Project 13

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MAR 21 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) Project No. 13 (Comparison of Proposed B-70 Force With Alternatives)

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) In response to your March 8, 1961, memorandum requesting a comparison of the operating plans, costs and total effectiveness of the proposed B-70 force with alternative forces, this memorandum and its enclosures:

a. Describe briefly the individual and combined operating plans of the missiles and aircraft which could comprise our strategic force in the late 1960's,

b. Discuss the B-70 force requirement,

c. Discuss in detail the cost effectiveness of a force with B-70's and alternatives - on the basis of a composite force analysis as well as on the less valid pure force basis, and

d. Discuss factors other than cost which influence total force effectiveness.

2. (SECRET) OPERATING PLANS. The expected individual weapon system and combined force operating plans in the late 1960's are as follows:

a. B-70.

(1) Although there will be only a few home bases for the entire B-70 force, the alert aircraft will be widely dispersed - three to five aircraft per alert base. Initially, two-thirds of the operational force will be on alert. As operational experience is gained, this fraction may exceed three-fourths. In this alert posture, the entire alert force could be launched in less than four minutes with crews in the cockpits and in less than six minutes with crews in alert shelters. Launch would be made on tactical warning and under positive control.

(2) The B-70 will be capable of carrying multiple and varied weapons, including two class "B" or eight class "D" or sixteen 250 KT guided bombs or combinations thereof. Advanced sensor equipment will permit detection of the most difficult targets. Because the B-70 will have the highest yield to accuracy ratio of any system, it will be applied against the hard, the imprecisely located and the mobile targets. It will also be used to provide back-up for high priority targets programmed to be struck by ballistic missiles. Other capabilities will include inflight retargeting, missile and bomb damage assessment with immediate reporting to the SAC command/control post, and reconnaissance strike. The majority of the strikes will be able to recover within the United States.

b. B-52 with GAM-87's.

(1) The B-52 force will be dispersed to 39 bases with 53 percent of the force on ground alert, capable of launching in less than fifteen minutes. Twenty-three squadrons will be equipped with GAM-87's by April 1967; the balance will carry GAM-77's. Weapon load capabilities include four GAM-87's or two GAM-77's and one class "B" to four class "D" weapons.

(2) The air-to-surface missiles will be launched, as soon as range to target permits, against precisely located soft complex targets and air defense systems. Bombs will be delivered at low altitude and are suitable for both hard and soft targets. A limited damage assessment capability can be achieved during withdrawal at high altitude.

c. TITAN II. The TITAN II force will be deployed in individual silos dispersed and [REDACTED]. Each missile will be on twenty-four hour alert, capable of being launched within [REDACTED] from receipt of execution order. Generally it will be utilized on [REDACTED]. It also is capable of delivering a [REDACTED].

d. MINUTEMAN - Hard. The MINUTEMAN (H) force will be [individually] dispersed in hardened silos. There will be five [launch] control centers, hardened to [REDACTED] for each group of 50 [CUT OFF]. These missiles, maintained on twenty-four hour alert, will be capable of being launched within thirty seconds after receipt of execution order. They will be employed against the general range of strategic targets, except for the very hard, the imprecisely located and the mobile targets. Some will be employed against enemy missile [CUT OFF] aircraft defense systems.

e. MINUTEMAN - Mobile. Missile trains will be deployed [autonomously] along the entire U.S. rail network. The trains will [CUT OFF] random along a number of routes and establish a condition of strategic alert at pre-selected launch sites for varying periods. [Approximately] seventy percent of the missiles will be on strategic alert at all times, capable of being launched within one minute. [If directed], those on the move can proceed to the nearest [CUT OFF] launchmark and launch their missiles within approximately [four] and twenty minutes. Targets for this force will be similar to those of the hardened MINUTEMAN.

f. POLARIS. The POLARIS force will be in one of four [CUT OFF] readiness conditions.

Condition one: On station with every-[CUT OFF] required to fire the missile functioning at maximum power. This [CUT OFF] maintained for approximately one hour.

Condition two: [On station,] but requiring fifteen minutes preparation before the first [missile] can be launched.

Condition three: Enroute to the launch area.

Condition four: In port with its tender.

Sixty-two percent of the [POLARIS] submarine force is programmed to be at sea in varying [conditions] of readiness. After 60 days submerged in the on-station [CUT OFF], the submarine will return to its tender stationed overseas.

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effectiveness of this force in a residual role will depend on it's [reponsiveness?] to command/control and target damage assessment [CUT OFF] during and after the initial strike.

