians – and no one else could tackle them – it was necessary that there should be a government and that this should gain sufficient acceptance and authority to enable it to grapple with these formidable tasks.

The Belgian Military Mission under the command of General Nyssens that was found by the Civil Affairs officers who entered Brussels on 4th September was an improvisation of the Resistance. The underground forces which it represented had posted proclamations in Brussels on the previous day. On 5th September there arrived from London an advanced party of the recognized Belgian Military Mission appointed by, and representing, the Belgian Government in London. The Head of this was Lieutenant-General Paul Tschoffen. He fortunately succeeded in drawing the Brussels Mission into his own organization and under his control – failure to do so might have had serious consequences. On 9th September the Supreme Commander's proclamation was published, assuming supreme authority within zones of operations. On the same day a proclamation was published

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

² cf. Ch. XVII., XXII., XXIII.

over the name of M. Pierlot at this time still in London. Speaking as the Prime Minister of Belgium he announced that until, in the near future, constitutional processes could be revived, his Council of Ministers would continue to exercise its legislative and executive powers. The impact of these proclamations fell short of expectations for, under the state of siege, which had been in force in Belgium before the occupation, and which now automatically revived, wide executive powers were already being exercised by Lieutenant-General Tschoffen's Mission. Two days later, on 11th September, the Allied authorities arranged for M. Pierlot and his Ministers to fly from London to Brussels. The Belgian Parliament was convened on 19th September. On the following day Prince Charles was appointed Regent, in the absence of King Leopold III who had gone with the Germans. M. Pierlot and his Ministers resigned and a new government was formed, still under M. Pierlot, still predominantly a 'London' government, but with local elements added, including one representative of the Resistance movement.

There was now a government, but it was still a question whether it would be able to govern. It was constitutional enough for the times, but like most returning emigré governments it was not popular.¹ And there was a well-armed Resistance movement, some eighty thousand to ninety thousand strong, the hard core of which included hostile Communist elements. To oppose these, there was no Belgian army, and the police and gendarmerie were unarmed. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the Ministers were soon criticised for failing to govern. During September and October the Government made various attempts to induce the Resistance forces to surrender their arms, but with little success. Until the police could be armed, and until alternative employment in the Belgian army could be offered to the Resistance forces, whom it was desired to disband, the Government was understandably hesitant. Towards the end of September the greater part of the gendarmerie and police received arms, 916 weapons of various kinds being handed over from Allied stocks on 25th September, and five thousand Sten guns with ammunition being parachuted in by British clandestine organizations. There were some anxious moments ensuring that these were dropped into the proper hands. Recruiting began at the same time for Belgian security battalions and labour groups.

Meanwhile little had been done about food and coal. With the approach of winter, discontent grew and at the end of October General Erskine warned the Supreme Commander that the possibility must be reckoned with either that the Government would collapse or that it would appeal for assistance from the Allies in order to obviate a

¹ The reasons for this unpopularity are more fully discussed in Ch. VIII. in connection with the Netherlands Military Administration.

breakdown. He said 'I have repeatedly pointed out that S.H.A.E.F. have no intention of assuming any responsibility for the government of Belgium and that they look to the Belgians to govern themselves. While I feel on firm ground that this is the right and correct attitude and the one most likely to spur on the Belgian Government to the greatest efforts, I feel that there may be a phase when a little practical support might prevent or limit trouble, and so avoid a worse situation.' He suggested that an immediate and practical measure towards steadying the situation would be for the Allied military authorities to issue and enforce an order prohibiting the possession of arms by civilians without a pass. There might then be some hope of the Belgian authorities taking effective action in concert.

On 18th November the Supreme Commander in replying reaffirmed that 'The sole concern of the military authorities is to ensure that the Allied war effort is not impeded by internal dissension in Belgium. We have no desire to interfere in Belgian internal affairs, but it is our duty adequately to secure our installations and lines of communication, and full precautions must, therefore, be taken.' If Allied intervention became necessary for the preservation of law and order, he went on to say, this was normally to be undertaken only at the request of the Belgian Government and only after that Government had done what it could with its own police and gendarmerie. Should it nevertheless become necessary for the Allied forces to act on their own motion or at the request of subordinate Belgian authorities he distributed responsibilities among the Allied commanders and indicated priorities.

Meanwhile the Belgian authorities, under Allied pressure, had issued yet another decree on 13th November requiring Resistance groups to demobilize and surrender their arms by 18th November. They also announced that they could absorb forty thousand of the Resistance in the Belgian army. General Erskine judged the situation to be serious enough for him to say to the government that 'the Allied forces will assist it in order to ensure respect for law and maintenance of order, both being essential for the conduct of military operations. The order recently given for disarming the Resistance groups and other regulations for the reorganization of the Belgian forces have the approval of S.H.A.E.F. It is especially hoped that no difficulties will result from the application of these measures; but, if there should be any, the Allied military forces at the request of the Government, will help restore law and order.' On 16th November three Communist Ministers, leaders of the Resistance, resigned from the Government. On the same day the Resistance groups were ordered by these leaders not to hand in their arms. General Erskine stepped in and on 17th warned the three ex-Ministers that the Allied military authorities, while taking no sides in internal politics, could not tolerate this flouting of the Government's orders, as it would interfere with the

war effort. His intervention was effective. The Resistance leaders were induced (by one means or another) to order their followers to surrender their arms, provided this could be done to the Allied forces and not to the Belgian authorities. Nevertheless, on 25th November a procession of protest took place, in defiance of the orders of the leaders. The traditional and dangerous goal, for demonstrations of this kind was the square where the Palais Royal faces the Palais de la Nation – the Parliament buildings – across the trees and lawns of a pleasant formal park. On this occasion the square also contained 21 Army Group tanks and troops, placed there at the request of General Erskine. The procession was forbidden, by the Belgian authorities, to enter the square but tried to force a way in. The gendarmerie were driven to shoot in order to disperse the demonstrators, and wounded thirty-five persons. They succeeded in controlling the situation, however, without calling on the Allied forces held in readiness. The forces of law and order had defeated the challenge to their existence. The Government might not be popular but its firmness in this crisis had gained it respect, and a solidly based preference emerged for the idea of effecting changes to the Government, should these be necessary, within rather than without the framework of the constitution. This was a decisive moment in the development of events in Belgium. By 25th November eighteen thousand arms had been surrendered; by 6th December the number had risen to about thirty thousand. A call for a general strike on 29th November was a failure. The Government was established and the political temperature showed signs of returning to normal. In the words of a S.H.A.E.F. summary at this time: 'The sun of hope has not yet dawned but is round the corner. Meanwhile the Belgian people are moving from bottleneck to bottleneck towards the open river'. Stirring times produced well-stirred metaphors. It was now possible to turn with greater energy to meet the physical problems of food, coal, and transport.¹

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With the broad development of events in Belgium after November 1944, towards the end of which month it had become clear that the Government and the Constitution were surviving the challenge of the revolutionary elements, the Mission was much concerned but not directly involved. Its task was not to govern or to administer, but to help the Belgians to do these things. In his final report on the work of his Mission General Erskine said

'The most narrow conception of the object of the Mission was to prevent disease and unrest in Belgium. It was quite clear from

¹ cf. Ch. XVII., XXII., XXIII.

the early days that the object would not be achieved by calories and medical supplies alone. The formula of helping the Belgians to help the Allies has been the basic policy.'

Success in this was achieved by leaving the Belgians to tackle their own problems, sometimes by insisting that they should do so, by making the calories, the medical supplies, the transport, available whenever possible, and by the occasional application of pressure or support. Above all it depended on gaining the good-will of the Belgians and keeping alive their loyalty to the Allied cause in the face of hardship and disappointments. In this the Mission was remarkably successful thanks in large degree, to the personality of its Head.

As in other liberated countries a grievous inflation of the currency stood in the way of any control or stabilization of prices. German military expenditure, and disbursement of francs in payment for exports to Germany, had trebled the volume of currency in circulation, without any counter-balancing imports from Germany upon which this could be spent. The Belgian Government's prime measure for countering this inflation was a drastic and courageous reform of the currency. This was devised and carried out by the Belgian authorities, but could not have been consummated without the help of the Allied forces in bringing the new currency from the United Kingdom – some 122 tons of this were carried by air and by sea – and in distributing it by road to the banks throughout Belgium and Luxembourg. Even so the necessary decrees could not be issued until 9th October, which was some fifteen days later than the Government had hoped. On this day the *Banque Nationale de Belgique* began issuing the new notes.

The currency reform did not touch coin and the smaller denominations of notes, i.e. those of 5, 20 and 50 *francs*: all these continued in circulation. Notes of higher values were declared to be no longer legal tender and to be not transferable. The head of every family was entitled to obtain 2,000 *francs* of new notes for each member of his family, in exchange for old notes of the higher denominations. The remainder of the higher denomination notes were required to be declared. A proportion of these would be released to the declarer: this was later fixed at 3,000 *francs* in respect of each person making a declaration. The rest of the high denomination notes would be credited to an account in the name of the declarer, forty per cent of which would be treated as 'temporarily unavailable' and sixty per cent as 'blocked'. Releases could be, and from time to time were sanctioned from the 'temporarily unavailable' part of this account for approved purposes. It was expected that most of the blocked part of the account would be absorbed by taxation. Provision was also made in the decrees for a proportion of bank and other deposits to be released to persons declaring them, and for other

matters. Naturally there were grumbles. But for the most part the reform was accepted with a good grace as an honest and courageous attempt to mend the situation. And indeed Belgium emerged with a currency probably more solid and stable than that of almost any other country in post-war Europe.

The Government established its right to live by the stand it took over disarming the Resistance forces, particularly when the unlawful procession was dispersed on 25th November, and when the threat of a general strike fizzled out on 29th November. Something else happened at the same time. On 28th November the first convoy of nineteen large ships was safely brought up the Scheldt and before night eleven of these were successfully berthed at Antwerp. Liège and the port and town of Antwerp were suffering heavy bombardment by pilotless aircraft and long-range rockets (V.1's and V.2's) but nevertheless the prospect of the arrival of supplies in Antwerp combined with the firmness of the Government, contributed to a relaxation of tension and improvement in morale. The number of workers in the docks and shipyards of Antwerp steadily increased. The Civil Affairs detachments there and in Liège assisted, with technical advice, transport, and appliances, in the creation of a Civil Defence organization. A Civil Defence Training School was opened. And 21 Army Group released supplies of prefabricated bituminous felt for the repair of workers' houses.

In mid-December came the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, with the loss of much food producing ground and severe fighting on Belgian soil. Many local Civil Affairs problems resulted. Local officials were ordered by the Belgian Government to remain in their charges. Some, understandably, refused to face the vengeance of the returning Germans and the collaborating Belgians, and had to be replaced. Refugee problems arose. Stocks of food were lost. The supply of pit props was cut off. Then, after a fortnight, the Germans were held and later were forced back. The spearhead stage of liberation had all to be gone through again.

Meanwhile the bombardment of Antwerp continued, although with decreasing intensity. Civilian labour employed at the port mounted from 7,652 early in December to some fourteen thousand in January. A Belgian organization was set up and took over on 1st January the responsibility for receiving and transporting all imported relief supplies. Previously this had rested upon the military authorities. During the month supply ships reached Antwerp, thirty-five discharging a total of 69,000 tons before the 27th. Increasing use was being made of canal barges for the distribution of food. Very severe weather through January and February – the canals froze for a time – meant that through these months the need for food and coal overshadowed all other problems. By March milder weather and a change of govern-

ment brought improvement. Coal production increased to a point at which it was possible both to make some official distribution to domestic consumers and to enable industry to make a start. There were to be setbacks again, but the corner had been turned and the Mission was able progressively to extricate itself from responsibility for the affairs of the country.

M. Pierlot's Government, tolerated but never popular, fell in February 1945. A series of coal strikes, apparently fostered by Communists for political ends, was the major cause. The new Government was composed of all parties and headed by M. Van Acker, a Socialist, a leader of the Resistance, and formerly Minister of Labour. The new Prime Minister was a man of great courage who took his political life in his hands when he accepted office at such a time. He introduced a new note of determination and served his country well.

One other problem needs to be referred to, although it was the Allied policy, consistently and successfully followed, to avoid any entanglement in its thorny dangers. It has been mentioned earlier that the King of the Belgians, Leopold III, remained in Belgium when his Government escaped to London in 1940. On the liberation of his country he withdrew to Germany where he was found, after the German surrender, in a castle near Salzburg. His absence during the early days had greatly eased the task of the Pierlot Government.

The great majority of the people of Belgium considered a monarchy necessary, if only in order to hold together the Flemish, or Germanic, element and the Walloon, or Latin, element of the population. But opinion was bitterly divided over the retention of Leopold as King. He had shown extreme favour to the Flemish element during the occupation and was popular with this, and with the Roman Catholic Church. He was accordingly most unpopular with the Walloons. On more reasoned grounds, he was unpopular with many because of the capitulation of 1940, and because he had refused to follow the advice and example of his Government to escape to England. On the other hand there were those who, while disapproving of the conduct of Leopold, firmly supported the monarchy and felt that his abdication would so weaken this institution, that it must be resisted. Where there were such bitter differences it would be misleading to speak of the emergence of any general sense of public opinion. But clearly a majority favoured retention of the monarchy and equally clearly a majority was resolved not to allow Leopold to return. Both these objects were ultimately achieved, but not for a long time. Certainly the Government of M. Van Acker would never have had the King back except on a signed abdication.

The discovery of King Leopold at Salzburg on 8th May 1945 fanned latent feelings and immediately threatened to bring on a political crisis. The Allied attitude from the start had been that it was for the

Belgians to decide how they wished to be governed and whether they would have King Leopold back. The King was unable to make up his mind whether to act on the promptings of his advisers that he should return to Belgium. He sought the advice of the Supreme Commander and of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, but these refused to depart from the attitude they had taken up. If King Leopold wished to return to Belgium, they would arrange for him to do so, and would guarantee his safety – as far as the frontiers of Belgium, but no further. Thereafter responsibility must lie upon the Belgian Government and upon himself, and it must be for the people of Belgium to decide what they wanted. But whether or not he should return was not a question upon which the Allied authorities could advise. So matters remained until after the dissolution of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, the King in uncertainty, the people of Belgium divided, suspicious and angry.

S.H.A.E.F. was dissolved on 14th July. With the disappearance of the Supreme Commander and the headquarters which they represented, came the end of all the S.H.A.E.F. country missions. Each was replaced by separate British and United States Missions. The G-5 or Civil Affairs element of the Mission in Brussels continued for a time as an Anglo-American organization forming a part of the Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency set up by S.H.A.E.F. for the winding up of its outstanding functions.

* * *

A short section is here added dealing with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, for, although in the first stages a separate Mission was established by S.H.A.E.F., ultimately its Civil Affairs problems became the responsibility of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium.

The Grand Duchy fell within the U.S. theatre of operations and First U.S. Army forces reached Luxembourg at about the same time as British forces entered Brussels. On 4th September the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, under command of First U.S. Army, reached the capital. On the 21st September it was ordered that the Mission should come directly under the command of S.H.A.E.F. in all matters affecting the relations of S.H.A.E.F. with Luxembourg. The Mission could call upon First U.S. Army for assistance, and First U.S. Army retained the right to intervene in any matter affecting operations. On 24th September the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, accompanied by three other Ministers and the Secretary-General of the Government, arrived in the capital and began the re-establishment of the administration. Civil Affairs detachments had been installed in the capital and also in the town of Esch. As in France and Belgium, one of the first tasks was to gain control of the various Resistance groups in the country. These had been accorded a certain recognition by the Allies

and were now forming themselves into the Union of Resistance. There was a tendency for them to take the law into their own hands. They were prevailed upon, however, to assist the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, and to recognize the authority of the commander of the Luxembourg armed forces appointed by the Grand Duchess. First U.S. Army made available arms and equipment for the lawfully constituted gendarmerie. Drawing strength from the personal popularity of the grand-ducal family, and aided whenever possible by the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, the Government in the event experienced little difficulty in re-establishing its authority. Shortly after 20th October the S.H.A.E.F. Mission proper was withdrawn. The Civil Affairs element continued in existence and was placed under the immediate command of 12th Army Group.

The city of Luxembourg was found little damaged and there were at first no major problems. A conversion of currency was effected, on lines similar to those followed in Belgium. A survey was made and by the end of November it was known that there were some thirty-one thousand refugees and five thousand displaced persons within the Duchy. There were shortages of food – fats, sugar, coffee, chocolate – of soap, and of coal and coke, but these were not serious. On the other hand there were some surpluses of potatoes and cattle – there were one third more of the latter than there had been before the war, and it was possible to export to Belgium and Holland.

This not unsatisfactory picture was darkened when the Germans launched their counter-offensive in the Ardennes. This swept across some of the most fertile land in Luxembourg. Where possible, arrangements were improvised to remove to safety live stock and perishable food supplies, but there was little civilian transport and little petrol, so that not much could be saved. Most of the remainder was destroyed, or removed by the Germans when they were once more driven back. The food shortages immediately became serious. At the same time the government was faced with loss of revenue, an increase in claims against the government for war damage, and the need to pay for imports to replace the lost food stocks. The immediate dangers were averted by Belgian and Luxembourg relief organizations and C.A. detachments, working in collaboration. Road convoys of food were taken to the outlying areas. The number of refugees had been doubled by the offensive and when it was over, in the course of March and April, some sixty thousand persons returned to their homes, as the Germans withdrew.

The avoidance of longer term difficulties was mainly a matter of obtaining for Luxembourg a fair share of the import of relief supplies into Belgium. The military programme was intended to meet the needs of both countries, but Belgian needs tended to be heard first, and when the claims of Luxembourg gained a hearing there was always

difficulty in transporting any stocks that might be allocated. In May 1945 for example there were accumulations of supplies waiting in Belgian depots because they could not be moved to Luxembourg.

Nevertheless, once the German counter-offensive had been repelled, the administrative and political situation improved steadily so that towards the end of April, with the war obviously drawing to a close, the Grand Duchess and her family returned to Luxembourg. They were received with the utmost enthusiasm, the reception warmly including Civil Affairs representatives also.

Soon after this the Civil Affairs staff, which had some time before been transferred from 12th Army Group command to Communications Zone, was incorporated in the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium, under General Erskine. Various matters concerning Luxembourg were handled by the Mission or came to its notice throughout this period. There were negotiations with Belgium to obtain fuel in exchange for iron ore so that the Luxembourg steel mills could work again. There were persistent shortages of solid fuel and petroleum products. There were difficulties arising out of a refusal by S.H.A.E.F. to allow Luxembourg nationals into Germany to recover their property. When there were delays in repatriating Luxembourg nationals from the concentration camps discovered in Germany the Union of Resistance organized a convoy that managed to get to Buchenwald without any permission or authority and rescued and brought home in triumph sixty-eight Luxembourgeois. Later the Mission helped in sending convoys to Dachau and Belsen. There were continual troubles over accommodation as a result of the insatiable military demands. Much resentment was caused by the requisitioning of private houses belonging to persons who had been deported by the Germans: it was felt to be intolerable that these persons, already punished by the Germans for their loyalty should on release be required to suffer further at the hands of the Allies by being deprived of the use of their property. Feeling became so strong that at the beginning of June S.H.A.E.F. ordered a full inquiry into the whole accommodation position in Luxembourg.

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This chapter may fittingly conclude with an extract from the last of the series of exceedingly readable fortnightly reports submitted by the Head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium:

'2. It is now nearly 10 months since Belgium was liberated and much has been accomplished by BELGIUM to restore her normal life. Very little would have been done without the powerful help of AMERICA and GREAT BRITAIN in giving her substantial material assistance and helping her to organize the future

for herself. Today BELGIUM is in an extremely healthy position but still absolutely dependent on continued assistance from the Allies.

3. The Belgian rations are good and bear favourable comparison with any country in EUROPE. The distribution is fair and well organised. The future supplies have been carefully planned. While there are no large reserves, the day has been passed when the chain of supply was direct from ship to stomach. There are good reports of this year's harvest. Cattle are increasing and there are much better prospects of their winter feed.

4. The ports and transportation system by rail, canal and road were thoroughly restored by the Allies for their own purposes and worked efficiently. These facilities will still be used by the military authorities but to a gradually decreasing extent. There is at present plenty of port capacity and transportation for civil needs and as these increase it is probable that the military needs will decrease. BELGIUM is a long way ahead of any country on the continent in respect of good workable ports joined to an adequate rail and canal system.

5. Belgian coal – the motive power for her industry – has caused more headaches than anything else. There has recently been a marked improvement with production averaging 50,000 tons a day. This is not enough but it has enabled the stock position at railway yards, power plants and gas works to look far better than at any previous date. There is every reason to expect further improvements as more Poles and prisoners of war get to work in the coal mines. A "set-back" in the coal production would be the most serious blow and could only occur in the form of a "self-inflicted" wound.

6. Industry has started on much more than a token scale. The requirements in BELGIUM are enormous particularly for building material, textiles, steel, rubber, machinery and chemicals. It is bound to be some months before the effects of present production are felt but the scale of production will increase in direct proportion to the supply of coal. Raw materials are in most cases available and the national import programme is showing a most satisfactory tendency to expand each month . . .

7. This winter will be hard for many people in Europe. There will be millions without houses, without adequate clothing, with little food and no coal. These conditions need not exist in BELGIUM if the Belgian people really take their coats off and work hard during the next 4 or 5 months. There is little enough time to prepare themselves for the winter and with the birds singing and the strawberries 20 francs a kilo people are inclined to forget that nature, in her wisdom, arranges winter to follow summer.'

The economic recovery of Belgium was indeed remarkable, particularly in comparison with her neighbours to north and south.

Largely this was because she had not suffered the destruction which overtook Holland and France. In particular the port of Antwerp was for the most part undamaged. Then Belgium's part in the war had been so limited that she had not consumed her overseas assets. During the war the Belgian Congo had been the main source of uranium for the United States so that large dollar balances had accumulated. And Belgium was not inhibited from accepting Allied assistance by the wounded *amour propre* and divided mind of France. Perhaps, also, Belgium, the cockpit of Europe, had more experience of being occupied: certainly there were few techniques unknown to her for getting the better of the occupier. Paradoxically, the fact that the Germans did not collapse in 1944 and that the battle continued through the winter so near to the Belgian border was probably a major factor in the recovery of the country. The Allied forces needed many things and paid well for them and employed much labour that would otherwise have been out of work owing to lack of raw materials. But for this the economic recovery of Europe, or at least of Belgium, would have been much slower.

Great credit for her recovery must go to the exceptional good sense and maturity of judgment displayed by General Erskine in the unfamiliar field of administration and politics.

CHAPTER VIII

NETHERLANDS

THE circumstances of the Netherlands differed from those of France or even of Belgium. When the German forces overran the country in 1940 the whole of the Government, including its constitutional head, escaped to England. The Queen and her Ministers set themselves up in London and continued to govern the Dutch colonies. Early in 1942, when Japan entered the war, the Netherlands East Indies were lost, after the Dutch Government had declared war upon the Japanese and ranged itself as an Ally alongside the British and Americans.

A Civil Affairs agreement was negotiated between the Netherlands Government and the British and American Governments. This was concluded in May 1944 and was in the standard form. In Belgium it was planned that the indigenous administration, through which the Supreme Commander would initially act, and to which he would later transfer his responsibility, should be, on the one hand, the existing local civil administration and, on the other, the re-established civil government at the centre. The Netherlands government planned to create an additional organization, a Netherlands Military Administration, which would in the first stages be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander and would later assume temporary governmental responsibility until the Netherlands Government felt able to do so. The ostensible reason for this was that the indigenous civil administration was believed to have been seriously 'dislocated and distorted', if not completely destroyed by four years of Nazi rule, and that it would be unable to function satisfactorily without the aid and control of the Netherlands Military Administration. In Belgium the Germans had established a temporary military administration which until a few weeks before liberation left the indigenous administration intact so long as it met German requirements. In Holland the civil administration had been taken over and Nazified from the beginning under a Reichskommissar, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, responsible direct to Hitler, with the intention that it should be incorporated in the Reich. The fears of the London Government regarding the competence and loyalty they could expect from the indigenous administration may well have been justified. That the agency proposed for its control should be military not civil sprang from other considerations. Since the Allies insisted upon 'a first or military phase' the Dutch felt

that co-operation with the Allied commanders would be easier for a military than for a civil organization. Indeed, they feared that if they did not provide a military organization the Allies might establish their own as in Italy. And a military administration seemed more appropriate to the state of siege it was proposed to revive.

But there was another reason for the establishment of the Netherlands Military Administration. There had been and perhaps still was a not inconsiderable proportion of Nazi sympathizers in the population at large. And, at the other end of the spectrum, there was a strong Communist element which the Government greatly feared in the various Resistance organizations. Consequently it was not known what reception would be accorded to the Dutch Government on its return. In these circumstances there was clearly much to be said for sending a temporary administration into the country first and allowing the civil government a little time in which to test and assess the political situation.

The Netherlands Military Administration was planned in the expectation that liberation of the low countries would be a largely uncontested, and therefore rapid, process – as indeed proved to be the case in Belgium – and that, although extensive ‘scorching’ must be expected, it would not be long before the national capital and the eleven provincial capitals were uncovered. It was set up therefore on a scale that would enable it to take charge of the administration at the provincial centres and to impose its will through the existing provincial organization. It was not of a strength that would enable it to assume control at lower levels or conduct direct administration itself; it could not have been, having regard to the many other demands upon the strictly limited Dutch manpower available outside the Netherlands.

The Netherlands Military Administration during the planning stages formed a Civil Affairs component of the Military Mission accredited to S.H.A.E.F. by the Netherlands Government.

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As the Allied advance swept through northern France and into Belgium, the Netherlands Country Unit was converted into the Civil Affairs element of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Netherlands. On 10th September advanced parties of this and of the Netherlands Military Administration flew to Brussels, temporarily establishing themselves alongside the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium at 24A Boulevard du Régent. On 19th September the main bodies arrived and the two organizations moved to a students’ hostel on the Avenue Paul Reger. The G-5 component left a rear headquarters in London to maintain contact with the Netherlands Government. All was now ready for

entry into Holland. Meanwhile the rest of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was being formed in London. In mid-October advanced elements moved to Brussels, the main body, however, remaining in London, near to the Netherlands Government.

By 10th September the momentum of the Allied dash through France and Belgium had carried their forces to the borders of the Netherlands, but here opposition began to stiffen. The Germans would not easily relinquish their stranglehold on the ports of Ghent and Antwerp, or their sites for the launching of V2's against London. A week later a combined ground and airborne thrust of unprecedented scale was launched, striking deep into Dutch territory, with the object of seizing a crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem. If this could be gained it would then be possible to turn right-handed on the far side of the Rhine and to drive into the vitals of the Ruhr from the unprotected side. At the same time an advance northwards to the IJssel Meer, or Zuyder Zee, would cut off the strong German forces remaining in the low countries. The operation was given the code name of 'Market-Garden'. The first part, 'Operation Market', involved the dropping of airborne forces along the line Hasselt - Eindhoven - Nijmegen - Arnhem, to seize the bridges. This was to be the task of the Allied Airborne Corps. The second part, 'Operation Garden', was to follow immediately the first had been launched, and consisted of an armoured drive by XXX Corps to link up the airborne gains and exploit opportunities beyond the Rhine.

For the purpose of this operation the Allied Airborne Corps was provided with a Civil Affairs staff. At Corps Headquarters were four staff officers, one Dutch Liaison officer and five other ranks (two British, three Dutch) the whole party under a Colonel, Civil Affairs. Each of the three Divisions, making up the Corps, 1st British Airborne, 82nd U.S., and 101st U.S. Divisions, was provided with two Civil Affairs officers and one Dutch Liaison officer. The Civil Affairs officers with the divisions were of the nationality of the division to which they were attached.

On the afternoon of 17th September the airborne attack began. The Corps Civil Affairs party landed near Bruk six miles southeast of Nijmegen and close to the German frontier and the Reichswald forest. The 82nd U.S. Airborne Division landed not far away in the area Nijmegen - Grave - Groesbeek. The 1st British Airborne Division landed ten miles to the north on the western outskirts of Arnhem near Oosterbeek. The 101st U.S. Airborne Division landed twenty miles to the south-west along the Veghel-Eindhoven road. Another twenty miles separated this division from the foremost Allied ground forces. Each division was accompanied by its Civil Affairs party.

On 17th and 18th there was little that the Civil Affairs staffs could do except to make contact with local inhabitants and to help in the

fighting. By 19th, as the occupied areas expanded, it was possible for the staffs with 82nd and 101st Divisions to get into Eindhoven, parts of Nijmegen, and neighbouring villages. Even in these unexpected circumstances the majority of the inhabitants received the Allies with enthusiasm and gave all the help they could. New Burgomasters were appointed to replace those who had disappeared with the Germans. The administration and the police continued to function. The Resistance forces were cooperative. Most public services continued, somehow, in operation. The British Airborne Division near Arnhem encountered more violent resistance and was speedily involved in confused and bitter fighting. At no time did it securely occupy more than its compact dropping and landing zones. The Civil Affairs element was accordingly unable to take even such preliminary steps towards the re-establishment of the administration as at Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The Dutch Liaison officer with the division was afterwards reported to have been 'invaluable in negotiating medical assistance with the Germans' for civilian wounded. There was not much else he could do for them.

The most that had been hoped was that the Civil Affairs officers with the Airborne forces should apply first-aid measures until the spearhead detachments on the ground under the command of XXX Corps could arrive to re-establish administration. Clearly much good work was done in the areas of Eindhoven and Nijmegen. At Arnhem very little could be achieved. But it is probable that the most important passage in the later report of the Commander of this Airborne Corps Civil Affairs party was the observation that 'C.A. Staff on an Airborne H.Q. must be self contained and be capable of fighting as infantry on landing'. Half the Civil Affairs staffs attached to the three Airborne divisional headquarters were lost.

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Meanwhile, fifty miles away from the British Airborne Division, XXX Corps were driving up the road from Hasselt to Eindhoven. The attack was launched from the bridgehead over the Meuse-Escout Canal, a mile or two short of the Dutch frontier, as soon as it was known that the airborne attack had begun on the afternoon of 17th September. With the leading troops, the Guards Armoured Division, went four spearhead Civil Affairs detachments, Nos. 203, 214, 123 and 222, charged, respectively, with the task of re-establishing civil administration in Eindhoven, Nijmegen, Arnhem and Apeldoorn as these were reached. The leading forces reached Eindhoven by the afternoon of 18th September, and Nijmegen on 19th September. So far progress was up to expectations, and it was only another ten miles to Arnhem. But resistance was stiffening and the long, narrow, congested, and in-

securely held line of communication was throttling down the momentum of XXX Corps' advance. All attempts to reach Arnhem failed, and after five days of struggling no more could be done than to hold out a hand to pull back the few survivors of the British Airborne Division across the Rhine from the suburbs west of Arnhem. Arnhem and Apeldoorn could not be liberated until the spring of 1945: Nos. 213 and 222 C.A. Detachments, destined for these towns, were given other tasks.

Meanwhile No. 214 Detachment, destined for Nijmegen, had spent the night of the 16th at De Grootte Barrier, just short of the Meuse-Escout canal. They came under shell and machine-gun fire during the night. On 17th they advanced with the Guards Division, camping that night in woods about a mile short of Valkenswaard. They moved forward again during the night of the 18th, being bombed on the way, and camped in a field some three miles south of Nijmegen. On 20th, while the Germans in Nijmegen were still being mopped up, the detachment moved into the town and opened its headquarters at 10 a.m., relieving the airborne detachment of responsibility. Notices were posted, and local officials contacted. Very large stores of German supplies were found, including food, blankets and tools. On 21st and 22nd the detachment was busy with usual Civil Affairs problems. A number of German refugees from the battle area were housed and fed. At 10 a.m. on 23rd the detachment was relieved by No. 302 Detachment assigned for static duties in the Nijmegen area. No. 214 Detachment spent the next three days waiting to move farther forward. On 27th, 28th, and 30th members of the detachment crossed to the north of the River Waal and visited the villages of Lent, Reet and Bemmel. At Bemmel on the evening of the 30th they made contact with the Burgomaster, completed 'usual arrangements', and managed to evacuate seventy aged and sick persons. On the 29th the enemy were so active that they could not cross the river.

By this time the Provincial Detachment (No. 312) that was to assume command of the static detachments had also moved in, reaching Grave on 21st September. It was temporarily driven out on 22nd September by an enemy attack but the village was re-captured and the detachment returned the same day. It moved twice to neighbouring villages and then on 10th October established itself in Nijmegen. On 28th October it passed from the control of XXX Corps to Second Army.

As static administration was established, all the familiar problems arose, but there were particular features about this first penetration into Holland. Many arose from the configuration of the long narrow salient held by the Allied forces. The two large towns of Eindhoven and Nijmegen, and many of the villages also, were cut off from their normal sources of food. Nijmegen was under frequent shell fire. All

normal rail and water transport, upon which the area depended for its fuel and other supplies was at a standstill. Then the salient reached from the province of Noord Brabant into Gelderland: but neither of the provincial capitals had yet been uncovered. The Allies were entering Holland by the back door and the Netherlands Military Administration, lacking control of the administrative centres, was finding itself called upon to undertake direct administration, for which it was ill-prepared. Other problems arose because German territory was so near and because of the uncertainty whether the Allies could retain their hold on the ground gained. Many inhabitants of the salient were pro-German, or indifferent; some who would have liked to welcome the Allies feared to do so. And then there was the approach of the winter to think about when fine weather improvisation would no longer do and fuel and better rations would be essential. The need to evacuate civilians from the overcrowded salient was heightened by the arrival of refugees from the three fronts to the west, north, and east, on which fighting was taking place. Yet large scale evacuation was impossible for lack of transport. But it was feared that the Germans might flood the low-lying land north of Nijmegen, between the Waal and the Neder Rijn rivers, so evacuation of the civil population from this area was put in hand.

As it became clear that the XXX Corps drive to the north had been stopped an attempt was made to swing the axis of attack east and south-east and to strike from Nijmegen into the Reichswald across the German frontier. But once the initial momentum had been lost, the going was heavy and it was soon realised that the first need was to push out the sides of the salient – eastwards towards the Maas and the German frontier, north-westwards, in conjunction with First Canadian Army operations in western Holland, towards 'Hertogenbosch and Tilburg and the lower reaches of the Maas. Above all it was necessary to open the port of Antwerp. Without the use of this no further large scale advance could be undertaken.

* * *

Antwerp and its port had fallen into Allied hands on 4th September, but at the end of the month the Germans still held a line running through Merxem, a northern suburb of the city. They were in full occupation of the north bank of the Scheldt estuary, formed by the South Beveland peninsula and the island of Walcheren, defended from the sea only by its dykes. And although a part of the south bank was in Allied hands, the Germans still held an area opposite Walcheren that came, from its chief town, to be known as "the Breskens Pocket". Early in October First Canadian Army began operations both to force a way along the Beveland peninsula, and to reduce the 'Breskens

Pocket'. At the same time Bomber Command bombed and breached the dykes of Walcheren, letting in the sea to flood three quarters of the island. There followed some of the bitterest fighting of the war in north-west Europe and it was not until the last days of the month that Allied forces entered Breskens and reached the tip of the South Beveland peninsula. Not till the 2nd November did resistance cease entirely in the Breskens Pocket. Meanwhile on 31st October Walcheren had been attacked across the causeway from Beveland. The bridgehead seized was lost again the following day, but early that morning Allied landings were made both in Flushing Harbour, and near Westkapelle. Six days of violent fighting culminated in the surrender of the German forces remaining on Walcheren.

Refugees were expected to prove the main problem. It was difficult to estimate numbers. While most of the refugees would be Netherlanders, there was little Netherlands territory in which they could be accommodated, and there were difficulties about taking them to Belgium. It was decided to use, in the first place, the eastern part of South Zeeland, the liberated Dutch territory lying south of the Scheldt and east of the German pocket around Breskens. Plans were made to accommodate fifteen thousand refugees in this area, around Axel and Hulst, five thousand from the Breskens Pocket and ten thousand from South Beveland and Walcheren. If these numbers were exceeded two thousand more could be received south of Antwerp, five thousand in the area St. Nicholas – Termonde, and ten thousand in the area Bruges – Thielt – Thourout. This was all Belgian territory and it was hoped to accommodate Dutch refugees in South Zeeland and to send only Belgians to the other areas.

On 11th October some refugees from the Breskens Pocket began arriving at Terneuzen. Final dispositions for dealing with them were complete. General control of the operations was exercised by 3rd Canadian Division to which was allotted No. 225 Civil Affairs Detachment. Other detachments concerned were Nos. 201, 614 and 629. No. 225 Detachment was to be responsible for coordination. Commander Slot, of the Netherlands Military Administration, had been designated Military Governor of the Province of Zeeland and was responsible for detailed arrangements for reception of these refugees. The principal route to be used was through Maldegem, Eecloo, Lembeke, Ertvelde and De Katte to Sas Van Gent. Here a collection centre was to be established from which Dutch refugees would be passed on, after a few hours rest, to the reception area around Axel. Belgian refugees would be dispersed southwards into Belgium. By the 23rd October some 2,500 refugees had been received. By the 26th the number had risen to something between three thousand and four thousand, somewhat less than the estimated five thousand. A few days later fighting ceased in the Breskens Pocket and the flow abated.

By this time it was becoming clear that the operations in South Beveland on the other bank of the Scheldt were not likely to give rise to any large refugee problem. On 26th October 2,400 refugees from the peninsula had arrived at Sandvliet, but with military operations progressing satisfactorily these were all likely to be able to go back to their own homes in a few days. On 27th October No. 611 Detachment established its headquarters at Baarland. It moved on to Goes when this small town was reached on 30th October. Some three thousand refugees were found in addition to the normal population of ten thousand. That afternoon a last moment change in plans for refugees was made lest these should clog military movement across the estuary of the Scheldt. It had been intended to bring them back from Walcheren to Breskens in returning landing craft but it was now decided that all movement of refugees must be prohibited during the first forty-eight hours, if this could possibly be done without inhumanity, and that thereafter evacuation should if possible be eastwards to South Beveland and not southwards across the Scheldt. News of this change was brought to Commander Slot in Goes on the evening of 31st October. By the following day arrangements were in hand for the establishment of a reception centre and small emergency hospital at Lewedorp, for hospital facilities at Heinkenszand and Goes, and for the billeting of ten thousand refugees in Goes and in villages throughout the peninsula. Two improvised ambulances and six trucks were all the transport available. It was believed that there were at least thirty-five thousand persons in Middelburg on Walcheren, but it was not expected that more than ten thousand of these would wish to come over to Beveland.

Meanwhile landings had been effected on Walcheren, at Flushing and near Westkapelle. No. 612 Detachment was attached to the forces landing at Flushing and had arrived at Groede near Breskens on 31st October. Here also were two officers of the Netherlands Military Administration (N.M.A.), Major Bokhorst and Lt. Stouthamer.

As darkness fell on 1st November, the day of the landings, some 120 civilians made their way over from Flushing in returning landing craft, despite the orders against such movement. They were received by the Dutch authorities in Groede and sheltered in two churches for the night. The following morning the commander of No. 612 Detachment crossed to Flushing and, on seeing the plight of the inhabitants, obtained permission to evacuate civilians across the water. An entry in the detachment war diary for this day runs:

‘This proved to be difficult as fighting was still in progress. Civilians were accommodated in the old Arsenal, some distance from the beach and could not be marshalled on the beach because of sniping and general interference with military operations. The quick turn-round of landing craft had to be given

first priority but it was possible to evacuate approximately 150 including one baby in an incubator attended by four nuns.'

On 3rd November Detachment Headquarters was set up in Flushing: the main body was still at Groede. On 4th the Detachment Commander and Major Bokhorst brought over tins of milk and medical supplies. They appointed the local Resistance leader to act as Burgomaster. On the 6th large quantities of German food were discovered and taken over for civilians. Police were ordered to try to keep the forty thousand people concentrated in Middelburg from moving out until arrangements had been made for their movement and reception. On the 7th the Detachment Commander with the N.M.A. officer accompanied 155 Brigade Commander in an amphibious vehicle, a 'Buffalo', to Middelburg. Here contact was made with No. 611 Detachment which had set up its advanced headquarters in the town hall, after coming up the South Beveland peninsula. The town was found very little damaged, with sufficient water, food and medical supplies for immediate needs.

But conditions were rapidly deteriorating. The dykes had been breached at four points, one near Westkapelle, one near Veere, and two near Flushing. The breaches were quarter to half a mile broad. Sea water lapped the edges of the town. The population was concentrated in the few villages that were still above water. There was practically no electricity in Middelburg and no gas. The sewage system was out of action, there was a great shortage of drinking water. Cattle were without feed or water. Nevertheless there was obstinate opposition when the Civil Affairs and N.M.A. authorities decided that much of the population would have to be evacuated to South Beveland, if the rest were to maintain a tolerable standard of living, and if outbreaks of disease were to be avoided. Boats and amphibious vehicles were used and routes were reconnoitred to the isolated villages. Casualties were suffered from mines. Somehow in the course of the next six or eight weeks, about five thousand persons were moved to Middelburg and thence to South Beveland.

Meanwhile, minesweeping operations had begun in the Scheldt estuary on 4th November. On 28th, nearly three months after capture, the first Allied convoy entered Antwerp docks.

* * *

It had become clear by now that there would be no further rapid advances for some time to come. With such shallow penetration into Holland it was impracticable for the formations to pass responsibility for administration to the Netherlands Military Administration and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission. Responsibility remained, for the first six weeks, in

most respects on First Canadian and Second British Armies, 21 Group Army Civil Affairs staff, back in Brussels, being by now largely pre-occupied with plans and preparations for military government in Germany. From the end of October, except for the provision and administration of relief supplies, responsibility rested almost entirely upon First Canadian Army. The headquarters of the N.M.A. and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission in Brussels were caught in a somewhat unenviable predicament. With no country for the former to administer they found themselves largely restricted to planning activities and to giving the detachments under the formations occasional assistance. And in the event they were not even allowed to assume full responsibility for the most important planning that took place during the months of stalemate, the planning for the relief of western Holland.

In the field first aid measures were effected by the spearhead C.A. detachments and the static detachments that closely followed them in. To most of these, liaison officers of the N.M.A. had been attached. The detachments worked sometimes directly, sometimes through the agency of the local officials, more often through the agency both of these and of officers of the N.M.A. The N.M.A., however, had great difficulties to contend with and progress was at times disappointing.

In the first place, the N.M.A. was designed to operate at the national and provincial levels, through the existing staffs. The Germans, however, defended Holland, with great bitterness. Re-occupation was slow and restricted. In most cases the provincial capitals of territory re-occupied remained in enemy hands. Much of the local administrative staff had been removed by the Germans, or having worked with the Germans, felt it wiser to disappear, or were frankly not anxious to cooperate with the Allies. Denied the local administrative centres and their records, and also much of the staff through which they had planned to exercise control, the N.M.A. quickly found itself in difficulties.

A second handicap was a lack of equipment which, although more realistic planning might have done something to remove it, was fundamentally the result of general scarcities and over-riding military priorities.

A third difficulty also arose from the course taken by the battle. On 23rd September forward elements of the headquarters of both the Netherlands Military Administration and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission established themselves at Eindhoven in the Arnhem salient. The main parties, however, had to remain in Brussels to be near headquarters 21 Army Group and because there was no room for them in Holland. Not until late in April 1945, could they move to the Royal Military Academy at Breda. Co-ordination of the activities of the N.M.A. and of Civil Affairs needs in general, between the First and Second Army areas, could be effected only by N.M.A. headquarters approached

through the S.H.A.E.F. Mission. In Brussels, this twin organization was a long way from the field of operation. The importance of an early transfer into Holland, nearer to its responsibilities, was recognized and repeatedly urged by both the formation Civil Affairs staffs and the N.M.A. but the pouring of military forces and material into the narrow strip of liberated territory rendered this extremely difficult.

A fourth difficulty was caused by Ministerial interference with the N.M.A. It was not the exercise in regular fashion of control by the London Government, as such, that made the trouble. A few Ministers of the Government insisted, against the advice of the Prime Minister and of the Head of the Military Administration, upon returning to the liberated strip of Holland. Here they were without authority, for this had been vested in the Military Administration, and without resources. There was little they could do but listen to complaints, criticise the Military Administration, and undermine its position. They missed few opportunities of doing these things.

A fifth difficulty was the usurpation of authority in the early stages by the Forces of the Interior, that is to say, by the Resistance, and their disinclination to stand down on the arrival of the N.M.A. The matter came to a head over the right to arrest persons suspected of collaboration. The Forces of the Interior made many such arrests as the Germans withdrew and refused to discontinue their habits as the Military Administration arrived. It took several months to curb the extravagances of the Resistance and a very large number of persons were arrested, many of them innocent, and detained in very harsh conditions. In January 1945 the Head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission drew attention to the fact that there were no less than fifteen thousand persons in detention and that little progress was being made with scrutiny of their cases. When the rest of Holland was liberated, more persons were arrested and by the end of June 1945 it was believed that over sixty thousand suspected collaborators were under detention. The officiousness of the Resistance accounted for a large part of this number. But partly also the Dutch Government and Military Administration would appear to have cast their net too wide.

A sixth and final handicap was that the N.M.A. encountered suspicion and frequently outright hostility from the people of Holland. Fundamentally this resulted from a lack of sympathy that was almost inevitable between those who had stayed in Holland during the German occupation and those who had not. The former, feeling they had borne the hardships of occupation, moral and physical, a little jealous, perhaps, of those who had had the initiative and the opportunity to escape, resented the return, in positions of authority, of those who had spent the war in freedom and comparative comfort. The latter, denied the experience of the occupation, found it hard to sense changes of outlook. The former, at least those who had taken part in the

Resistance, leant politically towards Socialism or even Communism. The latter, many of whom were drawn from the ranks of trade or industry, tended towards Conservatism. And then, those who had suffered years of German tyranny resented the dictatorial powers conferred upon the N.M.A. by the state of siege. The local authorities superseded by, or subordinated to, the N.M.A., had their particular grounds for resentment. The lawful government might have been able to surmount these handicaps, for fundamentally it enjoyed much loyalty and support. But the public found it hard to extend its tolerance to a third party, the N.M.A., the need for whose existence was in any case far from clear to them. And unfortunately many of the N.M.A. staff, recruited inevitably from a narrow field, enjoyed neither the experience nor the tact to make them acceptable to the people of the Netherlands. Accusations of favouritism, of inefficiency, of excessive bureaucracy, were continually being levelled against the 'Engelandvaarder'. With a few notable exceptions, it was probably the best of the Dutch leaders who had remained in Holland, the second best who went to England. In the face of these handicaps the N.M.A. was unable at first to achieve the success that had been hoped for it. It is clear that there was some disappointment with its performance in 21 Army Group circles. The difficulties under which the N.M.A. laboured were perhaps not sufficiently recognized, but it seems that while its members were good planners they were not quick improvisers and took time to adjust themselves to the unexpected situation.

Nevertheless, much was done, during the five months' stalemate, to deal with the normal but varied Civil Affairs problems with which we have become familiar in the course of earlier chapters. As elsewhere, the chief tasks were the distribution of relief supplies, the stimulation of coal production, and the revival of transport. Except for the particular case of the feeding of what came to be known as the B2 Area, which is dealt with later in the present chapter, these matters are recounted in separate chapters.¹ At the beginning of February 1945 Major-General J. K. Edwards was relieved as head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission by Major-General J. G. W. Clark.

It had been expected that on entry into Holland the main towns would be found largely destroyed and that there would in consequence be an immediate refugee problem of great magnitude. As the towns of Tilburg, Breda and Roosendaal were freed it was found that they had suffered little damage. The large scale movement of refugees never took place. A German concentration camp was discovered empty at Vught. It was intended by the Dutch to use this for refugees from 'sHertogenbosch. Before this could be done, however, Germans evacuated for military reasons from their villages in the Aachen area

¹ cf. Ch. XVII., XXII., XXIII.

were put into the camp. Dutch prisoners suspected of collaboration were also interned there. The number of the former category had risen by March 1945 to 6,644. Approximately the same number of collaborators were ultimately detained in the camp. The presence of German internees under 21 Army Group control on Dutch territory raised awkward questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction.¹ Repeated attempts by First Canadian Army to get Vught camp released for the accommodation of troops were unsuccessful.

* * *

When it had become clear that the Germans would not withdraw from the Netherlands in the autumn of 1944, revised plans had to be prepared for the establishment of administration in Holland. For these purposes the country was divided into four areas, A, B1, B2, and C. Area A was roughly speaking, that already liberated. Of the rest it had long been clear that the major Civil Affairs task in the Netherlands was likely to be the relief of the provinces of north and south Holland and the western part of Utrecht – what was now known as the B2 area. This most densely populated part of the Netherlands – itself one of the most populous countries of Europe – was an industrial and trading area which included the three great cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague. Even in normal conditions it required to import the greater part of its food supplies – mostly from the agricultural country of the north-east Netherlands. By 1944 the diet of the whole of the Netherlands had deteriorated to a point at which the ration yielded no more than 1,600 calories a day for the normal consumer. In the B2 area conditions were worse. When Operation Market Garden was launched and hope flared up for the early liberation of the whole of the Netherlands, appeals were broadcast to the Dutch underground movement by the Netherlands Government in London as a result of which transport workers throughout the country ceased to work, in order to embarrass German movements. These strikes, a remarkable example of loyalty, solidarity and discipline, continued until liberation, which, in the event, did not take place for another nine months. The strikes still further cut down imports of food for the B2 area. The Germans, understandably, refused to import supplies to relieve a situation resulting, in part at least, from strikes directed against themselves. But even this was not the end of the trouble. Virtually the whole of the B2 area lay below the level of the sea. It was quite possible for the Germans to let in the waters and submerge almost the whole tract; and no one doubted that they would do so, if it suited them.

When hope of ejecting the Germans during 1944 faded it had to be

¹ cf. Ch. XXI.

assumed that the conditions of life for the civil population of the B2 area, bad as they already were, would have still further deteriorated before help could be brought to them. The Netherlands Government pressed upon the United Kingdom Government the desperate need for food and medical supplies. They were themselves making provision for the time when operations had ended but urged that the fullest possible planning and preparation should be undertaken for the immediate relief of the area while operations were still in progress. The U.K. and U.S. Governments acknowledged the responsibility of their commanders for such planning which, in broad outline, a War Office committee had in fact already begun in London. 21 Army Group began to collect a reserve of 30,000 tons of relief supplies in the area of Oss and 'sHertogenbosch. S.H.A.E.F. brought some 1,700 three-ton lorries from the U.K. to build up this reserve and for later movement of supplies into the B2 area. If the Germans flooded the B2 area it might become necessary to rescue large numbers of refugees from the dunes, which alone would remain above water. Plans were made for the movement of three hundred thousand to the U.K.

Early in January 21 Army Group established a special line of communication organization, the West Holland District Headquarters, in Brussels but no directive was issued to this headquarters until February and no planning began until March. Reports received during these months from within Holland revealed a further disastrous deterioration in the situation. Official rations were said now to be down to six hundred calories a day – in the great cities they were even less. The Netherlands Government in London repeatedly pleaded with all the insistence it could command for an early liberation of the rest of Holland. In March the Netherlands Prime Minister wrote to Mr. Churchill:

'We have handed over to the allies everything we had; our ships, our men, our navy, even our supplies, are no longer at our disposal and we are obliged to take a passive role and wait until S.H.A.E.F. acts. Nevertheless while millions are starving, the question will sooner or later be asked; has the Netherland Government done everything that it could to help. If it appears that more could have been done and that a large number of loyal Dutchmen, who held firm to the last moment, met their deaths because we were insufficiently prepared or our plans too clumsy for rapid operation, such a revelation will come not only as a shock to public opinion, but as a scandal, the responsibility for which will be laid at the door not only of the Dutch Government, but also I fear, of the British Government.'


But the main object of the Allies was to defeat Germany and the military factors were clear. Liberation of Holland could be undertaken only at the expense of the main operations by the western Allies to

THE "B2 AREA" HOLLAND 1945



Legend

- Boundary of "B2 Area".....
- Land and Sea routes for introduction of relief supplies to "B2 Area".....
- Air dropped relief supplies for "B2 Area".....
- International Boundary



defeat Germany. But by this time Russian advances in the east had left Germany little hope. The Dutch, whose countrymen were starving, may well have wondered whether the western Allies were fighting to defeat the Germans or to forestall the Russians. As against this, operations to liberate the rest of Holland were likely to be so difficult, and the resultant destruction so great, that liberation was likely to be effected more quickly and with less damage by concentrating on the defeat of the main German forces covering Germany.

The pleas of the Netherlands Government, however, revealed the absence of detailed planning and the fact that all but some 6,000 tons of the stock of relief supplies collected for the B2 area had been diverted to the urgent needs of Belgium as a result of the German offensive in the Ardennes. Urgency was instilled into all preparations. Stocks of relief supplies were built up again. The possibility was considered of dropping relief from the air into occupied Holland in advance of liberation.

Towards the end of March the West Holland District was renamed Netherlands District. The detailed plans now prepared at this headquarters covered three methods of entry: by road from the east through Arnhem, by barge along inland waters to Rotterdam, and by sea from Belgium. In addition there would be air supply in the early stages and direct shipment from the United Kingdom when channels had been swept clear of mines. As soon as possible four Main Supply Depots were to be established at Rotterdam, the Hague, Amsterdam and Utrecht which would be responsible for stocking thirteen Civil Distribution Points. These would supply the ingredients for soup and the necessary fuel to Kitchen Centres; uncooked food and other commodities would be sent to Issue Points. Ninety-five Kitchen Centres were believed to be already in existence; it was planned to treble the number of these. It was planned to set up 972 Issue Points, 507 in towns, 465 in the country. In this way provision was to be made for the whole of the population of the B2 area, which was estimated to number 3,664,500. Responsibility for establishing and operating the Main Supply Depots, and for the movement of relief supplies through these as far as the Civil Distribution Points was to rest upon the normal Army Services. Civil Affairs would call forward supplies and receive them at the Civil Distribution Points. From here onwards responsibility was to lie upon the Netherlands Military Administration. In the early stages military assistance would be given in guarding and handling relief supplies. As soon as possible, however, the Netherlands Military Administration was to assume responsibility for discharging these functions through police, civil labour, and local transport.

While these preparations were being made for the relief of the population in general, a British - American - Dutch nutrition committee was appointed by S.H.A.E.F. to make plans for dealing with

cases of acute starvation. Fifty-one nutrition teams were recruited by the Netherlands Military Administration. Each of these consisted of one doctor, six nurses, and five welfare workers, and each was provided with an ambulance and other transport. On 26th February, it was decided to manufacture in the U.K. materials and apparatus for both oral and intravenous administration of pre-digested proteins, a form of treatment never previously tried on such a scale, to twenty thousand moribund cases. The assumed number to be cared for was later raised to seventy thousand. In view of the remarkable improvisation and co-operation that went into overcoming problems of manufacture so that requirements were delivered in full by the time the B2 area could be entered, it is disappointing that results eventually achieved by this particular treatment fell short of expectations.

Little or no direct administrative responsibility was to be laid upon Civil Affairs: the part projected for it in this operation was to supervise and assist with advice and liaison. For this task No. 7 Civil Affairs Group, consisting of thirty-six Civil Affairs detachments, was placed under the command of Netherlands District. It was planned to deploy eight of these detachments to Amsterdam, and seven each to Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Of the remaining seven, six were Relief Detachments and one was to be held in District Reserve.

* * *

Early in April news reaching the Netherlands government from occupied Holland spoke of a further rapid deterioration in the situation: there would be no food left for civilians after 28th April. More particularly on 14th April news was received of conferences held within occupied Holland between the Reichskommissar and Dutch representatives. The Reichskommissar's orders, he said at these, were to continue resistance and to demolish and inundate as might be necessary for this purpose. He was anxious to avoid inflicting this catastrophic and futile damage but so long as Germany continued fighting and so long as he was in communication with his Government there could be no question of surrender or of any formal truce. But he would be willing to enter into an informal truce with the Allies provided this could be done without the knowledge of his Government. If the Allies would halt their advance, the Germans would cease executions and Gestapo activity, would accord decent treatment to political prisoners, and would help open the Port of Rotterdam for the entry of food and coal.

The Allied Governments authorized the Supreme Commander on 24th April to negotiate a truce on these lines provided this did not prejudice the principle of ultimate unconditional surrender of the German forces involved. He was also instructed to begin the dropping

of relief supplies at once. That night, the Supreme Commander began reiterated broadcasts of an announcement that supplies would be dropped from the air; the Germans were warned not to interfere and the Dutch to prepare for reception. The Supreme Commander sent a message at the same time through underground channels, in view of the need for secrecy, to Dr. Seyss Inquart, the Reichskommissar, calling for an immediate meeting with him and the German military and naval commanders in the Netherlands to discuss the negotiation of a truce. He repeated his intention to drop supplies for the civil population and said that Allied forces advancing into the Netherlands would halt where they stood and abstain from any further bombing. On 25th the German Commander-in-Chief signalled his agreement to the proposals for introducing food but demurred to air dropping, for tactical reasons, and because both he and the Dutch representatives considered it impossible to prevent drops from getting into the wrong hands. On 27th a reply was received agreeing to a meeting with representatives of the Supreme Commander. At 8 a.m. on 28th fighting ceased on this front.

A preliminary meeting took place that day at a school in Achterveld.¹ On the following day the first dropping of supplies took place, a total of 500 tons being distributed fairly evenly between Valkenburg, Duindigt, Ypenburg, and Waalhaven. A second meeting on 30th held at Wageningen, was attended by the Reichskommissar, Dr. Seyss Inquart, accompanied by Naval, Army, and Air Force officers, and civilian experts. The Allied delegation was headed by General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, and included Major-General de Guingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, Major-General Galloway, Commander of Netherlands District, Major-General Strong of S.H.A.E.F., Major-General Suslaparoff representing the Russians, and Prince Bernhard, Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands forces. The meeting considered the general proposals of the Allies for introducing food to Holland and then adjourned, appointing committees to work out the details. There followed a private meeting between Generals Bedell Smith, Strong, de Guingand, and Suslasparoff, and Reichskommissar Seyss Inquart and two civil members of his party. A strenuous, but unsuccessful, attempt was made to persuade the latter to agree to a surrender of the German forces in Holland. The Reichskommissar, though visibly moved, was adamant that so long as the German authorities in Holland were in touch with their superiors outside, no formal truce or surrender could be contemplated.²

Immediately the plans for introducing food to the B2 area were put into effect. Air drops continued for ten days delivering about 1,000

¹ De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, pp. 446-450.

² De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, pp. 450-452.

tons each day. On 2nd May a convoy of lorries set out from Arnhem along the lower road leading to Utrecht and met the Germans at Rhenen. Here the supplies were unloaded and handed over to the Dutch food organization, together with lorries and the necessary motor fuel for movement into the interior. The head of this organization, Mr. Louwes, was permitted to come over to the Allies in order to concert arrangements. Further convoys made the journey to Rhenen on 3rd and 4th May. In all, 5,500 tons were brought in by road before the German capitulation. Four members of the nutrition committee were allowed through the lines on 5th May and entered into negotiations with the Germans for the admission of nutrition teams.

On 5th May the first ships, two coasters, reached Holland with supplies by sea.¹ The Colonel in charge of Civil Affairs supply at 21 Army Group visited Rotterdam by air to satisfy himself that the Germans were keeping their part of the bargain. He could not land but flew over at mast height. The whole dock area was cordoned off by military but the unloading and removal to sheds was under civilian supervision, as agreed. On 8th four more coasters arrived. Thereafter it was planned that nine coasters and one collier should arrive through every six-day period, bringing 11,700 tons of relief supplies and 2,500 tons of coal. Owing to acoustic mines in the waterway near Dordrecht it was not until 9th May that inland water barges could set out from Nijmegen and Arnhem down the Lower Rhine.

At a meeting on 4th May attended by Mr. Louwes and representatives of Netherlands District and the Netherlands Military Administration it was agreed that the Louwes food organization should establish a depot at Rhenen for the receipt of supplies coming in by road and another at Rotterdam for supplies by sea and inland water. It would undertake distribution within the occupied B2 area. The Netherlands Military Administration agreed to recognize, and to integrate its own food organization with the Louwes organization on liberation of the B2 area. It accordingly became necessary to modify slightly the depot organization planned for introduction after liberation. Netherlands District would establish one Base Supply Depot in Rotterdam and one Main Supply Depot at Utrecht. The combined Netherlands authorities would set up and operate two Main Supply Depots, at Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Civil Distribution Points and the rest of the relief organization would be formed on the lines already planned. Supplies brought in by sea or inland water would be handed over by the military authorities to the Netherlands organization, not at the Civil Distribution Points, but on delivery from the Base Supply Depot to the Main Supply Depot at Rotterdam. Supplies brought in by road, a rapidly decreasing quantity, would be delivered to the

¹ De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, p. 453.

Netherlands authorities at Utrecht on delivery from the Main Supply Depot.

When fourteen days reserve stocks were in the country and as soon as sufficient civilian transport was available all supplies would be handed over by Netherlands District at Rotterdam and the Netherlands authorities would assume full responsibility for distribution on normal civil lines.

* * *

At 8 o'clock on the morning of 5th May the German forces capitulated. Immediately steps were taken to put these revised relief plans into effect. Immediately, also, nutrition teams were hurried forward. By the end of the month all fifty-one of these were at work. On 8th May the Civil Affairs element of Netherlands District set up an advanced headquarters at Zeist on the western edge of the wooded heath-land held by the Germans. On 14th May Netherlands District, hitherto responsible only for the movement of relief supplies in conjunction with I Canadian Corps, took over full responsibility for Civil Affairs from I Canadian Corps for the whole of the B2 area. The C.A. detachments deployed came under its control.

On the same day an advanced party of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Netherlands moved from its main headquarters at Breda to the Hague. Its contacts there were with the representatives of the N.M.A., since it was to be another four weeks before the Dutch Government moved from London to the Hague.

The Allied forces were greeted with wild enthusiasm which for a time concealed the desperate straits to which the people had been reduced. The head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission reported:

‘1. On first appearances the condition of the people has proved unfortunately most deceptive. On the advent of Allied troops, the soldiers were greeted with cheers and bunting, and made their progress through a smiling countryside. But it was deceptive because men and women who are slowly dying in their beds of starvation unfortunately cannot walk gaily about the streets waving flags.

2. It is an empty country, inhabited by a hungry, and in the towns, a semi-starved population. It is no exaggeration to state that, had liberation been delayed for another ten days or so, many thousands of people would surely have died of hunger.

3. The existing food supplies in the area are practically nil. A day's ration consists of a very small cup of nasty 'ersatz' soup, a very small piece of an unappetising and sticky substance called bread, and a wafer of sugar beet. It is hardly surprising that a large proportion of the population, who were unable to buy on the black market, have lost on an average 45 pounds in weight.

4. The people, especially those in the big towns, are exhausted both physically and mentally. Generally speaking, they suffer from great weakness and the men are quite unable to perform a full day's work. It is reliably estimated that certainly 50% of the population are lousy. Figures were given to me by the Burgomaster of Amsterdam which showed that the death rate per week since January has been nearly always double that of the corresponding week last year and in some cases three or four times as great. The Relief Teams sent in by the British Red Cross consider that the conditions in Rotterdam are even worse than those in Amsterdam. It is also reliably estimated that more young children are dying per month *now* than per year in 1942.

Experiments have been conducted during the past week to find the general condition of the populace in the big towns. These yielded the following results:

Out of 100 people taken at random from the streets (and these are the people that are seen walking about every day and does not include those that are so weak that they remain indoors) 15% showed signs of bad malnutrition, 50% were definitely under-nourished and 35% were more or less normal. It is of interest to note that there were five times as many males suffering from starvation as females.

5. The black market flourishes to an alarming degree. Alarming because many middle class workers, in order to live, sold practically all their worldly goods to obtain money to buy "black". There was also a considerable traffic in coupon books which were bought by the rich from the poor with obvious results. No one was allowed by the Germans to draw from the banks more than 80 guilders a month. As it was essential to obtain more in order to deal in the black market, naturally permanent belongings had to be sold.

6. There is an absolute lack of the necessities of life. There is no coal, consequently no light; no soap, and nobody has had any new clothes for five years. In many of the big towns there is no water pressure which means that the sanitary arrangements are woefully deficient.'

Sir Jack Drummond, one of the members of the nutrition committee who first entered the B2 area said:

'Reports of a large number of deaths in the western Dutch towns from starvation are quite correct. We saw hundreds of people of both sexes and all ages as emaciated from starvation as any we had seen at Belsen concentration camp.'¹

Although relief supplies had been coming in to western Holland since the 2nd May, by road, air and sea, there was scarcely any transport for their internal distribution and it was not until 10th May that they

¹ *The Times*, 28 May, 1945.

began reaching the public in significant amounts. This was a frustrating and dangerous time-lag.

During the second half of May the arrangements for the relief of the inhabitants of the B2 area began to work more smoothly and there was an improvement in the scale of the rations, an improvement that was to continue slowly but without serious setback. The long planning and preparation was beginning to yield fruit. By now, however, another need was making itself felt with overwhelming insistence – the need for coal. Steps taken to deal with this are recounted in a separate chapter.¹

A major pre-occupation at this time, and for months before, was the repair of the Walcheren dykes which had been broken through by the Royal Air Force in October 1944. Of the island's 47,000 acres, seventy five or eighty per cent were inundated as a result and little or nothing could be done to restore the situation during the winter of 1944-45. By February 1945 the four main breaches had been much widened by the action of the sea and it was clear that only a very determined effort could hope to close the gaps before the winter of 1945-46. Plans for repair were initiated in December 1944 and by January materials and equipment were being brought to Walcheren by 21 Army Group and handed over to the civil authorities. Much of this material had to be specially procured by the Dutch Government from the U.K. or the U.S., since S.H.A.E.F. resources were unable to meet the demands. By March and April 1945, vessels for repair operations were arriving from England and repair materials were appearing at the breaches. Progress in the following two months was disappointing, however. In June and July, with the conclusion of hostilities, more liberal aid could be given from Army resources. By the middle of July, six dredgers had reached Walcheren, together with other floating equipment. A Dutch Field Company had been sent to aid with the work and prisoners of war were being employed to clear mines from the neighbourhood of the breaches. British technical troops also assisted. The race against the winter was won by the narrowest of margins with the closing of the three most important gaps a year after the breaching of the dykes.

Meanwhile, changes in the Civil Affairs organization had been taking place. At the beginning of June the main headquarters of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission moved from Breda to the Hague and established itself in Carl van Bylandtlaan. At the same time the Civil Affairs element of Netherlands District moved from Zeist to the Hague. On arrival parts of this element were integrated with the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, while parts handed over their responsibilities to the Mission and set off for Germany. The Mission now assumed a dual re-

¹ cf. Ch. XXII.

assumed that the conditions of life for the civil population of the B2 area, bad as they already were, would have still further deteriorated before help could be brought to them. The Netherlands Government pressed upon the United Kingdom Government the desperate need for food and medical supplies. They were themselves making provision for the time when operations had ended but urged that the fullest possible planning and preparation should be undertaken for the immediate relief of the area while operations were still in progress. The U.K. and U.S. Governments acknowledged the responsibility of their commanders for such planning which, in broad outline, a War Office committee had in fact already begun in London. 21 Army Group began to collect a reserve of 30,000 tons of relief supplies in the area of Oss and 'sHertogenbosch. S.H.A.E.F. brought some 1,700 three-ton lorries from the U.K. to build up this reserve and for later movement of supplies into the B2 area. If the Germans flooded the B2 area it might become necessary to rescue large numbers of refugees from the dunes, which alone would remain above water. Plans were made for the movement of three hundred thousand to the U.K.

Early in January 21 Army Group established a special line of communication organization, the West Holland District Headquarters, in Brussels but no directive was issued to this headquarters until February and no planning began until March. Reports received during these months from within Holland revealed a further disastrous deterioration in the situation. Official rations were said now to be down to six hundred calories a day – in the great cities they were even less. The Netherlands Government in London repeatedly pleaded with all the insistence it could command for an early liberation of the rest of Holland. In March the Netherlands Prime Minister wrote to Mr. Churchill:

'We have handed over to the allies everything we had; our ships, our men, our navy, even our supplies, are no longer at our disposal and we are obliged to take a passive role and wait until S.H.A.E.F. acts. Nevertheless while millions are starving, the question will sooner or later be asked; has the Netherland Government done everything that it could to help. If it appears that more could have been done and that a large number of loyal Dutchmen, who held firm to the last moment, met their deaths because we were insufficiently prepared or our plans too clumsy for rapid operation, such a revelation will come not only as a shock to public opinion, but as a scandal, the responsibility for which will be laid at the door not only of the Dutch Government, but also I fear, of the British Government.'

But the main object of the Allies was to defeat Germany and the military factors were clear. Liberation of Holland could be undertaken only at the expense of the main operations by the western Allies to

THE "B2 AREA" HOLLAND 1945




Legend

Boundary of "B2 Area".....

Land and Sea routes for introduction of relief supplies to "B2 Area".....

Air dropped relief supplies for "B2 Area".....

International Boundary - - - - -



defeat Germany. But by this time Russian advances in the east had left Germany little hope. The Dutch, whose countrymen were starving, may well have wondered whether the western Allies were fighting to defeat the Germans or to forestall the Russians. As against this, operations to liberate the rest of Holland were likely to be so difficult, and the resultant destruction so great, that liberation was likely to be effected more quickly and with less damage by concentrating on the defeat of the main German forces covering Germany.

The pleas of the Netherlands Government, however, revealed the absence of detailed planning and the fact that all but some 6,000 tons of the stock of relief supplies collected for the B2 area had been diverted to the urgent needs of Belgium as a result of the German offensive in the Ardennes. Urgency was instilled into all preparations. Stocks of relief supplies were built up again. The possibility was considered of dropping relief from the air into occupied Holland in advance of liberation.

Towards the end of March the West Holland District was renamed Netherlands District. The detailed plans now prepared at this headquarters covered three methods of entry: by road from the east through Arnhem, by barge along inland waters to Rotterdam, and by sea from Belgium. In addition there would be air supply in the early stages and direct shipment from the United Kingdom when channels had been swept clear of mines. As soon as possible four Main Supply Depots were to be established at Rotterdam, the Hague, Amsterdam and Utrecht which would be responsible for stocking thirteen Civil Distribution Points. These would supply the ingredients for soup and the necessary fuel to Kitchen Centres; uncooked food and other commodities would be sent to Issue Points. Ninety-five Kitchen Centres were believed to be already in existence; it was planned to treble the number of these. It was planned to set up 972 Issue Points, 507 in towns, 465 in the country. In this way provision was to be made for the whole of the population of the B2 area, which was estimated to number 3,664,500. Responsibility for establishing and operating the Main Supply Depots, and for the movement of relief supplies through these as far as the Civil Distribution Points was to rest upon the normal Army Services. Civil Affairs would call forward supplies and receive them at the Civil Distribution Points. From here onwards responsibility was to lie upon the Netherlands Military Administration. In the early stages military assistance would be given in guarding and handling relief supplies. As soon as possible, however, the Netherlands Military Administration was to assume responsibility for discharging these functions through police, civil labour, and local transport.

While these preparations were being made for the relief of the population in general, a British - American - Dutch nutrition committee was appointed by S.H.A.E.F. to make plans for dealing with

cases of acute starvation. Fifty-one nutrition teams were recruited by the Netherlands Military Administration. Each of these consisted of one doctor, six nurses, and five welfare workers, and each was provided with an ambulance and other transport. On 26th February, it was decided to manufacture in the U.K. materials and apparatus for both oral and intravenous administration of pre-digested proteins, a form of treatment never previously tried on such a scale, to twenty thousand moribund cases. The assumed number to be cared for was later raised to seventy thousand. In view of the remarkable improvisation and co-operation that went into overcoming problems of manufacture so that requirements were delivered in full by the time the B2 area could be entered, it is disappointing that results eventually achieved by this particular treatment fell short of expectations.

Little or no direct administrative responsibility was to be laid upon Civil Affairs: the part projected for it in this operation was to supervise and assist with advice and liaison. For this task No. 7 Civil Affairs Group, consisting of thirty-six Civil Affairs detachments, was placed under the command of Netherlands District. It was planned to deploy eight of these detachments to Amsterdam, and seven each to Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Of the remaining seven, six were Relief Detachments and one was to be held in District Reserve.

* * *

Early in April news reaching the Netherlands government from occupied Holland spoke of a further rapid deterioration in the situation: there would be no food left for civilians after 28th April. More particularly on 14th April news was received of conferences held within occupied Holland between the Reichskommissar and Dutch representatives. The Reichskommissar's orders, he said at these, were to continue resistance and to demolish and inundate as might be necessary for this purpose. He was anxious to avoid inflicting this catastrophic and futile damage but so long as Germany continued fighting and so long as he was in communication with his Government there could be no question of surrender or of any formal truce. But he would be willing to enter into an informal truce with the Allies provided this could be done without the knowledge of his Government. If the Allies would halt their advance, the Germans would cease executions and Gestapo activity, would accord decent treatment to political prisoners, and would help open the Port of Rotterdam for the entry of food and coal.

The Allied Governments authorized the Supreme Commander on 24th April to negotiate a truce on these lines provided this did not prejudice the principle of ultimate unconditional surrender of the German forces involved. He was also instructed to begin the dropping

of relief supplies at once. That night, the Supreme Commander began reiterated broadcasts of an announcement that supplies would be dropped from the air; the Germans were warned not to interfere and the Dutch to prepare for reception. The Supreme Commander sent a message at the same time through underground channels, in view of the need for secrecy, to Dr. Seyss Inquart, the Reichskommissar, calling for an immediate meeting with him and the German military and naval commanders in the Netherlands to discuss the negotiation of a truce. He repeated his intention to drop supplies for the civil population and said that Allied forces advancing into the Netherlands would halt where they stood and abstain from any further bombing. On 25th the German Commander-in-Chief signalled his agreement to the proposals for introducing food but demurred to air dropping, for tactical reasons, and because both he and the Dutch representatives considered it impossible to prevent drops from getting into the wrong hands. On 27th a reply was received agreeing to a meeting with representatives of the Supreme Commander. At 8 a.m. on 28th fighting ceased on this front.

A preliminary meeting took place that day at a school in Achterveld.¹ On the following day the first dropping of supplies took place, a total of 500 tons being distributed fairly evenly between Valkenburg, Duindigt, Ypenburg, and Waalhaven. A second meeting on 30th held at Wageningen, was attended by the Reichskommissar, Dr. Seyss Inquart, accompanied by Naval, Army, and Air Force officers, and civilian experts. The Allied delegation was headed by General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, and included Major-General de Guingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, Major-General Galloway, Commander of Netherlands District, Major-General Strong of S.H.A.E.F., Major-General Suslaparoff representing the Russians, and Prince Bernhard, Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands forces. The meeting considered the general proposals of the Allies for introducing food to Holland and then adjourned, appointing committees to work out the details. There followed a private meeting between Generals Bedell Smith, Strong, de Guingand, and Suslasparoff, and Reichskommissar Seyss Inquart and two civil members of his party. A strenuous, but unsuccessful, attempt was made to persuade the latter to agree to a surrender of the German forces in Holland. The Reichskommissar, though visibly moved, was adamant that so long as the German authorities in Holland were in touch with their superiors outside, no formal truce or surrender could be contemplated.²

Immediately the plans for introducing food to the B2 area were put into effect. Air drops continued for ten days delivering about 1,000

¹ De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, pp. 446-450.

² De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, pp. 450-452.

tons each day. On 2nd May a convoy of lorries set out from Arnhem along the lower road leading to Utrecht and met the Germans at Rhenen. Here the supplies were unloaded and handed over to the Dutch food organization, together with lorries and the necessary motor fuel for movement into the interior. The head of this organization, Mr. Louwes, was permitted to come over to the Allies in order to concert arrangements. Further convoys made the journey to Rhenen on 3rd and 4th May. In all, 5,500 tons were brought in by road before the German capitulation. Four members of the nutrition committee were allowed through the lines on 5th May and entered into negotiations with the Germans for the admission of nutrition teams.

On 5th May the first ships, two coasters, reached Holland with supplies by sea.¹ The Colonel in charge of Civil Affairs supply at 21 Army Group visited Rotterdam by air to satisfy himself that the Germans were keeping their part of the bargain. He could not land but flew over at mast height. The whole dock area was cordoned off by military but the unloading and removal to sheds was under civilian supervision, as agreed. On 8th four more coasters arrived. Thereafter it was planned that nine coasters and one collier should arrive through every six-day period, bringing 11,700 tons of relief supplies and 2,500 tons of coal. Owing to acoustic mines in the waterway near Dordrecht it was not until 9th May that inland water barges could set out from Nijmegen and Arnhem down the Lower Rhine.

At a meeting on 4th May attended by Mr. Louwes and representatives of Netherlands District and the Netherlands Military Administration it was agreed that the Louwes food organization should establish a depot at Rhenen for the receipt of supplies coming in by road and another at Rotterdam for supplies by sea and inland water. It would undertake distribution within the occupied B2 area. The Netherlands Military Administration agreed to recognize, and to integrate its own food organization with the Louwes organization on liberation of the B2 area. It accordingly became necessary to modify slightly the depot organization planned for introduction after liberation. Netherlands District would establish one Base Supply Depot in Rotterdam and one Main Supply Depot at Utrecht. The combined Netherlands authorities would set up and operate two Main Supply Depots, at Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Civil Distribution Points and the rest of the relief organization would be formed on the lines already planned. Supplies brought in by sea or inland water would be handed over by the military authorities to the Netherlands organization, not at the Civil Distribution Points, but on delivery from the Base Supply Depot to the Main Supply Depot at Rotterdam. Supplies brought in by road, a rapidly decreasing quantity, would be delivered to the

¹ De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, London, 1947, p. 453.

Netherlands authorities at Utrecht on delivery from the Main Supply Depot.

When fourteen days reserve stocks were in the country and as soon as sufficient civilian transport was available all supplies would be handed over by Netherlands District at Rotterdam and the Netherlands authorities would assume full responsibility for distribution on normal civil lines.

* * *

At 8 o'clock on the morning of 5th May the German forces capitulated. Immediately steps were taken to put these revised relief plans into effect. Immediately, also, nutrition teams were hurried forward. By the end of the month all fifty-one of these were at work. On 8th May the Civil Affairs element of Netherlands District set up an advanced headquarters at Zeist on the western edge of the wooded heath-land held by the Germans. On 14th May Netherlands District, hitherto responsible only for the movement of relief supplies in conjunction with I Canadian Corps, took over full responsibility for Civil Affairs from I Canadian Corps for the whole of the B2 area. The C.A. detachments deployed came under its control.

On the same day an advanced party of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Netherlands moved from its main headquarters at Breda to the Hague. Its contacts there were with the representatives of the N.M.A., since it was to be another four weeks before the Dutch Government moved from London to the Hague.

The Allied forces were greeted with wild enthusiasm which for a time concealed the desperate straits to which the people had been reduced. The head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission reported:

1. On first appearances the condition of the people has proved unfortunately most deceptive. On the advent of Allied troops, the soldiers were greeted with cheers and bunting, and made their progress through a smiling countryside. But it was deceptive because men and women who are slowly dying in their beds of starvation unfortunately cannot walk gaily about the streets waving flags.

2. It is an empty country, inhabited by a hungry, and in the towns, a semi-starved population. It is no exaggeration to state that, had liberation been delayed for another ten days or so, many thousands of people would surely have died of hunger.

3. The existing food supplies in the area are practically nil. A day's ration consists of a very small cup of nasty 'ersatz' soup, a very small piece of an unappetising and sticky substance called bread, and a wafer of sugar beet. It is hardly surprising that a large proportion of the population, who were unable to buy on the black market, have lost on an average 45 pounds in weight.

4. The people, especially those in the big towns, are exhausted both physically and mentally. Generally speaking, they suffer from great weakness and the men are quite unable to perform a full day's work. It is reliably estimated that certainly 50% of the population are lousy. Figures were given to me by the Burgomaster of Amsterdam which showed that the death rate per week since January has been nearly always double that of the corresponding week last year and in some cases three or four times as great. The Relief Teams sent in by the British Red Cross consider that the conditions in Rotterdam are even worse than those in Amsterdam. It is also reliably estimated that more young children are dying per month *now* than per year in 1942.

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A major pre-occupation at this time, and for months before, was the repair of the Walcheren dykes which had been broken through by the Royal Air Force in October 1944. Of the island's 47,000 acres, seventy five or eighty per cent were inundated as a result and little or nothing could be done to restore the situation during the winter of 1944-45. By February 1945 the four main breaches had been much widened by the action of the sea and it was clear that only a very determined effort could hope to close the gaps before the winter of 1945-46. Plans for repair were initiated in December 1944 and by January materials and equipment were being brought to Walcheren by 21 Army Group and handed over to the civil authorities. Much of this material had to be specially procured by the Dutch Government from the U.K. or the U.S., since S.H.A.E.F. resources were unable to meet the demands. By March and April 1945, vessels for repair operations were arriving from England and repair materials were appearing at the breaches. Progress in the following two months was disappointing, however. In June and July, with the conclusion of hostilities, more liberal aid could be given from Army resources. By the middle of July, six dredgers had reached Walcheren, together with other floating equipment. A Dutch Field Company had been sent to aid with the work and prisoners of war were being employed to clear mines from the neighbourhood of the breaches. British technical troops also assisted. The race against the winter was won by the narrowest of margins with the closing of the three most important gaps a year after the breaching of the dykes.

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¹ cf. Ch. XXII.

sponsibility, to 21 Army Group for the tasks previously discharged by Netherlands District, to S.H.A.E.F. for its original functions. A day or two later the Netherlands Government arrived from London. On 15th June responsibility for receipt and distribution of relief supplies, supervision of the ration scale, control of civilian transport, issue of P.O.L., control, maintenance and location of Netherlands voluntary bodies and coordination of public health and relief activities passed from the Civil Affairs authorities to the Netherlands Military Administration. Civil Affairs detachments were being rapidly thinned out and sent to take part in the military government of Germany.

It was clear that the days of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission were numbered. The coal situation was at last showing signs of improvement. A Minister of Energy had been appointed. The Head of the Mission 'hoped he will live up to his title'. Progress was being made in draining flooded areas although it was still doubtful whether the Walcheren dykes could be repaired in time for the autumn tides. Two matters were seriously agitating public opinion. In order to hasten the concentration and departure of the German troops after surrender, these had been permitted to retain temporarily bicycles, horses and carts seized by them in the Netherlands. The intention was that they should surrender this transport before finally quitting the country. In fact they were allowed to take some horses out of the country to pull their transport and it was now rumoured that these would not be returned. Alarm and indignation were the natural results. The second cause for discontent was the delay in compelling restoration by the Germans of property looted from the Netherlands. Satisfactory arrangements for the return of horses were made before the Mission was wound up. The return of loot was a longer and more difficult matter. First Canadian Army, which was to remain in the Netherlands longer than had been expected, offered to help with the harvest, with clearing bombed cities, with bulk transport, and in other ways. This generous offer to aid in the rehabilitation of the country was readily accepted by the Netherlands Government – though it raised delicate problems as there was no shortage of unskilled labour.

On 14th July S.H.A.E.F. was dissolved and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Netherlands ceased to exist. Residual problems were bequeathed to British and United States Missions to the Netherlands. Although theoretically distinct and answerable to their respective national authorities, these two Missions were in fact the British and American components of the old S.H.A.E.F. Mission and maintained, for the convenience of the Dutch and in continuation of their happy wartime cooperation, an integrated facade *vis-à-vis* the Netherlands Government.

Those concerned with Civil Affairs in the Netherlands could look back upon a great deal done for the Dutch. But it is doubtful whether

their recollections were particularly happy. Because of the way in which the battle developed there was throughout an unexpected multiplicity of authorities concerned with the planning and execution of Civil Affairs. In various ways and at various times, S.H.A.E.F., 21 Army Group, First Canadian Army, Second Army, the Netherlands District, the N.M.A., and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission itself were all involved. Often the Mission was on delicate ground, doing much planning, trying generally to help matters forward, but denied any executive powers. Much tact and patience were required in a situation that often made it a target for abuse. The Netherlands Military Administration for reasons that we have seen, was intensely disliked though some notably good work was done especially in the provinces. The Allies themselves, though initially received with enthusiasm, incurred much unpopularity for their failure to liberate Holland before advancing into Germany. The Dutch were disunited and, as a member of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission expressed it to the writer, 'there was a lot of politics in Dutch politics'. Altogether it was not a happy atmosphere. But then the Dutch are not a happy people, and the ordeal they had passed through after September 1944 was incomparably more severe than that suffered by any other country liberated in the west.

CHAPTER IX

DENMARK AND NORWAY

DENMARK and Norway received as much attention from the planners as did the other countries in which it might become necessary to revive or control civil administration. But the plans were never needed until after the fighting. Inevitably this detracts from the interest of events in these countries, for the tension of war had been released, and priorities no longer set those concerned with civil administration quite such teasing problems. On the other hand, the flow of supplies towards Europe dwindled as military necessity ceased to override the needs of the rest of the world. And the new task soon emerged of saving Europe from Communism. Accordingly, if reference to the work of the S.H.A.E.F. Missions in these countries cannot be so detailed as in the case of the Missions to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, it cannot be altogether omitted.

* * *

The case of Denmark differed from that of all other liberated countries in that the lawful, recognized, Government had contrived to continue in existence within its own territories, and as a neutral, for some three years after the German occupation. On 29th August 1943, however, as a result of mounting sabotage and underground resistance, the Germans declared martial law in Denmark and the Government resigned. The Resistance movement continued, however, and gained in strength and unity when, a little later, the various clandestine organizations joined to form the Freedom Council. Meanwhile the Danish Legation had continued in existence in London. Although denied official contact with its Government, and later having no government to represent, it was not altogether without unofficial channels, particularly through Sweden, for communicating with those who had been its principals. Early in 1942 the leader of the Danish Resistance, Christmas Møller, had been forced to escape to England, where he became a valuable link with the Freedom Council and the movement inside Denmark.

The early collection of information regarding Denmark by the Allied military authorities was undertaken by the Norwegian Section under Brigadier P. H. Hansen, V.C., but on 7th February 1944 a separate Danish Country Unit was created, under the control of

S.H.A.E.F. In mid-October, as a result of the autumn expectations that German collapse or surrender might be imminent, the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Denmark was formally constituted. It was built up on the Danish Country Unit, and was placed under the command of Major-General R. H. Dewing of the British Army, whose deputy was Colonel Ford-Trimble of the U.S. Army. Like other S.H.A.E.F. Missions, this was an integrated Anglo-American organization. Some three weeks later a Danish Military Mission accredited to S.H.A.E.F. came into existence, the G-5 Division of this being placed in due course under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel G. Rasmussen.

The call to action never came that autumn, however, and the Mission settled down to consolidate its planning in collaboration with the Danish Military Mission which was intended to be the normal channel for obtaining information concerning Denmark. But recourse was allowed to the Danish Legation if necessary and in fact this became the most fruitful source of contact. While the Danish Minister could give the most authoritative advice regarding the probable attitude of the Danish Government on restoration, he could not commit the Government to agreement. Indeed, it was not known how that Government would be composed. And since the negotiation of a Civil Affairs agreement with the Government, when discovered, might take time, plans were required to provide for a period of effective working without any formal agreement.

The original Civil Affairs directive issued by S.H.A.E.F. on 4th November 1944 to General Dewing contemplated that the Mission would be sent to Denmark without any Allied Task Force. Alternative directives were now prepared for use in case a Task Force also needed to be sent, or in case a Task Force had to be sent without the Mission – owing to the absence of any government to which the Mission could be accredited.

Denmark differed from the other liberated countries in a second respect: it was the only one that might be expected to have surplus food for export to a hungry world. But only if she could import coal and petroleum products, of which she had none. Accordingly questions of supply attracted much attention and supply procedures were drawn up. The total Plan A¹ provision for Denmark amounted to 1,282,700 tons, far more than for any other country in the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations, except only for France. Nearly the whole of this tonnage was to consist of coal. Estimates were compiled of the civilian relief supplies that would be required for the first and the second ninety-day periods after liberation. Plans were made for the formation of a Four Party Supply Committee, as in other liberated countries.

Contact was maintained with the Resistance forces in Denmark, largely through Mr. Christmas Møller, and plans were prepared in

¹ For Plan A cf Ch.XVII.

conjunction with the Danish Military Mission for the reorganization, training, and, at a later stage, the disarmament and disbandment of these forces. Plans were also prepared for particular operations e.g. to protect the radio station at Kalundborg on the liberation of Denmark.

A force of Danes, under the name of 'Danforce', was raised in Sweden with the knowledge of the Swedish Government and the support of the British clandestine organizations, ostensibly as a police force. In the second week of December 1944 the Head of the Mission visited Stockholm to learn more about this. It was ascertained that the force consisted of two battalions of five hundred men each, two nucleus battalions of about 170, and a support battalion of some two hundred. There were pioneer, communications, and transport sections, and the training included instruction in hand-to-hand and street fighting.

During the many months that elapsed before the Mission could go into action frequent visits were paid to Paris and Brussels for consultation with S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group, and for observation of the remarkably successful work of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Belgium.

