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WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

WASHINGTON

TO INSURE PROMPT ATTENTION IN REPLYING REFER TO

O.O. No. 381.4/260 Misc

ATTENTION OF

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED
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January 30, 1942
O. C. of O. [illegible]

Subject: Report of Defense Reserves

To: Chief of the Army Air Forces

1. In compliance with paragraph 1 of letter from The Adjutant General dated January 24, 1942, file AG 322.2 Army Air Force (1-12-42)MO-AAF-M - O.O. 322.1/197, there is submitted herewith status reports for Panama and Puerto Rico covering items of Ordnance having exclusive interest to the Army Air Forces.

For the Chief of Ordnance.

M. K. Barroll Jr

M. K. Barroll, Jr.,
Col., Ord. Dept.
Executive Assistant

381.4

(8)

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2 Incls.
Report(Panama)Def.Res.-in dup.
Report(Puerto Rico)Def.Res.-in dup.

FEB 2 1942

Enclosures filed in Envelope

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Air AS 381.4 (8)
CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/76

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(Air AG)

A C 90

January 12, 1942

SUBJECT: Reporting Defense Reserves, Items Procured by Air Corps for use of the Air Corps

TO : The Chief of the Air Corps

1. In accordance with the prescribed forms and the general provisions of secret letters AG381.4 (8-11-41) and (12-27-41)MC-D-M, subject "Revision of Instructions Covering Status Reports - Defense Reserves (Overseas Department)", it is directed that the Chief of the Air Corps submit quarter yearly secret reports (beginning January 1, 1942) as to status of defense reserves of gasoline fuels and lubricants in the overseas departments and Alaska.

2. For the guidance of the Chief of the Air Corps (4) four copies of the prescribed form for reporting defense reserves are attached.

3. Direct communication between the Chief of the Air Corps and agencies having previous experience with subject reports (G-4 Div. of Gen. Staff and Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services) is authorized for the purposes of obtaining any information relating to the preparation of the reports desired.

4. Distribution of subject reports will be made to the following:

Chief of the Army Air Forces (2 copies)
Assistant Chief of Staff -WPD
Chief of Staff, General Headquarters
(Panama Canal and Puerto Rico Depts. only)
Each Department Concerned (by air mail)

Dispatched
JAN 12 1942
AAG

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES							COORDINATION			
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A A G	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp.	Budget	Statistics
	✓	gx				✓				

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

3 Incls.
1- 4 Status Rpt-Def. Res.
2- AG 381-4 (8-11-41-) MC-D-M
3- AG 381.4 (12-27-41) MSC-D

AAF 39

Air Ag 381.4 (2)

381.4 (2)

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DOD Dirs. 5 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By [illegible] Date 4/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No.

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF

SUBJECT: Reporting Defense Reserves, Items Procured by Air Corps for use of the Air Corps.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS AAF/A-4 WRB/elm
1.	AAF A-4	AAG	1942 1/9/	1. It is requested that a directive substantially as follows be issued to the Chief of the Air Corps: a. In accordance with the prescribed forms and the general provisions of secret letters AG381.4 (8-11-41) and (12-27-41) MC-D-M, subject "Revision of Instructions Covering Status Reports - Defense Reserves (Overseas Department)", the Chief of the Air Corps will submit quarter yearly secret reports (beginning January 1, 1942) as to status of defense reserves of gasoline fuels and lubricants in the overseas departments and Alaska. (Air Adj. Gen. enclose copies of letters cited) b. For the guidance of the Chief of Air Corps four (4) copies of the prescribed form for reporting defense reserves are ~~forwarded herewith~~ attached. c. Direct communication between the Chief of the Air Corps and agencies having previous experience with subject reports (G-4 Div. of Gen. Staff and Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services) is authorized for the purposes of obtaining any information relating to the preparation of the reports desired. d. Distribution of subject reports will be made to the following: Chief of the Army Air Forces (2 copies) Assistant Chief of Staff - WPD Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, (Panama Canal and Puerto Rico Depts. only) Each Department Concerned (by air mail) Incl: 4 Status Report - Defense Reserves T.H. Jr. C/A-4

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(Do[illegible] reverse side) W-4071, AC. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. 1

AG 381.4 (7)

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DOD ltr
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

AAF/A-4
WRB/elm

(Written February 24, 1942)

AAF/A-4/463-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Publication of Directive Dated December 27, 1941, Entitled, "Defense Reserves - Overseas Bases and Departments--"

The Secretary of War directs that, in accordance with the provisions of Section II, paragraph 5, of attached study, a letter substantially as follows be issued:

"1. Existing plans provide for allocation of units at 2nd Aviation Objective Strength (strength as it applies to size of units in accordance with confidential letter AG580 (5-23-41) MC-F-M, dated June 9, 1941), to be made to the departments, commands, and bases shown on Tab A attached as indicated in that tab. Augmentation to 2nd Aviation Objective Strength will not be affected until calendar year 1943.

2. For intermediate guidance (calendar 1942) units at 1st Aviation Objective Strength (existing) are allocated in accordance with Exhibit A attached.

3. The allocations of units indicated in Tab A and Exhibit A are based on disposition of air units in furtherance of so-called "hemisphere defense".

4. Stockage of defense reserves will be made in accordance with the requirements set forth in Tab B attached.

5. The Chief of the Army Air Forces is authorized to initiate such action as is necessary to provide for the operating requirements of the forces as set forth in Tab A attached.

6. The Chief of Engineers is authorized to initiate such action as is necessary to complete construction requirements for the forces set forth in Tab A and the stockage indicated in Tab B attached along with such base and service units as the Chief of the Army Air Forces will advise as necessary to complement the forces in Tab A."

381.4 (6)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES							COORDINATION				
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A A G	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Sta [illegible]	

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DOD ltrs.
9 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/74

Encls:
Name C-4/33962 for C/AAF,
w/Name AAF/A-4/463-1 for
C/S, 12/27/41 w/Tabs A,
B, & C, Ex. A.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

T. J. HANLEY, Jr.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-4.

NOTED.....
Office Chief of the Air Staff

Memorandum for Record: Memorandum above drafted to provide a covering letter for the publishing of the contents of subject study (attached). Exhibit A introduced in accordance with verbal instructions from the Deputy Chief of Staff in order to present the intermediate or 1942 allocation picture. Stockage provided for the projected 1943 forces will be sufficient to meet the requirements of the 1942 forces.

ACTION TAKEN: 3-3-42 by mimeo ltr. to C/AAF & C of E w/cys to C.O.'s, Field Forces; Caribbean & Western Def. Cmds; & Hawaiian Dept. C/Arms & Services; & Div. WDGS. AE/jfr - 1705

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S. & C. Section

FEB 26 1942

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DOD-Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

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RECEIPTS

DATE ----------

SUBJECT: Publication of Directive Dated December 27, 1941, Entitled "Defense Reserves Oversea Bases & Depots"

Received from Headquarters Army Air Forces, Memorandum above subject, with the following inclosures;

Memo G-4/33982 for C/AAF, w/Memo
AAF/A-4/463-1 for C/S, 12/27/41
w/Tabs A,B, & C., Exhibit A.

Officer Rank

Office

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DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Supply Division, G-4

WASHINGTON, D. C.

G-4/33982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Defense Reserves of Avaition Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs, and Pyrotechnics-- Overseas Bases and Departments (other than Philippines).

The attached memorandum from the Chief of the Air Staff, A-4, dated December 27, 1941 subject as above is concurred in with the understanding that the allocation of shipping space to accomplish this purpose will be subject to priorities announced from time to time.

/s/ Brehon Somervell

BREHON SOMERVELL,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls:
Memo to C/S
AAF/A-4/463-1
12/27/41, w/incls.
Tab A, B, & C.
AAF/A-4/463-1,
(DS), 12-27-41.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 4/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-4

AAF/A-4/463-1

December 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs, and Pyrotechnics--Overseas Bases and Departments (other than Philippines).

I. Discussion.

1. Pursuant to confidential letter AG580(5-22-41) MD-P-M dated June 9, 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective - Strength of Units," the Chief of the Army Air Forces is proceeding with plans for the establishment of adequate outlying bases for the operation of the units of the so-called 84 Group Program.

2. Current estimates indicate that the equipping of 84 groups with airplanes will follow closely in point of time on the equipping of the 54 Group Program and will be completed during calendar 1942.

3. In order to insure uninterrupted progress toward the employment of the 84 groups and the preparation and stockage of bases from which they will operate, it is believed desirable to have directives issued to the Chief of the Army Air Forces approving allocation of units and war reserve requirements as set forth in Tabs A and B respectively of this study.

4. Computation of requirements has been based on the confidential "Minutes of the Subcommittee of the Air Corps Technical Committee on Revision of Air Corps Ordnance Requirements" dated May 5, 1941, along with approved revisions thereto. (Basis of computation presented in Tab C).

5. In computing requirements, it was not believed desirable to stock outlying bases that are not within range of ignitible objectives with 4 lb. incendiary bombs, and the 17% of missions normally allocated to 4 lb. incendiary bombs was allocated in other categories of bombs.

6. It is contemplated that certain bases (Newfoundland Airport; Borinquen, P. R.; Trinidad; Hawaii) will be used as transit

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COPY FOR:
GEN. MOORE

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bases for airplanes en route to other theaters of operation. In order not to deplete their own operating stocks, it is believed desirable to keep stocked continuously sufficient fuel and lubricants to provide one refueling for 300 heavy bombers over and above the operating requirements of these bases.

II. Action recommended.

The Secretary of War directs that:

1. The allocation of units as set forth in Tab A be the basis for establishing construction and stockage requirements.

2. The stockage of defense reserves be made in accordance with the requirements set forth in Tab B attached.

3. The Chief of the Army Air Forces is authorized to initiate such action as is necessary to provide for the operating requirements of the forces as set forth in Tab A attached.

4. The Chief of Engineers is authorized to initiate such action as is necessary to complete construction requirements for the forces set forth in Tab A and the stockage indicated in Tab B attached along with such base and service units as the Chief of the Army Air Forces will advise as necessary to complement the forces in Tab A.

5. The divisions of the General Staff, Theater, Army and Department Commanders interested, and Chiefs of Arms and Service be notified of the action taken herein.

III. Concurrences.

A. C. of S., - WPD ( )
A. C. of S., - S&S ( )
A. C. of S., - G-4 ( )

Incls.
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4.

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Authorized Locations of Aerial Platform Systems			
Holland, Netherlands	1 Sq. H/S (ASW) 1 Sq. H/S (Utility)	1 Sq. H/S 1 Sq. Det I	10
Greenland, Kangerlussuaq	1 Sq. H/S 1 Sq. Det I	1 Sq. H/S 1 Sq. Det I	100
Keflavik, Iceland-Naval Air Station	1 Sq H/S	1 Sq H/S	10
Kodiak	1 Sq. H/Spcm 1 Sq Det I	1 Sq. H/Spcm 1 Sq Det I	30
Kodiak, Aspotilla	1 Sq Det I	1 Sq Det I	10
Kunsan	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	30
Puerto Rico, Roosevelt	1 Sq H/S (-2 ea) 1 Sq H/S (-1 ea)	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq H/S	30
Puerto Rico, Losey	1 Sq H/S (-1 ea)	1 Sq Det I	30
Rodgers	1 Sq H/S	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	30 15
St. Croix	1 Sq H/S	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	30 15
St. Louis	1 Sq H/S	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	30 15
Sicily	1 Sq H/S (-1 Sq) 1 Sq Det I (-1 Sq)	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	45
Sr. Salvo	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq H/Spcm 1 Sq Det I	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq H/Spcm 1 Sq Det I	30
Tahiti, Faaa	1 Sq Det I	1 Sq Det I	45
Tahiti, Alfreds	1 Sq Det I	1 Sq Det I	45
Tahiti, Hawaii	1 Sq H/S	1 Sq H/S	45
Alaska	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	100
Hawaii	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	1 Sq H/S 1 Sq Det I	90

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By [illegible] 4/22/76
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Tab A

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DOD Ltr.
8 Feb. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/21/74

Army Air Forces

Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases

	BOMBS									AMMUNITION Thousands of Rounds				Aviat. FUEL + LUB Thousands of Gallons					SIGNAL (Existing Proc		
	2000#	1000#	500#	250#	100#	Chemical 100#	Incendiary 4#	100# Gasoline	20# Frag.	.30 Cal.	.50 Cal.	20 mm	37 mm	Gasoline	Oil	Drift Signal	Flare Bomb RCN	Bomb Photo Flash	M11	M14	[illegible]
Iceland (Reykjavik)	216	1,134	2,943	3,470	1,823	4,050	-	1,013	4,050	8,014	8,706	284	57	3,295	83	1,080	1,080	270	1,836	1,836	1,[illegible]
Greenland (Narsarssuak)	86	454	1,178	1,388	729	1,620	-	405	1,620	3,206	3,483	114	23	1,318	33	432	432	108	735	735	[illegible]
Newfoundland (Newfoundland Airport)*	144	756	1,512	2,088	1,215	2,700	-	675	-	303	764	-	-	1,346	34	720	720	180	324	324	[illegible]
Bermuda	15	76	377	322	122	270	-	68	1,350	2,551	2,597	95	19	561	14	72	72	18	483	483	[illegible]
Newfoundland, (Argentina)	-	-	90	45	-	-	-	-	540	1,008	1,008	38	8	570	15	-	-	-	180	180	[illegible]
Jamaica	72	378	981	1,157	608	1,350	-	338	1,350	2,672	2,902	95	19	1,099	28	360	360	90	612	612	[illegible]
Puerto Rico (Borinquen) *	168	882	2,100	3,480	2,228	3,150	-	1,238	-	530	949	-	-	1,660	42	990	1,260	315	567	567	[illegible]
Puerto Rico (Losey)	-	-	225	113	-	-	-	-	1,350	2,520	2,520	95	19	826	21	-	-	-	450	450	[illegible]
Antigua	72	378	869	1,100	608	1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	[illegible]
St. Croix	72	378	869	1,100	608	1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	[illegible]
St. Lucia	72	378	869	1,100	608	1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	[illegible]
Trinidad *	144	576	1,692	1,953	1,215	2,700	78,030	405	2,700	5,343	5,804	189	38	2,597	65	720	720	180	1,224	1,224	1,[illegible]
Br. Guiana	29	152	347	441	243	540	-	135	270	565	657	19	4	355	9	144	144	36	155	155	[illegible]
Panama (France)	-	-	450	225	-	-	-	-	2,700	5,040	5,040	189	38	851	22	-	-	-	900	900	[illegible]
Panama (Albrook)	-	-	450	225	-	-	-	-	2,700	5,040	5,040	189	38	851	22	-	-	-	900	900	[illegible]
Panama (Howard)	144	756	1,512	2,088	1,215	2,700	-	675	-	303	764	-	-	1,346	34	720	720	180	324	324	[illegible]
Hawaii *	432	2,268	5,886	6,939	3,645	8,100	-	2,025	8,100	16,028	17,411	567	114	6,989	175	2,160	2,160	540	3,672	3,672	3,[illegible]
Alaska	432	2,268	5,886	6,939	3,645	8,100	-	2,025	8,100	16,028	17,411	567	114	6,589	165	2,160	2,160	540	3,672	3,672	3,[illegible]

*Denotes transit as well as operating base.

The Air Staff - A-4 Division

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DOD Dirs. 5200.9 & 5200.10 June 1974
By [illegible] SCI Date 7/24/74

Army Air Forces

Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases

Chemical 100#	Incendiary 4#	100# Gasoline	20# Frag.	AMMUNITION Thousands of Rounds .30 Cal.	.50 Cal.	20 mm	37 mm	Aviat. FUEL & LUB Thousands of Gallons Gasoline	Oil	PYROTECHNICS Drift Signal	Flare Bomb RCH	Bomb Photo Flash	Alternate Requirement SIGNALS (Existing Procurement) M11	M14	M15	M16	SIGNALS (Recently Standardized, British) AMK28	AMK29	AMK30	AMK31	AMK32	AMK33	AMK34	AMK35	AMK36
4,050	-	1,013	4,050	8,014	8,706	284	57	3,295	83	1,080	1,080	270	1,836	1,836	1,836	1,836	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,431
1,620	-	405	1,620	3,206	3,483	114	23	1,318	33	432	432	108	735	735	735	735	573	573	573	573	573	573	573	573	573
2,700	-	675	-	303	764	-	-	1,346	34	720	720	180	324	324	324	324	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360
270	-	68	1,350	2,551	2,597	95	19	561	14	72	72	18	483	483	483	483	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333
-	-	-	540	1,008	1,008	38	8	570	15	-	-	-	180	180	180	180	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
1,350	-	338	1,350	2,672	2,902	95	19	1,099	28	360	360	90	612	612	612	612	477	477	477	477	477	477	477	477	477
3,150	-	1,238	-	530	949	-	-	1,660	42	990	1,260	315	567	567	567	567	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480
-	-	-	1,350	2,520	2,520	95	19	826	21	-	-	-	450	450	450	450	297	297	297	297	297	297	297	297	297
1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	387	387	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329
1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	387	387	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329
1,350	-	338	675	1,412	1,642	48	10	886	23	360	360	90	387	387	387	387	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329	329
2,700	78,030	405	2,700	5,343	5,804	189	38	2,597	65	720	720	180	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	954	954	954	954	954	954	954	954	954
540	-	135	270	566	657	19	4	355	9	144	144	36	155	155	155	155	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131
-	-	-	2,700	5,040	5,040	189	38	851	22	-	-	-	900	900	900	900	594	594	594	594	594	594	594	594	594
-	-	-	2,700	5,040	5,040	189	38	851	22	-	-	-	900	900	900	900	594	594	594	594	594	594	594	594	594
2,700	-	675	-	303	764	-	-	1,346	34	720	720	180	324	324	324	324	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360
8,100	-	2,025	8,100	16,028	17,411	567	114	6,989	175	2,160	2,160	540	3,672	3,672	3,672	3,672	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862
8,100	-	2,025	8,100	16,028	17,411	567	114	6,589	165	2,160	2,160	540	3,672	3,672	3,672	3,672	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862	2,862

Statistics Section - 12/26/41.

Tab B

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DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1966
By [illegible] Date 9/27/66
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30 DAYS' SUPPLY PER OPERATING TACTICAL AIRPLANE*

Type of Airplane	NO. OF MUNITION ROUNDS (1) 2000#	1000#	500#	250#	100#	GENERAL 100#	INCENDIARY No. of 100# Canisters	No. of 20# Rockets per canister (In addition to 100# Canisters)	No. of 20# Fwd. Racks (In cluster adapter for 100# Station)	GENERAL SPOT 10,000	GUNNERY Gas. Gal.	GASOLINE (Gals)	OIL (Gals.)
HEAVY BOMBARDMENT (8 missions per month 5 of which are bombing)	1.6	8.4 (8.4)	13.8 (16.8)	29.2 (23.2)	13.5	30.0	4.5 (7.5)	867 (0)	-	-	1890	14,550	304
MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT (15 missions per month 10 of which are bombing)	1.6	8.4 (8.4)	28.4 (28.4)	33.6 (40.4)	27.0	30.0	9.0 (15.0)	1734 (0)	-	-	675	14,448	432
LIGHT BOMBARDMENT (15 missions per month 13 of which are bombing)	-	7.2 6.0 Tr.	26.4 9.0 Tr.	50.4 -	90.0 (105.0) 10.5 Bas.	30.0	3.4 2.0 Bas.	650 (0) 3.4 Bas.	459 -	3.0 Bas.	1 Fuselage type 2 Wing type 303 (Number of Trunions(Tr) or Suspension Bands(Bas.) for Bomb Numbers.)	14,448	432
FIGHTER (30 missions per month 24 of which are bombing)	-	-	2.5	1.25	-	-	-	-	15	-	68	4,725	120

(1) Figures in Circle represent Alternate Things to cover stockage of those bases not within range of objective(planes) by AF Secondary Bombs (Atlantic Base, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, etc.).

Type of Airplane	30 DAY SUPPLY AMMUNITION (Rounds) (2) .30 cal.	(2) .50 cal.	(3) 20 mm	37 mm	INITIAL SUPPLY AMMUNITION (Rounds) .30 cal.	.50 cal.	20mm	37mm	Flares MK	Drift Signal	Flare Bomb MK	Bomb Photo Flash	PERCENTAGE Alternate Requirement: RIFLES (Belgian Requirement) M1A1	M1A4	M1C	M1A	BOMB-LOAD (4) (Percentage Apportionment, British) AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30	AN-M30
HEAVY BOMBARDMENT (8 missions per month 5 of which are bombing)	3,360	6,484	-	-	1200	3920	-	-	-	6.0	8.8	2.0	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
MEDIUM BOMBARDMENT (15 missions per month 10 of which are bombing)	4,320	9,450	-	-	1200	1800	-	-	-	10.5	15.0	3.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
LIGHT BOMBARDMENT (15 missions per month 13 of which are bombing)	13,320	9,450	-	-	2520	1800	-	-	-	-	15.0	3.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
FIGHTER (30 missions per month 24 of which are bombing)	28,800	28,800	1920	240	4800	4800	120	30	-	-	-	-	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
ALL OTHER TYPE PLANES																	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7

* The BOMB-LOAD of the representative aviable under procurement for Army Air Forces is used to present the GENERAL DISTRIBUTION by tactical types.
Heavy Bombardment Bomber B-17F, G, & B-24D, H & B-24J; B-24L (Service).
Medium Bombardment Bomber B-25C and D-B-26B (Marauder).
Light Bombardment Bomber B-25C (Mitchell) A-20G; A-24; A-26.
Fighter P-38L, P-47D, & P-51 (Mustang) P-47N; P-61.

(2) The 500# and 1000 # Bombing Bombs to be 70% General Purpose and 30% Semi-Armor Piercing.
(3) The .30 and .50 caliber ammunition to be 50% AP, 50% Incendiary, 50% Tracer.
(4) The 20 mm ammunition to be 60% AP and 40% Incendiary.
(5) Expenditure rate of 30% per mission plus a 50% reserve.

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DOD Rts.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/74

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SUPPLY PLANNING

Estimated Locations of Units (Semiarbore Defense)	115 Group Program (1942)	Base plans for reserve storage on Units	Period days
Iceland	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp Pur (F)	1 Gp Pur	90
Greenland	1 Sq H/B	1 Sq H/B	
	1 Sq Pur (F)	1 Sq Pur	180
Newfoundland	2 Sq H/B	2 Sq H/B	
	1 Sq Pur (F)	1 Sq Pur	60
Bermuda	1 Sq H/B	1 Sq H/B	
	1 Gp Pur (I)	1 Gp Pur (I)	30
Caribbean Area	(see notes)		
*Panama	1 Gp H/B (-1 Sq)	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Sq L/B (-2 Flt)	1 Sq L/B	
	3 Gp Pur	3 Gp Pur	60
	1 Gp Obsn		
	1 Sq Trans		
*Puerto Rico	1 Gp H/B (-1 Sq)	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp Pur (I)	1 Gp Pur	30
*Trinidad	1 Gp H/B (-2 Sq)	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp Pur	1 Gp Pur	30
*Antigua	1 Sq H/B	1 Sq H/B	30
**Jamaica	1 Sq H/B	1 Gp H/B	30
	1 Sq Pur (I)	1 Gp Pur	15
**St. Croix	1 Sq H/B	1 Gp H/B	30
		1 Gp Pur	15
**St. Lucia	1 Sq H/B	1 Gp H/B	30
		1 Gp Pur	15
**Br. Guiana	2 Sq H/B	2 Sq H/B	30
	1 Sq Pur (I)	1 Sq Pur	
Alaska	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	
	1 Gp Pur (I)	1 Gp Pur	180
Hawaii	[illegible] H/B	2 Gps H/B	
	[illegible] H/B	3 Gps Pur	
	3 Gps Pur (I)	1 Sq L/B	
	1 Sq Trans	1 Sq Trans	90

Notes * From A-3 Allocation of Units
** From Caribbean Defense CHD Plans

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Exhibit A

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DISPOSITION FORM

Date December 27, 1941.....

AG

AAF/A-4/463-1

SUBJECT: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs, and Pyrotechnics--Oversea Bases and Departments (other than Philippines).

	USW	ASW	ASWA	B-LP	BOWD	BPR
	C/S	G-1	G-2	2. G-3	3. G-4	1. WPD
	Sec.G/S	NGB	JAG	1G	QMG	SG
TO:	OCAC	CSO	Fin.	Ord.	Ex.R.A.	ENGR
	AFCC	Inf	FA	Cav	CAC	CWS
	TAG					

FOR:
SW directs
Draft of reply attached
Approved
Disapproved
File

~~Comment on~~ concurrence
Direct reply made
Inviting attention to
See notation of _____
Information

Information for reply
_____ Ind. approved
Primary interest
~~Notation and~~ return to A-4, ~~Air Staff.~~
Noted _____

AAF/A-4
WRB/mhh

Incls.
Memo to C/S,
AAF/A-4/463-1
12/27/41, abv.
subj. w/incls.
Tab A, B, & C.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

Edgar P. Sorensen

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4.

DEC 27 '41 PM

IN
WPD. WDGS

11 45 am REC'D-G-3 48001 JAN 3 1942

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H-4689, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/21/76

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

AAF/A-4
WRB/elm

(Written February 23, 1942)

FEB 2 4 1942

SUBJECT: Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases.

TO: Chief, War Plans Division of Ordnance.

1. Pursuant to the telephone conversation with Major W. M. Jefferies of your office on January 23, 1942, there is forwarded for your information one copy of the defense reserve requirements of various overseas departments and bases as approved by the Chief of Staff on January 21, 1942.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

Incl.
Chart - Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases, 12/26/41.

T. J. HANLEY, Jr.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-4.

381.4 (6) B

Hq. Army Air Forces
FEB 24 1942
AAG RECEIVED

Dispatched
FEB 25 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
						WB					

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AAF-39

a-4 ab 381.4 (6) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NARS, Date Apr 1974

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RECEIPT

_____.

SUBJECT: Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases.

Received from Headquarters, Army Air Forces, above subject, dated _____, with the following inclosures:

Chart - Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases, 12/26/41.

_____
Officer Rank

_____
Office

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COPY

DECLASSIFIED [redacted]ET SUPPLY PLANNING

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

Estimated Locations of Units,	Units at Army's 2nd Aviation Objective Strength	Base plans for reserve storage on Units	Period days
Iceland, Reykjavik	1 Gp. H/B (-1Sq) 1 Gp. Pur. I(-1sq)	1 Gp. H/B 1 Gp. Pur I	90
Greenland, Norsarssuck	1 Sq. H/B 1 Sq. Pur I	1 Sq. H/B 1 Sq. Pur I	180
Newfoundland, Newfoundland Airport	1 Gp H/B	1 Gp H/B	60
Bermuda	1 Sq. H/Recon 1 Gp Pur I	1 Sq. H/Recon 1 GP Pur I	30
Newfoundland, Argentia	1 Sq Pur I	1 Sq Pur I	60
Jamaica	1 Sq M/B 1 Sq Pur I	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	30
Puerto Rico, Borinquen	1 Gp H/B (-2sq) 1 Gp M/B (-1 sq)	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp M/B	30
Puerto Rico, Losey	1 Gp Pur (-1 sq)	1 Gp Pur I	30
Antigua	1 Sq H/B-	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	30 15
St. Croix	1 Sq H/B	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	30 15
St. Lucia	1 Sq H/B	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	30 15
Trinidad	1 Gp H/B (-3 Sq) L Gp Pur I (-2 Sq)	1 Gp H/B- 1 Gp Pur I	60
Br. Guiana	1 Sq H/B 1 Sq H/Recon 1 Sq Pur I	1 Sq H/B 1 Sq H/Recon 1 Sq Pur I	30
Panama, France	1 Gp Pur F	1 Gp Pur F	60
Panama, Albrook	1 Gp Pur I	1 Gp Pur I	60
Panama, Howard	1 Gp H/B-	1 Gp H/B	60
Alaska	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	1 Gp H/B 1 Gp Pur I	180
Hawaii	2 Gp H/B- 2 Gp Pur I	2 Gp H/B 2 Gp Pur I	90

[redacted]ET
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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan 4 of June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/74

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

RECEIPT

DATE _____

SUBJECT: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs, and Pyrotechnics--Overseas Bases and Departments (other than Philippines).

1. Received from the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, one memorandum, above subject w/3 inclosures:

Tab A
Tab B
Tab C

_____
OFFICER RANK

_____
OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

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DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 11/27/74

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

RECEIPT

DATE _____

SUBJECT: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs, and Pyrotechnics--Overseas Bases and Departments (other than Philippines).

1. Received from the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, one Disposition Form, above subject w/inclosures:

Memo to C/S,
AAF/A-4/463/-1
12/27/41, abv.
subj.; Tabs A,
B, & C.

_____
OFFICER RANK

_____
OFFICE

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/74

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823

AG 381.4 (9-27-41)MC-D JMH/mlh - 1712.

November 10, 1941.

SECRET
Auth: T.A.G.
Initials: DRV
Date: NOV 10 1941

SUBJECT: Priorities for Distribution of Ammunition.

TO: Chief of Ordnance.

381.4 (5)

1. Paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, this office, February 1, 1941, AG 381.4 (9-18-40)M-D, subject: Status Report on Defense Reserves for Overseas Departments, Ordnance, relative to the distribution of ammunition, is rescinded.

2. It is desired that the distribution of ammunition, aircraft bombs and pyrotechnics available to meet Army needs be made in accordance with the following general policy:

Priority 1 - Test Requirements.
Priority 2 - Task Force Reserves. (As established by War Department Directives).
Priority 3 - Training Requirements.
Priority 4 - Complete 60% of the Defense Reserves for Philippine Department and Alaska Defense Command.
Priority 5 - Complete Defense Reserves for Base Commands in Greenland and Newfoundland.
Priority 6 - Complete 60% of Defense Reserves for other Overseas Departments and Bases.
Priority 7 - Complete 10% of the Continental U.S. PMP Requirements as shown in the current War Department Expenditure Program (i.e. 10% of the total PMP Requirements shown less the authorized Task Force Reserves and Reserves for the Overseas Departments and Bases).
Priority 8 - Complete Defense Reserves for Philippine Department and Alaska Defense Command.
Priority 9 - Complete Defense Reserves for other Overseas Departments and Bases.
Priority 10- Complete Continental U.S. PMP Requirements as shown on the current War Department Expenditure Program.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By_____ LC; Date_____

3. The priority of distribution within priorities 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 will be in general accordance with priorities established for the distribution of controlled items of equipment.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. Van Stokler

Adjutant General.

COPIES TO: A. C. of S., WPD;
A. C. of S., G-3;
Chief, Chemical Warfare Service;
Chief of the Army Air Forces;
Chief of Staff, GHQ.

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an AG 381.4 (5)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/76

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AAF/A-4
WEB/gwd
Written Sept. 19, 1941.

SEP 23 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics for Leased Bases in Atlantic.

381.4 (2)

1. Reference attached memorandum, dated August 15, 1941, above subject (WPD 3337-53).

2. This Office concurs in the attached memorandum except insofar as it pertains to aircraft ammunition.

3. Freedom to interchange models of aircraft as the production or tactical situation may require indicates that it is necessary to provide ammunition for any of the more numerous models of airplanes under procurement for the Air Corps. In connection with this provision, it is to be noted that exigencies may require that the Air Corps substitute medium bombardment airplanes in heavy bombardment units. Also, P-38 series airplanes must be considered as available for interceptor missions.

4. Method of computing defense reserves, insofar as they pertain to ammunition, leads to the following expenditure basis per plane mission (based on 35% expenditure):

Bombardment	30 cal.	50 cal.	20 mm.	37 mm.
Heavy and medium	630 rounds	1330 rounds	-	-
Pursuit	1400 rounds	1400 rounds	53 rounds	11 rounds

5. Modification in the attached study would be made as follows:

Bermuda	37 mm.	7,920 rounds
	20 mm.	38,160 rounds
	50 Cal.	1,199,520 rounds
	30 Cal.	1,096,720 rounds
Newfoundland	37 mm.	11,880 rounds
	20 mm.	57,240 rounds
	50 Cal.	2,661,120 rounds
	30 Cal.	2,056,320 rounds

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Copy for AAG. Air AG 381.4 (2)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Date:

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Greenland	37 mm.	15,840 rounds
	20 mm.	76,320 rounds
	50 Cal.	2,399,040 rounds
	30 Cal.	2,196,440 rounds
Trinidad	37 mm.	15,840 rounds
	20 mm.	78,320 rounds
	50 Cal.	2,399,040 rounds
	30 Cal.	2,197,440 rounds
British Guiana, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia (each)	37 mm.	3,960 rounds
	20 mm.	19,080 rounds
	50 Cal.	599,760 rounds
	30 Cal.	549,360 rounds

Incls.-
D/F, 8/15/41, G-WPD 3337-53, above subject, w/memo, 8/15/41, WPD 3337-53, same subject.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps,
Secretary of The Air Staff

Dispatched
SEP 23 1941
AAG

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COPY FOR: Chief of the Army Air Forces.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED DOD Dirs. 5 Jan. & 30 June 1974 By [illegible] Date 4/26/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

noted A-1

PARAPHRASE OF RADIOGRAM

INFORMATION COPY

AG 381.4 (4-24-41)MC-E

EHB/cdm - 1712

TO: CG., PHIL. DEPT.

JULY 24, 1941.

FROM: TAG.

: S E C R E T :
:Auth: T.A.G.
:Initials CCW
:Date: 7-24-41.

JULY 24, 1941.

381.41

THE FOLLOWING IS IN REFERENCE TO YOUR FIRST INDORSEMENT, MAY TWENTY NINETEEN FORTY ONE, THREE EIGHT ONE POINT FOUR: ON BASIS OF 50,000 OFFICERS AND MEN FOR A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS, LESS RESERVES ITEMS THAT CAN BE FURNISHED BY PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH FOR AN APPROXIMATE AVERAGE OF 30,000 OFFICERS AND MEN OF PHILIPPINE ARMY LEVEL OF DEFENSE RESERVES IN PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT WILL BE COMPUTED. BASED ON QUANTITIES ACTUALLY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN DEFENSE FOR A PERIOD OF 180 DAYS WAR DEPARTMENT WILL ESTABLISH AMMUNITION TO BE INCLUDED IN DEFENSE RESERVE LEVEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES AND AS AVAILABLE SHORTAGES IN DEFENSE RESERVES WILL BE FURNISHED. DESIRE LIST OF UNITS COMPRISING FORCE OF 50,000 UPON WHICH DEFENSE RESERVES WILL BE COMPUTED, TOGETHER WITH PERTINENT TABLES OF ORGANIZATION. ALSO DESIRE COPIES OF ANY SPECIAL TABLES OF ORGANIZATION USED, PARTICULARLY FOR PHILIPPINE ARMY, IF NOT IN WAR DEPT. STRENGTHS SHOULD CORRESPOND CLOSELY TO APPLICABLE STANDARD TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT STANDARD TABLES SHOULD BE USED.

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LISTING WILL INDICATE SUB UNIT DEDUCTED COVERING DIFFERENCE IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION STRENGTH AND ACTUAL STRENGTH, WHERE ACTUAL STRENGTHS OF UNITS LISTED ARE LESS THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED IN APPLICABLE STANDARD TABLES OF ORGANIZATION. INFANTRY COMPANY LESS PLATOON IS EXAMPLE OF ABOVE. DESIRED THAT WAR PLANNING EQUIPMENT CHARTS FOR SUCH UNITS FOR EACH SUPPLY ARM AND SERVICE BE PREPARED AND FORWARDED WITH LEAST PRACTICABLE DELAY WHERE SPECIAL TABLES OF ORGANIZATION ARE USED.

COPIES FURNISHED:
A. C. of S., G-1;
A. C. of S., G-3;
A. C. of S., G-4;
Chief of the Army Air Forces;
Officers' Division;
Enlisted Division; (2)
Machine Records Section;
Returns Section;
Chief of Coast Artillery;
Chief of the Air Corps;
Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;
Chief of Engineers;
Chief of Ordnance;
Chief Signal Officer;
The Quartermaster General;
The Surgeon General; and
Chief of Finance.

PARAPHRASE OF RADIOGRAM

INFORMATION COPY

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SECRET

AAG 381.4 (1)

Air Ds 381.4 (B)

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STATUS REPORT-DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Panama
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Gs. Overseas Depts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16. Items on hand which are component parts of sets, will be included in Col. 12 to the extent necessary to eliminate shortages in sets as far as practicable. This will have the effect of completing sets and causing shortages to appear opposite the individual items. Component parts of sets which are still "short" will be immediately placed on requisition, and the entry made under remarks "component parts short placed on requisition - - -".
7. Column 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason (e. g. statement of size required) will be immediately requisitioned by Overseas Depts. Where requisitions are submitted, indicate in Cols. 14 and 16.
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept., and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed seven.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished).

1 (PAGE NO.)
1-29-42 (DATE)

(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE

Taken from Panama Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (8)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
1 4 0 0 3 0 MG Cal 3 0 BR AC Fix Ea	PC	01	42		64	64		64		64	603	539			
1 4 0 0 4 0 MG Cal 3 0 BR AC Flex Ea	PC	01	42		181	181		181		181	300	119	390		
1 4 0 1 0 0 MG Cal 5 0 BR AC Fix Ea	PC	01	42		1876	1876		1876		1876	335	1541S		1	
1 4 0 1 1 0 MG Cal 5 0 BR AC Flex Ea	PC	01	42		1263	1263		1263		1263	28	1235S	228	1	
1 4 0 2 6 0 Gun 2 0 MM Aircraft Ea	PC	01	42		633	633		633		633		633S		1	
1 4 0 3 9 0 Gun 3'7 MM Auto W Rec Mech Ac Ea	PC	01	42												
1 4 0 6 6 0 Pistol Pyro M2 AC Ea	PC	01	42		258	258		258		258	*257	18	90	2	*Includes 10 ea. pistol, pyro., M1.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [signature] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Panama
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Cs. Overseas Depts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16. Items on hand which are component parts of sets, will be included in Col. 12 to the extent necessary to eliminate shortages in sets as far as practicable. This will have the effect of completing sets and causing shortages to appear opposite the individual items. Component parts of sets which are still "short" will be immediately placed on requisition, and the entry made under remarks "component parts short placed on requisition - - -"
7. Column 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason (e. g. statement of size required) will be immediately requisitioned by Overseas Depts. Where requisitions are submitted, indicate in Cols. 14 and 16.
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept., and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed seven.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished).

2 (PAGE NO.)
1-29-42 (DATE)

Taken from Panama Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9−10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11−12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (S)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
1 4 5 2 0 1	Cart Sig AC Red Para M 11 Ea	PC	01	42					7,670		7,670	4,688	2,982S		1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4 (8-16-41)
1 4 5 2 0 2	Cart Sig AC Red CL M 14 Ea	PC	01	42					7,670		7,670	7,186	484S		1	Auth: Same as above.
1 4 5 2 0 3	Cart Sig AC White Blkr Para M 15 Ea	PC	01	42					7,670		7,670	12,932	5,262		1	Auth: Same as above. 2115 are M10
1 4 5 2 0 4	Cart Sig AC Green Blkr Para M 16 Ea	PC	01	42					7,670		7,670	7,185	485S		1	Auth: Same as above.
1 4 5 2 1 0	Bomb Photoflash M 12 A 1 M 23 Ea	PC	01	42					1,600		1,600	673	927S			Auth: CDC-S 381.4 (8-16-41); 00 475.72/235 places all M12 & M12A1 in Grade III - all on hand are Grade III.
1 4 5 2 2 0	Flare AC Para Bomb Reconn Ea	PC	01	42					3,050		3,050	983	2,067S	200		Auth: CDC-S 381.4 (8-16-41). In addn on hand are 218 M8 and 103 M8A1 for trng.
1 4 5 2 3 0	Flare AC Para Reconn M 9 Ea	PC	01	42					3,420		3,420	2,946	474S		1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4 (8-16-41)
1 4 5 2 4 0	Signal Drift M 25 Air Nav Ea	PC	01	42					1,680		1,680	1,054	626S	672	1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4 (8-16-41). 46 - Lt., float, Navy, MkIV.
1 4 5 2 5 0	Signal Dist AC Gren Smoke Ea	PC	01	42					1,000		1,000		1,000S		1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41)
1 4 5 2 6 0	Bomb Frag Stab M 41 Ea	PC	01	42					5,000		5,000	4,847	153S		3	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41) All are 30# M5.
1 4 5 2 8 0	Bomb Gas HS 30 lb M 46 Ea	PC	01	42					500		500	174	326S		3	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). All are M1.
1 4 5 2 9 0	Bomb Smoke WP 30 lb M 46 Ea	PC	01	42				DECLASSIFIED	5,000		5,000	2,442	2,558S	1,000	2	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41) 245 are MkIMIV.
1 4 5 3 0 0	Bomb Dem 100 lb M 30 Ea															

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STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Panama
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

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3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
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3 (PAGE NO.)
1-29-42 (DATE)

Taken from Panama Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9−10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11−12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (S)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
145310	Bomb Dem 250 lb M 31 Ea	PC	01	42					5,500		5,500	2,706	2,794S		2	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41) 730 are MkIIII(300#) 1970-300-lb M31.
145320	Bomb Dem 500 lb M 42 Ea	PC	01	42					2,500		2,500	2,353	147S		2	Auth:CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 460 are MkIIII (600#) and 1448 are M32 (600#).
145330	Bomb Dem 1000 lb M 44 Ea	PC	01	42					1,000		1,000	347	653	132	2	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 86 are MkIIIII (1100#) and 261 are M33 (1100#).
145340	Bomb Dem 2000 lb M 34 Ea	PC	01	42					700		700	50	650S	193	2	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 10 are MkIIIV.
145350	Bomb CML HS 100 lb M 47 Ea	PC	01	42					1,000		1,000		1,000S		2	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41)
145360	Bomb CML Incen 100 lb M 47 Ea	PC	01	42					2,000		2,000		2,000S		2	Auth: Same as above item.
145370	Bomb Incen 4 lb AN M 50 Ea	PC	01	42												
145380	Bomb Incen 40 lb AN M 51 Ea	PC	01	42												
145390	Bomb Semi AP 500 lb Ea	PC	01	42					1,000		1,000		1,000S		3	Auth: Same as above)
145400	Bomb Semi AP 1000 lb Ea	PC	01	42					500		500		500S		3	Auth: Same as above.
145410	Bomb AP 1600 lb Ea	PC	01	42					700		700		700S		3	Auth: Same as above.
145420	Bomb Depth Navy Type Ea	PC	01	42					2,500		2,500		2,500S		2	Auth: Same as above.
145431	Bomb Prac 100 lb M 38 A 2 Ea	PC	01	42								21,000	21,000			To be used for training.
145433	Bomb Prac Min M 36 Ea	PC	01	42												
145434	Bomb Prac 17 lb M 37 Att Ea	PC	01	42								690	690			To be kept for training.

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STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Panama
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

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4 (PAGE NO.)
1-29-42 (DATE)

(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE — Taken from Panama Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9−10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11−12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (S)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
1 4 5 4 4 0 Shot AP 20 MM AC Gun Ea	PC	01	42					48,000		48,000	0	48,000S		1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 80% AP; 20% HE (HE substitute for tracer).
1 4 5 4 5 0 Shell HE MKI 20 MM Hispano Ea	PC	01	42					12,000		12,000	0	12,000S		1	Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 80% AP: 20% HE (HE substitute for tracer).
1 4 5 4 6 0 Projectile Prac 20 MM Hispano Ea	PC	01	42												
1 4 5 4 8 0 Shot AP 37MM M59 AC Gun Ea	PC	01	42					4,800		4,800		4,800S			Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41) 80% AP; 20% HE (HE sub. for tracer).
1 4 5 4 9 0 Shell HE 37MM M 54 AC Gun Ea	PC	01	42					1,200		1,200	12,000	10,800			Auth: CDC-S 381.4(8-16-41). 80% AP; 20% HE (HE SUB, for tracer).
1 4 5 5 0 0 Shell Prac 37 MM M 55 Al AC Ea	PC	01	42												

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O.O. 381.4/260 misc Incl 12

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STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Puerto Rico
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

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1 (PAGE NO.)
1-30-42 (DATE)

(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE

Taken from Puerto Rico Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9−10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11−12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (S)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
1 4 0 0 3 0 MG Cal 30 BR AC Fix Ea	PR	01	42		184	184	28	212		212	281	69			
1 4 0 0 4 0 MG Cal 30 BR AC Flex Ea	PR	01	42		258	258	39	297		297	82	215S		1	DECLASSIFIED DOD ltr. 8 Jan. & 30 June 1944 By [illegible] M.D. Date 12/7/46
1 4 0 1 0 0 MG Cal 50 BR AC Fix Ea	PR	01	42		180	180	22	202		202	298	96		1	
1 4 0 1 1 0 MG Cal 50 BR AC Flex Ea	PR	01	42		115	115	14	129		129		129S		1	
1 4 0 2 6 0 Gun 20 MM Aircraft Ea	PR	01	42												
1 4 0 3 9 0 Gun 37 MM Auto W Rec Mech AC Ea	PR	01	42												
1 4 0 6 8 0 Pistol Pyro M2 AC Ea	PR	01	42		185	185	19	204		204	184	20S	176	1	
1 4 5 2 0 1 Cart Sig AC Red Para M11 Ea	PR	01	42			2,907		2,907		2,907	1,646	1,261S		1	Quantity on hand includes 1544 M10. See notes 2,3, & 4 Amm Annex Def. Res. established as Signals AC assorted with no breakdown.
1 4 5 2 0 2 Cart Sig AC Red CL M 14 Ea	PR	01	42			2,908		2,908		2,908	2,326	582S		1	See remarks under 145201.
1 4 5 2 0 3 Cart Sig AC White Blkr Para M 15 Ea	PR	01	42			2,907		2,907		2,907	*3,753	846		1	*M10 type satisfactory sub. See remarks under 145201. 2326 M - 15 1427 M - 10
1 4 5 2 0 4 Cart Sig AC Green Blkr Para M 16 Ea	PR	01	42			2,908		2,908		2,908	2,326	582S		1	See remarks under 145201.
1 4 5 2 1 0 Bomb Photoflash M 12 Al M23 Ea	PR	01	42			760		760		760	*300	460S		1	See notes 2, & 4 Amm Annex * Shipped on S.O. 847-S-1.
1 4 5 2 2 0 Flare AC Para Bomb Reconn Ea	PR	01	42			1,950		1,950		1,950		1,950S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex.
1 4 5 2 3 0 Flare AC Para Reconn M 9 Ea	PR	01	42			1,300		1,300		1,300	1,168	132S			See notes 2,3 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 2 4 0 Signal Drift M 25 Air Nav Ea	PR	01	42			1,150		1,150		1,150	1,362	212		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex.
1 4 5 2 5 0 Signal Dist AC Gren Smoke Ea	PR	01	42			340		340		340	2,103	1,763			7th Ind. AG 381.4(4-2-41) MC-E, June 13, 1941. See notes 3 & 4, Amm. Annex.

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STATUS REPORT-DEFENSE RESERVES

SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE: Ordnance-Puerto Rico

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2 (PAGE NO.)

1-30-42 (DATE)

(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE

Taken from Puerto Rico Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (-)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
1 4 5 2 6 0 Bomb Frag Stab M 41 Ea	PR	01	42												No def. res. established.
1 4 5 2 8 0 Bomb Gas HS 30 lb M 46 Ea	PR	01	42			500		500		500		500S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex. Chem. bombs authorized but no breakdown for gas or smoke.
1 4 5 2 9 0 Bomb Smoke WP 30 lb M 46 Ea	PR	01	42											1	See remarks under 145280.
1 4 5 3 0 0 Bomb Dem 100 lb M 30 Ea	PR	01	42			5,000		5,000		5,000	*2,565	2,435S		1	*Includes 1270 supplied for training. See notes 2,3 & 4, Amm. Annex.
1 4 5 3 1 0 Bomb Dem 250 lb M31 Ea	PR	01	42			8,000		8,000		8,000	141	7,859S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 3 2 0 Bomb Dem 500 lb M 43 Ea	PR	01	42			3,500		3,500		3,500	136	3,364S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 3 3 0 Bomb Dem 1000 lb M 44 Ea	PR	01	42			2,700		2,700		2,700	55	2,645S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 3 4 0 Bomb Dem 2000 lb M 34 Ea	PR	01	42			2,000		2,000		2,000	10	1,990S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm. Annex
1 4 5 3 5 0 Bomb CML HS 100 lb M 47 Ea	PR	01	42			1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 3 6 0 Bomb CML Incen 100 lb M 47 Ea	PR	01	42			2,500		2,500		2,500		2,500S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 3 7 0 Bomb Incen 4 lb AN M 50 Ea	PR	01	42											1	No def. Res. established.
1 4 5 3 8 0 Bomb Incen 40 lb AN M 51 Ea	PR	01	42											1	No def. res. established
1 4 5 3 9 0 Bomb Semi AP 500 lb Ea	PR	01	42			1,500		1,500		1,500		1,500S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 4 0 0 Bomb Semi AP 1000 lb Ea	PR	01	42			1,200		1,200		1,200		1,200S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 4 1 0 Bomb AP 1600 lb Ea	PR	01	42			2,000		2,000		2,000		2,000S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex If not available an equal number lf 2000-lb dem. bombs will be substituted
1 4 5 4 2 0 Bomb Depth Navy Type Ea	PR	01	42			2,500		2,500		2,500		2,500S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amm Annex
1 4 5 4 3 1 Bomb Prac 100 lb M 38 A 2 Ea	PR	01	42								26,822	26,822		1	For training only.

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STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

Ordnance-Puerto Rico
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

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- 3 -
(PAGE NO.)
1-30-42
(DATE)

Taken from Puerto Rico Status Report dated 1/1/42

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (S)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
145432	Bomb Prac 20 lb M 48 Ea	PR	01	42												
145433	Bomb Prac Min M 36 Ea	PR	01	42												
145434	Bomb Prac 17 lb M 37 Att Ea	PR	01	42												
145440	Shot AP 20 MM AC Gun Ea	PR	01	42			48,000		48,000		48,000		48,000S		1	See note 2 & 4 Amn. Annex 80% A.P. - 20.
145450	Shell HE MKI 20 MM Hispano Ea	PR	01	42			12,000		12,000		12,000		12,000S		1	See remarks under 145440
145460	Projectile Prac 20 MM Hispano Ea	PR	01	42												
145480	Shot AP 37 MM M 59 AC Gun Ea	PR	01	42			6,000		6,000		6,000		6,000S		1	See notes 2 & 4 Amn. Annex. No breakdown for AP or HE.
145490	Shell HE 37 MM M 54 AC Gun Ea	PR	01	42								12,000	12,000		1	See remarks under 145480.
145500	Shell Prac 37 MM M 55 A1 AC Ea	PR	01	42								2,000	2,000		1	

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O.O. 381.4/260 Misc Mal. 2L

SAS 381.4 HAWAII

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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AAF/A-4
HCB

SUBJECT: Hawaiian Department Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition.

2nd Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
MAR 11 1942 To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, FortShafter, T. H. (Thru the Adjutant General)

1. Inviting attention to letter AG381.4(2-24-42)MSO-G-M dated March 3, 1942, subject: Defense Reserves - Overseas Bases and Departments.

2. On the basis of authorized Stockage Requirements - Outlying Bases as contained in letter referred to above, bombs, ammunition and pyrotechnics will be shipped to the Hawaiian Department, as availability permits, to make up any existing shortage in reserve stocks.

3. In this connection, the records indicate that your stocks on hand plus releases since January 26, 1942 are more than sufficient in most cases to take care of requirements with the following exceptions:

87 1000# Demolition Bombs
2025 100# Incendiary Bombs
8100 100# Chemical Bombs
64,000 rounds 37 MM Aircraft Ammunition
527,000 rounds 20 MM Aircraft Ammunition
2,160 Bombardment Flares M-24
10,028,000 rounds Cal. 30 Ammunition
13,885,000 rounds Cal. 50 Ammunition

4. No Armor Piercing or Semi-Armor Piercing Bombs are available for issue. Two hundred (200) ea. 325# Mark XVII Depth Bombs are being shipped within a few days.

5. No 37 MM AP or 20 MM AP Ammunition is available and the supply of 30# Smoke or Gas Bombs will not permit a stockage at this time.

6. The critical status of Cal. 30 and Cal. 50 Ammunition will not permit a stockage of the authorized reserve in the near future.

FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

Incl: n/c
SOC

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

"COMEBACK COPY"

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Air AG 381.4 Hawaii (4)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By ala/ko, Date 4/27/74

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CS (AG-1)

In reply refer to:

A.C. 381.4

22 February 1942

SUBJECT: Hawaiian Department Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:

a. War Department Secret letter dated 8 August 1941 to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, subject: "Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics, Overseas Departments and Alaska," file AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC-E, (DOO 381.4/416).

b. Secret War Department radio #870-4 January 1942 to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (DOO 471/1248-a).

2. Experience indicates that the method of computing ammunition requirements, based on units of fire for infantry and artillery, has many advantages and greatly facilitates the computation of stocks and the preparation of ammunition reports. A similar system should be established for determining stocks of airplane bombs and aircraft ammunition.

3 3. In fixing the minimum stocks by missions for each type of bomb, sufficient allowance should be made for the fact that the exact type of targets cannot be predicted in advance. In addition, provision must be made in this Department for the needs of task forces operating from here, and for reinforcing bombardment aviation which would be sent to these islands from the mainland when threat of invasion becomes imminent. Requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force should be based on the following minimum number of planes:

200 Heavy Bombers, B-17 or B-24
50 Medium Bombers
3 Groups of Pursuit, totaling 375 operating planes.

4. The following minimum stocks of bombs should be established as a basis for future requirements for this Department:

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(Ltr. to TAG, fr. CG HD[redacted] Hawaiian Dept. Defense Reserve[redacted] Aircraft Ammunition, "2/22/42.)

TYPE	MISSIONS PER PLANE	NO. OF BOMBS REQUIRED
2000# Demolition	3 per heavy bomber	1200
1500# Armor Piercing	2 per heavy bomber	800
1100# Demolition or 1000# Demolition	2 per heavy bomber	1600
1000# S A P	2 per heavy bomber	1600
600# Demolition or 500# Demolition	6 per heavy bomber	9600
500# S A P	2 per heavy bomber	3200
300# Demolition or 250# Demolition	6 per heavy bomber	16,800
100# Demolition	2 per heavy bomber	8,000
300# Depth bomb	(2 per heavy bomber	5,600
	(2 per medium bomber	400

.50 Caliber ammunition for heavy bombardment aircraft, 6 missions of 5000 rounds per airplane for 200 planes - 6,000,000 rounds.

.50 Caliber aircraft ammunition for 3 groups of Pursuit (375 operating aircraft) 18 missions at 1800 rounds per aircraft - 12, 150,000 rounds.

.50 Caliber aircraft ammunition for medium bombardment aircraft, 12 missions of 2,500 rounds per airplane for 50 aircraft - 1,600,000.

5. Attached hereto, as Inclosure No. 1, is a table showing the status of defense reserves of aircraft ammunition in the Hawaiian Department based upon the abobe minimum stock level.

6. The 300-pound depth bomb, 1500-pound AP, 1000-pound SAP and 500-pound SAP bombs are not available in this department at present, and constitute a prime requirement. In the event that shipment of all or part of these items is made, the appropriate bombing tables and ballistic charts for them must be supplied, there being none available in this Department.

7. It is urgently recommended that the minimum stock level proposed in paragraph 4 above be approved and steps be taken by earliest available transportation to bring the defense reserve to the Hawaiian Department up to these levels, as indicated in Inclosure No. 1.

1 Incl. Table showing "Status of Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition, Hawaiian Department,"

/s/ Delos C. Emmons
DELOS C. EMMONS
Lt. General, U. S. A.,
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Hawaiian Department Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition.

AG 381.4 (2-22-42)MSC 1st Ind. WPR/ajn-1705

War Department, AGO, March 3, 1942 - To the Chief of the Army Air Forces.

For appropriate action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[redacted]

1 Incl. n/c. Adjutant General.

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AAG/1352

ag 381.4 Hawaii (4)

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DOD Hrs.
1 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/74

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TABLE A

STATUS OF DEFENSE RESERVE OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

ITEM	QUANTITY NOW AUTHORIZED (1)	QUANTITY REQUIRED	ON HAND HAW. GRP. ONLY	SHORTAGE UNDER REQUIRED	
BOMB, 2000 lb., Demolition	1,400	1,200	497	703	
" 1500 lb., Armor Piercing	1,000*	800	0	800	*To be replaced by 2000# Demo. if not available.
" 1100 lb., Demolition or " 1000 lb., Demolition	2,000	1,600	1,190	410	
" 1000 lb., S.A.P.	900	1,600	0	1,600	
" 600 lb., Demolition or " 500 lb. Demolition	3,500	9,600	6,797	2,803	
" 500 lb. S.A.P	1,500	3,200	0	3,200	
" 300 lb. Demolition or " 250 lb. Demolition	10,000	16,800	2,400	14,400	
" 300 lb. Depth	5,000	6,000	0	6,000	
" 100 lb. Demolition	10,000	8,000	8,085	0	
" 100 lb. Incendiary	5,000	5,000	0	5,000	
" 100 lb. Chemical	5,000	5,000	0	5,000	
" 20 lb. Fragmentation or " 30 lb. Fragmentation	4,500	4,500	0	4,500	
" 30 lb. Smoke or " 30 lb. Gas	4,500	4,500	0	4,500	
CART., AP or Ball, Cal. .30	16,000,000	16,000,000	4,882,000	11,118,000	
CART., Tracer, Cal. .30	4,000,000	4,000,000	1,118,000	2,882,000	
LINKS, Metallic belt, Cal. .30	20,000,000	20,000,000	3,943,000	16,057,000	
CART., AP or Ball, Cal. .50	16,000,000	16,000,000	2,600,000	13,400,000	
CART., Tracer, Cal. .50	4,000,000	4,000,000	926,000	3,074,000	
LINKS, Metallic belt., Cal. .50	20,000,000	20,000,000	3,526,000	16,474,000	

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TABLE A - Cont'd

	QUANTITY NOW AUTHORIZED(1)	QUANTITY REQUIRED	ON HAND HAW. GRP. ONLY	SHORTAGE UNDER REQUIRED
SHOT, AP, 37 mm, M59, AC gun	28,000	28,000	0	28,000
SHELL, HE, 37 mm, M54, AC gun	7,000	7,000	36,100	0
SHOT, AP, 20 mm, AC gun	80,000	80,000	0	80,000
SHELL, HE, Mk I, 20 mm Hispano	20,000	20,000	0	20,000
SIGNAL, Drift, M25, Air Navy	3,750	3,750	0	3,750
FLARE, AC, para., recomn, M9	5,310	5,310	1,300	4,010
FLARE, AC, para, Bomb recomn	5,880	5,880	0	5,880
BOMB, Photo flash	2,680	2,680	100	2,580
CART., Signal, AC, Asst.	46,600	46,600	2,000	44,600

(1) - File AG 381.4 (8-1-41) MC-E, dated 8 August 1941 (DOO 381.4/416) AGO to CG Haw. Dept., subject: "Defense Reserve of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics, Overseas Departments, and Alaska", and Interchange of Secret radios #1488-1st of Jan. '42, CG Haw Dept. to TAG and #870-4th Jan. '42 (DOO 471/1248-a).

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For
Byr ___ EO; Date ___

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] IC; Date [illegible]

RECEIPT

Date _____

SUBJECT: Hawaiian Department Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition

1. Received from the Headquarters Army Air Forces, 2nd Indorsement, above subject with one inclosure as follows: Table showing "Status of Defense Reserve of Aircraft Ammunition, Hawaiian Department."

_____
Officer Rank

_____
Office

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Air AG 381.4 Hawaii (4)

IMMEDIATE ACTION

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ALL COMMUNICATIONS [illegible] COPY AND ADDRESSED TO

249

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Dep. ___ I.C. Date ___

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TO INSURE PROMPT ATTENTION IN REPLYING REFER TO

O.O. No. 381.4/12

ATTENTION OF

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date 4/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hawaii (S)

Jefferys/pof

117

SECRET

February 24, 1942

O. C. of O. [illegible]

Subject: Report of Defense Reserves, Hawaiian Dept. as of January 1, 1942.

To: Chief of the Army Air Forces

1. In compliance with paragraph 1 of letter from The Adjutant General dated January 24, 1942, file AG 322.2 Army Air Force (1-12-42)MO-AAF-M-O.O. 322.1/197, there is submitted herewith Status Report for the Hawaiian Department covering items of Ordnance having exclusive interest to the Army Air Forces.

For the Chief of Ordnance:

John B. Bellinger
Colonel, Ord. Dept.
Executive Assistant

Air As 381.4 Hawaii (3)

117

2 Incls:
Report Def. Res. in dup.
Notes in dup.

Hq. Army Air Forces
FEB 26 1942
AAG RECEIVED

NO ACTION NECESSARY
EMB

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Air Ad 381.4 Haw. (3)

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OFFICE
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

FEB 25 1 06 PM 1942

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: [illegible]

STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES
AS OF JAN. 1, 1942

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

REMARKS
(Col. 16)

GENERAL SUPPLIES

Item No.
(Col. 1)

140030 Machine Gun Cal..30 Brg., AC., Fixed

Col. 12: Includes 1604 - M1917. Apparent excess of 157 are in use as substitute for M2 caliber ..30 MG tripod mounts.

140100 Machine Gun, Cal..50 Brg., AC., Fixed

Col. 14: Requisition (Oct. 1941 Status Report)

AMMUNITION

145031 Cart AP cal..30 M2 AC

Col. 14: Secret radios #1488-1st Jan, CG Haw Dept to TAG and reply #870 - 4th Jan (DOO 471/1248-A).

145051 Cart tracer cal..30 M1 AC

Col. 14: Secret radios #1488 - 1st Jan, CG Haw Dept to TAG and reply #870 - 4th Jan (DOO 471/1248-a).

145081 Cart AP cal..50 M1 AC

Col. 14: To be shipped as fast as supply permits - Secret radios #1488 - 1 Jan 1942, CG Haw Dept to TAG and reply #870 - 4 Jan (DOO 471/1248-a)

145091 Cart Ball cal..50 M1 AC

Col. 7: Should be increased to 900M to provide 2 yrs requirement for about 3 times the past requirement of the former garrison.

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Item No.
(Col. 1)

145101 Cart tracer cal..50 M1 AC

Col. 14: To be shipped as fast as supply permits - Secret radios #1488 - 1 Jan 1942 CG Haw Dept to TAC and reply #870 - 4 Jan (DOO 471/1248-a)

145120 Link Met Belt cal..30 M1 AC

Col. 5: Should be increased to 20,000m. Radio #870 - 4th Jan (DOO 471/1248-a)
Col. 6: To 2855.

145201 Cart Sig AC Red para M11

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941.

145202 Cart Sig AC Red Cl M14

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941.

145203 Cart Sig AC White Blkr Para M15

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941.

145204 Cart Sig AC Green Blkr Para M16

Col. 14 Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941.

145210 Bomb Photoflash M12A1 M23

Col. 14: Shipping Order #873-s-1 (1106041) and shipping order 468-S-1.

145220 Flare AC Para Bomb Reconn

Col. 14: 63 on requisition (Oct 1941 Status Report)
Col. 12: EXcludes 11-C M8A1 landing Flares

145230 Flare AC Para Reconn M9

Col. 14:/ 55C Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941, less 12C received in Haw Dept during Dec 1941.

145240 Signal Drift M25 Air Nav

Requisitioned on Status Report Oct 1941.

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Item No.
(Col. 1)

145250 Signal distress AC Green Smoke

Col. 6: Should be increased by 406 rds for 25 - half track M2 personnel carriers and 89 Lt tanks or Armored Force on hand.
Col. 7: Should be increased by 406 rds for 25 - half track M2 personnel carriers and 89 Lt Tanks or Armored Force on hand.
Col. 8: Increased by 11,240 for 70 days of supply maintenance plus overhead of 50% for 30 days of Supply (Armored Force)
Col. 9: By 11,646
Col. 11: By 11,646
Col. 13: By 11,646

145260 Bomb Frag. Stab. M41

Col. 7: Includes 3900 for 2 years training requirements for pursuit aviation.
Col. 12: Includes 9803 30-lb M5 but excludes 2011 25-lb MkIII and 325 17-lb MkII.
Col. 5: Cluster, adapter M1 (100-lb) standardized - Ref OCM #17049 - for use with fragmentation bombs M41 and M42.

145280 Bomb, gas, HS 30-lb M46

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Status Report Oct. 1941.

145290 Bomb, Smoke WP 30-lb M46

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145300 Bomb, Demolition 100-lb M30

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145310 Bomb, Demolition 250-lb M31

Col. 14: Secret Radio #667-15 Dec. 1941 promised 10,000 of which 1215 were received prior to 1 Feb. 1942.

145320 Bomb, Demolition 500-lb M43

Col. 14: Radio #667 - 15 Dec. 1941 - promised 6210; 6228 were received prior to Feb. 1942

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Item No.
(Col. 1)

145330 Bomb, Demolition 1000-lb M44

Col. 14: Radio #667 - 15 Dec. 1941 - promised 550 of which 548 were received prior to Feb. 1942. An additional 810 were requisitioned by Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145340 Bomb, Demolition 2000-lb M34

Col. 12: Includes 136 Mk series bombs.
Col. 14: Radio #667 - 15 Dec 1941 - promised 445 of which 215 were received prior to Feb 1942, an additional 673 were requisitioned by Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145350 Bomb, Chemical HS 100-lb M47

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145360 Bomb, Chemical Incendiary 100-lb M47

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145390 Bomb, Semi armor-piercing 500-lb

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145400 Bomb, Semi armor-piercing 1000-lb

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145410 Bomb AP 1600-lb

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145420 Bomb, Depth Navy type

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145431 Bomb Practice 100-lb M38 A2

Col. 7: Includes training requirements for the present garrison for 2 years.
Col. 14: Clear radio OOHD to OOWD dated 3 April 1941 as changed by HOD Stores Report dated 1 April 1941.

145432 Bomb Practice 20-lb M48

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

145434 Bomb, Practice 17-lb M37 ATT

Col. 14: Requisitioned on Oct. 1941 Status Report.

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Item No.
(Col. 1)

145440 Shot AP 20mm AC Gun

Col. 14: 80,000 requested secret radio #1488 - 1 Jan. 1942 - to TAG for which 40,000 Ctg. SA ball 20mm Hispano Suiza A/A gun are on WD Shipping Order #16-R-2 dated 6 Jan. 1942.

145450 Shell HE MkI 20mm Hispano

Col. 14: 20,000 requested by secret radio #1488 - 1 Jan. 1942 to TAG.

145460 Projectile Prac. 20mm Hispano

Col. 7: Preliminary estimated requirement for one squadron of 25 planes for one year is 3000, using par. 66-d and e, AR 775-10 as a gauge and estimating 2 flexible gunners and 2 armorers per plane, This quantity should be stored in the Haw. Dept. as contingency.

145480 Shot AP 37mm M59 AC Gun

Col. 14: 28,000 requested by secret radio #1488 - 1 Jan. 1942 to TAG. (80% of 35,000)

145490 Shell HE 37mm M54 AC Gun

Col. 14: 7,000 (20% of 35,000) requested by secret radio #1488 1 Jan. 1942 to TAG.

145500 Shell Practice 37mm M55 A1 AC

Col. 7: Same as for item 145460 above.

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DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED GENERAL SUPPLIES - PART I

STATUS REPORT-DEFENSE RESERVES

ORDNANCE - HAWAII
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Ca. Overseas Depts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16. Items on hand which are component parts of sets, will be included in Col. 12 to the extent necessary to eliminate shortages in sets as far as practicable. This will have the effect of completing sets and causing shortages to appear opposite the individual items. Component parts of sets which are still "short" will be immediately placed on requisition, and the entry made under remarks "component parts short placed on requisition - - -".
7. Column 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason (e. g. statement of size required) will be immediately requisitioned by Overseas Depts. Where requisitions are submitted, indicate in Cols. 14 and 16.
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept., and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed seven.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished).

# 1	(PAGE NO.)
1/1/42	(DATE)

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (*)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
140030	MG Cal. .30 Brg AC Fixed (EA)	H	01	42		580	580	58	638		638	898	260	30		See remarks attached.
140040	MG Cal. .30 Brg AC Flex "					188	188	19	207		207	800	593	5		
140100	MG Cal. .50 Brg AC Fixed "					255	255	26	281		281	773	492	22	2	See remarks attached.
140110	MG Cal. .50 Brg AC Flex "					126	126	13	139		139	448	309			
140260	Gun 20mm AC "				None											
140390	Gun 37mm Auto. w/rec Mech AC "											25	25			
140680	Pistol Pyro M2 AC "					286	286	28	314		314	383	69			

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/26/75

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SECRET DECLASSIFIED AMMUNITION - PT II

STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

ORDNANCE - HAWAII
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Gs. Overseas Dipts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16. Items on hand which are component parts of sets, will be included in Col. 12 to the extent necessary to eliminate shortages in sets as far as practicable. This will have the effect of completing sets and causing shortages to appear opposite the individual items. Component parts of sets which are still "short" will be immediately placed on requisition, and the entry made under remarks "component parts short placed on requisition - - -"
7. Column 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason (e. g. statement of size required), will be immediately requisitioned by Overseas Depts. Where requisitions are submitted, indicate in Cols. 14 and 16.
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept. and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed seven.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished)

2 (PAGE NO.)
1/1/42 (DATE)

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEP. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (-)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
	Unit - 1000															See remarks attached.
140031	Cart. AP Cal .30 M2 AC	H	01	42	10,400		10,591		10,591		10,591	5,458	5,133S	16,000	1	Col. 7 inclds 191 (M) for 2 years traing.
145041	Cart. Ball Cal .30 M2 AC						1,350		1,350		1,350	27,105	25,755	17,572	1	Trng reqt only - 2 years.
145051	Cart Tracer Cal .30 M1 AC				2,600		3,000		3,000		3,000	7,355	4,355	4,000	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 (M) for 2 years trng. See remarks attached.
145081	Cart AP Cal .50 M1 AC				3,000		3,000		3,000		3,000	4,907	1,907	16,000	1	See remarks attached.
145091	Cart Ball Cal .50 M1 AC				312		312		312		1,438	1,126				2 years trng reqt only. See remarks attached.
145101	Cart Tracer Cal .50 M1 ⅞ AC				750		805		805		805	1,698	893	4,000	1	Col. 7 inclds 55 (M) for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145120	Link Met Belt Cal .30 M1 AC				13,000		15,651		15,651		15,651	3,942	11,709S	20,000	1	Col. 7 inclds 2 yrs trng of 2651 (M). See remarks attached.
	Unit - Each				Above items of common interest will, in the future, be carried in Status Report for all other Army Ordnance items.											
145201	Cart Sig AC Red Para M11				11,700		12,100		12,100		12,100	1,000	11,100S	15,600	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for trng. See remarks attached.
145202	Cart Sig AC Red Cl. M14				11,700		12,100		12,100		12,100		12,100S	15,600	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for trng. See remarks attached.
145203	Cart Sig AC White Blkr Para	M15			11,700		12,100		12,100		12,100	1,000	11,100S	16,300	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for trng. See remarks attached.
145204	Cart Sig AC Green Blkr Para	M16			11,700		12,100		12,100		12,100		12,100S	15,600	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for trng See remarks attached.
145210	Bomb Photoflash M12A1 M23				2,700		3,000		3,000		3,000	100	2,900S	1,300	1	Col. 7 inclds 300 for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145220	Flare AC Para Bomb Reconn				5,900		6,300		6,300		6,300		6,300s	6,300	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145230	Flare AC Para Reconn M9				5,400		6,400		6,400		6,400	1,300	5,100S	4,300	1	Col. 7 inclds 10,000 for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145240	Signal Drift M25 Air Nav				3,800		4,200		4,200		4,200		4,200S	39	1	Col. 7 inclds 400 for trng. See remarks attached.
145250	Signal Dist AC Gren Smoke				1,400		1,400		1,400		1,400	16	1,384S		1	See remarks attached.
145260	Bomb Frag Stab M41				4,500		8,400		8,400		8,400	9,803	1,403			Col. 7 inclds 3900 for 2 yrs trng for pursuit aviation. See remarks attached.

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AMMUNITION PT II

STATUS REPORT - DEFENSE RESERVES

ORDNANCE - HAWAII
SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Gs. Overseas Dipts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dipt.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16.
7. Columns 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason i.e. g. statement of size required) will be immediately requisitioned by Overseas Depts. Where requisitions are submitted, indicate in Cols. 14 and 16.
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept. and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed three.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished)

2 (PAGE NO.)
1/1/42 (DATE)

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	REQUIREMENTS (6) T/BA AND T/A	REQUIREMENTS (7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	REQUIREMENTS (8) MAINTENANCE	REQUIREMENTS (9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEC. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	RESOURCES (11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	RESOURCES (12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (-)	STATUS (14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
145280	Bomb Gas HS 30-lb M46	H	01	42	3,000		3,000		3,000		3,000	1,146	1,854S	1,854	1 5	See remarks attached.
145290	Bomb Smoke WP 30-lb M46				1,500		1,500		1,500		1,500		1,500S	1,500	1 5	See remarks attached.
145300	Bomb Dem 100-lb M30				10,000		13,320		13,320		13,320	9,045	4,275S	4,097	1	Col. 7 inclds 3320 for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145310	Bomb Dem 250-lb M31				10,000		11,328		11,328		11,328	3,436	7,892S	8,785	1	Col. 7 inclds 1328 for 2 yrs trng. See remarks attached.
145320	Bomb Dem. 500-lb M43				3,500		3,500		3,500		3,500	8,429	4,929			See remarks attached.
145330	Bomb Dem 1000-lb M44				2,000		2,000		2,000		2,000	1,209	791S	812	1	See remarks attached.
145340	Bomb Dem 2000-lb M34				1,400		1,400		1,400		1,400	497	903S	673	1	See remarks attached.
145350	Bomb Cml HS 100-lb M47				5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000S	5,000	1 5	See remarks attached.
145360	Bomb Cml Incen 100-lb M47				5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000S	5,000	1 5	See remarks attached.
145370	Bomb Incen 4-lb AN M50					None										
145380	Bomb Incen 40-lb AN M61					None										
145390	Bomb Semi AP 500-lb				1,500		1,500		1,500		1,500		1,500S	1,500	1	See remarks attached.
145400	Bomb Semi-AP 1000-lb				900		900		900		900		900S	900	1	See remarks attached.
145410	Bomb AP 1600-lb				1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000S	1,000	1	See remarks attached.
145420	Bomb Depth Navy Type				5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000		5,000 S	5,000	1	See remarks attached.
145431	Bomb Prac 100-lb M38A2						33,408		33,408		33,408	30,000	3,408S			See remarks attached.
145432	Bomb Prac 20-lb M48						520		520		520		520S	4,185		See remarks attached.
145433	Bomb Prac Min M36					None										
145434	Bomb Prac 17-lb M37 ATT						520		520		520		520S	520	1 3	For training only. See remarks attached.
145440	Shot AP 20mm AC Gun				48,000		48,000		48,000		48,000		48,000S	80,000	1	See remarks attached.
145450	Shell HE MkI 20mm Hispano				12,000		12,000		12,000		12,000		12,000S	20,000	1	See remarks attached.
145460	Projectile Prac 20mm Hispano					None										See remarks attached.

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STATUS REPORT-DEFENSE RESERVES — ORDNANCE - HAWAII

SUPPLY ARM OR SERVICE

AMMUNITION - PART II

1. Refer to completed form furnished each Supply Arm and Service and Overseas Dept.
2. Column 1 - Report on selected list of important items furnished by War Dept. C. Qs. Overseas Depts. are authorized to add items which in their judgment should be included. S. A. S. will insert numbers for items added in Overseas Depts.
3. Column 3 - Enter: H for Hawaiian Dept.; PC for Panama Canal Dept.; PR for Puerto Rican Dept.; P for Philippine Dept.
4. Column 6 - Consult approved Defense Project for correct troop basis for computing requirements of T/BA items.
5. Column 11 - Equals Col. 9, minus Col. 10, unless it exceeds: (1) Quantity which can be turned over by current issues before deterioration renders stocks unserviceable; (2) Quantity for which storage is available.
6. Column 12 - Quantity exclusive of training stocks and current consumption stocks and items enroute to the Dept. (Items enroute should be included in Col. 14). All serviceable limited and substitute standard items on hand will be included. The number of substitute items so included will be indicated in Col. 16.
7. Column 14 - Quantity on current requisition must be stated to avoid duplication of supply. Shortages (except in controlled items) which cannot be supplied from data in this report for any reason (e. g. statement of size items on hand which are component parts of sets, will be included in Col. 12 to the extent necessary to eliminate shortages in sets as far as practicable. This will have the effect of completing sets and causing shortages to appear opposite the individual items. Component parts of sets which are still "short" will be immediately placed on requisition, and the entry made under remarks "component parts short placed on requisition - - -"
8. Column 15 - Will constitute a single priority for all items (regardless of supply branch). It will be filled in only for items of which there is a shortage in the Dept. which should be stored in the Dept., and for which adequate storage space is available. Numbers used to indicate priorities should not exceed seven.
9. Col. 5 - Give W. D. authority on all Special Project items in annex to this report. (See example furnished).

3 (PAGE NO.)

1/1/42 (DATE)

(1) ITEM NO.	(2) ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT OF MEASURE	(3) DEPT.	(4) DATE MO.	(4) DATE YR.	REQUIREMENTS (5) SPECIAL PROJECTS	(6) T/BA AND T/A	(7) = (5+6) AUTHORIZED INITIAL RESERVE	(8) MAINTENANCE	(9) = (7+8) AUTHORIZED DEF. RESERVE	RESOURCES (10) AVAILABLE LOCAL PURCHASE	(11) = (9-10) QUANTITY TO BE HELD IN DEPT.	(12) QUANTITY ON HAND	STATUS (13) = (11-12) EXCESS OR SHORTAGE (-)	(14) QUANTITY ON CURRENT REQUISITION	(15) PRIORITY	(16) REMARKS
145480	Shot AP 37mm M59 AC Gun	H	01	42	4,800		4,800		4,800		4,800		4,800S	28,000	1	See remarks attached.
145490	Shell HE 37mm M54 AC Gun				1,200		1,200		1,200		1,200	36,100	34,900	7,000	1	See remarks attached.
145500	Shell Prac 37mm M55A1 AC											1,300	1,300		3	See remarks attached.

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O.O. 381.4/12 Hawaii (S) Encl. 1

SAS 381.4 Panama

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date [illegible]

AAF/A-4
MFS
Written October 8, 1941.

381.4 Pan (2)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Subject: Reporting of AAF Defense Reserves.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram substantially as follows, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command:

RE YOUR SECRET RADIOGRAM NO TWO TWO FIVE DATED SEPTEMBER TWENTY FIVE NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY ONE THE MATERIEL DIVISION OF THE OFFICE CHIEF OF AIR CORPS IS PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO METHOD OF REPORTING AIR CORPS DEFENSE RESERVES PERIOD ADVICE WILL BE FORWARDED UPON COMPLETION OF STUDY ON SUBJECT END

For the Chief of the Air Staff:
EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps,
Secretary of The Air Staff

Incl.
Radio AG 381.4 (9-25-41)MC
exc cy No. 225, Sept. 25.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: In secret radio, dated September 25, 1941, the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, requested that he be given instructions with regard to submitting report on Air Corps Defense Reserves, as directed in paragraph 2 of secret letter AG 381.4 (8-21-41) which was dated August 12, 1941.

Dispatched
OCT 13 1941
AAG

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Copy for Air Adjutant General
Cnr AG 381.4 Pan (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD dtrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
Exp. [illegible] I.C. Date 9/20/74

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PARAPHRASE
OF RADIOGRAM

AG 381.4 (9-25-41)MC

AUGUST SEVENTEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ABOVE AGO LETTER CARIBBEAN COMMAND REQUESTS INSTRUCTIONS AS TO SUBMITTING REPORT ON AIR CORPS DEFENSE RESERVES.

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr
5 Jul. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 7/27/76

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VIA AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC-E 1st Ind. ESA

War Department, A.G.O., October 27, 1941. - To: Commanding General, Panama Canal Department.

1. The changes in the ammunition storage project, Panama Canal Department, proposed in basic letter are approved subject to the understanding that additional funds will not be required and that the quantity-distance requirements of TM 1370-A will be met.

2. Reference is made to recent changes in authorized defense reserves in the Panama Canal Department, contained in letter, this office, September 19, 1941, AG 381.4 (9-17-41)MC-E, subject: Defense Reserves of Ammunition for Ground Weapons for Overseas Departments, and letter, this office, to Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, August 8, 1941, AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC-E, subject: Defense Reserves of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics, Overseas Departments and Alaska. Such modifications in the project herein approved, within the limits of the funds allotted, as are necessary to meet the altered storage requirements are authorized without further reference to the War Department.

3. It is desired that final layout plans pertaining to all proposed ammunition-storage installations in the Panama Canal Department be furnished to the War Department.

4. In connection with the construction of the magazines referred to in paragraph 2 a of basic letter, attention is invited to recent improvements made in Igloo design. Copies of these plans are being furnished the Department Engineer under separate cover.

5. Requirements in bomb handling equipment, including power cranes, dunnage and other facilities for this purpose should

381.4 Panama (1)

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AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC-M, 1st Ind., continued.

be made known to the War Department sufficiently in advance of the completion of magazines to insure delivery of such equipment when required.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

4 Incls. (Added)
#1 - M-100 map,
#2 - M-48, map,
#3 - M-78, map,
#4 - Magazine Sites for Air Corps Stations, April 2, 1941.

COPIES TO: Chief of Coast Artillery, ref. 825.8/MC-M-2;
Chief of Ordnance, ref. O.O. 471.857/435;
Chief of the Army Air Forces;
Chief of Engineers, ref. C. of E. 825.8(Panama)41,
as inclosure to letter, 10/27/41.

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DOD Ltrs.
5 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [signature] LC. Date: 9/27/76

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AAF/A-4
LK/mr
Written 9/24/41.

381.4 Pan. (1)

Subject: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

4th Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
To: Chief of Engineers.

SEP 26 1941

1. Approval of changes set forth in basic letter is recommended.

2. It is recommended that for the construction of the magazine described in paragraph 2 (a) of basic letter, the following plans should be used: QM 652-318, QM 652-380, QM 652-394, QM 652-396, QM 652-538, QM 652-539, and O.C.E. 38-1-11.

3. As a matter of information for those charged with making the lay-out plans for these installations, the following data is submitted herewith: Plan BG-100, BG-48, BG-73, and Criteria entitled "Magazine Sites for Air Corps Stations."

4. Attention is invited to requirements for safety distances and safety zones as set forth in the above data, which are based on TR-1370-A.

5. It is requested that final lay-out plans pertaining to all of these proposed ordnance installations in the Panama Canal Department be furnished Buildings and Grounds Section, Office, Chief of Air Corps, for its files. It is further requested that a progress chart covering each of these installations separately be furnished to this same office monthly after the initiation of construction thereon.

6. Requirements in bomb handling equipment, including power cranes and other facilities for this purpose, and also dunnage, should be anticipated and requested sufficiently in advance of the completion of these igloos to insure the delivery of such equipment, when needed, based on priorities pertaining thereto.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

Sgd. Wm. W. Dick

WILLIAM W. DICK
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General

4 Incls.
1 - BG-100, map,
2 - BG-48, map,
3 - BG-73, map,
4 - Magazine Sites for Air Corps Stations.

Incls. with original only.

Copy for Air Adjutant General.

Dispatched
SEP 26 1941
AAG

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Air AB 381.4 Pan (1)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jun. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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COPY

AG 381.4/2 (Ord.)

August 1, 1941

Subject: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference letter AG 381.4/2 (Ord.), these Headquarters, August 7, 1940, subject as above and to paragraph 8 c., 4th Indorsement thereon. In order to store ammunition and bombs in localities which will be readily accessible from installations which are to be served, it has been found advisable to make certain changes in the approved project.

2. Several factors, listed below, have been introduced and the present solution varies in many respects from that previously determined.

a. The Standard Igloo Type Magazine has been increased from 71 feet to 81 feet.

b. The 90 m/m Antiaircraft Gun positions have been definitely located. These positions will be fully manned throughout the present emergency and will require adequate storage facilities at the positions.

c. The approval of the expansion of France Field renders that Field suitable for bombardment aviation and adequate bomb storage facilities should be provided.

d. The construction incident to the expansion of France Field and Albrook Field has rendered the existing magazine areas unsafe for storage of certain classes of explosives.

3. The changes made herein affect location and distribution primarily and will not require additional funds. On the contrary, under normal circumstances, the revised plan would result in substantial savings, particularly with respect to road construction. In letter AG 121-1 (C), Headquarters, Panama Canal Department, Subject: Engineer Estimates and Expenditure Program for Seacoast Defense Funds, dated June 7, 1941, a request was made for additional funds to complete the ammunition storage project. These funds are required for the increased plant and labor costs necessary to complete the project in as short a period as practicable, and are not the result of the changes in the project proposed in this communication.

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4. Antiaircraft Gun Ammunition.

a. In the 1st Indorsement to letter AG 381.4/2 (Ord.), these Headquarters, Subj: Defense Reserve Ammunition for Antiaircraft Weapons, Panama Canal, dated June 26, 1940, the following defense reserve was authorized:

60 fixed 3" guns @ 2000 rds. = 120,000 rds.
40 mobile 3" guns @ 2000 rds. = 80,000 rds.
92 mobile 90 m/m guns @ 2000 rds. = 184,000 rds.
12 fixed 105 m/m guns @ 2500 rds. = 30,000 rds.
112 mobile 37 m/m guns @ 5000 rds. = 560,000 rds.

b. To store this ammunition it is proposed to build 8 - 16'x20' magazines at 3" positions, 23 igloos at 90 m/m positions and 34 igloos for central storage. These additional magazines added to the 40 - 15'x20' magazines at 3" positions, 8 existing magazines at 105 m/m positions, 4 existing magazines at Fort Sherman, each equivalent to an igloo, 7 existing igloos at Cerro Pelado and 4 existing magazines at Cerro Tigre will be adequate to store the entire defense reserve.

5. Bombs.

a. In the 1st Indorsement to the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, to letter AG 381.4-4 (C), dated May 22, 1941, Subject: Defense Reserve of Bombs, the Commanding General, Caribbean Air Force recommended a reserve of bombs for the Panama Canal Department, as follows:

100 lbs.	14016
300 "	8688
500-600 lbs.	4100
1000-1100 lbs.	2460
2000 lbs.	672
30 lbs.	31200

This correspondence was forwarded to the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, on June 21, 1941, recommending approval.

b. To store these bombs as well as the bombs on hand for training purposes, and the necessary inert components and primers and fuses it is proposed to construct 19 igloos, 4 - 30'x90' above ground type magazines, 3 - 16'x20' magazines and 4 - 8'x12' magazines. These additional magazines added to the 8 existing igloos at Cerro Pelado and other smaller magazines at Albrook and France Field will be adequate to store the entire defense reserve plus the training bombs.

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6. Post Magazines for Small Arms and Miscellaneous.

a. The storage of small arms ammunition, 60 m/m, 81 m/m and 37 m/m Anti-tank ammunition for Infantry Weapons, 75 m/m F.A. ammunition, Post stocks of chemical munitions, pyrotechnics, practice bomb charges and saluting ammunition will require numerous small magazines located at each of the several posts concerned. The quantities, sizes, and distribution will be as shown in paragraph 8 below.

7. The remainder of the present approved project continues unchanged, but, in order to present the complete storage project as revised, they are included in the recapitulation in the following paragraph.

8. Recapitulation. Storage Required.

a. Antiaircraft Ammunition.

(1) 16'x20' magazines at 3" batteries	8
(2) 26'x81' igloos, 1 at each 90 m/m battery	23
(3) 26'x81' igloos, (Central Storage) Cerro Tigre	3
(4) 26'x81' igloos (Central Storage) Ft. Gulick	19
(5) 26'x81' igloos (Central Storage) Ft. Kobbe	12

b. Bombs.

(1) Defense Reserve and Training Bombs.

(a) 26'x81' igloo, Cerro Tigre	1
(b) 26'x81' igloos, France Field	2
(c) 26'x81' igloos, Howard Field (2 for bombs for training)	10
(d) 26'x81' igloos, Albrook Field	2
(e) 26'x81' igloos, Rio Hato, (1 for bombs for training)	3
(f) 26'x81' igloo, Aguadulce	1

(2) Primers and Fuses.

(a) 16'x20' magazine, France Field	1
(b) 16'x20' magazine, Albrook Field	1
(c) 16'x20' magazine, Rio Hato	1
(d) 8'x12' magazines, Howard Field	4

(3) Inert Components.

(a) 30'x90' magazines, Howard Field	2
(b) 30'x90' magazines, Rio Hato	1
(c) 30'x90' magazines, Aguadulce	1

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c. Post Magazines.

(1) Camp Pariso.

(a) 20'x30' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 8'x12' magazine for chemical munitions	1
(c) 16'x20' magazine for 60 m/m, 81 m/m, and 37 m/m A.T.	1
(d) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

(2) Fort Clayton.

(a) 20'x30' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 8'x12' magazine for chemical munitions	1
(c) 20'x30' magazine for 60 m/m, 81 m/m, 37 m/m A.T. and 75 m/m	1
(d) 8'x12' magazine for alert stock of ammunition for 1st Cav. Troop	1
(e) 8'x12' magazine for alert stock of ammunition for 2nd FA	1
(f) 16'x20' magazine for alert stock of ammunition for 2nd FA	1
(g) 4'x6'x8' hut for Saluting Ammunition (to near saluting gun)	1

(3) Post of Corozal.

(a) 8'x12' magazine for alert stock of chemical munitions for 1st Sep. Chem. Co.	1
(b) 20'x30' magazine for alert stock of chemical munitions for 1st Sep. Chem. Co.	1

(4) Albrook Field.

(a) 20'x30' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 16'x20' magazine for pyrotechnics	1
(c) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near saluting gun)	1
(d) 8'x12' magazine for chemical munitions	1

(5) Fort Kobbe.

(a) 20'x30' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 4'x6'x8' magazine for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

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AG 381.4/2 (Ord.), "Ammunition Storage Requirements, PCD", To: TAG, Wash., D.C. August 1, 1941., Page 5.

(6) Howard Field.

(a) 30'x45' magazine for small gun ammunition and miscellaneous items	1
(b) 20'x30' magazine for pyrotechnics	1
(c) 16'x20' magazine for Chemical munitions	1
(d) 20'x30' magazine for black powder charges for practice bombs	1

(7) Department Training Center, Rio Hato.

(a) 8'x12' magazine for Chemical Munitions	1
(b) 16'x20' magazine for pyrotechnics	1

(8) Fort Randolph.

(a) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

(9) Fort Sherman.

(a) 30'x45' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

(10) France Field.

(a) 30'x45' magazine for Chemical bombs and munitions	1
(b) 20'x30' magazine for black powder charges for practice bombs	1
(c) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

(11) Fort Davis.

(a) 30'x45' magazine for small arms ammunition	1
(b) 26'x81' igloo for 75 m/m ammunition for the 87th FA	1
(c) 8'x12' magazine for 37 m/m AT	1
(d) 4'x6'x8' hut for saluting ammunition (to be near the saluting gun)	1

(12) Fort Gulick.

(a) 30'x90' magazine for small arms ammunition and miscellaneous items	1
(b) 8'x12' magazine for chemical munitions	1
(c) 8'x12' magazine for Pyrotechnics	1
(d) 4'x6'x8' magazine for saluting ammunition	1

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(13) Storage of T.N.T.

(a) Fort Amador (Naos Island) 26'x42' bombproof Magazine	1
(b) Fort Sherman 26'x81' igloo	1

(14) Storage of Chemical Warfare Ammunition.

(a) Cerro Tigre 12'x12' magazines	2
(b) Cerro Tigre 8'x8' magazine	1
(c) Cerro Tigre Enlarge Open Storage, 1500 sq. ft. concrete slab, includes cut in hillside.	
(d) Cerro Tigre monrail hoist system for open storage.	
(e) Cerro Tigre metal dunnage racks.	
(f) Cerro Tigre installation of filling plant.	
(g) Cerro Tigre 120'x20'x10' bombproof magazine.	1

Information has been received that funds sufficient to complete the Storage of Chemical Warfare Ammunition have been allocated.

9. The Department Engineer has been directed to proceed with the necessary plans and surveys based upon project as listed in paragraph 8 above.

/s/ DANIEL VAN VOORHIS,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

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COPY

SUBJECT: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC 1st Ind. RPM/gwd-1712

War Department, A.G.O., August 11, 1941. - To: Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Army Air Forces, and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Adjutant General.

SUBJECT: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

633.8/35-E-2 2nd Ind.

War Department, Office, Chief of Coast Artillery, August 19, 1941. - To: Chief of Ordnance.

1. The Chief of Coast Artillery has no objection to the proposed changes in the ammunition storage project, with the understanding that, as stated in paragraph 3 basic letter, additional funds will not be required, and assuming that the quantity-distance requirements of TM 1370-A will be met.

2. F.Y. 1942 funds in the amount of $1,613,700 have been allotted to the Chief of Engineers for the continuation of the Ammunition Storage Project, Panama Canal Department, and it is contemplated including in supplemental estimates FY 1942 the additional funds ($708,000) required to complete this project as indicated in letter dated Headquarters, Panama Canal Department, May 5, 1941, subject, Increase in Allotments, (AG 660 (5-23-41)MC; C of E 662B (Panama) 231; OCCA 111/IT-3).

3. It is recommended that the changes in the ammunition storage project proposed in the basic letter be approved.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

/s/ C. E. COTTER,
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.,
Assistant

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COPY

O.O. 471.887/425
633.8/35-E-2 3rd Ind. GEN/mlr

War Department, Ordnance Office, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1941
To: Chief of Army Air Forces, and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN.

1. Predicated on the approval of the Defense Reserve of Bombs tabulated in paragraph 5a of the basic communication, it is recommended that the changes in the Ammunition Storage Project proposed in the basic letter, be approved.

For the Chief of Ordnance:

/s/ P. M. SKLEEN
Major, Ord. Dept.
Executive Assistant

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [signature] LC; Date 9/27/74

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Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

(12-B3)

1 Chief, Air 9-11
B. & G. Staff, 1941
Div. A-4
Div.

1. Approval of changes set forth in basic letter is recommended.

2. Certain improvements and revisions have been made by the Office, Chief of Engineers, in drawings for igloo type magazines. Therefore, it is recommended that for the construction of the magazines described in paragraph 2 (a) of basic letter, the following plans should be used: QM 652-318, QM 652-380, QM 652-394, QM 652-396, QM 652-538, QM 652-539 and O.C.E. 38-1-11.

3. As a matter of information for those charged with making the lay-out plans for these installations, the following data is submitted herewith: Plan BG-100, BG-48, BG-73, and criteria entitled "Magazine Sites for Air Corps Stations."

4. Attention is invited to requirements for safety distances and safety zones as set forth in the above data, which are based on TR-1370-A.

5. It is requested that final lay-out plans pertaining to all of these proposed Ordnance installations in the Panama Canal Department be furnished to this office for its files. It is further requested that a progress chart covering each of these installations separately be furnished to this office monthly after the initiation of construction thereon.

6. Requirements in bomb handling equipment, including power cranes and other facilities for this purpose, and also dunnage, should be anticipated and requested sufficiently in advance of the completion of these igloos to insure the delivery of such equipment, when needed, based on priorities pertaining thereto.

5 Incls.
1-Ltr. 8-1-41 Panama Canal Dept to AG w/3 Inds.
2-BG-100
3-BG-48
4-BG-73
5-Magazine Sites

F. M. K.
Chief, B. & G. Div.

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an AG 381.4 Panama ①

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

RECEIPT

DATE _____

SUBJECT: Ammunition Storage Requirements, Panama Canal Department.

Received from the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 4th Indorsement, above subject, with the following inclosures:

4 Incls.
1 - BG-100
2 - BG-48
3 - BG-73
4 - Magazine Sites for Air Corps Stations.

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OFFICE

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SAS 381.4 Phil.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: [illegible]

SECRET

2299

AG 381.4
(11-27-41)MC-D

LFL/ved-1712.

December 17, 1941.

SECRET
Auth: T.A.G.
Initials: DRV
Date: DEC 17 1941

SUBJECT: Defense Reserve of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics, Philippine Islands.

TO: Chief of the Air Corps,
Chief of Ordnance, and
Chemical Warfare Service.

1. So much of letter, this office, to Commanding General, Philippine Department, August 8, 1941, AG 381.4 (8-1-41)MC-E, subject: Defense Reserve of Aviation Gasoline, Ammunition, Bombs and Pyrotechnics, Overseas Department and Alaska (copies inclosed) as establishes subject reserves for the Philippine Department only, is rescinded. The following aircraft reserves are authorized for the Philippine Department:

a. Gasoline - 100 octane 18,952,020 gals.
b. Oil - lubricating 473,801 gals.
c. Bombs - General Purpose Demolition except where otherwise indicated:

DEC 27 '41 AM

RECEIVED
AIR WAR PLANS DIV.

2000#	944
1000# (or 1100#)	6,096 (30% SAP)
500# (or 600#)	14,925 (30% SAP)
300# (or 250#)	17,604
100#	13,410
30# Frag.	7,408
20# Frag.	6,270
30# Incen. (WP)	2,000
100# Incen. (Gasoline)	23,170
1500# (AP)	1,000*
325# (Depth Mark 17)	5,000
100# (Chem.)	21,053

* Equivalent number of 1000# modified 12" C.A. projectiles or 2000# demolition bombs to be substituted if available prior to production of AP bombs.

d. Ammunition - (50% AP 30% Incend., 20% Tracer for other than 37mm)

30 Cal.	7,534,100 rounds
50 Cal.	21,832,090 rounds
37mm	40,000 rounds

e. Chemical spray tanks (provided by CWS)

Wing (100# station, A-24 Airplanes)	520
Belly (500# station, A-24 Airplanes)	260

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AG 381.4 (11-27-41)MC-S December 17, 1941. (Cont'd).

f. Trunnion Bands, A-24 Airplanes (provided by Ordnance):

1560 for 1000# bombs
2340 for 500# bombs

g. Suspension Bands, A-24 Airplanes (provided by Ordnance:

3510 for 100# bombs
1170 for 100# Incend. bombs (gasoline filled)
520 for 100# Chemical bombs

h. Cluster Adapters (provided by Ordnance):

1045 cluster adapters for 20# Frag. bombs on 100# stations.

2. It is desired that you take necessary action to effect supply of shortages in the above Defense Reserves, at the earliest practicable date, in accordance with current priorities, subject to the availability of shipping.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. H. Van Sickler

Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cys Ltrs AGO, 8-8-41,
to CG, Phil Dept., w/cy
of Incl thereto.

COPIES TO: Chief of Staff, GHQ;
Chief of the Army Air Forces;
A. C. of S., G-1;
A. C. of S., G-2;
A. C. of S., G-3;
A. C. of S., WPD;

Hq. Army Air Forces
DEC 18 941
AAG Received

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AG 381.4 Phil. (4)

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DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
SUPPLY DIVISION G-4
WASHINGTON

G-4/27573-22

August 28, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

1. The following is referred to you as a matter of primary interest.

2. In answer to a request of The Adjutant General, (W.D. Radiogram 1193, July 30, 1941 (AG 381.4 (7-29-41)) to radio information covering shortages of the more critical items with designated priorities to aid in expediting supply the Commanding General, Philippine Department, replies in part as follows (Radio Phil. Dept. #160, August 20, 1941):

> "List of more critical items in desired shipping priorities: Air Corps, priority 1: Airplane and engine spares for types on hand in this Department; priority 2: Sensitized photographic materials. Kind and amounts are covered by current requisitions already mailed."

3. Requisition (AG 381.4, 6-26-41) for sensitized photographic materials was referred to the Chief of Army Air Forces by WPD 3602-4, August 22, 1941, subject: "War Reserve of Sensitized Materials, Philippine Department". Requisitions for airplane and engine spares have not come to the attention of this Division.

By authority of the Secretary of War:

S. J. CHAMBERLIN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

H. S. Aurand

H. S. AURAND
Colonel, General Staff,
[illegible]

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OUT-G-4 AUG 28 1941

Sb-957
Incl. #1.
Sb-618
Sb-466
Sn-981
A-366

Ann AG 3814 Phil. (3)

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AB/AC LC: Date 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCES
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

9/4

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

File No. .....

Tally No. AAF .....

SUBJECT: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	Ch. Air Staff	Ch. Air Corps	1941 9/3	AAF/A-4 LWD/mwb 1. Philippine Air Depot Requisition No. 42 was forwarded to your office on August 28, 1941. 2. Requisition for airplane and engine spares has not as yet been received. C. S. Chief of the Air Staff.
Incl: Memo, 8/28/41, frm. G-4/27573-22, above subject.				
2.	Ch.a.c.	Matl.	9/8/41	BHm.
3.	OCAC Mat.	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 10-17	(OCAC/4-G) JPN:ems 1. The following information is submitted regarding the principal types of airplanes on hand and recent and anticipated transfers of airplanes to the Philippines: P-26 Airplane: Airplane Spares - No recent requisitions for this type airplane. Engine Spares - All recent requisitions filled. P-35A Airplane: Airplane Spares - Recent stock replenishing requisition canceled. Stock will be received from contract on which deliveries are to start November 1st and be completed by February 1st. Engine Spares - All recent requisitions filled. P-40B Airplane: Airplane Spares - Supplied at the time airplanes were delivered.

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Sb-166 Sb-618
A9-8(6-a) A-2575

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V-4071, AC.Rev.8/14/41
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Air AG 381.4 Phil (3)

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AIR CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OCT 20 1941 PM

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. AAF/ _____

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS (OCAC-4/G) JPN:ems
3. (cont'd)	OCAC Mat.	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 10-17	Engine Spares - Supplied at the time airplanes were delivered and are now receiving their proportionate share from current contracts. B-18 Airplane: Airplane Spares - Philippine Requisition 42-5 is now in the Supply Branch, Field Service Section, Wright Field. Shipping Tickets on this requisition will be out of the above-mentioned office within a week. Engine Spares - No recent requisitions. A large quantity of spares was transferred from Hawaii a few months ago. 50 P-40E Airplanes: Airplane Spares - Full complement of airplane spares shipped with the airplanes. Engine Spares - 1st and 2nd Echelon engine spares shipped with the airplanes. Overhaul parts now being supplied from current contracts. 20 B-17D and 6 B-17C Airplanes: Airplane Spares - Spares for these airplanes are being shipped as they become available at the Boeing plant. A recent letter from Boeing indicated all spares for the B-17C's will be shipped by November 1st. Philippines have first priority on the C and D spares. Engine Spares - Full complement of engine spares are being supplied. 60 P-40E Airplanes: Airplane Spares - Spares being shipped with the airplanes. Engine Spares - 1st and 2nd Echelon engine spares shipped with the airplanes. Overhaul parts now being supplied from current contracts.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. AAF/ _____

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
3. (cont'd)	OCAC Mat. (4-G)	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 10-17	52 A-24 Airplanes: Airplane Spares - Douglas is now making delivery on these spares, and amended shipping instructions are being drawn up to include the Philippines in the distribution. Engine Spares - Engine spares will be shipped with the airplanes. 2. The following is general information on P-40 airplane spares: Anticipating the transfer of P-40 airplanes, the Philippine Air Depot recently submitted a requisition for P-40 spares. Since almost all of the spares on this requisition were shipped with the P-40E airplanes mentioned above, this requisition is being held by the Supply Branch of the Field Service Section, Wright Field, pending the receipt of receiving reports. 1 Incl. n/c. FEO O. P. E. Chief, Materiel Division
4	OCAC Exec	AAF C/AS	10/20	Forwarded. M.E.G. Asst. Exec
5	AAF C/AS	C/AC	10/25	AAF/A-4 WRB/emd 1. It is requested that an analysis of the propellor spare and spare part situation comparable to the airplane and engine spare and spare part analysis presented in Item 3 above be prepared for this office. Incl: Memo, 8/28/41 frm G-4/27573-22. CS C/AS

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Page No. 3.

W-4071, AC. Rev. 8/1/41

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Sb-466 10-29 (4-G) 2827

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OCT 29 1941 PM

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. Air AG 381.4 Phil. (3)

Tally No. AAF/ - - - - -

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
6.	C/AC	Mat. Div.	1941 10/29	(X) HWB/cj For compliance with Item 5 above. HWB for M. S. F., Executive. Incl. n/c
7.	OCAC Air Ser. Com.Lia. (14-S)	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 11-18	1. The following information is furnished in compliance with Comment No. 5 above: P-26 Airplane: No recent requisitions for this type propeller or spare parts to repair it have been received. It is believed an adequate stock of propellers and parts are available. P-35A Airplane: Inadequate percentage of complete spare propellers available for this airplane. Thirty-six spare blades were shipped in July. Delivery of complete propellers and additional spare blades expected to be poor, extending well into 1942. Nine each of the 36 spare blades were required for out of commission airplanes so that 27 spare blades should be available to provide spares for these airplanes in the interim. These airplanes were originally consigned the Swedish Government but were requisitioned prior to delivery. No propeller spares were obtainable, as it is believed they had been shipped. To provide spares for the P-35A airplanes consigned the Philippine Air Depot, six propellers were removed from AT-12 airplanes, which were later delivered to the Air Corps lacking these six propellers, and which still lack propellers. Fifty blades on an existing contract will be delivered in late December according to information received by wire from the contractor under date of November 14th. Hubs as used on A-24 and B-18 airplanes are also suitable for this airplane so that the hub presents no problem.

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Page No. 4

V-4071, AC.Rev.8/1/41

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. _____

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
7. (cont'd)	OCAC Air Ser. Com.Lie. (14-S)	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 11-18	P-40B Airplane: 35% spare propellers are now available at the Philippine Air Depot for these airplanes. Most requirements for spare parts have been met to date except for a few large items like power units and blade assemblies, which are being procured with delivery expected in 60 to 90 days. B-18 Airplane: Propeller spares and propeller spare parts for these airplanes were transferred from Hawaii some months ago. No requisitions have been received since listing parts specifically for these propellers. 50 P-40E Airplanes: 35% spare propellers are now available at the Philippine Air Depot for these airplanes. Most requirements for spare parts have been met to date except for a few large items like power units and blade assemblies, which are being procured with delivery expected in 60 to 90 days. 26 B-17D and B-17C Airplanes: 35% spare propellers are available at the Philippine Air Depot for these airplanes. No recent requisition received covering spare parts. 60 P-40E Airplanes: 35% spare propellers are now available at the Philippine Air Depot or are obligated for shipment during the month of November. Most requirements for spare parts have been met to date except for a few large items like power units and blade assemblies, which are being procured with delivery expected in 60 to 90 days.

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Page No. 5a

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W-4071, AC, Rev. 8/1/41

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. _____

Subject: Supply Requirements, Philippine Department.

1057

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
7. (cont'd)	OCAC Air Ser. Com.Lia. (14-S)	AAF C/AS Thru: C/AC	1941 11-18	52 A-24 Airplanes: 25% spare propellers are now available at the Philippine Air Depot or are obligated for shipment during the month of November. A substantial quantity of spare parts are also allocated on contract with delivery expected in next 45 days. 1 Incl. n/c. L. P. W. C/ASCL
8.	C/AC	AAF C/AS	1941 11/21	1. Forwarded. Inviting attention to number 7 above. Incl. n/c For M. S. F. Executive

381.4 Phil (3)

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Page No. 6.

ai 2301.4-4 Phil (3) Rev. 1/41

SAS 383

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 7/27/76

SECRET
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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S. WPD

Date

OPD
JWCR

WPD 383 (3-26-42)(3-16-42) March 27 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Conditions of Americans Interned in Manila.

I. Discussion.

1. On March 23, at the request of the Secretary of State the War Department forwarded a message to General MacArthur requesting his comments on the alleviation of suffering among Americans in the Philippine Islands and the part that the Red Cross and the State Department might play in this. A paraphrase of this same message was sent to General Wainwright requesting his views in the matter.

2. Radio Number 26 of March 26,1942 from General MacArthur addressed to the Chief of Staff replies to the above message as follows: That Americans in Manila are urgently in need of assistance in both money and food; that any efforts on our part must be made through diplomatic channels; that the appointment of a Swiss resident in Manila as Red Cross representative would be appropriate; and that the general attitude of the Japanese in the Philippines is to debase the white race.

3. Radio Number 599 of March 26,1942 from General Wainwright addressed to the Adjutant General replies as follows: That he concurs in the proposed action of International Red Cross for relief of Americans in the Philippines; that food is reported scarce in Manila though the situation is somewhat better in the providences; that if possible some action should be taken to render assistance to families of officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army as well in as much as numerous requests are received for such assistance; that he has no contact with the Red Cross in occupied areas and therefore cannot render the aid requested.

II. Action recommended.

It is recommended that the attached letter to the Secretary of State be signed by the Secretary of War.

noted - file
WFF

MAR 27 1942
AAG Received
No Enc.

Copy for Secretary Ar Staff

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

rsd

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
AGM AF 6146
Ar AB 383

HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD
Box 113 Folder 2
MILITARY
Declined
SAS 383.4
(1-64)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 4/27/74

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Disclosure of Military Information.

1	General Arnold	General Stratemeyer	1942 8/18	Note the attached. Take the necessary steps to impress upon Major Connor the seriousness of what he has done, and such action as will insure it will not be repeated.

H. H. A.

Incl: Memo to Gen. Arnold frm Gen. Kroner, 8/15/42 re above subj.

WEB:JT 5265

2	AFCAS	AFABI	1942 8-19	1. For action necessary to comply with Item No. 1 and preparation of reply for General Stratemeyer's signature to A.C. of S., G-2, stating that "necessary action has been taken".

Incl.
n/c

WILLIAM E. BALL
Colonel, A.C.

Dispatched
AUG 19 1942
AAG

File
ci 8/19/42

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Air AS 383.4 (64)

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 7/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING [illegible] SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFMAG	AUG 6 - 1942	AFDIS/CD/2 CH/epp/hma 1. The investigation of the personnel of your Division, listed below, has been completed and discloses no derogatory information: a. CAMPBELL, Murl Dwight b. CONLEY, Marion Cleo c. COPLEN, Ava Nell d. DOLAN, Margaret Ruth e. HARTLEY, Helen Heloise f. MORRISON, Harold J. for A. W. B. Jr. Dir. Intel. Serv.
2.	AFMAG	AFDIS	1942 8-8	PMW/pep 1. Since the initials for serial 1 are unknown, the statements contained therein are not deemed authentic. 2. Recommend this and all similar papers be signed by the executive of the division. P.M.W. P. M. W. Col., A. G. D. Asst. Air A. G.
3.	AFDIS CD/1	AFMAG	1942 8/12	AFDIS-CD/1 WJT-emm 1. Statements contained in Comment 1 are authentic. W.J.T. W. J. T., Lt. Col., A. C., Ch., Counter Intell. Div., AFDIS

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 13 1942
AAG RECEIVED

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383.4 (63)

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Page No. -1-

F-4071, AF. Rev. 8/16/41

Art/10 Investigation
Air AS 383.4 (63)

CD/2-73

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Albert Shulman.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS	AFMAG (Central Mail)	AUG 6 1942	REFERENCE R/R-1,7-21-42. AFDIS/CD/2 CH/epp 1. Investigation of the above subject has been completed by Military Intelligence Service and disclosed no derogatory information which would tend to reflect upon the character, discretion, integrity or loyalty of the subject. for A. W. B., JR., Dir. Intell. Serv.
2.	AFMAG	AFDIS	1942 8-8	PMW/pcp 1. Since the initials for serial 1 are unknown, the statements contained therein are not deemed authentic. 2. Recommend this and all similar papers be signed by the executive of the division. P. M. W. P. M. W. Col., A. G. D. Asst. Air A. G.
3.	AFDIS CD/1	AFMAG	1942 8/11	~~AFDIS-CD/1~~ WJT-emm 1. Statements contained in Comment one (1) are authentic. W. J. Thompson W. J. Thompson, Lieut. Colonel, A. C., Ch., Counter Intell. Div., AFDIS

Mr. Gray
Chf Sect notified Plse file (W) 8/18

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W-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

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Page No. _____

A-8/10 Shulman
Air AS 383.4 (63)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 4/27/76

CONFIDENTIAL

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383.4 (62)

Dispatched
AUG 6 1942
AAG

F de
ai 8/6/42

AAF 201-Smith, Paul H. 1st Ind. AFMAG

WD HQ ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington, D.C. AUG 6 1942 TO: Major John S. Candler, II, Hq. Army Air Base, Hunter Field, Savannah, Georgia.

If by inquiry you are able to ascertain that the person mentioned in paragraph 1, basic, is the Paul Smith who worked in confidential files under Sergeant Jones at Hq. AFCC, Bolling Field during 1941 and the Spring of 1942, the following comments will apply:

The undersigned has implicit confidence in the ability, efficiency, reliability, discretion, integrity, trustworthiness, [illegible] character, and loyalty to our Government, of Sergeant Paul H. Smith.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

P. M. WHITNEY,
Colonel, A.C.D.,
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

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DOD ltrs.
1 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR BASE HUNTER FIELD
Office of the Intelligence Officer
Savannah, Georgia.

(D-c-w)
Aug. 3, 1942

SUBJECT: Master Sergeant Paul H. Smith.

TO : Lieut. Colonel P. M. Whitney,
Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. Paul H. Smith, Master Sergeant, gives your name as reference.

2. This office has the duty of investigating selected military personnel, and a statement is requested of his ability, efficiency, reliability, discretion, integrity, trustworthiness, moral character, and loyalty to our Government.

3. You are assured that any information furnished will be used only for confidential military purposes. Your co-operation in protecting the confidential nature of this investigation by this office is requested.

JOHN S. CANDLER, II,
Major, Army Air Forces,
Base Intelligence Officer.

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CONFIDENTIAL

airab 383.4 (62)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

Investigation of Civilian Employees Handling Secret and Confidential Matter.

CGS/np

1.	AFMAG Administrative Division	AFDIS Counter Intelligence Division	1942 8-5

1. In accordance with Hq. Office Instruction No. 40-7, subject same as above, attached hereto are Forms NNI-140, for the following additional personnel of the Air Adjutant General's Office handling classified classified material:

Aurynger, John J.
Carey, Lawrence B.
Champion, William C.
Cobb, Charles E.
Coffman, Loss
Collins, Gerald L.
Conroy, Emmett A.
Cooley, Franklin D.
Cooper, Rolandus H.
Crandall, Frank E.
Crow, Harry M. Jr.
Cumbee, Harold R.
Ditto, George T.
Evanche, Nancy
Fitzgerald, Frank B.
Gillikin, Jacob W. Jr.
Hall, Theodore R.
Hayes, George R.
Howard, James E.
Jeffrey, Sarah A.
Johnson, Leroy J.
Johnson, Sadie M.
Judy, Minnie R.
Klugewicz, Aloysius C.
Law, Jane L.
Leviton, Bernard
McElroy, Mary A.
Marshall, Pauline W.
Mathews, Wilma F.
Moore, Dorothy B.
Morton, Winnie B.

(CONT)

383.4 (61)

File ci 8/6/45

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1. (Cont)	AFHRS	Adm.Div.	G. I. Div.	1942 8-5

Murphy, Jeanette M.
O'Boyle, Donald P.
Otis, Charles E.
Paulson, Marion L.
Purse, Floyd H.
Robertson, Aubrey W.
Rogers, Jeannette L.
Schanzenbacher, George A.
Sherman, Rena
Silver, Jack S.
Smith, Laura A.
Stallings, Sarah E.
Steakley, Robert M.
Strange, Grace G.
Sweeney, Katie H.
Thornton, Frank X.
Todd, Margaret J.
Vann, Elsie M.
Washington, Francis D.
Wiggins, Arden C.
White, Earl L.
Williams, Eulalia A.
Williams, Marion L.
Woods, Arthur D.

The following changes have taken place since Forms NNL-140 were completed:

Johnson, Raymond - Resigned July 25, 1942 (Form attached)

Haslett, Neil - Resignation will be effective August 8, 1942 (Form attached)

Fisher, William - Recommended for dismissal immediately (Form attached)

Kapelner, Alan - Resigned June 22, 1942. (Form was submitted by R&R Section June 18, 1942.

To Mail & Record Room
Date
EXECUTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE
B & G
CIVILIAN PERS.
FISCAL
INSPECTION
INTELLIGENCE
MATERIEL
MEDICAL
PLANS (COMT)
TRAIN. & OPER.
W. COM. AERO BD.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Civilian Employees Handling Secret and Confidential Matter.

Page Three

CGS/np

1. (Cont)	AFMAG Adm.Div.	AFDIS C. I. Div.	1942 8-5	Stone, Irving D. - Transferred to the Office of the Director of Statistical Control (Form submitted by R&R, dated June 22, 1942.

Dispatched
AUG 5 1942
AAG

Incls: - 58
Forms NNI-140

C. C. S.,
Major, Air Corps,
Actg Ass't Air Adj. General.

To Mail & Record Room
Date
EXECUTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE
B & G
CIVILIAN PERS.
FISCAL
INSPECTION
INTELLIGENCE
LEGAL
MATÉRIEL
MEDICAL
MILITARY PERS.
PLANS
TRAIN. & OPER.
W. COM. AERO BD.