3. (SECRET) STRATEGIC FORCE APPLICATION.

a. In the late 1960's the total strategic force will be [CUT OFF] dispersed and maintained in a high state of readiness. As [currently] envisioned, this force will retaliate in the following [CUT OFF] manner:

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b. The manned systems, primarily the B-70's, will provide essential data for programming the residual missiles and aircraft in the continued prosecution of the war.

4. (SECRET) B-70 FORCE REQUIREMENTS. Ultimate B-70 force levels have not been established and will depend upon many factors. For planning purposes, however, estimates have been made of the number of B-70's required to complement our future strategic force in its task of countering the threat. Our studies and war games have indicated that a force of about 225 B-70's will be needed to meet this requirement.

5. (SECRET) COST EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS.

a. One measure of the ultimate effectiveness of a weapon system can be stated in terms of enemy targets destroyed - either in the initial exchange or during the follow-on exploitation. Generally, this is extended to measure achievement in terms of cost effectiveness. Comparisons between systems, or forces, are often made on the basis of targets destroyed for a given investment. The usual practice has been to compare weapon systems by considering each system and its environment essentially in isolation.

b. This is unfortunate. The true measure of system worth can be found only by considering the over-all military capability that results when all component weapon systems are integrated into a composite strategic force. Only in this context can integrated force effects be considered in proper perspective. Important examples include interference effects, such as occur when interceptors and surface-to-air missile systems attempt to operate in the same air space, and complementary effects, such as occur when ICBM's degrade enemy air defenses through direct attack or as a fall-out effect of the attack on primary targets and more bombers survive to deliver their more effective weapons.

c. An integrated strategic force cost effectiveness study, relating to the problem of establishing the required size of B-70 force in relation to the total strategic force in the 1970 time period, was completed in November 1960 by the Air Force. The broad objective of the study was to determine, for a fixed cost, the composition of the most effective U.S. strategic force in 1969.

d. Within the limitations imposed by two different budget levels for both the U.S. and the USSR, the capabilities of a large number of equal-cost strategic forces to survive an initial Soviet attack and to carry out an effective counter-attack were examined. A facet of the study worthy of note at this point is the manner of treatment of Soviet defense forces. These forces were specifically tailored to counter the particular U.S. force being analyzed. The detailed inputs, procedures, results, and findings of this study are attached as Inclosure 1. The principal findings can be summarized as follows:

(1) Among the eight equal-cost composite forces studied under the current budget levels for both sides, the force with B-70's (12 squadrons) equalled or exceeded the level of target damage achieved by any alternative. Under this criterion, the force with MINUTEMEN provided nearly equal achievement; the force with B-52's was third. Ranking the forces on the basis of both target destruction and bomber survival, a secondary but nevertheless important consideration in view of the importance of residual forces, the order becomes B-70, B-52 and MINUTEMAN.

(2) Among the five equal-cost, high budget forces studied, the greatest target destruction was achieved by a force containing both B-70's and added MINUTEMEN. This force also provided the highest number of surviving bombers.

(3) Among the thirteen composite forces studied in 34 campaigns, the forces which showed the best strike effectiveness contained the B-70.

e. Inclosure 2 discusses briefly the results of the recent evaluation of strategic offensive weapon systems by the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group. Despite assumptions and an analytical treatment which underestimate the capability of the B-70, WSEG concludes that the B-70 would be able to penetrate even a sophisticated, high cost Soviet defense with "medium to high confidence". WSEG is now revising downward their B-70 cost estimates. If these costs are introduced into the cost effectiveness analysis which WSEG made, it is believed that the results would show that B-70 system would be preferred in all cases except against soft targets (on the order of three psi) and even here the difference would not be so marked as to rule the B-70 out of competition.

f. A simple cost effectiveness exercise comparing equal-cost (initial investment plus five years operating cost) pure forces as to the number of point targets of 10 psi and 100 psi hardness which each can destroy is contained in Inclosure 3. The results indicate a clear superiority for the B-70 force against 100 psi targets. The B-52 force ranked second with approximately half as many kills. Against 10 psi targets, the fixed MINUTEMAN force ranked first, the B-70 second and the B-52 third. TITAN, mobile MINUTEMAN and POLARIS ranked lower.

6. (SECRET) OTHER BOMBER FORCE CAPABILITIES. The ability to destroy precisely located, soft-to-hard primary targets is a major requirement which every weapon system in the strategic force should meet. However, additional capabilities are required of one or more of the systems if the total target destruction capability required to achieve national objective is to be realized and if other missions [CUT OFF] the force are to be accomplished. Important targets may be imprecisely located or mobile. Damage assessment is important to evaluate current success and to establish future plans of action (the residual force application). Manned bombers are particularly suited to perform these missions.

