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S#142307
Copy 2

8 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Amory

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes re Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack

I. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

A. Intelligence community currently engaged in re-examination of evidence relating to Soviet ICBM production and deployment.

1. Review not yet completed, but may lead to some revision of previous estimates.

B. Last year CIA estimated a Soviet program which would have given them 150 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961.

1. Other opinions in intelligence community ranged from Army-Navy view (50 in mid-1961) to Air Force view (200 in mid-1961).

2. CIA estimate for mid-1963 was 400. Army-Navy, 200; Air Force, 700.

C. CIA now believes that Soviet strength in ICBMs on launchers as of mid-1961 probably more nearly approximates 50-100.

1. While evidence indicates a large commitment of resources, program thus far appears to have been moderate in tempo.

2. We believe that 100-150 is the highest present force level which can be reconciled with the evidence.

3. A rigid interpretation of the evidence could lead to estimate of less than 50.

D. For future buildup, CIA estimates that Soviets probably will have 200-400 operational launchers by mid-1964 -- some for a new ICBM system.

1. Cannot exclude the possibility of as many as 450 by mid-1963.

E. Should note that these estimates represent CIA views -- current views of other intelligence agencies may well vary considerably.

II. Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

A. Soviets now have available ballistic missiles of 700 (SS-3) and 1,100 n. m. (SS-4) range which provide overlapping coverage of targets on the Soviet periphery.

1. Last year we estimated a requirement of about 250 launchers for these missiles -- 150 for SS-3 and 100 for SS-4 -- to be attained in mid-1961.

2. Requirement for missile inventory set at 450 for SS-3 and 300 for SS-4, to be achieved by mid-1963.

B. CIA estimates the same requirements for launchers and missiles, but believes they will be met by mid-1962.

1. Mid-1961 strength estimated at 100 SS-3 launchers (300 missiles) and 125 SS-4 launchers (400 missiles).

C. CIA estimates now take account of new 2,000 n. m. missiles.

1. Sees a buildup to 50-100 launchers and 150-450 missiles of this type by mid-1965.

2. By that time, reduction in medium range missile strength will probably have begun.

III. Long-Range Bombers

A. Previous estimates of Soviet long range bomber force substantially unchanged.

1. Mid-1961 strength of Soviet Long-Range Aviation estimated at 150 heavy bombers, jets and turboprops, and 950 jet medium bombers.

2. Estimates a decline in this force to about 100 heavies and 700 mediums by 1966.

3. Medium bomber category will include perhaps 100 new supersonic "dash" mediums.

B. Air Force estimates higher -- 200 heavies for 1962-1966 period, and slower decline in mediums.

IV. Submarine-Launched Missiles

A. Believe Soviets now have two types of submarine: capable of launching 150 n.m. or 350 n.m. ballistic missiles.

1. Converted "Z" class -- estimate USSR now has 6 of these, each with two missile tubes. Doubt that they will convert more.

2. "G" class -- estimated 15 now operational and 18 from mid-1962 on. Believe each can launch 3-4 missiles.

B. Soviets have also developed a 300 n.m. supersonic cruise-type missile which could be operational this year.

1. Have not identified the submarine for which it was designed.

C. Estimate that Soviets will go to nuclear powered subs equipped with new, longer range (500 - 1,000 n.m.) missiles.

1. USSR could have 2 of these by mid-1962 building up to 18 in mid-1966.

2. Might have a few nuclear-powered missile subs this year if they used missiles already available.