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3

CONFIDENTIAL

Rivals 383.4 (61)

GPO 16—9970

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 2/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Change in Status of Employees for whom Forms NNI-140 have been submitted.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS LBC:z
1.	AFMAG Pub. Div.	AFMAG	1942 8-3	1. In compliance with Hq. Office Instruction 40-7, the following changes have taken place since Forms NNI-140, were submitted: Raymond Johnson resigned July 25, 1942 Neil Haslett, resignation effective August 8, 1942 William Fisher, recommended for dismissal immediately. L. B. C. Major, A.A.F. Acting Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

(Do not use reverse side)

F-4071, AF. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

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DOD Rts.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] AC; Date 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel - Form NNI-140

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS TCH/mll
1	AFMAG Chief, Central Mail Section	AFMAG Chief, Office Service Division	1942 8/4	1. Attached herewith is investigation Form NNI-140 on the following personnel assigned to this section: Leviton, Bernard TCH T. C. H. 1st Lt., AC Chief, Central Mail Section

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AF, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/20/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel - Form NNI-140

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS TCH/mll
1	AFMAG Chief, Central Mail Section	AFMAG Chief, Office Service Division	1942 8/1	1. Attached herewith are investigation Forms NNI-140 on the following personnel assigned to this section: Morton, Winnie Blanche Rogers, Jeannette Lorraine Attachments 2 2 Forms NNI-140 T. C. H. 1st Lt., AC Chief, Central Mail Section

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AF, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 4/28/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Form NNI-140 - Investigation of Personnel

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS LBC:z
1.	AFMAG Pub. Div.	AFMAG	1942 7-29	1. Attached herewith are investigation Forms NNI-140 for personnel assigned to this Division handling classified material. The names of these individuals are as follows:

Aurynger, John J.
Carey, Lawrence B.
Champion, William C.
Cobb, Charles E.
Coffman, Loss
Collins, Gerald L.
Conroy, Emmett A.
Cooley, Franklin D.
Cooper, Rolandus H.
Crandall, Frank E.
Crow, Harry M. gr.
Cumbee, Harold R.
Ditto, George T.
Evancho, Nancy
Fisher, William V.
Fitzgerald, Frank B.
Gillikin, Jacob W. gr.
Hall, Theodore R.
Haslett, Neil T.
Hayes, George R.
Howard, James E.
Jeffrey, Sarah A.
Johnson, Leroy J.
Johnson, Raymond H.
Johnson, Sadie M.
Judy, Minnie R.
Klugewicz, Aloysius C.
Law, Jane L.
McElroy, Mary A.
Marshall, Pauline W.
Mathews, Wilma F.
Moore, Dorothy B.
Murphy, Jeanette M.
O'Boyle, Donald P.
Otis, Charles E.
Paulson Marion, L. Purce, Floyd H.
Robertson, Aubrey W.
Schanzenbacher, George A.
Sherman, Rena
Silver, Jack S.
Smith, Laura A.
Stallings, Sarah E.
Stoakley, Robert M.
Strange, Grace G.
Swaney, Katie H.
Thornton, Frank X.
Todd, Margaret
Vann, Elsie M.
Washington, Francis D.
Wiggins, Arden G.
White, Earl L.
Williams, Eulalia A.
Williams, Marion L.
Woods, Arthur D.

L. B. C.
Major, A.A.F.
Acting Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

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Page No. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

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AFDIS-AD/3
GCC/mcb
written 8/5/42

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DOD Dir. 5200.10
By ab/ta Date 9/28/76

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

AUG 5 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL

SUBJECT - Handling of Classified Documents.

1. In compliance with paragraph 8, Hq. Office Instructions No. 10-7, September 22, 1941, the following list of personnel, in the A-2 Division and the Intelligence Service who are authorized to handle secret and confidential papers, is forwarded for submission to The Adjutant General.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DIS

Spitzer, Vern K.	P-1	Jr. Airways Analyst
Woods, Maude W.	CAF-3	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer
Ingraham, David	P-1	Jr. Aerial Photo Interpreter

2. The personnel listed above have been furnished Form NNI-140 for completion and investigation by The Provost Marshal General.

383.4 (60) B

Dispatched to Cpt. G. C. Cobb, AF DIS.
AUG 6 1942
AAG

File
D

A. W. BROCK, Jr.,
Colonel, A.C.,
Director of Intelligence Service.

G. C. COBB,
Captain, A.C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
				AWB by [illegible]							

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5 Nov. & 20 June 1974
By ahl NC Date 9/20/76

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AAF 312.1 AFHRC

JUL 29 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Handling of Classified Correspondence.

With further reference to memorandum to The Adjutant General, November 6, 1941, above subject, it is requested that the following named employees be added as authorized to handle classified papers in this headquarters:

Coleman, Julian D.	P-2	Asst. Aerial Photo Interpreter
Cranham, Blanche	CAF-3	Asst. Clerk-Typist
Fowler, Rosalie R.	CAF-2	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Freeman, Miles C.	CAF-3	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer
Franklin, Blanche S.	CAF-2	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Haggren, Phoebe E.	P-1	Jr. Asso. Analyst
McCosker, Agnes	CP-3	Messenger
Milan, Peter	CP-3	Messenger
Purdy, Beverly B.	CAF-2	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Phillips, Martha E.	CAF-4	Clerk-Stenographer
Poor, Henry V.	P-4	Economic Analyst
Porter, Audrey C.	CAF-3	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer

Dispatched JUL 30 1942 AAG

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Signed

CHARLES O. STEVENSON,
Major, A. G.,
Actg. Asst. Adjutant General.

RECEIVED JUL 29 1942 AIR AG-6

U.S. Army Air Forces JUL 30 1942 AAG Received

File 7/30/42

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES						COORDINATION					
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-MPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

AHRC

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DOD Dirs. & Mfl June 1974
By dlj June, NARS, Date 9/6/78

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

DECLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

File No. .....

Tally No. .....

Subject: Handling of Classified Documents

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				AFDIS-AD/3 GHD/mcb
1.	AFDIS	AFMAG	JUL 20 1942	1. In compliance with paragraph 8, Hq. Office Instructions No. 10-7, September 22, 1941, the following list of personnel, in the A-2 Division and the Intelligence Service, who are authorized to handle secret and confidential papers, is forwarded for submission to The Adjutant General. A-2 DIVISION Phillips, Martha E. CAF-4 Clerk-Stenographer ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION, DIS Pardy, Beverly B. CAF-2 Jr. Clerk-Typist Foster, Rosalie R. CAF-2 Jr. Clerk-Typist Creahen, Blanche CAF-3 Asst. Clerk-Typist COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DIS McCombs, Aaron CU-3 Messenger INFORMATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DIS Mihas, Peter CU-3 Messenger OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DIS Knappen, Phoebe N. P-1 Jr. Aero. Analyst Poor, Henry V. P-4 Economic Analyst Porter, Audrey C. CAF-3 Asst. Clerk-Stenographer Freeman, Ellen G. CAF-3 Asst. Clerk-Stenographer Franklin, Minnie S. CAF-2 Jr. Clerk-Typist Coleman, JulianD. P-2 Asst. Aerial Photo Interpreter 2. The personnel listed above have been reported to the Counter Intelligence Division, DIS, for investigation by The Provost Marshal General. for W.B. D.I.S. A-2/6640

Hq. Army Air Forces
JUL 21 1942
AAG Received

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Page No.

W-4071, AC, Rev.8/1/41

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AG 383.4 (58)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

DATE July 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO [illegible]
CA

SUBJECT: WILCOX, Jean Euphemia

TO: The Office of the Air Corps
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of WILCOX, Jean Euphemia requested by Lt. Col. R. C. Lewis on 3-12-42 File number _____, an examination of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) [redacted] No derogatory information concerning the subject. ☐ The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

[redacted] Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

☐ On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

[illegible]

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.
Chief, Investigations Division.

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RESTRICTED

PMGO (ID) Form #20
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

OUT
JUL 17 1942
P.M.G.O.
L.D.

DECLASSIFIED
000 Hrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/20/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

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File No. 2D2-1062

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel - Jean Elizabeth Plympton (Mackall)

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS (C.I. Div.)	AFMAG	1942 7/9	AFDIS/2D2-1062 JBC/epp 1. The investigation of Jean Elizabeth Plympton (Mackall) has been completed and discloses no derogatory information concerning the subject. (N) File for W. B. Col., G. S. C., Dir. Intell. Serv.

Air AD 383.4 (56)

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. 1.

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Air AD 383.4 (56)

CONFIDENTIAL

2D1-8638

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS C.I.Div.	AFMAG	1942 6/24	AFDIS/2D1-8638 CH/rs 1. The attached eight P.M.G. Forms NNI-140, are returned to your Division for disposition. SSR for W.B. Dir. Intel. Ser. 8 Incls. 8 P.M.G. Forms

Hq. Army Air Forces
JUL 2 1942
AAG Received

Marcus # 00871
Herndon # 52562

File
ci 7/3/42

383.4 (54)

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W-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. Ati Pg 383.4 (54)

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DOD Dir.
E.O. Dec. 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

1942

1 AFDIS AFMAG 6/24 AFDIS/2D1-8638
C.I.Div. CH/rs

1. The attached eight P.M.G. Forms MMI-140, are returned to your Division for disposition.

W.B.
Dir. Intel. Ser.

Orig + 8 Incls. to Lt Hellick for return to originators
8 P.M.G. Forms

CONFIDENTIAL

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 4/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D1-9442

Tally No. AAF

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Potentially Subversive Military Personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFABI	1942 6/29	AFDIS/2D1-9442 BFRB/fl 1. It is recommended that the attached proposed memorandum to Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers of all Army Air Forces Activities be forwarded for the following reasons: a. It is highly important that potentially subversive military personnel be eliminated from all Army Air Forces organizations before transfer beyond the limits of Continental United States. b. Colonel Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of Military Intelligence has requested that the proposed action be taken. (See copy of letter dated May 10, 1942 attached.) c. This proposal is in conformity with similar action taken by the Army Ground Forces. (See copy of memorandum dated May 21, 1942 attached.) WB W. B. Dir.Intel.Serv. 3 Incls. Prop. memo Cy ltr 5/10/42 Cy memo 5/21/42
2.	AFABI	AFMAG	6/30	AFABI WJT/ghk 1. Approved. J.F.O. E. P. S. C/A-2 Incls. n/c

Army Air Forces
JUL 2 1942
AAG Received

383.4 (53)

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2) file gage

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W-4071, AF, Rev 8/14/42

PAGE NO. Air AG 383.4 (53) Personnel

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
[redacted]
WASHINGTON

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SUBJECT: Potentially Subversive Military Personnel.

TO: Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers of all Army Air Forces Activities.

1. At the time that warning orders are issued to organizations of the Army Air Forces, informing them of proposed transfer for service beyond the limits of Continental United States, the commanding officer of such organizations shall prepare and forward through intelligence channels to the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, the names of individuals in such organizations who are deemed to be potentially subversive and are therefore considered unfit for foreign service. The specific facts upon which this determination is based should be stated in each case.

2. At the same time that this report is submitted, a request for transfer of these individuals to other units shall also be submitted through command channels to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, attention Counter Intelligence Division. Such requests shall state the facts and the reasons for which a transfer is recommended.

3. As to those individuals found to be unfit for foreign service, this headquarters will arrange transfers to other organizations to be designated at the time of transfer.

4. In view of the fact that organizations may be ordered to foreign service on short notice a current check should be maintained to determine potentially subversive personnel.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

FOR DEFENSE
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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2D1-9442 Incl. 1

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MID 220.3

May 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES

Subject: Potentially Subversive Military Personnel.

1. It is requested that at the time that warning orders are issued to organizations within your command informing them of proposed transfer for service beyond the limits of continental United States, such organizations be directed to prepare and forward as soon as practicable through intelligence channels to the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, the names of individuals in such organizations who are deemed to be potentially subversive and are therefore considered unfit for foreign service. The specific facts upon which this determination is based should be stated in each case.

2. The Military Intelligence Service will give prompt consideration to the recommendations so submitted and upon concurring therein will issue directions for the transfer of the individuals concerned to organizations not scheduled for foreign duty.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

HAYES A. KRONER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

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Air AG 383.4 (53)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 June & 26 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY GROUND FORCES
Army War College
Washington, D.C.

014.311/7 (C)-GNGBI
(5-21-42)

May 21, 1942.

Subject: Potentially Subversive Military Personnel.

To: Commanding Generals,
Second and Third Armies,
II, VI, VII, and IX Army Corps,
I Armored Corps,
Airborne Command,
Antiaircraft Command,
Desert Training Center,
Replacement and School Command,
Tank Destroyer Command,
Chief of the Armored Force.

1. Upon being notified of proposed transfer to service beyond the limits of continental United States, organizations of the Army Ground Forces will prepare and forward to the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, through intelligence channels, the names of individuals in such organizations who are deemed to be potentially subversive and are therefore considered unfit for foreign service. Specific facts upon which this determination is based should be stated in such case.

2. At the time the above report is submitted, a request for transfer of these individuals to other units will also be submitted through command channels to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces. Such requests will state the reasons that transfer is desired.

3. This headquarters will arrange for the transfer of individuals concerned to other organizations to be designated at the time of transfer.

4. In view of the fact that units may depart on short notice a continuing check on potentially subversive personnel should be the rule.

By command of LT. GEN. McNAIR:

DECLASSIFIED

/s/ Clyde L. Hyssong
CLYDE L. HYSSONG,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" and "H"

Incl 3

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D-29383

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS C. I. Sec.	AFMAG Att.: Lt. Col. R. C. Lewis.	1942 5/9	AFDIS/2D-29383 TSC/bms 1. In accordance with the attached directive from the W.D., "AG Ltr., 321.19 M.I.D. (2-26-42) MB-M", dated 3/7/42, requests for loyalty investigations of personnel handling classified correspondence will be rendered on Form NNI-140. 2. It will be noted that the directive specifically sets forth that the individual who is to be investigated fill out the form. Upon completion, by the individual concerned, Form NNI-140 should be returned to this Section for proper handling and disposition. 3. This Section will notify your office when the investigation is completed, together with the nature of remarks. 4. Attached hereto is Form NNI-140 for Miss E. Iverna Eiker. SSE for CRB for C. E. H. Dir. Intel. Serv. 2 Atts.: Att.1.-1 Cy. W.D., "AG Ltr., 321.19 M.I.D. (2-26-42) MB-M", dated 3/7/42. Att.2.-1 Cy. P.M.G. Form NNI-140. file RCL

Air AG 383.4 (51)

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

(Do not [illegible]

W-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____ Air AG 383.4 (51)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

June 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Provost Marshal General
Washington D.C. (Attention: Col. O'Rear or,
Capt. Richardson, Bldg. H, 23rd & C Sts., N.W.)

SUBJECT: Investigations

1. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made of the following personnel who are now assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, of the Air Adjutant General's office, Army Air Forces.

Evans, Mohn Marshall

2. Attached is his personnel security questionnaire properly filled out.

3. It is requested that this office be notified of the results of this investigation.

For the Commanding General:

R. C. LEWIS
Lt.Col., Army Air Forces
Actg. Asst. Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
quest.

Dispatched
JUN 16 1942
AAG

File 6/16/42

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCL									

DECLASSIFIED

AAF-39

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Ans. AS 383-4 (50)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED
WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

File
RCL

June 10, 1942.

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Questionnaire Forms to accompany Requests to The Office of The Provost Marshal General for Investigations.

TO: The Actg. Asst. Air Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. Col. R. C. Lewis.

1. Reference is made to your communication dated June 9, 1942, which is herewith returned. In compliance with The Adjutant General's directive, dated March 7, 1942, No. 321.19 M.I.D. (2-26-42) MB-M, it is requested that completed Personnel Security Questionnaires, Form NNI-140, be submitted for the persons of whom the enclosed communication requests investigations.

2. There is enclosed a sufficient number of forms for this use.

For The Provost Marshal General:

W B Richardson
W. B. RICHARDSON,
Captain, Corps of Military Police,
Chief, Investigations Division.

2 Incls -
Incl. 1-Ltr. dtd. 6-9-42
2-50 copies P.S.Q(FormNNI-140)

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383.4 (50)

Adj ab 383.4 (50)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/29/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
(Attention: Col O'Rear or Capt. Richardson,
Building H, 23rd & C Streets, N.W.)

Subject: Investigation.

1. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made of the following personnel who is now assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, Air Adjutant General, A.A.F.:

J. Marshall Evans

2. It is requested that a number of Personnel Security Questionnaire Forms be sent us to be used in this and future investigations.

3. It is requested that this office be informed of the result of this investigation.

R. C. Lewis

R. C. LEWIS
Lt. Colonel, Army Air Forces,
Actg. Asst. Air Adjutant General.

FOR DEFENSE
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

DECLASSIFIED

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Air AS 383-4 (50)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/29/76

May 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO : Provost Marshal General
Washington, D.C. (Attention: Col. O'Rear, or,
Capt. Richardson, Bldg. H, 23rd and C Sts., N.W.)

SUBJECT : Investigations

1. Attached hereto are Personnel Security Questionnaire Forms for the following personnel assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, of the Air Adjutant General's office:

Burkhardt, Leah D.
Campbell, Murl
Coplen, Ava N.
Daly, Mary J.
Dolan, Margaret R.
Hampton, Lila R.
Noble, Avis C.
Olson, Mary E.
Hartley, Helen H.

2. Evelyn Burke and Amie L. London have transferred to another section.

3. Also attached is the questionnaire form of Evelyn Eiker assigned to the office, Air Adjutant General.

For the Commanding General:

File
c. 5/21/42

383.4 (48)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES						R. C. COORDINATION					
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	Lt. Col., Air Corps A-Mtg	A-IRD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	General
	Incls. 10 Quest. forms	RCR									

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Dispatched
MAY 21 1942
AAG

AAAS 383.4 (48)

DECLASSIFIED (CONFIDENTIAL)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/28/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

2D1-7606

May 8, 1942

Counter Intelligence Bulletin No. 7.

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Subversive Situation Affecting the Army Air Forces, April 16 - April 30, 1942.

I. AQUA SYSTEMS, INC.

1. THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES AND INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH AQUA SYSTEMS, INC. INSTALLATIONS AT ARMY AIR FORCES ESTABLISHMENTS:

a. EXPLOSIVE PROOF FITTINGS REQUIRED BY CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED.

b. LOCKS REQUIRED ON INTAKE AND VENT PIPES WERE NOT SUPPLIED.

c. HEMP TWINE, STRING, PAPER, ETC. WERE FOUND IN TRAP BETWEEN INLET PIPE AND STORAGE TANK, PREVENTING FLOW OF GASOLINE.

d. BENT NAILS WERE INSERTED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT TRAP VALVE CUTTING OFF WATER, APPARENTLY FOR PURPOSE OF CAUSING AIRPLANE GASOLINE TANKS TO BE FILLED WITH WATER INSTEAD OF GASOLINE.

2. IN MANY INSTANCES AND SINCE 1940 SEEMINGLY UNWARRANTED DELAYS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE INSTALLATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS.

3. TO PREVENT POTENTIAL SABOTAGE, CAUTION AND VIGILANCE SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF AQUA SYSTEMS, INC. INSTALLATIONS. AN IMMEDIATE THOROUGH INSPECTION OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS RECOMMENDED. IT IS FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT INSPECTIONS BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT PROBABLE COMPROMISE OF PENDING INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ABOVE REPORTED MATTERS.

4. SIMILAR PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH ALL GASOLINE FUELING EQUIPMENT, DUE TO ITS CRITICAL AND VITAL NATURE.

383.4 (47)

File

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II. SABOTAGE AND CARELESSNESS.

1. In Counter Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, dated April 18, 1942, there were listed certain instances of possible and known sabotage as specific illustrations of weak spots to be guarded against. Set forth below are additional instances:

a. Possible sabotage in plants engaged in war work for Army Air Forces:

(1) Plug left out at bottom of butane tank newly installed underground, causing leakage when butane was poured in.

(2) Airplane damaged by fall from dolly, due to missing bolt in anchor fitting in dolly leg holding connections in place.

(3) Air speed indicators of airplane found damaged.

(4) Vent line of gasoline tank of airplane found plugged with zinc chromite compound.

(5) Rubber battery drain tubing found in gasoline tanks of airplanes.

b. Possible sabotage at Army Air Forces bases:

(1) Stoppage of oil line of airplane engine, due to rags in vent.

(2) Shorting out of magneto by looping of wire around bayonets in firewall magneto lead bayonets plug.

(3) Lockwasher found in air intake tube of supercharger being tested, and rags and other debris found in air intake of another supercharger undergoing tests.

(4) Drift punch found wedged between right elevator and stabilizer of airplane.

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2. The reports continue to reflect a considerable number of cases of damage, several of which involved rather serious fires, caused by the apparent carelessness of workmen in plants producing war materials, and all possible efforts should be made to guard against such occurrences. Many of such instances appear to have happened because of inadequate supervision of workmen, particularly on night shifts.

III. The information set forth in this bulletin is strictly confidential. The information contained herein will not be reproduced in whole or in part without authorization of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

C. E. HENRY
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director, Intelligence Service.

Hq. Army Air Forces
MAY 14 1942
AAG Received

Charles R. Blake
By: CHARLES R. BLAKE
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Counter Intelligence Section

Distribution:

3- OUSW	50- AFEPD
1- AFABI	50- AFWPD
2- AFDIS	50- AFCPD
12- WD-MIS-CIC	50- AFMPD
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90- SEACTC	1- AFCAS
70- WCACTC	1- AFDAS
70- GCACTC	1- AFACT
50- AFTTC	1- AFADS
200- AFASC-Wr.Fld	1- AFAEP
1- AFASC-Bldg T	1- AFTAI
150- 1st.AF	1- AFDMR
110- 2nd.AF	1- AFRAD
160- 3rd.AF	1- AFRBS
90- 4th.AF	1- AFROM
2- AFAMC	1- AFDTS
20- File	1- AFFTC
5- 5th.ASC	1- AFAFC
2- AFMAG	

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AAF AG 383.4 (47)

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Div. A.G.O.

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CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

MAY 13 1942

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/[illegible]/76

Date April 30, 1942
File Numbers:
PMGO 01-5260
CA

MEMORANDUM for The Provost Marshal,

Third Corps Area,

Third Floor Equitable Building, Baltimore, Maryland

Subject: Notification of Investigation,

1. Investigation of the Subject MEAD, Dorothy Mae,

whose address is 1834 Eye Street, Washington, D.C.,
(~~[illegible]~~) (is requested of the Provost Marshal, 3 Corps Area) which is (assumed to be) the Office of Origin, and is based on the following facts:

The Office of the Air Adjutant General requested this Division by letter dated March 12, 1942 to investigate subject who is under consideration for appointment as Junior Stenographer.

For the Provost Marshal General:

W. B. Richardson
W. B. RICHARDSON,
Captain, Corps of Military Police,
Chief, Investigations Division

Am
Enclose 1 History Statement:

PMGO _____ 1st Ind.

Office of the Provost Marshal, _____ C. A. _____

_____ - To The Chief of the Investigations Division, PMGO, War Department, Washington, D. C.

This office has assigned the following case number to this investigation: _____
(CA) (Class) (Serial)

Hq. Army Air Forces
17 1942
AAG Received

File
BC-8

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CONFIDENTIAL

Form #2 (Rev. 12/31/41
Notif. of Invest.

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Rm # 884003

SEP 17 1942

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000 ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date [illegible]

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-5260
CA

SUBJECT: MEAD, Dorothy Mae

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General,
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of MEAD, Dorothy Mae requested by Maj. R. C. Lewis, on an expedite basis on 2-27-42 file number _____, an examination of the part of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) [X] No derogatory information concerning the subject. [ ] The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

[X] Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

[ ] On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

J. T. H. O'Rear

md

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

PMGO (ID) Form #20 MO
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

EMPLOYEE REPORT

NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTING CORPORATION

"CREDIT BUREAU REPORTS"

FORM 629
10M 7-41

REPORT ON Meade (Surname first) Miss (Mr.-Mrs.-Miss) Dorothy Mae (Given names) James Onie Mead (Wife's or husband's name) Alice M. Mead (If single, parent's name)

Residence Address 1834 Eye Street, N. W. (Number and Street or R. F. D.) Washington (City) D. C. (County) (State)

IDENTITY	1. Length of time applicant has been known in our files	new
	2. Length of time each of our informants has known applicant	1 month, 5 months, 5 years
	3. Last time applicant was seen or heard from	June 13, 1942
	4. Length of time applicant has resided at this address and in city	this address 5 months-in city 6 months
	5. Former residence address and how long there?	6105 Forest Drive, Cheverly, Maryland
	6. Age (If 21, verify if possible) Born November 4, 1922	Nationality, Descent and race American
	7. State if single, married, separated, widowed or divorced	single
	8. Number and identity of dependents	none known
	9. Disease, injury, deformity or peculiarity of appearance, if any	none known
HISTORY	10. Name and address of present employer or business	War Department, Washington, D. C.
	11. Nature of occupation or business and how long?	-
	12. How regarded as to competency in occupation or success in business	unknown
	13. Name of previous employer, position and how long?	Otoe Foods, office assistant, 18 months
	14. Previous employers' opinion and reason for leaving	accepted better paying position
	15. Relations with fellow employees, agreeable or disagreeable	agreeable
	16. Suits or garnishments, if any, with details	none known
	17. If ever bankrupt, give date, liabilities and details	-
	18. Domestic troubles and financial or personal difficulties	none known
	19. Condition of home and domestic surroundings	respectable rooming house
	20. State if safe, sane, dependable or if visionary erratic, impractical	dependable
	21. Details of educational advantages	high school graduate
CHARACTER	22. How regarded as to character, habits, morals, etc.	well regarded
	23. How regarded as to honesty and integrity (answer carefully)	no record of dishonesty
	24. Record of thrift thrifty Steady employment - Moving often no Over-buying	
	25. Suspicion, if any, of gambling, betting, speculating and unfavorable associates	nothing of this nature
	26. Suspicion of excessive drinking or use of drugs	no
	27. Desirability as an employee	desirable
RESOURCES	28. Approximate salary or commission and when paid	unknown
	29. Income from other sources or investments	none known
	30. Applicant owns home Rooms yes Boards yes Rents furnished Rents unfurnished	
	31. Generally estimated to be worth	no known assets other than current earnings
	32. Assets consist principally of	personal effects and cash
	33. Reputation for paying bills (prompt, slow or unsatisfactory)	satisfactory
	34. Extent of present indebtedness	unknown

CREDIT RECORD AND REMARKS:

Type of Business	How Long Sold	Lease or Open Acct.	Recent High Credit	Owes Now	Amount Past Due and How Long	PAYING HABITS (Specify 30, 60, 90 days, etc.)	Remarks

DESCRIPTIVE COMMENT ON REVERSE SIDE—Covering business experience, personal record, social standing, style of living and reputation and business of parents. If woman, state with whom she lives, and give parent's or husband's occupation and estimated income. Amplify any incomplete or unfavorable information given above.

Report for Provost Marshal - Third Corps Area

Compiled by National Consumer Credit Reporting Corp. Baltimore, Md.

Your File No. 01-5260

Date June 19, 1942

The confidential information given in this report is in answer to a request for same. This report is given as an aid to the subscriber in conducting the subscriber's business and is based upon information obtained from sources deemed reliable, the accuracy of which, however, is in no manner guaranteed. The subscriber, in accepting this report, agrees to hold same in STRICT CONFIDENCE for his own exclusive use, never to be communicated; and to be responsible for any and all damages arising from a violation of any of the above provisions and waives any claim for any loss which may occur to the subscriber through this report.

SUMMARY

Your applicant was born in Nebraska City, Nebraska, November 4, 1922. She is a high school graduate.

Her father, James Onie Mead, was born in Missouri, and her mother, Alice M. Meade, was born in Nebraska. The applicant was a resident of Nebraska City, Nebraska, most of her life, moving to the vicinity of Washington, D. C., about six months ago. She is now living there at 1834 Eye Street, N. W., and has been at that address approximately five months. She is well regarded by the few acquaintances she has made there. She is not known to have any club or organization activities. She is not the radical type and there is no evidence of subversive or un-American activities.

Applicant is stated to be employed by the War Department, Washington, D. C. She was formerly employed eighteen months by Otoe Foods, Nebraska City, as an Office Assistant. Left there for a better position.

Our investigation indicates the subject is an American citizen of good standing and there appears to be no reason whyshe should not be employed by the War Department.

MN

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

JUN 29 '42 PM

OUT
SEP 15 1942
P. M. G. O.

CONFIDENTIAL

(AFMAG) RCL:eie

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/29/74

DECLASSIFIED

May 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Provost Marshal General
Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Captain Heaton)

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel

1. Pursuant to the suggestion made by your office that a list be furnished you of all personnel on whom we have had no report regarding their investigations, the following information is submitted:

a. Request was made for investigation of the following on December 29, 1941, to G-2:

BOGAN, John
KWOLEK, Tillie
NICCOLSON, James
THOMAS, Bobby B.
VAN HORN, Devaine
WEEKS, Helene

On January 27, 1942, a satisfactory report was made on KWOLEK, TILLIE, and this office advised that we would be notified immediately on the other five listed above if any information of derogatory nature was learned.

b. Request for the investigation of the following was made on February 9, 1942:

CHAFIN, Harriett E.
ESTES, Irma F.
MEAD, Dorothy M.
TATUM, Margaret R.
WILCOX, Jean E.

Dispatched
MAY 14 1942
AAG

File
ci 5/14/42

No report has been submitted regarding this investigation.

c. To G-2 on April 1st, and to the Provost Marshal General on April 7th, a request for investigation of the following was

383.4/46

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics
		RCL								

AAF-39

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(AFMAG)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/29/74

May 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Provost Marshal General
Washington, D. C. (Attention: Col. O'Rear, or, Capt. Richardson, Bldg. H, 23rd and C Sts., N.W.)

SUBJECT: Investigations

1. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made of the following personnel who are now assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, of the Air Adjutant General's Office, Army Air Forces.

Burke, Evelyn
Burkhardt, Leah D.
Campbell, Murl
Coplen, Ava N.
Daly, Mary J.
Dolan, Margaret R.
Hampton, Lila R.
London, Amie L.
Noble, Avis C.
Olson, Mary R.

2. It is requested that this office be notified of the results of this investigation.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

R. C. LEWIS
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Actg Asst. Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
MAY 10 1942
AAG
File HRG

383.4 (44)

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Air Cbs 383.4 (44)

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DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By ala/mc LC; Date 9/28/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-5626
CA

SUBJECT: NICCOLSON, James Leslie

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of NICCOLSON, James Leslie requested by Lt. Col. David G. Erskine on 1-27-42 file number _____, an examination of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) [X] No derogatory information concerning the subject. [ ] The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

[XX] Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

[ ] On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

J. T. H. O'Rear

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

RESTRICTED

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PMGO (ID) Form #20
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

OUT
JUN 18 1942
P. M. G. O.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-2627
CA

SUBJECT: THOMAS, Bobby Brownell

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of THOMAS, Bobby Brownell requested by Lt. Colonel David G. Erskine, on an expedite basis on 6-15-42 file number ____, an examination of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) ☒ No derogatory information concerning the subject. ☐ The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

☒ Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

☐ On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

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PMGO (ID) Form #20 MD.
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

OUT
JUN 18 1942
P. M. G. O.

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-5625
CA

SUBJECT: BOGAN, John Dave

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of BOGAN, John Dave requested by Lt. David G. Erskine, on an expedite basis on 1-27-42 file number , an examination of ~~the~~part of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) ☒ No derogatory information concerning the subject. ☐ The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

☒ Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

☐ On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

[redacted]st Marshal General:

md [redacted]

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

DECLASSIFIED
RESTRICTED

PMGO (ID) Form #20 MO.
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

CONFIDENTIAL

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-3628
CA

SUBJECT: VAN HORN, Swaine Harland

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of VAN HORN, Swaine Harland requested by Lt. Col. David G. Erskine, on an expedite basis on 1-27-42 file number _____, an examination of part of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) ☒ No derogatory information concerning the subject. ☐ The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

☒ Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

☐ On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

DECLASSIFIED

PMGO (ID) Form #20 MD
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

OUT
JUN 18 1942
P.M.G.O.

RESTRICTED

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION Removed per E.O. 10501

DATE June 17, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 01-9629
CA

SUBJECT: WEEKS, Helene Louise

TO: Office of the Air Adjutant General
Room 2015, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of WEEKS, Helene Louise requested by Lt. David G. Erskine, on an expedite basis on 1-27-42 file number , an examination of part of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) ☒ No derogatory information concerning the subject. ☐ The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

☒ Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

☐ On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

JOHN T. H. O'REAR
Colonel, C. A. C.,
Chief, Investigations Division.

md

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

PMGO (ID) Form #20 MD.
Revised 5-22-42
Requester Notified

OUT
JUN 18 1942
P.M.G.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/20/76

(AFMAG) RCL:eie

May 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: The Air Inspector, Army Air Forces
(Attention: Colonel Scott)

SUBJECT: Investigations of Personnel

Pursuant to request made by your office, the following information is forwarded regarding the investigation, and the requests for investigation, of the military and civilian personnel in the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, Office of the Air Adjutant General.

383.4 (45)

1. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

For the following, a request for an investigation was made on December 29, 1941, and on January 13, 1942, a report was made that the search failed to reveal any information of a derogatory nature:

DALE, Richard
TURNER, Marie Jean

Also on December 29th, a request was made for an investigation of the following:

BOGAN, John
KWOLEK, Tillie
NICCOLSON, James
THOMAS, Bobby B.
VAN HORN, Devaine
WEEKS, Helene

On January 27, 1942, a satisfactory report was made on KWOLEK, TILLIE, and this office advised that we would be notified immediately on the other five listed above if any information of derogatory nature was learned.

A request for the investigation of the following was made on February 9, 1942:

CHAFIN, Harriett E.
[illegible], Irma F.
[illegible], Dorothy M.
TATUM, Margaret R.
WILCOX, Jean E.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES						COORDINATION				
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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On April 1, 1942, a request was made for an investigation of the following:

KING, K. W. - 2nd Lt.
MAGRATH, J. S. - 1st Lt.
STRYKER, T. B. - 1st Lt.
WILLIAMS, T. J. - 1st Lt.
WILBOURNE, A. E. - Capt.

No report has been made in regard to this investigation.

A request for investigation of the following military personnel was made of G-2 on May 9th:

MEYER, Edward D. - 1st Lt.
WOODLEE, Glen - 1st Lt.
COOMS, Alvin E. - 2nd Lt.
MORRISS, Reuben H., Jr. - 2nd Lt.
SHERWOOD, Abbot W., Jr. - 2nd Lt.
TUCKER, Edwin W. - 2nd Lt.

R. C. LEWIS
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps
Actg Asst. Air Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCP									

AAF-39

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/Ass LC, Date 9/29/76

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(AFMAG)

May 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Attention: Colonel Nicholas S. Beckett

SUBJECT: Investigation of Military Personnel

1. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made of the following military personnel, who are assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, Air Adjutant General's Office, Army Air Forces.

Meyer, Edward D.	1st Lt.
Woodee, Glen	" "
Coons, Alvin E.	2nd Lt.
Morriss, Reuben M., Jr.	"
Sherwood, Abbot W., Jr.	"
Tucker, Edwin W.	" "
Brinckman, Alvin L.	Pvt.
Heath, Gilford K.	PFC
Schindles, Harry	Pvt.

2. It is requested that this office be informed as to the results of these investigations.

3. It is also requested that this office be informed as to:

a. The results of the investigation of officers requested on April 1, 1942.

b. The result of your further investigation in regard to Capt. Reid Radford Lumsden and Capt. Harold MacDonald, re your letter of January 13, 1942.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

R. C. [illegible]
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Acting Asst. Air Adjutant General

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383.4 (43)

Air AG 383.4 (43)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
5 Jan & 30 June 1954
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

(AFMAG) RCL:eie

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May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Provost Marshal General
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Investigations.

1. The enclosed Personnel Security Questionnaires (Form NMI-140) are forwarded to your office in order that the investigations requested may be continued.

2. It is requested that this office be informed of the results of your investigations.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

R. C. LEWIS
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Actg Asst. Air Adjutant General

5 Incls.
Dispatched
MAY 7 1942
AAG

File
ai 5/7/42

383.4 (42)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCL.		DECLASSIFIED							

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Air AG 383.4 (42)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: ala [illegible] LC, Date: 4/29/76

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM for ☐ Record

☐ The Assistant Chief of Staff

☐ The Federal Bureau of Investigation, thru: G-2

☒ Major R. C. Lewis
Acting Assistant Air Adjutant General

Subject: Investigations

1. The (following)(~~[illegible]~~) data is forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

This office requests that the inclosed Personnel Security Questionnaires (Form NNI-140) be completed so that the investigations requested by you may be continued on the following subjects:

CONLEY, Marian
DUNAWAY, Clifford H.
DUNAWAY, Edward G.
FLECK, Vera M.
McPADDEN, James M.

2. The Office of The Provost Marshal General is not continuing the investigation of the subject.

For The Provost Marshal General:

Rodham C. Routledge
RODHAM C. ROUTLEDGE,
1st Lieut., Corps of Military Police,
Executive Officer, I. D.

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Form #41
Mem A.R.F.

3 Incl -
Incl 1 - A.G.O. Directive
Incl 2 - Sets of Instructions
Incl 3 - Five Personnel Security Questionnaires (Form NNI-140)

Air AG 383.4 (42)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1971
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED

May 9, 1942

SUBJECT: C. S.

TO : Major E. R. Swanson, C. S.,
Bolling Field, D. C.

For the activities under your direction, you will cooperate with Captain Carl E. Welchner, A.C., and all other officers engaged in this work, in the matter of C. S. coverage of military and civilian personnel.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

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Air AD 383.4 (41)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 7/[illegible]/76

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C. S.

Major E. R. Swanson,

1. You are directed to cooperate forthwith with Captain Carl E. Welchner, and all other officers engaged in this work, in the matter of C. S. coverage of military and civilian personnel under your control.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

WILLIAM W. DICK,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Air Adjutant General.

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Air AD 383.4 (41)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D-29346

Tally No. AAF

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: C. S. System.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS C.I. Sec.	AFMAG	1942 5/6	AFDIS/2D WRO/bbh 1. Major E. R. Swanson, in the OCAC Annex, has refused to cooperate in C. S. matters without written instructions to do so. It is requested that the Air Adjutant General forward the attached proposed directive to him. CRB for C. E. H. Dir. Intel. Serv. Incl. Prop. directive.

Hq. Army Air Forces
MAY 7 1942
AAG Received

Air AG 383.4 (41)

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PAGE NO. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/20/74

April 25, 1942

Investigations of Civilian Personnel Required to Handle Secret and Other Classified Papers.

Provost Marshal General. (Through Channels).
Attention: Investigation Division (Captain Rutledge).

1. In accordance with letter WD AGO, file No. AG 321.19 M.I.D., (2-26-42), MB-M, dated March 7, 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Form to Accompany Requests to the Provost Marshal General for Investigations", and telephone conversation with Captain Richardson of the Investigation Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office, it is urgently requested that a thorough investigation of the type which is described as routine, be made of the following employee:

Name	Classification	Transferred From
Davis, Violette Larsen	CAF-2	Farm Credit Adm.

2. This investigation is of particularly urgent importance because of the large proportion of secret documents in the mail handled by this office and the overwhelming proportion of mail which is classified. For this reason it is impossible to segregate the employees in such a manner that any one of them may be prevented from handling secret documents and yet discharge his duties efficiently and without causing confusion. It is requested, therefore, that the requested investigation be made with the least possible delay.

3. It is requested that the report be made direct to the Directorate of Air Defense, attention of Major J. M. Harper, Chief of Administrative Division. Form NNI-140 for the above named employee was delivered to Captain R. C. Rutledge, Executive Officer, Division of Investigation, Provost Marshal General, Division of Investigation, this date, together with a copy of this letter.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

GORDON R. SAVILLE,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director of Air Defense.

By: WILLIAM [illegible],
Lt. Col., Air Corps

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Air AG 383.4 (40)

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

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DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

1942 APR 28 AM 10 28

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

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DOD ltr.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/20/76

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HEADQUARTERS [illegible] FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D1-6422

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS C. I. Sec.	AFMAG	1942 4/25	AFDIS/2D1-6422 TSC/bms

Reference Memorandum dated April 4, 1942.

1. The records of this office disclose that investigations of the following named individuals were requested on the dates indicated:

a. Miriam Brooks 2/14/42
b. Harvey H. Monk 2/12/42
c. Helen A. Smith 2/8/42

2. P.M.G. Forms NNI-140 were forwarded for the following individuals on 4/24/42:

a. Gertrude Hood
b. Phyllis E. Robison
c. Theresa E. DiSesa
d. Emma L. Roberson
e. Helen P. Barrett
f. Irene Lawson
g. Hazel Henderson
h. Lois G. Grams
i. Eleanor Saba
j. Marjorie D. Simms
k. Dorothy Kaplan
l. Regina L. Carney
m. Suzanne H. Davis
n. Ruby M. Roberts
o. Korinne Vriezelaar
p. Charlotte F. Yoder
q. Lois H. Atwood
r. James G. Batson
s. James Brooks
t. Jean Bowman
u. Audrey E. Cawthorne
v. Bessie E. Cox
w. Anna Ftak
x. Dorothy F. Gibson

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PAGE NO. 1.

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3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D1-6422

Tally No. AAF

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1. (Cont)	AFDIS C. I. Sec.	AFMAG	1942 4/25	AFDIS/2D1-6422 TSC/bms y. Carl C. Giarrizzo z. Dorothy E. Gehring aa. Milton C. George ab. Kermit V. Gimmel ac. Felix N. Hanschmann ad. Goldie Goldner ae. Claire E. Holmes af. Helen C. Jones ag. Orrin E. Klapp, Jr. ah. William J. Kafka ai. John H. Langley aj. Glenn M. Massie ak. Mellie R. Merchant al. Walter Mace am. Robert C. Murray an. S. Edward Ralph ao. Sydney J. Roth ap. Frances M. Runtz aq. Clifton B. Shoemaker ar. Robert Sporn as. Betty L. Weir at. William W. Young au. Rhoda Cutshall sse for CRB for C. E. H. Dir. Intell. Serv.
		Hq. Army Air Forces APR 29 1942 AAG Received		2 Att.: Att.1.-Memo. dated 4/7/42. Att.2.-Memo. dated 4/4/42. noted by Col Whitney APR 30 1942 File.

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DOD ltrs. 8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] JC, Date: [illegible]

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201-6422

MID:333.5

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES.
Attention: Colonel P. M. Whitney,
Asst. Air Adjutant General.

Subject: Routing and Handling Classified Papers.

1. Reference memorandum of April 4, 1942, to the A. C. of S., G-2, subject: "Routing and Handling Classified Papers."

2. Investigation of civilian employees, where in the interest of national defense an investigation appears desirable because of the release to them of classified information, was transferred to the Office of the Provost Marshal General by A.G. letter of February 3, 1942. Request, therefore, for investigation of subjects listed in Paragraph 2 should be made to the Provost Marshal General.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Group:

N. S. BECKETT,
Lt. Col., Military Intelligence,
Chief, Investigating Branch.

Enclosure
1 - Cpy ltr dtd 4/4/42
frm Hq., A.A.F.

Att. 1

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AMF 383-4 (39)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/29/76

APR 4 - 1942 AFMAG

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualifications to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Gertrude Hood	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Phyllis E. Robison	Typist
Theresa E. DiSesa	Typist
[illegible]ma L. Roberson	Typist
[illegible]elen P. Barrett	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Irene Lawson	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Hazel Henderson	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Lois G. Grams	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Eleanor Saba	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Marjorie D. Simms	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Dorothy Kaplan	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Miriam Brooks	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Regina L. Carney	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Suzanne H. Davis	Jr. Clk-Typist
Harvey H. Monk	Jr. Adm. Assistant
Mildred E. Olson	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Ruby M. Roberts	Jr. Clk-Typist
Korinne Vriezelaar	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Charlotte F. Yoder	Jr. Clk-Typist
Lois H. Atwood	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
James G, Batson	Eng. Draftsman
James Brooks	Aerial Photo Inter.
Jean Bowman	Jr. Clk-Typist
Audrey E. Cawthorne	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Bessie E. Cox	Jr. Clk-Typist

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Anna Ptak	Clerk-Stenographer
Dorothy F. Gibson	Junior Clerk
Carl C. Ciarrisso	Jr. Eng. Draftsman
Dorothy E. Oehring	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Milton C. George	Asst. Airways Eng.
Kermit V. Gimmel	Jr. Eng. Draftsman
Goldie Goldner	Junior Clerk
Felix N. Hanschmann	Jr. Eng. Draftsman
Claire E. Holmes	Jr. Clk-Typist
Helen C. Jones	Junior Clerk
Orrin E. Klapp, Jr.	Jr. Airways Eng.
William J. Kafka	Jr. Eng. Draftsman
John H. Langley	Jr. Econ. Analyst
Glenn M. Massie	Asst. Clk-Stenographer
Nellie R. Merchant	Asst. Clk-Stenographer
Walter Mace	Jr. Airways Eng.
Robert C. Murray	Sr. Eng. Draftsman
G. Steward Ralph	Sr. Eng. Draftsman
Sydney J. Roth	Jr. File Clerk
Frances M. Runtz	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Clifton B. Shoemaker	Jr. Economist
Robert Sporn	Jr. File Clerk
Betty L. Weir	Jr. Econ. Analyst
William W. Young	Jr. Economist

In addition, the following personnel in the Administrative Section are authorized to sign for secret and confidential papers:

Rhoda Cutshall	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Helen A. Smith	Jr. Clk-Typist

For the Commanding General:

P. M. WHITNEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Air Adjutant General.

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Air AG 383.4 (36)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/20/74

April 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Provost Marshal General.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel.

1. The following personnel are assigned to work in the Cable Section, Classified Communication Division, Office of the Adjutant General, Army Air Forces. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the Status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Conley, Marian
Dunaway, Clifford H.
Dunaway, Edward G.
Fleck, Vera M.
McPadden, James M.

2. No report of the investigation of the following personnel has been submitted to this office:

Bogan, John D.
Chafin, Harriet E.
Estes, Irma
Mead, Dorothy M.
Niccolson, James
Tatum, Margaret
Thomas, Bobby B.
Van Horn, Dawaine H.
Weeks, Helene
Wilcox, Jean

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
APR 9 1942
AAG

383.4 (87)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCL					R. C. LEWIS, Major, Air Corps, Actg. Asst. Air Adjutant General.				

AAF-39

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Air AS 383.4 (87)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 4/27/74

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

AFDIS
2D-26241

March 31, 1942.

Counter Intelligence Bulletin No. 3.

SUBJECT: Fifth Column Activities.

1. The following extract from an intelligence report is cited for information and necessary action by all intelligence and security personnel:

> "On December 6, 1941, in the classified ad section of Honolulu daily papers, appeared notification to all Japanese to remain off the streets between the hours of 6 A.M. and 10 A.M. on December 7."

2. The events of December 7, 1941 at Honolulu clarify the item. It is desired that, as a routine matter, all local papers be perused carefully for clever indications of Fifth Column activity and that report of suspicious items be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Section, Army Air Forces Headquarters.

By Command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

C. E. HENRY,
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,
Director, Intelligence Service.

Charles R. Blake
By: CHARLES R. BLAKE,
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Counter Intelligence Section.

Distribution:
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70- WCACTC
70- GCACTC
50- AFTTC
200- AFASC
150- 1st. AF
110- 2d. AF
160- 3d. AF
90- 4th. AF
50- AFAMC
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20- File
5- 5th. ASC
2- AFMAG
50- AFEPD
50- AFWPD
50- AFCPD
50- AFMPD

Hq. Army Air
APR 9 1942
AAG Received

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Air AG 383.4 (38)

383.4 (38)

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

Date May 23, 1942
In reply refer to:
Case PMGO 09-13632
CA

SUBJECT: DUNNAWAY, Edward George

TO: Air Adjutant General's Office, Cable Section
Room 2205 Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

With regard to the investigation of DUNNAWAY, Edward George requested by the Air Adjutant General's Office on 5-8-42 file number , an examination of the records available to this Division has disclosed (check and complete the appropriate statement) [X] No derogatory information concerning the subject. [ ] The following data, which includes all of the information concerning the subject presently available to this office. It is submitted for your evaluation of the suitability of the subject for the position sought. (This information may or may not be applicable to the subject.)

3834

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The statement checked below will indicate the status of this case:

[X] Investigation of the subject is being continued and you will be currently advised of material developments in this case. This office should be advised of any action taken in this case which results in a material change in the present relation between the subject and the War Department.

[X] On the basis of the investigation made, this case is considered closed unless you request further investigation.

For The Provost Marshal General:

W. B. RICHARDSON,
Captain, Corps of Military Police,
Chief, Investigations Division.

md

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RESTRICTED

PMGO (ID) Form #20
Revised 5-6-42
Requester Notified

Noted RER 5/26/42

Noted RER

File

OUT
MAY 25 1942
P. M. G. O.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/29/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note: --A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

(V) AAF 312.1

SUBJECT: Handling of Classified Documents.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				AFABI GHD/cg
1	AFABI	AFMAG	1942 4/1	1. In compliance with paragraph 8, Headquarters Office Instructions No. 20-2, Sept. 22, 1941, the following new personnel assigned to this Division are authorized to handle secret and confidential papers:

(ADMINISTRATIVE)

Miss Gertrude Hood	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno
Mrs. Phyllis E. Robison	CAF-2 Typist
Miss Theresa E. DiSesa	CAF-2 Typist
Miss Emma L. Roberson	CAF-2 Typist
Miss Helen P. Barrett	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno

(CURRENT INTEL.SECT.)

Miss Irene Lawson	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Miss Hazel Henderson	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
Miss Lois G. Grams	CAF-2 Jr.Clk- Steno.
Miss Eleanor Saba	CAF-2 Jr. Clk.-Steno.
Miss Marjorie D. Simms	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
Miss Dorothy Kaplan	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Miss Miriam Brooks	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.

(INFORMATIONAL INTEL.SECT.)

Mrs. Regina L. Carney	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
Mrs. Suzanne H. Davis	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist
Harvey H. Monk	CAF-7 Jr. Adm. Asst.
Mildred E. Olson	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Ruby M. Roberts	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist
Korinne Vriezelaar	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Charlotte F. Yoder	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist

(OPERATIONAL INTEL. SECT.)

~~Mrs. Anne Adams~~	~~On loan from WPA~~
Lois H. Atwood	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
James G. Batson	SP-5 Eng.Draftsman
James Brooks	CAF-7 Aerial Photo Inter.
Jean Bowman	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist
Audrey E. Cawthorne	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Bessie E. Cox	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist
Anna Ftak	CAF-4 Clerk-Steno.

Omitted at the direction of Miss Conn 4/2/42

Released APR 24 1942 AIR 20-2

(Do not use reverse side)

W-4071,AC, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. 1

Personnel

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note:--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

SUBJECT: Handling of Classified Documents.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1 Cont.	AFABI	AFMAG	1942 4/1	(OPERATIONAL INTEL. SECT. CON'T.)

Dorothy F. Gibson	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.
Carl C. Giarrizzo	SP-3 Jr.Eng.Draftsman
Dorothy E. Gehring	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Milton C. George	P-2 Asst. Airways Eng.
Kermit V. Gimmel	SP-3 Jr.Eng.Draftsman
Goldie Goldner	CAF-2 Jr-Clk.
Felix N. Hanschmann	SP-3 Jr.Eng.Draftsman
Claire E. Holmes	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist
Helen C. Jones	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.
Orrin E. Klapp, Jr.	P-1 Jr. Airways Eng.
Wm. J. Kafka	SP-6 Jr.Eng.Draftsman
John H. Langley	P-1 Jr. Econ. Analyist
Glenn M. Massie	CAF-3 Asst.Clk.-Steno.
Mellie R. Merchant	CAF-3 Asst.Clk-Steno.
Walter Mace	P-1 Jr. Airways Eng.
Robert C. Murray	SP-6 Sr. Eng. Draftsman
S. Edward Ralph	SP-6 Sr.Eng. Draftsman
Sydney J. Roth	CAF-2 Jr. File Clk.
Frances M. Runtz	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Clifton B. Shoemaker	P-1 Jr. Economist
Robert Sporn	CAF-2 Jr.File Clk.
Betty L. Weir	P-1 Jr. Econ. Analyst
Wm. W. Young	P-1 Jr. Economist

2. In addition the following personnel in the Administrative Section are authorized to sign for secret and confidential papers:

Miss Rhoda Cutshall	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Steno.
Miss Helen A. Smith	CAF-2 Jr.Clk-Typist.

for R.C.W.
C/A-2

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AC, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. 2.

17-2/1022

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

AAF 311.5

SUBJECT: Civilian Employees Handling Confidential Material

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS WHM:z
1.	AFMAG Pub. Div.	AFMAG	1942 4-1	1. The following is a list of additional civilian employees in the Reproduction Section, Publications Division, who handle confidential material: Doran, Donald A. multilith op. Garrison, Henry H. mimeograph op. James, Walter S. mimeograph op. King, John I. mimeo op. Liggins, Rudolph mimeo Lombard, Gordon F. mult. op. McClendon, Macklean mimeo Marcellino, Thomas R. mimeo Mason, James C. mimeo Peloquin, Henry P. mult. Richter, Richard C. mult. Robertson, Aubrey W. messenger Smith, Lawrence H. mult. Smith, Roger R. mimeo [illegible] L.B.C. Major, A.C. Pub.Div. [illegible] APR 1 1942 AIR AG-7

CONFIDENTIAL

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(Do not use reverse side) F-4091, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

[illegible] 283.4 (45)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] C. Date 9/20/76

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AAF 383.4 AFMAG

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualifications to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Doran, Donald A.	Multilith operator
Garrison, Henry H.	Mimeograph operator
James, Walter S.	Mimeograph operator
King, John I.	Mimeograph operator
Liggins, Rudolph	Mimeograph operator
Lombard, Gordon F.	Multilith operator
McClendon, Macklean	Mimeograph operator
Marcellino, Thomas R.	Mimeograph operator
Mason, James C.	Mimeograph operator
Peloquin, Henry P.	Multilith operator
Richter, Richard C.	Multilith operator
Robertson, Aubrey W.	Messenger
Smith, Lawrence H.	Multilith operator
Smith, Roger R.	Mimeograph operator

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
APR 2 1942
AAG

P. M. WHITNEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Air Adjutant General.

A 1/AS
A 2/AS
Intel S
A 3/AS
A 4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil Req
A Def
Bomb
Gr Sup
Base S
War O&M
Ind Ir
Tech S
Comm
Weather
Traffic
Photo M&C
Tech Insp
Pub Rel
Dir Pers
Mil Pers
Civ Pers
Surg
JAdvoc
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt Con
Adj Gen
Org Pl
Stat Pl
Leg Pl
Mat C
A S C
F C

383.4

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

W-6934 AF

Air AS 383.4 (35)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/28/74

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

RCL:HHH

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Major Nicholas S. Beckett.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel.

1. It is requested that an appropiate investigation be made of the following officers who are now assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, Office, Adjutant General, Army Air Forces:

King, K. W., Lieutenant
Magrath, J. S., 2nd Lieutenant
Stryker, T. B., 1st Lieutenant
Williams, T. J., 2nd Lieutenant
Wilbourn, A. E., Captain.

For the Commanding General:

R. C. LEWIS
Major, Air Corps
Actg. Asst. Adjutant General, A.A.F.

383.4 (34) B

Dispatched
APR 1 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCL									

AAF-39

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Air AG 383.4 (34) B

Rel. Hdl

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: ala/ac LC, Date 9/27/76

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CONFIDENTIAL

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention, Major Nicholas S. Beckett.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel.

1. The following personnel are assigned to work in the Cable Section, Classified Communication Division, Office of the Adjutant General, Army Air Forces. It is requested that an appropiate investigation be made with regard to the Status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Conley, Marian
Dunaway, Clifford H.
Dunaway, Edward G.
Fleck, Vera M.
McPadden, James M.

2. No report of the investigation of the following personnel has been submitted to this office:

Bogan, John D.
Chafin, Harriet E.
Estes, Irma
Mead, Dorothy M.
Nicolson, James
Tatum, Margaret
Thomas, Bobby B.
Van Horn, Dawaine H
Weeks, Helene
Wilcox, Jean.

383.4 (34) A

Dispatched
APR 1 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS For the Commanding General COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		RCL					R. C. LEWIS Major, Air Corps				
						Actg.	Asst.	Adjutant General, A.A.F.			

AAF-39

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Air AG 383.4 (34)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

MID 333.5

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1942

383.4

(34)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Attention: Major R. C. Lewis, Acting
Assistant Adjutant General, A.A.F.

Subject: Investigation of Personnel.

1. Reference memorandum to the A. C. of S., G-2, Attention: Major N. S. Beckett, dated April 1, 1942, above Subject.

2. In accordance with the directives contained in A. G. letter of February 3, 1942, transferring certain operative functions from the Military Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General, investigations of civilian employees, where in the interest of national defense an investigation appears necessary because of the release to them of classified information, were transferred to the Provost Marshal General. Therefore, request for investigation of Subjects listed in Paragraph 1 should be made to the Provost Marshal General.

3. Requests for investigation of Subjects listed in Paragraph 2 have been referred previously to the Provost Marshal General for investigation and report to you.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Group:

N. S. Beckett
N. S. BECKETT,
Lt. Col., Military Intelligence,
Chief, Investigating Branch.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Air Ab 383.4 (34)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

Subject: Key Personnel.

AFDIS
LN:il

1 AFDIS AFMAG 1942 3/26

It is requested that the following name be placed on the list of Key Civilian Personnel signing for and handling Secret, Confidential and Restricted Material:

Miss Irene E. Lang
818 Maritime Building - Extension 5909
1818 H Street, N.W 5908
Washington, D.C.

(home address)
1426-21st Street, N.W. - Dupont 9046
Washington, D.C.

/i/ CEH
DIS

383.4 (33)

FMM:lg

2. AFMAG AFDIS Attn: Chief Informat. Intellig. Section 1942 6/11

With reference to request in serial 1 above, the following is quoted from letter from Military Intelligence Division, G-2:

"2. An investigation has been conducted on Irene E. Lang by this Service and a copy of the report forwarded to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, October 23, 1941. The report was satisfactory."

Dispatched
JUN 11 1942
AAG [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Bud. Ac.	Sta-tistics	
									Asst. Air A.G.		

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1934
By [illegible] C, Date 4/27/76

AAF 383.4

PMW/gr
AFMAG

MAR 30 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Gardner, Mary D.	Ass't Clk-Stenographer
Furia, Celestine A.	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Lang, Irene E.	Ass't Clk-Stenographer

For the Commanding General:

P. E. [illegible],
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General, AAF

Dispatched
MAR 30 1942
AAG

383.4 (33)

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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AAF-29

CONFIDENTIAL

An as 383.4 (33)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NC, Date [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. .....

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF .....

(2) AF 311.5

SUBJECT: Authorization to Handle Secret and Confidential Mail.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS	AFAAP WGR:mdg
1	AFAAP	AFMAG	1942 3-26	The A-1 Division requests that Miss Mary D. Gardner and Miss Celestine A. Furia be authorized to handle secret and confidential mail. They are in the Executive Office of the Division and receive and dispatched mail.	
		[illegible] Mail MAR 27 1942 AIR AF-2		WGR WGR Exec. A-1	

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AC. Rev. 8/14/41

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CONFIDENTIAL

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MID 333.5

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL P. M. WHITNEY,
Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces.

Subject: Investigation of Employees Handling Classified Papers.

1. Reference is made to memorandum to the A. C. of S., G-2, Subject: "Routing and Handling of Classified Papers", dated March 30, 1942, AAF 383.4.

2. An investigation has been conducted on Irene E. Lang by this Service and a copy of the report forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, October 23, 1941. The report was satisfactory.

3. A loyalty check has been made concerning Mary D. Gardner, and no information of a derogatory nature has been discovered in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, or her home police at Billerica, Massachusetts. Her references all report favorably.

4. There is no record of Celestine A. Furia.

5. Under the directives contained in A. G. letter of February 3, 1942, concerning the transfer of certain operative functions from the Military Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General, investigation of this type of case is now conducted by the Provost Marshal General to whom request should be made.

For the Chief, Military Intelligence Service:

C. J. Barrett

C. J. BARRETT,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, MIS.

Hq. Army A
APR 6 1942
AAG Received

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Air Ab 383.4 (28)

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DOD Hrs.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL

AAF 383.4

AFMAG
PMW/pcp

MAR 23 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Callan, Frank A., Jr.	Messenger CU-3
Davis, Andrew T., Jr.	Messenger CU-3
Levy, Miss Irene	Jr. Clerk Typist

For the Commanding General:

P. M. WHITNEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General, A.A.F.

Dispatched
MAR 23 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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AAF-39

CONFIDENTIAL

Air AG 383.4 (32)

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AFA/MA LC; Date 9/27/74

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

(To be filed with correspondence)

Note.—A line will be drawn across sheet after action by each office concerned.

(2) AF 311.5

AFAMC-4-933

SUBJECT: List of Civilian Employees Handling Classified Data

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	DATA
1	AFAMC-4	AFMAG	3/20 1942	1. Submitted herewith are the names of three additional civilian employees handling secret and confidential data or material in the Materiel Command: Callan, Frank A., Jr. — Messenger Davis, Andrew T., Jr. — Messenger Levy, Miss Irene — Typist O. P. E. Commanding General, Materiel Command

RECEIVED
MAR 21 1942
AIR AG-7

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM

AG
G- WPD 384.3 Air Raid (3-20-42)

SUBJECT: Air Raid Alarms

Date March 24, 1942

TO	___C/S	___G-1	___G-2	___G-3	___G-4	___Air Staff	
	___TAG	___WPD	___USW	___ASW	___ASWA	___CG	_____ Army
	___AC	___BLP	___BOWD	___ExRA	___NGB	___CG	_____Army Corps
	___INF	___FA	___CAV	___CA	___ENGR	___CG	_____CA
	___ORD	___QMG	___CSO	___SG	___FIN	___CG	_____Dept
	___GHQ	___JAG	___CWS	___IG	___B/PR	X CG, AAF	

FOR:	___S/W directs	___Comment or concurrence	___Necessary action
	___Draft of reply	___Remark and recommendation	___Information for reply
	___Direct reply	___Inviting attention to	___ _____Ind. approved
	___Approved	___See notation of_____	___Primary interest
	___Disapproved	___Information	___Notation and return
	___File	___Consult_____	Noted_____

By: ___Spcl Msgr | ___Radio | ___Air Mail | ___Immed Action Ltr | ___Letter | _____

The memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, dated March 20, 1942, is returned herewith as the action requested in Par 3 has been completed. By confidential letter, file AG 384.3, Subject: Air Raids (3-1-42) MC-C, dated March 13, 1942, The Adjutant General informed the Commanding Generals, Eastern Theatre of Operations, Western Defense Command, and Army Ground Forces of the President's desires concerning press releases on air raid alarms.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

L. W. Miller
L. W. MILLER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Incl.
Memo CG, AAF to AC/S WPD
3-20-42 Subject: Air Raid Alarms

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855863 MAR 24 42

CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

Rec'd as 383.4

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1942

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION:

Subject: Air Raid Alarms.

1. Letter from The Adjutant General, dated March 13, 1942, to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, states that the President has indicated a desire to have all comments made to the Press with reference to air raid alarms, and reasons therefore, emanate from the Army.

2. Such Press Releases may be authorized by the Commanding General of the Army or Defense Command concerned, or he may delegate this authority to officers of the Interceptor Command in which the alarm has taken place.

3. It is requested that appropriate instructions be issued through your office to the Theater and Defense Commanders.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

E. P. Curtis

E. P. CURTIS,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Executive, Air Staff.

MAR 21 '42 AM
WPD 384.3 air Cards (3-20-42)

IN
WPD. WDGS

FOR DEFENSE
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

855803 MAR 24 42
CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

air as 383.4 (30)

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3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. .....

Tally No. AAF .....

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: AIR RAID ALARMS

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AAF/Dir Air Def	Chief of Air Staff	1942 3-16	AFRAD WFM:hg Recommend that the attached letter be forwarded by 1st Indorsement to The Adjutant General as follows: "Request that a communication substantially as follows be sent by immediate action letter to Theatre Commanders and Defense Command Commanders: 'The President has indicated a desire to have all comments made to the Press, with reference to air raid alarms, and the reasons therefor, emanate from the Army. 'You are authorized to make such press releases or to delegate this authority to subordinate commanders, particularly Interceptor Commanders, under your control.' " WFM WFM Executive Incl: Ltr. 3/13/42

Hq. Army Air Forces
MAR 19 ...
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Air AG 383.4 (30)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO

AG 384.3 Air Raids
(3-1-42)MC-C

LVH/emk-1705.

March 13, 1942.

SUBJECT: Air Raid Alarms.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1. The President has indicated a desire to have all comments made to the press, with reference to air raid alarms, and the reasons therefor, emanate from the Army. Such press releases may be authorized by the commanding general of the army or defense command concerned, or he may delegate this authority to officers of the interceptor command in which the alarm has taken place.

2. It is desired that you take appropriate action to carry out the President's desires as indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[signature]

Adjutant General.

MAR 14 '42 PM

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DIRECTORATE OF
AIR DEFENSE

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RAD
CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

Subject: Graham Lusk Ringer.

3rd Wrapper Ind.

Office Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Air Force Combat Command, Bolling Field, D. C., March 3, 1942. To: Asst. Chief of Air Staff, A-2, The Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Request that the inclosed MID Report be forwarded to Commanding Officer, 454th Ordnance Company (Avn).

/s/ Gordon B. Ringgold
GORDON B. RINGGOLD,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl.-
No change.

AAF/A-2
JMS-sh
(Wtrn. 3/7/42)

4th Wrapper Ind.

War Department, Hq., Army Air Forces, MAR 7 1942 To Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Recommend that a radio message be sent warning soldier's commanding officer of his record. The unit to which subject is assigned has been transferred to a location which would indicate this action.

For the Chief of Air Staff:

R. L. WALSH
Colonel, Air Corps
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2

1 Incl.
n/c

383.4 (24)

Dispatched
MAR 9 1942
AAG

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Air AS 383.4 (24) A-2/545

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
M.I.D.

MID 201
RINGER, Graham Lusk
(12-4-41) (2-25-41)

G2/CI
WPG

January 27, 1942

Subject: Graham Lusk Ringer
Address: 4 St. Luke's Place, New York City, New York.
Pres. Stat: 454th Ordnance Co. Avn. Savannah Army Air Base, Ga.

Summary of Information:

Information has been received in this Division that, just prior to his induction on April 28, 1941, subject arrived in New York from Manila and claimed to be a free-lance journalist. He claimed to have traveled to Manila from Bucharest by way of the Near East from India, Singapore, and Hongkong. Subject was reported to have lacked proper credentials and was evasive about his past history. He was under suspicion by government authorities in India as having contacts with Nazi agents.

This Division has been informed that the State Department reported that subject lived in Europe as a student from 1930 to 1935, and that since 1935, he has continued in Europe as a journalist and photographer. He was in Spain in the latter capacity during the Civil War and had been in the Balkans for most of the time since the outbreak of the present war.

Previous Distribution
FBI
2nd CA

Distribution:
Ordnance
Air Corps
4th CA
File

AC Dist.:
AFCC
2-File

Evaluation
-of course -of information

X reliable X

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DOD 5200.1

8 Jan. & 20 June 1974

By [illegible] I.C. Date [illegible]

C O P Y

MID 201 Ringer, Graham Lusk 1st Wrapper Ind. (D-105)

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, Bolling Field, D. C.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 3rd Air Force, National Guard Armory, Tampa, Florida.

1. Forwarded herewith for your information a copy of an MID report on Graham Lusk Ringer, 454th Ordnance Co. (Avn), Savannah Army Air Base, Savannah, Georgia.

2. This report was received from the Security Services Branch, O.C.A.C.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

/s/ Gordon B. Ringgold
GORDON B. RINGGOLD
Major, Air Corps,
Asst. G-2

3AF 201 2nd Wrapper Ind. (D-6)
Ringer, Graham Lusk (Enl.)

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIR FORCE, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Tampa, Florida, February 27, 1942. TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Air Force Combat Command, Bolling Field, D. C.

1. Noted.

2. In view of the fact that the 454th Ordnance Co. (Avn) has been assigned to a Task Force and is no longer under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Air Force, subject report is returned herewith.

/s/ Arthur A. Ruppert
ARTHUR A. RUPPERT,
Major, Air Corps,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

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A 2/545

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

JKD:[illegible]

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SECRET

MAR 9 - 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Subject: Albert Francis Birch

It is requested that the case of Albert Francis Birch be reconsidered in the light of information contained in the attached correspondence, and a decision rendered in this case.

FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

JOHN E. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Incl.
1 cy of ltr to Col. Marriner
fr. F. W. Loomis

Dispatched
MAR 9 1942
AAG

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

COPY

ED MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Cambridge, Massachusetts

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR
8 Jan. & 30 June 1953
By: ___ Date ___

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E01 1453, Sec. 3(E) or 5(D) or (E)
Authority OSD Letter 3 May 72
BY [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/75

March 3, 1942

Subject: Albert Francis Birch

To: Colonel A. W. Marriner
Room 4205, Communications Section
Munitions Building
Air Force, War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. According to information sent us by Dr. Irvin Stewart of NDRC the Provost Marshal General of the War Department has recently ruled with regard to Albert Francis Birch, a member of the staff of the Radiation Laboratory:

> "Report indicates man favors communist form of government. Recommend disapproval of this man on that basis....
>
> "Investigation of the subject has been completed and the case is closed."

2. Pursuant to this ruling I have, necessarily, excluded him from access to this Laboratory and its work.

3. Dr. Birch is one of the most able and effective members of the staff of this Laboratory and his loss will constitute a severe handicap to the "high-power" project which both the Army and Navy regard as extremely urgent. He joined the Laboratory in Group G, which is responsible for this project, on December 18, 1941. He very quickly became extremely valuable in handling problems of mechanical design and construction of our developmental set and the five sets under construction for the Army. This group is developing a high powered set for use at Deer Island and the results obtained with this unit should be of the greatest value to the Army for coast defense work and may also be applied to the solution of Radar problems arising in the Navy. The five sets under construction are particularly for Army use in coast defense at selected localities and for operational uses where the 268 and 270 are not suitable. Dr. Birch is responsible for the very critical design of the mechanical and RF plumbing features of these sets and no adequate substitute for him can be found within a reasonable time.

Dr. Birch is an Assistant Professor of Geophysics in the Department of Geology at Harvard, from which position he is on leave of absence to serve in this Laboratory. He has been personally well known for many years, as a colleague, by several members of our staff, including Professors K. T.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Bainbridge and J. C. Street of the Harvard Department of Physics. They believe him to be wholly honest, straightforward, reliable and loyal citizen of the United States and I, on the basis of a much shorter acquaintance, concur with their estimate. We were aware, at the time we asked him to join our staff that his political philosophy was pinkish, that, e.g., he was a member of the Teachers Union and had contributed an article of scientific philosophical nature to a Marxist quarterly called "Science and Society." We had discussed his social and political attitude with him quite frankly and had decided that it was innocuous.

5. It would be greatly appreciated if you could do anything to bring about a review of Dr. Birch's case to determine whether the evidence against him is sufficiently serious to justify the loss of his really great abilities. We feel that it would clearly be a real disservice to the war effort if Dr. Birch's services were made unavailable for reasons of insufficient weight.

/s/ F. W. Loomis

F. W. Loomis
Associate Director

FWL:g
Carbon copies to: Lieutenant A. B. Martin
Dr. L. A. DuBridge
President Karl T. Compton
Dr. K. T. Bainbridge

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DOD ltrs.
8 Mar. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Tally No. AAF. . . . . .

Note:--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

53 ② AAF 311.5

SUBJECT: Marie Keohane

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				AAF/A-1 CDP/mlc
1	AAF/A-1	AAG RECEIVED MAR 2 1942 AIR AG-7	1942 3/2	1. Request that Marie Keohane be placed on the list of the A-1 Division authorized to handle classified documents. WEO W. E. T. Exec/A-1

(Do not use reverse side)

W-4071,AC,Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

AviAy 383.4 (22)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

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PMW:HHH:lg
(Air AG)

MAR 5 - 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employee has been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The name of this employee has been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of this employee to determine her qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to her loyalty to the United States Government.

Keohane, Marie Ass't Clk-Stenographer

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

P. M. WHITNEY,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

383.4

22

Dispatched
MAR 6 1942
AAG

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HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		W.									

CONFIDENTIAL

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Julius John Hartmann, alias Reverend Julius Hartmann.

AG 201 Hartmann, Julius John
(3-7-42)MC 1st Ind. RPM/fdp-1705

War Department, A.G.O., March 17, 1942. -To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

The within-named subject is a civilian priest of the Catholic Diocese of Santa Fe and is in no way connected with the Army Chaplaincy. Evidently he has been permitted to minister to the personnel at the Army Air Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, by permission of the Commanding Officer. This matter should be brought to the attention of the local Commander who may, if he wishes, confer with the Archbishop of Santa Fe, Most Reverend Rudolph A. Gerke, Box 707, Santa Fe, New Mexico, who is Father Hartmann's religious superior.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. G. Brackinridge

Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cy of MID Rpt, 2-20-42.
(dupl. cy w/d.)

Subject: Julius J. Hartmann 2d Ind.
alias Rev. Julius Hartmann

Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., MAR 20 1942
To: Commanding Officer, Kirtland Field, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Inviting attention to preceding indorsement.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

E. P. CURTIS,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Executive, Air Staff.

Dispatched
MAR 20 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
copy of MID Rept 2-20-42

Air AD 383.4 (21)

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CENTRAL MAIL SECTION AAF

CONFIDENTIAL

Air AD 383.4 (21)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rts
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: JULIUS JOHN HARTMANN, alias
REVEREND JULIUS HARTMANN.

TO : The Adjutant General.

1. Attention is invited to the attached copy of Military Intelligence Division Report, dated February 20, 1942, regarding the above named subject. It is requested that Chaplain Hartmann be immediately relieved from any assignment with the Army Air Forces.

H.P. CURTIS
Lt. Col.
Chief of Air Staff

Dispatched
MAR 6 1942
AAG

Incl. (in dupl.)
Copy of MID Rpt. 2/20/42.

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Air AS 383.4 (21)

20 23092

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

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WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

WASHINGTON

MAR - 3 1942

SUBJECT: JULIUS JOHN HARMANN, alias
REVEREND JULIUS HARTMANN.

TO : The Chief of Air Staff.

1. The attached letter with inclosures is forwarded for signature.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

A. S. Barnhart

A. S. BARNHART,
Major, Air Corps
Assistant Executive

Hq. Army A[illegible]
MAR 2 1942
AAG Received

Incl.:
Proposed ltr. to AGO,
with attachment

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2D-230[illegible]

Air as 383.4 (21)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NC, Date 9/27/74

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AAF/A-2

rewritten 3/9/42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subj: Sgt. Royale L. Steele 8th Ind.

War Department, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
MAR 10 1942 To: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Tampa, Fla.

1. Further investigation discloses that there is insufficient evidence against this individual to warrant his trial by court-martial.

2. No action will be taken at this time beyond the measures of surveillance indicated by his records.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arnold

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
MAR 10 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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AAF-39

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COPY

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

AIR BASE HEADQUARTERS
BAER FIELD
FORT WAYNE, INDIANA

February 8, 1942.

Subject: Sergeant Royale L. Steele.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, New York.
(Thru: Commanding General, 3rd Air Force, Tampa, Florida)

1. On January 15, 1942 we received confidential telegram to the effect that the above mentioned subject was being transferred to Baer Field from Mitchel Field because of suspected subversive activities. We have never received any details in this matter and in order to plan our work, request that information file be forwarded to this office. We do not have information whether the form CI-R1 was completed upon this subject or not.

2. For information of those concerned, I have before me copy of the court action in which this man's name was legally changed to the above from Samuel A. Ruiz. I am informed also that this man has a warrant or a discharge from the U. S. Army under the above name of Ruiz. Request, if possible, this material be sent without delay so that proper surveillance may be placed upon the subject.

/s/ Ellsworth L. Olcott, Jr.,
ELLSWORTH L. OLCOTT, JR.
Major, Air Corps, (MI),
Base Intelligence Officer.

1st Ind.

Air Base Headquarters, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Ind., February 8, 1942.
TO: Commanding General, 3rd Air Force, Tampa, Florida.

1. Forwarded.

P.I.F.

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AAG/1293

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

3AF 201-Steele, Royale, L. (Enl.) 2nd Ind. (D-6)

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIR FORCE, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Tampa, Florida, February 12, 1942. TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Air Force, Mitchel Field, New York.

It is requested that all records and information concerning suspected subject be forwarded to the Base Intelligence Officer, Baer Field, in compliance with Part II, paragraph 15 of MID SR 30-45.

/s/ L. O. Shutt
L. O. SHUTT,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. C of S., G-2.

3d Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCES, E.T.O., and FIRST AIR FORCE, Mitchel Field, N.Y., 15 February, 1942. - To: S-2, Baer Field, Ft. Wayne, Ind.

1. The case of Sergeant Steele is not entirely free of the possibility that an injustice might have been done. However here are the facts in the case:

2. Lt. Col. Gordon Saville, Executive Officer of the I Interceptor Command, reported to General McDonnell, during the October Maneuvers that he advised not to take subject to New York, as he might do great damage. He was therefore left with the rear echelon at Mitchel Field.

Steele is not his original name. His original name is Italian. He is very efficient, in fact so efficient, that he aroused suspicisions. (Which is perhaps a sad commentary on the army). Major Bulger, present Executive Officer warned him to be careful about minding his own business, and to steer clear of classified matter.

In January he again aroused suspicisions, and he transfer was requested from II Corps Area. Corps Area delayed and finally sent an investigator. They found in Steele's trunk locker a complete list of pursuit pilots, a list of telephone numbers frequently called, and a complete T.& O. report (confidential). The operatives then asked to visit the home of his sister in Bayonne, N.G. (not sure of this), but before they arrived he called his sister, and any incriminating papers were gone. There was enough, however, at the sister's house to indicate possibilities of unauthorized disclosures.

Steele was then sent to Mitchel Field, and convinced Captain Holden, the CS officer there of his innocence that Holden offered to take him on in his own office until either vindicated or convicted.

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AAG/1293

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3d Ind - cont.

The mere fact, however that this man deliberately disobeyed a direct order not to take confidential matter away with him, was, in my opinion enough to warrant his transfer. The New York Information Center is actually operating against the enemy, and no chances can be taken.

In addition to the items enumerated above, Steele had also voluminous shorthand notes on secret Derax equipment, which he had been absolutely forbidden to keep.

3. I am requesting Captain Holden to forward his files to you, also, although I imagine they will reach you through Corps Area channels, which are the proper ones. The above report is merely an additional sidelight of the case as I remember it from my personal contact.

4. As another sad commentary on army efficiency, a buddy of Steele's, (next army serial number), by the name of Neuman is now being trained as a flying cadet, although equally involved. He simply appeared before the flying cadet board with three letters of recommendation, and without further reference to his present commanding officer, was sent off to school. What is being done about him is up to Bulger.

/s/ E. F. Koenig
E. F. KOENIG
Colonel, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-2

201-Steele, Royle L. 4th Ind.

Base S-2 Office, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana, February 19, 1942. TO: Commanding Officer, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana.

1. The statements contained in the last two sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 2 of 3rd Indorsement appear to indicate that this man could have been tried by court martial for disobedience of orders and for retaining in his possession documentary material which he was forbidden to keep.

2. It is recommended that a more thorough investigation be made of his activities prior to transfer to Baer Field and that in case sufficient evidence can be obtained he be tried by court martial.

/s/ Ellsworth L. Olcott, Jr.
ELLSWORTH L. OLCOTT, JR.
Major, M.I.,
Base S-2.

201-Steele, Royle L. 5th Ind.

Air Base Headquarters, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana, February 19, 1942.
To: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Tampa, Florida.

1. Recommendation contained in 4th Indorsement concurred in.

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/s/ Douglas B. Netherwood, Colonel, AC
Commanding. AAG/1293

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3AF 201-Steele, [redacted] 6th Ind. (D-9)

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE, Tampa, Florida, February 22, 1942.
TO: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, Bolling Field, Washington.

It is recommended that a thorough investigation of this case be made as promptly as possible.

For the Commanding General.

/s/ H. M. Jones
H. M. JONES,
Lieut. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

ACC 383.4 (2-8-42) 7th Ind. (D-50)

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, Bolling Field, D. C., Feb. 28, 1942
TO: The Chief of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Recommend that this case be forwarded to G-2, War Department, for further investigation and decision as to whether court-martial is warranted.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ T. A. Fitzpatrick
T. A. FITZPATRICK
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

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DOD Ltr.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF/A-3/120 . . . . . .

311.5

SUBJECT: Classified Correspondence

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS AAF/A-3 JSI-1f
1.	AAF A-3	AAF AAG	1942 2-26	Mr. Carl DeGraw is authorized to receipt for and carry classified mail and documents pertaining to the A-3 Division. for H.S.V. C/A-3

RECEIVED
FEB 26 1942
AIR AG-7

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W-4071 AC, Rev.8/14/41

Page No.

Ai[illegible] 383.4 (19)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs. 4/4
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

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PMW/HHH/pop

AAF 383.4

(Air AG)

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

383.4 (19)

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employee has been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The name of this employee has been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of this employee to determine his qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to his loyalty to the United States Government.

DeGraw, Carl Clerk-Stenographer

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

~~See R & R for from A-3 authorization attached to file copy of similar letter to A.G.O. 2/26/42~~ ~~HHH~~

Dispatched
MAR 3 1942
AAG

P. M. WHITNEY,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		N.									

AAF-39

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Air AG 383.4 (19)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
Sig. [illegible] LC; Date 9/25/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

Note.-- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

③AAF 311.5

SUBJECT: Handling of Classified Documents.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				AAF/A-2 JTM/cg
1	AAF A-2	AAF AAG	1942 2/24	1. In compliance with paragraph 8, Headquarters Office Instructions No. 20-2, September 22, 1941, the following new personnel assigned to this Division are authorized to handle secret and confidential papers:

Miss Mildred Allen	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
" Henrietta Altman	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
Mrs. Jane B. Botsford	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
Miss Miriam Brook	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
" Verne F. Brown	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
Mrs. Suzanne H. Davis	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
Miss Norma L. Flynn	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
" Charlotte Grassman	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
" Lucretia Hoag	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.
" Regina K. McKenna	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
" Bette A. Margelis	CAF-2 Jr.-Clk.-Steno.
" Eleanor Phelps	CAF-4 Clk.-Steno.
" Rose J. Scileppi	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
" Ernestine Snell	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
" Helen A. Smith	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist

2. In addition the following personnel are authorized to sign for secret and confidential papers:

Miss Mary E. Conry	CAF-7 Admin. Asst.
Miss Norma L. Flynn	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
Miss Adelaide Eppler	CAF-3 Asst. Clk. Steno.
Miss Helen Jackson	CAF-3 " " "
Miss Regina McKenna	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Typist
Miss Ethel Midkiff	CAF-2 Jr.Clk.-Steno.

RECEIVED
FEB 25 1942
AIR AG-6

R.L.W.
C/A-2

(Do not use reverse side) AAC/1070 V-4071, AC.Rev.8/14/41

Page No. Air 16 383.4 (18)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

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PMW/GY/pcp

AAF 383.4

(Air AG)

FEB 27 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

383.4 (18)

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Allen, Mildred	Jr. Clk.-Steno.
Altman, Henrietta	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Botsford, Jane B. (Mrs.)	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Brook, Miriam	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Brown, Verne F.	Jr. Clk.-Steno.
Cagle, Madeleine Le Blanc	Asst. Clk.-Steno.
Davis, Suzanne H. (Mrs.)	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Flynn, Norma L.	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Grassman, Charlotte	Jr. Clk.-Steno.
Hoag, Lucretia	Jr. Clk.-Steno.
McKenna, Regina K.	Jr. Clk.-Typist
Margelis, Bette A.	Jr. Clk.-Steno.
O'Donnell, John M.	Jr. Clerk
Phelps, Eleanor	Clerk-Steno.
Scileppi, Rose J.	Jr. Clk.-Typist

Dispatched
FEB 27 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION

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AAG/1070

Air AG 383.4 (18)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Smith, Helen A. Jr. Clk.-Typist
Snell, Ernestine Jr. Clk.-Typist

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

P. M. WHITNEY,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

AAG/1070
Ass'ts 383.4 (18)

~~SECRET~~ Gray

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

PMW:HHH:lg
(Air AG)

FEB 24 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Josephine Hunter	Jr. Clk-Typist
Hope Gilfix	Sr. Clk-Stenographer
Elizabeth Myer	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Frances Ross	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Mrs. Tyler	Jr. Clk-Stenographer
Nathaniel Tracey	Messenger CU-3

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

Dispatched
FEB 24 1942
AAG

P. M. WHITNEY,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

~~SECRET~~ Gray
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

383.4
(16)

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-50

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] IC; Date 8/27/76

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-2
WJT-eh
(Wtrn. 2/27/42)

Subject: Operation of the Counter Subversive System in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps.

1st Ind.

War Department, Hq., Army Air Forces, the Air Corps. MAR 2 1942 To: Chief of

1. In conformity to A.A.F. Regulations No. 45e1, January 23, 1942, it is directed that the necessary action be taken immediately to comply with par. 2, basic letter, not only for offices located in the Munitions Building but also for all elements of this headquarters and of the office, Chief of the Air Corps, located in Washington or vicinity which do not have proper coverage under the Counter Subversive System.

2. Current instructions regarding the operation of the Counter Subversive System should be obtained from the appropriate branch of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arnold

383.4 (15)

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Hq. Army Air Forces
FEB [illegible]
AAG RECEIVED

Dispatched
MAR 2 1942
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HEADQUARTERS — ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	WJT			WJT							

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AAF-30

Air Ass 383.4 (15) AAG/879

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] NC Date: [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON MNE/cc-1705

In reply
refer to AG 383.4 (2-18-42)MSC-B

February 20, 1942

SUBJECT: Operation of the Counter Subversive System in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps.

TO: Chief of the Army Air Forces.

1. It has been called to the attention of this office that during the period from September 1941, to January 31, 1942, no reports have been made to the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division by your office as directed in the current instructions for the operation of the Counter Subversive System.

2, In regard to the offices located in the Munitions Building, it is directed that necessary action be taken to insure that proper coverage regarding counter subversive activities be provided and that current instnuctions regarding the operation of the Counter Subversive System be immediately complied with.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ R. G. Hersey
Adjutant General

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AAF/A-2
Air Intel
MWM
2/13/42

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

February 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Assistant Secretary of War for Air

SUBJECT: Mr. Frederick V. Field

1. On or about January 5, 1942, the attention of this office, Operations Unit, A-2, was directed to the above individual by the New York Office of G-2 (Colonel Frederick Sharp), as being qualified for employment in the Operations Unit, on either a civilian or commissioned status. Mr. Field was at that time interviewed in New York by an officer of the Operations Unit who was there at the time on other business. The results of the interview indicated that he was a candidate of sufficient promise to justify further interviews by the chief and other officers of the Operations Unit.

2. Mr. Field, accordingly, was interviewed in Washington by several officers of the Operations Unit on or about January 8, 1942. It was suggested that he make application for Civil Service appointment in order that his services might become available at as early a date as possible, and also apply for a commission, in which capacity his services would be of greater value later on.

3. About January 25th, Colonel Sharp of the G-2 New York Office informed one of the officers of the Operations Unit by telephone that he had received an adverse report on Mr. Field from an ONI investigator (Mr. Peterkin). Mr. Peterkin was put on the phone and stated that Mr. Field's connections were unfavorable; that his contacts with the Japanese in New York, with Mr. Joseph Lash, and with the Communist Party were such as to render his employment in intelligence activities undesirable. The Civilian Personnel Division was, accordingly, requested to withdraw Mr. Field's application.

383.4 (14)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	EC			WP							

AAF-39

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A-2/14058

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4. Mr. Field inquired by telephone on about February 10, 1942, as to the status of his application and was informed that it had been disapproved by higher authority. He appeared in person at the Operations Unit on February 13, 1942, and was informed that this office was not in a position to give out any information; that if he wished further information it would be necessary for him to investigate the matter himself. He stated that he would make an effort to see Mr. Lovett and Mr. Curry and try to get the matter straightened out.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

E. P. Curtis,
Lieut. Col., Air Corps,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
FEB 16 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	EPC			WB							
				MWF:jc							

AAF/A-2 Air Tel.

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DOD dir. 5 Nov. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NCD, Date 9/6/76

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G2/CI
NSB

MID 333.5 12-29-41

January 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Air Adjutant General,
Room 2015, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
Attention: Major Raymond C. Lewis

SUBJECT: Employees to be employed in the Cable Section.

1. Following are names of proposed employees in the Cable Section taken from your list of 12-29-41 on whom this office has been unable to secure Personal History Statements (Form 8) from the files of Civilian Personnel:

BOGAN, John David
NICOLSON, Leslie James
THOMAS, Bobby
VAN HORN, Duaine H.
WEEKS, Helene

2. Further investigation in the above cases cannot be made unless your office will forward Personal History Statements in each of the cases.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch.

DAVID G. [illegible],
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, C.I.B.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 201. 12-29-41
Kwolek, Tillie

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dirs.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

January 27, 1942

383.4 (12)

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Air Adjutant General,
Room 2015, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
Attention: Major Raymond C. Lewis

Subject: KWOLEK, Tillie (Miss)
(To be employed in the Cable Section)

1. The name of subject has been searched in the files of the Military Intelligence Division but the search failed to reveal any information of a derogatory nature.

2. Inquiries have been directed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the home police of the subject. Should any information of a derogatory nature be learned from these inquiries your office will be immediately notified.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch,

David G. Erskine

DAVID G. ERSKINE,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, C.I.B.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

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WWD/GY/pcp

AAF 383.4

(Air AG)

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Attention: Lieutenant Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Cavaness, Allen CU 3
Smith, Letha Jr. Clerk-Stenographer

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

Dispatched
FEB 7 1942
AAG

WILLIAM W. DICK,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Air Adjutant General.

383.4 (11)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A A G	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Statistics	
		[illegible]									

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Air AG 383.4 (11)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-2
MEC-[illegible]

FEB 6 - 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Counter Intelligence Section,
Office Chief of the Air Corps.

SUBJECT: Investigation of civilian personnel.

1. The civilian personnel listed below have been assigned to the A-2 Division, and it is requested that an investigation be made as to their suitability to handle "Secret" and "Confidential" papers.

Mrs. Jessica Rainwater Scardon
[illegible] W. Brandywine - Phone: Ch [illegible]
Home Address: El Paso, Texas

Mr. Jack L. Mannering
1611 Riggs Place - Phone: none
Home Address: Montezuma, Indiana

Miss Miriam Brock
[illegible] Parsons St., N.W. - Phone: Ce [illegible]
Home Address: [illegible] Ftelley Ave,
Bronx, New York

[illegible] 1942

MARTIN F. SCANLON,
Brigadier General, U.S.Army,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	[illegible]	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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Air AG 383.4 (12)

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECLASSIFIED

File No.

Tally No. AAF

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Counter-Intelligence and Security Matters.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AAF A-2	AAF AAG	1942 1/17	AAF/A-2 GWN-eh 1. It is recommended that the attached subject paper be published as an order to the Chief of the Air Corps. MFS C/A-2 GWN 1 Incl. Drft of order to be published to OCAC.
				Memo for record: Following action coordinated with: Lt. Col. L.S. Smith Executive Ass't to Ch. Air Corps Lt Col E.P. Curtis Sec. Air Staff Gen. Scanlon - A-2 A.A.F. 45-1 is explicit in delegating counter intelligence duties to OCAC - This is unnecessary repetition. Chief of Air Corps is to aware of his responsibility. All recommend that this not be sent. J.M.S.

Air Ob 383.4 (9)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (reverse side) W-4071, AC.Rev.8/14/41

Page No. Air Ob 383.4 (9)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AlnTwe LC; Date 9/27/76

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 350.09 Counterintelligence

January 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF, A-2:

Subject: Counterintelligence and Security Matters.

1. Paragraph 2 of the attached draft of a memorandum for the Chief of the Air Corps is susceptible of the interpretation that certain functions of Corps Area Commanders have been delegated to the Chief of the Air Corps. AAF Regulation 45-1, July 18, 1941, was more specific as follows: "those duties (and) those data normally pertaining to Military Intelligence, and purely pertinent to the Headquarters Army Air Forces". It is believed that the responsibilities assigned by the AAF Regulation quoted are those which would be performed by commanding officers of units stationed within a Corps Area, and that they concern counterintelligence operations among the military personnel assigned to the unit named.

2. Paragraph 3 does not clearly indicate that the liaison required in the counterintelligence system outlined above should be maintained with the Corps Area G-2.

3. In addition to the counterintelligence matters already discussed, the Chief of the Air Corps has additional responsibilities as the Chief of a Supply Arm. Sabotage, espionage, signal communication security, plant protection, are of concern to the Chief of a Supply Arm as they affect the procurement program. Distinction must be made, however, between the fields of jurisdiction of intelligence agencies of the Government. Disaffection and subversion among military personnel, civilians employed directly by the War Department and all persons employed on a military reservation are within the jurisdiction of the War Department. All other civilians, except for those occupying a corresponding relationship with the Navy Department, are within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is believed that all matter after the last comma of paragraph 4 of the attached memorandum should be eliminated, and that the remainder of the paragraph should be rewritten to show the relationship of the War Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the counterintelligence matters listed.

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4. In view of the fact that counterespionage measures and responsibility therefor are generally Confidential, it is believed that a similar classification should be given to the attached memorandum.

GWN

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

John T. Bissell

J. T. BISSELL,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch.

Enclosures:
Memo fm. Office of Chief
of AAF to Chief of AC
(11 copies)
Cpy. AAF Reg. No. 45-1

Noted
EPC

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jun. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MATTERS

Delegation of Routine Duties to
the Chief of the Air Corps.

1. MR-2 Section V - Par. 11-d charges the Corps Area Commanders with the coordination of all counter espionage operations within the territorial limits of their commands.

2. Under the provisions of A.A.F. Reg. No. 45-1, the routine duties or functions normally pertaining to counter intelligence and purely pertinent to the Headquarters Army Air Forces are delegated to the Chief of the Air Corps.

3. Under the provisions of these directives liaison with G-2 in all matters relating to Army Air Forces security intelligence is the responsibility of the Chief of the Air Corps.

4. Security matters include sabotage, espionage, disaffection, subversive security, loyalty, discipline, signal communication security, troop and supply movement, visitors at plants and Army Air Force installations, labor plant protection and generally all related domestic counter intelligence matters at Army Air Force installations, including civilian contract on non military reservations.

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Should be a Non Order 94

Classified Matter

929.2 AC

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

JAN 7 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of the Air Corps.

Subject: Counter Intelligence and Security Matters.

1. MR-2 Section V - par. 11-d charges the Corps Area Commanders with the coordination of all counter espionage operations within the territorial limits of their commands.

use ① ~~2.~~ Reference is made to AAF Regulation 45-1 dated July 18, 1941 delegating routine duties or functions of counter intelligence matters to the Chief of the Air Corps.

3. Under the provisions of these directives liaison with G-2 in all matters relating to Army Air Forces security intelligence is the responsibility of the Chief of the Air Corps.

4. Security matters include sabotage, espionage, disaffection, subversive security, loyalty discipline, signal communication security, troop and supply movement, visitors at plants and Army Air Force installations, labor plant protection and generally all related domestic counter intelligence matters at Army Air Force installations, including civilian contract on non military reservations.

For the Chief of The Air Staff

E. P. Curtis

E. P. CURTIS

Lt. Col., Air Corps

Secretary of the Air Staff

Should be AAF order as it also affects AFCC + GHQ

Air OD 383.4 (9)

and in those CI cases where the 7 13 1 is involved.

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DOD Dirs
E.O. 11652 & 20 June 1974
By dlm/jwc NC, Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

WWD/GY/pcp

AAF 311.5

(Air AG)

JAN 20 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. ATTENTION: Lt. Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

1. With further reference to memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated December 27, 1941, the following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

2. It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Barfield, Marie	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Berryman, Maryella	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Biggers, G. Elaine	Clerk
Biskup, Hilda S.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Blinderman, Anne	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Brown, Lorna	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Campbell, Marie	Clerk-Stenographer
Cashman, Frances H.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Connolly, Elisabeth J.	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Cutshall, Rhoda J.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Davis, Jessie E.	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer
Davis, Maxine E.	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Duchay, Mrs. F. G.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Duncan, Anna Belle	SP-4
Ebbeskotte, Pauline	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Eppler, Adelaide	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Fallon, Elisabeth	Clerk-Stenographer
Ferris, Gladys	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Fischer, Rita	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Folts, Mary L.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Goldberg, Gertrude	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Harvey, Norma	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Hascom, Daniel B.	Draftsman
Heine, Edwina George	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Hughes, Grace E.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Ryde, Mrs. Evelyn	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer

3823.4 (6)

Received
JAN 20 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES — CO PY FOR INFORMATION
A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-WD A-Opns Historical Section

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Kane, Norman E.	Spec. Consultant
Lail, Marjorie L.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Langtry, Anna M.	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer
Leimbach, Ruth	Clerk-Stenographer
McKinney, Wilma	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer
McMichael, Jane	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Mabie, Ida M.	Clerk-Stenographer
Miller, Marion	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Minott, Margaret	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Peterson, Harriet	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Robbins, June	Jr. Clerk-Typist
Shefferman, Lucille	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Smetana, Magdalene	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Trostle, Marcella M.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Vanderbeck, Kathleen	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Votaw, Mary M.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Wade, Virginia	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Walburn, Mrs. V.	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer
Waterman, Robert D.	Senior Administrative Asst.
Wilcox, Mary L.	Asst. Clerk-Stenographer

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

WILLIAM W. DICK,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Air Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
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AAF-29

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Certain civilian personnel have been added to this Division in the last few days. Because of the peculiar nature of the work carried on by this Division, it is impossible to avoid secret and other classified documents coming into their hands, if any use is to be made of them at all.

It is, therefore, requested that these persons be thoroughly and exhaustively investigated as soon as possible, in order that information of the highly secret plans formulated by this Division may not fall into unauthorized hands.

The names, addresses and phone numbers of the personnel mentioned are as follows:

Room	Name	Home Address	Home Phone
3106	Rita Fischer	YWCA, 614 E Street, N.W.	NA 1080
3106	Mary L. Foltz	235 2nd St., N.E.	TR 9090
3106	Marcella M. Trostle	YWCA, 614 E Street, N.W.	NA 1080
3106	Edward George Heine	314 Garland Ave., Takoma Park, Md.	SH 6483-J
3107	Anna Belle Duncan	1825 Kalorama Road, N.W.	CO 0379
3106	Grace E. Hughes	1724 Park Road, N.W.	CO 6330

Mr. Heine is being transferred from The Adjutant General's Office where he is as yet on a temporary basis. The other five are probation appointments.

H. L. George

H. L. GEORGE,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A-WPD.

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Air AG 383 4 (6)

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311.5

SECRET

CLASSIFIED

NWD/ GY/ rj

311.5 (Air AG)

December 27, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. x 371.19 ATTENTION: Lt. Bradford.

Subject: Routing and Handling of Classified Papers.

The following Civil Service employees have been designated by this headquarters as authorized to handle secret and confidential correspondence. The names of these employees have been submitted to The Adjutant General in accordance with established policy.

It is requested that an appropriate investigation be made with regard to the status of these employees to determine their qualification to handle secret and confidential correspondence and as to their loyalty to the United States Government.

Wesley D. Gray, Adm. Asst.
Edward M. Judge, Jr. Adm. Asst.
Richard P. Doolam, Jr. Adm. Asst.
George Younger, Jr. Adm. Asst.
James H. Dobson, Sen. Clk.
Carole Ingram, Clk.
June McDermott, Asst. Clk. Typ.
Tillie Bwulek, Jr. Clk. Typ.
Richard P. Dale, Asst. Clk. Typ.
W. Stanley Miles, Clk.
Jean E. Plympton, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Ruby D. Jackson, Asst. Clk.
Sarah Root, Jr. Adm. Officer
Nona M. Cox, Sen. Clk.
Catherine M. Clarke, Sen. Clk.
Gwendolyn J. Kipkead, Asst. Clk-Typ.
Pauline Gergovits, Asst. File Clk.
Maxine McKenzie, Jr. Clk-Typ.
Mary E. Westwater, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Hettie Dowtin, Jr. Clk-Typ.
Mary Conry, Jr. Adm. Asst.
Helen Jackson, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Ethel M. Midkiff, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Eleanor Paulsen, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Nola G. Weber, Clk-Steno.
Mary Sue Barger, Clk-Typ.

Iris M. Pinton, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Mary W. Buckley, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Elsie Drachenberg, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Merriel Russ, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Charles B. Thornton, Prin. Stat.
M. Virginia Erwin, Asst. Stat.
Thomas B. Markey, Clk-Steno.
Roberta Grable, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Mary E. Harris, Clk-Steno.
Lasette F. Irvin, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Bessie C. Libertucci, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Florence S. Penn, Sen. Clk.
Mary M. Robbins, Asst. Clk.
Dorothy J. Rohrman, Clk-Steno.
Ann C. Russell, Sen. Clk-Steno.
Margaret M. Murray, Clk-Steno.
Joseph S. Imirie, Jr. Adm. Asst.
Mary E. Bryant, Clk-Steno.
Lillian Ferrero, Jr. Clk-Steno.
T. L. McPherson, Jr. Adm. Asst.
Joseph P. Smyth, Clk-Steno.
Edna M. Adkins, Adm. Asst.
Miriam Dahlman, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Virginia Campbell, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Iris Turnquist, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Louis [illegible] Clk, Sr. Clk.

Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	AAG	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Sta tistics	

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AAF 39

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Mary S. Hughes, Jr. Clk-Typ.
June M. Williams. Jr. Clk-Steno.
Dorothy M. Wilson, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Ann Morse, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Jacqueline Knight, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Helen Griffiths, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Jean Turner, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Mary L. Ontko, Jr. Clerk-Steno.
Edna F. Martin, Jr. Clk-Typ.

Mary N. Hockaday, Jr. Clk-Steno.
John E. McClure, Jr. Clk-Typ.
Astrid E. Anderson, Asst. Clk-Steno.
Santa Lauri, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Amelia Alexander, Clk-Steno.
Phyllis M. Sitler, Jr. Clk-Steno.
Robert I. Carter, Prin. Clk.
Flora M. Edmundson, Jr. Steno.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

Sgd. Wm. W. Dick

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
DEC 30 1941
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES		COORDINATION									
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	AAG	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Stra tegics	
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AAF 39

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Washington

MID 201.
LUMSDEN, Reid Radford

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ala/HW LC: Date 9/27/76

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Air Adjutant General,
Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

Subject: LUMSDEN, Reid Radford.

1. After a review of all reports and records available to this office, there appears to be no evidence which indicates any reason to question the loyalty of the person named below:

NAME: LUMSDEN, Reid Radford, Capt., ASN 0-400875.

PRESENT STATION: AAF, Room 2012, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

BORN: January 17, 1911, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

2. Reference is made to memorandum from your office, dated May 27, 1942, subject, Investigation of Personnel. The information upon subject in the files of this Division indicates that further investigation will be unnecessary.

For the Chief, Military Intelligence Service:

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 1 1942
AAG RECEIVED

John T. Bissell
JOHN T. BISSELL
Colonel, General Staff
Asst. Executive Officer, MIS

383.4 (5) B

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[redacted]

I.S. #103
Air AG 383.4 (5) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 & 30 June 1974
By OSD/JCS LC, Date 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

May 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Subject: Investigation of Personnel.

1. Adverting to my request for an F.B.I. investigation of certain of my office personnel, submitted December 29, 1941 (Colonel Beckett) subject as above, and to paragraph 3 of your reply of January 13, 1942, MID 333.5 12-29-41, Subject: Proposed employees in the Cable Section, request is made for a final report in the case of Captain, then Lieutenant, Reid Radford Lumsden.

2. This headquarters has assumed that, owing to the absence of a positive report on Captain Lumsden, he is innocent of wrongdoing. However, his position calls for knowledge of highly secret correspondence by cable and radio. Also, since recurrent inspections by myself and other officers of this headquarters, charged with security matters, bring to light the correspondence with your office, it is in the interest of both the government and the individual that the matter be officially cleared up. The latest inspection this month was made by the Air Inspector of this staff; resulting in a report thereon to me, and at my suggestion to the Chief of the Air Staff; all of whom concur in the need for definitive action.

3. a. Captain Lumsden is held in high confidence by Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, A.C., by whom he was brought to active duty. He was on duty for about six months with the Intelligence Division, Office Chief of the Air Corps, on highly secret work before his transfer to this office. His immediate superior there, as well as the Chief of that division, was cognizant of the incident which lead to Captain Lumsden's surveillance by the F.B.I. My original request for a report therefrom, to which your memorandum was the reply, was made when I was informed by the subject himself of the incident.

b. My intention to request this as a final report on the subject was mentioned to Mr. Joseph Gerson of the F.B.I. by me last week; and it is possible he may have initiated steps toward the final clearing up of the bureau's investigation.

Chief of Staff	Secretary Air Staff	Inspector	Supply	Training	Operations	Intelligence	Personnel	Materiel
		MAY 27 1942 AAG						

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

File HRS

3823-4

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/22/76

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 333.5 12-29-41

January 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Air Adjutant General,
Room 2015, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
Attention: Major Raymond C. Lewis

SUBJECT: Proposed employees in the Cable Section.

1. The following names have been searched in the files of the Military Intelligence Division:

DeAGRO, Alfred S., First Lieutenant
LUMSDEN, Reid Radford, Second Lieutenant
MacDONALD, Harold, Captain
SLIKER, Roland Ellsworth, First Lieutenant
SIEBERT, Walter Arthur, Captain
DRUMWRIGHT, Arthur Lewis, Captain
LEWIS, Charles Raymond, Major

2. The search failed to reveal any information of a derogatory nature on any of the above names with the exception of Reid Radford Lumsden and Harold MacDonald.

3. Reid Radford Lumsden is under investigation as a result of a letter from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which reported him to be associated with persons suspected of Nazi activity. Preliminary report does not indicate anything but casual relationship with this element, however the investigation is continuing.

4. Harold MacDonald has listed several arrests on his personal history statement of which your office is cognizant.

5. Inquiries have been directed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the various police departments in the cities where the above named have resided in the past. Should any information of a derogatory nature be learned from these inquiries your office will be promptly notified.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch,

David G. Erskine

DAVID G. ERSKINE,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, C.I.B.

file
RCL.

383.4(5)

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By: Ala/aw LC; Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 333.5 12-29-41

January 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the Air Adjutant General,
Room 2015, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
Attention: Major Raymond C. Lewis

SUBJECT: Proposed employees in the Cable Section.

1. The following names have searched in the files of the Military Intelligence Division:

DAHLKE, Josephine Frances (Mrs.)
DALE, Richard
MARTIN, Edna Pearl
TURNER, Jeane Marie

2. The search failed to reveal any information of a derogatory nature on any of the above named persons.

3. Josephine Frances Dahlke was investigated at the request of the Office of the Chief of Air Corps and the investigation is now completed.

4. Richard Dale was investigated at the request of the Adjutant General's Office and the investigation is now completed.

5. The following names were listed on your communication of 12-29-41 on which we have insufficient information with which to conduct a proper investigation. Personal history statements have been requested from the Civilian Files and when these are received investigations will be initiated:

BOGAN, John David
KWOLEK, Tillie
NICCOLSON, Leslie James
THOMAS, Bobby
VAN HORN, Dwaine H.
WEEKS, Helene

6. Inquiries have been directed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the police departments of the various cities where the persons in paragraph 1 have lived. Should anything of a derogatory nature be learned from these inquiries your office will be further advised.

For the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch,

David G. Erskine

DAVID G. ERSKINE,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Executive Officer, C.I.B.

File
RCL

DECLASSIFIED

2-1

383.4 (5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ain/ms LC, Date 4/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-2
JTM/cg
Date written
1/13/42

BASIC COMMUNICATION - Memo fr A-2 to AC/S, G-2, 1/2/42, subject: "Investigation of Civilian Personnel".

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, HQ., ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington, D. C., JAN 14 1942
To Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1. A list of the personnel desired investigated, with the data requested, will be furnished you by the Intelligence Division, Counter Intelligence Unit, Office Chief of the Air Corps.

2. This personnel will handle confidential and secret documents.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

Dispatched
JAN 15 1942
AAG

MARTIN F. SCANLON,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A-2.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
				MTS							
				JTM							

DECLASSIFIED

AAF-39

CONFIDENTIAL

File Copy - A-2 Division Air Ag 383.4 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

MID 333.5 Air Staff 1st Ind. G2/CI
JL

G-2, W.D.G.S., Washington, D. C., January 6, 1942. To: A. C. of S., A-2, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

1. This Division will undertake investigation of all persons within its jurisdiction upon request.

2. It is requested that the names, together with all the personal data supplied by the Civilian Personnel Division Form 3 of all persons whom it is desired to have investigated, be forwarded to this Division.

3. It is also requested that with respect to each person a specific statement be made of the type of work upon which he or she is engaged.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 4/27/76

For the Acting A. C. of S., G-2:

JOHN T. BISSELL,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

AAF/A-2
MFS:vbw

January 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Subject: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

1. It is requested that the necessary steps be taken to have a check made to determine background and loyalty of all civilian personnel on duty with the Air Staff.

2. It is also requested that this matter be expedited.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

MARTIN F. SCANLON,
Brig. General, U. S. A.
Ass't. Chief of the Air Staff, A-2

Dispatched
JAN 3 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
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AAF-39

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Air AA 383.4 (A)

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2D 18104

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

File No.

Tally No. AAF

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AAF A-2	OCAC Counter Intell	1941 12/18	AAF/A-2 MCC/ekp 1. The civilian personnel listed on inclosure have been assigned to this Division and it is requested that an investigation be made as to their suitability to handle "Secret" and "Confidential" papers. 2. It is also requested that this matter be expedited, and if it can not be handled promptly through F.B.I. that you secure funds necessary to hire personnel to conduct this investigation and to complete the investigation previously requested on all personnel assigned to the Air Staff, Headquarters Army Air Forces. MFS M.F.S. C/A-2. 1 Incl. List of personnel.
2	OCAC Intel. (2D)	AAF A-2 (Attn: OCAC)	1941 12/24	OCAC/AC-2D CRB/aw 1. In order to comply with the directive in Item #1, it is requested that the attached proposed directive to the Chief of the Air Corps be signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. CRB for JGT C/Intel. Incl.#1 withdrawn and investigations requested. Incl.#2 - prop.directive to C/AC
3	OCAC Exec	AAF C/AS	12/24	In view of the fact that this is a function normally charged to G-2, request either that attached letter be signed or the direction contained in item 1 above be confirmed by your office. MEG Cadt. Exec.

C-4002 12/24 (2a2)
C-7045 12/19 (2a2)

CONFIDENTIAL

(Use reverse side)

Page No. A-2 Air AS 383.4 (4)

F-4071, AC.Rev.8/14/41


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COUNTER INTEL. SEC., OCAC.
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INTELLIGENCE BR. OCAC
DEC 24 1941 PM
EXECUTIVE OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: Personnel Investigations

TO: The Chief of the Air Corps

1. All personnel of the Army Air Forces must be of unquestioned loyalty and trustworthiness and free from disaffection and all other subversion toward the United States Government.

2. The Chief of the Air Corps is responsible for establishing the loyalty and trustworthiness of all Army Air Forces personnel. He is directed to activate immediately such organization as is necessary to discharge this responsibility.

Distribution:
1 - CG, AFCC

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CONFIDENTIAL

C-4002 12/24 (2a2)
Incl 2 12/24
2D18 104

Ai AS 383.4 (4)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

AAF/A-2
GWN-ch

(Wtrn. 12/30/41)

Subject: Investigation of Civilian Employees

383.4 (3)

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington, D. C.
DEC 31 1941 To The Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.

1. Request following information pertaining to subject applicants basic communication.

a. Name of Applicant.

b. Present and Permanent address.

c. Date and Place of Birth.

d. Employment Record for past five years.

By Command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

Disbursed
DEC 31 1941
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES JOINT DISPOSITION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	Major, Asst. MCD	A.G.D. Air Inspector	Budget	Statistics General	
				[illegible] GWN							

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AAF-39

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND
AIR SUPPORT SECTION
Army War College, Washington, D. C. (V-85)

December 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, BOLLING FIELD, D. C.

Subject: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1. Due to the fact that this section is located at the Army War College it is necessary to maintain a separate file section, rather than utilize the files of the AFCC.

2. With the large amount of "Confidential" and "Secret" material processed by this section it is necessary to designate two typists in connection with this processing.

3. It is therefore requested that the past records and histories of Misses Edith W. Kincheloe and Bernice J. Lieberman, on duty with this section, be investigated with a view of determining their suitability as typists in connection with "Secret" and "Confidential" correspondence.

/s/ Wm. E. Lynd,
WM. E. LYND,
Colonel, Air Corps.

ACC 330 (12-10-41) 1st Ind. (D-28)

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, Bolling Field, D. C., Dec. 12, 1941
To: The Chief of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. This headquarters has no investigative personnel or facilities.

2. Request that the investigation requested in basic communication be made.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ C. W. Russell
C. W. RUSSELL
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

HEAD[illegible] FORCES

DECLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2D 18245

File No. .....

Tally No. AAF .....

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AAF A-2	OCAC Intell	1941 12/18	AAF/A-2 HDB/ekp 1. For necessary action. MFS M.F.S. C/A-2. 1 Incl. Ltr from AFCC - Air Support Sec. - above subject - to CG, AFCC - 12/10/41 w/1st Ind.
2.	OCAC Intel. (2D)	AAF A-2	1941 12/23	OCAC/AC-2D TSC/mb 1. Unnecessary delays will be encountered by investigators unless the following information is furnished with all requests for personnel investigations: a. Name of Applicant. b. Present and Permanent Address. c. Date and Place of Birth. d. Employment Record for past five years. 2. Request that the above information, pertaining to the applicants mentioned in basic communication be furnished this office. 1 Incl.: n/c. CRB for J.G.T. C/Intel.

RECEIVED DEC 22 1941 AND FILE UNIT

RECEIVED DEC 23 1941 CLASSIFIED MAIL AND FILE UNIT

DECLASSIFIED

C-8021 12/22 (2-2)

A 12/22 (3-B)

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CONFIDENTIAL

A-21 [illegible] AC.Rev.8/18/41

Air 2 383.4 (3)

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DEC 22 41 PM

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INTELLIGENCE DIV. OCAC.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND
AIR SUPPORT SECTION
Army War College, Washington, D.C.

(V-85)

December 10, 1941

MEMORAMDUM TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, BOLLING FIELD, D. C.

Subject: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1. Due to the fact that this section is located at the Army War College it is necessary to maintain a separate File Section, rather than utilize the files of the AFCC.

2. With the large amount of "Confidential" and "Secret" material processed by this section it is ecessary to designate two typists in connection with this processing.

3. It is therefore requested that the past records and histories of Misses Edith W. Kincheloe and Bernice J. Lieberman, on duty with this section, be investigated with a view of determining their suitability as typists in connection with "Secret" and "Confidential" correspondence.

/s/ WM. E. LYND,
WM. E. LYND,
Colonel, Air Corps.

ACC 230 (12-10-41) 1st Ind. (D-28)

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMBAT COMMAND, Bolling Field, D. C., Dec. 12, 1941
To: The Chief of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. This headquarters has no investigative personnel or facilities.

2. Request that the investigation requested in basic communication be made.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ C. W. RUSSELL
C. W. RUSSELL
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD

Box 113 Folder 3

MILITARY

DECIMAL

SAS 383.4

(66-582)

383.4 (1-end)

INSCLASSIFIED
DOD Nos.
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By [illegible] Date 3/31/75

SAS 383.4

Cases 66 to 1000
1462

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/21/75

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Security Check on Private Daniel Revzan.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence — 14 April 1944

Deputy Chief of Air Staff, and, — 1
Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force — WFP/jc/74730

1. It is desired that this office secure a complete security check on Private Daniel Revzan, ASN 32827164. The duties contemplated for this enlisted man will be of a cartographical nature and will necessarily bring him into contact with Top Secret papers and material. He will also have some guard responsibility for the Army Air Forces Strategic Operations Room. It is for these reasons that such security check is requested.

2. Private Revzan is now assigned to Headquarters, Headquarters Squadron, Bolling Field.

W. F. PICKARD
Major, Air Corps

Dispatched
15 APR 1944
AAG

FILE

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Air AS 383.4 (182)

SAS 383.4

Case 161

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/31/75

AFSAS JSC/es, 2246
24 Aug. 44

DECLASSIFIED

24 AUG 1944

Honorable Sinclair Weeks

United States Senate

My dear Senator Weeks:

Further reference is made to your communication of August 3, 1944, addressed to General Arnold, concerning Aviation Cadet Gunter G. E. Trost, ASN 13123425, Selman Field, Louisiana.

Cadet Trost is now eligible and will enter Advanced Navigation School on September 5, 1944.

Your interest in the Army Air Forces personnel is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

RAY L. OWENS
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

Dispatched
24 AUG 1944
AAG

DECLASSIFIED

Copy for office of sig.

AFPMP-7-1M on
Major David C Nale, AC
Rm 2780 Gravelly
Ext 3300

DECLASSIFIED

18 AUG 1944

Trost, Gunter G. E.

Honorable Sinclair Weeks

United States Senate

My dear Senator Weeks:

This will acknowledge your communication of August 3rd, addressed to General Arnold, enclosing a letter from Aviation Cadet Gunter G. E. Trost, ASN 13123425, Selman Field, Louisiana.

Complete information regarding his status is not available in this headquarters. Therefore, a report has been requested, and as soon as it is received and reviewed you will be advised concerning the action possible in Cadet Trost's case.

The inclosure to your letter is returned as requested.

Sincerely yours,

Signed

RAY L. OWENS
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

1 Incl.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 Opy Comeback
1 Opy Genl Owen's Office
1 Opy AFOLS
1 Opy AFSAS
1 Opy Comeback to AFSAS

DECLASSIFIED

Dispatched
18 AUG 1944
AOG

GG 6431
SS #247

UNITED STATES SENATE

August 3, 1944

CLASSIFIED

Respectfully referred to

General Henry H. Arnold
Army Air Forces

with thanks for such favorable consideration as the communication herewith submitted warrants, and for a report thereon, to accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of

Sinclair Weeks

USS

DECLASSIFIED

Somerset Avenue
Segregansett, Mass.
July 31, 1944

DECLASSIFIED

Honorable Senator Weeks
Senate of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

August 5, 1942 I graduated from Temple University in Philadelphia. September 27, 1942 I enlisted in the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet--this took place in the Customs House in Philadelphia. At that time I was told there would be a wait of several months until I was called to active duty. During that time I worked as a timekeeper for the Defense Plant Corporation building a Naval Air Assembly Plant for Budd Co. at Bustleton, Phila., Pa.

February 3, 1943, I was called to active duty. Spent three weeks at Miami Beach, Fla. in basic training. March 1 I arrived at Mt. Union College, Alliance, Ohio; here we followed a more or less general college curriculum. Completed the course and left June 19 for the Cadet Center, San Antonio, Texas. First, went to the classification sector, where, by tests, it is determined whether you become a pilot, bombardier, or navigator. I chose navigation; however, even though I qualified, the need for pilots seemed great at that time, as practically everyone was made pilot. I was classified pilot. The group I was with left for Pre-Flight in San Antonio August 1, Class 44-D. About one week before my class was due to ship I was called in and asked for a translation of my birth certificate. I was born in Germany, came to this country when I was two years old. I took my birth certificate to the San Antonio Office of Censorship where I had it translated, then had it notarized. I returned this to the field in time to make the shipment, however, my name was not on the shipping orders. I had to wait in classification one month extra, then was sent to Pre-Flight with Class 44-E on Sept. 1, 1943.