7. (SECRET) One of the major objectives in the development program for the B-70 is to improve the capability of the strategic force to perform all of its missions effectively. This program will provide a weapon system capable of quick reaction, air and ground. Advanced detection and communication equipment will permit immediate in-flight reporting of detailed missile and bomb damage assessment. This equipment will provide excellent reconnaissance-strike capability. The system will be adaptable to wide, random dispersal and recovery and to future concepts of hardening. The B-70 will be superior in every one of these respects to the B-52.

8. (SECRET) Further, it should be noted that in the late 1960's, the time the B-70 would become operational, the B-52 will have been in the inventory for some twelve years and will have achieved its maximum growth potential. This growth was significant in every important aspect – maintainability, range, penetration capability, and weapon delivery. Of course, much of this growth was required to maintain pace with new developments in air defense. There is every reason to believe that the B-70 weapon system will enjoy a similar growth, thereby improving its capability relative to the B-52 and as well as improving the over-all capability of the strategic force to perform its missions effectively.

9. (SECRET) SUMMARY.

a. The operational plans of the weapon systems which comprise our strategic force are designed to exploit the peculiar capabilities of each system. The operating plan of the strategic force coordinates and integrates these systems to capitalize on the interactive, mutually enhancing effects through which a mixed bomber-missile force can achieve a joint effect that exceeds the sum of their separate effects.

b. Ultimate B-70 force levels cannot be established at this time. Recent exercises and war games indicate that a force of some 225 B-70's [CUT OFF] required to meet anticipated commitments.

c. Based on cost effectiveness considerations by both the Air Force and WSEG, it appears that a strategic force with B-70's is competitive with or exceeds the achievement of any other force in the counter-attack role. As a result, its additional capabilities in such roles as damage assessment, reconnaissance-strike, residual force become essentially [CUT OFF]-cost dividends. The capability of the initial configuration of the B-70 to serve in these roles will be significantly greater than the B-52. [CUT OFF] greater growth potential will increase this margin with time in inventory.

/S/
Eugene M. Zuckert

Incls
    1. Evaluation of Strategic Force Compositions
    2. WSEG on the B-70
    3. Cost Comparison

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MAR 16 1969

An Evaluation of Some Feasible 1969 U.S. Strategic Force Compositions

INTRODUCTION

Predicted improvements in the reliability, yield, and accuracy of ICBM's, in the performance of bombers as represented by the B-70, and in the effectiveness of future air defense systems raise difficult questions in connection with the composition of future strategic forces. Recent considerations of the importance of residual forces to seek out and destroy enemy capability remaining after the initial nuclear exchange, indicate the importance of strike reconnaissance, probably requiring manned systems, and raise the question of maintaining a mixed bomber-missile force even if a pure missile force proved to be superior to the mixed force in the initial exchange. Unfortunately, the residual force role of the strategic force is not spelled out clearly enough to permit quantitative analysis at this time. However, techniques have been developed whereby the initial exchange can be war gamed. The results, when considered in their proper context, can provide an important ingredient to the over-all considerations required to establish the composition of a strategic force which can meet all of the requirements laid on it.

This report is the result of a study directed to the problem of establishing the required size of the B-70 force in relation to the total strategic posture projected for the 1970 time period. In attempting to provide the required information, a more important question was considered, i.e., for a given cost, what is the composition of the most effective U.S. strategic force in the counterattack role? Actually, the results of the cost effectiveness study which was performed provide a better answer to this question than to the original problem, but it does appear that our strategic force will be better balanced with some 200 B-70's and additional missiles than with some 400 B-70's and no additional missiles.

The study compares the capabilities of several possible future strategic forces to survive a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack on the U.S. under conditions of 15 minutes' tactical warning and to carry out a counterattack campaign against the Soviet Union. The measures of effectiveness developed are target complexes and point targets destroyed and bomber survival. Two budget levels are considered for both the U.S. and the USSR. The time period is 1969.

3. STRATEGIC FORCES

The various force compositions studied were constructed combining various equal-cost, alternative add-on forces with a reference force which includes those weapon systems and numbers to which we now appear to be committed from a procurement standpoint. The composition of this reference force for the odd-numbered years through 1969 is given in Table 1.