* * *

On 4th May General Dewing visited 21 Army Group Headquarters in Brussels and learnt that an early surrender of the German forces in north-west Germany and Denmark was likely. In that case he was to enter Denmark at once with a small party of his staff and a company of troops as escort. The following morning he was told that the German surrender on the 21 Army Group front had actually taken place and was instructed to fly to Copenhagen and set up his Mission. The presence of large German forces in Denmark and the need to control these made it necessary to send also an Allied Task Force. In addition to being Head of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, General Dewing was also placed in control, by the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group, of such British troops as might enter Denmark and of all German forces found in the country. He thus owed a dual responsibility, to 21 Army Group in respect of the Task Force, to S.H.A.E.F. in respect of the Mission. On the afternoon of the same day, 5th May, escorted by a company of the 13th Airborne Battalion, Major-General Dewing and an advance party of his Mission, which had been flown from London to join him at Lüneburg, landed at Kastrup airfield, near Copenhagen. They were received by forces of the Resistance. Included in the advance party was Brigadier W. H. F. Crowe, Head of the G-5 element of the Mission, and a few of his staff. Brigadier Crowe immediately established a temporary Civil Affairs headquarters in Dagmarhuus. The Danish Government had emerged from its retirement and assumed office earlier the same day. That evening the Head of the Mission saw the Prime Minister, Mr. Vilhelm Buhl, who promised the full co-operation of his Government, so according the

necessary recognition to the Mission, pending the negotiation of formal Civil Affairs agreements.

On 7th May, a main air party of the Mission arrived. On the same day, the armoured cars of the Royal Dragoons crossed the border from Germany into Denmark. The G-5 rear party then came in by road. The next day, 8th May, Headquarters 1st Parachute Brigade arrived and took over immediate control of the token British force and of the German forces, under the Head of the Mission. The control of the German forces was to involve the evacuation from Denmark back to Germany of more than two hundred thousand active members of these forces, together with some eighty thousand wounded. The S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Denmark was established.

On 7th May His Majesty King Christian of Denmark received the Head of the Mission, and Admiral Holt, R.N., Flag Officer, Denmark. On the same day Mr. Christmas Møller arrived from England and took office as Minister for Foreign Affairs, through whom would be conducted most of the Mission's business with the Danish Government. Colonel Rasmussen was appointed chief intermediary between the Ministry and the Mission. On 9th the Danish Parliament was opened and the King conveyed the formal thanks of Denmark to the Allies for her liberation. On 12th Field-Marshal Montgomery visited Copenhagen and received what was described as an 'unparalleled ovation'. Meanwhile, on 7th May, Russians had bombed the Danish island of Bornholm, which in fact fell within their sphere of operations, and demanded surrender of the German forces on the island. The latter had already surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group and considered, but abandoned, the idea of resisting the Russians. The latter landed on 9th May and at once began deporting the Germans to Kolberg. There was some alarm regarding Russian intentions, but in fact, on Bornholm, relations were good and in the Spring of 1946 the Russians withdrew.

Early reconnaissance showed that physical conditions in Denmark were generally speaking good, certainly far better than in any other liberated countries. As had been expected, there was an acute shortage of coal and petroleum products, which had virtually brought traffic to a standstill. But the Germans had not had time, if they had ever intended, to apply a 'scorched earth' policy and Denmark could not only feed itself but could also export food to the rest of Europe – provided that coal and petroleum were made available. The administration too was in existence and functioning, for when the Government had resigned in 1943 it was only the Ministers who disappeared: the civil service remained and the departments continued in operation under their permanent heads. There was accordingly no break in continuity. The preservation of law and order presented more of a problem since in September 1944 the Germans had broken up the

police force and removed many of its members to concentration camps. For some days the only agency for the discharge of police functions was that of the Resistance forces, supported when possible by the handful of British troops in the country. There was wild shooting for some nights but the situation never got out of hand. By 23rd May the Civil Affairs agreement had been revised in the light of conditions found, and executed by the Danish Government and by General Dewing.

* * *

The scale of the food surpluses that might be expected is shown by the official estimates for the four and a half months from 12th May to 1st October 1955. These were:

Butter	33,000 long tons
Eggs	4,000 " "
Beef	5,000 " "
Pork and Pork products	15,750 " "
Cheese	700 " "
Potatoes	20,000 " "
Fish	80,000 " "

A proportion of these surpluses had already been promised under trade agreements made during the German occupation, to Finland, Sweden, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. It was a main task of the Mission to ensure and facilitate export of the remaining surpluses in the Allied interest. This involved educating the Danish Government and public regarding the close control exercised by the Allies through the machinery of the Combined Boards over foreign trade to ensure the optimum distribution of available resources. The outside world had grown accustomed to these measures. To the Danes, ignorant of the control established elsewhere, dependent upon their foreign trade, and hoping to resume this on the pre-war pattern, the restraints and close control imposed by the Allies came as a shock. It had to be made clear to them that the assistance which Denmark might expect to receive from the Allies would inevitably be influenced by the contribution which she could make towards meeting food needs elsewhere. Two obstacles required to be overcome before shipments could start; shipping had to be procured; and some agreement had to be reached regarding prices. Other difficulties had to be resolved if shipments were to continue after the first weeks; these included the provision of coal, petroleum products, salt, and a variety of packing materials – sacks for potatoes, cases for fish, wrappers for bacon. The question of prices was resolved, for the time being, by the Danish Government agreeing to ship and settle later. Packing materials were found for

early shipments and 'spot' demands were made upon the military organization to procure more. Ships were found, mainly Danish and British.

In response to Allied appeals the Danish authorities took steps to reduce food consumption in order to increase the exportable surpluses. On 9th June the first food ship sailed carrying some 1,500 metric tons of butter for the U.K. By the 13th June 5,502 tons of food had been exported. By 4th July the amount had risen to 15,311 tons. Of this, seventy-seven per cent had gone to the Ministry of Food in the U.K. and twenty-three per cent to the U.S. Army. It was then decided that future distribution should aim at giving a third share each to the British Army, the U.S. Army, and Civil Affairs. With still later arrangements we are not here concerned.

* * *

By the second half of June the work of the Mission was contracting. Public opinion was beginning to resent the degree of Allied control in Danish affairs. 'Germany put her heel on Denmark' it was being said 'but the Allies sit on her.' In fact the Allies were as anxious as any one to leave the Danes to manage their own affairs and the degree of interference was at no time great. For the security of their own small forces and the effective control of the much larger German forces, the Allies were compelled to insist upon the imposition of restrictions upon movement and correspondence. And although this small Allied force was never in the event required to assist the Danish police and the forces employed in keeping order, it did nevertheless constitute the ultimate military sanction behind the police forces, until the Danish army could be reconstituted and trained. With arms widely distributed throughout the country in the hands of the Resistance forces, this was a not unimportant function.

The control and evacuation of the German forces found in Denmark was not a G-5 commitment but nevertheless had certain Civil Affairs aspects. We have seen that Headquarters 1st Parachute Brigade arrived in Copenhagen on 8th May to relieve the Head of the Mission of direct responsibility for the control of the British and German forces in Denmark. The German forces numbered about three hundred thousand in all, including some eighty thousand sick and wounded. With the handful of British troops available it was out of the question to attempt to disarm the Germans or to arrest members of the Gestapo, the S.S., the S.D., or other wanted persons. Responsibility for making these arrests was placed upon the German commanders, and inevitably many of the principal criminals got away. The Germans were ordered to march into Schleswig-Holstein as quickly as possible, taking their personal weapons and equipment with them. Armament and material

were to be left behind. Movement began at once and by 12th May forty three thousand had crossed into Germany. Nor, with the number of British troops available, was it practicable to insist upon surrender of Danish currency as the Germans crossed the frontier. On the suggestion of Brigadier Babington-Smith, Head of the S.H.A.E.F. Finance Section, who was visiting Denmark, an order was issued to the German commander to instruct his Paymasters to collect Danish currency from their troops in exchange for receipts expressed in *Reichsmarks*, and to deposit all currency so collected, together with their own reserves of Danish currency, with the nearest branch of the Danish National Bank, without saying what was to be done with these deposits. The order could not be enforced, but there was nothing to be lost by issuing it. For once in Germany the Danish currency would become valueless except for the occasional black-market transaction, whereas it was just possible that some value might attach to the *Reichsmark* receipts. In view of this and of the generally good German discipline there was at least a chance that the order would be obeyed. It was – very widely, at least – and by 21st June some thirty-five million *Kroner* had been recovered from the various German Services and some one hundred and eighty million *Kroner* from the Paymaster's reserves. The Germans had been ordered to feed themselves on the way out from their own stocks. Should these become exhausted or should the organization break down, there was a risk of resort to looting. To insure against this General Dewing warned the Danish authorities to collect supplies along the evacuation route. But it never became necessary to fall back onto these preparations. A fortnight later, according to the last periodical report of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, 242,108 German troops had left Denmark for Germany. Those still remaining numbered 51,440, just over half of whom were in hospital. It was hoped to get these away soon. Surrender and evacuation proceeded smoothly, on the whole, provided that the Danish Resistance forces could be prevented from taking a hand. The Germans were emphatic that they had not surrendered to them. Attempts by the Resistance forces to disarm the Germans led to a number of shooting incidents. On 4th June when the German numbers had been sufficiently reduced, General Lindemann, their commander, was arrested in connection with war crimes.

* * *

On 9th April 1940 some hours after the invasion of Denmark, German forces attacked Norway, landing simultaneously and without warning, at Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. Norwegian forces made a fierce but forlorn resistance. The King and Government withdrew through Hamar and Lillehammer on

to Andalsnes. Here and at Namsos and Narvik British and French forces landed in response to the Norwegian appeal for help. On 29th April, with the Allies worsted and about to withdraw from the Andalsnes area, the King and Government embarked in H.M.S. *Glasgow* for Tromsø in the far north. Here they remained while the Allies extricated themselves from one landing after another along the Norwegian coast. On 7th June, the day before the final Allied withdrawal from Narvik, the King and Government embarked once more in H.M.S. *Devonshire* and, narrowly avoiding German warships, escaped to Britain. Before this the Reichskommissar appointed by the Germans for occupied Norway had made overtures to the Government which were rejected. The Government continued formally in existence in London. The bulk of the Norwegian merchant navy, of close upon seven million tons in 1939, escaped to Allied ports and made an important contribution to the shipping resources of the Allies. A strong underground movement developed within Norway. It became known as the Home Front and was in close communication with the Government in London.

A reinvasion of Norway by the Allies was frequently canvassed from 1940 onwards.¹ Planning in this connection was undertaken by the Joint Planning Staff, by Combined Operations Headquarters, by Canadian Corps Headquarters, and finally by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, with headquarters at Edinburgh. Early in 1945 a new Anglo-American headquarters came into being under the command of S.H.A.E.F. The greater part of its staff was British and was drawn from headquarters Scottish Command. It was known as Headquarters Force 134, and Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Thorne was placed in command while continuing at the same time as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Scottish Command. On 24th April 1945, as the date for operations drew near, Headquarters Force 134 became Headquarters Allied Land Forces Norway.

Study of the Civil Affairs problems involved in an invasion of Norway was begun long before this by the D.C.C.A.O. North-West Europe in the War Office. Work started in February 1943 on the preparation of a Civil Affairs agreement. In August 1943 the D.C.C.A.O.'s Norwegian planners, with the addition of a U.S. element, became the Norwegian Country Unit, operating in Hyde Park Gate with Brigadier P. H. Hansen, V.C. as its Head. The Unit in due course became a part of the S.H.A.E.F. organization. In May 1944 it developed into the planning nucleus of No. 2/19 Civil Affairs Unit, the U.S. element consisting of the 2nd Civil Affairs Unit of the U.S. forces, the British of No. 19 Civil Affairs Unit. After partial mobiliza-

¹ Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide*, London, 1957. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vols. II., III., IV., London, 1949-1951.

tion the unit was transferred to Edinburgh. Here it undertook a dual role. On the one hand its nucleus became the Civil Affairs element of Headquarters Scottish Command, which later became Headquarters Force 134 and then Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Norway. On the other hand its nucleus also became the Civil Affairs element designate of the Mission which would in due course be appointed to represent the Supreme Commander with the Norwegian authorities.

In February 1945 it was decided to appoint the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to Norway. In other liberated countries, where it was the task of the Allied forces to engage the Germans and pursue them into Germany, it was necessary to provide separate organizations to represent the Supreme Commander, so that these could be left behind as the battle swept forward. Since it was not contemplated that the Allied forces which liberated Norway would take part in any subsequent invasion of Germany, it was decided that the functions of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission should be discharged in addition to its primary task by the headquarters responsible for the invasion and liberation of Norway. No. 2/19 Civil Affairs Unit accordingly owed its dual responsibilities not to two separate commanders but to one Commander, who himself discharged a dual role.

Early in April mobilization of the remainder of No. 2/19 Civil Affairs Unit was ordered. The headquarters element of the Unit, with a strength of forty-six officers, British and U.S., became the largest and, as events developed, the most important element of the Mission.

It was, and until the very last days of planning remained, quite uncertain for what conditions plans must be prepared, whether Allied landings would be opposed, whether the Germans would apply a 'scorched earth' policy, how much damage would be caused by the Allies. Civil Affairs planning had, accordingly, to be compendious and flexible.

Throughout the period of planning very close and cordial liaison was maintained between the Civil Affairs planners and the Norwegian Government in London. There was also close contact with the Home Front in Norway. The leader of this came to the U.K. through Sweden to confer. Perilous but invaluable sea communication was maintained with Norway from the Shetland Islands throughout the German occupation, by Norwegian seamen working with the Scandinavian Section of Special Operations Executive. This was the main source of information for the planners, and the link with the Home Front. On the deployment of the Allied forces in Norway it was to provide the best and most reliable communications for the High Command.

* * *

During the months of planning and preparation one operational commitment supervened. In October 1944 Soviet forces fighting in Finland entered and occupied the eastern part of Finmark in the extreme north of Norway, driving the Germans before them. The Russians hoped it would be possible to land forces of the western Allies to aid them in this remote area, but only a token force could be spared consisting of a Norwegian Mountain Company.

The population of the territory entered numbered some forty thousand, and was experiencing great hardship because of shortages of food and coal and because of the damage caused by the bitter fighting. It was decided to send relief supplies from the U.K. and four shipments were made in Arctic convoys leaving British ports towards the end of October, November, December, and January. By January 1945, 5,183 tons had been sent, 3,515 tons consisting of Civil Affairs supplies from S.H.A.E.F. Plan A resources, and 1,668 tons of supplies purchased by the Norwegian Government from civil agencies. These shipments represented rather more than ninety days supplies for the area occupied, on a scale intended to make it possible to raise the calorific value of the normal daily ration from the existing level of something between 1,150 and 1,350 to more than two thousand. Civil Affairs officers accompanied these shipments in order to arrange for their distribution and in order to observe conditions in Norway. Russians met locally were friendly and helpful but the higher authorities insisted upon these officers being recalled. This was an ominous result of the first meeting in the field of the eastern and the western Allies. Plans for sending a further ninety days consignment had to be abandoned in view of a S.H.A.E.F. decision in February 1945 that it could not accept responsibility for the supply of areas falling within the Russian zone of operations: in the absence of British or American Civil Affairs officers it was impossible to ensure that supplies delivered actually reached the Norwegian people. It consequently became necessary for the Norwegian Government to procure the whole consignment from civilian agencies and to make its own arrangements for the shipment.

* * *

On 5th May at 8 a.m. the cease fire took effect on the 21 Army Group front. Through the 6th and 7th unsuccessful attempts were made to get in wireless touch with the German commander in Norway. On 8th contact was established and immediately emissaries under Brigadier R. Hilton, Chief of Staff to the Commander, Allied Land Forces, Norway, flew to Oslo. They accepted the surrender of the German commander at his headquarters at Lillehammer, 80 miles to the north, and made arrangements for the arrival of subsequent

parties. On 9th, advanced parties of British and Norwegian forces arrived at Gardemoen and Sola airfields. On the 10th, Major-General R. E. Urquhart, commanding 1st Airborne Division, together with troops of the 1st Airborne Division and the Norwegian Parachute Company, arrived and entered Oslo. On 11th, the main bodies of these formations began to arrive at Oslo, Stavanger, and Kristiansand. Everywhere the Allies were given an enthusiastic reception. Simultaneously Norwegian police and armed constabulary, raised in Sweden during the war, crossed the frontier and moved to Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. On 12th the cruisers *Ariadne*, *Apollo* and *Devonshire* arrived at Oslo carrying the Joint Force Commanders and members of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission. They brought also H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Norway, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Forces, together with a delegation of three Ministers representing the Norwegian Government in London.

A young Naval officer who accompanied the party wrote:

‘ . . . shortly after 1200 the Norwegian coast came up; all day it grew along the horizon; jagged cliffs with mountains and some snow behind. At 7 that evening we dressed ship, ensigns, and the Norwegian flag at the maintop. A German minesweeper came to us with pilots and everyone stopped while the sweepers took in their sweeps. The German came alongside us; he was very smart, with all his crew in their best clothes. They were obviously putting on a good show. For 20 minutes our ship’s side was crowded with curious men, looking down at these fellows; men in overalls and grimy vests. There were a few comments . . . “Glad you joined, Jack?” . . . and photographs taken. Whalers came alongside the sweeper to fetch pilots. There was a Norwegian, very smart and seamanlike; her crew scowled at the enemy, took their pilot away, covered with a revolver. At first they protested that we were trusting the Germans too much, but we assured them no chances would be taken. The force went into line ahead and steamed on, the German out ahead making a long smear of black smoke. (The navy never allows smoke to show from the funnels). That evening 3 little fishing boats came out to us, men standing on the cabin and decks, waving their arms, shouting. We were going so slowly they came close enough for people to throw them chocolates and cigarettes.

The weather still held; the next morning we got into Oslo fjord, with beautiful, rocky shores both sides. There was a lovely smell of larches all the way. Very soon the boats came off to join us; fishing boats, little pleasure steamers, rowing boats, tiny canoes; all waving and cheering . . . hiyah! hiyah, hurrah! Welcome to Norway. Thank you! but most just making a joyful noise. And flags and branches everywhere, and hundreds of children. Whole families came out, or just one little boy in his canoe. We threw chocolate and sweets out all along. The country

was so beautiful; the channel was very narrow but extremely deep. Twice we stopped for pilots, and finally steamed into Oslo. The boats had been coming out to us for 40 miles; I saw one couple in Salvation Army uniforms, and a boy giving a Scout salute, and men of the resistance presenting arms to us. We moored ship in Oslo at about 2 o'clock . . .'

I went to a jetty crowded with people; I jumped ashore and asked "Is there anyone here who speaks English?" Two boys volunteered so I showed them my map and tried to pronounce Norwegian names. They wanted to know where the Crown Prince was, was he coming ashore? when? Could they come in my boat? All along the sea front there were hundreds of people, very brightly dressed (the Germans did not allow them to wear anything red or bright blue). Roof-tops were crowded; everyone cheering and waving, flags everywhere. I took men ashore and a girl asked in English "May we come to your ship?" Alright . . . and 80 or more jumped aboard. We came back and I asked her to keep order in the boat and prevent everyone jumping out at once. They poured inboard leaving no-one with breath enough to reprove me. It had been announced that no leave would be given for the first few days till the situation was clear, but in an hour little boys were paddling out in canoes; climbing over the guns, getting chocolate; and our men were ashore. These people have had no white bread for years, no meat; only third-rate fish; they got a small cup of skimmed milk very occasionally. Once yesterday I was offered 10 kroner (10/-) for 20 cigarettes, and one man wanted to give us £1 0. 0. for them. We give away as many as we can, and, my goodness, they deserve it.'

The Crown Prince received a tumultuous welcome and it was clear that there was no uncertainty regarding the re-establishment of the monarchy. The Ministers were received with less warmth. The inevitable rift was opening between those who had remained and those who had escaped.

Civil Affairs officers accompanied the arriving troops and by 15th May were established at Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim. A party was also on its way to Tromsø. The headquarters of the Joint Force Commanders and of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was established in Oslo. The Commander, Allied Land Forces, Norway, took up residence later in the house that had been Vidkun Quisling's. Proclamations by the King of Norway and by the Supreme Commander were published on 17th May, Norway's Constitution Day.

At first, with the sprinkling of troops available, it was not possible for the Allies to assume any direct responsibility for territory beyond the immediate surroundings of Oslo, Stavanger and Kristiansand. Elsewhere, however, control was taken over from the Germans by the Norwegian local authorities or, more usually, by the Home Front

which proved competent, co-operative and well-disciplined. By the 30th May, as Allied forces arrived and could be distributed more widely, the whole of Norway, with the exception only of Eastern Finmark which was still occupied by Soviet forces, was formally placed under the military control of the General Officer Commanding 1st Airborne Division. Throughout the greater part of this area, however, the only agency for the establishment of physical control for the guarding of vulnerable points, for the control of traffic, was still the Home Front. So light was the occupation that there were apprehensions for a while lest the Russian forces might move in from the north, on the pretext of giving their assistance, and might then prove difficult to dislodge. To guard against this a British warship was dispatched to Tromsø. Civil administration having revived spontaneously, there was no need, and certainly no inclination, for the Civil Affairs staffs to busy themselves re-establishing administrative machinery – and in the event little or no time, for within a month of the first Allied landings responsibility for the civil government of the country was to pass, with inconsiderable reservations, from the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Norwegian Government.

The physical condition of the country was far better than the planners had dared assume. Except in Finmark, where the Germans had retired in October 1944 to the neighbourhood of Narvik, resisting the Soviet forces all the way,¹ the country had not been fought over or seriously bombed, nor had the German forces applied a 'scorched earth' policy. The public utilities were for the most part undamaged. Industrial plants were utilizable. The ports were workable. There were sufficient coasting steamers. The railway system was in a sufficient state of repair to meet foreseeable needs. But the people were hungry and the lack of coal and petroleum products were starving the utilities and industries, and had brought the transportation system virtually to a stop. If only food and fuel could be supplied it would not take long for the country to rehabilitate itself. So it was to the procuring of these that the Civil Affairs element of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission devoted most of its attention. An account is given in separate chapters.² But there are certain other points of interest concerning the work of the Mission which it is desirable to mention.

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As elsewhere, the Civil Affairs staff was charged with responsibility for ensuring that refugees and displaced persons were cared for and controlled. It was planned to discharge this responsibility through Norwegian agency. The Civil Affairs staff was not primarily respon-

¹ Keesing, 43-46, 6775-6777.

² cf. Ch. XVII., XXII.

sible for dealing with Allied prisoners of war found in German hands. For this a special organization had been created. But on arrival in Norway some seventy-five thousand Russian soldiers were found who had been taken prisoner by the Germans, far more than had been expected. It was clearly desirable to return these to Russia at the first possible moment. In the early stages Civil Affairs staffs assisted in the handling of these prisoners of war pending the time when the special organization could be deployed. Notwithstanding a slow start, by the last week of June forty thousand Russians had been repatriated and by the time the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was wound up all but those whose cases presented problems of nationality had left Norway.

Of the displaced persons, with whom the Civil Affairs staff was properly concerned, some thirty five thousand were Norwegians who had escaped to Sweden at the time of the German invasion or later. Arrangements were made between the Norwegian and Swedish Governments for collecting and sorting these within Sweden and then for repatriating them by rail to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik. Local arrangements were made for dispersing them from these centres to their homes. By 13th July this movement was virtually complete.

More difficult was the case of some ten thousand civilians, mostly foreign, sometimes forced labour imported by the Todt organization. Nearly half of these were Poles. Dutch, Czechs, and French accounted for most of the rest. They were scattered through the Oslo, Trondheim, and Tromsö areas. Local arrangements for the care of these were made under the authority of the Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare. Little organized repatriation of these persons could be carried out during the life-time of the Mission, but, by using empty space in returning aircraft and such other opportunities as offered, 2,675 were got away. The rest were cared for in camps or billets pending arrangements for their repatriation. They were grievously short of clothes but not otherwise in great distress.

The most difficult case was that of non-Germans found within the ranks of the German forces. The number of these continually increased as the German forces began to move out of Norway and more foreigners were discovered in the process. By 13th July the total had risen to over thirty thousand. Of these, 13,881 were Poles, and 12,665 Czechs. Once extracted from the Wehrmacht they were segregated by nationalities in camps under Allied military control. It was then planned to hand them over to the Ministry of Social Welfare to be housed and cared for in the same manner as other displaced persons. It was hoped to repatriate the smaller national groups when opportunity offered. There was, unfortunately, no immediate prospect of transport becoming available for the two large groups of Poles and Czechs. The movement out of Norway of Russians, of other Allied prisoners of war, and of Germans, had to take priority. The problem

arose, as in Denmark, of recovering local currency from the very large German forces which had surrendered in Norway. The procedure used in Denmark was at first rejected as impracticable.¹ It was ultimately adopted, however, and the amount of Norwegian currency recovered in this way exceeded one hundred and thirty three million *Kroner*. In addition, considerable quantities of Finnish *Marks* and Russian *Roubles* were impounded.

* * *

The surrender of the Germans placed large stocks of enemy war materials in Norway in the hands of the Allies. The control and allocation of these to the best advantage, after providing for the maintenance of the German forces on an austerity basis, and for their movement back to Germany, was to become a major function of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission. On first arrival arrangements were improvised by the Civil Affairs element of the Mission, the divisional Q staff, and the Norwegian Home Front, for locating, guarding and listing these stocks. Emergency civilian demands were fended off by small issues in the most needy cases. A cargo of potatoes, fifty tons of cabbage, 100 tons of petrol, fifty tons of diesel oil, 150 tons of coal, were released for civilian consumption.

On 25th May, more formal arrangements were made, with the establishment of a Joint Force War Materials Disposal Committee at the centre and subordinate committees in the several zones. The Joint Force Committee consisted of representatives of the Commander Allied Land Forces Norway, the Flag Officer, the Air Officer Commanding 88 Group Royal Air Force, Norway Command, the Norwegian Government, and the Q and Civil Affairs elements of the Mission. It sat daily and decided upon the distribution of commodities of which there were critical shortages, such as petroleum products, coal and coke, soap, foodstuffs, fodder, medical supplies, clothing and footwear. The distribution of less acutely needed commodities was left in the hands of the zonal committees, who also had power to dispose of perishable commodities.

It is difficult to give an exact picture of the assistance rendered to the Norwegian economy by the release of these stocks. Some idea of its scale is conveyed by the fact that some three hundred applications for release were granted and that by 13th July over 60,000 tons of goods had been distributed. Foodstuffs released included wheat, flour, macaroni, beef, pork, fish, potatoes, sauerkraut, cabbage, sugar, artificial honey, and hospital rations. Assistance to transport included the issue of small amounts of petrol and lubricants (small because the total

¹ For the procedure used cf. p. 159.

stocks were small) motor vehicles, tyres, spare parts, and road building equipment. For agriculture, German army horses were lent to farmers, fodder was issued, and a certain amount of farm machinery. A great variety of raw materials were released to industry, a few only of the more notable commodities being petroleum products, coal, timber, cement, wolfram, rubber, building steel, iron ore, lead, and electrical supplies. Machinery and industrial equipment released ranged from locomotives to the most delicate laboratory equipment. Miscellaneous assistance included buildings, tents, furniture and office equipment. The distribution of these stocks made an appreciable contribution to the revival of the Norwegian economy.

* * *

After some twenty months of planning and preparation, the brief life of No. 2/19 Civil Affairs unit soon came to an end.

The first step was the transfer of responsibility from the Allied Command to the Norwegian Government. This was made with the minimum of friction, as might have been expected in view of the uniformly excellent relations that had obtained in London between the government and the Allied military authorities, and of the restraint and discipline shown by the Home Front, and the public in general. Notwithstanding some mutual suspicion between the delegates sent by the London Government and the leaders of the Home Front, it early proved possible for the two parties to work together. The chief of the Home Front leaders, Mr. Paal Berg, resigned his appointment on the day after the arrival of the delegates, broadcast an appeal to all members of the Home Front to return to their normal tasks, and himself temporarily assumed the office of President of the Supreme Court. The administration purged itself but inevitably lacked leadership until it was known what sort of a government would be formed. The help and advice of the Civil Affairs element of the Mission was much sought at this stage.

The rest of the London Government, uncertain of its influence in Norway, hurried back, arriving on 31st May. They received what was described as 'quite a fair welcome'. They pressed at once for termination of the military period provided for under the Civil Affairs agreement. The need for the retention of Allied forces in the country in order to disarm the German forces had to be impressed upon them, but so well, in fact, had things gone that there was no need to postpone the transfer of responsibility. King Haakon was due to arrive in Oslo on 7th June. One hour before his arrival the Commander, Allied Land Forces, Norway, was able to announce that the Supreme Commander had accepted a recommendation to make the transfer on this date. The only rights and responsibilities

reserved to the Allied Commander were such as he needed in order

- (a) to disarm and remove the German military forces and other organizations, and to dispose of enemy property,
- (b) to repatriate ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons,
- (c) to withdraw Allied forces from Norway.

The King, arriving on 7th June, received 'a tremendous ovation and welcome'. It was in November 1905 that he had ascended the throne, and on 7th June 1940 that he had left Norway for England. Mr. Paal Berg was called upon to form a 'caretaker' Government until such time as elections could be held. He sought to do this with support from the right and from industry but failed. A superb organizer of the Resistance, he was less successful in the political hurly-burly. A Government was formed by Mr. Einar Gerhardsen with Labour support and took over responsibility for the government of the country.

The second step in the fading out of the Civil Affairs organization took place on 13th July, with the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. imminent. The S.H.A.E.F. Mission was discontinued and was replaced by separate British and U.S. Military Missions to the Norwegian Government. It will be remembered, however, that No. 2/19 Civil Affairs Unit discharged a second set of functions: it also provided the Civil Affairs element of the staff of Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Norway, and Civil Affairs officers for work in the field. These functions it continued to discharge for a little longer. In particular it continued to arrange for imports of coal, of petroleum products, and of relief supplies under the Civil Affairs programme. The remaining weeks were mainly taken up with closing down and handing over of Civil Affairs activities to the appropriate authorities. During this period the Norwegian programme of civil imports came increasingly into play. By September the programmed imports of relief supplies were virtually completed. Military responsibility for the import of coal ceased at the beginning of September and of petroleum products at the beginning of October. In Norway, as elsewhere, a Four Party Supply Committee had been formed. This played a major part in coordinating the progressive transfer from military to civil responsibility in matters of supply.

The final closing down of Civil Affairs activities began in the second half of October and was completed in the course of the next month. The task of the Mission was much simplified by the fact that the liberation of Norway took place only after the German surrender. But what it was required to do, and could do, it did well, and it could look back upon its record with satisfaction. The Head of the Mission, writing to Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Morgan, said:

'I had the privilege of being invited to lunch on Wednesday to meet the leaders of the Home Front. Mr. Berg was my host

and the party was held in the flat where their meetings had been held in secret for over three years. They told me frankly that to begin with, they regarded the arrival of Allied troops as yet another military occupation. He was kind enough to say that we had succeeded in removing these apprehensions completely.'

Perhaps the greatest tribute by the Norwegian Government to the work and attitude of the Mission and to the trust they felt in its Head was paid some five years later. When the Norwegian Government in 1950 decided that some form of reorganization was necessary in their High Command and in their army, they asked for General Sir Andrew Thorne to be chairman of a joint Norwegian, United States, and British committee to study their problems and make recommendations.

CHAPTER X

THE CHANNEL ISLANDS

IN all the territories with which this history has so far been concerned the Civil Affairs staffs were required to think and plan on a scale that involved millions of human beings. The only exception was the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg whose people numbered only three hundred thousand. But even the population of the Grand Duchy, itself a miniature, is three times that of the Channel Islands. Here the scale is altogether diminutive. But the case of the Islands is interesting nevertheless because it was the only instance in the European theatre of the reoccupation of British territory that had been overrun by the enemy. The Islands are also the oldest possession of the Crown, have a special constitutional relationship with the Crown, and still display characteristic features.

There were never any plans for attacking the German forces in the Islands. It was expected that these would withdraw or surrender as the result of pressure elsewhere, particularly when the Allies invaded the Continent. Plans for use in such circumstances provided that the Islands would be re-occupied by a token force that would be British but would operate under the general command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Its task would be to accept the surrender of the German forces and establish control over them. It was not designed to effect a landing in the face of opposition. Responsibility for preparing more detailed plans, and for providing in due course the British task force required, was placed upon the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command, who drew up a Joint Outline Plan in collaboration with both the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, and the Air Commander concerned. There was included in this an Outline Civil Affairs Plan.

Towards the end of April 1944, as the time for the invasion of the Continent drew near, Brigadier Snow was appointed Force Commander for the Channel Islands. The Force was to be an Independent Brigade augmented by the addition of specialist staff not ordinarily found below the level of a division, and of numerous specialist units, particularly of the Royal Engineers, for such tasks as the clearance and operation of the ports. At the same time Colonel H. R. Power was appointed Chief Civil Affairs Officer. A German withdrawal would become far more likely and might occur at any time, after the landings in Normandy, and it was desirable to have the Channel Islands Force

ready for action at the time of the Allied invasion. The Civil Affairs component was to be provided by No. 20 Civil Affairs Unit. But even before these appointments, planning had begun in the Home Office, and from about January 1944 onwards, preliminary work had started on detailed plans, in the War Office, at Southern Command and, to a lesser extent, at S.H.A.E.F. In particular, examination began in the War Office of the legal measures that would be necessary. This was undertaken by the legal adviser to the Civil Affairs Directorate together with Major Arnold the officer who was shortly to be appointed legal adviser to the Force Commander, and ultimately to become head of the legal staff of No. 20 C.A. Unit. This examination was carried on in collaboration with the Home Office, S.H.A.E.F., and the other authorities concerned. Plans and directives for other aspects of the work of No. 20 C.A. Unit in the Channel Islands were also brought to an advanced stage of readiness.

On first appointment, Colonel Power and the handful of Civil Affairs staff officers attached to him were under the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force – since the responsibility rested upon the latter for all Civil Affairs planning within his theatre of operations. This small planning cadre was the nucleus of No. 20 Civil Affairs Unit which, on full mobilization, was to be responsible for the military administration of the Channel Islands. It was set up in 32 Princes Gardens, London, and began work on the completion of detailed plans and directives. In addition to Colonel Power, there were Major Allen from S.H.A.E.F., Major Arnold, lately Legal Adviser and S.O.2 (Staff Officer, 2nd Grade) Legal, and Mr. C. W. Bickmore, made available by the Home Office to fill the post of S.O.1 (Staff Officer, 1st Grade) Finance and to be Controller of Finance and Accounts.

At the end of May as the date for the invasion drew near, orders issued for the urgent mobilization at Eastbourne of the remainder of No. 20 Civil Affairs Unit. Mr. Howard of the Home Office was attached to the Channel Islands Force Commander as an adviser on political and administrative matters. In the course of June and July, the unit was placed under Southern Command and the whole unit, both the planning cadre in London and the larger body at Eastbourne, moved to a camp at Cowley near Oxford. Operation Instruction No. 1 was drawn up with various supporting documents, and detailed plans for financial and legal matters, public safety, the provision of clothing and supplies, and the rehabilitation of postal and telegraph services. The unit was ready and eager to go into action.

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But nothing happened. And, as the weeks passed and the battle swept across France and into Belgium, there was still no sign of any

withdrawal of the German forces or of any move to re-occupy the Channel Islands. The unit had to settle down as patiently as it could to training and exercises and the perfecting of its already exhaustive plans. In the late summer it moved to Plumer Barracks in Plymouth. Officers were lent to the War Office; non-commissioned officers helped in weapon training of the troops assembling for the Channel Islands Force. In a long drawn out and remarkably successful campaign to keep up the spirits and keenness of the unit the C.C.A.O. pressed S.H.A.E.F. to be allowed to begin training his unit for its next probable assignment after the administration of the Channel Islands had been handed back to the civil authorities. This led to a study of the problems of military government in Germany and of the local conditions of the area to which the unit was likely to be sent.

In September a message was received from the German Government through Swiss channels that food stocks for civilians in the Channel Islands were approaching exhaustion and that the Germans would be willing to allow either withdrawal of the civil population, except for men of military age, or the import of food by Red Cross ships. The Prime Minister was 'entirely opposed' to the second of these suggestions and the British Government replied that so long as the Germans continued to occupy the Channel Islands they would be held responsible for feeding the civil population. If they could not discharge this duty they should surrender. But even as this reply was being sent news was brought by escaping refugees of the exceedingly serious extent of the deterioration in the supply of food for civilians in the Islands. Actually, when S.H.A.E.F. Headquarters moved to Granville at the end of August 1944, it was found that telephone communication still existed with the Channel Islands, and frequent conversations took place. Rations were being cut and it was believed that, in practice, stocks for even the reduced rations would not last beyond mid-September. There was no coal or petrol for civilian use.¹ With the Islands left far behind the Allied advance and the garrison completely cut off from other German troops and resources, it was clearly impossible for the Germans to discharge their responsibility under international law for feeding the population of the Islands. The U.K. Government decided in November 1944 to allow the Red Cross to import relief supplies of the kind normally sent to prisoners of war and to accept the risk of these being diverted to German use. This, if it did occur, could in any case have no effect upon the general course of the war. They were willing themselves to send soap and medical supplies in addition. After tortuous negotiations the consent of the German authorities was obtained and with the agreement of the Home Office a Swedish ship, the S.S. *Vega*, chartered by the War Organization of the

¹ Keesing, 1943-46, p. 6908C.

British Red Cross and Order of St. John, was loaded with a thousand tons of Red Cross food parcels, medicines, soap and salt. Under International Red Cross arrangements the S.S. *Vega* left Lisbon on 20th December 1944 and reached Guernsey on 27th. The vessel was unloaded by Germans and no complaint was ever made of misappropriation of stores. Five subsequent journeys were made, to the great comfort of the people of the Channel Islands, the last after re-occupation by the British¹ which in the event, was not to take place until after the German surrender in May 1945. On these later journeys Red Cross supplies were supplemented by gifts from firms and relief provided by the U.K. Government in the form of basic supplies such as food, fuel and other commodities outside the scope of Red Cross activities.²

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The main interest of the plans prepared for, and by, No. 20 Civil Affairs Unit arises from the fact that the Channel Islands were British territory. As in other liberated territory the plans provided for an initial period during which military needs must be paramount. Elsewhere this involved a temporary cession of sovereignty by the indigenous governments in favour of the Allied military authorities. In the Channel Islands it was British sovereignty and British law that would revive when German control was removed. As the occupying troops, although under the operational control of S.H.A.E.F., were to be a British force under a British commander, the paramountcy of military needs would not in the Channel Islands, involve any surrender of British sovereignty. All that was needed was to modify the channels through which authority normally flowed in such a way as to safeguard military requirements. As it could confidently be expected that the indigenous authorities would recognize the need for giving priority to military requirements, and would extend the fullest co-operation to the military commanders, there was little or no fear of any difficulty or deadlock arising. It was possible therefore to plan on the basis of the minimum disturbance of the normal channels of authority.

As to these normal channels, Jersey and Guernsey had each their own Government, their own Courts, and their own law. The islands of Alderney, Sark, Herm, and Jethou fell within the bailiwick of Guernsey but Alderney had its own legislative assembly. Alderney also had its own Court, but with limited powers. The law of the islands was of several kinds. First, Acts of the British Parliament if these were expressed to apply to the Channel Islands. Secondly, Acts of the British Parliament which had been applied by Orders-in-

¹ Keesing, 1943-46, p. 6908C.

² *Red Cross and St. John War History*, 1939-47, London, 1949, pp. 379-392.

Council. Thirdly, Orders-in-Council approving legislation initiated in the Islands themselves. Fourthly, local measures of a limited nature in the form of 'Reglements' enacted by the States of Jersey, and 'Ordonnances' enacted by the Royal Court of Guernsey which did not require the approval of the crown. Finally there was the customary law of the islands which was of Norman origin, and differed from English common law. On the 25th August 1939 certain provisions of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, passed by the British Parliament, were extended to the Channel Islands. Most of these provisions had been withdrawn in 1941, but it would be an easy matter on liberation to re-extend them, and to apply any other provisions of the Act considered necessary. It was proposed to ensure the paramountcy of the military authorities by giving to the military commander the power to make Defence Regulations for all the Channel Islands, under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. This would enable him to enact such legislation as appeared to him necessary '... for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community'. Similar and concurrent powers were to be conferred upon the States of Jersey and the Royal Court of Guernsey within their respective jurisdictions, excluding Alderney, however, from which the civil population had been evacuated by the Royal Navy before the German occupation. But the exercise of these powers by the legislatures was made subject to the approval of the military commander, so safeguarding the paramountcy of military needs. The power of the legislatures to enact 'Reglements' or 'Ordonnances' was not withdrawn, but the powers of the military commander in this field of legislation were in fact safeguarded by the provision in the Act that 'A Defence Regulation, and any order, rule or bye-law duly made in pursuance of such a Regulation, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.' In this way the normal processes of government could be allowed to continue in the Channel Islands, and military control could be superimposed to the extent necessary, and no further, and could be withdrawn as soon as it was no longer required.

Since the military commander was endowed with legislative authority, (and since, also, it was not necessary to guard against hurting the feelings of susceptible Allies) the military assumption of responsibility in the Channel Islands was to be known as Military Government; it need not be disguised as 'a régime of Civil Affairs'. It remained the policy, nevertheless, for the Military Government to conduct its administration indirectly, through the Channel Islands

authorities, and to avoid so far as possible assuming any direct administrative or executive responsibility.

The powers so conferred upon the military commander were expected to be sufficient for his needs except possibly in one respect. At the time when these plans were being prepared it was known that some nine thousand displaced persons, many of them forced workers, had been brought to the islands by the Germans from all parts of Europe. A large number of these were on Alderney which was believed, but mistakenly, to have been used as a penal settlement and which might therefore be expected to contain a high proportion of criminal or truculent persons. The maintenance of order among these was expected to be difficult. So consideration was given to the establishment of military courts to deal promptly with trouble-makers among the displaced persons. In the result, however, there was no need to establish such courts. The large bodies of displaced persons, for the control of whom the Courts were expected to be required, were not found. These had been members of the Todt organization and had been withdrawn to France after completing the fortification of the islands some time before D-day. Those remaining numbered only some two hundred and were most of them only too anxious to behave themselves in the hope of being allowed to remain in the Islands.

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The other plans call for little comment. They were, as we know, drawn up for the conditions of an unopposed landing. In view of the specific and known nature of the problems to be encountered and of the certainty that full co-operation would be enjoyed, the generalized and flexible machinery of the basic detachment was discarded in favour of a more particular organization, designed to dovetail into the existing civil administration. The unit was organized in four groups, a headquarters, a Guernsey party, a Jersey party and an Alderney party. Otherwise the plans did not differ greatly from those for other liberated territories. Control was to be indirect, through the recognized authorities, except in Alderney where it was assumed that there was no longer any civil administration. The whole unit, consisting of twenty-five officers and forty-five other ranks, was to travel to the Islands in the first party. Six civilians were to embark with the unit. In the second party a further nine civilians were to be brought in, six of these being Post Office engineers and the others officers of the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health.

In the matter of public safety and the restoration of posts and telegraph communications, the function of the unit was mainly to assist and co-ordinate the work of the Island authorities, the General Post Office officials, and the military authorities, and to provide liaison. A

Clothing Plan was prepared under which the unit was to be responsible for importing 218 tons of clothing and causing this to be equitably distributed by the Island authorities. The latter were to be assisted in introducing a modified form of the U.K. clothes rationing plan and in making arrangements for further imports of clothing after the first three months through normal post-war trade channels. The Ministry of Supply found it hard to adjust their preparations to the miniature scale of the Channel Islands and ultimately the Women's Voluntary Services arranged for the provision of the Islands' clothing needs. Similarly, under the Supplies Plan, the unit was responsible for importing three months supplies of food, soap, medical stores, tobacco, matches and miscellaneous items, and for ensuring fair distribution of these stocks and the superimposing of a modified form of the U.K. rationing plan upon the rationing measures already existing in the Islands. After the initial three months it was the intention that further imports should be obtained through normal trade channels. Except in cases of indigence, supplies brought in under military arrangements were to be paid for at rates to be fixed in keeping with those in force in the U.K. The plans provided for some departures from the rationing schemes then in force in the United Kingdom, having regard to the special hardships which had been borne by the Islanders during the enemy occupation.

The general intention of the Financial Plan was 'to assist the Islands administration as far as possible to re-establish without delay a sound and prosperous financial structure.' Banks and other financial institutions were to be helped 'to get back into full working order as soon as possible.' This involved the re-opening of channels of communication with the head offices in England of banks and financial institutions of all sorts, including insurance offices, friendly societies, and savings banks. For this purpose the five clearing banks operating in the Islands furnished the Controller of Finance and Accounts (C.F.A.) with a letter and enclosures for delivery to their branch managers in the Islands. These were requested to give the C.F.A. such assistance as he required and in particular to disclose to him, and to report to their head offices, the balances held in the branches. It was expected that German occupation currency and French *francs* would be found in circulation in addition to Channel Islands paper and Guernsey and U.K. coin. All forms of currency would be accepted in the initial stages, at rates based on those in force during the occupation. As soon as possible however, foreign currencies were to be withdrawn in exchange for sterling. For this and other purposes, such as use by the British force, or issue to the Islands authorities should the banks be unable to meet their requirements of currency, the unit was to bring in sterling notes and coin to the amount of £997,500. These stocks of currency were to be brought to the quayside in the U.K. by the Royal

Army Pay Corps. Thereafter responsibility for movement and custody would pass to No. 20 C.A. Unit.

The unit was explicitly relieved of direct responsibility for the feeding and control of the displaced persons expected to be found on the Islands. But it was believed that this might prove a heavy and difficult commitment and that the unit would be likely to find itself called upon to assist the military authorities proper in dealing with the matter.

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At the beginning of May 1945 it was clear that the time was at last approaching to put these plans into operation. On 2nd May the C.C.A.O. attended a conference at the Home Office for final preparations. The German forces on the 21 Army Group front surrendered with effect from 8 a.m. on 5th May. On the same day an envoy reached the Supreme Commander's headquarters at Reims to arrange for the general surrender of all German forces. This took effect at midnight on 8th May. Meanwhile at 9.45 a.m. on 8th May representatives of the Channel Islands Force Commander, including the C.C.A.O. had embarked in H.M.S. *Bulldog* and by 2 p.m. the party was a little to the south-west of Guernsey. A representative of the German commander was received on board. He was given terms of surrender to take back. At midnight, just as the general surrender to the Supreme Commander at Reims became effective, a plenipotentiary came on board and in the course of the night signed the local surrender. He went ashore again at 7.15 a.m. and half an hour later the C.C.A.O. and the Force Commander's representative, with two other officers landed at St. Peter Port amid scenes of 'tremendous enthusiasm'. The C.C.A.O. explained the arrangements planned for the administration of the Islands, and at 2 p.m. a small advanced party disembarked, consisting of one officer and twenty-five other ranks. Five of them were members of No. 20 C.A. Unit. A similar party landed in Jersey, at St. Helier, the same day. A small flag-hoisting ceremony was held both at St. Peter Port and St. Helier amid great rejoicings. The unit war diary entry for the 10th May ran:

"Continued discussions with island authorities in St. Peter Port and St. Helier. Telephonic communication between islands is established. Germans behaving very correctly. Rapid progress made everywhere explaining plans, everyone very pleased and grateful for trouble taken. It appears that little or no rations have been issued by Germans since Red Cross parcels began to arrive in VEGA. These parcels have been quite invaluable."

On 11th May the C.C.A.O. visited Jersey. On 12th, the main body

of the liberation force made landings at St. Peter Port and St. Helier. Formal flag-hoisting ceremonies were held that day in the presence of the Force Commander, at 2 p.m. in St. Peter Port and 6 p.m. at St. Helier. The Force Commander's Proclamation and a message from H.M. the King were promulgated. The Channel Island Force numbered about nine thousand whereas the strength of the German occupation force was twenty-seven thousand. It was impossible to confine or disarm the Germans individually. They were ordered to withdraw behind a certain line by a given hour. There was looting, and hooliganism before the British could arrive and stealing continued afterwards. On 14th May the Home Secretary paid a visit to both Guernsey and Jersey. On 16th the occupying forces landed in Alderney. Re-occupation was complete. On 7th June, in perfect weather, Their Majesties the King and Queen flew first to Jersey and then to Guernsey to meet again their loyal subjects of the Channel Islands.

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In comparison with areas that had been bombed, or fought over, the physical conditions found were far from bad. Buildings were shabby but there had been little or no destruction and they could very quickly be made habitable, if they were not already so. An exception to this was Alderney where damage was greater than in Jersey or Guernsey. Everywhere there was a great shortage of furniture and domestic equipment. The former had been requisitioned by the German forces, but owing to the coal shortage much had been broken up and burnt both by Germans and by inhabitants of the Islands. Public utilities were in fair order: water and electricity were available throughout Jersey and Guernsey. Gas became available a month after liberation, when coal arrived. Much of the islands had been mined. Very extensive fortifications had been built and there were immense stocks of ammunition for the guns in these.

The inhabitants had undoubtedly been short of food, particularly of bulk such as bread and potatoes, but health had not suffered seriously. It had, for example, been possible for the Islands to import surplus agricultural produce from Normandy, such as Camembert cheeses, which had not been seen in the U.K. for years. But there would have been a much sorrier story to tell had it not been for the supplies brought to the Islands by the S.S. *Vega*, from the end of December 1944 onwards.

The spirit of the Islanders was excellent and cordial relations were immediately established with the incoming Civil Affairs unit. These continued excellent throughout the military period at the level of the unit Command and the Channel Islands authorities. At a lower level, among the general public, there were many who had little realization

of the strains to which the U.K. economy had been submitted by the war, or of the damage done in other countries. As a result many people expected more than could by any means have been done for the Islands in the early stages. Dissatisfaction with the variety and quality of clothing imported, and impatience because the return of evacuees could not proceed faster, were among the symptoms of this lack of understanding. A general lethargy arose, partly from the same reason, the failure to realize the increased pressure of life in wartime in the U.K. Partly it sprang from the character of the Islanders. Mostly it was a result of prolonged under-nourishment. Agriculture and horticulture were suffering from lack of fertilizers and lime. Milk production had declined owing to the absence of cattle-cake. All agricultural activity was affected by uncertainty and unsettled conditions. In Jersey Colorado beetle was found, because, it was said, the Germans had prevented access to land near military sites and so rendered the necessary counter-measures impossible.

The export of Jersey potatoes to the U.K. was stopped in consequence, which was a severe blow to the revival of the economy of the Island. Guernsey, on the other hand, was able to begin exporting tomatoes to the U.K. again from the earliest days of re-occupation. Attempts were made to revive the fishing industry and the unit arranged for the provision of gear. But, commented the Civil Affairs officers, 'it's surprising to note that the leading fish traders are not really interested in developing local fishing but are anxiously awaiting the day when they can telegraph their orders to Grimsby and get the fish delivered by the mail boat next day.'

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Implementation of the Financial Plan proceeded smoothly, if not very fast. It was found that the authorities in Guernsey had already redeemed all German currency in the island. In Jersey arrangements were made to begin redemption on 15th May, and this was completed by 23rd. High initial prices for indigenous produce were brought tumbling down, by as much as fifty per cent, as the result of a ban on purchases by troops. It was not long before the ban could be lifted again by stages. Prices of imported food and clothing were fixed with regard to the prices current in the U.K.

The levels of prices and wages had not risen in the Channel Islands while they were under German occupation as they had done in the U.K. The level of wages was accordingly out of keeping with the prices fixed and it immediately became clear that increases would be necessary. Adjustment needed to be gradual if the economy of the islands was to be protected from undue distortion. The Islands authorities were fully alive to the situation and the process of revision began during the military period.

There was need at the same time for the imposition of fresh taxation to mop up some of the surplus spending power that had got into other hands during the occupation. The C.A. unit pressed frequently for the preparation of proposals but these were slow in coming forward and little had been done before the end of the military period.

It was part of the unit's task to report on the financial position of the Islands administrations, and to try and help them back to health. Both administrations, whose revenues during 1946 were estimated to be of the order of £600,000, with expenditure of similar amounts, were in debt to the extent of some £4¼ million. There was good hope that the earning power of the Islands and the revenues of their administrations would in due course revive but it was clear that financial assistance would be required from the U.K. in order to pay off these debts. There was also the question of compensation for war damage. The view of the U.K. government was that '... the primary consideration must not be compensation out of public funds for damage or loss sustained, but the taking of the measures immediately necessary for re-establishment of the economic life of the Islands.' They were ready to assist in meeting the cost of such measures but the first thing was to prepare an assessment of the amount of damage suffered. Work on this was beginning as the military period came to an end.

It was clear that these two matters could not be brought to any conclusion within the short military period. In view of the part played and knowledge acquired by Mr. Bickmore and Mr. MacKinnon, S.O.1. and S.O.2. Finance, in connection with these problems, it was agreed that they should remain in the Islands in an advisory capacity for some time after the hand-over to civil government.

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The legal task resolved itself, mainly, into a scrutiny of occupation legislation throughout the Islands. There was, on the one hand the legislation which had been enacted by the States of Jersey and the States of Guernsey. This had received the approval of the German Commandant but, of course, had not received the Royal Assent. In the absence of this, there was doubt as to the validity of these laws. It was necessary to consider which measures were required to remain in operation and to submit them for the Royal Assent.

On the other hand there was legislation which had been enacted by the German authorities. This was mainly of the Defence Regulations type and ceased to be valid on liberation. But for the period of the occupation it had been valid and had validly governed the conduct of the Islanders. And some of its provisions were still required. It was necessary to ascertain what legislation of this kind had been enacted. This was not always a simple matter. German enactments

which were required to be brought into force in the Islands were sent to the two administrations for formal registration as valid within their jurisdictions. In Guernsey separate formal registration was made of each enactment so that in this case there was no difficulty. But in Jersey, in order to avoid the repeated indignity of complying with requests from the German authorities for registration, a different procedure was adopted. The administration passed an omnibus resolution conferring registration on all enactments brought forward by the Germans. In this case it was a matter of some difficulty to find out what laws had been enacted.

Having ascertained what legislation of both kinds had been enacted it was necessary to validate or re-enact what was still needed and to draft fresh legislation to remove anomalies or to cover gaps that had arisen over the whole field of legislation during the occupation. In Guernsey the civil legal staff was much depleted and legal officers of the unit were able to fill some of the gaps, so long as they were in the Island.

A delicate problem arose from the public demand for the prosecution of collaborators. This was particularly strong in Jersey. The law which could be invoked was the Treason Act and the Treachery Act. Defence Regulation 2A (acts done with intent to assist the enemy) was not available since at the relevant time the Defence Regulations were not in force in the Channel Islands. After exhaustive investigation of allegations and of the law available it became clear that, although there was some evidence that a number of people had indulged in conduct '... of a highly reprehensible and even of a disloyal nature ...' which might conceivably have brought them within the scope of Defence Regulation 2A, there was nothing which, if proved, would amount to treachery or treason. The Island authorities abandoned the idea of prosecuting. They decided to press on with taxation measures which they hoped would not only counter inflation but also be seen by the public to enforce the disgorgement of the profits of collaboration.

There were delays in the import of clothing but this did not matter since much of the clothing eventually brought in had to be shipped away again. Clothing imported by the Red Cross just before re-occupation had taken the edge off the Islanders' appetite. And the fall in the quality of goods as a result of the war came as a shock to them. But mainly this was due to refusal of retailers to handle the goods, in the possibly well-founded belief that they could buy more attractive and more profitable stocks through normal commercial channels. The Supplies Plan was implemented with the greatest smoothness. Purchasing Commissions were set up in Guernsey and Jersey and early in June sent their representatives to London where they established themselves in the Home Office. By the end of the

military period a reserve of Civil Affairs supplies had been built up and stocks were already flowing down normal commercial channels.

One other task was to arrange for the repatriation to the Channel Islands of residents who had moved to the U.K. when the German occupation threatened. Plans were drawn up for thrice-weekly steamer sailings to begin on 25th June. Priority was to be accorded to those with homes and work in the Islands and whose services were needed in the public interest. After a disappointingly slow start the scheme worked well. By the end of the military period sailings were used to the full, some 700-800 persons arriving weekly, but the waiting lists were still long. A considerable number of persons, who intended to return to the U.K. permanently, or for a considerable time, travelled in the opposite direction.

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A particular, and particularly difficult, problem was represented by the Island of Alderney. This was re-occupied on the 16th May. The only persons found on the island were some fifty displaced persons. There were none of the original British residents. The island was heavily mined. Houses were dilapidated and mostly without furniture, but electricity and water were available. There was no gas. The Germans had established a farm on the island. The displaced persons were set to work on this to grow vegetables. There was a herd of cows that produced a surplus of butter.

Alderney was excluded from the re-patriation scheme. Although the Home Office had been informed in March 1945 that the majority of the Islanders wished to return it was undesirable, indeed impracticable, to bring them back unless certain physical conditions could first be established in the Island. Even then it would be impossible for Islanders to return unless they could be accorded financial assistance until their farms or quarries yielded a livelihood again. Plans were discussed, on Alderney and at the Home Office in London. In July British troops and German prisoners of war were set to the task of making such minimum essential construction and repairs as would enable the return flow to start. This involved making habitable a house and office for the civil government representative who would be in charge. It also involved the repair or construction of shops for the supply of essential daily needs, of a transit camp for returning Islanders, and of some three hundred houses. Work began with resources locally available and the Home Office promised to ship 1,000 tons of building materials. But the long term questions had not been answered before the end of the military period. The C.C.A.O. fired a volley of them at the Home Office. 'How much reconstruction is to be done? For how many people, and who are these people? What is going

to be the foundation of the Islanders' life in future? Quarrying, farming, tourists? . . . who is going to say this? Above all who is going to pay for the immense amount of work needed? Who is going to pay the islanders and subsidise allowances until their farms or quarries are producing again? . . . who is going to say that certain islanders can come back while others cannot? Do the islanders in fact want to come back?' He urged the early establishment of an Alderney Committee. This was already being considered by the Home Office, and a committee was appointed in August.

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Few subjects taken up in this chapter have been treated to a conclusion, for the period of military government was indeed short. One matter has not been touched upon at all because no effective action could be taken until after the period of military administration, and because it fell altogether outside the scope of those concerned only with short term problems. Yet it was in the background of many people's thoughts from the early days of liberation. This was the agitation for the reform of the antiquated and largely undemocratic constitutional and judicial systems surviving in the Islands. The agitation was partly a matter of principle but involved also allegations of misconduct by the administration during the German occupation. It was felt that these matters could not satisfactorily be taken up until fresh elections had given a renewed mandate to the elective assemblies the life of both of which would have expired during the occupation had it not been extended by emergency legislation. Elections could not be held until December 1945 four months after the hand-over of responsibility from the military administration to the civil governments.

This chapter has been concerned more with planning than with execution, but in the circumstances this is perhaps not unreasonable. The period of military responsibility in the Islands was a bare three and a half months, the Lieutenant-Governors taking over responsibility from the military commander on 25th August 1945. Active operations had ceased by the time that No. 20 C.A. unit took the field, and war had in any case long passed by the Channel Islands. Above all it was British territory that was being re-occupied. With the full and unhesitating co-operation that this made possible, and with the absence of the questions of prestige that frequently bedevilled Civil Affairs elsewhere, it is understandable that interest should centre, not so much upon the execution, which proceeded with exemplary smoothness, as upon the nature of the plans drawn up for a situation which was without precedent for the British in the European theatre of operations.

The ultimate objective towards which the short term military administration looked was the rehabilitation of the social and economic

structures of the Channel Islands. Some twenty thousand to twenty-two thousand persons out of a total population of forty thousand had left Guernsey for the U.K. to escape the German occupation. From Jersey the number was twelve thousand out of a population of fifty-one thousand. It was a question whether these people would return. That in fact the population of the Islands did return and is now greater than it ever was is some indication that the task of rehabilitation was not ill-done.

CHAPTER XI

SUPREME COMMANDER'S PLANS FOR GERMANY

IN Chapter IV an account has been given of the plans for the deployment of the British Civil Affairs organization in France. All these stopped short of the occupation and administration of Germany. The organization to be deployed there might not differ substantially from that for Civil Affairs but its purpose would be very different. A fresh series of instructions was clearly desirable.

It was expected that a tripartite control commission would assume responsibility for the control of Germany at the centre as soon as possible after entry into Berlin. Until then the Supreme Commander would remain responsible in areas occupied by Anglo-American forces. The new series of instructions stemmed formally from a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to S.C.A.E.F. that was approved on 28th April, 1944, but much preparatory work had been done earlier. This directive was confined to the period before the surrender or defeat of Germany. It was understood that a further directive would be issued for the period after surrender and before the control commission could assume responsibility. The distinction between the two periods was not at first sharply drawn or rigidly observed. It suddenly became important four months later.

Military action during the pre-surrender period would consist of the culminating stages of the great 'Operation Overlord', which was due to begin on the beaches of Normandy, shortly after issue of the directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Its shape could not at this stage be foreseen, for all depended upon the resistance offered by the enemy and the way in which the battle developed.

After surrender it was common ground between the three great Allies that the whole of Germany should be occupied, not merely a part, and agreement was soon to be reached as to the boundaries of three zones of occupation into which Germany would be divided. There was no doubt that the eastern zone would be occupied by Russia, but many months were to pass before it could be agreed which of the other two Allies should occupy the north-western zone, and which the south-western. Both wanted the north-west because of its industrial plants and techniques. But beyond this, the British considered that they had an overwhelming strategic interest in the control of the area. And

President Roosevelt had gained the impression that occupation of the south-west would necessarily involve American policing of a line of communication through France. To this he was strongly opposed both for political reasons and because of personal dislike for dealings with General de Gaulle. In August 1944, when no agreement had been reached, and it seemed that occupation of Germany might be at hand, the Supreme Commander cabled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he proposed to settle the question, during his period of responsibility, purely on grounds of military convenience. In the normal course of operations the British 21 Army Group would enter Germany on the left of the Allied front, the American Twelfth Army Group on the right. These relative positions of the British and American Forces derived from the original needs of the 'Overlord' plans for the southward crossing of the channel; it was preferable then that the Americans, who had landed in Northern Ireland, and established their bases, and made their preparations, in the west of England should assault on the west i.e. the right, while the British, the weight of whose preparations and resources were in the south-east of England, should assault on the left. The long standing controversy was settled in September 1944 at the second Quebec Conference. American proposals put forward there for transposition of the American and British forces, on the ground that this would enable the former to gain a direct sea line of communication to the great north-western ports of Germany, were dropped on the grounds that they would have involved a crossing of the British and American lines of communication, until the German ports could be opened, with the attendant logistical difficulties. It was decided that British forces should occupy the north-west of Germany, American forces the south-west.

During the advance into Germany both British and American forces would continue to be maintained through the 'Overlord' ports and along the L. of C. through France, Belgium and Holland and later through Antwerp. As soon as possible after entry into Germany it was planned to maintain the British forces through the port of Hamburg, and the American through Bremen and Bremerhaven. As a corollary to the decision that the north-west of Germany should be occupied by the British, a decision that placed both these ports of entry within the British zone, it was agreed in Quebec that 'control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in the immediate vicinity, will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.'¹

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Before turning to the military government plans for the pre-surrender and post-surrender periods, it may be convenient to recollect

¹ Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI., London, 1954, p. 142.

in bald outline, the development of events, and administrative conditions in Germany.

Germany under Hitler was governed by a highly centralized authoritarian government which had taken the constitutional forms of 1933 and so perverted or emasculated them as completely to destroy the Weimar republic without ever effecting formal repeal or abrogation of the constitution. Power had been seized by and through the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei*, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or, more shortly, the Nazi Party. This was the creation of Hitler to serve as his instrument in the pursuit of power. The party drew its membership mainly from three sources. There was, first, a genuine working class element, socialist but not communist, nationalist rather than internationalist. To this was added what remained of the *Freikorps* and other irregular forces of the period immediately following the First World War, those para-military organizations which, in the later guise of the S.A. (*Sturmabteilungen*), were to conceal the hidden reserves of the severely limited regular army. But it was probably the third element that most influenced the political character of the party. This consisted largely of rootless ex-service men who, if not of the middle-class nevertheless clung, with a pertinacity that sprang from their lack of other qualifications, to the belief in their superiority to the working class. These were frustrated men, nostalgically remembering the figure they had cut in the Army, the discipline that had relieved them of personal responsibility, and the security of regimentation. Policy the party had none, other than to seize and exercise power. But this did not matter. In a country that was disunited almost to the point of civil war, with an unfamiliar and therefore largely un-workable form of constitution, with a Government that was treated externally with suspicion and internally with contempt, a country moreover that was already prone to the worship of power, little other policy was needed. Hitler's passionate desire to seize and exercise power seemed to many to point the only way to the unification of Germany and the restoration of its self-respect.

Twelve years of blatant yet skilful propaganda, supported by hooliganism which was serious enough but as yet a faint shadow of the terrorism that was to come, built up the party, in spite of reverses, to a point at which in 1932 it gained thirty-seven per cent of the seats in the *Reichstag*. It was well short of an absolute majority over all other parties and was viewed with distaste by the propertied classes, by the army, and by President Hindenburg. It could not of itself form a government. Nevertheless it was the largest single party in the *Reichstag*. And the disunity of the remaining parties was such that no government commanding a majority could be formed by those opposed to Nazism. In this deadlock the business of the State was

carried on by a Chancellor selected by the President in his discretion and supported if necessary by the exercise of the President's emergency powers. At the beginning of 1933, however, when the very much smaller Nationalist Party overcame its reluctance to enter into a coalition with the Nazi Party, there was at last hope that an absolute majority could be scraped together, with the help, perhaps, of the Centre Party. The President, in search of a constitutional government, summoned Hitler and appointed him Chancellor.

Events now moved fast. The police and propaganda machines of the State were at the new Chancellor's disposal and he did not hesitate to use them. The party had long been building up not only a private army, but a private government and administration paralleling the official government at all levels, so that it could wield authority without hesitation when the time came, whether power was gained by constitutional process or seized by force. These were brought into play at once. The civil administration and the police were purged and good Nazis appointed to key posts. Where this was not done the official administration was quickly made to realize that it must obey the instructions of the unofficial party administration. Police powers were conferred on many of the S.A. and S.S. (*Schutzstaffeln*) and the regular police were warned not to interfere. The *Reichstag* was dissolved and a general election ordered. The incident of the *Reichstag* fire was staged, and quickly followed by the Decree for the Protection of the People and the State, conferring wide emergency powers on the Government. Propaganda was intensified, brutality and violence were encouraged. Even so, the Nazis and the Nationalists gained only a bare majority in the election. But it was a majority.

Not long after, the *Reichstag*, under threat and cajolement, passed, by the two thirds majority necessary for amendment of the constitution, the Law for Removing the Distress of People and Reich. Under this the power was conferred upon Hitler for four years to enact laws, even amendments to the constitution, and to conclude treaties, without reference to the *Reichstag*. Hitler was now entirely independent of the *Reichstag* and the President. In a few more months he had established his absolute control of the whole life and government of Germany.

The power so seized came to be formally exercised by Hitler, in the first place, through a personal secretariat which consisted of several Chanceries and the Bureau of the High Command of the Armed Forces. The official administration of the country was at first conducted by Hitler through the Cabinet and the Ministries. The Cabinet consisted of his Ministers, together with the chiefs of the Presidential, the *Reich*, and the Party Chancery, and certain other high officials. In the course of time, however, Hitler appointed a number, eventually a large number, of supra-Ministerial authorities. These enjoyed varying designations and functions but had this in common that they

derived their authority immediately from Hitler, and were under his direct control.

Below the central government there were, in general, three levels of administration. The first consisted of the *Länder* or States, some large such as Bavaria, some very small such as Brunswick, Anhalt, or Lippe. Prussia, the largest and the most important of the States before the rise of Hitler, was virtually dismembered into eleven *Provinzen* (twelve including Greater Berlin) which ranked with the *Länder*, but were in fact, in most cases, more important. Territory annexed since 1938 was formed into *Reichsgaue* which also ranked with the *Länder*. Below these the next level of general application was that of the *Kreise*, which might be *Stadtkreise* or *Landkreise*. The third and lowest level was that of the *Gemeinde*, which again might be a *Stadtgemeinde* or a *Landgemeinde*. These administrative units were often very small, the great majority having a population of less than one thousand.

Between the first and second levels, the *Länder* and the *Kreise*, an intermediate level was interposed, but only in the Prussian *Provinzen*, in the *Länder* of Bavaria, and Saxony, and in three of the *Reichsgaue*. This was the *Regierungsbezirk*. It found no place elsewhere. At none of these regional or local levels was there more than the slightest independence allowed to the local authorities by the central government. Of self-government there was no trace at all, since the closest control was exercised over the appointment and activities of local officials, either by the central government or by the parallel and unofficial Party administration.

It is possible that an objective and bare account, such as the foregoing, of the machinery by which Germany was governed may succeed in conveying an impression of regularity and decency which in the circumstances would be totally and dangerously misleading. It is well to remind ourselves that this machinery of absolutism was, in fact, operated by the Nazis for their own ends with complete and cynical ruthlessness, and that the Nazis were responsible for the establishment and operation of some five hundred concentration camps in which they murdered six million persons of whom some five million were Jews.

* * *

In the presurrender directive for Germany issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff the control of administration was no longer referred to as Civil Affairs. It had now become Military Government. The directive provided that:

‘Military Government will be established and will extend over all parts of Germany, including Austria, progressively as the forces under your command capture German territory. Your

rights in Germany prior to unconditional surrender or German defeat will be those of an occupying power.'

It added:

'By virtue of your position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority and power in the areas occupied by forces under your command.'

There was to be a firm and full assumption of authority by the Supreme Commander. International law and well-established international usage provided for such an assumption of authority and regulated its exercise.¹ It flowed from the fact that the legal government had been ousted by force of arms, and that *de facto* authority had been taken over by the commander of the occupying forces. It would continue to be exercised on this basis until such time as another had been provided by the terms of an instrument of surrender.

There was little indication in the directive as to the forms through which the Supreme Commander should exercise his far reaching powers, but he was instructed that 'Military government will be effected as a general principle through indirect rule'. He was further instructed that 'The principal link for this indirect rule should be at the *Bezirk* or *Kreis* level; controls at higher levels will be inserted at your discretion'. There were many reasons for instituting control at such a low level. Occupation was likely to be effected piecemeal, with the result that small administrative units were likely to come under control before complete larger units. Disruption of communications was likely to be such that all administration above the strictly local level might well be found to have disintegrated. Four fifths of the administrative organizations which would require to be brought under control were represented at the *Kreis* level. Only the remaining fifth, comprising the more complicated organizations, had their sole existence at higher levels. It was a lesson of the Allied occupation of Germany after the First World War that control, to be effective, must reach down well below the surface of any central administration. Most probably no central government would be found in existence through which control could be exercised. The best way to create such a government, if desired, would be by building upwards from foundations of healthy local administration. On the other hand it might well be undesirable to revive such a government at all, or for a time.

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S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group plans in accordance with the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff fitted into the general

¹ Hague Convention of 1907 (reproduced in *Manual of Military Law*, H.M.S.O., 1940, Ch. XIV.).

framework of the later stages of 'Operation Overlord'. The tempo of work on these was much accelerated by the break-out of the Allied forces from the Normandy bridgehead at the end of July 1944. German resistance had so weakened that a general collapse seemed possible. The Allies might be entering Germany by the Autumn. At S.H.A.E.F. a 'Handbook for Military Government in Germany prior to defeat or surrender' issued on 1st December 1944 after vicissitudes which will be referred to again later in this chapter.

The organization to be deployed under these plans was in no way different from that which had been adopted for Civil Affairs operations in the Allied countries. During the earliest, first-aid, stages even the objectives to be pursued were not different – the restoration of law and order, the prevention of disease and unrest, the ensuring that refugees would not obstruct the movements of Allied forces.

The decision reached at Quebec that the British should occupy the north-west zone of Germany involved the establishment of an American right of way through Bremen and Bremerhaven for the maintenance of their forces in the south-west of Germany. On 6th February 1945 the following agreement was reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British Zone subject always to the right of the American Commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.
2. The United States interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the South-Western Zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one Government through the Zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service each military Zone Commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/British) requirements of movement and transport from the other to assist in the co-ordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

It was intended that Bremen should be captured by Second British Army but that complete responsibility for the enclave should be transferred to American forces as soon as possible. American liaison officers were to be attached to Second Army, and afterwards to the British formations and Military Government detachments responsible for areas adjacent to Bremen.

* * *

Towards the end of July 1944 interest turned to 'operations in Europe in the event of German surrender'. Extensive planning for these had begun in the U.K. months before the launching of 'Operation Overlord', when it had been judged possible that Germany might surrender in the autumn of 1943. The success of this operation had rendered some of their detail obsolete. It also made it urgent to review the plans and bring them to readiness.

These plans were given the code name of 'Eclipse'. In their operational aspects and so far as they affected the British forces, they contemplated that the eventual military organization for the occupation of the British zone of Germany would be under the command of British Zone Headquarters. The zone would be subdivided into four Corps Districts, each Corps under the direct command of Zone Headquarters. In addition a fifth Corps would form a mobile central reserve. Within this framework the garrison would be progressively reduced as much as possible. It was expected that the change-over from the flexible and mobile organization, appropriate while active operations were still in progress, to this static organization would be achieved in three successive phases.

In the first phase, following immediately upon the German surrender, British troops were to advance with all possible speed in order to seize strategic areas throughout that part of Germany that fell within 21 Army Group boundaries until they established contact with the Russians. These areas were likely to be the Rhine crossings, Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel and the lines of communication to them. Military government was to be established along the lines of their advances. On the left flank forces might have to be detached to disarm and concentrate Germans in north-west Holland and in the part of Germany falling to the north of the line of the advance on Bremen. A British division and ancillary troops were to be sent to Berlin.

In the second phase occupation of the remaining parts of the 21 Army Group area would be completed and military government would be established throughout the area. Redeployment of forces would be undertaken to ensure that the areas actually occupied by the British, American, and Russian forces coincided with the agreed national zones of occupation. When this had been done 21 Army Group would become British Zone Headquarters, Army Headquarters would disappear, and the several Corps would assume their static roles as Corps Districts or become the central mobile reserve.

In the final phase, which was not expected to supervene for a considerable time, demilitarization and the repatriation of Allied prisoners and all displaced persons would be completed, and the occupation forces could settle down to their long term tasks which were defined in the 21 Army Group pamphlets as being:

- (a) to ensure that the Germans have no opportunity of reviving their ability to make war,
- (b) to complete the eradication of Nazism and German militarism,
- (c) to re-educate German youth.

At an early stage in the development of these phases it was expected that the Anglo-American Supreme Headquarters would be dissolved and that the British Commander-in-Chief would cease to owe allegiance to any authority other than the United Kingdom Government.

So far as specific preparations for military government were concerned, the expected directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the post-surrender period never came. The reason for this was inability to reach Anglo-American agreement, in circumstances which will shortly appear. On 7th May 1945, with fighting at an end, and with no further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander decided that since his directive for Military Government of Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender, and the S.H.A.E.F. Handbook for Military Government of Germany, were not significantly different from U.K. and U.S. post-surrender policies, so far as these were known to him, the directive and handbook should continue in force for the post-surrender period.

In the directive and handbook it had long been planned, within these general policies, to establish military government control at three levels below that of the central government. The plans for dealing with the centre will be described in a later chapter. The highest level was that of the *Provinzen* and the larger *Länder*, the next that of the *Regierungsbezirke* and the smaller *Länder*, the lowest but first to be established that of the *Kreise*. Control was to be indirect, whenever possible: that is to say, the relations of the Military Government officers would be not with the public but with the heads of the local administration at the various levels, the *Oberpräsidenten*, the *Regierungspräsidenten*, the *Oberbürgermeister*, and the *Landräte*. No control was to be undertaken at *Gemeinde* level, except through the *Kreis* authorities.

The boundaries of Corps Districts were intended to follow civil administrative boundaries so as to include the whole of one or more *Provinzen* or *Länder* within a district. Military Government detachments of appropriate size and composition, and under the command of officers of appropriate seniority, were to be established at the headquarters of all *Provinzen*, *Länder* and *Regierungsbezirke*, and also of the principal *Kreise*. An important town might well be the headquarters at the same time of a *Provinz*, a *Regierungsbezirk*, a *Stadtkreis* and a *Landkreis*. Four separate Military Government detachments would be located in such a town, each concerned with administration at its own particular level or within its particular sphere.

During the process of deployment it was intended that *Kreis* detachments, which might ordinarily be expected to be the first on the ground, should operate under the command of Corps. *Regierungsbezirk* and the smaller *Land* detachments were to come under the command of Armies. *Provinz* and the larger *Land* detachments were to be under Armies or under Army Group as the situation demanded. After the completion of deployment, when the static phase had begun, a change was to be introduced in the command arrangements. *Kreis* detachments were to become responsible to the *Regierungsbezirk* or *Land* detachment concerned, the latter was to become responsible to the *Provinz* department, and this in turn to come under the command of the Corps District. In other words, a separate Military Government chain of responsibility was to be established below the level of a Corps District headquarters since the area of a Corps District was, broadly speaking, the smallest viable unit of civil government ; above that level the normal military chain of command was to remain effective.

It had been contemplated that the 'Eclipse' plans would supersede 'Overlord' arrangements either on the date of formal surrender by the German forces or, if there were no formal surrender, on a date to be fixed arbitrarily. In view, however, of the piece-meal occupation of Germany and consequent gradual supervention of 'Eclipse' conditions, it was decided in April 1945 that no arbitrary date should be selected, for the transition from 'Overlord' to 'Eclipse' and that 'Operation Eclipse' would be assumed to have begun in those areas of Germany progressively over-run by Allied forces and that all plans and preparations for the execution of the policy contained in S.H.A.E.F. 'Eclipse' Memoranda, as appropriate to current operations, would be put into effect without delay.

* * *

Clearly, the policy underlying, and the spirit informing, the establishment of a military government in an enemy country must be very different from those appropriate to the conduct of Civil Affairs in Allied or friendly countries. But when it came to formulating a policy it was also clear that there was no unanimity of view, either between Americans and British, or within the two camps, as to what precisely they should be. No firm policy was ever evolved during the period with which this book is concerned.

In Allied countries the Supreme Commander's policy was to aid both the local administration and the central government to re-establish themselves early, to interfere as little as possible with their activities, to enlist their friendship and support, and to transfer the greatest measure of responsibility at the earliest date permissible, having regard to the essential requirements of military operations.

In Germany, on the other hand, the Supreme Commander was to exercise, in the words of the pre-surrender directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 'supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority'. The directive continued 'this authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to the exigencies of military operations and the objectives of a firm military government'. This theme was expanded in a Political Guide annexed to the directive:

'The administration shall be firm. It will at the same time be just and humane with respect to the civilian population so far as consistent with strict military requirements. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population. It should be made clear to the local population that military occupation is intended; (1) to aid military operations; (2) to destroy Nazism-Fascism and the Nazi Hierarchy; (3) to maintain and preserve law and order; and (4) to restore normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible, in so far as such conditions will not interfere with military operations.'

An Economic and Relief Guide instructed the Supreme Commander that 'in areas where there are no military operations in progress, when practicable and consistent with military necessity' he should:

'(a) See that the systems of production, control, collection and distribution of food and agricultural produce are maintained, that food processing factories continue in operation and that the necessary labour and transport are provided to insure maximum production . . .'

'(b) instruct the German authorities to restore the various utilities to full working order, and to maintain coal-mines in working condition and in full operation so far as transport will permit . . .'

Munition factories were to be closed down, unless their production was needed by the Supreme Commander. Other industrial productive capacity was to be preserved intact pending further instructions. It was not excluded that some of this might be required 'for the use of the United Nations'. Transport, communications, exports, imports, were all to be controlled in the interests of the Allied military effort. The Supreme Commander was, among other things, to 'instruct the German authorities to maintain the limits on prices and wages in force under the most recent German regulations'.

General Morgan's first comment on the instruction to 'restore normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible' was, aptly enough, that since about 1860 'normal conditions' in Germany had consisted of intensive preparation for the next war.

Apart from this the only policy enjoined for the treatment of Germany and the German people was non-fraternization and the extirpation of Nazism and the Nazi hierarchy. It was essential, added the political guide, to avoid all commitments to, or negotiations with, any political elements. It would be difficult to imagine anything more bleakly negative. A formidable series of questions arose. Was Germany to be dismembered? What were to be her boundaries in the west – was she to lose the Ruhr and the Saar? What sort of government or governments was it intended to set up? Was there to be any attempt to introduce or impose democracy? What reparation was Germany to be required to make? What standard of living were the Germans to be allowed? Above all, what was to be the general attitude towards Germany and the Germans? To most of these questions there could be no answer because there was no agreement between the Allies.

The main vehicle for the transmission of these necessarily vague political and economic policies to subordinate commanders within S.H.A.E.F., and for the development of their implications, was the S.H.A.E.F. 'Handbook for Military Government in Germany', work on the preparation of which was proceeding concurrently with the preparation of 21 Army Group plans. Doubt arose at S.H.A.E.F. whether the conditions to be expected on occupation of Germany were, in fact, those upon which the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was based. It was felt that this directive assumed that there would be at some date a single or mass surrender of the German forces. This now seemed far from probable. The Supreme Commander thought that the German Army might well never surrender as a whole and that on entering the country he might find a chaotic situation, with guerilla fighting, civil war, and no government in control. If these were to be the conditions on the entry of Allied forces into Germany, it seemed to the Supreme Commander that the economic structure of Germany was bound to collapse, notwithstanding any assistance that he might be able to give. In such circumstances he did not wish to be saddled with responsibility for controlling or trying to save the economic life of the country or for restoring normal conditions even to the extent contemplated in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 23rd August he represented these views to Washington and asked to be relieved of economic responsibility beyond the establishment, in accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of such economic and financial equilibrium as the conditions allowed.

To the British it did not seem that a complete collapse of the German structure was inevitable, or desirable, and they did not consider the Supreme Commander should be allowed to wash his hands of responsibility for its maintenance, at least up to the level contemplated in the original directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

And Anglo-American agreement having once been reached on the terms of the directive, they were extremely loath to reopen the flood gates of discussion. The reactions of the War Department in Washington were not dissimilar.

But just at this time Mr. Harry Hopkins had fallen from favour with President Roosevelt. The remarkable and intimate influence exercised by him passed, for a time and in a measure, but with less beneficent results, to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Junior, Secretary of the United States Treasury. Mr. Morgenthau had formulated for the President a comprehensive plan for the political and economic treatment of Germany after surrender, a plan which ranged far outside the primary sphere of Treasury responsibility. The 'Morgenthau Plan' contemplated that Germany should be stripped of much territory and that what remained of the country should be dismembered to form a South and a North German State. There was to be total destruction of the armament industry and also removal, by way of reparations or destruction, of other industries vital to military strength. In particular, the Ruhr, as the heart of German industrial power '... should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area'. Further '... all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed'. The area was to become part of a zone to be placed under international administration. There were to be no continuing payments of reparations which would have involved keeping parts at least of German industry alive. Instead, reparations were to be confined to the transfer of existing German resources, e.g. industrial plants, and existing German territory e.g. the Saar. In addition to the destruction and removal of resources, it was provided that there should be no Allied assistance whatever given to the German economy unless this was militarily necessary. 'The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations'. Allied control was to be established for at least twenty years in order to prevent the re-establishment of industries vital to the creation of military strength, and to regulate other industries. Germany, in fact, was to be left to stew in her own juice for a long time. This plan was taken up by the President with sudden enthusiasm. There had been no time for the British to reach a considered view, but their first reactions to this policy of creating chaos in Germany were sceptical and hostile. It was in this atmosphere that the Supreme

Commander's request to be relieved of economic responsibility in Germany was received in Washington.

But before any decision could be reached on the difficult question raised a sudden storm blew up over a different but not unconnected matter. For just at this time drafts of the S.H.A.E.F. Handbook for Military Government in Germany had somehow reached Washington. What happened then has been described in the U.S. Official War Histories:

'One copy had found its way to the President apparently through the Treasury Department. Mr. Roosevelt, in a strong memorandum to Secretary Stimson on 26 August, described the handbook as "pretty bad" and directed that it be withdrawn if it had not been sent out. The handbook displeased the President because of its emphasis on seeing that the governmental machinery of Germany ran efficiently and on retaining the highly centralized German administrative system unless higher authority directed otherwise. He disliked the statements that military government officers would see to it that needed commodities and stores were imported, industrial plants converted from war to consumer goods production, essential economic activities subsidized where necessary, and German foreign trade reconstructed with priority for the needs of the United Nations. President Roosevelt expressed displeasure because so many Americans and Englishmen held that the people of Germany were not responsible for the war, a view he insisted was not based on fact. "The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them", he declared, "that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization." If they needed food beyond what they had, to keep body and soul together, they should be fed with soup from Army kitchens, but he was unwilling to start a Works Progress Administration, a Civilian Conservation Corps, or a Public Works Administration for Germany when the Army of Occupation entered on its duties.'¹

At the end of August news of these developments reached S.H.A.E.F. informally. Then on 3rd September the Combined Chiefs of Staff cabled to the Supreme Commander. They objected that the handbook purported to apply to post-surrender conditions in Germany, procedures and policies based on the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was expressly confined to the pre-surrender period. They warned the Supreme Commander that policy for the post-surrender period was still under discussion and that the stabilizing policies which it was intended to apply while military operations still

¹ Forrest C. Pogue, *The European Theatre of Operations, The Supreme Command*. Washington, 1954, pp. 354-355.

continued had encountered opposition in some Washington quarters. Suddenly the distinction between the two periods of the Supreme Commander's responsibility became significant.

To this the Supreme Commander replied on 5th September, that final drafts of a German directive and handbook had since been sent to Washington and that he felt confident that these would be found to contain the Combined Chiefs of Staff policy for his period of responsibility to the extent that he felt this needed to be modified in view of the probability of economic collapse in Germany to which he had already drawn the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

On 6th October the Combined Chiefs of Staff, after consultation between the War Department in Washington and the War Office in London, required the Supreme Commander to redraft the handbook and directive to give effect to three principles. If any copies of the existing handbook had to be put into circulation before revision could be effected, a fly-leaf was to be added setting out the three principles. The first of these was:

'No steps looking toward economic rehabilitation of Germany are to be undertaken except as may be immediately necessary in support of military operations. In accordance with this policy the maintenance of existing German economic controls and anti-inflation measures should be mandatory upon the German authorities and not permissive as in the present edition of the Handbook.'

The first of these two sentences quoted expressed the President's view with complete clarity. The Supreme Commander was to be relieved of responsibility for rehabilitating the German economy to an even greater extent than he had requested. The British, despite uneasiness regarding the underlying Morgenthau policy, had accepted this principle without comment since it was not inconsistent with the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Also, since it was urgent that the handbook should issue, they were again influenced by a desire not to re-open discussion. And although they favoured a greater measure of economic rehabilitation than the President wished to allow, it was clear to them that, whatever they might hope for, physical limitations were likely to preclude anything more ambitious within the comparatively short period for which the pre-surrender handbook was likely to be in force. The second sentence was included because of a representation from the British in pursuance of their policy of standing firm on the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The War Office had pressed that the maintenance or imposition by the German authorities of a number of economic and financial control should be made mandatory and not merely permissive as in the handbook.

Typical of passages in the handbook that would require revision in the light of this second sentence were:

'During the period of activity of Military Government, the counter-inflationary controls already operating, such as rationing and measures to control prices and to combat black markets will be allowed to continue . . .'

'Until further instructions are issued, transactions in real estate and securities and transactions on Stock and Commodity exchanges will not be controlled by Military Government . . .'

'The objectives of Military Government . . . will be (a) to permit the German authorities to restore the agricultural and food administration . . . to its maximum efficiency . . .'

'The German Authorities will be permitted to control prices under the most recent German regulations.'

'The German Authorities will be permitted to continue the farm production system . . .'

'The German Authorities will be permitted to continue the regulation of prices and farm-product utilization . . .'

It was an odd situation. British and Americans favoured contrary economic policies towards Germany. Yet they agreed regarding the amendments which ought to be incorporated in the handbook, making the imposition of controls mandatory instead of permissive. The permissive form of these instructions had been adopted, not from any desire to absolve the Supreme Commander from economic responsibility, but from the belief that the modified revival of the German economy, which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had enjoined in their directive, and which the Supreme Commander expected would lighten his load, could best be brought about gradually by the interplay of natural economic forces. To make mandatory and permanent in peace, controls which had been established to meet the different conditions of war was likely, in the opinion of the S.H.A.E.F. planners, not to bolster up the German economy, but rather to hamper recovery and to create or continue a bankrupt, black market desert in Germany. It seemed to them that the amendments which the British demanded, in order that the Supreme Commander's handbook should accord with the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, could only operate to stultify the British policy of partial rehabilitation of the German economy, and would be likely to force the Supreme Commander to operate military government in the kind of chaos desired by the framers of the Morgenthau plan.

The second principle was:

'No relief supplies to be imported or distributed beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorders as might endanger or impede military operations.'

It is extremely doubtful whether those who drafted the handbook ever contemplated that relief supplies should be made available in excess of this level. But it is possible that the establishment by them of procedures for preparing estimates of requirements and demands and for handling imports, if these became necessary, may, in the absence of such a *caveat* as that prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, have suggested a greater readiness to make relief supplies available than was in fact the case. A time was to come when soup from the Presidents' 'Army Kitchens' would have represented luxury for many Germans.

The third principle was:

'Under no circumstances shall active Nazis or ardent sympathisers be retained in office for purposes of administrative convenience or expediency. The Nazi Party and all subsidiary organizations shall be dissolved. The administrative machinery of certain dissolved Nazi organizations may be used when necessary to provide certain essential functions, such as relief, health and sanitation, with de-Nazified personnel and facilities.'

The last sentence quoted was included in deference to British views which were that the Supreme Commander might well find himself forced for reasons of military necessity to make use, after adequate purging, of certain Nazi organizations, or parts of them. The passage of the draft handbook against which this was directed laid down the general rule 'that no holder of office in the Nazi Party organization should be continued in a governmental position unless there are compelling reasons for his retention'. Reasons would be considered compelling only if the agency in which the official served was one whose continuation was essential to military security and success in the achievement of the objectives of military government, and if the continuation in office of the official was essential to the continued functioning of the agency. This was felt to fall short of complete consistency with the declared aim of the United Nations to extirpate both Nazism and Militarism from Germany. In the final revision of the handbook, the discretion to retain for compelling reasons was omitted.