Graduated from Pre-Flight and on Nov. 1 was sent to Primary Flying School at Fort Stockton, Texas. At the end of Nov. was eliminated from pilot training due to flying deficiencies. As I had qualified for navigation in classification I was told I would continue my cadet training studying navigation. Was sent to Aerial Gunnery School at Harlingen, Texas, on Dec. 3. Completed the course and graduated Jan. 29, 1944. Was then sent to Selman Field, Monroe, La., for a four weeks refresher course before starting advanced navigation. I graduated from this course March 8, 1944. The whole class went on a ten day furlough, started advanced navigation school March 18. My name was not on the shipping list. I was told that my record from one of the service schools I had been in was incomplete, and until it was complete I could not start school again. Hence, I was sent home again until April 6. When I came back they told me my record was still incomplete, and I could still not start school until it was complete.

This is the way things have stood since March 8 to the present. I am still being told my records are incomplete. I have tried all possible methods to have some action taken on my case, but all seemed to have been of no avail. The navigation class I was in graduated July 3, and I have not even yet started advanced school. Since I was stopped from going to school I have been on details at the field, and have been given furloughs. I have even talked to the Inspector General from Randolph Field, but that does not seem to have helped much.

DECLASSIFIED

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I have been told that my records are being held up in Washington, and that until some action is taken there, there is nothing I can do. The only thing I can imagine that is holding me back is my German birth. I passed all examinations and tests successfully, was not held up for military reasons, so the only cause I can see is my German birth. I am hoping t is matter can be cleared up, as I have been waiting almost five months now, and see no quick solution. I have the feeling this whole thing has been held up by red tape somewhere along the line; am wishing it could get straightened out soon so I could move on and out, and see some action.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Gunter G. R. Trost
13123425
Sq. 2 AAFPS
Selman Field
Monroe, La.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Officers designated as Top Secret Security Control officers.

AC/AS, Intelligence (Counter Intelligence Division) 7 April 1944

Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force 1

HHH/bm/2246

It is requested that the following-named officers be added to the list of Top Secret Security Control officers for the handling of papers pertaining to the Twentieth Air Force:

Colonel T. A. FitzPatrick
Lt. Colonel H. H. Hewitt

H. H. HEWITT,
Asst. Adjutant General,
Twentieth Air Force.

Dispatched
7 APR 1944
AAG

AAG 383.4 (181)

DECLASSIFIED

FILE

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

CONFIDENTIAL

aab 383.4 (181)

16—[illegible]-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigation of Kenneth E. George, WOJG, W-2130451

AACS 333.5 1st Ind. TIS:ls

Hq AAF Army Airways Communications System Wing, Asheville, N. C., 28 February 1944.

To The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C., THRU The Commanding General, Washington 25, D. C., Attn: Air Communications Officer, Attn: Lt Col Wilmer L. Allison

Forwarded.

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ Francis T. Fogarty
FRANCIS T. FOGARTY
Maj, Air Corps
Deputy Asst Chief of Staff
Intelligence

2 Incls n/c

AAF 333.5 (201 George, Kenneth E.) 2nd Ind. HHH/[illegible]

Hq. Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., 7 March 1944.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

2 Incls n/c

Dispatched
7 [illegible]
AAG

383.4 (180)

File
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CONFIDENTIAL

COPY FOR AIR AG

Air Ao 383.4 (180)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5 Jan. 4, 1953
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH ATLANTIC AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS AREA
- GRENIER FIELD, MANCHESTER, N. H.

18 February 1944

SUBJECT: Loylaty Investigation of Kenneth E. George, WOJG, W-2130451

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Channels.

This is to certify that Subject whose photographs are attached hereto has been investigated in compliance with the provisions of confidential letter TAG 311.5 (2-12-43) OB-S-B-M, Subject: Identification Photographs and Policy with Respect to Qualifications of Personnel Authorized to Perform Duties in Connection with Secret and Confidential Cryptographic Systems of the Army dated 15 February 1943, and amendment file AG 311.5 (5-5-43) OB-S-B-M, same Subject, dated 8 May 1943, and found to meet fully the requirements of these letters.

For the AREA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL OFFICER:

/s/ Forrester H. Kildow
FORRESTER H. KILDOW
Captain, Air Corps
Area Communications Security Officer

2 Incls:
1 Photo (front view)
1 Photo (Profile view)

C
O
P
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DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rrs.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AN/BW LC; Date: 8/3/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Loyalty Investigation of Kenneth E. George, WOJG, W-2130451

Air Adjutant General 4 Mar 1944

Air Communications Officer, Communications Systems Division 1
Lt Troxell/jrm/71246

Forwarded.

1 Incl
Ltr dtd 18 Feb 44
w/1 ind & 2 incls

WILMER L. ALLISON
Lt Col, Air Corps

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 5/31/75

Investigation of Lt. John Kovencz, Jr., 0289192, AC

AC/AS, Intelligence, Counter Intelligence Division — 6 March 44

Air Adjutant General — 1

ND/lmg/2246

1. Request that First Lieutenant John Kovencz, Jr., 0289192,A.C., be investigated for the handling of very highly classified material.

2. This officer reported to this headquarters per special order #60, paragraph 5, Headquarters Technical School, AAF Technical Training Command, Chanute Field, Illinois, 29 February 1944. He was born 4 January 1905 in Hungary.

N. DEUTSCH
Major, A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adjutant General

383.4 (179)

Dispatched
6 [illegible] 1944
AAG

File
Ci 6 Mar 44

Cy for Air A.S.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Air AS 383.4 (179)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 8/31/75

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CONFIDENTIAL

HHH/hm/2246

AAF 333.5 10th Ind. (AFMAG)

Hq., Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 2 March 1944.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1 Incl.
(2 Photographs).

SUBJECT: Security Investigation - John E. Morrison, Jr. (Capt) 0 453872.

Dispatched
2 MAR 1944
AAG

383.4 (178)

File
Ci 2 Mar 44

cy for air a. g.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Air 383.4 (178)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 8/31/75

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigation

AACS 333.5 9th Ind TIS:ls

Hq AAF Army Airways Communications System Wing, Asheville, N. C., 23 Feb 1944

To The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C., THRU The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Air Communications Officer, Attn: Lt Col Wilmer L. Allison

Forwarded in compliance with par 6 of letter from the Adjutant General dated 24 December 1943, AG 311.5 (16 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M.

For the Commanding Officer:

FRANCIS T. FOGARTY
Maj, Air Corps
Deputy, Asst Chief of Staff
Intelligence

Incl n/c

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1978
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

Loyalty Investigation

Air Adjutant General 29 Feb 1944

Air Communications Officer, Communications Systems Division 1
Lt Frank/jrm/71246

Forwarded.

1 Incl
Ltr dtd 9 Nov 43
w/9 Inds & 1 incl

WILMER L. ALLISON
Lt Col, Air Corps

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Aln/mo LC; Date: 8/11/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Investigations, Employees of Message and Cable Division

AC/AS, Intelligence 29 Feb 44

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (General Hall) 1

RHH/ee/72141

1. In order to take care of the flow of messages to and from this headquarters, it is often necessary for the Message and Cable Branch, Administrative Services Division, Management Control, to use personnel as replacements who have not been investigated. A request for investigation of this personnel is made immediately upon their reporting to the Message and Cable Branch.

2. Since the work involved in the Message and Cable Branch is entirely with classified material, it is directed that the highest type priority be given the requests for investigation of this personnel.

Dispatched
29 FEB 1944
AAG

WILLIAM E. HALL
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Air Ab. 383.4 (177) a.

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Air Ab 383.4 (177) a

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Investigations, Employees of Message and Cable Division

AC/AS, Personnel 29 Feb 44

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (General Hall) 1

RHH/ee/72141

1. Due to the great necessity for security in the Message and Cable Division, Headquarters, AAF, it is desired that no personnel in the future, either officer, enlisted or civilian, be assigned to that division who have not previously been investigated as to loyalty and integrity.

2. A recent instance arose whereby an officer was assigned to the division and upon investigation there was found to be some question as to his suitability for such a position.

3. This will not serve to operate against those employees who are presently assigned to the office. Intelligence is being requested to expedite the investigations of those employees already assigned to that office.

Dispatched
29 FEB 1944
AAG

WILLIAM E. HALL
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Air AS. 383.4 (177) B.

File
c. 29 Feb 44

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Air AS 383.4 (177) B

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Refer To: 2D-79505
ATTENTION:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AFICO

FOR VICTORY BUY WAR

1 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General W. E. Hall

SUBJECT: Max Paul Schottenhamel, Cpl., ASN 39570382

Attached is Summary of Information which served as the basis for loyalty clearance of subject enlisted man.

1 Attachment
S/I re subj
dtd 31 Jan 44

THOMAS D. WHITE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

AAG 383.4 (176)

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Air As 383.4 (176)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

ATTENTION:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Washington, D. C.
(Place)

31 January 1944
(Date)

SUBJECT: MAX PAUL SCHOTTENHAMEL, Cpl., ASN 39570382

Summary of Information:

Information contained herein was obtained from reports of investigation made by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department; the final report being received by the Counter Intelligence Division, AAF, on 31 January 1944.

Subject was born 25 January 1906 at Munich (Bavaria), Germany. He entered the United States in 1938 and filed the preliminary form for Declaration of Intention 24 August 1939.

Subject is the husband of the former Mary Louise Pike Smith of Chicago, a wealthy divorcee, and a citizen of the United States. Until his enlistment in the Army of the United States, 10 April 1943, Subject maintained his residence in Beverly Hills, California.

On 8 December 1941, Subject was apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Beverly Hills, California, as a dangerous enemy alien and interned at Fort Lincoln, Bismarck, North Dakota. He was released unconditionally therefrom by order of the Attorney General dated 17 February 1943, after due consideration of his case.

Subject has been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division. Checks of acquaintances and neighbors at Beverly Hills revealed no derogatory information except from one neighbor who is characterized as overly suspicious. Further checks of Subject's conduct since his enlistment in the Army reveal nothing of an adverse nature.

Subject appears to be a well educated, cultured gentleman, having attended Universities of Munich and Erlangen, and having obtained the degree of Doctor of Economics and Doctor of Law. He also attended the London School of Economics for one year. He is fluent in English, German and French, and is at present employing his talents in the Library, Administrative Services Division, Office of Management Control, under the

Evaluation
-of source - of information
B 2

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DECLASSIFIED

Summary of Information: (continued)

supervision of Lt. Col. R. Finkelhor, who is his good friend and sponsor. His entire military record as reflected in the file is as follows:

10 April 1943	- Enlisted at Los Angeles, California
17 April 1943	- Sent to Fort Douglas, Utah
28 October 1943	- Transferred to Headquarters Squadron, AAF Bolling Field Sub-Base, Gravelly Point, D. C., for assignment and duty in the Administrative Services Division, Office of Management Control, Headquarters, AAF, from the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland
3 November 1943	- Promoted to Private First Class
22 November 1943	- Promoted to Corporal
10 December 1943	- Reported as recommended for grade of Sergeant

Consistently throughout the course of the investigations made, it appears that Subject has voiced his animosity to Hitler and the Nazi Regime in Germany. This attitude is consistent with his religious convictions which are strongly Roman Catholic.

In brief, Subject may be characterized as a sincere and intellectual refugee who on all occasions has voiced his appreciation for being in this country and for being a member of the Armed Services.

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Refer To: 2D-79505

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/31/75

AFICO

1 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General W. E. Hall

SUBJECT: Max Paul Schottenhamel, Cpl., ASN 39570382

Attached is Summary of Information which served as the basis for loyalty clearance of subject enlisted man.

1 Attachment
S/I re subj
dtd 31 Jan 44

THOMAS D. WHITE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

Personnel Security Questionnaire Investigation of Miss Mary Gardner.

AC/AS, MM&D - Attention: Air Provost Marshal. 17 Sept. 1943

Chief of Air Staff. 1
JRB/omc/73681

1. There is attached the Personnel Security Questionnaire of Miss Mary Gardner, an employee in the office of the Chief of Air Staff.

2. It is directed that the usual Security investigation be made and that a report of findings be reported to this office.

Dispatched
17 SEP 1943
AAG

J. R. BREWER,
Major, A.C.,
Asst. Secretary, Air Staff.

1 Incl.

AAG 383.4 (174)

File
cc 18 Sept 43

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

Air AS 383.4 (174)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

Personnel Security Questionnaire - Miss Louise Brownlee Wilson.

AC/AS, Personnel. Attention: Civilian Personnel Div. 17 Sept. 1943.

Chief of Air Staff. 1
JRB/cmc/73691

1. There is returned herewith the Personnel Security Questionnaire of Miss Louise Brownlee Wilson, a former employee of this office.

2. It is requested that the Questionnaire be placed in the proper file.

Dispatched
17 SEP 1943
AAG

1 Incl.

J. R. BREWER,
Major, A.C.,
Asst. Secretary, Air Staff.

Ads 383.4 (174)

File
ci 18 Sep 1943

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Air AS 383.4 (174

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Counter Intelligence Reports

TO: AC/AS, Intelligence

14 June 43

FROM: Air Adjutant General.

Comment No. 2
HHH/gk/5791

Proposed letter has been prepared for publication by this office, and redraft thereof (marked Incl. #2) is referred to you for approval.

2 Incls.
Added 1 Incl.
Incl. #2 - Redraft.

H. H. HEWITT,
Lt.Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst.Air Adjutant General.

Dispatched
15 JUN 1943
AAG

File
cc 15 June 43

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION	[illegible]					

Air ab 383.4 (173)

10—20243-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

1st Lt. Edward C. Crimmins, O-902392

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

Air Adjutant General

May 3, 1943

3
JBC:JB 5789

Transmitted as a matter pertaining to your jurisdiction.

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Col., A. G. D.
Asst. Air A. G.

3 Incls. n-c

Dispatched
MAY 3 1943
AAG

air AS 383.4 (169)

File
ci 5/4/43

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Air AS 383.4 (169)

☆ 16—[illegible] U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: Abr/AD LC, Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

TO: The Air Adjutant General

FROM: Air Provost Marshal

DATE APR 29 1949
COMMENT NO. 2
AFDPM/PSB-2086
GMC/gc 78687

1. Proposed 7th Indorsement for approval and signature.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - m/c.
Incl. 2 - m/c.
Incl. 3 added - 7th Ind.

H. G. REYNOLDS,
Colonel, Air Corps.

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AAF File

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 2/3/75

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

79234

8-354
2B-66706

1st Lieutenant Edward C. Crimmins 0-902392.

1. Air Provost Marshal
2. The Air Adjutant General

APR 24 1943

1

Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

AFABI-CD/4
LPH/lid-71139

1. Reference paragraph 4, second indorsement, inclosure 1. Under date of March 20, 1943, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, made the following recommendation to Military Intelligence Service relative to subject officer:

> "Inasmuch as Subject is disqualified from receiving instruction in the operation and maintenance of Air Forces equipment involving classified materiel, and inasmuch as Subject has been investigated as an espionage agent, it is recommended that he be transferred out of the Army Air Forces in accordance with letter AG 014.311 (11-3-42) OB-S-B-M, November 9, 1942, subject: Disposition of Potentially Subversive Personnel."

Under date of April 8, 1943, Assistant Executive Officer, Military Intelligence Service disapproved transfer out of Army Air Forces for reasons set forth in inclosure 2. Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, accepts Military Intelligence Service disapproval of subject's transfer out of Army Air Forces as a clearance of subject as to loyalty and concurs in such clearance.

2. Reference paragraph 2, fourth indorsement, inclosure 1. Issuance of Certificate of Eligibility under provisions of Army Air Forces Regulation No. 35-13, dated January 23, 1943, necessary to effect complete clearance of subject, is within the jurisdiction of The Air Provost Marshal.

2 Incls:
Incl 1 - Ltr to CO, BTD Basic Trng Center #7, AAFTTC, Atlantic City, N.J., w/6 inds, fr subject.
Incl 2 - Memo for DIS fr MIS, April 8, 1943.

A. W. BROCK, JR.
Colonel, G. S. C.

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CONFIDENTIAL

2D-66708

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Washington

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By 4/4/80 LC; Date 3/21/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MID 201
CRIMMINS, Edward C.

April 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AAF:

Subject: Lt. Edward C. Crimmins

1. Investigation of Lt. Edward C. Crimmins is now complete. The only adverse information disclosed by this investigation concerns this officer's business dealings wtih the Japanese from 1937 to 1939. A close scrutiny of these dealings indicates that at that time they did not constitute disloyal acts. It is therefore considered unjust to weight them in the light of succeeding events. There is also considerable information to the effect that Crimmins is a loyal American. This latter information seems to outweigh any derogatory facts.

2. For the above mentioned reasons the recommendation contained in the case summary from your office dated March 31, 1943, that Crimmins be transferred out of the Army Air Forces, is disapproved.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

/s/ L. R. Forney

L. R. FORNEY,
Colonel, General Staf Corps,
Asst. Executive Officer, MIS.

COPY

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

TO: The Air Adjutant General

FROM: Air Provost Marshal

DATE APR 29 1943
COMMENT NO. 2
AFMPM/PRB-[illegible]
GMC/gs 78[illegible]

1. Proposed 7th Indorsement for approval and signature.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - n/c.
Incl. 2 - n/c.
Incl. 3 added - 7th Ind.

H. G. REYNOLDS,
Colonel, Air Corps.

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Air Ad 383.4 (169)

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

M/L. 3818

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

Indiscreet Talk

AC/AS Personnel (Attention: Major Bean, Room 2622, Gravelly Pt.

April 22, 1943

Air Adjutant General

JBC/ir 5790

383.4 (162)

1. Administrative admonition has been signed and is attached. It is requested that it be delivered to Colonel Buhrmaster by you.

2. Attention is invited to paragraph 2, Comment No. 5 above, with respect to the reassignment of that officer.

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A.G.D.
Ass't. Air Adjutant General

5 Incls
n/c

Dispatched
APR 22 1943
AAG

File
cc 4/23/43

Dispatched
APR 22 1943
AAG

Air A.G. File Copy

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Air Adjutant General and
Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Personnel - IN TURN.

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

DATE 20 April 43

COMMENT NO. 5
MAL/mdg/5265

1. For signature on attached administrative reprimand and delivery of same to the addressee who may be reached thru Major Gerald Bean, Room 2622, AAF Annex #1, Gravelly Point.

2. In this connection Major Bean is directed to issue the necessary orders for reassignment of Lieut. Colonel Buhrmaster.

3. General Kroner (MIS) has been advised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (General Hall) of the action taken in this case and has indicated same is satisfactory thereby closing the case.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Incl. n/c

Air AG 353.4 (142)

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DECLASSIFIED

AFAJA EHS jac mha
Col Croghan 5753

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AG/mm LC, Date 3/21/75

April 22, 1943

SUBJECT: Administrative Admonition.

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Buhrmaster, C.M.P., Headquarters, Army Air Forces

1. A report received at this Headquarters alleges that on March 13, 1943, while you were a passenger on a train enroute from New York City to Washington, D.C., you engaged in a conversation appertaining to the existing military situation, and during the course thereof made certain indiscreet remarks.

2. The circumstances attendant upon the incident, as well as your previous excellent record, have induced the decision to accept your explanation and categorical denial of the adverse advices received. You are admonished, however, to employ extreme caution and restraint in the public discussion of any aspect of the war or military affairs.

By command of General ARNOLD:

FRED C. MILNER,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Air Adjutant General.

Copy furnished AFAHI - CD/1 JCM Rm 2734 AAF Annex

OFFICE SYMBOL	1 Air AG	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	JSC					
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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16—20242-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943

AFAJA-EHS/JAC/mha
Lt. Col. Croghan,
Ext. 5753

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: 3/31/75

DRAFT OF PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE ADMONITION

SUBJECT: Administrative Admonition.

TO: Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest G. Buhrmaster, C.M.P.,
Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

1. A report received at this Headquarters alleges that on March 13, 1943, while you were a passenger on a train enroute from New York City to Washington, D. C., you engaged in a conversation appertaining to the existing military situation, and during the course thereof made certain indiscreet remarks.

2. The circumstances attendant upon the incident, as well as your previous excellent record, have induced the decision to accept your explanation and categorical denial of the adverse advices received. You are admonished, however, to employ extreme caution and restraint in the public discussion of any aspect of the war or military affairs.

By command of General ARNOLD:

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl. 7

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1955
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

AFABI-CD/1
JCM/ad 72307
Apr. 15, 1943
2D-65681
4-16-43

SUBJECT: Indiscreet Talk.

TO: E. G. Buhrmaster,
Lieut. Colonel, C.M.P.,
Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

1. It has been reported to this Headquarters that on March 13, 1943, while a passenger on a train enroute from New York City to Washington, D. C., you engaged in conversation concerning military affairs, and that you made certain indiscreet remarks which were overheard by members of the public.

2. The circumstances surrounding this incident, as well as your previous excellent record, have been taken into consideration, and it has been decided to accept your explanation and denial of the specific charges made. You are, however, hereby reprimanded for discussing in public matters concerning the conduct of the war which were susceptible to misinterpretation by civilians.

3. You are cautioned to exercise the utmost discretion hereafter, and to refrain from discussing in a public place military affairs of even a general nature.

Not Used

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lieut. Wilson Company

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir
E.O. Dec. 1972
By Alice Beal NARS Date 2/4/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Admonition of Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Buhrmaster, A. C.

TO: Air Adjutant General (Attn. Colonel John B. Cooley, A.C.) DATE April 22, 1943

FROM: Air Judge Advocate COMMENT NO. 1
JAC/mha/5753

1. Since the categorical denials by Lieutenant Colonel Buhrmaster of the indiscreet statements imputed to him by the unnamed informant have proven acceptable to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, it is believed that an administrative admonition, as suggested in Comment No. 2, should be utilized in the present case in preference to a reprimand. This view gains support from the additional circumstance that the adverse information, as disclosed to the Military Intelligence authorities, in legal effect, was nothing more than hearsay.

While both administrative admonitions and reprimands are authorized as corrective measures not related to disciplinary action taken pursuant to Article of War 104 (M.C.M. 1928, p. 103), the reasonable doubt as to whether the subject officer made any indiscreet statement prompts the belief that an administrative admonition would serve as the better remedial agent.

2. There is attached a proposed administrative admonition which, if approved, may be addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Buhrmaster.

7 Incls:
#1-Memo 3-27-43 to CAS frm Gen Strong, G-2
#2-Memo for Lt Col Boberg, dtd Apr 6, 1943
#3-Memo for Maj L. P. Hutchinson, dtd Mar 31, 1943
#4-Statement of Lt Col Buhrmaster, w/2 atts.
#5-Proposed letter
#6-Comments No. 1,2,3,4 & 5 of R&R
#7-Proposed admonition

E. H. SNODGRASS,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Air Judge Advocate.

4/22/43 DC/AS (Col. Lutley) concurs in attnd. JSC

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1924
By: [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

TO: Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

DATE 9 April 43

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 3
MAL/mdg/5265

For preparation of an admonition to Lieut. Colonel Buhrmaster in accordance with your recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 preceding item.

Dispatched
APR 10 1943
AAG

File
cc 4/10/43

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Incl. n/c

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: aS 383.4 (162)

cc: aS 383.4 (162)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/21/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Indiscreet Talk

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

March 29, 1943

WEN:JT 5046 1

1. For immediate investigation and recommendation.

2. It is reported that this officer is now in Washington and can be reached through the Army Air Forces Military Personnel Division.

1 Incl.
Memo 3-27-43 to CAS
frm Gen Strong, G-2

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

---

air AS 353.4 (162)

File
ci 4/7/43

Carried by C I
Received by Robert Bishop, Captain A S

3/29/43

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Air AS 383.4 (162)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Indiscreet Talk

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence — March 29, 1943

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

WEE:JT 9246 1

1. For immediate investigation and recommendation.

2. It is reported that this officer is now in Washington and can be reached through the Army Air Forces Military Personnel Division.

1 Incl.
Memo 3-27-43 to CAS
from Gen Strong, G-2

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

TO: Intelligence Service.

DATE 3/30/43

FROM: The Air Adjutant General's Office.

COMMENT NO. 2
JPP/epi 5484

Forwarded.

Dispatched
MAR 31 1943
AAG

2 Attachments:
n/c

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

Air AG 383.4 (160)

File
ci 3/31/43

~~Confidential~~

1 Air AG 283.4 (160)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Mar. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 5/21/75

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Personnel Security Questionnaire - Dorothy H. Hyde.

Intelligence Service.

March 15, 1943

The Air Adjutant General's Office.

1
JPP/epi 5484

Attached hereto is Personnel Security Questionnaire on Dorothy H. Hyde. In view of the fact that Miss Hyde refuses to sign the usual statement attesting to the accuracy and completeness of the information given, it is believed that a special investigation would be advisable in this instance.

HENRY B. HOBMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

1 Incl:
Form NMI-140.

Dispatched
MAR 16 1943
AAG

air 383.4 (156)

File
de 3/16/43

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air 383.4 (156)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/4/75

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Personnel Security Questionnaire - Doris R. Swaim.

Intelligence Service. March 8, 1943.

The Air Adjutant General's Office. JPP/epi 5484 1

There is forwarded herewith, for appropriate action, Personnel Security Questionnaire for the following employee in the Office of the Air Adjutant General:

DORIS ROSE SWAIM

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adjutant General.

1 Attachment:
Form NNI-140.

Dispatched
MAR 8 1943
AAG

air AG 383.4 (153)

File
GK
3/9/43

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Air AG 383.4 (153)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

Personnel Security Questionnaires - Air Adjutant General's Office.

Counter Intelligence Division. Feb. 20, 1943.

The Air Adjutant General's Office. 1

JPP/epi 5484

1. Forwarded herewith, for appropriate action, Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following personnel in the Office of the Air Adjutant General:

Jackson, Elizabeth Haywood
Page, Sadie Mae
Stevenson, Margaret Lucille

3 Attachments:
Forms NNI-140

Dispatched
FEB 21 1943
AAG

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

air adj 383.4 (148)

File
a 2/22/43

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

air adj 383.4 (148)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AH/BAD C. Date 5/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

air AS 383.4 (146)

Dispatched
FEB 16 1943
AAG

TO: Counter Intelligence Division.

DATE February 16, 1943

FROM: The Air Adjutant General's Office.

COMMENT NO. 2
JPP/epi 5484

1. Forwarded for necessary action.

10 Attachments:
Forms NNI-140.

HENRY B. HORMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

File
ci 2/17/43

DECLASSIFIED
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air AS 383.4 (146)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
6 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By: Air/Ad 3 LC. Date 3/24/75

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Date: 2-9-43
Comment No. 6
JBC:JB 5789

FROM: Air Adjutant General

1. Attention is invited to inclosures 1, 2 and 3 and to comments 2, 3 and 5 above.

2. Request instructions as to action desired.

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

3 Incls. n-c

Air AD 383.4 (140)

2/16/43 File gyc

File
C. 2/17/43

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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Air AD 383.4 (140)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

TO: Asst. Chief of Air Staff, A-2

DATE: 2-6-43
Comment No. 4
JBC:JB 5789

FROM: Air Adjutant General

For comment.

JOHN B. COOLEY
Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

3 Incls n-c

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/21/75

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DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Lt. Col. Donald M. Danvers, A.C.

Air Adjutant General

FEB 9 1943
5

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2.

WB:eam 4700

1. Inasmuch as the question of subversive activity and loyalty to the United States is not involved in the attached papers, this Division does not feel competent to comment on the recommendations of the Director of Photography.

2. A command decision would appear to be involved inasmuch as the conclusions expressed in Par. III of the memorandum from Colonel Scott to the Air Inspector, dated January 7, 1943, have not been refuted except in general terms by the Director of Photography.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G. S. C.

3 Incls. n/c.

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

airas 383.4 (140)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Reg.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 3/21/75

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

TALLY NO.	K-3
FILE NO.	201

SUBJECT: Investigation of Julia S. Rickard.

TO: Air Adjutant General (Administrative Div.) DATE Feb. 6, 1943

FROM: Air Adjutant General (Central Files Section) COMMENT NO. 1

STE/mm 71134

1. The attached report on Mrs. Julia S. Rickard has been investigated by the undersigned and it is not believed that the matter is of sufficient importance to warrant further investigation.

2. Mrs. Rickard is employed in the 201 file section located in AAF Annex No. 1 and does not handle confidential material. I have interviewed Mrs. Rickard on two occasions prior to this report and she does not appear to be the type that "talks too much".

3. It is recommended that the attached report be filed without further action.

S. T. Edwards
S. T. EDWARDS,
Captain, A. G. D.,
Chief, Central Files Section.

TO: Air Adjutant General, Executive Division Feb. 6, 1943.
Attention: Lt. Col. Lewis
FROM: Air Adjutant General, Administrative Division No. 2
CGS/lg - 4583

The recommendation contained in Comment #1 is approved.

C. G. STEVENSON,
Lt. Col., A.C.,
Actg. Asst. Air A.G.

Att:
Report

noted
RCL.

File
2-6-43

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

Air AS 383.4 (143)

PAGE ____ Air AS 383.4 (143) 3-1109 A.F.

FEB 6 '43 AM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/21/75

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Milner

SUBJECT: Investigation of Julia S. Rickard

1. Captain B. H. Turner from Counter Intelligence, A-2, showed the undersigned a copy of Provost Marshall General Investigation Report dated January 13, 1943. Paragraph 7 is as follows: "7. Conclusion of investigation discbses no disloyalty to the United States Government. However, former employer states he would definitely not recommend her for any position where she handled confidential papers; she talks too much."

2. This report shown to Colonel Stevenson since subject is in Office Service Section of Air Adjutant General.

R. C. Lewis.

R. C. LEWIS
Lt. Col., A. C.
Acting Ass't. Air Adj. General

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

air OS 383.4 (143)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Lt. Col. Donald M. Danvers, A.C.

File
a 2/14/43

Air Ab 383.4 (140)

TO: Director of Photography,
THRU: Asst. Chief of Air Staff, A-2, and the Air Inspector.
FROM: Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Date 11 February 1943
Comment No. 7
TJH/cmc/6371

The Chief of the Air Staff directs that Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Danvers, 0-144339, be transferred out of the Directorate of Photography to a position in the field.

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Incls:
No change.

Corrected by officer
2/11/43

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Air Ab 383.4 (140)
Miss Ingram

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/21/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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TO: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Date: 2-9-43
Comment No. 6
JBC:JB 5789

FROM: Air Adjutant General

1. Attention is invited to inclosures 1, 2 and 3 and to comments 2, 3 and 5 above.

2. Request instructions as to action desired.

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

3 Incls. n-c

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/21/75

DECLASSIFIED
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TO: Counter Intelligence Division.

DATE 2/11/43

FROM: The Air Adjutant General's Office.

COMMENT NO. 2
COR/epi 5484

1. Forwarded.

2 Attachments:
Forms NMI-140

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

Dispatched
FEB 12 1943
AAG

File
ci 2/12/43

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1 Air AG 383.4 (140)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 3/31/75

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Personnel Security Questionnaire - Air Adjutant General's Office.

Counter Intelligence Division. 2/8/43

The Air Adjutant General's Office. JPP/epi 5484 1

383.4 (144)

1. Submitted herewith, for appropriate action Form NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaire, for the following personnel in the Office of the Air Adjutant General:

CHRYSANTHIA M. REZNICEK

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adjutant General.

1 Attachment:
Form NNI-140

Dispatched
FEB 8 1943
AAG

File
ci 2/8/43

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air ag 383.4 (144)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 3/31/75

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File
[illegible]
2/7/43

Dispatched
FEB 6 1943
AAG

TO: Asst. Chief of Air Staff, A-2

FROM: Air Adjutant General

For comment.

DATE: 2-6-43
Comment No. 4
JBC:JB 5789

JOHN B. COOLEY
Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

3 Incls n-c

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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☆ 16—[illegible]-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943

air ad 383.4 (140)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: Atn/AD LC, Date 3/21/75

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Investigation of Lt. Col. Donald M. Danvers, A.C.

The Air Adjutant General 2/3/43

The Air Inspector 3.
JFRS:EG 3653

1. It will be noted that the recommendation of G-2 in this matter was that Colonel Danvers "not be employed in a position of trust and confidence" and that he now is the Executive Officer of the Directorate of Photography.

2. In view however of the attitude of Colonel Kaye, who is the actual responsible officer in that Directorate, it is recommended that no further action be taken in this case and that Colonel Danvers be permitted to retain his position in that office. Colonel Kaye is the person most directly concerned in this matter and also the individual who has for many months had the best insight into Colonel Danvers' character and work. In view of the fact that he is thoroughly satisfied with Colonel Danvers and equally convinced as to this officer's integrity, it is believed his opinion should be given more weight than the opinion of Colonel Danvers' former competitors in business.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that if this recommendation is favorably considered steps should be taken to remove the block placed at the request of this office on the promotion of Colonel Danvers.

JOHN F. WHITELEY,
Colonel, Air Corps.

3 Incls. n/c

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CONFIDENTIAL

air Ab 383.4 (140)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 3/21/75

HEADQUARTERS [illegible] FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECLASSIFIED

CD/3

TALLY	
FILE NO.	AFDIS-CD/2 CD/2 -2153

SUBJECT: Investigation of Military Personnel.

TO: Air Adjutant General

DATE JAN 12 1943

FROM: Intelligence Service

COMMENT NO. 1
AFDIS-CD/2
JBC/epp/slm 6651

1. The investigation of Russell Thomas Scott, ASN 13082189, has been completed and discloses no derogatory information.

RECEIVED
JAN 14 1943
AIR AG-S

for A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

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UNCLASSIFIED CD/3

UNCLASSIFIED CD/3

PAGE

3-1109 A.F.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Mo. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 3/31/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

MAR 7 1943

TO: Director of Weather

DATE: 1/27/43

FROM: Director of Technical Services

COMMENT NO. 2
DRM/vw/74686

Note and return.

H. M. McCLELLAND
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

1a Incl.
n/c

TO: Director of Technical Services

DATE: MAR 7 1943

FROM: Director of Weather

COMMENT NO. 3
LLM:ice 72174

1. Noted.

1 Incl.
n/c

H. H. BASSETT
Colonel, Air Corps

air ab 383.4 (139)

TO: Chief of the Air Staff

File
BK
3/9/43

DATE: 3-8-43

FROM: Director of Technical Services

COMMENT NO. 4
DRM/vw/74686

Noted.

DECLASSIFIED

Incls n/c

H. M. McCLELLAND
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

air AG 383.4 (139)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
1 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

2 AFDIS AFMAG JAN 2 1943

AFDIS-CD/2
WLW/epp/vdw - 6651

1. Request that the inclosed loyalty check sheet be completed in quadruplicate by the above subject in compliance with Paragraph 8 of AG-Ltr., 383.4, dated October 3, 1942, and returned to this Division for necessary action.

2. Form NNI-140 completed by the subject is returned for disposition by your office.

2 Incls.:
Form NNI-140
1 Loyalty Check Sheet(quad.)

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

JPP/epi 5484

3. AFMAG AFDIS 1943 (Counter 1/6 Intel. Div.)

1. Request contained in Comment 2, Item 1, above complied with.

1 Att:
Loyalty Check Sheet (Quad.)

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adjutant General.

Dispatched
JAN 7 1943
AAG

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wk 2 383.4 (128)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 8/3/75

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AFMAG
I-

Personnel Security Questionnaires - Air Adjutant General's Office.

Counter Intelligence Division. 1/20/43

The Air Adjutant General's Office. 1

JPP/epi 5484

1. Submitted herewith, for appropriate action, Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following personnel in the Office of the Air Adjutant General.

Broadus, Goldie Elizabeth
Butler, Grace Cecelia
Cephas, Ethel Helena
Clinkscales, Sarah Elizabeth
Davis, Alma Gay
Dickens, Lucille Viola
Douglas, Frederick Adophus
Hallback, Alphonso
Hart, Elizabeth
Hicks, Mary Magdalene
Lancaster, Hester Marie
Owen, Doris Mae
Radcliffe, Dorothy Adele
Ransom, Dolores Oliva
Rucker, Lillise Adrienne
Saunders, Florence Mae
Stewart, Viola Elizabeth
Taylor, Dorothy Elaine
Thomas, Ruth Vernel
Thompson, W. Edgar
Tibbs, Edythe Brown
Washington, Dorothy Elizabeth

Dispatched
JAN 20 1943
AAG

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adjutant General.

22 Attachments:
Forms NNI-140

air ab 38 B. 135

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air a 2383. + 135

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 3/2/75

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AFMAG
I-10

Personnel Security Questionnaire - Margaret E. Henighan.

Counter Intelligence Division. 1/6/43

The Air Adjutant General's Office. 1
JPP/epi 5484

1. Submitted herewith, for appropriate action, Form NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaire, for the following personnel in the Office of the Air Adjutant General.

Margaret E. Henighan

Dispatched
JAN 7 1943
AAG

File
Ci

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Ass't Air Adjutant General.

1 Att:
Form NNI-140

air ab 383.4 (129)

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air ab 383.4 (129)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 26 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 3/31/75

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JAN 2 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General George V. Strong
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Division
War Department General Staff

SUBJECT: Dr. Harold U. Sverdrup

1. Dr. Harold U. Sverdrup, a Norwegian National, is the Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography of the University of California. I am told that some question has arisen as to his loyalty to our government. Cogent reasons exist for him to be in fervent support of the United States and those things for which we are fighting. They are briefly as follows:

a. Dr. Sverdrup's younger brother is a colonel in the Corps of Engineers in the Army of the United States on duty in Australia.

b. Another brother was a British Army Officer recently killed in action in a Commando raid on Spitzbergen.

c. Major Seiwell, an officer in the Army Air Forces on duty in Washington, D. C., has known Dr. Sverdrup for 14 years and has absolute faith in his loyalty.

d. A few days ago 22 of the foremost scientists in the United States voted almost unanimously for Dr. Sverdrup's scholarly excellence and for his unquestioned loyalty to this government.

e. Various persons in high positions and of unquestionable integrity are firmly convinced of this man's personal integrity and loyalty to our principles of government (copies of two supporting letters are attached).

2. Men working in Dr. Sverdrup's field (many of them competitors) agree without exception that he is extremely able, brilliant, and capable of work of the highest caliber. Had any doubt in this regard existed earlier, it would have recently been discarded. This man's work last fall (in the Army Air Forces, Weather Directorate) in the development of a new method of sea swell forecasting is, I am told, superior to anything which previously existed anywhere in the world. It is now in use here

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and has recently been requested by the British Admiralty. The probable location of Colonel Eichenbacher and his crew in the Southwest Pacific was worked out in a study prepared by Dr. Sverdrup for the Weather Directorate, but, through no fault of his, was completed too late to be of use.

3. While it is probable that most of the work which might be referred to him could be accomplished with fundamental scientific information and without the use of classified materials, it is urged that, at your earliest convenience, his case be re-examined with a view to full clearance.

4. The loss of Dr. Sverdrup's services is irreplaceable. Your reconsideration of his case is urgently requested.

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

Dispatched
JAN 2 1943
AAG

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

2 Incls:
Incl. 1 - Ltr fr Dr. Fleming
Incl. 2 - Ltr fr Lt. Col. Patterson

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dw A 2 B83.1 (12)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dirs
8 Jan & 20 June 1973
By Alla Jae NARS, Date 3/4/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Major General George V. Strong HRS/alk 73066

1. Director of Technical Services — Commanding General, Army Air Forces

1. The attached memorandum to Major General George V. Strong, prepared for your signature, concerns a Norwegian national, Dr. Harold U. Sverdrup. This gentleman, because of his training, experience, and brilliant mind, is recognized as one of the world's truly outstanding scientists, and his personal integrity and loyalty to our principles of government have been substantiated by overwhelming evidence. In bringing this case to your attention, I am prompted by my interest in preventing possible sabotage of this man's talents by the enemy and a miscarriage of justice.

2. The following additional information concerns Dr. Sverdrup's relations with the Army Air Forces. Last August the Army Air Forces, Weather Directorate, executed a contract with the University of California for the purpose of obtaining certain oceanographic and meteorological information to be prepared at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. Certain parts of the contract were written specifically from the standpoint of using Dr. Sverdrup's services, and, subsequently, consent for his work on classified War Department contracts was obtained from the Provost Marshal General in a letter to the Regents of the University of California, dated October 1, 1942. About the middle of October the Director of Weather called Dr. Sverdrup to Washington, and during the following four weeks Dr. Sverdrup developed a method of forecasting sea swell. This method, developed along new lines of reasoning, is, I am informed, superior to any other and is being used by the Weather Directorate.

3. Approximately one month after Dr. Sverdrup's arrival in Washington, a memorandum from the Director of Military Intelligence Service, dated November 19, 1942, requested that he be not employed in any capacity in the military establishment. The memorandum further stated that investigation had revealed Dr. Sverdrup's loyalty to the United States to be questionable. This is in contradiction of an overwhelming amount of evidence of his integrity, given by persons of unquestionable reputation. Two statements regarding Dr. Sverdrup, by Dr. John A. Fleming of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and Lt. Col. Sverre Pettersson of the Norwegian Air Force, are attached.

4. It has been brought to my attention that because of Dr. Sverdrup's international prominence and his collaboration with scientists of many nations the enemy is aware of his potential usefulness to the United Nations' cause. This man's ability is so unique that it is entirely possible that some form of subversive activity may be underway

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Memorandum to Major General George V. Strong, cont.

designed to discredit him.

5. Something intangible about the action of the Military Intelligence Service suggests that information from persons having personal differences with Dr. Sverdrup may have been accepted unknowingly. It is my understanding that the consent given by the Provost Marshal General was based on a reading of all files of information on Dr. Sverdrup. Furthermore, one of the most competent officers in the Weather Directorate, after reading the F. B. I. file on Dr. Sverdrup, could find nothing to bar this man from participating in military work.

6. It is pertinent to note that in 1930 because of Dr. Sverdrup's proved qualifications of personality and loyalty to the principles of government represented by our nation, he was offered an appointment as chief investigator on the staff of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of Carnegie Institution of Washington. However, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen protested against Dr. Sverdrup's going to America on the grounds that there were already too few men of such scientific ability in Norway, and he was induced to remain. In 1936, he was selected as the Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography; this appointment in itself is evidence of the high esteem he is regarded with in this country. The performance of his responsibility in this position has more than equaled the expectations, in regard to both research and administration.

7. Dr. Sverdrup cannot be replaced. His exclusion from War Department work represents a serious loss of talent critically needed in these days when available highly trained personnel is rare.

H. N. McCLELLAND
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Director of Te chnical Services

Encls:
Encl. 1-Ltr fr Dr. Fleming
Encl. 2-Ltr fr Lt. Col. Patterson
Encl. 3-Memo to Maj. Gen. Strong

1. Director of Technical Services, Command. General, Army Air Forces

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs:
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1942.

Attention: Mr. Gray.

The following persons in the Executive Section have been investigated by Military Intelligence and no derogatory information was disclosed:

Joseph Amos JYA.
Regina Bacher
Carolyn Ingram ci
Phyllis B. Lundy PBL
Mary S. Nims mn

J.P.P.
(Mrs. Pointer)

383.4

12-12-42 (125)

file
ci 12/12/42

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Air AS 383-4 (125)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr
E.O. Date

JBC:JB 5709

2 AFMAG AFDIS 12-5 The individual referred to in Item #1 cannot be identified as an employee of the Office of the Chief of Air Staff at the present time.

Dispatched
DEC 5 1942
AAG

JOHN B. COOLEY
Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/1/75

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AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-5525

Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

1 AFDIS AFCAS DEC 2 1942

AFDIS-CD/2
PHL/epp/cam 71291

1. The investigation of GERHOFF, Helen P. has been completed and discloses no derogatory information.

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

air CG 383.4 (124)

202-1341

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	aac 4179
FILE NO.	

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

SUBJECT: Gratings in offices.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFCAS	Asst.Ch Air Staff A-2	11-29	1. If you will notice, in some of our offices there is a grating on the walls that lead up to the next floor. General Arnold's office was thoroughly examined recently to determine if by any chance a microphone was located up in this grating. It is believed that you should take the necessary steps to investigate the offices occupied by the Army Air Forces and if gratings such as those installed in General Arnold's office near the ceiling, are installed in other offices, then the same examination should be made as was made in General Arnold's office. 2. I do not know the method as to how this should be done but it is believed that it is of such importance that you should contact the proper person in G-2 and have the necessary action taken. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, Major General, U. S. A. Chief of the Air Staff.
2.	AFABI	AFCAS	DEC 23 1942	AFDIS-CD/4 LPH/lid 71174 1. Reference is made to Item 1, above, and to Item 1, R & R, from AFCAS to Asst. Chief Air Staff, A-2, subject: Office Security, dated 11/23, which communications are related in that both deal with the possibility of conversations held within A.A.F. offices being compromised through interception by unauthorized persons. 2. The situation was discussed with Lieut. Colonel John A. Holman, Chief, Communications Branch, C.I.G., M.I.S., who presented the problem to Colonel John F. Bissell, G.S.C., Asst. Executive Officer, M.I.S., W.D.G.S. Colonel Bissell authorized C.I.G., M.I.S., to undertake a combined survey and inspection of sensitive offices located within Headquarters A.A.F. to ascertain the possibility of conversations held therein being overheard by unauthorized persons. A technician will supervise the work and consideration will be given to the possibility of interception instruments being introduced into such offices or the telephone circuits thereof. 3. Sensitive offices of Headquarters A.A.F. located within the Pentagon Building, as of December 10, 1942, were determined through survey made by AFDIS and the office numbers thereof have been furnished to M.I.S., W.D.G.S., a copy of list inclosed. Such survey is being continued to identify

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DIS 12/18 Gratings
Aer a S 385.4 (123)

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3-1109 A.F.

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By _____ NCD Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO	2DS-1341

SUBJECT: Gratings in offices. (continued)

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
2.	AFABI	AFCAS	DEC 23 1942	AFDIS-CD/4 LPH/lid 71174 other sensitive offices located within Headquarters, A.A.F., Washington, D. C. and vicinity, including those about to be moved to the Pentagon Building. A supplemental list of such offices will be furnished to M.I.S. A survey is not contemplated as to the A.A.F. Commands whose offices are located in Washington, D. C., or vicinity. 1 Incl.: List of rooms. EDGAR P. SORENSEN, Colonel, G. S. C.
3	AFCAS	AFMAG	12-28	Noted. For Files. M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G. S. C. Incl. n.c.

DEC 23 42 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED

3-1109 A.F.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

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SECRET

2D-8-1341

3-D-957
3-D-958
3-D-972
3-D-977
3-D-982
3-D-1041 and 3-D-1043
3-D-1061
3-D-1062

3-E-112
3-E-140
3-E-144
3-E-185 entrance to 3-E-179 to 3-E-193. (All included)
3-E-974
3-E-977
3-E-980
3-E-982
3-E-992
3-E-1000 (and small/ office connected therewith)
3-E-1006
3-E-1008
3-E-1022 entrance to 3-E-1018 to 3-E-1034. (All included)
3-E-1023 and 3-E-1025
3-E-1027 to 3-E-1029
3-E-1031 and 3-E-1033
3-E-1058
3-E-1050 and 3-E-1056
3-E-1063
3-E-1078
3-E-1069 to 3-E-1081
3-E-1082
3-E-1083 and 3-E-1085

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Incl #1

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 3/31/75

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2DS-1341

Gratings in offices. (continued)

2. AFABI AFCAS DEC 23 1942

AFDIS-CD/4
LPH/lid 71174

other sensitive offices located within Headquarters, A.A.F., Washington, D. C. and vicinity, including those about to be moved to the Pentagon Building. A supplemental list of such offices will be furnished to M.I.S. A survey is not contemplated as to the A.A.F. Commands whose offices are located in Washington, D. C., or vicinity.

1 Incl.:
List of rooms.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G. S. C.

---

3 AFCAS AFMAG 12-28

Noted. For Files.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.

Incl.
n.c.

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ai a S 383.4 (123) B

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DOD ltrs
2 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [signature] LC; Date 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	CAS 1499
FILE NO.	

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

SUBJECT: Office Security

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFCAS	Asst.Ch Air Staff A-2	11-23	1. Due to the grill work of the doors of our offices it is believed that anybody passing down the hall or standing just next to the door can hear all the conversation that goes on in the office. Any secret or confidential matter that is discussed in conference or conversations over the telephone can be very readily understood from the halls. 2. I am concerned about this and believe that it should be brought to the attention of G-2 and to the entire Army Air Forces Staff. What corrective measures can be taken I don't know, but I consider it of sufficent importance and serious enough to be brought to your attention as the Assistant Chief of Staff A-2 and the guardian of our security. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, Major General, U. S. A. Chief of the Air Staff.
2.	AFABI	AFCAS	DEC 23 1942	AFDIS-CD/4 LPH/cvi 71174 1. Reference is made to Item 2, R&R from AFCAS to Asst. Chief, Air Staff, A-2, subject: Gratings in Offices, Dated 11/29, which is a related communication in that it presents an additional phase of the subject problem. Reply to Item 1, hereof, is incorporated in the communication referred to above. 2. This communication, received unclassified, is classified as "Secret" to conform with the classification of related correspondence. EDGAR P. SORENSEN, Colonel, G. S. C.
3	AFCAS	AFMAG	12-28	Noted. For File. M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C.

12-220
RECEIVED
NOV 25 3 22 PM '42
COUNTER WELL SEC. SCAC.
Col. Lobeny

DEC 23 '42 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

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DIS 17/18 Air Ab 383-4 (123) B
A-1 Security

3-1109 A.F.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

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Gratings in offices.

1. AFCAS Asst.Ch
Air Staff 11-29
A-2

1. If you will notice, in some of our offices there is a grating on the walls that lead up to the next floor. General Arnold's office was thoroughly examined recently to determine if by any chance a microphone is located up in this grating. It is believed that you should take the necessary steps to investigate the offices occupied by the Army Air Forces and if gratings such as those installed in General Arnold's office near the ceiling, are installed in other offices, then the same examination should be made as was made in General Arnold's office.

2. I do not know the method as to how this should be done but it is believed that it is of such importance that you should contact the proper person in G-2 and have the necessary action taken.

Dispatched
NOV 30 1942
AAG

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

air ad 383.4 (123)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Mr Gray

air ad 383.4 (123)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. 4-20 June 1978
By AG/AF LC Date 2/31/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

2. AFMAG AFDIS 1942
11/26

WDG/11 2246

The individual referred to in Item #1 cannot be identified as an employee of the Office of the Chief of Air Staff at the present time.

Dispatched
NOV 28 1975
AAG

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A. G. D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Air Adj 383.4 (119)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION				Air Adj 383.4		(119)

☆ 16—20042-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954

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DOD Rts
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 3/31/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-5595

Investigation of Civilian Personnel

1 AFDIS AFCAS NOV 23 1942

AFDIS-CD/2
PHL/epp/veo 6651

1. The investigation of RUSSELL, Margaret McLean has been completed and discloses no derogatory information.

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

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air AG 383.4 (119)

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DOD ltrs
8 Feb. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

NOV 23 1942

Personnel

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,
The White House.

Dear Mr. Hopkins:

With reference to the attached letter from Mr. Oscar Cox, informal investigation indicates that Major to Roller's conduct has been such that it was deemed desirable by the War Department that he be requested to leave the country. The details are not a matter of record in the Army Air Forces.

The request for reconsideration has been reviewed by Major General Strong, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, G-2, who has disapproved on the ground that Mr. Cox's letter contains no additional evidence which would warrant a reversal of the earlier decision.

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Dispatched
NOV 23 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Ltr. to Mr. Harry Hopkins
fr Mr. Oscar Cox, 11/3/42.

Informal Concurrence -
Theodore Babbitt
Foreign Liaison Officer.

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Cy - General Arnold
Air G 383.4 (118)

SAJ 383.4 (118)

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CODING
By 6 Jan & 20 June 1955
LC, Date

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(B) or (E)
State Dept Letter 9 Aug 73
BY [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/75

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET, NW.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins

FROM: Oscar Cox

SUBJECT: Major H. J. G. to Roller

1. Major to Roller is chief air procurement officer in this country for the Royal Netherlands Air Force.

2. One of our people who knows Major to Roller received a telephone call yesterday from New York from a man stating himself to be Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. So far as we can determine, it was in fact Prince Bernhard.

3. Prince Bernhard was already known to us as an intimate friend of Major to Roller. He stated that he had been informed by his embassy that the State Department was still of a mind to request that Major to Roller leave the country, because of his conduct in connection with certain Wright Aircraft engine plans.

4. Prince Bernhard stated that he had written a letter to you two or three days ago about the matter, and that he was entirely willing to permit his name to be used in arranging to have to Roller stay in this country.

5. Our people have previously investigated this case at the request of Mr. Zimmerman, Minister of Colonies in the Netherlands Cabinet. In our opinion, no harm would be done by permitting to Roller to stay. The Department of Justice agrees, and the State Department is willing to permit him to remain if the War Department is agreeable.

6. If you think it wise, you could send us a copy of Prince Bernhard's letter, and we could take up the matter informally with the appropriate State and War Department authorities.

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Acc A 8 383.4 (118)

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: 5/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. CD/2-4880

Tally No. AAF AFDIS-CD/2

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of LISPI, Norma Gertrude.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS	AFCAS	NOV 11 1942	AFDIS-CD/2 PHL/rs - 71291 1. The investigation of LISPI, Norma Gertrude has been completed, and discloses no derogatory information. for A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
2	AFCAS	FILES	1942 11-12	WEH:JT 5246 Noted. WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General
NOV 12 '42 AM

File
cc 11/12/42

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(Do not use reverse side)

W-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

CONFIDENTIAL

Page No.

297

Air ab 383.4 (115)

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MID 333.5
Army Air Forces

Personnel

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WST

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AH/AW LC Date 3/31/75

NOV 7 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES

Subject: Loyalty of Army Air Forces Military Personnel.

This Division concurs in the proposal advanced in your memorandum of October 27, 1942 recommending "that A.A.F. check immediately, by correspondence, the birthplace, residence, business associations and reputation for discretion, integrity and loyalty of its military personnel on duty with A.A.F. Headquarters." However, this Division is prepared to make the proposed check for the Army Air Forces if you should so desire and estimates that such an undertaking could be completed within a period of thirty days.

NOV - 8 '42 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

rak

11/9/42
Gen. Stratemeyer
Look into
this & see
me H.H.A.

SAS 383.4 (113)

File

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Air Ws 383.4 (113)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Loyalty of Army Air Forces Military Personnel

WHH:JT 5246

3 AFCAS AFDMC 1942
12-5

1. For remark and recommendation.

2. Attention is invited to attached remarks from Colonel Milner and Colonel Hewitt.

Dispatched
DEC 7 1942
AAG

Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

File
Ci

Air Ad 383.4 (112)

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383.4 (112)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

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GES:nl

Loyalty of Army Air Forces Military Personnel

a 1. AFCAS Ass't Ch of Staff, A-2 11-9

1. Attention is invited to the enclosed papers consisting of a memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, dated November 3rd and a memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, dated November 7th.

2. General Arnold directs the following: "Look into this and see me. H.H.A."

3. You will submit your comments to the above directive hereon and then come in and discuss same with me.

383.4 (112)

Dispatched
NOV 10 1942
AAG

File

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Incl: Memo to CG,AAF from Gen Strong 11-7-42
Memo to CG,AAF from Gen Gullion 11-3-42

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. Gray

Cur as 383.4 (112)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1978
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

AFPCP-B

Sarah Trevino Flores

ETM/rd 72323-4

1942
1. AFPCP AFMAG 11-6

1. Attached letter regarding Sarah Trevino Flores is self-explanatory. It is requested that any information available, which will enable this office to satisfactorily answer the questions in paragraph 2, be furnished as an addition to this R&R. This office will furnish the verification of the employment record.

1 Incl.
Ltr.dtd.11-4-42

GORDON E. CLARK,
Colonel, Air Corps.

383.4 (111)

Dispatched
NOV 7 1942
AAG

File
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File
ETM/rd
11-6-42

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Air As 383 4 (111)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/21/75

DECLASSIFIED

November 4, 1942

TO : Gordon E. Clark
Chief of Civilian Personnel
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Sarah Trevino Flores

1. This office is conducting a personnel investigation of Sarah Trevino Flores. Plant Protection Personnel Identification data at the San Antonio Air Depot reflects that Sarah Trevino Flores was employed as a Junior Clerk Typist with the Army Air Forces in Washington, D. C.. from January 23, 1942 to October 15, 1942, and then made transfer to the Army Air Forces, San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, Texas.

2. Please verify the above employment record and also furnish all available information possible as to Subject's character, honesty, and trustworthiness. Also whether her habits were good or bad during her employment in Washington, D.C.

3. Sarah Trevino Flores is being considered for assignment to the section handling confidential and secret equipment.

J. J. O'BRIEN
1st Lt., Army Air Corps
Plant Protection Officer.

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DOD Ltr.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

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DECLASSIFIED

Personnel

00859

NOV 7 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Subject: Admonition of Capt. George Ross Herrman, Air Corps.

1. Herewith is copy of admonition given to the above named officer in compliance with your memorandum of 22 October 1942.

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1 Incl.
cpy. ltr.
Capt. Herrman.

Dispatched
NOV 7 1942
AAG

SAS 383.4 (110)

COPY FOR GENERAL ARNOLD.

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SAS 383.4 (110)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AG/MD LC, Date: 8/31/75

AFAJA
Col. Courtney Whitney
Room 4447 - Ext. 4747
jfs

Written 11/5/42

NOV 7 1942

SUBJECT: Admonition.

TO: Captain George Ross Harrman, Air Corps,
San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field
(Thru: Commanding General, Air Service
Command).

1. The attention of this Headquarters has been directed by the War Department to repeated instances in which you have given public expression to impressions gained by you while serving as a Pan American Airways pilot in Africa and Egypt, and in which you have further indulged in criticism of the British war effort, from which is reflected a substantial dislike of the British and a predisposition to credit all statements derogatory of them.

2. While it is the policy of the War Department and this Headquarters to encourage the free expression and transmission in proper military channels of constructive views and military information, designed to aid in the prosecution of the war, idle and unauthorized conversation concerning such matters or the public criticism of any of our Allies is manifestly inimical to our national interests, serves to give aid and comfort to our enemies, and cannot be tolerated.

3. A more strict rule of future military conduct is therefore enjoined upon you, lest it be necessary for this Headquarters to exact adherence to the elementary rules here involved through the imposition of severe disciplinary penalties.

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

COPY FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Air AS 383.4 (110)

MID 400.3295 (7-6-42) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] C. Date 3/31/75

OCT 22 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: 1st Lieutenant George Ross Herrman.

1. Investigation by the Military Intelligence Division has revealed the following information relative to 1st Lieutenant George Ross Herrman, ASN 0-350792, reported to be presently on active duty at San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, Texas:

a. Lt. Herrman has, on various occasions, by his own admission, repeated to other military personnel hearsay to the effect that the British have made improper use or have given improper handling to American supplies and equipment.

b. Lt. Herrman has also admitted having spoken on various occasions to other military personnel regarding the general impression he gained while serving as a Pan American Airways pilot in Africa and Egypt.

c. In connection with paragraph b above, apparently Lt. Herrman has formed a substantial dislike of the British, and he is observed to be predisposed to place full credence in any statements derogatory to them.

2. Lt. Herrman will be admonished for his lack of judgment in repeating incidents and hearsay capable of doing hurt to a military ally of the United States, and so capable of giving comfort to the enemy.

3. Lt. Herrman will be instructed as to the importance of reporting information he believes to be true and of value to the United States only to authorized military personnel having a legitimate interest therein.

4. A report of the action taken is desired.

By Direction of the Secretary of War:

Dispatched
NOV 7 1942
AAG

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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11/3

air AS 383.4 (110)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 5/31/75

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AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-4419

Investigations of Civilian Personnel.

1 AFDIS AFMAG OCT 31 1942

AFDIS-CD/2
PHL/epp - 6651

Hq. Army Air Forces
OCT 31 1942
AAG Received
2:40 pm

1. The investigation of GRAF, Dorothy Eva of your Directorate has been completed and discloses no derogatory information.

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

109

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CONFIDENTIAL

air ag 383.4 (102

Changes in Personnel

HBH:JPP:lg 5484

1 AFMAG AFDIS 1942
Counter 10/30
Intell.
Div.

1. In accordance with Hq. Office Instruction No. 40-7, the following changes have taken place since Forms NNI-140 were submitted:

Traimun, Margaret F. - Has been on LWOP status since 4/15/42. Resignation will be effective COB 10/31/42.

Harrell, Rosalee - Resignation will be effective COB 11/9/42.

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED

Personnel Security Questionnaires for Employees of Central Mail Section

GH/cva

1 AFMAG Central Mail Section | AFMAG Adm. Div. | 1942 10/28

1. There are forwarded herewith for appropriate action Personnel Security Questionnaires, Form NNI-140, which have been completed by the following-named employees of this office:

Brown, Yates
Greenberg, Charles
Palmer, Samuel
Phillips, Inez Jonetha
Rice, Thomas Henry

THOMAS C. HOLLICK
Captain, Air Corps

5 Attachments
Forms NNI-140

---

2. AFMAG | AFDIS Counter Intel. Service | 10-29

JPP/cba

1. For appropriate action.

HENRY B. HOHMAN
Major, A. G. D.
Ass't. Air Adjutant General

Incl. n/c

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

Changes in Personnel

JPP/bhm - 5484

1. AFMAG AFDIS 1942
Counter 10/28
Intell.
Div.

1. In accordance with Hqs. office instructions No. 40-7, the following changes have taken place since Forms NNI-140 were submitted:

Addison, Richard L. - Employee now on annual leave prior to induction in United States Army on October 23, 42.
Flores, Sarah T. - Transferred to San Antonio Air Depot, San Antonio, Texas October 16, 1942.
Jacobsen, Pauline - Transferred to Navy 10-10-42
Marcellino, Thomas - Military furlough 10-24-42
Herndon, Roderick H. - Employee on annual leave prior to enlistment in United States Marine Corps within next several days.
Schuman, Jack W. - abandoned job 10-23-42
Street, Roy - Military furlough 10/17/42
Earl White - military furlough 10-22-42

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

[redacted].

DECLASSIFIED

MAG

Personnel Security Questionnaires.

JPP:epd 5484

1	AFMAG	AFHIS (Counter Intel. Div.)	1942 10-22	1. Submitted herewith are Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following personnel in the office of the Air Adjutant General:

Bunde, Robert C. — Raphael, George
O.K. Echols, Mary J. — Rugg, Madge L.
Massee, Wayne W. — Van Horn, Roy M.
Davenport, Oliver — Haller, Lucille V.
Davis, Mildred I.

Att: 9 Forms NNI-140

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, , A. G. D.,
Act'g Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

DECLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	AFDIS-CD/2 CD/2-3962

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFCAS	OCT 29 1942	AFDIS-CD/2 PHL/epp/cam 71291 1. The investigation of KONIUK, Helen has been completed and discloses no derogatory information. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C. MAL:JT 5265
2	AFCAS	AFMAG	1942 10-30	Noted. For Files. MILLARD A. LIBBY Lt. Col., G. S.C.

OCT 29 42 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

File 10/31/42

383.4 (108)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ w a 383.4 (108)

S-800 A.F.

[redacted]
WEH:JT 5246

October 30, 1942

313.4 (105)

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Gantz,
Winthrop House,
1727 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Gantz:

I have your letter of October 27th with respect to your situation and your request for suitable assignment.

The reports of inquiries conducted have been received and, on the basis of recommendations made therein, your case is being referred to the Reclassification Board of the Third Service Area at Baltimore. You will, no doubt, shortly receive notice from them to appear for a hearing.

Obviously no action can be taken with respect to future assignment until action has been taken by the Reclassification Board and its recommendations approved.

Sincerely,

Dispatched
OCT 30 1942
AAG

[redacted]
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff

COPY FOR GENERAL STRATEMEYER

air ag 313.4 (105)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/3/75

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DECLASSIFIED

Lt. Colonel Harry Gantz.

3373
GES/hd

1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2 Attn: Col. Sorensen 1942 10-29

1. It is desired that you prepare an appropriate reply for my signature to the enclosed letter from Lt. Col. Harry Gantz. Please expedite.

383.4 (105)

Incl: Ltr fr Col. Gantz dtd 10-27

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
Oct. 29 1942
AAG

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[illegible]

air co 383.4 (105)

"Winthrop House"
1727 Mass. Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
October 27, 1942

313.4 (105)

Dear General,

Since the receipt of your note, both the Air Inspector, nice Colonel Scott and the Inspector-General's man, have both gone over me with the mailed fist and a hair shirt.

Just how serious the situation is, depends entirely on how tough they decide to make it for me. Private letters to private personal friends on private and personal matters written before our entry into the war, I am informed by good legal advice, are not so ehnious a crime as the Army I. G. tried to mde out. A personal prigate letter to a personal friend in which items of common knowledge, talk and supposition were mentioned and discussed, written since the war stareed, may be indiscreet but surely not a serious crime. If so, a vast majority of us are guilty of crimes.

I expect to be discharged from here (Walter Reed) within the next ten days. My recovery has been maddeningly slow, due in large part to the worry, uncertainty and anxiety over my mysterious status. I have had my practitioner working for me for weeks, both over my physical recovery and to help solve my official problems. I would get well quickly if the worry and anxiety were eliminated and I could be given duty in a job and location where I can serve best and be of most value in the war effort.

Granted that I am "personal non grata" in India, where I can be of the utmost help, whatever objections the British in India may be said to have, is not of their own doing but of American instigation and source. However I am certain General Chiang Kai Shek in Chung King is not so fussy and there are scores of spots in the Middle East and Near East as well as Africa where I could be of help. I understand there are scores of difficult spots where men of my tropical and oriental experience and knowledge are sorely needed. Past indiscretions of minor importance, notwithstanding. China, Egypt, Africa and also for officers to accompany troop movements to the Middle and Far East (Air Force Personnel) and back. If I am to be disciplined, give me one of your toughest assignments and watch me eat it up. Let me redeem myself, if necessary, thusly. My six months of sickness plus the four or five grand foreign assignments I have lost out on, should be punishment for any one. I certainly feel well whipped. If it is decided that I am "in the dog house" so badly that my usefulness to the Air Forces is no longer of any value I would like to know it so I can make plans to go where I can be of use and help. But if I am to be utilized, I ask, as an old timer, and Early Bird and a brother Dadalian, that I be assigned to duty where my extensive experience in Asia can be suitably and profitably used. Otherwise, what? You advice and help will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

/s/ Harry Gantz

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

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Lt. Colonel Harry Gantz

383.4 (105)

WEH:JT 5246

3 AFCAS AFMAG 1942
10-30

For dispatch.

Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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ant AG 383.4 (105)

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DOD ltrs:
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

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Lt. Col. Harry Gantz

MAL/imm 5265

1 AFCAS AFABI 1942 10-28 General Stratemeyer has noted the attached memorandum

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Dispatched
OCT 23 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Memo to C/AS fr Col
Sorensen, dated 10-26-42,
re: the above subj

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Atn Page LC. Date 3/31/75

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2 AFMAG AFDOP 1942 10-26

RBH/smr 71133

Attention is invited to proceeding item.

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Incls: n/c

Dispatched
OCT 27 1942
AAG

File

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
		H									

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OOD Rts.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 3/21/75

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The Case of Lt. Colonel Harry Gantz.

GBR:bjo 4700

1. AFABI AFMAG 1942 10-24

1. Forwarded herewith is complete file on the investigation on the above mentioned officer.

2. Since reclassification is a function of the Directorate of Personnel, it is recommended that this file be forwarded to that office for action.

3. It is further recommended that action be expedited.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G.S.C.

Incls:
G-2 file of case.
Air Corps file of case.
R/I, 10-14142, in dup.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/6/75

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence
Division G-2

OCT 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Lieutenant Colonel Harry Gantz,
AC, Specialist Reserve.

Forwarded, inviting your attention to the attached memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff from the Office of the Inspector General dated October 15, 1942.

/s/ GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl.
Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff
dtd 10-15-42 fr Inspector General
w/incls.

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON

IG 333.9-Gantz, Harry

October 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM for the Deputy Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Investigation concerning Lieutenant Colonel Harry Gantz, AC (Spec. Res.).

1. Herewith is the report of an investigation made by an officer on duty in this office concerning indiscretions on the part of Lieutenant Colonel Harry Gantz, AC (Spec. Res.), who while on active duty in the War Department, wrote letters to two vice consuls of the American Consulate in India and to other prominent persons residing in India, disclosing matters pertaining to the administration of the War Department and couched in tems disrespectful to his military superiors and Government officials, in an attempt to undermine an office of the Army who had been detailed by competent authority as a Military Observice in India.

2. This investigation was made pursuant to your intructions contained in Disposition Slip of September 27, 1942 (201 Gantz, Harry, Lt. Col.), based on a recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 W.D.G.S.

3. This office concurs in the opinion of the investigating officer that Lieutenant Colonel Gantz has demonstrated that he is not amenable to militar discipline; that he has shown a serious lack of discretion an good judgment and has failed to observe the ethical standards and proprieties of the military service.

4. Accordingly, it is recommended that this case be disposed of by reference of these papers through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D. G.S., to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, with a view to action under the provisions of AR 605-230, June 4, 1942 (Classification Board).

/s/ PHILIP E. BROWN,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Deputy The Inspector General.

3 Incls.
1--G-2 File of this case in bulk
2--Air Corps file of this case in bulk.
3--R/I, 10-14-42, in dup.

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000 ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AG/AD LC; Date 3/21/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: The Case of Lt. Colonel Harry Gantz.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS GBR:bje 4700
1.	AFABI	AFMAG	1942 10-24	1. Forwarded herewith is complete file on the investigation on the above mentioned officer. 2. Since reclassification is a function of the Directorate of Personnel, it is recommended that this file be forwarded to that office for action. 3. It is further recommended that action be expedited. Incls: G-2 file of case. Air Corps file of case. R/I, 10-14142, in dup. EDGAR F. SORENSEN, Colonel, G.S.C.
2	AFMAG	AFDOP	1942 10-26	HBH/smr 71133 Attention is invited to preceding item. HENRY B. HOHMAN, Major, A. G. D., Assistant Air Adjutant General. Incls: n/c
3	AFDOP	AFMAG	11-4	FLT:msb 4212 The complete file in the case of Lt. Col. Harry Gantz was forwarded this date to the Commanding General, Third Service Command, requesting that Col. Gantz be ordered to the Reclassification Center as recommended in the supporting papers. J. M. BEVANS, Colonel, Air Corps. Incls. w/d

Eq. Army Air Forces
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Air Adjutant

Eq. Army Air Forces
NOV 1942
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6 Mn. & 20 June 1974
By: dn/mo LC. Date 3/31/75

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Periodic MID check on AAF Personnel.

LSK:cmc 6371

1942
1. AFDAS AFABI 10-23

1. The desirability of periodic MID check on AAF personnel (civilian and military) was suggested by General Strong in conference in his office with General McClelland and the undersigned last night.

2. General Strong suggested that personnel handling or having access to classified papers should be grouped in three priority categories and that periodic checks be requested by A-2 on G-2.

383.4 (103) B

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Dispatched
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Mr Geary
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

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Investigation of A-2 Personnel by G-2.

LSK:cmc 6371

1. AFDAS AFABI 1942 10-23

1. In conference with General Strong in his office last night, he told General McClelland and the undersigned that A-2 had never requested special investigation by G-2 of any AAF personnel.

2. This comment was made after a statement to the effect that investigations took so long that special projects were, of necessity, occasionally assigned to personnel who had not been investigated.

3. It is possible that your requests for special investigation have been directed to the Provost Marshall General. If this is the case, General Strong has indicated that your "special requests" should be made on him directly.

Dispatched
OCT 23 1942
AAG

file

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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Mr Gray

Ltr AS 383-4 (103) a

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/AP LC. Date 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

Investigation of two civilians in the Directorate of Weather.

LSK:cmc 6371

1. AFDAS AFABI 1942 10-23

1. General McClelland and the undersigned discussed the case of Sverdrup and Mohk with the Deputy Chief of Staff at about two o'clock p.m., October 22, 1942. General Strong had recommended to him that these two individuals be summarily discharged. It was recommended to the Deputy Chief of Staff that they, possessing information of secret strategic importance, should not be summarily discharged and thrown out on the street. It was recommended that they be retained in their present employment under twenty-four hour surveillance and be denied further access to classified information. General McNarney directed that no action be taken until General Strong could be contacted, that the matter be discussed with him and that no action be taken until his conclusions have been obtained.

383.4 (102)

Mr Gray's copy return

2. Between six and seven o'clock p.m., October 22nd, 1942, General McClelland and the undersigned, in conference with General Strong in his office, reached the following conclusions:

a. These two individuals would be placed under 24-hour FBI surveillance and their previous and present contacts should similarly be traced. (General Strong telephoned and made arrangements for FBI officials to meet with General McClelland in General Strong's office on the morning of October 23rd, 1942.)

b. These two individuals are to continue for the time being in the Weather Directorate but will be denied further access to classified information except that necessary for the broad and basic consideration of long-range forecasting. (Their previous specific forecasts relating to projected operations are to be discontinued for the time being.)

c. General Strong would contact OPD to determine if the specific forecasts these two individuals were making should be continued and what action should be taken on data they have previously determined and disseminated. (These two individuals appear to be the only two who have the oceanographic knowledge and background necessary to continue these special forecasts.

3. Comment was made that the procedure of the Security Control Officer in dealing directly with individual officers he might select well down in the AAF chain of command might, and in this instance clearly did, result in prejudicing

(CONTINUED)

Mr Gray

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SECRET

Investigation of two civilians in the Directorate of Weather.

1. (Continued) rather than assuring security.

4. It was established that A-2 would continue investigation of these cases to establish responsibility for employment and use of these two individuals.

5. The undersigned assumed the responsibility for rescinding instructions of the Chief of the Air Staff to discharge these two individuals and the implied approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff of recommendations by G-2, also to that effect.

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Hq. Army Air Forces
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OCT 23 1942
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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: Aln/[illegible] Date 3/21/75

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Protest of Navy Department upon the Employment of H.U. Sverdrup and W.H. Munk.

3373
GES/hd

1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2 1942 10-21

1. It is desired that you make an immediate investigation of the enclosed report to the Deputy Chief of Staff by Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2. You will conduct your investigation through General McClelland, Director of Technical Services.

3. You will take the necessary action to terminate at once the employment of these two individuals.

4. Recommendation will be made hereon as to the disciplinary action to be taken by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces for the indiscreet action of his subordinates.

383.4 (102)

Incl:
Above mentioned memo dated 10-21

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

AFDIS-CD/1
JCM/gfg 72793

2 NOV 7 1942

1. Pursuant to paragraph one, item one above, an investigation has been conducted and report thereof is inclosed.

2. Upon authority, item one of R & R dated 10-23-42, AFDAS to AFABI from L. S. Kuter, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Air Staff, action to terminate the employment of H. V. Sverdrup and W. H. Munk has been deferred.

3. Investigation indicates that as to subject, Munk, a naturalized American citizen, the Office of the Director of Weather acted with due diligence in requesting a clearance for his employment from The Provost Marshal General, and that while confidential information was divulged to Munk pending subject's clearance such action is authorized.

4. Investigation further reveals that the subject, Sverdrup, an alien, was not employed by the Office of the Director of Weather, but that his services were contracted for with his employer, the University of California, and that in accordance with Army Regulations a request for clearance for the employment of the alien was submitted to the Office of The Provost Marshal General by the University of California on or about September 15, 1942, and that clearance was issued by the P.M.G. dated October 1, 1942, authorizing the use of the alien's services under the contract between the Army Air Forces and the University of California.

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DECLASSIFIED SECRET

Protest of Navy Department upon the Employment of H. U. Sverdrup and W. H. Munk.

2 AFAEI AFCAS 1942

5. No disciplinary action as to the Director of Weather is recommended.

6. With reference to the action of Captain Charles Hurley, Personnel Clearance Unit, Counter Intelligence Division, A-2, investigation indicates that on September 11, 1942, Captain Hurley reviewed reports containing adverse information concerning Munk from the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service.

7. The policy of the Personnel Clearance Unit, C.I.D., has been to communicate to the employing agency the substance of adverse reports concerning employees provided the identity of the individual is definitely established and the information is such as to affect the advisability of his continuing on the job pending completion of the investigation.

8. In this instance it was definitely established that the subject, Munk, and the subjects of the adverse reports were identical, and the information contained in these reports was derogatory in that:

a. Chief of Naval Operations objected to subject's employment in the University of Chicago.

b. Subject was stated to be the protege of Dr. H. V. Sverdrup accused of pro-German tendencies and subversive tendencies.

c. N.I.S. had recommended that subject be removed from work on secret and confidential projects.

d. Munk was the subject of extensive investigation by the F.B.I.

9. It is believed that Captain Hurley's failure to transmit this information to the Director of Weather was not in compliance with the policy of the Personnel Clearance Unit, C.I.D. He did, however, cause further investigation of Munk to be instituted by the Office of The Provost Marshal and also made diligent effort to obtain the report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which report has not been made available to the present date. Attention is invited to the fact that clearance has never been issued by Personnel Clearance Unit, C.I.D., for Munk's employment.

10. It is recommended that Captain Hurley be admonished for his failure to transmit adverse information concerning Munk in his possession to the Office of the Director of

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Protest of Navy Department upon the Employment of H. V. Sverdrup and W.H. Munk.

2 AFABI AFCAS 1942 Weather and that he be instructed to use due discretion in this regard in similar cases in the future.

11. The action of the Office of The Provost Marshal General in issuing clearance dated October 1, 1942, on Sverdrup has not been made the subject of inquiry in this investigation inasmuch as it was not within the scope of the directive.

12. It is recommended that a memorandum similar in form to the inclosed memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, subject: "Protest of Navy Department upon the Employment of H. V. Sverdrup and W. H. Munk." be sent to George V. Strong, Major General, A. C. of S., G-2.

NOV - 7 1942
RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G. S. C.

3 Incls.
Added 2 incls.
Memo to Chief, C.I.D., dated 10-30-42.
Suggested Memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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3 AFCAS AFABI 11-8 MAL/imm 5265

General Stratemeyer does not understand paragraph 12, preceding item. If inclosure #3 is referred to, you should so state by the simple remark "It is recommended that the attached memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, be signed by the Chief of the Air Staff."

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incls
n.c.

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GHR:bje 4700

4. AFABI AFCAS 1942
Hq. Army Air [illegible] 11-9

NOV 9 1942
AAG Received

1. It is recommended that the attached memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, be signed by the Chief of the Air Staff.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G.S.C.

Incls: n/c

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 8/31/75

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MAG

Personnel Security Questionnaires.

JPP:cpi 5484

1 AFMAG AFDIS 1942 (Counter Intel. Div.) 10-22

1. Submitted herewith are Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following personnel in the office of the Air Adjutant General:

Bonde, Robert C.
OK → Echols, Mary J. → 11/16/42.
Hassee, Wayne W.
Davenport, Oliver
Raphael, George
Rugg, Madge L.
Van Horn, Roy M.
Heller, Lucille V.
Davis, Mildred I.

Dispatched
OCT 22 1942
AAG

Att: 9 Forms NNI-140

HENRY B. HOHMAN,
Major, A. G. D.,
Act'g Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

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383.4 (99)

To Mail & Record Room
Date 10-22-42
EXECUTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE JPP
B & G
CIVILIAN PERS.
FISCAL
INSPECTION
INTELLIGENCE
LEGAL
MATERIEL
MEDICAL
MILITARY PERS.
PLANS
TRAIN. & OPER.
W. COM. AERO BD.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] C. Date: 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel - Form NNI-140.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				RHR/np 71130
1.	AFMAG Adm. Div.	AFMAG Coord. Div. Att'n: Mrs. Pointer	1942 10-14	1. Attached hereto is investigation Form NNI-140 for Lucille V. Heller assigned to this Office. RHR R. H. RYAN, Major, Air Corps, Actg Ass't Air Adj. Gen. 1 Incl:- Form NNI-140

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3-1109 A.F.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 3/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Questionnaires for new personnel

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				ART:SPK 2484
1	AFMAG (Photo Sec.)	AFMAG (Adm. Sec.)	1942 10-20	1. Submitted herewith are Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following listed personnel of the AFMAG Photographic Section: Bonde, Robert C. ok Echols, Mary Jane → 11/16/42 Hassee, Wayne W. Davenport, Oliver Raphael, George Rugg, Madge L. Van Horn, Roy M. J. L. Albright J. L. ALBRIGHT, Chief, Photographic Section. Att: 7 Forms NNI-140

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3-1109 A.F.

PAGE

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation of Civilian Personnel. (Page 2)

JPP/[illegible] S.[illegible]

1. AFMAG (CONT)	~~AFMAG~~ a7 AIS	1942	Davenport, Oliver
	C. I.	10-10	Dusk, Zelima
	Div.		Elwood, Cassie M.
			Epps, John L.
			Fihelly, Stella C.
			Givens, Clarence C.
			Hall, Frederick F.
			Kinnard, Darnell R.
			Miller, Robert E.
			Moore, Sherman W.
			Munnings, Bernice H.
			Murray, Dolores, M.
			Helms, Frank L.
			Noble, Raymon A.
			O'Kelly, Jack
			Pierce, L. P.
			Reed, Joseph L.
			Rickard, Julia S.
			Roache, William T.
			Ruddle, Wilda E.
			Shulman, Albert - Investigation reported completed but form not previously submitted.
			Smith, Lawrence
			Thompson, Earl J.
			Young, John R.

3. The following forms were filled out by former employees of the Air Adjutant General's Office and are returned herewith for proper disposition. It is desired that these investigations be cancelled:

Dauer, Charles	Cantrell, Wallace E.
Horowitz, Norman	Hingley, James V.

4. The following Forms NNI-140 have been destroyed:

52589	561394	657823
27149	561422	657817
443529	561482	657825
561265	561448	657835
561293	561456	103013
561361	607983	103014
561388	657814	90121

Incls:-
Forms NNI-140
Forms NNI-140
Marked "Void".

H. B. [illegible]
Major, A. G. D.
Ass't Air Adj. General.

Dispatched
OCT 11 1942
AAG
File
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Air AS 383.4 (98)

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Photo. M&C
Tech. Imp.
Pub. Rel.
Civ. Pers.
9. Advoc.
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
Rec. C.
P. C.

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/24/75 DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

JPP/mp

1. AFMAG AFDIS 1942
C. I. 10-10
Div.

1. Reference R&R, this Office, dated 10/3/42, paragraph two (2), forwarded herewith are Forms NNI-140 with exceptions as shown below:

Atkins, W. J.	-	Discharge pending.
Best, Mabel I.	-	Form attached.
Cannady, Ernest	-	" "
Dillard, Leon G.	-	" "
DiTommaso, M. A.	-	Out indefinitely on sick leave.
Dinsmore, Dorothy L.	-	Form attached.
Garnes, Leander	-	" "
Grandy, A. R.	-	" "
Hitt, Sarah, E.	-	" "
Johnson, J. B.	-	" "
Long, James A.	-	" "
Melnick, Lucile E.	-	" "
McLaughlin, C. M.	-	" "
Monfort, D. S.	-	Form attached.
Montgomery, B. E.	-	" "
Mullaney, J. J.	-	" "
North, Edward G.	-	" "
Payne, K. W.	-	" "
Piper, E. L.	-	" "
Randolph, M. F.	-	Listed on R&R under former name of Peck. Form attached.
Richardson, V. M.	-	Out indefinitely on sick leave.
Stephens, Harrison	-	Form attached.
Stickney, E. H.	-	Form attached.
Stecker, S. M.	-	" "
Walton, E. F.	-	" "
Weakley, N.	-	" "
Wehrell, M. M.	-	" "

2. Also forwarded herewith are Forms NNI-140 for the following additional employees of the Air Adjutant General's Office:

Addison, Richard L.
Bailey, Vernice H.
Broadus, Horace W.
Browne, Robert L.
Coates, Walter H.
Cornman, Mary W.

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
[illegible]
A-4/AS
Insp/AS
[illegible]
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Org.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

(CON'T)

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DOD Ltrs. 8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By Ala Lee IAG, Date 3/4/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS JEC:JB 5789
1	AFMAG EX	AFMAG (Col. Stevenson)	1942 10-5	With reference to the paragraph #2 of the attached R&R, AFMAG to AFDIS, dated October 3, 1942, it is requested that you get behind these and forward the completed forms as soon as practicable. J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. 1 Incl. R&R 10-3-42 fr AFMAG to AFDIS RHR/np 71130
2.	AFMAG Adm.	AFMAG Exec. Att'n: Col. Cooley	1942 10-9	1. In compliance with comment No. 1 above, the following Forms NNI-140 are submitted: Atkins, W. J. - Discharge pending. Best, Mabel I. - Form attached. Cannady, Ernest - " " Dillard, Leon G. - " " DiTommaso, M. A. - Out indefinitely on Sick Leave. Dinsmore, Dorothy L. - Form attached. Garnes, Leander - " " Grandy, A. R. - " " Hitt, Sarah, E. - " " Johnson, J. B. - " " Long, James A. - " " Melnick, Lucile E. - " " McLaughlin, C. M. - Still out on LWOP Status. Monfort, D. S. - Form attached. Montgomery, B. E. - " " Mullaney, J. J. - " " Payne, K. W. - " " (CON'T)

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(Do not use this space) AGO Form No. 48-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel. (Page 2)

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				RHR/np 71130
2. (Cont)	AFMAG Adm. Div.	AFMAG Exec. Att'n: Col. Cooley	1942 10-9	Piper, E. L. - Form attached. Randolph, M. F. - " " Former name - Peek, M. F. Richardson, V. M. - Out indefinitely on Sick Leave. Stephens, H. - Form attached. Stickney, E. H. - " " Stocker, S. M. - " " Walton, E. F. - " " Weakley, N. - " " Wehrell, M. M. - " " 2. The following forms were filled out by former employees of the Air Adjutant General's Office and are returned herewith for proper disposition. It is desired that these investigations be cancelled: Dauer, Charles Horowitz, Norman Cantrell, Wallace E. Hingley, James W. 3. The following Forms NNI-140 have been destroyed: Number 52589 Number 561448 " 27149 " 561456 " 443529 " 607983 " 561265 " 657814 " 561293 " 657823 " 561361 " 657817 " 561394 " 657825 " 561422 " 657835 " 90121 Incls: R&R - 10-3-42 22 Forms NNI-140 4 Forms NNI-140 marked "Void". R. H. RYAN, Major, Air Corps, Actg Ass't Air Adj.Gen.

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3-1109 A.F.

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DOD ltrs.
1 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 3/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Additional NNI-140 forms.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFMAG	AFMAG Col. Cooley	1942 10-9	RHR -- Miss Smith - 3493

1. Attached are the forms NNI-140 for additional personel of the Air Adjutant General.

Addison, Richard Livingston
Bailey, Vernice Hill
Broadus, Horace Wilbur
Browne, Robert Lennard
Coates, Walter Howard
Cornman, Mary Wright
Davenport, Oliver
Duck, Zellma
Elwood, Cassie Mae
Epps, John Lucius
Fihelly, Stella Crone
Givens, Clarence Calvin
Hall, Frederick Franklin
Kinnard, Darnell Roy
Miller, Robert E.
Moore, Sherman William
Munnings, Bernice Helen
Murray, Dolores Marie
Nelms, Frank Lindsey
Noble, Raymond ~~Noble~~ Augusta
O'Kelly, Jack
Pierce, Loydann Perry
Reed, Joseph Laurence
Rickard, Julia Sterling
Roache, William Thomas
Ruddle, Wilda Etta
Shulman, Albert (Investigation has been made but form has not been submitted.)
Smith, Lawrence
Thompson, Earl Joseph
Young, John Regenald

RHR

RICHARD H. RYAN
Major, Air Corps,
Act. Ass't. Air Adj. Gen.

Hq. Army Air Forces
OCT 9 1942
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6 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: Ala/AS LC Date 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AFDIS-CD/2
File No. CD/2-3220

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of MABIE, Ida Mary

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS	AFCAS	OCT 6 1942	AFDIS-CD/2 CH/rs - 6651 1. The investigation of MABIE, Ida Mary has been completed, and discloses no derogatory information. for A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
		Hq. Army Air Forces OCT 6 1942 AAG Received		
2	AFCAS	AFMAG	10-7	MAL/imm 5246 For file. M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C. File Ci 10/7/42

383.4 (97)

(Do not use reverse side) F-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

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Page No. _____

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2-209

Air ab 383.4 (97)

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DOD Dir. 5 Jan & 30 June 1954
By: ___ I.C. Date ___

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Investigation of Charles Dauer

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG Chief, Central Mail Section	AFMAG Chief, Office Service Division	1942 9/8	DPE/mll 2508 1. There is returned herewith for proper disposition Form NNI-140, No. 27135, which was completed by Charles Dauer, a former employee of this office. It is desired that this investigation be cancelled as Mr. Dauer was inducted into the Army on August 22, 1942. 1 Attachment: Form NNI-140, No. 27135 RHR Thomas C. Hollick THOMAS C. HOLLICK 1st Lieut., Air Corps

3-1100 A.F.

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: Alm/AS I.C. Date: 3/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	MAG
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Form NNI-140 Investigation of Personnel

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				mlz 73043
1.	AFMAG Pub. Div.	~~AFMAG~~ AFDIS Counter Intel. Div.	1942 9-28	1. Attached herewith are investigation Forms NNI-140 for personnel assigned to this Division handling classified material. The names of these individuals are: James Morton Gordon Ernest James Scala David Cromwell Wilson Incls. 3 J. E. PUNG Captain, A.C.

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DOD Ltr.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: LC Date

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO	DECLASSIFIED
FILE NO	

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Questionnaires

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG (Photo. Sec.)	AFMAG (Adm. Sec.)	1942 9-29	ART:SPK 2484 1. Submitted herewith are Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following listed personnel of the AFMAG Photographic Section: Battle, Hughey J. Biery, Galen A. McGuire, John J. Morris, Vada L. Nelmes, Edwin G. Smith, Walter W. Witcher, James O. 2. Mary A. DiTommaso, on sick leave since September 14, 1942 will accomplish Form NNI-140 upon her return. J. L. Albright J. L. ALBRIGHT, Ch., Photo. Sec. Att: 7 Forms NNI-140

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3-1109 A.F.

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 3/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Questionnaires

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG (Photo Sec.)	AFMAG (Adm. Sec.)	1942 9-30	ART:SPK 2484 1. Submitted herewith are Forms NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaires, for the following listed personnel of the AFMAG Photographic Section: Best, Cort W. Douglas, Frederick A. Johnson, Ted J. Key, Walter W. Mullen, William J. Stellato, Frank A. J. L. ALBRIGHT, JLA. Ch., Photo. Sec. Att: 6 Forms NNI-140

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3-1109 A.F.

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 3/31/75

SUBJECT: Military personnel suspected of disloyalty or subversive activity.

2d Ind. (AFMAG)

WD HQ ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington, D.C. October 1, 1942
TO: Commanding Officer, Fiftieth Troop Carrier Wing, Warrensburg, Missouri.

Attached are copies of the two letters requested in basic communication.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adjutant General

2 Incls.
#1- Ltr AG 014.311 (5-14-42) MC-B-M 5-19-42
#2- Ltr AG 324.11 (2-25-41) EA-A 6-6-41

Dispatched
OCT 2 1942
AAG

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
[illegible]
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Log. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

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Air AG 383.4(93)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

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1st Ind.
Headquarters, I Troop Carrier Command, Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana, September 28, 1942. To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., Attention: The Air Adjutant.

1. Request that the two letters cited in basic communication be forwarded direct.

For the Commanding General:

P.R.LOVE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2.

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DOD ltrs.
8 July & 20 June 1974
By: AA/AC, Date 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

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Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
5	AFMAG (Ex)	ADMIN. div. (Col. Whitney Rm 3216)	1942 9-23	1. Attached are NNI Forms 140 for civilian personnel of your division listed in paragraph 1d of Item #3 above. 2. The names which are circled are in other divisions. 3. Please have the forms completed as soon as possible and return them with these papers to me. JBC J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. Incls. NNI Forms 140
6.	AFMAG Adm. Div.	AFMAG (Exec) Col. Cooley	1942 10-1	CGS/np 71130 1. Forwarded herewith are Forms NNI-140 for all employees listed in 1 d, item No. 3 except the following: Alexander, T. J. - Military Furlough Status. Allen, V. C. - Transferred. Atkins, W. J. - On S/L - will be forwarded later. Austin, A. R. - LWOP status for one year. Baiardo, S. P. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Bendit, E. E. - Transferred. Best, M. I, - On A/L - will be forwarded later. Boucher, W. R. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Brannon, C. E. - Transferred to Office of Sec. of War For Air. Breen, D. T. - Resigned. Broderick, O. F. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42, under former name of Duenas, O.F. Brothers, J. J. - Transferred. Bryant, R. W. - Resigned. Burke, E. H. - Transferred. (CON'T)

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AiAG 383.4 (92)

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
6. (Cont)	AFMAG Adm. Div.	AFMAG Exec.	1942 10-1	Burns, C. J. - Suspended pending discharge. Cannady, E. - Form will be submitted later. Casale, A. S. - LWOP status until induction into Service. Catanzaro, Y. N. - Transferred. Coleman, M. O. - Resigning. Corrigan, V. L. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Danchik, A. L. - Transferred. Dillard, L. - Form will be submitted later. DiTommaso, M.A. - On S/L - Form will be submitted later. Dinsmore, D. L. - Form will be submitted later. Finks, M. - On Military Furlough Status. Fischer, H. C. - Resigned. Garnes, L. - Form will be submitted later. Gibson, J. T. - Transferred. Grandy, A. R. - On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Greenspan, L.P. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Griffin, A.S. - Military Furlough Status. Hawkins, E. R. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Hayden, E. A. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Helsel, J. E. - " " " " " " Hill, W. M. - " " " " " 8/26/42. Hillman, R. L. - Reassigned to Military Personnel Division. Hitt, S. E. - On S/L - Form will be submitted later. Hollihan, J. M. - Resigning. Hutchinson, G. L. Resigned. Ickes, M. L. - LWOP status for six months. Janofsky, D. F. - Transferred. Jensen, J. W. - Resigned. Johnson, E. J. - Resigned. Johnson, J. B. - Form will be submitted later. King, K. W. - No record of this person in office. LeVage, T. C. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Levine, S. - Military Furlough Status. Lewis, R. E. - LWOP Status. Linduff, M. - Transferred. Lipscomb, E. F. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Long, James - Form will be submitted later. Lowry, C. - Resigned. Mackall, J. P. - Transferred. McClendon, M. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. McElroy, M. A. - " " " " " 8/5/42. McLaughlin, C.M. - LWOP Status for one month. Melnick, L. E. - S/L - Form will be submitted later. Monfort, D. S. - Form will be submitted later. Montgomery, B. E. On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Moore, B. J. - Resigning. Morow, S. M. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Mullaney, J. J. - Form will be submitted later.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO	

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
6. (Cont)	AFMAG Adm. Div.	AFMAG Exec.	1942 10-1	Muth, T. K. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/5/42 O'Connor, J.M.- Military Furlough Status. Patterson, G. E. Resigned. Payne, K. W. - On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Peek, M. F. - Form will be submitted later. Piper, E. L. - Form will be submitted later. Proctor, M.L. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Richardson, V.M. On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Risavy, N. M. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Schibley, R. D. Resigned. Schwartz, S. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Smith, A. B. - Resigned. Smith, B. A. - Resigned. Smith, S. W. - Resigned. Standley, K.N.- Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Stephens, H. - On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Stephens, L. P. Form submitted by R&R dated 9/11/42. Stevens, A. N.- Form " " " " " Stickney, E.H.- On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Stocker, S. M.- Form will be submitted later. Stone, I. D. - Transferred. Street, R. L. - Form submitted by R&R dated 9/19/42. Strickland, M.E.- Resigned. Thomas, W. D.- Resigned. Tibbetts, B. G. Resigning. Trainum, M. F.- LWOP Status for one year. Trufant, L.W. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42 under former name of Wankell, L. Wagstaff, F.M.- Transferred. Walton, E. F. - On S/L - Form will be submitted later. Weakley, N. - On A/L - Form will be submitted later. Webster, M.E. - Form submitted by R&R dated 5/29/42. Wehrell, M. M.- On S/L - Form will be submitted later. Weinberger, E.W. - Form submitted by R&R dated 8/21/42. Wilson, C. A. - Resigned. Womack, D. L. - Transferred. Wright, M. E. - LWOP Status. Wright, T. C. - Resigned. Wyatt, J. T. - Military Furlough. 2. Also forwarded herewith are forms for the following employees listed in 1 c, item No, 3: Hampton, B. B. McCorkle, J. T. Van Horn, D. H. Winthrop, J. Incls: Forms NNI-140 C. G. STEVENSON, Maj., AC., Actg Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

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By: [illegible] LC; Date 3/31/75

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-21 1. Request investigation be initiated on the above mentioned employees.

J.B.C.
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

3 Incls. n-c

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

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Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of civilian personnel

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG (Ex)	Coord. Div. (Maj.Hohman, Rm 2215)	1942 9-23	1. Attached are NNI Form 140 for accomplishment by following personnel in Coordination Division: Adams, C. B. Gentile, E. L. Johnson, F.L. Lane, L. D. Rineer, I.D. Schrimpf, C.E. Townley, D. M. 2. Please have them completed and return to me as soon as practicable. Incls. NNI Forms 140 JBC J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G.
2	AFMAG (Coord.)	AFMAG (Ex)	1942 9/24	HBH/mlb 5787 1. Herewith NNI Form 140 completed by the following personnel: Adams, C. B. Gentile, E. L. Johnson, F. L. Lane, L. D. Rineer, I. D. Schrimpf, C. E. 2. Miss Townley had completed this form and turned it in to Colonel Whitney's office (Miss Prencipe) prior to transfer to this division. HENRY B. HOHMAN Major, A. G. D.

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
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AFDIS-CD/2
2D-49217

Safeguarding Classified Documents and Files.

1 AFDIS AFMAG SEP 17 1942 KmK/amw 6695

1. Attached hereto, for your information, is a copy of a report made by this Directorate to the Division concerned, as a result of inspection made on the night of September 10, 1942, by officer personnel of this Directorate, under the provisions of memorandum, above subject, AAF 313.3, July 15. 1942.

1 Inc.
Cy R/R to AFRBS

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

383.4 (90)

2 AFMAG AFTAI 9-18

1. Attention is invited to Item #1 above and to the inclosure thereto.

2. In view of the relatively excessive number of derelictions occurring in AFRBS, this correspondence is transmitted to you for such action as you may deem appropriate.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

1 Incl.
n-c

Dispatched
SEP 18 1942
AAG

File
ei 9/18/42

File Copy

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ab/AW I.C. Date: 5/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
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AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2- 2439
CD/2- 2441

File No.

Tally No. AAF

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 17 1942	CH/epp - 6651 1. The following civilian employees have reported for duty with the Directorate of Intelligence Service where they will have access to classified documents: a. LAYMAN, Helene Z. b. McNAUGHTON, James H. 2. A request for a loyalty investigation of the above named employees has been made to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and P. M. G. Forms NNI-140 for each of the above named subjects have been submitted in accordance with the directive from the W. D. "AG-Ltr., 321.19 M. I. D. (2-26-42) MB-M", dated March 7, 1942. for A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
				File 9/19/42

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AG. Army Air Force
17 942
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F-4071, AF, Rev. 8/18/41

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
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ROUTING AND [redacted] SHEET

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AFDIS/CD/2
File No. CD/2-2337

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of JAWORSKA, Leona Kathryn.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFCAS	SEP 16 1942	CH/gw 6651 1. The investigation of JAWORSKA, Leona Kathryn, of your office has been completed and discloses no derogatory information. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
				Hq. Army Air Forces 16 1942 AAG Received
				no longer employd in ocofas.

383.4 (88)

DECLASSIFIED

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[redacted]

Air Ord 383.4 (88)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AN/AW LC: Date 3/31/75

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

383.4 (87)

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-15
Att.Col.
Cutting

1. Attention is invited to Item #1 above.

2. The employees listed are new employees.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

10 Incls.
NNI Forms

File
ci 9/16/42

Dispatched
SEP 16 1942
AAG

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8 Jany & 20 June 1974
By: AN/AWC Date 3/31/75

Investigation of Civilian Personnel

2 AFMAG AFDIS 1942
9-15

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2 of your R&R AFDIS CD/2-2153, to this office.

2. Since Carl J. Ettore has been inducted into the service and is no longer employed in this office, request that his name be deleted from the list submitted.

3. With respect to paragraph 3 of your R&R PMGO (ID) Forms #20 on six (6) civilian employees of this office were transmitted to you by R&R on 9-11-42.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

1 Incl.
Cpy R&R, CD/2-2153
9-14-42

File
li 9/16/42

Dispatched
SEP 15 1942
AAG

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
Civ. Def.
Bomb.
Civ. Rep.
Base S.
War O&M
Int. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
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Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

383.4 (86)

Air AG 383.4 (86)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 3/21/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-2153

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 14 1942	REFERENCE R&R/9-9-42 CH/epp - 6651 Tally No. AAF-63 1. Investigations have been initiated concerning the civilian personnel of your office on whom forms were submitted with reference R&R with the exception of the following: a. Pvt. Russell T. Scott - Investigation of military personnel is made by the Military Intelligence Service. Accordingly, the completed PMG Form NNI-140 in this case will not be forwarded to the Provost Marshal General, but the necessary information has been taken from the form and transmitted to the Military Intelligence Service, Counter Intelligence Group, for investigation. b. The records of this Division reveal that the investigation of Pearl C. Powers has been completed with satisfactory results and that a notification to this effect was forwarded to your office on July 16, 1942. 2. Paragraph 2 of Comment 2 of reference R&R advised that a completed Form NNI-140 had been forwarded to this Division by R&R dated August 21, 1942 for Carl J. Ettare. This Division has no record of the receipt of subject form and it is recommended that a form be submitted at an early date. 3. Pursuant to telephone conversation between Lt. Col. J. B. Cooley of your office and Lt. Col. Theodore S. Cutting of this Division on September 11, 1942, reports received by your office from the Provost Marshal General are to be forwarded to this Division for association with the records on other personnel of Headquarters, Army Air Forces. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.

Army Air Forces
15 1942
Received

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W-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: LC, Date

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECLASSIFIED

AFDIS-CD/2

CD/2- 2155

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 14 1942	CH/epp - 6651 1. The following civilian employees have reported for duty with the Directorate of Intelligence Service where they will have access to classified material: a. BOATMAN, Olive L. b. DIXON, Roger C. c. WRIGHT, Robert B. 2. A request for a loyalty investigation of the above named employees has been made to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and P. M. G. Forms NNI-140 have been submitted in accordance with directive from the W. D. "AG-Ltr., 321.19 M. I. D. (2-26-42) MB-M," dated March 7, 1942. for A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
			9/16	file gsc

AAF 383.4

Hq. Army Air Forces
15 1942
Received

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Page No. _____

AAF 383.4

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By Atn Pas LC Date 3/31/75

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AFDIS-CD/2
File No. CD/2-2143

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 11 1942	CH/hma 6651 1. The following civilian employees have reported for duty in the Directorate of Intelligence Service where they will have access to classified documents: a. TUCKER, Florence B. b. WATSON, Anna L. 2. A request for loyalty investigation of the above named employees has been made to the office of the Provost Marshal General and P.M.G. Forms NNI-140 have been submitted in accordance with directive from the W. D., AG-Ltr. 321.19 M. I. D. (2-26-42"), MB-M", dated March 7, 1942. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
2	AFMAG	Classified Mail Unit (Att. Lt. Hollick, Rm 3151)	9-12	I cannot determine why AFDIS sends these reports to us. Are you interested in them? J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. 1 Incl. Cpy AG 321.19 MID
3.	AFMAG Central Mail	AFMAG Col. Cooley	9-14	CBC;s 2508 This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 7a of Office Memorandum 40-15, OCAC, dated August 20, 1941. However, Hq. Office Instruction No. 10-7, August 13, 1942, rescinds the abovementioned Memorandum. CLIFTON B. CARTER 1st Lieut., Air Corps

Hq. Army Air
SEP 12 1942
AAG Received

583.4 (84)

9/16 File (Do not use reverse side) F-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

Page No.

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583.4 (84)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Alt/AG LC: Date 3/31/75

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tr. Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

383.4 (83)

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-12

The abovenamed personnel are new employees in the Classified Mail Section handling confidential and secret material. They have started to work since forms on the other personnel were submitted.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

2 ~~Attachments~~ Incls. n-c

Dispatched
SEP 12 1942
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jul. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Investigation of civilian employees.

1 AFMAG AFDIS 1942
Att: Col. 9-11
Cutting

1. Pursuant to your request by telephone (Col.Cutting -Col.Cooley) PMGO (ID) Forms #20 for the following personnel are attached:

Mead, Dorothy M.
Thomas, Bobby B.
Weeks, Helene L.
Niccolson, James L.
Van Horn, Dwaine H.
Wilcox, Jean E.

2. Reference in this respect is made to [illegible] from this office to AFDIS, 9-9-42, subject as above.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

6 Incls.-
PMGO Forms

Dispatched
SEP 12 1942
AAG

File
ci 9/14/42

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

383.4 (82)

Air AG 383.4 (82)

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 26 June 1974
By: Ab/ [illegible] LC, Date 3/21/75

HEADQUA[illegible] CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]RCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-2109

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 10 1942	CH/epp - 6651 1. The Provost Marshal General has been requested to make an investigation involving the subjects listed below who are presently employed in the Directorate of Intelligence Service. a. FOSTER, Wilma O. b. WASDEN, Mayme L. 2. A P. M. G. Form NNI-140 for each of the above mentioned individuals is being forwarded to the Provost Marshal General this date. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
				9/12/42 file. gsc

383.4

(80)

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Ari AS 383.4 (80)

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By ala/RO LC, Date 3/31/75

HEAD [redacted] FORCES
ROUT[redacted] SHEET

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AFDIS-CD/2
CD/2-1332

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFMAG	SEP 10 1942	CH/epp - 6651 1. Miss Rose Marucchi has reported for duty with the Counter Intelligence Division of the Directorate of Intelligence Service where she will have access to classified documents. 2. A request for a loyalty investigation of the above mentioned employee has been made to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and P. M. G. Form NNI-140 has been submitted in accordance with the directive from W. D. "AG-Ltr., 321.19 M. I. D. (2-26-42) MB-M", dated March 7, 1942. for A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
				9/12/42 file. jmc

Hq. Army Air Forces
SEP 10 1942
AAG Received

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W-4071, AF. Rev. 8/14/41

AWAS 383.4 (81)

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LG Date 3/31/75

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Investigation of civilian employees.

1 AFMAG AFDIS 1942
9-10 With reference to R&R dated 9-9-42, from this office to you, attached is Form NNI-140 pertaining to J. M. [illegible] civilian employee.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

1 Incl.
Form NNI-140

File

[illegible]
11 1942
AAG

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
Def.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
Tr. O&M
Inf. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Met. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

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Air AG 3B.4 (79)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AA/AG LC Date 3/31/85

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

383.4 (76)

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-9

1. Attached is completed form pertaining to Mr. Wesley Gray.

2. Robert Carter has enlisted in the Army and is no longer on duty in this office.

3. Form pertaining to Jean Turner was transmitted to your office this date, pursuant to your R&R AFDIS-CD/2 - 648, 8-22-42, Subject: "Investigation of civilian employees".

1 Incl.
Form NNI-140
Gray, Wesley D.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

Dispatched
SEP 9 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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383.4 (76)

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By _____ I.C. Date _____

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AFDIS/CD/2
CD/2- 1041

Investigation of Civilian Personnel.

1 AFDIS AFMAG AUG 29 1942 CH/epp/gw 6651

1. Attached hereto are three P.M.G. Forms NNI-140, for completion by the personnel listed below:

a. GRAY, Wesley.
b. CARTER, Robert.
c. TURNER, Jean.

2. When these forms have been completed and signed, they should be returned to this office for necessary action.

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

3 Incls.:
3 P.M.G. Forms.

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DOD Dir.
5 Nov. & 30 June 1954
By [illegible] Date 8/5/75

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AFABI
EPS:mep
9/18/42
phone 5613

September 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRY GANTZ,
Walter Reed General Hospital,
Army Medical Center,
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Assignment.

1. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter to me dated September 4, 1942, and your letter to General Arnold dated September 15, 1942, and your official request for assignment for overseas duty dated September 16, 1942.

2. There are several items in your record which must be clarified before a decision is made as to your next assignment. Pertinent papers have been transmitted to the Air Inspector with instructions that he conduct an investigation of these items. You will be contacted by the Air Inspector, will be shown the nature of the data which appear in your record, and will be given every opportunity to refute statements which may be derogatory to your record. Your future assignment or disposition will be announced on completion of this investigation.

GEORGE H. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
SEP 19 1942
AAG

CC for Gen. Stratemeyer

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383.4 (75)a

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 3/31/75

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Letter from Lt. Col. Harry Gantz

5373
GES:nl

3. AFCAS Ass't Ch. 1942 of Staff, 9-5 A-2

1. Your attention is invited to another letter under date of September 4th from Col. Harry Gantz which is attached hereto. Note that his address is now Winthrop House, 1727 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

2. It is desired that the status of his case be reported hereon and that a reply be prepared to his letter of September 4th for my signature.

383.4

Incls: Ltr fr Col Gantz 8-20 w/incl cy ltr to Col Gantz, 8/23. R&R #1 AFCAS to A-2 7/22 w/incl. Ltr fr/Col Gantz to Gen Harmon 7/20/42 Cy Memo for Capt. Calvert fr/MIS 7/9/42 re: Col Gantz. Ltr from Col Gantz 9-4-42 to Gen Stratemeyer.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

75

Dispatched
SEP 6
AAG

File
ci 9/6/42

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Mr. Gray
Ass AS 383-4 (75)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
3 July & 20 June 1974
By: Ala/ac LC. Date: 5/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 2D-30666

Tally No. AAF

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel - Mrs. Pearl C. Towers.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFDIS (C. I. Div.)	AFMAG	1942 JUL 16	AFDIS/2D3066 JBC/epp 1. The investigation of Mrs. Pearl C. Towers has been completed and discloses no derogatory information concerning the subject. W. B. Col., G.S.C., Dir. Intel. Ser.
				File w/ [illegible]

Army Air
20 1942
AG Received

383.4 (73)

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383.4 (73)

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COD Rts.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By Atn/AD I.C. Date 3/31/75

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Investigation of Civilians in Statistical Control Section.

AFCAS
GES:pfp 3373

1 AFCAS Director 1942
of 8/30
Management
Control

1. It is desired that you take immediate steps to have all civilians employed in your Statistical Control Section investigated, starting tomorrow morning.

2. I have advised A-2 that this is to be done.

3. Contact A-2 this date and see that the necessary action is taken.

4. General Arnold has directed this.

Cys to A-1, A-2, AFDOP.

George E. Stratemeyer,
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
AUG 31 1942
AAG

File
ci 9/1/42

AAG File Copy

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SECRET

Mr Larson
Avi AG 383.4 (72)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 3/31/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AFDIS/CD/2
File No. CD/2-1470

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Nona Mae Cox

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDIS	AFCAS	AUG 28 1942	CH/hma 6651 1. The investigation of Nona Mae Cox has been completed and discloses no derogatory information. for A. W. BROOK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.
	acas	Our Files		E.P.S.

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 29 1942
AAG Received

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1072 - Mazar Streeter

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[illegible] 383.4 (21) B

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DOD Dirs.
5 Jan/& 30 June 1974
By [illegible] NLC: Date 3/21/05

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG EX.	AFMAG Admin. Div., (Col. Whitney)	1942 8-25	1. Attached are PMG Forms NNI-140 for completion by the following personnel of your office: **Classified Mail Subunit (Gravelly Point Bldg.)** Ellis, Rayford W. Patton, William L. (Completed) **Classified File Unit (Munitions Bldg.)** Anderson, Ora J. (B Anderson married in June) Windsor, Eloise M. **Classified File Subunit (Gravelly Point Bldg.)** Bauer, Doris, Charles **Cable Section** Broskoskie, Alice D. Burkhardt, Leah D. Transferred Chafin, Harriet E. Connellee, Lois M. Dale, Richard Daly, Mary J. Resigned Dick, Lohr M. Resigned Evans, J. Marshall Resigned Fleck, Vera M. Hall, Mary E. McGhee, Nancy E. McPadden, James M. Muth, Tillie K. Shutak, Anna L. Smith, Edna L. Smith, Edna Jane Thaxton, Beverly J. Turner, Jeane M. **Administrative Division (Executive Section)** Bringo, Anna B. Forges, Elvira E. Goldberg, Leah McKenzie, Maxine L. Olson, Axel J. **Publications Division (Reproduction Unit)** Battista, Mary Typ. Lens Laboratories Hopkins, Wendell Jordan, Harvey H. Peloquin, Henry Williams, Eulalia A.

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Air Ab 383-4 (70B)

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DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 3/31/75

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CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Note. — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG EX	AFMAG Coordin. Div. (Col. Milner)	1942 8-25	1. Attached are PMG Forms NNI-140 for completion by the following personnel of your office: Coordination Division Bailen, Mary L. Judge, Edward M. Reznicek, Chrysanthia M. Will, J. Linden 2. Request that the completed forms be assembled as soon as practicable and returned to this office for transmission to AFDIS. J.B.C. J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. 4 Incls. - PMG, NNI-140's.
2.	AFMAG (Coordination)	AFMAG (Exec.)	1942 8/28	FCM/mlb 5787 Executed forms attached. FRED C. MILNER, Colonel, A. G. D.

File

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CONFIDENTIAL

Ans AG 383.4 (70) a

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DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG Exec. continued	AFMAG Admin. Div.,	8-25	Photographic Section Albright, Joseph L. Alston, Pride Bearden, Ellen M. Brown, Leslie L. Cantrell, Wallace E. Resigned Dolan, Peter A. Ettare, Carl J. Resigned Hand, Ralph Hingley, James W. Resigned Horowitz, Norman Trans Humes, Charles Hunt, Louis Hussey, James L. Kopacki, Stella P. LaVigne, Armand A. Leap, James W. Harcey, Talbott L. McDaniels, Edgar Montgomery, Richard D. Olive, Milton J. Pandolfi, Carmine, Jr. Porter, Quentin R. Saunders, Joe Y. Shenk, Donald L. Sherman, Alfred I. Shively, James C. Resigned Speyrer, Bettina J. Talbott, Anna Ruth Thompson, Melville L. Thrasher, Sylvia F. Wallace, Charles A. Warshaw, Israel Weinberger, Edgar W. Wilburn, Alvin V. Wolfe, Manual 2. Request that the completed forms be assembled as soon as practicable and returned to this office for transmission to AFDIS. JBC J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. 68 Incls.- PMG, NNI-140's.

DECLASSIFIED

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AF, Rev.8/14/41

CONFIDENTIAL

Page No. _____

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: AHR/AN LC; Date 3/6/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	MAG
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Form NNI-140 - Investigation of Personnel

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				LBC:z 73043
1.	AFMAG Pub. Div.	AFMAG	1942 8-26	1. Attached herewith are investigation Forms NNI-140 for personnel assigned to this Division handling classified material. The names of these individuals are as follows: Frazier, Jean J. Gore, Boyd J. Hill, Daniel J. Huntley, Charles H. Martin, Allen Shacklett, Howard Smith, Jack L. Tucker, John A. Watts, Fernand C. White, Jack E. White, James E. L. B. CHAPMAN Major, A.C.

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PAGE ____

3-1109 A.F.

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DOD Dir.
8 Sept. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NC, Date 5/21/75

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No.

Tally No. AAF

Note.—A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS — CGS:lg - 71130
2	AFMAG (Admin.)	AFMAG (Ex.)	1942 9/5	1. Attached are PMG Forms MNI-140 for the following personnel:

Classified File Subunit - Gravelly Point Bldg.

Dauer, Charles

Cable Section

Broskoskie, Alice D.
Chafin, Harriet E.
Connellee, Lois M.
Dale, Richard E.
McGhee, Nancy E.
Muth, Tillie K.
Shutak, Anna L.
Smith, Edna Lucille
Smith, Elva J.
Thaxton, Beverly J
Turner, Jeane M.
Klein, Evelyn R.
Libowitz, Lillian
Mead, Dorothy M.
Thomas, Bobby B.
Weeks, Helene L.

Executive Section

Forges, Elvira E.
Goldberg, Leah
Powers, Pearl C.

A.A.F. Library

Wright, Robert E.

Photo Section

MacDaniels, Edgar

2. Forms are not submitted with respect to the following personnel listed in Item #1 for the following reasons:

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W-4071, AC, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No.

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By ... DC, Date ...

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. .....

Tally No. AAF .....

Note.—A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
2	continued.			

<u>Classified Mail Subunit</u> - Gravelly Point Bldg.

Ellis, Rayford W. - Form was submitted to AFDIS by R&R dated August 21, 1942.

Patton, William L.- Investigation was completed on July 27, 1942.

<u>Classified File Unit</u> - Munitions Bldg.

Anderson, Ora J. - Form submitted under the name of Ora B. Jenkins by R&R dated May 29, 1942. This person was married in June 1942 and her present name is Ora J. Anderson.

Windsor, Eloise M. -Form was submitted to AFDIS by R&R dated August 21, 1942.

<u>Cable Section</u>

Daly, Mary J. - Resigned
Dick, Lohr M. - Resigned
Evans, J. Marshall- Resigned
Fleck, Vera M. - Claims that she has filled out form but there is no record of receipt of same in this office. A new form will be sent her.

Hall, Mary E. - Claims that she has filled out form but there is no record of receipt of same in this office. A new form will be sent her. OK. Form Completed. Gray

McPadden, James M.- Claims that he has filled out form but there is no record of receipt of same in this office. A new form will be sent him.

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Page No._____

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No.

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Tally No. AAF

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Employees.

NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
2		continued		

Executive Section

Bringo, Anna B. - Form was submitted to AFDIS by R&R dated August 21, 1942.

McKensie. L. Maxine-Form was submitted to AFDIS by R&R dated August 21, 1942.

Olson, Axel J. - Form was submitted to AFDIS by R&R dated August 21, 1942.