In developing the equal-cost, alternative systems to be added to the reference force, two constant budget levels for the period FY 61 through FY 70 were considered. The first approximated our present budget in the strategic area. Under this budget, it was assumed that the reference force could be built up and supported and that, in addition, eight billion dollars would be available for additional procurement and support during this period. The equal cost alternative systems which could be added to the reference force under this budget are given in Table 2. An additional reason for the equality of the B-70 and B-52H buys is that the B-52H's achieve an earlier operational date than the B-70's and hence accrue higher operating costs in the time period. The DROMEDARY is a long endurance, chemically powered aircraft carrying missiles on an airborne alert.

A high budget situation was studied which was 1.6 billion dollars per year above the current budget in the strategic area. Half of this amount was assumed for weapon system procurement, making a total of 16 billion dollars available for this purpose. The remaining eight billion dollars under this budget was assumed to be required for the development of more advanced systems than those studied here. Table 3 shows the high budget, equal cost alternatives studied.

The weapon loads assumed for each delivery system are shown in Table 4.

The operational plan assumed provided that all missiles surviving the initial Soviet ICBM attack be launched immediately. The B-52 force was dispersed to strategic wing level, with one-third on ground alert and able to launch within 15 minutes. A high ground alert posture, achieved through seven-day, 24-hour maintenance and a crew-to-aircraft ratio of four to one, was assumed for the B-70. Through these means, it appears that 70 per cent of the force could be maintained on ground alert. By proper planning and aircraft configuration, it was assumed that, from the aircraft in the air on [CUT OFF] training missions, another five per cent of the [CUT OFF] could be added to the available striking force. By [CUT OFF] crews for aircraft in maintenance, it was [CUT OFF] that 50 per cent of the aircraft in maintenance could launch within 15 minutes.

[CUT OFF] SOVIET UNION FORCES

[Various] compositions for the strategic and air defense [CUT OFF] of the Soviet Union were developed under two budget [CUT OFF] equivalent to those studied for the U.S. Cost [CUT OFF] supplied by The Rand Corporation on the Soviet strategic and air defense forces estimated by ACS/Intelligence [CUT OFF], together with the RAND estimate that Soviet GNP [CUT OFF] by six per cent from 1958 to 1959, indicated that [CUT OFF] dollars was a reasonable estimate of the FY 1961 [CUT OFF] for such forces. It was also assumed that this budget [CUT OFF] increase at the average rate of four per cent per year [CUT OFF] period FY 1961-1970. The high budget studied [CUT OFF] 20 per cent increase in the current budget. The [CUT OFF] budgets for the first and last years of the cost [CUT OFF] in billions of dollars were as follows:

[Available] intelligence information regarding the capabilities of present and future Soviet weapon systems was [CUT OFF] the compositions of their strategic and air defense [CUT OFF] were specifically tailored from the weapon systems [CUT OFF] in Table 5 to counter the particular U.S. force being [CUT OFF].

[CUT OFF] important characteristic of the study is illustrated [CUT OFF] in Table 6, which indicates the five major components [CUT OFF] alternative equal-cost Soviet forces considered. For [CUT OFF], note the substantial M.3 fighter and improved surface-to-air missile programs when the B-70 is included in the force, [complete] cancellation of these programs in favor of bigger ICBM's, AICBM systems and lower performance fighters [when MINUTEMEN] are added instead of B-70's. The M.2 fighter buy [CUT OFF] increased because of its capability against B-52's [penetrating at] either high or low altitudes.

[PARAGRAPH DELETED]

[US] FORCE SURVIVAL

The Soviet attack involved an initial salvo of the [maximum] possible number of ICBM's. One hundred of these were directed against the air defense system. Fifty were directed against military control centers, and the balance were directed against SAC bomber bases and ICBM sites. The [objective] of the attack was to minimize the capability of the surviving forces to damage the Soviet Union. To achieve this objective, bomber bases, Atlas and Titan Sites were targeted with higher priority than were Minuteman Sites. Bomber bases with a sizeable number of non-alert bombers [remaining], each capable of carrying bombs having a total yield of many megatons, constituted essential and relatively [soft] targets. Atlas and Titan Sites were relatively high priority targets because of their large yield warheads. Minuteman sites carried a lower priority because, being [hard], a considerable effort was required to destroy a single missile which carried a relatively small warhead. The objective was achieved by assigning sufficient missiles to each base or site such that the product of the damage potential and the survival probability of every base or [site] is equal.

The ICBM attack was followed by manned bomber and submarine-launched missile attacks. The results of these attacks were not analyzed. All alert bombers were launched before the arrival of the ICBM attack and all the missiles which survived this attack were launched before the arrival [of] the follow-on manned bombers. Submarine launched missiles were not directed against ICBM sites.