The almost complete withdrawal of the modest discretion allowed to the military government in the earlier draft was to lead to considerable difficulties which will be discussed more fully in a later chapter dealing with the general problem of de-Nazification.¹ Withdrawal would have been even more categorical but for the views expressed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the British authorities.

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Besides observing the three principles laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander was also very properly

¹ cf. Ch. XX.

called upon to eliminate from his Proclamation No. 1 the implication, to be found in the words 'as in other countries liberated from the horrors of Nazi tyranny', that Germany was a liberated not a conquered country.

The Morgenthau plan, which was the cause of the unfortunate last moment stiffening of the Supreme Commander's instructions, was strongly pressed by President Roosevelt and Mr. Morgenthau at the Quebec Conference in September 1944 and was there 'initialed' by the President and the British Prime Minister, the latter with his eyes on the grant to Britain of credits totalling \$6,500,000, for the prosecution of the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. But the plan encountered strong opposition in the United States. Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War, said 'I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it.'¹ Later he added 'The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.'² The plan was described by Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, as 'a plan of blind vengeance', through which the people of Europe would suffer dearly, since 'by completely wrecking German industry it could not but partly wreck Europe's economy'.³ The President was soon glad to allow wiser counsels to prevail. Meanwhile in the U.K. formal examination crystallized the initial British dislike of the plan. The conclusion reached was that it afforded no solution to the problem of preventing future aggression by Germany, that the economic advantages to Britain of eliminating German industrial competition were largely illusory, and that the creation of chaos in Germany would react to the grave disadvantage of Britain. The plan was soon allowed to drop out of currency and it exercised little influence upon Allied policy after the Potsdam Conference of July and August 1945, where more realistic views were adopted. But during the life of S.H.A.E.F. it disastrously bedevilled much military government planning. Although not strictly speaking directed at the pre-surrender period, it contributed to the difficulty of formulating policy and led to a stiffening of the Supreme Commander's plans in many parts of the military government field that must be judged to have been unfortunate. As for post-surrender policy, it was for many months a major cause of the inability to reach Anglo-American agreement. In the absence of this it was impossible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to issue any directive to the Supreme Commander for this period. Possibly, however, the greatest effect of the plan was incidental, in a sphere outside that of

¹ Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1947, p. 571.

² *Ibid.* p. 579.

³ Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, London, 1948, p. 1606.

military government, when its contents were revealed to the American press. The plan was pounced upon by the German propaganda machine as evidence of what the 'unconditional surrender' demanded by the Allies would mean for Germany, and may have been a factor in the bolstering up of German morale to continue the war through the winter.

The contrast between Civil Affairs and Military Government was summarized by 21 Army Group Headquarters in its plans for Operation 'Eclipse' in the following words:

'It will be seen from the above that the conduct of affairs vis-à-vis the civil population is totally different in liberated, friendly territories and in Germany. In the former we are dealing with our Allies and it is only the accident of war that brings us into their country. We therefore respect their sovereignty and their institutions, and we endeavour to work in harmony with them. We do not interfere with their laws, nor attempt to impose any of our own; and we claim no jurisdiction whatever over their citizens. There is only one reservation to the foregoing, viz: that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and subordinate commanders as delegated, reserves at all times the right to do anything which may be demanded by military necessity. This right has not yet been exercised. In Germany, on the other hand, it is the duty of commanders to impose the will of the Supreme Commander upon the German people. The diplomatic approach to the civil authority which is used in liberated territories will be replaced by the issue of orders, obedience to which will be exacted, and disobedience to which will be punishable in our own Military Government courts. The civil administration, and all aspects of civil life, will be directed and controlled according to the requirements of, initially, the Supreme Commander and, ultimately, the Control Council, whose authority will be final. Germany will be made to realise that this time she has been well and truly beaten in the field by force of arms, and must now do as she is ordered. Military Government is the instrument, so far as the civil population is concerned, by which these orders will be conveyed and enforced'

In the event, as will appear in the following chapters, there was little disposition on the part of the Germans to act otherwise than as they were ordered, and military government in the British zone soon acquired a less forbidding, more British character than had been contemplated in these plans.

CHAPTER XII

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

ON the evening of 11th September 1944 the first Allied forces set foot in Germany, when an American patrol crossed the frontier near Prüm. No appreciable exploitation of this advance was possible for some months. Following a change in the operational spheres of Second British Army and Ninth U.S. Army, XXX Corps became responsible early in November for the military government of a small area near Gangelt, some fifteen miles north of Aachen. Occupation was so gradual and so restricted, and communications were so devastated, that the re-establishment of administration had to be effected at even lower levels than had been intended, at that of the *Gemeinden* or townships. In each of these the Supreme Commander's proclamation and other notices were posted, a temporary *Bürgermeister* was appointed, and Allied military police assumed responsibility for the preservation of order. Disarming and registration of the population followed, and investigation of foodstocks.

The first reports from Military Government officers carry a slight suggestion of surprise at the attitude of the civil population. If the Allied forces of invasion had not expected a hostile attitude, they had at least, and very properly, been prepared for it. But, in fact, they found a hungry, tired, apathetic, war-weary people. Any underlying resentment at the presence of conquering hostile forces was more than offset by the hope which their arrival brought that the end of the war was in sight. Disciplined docility turned generally to willing cooperation as the nature of the Allied occupation became clear. The industrious habits of a hard-working people soon reasserted themselves even in weariness and destruction. Only by work could the people of Germany hope to feed, shelter and warm themselves.

There was frequently difficulty over the appointment of officials because the German authorities had insisted upon an almost complete withdrawal of the leading officials, of members of the Nazi Party, and of the police. They had even attempted, but with only partial success, to evacuate the civil population as the Allied forces entered Germany. The key to the problem was, naturally, the selection of a *Bürgermeister*. A schoolmaster might be selected, or a local business man, an ex-official dismissed by the Nazis, even someone who had worked under

the Nazis provided he was believed to have retained sufficient independence of outlook. Sometimes the priest assumed responsibility until a more permanent appointment could be made, for the area was predominantly Roman Catholic and the Church offered ready cooperation. Military Government officers took into account the quickly ascertainable record of a candidate, but a more thorough screening was undertaken by the Counter-Intelligence Corps before an appointment was confirmed. At first few appointments were confirmed because scarcely one experienced administrator in Germany could claim an altogether immaculate record. As more territory was occupied suitable candidates grew more numerous. The main difficulty then became their reluctance to accept office for fear that this would result in persecution of their relatives still behind the Nazi curtain.

The next problem was that of feeding the people of the occupied territory. No reserve stocks of food were found. If there ever had been any the Nazis had withdrawn or destroyed them before they left. There was an immediate shortage of flour and an impending shortage of milk. Meat, potatoes, and vegetables would suffice for two months or more. Although distribution of resources was very uneven, rural areas were naturally better off than Aachen. This city of 165,000 was practically deserted on occupation by the Allies. If it were to fill up again imports of relief supplies would soon become necessary notwithstanding the Allied policy of not helping the Germans. Normal agricultural production from the surrounding area might have hoped to meet the more important needs. But there was no prospect of normal production. Farmers and labourers (the latter already far below strength) had fled or been ordered away by the Nazis. There was no fuel for threshing. There was little transport and no petrol for collection and distribution. Had there been any, the restrictions on movement imposed by the Allied forces would have prevented their use. Finally, the whole of the collection and rationing of food had been administered by the Nazi Party. With the complete withdrawal of its members the organization, with its accumulated records and experience, entirely faded out. It was symptomatic of the total disintegration of the administrative life of the country that it was at first impossible to plan rationing for larger units than the several *Gemeinden* and that the systems evolved might vary considerably from one township to the next. In rural areas the imposition of rationing could wait. The scales fixed in the towns were designed to ensure that the people of Germany should on no account be better nourished than their neighbours in the liberated countries. But in the absence of records and of an experienced control organization it was difficult to make even a guess at the quantities of food that were actually being consumed by Germans.

The third main problem was to ensure that there should be enough money in circulation, and credit available if necessary, for the immediate needs of private persons and of local authorities. At first few banks were found since the great majority of these had fled or been withdrawn to Germany. But by January 1945 some had re-opened and the *Kreissparkasse*, the Savings Bank, in Aachen which had opened on 27th November was receiving many deposits and was in a position to grant a credit of RM 500,000 to the municipal authority. A credit of a similar amount was made by Military Government to a coal mine to keep this in operation. Other mines were able to continue on their own resources the restricted operation practicable. It had also become clear that inhabitants of the occupied area had provided themselves with cash reserves which they hoped would be sufficient to tide them over until the banks reopened. As for the local authorities, no uniform picture emerged. Each authority was forced to act on its own. Those with industries within their boundaries were able to collect at least some revenue and had less unemployment to relieve. Others had heavy payments to make in relief of unemployment or distress and no revenue coming in. Some began with good cash balances, others were not so fortunate. Most had lost records and experienced staff. It was urgent that collection of taxes should be revived, and that the *Landkreise* should resume control and coordination in respect of their constituent *Gemeinden*.

A particular difficulty arose in the British area because of the early decision to evacuate the whole of the civil population from Gangelt. The evacuation was ordered to preserve the secrecy of operations. It had the incidental advantage of enabling troops to be housed in covered accommodation during the heavy rain that preceded the next phase of the battle. Endless difficulties ensued. As there was no German territory yet occupied to which the civil population could be moved they had to be sent away to the Netherlands, and since there was no suitable accommodation near they were sent to a camp at Vught which has been mentioned in an earlier chapter.¹ Because there was no one left to tend the cattle, these were requisitioned and made over to the Dutch across the border. Crops were also seized and issued to the Army or sent to relieve the civil population in the Netherlands. Fodder was removed for the use of the requisitioned livestock. It accordingly became necessary to feed the evacuees at Vught. The seizure and removal of persons and property to the Netherlands also raised legal questions.² Consequently, notwithstanding the removal of the population, it became necessary to set up Military Government courts in Gangelt to punish those who attempted to return. When some weeks later it became necessary as a result of further operations to

¹ cf. Ch. VIII.

² cf. Ch. XXI.

accommodate another 2,500 German refugees, Gangelt was the only German territory to which they could be sent. Having denuded the area of food stocks in the course of the first evacuation it now became necessary to feed these refugees also. It was decided that there should in future be no evacuation of the civil population except for the most compelling reasons. Instead they would have to be confined to their houses.

The operations which had created the 2,500 German refugees referred to above also resulted in the need to evacuate 8,500 Dutch from destroyed villages and towns. These were moved back into Holland and dispersed there. Indeed throughout this period of first-aid it was the evacuation of civilians from places of danger, that loomed largest in the daily work of Civil Affairs or Military Government officers. Often these evacuations were made from areas forward of battalion headquarters. There were many lunatic asylums along the Belgian-Dutch-German border, most of them managed by religious orders. Nightmare conditions attended the rescue and evacuation of inmates which frequently had to be conducted at night under fire. In one place a hundred lunatics were found in the basement of a building the top of which had been destroyed. For weeks they had been cared for by members of a religious order. Their only light was that of a lamp worked by a priest pedalling a bicycle. They were ultimately evacuated to Belgium. If these evacuations were small in themselves, they and the practical physical difficulties presented added up to a major commitment.

Another unexpectedly heavy task at all times but particularly during the early stages of the advance into Germany was the care of cattle. Everywhere in battle areas, dead, wounded, stray, or abandoned animals were found, sometimes in very large numbers. Disposal of the dead and wounded, for public health reasons, and care and control of the living, in the interest of future food stocks, became such a large part of the work of Civil Affairs and Military Government Officers as to suggest the need for a staff specially recruited to deal with these tasks.

* * *

On 8th February the advance to the Rhine began, with XXX Corps under command of First Canadian Army striking south-eastwards into Germany from Nijmegen, between the Rhine and the Maas. This was the northern arm of a pincer movement to crush the German forces covering Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and the Ruhr. The Ninth and First U.S. Armies were lined up along the River Roer in readiness to strike north-eastwards, as the southern arm of the pincers. Their blow had been intended to follow a few days after the advance from Nijmegen but on 9th February the Germans destroyed the Roer

dams, so flooding the lower reaches of the river. The American advance could not begin until 23rd February. But then it moved swiftly, and on 3rd March the pincers closed near Geldern. On 10th March the last of the German forces to be extricated from the trap were driven back across the Rhine from their bridgehead on the west bank opposite Wesel. Second British Army, temporarily denuded of most of its forces in order to strengthen First Canadian Army's thrust, took no active part in these operations, but held the front between the two arms of the pincers. Meanwhile on 5th March First U.S. Army reached Cologne, and then struck southwards up the west bank of the Rhine, in conjunction with advances by Third and Seventh U.S. Armies in the Eiffel and the Palatinate. On 7th March First U.S. Army tanks found and seized the railway bridge over the Rhine at Remagen a few minutes before it was timed to be destroyed.

The Military Government detachments accompanying XXX Corps entered the *landkreis* of Cleve on 8th February. Even in normal times this corner of Germany wears a colourless, somewhat forgotten, appearance. Now entering troops encountered utter destruction. A large area was flooded. In the town of Cleve itself no more than one thousand inhabitants were found sheltering in the cellars and dugouts. Fewer still were found among the rubble and ruins of Goch. Profiting from the experience of Gangelt, orders were issued that civilians should not be evacuated even from these deserts. But the orders were often disregarded, fighting troops forcing out inhabitants in order to use what remained of their houses. At Bedburg, two miles south-east of Cleve, a large hospital and lunatic asylum, the *Rhein Provinz Heil*, was found comparatively undamaged. Its thirty-seven buildings included an administration building, churches, a central kitchen, a bakery, a laundry, and even what was described as 'an exceptionally fine prison'. The sanatorium staff were present together with some one thousand sick and mental defectives and a further two thousand refugees from neighbouring villages. It was decided to use the sanatorium as a centre for German refugees or evacuees, as quickly as the various headquarters and troops that had seized possession in the battle could be induced to move out. Meanwhile a tented refugee centre was established near Goch, where refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons (D.P.s) could be received and sorted out. The non-Germans were passed back to Holland: the Germans were returned to their homes, if the fighting permitted, or else were passed on to Bedburg. By the end of February it was estimated that the civilians in the area occupied by XXX Corps numbered some 9,000-10,000, of whom eight thousand were at the Bedburg colony.

The dreadful sanitary conditions forced upon the colony by circumstances were improved. Food was brought in from the countryside. Military Government Courts were set up to establish discipline.

Refugees were got back onto their farms as soon as this was possible. Early steps were taken to appoint a colony *Bürgermeister* with a German staff to whom responsibility for the administration of the colony could be transferred, under the general control of the appropriate Military Government officer.

Meanwhile as 21 Army Group forces reached the western bank of the Rhine it was decided that, in order to preserve the secrecy of preparations for the forthcoming crossing of the Rhine, the whole of the west bank must be entirely cleared of its civil population, to a depth of six thousand yards. This complicated and difficult operation ultimately involved the movement of some 25,000-30,000 persons and their livestock. It was conducted mainly by II Canadian Corps, but also by XXX Corps, at first under the control of First Canadian Army, later under Second British Army, often in conditions of danger and hardship.

It was planned to accept these evacuees at Bedburg under canvas around the sanatorium and its organization. But while tentage was being collected some of the evacuees had to be placed temporarily in 'retention centres'. By the 10th March seven thousand had been received at Bedburg in addition to the earlier population. A week later eleven thousand had been sent there, the total population being twenty thousand. Seven subsidiary camps had been grouped round the sanatorium. Some three thousand persons still remained to be moved into the colony.

Throughout this period reports speak of the extensive looting indulged in by British troops. There was wanton slaughtering of livestock. Museums were pillaged, banks were rifled. Churches, monuments, works of art were desecrated, archives destroyed. The newly appointed Director of Military Government, Major-General G. W. R. Templer, found an immensely valuable collection of ceramics in a medieval castle totally and wantonly destroyed by the occupying British troops. But there were also entries on the credit side. At Cleve Major R. E. L. Balfour, a specialist officer charged with the care of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives, lost his life while rescuing two sculptured altar-pieces out of a fourteenth century church under shell and mortar-fire. A little earlier he had saved the archives of several towns including those of Goch, where also he was able to prevent the destruction of a medieval gateway to admit British tanks. In the archives room above the restored gateway there now hangs his photograph, with the words *Ehre Seinem Andenken*—honour to his memory.

On 13th March Second British Army moved into the area that had been occupied by the First Canadian Army advance across its front, in preparation for the crossing of the Rhine. First Canadian Army's interest swung back towards the north-east of the Netherlands. Initially VIII Corps assumed responsibility for the military govern-

ment of the Second Army area. The Bedburg Institute and the detachments there were placed under the direct command of Second Army. A week later, as the time for the assault across the Rhine and into Germany drew near, VIII Corps relinquished its responsibility for the area between the Rhine and the Maas to Second Army, and Second Army called in 507 Detachment under Colonel Usher, whom we last noticed at Caen, to assume charge of the area under the general control of the Army Military Government staff.

Many perplexing problems of evacuation and accommodation continued to press upon the Military Government officers. And all the time the forces and equipment for the approaching crossing of the Rhine were pouring into the area. The numbers accommodated at Bedburg rose from twenty thousand to twenty-two thousand and again a few days later to twenty-four thousand. The colony could take no more. Summary Military Government Courts had been set up at Bedburg, Goch, Kevelaer and Sonsbeck and were trying cases. A General Military Government Court was convened at Bedburg where also Second Army Prison was located.

Relief came swiftly as soon as the attack across the Rhine had been launched. From 26th March onwards a gradual return of evacuees to what was left of their homes in the evacuated strip was initiated. By 23rd April Bedburg was completely cleared of refugees.

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A few days before the crossing of the Rhine Major-General G. W. R. Templer succeeded Brigadier T. Robbins at 21 Army Group Headquarters, with the new designation of Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government and a greatly increased war establishment. By now Civil Affairs interest and activity had mostly passed elsewhere, to the S.H.A.E.F. Missions, and to Netherlands District for the relief of western Holland. But for Military Government in the British zone this was a momentous appointment. For the first time the General Staff at 21 Army Group began to observe the spirit of the War Office instructions that the head of the Civil Affairs and Military Government Branch was to be a Staff Officer with standing comparable to that of the senior G, A, or Q Staff Officers of the headquarters.¹ For the first time they really began to study the problems of military government.

A fortnight before the arrival of General Templer a Military Government staff officer was writing:

‘Sometimes I pray that I may be given strength to endure so that I may be in at the death; at other times I wonder whether

¹ cf. p. 27.

the ceaseless bitter struggle against one's own side is worth while.'

A fortnight after the arrival of the General the same staff officer wrote:

'We are really in the picture now, and people are beginning to understand what we have preached in vain for so long.'

Partly this change of attitude sprang from realization that the end of the war was in sight, when the problems of military government would soon acquire a greater interest and importance than those of military operations, when administration might even offer better prospects than soldiering. Partly it was owing to the impact upon the rest of the staff of the dynamic personality of Major-General Templer which also brought encouragement to the Military Government branch itself. Most of all it resulted from the fact that the new Director was a regular officer, acceptable to other soldiers and experienced in doing business with them.

In policy and ideas there was no great change, indeed it is clear that none was necessary, which constituted a striking tribute to the excellence of the planning and preparations undertaken by the Civil Affairs and Military Government staff under Brigadier Robbins, and particularly his chief staff officer, Brigadier A. E. Hodgkin. Their work was clearly sound and endured, and it made possible the later successes of the Director.

But a price had to be paid for these advantages, and in north-west Europe it took the form of a certain hardening in Anglo-American relations and opinions at S.H.A.E.F., as a more forceful, less accommodating spirit developed at 21 Army Group. In the circumstances of the time, with S.H.A.E.F. nearing the end of its life, and the gigantic problems of the administration of the Ruhr looming up, the loss of cooperation at S.H.A.E.F. was more than offset by the gain in purpose and efficiency within the British zone – if it was not possible to enjoy both.

* * *

The crossing of the Rhine on the 21 Army Group front was forced during the night of 23rd–24th March, on either side of Wesel. Second British Army crossed to the north, Ninth U.S. Army, temporarily under 21 Army Group, to the south, and XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, temporarily under command of Second Army, was dropped beyond. First Canadian Army on the left was to cross later in order to protect the flank of the bridgehead and prepare to join in the subsequent advance. Second Army itself attacked with XXX Corps on the left,

XII Corps on the right. The enormously powerful blow struck completely devastated all towns within the bridgehead seized. As earlier, in Caen, the destruction was so great that rubble and masonry obstructed the advance of the tanks. The town of Wesel was completely devastated. Government buildings, banks, the prison, were totally destroyed. The Nazi Party offices were extensively damaged. No public services operated, there was no transport and no fuel. The whole of the normal population had fled. Not one of the police force of forty was found. There was no one to appoint as temporary *Bürgermeister*. No records or archives were found except that the card indexes of local members of the S.A. were fortunately captured. Some twenty German refugees and some 450 displaced persons made their way into the smoking ruins. There was food for one day. The little walled town of Rees overlooking the Rhine was equally battered. As Army vehicles bumped and twisted along the only track cleared for them their advance was brought to a halt. It was a Russian worker who had previously been employed mending bombed roads and was now setting off to drive, in his diesel-engined roller, back to his home in Russia.

Appointed officials worked under the greatest difficulty. One was twice put into a prisoner's cage. The issue of a civilian coat and an armband saved him from a third incarceration. On release from his second imprisonment he found his house thoroughly looted. The advancing British troops incarcerated any German found wearing uniform on sight. In the heat of battle they could not be expected to distinguish between postmen, foresters, railwaymen, police, and soldiers. But it was hard for Military Government officers – and harder still for those imprisoned.

Immediate preparations were made for handling the expected flow of displaced persons, particularly at the Xanten, Rees, and Wesel crossings of the Rhine, but in the first days few only appeared.

The other immediate pre-occupation was with public health. A typhus scare led to the close medical examination of a group of civilians living in a farmhouse. 'Although thirty persons were residing in an ill-lit and poorly ventilated cellar a very close examination failed to demonstrate the existence of any louse infestation and, apart from the fact that scabies was present among the children, one could not fail to be impressed with the general standard of cleanliness . . .' ran a XII Corps report. Nevertheless, there were sick and wounded people in the ruins requiring attention. The civil hospital at Rees was totally destroyed, others at Millingen, Asperden, and Isselburg were badly damaged but were tidied up and brought into use to the extent possible. At this stage No. 6 Friends Ambulance Unit reinforced the Military Government medical staff. Civilian doctors and nurses were found, sometimes in refugee camps, and were helped to reorganize

medical services. Indigenous medical supplies were short, transport as always, was lacking. Fortunately no serious epidemics broke out.

* * *

On 28th March a completely new situation supervened. The 21 Army Group attack had broken clean through the German resistance and the swift advance began that was to carry the Allied armies to the Elbe and the Baltic and was to end only with the surrender on Lüneburg Heath. Second British and Ninth U.S. Armies were directed on to the Elbe, the latter at the same time to join First U.S. Army coming up from the south to complete the encirclement of the Ruhr. First Canadian Army was to reach the coast of Friesland and cut off the Germans remaining in Holland. Second Army, with which we are here mainly concerned, threw three corps, VIII, XII and XXX, into the advance, while I Corps assumed responsibility for static occupation and administration, first, of the area between the Maas and the Rhine, and also later of territory east of the Rhine. On the left II Canadian Corps under the command of First Canadian Army advanced against stiffer opposition into that part of Germany lying north of Osnabrück and west of Bremen. On 14th June II Canadian Corps transferred military government responsibility for the whole of this area to XXX Corps. With this transfer the Canadian forces passed out of the scope of this volume.

Military Government staffs and detachments were faced once again with the kind of task that they had been called upon to undertake during the swift advance across the Seine and into Belgium. But it was now no longer possible to thrust a bundle of notices into the hands of the *Maire* and wish him good luck. Proclamations and orders had to be issued and someone had to stay and see that they were obeyed. Partly for this reason, partly because the country had not yet been cleared of hostile troops and of mines, it was at first impossible for Military Government to operate off the main axis of the advance or out of the main towns. Difficulties of communication were great. Military Government detachments deployed for static work in the areas of VIII, XII and XXX Corps found themselves left behind the practicable range of control by these Corps long before I Corps was yet in a position to assume responsibility for them. Since no chief cities of provinces, and few of *Regierungsbezirke*, were expected to fall within the boundaries of Second Army operations, not a single Military Government provincial detachment, and only two *Regierungsbezirk* detachments were at first provided for Second Army. This meant that control of the *Kreis* detachments in the extensive hiatus area between the three forward Corps and the Corps in the rear, had in most cases to be exercised directly by the Second Army Military Government

staff, which had never been designed for such direct and detailed administrative supervision. This threw a heavy burden on the already over-worked Army staff and was a contributory reason for the slow start in building up administration above the *Kreis* level.

The line of the operational boundaries took little or no account of civil administration units although it was the intention to bring them into conformity on redeployment after the occupation. Accordingly a single *Kreis* might form part of two Army areas, and of several Corps areas, with all the difficulties of co-ordination involved.

By the 15th June, however, when responsibility for military government throughout the British zone passed from Second Army to 21 Army Group, in view of the imminent dissolution of Second Army Headquarters, military government had been satisfactorily established at least in the headquarters of all *Kreise* in the zone. Control outside these headquarters had yet to be established in most cases. The small detachments in remote *Kreise* had often to be left to fend for themselves in potentially hostile territory without military support and sometimes far from their own forces. In some cases they were sent to towns to which no Allied troops had previously penetrated. It was a tribute to the personality and resource of these officers that control was so speedily established and so well maintained.

Throughout the early stages of the advance to the Elbe the Germans continued to withdraw all important local administrative officials in front of the Allied advance. It was not until Osnabrück was reached that this policy broke down. From now on the civil administration was found virtually intact.

The picture of the times is best drawn by contemporary observers. An official report on Osnabrück ran:

'The town is probably three-quarters blitzed. The RB¹ Military Government Detachment got in early, being sniped on the way in. They surveyed the RB HQ and occupied the Brown House. They found civilians and D.Ps engaged in looting clothing and food. Being unable to obtain military assistance two officers of the Detachment tackled the crowd with their revolvers, and gained control after inflicting casualties. The commander of the RB Detachment then reinstated 24 hours house arrest for the entire population, and gained control which he has not again lost. . He then had to tackle the feeding and housing of a milling crowd of ex-prisoners and displaced persons with more pouring in. He placed Major . . . in charge, who met the situation admirably and never lost control. The usual problems exist in the town. Estimated 60,000 inhabitants, a large proportion living in the cellars. Town water supply (when functioning) and sewage system said to be mixed up.'

¹ *Regierungsbezirk*.

It was at Osnabrück also that a report came in that many Russian ex-prisoners of war had been poisoned and were dying. So they were, but because they had drunk V2 fuel discovered in a goods yard.

Two war correspondents reached Hanover early.¹ There was still fighting as Military Government moved in. Three quarters of the town centre was completely destroyed. There was no electricity, water, sewers. Some half million people inhabited these ruins. It was a town of looting, drunkenness, rape, and murder as forced labour broke out from restraint. Shots whistled by from drunken 'slaves' or left-behind snipers. Police were mobbed and their bodies strung from lamp posts. A new force was improvised and stopped the worst looting. It could do nothing yet about murders and rapes. On the way back to his suburban Mess the Commander of the Military Government detachment went and dispersed a drunken fighting crowd with two revolver shots over their heads and a stentorian shout of '*Raus! Go on there - raus! . . . the whole lot of you before I start firing lower.*' A *Bürgermeister* with an anti-Nazi record was appointed. Peremptory orders were issued to the electricity, gas, and water engineers and to other technical officials. They, pride hurt, protested to the *Bürgermeister*. 'Not help them' he roared. 'You fools, it is not them you are helping. It is us - we Germans. You and us and thousands of our people . . . If we do not cooperate . . . they will let us rot . . . they blame us for this war. But they are just and humane too . . . Go and do what the Military Government tell you.'

When seeking to revive social existence in such anarchy the essentials of administration once more stand revealed. In easier times they disappear under the proliferation of amenities which comes to be looked for as the proper function of administration. But without order and the enforcement of law the provision of other services is vain or impossible. It was the primary task of the Military Government detachments, as it must be of any administration, to re-establish these prerequisites of all other administrative endeavour. All Military Government officers turned to the task but it is scarcely possible to over-emphasize the importance of the part played at this stage by the Public Safety officers. From all sides tribute is paid to the achievement of these men, the great majority of whom were recruited, by the Home Office, from the police forces of the United Kingdom. Their training, experience, commonsense, and character was invaluable, not only in the handling of the public, but in the more general problems of administration. So highly were they esteemed in the integrated Anglo-American detachments of the Civil Affairs period, that when the time came to 'unscramble' in preparation for the entry into Germany, the detachments that were to become American refused at first to release

¹ L. O. Mosley, *Report from Germany*, London, 1945, pp. 68-76.

the British Public Safety staff. There is a not altogether apocryphal story of an occasion, during the great advance into Germany, when a crowd was getting out of control – a mob of Russian displaced persons had murdered a farmer near Soltau and wanted to make further trouble. A Military Government Public Safety officer arrived – in peace-time a London policeman. He pulled out his notebook and began ‘What’s all this, we can’t ’ave this ’ere . . .’ It needed no more to restore the situation. In all seriousness, however, it would be difficult to over-praise the contribution made by the police at this time.

The taking of Bremen fell to XXX Corps. By midday on 27th April the greater part of the city had been cleared of enemy. At 3.30 p.m. that day No. 625 Detachment had reached to within one mile of the centre of the city: fighting still continued in northern parts of the town and elsewhere. By 4.25 p.m. one Military Government detachment had established itself in each of the four police areas of the town and No. 625 Detachment had set up a co-ordinating headquarters in the *Polizei Präsidium*. American representatives were associated from the earliest stages. The German police chief, Schroers, was discovered and appointed *Bürgermeister* as a temporary measure. This was done in the full knowledge that he might not be suitable for permanent appointment, and indeed it became necessary to place him under arrest on 30th April. On this day also transfer of responsibility to the U.S. Detachment E2C2 began. A prisoner-of-war camp was discovered at Grambke and information came to light of brutal treatment of inmates, particularly of Russians, during the winter of 1941–42.

On 3rd May No. 625 Detachment handed over full responsibility for Bremen to the U.S. Detachment E2C2, and was then placed under command of VIII Corps for employment in Schleswig-Holstein. By 24th May transfer of responsibility to the incoming American forces was complete.

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One of the first of the German concentration camps to be discovered, and one of the most notorious, was at Belsen, within Second Army boundaries. On 12th April a German emissary came through the British lines under a white flag and told of the existence of the camp. There were some 1,500 cases of typhus, he said. There was no other warning that anything was seriously amiss. A local truce was arranged and on the late afternoon of 15th a small detachment headquarters and one battery of 63rd Anti-Tank Regiment entered the camp to take charge. No. 76 Field Hygiene Section also arrived and took over responsibility for sanitation in the area. A little later that evening Medical and Military Government staff officers arrived.

The full horror of the situation quickly became clear. An urgent request was sent to VIII Corps for more troops, and first thing the next morning the Brigadier, General Staff, the Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, the Deputy Director of Medical Services and the Deputy Director of Military Government of VIII Corps visited the camp to concert arrangements.

The concentration camp proper, which came to be known as Camp No. 1, had been built mostly of single storey wooden huts, sufficient to hold eight thousand. Some forty thousand men, women, and children were found in it, more women than men. The terrible condition of these people is described in a contemporary report from VIII Corps:

‘The unfortunate inmates were in the last stages of exhaustion from prolonged and deliberate starvation, and both typhus and typhoid were rampant. There had been no food or water in the camp for four days, the prisoners having previously subsisted on two litres a day of miserable soup made from turnips or potatoes. Large numbers were so weak and listless that they just lay on the ground and took no notice of what was going on, and in fact were difficult to distinguish from the corpses which lay everywhere. Some of the corpses were in heaps, some were lying where they had been dragged out of the huts and large numbers were still in the huts, the inmates either being too weak or too apathetic to move them.

It was estimated that there were 2,000 corpses actually lying in the camp, and at the far end there were huge open pits containing thousands of bodies in various stages of decomposition, and it was noticed that in some cases scraps had been cut from the legs and heart and liver removed and eaten by the starving survivors.

Of sanitation there were no signs, the men and women were herded together and had to obey the calls of nature as and when they could, and the general state of dirt and filth was much increased by the presence of thousands of what appeared to be rags but were in fact the garments torn from the dead. An unbelievable stench pervaded the whole area.’

It later became clear that in all, the unburied bodies about the camp numbered not two thousand, but ten thousand, and that a further seventeen thousand had died and been ‘buried’ during the preceding month in open or scarcely covered pits. The *daily* death rate at the time of entry was guessed to be five hundred. Some twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand of the inmates urgently needed to be put into hospital: ten thousand of these would probably die before they could be got there.

About a mile away were some excellent military barracks still occupied by German troops, including a number of wounded in

hospital. A portion of these barracks housed a second concentration camp of fifteen thousand men which came to be known as Camp No. 2. Conditions here were not so bad, and there was no typhus but most of the inmates showed signs of malnutrition. It was a part of the truce arrangements that the German troops were to vacate these barracks and rejoin their main forces as soon as possible, so making more accommodation available for those rescued from internment.

All available resources of VIII Corps and Second Army were employed to relieve conditions in this nightmare camp. By 5 p.m. of 16th, 24 hours after discovery of the camp, rations, water-carts, and coal reached Belsen. On 17th, No. 224 Military Government Detachment arrived and assumed responsibility for the detailed control of Camps 1 and 2. No. 11 Light Field Ambulance arrived on the same day and took over the appalling responsibility for medical measures in Camp 1. Both the Military Government Detachment and the Field Ambulance leant heavily upon the battery of 63rd Anti-Tank Regiment for the execution of the first aid measures planned. No. 32 Casualty Clearing Station arrived on the same day. This concentrated upon the preparation of a hospital area in accordance with plans shortly to be described. Its Commanding Officer became Senior Medical Officer, Belsen, responsible for the supervision of all medical arrangements throughout all camps as well as in the hospitals. No. 30 Field Hygiene Section and No. 7 Mobile Bacteriological Laboratory also arrived on 17th. The first of these became responsible for typhus control throughout the area: the second was diverted from its specialist task to take charge of the reception and disinfection of patients before admission to hospital. On 18th Headquarters No. 10 Garrison arrived and assumed coordinating military control of the whole of the operations being conducted in the camp and barracks area. Further medical and hygiene units were hurried to the spot and all possible help continued to be given by Corps and Army Services. A second Military Government detachment was made available, and Colonel Spottiswoode of the Second Army Military Government staff was placed in charge of both detachments as Military Governor of the camp and barracks area. In technical matters he was under the immediate control of Second Army Headquarters. Operationally he was under command of the Commander of No. 10 Garrison with whom ultimate military responsibility in the area rested. A third Military Government detachment, six British Red Cross teams, ninety-seven volunteers from among London medical students, a Medical Research Council nutritional team, and many other helpers later joined in the work. On 28th April, advanced parties of No. 9 British General Hospital reached Belsen, and on 8th May No. 163 Field Ambulance arrived. On 14th May No. 35 Casualty Clearing

Station arrived, followed on 19th May by No. 29 British General Hospital.

Camp 1 was the main problem, with its forty thousand dying inmates. The initial tasks were clear, to provide food and water, to get those who could benefit into hospital, to get those who could walk into cleaner surroundings, to bury the dead and clean up the camp. Those who were fit enough to walk were to be disinfected and moved at once to the Military barracks, either to Camp 2, when space could be made there by moving its fitter inmates to displaced persons camps elsewhere, or to a new Camp 3 that was being prepared at the far end of the barracks. Ultimately Camp 2 was used for men, Camp 3 for women. The acutely sick were to be moved into an improvised area consisting of the central part of the barracks, between Camp 2 and the new Camp 3, and also, as soon as the German military wounded could be moved out, into the permanent hospital buildings of the barracks. The worst cases of starvation, not suffering from infectious disease, were to be transferred at once to what had been the German officer's mess. It was estimated that fifteen thousand hospital beds would be required and for this purpose the hospital area was in due course considerably enlarged. The assembling of the necessary equipment in time was a staggering task – 750 new beds had to be found from somewhere every day to keep pace with admissions. In fact some fourteen thousand beds were eventually made available. On completion of evacuation, Camp 1 was to be destroyed by fire.

Evacuation from Camp 1 to the hospital area began on 21st April, when 320 persons were moved out. This could have begun a day earlier if the German troops, ordered to move out and rejoin their forces, had not cut the water supply to the barracks before going. Evacuation of the comparatively fit to Camp 2 did not begin till 24th because of a slow start with dispersal of the fitter internees from that camp to other displaced persons centres. Then 23 persons were moved out. Military Government officers felt there had been avoidable delay here also, resulting in the loss of more lives. On 25th, 515 persons went to Camp 2. On this day 628 were also evacuated to hospital. It was estimated that twenty thousand corpses had been burned by this date. From then until 9th May, that is to say for a fortnight, evacuation continued at a similar average rate of some 1,100 a day. Thereafter the numbers decreased until the camp was completely cleared on 19th May when the last 421 persons were evacuated. On 26th April deaths, which had at first averaged more than five hundred a day, were down to 301. They remained at about this figure until 3rd May when they dropped to 223. On 11th May the numbers dropped below a hundred for the first time. On 19th there was only one death.

The evacuation of the sick from Camp 1 to the Hospital Area was

undertaken by the members of No. 11 Light Field Ambulance. According to the Senior Medical Officer these men

'... wore protective clothing and were instructed to strip all patients completely in Camp 1. In view of the appalling sights and smells it was found quite impossible to work the men for more than ten minutes at a time in the huts. It is desired to record here an appreciation of the magnificent work performed by this Unit in Belsen. As a result of it, 20 of their number developed Typhus.'

For the Military Government Detachment administering Camp 1 almost the greatest problem was to ensure the fair distribution of food. In the early stages, with little or no control or supervision of distribution, the stronger inmates seized the food and left the weaker to die. The unaccustomed quantities of food killed many of the stronger also. With the arrival of more helpers it became possible to improve distribution of food and general treatment of the starving. The medical students gave invaluable help in this. In the early stages food and clothing were directly levied from surrounding villages: later normal channels of procurement were employed.

Some fifty doctors and 150 trained nurses were found in Camp 1 and it was naturally desired to use them to reinforce the overworked British staffs. Most were too ill or demoralized by starvation and ill-treatment to make this possible. But there were two outstanding exceptions, both women, as will be seen from the following extract from the Senior Medical Officer's report:

'One was Dr. Ada Bimko, a Polish Jewess who had lost her entire family in concentration camps. The other was Dr. Ruth Gutmann, an Austrian. These remarkable women controlled the so-called Hospital Area in one of the female lagers of the camp. The hut in which those women lived was the only clean one in this whole camp. They had carried on in the face of indescribable difficulties the practice of their profession, without equipment medical or otherwise. It was therefore decided to appoint Dr. Bimko (who was in a reasonable state of health) as Senior Internee Doctor in the new Hospital Area; her duties were manifold e.g. the drafting up from Camp 1 of Internee Doctors and nurses in direct ratio to the reception of patients into the new Hospital Area, but to leave behind in Camp 1 some of her best doctors and nurses to look after the sick there until such time as they could be evacuated from it. She was also made responsible for the discipline and control of the Medical Staffs drafted into the new Hospital Area.'

On 21st May Camp 1 was burned down. The first phase of the relief operation was complete. Much remained to be done, but the later tasks, the treatment and rehabilitation of the sick, the repatriation of

the fit, the care of those who could not be repatriated, were more normal incidents of the problem of dealing with displaced persons, and will be given a more generalized treatment elsewhere in this volume.

The Senior Medical Officer's report, from which quotation has already been made, concluded:

' . . . I wish to make it quite clear in this official account that the conditions found at Belsen were the result of deliberate and bestial cruelty on the part of those responsible. 26,000 people were buried there during the period of our stay; it is my considered opinion that another 15,000 at least would have died within 14 days from the 15th April but for the entry of our troops on that date. In fact the position was one of attempted mass murder.'

The only matter for surprise in this report is the use of the word 'attempted'.

In a war crimes trial six months later nine persons were convicted by a Military Court and sentenced to death by hanging for their actions at Belsen.

There were other concentration camps in the British zone, Fallingbostal, Neuengamme, and some fifty satellite camps. The numbers imprisoned in these were not so great but the horrors were in general no less.

* * *

On 5th May at 8 a.m. the cease fire took effect.

Second Army was stretched across the north-western plains of Germany, from the Rhine to the Baltic. On the west XXX Corps was pushing northwards from Bremen to clear the Cuxhaven peninsula, XII Corps was in Hamburg, ready to advance into Denmark if needed. VIII Corps was on the shores of the Baltic, round about Lübeck: XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, which had been placed under command of Second Army for the crossing of the River Elbe, faced east along the line Wismar – Schwerin – Ludwigslust. Contact had been established with the Russians at Wismar on the evening of 2nd May and elsewhere on the succeeding days. Far in rear I Corps protected the Rhine crossings and by the time of the surrender the resources at its disposal had enabled it to assume responsibility for an area reaching forward of the Dortmund-Ems canal into part of the *Regierungsbezirk* of Osnabrück. In the hiatus inevitably left between the forward boundaries of I Corps, and the rear boundaries of the four leading Corps, occupational responsibility was placed upon various miscellaneous formations under the direct command of Second Army.

First Canadian Army occupied Oldenburg and surrounding territory for some weeks, to the west of XXX Corps, but its main responsibilities lay in the Netherlands. Ninth U.S. Army had passed back to American command a month before surrender.

Scattered over the Second Army area were some 180 Military Government detachments of various kinds.¹ These included only one provincial detachment under command of VIII Corps. The majority of the remaining detachments were under Second Army command, as were a number of volunteer units provided by the British Red Cross, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.), and the French *Groupe Féminine*. Within the limits of the British advance the ground had been covered, albeit unevenly and dangerously thinly.

Beyond the limits of that advance, up the Schleswig-Holstein peninsula to the Danish frontier, a considerable area was still occupied by German forces. There was no choice but to place responsibility for civil administration and the maintenance of law and order upon the German Commander. Pending the arrival of British troops General Blumentritt was ordered by 21 Army Group to suspend Nazi laws, care for displaced persons and political prisoners, restrict civilian movement, impose a curfew, and order civilians to surrender firearms. British occupation forces moved in to the area as early as possible and Military Government detachments assumed control.

Original plans for the occupation of Germany had contemplated the establishment of four Corps Districts. Later planning reduced these to three. It was now necessary to redeploy 21 Army Group forces in such a way as to free XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps and also XII Corps, which was not to take part in the occupation, to enable I, VIII and XXX Corps to assume responsibility for their respective districts, and to adjust the external boundaries of the area occupied by 21 Army Group so as to bring these into accord with the agreed boundaries between the British, U.S., and U.S.S.R. zones. 21 Army Group itself was to become Headquarters British Zone. Second Army Headquarters would disappear and the Corps Districts come under the direct control of 21 Army Group. I Corps passed to direct control by Army Group on 21st May, XXX Corps on 8th June, and VIII Corps on 16th June. Thereafter, Second Army was absolved of all responsibility for military government.

Kreis detachments were thickened up on the ground, and any possible steps were taken to bring the occupational military government boundaries into agreement with normal civil administrative boundaries. By the middle of June the mobile period of occupation was over, and military government had been established throughout

¹ cf. map facing page 227

the British zone, on a first aid basis, and at the *Kreis* level. A new, static phase had supervened in which it would be possible, and was rapidly becoming necessary, to rebuild administration at levels above that of the *Kreis*. This new phase of military government requires treatment in a separate chapter.



Legend

- BOUNDARIES
- International - - - - -
 - PROVINZEN - - - - -
 - LANDER - - - - -
 - REGIERUNGSBEZIRKE - - - - -
 - British Zone —————
 - Corps District [hatched pattern]
- H.Q. B.A.O.R. [square with cross] CORPS H.Q. [flag symbol]
- P Detachments [circle with dot]
 - L/R. " [circle]
 - A, K, L/K or R Detachments [square]

Note. (●) (○) include Subordinate Detachments at same H.Q.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE

BY the end of May close on two hundred separate German local administrations had been revived within the British zone, under the control of close upon two hundred Military Government *Kreis* detachments. Until these administrations could be fitted into some wider administrative organization, however, they were like so many independent governments. This state of isolation was worsened by the break-down of almost all means of movement and communication, and the extensive monopolization by the Allied forces of such as had survived. It became increasingly necessary to re-build some part at least of the administrative superstructure, on the foundations of the *Kreise*.

Subject to occasional local exceptions, the next level of administration was that of the *Regierungsbezirk*, of which there were some thirteen in the British zone. In area roughly comparable to a British county, they enjoyed considerably less independence and responsibility. They were administered by an appointed *Regierungspräsident*, normally a career civil servant. For the revival and control of German administration at this level, *Land/Regierungsbezirk* detachments were made available by 21 Army Group. These differed somewhat from the *Kreis* detachments by the inclusion of specialist officers not needed at lower levels. The next, and more responsible level of administration was that of the *Provinz*, headed by an *Oberpräsident*.

The original intention was that the British zone should comprise four major German civil administrative areas, the four Prussian provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Westphalia and Rhine and that each of these should be occupied and controlled by a Corps, its administration being placed under the military government control of a provincial detachment, under the Corps Commander. Civil administrative areas falling outside the four provinces, were to be placed under one or other of these detachments, the Hanseatic town of Hamburg under the detachment for Schleswig-Holstein, the *Länder* of Oldenburg, Anhalt, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Brunswick under the detachment for Hanover. The decision that a zone of occupation should be allocated to the French led to the division of Rhine Province into North Rhine and South Rhine. Only the former

of these was to fall within the British zone. And in the event only three Corps were available for occupation duties. It was accordingly decided that North Rhine and Westphalia should be placed under one Corps Commander, though two provincial detachments would be provided.

The first of the Provincial Detachments to come into action was that for Westphalia, No. 307/8 Detachment. Since much of this province together with Münster, the chief town, fell initially within the American theatre of operations, the detachment moved into Germany under the command of Ninth U.S. Army, establishing itself at Münster on 5th April. On 30th May, as re-deployment took effect, and I British Corps took over responsibility for the American-occupied part of the province, 307/8 Detachment assumed control of the whole of Westphalia.

For similar reasons 229 Detachment, for Hanover, was also initially placed under American command. It set up its headquarters near Hanover on 14th April. On 22nd May, on re-deployment 229 Detachment came under command of XXX Corps and assumed formal control throughout the province.

The next detachment to move forward, No. 312 Detachment, was that for Schleswig-Holstein, the only province to fall entirely within the British sphere of operations. On 17th May the detachment relieved VIII Corps of partial responsibility for control. By 14th June it was able to assume full executive responsibility except only that the handling of displaced persons was still retained by the Corps Military Government staff.

Last came No. 714 Detachment preparing to assume control of the North Rhine Province when this should become due for transfer from American to British control. On 21st June I British Corps relieved the U.S. forces, and the Corps Military Government staff assumed control of all detachments deployed. No. 714 Detachment, being considerably under strength, was not able to assume full responsibility for the military Government of North Rhine Province until 16th July.

There was at first little that the provincial detachments could do except begin the search for someone suitable to be appointed *Oberpräsident*. In Westphalia the detachment was aided by the advice of Graf von Galen, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Münster, known for his courageous opposition to the Nazis. It seemed possible at one time that the Bishop himself might become the first *Oberpräsident*, but early in July Dr. Amelunxen was appointed.

In Hanover, on 1st May Herr Hinrich Kopf was appointed *Regierungspräsident* and on 11th May Herr Eberhardt Hagemann acting *Oberpräsident*.

In Schleswig-Holstein the German civil administration was found in being and functioning in contrast to the state of affairs dis-

covered in the other provinces of the British zone. By 24th May Dr. O. Hoevermann had been appointed as temporary *Oberpräsident*. During June, it appeared that there was some reluctance on the part of the administration in the towns of Köln and Aachen to accept the control of the *Oberpräsident*, Dr. Fuchs, whose appointment had originally been made by the Americans and later been confirmed by the British. The Commander of No. 714 Detachment acted swiftly and effectively, reminding the opposition that any failure to support Dr. Fuchs would constitute an offence triable in Military Courts.

Some difficulties were caused initially to the provincial and other detachments by the fact that much of what was to become the British zone was in the first place invaded and occupied by American troops, but these soon passed. Some of them arose from the fact that during the period of American command the over-riding practical problem of the time was the control and care of refugees and displaced persons. In both Westphalia and Hanover the Detachment Commanders were unable to prevent their detachments being dissipated in small parties as reinforcements for this task. They attempted to explain that this was wasteful employment of trained specialist staff, and that, shorn of these elements, their own headquarters would be unable satisfactorily to discharge their primary task of control at the provincial level. It took ten days and a personal visit to the Corps Commander to get No. 229 Detachment reassembled and able to start on the more complicated tasks for which it was designed.

In North Rhine Province during the period of American control the headquarters of the administration had been in Bonn nearer the axis of advance of the American armies. It was one of the first acts of the British to require its early transfer to Düsseldorf, less damaged than Köln or Essen, and alongside the Ruhr, the industrial centre not only of the province but of the whole British zone.

Grave and genuine concern was felt by many over the division of the old province into North and South Rhine Provinces. The change created very serious administrative dislocation. No less inconvenience was caused in the economic sphere, as in the early stages the American forces tended to erect an economic barrier between the two parts of the old province. However the French, who assumed control of South Rhine Province about 11th July, showed no desire to create an economic, or any other, barrier between the French and the British parts of the province.

By far the greatest problem in the North Rhine Province, however, was that of the Ruhr, the feeding and housing of its people, the revival of its coal mines. Various aspects of this will be dealt with in later chapters dealing with food, transportation and coal.¹

¹ cf. Ch. XVII., XXIII., XXII.

Through the levels of the *Kreise*, the *Regierungsbezirke*, the *Länder* and the *Provinzen*, the pattern was clear. First a control organization was established by the deployment of Military Government detachments, simple in the case of the *Kreis*, increasingly complex and technical at the higher levels. These detachments constituted the field organization for military government. Then, under the supervision of these, the corresponding German civil administration was revived and called upon to assume responsibility within its jurisdiction.

Above the level of the province however, the pattern breaks and becomes less clear. The next level of German administration had been that of the *Reich*. It had been agreed in the European Advisory Commission that a control organization should be established at this level. It had not been suggested in the agreement, or anywhere else, that pending the creation of a central administration any German civil administration should be created at the zonal level. The zones were artificial creations, rooted in neither history nor geography, which had never enjoyed a civil administration of their own. In any event, there was current the reasonable expectation that some sort of central administration would in fact be revived in the not very distant future and would assume responsibility, under control, for administration above the level of the province. Meanwhile, supreme authority and responsibility within the British zone rested upon the British Commander-in-Chief. In the absence of any German organization at its level 21 Army Group Military Government Headquarters became the *de facto* government of the British zone of Germany, exercising its authority, not through any corresponding German organization, but through the control machinery at the level of the provinces.

* * *

The surrender of Germany had greatly heightened the need for policy guidance as to the future of that country. But the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in no better position to give it.¹ It could only be hoped that the projected tripartite meeting at Potsdam would answer some of the outstanding questions. Meanwhile, however, S.H.A.E.F. was to be dissolved. It had long been intended that this should happen when the fighting was over. With this development in view the British and the American governments had for many months past been drawing up directives for their respective Commanders-in-Chief, which would come into operation on the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. These will be further discussed in a later chapter.² Pending the holding of the Potsdam Conference they could give little more positive guidance than

¹ cf. pp. 196-205.

² cf. Ch. XIV.

had been contained in the directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

* * *

As the provisional government of the British zone, Army Group Military Government Headquarters found that there were two main aspects to its work. The first, with which we are here concerned, was the administration of the zone itself. The second was the expansion of its own headquarters by the absorption of the increasing numbers of Control Commission staff arriving, and the preparation for the transformation of this enlarged headquarters into the Civil Divisions of the British element of the Control Commission. This will be touched upon in a later chapter dealing with the deployment of the British element of the Control Commission.

While the *Kreis* detachments wrestled with day-to-day problems of administration and the *Regierungsbezirk* and *Provinz* detachments were building up the administrative pyramid, Major-General Templer and his Military Government officers at 21 Army Group were facing the longer term problems posed by the physical conditions found in Germany. To some of them there could be no answer until after the period with which this book is concerned – if indeed there was any answer to be given then.

Not the least of the difficulties facing the 21 Army Group Military Government staff at this stage was that of explaining to the rest of the forces under Army Group command why on 4th May 1945 it had been their duty to kill Germans and to destroy the material resources of Germany, but since the 5th May it had all at once become their duty to save the lives of their enemies, to rebuild their houses, and to revive their public services, notwithstanding the fact that Hitler himself had done his utmost to destroy these. However, the argument was clear. It was scarcely summer yet. But it was only six months to the winter in all its northern European severity. Unless more food, coal and housing could be made available by then a catastrophe of death by cold and by starvation stared Germany in the face. It was instantly decided by Major-General Templer that, even on the narrow basis of military necessity, 21 Army Group Headquarters must accept responsibility and begin planning for the sheltering and even more particularly the feeding of the people of the British zone through the winter. This undertaking came to be known as the Battle of the Winter. If this battle were to be lost, such disease and unrest must be expected as would involve the British forces in police operations for the restoration of order and in relief operations on a scale far greater than would have sufficed to win the battle in the first place. The result of these would be to prevent the redeployment of forces needed to bring to an end the war

in the Far East, and would delay demobilization of those who could be spared from this task. The rescue of Germany from famine and anarchy was demanded not by sentiment but by self-interest. Indeed, the initial fixing of a ration scale that would yield to the ordinary consumer about 1,100 calories a day, its raising to 1,550 calories after the harvest, and its subsequent reduction in March 1946 to 1,000 calories were unlikely to convey any impression of sentimentality. They were more likely to incur charges of vindictiveness – which in their turn were unfounded. The level of nutrition for Germany was dictated by world shortages and a resolve that Germans should not feed better than their neighbours, upon whom they had fattened for so long.

It was realized, quickly by the British, apparently more slowly by the Americans, that the Battle of the Winter consisted in reality of two battles. There was the struggle, conducted against physical difficulties, which had for its object the saving of Germans from starvation and disease. But there was at the same time the fight against Russian intransigence, against exploitation by the Russians of their control of the main food producing areas of Germany, and against Russian clandestine interference to prevent Germany being saved from starvation and disease since these were the conditions in which Communism would be propagated best. In this second battle the object was to save western Germany from disappearing into the Communist sphere of influence and to prevent Russia throwing her outposts across the Rhine.

* * *

The struggle for coal and food, and for the transport to move these, and the measures taken to deal with some of the more specialized problems facing the British military authorities will be considered in greater detail later.¹ After food the most pressing need of the civil population was probably for a roof under which to find shelter. The British zone had begun the war with a serious deficit of accommodation. Since then there had been devastating losses from Allied bombing. It is only necessary to mention Hamburg, Aachen, and Köln, where only one house in five was left, but there were many other cities where the damage had been almost as severe. In the zone at large less than half the houses were undamaged. Close on two fifths were beyond repair. But not only were there fewer houses. There were far more people needing a roof than before the war because of the refugees who had fled from the east before the Russians.

The provision of housing, therefore, was one of the main tasks to

¹ cf. Ch. XXII., XVIII., XXIII.

which the revived German civil administration addressed itself. In military government reports, however, for the first three months after surrender, the matter is scarcely mentioned. For this there were probably several reasons. It was summer; and although winter would follow, there were so many immediate problems pressing in upon Military Government officers that the problem tended to be pushed aside. But even had the matter been otherwise little more could have been done. There was a desperate shortage of all materials needed for repair of the shattered houses, and control of such stocks as were available within the British zone had been assumed by the military authorities, acting through the Royal Engineers. Up to 17th August no priority whatever had been accorded to the needs of civilians in distributing these resources, attention being confined to accommodating the British army, the remaining hard core of displaced persons, and what remained of the German army. It was decided on 17th August that the claims of the civil population should be accorded priority equal to those of the German army, and that it might be necessary to do more than this for the Ruhr miners if they were to be induced to increase coal production. Everything possible was to be done to step up manufacture of corrugated iron sheeting and glass substitute.

It was at the same time decided that as there were not sufficient Royal Engineer officers or Housing and Building Industries officers to organize the repair of civilian houses, the German housing and building industry should be revived to the greatest practicable extent and be required to undertake the task under British control. It is difficult to believe that any other course should ever have been seriously contemplated, for an imposed alien organization, without local knowledge or experience, could never have hoped to operate so effectively. Of the need for the indigenous industry to operate under control at this stage there can, however, have been no doubt. Without this it would have been impossible for the military authorities to ensure that effort was divided fairly and in accordance with the general policies of Military Government.

Once materials could be made available, the greatest difficulties facing reconstruction were the shortages of transport and labour. It was clear that the British army would need to help in the matter of transport, and arrangements were made for Military Government officers to bid for civilian needs and that these should be considered in competition with the many military demands upon the available transport.

Except possibly in the Ruhr, for miners and their families, no new construction was to be undertaken. The object was to be to give such minimum first aid repairs to existing houses as would make them waterproof, safe, and hygienic, through the coming winter.

Building Committees were to be set up in each Corps District to control priorities, if this had not already been done. In Schleswig-Holstein a committee had been set up and had held its first meeting on 6th July. The work of these committees would be co-ordinated by a Building Sub-Committee of the Economic Planning Committee which was about to be set up at 21 Army Group Headquarters.

The case of the Ruhr afforded a particular, and a particularly acute, example of the housing problem, for the destruction of property had been exceptionally heavy in this thickly populated industrial area. While it was proposed to make special efforts to house the miners, it seemed to the Military Government authorities that the only solution to the problem was to evacuate the rest of the population from their shattered homes. Dr. Lehr succeeded Dr. Fuchs as *Oberpräsident* of North Rhine Province on 2nd October 1945. Within a few days of appointment he was called upon by the Senior Military Government Officer to evacuate six hundred thousand persons from the Rhineland, and especially from Düsseldorf, because there was no accommodation for them against the winter. Dr. Lehr protested that this was impossible, because it could not be done without using troops to eject the inhabitants, and he felt sure the British would not use troops for this purpose. He pleaded for, and was given, three days in which to make counter-proposals. He called in the architect who was later to design the Bonn Parliament Building and they hastily drew up a plan for repairs and construction of temporary buildings. When he laid this before the Senior Military Government Officer, the latter gave him two months to show what he could do. If by then preparations were shaping well he would give him further time. In the event the German authorities succeeded in improvising accommodation not for six hundred thousand persons but for one million. People began to come to North Rhine Province from other parts of Germany because they heard there were houses. Notable assistance was given by the British military authorities in the provision of materials and transport. This successful undertaking was the beginning of close and fruitful co-operation between the German civil authorities and the British Military Government staffs. Within a few months a great confidence had grown up between Brigadier Barraclough and Dr. Lehr.

Experience in other provinces and at other levels was strikingly similar. British and German opposite numbers, with few exceptions, developed a respect and a warm liking for each other, and often remained in friendly communication after their ways parted.

* * *

It is clear from the repeated complaints of Military Government officers at all levels, that frequent difficulty arose at this time be-

cause Commanders disregarded the Military Government technical channels of communication. When, on 26th April, No. 229 Provincial Detachment was placed under the direct command of Ninth U.S. Army, it was only with great difficulty that the Detachment Commander was able to secure that the three *Regierungsbezirk* detachments of his charge as it then stood, that is, of Hanover, Hildesheim and Brunswick, should come under his technical control at all. He failed in regard to the *Kreis* detachments, all these being excluded from his technical control and placed under local formations, sometimes even under regiments or battalions which had no military government element on their staffs at all. This decentralization of military government responsibility, instead of its concentration and exercise by the Provincial Detachment Commander, led to overlapping and lack of co-ordination. Every time a new division arrived in Hanover, the Detachment Commander reported, it closed the banks. On first arrival, but only on first arrival, this was the correct action. Subsequently the Detachment Commander observed 'These questions have been adjusted on each occasion, but they all take valuable time'. He went on:

'This system has, in my view, been extremely unfortunate as it has resulted in my being divorced from all the detachments in this area which had been allotted to important towns. For four weeks I have had no control of the doings of the detachments in the towns of Hanover, Hildesheim and Brunswick while I have never had any say in the affairs of Hamelin and Göttingen.

Meantime an unknown and ever changing number of American Detachments and Military Government officers have been working at *Gemeinde* level. It has proved utterly impossible to keep trace of their movements, especially as they were operating under command of various Divisions and even lower formations.

The presence of this kaleidoscopic array of troops on the ground has rendered the reactivation of the civil administration at *Regierungsbezirk* and *Provinz* level extremely difficult. It does not help when a food official is sent out three times in a car to do a particular job and each time returns afoot despite the liberal plastering of his various vehicles with every conceivable kind of authority, both British and American.'

This particular difficulty did not cease when No. 229 Detachment was transferred from American to British command, the Military Government staff at all levels being continually engaged in efforts to prevent the short-cutting of Military Government channels by Commanders issuing direct orders to *Kreis* detachments on technical matters.

A second difficulty which the Commander of No. 229 Provincial

Detachment complained of was that of knowing whether he was under the control of Corps or of higher formations, orders coming to him from both.

A third kind of difficulty arose, of which the following entry in the provincial detachment war diary affords an example:

' . . . Three Colonels [on 21 Army Group Military Government staff] walked into the Commander's office . . . They stated that they had ordered a certain factory to start operating. Lt. Colonel Patterson and Lt. Colonel Stebbing [of 229 Det] are sent for and conferred until 20.30 hours and Commander pointed out that by their action coal necessary for dairies and food processing has been diverted. Final conclusion is that work already going on as ordered by Lt. Colonel Stebbing is about all that can be done.'

These three difficulties were all concerned with the chain of command and in order to understand them it may be well to restate what provision had been made for this.

In the initial mobile phase of occupation, detachments for the control of civil administration at the *Kreis* or lowest level of direct control, were normally deployed under the command of Corps. As operations and the Corps areas moved on, command of these detachments was passed back to relieving Corps, to Army, to L. of C. Command, or to L. of C. Areas. Since operational boundaries naturally could not be made to coincide with civil administrative boundaries, and since the boundaries of lower formations were frequently changing, detachments for the control of civil administration at higher, i.e. *Regierungsbezirk* or *Provinz*, levels were normally deployed under the command of Armies, or even of Army Group. The principle that formation commanders were responsible for military government within their own areas required, however, that command and technical control of detachments within an area commanded by a lower formation should be exercised by that formation and its Military Government staff and by no other. It was, therefore, impossible at this stage to allow to the *Regierungsbezirk* and *Provinz* Detachments, deployed under Army or higher command, even a technical channel of control to the *Kreis* detachments, which were under the command of lower formations and under the technical control of the Military Government staffs of these formations, although the *Kreis* detachments were established in areas for the civil administration of which the *Regierungsbezirk* or *Provinz* Detachments were later to become responsible. It was not practicable to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs until the mobile phase gave place to the static. Then formation, particularly Corps District, boundaries could be made to follow civil administrative boundaries. *Provinz* and *Regierungsbezirk* detachments

were then brought under the command of Corps Districts, and the military government hierarchy was created by allowing *Provinz* Detachments control of *Regierungsbezirk* Detachments, and *Regierungsbezirk* Detachments control of *Kreis* Detachments, within their respective charges.

If the nature of this chain of command and the way in which it changed at the transition from the mobile to the static phase, can be clearly grasped – and it is not by any means easy to do so – it becomes easier to understand the difficulties encountered by 229 Detachment. The initial isolation from the *Kreis* detachments as the American forces were advancing into Germany would seem to have been a normal and proper feature of the chain of command as planned, before the static phase, since the *Provinz* Detachment was under Army Command and the *Kreis* Detachments were under the command of lower formations. The shortcircuiting of the Military Government technical channels by British formation commanders may have resulted from a failure to realise that the static phase had supervened, from a lack of understanding of the nature of the change in command arrangements at this juncture, or possibly from the need for an outlet for the energies of formation commanders, no longer fully utilised, since the capitulation, in the pursuit and destruction of the enemy. For the third difficulty, direct intervention by Army Group Military Government officers in the affairs of the areas under control of the Provincial Detachment, without consulting the Detachment Commander, there would seem to have been no excuse – except that many of these officers, if specialists, were incoming members of the Control Commission that was to take over responsibility for the British zone. Such officers were often ignorant of the procedures of Military Government and of the necessity for them, and often not particularly sympathetic towards them.

* * *

The wisdom of the policy of non-fraternization with the German people early began to be questioned. There were Military Government officers who had been opposed to it from the outset. An unknown, perhaps not very large, but nevertheless significant, proportion of the people of Germany had hated as well as feared the Nazi tyranny, had suffered under its terror, and had lived in the hope that one day it would be overthrown. To find themselves treated as outcasts, something less than human, threatened to knock away their last support and to remove all incentive to rebuild something better in the place of Nazism. A German was reported to have said 'We stood the Nazi's persecution, we stood the bombs, but this non-fraternization is the worst of the three.' In August the Bishop of Münster said:

'If it is represented now that the whole German people – everyone of us – is to blame for the casualties which have been committed by members of our race during the war, then this is unjust. If it is said that the whole German people – everyone of us – participated in the guilt for all the crimes committed abroad and in Germany, above all in the concentration camps, then it is for many of us an unjust and untruthful accusation. The very concentration camps themselves, with their numerous German inmates and sacrifices, show by what means every resistance to the oppressive measures of the rulers, indeed free expression of opinion, has been suppressed, punished, and really made quite impossible.

It is a denial of justice and love if it is declared that every German person participated in the guilt of each criminal act and thus is deserving of punishment. The unavoidable results of war, the sorrow for our dead, for the destroyed cities, dwellings, and churches, we will accept and patiently bear with God's help; but not unjust accusations and punishment for injuries and cruelty under which we sighed and suffered heavily.'

'It is always "they" who did these things; never "we" ' was a natural and proper reaction to many statements of this kind. But Graf von Galen, by his fearless opposition to the Nazis had earned the right to speak these words. 'Fraternization' even began to take on a special meaning. The Commander of 229 Detachment wrote: 'A young German typist complained to a senior officer of my staff: "Can some British soldier be allowed to talk to me; I cannot bear this silence"'. The officer began to explain the "non-fraternization" rule. The girl quickly drew herself up and said "I never meant that".'

If the German people were to be re-educated, and this was one of the professed objects of the Allies, there clearly must be some sort of contact between them and the forces of occupation. Realization of this need gradually gained acceptance, but it was the practical difficulties to which the policy of non-fraternization gave rise that, in the event, forced an early change of policy. There was the impossibility of preventing British and American soldiers speaking to the children or enjoying more intimate contacts with the women around them. A difficult situation became intolerable when Americans were permitted to speak to little children. A British soldier could now be court-martialled for conduct that in the case of an American was perfectly correct. There was further the extremely unfavourable comparison that would inevitably be drawn by Germans, especially in Berlin, between the behaviour of British and Russian troops. The latter, often severe and ruthless, would at the next moment make friends without inhibition.

The British quickly followed the Americans in allowing their troops to speak to children. And on 9th July the Cabinet authorized the

Commander-in-Chief to make further relaxation of the prescribed policy, provided that (a) this was done gradually, (b) there was no direct encouragement of fraternization, and (c) any relaxation should be so timed that the people of Austria enjoyed better treatment than the people of Germany. The Commander-in-Chief at once relaxed his orders so as to allow British soldiers to speak and mix with adults as well as with children. There was to be no entering of German homes yet. This was to come later.

* * *

There were other ways also in which attention was drawn to the fundamental question of what should be the Allied attitude towards the people of Germany.

Through these early weeks the attitude of the civil population was correct and not unfriendly, but a great apathy and war-weariness spread over the country. This was a natural enough result of a long war and of defeat, but a contributory factor probably was the almost complete lack of mental nourishment. There were no newspapers apart from a few officially sponsored weekly papers. There were no cinemas and no broadcasting. Most bookshops had been destroyed. The Commander of 229 Detachment said 'I am a little concerned at the lack of matter to occupy the German mind. It has been used to continual propaganda for years. This has suddenly ceased'. The mind of the German '... is very receptive and he is looking around for something to absorb. I feel we cannot afford to waste this time or we shall find the wrong matter being absorbed.'

Opinion within Hanover Military Government circles was strongly divided, however, as to the proper remedy. Some officers pressed for a large increase in B.B.C. broadcasts to Germany, particularly on general subjects that would bring Germans once more into touch with thought and events in the outside world. But when instructions were issued to install loudspeakers in public places in towns and villages for the wider dissemination of broadcasts from Hamburg many detachment Commanders protested that Germans were surfeited with propaganda and would view such measures with suspicion.

This second view received support from a leading and liberal German with personal experience of administration in the military government period who said to the author 'There was not much sense in propaganda anyway: for the educated ten per cent who had always listened to broadcasts from outside it was not necessary: for the remaining ninety per cent, the uneducated and stupid, it did nothing as they just disbelieved it anyway, after their experience with the Nazis.' It is indeed doubtful whether these public broadcasts can have achieved the desired results.

But on the need for more newspapers there was complete unanimity of opinion. By mid-June the 'Hannoversche Kurier' produced weekly by German editorial staff and printing presses, under the close and positive control of the British military authorities, had attained a circulation of over half a million copies.¹ There were similar newspapers appearing in the other chief towns of the British zone. As conditions permitted these began to appear twice weekly. There were also daily 'Nachrichten-blätter', single-page news sheets. It was planned in due course to license German-controlled newspapers under the necessary censorship conditions, but in the British zone this stage was not reached until 8th January 1946. In addition a number of broadsheets were issued under the auspices of various Military Government detachments to disseminate local news and information about Military Government activities. Throughout this period the lack of newsprint placed severe limits upon what could be done.

A symptom of the vacuum in various minds was the prevalence of rumours, none too wild to receive credence. A campaign against these was initiated. A Detachment Commander was addressing a meeting of the *Bürgermeister* in his charge on the importance of this campaign. When he concluded, a *Bürgermeister* jumped to his feet and said 'Herr Oberstleutnant, I have the solution to the problem. Let official denials of each rumour be published in the "Neue Hannoversche Kurier" and the "Nachrichtenblatt". Let the Military Government issue an order that the people should *read* the denials. Then let Military Government issue a separate order that they should *believe* the denials.'

The need to give the Germans something to think about raised large questions concerning the attitude of the British, and their Allies, towards the German people. Under his directive from the War Office the British Commander-in-Chief enjoyed considerable discretion to allow political activity and encourage freedom of speech and thought. Not unnaturally, however, he was reluctant to exercise this until there were grounds for considering it safe to do so. Early in July the state of affairs in the British zone was summarized as follows:

- '(a) No political activities are at present allowed;
- (b) The Russians allow political activity in their Zone, and are said to have sent Communist agents into ours;
- (c) The German people are recovering from their initial physical and mental shock;
- (d) The non-fraternization order is becoming a boomerang.

¹ Balfour, *Four Power Control in Germany and Austria*, 1945-46, London, 1956, p. 212.

- (e) There is no central focus in Germany nor in our Zone;
- (f) The Germans have no mental target at which to aim; they merely know that we do not like them and soon, in the absence of anything to persuade them to the contrary, they will begin to suspect that we do not ourselves know what to do with them;
- (g) We have clamped down on all local newspapers and other publications, and have supplied an exceedingly meagre diet in exchange;
- (h) We have prohibited public gatherings except under permit;
- (i) We have taken on, willy nilly, a good measure of direct rule and so long as we do this the Germans will be quite content to sit and watch — and criticize;
- (j) In general, so far as the Germans' mental processes are concerned, our attitude is wholly negative.'

In fact the decision had already been taken to relax the non-fraternization policy sufficiently to allow speaking and mixing with adults. And it was now decided at 21 Army Group Headquarters that in regard to other matters also a more liberal attitude was both desirable and not incompatible with military security. A few weeks later a group of ordinances was enacted considerably relaxing the provisions regarding the formation of political parties and the holding of public meetings and processions.¹

But if politics were to be permitted this raised at once a further question. The 21 Army Group letter from which quotation has already been made ran:

'We have been asked for our views on political activities in Germany. The immediate answer must be "within what framework"? If political parties are to be allowed freedom, to what end will their energies be directed? Towards a Germany in chains or a free Germany? Towards the British zone only, or towards a united Germany comprising all zones? In other words, what is the policy of H.M. Government?'

To these questions there could be no full or clear answers, for the Potsdam Conference, which itself produced only very partial answers, had not yet been held at the time this letter was written.

* * *

Two other sets of problems arose which high-lighted the unanswered questions concerning Allied policy towards Germany. Was the country to be dismembered, or treated as a unit? Was it to have

¹ cf. Ch. XXI. where this legislation is also referred to.

its own government, or to be administered by the Allies? If the latter, was this to be for a short, or for a long period?

The first set was purely administrative and resulted from the uncovering of certain regional organizations of the central administration. In the absence of a central government these lacked both a controlling authority and funds for their continued existence. It was decided in the province of Hanover that the salaries of employees of these central departments within the province must be brought on to the provincial budget and that the provincial government should assume temporary control within its sphere of responsibility. In North Rhine Province a different course was adopted in regard to the *Reichspost*; control was exercised, not by the German provincial authorities, but directly by British specialist officers.

The second set of problems arose when, at a very early stage, practical considerations made it necessary to deal with many matters on a wider-than-provincial basis. Communications, transportation, coal, oil, broadcasting, and other matters could not sensibly be handled in watertight provincial compartments. In this case the absence of any plans for the setting up of a central government or administration led to such matters being dealt with on a zonal, instead of a national basis. Since there was not, and never had been, any German civil administration at the zonal level, Military Government headquarters at 21 Army Group found themselves increasingly forced into becoming a direct zonal government. This involved an assumption of executive responsibility which was completely at variance with the policy that military government should be indirect. In the absence of any German civil administration this was accepted as inevitable. It was at first conceived of as a temporary measure to be adopted only for so long as no central administration had been revived. In regard to some of the matters to be dealt with on a zonal basis it became necessary, whether, because of the extent, or the technical nature, of the action to be taken, or of the control to be exercised, or because the centres of action or control were at too great a distance from Army Group headquarters, to create new agencies, deriving their authority and their instructions from the Commander-in-Chief and his staff, for the discharge of their responsibilities.

An early and important military zonal agency was the North German Coal Control. In the course of July a 21 Army Group North German Oil Control was created. By the end of July there had been created, or steps were being taken to create, other German zonal authorities, which could later be absorbed into any central German Ministries or Departments which it might be decided to revive. These included a Food Committee at Hanover, an Economic Committee, a *Reichsbahn* organization, and a *Reichspost Oberdirektion*. The creation of other such zonal agencies was under consideration.

The Potsdam Conference held during the second fortnight of July, seemed at last to have formulated a policy in regard to the re-establishment of any central German Government. Here it was decided that '... for the time being no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.' It was also decided that 'during the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit.' The decision that no central German government should be revived made it all the more necessary that military zonal agencies should be created to deal with matters requiring wider-than-provincial treatment, provided that they were planned on lines that would permit of their absorption into whatever arrangements were ultimately made for the creation and control of the 'essential central German administrative departments'.

In August a further step was taken when 21 Army Group set up an Economic Planning Committee for the British zone. Sub-committees had already been, or were about to be, formed in each of the three Corps Districts. The committee, and the sub-committees, were to be advisory and to have no executive functions: effect would be given to their recommendations, if approved, through normal Military Government channels.

An early recommendation of the committee was that a Central German Control Bureau should be established in the British zone. This was to consist of German economic advisers, aided if necessary by advisory bodies of industrialists. The bureau could in due course be integrated with any central German economic department or ministry that might be established in Berlin. This bureau, and the Central German Oil Despatching Agency were probably the first German organizations formed within the British zone at a level above that of the provinces. Early in August the *Bürgermeister* of Hamburg, the *Oberpräsidenten* of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, and Westphalia, and the *Oberbürgermeister* of Köln and Hanover urged the need for the creation of a German zonal authority. These early moves prepared the way, however hesitantly, for the creation of a German zonal organization when it later became clear that there was no hope, in the foreseeable future, of establishing a central government of Germany. But for many months yet it was still planned and expected that real central control, through central German departments would be set up.

* * *

To summarize: by 18th June redeployment of Corps into their Corps Districts was complete and the whole of the British zone of Germany had been brought under the control of either I, VIII, or XXX Corps Districts. By mid-July the Military Government field organization had been established and had assumed responsibility for control under the general direction of the Corps Commanders. By the same date reconstruction of the German civil administration up to the provincial level had at least reached the stage, in all provinces, of provisional recognition of a head of the administration. In some provinces, as in Schleswig-Holstein, where the administration had been found in being and functioning when the British forces arrived, reconstitution of the civil administration had proceeded further. But even in Westphalia, where the selection of a candidate for appointment as *Oberpräsident* had taken longest, by early July Dr. Amelunxen had been provisionally appointed and was gathering together the assistants required to enable him to administer the province.

Above this level, Second Army Headquarters had been dispersed and 21 Army Group Headquarters exercised command of the Military Government field organization through the Corps Commanders. On 25th August, Headquarters, 21 Army Group, was redesignated Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine. In the absence of any central administration, or of any firm plans for its establishment, 21 Army Group Headquarters had become the *de facto* government of the British zone. It had taken the initiative in evolving a more liberal and workable policy for relations with the people of Germany. A very limited beginning had been made with the creation of German zonal authorities which could in due course relieve 21 Army Group, or its successor, the British element of the Control Commission, of part at least of the burden of direct administration resulting from these developments. Many of the basic problems had emerged which were to face the British element of the Control Commission when it assumed responsibility in September 1945.

In all Allied planning it had been agreed that responsibility for the control of German administration should pass at the earliest possible date from the military to the civil authorities. No sooner, therefore, was the 21 Army Group Military Government organization firmly established on the ground, than we must turn to see how the hand-over of responsibility was made. This will mean, in the first place, recounting the plans and preparations made for the building up and deployment of the British element of the Control Commission. Secondly, although the exercise of quadripartite control at the centre was never in any real sense a military responsibility and therefore falls beyond the scope of this book, it will involve telling the story of the initial struggle to establish the machinery of quadripartite control. For in the early stages the principal task of the Control Commission was conceived

of as being not the administration of the British zone but the establishment of control at the centre. Accordingly the British element of the Control Commission was not put into the field until it could hope to reach Berlin and exercise control there. And until it took the field, there could be no transfer of responsibility to it for control of administration within the zone.

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
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ZONES AND SECTORS GERMANY 1945



CHAPTER XIV

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONTROL COMMISSION

IT will have become clear that the S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group plans for the development of the military government organization made no provision for the establishment of a central government in Germany. They were concerned only, as were the Civil Affairs plans in the Allied countries, with the creation of a local and regional organization. In these countries it was the intention that supreme authority temporarily vested in the Supreme Commander, should be transferred at the earliest date compatible with military interests, to the lawful indigenous governments. In the case of the enemy countries there might well be no central civil government surviving; and if there were, it was more than probable that it would not be politically acceptable to the Allied governments. It was for consideration even whether the Allies wished to see a single German or Austrian government re-established at all.

The question of the treatment to be accorded to Germany after defeat or surrender was brought up at the Foreign Secretaries' Conference held in Moscow in October-November 1943 to prepare the ground for the approaching conference of the Big Three at Teheran. It was agreed to establish a body to be known as the European Advisory Commission, upon which the three Governments should be represented. The Commission was required to '... study and make recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it...' In particular the Commission was required to '... make detailed recommendations... upon the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European States with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of these terms...'

The arrangements for the occupation and control of Germany, which were agreed to by the European Advisory Commission and later approved by the Governments, were contained in three documents - later a fourth became necessary as we shall see. The first of these documents was the Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin. Under this, Germany, for the purposes of the Allied occupation, was to be divided into an

eastern zone, a north-western zone, and a south-western zone. The eastern zone would be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R. At the time of approval of the Protocol it had not yet been decided which of the remaining zones should be occupied by the British and which by the Americans. A later agreement gave effect to the decision reached at the Quebec Conference in September 1944 that the British would occupy the north-western and the Americans the south-western zone.¹ Under the Protocol it was further provided that Berlin should be divided into a north-eastern, a north-western and a southern part. The north-eastern part would be occupied by the Russians. Again under a later agreement it was provided that the British should occupy the north-western and the Americans the southern part.

The second document was the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany.² The first Article of this ran as follows:

‘Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.’

The supreme organ was a Control Council, consisting of the three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body. To carry out the decisions of the Council and to exercise day-to-day control there was to be set up a Co-ordinating Committee consisting of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief. A Control Staff was to be set up to control German Ministries and central institutions, to advise the Control Council, and to transmit the decisions of the Council to the German central authorities. This Control Staff was initially to be organised in the following Divisions: Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Manpower. Each of these Divisions would comprise elements furnished by each of the three Powers: each would have three heads, one from each Power, required to act jointly. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority or *Kommandatura*, consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, was to direct the administration of the ‘Greater Berlin’ area, under the general direction of the Control Council.

Until the Spring of 1945 it was assumed that some German central government would survive and be competent to sign a general

¹ cf. p. 188. Also Appendix IV.

² cf. Appendix V.

surrender, so effecting the necessary transfer of authority in Germany to the Allies. A third document of unconditional surrender was accordingly drawn up by the European Advisory Commission for this purpose. In March and April 1945 it began to appear that there might well be no government left to execute a surrender. There were no precedents for dealing with such a situation and a new legal basis for occupation and control had to be devised. On a proposal by the Foreign Office this took the form of a fourth document, a declaration that Germany had been completely defeated, that in the absence of a Government competent to sign a surrender agreement, her unconditional surrender had thereby been effected, and that the Allied Governments had assumed supreme authority with respect to Germany.¹ In virtue of the authority so assumed, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief acting as representatives of their Governments were to impose upon Germany the requirements that would otherwise have been incorporated in the document of unconditional surrender. If no German authority survived to execute a formal agreement of surrender it was the intention that the declaration of defeat and assumption of supreme authority should be formally signed and promulgated by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief on behalf of their respective Governments as soon as practicable after the surrender of the German military forces or the cessation of fighting.

One more document needs to be mentioned, the Agreement on Certain Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany. The provisions of this were extensive and supplemented the requirements of the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority. The right to impose these provisions had been expressly reserved both in the document of unconditional surrender and in the document which superseded this, the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority.

All these plans contemplated three-power control by the three major Allies, the British, the Russians and the Americans. At the Yalta Conference, however, it was decided to invite France to participate in the occupation of Germany. The Russians would agree to this only on the condition that a zone for France and a sector for her in Berlin should be formed by subtraction from the U.K. and the U.S. zones, not from the U.S.S.R. zone. This was agreed to in principle and the matter was referred to the European Advisory Commission. But not until 26th July 1945 was agreement reached on the boundaries of a French zone and the necessary revision of the boundaries of the U.K. and U.S. zones. As for a sector in Berlin, the Commission felt unable to make specific proposals but recommended that a sector to be formed from the U.K. and the U.S. Sectors should be determined by

¹ cf. Appendix VI.

the Control Council. The agreement reached at the European Advisory Commission did not receive full ratification until 13th August 1945. The plans drawn up by the Commission were amended to provide for four-power control, and after the agreement of 26th July had received approval a zone and sector were made over to the French.

The terms of all these documents involved a partial assumption of sovereignty in Germany by the Allies. The provisions for the exercise of supreme authority in Germany as a whole – that it should be exercised on instructions from three, later four, governments, by three, later four Commanders-in-Chief whose decisions in the Control Council were required to be unanimous – would have been difficult enough to work if the governments concerned had enjoyed a common approach to their task, confidence in each others' intentions and a determination to succeed. When these were found to be lacking the provisions agreed upon immediately became unworkable. For anyone who did not wish them to bear fruit they could hardly have been better designed.

* * *

In November 1943, on the assumption that some form of Allied Control Commission would be set up in Germany after surrender, and at the same time as the European Advisory Commission was brought into being, a nucleus was formed of the British element of any future Control Commission that might be set up. The full Commission would ultimately be concerned with political and economic as well as military matters. The body created at this stage was to be responsible for the latter only, being in fact the military divisions of the Control Commission in embryo. It was at first given the designation of 'Control Commission Planners', but this was early changed to the more accurate 'Control Commission (Military Section)'. At about the same time a Ministerial Committee, the Armistice Terms and Civil Administration Committee, placed the responsibility for the preparation of detailed plans for a Control Commission in Germany upon the Secretary of State for War. This responsibility was not confined to the military functions of the Commission but included also the creation of the political, economic, and other civil divisions. It was a logical extension of the responsibility already placed upon the War Office for civil affairs in liberated territories and military government in enemy territories. It was recognized that at some stage, after the end of fighting, political considerations would so far outweigh military, that responsibility would need to pass to the Foreign Office.

A little later, an Economic and Industrial Planning Staff was set up to initiate and co-ordinate with the authorities responsible the

DATE					TOTAL	
	French		Others		Repatriated to date	Still in camps
	Repatriated to date	Still in camps	Repatriated to date	Still in camps		
1/7/45	209,532	615,000	Nil	114,000	740,360	1,474,000
1/8/45	253,427	1,300	Nil	61,000	1,078,687	983,000
1/9/45	268,757	1,127	1,823	72,921	1,467,924	629,463
1/10/45	269,795	1,442	2,443	2,510	1,530,952	596,625
1/11/45	271,348	865	2,763	88,312	1,588,156	552,464
19/6/46	271,675	1,065	5,846	123,628	1,832,385	365,872

study of economic and industrial problems and the drafting of policy directives in connection with a German surrender. The Foreign Office became responsible for the administration of this staff. Whereas the Control Commission (Military Section) was intended to become a part of the machinery for control in Germany, the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff was not.

On the 17th March 1944 the Armistice Terms and Civil Administration Committee decided to appoint a single senior officer who should not only assume responsibility for the military functions so far discharged by the Control Commission (Military Section) but should be required to plan and prepare for the creation of the other divisions of the Control Commission. This officer was to be given a dual responsibility to the Committee and to the Chiefs of Staff but would be under the departmental control of the Foreign Office, not the War Office, since the machinery contemplated would operate mostly at the end of hostilities and would be mainly concerned with the control of civil administration. When it appeared that Mr. I. A. Kirkpatrick, selected by the Foreign Office, would not be free until September, the War Office agreed in June to make Major-General S. W. Kirby available for appointment, under the Foreign Office, ultimately to become a junior partner to Mr. Kirkpatrick, but, until the arrival of the latter, to take charge of all preparations and planning. When Mr. Kirkpatrick arrived in September, he became Deputy Commissioner (Civil) responsible for the political side of the work while Major-General Kirby, as Deputy Commissioner (Military), remained responsible for the rest.

Subsequently, in October, the Foreign Secretary informed the Deputy Commissioners (Planning) (Civil and Military) that they were required to prepare the British organization for the enforcement of the surrender terms and the control of Germany, and that this organization would be responsible in the military period to the British Commander-in-Chief and in the subsequent period to the British High Commissioner.

A little before this the three divisions of the Control Commission (Military Section) took their place alongside the 'civil' divisions so far created, under the general control of the Deputy Commissioner (Military). The British element of the future Control Commission for Germany had taken formal if somewhat rudimentary shape.

* * *

With the appointment of General Kirby as Deputy Commissioner in July 1944, detailed planning and preparation began by the British element for the 'civil' work of the Control Commission. Almost immediately there followed the Allied break-out from the Normandy

bridgehead. It seemed that the war might end before the winter and the Control Commission was called upon to make itself ready to operate in Berlin by 1st November.

Through July, August and September attention was concentrated on the bare essentials of the task of creating an organization and procedure for the British element. The unfamiliar work and needs of the Commission required to be explained to the many already heavily burdened authorities that would be concerned. Staff required to be recruited for ever mounting needs in competition with bidders accorded higher priorities. On 18th August most of the British members of the S.H.A.E.F. German Planning Unit were transferred to the British element. Accommodation had to be found in over-crowded London. Initially room was found in Norfolk House, its S.H.A.E.F. occupants having moved overseas.

The plan was to create, first, a headquarters and co-ordinating staff, together with the necessary secretariat, secondly, an administrative or 'house-keeping' staff, and thirdly, the various functional divisions contemplated by the European Advisory Commission. In addition it was proposed to build up an Intelligence organization. The Military Government detachment that would ultimately be responsible for the administration of the British sector of Berlin would be borne on a Control Commission, not an Army Group, war establishment since the administration of Berlin was to be placed under the direction of an Inter-Allied Governing Authority (the Kommandatura) which in turn was to act under the general direction of the Control Council. It would be recruited by the British element of the Control Commission and would be required both to provide the British element of the Kommandatura and to administer the British sector of Berlin. Initially the party would be acting under the British element of the Control Commission, not under 21 Army Group. In the event matters were to fall out somewhat differently. By the beginning of October nine divisions, including the Service or 'military' Divisions, had been brought into existence, as follows: Navy, Army, Air Force, Economics, Finance, Transportation, Manpower, Interior, and Legal. The state of readiness of these divisions varied considerably. Overall, only 598 officers and other ranks had reported for duty, with another 96 expected shortly, against requirements which already totalled 3,946 and were still rapidly expanding. No more than 18 per cent of the staff required could possibly be at work by 1st November when the British element was required to be ready to go into action.

Concurrently an American element of the Control Commission had been formed in London by E.T.O.U.S.A. on 9th August 1944. It was designated the U.S. Group, Control Council for Germany, and was placed under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Wickersham, an officer of outstanding personal qualities. It drew initially for staff

upon the U.S. members of the S.H.A.E.F. German Planning Unit. Very close and happy liaison was established between the British element and the U.S. Group.