Publications Section - Reproduction Unit

Battista, Mary - On one year leave of absence.
Jordan, Harvey H. - Form submitted by R&R to AFDIS June 18, 1942.
Hipkins, Wendell - Form submitted by R&R to AFDIS June 18, 1942.
Peloquin, Henry - Form submitted by R&R to AFDIS May 29, 1942.
Williams, Eulalia A. Form submitted by R&R to AFDIS Aug. 5, 1942.

3. Forms were submitted to AFDIS for all personnel listed in Item #1 under the Photo Section by R&R dated August 21, 1942, except the following:

Cantrell, Wallace E. Resigned
Hingley, James W. - Resigned
Horowitz, Norman - Transferred out of section.
MacDaniels, Edgar - Form submitted herewith.
Shively, James C. - Resigned
[redacted]

CHARLES G. STEVENSON,
Major, A.C.,
Actg. Asst. Air A.G.

22 Incls:
PMG Forms MNI-140.

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W-4071, AC. Rev. 8/14/41

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Gen. Ltr.
Dec. 31, 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 5/31/75

List of civilian personnel.

1 AFMAG AFDIS 1942
(Att.Maj. 9-9
Cutting)

Pursuant to your recent request by telephone to me, attached is a list of civilian employees of the Air A.G. office.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

1 Incl.
list

Dispatched
SEP 10 1942
AAG

File
G

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
[illegible]
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

AirAG 383.4 (69) B

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 3/31/75

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

AAF 230

SUBJECT: List of Civilian Personnel.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS CGS/pop Ex. 4583
1.	AFMAG Adm.Div.	AFMAG Executive	1942 9-7	Herewith is list, in duplicate, of all civilian personnel employed in the Office of the Air Adjutant General. C. G. STEVENSON Major, A.C. Acting Asst. Air Adjutant General 1 Incl. (in dup.) List as of 9-7-42.

(Do not use reverse side)

U-0071.AF. Rev.8/10/41

Page No. _____

LIST OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICE OF THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL AS OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1942

Abell, M. F.
Abrahim, E. R.
Abraham, R. A.
Adams, C. R.
Addison, R. L.
Albright, J. L.
Alexander, T. J.
Allen, R. V.
Allen, V. C.
Alston, P.
Amos, J. G.
Anderson, A.
Anderson, C. J.
Anderson, W. Q.
Apgar, H. L.
Arvilla, E. V.
Armstrong, J.
Armstrong, W.
Asmin, E.
Atkins, W. J.
Aurynger, J. J.
Austin, A. R.
Bacher, R. R.
Balardo, S. P.
Bailen, M. L.
Banks, C. F.
Barnes, R. L.
Baron, S. B.
Batt, M. F.
Battle, H. J.
Bayley, S. M.
Bearden, R. M.
Belscher, M. L.
Bender, J.
Bendit, E. E.
Benjamin, J. L.
Bernson, B. E.
Best, M. I.
Bice, C. C.
Biery, S. A.
Beardley, E. M.
Bobo, M. D.
Boch, M. E.
Bogan, J. D.
Bostick, L. E.
Bowker, W. E.
Bounds, J. M.
Braley, B. J.
Brannen, C. E.
Breen, D. T.
Breen, M. M.
Bringe, A. B.
Broadus, M. W.
Broderick, C. F.
Bronson, R. L.
Brooks, J. R.
Brosheckie, A. D.
Brothers, J. J.
Brown, L. L.
Bryant, R. W.
Burke, E. H.
Burns, C. J.
Cannady, E.
Carey, L. E.
Carmody, W. E.
Carpenter, C. C.
Carter, R. L.
Casale, A. S.
Catanzaro, T. M.
Cesario, S. S.
Chafin, M. E.
Champion, W. C.
Chaney, J.
Chase, M. M.
Chew, W. C.
Cobb, C. E.
Coffman, L.
Coleman, L. S.
Coleman, M. C.
Collins, C. L.
Conley, M. C.
Connelee, L. M.
Conroy, E. A.
Cooley, V. D.
Cooper, E. M.
Coplon, A. M.
Corrigan, V. L.
Cox, C. L.
Coyne, J. J.

Craigwell, E. M.
Crandall, F. E.
Crichlow, C. A.
Cross, D. C.
Crow, H. M. Jr.
Cruse, B. O.
Culbertson, D. O.
Cumbee, M. R.
Cummings, R. A.
Dacy, G.
Dale, R.
~~Daly, M. Jr.~~
Danshik, A. L.
Dant, M. E.
Darlington, J. Jr.
~~Dawson, G.~~
Davis, E. R.
Davis, J.
Davis, J. D.
De Dow, P. F.
Dillard, L.
Dinsmore, D. L.
Di Tommaso, M. A.
Ditto, G. T.
Dockery, G. M.

Dolan, M. R.
Dolan, P. A.
Donaldson, M. E.
Doran, D. A.
Drayson, M.
Dunaway, C. E.
Dunaway, E. G.
Dutton, E. F.
Dyer, M.
Echols, E. W.
Edwards, M.
Eilers, E.
Ellis, R. W.
Elvington, H. R.
Erwin, L. L.
Eschbacher, A. V.
Estes, I. F.
Evanche, H.
~~Evans, J. M.~~
Eves, P. E.
Fagan, G. E.
Fanning, L. M.
Feingold, M. C.
Felsberg, L. E.
Fihelly, S. G.

Fike, F. E.
Finks, M.
Fischer, H. C.
Fitzgerald, F. E.
Flock, V. M.
Flores, S. T.
Foley, S., Jr.
Footman, E. E.
Ford, E. S.
Ford, P. S.
Forges, E. E.
Fowler, R. L.
Frank, E.
Frazier, J. J.
Freeman, J. U.
Furney, A. J.
Ganley, J. L., Jr.
Garnes, L.
Garrison, H. H.
Gentile, E. L.
Gibson, J. T.
Gillikin, J. W.
Gillim, Alice
Gitelowitz, J.
Goldberg, L.

Goldsmith, E. J.
Gordon, E. J.
Gordon, J.
Gore, B. J.
Gayke, W. E.
Grandy, A. R.
Grant, A. E.
Gray, W. D.
Greenspan, L. P.
Greenwald, M. S.
Gregg, G. C.
Gregory, M. V.
Griffin, A. S.
Grove, G. V.
Hall, D.
Hall, M. E.
Hall, T. R.
Halpern, S. H.
Hamm, H. L.
Hampton, B. B.
Hand, R. A.
Harmon, W.
Harrell, R.
Harrelson, M. P.
Harris, I. S.

Hartley, E. H.
Harvey, J. M.
Haslett, H. T.
Havlena, C. F.
Hawkins, E. R.
Hayden, E. A.
Hayes, C. R.
Hayes, H. H.
Helfand, I.
Helsel, J. E.
Henderson, J. C.
Herndon, R. H.
Hewitt, E. R.
Hicks, C. H.
Hill, D. J.
Hill, H.
Hill, Q.
Hill, W. H.
Hillman, R. L.
Hilton, F. H.
Hindman, W. H.
Hingley, J. H.
Hipkins, W.
Hitt, S. E.
Holliman, J. M.
Hollin, A.
Holmes, C. A.
Howard, J. E.
Howell, E. A.
Huddleston, E. H.
Hughes, C. R.
Hume, C. H.
Hunt, Louis
Huntley, C. H.
Hussey, J. L.
Hutchinson, C. L.
Hyson, W. W.
Ickes, H. L.
Ingram, C.
Irvin, R. L.
Jackson, C. L.
Jackson, C. V.
Jacobson, P. C.
Jasefsky, P. F.
Jeffrey, S. A.
Jennings, E. H.
Jensen, J. W.
Johns, R. T.
Johnson, E. J.
Johnson, E. L.
Johnson, F. A.
Johnson, F. L.
Johnson, J. E.
Johnson, L. J.
Johnson, S. H.
Johnson, W. C.
Jones, E. H.
Jordan, H. H.
Jordan, H. J.
Judge, E. H.
Judy, H. R.
Kalapp, P. F.
Kalmanowitz, H.
King, H. P.
King, J. T.
King, K. W.
King, R. G.
King, W. W.
Kirby, E. H.
Kirby, Thomas
Kleih, E. R.
Klugewics, A. C.
Kopecki, S. P.
Krarup, E. M.
Kupfer, H. C.
Kydd, L. G.
Lane, L. D.
Lattimore, K. E.
Lavigne, A. A.
Law, J. L.
Leap, J. W.
Lee, L. L.
Lee, V. E.
Lefwich, J. H.
Lehew, H. D.
LePage, T. G.
Levine, S.
Levine, W.
Levitan, E.
Levy, H. D.
Lewis, C. V.
Lewis, R. E.
Libowitz, E.
Liggins, R. E.
Lindenbaum, H.
Lindorff, H.
Lipar, H. L.
Lipscomb, E. F.
Lohr, H. G.
Lomax, E. A.
London, A. L.
Long, James
Longenecker, E. G.
Lowery, G.
Lundy, P. E.
Mackall, J. P.
Malone, L. E.
Malone, H. V.
Maloney, E. G.
Mann, S. H.
Marcellino, T. E.
Marcey, T. E.

Marcus, F. J.
Marsden, E. V.
Marshall, P. W.
Martin, Allen
Mason, J. C.
Mason, O. T.
Mathews, W. F.
McCarthy, H. L.
McClendon, M.
McCorkle, J. T.
McCoy, B. M.
McDaniels, E.
McElroy, M. A.
McGhee, N. E.
McGuire, J. J.
McKenzie, L. M.
McLaughlin, C. M.
McPadden, J. H.
McVeigh, K. A.
Mead, D. M.
Melnick, L. B.
Menter, P. U.
Milasso, V. E.
Miller, H. L.
Miller, R. E.
Miller, W. B.
Mitchell, A. S.
Moltke, H. J.
Monfort, D. S.
Montgomery, B. E.
Montgomery, R. D.
Moore, E. J.
Moore, D. B.
Moran, C. R.
Morgan, A. M.
Morow, S. M.
Morris, J. M.
Morris, V. L.
Morrissey, R. A.
Morrison, F.
Morrison, H. J.
Moss, J. A.
Morton, W. B.
Mullaney, J. J.
Murphy, J. H.
Mulcahy, G.
Muth, T. K.
Nelmes, E. G.
Nesline, D. P.
Niccolson, J. L.
Nims, M. S.
Noble, R. A.
Nolan, W. T.
North, E. G.
Oberg, R. O.
O'Boyle, D. P.
O'Connor, J. M.
Olive, M. J.
Oliver, W. E.
Olsen, A. J.
Olson, M. E.
Orchard, I. M.
Othmer, A. M.
Otis, G. E.
Pandolfi, G.
Papalco, L. J.
Patterson, G. E.
Patton, W. L.
Paulson, M. L.
Payne, K. W.
Peck, M. F.
Peloquin, H. V.
Pepper, A.
Phaneuf, R. A.
Phillips, J. C.
Pimple, A. E.
Piper, E. L.
Pointer, J. P.
Porter, Q. R.
Powers, P. G.
Prater, E. R.
Prater, R. R.
Principe, H. C.
Price, J. E.
Pringle, T. J.
Proctor, M. L.
Purce, F. H.
Ragsdale, J. H.
Rathman, C. M.
Reese, K. B.
Reid, W. J.
Resnicek, C. M.
Richardson, H. H.
Richardson, R. M.
Richardson, V. M.
Richter, R. G.
Richard, J. S.
Rincer, I. D.
Risavy, N. M.
Ritchie, F. D. J.
Robertson, A. W.
Robitaille, F. J.
Rock, J. O.
Rogers, J. L.
Ross, R. J.
Royster, F.
Roston, H. B.
Rude, M. I.
Russell, J. R.
Russell, M. C.
Rutherford, E. E.
Sadler, H. C.
Saffell, B. F.
Saunders, J. Y.
Schafer, M. M.
Schansenbacher, G. A.

Schoblik, T. J.
Schibley, R. D.
Schmidt, N. P.
Schoendorf, C. W.
Schrimpf, C. E.
Schwartz, S.
* Scott, R. T.
* Shacklett, H.
Shaffer, G. R.
Shankle, W. J.
/ Shenk, D. L.
/ Sherman, A. I.
Shufeldt, A. M.
Shulman, A.
* Shutak, A. L.
Siegel, A. A.
Signor, D. M.
Silver, J. S.
Smith, A. B.
Smith, B. A.
Smith, B. P.
* Smith, E. L.
* Smith, F. E.
* Smith, J. L.
* SmithJ. E.
Smith, L.
Smith, Laura
Smith, M. O.
Smith, S. W.

Smith, T. H.
Smith, W. W.
Snipe, A. C.
Snoddy, M.
Sobel, H. R.
Solis, M. G.
Spence, A.
/ * Speyrer, B. J.
Spindler, A.
Staib, B. W.
Stallings, S. B.
Standley, K. N.
Stanback, T. E.
Stephens, H.
Stephens, L. P.
Stevens, A. N.
Stevenson, D. N.
Stevenson, N. G.
Stewart, H. M.
Stickney, B. E.
Stockley, R. M.
Stocker, S. M.
Stone, I. D.
Stout, J. L.
Strange, G. G.
Street, R. L.
Strickland, N. B.
Strouse, J.
Sutherland, H. A.

Swarts, L. A.
Sweaney, K. H.
/ Talbott, A. R.
Tarpley, L. W.
Tasker, G. C.
Taylor, H. N.
Taylor, R. C.
Tennyson, A. M.
Tew, H. J.
* Thaxton, B. J.
* Thomas B. B.
Thomas, J. J.
Thomas, W. S.
Thompson, L. L.
/ Thompson, M. L.
Thornton, F. X.
/ Thrasher, S. F.
Tibbetts, B. G.
Tilson, I. R.
Todd, M. J.
* Torre, G. J.
Townley, D. M.
Trainum, M. F.
Trent, O. F.
Trenta, W.
Truehoart, G. Jr.
Trufant, L. W.
* Tucker, J. A.
* Turner, J. M.

Tyus, M. C.
/ Van Horn, D. H.
Vann, E. M.
Wagner, G. E.
Wagstaff, F. M.
/ Wallace, C. A.
Walton, E. F.
/ Warshaw, I.
Washington, F. D.
Wathen, M. M.
* Watts, F. C.
Weakley, N.
Webster, J. M.
Webster, M.
Webster, M. E.
* Weeks, H. L.
Wehrell, M. M.
/ Weinberger, E. W.
White, E. L.
* / White, Jack E.
* White, James E.
Wiggins, A. C.
/ Wilburn, A. V.
/ Wilcox, J. E.
* Will, J. L.
Williams, C. A.
/ Williams, E. A.
Williams, E. G.
Williams, E. H.

Williams, K. L.

Williams, M. L.

Willie, S. B.

Wilson, C. A.

Windsor, E. M.

Winfield, J. I.

Winthrop, J.

Witcher, J. O.

Wolfe, M.

Wolin, L. P.

Womack, D. L.

Woods, A. D.

Wright, M. E.

Wright, R. E.

Wright, T. C.

Wyatt, J. T.

Yard, E. C.

Yearwood, M. L.

Young, B. C.

Zajac, M. L.

NOTE: *PMG Forms NMI-140 submitted to AFDIS by R&R 9-9-42

See R&R (AFMAG to AFDIS), 9-9-42, subject: "Investigation of civilian employees".

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A. G. D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By AHL/[illegible] LC; Date 5/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL

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Investigation of civilian employees.

2 AFMAG AFDIS 1942 9-9

1. With reference to Item #1 above, PMG Forms NNI-140 are attached for the following personnel:

a. Cable Section
Broskoskie, Alice D.
Chafin, Harriet E.
Connellee, Lois M.
Dale, Richard
Fleck, Vera M.
Hall, Mary E.
McGhee, Nancy E.
Mead, Dorothy M.-Has already been investigated. See case PMG O 01-5260, 6-18-42.
Muth, Tillie K.- Was investigated under maiden name of Tillie Kwolek. See attached Memo of 1-27-42, MID 201.
Shutak, Anna L.
Smith, Edna L.
Smith, June E.
Thaxton, Beverly J.
Thomas, Bobby B. - Has already been investigated. See case PMGO 01-5627, 6-17-42.
Turner, Jeane M.
Weeks, Helene L. -Has already been investigated. See case PMGO 01-5629, 6-17-42.

Administrative Division
(Executive Section)
Forges, Elvira E.
Goldberg, Leah

(Photographic Section)
McDaniels, Edgar

Executive Division
Amos, Joseph G.
Bacher, Regina R.
Bounds, June M.
Ingram, Carolyn

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Air AD 383.4 (69)

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of civilian employees

2 APMAG AFDIS 9-9
Cont'd

Lundy, Phyllis B.
Nims, Mary S.
Scott, Russell T.
Smith, Frank E.

Coordination Division
Bailen, Mary L.
Judge, Edward M.
Reznicek, Chrysanthia M.
Will, J. Linden

2. Forms are not attached for following personnel listed in Item #1 above for reason indicated:

Classified Mail sub-unit
(Gravelly Point Bldg.)
*Ellis, Rayford W.
Patton, William L. - Investigation completed on 7-27-42. See attached copy of R&R AFDIS-34-2091.

Classified File Unit
(Munitions Bldg.)
Anderson, Ora J.-Form submitted under maiden name of Ora B. Jenkins to AFDIS by R&R 5-29-42
*Windsor, Eloise

Classified File sub-unit
(Gravelly Point Bldg.)
Dour, Charles - Now in Army.

Cable Section
Burkhardt, Leah D.-Transferred
Daly, Mary J.- Resigned
Dick, Lohr M.- Resigned
[illegible], J. Marshall-Resigned
McFadden, James M.- Temporarily absent. Form will be furnished at a later date.
Niccolson, James L.- Has already been investigated
See case PMGO 01-5626, 6-17-42.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Stat. Lst.	[illegible]

AAF-39

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Investigation of civilian employees

AFMAG ont'd AFDIS 9-9

Van Horn, Dwaine, H. - Has already been investigated. See case PMCO 01-5628, 6-17-42.
Wilcox, Jean E.- Has already been investigated. See case PMCO 01-5262 7-17-42.

Administrative Division
(Executive Section)
*Bringto, Anna B.
*McKenzie, Maxine L.
*Olson, Axel J.

Publications Division
(Reproduction Unit)
Battista, Mary-On 1 year leave of absence.
Hipkins, Wendell-Form submitted to AFDIS by R&R 6-18-42
Jordan, Harvey H.-Form submitted to AFDIS by R&R 6-18-42
Peloquin, Henry-Form submitted to AFDIS by R&R 5-29-42
Williams, Eulalia-Form submitted to AFDIS by R&R 8-5-42

Photographic Section

*Albright, Joseph L.
*Alston, Pride
*Bearden, Ellen M.
*Brown, Leslie L.
Cantrell, Wallace E.-Resigned
*Dolan, Peter A.
x *Ettare, Carl J.
*Hand, Ralph
Hingley, James W.-Resigned
Horowitz, Norman-[illegible]
*Hames, Charles
*Hunt, Louis
*Hussey, James L.
*Kopacki, Stella P.
*LaVigne, Armand A.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES										
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics

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Investigation of civilian employees.

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-9

*Leap, James W.
*Marcey, Talbott L.
*Montgomery, Richard D.
*Olive, Milton J.
*Pandolfi, Carmine Jr.
*Porter, Quentin R.
*Saunders, Joe Y.
*Shenk, Donald L.
*Sherman, Alfred I.
Shively, James C.-Resigned
*Speyrer, Bettina J.
*Talbott, Anna Ruth
*Thrasher, Sylvia F.---Thompson, Melville L.
*Wallace, Charles A.
*Warshaw, Israel
*Weinberger, Edgar W.
*Wilburn, Alvin V.
*Wolfe, Manual

*Note: Form submitted to AFDIS by R&R 8-21-42.

3. Forms for the following personnel are attached, although the names are not listed in Item #1 above:

Publications Division
Frazier, Jean J.
Gore, Boyd J.
Hill, Daniel J.
Huntley, Charles H.
Martin, Allen
Shacklett, Howard
Smith, Jack L.
Tucker, John A.
Watts, Fernand C.
White, Jack E.
White, James E.
Cable Section
Klein, Evelyn R.
Libowitz, Lillian

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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Investigation of civilian employees.

2 AFMAG AFDIS 9-9

Executive Section
(Administrative Div.)
Powers, Pearl C.

AAF Library
Wright, Robert E.

Executive Division
Roston, Helen B.

Coordination Division
Torre, Grace J.

J.B.C.
Lt.Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air A.G.

3 Incls.
#1-MID 201 Kwolek, Tillie
#2-Cpy, R&R AFDIS 34-2091
#3-Forms WNI-140 (48)

File
D

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-MPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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AAF-30

AirAG 383.4 (69)

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 3/31/75

AFDIS-CD/2

Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1 AFDIS AFMAG AUG 22 1942 CH/cam 6651

Reference: R/R 1 from
AFMAG to AFDIS
8/7/1942

1. There are attached PMG Forms NNL-140 for completion by the following personnel of your office:

Classified Mail Subunit
(Gravelly Point Bldg.)

Ellis, Rayford W.
Patton, William L.

Classified File Unit
(Munitions Bldg.)

Anderson, Ora J.
Windsor, Eloise M.

Classified File Subunit
(Gravelly Point Bldg.)

Dour, Charles

Cable Section

Broskoskie, Alice D.
Burkhardt, Leah D.
Chafin, Harriet E.
Connelloe, Lois M.
Dale, Richard
Daly, Mary J.
Dick, Lohr M.
Evans, J.Marshall
Fleck, Vera M.
Hall, Mary E.
McGhee, Nancy E.
McPadden, James M.

Air AG
File Copy.

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Air AD 383.4 (69)

AFDIS-CD/2

DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1 AFDIS AFMAG AUG 22 1942 CH/cam 6651
cont'd

Head, Dorothy M.
Muth, Tillie K.
Nicolson, James L.
Shuiak, Anna L.
Smith, Edna L.
Smith, June B.
Thaxton, Beverly J.
Thomas, Bobby B.
Turner, Jeanne M.
Van Horn, Dwaine H.
Weeks, Helene
Wilcox, Jean E.

Administrative Division

(Executive Section)

Bringe, Anna B.
Forges, Elvira B.
Goldberg, Leah
McKenzie, Maxine L.
Olson, Axel J.

Publications Division

(Reproduction Unit)

Battista, Mary
Hipkins, Wendell
Jordan, Harvey H.
Poloquin, Henry
Williams, Eulalia A.

Photographic Section

Albright, Joseph L.
Alston, Pride
Bearden, Ellen M.

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Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1 cont'd	AFDIS	AFWAS	AUG 22 1942	Brown, Leslie L. Cantrell, Wallace R. Dolan, Peter A. Ettaro, Carl J. Hand, Ralph Hingley, James W. Horowitz, Herman Hunes, Charles Hunt, Louis Hussey, James L. Kopaski, Stella P. LaVigne, Armand A. Leap, James W. Marcey, Talbott L. Nathaniels, Edgar Montgomery, Richard D. Olivo, Milton J. Pandolfi, Carmine, Jr. Porter, Quentin R. Saunders, Joe T. Shenk, Donald L. Sherman, Alfred I. Shively, James C. Spayrer, Bettina J. Talbott, Anna Ruth Thompson, Melville L. Thrasher, Sylvia F. Wallace, Charles A. Warshaw, Israel Weinberger, Edgar W. Wilburn, Alvin V. Wolfe, Manuel Executive Division Amos, Joseph G. Basher, Regina R. Bounds, June M. Ingram, Carolyn	CH/can	6651

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AFDIS-CD/2

Investigation of Civilian Employees.

1 cont. AFDIS AFWAS AUG 22 1942 Lundy, Phyllis B. CH/can 6651
Rice, Mary S.
Scott, Russell P.
Smith, Frank M.

Coordination Division

Bailen, Mary L.
Judge, Minard M.
Merwick, Chrysanthia M.
Will, J. Linden

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

26 Incls.
as noted above.

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date: 3/31/75

DECLASSIFIED

Questionnaire - Angela M. Meyer

CB - 3902

1. AFPCP AFDAS 8/21/42

1. It is requested that the attached questionnaire regarding Angela M. Meyer be executed and returned to this office. Miss Meyer was employed in the Executive Division prior to her transfer to the Army Air Forces at Large.

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 21 1942
AAG RECEIVED

1 Attach.
Questionnaire

Gordon E. Clark,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps.

2 AFCAS AFPCP 1942 8-27

1. The attached questionnaire has been accomplished.

Incl: n/c

G.E.S.
AFCAS

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 21 1942
AAG Received

Dispatched
AUG 28 1942
AAG

File
[illegible] 8/28/42

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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3 AS
A-4/AS
Plans AS
Insp. AS
Gr. Sup.
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Met. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

Air AD 383.4 (68)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Alm/AW LC; Date 3/31/75

Investigation of Civilian Employees Handling Secret & Confidential Matter.

Page Two.

CGS/mp 71130

1. AFMAG AFDIS 1942
(Cont) C. I. 8-21
Div.

Thompson, Melville L.
Thrasher, Sylvia F.
Wallace, Charles A.
Warshaw, Israel
Weinberger, Edgar W.
Wilburn, Alvin V.
Windsor, Eloise M.
Wolfe, Manuel

2. Certain employees of the Photographic Section, of this Office should be investigated as soon as possible. Therefore, it is requested that Mr. Albright, Extension 2484, be contacted for the names of these employees.

3. Form NNI-140, Number 27124 was inadvertently destroyed.

Incls: - ~~27~~ 37
Form NNI-140

C. G. STEVENSON,
Major, Air Corps,
Acts Ass't Air Adj. Gen.

Dispatched
AUG 22 1942
AAG

File
cc 8/23/42

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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Air AG 383.4 (67)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: Ab/AW LC, Date 3/31/75

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Civilian Employees Handling Secret & Confidential Matter.

CGS/mp 71130

1. AFMAG AFDIS 1942
C. I. 8-21
Division

1. In accordance with Hq. Office Instruction No. 40-7, subject same as above, attached hereto are Forms NNI-140, for the following additional personnel of the Air Adjutant General's Office handling classified material:

Albright, Joseph L.
Alston, Pride
Bearden, Ellen M.
Bringe, Anna R.
Brown, Leslie L.
Dockery, Gayle M.
Dolan, Peter A.
Ellis, Rayford W.
Feingold, Morton C.
Frank, Etta
Hand, Ralph A.
Humes, Charles H.
Hunt, Louis
Hussey, James L.
Kopacki, Stella P.
Lavigne, Armand, A.
Leap, James W.
McKenzie, Leona M.
Marcey, Talbott L.
Montgomery, Richard D.
Olive, Milton J.
Olson, Axel J.
Pandolfi, Carmine C.
Porter, Quentin R.
Saunders, Joe Y.
Shenk, Donald L.
Sherman, Alfred I.
Spayrer, Bettina J.
Talbott, Anna R.

(CON'T)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By LC Date

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Civilian Personnel Handling Classified Matter

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS (JLA:SPK)
2	AFMAG (Photo Sec.)	AFMAG (Administrative Division	1942 8-19	1. Submitted herewith are thirty ~~three (33)~~ Two 32 Forms No. NNI-140 entitled Personnel Security Questionnaires that have been accomplished by personnel of the Photographic Section. There are certain of these employees handling classified material that should be investigated as soon as possible. It is requested that the Counter Intelligence Division contact Mr. J. L. Albright of the Photographic Section, Extension #2484 for the names of these employees. JLA J. L. A., Jr. Chief, Photo. Sec. Att: 32 Forms No. NNI-140

(Do not use reverse side) F-4071, AF. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

Investigation of Civilian Personnel Handling Classified Matter.

CGS/mp

1.	AFWAC Administrative Division	AFWAC Photo Section Att'n: Mr. Albright	1942 8-5	1. Please submit a new list of all persons authorized to handle classified matter, giving their names and Civil Service classification. Also indicate whether investigation has been completed by the Provost Marshal General's Office. If application for such investigation on "Personnal Security Questionnaire", Form WNL-140 has not yet been made for any individual handling classified matter, such application should be filled out and forwarded to this Office at once.

C. G. S.,
Major, Air Corps,
Actg Asst Air Adj. General.

42
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8

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel - Form NNI-140

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS TCH/mlb
1	AFMAG Central Mail Section	AFMAG Office Service Division	1942 8/14	1. Attached herewith is investigation Form NNI-140 on the following personnel assigned to this section: Ellis, Rayford Wilson C. S. C. 1st Lt., A. C. Actg. Ass't. Air Adj. Gen.

(Do not use reverse side) AF-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Investigation of Personnel - Form NNI-140

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS TCH/mll
1	AFWAC Chief, Central Mail Section	AFWAC Chief, Office Service Division	1942 8/8	1. Attached herewith is investigation Form NNI-140 on the following personnel assigned to this section: Windsor, Eloise Mae T. C. H. 1st Lt., AC Chief, Central Mail Section

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 3/31/75

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

MID 333.5

August 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADQUARTERS OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Attention: Air Adjutant General.

Subject: Investigation of Military Personnel

1. Reference is made to the memorandum from your office dated, May 9, 1942, wherein it was requested that appropriate investigation be made on military personnel who are assigned to the Cable Section, Classified Communications Division, Air Adjutant General's Office, Army Air Forces.

2. A loyalty check consisting of a search of the files of the Military Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence revealed no information of a derogatory nature on the following individuals:

BRICKMAN, Alvin L., ASN 16067716, Pvt.
HEATH, Gilford K., ASN 34030709, Pfc.
MEYER, Edward Donald, 0-309411, 1st Lt.
MORRISS, Reuben Moores, Jr., 0-305886, 2nd Lt.
SCHINDLES, Harry, ASN 16054287, Pvt.
SHERWOOD, Abbot Wilson, Jr., 0-304940, 2nd Lt.
TUCKER, Edwin W., 0-314457, 2nd Lt.
WOODLEE, Willis Glen, 0-261322, 1st Lt.

3. Second Lieutenant Alvin Emery COONS, 0-295844, is under investigation at the present time due to information developed from a confidential informant and your office will receive a copy of the report of the investigation when completed.

4. The investigation of the following individuals requested in your communication dated, April 1, 1942, is being conducted in the various corps areas, however reports of the investigation have not been received:

KING, Kenneth Wilson, 0-434692, 2nd Lt.
MAGRATH, Joseph Stephen, Jr., 0-401761, 2nd Lt.
STRYKER, Theodore Berrien, 0-395875, 1st Lt.
WILLIAMS, Tully Jefferson, 0-360981, 1st Lt.
WILBOURN, Ashford Emery, 0-267598, Captain

RECEIVED
AUG 17 11 30 AM '42
COUNTER INTELL. SEC. [illegible]

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

RECEIVED
AUG 18 1942
C.M.U. - HQ., AAF

REC'D
AUG 18 1942
CD/3

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887053

RM# 911625 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Air [illegible] 383.4 (66) MAG

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MID 333.5 (continued)

5. Your office was informed by memorandum dated, July 30, 1942, to the effect that after a review of the records and information available on Second Lieutenant Reid Radford LUMSDEN, O-400875, indicate there was no reason to question his loyalty and that no further investigation was necessary.

6. The files of the Military Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and appropriate police departments failed to reveal any derogatory information in the case of Captain Harold MACDONALD, O-302344, with the exception of information regarding a charge of fraudulent use of the U. S. mails, which information is already known to your office.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

F. A. CALVERT, JR.,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Executive Officer, Investigation Branch, CIG.

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AMS 383.4 (66)

HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD

Box 113 Folder 4

MILITARY

DECIMAL

SAS 383.6

through 384

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9-23-76
State Dept
JCS Memo

SAS 383.6

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible]LC; Date 9-23-76
State Dept

By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces

Date Initials

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Prepared: AC/AS,
M&S, Traffic Div.
AFDTR-8, Capt.Cox/3167
24 July 1945

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

24 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

SUBJECT: Request for Air Transportation for Prisoners of War

1. Reference is made to your Memorandum of 17 July 1945 on the above subject, your File No. SPMGO (27) 383.6.

2. With reference to the transportation of subject prisoners of war by air, it does not appear economical to transport these prisoners and the necessary American guards by aircraft solely in order to conserve motor or rail transportation. It is the policy of the AAF to assign aircraft for transportation of personnel and cargo only when urgency requires air transportation, and no other means of travel will accomplish the mission.

3. At the present time, transport type aircraft of the AAF are being utilized for the movement of war materials and personnel in connection with redeployment and it is not desired to divert such equipment from this mission except for movements of great urgency.

4. Since the prisoners are presently located within the Eighth Service Command Area, it is pointed out that aircraft are assigned to that Command, to be used at the discretion of the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command. It is suggested that the Eighth Service Command might assign one of its aircraft to the mission, if it is deemed sufficiently urgent.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Signed

C. C. CHAUNCEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

DISPATCHED
28 JUL 1945

Copy for Office of Signature

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~~SECRET~~

AAG

aa 383.6 (105)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Nov. & 20 June 1946
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/76

~~SECRET~~

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Request for Air Transportation for Prisoners of War

Secretary of Air Staff

24 July 1945

AC/AS, MAS, Traffic Division, Air Transportation Branch

1
Capt.Cox/va/3187

1. The attached memorandum has been prepared for the signature of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, in reply to memorandum from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, copy attached as inclosure No. 2.

2. It is requested that the memorandum be signed and forwarded.

C. R. SPEERS
Lt. Col. Air Corps
Chief, Air Transportation Branch

2 Incls.
1. Memo. to CG, ASF
2. Memo. fr.CG, ASF

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/25/76

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
19 JUL 1945 [illegible]
Date Initials

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMANDER, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: "History of the U. S. AAF Prisoners of War of the Center Compound Stalag Luft III, Germany" prepared by Colonel Delmar T. Spivey

1. The following are pertinent points of subject report:

a. The Compound was organized on a strictly military basis.
b. None but authorized relations with the Germans was permitted.
c. The number one problem of every POW was to get enough food and clothing.
d. Camp conditions were not bad at Sagan where a limited number of recreational facilities existed.
e. The YMCA parcels were always available in sufficient quantity.
f. The Protecting Power was co-operative but ineffectual.
g. The move from Sagan to Moosburg was under very trying conditions, but due to previous planning by the Senior American Officer was made without loss of life.
h. Moosburg was terribly overcrowded with no facilities for recreation.
i. S-2 activities flourished.

2. A complete copy of subject report is attached for such information as may be desired.

3. Appropriate dissemination of subject report has been made to AAF agencies.

1 Incl
Report as above

E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

File
a

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ aa2 383.6 (1w)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 June 2-10 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 4/26/74

~~SECRET~~

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AAF POWs in Japan

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

DATE 6 July 1945

FROM: Deputy Commander, AAF

COMMENT NO. 2
MAL/hd/3373

1. General Baker requests your comment.

Signed

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Executive, Deputy Commander, AAF

DISPATCHED
6 JUL 945

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~~SECRET~~

File

SAS 383.6 (102)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dirs.
8 Sept. & 30 June 1973
By Alm/Nw AG: Date 9/6/74

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
13 JUL 1945 45 HR.
Date Initials

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMANDER, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Army Air Forces Personnel Recently Liberated from Japanese POW Camp at Rangoon

1. Composite report of the interrogation of subject personnel, numbering 112, reveals the following pertinent facts. (Tab A)

a. Pre-capture training could have benefited them had not certain unforeseen and unpredictable circumstances arisen.

b. In all cases, the natives (Burmese) turned them over to the Japanese.

c. In most cases, there was mistreatment at the hands of the Japanese immediately following capture. This conduct was generally caused by the subject's refusal to answer certain questions during preliminary interrogation. Despite War Department directive to the contrary, subject personnel were forced to make statements to avoid torture. Consequently, a revision in this policy is indicated.

d. The Japanese made little attempt to improve inadequate camp facilities or the over-all state of health and conditions of POW's. The general morale was from fair to good. Both officers and men were treated like coolies and working conditions were bad. No mail or Red Cross parcels were received. Many deaths were reported, caused chiefly by over-all malnutrition, followed by inadequate medical care.

e. A noticeable change has occurred more recently in Japanese attitude toward POW's. However, discrimination exists against AAF personnel.

2. Eight documents touching on various phases of imprisonment under the Japanese in Rangoon indicate the following:

a. Interview of Senior American Officer (Tab B) - Lt. Colonel Gilbert, Liaison Officer with the Chinese Army in Burma, describes his capture and interrogation which consisted of questioning and beatings. After four days the Colonel decided to give more information than name, rank and number as he feared that in a semiconscious state which he felt would soon overtake him he might give information of value. His punishment lessened on adoption of this plan. The further interrogations were concluded in the rear and finally at Rangoon where he was imprisoned.

b. Copies of Various Protests to the Camp Commandant (Tab C) - Protests include attempt to recover articles taken from American POW's, request for better care for the sick, protest that under International

AAG 383.6 (100)

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AAG 383.6 (100)

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Law officer prisoners cannot be forced to work, request to draw personal funds previously deposited in a Japanese bank for use in securing better food for the sick in the camp; all protests were of practically no avail.

c. Penal Laws Invoked by Japanese (Tab D) - Penal laws with regard to PGW's are contained in twelve Articles, some with a number of sections. Penalties range from Death to imprisonment of at least one year.

d. The Departure from Rangoon (Tab E) - This is an account of a march out of Rangoon under Jap guard, subsequent abandonment of the PGW's by their guard, and contact with Allied Forces.

e. Safe Conduct Pass Left with PGW's When Japanese Left (Tab F) - Translations of two letters and one safe conduct pass given PGW's when freed by Japanese. Part translation of one letter reads, "We hope that we shall have an opportunity to meet you again at battlefield of somewhere."

f. Graves Registration (Tab G) - Diagram showing location of graves of PGW's, with an attached sheet in English and Japanese giving name and corresponding grave number of American graves.

g. Roster of Those Repatriated (Tab H)

h. Propaganda (Tab I) - Several pages of propaganda explaining the causes for the Japanese attack on United States and Great Britain, glorifying the Japanese conquests to date (document is undated, but content reveals that it was written at about the height of Japanese conquests), and ending with an admission that the Japanese are unskilled in the art of propaganda and therefore PGW's are asked to sign the last page indicating that they will help the Japs develop and put across a better propaganda program.

3. Appropriate dissemination has been made within Army Air Forces.

9 Incls
#1 - Tab A
#2 - Tab B
#3 - Tab C
#4 - Tab D
#5 - Tab E
#6 - Tab F
#7 - Tab G
#8 - Tab H
#9 - Tab I

Signed

K. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

File

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SECRET

JS 383.6 (00)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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DECLASSIFIED

AGPD-B 200.6 (7 Jun 45)

2 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR General Hull, ACofS, OPD
General Bissell, ACofS, G-2 War Dept.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Colonel David L. Hardee, Inf. a returned POW.

1. I have shown the inclosed to General Arnold.

2. We find that our present directives to the Twentieth Air Force do not call for direct attacks against the Emperor's Palace. It has been impressed upon the crews that the Emperor is not a target for attack. On the other hand it has been equally impressed that we are not to spare attacks against high priority targets because of the fear of bomb spillage into the Emperor's Palace.

3. Our present view is that this existing policy is sound.

Signed

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

Incl:
Memo to DC/S from Pres. WD
Decorations Board, dtd 7 June '45

SAS 383.6 (99)

File

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SAS 383.6 (99)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/23/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D.C.

AGPD-B 200.6 (7 Jun 45) 7 June 1945

MEMORANDUM: For the Deputy Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Conversation with Colonel David L. Hardee, Infantry, a returned POW

The above officer conferred with me recently with reference to awards for fellow prisoners of war. In this conversation he stated in effect most seriously and emphatically:

"My main concern now is to see that the interest of those fellows who are still in the hands of the Japs are protected. I know that everything possible is being done for them but you and every other officer who has any power should exert it to prevent the bombing of the palace of the Emperor of Japan. Prisoners of war are looked upon in Japan as personal property of the Emperor. If he is injured by our bombs, our prisoners believe that retaliatory measures will be inflicted upon them. They realize of course that an occasional bomb may strike within the palace grounds but planned attacks upon the palace should not be made."

/s/ J. E. SLOAN
Major General, U.S. Army
President, War Department
Decorations Board

COPY

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rts.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1978
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/78

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
30 JUN 1945
Date Initials

30 JUN 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMANDER, ARMY AIR FORCES:

SUBJECT: Report on AAF Prisoner of War Camp at Stalag Luft #1, Barth, Germany, dated 22 June 1945

1. In compliance with request of 30 May 1945, copy of subject report is submitted herewith. This official report was prepared for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, by Colonel J. R. Byerly, Senior Air Officer at Stalag Luft 1 from 23 February 1944 to 16 December 1944.

2. The highlights of the report are briefed on the attached cover sheet. In view of certain references in this report to secret American POW camp activities and channels of communication under War Department control, dissemination of this report by G-2 is being strictly controlled.

Incl:
Sp Rpt Hist USAAF Pa/W
at Stalag Luft I, Barth,
Germany Sept 43 to Liberation
14 May 45

Signed

JOHN F. TURNER
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive
Office of Ass't Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

SAS 383.6 (98)

File

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SAS 383.6 (98)

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9 Jan/& 30 June 1974
By: Ain/Auric, Date: 9/23/74

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By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
30 JUN 1945
Date Initials

Digest of Attached Report on AAF Prisoner of War Camp at Stalag Luft #1, Barth, Germany

1. The Camp's administrative organizations took steps to promote better co-ordination between the British and Americans for mutual benefits and a consolidated front against the Germans.

2. The Camp grew from some 1,200 officers and enlisted men in January 1944 to over 9,000 by 1 April 1945.

3. A brief description of German Camp personnel as to Camp duties, previous background, punishment imposed, and crimes committed.

4. A detailed history of the Camp from 20 January 1944 to date of liberation reveals that overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions with the resulting hardships and pests were protested to no avail. The Protecting Power representative, Mr. Braun of the Swiss Legation, was ineffectual.

5. German food ration was cut from 1,200 calories daily per man to 800 on 1 October 1944 by an SS order regarding the diet of POW's. Red Cross parcels, when available, were issued at the rate of one per person per week.

6. Religious services were frequently held in spite of the shortage of chaplains and the fact that the Germans did not provide a single communal room.

7. Sports and games were enjoyed on an inter-compound basis. Theatricals and bands were organized. YMCA education books, courses and study were helpful. Incoming mail took six to seven months to arrive.

8. A thoroughly understaffed hospital was maintained, and supplemented by First Aid Stations staffed by POW's with little or no medical experience. Clothing was not adequate.

9. XYZ Underground Activities...target information as well as unusual activities of the Germans was secured,..even though unsuccessful, many escape attempts throughout the war tied down a large number of German guard personnel...an undercover paper called "Pow Wow" contained regular BBC news broadcasts. This news was the only source of maintaining high morale and high esprit de corps within the camp.

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~~SECRET~~ SDS 383.6 (98)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/25/74

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

TO: Chief of Air Staff (Att: Colonel Robert Proctor) DATE 23 May 1945

FROM: Air Judge Advocate COMMENT NO. 2
Maj. Badgett/jgMc/5753

1. The report concerning the alleged dereliction of Major William L. Orris, AC, reflects that on or about 1 April 1945 US and British POWs were being marched from Nuremberg to Moosberg, Germany; that prior to the decision by captor authorities to make the march, Colonel Darr Alkire, AC, SAO, stated to senior officers that while he would issue no order forbidding escape, it was essential that officers in responsible positions who intended to escape on march report their intentions in order that replacements could be made from among officers who would remain with their units. Major Orris was a commander of a unit consisting of approximately 150 officers. Several other senior officers reported an intention to escape and were relieved of their assignments. Major Orris did not plan to escape originally, and did not make his intention to do so known until the afternoon before the morning the march was to begin. At that time he stated to Colonel William L. Kennedy, his immediate superior, his determination to escape. Colonel Kennedy ordered him to remain with his unit, and gave the following reasons for his order:

a. There was insufficient time to replace Major Orris with an officer familiar with the movement.

b. Colonel Kennedy knew of Major Orris' capacity, and had confidence in his performance of the duty assigned.

c. Although the German camp commandant had instructed his guards not to shoot any of the prisoners, there were numerous SS troops in the vicinity, which fact presented a grave hazard if the units became scattered.

SAS 383.6 (95)B

File 5/22

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SAS 383.6(95)B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AlnTAS LC, Date 9/23/74

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Case of Major Wm. L. Orris

Chief of Air Staff (Att: Colonel Robert Proctor) 23 May 1945

Air Judge Advocate Maj. Badgett/jgMs/5753

d. The possibility of interception of the prisoner column by United States armored units, in which event quick movement would be necessary.

e. The possibility of an attempt to march the prisoners into the Salsburg redoubt, and in event of such effort, the necessity for adopting immediate and desperate measures to safeguard lives with the resulting need for the services of fully briefed unit commanders.

2. Colonel Kennedy has certified that the foregoing reasons were explained to Major Orris concisely and in detail, that explicit and direct orders were given him to remain with his unit, and that full understanding thereof was acknowledged by him. In spite of this, on the second night of the march Major Orris deserted his unit and made his escape, with the result that the unit fell into serious disorder.

3. No specific disciplinary action was proposed by this office. Although it was stated that the facts reflected would warrant such measures being taken, it was recommended that nothing be done without first affording Major Orris an opportunity to explain or otherwise justify the conduct complained of.

4. The file was forwarded to The Adjutant General with a suggestion that it be transmitted to Major Orris' present commanding officer for investigation and such action as may be deemed appropriate thereafter. A copy of the opinion of this office as expressed in R & R Comment No. 1 to the Chief of Air Staff, 19 May 1945, is attached.

Signed

HERBERT M. KIDNER
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Acting Air Judge Advocate

Incl. Cy R & R fm AJA to C/AS, 19 May 45, above subj.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Mar. & 20 June 1974
By: AG/AD LC, Date: 9/23/76

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

TO: Chief of Air Staff (Att: Colonel Robert Proctor) DATE 23 May 1945

FROM: Air Judge Advocate COMMENT NO. 2
Maj. Badgett/jgMc/5753

1. The report concerning the alleged dereliction of Major William L. Orris, AC, reflects that on or about 1 April 1945 US and British POWs were being marched from Nuremberg to Moosberg, Germany; that prior to the decision by captor authorities to make the march, Colonel Darr Alkire, AC, SAO, stated to senior officers that while he would issue no order forbidding escape, it was essential that officers in responsible positions who intended to escape on march report their intentions in order that replacements could be made from among officers who would remain with their units. Major Orris was a commander of a unit consisting of approximately 150 officers. Several other senior officers reported an intention to escape and were relieved of their assignments. Major Orris did not plan to escape originally, and did not make his intention to do so known until the afternoon before the morning the march was to begin. At that time he stated to Colonel William L. Kennedy, his immediate superior, his determination to escape. Colonel Kennedy ordered him to remain with his unit, and gave the following reasons for his order:

a. There was insufficient time to replace Major Orris with an officer familiar with the movement.

b. Colonel Kennedy knew of Major Orris' capacity, and had confidence in his performance of the duty assigned.

c. Although the German camp commandant had instructed his guards not to shoot any of the prisoners, there were numerous SS troops in the vicinity, which fact presented a grave hazard if the units became scattered.

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383.6 (95) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LO; Date: [illegible]

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Case of Major Wm. L. Orris

Chief of Air Staff (Att: Colonel Robert Proctor) 23 May 1945

Air Judge Advocate Maj. Badgett/jgMc/5753

d. The possibility of interception of the prisoner column by United States armored units, in which event quick movement would be necessary.

e. The possibility of an attempt to march the prisoners into the Salsburg redoubt, and in event of such effort, the necessity for adopting immediate and desperate measures to safeguard lives with the resulting need for the services of fully briefed unit commanders.

2. Colonel Kennedy has certified that the foregoing reasons were explained to Major Orris concisely and in detail, that explicit and direct orders were given him to remain with his unit, and that full understanding thereof was acknowledged by him. In spite of this, on the second night of the march Major Orris deserted his unit and made his escape, with the result that the unit fell into serious disorder.

3. No specific disciplinary action was proposed by this office. Although it was stated that the facts reflected would warrant such measures being taken, it was recommended that nothing be done without first affording Major Orris an opportunity to explain or otherwise justify the conduct complained of.

4. The file was forwarded to The Adjutant General with a suggestion that it be transmitted to Major Orris' present commanding officer for investigation and such action as may be deemed appropriate thereafter. A copy of the opinion of this office as expressed in R & R Comment No. 1 to the Chief of Air Staff, 19 May 1945, is attached.

Signed

HERBERT M. KIDNER
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Acting Air Judge Advocate

Incl. Cy R & R fm AJA to C/AS, 19 May 45, above subj.

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DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC: Date [illegible]

COPY

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TO: Chief of Air Staff (Attention Deputy Chief of Air Staff, General Owens)
FROM: Air Judge Advocate

DATE 19 May 45

COMMENT NO. 1
Capt McCloskey/ess/5753

1. The attached letter reflects conduct on the part of Major William L. Orris, O-399548, AC, which if not satisfactorily explained by him warrants disciplinary action appropriate to the offense committed. No such action should be taken, however, without first affording Major Orris an opportunity to explain or otherwise justify the conduct complained of.

2. Accordingly, it is recommended that the basic letter be forwarded to TAG by indorsement suggesting that it be transmitted to Major Orris' present commanding officer for investigation and such action as may be deemed appropriate thereafter.

3. A suggested indorsement is attached.

/s/ Herbert M. Kidner

HERBERT M. KIDNER
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Assistant Air Judge Advocate

1 Incl
Ltr 14 May 45
w/ proposed 1st ind

INCL 1

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COPY

AFAJA
Col Brosman/ess/2145
Written 23 May 45

1st Ind.

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Forwarded with the suggestion that the basic communication be transmitted to the present commanding officer of Major William L. Orris, O-399538, AC Reserve, for investigation and such action as may be deemed appropriate.

2. It is requested that the headquarters concerned be directed to furnish to this Headquarters a report of the above investigation and any action taken thereon, when available.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

(signed) Herbert M. Kidner

Herbert M. Kidner
Col., J.A.G.D.
Ass't. Air Judge Advocate

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DOD Ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/22/74

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9 MAY 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL P. W. TIMBERLAKE
(Attention: Colonel Libby)

Subject: Return of German P/W, CM-IN 6347, 7 May 1945

1. Action is being expedited for the return of subject Prisoner of War for interrogation. CPM Branch, G-2, WDGS, cabled this morning requesting immediate return of P/W to War Department for interrogation. Upon return, G-2 will interrogate and will also make subject P/W available to AC/AS, Intelligence for detailed interrogation.

2. Dissemination of interrogation reports will be expedited through established channels with particular emphasis on Air Staff agencies interested in the Japanese air force.

JAMES P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

SAS 383.6 (94)

File 5/10

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SAS 383.6 (94)

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600 Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/25/74

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Reports from Captured German Personnel

General Hodges 12 April 1945

General Kuter LSK/hd/3373 1

1. These two papers are fascinating reading.

2. Would like to have you give both papers to General Giles to take home and read and enjoy with a view to his similar recommendation to General Marshall unless General Marshall has previously read the papers.

Signed

L. S. KUTER
Major General, U. S.Army
Acting Chief of the Air Staff

Incls:
Rpr from Gen. Peabody dtd
31 March
Report from Gen. Peabody
dtd 3 April

SAS 383.6 (93)

DISPATCHED
13 APR 1945
AFSA

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SAS 383.6 (93)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jun. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
[illegible]
Date Initials

wrtn 24 February 1945
AFIGI/IH
WHB/mcg/4544

27 FEB 1945

Major General John K. Cannon
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
APO 650, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Jock:

With reference to your letter of 14 February 1945 relative to the monitoring of Germany's short wave propaganda broadcasts by the Federal Communications Commission, I am hopeful that you are finding our daily cables, containing lists of our boys recently taken prisoner by the Germans, a morale builder.

We are now sending daily cables on this subject to the Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces so we feel real value can be derived from these lists.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Signed

BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces and
Chief of Air Staff

28 FEB 1945

Copy for Secretary of Air Staff

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jun. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 3/13/74

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SAS 383.6 (9)

COPY

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
APO NO. 650

14 February 1945

Lt. General Barney M. Giles, USA
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces
and Chief of Air Staff
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

Dear Barney:

With reference to your letter of 6 February relative to the monitoring of Germany's short wave propaganda broadcasts by the Federal Communications Commission, we should be most grateful for any information that you may be able to furnish of our boys recently taken prisoner by the Germans. It will indeed act as a morale builder.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

S/ Joe

T/ JOHN K. CANNON
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible], LC; Date 7/23/76

SECRET

Copy

AFPP[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/76321
Room [illegible]02, Munitions
1 - 29 - 45

Major General John K. Cannon
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
APO 650, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Cannon:

The Federal Communications Commission constantly monitors Germany's short-wave propaganda broadcasts, during which are given names, grades, serial numbers, home addresses, and the condition of our boys whom they have recently taken as prisoners.

We are cabling this data, as received to the Eighth, who value it as a morale builder. They check the names against their casualty records, and upon finding any of their own personnel listed, publish the news to the officers and men at the bases.

Action has been initiated to transmit the list to the Twelfth also, as I believe you may find it welcomed in your organization. Let me know via air mail whether or not you can use the information; the first cable has already been dispatched.

Best regards.

Sincerely,
(Stamped) BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces and
Chief of Air Staff
T/ H. H. ARNOLD
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Dispatched 6 Feb 45

Same letter to General Vandenberg (9th) and General Twining (15th)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 1/23/76

[redacted]

AFPMP-3
JLB:GEN:emc 2798

21 February 1945

Brigadier General William E. Hall
Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force
APO 520, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Bill:

The first hand report on the success of your mission, which Major Walter A. Smith, Jr., carried back with him, was very interesting. Such encouraging letters are always most welcome.

Major Smith was so anxious to be with his family that he didn't wait to get his personnel papers; however, the copy of his 66-2 which was transmitted to The Adjutant General when he became missing in action has been sent to the AAF Redistribution Station at Miami where he is to report after his leave. A photostat of the qualification record was mailed to him at his home in Georgia, and the letter transmitting it advised that the original had been forwarded to Miami, and also that he should notify our Personnel Office if he wants any other data.

I suppose that by this time General Bevans has read you in on some of the late developments on this side.

Keep up the good show, and best regards.

Sincerely,

Signed
BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces and
Chief of Air Staff

SAS 383.6 (89)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

24 FEB 1945

File copy was sent to classified file on 21 Feb 45.
With classified letter from
Gen Hall to Gen. Giles

CENTRAL FILES

Date: 21 Feb 45

Forwarded by
AC/AS, Personnel:

AFAAP
AFPMP-3
AFPCP

[redacted]

AFSAS

SAS 383.6 (89)

SECRET

16 January, 1945

Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles,
Chief of Air Staff, Hq., AAF,
The Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Giles:

This will probably be my last letter to you from Bulgaria as we are at this moment closing out our offices here and preparing for the trek back to Italy. Within an hour, we are expecting General Eaker also who plans to pay us a short visit; so as you can imagine, excitement and confusion reign supreme in the Hall Mission, Sofia.

Our box score as we prepare to move on is twenty-three (23) confined, eleven (11) under surveillance, seven (7) dead, forty-three (43) released but with pictures and complete records of participation (if any) on file. We have a couple of hot suspects on the griddle at the moment which may change the above figures somewhat.

One of the brightest spots in this whole show has been the absolutely complete cooperation we have gotten from higher echelons. Everything I have even suggested has been immediately granted by MAAF.

General Eaker radioed me the other day that you were in U.K. Wish you could have taken a side trip to Sofia to observe the Hatchet Detail in action.

I am enclosing a letter of commendation which I put into channels here concerning the bearer of this letter, Major Walter A. Smith, Jr. Too many good things cannot be said about this officer. He was the senior Prisoner of War at the Bulgarian Prison Camp at Shumen and it is due to his initiative, intelligence and pure damn Georgian stubborness that kept our three-hundred and thirty-five boys alive and kicking through some very tough and unpleasant months. He has been with me ever since I started in this business and has at all times been absolutely top-flight.

Due to his rather peculiar history (Prison Camp, etc.) his personnel records are in one helluva shape. Would you turn around and push that button on your squawk-box marked "Personnel"

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (89)

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and tell them to give him the help he needs to get properly straightened out?

Please give my best to that good gang around the office and accept my best wishes for your own continued success.

Sincerely,

Signed

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Brigadier General,
United States Army.

1 Inclosure

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date: 1/23/76

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

TO G-1 FROM Asst Chief of Air Staff, Personnel Date 6 Mar 45 Comment No. 4

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2 of Comment No. 1.

2. On 14 October 1944 the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, charged the Commanding General, AAF Personnel Distribution Command, with the responsibility of establishing and administering an appropriate rehabilitation program for former Prisoners of War (American) in accordance with the policies outlined in confidential War Department letter AG 383.6 (11 Sep 44)OB-S-A-M, Subj: "Repatriation, Recovery and Rehabilitation of American Prisoners of War in Europe", dated 3 October 1944. The Commanding General, Personnel Distribution Command, in addition to being responsible for the redistribution program for the Army Air Forces is responsible for administering the AAF Convalescent Program. The rehabilitation and reassignment procedures utilized by the Commanding General, Personnel Distribution Command, in carrying out the subject responsibilities are herewith outlined:

a. For convenience in designation and handling, all European Prisoners of War and Recapees have been labeled Project "R". This designation is included on all orders reassigning such personnel from the Personnel Distribution Command to the continental Air Forces and Commands. Information to this effect has been furnished the using Commands. Returnee personnel are included in this Project only after interrogation by the Intelligence Officer.

b. Experience has shown that segregation of this type of personnel has a deleterious and delaying effect upon their rehabilitation and reassimilation into full military service. For this reason subject personnel are processed in the same manner as other returnees and not set apart as a special group. Upon arrival at Redistribution Stations, after the normal twenty-one day returnee leave, they attend the usual orientation lecture in which announcement is made that all

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HQ AAF - AFPMP
Dated 3-6-45
KHL/jmb/71894
Major Luten
Room 5 A 286.

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Page 2 of Comment No. 4 of Disposition Form to C-1.

Prisoners of War, Escapees, Evadees or Internees should contact the Intelligence Officer. This announcement is received from time to time during the various stages of processing to insure that all such personnel are met and interviewed by the Intelligence Officer in order that their status may be accurately determined. Subject personnel are given a complete physical examination. If indicated, they are then sent to rest camp or convalescent hospital for observation and treatment. Upon release from this, they are again checked to insure proper physical condition for return to duty. Normal returnee processing, pertinent to this type of personnel, also includes bringing pay accounts and records up to date, classification interviews, and reassignment.

c. In addition to the normal processing outlined above, returnee Prisoners of War are given a special orientation lecture when their status as such has been determined, a copy of which is attached as Inclosure No. 1.

d. In the classification interview, returnees in this category are acquainted with their special prerogatives and choice of assignments, attendance in schools, and refresher training, as outlined in letter FDC No. Subj: "Assignment of Project "R" Type Returnee Personnel", 8 December 1944, attached as Inclosure No. 2. Since the greater number of personnel in this category are air crew members, procedures outlined therein are effected in the majority of cases. Personnel desiring direct assignment to continental Air Forces or Stations for whom provision is made therein are so assigned as set forth in subject letter. In like manner, ground personnel are afforded opportunity to attend certain schools, and reassigned when thoroughly ready for return to duty.

For The Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

2nd
H. R. Harmon
Maj. Gen, USA
AC/AS, Personnel

2 Incls -
Incl 1 - Cy of Orientation Lecture.
Incl 2 - Cy of FDC Letter.

DISPATCHED
8 MAR 1945
AFSAS

COPY FOR SEC OF AIR STAFF

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SAS 2336 (88)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/25/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

File No. 383.6

Subject: Investigation of Alleged Bombing and Strafing by American planes of Military Internment Camp at HongKong

TO: CG, AAF

FROM: G-1 DATE 10 Feb 45 COMMENT NO. 1
Maj Brown/73528/fw

The Secretary of War directs investigation and report to G-1

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Incls
Cy of ltr 7 Feb 45
fr D/State to G-1 w/incl

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Attached radio from the American Consul, Geneva, Switzerland, dated 31 January 1945, was forwarded to the Deputy AC/S, G-1, for comment by the Chief, Special War Problems Division, Department of State, under cover of a letter dated 7 February 1945. The radio indicates that, according to a report by the representative of the IRCC in Hongkong, American planes bombed and machine-gunned a military internment camp at HongKong on 16 January 1945, with resultant casualties to British personnel.

FEB 14 1945

COMMENT NO. 2
Major Watkins-3351/as

TO: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

1. Information available at headquarters AAF indicates that no AAF aircraft were operating in the HongKong area on 16 January.

2. The only information of U.S. air activity in that area is a communique issued 17 January by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which states that U.S. carrier based aircraft of the Third Fleet, including fighters and dive bombers, carried out a series of strikes against targets in the Hongkong port area on 15 January and 16 January.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

L.S. KUTER
Major General, USA
Asst Chief of Air Staff, Plans

File

16 FEB 1945

1 Incl
n/c

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Operational Plans Division

DECLASSIFIED
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SAS 383.6

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
31 Jan 45 LSP
Date Initials

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

ATTENTION:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

2 FEB 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

Subject: Prisoner of War Camp Conditions in Germany Re: AAF Enlisted Men Personnel

1. The following information has been furnished by several AAF enlisted men repatriated from Germany 5 January 1945 arriving in the United States by air transport 24 January 1945.

a. Due to transportation problems, there is some concern over supply of Red Cross Food Parcels. However, approximately one month's supply is available at both Stalag Luft 4 (Gross Tychow, Germany) and Stalag 17B (Gneixendorf, Germany). All AAF enlisted men personnel are in these two camps.

b. General camp conditions have shown some improvement over past two months; however, the over-all picture is not too good. Both camps are in line with the retreating German armies and not far distant from the advancing Russian armies.

2. A more comprehensive report will be forwarded when the main contingent, approximately 410 American Prisoners of War recently repatriated from Germany, arrives in the United States.

Noted
[illegible]

W. M. BURGESS
Colonel, GSC
Deputy, Assistant Chief of
Air Staff, Intelligence

File

File
cc

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (85)

SAS 383.6 (85)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
25 Jan 45
Date Initials

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

26 JAN 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES

Subject: Prisoner of War Camp Conditions in Germany Re: AAF Officer Personnel

1. The following information has been furnished by several AAF officers repatriated from Germany the first part of January 1945 arriving in the United States by air transport 24 January 1945.

a. There is an ample supply of Red Cross Food Parcels at both Stalag Luft #1 (Barth, Germany) and Stalag Luft #3 (Sagan, Germany). Stalag Luft #1 receives Red Cross supplies from Sweden, Stalag Luft #3 from Switzerland. All AAF officer personnel are in these two camps.

b. Both camps are well organized and morale is excellent.

c. German propaganda is offset by the daily receipt through secret means, of BBC news broadcasts.

2. Report on Stalag Luft #4 and Stalag Luft 17B, where all AAF enlisted personnel are quartered, will be forwarded immediately upon receipt.

JAMES P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

SAS 383.6 (84)

file 1/29/45

SAS

File

B-1068
1/29

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~ SAS 383.6 (84)

AFPMP-10 Rm 2037 Grav Pt
Maj Walls/emh/3719
Date typed 12-27-44

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/20/74

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

30 DEC 1944

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, U.S.A.
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
A. P. O. 650, c/o Postmaster
New York City

Dear Ira:

This is in reply to your letter of 17 December 1944. I believe I can be of some help in answering Hall's third question in the attached message to you.

The air crew members of Hall's mission are in no danger of being removed from flying status.

The law requires that flight requirements must be met before flying pay may be claimed; however, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 10 (f), AR 35-1480, states that where the commanding officer of otherwise qualified air crew members certifies that due to military operations of the particular command under combat conditions, the usually required number of flights or hours flying time cannot be performed, requirements may be met by performing 60 or more flights totaling at least 18 hours, or in lieu thereof, being in the air at least 24 hours, over a period of 6 consecutive calendar months. These requirements for any particular period may be met at any time during such period.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]
30 DEC 1944
[redacted]

Signed
BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces, and
Chief of the Air Staff

1 Incl
Msg to Eaker from Hall,
NR-84

COPY FOR SECRETARY AIR STAFF

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (83)

SAS 383.6 (83)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD dirs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1978
By_____ NC, Date_____

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF
HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES
APO 650
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

17 December 1944

Lt General Barney M. Giles, USA.,
Chief of the Air Staff,
Hq, Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

Dear Barney:

Enclosed is a message I had this morning from Hall, which I think will be of interest to you. I am hopeful that I will get over there tomorrow to see him and will give him the best answers we have to his questions. If your staff can furnish any help on question 3 it will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

1 Incl Eaker from Hall Ref NR - 84

Question 3 on attached message: What are dangers of air crew members of mission losing flight pay and flight status?

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

2677th Regt.
Office of Strategic Services
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOR M.A.A.F. NR-84 DATE 16 DECEMBER 1944

CONFIRMATION

MAAF M/C NO. 48540

EAKER FROM HALL:

ON 10 NOVEMBER I ESTIMATED COMPLETION OF MY MISSION HERE BY DECEMBER 1. ON NOVEMBER 19 ESTIMATE WAS REVISED TO NOVEMBER 29. IT IS NOW DECEMBER 16 AND END NOT YET IN SIGHT AS THERE REMAIN 24 CASES TO INVESTIGATE IN SPITE OF FACT THAT 72 CASES ARE NOW PREPARED. I IMAGINE BY NOW YOUR FAITH IN MY ESTIMATES IS AS WEAK AS MINE. IT IS HOPED THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IN MANY CASES INVESTIGATION PRODUCES NEW EVIDENCE AND NEW NAMES WHICH ACCORDING TO MY DIRECTIVE MUST BE PURSUED. PRESENT POOR STATE OF ROAD, TELEPHONES MAKES COMMUNICATION HERE DIFFICULT, WHICH ALSO SLOWS US DOWN OCCASIONALLY . THIS MESSAGE NOT SENT AS PLEA TO ALTER DIRECTIVE NOR AS APOLOGY FOR PROGRESS BUT AS ATTEMPTED EXPLANATION FOR FURNISHING FAULTY INFO TO YOU CONCERNING COMPLETION DATE. MORALE OF MISSION MEMBERS IS HIGH AS ALL ENJOY CRACKING DOWN ON THOSE WHO PUSHED OUR POWS AROUND. MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO MOVE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE BUT HESITATE TO ESTIMATE TIME OF COMPLETION DUE TO PAST BAD GUESSES. COOPERATION FROM ALL SOURCES CONTINUES TO BE AS ENTHUSIASTIC AS IN PAST. I DO NOT KNOW PRESENT STATUS OF WAR CRIMES PROJECT AND CONSEQUENTLY AM NOT IN GOOD POSITION TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FUTURE ACTIVITIES MY MISSION HERE. HOWEVER IN HOPES THAT PROJECT WILL BE PUSHED TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION I RECOMMEND THAT WE CONTINUE HERE UNTIL I AM SATISFIED THAT ALL CRIMINALS WHOSE APPREHENSION IS AT ALL PRACTICABLE ARE ROUNDED UP AND AVAILABLE FOR TRIAL. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FORMER POWS HERE ARE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT IS IN STORE FOR THEM WHEN WE GET THROUGH.

3, WHAT ARE DANGERS OF AIR CREW MEMBERS OF MISSION LOSING FLIGHT PAY AND FLIGHT STATUS?

4, PLEASE ADVISE CHAUNCY THAT REQUEST MADE HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

29 December 1944.

Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles,
Chief of Air Staff, Hq., AAF,
The Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Giles:

Your letter of 28 November reached me in Bulgaria on Christmas Day. In fact, it came in on a B-17 which dropped by to take me back to Italy for a short conference with MAAF headquarters. I stayed there only one day and have now returned to wind up our witch-hunt. This sort of a job could go on and on as each investigation points a finger at an additional suspect; but I now plan to wind up about 15 January as I believe we shall surely have most of the criminals where we want them by that time.

I have learned that Colonel R. G. Storey, who was with me here for a while, has returned to the States with some of our interim reports. I hope you have time to talk to him as he has the complete story on our procedure and progress.

Unfortunately, I missed General Eaker on my brief visit to Caserta but I had a good session with Charlie Chauncey and Nate Twining. They are both well and in good spirits and were glad to know that I had recently gotten a letter from you.

All of us here are delighted at the stand the Air Forces took on letting the former POW's return to the United States, even though at some future date they may have to return to Bulgaria for the War Crimes Courts. They have had a long, tough session and deserve to be back home for a while at least.

Your reassignments in the cases of Ted Hill and Bob Walsh sound extremely good. Both are particularly well qualified for the jobs you have given them.

The B-29's are going to town, aren't they?

Best of luck to you and a good New Year!

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Brigadier General,
United States Army.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

File 3/6/45

SAS 383.6 (81)

~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (81)

DECLASSIFIED

28 November 1944

Brigadier General William E. Hall
A.P.O. 650, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Bill:

Your letter of 11 November reached me a few days ago and needless to say, we are all very proud of the excellent work you are doing in rounding up and bringing to justice the war criminals in Bulgaria. I know it has been a very trying and difficult job to round these people up and I think that your score of thirty-five suspects and the five probables who are dead is an outstanding record. I only wish that I could have had some part in this task as you know how strongly I feel about matters of this nature.

General Eaker was here for a visit, as you know, and I think the change and rest did him worlds of good. It also gave him a splendid chance to air any of his small problems with the Air Staff.

By now you are probably well aware of the spectacular missions of the XXI Bomber Command over Tokyo. You will be interested to know that your friends Rosey O'Donnell, Cam Sweeney and Sam Harris particularly made the headlines. It looks as though this outfit is now on a paying basis and that we may expect to hear more from it as time goes on.

General Ted Hill was with us for a short visit and has since returned to his new assignment as a replacement for General Bob Walsh. I think that this assignment will prove to be one of the best we have made in a long time.

All of your very good friends in this headquarters join me in sending our very best wishes for your good health and continued success.

Sincerely,

Signed
BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

File

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By LC; Date 9/23/76

29 NOV 1944

SAS 383.6 (81)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

11 November 1944.

Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles,
Chief of Air Staff, Hq. AAF,
The Pentagon Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Giles:

I don't know whether my reports to General Eaker on this mission have been coming through to you or not; but in case they have not, I wanted to let you know that beginning with the last week in October, things picked up considerably.

At present writing, thirty-five suspects have been rounded up and investigated with the result that fifteen are now behind bars awaiting trial by a War Crimes Court. I am still on the prowl for more and expect that before I leave here, our non-paying guests will about double in number. Five are dead so we can't get at them.

I have enjoyed this mission tremendously; first because I get so much satisfaction out of catching up with the bastards who kicked our boys around over here, and secondly because there is no precedent to follow in how to go about it.

I hope the results are pleasing to you and the Boss. If not, it is certainly no fault of General Eaker's, who has given me everything I've asked for.

Enclosed is an envelope for Helena. Will you ask Miss Cox to send it out to the house for me?

Give my regards to your faithful retainers and accept my best wishes for your good health.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Brigadier General,
United States Army.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date 4/23/76

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
3 Ind. & 20 June 1974
By: AM/AD LC; Date: 4/23/76

~~SECRET~~

Sec. of Air Staff

DECLASSIFIED

11 DEC 1944

1st Ind

AFICL-LI

JZM:bwl:5264
1 Dec 44

Hq Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, WDGS, Washington, D.C.
Attention: Liaison [redacted]

1. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War dated 20 November 1944 refers to a letter from the Secretary of War dated 7 November 1944 in which reference is made to informal conversations between the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Commanding General, Air Transport Command and a representative of a Swedish airline. In these conversation, it was intimated that at such time as definite arrangements were made for the release of interned American air crews in Sweden favorable consideration might be given to the allocation of five C-47 type aircraft. The letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War states that in view of the political and economic considerations, the State Department suggests that no aircraft should be allocated to Sweden at this time.

2. The decision of the Swedish Government to release interned AAF personnel in Sweden has no connection with the allocation of C-47 aircraft to a Swedish commercial airline.

3. The Army Air Forces is not in position to state what its stand will be with respect to future negotiations concerning transport aircraft allocation, in view of the fact that the situation in Sweden has not yet crystallized. The Army Air Forces feels that an answer to the State Department at this time might make it necessary to state a position which would be prejudicial to the position it might take in future negotiations.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

SAS 383.6 (80)

J. E. W. Low, Maj. A.C.

ROBERT C. LOWE
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Liaison Branch
Office of Asst. Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

File

1 DEC 1944

AFICL-LI

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

383.6 (80)

Sec of Air Staff
Asst Sec of War
for Air

OPD 336 Sweden
20 Nov 44

Allocation of Aircraft (Five C-47 Type Aircraft to Swedish Airline)

Returned for the inclusion of additional information for the Chief of Staff in accordance with telephone conversation between Lt Col J S Wise, OPD and Major Julius Z Hims, AAF Room 3E 138.

For the AC/S OPD:

1 Incl
OCS DS dtd 27 Nov 44
to OPD w/saf summary
sheet dtd 24 Nov 44
w/incl

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/25/74

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DECLASSIFIED

X Chief of Staff

AFICL-LI

JZM/dnf/5264

Allocation of Aircraft.

24 November 1944

SUMMARY

1. The inclosed letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War refers to informal intimations that favorable consideration would be given to the allocation of five C-47 type aircraft to Aktiebolaget Aerotransport, Swedish airline, provided definite arrangements were made for release of United States internees in Sweden.

2. The Acting Secretary of State reiterates his Department's views that the balance of power in post-war Scandinavian aviation, now being accomplished, should not be upset. He suggested that any assignment of C-47's be made only from such aircraft as may be declared surplus, after consideration of the requirements of all foreign carriers.

3. No C-47's are at present declared surplus.

4. As no reply to the letter of the Acting Secretary of State is believed necessary, and to avoid taking a definite AAF stand that might prejudice our position in future negotiations, recommend no further action at this time.

COORDINATION

Reply has been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Signed

Incl.
Ltr. to Sec/War, from Acting Sec/State, dtd 20 Nov. 1944.

BARNEY M. GILES,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces and
Chief of Air Staff

File
27/4

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26 NOV 1944

Cy. for. Sec. [illegible]

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SOS 383.6 (80)

SOS 383.6 (80)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/25/74

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DECLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces

Date Initials

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF: (Attention: Operations Division)

Subject: Allocation of Aircraft.

I. Discussion

1. The inclosed letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War refers to informal intimations that favorable consideration would be given to the allocation of five C-47 type aircraft to Aktiebolaget Aerotransport, Swedish airline, provided definite arrangements were made for release of United States internees in Sweden.

2. The Acting Secretary of State reiterates his Department's views that the balance of power in post-war Scandinavian aviation, now being accomplished, should not be upset. He suggested that any assignment of C-47's be made only from such aircraft as may be declared surplus, after consideration of the requirements of all foreign carriers.

3. No C-47's are at present declared surplus.

II. Action recommended

As no reply to the letter of the Acting Secretary of State is believed necessary, and to avoid taking a definite AAF stand that might prejudice our position in future negotiations, recommend no further action at this time.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

not used

Incl:
Ltr fr Actg Sec State
to Sec/War 20-11-44

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Sec. Air Staff
SAS 383.6 (80)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

DECLASSIFIED

November 20, 1944

In reply refer to
AD 858.79661/11-744

~~SECRET~~

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 7, 1944, in which you refer to the informal conversations which have taken place between the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces and the Commanding General, Air Transport Command, and the representative of Aktiebolaget Aerotransport, the Swedish airline. It is noted that in these conversations it was intimated that at such time as definite arrangements were made for the release of American airmen interned in Sweden, favorable consideration would be given to the allocation of five C-47 type aircraft.

You will recall that at the time the matter of the release of the interned American airmen was first taken up with the Swedish authorities, they were offered in return from 60 to 150 fighter planes and the loan of several Flying Fortresses. The Swedish Government replied that it could not accept any bragaining arrangement in return for which it would release the aforesaid airmen. Thereafter, and as a gesture of good will, the officer of this Government was renewed on a basis separate and apart from the release of the crews. As you know, Mr. Norlin represents a private corporation and is not in a position to speak for the Swedish Government, nor is it believed that he was connected with the decision regarding the release of the airmen.

There has been a considerable amount of rivalry, particularly in the field of commercial aviation, between our ally, Norway, and neutral Sweden. The Norwegians are already fearful that the Swedes will dominate commercial aviation in Scandinavia, being quite sensitive on this point, and the same view has been taken by the Danes. At the present time, this situation has ameliorated somewhat, but were Sweden to be provided now with aircraft having a post-war utility, the balance which is in process of being accomplished would, no doubt, be upset. In view of the political and economic considerations as stated above, the Department of State feels that the position outlined in the third paragraph of its letter to you of October 24, 1944, is fundamentally sound.

DECLASSIFIED

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DECLASS

The Department suggests that the requirements of Sweden's commercial air carrier be provided for at such time as , after having considered the relative urgency of the requirements of all foreign carriers, the Surplus War Property Administration, upon advice of the Interdepartmental Working Committee on Surplus Aircraft Disposal, determines that C-47 aircraft can be made available to ABA from surplus.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Acting Secretary

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

24 October 1944

File
MAR
M

Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles,
Chief of the Air Staff,
Hq., Army Air Forces,
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Giles:

Your good letter of 3 October reached me in Bulgaria and found me in a rather low frame of mind, due to the fact that progress on my mission has been so maddeningly slow. It is not that we have not been doing everything possible to get going; it is simply that unsettled political conditions and lack of Russian enthusiasm have blocked me at every turn.

On 21 October, however, it was agreed with the Russians that I could operate through the new Bulgarian government, which seems to welcome the opportunity to exonerate itself at the expense of those who acted unwisely during the pro-fascist regime. My morale is somewhat better now as I believe the new approach is going to pay dividends.

Thanks for your prompt action on Bob Harper. I consider myself very fortunate to have him as we have worked together for so long.

Please remember me to General Arnold and say "Hello" for me to the gang around the office.

Best of luck to you.

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Brigadier General,
United States Army.

383.6 (79)

File
11/11/44

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
SECRET By: [illegible]; Date 9/23/76

SAS 383.6 (79)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/ma LC, Date 9/25/76

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
AFIAN-FE
7 Nov 44 ... Ha
Date Initials

7 NOV 1944

Alleged Bombardment of American Prisoners of War in Hong Kong

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
War Department General Staff
Washington 25, D. C.

Att: Lt Col G. B. Walker, Jr., Asst Executive

1. Reference is made to Disposition Form, 25 October 1944, WDGAP 383.6, subject "Alleged Bombardment of American Prisoners of War in Hong Kong," and to reply by 1st Ind from this Headquarters, 1 November 1944.

2. Further information has been obtained from General Chennault, as follows:

a. All crews participating in the Hong Kong mission, 16 October, have been thoroughly interrogated.

b. Only one American gunner fired in the direction of shore installations. This gunner, in the tail of a B-25, returned ground fire at a point approximately 2,000 feet southeast of one Prisoner of War Camp. It is conceivable that a few stray missiles from the B-25 may have struck the camp area, but extremely improbable, since the location of the camp was at approximately 90° to the line of flight.

c. The Fourteenth Air Force briefs all crews on the locations of known Prisoner of War installations.

3. In view of the above information it is suggested that, if an Allied Prisoner of War Camp was in fact fired upon, the firing in all probability originated with the intercepting Japanese aircraft.

4. Reference is made to War Department Come-In 3059 dated 3 November 1944, for exact text received from General Chennault.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Signed

RAY L. OWENS,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

File
cc

Cy for Sec/AS

DECLASSIFIED

Dispatched
7 NOV 1944
AAG

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SAS 383.6 (78)

383.6 (78)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

Alleged Bombardment of American Prisoners of War in Hong Kong.

Secretary of the Air Staff 4 NOV 1944

AC/AS, Intelligence 1

1. Original request for this information came from G-1 on a WD Disposition Form, dated 25 October 1944. Request was partially answered by 1st Ind. which Brig. General R.E. Owens signed on 1 November. This is the final answer that was promised in 1st Ind.

1 Incl:
Ltr to G-1,
same subject.

W. J. PAUL
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive
Office of Asst Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

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AFICL-LI
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71097
3-11-44

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
3 NOV 1944 [illegible]
Date Initials

3 NOV 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Current Report on American Airmen Interned In Sweden.

1. As of 21 October 1944, which was the last communication on this subject from the Military Air Attache, Stockholm, Sweden, the status of American airmen interned in Sweden was as follows:

a. 1076 U.S. airmen interned as of that date.

b. 616 released by the Swedes, leaving 460.

c. Of the 616, 318 have been flown to the United Kingdom leaving 298 awaiting transportation by ATC.

2. It was estimated by the Military Air Attache that of the remaining 298, 150 a week could be evacuated if the weather was favorable.

3. Military Air Attache, Stockholm, further advised that as soon as those who had been released were evacuated, he expected the Swedes to release all the remaining 460 internees.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Sgd

BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief of Air Staff

383.6 (76)

Orig carried to USW by Col Libby 11/3/44

File

DECLASSIFIED 383.6 (76)
SECRET
Cy for Gen Giles

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rts.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/25/76

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DECLASSIFIED

Conduct of AAF Personnel in event of capture.

TO: Chief of Management Control (Organizational Planning Div.)

Date: 11 Nov 44

FROM: Chief of Air Staff

Comment No. 5
WDG:JB 5789

For publication of attached draft of AAF Letter (Incl. #4).

Signed

C. J. MARA,
[illegible], Air Corps,
Asst. Secretary, Air Staff.

Incls n/c

383.6

75

[illegible]
[illegible]
13 NOV 1944
[illegible]

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER					
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION					

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16—[illegible]-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Conduct of AAF Personnel in Event of Capture

General Owens. 4 Nov 44
CJM/jm/5789

Chief of Air Staff. 1

It is felt that the purpose of this letter, i.e., the wide distribution of the information contained therein, would be defeated by classifying the letter "secret." War Department Pamphlet No. 21-7 referred to therein is not secret, and it is therefore recommended that it be published either in the "open" or "restricted."

C. J. MARA
Colonel, A. C.
Executive, Secretary Air Staff

Incls. n/c

TO: Secretary of the Air Staff, Att'n: Colonel Mara DATE: 6 Nov 44

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, General Owens COMMENT NO. 2
JRB/ee/72141

Please secure the concurrence or comment of AC/AS, Intelligence to the recommendation contained in Comment No. 1 and return for further consideration by General Owens.

Signed
J. R. BREWER
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Executive
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Incls: n/c

TO: AC/AS, Intelligence DATE 6 Nov. 44
CJM/jm/5789

FROM: Chief of Air Staff Comment No. 3

For Comment.

[illegible]
7 NOV 1944
AAG

Signed
C. J. MARA
Colonel, A. C.
Executive, Secretary Air Staff

Incls. n/c

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SAS 383.6 (75)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 June & 30 June 1974
By: AL/AWC, Date 9/23/76

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Release of Interned AAF Personnel in Sweden

AC/AS, OCAR, THRU: AC/AS, Intelligence — 7 November 44

Chief of the Air Staff — 5
FHS, Jr: JT 6371

1. This office concurs in the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of Comment 3 as amended by Comment 4.

2. General Spaatz must be informed of the urgency of this project. His current shortages in P-47 type airplanes will operate against the early fulfillment of our obligation to Sweden unless he is assured of the project's importance and of our intention to make up the increased shortage incident to his compliance at an early date.

Signed

F. H. SMITH, JR.,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

7 NOV 1944
AAG

383.6 (71)

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

File

SAS 383.6 (71)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Res.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Alr/Aw LC, Date 9/23/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Release of Interned AAF Personel in Sweden

383.6 (71)

To: (1) Deputy Chiefof Air Staff (Gen. Smith)
(2) AC/AS, OC&R, Commitments Division
(3) AC/AS, Plans, Logistics Division

Date: 22 Oct. 1944

Comment No. 2
RLO/gwd/5246

1. Noted.

2. Forwarded as a matter pertaining to offices of address.

Dispatched
23 OCT 1944

Signed

RAY L. OWENS,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

File
10/24/44

DECLASSIFIED

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Copy for SAS
SAS 383.6 (71)

AFAEP
GHQ/mar/6724
wtn 17 Oct 44

DECLASSIFIED
000 ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 11/23/74

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21 OCT 1944

Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
The Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Stettinius:

In your letter of October 4, relative to the Army Air Forces' interests in Sweden, you suggest that the approach to the Swedish Government on Air Transport Command operations should be postponed until a decision is reached on the proposed demarche calling for the closing of the Goteborg and Malmo ports to German vessels and the termination of Swedish iron ore shipments to Narvik.

Because of the time that has elapsed without a final decision on the proposed demarche, I do not now feel that our Air Transport Command operations in Sweden should be jeopardized by further delay in obtaining official approval of arrangements for facilities required at Stockholm. I have received a message from General Spaatz in which he states that arrangements for ATC facilities at Stockholm have been informally completed. He further states that the U. S. Minister to Sweden has not yet received instructions which will permit him to officially support these negotiations.

May I, too, urge that the Minister be authorized, without delay, to take whatever steps are necessary to assure approval of the facilities required for Air Transport Command operations into and through Sweden on an openly military basis?

Sincerely yours,

Signed

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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File

COPY FOR GENERAL SMITH

383.6 (69)

SAS 383.6 (69)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED
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OCT 18 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Subject: Air Transport Command Operations in Sweden.

I. Discussion

1. In his letter of 4 October, Mr. Stettinius suggested that the approach to the Swedish Government, in the matter of ATC operations and facilities in Sweden, should be postponed until a decision is reached concerning the proposed demand that Swedish iron ore shipments to Narvik be terminated and that the Malmo and Goteborg ports be closed to Germany.

2. In CM-IN-14656 (15 October 44) General Spaatz announces informal completion of arrangements for ATC facilities at Stockholm and his intention to complete the necessary installations, but urges that the State Department take action toward official approval of this action. He complains that the State Department has not given the Minister instructions in the matter. Regarding this message, General Giles commented to General Kuter, "Prepare strong letter for General Arnold's signature to State Department."

3. Because Mr. Stettinius has apprised us of the reason for the State Department's delay in authorizing negotiations for the desired ATC facilities, and because a decision has not been made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the proposed demarche to Sweden, it would appear that we should urge, but not demand, State Department action to obtain the rights desired for our ATC operations.

II. Action Recommended

4. It is recommended that the attached letter be transmitted to Mr. Stettinius, urging that the U. S. Minister in Stockholm be authorized to go ahead with negotiations to meet ATC requirements.

[redacted]

L. [redacted]KUTER
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

Incl
Prop. ltr to
Mr. Stettinius

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SAS 38306-(69)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO: DECLASSIFIED DOD Ltrs. 8 Jan. & 20 June 1974 By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

15 OCT 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Lt. Adalbert D. Porter and Lt. William F. Higgins, Jr.

1. Subject officers, recently repatriated from Staluf Luft 3, were referred to this Division by the Office of Chief of Air Staff on the morning of 22 September, when they were interviewed by the Interrogation Branch, AC/AS, Intelligence, on matters of interest to the AAF.

2. On the evening of 22 September, Deputy AC/AS, Intelligence, issued instructions that Lt. Porter be held at Walter Reed Hospital pending possible interview with Mrs. Arthur Vanaman, wife of General Vanaman. Instructions were issued and Lt. Porter was held at the Hospital. At the same time, Personal Affairs Division, AC/AS, Personnel, was contacted for information as to Mrs. Vanaman's whereabouts. Interrogation Branch, AC/AS, Intelligence, was informed that Personal Affairs Division had already been searching for Mrs. Vanaman at the instance of Mrs. Arnold and would let Interrogation Branch know as soon as Mrs. Vanaman was located. On 23 September instructions were issued to the Interrogation Branch from the Chief of Air Staff through AC/AS, Intelligence and the Deputy that Lt. Porter was to proceed to his home or hospital nearest his home and to hold himself in readiness either to visit Mrs. Vanaman or await a visit from her. These instructions were transmitted to Lt. Porter who proceeded according to them.

3. On 6 October advice was received from both the Personal Affairs Division and the Secretary of Air Staff that Mrs. Vanaman would be in Washington possibly for ten days. The AC/AS, Personnel, at the request of this Division issued telephonic orders to Lt. Porter, who left California on 7 October, arriving in Washington on 8 October. He was met at the Airport by an officer from this Division and was taken immediately to see Mrs. Vanaman.

JAMES P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

File 10/16/44

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESS REPLY TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

383.6 (68)

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

AFICL-LI

19 OCT 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

SUBJECT: Current Report on American Airmen in Sweden

1. The following is a paraphrase of a cable from the Military Air Attache in Stockholm, Sweden dated 17 October 1944:

A total number of 1076 U. S. airmen have been interned in Sweden to date. Of this total 432 have been released, leaving 644. All airmen who have been released, except 191, have gone to the United Kingdom. The remainder will be flown over as soon as the weather permits ATC operations.

The following details are given on the release of each group:

15 Dec. 1943, 10 airmen released in exchange of Nazi trainer.

14 Mar. 1944, 9 airmen for personnel ditching outside Swedish territorial waters.

11 Mar. 1944, 2 airmen when German seaplane landed in Swedish territorial waters with crew of two.

24 Mar. 1944, 10 airmen released in exchange of Nazi seaplane landing Swedish waters.

6 Jun. 1944, 5 airmen releasedfor returning Nazi trainer.

17 Jul. 1944, 10 airmen released for return of Nazi trainer.

17 Jul..1944, two airmen released for medical reasons

16 Aug. 1944, 1 flight surgeon released

21 Aug. 1944, 23 airmen released in exchange for Radar from Britain with transportation by ATC

7 Sept 1944, 37 airmen released in exchange for Radar as above.

13 Sept 1944, 18 airmen released for two Nazi trainers

17 Sept 1944, 35 airmen released in exchange for equal number of German soldiers arriving in Sweden

30 Sept 1944, 270 airmen released in anticipation of influx into Sweden of German Military from Finland

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(66)

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ADDRESS REPLY TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 OCT 1944

2. The Military Air Attache further reports that the remaining released internees will be flown to the United Kingdom in the next seven ATC planes leaving Sweden. After this he expects more and probably all those remaining will be released.

3. The British have had all but 14 of the 117 R.A.F. airmen released since the 1st of January 1943. This was arranged on the same basis as the personnel released for the United States.

[illegible] P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

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AAS 383.6 (66)

HEADQUARTERS AAF

ROUTING SLIP

TO ➡ OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1. Gen Hodges	14 OCT
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

FOR ➡ FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE OR PHONE ME		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT

When you get some positive info re. just how many internees have been released, Gen Giles wants it.

[illegible]

FROM ➡	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL	PHONE

3-210. AF Rev. 1 Aug 1944

SAVE

IN REPLY REFER TO:

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

AFICL-LI

13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

SUBJECT: American Airmen Interned in Sweden

1. Up-to-date statistics on internees in Sweden are as follows:

1150	Airmen interned in Sweden
144	Released prior to recent negotiations
1006	
330	Involved in recent negotiations with the Swedes (300 released as a gesture of good-will toward the United States with no strings attached 30 released in exchange for three forcelanded German aircraft)
676	Total remaining in Sweden

2. It is believed that all the 330 airmen involved in the recent negotiations have left Sweden. An account of an interview with two Air Force officers in London, appeared in the New York papers, Sunday, 5 October. These officers stated that they had just been released from Sweden in exchange for two German airmen and that a number of other internees would be released on the same basis in the near future. Action has been taken to prevent a repetition of this indicated breach of security and discipline by the despatch of a cable to General Spaatz and the Military Air Attache in Stockholm requesting investigation and disciplinary action. The State Department was not too concerned by this incident other than to feel that it was a breach of discipline and should be corrected. OPD and this office concur in the State Department's attitude.

3. Ambassador Winant cabled the State Department 5 October to advise that the British Foreign Office was stressing the importance of keeping the Soviets fully informed on all negotiations involving the release of our airmen for German prisoners of war. The Swedes have kept both the Russians and the British fully advised on all internee negotiations.

W. J. Paul

JAMES P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
for Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

ADDRESS REPLY TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

383.6 (66)

HEADQUARTERS AAF

ROUTING SLIP

TO ➡ OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1. Gene Owens RLO	10/13/44
2. Gene Hodges JPH	10/16
3. Loc. of Air Staff	10/16
4.	3E1045
5.	

FOR ➡ FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE OR PHONE ME		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT

Please note & return

noted - R.L.O

JPH

TWF

FROM ➡	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL	PHONE
	T. H. FITZPATRICK Colonel, G.S.C. Secretary of Air Staff	5790 5789

3-318, AF Rev. 1 Aug 1944

(12)

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DECLASSIFIED

Office of the Commander - in - Chief

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

A. P. O. 650

C/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

6 October 1944.

Lt. General Barney M. Giles, USA.,
Chief of Air Staff,
Hq. Army Air Forces,
WASHINGTON. D.C.

File
MAL

Dear Barney,

Replying to your letter of September 30 on the question of the OSS teams in Bulgaria and Rumania, I believe the question is now cleared up. It was a fact that the OSS team in Bulgaria was ordered to leave. They did in fact leave, but in the meantime the Russians decided it was all a horrible mistake and said they could go back. I have not been able to learn whether or not they have actually gotten back - communications through Cairo, Turkey and points east are not very prompt with these teams.

With regard to your concern about our position in Rumania, it still appears good. The local Russian Commander has been very courteous to all our teams going into Ploesti. General Chauncey is now there with the object of making arrangements to put a liaison unit of ours on duty with the senior Russian Commander for the purpose of coordinating our bombing with his ground effort. He is also trying to make arrangements so that we can send a party of war correspondents in to see Ploesti; this with a view to getting a better coverage of our work on that target. Upon Chauncey's return, and after ascertaining the degree of success of his mission, I can and will give you further information. On the whole I feel, however, as I wrote to you recently, that our relations with the Russians are improving. You will recall that we got a very quick response to our request for authority to send Hall and his party into Bulgaria to check the criminals who committed atrocities against our prisoners of war.

383.6 (65)

Sincerely,

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.10
By: [illegible] Date 1/22/70

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SAS 383.6 (65)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] 1C; Date [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Correspondence between General Arnold and Mr. Stettinius regarding Sweden.

TO: Secretary of the Air Staff

DATE OCT 12 1944

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

COMMENT NO. 1
GHG/mar/6724

The attached file, containing the coordination copy of a letter from General Arnold to Mr. Stettinius on 27 September 1944, Colonel Fitzpatrick's request to Classified Files for this copy, and an informal memorandum for General Arnold signed "DEAN" on 21 September, are returned for disposition by your office.

S M Guyer, Col GSC
for JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Operational Plans Division

Incl.
File

File returned to Class. Files

GHG

383.6 (64)

File

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

PAGE SAS 383.6 (64)

3-1109 A.F.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Mar. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/23/76

383.6 (63)

TO: Chief of the Air Staff

FROM: AC/AS, Plans

4 Nov 1944
Comment No. 2
DD/ni/72538

An outline plan, designed to provide protection for American Prisoners of War in Germany and German held territory, has been prepared by the Office of The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, and submitted to General Arnold. The proposals contained therein have been approved by General Arnold and are presently being prepared for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

L. S. KUTER
Major General, U.S.A.
Asst Chief of Air Staff, Plans

Incl n/c

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11/9/44

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SAS 383 6 (63)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AFA/AWS LC. Date 9/23/74

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Messages from American P/W Camps in Germany.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans — 13 Oct. 1944

Chief of the Air Staff — 1
RLO/gwd/5246

1. Your attention is invited to the attached memorandum, subject as above, from the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.

2. It is desired that plans be made at this time, and presented for approval by General Arnold, for airborne landings, immediately upon cessation of hostilities, at all existing Prisoner of War camps in Germany and at such other places on the European Continent where American prisoners of war are being held.

Signed

BARNEY M. GILES,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl:
Memo, dtd.10/11/44,
frm. AFABI to CG,AAF.

383.6 (63)

14 OCT 1944

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Copy for SOS

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
10 [illegible] MS
Date

11 OCT 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Messages from American P/W Camps in Germany

1. The following messages were received by CPM Branch, MIS from AAF repatriates who arrived on the Gripsholm:

a. Col. Darr H. Alkire, SAO, West Compound of Stalag Luft 3, briefed Lt. Russell P. Allman to request that men, arms, and food be flown into his camp as soon as the war ends. He stressed the importance of the Ps/W getting out of the area as soon as possible as he fears possible uprisings by civilians and is sure there will be an acute food shortage. Up to 25 July 1944 he had not received instructions for his guidance upon German collapse.

b. Col. Delmar Spivey, SAO, Center Compound of Stalag Luft 3, briefed Lt. Charles E. McKee to request weapons and food as soon as collapse comes. He believes American Ps/W will be in a very dangerous position when organized resistance comes to an end, because the attitude of German civilians is very unfriendly, because there is a possibility that Ps/W will be held as hostages by the Gestapo, and because chaos may develop due to the large number of foreign workers in the Sagan area who will probably cut loose after Germany's collapse. Also, civilians and guards may attack the camp for food as well as revenge. He wants troops flown in who should be "prepared to fight." The airfield east of the Belaria compound of Stalag Luft 3 is suggested as an ideal place for such troops to land. He desires further instructions on air-to-ground communication to be set up following collapse. He states that he can receive from the air but cannot send.

2. Above information has been passed to ETOUSA for transmittal to appropriate authorities of SHEAF.

Signed
JAMES P. HODGES
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

SAS 383.6 (63)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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BWG

HALL MISSION TO BULGARIA

A message was received from Eaker, dispatched 9 October, which states that General Hall had arrived in Bulgaria and had a most satisfactory conference with the Russian Commander. He states that the local cooperation was excellent and that he intended to stay there until the machinery for committing the criminals to confinement or other punishment was actually operating.

It does not appear that to date the Russians have granted the British permission to enter Bulgaria for the same purpose as General Hall's mission.

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10/20/44

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SAS 383.6 (62) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

DECLASSIFIED

Investigation of Mistreatment of AAF Personnel in Bulgaria

The Air Judge Advocate 9 October 44

Chief of the Air Staff 1

Forwarded for your information and inclusion in the file on war criminals.

1 Incl.
29 Sept 44 memo
same subj

Jmc for
F. H. SMITH, JR.,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

10 OCT 1944

383.6 (62)

file
cc

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SAS 383.6 (62)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Reply to letters of 3 and 4 October 1944 from Mr. Stettinius to General Arnold re Sweden

Chief of the Air Staff

AC/AS, Plans

OCT 11 1944
GHG:ewm 6724

1. In a letter dated 27 September 1944, General Arnold stated to Mr. Stettinius our desire for openly military operation of the Air Transport Command into and through Sweden, and our unwillingness to consider any further allocation or loan of aircraft to Sweden until final agreement is reached concerning release of all our internees.

2. In a reply dated 3 October 1944, Mr. Stettinius reported on State Department efforts to obtain release of our internees. In this letter, he raises the question of Soviet concurrence in the release of Germans against the release of Allied internees, which the British Foreign Office and the Swedish Government feel is required.

3. In his letter of 4 October, Mr. Stettinius suggests that the Swedes should not be approached on the matter of Air Transport Command operations until a conclusion is reached concerning a proposed Anglo-American demarche calling for tightening of the blockade between Sweden and Germany. He further expressed the State Department's view that aircraft should not be furnished Sweden to the prejudice of our desires to operate air transports through Sweden to Moscow.

4. Attached is a proposed reply to Mr. Stettinius in which we state that (a) because Americans predominate among Allied internees in Sweden, we feel ours should be the governing opinion and advise against seeking Soviet concurrence, (b) because it is unlikely that we shall be permitted to operate air transports into Soviet territory, we see little objection to the loan to Sweden of additional Fortress aircraft as requested by the Swedes and earnestly recommended by the U.S. Minister in Stockholm and (c) we urge continued effort to make the blockade of Germany completely effective.

5. The following information was received today: (a) ball bearing shipments from Sweden to Germany are to be terminated on 12 October 1944, (b) the U.S. Minister in Stockholm recommends lending Sweden four additional interned Fortresses as a gesture of appreciation for the recent release of over 300 internees and (c) the British Foreign Office has instructed its representative in Stockholm to keep his Soviet colleague informed of developments in the release of internees, after informing the U.S. Minister of these instructions.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Brig General, U.S.A.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

3 Incls:
#1 - Proposed reply
#2 - Ltr fm St Dept dtd 3 Oct 44
#3 - Ltr fm St Dept dtd 4 Oct 44

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Cy for Sec A.S.

SECRET

COPY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. Date 9/23/74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1944

~~SECRET~~

My dear General Arnold:

I refer to your letter of September 27 regarding the urgent desires of the Army Air Forces to obtain the release of the American airmen interned in Sweden and to maintain Air Transport Command operations in that country. I am writing you a separate letter with regard to the latter subject.

As regards the interned airmen, you have undoubtedly been informed of the release by the Swedish government on September 28 of 300 of our aircraft personnel "in anticipation of any Germans who may come into Sweden". A paraphrase of the telegram on this subject from the American Minister at Stockholm is attached.

Because of the extremely high importance attached to this matter by the War Department, our Minister is under instructions to utilize every available method to secure the release of the interned American aircraft personnel at the earliest possible moment. In general, these consist of three separate lines of approach, namely:

(a) As proposed by Mr. Stimson in his letter to Mr. Hull of September 8, 1944, the release of our airmen now or hereafter interned in Sweden against the sale to the Swedish Government of a maximum of 150 P-47 type aircraft and the loan of four Flying Fortresses.

(b) The release on a man-for-man basis of our aircraft personnel against German soldiers crossing the Swedish border and offered the choice of either remaining in Sweden or returning to Germany.

(c) The exchange of our airmen against force-landed German planes on the basis of approximately ten Americans for one German plane. As regards this latter method, the United States Military Attache for Air at Stockholm passes on the advisability of releasing the German planes.

Although the American Minister at Stockholm made known to the Swedish authorities immediately after the receipt of Mr. Stimson's letter the proposal to exchange airmen for the sale and loan of aircraft to Sweden, the Swedish Government has not yet decided whether or not it desires to

Major General Henry H. Arnold,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
War Department.

DECLASSIFIED

SAS 383.6 (61)

DECLASSIFIED

purchase the P-47 aircraft and to obtain the use on a loan basis of four interned Flying Fortresses. The efforts of our Minister have, however, been more successful as regards methods (b) and (c), 333 airmen having recently been released on an actual or anticipated man-for-man exchange basis, with the possibility that from 35 to 40 men may shortly be released against three force-landed German aircraft.

We have just been informed, however, that since the German military personnel entering Sweden against whom our airmen are exchanged, are crossing the border as a result of Soviet pressure, the British Foreign Office and to a certain extent the Swedish authorities themselves consider that the agreement of the Soviet Government should be obtained to the exchange procedure. Politically, this step would seem to be desirable. On the otherhand, it is my opinion, as well as that of our Ambassador in Moscow, that if this matter is brought to the attention of the Soviet authorities, they may object on the grounds that the released German soldiers would again be used against the U.S.S.R. In these circumstances, I should appreciate the views of the War Department as to whether or not the need for these men is sufficient to warrant the political undesirability of attempting to proceed with this plan without taking it up with the Soviet Government. In the meanwhile, we shall, of course, continue to make every effort to secure the release of the remaining airmen.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of telegram

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AlnTAC LC: Date 9/23/76

PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING ~~SECRET~~ TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

NUMBER: 3939

DATED: September 28, 7 p.m.

FROM: American Legation at Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

Mr. Boheman of the Foreign office has just informed me that the Swedish Government, in view of our representations, has decided to release to us at once without any compensating factor, 300 of our interned airmen "in anticipation of any Germans who may come into the country". The men to be released are to be chosen by ourselves as we wish and regardless of the time of their arrival in Sweden. (This message is repeated to London for the Ambassador and General Spaatz in my telegram number 1171, September 28, 7 p.m.). Mr. Boheman said that the Swedish Government prefers to release these men as a gesture of good will and friendship toward the United States, that it does not wish to consider the question on the basis of any compensation for Sweden, and that it regrets it is not practicable to release the entire number at once. He added that we should first get these men out, then we can examine the question of the remaining ones and see what may occur in the meantime. He indicated that it would be embarrassing for the Swedish Government from an internal political view point to empty all of the American camps at once.

He said that the Swedish Government might take up with us later the possibility of securing on the same terms as previous aircraft loaned to Sweden, two additional ones to be refitted as transport planes, but added that this request would be made at a suitable moment and was in no way tied up with the release of our men. Later on he mentioned that the Swedish

Government hopes that the Swedish airplane industry will be able to buy a license for the manufacturing rights to an aircraft engine after the war of a type which has not yet been decided upon. He hopes that sympathetic consideration will be given to this matter when it comes up.

I expressed my thanks to Mr. Bohman for what the Swedish Government had done and informed him that it would be greatly appreciated by the American Government as well as by our air authorities.

Please inform the War Department immediately.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

C
O
P
Y

DECLASSIFIED
Per State Dept
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/74

In reply refer to
NOE

October 4, 1944

~~SECRET~~

My dear General Arnold:

Reference is made to your letter of September 27 in regard to the release of interned American airmen in Sweden and to Air Transport Command operations in that country.

In my letter of October 2 I informed you concerning the present status of the matter of the interned aircraft personnel. As regards Air Transport Command operations in Sweden, the Department of State is fully prepared to instruct our Minister at Stockholm to request the Swedish Government for permission to establish independent Air Transport Command facilities in Sweden and to operate military rather than Psuedo-civilian air transports into and through Sweden from both Iceland and the United Kingdom. The request will also relate to permission to establish an independent Air Transport Command station with thenecessary facilities.

As you may be aware, we are giving serious consideration to a proposal that a new Angle-American demarche be made to Sweden, calling upon it to close the ports of Goteborg and Malmo to German vessels and to terminate the shipments of Swedish iron ore to Narvik. It is anticipated that final decision on this matter will be reached by the American and British military authorities during the next few days. Accordingly, I believe that it would be advisable to postpone the approach to the Swedish Government on ATC operations until after the matter of Swedish-German trade has been decided.

I fully concur in your view that in approaching the Swedish Government regarding ATC operations any question of reciprocal commercial rights should be avoided. Our position in this matter is that no reciprocal arrangements with individual countries should be made in advance of the forthcoming aviation conference which has been called for this express purpose.

Our Minister at Stockholm has told the Swedish authorities that we would be willing to lend them four Flying Fortresses for use as transports as a part of our proposal regarding the release of American airmen now or hereafter interned in Sweden. The Minister has reported that additional planes are urgently desired by the Swedes in connection with the projected

Major General Henry H. Arnold
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
War Department
Washington, D.C.

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early opening of the Stockholm-Moscow run. Considering that such a service might prejudice our obtaining the same rights from the U.S.S.R., it is the view of the State Department that no further Fortresses or Douglas C-47 type aircraft should be offered to Sweden until satisfactory arrangements have been made with the Soviet Government for the operation of either ATC planes or American commercial planes between Stockholm and Moscow.

It is my understanding that, in addition to calling on General George, Mr. Norlin, of AB Aerotransport, has submitted an application for five Douglas C-47 type aircraft through the established channels for civilian applicants and that it is at present being considered. Any allocation which may be made as a result of this application must, of course, take into account the overall question of civilian air transport supply needs.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/25/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Examination of Captured Enemy Documents

AC/AS, Intelligence 10/1/44

Office of the Commanding General 1

1. Attached letter from General Donovan, director of OSS, requests that arrangements be made by the Air Staff to send appropriate intelligence officers to OSS to examine recently acquired captured enemy documents concerning objects of vital interest to AAF.

2. General Arnold desires that Air Intelligence complies.

3. Colonel Turner has been verbally requested to submit draft reply of letter of appreciation to General Donovan for General Arnold's signature.

/s/
DEAN

1 Attach.
Ltr to Gen Arnold frm
Gen Donovan dtd 9/29/44

3 October 1944

Office of the Commanding General 2

Assistanct Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence DLS/ro 72510

1. Letter referred to in paragraph 1, comment 1 was received, noted and an answer drafted for General Arnold's signature which was delivered to Colonel Dean on 1 October 1944.

2. Air Intelligence Officers commenced examination/or documents herein referred to on Friday, 29 September 1944 and this project is going forward.

3. Report on intelligence obtained from this material will be presented to General Arnold promptly as examination is completed.

1 Attach.
no change.

JOHN F. TURNER
Colonel, Air Corps
Operational Deputy
Office of Asst Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

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SECRET DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 September 1944

DECLASSIFIED
Per
SK Note 7/1/86
By AW DC; Date 10/6/94

Gen eral H. H. Arnold
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear General Arnold:

As you know from your recent discussion with Lt. Dorr and Lt. Coombs, the OSS Bucharest team acquired a substantial volume of captured enemy documents concerning oil, the German Air Force and German war industries which is expected to be of substantial interest and value to the United States Army Air Forces.

All of this material has been screened in Italy by a joint committee of RAF, USAAF, G-2, and OSS intelligence officers for the purpose of extracting items of immediate operational interest to Allied ground and air forces in all theaters. Such items were immediately photostated or digested in a special series of OSS reports and distributed to the operational headquarters concerned. You will be interested to know that this initial screening produced substantial material of importance to the Army Air Forces and revealed potential new air targets, particularly in the aircraft, oil and ball-bearing industries. This information has been given to HQ, MAAF, 15th Air Force, and 8th Air Force. In addition, considerable material relating to all aspects of the attacks on Roumanian oil targets has been made available to the AAF/MTO Evaluation Board, together with an officer of the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS, who will assist in its analysis.

Most of the material has been brought to Washington and is now undergoing sorting and segregation by my staff in accordance with the needs of various Washington intelligence agencies. First priority has been given to the selection of material for the Air Forces in view of its particular interest in this material. This processing has now progressed to the point where considerable material is ready for examination by Air Force intelligence officers. As I am anxious that all of this material be made fully available to the Army Air Forces in the shortest possible.

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time, it is respectfully requested that arrangements be made by your staff to send appropriate intelligence officers to OSS to examine documents in the following categories:

(a) OIL

(b) German Air Force Technical Intelligence

(c) German Air Force Order of Battle and General Items

(d) Industrial Targets in Europe

In conclusion I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the splendid support given the OSS Bucharest team by HQ, MAAF and 15th Air Force, and particularly by Lt. General Eaker and Major General Twining.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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COPY

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Per
St Note 7/1/86
By: PL DG; Date 10/6/94

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

21 September 1944

General H. H. Arnold, USA
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Arnold:

I am very grateful to you for your generous letter of the nineteenth of September. I know it will be a source of encouragement and gratification to our men in the field. We are all most happy to have been of service to you.

Such help as we have been able to give to the Air Forces in this and other ways has been largely due to the attitude of your Command. I do not refer alone to the aid you have given us by providing the air lift which is necessary in connection with so many of our activities. I mean the flexibility of mind and receptiveness of your personnel to new concepts and modern methods for waging war. Your officers and men are constantly aiding OSS personnel in every theater of operations. They have not hesitated to call on us for help when they thought we could give it; they have been quick to aid us in developing ideas of merit. The result has been a working relationship which has led to mutual accomplishments such as the Balkan rescue work.

Sincerely yours,

S/ Donovan

T/ William J. Donovan
Director

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HEADQUARTERS AAF

ROUTING SLIP

TO ➡ OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1. ~~Gene Omond~~ ✓ RLO	10/1/44
2. ~~Gene Timberlake~~ PWT	10/2/44
3. ~~Gene Smith~~	
4. ~~Gene Kutes~~	JHS
5. Gene Hodges 3E150	JHS

FOR ➡ FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE OR PHONE ME		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT

Please note & return

noted - RLO

" PWT

JHS

" Kutes

EPC 2106 TAF

T. A. FITZPATRICK

Colonel, G.S.C.

FROM ➡	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL Secretary of Air Staff	PHONE 5783 5790

3-210, AF Rev. 1 Aug 1944

OCT 6 4 PM

RECEIVED
SECRETARY, AIR STAFF
OCT 1944

6 Oct

~~SECRET~~
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Per State Dept
Per [illegible] Date 9/27/74

PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE

Personal Attention Gen. Giles. (Passed to Gen. Giles per direction of Gen. Bissell.)

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Sec. of State

DATED: 28 Sept. 1944

NUMBER: 3939

Please transmit the following information to the War Department immediately.

Following various representations made by us, Boheman (Swedish Foreign minister) has just informed me that his Government has decided to release immediately 300 of our interned airmen without expecting any compensating factor and we may choose the men we want released regardless of when they arrive in this country. Boheman pointed out that he is taking this action in anticipation of any Germans who may enter Sweden. He stated that his Government desires that these men be released as an indication of good will and friendship for the US and he does not ask that we consider this question on any basis of compensation for Sweden. He told me that we should first get these men out of Sweden and then we could look into the question of the men remaining here and in the meantime see what transpires. Boheman expressed his regrets that it does not seem practicable to release all the American airmen at once and he indicated that if all the American camps were emptied at once it would be embarrassing for his Government.

Boheman stated that he plans to take up with us at a later date the possibility of obtaining two additional planes to be refitted as transport planes on the same terms as the previous arrangement made with the Swedes, but he added that it was not tied up with the release of our men and that this request would be made at a suitable time. Boheman went on further to say that his Government hopes that after the war it will be possible for the Swedish aircraft industry to purchase license for manufacturing rights of an aircraft engine of a type upon which a design has not yet been decided. Boheman expressed the hope that this request will be given sympathetic consideration when it is made.

I told Boheman that I was confident that my Government as well as our air authorities would greatly appreciate this Swedish gesture and I thanked him for the action taken by his Government.

(My 1171, 28 September, repeats this to London for Ambassador and General Spaatz.)

Johnson (Minister)

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SAS 383.6 (52)

File 10/7/44

Copy #11

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

AFICL-LI
RCL?dnf 6548
wrtn. 29 Sept. 44

6 OCT 1944

Lt. General Ira C. Eaker
Commander-in-Chief
Allied Air Forces
APO 650, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Ira:

On 19 September, General Arnold wrote General Donovan a letter of appreciation for the excellent work done by the Office of Strategic Services in rescuing Army Air Force personnel from the Balkans.

General Arnold has asked that I send you a copy of General Donovan's reply, which is enclosed. I feel certain you will be interested in his comments on cooperation between the Army Air Forces and the Office of Strategic Services.

Sincerely yours,

Signed

BARNEY M. GILES,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief of Air Staff

Incl: 1
Ltr frm Gen. Donovan
dtd 21 Sept. 1944

383.6

56

6 OCT 1944

COPIES

IDENTICAL LETTERS SENT TO:
Lt. General George C. Kenney
Major General George E. Stratemeyer
Lt. General Carl Spaatz
Lt. General M. F. Harmon

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Copy for Sec/AS

SAS 383.6

56

Same Letter to:

General Spaatz
General Kenney
General Stratemeyer
General Harmon

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

DECLASSIFIED

AFICL-LI
RCL:dnf 6548
wrtn 29 Sept 44

6 OCT 1944

Lt. General Ira C. Eaker
Commander-in-Chief
Allied Air Forces
APO 650, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Dear Ira:

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General Arnold has asked that I send you a copy of General Donovan's reply, which is enclosed. I feel certain you will be interested in his comments on cooperation between the Army Air Forces and the Office of Strategic Services.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
BARNEY M. GILES,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl: 1
Ltr frm Gen. Donovan
dtd 21 Sept. 1944

Identical letters sent to Generals Kenney, Stratemeyer, Spaatz and Harmon.

COPY FOR GENERAL GILES

DISPATCHED
6 OCT 1944
AAG

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~~SECRET~~

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MANUSCRIPT DIVISION

CLASSIFIED ITEMS REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they contain security classified information:

Series: Military Decimal

Folder Title: SAS 383.6

Item(s) and Security Classification:

9/21/44

Donovan

HHA

S

aln

Reviewer

9-23-76

Date

86-57 (rev 4/90)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan/& 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/22

~~SECRET~~
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Discussion with State Department concerning Sweden.

General Giles 21 Sept 1944

General Arnold 1

In connection with the attached I am not satisfied with the way this was handled. It looks to me that if this was important enough to go to all that trouble, it was important enough to send a man to do a man's work instead of a boy to do a ~~boy's~~ man's work.

Incl.
Memo for Gen. Arnold
9/21/44 from Colonel
Dean.

H. H. A.

383.6

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~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (55)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

18 September 1944

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
9/18/44 [illegible]
Date Initials

Conversation between General Giles and Mr. Trimble of the State Department.

Mr. T: Hello. General Giles this is William Trimble of the State Department. Hugh Cummings went to Montreal and he asked me to keep you informed of the play-by-play account of that conversation he had with you the other day?

Gen. G: Yes, on the Swede deal?

Mr. T: We've got some pretty good news. It's just come in and they said that certainly if any German crosses the border they will release one of our men immediately. A convoy of Finnish ships with German military on board has landed - reached Swedish ports. And he said that all German military personnel on these boats will be interned immediately, and that the Swedes will release one of our airmen for each of them immediiately.

Gen. G: I see. For each one that's interned?

Mr. T: I want to clarify that point though because it doesn't seem to make much sense. I don't see how they can release our men if they interne the Germans. I'm going to send a flash back to them on it.

Gen. G: O.K. And also push that airplane deal. Have you got the memorandum from the Secretary of War on the 8th of September?

Mr. T: Yes. Then there's one thing - the second thought of your thing - that was the force landed bombers - they don't like that.

Gen. G: I see - they don't want that part of it?

Mr. T: No, but they'll --

Gen. G: Well, go ahead and release those that are there, and we'll dicker for the others.

Mr. T: If you can send somebody over sometime, I can give them your copy of this thing.

Gen. G: I'll send some one over today and get in touch with you.

Mr. T: Fine. Room 361.

Gen. G: Thank you.

Mr. T: Thank you.

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MAL
File

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383.6 (54)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date

DECLASSIFIED
Per State Dept
By: LC; Date 9/25/74

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Legation, Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: September 16, 1944, 6:42 p.m.

NUMBER: 3700

I have discussed the suitable portions of the Department's 1829, September 13, 7 p.m. with Mr. Boheman. He promised that he would go into the matter thoroughly, and I am sure that he fully understands the implications as well as the opportunity now afforded to Sweden to make a welcome gesture. Although Mr. Boheman made no definite commitments, I gather that the release of the air-force personnel would offer less difficulties than the release of force-landed bombers. Boheman said that if the Swedish Government should agree to our request for the release of force-landed bombers now and in the future, it would practically make Sweden a base of military operations against Germany and that this would not be possible. I intend to see him again early next week and in the meantime have urged him to explore every possibility and to dismiss nothing as being "impossible". I shall also discuss the subject informally with General Nordenskiold.

While in the Baltic, news of the German attack on Hogland reached a convoy of fifty Finnish vessels under German requisition or charter which departed from Finland yesterday having on board evacuated military materiel and some military personnel.