US Force survival are given in Table 7 for four of the [CUT OFF] studied. The number of B-70's surviving includes the aircraft on alert plus those in maintenance which were able to launch within the 15-minute warning time. The large numbers of MINUTEMEN surviving results from the limited number of missiles available to the Soviets and the criterion used for target assignment as discussed earlier.

US COUNTERATTACK

The effectiveness of the various US strategic forces was studied in terms of an attack on Western Russia. Out of a [CUT OFF] of 250 strategic target complexes in the Soviet Union [CUT OFF] China as furnished by ACS/Intelligence, 116 were located [CUT OFF] attacked. In addition, between 200 and 220 targets of the categories shown in Table 8 were in [CUT OFF], the number varying according to the extent to which [CUT OFF] defense bases were targeted. Many surface-to-air missile sites in the region were also targeted, with the number [CUT OFF] considerably from case to case. The target complexes [CUT OFF] of points of military and industrial value [CUT OFF] that a single weapon can do damage to more than [CUT OFF] point. For analysis purposes, an aggregated target complex as established by AFCIN was used. [CUT OFF] targets included all value points of the [CUT OFF] listed in Table 8 which appear in the Target [CUT OFF] for the area under attack and which are not [CUT OFF] any of the 116 complexes.

[CUT OFF] range missiles, light bomber bases, their military [CUT OFF] and other types of targets of particular concern to [CUT OFF] US tactical forces were not targeted and the attack [CUT OFF] forces was not analyzed. Thus the possible [complementary] effects of this attack on the penetration capability of strategic bombers was not considered. Possible contributions of the Polaris weapon system in this connection were disregarded [CUT OFF] a matter of fact, Polaris may serve its most effective [CUT OFF] as a member of the residual force.

Considering that 41 of the first 50 target complexes [CUT OFF] by priority and the majority of the important point [CUT OFF] in the area considered, it was estimated that [CUT OFF] 60 per cent of the target system, in terms [CUT OFF] was involved. As a result, 60 per cent of the US [CUT OFF] attack effort was directed to this area.

Target assignments were based on considerations of the capabilities of each available weapon system and [CUT OFF] given in Table 9 was evolved. In the high [CUT OFF] reference force plus B-70 and MINUTEMAN case, for [CUT OFF], a feasible assignment which tends to maximize force [CUT OFF] is given in Table 10.

[DELETED PARAGRAPH]

The attack sequences and the interactions considered in [CUT OFF] analysis of the counterattack are worthy of note. First [CUT OFF] sequence of attacks was the ICBM attack on both defenses [CUT OFF] prime targets. The consequences calculated included target destruction, direct defense destruction by blast and defense degradation due to fallout. Hand computation methods were used. B-70's, when a component of the force, comprised the second element of the attack, lagging the ICBM attack by approximately three hours. The B-52 force arrived approximately nine hours after the ICBM attack. Generally, these elements attacked primary targets only but they did make indirect contributions, through both blast and fallout, to the degradation of the defenses for follow-on elements. The consequences of the manned bomber attacks were calculated using a highly aggregated penetration model which was programmed for the IBM 709 and 7090 computers. In addition to target destruction and defense degradation calculations, bomber weapons delivered and bomber survival were computed.

The penetration model used in the study divides space into geographical zones and time into periods. An individual air battle is fought in each zone for each time period. The participants in each battle are drawn from the survivors of earlier battles. The model is an expected value model.

RESULTS

Among the eight equal-cost composite forces studied under the current budget level for both sides, Table 11 shows that the force with B-70's equalled or exceeded the level of target damage achieved by any alternative. By this criterion, the MINUTEMAN case provided nearly equal achievement; the B-52H case was third. In considering the significance of the results, it is important to keep in mind that the values shown are not absolute measures of effectiveness. The relative standings, [CUT OFF] real, however, and, for lower value of effectiveness, the differences would increase in significance.

The primary objective of the force is, of course, target destruction. However, bomber survival for residual force purposes is becoming an increasingly important consideration. It is thus of interest to rank the various cases in terms of bomber survival as well as in terms of targets destroyed. On applying the fractional survival numbers of Table 11 to the portion of the alert force used to attack the western part [CUT OFF] Soviet Union, it is found that the B-70 case ranks first [CUT OFF] total of 93 survivors, 46 being B-70's (0.56 survival) [CUT OFF] being B-52's (0.54 survival). The B-52H case ranks [CUT OFF] with 75 surviving B-52's (0.64 survival), and the [CUT OFF] third with 53 surviving B-52's (0.61 survival). [CUT OFF] that these are the numbers of bombers surviving [CUT OFF] from Soviet territory. Before they can become [CUT OFF] components of the residual force, they must return [CUT OFF]. Many, if not most of them, will require a post- [CUT OFF] base to accomplish this. The probabilities [CUT OFF] bases will survive or, given survival, that the [CUT OFF] will, in fact, effect their return to the US may be [CUT OFF]