One of the earliest needs was to effect a satisfactory co-ordination between the responsibilities of S.H.A.E.F. and those of the Control Commission. S.H.A.E.F. was to re-establish local administration within its theatre of operations and to place control staffs in position at all levels below that of a national authority. The recognition and control of a national or central authority, to which responsibility could be transferred, were matters for the Control Commission. Very close co-operation would be needed between the two authorities, both in order to enable the Supreme Commander to conform, as he was required to do, with the longer term policies of the Control Commission, and in order to enable the Control Commission to make contact with surviving German central authorities within the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations, and to establish such a relationship with the local control staffs deployed in the theatre as would justify the Supreme Commander in transferring his responsibility. Staff Memoranda were negotiated, not without friction, which came to be known as the 'Treaty of Portsmouth' and the 'Treaty of Versailles'. These issued on 23rd August and 5th December 1944, defining the relationship between Supreme Headquarters A.E.F., and the United States and British elements of the Control Commission for Germany. Under these the U.K. and U.S. elements were to continue responsible to the British Government and to E.T.O.U.S.A., respectively, but were required to work in closest liaison with S.H.A.E.F., and particularly to advise the Supreme Commander regarding control machinery in his area of Germany and 'on the measures to be taken to implement established policies'. After surrender, or as soon as Berlin was occupied, these staffs were to be placed temporarily under the Supreme Commander, though at no time becoming a part of S.H.A.E.F. They were normally to be the channel of communication between the Supreme Commander and the German central authorities. Meanwhile control staffs at lower levels in Army Group areas were to remain responsible to the Supreme Commander through normal command channels. After the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. the staffs were to come under their respective Commanders-in-Chief.

It was soon realized by the British and American elements of the Control Commission that while the field staffs to be deployed by S.H.A.E.F. would be adequate for the first aid and short-term measures contemplated by the military authorities, they would not be sufficient for the more searching and extensive measures of control planned by the Commission. Recruitment would be necessary by the British element of the Commission, not only for its headquarters and central

control operations, but also in order to strengthen the field staff which it would ultimately inherit.

* * *

By October, however, as the Arnhem operation fell short of the full hopes placed upon it, it was clear that the Control Commission would have longer in which to prepare itself for action. There followed six months of more detailed planning and preparation. In these the British element was guided both by its own researches into the administrative framework that might be expected to have survived in Germany, and by the trend of the discussions proceeding in the European Advisory Commission. Major-General Kirby and Brigadier-General Wickersham visited Washington to explain the nature of their planning and to gain American acceptance of the principle that the structure of the two elements they were creating ought to parallel, not the military organizations with which they would at first be required to work, but the German civil administration. This was desirable not only for the obvious reason that it was the German administration they would eventually have to control but in order to prevent divergence between the work of the British and the Americans on account of their different military and administrative preconceptions.

During this period there was no material change in the form of the British element's own organization. The number of divisions remained at nine until December when a beginning was made with formation of the Political Division – a task undertaken by the Foreign Office. By the end of the year the British element had spread from Norfolk House to Ashley Gardens; the Service divisions were still in Prince's Gardens. Recruitment still presented the greatest difficulty and by the end of the year staff employed numbered only 1,380 against still increasing requirements of 5,386. While the British people continued mobilized for war improvement in recruiting could be secured only by a change of priorities. It was already clear, however, that on the surrender of Germany the needs of the war with Japan and of reconstruction in the U.K. were likely to take precedence over those of the control of Germany. And once the war with Japan had ended the difficulty would be to persuade persons of the necessary calibre and technical experience not to hasten back to their normal field of professional or industrial employment. For this purpose General Kirby urged the creation of a 'Control Service' which should attract by offering a measure of security and the prestige of public service, but the plan found no favour with the Foreign Office and Treasury.

With the main lines of its own organization settled the British element was, increasingly able to turn its attention outwards to study

of the problems it would encounter. Its main function would be to partake in establishing control over such central German government as might be found in existence on the conclusion of fighting. An even earlier task, however, was the occupation of the British sector of Berlin and the establishment of military government therein. It was desirable that this should be done at the earliest possible moment, which meant before the demise of S.H.A.E.F. Detailed plans were accordingly prepared in consultation with S.H.A.E.F.

Planning proceeded on the assumption that the Anglo-American forces would reach Berlin before the Russians and would occupy the whole of the city. A Berlin Military District would be established behind the fighting forces and under direct S.H.A.E.F. command. Responsibility for the city would pass from the Commander of these forces to the Commander of the District, who would establish combined Anglo-American military government. National sectors were not to be created at this stage although as a matter of convenience the parts of Berlin which were ultimately to form the British and the American sectors were, so far as possible, to be administered by British and American Military Government teams. On the arrival of the Russian forces the S.H.A.E.F. Berlin Military District would withdraw to the British and American sectors. At a later stage the Berlin District Headquarters would split into separate British and American organizations each responsible for its own sector. The Military District Headquarters was in general to be an 'integrated' organization on the normal S.H.A.E.F. pattern, but so arranged that it could divide when the time came. Its Military Government component however was to be 'combined', not integrated, so making partition even simpler. Military government control was to be established at two levels, one, that of the city and the other that of the *Verwaltungsbezirke*.

Control of central government ministries discovered in Berlin was not the responsibility of the Berlin District Commander but of a special S.H.A.E.F. control organization. The British and the U.S. elements of the Control Commission combined with S.H.A.E.F. to constitute, and have in readiness, parties equipped to establish control of the Ministries or other central agencies it was expected to uncover, wherever these might be found. These parties would be placed, initially, under command of S.H.A.E.F. and would enter Berlin closely on the heels of the fighting troops. If called forward to Army Group areas, they would be placed under Army Group command, if to Berlin, under the command of S.H.A.E.F. Special Echelon (referred to below) or, if members of this were not present, of the Berlin District Commander. These parties came to be known as the S.H.A.E.F. Ministerial Control Parties. They were to be 'combined', not 'integrated', as in the case of the teams for the military government of Berlin. At a later

stage, in April 1945, as the need made itself felt, eight smaller groups were formed, known as Ministerial Investigation Teams, each consisting of one British and one American officer and an interpreter, and each provided with a car. The duties of these teams were to follow the forward troops and to reconnoitre for the Ministerial Control Parties, sending back information that would enable the appropriate, and appropriately constituted, Control Parties to be sent forward, as soon as central German Ministries or other objectives were discovered.

There was also created an Anglo-American staff that came to be known as S.H.A.E.F. Special Echelon. This organization was similarly constituted to the Ministerial Control Parties. Its primary function was to establish liaison as early as possible with the Soviet High Command or the Soviet element of the Control Commission, and to make the initial arrangements for the establishment of this Control Commission. In addition it was to command, and co-ordinate the work of, the Ministerial Control Parties. It would initially be under the Berlin District Commander but would in due course expand and become part of the Allied Control Commission.

Throughout the winter the British element maintained close liaison with the U.S. Group, Control Council, with S.H.A.E.F., and with 21 Army Group by conferences and visits. Technical officers were lent to S.H.A.E.F. and Army Group. Numerous detailed planning studies undertaken covered such subjects as the U.S. responsibilities in the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave, the disposal of German war material, the resources of German road transport, the relation of Zone Headquarters to the British element of the Control Commission, and the policy that should govern relations of the occupying forces with the German people. In February an Advanced Headquarters of the British element of the Control Commission was set up at St. Cloud in order to provide more permanent contact with S.H.A.E.F., the U.S. Group, Control Council, and the French Liaison Mission for German affairs, which were then located at Versailles.

By this time, although staff recruited to the Control Commission numbered only 1,990 against requirements that had by then risen to 6,948, it was possible to report that:

'In spite of the above deficiencies the British Element is by now well established, not merely as a planning body, but as an organization technically capable – when certain senior appointments have been made, additional staffs for the Economic and Political Divisions obtained, and the "housekeeping" personnel provided – of taking its place in the central Allied machinery of control in Germany.'

And during this month, at last, it was ruled that in regard to technical personnel, employment in the Control Commission should be regarded

as vital war work. With this improved priority accorded it was hoped that recruitment would be accelerated.

* * *

Early in 1945 the time for going into action was obviously drawing near. In January the Control Commission had been warned that it must be ready to move at one month's notice at any time after 1st April. In February the British element was allowed to recruit its military staff, up to 'impact requirements'; previously it had not been allowed to recruit in excess of its planning needs. In March it received orders to complete the greater part of mobilization by 26th April. But just at this time something else was happening to intensify the urgency and pressure of preparations. Events in Germany forced realization that, after all, there would probably be no German Government left and that a far more direct responsibility would lie upon the Control Commission than had ever been contemplated. Furthermore, chaos and destruction were likely to be so great that, far from being able to utilize German resources for Allied needs, it would very probably be necessary to import food in order to avoid starvation. Much of this additional responsibility would devolve initially upon 21 Army Group. The Control Commission, faced with the probability that it would be called upon to shoulder unexpectedly detailed and direct responsibility for administration, found itself faced with greatly increased requests from 21 Army Group for the immediate services of technical officers mostly for work in connection with food, agriculture and coal. These requests were met either by placing officers on Control Commission war establishments temporarily at the disposal of Army Group, or by lending officers for employment within Army Group against its own establishments. By the 27th April, as many as 1,953 applicants had been interviewed for appointment to meet demands for 955 officers and 534 had been selected. Nineteen officers and ten other ranks were also requested for attachment to S.H.A.E.F. G-5.

A few days later fighting ended. Final decisions regarding the organization of the British element of the Control Commission at the top levels and the appointments of senior officers were held up because it was not yet known who would become its head. Then on 22nd May the following announcement was made:

'By command of the King, the Prime Minister announces that Field Marshal Montgomery, K.C.B., D.S.O. has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces of occupation in Germany and British Member of the Allied Control Council in Germany.

His chief representative for control questions will be Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Weeks, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.'

General Weeks was designated Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Montgomery for control matters, or Chief of Staff (Zone). In this appointment he served Field Marshal Montgomery in his capacity as the British Member of the Allied Control Council. The Field Marshal in his other capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the British forces of occupation, retained General de Guingand as Chief of Staff in respect of purely military matters. As a Commander-in-Chief had been appointed, not a Commissioner or High Commissioner, the designations 'Deputy Commissioner (Civil)' and 'Deputy Commissioner (Military)' were no longer appropriate. The former became Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief; the latter became Assistant Chief of Staff. A little later, when the Control Commission moved overseas, the Assistant Chief of Staff became Deputy Chief of Staff (Organization). A little later still, two other Deputies were appointed, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Execution) and the Deputy Chief of Staff (Policy). On 1st June ministerial responsibility for the affairs of the British element passed from the Foreign Office to the War Office in accordance with Cabinet decisions taken in November, 1943 that the military authorities would have to retain for a while, even after fighting had ceased, absolute control of transport and other facilities in Germany.

Early in April the British Control Commission component of the S.H.A.E.F. Special Echelon had moved overseas to the neighbourhood of Versailles and S.H.A.E.F. Main Headquarters. The function of this echelon was to effect liaison with the Soviet authorities. When, early in June, direct contact was established between the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and their Staffs, the Special Echelon became redundant and was dissolved. Meanwhile the British component of the Ministerial Control organization, comprising Investigation Teams, Control Parties and a Control Staff, left England for the neighbourhood of Versailles on 9th May where it could be alongside S.H.A.E.F. Main Headquarters and be called forward into Germany as required. Reports began to flow back from the Control Parties in the field, twenty-nine being received in London in May, seventy-one in June. On 7th June the Ministerial Control Staff, reinforced by a part of the British element of the dissolved S.H.A.E.F. Special Echelon, moved forward from Versailles to the neighbourhood of Kassel. Here it was renamed the British element of the Ministerial Collection Centre. Late in May it was decided that the main body of the Control Commission when it moved overseas, should be established near 21 Army Group Headquarters in the neighbourhood of Minden, between Hanover and Osnabrück. The Advanced Headquarters of the British element of

the Control Commission which had been established at St. Cloud in February moved on 13th June to Höchst near Frankfurt, in conformity with the movements of S.H.A.E.F. Main Headquarters. Here it became known as Detachment Advanced Headquarters Control Commission (British) to distinguish it from the Advanced Headquarters that was being sent to the Minden area to prepare for the arrival there of Main Headquarters. On 27th June it was renamed the Special Echelon Control Commission for Germany (British) and given the task of moving to Berlin when possible.

Notwithstanding the despatch to the Continent of these various parties, the main body of the British element of the Control Commission was still waiting in London. Its main function was to partake in the establishment of central control of the German administration. This could not be done without access to Berlin and the cooperation of the Russians. How at least the former of these was gained will be told in the next chapter.

* * *

While the Control Commission was being built up, the policy for its employment was under consideration. Study began towards the end of 1943, before the British element of the Control Commission had come into being, when the Foreign Secretary sought instructions from the War Cabinet before attending the conference of Foreign Ministers held in Moscow through October 1943. Particular questions of post-war policy in Germany received no formal consideration at this conference, but a forum, the European Advisory Commission, was created for their discussion. Meanwhile in the U.K. a series of directives was drafted to set out British ideas as to the instructions that ought to be issued, after tripartite endorsement, to the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief, for the period following the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. The directives were drafted under responsibility of the departments mainly concerned or in the appropriate inter-departmental committees or sub-committees, and final shape and approval was given to them, as expressing the British point of view, in the Armistice and Post-War Committee, a Ministerial Committee of the War Cabinet. The directives were then placed before the European Advisory Commission for the consideration and approval of the other governments. These, meanwhile, were engaged in preparing drafts that set out their own view-points. Laboriously, agreed tripartite policies were evolved, but progress was so slow that in October 1944 the War Office printed and issued in hand-book form a collection of thirty-eight directives which, although they had not yet received tripartite approval, at least set out the considered British view-point. Pending tripartite agreement to any other policy, these directives were designed to afford authoritative

guidance to the British element of the Control Commission. Other directives were added during the period March-July 1945. The British element took a part in preparing these directives and a larger part in the discussion and shaping of the corresponding directives drafted by the Americans, many of which were under consideration in the European Advisory Commission through the winter.

The War Office handbook included general political directives setting out in broad lines the purposes of the occupation and the attitude to be adopted towards the people of Germany and of Austria. Although it was no longer necessary in this connection to produce combined directives, the British and American governments still found it difficult to formulate any clear-cut or positive policy in these matters. Partly it was that they did not wish to endanger Anglo-American solidarity by adopting divergent policies. Partly it was that they were still not agreed within their own ranks. Partly the problems raised were intrinsically difficult of solution. For the British there was the added difficulty that it was not known till after the German surrender who would head their element of the Control Commission. In the words of the officer ultimately appointed 'we learnt by bitter experience in the war that to work on the principle of the absentee commander is most dangerous and always leads to trouble'.¹

The basic directive was described by Field Marshal Montgomery as 'wide and loosely worded' – which indeed it was.² Three important matters were scarcely touched upon in the handbook. In the first place there was no directive on general economic policy. Particular, if obvious, instructions could be found in directives on food and agriculture, on the rationing and distribution of textiles, and in the matter of leather and footwear. Nothing was anywhere said about the general policy to be adopted towards industry, whether it should be permitted or assisted to revive and if so to what level. Nor was anything said about policy towards coal production. These matters raised questions of the greatest difficulty. Views expressed in British circles alone covered a wide range. There was the view that

'at all costs Nazi influence and the German warlike cult must be utterly rooted out, even if the result at first is that Germany will feel the full impact of military defeat, including loss of territory, influx of transferred populations, political and economic turmoil and so on.'

On the other hand there was the view that political and economic turmoil in Germany was more likely to frustrate than to promote Allied aims, which were the demilitarization of Germany, the eradication of Nazism, and the extraction of goods and services from Germany

¹ Montgomery. *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*. London, 1958, p. 357.

² *Ibid.*

for reconstruction. There was also the middle view that it would be preferable to seek to destroy Germany's power to make war by eliminating selected industrial activities but to allow revival in other fields of her economy. When the oscillation of British views steadied to a policy of the latter nature, there remained a gap, unbridgeable for many months, between this policy and that to which Mr. Morgenthau had converted the President of the United States. The Morgenthau plan required, as we have seen,¹ that the Ruhr should be not only 'stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area.' Only at the Potsdam Conference were the broad outlines settled for an economic policy. Even then these were so broad that their translation into specific measures was to lead to bitter and prolonged debate in the Control Council.

A second notable omission from the handbook concerned the policy to be adopted towards the recognition or reconstruction of a central German Government. It was assumed throughout the directives that it would be the duty of the Control Commission to control the central administration. But the political directive ran '... You should be aware that the United Nations hope to encourage any movement in Germany towards decentralization or federation. Movements of a separatist character will also be looked upon with favour by the United Nations...' The possibility of dismembering Germany was in the minds of the Allied leaders throughout 1944 and at the Yalta conference in February 1945 was agreed to in principle. In the following months the military and political implications were considered both at a tripartite level, and at the British national level. Although the policy was never formally renounced, by the time of the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, expressed opinion had hardened against dismemberment, mainly because the opposite policy would be likely to make more available for reparations. It was only at the conference that a policy was formulated under which, although no central German Government was to be established for the time being, certain essential central German administrative departments should be revived.

The third notable omission was in regard to reparations, of which there was no mention whatever. Here again there was not sufficient agreement between the three major Allies. At Yalta in February 1945 the position reached was as follows:

'We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognize it as just that Germany should be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established.

¹ cf. pp. 199-205.

The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.'

In the following months the Reparations Commission worked on this question but it was only at the Potsdam Conference that agreement was reached regarding a formula for determination of the capital equipment available for reparations, and the manner in which this should be divided between the Allies. The difficulties that attended the application of this formula fall beyond the period with which this book is concerned.

CHAPTER XV

HAND-OVER TO QUADRIPARTITE CONTROL

ON 4th May the German forces on the 21 Army Group front surrendered and on the following day fighting ended in this theatre of operations. On 7th May unconditional surrender of all the German forces was made by a representative of the German High Command at General Eisenhower's headquarters in Reims, and all hostilities ceased on 8th May. On the 9th a second formal surrender, to the Russians, took place in Berlin. All these were purely military surrenders since there was no central political authority with which the Allies could consider treating. The time had come for the establishment of four-power control of Germany at the centre.

The momentum of the British and American advance had carried their forces deep, in some places more than a hundred miles, into the agreed Russian zone of occupation. But on 4th May the Soviet forces had announced their capture of Berlin. The situation had been entirely changed. It was now no longer a matter of setting up British and American military administration in the wake of an advancing army, but of obtaining permission to enter the Russian theatre of operations in order to replace the Russian military administration of Berlin by a quadripartite administration.

In the absence of a German Government to execute a surrender, it was planned to obtain the legal authority for the establishment of the Control Commission and the Kommandatura by the unilateral issue of the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority, to be signed and published with due formality by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief on behalf of their governments. When the German forces surrendered and fighting ended, agreement had not yet been reached within the European Advisory Commission on the terms of this declaration. Not until 4th June was the Commission able to recommend to the four governments that their Commanders-in-Chief should meet in Berlin for the purpose of signing and publishing the declaration. On the very next day, 5th June, the meeting took place. It is improbable that the late approval of the declaration contributed in any way to the delays in convening a meeting of Commanders-in-Chief for its signature. For General Eisenhower has described the many

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obstacles which had to be overcome before a meeting could be convened.

‘Preliminary arrangements for an initial meeting of the Allied Council in Berlin were accomplished with difficulty. Complications included differences in language and laborious methods of communication, the lack of intimate contacts between senior commanders, and the destruction in the city of Berlin which so stringently restricted accommodations. It was not until 5th June that we progressed far enough with all these tortuous negotiations to hold the first formal meeting of the Allied Commanders in Berlin.’¹

To the British and American Military Government teams, which had already been waiting a month to get into Berlin, these delays were bitterly frustrating. But there was as yet little ground for believing that the Russians were at this stage being deliberately obstructive. That, and the reasons for obstruction, became clear later. Initially, the opposition was for the purpose of levering the British and U.S. forces out of the Russian zone. After the British and Americans had entered Berlin it was realized that the Russians had also made good use of the delay to carry away industrial plant that should have been brought into the common pool for reparations. A third reason seems to have been simply a desire for time to re-establish discipline and restore appearances after the licence and looting which had been the reward of the conquerors of Berlin.

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The meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief on 5th June was held for the purpose of signing the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority. Primarily this was necessary to create the legal basis that would enable the Control Commission to be set up. The British and American parties, however, went to Berlin in the hope that it would prove possible also to take further positive steps towards the establishment of the Commission. In addition the declaration was necessary in order to enable quadripartite occupation and administration of Berlin to begin. Without this physical foothold in the capital, the British and Americans were unwilling to partake in any measures of central control. And they wanted the foothold before the big tripartite conference to be held in Berlin. The date fixed for this was 15th July so time was short. In addition there were many supplementary matters which the western Allies hoped to discuss at the meeting. A French party also went to Berlin, headed by the French Commander-in-Chief.

¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 475.

The Americans arrived in the forenoon, understanding that signing of the declaration would take place early, at 12 noon according to General Clay,¹ in 'the middle of the afternoon' according to General Eisenhower.² The British were late and did not arrive at Tempelhof airport until 12.40 p.m. Their representatives were taken to excellently prepared accommodation near Marshal Zhukov's headquarters on the outskirts of Köpenick. It was clear that they were expected to stay overnight. But both General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery intended to leave before dark. At 2.30 p.m., Field Marshal Montgomery, accompanied by a number of his party, walked over to Marshal Zhukov's villa. It appeared at once that Marshal Zhukov would agree to do little more than sign the declaration until the British and American forces withdrew into their own zones. He refused to accept a Control Commission Secretariat or a British liaison party in Berlin. He said the signing of the declaration would take place at 5 p.m. Berlin, which was also Moscow, time, or 4 p.m. Double British Summer Time.

The British party then joined the Americans, some time after 3 p.m. By now the latter were very impatient. According to General Eisenhower and General Clay, they could not discover when signature would take place. The British also had their eyes anxiously on the clock. Part of the tension may have been due to the fact that announcement of the signing of the agreement had already been released to the British and American press with permission to publish at 6 p.m. General Eisenhower could see 'no valid reason for a delay that began to look deliberate'. He was just preparing to protest, when, precisely at the time fixed with the British, the parties were summoned for signature.

After last minute alterations the declaration was signed by the four Commanders-in-Chief at 4.40 p.m. or a little later. After photographs, a final meeting was held at 5 p.m. Marshal Zhukov now withdrew his consent, given earlier to Field Marshal Montgomery, to preliminary meetings of the Deputies of the Commanders-in-Chief. He would not permit the Control Commission, or any advance instalment of it, to be established in Berlin until he had full control of his own zone. Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower agreed to report to their governments 'the difficulty that the question of the zones created with regard to the establishment of the Control Commission', so that a date for withdrawal of British and American forces into their own zones could be settled between governments. After the meeting broke up Sir William Strang, political adviser to Field Marshal Montgomery, drew the attention of Mr. Vyshinsky, Marshal Zhukov's political

¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 20.

² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 475.

adviser, to a conclusion of the European Advisory Commission, reached the previous day:

‘That upon signature of the Declaration, the four Allied Representatives will constitute the Control Council in order to deal with matters affecting Germany as a whole and in order to begin the establishment of the control machinery . . .’

Mr. Vyshinsky professed to have no knowledge of this, but it would presumably have made little difference if he had. For, in the words of General Clay, ‘the Soviet Government seems to be able to find technical reasons at will to justify the violation of understandings whether verbal or written.’¹ The declaration had been signed and the main purpose of the meeting achieved. But nothing else had been discussed. It was clear that neither the Control Commission nor the quadripartite occupation of Berlin would come into being until the British and Americans had withdrawn to their zones, and until further tripartite meetings had been held.

At the military level, and with the view limited to Germany, it was difficult to oppose the Russian contention. There were as yet merely rumours of the systematic spoliation of the British and American sectors of Berlin that was later found to have taken place under cover of the delay in the arrival of the British and Americans. And it is probable that these losses were partly counterbalanced by removals from the Russian zone before the British and Americans withdrew. Clearly withdrawal was required by the Yalta decisions. It was only at the political level, and with the horizon extended beyond Germany, that the matter took on a different complexion, as the British Prime Minister was quick to see.² For if the agreements reached at Yalta were so elastic as to make it difficult to fix any specific breach upon the Russians, nevertheless the Russian interpretation of these agreements differed totally from what the western Allies conceived to have been their spirit. Examples were afforded by events in Roumania and Austria. Particularly was it the case, however, in regard to the re-establishment of an independent Poland. The Prime Minister has himself told of his unsuccessful efforts to induce the U.S. authorities to take cognizance of these violations and to refuse to withdraw their forces before the Potsdam Conference. These matters form no part of the subject of this volume, but unless they are remembered it is possible to feel that the Russians in Berlin acted with greater rectitude than was perhaps the case.

As the last meeting on the 5th June broke up, its members were bidden to a banquet in their honour. General Eisenhower has explained the circumstances in which he and Field Marshal Montgomery

¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 26.

² Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, 1954, Vol. VI. Ch. XXXIV and XXXVI.

felt constrained to leave before the dinner had scarcely begun.¹ The British political adviser felt 'It was a pity to have to maim so agreeable an occasion . . .'² But maimed it certainly was in Russian eyes.

* * *

A further inter-Allied meeting would clearly have to be held, but the date for this was dependent upon the arrangements to be made for the retirement of the British and American forces to their zones.

The Prime Minister continued to press the need to postpone withdrawal of S.H.A.E.F. forces with all the vigour and eloquence at his disposal. Nevertheless he was determined that the British representatives for the forthcoming meeting should be enabled to negotiate from the firm base of their own sector in Berlin, and not be dependent upon Russian hospitality. President Truman, though not unaware of the discrepancies between Russian actions and Russian undertakings at Yalta, was determined to take no steps that could possibly be construed as a breach of American undertakings, and still hoped by example to shame the Russians into observing their promises.

It was in the end arranged that the withdrawal of British and American forces from the Russian zone should begin at the same time as the entry of British and American forces into Berlin. The date fixed was the 1st July and it was hoped to complete the movements by 4th July. There was little time to spare before the holding of the big conference.

A second meeting was accordingly held on 29th June. The British hoped to arrange for the withdrawal of British troops from those parts of the Russian zone occupied by them and for the entry of Russian troops; to arrange for the entry of British troops into their sector of Berlin and the withdrawal of Russian troops; and to obtain facilities required for the approaching conference in Potsdam. Marshal Zhukov attended the conference but Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower were represented by their Deputies for Military Government, General Weeks and General Clay. There was no French representative since the Russians refused to negotiate with the French on the grounds that they had no zone yet. The arrangements reached were generally speaking satisfactory, except, perhaps, with regard to the right of access to Berlin by rail, road and air. There had been no explicit guarantee of this in the agreement negotiated at the European Advisory Commission. The Americans on the Commission would have liked positive guarantees. The British took the view that agreements for the establishment of the Control Commission and of the quadripartite administration of Berlin must automatically include the right

¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 476.

² Strang, *Home and Abroad*, London, 1956, p. 228.

of access. They thought it certain that the Russian representative would counter with this argument if any request for such a right were formally raised. As a result of the meeting on 29th June it was left for General Weeks and General Clay to attack the problem. They urgently needed running rights over certain routes for the move into Berlin but were anxious to obtain these as part of a general right of access, not in the form of limited rights over specific routes. They felt that the latter 'might be interpreted as a denial of our right of access over all routes . . .' They were however driven to accept limited permission for the use of a main highway each, a rail line, and two air corridors. This they did under protest and reserving the right to raise the matter at the Control Council.

No progress was made at this meeting in regard to the establishment of the Control Commission or of quadripartite administration of Berlin. According to the British record these items were not formally raised at all – in fact they were not on the British agenda – nor, according to this record, was the question of the responsibility for the provision of food and coal to the British and American sectors touched upon. According to General Clay this thorny question was 'left unsettled'.¹

* * *

However, it was at last possible to enter Berlin. At 4.30 a.m. on 1st July an advanced reconnaissance party of the British detachment set out from Wolfenbüttel near Brunswick. It was halted by the Soviet authorities at the bridge on the *Autobahn* near Magdeburg. After two hours' delay the party discovered an alternative way across the river within the town where it was not checked by the Russians. The party crossed the Elbe, regained the *Autobahn*, and continued its journey, reaching Berlin about 5 p.m. On the following day, 2nd July, an advanced party of the detachment, the whole of which was officially designated Military Government Berlin Area (British), reached Berlin under its commander, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde. On 5th July the main body arrived.

The American party was much larger, consisting of some five hundred officers and men. It started on 30th June, a day ahead of their main party, a day ahead also of the day appointed. It was quickly stopped at the Dessau bridge on the *Autobahn* which converged from the south-west upon the British route. After much argument, thirty-seven officers and 175 men only were allowed to go forward. But even this party was stopped on the outskirts of Berlin and not allowed to enter until the 1st July, which indeed was the agreed day.²

On 3rd July the British and American Commanders for Berlin,

¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 27.

² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, pp. 30-31.

Major-General L. O. Lyne and Major-General F. Parks, together with their Deputies for Military Government and other staff officers, attended a meeting with their Russian opposites, at the Russian headquarters. Withdrawal of Russian tactical troops was by now almost complete ; guards and military government detachments alone would remain in position until relieved by the incoming British and American forces. It was decided that the British would assume responsibility for military government on 5th July. The Americans wished to take over on 4th, Independence Day.¹ The question of the responsibility for the provision of food and fuel for the British and U.S. sectors was raised by the British and American representatives. They wished the Russians to remain responsible, on the ground that Berlin had normally drawn the bulk of its supplies, at least of food, from eastern Germany. The Russian attitude was that each Commander-in-Chief must be responsible for feeding his own sector. They entirely refused to discuss the matter, however, saying it was due to be dealt with at the forthcoming conference in Potsdam. They had left ten days' food stocks in the British and U.S. sectors, and provided 600 tons of petrol for the whole of Berlin for July. Coal stocks were low.

Very late during the night of 3rd-4th July General Lyne was called to Marshal Zhukov's headquarters. A bridge on the highway allotted to the British was unsafe, the Marshal said; they might use the route allotted to the Americans. The main body of troops for the occupation of the British sector was due to move into Berlin on 4th July and careful plans had been drawn up to ensure an impressive entry. To divert the party at this late hour to the route along which the Americans would be entering simultaneously, could only cause disruption and confusion. General Lyne suspected this was precisely what the Russians intended and his strong protests ultimately induced Marshal Zhukov to restore permission to use the route originally allotted. There was nevertheless much obstruction and delay over the move on the following day. By the evening the situation was still so unsatisfactory that General Lyne ordered Brigadier Hinde to refuse to take over military government of the British sector on the following day. On the morning of the 4th the U.S. Military Government officers established themselves in their *Verwaltungsbezirke*,² but the Russians refused to move out and there was a deadlock and no hand-over.

So matters remained until 7th July.

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¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 31.

Howley, *Berlin Command*, New York, 1950, p. 45.

² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 31.

Howley, *Berlin Command*, New York, 1950, p. 45, p. 62.

At the meeting on this day the principals were Marshal Zhukov, Lieutenant-General Weeks and Lieutenant-General Clay.¹ Preliminary arrangements were made for the establishment of the Kommandatura, and Marshal Zhukov undertook to prepare a charter to be laid before a further meeting. It was agreed that the date for the transfer of military government responsibility within the British and American sectors should be decided by the Kommandatura itself when this met. When the provision of food and fuel for Berlin was discussed Marshal Zhukov made it clear that in his view the Allied Zone Commanders were each responsible for supplying their own sectors. This was not at all what the British and Americans had expected, or were prepared to agree to, and General Weeks and General Clay said they must first consult their Governments. There was no reference at all at this meeting to the setting up of the Control Council.

A further meeting was held on 10th July.² At this the Russians relented in their opposition to negotiating with the French and from now on all four powers were represented.³ The charter prepared by Marshal Zhukov was accepted by the meeting. It was decided that the Kommandatura should hold its first meeting the next day. General Weeks and General Clay had been informed by their governments that the responsibility for the provision of food and fuel to the sectors of Berlin was to be discussed at the approaching conference. Once again, therefore, as they had done in the matter of access to Berlin, they agreed, as a temporary measure, and without prejudice to any decisions that might be reached at Potsdam, jointly to provide wheat, potatoes, sugar, and salt for their sectors for one month beginning on 15th July. The month's supply would amount to some 40,000 tons. General Weeks also agreed to supply 2,400 tons of coal daily for Berlin. Thereafter General Clay tabled American proposals for the organization and setting up of control machinery. Marshal Zhukov asked for time to study these.

The first meeting of the Kommandatura was held on 11th July and it was decided that the British and American Commandants should assume responsibility for the government of their sectors on the following day. At 9 a.m. therefore, on 12th July, six British teams took over the control of the German administration which had been set up by the Russians in the six *Verwaltungsbezirke* of Reinickendorf, Spandau, Wedding, Charlottenburg, Tiergarten, and Wilmersdorf. On the same day the U.S. Military Government teams formally assumed responsibility within the *Verwaltungsbezirke* which they had informally invaded on 4th July.⁴

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¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Howley, *Berlin Command*, New York, 1950, p. 62.

The later activities of the Berlin Kommandatura were conducted after the transfer of responsibility from Army Group to Control Commission and pass beyond the scope of this book. But the British team for the military government of Berlin was initially introduced under 21 Army Group command, and continued for some weeks to function under the Director of Military Government at 21 Army Group. It seems desirable therefore to try to convey some impression of the early work of this team and of the nature of the city administration it built up before passing from Army Group command.

There were two levels of local government in Berlin, that of the city, and that of the constituent boroughs. Fundamentally the establishment of military government in Berlin was just another example of the spreading of the administrative carpet at the *Kreis* and higher levels. Particularly is this true of the entry of the British teams into the *Verwaltungsbezirke* or boroughs of the British sector. Here their first task was to establish control over the *Bürgermeister* and over the rest of the *Bezirk* administration. This was exercised, except for functions which the *Bürgermeister* were by law required to discharge under the orders of the *Oberbürgermeister* of the city, through the Military Government teams in the borough by the Commandant of the British sector, under the general but remote control of the Director of Military Government. Since the arrival of the British and Americans took place so shortly before the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., it was decided that their parties should enter Berlin as separate national units under their respective national military commanders, not as the combined Anglo-American organization which had been planned.

But if this part of the establishment of military government in the British sector of Berlin is described as a particular example of the spreading of the 'Kreis carpet', it immediately becomes necessary to qualify this statement for there were considerable differences. In the first place, the Russians had been in occupation of Berlin for two months before the British and Americans arrived. In the zone, the primary task had been to discover or improvise a German administration and, after purging it of Nazi elements, to ensure that this set to work with the least possible delay. In Berlin this first stage had already been completed by the Russians, denazification being probably less methodical, but almost certainly more effective, than it tended to be within the British and U.S. zones. On entry the Russians had revived the *Magistrat* or Municipal Senate as the central organ of city government. They had appointed a nonentity as *Oberbürgermeister* but had made sure that the other important official posts were held by Russian-trained German Communists, bound to the Stalinist party line.¹ Similarly in the *Verwaltungsbezirke* they had appointed *Bürgermeister*

¹ Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, London, 1957, Ch. VII.

who might at first appear independent, or representative of opinion in their charges, but in fact were closely controlled by other Communist officials subservient to the Russian Communist Party.¹ They had also undertaken a systematic and thorough removal of heavy equipment used by industry and the public utilities throughout the city. Although strictly against the agreements reached at Yalta, the technical efficiency of the process gained the unwilling admiration of British Military Government officers. The task of the British teams on taking over in the *Verwaltungsbezirke* was, accordingly, to establish control of an already functioning administration, to purge it of disproportionate Communist representation, and to assert British authority in face of the tendency of officials, originally appointed by the Russians and still either bound in gratitude to them or now going in fear of them, to ask the Russians for permission before obeying British orders.

A greater difference, however, was at the next higher, the city, level. Here control of the administration was to be exercised by the Commandants of the national sectors, acting jointly. The British Commandant in Berlin, was accordingly required to take part in creating the Kommandatura, and thereafter to control the Russian-sponsored *Magistrat* acting as one of the four members of the Kommandatura. In this capacity, while remaining under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group, he was able to act only if the four members of the Kommandatura had reached unanimous agreement. He was also required to submit himself, as part of the Kommandatura, to control by the Control Council – when this could be constituted. And although his own Commander-in-Chief was a member of the Council, the latter was also restricted, when handling Control Council affairs, by the need for reaching unanimous agreement at that level before any action could be taken. A more awkward set-up could hardly have been devised. Yet in the circumstances no other would have been acceptable.

In fact, however, for the first three weeks of the Kommandatura's life, there was no Control Council and the Commandants remained under the full command of their respective Commanders-in-Chief subject only to the necessity of reaching unanimity at their own level. The British Commandant was left very much on his own to deal with an unprecedented situation in which were quickly thrown up in miniature many of the issues that were soon to split the Allies at the level of the Control Council.

The weight of current day-to-day work, the establishment of order, the handling of innumerable Russian 'incidents', the distribution of such rations as were available, the prevention of disease, the patching and allocation of accommodation, the opening of schools, fell upon

¹ Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, London, 1957, Ch. VII.

the Military Government teams in the *Verwaltungsbezirke*. Nevertheless it was upon the Kommandatura, not the *Bezirk* teams, that the main interest was focused, for it was at this level that real control of the city was intended to be established. It was through the Kommandatura also that controls must be established over the *Verwaltungsbezirke* in regard to matters in which the *Bürgermeister* acted under the orders of the *Oberbürgermeister*. For it was only through the Kommandatura that orders could be issued to the *Oberbürgermeister*.

Physical conditions encountered were similar to those in such cities as Hamburg and Köln, but even more calamitous. Let an eye-witness paint the picture:

‘There were only 20 fire department stations in operation compared to a normal total of more than 80. Almost 3,000 breaks in water mains were still to be repaired and gas was available to only a small portion of the city. Hospital beds were limited in number and far below demand. Medical supplies were scarce and many of the hospitals were completely out of narcotics. Motor ambulances were not available and transport of the sick and the dead was by hand stretcher or by cart. Dead bodies still remained in canals and lakes and were being dug out from under bomb debris. It was a common sight to see a headstone of wood on top of a mound of debris with flowers placed at its foot. Large quantities of untreated sewage had to be discharged in the canals, creating an additional health hazard, and only 23 of 84 sewage pumping stations were in operation. In the borough of Steglitz it was estimated that out of 14,000 homes 3,260 had been destroyed, 3,200 were uninhabitable, and in the remaining 7,500 which were considered habitable 10,000 out of 43,000 rooms were seriously damaged. In the borough of Schoeneburg, 45 per cent of the housing was completely destroyed, 15 per cent heavily damaged, and only 5 per cent undamaged.’¹

At the Kommandatura for the first few weeks the major pre-occupation was with the responsibility and the arrangements for the procurement and transport of food and fuel. Underlying these negotiations was the reluctance of the Russians to admit the British, the Americans, and the French, to Berlin and their strong reaction to the attempts of the western Allies to force their way in. The Russians began with a much fuller and clearer understanding of the constitution and manner of operation of the newly created Kommandatura than did the British and American members. They also had the advantage of knowing exactly what they wanted to do, and of being little inhibited by consideration for their Allies or by any ideas of reforming their enemies. Yet relations with individual Russians ‘out of school’ were

¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 32.

friendly, both at the Kommandatura and at higher levels. The warmth and sincerity, at least of their military representatives, made a strong impression on many British officers. It was different with their civil representatives. Perhaps the Russians felt this equally. After one meeting Marshal Zhukov said to General Weeks that he thought they had achieved a great deal. When General Weeks agreed, Marshal Zhukov added: 'I think we will go on achieving a great deal so long as the politicians keep out.'

* * *

It took a little longer to establish inter-Allied control for the centre. As soon as permission had been obtained to enter Berlin, and while General Clay's proposals for the establishment of control machinery were being studied by the Russians, the main body of the British element moved from London to Lübbecke, and to such near-by towns as Bad Oeynhausen, Minden, Bunde, and Detmold. At about the same time a party moved to Berlin to prepare for the arrival in August of an Advanced Headquarters of the British element. In due course the Russian Government signified its approval of General Clay's proposals. The first meeting of the Allied Control Council was held on 30th July 1945 in the U.S. headquarters in Berlin. All four Commanders-in-Chief were present, General Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov, Field Marshal Montgomery, and General Koenig. The chair was taken by General Eisenhower. The full machinery of inter-Allied control had come into being.

* * *

Once the British element had been deployed in Germany and had succeeded in assuming its share of responsibility at the centre, the stage was set for the transfer to it of control within the British zone also. Two processes were involved. One was the transfer of command of the field organization for military government which 21 Army Group had placed in position. The other was the transformation of the field organization itself from a body of exclusively military, to one of predominantly civil character.

The second of these processes was a gradual development effected, at first, by the addition of civilian specialists to the original Military Government detachments, and, later, by the replacement, as occasion arose, of the military officers of these detachments by civilians. This change of character from military to civil continued over the months, and, although there was little uniformity in the rate of change in the various detachments and at the various levels, in time a critical point was reached when control was locally felt to have become more civil than military in character.

The first process, the transfer of responsibility for command of the field organization, was also gradual but involved three clearly marked steps. These occurred as transfer was successively effected at each of the three levels at which command of the field organization was exercised. These were, the level of the Corps Commanders, that of 21 Army Group which on 25th August became British Army of the Rhine, or B.A.O.R., and that of the War Office. The Army Group level was the first to be affected – too early, in the opinion of many soldiers, who doubted whether the untried machinery of the British element could hope to control a situation that threatened to overwhelm the battle-tested military organization. As the staffs of the various divisions of the British element arrived in Germany they established themselves alongside the corresponding sections of the Military Government branch at 21 Army Group Headquarters. Some incorporated themselves into these sections. Others took over specified executive functions and began to operate under the control of the Chief of Staff of the British element so initiating the transfer of responsibility. By the end of August the headquarters of the British element felt sufficiently established to take over full responsibility for military government of the British zone, including the British sector in Berlin. On 3rd September the Military Government branch of Headquarters, B.A.O.R., which had already transferred some of its functions to the British element, ceased to exist as a part of B.A.O.R. Its staff was transferred to the British element where it amalgamated with Main Headquarters of the British element.

General Templer who had hitherto been the Director of Military Government at 21 Army Group, responsible to the Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, and to Field Marshal Montgomery as Commander-in-Chief, became Deputy Chief of Staff (Execution) at the Main Headquarters of the British element, responsible to the Chief of Staff (British Zone) and to Field Marshal Montgomery in his other capacity of British Member of the Allied Control Council. The sections of the Military Government branch at B.A.O.R. which had not already been integrated with divisions of the British element now became divisions of the British element and continued to function under General Templer, in his new capacity of Deputy Chief of Staff (Execution). Except for a few residual and unimportant matters, responsibility for military government had now passed entirely from B.A.O.R. to the British element of the Control Commission. At this level command was now, in theory at least, civil not military. But in fact the great majority of the staff of the British element was still military, and this supposedly civil level was still sandwiched between two military levels, that of the War Office and that of the Corps Commanders, who were still the Military Governors of their Districts.

The next level to be affected was that of the War Office itself.

Under the Cabinet decisions of November 1943 ministerial responsibility for the affairs of the British element was to remain on the Secretary of State for War until Germany was no longer of 'operational significance'. As early as February 1945 doubts had arisen in the Foreign Office whether, since the British element could not be deployed until after the surrender of Germany, the period of operational significance might not by then have passed, and whether, therefore, responsibility should at any time leave the Foreign Office. The War Office were emphatic that so long as the British representative on the Control Council was the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of State for War must be the Minister responsible. Immediately the British element went into action, however, the War Office found itself embarrassed by the amount of Control Commission business passing through its hands that concerned other departments. The Secretary of State proposed that the British element should be constituted a separate government department with a Permanent Under-Secretary of its own, who should, however, remain responsible to the Secretary of State. The new department would leave a section behind in London. The change of Government in July 1945 put this proposal temporarily into abeyance. It was not long before it was revived, but with one important modification. The new department would be headed by a separate Minister, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, subject, however, '... to the ultimate responsibility to Parliament being retained by ... the Secretary of State for War'—whatever this might mean. These arrangements took effect on 22nd October 1945. In fact the Control Office was essentially civilian in character, discharged its functions without interference by the War Office, and within two years passed on its responsibilities to the Foreign Office.

These changes, real enough at their own levels, meant very little to the members of the field organization, and still less to the German public. For at the level of command immediately above the field organization there had been no change, and within this organization itself very little. The Corps Commanders were still the Military Governors of Germany, as they had been from the first arrival of the British forces. With them, military considerations remained, in the last resort, paramount. And it was upon the military resources controlled by them, that the field organization largely depended for material aid in its task of bringing order out of chaos. Not until the responsibility of the Corps Commanders disappeared would a clear and uninterrupted civil chain of command come into existence.

The way had been paved for the change at this level as far back as July, from which time onwards the functions previously discharged by the Corps Commanders' Military Government staffs were progressively transferred to the provincial detachments in preparation for

the elimination of the Corps Commanders. At the same time a progressive transfer began of the control of certain functions of military government from the Corps Commanders to the Control Commission. The final step, however, was not taken until mid-April 1946 when four civil Regional Commissioners were appointed, Mr. William Asbury for the North Rhine Region, Mr. Henry Vaughan Berry for Westphalia, Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Champion de Crespigny for Schleswig-Holstein, and Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Macready for Hanover.¹ (That the Commissioners for Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover happened to be officers of the armed services did not detract from the essentially civil nature of these appointments which were made under civil authority and outside the military chain of responsibility). Later a fifth Regional Commissioner was appointed for Hamburg. The Regional Commissioners took over from the Corps Commanders their remaining functions of military government, and the latter from this time on were relieved of all responsibility for the control of civil administration unless called in to act in support of the civil power or to assist with administrative resources available to them. The military commanders of the provincial detachments for North Rhine, Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hanover, and the commander of the detachment for Hamburg, became Deputies to their respective Regional Commissioners.

Although military still outnumbered civil officers, and continued to do so until September 1946 at almost all levels of the control organization, formal military responsibility for the control of civil administration in Germany had now ended. From this point onwards events in Germany finally pass beyond the view of the present volume.

* * *

While responsibility was gradually swinging over from the military to the civil authorities, certain other significant administrative changes were also taking place.

Instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief, British Zone, on 3rd December 1945 required, *inter alia*, a change of the administration from a direct to an indirect basis. It had in fact been the policy throughout to control by indirect methods. And at all levels a very considerable measure of indirect rule had been established, in the sense that executive contact with the public was generally effected by German, not British officials. No other course would have been practicable, having regard to limited British manpower. These officials, however, were acting within the framework of orders issued by the British, and responsibility rested, broadly speaking, upon the latter. If indirect

¹ HC Deb. 5th Series, Vol. 422, 10 May, 1946, Col. 1354.

administration, is not to become a sham, it involves the transfer of a measure, probably of an increasing measure, of responsibility to the indigenous authorities. It must be assumed that it was in this sense that the Commander-in-Chief required a change to be made.

But before transferring responsibility to the Germans the attempt was to be made to prevent the emergence of another dictatorship. In the first place it was hoped to enhance the influence of the individual at the expense of the state, by giving him responsibility and inducing him to exercise the power so conferred, in other words by establishing a democratic form of government. It was also hoped that by giving the people something to think about and the prospect of a share in their own government they might be protected from boredom and despair and so saved from drifting into the various extremisms for which disaster had prepared the ground. Secondly it was hoped to weaken the excessive power of government at the national level by decentralizing authority to democratized local government, by building up the latter, and by encouraging local patriotism.

In the American and French zones democratization was effected by reverting so far as possible to the indigenous forms of local government before the Nazis had debased and perverted the system. This had not been uniform throughout Germany but its essentials were that the chief officials should be professional civil servants enjoying a long and secure tenure of office, but that these officials had to carry with them in their administration a majority of their local parliament.¹ British policy differed from that of the Americans and French. It replaced the indigenous form of administration by the British system of local government, under which policy is decided by an elected council headed by its elected Mayor, and then carried out by professionals in the employ of the council. This policy was unpopular with Germans as being alien to their institutions, and was in the view of at least some of the British officials concerned with its application, misconceived.² It involved the establishment ultimately of elected representative councils throughout the British zone. There were strong reasons, however, for postponing elections. There were the practical difficulties of compiling a register of voters, and of making the arrangements for voting. But there were also the political objections that the only one of the political groups to retain its leadership and organization by the end of the war was the Communist Party, and that this advantage would be further reinforced by the conditions of disaster and chaos ruling at the time of the German surrender. It was felt to be necessary to allow time for the other parties to revive and for more settled conditions to develop if elections were to reflect the real mind of the German people. A beginning was made, however, with the appointment of nominated repre-

¹ W. Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany*, London, 1947, pp. 101-102.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 101-104.

sentative councils selected so as to ensure the best possible reflection in the circumstances, of the balance of opinion in the zone. By the end of April 1946 over 8,100 nominated representative councils had been established, beginning at the lower levels. By the end of June the formation of councils at the *Gemeinde* and *Kreis* levels was almost complete.

At the levels of the *Kreis*, the *Regierungsbezirk*, and the province, the change from direct to indirect administration was a matter of putting more responsibility upon an indigenous organization after this had been purged and reformed. At the zonal level there was no such organization. It had first to be decided whether one should be formed at all. The original British plans were based on the assumption that a central government would survive or quickly be revived. Three main considerations tended increasingly to establish the need for some kind of German zonal administration.

There were, in the first place, practical, in most cases economic, reasons why certain administrative organs were early found necessary above the level of the province.¹ In the second place, there was the policy of changing from direct to indirect administration. This was desirable, not only as part of a policy for the re-education of the German people, but in order to relieve the British zonal authorities, at first military, then increasingly civil, from the unexpected burden of having themselves to govern the British zone. This could be done only by creating German zonal authorities to which responsibility could be transferred. This process was embarked on with hesitation, lest it might prejudice the revival of a central administration, and all the organizations set up were designed so as to permit, with the least dislocation, fusion with any central government that might emerge. The third consideration involves taking a look at what was happening at the centre.

The main task of the various elements of the Control Commission, was initially conceived of, by the western Allies, if not by the Russians, as being the establishment of control at the centre, rather than the administration of the several zones. Accordingly interest was at first largely centred on Berlin. Through the autumn of 1945 work in the zone was conditioned by the assumption that the zone would in the near future become a part of an integrated Germany. The idea of a separate zonal entity had not yet arisen. It was not long, however, before disillusion supervened, at least in British and American circles. Central control was theoretically established on 30th July 1945 when the first meeting of the Allied Control Council was held in Berlin. At Potsdam it had been decided that central German administrative departments for finance, transport, communications, and foreign trade

¹ cf. pp. 242-3.

and industry should be established. By October it had become clear that the French were determined to oppose the constitution of these central departments on the ground that to bring them into being would pre-judge the question of the dismemberment of Germany and, more particularly, of the removal of the Ruhr from German control. The policy of dismemberment had been agreed to in principle by the three great Allies at Yalta, had apparently been tacitly dropped at Potsdam but was still strongly advocated by the French, who had not been represented at either of these conferences. But even if the central departments had been re-established, such deep divergences of outlook developed between the occupying powers as precluded the hope of early, or perhaps of any, agreement and decision on many fundamental matters. Such a divergence was that revealed by the Russian application for the dismantlement of equipment in certain German enterprises, mostly in the British zone, and its removal to Russia as an advance payment of reparations. Another was that over the level of industrial activity that should be permitted to Germany. With these and other wide issues that arose in the Control Council this book cannot be concerned, except to note the effect they had upon the attitude of the British Commanders. As it became clear to these that the creation of any central administrative departments was likely to be indefinitely postponed, the idea grew of the zone as an entity which should have a political, economic, and administrative life of its own, and there was for this reason a quickening of interest in the creation of German zonal administrative machinery.

It was not easy to create and use this. Zonal administration was something new, whereas the provincial and lower administrations had existed before. Neither history nor geography had determined the area which the zonal government was called upon to administer. There was also the difficulty, encountered at all levels but felt more acutely, perhaps, at a high and new level, that denazification was depriving the public service of a very large number of experienced officials. A further difficulty arose from the fact that in the absence of any German administration above the provinces there had been a rather natural tendency for the provincial administrations to arrogate to themselves powers and importance that had belonged to the old central Government. It became necessary to correct this exaltation of the provincial administrations, which tended to become something like subordinate governments. It was necessary both in order to preserve the authority of the Control Commission itself and to give a chance to the German zonal authorities as these came into existence.

* * *

During the seven months' transition from full military to full civil control a rapidly decreasing but nevertheless significant responsibility still lay upon the military authorities. It is unnecessary to treat this period in detail, but this account would be incomplete without some reference to the part played by the Corps Commanders in their capacity of Military Governors during this closing phase.

The main preoccupation was with the battle of the winter. Its most important aspects, the provision of food and coal, are dealt with in separate chapters.¹ The major military contributions in regard to these were the repair of the transport system which also is dealt with in a later chapter,² and the physical movement and guarding of commodities. The care and control of displaced persons and the preparation of medical and public health measures also claimed the attention of the Corps Commanders.

First aid to housing has been mentioned in an earlier chapter³ and there is little to add. The positive contribution of the British authorities was inconsiderable. Small quantities of material were supplied from British military stocks, and transport facilities played their part. The main function of Military Government in regard to housing was the negative, but important, one of preventing the use in building shelter for the civil population of materials and labour that were more pressingly required for reparations, for the needs of the occupying forces, for the relief of non-Germans, for the feeding of Germans, or for the saving of the German economy from complete collapse in the months ahead. From September 1945 until early 1946 this responsibility was laid upon the Royal Engineers. To the Germans they must often have appeared as the main obstacle to the re-housing of the inhabitants of the British zone. But in regard to the broader lines of Allied and British policy, they played a vital part. And in the long run they made their contribution also to the rehabilitation of the German economy.

The care and control of displaced persons is dealt with in a separate chapter.⁴ Although not strictly speaking their responsibility, the Corps Commanders could not deny the indigenous authorities aid in dealing with German prisoners who would arrive unannounced in large train loads, starving, and many dead.

In the matter of public health, the British army medical services were much concerned with the possibility of the outbreaks of major epidemics. The obvious dangers of the inadequate ration scale, total lack of coal for domestic heating, and extensive destruction of housing, were re-inforced by memories of the great influenza epidemic of 1918.

¹ cf. Ch. XVIII, XXII.

² cf. Ch. XXIII.

³ cf. Ch. XIII.

⁴ cf. Ch. XIX.

Medical supplies were amassed and teams of medical men were organized, in consultation with Military Government staffs and the German authorities, in readiness for any outbreak. But in fact, thanks in part at least to an exceptionally mild winter, and to the preventive measures undertaken, the British zone of Germany was spared any major outbreak of disease through the winter of 1945-46.

CHAPTER XVI

AUSTRIA

PRELIMINARY study of the problems involved in the establishment of military government in Austria began in 1942 when the D.C.C.A.O. North-West Europe was appointed in the War Office.¹ Responsibility passed to C.O.S.S.A.C. and thence to S.H.A.E.F. It was, accordingly, to the Supreme Commander in the European theatre that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in April 1944 addressed their policy directive for the military government of Germany including Austria, *before* defeat or surrender. When it appeared that invasion of Austria would take place from Italy, S.C.A.E.F. transferred responsibility for detailed planning and preparation to S.A.C.M.E.D. In June 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided that, since current plans did not provide for occupation of Austria until after the surrender of Germany, responsibility should lie upon neither of these commanders but upon the nucleus of the tripartite authority for the control of Austria after surrender, the creation of which was under consideration by the European Advisory Commission.

At the end of July 1944, by which time a sudden collapse of Germany in the autumn seemed possible, both S.A.C.M.E.D. and S.C.A.E.F. pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff for instructions. On 9th September the latter directed S.A.C.M.E.D. to prepare a plan for use if his forces entered the country before the issue of any post-surrender directive. They instructed him to base his planning generally upon the pre-surrender directive which had been issued to S.C.A.E.F. five months earlier.

Then in the spring of 1945 came the big advance into Germany from the west and with this the probability revived that S.C.A.E.F.'s forces might after all find themselves entering and controlling the north-western parts of Austria, adjoining Bavaria. Responsibility for the occupation and military government of any parts of Austria entered from Italy, and of Vienna outside the Russian sector, remained with S.A.C.M.E.D., to whom also was to be transferred as soon as possible, any responsibility temporarily assumed by S.C.A.E.F. in areas occupied by S.H.A.E.F. Forces.

Meanwhile arrangements had been made for planning control of the Austrian central administration on the lines agreed at the European

¹ cf. Ch. I.

Advisory Commission. In August 1944, the Civil and Military Deputy Commissioners already appointed to the British element of the Control Commission for Germany, formed a British element for Austria. Both elements, for Germany and for Austria, were at this stage under the control of the Foreign Office. In November Mr. W. H. B. Mack took charge as Deputy Commissioner of the Allied Commission for Austria, by then in St. Paul's School, at Hammersmith. A little later, Brigadier, later Major-General, T. J. W. Winterton became Deputy Commissioner (Military) Mr. Mack continuing as Deputy Commissioner (Civil). An advanced party of the British element went to Caserta to be alongside A.F.H.Q. In the course of March and April, in the face of many difficulties, the main body succeeded in moving from London to Rome, ready to move into Vienna whenever this became possible.



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The planning for the military government of Austria before surrender, conformed generally to that for the military government of Germany. But occupation and control would be conducted in a different spirit.

On 1st November 1943 the conference of Foreign Ministers of the U.K., the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. in Moscow declared that, although the Austrian people had fought on the side of Germany and must expect to have to work their passage home, the three Allied Governments wished to see re-established a free and independent Austria. On 16th November the French Committee of National Liberation associated itself with the views contained in the declaration. The political guide for Austria by the Combined Chiefs of Staff ran: '... The attitude to the Austrian population should be more friendly than in Germany. There will be no need to discourage some degree of fraternization. You should be prepared to give more latitude to political activity in Austria than in Germany . . .' The Germans were to be made to taste defeat. The Austrians were to be liberated from German domination and their country restored to freedom and independence.

The geographical conditions under which planning should be conducted were at first not clear. But by January 1945 the Americans had decided to accept a zone as well as a share in the government of Vienna and of Austria as a whole. By April it was known that the French had accepted the invitation issued to them after the Yalta Conference and would also occupy a zone. Although final agreement had not been reached before the Russians entered Vienna on 13th April and was in fact not reached until 9th July or ratified until later still, it could be assumed for planning purposes, that the country would be divided into four zones. The north-eastern zone would be occupied

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by the Russians. The British had proposed that this should consist of Lower Austria. But the Russians stood out, successfully, for the addition to their zone of part of Upper Austria from the U.S. zone and of part of Burgenland from the British zone. This had the ominous effect of completely isolating Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the western Allies in Austria – though Czechoslovakia still marched with the U.S. zone in Germany. The north-western zone consisting of Salzburg and the rest of Upper Austria would be occupied by the Americans. The western zone consisting of Tirol and Vorarlberg would be occupied by the French. The southern zone consisting of the *Länder* or provinces of Carinthia, including Ost-Tirol, and Steiermark or Styria, would be occupied by the British. Vienna was to be jointly occupied, a central district by the forces of the four powers jointly, the remainder, divided into four parts, by the forces of these powers individually. The provision for a jointly administered central sector was adopted on British initiative. It found no counterpart in the arrangements for the occupation of Berlin. Whether Vienna was to mean the old city of Vienna, or the more extensive Nazi *Gau* of Vienna, was not settled. The question was to cause much difficulty.

The organization for the establishment of military government in the British zone, and in the British sector of Vienna, was not in any important respect different from that planned for Germany. It was to be under the command of V Corps in regard to matters affecting the occupation troops. But, and here the arrangements differed from those for Germany, there was no military government staff at Corps headquarters; in all technical or civil administration matters, therefore, the organization was under the direct command of the Military Government staff at Eighth Army Headquarters—soon to become British Troops in Austria (B.T.A.).

While these pre-surrender preparations were being made, planning for the post-surrender establishment of the Allied Commission and of central control for Austria was undertaken, in respect of the British zone by the nucleus of what was to become the British element of the Commission. The control machinery under discussion at the European Advisory Commission and ultimately, but not until some weeks after the entry of Allied forces into Austria, agreed to by the four powers, was in essentials the same as that for Germany. The difference lay, once more, in the objects of the control to be established. There could be no question of early revival of sovereignty in Germany. In Austria control was to ensure separation from Germany and the early establishment of a freely elected independent Government.

* * *

The Russians were the first to enter Austria, occupying Vienna

on 13th April. They drove on westwards up the valley of the Danube, reaching Linz on 5th May. Shortly afterwards they met American Third Army forces under the command of S.H.A.E.F. advancing from Bavaria. At the same time the Russians swept south-westwards into parts of Styria. Meanwhile on 3rd May, the German South-Western Armies, driven into the north-east corner of Italy, had surrendered to Field Marshal Alexander, commanding the Allied forces in Italy. Forces of British Eighth Army, which had fought from Alamein to Tunis, and from Syracuse to Ferrara pushed up from Udine into Carinthia, under the command of V Corps, crossing the Austrian border on 6th May. A column of regular Yugoslav troops followed up the road behind them. As the British forces continued their advance it became clear that other Yugoslav troops had already crossed the Austrian frontier from the south, coming through the mountains from the direction of Ljubljana, and had established themselves in many villages. British troops reached Klagenfurt three hours before the Yugoslavs and quickly established themselves there. A little beyond this they met the Russians, firmly in occupation of much of Styria. Simultaneously the U.S. Seventh Army, advancing southwards from Bavaria, and the U.S. Fifth Army coming up from Italy, met over the Brenner Pass. The French First Army began to enter Vorarlberg from the direction of the Lake of Constance. The over-running of Austria was complete.

* * *

Until the German surrender Eighth Army Military Government staff had been concerned primarily with the administration of north-east Italy. With the German surrender, it became responsible for establishing military government in Austria. To enable it to concentrate on this very different task, it unloaded its responsibilities for Italy onto XIII Corps, which was placed under the direct control of the Allied Commission for Italy and of A.F.H.Q. in Rome. Within a few weeks Eighth Army became British Troops in Austria.

On 8th May, a Military Government party of twenty officers and twenty-seven other ranks, entered Austria, reaching Villach and Klagenfurt. Their task was to establish military government and initiate first-aid measures in the field until control could be established at a higher level. The party destined for Graz, could not be despatched as it was known that the Russians were firmly in occupation of most of Styria. On 16th May the Senior Military Government Officer for Carinthia had gathered sufficient headquarters staff to be placed in charge of the military government of so much of Austria as had been occupied by the British forces. This was at this stage no more than Carinthia with the addition of very small areas of Styria and Salzburg.

Proclamations 1 and 2 by Field Marshal Alexander were promulgated. Physical damage was not severe. Stocks of food were greater than had been expected. The people were resigned and indifferent – certainly not disposed to cause any trouble. Two problems claimed the attention of Military Government officers at the outset, the presence of Yugoslav troops within the boundaries of Austria and the presence of a great but as yet unknown number of displaced persons and refugees.

A division of Marshal Tito's partisans had entered Austria from the direction of Ljubljana and was established south-east of Klagenfurt.¹ Some of these troops had entered Klagenfurt, Villach, and Völkermarkt. They proclaimed that Carinthia had been liberated by the Yugoslav Military Government. They had opened offices in these three towns, and gave every indication that they meant to stay. They were requisitioning or looting property and there were many reports of abductions. The inhabitants were terrified. In addition White Slovene refugees were fleeing from Yugoslavia before the advance of these troops, so complicating an already difficult refugee problem. Strong representations were made to Marshal Tito who finally agreed to withdraw all Yugoslav forces from Carinthia, with effect from 21st May.

At first it was difficult to grasp the situation concerning refugees and displaced persons. An early report was of some four thousand persons found near Villach. Besides this it was clear that many thousands of Italians were streaming down through the mountains into Italy. After a fortnight the picture was forming; some sixty-five thousand persons, Italians and others bound for the west, had been evacuated to Italy. Congestion in the camps there and along the lines of communication made it necessary early in June to stop temporarily the movement of any further numbers into Italy unless they were Italians.

In Austria camps had been established near Spittal, Villach, Klagenfurt, St. Veit, and Wolfsberg, and these still held some 20-25,000 displaced persons. For many of these people there was as yet no shelter; a camp meant merely a bivouacking ground. Many nationalities were represented, but Yugoslavs (mostly Slovenes), Russians, French, and Poles predominated. The expected displaced persons problem had proved far less than it might have been.

But instead there was another that had not been foreseen. Some 60-70,000 inhabitants of Yugoslavia, hostile or politically unacceptable to Marshal Tito's régime and going in terror of its partisans, had fled across the border into Austria. Another 30-40,000 were reported fleeing before Marshal Tito's forces as these advanced northwards.

¹ cf. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-45*, H.M.S.O., 1957, pp.328-350, for frontier problems between Italy and Yugoslavia and previous negotiations with Marshal Tito.

Many were Slovenes. Others were Germans who had settled in the country generations, if not centuries, before. Because the Nazi invaders had claimed and employed these as *Volksdeutsche*, often against their will, they were now thrown out by the Yugoslavs. It soon became clear that well over one hundred thousand of these refugees would seek asylum in Austria where they were likely to become a permanent liability.

Evacuation of western Europeans to Italy was resumed in the second half of June, at a reduced rate. Most of the Russians were collected at Wolfsberg, whence they were transferred to Styria and from there to the Russian zone. In a few weeks there were not many of these left in the British zone.

From a very early stage efforts were made to rebuild a communal life in the camps. By the end of June it was reported that 'most camps now have some form of occupational work in progress. Sewing and dressmaking classes have been formed at all camps, and toys are being made. Theatricals have been started . . . and there is a choir at Viktring. Viktring also runs its own newspaper, school and gymnastic classes.'

Notwithstanding evacuations, the population of the camps remained fairly steady at about twenty-thousand as fresh arrivals took the place of those who moved out. And the estimates of displaced persons outside camps also remained constant, at a figure considerably above one hundred thousand. During the summer these did not present such a problem, and, in fact, larger numbers than had at first been expected began returning to Yugoslavia. But when winter came those remaining, estimated at sixty thousand persons, would need shelter. Work began on expansion of the camps and some progress was made despite crippling shortages of labour and materials. As the autumn closed in the numbers in the camps rose. By the end of November they had reached thirty-five thousand.

The concentration and repatriation of prisoners of war was not normally a Military Government task, but there was one transfer to the Russians which had a Military Government aspect. This was the case of some twenty-five thousand Cossacks and Caucasians who had been recruited by the Germans from Russian prisoners. These had fought with ferocity, not to say savagery, for the Germans, and had now fallen into the hands of the Allies. The military government concern arose because the Cossacks were accompanied by civilians including priests, women and children. The probable fate of these unfortunate people, if handed back to the Soviet authorities, was only too clear, and armed force, sometimes resulting in fatal casualties, was needed to overcome their resistance. Unfortunately the provisions of the Yalta agreement regarding the repatriation of Soviet nationals left the Allies no choice.

Apart from these pre-occupations conditions found were better than had been expected. The local administration after the appointment of new officials to replace Nazis, was able to function. Officials were encountered who had been appointed by a provisional central government under Dr. Renner which had been set up in Vienna, under Russian auspices. Their appointments could not be recognized but there was no reason why they should not be re-appointed if judged acceptable. A clandestine Liberation Committee in Klagenfurt acting as a provisional *Land* Government had taken over control of the administration, appointed *Bürgermeister*, and formed local committees in most towns. It had to be made clear to this committee that it could not in any degree be recognized as a local government. But when satisfied that this was neither a Nazi body nor a creature of the central government established by the Russians in Vienna, the Military Government authorities very soon recognized it, with some changes of membership, as a Political Advisory Committee. Herr Hans Piesch became head of this, and later *Landeshauptmann*.

The Russians were induced to withdraw from Styria. On 23rd July as the Russians began their withdrawal, British Military Government officers entered Graz. Two days later headquarters was set up in the town and the establishment of British Military Government throughout the *Land* of Styria began.

Conditions found were little different from those in Carinthia, but denazification of the administration had been left by the Russians to the local Austrian officials and in consequence little had been done. A provisional *Land* Government was found, which had been set up by the Russians, four of its twelve members being Communists. This was dissolved, but its head, Herr Reinhard Machold, was called upon to form a new Provisional Government in which the Communist Party was not to be represented in excess of its estimated strength. This Government was required not to enter into any relations with the Vienna Government. The Carinthian advisory committee was at the same time raised to the status of a Provisional *Land* Government.

During their occupation of Styria the Russians had undertaken systematic and extensive depredations. It was estimated that these included the removal of industrial plant, raw materials, and processed goods to the value of 1,000 million *Reichsmarks*, of cash assets amounting to more than 140 million *Reichsmarks*, and of domestic property amounting to 300 million *Reichsmarks*. Over 50,000 tons of food-stuffs of all kinds, and 5,600 tons of feeding-stuffs had also been removed. It is probable that much of the property so removed, especially the industrial plant, consisted of German assets in Austria but much was treated by the Russians as the property of the Germans, however dubiously it had been acquired by the latter from its original Austrian

or other owners.¹ Genuine German assets were properly liable to be taken as reparations; but no reparations were to be taken from Austria. But it was the western Allies, not the Russians, who should have benefited by removals from the territory that was to become their zones.

* * *

With provisional local governments established in the two *Länder* of the British zone, and the local administration functioning not unsatisfactorily under these, interest swings to the centre.

Although the Germans surrendered on 7th May 1945, four months were to elapse before quadripartite control was established. This period fell into two phases of completely different character. In the first, which lasted some two months, the western Allies were strenuously seeking the permission of the Russians to enter Vienna in order to set up the machinery of central control. In the second, which lasted almost as long, the positions were reversed. The Russians strongly pressed the western Allies to set up the Allied Commission. The British, at first with the support of the Americans and French but later alone, resisted by all means the establishment of the Commission.

The character of the first phase was determined by the fact that when the Russian forces entered Austria the European Advisory Commission had not reached agreement on zones of occupation. The main reason for this was inability to agree regarding the extent of the area at the centre that should be excluded from the Russian zone in order to be placed under quadripartite administration, and how this area should be divided between the Allies. The Russians wished to confine the area to the city of Vienna which contained no facilities for landing aircraft, and to allow to the western Allies the use of only one airfield, Tulln. This would be twelve miles away on the other side of a range of hills, outside both the *Gau* and the city. Experience in the Balkans had taught the western Allies that, if their representatives were not to become virtually prisoners of the Russians, they must have full and free access to suitable airfields. Accordingly they rejected the offer of Tulln and demanded the larger area of the *Gau*, which would give them the necessary facilities, and incidentally give them more accommodation and space for the training of troops. The Russians contended that the *Gau* no longer existed as an administrative unit: they said it had been swept away by them because it was a legacy of Nazism. But underlying this was another reason that was not appreciated by the western Allies until later. Although no reparations were to be taken from Austria as such, German assets, including industrial

¹ Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk*, New York, 1950, pp. 466-467.

plants owned by Germans, were liable to removal, on the agreed conditions. Industrial expansion had taken place on the outskirts of Vienna. Much of this fell outside the city but within the *Gau*. The transfer of the *Gau* to quadripartite control, instead of the city only, would mean the loss to the Russians of a very great part of the industrial capital upon which they hoped still to lay their hands, although much had already been removed, as in Berlin, before the western Allies could gain entry.

When Vienna was occupied by the Russians on 13th April, Marshal Stalin proposed to the U.S. Ambassador that British, American, and French representatives should meet Russian representatives in Vienna as soon as possible to settle zones of occupation for the city, the European Advisory Commission having so far failed to do so. The Soviet Government nevertheless made difficulties and it was only after protests to Marshal Stalin in person, that permission was given on 18th May for Allied Missions to enter Vienna to reconnoitre and advise their respective Governments regarding zones so that final agreement could be reached at the European Advisory Commission.

Accordingly on 3rd June British, American and French Missions, headed by Major-General Winterton, Brigadier-General Flory, and General Chérière, reached the capital. The British and U.S. Governments would have liked to keep their Missions in Vienna but the Russians insisted upon withdrawal on completion of their reconnaissance. On return to Italy the Missions recommended to their Governments that the claim to the *Gau* should be abandoned and that, instead, the western Allies should concentrate upon obtaining from the Russians a firm agreement to their use of certain areas outside the city boundaries, but adjacent to their own national zones, for accommodation, training, and recreation. They made proposals for sectors within the city and recommended the allocation of airfields outside, Tulln to the U.S., Schwechat to the British, Götzendorf to the French, and all airfields to the east of the Danube to the Russians. There must also be clear and firm agreement conceding free and unrestricted transit rights throughout Vienna, and for the purpose of reaching airfields and training areas.

Meanwhile on 14th and 15th June the President and Prime Minister had been pressing Marshal Stalin to agree to the early redistribution of forces in Germany and Austria into their respective occupation zones and the entry into Berlin and Vienna of the forces of the western Allies. Marshal Stalin replied that the Russians would not be ready until 1st July. In regard to Austria he added that it was also necessary that the European Advisory Commission should reach agreement on the zones of occupation. It soon became clear that the Russians would make no move, and would allow no one else to move, until this had been done. Agreement was reached on 9th July. It was approved by

the U.K. on 12th, by the French on 16th, by the Russians on 21st, and by the Americans on 24th. The British were allotted the Schwechat airfield. On 20th at the Potsdam Conference Marshal Stalin gave permission for the forces of the western Allies to move into their zones and into Vienna. The way at last seemed open for entry into the capital.

* * *

But by this time the second phase was beginning to supervene, in which the British held back. Despite a large measure of agreement with the Russians, difficulty was caused by their view that under the instruments of surrender armies of occupation must have the first claim on the resources of Austria. As a statement of the legal position this was true enough but the development of events in Berlin at this time showed what it might mean. Vienna and many parts of Austria, like Berlin and the western zones of Germany, were dependent for their food upon the Russian zone. If the Russian army of occupation were to take all the food surpluses from the zone, there would be nothing left for Vienna and the western zones. It began to appear that the Russians would agree to the western Allies entering Vienna only if they could saddle them with responsibility for bringing in food for their own zones, or that, having allowed them to enter, they would have no difficulty in forcing this responsibility upon them.

Pressed by Mr. Churchill and Field Marshal Alexander at the Potsdam Conference, Marshal Stalin replied on 24th July that Marshal Koniev had agreed to continue to provide rations for the people of Vienna until some alternative and more permanent arrangement could be made.

Meetings of the four Chiefs of Staff for control matters were held on 24th and 25th July. Agreement was reached regarding allocation of accommodation (although difficulties continued to be encountered in practice at lower levels) and a number of other matters. A 'protocol' was drawn up and accepted (not without some difficulty) as the record of all meetings so far held. The existence of this local agreement over and above the agreements reached at Governmental level through the European Advisory Commission was later to prove of great value. It was never repudiated by the Russians and was to provide a firm basis for subsequent quadripartite negotiations, a basis that was never present in Berlin where no comparable agreement was ever achieved. But no agreement could be reached on a number of matters, including the all-important question of responsibility for feeding Vienna and the rest of Austria.

Then on 8th August economic representatives of the four powers met in Vienna for the first time. Only now did the full gravity of the food situation become clear, and also the extreme reluctance of the Russians

plants owned by Germans, were liable to removal, on the agreed conditions. Industrial expansion had taken place on the outskirts of Vienna. Much of this fell outside the city but within the *Gau*. The transfer of the *Gau* to quadripartite control, instead of the city only, would mean the loss to the Russians of a very great part of the industrial capital upon which they hoped still to lay their hands, although much had already been removed, as in Berlin, before the western Allies could gain entry.

When Vienna was occupied by the Russians on 13th April, Marshal Stalin proposed to the U.S. Ambassador that British, American, and French representatives should meet Russian representatives in Vienna as soon as possible to settle zones of occupation for the city, the European Advisory Commission having so far failed to do so. The Soviet Government nevertheless made difficulties and it was only after protests to Marshal Stalin in person, that permission was given on 18th May for Allied Missions to enter Vienna to reconnoitre and advise their respective Governments regarding zones so that final agreement could be reached at the European Advisory Commission.

Accordingly on 3rd June British, American and French Missions, headed by Major-General Winterton, Brigadier-General Flory, and General Chérière, reached the capital. The British and U.S. Governments would have liked to keep their Missions in Vienna but the Russians insisted upon withdrawal on completion of their reconnaissance. On return to Italy the Missions recommended to their Governments that the claim to the *Gau* should be abandoned and that, instead, the western Allies should concentrate upon obtaining from the Russians a firm agreement to their use of certain areas outside the city boundaries, but adjacent to their own national zones, for accommodation, training, and recreation. They made proposals for sectors within the city and recommended the allocation of airfields outside, Tulln to the U.S., Schwechat to the British, Götzendorf to the French, and all airfields to the east of the Danube to the Russians. There must also be clear and firm agreement conceding free and unrestricted transit rights throughout Vienna, and for the purpose of reaching airfields and training areas.

Meanwhile on 14th and 15th June the President and Prime Minister had been pressing Marshal Stalin to agree to the early redistribution of forces in Germany and Austria into their respective occupation zones and the entry into Berlin and Vienna of the forces of the western Allies. Marshal Stalin replied that the Russians would not be ready until 1st July. In regard to Austria he added that it was also necessary that the European Advisory Commission should reach agreement on the zones of occupation. It soon became clear that the Russians would make no move, and would allow no one else to move, until this had been done. Agreement was reached on 9th July. It was approved by

the U.K. on 12th, by the French on 16th, by the Russians on 21st, and by the Americans on 24th. The British were allotted the Schwechat airfield. On 20th at the Potsdam Conference Marshal Stalin gave permission for the forces of the western Allies to move into their zones and into Vienna. The way at last seemed open for entry into the capital.

* * *

But by this time the second phase was beginning to supervene, in which the British held back. Despite a large measure of agreement with the Russians, difficulty was caused by their view that under the instruments of surrender armies of occupation must have the first claim on the resources of Austria. As a statement of the legal position this was true enough but the development of events in Berlin at this time showed what it might mean. Vienna and many parts of Austria, like Berlin and the western zones of Germany, were dependent for their food upon the Russian zone. If the Russian army of occupation were to take all the food surpluses from the zone, there would be nothing left for Vienna and the western zones. It began to appear that the Russians would agree to the western Allies entering Vienna only if they could saddle them with responsibility for bringing in food for their own zones, or that, having allowed them to enter, they would have no difficulty in forcing this responsibility upon them.

Pressed by Mr. Churchill and Field Marshal Alexander at the Potsdam Conference, Marshal Stalin replied on 24th July that Marshal Koniev had agreed to continue to provide rations for the people of Vienna until some alternative and more permanent arrangement could be made.

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to allow the movement of any food supplies from the areas under their control into Vienna or the zones of the western Allies. Consequently, when the Russians at last suggested 14th August for a meeting of the Allied Commission, the British held back. Lieutenant-General Sir Richard McCreery the Commander-in-Chief, had gone to London for instructions. These were given to him by the United Kingdom Government on 16th August. He was to assume no responsibility for the administration of the British sector in Vienna, nor was he to agree to the setting up of quadripartite control, except on the basis of full equality with the Russians. He was to enter into no long-term commitments for the supply of food and fuel from the west unless the Russians would agree to certain conditions regarding, *inter alia*, payment for such imports, and the level of ration scales to be adopted. It was hoped to have these matters discussed early, at the Council of Foreign Ministers which had been set up by the Potsdam Conference. Meanwhile he was to try to reach agreement with the French and Americans for the western Powers to undertake the interim supply of food to Vienna for a period of two months. He was authorized to provide 6,000 tons of food per mensem for this purpose from British stocks. He was also authorized to attend the forthcoming meeting in Vienna which was now arranged for 23rd August but only if it could be clearly established that it was a meeting of Commanders-in-Chief, not a meeting of the Allied Council. Since it was clear that at the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers one of the first matters for discussion would be the question of quadripartite recognition of the Provisional Austrian Government under Dr. Renner already set up and recognized by the Russians in Vienna, the British representative was also instructed to do nothing that might amount to recognition of this Government.

On the 23rd August there was a parade and march-past of Allied troops. The Russian invitations for the subsequent meeting had been for a first meeting of the Allied Council. By now the Russians may have felt that early establishment of the Council would be the best way to rid themselves of part of the responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating food situation. General McCreery explained that, since his Government was opposed to any meeting of the Allied Council before agreement had been reached over the feeding of Vienna and of Austria as a whole, he was not authorised to attend the meeting if it was to be one of the Allied Council. Notwithstanding protests by the Russian and other Commanders-in-Chief, Marshal Koniev had to agree that the meeting should become one of the four Commanders-in-Chief, not of the Allied Council. It was decided, however, on the proposal of General McCreery, that the Deputies, hitherto referred to as Chiefs of Staff to the Commanders-in-Chief, should begin immediate examination of the food problem.

At this meeting it was also proposed by the Russians that the authority of the Renner Government should be extended to the other zones. The matter was referred on British initiative to the Deputies of the Commanders-in-Chief, in a less radical form, with instructions 'to examine the competence of the Departments of the Central Austrian Administrative machine and to make recommendations as to the extent to which they could be used to assist the Allies in their task'.

But the Americans were anxious to set up quadripartite control and take over administration of their sector and felt little sympathy for the stand which the British were trying to take. And in fact the British were already extensively committed in Vienna: they had some 5,000 troops in the city; their Commandant-designate took part in informal meetings of the Kommandatura; with effect from 1st September they would, under interim arrangements, be importing food for the civil population and supplying trucks for its distribution; preparations for taking over the British sector were well advanced; it became increasingly difficult to refrain from formal assumption of authority when in practice such a large measure of responsibility was already being exercised.

Then on 28th August the Russians forced the issue by announcing that they would withdraw their Kommandaturas from the various *Bezirke* in the British, U.S. and French sectors of Vienna, on 1st September. This was clearly going to leave the British in *de facto* effective occupation of their sector and render it virtually impossible for them to refuse any longer to accept formal responsibility. On 31st August, therefore, the War Office agreed to the Allied Council being set up immediately and to the British authorities accepting full responsibility for their sector of Vienna on certain conditions, the chief of which were that the British reserved the right to discuss the future arrangements for the supply of Austria at the coming Foreign Secretaries' conference, and that their participation should not in any way involve recognition of the Renner Government.

The Allied Council met on 11th September in Vienna – which, as it happened, was also to be the date of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London – and assumed supreme authority throughout Austria. The Council also approved the composition with immediate effect of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura for Vienna which was to consist of the four Allied Commanders of zones within the city – Lieutenant-General Blagodatov (U.S.S.R.), Brigadier Palmer (British), Brigadier-General Lewis (American), and General de Brigade Noel du Pagrat (French). The organization was generally speaking similar to that set up in Berlin. Although driven to assume responsibility without any compensating concession from the Russians as to the provision of food for Austria, the British felt that the stand taken by them had nevertheless done something towards gaining them

equality with the Russians, and had perhaps been the means of throwing light upon Russian intentions.

* * *

With the establishment of the Allied Council there came into being the authority to which it had been planned that the military commanders should pass their responsibility for the control of civil administration.

In the case of Germany the present account has been brought to a gradual close as military responsibility disappeared at one after another of the three levels at which command of the field organization was exercised as the Control Commission came into being. In Austria the levels were different. Corps Commanders exercised no military government responsibility. Eighth Army, soon to become British Troops in Austria, constituted the first level of command above the field organization. The transfer of its responsibilities on various dates in the first half of October to the British element of the Allied Commission, itself under the command of the War Office, short-circuited the previously existing chain of command through 15th Army Group, A.F.H.Q., and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When the War Office handed over its responsibilities to the Control Office, which it did on 22nd October, as in the case of Germany, military responsibility for the operational control of the field organization faded out entirely. In the matter of relief supplies, military responsibility faded out by different stages. Combined Anglo-American operations ceased on 12th November 1945 and by the end of the year remaining military responsibility had disappeared, except only that Headquarters Central Mediterranean Force, the British component of A.F.H.Q., continued responsible for the physical movement of relief supplies from the Italian ports of arrival into the British zone of Austria.

But, in fact, Austria was treated more as liberated than as conquered territory. And in liberated territories the responsibility of the military authorities for the control of administration passed not to any Control Commission but to the indigenous governments. The recognition of these governments by the Allies was the main landmark in the progress from military to civil control. In Austria such a government was set up and recognized by the Allies not many weeks after the date on which the War Office handed over its responsibilities to the Control Office and this in fact seems in many ways a more satisfactory point at which to close the present account rather than when the Control Office took over from the War Office.

It remains only to summarize the chief happenings from the time when the Allied Council assumed responsibility to the time when the Allies accorded their recognition to the new Government of Austria.

* * *

There was, first, the train of events that led to the recognition of the new Government. The Russian authorities had very early recognized a provisional government in Vienna under Dr. Renner with authority throughout the parts of Austria occupied by the Russians. The question of the attitude to be adopted towards this had exercised both British and Americans. The Council was asked by the Russian member at its first meeting to recognize the authority of this government throughout the other zones of Austria. Consideration of the matter was postponed until after the holding of a conference of representatives from all *Länder* summoned by Dr. Renner from 24th to 26th September. This resulted in some transfer of authority from the centre to the provinces, and in a reduction of Communist representation at the centre. On 1st October the Council accordingly resolved that members should recommend to their Governments that the authority of the reconstituted Provisional Government should be extended to the whole of Austria, subject to certain conditions. The chief of these was that the Provisional Government would function 'under the guidance and control' of the Allied Council, and that 'certain functions of government which will be the subject of a separate recommendation will be reserved to the Allied Council.' At the meeting of the Council on 20th October the recognition of the Provisional Government by the four Allied Governments was formally communicated to Dr. Renner, the head of the Provisional Government.

But there remained the stumbling block of the functions of government to be reserved to the Allied Council. It seemed that unanimity was almost within reach on the basis of reservation of foreign affairs and diplomatic representation, demarcation and alteration of frontiers, displaced persons and repatriation, demilitarization, problems concerning property of foreigners and commercial and financial relations with foreign countries. But difficulty arose over the proviso which the Soviet representatives were insistent upon adding to the first and last of these functions – 'exception being made in the case of those nations, who are members of the Allied Council'. This would have meant that the governments represented on the Council could enjoy direct relations with the Austrian Government in diplomatic, commercial and financial matters, without reference to the Council. This proposal would completely undermine the authority of the Council and the other members were equally insistent that it must be rejected. On 16th November the contending parties managed to disengage by deciding that 'since Article 14 of the London Agreement of July 4th, 1945, provides that the nature and extent of Allied direction and guidance in Austria will be considered after the recognition by the four Powers of a freely elected Austrian Government, the Council will await the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the aforesaid Article before resuming the discussion of the question of Reserved Powers'. Dr.

Renner himself had played a large part in suggesting to the Allies that the way out was to press on with the holding of elections. In this and other ways he rendered great service to his country.

The elections were held on 25th November, the Allied Council expressing itself as satisfied that they 'took place without interruption, in conformity with the Electoral Law and on a democratic basis'. On a very heavy poll, the *Volkspartei* gained 85 seats, the Socialist Party 76, and the Communists, to Russian surprise, only 4. A new Austrian Government was formed, reflecting the results of the election, and on 20th December the members of the Allied Council agreed to recommend to their respective Governments that the new Government should be recognized. The Soviet Government took the view that the recognition given by them to the provisional government on 20th October was sufficient and that no further formal recognition was required. The other Governments signified their recognition on various dates from 22nd December to 5th January. The recognition accorded by the British Government was in the following terms:

- (1) That they recognise Austria as a State with the same frontiers as in 1937 pending a final definition of the frontiers.
- (2) That they recognize Dr. Renner as the duly elected Head of the Austrian State and recognize the present Austrian Government under his presidency as the *de jure* Government of Austria.
- (3) That this declaration in no way affects the control exercised over Austria and the Austrian Government by the Allied Council for Austria which is maintained in its existing form pending the conclusion of a new agreement on the subject between the four Governments.

In fact it was not many months before the new government became virtually independent of control by the Allied Council. In its 'existing form' control was such that Austrian legislation could come into force only if approved by the Council. The unanimity rule therefore made it possible for one member of the Council to prevent the enactment of any law. But under the 'new agreement' promulgated on 28th June 1946 it was provided that Austrian legislation, other than constitutional laws, and any international agreements, would come into force after thirty-one days *if not vetoed by the Council*. The unanimity rule now meant that any law could be brought into effect so long as one member of the Council refused to apply the veto. For constitutional laws the positive approval of the Council remained necessary.

* * *

Two other major topics attracted the attention of the Council through these weeks but neither could be brought to any conclusion

during the period with which this book is concerned. The first was the preparation of a plan for the feeding of the whole of Austria. There was no disagreement in the Allied Council regarding estimates of the food that could be produced by Austria. The volume of imports required to meet the balance of the country's needs depended upon the standard of living contemplated and several sets of figures were produced. The U.S.S.R. calculated that 490,000 tons of food would need to be imported. The British, French, and Americans suggested between 550,000 and 600,000 tons. It was agreed that it must be for the Council of Foreign Ministers to fix the level to be aimed at since this decision would affect the whole of Europe, not Austria alone. The Allied Council also agreed that in view of the severe shortages of food in Austria, the Allies would make no demands upon the food supplies of the country. The important question, however, was where the supplies of food should come from, and on this original cause of disagreement there was no sign of any coming together. The western Allies contended that supplies should be drawn from 'normal pre-war sources' i.e. principally from Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Russians, keenly aware of their own desperate shortages, and of the shortages in some of these countries, convinced also that in the last resort supplies would be brought from America, would not agree. Bulgaria and Rumania, they said, had no surpluses and in fact Russia was already supplying food to these countries. Furthermore other countries also, besides those named by the western Allies, had supplied food to Austria before the war. On this point no agreement was possible. Members transmitted the agreed recommendations to their Governments, and reported this disagreement. A fortnight later the Council of Foreign Ministers replied that the consumption level to be aimed at initially in the deficiency areas of Austria was a ration yielding 1,550 calories a day, with additions for persons employed on more heavy work, but that this should be raised to 2,000 calories as more supplies became available. Nothing was said, presumably nothing could be said, as to where the food was to come from.