According to the information the Swede's have received, nine of the vessels immediately broke away from the convoy and headed for Swedish ports. Three of them have already arrived in Sweden. Mr. Boheman believes that the others will arrive today. The masters and crews aboard these ships are Finnish citizens. All of the German military personnel on board these vessels will be immediately interned, and Mr.

Boheman

Boheman has promised that he will release one of our airmen for each one of them immediately. Mr. Boheman has also given entirely satisfactory assurances in regard to the immediate release from internment of one American airman for each German soldier who may come to Finland from Germany and who may be offered the chance to either remain in this country or return to Germany. (Please see Department's 1834 of September 14.)

DECLASSIFIED
For State Dept
By: A-[illegible] Date 9/22/76

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

FROM: American Legation, Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: September 14, 1944, 12 noon

NUMBER: 1834

You will please inform Boheman that the American Government expects the immediate release from internment of one American airman for each German soldier given the choice of remaining in Sweden or returning to the Reich.

DECLASSIFIED
Per State Dept
Sp. Air LC; Date 9/23/74

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

FROM: American Legation, Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: September 13, 1944

NUMBER: 1829

You are requested to ascertain, on behalf of the War Department, the views of the Government of Sweden to a proposal that the United States Government make available for purchase by Sweden of from 60 to 150 P-47 aircraft and loan Sweden four interned B-17 aircraft for use as transports in return for the release of all United States air crew personnel now or hereafter interned by Sweden and the assurance that all American bombing aircraft now or hereafter force-landed in Sweden will be released. The final number of P-47 aircraft to be made available within the above limits is left to your discretion for determination during the course of your negotiations with the Swedish authorities.

For your confidential information, the highest importance is attached by the War Department to the release at the earliest possible moment of the air crew personnel now interned in Sweden. You are therefore instructed to take up this matter immediately with the Swedish authorities. We wish to be kept currently informed by cable concerning the progress of your negotiations.

For your further confidential information, it is the desire of the War Department, should a favorable reply be received to the above proposal, to send a military air mission to Sweden in order to instruct the Swedish air force in the maintenance and operation of the American planes. Unless the Swedes themselves indicate the need for instructors, no mention should be made at this time of the second proposal.

DECLASSIFIED
Per State Dept
Apr 2 1971 Date 9/23/71

PERTINENT SECTION OF TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

FROM: American Legation, Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: September 8, 1944, 10 p.m.

NUMBER: 3566

During my conversation with Mr. Boheman last night, he appeared to be confident of Sweden's military preparedness in the event of war-like developments in the far north and said that Sweden's border with Finland was completely manned. He believed that several thousand deserters from General Rendulic's Lapland Army would come across the border and mentioned that this would be advantageous to us. In reply to my question, Mr. Boheman left the impression that the Swedish Government would not regard these Germans as soldiers subject to internment and stated that the Swedes would offer them the choice either of remaining in Sweden or returning to the Reich.

He implied that this would provide a basis for us to secure the release from internment in Sweden of equivalent numbers of Allied or American troops.

Letter to General Eaker.

General Giles.

General Loutzenheiser.
AC/AS, Plans, Operational Plans Division. GGC:hmf/V2879 1

Request that the attached letter, regarding Colonel John Hay Whitney, be forwarded to General Eaker for such action as he deems necessary.

JOE L. LOUTZENHEISER
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Chief, Operational Plans Division

1 Incl:
Proposed letter to
Gen Eaker.

8836 (52) B

File

22 SEP 1944

Lieutenant General I. C. Baker
Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Dear Ira:

I am forwarding the following information to you for such action as you deem necessary.

On Wednesday, 21 September 1944, Mrs. Charles Payson telephoned this Headquarters to say that Mrs. Payne Whitney, mother of Colonel John Hay Whitney, had been taken to the hospital yesterday under much the same condition as existed this time last year, except there is no heart trouble this time and that there is every reason to expect she will recover. The family is overjoyed as a result of his fortunate escape and return to duty.

Sincerely,

Signed

BARNEY M. GILES,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff.

22 SEP 1944
AG

805 3836 (52)

R-1

GENERAL EAKER IS NOW HERE YOU CAN GA

YES HERE IS THE STORY

[redacted]

COL WHITNEY IS OUR LIAISON OFFICER WITH OSS, OWI, THE FRENCH AND THE BALK PARTISANS ON AUG.22 IN THE BRIDGE HEAD AREA OF SOUTHERN FRANCE NEAR LAMBERT HE WAS WITH ON OSS PARTY IN AN AREA BELIEVED TO BE FREE OF GERMANS AT 5:20 PM ON ROUNDING A TURN IN THE RAOD A CONCEALED GERMAN TANK OPENED FIRE ON THEIR CAR. THE PARTY TOOK TO THE DITCH BESIDE THE ROAD AND SOON MADE THEIR WAY TO A NEARBY FARM HOUSE. THE TANK BEGAN SHELLING THIS HOUSE AND [redacted] SOON KNOCKED IN THE ROOF.

383.6 (52)

R-2

TO AVOID CERTAIN CASUALTY THE PARTY PUT OUT A WHITE FLAG AND SURRENDERED.WHILE THE GERMANS WERE [redacted] REMOVING THE PARTY, TWO OF THE OSSS GROUP ESCAPED. IT IS FROM THEM WE HAVE THE ACTUAL EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT. THEY ARE DEFINITE THAT COL. WHITNEY WAS UNINJURED. WE HAVE BEEN MOST HOPEFUL THAT OUR TROOPS WOULD RECAPTURE COL. WHITNEY. WE ARE STILL OF THE BELIEF THERE IS A GOOD [redacted] POSSIBILITY OF THIS MAKE CERTAIN NO [redacted] PUBLICITY IS GIVEN AS THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY ENDANGER HIS CHANCES. IT SENT OFF TO MRS WHITNEY THE FOREGOING DETAILS ON MY LAST COURRIER ON THE 25TH WITHIN AND HOUR OF RECEIVING THE INFORMATION.

[redacted]

SHE SHOULD HAVE THAT LETTER BY NOW. WILL ADVISE GEN. GILES PROMPTLY IF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION COMES IN. I TALKED TO GEN. DONOVAN LAST NIGHT AND EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE TO OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION THROUGH OSS CHANNELS

R-3

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

~~NOTHING FURTHER THANK YOU~~

File

SAS 383.6 (52)

'Jock' Whitney Captured, Report

Seized in France, Secretary Hears

NEW YORK, Aug. 29 (U.P.). Col. John Hay (Jock) Whitney, scion of one of the nation's oldest and wealthiest families, tonight was reported to have been captured by the Germans "somewhere in France" while riding in a jeep with four other officers.

His secretary said the story had been received from several "sources" today, and that while there has been no confirmation from the War Department she was inclined to believe it was true.

Whitney arrived in England early in 1943 to head the public relations office of the Eighth U. S. Air Force and subsequently was transferred to the Italian war theater. The report of his capture was the first indication he was in France.

His wife, the former Betsy Cushing, ex-wife of James Roosevelt, was in New York city, but could not be reached for comment. He was formerly married to Mary Elizabeth Altemus, the "Liz" Whitney of the turf sport.

...Cool Today,

See WAR, Page 2, Column 3

Col. 'Jock' Whitney, Turf Family Scion, Captured by Nazis

New York, Aug. 29 (U.P.).—Col. John Hay (Jock) Whitney, scion of one of America's most eminent racing families, has been captured by Germans somewhere in France, his office announced today.

WHITNEY

The only details of the capture available were that Whitney was riding in a jeep with four other officers in what they thought was friendly territory when taken prisoner.

Whitney, who married the former Betsy Cushing, ex-wife of James Roosevelt in 1942 following his divorce from "Liz" Whitney of Hollywood and turf fame, was himself a prominent sportsman. At one time he was chairman of the board of directors of Selznick International Pictures and financed "Gone With the Wind." Until recently he was vice chairman of the N. Y. State Racing Commission and a director of Pan American Airways.

He left his position as a dollar-a-year director of the Motion Picture Division of the coordinator of Inter-American affairs to enter the service and went to England as a captain in 1943.

He was later shifted to Italy and it was not known that he was in France until the report of his capture was received today.

... Capitol Senator Fergu... (R.), of Michigan sent up a trial balloon when he quoted "reliable sources" to the effect Nelson would succeed former Supreme Court Justice Byrnes as war mobilization director and head of the vast demobilization program.

Seeks Source of Report

But the President would not bite on that one. He would provide the answer, he said, if the source of Ferguson's information was furnished him. He had a right, he thought, to know where such reports originated and he intended to find out, if possible. Often, he pointed out, taking a poke at the Michigan Senator, such "reliable source" information originated in the same person's head.

It was Nelson's turn next. When a reporter asked what the President's reaction would be to OPA Director Chester Bowles as head of the demobilization program, the President said That he had not noticed Bowles permitting internal rows in his organization.

A spokesman at Byrnes' office said that the former justice stands on his statement to Congress that he has no intention of keeping his war post after the war was over.

Halleck Snipes at Krug

"Mr. Byrnes feels that whoever takes on the job (when it is established by Congress) should be prepared to stay and finish it—stay for at least a year or two," the spokesman said.

Except for a small blast at the newly appointed WPB acting director, 36-year-old J. A. Krug, on the floor of the House, the agency spent a quiet day for the first time in many.

"He (Krug)...

...rgns
...nd E Sts. NAtional 9800

all Nylon

Good Behavior

SLIPS

by Movie Star

100% Nylon (Government reject), that wonder fabric which launders like a charm and requires no ironing, fashioned into a sleek, costume black slip. Two-seam bias cut and shirred bosom for smooth fit. Adjustable shoulder straps for desired length. Sizes 32-40.

2.25

LANSBURGH'S—Lingerie Third Floor

ROUTING SLIP

TO	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1.	Gen Smith	9/15/44
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

FOR → FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE OR PHONE ME -		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT

OK for dispatch

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

T. A. FITZPATRICK

FROM → OFFICE Col. A.G.S.C.
Secretary of Air Staff

PHONE

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

ATTENTION:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/23/76

SEP 12 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GILES:

Subject: Evacuation of U.S. Prisoners of War from Bulgaria.

1. Relative to CM-IN-8322 (9 September 1944), you commented, "General Jamison prepare reply." This is a State Department message in which our Ambassador in Turkey reports that the Bulgarian Government is considering the release and means of evacuation of the American prisoners of war in that country. He further states that he is doing all he can to effect this release and evacuation.

2. In CM-IN-10715 (12 September 1944) Ambassador Steinhardt reports further, in a message dated 10 September, that 335 American airmen had arrived at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Arrangements are being made to hospitalize at Istanbul those requiring such treatment, and to move the others to Cairo without delay.

3. Attached is a proposed message to Ambassador Steinhardt, thanking him for his efforts.

G. C. JAMISON
Brigadier General, USA
Actg. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

Incl.
Proposed message to
Ambassador Steinhardt

SC 4580
Cable Dispatched
16 Sept. 44

383.6 (51)

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~~SECRET~~

AAS 383.6 (51)

13SEP1944

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

303.6 (50)

TO: Management Control

Date: 18 Sept. 1944

FROM: Secretary, Air Staff

Comment No. 2
FEG/cg 6751

1. Attention is invited to preceding comments.

2. For preparation of reply to G-1.

FREDERICK E. GIGNOUX, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Secretary, Air Staff.

Incl.
n/c

File
Cr

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/23/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Repatriation, Recovery and Rehabilitation of Prisoners of War

Secretary of the Air Staff

16 Sept 1944

AC/AS, Personnel

1
AFPMP-13/ENY-so/73057

1. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, concurs in general in the principles of the proposed memorandum.

2. It is recommended, however, that paragraph 24b be rewritten or supplemented with discretionary authority to the Commanding Generals of the major forces concerned to route Prisoners of War upon arrival in continental United States consistent with procedure of paragraph 24a, or to leave and furlough or delay enroute prior to reporting to the appropriate redistribution station. Such supplementary authority in this paragraph will not affect the routing as authorized in paragraph 24b, but will make the authority discretionary as is expedient. Such discretionary authorization is required because of the different procedure by the Service Forces and the Air Forces in determining the essentiality of the returnees. In the former case, it is determined at the reception station and in the latter case, it is not.

1 Incl
Disposition Form fr
WDGS, G-1, w/atts

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCU 383.6 (50)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LG; Date 4/23/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Proposed Confidential AG Memorandum Concerning Repatriation, Recovery and Rehabilitation of Prisoners of War

Secretary of Air Staff 14 Sept 44

AC/AS, Intelligence 1

1. AC/AS, Intelligence concurs in general to the proposed memorandum. It is to be understood that the memorandum does not affect current practices as to the use of this type of personnel for intelligence matters. It is further understood that in processing this personnel necessary precautions are taken in regards to security in accordance with existing directives.

2. It is felt that the subject matter of the proposed memorandum is of primary interest to AC/AS, Personnel and The Air Surgeon.

1 Incl w/incls n/c

JOHN F. TURNER
Colonel, Air Corps
Operational Deputy
Office of Asst Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

383.6 (50)

TO: Management Control

Date: 18 Sept. 1944

FROM: Secretary, Air Staff

Comment No. 2
FEG/cg 6751

1. Attention is invited to preceding comments.

2. For preparation of reply to G-1.

FREDERICK E. GIGNOUX, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Secretary, Air Staff.

Incl.
n/c

Dispatched
18 SEP 1944
AAG

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SAS 383.6 (50)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By _____ NO. Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Repatriation, Recovery and Rehabilitation of Prisoners of War.

Secretary of the Air Staff. 16 Sept. 1944

Air Surgeon's Office. 1.

CLB:bmh 6665

1. The Air Surgeon concurs in general in the principles of the proposed memorandum.

2. It is recommended that the first sentence of paragraph 10 be changed as follows:

"Recovered personnel will be given a thorough medical examination upon reporting to duty at a Redistribution Station; or, in the case of casualties, upon arrival at an appropriate medical facility."

H. G. ORMSAULT
Colonel, Medical Corps
Director of Professional Services

1 Incl. n/c

DECLASSIFIED

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Repatriation, Recovery and Rehabilitation of Prisoners of War

Secretary of the Air Staff 16 Sept 1944

AC/AS, Personnel 1
AFPMP-13/ENY-so/73057

1. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, concurs in general in the principles of the proposed memorandum.

2. It is recommended, however, that paragraph 24b be rewritten or supplemented with discretionary authority to the Commanding Generals of the major forces concerned to route Prisoners of War upon arrival in continental United States consistent with procedure of paragraph 24a, or to leave and furlough or delay enroute prior to reporting to the appropriate redistribution station. Such supplementary authority in this paragraph will not affect the routing as authorized in paragraph 24b, but will make the authority discretionary as is expedient. Such discretionary authorization is required because of the different procedure by the Service Forces and the Air Forces in determining the essentiality of the returnees. In the former case, it is determined at the reception station and in the latter case, it is not.

1 Incl
Disposition Form fr
WDGS, G-1, w/atts

JOHN H. McCORMICK
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Asst Chief of Air Staff,
Personnel

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan 1 & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/23/74

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DECLASSIFIED

Exchange of Prisoners

AC/AS, Personnel

Chief of the Air Staff

14 Aug 44

2
JRB/ac/72141

1. The arrangements outlined in Item 2 for handling repatriated AAF military personnel flown into the country and brought in by Exchange Ships appear satisfactory.

2. Care should be exercised, however, to be sure that such AAF personnel are shown at all times the consideration they may need and which we want them to have.

[illegible]

DONALD WILSON
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Acting Chief of the Air Staff

Incls:
n/c

SAS 3036 (46)

Dispatched
15 AUG 1944
AAG

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SAS 3036 (46)

383.6 (45)

TO: AC/AS, Intelligence

FROM: Chief of Air Staff

For Comment.

DATE 6 Nov. 44
CJM/jm/D789
Comment No. 3

6 NOV 194
AAG

Signed

C. J. MARA
Colonel, A. C.
Executive, Secretary Air Staff

Incls. a/c

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

File
383.6 (45) c

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/26/74

File
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AFICL/IN

1 AUG 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

Subject: AAF POW's in German Camps

1. A comparison of the latest G 2-MIS report dated 1 July 1944 with report dated 1 June 1944 reveals the following information concerning status of AAF prisoners of war:

	1 July	1 June	Increase	
a. Stalag Luft 1 Barth	2,867	1,613	1,254	AAF Officers
b. Stalag Luft 3 Sagan	3,363	2,315	1,048	AAF Officers
c. Stalag Luft 4 Gross Tychow	1,482	350	1,132	AAF ECO's
d. Stalag Luft 6 Heydekrug	2,411	2,000	411	AAF ECO's
e. Stalag 17B Gneixendorf	4,500	4,500	—	AAF ECO's
f. Rumania	543	275	268	AAF Personnel
g. Misc.—Oflags Stalags, Hospitals & Transit Camps	1,500	1,500	—*	AAF Personnel
TOTAL				
AAF Officers	6,230	3,928	2,302	
AAF ECO's	8,393	6,850	1,543	
AAF Rank Unknown	2,043	1,775	268	
	16,666	12,553	4,113	

*Estimate of AAF personnel captured in June but not yet reported.

2. The total number of American POW's in German Camps as of 1 July 1944 is 28,867.

File
Cond
8-1-44

THOMAS D. WHITE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

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SAL 383.6 (43)

SAL 383.6 (43)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Mistreatment of AAF Prisoners of War

AC/AS, Intelligence
THRU: Secretary of Air Staff
Management Control

31 JUL 1944
1
MGO/lnh/5939

1. The functional responsibility for compiling lists of American citizens mistreated, tortured, or killed as prisoners of war, and records of such action is clearly that of the State Department.

2. It is the suggestion of this office that the office, AC/AS, Intelligence work out with the State Department the necessary details to insure that such lists are accurate and complete.

BYRON E. GATES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Management Control

1 Incl
Memo for C/AS, 19 Jul 44

TO: AC/AS, Intelligence

DATE 1 August 1944

FROM: Secretary, Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 2
WDC/ hlm/ 5791

Attention is invited to action of the Acting Chief of Air Staff on your attached memorandum dated 19 July 1944, and to Comment #1 thereon.

Signed
T. A. FITZPATRICK
Colonel, GSC
Secretary, Air Staff

1 Incl
n/c

Dispatched
1 AUG 1944
AAG

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

SAS 383.6 (41)

SAS 383.6 (41)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/28/76

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AAF Personnel Escaped from Enemy Territory.

Chief of Air Staff

4 JUL 1944

AC/AS, Intelligence

1

WMB:chk 4728

Request attached staff study be signed and forwarded. The coordination of OPD, G-1, G-2 has already been obtained.

W.M. BURGESS
Colonel, GSC
Acting Deputy,
AC/AS, Intelligence

1 Incl:
Staff Study, subj. as above
w/2 incls. as listed.

File
[illegible]
9-6-44

SAD 383.6 (40)

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SAD 383.6 (40)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED

Whereabouts of USAAF Escapees from Russia

AC/AS, Personnel

11 May 44

Chief of the Air Staff

1
MAI/ee/3373

1. In view of the recent difficult situation involving Sgt. Labans' activities, the Chief of Air Staff desires that you in collaboration with AC/AS, Intelligence determine without delay the present whereabouts of all USAAF personnel who have escaped from internment in the USSR.

2. When these people are located, General Giles desires that their Commanding Officers be strongly cautioned to instruct them that absolute silence must be adhered to with respect to the incidents attending such escape.

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Executive, C/AS

Dispatched
12 [illegible]
AAG

File.
cc 13 May 44

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Air AS 383.6 (33)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

ATTENTION:

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON AFABI

5 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

Subject: AAF POW's in German Camps

1. Herewith is the latest information concerning status of AAF prisoners of war:

a.	Stalag Luft 1	802 AAF Officers
b.	Stalag Luft 3	2078 AAF Officers
c.	Stalag Luft 6	1280 AAF NCO's
d.	Stalag Luft 17B	2950 AAF NCO's
e.	Rumania	*112 AAF Officers & NCO's
f.	Misc.--Oflags, Stalags, Hospitals, transit camps	**1500 AAF Officers & NCO's
	TOTAL	2880 AAF Officers (no change) 4230 AAF NCO's (899 increase since last report, 17 April). 1612 AAF Rank Unknown 8722 (an increase since 17 April of 2511)

* Ploesti raiders - reported for first time.
** Of a total of 2084 men in this category, it is estimated that approximately 1500 are AAF officers and NCO's captured during April operations but not yet officially reported.

2. The total number of all American POW's reported in German Camps is 18,439 as of 1 May, an increase of 3637 over total reported on 17 April 1944. Of this 3637 increase reported in the period 17 April to 1 May approximately three-fifths are Air Force personnel.

3. The above figures do not include personnel in transit camps or hospitals.

SC 74

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CONFIDENTIAL

WILLIAM C. BENTLEY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Deputy,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

SAS 382.6 (32)

Add 383.6 (32)

HQ. AAF
6 MAY 1941
CLASSIFIED MAIL SECTION

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

~~SECRET~~
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Exchange of Prisoners

Chief of the Air Staff

5 JUN 1944

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

3
MDW/hl/78274

1. In accordance with suggestion in paragraph 2, Comment No. 1 above, thorough investigation has been made of docking procedure of exchange ship Gripsholm, which confirms advisability of Personal Affairs Officer meeting the boat.

2. Analysis of passenger list of military personnel does not disclose the presence of any AAF members in the group aboard the Gripsholm. However, to be certain that the matter is satisfactorily covered in case such passenger list is inaccurate and AAF military personnel are among those aboard, arrangements have been made for a qualified officer to meet the ship at time of docking, prepared to render financial aid through Army Emergency Relief or any other appropriate assistance, both at the dock and at Halloran General Hospital, to which it is understood all military personnel will be transferred. Report of findings and recommendations by such officer has been requested.

3. The Air Surgeon has been made familiar with the details of the arrival of the Gripsholm, in accordance with Comment No. 2.

J. M. BEVANS
Major General, U. S. Army
Asst Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

SAS 383.6 (31)

File
ci 7 June 44

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SAS 383.6 (31)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LG; Date 9/23/74

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Exchange of Prisoners

AAG 383.6 (31)

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
6 MAY 1944
AAG

DATE 5 May 1944

COMMENT NO. 2
WEM/hd/3373

For appropriate action on the part of Prisoner of War Branch, Personal Affairs Division. Please see that the Air Surgeon is familiar with details.

WILLIAM E. HALL
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

FILE

Air AS 383.6 (31)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan 6 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/25/76

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DECLASSIFIED

AFABI

24 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: AAF POW's in German Camps.

1. The latest report dated 17 April reveals the following, which is submitted for your information:

a.	Stalag Luft 1	802 Officers of AAF
b.	Stalag Luft 3	2,078 Officers " "
c.	Stalag Luft 6	381 NCO's " "
d.	Stalag Luft 17B	2,950 NCO's " "
	TOTAL	2,880 Officers " "
		3,331 Enlisted Men
		6,211

2. The total number of American POW's in German Camps is 14,802 Officers and Men of all arms.

3. The above figures do not include personnel in transit camps or hospitals.

WILLIAM C. BENTLEY
Colonel, GSC
Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

File
4/30/44

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL AAF 383.6 (30)

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/22/76

TO: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

DATE: 19 April 1944

FROM: Ass't Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

COMMENT NO. 2.
WJG:cdl/72495

Information from Major Smith of the Collection Branch, G-2, is to the effect that a message is being prepared along lines that are believed to be in keeping with the desires of General Arnold. Major Smith will coordinate the message with your office and Colonel Loutzenheizer prior to dispatching the message.

J. M. BEVANS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Ass't Chief of Air Staff, Personnel.

File
[illegible]
4/27/44

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

AG 383.6 (29)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan 1 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/20/74

CONFIDENTIAL

Cable #263 dated 15 April 1944 DECLASSIFIED

AC/AS. Personnel 4-18-44

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 1

WEH:JT 5246

1. Your attention is invited to copy of incoming cable No. 263 dated 15 April 1944 from U.S. Military Attache in Stockholm. I have been informed that a Major Smith in the Collection Branch, is preparing the reply. General Arnold desires that no action be taken along the lines indicated by the Military Attache as room and board are not the only incidental expenses to which our internees are subjected.

2. If you have difficulty in persuading G-2 to answer this cable accordingly, please so inform me. Otherwise I shall assume that action along the lines indicated by General Arnold is being taken.

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

Air AB 383.6 (29)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

AAG 383.6 (26)

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

Date: 3 April 44

FROM: Air Adjutant General

Comment No. 3

1. Please note and return.

2. AC/AS, Intelligence has been informed. A compilation indicating the number, and names of AAF prisoners of war of the German Government is now in course of preparation by this office in collaboration with Statistical Control.

Dispatched
3 APR 1944
AAG

T. A. FITZPATRICK,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Air Adjutant General.

Incl n/c

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

DECLASSIFIED
Acr AS 383.6 (26)

16—20342-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/22/76

~~SECRET~~
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TO: Air Adjutant General

Date 30 Mar 44

FROM: Management Control

Comment No. 2
AMW/ga/3930

This information was used in the Daily Activity Report to the Commanding General dated 30 March 1944.

BYRON E. GATES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Management Control

Incl.
n/c

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

383.6(26)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

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Strength Distribution of AAF Prisoners of War in German Prison Camps

Chief, Management Control (Attention: Colonel Wood) 29 Mar 44

Air Adjutant General 1

TAF:JB 5791

1. Suggest resume of attached memorandum be included in daily diary for the Commanding General.

2. Please return to this office when it has served its purpose.

T. A. FITZPATRICK
Colonel, A. G. D.
Air Adjutant General

1 Incl.-
Memo fr AC/S G-2 24 Mar 44

383.6

(26)

Carried by Col Fitzpatrick

Dispatched
29 MAR 1944
AAG

FILE ~~[illegible]~~ 3/29/44

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION					383.6	(26)

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~~SECRET~~ Air Adj

16—20343-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

24 March 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL, Attention: Major E. A. Bradunas, Room 4A284, Pentagon Building.

Subject: Strength Distribution of AAF Prisoners of War in German Prison Camps.

1. The following estimate of AAF personnel strengths in important prisoner of war camps in Germany has been procured by the Prisoner of War Branch, MID, from U.S. military personnel recently repatriated from enemy territory:

Stalag Luft III

South Compound - 1200
Center Compound - 900

Stalag Luft I - 500 to 900

Stalag 17B 3000

2. The above statistics account for some 6,000 AAF prisoners of war, but it has been estimated from other sources that there are at least 8,000 AAF prisoners held in Germany. In this connection, it is reported by the repatriated personnel that no fewer than 600 AAF prisoners move through Dulag Luft each month. Stalag Luft III is known to be full, and while a new compound is expected to be ready to receive additional AAF officers soon, few new prisoners have been arriving there lately. Undoubtedly, some of the personnel which are not accounted for are scattered in small hospitals throughout enemy-occupied territory. But, by a conservative estimate, 1,200 to 1,500 others must have been held in undisclosed camps, as of 15 February last.

3. The above is submitted for your information and whatever action you deem necessary. Additional dissemination of these facts has been made to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and to the Department of State.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

CATESBY ap C. JONES,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Assistant Executive, G-2.

DECLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/23/76

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
1-17-44 JFT
Date Initials

TO: Deputy Chief of Air Staff (General Hall) DATE 17 JAN 194

FROM: AC/AS, Intelligence, Training Plans Division COMMENT NO. 2
AFITP
LJK/ams/72302

1. Records indicate that a First Lieutenant Sam R. Turner 0-791521 force landed at Romanshorn, Switzerland. Plane sank in deep water.. Lt Turner was reported injured but subsequent notifications are to the effect that he is recovered. The next of kin were notified by AG 24 September 1943, that Lt. Turner was interned in a neutral country.

2. The next of kin of flyers interned in neutral country are not notified of the country in which they are interned so that any undue publicity will not interfere with the ultimate release of such personnel.

3. There is no record of a "Dudley Norman" purporting to be sending cablegrams regarding this internee. Presumably, he is a friend of Lt. Turner, but telegrams such as these tend to compromise the situation of other internees and their ultimate release, as well as that of the subject officer.

4. The Prisoner of War Branch, Military Intelligence Service, requests that the above information contained in paragraph one (1) be not disseminated.

383.6 (22)

Incl: n/c

JOHN F. TURNER
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Chief, Training Plans Division

Concurrence:

POW Br MIS (_____)

File
GK
1/20/44

DECLASSIFIED

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Air As 383.6 (22)

COPY

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr

War Department
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington, D.C.

22 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Enemy Reprisals against American Airmen.

(Reference General Marshall's memorandum of December 29th and the President's memorandum of January 10th on this subject)

I am glad that you approve of the proposed joint statement in my memorandum of December 29th. It should, I think, be issued only when and if we have concrete evidence of the Germans' purpose to take action, and I shall hold it for your further consideration when that moment arrives.

Germany

In accordance with your note we have endeavored to reach an agreement as to just what would be, as a practicable proposition, the "most drastic measures" to be taken by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States. It has been suggested that we could strike at the perpetuation of the German people by delaying the return of their men after the Armistice. By such a procedure we would punish large masses of people in whom family sentiments are strong. If credible evidence should be received that the German Government has initiated trials of our airmen for war crimes allegedly constituted by the bombing of targets in Germany, the British and United States Governments might issue some such statement as the following:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States having learned of the intention of the German Government to bring to trial Allied airmen on charges identified with the bombing of targets in Germany, wrongfully termed war crimes, issued on _____ a solemn warning to the German people as well as to their military and civil officials that the most drastic measures would be adopted to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare would be fatal to the future of the German people.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

"This warning has been disregarded and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States now notify the German Government and the people of Germany that for each Allied airman sentenced as the outcome of the proposed trials, 10,000 German prisoners, or other German males who will later be taken into custody, will be selected and detained subsequently to the imposition of peace terms, for such substantial period as these Allied Governments deem proper. Should the German Government commit additional crimes against Allied prisoners of war, the period of detention will be increased accordingly.

"These prisoners of war will be employed anywhere in the world that the interests of the various Allied nations dictate. Moreover, upon the conclusion of hostilities every person found responsible for these trials, including the judges, will be pursued, arraigned before Allied courts and punished accordingly.

"The United States and British Governments reaffirm their intention to intensify attacks upon Germany, making every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable."

Japan

In the case of Japan the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already recommended to you that atrocities committed by the Japanese be publicized. I do not believe that any official statement by our Government is desirable at this time since you have already given warning as to the punishment of all persons guilty of war crimes. However, in the event of a Japanese threat to mistreat prisoners in order to deter us from bombing Japan or as reprisals for alleged war crimes committed against them, we shall have to take a course different from that indicated for Germany because of the lack of Japanese prisoners and the fact that the Japanese Government would be ruthless in consideration of the hazard to their nationals. The following statement is suggested:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the repeated acts of barbarism committed by the Japanese authorities against British and American prisoners of war despite the agreement of the Japanese Government to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conventions. These brutal reprisals upon helpless victims evidence the shallow advance from savagery which the Japanese people have made.

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States reaffirm their intention to bring the present hostilities to an

end by the use of every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable. We serve notice upon the Japanese military and political leaders as well as the Japanese people that the future of Japan as a nation, in fact that of the Japanese race itself, depends entirely and irrevocably upon their capacity to progress beyond their aboriginal barbaric instincts which are manifested by the treatment accorded to British and American personnel in Japanese hands. Every person, irrespective of rank, who is responsible directly or morally for the mistreatment of American and British prisoners of war will be relentlessly pursued, arraigned before Allied courts, and punished as they deem fit."

miss reason has these clearances

This matter has been discussed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, who are in accord with it.

Chief of Staff.

File
Ci 3 Feb 44

Ans AS 383.6 (20)

MANUSCRIPT DIVISION

CLASSIFIED ITEMS REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collections because they contain security classified information:

Series: Decimal

Folder Title: 383.6

Item(s) and Security Classification:

1. Memo., FDR to Gen. Marshall, 1/10/44, 1p. S.
   Originating Agency: White House

PK /AW — 1994 /10/94 10.12.94

Reviewer — Date

85-57 (rev 4/90

MANUSCRIPT DIVISION

CLASSIFIED ITEMS REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they contain security classified information:

Series: Decimal File

Folder Title: SAS 350.2 Netherlands to Yugoslavia

Item(s) and Security Classification:

Zivoyin Radoyevich to Foreign Liaison Officer, War Dept. 23 April, 1942 1p

Restricted

FGI

Yugoslavia

HW

Reviewer

10/7/94

Date

86-57 (rev 4/90)

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SECRET DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
000 ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

December 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: German reprisals against American airmen.

Before the Russian Kharkov "trials" it was predicted that, as the effects of the bombing of Germany grew more serious, desperate measures would probably be employed to discourage further attacks. The recently announced intent of the Germans to try captive American and British airmen is concrete evidence of such intention. Just what action this Government and the Government of Great Britain should take remains to be determined, but I am of the opinion that such action should be prompt, whatever it may be. Also, it appears advisable in promulgating this action to address it to both German military and civil leaders and to the entire enemy population.

From the military point of view consideration naturally has been given to what line of action should be taken and the character of the statement to be made. It is believed unwise to specify any particular form of retribution. Any mention of chemical attack, for instance, or other specific measures might well play directly into German hands.

An important consideration in this matter is the fact that the German propaganda specifically excludes Russian airmen from the list mentioned. The probability is that the Germans recognize the fact that the Russians would retaliate immediately and in a manner that would be fatal to German interests. On the contrary the Germans have reason to assume that the pressures on the home front will tend to make the British and American reaction much softer. Whether or not the American public would at this time fully back reprisal in kind is a question, but it would appear that if we take a strong position in the matter the public will shortly be led to accept the necessity of such decision, particularly if documented cases of mistreatment and torture were published. It is considered advisable that we should go this far at the present time.

There is another very important point to be considered in this matter and that is the reaction of the Japanese. They are in great fear of the bombing of Japan. They hold large numbers of Allied prisoners, while we hold few of theirs and those few the Japanese would ignore in their considerations. I anticipate that the moment the bombing of Japan is started the Japanese will resort to every conceivable measure

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to deter us from the continuation of that operation, to the extent of placing all of our people in their hands at the hazard. This will present a most serious situation and it should be considered at the present time in connection with the preliminary moves of the German Government to deter our bombing of their cities.

It is recommended that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain issue a statement to the effect that notice of the recent threats has been taken at the highest level and that immediate retaliatory action will be taken if such threats are carried out. A draft of such a preliminary statement is herewith submitted:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the threats recently made by the German Government against British and American airmen captured by the German forces. Notice is hereby served on the German political and military leaders, and the civil population generally, that if these threats are carried out the Governments of the United States and Great Britain will adopt the most drastic measures to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare will be fatal to the future of the German people."

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

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"ADDRESS" REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
17 Nov 43
Date Initials

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: alr/ LC, Date 9/23/76

17 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: AAF Personnel Interned in Turkey

1. The following information is contained in a State Department cable sent from Ankara by Ambassador Steinhardt to General Arnold, 14 November 1943, following a conference between Ambassador Steinhardt and Turkish Foreign Minister Numan:

Some of the AAF personnel from the last Ploesti raid are still in Turkey and these have recently been joined by seven men from one of the planes which bombed Salonika. The Foreign Minister promised to release twelve AAF personnel immediately if given a priority list of names. Ambassador Steinhardt furnished him with a list of fifteen names of personnel whom General Tindall wishes to have released. When these fifteen aviators are returned, only seventeen will remain in Turkey and it is likely that these seventeen can be released in the near future.

2. A cable was sent to the Military Attache at Ankara for Ambassador Steinhardt signed Arnold thanking Ambassador Steinhardt for his continued interest and help.

WILLIAM C. BENTLEY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Actg. Deputy Assistant Chief of
Air Staff, Intelligence

AAG 383.6 (19)

A3 file
WB

File
GK
11/23/43

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

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~~SECRET~~

Air Ag 383.6 (19)

NOV 17 '43 PM

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 7/23/74

Security of B-29 Project.

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence. 30 October 43

Chief of the Air Staff 1

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For remark and recommendation.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Incls.

Dispatched
30 OCT 1943

AAS 383.6 (17)

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Ci 10/30/43

DECLASSIFIED

Au AS 383.6 (17)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dirs. 5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] NCD, Date 9/22/76

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

18 AUG 1943

Major General Ira C. Eaker,
Commanding General,
Eighth Air Force.

Dear Ira,

We have just received a communication from what is believed to be a reliable source, the gist of which is quoted herewith:

"Information indicates that a number of aviators of the U.S. Army Air Forces were not considered as prisoners of war because they were wearing civilian clothing over their uniforms. They did have proper means of identification in their possession. After capture they were held incommunicado in prison for long periods lasting up to six weeks. Their food was insufficient, bad, and unfit. They were given no toilet articles. Cells were dirty and infested with vermin. Only twenty minutes of exercise in a badly aired court was allowed twice a week. First interrogation was after several weeks' confinement. They were called on to disclose their identity (name, name and address of their parents, date of birth, serial number, rank). When they refused to give any information of a military character they were handled roughly. Only some time later were they transferred to a temporary camp. The health of some of the men was not good."

I pass this on to you for whatever use you may think proper. It is believed that the Germans are not aware that the report has come through to us.

Sincerely,

Signed
BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
13 AUG 1943
AAG

COPY FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jun 5-20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

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Mistreatment of American prisoners of war by the Germans

General Giles 8/8/43

General Arnold 1.

Note the attached. The thought occurred to me that perhaps it might be a good thing for General Eaker to be informed of this condition. On the other hand, if this information got out to our aviators, it might have just the opposite effect than we had hoped.

Have some of your people make a study of this situation and see just what we should do.

H. H. A.

Incl: Para. of Tel. #4804, 8/7/43
(Dept. of State Para.)

TO: Ass't. Ch. of Air Staff, INTELLIGENCE Date: 9 August 1943

FROM: General Giles Comment #2.

Submit comments as to the action that should be taken on this paper.

Dispatched
10 AUG 1943
AAG

BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Encl: n/c

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[illegible]
8/10/43

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Air as 383.6 (14)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/23/76

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
DATE INITIALS

March 6, 1943

Report on Prisoner of War

383.6 (11)

x TAG

Attached for your information is a report on prisoner of war received in this office.

For the Commanding General:

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

1 Incl.
Letr 2-4-43 fr 10th AF

Dispatched
MAR 6 1943
AAG

File
SK 3/7/43

OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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Ltr as 383.6 (11)

SECRET

☆ 16—20243-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Routing Slip — Date 3/1/43

TO: Air Adjutant General Bldg.
(Office or Symbol)

Attn: Col Carter Room 3E 1007

Coord.		Invest.		Rec. Action	
Infor.		Recomd.		Sig.	
File		Confer.			

Remarks:

From:
Name: Major Cobb Phone 72287

Office DIS Bldg Navy #1 Rm. 1064
(Name or Symbol)

3-218, AF.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/25/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
3/3/43 JSC
DATE INITIALS

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Report on prisoner of war.

TO: Director of Military Personnel

DATE 3-3-43

FROM: Air Adjutant General

COMMENT NO. 1
JBC:JB 5789

To note and return.

JSC
JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.- Ltr. to A-2 fr 10th AF
2-4-43

TO: Air Adjutant General.

DATE 3-4-43

FROM: Military Personnel Division.

COMMENT NO. 2
(3)JLB:hh 2798

Noted.

E. S. WETZEL,
Colonel, Air Corps.

1 Incl.
n/c.

Note.- Phone call to Maj. Cobb (DIS) on 3/3/43 indicated that he did not know what to do with the Report so he sent it to Air AG for appropriate action. Report was received directly from Mail Room.
JSC

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SECRET Air AG 383.6 (1)

3-1109 A.F.

MAR 5 - 43 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

RW 2468

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X-8064

Army Air Forces
AFRICA MIDDLE-EAST WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAS

ERT/bat

c/o Postmaster, Miami, Fla.
December 11, 1942

SUBJECT: Return of Interned B-25 Crew from French North Africa

TO: Lt. Col. John H. Snyder, A-2, ATC, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to a letter from the Chief of Intelligence, ATC, July 16, 1942, and my report of August 1, 1942, there are enclosed herewith 3 copies of statements made by the crew of the B-25 which landed at Conakry on May 6, 1942, and arrived at Accra the evening of December 9, 1942, having been interned 7 months and covered 6,000 miles in French West Africa in the meantime.

2. The crew is in comparatively good health, but has lost a good deal of weight and requires treatment for malaria and bad teeth. Its members are as follows:

2nd Lt. Daniel E. Kelly, Pilot, 0-42114
2nd Lt. George A. Young, Jr., Co-pilot, 0-436553
2nd Lt. Jerome H. Goldsmith, Navigator, 0-789095
2nd Lt. Erick Downs, Bombadier, 0-724156
Corp. John F. Thom, Radio Operator, 18012898
Pvt. Herbert H. Holmes, Gunner, 6271975

3. A radiogram was sent to you immediately on their arrival in this office on the morning of December 10, and a message was similarly sent to the Commanding General, 10th Air Force. No decision will be reached for a few days as to further orders for the crew. Subsequent to their interrogation in this office, a press conference was held for the members of the crew.

4. As soon as possible this office will investigate what disposition was made by the French authorities of the plane, bomb sight, secret material and two bags of mail which were in the ship and not destroyed.

5. The principal value, from the Intelligence point of view, of this entire episode is the following:

(a) Crews must be briefed on capture, parole and escape.
(b) Efforts to escape must be made quickly, since difficulties progressively increase.
(c) Contact must be established as soon as possible between the prisoners and those interested in effecting an escape.

INCL. 3

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HARRY R. TURKEL
Maj., A.C.
A-2, AMEW, ATC.

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 27 '43 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General's

10:00 A. M. December 10, 1942

Interrogation of Flight Crew Interned in French West Africa

2nd Lt. Kelley Speaking:

We took off from Natal on May 5th at 8:30 P.M. Just before taking off, Lt. Sorenson, in charge of tool boxes, gave us a tool box weighing 150 lbs. We never thought about its deflecting the compass. Right after we got out, the navigator noticed that his compass and the pilot's compass were not reading the same as they had on earlier legs of the flight. We went on with the flight. Got up to 10,000 ft. and headed across. According to the weather, we should have been in sight of the coast line in 10 hours. We were on instruments about 15 minutes. When we should have seen land, that is, according to the time, we didn't see any. Then the navigator took a shot at the sun and drew a line of position. Flew on with new heading for about one hour on a course which should have been parallel with the coast. Later we turned north. Flew about that way for about 30 minutes. Visibility was very poor, but we finally sighted land. Came in at a point which finally proved to be about 100 miles north of Conakry. Before sighting land, we were tuned in to Roberts Field. Tried to work out an orientation problem. We never did get a definite position. Our radio operator was working with the liaison set. We worked the radio up to the time we landed, had been in contact for about 30 minutes to the time we landed. There was a lot of interference from other ships calling in.

Corp. Thon Speaking:

Called control tower and asked them to turn on their beam on a lower frequency. We called them several times and asked them if they could see us. We could see an airport but Roberts Field told us they could not see us. They gave us landing instructions and then signed off.

2nd Lt. Goldsmith Speaking:

Before we sighted the field we described what we could see and Roberts Field told us they could not see us them. We asked to have the beam turned on and it finally was, but we still couldn't pick it up. Just before we landed, they told us they could see us. Saw a field and then we headed in for it.

2nd Lt. Young Speaking:

Our tanks were low and the red lights were showing. On the left we could see steep hills and on the left there was a peninsula.

2nd Lt. Kelley Speaking:

We had been told never to use voice on the radio in getting contact with the control tower at any field. We had definite instructions as to how to go into a field. We used the key. That was the way we were supposed to communicate.

(Here Major Turkel asked if there was any hostile action taken when they landed.)

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Lt. Kelley Speaking:

When we got in we didn't circle the field or anything, but went straight down. We were out of gas. When we landed our left tire had evidently gone down in flight and we went off the runway and onto the grass. On the right side we saw about 25 colored soldiers armed with service revolvers led by a French lieutenant, armed with a rifle and a service pistol. In about five minutes they were up to the plane and we had all got out. Goldsmith could speak a little French, but very little at that time. They asked us who we were.

Lt. Goldsmith:

When we landed the flames from the left exhaust set fire to the tall grass, and by the time we had stopped there was a roaring grass fire about 200 feet behind us. This caused quite a bit of commotion. (We landed at 11:00, May 6.)

Major Turinal Speaking:

How were you treated?

Lt. Goldsmith:

They got us away from the airplane as quickly as they could and took us to a little shack near the field. We had no chance to destroy anything. We had to fight the flames with our leather jackets. This was as much as we got out of the plane, and before we had any idea where we were. After we had been disarmed the native soldiers put out the fire. We didn't even have time to get our briefcases. They got everything we had in the plane, papers, instruments, including the bomb sight. Immediately on getting out of the plane we were surrounded.

Lt. Kelley speaking:

Goldsmith and Young were disarmed immediately. They had their guns trained on us all the time. When they put us in the little shack they told us we would have to wait for the colonel in charge to come out and investigate. When he came they took us out to the plane and asked us what was the matter with it. We told him we were out of gasoline. Next, and showed him the tire. A major, an Intelligence officer, was out there and he took pictures. (Q. What about your records?) We do have a record of operating and our radio log and I have a diary.

Lt. Goldsmith:

The colonel came out and asked for our identification, and we had to go through our identification process. Lt. Kelley went through the plane with the Intelligence officer and they took pictures. We were permitted to go back to the plane, but not to get in it. Our baggage was taken out and we were taken to headquarters, which is about 10 miles from the airport. We spent most of the afternoon, [illegible] to clean up and then they fed us. We had an interview with the colonel through an interpreter. We gave him only our names and service numbers. He didn't seem to have any idea of what he do with us. Toward twelve o'clock that night we were told that we were to go to Dakar, a military prison camp some afternoon. We never saw the plane again. We went to the station in

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a boat. We stayed there for about 12 days. The four officers lived in the home of a Captain and the enlisted men lived with the French enlisted men. They let us go around the island, but we were under constant surveillance. They let us walk around with a French officer, but they made us keep away from certain points. We requested some of our personal goods from the plane and some of it did come, our medical kits, flashlights, etc. We kept requesting to communicate. We were permitted to write letters, but that was all.

Lt. Kelley:

At the colonel's office we asked him to notify the authorities at Roberts Field, also the American Consul. He promised that they would.

Lt. Goldsmith:

On May 18th they told us that we were leaving. We were sent by boat to Conakry where they kept us under constant guard, one officer and several Negro guards. They treated us well. They took us to the officers' club and kept us there all afternoon. We asked to speak to someone of higher authority and later a major came out. He was the highest ranking officer there at the time. He told us that we would be fed and taken to the train, which would leave the following morning. That's what we did. We slept in the train that night.

Lt. Kelley:

Our gunner, Holmes, was sick with malaria from the day we landed, for four days.

Lt. Goldsmith:

The beds at Tamara were pretty bad. Full of bugs and lumpy. We left Conakry the morning of May 19th at 6:00 and went to Mamou and slept there for that night. They took us by truck to a military post where it was very hot, full of mosquitoes, and they put us in a house which was more like a barn. We slept on the floor or on a straw mat on bedsprings of the double beds there. We had about 10 guards surrounding the house. The captain had left orders that all doors were to be kept locked, but it was so hot we made the guards get permission to leave the doors open. We stayed there the following day. An American missionary came out to see us. The next day he brought us some cake. On the morning of the 22nd we left Kankan at 1000 with about 12 guards in charcoal burning trucks. They took us as far as Siguiri that day. Next morning we left there at 7:00 by truck for Bamako, arriving there about 4:00 that afternoon. We went to headquarters and the officer in charge there took us to some Negro school where we were given a room. After a week there I came down with malaria. Later Young and Kelly and Holmes got it too. They brought our food to us in tin pans carried on the heads of Negroes for about two miles. The food was only black rice and raw meat. We did manage to get some food from the hotel by paying for it. Everything was rationed. We were at Bamako for 17 days. While we were there they gave us Aspirant Bonnier who spoke English. We always had six guards. On the 8th or 10th of June the guard was doubled and kept around constantly. We later found out that was because some Greek in Bamako tried to help us to escape, but we didn't know anything about it at the time.

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Lt. Goldsmith continues:

On the trip to Gao there were 12 trucks, 4 diesels and the rest were charcoal burners. We stopped at several villages. All that time we were writing letters and they told us they were mailed.

Lt. Kelley:

I sent telegram after telegram to the consul, and had written home and telegraphed. Up to that time we had not heard from the consul. We first heard from him when we arrived at Gao, about three months after we had been taken by the French. But that letter had been addressed to Conakry. I guess he never knew we had been moved.

Lt. Goldsmith:

We left Bamako on June 11th, passed several villages, stopped overnight at some of them, (Mapti, to Bouenza, Hombori, Gao). We were seven days on the road. We stayed two days at San. We arrived at Gao on June 18th, at night. Ferried across the Niger river into the town. We were taken to the airport, and given a house seven miles from town at the airport. North and east of the house was desert. The heat was terrible during the first month and a half. The food was as bad as before if not worse. We arrived at Gao on June 18th and stayed in that house for two months and four days. We were constantly guarded, never allowed to go far from the house. Colonel Reben of that district came out to see us. We complained about the food. He seemed to be doing everything he could for us. He said he would give us a cook, which he did and the food improved. He gave us money for the kitchen and paid the cook's salary. That was after we had been there about a month and a half. All of us had attacks of malaria while in Gao. We never did feel well there, always suffered from fatigue and the heat. Occasionally they took us to town by truck. About the 15th of July they told us they would treat us better after that and that we would have complete freedom, but were on parole, that is, we were not to try to escape. However, we did try to have our houseboy get us a boat to escape down the Niger River. They found out about that. The rainy season came and cooled things off a little. But the wind and sand storms were terrible. A colonel arrived by plane and told us plans were being made to move us to Guinea. One of the plans was for us to go from Gao to Bakar to Algiers, to Casablanca, to Lisbon and from there home by Clipper ship. During all this time we were never allowed to speak to civilians anywhere. Even after we were set free, every time we went to town we had at least one guard, usually a master sergeant. At the airport we were still restricted as to where we could go. All in all, we were extremely well treated from about July 25th on.

Lt. Goldsmith continued:

On August 22nd we were given travelling orders to proceed to French Guinea where the climate was supposed to be better for us.

Lt. Kelley:

We got our first letter from the American Consul at Gao, and about three letters

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home. We wrote the American Consul and asked for different things, and his replies were pretty snarly. For instance, we wrote our families asking that they send us some American cigarettes. We wrote back that he had become accustomed to Algerian cigarettes and he guessed we could too.

Lt. Goldsmith:

On August 22nd we were taken aboard a river boat, the Haga. The French officers came down to see us off. The boat left late that afternoon. We were on the river for about 12 days to Kouilimare. We arrived at night and our bags were taken to the train station. The road from the ferry to the station at Kouilimare was extremely bad and we all fell into holes. The boat was a regular steam paddle wheeler burning wood, and had five barges in tow. All the officers were put in staterooms, and the enlisted men had to sleep in the mess. The rooms were very bad, and the mosquitoes were terrible. On the boat some of us slept in our rooms and one of us slept on the deck. The beds were full of bedbugs, and the mosquito nets were all rotten and full of holes. We arrived at Kouilimare on September 3. Remain September 4th. We got there early in the morning. We had been told to report to the general and when we got there he would not see us and we reported to a Captain. Later we were sent to a different school from the one where we had lived before because the English were now staying there. We stayed at the school until they had made their plans. Stayed there Friday, Saturday and left Kamako Sunday, September 6 for Conakry. We left by truck, there were four trucks in all. That was a pretty rough and dirty trip.

Lt. Kelly:

We received no money from the French at any time except for 1,000 Fr. each at Gao for the trip to French Guinea. We slept on the French Guinea border that night in the wet and cold. We stayed at Siguri 2 nights and 2 days.

Lt. Goldsmith:

We stayed at Siguiri 2 nights and 2 days, and arrived at Kankan September 9. There they let us stay with an American missionary, Mr. Ryan. We arrived there on Wednesday and left on September 12 for Kamaro. We went by train and arrived there the same night, stayed at Labe one night, Labe to Tougue, where we arrived on September 14. We were there for two nights and stayed in a hut with a thatched roof and mud dung floor. Aspirant Bonnier was in charge of the camp at Tougue and treated us well. He had been with us during half our stay at Kamako and then he returned to Tougue. (We had been treated very well by Capt. Ponce at Gao, Commandant of the Motorized Company at Gao. Captain Ponce and Colonel Reben are the only ones who should be recognized as having been helpful to us.) We left Tougue on November 27th. Tougue to Labe, where we received our first package from outside sources, a bag of tinned foods and things from the British Red Cross. Went from Labe to Kamaro, Kamaro to Conakry, Conakry to Sierra Leone's border. On November 8th at Tougue, we were informed that we were prisoners of war, but this was revoked on November 27th. At Conakry on November 30, the French offered to pay us for the time we were prisoners. This was the only time they offered to pay us, except for the 1000 Fr. each at Gao.

(Lt. Kelley has a document certifying that the group was not paid at any time during its stay in French West Africa.)

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Lt. Goldsmith:

We went by truck to from Conakry, leaving there December 1st, and arrived at Forecariah, then by boat to Freetown, arriving Freetown same day, departed Freetown December 3, via U.S. Liberty Ship under convoy. Arrived at Takoradi December 7th or 8th, and here at Accra December 9.

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From Col. Twitty
I.C. POA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese South Pacific Area General Headquarters Regulations

Pertaining to the Treatment of United Nations

Prisoners of War and Captured Materials

V-11020
Copy #1

A translation from a Japanese document captured in the South Pacific Area. Of particular interest is Part I stating that prisoners of war and captured materials will be used to increase the fighting strength of the Imperial forces, and to contribute to the local self-support of the Army; that prisoners should be used to promote general [illegible] by utilizing their individual capabilities. It is also noted that these regulations provide for discrimination between the treatment accorded nationals of the Far East and persons of the Caucasian race in that whites are to be treated with due respect "as a matter of form" whereas nationals of the Far Eastern countries are to be treated with respect "as a matter of fact".

Japan
9950
x9000
x Australia
9000
Captured
[illegible]

File
Ci 2/26/43

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Japanese South Pacific Area General Headquarters Regulations

Pertaining to the treatment of United Nations

Prisoners of War and Captured Documents

PART I Management Policy

I) Prisoners of war and captured (confiscated) materials will be used to increase the fighting strength of the Imperial forces and to contribute to the local self-support of the army. The policy will be not only to lighten the burden of the Empire and the army, but also to create labor battalions.

Prisoners should be used to promote general peace, by utilizing their individual capabilities.

PART II Degree of Treatment of Prisoners

1. Those who comprise prisoners of war:

II) Prisoners of war are the following persons who have come under our jurisdiction.

1) Enemy army, navy, and air force personnel. This does not include non-combatants or persons protected under the Red Cross Agreement.

2) Newspaper reporters and camp followers attached to enemy forces; civilian passengers aboard military ships and aircraft.

3) Those who cooperate with the enemy (Volunteer troops, guerrillas, etc.) as specified in the Articles of War, sections (1) and (2).

4) The crews of government-owned and privately owned enemy vessels, (excluding crew members of neutral nationality).

5) The crews of enemy machines not intended for war use.

III) Even if wounded or sick, the persons mentioned in the above section are all regarded as prisoners of war.

IV) Aside from those mentioned in the foregoing two clauses, enemy people, or residents (in hostile territory) may not be taken prisoners of war. [illegible] the furnishing of (material) support, only upon [illegible]

[illegible] regarded as the same prisoners of war.

[illegible]

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valuables, etc. This does not include weapons, horses, arms, and documents containing military information.

Armies may confiscate every military thing found in the possession of prisoners of war, but only on receipts and in accordance with instructions officer or higher rank head each prisoner accompanying to the nearest headquarters.

VI) Except in specially indicated circumstances, as when a prisoner is selected for a special reason, every army army (including the Japanese army and others) shall evacuate prisoners to the rear as quickly as possible and the evacuation of prisoners to the rear by all armies is governed by Section Three on the Treatment of Prisoners. All armies must comply with this.

VII) Every armed force, when it has captured prisoners, must immediately separate them into racial and social groups and search them. Then they must determine the identities and official positions of those whose very lives may be of value from the standpoint of prosecuting military or intelligence. Then they are to assist an outline to command headquarters giving the classification and allocation of prisoners. This will specify which ones are to be held, released, or put to work. Also they are to recommend the disposition of materials found in possession of the prisoners.

VIII) If troops should capture medical corps personnel (who should receive protection according to the Red Cross Agreement), the procedure is as follows: They should be put under military protection, and at the earliest possible opportunity should be returned to the enemy side. However, any army upon taking these prisoner may use them for the medical treatment and nursing of sick and wounded.

5. Treatment of Prisoners.

IX) War prisoners, especially prisoners of Far Eastern nationality, should be treated benevolently and humanely under the idea of the foundation of a Greater East Asia. Violence, insult and bad treatment must not be inflicted without good reason.

War prisoners should be treated with due respect for individual character and privilege and women should be granted the care due to their sex. In respect to white people this should be done as a matter of form. In respect to Far Eastern people this should be done as a matter of fact.

X) White prisoners, except in special cases, should be accommodated in field retention camps.

XI) After prisoners of Far Eastern nationality have completed the necessary education they are to be set free and sent back. However, when they must be retained to labor for our military needs they are also to be accommodated at field retention camps. The military commander will make use of any of the above mentioned prisoners who are useful for intelligence and strategy. He will also enroll prisoners for the self-protection police system.

XII) You are to inquire the nationality of all sick and wounded and treat them with the utmost kindness. They are to be given as much care and protection as circumstances permit, and are to receive all necessary nursing. All armies apply to this purpose a part of their medical corps, and as much of essential medical supplies as circumstances permit.

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XIII) Those killed in battle (this category includes those who are wounded and die later as a result of their wounds) are to be respectfully buried or cremated. This is done in application of the "Article regarding method of payment for burial of prisoners of war." As carefully as conditions permit the [illegible] of those killed in battle are to be retained and put in protective custody along with their identification.

XIV) The regulations for War Prisoner Labor will be applied in handling prisoners in the retention camps. They are to be used to fill the army's need for labor in their particular area; and each person is to perform services in proportion to his capacity.

XV) In regard to maintenance of prisoners, rely as much as possible upon local products for supply; and have prisoners cook for themselves. The allotted amount for maintenance shall depend upon current conditions, particularly the [illegible] of military supply and the severity of labor duties. Each force, after it has made suitable arrangements, shall report to General Headquarters. After conditions have become stabilized, definite arrangements will be decided upon.

XVI) For other advice relevant to the treatment of prisoners refer to Regulations Part One.

4. The Accommodation and Disposition of Prisoners.

XVII) Every army shall set up prisoner retention camps on the field of operations at a suitable place and time. This is provided for in the third section on the accommodation of prisoners of war.

XVIII) In order to make policing of the camps less difficult, and to prevent escapes, buildings set up on the grounds will be used to counteract dangers to health. Prisoners will be transferred (to the rear) depending upon the quotas received.

XIX) Control of prisoners in the retention camps is based on the third section of Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners. Supplement this with the provision for the punishment of prisoners; and the provision allowing for prisoners to go about freely and live at home.

XX) Each unit commander will report to General Headquarters when he has established the standing orders for the camp under his jurisdiction.

XXI) Each force shall report about once a month to General Headquarters whenever there is any change after taking prisoners. That is, any change important to battle strategy.

PART III <u>Rules for Disposition of Captured (Confiscated) Materials</u>

1. What comprises captured (confiscated) materials.

XXII) The following things, being trophies of war, are considered captured materials.

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1. Enemy army, navy, and air force military stores (this includes arms and such things used for military purposes.

2. Cash, gold and silver bullion, valuable bonds, etc., and all such movable property as may be of value in the movement of troops or the assistance of strategy.

3. All weapons, animals for military use, and documents with military content in the possession of war prisoners and enemy dead.

4. All weapons, animals for military use, and documents with military content abandoned on the field of battle.

XXIII) The following things comprise confiscated materials.

1. All possessions of enemy materials which could be put to use directly or indirectly as war materials. (arms, ammunition, livestock, communication equipment, vehicles, small boats, etc.)

2. Immovables belonging to enemy materials (land, standing timber, arable fields, buildings, established shipping, etc.)

3. War materials belonging to neutral nations and neutral nationals, which are suspected to be in their possession for the use of the enemy forces.

4. All property belonging to people employed by enemy or hostile nations.

5. Submarine cables connecting enemy and neutral nations.

6. Outside of the above mentioned cases, enemy nations' or enemy materials' property is to be indiscriminately confiscated only when unavoidable battle necessities demand it.

XXIV) Any private property which does not fall within the above two categories cannot be seized even though it belongs to the enemy. When it is absolutely necessary to compel the offer of privately owned residences and goods; resort to requisitioning and such methods. The property of institutions of a religious, philanthropic, artistic, or educational nature are to be treated as private property; even when owned by the state.

3. The Disposition of Trophies and Confiscated Materials.

XXV) When any unit has acquired trophies or confiscated materials they are to either send them to the rear or put them into protective custody. This depends upon the decision of the commanding officer. Captured food goods may be used if there is no order to the contrary.

XXVI) When commanders have obtained trophies or confiscated materials, they may evacuate the types mentioned in the bulletin, section 3 - "Evacuation of trophies and confiscated materials." Outside of the varieties of materials

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and quantities of money mentioned above, there are some things so meagre as to be unimportant. These may be used by any force, along with other materials necessary for strategy such as raw materials for construction, supplementary supply, or maintenance. Those of the trophies which are not sent back or used on the spot are to be appropriately disposed of by the commander. He may sell, barter, or consume them to improve the self-sufficiency of his unit, and to maintain their fighting strength. When the commander has disposed of the material or put it to use in accordance with the above, he will report to General Headquarters. He will report the classification and quantity of the materials as well as the way in which he disposed of them.

XXVII) In unavoidable circumstances, the commander may overlook the above two paragraphs concerning immediate use or disposal of materials. Any division commander (or officer of equal rank) may dispose of them at his own discretion.

XXVIII) When a commander sees the necessity in the field for transferring trophies or confiscated materials for other than military purposes; he must receive an order by reporting to General Headquarters. He will report the classification, amount, and value of the materials (current prices, or if that is not available, appraised value). He must also explain to General Headquarters the cause for the unavoidable transfer in such circumstances, General Headquarters will report to Imperial Headquarters and obtain the necessary orders.

XXIX) Those of the trophies and confiscated materials which are to be used on the spot will be transferred to the custodian of military supplies (in case of real estate, to a specially appointed official) they will then be handled as ordinary military supplies. The handling of goods received in barter for trophies or confiscated material is the same as the above.

XXX) In the confiscated category, such immovables as buildings, etc., will be controlled for the present by the army. The army will control mines, private companies, and factories, etc. In some cases management will be carried on by private businessman. (The elections to important posts will be made by central headquarter; except in unavoidable circumstances, where the army will make the choice on the spot). Generally speaking, buildings are preferably to be used for housing troops. This condition is to be fully exploited for the establishment of a peaceful relationship.

XXXI) As far as is possible, respect is to be accorded religious, philanthropic, artistic, and educational institutions. Also to historical memorials, and to objects of art and scholarship. Avoid confiscated and destruction or damage to such things whenever it is possible.

XXXII) Protect and respect medical institutions with all possible care. This is done with the object of putting them to proper use.

XXXIII) Material at first adjudged to be trophies or confiscated materials may later be confirmed as private property; on the other hand private property may be confirmed as material of an enemy nature. In such cases the commander will report and submit evidence to General Headquarters. Thereupon he will receive orders.

In such circumstances, General Headquarters will report to Imperial Headquarters and receive orders, regarding return of the materials or payment of indemnity.

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5. The Evacuation of Trophies and Confiscated Material.

XXXIV) Those of the trophies and confiscated materials which are to be evacuated to Japan proper are as listed in the Appendix.

XXXV) When any unit has trophies or captured material which corresponds to those in the preceding two sections the procedure is thru: -

The unit which receives the material should classify every item, and send them with all possible speed to Japan. In cases where they are relevant to shipping, address them to General Headquarters or to Formosa (if they concern ordnance, address Formosa Supply Depot. If in another category, send them to Army Quartermaster Depot at Formosa).

XXXVI) To facilitate efficiency of shipping a report should be made to General Headquarters during the first ten days of each preceding month - relevant to material which is to be evacuated. It is to be sent with other material being evacuated, and should contain the following necessary data.

Urgent articles should be reported at once.

1. Names and classifications of items to be evacuated.

2. Assembly point, and considerations upon which to base plans for loading.

3. Number and quantity (according to classification, give weight, volume, length, etc., to make possible a suitable allotment of shipping space.

4. Classification according to detachment.

5. Detachments which are taking charge of assembling and sending the materials.

6. Data concerning shipment by sea. Kind of vessel into which they can conveniently be loaded. Estimated number of days in which they could be loaded in necessity.

   Prospective loading point.
   Order of precedence for loading.
   The necessary number of men, machinery and equipment for loading.

7. Any additional information which may be necessary.

XXXVII) In the actual evacuation of materials the assignment of shipping space is based upon the foregoing data. Make all possible efforts to make the maximum use of our tonnage on the return trip. In connection with this, maintain a close liaison with units attached to shipping. Do not interfere with planned shipping routes; and even though the shipment be small, be clever in using the available space.

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FEB 24 '43 PM
RECEIVED
Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Routing Slip Date 12-17-42

TO: Col Milner Bldg.
(Office or Symbol)

Attn: Room

Coord.		Invest.		Nec.Action	
Infor.		Record.		Sig.	
File		Confer.			

Remarks:
Called Casualty Branch (Interment Sec - Mrs Hicks) AGO.
Notification received by TAG from State Dept 12-16-42 and nearest relatives notified by letter same date.

A L M Jr

From: ALVIN L. NEWMYER, JR.
Name: 1st Lieutenant, Air Corps Phone
[redacted] Air Adjutant General
Office Bldg. Rm.
(Name or Symbol)
File 12/17/42. J B Gray 3-218, AF.

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE, SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF

DISPOSITION SLIP

Subject of paper: .....

To	TALLY No. 210.31 (12-14-42)	DATE
	A. C. of S., G-1	
	A. C. of S., G-2	
	A. C. of S., G-3	
	A. C. of S., G-4	
	A. C. of S., W. P. D.	
	The Adjutant General	
	Legislative and Liaison Division	
	C. G. Ground Forces	
✓	C. G. Air Forces (Maj Peterson)	12/14/42
	C. G. Services of Supply	
	Bureau of Public Relations	
	Coordination & Record Section	

For—

- ..... Information.
- ..... Necessary action.
- ..... Preparation of study.
- ..... Note and foreword.
- ..... Remark or recommendation.
- ..... Comment or concurrence.
- ..... Inviting attention {notation / direction} of Sec. War.
- ..... Prep. of reply.
- ..... Signature.
- ..... Direct reply.
- ✓ Note and file.
- ..... File.
- ..... D. C. of S.

Gen Arnold is probably conversant with this action — If so forget about destroy

By direction of C.S. HULGEN

Col. General Staff

Asst. Secretary, General Staff

WAR DEPARTMENT
O. C. of S.—Form No. 3 ☆ GPO 16—24681-2

A-1331

ACG


DEC 15 1942
OUT

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:
(Att: Colonel Schulgen)

Subject: B-25 Crew Interned at Conakry.

1. Message CM-IN-4751 (12-11-42) from the Commanding General, African-Middle East Wing, Air Transport Command reports that the crew of the B-25, which landed in Vichy French territory and were interned on May 10, 1942, have arrived at Accra Gold Coast safe and well. The crew consisted of the following:

Lt. Daniel E. Kelley	0421114
Lt. George A. Young, Jr.	0436553
Lt. Jerome M. Goldsmith	0789095
Lt. Erick Downs	0724156
Cpl. John F. Thom	112898
Pvt. Hubert H. Holms	6271975

2. Message CM-OUT-4427 (12-13-42) sent by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, stated that if these personnel are well and fit it is desired that they proceed to India and report to the Headquarters 10th Air Force to which they were originally assigned. However, if personnel should be returned to the United States for physical or training reasons, it is desired that they be returned to the United States, reporting to the Headquarters 3rd Air Force at Tampa, Florida.

12/16/42
A.A.G.
Notify their nearest relation
[illegible]

Douglas V. Johnson
DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON
Colonel, G.S.C.
African-Middle Eastern Theater

21347
RECEIVED
DEC 15 1942
U.W.W. - WO. AAF

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES BONDS AND STAMPS

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C# B2159

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: alr/ao SD Date 9/23/74

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DECLASSIFIED

H.H.A

WD 383.6 (11-20-42)OB-S-E

DEC 8, 1942.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

My letter of November 12, 1942 referred to participation by the five members of the Doolittle Crew who are interned in Russia in useful professional work under parole.

In view of the changes that have taken place in the military situation and the existing relations between the United States and Russia, the War Department feels that it may be possible now, or at an early date, to effect the complete release of this crew instead of their being merely permitted to work under parole. Strong representations to the Russian Government at a suitable time will perhaps attain this highly desirable result.

Any assistance that you can give towards bringing this about at as early a date as is appropriate will be greatly appreciated.

DEC 14 42 AM

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert P. Patterson

Secretary of War.

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

INFORMATION COPY TO:
1. Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

File
12/16/42

MAG 19184
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DEC 10 1942
A.H.G. - HQ., AAF

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C# F-30002 95 ~~SECRET~~ a-a 383.6 (6)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: [illegible]

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Internees in Turkey

MEM:JT 5246

1 AFCAS AFARI 1942 11-20

1. In General Randy's meeting this morning it was reported that one of the American internees in Turkey had been released due to sickness.

2. General Arnold expressed considerable interest in this subject and directed me to see that he was kept posted on further developments concerning our personnel interned by the Turks.

3. Request that as information on this subject becomes available I be notified.

Hq. Army Air Forces
[redacted] Dispatched
[redacted]d NOV 21 1942
AAG

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

File

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air a 383.6 (5)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

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Crew of U. S. Bomber Interned in French West Africa.

3373
GES/hd

1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2 1942 11-19

1. Your attention is invited to the enclosed memorandum from Colonel Douglas V. Johnson, O.P.D. for Colonel Schulgen, Office of the Chief of Staff, and General Arnold's comment thereon which reads as follows: "That is all right but it doesn't get our men out of Africa. H.H.H."

2. It is desired that you maintain close contact with G-2 and secure the release of this bomber crew as soon as possible.

Dispatched
NOV 20 1942
AAG

Incl:
Above mentioned memo dtd 11-18-42 re above subj.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Air AB 383.6 (4)

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Miss Intrans
Air AB 383.6 (4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1924
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

November 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SCHULGEN, OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Crew of U. S. Bomber Interned in French West Africa.

1. Plane landed May 7, 1942, at Conakry Airport. The crew consisted of:

Lt. George A. Young (0-436553)
Lt. Erich Downs (0-724156)
Lt. Daniel E. Kelley (0-421114)
Lt. Jerome M. Goldsmith (0-789095)
Corp. John F. Tom (18012898)
Pvt. Hubert H. Holmes

2. As of July 15, 1942, the Consul at Dakar reported that they were at Gao, French Sudan; that they had plenty of good food, good quarters and were well treated.

3. On August 9, 1942, the Consul at Dakar was notified that these men were to be transferred to Tougue (88 kilometers northeast of Labe) in French Guinea.

4. G-2 has been in communication with the men by mail through the Consul at Dakar. Arrangements were also made through the Consul to furnish money to these men. No further information has been received about them.

5. Because of the present uncertain and delicate political situation in French West Africa, it is considered inadvisable to make an issue of this matter at this time. Action will be taken by the State Department at the instance of G-2 to secure the release of these men as soon as the situation permits.

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON
Colonel, G. S. C.
Acting Chief, African-Middle Eastern Theater

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A-1 D 383.6 (4)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
9 Jan & 20 June 1924
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
DATE INITIALS

NOV 21 1942

Army Air Forces Aviators Interned in Russia.

(1) G-2 for C/C

X Sec. G/S

DEC 14 42 AM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

Forwarding Letter for the signature of the Secretary of War.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Concurrence.

A. C. of S., G-2. ( )

ACTION TAKEN: 12-8-42. Ltr fm S/W to S/S signed & dispatched 12-8-42 fm O/CS. Cy to CG, AAF. LVH-cm-2B-939

JOHN N. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Ltr fr S/W
to S/S.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

General Arnold feels that a strong effort should be made to effect the release of the personnel of the Doolittle-Tokyo flight, listed below, who have been interned in Russia, since April 18, 1942.

(See Over)

RECEIVED
DEC 12 1942
AIR - HQ. AAF

20045
MAK

C# F-30285

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P	Capt. Edward J. York	0-21151
CP	Lt. Robert G. [illegible]	0-24104
BN	Lt. Nolan A. Norndon	0-419328
EG	Sgt. Theodore H. Laban	6559855
G	Cpl. David W. [illegible]	6152141

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Our Aviators Interned in Russia.

3373
GES/hd

1	AFCAS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2	1942 11-14	1. General Arnold directs that you take the necessary steps through G-2 and the State Department to obtain the release of our aviators interned in Russia. The British have had squadrons fighting the Axis in Russia. We are an ally of Russia and therefore we should be able to obtain the release of our interned aviators.

2. Coordinate with Colonel Ballard, A-4.

File

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

383.6 (3)

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Mr. Gray
as OS 383.6 (3)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan 78 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/23/76

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Crew and Plane at Conakry, French Guinea

RHH/hk

1. CAS A-2 7/18

1. In the message dated July 2 from Freetown it was stated that the report had been received that six members of the crew of a B-25 Bomber which landed in Conakry, French Guinea in May are now in Fotoba prison, which is a dirty native jail located on the northeast end of Tamara Island off Conakry. The report also stated that the plane was still at Conakry.

2. This was checked through A-2 and G-2 who in turn took the matter up with the State Department and the report which came back to us from the State Department was to the effect that the crew members were being treated all right.

3. General Arnold wants to know why these crew members and the plane cannot be released immediately and wants all the pertinent facts in writing so that he can contact Mr. Sumner Wells at the State Department directly regarding the matter if necessary.

4. Please give this matter your immediate attention.

G.E.S.
C/AS

SAS 383.6 (2)

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[illegible]
7-20-44

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383.6 (2)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

Routing Slip Date _____

TO: _____ Bldg. _____
(Office or Symbol)
Attn: _____ Room _____

Coord.	Invest.	Nec.Action
Infor.	Recomd.	Sig.
File	Confer.	

Remarks:
Col. Ringgold—
It seems to me this question is moot by now.

From:
Name. _____ Phone _____
Office _____ Bldg. _____ Rm. _____
(Name or Symbol)

3-218,AF.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/23/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: U. S. Plane and Crew Interned in French Guinea

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS AFABI EPS:mep
1	AFABI	AFCAS	1942 8/19	1. Attached is recent correspondence reference the above subject. There is no indication from General Arnold that he desires further action other than your own question on the routing slip as to whether we can do anything else. 2. The attached papers include a rebuttal prepared in this office. This is for General Arnold's information if you think he cares to see it, and if you think it desirable to incorporate any part of it in a return letter to the Under Secretary of State. EPS E.P.S. C/A-2 3 Incls. Memo for CG,AAF subj: as above. Ltr fr Under Secretary of State 8/6/42 CC ltr to Under Secretary of State 7/29/42
2	AFCAS	AFABI	8/21	RCWB/imm 5246 With reference to your statement in paragraph 2, Item 1 above, General Stratemeyer desires your recommendation in this matter before he decides whether or not this matter should be taken into General Arnold. ~~S. E. S.~~ S/AS ~~C/ A.S.~~ Incls. n.c.

Cas. 515

(Do not use reverse side)

W-4071,AF. Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

A/1 Internment
Air Ab 383.6 (2)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By _____ LC, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO	
FILE NO	

SUBJECT: U. S. Plane and Crew Interned in French Guinea

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
			1942	WB:mep 4700
3	AFABI	AFCAS	9/27	1. In view of the attitude taken by the State Department, it is recommended that no further action be taken.
				EDGAR P. SORENSEN Colonel, G. S. C.
				Incls. n/c
				9/29/42
				Approved
4	AFCAS	AFMAG	9/30	For File
				M. A. LIBBY Lt. Col., A. C.

Hq. Army Air Forces
SEP 28 1942
AAG Received

383.6 (2)

1989

PAGE ____ Ans 383.6 (2)

3-1109 A.F.

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FO
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

SUBJECT: U. S. Plane and Crew Interned in French Guinea.

1. These comments are respectfully submitted in answer to Mr. Welles' letter of August 6, 1942.

2. It is important to note the admission that there is no treaty or convention in force between the United States and France which covers the situation.

3. Although the sovereignty and safety of any country does certainly preclude a trespass through the air over the country, regardless of any rule or custom ("quod est eius, eius est ad coelum"), the conclusion that a plane must be interned for violating the same does not follow.

4. As it has been admitted that there is no treaty governing the status, it is necessary to consider whether there is any binding rule or custom. The letter from the State Department and the numerous citations fail to establish any such custom.

5. The attempt is made to establish a custom by: (a) the text of conventions and treaties which were drawn but never ratified; (b) by textbook discussions as to what the rule ought to be; and (c) by reports of various committees such as those from the Harvard Law School and Jurists at the Hague Conference, stating a proposed uniform international law which the committees had no power to put into effect or enforce.

6. If, however, for the sake of argument, it is admitted that there was once an international custom requiring internment, it does not follow that France can be heard to urge its existence while continually flaunting its performance to the direct advantage of an enemy of the United States.

A. A cable received by the State Department from Vichy on August 4th in reply to a specific question asked by A-2 states that there have been a few cases of Axis planes and crews being released where they landed in unoccupied France. Internment has not been enforced in North Africa against either the plane or crews when Germans made forced landings, or when Italians made frequent landings in Tunisia presumably for the sole purpose of gaining a few days' respite from the battle front. Until now, there has been no instance of an Axis plane or its crew having been interned in French territory.

7. The necessity for immediate and persistent action, and the gravity of the situation can be best brought home to the State Department by the German position and demands in the matter. They are insisting that under the German construction of Article 12 of the Armistice Convention any enemy plane which lands on French territory or in French possessions must be turned over to the Germans. (Cable from Thompson (Vichy) August 5th.) Not only are the Germans unwilling to allow internment of their planes, but they are going to the opposite extreme in requiring that everyone else's be surrendered.

8. It is true that the United States has no treaty with France, setting up "the most favored nation treatment" rule. However, it should be equally well recognized that there is no such thing anymore as international law. The rule is dependent upon the might to enforce it. Certainly, the United States is justified in adopting the fair rule, and insisting upon the application of the practice, that in such matters it will demand from supposed neutrals at least as favorable treatment as such neutral is according to our enemies.

Edgar P. Bowers

Air AG 383.6 (2)

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY AIR FORCES

DATE 8/10/42

TO:	Correspondence Symbols
Commanding General, Army Air Forces	AFACG
Chief of the Air Staff	AFCAS
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff	AFDAS
A-1, Asst. C. of A/S	AFAAP
✓ A-2, Asst. C. of A/S	AFABI
A-3, Asst. C. of A/S	AFACT
A-4, Asst. C. of A/S	AFADS
Plans, Asst. C. of A/S	AFAEP
The Air Inspector	AFTAI
Director of Intelligence Service	AFDIS
Director of Military Requirements	AFDMR
Director of Air Defense	AFRAD
Director of Bombardment	AFRDB
Director of Ground-Air Support	AFRGS
Director of Base Services	AFRBS
Director of War Orgn.& Movement	AFROM
Director of Individual Training	AFRIT
Director of Technical Services	AFDTS
Director of Communications	AFTSC
Director of Weather	AFTSW
Director of Traffic Control & Reg.	AFTST
Director of Photo., Maps & Charts	AFTSP
Director of Technical Inspection	AFTSI
Public Relations Officer	AFPRO
Director of Personnel	AFDOP
Military Personnel	AFPMP
Civilian Personnel	AFPCP
The Air Surgeon	AFTAS
The Air Judge Advocate	AFAJA
The Budget Officer	AFTBO
The Fiscal Officer	AFBFO
Director of Management Control	AFDMC
Adjutant General	AFMAG
Director of Orgn. Planning	AFMOP
Director of Statistical Planning	AFMSP
Director of Legislative Planning	AFMLP
Flying Training Command	AFFTC
Materiel Command	AFAMC
Air Service Command	AFASC
Ferry Command	AFAFC
Technical Training Command	AFTTC
_____ Air Force	

Looks like we lost.
Can we do anything
else?

G.C.S.

X-398,AF

~~Alone~~ Development of a "generally accepted" rule of Int Law forbidding military ac to fly over neutral territory and "permitting (or, more accurately obliging) a neutral state to ~~the~~ intern ac that may land on its territory –

Rule adopted by commission of Jurists but although U.S. attempted obtain adoption in Italy form it never was in fact adopted –

Inter American Convention

Any declaration of neutrality by neutrals in 1939 obviously do not apply to France who was not then nor now a neutral

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Gen Strat
(A-2)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Le 811.2351T/

August 6. 1942

Copy att.

My dear General Arnold:

I am in receipt of your letter of July 29, 1942 with respect to the B-25 airplane and its crew of six members of the United States Air Force now interned in French Guinea by the French Government, in which you urge that the immediate surrender of the plane and crew be demanded. I assume that you refer to the plane which landed at Conakry on May 7, 1942 which was the subject of this Department's letter of June 17 to the Secretary of War.

The Department would be only too glad to insist upon the immediate release of the airplane and its crew if there were any justifiable grounds for doing so. It is unqualifiedly of the opinion that such a demand would be unwarranted and without hope of success.

There is no treaty or convention operative between the United States and France which covers this situation. There has developed, however, since the advent of air navigation a generally accepted rule of international law forbidding belligerent military aircraft to fly over neutral territory and permitting (or, more accurately, obliging) a neutral state to intern belligerent military aircraft that may land on its territory. Lauterpacht, in the sixth edition of Oppenheim's International Law (1940), states the prevailing view, as follows:

"The almost invariable practice of neutral States during the World War, coupled with the general acquiescence of belligerents, may be

said

Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

AAG/3343
Ar/10. Internment
Air AD 383.6 (2)

408

said to have established two customary rules: firstly, that belligerent aircraft must not enter the air space over neutral territory in time of war; and, secondly, that if they do, either intentionally or inadvertently, and are compelled to land, the neutral State must intern them. Moreover, when belligerent aircraft passed over neutral territory without intending to land, they were fired at for the purpose of compelling them to do so. . . ." (Vol. II, p. 586.)

The incidents giving rise to these developments during the World War of 1914-1918 are briefly discussed in the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Recueil de diverses communications du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Etats-Generaux par rapport à la neutralite des Pays-Bas et au respect du droit des gens (1916) 135 et seq.; I Garner, International Law and the World War (1920) 471 et seq.; 1926 U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 100 et seq.; 1936 idem 72-75; and in the comment upon the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War prepared by the Research in International Law under the auspices of the Harvard Law School, 33 A.J.I.L. Supp. (1939) 766-768.

The Rules of Aerial Warfare drawn up by the Commission of Jurists, meeting at The Hague from December 11, 1922 to February 19, 1923, represent an official attempt to clarify and formulate the rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war. The United States was represented on this Commission by John Bassett Moore and Minister Albert Henry Washburn. These Rules recite that "Belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of a neutral State" (art. 40); and that a neutral government is obligated to "use the means at its disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent military aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered," and to "use the means at its disposal to intern any belligerent military aircraft" which has "alighted for any reason whatsoever, together with its crew and the passengers, if any" (art. 42). It is stated in the General Report of the Commission of Jurists that:

"The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft are those arising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates to flying

ambulances.

ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board a warship is deemed to be part of her, and therefore will follow the fate of that warship if she enters neutral ports or waters. . . ." (Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report upon the Revision of the Rules of Warfare (The Hague, 1923) 260, 261-262.)

Secretary of State Hughes expressed his approval of these Rules and the United States attempted in 1924 and 1925 to obtain their adoption in treaty form (see 1925 For. Rel., vol. I, pp. 93 et seq.).

The inter-American convention on maritime neutrality signed at Habana February 20, 1928, to which the United States is a party, provides in article 14:

"The airships of belligerents shall not fly above the territory or the territorial waters of neutrals if it is not in conformity with the regulations of the latter." (4 Treaties, etc. (Trenwith, 1938) 4743, 4747; 47 Stat. 1989, 1993.)

The Research in International Law under the auspices of the Harvard Law School concluded in article 95 of its Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War that:

"A neutral State shall use the means at its disposal:

"(a) To prevent belligerent military aircraft from entering its territory; and

"(b) To compel them to alight if they have entered; and

"(c) To intern them after they have alighted, whether the landing be voluntary or forced, together with persons and property on board." (33 A.J.I.L. Supp. (1939) 764-765.)

The proclamations and rules of neutrality laid down by various neutral states upon the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 are in accord with this position. The general declaration of neutrality approved by the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Panama on October 3, 1939 provides that the American Republics

"Shall

"Shall regard as a contravention of their neutrality any flight by the military aircraft of a belligerent state over their own territory." (Report of the Delegate of the United States of America to the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Held at Panama, September 23-October 3, 1939 (Department of State Conference Ser. 44, 1940) app. II, p. 55.) In the Naval War College discussions on international law in 1939 the conclusion is reached that--

> "It can now be said to be international law that belligerent war planes have no right to fly into or through neutral jurisdiction. The subjacent neutral state has complete jurisdiction over the air, and the practice of neutrals in the last war and the provisions of codes and conventions since that time established the fact that the military planes of belligerents are barred from flight in neutral air. . . ." (1939 U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 85.)

It is true that a Canadian army plane on a training flight, not at the time engaged on any hostile mission or in any hostile activity, was allowed to depart within 24 hours after making a forced landing, through mistake, in territory of the United States near the Canadian border on March 9, 1940; but it was indicated at the time that the ruling was not to be taken as a precedent, and the circumstances would seem to differ considerably from those of the incident under discussion as the Department understands them.

Even if any doubt should remain with respect to the duty of a neutral state to intern a belligerent military aircraft and its crew, there would seem to be no possible ground on which to contend that it lacks the legal right to exclude military aircraft of a belligerent and to intern them if they land upon its territory. The sovereignty of a state over the airspace above its territory is now well established in international law, and is the basic premise underlying the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements regarding aviation. The multilateral treaties on aerial navigation, such as the Paris convention of 1919 (to which France, but not the United States, is a party) and the Habana convention of 1928 (to which the United States, but not France, is a party), provide

only

only for the passage of civil aircraft. Article 32 of the Paris convention of 1919 provides:

> "No military aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another contracting State nor land thereon without special authorisation. . . ." (3 Treaties, etc. (Redmond, 1923) 3768, 3778.)

The sovereignty of a state over the airspace above its territory, as well as its right to exclude foreign military aircraft, is expressed in various national legislation, of which section 6(a) of the United States Air Commerce Act of 1926 is an example:

> "The Congress hereby declares that the Government of the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United States, including the Canal Zone. Aircraft a part of the armed forces of any foreign nation shall not be navigated in the United States, including the Canal Zone, except in accordance with an authorization granted by the Secretary of State." (44 Stat. 568, 572.)

There would seem to be no adequate basis for us to insist, as suggested in your letter, that any French infractions of this rule of customary international law have rendered it no longer operative. Violations by a state of a rule of international law do not suffice to abrogate the rule. Violations of international law to our injury would of course give us a right to demand redress, and might serve as a basis for reprisal. But such violations on the part of France in one situation would not justify our insistence that France depart from her rights and duties under international law in a wholly different situation.

Concerning your inquiry whether it is possible for us to insist upon the rule that we be accorded most-favored-nation treatment in this matter, I am of the opinion that there is no basis for such insistence. There is no treaty or other international agreement under which the United States may demand from France most-favored-nation treatment in this matter. Indeed, the air navigation arrangement between the United States and France, effected by notes exchanged July 15, 1939, specifies that even in time of peace military aircraft of either party may not be flown

over

over the territory of the other or landed without special authorization. (Executive Agreement Series 152.)

Regarding your suggestion that the United States demand the surrender of the plane and its crew in return for food and medicine which we are sending to the French people, I may state that such humanitarian relief as has been extended unoccupied France has been not by this Government but by the American National Red Cross and obviously could not be made a matter of bargaining between this Government and the Government of France. Such shipments as are permitted to go to French possessions in North Africa are being paid for by France out of blocked funds and are allowed to go forward only in return for certain considerations in our favor.

In brief, it is the opinion of the Department that the internment of the plane and its crew by the French Government is not open to question and that this Government is not in a position to request their release.

Sincerely yours,

Under Secretary

Office, C. G., A.A.F.
AUG 8 1942
Received

our ay 383.6 (2)

COPY

July 29, 1942

Honorable Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

I beg to refer to the B-25 airplane and its crew of six members of the United States Air Force now interned in French Guinea by the Vichy French Government.

Everything possible should be done to secure the immediate surrender of the plane and crew. This should be demanded of the French and insisted upon. It is my opinion that had this been done immediately, the French would have been more impressed with our determination in the matter.

Our lawyers state that there is no established international law, nor treaty or convention between the United States and France which justifies the interning of this plane.

If France should rely upon usage or custom or its accepted interpretation of the rule of any claimed international law, then we must insist that the custom is no longer operative, in view of its repeated infraction by the French Government in its dealings with the German Reich.

Is it not possible for us to insist upon the rule that it will be accorded the most favored treatment accorded to nationals of any other country?

As an additional proposition we are sending enormous supplies of food and medicine to the French people. In return for this bounty we are certainly justified in demanding our men and property. We can demand the return of the plane as a consideration for the food to be delivered to the French.

It is my studied opinion that a firm hand in this matter will result [redacted] speedy return of the plane.

Sincerely yours,

Originally written by a-2

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

(As rewritten in Gen. Arnold's office 7/29/42.)

U. S. Plane and Crew Interned in French Guinea

WDmsep 4700

3 AFAEI AFCAS 1942 9/27

1. In view of the attitude taken by the State Department, it is recommended that no further action be taken.

Hq. Army Air Forces
SEP 28 1942
AAG Received

EDGAR P. SORENSEN
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incls. n/c

AAG 383.6 (2)

U. S. Plane and Crew Interned in French Guinea.

4 AFCAS AFRMO 9/30 For File

M. A. LINEY
Lt. Col., A. C.

subject: U. S. Plane and Crew interned in French Guinea

RCWB/imm 5246

2 AFCAS AFABI 8/21 With reference to your statement in paragraph 2, Item 1 above, General Stratemeyer desires your recommendation in this matter before he decides whether or not this matter should be taken into General Arnold.

G. E. S.
C/ A.S.

Incls.
n.c.

Dispatched
AUG 21 1942
AAG

CA 8-10-

AG AAF
file copy file
a 8/28/42

Air AB 383.6 (2)

July 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

Subject: Six American Prisoners held in French Guinea

1. Reference Cable from Freetown, Africa. A B-25 airplane had gone down in French Guinea and six members of the crew are now held in confinement in a dirty native jail on the north end of an island off shore from French Guinea.

2. This matter was taken up with G-2 War Department and that agency contacted the State Department at about 5:30 last night and received the promise from the State Department that they would make strong representations to the Vichy French Government for release of the six American prisoners.

3. 9:45 this morning. G-2 reports that the State Department has advised them that information contained in State Department office indicates that these six men are not in a native jail, but are being treated with the utmost courtesy and associating with officers.

4. State Department will make further inquiries with reference to the report and verify the present status of the six ~~navigators~~ aviators.

3836 (M)

G-2 Col. Goodfellow
7-3-42
noted

DECLASSIFIED
OOD ltrs.
Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: U. S. Planes and Crews interned in French Guinea.

1. Inclosed is a letter to the Honorable Sumner Welles submitted for your consideration.

2. The preparation of this letter has been held up and was not ready this morning for your signature due to the fact that we wished specific information from our representative in Vichy of instances where German planes had landed in unoccupied France and then had been released. The answer to this cable has not yet been received.

3. A further argument suggests itself which seems entirely sound. A belligerent has an undoubted right to buy implements of war from a neutral as is best exemplified by the purchase by Germany of anti-aircraft guns from Sweden. The plane can be purchased with supplies now being furnished France or with credit balances which we may hold against that country.

4. In our study of this question we reached the conclusions:

a. That there is no treaty or convention specifically governing the question, binding on the United States.

b. Some argument can be submitted that there is an international custom requiring internment. If an argument is to be founded upon such a custom by the French, the French would have to show that the custom had been recognized generally and adhered to uniformly. If it can be shown that the French have not enforced the claimed custom in any particular instance, then the French nation can no longer contend with any force that such a custom exists.

E. O. HUNTER,
Major, Air Corps,
Chief, Current Intelligence Sec., A-2.

1 Incl -- Ltr to Hon. S. Welles

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File
a 8/6/42

383.6 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1942

Honorable Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

I beg to refer to the B-25 airplane and its crew of six members of the United States Air Force now interned in French Guinea by the Vichy French Government.

Everything possible should be done to secure the immediate surrender of the plane and crew. This should be demanded of the French and insisted upon. It is my opinion that had this been done immediately, the French would have been more impressed with our determination in the matter.

Our lawyers state that there is no established international law, nor treaty or convention between the United States and France which justifies the interning of this plane.

If France should rely upon usage or custom or its accepted interpretation of the rule of any claimed international law, then we must insist that the custom is no longer operative, in view of its repeated infraction by the French Government in its dealings with the German Reich.

Is it not possible for us to insist upon the rule that it will be accorded the most favored treatment accorded to nationals of any other country?

As an additional proposition we are sending enormous supplies of food and medicine to the French people. In return for this bounty we are certainly justified in demanding our men and property. We can demand the return of the plane as a consideration for the food to be delivered to the French.

It is my studied opinion that a firm hand in this matter will result in the speedy return of the plane.

Sincerely yours,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Dispatched Copy to A-2 & Chrfd Files
JUL 30 1942
AAG
As rewritten in Gen A's office 7/29/42
File 8

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

383.6 (2)

Air AY 383.6 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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U. S. Planes and Crews interned in French Guinea.

1. AFCAS A-1 7-30 General Arnold has revamped the attached letter, softening it a bit, and has mailed his own copy as revamped, to Mr. Sumner Wells.

Dispatched
JUL 31 1942
AAG

G.E.S.
AFCAS

Encls.
Memo 7/29/42 to CG AAF fr A-2
w/ Incl. ltr for sig CG AAF to
Hon. Sumner Wells
R/R w/ 4 comments CONFIDENTIAL
cy. paraphrase tel. #250

383.6 (2)

File
Ci 8/1/42

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ai OD 383.6 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Crew and Plane at Conakry, French Guinea.

383.6 (2)

Dispatched
JUL 26 1942
AAG

File
a 7/26/42

AFCAS
DES:dmc

3. General Staatemeyer. Ass't. Chief of Air Staff, A-2. 7/25

1. General Arnold desires that a letter be prepared for his signature to Mr. Sumner Wells, setting forth briefly what has happened to our interned crew, and with a very definite request that action be taken to secure the release of our interned aviators.

2. Since a ship on the high seas, entering a neutral port in war time is given a twenty-four hour period to restrock with supplies, make repairs, and then leave, General Arnold feels, as a result of this, that an airplane crew that is forced down in a neutral country should have the same rights. Your letter should clearly bring this out with a request that this be done.

G.E.S.
AFCAS

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ In Mr. Gray's Cy. 383.6 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

DECLASSIFIED

Crew and Plane at Conakry, French Guinea

RHH/hk

1. CAS A-2 7/18

1. In the message dated July 2 from Freetown it was stated that the report had been received that six members of the crew of a B-25 Bomber which landed in Conakry, French Guinea in May are now in Fotoba prison, which is a dirty native jail located on the northeast end of Tamara Island off Conakry. The report also stated that the plane was still at Conakry.

2. This was checked through A-2 and G-2 who in turn took the matter up with the State Department and the report which came back to us from the State Department was to the effect that the crew members were being treated all right.

3. General Arnold wants to know why these crew members and the plane cannot be released immediately and wants all the pertinent facts in writing so that he can contact Mr. Sumner Wells at the State Department directly regarding the matter if necessary.

4. Please give this matter your immediate attention.

383.6 (2)

Dispatched
JUL 18 1942
AAG

G.E.S.
C/AS

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HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—A.G.O. [illegible]

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A-1	A-2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				

AAF-39

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

(2-A)

OCT 11 1941

383.6 (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Subject: German Prisoners in Surinam

1. Inviting attention to attached memorandum for such action as you may care to take.

2. Request this office be informed of any action taken by you.

3. This office understands that Dutch troops have been moved into this area, on September 25th.

J. G. TAYLOR,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Division

1 incl.
Memo for Ch/Intel Div.,
10/8/41, fr. Eval.Unit, Intel.Div.

Cy. to A-3, air staff
Copy also sent to A-2

A 10/13 (22-B)
C-3563 10/13 (2A-2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

Air 383.6 (1)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

C-1021

COPY

COPY

(2-B-2)

October 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Intelligence Division
Office, Chief of the Air Corps

SUBJECT: German Prisoners in Surinam.

1. It is believed consideration should be given for the protection of the aviation field at Zanderij, Surinam, against possible sabotage by Germans held in custody by the Surinam Government. This is one of the airports constructed by the Pan American Airways Air Development Program.

2. Attention is invited to the German sailors held in custody by the Surinam government. These men are the crew from a German boat which was scuttled in the port at Paramaribo and are held in custody at two locations, one of which is about one-half way between the cities of Paramaribo and the airport. There is no stockade, and the Germans apparently are held in custody and considerable liberties are given to them due to the peculiar situation of the Dutch Government in Holland being occupied by Germany.

3. This is submitted as a result of personal observation during September and December of 1940.

4. Attention is invited to M/A Surinam (Dutch Guiana) Report No. 6, September 8, 1941.

/s/ Leigh Wade

LEIGH WADE,
Major, Air Corps,
Evaluation Unit

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C-3509 10/9 (2A-2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jul. & 30 June 1954
By: AM/AW LC; Date 9/23/74

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED (*CONFIDENTIAL)

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

FILE NUMBER:

Station

Date

SUBJECT: Receipt.

TO: The Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C.
(Intelligence Division)

1. Received from the Chief of the Air Corps the following listed (~~*Secret~~ *Confidential) documents:

Copy of Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: German Prisoners in Surinam, w/1 Incl. (Memo for Ch/Intel.Div., 10/8/41, fr. Eval. Unit, Intel.Div.)

10/10 Orig. sgd. by Gray

Please accomplish and
return immediately to:
Classified Mail and File Unit,
Administrative Division,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps.

Name Rank Branch

Office of:

*Strike out word not applicable.

DECLASSIFIED
[redacted] (~~*CONFIDENTIAL~~)

W-4003, A.C.

A 10/13 (22-B)
C-3563 10/13 (2A-2

A-11/18
air AG 383.6 (1)


RECEIVED
OCT 18 1941

HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD

Box 113 Folder 5

MILITARY

Durand

BAS 384

SAS 384

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible]; Date 9-23-76

4

JCS Memo

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] AC, Date: 9/22/76

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

AFEPG 27 Aug. 1945

Col. Ladd - 4563

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
27 Aug 45 JJL
Date Initials

WDGS, OPD

XInformation

Transfer of Units and Responsibilities to ATC.

Comment #2

1. In accordance with D/F OPD, file 384 TS (12 Aug 45), subject: "Transfer of Units and Responsibilities to ATC", to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces from OPD, dated 13 August 1945, certain units on the island of Oahu have been transferred to the Commanding General, Air Transport Command by proposed AG letter forwarded to OPD for approval.

2. AAF representatives who visited AFMIDPAC with regard to the above transfer, state that the Commanding General, Army Forces, Middle Pacific and the Commanding General, Pacific Division, Air Transport Command have arranged "details of personnel shifts" required by WARX 44301 dated 3 August 1945, by a letter and indorsement between the two commanders. An information copy of this letter will be sent to the War Department and it is recommended the provisions of the letter be published by Adjutant General letter in order to record official War Department approval of the agreement. No exceptions to War Department Circular 386, dated 26 September 1944, will be necessary solely because of the above transfer. AAF will discuss a change of policy with regard to responsibility for third echelon of maintenance by separate action.

Signed

JOSEPH J. LADD
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Organization Division
Office, Asst. Chief of Air Staff-3.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/21/75

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Command Set Up in the Pacific

ACAS, Plans 6/4/45

Deputy Commander, AAF 1

ICE/es/3373

General Hull took up with me today that part of General MacArthur's reply on the air command set-up in the Pacific which stressed the importance of having unified logistic support for all the air elements involved in the Pacific. General Hull feels that after General Spaatz' return, and before he departs for the Pacific, we should have high level conferences with them on this. General Hull would like to sit in. I think he has an excellent point here, and as soon as General Spaatz returns permanently from Europe we should take this up with him and work out our proposal, and thereafter ask General Hull to sit in on the final conference.

Signed

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Deputy Commander, A. A. F.

SAS 384 (45)

5 JUN 1945
AFSAS

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/75

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Command Set Up in the Pacific

ACAS, Plans 6/4/45

Deputy Commander, AAF 1

ICE/ea/3373

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IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Deputy Commander, A. A. F.

SAS 384 (45)

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8 JUN 945
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SAS 384 (45)

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1954
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/75

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Change in Commanding Officers at Bolling Field

AC/AS, Personnel

21 Mar 45

Chief of the Air Staff

1
PGT/ewe/5265

1. The Chief of Air Staff has promised Colonel Hutchison, the present commanding officer of Bolling Field, that he will be given an overseas assignment sometime around 1 July. In order to carry out this agreement, Colonel Raymond L. Winn, 0-17478, has been selected as Colonel Hutchison's successor.

2. It is desired that Colonel Winn be ordered to Bolling Field at least one month before the departure of Colonel Hutchison so that he may take over the duties without a break in the continuity of the operation of the base.

Signed

COPIES TO:
AC/AS, OC&R
General Owens
General Hood

PATRICK W. TIMBERLAKE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

DISPATCHED
[illegible]
AFSAS

SAS 384 (42)

CO-Bolling

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Copy for General Hood

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SAS 384 (42)

Chart of organization as of
HEADQUARTERS, AIR TECHNICAL SERVICE COMMAND
15 November 1944

HEADQUARTERS, AIR TECHNICAL SERVICE COMMAND
Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio

LT.	GEN. H. H. ARNOLD	DIRECTOR, AIR TECHNICAL SERVICE COMMAND
MAJ.	GEN. B. E. MEYERS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AIR TECHNICAL SERVICE COMMAND
MAJ.	GEN. L. T. GILLAM	CHIEF, SUPPLY DIVISION
MAJ.	GEN. D. N. WILSON	ASSIST. ATSC
MAJ.	GEN. H. A. CRAIG	AIR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (Pending U. S. Orders)
BRIG.	GEN. K. E. ARNOLD	CHIEF, MANAGEMENT CONTROL
BRIG.	GEN. L. F. HEAT	CHIEF, PERSONNEL & BASE SERVICES DIVISION
BRIG.	GEN. E. H. HOLT	CHIEF, ENGINEERING & PROCUREMENT
BRIG.	GEN. F. O. CARROLL	CHIEF, ENGINEERING DIVISION
BRIG.	GEN. O. P. CLAY	CHIEF, PROCUREMENT DIVISION
BRIG.	GEN. C. T. STANFORD	ASSIST. ATSC
BRIG.	GEN. C. E. BEVERLEY	AIR INSPECTOR

CENTRAL PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
Detroit 26, Mich.
A. E. JOHNSON
Colonel
District Supervisor

EASTERN PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
New York 4, N. Y.
J. P. COLLINS
Colonel
District Supervisor

MIDCENTRAL PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
Chicago 4, Ill.
F. A. PALMERT
Colonel
District Supervisor

MIDWESTERN PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
Wichita 1, Kans.
F. C. HARRIS
Brig. General
District Supervisor

SOUTHEASTERN PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
Atlanta 3, Ga.
F. H. PROFFIT
Colonel
District Supervisor

WESTERN PROCUREMENT DISTRICT
Los Angeles 64, Calif.
D. P. STACE
Brig. General
District Supervisor

ATLANTIC OVERSEAS ASC
Fort of Embark
Newark 5, N. J.
F. H. SMITH
Brig. General, USA

FAIRFIELD ASC
Patterson Field,
Ohio
F. A. HARMON,
Brig. General, USA

[illegible] AIR DEPOT
Miami, Fla.
F. J. ANDRE
Brig. General, USA

HAMILTON ASC
Clinton Field,
Middleton, Pa.
J. E. CLARK
Brig. General, USA

MOBILE ASC
Brookley Field,
Mobile, Ala.
J. E. MORAN
Colonel, USA

OGDEN ASC
Hill Field,
Ogden, Utah
F. E. HILP
Colonel, USA

PACIFIC OVERSEAS ASC
1020 Broadway
Oakland 12, Calif.
C. F. ASTOR
Colonel, USA

RENO ASC
Reno Army Air Field
Reno, N. V.
J. P. MATTHEWSON
Colonel, USA

SAN BERNARDINO ASC
San Bernardino
Army Air Base
F. FERRELL
Colonel, USA

SPOKANE ASC
Spokane
Army Air Field,
S. V. ZEIGER
Brig. General, USA

OKLAHOMA CITY ASC
Tinker Field,
Oklahoma City, Okla.
L. H. HILBY
Colonel, USA

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
TINKER FIELD,
Oklahoma City, Okla.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
TINKER FIELD
Oklahoma City, Okla.

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
TINKER FIELD
Oklahoma City, Okla.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
KLAMATH AAFLD,
Klamath, Ore.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
HERSEY AAFLD,
Hersey, Mich.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
VALDEZ AAFLD,
Victoria, Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
FRATT AAFLD,
Frett, Kansas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
TINKER FIELD,
Oklahoma City, Okla.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
GREAT BEND AAFLD,
Great Bend, Kansas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
GREAT FALLS AAFLD,
Dallas, Kansas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
MCCOOK AAFLD,
McCook, Neb.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
GRAND ISLAND AAFLD,
Grand Island, Neb.

HAMILTON FIELD ASC
Hamilton Field,
San Rafael, Marin Co., Calif.
J. E. MORAN
Brig. General, USA

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ROSWELL FIELD 1,
N. Mex.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ROSWELL FIELD 1,
N. Mex.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
WATSON AAFLD,
Yazoo, Miss.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
LA JUNTA AAFLD,
La Junta, Colo.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
WATSON AAFLD,
Yazoo, Miss.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
MATHIS FIELD,
Laredo, Texas

SAN ANTONIO ASC
Kelly Field,
San Antonio, Texas
E. MORAN
Brig. General, USA

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
KELLY FIELD,
Texas

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
KELLY FIELD
Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
RANDOLPH FIELD,
San Antonio, Texas

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
KELLY FIELD,
Texas

[illegible] AIR DEPOT GROUP
KELLY FIELD,
Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
RANDOLPH FIELD,
San Antonio, Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
RANDOLPH FIELD,
San Antonio, Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
RANDOLPH FIELD
San Antonio, Texas

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
RANDOLPH FIELD
San Antonio, Texas

SACRAMENTO ASC
McClellan Field,
Sacramento, Calif.
J. E. MORAN
Brig. General, USA

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

[illegible] SERVICE GROUP
ASC [illegible] CENTER
Fresno, Calif.

* Enlisted Negro Personnel

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 4/22/76

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Sas 384 (39)

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/72

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 373-2 GCT-AGM

APO 757 (Main)
20 October 1944

SUBJECT: Command and Control of Allied Air Forces

TO : All concerned

1. COMMAND. With effect from 0001 hours, 15 October 1944, Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force is dissolved. Pursuant to existing policy governing responsibility for the direction of air operations, the Supreme Commander will exercise command of all Air Forces now or later placed under his command, through authority delegated by him to the Deputy Supreme Commander. The Deputy Supreme Commander, in addition to his other duties, is directly responsible to the Supreme Commander for the coordination of air operations in support of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, AEF AIR STAFF. To assist the Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the discharge of his responsibilities, an integrated Air Staff will be formed at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, and will be organized in two echelons - Main and Rear. Both echelons will report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air).

3. SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, AEF MAIN (AIR). The Air Staff will be organized into Staff Divisions parallel with those already existing in Supreme Headquarters, AEF. The Air Staff Divisions shown below are responsible for preparing necessary action required for the coordination of the Tactical Air Forces, preparing and examining recommendations for the use of Strategic Bomber effort and for all Air Staff functions not specifically assigned to Rear:

A-1 - Personnel: None to be established.

A-2 - Intelligence: This division will be responsible for all Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Air Intelligence activities.

A-3 - Operations: A-3 will be divided into two sections:

(1) A-3 (Ops): controlling Current Operations
Operational Plans
Operational Records
Meteorology
Photographic Reconnaissance
Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR)
Flying control and aircraft safety
Communication Squadron.

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~~SECRET~~ SAS 384 (SF)

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(2) A-1 (Air Plans): controlling combined future operational planning and air disarmament as defined in paragraph 6, below.

A-4 - Air Logistics: Responsible for liaison with Chief Administrative officer and G-4, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, formulation of administrative policy and plans affecting all Tactical Air Forces and maintenance of air logistic information.

A-5 - Civil Affairs: None to be established.

Signal Division (Air): Responsible for Air Signals matters.

4. All Air Staff Divisions will coordinate with other Staff Divisions of this headquarters as laid down in existing staff memoranda.

5. SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, AEF, REAR (AIR). A small Air Staff at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Rear (Air) will provide a link with those Air Forces based in the United Kingdom which do not have direct representation at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Main (Air). This Staff will also undertake the smooth transfer of Royal Air Force administrative functions from Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force to Headquarters, Second Tactical Air Force.

6. AIR DISARMAMENT AND POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING. A small combined air disarmament and post-hostilities planning section will work at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Main in conjunction with the army and naval staffs. The Supreme Commander's policy will be implemented by the Air Staff at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Rear (Air) and by Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, as appropriate.

7. APPOINTMENTS. Announcement of appointments will be made at a later date.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

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8 Nov. & 20 June 1974
By AGNA LO; Date 9/23/74

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

DECLASSIFIED
By LO; Date
Per

AG 373-2 OCT-AGN

AFC 757/(Main)
20 October 1944

SUBJECT: Command and Control of Allied Air Forces

TO : All concerned

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Photographic Reconnaissance
Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR)
Flying control and aircraft safety
Communication Squadron.

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SAS 384 (38)

~~SECRET~~

SAS (38)

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A-4 - Air Logistics: Responsible for liaison with Chief Administrative officer and G-4, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, formulation of administrative policy and plans affecting all Tactical Air Forces and maintenance of air logistic information.

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By command of General EISENHOWER:

T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS AAF

ROUTING SLIP

TO ➡ OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL IN TURN	DATE FORWARDED
1. General Smith	4 Nov 44
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

FOR ➡ FOLLOWING ACTION(S) AS CHECKED

	COORDINATION		NOTE AND RETURN		INFORMATION
	NECESSARY ACTION		RECOMMENDATION		FILE
	SEE OR PHONE ME		APPROVAL		SIGNATURE

COMMENT It is suggested that a copy of the attached mimeographed letter be furnished to each of the following:

Chief of Air Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff
Colonel Dean
AC/AS - Personnel
AC/AS - Intelligence
AC/AS - Training
AC/AS - Materiel & Services
AC/AS- O. C. & R.
AC/AS - Plans
The Air Inspector
The Air Surgeon
The Air Judge Advocate
Air Communications Officer
Office Technical Information
Management Control

If you agree, this office will type and distribute the extra copies.

Copies distributed 11/8/44

FROM ➡	OFFICE & INDIVIDUAL	PHONE
	O. H. LAVER Lt. Col. Air Corps Assistant Secretary, Air Staff	5790 AFSAS

3-218, AF Rev. 1 Aug 1944

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SECRET
Auth: SC, AEF
Initials MER
20 October 1944

457

AG 373-2 GCT-AGM

APO 757 (Main)
20 October 1944

SUBJECT: Command and Control of Allied Air Forces

TO : All concerned

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Operational Records
Meteorology
Photographic Reconnaissance
Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR)
Flying control and aircraft safety
Communication Squadron.

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OPERATIONS BRANCH
OCT 23 4 57 PM '44
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7. APPOINTMENTS. Announcement of appointments will be made at a later date.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

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HQ. AAF
8-NOV
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Address reply to
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

29 May 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GILES

SUBJECT: Organization of Air Service and Materiel Command.

Attached hereto for your information are my comments furnished General Gates at his request on the above subject.

O. P. ECHOLS
Maj. General, U. S. A.
Asst. Chief of Air Staff
Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution

Incl.
cc Memo for Gen. Gates,
5/29/44, w/cy Incl.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/23/74

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29 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GATES

SUBJECT: Organization of Air Service and Materiel Command.

1. The attached study on the above subject has been shown to General Carroll, Acting Commanding General of the Materiel Command. He has read and noted the study but, as he has been Acting Commanding General for only a few days and is not familiar with any of the reasons for the proposed change, he is unwilling to comment at this time except to say that he hopes that "middle of the stream" changes will be held to a minimum.

2. In accordance with your request, I offer the following comments:

a. Your statement to me that this organization is to be built on "sound principles" and not on personalities is sound in principle only. In actual practice an organization of the kind proposed cannot work unless it is based on "team play" which is based on personalities. The present organization is bad enough in regard to "layering", but the proposed organization with the following chain of layers makes me dizzy to think about it:

Chief of Air Staff
Deputy Chief of Air Staff, M & S
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M & S
Commanding General, Air Materiel Service Command
Commanding General, Materiel Command
Commanding General, Air Service Command.

Fundamentally, it seems to me that there are too many staff layers and there are too many Command layers. The line of communication for information of the type required daily by the Commanding General, AAF is extremely long. The division of authority is uncertain and the division of responsibility is not clear.

b. The military concept that a staff plans and makes policies, and that a command operates is sound in theory as far as operational functions are concerned but in supply matters, particularly in time of war, it is difficult to divide staff and operations. I believe that the Army Air Force is the only Government agency which endeavors to break down its supply functions into staff and command.

COPY FOR GENERAL GILES

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DECLASSIFIED 5/29/46

Memo for Gen. Gates
Subj: Organization of Air Service and Materiel Command

The Army Service Forces is a command, and most of its success and tremendous prestige has resulted from the fact that the Commanding General has responsibility and authority. As far as I can determine, the Navy has no supply staff and supply Commands.

2. Unfortunately, a large percentage of the Government's business is done in Washington. Other Departments have their establishments here and these establishments resemble. If we do not operate in Washington on supply matters, then we are at a disadvantage. The following agencies must be dealt with in Washington in regard to the following functions and most of them at an operating level:

Research and Development:

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Navy Department in coordination of progress, standardization, preparation of A & S Specifications
NDRC and OSRD
Signal Corps and Ordnance Department
OSRD

Procurement and Production:

The Under Secretary of War's office on contract policy, defense of contracts, production, pricing, readjustment policy, contract renegotiation, facilities, labor and manpower problems, surplus property, and a large number of other problems;

The War Production Board in regard to tools, materials, facilities, manpower, requirements and production;

The WPB on facilities and contracts therefor;

The War Manpower Commission Inter-Agency Board.

Requirements:

OPNAV
G-4 of the War Department
Agencies of the Army Service Forces.

Defense Aid:

The Munitions Assignment Board, the Joint Aircraft Committee, and the Beneficiary nations concerned.

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Memo for Gen. Gates 5/29/44
Subj: Organization of Air Service and Material Command

Supply:

All agencies of the Army Service Forces, G-4 of the War Department, the Navy Department, foreign theatres, the Petroleum Administration, the Joint Logistical Committee.

Aircraft Modification:

OCAR
Air Communications
Air Plans

The above functions cannot be handled by "broad policies" and "broad controls" and "carrying on a policy of liaison". They involve much work, and in most instances on the operating level of what to do and how to do it, and in many cases the actual doing of it.

3. I am sure that under the proposed organization the Commanding General, Air Material Service Command, will insist on the prerogatives of command functions as allotted to him. He will deal with the Personnel Division on Personnel, the Training Division on training, Office Management on manpower, organization, etc., and the Commanding General, AAF, on policy. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff of Material and Supply will be in the unenviable position of being held responsible for getting things done, but having no actual authority to do them.

4. MMSD is operating, not through any desire to do so, but in order to carry out the instructions given it by higher authority and the various other agencies of the Air Staff. Both the Commanding General of the Air Service Command and the Commanding General of the Material Command, if I am informed correctly, have complained to General Arnold about the operations of MMSD. The same difficulties are inherent in the proposed organization that there are in the present one.

5. Assuming that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces is dissatisfied with the present organization and has decided to change, it seems to me that either of the following is better than the proposed organization:

a. Give the Assistant Chief of Material and Supply Command authority in order to furnish him with the power to get things done.

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Memo for Gen. Giles 5/20/44
Subj: Organization of Air Service and Material Command

b. Eliminate the Office of the Assistant Chief of Material and Supply. Charge the Commanding General, Air Material Service Command with the job of equipping and supplying the Air Force, and maintain only a small "technical liaison" group in Washington, this group to report to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Maintenance and Supply (General Kimberlein).

Incl.
as memo for CG,AAF,
above subj.

O. P. ECHOLS
Maj. General, U. S. A.
Asst. Chief of Air Staff
Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution

cc: Gen. Giles

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Organization of Air Service and Materiel Command

I. DISCUSSION

1. General Arnold has approved a plan of consolidation of the Air Service and Materiel Commands. This plan involves the establishment of an Air Materiel Service Command directly over the Materiel and Air Service Commands to coordinate and integrate the operations of the two commands which now command will be directly responsible to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Materiel and Supply (see Tab A).

2. The levels of responsibility envisioned under this plan are:

a. AC/AS, Materiel and Supply

Responsible for direct control and supervision over the Air Materiel Service Command and the establishment of broad policies and exercising broad controls in the fields of resources, engineering, procurement, production, modification, supply and maintenance, traffic, and installation and carrying on of policy liaison with ASF headquarters, WDGS, WPB, Navy and other governmental and Washington agencies on the foregoing matters.

b. Commanding General, Air Materiel Service Command

Under the direct supervision of and subject to the broad policies established by and controls exercised by the AC/AS, Materiel and Supply, is responsible for supervision of Air Service Command and Materiel Command including the establishment of detailed policies and exercising detailed controls over the operations of the Air Service and Materiel Commands to bring about and insure proper balance between programs and progress, effective organizational and procedural relationships, adequate budgetary control over the combined operations, and proper intermeshing of joint operations and operational policies in critical fields such as, modification, procurement, requirements, readjustments, cutback scheduling, contract termination, redistribution and disposal of surplus, labor and manpower control, depot and district relationships, and supply and maintenance relationships with other commands and airforces.

c. Commanding General, Materiel Command

Under supervision of and subject to the detailed policies established by and detailed controls exercised by the Commanding General, Air Materiel Service Command, is responsible for carrying out the AAF development engineering, production, procurement, termination, and quality control programs.

d. Commanding General, Air Service Command

Under supervision of and subject to the detailed policies established by and detailed controls exercised by the Commanding General, Air Materiel Service Command, is responsible for AAF supply and maintenance operations which include computation of requirements, stock control, performance of depot maintenance, providing technical information to other air forces and commands in line and base maintenance, developing and operating uniform systems of supply control and providing technical information on supply, depot operations for receipt, storage, issue, salvage, and disposal of supplies for zone of interior and overseas destined supplies and equipment, and the training of certain supply and maintenance tactical organizations such as service groups and depot groups.