[CUT OFF] the five equal-cost, high budget forces studied, [CUT OFF] target destruction was achieved by a force [CUT OFF] both B-70's and added MINUTEMEN, as shown in Table 12. [CUT OFF] effect which may be achieved by a mixed and [CUT OFF] balanced bomber-missile force is clearly illustrated. [CUT OFF] 24 squadrons of B-70's were added, the missile force [CUT OFF] that it was virtually eliminated by the Soviet [CUT OFF] attack. Soviet defenses suffered no damage prior to [CUT OFF] of the bombers and overall US force achievement [CUT OFF], particularly with regard to bombers surviving. [CUT OFF] destruction remained reasonably high because of the bomb carrying capability of the bombers. When a [CUT OFF] B-70's and missiles was added, both target destruction [CUT OFF] survival increased significantly.

[CUT OFF] the forces according to bombers surviving to the [CUT OFF] point, the combination buy of B-70's and MINUTEMAN [CUT OFF] first with 106 survivors, compared with only 57 [CUT OFF] in the pure B-70 buy.

[CUT OFF] deriving the results shown previously, the bombers [CUT OFF] to carry ECM equipment of moderate effectiveness. [CUT OFF] deliberate attempt was made not to over-estimate [CUT OFF] of combat conditions, including such factors as [CUT OFF] communication links, radars and control centers [CUT OFF] or deliberately destroyed, psychological effects [CUT OFF] personnel, etc., on the real as contrasted with the [CUT OFF] capabilities of the defenses. In this connection, [CUT OFF] be noted that the effect of fallout were treated [CUT OFF] and specifically. It played an important role in [CUT OFF] B-52 penetration but not B-70 penetration, principally [CUT OFF] the difference in HHCL arrival times. The absolute [CUT OFF] ECM and combat effectiveness are impossible to predict [CUT OFF]

[CUT OFF] the situation in World War II, we will be unable [CUT OFF] defenses and develop specific counters if short- [CUT OFF] are discovered. For these reasons, the sensitivity [CUT OFF] to these assumptions was tested. The results [CUT OFF] for the B-70 case were based on a defense degradation factor of 0.8, covering ECM effects and combat [CUT OFF] 0.8 value of the degradation factor corresponds [CUT OFF] in which ECM achieves a moderate level of [CUT OFF] Both higher and lower values of the degradation factor [CUT OFF] studied. The results are given in Table 13 for [CUT OFF] budget, strategic force with B-70's. Note that [CUT OFF] depended much more strongly on the particular [CUT OFF] than did target damage. A comparison of the [CUT OFF] the 0.8 and 0.4 factors shows that, even though [CUT OFF] was reduced by nearly 60 per cent, the [CUT OFF] of the force was reduced only 16 per cent. [CUT OFF] for this is, of course, the multiple bomb [CUT OFF] capability of the manned bomber. In this study, [CUT OFF] carried eight bombs. Only in exceptional cases [CUT OFF] destroyed with a full load of bombs. Many [CUT OFF] of their bombs. This fact is illustrated [CUT OFF] by the 0.4 case in the table. Only one-fourth [CUT OFF] survived but one-half of the bombs carried by [CUT OFF] were delivered.

[CUT OFF] factor contributing to the high effectiveness [CUT OFF] the bomber forces was the employment of MINUTEMAN [CUT OFF] defense busting role. Both air defense bases and [CUT OFF] surface-to-air missile sites were targeted. In fact, [CUT OFF] the cases studied, all MINUTEMEN were targeted [CUT OFF] The effect of not targeting defenses with [CUT OFF] studied in the current budget B-70 case for [CUT OFF] degradation factors. The results are indicated in [CUT OFF]

Again, bomber survival depends more strongly [CUT OFF] of defenses than does force effectiveness. [CUT OFF] that assigning MINUTEMEN to SAM's can provide [CUT OFF] insurance against the eventuality that our estimate [CUT OFF] of ECM and/or combat degradation factor [CUT OFF] error.

[CUT OFF] different composite forces studied in 34 campaigns, [CUT OFF] which showed the best strike effectiveness contained [CUT OFF] this fact is doubly important. The additional [CUT OFF] capabilities of the bomber, such as flexibility of operation, reconnaissance, destruction of poorly located or mobile targets, restrike, and residual force, would improve further the achievement of the primary objectives of the strategic force.