This issue was side-stepped by invoking the aid of U.N.N.R.A., which had resolved in August that, since Austria was being treated by the Allies as a liberated, not an enemy, country, it was not debarred by its charter from coming to the assistance of the Austrian people.¹ In March, April, and May 1946, U.N.R.R.A. progressively took over responsibility from the military authorities for the import of relief supplies to Austria. There was another advantage in employing U.N.R.R.A. while there was no Austrian government able to arrange for imports of food on the requisite scale. By doing so Austria was

¹ Woodbridge, *History of U.N.R.R.A.*, New York, 1950, pp. 295-301.

treated as an economic unit in accordance with the Moscow declaration when, otherwise, economic sectionalism would have supervened.

* * *

The second important topic was the conversion of the German *Reichsmark* currency into an Austrian national currency. The need and urgency for this was indisputable. Politically and psychologically it was an important step in the separation of Austria from Germany. Financially it was necessary in order to create a currency which was effectively under the control of the Austrian Government and which could prove stable in terms of purchasing power. For inflation as disastrous as that which followed the First World War was just round the corner. Low controlled prices for commodities, high cash balances, the influx of *Reichsmarks* no longer valid in Germany, but above all the enormous expenditure of the occupation forces, an astonishing preponderance of which had been spent by the Russians, all contributed to this danger. By conversion it would be possible to eliminate at least some of these many inflationary pressures.

The western Allies favoured conversion in two stages. *Reichsmarks* would be replaced by Allied Military *Schillings* at once. Conversion of these into an Austrian national currency would take place later, probably in the Spring of 1946. This double operation had the support of the Austrian Provisional Government and was initially accepted by the Russians. Conversion was to begin on 15th October. On 4th October, the Russian representative on the Executive Committee withdrew agreement and pressed instead for immediate conversion into Austrian currency. The conversion operation had to be abandoned. The western Allies contended that immediate conversion into Austrian currency was not practicable since notes could not be printed in sufficient quantities before April 1946, and that in any case the Austrian winter would make earlier distribution to the remote parts of the country impossible. The Russians would admit neither argument. Their objection to the use of Allied Military *Schillings* may have been not unconnected with the fact that these notes were printed in the United Kingdom, where the plates were held. If there had been a conversion into Allied Military *Schillings*, the western Allies would in the last resort have controlled the provision of currency. An additional reason for the Russians preferring Austrian to Allied Military currency may have been that, whereas the latter would have been based on a decree of the Allied Council, the former involved legislation by the Provisional Austrian Government. The Russians may have hoped to drive the western Allies into recognition of the latter by insisting upon a conversion measure that would involve legislation by the new Government.

After stubborn negotiations a scheme was agreed to on 16th November for immediate conversion, as desired by the Russians, of *Reichsmarks* and Allied Military *Schillings* of denominations greater than RM 5 or 5 *Schillings* into Austrian national *Schillings* on the basis of one *Reichsmark* to one *Schilling*, between 13th and 20th December. In deference to the fears of the western Allies regarding the practicability of such a conversion, the Austrian Government was to retain in use for small change 250 million Allied Military *Schilling* notes of smaller denominations, which were, however, to be withdrawn from circulation as soon as Austrian national currency became available.

Violent disagreement broke out again, however, over the matter of occupation costs. The western Allies considered that before any communication was made to the Austrian Government regarding the sums it was to be required to place at the disposal of the several Commanders-in-Chief, there must be preliminary co-ordination of these demands by the Allied Council. The Russians were utterly unwilling to admit this contention. In their opinion '... military expenditure was within the exclusive competency of each Government and, by its nature, secret; it, therefore, could not, for any reason, be submitted to the Allied Council.'

Later on the same day a breakdown was averted by an understanding that the distribution of Austrian national currency among the four forces of occupation would be the subject of informal conferences of the four Commanders-in-Chief, not of a formal meeting of the Military Commissioners. This enabled the conversion scheme agreed upon earlier in the day to be formally approved. Under this each individual was to receive for his holdings of *Reichsmarks* or Allied Military *Schillings*, 150 Austrian *Schillings* in cash, the balance being credited into a bank account, sixty per cent of which was totally, and forty per cent partially, blocked, until further orders. On 30th November the necessary Austrian legislation, the *Schillinggesetz*, was approved and conversion took place between 13th and 20th December 1945. Russian optimism was justified. Accelerated production of notes and a severe cutting-down of reserves obviated the breakdown which the Western Allies had feared.

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In comparison with the development of events in Germany, the outstanding, perhaps the surprising, feature of the short period with which this chapter is concerned is the emergence, within a few months of the end of hostilities, of a politically and economically unified Austria, which only a few months later still was to be given a very large measure of independence.

There was, of course, no policy of dismemberment for Austria. She

was not the aggressor that Germany had been. What the Allies were most concerned to do was not to break up Austria any further, but to ensure that she no longer formed a part of Germany. A useful first step in this direction was to endow her with a life of her own. In any case there was the Moscow declaration that the Allies wished '... to see re-established a free and independent Austria...' But the danger of political sectionalism or dismemberment was nevertheless present. East and west both hoped to get Austria aligned on their side. The Russians having entered the country first, and having set up and recognized Dr. Renner's Provisional Government, there was a danger that the western Allies would withhold their recognition on the ground that Dr. Renner was a creature of the Russians, and would then create and formally recognize their own Austrian government or governments. Dismemberment would then have been well on the way.

Fortunately this danger was averted. Economic unification resulted, as we have seen, from the decision to hand over responsibility for the relief of Austria to U.N.R.R.A. Politically Dr. Renner disarmed the suspicions of the west, in particular by holding the conference of the representatives of the *Länder* on 24-26th September when the provisional Government was re-organized so as to transfer authority from the centre to the *Länder* and so as to reduce Communist representation. Partly, however, it was that events drove the western Allies into recognition of the Provisional Government. When further progress was jeopardized by the inability of the Allies to agree on the powers to be reserved to the Allied Council, it was Dr. Renner who found a way forward when he pressed for the holding of elections and suggested postponement of the debate about reserved powers until after the elections had been held. Both east and west, the latter on French initiative, agreed to the holding of elections. To the unconcealed surprise of the Russians, the people of Austria decisively rejected Communism and Dr. Renner refused to become their puppet, although originally put into power by them. By now the danger of dismemberment had passed and events moved forward to the promulgation on 28th June 1946 of the new agreement on control of Austria by the Allies. It remains, from the Austrian point of view, an inexplicable miracle that the Russians accepted the provisions of this which conferred virtual independence upon the new Austrian Government.

CHAPTER XVII

RELIEF SUPPLIES

EARLY planning of relief supplies generally, including supplies for Europe, and the growth of the principles to govern this, will be more fully discussed in another volume of this series. By January 1944, when S.H.A.E.F. came into existence, the important and far reaching decision had been taken that initial responsibility for relief would rest upon the military authorities. It would be confined to a period assumed for planning purposes at six months. It would also be confined to territory actually under military occupation. It would, lastly, be confined to supplementing indigenous resources to the level necessary for the bare prevention of disease and unrest. In the matter of food supplies this 'prevention of disease and unrest' formula was early translated into practical terms as involving responsibility for ensuring, so far as possible, that the normal average diet in liberated countries did not yield less than two thousand calories daily.¹ Whenever possible increased rations yielding an additional one thousand to two thousand calories were to be provided for heavy manual workers. Work in the U.K. and later in the U.S. resulted in the preparation, and approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and by the two governments, of an over-all estimate of the relief that would be needed in any country of Europe which the Allied forces might invade. This was known as Plan A and resulted in the ear-marking of productive capacity by the appropriate authorities for the Supreme Allied Commander to enable him to meet his relief responsibilities as they arose.

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But only the military commander undertaking the invasion could know where the invasion would actually strike and how much of any given country might be liberated and need relief at any given time. It was the task of S.H.A.E.F. in consultation with its two Army Groups to translate the generalized six-months' estimates of Plan A into specific monthly requirements against the productive capacity made available under the Plan and to divide this capacity between Army Groups. Pending the creation of, and preparations by, S.H.A.E.F., the British had taken out two insurances against sudden need. The

¹ For British war-time rations, cf. p. 65.

A.T.(E.) Committee had agreed in September 1942 to the procurement from U.K. sources of a stock of 'hard' rations sufficient for five million people for forty two days, and of certain medical supplies. This arrangement was superseded when the U.K. Government undertook, notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining the civil ration, and subject to the right to give ninety days notice in case of inability to fulfil the undertaking, to provide from its own stocks almost the whole of S.H.A.E.F.'s requirements of food for the first ninety days of the operations, whether for a contested landing or for the case of enemy collapse. The eventual U.K. liability under S.H.A.E.F. combined plans was to be reduced by the amount provided under this arrangement which came to be known, from the number of the telegram in which the U.K. authorities made their offer, as the CIV 308 commitment.

By the beginning of 1944 S.H.A.E.F. had compiled and sent to the C.C.A.C. for approval two sets of detailed estimates, Plans I and II. Plan I was for the case of a total enemy collapse, Plan II for a contested invasion. Both covered a period of six months. Both covered only areas expected to come under actual military occupation. Both were generally within the scale and framework of Plan A and both were approved by the C.C.A.C.

A month or two later, as it became clear that collapse of the enemy was not imminent, and as the probable nature of the operations for the invasion of the continent became clearer, a revised version of Plan II for contested invasion was submitted. In this and subsequent revisions the pre-planned detailed estimates covered the first ninety days only of the invasion, divided into three thirty-day periods: a procedure was established, however, under which estimates for succeeding months should be prepared three months ahead and revised at monthly intervals as information regarding conditions in the invaded country became fuller, and as the probable development of the battle became clearer. There were set out the stocks already available in the U.K. under C.C.A.C. sanctions, the quantities available there but not yet sanctioned by C.C.A.C., and the quantities which were not available in the U.K. and would have to be imported from elsewhere. Virtually all food items or equivalents and most medical supplies were available in the U.K. Much of the clothing was also available but a proportion of this would require to be imported from the U.S. Once again the requirements were broadly speaking within Plan A. Subject to further consideration of the need for requirements falling outside this plan, and subject to a few modifications, the estimates were accepted by the C.C.A.C. and provision of the requirements sanctioned.

Early in May S.H.A.E.F. prepared revised estimates of food requirements for the first ninety days. Hitherto these had been based on overall regional estimates a proportion of which would be utilized

as required. Now that a specific operation was clearly imminent a fresh approach to the problem was made, starting with an estimate of the 1943 harvest in France, and taking into account actual areas that might be liberated.

* * *

It was the task of Army Groups to convert the S.H.A.E.F. ninety day estimates and allocations into daily tonnages to be landed on the beaches, and to create the machinery and procedure for calling forward, moving, storing, and distributing the goods as they became available. Here the plans of the British 21 Army Group only will be considered but in effect, if not in method, the American plans were similar.

A preliminary point requires to be made. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, controlled all land forces, American as well as British, taking part in the invasion of Normandy, and continued in operational command of these until September 1944, when the Supreme Commander took over immediate direction of the battle. In administrative matters, however, the British and American systems of supply being fundamentally different, 21 Army Group was responsible only for the British forces engaged while the American forces were maintained by their own organizations. Accordingly the 21 Army Group arrangements for relief supplies were designed only for the British zone of operations, not for the whole of the area under its command.

These arrangements became an integral part of the preparations for 'Overlord'. For the first ninety days plans were drawn up before the invasion of the continent setting out in detail the kinds and quantities of relief supplies that it was hoped to bring in, and the rate of flow over the beaches. The commodities which it was planned to import were food, soap, medical supplies, liquid fuel, lubricants, a little coal, clothing, blankets, and emergency feeding equipment for refugee camps. Urgently needed engineering materials could be drawn from normal army stocks, if they could be spared. For the first seventeen days Second Army was to be responsible for plans and arrangements. The total amount to be landed during this period was 783 tons. Thereafter 21 Army Group took over responsibility. What these arrangements meant in terms of daily landings on the beaches has been shown in connection with plans for the return to France.¹

The organization for handling these supplies centred on 21 Army Group where a colonel in charge of civilian supplies, Colonel P. J. E. Rowell was responsible, under the direction of the D.C.C.A.O. 21 Army Group, for programmes and movement of relief supplies, for

¹ cf. Ch. IV.

their distribution, and for the maintenance of accounts. There were also specialist supply officers at Army and Corps Headquarters.

All C.A. supplies were to be moved along normal military channels to, and at, beaches or base ports. In the early stages onward movement would also be down normal military channels to the C.A. detachment requiring the supplies. As soon as the C.A. organization was sufficiently established on the continent, it was to set up its own Base Port Depots. Into these would flow those commodities not normally handled by the military services, i.e. food, soap, medical supplies, clothing, blankets, emergency feeding equipment. Liquid fuel, lubricants, coal and other common user goods, such as engineering materials, would continue to be distributed through normal military channels. As soon as the indigenous civil government had set up a sufficiently effective organization responsibility for the further distribution of relief supplies brought in under these arrangements was to be transferred to it. Until such time as this could safely be done a sufficient number of Civil Affairs Inland Depots was to be formed for the handling of those relief supplies which were not to be distributed through normal military channels. In addition, Port Sections and Handling and Forwarding Sections were improvised as and where this became necessary to establish control and expedite the handling of Civil Affairs supplies.

It remains only to describe the procedure for calling forward these supplies. It was laid down that the estimates for the pre-planned first ninety days requirements. '... are given only as a guide to assist planning by subordinate formations and do not constitute a firm allocation. Allocations for specific periods will be notified from time to time.' These estimates were to be continually revised in the light of the developments of operations and converted into firm requirements by monthly bids, which normally gave a firm requirement for thirty days, together with a provisional bid for the next thirty days, and a forecast for the following thirty days. The same procedure was applied to the estimation and calling forward of requirements after the pre-planned period of ninety days. The monthly progression, from forecast to provisional bid, and from provisional bid to firm requirement, ensured that relief supplies began moving towards the continent in time and in broadly appropriate quantities, but that only those were sent overseas that closer and more precise knowledge of conditions still showed to be necessary. Initially, for a period of some three months, while the CIV 308 commitment was operative, the bulk of these bids was to be placed by 21 Army Group directly upon the Directorate of Civil Affairs in the War Office. Afterwards bids were to be placed upon S.H.A.E.F. which would route them onwards to the U.K., to the U.S., or to Canada, in accordance with the allocations communicated by the C.C.A.C.

As soon as the War Office or S.H.A.E.F. notified 21 Army Group that the commodities bid for were in fact available for calling forward, the Civil Affairs staff at Army Group would make their bids for shipping space, through the G and Q (Movement) staffs which would assess the proportion of precious lift that should be spared for the needs of the civil population. Supplies would then be called forward by 21 Army Group. S.H.A.E.F. at no time took part in the actual calling forward. It was not an executive authority in this respect. Once it had apportioned resources as between 21 Army Group and the appropriate U.S. authorities it was for these to take executive action. When relief supplies had been landed a similar bidding procedure would be employed to determine the manner in which the limited transport facilities for onward distribution – rail, or road – should be shared.

* * *

All the planning so far described was concerned with areas under actual military occupation, and was closely integrated with the operational plans for 'Overlord' and the operations that were to follow.

In May 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consulted the Supreme Commander regarding the practicability of the assumption by him of responsibility for the relief of what came to be known as 'hiatus areas' in his theatre of operations, and the additional resources that he would require. Military interest in the prevention of disease and unrest within areas under actual military occupation needed no demonstration. But as the battle moved on there would be left areas in which this interest would disappear. And if landings were effected on the continent and prospered, it was at least likely that the enemy would withdraw from other areas in which no military operations were planned and over which no military occupation was practicable. It was these that were described as 'hiatus areas.' The Supreme Commander replied that he would be able to prepare estimates of the needs of such areas and provide a minimum of Civil Affairs staff to survey and report on conditions on the ground and supervise the unloading of supplies and their delivery to the indigenous authorities, provided that the C.C.A.C. arranged a separate shipping programme for hiatus areas and shipped supplies direct from source to hiatus ports, when these were called forward by appropriate authorities under the Supreme Commander. What he could not do was to spare shipping or to undertake distribution.

On 27th May the Combined Chiefs of Staffs issued their instructions to the Supreme Commander. The military authorities were to become responsible for the relief of hiatus areas even if this was not essential to the success of their operations. This fundamentally modified the

nature of military responsibility. But in view of the considerations raised by the Supreme Commander, he was made the judge of the extent to which it was practicable for him to assume this responsibility, having regard to the needs of his operations, and was given discretion to refuse to assume the responsibility if conditions in any areas were not sufficiently stable to justify the provision of relief. Responsibility for internal distribution was to rest as far as possible on the indigenous authorities, national if possible, local if necessary.

Hiatus areas were by definition areas in which there was to be no actual military operation. It became necessary, therefore, to conceive of relief - supply planning for these areas, not as a part of operational planning, but in terms of the countries to be liberated, and to devise fresh machinery for preparing estimates, calling forward supplies, handing them over to indigenous organizations, and exercising such minimum supervision of the distribution made as would satisfy the Supreme Commander that he was not wasting his resources. It was not appropriate for Civil Affairs staffs with formations which might be engaged in fast moving operations, possibly advancing beyond the boundaries of the countries concerned, to undertake these functions. The obvious agencies were the 'country houses' which were the repository for information and special knowledge concerning their respective countries and in any case were destined to become the Civil Affairs elements of the various S.H.A.E.F. Missions to liberated countries.

It was axiomatic that the existing complicated machinery and procedure for handling relief supplies should be utilized with the minimum of disturbance. In any case it was from the over-all Plan A allocation of productive capacity for the country concerned that the requirements of the hiatus areas would be met. Initial allocation of productive capacity and advance procurement for hiatus areas of France were ensured by calling upon the C.C.A.C. to make an arbitrary addition of twenty-five per cent to the 'Overlord' allocations for the first 180 days. Meanwhile phased estimates were drawn up for these areas in France and elsewhere by the respective country houses. The later progressive revision of these import programmes at monthly intervals both in France and other liberated countries, became the task of the S.H.A.E.F. Missions to the countries concerned. It was the function of the Missions also to receive and screen any demands put forward by the indigenous national authorities and to incorporate the quantities admitted in their estimates. Balancing of the needs of the several countries was undertaken at Headquarters and allocations of productive capacity made to each. The appropriate organizations, Communications Zone in France, 21 Army Group in Belgium, actually called forward supplies, since they alone, and not the Missions, disposed of the physical resources for doing so, and handed them over

at ports to the indigenous authorities. The Missions were then to exercise such discreet supervision as was possible over the distribution made, in order to ensure that there was no serious abuse of the aid made available.

* * *

It may be asked how these great quantities of relief supplies were to be paid for. If supplies were procured in the U.S.A., Canada or elsewhere in the British Empire, the initial cost was to be borne by the Governments of the U.S., Canada, or the U.K. respectively. The cost of supplies procured outside these countries was to be divided between the U.S. and the U.K. The Governments of the countries receiving supplies were to be required to pay for what these countries had received. Losses were to be borne by the Governments of the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. in an agreed proportion. A formula was evolved to take into account these various factors, under which the recipient governments paid for supplies received in the proportion of sixty-two per cent to the U.S. in dollars, thirty-three per cent to the U.K. in sterling, and five per cent to Canada in Canadian dollars. The extent of their indebtedness was ascertained by reference to the quantitative receipts which the military authorities were required to take for all supplies handed over to civilian organizations, in the light of the prices worked out by a body known as the Combined Weighted Average Landed Cost Sub-Committee of the C.C.A.C.

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Relief supplies began to be landed from the earliest stages but it is hard to say in what quantities for difficulty was experienced in identifying them on the beaches. Partly this was due to the natural confusion of battle. Partly it was because Civil Affairs supplies at first lacked distinctive markings, a fault that was later remedied. In fact, however, during the early days there was little need for relief. Local stocks of food and captured enemy supplies were sufficient for immediate needs. On 19th June the S.C.A.O. Second Army reported that it had so far proved necessary to draw only four tons of Civil Affairs supplies.

In these early stages, such C.A. supplies as came in were handled by the normal military supply organization. Two Detail Issue Depots (D.I.D.'s) were placed temporarily at the disposal of the Civil Affairs organization for this purpose. Civil Affairs units drew their requirements from these. We have seen, however, that it was planned to set up C.A. Base Ports Depots, and C.A. Inland Depots, as soon as practicable, for separate handling of C.A. supplies, forward of the beaches or ports.

The first of such depots to arrive was No. 3 C.A. Inland Depot. It came ashore on 14th June at Craye-sur-Vie and went straight to Sommervieu near Bayeux. Its equipment was slow in arriving and it took time to assemble material and civilian labour in order to wire in the depot and make the necessary roads. A beginning was made with the distribution of soap and medical supplies. The latter were to be a continual source of worry. Although small in tonnage they included a vast number of items whose purpose could be known only to medical men. Civil Affairs Port Sections, and Handling and Forwarding Sections, could manage such things as emergency medical packs. When bulk stores began to arrive they could have done with experts on their staffs. The first shipload of flour and bulk supplies for Civil Affairs purposes arrived during the last week of June. At about the same time No. 64 Base Supply Depot, part of the normal military organization, landed and began to operate in support of the D.I.D.'s and No. 3 C.A.I.D. On 3rd July No. 3 C.A.I.D. was able to begin bulk issues to the French Regional Commissioner for Rouen, when 79 tons were handed over, mostly biscuits. A fortnight later regular bulk issues of flour were being made to mills. On 21st August a sub-depot of No. 3 C.A.I.D. was established at Falaise and 120,000 hard rations were sent to it on the next day. On 27th-29th August No. 3 C.A.I.D. moved forward to St. Symphorien near Laigle. Here it received stores sent up from Bayeux and pushed some of these forward to Vernon for the use of XXX Corps C.A. officers. In forward areas supplies were normally required either for refugee centres, or for handing over to the local *Maires* for distribution. On 1st September the Falaise sub-depot rejoined its parent unit, and over the period 9-18th September the depot moved on to Zaventem near Brussels. Stocks remaining at St. Symphorien were handed over to French regional officials. Almost at once an advance depot was required to be set up at Eindhoven. There were frequent arrivals now of trains with C.A. supplies and also of motor transport convoys. Early in October trains began to arrive from Dieppe when No. 4 C.A.I.D. was established. On 14th-17th October the depot moved forward once more, this time to Helmond in Holland. Here it remained for the rest of the year, being rejoined by the Eindhoven sub-depot on 25th November.

Meanwhile No. 1 C.A. Base Port Depot had landed in Normandy on 2nd July and immediately joined No. 3 C.A.I.D. at Sommervieu. There followed three weeks of uncertainty and inactivity, of orders and counter-orders. Then the unit was ordered by Headquarters L. of C. to take over all the Civil Affairs stocks in No. 64 Base Supply Depot, amounting to 1,700 tons, by 27th July and to begin receiving incoming stores at once. It is clear that in these first weeks there were too many administrative and Civil Affairs units in the bridgehead. But planning

had assumed a faster expansion and the additional staffs might well have been needed. The depot remained near Bayeux all through the months of August, September and October. There was constant difficulty over labour. It had been intended that the depot should employ civilians. But very few came forward to be employed. In August Spanish Pioneers were allotted for work at the depot but these were idle. Civilians and pioneers both pilfered badly. Prisoners of war proved by far the most satisfactory labour. In November it was clear that a move was imminent. All stocks were sent forward, mostly to Malines and Eindhoven, and over the period 22nd-29th November the depot moved forward to 'sHertogenbosch, where it was based on Antwerp and only three miles from the front. The machinery was now working more easily and there was never any lack of work for the depot. But labour difficulties continued and there was much dissatisfaction with the rates of pay fixed. It was difficult for depot staff not to resent what seemed to them the frequently ungracious acceptance of relief supplies made available at the cost of the U.K. civil ration, and brought to the continent in difficulty and danger. But the recipients were paying for the supplies, and sometimes did not need them, sometimes felt they should be getting more, sometimes had received more under the Germans. Some were not well disposed towards the Allies. Others were friendly enough but could not at once get out of 'working to rule' or actively sabotaging as they had been urged to do during the German occupation.

We have looked somewhat closely at the doings of No. 3 C.A.I.D. and No. 1 Base Port Depot in order to gain an impression of the day-to-day work of the Civil Affairs supply organization and because they were the first of their kind to reach the Continent. They were followed at intervals by Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, C.A.I.D.'s and by No. 7 B.P.D. By September all these were in the field. In addition Port Sections, and Handling and Forwarding Sections were formed on an *ad hoc* basis as they were needed. It had been planned that relief supplies should be distributed forward of beaches and base ports by military transport until such time as indigenous civilian transport could undertake the task. Such was the pressure of the operational demands upon the military L. of C., however, that Civil Affairs needs, with their low priorities, were always in danger of being squeezed out. And such was the shortage of civilian transport that the indigenous authorities could do little without military assistance. To meet this situation the Civil Affairs authorities built up what was in effect a separate L. of C. In the U.K. there were more lorries than drivers; in France more drivers than lorries. Indigenous transport companies were formed in France. Lorries and blue uniforms were sent from the U.K. to C.A. depots. The companies consisted of locally recruited civilian volunteer drivers, commanded by French officers and other ranks

provided by the French Military Mission. The companies were administered by C.A. Headquarters as military units and were used mainly on the local distribution of supplies from depots.¹ Later, similar companies were formed in Belgium and Holland. There were times when this Civil Affairs L. of C. was able to help the normal army L. of C. to carry urgent military demands.

In January 1945 it was decided to transfer to the normal Army services the responsibility for the import and storage of Civil Affairs and Military Government stores in rear areas. This was becoming possible because of the increasing part played by the national organizations of the liberated countries. A reduced Military Government supplies organization would suffice for the expected commitments in Germany, where, relief was to be confined if possible to United Nations displaced persons. The Civil Affairs Base Port Depots and half the Civil Affairs Inland Depots were disbanded. Nos. 2, 4, 8, and 10, became Military Government Inland Depots for employment in Germany, in the field. Here also the handling of Military Government stores further back was, in the event, placed upon normal military Base Supply Depots and Detail Issue Depots allocated for the purpose.

The machinery for keeping under review the estimates of relief supply requirements, and for calling these forward, worked smoothly. Civil Affairs officers on first arrival in an area were urgently required to seek information from the *Maire* or from other local officials regarding stocks of food and other supplies. On the basis of such information, checked when possible by personal observation, supplies available were called forward to meet deficiencies, and estimates of future needs were passed back. Distribution could obviously not always be made on a uniform basis, but it was the task of Civil Affairs staff officers to strike the best possible rough and ready balance between areas.

Meanwhile planning and preparation began for the greatest single task that the Civil Affairs supplies organization was called upon to undertake in north-west Europe – the feeding of the densely populated areas of western Holland. A full account of the planning and execution of this operation has been given in an earlier chapter.² It was at first sought to place this responsibility elsewhere in order to free 21 Army Group for its main task of defeating the German forces. But the logic of the situation forced it back, and there was then set up a special L. of C. organization for the purpose under 21 Army Group command. This was the West Holland District, later renamed the Netherlands District.

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¹ The formation of these transport companies is referred to also in Ch. XXIII.

² cf. Ch. VIII.

It was not to be expected that the quantities of relief supplies actually landed in the course of battle would come up to the hopes incorporated in the plans. An early Second Army report ran:

'Owing to the dislocation of the shipping programme it has been extremely difficult to identify and trace C.A. supplies/stores, and quite impossible in the case of those not specially marked. They have come in scattered consignments on different beaches, on the wrong dates, and have become dispersed through different service depots. At 1 July there were large deficiencies against the amounts due of all C.A. food supplies . . . Cases out of the first four medical packs are still arriving at 3 Inland Depot and two packs are now complete with the following exceptions: Unit 71 Case No. 55, Unit 72 Case No. 58. Emergency feeding equipment has started to arrive, but *no* complete set has yet been traced.'

One may feel that it was not far short of a miracle that these supplies arrived at all.

At the end of the first month, when the planned imports amounted to 2,749 tons, the supplies actually called forward amounted to 2,271 tons. Ninety per cent of these requirements, 2,025 tons, had been shipped. Of these shipments, 822 tons only had been discharged on the Continent; 264 tons were in process of unloading; 939 tons were still awaiting discharge. Clearly it was handling over the beaches that was the bottleneck which resulted in little more than one third of the quantities demanded actually reaching France. A month later, on 8th August, and again, after sixty days, little more than one third of the amounts demanded had actually been received. It was still discharge capacity that controlled the rate of arrival. After ninety days, however, at the end of the preplanned period, almost two thirds of the amounts demanded had actually been delivered. The handling of goods over the beaches had greatly improved.

In the next few months the movement of relief supplies suffered a setback. The Arnhem offensive was undertaken at the expense of opening the Scheldt. As a result 21 Army Group depended on beach head maintenance for longer than had been planned, and every available vehicle had to be used – including the Civil Affairs companies – to maintain the fighting troops; 21 Army Group even had to use American transport aircraft for maintenance, so bringing General Patton's advance to a halt. The pressure upon these lengthened communications of the Arnhem operations themselves, and then of the sudden demands resulting from the enemy offensive in the Ardennes, all had their part in cutting down the flow of relief supplies. But mainly it was because responsibility for France had passed to the U.S. Communications Zone, and because in Belgium, which now formed the greater part of

21 Army Group responsibility, stocks of food were in general not so low, at least before the end of 1944, as to justify diverting resources from the battle.¹

The figures of imports so far quoted refer to the 21 Army Group area only. Until after the battle of the Falaise pocket in mid-August this did not extend outside the Department of Calvados. In the course of the swift advance that followed it expanded to take in all or part of the Departments of Orne, Eure, Eure et Loire, Seine Inférieure, Seine et Oise, Oise, Somme, Pas de Calais and Nord. In September it took in the greater part of Belgium. Responsibility for Holland was to lie entirely upon 21 Army Group but in the autumn of 1944 only a narrow strip had been liberated. On the right of 21 Army Group a far greater part of France and a portion of Belgium were liberated by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. As this formation moved forward administrative functions were passed back to Headquarters U.S. Communications Zone which assumed responsibility for the import of relief supplies. In October the U.S. Sixth Army Group, coming up from the Mediterranean, took its place on the right of Twelfth Army Group and soon after Headquarters Communications Zone assumed administrative responsibility also for areas liberated by Sixth Army Group. Over the period October 1944 to March 1945 21 Army Group progressively handed over areas of responsibility in France to U.S. Communications Zone until it retained only the Departments of Pas de Calais and Nord, and certain rights in connection with British enclaves within Calvados and Somme. Notwithstanding the retention of these areas in France by 21 Army Group and the existence of an American zone within Belgium, it proved administratively convenient to parcel out responsibility for relief supplies on a national basis. U.S. Communications Zone assumed responsibility for the whole of France and 21 Army Group for the whole of Belgium.

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Meanwhile most of France and Belgium had passed into the category of hiatus areas, where there was no longer, or never had been, any actual military occupation. It had been planned that responsibility for relief supplies in these areas should pass from 21 Army Group, or U.S. Communications Zone to the S.H.A.E.F. Missions. Ultimately it did, but in the case of France there were difficulties.

Under its directive the Mission to France was made responsible for receiving, screening, and consolidating French requests for relief supplies and making recommendations on these to S.H.A.E.F. When

¹ cf. Ch. VII., Belgium and Luxembourg.

supplies were made available the Mission was required to facilitate delivery to the French, whether at ports or other terminals. By the time the Mission came into existence the great bulk of relief supply operations in respect of France was being conducted by the American Headquarters Communication Zone. All demands for supplies handled by this headquarters had been made under *ad hoc* arrangements, between the French local authorities, and the appropriate Civil Affairs agency in the field or with formations. The intention of the directive to the Mission was that future requirements should be handled on a nation-wide basis, by the Provisional Government, through the S.H.A.E.F. Mission, and S.H.A.E.F. itself, not locally. But Headquarters Communication Zone would not accept these arrangements. It had been charged with Civil Affairs responsibility behind areas of active operations. It had established contacts with the French before the Mission had come into existence. It, and not the Mission, had the physical resources for receiving, storing and issuing supplies. For this reason it strongly opposed transfer to the S.H.A.E.F. Mission of the responsibility it was already largely exercising. And as we have seen, Communications Zone, although under the command of General Eisenhower as Commanding General E.T.O.U.S.A., was *not* under the command of S.H.A.E.F. But there were other difficulties. At all times cuts had to be imposed on demands because of shipping shortages. These cuts raised questions of priorities. Headquarters Communications Zone felt that the Mission, with no responsibility for military operations, was not competent to adjudicate upon these questions. Conversely, the Mission felt that Headquarters Communication Zone, which had no contact with the Provisional Government (for this was the function of the Mission) was not competent to adjudicate as to the urgency of civil needs, as against each other, or as against military requirements. There was justice in both points of view. But the truth is that neither Communications Zone nor the Mission was competent to balance military and civil needs the one against the other. S.H.A.E.F. itself was alone fitted and should have been given the requisite authority over Communications Zone to enable it to discharge this function. It was some three or four months before a satisfactory procedure was evolved for the handling of French demands on a national basis. Meanwhile they continued to be met, so far as circumstances permitted, under improvised arrangements. With the Provisional Government, Headquarters Communications Zone, and the Mission, all in Paris, and S.H.A.E.F. no further away than Versailles, it is difficult to avoid the impression that there was here some failure of co-ordination.

But these delays caused less harm than might have been expected because, until the end of 1944, the volume of Civil Affairs supplies imported to France was not great, being only a fraction of that

contemplated in the plans. Shipping, the capacity of the beaches and ports, and the ability to move supplies once landed, were all limited. The invasion had taken place in an area of food surpluses. There had been no serious destruction of food stocks or crops by the enemy – although considerable amounts of food had been requisitioned. When the Allied forces broke out from their bridgehead they captured German food stocks. Finally, the harvest was approaching. In these circumstances, however much the Allies might wish to be more generous in their treatment of the French, it was clearly their duty to avoid trenching upon the ‘lift’ available for ammunition and petrol and the other supplies that would help their armies forward on the way to Germany. By the end of October 1944 less than 100,000 tons had been imported into France. This figure takes no account of coal and petroleum products imported. By 31st January 1945 the comparable figure had risen to 220,000 tons. By far the greater part of this had been for areas liberated by the invasion of the south of France, where conditions had been much worse than in the north. This figure must be compared with the estimate in Plan A of 700,000 tons of food to be imported for France during the first six months. Coal imports by 31st January were 585,272 tons, and compared better with Plan A estimates which were 915,000 tons. By the end of 1944 less than 45,000 tons of petroleum products had been released for civilian needs against Plan A provision of 156,300 tons. By the closing months of 1944 it was becoming clear, first, that such small hidden reserves of food as France had enjoyed were fast being eaten down, and, second, that France needed, even more acutely than food, the raw materials to start her industries again, if a political and economic disaster was to be avoided that would force the Allies to assume responsibilities far greater than they had ever contemplated, or than were compatible with the concentration of their efforts against Germany. Imports of Civil Affairs supplies were greatly stepped up in the new year.

But the major contribution to rehabilitation was made by the French civil import programme. For even while attempts were being made to evolve a procedure whereby French demands for military imports of relief supplies should be handled on a national basis, as intended in the S.H.A.E.F. directive, and not under local arrangements, preparations were in hand for the next stage after that, when the French themselves would assume responsibility for the procurement and handling of imports. It was naturally a part of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission’s task to aid the French authorities in drawing up their programme and putting it into operation. It was the responsibility of the Mission to satisfy itself that the French arrangements were such that the military authorities could discontinue their imports without bringing about conditions within France that would endanger the success of their military operations.

Towards the end of October there came into existence informally a committee which in the following month was formally recognised as the Four Party Committee (France). Similar committees were formed in due course in the other liberated countries. The four parties were the Allied military authorities (represented by the S.H.A.E.F. Mission) the Provisional Government, the British civil authorities (represented by an economic adviser at the British Embassy in Paris), and the United States civil authority (similarly represented). The committee had no executive authority but it acted as a convenient forum for the discussion of procedure and priorities in regard to the import of relief supplies, both by the Allied military authorities and the Provisional Government, and for the co-ordination of the two programmes with each other, and with the hard facts of the logistical situation. At its first meetings the committee was concerned mainly with consideration of the civil import programme drawn up by the French authorities and of the French Government's bids for shipping to handle the goods procured under this. The programmes for the first eight months amounted to 6,749,523 tons, made up as follows - coal and pitch 2,500,000 tons, petroleum products 800,000 tons, and other supplies 3,444,523 tons. The 'other supplies' consisted, approximately, as to one-third, of food and fats, as to one-third, of phosphates, and as to one-third, of minerals, raw materials, and semi-finished products.

It became clear at once that the acute world shortage of shipping might make it impossible to allot any shipping at all for French civilian needs. M. Monnet, the President of the 'Commission des Importations', visited Washington and succeeded, amongst other things, in obtaining the allocation in January of six ships for imports from America under the civil import programme and ten ships for February and March. An additional 20,000 tons of shipping were also allocated for imports from the U.K. during January. These allocations represented but a fraction of the shipping required to handle the imports for which the French Government was arranging. This repeatedly found itself denied shipping and other facilities on the ground that provision had already been made under the military import programme. The French Government strongly urged the early discontinuance of the military programme so that it could obtain a hearing for its demands before the C.C.A.C. and the Combined Boards concerned. The final frustration for the French was that while the existence of a military programme denied a hearing to the claims of a civil programme, it did not necessarily mean the arrival of imports in France. In January for example the Government complained that only 20 per cent of the supplies planned had actually arrived. In the following months however it became possible to allocate more shipping for French civilian needs and arrivals under the national import programme grew as below:

RELIEF SUPPLIES

November 1944	3,102	tons
December "	6,036	"
January 1945	23,685	"
February "	60,776	"
March "	157,824	"
April "	227,077	"

In April the C.C.A.C. decided that it was safe to discontinue imports under the military programme on completion of the April loadings in respect of all commodities other than coal and petroleum products. These were of such vital importance to the military authorities that it was necessary to continue centralized control and distribution for some months longer.

* * *

In Belgium, there were two clearly marked phases in the struggle to feed the country. Plan A contemplated the import of 396,300 tons of supplies for the civil population under military arrangements. But the Germans by their stubborn resistance on either side of the mouth of the River Scheldt successfully denied the use of the ports of Antwerp and Ghent to the Allies until the end of November 1944. This very greatly taxed the small capacity of Ostend and the long overland supply lines through France to meet the needs of the Allied forces. Belgium was liberated as the harvest was being brought in. Except in regard to fats there were known to be sufficient stocks in the country to feed the people, albeit on an extremely austere basis, for three or four months, say to the end of 1944. On the recovery, almost intact, during the first part of October of a large margarine factory at Merxem the position was greatly improved even in regard to fats. It was accordingly decided that it was not at this stage justifiable to subtract from the military effort the tonnages that would be required for the import of relief supplies.

During this period the problem within Belgium was one, not so much of production, as of collection and distribution, and of keeping the food out of the black market. And unfortunately the Belgian Government lacked both the determination and the organization to succeed in this task. The organizational deficiencies proceeded from two causes. Under the German occupation the collection and processing, but not the distribution, of food had been the responsibility of a German-inspired organization known as the *Corporation Nationale de L'Agriculture et de l'Alimentation*. The distribution of food on the other hand, was controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. To the Belgian Government in London the *Corporation Nationale* was objectionable both on account of its Nazi origins, and because it was a monopoly.

Its dissolution had been decreed even before the return to Belgium. Its functions were to be taken over by the appropriate Ministry. But whereas this had previously been the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, it had now been decided to split this into two independent Ministries, and it was some time before the responsibilities and organization of the new Ministry of Food became clearly defined. Consequently on the liberation of Belgium, both the existing agency for the collection of food was dissolved, and the agency for distribution was so changed that it at first was unable to function. And the Government itself felt unable to take a strong line with the public. Liberation resolutions were forgotten, appeals to public spirit were unheeded, and all hastened back to the black market. The natural tendency of those who could resort to this market, had been rationalized during the German occupation as a means of keeping commodities out of reach of the enemy. The excuse had gone but the habit re-asserted itself. And the official ration was indeed meagre.

A month after the return of the Government to Belgium the situation showed signs of becoming desperate. The Ministry of Supply was reduced to despatching armed columns of trucks into the countryside to collect meat and butter from farmers who would not bring their produce to market. An important meeting was arranged on 23rd October by the Head of the Mission at which he made certain suggestions to the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Supply and Communications. At this the Prime Minister explained the action that was being taken, which included the strengthening of the organization for collection and distribution. He appealed for some imports to tide over the period of reorganization and to exert a psychological effect on prices and deliveries. In response 21 Army Group agreed to provide 4,000 tons of food at the rate of 200 tons a day for twenty days, beginning on 1st November. A temporary improvement resulted in the food situation, but the advance of winter, the approaching exhaustion of indigenous stocks, and then the German offensive in the Ardennes, which not only deprived the rest of the country of supplies of farm produce from this surplus area but converted the Ardennes country itself into a deficit area, were too much for the uncertain improvement in the Belgian organization. By January and February the position was once more desperate and in fact was a major cause of the fall of the Government which took place in February.

The second phase of the food problem began, a little before this, with the approaching complete exhaustion of Belgian stocks at the end of 1944. Military imports of relief supplies could no longer be withheld. The ports of Antwerp and Ghent had been opened and were being brought into use. For the next few months, although it was still important to strengthen and improve the Belgian organization for collection and distribution – a task which the new Government tackled

with energy – the food of the country depended mainly on imports, at first under military arrangements from Plan A allocations, later under the Belgian Government civil import programme. Early in November the Mission had given a warning to S.H.A.E.F. that imports of food, mainly of wheat, fats, and meat, under military arrangements would become necessary at the beginning of January at the monthly rate of 76,000 tons for January and February and of 80,000 tons for March, April and May. S.H.A.E.F. authorized the import of 41,956 tons for January and a programme on the scale of the Mission's full demands for the following months. There were certain additional urgent demands, notably for 2,000 tons of oil, once in November and again in February, for the manufacture of margarine. First deliveries against January allotments began to arrive in mid-December and by the end of January the full programme for the month had been delivered. Results in February were much less satisfactory only 45,747 tons arriving against an amended programme of 84,054. Even these results were only achieved with the help of 10,000 tons from 21 Army Group depots. In particular, less than half the allotment of wheat was delivered, and a bread crisis resulted. By the end of March full deliveries for the month had been made and a further 5,000 tons against the deficit inherited from February. In the course of April the arrears were further overtaken but deliveries of meat and fats were still seriously behind programme. By now, however, the other source of supply, the Belgian Government civil import programme, was getting into its stride. The first instalment of this amounted to 250,000 tons. It had been drawn up with the needs in mind of the first three months of 1945, but it was realized that shipping and port facilities might force this programme to be spread over a longer period. Before March imports of this category were altogether insignificant, mainly on account of the difficulty of obtaining shipping. In March, however, 47,016 tons were imported of which 18,085 were food. In April the total was 53,461 of which 33,137 was food. In May the figures were 111,009 and 45,227, in June 109,746 and 36,450.

The corner had been turned. The official ration during the first three months of 1944 under German occupation had yielded 1,470 calories. In the following months it had dropped to under 1,200. For the first three ration periods after liberation, between 18th September and 16th December, it was up to 1,450 – if coupons were honoured, which they frequently were not. After a slight improvement between 17th December and 14th February it slumped again to 1,464. But in the following months real improvement began, and in June the figure was 2,020 – and coupons were being honoured. It had taken nine months to achieve the minimum ration which the Allied authorities had all along accepted as necessary for the prevention of disease and unrest.

It was a tribute to all, especially the people of Belgium, that there had been so little of either during these bitter months.

* * *

In Holland the distribution of relief supplies, though all important, at first showed no characteristics that have not been met in Belgium and France. There was the import through the winter of Civil Affairs relief supplies, and the hunt for local surpluses; the transfer of these to less fortunate areas; the ever present difficulties of transport; arrangements with the authorities in Belgium and France for exchange of surpluses, or for imports against promises to export later. The ration officially available to the ordinary adult consumer immediately after liberation and for some time after was well down below the 1,500 calorie level. However, by the 25th April, Civil Affairs imports had reached the total of 230,746 gross tons: by the 30th June this figure had increased to 505,752 tons. By March imports for the national civil import programme were earmarked for shipment, 38,098 tons for March, 60,206 tons for April, 73,149 tons for May and 82,150 tons for June. Actual shipments began in March but only some 2,000 tons reached Holland that month. In April 28,666 tons were imported. Thereafter the flow increased very rapidly and by the end of June 208,979 tons had been imported under this programme against allocations of 252,603. It now became possible to reduce the volume of Civil Affairs imports and by the end of August shipments under this programme ceased.

Over this period the rations available to the public had been very slowly but steadily improved. The calorie content which was below 1,500 in December rose to 1,600 by mid-January, to 1,650 by the end of the month, to 1,776 by the end of February, to 1,800 by the end of March, and to 1,912 by early June. It was not until the end of June that the 'target' of two thousand was generally reached.

Peculiar to Holland was the largest single relief operation of the war in the west, the feeding of the people of the so-called B2 Area. This has been fully recounted in an earlier chapter.¹

* * *

The total provision for Denmark in the Plan A estimates amounted to 1,282,700 tons. Denmark alone among the countries to be liberated by the Western Allies could be expected to yield exportable surpluses of food. Accordingly, of the Plan A provision of 1,282,700 tons, only 11,000 tons consisted of food, while no less than

¹ cf. Ch. VIII.

1,204,000 tons represented coal. Of the rest, 54,100 tons was accounted for by petroleum products, while the remaining 13,600 tons were divided between medical and sanitary supplies, soap, clothes, shoes, textiles, and the needs of agricultural rehabilitation. The first meeting of the Four Party Supply Committee was held on 12th May. It quickly became clear, as indeed had been expected, that lack of fuel was at the root of the great majority of economic problems. A call for help was accordingly sent to the S.H.A.E.F. Solid Fuels Sub-Section for Denmark. The sub-section arrived the following day and two days later requested allocations for Denmark of 30,000 tons of coal for May and 80,000 for June. The Mission also warned that 80,000 tons would be needed in the autumn for sugar production. But stocks of coal discovered were in fact larger than had been expected, amounting to six weeks' supply of locomotive coal, and three months' supply for the manufacture of gas and electricity, on the existing restricted basis. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, in view of the desperate shortages of coal in Europe, that early deliveries of coal to Denmark fell very far short of the estimated requirements. Allocations of coal for May and June were 24,500 and 39,650 tons. For July they were 60,000 tons at the time of the issue of the last fortnightly report by the Mission, on 7th July. The amount called forward from this and earlier allocations, however, was only 13,961 tons. And by 4th July the quantity actually received was a mere 7,661 tons. Some of this had been brought overland to Padborg where it was received by a Civil Affairs Port Detachment for distribution. The greater part was brought by ship to Copenhagen. The tonnage of petroleum products called forward was 30,473 but the amount actually delivered was only 13,976 tons. Stocks, which had been about 8,000 tons at the time of liberation, had been reduced by 15th June to a little less than 4,000 tons. By the time that military imports were discontinued the total deliveries of coal and petroleum were only 112,000 tons or less than ten per cent of the Plan A estimates. Of salt, 13,798 tons had been delivered against 18,000 tons called forward.

These deliveries were very disappointing to the Danes and the Mission warned that there was a real danger that coal consumption would be cut, in order to conserve stocks, to a point at which it would endanger the export of food. In fact, however, during the period with which this book is concerned, it does not appear that lack of coal, petroleum products, or salt ever actually interfered with shipments of food.

* * *

The Plan A estimates for Norway made provision for imports, during the assumed six months of the military period, of 848,000 tons. Of these 128,600 tons represented food, 674,000 tons coal and 39,000 tons

petroleum products. All other items taken together amounted to 6,400 tons. As elsewhere, coal and petroleum products were made available by allocations from general military stocks. For the remaining items a separate programme of Civil Affairs imports was prepared and operated by the Civil Affairs staffs. The Norwegian Government had drawn up a six-months' national import programme amounting to some 3,000,000 tons, almost half of which was for coal.

Token loads of food of twenty-two tons each, were carried to Oslo, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsö in the first Allied ships for these ports. These were followed ten days later by consignments in twelve coasters allotted by the Ministry of War Transport, totalling 25,000 tons for distribution within the country. Of these shipments eighty-three per cent were food. In view of the pressing need for food almost the whole of the first ninety days' allocation was called forward during the first month after liberation. While this was coming forward emergency needs were met by raids upon captured German stocks in anticipation of considered decisions as to the manner in which these should be used. These stocks played a valuable part in the early weeks, being large and, still more important, immediately available. Commodities released from German stocks included wheat, flour, macaroni, beef, pork, fish, potatoes, sauerkraut, cabbage, sugar, and artificial honey. By the 13th July, when the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was dissolved, two months after the first landings, 43,065 tons of food had actually been shipped for Norway. This represented sixty-four per cent of the first ninety days programme, but some items, notably flour, biscuits, and vitaminized chocolate had been supplied in full or virtually so. Salt, wheat, and pulses were below the sixty-four per cent average. Shortage of shipping was the main reason for the short-fall. Not only had supplies to be brought to Norway by sea; in the almost complete absence of roads and railways, the greater part of the subsequent distribution had to be effected by 'puffers', small coasters plying up and down the long seaboard of Norway. But for these vessels food would never have reached the remoter parts of Norway. (Nor would the German forces, strung out along the coast ever have been concentrated.) By 30th September food imports under the Civil Affairs programme had risen to 66,000 tons. Most of the later imports were procured from the United States. Grains accounted for 48,760 tons of the total. These Civil Affairs imports were not large in comparison with the Norwegian civil import programme, but they represented an addition to the daily ration scale of between 250 and 300 calories for one person, and they tided over the first few months until civil imports could begin to arrive.

Perhaps the greatest of all needs was for coal. Railways, water transport, thirteen out of fourteen gas plants, fishing vessels, industry, were all held up for lack of coal. The fishing industry revived could be

expected to export a significant contribution towards the food supplies of Europe. Hydro-electric power and a plentiful supply of timber made of Norway a comparatively modest consumer, but some coal was essential and none was produced within Norway. Before the war mines on Spitzbergen had met a part of the demand, but these had been put out of action, first by the Allies and then by the Germans. It was planned to deliver 112,000 tons for each of the first three months, the Plan A monthly rate, although the Mission believed that double these quantities were really needed. In fact, however, only 23,500 tons could be allocated for the first month and 50,000 tons for the second. And actual deliveries over the two months were only 59,000, against the 73,500 allocated. In the third month deliveries overtook the short fall and by late September the total of actual deliveries had reached the figure of 472,794 tons which was very close indeed to the monthly rate contemplated in the Plan A estimates. Thereafter the import of coal was made by the civil government under European Coal Organization allocations. From time to time, to meet extreme emergencies, small quantities of coal were released from captured German stocks, mainly in order to enable 'puffers' and fishing vessels to put to sea, and in order to keep the railways running. They totalled 9,976 tons. As in the case of food, distribution was the responsibility of the Norwegian administration. Plans were made for re-opening the Spitzbergen mines, but these were held up for lack of electrical generators.

There was a desperate shortage also of petroleum products, all of which required to be imported. The initial allocation for Civil Affairs purposes was 19,100 tons for the first ninety days. But this was found to represent only one third of essential requirements and towards the end of June the allocation was trebled, to 57,043 tons. By the 26th June however total deliveries were no more than 1,632 tons. Of the 7,824 tons of Diesel oil provided, on paper, for May and June only 408 tons had arrived. By mid-July when the S.H.A.E.F. Mission was dissolved 16,330 tons had arrived, but this was still a good deal less than half the requirements up to that date. By the end of September deliveries had overtaken arrears and averaged a monthly rate of some 19,000 tons. For five weeks through June into July there had been a complete hold-up in deliveries. Hundreds of fishing vessels were idle in consequence, and transport and industry held back. Captured German stocks were not large in relation to their own needs, but it was found possible during the two months' life of the Mission to release 7,581 tons from these stocks in order to meet emergency requirements.

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In the case of France, military responsibility for the import of relief supplies, other than coal and P.O.L., ended with loadings completed

in April 1945. As for Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway and Denmark, military responsibility ended with August loadings, for all kinds of supply, except that special but similar arrangements were made in regard to petroleum products. Responsibility for the provision of coal and petrol to France ended at the same time. Deliveries of certain items continued for some time longer, as belated supplies came forward. A final cut-off date beyond which deliveries would no longer be treated as Civil Affairs supplies, but as imports under national programmes was ultimately fixed. This was 31st October 1945. In June 1945 it was estimated that by the end of that month 5,631,800 tons of Civil Affairs supplies, rather more than the total Plan A provision, would have been delivered to France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, and Denmark. Of this tonnage, forty-four per cent would have been supplied by the United States, 49.3 per cent by the United Kingdom, and 6.7 per cent by Canada. In value, these imports amounted to 722.1 million dollars, the United States share being 49.5 per cent, that of the United Kingdom 42.1 per cent, that of Canada, 8.4 per cent. It was to take nearly two years to compile final figures, but these were in fact little different from the estimates of June 1945, for by this time imports of Civil Affairs supplies to France had ceased, and the national import programmes of the other countries were increasingly taking over responsibility. It is not easy to ascertain a final tonnage comparable to that estimated in June 1945 but a figure of 5,750,000 tons cannot be far wrong. Nor can there be any significant change in the respective shares of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in providing these supplies.

The original Plan A estimates had envisaged the import of some 5.25 million tons of Civil Affairs supplies over a period of six months. In the case of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland the period of military responsibility for the import of supplies was in the event more like eleven months. In the case of Norway and Denmark it was about three months. On the other hand, although the period of military responsibility was in most cases (and these cases comprised the countries requiring nine-tenths of the imports) considerably longer than had been expected, there were counter-balancing factors which led to the imports being spread more thinly than had been planned. Demands for Civil Affairs supplies were reduced because the initial advance was slower than had been assumed. Plan A had been drawn up for the case of a complete and sudden collapse of the enemy. Instead the invasion was conducted in the face of opposition that was at times extremely bitter and determined. It was neither necessary nor possible to bring in supplies at the rate contemplated in the Plan. The flow had to be adjusted to the numbers liberated, and the capacity of the beaches and ports. Demands were also reduced because the invasion took place not long before the harvest and because in some cases local

yields had been under-estimated. Consequently, notwithstanding the extension of the disease and unrest formula to justify unforeseen demands for first aid to the economies of the liberated countries, the original Plan A imports were, broadly speaking, sufficient, notwithstanding the lengthening of the military period. Only in respect of food were the Plan A estimates significantly out. These contemplated imports of 1.25 million tons of food. In the event, notwithstanding the early collection of the harvest, it proved necessary to bring in 2.15 million tons of food, and even this was far short of what was needed to achieve the two thousand-calorie level aimed at.

An attempt may be made to sum up. In the limited sense that the total quantities planned were delivered, relief operations were one hundred per cent successful; in ensuring that rations did not fall below the two thousand-calorie level they largely failed. In the broad and practical purpose of preventing disease and unrest, however, they were remarkably effective. There was no unrest requiring special troop movements and, in the sense of large epidemics, there was no disease. There was malnutrition in Holland, but this resulted from starvation under the German occupation. Allied operations, after a slow start, quickly brought relief. There was malnutrition in parts of Germany, but the Allies at first accepted no responsibility for combating this. How they were in the event driven to import wheat is told in a later chapter.¹ Had the Germans effectively scorched the earth in their retreat, disaster would have followed for there was little enough margin without this added difficulty. In the early stages shipping and port facilities restricted relief. After the port of Antwerp had been opened they were no longer a limitation. Road transport shortages were always troublesome but never prevented the distribution of imports. The failure to reach the two thousand-calorie level was due rather to maldistribution of local resources than to inadequacy of imports. Farmers would not disgorge stocks. It had long been patriotic, and for some people profitable, to sabotage the rationing system by black-marketeering. The public was not easily weaned from these habits. Two factors probably saved the situation, although the two thousand-calorie level was not attained. People survived longer on fewer calories, and then picked up again, than the dieticians had expected, and there was always just a little more food, hidden away and obtainable in the black market or otherwise, than the planners had assumed.

¹ cf. Ch. XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII

FOOD FOR GERMANY

THE Allies had no intention of feeding the people of Germany whose daily diet for the better part of five years, had been assured by depredation of the occupied territories. Germans were to be required to feed themselves and by so doing to learn what Nazism had done to the economy of Europe. But before feeding themselves, they were to be required to ensure that United Nations displaced persons found in Germany, should be fed while in that country at least as well as the people of the neighbouring liberated countries. Nothing less would have satisfied the sense of justice of the invaders.

If these hopes were to be realized two things were necessary – to maximize German production of food, and to control strictly the proportion of this which was allowed to be consumed by Germans. As to the first of these, there was never any doubt, whatever proposals might be advanced for destroying the coal mines of Germany, or for depressing the general level of her industries, that Allied policy would be to revive agriculture, fisheries and all food processing industries. This was to be done by the Germans with their own resources and they were to be required to maintain or re-establish the administrative and economic controls of these industries, and to do everything in their power to revive food production. If necessary and practicable, materials required to enable production to start would have to be imported, if these were not procurable in Germany. The impossibility of reviving these industries without coal was at first disregarded in deference to the framers of the Morgenthau plan.

As to the control of German consumption, it was a fundamental principle that the German people should not, in the lean times ahead, have more to eat than the people of the liberated countries, who had for years gone short in order that Germans could be fed. Initially, and until further orders, the objective was to be to fix the ration scales for the German people as follows:

	<i>Calories</i>
Children under 3 years	1,000
„ 3–5 years	1,250
„ 6–9 years	1,600
Adolescents 10–17 years	1,750
Expectant and nursing mothers	2,700

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Normal consumers	1,550
Heavy and Night Workers	2,250
Very Heavy Workers	2,800

It was expected that unrationed commodities would add 230 calories to the over-all average of these scales, which was 1,625 calories a day. The implications of a normal consumer's ration of 1,550 calories a day will become clear from the table below:

	<i>Calories per day</i>	<i>Grammes per day</i>	<i>Ounces per day</i>
Bread	890	357	12·7
Meat	25	21	0·7
Fats	102	14	0·5
Sugar	71	18	0·6
'Nährmittel'	258	71	2·5
Jam	22	9	0·3
Cheese	3	2	0·07
Potatoes	186	285	10·5
	<hr/>		
	1,557		
		<i>Litres</i>	<i>Pints</i>
Skimmed Milk	47	0·13	0·2
	<hr/>		
	1,604		

The planners considered that a higher scale would place Germans in a more advantageous position than the people of the liberated countries. A lower scale would be likely to increase the black market to a point at which it would be impossible to control.

The climate of opinion was such that it would have been impossible at this stage to draw up plans for importing food for the German population, although it was recognized that the indigenous resources of the British zone would not provide even the minimum diet necessary to maintain essential coal production that would be urgently needed from the Ruhr or to secure a tolerable measure of efficiency in administration and in the distribution of supplies. Provision was made for the procurement of relief supplies for United Nations displaced persons lest there should be any failure of the German authorities to meet the responsibility that was to be placed upon them. The contingency that relief might have to be found for the Germans themselves was covered by the provision that the policy not to import relief supplies into Germany '... will only be modified in extreme emergencies to the minimum extent necessary to prevent disease or such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.' Whatever might have been the position if Germany had been overrun in the autumn of 1944, it

was soon to become clear in the Spring of 1945 that an extreme emergency had already arisen.

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As the Allies advanced into Germany in April and May 1945 a far more desperate picture gradually emerged than the planners of 1944 had painted. There was a complete breakdown of transport, communications and administration. People lived on ill-distributed and generally insufficient local stocks, or on their own slender accumulations. Lacking these, they went out into the country – if they were able – and bought what they could persuade the farmers to part with, or else stole. In January 1945 the official ration scale fixed by the German administration had yielded 1,625 calories daily for the ‘normal consumer’. After this, uniform, centralized rationing broke down and scales were fixed under local arrangements. By April 1945 the normal consumer’s daily ration was down to about 1,220 calories. In the 75th rationing period, during which the final surrender of the German armies took place, scales were even lower, 1,100 calories *per diem* in the British zone generally, less than one thousand in the Ruhr. In most places there was no longer any attempt to provide supplementary calories for very heavy workers. When the western Allies reached Berlin they found that the Russians had approved a ration scale yielding 1,240 calories a day. In practice the Berliners¹ had to consider themselves lucky if they received two-thirds of this. In fact there was no longer any orderly distribution; some got more, most got a great deal less than they were entitled to on paper.

The broader background was no more reassuring. The British zone contained the Ruhr, the largest concentration of heavy industry in Europe. It contained also certain farming areas but these were quite insufficient to feed the zone. Even in normal times it had been necessary to rely on several million tons of foodstuffs, mostly grain and potatoes, from parts of Germany now under Russian control. The extensive dislocation of the German transport system by Allied bombing had very largely prevented the movement of these foodstuffs from eastern Germany during the 1944–45 agricultural season. It was becoming clear that nothing was likely to come out of eastern Germany during 1945–46. The current harvest of grain and potatoes within the zone must be expected to fall well below normal as a result of military operations and of the difficulties of collection and milling. Furthermore, the principal form of agriculture within the zone was dairying. A great part of the food produced by the zone accordingly took the form of butter. Owing to lack of coal there had been a complete breakdown

¹ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 31.

of milk processing plants and it unfortunately proved quite impossible to start these again in time to make use of the summer increase in milk production. Little or no butter was made in 1945 within the zone. At Hamburg supplies of fats, meat, and fish were discovered but these would do no more than feed the city for a few weeks. At Hanover there was a considerable stock of sugar, removed from the Magdeburg area before this was handed over to the Russians. There were scarcely any stocks of other foods in the British zone.

* * *

Two tasks clamoured for immediate attention, even before any steps could be taken to increase the production of food, or to control consumption within the zone.

The first of these was the feeding of the displaced persons found within the zone. Responsibility for providing the food required was fixed firmly upon the Germans. But the possibility had been envisaged that the responsibility would not be met, whether because the food was not available, or because the German food administration had entirely disintegrated. Relief supplies for this purpose had accordingly been included in the Allied estimates, and were pushed forward by stages from Helmond in Holland to Kevelaer in Germany, to Burgsteinfurt, to Diepholz, and finally to Belsen. But by 7th June, little more than a third of these stocks had been issued, 135 tons to Belsen Camp, 1,037 tons for the relief of displaced persons. None had been issued to Germans other than inmates of Belsen. These figures are an indication of the success achieved by Second Army in divesting itself of the responsibility for the care of displaced persons and placing this upon the people of Germany.

The second immediate task was to discover what remained of the German Food Administration and, notwithstanding the ravages of de-Nazification, to galvanize this into assuming responsibility for feeding the displaced persons and the people of Germany within the British zone. In the early stages of the occupation, before the crossing of the Rhine, the advance was slow, the fighting bitter, and most of the indigenous administration had been withdrawn as the German forces retreated. The machinery of food distribution had largely disintegrated. After the crossing of the Rhine, the advance into northern Germany was so swift that there had been no time to evacuate the administration, which was generally found in a state of somewhat suspended animation. At the *Kreis* level, there was little disturbance as a result of the invasion, and the purely local food administration was in most cases kept in operation without over much difficulty. There were other difficulties however. Chief of these was the fact that the 21 Army Group theatre of operations, as opposed to the ultimate British

zone of occupation, included no provincial capital until Schleswig – Holstein was uncovered. Accordingly none of the nerve centres of the Food Administration at levels above that of the *Kreis* were initially available for the organization of the distribution of food at higher levels. Not until the redeployment of the British forces into the area of the British zone was this difficulty overcome. Another difficulty during the first few weeks after the crossing of the Rhine arose from the frequent changes of command to which Military Government officers were subjected. The Military Government detachments were static, the formations exercising command very mobile. As a result there was at first great difficulty in transmitting a coherent and balanced picture from the local officers to the higher military levels.

* * *

The main positive contribution of the Army in food matters was the aid which it could give in measures taken to maximize production. The first step towards this was to ensure that the approaching harvest was fully gathered in. The action taken was one of the most spectacular of 21 Army Group Military Government undertakings at this time. It was known as 'Operation Barleycorn'. Fighting on the 21 Army Group front ceased on 5th May. Two days later the general unconditional surrender of all German forces took place. Whatever more considered reports on the condition of Germany might reveal, one thing was already certain – there would not be enough food to go round in the coming year. Within a few weeks the harvest must be got in. Any failure to do this would place upon an already hungry world the burden of feeding Germany through the winter, a task that would not be willingly undertaken and might even prove beyond its powers. First guesses were that there would be a shortage of three hundred thousand agricultural labourers. Later this figure was raised to nearly five hundred thousand. With the disappearance of foreign, often forced, labour, the only source from which these workers could be recruited was the German armed forces.

The 21 Army Group plans for the occupation of Germany required the 'orderly destruction of the German Armed Forces.' The task was to be carried out '... with due regard to the requirements of the Allied Governments for German labour, both military and civil, to the ensuring (as far as possible) of orderly absorption into civil life, and to the availability of transport.' Three types of discharge were recognized, emergency, priority, and general. It was also recognized that it might become necessary to discharge either as 'emergency' or 'priority', according to the progress of documentation, any of a number of specified categories of workers found within the German armed forces. Included in these were agricultural workers, and it quickly became

clear that an overwhelming case existed for their emergency or priority discharge.

A plan was speedily prepared at 21 Army Group Headquarters and first instructions were issued on 21st May. A small *ad hoc* Control Centre was formed, consisting of representatives of the following branches of 21 Army Group headquarters – Staff Duties, A (Wehrmacht), Q (Maintenance), Q (Movements), Supply and Transport, and Military Government. A strong signals detachment was added. This control centre set up its own headquarters in Herford. The German armed forces were already being concentrated in the north and north-west of the British zone for disbandment. Fourteen ‘Discharge Collecting Centres’ were to be established near the disbandment concentration areas. These were grouped and placed under the control of six ‘Discharge Collecting Group’ headquarters, normally a battalion or other suitable headquarters in the neighbourhood, reinforced with a special signals detachment and a transport pool under a Royal Army Service Corps officer. The German Commanders were required to send a daily quota of agricultural workers from the forces under their control to the Discharge Collecting Centres, one thousand being the number to work up to for most centres, five hundred for the others. These were to consist in the first place of men normally living in the British zone, who would be given a permanent release. If these did not suffice, temporary release was to be made of men normally living in the Russian zone and so due to be given their permanent discharge in that zone. If still more were needed, it was hoped to arrange for the return to the British zone, on exchange, and for the release there, of men who had surrendered within the U.S. zone but who normally lived in the British zone. At Discharge Collecting Centres the men were sorted, by Germans working under British supervision, in accordance with the *Regierungsbezirke* in which their homes lay. The provision of rations for them while in the centres, and for a two-day journey to their *Regierungsbezirke*, was the responsibility of the neighbouring German Commanders. Parties organized by Discharge Collecting Group Headquarters under the co-ordination of the Control Centre at Herford were then taken by convoys of military transport, breaking their journey at Staging Camps if necessary, to ‘Dispersal Point Camps’ at the main town or other convenient place in the *Regierungsbezirke* to which they belonged. Military Government officers were responsible for the organization and control of these camps, but responsibility for the provision of food, cooking facilities, water, and medical and sanitary arrangements, was to rest upon the German civil authorities. Here a further sorting took place, according to the *Kreis* in which the men’s homes lay and the resulting parties were again taken in military vehicles to the *Kreis* concerned. At this point the German civil authorities were required to take over responsibility for the reception and

registration of these men, and for their distribution to particular farms. The whole operation was conducted by the Control Centre working through Commanders of Discharge Collecting Groups, Discharge Collecting Centres, and Dispersal Point Camps, and aided by an elaborate signals network and a force of Royal Army Service Corps motor vehicles that numbered eighty platoons at the start and at one time rose to as many as ninety-one.

The operation began on 5th June, on which day, 2,532 men were started on their journey to the land. It had been planned to discharge twelve thousand men daily, but as the organization got into its stride this figure was greatly exceeded and for a fortnight in the middle of July over twenty thousand persons were released every day. Thereafter the figures gradually fell, as the supply of agricultural and other workers grew less, until on 21st September the 'Barleycorn' machinery was closed down and the Control Centre disbanded.

The original intention had been to move three hundred thousand agricultural workers to the land for the gathering of the harvest. This objective was later raised to 494,000. Through July, the scope of the scheme was widened by the decision to release through its machinery coal miners and all other trade categories of men normally resident in the British zone, and also members of the German Women's Services. In addition the 'Barleycorn' organization was used to repatriate German prisoners of war and disarmed forces, particularly from Norway. The total of persons moved by the organization from 5th June to 21st September reached the remarkable figure of 1,269,428. To do this, 2,603 convoys were run with a total mileage of 14,455,933. But as originally conceived the scheme was one for getting in the harvest.

* * *

While taking steps to ensure the gathering of the 1945 harvest, plans were also prepared for the 1946 harvest, which should take account of the change in the circumstances of Germany since the 1945 planting, and would ensure maximum production. It is beyond the scope of this book to go into the detail of the plans prepared. An expert from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries toured the British zone at the end of May and the beginning of June and made his suggestions for the use of 21 Army Group and the Control Commission. The heart of his proposals was that it was essential to grow more potatoes and breadcorn for direct human food and far fewer crops for conversion into meat. The first priority was to increase the potato crop by at least one hundred per cent in Westfalen and Schleswig-Holstein, by seventy-five per cent in Oldenburg, and by fifty per cent in Hanover. The second priority was to increase bread-

corn by a proportion that varied from ten per cent to twenty per cent in different areas. The greatest possible acreage of grassland was to be ploughed. Every possible step was taken to increase the acreage of beans and peas. There were also suggestions regarding the cultivation of oil seeds, sugarbeet and oats, and the maintenance of the seed-growing industry.

It is pleasant and not inappropriate to end this brief section by quoting the tribute to the work of Military Government officers accorded by Sir William Gavin, the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries:

'No one could fail to be impressed by the determination and energy with which Major-General Templer has inspired his whole staff to meet what is undoubtedly the biggest task of civil administration which any military organization has ever undertaken and to meet it in the face of almost incredible destruction and disorder. Everywhere I found officers of all ranks shouldering heavy and unfamiliar responsibilities with cheerful resource.

The first four weeks of peace have seen a great deal done.'

* * *

It soon became clear that the problem of feeding the British zone was, for practical purposes, the problem of feeding the Ruhr. Its urgency had two aspects. In the first place, the Ruhr was hungrier than the rest of Germany and if famine were to be allowed to sweep through this populous industrial area, there would indeed be a 'disease and unrest' problem of terrifying magnitude. But secondly it quickly became apparent that the maximizing of food production elsewhere in the zone was inseparably bound up with the increase of coal production in the Ruhr. For without coal it would be impossible to process or store food or to undertake its distribution. Not only, therefore, must the Ruhr be fed, if possible, at the bare prevention of disease and unrest levels applicable to the rest of the zone. In addition the miners and their families must be given enough food to enable the miners to hew coal, for without coal there would be little hope of achieving, and none whatever of raising, even these austere levels, whether in the Ruhr itself or in the zone at large. It was not to be long before a conflict developed between the principle of maximum food production and the principle of no imports for Germany. But before coming to this we must see what it proved possible to do by the redistribution of indigenous resources, by improvization from military stocks or the reserves of neighbouring countries.

The small reserves of fats, meat and fish discovered in Hamburg and the stocks of sugar at Hanover, required to be husbanded with the

utmost caution. It would need time to replace them, if they could be replaced at all, and meanwhile there was nothing else with which to push up the ration for the Ruhr miner. In June cattle trains were run from Schleswig-Holstein to the Ruhr. Potatoes were brought from Uelzen. Sugar was brought from Brunswick and Madgeburg. *Ad hoc* imports were arranged of potatoes from Koevorden in Holland and of 7,000 tons of flour from military stocks at Antwerp. Even so, when the 77th ration period began during the last week of June, it was impossible to fix the official scales for the ordinary consumer, even for North Rhine Province and Westfalen, in which lay the Ruhr, at levels that would yield more than 1,150 and 1,040 calories a day respectively. These represented fairly rapid starvation. Actual issues were in some places as low as eight hundred calories. By the beginning of July it had become possible to replace the cattle trains from Schleswig-Holstein by refrigerated trains carrying meat. Towards the end of August 700 tons of butter and 500 tons of fruit were moved into the Ruhr. Until the harvest was reaped little more could be done from internal resources. The movement of sugar from Magdeburg to the Ruhr before this area was handed over to the Russians was part of a process described as the 'evacuation' of sugar from Magdeburg. Similar movements were differently described when conducted by the Russians. Consignments were sent to Westfalen (3,500 tons) and also to Schleswig-Holstein (2,500 tons), and through June an intensive effort was made to increase the removal by short railway hauls to Brunswick and Hanover from Magdeburg before the hand-over was effected at the beginning of July. In addition, the pedigree seed needed to produce the commercial seed on which the whole of western Germany depended for its sugar beet crop was removed. But for this, sugar from western Germany would have had to be imported from abroad, if indeed it could have been imported at all.

The Army made a contribution by abstaining from local procurement of food. Although not ruled out in principle, this was in practice virtually confined to salt and to fresh fruit and vegetables and, in the case of the last two, was permissible only with the consent of the Military Government authorities and on condition of replacement with dried or tinned foods of a similar nature.

* * *

But the 77th period ration scales had made it clear, if it was not clear before, that there was no hope of feeding the miners sufficiently for them to extract coal, or indeed of preventing wide-spread starvation in the zone, without large-scale imports from outside Germany. A 21 Army group paper of the 22nd July 1945 put the matter in unmistakable terms:

'It cannot be too often emphasized that the question is not one of sentiment, but of hard economic facts. It may or may not be politically desirable or morally just that the Germans, or some of them, should be starved. Economically, however, it is obvious that Ruhr coal is essential if the food resources of western Europe are to be developed to the maximum at a time when there is a world shortage of food. It is also obvious that the Ruhr coal will not be forthcoming if starvation in the Ruhr is allowed to proceed to a stage at which disease or death is widespread. This issue, therefore, is whether it is wiser to use imported grain now to support the standard of life in the Ruhr, or to risk losing the sugar, fat, meat and fish harvests in western Germany and in other parts of Europe dependent on Ruhr coal, and to bring upon ourselves the necessity for bringing relief later in a form which cannot then be limited to wheat. The low margin of safety in the Ruhr at present or the magnitude of the consequences of a break-down may not yet have been fully appreciated.'

Already S.H.A.E.F. had accepted the need for imports and had sanctioned the release of 77,500 tons of wheat for the British zone for the month of June from stocks imported under combined Anglo-American procedures. This could bring no increase to the ration scales until the succeeding period, beginning on 23rd July. For that period it was hoped, as a result of these releases, to raise very slightly the official scales. The ordinary consumer would receive 1,200 calories a day. Supplements for very heavy workers would bring this up to 3,200 calories for miners. It was hoped to raise the ration for the ordinary consumer to 1,550 calories a day in the next period. This was the level suggested by S.H.A.E.F. But this could only be achieved if further quantities of 77,500 tons of wheat were released for feeding the British zone during each of the months of July and August.

Unfortunately the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. on 14th July threatened a breakdown in these arrangements. It had been agreed that on termination of combined command all Civil Affairs supplies which had been consigned to S.H.A.E.F. but which had not been distributed to Army Groups should revert to the ownership of the supplying country in the person of its military commander in what had been the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations. Stocks of wheat procured and called forward from the U.S. under combined arrangements were in the British zone in the physical possession of 21 Army Group. Sharp contention arose over the question whether these had been allocated to the British or had reverted to American ownership. General Clay contended that they had reverted to his control and that, although it had been accepted that the cost of release from such stocks should ultimately be a charge on German exports, if any, no agreement had been reached between the U.K. and the U.S. as to how releases in

the meantime should be financed. He was accordingly unwilling to sanction releases for general use in July on the scale required by the British unless the latter guaranteed payment. Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Robertson, the Chief of Staff or Deputy Military Governor for the British zone, contended that the stocks had been allocated to 21 Army Group and that the question of financing issues was already governed by the agreement between the U.K., the U.S., and the Canadian Governments, that 'any ultimate irrecoverable loss on all Combined Civil Affairs supplies, including supplies allocated to S.H.A.E.F. for Germany, should be borne by the three contributory Governments in specified proportions.' In the resulting deadlock General Clay, who was authorized to make an exception in the case of miners, agreed to release immediately for their particular use 20,000 tons from the wheat stocks in the British zone.

Already it had become necessary to fix the ration scale for the ordinary consumer in North Rhine Province at 1,150 calories instead of the hoped-for 1,200. Miners were to receive 2,800 calories instead of the 3,200 planned. As the only means of fulfilling even this low scale, Major-General Templer, the Director of Military Government at 21 Army Group, took the responsibility for ordering the release of a further 20,000 tons of wheat from the stocks in the British zone, making 40,000 in all. If there was to be any hope of an increase in this desperately low scale during the next ration period beginning on 20th August, it was essential to obtain release not only of the August quota of 77,500 but of the remainder of the July allocation asked for. On the very strong representations of General Robertson, General Clay gave his approval to the second 20,000 tons already released, and agreed to release the balance of 37,550 tons. The scales fixed for the 79th period, beginning on 20th August yielded a daily calorific value for the normal consumer as below:

Niedersachsen	1,500
Westfalen	1,500
Nord Rhein Provinz	1,500
Weser-Ems	1,380
Schleswig-Holstein	1,240
Average for British Zone	1,430

A few days later, however, these particular difficulties were resolved by War Department instructions from Washington, that pending creation of four power machinery or completion of negotiations for termination of current supply arrangements, supplies for civilians in western Germany would be procured and financed on a combined basis. Under this arrangement supplies procured in the U.S. would be initially financed by U.S., and the U.K. would not be required to pay for such supplies allocated to the British zone. Fair distribution between

zones would be settled by Zone Commanders acting jointly, regardless of questions of responsibility for payment.

By the end of August wheat released from S.H.A.E.F. stocks for use in the British zone amounted to 193,000 tons in all. Shortly after this a final division was made of the wheat which had been imported under combined Anglo-American arrangement. This raised the total share of the British zone to 537,000 tons. As the result of these various arrangements it was possible to release stocks for current needs that enabled a ration of about 1,500 calories to be maintained—in October the official scale varied from 1,538 calories in Westfalen to 1,403 in Schleswig-Holstein, the average for the zone being 1,517.

Hitherto the argument had been between the British Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force for a share in combined Anglo-American imports. With the final distribution of these, the argument was to shift to higher ground and was to be conducted largely between the British and the U.S. Governments for a share in the global allocations by the Combined Boards, and the U.S. Government.

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The releases from what had been S.H.A.E.F. stocks were none of them more than short term measures to tide over the period until the 1945 harvest could be used to support the ration. The reaping of the harvest would afford a breathing space but gave little ground for optimism. As we have already seen the British zone normally required to import from other parts of Germany several million tons of food, mostly grain and potatoes from eastern Germany. These imports were no longer available. The harvest in the British zone was reaped, thanks to Operation Barleycorn. But it was considerably below normal. Lack of fertilizers, shortage of labour, difficulties of collection and milling, and, at the last, bad weather, all combined to reduce out-turns. The wheat and rye harvest was not expected to be more than seventy per cent of normal. In these circumstances 21 Army Group estimated that it would be necessary to import 2,000,000 tons of wheat for the British zone, excluding Berlin, during the year September 1945–September 1946. Nothing less would serve to avert serious disease and unrest and to keep in operation the coal mines on which Europe as well as Germany depended for movement and processing of food, and for the revival of industry. Early in July, before the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., this need was represented to S.H.A.E.F. by 21 Army Group. On the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. the matter was referred to the Combined Resources and Allocations Board where the U.S. and French representatives rejected the British request. Early in August the Combined Resources and Allocations Board was still unable to

agree regarding the request for 2,000,000 tons of wheat, but did concede that, pending assessment of wheat imports required for the coming year, it was urgently necessary in order to meet immediate requirements to build up, not later than 1st January 1946, a reserve stock of 500,000 tons of wheat, or the equivalent in flour, in Germany, over and above any existing stocks. It was expected that this reserve would be used, forty-five per cent for the British zone, forty per cent for the U.S. zone, and fifteen per cent for the French zone. On 21st September the British element of the Control Commission was told by the War Office that the Combined Food Board could not, on account of world shortages, make available for loading before 31st October more than 250,000 tons towards this reserve but that it would deal with the outstanding requirements as early as possible. The War Office was arranging procurement of 112,500 tons, *i.e.* forty-five per cent of the allocation. In the event this consignment did not reach the British zone until December 1945.

The protests of the Control Commission at the dangerous inadequacy of these measures, and the efforts made to obtain further imports of wheat for the British zone of Germany, fall somewhat beyond the period with which this book is concerned, and no more than a brief summary of them can be attempted here. By early March there had been no further imports of wheat to the British zone. The U.S. Government took the not unreasonable view that reserves in the U.K., which throughout the war had been maintained at twelve weeks' supply, could now safely be lowered and that help for the British zone should be found from these. It now became clear that the German ration could no longer be held, even to the 1,550 calorie level without immediate imports of wheat. To prevent a cut, 150,000 tons were needed. This the U.K. Government would not release since it would mean reducing their reserves, but they agreed to allow 75,000 tons to go to the zone. A cut in the German ration accordingly became necessary, to the desperate level of 1,014 calories. Without the 75,000 tons the cut would have had to be even more disastrous.

Two months later, in May 1946, when there were still no wheat imports in sight for the British zone, other than a token 20,700 tons proposed by the United States, the British Government sent a mission to America to advocate the needs of the British zone. By agreeing to reduce U.K. claims for the replenishment of its stocks by 200,000 tons, and to run down its reserves to ten weeks' supply, the mission was enabled to obtain the release by the U.S. Government of 675,000 tons of wheat for the British zone. Later, reserves were still further lowered, to eight or even seven weeks' supply, without inconvenience. The cumulative total of allocations of wheat to the British zone had now reached 1,399,500 tons. By the end of May 1,205,340 tons had actually been delivered to the zone.

No significant quantities of German exports had as yet been received in the U.K. in exchange, since virtually the only commodity of which Germany had an exportable surplus at this time was coal and this was not required in the U.K. but was desperately needed elsewhere. For the year 1946-47 the cost to the British tax-payer of essential imports into Germany was expected to be £100,000,000. About one sixth of these were bread grains, the rest plant and raw materials for a modest revival of industry that would make possible the production of fertilizers, of consumer goods to stimulate the extraction of coal, and of exports to enable Germany to begin to pay for these imports – it was hoped she would in this way be able to pay for half this aid.¹ Other expenditure to be incurred in Germany by the British element of the Control Commission during 1946-47 was estimated at £30,000,000. In the words of the Select Committee on Estimates at the time 'It is probably without parallel in history that twelve months after the end of a war, Great Britain should be paying £80 million a year towards the upkeep of her principal adversary.'²

¹ Report of Select Committee on Estimates, 1945-46, Second Report.

² *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XIX

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

ONE of the chief reasons for creating a Civil Affairs organization at all was that it should keep refugees from impeding military operations. It soon became clear that this task would be as nothing compared to the cognate undertaking of dealing, after the defeat of Germany, with the results of the great movements of population that had taken place within Hitler's Europe. The greater part of these were due to the organized transfer, often half across Europe, of persons recruited by the Germans into the armed forces or as civilian labourers. Some of these recruits had been impressed against their will and were not inaccurately described by the Allies as 'slave labour'. But others had gone willingly, attracted by the wages offered and the higher standards of living, or by the prospects of seeing the world. It was assumed that these persons would wish to return to their countries, or that it would become necessary to send them back, whether they wished it or not, in order to relieve the countries in which they were found of the burden of feeding and caring for them. Such persons clearly were not refugees in the ordinary sense although their plight was in many ways similar, and they came to be known as displaced persons. For administrative purposes the military planners adopted an arbitrary definition under which persons displaced as a result of the war were classified as displaced persons if found outside, but as refugees if found inside, their own countries. The cases of many of the displaced persons were likely to prove intractable in the extreme. For these unhappy people might be a great distance from their homes and political changes might well have made the governments of their countries unwilling to take them back, or the displaced persons themselves resolved never to return.

In May 1944 it was believed, and events proved this figure very nearly right, that there were over eleven million refugees or displaced persons in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Germany. Some twenty different languages were spoken by these people. And this total took no account of any German refugees since it was intended that responsibility for looking after these persons should be pinned on to the people of Germany. As for the British share of this commitment, there were likely to be about two and a half

million displaced persons within the British zone of Germany, as shown in the table below:

<i>Westbound</i>		<i>Eastbound</i>	
French	464,000	Russians	121,000
Belgians	219,000	Poles	580,000
Dutch	151,000	Czechs	422,500
Others	98,500	Italians	120,500
		Yugoslavs	114,000
		Others	171,000
Total	932,500	Total	1,529,000

Grand Total 2,461,500

* * *

In liberated Allied territory the responsibility initially assumed by the military authorities for the care and control of all refugees and displaced persons would pass to the Allied Governments concerned as soon as zones of the interior or their equivalent were recognized under the Civil Affairs agreements (all accessible Allied Governments had signified their readiness to fall in with this arrangement).

On entry into Germany responsibility would rest, as before, upon the military authorities. The establishment of initial control over all categories of persons by the military authorities might well be an operational necessity without distinction between friend and enemy. But after this there was to be a difference in treatment. In the case of enemy refugees and displaced persons it was the Allied policy to place upon the Germans with all speed the fullest possible responsibility for control, care, and repatriation. In the case of displaced persons who were Allied or United Nations' nationals, or who were enemy nationals but had suffered at the hands of the Nazis for racial, religious or political reasons, control, care and repatriation were to be a function of the Allied military commanders working through the military or civilian organizations at their disposal. In either case, however, the German authorities were to be required to provide essential living requirements, even if this meant German civilians going short. In the case of United Nations nationals or persons who had suffered under the Nazis it was felt this would constitute a small instalment of restitution.

The whole problem was in many respects international and it was intended throughout the planning that responsibility for its handling should pass at the earliest possible moment from the military authorities to an international agency to be set up for the purpose by the United Nations Organization. This was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration - U.N.R.R.A. - established in No-

ember 1943 and required to arrange, on the invitation of the government of the country concerned, for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations.

A year later, when an agreement was executed to regulate the relations of the Administration with the Allied military authorities in north-west Europe, provision was made for operation within Germany also, with the consent of the military authorities and for the limited purpose of succouring United Nations' displaced persons. It was the clear intention of the military authorities at this time to transfer full responsibility to U.N.R.R.A. as early as possible. It was, further, the intention that U.N.R.R.A. should in due course close down and pass its residual responsibilities to the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees which had been established in 1938 to aid the many thousands of refugees, mostly Jews, escaping from the Nazi terror.

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At S.H.A.E.F. twelve U.N.R.R.A. representatives were attached to build up common experience and mutual understanding that would facilitate the later transfer of responsibility.

As the Allied forces entered Germany, the Supreme Commander planned to bring into existence an organization, part military, part civil, to be known as the Displaced Persons Executive.

In the field this was to consist of Military Government detachments and any other military officers and men allotted for displaced persons duty, and of civilian Red Cross teams, and U.N.R.R.A. units. Allied liaison officers were to be included of the nationalities expected to be encountered. In the early stages the military element in the organization would preponderate; later it was planned to increase the civilian element to a point at which it would take over full responsibility. The field organization was to be under military command which would be exercised through the Displaced Persons staffs of the formation commanders concerned. A direct channel of communication and command was allowed between the various levels of Displaced Persons staffs, in regard to all technical matters. The channel for all policy matters remained the normal military channel from commander to commander.

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Detailed plans were based on the establishment of control lines at frontiers or at convenient geographical barriers. Close to these control lines there were to be established Assembly Centres sufficient to handle the flow expected. All displaced persons arriving at a control line without proper movement authorization were to be detained and,

after security scrutiny, collected in the nearest Assembly Centre. In Assembly Centres United Nations' displaced persons were required to be accommodated apart from enemy refugees or displaced persons. Where practicable separate centres were to be established for other national groups also, as well as for non-repatriable persons, who would require more elaborate and permanent arrangements. The 'processing' of displaced persons involved the identification of their nationalities and the registration of personal information. It involved also medical inspection, disinfection and immunization, the issue of meal record cards and the provision, where necessary and possible, of essential clothing. It also involved a security check to prevent the escape of wanted enemy nationals from Germany. For the maintenance of discipline in assembly centres it was provided that United Nations' displaced persons were normally liable to trial by Allied Military Government Courts. The intention was that all except non-repatriable persons should be repatriated at the earliest possible date.