3. The naturally flowing process from the determination of what equipment and supplies are to be procured through the stages of manufacture, acceptance, modification, distribution, maintenance, resupply, disposal of surpluses, cutbacks and terminations is so closely integrated that the division which now exists between Air Service and Materiel Commands is unsound. Superimposing a command over these two organizations, to supervise and coordinate and integrate their activities is essential in order that the AAF avoid the dangers of over-procurement, unbalanced procurement, or failure to meet or foresee accurately requirements whether increases or cutbacks are involved.

4. The necessity for direct control by AC/AS, Materiel and Supply over this new command is essential to insure that the operations at the Dayton area will be closely and immediately synchronized with the broad policies and controls of this headquarters and the inter-related policies of the Army Service Forces and the Under Secretary of War and the War Department General Staff (G-4).

II. ACTION RECOMMENDED

The Commanding General, Army Air Forces directs that:

a. A command known as the Air Materiel Service Command be established with command relationships as shown in Tab B.

b. The office AC/AS, MM&D be redesignated as AC/AS, Materiel and Supply organized as indicated in Tab C.

c. The responsibilities at the AAF headquarters and Command echelons in the materiel and supply field will be as outlined in paragraph 2 above.

CONCURRENCE:

_____
AC/AS, MM&D

_____
Commanding General, Air Service Command

Noted only /s/ F.O.Carroll, Brig.Gen. USA.
Commanding General, Materiel Command

Sec. 3.4 (39)

ROBERT E. WOOD
925 SOUTH HOMAN AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

7

File / [illegible]

Confidential.

June 21, 1944.

Gen. H. H. Arnold,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Pentagon Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Determined to be
Administrative Marking
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.1(a)
By [illegible] LC Date 10/12/94

My dear Arnold:

I have been thinking over what you said to me in Washington about combining the Air Service Command and the Materiel Command and putting them under Knudsen.

I want to tell you frankly that while I made the original recommendation, I think it would be a great mistake to do it at this time and above all to put Knudsen in charge.

The Air Service Command is pretty well straightened out and is functioning smoothly. The Materiel Command, on the other hand, has made very little progress since I saw it in 1943 a little over a year ago. Probably this is due to the fact that Gen. Branshaw was ill and his absence in the last two months with the Command drifting leaderless has hit it even harder. Until Wright Field is straightened out, I would not make this consolidation. When you do make it, Knudsen is the last man to put in charge. I know Knudsen well and have a high regard and admiration for him, but he is not the man for this job. He is essentially a shop production man and that is the least of your problems today in either the Materiel Command or the Air Service Command. I most strongly recommend that you take no action on it at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

Sec 384. 35

6/22/44
Gen. Giles
what?
[illegible]

Let 10:30 8
5:30

File and 6/26/44

Sec 384 35

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/23/74

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

15 JUN 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF: (Attention Colonel Libby)

Subject: Marriage of Service Units to Tactical Units

For Gen. Arnold

1. As directed by the Chief of Air Staff in Routing and Record Sheet No. 1, dated 9 May, to Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution, subject as above, cables were sent to all theatres requesting their comments as to the desirability of marrying combat and service groups. Replies have been received from five theatres, all of which indicated the plan was not favorably considered.

2. No reply has been received from the Central Pacific Area nor from the India Burma Sector. It is doubtful if such a rigid system would work in either of these theatres, due to the nature of their operations which require extreme flexibility.

3. Attached is a paraphrase of each of the cabled replies received.

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of
5 Cables to [illegible]
[illegible]

L. P. WHITTEN,
Brig. General, U. S. Army,
Chief, Air Services Division,
Office of Asst. Chief of Air Staff,
Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution

SAS 384 (34)

File [illegible] 6/21/44

Gen A. informed
Noted
File

MCL

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SAS 384 (34)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Nov. & 30 June 1954
By: [illegible] (C) Date: 9/23/74

[redacted]
DECLASSIFIED

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we

November 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FAIRCHILD:

Attached is a copy of the letter from Air Vice-Marshal Slessor to me dated November 12th, which you requested.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Air 384 (31)

File
[illegible]
4/6/44

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Air AS 384 (31)

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

AIR STAFF

Personal & ~~MOST SECRET.~~

12th November, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo
2 Jan. 1975
By LTC; Date 9-23-76

Major General George Stratemeyer,
U.S.A.A.F.,
Munitions Building,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Strat-

1. I said I would let you have a few thoughts on the subject of the organisation of U.S. Air Force Command in the United Kingdom and North Africa. Here they are.

The two alternatives we discussed were:-

(a) U.K. to be declared an air theatre for the U.S. Army. The theatre commander to be an Air Force General - obviously Spaatz - and he should be given a directive as to the task he is to perform, in co-operation with the R.A.F., and should be told definitely by the Combined Chiefs of Staff what forces he is to have to perform it with. This I know was Spaatz's view when I discussed it with him just before I left England; it is Portal's view, and it makes sense if the strategic policy recommended by our Chiefs of Staff and by General Arnold in your new A.W.P.D. is adopted.

(b) Your idea that E.T.O.U.S.A. should be extended for the air as it has been for the Army, and Spaatz to be the Air Commander-in-Chief, under Eisenhower, of the whole U.K. - North African area, having under him the 8th Air Force in U.K. and the 12th Air Force in N. Africa with the power to switch air forces from U.K. to Africa or vice versa according to the strategic situation, the weather etc. If this were adopted I don't see why the R.A.F. contingent in the TORCH area should not also be under the strategic control of Spaatz in the same way as the U.S. Air Force in Egypt is under the strategic control of Tedder.

I'm not at all sure the second alternative is not the best of the two, but it wants very careful figuring out.

2. There is one strong point in favour of (a), namely that you would have the Air Force as top-dog in U.K.; you would be more likely to have it used properly and not diverted on to all sorts of side issues in Northern Europe; and you would be less likely to have your build-up interfered with by diversion of shipping to carry ground troops and equipment into the theatre. As far as we are concerned U.K. is now primarily an air theatre and will be until the combined air forces have beaten the power of resistance out of Germany. And it would undoubtedly make for easier working between us and you if Portal had an American Air Force opposite number who was the boss in U.K.

/ Actually .....

Actually, as long as Eisenhower is theatre commander I think things will work out all right because he is one of the very few ground Army generals (British or American) who knows what air power means. But I'm not by any means so sure it would work well under certain other possible Commanders-in-Chief.

3. Another advantage of (a) is probably that there would be less danger of unjustified diversions from the main job of bombing Germany. There would be a quite clear cut definite job for the air theatre commander in U.K. - to knock hell out of Germany; and I feel he might be in a better position to resist demands to switch his bombers from Germany to deal with some bright thought that the U.S. ground army or the British Navy may suddenly produce in the Mediterranean. But maybe that is not so - you'd know that better than I.

4. The attractions of course (b) are obvious. But they seem to me to depend very largely on whether in fact you could build up adequate duplicate servicing facilities in North Africa and U.K. so that you really could fly Heavy Bomber Groups from U.K. to North Africa and back again and maintain them effectively and economically at either end. If you can not do that - for any reason such as shortage of trained maintenance personnel or of shipping - then course (b) largely loses its point.

5. There is one very complicated aspect of the business, which we have got to solve whether you adopt course (a) or (b) and that is the system of control for anti-submarine and convoy escort operations. Assuming we are able quickly to clear the Axis out of North Africa the task of the Air Forces in North Africa - including Egypt - will be (broadly speaking) two-fold -

(i) to act offensively against Axis territory on the mainland of Europe and the islands, and

(ii) to secure the passage of convoys through the Mediterranean against Axis air, submarine and surface attack.

If it were only (i) we have to deal with it would be relatively simple, though even that has complications - such as the method of co-ordinating offensive operations as between Allied Force H.Q. in the West and the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East in the East, how does Malta fit in as an advanced operational base for hitting Italy, etc. But (ii) introduces many complications - particularly in that from the Naval point of view the Mediterranean will, I imagine, be entirely the Royal Navy's baby. And the complications extend outside the Mediterranean as well.

6. The R.A.F. in Gibraltar - except now temporarily during the initial stage of TORCH - is under Coastal Command, and I think must continue to be because the convoy escorts and a/s patrols from Gibraltar must tie in with those from Southwest England - and incidentally with those from the Azores if and when we are able to get in there. That is as far as outside the Straits is concerned. At present the a/s work inside the Straits is also being controlled by A.O.C. Gibraltar under A.F. H.Q. What the arrangements will be for inside the Mediterranean when we have cleaned up North Africa I don't yet know - our Joint Planners were working on that when I left U.K. and I've

/ sent ....

sent them a signal asking for their conclusions. The problem is going to be to pass convoys through the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Alexandria or Beirut, hugging the African shore, under a continuous umbrella of Fighters to protect them against air attack; (or anyway with Fighters available to cover them on receipt of warning from the Radar system we shall have to build up all along the North African shore); with a continuous escort of at least one patrol bomber day and night to protect them against submarine attack; and with a striking force in reserve to deal with any sortie by the Italian Fleet. I don't think the last matters much - there shouldn't be much Italian Fleet left if your B-17 Groups get busy in the near future. But the Ju.88 and the U-Boat and possibly the E-Boat will remain a nasty headache.

I think you will agree that these anti-air and anti-submarine escorts must be controlled from one operational H.Q. which must be working in the same operations room as the naval control - as they are in the Combined Area Headquarters at Plymouth, Liverpool etc. for British Home waters. Whether or not one control stationed at - say Biserta - could effectively work the whole length of the Mediterranean I am not sure; it may be that we should have to have two controls, one perhaps at Algiers for the Western half and one at Alexandria or Tobruk for the Eastern end, with a hand-over line somewhere East of Sicily. In particular we shall have to have a strong cover of Fighters and probably Fighter-Bombers over the narrows between Cape Bon and Sicily, tied in closely with the R.A.F. in Malta.

Just how that is going to be fitted in with your 12th Air Force in Morocco I don't know, it will need a lot of working out. But I think you ought to consider it rather carefully when you are thinking out your system of command there. Another thing - where do our new French allies fit in? No doubt that is going to be the next headache.

I'll let you know when I hear from our Joint Planners what their views are. But I do think it is a subject which will very soon have to be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - through the Combined Planners. Its one of those horny problems which just does not lend itself to simple solution. Actually it was with the object of putting a paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Joint Planners were considering the question, and I think the sooner we can get it submitted, the better.

Yours sincerely,

John Slessor.

AIR 20 384 (3)

DECLASSIFIED
000 ltrs.
8 Jun. & 30 June 1974
By AG/AC LC; Date 9/20/76

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DECLASSIFIED

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Rewritten AFMAG/HTM/lmg
6751

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26 APR 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS DIVISION:

Subject: Creation of Azores Base Command Responsible Directly to the War Department

1. This headquarters concurs in the recommendation set forth by the Commanding General, Air Transport Command, dated 14 April 1944, attached.

2. Establishment of the United States Forces in the Azores as an independent base command is considered as a favorable move at this time. At present a study is being prepared as to the means of action required for acquisition of an exclusively American Air Base in the Azores.

3. Our present information is to the effect that Doctor Salazar, the Portugese Foreign Minister, has indicated his willingness to discuss the establishment of an American Air Base on the Island of Santa Maria. He has suggested that a survey party from Pan-American Airways is desired to conduct the survey.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Barney M. Giles,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of the Air Staff.

1 Incl.
Ltr fr ATC dtd
14 Apr 1944

Dispatched
26 APR 1944
AAG

FILE

COPY FOR OFFICE OF SIGNATURE

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384 (32)

AAF/A-2
LS/MEC/wm
2/16/42

February 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of the Army Air Forces.

SUBJECT: Possibility of Joint Air Attack by Germany and Japan.

In any air estimate of the world situation, the possibility of a joint air attack by Germany and Japan, converging upon India from east and west, must be examined as a probable Axis objective. Therefore, we must consider the strong probability of:

MAJOR OPERATIONS

which will constitute the first aerial pincer movement in the history of air warfare. Such a movement would call for:

1. Japan, after seizing Java and Sumatra, to attack India via the Burmese flank, bringing carrier-based aircraft into the Bay of Bengal for support, with Calcutta the primary objective.

2. Germany, at a concerted time, to launch an all-out offensive upon the Nile Delta, with her primary objective control of the Suez and the possession of the oil supply of Iraq and Iran.

3. The ultimate phase to consist of a meeting between the two Axis aerial forces on the line, Karachi - Calcutta.

(1) 1846

INDICATIONS OF JAPANESE TENDENCIES

The air strength of the Japanese is reported to be around 4,000 combat airplanes of all types. This strength is now widely dispersed in an effort to hold the Malayan barrier against ABDA pressure from the Australian centre.

HEADQUARTERS					
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	

Japanese production of aircraft has been estimated at 565 per month. Even on [illegible] this production is not believed sufficient for aerial reinforcement and replacement to hold the Malayan barrier against the rising index of American aircraft production nor is there sufficient time to organize the loot of the Indies.

AAF-20

The only industrial state available to Japan, and subject to capture and use, is in India with its new armament and war industries. Its subjugation to and inclusion in the Japanese economy is a necessity.

2. Japan must take all measures to protect her home centres of production from the threat of sustained attack upon the Japanese homeland from air forces eventually based in China. Therefore she must sever the lines of aerial supply between China and the pivotal bases of United Nation forces in India.

3. Japan must look to Germany for collaboration and for aerial reinforcement in this task, as her own air equipment is not believed capable of such an operation over a long period of warfare, and requiring such wear and tear over so lengthy a line of supply.

INDICATION OF GERMAN TENDENCIES

to join in such an aerial pincers operation may be gained by considerations of the threat upon Germany from the following quarters:

1. American and British air bombardment groups are forming in the British Isles for sustained air assaults upon the German centres of production. It is believed that the German air force is not sufficiently strong to prevent this concentration. Therefore, Germany must at all costs attempt to interrupt this concentration of Allied air strength and to disperse American effort towards other theatres of war.

2. That Germany intends to stand on the aerial defensive in Europe is indicated by the recent air withdrawals from Russia, and by the corresponding concentration of her naval strength to her northern flank.

3. German air concentrations in the Mediterranean area, which are now reported to be upwards of 2,000 combat aircraft of all types, are mainly based upon Rommel's positions.

4. German preoccupation with Rommel's careful organization of the Cyrenaica airfields and communicating lines to Tripoli are indicative of a major operation in the Near East.

5. German preparations for troop transport in concrete landing barges now being constructed on a large scale in Mediterranean ports are reliably reported.

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A. C. G.									

AAF-30

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/25/76

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DECLASSIFIED

AERIAL SITUATIONS TO BE CREATED

include the immediate disposition of a Japanese naval force in the Bay of Bengal as protection for carrier-based aircraft to intercept sea transportation and air transport from British-held Africa, this operation designed to dominate the Indian Ocean.

1. A three-fold land, sea, and air attack upon the port of Rangoon.

2. An air and sea attack upon Calcutta as the alternate port of entry for supplies to the Burma Road.

3. The occupation of the Island of Ceylon despite strong British naval forces defending it.

4. To destruction by air and sea attack of the secondary British naval base at Madras.

5. The seizure of the island of Madagascar to interdict both sea and air transport via the middle-African stages.

6. Diversions and feints against our West Coast installations from Alaska to Peru.

384 (1)

AERIAL SITUATIONS TO BE CREATED BY GERMANY

As a compliment to the Japanese aerial pincer movement, the Germans must consider the following thrusts:

1. Preliminary feints at Recife and other South American bases on the American line of supply to Africa, these to be made by naval and air raids of a hit-and-run nature designed to work a psychological, as well as a tactical, diversion of American efforts.

2. Feints in force against Iceland from the now considerable naval forces protecting the Scandinavian peninsular.

3. Use of carrier-based aircraft to restrain long-range British and American heavy aircraft from aerial reinforcement of the Suez.

4. To create a demand from the British public for an all-out assault by land, sea and air upon the German-held continent of Europe at a premature point in the development of such a contemplated assault.

	Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics

CONCLUSIONS TO BE FACED BY GERMANY AND JAPAN

1. Germany, at the moment of a thrust towards Suez, must expect immediate air assault from England to divert her forces from the Cairo drive.

AAF-39

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(a) It is to Germany's interest to provoke such a premature assault, and gain time.

(b) A possible attempt at invasion of the European shoreline would not divert a critical portion of Germany's Mediterranean air forces, as the situation could be met with the main resistance by surface forces on both land and sea, meanwhile the total effort being a serious attrition of British air forces now massing for that eventual major operation.

(c) Germany could expect an aerial assault from Russia only in the degree necessary for maintenance of Russian surface operations, because of the diminution of aerial reinforcements from the United Nations to Russia. Germany has already gauged the minimum amount of air forces needed for this defensive task.

(d) Germany by her spectacular union of all her naval forces has greatly minimized any joint attack by Russia and British-American naval forces on her Northern flank.

2. Japan, while Germany is provoking a critical diversion of Allied aerial strength, can be reasonably secure from heavy aerial attacks from the Australian centre.

(a) This is only a temporary advantage, which will be eventually overcome by the ABDA forces if they are permitted to gather strength unmolested.

(b) Japan's will to victory, encouraged by huge initial successes, cannot now arrest her aerial momentum and leave India open to United Nations air-grouping in depth for an eventual assault through China upon her long lines of communications.

(c) Japan can have no illusions as to the eventual American air supremacy of the South Pacific, and therefore must continue to thin out her aerial defenses by seizing all possible staging points vital to the transport of American fighter aircraft.

3. While Japan is temporarily victorious in the East, and while Germany remains the master of the great plain of Western Europe, the Axis forces can only hope to unite by aerial [illegible] meeting ground being [illegible] Calcutta line. Therefore it is a strong probability that the two Axis Powers will attempt a pincer operation [illegible] with the employment of aircraft within present ranges of design, while forcing the United Nations on a continuous defensive over lines of supply and communication more tenuous and difficult than those of the Axis powers.

AAF-30

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4. Such an all-out attempt for a meeting of the two aerial forces of Germany and Japan is the logical air estimate of the present world situation.

CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN BY THE AMERICAN AIR FORCES

It is unlikely that an invasion of the continent of Europe is feasible at this time. It is also unlikely that this land duel between Russia and Germany can be settled decisively in favor of the Soviets in time to prevent the major operations of Germany and Japan against the Suez positions. The cost of day bombardments of Germany from British bases is prohibitive with present strength and tactical training of crews. Therefore it is submitted that the only effective and immediate attempt to frustrate the aerial offensive of the Axis nations must be made at Japan's long line of communications.

1. By the immediate restoration of General MacArthur's position as one capable of severely restraining the freedom of Japanese movements through the China Sea. This should be a major operation which then would assure adequate aerial reinforcement and sufficient increase in the supplies and surface combat forces to assure the success of our operations.

2. By the immediate dispatch into China of available heavy bombardment units; these to commence at once a series of raids upon Japanese communications in China and in the China Seas, and Japan itself.

3. By the seizure, upon diplomatic pretexts, of Russian bases such as Kamchatka for direct air assault upon the Japanese homeland.

4. In conjunction with the above, air raids from carriers against Japan.

5. By continuing pressure upon the Malay barrier from the continent of Australia with the use of long-range air bombardment of Japan's central position at Singapore, with diversions aimed at tactical surprise by carrier-based aircraft such as our naval forces recently achieved in the Marshall Islands.

FEB 16 1942
AAG Recd

Carried by hand

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATIO

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Inst.
				4175				

MARTIN F. SCANLON
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A-2.

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FO

ROUTING SLIP

TO: Advisory Council

DATE 25 Jan

OFFICE OR SYMBOL	BUILDING
ATTENTION: Colonel Dean	ROOM

FOR:

	COORDINATION		INVESTIGATION		NEC. ACTION
	INFORMATION		RECOMMENDATION		SIGNATURE
	FILE		CONFERENCE		

REMARKS:

1. General Vandenberg indicates no reply necessary.

2. Do you have copy of letter of 27th December?

WB

FROM:

NAME		OFFICE OR SYMBOL
Lt. Colonel W. R. Burt		DAS
PHONE	BUILDING	ROOM
5458	Pentagon	3-E-1027

3-218, AF

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington

Date 27 Jan

MEMORANDUM for Col Fitzpatrick

Gen Vam would like to know how come he did not see attached on way out - particularly in view of Gen Arnold referring answer to him.

WB

P.S. Never even got a copy as far as we can see

WB

Wm. R. BURT,
1st Lieut., Air Corps,
Air Staff--A-[illegible] Division

29 Jan 44

COPY

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SECRET DECLASSIFIED

27 Dec.

Major General George Stratemeyer
Commanding General, AAF India Burma Sector
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo
2 Jan. 1975
By LLL, LC; Date 9-23-76

Dear Strat:

I have been back in Washington for a week now and I had hoped the C.C.S. would have reached a definite decision which would enable me to write a more concrete letter, but affairs are still in a state of flux in regards to operations in your theatre, so I'll outline things as they appear to me now.

The Command Set-Up as regards to air activities of SEAC remain as outlined in my letter of December 3 to adm. Mountbatten, i.e., the S.A.C. is appointed with command of all operations of all air forces in the SEAC except U.A. air transport with the understanding that:

(a) The integrity of groups be retained when integrating U.S. and R.A.F. air units.

(b) Administration control remains under U.S. commanders.

(c) The responsibility for supply remains with U.S. commanders.

(d) The S.A.C. accept responsibility for the defense of all U.S. ATC facilities in SEAC, and the CG U.S. AAF I.B. will keep the S.A.C. informed of ATC operations and requirements.

(e) Subsequent to the successful completion of TARZAN and BULLFROG, or when deemed appropriate, a re-examination of command and relationships, will be made by the C.C.S. Any previous direction or approved action in conflict with the above is rescinded.

As you know BULLFROG has been indefinitely postponed and it looks as though TARZAN may follow suit at the next C.C.S. meeting. This might be called sufficient reason to call for a re-examination of the Command Relationships by the C.C.S., but I believe we should give S.A.C. every opportunity in the immediate future to work out his problems with our full support in spite of the arguments recently presented by you and Stilwell jointly.

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Regarding the ATC division as approved in C.C.S. 411/5, there is no reason to adhere to this if TARZAN is postponed, as the allocation of aircraft was predicated on TARZAN being implemented.

The 14th Air Force, assuming TARZAN is postponed, should receive much of the benefit of the increased "hump" lift and I know you will do all you can to help them out, particularly with regard to the 341st Group, concerning the transfer of which there was no alternative. Chennault should also be able to maintain the balance of his Composite Wing with the increased tonnage.

C.K.S. in reply to the telegram sent from SEXTANT has asked for a large loan (Lend-Lease), doubling of the ATC lift, doubling of 14th and Chinese Air Forces, postponement of the Y Forces advance until after the next monsoon, and two billion dollars Chinese for construction of the Chengtu airfields. Based on 100 to 1 this means 20 million dollars or four million per airfield which is not unreasonable from here, but I would like to have your opinion on this.

The President cabled C.K.S. on December 20 briefly as follows:

(a) The major contribution we can make is to drive a land route across Burma to China this dry season.

(b) Chennault is still so limited we must improve communications before further increasing air forces in China.

(c) The effect of the Chengtu operation should do much to brighten the morale of both our nations.

(d) The ATC goal is 12,000 tons per month provided there are no diversions of ATC aircraft.

(e) My staff is planning the overall defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time before the war in Europe is ended.

(f) The financial matters will be made the subjects of a later message.

MATTERHORN is of course one of the things constantly in my mind as well as the President's, and everything must be done to make a go of it. Due to the necessity of sending all available P-51's to escort duty in U.K., we can only support the 311th group in the 10th Air Force and one squadron of Chennaults with P-51B's. The rest of the P-40's in the 10th and 14th Air Forces will be converted to P-47's by attrition replace-

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COPY

Gen Stratemeyer

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Page #3

ments. It is also necessary to convert the two fighter groups from North Africa to P-47's which will practically be doubling the planned maintenance tonnage for them in Chengtu; so if you see fit, later on, to exchange the 311th Group for one of the Chengtu P-47 groups, it will increase the bombing ability of the VLR'S.

I notice that you have made other plans regarding Bill Welsh, so no further action will be taken on the matter. Kuter tells me that he has thoroughly investigated the possibilities of your request for the allotment of grades outlined in your memorandum of 29 November and has been assured by the Air Staff that it is impossible to provide them within the present AAF troop basis.

I fully realize how much you need them as well as lots of other things, but as you saw at SEXTANT, the emphasis is still on the other foot, so lets hope it won't be too long before we can send you more than you can handle.

In the meantime, keep up the good work which is well appreciated.

Sincerely,

Signed Gen. A.

File
a 1 Feb 44

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ad 384 (24)

~~SECRET~~

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AAF 871

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
INDIA BURMA SECTOR
CHINA BURMA INDIA THEATER
&
EASTERN AIR COMMAND
SOUTH EAST ASIA

APO #885,
11 January 1944

Gen. Vandenberg
Note - & any reply
necessary

General H. H. Arnold,
C.G., Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

Thanks very much for your letter of the 27th December 1943 which was a great help to me in piecing together loose ends.

The U.S. Army Air Force Units in India have now been integrated with R.A.F. units in the South East Asia Air Command and the Eastern Air Command has been formed and is functioning. The principles laid down by Combined Chiefs of Staff paper have been followed as closely as possible.

Although insufficient time has elapsed for the organization to be operating smoothly, I feel that much progress has been made and that within two weeks the four Commands of the Eastern Air Command will have been fully organized and communications established to the extent necessary for effective operation.

We are anxiously awaiting the arrival of General Wolfe and the Advance Echelon of the 20th Bomber Command so that operational plans for the use of these aircraft may be placed into execution. Construction on airports for this project in India is lagging behind target dates due primarily to the fact that Engineer Troops did not arrive in the Theater as originally contemplated. General Godfrey is on the job and with close cooperation of S.O.S. is doing everything possible to speed up the construction of these bases.

Construction of MATTERHORN airdromes in China is progressing satisfactorily although delayed at first awaiting full approval and instructions by C.K.S. It is believed that these airdromes will be ready by the target dates set.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By LC, Date 9/23/70

SECRET

(141)
R-2744

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With reference to the request by C.K.S. for two billion Chinese dollars Lend-Lease loan for construction of the CHENGTU airfields, it is my opinion that this price is extremely unreasonable. Your letter indicates that you base the exchange rate on a ratio of 100 to 1, which would mean twenty million dollars for five fields, or four million dollars each. Lend-Lease Administrators here advise me that although they are negotiating to change the official rate of exchange, nothing definite has been accomplished and the rate still remains at 20 to 1. This would mean that each of the four airfields would cost twenty million dollars. I will check further on this subject and advise you of any information I obtain.

We are looking forward anxiously to the time when sufficient P-51B aircraft and P-47 aircraft have arrived to replace our P-40's in reasonable numbers, and believe that when this has occurred we can give the Japanese air units in this area something to write home about.

Sincerely,

Geo. E. Stratemeyer

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Commanding.

Noted G. G. Carey
Jr. T. Kenny

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dtrs.
June 1974
Date 9/23/76

SECRET

Air AS 384 (24) B

a 2944

1/6/44
Col O'Donnell sent to Col Lahey to rewrite reply - It is now in Plans being rewritten

~~SECRET~~
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"1/4/44
Col O'Donnell - Read & summarize for me. H.H.A."

India

A.P.O. 885,
17 December 1943.

Dear General Arnold,

This letter is written to bring you up to date on developments of interest since my letter to you of 31 October 1943.

Organization:

As a result of our talks in Cairo, you are familiar with Southeast Asia Air Command organizational problems as they existed ten days ago. Shortly after Lord Mountbatten returned, he issued a directive integrating the Tenth Air Force and the Bengal Air Command, R.A.F., under the unified command of Air Chief Marshal Peirse. These combined Air Forces were formed into a subordinate air command to be known as the Eastern Air Command and I was designated as Commander. Command of the Fourteenth remains under General Stilwell. You are familiar with the objections to this plan which General Stilwell and I had Lord Mountbatten lodge with the combined Chiefs of Staff. These objections were merely for the record and I am undertaking to comply to the best of my ability with the Supreme Commander's directive.

As you know by now, I have organized the Eastern Air Command under me into a Strategic Air Force under General Davidson and a Tactical Air Force under Air Marshal Baldwin. The integrity of our groups and of the R.A.F. wings will be retained. Administrative control and responsibility for supply remain separate A.A.F. and R.A.F. responsibilities. On 15 December I radioed to you a copy of extracts from my General Order Number 1 setting out the organizational arrangements. Many thanks for your wire of congratulations which I have just received.

After a good deal of thought, I have concluded to keep my Headquarters here in Delhi as long as Lord Mountbatten and Air Chief Marshal Peirse also remain here. There are so many important questions coming up during this formative stage which involve the future of our Air Forces in this Theater that I do not dare leave the place where decisions are made. If and when the Headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command move out of here, I will find a new location further east to which

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/23/76

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I can move my Headquarters as a unit. I am most anxious to avoid breaking my Headquarters up into a Forward and a Rear Echelon. There are already too many Headquarters in this Theater.

We will have four good men on Peirse's staff working in his Plans, Operations and Intelligence Divisions. I am counting heavily on General McBlain and Colonel Wold (formerly Commanding Officer of the 341st Group) to represent the A.A.F. point of view at this level. General Beebe is also a tower of strength in General Wedemeyer's Plans Section of Lord Mountbatten's staff. I have asked for a number of British officers for the staff of the Eastern Air Command to serve in the Operations, Plans, Intelligence, Communications, Weather, Photographic and Public Relations Sections. There will be a similar exchange of staff officers in General Davidson's and Air Marshal Baldwin's Headquarters.

It has not yet been definitely determined just what operations will be conducted in Burma this winter and spring. Lord Mountbatten has told me, however, that he means to fight hard with what he has, and it looks as though I will be held responsible for the air part of the plan as well as the defense of the hump.

We are most anxious to know what decisions were finally made as to who will control Twilight. Lord Louis quite naturally takes the position that any air operations based in India must come under his Command. I am still hoping, however, that you can sustain the position that Twilight should be an all American show.

Personnel:

We are in the uncomfortable position of having filled our authorized grades in my Headquarters and still being short-handed. Headquarters, Air Service Command, is rapidly getting into the same boat since they have to provide personnel for the Headquarters of their three Area Commands from the bulk allotment we received a couple of months ago. Because of poor communications and the great distances in this Theater, it is vital for proper supervision that these air service areas be organized. Two of them have been established and are beginning to operate with provisional organizations. Formal activation of units for these areas in accordance with existing T/O's has been requested. It is

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JC; Date 4/23/76

hoped that approval of the use of these T/O's will be expedited. This establishment of Air Service Areas follows the principles of organization applied in the United States, Northwest Africa and the U.K. Until these T/O's are approved, personnel to man the areas must be withdrawn from the Headquarters Squadron of the Air Service Command which is already operating on only 75% of its requested T/O strength. Meanwhile work and responsibilities increase to an extent not contemplated when our Tables of Organization were submitted to the War Department last September. You will recall that we were only given 75% of what we requested at that time. When I was in Cairo, I gave General Kuter a memorandum along these lines asking that our bulk allotment be increased to 100% of our initial requests. Our responsibilities are at least as heavy as those of the R.A.F. in this Theater and the allotment of grades for our Headquarters allows approximately 50% of their present strength. I think you know that I have no desire to build an empire, but I do need badly enough people to get the job done.

We are hoping that the study on rotation of personnel in this Theater which Colonel Higgs carried back to Washington about a month ago will result in our obtaining a flow of replacements which will permit us to begin sending home a substantial number of ground personnel whose efficiency has been seriously impaired by long service under trying conditions in this Theater. The combat crew situation is pretty well under control, but to date absolutely nothing has been done to relieve the critical situation among A.A.F. ground personnel.

The Staff Judge Advocate returned from six weeks Detached Service in China supervising the preparations for trial and trial of both enlisted and commissioned personnel of the Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces and Air Transport Command for smuggling. Seven cases were tried with sentences ranging from dishonorable discharge and confinements to fines from $1500 to $2250. Seven officers were reprimanded and five of these seven were also fined under the provisions of Article of War 104.

An Assistant Staff Judge Advocate spent two weeks in Eritrea and the Middle East procuring civilian instructors and construction engineers, former Douglas employees, who were placed under contract for the Air Service Command in this Theater.

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By LC; Date 6/23/76

Arrangements were made for the draft deferment of civilian employees of Hindustan Aircraft Ltd. through the Central Deferment Board, Washington, D.C.

A procurement officer was sentenced to dismissal for attempting to procure an interest in local firms which were doing business with the Government.

During the month there were no general court cases, thirteen special court cases and twenty-two summary court cases for both AAF (IBS) and ASC personnel in India.

Three technical representatives were ordered returned to the United States for smuggling.

The total civilian personnel (Indian) for November, employed by the various units of the Command numbered approximately 8,000 of which 92% of the wages paid, roughly $106,000, was reimbursible under Reverse Lend/Lease. Under the terms of Reverse Lend/Lease, stenographic and clerical wages are not payable. With this in view, a program of reclassification of this personnel is in progress to attempt bringing 98% of civilians employed under Reverse Lend/Lease.

Air Service Command:

Lack of satisfactory Signal communications is one of the most pressing problems we have. There is great need for wire communication facilities. Plans for providing same to at least meet minimum requirements were well under way and we anticipated some relief in the near future when suddenly radiogram 4641, Marshall to Stilwell information Covell and Herbert, dated 2 December 1943, cancelled all projects for Phase 2 and 3 of "D" plan for the Theater as well as Class 2 supplies needed for replacements and fillers of T/E equipment for Air Units.

Apparently it will be necessary to resubmit all projects and requisitions with a resultant delay running into months. Anything you can do to get reconsideration of this matter and insure early arrival in this Theater of Signal Construction Troops and wire line material will be of great help to us.

I understand that both General Stilwell and General Covell are protesting the cancellation of these projects and requisitions.

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8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 4/23/76

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Distribution of POL, particularly in the Assam area, has been, and will continue to be, a very great problem due to transportation difficulties. An officer in the Assam area has been given as his principal duty supervision of this distribution, and an officer here in Delhi has been given as his principal duty the solution of POL problems for the entire Theater. He will, of course, work in close coordination with the British authorities and the S.O.S.

A Movement Control Section has been set up in ASC Headquarters to facilitate the movement of AAF supplies through the ports, over the very congested roads and railroads, and into the hands of the using organizations. Very satisfactory cooperation with the corresponding British organization has been established, and it is expected that this section will go a long way towards improving the overall supply situation.

Badly needed supplies, shops and buildings of the Gura Depot have been moved from Eritrea into this Theater. The benefits of this move are beginning to be felt, particularly insofar as overhaul of instruments, sheet metal work and photographic supplies are concerned.

Considerable difficulty has been experienced to date in obtaining Jute mills for badly needed storage space in the Calcutta area. The present space occupied, and that requested, totals approximately 600,000 sq. ft. For proper operation of this vital depot, including estimates for Twilight, total is approximately 3,000,000 sq. ft. The British have been informed and are in sympathy with our need for the additional 2,400,000 sq. ft., and formal procedure for the acquisition is starting immediately.

Gliders for Project 9 are being erected at Barrackpore and then promptly moved to another base. The supply and maintenance phases of Project 9 are progressing smoothly.

25 of the B-24 D's which were being sent home were allotted to ATC and modifications made. These are used to advantage on the hump operation.

Commanding Generals of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces approved the following modifications:

a. A number of modifications have been made on B-25 C's and D's to install 8 fixed forward firing

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8 Jun & 20 June 1974
By [illegible], LC; Date 5/23/76

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50's in the nose. These have proved very satisfactory in skip-bombing attacks. However, further modifications to these ships will not be made since they will be replaced by G's and H's in the near future.

b. Armament of B-25 G's will be modified by addition of 4 x .50 guns to make, 4 in the nose, 2 in the outside blister on right side.

c. Armament in the B-24 J's will be modified to have 6 x .50 fixed forward firing guns, 2 in turret, 4 additional in quick detachable mounts on right and left side of bombardier-navigator's compartment.

The Staff Engineer was attached to Headquarters Combat Troops, A.P.O. 689, in connection with operations in northern Burma. He made reconnaissances by air and on foot and organized the unit for advanced airfield construction. The 900th Airborne Company was engaged in this operation, as was a detail from the 958th Engineer Topographical Company, and a provisional Battery 464th AA.

There has been an internal reorganization of the ASC Supply Division, and it is believed that improved bookkeeping and records will result. A Stock Control section will shortly be moved to Calcutta.

Frag clusters and incendiary clusters continue to be our most critical munitions. Less than one mission of frag clusters was on hand for recent Rangoon operations. A better supply of clusters is most desirable.

Steps were taken to alleviate the serious meat shortage for our troops in the Assam area by flying dressed beef back over the hump from China.

Training:

Plans have been initiated for the establishment of a Heavy Bombardment Refresher Training Course under the Air Forces Training Command, I.B. Sector, at Karachi. The initiation of such training is necessary primarily to increase efficiency of aerial gunners, many of whom arrive in the Theater with insufficient training. Other aerial gunners require constant practice to maintain their efficiency. After

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By LC; Date 7/23/74

this establishment it will also be used as a Reception Center for new heavy bombardment crews arriving in the Theater and they will be given some instruction and proficiency tests prior to assignment to heavy bombardment units.

Plans have also been made for the training of forty (40) Chinese aerial engineer gunners for use in B-25 aircraft of the Chinese Air Force and possibly the Chinese American Composite Wing. Students have not yet arrived from China but arrangements have been made for their reception and training at Karachi under the Air Forces Training Command.

Air Transport Command:

Tonnage transported to China for November was disappointing:

ICW Tonnage (net)	6490.65
2nd Troop Carrier Sq. (net)	88.37
CNAC (net)	700.25
Total (net tons)	7279.28

This drop in tonnage is largely attributed to the heavy attrition rate and the non-receipt of anticipated new airplanes. Hampering factors were the spare parts situation and weather. During November only two special U.S. to Agra spare parts shuttle airplanes arrived in the Theater. Ground fogs cost one days operations and seriously restricted flying operations for four days.

Thirty airplanes were lost during the month which includes twelve listed as missing in flight, some of which may possibly have been lost by enemy action. Six C-87's with American Airline crews were returned to the United States for modifications and repairs.

During the latter part of November twenty-six B-24-D's were assigned to the ICW to augment the airplane shortages. However, these B-24-D's were retired combat planes which required inspections and in most cases minor repairs so that their weight was not really felt on hump operations during the month. Between November 26 and the end of the month only four of these B-24-D's were capable of hump operation and carried 90.6 tons in this period.

There were no new airplane gains during the month except for one C-46 which arrived at Karachi on November 30.

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8 [illegible] & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/[illegible]

December, so far, has been much more satisfactory with respect to operations. The 10,000 ton rate for the month was hit on December 13th and has been maintained to date. General Hoag and Colonel Hardin deserve a lot of credit for this improvement.

Twilight:

We have still not received the detailed plan for Twilight. The information available at Cairo is not up to date since it called for the movement, during November, of forces which so far as we are advised were not, in fact, started on their way. We have prepared a tentative plan for the Weather, Communications, Signal, Ordnance and Gasolene storage phases and a construction directive is being based on this plan. Work is proceeding on the fields in India and a long list of equipment and supplies have been requested by the S.O.S.

Colonel Byroade has completed a survey of the fields in the Chengtu area and General Stilwell is presenting a plan to the Generalissimo for his approval. Not much can be done in China until he gives the green light. We hope to receive favorable word from General Stilwell momentarily.

At the present time, the Ledo Road, coming spring operations and the pipe lines have priority over the Twilight Project.

General Godfrey has arrived and will take charge of the Chinese end of the construction phase. He leaves for an inspection trip in China on December 17th.

Operations:

Our operations since the 1st of November are roughly divided into four general categories:

a. P-40's of General Old's Command have maintained constant patrols over Northern Burma from dawn to dusk in order to protect the operations of A.T.C. over the hump.

b. Our fighter bombers have operated almost daily in support of Chinese ground troops in the Hukawng Valley, attacking enemy troop concentrations, artillery positions, and logistical installations and lines of communication in Northern Burma.

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By: [illegible], LC; Date 9/23/76

c. Medium bombers of the Tenth Air Force have concentrated mainly on enemy communications, airdromes, oil storage and processing plants, and enemy supplies and administrative installations in central Burma. During the blitz on Rangoon they participated in the raids on the Insein Engine Works and Mingaladon Airdrome.

d. The heavies have been active against such strategical targets as Rangoon, Port Blair, enemy airfields in rear areas, and carried out mine laying operations in the Rangoon River and Moulmein channel.

The highlight of these operations was a series of heavy attacks carried out in the Rangoon area, during the week 25 November - 1 December, in conjunction with the 308th Bomb. Group (of the Fourteenth Air Force) which was temporarily based in Bengal, and the heavy squadrons of the R.A.F. all of which worked together in close cooperation.

Most bombardment missions, except those against targets that were known to be heavily defended by enemy fighters, were executed without the benefit of fighter protection. In general, our losses due to enemy fighters were quite low except during the Rangoon attacks, when the enemy moved several fighter units into that area after our initial attacks. The problem of providing fighter escort for these missions was complicated by the fact that it was necessary to stage our fighters at forward airdromes where only limited servicing and communications facilities existed. In several instances, fighters failed to rendezvous with the bombers due to fog at forward airdromes or lack of service. The lack of communications prevented them from notifying the bombers, and as a result our people ran into rather heavy opposition without having fighter support.

The enemy's offensive operations have been limited for the most part to a few sporadic attacks against our air installations in forward areas which did very little damage. The Japanese carried out one attack against Calcutta in considerable force, and in spite of the fact that the defense was greatly handicapped due to the Spitfire squadrons having been moved a few days previously from Calcutta to forward airdromes, only minor damage resulted to the Kidderpore Docks and shipping. Casualties were about 500, of which nearly all were coolie laborers.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

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Since the 1st of November the aircraft of the Tenth Air Force have flown 3,491 sorties and dropped 1,438 tons of bombs on enemy objectives. On these missions they contacted approximately 300 enemy aircraft of which 38 were bombers and the balance fighters. Our claims are 60 enemy aircraft destroyed, 27 probably destroyed and 25 plus damaged. Our losses were 26 airplanes destroyed and 44 damaged. None of our planes were lost as a result of A.A. fire, but several were damaged.

Sincerely,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

General H. H. Arnold,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan 70 & 26 June 1974
By: LC; Date 4/23/76

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date

SECRET
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28 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL WILLIS HALE.

1. After a conference on a higher staff level, General Arnold desires that your plan for control of air power in the Pacific call for an Army Air Force Commander to command all land-based aviation in the Central Pacific and to command the logistic setup in support of land-based air units.

2. General Arnold is of the opinion that the command, as envisaged in FM 100-20 for the Central Pacific should not be pressed at this time.

BARNEY M. GILES,
Major General, U. S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
29 FEB 1944
AAG

Air AB 384 (29)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date 9/23/76

SECRET

Air AB 384 (29)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
2 Jan. 5-20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

DECLASSIFIED

Teletype Conversation

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans 2-2-44

~~Deputy Chief of the Air Staff~~
Chief of the Air Staff WEH:JT 5246 1

The following transcript from a teletype conversation between General Spaatz and me this morning is furnished for your information and action:

Gen Spaatz: Will CCS directive along lines of proposed directive you showed me while in U. K. be formally issued on USSAFE?

Gen Giles: Yes. Directive setting up General Spaatz as the Commanding General, American Air Forces in U.K. will be issued very shortly.

Dispatched
3 FEB 1944
AGS

BARNEY M. GILES,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

AG 384

27

File
C 3 Feb 44

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/22/74

DECLASSIFIED

Over-all AAF Commander in the United Kingdom.

General Kuter

1 February 44

Chief of the Air Staff.

1
MAL/mgq/3373

General Giles desires to know what mechanics are necessary to have Lieut. General Spaats officially designated as the Over-All Army Air Forces Commander in the United Kingdom.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
1 FEB 1944
AAG

File
Ce 2 Feb 44

DECLASSIFIED

Air AS 384 (26)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington

Date_____

MEMORANDUM for:

Gen Arnold's
hdq —

Signature_____

X-491,AF

GOC/MB 72279
Wtn: 12-22-43

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

India

Major General George Stratemeyer
Commanding General, AAF India Burma Sector
New Delhi, India

Dear Strat:

I have been back in Washington for a week now and I had hoped the C.C.S. would have reached a definite decision which would enable me to write a more concrete letter, but affairs are still in a state of flux in regards to operations in your theatre, so I'll outline things as they appear to me now.

The Command Set-up as regards to air activities of SEAC remain as outlined in my letter of December 3 to Adm. Mountbatten, i.e., the S.A.C. is appointed with command of all operations of all air forces in the SEAC except U.S. air transport with the understanding that:

(a) The integrity of groups be retained when integrating U.S. and R.A.F. air units.

(b) Administration control remains under U.S. commanders.

(c) The responsibility for supply remains with U.S. commanders.

(d) The S.A.C. accept responsibility for the defense of all U.S. ATC facilities in SEAC, and the CG U.S. AAF I.B. will keep the S.A.C. informed of ATC operations and requirements.

(e) Subsequent to the successful completion of TARZAN and BULLFROG, or when deemed appropriate, a re-examination of command and relationships will be made by the C.C.S. Any previous direction or approved action in conflict with the above is rescinded.

As you know BULLFROG has been indefinitely postponed and it looks as though TARZAN may follow suit at the next C.C.S. meeting. This might be called sufficient reason to call for a re-examination of the Command Relationships by the C.C.S., but I believe we should give S.A.C. every opportunity in the immediate future to work out his problems with our full support in spite of the arguments recently presented by you and Stilwell jointly.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs. 8 Nov & 20 June 1974
By LC; Date 9/23/76

SECRET

CC: General Arnold

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Regarding the ATC division as approved in C.C.S. 411/5, there is no reason to adhere to this if TARZAN is postponed, as the allocation of aircraft was predicated on TARZAN being implemented.

The 14th Air Force, assuming TARZAN is postponed, should receive much of the benefit of the increased "hump" lift and I know you will do all you can to help them out, particularly with regard to the 341st Group, concerning the transfer of which there was no alternative. Chennault should also be able to maintain the balance of his Composite Wing with the increased tonnage.

G.M.D. in reply to the telegram sent from SEXTANT, has asked for a large loan (Lend-Lease), doubling of the ATC lift, doubling of the 14th and Chinese Air Forces, postponement of the X Forces advance until after the next monsoon, and two billion dollars Chinese for construction of the Chengtu airfields. Based on 100 to 1 this means 20 million dollars or four million per airfield which is not unreasonable from here, but I would like to have your opinion on this.

The President cabled G.M.D. on December 20 briefly as follows:

(a) The major contribution we can make is to drive a land route across Burma to China this dry season.

(b) Chennault is still so limited we must improve communications before further increasing air forces in China.

(c) The effect of the Chengtu operation should do much to brighten the morale of both our nations.

(d) The ATC goal is 12,000 tons per month provided there are no diversions of ATC aircraft.

(e) My staff is planning the overall defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time before the war in Europe is ended.

(f) The financial matters will be made the subjects of a later message.

MATTERHORN is of course one of the things constantly in my mind as well as the President's, and everything must be done to make a go of it. Due to the necessity of sending all available P-51's to escort duty in U.K., we can only support the 311th Group in the 10th Air Force and one squadron of Chennaults with P-51B's. The rest of the P-40's in the 10th and 14th Air Forces will be converted to P-47's by attrition replace-

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: LC; Date 1/23/K

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Gen. Stratemeyer Page #3

ments. It is also necessary to convert the two fighter groups from North Africa to P-47's which will practically be doubling the planned maintenance tonnage for them in Chengtu; so if you see fit, later on, to exchange the 311th Group for one of the Chengtu P-47 groups, it will increase the bombing ability of the VLR's.

I notice that you have made other plans regarding Bill Welsh, so no further action will be taken on the matter. Kuter tells me that he has thoroughly investigated the possibilities of your request for the allotment of grades outlined in your memorandum of 29 November and has been assured by the Air Staff that it is impossible to provide them within the present AAF troop basis.

I fully realize how much you need them as well as lots of other things but, as you saw at SEXTANT, the emphasis is still on the other foot, so lets hope it won't be too long before we can send you more than you can handle.

In the meantime, keep up the good work which is well appreciated.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/21/76

SECRET

Air Ab 384 (24)

DECLASSIFIED

December 27, 1943.

Receipt is acknowledged of a SECRET letter to Gen. Stratemeyer from Gen. Arnold dtd 12/27/43.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Please accomplish and return to:

General H. H. Arnold
Room 3 E 1012, Pentagon Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jun & 20 June 1974
By [redacted] LC; Date 1/23/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

A.P.O. 885,
24 December 1943.

Dear General Arnold,

In my letter of 17 December to you, reporting on developments of interest during the last six weeks, I referred to certain problems incident to the organization, Eastern Air Command. Thinking you would be interested, I am inclosing a copy of a memorandum to Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, dated 14 December 1943, a copy of his reply, 20th December 1943, and a copy of General Orders Number 1, Headquarters, Eastern Air Command, dated 15 December 1943.

Sincerely,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:
Incl 1 - Memo (14-12-43) fr. Gen. Stratemeyer to ACM Peirse.
Incl 2 - Ltr (20-12-43) fr. ACM Peirse to Gen. Stratemeyer.
Incl 3 - GO 1 (15-12-43), Hq. Eastern Air Command.

General H. H. Arnold,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

1/8/44

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces
7 Dec. 43 ..... mb
Date Initials

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jul. & 20 June 1974
By: Air/AW LC, Date 9/23/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFABI
7 December 1943

File
mal

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GILES:

Subject: Japanese Gas Attacks Against the Chinese.

1. No reliable confirmation exists concerning the use of lethal gas by the Japanese against Chinese military or civilian personnel.

2. Chemical Warfare Service has cabled General Stilwell 6 December 1943 requesting that complete facts be secured and forwarded at once covering the following for both recent and any future incidents:

a. location of gas attacks;

b. dates;

c. types of chemicals used;

d. total casualties.

Chemical analysis of samples have been requested together with any captured documents or orders directing the use of gas by the Japanese authorities.

3. Chemical Warfare Service has advised General Stilwell that if he does not have a qualified officer on his staff to investigate the matter, two competent officers will be sent to him.

Clayton Bissell

CLAYTON BISSELL
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

Ass 384 (23)

File
SK
12/10/43

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

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~~SECRET~~

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DEC 8 '83 AM

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AH/AO LC, Date 9/23/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 23 AUG 1943

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, Army Air Forces

SUBJECT: Possibilities of the Appearance of New and Effective German Defenses Against Heavy Bomber Daylight Operations.

1. Indications received in recent Operations Reports from the European and Mediterranean theatres suggest that serious consideration should be given to the possibility that the Germans have made real progress in developing new defenses against our heavy bomber daylight attacks, and that these may soon be brought to bear against us in force.

2. The two new developments, concerning which sporadic evidence has been received, have been air to air bombing and the employment by German fighters of a rocket gun. The first of these has been rather frequently employed but with only moderate, and to date unalarming, success. Reports of the use of rocket guns have been less frequent, and identification to date has not been conclusive. On one occasion, however, over Germany, it was reported that German fighters flew out of range of the B-17's and fired at them successfully with heavy projectiles that produced a larger than normal flash.

3. In the B-17 attack on Foggia, 19 July, 5 B-17's were shot down and the cable states that these losses were due to bombs dropped by fighters and to large projectiles also fired by fighters. The same cable also states that in the attack on Foggia, on 16 August, by B-24's of the 9th Air Force, the attacking aircraft had a similar experience and lost 8. It was reported that an investigation was in progress.

4. In the New York times on 21 August there was a report that Goebbels had broadcast to the German people that a new weapon had been developed that would soon give them relief from air attacks and that every effort was being made to secure maximum production of these new weapons.

5. While the threat of new weapons has been a recognized element in German propaganda, the appearance of this item in conjunction with our recent reports from the combat theatres suggests that the Goebbels claim should not be discarded as sheer propaganda.

21

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED 23 AUG 1943

Possibilities of the Appearance of New and Effective German Defenses Against Heavy Bomber Daylight Operations. Continued

6. The possibility should therefore be considered that the Germans have made substantial progress in developing either the technique for air to air bombing or the long range rocket gun on fighters, or both, to a point where they may soon appear on a large and effective scale. Their use to date may well have been of a testing and experimental character under combat conditions. The smart policy for the Germans to adopt would be to refrain from using these new weapons regularly until they had sufficient aircraft equipped with these devices to throw them into combat on a large scale; in other words, avoid the mistake made by the British in the last war in the premature employment of their tanks.

7. A Press interview with Major John C. Egan, published in the New York Times, 23 August, describing his experiences on the Regensburg mission, suggests that the heavy losses experienced on that mission may have been the result of a large-scale introduction of rocket-equipped enemy aircraft. Major Egan is reported to have said that the Germans dropped aerial bombs on our formation and attacked with large twin engine planes which came within 2500 yards of the formation and fired rockets at them. Both of his wing men were shot down. No cables have been received describing these tactics, other than the one referred to above, in connection with the attacks on Foggia.

8. Careful scrutiny of German tactics and anti-bomber operations for the next few weeks is essential. In addition, it is believed that every effort should be expended toward the development of the weapons, tactics, and technique necessary to defend our heavy bomber formations from enemy planes at a distance up to 2500 yards.

A. W. BROCK, JR.
Colonel, G. S. C.
Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence.

DISTRIBUTION:

AC/AS, Plans
AC/AS, OCR
AC/AS, MMD
AC/SG-4, WDGS, New Weapons Branch

File
GK
7/30/43

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Air As 384 (21)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] C. Date 9/23/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Responsibilities and Authority of Base Commanders.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Management Control. 2/3/43

Deputy Chief of Air Staff. 1

TJH/eva/6371

1. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, has directed that the Army Air Forces conduct an investigation to determine if base commanders have sufficient control and authority to stop Air Force groups and squadrons at some place along the ferry route and to relieve the commander of such units if he lacks proper command ability and leadership qualities.

2. It is desired that you study the Air Forces' organization and determine the responsibilities and authority of base commanders, particularly those along the Air Transport Command routes, submitting your findings to this Headquarters.

Dispatched
FEB 4 1943
AAG

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/20/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Cablegrams No. 448, 391 and 4667.

TO: General Stratemeyer

DATE 1/7/43

FROM: General Arnold

COMMENT NO. 1

It is desired that Colonel Maxwell, Commanding the Gunnery School at Panama City, be given a Heavy Bombardment Command.

Cablegram No. 448 from Eisenhower (Doolittle) indicates the necessity for reorganizing his command into 4 Service Area Commands under the 12th Air Force Service Command. I see no reason why this should be sent back here - he should have taken care of it himself and then told us about it. 384 (17)

Cablegram No. 391 from Eisenhower (Doolittle) states that of the 24 photo reconnaissance planes originally available in the 3rd Photographic Group, only 11 are available now and they ask for 100% replacement. Information is desired as to when the replacement planes will be shipped. 452.1 africa (11)

Cablegram No. 4667 from Brereton states that he needs 22 complete groups to bring his Heavy Group up to the minimum operating strength. I cannot understand this in view of the fact that, in my opinion, he had ample crews for the 2 Heavy Groups. Brereton further states that 11 crews per month will be required to relieve combat crews after 50 hours operational flying. I cannot understand why in this theatre it is considered necessary to relieve the crews after only 50 hours while in other theatres 250 or 300 hours are flown before being relieved. I believe a cablegram asking for clarification should be sent at once.

384 (17)

H.H.A.

Action taken by separate R & R's

J.E.S.

320.2 [illegible] (8)

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PAGE ____

3-1109 A.F.

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DOD Dir.
9 June & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/74

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Cablegram No. 448.

Director of Military Requirements 1/7/43

General Stratemeyer 1

GES/hd

1. I quote the following comment from General Arnold for your information:

"Cablegram No. 448 from Eisenhower (Doolittle) indicates the necessity for reorganizing his command into 4 Service Area Commands under the 12th Air Force Service Command. I see no reason why this should be sent back here - he should have taken care of it himself and then told us about it."

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

cc- Program Planning

Dispatched
JAN 7 1943
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Miss Ingram
air [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: A/a/AD LC; Date: 7/23/74

DECLASSIFIED

africa

MEMORANDUM for General Arnold.

(Through Director of Military Requirements, AAF)

Subject: Cable No. 2487 from London to AGWAR, December 19, 1942.

1. Cable received the morning of the 23rd. Immediate contact was made with General Lentz, G-3, Army Ground Forces, and the Director of Air Defense. General McNair had already seen the cable and OPD was holding a conference at the time with representatives of Army Ground Forces, Lt. Colonels Totten and Giffin of Air Defense, and G-3. General McNair believes shortage of equipment is causing the deficiency.

2. In October, 1942, I sent a letter for you to Army Ground Forces looking toward remedy of anti-aircraft deficiencies as reported from maneuvers. The joint Air Support Board, recently adjourned, took cognizance of this and General McNair recommended the umpire system on maneuvers be improved for better assessment of casualties from air attacks on Ground Forces and from anti-aircraft fire on airplanes. We will continue close liaison with Army Ground Forces to achieve this result.

3. The Army Ground Forces are taking the following action:

a. Increasing organic weapons in new T/O's.

b. Providing ring mounts on heavy and 3/4 ton trucks. (Heavy motor equipment was not in the initial convoy.)

c. Providing pedestal mounts on 3/4 ton trucks.

d. Providing an improved ground mount for the .50 caliber machine guns.

4. OPD has cabled General Eisenhower, offering additional anti-aircraft in such quantity as he feels necessary from a shipping standpoint. To date, no reply has been received.

12/31/42
Gen Strategy
H.H.A.

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SAS 384 (16)

SAS 384 (16)

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5. The Director of Air Defense has noted in his Diary the results of the OPD conference, namely, to stimulate additional training of ground troops in anti-aircraft fire and to offer General Eisenhower additional anti-aircraft machine gun units.

6. This problem ties in definitely with our airdrome security battalion, which Air Defense has been working on for some time. It is considered doctrine that the Ground Forces secure the Air Force base airdrome areas. On the other hand, the Ground Forces apparently depend too much on the Air Forces for security from air attack. This was pointed out at a conference with the Ground Forces, and it is believed they will continue to take action to increase their own ability to fight back against air attack. Our program at the same time must be to provide greater airdrome security for our own units under Air Forces control. The airdrome security battalion should serve a two-fold purpose:

a. To furnish initial airdrome protection against ground attack or sabotage, pending arrival of ground reinforcements; and

b. To guard against air attack on our airdromes.

The present organization is not able to completely meet these missions. A test of the airdrome security battalion was recently held at Orlando. Air Defense is now processing a Board Report as a result of this test. The defense against air attack provided by such a unit must necessarily be backed up by the use of all available men and weapons.

7. In conclusion, I believe one of the main deficiencies in the Tunis-Bizerte area was lack of a suitable AWS with airdrome security elements. Corrective action had been initiated by Air Defense and provision for more adequate air defense is en route to North Africa. General Saville will undoubtedly have further recommendations to make on his return. I believe the demand for an air umbrella will diminish as our ground troops gain experience, as a more adequate air defense system becomes operative, and as our air offensive assumes sizeable proportions.

Abt.
Cable 2487

D. M. SCHLATTER,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director of Air Support.

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Air AG 354 (16)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/25/74

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6. AFDMR AFCAS 12-26

MEG:vk 3020

1. The comments of the Director of Air Support, contained in Item 3, are concurred in.

2. A suggested reply to Colonel Reeves is attached hereto.

DAVENPORT JOHNSON,
Major General, U. S. Army.

Incls. 2
Ltr fr Col Reeves, 12-6-42, w/5 charts
Ltr to Col Reeves (Proposed ltr)

MAL/imm 5265

7 AFDAS AFDMR 12-30

General Hanley has noted the attached and directs that the letter prepared by you be dispatched over General Johnson's signature as Director of Military Requirements.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incls.
n.c.

Dispatched
DEC 31 1974
AAG

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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MAL/imm 5265

7 AFDAS AFDMR 12-30

General Hanley has noted the attached and directs that the letter prepared by you be dispatched over General Johnson's signature as Director of Military Requirements.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Dispatched
DEC 30 1942
AAG

Incls.
n.c.

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DOD Ltr.
8 Feb. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

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Air Support Aviation

WEH:JT 5246

1 AFCAS AFDMR 1942
12-9

For your information and comment.

Dispatched
DEC 10 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Ltr 12-6-42 fr
Col Dache Reeves 3rd AF

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LG; Date: 7/23/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

December 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General I. H. Edwards,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
Room 3A 882, Pentagon Building.

Colonel Reeves asked me to send this to you. It has not been previously studied by anyone, and I am sending it simply because Colonel Reeves asked me to do so.

1 Incl.
Cy ltr 12-6-42 w/
Incl, subj "Air Support
Aviation"

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, Air Staff

Dispatched
DEC 11 1942
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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ala/MD LC; Date 9/23/74

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Reorganization of Air Support Commands.

WEH:cmc 5246

B. AFCAS AFACT 1942
12-12

1. For action necessary to effect the recommendations contained in attached memo for Chief of the Air Staff.

2. The balance of the I and IV Support Commands following their reduction will be used to augment the II and III Air Support Commands.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl: n/c

Dispatched
DEC 14 1942
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DOD Dir.
By [illegible] NC, Date 9/25/74

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2. AFRAS AFCAS 12/9 1. Returned as per phone conversation. The II and III Air Support Commands belong to the Second and Third Air Forces as do the IV and I Support Commands, respectively. Action with respect to absorbtion of personnel and duties is properly an Air Force function and there is not envisaged in this paper any transfer between Air Forces. The project has been discussed with General Stratemeyer, General Olds, and has received their verbal concurrence. It is believed recommendations as to the II and III Support Commands is not properly a part of this paper.

B. M. SCHLATTER
Colonel, Air Corps

1 Incl.
M/s

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/23/74

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Reorganization of Air Support Commands

WEH:JT 5246

1 AFCAS AFRAS 1942 12-8

1. General Hanley assumes that under this plan the II and III Air Support Commands will absorb the personnel of the I and IV Air Support Commands which will remain following the reduction of the latter two Commands.

2. This plan, in general, is favorably considered; however, to make a complete study, the II and III Air Support Commands should be included in Section II, "Recommendations".

Dispatched
DEC 8 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Memo fr Dir Air
Support 12-4-42

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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DOD Dir.
By: [illegible] I.C. Date 9/23/76

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AAF Space Requirements in Washington

1. AFDAS AFDMC 1942 10-28

1. The Deputy Chief of Staff at the General Council Meeting on October 26, 1942, stated that he could see no reason for the Troop Carrier Command, very little for the Air Service Command, and not much reason for the Army Transport Command to be stationed in Washington.

2. It is desired that you prepare a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff containing a justification for the presence of these Commands in Washington, and inclose a report on the number of personnel and the amount of space assigned to them.

3. It is requested that your report be in this office not later than noon, October 29th.

384 (11)

Dispatched
OCT 28 1942
AAG

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T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Cpy: General Stratemeyer

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Ari ar 384 (11) Mr Gray

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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Position Vacancy for General Officer

WHM:JT 5246

1 AFCAS AFAAP 1942
10-26

For your information.

Dispatched
OCT 27 1942
AAG

File

1 Incl.
Memo same subj
10-24 fr G-1

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/23/74

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

October 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Subject: Position Vacancy for General Officer

384 (10)

1. It is recommended that a position vacancy be authorized for one (1) brigadier general to command the Air Service Command for the Port of New York.

2. The Air Service Command activities in the vicinity of the Port of New York include Intransit Depot No. 5, the Newark Airport, and United Nations Depots Nos. 1 and 8.

3. The movement of Air Forces supplies and equipment through this port area is of maximum importance to the successful operation of Air Forces overseas and consequently it is essential that the highest possible degree of coordination of all Air Service Command activities and with the Commander of the Port and other SOS officers be achieved.

4. The monthly rate of movement of Air Forces supplies through the United Nations Depots in the New York Port area has recently approximated 3,000,000 pounds. The approximate monthly rate of movement through the Newark Intransit Depot is 24,000,000 pounds. There is substantial movement through the Newark Air Intransit Deppt. It is expected that these monthly movements will materially increase. There is at present on hand for early movement to Russia one single item of approximately 4,000,000 pounds.

5. There is at present no single officer of adequate grade who is charged with the duty and responsibility of coordinating all Air Service Command activities in this port area but reliance is necessarily placed on the cooperation of the activities' commanders, the Port Air Officer, and SOS officers to accomplish the desired results.

6. In view of the above and of the vital importance of a coordinated effort between the Air Service Command and the Port Commander, who is a general officer, it is recommended that this Command be authorized the assignment of an officer of general officer grade t command all Air Service Command activities in the Newark-New York area.

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7. The responsibilities to the Air Service Command are to see that sufficient space is made available for shipment of Army Air Forces Material through the port with the least practicable delay. Since this port serves the largest theater of operation, this is a most important assignment. The responsibilities to the Port Commander are to act as a member of a staff and assist in planning of movements through that port. The assignment is not one which involves so much the direct command of a great number of people or a great property responsibility, but of indirect responsibility by coordination with the Port authorities and Commander for the movement of equipment through the port. Since the movement of such equipment requires lateral coordination rather than vertical direction, on account of the Army Air Forces not being under the U. S. Army Services of Supply, it is believed that this assignment is fully justified.

For the Commanding General:

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
OCT 16 1942
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DOD ltrs.
Dtd. 20 June 1974
By AG/AS LC; Date 9/23/74

SECRET CLASSIFIED

Command of Alaskan Theater

3373
GES:nl

1. AFCAS Colonel 10-9
Cabell,
Advisory
Council

1. General Arnold has stated that the enclosed paper will be held in your file for future use, if desired.

2. The other problem of command which he has presented to the Chief of Staff overshadows this paper.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of Air Staff

Incl: Memo to C/S
from Gen Arnold
10-8-42.
Incl. A,B,C.

Dispatched
OCT 12 1942
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Mr. Gray

Air AS 384 (9)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Feb. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

AFAAP
JHMcC/ab

October 14, 1942

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Subject: Position Vacancy for General Officer

1. It is recommended that a position vacancy be authorized for one (1) brigadier general to command the Civilian School Area, Technical Training Command, New York.

2. This District includes 22 schools, 6,356 students, 47 officers and 123 enlisted men. A detailed statement of the schools included in the Area is set forth in Tab "A". The Table of Organization for the Hq. and Hq. Sq. Civilian Schools, Army Air Forces Technical Training Command is included at Tab "B".

For the commanding General:

(Signed)

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
OCT 14 1942
AAG

written
10/10/42

Incls.
Tabs "A" and "B".

Hq. Army Air Forces
OC. 10 1942
AAG Received

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Air AS 384 (8)

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Met. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

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DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

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Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command

WEE:JT 5265

4 AFGAS [illegible] 1942 9-15 See action directed by General Kuter on enclosure.

Incl. n/c WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.

WEE:JT 5265

6 AFGAS File 1942 9-29 Noted.

Incl. n/c WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.

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ci 9/30/42

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command

SECRET DECLASSIFIED 23:dmr 78485

2. AFRDB AFACT 1942 8/29

1. It is thought reasonable to assume that an enemy sea-borne attack in force on the East Coast of the United States would be detected a considerable time ahead of its arrival, whereas it is conceivable that such an attack could be made on the West Coast with probably little warning. Therefore, this office offers the following comments:

a. Since an attack on the West Coast, made with little chance for redisposition of defending forces inthe United States, might considerably disrupt bomber production, it is thought that a reasonable bombardment strength mush be maintained actually on that coast and that the reduction in danger to bom er production justifies andy momentary diversion of aircraft presently allocated elsewhere but now needed for a West Coast defense force.

b. Pending obtaining sufficient bombardment aircraft for more adequate defense of the East Coast, it is thought that the activities and equipment of the 1st Air Force should normally be limited to those incident to reconnaissance and anti-submarine functions.

c/ Also pending the ability to provide for more specific eastern defense, it is believed that bombardment forces can be moved to the East Coast in sufficient time to meet any real attack whichmight develop meanwhile.

d. As a ppssible additional defense measure, it is thought that plans should be made for the utilization of any forces which might be in the Concentration Area at any time when such forces might be required to supplement those otherwise available.

F. L. ANDERSON, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps

Incl/ n/c

File 9/28/42

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
000 Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/23/74

copy

Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command

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1 AFAEP AFCAS 1942 thru 8/12 AFACT

1. Nonconcurrence on the attached memorandum for the Chief of the Air Staff, subject: "Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command", is hereby expressed, for the following reasons:

a. For planning as well as operational command purposes it is believed the 1st Bomber Command is the only available logically selected organizaation to assume responsibility for bomber operations, as part of the Air striking force to support the Eastern Defense Command. Bomber groups from time to time in the Bolero Concentration Area should be, and are, available to be placedunder operational control of the 1st Bomber Command in the event of invasion attempt on our East Coast. It is believed appropriate that this fact be brought to the attention of the Commanding General, First Air Force, so that his plans for the Air Defense of the East Coast will be kept currently modified accordingly.

b. The Commander of the Bolero Concentrat on Area has a purely administrative function, is organized accordingly, and should not be charged with tactical planning or operations.

c. Units moving to Bolero are not expected to remain in the Concentration Area longer than approximately two weeks. If these units were charged with the responsibility suggested, there would be no continuity of planning and command such as is required for efficient tactical operations.

d. There is no uniformity of the number or types of groups in the Bolero Concentration Area.

No Medium Bomber Squadrons are scheduled to move to Bolero in August, November or December 1942, or in February 1943. No Heavy Bomber Groups in December 1942, or March 1943, and only one in November 1942.

O. A. A.
C/AFAEP

Incl:
Memo to CAS
subj. as abv.

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A-1 AS
Intel. S.
A-3 AS
A-4 AS
Plans AS
Insp. AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Stat. Fi.
Leg. Fi.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

AFRDE
26:ab
Rm 4320-D
Ext. 72936
Date 8/10/42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command.

I. Discussion.

1. The 1st Bomber Command is now organized, equipped, and operating as an anti-submarine Force.

2. The equipment assigned the 1st Bomber Command, consisting primarily of ASV equipped B-18, A-29, and B-34 type airplanes, is not operational for use as a striking force in defense of the East Coast.

3. Units destined for Bolero are concentrated for various periods of time before departure in the North East. These units are operational.

II. Action Recommended.

1. That the 1st Bomber Command's functions in the defense of the East Coast be limited to reconnaissance and antisubmarine measures.

2. That a plan be prepared to use the units in the Bolero Concentration Area as a striking force for the defense of the East Coast in the event such should be required.

III. Concurrences.

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Air CS 384 (6)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/Ar LC; Date 9/23/74

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2 AFRDB AFACT 1942 8/29 23:dmr 72485

1. It is thought reasonable to assume that an enemy sea-borne attack in force on the East Coast of the United States would be detected a considerable time ahead of its arrival, whereas it is conveivable that such an attack could be made on the West Coast with probably little warning. Therefore, this office offers the following comments:

a. Since an attack on the West Coast, made with little chance for redisposition of defending forces in the United States, might considerably disrupt bomber production, it is thought that a reasonable bombardment strength must be maintained actually on that coast and that the reduction in danger to bomber production justifies any momentary diversion of aircraft presently allocated elsewhere but now needed for a West Coast defense force.

b. Pending obtaining sufficient bombardment aircraft for more adequate defense of the East Coast, it is thought that the activities and equipment of the 1st Air Force should normally be limited to those incident to reconnaissance and anti-submarine functions.

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Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command

2 AFRDB AFACT 1942
(continued) 8/29

c. Also pending the ability to provide for more specific eastern defense, it is believed that bombardment forces can be moved to the East Coast in sufficient time to meet any real attack which might develope meanwhile.

d. As a possible additional defense measure, it is thought that plans should be made for the utilization of any forces which might be in the Concentration Area at any time when such forces might be required to supplement those otherwise available.

F. L. ANDERSON, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps

Incl. n/c

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3 AFACT AFCAS 1942
9/12

WEB:vme 6110

1. In view of the limited resources available, this Division believes the matter of the defense of the East and West coasts must be handled on a month to month basis.

2. General Arnold has recently approved a chart setting up the flow of aircraft to all theaters on the basis of existing commitments and putting into effect this flow appears to promise satisfactory, compromise results.

3. This Division does not concur in attached memorandum and favors no change in plans as they are now set up.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl. n/c

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Au as 384 (6)

AFRDB
26:ob
Rm 4320-D
Ext. 72936
Date 8/10/42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

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I. Discussion.

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II. Action Recommended.

1. That the 1st Bomber Command's functions in the defense of the East Coast be limited to reconnaissance and antisubmarine measures. "LSK"

2. That A-3 a plan be prepared to use the units in the Bolero-WS Concentration Area as a striking force for the defense of the East Coast in the event such should be required.

III. Concurrences.

(Sgd) L S Kuter

AFACT
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AG/NW LC; Date 9/23/74

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Striking Force for Eastern Defense Command

WEH:JT 5265

4 AFCAS AFACS 1942 9-15 See action directed by General Euter on enclosure.

Dispatched
SEP 16 1942
AAG

Incl.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

384 (6)

File
cc 9/16/42

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AG 384 (6)

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000 Hrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DECLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Tactical Command of Army Air Units.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG	Col. Sorensen, Rm 2000 Col. Anderson, Rm. 2113 Col. Norstad, Rm 2131 IN TURN	1942 7-24	To note and return. 1 Incl.- OPD 384 (7-16-42) w/allied papers. JBC J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. JBC:jmb
2	AFABI	Colonel Anderson Rm 2113	7/25	Noted. Incl. n/c EPS E.P.S. C/A-2 AFABI EPS:mep
3.	AFAEP	Col. Norstad, Rm 2131	7/27	Noted. Incl. n/c OAA A/AFAEP AFAEP OAA/jw
4	Col. Norstad	AFMAG Hq. Army Air Forces JUL 20 1942 AAG RECEIVED	7/29	Noted. 1 Incl.- No change. L. N.

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(Do not use reverse side) F-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

7/29/42 File JBC

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By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/74

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4 Col. AFMAG 7/29 Noted.
Norstad
Eq. Army Air Forces
JUL 2[illegible] 1942 1 Incl.- L. N.
AAG RECEIVED No change.

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Air AD 384 (5)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 384 (7-16-42) July 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Tactical Command of Army Air Units.

1. General Harmon's memorandum raises the general issue of unity of command. He specifically points out the difficulties invariably experienced by Army Commanders under the Navy's interpretation of the principle of unity of command.

2. We may as well face the issue in this connection. The Army and Navy have been at loggerheads over this question for 20 years and no solution satisfactory to both has yet been evolved. Such agreements as have been reached were and are essentially compromises which have completely suited neither service.

3. Unity of command to be effective, must start at the top. Some one individual of the military services must have the authority to coordinate the activities of both the Army and the Navy.

4. Accordingly, until such a condition is feasible, we may as well admit the futility of adjusting local situations and disagreements between the Army and the Navy with respect to unity of command.

5. In view of the above, I do not believe it would be wise to endeavor to interpret in specific terms, the existing directive to General Harmon as Commander of the U. S. Army Forces in the South Pacific.

Hq. Army Air Forces
JUL 22 1942
AAG Received

Thos T Handy
THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Memo to AC/S, OPD
frm CG,AAF, 7/16/42
w/incl. as listed

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

Noted AWD

Noted by Gen. Stratemeyer 23/7/42 [illegible]

Received JUL 21 1942 A
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FR. OCAC 879279

D-810 Courier service

Air OD 384 (5)

OPD 384 (7-16-42) July 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Tactical Command of Army Air Units.

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THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Memo to AC/S, OPD
frm CG,AAF, 7/16/42
w/incl. as listed

Copy to accompany

Ai AD 384 (5)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Gen Streett.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPD:

Subject: Tactical Command of Army Air Units

In connection with the attached, I am in accord with General Harmon's recommendations and suggestions.

I believe to get the best results from forces available, some change, such as outlined in the attached or of a similar nature should be secured, unless it is possible to get an interpretation of the existing directive which will accomplish the same results.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl:
Memo for CG/AAF, 7/15/42 frm
Gen. Harmon re above subject
with preliminary draft for
study purposes also submitted
by Gen. Harmon.

IIII 17 A.M.
7-17-42
IN
OPD. WDGS

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Tactical Command of Army Air Units

1. Initially I had planned to submit to you a longer and more comprehensive memorandum on this subject. In the interests of brevity and because of my early departure, I have found it necessary to abbreviate and to correlate my discussion with a specific case. The original draft of my memorandum I have turned over to Major Gaylord who has in recent days made a rather exhaustive study of this subject in consultation with Colonels Norstad, Anderson and Sorensen, and has investigated and correlated considerable data relative thereto.

2. Under my directive of July 7 I am designated as Commanding General Army Forces South Pacific Area, under the Naval Commander of the South Pacific Area. Further, I am directed to assist the Commander of South Pacific in the preparation and execution of plans for the employment of Army Forces in that area. I am using this just as an illustration in its relation to basic principles involved, and not with the specific view of upsetting present plans for this area.

3. Under the joint directive of July 2 for operations in the Southwest Pacific Area appears under:

> "GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. (c) Direct Command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks."

4. The question should be asked as to whether the joint directive assumes the placing of "direct command of the tactical operations" of Naval Forces under the Naval Commander, and "direct command of the tactical operations" of the Army Air Forces under the Commanding General.

FOR VICTORY
BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

5. This matter of tactical control of Army Forces by Army Command should be confirmed, first because it is essential to the proper application of unity of command, and further because the recent trend of tactical control leaves grave concern in the minds of Army Air Commanders as to the views that may be held in this regard by the Navy.

6. The application of unity of command in the Midway action resulted in direct tactical control of Air Force units by a Naval officer. In the opinion of experienced Air Force officers this condition did not fully exploit the capabilities of the Air Force units.

7. While unity of command is a sound principle, it is subject to such abuses that its purpose is defeated under circumstances tending to curtail the initiative and freedom of action of coordinate forces; thus failing to exploit properly those forces within their powers and limitations.

8. The Air Force Commanders are especially trained to appreciate the peculiar powers and limitations of the Air Arm, and are therefore particularly suited to exercise tactical command in order to realize the maximum performance of the units involved.

9. For the Navy to impose direct command of tactical operations in echelons lower than the Army Air Commander of the area opens the door to possible conflict in doctrine and operational procedure such as to destroy confidence and efficiency.

10. The Navy can no more appraise Army capabilities, training, and personnel than can the Army shoulder a like responsibility in Naval affairs.

11. While I am not advocating the revocation of the principle enunciated in paragraph (c) as quoted in paragraph 3 above, I am proposing that the same principle be applicable to Army Air Forces serving with the Navy under the principle of unity of command, that is, direct command of the tactical operations of Army Air Forces will remain with the Army Commander throughout the conduct of operations.

12. Attached is a copy of the original draft of my first memo which contains some background on this subject, but is definitely subject to review and revision.

M. F. HARMON
Major General, U. S. Army.

Ala AD 384 (5)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

While unity of command is theoretically a sound principle, it is subject to such abuses that its purpose is defeated under circumstances tending to curtail the initiative and freedom of action of co-ordinate forces; thus failing to properly exploit those forces within their powers and limitations.

Unity of command properly applied should go no further than to assign overall tasks to such forces and leave the control of their operations in the hands of their respective commanders.

Specifically to superinpose Naval Air Command over Army Air Forces in echelons lower than the supreme commander of a theater or an area opens the door to determination of doctrine and operational procedure to a Naval Commander unfamiliar with and untrained in the doctrine of employment and operational procedure of such forces, and inevitably results in stifling of initiative and misdirection of effort.

One objectionable result is that the higher commanders of Air Forces whose life training has been along these lines are practically shelved, their knowledge and experience not used to maximum advantage for the culminating effort.

Another objection is that the morale, and consequently the efficiency, of Air Forces is seriously affected because of their knowledge that their commanders under whom they have worked and trained

for years are not leading them - that leadership has been turned over to people they do not know and in whom they cannot have the same confidence. In addition the Air Force Commanders know their own subordinates, their strengths and weaknesses, and are best prepared to get the maximum performance from their commands.

If unity of command were exercised in such manner as to give to the Army Commanders full command and operation control of all Air Force units; being responsible directly and only to the Theater or other supreme commanders, most of the objections incident to Naval procedure in the exercise of Unity of Command would disappear.

Should MacArthur be given an augmented Naval force to serve under his command for a particular operation he would undoubtedly charge the Naval Commander, under the operational plan, with a specific series of tasks and leave to him the full execution of his missions and the full command of his forces. This practice is not followed by the Navy in similar cases.

In Hawaiian Manoeuvers in 1937 an Army Bombardment Squadron attached to Naval Air Command was, against the advise of the Army Group Commander, several times needlessly alerted and on one occasion held an air alert for over four hours; thus seriously reducing the effectiveness of a major striking unit.

Naval operational control of Army Air Forces on both the East and West Coasts and in Alaska since Pearl Harbor has been characterized in many instances by a lack of knowledge of, or desire to observe sound doctrine of employment and tinged with petty annoyances of operational procedure through ignorance or faulty exercise of command.

The truth of the matter is that Naval officers do not possess the background of knowledge and experience that qualify them to assume operational control of Army Air Forces any more than would an Air Force officer be qualified to exercise operational control of a task force of carriers, cruisers and destroyers.

A recent example is afforded by the Midway action where Army bomber Striking Force was operated not under the direct command of Emmons or even Tinker, but under a subordinate Naval aviation commander.

It is such abuse of the powers conferred under the principle of Unity of Command that gives concern to the Army lest the years of indoctrination, training and effort be not fully and effectively applied with maximum efficiency in the destruction of enemy forces and facilities.

A preliminary study of the Midway actions indicates that maximum use was not made of bombardment. Although the plan of the Navy Command was carefully thought out, and striking forces were not sent to the target until the mission had been carefully prepared by patrol reconnaissance. Nevertheless later in the action, perhaps through lack of understanding of Army capabilities and training, units were held on the ground when they were fully prepared to execute missions and when vulnerable targets were in close range.

In one instance in particular a flight of B-17's was held on the ground for several hours because the Navy Air Commander was afraid they might mistake friend for foe - altho these crews were trained in vessel identification and should have known the general fleet dispositions from the Navy. Had the command of Army Air Forces been under an Air Corps officer who was fully familiar with the composition and training of his

Lack of time has prevented my making a proper verification of these statements. [illegible]

crews and their capabilities of identification, it might well have resulted in greater confidence at such moment. This is simply a case where some chances must be taken if the full victory is to be secured - and the chances were very, very small.

With the exception of submarine activity, no element of the U.S. Fleet has yet been employed in major action in which surface forces, other than carrier, exercised any material influence on the action. Where proper employment of both Army Bombardment and Naval Aircraft has been planned, as at Midway, it is obvious that offensive action should be initiated by Army Bombardment and at proper range carried through later by joint use of carrier aircraft and land based Army Bombers.

At this time it is impossible to define exactly the damage inflicted by Army bombers as against carrier based air-planes together with the losses of each as the Navy has not as yet furnished exact times of carrier based missions. Without this information, it can not be properly estimated. It is to be noted that on June 3rd when the enemy was beyond the range of Naval combat aircraft that the B-17's were strategically employed. On June 4th when the enemy was within range of Naval combat types of planes reported ready for action at 1300 with the enemy in a favorable position, were held on the ground for some time. It was at this moment that the Naval carriers were engaged in attack.

From the very beginning of our entrance in the war, from the Philippines down to Australia and clockwise around the world to India, it has been the land based Army aircraft that have formed the "First line of Offence" -- the spear head of the attack of this nation.

No matter how large the Navy becomes, no matter how many carriers it builds, as long as Japan's dispositions and air strength do not deteriorate,

it cannot move forward to victory unaided. The way must be broken and blasted for it by the action of land based Army aircraft -- bombers and fighters, followed by supporting ground and Naval forces.

The past, and I regret to say the present, attitude of the Navy in regard to the development of a proper Army Air Force for the safeguarding of American National aims has been a "dog-in-the-manger" one. Some years ago the Navy endeavored to stifle development and production of long range heavy bombardment by advocating a restriction as to how far to seaward the Army Air Force might be permitted to operate. This and other measures

caused trouble and delay in the development of the long range bomber.

Before Pearl Harbor the Navy was strong in its avowal of its responsibilities for Coastal-Seaward reconnaissance and blocked Army efforts to create forces appropriate to this purpose. Since Pearl Harbor the big burden of this task has been performed by the Army, for the Navy and under Naval command.

An example in effect today may be cited in Alaska where Theater Command is vestedin the Navy while all the application of force against the enemy is being performed by Army Air Forces.

The Navy has not hesitated to adopt every possible means to "take-over" the reconnaissance and striking forces of the Army Air Force by negotiation for command control; by carefully regulated publicity; by imposition of restrictions; by infiltration into the land based bomber production program and by taking direct operational control of subordinate Air Force units under the guise of, but truly in violation of the spirit, of the principle of Unity of Command. There is a definitely formulated opinion in the minds of thinking Air Force officers that the Navy is not altruistic in this attitude - that it is a deliberately formulated and prosecuted campaign. That the Navy, belatedly appreciating the relegation of surface forces to a secondary role, is making its fight to take over Air Power. Why else should the Navy insist on prostituting Unity of Command by extending it to lowest echelons, endeavor to place restrictions on Air Force over-sea action, build up a land based bomber force of its own?

Now the Navy is endeavoring to build up a long range land based bombardment force of its own; and this is a foolish and wasteful duplication of a function the Army is fully capable of performing to the limit

of the Nation's production capacity in this arm.

The Navy, against the advise of many Army Air Force officers, has made a number of costly mistakes in its estimate of the situation and preparation for this conflict.

One, a blind faith in the value of the battleship.

Two, a lack of vision as to the number and characteristics of aircraft carriers that would be required and recognition of their obsolescence in the predictable future.

Three, a pathetic confidence in the suitability of the PBY type.

Four, a failure to appreciate the need for vastly larger numbers of submarines as opposed to the "need" for battleships. (The need for more submarines was stressed by a general of the Army at a critique in Hawaii in 1937).

Five, and from this one grew most of the others, - a failure to develop a "Sea-going" Navy around the carrier instead of a battleship, free of the embarrassments of land based echelons without which it could not operate; and prepared for high speed operations. The Air Corps Tactical School appreciated this and advocated its adoption many times to Senior Naval Officers as far back as 1935, but without result. Conference files and testimony of a number of officers is available in case substantiation is desired. See Gen. Kuter.

The Air Force had the vision and the initiative and the determination, in spite of Naval inertia and opposition, to create a long range effective striking force and would be remiss in its obligations, and endangering the safety of the Nation did it not insist on its obligation to command and direct the operational activities of that force.

Surface Navies have definitely lost the ability to exercise the prerogatives of Sea-power. Our own Navy was unable or unwilling to read the handwriting on the wall and has only fully appreciated this fact after the cumulative lessons of Crete, Malaya, the Mediterranean, Coral Sea and Midway.

In illustration a Senior Naval Air Officer at the Air Corps Tactical School forced a reprimand because the school enunciated the fact that power over the sea could no longer be exercised by the Battleship Navy.

This principle was well appreciated as far back as 1936 by the Air Corps Tactical School and was fully and specifically covered by lecture and conference, copies of which are here available in the office of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

As a consequence of all this, the Army Air Forces have for years been thinking in terms of the application of Air Power built around the long range bomber as the main striking force. The Air Force as a whole and its individual offices are thoroughly indoctrinated with this principle and trained in its application. On the other hand it is a principle new to the Navy, revolutionary in all its implications and applications; one which destroyes indoctrination based on hundreds of years of Naval tradition and experience; one to which the Naval officer must adjust himself and one whose import he is not qualified by precept, indoctrination or training to translate into the details of offensive employment.

The best interests of our National offensive effort will be served by concentrating the experience and talent of the Army Air Force on

the development, training and operational command of our land based air reconnaissance and striking forces while the Navy wholeheartedly devotes its effort to the development in highest efficiency of a highly mobile, high speed carrier - cruiser - destroyer - submarine fleet.

Basic principles, in effect as follows, should be approved by the J.C.S. for future control of operations:

a. That the operation of land based reconnaissance and bombardment aircraft be definitely determined an Army Air Force function.

b. That in the application of the principle of Unity of Command the Naval, or other, Commander exercise such authority directly thru the commander of the attached forces, whose right of command of his subordinate echelons shall not be infringed upon.

c. That where action against enemy forces is paramountly air action Unity of Command will be vested in the air commander.

In the event that negotiations with the Navy direct or thru the medium of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fail to obtain subscription to the above principle, it is urgently recommended that strong representation be made to the President for a basic decision.

Preliminary draft for study purpose.

Air AD 384 (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1954
By [illegible] LC Date 9/23/70

DECLASSIFIED

Tactical Command of Army Air Units.

JBC:jmb

384 (5)

1	AFWAG	Col. Sorensen, Rm 2000 Col. Anderson, Rm. 2113 Col. Norstad, Rm 2131 IN TURN	1942 7-24	To note and return. 1 Incl.- OPD 384 (7-16-42) w/allied papers.	J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Adm. A.G.

File
a 7/25/42

Dispatched
JUL 25 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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Per OD 384 (5)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jun. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/23/76

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Preparing the U. S. Bombardment Force for Its Contribution to the Defeat of Germany.

I. Discussion.

1. Bombardment aviation can perform effective day and night operations and destroy the vital German installations essential to her prosecution of the war. Successful bombardment operations may in themselves be decisive. In any event, such operations must precede a final land offensive.

2. Assumptions have been made that against German objectives:

a. Day bombardment is virtually impossible.

b. Night bombardment is ineffective.

These assumptions lean upon the precedent of failure - failure (it must be pointed out) in the operations of a foreign Air Force which has not had the opportunity of employing improved heavy bombers in any quantity; whose combat crews have been inadequately trained; and whose tactics and technique have been deficient.

The Air War Plans Division cannot subscribe to these assumptions.

History records many initial failures preceding successful and decisive accomplishment. Those who have believed in the ultimate success of their venture have not been wanting in the courage and confidence to meet and overcome disappointment and reverses. The security of the Nation is at stake. This is no time to discard one of the decisive means of winning the war until a full opportunity is taken to exploit it. We will not base our conclusions as to the effectiveness of a means and method for prosecuting the war upon initial British failure.

3. Effective bombardment attacks depend upon:

a. Adequate force in bombardment aircraft.
Comment: The industry should have this force created within two years at the most.

Air AS 384 (2)

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b. Technical superiority in aircraft.
Comment: Improved fire power and defensive armor, together with other technical improvements, are being incorporated in our aircraft.

c. Properly trained combat crews.
Comment: Steps are already being taken to train the bombardment combat crews in efficient handling of their equipment.

d. EFFICIENT METHODS OF OPERATIONS, VIZ: PROPERLY DEVELOPED TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE.
Comment: The rapid expansion which has faced the Army Air Forces during the past year and a half has prevented adequate thought being paid to the development of sound bombardment tactics and technique without which bombardment aviation can neither be efficiently nor effectively employed in modern war.

4. The Army Air Forces, as noted in par. 3 above, are meeting three of the requirements for efficient bombardment of Germany. The action essential to meet the fourth requirement has not been taken.

5. The key to tactical success is superior tactics. Superior equipment and personnel will be wasted if employed in accordance with inferior tactics. The noteworthy failure of British bombardment against Germany may be charged in a large part to failure to develop and employ proper tactics. (See Tabs A and B.)

6. Our American bombardment force established for operations against Germany must be provided with equipment and must be trained to handle it with the highest degree of efficiency. It must operate in accordance with tactical methods which are designed to meet and overcome the Nazi resistance.

7. Immediate action is demanded to develop the tactics and technique essential to driving home the bombardment attack against Germany.

8. For support of the position taken in this paper, see the Final Report of Bombing Board on Trip to England (Tab B).

II. Action Recommended.

The Chief of the Army Air Forces directs the Chief of the Air Staff to:

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1. Create a Bombardment Tactical Committee at once. The Committee will be charged with:

a. Making an exhaustive analysis of present and probable future pursuit, anti-aircraft, and related defenses of Germany.

b. Preparing a comprehensive doctrine on those tactics and technique required to overcome the German defenses and to drive home the American bombardment effort against Germany.

c. Recommending such improvements or developments in equipment and training as are essential to fulfilling the tactics and technique prescribed.

2. Compose the Bombardment Tactical Committee of at least seven officers as follows:

a. At least two Air Corps officers (one of which will be the Chairman) who have had wide practical experience in bombardment aviation, a comprehensive academic background, and a thorough appreciation of the subject in all of its ramifications.

b. One Air Corps officer versed in pursuit interceptor tactics, technique, and technical methods.

c. Two Air Corps officers trained respectively in meteorology and communications.

d. One Coast Artillery officer well trained in anti-aircraft artillery.

e. One Air Corps officer to function as Secretary of the Committee.

3. Relieve the Committee from all other duties and direct it to make, in the United States, as comprehensive a study of the problem as is possible from data available. Provide the Committee with office

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space and stenographic personnel.

4. Upon conclusion of such study to direct the Committee to proceed to England and complete the study and preparation of recommendations for the Bombardment Tactics and Technique required in successful attacks against Germany.

5. Provide the Committee with the funds necessary to enable essential clerical personnel to be hired in England, together with other requirements, such as office space, if essential.

H. L. GEORGE
Col. Air Corps
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-WPD

2 Incls.
Tab A: Development of Bombardment Tactics for Defeat of Germany.
Tab B: Final Report of Bombing Board on Trip to England, to A. C. of S., G-2, 12/17/41 (attached to original only)

Hq. Army Air Forces
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
							KNW				

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TAB A

DEVELOPMENT OF BOMBARDMENT TACTICS

FOR DEFEAT OF GERMANY

1. The defeat of Germany by active offensive is a matter of the first strategic importance under the present concept of the war. Whether or not ground invasion will be ultimately necessary for complete defeat of Germany, it is clear that successful offensive air force action must precede any other type of operation.

2. Success of an air force is dependent upon the success of its bombardment component. Pursuit operations may stave off defeat. Only by successful bombardment operations can the enemy be defeated.

3. Bombardment operations over the continent of Europe and the British Isles have permitted certain hasty assumptions to be made. They are: that successful day bombardment operations are impossible of accomplishment, and night bombardment operations are ineffective. Proponents of these assumptions are relying upon the precedent of failure without a comprehensive attempt to analyze the reasons therefor. An examination of the situation unfolds the following salient points:

a. Bombardment airplanes have been inferior to pursuit airplanes in defensive armament and armor.

b. Bombardment crews and units have not been trained adequately for the mission.

c. An adequate force of bombardment airplanes (with respect to Great Britain) has not been available.

d. Sound bombardment tactics and technique have not been used by the British.

4. Those deficiencies with respect to technical development of bombardment airplanes are being taken care of by improved and increased gun fire and by more adequate armor plate. The industry is turning out planes which

should within two years provide the force of the desired strength.

5. Bombardment training, however, still leaves much to be desired. This deficiency has been recognized and efforts are now being made to adequately train bombardment personnel before committing the units to a theatre of operations. Nevertheless, additional emphasis with respect to training of bombardment personnel is required. This should include a "model theatre" in which bombardment units may gain the type of training required to familiarize them with the problems that they will meet in active operations over Germany and surrounding territories.

6. Training, however, must be predicated upon fulfilling tactics and technique required in actual operations. A cursory study of British tactics and technique reveals that this field of development has been treated inadequately or improperly. The development of tactics and technique for bombardment aviation requires a thorough, comprehensive, and exhaustive study of all means by which the enemy may prevent the successful operation of bombardment aviation. With these latest data as a background, it is then necessary that careful studies be made as to those methods, those tactics, and that technique which will overcome the defenses. Before the Army Air Forces can accept any conclusions as to the inadequacy of inefficiency of bombardment aviation comprehensive tactical study is demanded. No such study has been made anywhere within the Army Air Forces.

7. It does not matter if we build the necessary number of airplanes properly. It does not matter whether or not the crews and the units are well trained. These facts do not matter so long as there are no sound tactics technique under which the units will be employed against the critical targets.

8. The grave importance of this indicates that the following action should be taken and is so recommended:

a. A Bombardment Tactical Committee should be created immediately. It should be charged with the responsibility of preparing an exhaustive study, recommendations, and tactical plans for the conduct of bombardment operations against Germany. This committee should comprise at least two bombardment officers with wide experience in the tactics and technique of bombardment aviation.

Included in the committee should be an officer well versed in the tactics and technique of anti-aircraft artillery; an officer capable of analyzing pursuit defenses; a communications and a meteorological officer.

b. This committee should be formed immediately and relieved of all other duties. It should first make as exhaustive an initial study as possible, in the United States, of the situation pertaining to German defense against bombardment operations.

c. After the background is gained in making the initial study noted above, this committee should then be sent to England for the purpose of securing additional information pertaining to the subject.

d. As a result of these studies the committee should prepare the detailed tactics and technique required for successful bombardment operations against Germany, as the basis for active operations and training therefor.

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/23/76

Pages attached corrected these

AAF/A-WPD
KNW

DATE INITIALS

wtn 2/18/42

FEB 18 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Preparing the U. S. Bombardment Force for Its Contribution to the Defeat of Germany.

I. Discussion.

1. Bombardment aviation can perform effective day and night operations and destroy the vital German installations essential to her prosecution of the war. Successful bombardment operations may in themselves be decisive. In any event, such operations must precede a final land offensive.

2. Assumptions have been made that against German objectives:

a. Day bombardment is virtually impossible.

b. Night bombardment is ineffective.

These assumptions lean upon the precedent of failure and represent a defeatist attitude.

To these assumptions and to this attitude the Air War Plans Division will not subscribe.

History records many initial failures preceding successful and decisive accomplishment. Those who have believed in the ultimate success of their venture have not been wanting in the courage and confidence to meet and overcome disappointment and reverses. The security of the Nation is at stake. This is no time to discard one of the decisive means of winning the war until a full opportunity is taken to exploit it. We will not base our conclusions as to the effectiveness of a means and method for prosecuting the war upon initial British failure.

3. Effective bombardment attacks depend upon:

a. Adequate force in bombardment aircraft.
Comment: The industry should have this force created within two years at the most.

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b. Technical superiority in aircraft.
Comment: Improved fire power and defensive armor together with other technical improvements are being incorporated in our aircraft.

c. Properly trained combat crews.
Comment: Steps are already being taken to train the bombardment combat crews in efficient handling of their equipment.

d. EFFICIENT METHODS OF OPERATIONS, VIZ: PROPERLY DEVELOPED TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE.
Comment: ----------/111

4. The Army Air Forces, as noted in par. 3 above, are meeting three of the requirements for efficient bombardment of Germany. The action essential to meet the fourth requirement has not been taken.

5. The key to tactical success is superior tactics. Superior equipment and personnel will be wasted if employed in accordance with inferior tactics. The noteworthy failure of British bombardment against Germany may be charged in a large part to failure to develop and employ proper tactics. (See Tabs A and B.)

6. Our American bombardment force established for operations against Germany must be provided with equipment and must be trained to handle it with the highest degree of efficiency. It must operate in accordance with tactical methods which are designed to meet and overcome the Nazi resistance.

7. Immediate action is demanded to develop the tactics and technique essential to driving home the bombardment attack against Germany.

8. For support of the position taken in this paper, see the Final Report of Bombing Board on Trip to England (Tab B).

II. Action Recommended.

The Chief of the Army Air Forces directs the Chief of the Air Staff to:

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HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD
Box 113 Folder 6

MILITARY

Declined

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9-27-76

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6 Jan. & 20 June 1924
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

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Expediting Answers to Messages.

RCWB/hk

5. DAS DMC 7/25 1. The attached correspondence is quite an exhibit. Considering that this started on May 9 from General Arnold with the request that means be found to expedite matters in this Headquarters, we rather doubt the propriety of presenting this paper to him showing a reply coming in under date of July 21. General Kuter suggests that you place it among your relics as perhaps a prize exhibit. No further action is desired.

R.C.W.B.
S/AS

Incl: n/c

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JUL 28 1942
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HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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Expediting Answers to Messages.

RCWB/hk

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Dispatched
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R.C.W.B.
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

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Expediting Answers to Messages.

GV:72728:tn

1. AFDMC AFDAS 1942 7/21

1. Immediately upon receipt an investigation was made of the time loss in the handling of the subject communication by the Classified Mail Unit. The report indicated a loss of five days (items g and h) in the Central Mail Section. Actually, a receipt is available in the Classified Mail Unit showing that the material was delivered to Colonel Chauncey on the same day that it was received by the Classified Mail Unit. This would indicate that the flow of mail through the Classified Mail Unit was not at fault.

2. In the meantime contact was made with the Air Inspector, Colonel E. W. Hill. Colonel Hill appointed Colonel J. F. R. Scott to discuss the matter with this office. The discrepancy in handling by the Classified Mail Unit was called to Colonel Scott's attention. In addition, Colonel Scott visited the Central Mail Section including the Classified Mail Unit in order to observe the method and speed of handling communications. It is understood that Colonel Scott might prepare a report on these methods.

3. Since the preparation of the recommendations by the Air Inspector, General Arnold's office has established a suspense system. Attached is a copy of a typical suspense item which was recently received by the Director of Management Control. It is recommended that the same system be established in the Office of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. The mail coupon system in use in the Army Air Forces can be used as a suspense system. The advantage of so doing would be to eliminate one additional type of forms in use by the Army Air Forces. Actually this same system could also have been used by General Arnold's office.

4. A memorandum has also been prepared recently whereby correspondence prepared in an office of Headquarters, A.A.F., for the signature of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, or the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff, will be delivered to the Air Adjutant General within 48 hours after receipt of the order directing the preparation of the correspondence.

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Expediting Answers to Messages.

GV:72728:tn

4. AFDMC AFDAS 1942
(continued) 7/21

5. It is not believed that there is any great loss of time in the flow of inter-office papers through the central mail system. The loss comes when the mail is intercepted at various points for purposes of making a record. This is particularly true in the case of classified mail since everyone who signs feels that they must make a record to protect themselves. Unfortunately this destroys the very purpose for classifying the mail since it must be read in order to make a record. As an example of the promptness of dispatch, this memorandum will be sent through the normal channels and the actual time that it leaves this Directorate will be written in the space below.

This communication left AFDMC mail desk 10:00 AM.

B. E. GATES,
Colonel, A.A.F.,
Director Management Control

Attach -
Suspense item.
Other Incl. n/c

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Expediting Answers to Messages.

RCWB/hk

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R.C.W.B.
S/AS

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

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Flight to Determine Extent of Black-outs on East Coast.

4 AFROM AFDMR 1942 4-22
E-I
vmf

1. Subject test was run as directed and full report was mailed from 1st Air Force through Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command on April 18, 1942.

2. This report should arrive in this headquarters this week.

O.S.F.,
Col., A.C.,
Dir/W O & M.

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DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A.A.F.

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DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A.A.F.

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2 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/76

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Miss D.

Misc.

JUN 5 1942

SUBJECT: Blackouts

TO: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations

1. Reference is made to your letter of April 8, 1942, subject: "Blackouts" and to the enclosures which accompanied it.

2. Your attention is invited to paragraph 9, page 8 of attached Office of Civilian Defense pamphlet entitled "Air Raid Warning System". As indicated in this paragraph, a red warning may be issued without the prior issuance of a yellow or blue warning. It is, therefore, unnecessary to go through the "Phases of Blackouts" referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter of March 25, 1942 from the Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

3. In view of the above and of the fact that bombers might not approach their objective in a direct line from the sea, it is not believed advisable to eliminate the yellow and blue warning signals. Time permitting, these signals give advance warnings to essential industry and transportation. They may be issued before the objective of the raid is definitely determined, and when it would be undesirable to issue a general red warning to the public.

4. Your attention is also invited to paragraph 8, page 8 of the attached O.C.D. pamphlet entitled "Air Raid Warning System" wherein the statement is made: "Prior to the time of being alerted, there need be no lighting restrictions imposed upon an area." Experience has indicated that this statement is incorrect and that it is desirable to eliminate unnecessary lighting in critical defense areas for the duration of the war.

5. Under the provisions of Executive Order 9066, dated February 19, 1942, Commanding Generals, Defense Commands, are authorized to prescribe military areas within the geographic

Office, G., A.A.F.
JUN 5 1942
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limits of their respective Defense Commands. This has already been done in the Eastern Defense Command. Within these military areas, Commanding Generals, Defense Commands, are responsible for the planning and execution of all defense measures, and they have been charged with the responsibility of defining unnecessary lighting, the areas within which it should be eliminated, and enforcement thereof. Vigorous steps to institute dimouts along the coast are well under way and action is now being considered to extend the control of lighting inland to meet the threat of hostile air raids.

(Sgd) JOSEPH T. McNARNEY

Chief of Staff

1 Incl.

JUN 5 1942

OUT OUT

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

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Copy for Gen. Arnold

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

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SUBJECT: Blackouts

TO: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations

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HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION

Sgty Air Gen.	A.A.	A	A	A	A	A	A-Insp.	Bdcst	Sec'd

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Chief of Staff.

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MAY 29 1942
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Dispatched to Sec. Gen Staff

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HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION

	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4		Assoc.	Bureau	Bureau	AFRAD
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By: [illegible] LC. Date [illegible]

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Surg
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384.3 (7)

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Dispatched to Secy Gen. Staff.
APR 27 1942
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Photo M&C
Tech Insp
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DOD Dir.
By [illegible] IC, Date [illegible]

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In reply refer to Initials
and No.
Op-30-A-AD
(SC)A16-5
Doc. 46850
Serial 088330

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1942.

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

Subject: Blackouts.

Reference: (a) Com-6 Conf. ltr. A7-3/A16/ND6 (FDP-D128-Bh) of March 25, 1942 to CNO
(b) CNO ltr. Op-30B2 A16-5(420308) Serial 166330 3/14/42 to ND Comdts.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).
(B) Copy of reference (b).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for your consideration and such action as you may deem advisable with regard to paragraph 5a, b, c, d, f, and, as to aerial aids, g.

2. As to paragraph 5c, d, it will be noted, reference (b), that the Chief of Naval Operations has already initiated action toward reducing bright lights on the coast. This was based primarily on their reported value to enemy submarines in silhouetting surface craft.

3. With respect to the recommended changes in Air Raid Warning Signals this Office has not understood, as the Commandant implies, that, with an air attack impending, such signals would be withheld to conform with the minimum times indicated by the signals. Rather, it was believed that more time would be available to execute the blackout if the situation permitted, but the population would act on the basis of the times prescribed. Conversely, it is assumed that yellow and blue phases would automatically be omitted if time available so dictated.

4. This Office will be in thorough accord with any steps considered advisable by the Army to improve its Air Raid Warning Service or blackout measures.

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5. It is to be noted that these Army matters should have preferably been made the subject of local joint recommendations.

F. J. HORNE

Copy to: Cominch*
Com. Eastern Sea Frontier
Com-6*
Op-12*
Op-32*

*(Less Enc.(B)).

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DOD DIR
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT
United States Navy Yard
Navy Yard, S. C.

A7-3/A16-ND6
(FDP-D128-Bh)

March 25, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commandant, Sixth Naval District
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Blackouts

1. At present the instructions and orders for Blackouts contemplate three conditions of warning and preparation, namely "Air Raid Warning YELLOW", Air Raid Warning BLUE", and "Air Raid Warning RED." The last condition only contemplates complete Blackout.

2. From numerous conferences held here between the Army and Navy it appears that not more than twenty (20) minutes warning of the approach of planes from seaward can be expected on the sea coast. This period is obviously too short to permit passing through phases of Blackout, but indicates definitely that on sea coasts, and for at least one hundred (100) miles inland, the only Blackout order that is of any value is RED.

3. It is obvious, too, that attacking planes would be so close when even a twenty (20) minutes warning were given that the lights of coastal cities would have been sighted by the planes before the blackout could be effective. This indicates that coastal cities should immediately institute at least a "dim out", eliminating all brilliant lights and reducing greatly all street lighting. Illuminated advertising signs should be completely darkened.

4. Blackouts, or dim outs, of coastal areas would be futile, however, without a corresponding reduction in the intensity of Navigation lights, radio beacons, air-way beacons, or the complete elimination of all such aids that are not absolutely essential.

5. In view of the seriousness of the situation presented by reason of the very short interval of warning of air attack now available to coastal communities it is recommended that:-

a. Air raid condition warnings YELLOW and BLUE be eliminated for all areas within one hundred (100) miles of the sea coast, and "Air Raid Warning RED" be prescribed exclusively in such areas.

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A7-3/A16/ND6
(FDP-D128-Bh)

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SUBJECT: Blackouts

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b. "Air Raid Warning YELLOW" be eliminated as a condition of readiness for all areas within one hundred (100) miles to two hundred (200) miles of the sea coast, and "Air Raid Warning BLUE" and "RED" be prescribed exclusively in such areas.

c. All coastal areas within one hundred (100) miles of the sea coast be regularly "dimmed out" every night.

d. All illuminated advertising signs within three hundred (300) miles of the coast be permanently prohibited for the duration of the war.

e. All possible navigation lights and radio beacons be discontinued at once.

f. All possible aerial beacons and radio direction beams within three hundred (300) miles of the sea coast be discontinued.

g. Such navigational aids, both maritime and aerial, as can not be discontinued in the coastal areas be reduced as much as possible in intensity.

W. H. ALLEN

Copy to:

Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Commander First Interceptor Command
Commanding General Fourth Corps Area

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jun. & 30 Jun.
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

Op-30B2-BP
A16-5(420308)
Serial 166330

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts in Continental United States

Subject: Anti-submarine Precautions - Dim-out of Coastal Cities.

Enclosure: (A) CinC, U.S. Fleet ltr FF1/A16-3, Serial 439 to CNO of March 8, 1942.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for appropriate action by the Commandants of all Naval Districts in continental United States.

2. The reduction of lighting usual to seaside resorts on the coasts as well as the reduction of the lights of coastal cities and towns should be included in the arrangement for coastal light "dim-out".

3. It is suggested that the Coastal Lookout System and patrol vessels can effectively assist to insure continuous execution of "dim-out procedure.

4. The assistance and cooperative effort of Federal, State and local authorities will be required.

R. W. CARY
By direction

B

Copy to: Asst. SecNav
Cominch
Op-12
Op-13
Op-32

A TRUE COPY

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs. 1974
Feb. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 4/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

March 8, 1943

FF1-A16-3
Serial: 439

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-submarine Precautions; dim-out of coastal cities.

1. Recent reports confirm the experience of the last war that hostile submarines lie off brightly lighted coastal cities and pick up passing merchant vessels as they are silhouetted against the glare of lights ashore.

2. This question came up at a conference in the War Department on 4 March which was attended by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Rear Admiral Edwards of my staff. It was agreed that action in this matter was a Navy function. I believe that such matters are under the cognisance of the Chief of Naval Operations, but I am interested in that suppression of glaring lights ashore would be a valuable element in the general plan for protection coastwise shipping.

3. I suggest that you arrange for "dim-out" of coastal lights at such places as you deem appropriate. It is not necessary that there be complete "blackout" but only suppression of bright lights showing to seaward.

/s/ E. J. KING

ENCLOSURE(A)

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A TRUE COPY

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

Proposed AAF Reg. 90-1.

HPH/rrb

(AFMAG-Pub. Div.)

1. AFMAG AFMOP 1942 3/24 The attached proposed A.A.F. Reg. 90-1, March 24, 1942, is referred to you for review and approval prior to publication.

Dispatched
MAR 25 1942
AAG

Incl.
Prop. AAF Reg. 90-1,
w/1 incl.

H. H. H.
Asst. AG, AAF.

AG 384.3 (6)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-MPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

AG 384.3 (6)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date: 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION

Subject: Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting

1. The attached correspondence is forwarded for such action as you may deem necessary in connection with the study on this subject now being conducted.

2. Request that any instructions to be issued on this subject be referred to the Director of Air Defense for comment prior to issue.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

GORDON P. SAVILLE,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director of Air Defense.

3 Inclosures
Sp. Ltr. 1/12/42 to Sec. War
Sp. Ltr. 2/7/42 to CG, Field Forces
w/1st and 2nd Inds.
Receipt

3843 (8)

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

AFRAD

GWH/Mge

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

WDCLA 384.3 Blackout (3-11-42)

DEF 384.3 2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND FIRST ARMY, Governors Island, New York MAR 11 1942 TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that all uncontrolled lighting in the critical defense areas of the Eastern Theater of Operations be eliminated and all lights visible from the sea, except those operated by the Coast Guard and Civil Aeronautics Authority, be effectively screened from the sea for the duration of the emergency.

2. Critical defense areas are defined as follows:

a. A zone extending 150 miles inland from the shoreline from Portland, Maine, to Norfolk, Virginia, both inclusive.

b. An area 20 miles in radius from Wilmington, N.C., Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, Jacksonville, Florida, Miami, Florida and Pensacola, Florida.

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SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

[illegible] 384.3 2nd Ind. (Cont'd)

Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting (Cont'd)

3. Uncontrolled lighting is defined as lighting that cannot be extinguished by mechanical devices within one minute after notice is given in each area.

For the Commanding General:

S. E. SENIOR
MAJOR, A. G. D.,
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL.

2 Incls: n/c

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

AG 44.1/1830
ans [illegible] 384.3 (5)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: AM/MD LC, Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

DEF 384.3 2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND FIRST ARMY, Governors Island, New York MAR 11 1942 TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

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2. Critical defense areas are defined as follows:

a. A zone extending 150 miles inland from the shoreline from Portland, Maine, to Norfolk, Virginia, both inclusive.

b. An area 20 miles in radius from Wilmington, N.C., Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, Jacksonville, Florida, Miami, Florida and Pensacola, Florida.

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WDCLA 384.3 Blackout (3-11-42)

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

DNF 384.3 2nd Ind. (Cont'd)

Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting (Cont'd)

3. Uncontrolled lighting is defined as lighting that cannot be extinguished by mechanical devices within one minute after notice is given in each area.

For the Commanding General:

S. E. SENIOR
MAJOR, A. G. D.,
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL.

2 Incls: n/c

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

AGAAF/1230

ais at 384.3 (5)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 6 June 1974
By [illegible] IG, Date 6/27/74

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DISPOSITION FORM

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

Date February 28, 1942

AG

AAF

SUBJECT: Reduction of Lights on Eastern Seaboard.

	USW	ASW	ASWA	B-LP	BOWD	BPR
	C/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	WPD
	Sec.G/S	NGB	JAG	1G	QMG	SG
TO:	OCAC	CSO	Fin.	Ord.	Ex.R.A.	ENGR
	AFCC	Inf.	FA	Cav	CAC	CWS
	TAG					

FOR: SW directs
Draft of reply attached
Approved
Disapproved
File

Comment or concurrence
Direct reply made
Inviting attention to
See notation of _____
Information

Information for reply
_____ Ind. approved
Primary interest
Notation and return
Noted _____

384.3 (4)

AAF/A-3
MDJ:rlc

Copy of communication attached. (Writer of basic communication has been advised that all copies of communication to which reference is made, are being remarked as requested).

MAR 3 1942

1 Incl: Cy ltr 2-21-42 to C/AAF
frm Hq, AF ETO & 1st AF.

For the Chief of the Air Staff

NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

H. S. Vandenberg
H. S. VANDENBERG,
Colonel, Air Corps
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Request for reclassifying as "Secret" (because of addition of "Secret" inclosure) letter February 7, 1942 fr C/AAF to CG,FF, Subject: "Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting".

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

AAG/1441
W-4689, A.C.
an AG 384.3 (4)

T-15, 3/6

(COPY) [redacted] DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCES, EASTERN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
and
FIRST AIR FORCE

By authority of: CG

384.3 x
381.9

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
[illegible]
By [illegible] Date 9/27/74

February 21, 1942.

SUBJECT: Reduction of Lights on Eastern Seaboard.

TO: Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. Letter AAF 384.3, February 7, 1942, Subject "Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting," has been classified SECRET by these headquarters, a Secret inclosure having been added.

2. It is requested that all copies be so classified.

For the Commanding General:

H. B. SEPULVEDA
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

Incl

DECLASSIFIED
[redacted]

AAG/1441
an #384.3 (F)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

February 28, 1942

Reduction of Lights on Eastern Seaboard.

X Sec. G/S

Inviting attention to

AAF/A-3
MDJ:rlc

Copy of communication attached. (Writer of basic communication has been advised that all copies of communication to which reference is made, are being remarked as requested).

MAR 3 1942

1 Incl: Cy ltr 2-21-42 to C/AAF
frm Hq, AF ETO & 1st AF.

For the Chief of the Air Staff

NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

H. S. VANDENBERG,
Colonel, Air Corps
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff

WAR DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Request for reclassifying as "Secret" (because of addition of "Secret" inclosure) letter February 7, 1942 fr C/AAF to CG,FF, Subject: "Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting".

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AAG/1441
[illegible] 384.3 (4)

(3) 384.3 (2-28-42)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

February 28, 1942

Reduction of Lights on Eastern Seaboard.

X Sec. G/S

384.3 (4)

X Inviting attention to

AAF/A-3
MDJ:rlc

Copy of communication attached. (Writer of basic communication has been advised that all copies of communication to which reference is made, are being remarked as requested).

1 Incl: Cy ltr 2-21-42 to C/AAF
frm Hq, AF ETO & 1st AF.

For the Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
MAR 3 1942
AAG

Hq. Army Air Forces
MAR 1 19..
AAG RECEIVED

H. S. VANDENBERG,
Colonel, Air Corps
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-3.

COORDINATION

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Request for reclassifying as "Secret" (because of addition of "Secret" inclosure) letter February 7, 1942 fr C/AAF to CG,FF, Subject: "Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting".

AAF-39

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

air ag 384.3 (4)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR
8 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

DECLA[redacted]
(COPY)

HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCES, EASTERN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
and
FIRST AIR FORCE

384.3 x
381.9

By authority of: CG

February 21, 1942.