Only two B-70 buys were studied, 12 squadrons and 24 squadrons. As a result, the question regarding optimum force size cannot be answered specifically. However, it appears that a total buy greater than 12 squadrons might be desirable -- with 12 squadrons on 75 per cent ground plus air alert it was not feasible to assign B-70's to pertinent targets in the entire area studied. Residual force considerations may further increase the total number of B-70's required. On the other hand, the results of the high budget comparisons clearly indicate that, at the level studied, a combination buy of additional missiles and fewer than 24 squadrons of B-70's provided the greatest force effectiveness.

As by-products of the study, the payoffs to be derived from using missiles in a defense busting role and carrying multiple weapons on bombers were clearly indicated.

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TABLE 1
US REFERENCE FORCE

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TABLE 2
US Strategic Force Equal Cost* Choices - Current Budget

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TABLE 3
[CUT OFF] Strategic Force Equal Cost [*] Choices - High Budget

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TABLE 4
US Strategic Force Weapon Loads

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TABLE 5
SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS

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TABLE 6
SOVIET UNION STRATEGIC AND AIR DEFENSE FORCE
NUMBER OF:

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ENTIRE PG CLASSIFIED SECRET

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TABLE 8
TARGET SYSTEMS

[CUT OFF] Complexes

Military and Industrial Values

[CUT OFF] Points

Weapon Storage and Production
Bomber Bases, Main and Staging
Interceptor Bases
ICBM Controls
Military Controls

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TABLE 9
TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

MINUTEMAN

Defense Busting
Complex Destruction

ATLAS, TITAN

Complex Destruction

B-70, B-52

Hard Targets
   Weapon Storage Sites
   Control Centers

Soft Targets
   Bomber Bases
   Weapon Production

Poorly Located Targets
Complex Destruction

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TABLE 10
TARGET ASSIGNMENTS - HIGH BUDGET B-70 + MM Case

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TABLE 11
ATTACK OUTCOMES - CURRENT US AND SOVIET BUDGETS

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TABLE 12
US ATTACK OUTCOMES
(High US and Soviet Budgets)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

TABLE 13
EFFECT OF COMBAT DEGRADATION PLUS B-70 ECM FACTOR
(Current Budget Force with B-70's)

TOTAL COMPLEXES TARGETED = 116
TOTAL POINTS TARGETED = 210

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TABLE 14
EFFECT OF TARGETING SAM DEFENSES
(Current Budget Force with B-70's)

TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPLEXES = 116
TOTAL NUMBER OF POINT TARGETS = 210

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WSEG on the B-70

WSEG Report No. 50, "Evaluation of Strategic Offensive Weapon Systems," was published in December 1960. The time considered is 1964 - 1967, and the B-70 is studied as a weapon system which could begin to enter the inventory toward the end of the period.

The WSEG study appears to have some rather serious limitations. The most important of these are discussed below.

WSEG used single idealized US weapon systems in its calculations rather than a mixture of US systems. This use of "pure" rather than "mixed" forces seriously underestimates probable effectiveness of individual weapon systems, which in a mixed force both contribute to and benefit from the accomplishments of other systems. For example, in a mixed force, the B-70 benefits substantially from the preceding ICBM attack and, in turn, materially assists subsequent, and lower performance, manned bombers to penetrate. This complementary characteristic of a mixed force has been shown very clearly in other studies of US Strategic Force Composition.

WSEG's pessimistic assumption that Soviet defenses and command and control systems are undegraded at the time of penetration is, by their own admission, unrealistic. It underestimates the ability of bombers to penetrate. This is particularly unfair to the B-70 which would benefit more than lower performance bombers from degradation of defenses because of the vulnerability of the netted system which is required to counter it.

Despite assumptions and an analytical treatment which we believe underestimate the capability of the B-70, the WSEG study concludes that it should have a penetration advantage over all programmed US bombers. WSEG postulates two possible levels of Soviet defenses - one rather moderate, the other quite sophisticated and involving a large investment - and estimates B-70 performance against each. Against the lesser defense system, the B-70 is a high confidence system, and against the sophisticated defense it is considered to be of medium to high confidence.

Essentially, then, WSEG's reservations about the desirability of the B-70 are not based upon doubts as to its ability to do the job, but rather, primarily, upon a cost effectiveness comparison between it and equal cost forces of missiles. One of the assumptions made in computing effectiveness is that survivability is neglected. All of the missiles are launched under this assumption but only 1/3 or 2/3 of the B-70's launch. Thus, survivability does not appear to have been ignored in the bomber calculations. The costs preferred and used by WSEG for the B-70 were higher than the detailed costing information supplied by the Air Force.