Certain special categories of displaced persons were recognized. Chief among these was that of the liberated Soviet citizens. This resulted from an agreement reached between the British and the Americans on the one hand and the Russians on the other, at the Yalta Conference. Separate centres were required to be established for the segregation of Soviet nationals once these had been identified by the Soviet Repatriation Representatives for which the Yalta agreement made provision. These representatives were to appoint their own administrative staff for the internal discipline and management of the centres in accordance with U.S.S.R. military procedure and law. The transfer of whole centres, or of displaced persons from one centre to another was to be effected, unless exceptional circumstances existed, only with the agreement of the Soviet Repatriation Representatives. Soviet nationals employed outside centres were to work under the supervision of Soviet officers. This extra-territoriality was scarcely curtailed by the provisions that the British or American commanders were to appoint a Centre Commandant 'who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the centre', that these Commandants were to be 'responsible for the outside protection of, and access to and from, these centres', and that offences by Soviet citizens against the law enforced by Military Government or against British or U.S. subjects would be dealt with in Military Government Courts. Finally it was provided that 'After identification by Soviet Republican Representatives, Soviet displaced persons will be repatriated regardless of their individual wishes'. Other United Nations' displaced persons refusing to return to their countries could not be compelled unless they were required for war crimes. At the Yalta Conference it was not so clear as it later became that this, in effect and in some cases, gave the Soviet Repatriation Representatives

the power to pass a sentence of death. It was still hoped by many that friendliness and fair dealing by the West would elicit the same from the East.¹

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The deployment of the Displaced Persons Executive as the Allies approached Germany, did not proceed according to plan. On 2nd December 1944 S.C.A.E.F. asked for two hundred U.N.R.R.A. teams to be made available over the period 25th January – 1st April 1945. On 1st February he asked for a further 250 teams.² By the end of March the number provided was only eight of which two teams were allotted to 21 Army Group. The extensive failure of U.N.R.R.A. to meet these demands was largely due to lack of equipment, especially of transport, for the teams to be put into the field. This in its turn was caused by the difficulty of obtaining transport in competition with military priorities. But partly also it seems to have been due to lack of realism and drive in U.N.R.R.A. preparations. In the British theatre military teams were improvised to take the place of U.N.R.R.A. These were Disbandment Control Units, which were being held in readiness for the task of disbanding the German forces on general surrender, and Displaced Persons Assembly Centre Camp Staffs specially recruited, mainly from L. of C. units that could be spared as German opposition crumbled.

In the course of April, May, and June the number of U.N.R.R.A. teams in the field rose to 322. By 11th August the number serving with the British forces was 136. At this time the number of Displaced Persons Assembly Centre Camp Staffs was eighty six. There were also some ninety civilian relief units working with the British forces. Most of these were Red Cross units but others had been recruited by the Friends Ambulance Unit, Scouts, Guides, the Salvation Army and other organizations.³

It was intended at S.H.A.E.F. that these voluntary units should be allowed to work only under the control and co-ordination of U.N.R.R.A. But in the British zone, for the period with which this volume is concerned, the functions planned for U.N.R.R.A. were, in fact, performed by the British Red Cross. Not only was this experienced and well-tested organization, under Major-General G. M. Lindsay, able to take the field before U.N.R.R.A., but its long record of successful co-operation with the Army gained for it the confidence of the military authorities, in a way that was inevitably denied to U.N.R.R.A. There was also a reluctance on the part of the older

¹ cf. p. 267.

² Woodbridge, *History of UNRRA*, New York, 1950, Vol. II., pp. 483-484.

³ *Red Cross and St. John War History*, 1939-47, London, 1949, p. 503.

voluntary bodies to subordinate themselves to the new organization, a reluctance which was understandable, but probably contributed to the difficulties of U.N.R.R.A. in taking the field.

* * *

It never proved possible to transfer full responsibility to U.N.R.R.A., and that mainly for three reasons. In the first place the organization and the administrative competence of the U.N.R.R.A. displaced persons teams, and the rate at which they were put into the field, were not such as to gain the confidence of the military authorities. In the second place, even if these had been all that the army could desire, throughout the period of U.N.R.R.A.'s life, ultimate responsibility in Germany and in Austria was vested in the military commanders. The control and care of displaced persons was in all zones a matter of such importance that it was difficult for a Commander-in-Chief to contemplate any full transfer of responsibility for its satisfactory handling. Lastly, the specialized Displaced Persons Executive was by no means the only one of the military services bearing responsibility for displaced persons. It was concerned with the personal administration and control of displaced persons. For the successful discharge of these functions, however, it leaned heavily upon other services of the army which were called upon to provide food for the Displaced Persons Executive and its charges, and often clothing, shelter, fuel, transport, protection, and all materials required. So long as these essential functions were performed by the military authorities proper, it would have been obviously inappropriate to transfer full responsibility for displaced persons to U.N.R.R.A. In fact it is doubtful whether such a transfer can ever have been seriously intended, but the words employed in the relevant agreements and instruction certainly suggest it.

What was done, by degrees, was to transfer full responsibility from the military authorities to U.N.R.R.A. for the personal control and care of displaced persons, particularly within centres and camps, and for their rehabilitation and re-education, leaving ultimate responsibility both for policy and for physical maintenance upon the military commanders.

* * *

Early operations in France, Holland and Germany for the relief of refugees and displaced persons have been described in previous chapters as part of the main story of civil affairs and military government. During November and December of 1944, some twelve thousand Russian displaced persons were uncovered in 12th Army Group area.


The movement of these into France quickly showed up the total inadequacy of the arrangements for their reception. There were valid excuses – particularly the monopolization of nearly all suitable accommodation by Allied forces – but there was also a lack of co-ordination between the French ministries. Towards the end of January, some of the Russian displaced persons obtained arms, broke out of their camps and committed acts of violence. The trouble was brought under control and the S.H.A.E.F. Mission brought pressure to bear on the French to improve their preparations. The Allied forces were required to render all possible assistance to the French in the establishment of centres and depots, and, significantly, to refrain from requisitioning supplies in the French supply depots.

* * *

But only after the crossing of the Rhine, as the Allied forces drove on into Germany, were the full results revealed of the stirring of the witches' cauldron by the Nazis.

The first barrier, within the British theatre for the rounding-up of displaced persons was established along the River Rhine and the River Ijssel on 24th March, with crossings at Rees, Xanten, and Wesel, and improvised assembly centres nearby.¹ Before this, an assembly centre had been set up, some twenty miles further back, at Kevelaer which was then Second Army railhead. From here the trickle of displaced persons in the week preceding the crossing of the Rhine was sent back by empty motor trucks to Eindhoven, and thence by rail to Belgium and France. On 28th March, when the big advance into Germany began, the tide rose. With great difficulty centres were improvised on either side of the Rhine. Towns and villages were almost totally destroyed and tents and sites were difficult to find for camps under canvas. The flow of displaced persons began, back to Kevelaer and the railway. By 7th April, as the advance progressed, the Dortmund–Ems Canal barrier was up, with crossings and centres at Rheine and Greven. By now ten thousand persons were in the various camps and six thousand had already been passed back to Kevelaer. On 8th April the first evacuation by air took place, from Rheine. Meanwhile the channel for ground evacuation was also pushed forward to Rheine which became an Army roadhead, with a transit camp. Next, the Weser barrier was set up and roadhead advanced to Sulingen, whither, some weeks later, railhead was also pushed forward. Assembly centres were formed on the barrier, and a transit camp at Sulingen. Finally the Elbe barrier was set up, and assembly centres formed also in important centres such as Bremen and Hamburg. In all, within the Second Army boundaries, assembly and transit

¹ cf map on p. 348.



centres numbered some twenty-seven. The barriers were not impassable; there very soon emerged a scale of payment that ensured a crossing under cover of darkness. But they very largely controlled movement.

Through the second half of April the number of displaced persons in Second Army camps rose to about fifty-five thousand and then remained steady at this figure, the number evacuated down the line being balanced by new arrivals in the camps. In May, however, the figure increased and by the time of the German surrender the number being cared for had risen to over one hundred thousand.

West-bound persons were being repatriated as opportunity offered, some eighty thousand having already been passed back. East-bound persons had to wait until contact with the Russians opened an eastward channel. For the next two months, notwithstanding the repatriation of some 750,000 persons, to west and to east, this number in the camps rose with terrifying speed, as more of the zone came under occupation

and as more persons flocked into centres. In addition, as the German army disintegrated, there were found great numbers of ex-prisoners of war in German hands; there were also five hundred thousand German soldiers who had surrendered to the Allies, and a host of German refugees was fleeing in front of the Russian advance. Now First Canadian Army, hitherto mainly concerned with ex-prisoners of war, also began to feel the weight of displaced persons. At the time of hand-over to XXX Corps over eighty thousand were in camps or in villages from which the German inhabitants had been expelled. By the beginning of July it was estimated that there were over one and a half million displaced persons in the British zone, nearly all of them in camps. Denmark and Norway contributed their share to the problem, three hundred thousand Germans and seventy-five thousand Russians taken prisoner by the Germans in the former, and some forty thousand assorted displaced persons in the latter. But this was the peak. There were now few left to be brought into camps and the various measures of repatriation were beginning to take effect. Steadily the number in camps fell, and steadily over the next twelve months persons were repatriated as shown in the table overleaf.¹

From a very early stage there loomed up the problem of the east-bound displaced persons who could not, or did not dare to return to their countries. Some of these — Poles, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ruthenians — their countries having been overrun and annexed, in whole or in part, by the Russians, were claimed by the Soviet Repatriation Representatives as Soviet citizens. The British and U.S. Governments countered by refusing to recognize such annexations and by ordering that persons from such areas would not be treated as Soviet citizens unless they affirmatively claimed Soviet citizenship.² The care of these unfortunate persons was, in the event, to become the main task of U.N.R.R.A. in connection with displaced persons. But during the first months of the occupation, with which this book is mainly concerned, there was more than enough to do in getting back to their homes those who were anxious to go, without worrying about those who were not. Similarly, although later U.N.R.R.A. was to be faced with difficult quasi-legal questions as to the particular categories of displaced persons eligible for repatriation under the charter of the Administration, in the early stages with which this book is concerned such questions scarcely arose. It was all the military government authorities could do to deal with the masses who were

¹ Inconsistencies in the table are due to the following reasons:

- (a) Some totals, particularly earlier ones, are estimates only.
- (b) There were transfers of persons from one category to another.
- (c) There were at least two changes in the basis upon which figures were compiled.
- (d) There was always movement into and out of camps without repatriation.

With these reservations the table gives a broadly consistent picture of the trend of repatriation.

² Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, London, 1957, p. 215.

prima facie entitled to repatriation, and whom it was essential to control and care for in the military interest.

The repatriation of west-bound displaced persons presented comparatively little difficulty. There was much transport returning empty after supplying the forces, and there were few political obstacles. By the end of June evacuation was complete except for the sick and a few others. From July onwards evacuation was only of west-bound displaced persons found by the Russians within the area overrun by them and handed over under the arrangements to be described in the next paragraph. These persons numbered some 180,000 but since many of them were repatriated without passing through camps much of this total is not reflected in the table.

Eastward evacuation was more difficult and much slower. There was first the case of the Russians. Early evacuation was conducted under arrangements improvised between local commanders as soon as the British and Russian forces met. More formal arrangements were agreed upon as the result of a meeting in Leipzig on 22nd May 1945. The agreement then reached provided for the delivery through the British and Russian lines of all Russian prisoners of war and displaced persons in British hands to the east, and of all western European prisoners of war and displaced persons in Russian hands to the west. These persons were to be assembled at reception and delivery points on each side of the lines. Transport for exchanges between these points was to be provided by S.H.A.E.F. forces, which would carry Russians eastwards and then bring back Allied nationals. The exchange points with which the British forces would be concerned were to be at Wismar (west) and Wismar (east), at Wustmark and Krivitz, at Ludwigslust and Perchim, at Stendal and a point east of Stendal, and at Magdeburg (west) and Magdeburg (east). It was the intention that each of these exchange points should handle 2,000–5,000 persons daily each way. An estimate at this time of the numbers involved placed the Russians to be handed over by the west at 1,500,000 and the west-bound total at three hundred thousand. These arrangements had scarcely come into operation when the transfer of parts of Magdeburg and Mecklenburg from British to Russian control made it necessary to set up fresh exchange points. These were established a little to the east of Lübeck, of Hamburg, and of Hanover, at Lübeck-Schomberg, at Lüneburg, and at Helmstedt-Fallersleben. The rate of flow varied greatly from time to time, mostly in accordance with the Russian ability to handle numbers, but from the beginning of July, when few more displaced persons were coming into the camps in the British zone, the numbers repatriated resulted in a direct and corresponding reduction of the numbers in camps. Russians in Norway were repatriated under separate arrangements through Sweden and round North Cape.

More difficult was the case of the other east-bound displaced

persons. By far the greater number of these were Poles. There was, first, the physical difficulty of moving these persons back to Poland. It was impossible for the British or the Russian authorities to make available sufficient covered rail wagons for the long journey to Poland. Nor could shipping at first be spared for repatriation by sea. Not until the end of October could any arrangements at all be made for their movement. Then the flow began by road at the rate of three thousand persons a day, to be carried in British motor transport, by way of Hamburg–Ludwigslust–Wusterhausen–Liebenwalde–Prenzlau–Pasewalk–Stettin. But there was, secondly, the difficulty that many of these persons refused to return to Poland for fear of persecution at the hands of the new regime. There were similar political difficulties with regard to Yugoslavs and Czechs.

In the case of the Italians there were no political difficulties, but the movement of more than two hundred thousand persons half across Europe's devastated transport system created many logistical problems.

* * *

A particular case which remains to be considered is that of German refugees and of such enemy displaced persons as came to notice. Ultimate responsibility for this matter could not but lie upon the military commanders since they had assumed supreme authority and control in Germany. But the policy was, in the words of the 21 Army Group instructions, that these commanders should '... normally delegate this responsibility to German authorities who will then operate under their supervision'. Commanders were responsible for ensuring that the German authorities 'make all provision necessary for the reception of enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent displaced persons and refugees'.

In fact through the early stages of the occupation German refugees were left entirely to the care of their own authorities or such of them as survived. In May, Second Army Military Government staffs reported that responsibility for the German refugees was placed firmly upon the German administration.¹ They themselves had more than enough to do with handling the enormous and steadily mounting numbers of United Nations' displaced persons. There is little reference to refugees in the Second Army and 21 Army Group war diaries for the succeeding weeks. But as administration of the zones became better established, and as zonal boundaries became more difficult to cross, a refugee problem began to take shape, forced itself upon the attention of the military government authorities, and began to receive mention in the Control Commission progress reports.

It had two main aspects. The major one arose from the decision of

¹ cf. 330.

the Potsdam Conference that the German populations remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary must be transferred back to Germany 'in an orderly and humane manner'. The responsibility for conducting these large scale organized transfers must rest upon the military authorities. But in July it was agreed between the Zone Commanders that 'no organized movement of German civilians within, to or from the British Zone, is to take place until the bulk of repatriable displaced persons are evacuated'. In the circumstances this decision was inevitable. Its effect was to postpone the start of these organized movements of population until the early part of 1946. When they began they depended heavily on military logistical resources, but in other respects were more a civil than a military commitment. This, and their date, put these movements beyond the scope of the present volume and no further reference is necessary to them. There were also some three hundred thousand Germans to be repatriated from Denmark whither they had fled to escape the Russian advance.

The other aspect of the matter was the uncontrolled movement of population, which could not be postponed by a stroke of the pen. Already in August there was a threat of such movement from the Russian into the British zone. In September the flow began, mostly through the Harz Mountains towards the university town of Göttingen, south of Hanover, and fortunately undamaged by bombing. At first the refugees came eight to ten thousand in a week. By the end of the month the rate had risen to fifty and sixty thousand. Most of these people fended for themselves when they reached the British zone. Those who did not were collected and moved by rail to *Land Oldenburg*. The same kind of thing was happening in Berlin but was much harder to deal with because the city was surrounded by Russian-controlled territory. By October, thirty thousand persons claiming domicile in the British zone had entered the British sector from the surrounding Russian zone. Of these twelve thousand had been transported by road to the British zone and then dispersed by rail. The remaining eighteen thousand waited in the British sector with such patience as they could summon for a chance to make the journey to the west. To control the movements an arrangement was reached at this time between the zones for an organized exchange of refugees claiming domicile in another zone. This was to be conducted on a 'head for head' basis. Official exchanges began during October between the British and the Russian zones, at the rate of six thousand a day, in the neighbourhood of Göttingen. But many people continued to steal across the frontier by night. There was not sufficient transport available to start exchanges with the other zones yet. But in their cases the matter was not so pressing.

* * *

To the individual displaced person what mattered most after, or sometimes even before, the question of achieving or avoiding repatriation, was the treatment accorded to him in the various centres into which he found himself swept.

Centres were established in any suitable, or sometimes unsuitable, accommodation that survived and had not already been occupied by Allied troops. Barracks, labour camps, concentration camps, schools, gymnasia, factories, airport buildings, barns, granaries, groups of villages from which the Germans had been evicted, all were used for the housing of displaced persons. It was a rule, however, that no displaced persons should be billeted upon German families. It was the exception if the accommodation allotted had not been seriously damaged by bombing or in battle. In the rubble and ruins there was rarely any water, electricity, or sanitation. Still less frequently was there any furniture or equipment.

The task of preparing the selected site for the reception of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of displaced persons was normally entrusted to a Displaced Persons Assembly Centre Camp Staff, although in emergency it might devolve upon a Military Government detachment or any other available unit. The Camp Staffs had been improvised, it will be remembered, when it became clear that U.N.R.R.A. teams could not be put into the field in the numbers or by the time required. They consisted of two officers and ten other ranks, the latter including a cook, a storeman, a clerk, a medical orderly, and drivers for the one three-ton and two fifteen-hundredweight trucks and the one motor cycle provided. Equipment included cookers and cooking utensils. As they became available, other teams or individual workers were attached to the Camp Staffs, to help, to learn as they helped, and ultimately to take over part of the responsibility. Such were furnished by the British Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Friends Ambulance Unit, U.N.R.R.A., French and Netherlands Missions, and various other organizations. A tribute to the work of these teams by the Director of Military Government may be quoted:

‘Units of all kind did great work, not only in the obvious ways you would expect a relief organisation to work, but also in the hundred and one different problems that such units are prepared to tackle. It is this readiness to adapt themselves to any circumstances, and the refusal to be defeated by apparently insuperable obstacles, that had endeared them to those branches of the Army which have had to deal with the many difficulties encountered while working with displaced persons . . . they will long be remembered by those with whom they worked.’¹

There were also the Allied Liaison Officers and Soviet Repatriation

¹ *Red Cross and St. John War History*, 1939-47, London, 1949, p. 505.

Representatives. The tasks of the Military Government detachments which had specialized on displaced persons work were normally to control and co-ordinate the work of a group of centres and to ensure, by their own efforts or through the military police or other agencies, that displaced persons at large were controlled and shepherded into the appropriate centres.

The initial cleaning and clearing of sites, the provision of water, and the improvisation of latrines was made generally by German labour supervised and aided by such Allied military units as were near. Whenever possible, and during the first week it generally was possible, food and fuel for cooking were required to be provided by the local German authorities. The intention was to provide a two thousand-calorie diet, comparable to the minimum level planned for liberated populations and more generous than the 1,500-calorie diet which it was hoped to achieve for the Germans. For a while the two thousand-calorie level was very widely attained, sometimes exceeded, by the use of German stocks, supplemented by army rations, imported relief supplies, and Red Cross parcels. But neither in the liberated countries nor in Germany was it possible to hold to the intended levels of nutrition and it was not long, as the small German stocks were consumed, before there had to be cuts in the rations for displaced persons also. By March 1946, when the ration for German civilians was cut to one thousand calories the level for displaced persons was down to 1,850 calories. In July 1946 it was assimilated to the civilian ration which by then was up to 1,550 calories again.¹ As for most other people in Europe at the time, the diet was monotonous as well as inadequate, and consisted largely of potatoes and soup. There was little meat or fat in the ration. Beds, other essential furniture, mattresses, blankets, clothes, were obtained from captured German army stocks, or levied through the local authorities from the Germans of the neighbourhood. Conditions of comfort naturally varied greatly from time to time and from place to place, from straw in a barn to not uncomfortable semi-permanent accommodation in army barracks or similar buildings.

When displaced persons first arrived at a centre their food would be cooked by the Camp Staff cook. As the numbers grew cooks and assistants would be selected and set to work from among the displaced persons themselves. The help of displaced persons was enlisted in other respects also. Particularly was this so in the case of any persons with medical or public health training. These were immediately called in to help the always overworked centre medical staffs with the examination, disinfestation, and immunization of new arrivals, and the treatment of sick among the centre residents. As soon as possible displaced persons would be further associated with the

¹ Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, London, 1957, p. 252.

administration and control of the centre by the appointment of national committees, in consultation with the Liaison Officer concerned. These played an important part in the government of the community, and in the development of amenities and communal activities, such as news bulletins, schools, entertainments and sports. It has been claimed for U.N.R.R.A. that its distinctive contribution was that it sought '... to rehabilitate the individuals in the camps; it wanted to achieve the objective so often and so sincerely expressed by its first Director-General – to help people help themselves; it did not want to run the camps, it wanted the residents to run them.'¹ The military authorities, it is said, were only concerned to run the camps efficiently. But, in fact, from the earliest days S.H.A.E.F. was saying 'An important principle of organization of these centres is the employment of the displaced persons themselves to the maximum extent possible in their administration, with a corresponding minimum of other supervisory civil or military personnel.' There can be no doubt that this principle was always present in the minds of the military authorities and applied wherever possible since, theoretical considerations apart, only by so doing could they hope to spread their limited resources of manpower sufficiently thinly and widely. In addition it was not long before U.N.R.R.A. teams were permitted to be recruited as to one half from among displaced persons themselves, so offering to residents of centres a further opportunity to take part in their own administration and rehabilitation.

But for the individual displaced person the actuality of conditions in the centres fell sadly short of the hopes and excitement that had filled him when he knew the war was over and that he had been liberated from his Nazi masters. Accommodation was often damaged and squalidly patched up with salvaged or improvised material. Water, electricity, and sanitation were seldom available. Food was poor and scarce. In the circumstances of the time such conditions were inescapable. They were better than those of many Germans, but in all these respects displaced persons were frequently worse off than they had been under the Nazis. For most of them life held but one thought – repatriation. For others it was how to avoid repatriation. For east-bound as opposed to west-bound persons movement was inevitably slow despite the best efforts of the western Allies. Even worse than the delays were the complete uncertainty and absence of information about the probable departures. And when eventually, the day came, journeys often had to be performed in great discomfort. Preliminary stages might have to be travelled on foot. There were the hours, sometimes days, of waiting that are inseparable from military extempore transportation without regular time-tables. The journey itself

¹ Woodbridge, *History of UNRRA*, New York, 1950, Vol. II., p. 522.

would be made packed in army motor vehicles, or twenty or more to a railway goods truck, furnished only with a jerry-can of water, a lavatory bucket, and, in fortunate cases some straw and a brazier. The journey might last many days. An entry in the diary of a military Government Detachment for July ran:

‘Received order to evacuate 400 Jewish D.P.’s to Belsen. Only 150 would consent to go in open trucks in rain in the middle of the night.’

It was no longer the Nazi Belsen and the intention was to evacuate these persons through the camp to Sweden. But perhaps the refusal was not altogether surprising. The few who travelled by air were more fortunate but frequently had their share of waiting too. The doubts and delays were often repeated before admission to reception centres at the end of the journey, where trains were apt to arrive without warning.

For those awaiting their turn for repatriation, there was often little or no work. As the winter approached there was cutting of wood for fuel to employ some. A great boredom and uncertainty filled the lives of these people. Many were uneducated, of poor mentality, and of crude outlook. Seeing around them the now defenceless Germans, for whom they had long been compelled to work, and at whose hands numbers had greatly suffered, it was not surprising that many took the opportunity for revenge, particularly when this could be combined with acquisition of some of the things for which they hungered. There were attacks upon Germans, particularly upon residents of lonely farm-houses, in search of food, alcohol, and women. The Germans resisted. Murder, rape and looting followed. British military patrols restored order. It became necessary to re-arm the German police. Displaced Persons Centres had to be wired in and their residents confined to camp under curfew orders. More than ever it seemed to these unfortunate people that they had only exchanged one labour camp or concentration camp for another.

A report in the middle of July, ran:

‘Several reports from Kreise indicate a slight reduction in D.P. and P.W.¹ depredations, with the exception of L.K.² Oldenburg, where, particularly in the area of Ganderkeese, conditions have been so acute that the Germans have lost faith in our ability to maintain law and order. It is also reported to be unsafe to work in fields within eight miles of Adelheide D.P. camp owing to sniping in this area. A total of 1,200 cattle have been slaughtered and looted by D.P. and P.W. quite apart from atrocious crimes against the inhabitants. Reprisals by D.P. and P.W.

¹ Prisoner of War.

² *Landkreis*.

of this camp against informers have terrorised the Germans against giving evidence.'

A military Government officer writes:

'It may help you to visualise the situation if I tell you that, at this time, I, on my frequent and long trips about our Zone, always had a loaded pistol at hand, and my driver with a loaded rifle! Russians and Poles; Poles and Russians; and both far worse than any kind of wild beast.'

But there was violence within the centres too. There were inflammable mixtures of nationalities. There were bitter ideological divisions within nationalities. Liaison Officers of the Russian, Polish and Yugoslav Governments encountered hostility when they sought to persuade politically opposed nationals to return to their countries. Emissaries of the Polish 'London' Government suffered similarly when they tried to persuade other Poles not to return. The following diary entries of a Military Government detachment are not un-typical:

'4 July. Alleged shooting of a Polish D.P. by a British soldier.

5 July. Demonstration by Polish D.P. Community including assaulting of German civilians and damaging property. Early curfew and additional penalties imposed on Poles.

6 July. . . . Serious disorder amongst Russian Community resulting in shooting of a Russian D.P. by a Russian officer who was subsequently lynched by an infuriated mob. Order eventually restored with aid of R.A.¹ guard supplied by 215/51 Med. Regt.² R.A. Russian Liaison Officer taken into protective custody.

7 July. Conference held with C.O. 51 Med. Reg. R.A. and locally elected council of six Russians D.P.'s to enforce the law and order in Russian area of the camp.

English soldier alleged to have shot Pole was arrested and admitted guilt. Further incidents and cases of looting by the Russians resulting in several arrests.'

Yet ten days later in the diary of the same detachment the following entry occurs:

'26 July. A violin recital was given to D.P.'s of all nationalities by Yehudi Menuhin in the Camp Reception Centre and was very enthusiastically received.'

Here, in such stark contrasts, was the essence of life in the displaced persons' centres and camps. Boredom, then sudden murder. Concerts by international celebrities, but squalid and insanitary shelter. Schools for the children and parties at Christmas, but not enough food or

¹ Royal Artillery.

² Medium Regiment.

clothing. Some of the best and some of the worst of the people of Middle Europe. The heroism and self discipline of workers like Dr. Ada Bimko and Dr. Ruth Gutmann at Belsen¹ standing out against the complete erosion in others, by torture and starvation, of all sense of moral obligation. Finally, there was the contrast between, on the one hand, the disappointment felt by many displaced persons with the results of liberation, and, on the other hand, the remarkable scale on which they were in fact aided by the Allied armies. By June 1946 British military transport and organization had taken 1,832,385 persons home to their countries. While waiting, these people had been sheltered, reclothed, not well, but better than this could have been done at the time by any civil authority. They had been fed, again not well, but for many months better than most of the peoples of the liberated countries. From the whole of what had been the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations the number of persons repatriated by 30th September 1945 was almost six million. In the same period the Russians had repatriated almost 4,500,000 persons. By June 1946 the total was half a million more. This was no mean achievement for organizations that were primarily designed in order to make war.

¹ cf. p. 223.

CHAPTER XX

THE EXTIRPATION OF NAZISM

IT was one of the declared war aims of the Allies to destroy and eliminate the influence of Nazism and Militarism in Germany. The Supreme Commander gave expression to this in his first proclamation issued to the German people when his troops occupied Germany. He said:

‘ . . . we shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel, oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party has created.’¹

The initial instructions on which this proclamation was based were contained in the directive of 28th April 1944 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the military government of Germany before defeat or surrender.

By this, three specific tasks were laid upon the Supreme Commander, first, to destroy the Nazi Party and its numerous subsidiary organizations, second, to eliminate objectionable Nazi laws and Courts from the legal system of Germany, and, third, to ensure that no Nazis of any importance and no member of the German General Staff, should be retained, in, or appointed to, any position of authority.

* * *

The first task, the destruction of the Nazi Party, was in essence a police problem. It involved seizing the offices and records of all Party organizations, suspending the activities of these organizations, unless required for administrative convenience, arresting high Party officials, and seizing Party property. Prime responsibility for these measures was laid upon the Counter-Intelligence Corps, not Military Government staffs, but responsibility for purging the police was laid upon the latter. Responsibility for the control and disbandment of the various military or para-military formations of the Nazi Party was to be discharged through normal command channels, other than those for military government. Examples of such formations were the S.A. (*Sturmabteilungen*), the S.S. (*Schutzstaffeln*), the Hitler Youth, and the Todt Organization. Other organizations of the Nazi Party were to be dissolved by the Counter-Intelligence Corps itself. These included

¹ Supreme Commander's Proclamation No. 1. cf. Appendix III.

the central offices of the Party (such as the Party Chancellery, the *Führer's* Chancellery, the Office of the *Reich* Propaganda Leader of the Party, and many others), the regional and local offices of the Party, and many professional, political, and other Party organizations.

Upon the Military Government staff fell the responsibility for providing the legal sanctions in support of these measures. These were furnished by Military Government Law No. 5, Dissolution of Nazi Party, to be promulgated immediately on occupation. This declared illegal, and prohibited the activities of, the Nazi Party and more than fifty of its subsidiary organizations. It prohibited recruitment to eight para-military organizations of the Party and provided that these should 'in due course' be disbanded and dissolved. It provided for the seizure of all funds, property and records of the Party and its subsidiary organizations. Any offence against the provisions of this law was made punishable with death, or any lesser penalty. The arrest of Party officials by the counter-intelligence organization was to be made in accordance with a list drawn up beforehand by the Military Government staff. This automatic-arrest list included all members of the *Gestapo*, all members of the S.S., Party officials above a certain rank (*Bereichsleiter*), all officers of the *Waffen* S.S. and the *Allgemeine* S.S., all members of the S.A., the Hitler Youth, and other para-military organizations, above certain specified ranks, and a number of police and other officials. The number of persons to be arrested under these provisions throughout Germany was expected to total two hundred thousand. Close upon one quarter of this number might be found within the British zone of occupation.

* * *

These measures for the destruction of the Nazi Party would appear to have been entirely successful in their comparatively limited object. There has been no reappearance of the Nazi Party as known to history during the years 1933-45.

But this success was achieved at the cost of expanding the automatic-arrest category to a point at which it created difficulties and subsequent embarrassment. In the British zone alone some fifty to sixty thousand persons were imprisoned during the early stages. The automatic arrest category was in due course replaced by a mandatory-arrest category and a mandatory - investigation category. These came into use on 1st September 1945, but afforded little relief since by this time there were few people left to proceed against. By now the major difficulty was that of deciding what to do with the great number of persons already incarcerated. If these were war criminals, they were required to be brought to trial. If they were not, no indication whatever had been given as to how they should be treated after arrest.

By July 1946 some sixty-six thousand persons had been arrested within the British zone. At the end of the year the number had risen to 68,500. The great majority of these arrests took place during the period of military responsibility. In some 2,100 cases the persons arrested were individual security suspects. The remainder, say sixty-three thousand, were persons arrested merely because they fell within the automatic-arrest category. By July 1946 some twenty-four thousand of these persons had been released on review of their cases, leaving forty-two thousand in custody. Some five hundred of these were accused of specific war crimes and were either under trial or awaiting trial. The rest had all undergone interrogation but had none of them been brought to trial before any court. They were kept interned because they were considered dangerous, or potentially dangerous, to the Military Government or its objectives. In a very few cases the danger arose from the individual actions of the persons interned. In the great majority of cases it arose exclusively from the fact that they had been members of, or had held office in, notorious Nazi organizations. A Select Committee on Estimates commented:

'If part of the object of occupation is to attract Germans to the British way of life, this is a singular method of setting about it.'¹

It was not until long after military responsibility had ceased that quadripartite agreement could be reached on principles for liquidating this liability.

The Control Commission directive which ultimately issued, in October 1946, bore marks of the struggle involved in its preparation, and of the compromises reached, and is far from easy to interpret. The directive established five categories of persons – major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers, and persons exonerated – and a graded list of penalties and 'sanctions'. It listed the actions or activities which justified the inclusion of persons within the several categories. It also listed a large number of official positions the holding of which, while it did not incur the automatic imposition of sanctions, did require that the conduct of the holders should be investigated.

Within the British zone, persons accused of violating the laws or customs of war, or of committing 'Crimes against Peace' or 'Crimes against Humanity', as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, were to be judicially tried by British Courts, Military Government Courts, the ordinary German Courts, or specially-constituted German Tribunals, according to the nature of the offences alleged. These were punishable with fine, total forfeiture of wealth, imprisonment or death. Persons not accused under Law No. 10 were to be 'categorized' in accordance with the directive, the more serious offenders by

¹ Report of Select Committee on Estimates 1945-46, pp. 536-541.

British Review Boards, others by German Tribunals or German Denazification Panels (which had already been set up to handle classification under the *Fragebogen* procedure which will be referred to again in a later section of this chapter). The sanctions awardable as a result of 'categorization' ran from imprisonment for as much as ten years, down through confiscation of property, loss of civic rights, and exclusion from employment above that of ordinary labourer, to restriction of residence and compulsory reporting to the police. In the case of the German Tribunals and Panels an appeal lay to German Appellate Tribunals and Labour Boards. Nevertheless the whole of the 'categorization' procedure was administrative, not judicial, and cannot be held to have given the persons concerned a full or fair legal trial.¹

By October, 1947, the number of persons in internment camps within the British zone had been reduced to nineteen thousand. Of these, sixteen thousand were awaiting trial by German courts, in virtue of the decision of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, that mere membership of certain Nazi organizations amounted to the commission of a war crime. Of the remaining three thousand, 1,700 were recent arrivals, who had not yet been placed in any category, and two hundred were awaiting release. The cases of nine hundred were still under investigation. Only 535 had been declared dangerous and ordered to be detained. The cases even of these were being reviewed and considerable numbers were being released.²

The second task laid upon the Supreme Commander was to eliminate objectionable Nazi laws and courts from the legal system of Germany. This was primarily a legal problem, the responsibility for which was placed firmly upon Military Government. It will be dealt with in a later chapter on legal matters.³

The third task was to ensure that no active Nazis or ardent Nazi sympathizers and no members of the German General Staff should be retained in, or appointed to any positions of authority. With the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander and the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, proposed to allow exceptions in favour of unimportant Nazis on compelling grounds of expediency or administrative convenience. It has been told in an earlier chapter⁴ how a copy of the Supreme Commander's draft Handbook for Military Government in Germany reached the President. A number of its provisions earned his keen disapproval, among them the modest discretion allowed to retain in employment comparatively unimportant officials of the Nazi Party. The Supreme

¹ Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany*, London, 1947, p. 118

² H of L Deb. 55. Vol. CLII., Col. 625-31.

³ cf. Ch. XXI.

⁴ cf. Ch. XI.

Commander was peremptorily required to revise this part of the Handbook in the light of the following principle:

'No convinced Nazis or active sympathisers shall in any circumstances be continued in office for the convenience of the Administration. The Nazi Party shall be destroyed together with its ancillary organizations. If necessary for the provision of relief or of health and sanitation services, the administrative facilities of certain of the dissolved organizations may be used, provided that only de-nazified persons are employed.'

Had it not been for British representations, this prohibition would have been even more categorical. The Supreme Commander accordingly issued revised instructions that no exceptions would be made on grounds of administrative convenience or expediency.¹

Responsibility for enforcing this policy was laid upon Military Government which was armed with three lists. The first of these enumerated the important political officers and civil servants whom it was mandatory to dismiss or suspend, immediately on occupation. These included ministers and the most senior civil servants in both *Reich* and *Land* Ministries, supreme *Reich* authorities, heads of *Reich* institutions, *Regierungspräsidenten*, *Ländrate*, *Oberbürgermeister* of important towns, judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Courts of Appeal, senior police officers, all members of the *Gestapo* and *Sicherheitsdienst*, University Rectors and Curators, and many others, to a total of nearly five thousand in the whole of Germany. The second list enumerated the positions in the Nazi Party or its subsidiary organizations, and the honours conferred by the Party, the holding of which also entailed dismissal or suspension or disqualification for employment. The third list set out the important quasi-governmental positions from which officers were to be removed. The peculiar interpenetration and duplication of the governmental and Party hierarchies meant that there was inevitably a good deal of overlapping of these three lists. There was in addition a further overlapping of the counter-intelligence automatic-arrest lists with the three lists upon which the Military Government staff worked.

Where a person was known to fall *prima facie* within one of the mandatory removal categories it was the duty of the Military Government officer concerned immediately to remove or suspend him, unless very special reasons existed for his temporary retention. Clearly, however, there would be many more whom, upon fuller enquiry, it would become necessary to remove, whether because they fell within the prescribed categories or for other reasons. The *Fragebogen* or questionnaire was the method adopted for this purpose.² At every

¹ cf. Ch. XI.

² cf. Appendix VII.

important Military Government centre a Special Branch was formed, of Public Safety officers, with the object of ensuring 'security' of civil administration. It became an important part of its duties, to examine, investigate, and evaluate the information furnished through these documents.

All officials not immediately removed, and all applicants for appointment to official posts, were required to answer a *Fragebogen* without delay. After eliciting personal particulars, the *Fragebogen* was designed to ascertain whether the person concerned or any of his close relations had ever had any affiliation to the Nazi Party or its subsidiary organizations, and if so what the nature of the connection had been. The person completing the *Fragebogen* was then required to list all his writings and speeches other than those of a strictly non-political character, to give a history of his employment, and to show the sources and amount of his income for each year beginning with 1933. He was also required to give an account of his military service, of any journeys outside Germany since 1933, and of his political affiliations, with the particular purpose of ascertaining if he had ever opposed or resisted the Nazis. The replies given were to be checked against any other information obtainable from seized Nazi Party records, newspapers, official records, printed publications, and the statements of informers. People spent so much of their time filling in *Fragebogen* that '. . . they became a somewhat rueful joke. *Bogen* in German also means an arch, and it was said of types of architecture that Roman was *rundbogen*, Gothic *spitzbogen*, and English *fragebogen*.'¹ Omissions, or false or incomplete answers, would incur prosecution. After such further enquiries as appeared necessary each *Fragebogen* was classified into one of four categories: M, removal or non-appointment mandatory; D, removal or non-appointment within discretion of Military Government; NEG, no objection to appointment or retention; R, retention or appointment recommended.

* * *

There was never any doubt regarding the sharpness or efficacy of the measures described in the preceding section. An unsatisfactory classification excluded from employment in the civil service, in quasi-governmental organizations, or under the military authorities. There seems at this stage to have been no explicit bar to a person obtaining other employment, but in practice he was unlikely to do so. Later, Control Council Directive No. 24 dated 12th January 1946 required the *fragebogen* to be completed by all persons in public employment above that of ordinary labourer, and by all persons in semi-public

¹ Spottiswoode, *Military Government*, Royal Engineers Journal Vol. LXII., March 1948

employment or in important private undertakings of roughly comparable standing. An unsatisfactory classification debarred the person concerned from virtually all employment above that of ordinary labourer. In the case of a public servant it entailed loss of pension and other rights also.

* * *

The measures for denazification quickly ran into difficulties. The first of these had been foreseen by the British planners for military government, and had indeed been inevitable ever since the time of President Roosevelt's ill-judged intervention to 'toughen up' the S.H.A.E.F. handbook for military government. It is clearly stated in a letter of 26th February 1945, from the D.C.C.A.O. 21 Army Group to the G-5 Division of S.H.A.E.F.:

- '(a) In many departments of the civil administration in Germany the membership of the N.S.D.A.P.¹ is virtually a condition of employment. *Immediate* dismissal of *all* such officials might therefore be tantamount to abolishing the department until a new administration can be recruited and trained. Chaos would follow.
- (b) The destruction of records may result in a situation in which the civil administration can only be maintained by the personal knowledge of an official (who may be a Nazi). An example of this is believed to have occurred in Aachen, where in the absence of maps showing the underground electricity distribution, the services of an official in the Public Utilities Department were indispensable.'

The D.C.C.A.O. asked for some relaxation of the absolute prohibition against employment of Nazis to enable him to avert the chaos he predicted.

S.H.A.E.F. could only re-affirm the policy laid down by the President. It was clear to the British element of the Control Commission, then still in London, that this policy created a conflict between the need to purge German society of Nazism and the need, not merely to keep the revived German administration working, but to provide the inhabitants of the British zone with food, water, and some protection from disease. If famine, pestilence, and anarchy were to supervene, suffering would not be confined to the Germans. The British forces would be involved also, and would be forced, by world opinion and in self protection, to embark upon far greater operations for relief and the restoration of order than would have been necessary had action been taken before administrative and economic collapse. Furthermore,

¹ *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei*, the Nazi Party.

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it was precisely the development of such conditions that would favour the recrudescence of Nazism or the emergence of Communism. It was the pressure of these self-regarding considerations that ultimately decided how the conflict would be resolved within the British zone. The Russians struck a different balance. On the one hand, they were ready to accept a deterioration of physical conditions that was not tolerable to western standards. On the other, the purging of Nazism, which brought mainly negative advantages to the British, conferred positive benefits upon the Russians, since it was largely achieved in their zone by the simple expedient of replacing Nazis by Communists.

On the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. the British sought to loosen the instructions. But the Potsdam Conference laid down that:

“Nazi leaders, influential Nazis, supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other person dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who by their political and moral qualities are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.”

However, the absolute rigidity of the earlier S.H.A.E.F. instructions had disappeared. And even before that, these were not enforced in their full rigour in the British zone. Exceptions were made in favour of ‘experts’ whose services were considered indispensable. In this way the administrative situation was saved. But only at the cost of discrimination, the results of which will be referred to again later in this chapter.

* * *

While it was the excessive severity of denazification with regard to a limited sector of the community that created difficulties for the administration, the policy soon ran into difficulty on the opposite ground that it was insufficiently severe with regard to the community at large. German opinion early became critical of the denazification programme in the British zone on the ground that although a searching perhaps, too searching, purge of Nazis was being made in official positions, not enough was being done against Nazis in business and industry.

The matter came up for consideration in mid-July just as the combined Anglo-American command was being dissolved. 21 Army Group were doubtful of their authority to remove Nazis, however ardent, from unofficial positions. They addressed S.H.A.E.F., and also, a few

days later, the British element of the Control Commission, recently arrived in Germany. The latter replied that a United Kingdom directive was under preparation but that meanwhile, United Kingdom policy should be taken to be that contained in a United Kingdom redraft of a United States 'over-all' directive under discussion at the European Advisory Commission, the relevant portion of which read:

'All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of major responsibility in important private undertakings.'

But having widened the scope of denazification to include virtually all sectors of the community, the need arose once more for special dispensations in favour of the 'experts' if the German economy was to be saved from complete collapse. A good example is afforded by the coal industry.¹

* * *

The most obvious difficulty arose from the sheer numerical magnitude of the task. By March 1946 the cases of some eight hundred thousand persons had been dealt with – 'evaluated' was the expression current at the time – within the British zone.² By the end of the year the number had risen to 1,524,825. Of this total, applicants for employment accounted for 1,116,893 cases. In the U.S. zone 1,456,467 cases had been evaluated by 1st June 1946, 373,762 persons being removed or excluded from office and 1,082,705 being retained. On this date within the American zone a fundamental change in denazification policy was brought into force by a Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism. Under this all persons over the age of eighteen were required to answer a *fragebogen*. Denazification on such a scale was not expressly enjoined by the Potsdam Conference but was undertaken to implement the Control Council ruling that the Potsdam resolution for the *removal* of persons who had been more than nominal Nazis must be held to mean also their *exclusion* from office. The responsibility for the appraisal of the answers given to the questionnaires was largely transferred to the German authorities. Under this law, by the end of 1946 the startling total of 11,674,152 *fragebogen* had been completed. Of these, 6,210,818 had been dealt with by the authorities, leaving 5,463,334 still to be evaluated. In the British zone there was never any attempt to conduct denazification on such a scale but the operation nevertheless involved the evaluation of several thousand *fragebogen* daily.

¹ cf. Ch. XXII.

² Keesing, 1947, 7902. Select Committee on Estimates, 1945-46, p. 562.

The difficulty made itself felt in two ways. In the first place the purge would inevitably take time, and many people would have to wait months, perhaps many months, before it could be known whether or not they might continue or resume the employment by which they had always earned their living. A frustrating and demoralizing uncertainty was added to the other difficulties of the times, which bore most heavily upon the Germans awaiting decision, but also made harder the task of the military government officials. Secondly, in order to hasten denazification, as well as to associate the German people in responsibility for adjudication, the process was handed over as much as possible to German tribunals set up for the purpose. Only the most important categories continued to be dealt with by Military Government officers. The German tribunals tended, for one reason or another, to take a much more lenient view. Once again there was inequality of treatment, and although in this case discrimination favoured the unimportant as against the important Nazis, this did not serve to redress the balance. It merely created another cause for resentment, and further undermined confidence in the general equity of the process of denazification.

* * *

The greatest difficulty, however, was to assess fairly and realistically who had, and who had not been more than nominal participants in the activities of the Nazi Party. Much of the evidence was suspect. Military Government tended to see the affairs of Germany through the eyes of refugees, mostly Jews. It was right that many such persons, who had fled from Germany when the Nazis came into power, should be employed in Military Government. Their knowledge of Germany and of the German language was invaluable. But it was difficult for them to take an objective view of denazification. When Military Government officers looked around inside Germany for witnesses or for persons to employ, they naturally selected, indeed they were enjoined to select, 'politically reliable' persons, that is to say, persons who had opposed the Nazis. And in a totalitarian state the certain result of opposition is dismissal or exclusion from employment, if indeed employment had not been refused beforehand. For such persons also it was difficult to be objective in saying who had, and who had not, been a Nazi. Much of the evidence received from whatever source, was tainted by fantastically contorted motives of revenge. But the central difficulty was that experienced by persons who had never lived under a dictatorship in understanding the ramifications and the strength of the Nazi Party's hold on the life of the community, or, having grasped it, in knowing what judgment to pass upon the actions of persons held in its grip.

Many persons joined the Party for harmless, or even commendable

reasons, but found that mere nominal participation was not readily tolerated. If dark and unknown corners later came to their notice, close enquiry was likely to prove dangerous. Most joined for reasons of self-interest. Entry to the government or quasi-government services was virtually closed except to members of the Party. Promotion was equally difficult for a non-member. Most civil servants joined, because they had to continue earning a living or because they feared what might happen to their relations if they did not. Refusal to join required sustained courage and determination. There were also cases in which civil servants, though hostile to the Party, became nominal Nazis so as to protect the public from the results of their replacement by a genuine Nazi. An industrialist who did not support the Party was refused permits or licences. It was the same at lower levels. If a house decorator, or some member of his family, did not join the Party, he was able to buy no paint. A baker got no flour. Here again it was a brave man who exposed himself – but particularly his family – to the dangers resulting from refusal to join. An artist, scholar, scientist, who achieved sufficient distinction might have Nazi honours or appointments thrust upon him, although totally out of sympathy with Nazi ideas. For the Party would not let it be thought that their movement did not include the artistic or intellectual leaders of the country. The individual could refuse these honours only at his peril – and that of his family.

Such talk of peril may seem melodramatic. What, in the last resort, could happen to someone who refused to join the Party, or otherwise incurred the displeasure of the Nazis? The answer is to be found in many books. For the writer, one case, not important, not unusual, but which occurred to persons whom he is proud to number among his friends, has made the answer real. An officer was condemned to death for complicity in the attempt upon Hitler's life on 20th July 1944. His wife and children were thrown into prison, where they were not to be visited. The Pastor of their Church, refusing to abandon a parishioner in distress, visited the wife. Soon after, the *Gestapo* reported having gone to his house. They said they had found his dead body and a letter saying he was about to take his own life. There is no reasonable doubt that, as happened in other cases also, the *Gestapo* first compelled him to write the letter as the only means of saving his family from death at their hands and then either shot him, or compelled him to shoot himself under similar threat. There can have been few families in Germany which did not have personal knowledge of the ruthless and barbarous manner in which the Party enforced its will.

The difficulties of understanding what the Nazi screw had meant and the tendency to view the affairs of Germany exclusively through the eyes of refugees and other anti-Nazis, tended to establish a demand, as a condition of denazification for a standard of conduct that was, in the

circumstances, unrealistic. This tendency was reinforced by President Roosevelt's insistence upon a 'tough' policy towards Germany, and by outraged public opinion as the full horror of the Nazi atrocities was uncovered by the Allied advance. This tendency ended by '... posthumously erecting active resistance to Hitler as the norm, and condemning anyone who had failed to take part in it.'¹ The judges, as the same writer puts it, 'did not treat willingness to face martyrdom as a subject for admiration, but as the standard to be expected of everybody.' These words were written of the Nüremberg trials, but they have their application to the ordinary processes of denazification.

But if it was hard in the first place to understand the cynical malignity and bestiality of the Nazi terror it was perhaps harder still, once this had been grasped, to sit in judgment on those who, because they had lacked the great courage required, might be held to have over-stepped the limits of 'nominal participation'. It was idle to suppose that if Britain had been occupied by the Nazis, and the *Gestapo* had been set to work, there would have been no collaborators. And how many of those now required to pass judgment would have had the courage to take a course that would have meant loss of employment, poverty, torture, and possibly death for themselves and their families? Let the point be made by someone who was there at the time:²

'After the end of the war I worked for two and a half years in Germany and I was left with one very strong impression, that thousands of men and women in that country during the period of Nazi rule had found themselves faced with what seemed to be an impossible dilemma. They did not approve of the regime; many felt utterly ashamed of it. But what were they to do? Resistance seemed quite futile, and what would happen to their wives or husbands, their parents or children, if they made their protest? Most men and women are not strong enough to solve such a dilemma, and certainly someone who has not had to live in a totalitarian country has no right to condemn them. In Germany I had at one time to work with four *Land* Ministers of Education; three of them had been in concentration camps (two were Socialists and one had been a Deputy of the Catholic Centre Party); the fourth, who had been a Headmaster, was dismissed from his post the moment the Nazis gained power. We used to meet regularly to discuss our common problems, and I never met them without wondering whether I could have shown the courage they had shown.'

And yet, failure to pass judgment would amount to a condonation of Nazi crimes, and a betrayal both of the principles for which the Allies

¹ *The Observer*, 17 July, 1955, article by Marion Doenhoff.

² Robert Birley, vide Annedore Leber, *Conscience in Revolt*, English version, London, 1957, p. xxii of introduction.

had gone to war, and of those Germans, numbering thousands, who had shown the courage to solve the impossible dilemma and in so doing had lost their lives at the hands of the Nazis.

* * *

It was not to be expected that when the Allies occupied Germany there should be a general desire on the part of the inhabitants for measures of denazification. But there was an influential minority that was ready to welcome a purge. The core of this consisted of those opposed in principle to any form of dictatorship and conscious of the vileness of the Nazi tyranny. But there were also included many whose chief motive was resentment because their services or professions had been invaded by Nazis who had been placed or promoted over their heads. The interlopers were often of inferior education and social standing, and lacked the training and experience required for the posts into which they had been placed. Or the resentment of the older members proceeded from the fact that they had been allowed to remain in their posts but only on condition of joining the Party, a course which they had not liked but had not felt able to refuse.

Outside the ranks of this minority were many who had been not unwilling to acquiesce in the Nazi regime so long as it brought success, but who now were equally prepared to accept denazification as a natural result of defeat. In all, it is probably true to say that a majority of Germans was ready to accept a purge as a not unreasonable measure.

It was not long, however, before this readiness weakened. Confidence in the process of denazification was first undermined and resentment created by the exemption from penalties of the 'experts' considered indispensable to the administration. These might have been, and often had been, notorious Nazis, because only by joining the Party could they gain promotion. There was, next, the early failure to proceed against notorious Nazis in business and industry. This further weakened confidence in denazification and permitted many of the offenders to escape or cover up their tracks. Then there were the delays resulting from the scale upon which denazification was attempted. There were also the inevitable unpredictability and the discrepancies of the judgments of the denazifiers. In the murk and misery, the intrigue and machination, of life under the tyranny, it was sometimes difficult enough for Germans to know who were the oppressors and who the oppressed. For the Military Government officer it was frequently all but impossible. Many of the rank and file who were judged to have been more than nominal participants felt they were being punished because they had been doing what they conceived to be their duty to their country and because they had sought to support their countrymen suffering at the front. The not unnatural reaction with many of

these was to feel that perhaps the Nazis had not really been so bad after all. Many even of those whose consciences were clear and whom the military government officers or the tribunals exonerated were nevertheless stung to recusance on occasion, not so much by the indignity of the process of denazification as by the quality of some of those who advised the Military Government officers or constituted the tribunals, and sometimes by the superficiality or irrelevance of the grounds for acquittal.

Above all it was the inevitable imprecision and uncertainty of a process that attempted to cover so much ground that soured the German attitude to denazification.

* * *

This chapter has so far been concerned with administrative steps to eliminate the symptoms of Nazism – the Party and its members – from the life of Germany. The treatment of the disease itself, involving the education of the young and the re-education of the adult could scarcely begin during the brief period of military responsibility. But a few first steps were possible.

On entry into Germany, broadcasting, the press, films, the theatre and other forms of entertainment were shut down and re-opened only under close military control. If this was done primarily for security, and to obtain facilities for the instruction and entertainment of Allied forces it was also intended later to play its part in adult re-education. Until a separate net-work could be arranged a quarter of broadcasting time was allotted to the civil population. Relayed broadcasts from external sources were the rule but it was planned to increase German-originated broadcasts. A limited number of newspapers were produced by German editorial staff under close control. It was planned to license German-controlled newspapers under conditions, but this stage was, in fact, not reached in the British zone until January 1946, by which time military responsibility had largely evaporated. Other media of information would be gradually revived under the strictest practicable censorship. All media were harnessed to the needs of propaganda and were required to co-operate in destroying Nazism, to convince the Germans that their troubles had been brought upon them by their own people and governments and were well deserved, and to induce them to submit peaceably to the conditions it was sought to impose upon them. The creation of a healthy and independent press was not mentioned. Until political activity was allowed it scarcely could be.

* * *

As to the education of the young, the measures intended to disinfect and liberalize the schools and universities fell into two phases.

The first coincided more or less with the period of full military responsibility. The initial step was to close immediately all educational institutions, and to abolish a number of educational organizations and youth organizations specially created by the Nazis. In view of the particular importance of eliminating as far as possible all Nazi influences from the schools, denazification was stiffened by the use of 'Black', 'Grey' and 'White' Lists. The White List contained names of persons '... whose character, professional standing, experience and political reliability render them especially suitable to be placed in positions of responsibility...' The reference to 'political reliability' was perhaps unhappy in a document that, a few paragraphs earlier, had referred with obvious disapproval to the introduction by the Nazis of 'political reliability' (*Politische Zuverlässigkeit*) as a qualification for admission to certain schools and examinations. But then it is difficult to introduce democratic institutions when the first result of doing so is likely to be a vote against democracy.

The next step was to confiscate all text books expounding or reflecting Nazi ideologies and to instruct all teachers, in the words of the S.H.A.E.F. handbook for military government, to eliminate from their teaching anything which:

- '(i) glorifies militarism, expounds the practice of war or of mobilization and preparation for war, whether in the scientific, economic or industrial fields, or the study of military geography;
- (ii) seeks to propagate, revive or justify the doctrine of Nazism or to exalt the achievement of Nazi leaders;
- (iii) favours a policy of discrimination on grounds of race or religion;
- (iv) is hostile to, or seeks to disturb the relations between any of the United Nations'.

It was intended that, if necessary, emergency text-books should be supplied by the military authorities. As soon as these authorities were satisfied that the initial measures for the eradication of Nazism had been effectively taken the schools were to be progressively re-opened, beginning with elementary schools and schools for handicapped children.

There was little that was positive or constructive in these plans. Partly this was because in the first phase there would be little time for the application of more fundamental cures. Partly it was due to the determination not to attempt to remould the German education system from without. New ideas must be generated from within. It was precisely such external authoritarian imposition of ideas that the Allies had fought to prevent.

The second phase, supervened when authority began to pass to the Control Commission. The British Commander-in-Chief was instructed:

- '(a) to re-establish in German education the former standard of respect for objective facts and to extend this standard to fields in which it did not even formerly operate;
- (b) to foster in German education interest in the ideas of popular democracy, such as freedom of opinion, speech, the press and religion'.

The Commander-in-Chief was required to encourage the use by German schools of Allied educational broadcasts and films. Such broadcasts were not to be controlled by German refugees. Inevitably there had to be much reliance upon such persons. But it was not healthy that too many of them should be enabled to set the tone of relations between the Allied forces and the German people. Still, and for the same reasons as before, Military Government was required to avoid detailed intrusion into the German educational system.

* * *

One further measure touched the daily lives, both of the Germans and of the occupying forces, in a way that no others did. This was the policy of non-fraternization, the decision to send the whole German people to Coventry largely in order to express disgust for the bestialities of Nazism. The policy soon broke down. It is not possible to administer a country – least of all to do this indirectly – if it is not permissible to have social contacts with its people. But even had this not been so, the British soldier is a friendly person who cannot long resist children and a fireside. Discipline was not sufficient – perhaps no discipline could have been in the reaction that followed the strain of war – to prevent closer, sexual intimacies.

But while non-fraternization lasted there is plenty of evidence that it hurt. And there can have been few Germans who did not understand why they were being shunned, after Field Marshal Montgomery's message to the people of the British zone of 10th June 1945. The initial sharpness of non-fraternization may have done some good. But it had lost its edge even before it broke down.

* * *

The criticism has not infrequently been voiced that a chance was missed during the first months of the occupation of Germany of befriending the 'good' Germans, and through them of re-educating the country towards democracy. This is said to have happened because of non-fraternization, because of the prohibition of political activity

and of the incurring of any commitments to political elements, because of ruthless requisitioning of accommodation, and, generally, because of the lack of any positive policy towards the Germans.

That a positive policy was lacking is true. But otherwise the criticism overlooks much.

It is clear that at official levels the chance was *not* missed of making friends with Germans – the still-continuing friendships between many Military Government officers and their German opposite numbers are proof of this and one may hope, a source of encouragement to those who are seeking to build up a decent public life in Germany. The criticism is, in fact, that a chance was missed of befriending the anti-Nazi political elements. Now, there was in the first place the difficulty of identifying these. Then, when identified, they would certainly prove to be a minority. Many were Communists and more unpopular than the Nazis with the people of Germany. To be committed to supporting an unpopular minority would have placed the military administration in an entirely false position. The very fact of support from outside would have further antagonized the other Germans. And Allied opinion, though less hostile to Communism than now, would not long have stomached the support of predominantly Communist parties. The criticism assumes that re-education towards democracy was a proper goal in Germany. But many of the military government planners felt that the process of re-education would need to be prolonged, and that meanwhile it would be premature and dangerous to introduce the forms of democracy. In the later words of one of these planners:

‘The Germans are schizophrenic. On the one side they are charming, artistic, cultured, friendly, and peaceable; on the other, at the word of command (whether from Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hindenburg, Hitler *or* Adenauer) your best friend, your sister, your wife, your life-long servant will turn against you and do to you whatever has been ordered – without a qualm and without remorse . . .

The German race demands leadership; it does not want to think for itself, nor to shoulder individual responsibility . . .’

Until voters could be shaken out of their laziness of blind obedience, until political leaders had demonstrated their resolve to observe not only the idea but also the spirit of democracy, it was unrealistic to introduce democratic institutions and dangerous to expect them to work. At the day-to-day level of human contacts the ordinary British soldier (until he got to the stage of ‘being sorry for the kiddies’) was in no frame of mind to be friendly with Germans – or, for that matter, the Germans to be friendly to the soldiers. And there is unfortunately little doubt that the Germans would not at all have understood, and

... have taken advantage of, any general policy of denazification.

None of the matter is that most of these critics were from the left wing. Their idea of allowing political activity was to allow left-wing groups to revive, not the others. One of them, lunching at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre at Wimbledon is reported by one of the staff to have said that 'he didn't like our outfit because when we got to Germany, we were going "to put the lid on", instead of taking it off to let the Left have a go. I told him that the main object of our job was indeed to put the lid on, and secure it there with thumbscrews; and conversation then languished.'

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Lord Pakenham, then head of the Control Office, speaking in the House of Lords two and a half years after the German surrender said:

'Denazification is a horrid tiresome business at the best, and I suppose there is no Englishman concerned – and perhaps few Germans – who has not wished to Heaven at some moment that the whole thing could be terminated forthwith. We are nearly all agreed – or all who have gone closely into it are agreed, whether we are talking now of Englishmen or Germans – that some such process had to be gone through; some widespread process of that kind had to be employed if Nazism was to be extirpated from the dominant position that it had secured in the life of the people'.¹

Few would be found, whether in 1945 or at the present day, to disagree with the necessity for denazification. Failure to apply some process of screening would have been totally incompatible with the professed and just war aims of the Allies.

But if there is wide agreement that denazification was necessary, there is almost equally wide agreement that the procedures actually adopted were not satisfactory. The reasons for dissatisfaction vary widely. Many have been touched upon already in connection with the difficulties encountered as the screening procedure was brought into play. Many were peculiar to individuals or to particular times and places. But whatever the detailed reasons, the critics are mostly at one in asserting that while too many of the rank and file were penalized, too many of the important Nazis escaped. Wisdom after the event

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suggests that the net was cast too wide, and that the effort put into combing out the middle, and even the lower, levels of administration and industry would have been better employed in making sure that the leaders, especially in business and industry, were not allowed to escape.

In many respects it would, of course, have been better if the Germans could have denazified themselves. Not only would it have been reasonable to expect a greater consistency and realism in categorization, but the decisions reached would have carried greater conviction to the public and have helped to restore German self respect. The arguments for such a course were set out in March 1946 when the leading German officials in the U.S. and the British zones submitted a resolution to the Allied Control Council asking that Nazi war criminals should be tried by German tribunals under German law and not by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The reasons then advanced were equally applicable to the process of denazification. The officials pointed out that the atrocities for which the war criminals were to be tried had been committed not only against foreign nationals but against the people of Germany and that the latter had indeed endured these longer than foreign nationals. They said:

‘Judgment pronounced by a German Court will affect the German people politically in a manner which could not be equalled by a sentence of an international military tribunal. Considering the development of a sound German democracy in the years to come, the political importance of such a procedure will greatly contribute to the final denazification of the German people and cannot be over-emphasized. It will prevent the creation of a legend that the war criminals have, indeed, been found guilty by an international tribunal but not by the German people.

It is our considered opinion that the full extent of guilt will be revealed before the eyes of the world only if and when the crimes of the war criminals committed also against the German people will, through the sentence of a German court, find punishment.’

But, in practice, when denazification was entrusted to German tribunals the standards applied were markedly more lenient than those of the British adjudicators and so brought the process of denazification still further into disrepute. This delegation of responsibility might never have worked, even if it had been made earlier, but certainly it came too late to have any chance of success. In the words of one who was present at the time:

‘. . . the German denazification committees and tribunals have begun to operate at a time when the original enthusiasm for denazification has been largely replaced by a wave of disgust and cynicism among the Germans. This is sometimes mixed with fear of eventual revenge by those who have been found wanting

by a denazification committee or tribunal. More Germans than one would wish reckon with the possibility of a new nationalist regime.'¹

A distinguished and liberal German civil servant who held high office under Military Government was probably speaking for many of his compatriots when he said that it was one of the tragedies of history that no revolution broke out in Germany against the Nazis, even in the last days before occupation. If the purge could have been conducted in this way a few innocent men might have been strung up to lamp-posts – he might have been one of them himself, he said – but it would have been far better for Germans to have dealt with the matter themselves than that the Allies should have tried to sit in judgment. Denazification was to him a miserable paper substitute for a spontaneous revolution that would have freed the soul of Germany. But since the revolution did not happen, there was nothing for it but the *fragebogen*.

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CHAPTER XXI

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THE conduct of Civil Affairs in the liberated countries, the establishment of military government on entry into Germany and Austria, and the later imposition of quadripartite control in these two countries all in varying degrees, involved an assumption of supreme authority by Allied Military Commanders. In the case of Civil Affairs and the earlier establishment of military government while fighting still continued, this assumption sprang from the need to protect and support the Allied forces in their task of overpowering the enemy, such military necessity being recognized as sufficient justification under international law. In the case of the quadripartite military control subsequently established, it was a consequence of the defeat of Germany.

The formal legal basis for the exercise of the supreme authority so assumed was different for each of the three cases distinguished above.

In the case of the liberated countries it was to be found in the Civil Affairs agreements freely negotiated between the U.K. and U.S. Governments on the one hand and the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other.¹ All the agreements recognized a first or military phase during which the Supreme Commander would *de facto* be vested with supreme authority. All the agreements provided for the resumption of this authority by the indigenous sovereign governments at the earliest practicable date. In the proclamations issued by the Supreme Commander on entering the liberated countries there was no formal announcement of the assumption of supreme legislative, judicial, and executive functions. But in each there was a reference to his temporary assumption of supreme authority, couched in terms that accorded with the particular formula adopted in the relevant Civil Affairs agreement. It was the agreement, not the proclamation, that was the formal basis.

In the case of Germany the formal basis was Proclamation No. 1 which declared that supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority was vested in the Supreme Commander.² The basis for the later assumption of supreme authority by the Control Council in Germany and the Allied Council in Austria has been discussed in an

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earlier chapter.¹ In the absence of any sovereign government competent to surrender to the victors, supreme authority was assumed by the unilateral promulgation by the Allies of a document which required no German signature. This contained a declaration that Germany had been defeated, that her surrender had thereby been effected and that the Allies had assumed supreme authority with respect to Germany. The document was in the event signed and promulgated by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief on 5th June 1945, in Berlin.²

Two points may be noticed about this assumption of authority. In the first place it was made by the Allied Governments, not by the Allied military commander or commanders. The latter in fact signed the declaration but did so only as agents for their governments. In the second place, this assumption of 'supreme authority' did not amount to an assumption of sovereignty. That would have entailed annexation of Germany. There was a temporary assumption of all the attributes of sovereignty, which fell short of the assumption of sovereignty itself, in few if any other respects than that it was not permanent.

* * *

The assumption of supreme authority included assumption of the power to enact legislation.

In the case of the liberated territories there was no express recognition of this power under international law. It flowed in the last resort from the undoubted right of a commander in time of war to take all measures which are essential to the safety of his force and the conduct of his operations, and which are not forbidden by international law. It was limited in scope to what was necessary for these purposes. The power was not expressly mentioned in any of the Civil Affairs agreements but was, in fact, contained within the provisions which recognized a 'first or military phase' and provided that during this phase 'the Commander-in-Chief . . . will, to the extent necessitated by the military situation, *de facto* possess full authority to take all necessary measures.' The French agreement was more meticulous but to the same effect. The susceptibilities of the French Committee of National Liberation were well protected, but, in the last resort, and to the limited extent necessary for the safety of his force and the conduct of his operations, the Supreme Commander had the power to enact legislation. This power was delegated by him to subordinate commanders, with certain limitations. The policy, however, in all liberated territories was to abstain from the exercise of this power if there was any indigenous authority that could and would issue such legislation as the Commander-in-Chief considered essential.

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In fact, no formal major legislation was at any time enacted by the Supreme Allied Commander within liberated territories. The initial proclamations were in no sense legislation. They merely called upon the people to obey any orders which the Supreme Commander might have to issue. It is possible that minor local legislation in the form of rules and orders may have been issued by the military authorities here and there during the earliest stages. But even of this there can have been little, for the practice on entering any liberated territory was to have, ready printed, orders dealing with first needs, but only to have these promulgated and signed by the *Maire* or other local authority first discovered.

* * *

In occupied enemy territory the power of the Commander-in-Chief to legislate was recognized by international law to the extent that this might be 'temporarily necessitated by his interest in the maintenance and the safety of his Army and the realization of the purpose of war.'¹ It was explicitly assumed by the Supreme Commander in his Proclamation No. 1. It was the policy to recognize and enforce existing law in occupied territory unless international law, military necessity, national policy, or the proper conduct of military government necessitated modification. There were, nevertheless, many reasons why the Supreme Commander would be compelled to exercise his power to legislate. In the first place fresh legislation would be required in order to set up military government and to provide for the safety of the Allied forces. It would have been inappropriate and unwise to require this to be enacted by a German Government, and impracticable to wait until such a government had been uncovered. But in any case it had become clear that there would, almost certainly, be no German Government in existence to undertake any legislation at all. In the second place, it was a part of the declared purpose of the Allied Forces to eliminate Nazism, and 'the cruel, oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party had created.' This would require prompt and sweeping modification of much recent German legislation. Here again, and for the same reasons, the Supreme Commander would be forced to undertake the necessary legislation himself.

Under Article 43 of the Hague Rules an occupying power is required, in restoring law and order, to respect 'unless absolutely prevented' the laws in force in the country.² By announcing his intention to repeal Nazi laws the Supreme Commander recognized, by implication, and in accordance with the requirements of international law,

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the rest of the existing body of law in Germany. To the extent that he was not 'absolutely prevented' from maintaining the Nazi laws it could be contended that there was an apparent breach of the letter of the Hague Convention and Rules. But in fact these laws were to die with the collapse of Hitler's régime, and no German Government, if there had been one, could have continued to apply them. It is doubtful if they were then a part of the existing law of Germany. And any course other than that taken would have been inconsistent with the declared objective of the Allies to extirpate Nazism and militarism from the life of Germany, and altogether repugnant both to world opinion and to the wider interests of international law itself.

Military Government legislation took the form of Proclamations, Laws, Ordinances, Notices and Regulations. In fact during the period with which this book is concerned only the one Proclamation was issued, Proclamation No. 1 by General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. There seems to have been some confusion over the use of Military Government Laws and Military Government Ordinances. It was intended that legislation for an Army Group area or less should take the form of Ordinances but that legislation of wider validity should take the form of Laws. This was the principle adopted when the Control Council came into existence. But the first three enactments of the Supreme Commander after the issue of Proclamation 1 took the form of Ordinances, although they were clearly valid throughout his area of command. All subsequent legislation by the Supreme Commander took the form of Laws. Legislation in the form of Notices was directed to the inhabitants of a particular area and required them to take specific action. Regulations were issued under, and in pursuance of, a law or ordinance and were binding on persons accordingly.

The Supreme Commander's Law No. 4 established official gazettes for the Army Group areas in Germany under his command. This was later amended to provide for an official gazette for the British zone. In order to ensure the continuity of military government legislation, on the expiry of S.H.A.E.F., there was issued, in the British zone, Ordinance No. 4 which confirmed and continued in force all the Supreme Commander's legislation within the British zone, with such textual amendments as were necessary.

When the Control Council was set up on 30th August 1945 it issued a fresh Proclamation No. 1 announcing its establishment and providing that all legislation issued by the several Commanders-in-Chief in Germany should continue in force within their respective zones.

* * *

The legislation enacted during the S.H.A.E.F. period fell for the most part into three groups.

The first concerned the administration of justice and will be described later in this chapter. The third concerned financial matters and will be discussed in a later chapter.¹

The second and largest group was concerned with the destruction of the Nazi Party, and the elimination of its influence from the legal system and other institutions of Germany. Law No. 1 was designed 'to eliminate from German Law and administration within the occupied territory the policies and doctrines of the National Socialist Party, and to restore to the German people the rule of justice and equality before the law.' It deprived the fundamental Nazi laws of effect, and prohibited the application of any other law, to the extent that this would favour persons connected with the Nazi Party or discriminate against persons on grounds of race, nationality, religious beliefs, or opposition to the Party. The tendentious application of laws in accordance with Nazi doctrine was prohibited, and certain limitations were imposed upon the punishments that might be inflicted. In particular 'punishment for offences determined by analogy or in accordance with the alleged "sound instincts of the people" (*gesundes Volksempfinden*) is prohibited.' Law No. 2 provided for the suspension of all German courts, whether ordinary or special, until such time as the Military Government authorities directed that they should re-open, subject to such conditions as these authorities considered it necessary to impose. This law also provided for the total and permanent abolition of the special courts, namely the *Volksgesichtshof*, the *Sondergerichte*, and all courts and tribunals of the Nazi Party and its subsidiary organizations.

These three groups of legislation all consisted of enactments of the Supreme Commander. On the disappearance of S.H.A.E.F. the power to legislate for the British zone vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the zone. Of legislation enacted by him mention may be made of Ordinance No. 5, to provide for the trial of British civilians who had committed offences in Germany, and of a group of five ordinances issued on 15th September, 1945. These were Ordinance No. 8 Regulation of Public Discussion and other Public Activities, Ordinance No. 9 Public Meetings for non-political purposes, Ordinance No. 10 Political Meetings, Ordinance No. 11 Public Processions, and Ordinance No. 12 Formation of Political Parties. Notwithstanding the repressive appearance of their titles, the purpose of these ordinances was emancipatory. Nazi legislation had imposed prohibitions and restrictions upon public discussion and upon the formation and activities of political parties. The present group of ordinances repealed this legislation, exempted non-political meetings from the need to seek Military Government permission, set out the conditions upon which public discussion was permitted, and prescribed the procedure

¹ cf. Ch. XXIV.

would immediately have taken advantage of, any general policy of leniency.

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² Hague Convention of 1907 (reproduced in *Manual of Military Law*, H.M.S.O., 1940, Ch. XIV.).

the rest of the existing body of law in Germany. To the extent that he was not 'absolutely prevented' from maintaining the Nazi laws it could be contended that there was an apparent breach of the letter of the Hague Convention and Rules. But in fact these laws were to die with the collapse of Hitler's régime, and no German Government, if there had been one, could have continued to apply them. It is doubtful if they were then a part of the existing law of Germany. And any course other than that taken would have been inconsistent with the declared objective of the Allies to extirpate Nazism and militarism from the life of Germany, and altogether repugnant both to world opinion and to the wider interests of international law itself.

Military Government legislation took the form of Proclamations, Laws, Ordinances, Notices and Regulations. In fact during the period with which this book is concerned only the one Proclamation was issued, Proclamation No. 1 by General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. There seems to have been some confusion over the use of Military Government Laws and Military Government Ordinances. It was intended that legislation for an Army Group area or less should take the form of Ordinances but that legislation of wider validity should take the form of Laws. This was the principle adopted when the Control Council came into existence. But the first three enactments of the Supreme Commander after the issue of Proclamation 1 took the form of Ordinances, although they were clearly valid throughout his area of command. All subsequent legislation by the Supreme Commander took the form of Laws. Legislation in the form of Notices was directed to the inhabitants of a particular area and required them to take specific action. Regulations were issued under, and in pursuance of, a law or ordinance and were binding on persons accordingly.

The Supreme Commander's Law No. 4 established official gazettes for the Army Group areas in Germany under his command. This was later amended to provide for an official gazette for the British zone. In order to ensure the continuity of military government legislation, on the expiry of S.H.A.E.F., there was issued, in the British zone, Ordinance No. 4 which confirmed and continued in force all the Supreme Commander's legislation within the British zone, with such textual amendments as were necessary.

When the Control Council was set up on 30th August 1945 it issued a fresh Proclamation No. 1 announcing its establishment and providing that all legislation issued by the several Commanders-in-Chief in Germany should continue in force within their respective zones.

* * *

The legislation enacted during the S.H.A.E.F. period fell for the most part into three groups.

The first concerned the administration of justice and will be described later in this chapter. The third concerned financial matters and will be discussed in a later chapter.¹

The second and largest group was concerned with the destruction of the Nazi Party, and the elimination of its influence from the legal system and other institutions of Germany. Law No. 1 was designed 'to eliminate from German Law and administration within the occupied territory the policies and doctrines of the National Socialist Party, and to restore to the German people the rule of justice and equality before the law.' It deprived the fundamental Nazi laws of effect, and prohibited the application of any other law, to the extent that this would favour persons connected with the Nazi Party or discriminate against persons on grounds of race, nationality, religious beliefs, or opposition to the Party. The tendentious application of laws in accordance with Nazi doctrine was prohibited, and certain limitations were imposed upon the punishments that might be inflicted. In particular 'punishment for offences determined by analogy or in accordance with the alleged "sound instincts of the people" (*gesundes Volksempfinden*) is prohibited.' Law No. 2 provided for the suspension of all German courts, whether ordinary or special, until such time as the Military Government authorities directed that they should re-open, subject to such conditions as these authorities considered it necessary to impose. This law also provided for the total and permanent abolition of the special courts, namely the *Volksgerichtshof*, the *Sondergerichte*, and all courts and tribunals of the Nazi Party and its subsidiary organizations.

These three groups of legislation all consisted of enactments of the Supreme Commander. On the disappearance of S.H.A.E.F. the power to legislate for the British zone vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the zone. Of legislation enacted by him mention may be made of Ordinance No. 5, to provide for the trial of British civilians who had committed offences in Germany, and of a group of five ordinances issued on 15th September, 1945. These were Ordinance No. 8 Regulation of Public Discussion and other Public Activities, Ordinance No. 9 Public Meetings for non-political purposes, Ordinance No. 10 Political Meetings, Ordinance No. 11 Public Processions, and Ordinance No. 12 Formation of Political Parties. Notwithstanding the repressive appearance of their titles, the purpose of these ordinances was emancipatory. Nazi legislation had imposed prohibitions and restrictions upon public discussion and upon the formation and activities of political parties. The present group of ordinances repealed this legislation, exempted non-political meetings from the need to seek Military Government permission, set out the conditions upon which public discussion was permitted, and prescribed the procedure

¹ cf. Ch. XXIV.

for obtaining permission for political meetings, processions, and the formation of political parties. Such parties would not initially be permitted to operate on a wider basis than that of the *Kreis*.

* * *

Another, and most important, aspect of Civil Affairs and Military Government legal activities was the administration of justice.

For the liberated territories, no Allied Military Government was established and no Allied Military Government Courts were set up and there was accordingly no direct administration of justice by the Civil Affairs detachments. All trials of civilians, even for offences against the Allied forces, were conducted in indigenous courts, whether these were ordinary courts, or special military tribunals, acting under a 'State of Siege' or Martial Law. Civil Affairs merely watched for undue delay or any failure of justice and made their representations to the indigenous authorities. Of delay, it was in the circumstances inevitable that there should be a great deal. Of failure of justice, there are few complaints traceable.

The only exception to this rule occurred in Norway. It was the surrender and presence of more than 300,000 German troops, and the arrangements made for dealing with them, that introduced a new factor. Prisoners of war have a recognized status under international law, and certain minimum obligations in regard to their treatment are undertaken by all parties to the Hague Convention. These obligations include the provision of rations, quarters, and clothing on the same footing as the troops of the government which captured them. They placed no intolerable strain on British military resources, in regard to prisoners taken in the course of operations. On general surrender, however, the number of German soldiers falling into British hands in Germany, Holland, Norway, and elsewhere might run into millions. It would have placed an intolerable load on British resources, already stretched to their utmost, to accord prisoner-of-war treatment to German troops in such numbers. Further, it would have involved the anomaly that those who had for so long fed at the expense of the rest of Europe would now have to be maintained by their conquerors on a more lavish scale than could be enjoyed by the peoples of the liberated countries. It was decided that, while prisoner-of-war status would still be accorded to all Germans captured while fighting continued, all such persons surrendering afterwards would be placed into a new category, unknown to international law, of 'Disarmed Military Personnel'. These would be required to continue to feed themselves, but at the lowest scale compatible with the prevention of disease and unrest, and to continue to provide their own medical services. Their Commander would be made responsible for maintaining discipline, but

any person alleged to have committed any offence against the Allies would be tried by an Allied court. The general control of 'Disarmed Military Personnel', like that of prisoners-of-war, was an A Branch responsibility. In Norway it was decided, because of the international character of the problem and because of the equivocal standing of this new category of persons, that all legal matters concerning them would be handled by Civil Affairs Legal Officers, and not by the Judge-Advocate-General's department.

The question arose early of the arrangements to be made for the trial of alleged offences against the orders or the persons of the occupying forces or their Allies, or against other Allied nationals. The Norwegian Government was willing for such cases to be tried in Norwegian courts if they concerned Norwegian persons, property, or security. If they concerned other nations, and these were for the most part Russians, they did not wish their courts to be used. For the trial of these it became necessary to set up an Allied General Military Court and an Allied Summary Military Court. There had been no formal assumption of judicial authority by the Supreme Commander and the authority for the establishment of these courts must be held to have flowed from military necessity and the consent of the Norwegian Government. The need for such arrangements did not arise in the other liberated countries because at the time of the surrender either they had already been cleared of German forces, or these forces could be promptly moved back to Germany.

Delays were particularly heavy in Holland where the resulting long incarcerations without trial were in time felt by the Civil Affairs authorities to amount to a positive failure of justice.

It was the fact that no Allied Military Government Courts had been established in the Netherlands that led to the difficulties at Vught concentration camp touched upon in earlier chapters.¹ During the early stages of the invasion of Germany the German population from several villages was deported to Holland and placed in this concentration camp. To preserve order it became necessary to devise machinery for the trial of any offences committed by the inhabitants. Ordinance No. 501, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (which was in fact the first and only ordinance issued by this headquarters before it became Headquarters B.A.O.R.) provided that civilians evacuated from Germany in such circumstances and detained in camps, or elsewhere, under the military authorities, remained subject to Military Government legislation and the ordinary law of Germany, and to the jurisdiction of Military Government Courts if they committed offences within their places of detention. If they committed offences outside these they were liable to trial and punishment under

¹ cf. Ch. VIII.

the laws of the country concerned. The assumption of partial extra-territorial jurisdiction was much resented by the Dutch as infringing their sovereignty and was theoretically difficult to justify since there had been no establishment of military government or of Military Government Courts by the Allies in Holland. In practice, however, the only alternative was for the Dutch to accept full responsibility for control of these German civilians and this they were quite unwilling to do.¹ A few trials were held in Vught camp during the early days. Thereafter the practice was discontinued in deference to Dutch susceptibilities. The Camp Commandant was vested with disciplinary powers sufficient for minor breaches. In more serious cases proceedings and the parties had to be transferred back to Germany.

* * *

Once in Germany, the responsibilities of the Military Government organization in the administration of justice grew enormously. The indigenous judicial system was not to be allowed to function until it had been purged of Nazi perversions. Military Government Courts were set up 'to provide for the security of the Allied Forces and to establish public order throughout the territory occupied by them'. For this purpose Military Government Ordinance No. 1 enumerated offences which would be punishable by such courts. Many of these were already offences under the laws of war. Others, 'acts in aid of the enemy or endangering the security of the Allied Forces', of the kind dealt with under Defence-of-the-Royal-Realm, or emergency legislation, were created by the ordinance. The ordinance attached penalties which, in regard to the more serious offences, such as espionage, armed attack on, or armed resistance to, the Allied forces, killing or assaulting any member of the Allied forces, and unlawful possession of arms, might extend to punishment by death. Provision was also made for the imposition of collective fines upon any community on proof that its members, or a substantial number of them, were collectively responsible for any offence.

Courts for the trial of these and other offences were either General Military Courts, Intermediate Military Courts, or Summary Military Courts. General Military Courts consisted of three or more members, the lower courts of one member or more. Jurisdiction was not confined to offences under Ordinance No. 1; it covered also offences against the laws of war, against other Military Government legislation, and against the laws of Germany. Powers of Courts to impose sentence were graded, General Military Courts being authorized to inflict 'any lawful sentence including death.' An accused person was guaranteed the essentials of

¹ H. A. Smith, *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 4, 1955, pp. 140-145.

a fair trial, including the right to know in advance the charge against him, to employ the lawyer of his choice, to be present and to give evidence at his trial, to call and examine his own witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses against him. There was no appeal against any order of a Military Government Court, but every convicted person was entitled to have his case reviewed. The reviewing officer enjoyed the widest powers to modify the findings and sentence of the Military Government Court, except only that he was not empowered to set aside a finding of not guilty. No death sentence might be executed until it had been confirmed by the Supreme Commander 'or other head of the Military Government for the time being, or such other officer as he may designate.' The language of the courts was at first to be English. When it was known that the French would take part in the occupation of Germany both English and French became official languages.

No attempt was made to enforce the meticulous British rules governing the admissibility of evidence. The Military Government Courts were required to use their discretion and common sense. The complexity of the British methods would in the circumstances of the time have hindered the administration of justice and would have been unfamiliar and totally bewildering to the Germans. The simpler procedure adopted was speedy and was intelligible, since it was the normal continental practice. The effect was, in the main, that 'hearsay' or secondary evidence was more readily admissible than under the British system. In order to guard against possible danger the courts were enjoined to take the greatest care in admitting such evidence, to require generally corroboration thereof, and to exclude all evidence that was irrelevant or unfair.

While the German courts were closed there would be no other courts operating. When the German courts reopened Military Government Courts would continue to try cases involving offences against any order of the Allied forces, or any enactment of Military Government, or involving the construction or validity of any such order or enactment together with particular cases or classes of cases which might be excluded from the jurisdiction of the German courts. But once these were re-opened it was the intention to make the fullest possible use of them, in the enforcement of German laws which had not been abrogated.

From the earliest stages of the entry into Germany it was sought to build up an example of the manner in which justice should be administered, however difficult the physical circumstances. The first Military Government Court to sit within the British theatre of operations in Germany was set up at Gangelt near Aachen on 22nd November, 1944. The battle had scarcely moved on from the heavily damaged village. Sixteen Germans were tried for offences under the

Frontier Control Law. Sentences ranged from twelve months' imprisonment to a fine of RM.20. Two women were acquitted and a youth was awarded a suspended sentence of six months. A contemporary report describes the proceedings:

'The Courtroom in the Town Hall was a fair size, well adapted for use as a courtroom. It was excellently set up, with raised dais for the judge, and provision for the prisoners' box, and so on.

The flags of Great Britain, U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. were displayed.

The Court was conducted with dignity, and was well handled by Capt. Seddon, the legal officer with the detachment. He wore serge. All personnel in the Court were well turned out.

The cases had been well prepared.

The interpreter was good, and there was every evidence that the accused were able to understand and knew exactly what was being done.

Guards had been arranged from one of the Guards units, and made a splendid appearance, and everyone seemed to know and carry out their particular task well. Arrangements had been made for the Dutch lawyers, Charles van Oppen and Jan van Wessen, to defend. One wore his gown. The prisoners were satisfied with them.

The Press were present and to me expressed that they felt it was handled as justice should be, without fear or favour, and I am told that comment on the wireless this morning was good.

The *Bürgermeister* was told to attend, and did. He said he was absolutely astounded at British justice and its fairness.

There was, no doubt, apprehension on the part of the prisoners. I am told by the Public Safety Officer that they asked if they were likely to be shot.'

Every effort was made to adhere to the standards set in these early days, as the occupied area of Germany increased in 1945. But in the early months there was a tendency to inflict the death penalty for the unlawful carrying or concealment of firearms on disquietingly flimsy evidence or where the circumstances afforded little justification. The number of weapons in the country was so vast, the risk of their falling into the wrong hands so great, and the resultant danger so real, that this lapse from judicial objectivity can perhaps be understood, if it cannot be defended. Confirmation was withheld where necessary. In all, some two hundred death sentences were pronounced in the British zone during the twelve months following the surrender of Germany. On submission to Military Government Headquarters rather more than half of these were commuted. But in general the courts displayed a commendably objective approach to their difficult and often unfamiliar task. It often seemed, however, that nothing could undo the damage caused by the Nazis to the conception of

natural justice. In August 1945 a Military Government staff officer at 21 Army Group Headquarters noted: 'Neither lawyers nor laymen can get accustomed to the idea of the judiciary being anything other than a weapon for enforcing the political policy of the Government and for dealing with its opponents.' But gradually confidence grew in the impartiality of the Military Government courts. When a Polish displaced person who had led a raid on a German village was sentenced to death this evoked comment in the Press to the effect that 'the fact that the laws are applied to their full extent to the citizens of the United Nations serves to re-awaken the sense of justice among the German people.'¹

Two factors that might have undermined the attempts to restore a rule of law do not appear to have carried such weight during these early months as might have been expected. One, the prevalence of looting by British troops, and the almost complete failure to punish this, seems to have been accepted as an inevitable concomitant of war and occupation. The other, was the partial exemption of Allied persons in Germany from the operation of the law. There was at first, for example, no effective way of bringing civilians employed by Military Government to trial for any offences committed. And when means were provided they were not used. And since German courts, civil as well as criminal, had no jurisdiction over members or followers of the Allied forces, there was at first no means by which Germans could claim compensation for damage caused by military or civil employees of the Allies.² This placing of individuals out of reach of the law was later to become a major irritant.

Nevertheless it was generally felt by Military Government officers, and there is much testimony from Germans, that the administration of criminal justice by the Military Government courts was one of the most successful aspects of the work of the occupation forces.

* * *

Meanwhile, all German courts were to be closed under Military Government Law No. 2. In fact they had already been forced to close by the anarchy of defeat. But the law controlled their re-opening. The objectionable Special Courts, Party Courts, or Tribunals which had been incorporated in the judicial system by the Nazi Party, were to be abolished. Ordinary civil and criminal courts were to be re-opened in due course, subject to certain general limitations of jurisdiction, to the grant of permission by Military Government and to the imposition of any special limitations. These consisted of *Amtsgerichte*, of which there were some two thousand in the whole of Germany. Above these

¹ Wiener Library, *Europe 1945*, Vol. I, p. 6.

² Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany*, London, 1947, pp. 175-178.

were some 180 *Landgerichte*, courts both of first instance and of appeal. At a higher level still, were the *Oberlandesgerichte*, appellate courts numbering thirty-four. Of these, seven fell within the British zone, the *Oberlandesgerichte* of Kiel, Hamburg, Oldenburg, Braunschweig, Celle, Düsseldorf, and Köln. The Supreme Court, the *Reichsgericht*, sat in Leipzig.

It was the intention to grant permission for the re-opening of these courts as soon as the judges and the lawyers required for their functioning were considered to have been adequately purged of Nazis. This was to be effected by prompt and especially searching application of the ordinary procedures for denazification. There could, of course, be no re-opening of the *Reichsgericht* until some sort of central administration had been reconstructed.