SUBJECT: Reduction of Lights on Eastern Seaboard.

TO: Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. Letter AAF 384.3, February 7, 1942, Subject "Elimination of Unnecessary Lighting," has been classified SECRET by these headquarters, a Secret inclosure having been added.

2. It is requested that all copies be so classified.

For the Commanding General:

H. B. SEPULVEDA
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Subject: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

AAF/A-2
JMS-ch
(Wtrn. 2/11/42)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AM/AW LC, Date 9/27/74

3rd Ind.

FEB 13 1942

War Department, Hq., Army Air Forces, To
The Adjutant General.

1. It is believed that letter AG 383 (12-16-41)MB-C, dated December 19, 1941, subject: "Instructions re Air Raid Precautions Measures, Continental United States" has clarified most of the points raised in basic communication.

2. With reference to a permanent rerouting of commercial aircraft, letter AG 580.8 (10-29-41)MC-C-M, dated October 31, 1941, subject: "Air Space Reservations and Danger Areas", provides a means of approach to this problem.

FOR THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Hq. Army Air Forces
FEB 14 1942
AAG RECEIVED

Dispatched
FEB 13 1942
AAG

384.3 (2)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Air AG 384.3 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By 46 Tm LC; Date 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

COPY

HEADQUARTERS EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
Chemical Warfare Service
Office of the Commanding General

December 17, 1941.

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

To: Chief, Chemical Warfare Service,
Washington, D. C.

1. In connection with the blackout of Edgewood Arsenal, it has been determined that blackout of the Arsenal alone will not provide the protection which a blackout is supposed to furnish. This is due principally to lights, control of which is not within the jurisdiction of this headquarters. The most important of these lights are:

a. Airway Beacons, including lights required to be maintained on water towers, chimneys, etc.

b. Navigation Lights for waters contiguous to the Arsenal.

c. Lights along the main line of the Pennsylvania and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads.

d. Illuminated advertising signs and billboards on highways, principally on U. S. Highway 40.

e. Lights in the towns of Edgewood and Magnolia, the Government Housing Project, and scattered dwelling houses in the area near the Arsenal.

2. It is believed that the lights mentioned under subparagraph e above can be satisfactorily controlled through the cooperation of the District Air Raid Wardens. It is suggested that steps be initiated for necessary action by the War Department for the control of lights mentioned in subparagraphs a to d above. In this connection it is suggested that the rerouting of commercial aircraft be considered.

/s/ R. L. Avery
R. L. AVERY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

CWS 381/156 ~~SECRET~~ COPY 2-4
(12-17-41)

War Department, O-C, CWS., December 23, 1941. To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Attention is invited to the requests of the Commanding General, Edgewood Arsenal, in paragraph 1 a, b, c, and d, and to the request in paragraph 2 for the rerouting of commercial aircraft to eliminate flying of such aircraft over the Arsenal. This office recommends favorable action on these requests insofar as may be practicable.

For the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service:

/s/ Charles E. Loucks
CHARLES E. LOUCKS,
Lt. Colonel, C. W. S.,
Executive.

32 AGO
Dec 26 1941
Received

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

AG 384.3 (12-17-41)MSC 2nd Ind, RPM/gc - 1705

War Department, A.G.O., December 29, 1941. To: Chief of Army Air Forces.

D.R.V.

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: Aln/[illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
4	MDCA	A-2	1942 2-5	The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics advises that: 1. The beacons can be promptly extinguished. 2. The possible time lag between blackout order and discontinuance of lights should not exceed ten minutes. 3. The person to be contacted to make arrangements for desired blackout procedure is Mr. John E. Sommers, Regional Manager, Civil Aeronautics Administration, LaGuardia Field, Jackson Heights, New York. Telephone: Havemeyer 9-3909. It is suggested that a representative from the Chemical Warfare Service should personally arrange details with Mr. Sommers, in order that each may be fully informed of the wishes and requirements of the other, and the final agreement should be made a matter of record for instant reference should the occasion arise. DHC D.H.C. MDCA

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

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W-4071,AC, Rev.8/14/41

Page No._____

A-7/9 Blackout

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Air/AC LC; Date 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Tally No. AAF . . . . .

Note.-- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AAF A-3	AAF A-2	1942 1-24	AAF/A-3 CFC:fg 1. Forwarded for necessary action as per paragraph 1 c and d of attached correspondence. 2. A suggested draft of letter to the Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics is attached requesting information relative to discontinuing operation of airway beacons adjacent to this establishment. 3. Attention is invited to letter AG 580.8 (10-28-41) MC-G-M authorizing extinguishing of lights, etc. within the area involved. Incls. 1- Ltr C.G. Edgewood Arsenal 12/17/41 w/2 Inds. 2 - Copy of ltr to Adm. CAA for E.L.N. C/A-3
2.	AAF A-2	AAG	1942 1-30	AAF/A-2 JMS-jd 1. Action indicated in paragraphs 1b, c, and d of attached correspondence is not believed a function of the Air Staff. 2. It is believed that any action concerning control of airways beacons should be coordinated with the Office of the Military Director of Civil Aviation prior to communicating with the Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics. JAN 31 1942 AAG Received Incls. n/c for M.F.S. C/A-2
3.	Air AG	Mil.Dir. Civ.Avia.	1-31-42	1. For appropriate action. Incls. n-c W.W.D. Air A.G.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

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Page No. _____

Air ab 384.3(2)

Y-4071, AC, Rev. 8/14/41

A-2/19

A-2 1/26 Blackout

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Military Director of Civil Aviation

With reference to your recent request for information on which to base reply to the Chief of the Army Air Forces on the subject of extinguishing airway beacons in the vicinity of Edgewood Arsenal, the following information is offered:

The C. A. A. advises that:

1. The beacons can be promptly extinguished.

2. The possible time lag between blackout order and discontinuance of lights should not exceed ten minutes.

3. The person to be notified of the desired blackout is Mr. John E. Sommers, Regional Manager, Civil Aeronautics Administration, LaGuardia Field, Jackson Heights, New York. Telephone: Havemeyer 9-3909.

4. A representative from the C.A.A. should personally arrange details with Mr. Sommers, in order that each may be fully informed of the wishes and requirements of the other ~~in complying with said request~~, and the final agreement should be made a matter of record for instant reference should the occasion arise.

A. S. Koch

(?)

A.2

AMG

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
Department of Commerce,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The Commanding Officer of Edgewood Arsenal has reported that complete blackout of the arsenal when necessary cannot be obtained unless airway beacons in the vicinity are extinguished.

Please advise if the operation of these beacons can be discontinued on short notice, the possible time lag between blackout order and discontinuance of lights and the office, or name of person, to be notified should it become necessary to discontinue operation of the lights.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

A-2/17
air ab 384.3 (2)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By NARS, Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED
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384.3 (2)

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FEB 12 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION

	Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
3.	Air AG	Mil.Dir. Civ.Avia.	1-31-42	1. For appropriate action.								
				Incls. n-c					W.W.D. Air A.G.			

AAF-39

DECLASSIFIED
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Air AG 384.3 (2)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

AAF/A-3
CFC:fg

1 AAF A-3 AAF A-2 1942 1-24

1. Forwarded for necessary action as per paragraph 1 c and d of attached correspondence.

2. A suggested draft of letter to the Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics is attached requesting information relative to discontinuing operation of airway beacons adjacent to this establishment.

3. Attention is invited to letter AG 580.8 (10-28-41) ME-G-M authorizing extinguishing of lights, etc. within the area involved.

Incls.
1- Ltr C.G. Edgewood Arsenal 12/17/41 w/2 Inds.

E.L.N.
C/A-3

2 - Copy of ltr to Adm. CAA

---

2. AAF A-2 AAG 1942 1-30

AAF/A-2
JMS-jd

1. Action indicated in paragraphs 1b, c, and d of attached correspondence is not believed a function of the Air Staff.

2. It is believed that any action concerning control of airways beacons should be coordinated with the Office of the Military Director of Civil Aviation prior to communicating with the Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

JAN 31 1942

Incls. n/c

M.F.S.
C/A-2

---

3. Air AG Mil.Dir. Civ.Avia. 1-31-42

1. For appropriate action.

Incls. n-c

W.W.D.
Air A.G.

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Air AG 389.3 (2) A-1/17

COPY

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dirs.
By: [illegible] Date: 4/27/74

War Department

Office of the Chief of the Army Air Forces

Washington

Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
Department of Commerce,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The Commanding Officer of Edgewood Arsenal has reported that complete blackout of the arsenal when necessary cannot be obtained unless airway beacons in the vicinity are extinguished.

Please advise if the operation of these beacons can be discontinued on short notice, the possible time lag between blackout order and discontinuance of lights and the office, or name of person, to be notified should it become necessary to discontinue operation of the lights.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Air 06 384.3 (2)
A-2/17

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-3
CFC
Jan.21,1942

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

Acting Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
Department of Commerce,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The Commanding Officer of Edgewood Arsenal has reported that complete blackout of the arsenal when necessary cannot be obtained unless airway beacons in the vicinity are extinguished.

Please advise if the operation of these beacons can be discontinued on short notice, the possible time lag between blackout order and discontinuance of lights and the office, or name of person, to be notified should it become necessary to discontinue operation of the lights.

Sincerely yours,

mc

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
					[illegible]						

AAF-39

DECLASSIFIED Air Ag 389.3 (2)

SECRET

A-2/17

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1924
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

CWS 381/156 SECRET 1st Ind. 2-4
(12-17-41)

War Department, O-C, C.W.S., December 23, 1941. To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Attention is invited to the requests of the Commanding General, Edgewood Arsenal, in paragraph 1 a, b, c, and d, and to the request in paragraph 2 for the rerouting of commercial aircraft to eliminate flying of such aircraft over the Arsenal. This office recommends favorable action on these requests insofar as may be practicable.

For the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service:

/s/ Charles E. Loucks,
Lt. Colonel, C.W.S.,
Executive.

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

AG 384.3 (12-17-41) MSC 2nd Ind. RPM/gc - 1705

War Department, A.G.O., December 29, 1941: To: Chief of Army Air Forces.

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

A-2/17

COPY

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
A/n/m LC Date 9/27/74

Headquarters Edgewood Arsenal

Chemical Warfare Service

Office of the Commanding General

Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
December 17, 1941

SUBJECT: Blackout, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

TO: Chief, Chemical Warfare Service,
Washington, D. C.

1. In connection with the blackout of Edgewood Arsenal, it has been determined that blackout of the Arsenal alone will not provide the protection which a blackout is supposed to furnish. This is due principally to lights, control of which is not within the jurisdiction of this headquarters. The most important of these lights are:

a. Airway Beacons, including lights required to be maintained on water towers, chimneys, etc.

b. Navigation Lights for waters contiguous to the Arsenal.

c. Lights along the main line of the Pennsylvania and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads.

d. Illuminated advertising signs and billboards on highways, principally on U.S. Highway 40.

e. Lights in the towns of Edgewood and Magnolia, the Government Housing Project, and scattered dwelling houses in the area near the Arsenal.

2. It is believed that the lights mentioned under subparagraph e above can be satisfactorily controlled through the co-operation of the District Air Raid Wardens. It is suggested that steps be initiated for necessary action by the War Department for the control of lights mentioned in subparagraphs a to d above. In this connection it is suggested that the rerouting of commercial aircraft be considered.

/s/ R. L. Avery,
Brigadier General, U.S.Army,
Commanding.

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A-2/17

SAS 384.3
Japan

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 19[illegible]
By: [illegible]LO; Date: [illegible]/23/76

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AAF-A2
(Hotep)
SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY Air FORCES
2/9/42 WFS
DATE INITIALS

February 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

Subject: Bombing the Japanese Mainland.

1. There are at present in Australia the following U. S. Army aircraft:

B-17	28
B-24	2
LB-30	10
A-24	52
P-39	25
P-40	166
	283

2. The following U. S. Army aircraft are enroute:

B-17	35
LB-30	5
A-24	15
P-39	129
P-40	206
	390

3. There is a possibility that no bases in the Netherlands East Indies can be used for very much longer, and there is also a possibility that both the African-Indian and Pacific ferry routes will be cut.

4. Therefore, the proposed concentration of our air strength in Australia may be strategically unsound, if we delay too long in bombing the Japanese mainland. If the enemy is permitted to consolidate his gains in Malaya, it will tax any amount of air strength we may support there when we commence final operations against the enemey's center. His shorter lines of communication and his naval dominance need no further pointing-up in this memorandum.

5. On the other hand, the use of India as a pivot for alternate routes to the Burma road may achieve great results from a relatively small effort, if we immeidately use this pivot for sustained air attacks

Air WD 384.3 Japan (1)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible], LC; Date 1/5/76

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A-646

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SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
DATE INITIALS

from Chinese bases. There are several operational airports and there is a certain amount of gasoline available, and a plan of operation is being formed. I have in mind the entrance of our air forces into Chungking via a Burma road alternate which uses the railway Calcutta-Myitkyina to the Burmese railhead for ground transport, a study of which A-2 has just completed and forwarded.

6. It is believed that such attacks can be sustained from Chinese bases, and that each attack will bring our landing fields closer to the heart of Japan. The immediate tactical results of such bombings - the concentration of enemy air power for home defense, to the detriment of Japanese attacking forces - is too obvious for more comment. The long view of the situation encourages us to proceed further with the plan. For the reverberations of the first bomb bursting upon Tokyo will constitute a shot-in-the-arm for Generalissimo Chiang. The tonic effect upon the Russian air forces in Siberia will be exhilarating. The effect upon the morale of American home forces will be of immense significance. Granted that Hitler is our chief enemy and that we are committed to attack him from Britain, it can still be pointed out that here, in the United States, the bonus clubs have been putting up prize money for the first air attack upon Japan.

7. Admitting the difficulty of establishing our bases for heavy bombardment in China, we can be assured welcome assistance by hordes of loyal Chinese, blooded in the cause against a common enemy. There are at least 3,000,000 Chinese troops, short of equipment, it is true, but a potentially powerful army. It is not beyond conjecture that such an offensive operation could kindle a new offensive spirit in the Chinese themselves - and once these people retook Hankow and Canton, our air forces could begin striking with more than a modest strength. Then we might press home our air forces quickly in major strength, clean up our Pacific situation and turn with full force upon Germany. Assuredly then, your recent inquiry as to the feasibility of operating heavy bombardment from Outer Mongolia could then be counted upon as an effective certainty. As I stated then, bases with a reasonable degree of security upon the Chinese mainland constitute the logical and effective plan for striking at the heart of Japan. And I believe that the present total concentrations in Australia will entail the cutting off of the tentacles of the octopus one by one, in a painful process, while the attacks from China would strike at the heart of the Kobe-Osaka armament plants, leaving the tentacles to die off in time.

8. The use of heavy bombardment for sustained attack, at first from hide-and-seek bases in China, will at once cause the enemy to wear his air equipment out against dispositions in depth in order to defend his extended positions. His Formosa, Saigon and Hainan aerial stages become insecure under our first threat, though we may employ a minimum number of bombardment planes capable of sustained attack. With his limited powers

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By LC; Date 7/3/76

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
DATE INITIALS

of aerial reinforcement the enemy must eventually relax pressure by air upon Australia and South Pacific areas if we sustain our attacks. And instead of attempting the almost impossible and very costly task of driving him out of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, he will be forced to withdraw in order to protect the vital bases and centers in Japan.

Martin F. Scanlon

MARTIN F. SCANLON,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2.

2/3/42 → 20 a-WPD

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible], LC; Date 9/3/76

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A-646

air 4Y384.3 Japan ①
A-2/105

JAS 384.51

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 June & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible]; Date 9-23-76

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AFOCR
Maj Hill/hn/6765
14 Dec 43

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By WNRC; Date 9-23-76

15 DEC 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF: (Attention: A.C. of S., OPD)

Subject: Elimination of Practice Air Raid Alerts

I. Discussion

1. The Joint Intelligence Staff in a recent study requested by the Joint Staff Planners (see Tab A attached) concluded that air attack upon the continental United States by Germany and her satellites is possible on a very small scale, but is most improbable. With respect to Japan, the Joint Intelligence Staff concluded that attack by land-based aircraft is impossible. Attack by Japan with ship-borne aircraft is possible in greater scale than by Germany, but such attack is very unlikely.

2. The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, has consistently refused to order practice air raid alerts on the grounds that the interference with essential war activities and dislocation of normal life caused by such alerts more than offset any benefit derived therefrom.

3. Such practice alerts as are now ordered, in large part result from pressure from the Office of Civilian Defense, which desires to maintain the interest of civilian volunteers by activating them from time to time. There is no longer any need for calling practice air raid alerts for training purposes. Dislocation of normal activities and interference with the war effort that results from such practice alerts is illustrated by the one that was called on Thursday, 9 December 1943, and which resulted in everyone in the Pentagon Building having to leave their offices for a period of approximately 35 minutes.

II. Action recommended

The Secretary of War directs that a letter substantially as follows be addressed to the Commanding General, Eastern, Western, Central, and Southern Defense Commands:

"The dislocation to the war effort caused by practice air raid alerts, plus the fact that communities which might be subject to air raids have already been afforded extensive practice in such alerts over a long period of time, dictate that no further practice air raid alerts should be ordered.

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COPY TO CG, AAF

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"It is desired that future requests for such alerts be disapproved, but that no public announcement of policy in this respect be made."

For the Commanding General

Signed

Barney M. Giles,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of the Air Staff.

1 Incl
Cpy of Report by the Joint Intelligence Staff, subj "Scale of Enemy Air Attack on the Continental United States"

Dispatched
15 DEC 1943
AAG

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Cu 12/16/43

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Air AS 384. S1 (1)

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TAB A

COPY

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SCALE OF ENEMY AIR ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Report by the Joint Intelligence Staff

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Memo
2 Jan. 1976
By dlr, LC; Date 2-23-76

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Intelligence Staff has been requested by the Joint Staff Planners to furnish a statement relative to enemy capabilities and the probable scale of air attack on the continental United States.

DISCUSSION

2. Capabilities and Probable Scale of Attack Upon the Continental United States by Germany and Her Satellites. Attacks by any type of aircraft are extremely improbable. Land-based air attack is physically possible, but because of range limitations would involve the sacrifice of the aircraft used and their crews and could not be carried out on a scale which could exert any material effect on the outcome of the war. An attack by ship-based aircraft would offer less physical difficulty, but would be very limited in its maximum scale. The one German aircraft carrier, GRAF ZEPPELIN, has been laid up, and there is no indication that she will be available for service in the near future, if ever. Lacking an aircraft carrier, only catapulted planes or seaplanes could be used. The vessels transporting the planes would be subjected to a serious risk of loss. The possibility that Germany would accept these risks appears to be increasingly remote. Germany is not known to have any submarines equipped to carry aircraft. The offensive value of such aircraft in any event would be negligible.

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3. Capabilities and Probable Scale of Attack Upon the Continental United States by Japan. Land-based air attack is impossible from present bases. Japan lacks both naval strength and shipping to conduct large scale ship-borne attacks against the continental United States. Ship-based air attack is limited to attacks from submarines and surface raiders, the latter ranging in scale up to hit and run operations by a carrier task force.

Japan could form a suitable task force and, considering the vastness of the Pacific, could perhaps bring it undetected within effective range of a profitable target such as Los Angeles - San Diego, the Puget Sound - Vancouver area, or the San Francisco Bay area. The risks, however, would be enormous, and at this juncture Japan cannot afford to risk either carriers or other vessels for indecisive purposes. All such craft available to her are, moreover, required for other uses. Sporadic attacks by aircraft launched from submarines, although a continuing capability, are possible only on a small scale. Their effectiveness would be negligible.

CONCLUSIONS

4. Air attack upon the continental United States by Germany and her satellites is possible on a very small scale, but is most improbable.

Attack by Japan with land-based aircraft is impossible. Attack by Japan with ship-borne aircraft is possible in greater scale than by Germany. Such an attack is, however, very unlikely.

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Elimination of Practice Air Raid Alerts

Secretary of the Air Staff 14 Dec 1943

Asst C/AS, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements 1
Maj Hill/hn/6765

A memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, subject as above, is attached for signature.

1 Attachment
Memo for Asst Chief of Staff, OPD,
subj as above

WILLIAM F. McKEE
Colonel, Air Corps

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Ci 12/10/43

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SAS 384.6

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DOD Dirs.
By: [illegible] 9-27-76

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DOD Rts.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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12

Camouflage Paint for Fifteenth Air Force HBX-Equipped Aircraft

DAS

AC/AS, MAS, Material Division
Att: Captain Brockley

NOV 1 1944
1

AC/AS, OCSB, Requirements Division

Lt.Col.Cozens/vcj/2092

1. Request that all heavy bombardment HBX-equipped aircraft allocated to the Fifteenth Air Force be painted a medium camouflage grey.

2. Nomenclature of paint desired is as follows: "Lacquer, camouflage, cellulose nitrate, neutral grey, specification number 14105, shade number 43, stock number 73-500160."

3. The Fifteenth Air Force stated that they can continue painting the aircraft until the procedure can be set up in the United States. Consequently, this modification should not be introduced until such time as no delay in flow of HBX aircraft to the theatre will be incurred.

4. A 1-A priority is assigned this special modification.

F. RACEN
Colonel, A. C.
MERVIN E. GROSS
Brigadier General, USA

Bomb Dr. _____

A/C Sec. _____

AFREQ/M _____

384.6 (7)

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Gen Timberlake

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SAS 384.6 (7)

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DOD ltrs.
8 June & 30 June 1974
By: Aln/[illegible] LC: Date 9/27/76

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Deception Officers and Units

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

15 August 1944

Chief of the Air Staff

1

RHH/hd/3373

Recommendations contained in memorandum dated 12 August 1944 disapproved.

[illegible]

DONALD WILSON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Chief of the Air Staff

Incl:
Memo fr Gen. White
re above subj

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By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

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Camouflage:

AMS 384.6 (3)

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JK
11/27/43

TO: AC/AS, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution.
(Attention: General Meyers)

Date: 27 Nov. 1943

Comment No. 3
MAL/gwd/3373

FROM: Secretary of the Air Staff.

1. Noted by the Chief of the Air Staff.

2. It is directed that this report be returned when official reply from the British has been received.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Incls. n/c

Dispatched
27 NOV 1943
AAG

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Copy for Miss Ingram
Air AS 384.6 (3)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] SC, Date 9/20/74

DECLASSIFIED

Camouflage.

AC/AS, Material, Maintenance & Distribution. - 11 November 43
ATTENTION: General Meyers.

Chief of the Air Staff. MAL/mdg/5265 1

The Chief of the Air Staff has noted the attached memorandum and desires that your division actively follow this project reporting status thereof not later than 20 November 1943.

Dispatched
12 NOV 1943
AAG

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Att: Memo for C/AS fm.Gen.
Meyers, November 10, 1943.

AAG 384.6 (3)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AG/AS LC; Date: 9/27/74

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

DECLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Camouflage.

TO: AC/AS, MM&D

DATE 18 Oct 43

FROM: Deputy Chief of Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 1
ESP/eva/6371

Please give me a squib on the Production ramifications of Military Requirements Policy #15, subject, "Camouflage," so that I can talk it over with General Giles.

EDWIN S. PERRIN,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

TO: Deputy Chief of Air Staff - Attention: Gen. Perrin

DATE 20 Oct 1943

FROM: AC/AS, MM&D, Materiel Div.

COMMENT NO. 2
BWC/ah/71500

1. Several questions have arisen in reference to Military Requirements Policy No. 15, subject: Camouflage (Elimination of camouflage from AAF aircraft). From a production standpoint the deletion of camouflage from Army Air Force aircraft necessitates decisions on the following questions:

a. Shall all Lend-Lease and Navy aircraft be left uncamouflaged? (Factory production airplanes must be either all camouflaged or non-camouflaged in order to avoid production loss.)

b. Military Policy No. 15, dated 16 October, states that all production AAF airplanes subsequently produced have camouflage painting eliminated. It must be realized that thousands of bits and pieces, particularly subcontractor items, are already in the prime contractors' plants currently being installed or about to be installed on production line airplanes. To stop production sufficiently long enough to remove the camouflage paint and, in the case of tail surfaces, ailerons, etc., repaint with aluminized paint, would seriously jeopardize the production schedule. For this reason, authority is requested to establish a set-forward deadline date of approximately seventy-five (75) days in order to cover the normal flow time of subcontractor fabricated items.

Note: This set-forward date is necessary because of the time required for establishment of different handling technique, the securing of cleaning and polishing equipment, aluminized paint, etc.

B. W. CHIDLAW,
Brig. General, U.S.A.
Chief, Materiel Division.

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3-1109 A.F.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

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WAR DEPT., WASH., D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/AW LC, Date 9/27/76

5 NOV 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF: Attention: Colonel M. A. Libby, Secretary, Air Staff.

Subject: Termination of All Camouflage Projects for Passive Defense of Army Air Force Installations in the Continental United States.

I. Discussion

1. The attached memorandum from the Chief of Air Staff to Commanding General, Army Air Forces and the Commanding General's approval thereof have been noted. Future action of this office will be based thereon.

2. This office has informed the Chief of Engineers that hereafter concealment measures for Army Air Force stations will only be required at specific stations where needed for training. The list of these stations has been approved by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff and forwarded to the Chief of Engineers.

3. Regarding General Perrin's statement, (noted by the Secretary, Air Staff, on routing slip), that the construction of revetments in the Continental United States should be mentioned; attention is invited to letter War Department, Adjutant General's Office, 4 March 1942, to Chief of the Air Corps, subject: "Construction of Airplane Revetments in the Continental United States," copy attached. Copies of this letter were transmitted to all Commands and field agencies at the time it was received; and no revetment construction has been authorized by this office since that time. Present policy of this office limits the construction of further dispersed parking facilities, such as hardstandings, in the United States to those needed for training purposes.

II. Action recommended.

In view of the Adjutant General's letter, referred to above, it is recommended that no additional directive prohibiting construction of revetments be issued.

Approved
MAL
S/AS
8 Nov, 1943

L. P. WHITTEN,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief, Air Service Division,
AC/AS, MM&D.

2 Incls:
#1 - Memo fr C/AS to CG, AAF.
#2 - Ltr fr WDAGO to Chief of the Air Corps dtd 4 March 42.

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ci 11/9/43

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DOD Ltr.
9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/27/76

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Camouflage of Radar Installations at Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics

AC/AS, Materiel, Maintenance & Distribution 28 Sep 43

Chief of the Air Staff 1

MAL/ee/5265

1. General Giles has noted the attached and directs that a memorandum be prepared for his signature to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, recommending discontinuance of all pending camouflage projects other than those absolutely required in training for purposes of simulating actual theater of operations conditions.

2. The Chief of the Air Staff is of the conviction that the money, effort and materials expended on camouflage projects in this country can be more gainfully utilized.

Incls:
Memo to C/AS dtd 16 Sep 43
w/Basic ltr fr HAAF to
Commandant, AAFSAT dtd 8/28/43
w/1st Ind.

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, Air Staff

Dispatched
28 SEP 1943
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HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD

Box 113 Folder 7

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DECIMAL

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8 Jan. & 29 June 1971
By [illegible] Date 9-27-76
Stat Dept

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: ALC; Date 9-27-76
State Dept

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

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385 (53) B

Air Estimate of Axis Coke Ovens.

1 General Arnold General Strate-meyer 1942 10-23 For Necessary action.

Incl: Air Estimate Axis Coke Ovens, Intelligence Service, AAF Copy No. 7

H.H.A.

3373
GEC/hd

2 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2 1942 10-24

1. General Arnold has noted.

2. A copy of this estimate should be sent to General Spaatz.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl: n/c

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

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DOD dtd
9 Jan & 30 Jan 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/74

OCT 2 4 1942

MEMORANDUM TO DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT.

SUBJECT: NDRC Report on Incendiary Bomb Requirements.

385 (52)

1. The British views of the relative importance of the incendiary versus the demolition bomb, and their concepts of the elastic limit of cities, as expressed again in the attached NDRC report, have received thorough consideration, and will continue to be evaluated as further combat experience is gained.

2. It is to be noted that the British analysis of the comparative effectiveness of incendiary and demolition bombs is predicated upon the use of both in mass raids with 800 - 1000 airplanes participating, using area bombing tactics only. Our Air Forces are dedicated to precision, pin-point bombing and have proved in combat their ability to hit specific targets. This basic difference in bombing theory introduces different values of the relative importance of various targets and munitions required to destroy these targets. It is believed that when only limited numbers of bombardment planes are available, the priorities of targets for precision bombing in most cases establishes targets that can be attacked to best advantage with demolition bombs.

3. However, developments have been instituted and production initiated on an incendiary bomb program which soon will permit the Air Forces to employ incendiary bombs to the fullest extent demanded by the target and the tactics.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Hq. Army Air Forces
OCT 25 1942
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: ala/ae LC; Date 9/22/74

20/jem 72485

2. AFRDB AFDAS 10/20

1. Comment requested is attached.

2. It is pointed out that the paper under consideration is the impression that an NDRC representative gained of the British views of mass incendiary bombing, and that these impressions are colored considerably by the enthusiasm for the NDRC - developed 6 lb. oil incendiary.

3. With regard to the claim made that insufficient preparation is being made for full scale manufacture of incendiaries, this is not correct. At the present our supply of satisfactory incendiary bombs is not adequate for A.A.F. requirements, but the necessary action has been taken to step up both development and production so that in the near future, superior incendiaries will be available in sufficient amounts to meet all needs.

E. L. EUBANK
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

2 Incls.
1-n/c
2-Memo to Deputy
Chief of Staff

WEH:JT 5246

3 AFCAS AFMAG 1942
10-24

For dispatch.

Hq. Army Air Forces
OCT 2 1942
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WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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DOD ltrs
5 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Ord [illegible]

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Incendiary Bomb Requirements.

LSK:cmc 6371

1. AFDAS AFRDB 1942 10/17

1. Please prepare a brief comment on the attached paper for signature by General Stratemeyer to General McNarney.

2. On one quick reading, it sounds to me like good CWS salesmanship directed clearly at the RAF rather than the AAF.

385 (52)

Incl: Memorandum on Incendiary Bomb Requirements, dtd 9-14-42, 7 pages - Confidential.

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Dispatched
OCT 18 1942
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr Gray
Air AS 355 (52)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/27/77

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO	3284
FILE NO	

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SUBJECT: U. S. Bombing Activities from Bases in Great Britain.

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS LSK:fjw 6371
1.	AFDAS	AFRDB	1942 10/14	1. For your information in the event that these papers had not previously come to your attention. 2. General Stratemeyer believes that this approach to a running account and current summary of United States bombing activities from bases in Great Britain is a good idea and should be extended. He suggests that each mission, after a brief discussion of the type now in this account, should include a tabulated summary of that particular mission. It is suggested that B-17 and B-24 missions be clearly identified. 3. While it is felt that these data should properly be compiled under the supervision of A-2, it is desired that your directorate remain in close touch with A-2 in the assembly, preparation, and presentation of these data. [signature] E. S. KUTER, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Air Staff. Incl: Summary of U.S. Bombing Activities frm Bases in Gt. Britain in acco binder.
2	AFRDB	AFDAS	11-2	4/hbm 71807 Provisions of paragraph 3, Item 1, will be complied with. Hq. Army Air Forces No. 5 942 9/30 AAG Received AM 1 Incl.: n/c [signature] E. L. Eubank, Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
3	AFDAS	AFMAG	11-5	Noted. For files. [signature] M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C. Incl. n.c.

Hq. Army Air Forces
No. 5
AAG Received

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PAGE

3-1109 A.F.

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IN OUT
OFFICE OF
DIRECTOR OF

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Most Secret "Bomber Command" Paper by Harris.

LSK:fjw 6371

1. AFDAS AFRDB 1942 10/15

1. General Arnold obtained the inclosed secret British War Cabinet Paper under exceptional conditions from the White House. This paper and any reference to its source are of considerably higher than the normal classification of secret.

2. There are three copies of this paper in the Air Staff. General Stratemeyer has Copy No. 35-A. Copy No. 35-C (a negative copy) is inclosed herewith and assigned to your office.

3. It is desired that you circulate through your directorate this copy and acquaint the proper individuals with its contents. Copy No. 35-B is being transmitted to the Advisory Council. General McClelland has read General Stratemeyer's copy.

385 (50)

L. S. KUTER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Incl:
Negative Copy No. 35-C
of paper Bomber Command
dated 8/24/42.

Dispatched
OCT 15 1942
AAG

File

Air AG 385 (50)

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Mr. Gray

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ala/AW LC, Date 9/27/76

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R.A.F. Bomber Offensive against Germany in 1942

3373
GES/hd

1 AFCAS Director of Military Requirements Attem: Director of Bombardment 1942 10-14

1. The enclosed letter from Air Marshal Evill and the copy of his statements on the R. A. F. Bomber Offensive as given in the Meeting of Military Representatives on October 9th, is forwarded to you for the purpose of having a summary of these papers made for General Arnold. The summary should be brief and to the point.

Dispatched
OCT 15 1942
AAG

Incl:
Ltr fr Air Marshal Evill dtd 10-12
w/ report re above subject (11pgs)

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

385 (49)

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Air OG 385 (49)

Mag Gray

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/76

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October 3, 1942

385 (48)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Enemy Bombs and Bombardment Effects.

1. In accordance with your desires indicated in your memorandum of September 18, 1942, I have caused to be prepared the attached study relative to the nature and effect of enemy bombs.

2. It is suggested that the attention of the Civilian Defense authorities to whom the attached report may be transmitted be invited to the fact that the material contained therein is classified as "Confidential", and to appropriate extracts of the Espionage Act and AR 380-5.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Hq. Army Air Forces
OC 10 1942
AAG Received

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of the Air Staff.

1 Incl:
"Nature & Effects
of Enemy Bombs",
9/26/42, Confid.

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Air AG 385 (48)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ah/A, AC, Date 9/27/74

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Material and effect of Enemy Bombs

WEH:JT 5246

1 AFCAS AFABI 1942 For necessary action.
10-12

Dispatched
OCT 13 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Memo fr Asst S/W
10-9-42 w/ 1 Incl.

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

385-(48)

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Air ab 385 (48)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AH/AO LC Date 9/27/76

Establishment of a Situation Room.

385 (46)

CDM:glg 3082

AFDOP ~~AFDPU~~ AFCAS 1942 10/5

1. Ad indicated in a telephone conversation with Colonel Hall, your office, this Directorate requests approval of the establishment of a Situation Room for the purpose of centralizing necessary data and disseminating consistent information on all personnel matters, to the various Directorates and Divisions at Gravelly Point who require same.

2. Charts will be developed to show the present and projected status on personnel, housing availability, and unit requirements for all theaters.

3. The security of this room has been approved by the A-2, Intelligent Service, as noted in attached copy of R&R, and it is proposed to further protect this installation by a burglar alarm system.

4. In this connection the building Security Officer, as indicated in the attached letter, will not have access to this room and, therefore, has outlined the procedure in the event entrance is necessary.

J. M. BEVANS,
Colonel, Air Corps.

Incls.
#1 R&R subject, "Safeguarding Military Information."
#2 Copy of letter Army Headquarters Commandant.

MAL/imm 5246

2 AFCAS AFDOP 10-8 Approved.

M. A. LIBBY
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Dispatched
OCT 8 1942
AAG

Incl.
n.c.

File

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Ass No 385 (46)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/86

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECLASSIFIED

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Selection of objectives in Overseas Theatres

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				WEH:JT 5246
1	AFCAS	AFAEP (Personal Attention: of Gen Anderson or Col Williams)	1942 10-6	1. Attached is a memorandum from General Somervell to the Chief of Staff bearing a notation to General Arnold from General Marshall. 2. A draft of proposed radiogram to General Spaatz has been prepared and is submitted for your remarks and recommendations. 3. Please expedite. WHA for L. S. KUTER Brig. Gen., U. S. A., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
	2 Incls. #1 - Memo to C/S 10-5-42 #2 - Draft of radiogram			
				Returned by Colonel Williams to the Secretary, Air Staff
				WEH:JT 5246
2	AFDAS	Cable Secretary	1942 10-6	For dispatch. WHA WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.
				Incls. n/c
				Dispatched 10-6-42 1805
3	AFDAS	AFMAG	10-7	For Files MAL M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C.

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385 (45)

Air Ab 385 (45)

3-1109 A.F.

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DOD Ltrs
8 Feb. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 7/27/76

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CABLEGRAM TO GENERAL SPAATZ

Following comments on the selection of objectives for 8th Air Force forwarded this date to this headquarters by Chief of Staff: "Headquarters, Services of Supply, Washington, D. C., memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

1. Our success in overseas theaters is jeopardized to a greater extent by the submarine menace than from any other cause. I note that the Army Air Forces in England select all kinds of targets and that their efforts are evidently dispersed over a wide area. If the Army Air Forces could destroy submarine bases and yards, they would do more to help our overseas activities than they could in almost any other way.

2. It is recommended that instructions be issued to the effect that the Air Force should concentrate on these objectives until they have secured some real results and not scatter their activities over such a wide front. These objectives are heavily defended and will involve a corresponding number of casualties. The results to be secured through success in this field will be correspondingly great.

/s/ BREHON SOMERVELL

In order to convey to General Somervell a clear picture of the present overall governing policies of objective selection by the 8th Air Force and without implying criticism by this Headquarters the

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following information is requested by cable: In general terms how objectives for 8th Air Force are selected: What consideration has been given to the bombing of German submarine bases and manufacturing facilities and the broad remarks and recommendations for your theatre on the memorandum quoted above.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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Air 16385 (45)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: AH/AD LC Date 9/27/76

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to AEP (Andr Wms Ltgt)
for remarks & [illegible]

RADIOGRAM TO GENERAL SPAATZ

Following constructive criticism of comments on the selection of objectives for 8th Air Force forwarded this date to this headquarters by Chief of Staff:

"Headquarters, Services of Supply, Washington, D. C., memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

1. Our success in overseas theaters is jeopardized to a greater extent by the submarine menace than from any other cause. I note that the Army Air Forces in England select all kinds of targets and that their efforts are evidently dispersed over a wide area. If the Army Air Forces could destroy submarine bases and yards, they would do more to help our overseas activities than they could in almost any other way.

2. It is recommended that instructions be issued to the effect that the Air Force should concentrate on these objectives until they have secured some real results and not scatter their activities over such a wide front. These objectives are heavily defended and will involve a corresponding number of casualties. The results to be secured through success in this field will be correspondingly great.

X

/s/BREHON SOMERVELL

Cable ~~Radio~~ reply desired stating in general terms how objectives for 8th Air Force are selected: What consideration has been given to the

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bombing of German submarine bases and manufacturing facilities and the broad remarks and recommendations for your theater on the memorandum quoted above.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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Air 06385 (45)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

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Summary of Bombing in England.

385 (44)

3373 GES:ml

2. AFCAS Ass't Ch. 10-5 of Staff, A-2. (Attention of Col. Hunter)

1. It is desired that the summary called for by General Arnold in comment #1 be prepared as expediously as possible.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Dispatched
OCT 5. 1942
AAG

File

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Mr. Gray
Civ AG 385

(44)

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DOD ltrs
8 Feb. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

Accuracy of Bombardment.

1. AFCAS Dir. of Bombardment. 10-4 Enclosed is a letter from Major General Ira C. Eaker to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, subject: "Accuracy of Bombardment - 4 Missions", with indorsement by General Spaatz. These papers are forwarded to your Directorate for your information and file.

385 (43)

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Encl.
Letter from Gen. Eaker 9/27/42
subj: as above, w/1st
Ind. fr Gen. Spaatz

Dispatched thru Col. Hunter in C/W-44
OCT 5 1942
AAG

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Mr. Geary

Air AG 385 (43)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Rs. 4
6 Mo. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/76

[redacted]
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Information on coke ovens in Japan

[illegible]
[illegible]

1. AFCAS AsoSt Ch 1942 of Staff, 9-11 A-2. Herewith is additional information on coke ovens submitted by General Lowe.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

385 (42)

Incls:
Ltr from H.B.Baird to Brig.Gen Lowe, 9-9-42
Memo (transmittal) from Ch of Staff to General Arnold, Pamphlet, "List of Coke Ovens in Japan" Revised September, 1942
Maps of Japan (4)

Dispatched
SEP 12 1942
AAG

File
Ci 9/14/42

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[redacted]

Mr. Gray

air as 385 (42)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

SEP 19 1942

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Hist. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject: German Coke Industry as a Bombardment Target.

1. Early this month you transmitted to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, by informal memorandum certain material received through Brigadier General Frank R. Lowe from Mr. H. B. Baird of the Koppers Company. The studies attempted to show that coke ovens offer a lucrative target for air attack and that their destruction would paralyze the Axis war effort.

2. This subject has been under careful study for some months prior to receipt of your memorandum, and it has been concluded that German coke ovens are not a profitable objective for air force attack.

3. You will probably have noticed that AWPD-42 does not include the German steel industry as a target system. Feeling that you may wish to know something of the basis for this omission, there has been attached hereto a brief analysis of German coke ovens as a bombing target.

1 Incl.
Study w/ Tab A.

Dispatched
SEP 19 1942
AAG

H. S. KUTER
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

For and in the absence of

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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AAG AD 385 (41)

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DOD ltrs
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/74

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Analysis of German Coke Ovens as a Bombardment Target

1. Anticipated Effects.

The effects on the Axis war effort to be expected from the destruction of coke ovens would be twofold: a reduction in steel production and curtailment of by-product production.

2. Steel Production.

An examination of the Axis steel position indicates that Germany requires 25,000,000 tons annually and has a production capacity of some 52,000,000 tons. She is, therefore, 206% self-sufficient. These figures do not take into consideration the fact that 50% of Russian steel production facilities are now under Axis control. Conservative estimates indicate that sufficient steel is available in stocks, in transit, and in process to meet four months' requirements. That period of time would, therefore, be available for readjustment following a widespread attack.

3. Force Required.

Coke production is characterized by a high degree of dispersion, over 630 batteries being known to exist in German-controlled Europe, exclusive of U.S.S.R. Of this number 547, producing 78% of the total output, are within 500 miles of London. Batteries average 50 by 140 feet in size and each represents a separate target requiring the most precise bombing for its destruction. Based on the same assumptions and using the methods of computation employed in determining the force required in AWPD-42, it is estimated that 597,324 sorties would be required for the destruction of the above mentioned 547 batteries. In order to complete the operation within a six-months' period, this would necessitate an initial force of 346 groups, replacements in the amount of 415 groups, total 761 groups. Using the most optimistic assumptions as to bombing accuracy and accepting a 70% instead of 90% assurance of success and presuming that one hit would destroy the target, the force required would be reduced to 27 groups initially, 60 replacement groups, total 87 groups. The first case is obviously beyond the realm of possibility. The second, while perhaps within our capabilities if considered alone, requires an effort out of proportion to the results to be obtained. (See Tab A for the computation of the force required.)

4. Effect on Steel Production.

Even if 78% of all coke production were destroyed, the effect on Germany's war effort would not be decisive. The remaining 22% together with available stocks of scrap and charcoal pig iron would permit production of sufficient steel to meet her normal requirements.

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In addition to this, it is possible to construct "beehive" type ovens within 60 days which, while inefficient, could be built within the ensuing year in sufficient quantities to enable the production of an additional 7,500,000 tons of steel.

5. Effect on By-product Production.

The second effect to be obtained from the destruction of coke ovens is the curtailment of by-product production. While it is true that use is made of coke by-products in several vital war industries, a relatively small percentage of the total coke producing capacity is required to meet demands. In order to obtain decisive results in this respect, it would probably be necessary to destroy something over 90% of German coke production. Since the force required for the destruction of 70% is not within our capabilities, detailed computation of the forces required to achieve 90% destruction has not been made.

U. S. Army Air Forces,
A2 Division,
Sept. 14, 1942.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/76

Computation of the Force Required for Destruction of German Coke Production

Target size	40' x 150'
Near miss danger radius	10' 10'
	50' x 160'

Method of bombing; in train, 4 bombs, 40' spacing, length 120'.

Effective target size:	50' x 160'
½ train length	60'
	110' x 160'

	Basis A	Basis B
	Circular Probable Error 934'. Equivalent to average circular error of 1000'. Hits required, 2- 500# bomb. 90% assurance of success.	Circular Probable error 467'. Equivalent to average circular/ of 500'. Hits required, error 1- 500# bomb. 70% assurance of success.
Sorties per target.	950	75.
15% addition for airplanes failing to reach target.	142	11.2
	1092.	86.2
Targets within 500 miles of London.	547.	547.
Total sorties required	597,324.	47,151.
Total number of operating days @ 6/month,-	36.	36.
Number of sorties per operating day.	16,592.	1,309.
Number of operating groups @ 48 planes per group.	346.	27.
Replacement groups based on 20% attrition/month.	415.	60.
Total groups required.	761.	87.

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COPY

Determined to be
Administrative Marking
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.1(a)
By AW LC Date 10/12/

H. B. BAIRD
KOPPERS BUILDING
PITTSBURGH

(Private and Confidential)

September Third
1942

Dear Frank,

I am enclosing herewith a brief summary of the situation that I spoke to you about in regard to the vulnerability of the Germansteel industry thru its weakest link which is its coke over batteries, and am also enclosing a map prepared by our people in Pittsburgh, which shows all the plantsof which we have record in the principal coke production area which of course is the Ruhr section. The size of the circles is generally indicative of the capacity of the plants in question, and I believe that the map, together with the accompanying table, pretty much speaks for itself.

In regard to the Japanese plants and the large plant at Manchukuo, I find that our people in Pittsburgh are preparing a map for the Bureau of Economic Warfare, which they expect to have completed within the next few days, and as soon as it is finished I will see that it is sent to you.

In talking to you about this matter I believed that I mentioned that we had discussed it at some elngth with Mr. Herman A. Brassert, and that Mr. Brassert entirely concurred in our views. I find that Mr. Brassert has sent a memorandum to Washington on the same subject, which I presume was forwarded thru his son who is an officer in the U. S. Army Intelligence service.

For your information, I would like to say that Mr. Brassert is perhaps the most outstanding independent consulting engineer in the world today on the subject of blast furnace and steel plant design. And it was he who, just prior to the War, designed and constructed the large low-grade ore plant in England for British interests. After this plant was completed, he was asked by the Nazi regime to come to Germany and design a low-grade ore plant for them, and this plant - which is known as the Goering Steel Works - was well along in construction just prior to the time that hostilities commenced. Mr. Brassert, who of course was living in Germany at the time, got out before War was declared and returned to this country and has been here ever since. And, should you desire to look him up, I believe that you will find that he is well known to the State Department.

Needless to say, we have all been tremendously interested in the possibilities contained in this

.....continued

cy
Tel w/d

air AD 385 (41)

memorandum, and a great deal of work has been done with the officials of the Army Intelligence; models of batteries and photographs of coke plants have been shown them, and they have made personal visits to a number of coke plants in the country so as to familiarize themselves with the situation, and I believe that the investigation they are conducting is a very thorough one and that in due course the results of this investigation will be presented to the proper authorities.

Also, needless to say, this memorandum and the map are being sent by me to you personally, and what you see fit to do with them is your own business. I say this because I would not want to cross any wires in this connection, and I know that you are in the same boat.

Sincerely,

/s/

Hoby

Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe
1316 NewHampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Apartment 31

(enclosures)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
3 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 4/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: The Byproduct Coke Industry of Germany.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS LSK:cmc 6371
1.	AFDAS	AFABI (A-2)	1942 9-5	1. For necessary action, including the transmission of appropriate portions to the 8th Air Force. 2. Please prepare for General Arnold a brief statement of the action taken on these papers and submit it through this office. L. S. KUTER Brig. Gen., U.S.A. Incls: Informal disposition slip to Gen. Arnold frm Gen. Marshall fwding Ltr to Gen. Lowe frm H.B.Baird, 9/3/42 (Conf.) w/incls: Summary of memo with respect to bombing coke plants as a major blow at the enemy. 1 Map of the byproduct coke industry of Germany - location & capacities of plants in the Ruhr Dist. as of 9/3/39. 4-page chart - Table 1 - key to above mentioned map.
2	AFABI	AFDAS	9/14	WB:lh 1. German Coke Ovens have been the subject of detailed study and analysis in the Target Information Section, AFDIS, for several months past. These investigations have included conferences with representatives of Koppers Company, engineering firms, and the Ordnance Department. 2. Attached hereto is a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, for General Arnold's signature, which outlines the results of this study. 3. The original inclosures have been withdrawn and the information contained therein, together with additional material

(Do not use reverse side) DECLASSIFIED F-4071,AF, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

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1594

Air AS 385 (4)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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DECLASSIFIED

File No. _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: The Byproduct Coke Industry of Germany.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
2.	Continued -		9/14	developed in AFDIS, will be made available to the A-2, Eighth Air Force. EDGAR P. SORENSEN, Colonel, G. S. C. Incls. w/d. Incl. added. Memo to C/S w/ Incl.
	Hq. Army Air Forces SEP 15 1942 AAG Received			
				WEH:JT 5265
3	AFCAS	AFMAG	1942 9-17	For dispatch. WSH Incl. n/c WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.

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W-4071, AF. Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

Air AG 385 (41)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AFRDB 26:vej
Rm. 4320-D 72936
wrtn. 8/22/42

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

SUBJECT: Army Air Forces Bombardment Doctrine.

1. The attached cable from General Spaatz describes the recent daylight raid on Rouen by our heavy bombers. Three sentences are particularly pertinent:

"Bombing attack on Rouen far exceeded in accuracy any previous altitude bombing this theater either by German or Allied aircraft."

"Combat crews are enthusiastic about flying fortresses. Gunners are confident. Turrets are working perfectly."

"I would not exchange it for any British bomber in production."

2. This mission again verifies the soundness of our policy of the precision bombing of strategic objectives rather than mass (blitz) bombing of large, city size areas. The Army Air Forces early recognized the fact that the effective use of air power on a world wide basis required the ability to hit small targets from high altitudes. Consequently, war experiences of all nations were carefully studied and evaluated. The inabilities of others to accomplish precision bombing were determined and our training, material, and tactics modified accordingly. Results against the Japanese and Italians have been more than satisfactory, especially considering that the crew training prior to operations was much less than desired. Results against the Germans are just beginning. Inasmuch as Admirals Leahy and King may be interested in this matter, it is recommended that this information be transmitted to them.

Incl. Cable from
Gen. Spaatz, 8/18/42.

385 (36)

File G

Copy of R&R 1 & 2 & C/B copy of above returned to AFRDB
Orig of " " & copy " " sent to Clasfd. Files
Pen note on R&R:- "Gen. Arnold has noted and says file. G.E.S."

Avi WS 385 (36)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By AG/MD LC Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

High Altitude Accuracy Bombing.

GES/hd

1	AFCAS	Director of Military Requirements (Atten: Dir. of Bombardment)	1942 8-19

1. It is desired that a memorandum be prepared for General Arnold to General Marshall quoting the cable from General Spaatz, signed Eisenhower, No. 1274 August 18, 1942, in which General Arnold desires an explanation of just what this cable means reference our beliefs and tactics on precision bombing. In the memorandum make a recommendation that Admiral King and Admiral Leahy be advised of our thoughts on this matter. Particularly note three statements: "Bombing attack on Rouen far exceeded in accuracy and previous altitude bombing in this theater either by German or Allied aircraft" and "Combat crews are enthusiastic about flying fortresses as the gunners are confident and the turrets are working perfectly" and "I would not exchange it for any British bomber in production".

G.E.S.
AFCAS

File
ci 8/19/42
Mr. Gray -

Dispatched
AUG 19 1942
AAG

Sent by spec messenger

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Air AG 385 (36)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: alr/aw C. Date 9/27/76

CONFIDENTIAL

(AFMAG-HHH/rrb-5790)
(AFDMR)

AAF 385

DECLASSIFIED

September 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W.D.G.S.

Subject: Bombing Effectiveness, Eleventh Air Force.

1. From information reaching this headquarters, it appears that Army Air Forces bombing missions against Japanese installations in the Aleutians are not as effective as they might be, because the high or maximum altitude mission is the only type selected for our heavy bombers in that locality.

2. It is believed that B-17 and B-24 type bombers would be more effective on low altitude attacks.

3. In view of the above facts and in view of the recent publication of War Department Training Circular No. 46, July 25, 1942, containing pertinent information on the subject, it is recommended that the material contained in that circular be forcefully brought to the attention of all officers commanding bombing units in Alaska.

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
Sep 10 1942
AAG

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Sup.
S.
War O&M
Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
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Dir. Pers.
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(AFDMR)

AAG 385

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir
8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] J.C. Date: 9/27/76

Sept 9
~~August 17,~~ 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W.D.G.S.

Subject: Bombing effectiveness, Eleventh Air Force.

1. From information reaching this headquarters, it appears that Army Air Forces bombing missions against Japanese installations in the Aleutians are not as effective as they might be, because the high or maximum altitude mission is the only type selected for our heavy bombers in that locality.

2. It is believed that B-17 and B-24 type bombers would be more effective on low altitude attacks.

3. In view of the above facts and in view of the recent publication of War Department Training Circular No. 46, July 25, 1942, containing pertinent information on the subject, it is recommended that the material contained in that circular be ~~forcibly~~ forcefully brought to the attention of all officers commanding bombing units in Alaska.

For the Commanding General:

W — W. D — OK WND

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DECLASSIFIED
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Bombing Effectiveness, 11th Air Force.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS - RCWB:JT
1	AFDAS	AFMAG	1942 8-16	1. For action as noted in paragraph 1, section II, of the attached memorandum, and return to Director of Bombardment for specific recommendation when and if determination ~~are~~ is made in regard to paragraph 2, section II. 1 Incl. Ltr fr Col M.E.Gross w/1 Incl. R.C.W.B. S/AS
2.	AFMAG	AFRDB	9/9	HHH/rrb 5790 1. Action has been taken in accordance with the recommendation made in paragraph 1, section II, attached directive. Copy of memorandum from this office to the Operations Divisions, W.D., G.S., is attached. 2. Referred to you for action indicated in Item #1, above. 2 Incls. #1- n/c. #2- Added - cy memo. AAG to OD, WDGS, 9/9/42. W. W. D. Col., A.G.D. Air Adj. Gen.
3.	AFRDB	AFDAS Thru: AFDMR Hq. Army Air Forces SEP 23 1942 [illegible] Received	-9-22	23:hmr 72485 Action has been initiated to obtain authority for Colonel Charles G. Williamson, A.C., of this Directorate, to proceed to the Alaskan theater for the purpose mentioned in the basic memorandum. 2 Incls. n/c E. L. EUBANK, Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

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(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AF, Rev.8/14/41

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Air OD 386 (34)

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OFFICE OF
DIRECTOR OF BOMBARDMENT

DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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TALLY NO.	
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SUBJECT: Bombing Effectiveness, 11th Air Force

ITEM NO	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
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4	APDAS	File	1942 9-24	2 Incls. n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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3-1109 A.F.

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DOD ltrs
3 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 4/27/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AUG 14 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF:

Subject: Bombing Effectiveness, 11th Air Force.

I. Discussion.

1. It was announced in the Air Room on August 10, 1942, that an Army Air Force bombing mission against Japanese installations had been abandoned because of overcast conditions in the target area.

2. On the same date, it was also announced that eight Navy PBY's had successfully completed a bombing mission in the same area at a low altitude.

3. Airplanes of the B-17 and B-24 types should be far more effective on low altitude attacks than PBY's.

4. It seems evident, from all missions flown to date in Alaska, that the high or maximum altitude mission is the only type considered favorably for the Army Air Force Heavy bombers.

II. Action Recommended.

1. That the material included in W. D. Training Circular No. 46, dated July 25, 1942, copy of which attached hereto, be forcibly brought to the attention of all officers commanding bombing units in Alaska.

2. That if bombing missions in this area continue with the same ineffectiveness, a qualified bombardment tactical officer be sent to this area to determine the actual causes of same and corrective action required.

III. Concurrences.
AFACT (RWH)

Muir S. Fairchild
Brig. General, U.S. Army
Director of Military Requirements

Incls. 1
Trng.Cir. No. 46
Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 15 1942
AAG Received

Mervin E. Gross

Mervin E. Gross
Colonel, Army Air Forces

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[TC 46]

TRAINING CIRCULAR No. 46

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 25, 1942.

Minimum altitude attack of naval objectives.—Pending revision of FM 1–10, November 20, 1940, the following is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

1. **Purpose.**—The purpose of this training circular is to amplify the information presented in section V, chapter 4, FM 1–10.

2. **Types.**—Attacks against naval objectives may be accomplished at minimum altitudes, using either bombs or torpedoes.

3. **Bomb *vs.* torpedo.**—*a. Method of individual torpedo attack.*—Present United States Army Air Forces torpedo airplanes are the A–20, B–25, and the B–26. With these types of high performance aircraft, the recommended procedure is to release torpedoes at ranges from 700 to 1,000 yards, from 175 to 200 feet altitude, at speeds not in excess of 200 mph. Withdrawal should be made at full throttle directly over the vessel attacked. Defense against antiaircraft fire should be obtained by coordinated attacks of high altitude bombers using fragmentation, 100-pound, or 250-pound bombs with instantaneous fuzes, by use of evasive action, and/or cloud cover.

b. Advantages of using bombs in lieu of torpedoes.—Inasmuch as airplanes making torpedo attacks clear by flying across the attacked vessel, bombs may also be used to great advantage. Advantages of using bombs are—

(1) A much greater percentage of hits will be obtained.

(2) Bombs contain a greater percentage of weight explosive and consequently hits will result in greater damage.

(3) Torpedoes are relatively expensive, require special equipment, are very difficult to maintain, and present supply is limited.

(4) Bombing attacks may be made at any speed and altitude, thus giving much greater security to the attacking aircraft.

4. **Individual minimum altitude bombing attack.**—*a. Bomb size.*—As specified in Table 1, Tactics and Technique Memorandum No. 1 (AAF), Effectiveness of Bombs.

b. Fuzing.—Omit nose fuzes. Use 45-second, 11-second, or 4-second tail fuzes in accordance with the tactical situation and plan of attack.

c. Sighting.—Pilot's judgment, modified gun sight for pilot, or D–8 bomb sight are suitable. Tests have proved that greatest accuracy is obtained by the pilot using a gun sight modified so that dropping angles may be set into it.

d. Point of aim.—(1) *Vessels having 1 inch or less armor plate.*—Side of vessel.

(2) *Vessels, such as battleships and heavy cruisers, having armor plate over 1 inch thick.*—In this case the 4-second delay tail fuze must be used unless the vessels are lying in a harbor less than 70 feet deep. Bombs should be so released as to strike the water from 50 to 100 feet from the side of the vessel attacked. Caution should be used not to strike the armored side directly as the bomb case will then rupture, resulting in a low order detonation with but little damage to the ship but with probable damage or loss of the attacking airplane.

5. **Coordinated unit daylight attack.**—*a. Forces required.*—Both a synchronized high altitude bombing attack and accompanying fighters are

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of great assistance to a minimum altitude attacking force, and should be provided whenever possible. The high altitude bombers, loaded with antipersonnel bombs, should destroy a considerable portion of the antiaircraft defenses while at the same time drawing part of their fire. The fighter escort provides protection primarily for the minimum altitude airplanes.

b. Distribution of aircraft.—The relative distribution of airplanes to the high and minimum altitude forces is variable, being dependent upon the nature of the objective, the necessity for complete destruction of the enemy force in a single mission, and the aircraft available. Where the available aircraft are few and must be conserved, and there is no necessity for quick destruction of the enemy, this method should not be used inasmuch as high altitude attacks above 20,000 feet can be accomplished time after time with but small losses. If more than one type of bomber is available, that type with the greatest sea level speed should be used for the minimum altitude force.

c. Synchronization.—Synchronization of the various attacks is extremely difficult and can normally only be obtained by prearranged timing or by both forces remaining in visual contact until the enemy is sighted. Inasmuch as surprise is one of the greatest factors contributing to completion of minimum altitude attacks without suffering excessive losses, the second method above may not be feasible. A combination of the two, the minimum altitude force accompanying the high altitude force to within 50 to 100 miles of the objective before descending, provides an excellent solution. In any event, it is extremely desirable that all personnel concerned be accustomed to working with each other in this method of attack.

d. Basic unit.—The basic unit to be used in the final assault is the flight of two or preferably three airplanes. Squadron formations should be held until the target is sighted. Upon approaching the target, each flight selects a vessel, fans out, and attacks. If it is desired to attack a target vessel with more than one flight, the tactics used must be adjusted to the fuzing.

6. **Dawn and dusk attacks.**—*a. Advantages.*—(1) Surprise is more likely to be achieved.

(2) Hostile fighters will be less effective.

(3) Avoiding action taken by target is likely to be ineffective, particularly if it consists of a number of ships in company whose mobility in conditions of darkness is restricted.

b. Disadvantages.—(1) Dawn attack requires flying in formation over water in darkness.

(2) Target more difficult to find.

(3) Timing of the force must be exact. A late or early arrival at the target will result in the attack being carried out in broad daylight or darkness.

c. Conditions where dawn or dusk attacks are desirable.—(1) Where the objective is sufficiently close to insure accurate timing.

(2) Where high altitude bombing diversion and accompanying fighters are not available, and when heavy opposition is expected.

(3) When the number of airplanes available is small and must be conserved.

7. **Night attacks.**—Night attacks are subject to essentially the same advantages and disadvantages as are dawn and dusk attacks. However, under good visibility conditions with some moonlight, they can be effectively

accomplished by small forces without interference from fighters and with reduced amount of antiaircraft fire.

[A. G. 062.11 (7-20-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1942

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AAF 385

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/74

(AFDMR)

September 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W.D.G.S.

Subject: Bombing Effectiveness, Eleventh Air Force.

1. From information reaching this headquarters, it appears that Army Air Forces bombing missions against Japanese installations in the Aleutians are not as effective as they might be, because the high or maximum altitude mission is the only type selected for our heavy bombers in that locality.

2. It is believed that B-17 and B-24 type bombers would be more effective on low altitude attacks.

3. In view of the above facts and in view of the recent publication of War Department Training Circular No. 56, July 25, 1942, containing pertinent information on the subject, it is recommended that the material contained in that circular be forcefully brought to the attention of all officers commanding bombing units in Alaska.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM N. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

Incl #2

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Air AD 385 (34)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AlR/AD LC, Date 4/27/76

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Bombing Effectiveness, 11th Air Force

23:hmr 72485

3. AFRDB AFDAS -9-22 Action has been initiated to obtain authority
Thru: for Colonel Charles G. Williamson, A.C., of this Directorate,
AFDMR to proceed to the Alaskan theater for the purpose mentioned in the basic memorandum.

E. L. KUBANK,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

2 Incls.
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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

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A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
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Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
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385 (34)

HHH/rrb 5790

2. AFMAG AFRDB 9/9

1. Action has been taken in accordance with the recommendation made in paragraph 1, section II, attached directive. Copy of memorandum from this office to the Operations Divisions, W.D., G.S., is attached.

2. Referred to you for action indicated in Item #1, above.

Dispatched
SEP 10 1942
AAG

File

2 Incls.
#1- n/c.
#2- Added - cy memo. AAG to OD, WDGS, 9/9/42.

W. W. D.
Col., A.G.D.
Air Adj. Gen.

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Air AG 385 (34)

AFCAS
RCWB/hk

August 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Book of War Room Passes

1. Inasmuch as the War Room has been discontinued, the book of passes, No. 211 thru No. 300, is returned herewith.

R. C. W. HLESSLEY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, Air Staff

Inel:
Book of Passes
No. 211 to No. 300

Dispatched
AUG 19 1942
AAG

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
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Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

8/10/42
Col Dick

August 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE A. C. OF S., G-1,
G-2,
G-3,
G-4,
OPD,
CG, Army Air Forces,
CG, Army Ground Forces,
CG, Services of Supply,
CG, Washington Military Area,
Officer in charge of the war room:

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. The War Department war room will discontinue operation on Monday, August 10, at 12:00 noon.

2. It is desired that all equipment, charts, and secret data be removed by Thursday morning, August 13, by any of the above agencies responsible for this equipment.

3. The guard on the War Department war room will stand relieved at 8:00 a.m., Thursday, August 13, and will be reported by the officer in charge of the guard to their organization.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

R. N. YOUNG,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

Air AG 385

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8/10/42

C. B. T. E. — for AFMSP

File
JBC

GBR for A-2.

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DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
LC, Date 3/27/74

AFCAS

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Timely Tactical Topics II

9/16
Mr Gray

385 (32)

Hq. Army Air Forces
AUG 6 1942
AAG Received

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

AIR INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 3

WAR DEPARTMENT · WASHINGTON, D. C.

Air AS 385 (32)

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I. INTRODUCTION.

Every country has its individual practices in warfare. Yet, underlying the differences in such matters as formations, tactics, equipment, and commands, there is a common aim—to find the most effective manner of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion. Ways and means are initiated by necessity and are perfected by experience. Experience does not come from keeping your eyes in your own backyard. It comes from tapping every available source, incorporating, rejecting, combining, and altering until the most effective ways and means are found. This is a continuing process.

This bulletin is a compilation of information gathered from various battlefronts in recent months. Its purpose is to keep our forces informed of the latest trends in aerial warfare so that they may profit from the experience of others and thus be better equipped to defeat our common enemy.

II. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITIES.

A. Japanese Pattern of Warfare.

1. *Theory of combat.*—Japan's success in the Pacific islands campaign is primarily due to air power. Only with air superiority has it been possible for Japan to extend military domination over so vast an area in so short a time.

Roughly speaking, Japan's strategy is that of the prize ring: "Hit 'em where they ain't." The offense set a pace which denied the defenders time to catch their breath.

The general course followed has been: first, bombardment of airdromes; second, destruction of defending aircraft on the ground or in combat; and, third, occupation from convoy.

2. *Application of theory of combat.*

a. Air participation.

(1) *Striking power.*—The air force represents the initial power of all Japanese offensive action. Japanese staff work shows the utmost thoroughness. Attack by echelons is excellently timed and planned to sustain the continuity of striking power against land and naval targets.

(2) *Range of operations.*—The specific objective of the Japanese is selected within 400 miles of Japanese bases. Whether an overland or overseas operation, the 400-mile range has constituted the yardstick of effectiveness against new objectives from Japanese-controlled air bases.

(3) *Air preparation.*

(*a*) The Japanese precede all long-distance raids with ample reconnaissance. Scouting aircraft communicate with the home base by radio. Before the main flight leaves the base, the squadron is given alternative objectives.

(*b*) In several instances, the direction to the objective has been marked on the ground with arrows. These arrow-shaped markings of cut grass, palm fronds, or other natural growths are laid out by Fifth Columnists.

(*c*) Submarines usually make reconnaissance ahead of the task force. Additional reconnaissance and light

daylight attacks are then made by long-range reconnaissance planes, which may be flying boats. Should this reconnaissance reveal a concentration of defending aircraft on the flying field, a surprise raid is often launched to destroy the aircraft on the ground.

(*d*) These reconnaissance attacks are followed with light attacks by Type "96" heavy bombers, which operate from the nearest land bases and are usually unescorted by fighters.

(*e*) The objectives of these initial tactics are: to gather information about the opposition; to destroy airdrome installations; and to provide data on weather conditions. Runways are usually left undamaged, indicating Japanese confidence in the eventual outcome.

(*f*) Intermediate bases existing between the Japanese base and the major objective are kept under continuous attack.

(4) *First heavy bombing attack.*—This is undertaken with the support of land-based or carrier-based fighter planes for the purpose of destroying opposing aircraft. The fighters invite combat over the Allied airdromes, prolonging the fight until the defenders are forced to land to refuel. Then the bombers fly in to catch the aircraft on the ground. The bombing attack may be sustained if it appears that the defenders are flying in replacements for the planes originally destroyed.

(5) *Second heavy bombing attack.*—This is the final heavy bombing before landings are attempted. Usually 50 to 150 aircraft make the attack to destroy communications, coast defense batteries, and antiaircraft installations.

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(6) *Convoy protection preceding the attack.*—The approaching convoy is doubly protected on the day before the landing is to be attempted. In addition to direct air assistance from all Japanese bases and carriers within range, protection is indirectly afforded by aerial attacks on opposition air bases which might be an assembling place for the attack against the convoy.

b. The landing attack.—The landing attack with ample aircraft cover, usually begins shortly before dawn. Generally the attacking force is carried to the shore in motor landing craft, which are protected by aircraft under the radio control of the landing units. The bulk of the air task force is held in reserve to counterattack opposition basis within feasible range. Successful occupation of strategic objectives takes place as soon as surface occupation forces can follow the air preparation.

c. The attack after landing.—Once a landing is effected, a second pattern of attack begins as follows:

(1) *Seizure of airdrome.*—Parachute troops or special landing units try to seize an airdrome from which fighter planes may operate. On the first day, protection of the ground troops is provided, usually by seaplanes or carrier-based aircraft.

(2) *Establishment of fighter squadrons.*—Fighter squadrons are quickly established on seized airdromes. From one or more of these fields or from carriers, Type "O" fighters immediately come to the support of troops.

(3) *Repair of airdromes.*—Native labor is put to work promptly on occupied airdromes to repair, resurface, and extend the fields for use by heavy bombers. Within 2 to 7 days, the fields are usually ready for operations.

(4) *Establishment of interceptor units.*—Within 14 days prefabricated shelters are erected and interceptor units are quickly installed, with warning detachments spread out over a radius of 60 to 100 miles. There is also evidence of searchlight installations being correlated with effective sound detectors.

(5) *Accumulation of supplies.*—Supply dumps are quickly established at intermediate points and service and maintenance units for aircraft are set up, all within a period of 2 to 3 weeks.

3. *Evaluation of theory of combat.*—Of the three elements contributing to air superiority, planes and crews, communications, and operational bases, the success of Japanese operations lead to the conclusion that the third factor—operational bases—is the real key to advance. It is not difficult to arrive at a time norm for the production of a plane or the training of a pilot, but the time required to establish an operational air base necessarily remains a variable quantity, particularly in the dense jungles of the equatorial belt. Modern airbase equipment presents a serious transportation problem. From the point of view of time alone, attempted recapture of Japanese bases would appear preferable to building new bases. In the light, however, of the enemy's perfected ground defense and local naval superiority, the building of a number of new bases will be necessary in passing to the offensive in the air. With local air bases established, thus mak-

ing local air superiority possible, the recapture of air bases from the Japanese may then proceed in much the same pattern as the Japanese conquest.

Japan's success must also be attributed to numerical superiority in aircraft, to full use of the element of surprise, to excellent timing, to almost perfect coordination with ground or naval forces, and to the fighting spirit of her airmen—the success of any undertaking, however brilliant and audacious it may appear to be, is largely dependent upon the energy and enthusiasm with which it is executed. The Japanese airmen are fanatics in carrying out their tactical conceptions.

B. Air Bases as a Factor in Germany's Air Warfare.

1. *Construction program.*—For the past 20 months the Germans have pursued an intensive airdrome construction program in occupied countries. The primary objective has been to establish a chain of first-class bases along the entire western coast of Europe from the northernmost tip of Norway to the southern border of France. Construction was begun as soon as possible after occupation. Existing civil and military fields were either enlarged or made completely unusable. New airdromes were established in areas suitable for training centers or repair depots, and wherever air defense was needed. Installations, quarters, workshops, and storage units are well planned and give every indication that the fields were designed for permanency.

Early in 1942 the Germans had almost completed a chain of bomber-operations airdromes at 50-mile intervals along the north coast of France, with the primary object of supplementing airdromes nearer the coast. The latter are now available for short-range aircraft, particularly fighters, for patrolling the English Channel, for fueling and bombing-up to increase the range and load of bombers, for advanced bases for aircraft intended for more than one sortie, and for aircraft returning from raids in a damaged condition or short of fuel.

The extent of the German program may be gaged by the number of airdromes in occupied countries now available for use by the heaviest types of bombers. There are at least 8 of these in Holland, 7 in Belgium, and about 35 in northern France. Besides these heavy bomber bases, there are many airdromes suitable for fighters, light bombers, and transports.

2. *Characteristics of airdromes.*—The outstanding characteristic of the new German airdromes is the number and length of their runways. In 1940–41 few German airdromes on the Western Front had more than one runway. By mid-1942, however, practically all bomber airdromes on this front are expected to have three concrete runways. Also, many of the existing fields had runways large enough for transports and fighters, but few could accommodate modern bombers. The Germans, therefore, have constructed long runways averaging 1,500 to 3,000 yards for bombers and 850 yards for fighters. Where the limits of a field did not permit sufficiently long runways, extensions have been cut through the neighboring countryside.

3. *Dispersal areas.*—Aircraft are being protected by an extensive system of dispersal areas. Separate dispersal areas for each squadron (*Staffel*) of 9 to 12 aircraft are planned. At least three such areas are provided on airdromes designed to accommodate one group (*Gruppe*). Each squadron has its own facilities and personnel for servicing and maintenance purposes. The size of dispersal areas depends upon the type of field. Bomber airdromes have large dispersal points well removed from the field. Fighter dispersal areas are smaller and close to the perimeter of the field. Thus fighter airdromes have a tendency to be longer and narrower than bomber airdromes. Dispersal of aircraft on German airdromes has been known to cover an area of 6 miles.

Fighter aircraft are also being protected by satellite airdromes, that is, auxiliary airdromes located near the main field and functioning chiefly as extended dispersal areas. It now appears that most of the permanent fields along the French coast are to have some kind of satellite fields in the vicinity. An estimate 20,000 acres have already been lost to cultivation because of this program.

4. *Installations.*—The Germans have not been niggardly in their installations. All usable fields are surrounded by a concrete taxi track. Additional concrete taxi tracks connect the perimeter track with the dispersal areas. Shelters are usually of rough U-shape with walls of sandbags or earth. Also, a noticeable feature of many airdromes is the number of shelters in excess of present requirements. About 40 to 50 shelters are provided for the normal complement of 40 aircraft permanently stationed at German bomber airdromes. The installation of night lighting systems has been widespread. All bomber and night-fighter bases are being equipped with the Visual Lorenz system (German blind landing system).

5. *Antiaircraft protection.*—All airdromes have been provided with some form of antiaircraft protection, including light or heavy antiaircraft guns or both. Many fields also have machine-gun posts. The normal distribution is one battery of heavy guns to two or three batteries of light weapons, plus a varying allotment of small-caliber machine guns. Heavy weapons are usually located in a four-pointed star pattern, the gun positions constituting the points, with the predictor unit in the center. Wherever obstacles such as woods or buildings interfere with the field of fire, towers are built and the lighter weapons are mounted. This system provides a 360° defense against low-flying attack.

6. *Supply facilities.*—The majority of the airdromes depend upon railway communications for supplies. Frequently the entire airdrome is encircled by spur tracks with several different service points. Occasionally the spurs pass underground to discharging points below the airdrome. Where railways do not reach the field, sidings are constructed for interchange from railway tank cars to motor units.

7. *Camouflage.*—The Germans are camouflaging these airdromes by the usual methods. Runways are darkened, and field lines and patterns are painted on the ground. Buildings are camouflaged, and nets are gen-

erally used to break shadows. Frequently, living accommodations and shops are built to represent farm buildings and are situated among existing structures. A German innovation is the individual hangar made of concrete walls with a wooden or camouflaged net top. The Germans are also camouflaging hangars by rounding the north, east, and west sides to slope right into the ground. Only the fourth side is vertical to the ground, but since this side is always built to face south, it casts no shadow. The roof is then covered with sod or netting in which trees or bushes are planted or woven.

8. *Dummy airports.*—Dummy airports are frequently set up a few miles from the real airdrome. Here runways are cut through grassland and farmland, dummy hangars and shelters are set up, and even complete lighting systems are installed in the exact pattern of the real airdrome.

9. *Evaluation of the air base factor in German warfare.*—The Germans have made the most of the resources which they have acquired on the Western Front. They have expropriated forest and farmland and have utilized the vast reserve of labor available in prisoners, demobilized soldiers, and unemployed civilians. Except in Norway, they have been aided by good communications and suitable terrain. The ground personnel, fuel, and ammunition supplies more than meet the demands made by units currently operating from this area.

Thus it can no longer be said that lack of suitable airdromes would restrict German Air Force operations

on the Western Front. Should the Germans decide to resume intense air activity over England, the entire German long-range bomber force could operate from the Western Front under what might be termed "luxury" conditions. Conversely, should the British increase their operations over the Western Front, the entire German fighter force could be concentrated there under equally comfortable conditions. Therefore, in view of the facilities and installations now available also in Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, there is every indication that the entire first-line strength of the G. A. F. could be accommodated on the Western Front.

III. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

A. General Tactical Principles.

1. *Basic rule.*—Never, under any circumstances, should a plane fly straight and level when enemy fighters are likely to be encountered. They should weave continually and maintain a good lookout in all directions, thus following one of the oldest lessons in air warfare but one that apparently cannot be overstressed.

2. *Aim of offensive operations by British fighters over enemy-occupied territory.*—The aim of these offensive operations are—

a. To destroy enemy aircraft.

b. To force the enemy to increase his fighter strength in the West at the expense of other vital fronts.

c. To dislocate transport and industry.

d. To obtain morale superiority in fighting.

e. To build up and maintain a high standard of fighting efficiency in allied squadron.

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3. *Conditions under which offensive fighter operations are carried out.*—Operations by single-seater fighters over enemy-occupied territory suffer from two handicaps:

a. Sooner or later the fighters must turn for home and then become more vulnerable to attack by enemy fighters.

b. Damage to aircraft, which over United Nations' territory would only cause a forced landing or a parachute descent, may lead to the loss of both pilot and aircraft.

It is consequently essential that squadrons taking part in these operations be highly trained both in air fighting and in giving mutual support, that such operations be carefully designed to offer the best prospects of success, and that pilots be carefully instructed as to their roles.

4. *Valuable points in offensive operations.*

a. Never fly immediately below a cloud level. Leave a sighting gap of at least 2,000 feet, or else put another force just above the cloud. Similarly, it is unwise to fly immediately above a cloud layer, owing to the clear silhouette given.

b. Always try to withdraw across the sun—unfortunately withdrawal up sun is seldom possible.

c. Plessey devices (six-cartridge, automatic, pyrotechnic pistols) are not to be employed for recognition by day fighters. They should be used only to indicate distress, and then red lights should be fired.

d. Many German pilots dive away at the first opportunity when engaged and are at an advantage in

so doing, since their engines are not affected by negative G (gravity). Moreover, the Me 109 has a good initial acceleration. Under such circumstances, a good following maneuver is to roll down after the enemy.

B. Japanese Tactics.

1. *Typical squadron formation.*—A favorite tactic of Japanese fighter squadrons is to divide into two sections, one section flying low to tempt enemy aircraft to dive, the other section remaining in position to dive on the enemy.

2. *Maneuvering.*—In the initial attack on the Philippines, Japanese fighters dived out of the clouds, made a stern attack on the United States bombers, and pulled out with a steep climbing turn, offering a good target.

3. *Ground-strafing.*—The formation used is commonly a vee of three aircraft flanked by echelons of two planes each, the sum being a vee of seven aircraft. If not opposed by fighters, the above echelons may form a second vee in column. The remaining fighters act as a top cover while the attack is being made. If there is fighter opposition, the echelons engage the enemy fighters while the vee executes the ground attack.

C. German Tactics.

1. The Germans always try to evade action unless in a superior position. Even then they usually confine such action to diving tactics, for which the Me 109F[1] is well suited.

[1] The Me 109F is an improved type of the Me 109.

2. On one occasion, Spitfires encountered five German fighters. Two of the German fighters dived from 3,000 feet, placing themselves in front of the Spitfires. As the Spitfires went in to attack, the remaining three dived down and forced the Spitfires to take violent evasive action.

D. Offensive Operations by British Fighters.

1. *Formations.*—British fighter squadrons in the air are now organized on the basis of the "pair" of aircraft as the smallest formation. Two pairs work as a "four," and three fours make a squadron. Each squadron on a large operation is given its role as part of a wing, and each wing has a specified part to play. A nice balance must be kept between compactness and flexibility. Aircraft must be in mutual support and at the same time be free to maneuver and fight.

2. *Types of offensive operations.*—For brevity of description, British offensive operations have been given the following code names:

a. Circus.—An attack by bombers, escorted by fighters, in which the object of the attack is primarily to bring the enemy fighters into action.

b. Ramrod.—An attack by bombers (or fighters/bombers) escorted by fighters, in which the destruction of the target is the primary object.

c. Rodeo.—A fighter sweep without bombers.

d. Roadstead.—An attack on enemy shipping by bombers (or fighter/bombers) escorted by fighters.

e. Rhubarb.—A small-scale attack by fighters using cloud cover and surprise, the objectives being enemy

aircraft in the air and worthwhile targets on the ground or sea.

3. *Execution of a circus.*—The following brief description of the manner in which a circus is carried out is also applicable to ramrods, rodeos, and roadsteads, with certain modifications which are referred to later. Rhubarbs form a different class of operation, and their method of execution will be dealt with separately.

Orders for the operation are printed, or, if time is short, they are issued by telephone on the operational lines, furnishing data as to the forces to be employed, the rendezvous, the target and bombing height, the role of the forces, the route and timings of various points, the direction of turn by the bombers over the target, and any special signal arrangements.

The bombers should arrive at the rendezvous, preferably a prominent landmark, a few minutes before the zero hour, in order to assist the fighters in joining up with them without wasting the fighters' fuel. Both bombers and fighters should, as far as possible, gain height and approach the rendezvous in the manner best calculated to minimize the time of warning given by the enemy radio direction finder. The bombers should leave the rendezvous at the zero hour and not before, having satisfied themselves that their escort and other supporting fighters have arrived. Wireless telegraph silence will be maintained, except in emergency, until the enemy coast is reached. Bombers should fly in a "box" as compact as possible, avoiding straggling or wasting time over enemy territory. Upon reaching the English coast on the return flight, they should steer a

course inland and not remain near the coast any longer than is necessary.

a. Functions of the fighters.

(1) *Escort wing.*

(*a*) *Role of the escort wing.*—The role of this wing is to protect the bombers from interference by enemy fighters. The escort wing must remain with the bombers as far as possible, and during the whole of the penetration and withdrawal, it must not be drawn off.

(*b*) *Formation of the wing.*—The wing originally consisted of three squadrons, but it was found necessary to provide an additional squadron to protect the bombers from enemy fighter attacks from below. Consequently, one of the escort squadrons was detailed for this purpose. The remaining two or three squadrons of the escort wing provide close protection against attacks from above.

(*c*) *Function of escort wing's squadrons.*

1. The role of the squadron performing close escort is to remain with the bombers under all circumstances. It is purely defensive, and must not be led away into a fight.
2. The second squadron is free to engage any enemy fighters attacking the bombers.
3. The third or top squadron acts as a top cover for the escort wing, and should remain in position as far as possible.
4. The fourth squadron acts as underneath cover for the bombers. This squadron normally flies 1,000 feet below bomber height in the same formation as the first squadron of the close escort wing. It should open to the flanks in flak[1] areas, but should remain under the umbrella cover above.
5. All squadrons in the escort wing weave continuously.
6. The height interval between each squadron in the escort wing is 1,000 to 1,500 feet.

(2) *Escort cover wing.*

(*a*) The role of this wing is to protect the bombers and the escort wing.

(*b*) *Formation of wing.*—The bottom squadron of this wing is usually about 1,000 feet above the top squadron of the close escort, the second squadron being 1,000 feet above the bottom squadron and the third squadron 2,000 feet above the middle squadron. The wing should be able to prevent enemy fighters from positioning themselves for a favorable attack on the escort wing and bombers.

This wing normally consists of three squadrons. It has greater freedom of action than the escort wing and usually flies in a more open formation.

(*c*) This wing makes the same rendezvous with the bomber formation and flies the same course out and home as the bombers and escort wing.

(*d*) One essential rule for this wing is that it should be up sun of the main formation, and squadrons in the wing should be stepped up sun of each other.

[1] A German abbreviation from "Fliegerabwehrkanone" (antiaircraft artillery).

(*c*) Provided at least one squadron of this wing remains as top cover, the lower squadrons are free to engage and fight the enemy.

(3) *High cover wing.*

(*a*) The role of this wing is to protect the escort cover wing. It flies in more open formation and has greater freedom of action than the other two wings.

(*b*) This wing consists normally of three squadrons. The formations vary and are left to the discretion of the wing and squadron leaders. The three squadrons are stepped up from the escort cover at 1,000-, 2,000-, 4,000-, and 5,000-foot intervals.

(*c*) This wing should be up sun of the escort cover wing, and squadrons in the wing are stepped up sun of each other. All squadrons weave and the two lower squadrons are free to engage the enemy as long as the highest squadron remains as top cover.

(4) *Target support wings.*

(*a*) The function of these wings is to achieve air superiority en route to the target and over the target area itself prior to the arrival of the bombers. As soon as the wings arrive over the target, they split into sections of four and cover the whole area at varying heights above the bombers.

1. One wing usually approaches on approximately the same line as the bombers, but overtakes them on the way to the target. This wing must deal with any opposition met with on the way to the target.

2. Other wings take the most suitable route as selected for the operation. They remain over the target until after the bombing and then cover the withdrawal of the bombers and escort wing.

(*b*) It might be thought that the advantage of surprise would be lost by indicating the selected targets in this way. This is not so, however, because as soon as the enemy radio direction finder system indicates an approaching raid, enemy fighter patrols are put up in the vicinity of all the important targets.

(5) *Forward support wing.*

(*a*) The role of this wing is to cover the withdrawal of the bombers and the escorting fighters. The wing is positioned on the withdrawal route of the bombers either on, or a few miles inside, the French coast. This wing should be at high or medium altitude according to the expected height of the enemy. The forward support wing will take up its position shortly before the bombers are due to cross its patrol line on their return. As this wing will have fuller fuel tanks than the wings which have been the whole way to the target, it will be in a position to stay and fight while the main force returns.

(*b*) This wing should remain in its patrol area for some minutes after the withdrawal of the bombers and their escort in order to prevent the enemy following the main formation back to the English coast.

(6) *Rear support wing.*

(*a*) The role of this wing, which may consist of only two squadrons, is to act as reserve in position about

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half-way across the Channel at medium altitude, and is capable of being directed quickly to reinforce any friendly forces which are in trouble on their return.

(*b*) This wing takes off in time to be in position a few minutes before the main force approaches the French coast on its return journey.

(*c*) Sometimes this wing may be used to patrol an area about 10 miles off the English coast from 1,000 to 10,000 feet. The reason for this positioning is that on many occasions enemy aircraft have crossed the Channel from the French coast very low, pulling up to a medium height near the English coast. They have then dived for France, shooting down any of our stragglers or damaged aircraft returning at low altitude.

(7) All of the above wings are not necessarily employed in every circus. Much depends on the position of the target and the estimated strength of enemy opposition. The tactical situation has been changing constantly. At certain times it was necessary to have only one target support wing. Later the enemy increased his opposition and made it necessary for the provision of a second wing with the same role.

Similarly, one can dispense with a forward support wing for targets close to the French coast. When particularly strong opposition is expected, successful operations have been carried out by staging one circus some 50 minutes before another. The first one will not penetrate deeply. Its object will be to draw up as many enemy fighters as possible. Then, when the enemy aircraft are going down to land, the second and main penetration will take place.

4. *Execution of types of offensive operations other than circuses.*—Reference was made above to five types of operations, but only the method of execution of a circus has been given in detail.

a. Execution of a ramrod.—A ramrod is identical to a circus in execution, except that the destruction of enemy aircraft is incidental and is not the main object of the operation. Where fighter/bombers are used instead of bombers, the number of accompanying fighters can be reduced.

b. Execution of a rodeo.—A rodeo is similar, though there are no bombers and consequently there is no escort wing. Target support wings are not necessary, and the object is to destroy enemy aircraft.

c. Execution of a roadstead.—A roadstead is usually composed of eight antiflak Hurricanes,* four Hurricane bombers, and two Spitfire squadrons. The rendezvous is carried out below 500 feet to cheat the enemy radio direction finder, and the whole force—led by the antiflak aircraft—goes out at sea level. When the target is sighted, the antiflak Hurricanes (both cannon and 12-gun types) pull up to about 2,000 feet and then dive on the flak ships. The Hurricane bombers pull up with them and go down on their tails to get the benefit of the antiflak fire, and pull their bombs off as low as possible (with 11 seconds' delay). Meanwhile, the two Spitfire squadrons have pulled up to 3,000 feet and 5,000 feet. As many flak ships as possible should be attacked out of

*Hurricane IIB, which may be equipped either with twelve .303 caliber machine guns, carrying 350 rounds each, or four 20-mm. cannon, carrying 85 rounds in outboard cannon and 95 rounds in inboard cannon. This is a fighter plane similar to old U. S. attack planes.

the sun. There should only be the shortest practicable delay between the antiflak attack and the bombing.

d. *Execution of a rhubarb.*—A rhubarb, as described, takes advantage of cloud cover, which should be adequate for concealment and should have a base of at least 1,500 feet for safety in breaking cloud. If cloud cover is unsatisfactory, the aircraft—which are not more than one pair—should return immediately. Rhubarb aircraft should be detailed to a route and time and given an area in which to break cloud. Their first objective is enemy aircraft in the air, but the area will also contain alternative ground objectives concerning which pilots must be carefully briefed. They should not, however, take unnecessary risks to find the ground target if it is not at once located.

5. *Formations and fighting tactics.*—The Germans like to make a surprise pecking attack and then get away as quickly as possible. Each squadron, therefore, needs a well-thought-out and practical plan of action to meet this form of attack. Two cardinal principles may be laid down:

a. Always turn to the attack.

b Try to maintain height and tactical cohesion, for scattering is fatal.

To fulfill both of these conditions, a flexible and maneuverable formation is necessary, enabling either the whole formation to turn or flights (or pairs) to turn outwards and form circles at the same height. Such maneuvering places the aircraft in a position advantageous for attack or quick reforming.

Surprise by the enemy must also be avoided. This can best be achieved by weavers—placed about 500 feet above and below the formation and just ahead of it—or by the weaving of the whole formation or of selected pairs. Many formations can be adopted, each equally good, but in every case the formation must be flexible and maneuverable without being rigid. If weavers are employed, they should be changed at frequent intervals.

It is also essential to have a plan for the detachment from the formation of a suitable attacking force according to the target presented. The force sent down must be capable of fighting its own way out, but at least one-third of the original force should remain above as an "umbrella."

Each aircraft of a pair should be spaced about 50 yards apart, and each pair about 100 yards apart. Close to home territory these distances should be opened out, affording greater flexibility for attack.

E. Notes for Air Crews on Night Visibility as Applied to Night Fighting.

1. Study the weather and decide how to apply it to your tactics before each sortie.

2. Remember that once you have picked up your enemy, it is easier to hold him in view than to start your search afresh.

3. A moving target is much easier to see than a stationary one. Create relative movement, therefore, by gently rocking your aircraft when searching.

4. Do not search vaguely into space. Try to visualize your target at the range at which you expect to find it and search accordingly.

5. Provided conditions are constant, an aircraft is twice as easy to see in plan as in elevation.

6. Favorable conditions for spotting aircraft:

a. In moonlight, high cirrus clouds above the target provides the most ideal conditions for upward search, and the most favorable condition for unaided sighting at night.

b. In moonlight, with a clear starlit sky above, and a cloud carpet beneath, the visibility from below the target is approximately five times less than from astern and slightly above.

c. Very little moonlight is required to make downward visibility exceed upward visibility provided there is unbroken carpet below. A choppy sea or snow below provides as effective a background as does a cloud carpet.

d. A cloud carpet below of less than seven-tenths reduces the effectiveness of downward search and consequently makes it unreliable.

IV. BOMBARDMENT AIRCRAFT.

A. British Defensive Tactics for Bomber Aircraft.

1. *Detection of enemy aircraft.*

a. The crews of bomber aircraft flying over hostile territory must maintain constant and systematic search of the sky to avoid surprise by enemy fighters. The avoidance of surprise is of first importance.

b. When searching, aircraft will usually be in cruising formation. While all members of each crew should keep a general lookout within their fields of vision, most of their attention should, in addition, be devoted to special sectors allotted by the formation leader. It

is not enough to gaze vaguely around the allotted sector. Each man must scan his sector methodically, dividing it mentally into parts and examining each part in turn.

c. Reports of enemy aircraft must be clear and concise and are best done by practiced drill. This drill is based on radio, but visual signals are also suggested.

2. *Engagement with enemy fighters.*

a. The approach phase.—Fighter aircraft usually attempt their approach from a position abeam of the bomber formation, though this is, of course, dependent on the direction in which sighting first takes place and on the position of the sun and clouds. The leader of the fighter formation decides on the type of attack to be made while still some distance from the bombers. His difficulty is to assess the frontage on which he can attack and, consequently, the number of fighters that can attack simultaneously.

Bomber formations can exploit this approach by reducing the frontage occupied. If the change to fighting formation by the bombers is made shortly before the fighters come within the range at which the bombers would normally open fire, the reduction of front may disorganize a mass attack by leaving the wing fighters without a target. On the other hand, rapid changes of formation are likely to reduce considerably the accuracy of aim and consequently the fire power of the bombers.

b. *The attack.*

(1) *Direction of attack.*—The attacks developed by fighter command for fixed gun fighters fall into two

main classes; those which are delivered from flat astern of the target, and those in which the attack is delivered from astern in a position either higher or lower than the target.

During the first few weeks of the war, German fighters attacked from the astern position, varying from slightly below to slightly above the bombers level. As a result of effective counterfire from bombers, German fighters have recently attacked from the beam. This method of attack has previously been considered impracticable in view of the very large deflection allowance required.

It should not be assumed, however, that the beam attack is the only method that will be employed by German fighters. Many instances have been reported in which beam and stern attacks are carried out simultaneously.

(2) *Range of gun fire.*—The fire of an 8-gun fighter is considered to be ineffective until the range is about 400 yards.

The fire of a 4-gun fighter such as an Me 109 will usually be effective at even closer ranges. In cases where cannons are fitted, fire may be directed at 600 to 800 yards.

(3) Recent experience has shown that the armament of British heavier bombers has deterred many fighters from pressing home their attacks.

(4) The object should be to give a fighting burst at 600 yards, and then to open the main volume of fire at 400 yards. Should the fighter stand off at 800 yards and use cannon fire, bombers should not reply

by "blazing away" their limited supply of ammunition. When fighters press home attacks to close ranges, the bombers should always endeavor to open fire first in order to disturb the fighters' aim and possibly destroy them before the fighters can get in a decisive burst. Since fighters achieve the best results when overtaking at 30 to 40 miles per hour, there should be time for bombers to take deliberate aim.

(5) Some bombers produce a violent slip stream which rises about 20 feet at about 50 yards astern, from which height it falls and disperses after about 600 yards. It would seem that these characteristics could be used to the disadvantage of the fighter. However, it should be remembered that by accelerating to attain the speed at which this effect is most marked, the formation leader might find that he has dislocated his formation and subjected the rearmost aircraft to isolated attacks.

(6) The maneuver of bombers during the attacks should be designed—

(*a*) To induce inaccuracies of the fighters' aim.

(*b*) To defeat the particular type of attack adopted by the fighters.

(*c*) To distract the attention of fighter pilots attacking in mass by causing them to maneuver their aircraft to avoid collision with other fighters.

These evasive maneuvers should be timed to begin at the moment before the fighter opens fire so that he must realign his sights. It is then that offensive fire from the bomber formation can be brought to bear.

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3. *Conclusions.*—The general conclusions from the foregoing paragraphs are:

a. A bomber formation can, by changing its formation, advantageously limit the number of fighters that can be deployed simultaneously against the rear of the formation, though the experience of crews, the degree of warning of attack, and the possible dislocation of the bomber's fire power as a result of too rapid change of formation should not be overlooked.

b. Maneuvers should be designed to disturb the accuracy of enemy fire and to create a collision risk amongst the fighters.

c. There should be time under present-day closing speeds for the bomber to take decisive aim at the fighters before he closes to his effective range, but the tendency to "blaze away" without having taken decisive range may leave the gunner without any ammunition for the next attack.

d. To be really effective, the adoption of a fighting formation, the execution of maneuvers, and the opening of fire all depend on accurate timing. Judgment of timing can only be gained from experience and practice. Until all have gained this experience, it may be wise to rely on a fighting controller—an individual who has this knowledge.

4. *Types of formations.*

a. General requirements.—An operational formation should meet certain requirements. These requirements in general are—

(1) Effective delivery of the bombing attack.
(2) Negotiation of clouds.

(3) Avoidance of fatigue.
(4) Maneuver against high altitude antiaircraft fire.
(5) Observation against surprise by enemy fighters.
(6) Mutual fire support.
(7) Flexibility for the employment of fighting maneuvers.

The delivery of the bombing attack is the end in itself. The type of formation for the delivery of the bombs must depend on the nature of the target, the weather, the method of attack, etc.

b. Additional requirements.—Other requirements governing the choice of formation are obviously variants, which are discussed in the following paragraph.

(1) *Negotiation of clouds.*—Experience has indicated that a well-trained section can keep formation while negotiating normal cloud, though some pilots prefer to climb through cloud individually and to rendezvous about it. It is clearly more desirable for aircraft to "hold together" whenever practicable. Knowledge of clouds and their formation will best enable a formation leader to decide.

(2) *Avoidance of fatigue.*—It is generally agreed that the section in loose vee is the least tiring to pilots and is the type of formation in which they are most practiced. Whatever type of formation may be adopted to provide the required supporting fire, due regard must be paid to the possibility of fatigue that comes from close formation for unnecessarily long periods.

(3) *Antiaircraft fire—High altitude.*—Maneuver and dispersal by sections reduces the efficacy of antiaircraft fire. The degree of maneuver necessary to

provide practical immunity is discussed later. The degree of dispersal required to localize the danger of individual shell bursts is 100 yards displacement between aircraft in a horizontal plane. To comply with this requirement would entail such a straggling formation that fighters, who are the greater danger, would have their task simplified. The best compromise may be achieved by flying in section about 200 yards apart in support of one another.

(4) *Mutual fire support.*—It is very necessary for a formation to be disposed with a view to concentration of fire power and the mutual support of all its members.

(5) *Flexibility.*—A formation must be flexible—

(*a*) To allow for maneuver against antiaircraft fire and fighters.

(*b*) To permit easy changing between cruising and fighting formation.

(*c*) To enable aircraft to be redisposed in the formation. From the foregoing there appear to be three main requirements—a formation effective for cruising, for fighting, and for bombing.

5. *Choice of formation.*

a. Cruising formations.—A cruising formation should—

(1) Throw the least possible strain on the pilots.

(2) Permit a constant lookout for enemy fighters.

(3) Allow quick assembly into a fighting formation.

(4) Be suitable for evading high altitude antiaircraft fire. For three aircraft the choice is comparatively simple, the vee formation being generally considered the best.

For six aircraft the choice is more difficult. The open "box" is likely to be tiring for long periods, particularly so if flying into the sun. Also, the restricted visibility in this formation hinders detection of enemy aircraft. The only advantage of the close-up to close "box" as a cruising formation is that it is rapid and easy to form. Two sections in vee, each in close formation, the rear section stepped up to a flank or in line astern at a distance of about 200 yards, may provide a satisfactory compromise.

b. Fighting formation of bombers.—A fighting formation should—

(1) Afford effective mutual fire support.

(2) Present a narrow frontage on which fighters can attack.

(3) Permit evasive maneuvers.

For a section, a good fighting formation is a stepped-up close vee.

Two sections can also fly in echelon in readiness to carry out a fighting maneuver such as the sliding-sec-sections maneuver, but it should be remembered that in order to be effective, fighting maneuvers depend on accuracy of execution.

Nine aircraft from one squadron will normally operate as a formation of six and a section of three, the latter acting independently.

Twelve aircraft will operate in two separate boxes of six in support, but each under the independent control of its own leader.

c. General.—In the event of casualties in any formation, it may be necessary to alter the disposition of the

aircraft in the whole or in each subformation. It is the responsibility of the squadron commander to detail before the departure of a raid what changes in formation are to be adopted as a result of casualties. Possible alternative formations would consist of single vee formations, or, if an even number of aircraft is concerned, a vee formation with the leader stationed just ahead of the apex.

6. *Fighter maneuvers for bombers.*

a. General considerations.—The fighting maneuvers of bombers contained herein have been proved by experiments to increase the difficulties of fighters when attacking a bomber formation. It is the responsibility of the formation leader to decide which maneuvers to adopt, bearing in mind the standard reached in executing these maneuvers and the disturbing effect on the aim of the gunner owing to change of formation.

It should be realized that success against fighters is dependent both on fire power and on maneuver. Correct timing and application of these two factors give the bombers their best chance of success.

The aim of evasive action is to throw off the aim of the fighters while enabling the bombers to fire. It may be achieved by the changes of course, speed, and relative position described hereafter.

b. Corkscrewing.—When an aircraft flies in a spiral path of from 4° to 6° from the line of flight, it is said to corkscrew. Corkscrewing gives the fighter a difficult target, as his deflection is continually changing. This maneuver is suitable for aircraft in a formation to carry out independently.

c. Protection by friendly vessel's antiaircraft fire.—A plane attacked by three enemy fighters successfully protected itself by seeking the protection of a friendly vessel's antiaircraft fire.

d. Skidding.—The skidding of individual aircraft in a formation may spoil the fighter's aim but also has the disadvantage of disturbing the bomber gunner's aim.

e. Undulating.—Undulating is an up-and-down switch-back motion which can be made as a section maneuver or by aircraft individually in the section. It should not unduly disturb the air gunner's aim but will compel the fighter continually to resight.

f. Sliding.—The sliding to and fro of the rearmost of two sections astern of and below the leading section gives the fighter a difficult changing deflection shot.

g. Turning.—Turning in formation before fighters open fire should throw off the fighters' aim and allow the upper free guns of the bomber to be brought to bear.

h. Countermeasures against fixed gun beam attacks.—In encounters between certain bombers and enemy fighters there have been instances of the enemy's delivering beam attacks. Trials undertaken have confirmed previous experience that such attacks only permit snap-shooting by the fighter, and can be effectively countered by maneuvers designed to upset the aim of the attacker and to bring the armament of the bombers into play.

It is apparent that the length of time in which "possible hits" would be obtained by this form of attack

is measured in tenths of seconds only. This is with an 8-gun fighter: with the enemy 4-gun or cannon fighter, the efficiency of fire would be still less.

Where beam attack is experienced, there is a danger of enfilade of the bomber formation, but this can be met by altering the relative positions of the aircraft in the formation.

There is clear evidence to show that the enemy has been forced to resort to these beam attacks when the formation tactics and powerful armament of our bombers have made it hazardous for him to attempt attacks from directly astern.

i. Best measures to counter enemy beam attacks.

(1) *Beam attack delivered after an approach from ahead.*—The best counter to this attack is to turn in towards the fighter with the object of misplacing him, disturbing his aim, and closing the distance as rapidly as possible. In addition, it may be possible to bring the front fixed gun to bear on the fighter, but any tendency on the part of the formation leader to turn his formation too violently in order to do this should be checked.

The turn towards the enemy should be begun as soon as he is committed to his attack, a point in time which can be judged only by experience. This maneuver should, therefore, be practiced in affiliation exercises.

(2) *Beam attack delivered after an approach from astern.*—Here again the best countermeasure has proved to be the "turn in."

It must always be remembered that the primary function of a bomber is to maintain its course and to reach its target. Any turning to evade enemy attack must, therefore, be made good as quickly as possible.

If a "turn in" is made to avoid the attack, rear gunners should train their guns so as to be able to deliver a rapid burst at the fleeting target presented by the fighter as it breaks away. Unless this is done, valuable opportunities may be missed.

(3) *Attack from the sun.*—In all attacks it is necessary to keep the enemy in sight from the earliest possible moment so that the correct time to turn in in order to throw off the fighters can be accurately judged. If the bombers are surprised, it will be too late for them to produce an effective evasion.

For this reason it cannot be too strongly stressed that when the sun is visible, antiglare spectacles should be worn by as many members of the crew as possible.

j. *Summary.*—The following fighting formations and maneuvers have been found to be effective:

(1) *Section.*

(*a*) Undulating of the formation in unison or by aircraft individually;

(*b*) Turning-in formation;

(*c*) Corkscrewing.

(2) *Flight.*

(*a*) Box formation, individual aircraft corkscrewing;

(*b*) Sliding sections, the rear section passing to and fro, close astern of and below the leading section;

(*c*) Turning-in formation.

7. *Low flying.*—It will often be desirable to carry out low attacks preceded and followed by low flying

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in the approach and in the get-away. Light flak and small-arms fire have been found to be effective up to a height of 4,000 feet.

If aircraft fly really low, under 200 feet, the antiaircraft gunner's field of view and field of fire are so restricted, and the rate of change of angle of the guns may be so high, that the aircraft becomes a very difficult target. "Jinking" will add appreciably to the aircraft's security.

A low-flying bomber is not easily detected by fighters. If the bomber is very close to the ground, the fighter is restricted to a direct approach from astern and above. This provides an unobstructed target for the upper rear guns and reduces the area which the bomber must keep under observation.

Good tactics for the bomber, therefore, against both light antiaircraft fire and fighters are "hedge hopping" and "jinking." These tactics may be possible in close formation with a well-trained section, but generally it will be more practicable with a section flying in "contact," with individual aircraft spaced, say, at 250 yards. For aircraft flying independently these tactics should present little difficulty.

8. *Fighting control.*

a. The problem of fighting control in bomber aircraft has been under investigation for some time. Opinions differ greatly as to its practicability and efficacy. In general, it is agreed that some form of control is most desirable.

The layout of crew positions in certain bombers create difficulties in formulating an efficient system of

fighting control, owing to restricted space and poor visibility.

The system suggested in the following paragraphs is that which is considered most suitable:

(1) It is considered that the timing of maneuver and fire can best be controlled from the upper gunner's position of the leader's aircraft. This is the best position from which to observe both the whole bomber formation and the enemy aircraft.

(2) The maneuvers to be adopted should normally be decided by the formation leader, who will inform the fighting controller. Provision must be made for change from cruising to fighting formation. This change must be automatic after warning is given by any member of the formation in the case of absence of any instructions from the formation leader or the fighting controller.

(3) Fighting control cannot, however, be effective unless adequate warning of the approach of fighters is received. It is, therefore, vital that a keen lookout be kept to prevent surprise attacks. All personnel of the formation should search for enemy aircraft. Sighting reports should be made to the formation leader.

b. Responsibilities of the fighting controller.—The responsibilities of the fighting controller should be:

(1) To keep the formation leader informed as to the position and range of enemy aircraft so that the leader can judge the correct time to order evasive maneuvering;

(2) To indicate targets to be engaged by one or more air gunners, and to check any tendency to open fire prematurely or to waste valuable ammunition.

9. *Avoidance of high altitude antiaircraft fire.*—*a.* The lethal range of fragmentation of single bursts may be as high as 40 yards, but at a height of 10,000 feet the zone of error makes a distance of about 200 yards between sections advisable.

Antiaircraft fire does not utilize observation of previous rounds. Each shot is treated as a separate problem and is solved with the aid of the predictor. The first burst, therefore, may be effective if avoiding action has not been taken. Suitable avoiding action to provide practical immunity at various heights is shown in the following table for a cruising speed of 200 miles per hour. Change can be made, of course, in any dimension.

Aircraft height in feet	Under fire		Not under fire	
	Safe time to maintain straight course	Change of course required	Safe time to maintain straight course	Change of course required
	Seconds	°	*Seconds*	°
5,000	10	12	15	8
10,000	15	8	20	6
15,000	20	6	35	4
20,000	25	5		

A sequence of changes for the passage of an antiaircraft-defended area should be detailed before flight.

For example, a formation at a height of 15,000 feet and at a speed of 200 miles per hour could change a course of 4 degrees every 35 seconds in the following order—Right, Climb, Left, Dive. After antiaircraft fire is opened, the changes would be 6 degrees every 20 seconds.

On the other hand, it may be argued that such tactics are too involved and that a more simple procedure is preferable. A standard turn of 10 degrees every 20 seconds should present less difficulty to both formation leaders and pilots. If the antiaircraft fire becomes uncomfortably accurate, then pilots can resort to change of height.

It should be noted that when German fighters are in the vicinity, antiaircraft gunners have drawn their attention to a bomber formation by firing bursts pointing toward the formation.

b. Over clouds.—When aircraft are flying over clouds, the conditions are similar to those at night, antiaircraft guns being directed by sound.

10. *Night operations.*—There are three types of opposition to be expected by night-flying aircraft: searchlights, antiaircraft guns, and fighters.

a. Searchlights.—Searchlights are used to illuminate bombers so that—

(1) Antiaircraft gunners can use their normal prediction methods.

(2) The bombers' position may be indicated to fighters, enabling the fighters to attack.

(3) The bombers' crews may be so dazzled that they cannot see fighters.

A searchlight is trained initially with the aid of sound locators, but when it has once picked up an aircraft, it is trained by sight. As sound travels at about 1,100 feet per second, the sound locator never points at the present position of an aircraft, but at a past position where the aircraft was when it emitted the sound. For example, sound takes about 10 seconds to travel 11,000 feet. In this time an aircraft flying at 150 miles per hour travels 2,200 feet. As the diameter of a normal searchlight beam at 11,000 feet is about 550 feet, a large allowance is necessary. Searchlight crews make this allowance by guessing the aircraft's speed or by having lines of sound locators at a definite interval to measure its speed.

It will be apparent that it is much more difficult for the searchlight to make its first contact than to hold an aircraft. A bomber's tactics should, therefore, be designed primarily to avoid being picked up by the searchlight rather than to escape from the beam after having been picked up.

Searchlights are also being used by the Germans for the following purposes: To hide targets from view by concentrating a cone of light over them; and to nullify the effect of a parachute flare dropped by a bomber by concentrating a cone of light underneath the descending flare, thus hiding the target from the bomber's view.

The following methods have proved successful in distracting the searchlights and antiaircraft defenses when two or more aircraft are attacking the same target:

In the first method one or two aircraft make feint attacks in the vicinity of the target at a comparatively safe height. These aircraft burn their navigation or recognition lights. Experience has shown that the attention of the defenses is attracted to them while the remaining aircraft are left comparatively free from opposition, particularly if they make gliding approaches from various directions. The "decoy" aircraft can proceed to bomb the target when their "decoy" value has been lost or is no longer required.

The second method is to attack simultaneously with a number of aircraft operating at different heights. It has been found that the searchlights and antiaircraft defenses are generally attracted to the lowest ones, leaving the higher one unmolested.

b. Avoiding action.—To avoid being picked up, the time lag inherent in any sound-locating system can be exploited. Whatever system is in use, it will probably be necessary for locators to follow an aircraft for some time before the searchlights can be switched on with any probability of illuminating the target. If an aircraft continually changes course, therefore, the searchlight should fail to find it. A change of height does not affect the problem, as the aircraft would not thereby escape the beam. The best avoiding action appears to be to change course about 5 degrees every 1½ minutes when over a suspected searchlight zone.

Desynchronization of engines will probably confuse an inexperienced sound-locator operator temporarily but will not be effective against a trained operator.

This stratagem is not, therefore, a substitute for the avoiding action described above.

An aircraft with the engine throttled back is normally manœuvrable above 6,000 feet, and at greater heights should remain manœuvrable with partial throttle. Advantage of this can be taken by approaching and passing over a defended area in a shallow power glide. In this way large distances can be covered without much loss of height.

11. *Visibility.*—Experience has shown that an aircraft painted with antireflection paint is invisible from the ground at 12,000 feet and above, even when illuminated by searchlights. When illuminated by searchlights at 12,000 feet or above, therefore, normal avoiding action as given above should be sufficient to take an aircraft clear of the lights.

Since it must not be assumed, however, that the aircraft will also be invisible to a nearby fighter, a close lookout will be necessary.

At lower heights, when an aircraft is held in a searchlight beam and can be seen from the ground, attacks by antiaircraft guns or by fighters or by both can be expected shortly thereafter. As these attacks will be dependent for their effectiveness on searchlight illumination of the target, it is of first importance to escape from the beam. Alterations in height are not in themselves effective except in so much as they involve alterations of speed. The best avoiding action is to make a steep turn and increase speed. It may sometimes be advisable to lose a little height to gain speed. Alternatively, if the aircraft is near the limit of visibility, it

might be advisable to make climbing turns so as to reach invisibility height. If below 3,000 feet, and the beam cannot be shaken off, it may be advantageous to lose height, since searchlights cannot easily be traversed quickly enough to follow an aircraft very low down.

The German defense system includes an outer screen of flak ships in the North Sea. These ships cannot be as efficient as sound locators on land. The sound of wind and waves, combined with the instability of a ship, makes accurate sound locating almost impossible except in a flat calm.

In fact, it is questionable whether high flying aircraft could be heard at all, especially if throttled back slightly. The ships will, therefore, not normally be able to give warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft.

12. *Antiaircraft guns.*—If a bomber can be seen in searchlight beams, antiaircraft gunners follow normal daylight prediction methods. The method of escaping a beam given above is more violent than the avoiding action necessary against antiaircraft fire in daylight and will, therefore, be effective against night antiaircraft fire.

In other cases, when a bomber is either too high to be seen in searchlight beams, or is above cloud, antiaircraft guns are laid by sound-location methods which are subject to the time lag. To the time lag, owing to the speed of sound, must be added the time of flight of the shell. The action recommended to avoid being picked up by searchlights should, therefore, be equally

effective against antiaircraft gun fire. As an additional safeguard, however, it is advisable to change height as well as course, since an antiaircraft shell must be correct both in range and line, a dual requirement that does not arise with a searchlight beam.

Another method used by antiaircraft gunners when an aircraft cannot be seen is to put a barrage around it. Many barrages will be wide and will necessitate no additional maneuvers. Some, however, may be uncomfortably close. If the position of the center of the group of bursts can be approximately estimated, the aircraft should maneuver away in the opposite direction.

If this positon is not apparent, the following consideration should be borne in mind. An antiaircraft shell brust is more dangerous below than above. Although the blast effect from a near miss in any position will be the same, the fragments from an "over" never hit an aircraft, but those from "short" may do so. A loss of height is therefore normally more effective than a gain of height. Again, bursts are more dangerous in front than when flying away from them. Hence, an increase in speed will normally be more effective than a decrease in speed.

13. *Fighters versus bombers.*—A fighter's greatest difficulty at night is to find the bomber. The position of bombers is often indicated to fighters by the intersection of searchlight beams and by antiaircraft fire. Searchlight beams ahead of a bomber may be used to silhouette it to a fighter approaching from behind.

When an aircraft is not held in a searchlight beam, it can be seen much more easily from below than from

above. A fighter's best approach is, therefore, from slightly below and behind. Since, owing to the difficulty in judging range and closing speed, he is unable to close as quickly as in daytime, he will try to stalk the bomber, drawing gradually closer to get to point blank range. A very close lookout must be maintained by the bomber crew in the restricted area of fighter approach below and astern. Night glasses may help to insure that the fighter is seen in time.

When bombers are flying above clouds which are illuminated from below by searchlights, to a fighter above they may be clearly silhouetted against the clouds. In these circumstances, a careful watch should be maintained by the bombers' crews in all directions.

The main counter to fighter attack at night must be evasion. When a fighter is seen or opens fire, the bomber must immediately dive and turn steeply away. A loss of as little as 500 feet should shake off the fighter, who will probably never regain contact. It must be emphasized that it is useless to restrict maneuver in order to give the rear gunner a good shot. At night a fighter can approach so closely, before being seen, that he has a big advantage over the bomber in a shooting match. On the other hand, it is difficult to keep the bomber in view, and evasive action by the bomber should always be successful if taken in time.

Intercommunication between the pilot and the rear gunner must be rapid and certain at all times.

14. *Summary of defensive bomber tactics.*—*a.* The following action is recommended:

(1) An attempt should be made to get far into a defended area undetected. This is done by partially throttling back and losing height.

(2) When flying over a defended zone, a change of course of 5° every 1½ minutes should be made, and height should be continually varied.

(3) If caught in a beam over 12,000 feet or above cloud, the same changes of course should be continued.

(4) If caught in a beam within visibility height. turns should be made and speed increased, or climbing turns to invisibility height should be made.

(5) In an antiaircraft barrage, a turn in the opposite direction from the center of the group should be made. If in doubt, speed should be increased and height lost.

(6) When a fighter is seen in position to attack, a diving turn should be made for about 500 feet.

The bomber's task is to get to the target. The avoiding action recommended above is purely defensive and is designed to increase the chance of reaching the target. It must not be carried to such an extent that the main offensive task is prejudiced. Losses of height and deviations from track caused by evasive maneuvers must therefore be made good at the first opportunity.

B. Offensive Bombing Tactics.

1. *Japanese.*—*a. Horizontal bombing.*—Horizontal bombing precedes torpedo bombing. The aircraft attack in close line abreast, at an altitude of 12,000 feet, and drop their bombs simultaneously on signal. The tactical unit is nine.

b. Torpedo bombing.—Torpedo bombing was observed to proceed as follows: The bombers lost altitude out of gun range, approached in a loose column, and deployed for attack into a wedge or loose diamond formation, dropping torpedoes at an average distance of 1,500 yards, some closing to 300 yards. Altitudes at the time of dropping torpedoes varied up to 300 feet. Only individual attacks were made and always with complete disregard for antiaircraft fire. The tactical unit is nine.

c. Heavy bombers.—Heavy bombers operate in multiples of nine aircraft, divided into subflights of three. Station-keeping is generally good, though outside flights lose distance on turns. There is evidence that on occasion such formations have been commanded from one of the extreme outside aircraft. Occasionally one or two aircraft are missing from the formation. A theoretical explanation suggests that the missing aircraft have performed a reconnaissance mission earlier.

d. Bomb delivery.—Over Philippine objectives, two or three practice runs were made. On the bombing run the leader rocked his plane before the point of bomb release was reached. The approach was made in formation and the sound of engines could be heard for several minutes before the delivery of bombs. Usually all aircraft released bombs simultaneously. Bombers were believed to be equipped with a mechanical device which opened the bomb racks at regularly spaced intervals. The course of flight was changed immediately after delivery of bombs.

e. Medium bombers.—High-altitude bombers fly in vee formation separated by the width of two aircraft. Bombs are released at altitudes of 8,000 to 12,000 feet. High-altitude attacks are well synchronized with those of dive bombers.

f. Dive bombers.—The dive is shallow, in Hawaii the angle observed being between 45 and 50 degrees. Usually aircraft follow each other closely onto the target and release bombs at a low altitude. After release of bombs, the aircraft climb steeply. Targets are struck from all directions almost simultaneously; the dive is initiated from 3,000 to 5,000 feet and continues nearly to the target. Having released bombs, dive bombers employ their machine guns against ground installations.