Using the original WSEG costs, the B-70 is not attractive from a cost effectiveness point of view, except against targets of 100 or more psi hardness. On the other hand, using the Air Force costs supplied to WSEG, the B-70 proves to be competitive with fixed ballistic missiles in all cases, with an advantage which increases with target hardness. Its advantage over mobile missile systems of Minuteman or Polaris yield and accuracy (and costs) is much more pronounced. Using Air Force costs, the B-70 is shown to be more effective than other manned bombers.

In view of the importance assigned to this cost effectiveness comparison, it is very pertinent that WSEG is in the process of revising their costs downward. Using these revised costs and interpolating linearly between the original WSEG and Air Force costs presented in the WSEG study, the B-70 appears to be preferred in all cases except against quite soft targets (on the order of 3 psi), and even here the difference is not so marked as to rule the B-70 out of competition.

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A COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON OF PURE STRATEGIC FORCES

Pure force cost comparisons are admittedly of limited value since they ignore significant complementary, interference and enhancement effects which occur in real life when a mixed force of strategic weapon systems engages a mixed force of defensive weapon systems. These effects influence strongly and differently the ground survival and penetration capabilities of the various systems. However, if care is exercised in establishing the input values and if the inherent limitations of the exercise are kept in mind, a pure force cost comparison can indicate the relative merits of competing systems in severely restricted situations. Note the word relative. It is essential to view the results in terms of relative standing only. The results of such a restricted comparison cannot pretend to represent absolute capabilities under any realistic condition.

The cost effectiveness comparison reported here is based on the capability of alternative equal-cost, pure forces to destroy 10 psi and 100 psi point targets. Using the initial investment plus five years' annual operating cost of an operational force of 200 B-70's as a base, (225 total buy), the numbers of missiles or B-52's with GAM-87's which could be procured and supported for five years for the same cost were determined. The results are given in Table 1.

It is important to note that research and development costs were not considered. They were omitted on the assumption that the decision has been made to complete this phase for each of the systems compared whether it is eventually procured or not. The sensitivity of the results to this assumption is discussed briefly later.

Table 2 contains the assumptions made regarding certain pertinent characteristics and capabilities of the systems as well as the results of the comparison. The survival factors are based on the predicted minimum alert capabilities of the bombers, the fraction of Polaris submarines on station, and an estimate of the capability of the other missiles to survive the initial Soviet ICBM attack. With regard to reliability and CEP, the same value as were utilized in WSEG 50 have been applied.

Substantial uncertainties are associated with the penetrability factors assumed. The important point to be borne in mind when evaluating these assumptions is that the B-70's are carrying eight bombs and that the B-52's are carrying four bombs. Bombers that survive the penetration will deliver all their bombs. Only in exceptional cases will bombers be killed before they have delivered any of their bombs. Results of analyses indicate that, on the average, a dead bomber will deliver half its weapons before it is killed. Further, this factor appears to be relatively independent of the actual attrition rate achieved by the defense. Thus, the factor of 0.75 assumed for the B-70 represents, in fact, a bomber survival factor of the order of 0.50. The penetrability factors assumed for the missiles are low if the Soviets do not develop an AICBM capability but probably are high, particularly for POLARIS and MINUTEMAN, if they do achieve an effective missile defense.

The results are based on an attack by the entire force against point targets having a hardness of 10 psi or 100 psi. The computation is based on the number of weapons of the specified yield and accuracy required to provide a probability of 0.85 of destroying the given target. The total number of targets damaged by the force is then given by:

Nt = D_0.85 * Ps * Pr * Pp * F * W,

where

Nt = total number of targets destroyed

D_0.85 = number of weapons required to achieve 0.85 probability of damage

Ps = probability of survival

Pr = reliability factor

Pp = conditional probability that weapon is delivered

F = total force size

W = number of weapons/warheads carried by each bomber/missile.

Against 100 psi targets, the B-70 force shows a substantial margin of superiority over the B-52 and even a greater margin over any missile

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Against 10 psi targets, the B-70 force appears to be slightly more effective than the B-52 force; both are significantly less effective than the fixed MINUTEMAN force but significantly more effective than any other missile force.

The above equation shows that the number of targets damaged varies with every input in direct proportion. Thus, doubling or halving any factor, doubles or halves the number of targets killed. This greatly simplifies sensitivity considerations.

If research and development costs are added, the B-70 force would still have a significant advantage against 100 psi (and harder) targets and it would still be competitive with the B-52 force against 10 psi targets. The rank of the missile forces would not change.