Once the courts had been re-opened, every judge, prosecutor, notary or lawyer was required, before being permitted to act, to take the following oath:

‘I swear by Almighty God that I will at all times apply and administer the law without fear or favour and with justice and equity to all persons of whatever creed, race, colour or political opinion they may be, that I will obey the laws of Germany and all enactments of the Military Government in spirit as well as in letter, and will constantly endeavour to establish equal justice under the law for all persons. So help me God.’

It was provided that any person taking this oath was thereby released from the obligations of any previous oath of office.

The first German courts to be re-opened in the British Zone were the *Amtsgericht* and *Landgericht* in Hanover, on 1st June. In all, two *Landgerichte* and nine *Amtsgerichte* were opened during the month. In July four *Landgerichte* were opened and forty-two *Amtsgerichte*. In August the figures were fourteen and eighty-five, and in addition one *Oberlandesgericht* was re-opened. The rate of further progress was now conditioned only by the speed of denazification. These courts not only enforced the criminal law; they dispensed civil justice as between Germans. But against members and followers of the Allied forces, who were excluded from the jurisdiction of the indigenous courts, Germans could not file claims for compensation, until the establishment of the Control Commission Claims Panel in the British Zone in May 1947. And even this was an administrative, not a judicial tribunal, many kinds of claims, e.g. claims for non-fulfilment of private contractual and domestic obligations, and bastardy claims, were excluded, and any compensation awarded was to be paid from German public funds.

It was however a main object of the western Allies to re-establish a rule of law in Germany. For this perhaps the most important require-

ment was that the courts should be, and should be known to be, free from executive interference. It was largely by such interference that the Nazis had established their vicious hold over the country. Nevertheless it was an inescapable incident of the establishment of a military government in enemy territory, and inevitable until the courts had shown their readiness to administer the law with impartiality, that power of control and supervision should be retained by the Military Government authorities. The paradox that those who wished to build up the independence of the judiciary had to begin by assuming unlimited powers of interference was merely a part of the greater inconsistency that those who hoped to establish a democracy had to begin by excluding from public and official life those whom the majority of the country would probably have chosen as their leaders. Power was retained to dismiss or suspend judges or officers of the courts, to attend proceedings, to call for records, to review decisions, to transfer cases, and to control the administration of courts. On review it was permissible '... to modify, suspend, commute or otherwise modify any finding sentence or judgment...' No sentence of death was to be carried out without the consent of Military Government. Had a central Ministry of Justice been reconstituted it would have been used as the channel for control. In the absence of the Ministry, and of the *Reichsgericht*, it was planned to use the *Oberlandesgerichte* as soon as these could be re-opened. Until then direct control of individual courts had to be exercised at lower levels.

The responsibility for the exercise of these far-reaching powers lay at first upon the legal staff of 21 Army Group Military Government Headquarters. But few of the German courts had come into full operation before responsibility for this function passed, on 27th July, 1945, to the British element of the Control Commission. Control was therefore exercised virtually from the start, through the Legal Division of the British element. The detailed manner of its exercise accordingly falls beyond the scope of this book.

If there was to be any hope of the creation of an independent judiciary and of a rule of law, the control exercised must seek to persuade Germans of its good faith, by the purpose, by the infrequency, and by the essentially temporary nature of its interventions. The power to exercise administrative control over budgets and personnel was, of necessity, freely used in the early months. The power to inspect the working of courts and to review their decisions was also freely exercised, but of interference there was surprisingly little. The power to dismiss judges or to disbar lawyers, was used scarcely, if at all. But whether the powers were actually exercised or not, German judges had fundamentally no security of tenure, since they held office at the pleasure of the Control Commission. In theory, therefore, there could be no independence of the judiciary. In practice, it is permissible to

doubt whether this followed quite so inexorably, if the judges and their controllers were both working with sincerity to the same end, to restore the rule of law and administer it without fear or favour. That such a common purpose did indeed exist is strongly suggested by the remarkable confidence that in fact grew up between the British and the German legal administrators.

* * *

The Supreme Commander was required to arrest and hold '... for investigation and subsequent disposition...' all persons suspected of having committed war crimes. Responsibility for the actual arrest of such persons lay upon the Military Government staffs, with the assistance of the Counter-Intelligence Corps. But the further responsibility for investigating the allegations of the commission of war crimes was to lie upon investigation teams specially appointed by the Governments concerned. In regard to these teams the function of the Military Government staffs was to be to co-ordinate their work, and to pass to the appropriate team any information obtained. Only in Norway was actual investigation undertaken by the Civil Affairs Public Safety Officers, and then only during the early stages. It was soon found that this added work was too great for the already heavily-burdened Civil Affairs staffs. Special investigation teams were imported from the United Kingdom, as had been done elsewhere. No responsibility for the trial of war criminals was ever placed upon Military Government staffs.

* * *

For the discharge of the various legal functions described in this chapter a considerable staff of legal officers was necessary. This consisted of persons with legal qualifications and experience recruited from civil life or from other units of the Army.

The G-5 Division at S.H.A.E.F. was initially equipped with four legal officers. The sections undertaking detailed planning for particular countries, which were loosely attached to S.H.A.E.F., included legal elements that varied in strength from six officers in the German planning unit, and five in the French country section, down to one in the case of the Danish country section. The Civil Affairs staff at 21 Army Group included seven legal officers. The task of the planning sections, under the general guidance of the S.H.A.E.F. legal staffs, particularly in policy matters, and in collaboration with the Army Group staffs, was to collect the fullest possible information regarding the judicial systems and the legal problems that would be found in the countries for which they were planning, to seek the decisions of

S.H.A.E.F. on the policy to be adopted in those countries, and to draft the legal instructions and proclamations that would be required.

For the invasion of Europe two legal officers were included in the Civil Affairs staffs of First Canadian and Second British Armies. Legal officers were not at this stage attached to Corps. The normal Civil Affairs detachment included no legal officer. But an 'increment' of one such officer was provided for detachments at the headquarters of departments or similar administrative units.

On entry into Germany it was clear that legal officers would be called upon to play a more positive part. A pool of Military Government legal officers was held at Second Army Headquarters both for general legal duties in the Army area, and for employment in connection with Intermediate and General Courts. These courts were normally to be established at places where there had been a *Landgericht* or an *Oberlandesgericht*. They were, whenever possible, to include a Military Government legal officer as a permanent member. The review of cases handled by these courts was to be undertaken by the Military Government legal staff at Army Headquarters, except for cases in which a death sentence had been imposed which required to be reviewed at the 21 Army Group level.

In addition each Corps Headquarters was to hold a pool of four Military Government legal officers. Two of these were for work at Corps Headquarters, one to give legal advice, to undertake drafting, and to review cases, the other primarily for appointment as member of any Intermediate or General Military Government Courts that might be set up in the Corps area. The other two legal officers were for employment in the field as required with lower formations or Military Government detachments.

As the Allied forces entered deeper into Germany and the full extent of destruction and disorganization became clear Military Government detachments were so hard pressed with administrative tasks that they had to be relieved for a while of the responsibility for setting up and operating Military Government Courts. Special detachments were formed, consisting of legal and public safety officers, each of which would establish a court and a prison, to be operated in conjunction. One was allotted to Second Army and one to each of the Corps operating in Germany. These special detachments did valuable work during the early, fluid, stages. When the situation became more stable, and forces could be redeployed into their occupation areas, the need for them disappeared and their responsibilities passed back to the ordinary Military Government detachment.

CHAPTER XXII

COAL

IT is an inescapable platitude that the industrial civilization of present day Europe is built on a foundation of coal. But few of the European political units enjoyed within their boundaries, as these were drawn before the Second World War, sufficient resources of coal to meet their own needs, industrial and domestic. The rest were forced to depend, in greater or less degree, on imports. In the aggregate their normal annual requirements amounted to more than seventy-five million tons. The principal countries with surplus production that could before the war be utilized to meet these requirements were the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland. The yearly exports from these countries were of the order of thirty-eight million, thirty million, and eleven million tons respectively.¹

By 1944 and 1945 falling production had largely extinguished the amount of coal available for export from the United Kingdom. Until Germany was invaded there could be no access to German or to Polish production. When Germany was ultimately invaded this came about in such circumstances that there was still no hope of tapping Polish production. Shortages of shipping precluded any appreciable imports from new sources outside Europe, even if such imports could be made available. The indigenous production of the deficit countries in Europe, normally insufficient to meet more than a part, in some cases a very small part, of their needs, would certainly be found seriously, perhaps catastrophically, reduced as a result of enemy depredations and 'denials' and of damage inflicted in the fighting – to say nothing of the effects upon production of under-nourishment, lack of transport, and lack of incentives to work. It was clear that as the Allies liberated the countries of western Europe they must expect to encounter a coal situation of the utmost gravity. Furthermore they would inevitably worsen this situation by the demands they would have to impose upon the reduced coal output of the liberated countries for their own military needs.

In short, a coal famine was to be expected in Europe at the end of the war '... of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order ...' If such conditions were allowed to develop they would

¹ U.N. *Quarterly Bulletin of Coal Statistics for Europe*, Vol. III., No. 1, 1954, Geneva, 1954.

imperil not only the safety of the Allied forces, but also the possibility of re-establishing stable conditions at all in post-war Europe.

* * *

For the invasion of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway the only economic guidance given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander was:

‘You will consult with the Belgian [etc. etc.] authorities and render them such cooperation as is consistent with the success of military operations in order to enable them to re-establish the economy of their country.’

There was no explicit reference to coal. For the re-occupation of France there was no economic guide at all – the reasons for this have appeared in an earlier chapter¹ – but in fact the policy of the Supreme Commander was not dissimilar.

In the S.H.A.E.F. Manual of Standard Policy and Procedure the position, so far as it concerned the Civil Affairs staff, was expressed as follows:

‘Subject to coordination by the appropriate agency of S.H.A.E.F., C.A. Detachments will assist the other services to make use of the facilities offered by trade and industry for military purposes within the areas affected by military operations. They will take all possible steps to ensure that local agencies themselves restore the industrial and commercial life of their country.’

The Supreme Commander, in his Civil Affairs directive for Overlord, gave a slightly wider twist to these instructions. If the indigenous authorities failed to restore industrial and commercial life to a level at which they were of maximum utility to the military effort, or were unable to restore them even to such a level as would prevent disruption of local life to the prejudice of operations, then his Civil Affairs officers were authorized to take over partial or complete control. These instructions of the Supreme Commander recognized what could, in fact, never have been doubted by anyone, that military necessity would require, and would by the military authorities be held to justify, the harnessing, to the greatest practicable extent, of all the economic resources of the liberated countries to the Allied war effort.

Obviously one of the chief of these resources was coal. The governments of the coal-producing countries liberated by the Allied forces, France, Belgium and Holland, were to be given all practicable aid in reviving their coal-mining industries. Primarily this was because coal was directly needed for the movement and supply of troops, and for

¹ cf. Ch. III.

other purposes in connection with military operations. If sufficient coal for these needs could not be obtained from the mines of Europe precious shipping and other transport would require to be used to import the army's needs. Secondly, coal was needed for civil use in the liberated countries themselves, some of it to ensure to the people of these countries a standard of living sufficient to avoid disease and unrest, but more of it to make possible the production of materials needed for the prosecution of the war, which, again, it would be necessary to import if they could not be obtained locally.

In accordance with the general economic policy outlined above it was to be left to the indigenous Governments to revive the coal industry, unless in particular instances they showed themselves incapable of doing so.

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At the time of the invasion of the Continent two divisions of S.H.A.E.F. shared the responsibilities in connection with coal, both G-4 and G-5 having their own Petroleum and Fuel Sections. While the G-4 Section was primarily concerned with imports of coal for army needs, the G-5 Section was primarily responsible for giving effect to Allied policy regarding indigenous production of coal, that is to say for helping the liberated countries to help themselves. Early experience in France forced realization of the size and importance of the problem of coal production and distribution and of the vital necessity to operations that the Supreme Commander should assume and exercise complete control over the coal resources of Europe. As a result, on 22nd September, the G-4 and G-5 Fuel Sections were combined into the G-4 Solid Fuels Section, the purposes of which were to attain centralized control of solid fuels while there was a critical shortage of these, and to ensure full exploitation of indigenous resources.

Country sub-sections were formed for France (at Versailles, Lyons and St. Avold), Belgium (at Brussels), the Netherlands (at Brussels and Heerlen). Teams consisting of British and United States officers were established within important indigenous firms and within such indigenous control organizations as were found existing. Sub-sections were also formed for Germany (at Aachen and in the Saar).

As the S.H.A.E.F. Missions assumed Civil Affairs responsibility for liberated territories behind the battle area, the country sub-sections passed under their control, and the Missions, provided with the necessary technical officers, became the channel of communication between S.H.A.E.F. and the sub-sections. The weight of effective central control remained with the G-4 Solid Fuels Section at S.H.A.E.F.

* * *

It had been clear from the earliest days of planning that France's major problem on liberation would be the supply of coal. Of a pre-war annual consumption of seventy-five million tons, thirty million tons had been imported, mostly from Germany. The loss of these imports was inevitable for a considerable time after liberation, and must prove disastrous, quite apart from any shrinkage of indigenous production. But for the first three months after the invasion of Europe this particular problem was dormant. There were few or no railways to operate, it was summer, and the coalmines were still in the German-occupied parts of France. By September, however, the problem was forcing itself upon the attention of all concerned. The French mines had been uncovered, it was essential for the Allies to substitute rail for road transport in their enormously lengthened lines of communication, and for the civilians the winter was looming ahead.

The situation was at first sight reassuring. There was little damage to the mines and the stocks at pithead were considerable. Although shortages were reported from various places, it was hoped that reviving transport would gradually remove these. But production had almost stopped, many of the miners had disappeared, and, above all, there were none of the pre-war imports coming in. Nor was it long before another adverse factor began to make itself felt. This was the needs of the Allied armies. To meet these it had been planned to import coal from the U.K., 15,000 tons in bags over the beaches during the first forty-one days, 75,000 tons in bulk from the forty-second to the ninetieth day, (over which period it was hoped to release 10,000 tons for Civil Affairs needs), and 2,700,000 tons for the next 180 days, or a total of 2,790,000 tons for the first nine months of the operations. This estimate of needs was remarkably accurate for during the first nine months the quantities of coal handed over for military uses in north-west Europe amounted to 2,665,526 tons. The quantity so used in France was, 1,566,477 tons. But imports of coal from the U.K. to France over this period had not kept pace. In June only 1,039 tons had been landed on the beaches. In July the amount was 8,770 tons. Monthly landings increased as soon as an artificial harbour or other port could be brought into use. Cherbourg opened for the discharge of coal on 28th August, Caen on 3rd September, St. Brieuc on 16th September, Granville on 21st September, Rouen on 2nd November, Dieppe on 1st December, Le Havre on 4th December, and Antwerp on 13th December. But even so the total quantity landed in the first nine months was only 810,812 tons against the 1,566,477 tons used by the army in France. The balance had to come out of French production.

This production did increase through the winter, but even so it was a time of shortages and hardship. Many domestic consumers received no coal at all, and by the end of January the shortage in Paris was

critical. By February–March the total amount of coal available for consumption, including about 200,000 tons a month from the U.K., was only forty-three per cent of pre-war consumption. Of this total the Allied armies were taking about one-sixth, leaving the French with little more than thirty-five per cent of their pre-war needs. This had to provide for the very limited working of the railways to meet the needs of civilians.

In April 1945 it seems to have been realised that all was not well in the matter of France's coal supplies. A working party was formed to investigate in conjunction with the French sub-section of the S.H.A.E.F. Solid Fuel Section. A little later the Four Party Committee, which will be referred to again later in this chapter, appointed a Coal Sub-Committee. In May the Mission reported that as a result of these steps 'It is felt that a better understanding is now being reached between the French civil authorities on the one hand and the Allied civil and military authorities on the other . . .' It is not clear that they resulted in any increase in the amount of coal available for the French. Throughout the summer, when, in normal times, stocks would have been built up against the winter, the heavy demands of the Allies for 're-deployment' prevented any accumulation of reserves.

On the surrender of Germany the French immediately pressed their claim to a share of German coal. Just as the Mission was being wound up a beginning was made with the export of 50,000 tons from the Ruhr to France. Unfortunately at the same time 5,000 tons in the military import programme were diverted from French to Dutch needs and the French were warned that there might have to be further such diversions.

* * *

It seemed at first that the coal problem should be easier of solution in Belgium since the mines were essentially undamaged and Belgium normally produced enough coal for her own needs. But daily production, which at the time of liberation had dropped to 7,000 tons, was running during the first weeks at a level of 18,000 tons whereas 40,000 was needed to escape disaster and 60,000 to make a beginning with the revival of industry. Normal peace time out-turn was of the order of 100,000 tons a day.

The first limiting factor was the supply of pit props. Forestry companies of 21 Army Group reinforced the depleted local labour for cutting, and two 21 Army Group transport companies carried pit props from the forests of the Ardennes to railhead. At first 1,500 tons and later 2,000 tons were brought in daily. Operations were set back by the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes in December, but 21 Army Group cut and brought wood from forests west of the Meuse

and 7,650 tons of pit props were brought from the United Kingdom. In April the 21 Army Group forestry companies were required to move into Germany, but the Belgian authorities improvised arrangements. In the event production was at no time appreciably held back for lack of pit props – largely owing to the support given by 21 Army Group.

A second limiting factor was lack of transport to remove the coal raised, or even to get miners to work. A hundred lorries were sent by the Allied military authorities to Hasselt early in October to relieve the second of these difficulties. The first could only be met by the general rehabilitation of the Belgian transport system. When production rose in November to a daily level of 40,000 tons it seemed for a time that the transport system would prove unequal to the task of distribution. But the Ardennes counter-offensive of the following month and the strikes of February gave the transport system a breathing space and when, later, production really began to expand, there was never any failure to move the output of the mines.

In the course of November it became clear that a third limiting factor was apathy and dissatisfaction among the miners, for both of which, indeed, there was ample excuse. During the German occupation miners had received daily a supplementary ration of forty-five grammes of meat and forty-five grammes of fat. They were now receiving this infrequently, if at all. This was a physical handicap but an even more serious psychological irritant. From 22nd November the military authorities provided meat and fats to meet this supplementary ration until the Belgian authorities were in a position to honour it themselves. This injection of calories resulted in an immediate improvement in morale and production. Wages were also raised. But something more was needed. In the words of the Head of the Mission:

‘The further incentive required was “consumer goods” to buy with their money – particularly clothing and dresses for their wives. We brought in nylon stockings, good shoes, dresses, underclothing, bicycles, and trinkets of all sorts. The wives made their husbands work much harder to procure these consumer goods.’

Strikes in January caused the fall of the Government in February. The new Government displayed far more determination to govern, and there followed a marked improvement in production. There were serious strikes again in May, and also later, but the corner had been turned.

During the German occupation some twenty-three thousand foreign workers had been employed in Belgium, most of them in the mines. These had escaped or been withdrawn as the Germans departed. In April five hundred German prisoners of war under British guards were made available to take their place in the mines. Later, arrangements

were made to increase this number to fifteen thousand, who should be handed over to the Belgian Government for custody. At the same time the Belgian Government began largely unsuccessful attempts to recruit up to forty thousand miners from Polish displaced persons found in Germany.

In December it was realized that lack of transport was not the only obstacle to satisfactory distribution. The official price of coal at the pithead was 350 francs a ton. In the black market in Brussels it could be sold for 5,000 francs, in Ghent for 6,000, sometimes for more, rates that represented some £30 a ton when the price of domestic coal in the U.K. was of the order of £4 or less. The *Comptoir Belge de Charbon*, or Cobechar, which controlled the distribution of coal, was the servant not the master of the mining companies. It is not surprising that there was theft of coal and extensive leakage to the infinitely more profitable black market. In December the Mission formed a Coal Distribution Section (Belgium), known as Codisec. This gradually established control of coal stocks in depots and on trains, barges and road transport. The Civil Affairs staff did what it could to supervise the civilian distribution agencies. In the four and a half months of its existence before it handed over to a comparable organization, the *Section Distribution de Charbon*, or Sedichar, created by the Belgian Government, Codisec achieved a remarkable measure of success.

In February many domestic consumers received their first allocation of coal for months. In March there was enough coal to make a beginning with the revival of certain industries. By June there was further improvement still.

Since Belgium was virtually self sufficient in coal no provision had been made in Plan A for imports. Nevertheless, over the period October 1944 to February 1945, the Allied authorities took from Belgium for military needs 975,638 tons of coal out of a production of 4,554,000 tons, representing twenty-five per cent of merchantable production. By the close of this period production had risen to forty-nine per cent of normal. After the military authorities had taken their cut, this left, say thirty-five per cent of normal production for civilian needs. The Belgian people here made a very notable contribution to the prosecution of the war.

* * *

Normal peacetime requirements of coal for the Netherlands amounted to some eighteen million tons per annum of which thirteen and a half million tons were obtained from Dutch mines in the south of Limburg. The remaining four and a half million were imported from Germany and Wales. In Holland any deficiency held peculiar danger for coal was needed to generate electricity required for the

pumping and draining of the immense areas that lay below the level of the sea. Without coal it was literally true that much of the country could not continue to exist at all. No provision was made in the Plan A estimates for the import of coal by the Allied military authorities.

On liberation the Limburg mines were found essentially undamaged although much equipment had become unserviceable, or been deliberately damaged, or looted. By November indigenous production was running at barely one fifth of normal out-turn. This, however, was more than sufficient for the needs of the areas of Holland so far liberated. But its movement to those areas was a matter of the very greatest difficulty. The transport systems of Belgium and of liberated Holland had suffered severe damage. The normal routes ran through or near battle areas and cut right across the army's already overloaded lines of communication. Much of the liberated area of Holland was more accessible from some of the Belgian mining areas, and Dutch coal could be moved more easily into Belgium. An agreement was accordingly reached between the Dutch and Belgian governments under which the whole of the minimum requirements of the liberated Dutch territories, other than the mining areas in south Limburg, would be supplied from Belgian mines, while an equivalent proportion of the output of the Dutch mines would be exported to Belgium. Unfortunately, when it came to the point, Belgium was herself in the throes of a coal crisis and these arrangements brought little relief to Holland. Arrangements were then made for the movement of 2,000 tons *per diem* by barge from Limburg to the other liberated provinces. 21 Army Group agreed to the movement of 5,000 tons by rail until the barges began to arrive.

From March onwards as the whole of Holland was liberated the requirements for coal leaped up and it was production not transport that was the limiting factor. Unfortunately at this stage signs appeared of serious dissatisfaction among the Dutch mine workers and all attempts, including the provision of more consumer goods on which miners could spend their wages, to raise production above a level of some 15,000 tons *per diem* – one third only of pre-war production – were abortive. It was not until the surrender of Germany and the liberation of the densely populated industrial provinces of North and South Holland, however, that the problem stood revealed in its full unpleasantness. The economy of the country was dependent upon an output of 45,000 *per diem* from the Dutch mines together with imports of four and a half million tons *per annum*. It was quite uncertain whether imports would be obtainable from German, or any other sources, and indigenous production was running at no more than 15,000 tons *per diem*. Furthermore, over the period October 1944 to March 1945 military needs had consumed some fifteen per cent to twenty-five per cent of merchantable production.

The Head of the Mission concluded that the main reason for poor production was lack of confidence among miners in the mine Directors on the grounds that 'the Directors have not been fully purged and have shown themselves unappreciative of the need for new conditions in the post-war world.' The position of the Directors had been rendered difficult by a confusing compromise between private and state control; before the war some mines belonged to the state and some were owned by private companies, but now it seemed that one system or the other should be adopted and he did not think the miners would tolerate a return to private enterprise. Additional reasons for the failure to improve production were the lack of certain technical supplies, shortage of pit-props, lack of transport—particularly of personal transport for miners, and lack of other amenities such as clothing, beer, tobacco and consumer goods in general. On 14th June the Head of the Mission addressed the Minister-President of the Netherlands Government, which had recently arrived from London, drawing attention to these findings and suggesting action that could be taken both by the civil government and by the Allied military authorities to ease the situation. In particular he suggested that the Government's policy and organization for dealing with the mines needed clarification.

There stands out clearly from the preceding sections the important contribution made by France, Belgium, and Holland to the conduct of the Allied military operations, a contribution that imposed harsh restrictions upon the revival of industry and virtually total denial of fuel for domestic purposes through the winter.

* * *

The formulation of the policy to be pursued towards Germany followed a different and more complicated course. In an economic guide issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the military government of Germany before surrender the Supreme Commander was instructed that:

'... In areas where there are no military operations in progress, when practicable and consistent with military necessity you should:

(a) ...

(b) instruct the German authorities to maintain coal mines in working condition and in full operation so far as transport will permit.'

On 10th September 1944 the Supreme Commander issued an interim directive to his Army Group Commanders. But there was no mention whatever of coal. The reason for this omission was that in the meantime

President Roosevelt, carried away by the Morgenthau Plan, had¹ signified his disapproval of many of the policies, particularly the economic policies, contained in the draft seen by him of the S.H.A.E.F. handbook for military government in Germany. Under the Morgenthau Plan the coal mines of Germany were to be closed and stripped of their equipment and the Allied Military Government "shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as . . . production, reconstruction . . . or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations."² The Germans were to be deprived of everything that could give them the power to make war and were to be made to save themselves by their own efforts from the predicament into which they had fallen or been brought. Unfortunately the resources for making modern war included most of the resources required for the survival of Germany in peace, and the results of economic collapse could not be confined to Germany, but would bring down also many of Germany's neighbours. The Supreme Commander was required to amend the handbook and his interim directive accordingly. He was told, on 6th October, that

'he was to take no steps towards rehabilitating the German economy unless imperatively required by military necessity.'

Instructions issued by 21 Army Group on 8th October 1944 incorporated these policies.

Meanwhile on 17th September 1944 the Supreme Commander received an interim directive for his guidance if Germany collapsed or was defeated or surrendered before it had become possible to reach tripartite agreement on the post-surrender policies to be followed in that case. Parts of the economic directive then received ran:

'No steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany are to be undertaken unless and until further directed. Except as otherwise directed you will not assume responsibility for such economic problems as . . . production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy . . .'

So matters remained for several months.

But at last realism returned. On 21st April, 1945 the Combined Production and Resources Board in America drew the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the critical coal position in north-west Europe and to the urgent necessity for reviving coal production in Germany 'by every step however drastic.' On 7th June an Anglo-

¹ cf. Ch. XI.

² Morgenthau, *Germany is our Problem*, New York, 1945.

American Mission, which came to be known, from the names of its Chief American and British members, as the Potter/Hyndley Mission, reported that '... unless immediate and drastic steps are taken, there will occur in North West Europe and the Mediterranean next winter a coal famine of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order, and thus delay any chances of reasonable stability.' The Mission went on to recommend '... that Western Germany is to make available for export a minimum of ten million tons during 1945, and a further fifteen million tons by the end of April, 1946. It should be made clear that this amount must be made available irrespective of the consequences to Germany, and irrespective of plans for other industries or the internal economy of Germany, and that any action deemed necessary by the Zone Commander to deal with any unemployment or unrest which may result will be fully supported.' In the body of its report the Mission made clear what they thought the consequences to Germany might be, saying '... if acute unrest is to take place somewhere, as would seem inevitable unless coal is made available, it would surely be better for this to occur in Germany than elsewhere. Should it become necessary to preserve order by shooting, this would best occur in Germany.' Even before the recommendations of the Potter/Hyndley report were known it had become clear to those on the ground that the damage to the German transportation system would make it quite impossible to move away from the mines coal on the scale called for. In this respect the report was clearly unrealistic, and was seen at the time by many to be unrealistic. But the overwhelmingly valuable service rendered by it was to sweep away the Morgenthau thinking and to state authoritatively and in the clearest possible terms that the German coal industry must be revived and must produce the greatest possible amount of coal.

* * *

In Germany the G-4 Solid Fuels Section exercised control through two sub-sections; one at Aachen for the mines of that area and, in due course, for the mines near Köln and in the Ruhr; the other for the Saar. Control was to be closer and more direct than in liberated territories. For this purpose a combined Anglo-American field organization was created and placed under the sub-section at Aachen. It was known at first as the Rhine Coal Control. But since the plans for the division of occupied Germany into zones meant that coal would ultimately be in the main a British responsibility, the Rhine Coal Control was from the start predominantly British in staff. It consisted of a Headquarters, eight Coal Districts, and the appropriate numbers of Mine Detachments. It was initially under American command; in due course its headquarters was established at Krefeld.

The transfer to the British of responsibility for control of the major parts of the coal mining industry took place on 17th June 1945. At the staff level, a Section known as Headquarters 21 Army Group Military Government 7, assumed responsibility. The Rhine Coal Control became a British organization known as the North German Coal Control and the U.S. element of the staff faded out. A number of American, French, and Belgian Officers remained temporarily attached to the new organization for liaison purposes. The new body was formally a part of the British element of the Control Commission but was at first placed under the control of the Military Government Branch at 21 Army Group Headquarters. Later, control passed progressively to the appropriate division of the British element, in accordance with the general arrangements for the hand-over of responsibility from 21 Army Group. The headquarters of the North German Coal Control, headed by a Controller-General, was established in the Villa Hügel at Bredene, near Essen, the lodge gates of which had been opened to the advancing Allies by Herr Krupp himself, hat in hand. A few weeks later it was re-organized, being split into three branches, Administration, Production and Supplies, Distribution and Allocation. Eventually its three branches became Production, Distribution, and Finance, each headed by a Deputy Controller-General, under the Controller-General. It had under its command seven Coal Districts, five in the Ruhr, one at Aachen, and one at Köln. A Coal District headquarters included a military commander and a controller. The former was responsible for general administration and liaison with the Military Government detachments concerned, the latter for all technical matters. When a military officer had coal experience it was sometimes possible to combine the two appointments with very satisfactory results. The North German Coal Control also had under its command Colliery Detachments, augmented by Shaft Increments, each with a planned strength of 120. Its functions were to obtain complete and detailed control of the German coal industry within 21 Army Group zone, to ensure maximum production of coal by German labour and organizations, and to despatch coal in accordance with the allocations made by the S.H.A.E.F. G-4 Solid Fuels Section or its successor. At this level there was no doubt in anyone's mind, whatever the disagreements and vacillations regarding policy above, that there would be crying need for all the coal that could possibly be mined. In policy matters the channel of communication ran from S.H.A.E.F. through 21 Army Group Military Government. In technical matters direct communication was permitted between the German sub-section of the G-4 Solid Fuels Section and Headquarters North German Coal Control. This headquarters was under the direct command of 21 Army Group except that it was for a while

placed under the local military Commander for administrative purposes.

It, and the headquarters of its subordinate coal districts, were in continual close touch with the Military Government officers within whose charges coal operations were carried on. The maintenance of law and order, in fact all matters of general administration, were the responsibility of these officers. Coal production and everything concerned with this were the responsibility of the North German Coal Control. The original boundaries of the coal districts were later modified to conform with the boundaries of colliery companies rather than with administrative boundaries in order to avoid colliery managements being placed under two coal authorities.

Although control was to be far more close and detailed than in the liberated territories, it nevertheless remained, essentially, indirect. For the North German Coal Control had neither the staff nor the local knowledge to assume direct responsibility for operating the mines. Far better results would be achieved by employing German managerial staff, under the close control of the Military Government authorities. The German staff appointed were, understandably, eager to revive the industry upon which their own livelihood and the revival of the German economy depended.

* * *

It was not until after the German surrender that a serious start could be made with reviving coal production. And very shortly after this the combined Anglo-American Rhine Coal Control was replaced by the British North German Coal Control.

Immediately 21 Army Group observers reinforced the views already expressed by the Potter /Hyndley Mission, reporting:

'It is now evident that the shortage of coal in Germany will result in a very grave crisis. It is also evident that unless immediate steps are taken to mobilise and employ all available resources, both British and German, to facilitate the movement of coal by rail, road and I.W.T. the crisis will develop into a catastrophe.'

Some ten per cent of the mines were damaged beyond hope of early restoration. Some twenty-five per cent of the remaining mines were 'really seriously damaged' and scarcely a mine was unhurt.¹ That the official Allied policy at this time was still to undertake no economic rehabilitation of Germany scarcely touched this situation. If the catastrophe developed, it would suck into its vortex British military resources, that ought either to be transferred to the Far East or to be

¹ H. E. Collins, *Progress in Rebuilding the Coal Mining Industry in Western Germany*, excerpt from transactions of the Institute of Mining Engineers, Vol. 107, Part 8, p. 1.

demobilized, and it would favour the re-emergence of just those political ideas and parties which it was a principal aim of the Allies to eradicate from Germany.

The North German Coal Control, with the support of 21 Army Group and its resources, embarked upon an all-out attempt to revive production. A preliminary task was to round up and establish control over the bands of displaced persons roaming throughout Germany, but particularly in the Ruhr. Neither person nor property was safe from the depredations of these unhappy people, many of whom had been drafted to the mines by the Germans as forced labour. That they should use their regained liberty to loot and revenge themselves upon their former masters was understandable, but it made it quite impossible to start Germans working on the mines. This was a task for the Military Government officers and combatant units rather than for officers of the Coal Control.

Once order had been sufficiently restored it became possible to assemble and re-employ German miners. The number employed by mid-June was 117,000, but this had to be compared with a pre-war figure of some 330,000. The fall in numbers was due partly to the loss of foreign forced labour, partly to the absence of indigenous miners who had been recruited into the German army, and partly to scattering of the local population through bombing and the approach of fighting. It was essential and urgent to increase this labour force.

On 5th July a scheme for the speedy release of Class A miners from the disarmed German forces to the mines was put into effect. It was grafted on to the 'Barleycorn' machinery for the release of agricultural workers.¹ Miners were brought under 'Barleycorn' arrangements to Weeze near the Ruhr at the rate of 840 a day. From Weeze these men were moved under separate arrangements to camps in the Herne-Castrop-Rauxel area, the Bottrop area, and the Krefeld area. Here they came under the orders of the North German Coal Control which was responsible for their 'documentation' and distribution to mines where the greatest output per man could be hoped for – miners being sent whenever possible to mines near their homes. The part of this scheme which was additional to the 'Barleycorn' machinery was given the code name of 'Coalscuttle.' The total number of miners handled under this scheme by 21st September, 1945 was 31,852. Of these 1,382 were sent to the Hanover area and the rest to Weeze for the Ruhr. Gradually, with occasional setbacks, the labour force employed on the mines was raised to about 160,000 during the second half of August. Through September it increased to 178,686 and in October it rose to 188,843. But this was still far below minimum needs, which amounted to some three hundred thousand.

The most effective means of attracting further recruits were the

¹ cf. pp. 331-333

provision of essential consumer goods for miners to purchase for themselves and their families, and the provision of additional rations – which indeed was necessary also if the miners employed were to have the strength to extract coal. It was decided early in August that some essential consumer goods should be released to the retail trade under arrangements which would ensure that miners should be accorded priority in buying them. The struggle to maintain the basic ration, both in and out of the mining centres, has been described in Chapter XVIII.

Wages were a comparatively unimportant consideration in attracting recruits for there was in any case so little to buy. But housing was a major factor. A survey in the Ruhr showed that of 1,200,000 houses, 400,000 were destroyed, 320,000 were more or less badly damaged but repairable, 260,000 were slightly damaged, and only 220,000 undamaged. First-aid repairs to 420,000 of the less damaged houses were estimated to require 40,000,000 tiles, 231,000 square metres of glass, 17,000,000 bricks, and other materials in proportion. A labour force of 42,000 would be necessary, but there was a great scarcity of skilled labour. There was also a great shortage of the transport required. Above all there was a desperate shortage of building materials. Control of such stocks as were available had been assumed by the British military authorities. Up to the 17th August, 1945 no priority whatever had been accorded to the needs of civilians in distributing these resources, attention being confined to accommodating the British army, the remaining hard core of displaced persons, and what remained of the German army. It was decided on 17th August that the claims of the civil population should be accorded priority equal to those of the German army, and that it might be necessary to do more than this for the Ruhr miners in order to attract labour and increase coal production. Except possibly in the Ruhr, for miners and their families, no new construction was to be undertaken. The object was to give such first-aid repairs to existing houses as would make them weatherproof, safe and hygienic.

The technical keynote in respect to production was concentration of effort, in order to make the best use of the severely limited labour force and steel and other mining supplies available. The more severely damaged mines were not re-activated and mines of low efficiency were closed so enabling labour to be transferred to the mines of greatest efficiency. Within mines work was concentrated on the more productive seams, within seams on the number of working faces that could be exploited efficiently by the available labour. Repairs were limited to essential plant so that steel supplies could be conserved for productive machinery. Notwithstanding the many technical difficulties involved, it proved possible by these methods to raise the proportion of coal face labour from little more than twenty-five per

cent to thirty-eight per cent of the total labour force above and below ground.¹

Basic Allied policy, until August 1945, was that nothing should be done to help rehabilitate German industry. But the need for coal was so great that it was early realized that some import of mining machinery and supplies might well become necessary. In most cases it proved possible to revive German sources of supply. But there were imports of small quantities of vital mine supplies and it was possible to release small amounts of army supplies, e.g. clothing for the use of miners. Towards the end of August P.O.L. began to be imported to Germany for civil needs, at first by rail from Antwerp, later by bulk shipments to Hamburg. Directly or indirectly these imports helped meet the needs of the coal mines. At no time was production allowed to be checked for lack of mining supplies.

Throughout the early months of occupation there was continual anxiety regarding the supply of pit-props. Before occupation some fifty-five per cent of the needs of the Ruhr were obtained from areas that fell within the Russian zone. Much of the rest came from areas in the U.S. zone. In July two mines had to be closed for lack of pit props. There were no reserve stocks. Pit wood brought in one day had to be used the next. Minimum daily requirements were estimated to be 2,700 tons in August, 3,000 tons in September, and 3,500 tons thereafter, and even these quantities would not permit the building up of any reserves. Arrangements had been made for the supply of 1,500 tons a day from the U.S. zone beginning in August. Representations to the Russians yielded no results. The balance would have somehow to be found from the British zone which had not the forests of the other three zones. But, in fact, in one way and another, they were found. By the end of August stocks were 21,000 tons which represented some six days' reserve. Over the next three months the position gradually improved stocks rising to twenty-eight days' reserves. For the time being at least the crisis was past. The organization of the extraction of this timber and of its movement to the mines was undertaken by Military Government officers and the army services concerned. Much of the timber was carried in army transport.

But throughout the early months the main obstacle to production was not, in fact, the shortage of pit props, but the lack of wagons and the continuing failure of recipients of coal to return empty wagons.

As these difficulties were grappled with, others arose. Early in 1946 denazification figured in a list prepared by the British authorities of the major causes for the very disappointing output of coal. It operated in two ways. It gravely lowered standards of efficiency and safety by removing large numbers of skilled and experienced operators. But it

¹ H. E. Collins, *Progress in Rebuilding the Coal Mining Industry in Western Germany*, excerpt from transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, Vol. 107, Part 8, pp. 3-4.

also seriously impaired discipline in the mines. Few, if any, of the foremen, or others in authority, had not at some time indulged in acts that amounted to, or could plausibly be represented as amounting to, collaboration with the Nazis. Fear of denunciation by their subordinates inhibited their determination and undermined their authority.

In the first half of June the daily average merchantable production of all kinds of coal was 28,148 tons. Many collieries at this stage needed to consume the whole of their production in order to operate at all. (In normal conditions four to ten per cent of output would need to be so consumed). By the end of August output had almost trebled and the *total* merchantable production of coal for the month was 2,122,040 tons. By September the monthly total was 2,724,804 tons, by October 3,423,459 tons, and by November 3,730,181 tons. In terms of annual production (44,762,172) the last figure was still only one-tenth of 1943 production. But it was five times greater than the output of June 1945.

Of the merchantable stocks available in September 3,128,883 tons were allocated for consumption. The amount actually loaded for distribution was 2,629,994 tons, 84.1 per cent of allocations. The shortfall was due mainly to lack of wagons and it looked during the month as if it might well have been greater. Of the total quantity loaded 48.6 per cent was for essential civil purposes in the British, United States and French zones; 23.5 per cent was for military requirements in these three zones – the greater part for the working of railways and ports; 4.4 per cent was sent to Berlin for public utilities, essential services, and industry. The remaining 23.5 per cent was exported to France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg and Austria. Taking into account the quantities of coal consumed by the collieries, issued to cokeries and briquette plants, and consumed by miners, the quantity removed out of Germany was nearer eleven per cent of the gross production during this month. The percentage taken for export was similar to that taken for military needs in liberated countries. In fact, however, it represented, and was undoubtedly intended to represent, a very much heavier contribution, for it was taken out of a production, that was struggling to reach ten per cent of normal, whereas production in France was soon up to fifty per cent and sixty per cent, and in Belgium and the Netherlands to fifty per cent and thirty per cent of pre-war output.

Of the 48.6 per cent of merchantable production allocated to the three zones for essential civil requirements, three-quarters went to the British zone. Of the British share more than one-third went to public utilities and gas works. About the same proportion went to food processing, particularly of sugar-beet. The remainder was distributed between fertilizers, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, vehicles, tyres and rubber, textiles and footwear, building industries, other light

industries, iron and steel, heavy industry, laundries and hospitals. There was no allocation whatever for domestic use.

In regard to distribution, the policy of indirect operation of the coal industry involved the re-activation of at least a part of the machinery of the great German coal syndicates, in particular the *Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat* in the Ruhr, since these, as the German coal industry was organized, were the agencies co-ordinating production and distribution. Fortunately the North German Coal Control, entering the Ruhr close on the heels of the U.S. Forces, were able to seize the organization and records of the *Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat*, virtually intact. Many notorious Nazi industrialists had been members of these syndicates, and even the partial revival of these organizations provoked quick and understandable criticism, in Germany, in the U.K. and in the U.S. The political objections to any recognition of the syndicates were obvious and real. But the need for coal was paramount and the British authorities judged that they could not avoid using the machinery of the syndicates if they were to distribute any substantial amount of coal from the Ruhr in the coming months. It was hoped to counter or to forestall political criticism by removing from the syndicates their most prominent members, by changing their names, by modifying their organization, by restricting the scope of their activities so far as possible, by depriving them of all power to make policy and making them responsible, not to their old heads but to the North German Coal Control. It could fairly be claimed that the old syndicates no longer existed. But if a major catastrophe was to be avoided, the old machinery of distribution must continue to perform its functions of co-ordination.

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At this point it is necessary to turn back in order to consider briefly certain changes that were taking place in the high-level Allied organization for the control of coal distribution. With the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. on 14th July 1945 the authority of the G-4 Solid Fuels Section had lapsed. Nor, with the ending of active operations more than two months before, was it any longer practicable or justifiable to continue the supra-national military control imposed and accepted, with greater or less willingness, so long as there was a war to win.

At the supra-national level there was brought into being the European Coal Organization. This was set up as a provisional body in May 1945 but was not formally constituted until January 1946. Its functions were then established as being 'to promote the supply and equitable distribution of coal and scarce items of coalmining supplies and equipment while safeguarding as far as possible, the

interests of both producers and consumers'.¹ The organization was an advisory body without executive powers. It could only '... make appropriate recommendations to the Governments concerned and to any other competent authorities.' The members of the organization, however, pledged themselves to 'give their full co-operation to the Organization in the accomplishment of its task.' The member States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This body would in future plan over-all allocations and recommend their acceptance to the appropriate allocating authorities. These, in liberated countries, would be the national governments; in Germany they would be the several Zone Commanders acting within the framework of the Allied Control Council.

At the national level, the functions which the solid fuels section had assumed, namely the stimulation and control of production, the estimating of military and civil needs, the estimating of exports and of import requirements, and the control of allocation within national boundaries, passed back to the national Governments of the liberated countries. In the case of Germany it passed to the several Zone Commanders and the quadripartite Control Authority. Pending the establishment of this Authority and of machinery thereunder for the handling of coal questions, an Anglo-American Combined Resources and Allocations Board was set up under the joint authority of the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group and of the Commanding General United States Forces, European Theatre. A sub-committee of this Board dealt with the problem of coal allocations. The French military authorities were associated with the working of the Board, at first by liaison, later in full participation. On the establishment of the Allied Control Council for Germany and of the Coal Sub-Committee of the Economic Directorate, the Combined Resources and Allocations Board ceased to exist.

The functions of the Solid Fuels Section, transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Zone, for exercise under the quadripartite control authority, were at first discharged by Headquarters 21 Army Group Military Government 7 and the Economic Planning Committee set up at that headquarters. Later they were taken over by the British element of the economic directorate of the Control Commission.

* * *

By October 1945 the greatest part of the responsibility for the control of the civil administration in Germany had passed from the

¹ Cmd. 6732.

military to the civil authorities.¹ Through the closing months of 1945 and the early months of 1946, as the remaining military responsibility tapered away and the British element of the Control Commission increasingly took over charge from the Corps Commanders, the Battle of the Winter was being fought, for the survival of Germany and the preservation of order in western Europe. For the winning of this battle the mining of coal was of primary importance.

Yet until the Potter/Hyndley Report had been published in June 1945 and its principles accepted, the military authorities were authorised to do nothing towards rehabilitation of the coal industry except to the extent that this was directly necessitated by military operations. As a result of the Potter/Hyndley report the conception that the future peace and prosperity of Europe could be assured by wrecking its main source of coal was at last discarded. On 2nd August there was issued a directive communicating the new policy to the British Commander-in-Chief in Germany. In this he was directed 'to make available for export, out of the production of coal mines in western Germany, a minimum of ten million tons of coal during 1945 and a further fifteen million tons by the end of April, 1946'. He was '... to assign the highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximising the production and transportation of German coal...' Lastly, 'this requirement should be subordinate only to the civil and military requirements necessary to ensure the safety, security, health, maintenance and operation of the Allied forces and to ensure the speedy re-deployment of Allied forces from Germany.' Similar directives were issued to the U.S. and French Zone Commanders.

Under this directive, although production was to be maximized, no coal whatever was to be released for industry, public utilities, domestic use, or any other purpose within Germany, except, first, for the production and movement of coal for export, and secondly, for releases which, under the provision quoted above, could be justified as 'civil... requirements necessary to ensure the safety, security, health, maintenance and operation of the occupying forces and to ensure the speedy redeployment of Allied forces from Germany.' Field Marshal Montgomery at once asked that an 'adequate' interpretation be placed upon these civil requirements. He went on to say:

'In my view the provision of coal for military needs, for certain transportation purposes, for essential public services, for the manufacture of durable building materials and of sanitary and medical requirements, as well as for other basic needs, must in any case be a first charge on mine output. I do not think it feasible to keep industry suspended so long. A complete stoppage of this kind appears without precedent, and I recommend that

¹ cf. Ch. XV.

consideration be given to the implications of this directive particularly with regard to the creation of extensive unemployment.'

In short, the complete denial of coal to Germany would operate against the revival of coal production, would prevent the creation of any export surplus, and might involve an increase in the British forces which it would be necessary to keep and employ in Germany, and ultimately force the U.K. Government to assume a far greater responsibility for relief than would otherwise have been necessary, in order to avert anarchy and preserve the safety of these forces.

The U.K. Government had no difficulty in recognizing the weight of their Commander-in-Chief's representations. The U.S. Government was reluctant to weaken the directive, fearing that to do so would inevitably result in placing the people of Germany in a more favourable position than the peoples of the liberated countries. The U.K. Government authorized its Commander-in-Chief when applying the directive to exercise the normal discretion enjoyed by him, 'provided always that the needs of the civil population in the liberated territories concerned have preference over the needs of the civil population of Germany and that the general standard of coal consumption in Germany remains below that in those liberated territories.'

Full use was made through the winter of 1945-46 of the discretion conferred upon the Commander-in-Chief to make some allocation of coal for public utilities and for first aid in reviving essential industries. But it soon became clear that the exhaustion of the German economy was so profound that the removal of any coal for export threatened to deny it the strength to recover at all. Through the winter the necessity was discussed of closing down exports entirely. The argument soon soared above the level of the Corps Commanders, who were by now the only military link left in the military government chain of command. It was not until June 1946, by which time even the Corps Commanders' responsibility for the control of civil administration had disappeared, that the economic justification for imposing a complete moratorium on coal exports from the Ruhr was generally accepted. Even then, however, political reasons prevented the adoption of this remedy.

Under the directive of 2nd August 1945, the military authorities were formally enjoined to do what commonsense and vital necessity had from the beginning led them to do - to maximize the production and transportation of German coal. In the matter of production the strictly military part was slight, for the North German Coal Control was essentially a technical, and a civil organization, which passed almost at once under the technical control of the Control Commission. Measures of the kind described earlier in this chapter for stimulating

recruiting were continued. In the matter of transportation, however, the military authorities took a major and direct share, for without the aid of their resources of engineers and material the rehabilitation of the German transport system would have been a far slower matter,¹ with consequent restriction in the movement and availability of coal both for internal distribution and for export. The increase in coal production continued till January 1946 when weekly out-put reached twelve per cent of the 1943 figures. This level was held until lack of wheat forced serious cuts in the ration scale during March, the daily calorie content of the normal consumer's ration dropping from 1,555 to 1,050, and that of the miners from 3,400 to 2,864.² Production then dropped back to ten per cent. Through May and June it showed signs of rallying and did recover to the January level.

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This chapter may fittingly conclude with a different example of military assistance. At midday on 20th February 1946 an explosion occurred at the Monopol Grimberg mine near Kamen in the Ruhr, trapping 498 men, including three British officers, three thousand feet underground. The force of the explosion was such that it reached the surface, completely destroying shaft equipment and head structures. Trained rescue squads began work at once. Officers of the North German Coal Control including the Deputy Controller-General of Production, directed and took a personal part in the dangerous rescue operations. Men of the 9th Battalion Durham Light Infantry were on duty to preserve order. Many of these were miners in civil life and volunteered to help, but officials would not accept them because there were sufficient German rescue teams familiar with the type of workings in which the disaster occurred. An appeal was made to I British Corps which immediately threw in its great resources for digging, rescue, the provision of amenities and of medical assistance.

Fifty-eight men were rescued on 20th. Eleven dead were found underground and three on the surface. On the 21st morning eleven survivors were located in the lower levels of the mine, but no rescuers could reach them. Three days later, in the early hours of 24th eight of these men were nevertheless rescued alive. One more survivor managed to make his way out. In all 418 persons, including three British officers, lost their lives. Sixty-seven were saved. It was suspected that the lowered standards of safety resulting from denazification had contributed to this disaster, unprecedented in German mining history. It was certain that after the explosion there was only one man left with

¹ For the part played by the military authorities in the rehabilitation of the German transport system cf. Ch. XXIII.

² cf. Ch. XVIII.

sufficient knowledge of the mine workings to direct rescue operations and that he was so nervous and uncertain of himself as to be unequal to the task. It appeared that he had been denounced a week earlier by Communist workers and arrested by the Field Security Staff, and that, although subsequently released, he was still unnerved by the incident. The greatest fire-fighting expert in Germany had been arrested as a Nazi. He was released and came straight from gaol to direct the work of rescue.

A deep impression was made by the promptness and scale of the army's aid, and by the devoted and courageous work of the Deputy Controller-General of Production and his officers.

CHAPTER XXIII

TRANSPORTATION

IT is well to make clear the strictly limited scope of this chapter. It is not concerned with the creation and operation of the military line of communication, although there is an enthralling story to be told in this connection. That story includes the establishment and operation of the first beachheads, the construction of the artificial 'Mulberry' harbour at Arromanches, and the repair and operation of the ports, from the little fishing and holiday harbours of Port en Bessin and Courseulles, to Ouistreham, Caen, Le Tréport, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, Ostend, Ghent, and lastly the great ports of Antwerp and Hamburg. There was also the landing of motor transport, the clearing and repair of roads, the rebuilding of bridges and the operation of a road line of communication, at one time three hundred miles long, twice the length for which provision had been made. There was the reconnaissance, repair and operation of a rail line of communication from the neighbourhood of Caen into Holland, and then from Antwerp and the Channel Ports into Germany. This involved the repair or construction of over a hundred bridges, crossing the Orne, the Seine, the Somme, the Albert Canal, the Maas, the Rhine, and the Ems, besides many smaller rivers and canals. There was the clearance, repair and operation of the canals, particularly of Belgium and Holland. But these tasks were undertaken by the 21 Army Group Transportation Services and the Supply and Transport Service, not by the Civil Affairs or Military Government staffs. And although the latter were required to give their assistance when possible, and benefited, in common with the rest of the army, from the creation of the line of communication, there was little or no Civil Affairs or Military Government aspect to these operations. There is, accordingly, little direct reference in this chapter to the great achievement represented by the creation of this military line of communication – and indeed the present writer would be ill-qualified to do justice to it.

What might have been, and in part was, a Civil Affairs or Military Government commitment was the rehabilitation of the civil transport systems at large, outside the limited sectors essential to the operation of the military line of communication. But, in fact, in the liberated territories, responsibility for the revival of railways, ports, and inland water transport was left to be assumed by the indigenous civil governments, with such adventitious assistance as might accrue to them from

the fact that the military services required temporarily to operate a part of their systems for the realization of military purposes. The revival of these, accordingly, also falls outside the scope of the present chapter.

In Germany, however, since there was no indigenous government, the responsibility for the restoration and control of these services, which in liberated territories was assumed by the indigenous governments, rested upon the Allied military authorities. For its discharge technical officers were required of the kind to be found within the Transportation Services and it was obviously proper that the task should be laid upon them. But this was in essence a function of military government and the present chapter would be incomplete without an account of the manner in which it was discharged. And in order to give some idea of the setting in which this was done it has seemed desirable to include also a brief account of the earlier steps taken by the Transportation Services within Germany in the direct reconstruction and operation of those parts of the German transport system required for Allied military purposes, before these tasks could be transferred to the indigenous organizations.

Upon Civil Affairs and Military Government officers, however, was placed the responsibility for early steps in fostering the revival of road transport and this will be more fully considered in a subsequent section of this chapter.

An additional responsibility placed upon Civil Affairs and Military Government officers was to ensure, in conjunction with the other branches of the staff and services, the forwarding of relief supplies. This will be seen, later in this chapter, to have involved the creation of what was in some respects a subsidiary but separate L. of C. for relief supplies.

* * *

Although Civil Affairs officers in the liberated countries were not concerned with the technicalities of rehabilitation of the railways, the ports, and the inland water-transport system, it was a part of the Civil Affairs task to ensure that full use was made of local resources. Possibly the most valuable of these were the transportation systems of the countries liberated. In France sixty-six per cent of the freight carried by the railways in February 1945 was on military account, only thirty-four per cent for civil purposes. In Belgium at the same time a very similar proportion ruled. As in both cases the total tonnage carried was less than half the pre-war figure, it appears that the French and Belgian people had to manage with no more than fifteen per cent of normal use of their railways. Port capacity in France available for civil use compared even less favourably with that taken for military needs.

In Belgium, once the port of Antwerp had been opened, there was no shortage. It is clear that there was no failure to make use of indigenous resources. For the liberated countries, however, economic revival was difficult on such terms. The notable contribution made by them in these ways to the Allied war effort should not be overlooked.

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The revival of the indigenous road transport system in liberated territories presented very great difficulties. The Germans, themselves desperately short of transport, had taken away all the civilian motor vehicles they could, which were still in running order. Accordingly the number of load-carrying vehicles found on liberation was little more than a quarter of that which had been in use before the war. All vehicles were decrepit and many could never be brought to reliability. Until tyres, batteries, spare parts and repair tools could be provided, few vehicles were in a condition to undertake long hauls. An important step towards removing the tyre shortage both for cars and for the popular bicycle, was the re-activation of the Belgian tyre-factories, including a large one at Liège and another near Ostend. During the occupation these had been organized for the manufacture of artificial rubber on the German system. It was now necessary to convert these to the different American systems and to import American synthetic materials. This took time but the results were satisfactory. It was not until January or February 1945 that it became possible to begin importing these supplies, and even then it was no more than a beginning. No significant increase in the volume of road traffic was possible until new vehicles could be imported.

No petrol or lubricants were available except those brought in by the Allied forces. A proportion of these was allocated to be distributed for civil needs. Releases for civil use could not be large, but at all times the limiting factor was the number of vehicles that could be put on the road rather than the quantity of petrol that could be put into the vehicles.

Indigenous laws contained the provisions required for the control of movement but it was seldom that legal measures needed to be invoked for this purpose. Sufficient control could more easily and effectively be established by controlling the distribution of petrol. Such distribution was in fact largely confined to issues for motor vehicles requisitioned by the military authorities or for other specific needs in connection with the movement of relief supplies.

To meet the acute shortage of transport for civil needs there were various loans or transfers of vehicles from the military to the indigenous civil authorities. A hundred 15-cwt. trucks were lent to the Belgian authorities for transporting miners to and from work on the Campine

coalfields. Vehicles were released to the Belgian and Netherlands authorities for fire-fighting purposes. There were also handed over to the Belgians 114 reconditioned load-carrying vehicles that had belonged to the British Ministry of Supply. Reconditioned trucks were seldom strong runners, but they were better than nothing, and Civil Affairs were at the bottom of priorities. Some 1,300 vehicles and five hundred trailers had been handed over from British army stocks to the authorities of the liberated countries by February 1945 under the quasi-military arrangements for the movement of relief supplies to be more fully described in the next section, which will deal with the discharge of the Civil Affairs responsibility to ensure the forwarding of relief supplies.

It was laid down that Civil Affairs officers were required to ensure that military demands were met in regard to the hiring and requisitioning of civil vehicles and in regard to the provision of indigenous garage and workshop accommodation and maintenance and repair facilities. For most of the time they were far more concerned with obtaining these facilities from the army for civilian vehicles.

* * *

The second function laid upon the Civil Affairs and Military Government staffs was to 'ensure the forwarding of Civil Affairs supplies'. We have seen in an earlier chapter¹ the organization and procedure for calling forward these supplies, for their movement down normal military channels into the Civil Affairs depots and for their issue from these depots. The transportation responsibilities of the Civil Affairs service were normally concerned with the distribution and movement of these supplies from the Civil Affairs depots onwards to the indigenous authorities or to the Civil Affairs officers in the field. Movement into these depots was usually effected by the Supply and Transport Service. But there were occasions when Civil Affairs had also to move supplies from bases in the rear into the depots. Onward movement to the indigenous authorities could sometimes, but not often, be undertaken by indigenous civil transport. At other times it could be effected by normal army transport. Generally however there was no civilian transport available, and it was virtually impossible to obtain army transport, which had many other pre-occupations.

The limiting factor in regard to the latter was the number of drivers available rather than the number of vehicles. Accordingly in France the Civil Affairs staffs raised French motor transport companies, consisting of French civilian drivers under the command of French

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

military officers. British army General Transport companies could hand over their vehicles to these and so release British drivers to take over the reinforcements of military vehicles coming forward. This arrangement began at the time when French civilian drivers took over and drove parts of the British army convoys with relief supplies for Paris. Shortly after this five French motor transport companies were formally constituted and 250 three-ton lorries were handed over to them. By the end of September 1944 arrangements had been made for the raising of fifteen such companies and the hand-over of a total of 350 3-ton lorries, 450 15-cwt. trucks, and five hundred 1-ton trailers. These companies were raised and trained in France and were to be used for the distribution of relief supplies, under the operational control of the 21 Army Group C.A. Staff, and might be employed to move supplies from one army depot to another, from army depots to the French authorities, or from one French authority to another. They might also be used outside France, and four companies were in fact sent for a time to Belgium and five to Holland. Some spare parts and repair tools were handed over with the vehicles but maintenance was at first a French responsibility. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, particularly when the motor transport companies operated outside France, and in January 1945 it was arranged that the vehicles should be maintained under normal British Army arrangements.

In December the raising began of eleven Belgian and three Netherlands motor transport companies on a similar basis. These consisted of civilian drivers and were all under Civil Affairs control. In addition seventeen Belgian companies were raised consisting of military drivers.

In March 1945 the Belgian and Dutch companies, hitherto under Civil Affairs control, passed to the Supply and Transport Service and became part of the general 21 Army Group pool of transport available for all military purposes in accordance with priorities of the moment. At the same time responsibility for the administration and maintenance of these companies passed to the Supply and Transport Service. Only the French companies, the first to be raised, remained under Civil Affairs control, exercised by the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France.

The transfer of the Belgian and Dutch companies to control by the Supply and Transport Service in March 1945 closed down the separate Civil Affairs line of communication that had come into existence during the previous months. Theoretically suspect, as duplicating existing machinery, it was in practice of the highest value by tapping resources of skilled drivers in liberated countries. Because of the low priorities inevitably accorded to Civil Affairs needs in comparison with operational requirements, any logistical crisis tended to shut the main line of communication entirely for the flow of relief supplies. The subsidiary line of communication was often the only means by which the Civil Affairs organization could discharge its responsibility

to ensure the forwarding of relief supplies, and not infrequently the Civil Affairs line of communication was able to reinforce the main line of communication in the movement of strictly military supplies.

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The next stage in military operations involved the invasion and occupation of enemy territory. The Supreme Commander's interim directive for the military government of Germany issued to Army Groups on 10th September 1944 ran:

'It is the policy of the Supreme Commander to provide for the restoration and control of transport facilities and services in Germany, including railways, road transport, inland waterways as well as ports and merchant shipping in order to attain all military objectives and to meet such essential civilian transportation requirements as the military situation will permit.'

The reconstruction and the direct operation of railways, ports and inland water transport, to the extent that these were needed for the purposes of military operations were the concern of the military Transportation Services. The provision of military road transport was the responsibility of the Supply and Transport Service. In the absence of a German government the responsibility for the restoration and control of the German transportation system at large, to the extent that this was compatible with military needs, rested upon the military authorities until such time as they could pass it on to the Control Commission. In regard to civil road transport, this responsibility was carried by the Military Government staffs; in regard to other forms of transport, by the army Transportation staffs. Restoration and operation of the transportation systems was initially to be undertaken by the military authorities acting directly. It was planned, however, that at the earliest possible stage direct reconstruction and operation should pass to the Germans, and that the military authorities should act by controlling the German organizations.

The 21 Army Group plans for control involved the establishment of officers of the Movements and Transportation staff in the Ministry of Transport, in Area Traffic Offices, in the administrative regions, or *Reichsbahndirektionen*, of the German railways, at inland navigation centres, and at all ports. Regional control teams and port executive committees were to be formed for this purpose. Control of shipping would rest with 21 Army Group Movements and Transportation staff, in conjunction with the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport. Meanwhile a certain number of Transportation units were to be retained as a reserve for the direct operation of transport facilities in case of sabotage or civil disturbance.

Responsibility for the revival and general control of civil road

transport lay upon the Military Government staff. As soon as the structure and organization of the German controls could be ascertained, this responsibility, together with responsibility for the distribution of motor fuels for Allied and essential civilian purposes was to be placed upon them under Military Government control. Actual traffic on the roads would be subject to normal military movement control. Stocks of tyres and spare parts were to be taken over and issues brought under control. In the case of military stocks the Q staff would be responsible, in the case of civil stocks, the Military Government staff. Control of future production was to be exercised by Military Government, the Q staff supplying information as to military needs. It was expected that there would be a serious shortage of civilian transport. Only short hauls and local services, within a radius of one hundred kilometres, would be allowed at first. Longer distance services might be permitted later.

Responsibility for the repair of roads and bridges was divided: where military engineer services were available the responsibility both for direct work and for the control of German agencies was placed upon them; elsewhere the control and direction of German agencies was to be undertaken by Military Government officers under the general supervision of the military engineer services.

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To appreciate the magnitude of the task facing the Allies and the Germans it is necessary to remember the extent of the damage which the German transport system had suffered. For many months the Allied air force had been doing their utmost to bring operation of the system to a standstill by attacking bridges, rolling stock, marshalling yards and workshops, and by bombing to destroy and prevent the movement of oil. In the last weeks of the war the Nazis themselves joined in the destruction in the hope of delaying the Allied advance, or sometimes in mere frenzy of annihilation as they saw their doom approach. Albert Speer, the German Minister of Production, saved what he could but this was little. At the time of the German surrender, in the British zone of Germany there were some 1,300 demolished railway bridges, and only 656 miles of track could be operated out of 7,932 miles within the zone. Within the Ruhr one bridge was destroyed in every three quarters of a mile of canal. Elsewhere one bridge was down in every two and a half miles of canal. There had been seven railway bridges across the Rhine within the zone. All of these were destroyed. Some 1,500 road bridges had been destroyed.

The over-riding task during the phase of direct operation was to repair and bring into operation a line that would supply the British forces from Holland until this could be done by sea through Hamburg.

Since there was no bridge intact across the Rhine in the British theatre, the selection of a route was governed by the choice of the site for the building of a bridge. This was Spyck near the point at which the Rhine flows out of Germany into Holland. A railway line led to an oil-refinery on the south bank. On the north bank only a short length of line would be needed to connect with the Arnhem – Emmerich – Wesel line. The total length of the bridge would be 2,340 feet of which 1,905 feet would be over water. Work could not begin until 7th April because of the commanding position still occupied by the enemy on the north bank, but was completed on 8th May, the bridge being opened to traffic the following day, one day earlier than the engineers had undertaken. Meanwhile much work had been done on the line of communication forward of the Rhine. The first train east of the Rhine ran on 16th April only three days after the crossing. A motor transport ferry service bridged the river. Consequently, on the opening of the bridge, through running was immediately established to the Bremen area, 175 miles beyond the Rhine.

The conclusion of fighting brought a great change in the purposes for which the Transportation Services were employed. Hitherto their main task had been the movement and maintenance of the British forces. Now fresh and weighty commitments were incurred which had first to be met by the Transportation Services themselves, but must be transferred early to German shoulders. Allied prisoners-of-war needed to be repatriated. Displaced persons required to be transported across half Europe. The disbanded German forces required to be returned to their homes, or to the coal mines, or to the reaping of the harvest. German forces awaiting disbandment required to be maintained. German war material would have to be moved, whether as reparations or for other needs. Above all, coal from the Ruhr had to be carried away for the needs of the Allied forces, of liberated Europe, and of Germany herself. The whole of the transportation network now needed to be revived, not merely that part of it required for the supply of the Allied armies.

The waterway of the Rhine and the extensive canal system of north-west Germany, were essential parts of the German transport system. The use of the Rhine was at first impossible, because of the wreckage of the bridges destroyed by the Germans. It was further denied by the temporary bridges thrown across the river by the Allies; these were such as could most quickly be erected, which meant that their spans would not allow the passage of the great barges used on the river. It was necessary to blow up or otherwise remove the wreckage of the permanent bridges, and to improve the temporary bridges in order to make barge traffic possible. The river was re-opened to navigation by the Royal Engineers and by Germans working under their direction, by 1st September 1945. Damage to the canals was worse and although

repairs began at once it was not possible to bring into use more than a very small mileage during the period with which this book is concerned. Much of the clearance of wreckage was undertaken by the Royal Engineers directly.

British efforts to bring German ports into operation were at first concentrated upon Hamburg which was needed to replace Antwerp. Clearance of obstructions and salvage of wrecks were undertaken initially by the Royal Navy and subsequently by Germans working under Royal Navy control. The first ship discharged cargo in Hamburg on 8th June 1945. Other ports in the British zone such as Lübeck, Emden and Kiel, were cleared and brought into use mainly by Germans working under the control of the Royal Navy or the army Transportation Services. The opening of Bremen was an American responsibility.

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Until the Rhine had been crossed there could be no thought of establishing indirect control of the railways since few or no German railway employees were discovered. But once across the Rhine, German railwaymen began to be found. At first they were set to work under local improvised arrangements. It was urgent, however, especially as the need for reconstruction and operation spread outwards from the military line of communication, to discover the regional railway authorities, the *Reichsbahndirektionen*, to establish control over them, and to set them to the task of running their regions in accordance with 21 Army Group requirements. At first three regions were involved with headquarters at Münster, Hamburg, and Hanover. A part of the Münster Region fell initially within the 21 Army Group theatre of operations and this did not contain the headquarters town of Münster. Such members of the *Reichsbahndirektion* as were available were accordingly used by the U.S. Forces in Münster. It was only when the British found the nucleus of a *Reichsbahndirektion* in Oldenburg that a beginning could be made with indirect operation under a skeleton control team. At Hamburg, on the other hand, the *Reichsbahndirektion* was still operating at the time of occupation and a skeleton control team was installed at once.

Part of the Schwerin Region, of which the rest fell in the Russian theatre, had to be administered by the Hamburg organization. At Hanover most of the region was occupied by United States Forces and little could at first be done by the British pending re-deployment into final occupation zones. By June, however, *Reichsbahndirektionen* and their attendant control teams had been set up in Essen, Wuppertal, and Cologne. There was no longer any direct operation of the German railways by British Transportation Services.

The next need was to bind the regions together under a co-ordinating organization for, obviously, no railway could be run on the basis of disconnected *Reichsbahndirektionen*. Initially co-ordination was effected by the 21 Army Group Transportation Services acting directly. A German organization was needed, however, that would undertake the co-ordination and become the channel for Army Group control. But many difficulties were encountered. First there was the problem of finding the necessary German staff with railway and administrative experience. This difficulty largely disappeared when two trains were found in the Hamburg area, one containing much of the senior staff of the Ministry of Transport, the other some hundred railway officials. Secondly there was the difficulty of assembling an effective British control organization. Transportation officers of the requisite calibre were few and the ranks of these were being thinned by demobilization and re-deployment to the Far East for the war against Japan. Thirdly there was the background of complete uncertainty whether and when any German central organizations were to be reconstituted. Lastly there were all the difficulties of providing the German co-ordinating authority with an adequate system of communications. Not until 20th August was it practicable to set up a *Reichsbahngeneraldirektion* for the operation of traffic within the British zone, which even then discharged only certain limited functions. Concurrently steps were taken to set up zonal German co-ordinating agencies for railway stores and railway workshops.

In May, Regional Port Controls were established at Emden, Hamburg, and Lübeck. In the same month Inland Water Transport Regional Control Teams were established at Hamburg, Hanover, Münster and Duisburg but they were at first only at half strength.

Meanwhile, Military Government officers were establishing control over their field of responsibility. The German road transport organization was uncovered. It was revived from the earliest stages at the *Kreis* and *Regierungsbezirk* level and a little later at *Provinz* level. The duties of these organizations covered the routing of loads within their jurisdiction, the registration and repair of vehicles and the distribution and rationing of P.O.L. It was through them that military control was established. By the time 21 Army Group handed over to the British element, control on a zonal basis was well on the way to being established through a German organization that could in due course be incorporated into a central all-German machine when such could be set up.

The dissolution of S.H.A.E.F. in mid-July removed the only co-ordinating and controlling authority at a level above that of the zones. Pending the establishment of full quadripartite machinery under the Allied Control Council, a combined Anglo-American Transport Board was set up with committees for railways, road transport, inland

water transport, ports, and coastal shipping. The board and its committees ceased to exist when the quadripartite Transport Directorate was set up by the Control Council as a result of the decisions reached at the Potsdam Conference. The Transport Directorate held its first meeting on 18th August 1945. Its activities fall beyond the scope of this book.

* * *

Through June, July and August the chief bottleneck affecting the operation of rail traffic throughout the British zone was the stretch of line between Löhne and Hanover, where there was only one single-line bridge available over the Weser near Bad Oeynhausen. The congestion over this stretch of line was increased by the fact that traffic from Bremen for the U.S. zone had temporarily to be routed over it, until the main line southwards from Hanover through Göttingen to Kassel could be brought into use. Further pressure on the Löhne-Hanover section was also caused by a complete break in east-west traffic at Bremen on the parallel line further north. But gradually the situation improved. At the end of July, U.S. traffic could be sent *via* Göttingen, and first one and then two lines were brought into use at Bremen, on 16th and 26th August. Shortly after this, a second single-line bridge was built across the Weser near Bad Oeynhausen.

A shortage of wagons now threatened, to meet which rolling stock not beyond repair was extracted from the wreckage of burnt-out wagons and twisted rails that had once been marshalling yards. Paths were cleared with the aid of bull-dozers and oxy-acetylene cutting apparatus. Bomb craters were filled. Trucks were hauled to an open line, or a temporary line was built to where they lay, so that they could be picked up and manoeuvred onto the rails. Tank transporters were used to bring wagons from sections of the line completely isolated by demolished bridges.

From a Military Government point of view, the most important freights handled by the railways during these three months were flour, potatoes, salt and coal. Much of the flour was imported through Antwerp or Hamburg. Smaller quantities of biscuits and wheat were also imported. The movement of potatoes was almost entirely within the zone, mostly from areas near Celle and Uelzen to the Ruhr, but some were imported from Holland. Much of the salt was exported to Denmark. Throughout this period the railways were in fact able, with one important exception, to meet all demands made upon them by the Military Government authorities, so reduced were the quantities of supplies needing movement and the labour for their handling. The exception was coal. In this case it was the shortage of coal wagons and the delay in releasing empty wagons by countries receiving coal

from Germany that imposed a limitation on the distribution of the coal stocks available.

Through September and October, the railway passenger services restored represented a mileage of twenty-two per cent of that worked in 1938. The goods traffic handled bore a somewhat better proportion. Shortage of coal stocks made it probable that passenger services would have to be cut back even further. These shortages arose primarily from the low production of coal but were accentuated by difficulty in moving such coal as had been mined. The holding up at Helmstedt of coal trains destined for Berlin, which will be referred to again later in this chapter, held back the general distribution of coal.

During these months there was a slight all-round improvement in the performance of ports, inland water transport, and shipping, but generally speaking capacity was still greater than the very small quantities of goods yet requiring to be shipped. An exception was the movement of coal on the Rhine. Downstream tonnage was sufficient, but there were not enough tugs available to tow the quantities required to be moved upstream.

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The first task with regard to road transport, as in the case of the railways, was to repair or replace the 1,500 bridges destroyed by bombing or by the Germans themselves. In this the Royal Engineers played a vital part.

On a survey of the vehicles available it soon became clear that the position, bad though it might be, was not quite so serious as had been feared. By the end of July it had been ascertained that 29,950 load-carriers and 28,129 cars were fit to use in the British zone. But they were fit only by the lowered standards of a desperate situation, and to keep them on the roads would be a formidable task. It was estimated that as soon as industry began to revive another 15-20,000 lorries and ten thousand cars would be essential.

By the end of July 530 *Kreis* workshops were in operation under Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer control. Nine Provincial Heavy Workshops undertook cannibalization and major repairs. Sixteen Provincial Auxiliary Workshops were producing complete assemblies such as gearboxes, axles, and engines. It was reported that '... great benefit is being felt generally from the very considerable effort which is being put in to organize and restart these workshops and garages'. Outside stimulus can hardly have been necessary in order to produce this effort for upon the making of it depended the feeding and housing of Germany. The function of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and of Military Government was to make available such parts and materials as could be procured,

generally locally but exceptionally by import, and to ensure that these were put to use for the maximum common good. Of the readiness of the Germans to work, if they were allowed to, there can hardly have been much doubt.

In August shortages of tyres and batteries began to make themselves felt and it became clear that these would persist for some weeks until indigenous production resumed output. In this month it became necessary to prohibit hitch-hiking on load carrying vehicles in order to ensure maximum carriage of freight. Only vehicles on essential service or operating under the orders of Military Government, were allowed on the roads. There was some increase in the numbers of cars and lorries in use during September but in the following month a twenty per cent cut had to be imposed on the numbers licensed, owing to shortage of petrol. The shortage of coal had its effect on road traffic also. Initially trams had been encouraged in preference to buses, in order to economise in petrol and tyres. In the course of September it became more important to economise in coal: buses were accordingly restored to favour in order to save electricity produced from coal. The movement of the sugar beet harvest, and of the fuel required for its conversion into sugar, faced the road transport system with the need to lift some one and a half million tons before the middle of December. Civilian vehicles were able to deal with three-quarters of this. The remaining quarter was planned to be moved by British army vehicles.

* * *

Two particular tasks in these early months may be mentioned in more detail: the transport of sugar from Magdeburg, and the supply of food and coal to the British sector of Berlin. The first of these has been referred to already in a chapter on food for Germany.¹ From the railway point of view it represented the manning of forty-six sugar trains from Magdeburg and Tängermunde during the month of June. From Magdeburg 11,178 tons of sugar out of a stock of sixteen thousand were 'evacuated', 4,717 to Hanover and 6,461 tons to Brunswick. From Tängermunde 19,731 tons out of a stock of 69,400 were removed, 16,002 tons to the Ruhr, and 3,729 tons to Hamburg, Lübeck, and Kiel. In addition five trains were run from Magdeburg carrying 1,386 tons of sugar beet seed, mostly to Hanover.

The Berlin problem raised its head early in July, a few days after the completion of the Magdeburg sugar evacuation, when the Russians made it clear² that the British and the Americans would be required to provide food and coal for their sectors of Berlin. Plans were made at

¹ cf. Ch. XVIII.

² cf. Ch. XV.

once. They were conditioned by the fact that the railway bridge over the Elbe at Magdeburg on the main line to Berlin from the west was out of action, although there were hopes that it might be brought into use again about 26th July. Food for the British sector would be brought forward from Antwerp through Hanover to Helmstedt, on the frontier of the Russian zone, where the trains would be handed over to the Russians. These trains would then be worked forward to Magdeburg by the Russians where their freight would require to be unloaded, moved across the Elbe, and reloaded on trains for Berlin. As for coal, this trans-shipment would be so difficult that it was planned to route trains from the Ruhr (whence all the coal would be supplied) by a more southerly and much longer route through the U.S. zone to Hönebach, not far from Eisenach. Here they would be handed over to the Russians for movement to Berlin through Leipzig. The hand-over of food trains was to begin on 15th July and of coal trains exactly a week later.

On 14th July the first British food trains arrived at Helmstedt to be handed over the following day. Others followed at the rate of two trains of flour a day. A similar number of U.S. trains were arriving also. In addition, over the period 21st-25th July, seven potato trains were due to arrive. But on 15th and 16th the Russians would accept no trains and on 17th they asked that they should be worked forward of Helmstedt by British and American crews to Magdeburg and handed over there. On the night of 17th-18th the first four trains were accordingly handed over, two British, two American. Thereafter acceptances at Magdeburg were of the order of two trains a day, which did not keep pace with arrivals from the west. To meet this situation arrangements were made for 1,000 tons of food a day for the British sector to be carried by road in army vehicles right through from Brunswick to Berlin, beginning on 25th July. On 27th the Magdeburg rail bridge was opened to traffic. The daily road lift was discontinued on 31st July.

Meanwhile twenty-two trains carrying 18,291 tons of coal had been sent from the Ruhr to Berlin via Hönebach and Leipzig, fourteen of these arriving in Berlin by the 30th July. From that date, coal trains also began to be routed the short way through Magdeburg.

Trains were now arriving at Magdeburg at the rate of more than seven trains a day, two British food trains, two U.S. food trains, three coal trains from the Ruhr, and sometimes more. As the coal sent during the first fortnight had been some 10,000 tons less than requirements it was also planned to run an additional thirteen coal trains. The food trains brought flour, potatoes, tinned meat, salt, sugar, milk, and fats. For a while this flow of traffic proved too much for the newly opened line and for the Russian organization to handle, and trains began to pile up at the frontier again. By 15th August there

were twenty British and twelve U.S. trains waiting at Helmstedt and Brunswick and it had become necessary to cancel the despatch of coal and potato trains. But now the position rapidly improved. By the 20th the number of waiting trains had dropped to fifteen, by the 22nd to eight, by the 26th to six and by the 27th to none.

By the 25th August eighty-six trains had been sent from the Ruhr to Berlin, carrying 68,967 tons of coal. By the 27th August the British food trains sent numbered seventy-five. They had carried 34,316 tons of potatoes, 6,469 tons of flour, 897 tons of milk, 688 tons of salt, 670 tons of tinned meat, 636 tons of fats and 587 tons of sugar. Even so the British and Americans, not surprisingly, were less successful than the Russians in honouring within their sectors the agreed, but still desperately low, ration scale for the city.

* * *

The 'Battle of the Winter' has been described in an earlier chapter.¹ And it was shown there that in the winning of this battle the major contribution by the military authorities, as distinguished from the Control Commission, which was fundamentally civil not military, was in the field of transportation. But even this statement needs qualification. For throughout the winter the operation of the railways, the canals and rivers, and the ports, was undertaken by the Germans themselves. The Commander of a Provincial Military Government detachment has described to the writer the lack of success that attended the efforts of a British railway team to bring a section of the *Reichsbahn* into operation. Once the responsibility was passed to the Germans matters went far better. They knew their own railways and it was they who would starve if the trains did not run. The tendency to interfere too much and in too great detail was one against which senior Military Government officers had frequently to inveigh. The part played by the military authorities was often the merely negative one of controlling and restricting the revival of the German transportation system so that it should not make excessive inroads upon resources required for other purposes, for military needs, for reparations, for displaced persons, for the revival of the German economy at large. The major positive contribution of the military authorities was the rebuilding of bridges and restoration of communications, much of which was undertaken by them, or under their technical direction, over those parts of the railway system which they needed to use. They also took a leading and often direct part in the clearance of ports and inland waterways. In the matter of road transport, they aided with the repair of bridges, and with the provision of petrol and lubricants. And a considerable

¹ cf. Ch. XV.

contribution must have been made in the use of military road vehicles to aid in the collection and distribution of food, in the movement of coal, and in providing transport for miners and other labour to go to work. But to say that the army won the battle of the winter in the British zone of Germany would be to overstate the case. It was won by the people of Germany, under the direction of the Control Commission, and with the aid of the Control Commission and of the British forces.

CHAPTER XXIV

FINANCE

WHEN asked concerning the functions of the Civil Affairs or Military Government Finance Section at 21 Army Group Headquarters, someone who had been a Senior Staff Officer of the D.C.C.A.O.'s headquarters replied 'They were part of 21 Army Group Military Government staff, but always pretended they were not. What they did I have no idea at all.' In fact the Finance Section did enjoy a special status and this chapter must be devoted to finding out what it was they did.

The special status of the section flowed from the following provisions of the War Office Military Manual of Civil Affairs in the field:

'The Senior Staff Officer, Civil Affairs (Finance) is the representative of the Accounting Officer for the War Office who is responsible to Parliament for the regularity of all British Army expenditure, including that on Civil Affairs, which falls on British Army votes. As this representative, the S.S.O.C.A. (Finance) has the right of direct access on financial matters to the Accounting Officer should need arise. Notwithstanding this direct responsibility as financial and accounting officer, the S.S.O.C.A. (Finance) is under the command of the C.C.A.O. and must carry out his policy subject to the right of access to the Accounting Officer, War Office.'

This status of the head of the Finance Section, who was more commonly known as the Controller of Finance and Accounts, or C.F.A., and will be so described below, was comparable to that enjoyed under normal British Military practice by a Financial Adviser in respect of his Commander-in-Chief.

The double channel of communication allowed reflected the fact that both the C.F.A. and the military Financial Advisers were required to discharge a double function. They were to act as advisers to their respective commanders but were at the same time required to act as watch dogs over expenditure incurred by them. It was to enable the Financial Advisers to discharge the second of these responsibilities that they were given direct access to the Permanent Under Secretary (Finance), who, throughout the period with which this book is concerned, acted as Accounting Officer in the War Office. The same argument made it necessary for the C.F.A. to enjoy direct communication. In practice, however, for reasons that will become clear

there was to be virtually no expenditure of British funds on Civil Affairs or military government and consequently little or no need for any watchdog. But there were other good grounds, already recognized by the precedent set when military administration was first established in north and east Africa, for allowing direct communication. The control of expenditure was in fact only a minor part of the C.F.A.'s responsibilities. He was required to deal also with all matters of financial policy other than those which related in the strictest sense to military matters. He was thus responsible for dealing with such subjects as rates of exchange, inflation, banking and financial operations of the indigenous governments. All of these were quite outside the normal experience of military commanders or their Financial Advisers. For the handling of these, direct access to the P.U.S.(F), and through him to the appropriate banking and financial authorities in London, was highly desirable.

In the event, the fact that both the C.F.A. and the military Financial Advisers were directly responsible to the Permanent Under-Secretary (Finance) was to have another incidental advantage. The latter was thus helped to keep the demarcation between the two types of activity clearly established, whereas under any other system there might well have been overlapping. In the opinion of the C.F.A. at 21 Army Group the existence and maintenance of the direct line of communication between him and the War Office was probably the most important single factor in the success of his operations. The scope and complicated nature of these was further recognized by the recruitment to the Civil Affairs and Military Government Finance staffs not of officers of the Royal Army Pay Corps but of persons with experience of banking and finance. Their task was to be nothing less than to revive and stabilize the economic life of the several countries entered by the Allied forces.

* * *

The primary task of the finance staffs, whether in liberated or in occupied territory, was to ensure that currency should be available for the use of the Allied forces, including their Civil Affairs and Military Government staffs. It was planned in the first place to use the currencies already in circulation, *francs, guilders, kroner, marks, Reichskreditkassenscheine*, being German military currency issued in territory occupied by German forces, and valid only in such territory, were not legal tender in Germany and would not be utilized. But since in the early stages adequate indigenous stocks might be hard to come by, particularly in enemy territory, arrangements were necessary to supplement these. In the case of Belgium, Holland and Norway, the Governments, all of which had emigrated to London, made fresh issues of notes and coin which would be put into circulation by the Allied

forces as required. For Luxembourg the Belgian Government was willing to supply currency (in normal conditions Belgian currency circulated freely in the Grand Duchy) and when it became possible to make contact with representatives of the Luxembourg Government they proved ready to fall in with this arrangement.

France presented a special case since there was no government recognized by the Allies. Accordingly supplemental *francs* were printed in the U.S. to be brought into use by the Allies on landing. The difficulties resulting have been more fully recounted in earlier chapters.¹ Briefly, the British and some of the U.S. planners wished the supplemental *francs* to be proclaimed legal tender by the French Committee of National Liberation. President Roosevelt strongly opposed this on the ground that to do so would accord to the French Committee of National Liberation that recognition of sovereignty which he was unwilling to give until it was known how the Committee had been received in France. General de Gaulle was willing, in fact anxious, to issue the necessary proclamation but only on condition that it was expressed to be a proclamation of the Provisional Government. This was precisely what the President would not allow. There was no escape from this impasse until the end of August when the Civil Affairs agreements were negotiated with the Committee. Under these, control and issue of all 'notes denominated in *francs*' and of all *franc* coin, was taken over and would in future be exercised by the *Trésor Central Français*. 'Notes denominated in *francs*' included the obnoxious supplemental *francs*. The Allied forces undertook to introduce no other currency into France except in an emergency. Here, as elsewhere, French dignity was saved while the Supreme Commander retained his essential powers. The shape and format of the supplemental *francs* were not liked, being similar to those of dollar bills and quite unlike the traditional French notes. They were from a technical point of view not good notes because they were easy to forge, a point which did not escape the underworld, so that by September 1944 forgeries of the larger notes began to appear. By this time, however, access had been gained to the reserves of metropolitan *francs* within France and first the larger and then the smaller of the supplemental notes were withdrawn.

In the case of Denmark there had been no emigration of the Government or of any quasi-governmental body that could provide currency. It was hoped that the Government, when met, would prove co-operative, but there could be no certainty of this. In Germany if a government was found at all, or in time, it would be impolitic to recognize its competence to issue currency. For these two countries, therefore, it was planned to supplement indigenous stocks by Allied

¹ cf. Ch. IV. and V.

military currency, *kroner* and *marks*, as needed. The *marks* were described and declared legal tender in Supreme Commander's Law No. 51, and were to be in all respects equivalent to existing legal tender *mark* currency of the same face value.

It was necessary, however, to consider the possibility that the new currencies brought in might not prove acceptable. There might also be temporary local shortages. In such an emergency the right was reserved to the Allied Commander to use, for U.S. forces, distinctive United States 'Yellow seal' dollars specially printed for use in such circumstances and regular U.S. coin, and for British forces, British Military Administration notes and regular British coin. 'Yellow seal' dollars bore a gold seal in place of the usual blue and red seal. In contrast to B.M.A. sterling notes which were legal tender only in the territories in which they were issued these dollars were legal tender in the U.S.A. which enhanced the inconvenient tendency for them to go to a premium over the B.M.A. notes. Resort was not to be had to these measures except in emergency and the British and American currencies were to be withdrawn again at the earliest possible moment.

Rates of exchange were to be decreed between the currencies of the U.S., the U.K. and the liberated Governments. For Germany no formal rate of exchange was to be established until there had been time to observe conditions. Meanwhile an arbitrary rate was fixed for the purpose of the pay of troops and of internal accounting only. This was:

$$\begin{aligned} 40 \text{ marks} &= \text{£}1 \ 0 \ 0 \\ 10 \text{ marks} &= 1 \text{ dollar} \end{aligned}$$

As soon as the respective central banks were sufficiently revived to take on the responsibility, these or any other more suitable banks, were to be used for official business.

* * *

In the first instance it was provided that currency for the requirements of the military forces was to be debited against the military force while currency for civil administration should be debited to the indigenous Governments, or, in the case of Germany, to the Allied Military Government. In liberated territory ultimate debit was to be made in the light of mutual aid or other agreements drawn up between the U.S. and the U.K. Governments and the Governments of the liberated countries. Such an agreement was entered into between the U.K. Government and the French authorities in Algiers on 8th February 1944, and later applied to continental France. Agreements with the Belgian and Netherlands Governments were concluded on 22nd August and with the Norwegian Government on 4th October 1944.

The main provisions of the agreements were similar. In them the incidence of the cost of the provision of currency was regulated within the framework of agreed general principles regarding the incidence of the cost of the provision of materials and facilities by the one Government to the military forces of the other. Broadly speaking each party undertook to make no claim against the other for reimbursement of the cost of supplies, services, and facilities, which could 'most effectively' be provided, and were provided, by it to the military forces of the other party. While the forces of the French, Belgian Netherlands and Norwegian Governments were in the United Kingdom, before the liberation of their countries, it would, again broadly speaking, fall to the United Kingdom Government to equip and maintain these forces without claiming reimbursement of the cost. Once the Allied forces were operating on the Continent, it would fall to the Governments of the liberated territories to provide free of charge 'stores, supplies, services and facilities required by the British Armed forces for military purposes' if these could 'most effectively' be procured in their territories. It was specifically provided that the cost of the Civil Affairs administration and of Civil Affairs relief supplies would be borne by the Governments of the liberated territories concerned. Each Government would bear the cost of the pay of its own forces. The underlying principle of mutual aid was that each should put into the common pool what he could best contribute towards the war against Germany.

As for currency, the Governments of the liberated territories agreed to place at the disposal of the War Office such funds in their own currencies as were required in their territories by the British armed forces. Whether these Governments were to be reimbursed for these funds was to be determined by reference to the principles governing mutual aid. If the currency was used by the British forces to procure goods or services which it fell to the indigenous Governments to provide free of charge, then there was to be no reimbursement by the War Office. If it was used for the pay and allowances of the British forces then reimbursement must be made by the credit to the Government concerned of the sterling equivalent of the currency so used.

All the agreements included provision for the avoidance of unnecessary disruption of the economies of the liberated countries. All were deemed to have been in force since the Allied invasion of the Continent. They were to expire six months after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany.

In Germany ultimate responsibility for the cost of providing currency would be governed by paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany in pursuance of the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority. Under paragraph 20 the German authorities were required to supply free of cost currency for the Allies and to redeem in their own currency all

currencies issued in Germany by the Allies, during military operations or occupation. Under paragraph 21 they were required to defray the whole cost of the occupation and to pay for any relief provided.

It was a result of these various arrangements that there was virtually no expenditure from British funds on Civil Affairs or military government.

* * *

The organization created to hold and issue currency for the S.H.A.E.F. theatre of operations took the form of Currency Sections for each of the countries to be liberated or occupied. The main functions of these sections were to provide currency and postage stamps for military, including Civil Affairs, purposes, to provide a central depository for receipts and issues of S.H.A.E.F. funds, to revive and, in the case of Germany, control the indigenous banking system and currency structure, and to maintain prescribed accounts and records.

Currency and stamps were for the most part in the physical custody of the War Office but under the control of the currency section concerned. Shortly before D-Day these stocks included more than four thousand million Belgian *francs*, eighty-one million Dutch *florins*, and 114 million Norwegian *kroner*, made over to the War Office by the respective Governments. There had also been received in the Bank of England for the War Office 5,649,524,055 metropolitan French *francs*, and 31,064,064,000 supplemental (Allied) *francs*. More than half the metropolitan *francs* and some five thousand million supplemental *francs* had already been issued to the invading forces. Until the currency sections could establish themselves overseas currency required was issued by the War Office direct to the services concerned under the authority of the currency sections. As soon as these could move overseas they were to take over responsibility for making issues to the services as required, calling forward stocks in bulk for the purpose. The physical transfer of these stocks was made by Civil Affairs officers, or by normal Pay Services, as was convenient. Once overseas, the currency sections in due course were to establish themselves in the capital of the countries for which they were responsible, but it was realized that there might be preliminary periods during which they would need to conduct their operations in the field. They were authorized to use indigenous banks, preferably the central bank, as their agents. And as these showed themselves equal to the task a greater measure of responsibility would be transferred to them.

The S.H.A.E.F. Financial Branch firmly established the principle that if it was driven to administering injections of currency it would do so only at the top level. If, for example, currency was required in order to get coal mines working, the mines must go first to their

banks or other normal source of cash. If the banks were unable to meet the demand, they must apply to their central bank. Only if this could not find funds, would the S.H.A.E.F. Currency Section be authorized to release currency, and then to the central bank, not to the mine operating companies. Similarly, if military units required cash, they must first try Field Cashiers and the Army Pay organization, and the Currency Section would deal only with the heads of this. The rigorous enforcement of this principle greatly facilitated the task of the S.H.A.E.F. Financial Branch, stimulated the revival of the central banking organizations, and compelled the latter to assume responsibility from an early stage.

* * *

In liberated countries the indigenous authorities were quick to revive as had been expected. The finance staffs were accordingly relieved of many of the functions they would have to assume in Germany, and were mainly concerned to provide currency and resolve problems of exchange.

The first of the currency sections to come into action was that for France. The advance party crossed to Normandy on 1st July. It consisted of two Lieutenant-Colonels and four other ranks with two one and a half ton trucks loaded with boxes of currency. Half of this party stayed in Bayeux and set up an office in the Credit Lyonnais building. The other half went on to Cherbourg and deposited its boxes in the Banque de France. The main body followed on 5th August and established itself in Cherbourg. A few days later it opened a branch at Bayeux. This was closed again on 20th September in view of the approaching move of 21 Army Group Headquarters into Belgium. In the course of the month offices were opened at Marseilles, and in Paris immediately after entry. Fullest cooperation existed throughout between the currency section and the French banks. Until the Supreme Commander took over direct control of the land forces operating in Europe, in September 1944, the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group directed the battle and was responsible for Civil Affairs throughout the liberated area. During this period the currency section for France was placed under the command of the Controller of Finance and Accounts, at 21 Army Group. Thereafter the section was placed first under the control of the head of the S.H.A.E.F. G-5 Finance Branch, on 7th September 1944, and later, on 3rd October 1944, under the control of the S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France.

An early task requiring the utmost exactness of planning and execution had to be undertaken even before D-day. It was considered necessary to morale that all troops landing on D-day should have something in their pockets which they could spend in France. It was

even more important, however, not to give away the secret of their destination. Elaborate arrangements were undertaken to issue French currency to all troops crossing on D-day, and to do this so late that they had no opportunity to talk to civilians ashore. Once across the Channel, the currency section's first task was to ensure that there should be enough currency available, and of the proper denominations, to meet all needs of the Allied forces at any time even in the most forward areas. Included in these needs was the need that civilians in liberated areas should have enough currency for their immediate requirements. Currency must not be issued in excessive quantities or any other action be taken that might undermine the confidence of the people in the money put into circulation. And when the need contracted currency must be withdrawn from circulation. These were largely the functions of a central bank and in fact the currency section was a central bank – on jeeps. Currency stocks were held for the greater part in the Bank of England and were flown out to the currency section as required. Even in the stress of launching great attacks, the aircraft were always made available for this purpose.

In the event, notwithstanding the difficulties experienced with the French authorities regarding use of the Allied supplemental *francs*, there was no lack of confidence by the public in regard to this currency. The Germans had made no attempt to destroy or take with them any large quantities of French currency. There were, therefore, adequate stocks in banks which were able to continue business much as usual. It was unnecessary to make advances from Civil Affairs funds to public authorities or essential industries. Indeed it was soon possible to withdraw the initial issues of supplemental *francs* altogether.

In the course of September arrangements were made with the French authorities under which the Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief 21 Army Group should open an account with the Banque de France, and subsidiary accounts as necessary in provincial branches of the Banque. Into this account the Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief would credit any receipts, especially of large denomination notes, surplus to his immediate requirements. The main source for replenishment of the account, however, was the initial stocks of currency deposited by the pay authorities, the Banque being willing to undertake safe custody of these up to the amount of three thousand million *francs*. Transfers would be made from this deposit to current account as needed.

The conditions encountered in Belgium and Holland by the currency sections for those countries were not dissimilar. In both countries there were occasions when shortage of currency resulted in failure to pay wages. The currency section concerned was able to make stocks available to tide over these emergencies. There were also occasions when there was delay on the part of the local authorities in paying for goods that had been requisitioned for the use of the Allied

forces. This was generally found to be due to ignorance of the existence of, or lack of understanding of the provisions of mutual aid agreements entered into by the Governments.

Rates of exchange throughout the liberated territories were fixed in consultation at Governmental level and were then communicated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for promulgation in the countries concerned. The rates were:

France	200 francs	= £1	49.5663 francs	= 1 dollar
Belgium	176.625 francs	= £1	43.7732 francs	= 1 dollar
Nether-				
lands	10.691 guilders	= £1	2.6496 guilders	= 1 dollar
Norway	20 kroner	= £1	4.9566 kroner	= 1 dollar
Denmark	24 kroner	= £1	5.9480 kroner	= 1 dollar

These rates appear to have been generally satisfactory through the period with which this book is concerned, although there were complaints in Denmark that the *kroner* rate fixed for that country favoured the Allies unduly. Civil Affairs finance officers were required to observe the operation of these rates and to report if changes seemed desirable.

They frequently found themselves faced with practical problems of exchange. In the case of the civil populations they had no authority to act – the matter was one to be dealt with under the regulations of the indigenous authorities, even though, as in the cases of Belgium and Holland, the foreign currency had been brought into their countries by Allied troops and accepted from them in good faith by the civil population in payment for goods bought. In the case of Allied troops Paymasters were authorized, subject to conditions and within narrow limits, to effect exchanges of currency. Questions concerning the principles and rates that should govern such transactions were the province of the Civil Affairs finance staff.

* * *

In Germany other tasks would have to be undertaken besides the provision of currency. It would be necessary to seize and control the whole of the German financial machine, and to ensure that this operated only in accordance with Allied policy.

The first step towards this would be to establish control over all banks and other financial institutions after temporary closure if necessary. Under Law No. 53 strict foreign exchange control was to be imposed. Law No. 52 provided for the blocking and control of property. 'Blocking', ensured that 'no person shall import, acquire or receive, deal in, sell, lease, transfer, export, hypothecate or otherwise dispose of, destroy or surrender possession, custody or control of any property'

brought under ban. Law No. 52 'blocked', with a few exceptions, all transactions of whatsoever kind in property owned or controlled by certain categories of persons, unless such transactions were generally or specially authorized by Military Government. Chief of these categories were the State, the Nazi Party, persons detained by Military Government or specified by them in this connection (a formidable list), organizations prohibited by Military Government, and, to frustrate fraudulent disposal through these, any charitable or religious institutions. In addition any important work of art or cultural material was 'blocked', regardless of ownership. So far as possible control of the banks was to be exercised indirectly through the *Reichsbank*. Insurance companies, and stock and commodity exchanges, were to be allowed to continue operating, subject to the provisions of Military Government law, particularly the 'blocking' legislation, and subject to control by Military Government.

In the matter of public finance, the action to be taken was, at least in principle, clear and simple. The collection of taxes under existing German law was to continue, and indeed to be pressed. Only such forms of revenue would be discontinued as discriminated against any person because of race, colour, creed, or political opinion. In the matter of expenditure, normal payments would continue to be made, especially of pensions, allowances, and social security payments, provided that the disbursements were not on objects prejudicial to military security or in conflict with Allied policy. In particular no expenditure was to be incurred for the benefit of the Nazi Party, or its officers and leading members, or for any person on the 'blocked' list. Budgets would require to be prepared and approved by Military Government finance officers. If there were deficits, as was inevitable, loans or advances must be obtained from the German banks or from any other normal channel of finance. Only in the last resort would the Supreme Commander consider making an advance and then only if it was clearly demonstrated that the failure to make the loan would prejudice Allied interests.

Law No. 52 provided also for 'Property Control', a specialized function of Military Government which requires more detailed mention. The right to control property was to be assumed with a two-fold object. It was needed in order to ensure that the property of the German State, of the Nazi Party, of their subsidiary organizations, and of any other hostile or undesirable persons, should not be dissipated or fraudulently transferred in order to escape control or penalties imposed by the Allies, and should not be used for the benefit of its owners or to the prejudice of Allied interests and policy. It was needed, secondly, in order to ensure that the property of absent owners, particularly of Allied or United Nations nationals, and also loot from outside Germany, should be recovered and safeguarded for its right-

ful owners. The power of control was assumed by declaring the property of these persons 'to be subject to seizure of possession or title, direction, management, supervision or otherwise being taken into control by Military Government.' The power assumed was 'possession' not 'ownership' and accordingly did not normally extend to disposal by sale, or otherwise, of the title to property. On the other hand the power was not confined to that exercised by a receiver or trustee, and Military Government officers were instructed to 'do what is reasonable in the circumstances.'

The specialized nature of the function of property control was recognized by the intention that Military Government officers should, after the initial stages, discharge their property control duties under the close instruction and supervision of specialist Property Control officers. In the initial stages, however, Military Government officers must be prepared to act on their own responsibility in this as in all other functions. They were instructed to proceed first against property the use of which was required for the war effort or which could be used to the prejudice of that effort. They were also to discover and safeguard all public registers useful in tracing property interests. So far as possible German persons or courts were to be appointed to take physical custody of seized property. Only in the last resort were Military Government officers or other members of the Allied forces to be diverted to this task. Property seized might continue to be used for its normal purposes, provided that business enterprises were not to engage in any transactions which might diminish or imperil their assets. Accounts of income and expenditure were required to be maintained in approved form in regard to all property subjected to control. No policy was enunciated as to the ultimate disposal of property taken under control. Ownership could only be transferred in accordance with the law. Industrial property might require to be dismantled and removed as reparations. Property of major offenders might have to be confiscated. In appropriate cases property might be released from control. Presumably the greater part of the property seized would be owned by the State or its agencies. In regard to this there would be gradual reduction of the degree of control exercised as denazification progressed or other precautions were taken against mis-use, until finally it was considered safe to relinquish control altogether.

* * *

In the field, events developed much in accordance with expectations and plans. In March 1945 an area of Germany west of the Rhine was occupied by 21 Army Group forces. All banks (there were thirty-one in the area) and all financial institutions were found closed. It was reported that eighty per cent of them were incapable of re-opening

in the near future owing to the disappearance or destruction of buildings, records and firms and the absence of staff. A 'central bank' for the area was improvised at Issum, ten miles south-west of Wesel. Clerical work was carried on in the *Spahr-und-Darlehnskasse*, a savings bank, into which, incidentally, Allied troops had broken and had looted the cash in the till, 95,000 *marks*, at the point of the revolver. Cash was placed in two large safes in the town hall, most of which was being used as a British military hospital.

There had been little or no collection of revenue since January 1945 and the local authorities were for the most part entirely without funds. They were required to resume collection of taxes and to prepare weekly budgets of expenditure essential for relief, salaries and pensions, and first-aid repairs to essential services. Advances were made by the Issum 'central bank' if the local authorities could not make ends meet. Little more could be done in these early stages.

There followed the advance to the Baltic, in the course of which this story was repeated, with variations. Near the Rhine crossings and in other areas which had been the targets of Allied bombing, destruction was as severe as that found on first entry into Germany. Elsewhere the working of the financial machine was scarcely affected. Distribution of currency was very irregular because of the uneven incidence of damage, of the destruction of communications, and of the distintegration of the highly centralized control upon which the system had depended. To meet this situation the head branches of the *Reichsbank* in Kiel, Hamburg, and Hanover were temporarily constituted 'provincial' central banks, and redistribution of currency between banks was made under army arrangements, often in the face of great physical difficulties.

In public finance, emergency budgets continued to be prepared by local authorities covering *ad hoc* periods that might extend to a week or a few weeks only. The smaller local authorities, such as the *Gemeinde* and *Kreise*, had in the past depended very largely on grants from central revenues, the proportion of local taxation allocated to them being insufficient to meet their expenditure. With no central or even zonal government to draw upon, this difficulty was met by allowing to be used for local expenditure all central taxes locally collected. Frequently, however, even this measure did not suffice to balance the budgets, particularly since very extensive abnormal expenditure needed to be undertaken on relief measures, such as the opening of communal feeding centres, on the care of displaced persons, on matters normally paid for by the central, not the local, authorities, and finally on meeting the requirements of the Allied forces, especially for accommodation. It was arranged to meet these deficits by borrowing. In the case of the larger local authorities, such as the provinces and the *Regierungsbezirke*, advances were normally made by the *Reichsbank*. At

lower levels it was normally the local savings banks that advanced the cash required.

At this stage little more than a beginning could be made with property control. Search was made for the *Grundbuch* and *Handelsregister* containing records of title to land and of business undertakings. These were generally found, and then safeguarded. Enquiries were begun as to property liable to seizure. In a few obvious cases control was established summarily. By the end of May, however, properties taken into formal control within the British theatre of operations numbered only fifteen. Four of these were foreign-owned, one of them a Unilever Margarine factory. Eight had been owned or controlled by the Nazi Party. Two consisted of aggregations of material that had apparently been looted by the Germans from occupied territories. One was property found abandoned. That these numbers were so small was due partly to the fact that there had been little time or opportunity for thorough investigations, but partly also to the fact that a large number of properties otherwise liable to seizure had already been entered and occupied for their own purposes by British troops. An unexpected problem was tackled by Property Control officers when they transferred two elephants from Münster to the Zoo at Antwerp, because it was too difficult to feed them in Germany and they were too valuable to destroy.

A number of interesting matters came to light as a result of the enquiries made by Property Control officers. Hoards of Netherlands currency amounting to twelve million and three million guilders were discovered. These were all unused 100-guilder notes deposited in the names of members of the Seyss-Inquart administration in Holland. A large quantity of valuables and personal possessions, obviously the property of internees, was found buried below the S.S. quarters at Belsen. And there was the *Deutsche Erd-und-Steinwerk*, a tile and brick factory at Neuengamme, near Hamburg. The factory was inside the Neuengamme concentration camp and was run exclusively with prison labour for the benefit of the S.S. The original capital of RM 20,000 had apparently been provided by the S.S. in 1938. In December 1940 the capital was increased to RM 500,000, of which RM 480,000 was registered in the name of the S.S. *Obergruppenführer*. By May 1942, the excess of assets over liabilities amounted to RM 30,000,000. In April 1943 the capital was increased again to RM 5,000,000.

A question that faced Military Government officers with ever increasing insistence as they penetrated into Germany was whether, and how, payment of interest on the German national debt should be resumed. *Prima facie*, the position was clear. Such payments had been prohibited by the last sentence of the financial directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to S.C.A.E.F., which ran:

'Taxes or other revenues will not be used for the payment of principal or interest on government obligations without prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff'.

The question was whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be moved to give their approval. But it was inadvisable to lift this prohibition until there was some prospect of bringing public expenditure into balance with public revenue. And in fact no answer could be given to the question within the period with which this book is concerned, for, apart from the difficulty of balancing income and expenditure, this was essentially a long-term problem and a matter to be decided by the Control Commission, rather than the Supreme Commander.

By the end of the mobile phase the Second Army Military Government staff felt justified in claiming that they had accomplished the three main financial tasks laid upon them, namely:

- (a) the imposition of blocking and freezing controls
- (b) denazification with regard to the 'automatic' categories,
- (c) the re-establishment of an emergency short-term financial administration.

* * *

In war some degree of inflation is inevitable. The combating of this in liberated territories was no direct concern of Civil Affairs, being a matter for the indigenous governments. In Germany the preparation of a long range programme for the purpose was a matter for the Control Commission. Yet, in bringing about conditions that would facilitate rather than obstruct military operations, an important element was the creation of reasonably stable financial conditions and the existence of a sound currency. Accordingly the Supreme Commander felt it incumbent upon him, and in Germany was specifically enjoined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to take such steps as were possible to prevent inflation. To this end the German authorities were to be ordered to continue the counter-inflationary controls already operating, such as rationing and measures to control prices and to combat black markets. The Allied military authorities for their part planned to reduce purchasing power by encouraging members of their forces not to spend more than they need and by making it as easy as possible for them to remit home any surpluses. They also planned to limit outright requisitioning as far as possible since this might be expected to force goods underground and inflate black market prices, and, in liberated countries, to import goods for civilian consumption in order to reduce the disparity between purchasing power and essential commodities.

It is difficult to say how effective these avowedly short term measures

proved in the event. Conditions were too varied, disturbed, and uncertain, and transport and communications were too lacking, for anything like a genuine price-level to emerge during the period with which this book is concerned. Controlled prices in liberated countries tended to be about double 1939 prices. The black market flourished in Belgium and France. In Germany it was at first comparatively insignificant. Black market prices were anything from five to fifteen times the pre-war normal prices. All that can safely be said is that the measures taken by the Allied authorities must have minimized these evils.

* * *

Before leaving the subject of Finance, brief reference is necessary to the arrangements for the maintenance and audit of accounts.

A preliminary point needs to be made. Although a combined, or 'integrated', Anglo-American Supreme Headquarters had been established for the conduct of operations against Germany, under a Supreme Commander, who might have been either British or American but in point of fact was American, there were no combined funds for this purpose. No order by the Supreme Commander could of itself directly result in expenditure. All that it could do was to require expenditure by Army Group or other Commanders from their own national resources, British or American, as the case might be. Agreement regarding the necessity for such expenditure, and the general purposes to which it should be directed, would be reached at the appropriate level of the combined Anglo-American machinery. Formal sanction would need to flow down normal British or American military channels. Responsibility to account for the expenditure sanctioned would follow the same channels. But if the Supreme Commander disposed of no combined funds, he did directly control issues from the stocks of relief supplies which, for reasons that have been given in another chapter¹, had been procured under combined arrangements. The responsibility to account for the use of these ran up to the Supreme Commander, not along national channels. Accordingly, the Controller of Finance and Accounts at 21 Army Group, the senior British formation, owed a divided responsibility. For relief supplies he was required to account to S.H.A.E.F. and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For cash and currency he owed a dual responsibility, to S.H.A.E.F. for ensuring that the general lines of agreed Allied financial policy were observed, to the War Office for ensuring that funds made available by it were spent on the purposes for which they had been provided.

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

Little comment is necessary regarding the various sets of accounts required to be maintained. The responsibility for the maintenance of cash accounts in the field was divided between two levels. The basis of the machinery for the keeping of these accounts was the appointment of particular Civil Affairs or Military Government officers as sub-accountants and the concentration upon them so far as possible of all cash transactions in the field. The only other level at which accounts were maintained was that of the C.F.A. where centralized control accounting took place. Other levels of the army hierarchy were skipped, and sub-accountants enjoyed direct communication with the C.F.A. Property control accounts were of two kinds. There were first the accounts of transactions by Military Government officers themselves in connection with property taken into control. The responsibility for the maintenance of these, which were liable to raise questions of a more technical nature than the ordinary cash accounts, rested mainly on specialist Property Control officers. Secondly there were the internal accounts recording the transactions of business enterprises and of custodians administering other property. The responsibility for the maintenance of these rested upon the businesses affected or upon the appointed custodians under the supervision of Property Control or other Military Government Officers. The customary method of accounting might not be altered without approval of the Deputy Property Control Officer at the military headquarters concerned.

As for supply accounting, the initial arrangements for the issue of supplies required prepayment by the indigenous authorities and the maintenance of a record of the value of the supplies issued to enable an ultimate settlement to be made between the governments concerned. In October 1944 a revised procedure was introduced under which issues were made in exchange for a quantitative receipt from the indigenous authorities. Supply accounting in the field now, theoretically, involved nothing more elaborate than the taking of these receipts and the maintenance of a quantitative record, so that claims could in due course be prepared against the indigenous authorities. Anything more complicated was adjudged impracticable. Average prices for supplies were fixed outside the theatre of operations for the purpose of claims against recipient Governments, taking into account the various sources of provision of the goods supplied. But it was not without difficulty that the duty even of taking quantitative receipts was laid upon the Civil Affairs staff. Under U.S. Army procedure supplies did not require to be accounted for once they had been issued from a depot *if the issue took place in a theatre of war*. Civil Affairs supplies were clearly issued in a theatre of war and much persuasion was needed before American staffs would agree to placing the burden of taking quantitative receipts upon forces in the field. Without such receipts, however, it would have been impossible either to give effect to the

agreed policy that the countries receiving relief supplies should be called upon to pay for them if able to do so, or to ascertain the proportions in which these imports originated from the U.K., the U.S. and Canada. American agreement was ultimately obtained. To what extent the U.S. forces observed the resulting orders, however, is another matter. It is not impossible that the picture given at the end of Chapter XVII of the comparative shares of the western Allies in the provision of supplies for the liberated countries is significantly out of balance and that the total of these imports was in fact greater than they can be shown to have been.

Of audit there was not a great deal. Internal audit of all kinds of accounts was undertaken by audit officers at S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group to the extent that this was practicable. But, in fact, so far as cash accounts in the field were concerned, there was little to audit since, because of mutual aid, and of the conditions imposed on Germany, very few transactions found their way into the Civil Affairs or Military Government accounts. The only external audit was conducted after the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., when the Combined Civil Affairs Committee appointed Combined Auditors. But they were required to conduct a general survey rather than a formal audit. The conclusion reached by these auditors was that the cash and currency accounts properly reflected relationships between the combined military authorities and the governments or authorities involved, adequately protected combined interests, and provided data in a form suitable for negotiating post war inter-governmental settlements. They found that the supply accounts did not fully perform these functions. The apparently simple procedure for taking quantitative receipts had not worked satisfactorily. There were various reasons, but in the main it was due to the conditions in which the system had had to be operated. These were described by the Combined Auditors. They said:

‘The simplest way to get a clear general picture of the conditions under which supply issues in the European Theatre of Operations were made is to consider the operation as a large merchandising business, probably involving more than \$1,000,000,000. But it is a peculiar and unusual business carried on under conditions without precedent.

1. The total amount of purchases (goods shipped or diverted for Civil Affairs purposes) is not precisely known and the liability to suppliers (US, UK or Canada) is not known in total, nor does any exact basis exist for the division of such a total if known.
2. No central stock control exists.
3. In U.S. depots, complete and reasonably accurate physical inventories have not been taken, and we are informed that such inventories are considered impracticable. In UK Civil Affairs depots, physical inventories are taken periodically and discrepancies adjusted.

4. Prices and uniform descriptions have not been prepared for the greater part of the goods issued or in stock.
5. Sales (goods billed) and accounts receivable (uncollected bills) are based on quantitative receipts of National Authorities, forwarded by the issuing depots, together with additional information derived from some cross-check of the depot records and the records of the National Authorities (See II-BI1, Appendix 2).
6. In view of the foregoing, it is obvious that this large business is being run without financial books, as the basis for such books, that is, value of goods shipped, monetary amount of losses in transit, value of inventories and value of issues, is incomplete.'

The auditors continued:

'Apparently the original scheme envisaged that all stores and supplies furnished for Civil Affairs purposes would be clearly marked, would be shipped separately, unloaded into special dumps and depots, and at all times would be clearly kept apart for Civil Affairs needs and controlled by Civil Affairs personnel.

If this was the intention, it seems to have broken down as from D-Day. This condition existed for several months. Any and all stores and supplies, whether for Army or for civil use, were likely to be mixed up and shipped in any available space; they were unloaded in conditions of the utmost haste and danger on the beaches, with resulting confusion, and were hurried away inland at top speed. Much of the marking was indistinguishable, and even if it were not, little notice would be taken of it when operational needs supervened. Many of the items for Civil Affairs were identical with army items, and if troops needed biscuit, they got biscuit, regardless of whether cases were marked CA or not. Similarly, a starving village, when overrun in the advance, would, on occasion, be fed with biscuit from the most convenient source, regardless of whether it was from CA or from Army supplies.'

The auditors listed other causes for confusion, inaccuracy, and inability to maintain records. But they also made clear their view that the conditions were largely unavoidable and that nothing in their report should be taken as criticism of any officer or official.

* * *

Comment was made when writing of the incredible complexity of the plans for the return to Europe, that it was nothing short of a miracle that the invasion was ever launched and succeeded in establishing itself on the continent.¹ This applies with quite particular force to the financial arrangements, especially to those for the provision

¹ cf. Ch. IV.

of currency. For in the making of these it was not only necessary to overcome the physical difficulties which attended the delivery of all material at the right time and place on the shores of Normandy. Money depends for its usefulness upon the intangible and elusive factor of confidence. It was, accordingly, also necessary to create confidence in the currency imported and confidence in the ability of the authorities concerned to provide it when and where required. Any failure in this delicate task would have entailed the most serious consequences. Taking into account the difficulties arising from the integrated Anglo-American nature of the undertaking, considering also the number of countries and currencies concerned, the amounts of currency involved, the improvisation, and the nomad conditions in which the 'central bank on jeeps' was required to operate, it is remarkable and a tribute to all who took part in the planning and execution, how smoothly the financial arrangements worked.

CHAPTER XXV

CONCLUSION

THROUGH the last months of 1945 and the early months of 1946 it was not infrequently said that the British military authorities were 'winning the Battle of the Winter'. Though fair enough as a dramatization of the difficult and dangerous situation facing the forces of occupation, this must nevertheless have caused a certain lifting of the eye-brows among Germans, dazed and war-weary though they might be. For indeed it was their resilience and industry, their ability to survive on a ration that the experts had pronounced insufficient to sustain life and make work possible for more than a few months, that enabled the battle to be won. The question naturally arises how much the Civil Affairs and Military Government organization was in fact able to achieve, and whether it did not tend to see itself as accomplishing tasks that in fact it had done no more than enable, sometimes merely permit, others to undertake.

In the liberated territories its major positive contribution was the import of relief supplies. The imports were but a small proportion of the total tonnages handled by the military machine, and were for the most part small in comparison with the indigenous contribution. Even in the case of Paris, where an exceptional effort was made by the Allies, a great deal more was brought into the city by the French from their own resources than by the British and Americans.¹ On the other hand much of the French effort was made possible by the use of Allied transport and petrol. And at certain times and places, for example in Belgium, the Allied contribution probably just saved a situation that might have become dangerous.² In Holland there can be no doubt that it played a decisive part in saving thousands of Dutch people from death by starvation.³ And it remains a very remarkable thing that the western Allies while engaged in a struggle for their very existence should have planned to import, and should in fact have succeeded in landing on the continent, five and a quarter million tons of supplies for the relief of the civil population of the liberated countries.⁴

An incidental uncovenanted advantage which many of the liberated countries enjoyed in addition, was the partial rehabilitation by the Allies of their public services, particularly transport and communica-

¹ cf. Ch. V.

² cf. Ch. VII.

³ cf. Ch. VIII.

⁴ cf. Ch. XVII.

tions. This remains true although such rehabilitation was undertaken primarily for military, not civil purposes, and although the countries concerned had to pay for the benefits they received by suffering from extensive, albeit temporary, monopolization of these services by the Allied forces.

But at this point it is perhaps desirable to remind ourselves of the tasks which had in fact been laid upon the Civil Affairs organization. In the War Office Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field these were stated to be “. . . to further present and future military operations by:

- (a) Ensuring the security of the Occupying forces.
- (b) Maintaining good order.
- (c) Conserving fighting troops for active operations.
- (d) Developing the economic resources of the occupied territory.”

The relief of the liberated peoples was, in fact, a legitimate object only to the extent that it might conduce to the attainment of the first three of these objectives.

In regard to the fourth objective it is possible to claim only very partial success. In many fields nothing could be done within the period of military responsibility. This was due rather to the circumstances of the time than to any failure of the organization. It is more than unlikely that any other form of organization could have succeeded as well. And in fact something was achieved in the rehabilitation, and much in the utilization, of indigenous transport, accommodation and coal resources.

In regard to the first three objects the Civil Affairs organization can unhesitatingly claim success. There were no outbreaks of epidemic disease. There was no unrest requiring diversion of troops from prosecution of the battle. The occasion when this most nearly happened was in Brussels on 25th November 1944,¹ but in the event the Belgian gendarmerie succeeded in mastering the situation without calling in the 21 Army Group tanks. There were no complaints of refugees obstructing or hampering the movement of troops. The very fact that many commanders scarcely noticed the Civil Affairs organization and knew little of what it was trying to do is in some sort a tribute to the success of the work undertaken by the organization. If there had been failure the commanders, and the Civil Affairs staffs, would have known soon enough.

* * *

The statement of objects in the War Office manual concluded with the following:

¹ cf. p. 119.

“The sooner a just and stable government of the occupied territory can be established the better will these objects be achieved.”

As the battle moved on, the weight of Civil Affairs activity and interest in liberated territories shifted from the basic detachments and formation staffs to the S.H.A.E.F. Missions, and it was with this objective of encouraging the revival of indigenous governments that the Missions were mainly concerned.

Their work was basically the same in all the liberated countries. But there were marked differences of atmosphere. There was the insecurity and hurt pride of France. There was the warm, perhaps too easy, too practised, welcome of the Belgians, and their ready acceptance of the Head of the Mission as almost a temporary constitutional monarch (he was known to his intimates as King Robert I of Belgium). There were the internal divisions and rivalries of Holland. It is curious that the Dutch probably did more and suffered more for the Allies than any of the other liberated peoples, and that Civil Affairs probably did more for the Dutch, but that nevertheless relations in the field between the Allies and the Dutch remained the least cordial. For this there were at least two reasons not difficult to understand. There was, first, the inability of the Allies to liberate the country after the drive to Arnhem, notwithstanding the hopes raised by their appeal for strikes to hamper German movement and the whole-hearted response to this by the Dutch. There was, secondly, the great disappointment of the Dutch when, in the spring of 1945, 21 Army Group pressed on into Germany instead of wheeling left and liberating the B2 Area. By this time victory was assured and many in Holland were beginning to wonder whether it was the Germans or the Russians that the western Allies were really fighting.

In view of the nature of their task the work of the Missions was less positive and direct than that of the Civil Affairs detachments in the field, and the formation staffs. All the Missions consistently and successfully adhered to a policy of non-intervention in internal politics. It is the measure of the success of their work that in none of the liberated territories was it long before an indigenous government was able to assume responsibility, subject to quite inconsiderable reservations in favour of the Supreme Commander.

* * *

On entry into Germany the basic objectives already quoted remained valid. But they required to be pursued under different conditions.

In the first place there were to be no relief supplies. It was the policy that the German people should be required to feed themselves and so learn what their leaders had done to the economy of Europe

'Taxes or other revenues will not be used for the payment of principal or interest on government obligations without prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff'.

The question was whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be moved to give their approval. But it was inadvisable to lift this prohibition until there was some prospect of bringing public expenditure into balance with public revenue. And in fact no answer could be given to the question within the period with which this book is concerned, for, apart from the difficulty of balancing income and expenditure, this was essentially a long-term problem and a matter to be decided by the Control Commission, rather than the Supreme Commander.

By the end of the mobile phase the Second Army Military Government staff felt justified in claiming that they had accomplished the three main financial tasks laid upon them, namely:

- (a) the imposition of blocking and freezing controls
- (b) denazification with regard to the 'automatic' categories,
- (c) the re-establishment of an emergency short-term financial administration.

* * *

In war some degree of inflation is inevitable. The combating of this in liberated territories was no direct concern of Civil Affairs, being a matter for the indigenous governments. In Germany the preparation of a long range programme for the purpose was a matter for the Control Commission. Yet, in bringing about conditions that would facilitate rather than obstruct military operations, an important element was the creation of reasonably stable financial conditions and the existence of a sound currency. Accordingly the Supreme Commander felt it incumbent upon him, and in Germany was specifically enjoined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to take such steps as were possible to prevent inflation. To this end the German authorities were to be ordered to continue the counter-inflationary controls already operating, such as rationing and measures to control prices and to combat black markets. The Allied military authorities for their part planned to reduce purchasing power by encouraging members of their forces not to spend more than they need and by making it as easy as possible for them to remit home any surpluses. They also planned to limit outright requisitioning as far as possible since this might be expected to force goods underground and inflate black market prices, and, in liberated countries, to import goods for civilian consumption in order to reduce the disparity between purchasing power and essential commodities.

It is difficult to say how effective these avowedly short term measures

proved in the event. Conditions were too varied, disturbed, and uncertain, and transport and communications were too lacking, for anything like a genuine price-level to emerge during the period with which this book is concerned. Controlled prices in liberated countries tended to be about double 1939 prices. The black market flourished in Belgium and France. In Germany it was at first comparatively insignificant. Black market prices were anything from five to fifteen times the pre-war normal prices. All that can safely be said is that the measures taken by the Allied authorities must have minimized these evils.

* * *

Before leaving the subject of Finance, brief reference is necessary to the arrangements for the maintenance and audit of accounts.

A preliminary point needs to be made. Although a combined, or 'integrated', Anglo-American Supreme Headquarters had been established for the conduct of operations against Germany, under a Supreme Commander, who might have been either British or American but in point of fact was American, there were no combined funds for this purpose. No order by the Supreme Commander could of itself directly result in expenditure. All that it could do was to require expenditure by Army Group or other Commanders from their own national resources, British or American, as the case might be. Agreement regarding the necessity for such expenditure, and the general purposes to which it should be directed, would be reached at the appropriate level of the combined Anglo-American machinery. Formal sanction would need to flow down normal British or American military channels. Responsibility to account for the expenditure sanctioned would follow the same channels. But if the Supreme Commander disposed of no combined funds, he did directly control issues from the stocks of relief supplies which, for reasons that have been given in another chapter¹, had been procured under combined arrangements. The responsibility to account for the use of these ran up to the Supreme Commander, not along national channels. Accordingly, the Controller of Finance and Accounts at 21 Army Group, the senior British formation, owed a divided responsibility. For relief supplies he was required to account to S.H.A.E.F. and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For cash and currency he owed a dual responsibility, to S.H.A.E.F. for ensuring that the general lines of agreed Allied financial policy were observed, to the War Office for ensuring that funds made available by it were spent on the purposes for which they had been provided.

¹ cf. Ch. XVII.

Little comment is necessary regarding the various sets of accounts required to be maintained. The responsibility for the maintenance of cash accounts in the field was divided between two levels. The basis of the machinery for the keeping of these accounts was the appointment of particular Civil Affairs or Military Government officers as sub-accountants and the concentration upon them so far as possible of all cash transactions in the field. The only other level at which accounts were maintained was that of the C.F.A. where centralized control accounting took place. Other levels of the army hierarchy were skipped, and sub-accountants enjoyed direct communication with the C.F.A. Property control accounts were of two kinds. There were first the accounts of transactions by Military Government officers themselves in connection with property taken into control. The responsibility for the maintenance of these, which were liable to raise questions of a more technical nature than the ordinary cash accounts, rested mainly on specialist Property Control officers. Secondly there were the internal accounts recording the transactions of business enterprises and of custodians administering other property. The responsibility for the maintenance of these rested upon the businesses affected or upon the appointed custodians under the supervision of Property Control or other Military Government Officers. The customary method of accounting might not be altered without approval of the Deputy Property Control Officer at the military headquarters concerned.

As for supply accounting, the initial arrangements for the issue of supplies required prepayment by the indigenous authorities and the maintenance of a record of the value of the supplies issued to enable an ultimate settlement to be made between the governments concerned. In October 1944 a revised procedure was introduced under which issues were made in exchange for a quantitative receipt from the indigenous authorities. Supply accounting in the field now, theoretically, involved nothing more elaborate than the taking of these receipts and the maintenance of a quantitative record, so that claims could in due course be prepared against the indigenous authorities. Anything more complicated was adjudged impracticable. Average prices for supplies were fixed outside the theatre of operations for the purpose of claims against recipient Governments, taking into account the various sources of provision of the goods supplied. But it was not without difficulty that the duty even of taking quantitative receipts was laid upon the Civil Affairs staff. Under U.S. Army procedure supplies did not require to be accounted for once they had been issued from a depot *if the issue took place in a theatre of war*. Civil Affairs supplies were clearly issued in a theatre of war and much persuasion was needed before American staffs would agree to placing the burden of taking quantitative receipts upon forces in the field. Without such receipts, however, it would have been impossible either to give effect to the

agreed policy that the countries receiving relief supplies should be called upon to pay for them if able to do so, or to ascertain the proportions in which these imports originated from the U.K., the U.S. and Canada. American agreement was ultimately obtained. To what extent the U.S. forces observed the resulting orders, however, is another matter. It is not impossible that the picture given at the end of Chapter XVII of the comparative shares of the western Allies in the provision of supplies for the liberated countries is significantly out of balance and that the total of these imports was in fact greater than they can be shown to have been.

Of audit there was not a great deal. Internal audit of all kinds of accounts was undertaken by audit officers at S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group to the extent that this was practicable. But, in fact, so far as cash accounts in the field were concerned, there was little to audit since, because of mutual aid, and of the conditions imposed on Germany, very few transactions found their way into the Civil Affairs or Military Government accounts. The only external audit was conducted after the dissolution of S.H.A.E.F., when the Combined Civil Affairs Committee appointed Combined Auditors. But they were required to conduct a general survey rather than a formal audit. The conclusion reached by these auditors was that the cash and currency accounts properly reflected relationships between the combined military authorities and the governments or authorities involved, adequately protected combined interests, and provided data in a form suitable for negotiating post war inter-governmental settlements. They found that the supply accounts did not fully perform these functions. The apparently simple procedure for taking quantitative receipts had not worked satisfactorily. There were various reasons, but in the main it was due to the conditions in which the system had had to be operated. These were described by the Combined Auditors. They said:

‘The simplest way to get a clear general picture of the conditions under which supply issues in the European Theatre of Operations were made is to consider the operation as a large merchandising business, probably involving more than \$1,000,000,000. But it is a peculiar and unusual business carried on under conditions without precedent.

1. The total amount of purchases (goods shipped or diverted for Civil Affairs purposes) is not precisely known and the liability to suppliers (US, UK or Canada) is not known in total, nor does any exact basis exist for the division of such a total if known.

2. No central stock control exists.

3. In U.S. depots, complete and reasonably accurate physical inventories have not been taken, and we are informed that such inventories are considered impracticable. In UK Civil Affairs depots, physical inventories are taken periodically and discrepancies adjusted.

4. Prices and uniform descriptions have not been prepared for the greater part of the goods issued or in stock.
5. Sales (goods billed) and accounts receivable (uncollected bills) are based on quantitative receipts of National Authorities, forwarded by the issuing depots, together with additional information derived from some cross-check of the depot records and the records of the National Authorities (See II-BI 1, Appendix 2).
6. In view of the foregoing, it is obvious that this large business is being run without financial books, as the basis for such books, that is, value of goods shipped, monetary amount of losses in transit, value of inventories and value of issues, is incomplete.'

The auditors continued:

'Apparently the original scheme envisaged that all stores and supplies furnished for Civil Affairs purposes would be clearly marked, would be shipped separately, unloaded into special dumps and depots, and at all times would be clearly kept apart for Civil Affairs needs and controlled by Civil Affairs personnel.

If this was the intention, it seems to have broken down as from D-Day. This condition existed for several months. Any and all stores and supplies, whether for Army or for civil use, were likely to be mixed up and shipped in any available space; they were unloaded in conditions of the utmost haste and danger on the beaches, with resulting confusion, and were hurried away inland at top speed. Much of the marking was indistinguishable, and even if it were not, little notice would be taken of it when operational needs supervened. Many of the items for Civil Affairs were identical with army items, and if troops needed biscuit, they got biscuit, regardless of whether cases were marked CA or not. Similarly, a starving village, when overrun in the advance, would, on occasion, be fed with biscuit from the most convenient source, regardless of whether it was from CA or from Army supplies.'

The auditors listed other causes for confusion, inaccuracy, and inability to maintain records. But they also made clear their view that the conditions were largely unavoidable and that nothing in their report should be taken as criticism of any officer or official.

* * *

Comment was made when writing of the incredible complexity of the plans for the return to Europe, that it was nothing short of a miracle that the invasion was ever launched and succeeded in establishing itself on the continent.¹ This applies with quite particular force to the financial arrangements, especially to those for the provision

¹ cf. Ch. IV.

of currency. For in the making of these it was not only necessary to overcome the physical difficulties which attended the delivery of all material at the right time and place on the shores of Normandy. Money depends for its usefulness upon the intangible and elusive factor of confidence. It was, accordingly, also necessary to create confidence in the currency imported and confidence in the ability of the authorities concerned to provide it when and where required. Any failure in this delicate task would have entailed the most serious consequences. Taking into account the difficulties arising from the integrated Anglo-American nature of the undertaking, considering also the number of countries and currencies concerned, the amounts of currency involved, the improvisation, and the nomad conditions in which the 'central bank on jeeps' was required to operate, it is remarkable and a tribute to all who took part in the planning and execution, how smoothly the financial arrangements worked.

CHAPTER XXV

CONCLUSION

THROUGH the last months of 1945 and the early months of 1946 it was not infrequently said that the British military authorities were 'winning the Battle of the Winter'. Though fair enough as a dramatization of the difficult and dangerous situation facing the forces of occupation, this must nevertheless have caused a certain lifting of the eye-brows among Germans, dazed and war-weary though they might be. For indeed it was their resilience and industry, their ability to survive on a ration that the experts had pronounced insufficient to sustain life and make work possible for more than a few months, that enabled the battle to be won. The question naturally arises how much the Civil Affairs and Military Government organization was in fact able to achieve, and whether it did not tend to see itself as accomplishing tasks that in fact it had done no more than enable, sometimes merely permit, others to undertake.

In the liberated territories its major positive contribution was the import of relief supplies. The imports were but a small proportion of the total tonnages handled by the military machine, and were for the most part small in comparison with the indigenous contribution. Even in the case of Paris, where an exceptional effort was made by the Allies, a great deal more was brought into the city by the French from their own resources than by the British and Americans.¹ On the other hand much of the French effort was made possible by the use of Allied transport and petrol. And at certain times and places, for example in Belgium, the Allied contribution probably just saved a situation that might have become dangerous.² In Holland there can be no doubt that it played a decisive part in saving thousands of Dutch people from death by starvation.³ And it remains a very remarkable thing that the western Allies while engaged in a struggle for their very existence should have planned to import, and should in fact have succeeded in landing on the continent, five and a quarter million tons of supplies for the relief of the civil population of the liberated countries.⁴

An incidental uncovenanted advantage which many of the liberated countries enjoyed in addition, was the partial rehabilitation by the Allies of their public services, particularly transport and communica-

¹ cf. Ch. V.

² cf. Ch. VII.

³ cf. Ch. VIII.

⁴ cf. Ch. XVII.

tions. This remains true although such rehabilitation was undertaken primarily for military, not civil purposes, and although the countries concerned had to pay for the benefits they received by suffering from extensive, albeit temporary, monopolization of these services by the Allied forces.

But at this point it is perhaps desirable to remind ourselves of the tasks which had in fact been laid upon the Civil Affairs organization. In the War Office Manual of Civil Affairs in the Field these were stated to be “. . . to further present and future military operations by:

- (a) Ensuring the security of the Occupying forces.
- (b) Maintaining good order.
- (c) Conserving fighting troops for active operations.
- (d) Developing the economic resources of the occupied territory.”

The relief of the liberated peoples was, in fact, a legitimate object only to the extent that it might conduce to the attainment of the first three of these objectives.

In regard to the fourth objective it is possible to claim only very partial success. In many fields nothing could be done within the period of military responsibility. This was due rather to the circumstances of the time than to any failure of the organization. It is more than unlikely that any other form of organization could have succeeded as well. And in fact something was achieved in the rehabilitation, and much in the utilization, of indigenous transport, accommodation and coal resources.

In regard to the first three objects the Civil Affairs organization can unhesitatingly claim success. There were no outbreaks of epidemic disease. There was no unrest requiring diversion of troops from prosecution of the battle. The occasion when this most nearly happened was in Brussels on 25th November 1944,¹ but in the event the Belgian gendarmerie succeeded in mastering the situation without calling in the 21 Army Group tanks. There were no complaints of refugees obstructing or hampering the movement of troops. The very fact that many commanders scarcely noticed the Civil Affairs organization and knew little of what it was trying to do is in some sort a tribute to the success of the work undertaken by the organization. If there had been failure the commanders, and the Civil Affairs staffs, would have known soon enough.

* * *

The statement of objects in the War Office manual concluded with the following:

¹ cf. p. 119.

“The sooner a just and stable government of the occupied territory can be established the better will these objects be achieved.”

As the battle moved on, the weight of Civil Affairs activity and interest in liberated territories shifted from the basic detachments and formation staffs to the S.H.A.E.F. Missions, and it was with this objective of encouraging the revival of indigenous governments that the Missions were mainly concerned.

Their work was basically the same in all the liberated countries. But there were marked differences of atmosphere. There was the insecurity and hurt pride of France. There was the warm, perhaps too easy, too practised, welcome of the Belgians, and their ready acceptance of the Head of the Mission as almost a temporary constitutional monarch (he was known to his intimates as King Robert I of Belgium). There were the internal divisions and rivalries of Holland. It is curious that the Dutch probably did more and suffered more for the Allies than any of the other liberated peoples, and that Civil Affairs probably did more for the Dutch, but that nevertheless relations in the field between the Allies and the Dutch remained the least cordial. For this there were at least two reasons not difficult to understand. There was, first, the inability of the Allies to liberate the country after the drive to Arnhem, notwithstanding the hopes raised by their appeal for strikes to hamper German movement and the whole-hearted response to this by the Dutch. There was, secondly, the great disappointment of the Dutch when, in the spring of 1945, 21 Army Group pressed on into Germany instead of wheeling left and liberating the B2 Area. By this time victory was assured and many in Holland were beginning to wonder whether it was the Germans or the Russians that the western Allies were really fighting.

In view of the nature of their task the work of the Missions was less positive and direct than that of the Civil Affairs detachments in the field, and the formation staffs. All the Missions consistently and successfully adhered to a policy of non-intervention in internal politics. It is the measure of the success of their work that in none of the liberated territories was it long before an indigenous government was able to assume responsibility, subject to quite inconsiderable reservations in favour of the Supreme Commander.

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On entry into Germany the basic objectives already quoted remained valid. But they required to be pursued under different conditions.

In the first place there were to be no relief supplies. It was the policy that the German people should be required to feed themselves and so learn what their leaders had done to the economy of Europe

and their country. And, although the establishment of a just and stable government was as desirable in Germany as anywhere else, it was quite undecided when and how an indigenous government would be revived, and very clear that much doubt and difficulty would attend the birth of the temporary Allied organ of central control. Above all, there was to be a different temper about proceedings. In words that have already been quoted.¹

“... in liberated, friendly territories . . . we are dealing with our Allies . . . we therefore respect their sovereignty and institutions and we endeavour to work in harmony with them . . . In Germany . . . it is the duty of commanders to impose the will of the Supreme Commander upon the German people . . . Germany will be made to realize that this time she had been well and truly beaten . . . and must now do as she is ordered.”

The direct maintenance of order had now become the prime task, a responsibility that in liberated countries it had generally speaking been possible to farm out upon the indigenous authorities, whether police or resistance forces.

At the outset this task resolved itself into two. There was first the need to revive and then control the German administration. Clearly this was done with a high degree of success.² Partly this resulted from the orderly, disciplined character of the German people, and their readiness to accept Allied control. Partly it resulted from the thoroughness and soundness of the Allied plans and preparations. Above all it proceeded from the good sense, courage, initiative and readiness to take responsibility of Military Government officers in the field. No apology is made for repeating a tribute paid to the work of these men by the Political Adviser to their Commander-in-Chief which has already been quoted.³

‘Of the staffs of these [military Government] detachments, I would say that I was deeply impressed by the single-minded devotion which they were bringing to their unprecedented task. I had seldom met a body of men who were more obviously enjoying the work they were doing, though they had to operate with inadequate staff, working long hours and sometimes without the requisite instructions. It seemed to me that the skill, good humour and common sense with which they were guiding the local German administrations which were growing up under their care might fairly be said to derive from a traditional aptitude for government. But I also thought that they reflected credit upon those who, while the war was still being fought, had

¹ cf. Ch. XI.

² cf. Ch. XII and XIII.

³ cf. Ch. II.

planned and conducted the courses of instruction under which these staffs had been trained.¹

The same observer after voicing criticism that applied rather to the Control Commission than to the military authorities, added:

'But having said all this, I would say also that if there is a better all-round administrator, able to tackle any problem in no matter what field, than the trained staff-officer of the British Army I have yet to find him. In Germany he was put to the test and he proved his worth in brilliant fashion.'²

The other part of the task was the control and care of the hordes of displaced persons found in the British zone of Germany. This formidable undertaking has been described in an earlier Chapter.³ It was no mere soup-kitchen operation, for control had to precede care, and this involved the assertion of authority over rather more than two million persons, many of whom were maddened into brutishness by hunger, lust, alcohol and a craving for revenge. Not infrequently fire had to be opened, sometimes with fatal results. Gradually some sort of discipline was established. With the help of the British Red Cross and other voluntary organizations, the military authorities fed, sheltered, re-clothed these unhappy persons. Before handing over responsibility to the Control Commission they had repatriated no less than one and a half million persons, notwithstanding the shattered state of Europe's transport, and the many other demands upon its resources. This was indeed an achievement of which all those who took part may well be proud.

With these two tasks in hand, there followed the complex operation described as the Battle of the Winter, and we can return to the question of the part which the Military Government organization in fact played therein. The coal produced in this battle was Ruhr coal. The men who won it were German miners. The calories to enable them to hew were, for the most part, scraped from the German barrel. Machinery was patched up or pieced together from indigenous resources often by processes of 'cannibalization'. Distribution was in the hands of denazified German organizations. The railways that moved food and coal were German railways, using German rolling stock, operated by German railwaymen, burning German coal. In the matter of food there had, in the event, to be a contribution by the Allies, but even so by far the greater part of the ration was found from indigenous production. In housing, above all, it was German labour, using the negligible stocks of new materials, and salvage from the ruins of their cities, with the minimum of Allied assistance, that put a roof over the

¹ Strang, *Home and Abroad*, London, 1956, pp. 229-230.

² *Ibid.* p. 238.

³ cf. Ch. XVIII.

houses which were not irreparably damaged, and patched their windows with tin, wood, paper or, rarely, with glass. In all these matters it must often have seemed to Germans that the military authorities, far from 'winning the battle of the winter,' were merely engaged in seizing indigenous resources, using these for the transportation and accommodation of themselves and of the displaced persons, and releasing the bare minimum, often not even that, for the civil population. And where the Allied forces did take part in rehabilitating essential services the results were not always happy. Reference has already been made in an earlier chapter to the lack of success that attended their efforts to bring a railway into operation until the task was handed over to Germans.¹ Finally, it was, very properly, a provision of the Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany under the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Supreme Authority, that the cost of all relief and rehabilitation, whether undertaken by Germans or by the British military authorities, was to be borne by Germany. Where, it may legitimately be asked, did the Military Government contribution come in?

With invasion and defeat, all authority and organization had collapsed in Germany, except here and there at the local level. Transport and communications, without which there can be no administration, or even distribution of food, had ceased to function. Most persons who had been in positions of responsibility had disappeared. The Germans left were dazed and without hope or purpose. It was the vital contribution of Military Government to supply the initiative, to confer the authority, to provide the minimum framework of transport and communications for the salvaging of an administration, to control and direct its operations and resources. By insisting that the latter should be applied first to the needs of displaced persons and of the Allied forces (though the latter in fact made but small demands upon the food of Germany) the military authorities further reduced the food, shelter, clothing and coal available for the people of Germany and in so doing endangered their own chances of success in the battle of the winter. But no other course would have been tolerable to Allied opinion, or the armed forces themselves. For years Germany had fed, and added to her industrial capital, at the expense of the rest of Europe. Only in the last resort would the military authorities consider bringing relief from outside. But when it became clear that such relief must be furnished if there was not to be a major disaster, they took the unpopular but all-important decision to press for imports of wheat. The difficulties then encountered have been told in an earlier chapter.² But at length a trickle of grain began to arrive. It furnished a mere fraction of the German ration. By such a narrow margin was

¹ cf. Ch. XXIII.

² cf. Ch. XVIII.

famine averted, however, that the absence of even these slender imports might well have precipitated collapse. And taken the decision was, in the nick of time.

Least satisfactory, probably, of Military Government undertakings was denazification. For in truth it was impracticable, above all for a foreign authority, to conduct with realism an inquisition on the scale attempted into the tangled and perplexing problem of the degree of involvement of individual Germans in the Nazi movement and ideology. It was hoped that after the purge political life would revive in democratic form. At this stage there was applied again the policy of non-intervention in internal politics. This soon attracted criticism on the ground that the Allies should have given support and encouragement to the liberal and democratic anti-Nazi parties. But many of the anti-Nazi parties were neither liberal or democratic. And it was inconsistent with the object of a war fought to eradicate militarism and totalitarianism and to introduce a democratic way of life, to seek to force a particular party into power.

But although denazification attempted the impossible and therefore fell short of success, it was far from failure. And the broader picture was one upon which the military authorities could fairly congratulate themselves. Order had been re-established. The care and repatriation of displaced persons was inevitably rough and ready but had achieved a remarkable degree of success, given the scale and conditions of the problem. Disease on anything approaching an epidemic scale was averted. Hunger was not. But someone in Europe had to go short and it was clearly the turn of Germany. And hunger was not allowed to develop into starvation such as had been encountered in Holland. Above all, administration had been revived and authority re-established, 21 Army Group Military Government Headquarters supplying the motive power and assuming the part of the government of the British zone. And this essentially military government had taken the initiative in relaxing restrictions on political activity and freedom of speech and thought.¹

* * *

Justly to appreciate the real quality of these successes, however, we need to remind ourselves of the background against which the men who achieved them had to work.

The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for his military operations ran:

‘You will enter the Continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces’.

¹ cf. p. 241 and pp. 383-384.

These instructions were terse and clear and were issued to the Supreme Commander when he assumed responsibility. There were no subsequent modifications or hesitations. In the field of Civil Affairs and military government there was a striking contrast. Most of the military planning and preparation for the administration and control of countries entered in the course of the invasion of Europe had to be undertaken without instruction from above or in the light of directives that were so general and colourless as to afford little positive guidance. In the sphere of operations there was little room for differences of opinion. The object was to defeat the enemy. The need to do this was what had brought the Allies together. The Civil Affairs and military government directives, however, involved political considerations, and at once came near to the matters that kept the Allies apart. It is safe to say that never before in the history of war had two Allies so completely pooled and integrated their physical resources as the British and Americans. Yet, as always in the past, there remained the political difficulties of waging war in alliance. And in this field there was a third partner to be considered, remote but influential. It was scarcely surprising that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have experienced difficulty in framing their instructions to the Supreme Commander in respect to Civil Affairs and military government.

In the case of France there was no room for doubt regarding the attitude of the Allies to the people. The Anglo-American forces came as friends anxious to liberate and to help the French. It was the question of recognizing and working with General de Gaulle and the organization he had built up with such awkward determination in the United Kingdom, in Algiers, and later in France, that created the difficulties. The slow development of Allied willingness to recognize the Provisional Government meant that no directive for Civil Affairs in France was ever issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander until long after the invasion of France was over.¹ The Supreme Commander waited for months and finally issued his own instructions to his Army Groups on a provisional basis, a bare fortnight before the landings in Normandy. The multifarious and extremely complex plans for the revival of administration in France drawn up by 21 Army Group and its subordinate Armies and Corps had to be undertaken by these formations months before receipt of the provisional instructions from the Supreme Commander, very largely of their own motion, and in the light of the Civil Affairs doctrine evolved at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre, of what could be found out of planning at higher levels, and of their own assumptions as to what would be necessary. The plans evolved are a striking tribute to the quality of the Civil Affairs staffs concerned.

¹ cf. Ch. III.

In the case of Germany the uncertainty reached a great deal further, involving not only the measures to be taken to govern the country, but also the attitude to be adopted towards the people, and the economic policy to be followed. As in the case of France this uncertainty arose from the inability of the major Allies to reach agreement between themselves or even at times within their own ranks. And Soviet Russia was now involved, to a degree that she had not been in the case of France. It sprang from no failure on the part of the Civil Affairs and Military Government planners to request guidance. Even in the C.O.S.S.A.C. days General Morgan had repeatedly pressed for instructions.

'Very early in the proceedings we felt obliged to question the object given to C.O.S.S.A.C. . . . Was it indeed a fact that [the Combined Chiefs of Staff's] sole object in invading north-west Europe would be to defeat the German fighting forces in that locality? . . . It was true . . . that the particular task of C.O.S.S.A.C. was strictly circumscribed, but of necessity the method by which C.O.S.S.A.C. was to perform its allotted portion of this great design must depend on the over-all general intention that was to inspire the movement of the forces across the Channel . . . we tried, but tried in vain, to obtain some such statement of a long-term political object.'¹

Later, the S.H.A.E.F. and 21 Army Group planners were ever keenly conscious of the lack of political guidance.

The plans prepared by them for the military government of Germany before the end of fighting were based on a directive from the combined Chiefs of Staff that was general in the extreme, and entirely negative in character. The plans had then to be twisted out of shape in the light of President Roosevelt's espousal of the Morgenthau plan—a plan that was quickly and strongly opposed by the State Department and War Department in Washington, and, after a time lag, by the British authorities also. For military government after surrender the Combined Chiefs of Staff had promised a further directive, but none ever reached the Supreme Commander. He decided at the last moment to extend to this period the pre-surrender plans prepared by S.H.A.E.F. and its subordinate formations, 'since these were not significantly different' from what was known to him of the intentions of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

It was against the background of these great uncertainties that 21 Army Group and the American Army Groups (though we are here expressly concerned only with the British formation) faced a situation without precedent in history. Never before had such a complex and highly developed society suffered such devastation. Not for centuries,

¹ Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, London, 1950, pp. 65-66.

perhaps never before, had civilization experienced such a reversion to bestiality and barbarism as the Nazi reign of terror. And suddenly, as this pestilence passed away, there loomed up behind it an even more redoubtable but as yet ill-understood menace. It was the emergence of this during the months of military responsibility that began, insensibly at first, to modify the fundamental attitude of Military Government. The original determination that Germany should be jointly and firmly, if not punitively, occupied by the three victorious Allies, and deprived, at all costs and for as long as possible, of the power to make war, began to yield to a different purpose which could only be clearly discerned after military responsibility had ceased. The essence of this was that the British zone, while being kept under adequate control, should above all be saved from economic collapse and further social disintegration, and be preserved as a counterpoise to the Russian zone and, if necessary, as a defence against the westward spread of Russian influence.

It was against this uncertain and shifting back-ground that Military Government officers carried on the day-to-day business of dealing with Germans and that the Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government at 21 Army Group Headquarters took two momentous and far-reaching decisions. The first was that every possible step should be taken to revive the coal industry of the Ruhr. The second was that wheat must be imported for the German people. These decisions were taken at a time when no guidance on economic policy had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when the Potter /Hindley report had not yet succeeded in modifying the declared presurrender policy that

‘No steps looking toward economic rehabilitation of Germany are to be undertaken except as may be immediately necessary in support of military operations’

and in the face of the S.H.A.E.F. instruction that

‘It is the policy not to import relief supplies into Germany. This policy will only be modified in extreme emergencies to the minimum extent necessary to prevent disease or such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.’

They were taken also at a time when Allied public opinion, within and without the Armed forces, which over the years had been hardened by propaganda in resolution to destroy the German state, had now in the case of many persons been inflamed, by the discovery of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps, into hatred of the German people.

With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that, once Germany had been defeated, the issue of greatest moment to the people of western

Europe, if not the world, was the question where the 'iron curtain' would descend, and how far west of the agreed line Communist influence might be pushed as a result of famine and chaos in the west. These two decisions, taken by the Director of Military Government were not popular. They were taken in view of the existing circumstances but against what was known of Government policies at the time. They were courageous and statesmanlike decisions and were among the earliest, and by no means the least important, of the steps taken to preserve and consolidate the anti-Communist bridgehead in Europe.

* * *

Finally, if he may be forgiven for concluding at a more personal and day-to-day level, the present writer is left with two very strong impressions gained while working on this book. The first was formed in the course of a visit to Germany to meet a number of the leading Germans who worked under the military administration established by 21 Army Group. The tributes paid by them to the competence and integrity of their opposite numbers in the British administration with whom they found themselves called to work, were warm and clearly genuine. In many cases friendships had continued after the departure of the British officers from Germany, friendships which may be a source of strength to those seeking to repair the damage done by Nazism to the public life of Germany, long after official policy has been forgotten. The second impression grew out of meetings with many ex-military government officers in the United Kingdom. Few recruits came happily to Civil Affairs in the first instance, for there was a certain lack of glamour about a service which was clearly going to be largely concerned with the operation of public utilities, of banks, of criminal courts and of what looked as if it might become a nightmare grocery business. Regular officers particularly were inclined to ask what on earth they had done to deserve such a fate. But little by little their attitude changed. They found themselves engaged in work of great value and absorbing interest, work, above all, that was constructive in a world temporarily given over to destruction. Many, from the Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government at 21 Army Group downwards, have made it very clear to the writer that by the time their connection with military government was to be severed, they had come to feel it was the most rewarding work they had ever undertaken. One, a man of penetrating honesty and exacting standards with a record of valuable service behind him wrote that he '... privately and quite honestly has always considered it the only really worth while thing he ever did in his life.' It is hard to believe that work which yielded such satisfaction and fulfilment was anything but worth while and well done.

Appendices

APPENDIX I

Civil Affairs Agreement—Norway

Arrangements for Civil Administration and Jurisdiction in Norwegian Territory Liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force

The discussions which have taken place between the Norwegian and the (American)/(British) representatives concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdiction in Norwegian territory liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under an Allied Commander-in-Chief, have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions.

The agreed arrangements set out below are intended to be essentially temporary and practical and are designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Commander-in-Chief and to further our common purpose, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Norway and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.

1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must, to the full extent necessitated by the military situation, exercise supreme responsibility and authority.

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the military situation permits, the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied forces, such as ports, lines of communication and airfields, and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied forces of such other facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

3. (a) During the first phase the Commander-in-Chief will make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance which will be tendered to him through Norwegian liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in the personnel of a Norwegian military mission to be appointed by the Norwegian Government. He will also make the fullest possible use of loyal Norwegian local authorities.

(b) The Norwegian liaison officers referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the Allied military authorities and the Norwegian local authorities.

4. During the first phase the Norwegian Government will assist the Commander-in-Chief by reorganizing or re-establishing the Norwegian administrative and judicial services through whose collaboration the Commander-in-Chief can discharge his supreme responsibility. For this purpose the Norwegian Government will act through its representatives

on the spot, who, for practical reasons, will be included in the Norwegian military mission referred to in sub-paragraph 3 (a) above.

5. The appointment of the Norwegian administrative and judicial services will be effected by the competent Norwegian authorities in accordance with Norwegian law. If during the first phase (see paragraph 1 above) conditions should necessitate appointments in the Norwegian administrative or judicial service, the competent representative of the Norwegian Government will, upon the request of the Commander-in-Chief and after consultation with him, then appoint the requisite officials.

6. Members of the Norwegian armed forces serving in Norwegian units with the Allied Expeditionary Force in Norwegian territory shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Norwegian courts. Other Norwegians, who, at the time of entering Norway as members of the Allied Expeditionary Force, are serving in conditions which render them subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, will not be regarded as members of the Norwegian armed forces for this purpose.

7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Norwegian Government will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Norwegian courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offences against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces, without prejudice however to the power of the Commander-in-Chief, if military necessity requires, to bring to trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offence of this nature.

8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 15, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied forces respectively and over all persons of non-Norwegian nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to Allied naval, military, or air force law. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen as are not subject to Allied service law will require special consideration and should form the subject of a separate agreement.

9. Persons thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the Norwegian police for offences against Norwegian law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied service authority. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in paragraph 8, shall be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement.

10. The Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Norwegian authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or Norwegian jurisdiction.

11. There shall be established by the respective Allies claims com-

missions to examine and dispose of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Norwegian civilians against the Allied forces exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.

12. Members of the Allied forces and organisations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or to the Allied Governments, shall be exempt from all Norwegian taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Allied and Norwegian Governments. The Allied authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that such property is not sold to the public in Norway except in agreement with the Norwegian Government.

13. The Commander-in-Chief shall have power to requisition billets and supplies and make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of the forces under his command. Requisitions will be effected where possible through Norwegian authorities and in accordance with Norwegian law. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of Norwegian liaison officers attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

14. The immunity from Norwegian jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 12 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in Norway on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Expeditionary Force as may from time to time be notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the competent Norwegian authority.

15. Should circumstances in future be such as to require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Norwegian members of the Allied forces present in Norway, the Allied Governments concerned and the Norwegian Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

16. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Norwegian territory by an Allied Expeditionary Force (in particular questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first or military phase) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall form the subject of further negotiation as circumstances may require.

APPENDIX II

Civil Affairs Agreement—France

Memorandum No. 1. Relating to Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions

The present agreement, relating to the administrative and jurisdictional questions which will arise in the course of military operations of liberation on continental French territory, is intended to be essentially temporary and practical. It is designed to facilitate, as far as possible, the accomplishment of the following common objectives:

- (a) The speedy, total and final defeat of the common enemy, the liberation of French soil, and the resumption by France of her historic place among the Nations of the world.
- (b) The direction and co-ordination of the assistance which the French authorities and people will be able to render to the Allied Expeditionary Forces on the territory of continental France.
- (c) The adoption in that territory of all measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander for the successful conduct of his operations.

1. In areas in which military operations take place the Supreme Allied Commander will possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which in his judgment are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. Arrangements designed to carry out this purpose are set forth in the following Articles.

2. (i) Liberated French continental territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.

(ii) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (iv) below.

(iii) The interior zone will include all other regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (ii) below.

(iv) The Delegate referred to in Article 3 below will effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law in such manner as to meet the requirements stated by the Supreme Allied Commander.

3. (i) In accordance with Article 1 of the Ordonnance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on the 14th March, 1944, a Delegate will be appointed for the present theatre of operations. Other Delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

(ii) The Delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a Military Delegate and Liaison Officers for administrative duties. The Delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the French authorities.

(iii) When the powers conferred on the Delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the Delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:

(i) The Delegate will take, in accordance with French law, the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander to give effect to the provisions of Article 1, and in particular will issue regulations and make appointments in and removals from the public services.

(ii) In emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander under paragraph (i) of this Article, the latter may, as a temporary and exceptional measure, take such measures as are required by military necessity.

(iii) at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the French Military Delegate will take such action under his powers under the State of Siege in accordance with French law as may be necessary.

5. (i) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefor, including the powers under the State of Siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities. Special arrangements will be made between the competent French authorities and the Supreme Allied Commander at the latter's request in order that all measures may be taken which the latter considers necessary for the conduct of military operations.

(ii) Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 (iii) and (iv), certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special régime on account of their vital military importance; for example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration areas. In such zones, the Supreme Allied Commander is given the right to take, or to cause the services in charge of installations of military importance to take, all measures considered by him to be necessary for the conduct of operations and, in particular, to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. Consistent with these provisions, the conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities.

6. The Liaison Officers referred to in Article 3 (ii), placed by the Military Delegate at the disposal of the French administration, will ensure liaison between the said administration and the Allied forces.

7. (i) Members of the French armed forces serving in French units with the Allied forces in French territory will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts.

(ii) Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the French authorities may, in the absence of such authorities, be arrested by the Allied Military Police and detained by them until they can be handed over to the competent French authorities.

8. (i) In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Delegate will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial, in competent French courts in the vicinity, of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offences against the persons, property or security of the Allied forces.

(ii) For this purpose the Military Delegate will establish military tribunals as laid down in the Ordonnance of the 6th June, 1944, and ensure their effective operation. The Supreme Allied Commander will designate the military formations to which he wishes a military tribunal to be attached. The Military Delegate will immediately take the necessary measures to allocate these tribunals accordingly. The Supreme Allied Commander will be kept informed of the result of the proceedings.

9. (i) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 13, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of their respective forces.

(ii) British or American nationals not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces, and are subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, will for this purpose be regarded as members of the Allied forces. The same will apply to such persons, if possessing the nationality of another Allied State, provided that they were not first recruited in any French territory. If they were so recruited they will be subject to French jurisdiction in the absence of other arrangements between the authorities of their State and the French authorities.

(iii) The Allied military authorities will keep the French authorities informed of the result of proceedings taken against members of the Allied forces charged with offences against persons subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the French courts.

(iv) The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen of non-French nationality as are not subject to Allied service law will require special treatment and should form the subject of separate arrangements.

10. Persons who, in accordance with Article 9, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the French police for offences against French law and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied Service authority. The procedure for handing over such persons will be a matter for local arrangement.

11. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in Article 9 shall be conclusive.

12. The necessary arrangements will be made between the Allied military authorities and the competent French authorities to provide

machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and ensuring the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or French jurisdiction.

13. Should circumstances require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-French members of the Allied forces present in France, the Allied Governments concerned and the competent French authorities will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

14. (i) The Allied forces, their members and organisations attached to them, will be exempt from all direct taxes, whether levied for the State or local authorities. This provision does not apply to French nationals, nor, subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below, to foreigners, whatsoever their nationality, resident in France and recruited by the Allied forces on the spot.

(ii) Articles imported by the Allied forces or for their account, or by members of those forces within the limit of their personal needs, or imported by Allied forces or agencies for the purpose of free relief, will be exempt from customs duties and from all internal dues levied by the customs administration, subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below.

(iii) The application of the above provisions, including any questions relating to the sale to the civilian population of imported articles referred to in paragraph (ii) above, will form the subject of later negotiations, which, at the request of either party, may be extended to cover taxes which are not referred to in this Article.

15. The immunity from French jurisdiction and taxation resulting from Articles 9 and 14 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied forces, as may from time to time be notified by the Allied military authorities to the competent French authority.

16. (i) The respective Allied authorities will establish Claims Commissions to examine and dispose of any claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred in continental France against members of the Allied forces concerned (other than members of the French forces), exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy. These Claims Commissions will, to the greatest extent possible, deal with these claims in the same way and to the same extent as the competent French authorities would deal with claims arising out of damage or injury caused in similar circumstances by members of the French armed forces.

(ii) The competent Allied and French authorities will later discuss and determine the detailed arrangements necessary for examining and disposing of the claims referred to in this Article.

(iii) Nothing contained in this Article shall be deemed to prejudice any right which the French authorities, acting on behalf of French claimants, may have, under the relevant rules of international law, to present a claim

through diplomatic channels in a case which has been dealt with in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article.

17. (i) The Allied forces may obtain, within the limits of what is available, the supplies, facilities and services which they need for the common war effort.

(ii) At the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the French authorities will requisition, in accordance with French law (in particular as regards prices, wages and forms of payment), supplies, facilities and services which the Supreme Allied Commander determines are necessary for the military needs of his command. However, in the exceptional cases provided for in Article 4 (ii) above, the right of requisition is delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander, who will exercise it in accordance with current French prices and wages.

(iii) In order that the satisfaction of the local requirements of the Allied armed forces may have the least possible disruptive effect on the economy of France, the Allied military authorities and the French authorities will consult together, whenever operations permit, as to the stores, supplies and labour which procurement agencies and individual officers and men of the Allied forces are permitted by the Supreme Allied Commander to obtain locally by requisition, purchase or hire. The Allied military authorities will place such restrictions as are agreed to be necessary on purchases whether by agencies or troops.

(iv) The French and Allied military authorities shall jointly take the measures necessary to ensure that the provisions of this Article are carried out.

18. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of continental French territory which are not dealt with in this Memorandum shall form the subject of separate arrangements. Special arrangements will be made to secure the observation by the Allied forces of the French regulations concerning the exchange of currency and export of capital and will be set out in an Annex to this Memorandum.

APPENDIX III

Supreme Commander's Proclamation I—Germany

Proclamation No. 1

TO THE PEOPLE OF
GERMANY

I, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, do hereby proclaim as follows:

I

The Allied Forces serving under my command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my command, we shall obliterate Nazi-ism and German Militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel, oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the Party has created. We shall eradicate that German Militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and Party leaders, the Gestapo and others suspected of crimes and atrocities will be tried and, if guilty, punished as they deserve.

II

Supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government is established to exercise these powers under my direction. All persons in the occupied territory will obey immediately and without question all the enactments and orders of the Military Government. Military Government Courts will be established for the punishment of offenders. Resistance to the Allied Forces will be ruthlessly stamped out. Other serious offences will be dealt with severely.

III

All German courts and educational institutions within the occupied territory are suspended. The Volksgerichtshof, the Sondergerichte, the S.S. Police Courts and other special courts are deprived of authority throughout the occupied territory. Re-opening of the criminal and civil courts and educational institutions will be authorized when conditions permit.

IV

All officials are charged with the duty of remaining at their posts until further orders, and obeying and enforcing all orders or directions of

APPENDIX III

Military Government or the Allied Authorities addressed to the German Government or the German people. This applies also to officials, employees and workers of all public undertakings and utilities and to all other persons engaged in essential work.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, General
Supreme Commander
Allied Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX IV

Protocol between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and The Provisional Government of the French Republic on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of "Greater Berlin".

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have reached the following agreement with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender of Germany:

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the four Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the four Powers.

2. The boundaries of the four zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the four zones as between the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic will be as follows:

Eastern Zone

The territory of Germany (including the province of East Prussia) situated to the East of a line drawn from the point on Lübeck Bay where the frontiers of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg meet, along the western frontier of Mecklenburg to the frontier of the province of Hannover, thence, along the eastern frontier of Hannover, to the frontier of Brunswick; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony to the western frontier of Anhalt, thence along the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

North-Western Zone

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined in the description of the Eastern (Soviet) Zone, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the frontier between the Prussian provinces of Hannover and Hessen-Nassau meets the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony; thence along the southern frontier of

Hannover; thence along the southern-eastern and south-western frontiers of the Prussian province of Westphalia and along the eastern frontiers of the Prussian Regierungsbezirke of Köln and Aachen to the point where this frontier meets the Belgian-German frontier will be occupied by armed forces of the United Kingdom.

South-Western Zone

The territory of Germany situated to the south and east of a line commencing at the junction of the frontiers of Saxony, Bavaria and Czechoslovakia and extending westward along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the junction of the frontiers of Hessen-Nassau, Thuringia and Bavaria; thence north and west along the eastern and northern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the frontier of the district of Dill meets the frontier of the district of Oberwesterwald; thence along the western frontier of the district of Dill, the north-western frontier of the district of Oberlahn, the northern and western frontiers of the district of Limburg-an-der-Lahn, the north-western frontier of the district of Untertaunus, and the western frontier of the district of Rheingau; thence south and east along the western and southern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the River Rhine leaves the southern frontier of Hessen-Nassau; thence southwards along the centre of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where the latter leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where the frontier of the district of Karlsruhe meets the frontier of the district of Rastatt; thence north-east and south-east along the eastern frontier of Baden to the point where the frontier of Baden meets the frontier between the districts of Calw and Leonberg; thence south and east along the western frontier of the district of Leonberg, the western and southern frontiers of the district of Böblingen, the southern frontier of the district of Nürtingen and the southern frontier of the district of Göppingen to the point where the latter meets the Reichsautobahn between Stuttgart and Ulm; thence along the southern boundary of the Reichsautobahn to the point where the latter meets the western frontier of the district of Ulm thence south along the western frontier of the district of Ulm to the point where the latter meets the western frontier of the State of Bavaria; thence south along the western frontier of Bavaria to the point where the frontier of the district of Kempten meets the frontier of the district of Lindau; thence south-west along the western frontier of the district of Kempten and the western frontier of the district of Sonthofen to the point where the latter meets the Austro-German frontier will be occupied by armed forces of the United States of America.

For the purpose of facilitating communications between the South-Western Zone and the sea, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in the South-Western Zone will:

- (a) exercise such control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in the vicinity thereof as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements;
- (b) enjoy such transit facilities through the North-Western Zone as

may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements.

Western Zone

The Territory of Germany situated to the south and west of a line commencing at the junction of the frontiers of Belgium and of the Prussian *regierungsbezirke* of Trier and Aachen and extending eastward along the western frontier of the Prussian *regierungsbezirk* of Trier; thence north, east and south along the western, northern and eastern frontiers of the Prussian *regierungsbezirk* of Koblenz to the point where the frontier of Koblenz meets the frontier of the district of Oberwesterwald; thence east, south and west along the northern, eastern and southern frontiers of the district of Oberwesterwald and along the eastern frontiers of the districts of Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn and Sankt Goarshausen to the point where the frontier of the district of Sankt Goarshausen meets the frontier of the *regierungsbezirk* of Koblenz; thence south and east along the eastern frontier of Koblenz and the northern frontier of Hessen-Darmstadt to the point where the River Rhine leaves the southern frontier of Hessen-Nassau; thence southwards along the centre of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where the latter leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where the frontier of the district of Karlsruhe meets the frontier of the district of Rastatt, thence south-east along the northern frontier of the district of Rastatt; thence north-east and south along the western, northern and eastern boundaries of the district of Calw; thence eastwards along the northern frontiers of the districts of Horb, Tübingen, Reutlingen and Münsingen to the point where the northern frontier of the district of Münsingen meets the Reichsautobahn between Stuttgart and Ulm; thence south-east along the southern boundary of the Reichsautobahn to the point where the latter meets the eastern frontier of the district of Münsingen; thence south-east along the north-eastern frontiers of the districts of Münsingen, Ehingen and Biberach; thence southwards along the eastern frontiers of the districts of Biberach, Wangen and Lindau to the point where the eastern frontier of the district of Lindau meets the Austro-German frontier will be occupied by the armed forces of the French Republic.

The frontiers of States (*Länder*) and Provinces within Germany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of the 25th June, 1941 (published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Part I, No. 72, the 3rd July, 1941).

*Berlin Area*¹

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be

¹ Although the rest of the Protocol was amended after the Provisional Government of the French Republic had been invited to participate in the occupation of Germany, the European Advisory Commission recommended '... that the question of the delimitation of the French area in "Greater Berlin" which will have to be allotted from the American and British areas of "Greater Berlin" as a consequence of the greater destruction in the Soviet area of the City, should be referred to the Control Council in Berlin for consideration'.

jointly occupied by armed forces of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic. For this purpose the territory of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into four parts:

North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin"

(districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

North-Western part of "Greater Berlin"

(districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf) will be occupied by the forces of the United Kingdom.

Southern Part of "Greater Berlin"

(districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Templehof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of the United States of America.

The boundaries of Districts within "Greater Berlin" referred to in the foregoing descriptions are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on the 27th March, 1938 (Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin, No. 13 of the 27th March, 1938, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the four zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the four Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-Allied governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of four Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in quadruplicate in the English, Russian and French languages. The three texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

APPENDIX V

Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:

ARTICLE 1

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.

ARTICLE 3

(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ of control called the Control Council.

(b) The functions of the Control Council will be:

(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation;

(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;

(iii) to control the German central administration, which will operate under the direction of the Control Council and will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands.

(iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.

(c) The Control Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control Council will be held in rotation by each of its three members.

(d) Each member of the Control Council will be assisted by a political

adviser, who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air advisers.

ARTICLE 4

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Co-ordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.

ARTICLE 5

The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will include:

- (a) the carrying out of the decisions of the Control Council;
- (b) the day-to-day supervision and control of the activities of the German central administration and institutions;
- (c) the co-ordination of current problems which call for uniform measures in all three zones;
- (d) the preliminary examination and preparation for the Control Council of all questions submitted by individual Commanders-in-Chief.

ARTICLE 6

(a) The members of the Control Staff, appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organised in the following Divisions:

Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.

(b) At the head of each Division there will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power. The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting jointly, will include:

- (i) exercising control over the corresponding German Ministries and German central institutions;
- (ii) acting as advisers to the Control Council and, when necessary, attending meetings thereof;
- (iii) transmitting to the German central administration the decisions of the Control Council, communicated through the Co-ordinating Committee.

(c) The three heads of a Division will take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Division are on the agenda.

(d) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.

ARTICLE 7

(a) An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be organised to serve the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the local organs of "Greater Berlin", which are responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-Allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and will receive orders through the Co-ordinating Committee.

ARTICLE 8

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.

ARTICLE 9

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect of their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.

ARTICLE 10

The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

ARTICLE 11

The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

APPENDIX VI

Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

The German armed forces on land, at sea, and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears the responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives", acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the

status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:

ARTICLE 1

Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.

ARTICLE 2

(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.

(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.

(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.

(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 3

(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.

(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.

APPENDIX VI

ARTICLE 4

(a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of the Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 5

(a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:

(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material;

(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;

(iv) all transportation and communication facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:

(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.

(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.

ARTICLE 6

(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief.

(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 7

The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:

(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilised for the above purposes and for

APPENDIX VI

the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 8

There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 9

Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

ARTICLE 10

The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

ARTICLE 11

(a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.

(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.

(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.

ARTICLE 12

The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.

ARTICLE 13

(a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French

Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration.

All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, ordinances and instructions.

ARTICLE 14

This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfil their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.

ARTICLE 15

This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

APPENDIX VII

Fragebogen—Germany

Personnel Questionnaire

WARNING. In the interests of clarity this questionnaire has been written in both German and English. If discrepancies exist, the English will prevail. Every question must be answered as indicated. Omissions or false or incomplete statements will result in prosecution as violations of military ordinances. Add supplementary sheets if there is not enough space in the questionnaire.

A. PERSONAL

Name..... Identity Card No
Surname Middle Name Christian Name
Date of birth Place of birth.....
Citizenship Present address
Permanent residence..... Occupation.....
Present position Position applied for
Position before 1933.....

B. NAZI PARTY AFFILIATIONS

Have you ever been a member of the N.S.D.A.P.? yes, no. Dates.

Have you ever held any of the following positions in the N.S.D.A.P.?

(a) *Reichsleiter* or an official in an office headed by any *Reichsleiter*?
yes, no; title of position; dates.

(b) *Gauleiter* or a Party official within the jurisdiction of any Gau?
yes, no; dates, location of office.

(c) *Kreisleiter* or a Party official within the jurisdiction of any *Kreis*?
yes, no; title of position; dates; location of office.

(d) *Ortsgruppenleiter* or a Party official within the jurisdiction of an *Ortsgruppe*? yes, no; title of position; dates; location of office.

(e) An official in the Party Chancellery? yes, no; dates; title of position.

(f) An official within the Central N.S.D.A.P. headquarters? yes, no; dates; title of positions.

(g) An official within the N.S.D.A.P.'s Chief Education Office? In the office of the Führer's Representative for the Supervision of the Entire Intellectual and Politico-philosophical Education of N.S.D.A.P.? Or a director or instructor in any Party training school? yes, no; dates; title of position; Name of unit or school.

(h) Were you a member of the *Corps of Politische Leiter*? yes, no; Dates of membership.

(i) Were you a leader or functionary of any other N.S.D.A.P. offices or units or agencies (except Formations, Affiliated Organizations and Supervised Organizations which are covered by questions under C below)? yes, no; dates; title of position.

(j) Have you any close relatives who have occupied any of the positions named above? yes, no; if yes, give the name and address and a description of the position.

C. NAZI "AUXILIARY" ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

Indicate whether you were a member and the extent to which you participated in the activities of the following Formations, Affiliated Organizations or Supervised Organizations:

	Member		Period of Membership	Offices Held	Period
	Yes	No			
1. Formations					
(a) S.S.					
(b) S.A.					
(c) H.J.					
(d) N.S.D.St.B.					
(e) N.S.D.					
(f) N.S.F.					
(g) N.S.K.K.					
(h) N.S.F.K.					
2. Affiliated Organizations					
(a) Reichsbund deut. Beamten					
(b) D.A.F. einschl. K.d.F.					
(c) N.S.V.					
(d) N.S.K.O.V.					
(e) N.S. Bund deut. Technik					
(f) N.S.D. Ärztebund					
(g) N.S. Lehrerbund					
(h) N.S. Rechtswahrbund					
3. Supervised Organizations					
(a) V.D.A.					
(b) Deutsches Frauenwerk					
(c) Reichskolonialbund					
(d) Reichsbund deut. Familie					
(e) N.S. Reichsbund für Leibesübungen					
(f) N.S. Reichsbund deutscher Schwestern					
(g) N.S. Altherrenbund					

	Member		Period of Membership	Offices Held	Period
	Yes	No			
4. Other Organizations					
(a) R.A.D.					
(b) Deutscher Gemeindetag					
(c) N.S. Reichskriegerbund					
(d) Deutsche Studentenschaft					
(e) Reichsdozentenschaft					
(f) D.R.K.					
(g) "Deutsche Christen" Bewegung					
(h) "Deutsche Glaubensbewegung"					

5. Were you ever a member of any N.S. organization not listed above? yes, no; name of organization; dates; title of position; location.
6. Did you ever hold the position of Jugendwarter in a school?
7. Have you ever been the recipient of any titles, ranks, medals, testimonials or other honours from any of the above organizations? yes, no. If so, state the nature of the honour, the date conferred, and the reason and occasion for its bestowal.

D. WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

List on a separate sheet all publications from 1923 to the present which were written in whole or in part, or compiled, or edited by you, and all addresses or lectures made by you, except those of a strictly technical or artistic and non-political character, giving title, date and circulation or audience. If they were sponsored by any organization, give its name. If none, write "No speeches or publications."

E. EMPLOYMENT

Give a history of your employment beginning with January 1, 1930 and continuing to date, listing all positions held by you, your duties and the name and address of your employer or the governmental department or agency in which you were employed, the period of service, and the reasons for cessation of service, accounting for all periods of unemployment, including attendance at educational institutions and military service.

APPENDIX VII

H. TRAVEL ABROAD

List all journeys outside of Germany since 1933.

Countries Visited	Dates	Purpose of Journey

Was the journey made on your own account? **yes, no.** If not, under whose auspices was the journey made? Persons or organizations visited.

Did you ever serve in any capacity as part of the civil administration of any territory annexed to or occupied by the Reich? **yes, no.** If so, give particulars of offices held, duties performed, territory and period of service.

I. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Of what political party were you a member before 1933?

Have you ever been a member of any anti-Nazi underground party or groups since 1933? **yes, no.** Which one? Since when?

Have you ever been a member of any trade union or professional or business organization suppressed by the Nazis? **yes, no.**

Have you ever been dismissed from the civil service, the teaching profession or ecclesiastical positions for active or passive resistance to the Nazis or their ideology? **yes, no.**

Have you ever been imprisoned, or have restrictions of movement, residence or freedom to practise your trade or profession been imposed on you for racial or religious reasons or because of active or passive resistance to the Nazis? If the answer to any of the above questions is **yes,** give particulars and the names and addresses of two persons who can attest to the truth of your statement.

J. REMARKS

The statements on this form are true.

Date

Witness



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