2. *German.*—*a. Dive-bombing.*—The usual number of dive bombers employed on raids has been 30 to 40, with an escort of about ten Me 109's. The enemy has used either Ju 88 or Ju 87. The Ju 88's generally dive-bomb at an angle of 50 to 60 degrees; the Ju 87's, at 70 to 80 degrees. Formations approached at 14,000 to 17,000 feet from the sun and dived out of the sun, releasing their bombs at about 6,000 feet. When antiaircraft fire is heavy, they do not stay on each others' tails in the dive but maintain a good interval. They release their bombs about 500 feet above the target. When antiaircraft fire is light, they sometimes attack four at a time in a single line. They generally release one large and four small bombs from each aircraft, or one large and two small. They never make more than one run. The bombs form no

pattern, and the large bombs usually overshoot the small ones. The bombs usually fall within 50 to 150 yards of the target.

After pulling out, the dive-bombers disperse seaward at low altitude, about 100 feet, occasionally machine-gunning indiscriminately.

Raids are generally concentrated on a single target. Forty Ju 87's, in five or six flights, attacked one four-gun antiaircraft post. When Hurricanes were in action, enemy losses were often 50 percent. The heavy antiaircraft harbor barrage has forced 70 percent of the dive bombers to release their bombs at over 4,000 feet, with consequent loss of accuracy. Many divers have been seen to swing sideways near the end of their dive to try to avoid the barrage. In these cases the bombs drop over 400 yards wide.

Recent dive-bombing raids have also been accompanied by one or two Hs 126's which stay up at 15,000 feet or higher and watch the performance.

b. Attacks by torpedo-carrying aircraft.—There are indications that an increase in enemy attacks on shipping by torpedo-carrying aircraft is to be expected shortly. The following notes give some idea of the probable behavior of enemy aircraft engaged on such attacks:

(1) The torpedo must be aimed from a position before the beam and not too fine on the bow. Before firing, the pilot has to make an estimate of the approximate speed and course of the target ship. Thus he has to settle on a course and observe the enemy for an appreciable time before releasing his torpedo.

The torpedo cannot be angled except by turning the aircraft. The aircraft course will therefore be roughly towards a point ahead of the target ship.

(2) The closer the aircraft is to the target, the more likely the torpedo is to hit. It is safe to say that below 1,000 yards there is a very reasonable probability of hitting, whereas beyond that range accuracy falls off sharply. The 12-pounder fitted to most merchant ships is regarded as fully effective up to this range.

(3) Unless specially strengthened and fitted with some form of rudder or wings that will stabilize its position, an ordinary (naval) torpedo cannot be dropped from a height greater than 30 feet. German torpedoes of this type are said to be about 16 feet long and 20/24 inches in diameter, fitted with a box-like stabilizing fin, the motive power being compressed air.

(4) On some He 111 aircraft, at least, it is possible to preset the angle of lead (drift) and the depth by means of a Bowden wire. The height of release would be 150 to 200 feet.

c. Minelaying.—The following are reported tactics by enemy aircraft engaged in minelaying:

(1) A prominent landfall is chosen and a compass course set. Before reaching the desired position, the aircraft is put into a gentle dive and the mine is released from a height of 1,500 feet at a maximum initial air speed of 220 miles per hour. The pilot then tries to gain height.

(2) Minelaying aircraft in the Thames Estuary are reported as utilizing the following headlands for pin-

pointing: Margate, Foulness Point, Shoeburyness, and, on occasion, Garrison Point, Sheerness.

(3) The longest run up from the final pin-point to the point of releasing the mine appears to be about 5 minutes, but wherever possible a landmark is selected requiring a run of not more than 2 or 3 minutes. When minelaying aircraft sight a convoy before releasing their mines, they fly ahead of the convoy, on the same course, and release the mines sufficiently far ahead to escape observation.

(4) A new type of mine is now being carried. It is painted black so that no markings can be seen. The Germans consider that this new type of mine is difficult, if not impossible, to sweep. Their faith in its effectiveness is such that they are said to be planning to employ it extensively if and when their bomber units are withdrawn from the Eastern Front. They estimate that they would be able to concentrate a force sufficiently large to necessitate the full time employment of 8,000 of our ships and 1,000,000 men in the work of sweeping.

3. *British.—a. Torpedo attacks.*—The reports of actual attacks on the enemy during 1940 give the following results:

	Hits
Torpedoes against anchored or moored targets	52%
Dive-bombing against anchored or moored targets	14%
Torpedoes against convoyed transports, etc., underway	27%

	Hits
Torpedoes against maneuvering warships of all types	12%
Dive-bombing against maneuvering warships of all types	6%

The hits from horizontal bombing by carrier aircraft were not mentioned. It is apparent from the results of actual attacks on Germans during 1940 that airborne torpedo attacks have proved the most powerful weapons of the British Navy.

(1) *Method of attack.*—The British have two general forms of torpedo attack: one to be used against harbor target, or when there is low visibility; the other, at all other times. In the first type of attack the approach is made close to the water for a great distance to avoid the radio direction finder and sight detection. When close to the target, the squadrons go into line astern 100 to 200 yards and attack successively, if in the close confines of a harbor, or simultaneously, if in the open.

For the standard good-visibility attack, the approach is made at 4,000 to 6,000 feet, or above the overcast, if there is one. When in the vicinity of the target, as shown by the ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radio, one plane is sent below the overcast to note the course, speed, bearing, and distance of target. The plane rejoins the formation and informs the leader visually. The squadron then goes into a column of sections (at a distance of 300 to 400 yards) and proceeds to the desired striking position, within a 3 to 4-mile semicircle forward of the target's beam. Sections are then formed into a column (about 200 yards between planes) and follow the leader in a 45 degree dive through the overcast, between the clouds, or out of the sun, depending on the weather.

In general, the first section usually takes the far bow of the target, the second the near bow, and succeeding sections go in as they judge best from the maneuvers of the target. The actual attacks are left to the individual pilots, who are free to make their final approach as they see fit and drop where they like. The only rules governing this part of the attack are that the torpedo must be dropped at a height of 50 to 100 feet, at a speed of 120 to 140 knots, and from 800 to 1,200 yards from the target. The dive is in open column in order to prevent the enemy from guessing into what form the attack is likely to develop; to give the leader complete freedom of maneuver; to present the enemy with numerous confusing targets; and to exercise the initiative of all pilots.

After dropping, all planes retreat close to the water. Excess speed picked up during the dive enables them to carry out aerobatics during the retreat that are confusing to antiaircraft and fighters alike. Extreme maneuverability is one of the advantages of the old biplane torpedo-carriers of the Fleet Air Arm.

(2) *Torpedo planes.*—The British carrier-based torpedo plane is either a Fairey, a Swordfish, or an Albacore. Both are slow biplanes carrying an officer observer-navigator in addition to the pilot and air gunner. The range is 400 miles at 103 miles per hour, with an additional 180 miles possible when using long-range gasoline tanks. With these tanks installed there is room for only one person in the rear compartment, so that either the observer or the air gunner must be left

behind. Landing speed is 69 miles per hour; top speed is 126.7 miles per hour. The torpedo weighs 1,500 pounds and carries a 270-pound warhead. Against anchored targets or in shallow water, a setting of 27 knots giving a range of 4,000 yards is used. For all other forms of attack 40 knots (31M) giving 1,800 yards is used.

(3) *Position of torpedo.*—The torpedo is carried flush against the bottom of the fuselage with its axis parallel to the longitudinal axis of the plane. This is more satisfactory than our method of slinging the torpedo from a bombing device with the axis of the torpedo depressed 9 degrees from the axis of the plane. It is possible for the British to make good drops when carrying the torpedo flush, since they have air rudders that actually steer the torpedo and keep it parallel to the tangent of the trajectory. To assist in this steering of the torpedo into the water, wire cables are attached to its stern, thus prolonging for a moment its position in a vertical plane.

(4) *Description of torpedo.*—The torpedoes are fitted with duplex pistols that detonate on contact or when the torpedo passes under the ship. Except under conditions of very heavy swell the torpedoes are set to run 3 to 5 feet beneath the target. In order to detonate when passing under degaussed ships,[1] the electric mechanism must be extremely sensitive. It is so senitive that with heavy seas the duplex pistol must be removed and

[1] A ship is degaussed when magnetic lines of force between it and a magnetic mine have been broken.

the contact detonators used alone. During the first attack on the Bismarck by the torpedo planes of the Ark Royal, many torpedoes exploded prematurely before reaching the target. Experts believe this was due to the swell changing the strength of the earth's field in the pistol.

(5) *Training for torpedo dropping.*—British torpedo squadrons spend a great deal of time perfecting their attacks, averaging at least two torpedo practices a week, in which smoke bombs are dropped to indicate the point of release. On carriers, instead of dummy torpedoes, two 500-pound bombs are carried to simulate the maneuvering quality of a plane with a torpedo. All planes are equipped with cameras to aid in the complete analysis of the drop.

b. Aircraft attacks on submarines.—It is not advisable to load any of the present type antisubmarine planes (Swordfish or Albacores) with more than two 420-pound depth charges, unless a submarine is actually reported and unless the plane is sent off as a striking force with little chance of landing back aboard.

(1) *Conditions under which a submarine is sighted.*—(*a*) Running on the surface.

(*b*) In the act of diving. The average range of sighting in the North Atlantic and North Sea, with good visibility, is 6 miles. The submarine almost invariably sights the aircraft before the latter sights the submarine. Thus if the submarine intends to dive, it is actually on the way down when first sighted by the plane. Because of the small reflecting surface of the

submarine, the radio detection equipment ASV (Aircraft to Surface Vessel) carried by antisubmarine patrol planes is less effective against submarines than it is against other ships.

(*c*) Low visibility—at close range.

(*d*) Running submerged. This situation is rare except in the Mediterranean or in similarly clear waters. In the North Sea submerged submarines are sometimes located by the kites they fly for carrying antennae. When submerged to periscope depth, submarines can locate planes with their 45-degrees periscopes.

(2) *Method of attack.*—(*a*) It is difficult to formulate exact rules for aircraft attack on submarines, but no pilot can go far wrong if he makes for a sighted U-boat by the shortest route so as to get his release in before the U-boat has disappeared. Thereby he gets a visible aiming mark on the target that he is trying to hit. Once it has dived, all that he has as an aiming mark is the swirl left on the surface, and his problem is correctly gauging the distance ahead and the range of an unseen moving object is considerably increased.

(*b*) When calculating the distance ahead of the U-boat in order to time the dropping of the stick, a standard allowance for the time of flight from 50-foot altitude is 2 seconds plus the time the depth charge takes to reach its depth before exploding, which, for a 25-foot setting, is 3 seconds. This makes 5 seconds—that is, 65 feet or 22 yards. If a portion of the U-boat is visible, the release must be pressed so

as to drop the stick 22 yards ahead of the visible portion.

(*c*) For example, if the time interval from the U-boat's disappearance to the release is, say, 20 seconds, the extra distance ahead would be 20×4.4 yards, or 88 yards. Thus the stick must be released so as to fall $88+22$ yards, or 110 yards ahead of the apex of the swirl.

When making a beam attack, beware of releasing the stick too soon, even if all calculations as to distance ahead have been made correctly. Ninety-five percent of misses have been astern or when a beam attack misses short of the track.

(*d*) Other methods used in the approach, such as attacking down sun, up to dawn or dusk horizon line, and up the moon path, will come with practice.

(3) *Coastal command tactics.*—(*a*) At night or when the initial sighting of a U-boat is made at short range by an aircraft flying at heights over 1,500 feet, it may be impossible to make an attack from 50 feet without greater danger to the aircraft or without wasting time by maneuvering to lose height. The attack should be made at full speed with the least delay. To do this in the circumstances mentioned above, aircraft must have a weapon which can be dropped from heights up to 2,000 feet or in a diving attack from 500 feet.

(*b*) As long as some part of the U-boat can be seen, or when it has not been submerged for more than 15 seconds and there is still a distinct swirl left by the

conning tower, the smallest line error will be obtained by attacking at 50 feet. The range errors at this height will tend to be larger than those obtained by using a bomb sight from 500 feet, but with careful and continuous training they should not exceed the dimensions of the "stick." The chances of doing lethal damage will therefore be greater when attacking from 50 feet, and this form of attack is to be made whenever conditions permit.

(*c*) Bombs cannot be used for attacks at 50 feet, since they may not arm before hitting the sea. At shallow striking angles they may bounce, thus starting the fuze, which, with short delay settings, will explode the bombs in mid-air below the aircraft's tail.

(*d*) Since it is now the intention to concentrate effort on attacking submarines which have not had time to submerge or have not been submerged for more than 15 seconds, the weapon must be made to explode so that its lethal effect will reach the pressure hull of the U-boat not more than 30 feet below the surface.

(*e*) In cases where the submarine is out of sight before the plane reaches the target the following method of attack is used; the pilot heads for the submarine, reducing his altitude from the search height (600 to 1,200 feet) to 50 feet. During this time the exact course of the submarine when diving must be carefully noted. Also, the pilot must keep his eye constantly on the submarine-submerging swirl or he will lose it. As the conning tower disappears, the pilot calls out

"dived" to the observer. The plane then approaches the swirl so as to pass over it on the exact course of the submarine when last seen. Prior to reaching the swirl the pilot tells the observer that they will be over the bubble in a minute or two.

By reference to the accompanying table the observer knows how many charges are dropped 200 feet apart by means of a simple timing mechanism known as a "mickey mouse." On this the speed, altitude, and number of feet desired between depth charges are set. It is well to remember that any errors should preferably be made toward the stern of the submarine, as this part is the most vulnerable. Furthermore, any turns that the submarine is likely to make will cause it to slow down.

(*f*) This table is made out for a 6-knot submarine and a 120-knot plane (ground speed), the plane being at an altitude of 50 feet and being equipped with depth charges that detonate at 100 feet. If the water is shallow, the depth charges detonate at the time it would take for them to sink to 100 feet. If the depth charges are dropped on a surfaced submarine, they will rarely detonate, usually breaking up or rolling harmlessly over the side.

(*g*) If the submarine is still in sight, the diving approach is made as aforesaid, with a view to dropping one depth charge near the stern and the other near the bow by means of the "mickey mouse." The table follows:

Time between disappearance of conning tower and arrival of plane over bubble *Minutes*	Delay after reaching bubble after releasing first of two depth charges *Seconds*
½	0
1	1
1½	3
2	5
2½	6
3	8
3½	9
4	11
5	14
6	17

(4) *Signs of successful or unsuccessful attack.*—After an attack certain surface indications imply success; others mean very little.

(*a*) Depth charges themselves give off a dirty oil residue after explosion.

(*b*) Air bubbles seen immediately after may only signify that the U-boat is adjusting a temporary upset and is blowing or perhaps venting outboard some internal tanks. Oil appearing on the surface immediately after will probably only be the result of depth-charge action on the comparatively flimsy external fuel tanks, forcing oil out through the self-compensating system.

(*c*) A very near depth charge may split one or more oil-fuel tanks, and in this case very large quantities of oil will arrive on the surface gouts. This certainly is evidence of a close miss and will give away the position

of the U-boat, but in itself it is no evidence of any damage to the vital pressure hull.

(*d*) A continual stream of small air bubbles is evidence of damage to the external connections of high-pressure air bottles which are often carried in the casing under the upper deck and above the pressure hull. Again, this is annoying to the U-boat but not serious.

(*e*) The U-boat may break surface, either momentarily or for a period of some minutes, assuming sharp angles, either stern up or bow up. This may only be due to temporary loss of trim or control and may not be evidence of serious damage.

(*f*) Large bubbles causing a commotion on the surface and lasting for a considerable time are evidence of trouble. Continuation for 10 minutes or more indicate that serious internal flooding has taken place and that main ballast is being blown out dry in an attempt to restore buoyancy. Accompanying masses of oil indicate that the submarine may be desperate and is blowing out its fuel tanks as well. If it does not soon reappear on the surface, it may be going down "not under control." If in ocean depths, it will finally collapse and be a total loss without any further evidence appearing on the surface.

(*g*) If sea bottom is within 600 feet of the surface, the submarine may survive and make a getaway in a crippled condition when darkness falls. For this reason, when a pilot has seen his depth charges exploding close to a U-boat that is still visible, he should signal to base that he has made a first-class attack. Every endeavor can then be made to get on the spot as quickly

as possible neighboring aircraft, relief aircraft from base, and surface antisubmarine forces. If a U-boat in the act of diving (even after 30 seconds' disappearance) is injured by depth charges or bombs, it is probable that it can regain the surface by blowing everything and going full speed on motors with hydroplanes at "hard to rise" for long enough to get the crew out of the conning tower and over the side.

V. GREAT BRITAIN'S COASTAL COMMAND AND FLEET AIR ARM.

A. Coastal Command.

The status of the Coastal Command has appeared somewhat ambiguous to many people in the U. S. Air Forces. The following paragraphs give a brief picture of its place in the Royal Air Force and its relationship to the Royal Navy.

1. *Function.*—The Coastal Command is one of four Operational Commands of the R. A. F. in the United Kingdom. Its main function is general reconnaissance over the sea by shore-based aircraft. The Command also includes the comparatively small striking force of shore-based bombers and torpedo-bomber aircraft, together with an appropriate proportion of long-range fighter aircraft, to provide cover against attacks on shipping in the local areas beyond the range of Fighter Command aircraft.

2. *Training and administration.*—The Coastal Command is an integral part of the R. A. F. The Air Ministry is thus responsible for its administration

and provisioning as well as for the recruitment and training of personnel. Coastal Command air crews receive specialized training in overseas reconnaissance with particular emphasis on advanced navigation and ship recognition.

3. *Operational control.*—To insure the closest cooperation with the Royal Navy, operational control through R. A. F. commanders of the Coastal Command is exercised by the Admiralty. By mutual agreement between the Air Ministry and Admiralty this arrangement was actually in force before the outbreak of war, being officially recognized by agreement between the chiefs of staff at the end of 1940.

4. *Chain of command.*—General operational instructions for the Coastal Command are worked out by the Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief of the Coastal Command, who has an office in the Admiralty and is responsible for issuing the detailed orders. To insure the closest liaison and cooperation at all stages in this chain of command, R. A. F. liaison officers are attached to the Admiralty. A naval officer is attached to the Director of Operations (Naval Cooperation) at the Air Ministry, and naval officers are attached to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Coastal Command. Similarly the R. A. F. group headquarters of the Coastal Command are situated near the respective subsidiary naval commands, and the joint operations of Service and Air Forces in the defense of sea-borne supplies are directed and coordinated from combined area headquarters at this level.

B. Fleet Air Arm.

The Fleet Air Arm is an integral part of the Royal Navy. It includes all ship-borne aircraft. The Admiralty is responsible for its administration and provisioning and for the recruitment and training of personnel. Part of the basic training is carried out for the Admiralty by the Air Ministry on an agengy basis. R. A. F. personnel in certain trades are still on loan to the Admiralty for service with the Fleet Air Arm.

VI. ANTITANK ACTION.

A. British Tactics.

The British have adopted the following principles for air attack on tanks:

1. Reconnoiter for enemy tanks before attacking.

2. Try to attack the tanks while they are moving so that their own noise will help conceal the approach of the aircraft.

3. Attack the tanks from the rear, if possible. Twenty-mm shells can be effective through engine ventilators and thin armor and will frequently break or crack tracks. Attacking from the direction of the sun is also good practice.

4. Attack in force, in waves of not less than a squadron each. Spread out in echelon so that each plane can pick its own target.

5. Use terrain to conceal distant approach. Attack from 250 feet (never over 400 feet (because of vulnerability).

6. Make a shallow (15-degree) dive in the actual attack. Fire a half-second burst and get away.

7. An attack should have an umbrella of fighters and should come in two directions.

8. On getaway, "jink" and make use of cover.

9. Use a spotter at about 1,200 feet to avoid surprise.

B. British Equipment.

British requirements for antitank missions, in addition to maneuverability, are as follows:

1. Good armor.

2. Accurate weapons (cannon or rocket bombs that will destroy tanks).

3. Medium-sized to small planes, each with a carrying capacity of four 250-pound bombs.

C. Armament Used in Antitank Aircraft.

1. Small bombs are used to disperse tanks. Direct hits are too difficult.

2. The Russians are reported to have used a rocket bomb in level attack, releasing the bomb nearly horizontally.

3. A member of the British Air Mission in Moscow reports that Russian aircraft drop grenades which explode when run over by German tanks, also that they start fires by dropping incendiaries in the areas where tanks are operating.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. Bombs Used by Japan, Germany, and Great Britain.

1. *Delayed-action fuzes.*—Japan is reported to have used delayed-action fuzes in bombs. The delay ranges from 24 to 60 hours.

2. *Gas bombs.*—Several instances have been reported the use of gas bombs by the Japanese in China.

3. *Fragmentation and demolition bombs.*—Fragmentation and demolition bombs are used by Japanese dive bombers. In Hawaii the largest reported was 500 pounds.

4. *German rocket-propelled bomb.*—The P. C. 1,000 RS weighs 1,000 kilograms (2,205 pounds), with armor-piercing characteristics, and is intended for use against heavily armored warships. A rocket attachment of eight separate rockets replaces the usual tail and fins. These rockets discharge, in successive pairs, after the bombs are released and lose their forward momentum. The rockets are said to supply a maximum velocity of 620 miles per hour with great penetrating powers. They can be released by dive or glide, and the use of the B. Z. A. 1 bombsight seems intended. Aiming is said to be more accurate than with ordinary bombs, owing to the comparatively straight trajectory. It is intended that a Ju–88 shall carry only one of these externally under the fuselage, since the distance from German bases to British objectives is likely to call for a maximum fuel load. These bombs have not yet been used operationally.

5. *British 9-pound bomb.*—The new 9-pound bomb is dropped in level flight in clusters of 24. At 250 feet and 190 miles an hour they make a pattern of 30 yards by 60 yards. These will penetrate 2 inches of armor, but in order to destroy a "buttoned up" tank, they must obtain a direct hit. The British are not satisfied with this weapon.

B. Antiaircraft Defense.

1. *Colored antiaircraft fire.*—Such fire has been observed as one red burst in boxes of four black bursts. Frequent reports indicate that colors of pink and orange has also been observed. The British believe the primary purpose of these bursts may be to direct aircraft or antiaircraft to specific targets.

2. *Flak towers.*—These are being used in increasing numbers by the enemy. They are frequently found in built-up areas close to vulnerable points and as part of airdrome defenses. They give a clear field of view in all directions and a low angle of sight. Types vary from simple light construction for light flak to massive concrete buildings for heavy flak. The light flak tower probably mounts 20-mm (.79-inch) guns. In the ordinary type, the gun platform is supported on four wooden poles, set into four concrete blocks and bolted together. A movable type has also been reported. It is about 26 feet high and, instead of wooden poles, has 20-mm steel tubes. There are also reports of flak on broken-off church steeples, and on factory chimneys cut down to half size.

3. *Fixed low-level barrages.*—Such barrages have been reported by day on the channel coast as a means of defending ships against low-level attacks.

4. *Flashless propellant.*—It is thought that a flashless propellant is now being used by some heavy flak batteries. The use of this type of propellant was first reported by British ships after an engagement with German destroyers in November 1940. The advantage of its use, in addition to increasing barrel life, is to conceal heavy flak positions.

5. *Flak position maps.*—These maps are pinpointed with every known flak position. Smaller maps, such as those used in target and port dossiers, contain the exact location of each gun position, whereas large-scale maps merely contain the number of installations spotted in a specific area. These maps, or overlays of the same, are in constant demand by the Bomber Command, the Fighter Command, and the Air Ministry for use in impending British operations. They contain all details, such as caliber and number of guns, at each specific position, and locations of all searchlights, barracks, and antiaircraft auxiliaries. An up-to-date record is kept of progress in construction and of all temporary and permanent installations, covering also balloon barrages, which have greatly increased over Axis and Axis-occupied territory during recent months.

C. Firecrackers.

Firecrackers are used by the Japanese to draw defensive fire from the enemy. Usually great batches of crackers are dropped from planes, with a lighted fuse set to ignite them after they fall. The Japanese hope the explosions will cause the enemy to fire and thus expose his position.

D. Night Navigation Maps.

German Air Navigation maps recently captured by the British were partly transparent and were described as "moon maps." They were on a 1:50,000 scale and showed the British coast line in black, leaving the sea transparent. Important towns and airdromes and a few heights were marked. Transparency enables the observer to hold the map against the

perspex[5] nose and read it by studying the silhouette of the coast line outlined against the moon. These maps were not thought to have been very successful, but a second issue was apparently justified, this time with the land colored green instead of black.

E. Parachutists.

The Russians have emphasized the advantage of delayed-opening jumps, which reduce the time of exposure to cold and low oxygen and eliminate to a greater degree drift and the danger of ground fire.

F. Camouflage Schemes of German Fighters.

1. *Me 109.*—*a.* Grey with black crosses outlined in yellow.

b. All dark grey, no yellow coloring on the nose.

c. Blue-white undersurfaces with yellow nose.

d. Black with yellow nose.

e. Red tail.

f. Red spinner, front half of underside bright red.

g. Yellow strip 6 inches wide at wing tips and duck-egg-blue spinner.

h. White all over and somewhat faster than its fellows.

i. Yellow noses.

j. Pale blue-grey without yellow nose.

k. Light-colored tails.

l. Reddish-brown tails.

m. Mottled green.

2. *FW 190.*—Silver camouflage instead of the usual yellow stripes on the wing tips and leading edges, and solid yellow on the tail fins.

[5] A trade name for a synthetic glass used on the nose of bomber planes.

G. Characteristics of New Enemy Aircraft Types.

1. *Japanese Zero fighter.*—*a. Performance.*—Pilots who have engaged Japanese Zero fighters in the Pacific say it is folly to underestimate the equipment of the enemy. Because of its great maneuverability, the Zero plane is described as "deadliest" against faster, more powerful, and better armed planes of the United Nations.

b. Engine.—It is powered with a 900-horsepower engine and carries two 20-caliber cannon and two fixed machine guns.

2. *German aircraft.*—*a. Heinkel He 111–H6.*—

(1) *Wooden propeller.*

(2) *Armor.*—An instance of engine armor on an enemy aircraft was found on the He 111 shot down over Anglesey. A sheet of 5-mm plate, 3 feet 1½ inches long by 10¼ inches wide was fitted at the back of each engine at the level of the lower half of the bulkhead, between engine and undercarriage bay. This was evidently intended to protect vulnerable accessories at the back of the engine and between the cylinders.

(3) *Engine.*—Junkers Jumo 211F with new type of five-fingered exhaust outlet fitted to each of the in-line stubs.

b. Focke-Wulf FW 190.—(1) *Armament.*—A pilot reports their armament as two machine guns in each wing. There was no sign of cannon or of guns firing through the propeller.

(2) *Performance.*—Reported to outclimb the Spitfire. From a distance, they appeared to have a good turn of speed at 19,000 feet.

(3) *Markings.*—Yellow stripes on the wing tips and leading edges, and solid yellow on the tail fins.

(4) *Engine.*—Radial.

c. Messerschmitt Me 210.—(1) *Armament.*—There is apparently provision for a considerable bomb load internally, and the armament is said to consist of three cannon and four machine guns.

(2) *Construction.*—This plane is a development of the Me 110, although it differs in having a single tail instead of twin tails. It is believed to have a span of about 57 feet.

(3) *Engine.*—Twin B. M. W. 801 or B. M. W. 802.

(4) *Use.*—Tactically, it is intended as a fast surprise bomber rather than a heavy fighter like the Me 110. It is believed to have been in operation in Greece.

d. Messerschmitt Me 216.—(1) *Performance.*—Similar to the Me 210, but faster.

(2) *Armament.*—Armed with three cannon and six machine guns.

e. Heinkel He 177.—(1) *Construction.*—It is said to incorporate a means of increasing the wing area to assist take-off and landing. The device is now thought to be similar in principle to the Fowler flap, such as is fitted to the Hudson. The operating mechanism is hydraulic. The wing is believed to be of typical Heinkel pattern.

(2) *Bomb load.*—All bombs are carried internally. The maximum bomb load is allegedly over 6 tons. Al-

ternative loads are said to be either eight small torpedoes or a two- to three-man tank.

f. Blohm and Voss BV 141.—(1) *Use.*—"Short-range reconnaissance" or "battle-front aircraft." Little is known as yet regarding this unorthodox aircraft.

(2) *Construction features.*—The cabin is fitted in the starboard wing and is supposed to give a better all-around view.

(3) *Engine.*—Believed to be a B. M. W. radial.

(4) *Armament.*—One rear machine gun, firing through the tip of the cabin nacelle.

g. Henschel Hs 129.—(1) *Use.*—"Battle aircraft" intended for use against troops and for ground-strafing of tanks, moving columns, etc.

(2) *Armament.*—Heavily armed forward, with a combination of cannon and machine guns.

(3) *Heavily armored.*

(4) *Engines.*—Probably DB 601 or DB 603.

h. Blohm and Voss BV 222.—(1) *Armament.*—None.

(2) *Construction.*—Similar to Short Sunderland except for engines. Highwing monoplane flying-boat, with twin decks and retractable wing-tip floats.

(3) *Performance.*—Rather slow, but with a range of about 5,600 miles.

(4) *Engines.*—Six.

(5) *Use.*—It is known to have operated in the Mediterranean, principally to convey passengers between Greece and Libya. It is said to carry 80 passengers, and is generally escorted by two or three Me 110's.

i. Gotha 242 twin-boom glider.—(1) *Armament.*—Eight gun positions for eight light guns with belt feed.

(2) *Armor.*—The first pilot's seat is fully armored with 8-mm plate.

(3) *Construction.*—Twin boom monoplane. Fuselage of tubular metal construction. Wings, tail booms, and tail unit of wooden construction. Dual control. Skid and wheel undercarriage, the wheels being jettisonable. Rear end of fuselage, hinged at trailing edge of wing, lifts upwards, making an opening 7 feet by 6 feet for loading. Span 79 feet; length 52 feet. The useful load is 5,500 pounds or 21 fully equipped soldiers in addition to the 2 pilots. The freight stowage space is 20 feet by 7 feet by 6 feet.

(4) *Use.*—Troop and freight transport.

j. Dornier Do 217.—(1) *Design.*—As in the Do 17Z, the crew's compartment is forward of the wing leading edge; the upright slots on the fins take the form of fixed slats, the trailing edge of the slats being on the inside on the fins. It is suggested that this is to prevent one fin from stalling when flying with large angles of side slip, as when flying on one engine.

No indication of any fittings to take an antiballoon device of the kind recently found on a Heinkel He 111.

An oil tank is fitted outboard of each engine in the wing. A fuel tank is fitted in each wing inboard of the engine nacelle, and another inboard of the oil tank. The fifth fuel tank is in the fuselage. Fuel can be jettisoned from the two inboard tanks and the main center tank through special large-diameter pipes running the whole length of the fuselage, pressure being supplied

from two carbon dioxide bottles behind the main fuselage tank.

The 12-bladed cooling fan is situated behind the propeller and driven at 1.72 crankshaft speed, rotating in the same direction. The blades are 5½ inches high by 4 inches wide.

(2) *Instrument equipment.*—In addition to radio telegraph equipment (F. U. G 16) the aircraft has incorporated in the normal F. U. G. 10 wireless telegraph set a new blind-approach course receiver, covering a wave band of 30.0 mcs. to 33.5 mcs.

(3) *Landing light.*—A new retractable type of landing light is situated about 2 feet behind the leading edge, and 8 feet in from the wing tip.

(4) *Weight.*—Empty: approximately 8 tons. Loaded: about 16¼ tons. Cross wing loading: 55 to 60 pounds per square foot.—

(5) Movement of control surfaces is effected mainly by push rods and levers. The elevator control is interesting. Instead of the control wheel being mounted on a column hinged at the bottom, the wheel is mounted on a horizontal bar projecting from under the center of the instrument panel. This has a rack on its upper surface engaging with a pinion behind the dashboard which operates the elevators. The use of plastic material for guide brackets for certain of the control rods should be noted.

(6) Muff-type heaters are fitted around four exhaust pipes, two supplied with fresh air from forward-facing pipes for cabin heating and two receiving air which has passed over the cylinders for wingleading

edge and bomb compartment. The leading edge ring of the cowling is moved fore and aft by cranks from an electric motor, the ring varying the width of the slot controlling the air flow to the cooler, the air returning to the main flow inside the cowling after passing over the cooler.

k. New German aircraft engines.—(1) *Junkers Jumo 211F.*—This engine is similar to its series except that it has a specially developed blower with a shrouded impeller. Its volumetric compression ratio has been increased from 6.6 to 6.8. The engine has 100 more revolutions per minute, and runs at a higher boost pressure. Cooling temperature indicates a 50/50 mixture of water and glycol. Total horsepower is estimated to be 1,200 horsepower at 17,000 feet, with a 30-minute combat rating of about 1,150 horsepower. Installations of this engine have been found in a Junkers Ju 88 A4 and a Heinkel He 111.

(2) *Junkers Jumo 211J.*—An engine bearing this mark is known to exist. It may have an inter-cooler, a device for cooling the air on its way from the blower to the cylinders. This may give an emergency rating of 1,200 horsepower at 19,000 to 20,000 feet.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, June 18, 1942

AIR INFORMATION BULLETIN
No. 3
MID 461

TIMELY TACTICAL TOPICS II

NOTICE

1. Like "Timely Tactical Topics I," Air Information Bulletin No. 2, February 14, 1942, this brief study of certain foreign trends and developments in aerial tactics and equipment is furnished as a matter of general interest to show what is resulting from the present war. The statements made and the conclusions drawn should not necessarily be considered as applicable to or desirable for our own service. It is hoped that this and future studies of like character will be useful to planning, training, and procurement agencies, and to air force units, as a reference source of current air intelligence.

2. In order to safeguard the information contained herein, this bulletin will *not* be carried in aircraft. Attention is invited to paragraph 9d, AR 380-5, which is quoted in part as follows: "Confidential military information will neither be discussed with nor disclosed to unauthorized persons. The contents or whereabouts of confidential documents • • • will be disclosed only to those persons in the Government service whose duties require that they have such knowledge and to such other persons of especial trust who must be informed."

August 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF: (Colonel Nelson)

Subject: Admittance to War Room for Colonel William Ball

1. Colonel William Ball has been appointed Deputy Chief and Executive, A-2, vice Colonel James F. Olive, Jr. It is, therefore, requested that he be placed on the permanent War Room list and that the name of Colonel Olive be removed from this list.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Dispatched
AUG 5 1942
AAG

R. C. W. BLESSLEY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, Air Staff

Cy & R & R to Central Files

File
a 8/6/42

385 (31)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

August 6, 1942

Major General Lewis H. Brereton

Dear Louie:

The material inclosed covers the latest lessons from experiment and experience in various theatres concerning attacks on naval vessels. We are especially interested in the new possibilities which have opened up for the use of bombs instead of torpedoes for minimum altitude attacks, as covered in the marked parts of the inclosures.

We should like very much to hear what results you may obtain from attacks of this type in your theatre if such attacks are, or have been, made.

Bestest,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of the Air Staff

2 Incls:
Incl. #1 - Tr. Circ. #46
Incl. #2 - Table I - "Effectiveness of Bombs".

File
Ci 8/7/42

Dispatched
AUG 7 1942
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A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
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Mil. Req.
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Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
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Weather
Traffic
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Air AD 385 (29)

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By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

(1817)

File No. _____

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SUBJECT: Bombing.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFACG	AFCAS	1942 7/25	1. The attached draft of a memorandum concerning bombing will be published and distributed to the Army Air Forces. 2. Take action immediately to give to all bombardiers destined for theaters in the PACIFIC, training which will equip them for bombing highly maneuverable naval targets. 1 Incl.- Draft of Memo re above sub.
2.	AFCAS	Air Adj. General	7-28	1. For compliance with General Arnold's directive in Comment No. 1. 2. I invite your particular attention to paragraph 2. G.E.S. AFCAS Incl. n/c
3	AFMAG	AFDMR	1942 7/28	1. For necessary action with respect to paragraph 2, Item #1 above. 2. The attached comments of AFACG on "Bombing", referred to in paragraph 1, Item #1, are being published and distributed by this office to agencies of the Army Air Forces. W. W. D., Col, A.G.D., Air A.G. 1 Incl: n/c.

Army Air Forces
JUL 28 1942
AAG Received

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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F-4071, AF. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. 1

Arias 385 (28)

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MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
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DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A.A.F.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

1817

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File No. _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Bombing.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
4.	AFDMR	AFRDB	7-29 1942	AFDMR HWB:vk For necessary action in compliance with General Arnold's directive. Incl. n/c M. S. F. Dir. Mil. Req.
5.	AFRDB	AFDMR	8/4	AFRDB 30/rsm Attached herewith are copies of directives to the 2nd and 3rd Air Forces, submitted in compliance with General Arnold's directive. Incl. as above. F. L. A., Jr., Actg. Dir. Bombardment.
6.	AFDMR Hq. Army Air Forces AUG 8 1942 AAG RECEIVED	AFMAG	8/8	AFDMR/HCL:ha 1. For your information. 3 Incls. M. S. F. Dir. Mil. Req.
			8/8	File. JBC

385 (28)

(Do not use reverse side) DECLASSIFIED F-4071, AF. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Aerials 385 (28)

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F

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DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

1942 JUL 30 PM 2 10

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

1942 AUG 7 PM 5 14

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By A/n/ LC. Date 9/27/76

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

BOMBING

1. For many years the Army Air Forces have believed in a balanced bombardment program. We have developed several bombing methods to meet the requirements of the many objectives and conditions which might confront us. In the development of one of these methods, horizontal precision bombing, we have led the air forces of the world. Results in this war have demonstrated beyond question the soundness of that development. The effectiveness of horizontal precision bombing has, in fact, exceeded that indicated in peacetime bombing practice. To implement this bombing method, the Army Air Forces have developed high altitude, long-range bombers to a greater extent than any other air force. The possibilities of this combination of high-altitude, horizontal precision bombing, with aircraft having great range and load-carrying capacity, have only begun to be realized.

2. Broadly speaking, targets are either fixed or moving. We have practiced extensively against fixed targets. Our practice against the most difficult of targets, highly maneuverable naval craft, necessarily has been limited. If we permit this difficulty to limit our operations against moving objectives solely to those bombing methods, such as dive bombing, by which accuracy may be most easily attained, we unnecessarily restrict the effectiveness of our air forces.

3. The Army Air Forces are challenged, in our bombing methods and our bombing aircraft, to meet effectively the requirements of actual operations, in which success can be judged only in the cold light of tangible results. To ensure the greatest success possible, the Army Air Forces must adopt every conceivable means of improving the accuracy of its bombing, and of exploiting the full power of its great offensive force. I am confident that this challenge will be met.

4. I urge initiative and energy in training in order that we may be well-equipped to perform our tasks, resourcefulness and determination in the execution of combat missions in order that we may produce results of maximum effectiveness, and mental flexibility and courage at all times so that the breaks of battle will be of our making and to our advantage.

H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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DECLASSIFIED

air ab 385 (28)

DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A. A. F.

1942 JUL 30 PM 2 10

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By AN/AD LC. Date 4/27/76

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AFRDB
30/rsm
Wrtn 8/4/42
Rm 4326, Ext 7157

SUBJECT: Bombing Maneuverable Targets.

TO : Commanding General,
Third Air Force,
Tampa, Florida.

1. Results of operations against naval vessels in the Southwest Pacific by our bombardment aircraft indicate that great difficulty is being experienced in obtaining hits on highly maneuverable targets from high altitudes. Although the problems involved in horizontal precision bombing of maneuvering targets are appreciated, it is nevertheless felt that results obtained can be greatly improved by emphasizing this type of bombing in our operational training. In the past, extensive practice has been provided our crews in bombing of fixed targets and targets moving along a straight path. Practice against highly maneuverable naval craft, which is the most difficult phase of horizontal precision bombing, has been limited. It is desired that immediate steps be taken to correct this condition.

2. It is therefore directed that all graduate and student bombardiers in your Air Force be given not less than ten hours of supervised instruction utilizing the bombing trainer with a maneuvering target. It is suggested that lines be drawn to scale representing evasive paths that can be taken by various types of naval vessels, and that the target be made to follow these lines.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1942.

SUBJECT: Bombing.

TO: Commanding Generals: All Air Forces and All Army Air Forces Commands.
Chiefs of All Divisions, Directorates and Other Agencies of the Air and Operating Staffs.

Transmitted for your information and guidance are the comments of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on the subject of "Bombing".

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

Wm. W. Dick

WILLIAM W. DICK,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
"Bombing".

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5200.30, June 18, 1979
By [illegible] L.C., Date 9/27/76

Air AG 385 (28)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

BOMBING

1. For many years the Army Air Forces have believed in a balanced bombardment program. We have developed several bombing methods to meet the requirements of the many objectives and conditions which might confront us. In the development of one of these methods, horizontal precision bombing, we have led the air forces of the world. Results in this war have demonstrated beyond question the soundness of that development. The effectiveness of horizontal precision bombing has, in fact, exceeded that indicated in peacetime bombing practice. To implement this bombing method, the Army Air Forces have developed high altitude, long-range bombers to a greater extent than any other air force. The possibilities of this combination of high-altitude, horizontal precision bombing, with aircraft having great range and load-carrying capacity, have only begun to be realized.

2. Broadly speaking, targets are either fixed or moving. We have practiced extensively against fixed targets. Our practice against the most difficult of targets, highly maneuverable naval craft, necessarily has been limited. If we permit this difficulty to limit our operations against moving objectives solely to those bombing methods, such as dive bombing, by which accuracy may be most easily attained, we unnecessarily restrict the effectiveness of our air forces.

3. The Army Air Forces are challenged, in our bombing methods and our bombing aircraft, to meet effectively the requirements of actual operations, in which success can be judged only in the cold light of tangible results. To ensure the greatest success possible, the Army Air Forces must adopt every conceivable means of improving the accuracy of its bombing, and of exploiting the full power of its great offensive force. I am confident that this challenge will be met.

4. I urge initiative and energy in training in order that we may be well-equipped to perform our tasks, resourcefulness and determination in the execution of combat missions in order that we may produce results of maximum effectiveness, and mental flexibility and courage at all times so that the breaks of battle will be of our making and to our advantage.

H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5200.30, June 18, 1979
By [illegible] J.C.; Date 1/27/76

Air AG 385 (28)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By AL/AW LC Date 7/27/76

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3 AFMAG AFDMR 1942
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Dispatched
JUL 29 1942
AAG

File 7/30/47

1. For necessary action with respect to paragraph 2, Item #1 above.

2. The attached comments of AFACG on "Bombing", referred to in paragraph 1, Item #1, are being published and distributed by this office to agencies of the Army Air Forces.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
			1 Incl	- n/c					Col, Air	A.G.D., A.G.	

AAF-39

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Air AG 385 (28)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date 9/27/74

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Bombing.

1	AFACG	AFCAS	1942 7/25	1. The attached draft of a memorandum concerning bombing will be published and distributed to the Army Air Forces. 2. Take action immediately to give to all bombardiers destined for theaters in the PACIFIC, training which will equip them for bombing highly manoeuvrable naval targets. 1 Incl.- Draft of Memo re above sub. H. H. A.
2.	AFCAS	Air Adj. General	7-28	1. For compliance with General Arnold's directive in Comment No. 1. 2. I invite your particular attention to paragraph 2. G.E.S. AFCAS Incl. n/c

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Air AG 385 (28)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By sla/AU LC. Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING

1. For many years the Army Air Forces have believed in a balanced bombardment program. We have developed several bombing methods to meet the requirements of the many objectives and conditions which might confront us. In the development of one of these methods, horizontal precision bombing, we have led the air forces of the world. Results in this war have demonstrated beyond question the soundness of that development. The effectiveness of horizontal precision bombing has, in fact, exceeded that indicated in peacetime bombing practice. To implement this bombing method, the Army Air Forces have developed high altitude, long-range bombers to a greater extent than any other air force. The possibilities of this combination of high-altitude, horizontal precision bombing, with aircraft having great range and load-carrying capacity, have only begun to be realized.

2. Broadly speaking, targets are either fixed or moving. We have practiced extensively against fixed targets. Our practice against the most difficult of targets, highly maneuverable naval craft, necessarily has been limited. If we permit this difficulty to limit our operations against moving objectives solely to those bombing methods, such as dive bombing, by which accuracy may be most easily attained, we unnecessarily restrict the effectiveness of our air forces.

3. The Army Air Forces are challenged, in our bombing methods and our bombing aircraft, to meet effectively the requirements of actual operations, in which success can be judged only in the cold light of tangible results. To ensure the greatest success possible, the Army Air Forces must adopt every conceivable means of improving the accuracy of its bombing, and of exploiting the full power of its great offensive force. I am confident that this challenge will be met.

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H. H. Arnold

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Ar. AG 385 (28)

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 7/27/74

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Subject: Possibility of Enemy Bombing Raids

1.	General Arnold	General Stratemeyer	1942 7-27	It is entirely possible and logical that enemy bombing raids will take place on Takoradi and Accra from Southern Libya. This will become more probable as American air strength is felt in Northern Libya and Egypt and can be accomplished without Vichy aid. In view of the above, information is requested as to the present status of the study on building up defense for our Trans-African airline. H. H. A.

385

(27)

2.	AFCAS	Asst. Chief A r Staff-Plans	7-27	1. Note General Arnold's comment above. I do not recall having received any directive reference the building up defense for our Trans-African airline. In all probability this directive was issued prior to my assignment as Chief of the Air Staff. 2. It is desired that this be given immediate attention and the study as desired by General Arnold be submitted. G.E.S. AFCAS

Dispatched
JUL 28 1942
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CAS
RCWB/hk

July 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF: (Colonel Nelson)

Subject: Permit for admittance to War Room for Major Wildman.

1. Major F. S. Wildman has been assigned to our A-2 Section. It is believed desirable that he be permitted to go to the War Room regularly for a few days. It is, therefore, requested that he be put on the list beginning the 15th to and including the 22nd of July.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

R. C. W. BLESSLEY
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, Air Staff.

385 (25) E

Dispatched
JUL 14 1942
AAG
Fulg

Copy to Maj. Wildman

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION

Chief of Comp	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.C.	A-1	A-2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

AAF-25

June 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. Pursuant to Memorandum of June 24th from the Deputy Chief of Staff on the above subject, copy attached, the following officers of this headquarters should be authorized admission to the War Room:

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Maj. Gen. H. F. Harmon
Maj. Gen. C. E. Stratemeyer
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter
Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild
Brig. Gen. S. C. Godfrey
Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody
Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr.
Col. H. M. Chalmire
Col. F. T. Davison
Col. E. P. Sorenson
Col. J. F. Olive, Jr.
Col. H. S. Vandenberg
Col. C. A. Anderson
Col. R. C. Breene
Lt. Col. F. L. Anderson

*Becomes Chief of the Air Staff upon the departure of General Harmon.

2. The following individuals participate in the operation of the War Room and should be authorized admission thereto as provided in basic memorandum:

Major B. Gaylord
Major J. H. Hynes
Major E. C. Hunter
Major C. Spaan
%Major C. B. Thornton
Capt. B. Dixon
%Captl H. Lockwood, Jr.
1st Lt. W. Haines
1st Lt. W. D. Knight
2nd Lt. C. T. McCrearty
Mr. B. Webster
%Miss V. Erwin
%Mr. E. Basch
%Mr. B. Mills
%Mr. A. Traster
%Mr. H. Zichterman

%Individuals so indicated to be admitted when accompanied by individuals marked %.

385 (25)

Air/AGF 1-

3. In addition to the individuals listed in paragraph 2 above, the following officers are called upon from time to time to participate in operation of the War Room and should be admitted as occasion demands:

Major A. H. Alexander
Major R. [illegible]elling
Major A. J. [illegible]mith
Capt. G. D. Mattison
Capt. D. Sage
Capt. D. Van Slyck
1st Lt. R. Carlisle
1st Lt. S. Sealfon
1st Lt. H. V. Williams, Jr.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cpy. Memo., 6-24-42

COPIES FURNISHED:
AFACC (Col. Shelmire)
AFCAS
AFDAS
AFSAS (Col. York)
AFAAP
AFABI (4)
AFACT
AFADS
AFAMP
AFTAI
AFDMR
AFRDB
AFRBS
AFROM
AFDTS
AFDMC (Col. Gates)
AFMSC
AFTSW

[illegible]
JUN 26 1942
AAG

AirAD 385 (25)

WDCSA/020 (6-24-42) June 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
A. C. OF S., G-1,
A. C. OF S., G-2,
A. C. OF S., G-3,
A. C. OF S., G-4,
A. C. OF S., OPD,
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. The hours during which the War Department War Room will be opened to authorized visitors have been reduced to the period, 9:30 to 12:30 daily.

2. It is desired to restrict admission to the War Room to those officers whose duty makes it necessary for them to receive the information presented in the War Department War Room. All divisions of the War Department General Staff and the three principal commands, and the Bureau of Public Relations, will reexamine the list of officers whom they desire to have admitted to the War Room. As a guide, the following quotas are tentatively assigned: Army Ground Forces, 5; Army Air Forces, 15; Services of Supply, 15; Bureau of Public Relations, 3; G-1, 3; G-2, 12; G-3, 4; G-4, 2; and OPD, 15. These quotas do not include individuals participating in the operation of the War Room. Officers who desire occasional admission to the War Room may secure passes from the Office Chief of Staff.

3. Lists of officers authorized to enter the War Room will be submitted to the Secretary, General Staff by June 30, 1942.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

/s/ O. L. Nelson
O.L. NELSON
Lt. Col., General Staff
Asst. Sec., General Staff.

AirAG File
AG 385 (25)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

SUBJECT: War Department War Room

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG	AFCAS	1942 6-25	1. Attention is invited to attached memorandum of June 24th, from the Deputy Chief of Staff which assigns this headquarters a quota of 15 persons who may be admitted to the War Department War Room. 2. According to the records of the War Room, 57 individuals in AAF Headquarters are now authorized admission thereto, (Incl. #2). 26 of these work in the War Room. 3. It is requested that there be indicated on the attached list the 15 individuals to be reported to the Secretary, General Staff, as authorized to be admitted in the future. J. W. A. W. W. D. Col., A.G.D. Air Adjutant General. 2 Incls.- Incl. #1 - Memo. 6-24-42 Incl. #2 - List.

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071,AO, Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____ Air AB 385 (25)

June 25, 1942

Individuals Now Authorized Admission to War Department War Room

AFACC

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Col. H. M. Shelmire

AFCAS

Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon

AFDAS

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter

AFSAS

~~Col. J. I. York~~

AFAAP

Col. F. T. Davison

AFABI

Col. E. P. Sorenson
Col. J. F. Olive, Jr.
~~Lt. Col. L. P. Ordway~~ (No longer in Washington)
Maj. A. H. Alexander
Maj. R. H. Bolling
Maj. B. Gaylord - OP
Maj. J. H. Hynes - OP
Maj. E. C. Hunter - OP
~~Maj. N. W. Rice~~ (?)
Maj. A. J. Smith
Maj. C. Spaan - OP
~~Maj. R. Vidmer~~
Capt. P. Dixon OP
~~Capt. R. E. Falconer~~
Capt. G. D. Mattison
Capt. D. Sage
~~Capt. B. E. Smith~~ (No longer in Washington)
Capt. D. Van Slyck
~~1st Lt. J. M. Brodie~~ OP
1st Lt. R. Carlisle
~~1st Lt. R. Dahlstrom~~
1st Lt. W. Haines OP
1st Lt. W. D. Knight OP
~~1st Lt. A. T. Liggett~~
1st Lt. S. Sealfon
~~1st Lt. R. Smyers~~
~~1st Lt. S. T. Terhune~~

Incl #2

Air AG 385 (25)

AFAEI (Cont'd)

% 1st Lt. H. V. Williams, Jr.
% 2d Lt. P. A. Kennedy
% 2d Lt. G. T. McGroarty OP
% 2d Lt. A. B. Taylor
% Mr. B. Webster

% Individuals so designated engaged in operation of War Room.

AFACT

Col. H. S. Vandenberg

AFADS

Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr.

AFAEP

~~Col. H. A. Craig (No longer in Washington)~~
Col. O. A. Anderson

AFTAI

~~Col. E. W. Hill~~

AFDMR

Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild
~~Col. M. E. Gross~~

AFRDB

Lt. Col. F. L. Anderson
Lt. Col. W. C. Sweeney, Jr. — NOT in AFRDB

AFRBS

Brig. Gen. S. C. Godfrey

AFRCM

Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody

AFDTS

Col. R. G. Breene

AFDMC

~~Col. D. E. Gates~~

AFMSC

\# Maj. C. B. Thornton
* Capt. H. Lockwood, Jr.
* Miss V. Erwin
\# Mr. E. Basch
\# Mr. B. Mills
\# Mr. A. Traster
\# Mr. H. Zichterman

All engaged in operation of War Room (Capt Lockwood)

Individuals designated * admitted at all times; those indicated by # admitted when accompanied by *.

AFTSW

Col. D. Z. Zimmerman
Lt. Col. J. K. Macy
Lt. Col. T. S. Moorman
Lt. Col. H. L. Smith

off (Okly Col Z).

Miscellaneous

Eighth Air Force - Maj. Gen. C. Spaatz
Maj. J. M. Murphy
Board of Economic Warfare - Maj. G. L. Hart, Jr.

Air 42 385 (25)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Note. -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: AFO29.21 War Department War Room.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFMAG	AFDMR & AFTSW IN TURN	1942 7-13	For notation of the attached memorandum and return to this office. J.B.C. Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst. Air A.G. 1 Incl. Approved Memo., 7-1-42
2.	AFDMR	AFRAD (Attn: Colonel Saville) AND AFTSW	7/13	AFDMR/HWB/br 1. Noted. M. S. F. Dir. Mil. Req.
3	AFRAD	AFTSW	7/14	AFRAD/WFM/mlh 71682 Noted. Incl/n/c S. R. S. Director of Air Def
4	AFTSW	AFMAG	7/17	Noted. RECEIVED JUL 18 1942 AIR AG-8 D. Z. Z., Colonel, A. C., Director of Weather.
			7/18	1) noted 2) file JBC

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Page No. _____ A.G. 385 (25) D

A.G. 385 (25) D

DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A. A. F.

1942 JUL 13 AM 11 25

DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A. A. F.

1942 JUL 13 PM 2 12



WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

(AFMAG)

July 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. Reference is made to Memorandum from this office, June 26, 1942, subject as above, which listed individuals in this headquarters who should be admitted to the War Department War Room.

2. In addition to the persons listed in paragraph 2 of that memorandum, the following officers participate in the operation of the War Room and should be admitted thereto:

Lieut. S.G. Irving P. Krick. U.S.N.
1st Lieut. William W. Stone

3. It is requested that the name of Colonel Gordon P. Saville be added to the list of officers authorized admission under the quota assigned to the Army Air Forces. Colonel Saville as Director of Air Defense is vitally concerned with the tactical and strategical situation from day to day as presented in the War Room and is continually called upon for recommendation concerning the employment of air defense activities in the various theaters.

4. It is further requested that this office be advised of your action with respect to authorizing Colonel Saville's admission to the War Room.

For the Commanding General:

W. W. Dick

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General

JUL 1 1942

JUL 10 1942
APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff
By O. L. NELSON
Col. G.S.C., Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S.

FOR DEFENSE

BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

WDCSA 020 War Room (6-24-42)

WAR DEPARTMENT

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DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
A. A. F.

1942 JUL 13 PM 2 12

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. Pursuant to Memorandum of June 24th from the Deputy Chief of Staff on the above subject, copy attached, the following officers of this headquarters should be authorized admission to the War Room:

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon
*Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter
Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild
Brig. Gen. S. C. Godfrey
Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody
Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr.
Col. H. M. Shelmire
Col. F. T. Davison
Col. E. P. Sorenson
Col. J. F. Olive, Jr.
Col. H. S. Vandenberg
Col. O. A. Anderson
Col. R. G. Breene
Lt. Col. F. L. Anderson

*Becomes Chief of the Air Staff upon the departure of General Harmon.

2. The following individuals participate in the operation of the War Room and should be authorized admission thereto as provided in basic memorandum:

Major B. Gaylord
Major J. H. Hynes
Major E. O. Hunter
Major C. Spaan
%Major C. B. Thornton
Capt. P. Dixon
%Capt. H. Lockwood, Jr.
1st Lt. W. Haines
1st Lt. W. D. Knight
2nd Lt. G. T. McCroarty
Mr. B. Webster
%Miss V. Erwin
#Mr. E. Basch
#Mr. B. Mills
#Mr. A. Traster
#Mr. H. Zichterman

#Individuals so indicated to be admitted when accompanied by individuals marked %.

Ai AD 385 (25)

RECEIVED
JUL 11 1942
AIR

3. In addition to the individuals listed in paragraph 2 above, the following officers are called upon from time to time to participate in operation of the War Room and should be admitted as occasion demands:

Major A. H. Alexander
Major R. H. Bolling
Major A. J. Smith
Capt. G. D. Mattison
Capt. D. Sage
Capt. D. Van Slyck
1st Lt. R. Carlisle
1st Lt. S. Sealfon
1st Lt. H. V. Williams, Jr.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cpy. Memo., 6-24-42

JUN 26 1942

JUL 10 1942

APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff

By O. L. NELSON
Lt. Col. G.S.C., Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S.

WAR DEPARTMENT

7/13/42 File
gsc

air AG 385 (25)

WAR ROOM PERSONNEL

G-2

ORR, Captain S. M.
DAVENPORT, Captain B. W.
PEYITO, 1st Lt. F. A.
DUPS, 1st Lt. L.
STEWART, 1st Lt. O. C.
FOGLER, 1st Lt. F. B.
MARTIN, 1st Lt. O. A.
ADAMS, 1st Lt. R. H.
BUNNARE, 1st Lt. C. R.
BURKE, 2nd Lt. A. B.
GOOLRICH, 2nd Lt. W. K.
BALDWIN, 2nd Lt. R.

GLIDDEN, Tech. Sgt. John E.
THOMPSON, R. Pierce, Civilian

A-2

21
23

KNIGHT, 1st Lt. W. D.
BASS, 1st Lt. George W.
WOODWARD, 1st Lt. Charles
BRODIE, 1st Lt. J. M.
McGROARTY, 2nd Lt. G. P.

ARMY GROUND FORCES

HARAMORE, 1st Lt. W.

SERVICES OF SUPPLY

KILBORN, Major R. C.
PALMERLEE, Captain A. S.
WILEY, Captain C. C.
SCHEIDER, 1st Lt. Charles F.

JBC/rrb
(AFMAG)

July 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. Reference is made to Memorandum from this office, June 26, 1942, subject as above, which listed individuals in this headquarters who should be admitted to the War Department War Room.

2. In addition to the persons listed in paragraph 2 of that memorandum, the following officers participate in the operation of the War Room and should be admitted thereto:

Lieut. S.O. Irving P. Krick, USN.
1st Lieut. William W. Stone

3. It is requested that the name of Colonel Gordon P. Saville be added to the list of officers authorized admission under the quota assigned to the Army Air Forces. Colonel Saville as Director of Air Defense is vitally concerned with the tactical and strategical situation from day to day as presented in the War Room and is continually called upon for recommendation concerning the employment of air defense activities in the various theaters.

4. It is further requested that this office be advised of your action with respect to authorizing Colonel Saville's admission to the War Room.

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
JUL 1 1942
AAG

Sgd. Wm. W. Dick

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

385 (2-5) x

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

JBC/rrb

2. AFMAG AFMMR 7/1

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of memorandum to the Secretary, General Staff.

2. Upon receipt of reply, you will be advised in the premises.

File

J. B. C.
Asst. Air AG.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	Initial Copy	Memo. 7/1/42.		A-4	A-WPD.	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

War Department War Room

AFDMR/HWB/br

1. AFDMR AFMAG 1942 6/29

1. Reference is made to memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff, dated June 26, subject, War Department War Room, signed by the Air Adjutant General.

2. Names of those officers who are authorized admission to the War Room are listed.

3. General Fairchild urgently recommends that every effort be made to add the name of Colonel Gordon P. Saville to this list. Colonel Saville, as Director of Air Defense, is very vitally concerned with the tactical and strategical situation from day to day as presented in the War Room inasmuch as he is continually called upon for recommendations concerning the employment of air defense activities in all Theaters.

RECEIVED
JUN 30 1942
AIR [illegible]

4. Reply is requested.

M. S. F.
Dir. Mil. Req.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

AAF 02421

SUBJECT: War Department War Room

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFTSW JKL:gep	AFMAG	1942 6/29	It is recommended that the two officers listed below be authorized admission to the War Department War Room, since these officers participate in its operation: Irving P. Krick, Lt. S.G. William W. Stone, 1st Lt. JKL for D.Z.Z. Colonel, Army Air Forces.

RECEIVED
30 1942

(Do not use reverse side)

F-0071, AF. Rev.8/14/41

Page No. _____

List to enter War Room

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. Pursuant to Memorandum of June 24th from the Deputy Chief of Staff on the above subject, copy attached, the following officers of this headquarters should be authorized admission to the War Room:

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Maj. Gen. H. F. Harmon
*Maj. Gen. C. E. Stratemayer
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter
Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild
Brig. Gen. S. C. Godfrey
Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody
Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr.
→ Col. H. M. Shelmire
Col. F. T. Davison
Col. K. P. Sorenson
Col. J. F. Cline, Jr.
Col. H. S. Vandenberg
Col. C. A. Anderson
Col. R. G. Breene
Lt. Col. F. L. Anderson

*Becomes Chief of the Air Staff upon the departure of General Harmon.

2. The following individuals participate in the operation of the War Room and should be authorized admission thereto as provided in basic memorandum:

Major B. Gaylord
Major J. M. Hynes
Major E. O. Hunter
Major C. Spaan
%Major C. B. Thornton
Capt. P. Dixon
%Capt. H. Lockwood, Jr.
1st Lt. W. Haines
1st Lt. W. D. Knight
2nd Lt. G. T. McGroarty
Mr. B. Webster
%Miss V. Erwin
#Mr. E. Basch
#Mr. B. Mills
#Mr. A. Trester
#Mr. H. Zichterman

Individuals so indicated to be admitted when accompanied by individuals marked %.

SAS 385 (25)

SAS 385 (25)

3. In addition to the individuals listed in paragraph 2 above, the following officers are called upon from time to time to participate in operation of the War Room and should be admitted as occasion demands:

Major A. H. Alexander
Major R. H. Bolling
Major A. J. Smith
Capt. G. D. Mattison
Capt. D. Sage
Capt. D. Van Slyck
1st Lt. R. Carlisle
1st Lt. S. Scalfon
1st Lt. H. V. Williams, Jr.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General

1 Incl.-
Cpy. memo., 6-24-42

COPIES FURNISHED:
AFACG (Col. Shalmire)
AFCAS
AFDAS
AFSAS (Col. York)
AFAAP
AFABI (4)
AFACT
AFADS
AFAEP
AFTAI
AFDMR
AFRDS
AFRES
AFROM
AFDTS
AFDMC (Col. Gates)
AFMSC
AFTSW

Dispatched
JUN 27 1942
AAG

Air AG 385 (25)

WDCSA/020 (6/24/42)

June 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES,
COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
A. C. OF S., G-1,
A. C. OF S., G-2,
A. C. OF S., G-3,
A. C. OF S., G-4,
A. C. OF S., OPD,
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS,
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. The hours during which the War Department War Room will be opened to authorized visitors have been reduced to the period, 9:30 to 12:30, daily.

2. It is desired to restrict admission to the War Room to those officers whose duty makes it necessary for them to receive the information presented in the War Department War Room. All divisions of the War Department General Staff and the three principal commands, and the Bureau of Public Relations, will reexamine the list of officers whom they desire to have admitted to the War Room. As a guide, the following quotas are tentatively assigned: Army Ground Forces, 5; Army Air Forces, 15; Services of Supply, 15; Bureau of Public Relations, 3; G-1, 3; G-2, 12; G-3, 4; G-4, 2; and OPD, 15. These quotas do not include individuals participating in the operation of the War Room. Officers who desire occasional admission to the War Room may secure passes from the Office Chief of Staff.

3. Lists of officers authorized to enter the War Room will be submitted to the Secretary, General Staff by June 30, 1942.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

(Sgd) O. L. NELSON

O. L. NELSON,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Asst. Sec., General Staff.

AMD 385 25

War Department War Room

1 AFMAG AFCAS 1942
6-25

1. Attention is invited to attached memorandum of June 24th, from the Deputy Chief of Staff which assigns this headquarters a quota of 15 persons who may be admitted to the War Department War Room.

2. According to the records of the War Room, 57 individuals in AAF Headquarters are now authorized admission thereto, (Incl. #2). 26 of these work in the War Room.

3. It is requested that there be indicated on the attached list the 15 individuals to be reported to the Secretary, General Staff, as authorized to be admitted in the future.

W. W. D.
Col., A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

2 Incls.-
Incl. #1 - Memo. 6-24-42
Incl. #2 - List.

Air AG 385 (25)

Taken by hand by
Col. Cooley 5/25/42

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

Air AG 385 (25)

June 25, 1942

Individuals Now Authorized Admission to War Department War Room

AFACC

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Col. H. M. Shelaire

AFCAS

Maj. Gen. H. F. Harmon

AFDAS

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter

AFSAS

Col. J. Y. York

AFAAP

Col. F. T. Davison

AFAEM

Col. E. P. Sorenson
Col. J. F. Olive, Jr.
Lt. Col. L. P. Ordway (No longer in Washington)
X Maj. A. H. Alexander
X Maj. R. H. Belling
X Maj. B. Gaylord
X Maj. J. H. Hynes
X Maj. E. O. Hunter
Maj. N. W. Rice
X Maj. A. J. Smith
X Maj. C. Spaan
Maj. R. Vidmer
X Capt. P. Dixon
X Capt. R. E. Falconer
X Capt. G. D. Mattison
X Capt. D. Sage
Capt. E. E. Smith (No longer in Washington)
X Capt. D. Van Slyck
X 1st Lt. J. M. Brodie
X 1st Lt. R. Carlisle
X 1st Lt. R. Dahlstrom
X 1st Lt. W. Haines
X 1st Lt. W. D. Knight
1st Lt. A. T. Liggett
X 1st Lt. S. Sealfon
X 1st Lt. R. Sayers
X 1st Lt. S. T. Terhune

AFABI (Cont'd)

% 1st Lt. H. V. Williams, Jr.
% 2d Lt. P. A. Kennedy
% 2d Lt. G. T. McGroarty
% 2d Lt. A. B. Taylor
% Mr. B. Webster

% Individuals so designated engaged in operation of War Room.

AFACT

Col. H. S. Vandenberg

AFADS

Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Jr.

AFAEP

Col. H. A. Craig (No longer in Washington)

AFTAI

Col. E. W. Hill

AFDMR

Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild
Col. M. E. Gross

AFRDB

Lt. Col. F. L. Anderson
Lt. Col. W. C. Sweeney, Jr.

AFRBS

Brig. Gen. S. C. Godfrey

AFRCM

Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody

AFDTS

Col. R. G. Breene

AFDMC

Col. B. E. Gates

AFMSC

% Maj. C. B. Thornton
* Capt. H. Lockwood, Jr.
* Miss V. Erwin
# Mr. E. Baach
# Mr. B. Mills
# Mr. A. Traster
# Mr. H. Zichterman

Individuals designated * admitted at all times; those indicated by # admitted when accompanied by *.

AFSOW

Col. D. Z. Zimmerman
Lt. Col. J. K. Lacy
Lt. Col. T. S. Moorman
Lt. Col. H. L. Smith

Miscellaneous

Eighth Air Force - Maj. Gen. C. Spaatz
Maj. J. M. Murphy
Board of Economic Warfare - Maj. G. L. Hart, Jr.

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

(AFMAG) JBC:eie

May 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary, W.D.G.S.

SUBJECT: Admission to War Department War Room

1. Reference is made to AG 029.21 (3-17-42)MC-F, March 19, 1942, subject as above, and to reply thereto from this office dated April 1, 1942.

2. It is requested that the name of Brigadier General Hume Peabody be added to the list of those officers authorized admission to the War Room under paragraph 3d of that letter, vice Colonel Robert L. Walsh. General Peabody is being appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

MAY 28 1942
AAG

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Air Adjutant General

5/28/42 Above at request of A-2 (Col. Ringold).
JBC

Y-le 5/28/42

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Army Air Staff	A-A	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
(Note: Copy for Col. Walsh (A-2) Copy for A-2 (Col. Ringgold))											

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Air AG 385 (24)

385 (24)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMY AIR FORCE:

Portuguese Situation

In the event that the Azores are attacked, it is likely that Germany would step in with her long range bombers. In Lisbon preparations have already been made to take care of landings and take-offs.

SOURCE: Highly reliable

W. T. Pigott
W. T. PIGOTT,
Lieut. Col., Infantry

385 (23)

File per Mrs. Clark
ci 8/28/42

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~~SECRET~~

A-784

Cu as 385 (23)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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Strategic Targets within range of Middle East Air Bases

RB/hk

1. CAS AEP 1942 5/21 1. For use in connection with the planned project.

Incl:
n/c

R.B.
S/AS

385 (22)

Dispatched
MA. 22 1942
AAG

File
ai 5/22/42

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

[redacted] Air AG 385 (22)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

MAY 15 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES.

SUBJECT: Strategic Targets Within Range of Middle East Air Bases.

With reference to Colonel Feller's Cable No. 987, Cairo, April 22, 1942, which Gen. Arnold called to the attention of the Plans Division for study, the following data has been prepared by this Division in conjunction with A-2. Some of the data is more recent and more complete than that submitted in a previous study by this Division, i.e. "The Danube as an Objective for Air Attack."

I. Discussion.

1. a. The oil refined by the Roumanian refineries in or close to Ploesti produce over six million tons a year of refined products. This represents approximately 90% of all the oil the Germans can get out of the entire area. Hence this small Ploesti area constitutes one of the most important bombing objectives in Europe well within range of attack by heavy bombers based on Syria, Egypt, or Libya.

b. These refineries, concentrated in a small area, are highly vulnerable to air attacks. Any failure of power while a refinery is in operation will cause serious explosions throughout the refinery within less than an hour. Low-flying, daylight attacks permit the bombardiers to pick out vital units, destroy them, and leave the rest of the refinery to blow up itself as a result of sudden stoppage in the refining process. The vital and vulnerable points are Power House, Cracking Plant, Distillation Units, and Boiler House.

2. a. At present the flow of oil products from Ploesti goes mostly to Germany and the Ukranian front. This oil is being shipped by rail, using three major railroad lines, and by tank barges going up the Danube River. If Russia loses control of the Black Sea, Germany will again be able to ship oil through the Black Sea port of Constanza. However, this port cannot be used for oil storage and transshipment until such control is lost.

b. Destruction of the large oil pipe lines and railroad communications between Ploesti and Giurgiu would vitally affect oil shipments to Germany. Destruction of the numerous railroad bridges on the Ploesti - Focsani - Botosani railroad line would paralyze shipment to their Ukranian front.

c. Traffic on the Danube River is always very heavy from March to December. A small peak load occurs after the ice thaws in early spring, when the accumulated oil stock is rushed up the Danube River. Major

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peak load is from mid-August to December when both oil and grain are being moved. Best method to cause serious disruption to traffic on the Danube River may be obtained by magnetic mining of river between the towns of Giurgiu and Belgrade. This is a 450-mile target.

3. Additional information Tabs I to VII as shown on Table of Contents inclosed.

II. Conclusions:

1. Maximum assistance to Russia could be obtained by interrupting the flow of some 100,000 tons of refined products which are shipped each month from Ploesti to the German Ukranian front.

2. A severe disruption of overall German war effort can be accomplished by the destruction of this oil refining center and the interruption of water and rail communications between Ploesti and Germany.

3. The Ploesti Oil Refineries and lines of communication constitute the most remunerative and vulnerable target for Allied air attacks which would contribute materially to the offensive against Germany.

4. Priority of Targets:

a. First consideration should be given to Ploesti with its high concentration of oil refineries.

b. Second priority to railroad communication between Ploesti and Focsani to prevent shipment of oil to the German Ukranian front.

c. Third priority to the Danube River, particularly through the summer months.

d. Fourth priority to the pipe line facilities and rail communications between Ploesti and Giurgiu and all remaining railroad facilities leading out of the Ploesti area.

III. Recommendations:

That in the event Halpro cannot get to its present destination that this force be employed from the Middle East on this Mission.

H. A. CRAIG,
Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans.

1 Incl:
Table of Contents
w/Tabs I to VII

Tab VII sent to Ofen Div WD&S

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Au AS 385 (22)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab I — Memorandum from Operations Division, WDGS, reference previous study "The Danube as an Objective for Air Attack."

Tab II — Secret Cable #987, Cairo, April 22, 1942, included with original only.

Tab III — a. List of 12 Major Refineries with their Production Capacity in Barrels per day.

b. Detailed Description of Eight Major Refineries in or near Ploesti, Roumania.

Tab IV — Aerial Photograph of Ploesti Refining Center, included with original only.

Tab V — Plan of Town of Ploesti showing exact location of 12 Oil Refineries, included with original only.

Tab VI — Map of Central Europe and the Mediterranean showing Locations of Strategic Areas.

Tab VII — Large folder containing Target Maps of every Strategical Point mentioned in Colonel Faller's Cable, has been furnished the Operations Division, WDGS. This folder contains:

Volume I - Roumania and Bulgaria Target Maps.

Volume II - Greece - Crete - Dodecanese Islands Target Maps.

Volume III - Italy - Sicily - Sardinia Target Maps.

Encl. No. 1

Air AG 385 (22)

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Removed per E.O. 10501

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May 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

SUBJECT: Placing Name of Captain Van Slyck on the War Department War Room Approved List.

1. Request that Captain DeForst Van Slyck, A-2 Division (Current Intelligence Section) be placed upon the roster of officers permitted to enter the War Department War Room.

2. The necessity for Captain Van Slyck's entrance to the War Room arises from the fact that he is in A-2 Division (Current Intelligence Section) and it is necessary for him to secure data for presentation to the Air Staff.

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
MAY 5 1942
AAG

File
[illegible]

FRED C. MILNER
Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst. Air Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES—COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	[illegible]										

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Air AG 385 (19)

AAF-39

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Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

April 16, 1942

385 (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brig. General L.S. Kuter	Col. R.G. Breene
Col. J. Y. York	Capt. H. Lockwood Jr.
Col. F. T. Davison	1st Lt. C.B. Thornton
Col. R. L. Walsh	1st Lt. R. Carlisle
Col. H.S. Vandenberg	1st Lt. R.R. Smyers
Col. T. J. Hanley, Jr.	1st Lt. W.P. Knight
Col. H. A. Craig	1st Lt. A.P. Liggitt
Col. E.W. Hill	1st Lt. J.C. Rathborne
Brig. General M.S. Fairchild	2d Lt. P. A. Kennedy
Col. M.E. Gross	2d Lt. A. B. Taylor

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. The new War Department War Room at the head of the 4th wing has been completed and is now in operation.

2. Representatives from G-2, Operations Division, and the Air Staff will present the latest changes in the war situation at 9:30 A.M. each morning. All officers eligible to enter the War Room are encouraged to be present at these sessions and to use other information which is available in the War Room.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Air Adjutant General.

4/18/42 file on "War Room" file.
JSC

FOR DEFENSE
BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

RESTRICTED

Air AG 385 (18)

WDCSA 020 War Room
(4/10/42)

April 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE A. C. OF S., G-1,
G-2,
G-3,
G-4,
Operations Division,
Office Secretary of War,
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Commanding General, Services of Supply:

Subject: War Department War Room.

1. The new War Department War Room at the head of the 4th wing has been completed and is now in operation.

2. Representatives from G-2, Operations Division, and the Air Staff will present the latest changes in the war situation at 9:30 A. M. each morning beginning Tuesday, April 14th. All officers eligible to enter the War Room are encouraged to be present at these sessions and to use other information which is available in the War Room.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

(Sgd) JOHN R. DEANE

JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Hq. Army Air Forces
APR 15 1942
AAG RECEIVED

APR 13 1942

OUT OUT

Copy for CG Army Air Forces

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

Air AG 385 (17) APR 13 1942

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

(AFMAG)

April 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, W.D. G.S.

SUBJECT: Admission to War Department War Room.

1. Reference is made to memorandum of April 1st from this office to you, Air AG, 385 (15), above subject. Under the heading "f" of that memorandum, the names of certain assistants authorized admission to the War Room were to be reported later.

2. It is reported that Colonel Mervin E. Gross, Air Corps, is authorized admission as the designated assistant of the Director of Military Requirements, Brig. General Fairchild.

For the Commanding General:

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A.G.D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
APR 3 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

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DECLASSIFIED

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, W.D.G.S.

Subject: Admission to War Department War Room.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of AG 029.21 (3-17-42)MC-F, March 19, 1942, to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, subject as above, the following individuals are authorized admittance to the War Department War Room:

Under paragraph 2 of letter.-
Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold.
Major General Millard F. Harmon

Under paragraph 3 of letter.-
d. Brig. General L. S. Kuter
Colonel F. Trubee Davison
*Colonel Robert L. Walsh
Colonel H. S. Vandenberg
Colonel Thomas J. Manley, Jr.
Colonel Howard A. Craig
Colonel Edmund W. Hill
f. Brig. General Muir S. Fairchild
Assistant - to be reported later.
Colonel Robert G. Breese
Assistant - to be reported later.
g. Captain Hamilton Lockwood, Jr.
1st Lt. Charles D. Thornton
1st Lt. Robert Carlisle
1st Lt. Robert R. Smyers
1st Lt. W. P. Knight
1st Lt. A. F. Liggitt
1st Lt. J. C. Rathborne
2nd Lt. Paul A. Kennedy
2nd Lt. A. R. Taylor

Colonel John Y. York

Colonel Melvin E. Gross

385 (15)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
					~~RESTRICTED~~						

AAF-39

Air AG 385 (15)

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

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DECLASSIFIED

Under paragraph 4 of letter.-
Mr. Benj. Webster
Miss. Virginia Erwin
#Mr. Ben Mills
Mr. Allen Trester
Mr. Harry Zichterman
Mr. Edwin Basch

* Lt. Col. James F. Clive, Jr., (Executive, A-2) is designated as alternate for admission to War Room for and in the absence of Colonel Walsh.

Individuals so designated to be admitted when accompanied by Captain Hamilton Lockwood, Jr., Lt. Charles B. Thornton, or Miss Virginia Erwin.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General, A.A.F.

COPY FURNISHED:
~~S/GS (Col. Young)~~
Secretary Air Staff, Col. York
A-2

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

AG 020.21 (3-26-42) MC-F JAH

March 20, 1942

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Paragraph 1 of letter, this office, March 19, 1942, AG 020.21 (3-17-42)MC-F, subject as above, is amended to read as follows:

Special Guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal, District of Columbia, will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. Ulio
Major General,
The Adjutant General

COPY FOR:
A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
Plans
Air-Inspector
Dir. of Mil. Req.
Air. Tech. Services.

Air AG 385 (14)

AAG/3 2/9
Air AG 385 (14)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED

IN REPLY REFER TO AG 029.21 (3-26-42)MC-F

WASHINGTON JAU

March 28, 1942.

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.
ON

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Paragraph 1 of letter, this office, March 19, 1942, AG 029.21 (3-17-42)MC-F, subject as above, is amended to read as follows:

Special Guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal, District of Columbia, will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

385 (14)

742830 MAR 31 42
CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

RESTRICTED

air ab 385 (14) MAY

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

~~RESTRICTED~~ DECLASSIFIED

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Air Inspector.

SUBJECT: Admission to War Department War Room.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent letter from The Adjutant General on the above mentioned subject.

2. In order that the required report may be made to The Provost Marshal General, it is requested that the names of such individuals under your jurisdiction, as may be authorized admittance to the war room under the provisions of paragraphs 3 d, f, and g, be furnished this office with the least practicable delay.

3. It is further requested that any changes in the officers designated be furnished this office when such changes occur.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arnold

John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General, A.A.F.

1 Incl.
Cy AG 029.21 (3-17-42)
MC-F, 3-19-42.

1st Ind.

Headquarters Army Air Forces, Office of the Air Inspector, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1942. TO: Adjutant General, Army Air Forces.

The undersigned is designated as representative of this office under paragraph 3 d of basic letter.

Edmund W. Hill

EDMUND W. HILL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
The Air Inspector.

~~RESTRICTED~~

AGAA/2201

1st Ind.

Headquarters Army Air Forces, Office of the Air Inspector, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1942. TO: Adjutant General, Army Air Forces.

The undersigned is designated as representative of this office under paragraph 3 d of basic letter.

EDMUND W. HILL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
The Air Inspector.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

Air AB 385 (13) C

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington

AG 020.21
(3-17-42)MC-F

March 19, 1942.

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1. Special guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal General will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

a. Double doors have been constructed at either end of the hall in the War Department Munitions Building, in which the War Room is located. One guard will be posted outside of each of the outside doors to deny entrance to all persons except those who state that they have or are known by the guard to have authority to be admitted to the War Room. This guard will be familiar with the photographs and the rulings cited below. Another guard will be posted at a desk between the inside and outside doors at each end of the corridor in which the War Room is located. This guard will verify passes and will maintain a log showing names of visitors and the date and hour of their arrivals and departures.

2. A limited number of officials will always be admitted to the War Room without question and may bring with them any persons they choose. Photographs of these officials will be posted and kept before the sentry at the desk between the doors to the War Room. Initially these officials will be:

The Secretary of War
The Under Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
The Deputy Chief of Staff
The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, WPD
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Services of Supply

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

3. In addition to the foregoing the following officials will be admitted upon presentation of War Department identification cards (AGO Form Number 65-1):

A. All regularly detailed members of the War Department General Staff.

B. The Chief and the Executives, Military Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Intelligence Group, his Executive Officer, and the Situation Officer, Military Intelligence Service.

C. In addition to A above, the following officers of the War Plans Division will be admitted:

All members of the Joint Strategic Committee
All members of the Combined Subjects Committee
All members of the Strategic Committee
All members of the Future Plans Section
All members of the Operations Branch

D. The Deputy Chief of Staff and one member of each of the divisions of the Policy Staff of the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply.

E. The Chief and one member of the Military Requirements and of the Training Divisions of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

F. The Director of Military Requirements and one Assistant and the Director of Technical Requirements and one Assistant of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

G. Officers whose daily duty includes posting information in the War Room.

4. Civilian personnel whose daily duty is within the area inclosed by the entrances to this War Room will be admitted upon the presentation of the Army identification badges. Only personnel whose records have been examined and whose characters have been found to be unimpeachable will be employed within this area.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

5. No other persons will be admitted to the War Room without special passes issued on the authority of the Chief of Staff by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff. These passes will be collected by the sentry on duty at the desks in the entrance to the War Room and will be returned to the Secretary, General Staff for check and for final disposition.

6. For the convenience of the Chief of Staff, it is desired that visits to the War Room be held to the minimum during the periods: 7:45-8:45 a.m., noon to 1:00 p.m., and 4:15 to 5:15 p.m., each day.

7. All personnel are enjoined to visit the War Room as frequently as is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. On the other hand, it is evident that visits to the War Room must be restricted to the smallest number consistent with the performance of these duties.

8. Each major War Department activity is responsible for keeping the sentries on duty at the desk in the entrance to the War Room posted as to the names of the members of their organizations who should be admitted to the War Room within the restrictions indicated above.

9. The foregoing indicates a tentative authorization for admission to the War Room. If congestion in the War Room indicates that too wide authority has been granted for admission, it may be necessary to delay entry or to deny admission to some of the officials indicated above, pending revision of this memorandum.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Signed. J. A. Ulio
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

RESTRICTED

Air Ab 385 (13) a

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

BASIC: Admission to War Department War Room

385 (13) c

1st Ind.

Headquarters Army Air Forces, Office of the Air Inspector, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1942. TO: Adjutant General, Army Air Forces.

The undersigned is designated as representative of this office under paragraph 3 d of basic letter.

EDMUND W. HILL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
The Air Inspector.

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES

Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. C.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-W.P.D.	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics

RESTRICTED

Air Ab 385 (13) c

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

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DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Assistant Adjutant General,
Army Air Forces.

SUBJECT Admission to War Department War Room.

1. In compliance with your memorandum of March 31 the following Officers have been designated to represent the Directorate of Military Requirements through admission to the War Department War Room:

Brigadier General Muir S. Fairchild
Colonel Mervin E. Gross

H. W. Bowman

H. W. BOWMAN,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive,
Directorate of Military
Requirements.

4/3/42 Gen Fairchild reported by memo to S/W 065
on 4/1/42
JSC

~~RESTRICTED~~

Air AG 385 (13) C

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

March 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Technical Services

Subject: Admission to War Department War room.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent letter from The Adjutant General on the above mentioned subject.

2. In order that the required report may be made to The Provost Marshal General, it is requested that the names of such individuals under your jurisdiction, as may be authorized admittance to the war room under the provisions of paragraphs 3 d, e, and g, be furnished this office with the least practicable delay.

3. It is further requested that any changes in the officers designated be furnished this office when such changes occur.

John B. Cooley.
JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General, A.A.F.

1 Incl.
cy AG 029.21 (3-27-42)
MC-F, 3-19-42.

4-1/MR

Air AG 380 (13) C

ACAAF/3205
Air AG 380 (13) C

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Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington

AG 029.21
(3-17-42)MC-F

March 19, 1942.

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1. Special guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal General will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

a. Double doors have been constructed at either end of the hall in the War Department Munitions Building, in which the War Room is located. One guard will be posted outside of each of the outside doors to deny entrance to all persons except those who state that they have or are known by the guard to have authority to be admitted to the War Room. This guard will be familiar with the photographs and the rulings cited below. Another guard will be posted at a desk between the inside and outside doors at each end of the corridor in which the War Room is located. This guard will verify passes and will maintain a log showing names of visitors and the date and hour of their arrivals and departures.

2. A limited number of officials will always be admitted to the War Room without question and may bring with them any persons they choose. Photographs of these officials will be posted and kept before the sentry at the desk between the doors to the War Room. Initially these officials will be:

The Secretary of War
The Under Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
The Deputy Chief of Staff
The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, WPD
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Services of Supply

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

3. In addition to the foregoing the following officials will be admitted upon presentation of War Department identification cards (AGO Form Number 65-1):

a. All regularly detailed members of the War Department General Staff.

b. The Chief and the Executives, Military Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Intelligence Group, his Executive Officer, and the Situation Officer, Military Intelligence Service.

c. In addition to 3a above, the following officers of the War Plans Division will be admitted:

All members of the Joint Strategic Committee
All members of the Combined Subjects Committee
All members of the Strategic Committee
All members of the Future Plans Section
All members of the Operations Branch

d. The Deputy Chief of Staff and one member of each of the divisions of the Policy Staff of the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply.

e. The Chief and one member of the Military Requirements and of the Training Divisions of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

f. The Director of Military Requirements and one Assistant and the Director of Technical Requirements and one Assistant of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

g. Officers whose daily duty includes posting information in the War Room.

4. Civilian personnel whose daily duty is within the area inclosed by the entrances to this War Room will be admitted upon the presentation of the Army identification badges. Only personnel whose records have been examined and whose characters have been found to be unimpeachable will be employed within this area.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

6. No other persons will be admitted to the War Room without special passes issued on the authority of the Chief of Staff by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff. These passes will be collected by the sentry on duty at the desks in the entrance to the War Room and will be returned to the Secretary, General Staff for check and for final disposition.

7. For the convenience of the Chief of Staff, it is desired that visits to the War Room be held to the minimum during the periods: 7:45-8:45 a.m., noon to 1:00 p.m., and 4:15 to 5:15 p.m., each day.

8. All personnel are enjoined to visit the War Room as frequently as is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. On the other hand, it is evident that visits to the War Room must be restricted to the smallest number consistent with the performance of these duties.

9. Each major War Department activity is responsible for keeping the sentries on duty at the desk in the entrance to the War Room posted as to the names of the members of their organizations who should be admitted to the War Room within the restrictions indicated above.

10. The foregoing indicates a tentative authorization for admission to the War Room. If congestion in the War Room indicates that too wide authority has been granted for admission, it may be necessary to delay entry or to deny admission to some of the officials indicated above, pending revision of this memorandum.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Signed. J. A. Ulio
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501
DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Admission to War Department War Room.

The name of Colonel H. S. Vandenberg, G.S.C., is submitted for the War Department War Room.

H. S. Vandenberg
H. S. VANDENBERG
Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of A.S. - A-3

Air AS 385 (13) C

4/2/42 1) Name included on Memo. to Sect., G/S, 4/11/42.
2) File
JJC

RESTRICTED

557

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. 020.21

Note.--A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF

SUBJECT: Admission to War Department War Room.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	AFADS	AFMAG	1942 4/1	AFADS FMM/nmb 1. In compliance with Paragraph 2, your memorandum of March 31, 1942, subject, above, the name of Col. T. J. Hanley, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-4, is submitted. TJH C/A-4
				4/2/42 1) Col. Hanley included in memo for sgnt, WDGS, 4/1/42. 2) file psc

RECEIVED APR 1 1942 AIR AG-7

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AG. Rev. 8/14/41

Page No.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED

1st Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C.
To: The Air Adjutant General.

1. It is reported that of the officers of the A-1 Division, it is desired that Colonel F. Trubee Davison, A.C. of A.S., A-1 be authorized admittance to the War Department War Room.

2. The name of Colonel Davison was reported to the Provost Marshal General in compliance with a telephone request from his office.

W.G. Brill
WILLIAM G. BRILL,
Major, Air Corps,
Executive, A-1.

Incl. n/c for A.C. of A.S., A-1.

Air As 385 (13) C

4/1/42 1) Col. Davidson included in report to Sect, 6/S, this date.
2) file.
JGC

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON
~~RESTRICTED~~

DECLASSIFIED March 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1

Subject: Admission to War Department War Room.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent letter from The Adjutant General on the above mentioned subject.

2. In order that the required report may be made to The Provost Marshal General, it is requested that the names of such individuals under your jurisdiction, as may be authorized admittance to the war room under the provisions of paragraphs 3 d, f, and g, be furnished this office with the least practicable delay.

3. It is further requested that any changes in the officers designated be furnished this office when such changes occur.

John B. Cooley,
JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General, A.A.F.

1 Incl.
cy AG 029.21 (3-17-42)
MC-F, 3-19-42.

FOR DEFENSE
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

~~RESTRICTED~~

AGAAF/2199
Air as 385 (13) C

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington

AG 029.21
(3-17-42)MC-F

March 19, 1942.

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1. Special guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal General will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

a. Double doors have been constructed at either end of the hall in the War Department Munitions Building, in which the War Room is located. One guard will be posted outside of each of the outside doors to deny entrance to all persons except those who state that they have or are known by the guard to have authority to be admitted to the War Room. This guard will be familiar with the photographs and the rulings cited below. Another guard will be posted at a desk between the inside and outside doors at each end of the corridor in which the War Room is located. This guard will verify passes and will maintain a log showing names of visitors and the date and hour of their arrivals and departures.

2. A limited number of officials will always be admitted to the War Room without question and may bring with them any persons they choose. Photographs of those officials will be posted and kept before the sentry at the desk between the doors to the War Room. Initially these officials will be:

The Secretary of War
The Under Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
The Deputy Chief of Staff
The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, WPD
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Services of Supply

RESTRICTED

3. In addition to the foregoing the following officials will be admitted upon presentation of War Department identification cards (AGO Form Number 65-1):

a. All regularly detailed members of the War Department General Staff.

b. The Chief and the Executive, Military Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Intelligence Group, his Executive Officer, and the Situation Officer, Military Intelligence Service.

c. In addition to the above, the following officers of the War Plans Division will be admitted:

All members of the Joint Strategic Committee
All members of the Combined Subjects Committee
All members of the Strategic Committee
All members of the Future Plans Section
All members of the Operations Branch

d. The Deputy Chief of Staff and one member of each of the divisions of the Policy Staff of the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply.

e. The Chief and one member of the Military Requirements and of the Training Divisions of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

f. The Director of Military Requirements and one Assistant and the Director of Technical Requirements and one Assistant of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

g. Officers whose daily duty includes posting information in the War Room.

4. Civilian personnel whose daily duty is within the area inclosed by the entrances to this War Room will be admitted upon the presentation of the Army identification Badges. Only personnel whose records have been examined and whose characters have been found to be unimpeachable will be employed within this area.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED

AG 020.21 (3-17-42)MC-F (Cont'd) March 19, 1942.

5. No other persons will be admitted to the War Room without special passes issued on the authority of the Chief of Staff by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff. These passes will be collected by the sentry on duty at the desks in the entrance to the War Room and will be returned to the Secretary, General Staff for check and for final disposition.

6. For the convenience of the Chief of Staff, it is desired that visits to the War Room be held to the minimum during the periods: 7:45-8:45 a.m., noon to 1:00 p.m., and 4:15 to 5:15 p.m., each day.

7. All personnel are enjoined to visit the War Room as frequently as is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. On the other hand, it is evident that visits to the War Room must be restricted to the smallest number consistent with the performance of those duties.

8. Each major War Department activity is responsible for keeping the sentries on duty at the desk in the entrance to the War Room posted as to the names of the members of their organizations who should be admitted to the War Room within the restrictions indicated above.

9. The foregoing indicates a tentative authorization for admission to the War Room. If congestion in the War Room indicates that too wide authority has been granted for admission, it may be necessary to delay entry or to deny admission to some of the officials indicated above, pending revision of this memorandum.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Signed. J. A. Ulio
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

~~RESTRICTED~~
DECLASSIFIED

March 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Subject: Admission to War Department War room.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent letter from The Adjutant General on the above mentioned subject.

2. In order that the required report may be made to The Provost Marshal General, it is requested that the names of such individuals under your jurisdiction, as may be authorized admittance to the war room under the provisions of paragraphs 3 d, f, and g, be furnished this office with the least practicable delay.

3. It is further requested that any changes in the officers designated be furnished this office when such changes occur.

Air AG 380 (13) C

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General, A.A.F.

Cys. to. - A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
Plans
Dir. Mil. Req.
Dir. Tech. Services
Air Ins.

1 Incl.
cy AG 029.21 (3-V-42)
MC-F, 3-19-42.
Copy to A-1, A-2 A-3, A-4, Plans,
Dir. of Mil. Req. & Dir. Technical
Services.

Dispatched
MAR 31 1942
AAG

AG/AAF File

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

~~RESTRICTED~~
DECLASSIFIED

March 31, 1942

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO: The Adjutant General.

1. Reference is made to AG 029.21 (3-17-42)MC-P, March 19, 1942, above subject.

2. It is requested that "The Secretary, The Air Staff," be added to the individuals authorized to be admitted to the War Room. This request is made because of the fact that the individual in question is a member of Joint and Combined Airplane Allocation Committees and is required by that duty to have regular and frequent contact with plans and progress of the War.

For the Commanding General:

Dispatched
MAR 31 1942
AAG

WILLIAM W. DICK
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General, Army Air Forces.

Air AS 385 (13) B

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
✓ R+R											

AAF-39

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Removed per E.O. 10501

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF . . . . . .

AF 029.21

SUBJECT: War Department War Room.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS AAF/AS LSK/hd
1	AFDAS	AFMAG RECEIVED MAR 30 1942 AIR AG-7	1942 3-30	1. On or about March 20, 1942, The Adjutant General informed the Commanding General, Army Air Forces of his responsibilities and other matters pertaining to the War Department War Room, together with authority for certain members of the Air Staff to visit the War Department War Room. That letter or memorandum listed certain Air Staff positions in connection with admission to the War Department War Room and required this Headquarters to report the names of the officers holding those positions. 2. If it has not already been accomplished, it is desired that direct action be taken by your office in providing the required names and in keeping that list current. As soon as the proper names have been provided it is desired that Colonel Young (Assistant Secretary, General Staff, phone 6550) be informed thereof. 3. In addition to the positions listed on the Adjutant General's memorandum, it is desired that your office take the necessary action to have the position, "The Secretary, The Air Staff", and the name "Col. York" added to the list of positions and individuals who may be admitted to the War Department War Room. The reason for this addition is the fact that Colonel York is a member of Joint and Combined Airplane Allocation Committees. That duty requires regular and frequent contact with plans and progress of the war. L.S.K. AFDAS

(Do not use reverse side)

W-4071,AC, Rev.8/14/41

Page No._____

Air As 385 (13) B

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501
DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO

AG 029.21
(3-17-42)MC-F

JAU

March 19, 1942.

SUBJECT: Admission to the War Department War Room.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1. Special guards will be posted at both approaches to the War Department War Room at all times after noon on March 19, 1942. The Provost Marshal General will be responsible for the provision of the necessary guards and for the enforcement of special security measures concerning access to the War Room.

a. Double doors have been constructed at either end of the hall in the War Department Munitions Building, in which the War Room is located. One guard will be posted outside of each of the outside doors to deny entrance to all persons except those who state that they have or are known by the guard to have authority to be admitted to the War Room. This guard will be familiar with the photographs and the rulings cited below. Another guard will be posted at a desk between the inside and outside doors at each end of the corridor in which the War Room is located. This guard will verify passes and will maintain a log showing names of visitors and the date and hour of their arrivals and departures.

2. A limited number of officials will always be admitted to the War Room without question and may bring with them any persons they choose. Photographs of those officials will be posted and kept before the sentry at the desk between the doors to the War Room. Initially these officials will be:

The Secretary of War
The Under Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
The Deputy Chief of Staff
The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, WPD
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces
Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Services of Supply

8519 MAR 21 42
CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F
RESTRICTED

MAR 21 [illegible] AM

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AIR WAR PLANS DIV

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION Removed per E.O. 10501
~~RESTRICTED~~
DECLASSIFIED

3. In addition to the foregoing the following officials will be admitted upon presentation of War Department identification cards (AGO Form Number 65-1):

a. All regularly detailed members of the War Department General Staff.

b. The Chief and the Executives, Military Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Intelligence Group, his Executive Officer, and the Situation Officer, Military Intelligence Service.

c. In addition to 3a above, the following officers of the War Plans Division will be admitted:

All members of the Joint Strategic Committee
All members of the Combined Subjects Committee
All members of the Strategic Committee
All members of the Future Plans Section
All members of the Operations Branch

d. The Deputy Chief of Staff and one member of each of the divisions of the Policy Staff of the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply.

e. The Chief and one member of the Military Requirements and of the Training Divisions of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

f. The Director of Military Requirements and one Assistant and the Director of Technical Requirements and one Assistant of the Operating Staff of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

g. Officers whose daily duty includes posting information in the War Room.

4. Civilian personnel whose daily duty is within the area inclosed by the entrances to this War Room will be admitted upon the presentation of the Army identification badges. Only personnel whose records have been examined and whose characters have been found to be unimpeachable will be employed within this area.

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CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.
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RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
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DECLASSIFIED

5. No other persons will be admitted to the War Room without special passes issued on the authority of the Chief of Staff by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff. These passes will be collected by the sentry on duty at the desks in the entrance to the War Room and will be returned to the Secretary, General Staff for check and for final disposition.

6. For the convenience of the Chief of Staff, it is desired that visits to the War Room be held to the minimum during the periods: 7:45-8:45 a.m., noon to 1:00 p.m., and 4:15 to 5:15 p.m., each day.

7. All personnel are enjoined to visit the War Room as frequently as is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. On the other hand, it is evident that visits to the War Room must be restricted to the smallest number consistent with the performance of these duties.

8. Each major War Department activity is responsible for keeping the sentries on duty at the desk in the entrance to the War Room posted as to the names of the members of their organizations who should be admitted to the War Room within the restrictions indicated above.

9. The foregoing indicates a tentative authorization for admission to the War Room. If congestion in the War Room indicates that too wide authority has been granted for admission, it may be necessary to delay entry or to deny admission to some of the officials indicated above, pending revision of this memorandum.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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CENTRAL MAIL SECTION A.A.F.

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of the General Staff
Attention: Col. Strong

SUBJECT: Entrance to the Air Room of the War Department War Room.

1. It is requested that the following individuals be granted admission to the Air Room of the War Department War Room for purposes of presenting, maintaining and interpreting the information made available in that room.

2. Individuals to have access at all times:

Lt. Charles B. Thornton
Miss Virginia Erwin
Captain Hamilton Lockwood, Jr.

3. Individuals to have access to the room when accompanied by any one of the three listed above:

Mr. Ben Mills
Mr. Allen Traster
Mr. Harry Richterman
Mr. Edwin Rauch

4. It is further requested that on certain occasions when the services of specialized personnel from this office are required in the Air Room that the Director of Statistical Control, Lt. Charles B. Thornton, be permitted to gain admission for those individuals and accompany those individuals to the Air Room and during the performance of their duties therein.

Charles B. Thornton
CHARLES B. THORNTON
1st Lieutenant, A. C.
Director Statistical Control

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

DECLASSIFIED
~~RESTRICTED~~

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Air Inspector.

SUBJECT: Admission to War Department War Room.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent letter from The Adjutant General on the above mentioned subject.

2. In order that the required report may be made to The Provost Marshal General, it is requested that the names of such individuals under your jurisdiction, as may be authorized admittance to the war room under the provisions of paragraphs 3 d, f, and g, be furnished this office with the least practicable delay.

3. It is further requested that any changes in the officers designated be furnished this office when such changes occur.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arnold

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General, A.A.F.

1 Incl.
Cy AG 029.21 (3-17-42)
MC-F, 3-19-42.

385 (13) c

Dispatched
APR 1 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

AAF-39

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Air Ins 385 (13) c

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

AF
OAA/alm
3/26/42

FICA

MAR 2 6 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:

Subject: Use of beach ships to entice enemy submarines to run aground.

1. The enclosed plan on above subject submitted by Harold S. Vanderbilt was forwarded to this office.

2. This plan is being forwarded to your office as a matter pertaining to Naval strategy.

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

H.A. CRAIG,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.

Dispatched
MAR 27 1942
AAG

Incls:
Cy Memo to H.S. Vanderbilt, 3/5/42, w/ 3 Inds and Memo to CO Morrison Fld above subj.

Air AS 385 (12)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION										
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics

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AAF-39

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Nov. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date [illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Ltr. to C.O., Morrison Field.
From Harold S. Vanderbilt.
SUBJECT: Use of Beach Ships to Entice Enemy Submarines to Run Aground.

1st Ind. (B-4)

HQ., SOUTH ATLANTIC SECTOR, Foreign Division, ACFC, Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Fla., March 5, 1942. TO: Headquarters, Foreign Division, Air Corps Ferrying Command, Washington, D. C.

1. For your information.

/s/ Paul E. Burrows,
PAUL E. BURROWS,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

Incl.
c/s/ Ltr. to Harold S. Vanderbilt,
Lantana, Florida.

2nd Ind. S-2 HFC:ijd

Headquarters of the Ferry Command, Washington, D. C. March 14, 1942. To: Com. General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. It is suggested that the attached, after being studied by the Air Staff, be forwarded to the Navy Department as a matter pertaining to that Department.

For the Commanding General:

Incl. H/C

To Mail & Record Room
EXECUTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE
B & G
CIVILIAN PERS.
FISCAL
INSPECTION
INTELLIGENCE
LEGAL
MATERIEL
MEDICAL
MILITARY PERS.
PLANS
TRAIN. & OPER.
W. COM. AERO BD.

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CONFIDENTIAL

acfc (2) 3-10-60

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

(B-4)

March 5, 1942.

SUBJECT: Use of Beach Ships to Entice Enemy Submarines to Run Aground.

TO : Mr. Harold S. Vanderbilt,
Lantana, Florida

1. The Commanding Officer has directed me to advise you that we are not, at Morrison Field, set up to take advantage of the suggestions contained in your undated letter received here on March 4, 1942.

2. We are highly appreciative of your interest and have referred your letter to higher Headquarters, Foreign Division, Air Corps Ferrying Command, Washington, D. C.

FRANK A. McKENRY,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Executive Officer.

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acp(2) 5-10-60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir
5 Nov & 20 June 1974
By 8th/NP LC. Date 9/27/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LANTANA
FLORIDA

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~~Confidential~~

To: Commanding Officer Morrison Field

From: Harold S. Vanderbilt

Subject: Use of Beach Ships to Entice Enemy Submarines to Run Aground.

1. During the last war more German submarines were destroyed as a result of artifice than by any other method. Mystery ships, moving light ships to induce groundings, etc. were largely responsible for this fact which I definitely ascertained by personal inspection of the official British naval records in Admiral Sims's London Headquarters in August 1918.

2. While aerial bombing will undoubtedly change the submarine loss statistics in this war, there is no reason why artifice can not still account for a large percentage. Certain sections of the Florida coast line are well suited for attempted destruction by this method.

3. Probably the most promising section of our coast line from East-post Maine to Key West lies between Jupiter and Hillsboro Lighthouses where there is a continuous and, for all practicable purposes, straight, beach line broken only by one large and three small inlets. The depth of water off this "beach" is uniform, gradually increasing as we leave the shore, until, perhaps a mile out, we suddenly reach the edge of the continental shelf which falls away very rapidly. The most important factor of all is that southbound coastwise traffic always hugs this beach to avoid the strong head current of the Gulf Stream, which reaches its maximum strength of about 3 1/2 knots about ten miles off shore.

4. The natural reaction of any sailor navigating this stretch of coast line can only be, when he sees a steamer close inshore, underway and proceeding south - "as long as I keep outside of her, i.e. to the Eastward of her, I cannot possibly run aground." I suggest that we try to profit by catering to this reaction.

5. A "Beach Ship" in its simplest form, would consist of from ten to five light trucks or light tanks, each carrying, on a pole of appropriate height, a running light of a south bound steamer - viz, if five vehicles are used, the first vehicle would carry the bow light, the second the foreward range light, the third the red sidelight, the fourth the after range light, and the last, the stern light. If but four vehicles are used, the forward range light and red sidelight could be carried on the same vehicle; and if but two vehicles are used, the bow and stern lights would be omitted. A more elaborate and perhaps more desirable type of beach ship would be a fake steamer, mounted on an underframe of vehicles, but this might present storage and other difficulties. Experiments would be required to determine the best type of beach ships.

6. The "Beach Ship" must move at a continuous uniform speed south bound of ten statute miles per hour (the speed of the average tanker allowing for a one know head current) and the vehicles representing it must be continuously uniformly spaced in single file (about 60 or 70 feet apart if five are used).

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ncpt(2) 3-10-42

(Cont'd.)

7. While the beach ship is in operation, the coast line would have to be blacked out and the coastal highways closed to all traffic. In view of this and other considerations, it would seem that the operation of the beach ship should probably be limited to the hours between 1 A.M. and daylight, to dark nights with no moon, to comparatively smooth nights, and to falling tidal conditions.

8. Experimentation alone can reveal whether the Beach Ship idea is worth a sustained effort and, if so, whether this ship should be operated on the beach itself or on certin sections of the ocean road where it is adjacent to the beach. If on the latter, a few trees might have to be cut down, and telegraph poles moved to the west side of the road to avoid interceptions of the running lights of the beach ship. Steps might have to be taken to avoid undue swinging of the running lights caused by uneveness of surface.

9. I am addressing this letter to you because I believe you have the necessary trucks and/or tanks available for conducting the necessary experiments. Surely the local coastguard would provide an observing boat.

10. If I can be of any service in connection with the further development of this idea and the experiments it involves I would be glad to cooperate in any way.

/s/ Harold S. Vanderbilt

mpl 2/3-10-60

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By AAn/AS LC Date 9/27/76

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AFAEP
GTMcH-hlg

Wtn. 3/24/42

MAR 26 1942

The Danube as an Objective for Air Attack.

385

x WPD

(11)

FOR: Primary interest.

AFAEP
GTMcH-hlg

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Dispatched
MAR 26 1942
AAG

H. A. CRAIG,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans

Incls. - Memo to AFAEP,
abv. subj. (2/19/42),
Study on abv. subj.
(3/24/42).

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A- WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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Air AS 385 (11)

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Dec 6 20 June 1974
Reg. NA/A LC Date 9/27/76

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AAF/A-2
Air Int.
RDH:eb
2/18/42

FEB 19 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A.W.P.D.

SUBJECT: THE DANUBE AS AN OBJECTIVE FOR AIR ATTACK

1. Two of the most serious German deficiencies, oil and breadgrains, are largely offset by the oil and breadgrain surpluses of the Balkan countries.

2. The communications between these two areas are vital to Germany and their interruption would achieve, in the end, the most serious consequences for her.

3. The major communications are three railroad lines and the Danube - the latter being the most important. All are working to capacity and the traffic of one could not be absorbed by the others.

4. An air attack on the Danube gives promise of being feasible and highly profitable for the following reasons:

a. The Danube, between Giurgiu and Belgrade, a distance of approximately 450 miles, is vulnerable to air attack from Egyptian, Libyan or Syrian bases.

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b. Serious disruption of traffic may be obtained by magnetic mining of the river at practically any point between the above cities.

c. The objective is too extensive to be effectively covered by anti-aircraft, searchlights, balloon barrages, or smoke.

d. A wide river is one of the easiest objectives to locate from the air at night.

5. The best time to commence mining operations would be in the second of half of August when the harvest begins to move and the river traffic is burdened with both grains and oil. Mining should be continued until the Danube freezes over in November or December.

6. When the Danube freezes, the planes could profitably be diverted for two or three months to the bombing of the rail communications and the Ploesti oil refineries, and mining should again be resumed after the ice thaws.

7. The Danube and these railroads are also the main supply routes which, in reverse, would supply any major German operation through Turkey towards Iraq and Syria.

8. If this objective were given a high priority, a high priority would have to be immediately granted for the allotment of magnetic mines, without which the task cannot be accomplished.

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AAF/A-2
Air Int.
RDH:eb
Written 2/18/42

9. It is suggested that the above be given due consideration in your division and appropriate action taken.

MARTIN F. SCANLON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief, Air Staff, A-2

HEADQUARTERS—ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A. A. G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
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				RDH:eb AAF/A-2 Air Int.							

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A-2/1805-

WDCSA e20 War Room (S-30-42) March 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE Commanding General, Army Ground Forces,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Commanding General, Services of Supply,
A.C. of S., G-2,
A.C. of S., Operations Division,
Provost Marshal, District of Columbia,
Secretary, General Staff,
Assistant Secretary of War:

1. Construction in the new War Department War Room will be completed by 8 A.M. Wednesday, April 1, 1942.

2. Regularly assigned guards under supervision of an officer will be posted at that date and all persons will be excluded from the War Room except those included on the approved lists.

3. Information may be posted beginning at 8 A.M. April 1st. It is desired that this information be ready for display by Friday, April 3, at 7:30 A.M.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

(SGD) R.N YOUNG

R. N. YOUNG,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

COPY FOR DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL SERVICES

Air AB 385 (10) B

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ex Dir of Mil Reg. & 1 asst } - Var Dept -
Dir of Tech Reg - -

5789

Col. Cooley

M 6 C

Copies furnished:

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Sec of AS
A-2
A-3
A-WPD
Ferrying Comm

Dispatched
MAR 30 1942
AAG [signature]

File per Col
Cooley

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington

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MEMORANDUM for:

H. H. HEWITT,
Captain, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

AAF-10B-1

WDCSA 020 War Room (3-30-42) March 30, 1942.

385 (10) B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE Commanding General, Army Ground Forces,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Commanding General, Services of Supply,
A. C. of S., G-2,
A. C. of S., Operations Division,
Provost Marshal, District of Columbia,
Secretary, General Staff,
Assistant Secretary of War:

1. Construction in the new War Department War Room will be completed by 8 A.M. Wednesday, April 1, 1942.

2. Regularly assigned guards under supervision of an officer will be posted at that date and all persons will be excluded from the War Room except those included on the approved lists.

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By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

(Sgd) R. N. YOUNG

R. N. YOUNG,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

MAR 30 1942

Copy for Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Aria 385 (10) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
5 Sep & 20 June 1974
By Alm/JC Date 9/27/74

AAF/Awpd
OAA/alm
3/9/42

SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF of the ARMY AIR FORCES
DATE INITIALS

MAR 10 1942

AAF/AWPD/40-14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: Comments on paper by Stanley K. Hornbeck re Pacific Strategy.

1. Much of the matter discussed in this paper is generally appreciated in the War Department and is receiving continuous study. The progressive loss of bases to which we have been and are now being subjected has long been recognized as an enemy capability. Each phase of this retrograde movement on our part magnifies the difficulty we must face if we attempt to regain them by direct offensive action. Japan will surely have provided a much more effective and balanced defense force than anything with which we have been able to oppose her. A disposition of island bases equipped for efficient defense, which we can now expect, should exact a series of heavy tolls from the attacker. We will inevitably face such an organization if and when we conduct offensive operations in the southwest Pacific to regain our former status.

2. Offensive operations in this theater by United States forces faces an obstacle of prodigious proportions, in our open and exposed lines of communications, the extended distances of these lines, and in the quantity of equipment and supplies that must be transported to support an effective force.

3. Unless we are able to retain a reasonably secure base in this theater, having the capacity to support the forces to be employed, major offensive operations are not believed feasible. If we lose New Caledonia and the New Hebrides, it is seriously questioned that any such suitable base installation can be maintained. With these islands lost, New Zealand becomes too far removed and too limited in capacity to serve this purpose. The Fiji-Samoa and surrounding islands are equally inadequate. It is, therefore, visualized that we will need as a minimum the total of these three groups to meet our initial base requirements. Our ability to hold these island bases with forces now available in this area, is extremely doubtful. New Caledonia and the New Hebrides are already threatened.

4. The assumption that Japan will increase in military strength through her vast acquisition of resources is sound. Even more important, however, is her advancing organization in depth on the continent of Asia. The Japanese Army and Navy [illegible] and is obviously so recognized by the Japanese. The

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Asst Chief of Staff	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	Plans	Supply	Stat

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is rapidly overcoming this military weakness, however, by continental expansion. With this achieved, Japan becomes geographically one of the strongest of military nations; she has no strong military neighbors and is protected by vast natural barriers. The problem, therefore, of overcoming Japan will never be a simple one.

5. Hit and run tactics suggested in basic communication are an appropriate method of employing inferior forces. Properly executed counter-thrusts at an advancing enemy, particularly from the flank, should constitute an efficient conduct of operations by inferior forces. This tactical principle has been recognized and generally applied in war. It is not a new concept. That we have done so little of it is primarily due to our failure to organize and equip task forces suited to this type of operation in our present war.

6. The suggestion that we immediately flew munitions to China is restricted by inability, not by choice. That inability will, in all probability, continue for some time.

7. The suggestion that we now strike at Japan proper in a major effort is premature. Raids by naval air forces, carrier based, are probably our only capability along this line of operations at this time. Bases within effective radius deny this capability to land based aviation. The problem is, therefore, one for Naval solution.

8. The role played by aviation in operations of either an offensive or defensive nature is and will be of decisive proportions in the Pacific war. Airplane carriers in quantity are an essential to any successful action in this theater. High speed is an essential not only for the carriers but equally for their Naval escort. It is not possible, for that reason, to conceive operations in the Pacific in which battleships or heavy cruisers will play a major role. So long as the enemy is able to bring combat aircraft, land or carrier based, into any sea battle, the battleship is confined, because of its inferior speed, exclusively to a defensive and indecisive role.

9. The suggestion that "a clear, emphatic, and intensive priority to the production of planes and in the construction of aircraft carriers" should be invoked is strongly concurred in.

Declassified
MAR 11 1942
AAG

For the Chief of the Air Staff:

H. A. [illegible]
Colonel, A.C., Comm.
Actg Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-WPD

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES — COORDINATION

Chief of Staff	Secretary			A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	AMP 381 Ltr. from [illegible] 2/25/42 re above subj., w/incl. Memo to Gen Marshall, fr S.K. Hornbeck, 2/27/42										
	w/incls.						DAG				

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Abr/AW LC Date 9/27/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

February 28, 1942.

The Chief of Staff

Dear General Marshall:

Again I venture to send you, as another person-to-person communication, a memorandum regarding the situation and possibilities in the Pacific. The reflections set down in this memorandum were first put on paper on February 18. Since then I have seen the Hanson Baldwin article of February 20 and several other articles presenting in one form or another thoughts running in the same direction.

I know what a nuisance amateur and armchair strategists can be, and I have no desire to be either of these. I fully realize that none but those who have the responsibility can know what are the real plans and operations, what are the practical possibilities, and why.

Nevertheless, it is impossible for one as much concerned with some aspects of the problem of the Pacific as am I to avoid reflecting on angles of the problem which are beyond his purview. I take the liberty of passing on to you these observations (essentially speculative) on this highly complicated subject simply on the mere offchance that some part of them may have some value and that, given to you only, they can at least not do any harm.

I of course do not invite or expect a reply.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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BRIEF

Subject: Stanley K. Hornbeck's Observation of Pacific Theater.

A Change in Strategy: Mr. Hornbeck submits his observation for a changed strategy in the Pacific assuming Allied forces will fall back on Hawaii and abandon line of communication in South Pacific.

General Plan: Bombing Japan's naval bases, home ports and industries by building up air force on West Coast, Hawaii and Alaska; sending munitions to China and establishing large air force in unoccupied area.

Conclusion:

(a) If Japan can turn newly gained raw materials into finished products, she will gain strength. To drive Japan from source of raw material would be a tedious job. Striking early at Japan's industry and supply will hastern day of invasion.

(b) Need for priority in production of planes--training air personnel and construction or airplane carriers.

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

385 (8)

5th Ind. (Air AG)

WD HQ ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington, D. C. March 6, 1942.
TO: The Adjutant General.

1. Noted.

2. It is suggested that the suggestions contained in par. 1(B) are of primary interest to the Navy Department.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

Dispatched
MAR 7 1942
AAG

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: Abr/[illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

SUBJECT: Construction of Buoy for Antisubmarine Detection.

AG 385 (2-16-42)MSC 3rd Ind. RPM/rch-1705.

War Department, A.G.O., February 25, 1942. - To: Chief Signal Officer and Chief of the Army Air Forces, ~~IN TURN~~.

For remark.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. Van Sickler
Adjutant General.

(4th Ind. on next page)

COPY FOR: Chief of the Army Air Forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

Ans 385 (8)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Atn/ LC. Date: 9/27/74

(Air AG)

A G 214

DECLASSIFIED

January 26, 1942

SUBJECT: Bombing Tests

TO : The Chief of the Air Corps

1. Tests will be immediately undertaken to determine the feasability of attacking surface vessels with demolition bombs in a manner similar to torpedo attacks from aircraft, and to develop pertinent tactics and technique to accomplish such attacks.

2. The basic idea is to approach a surface vessel from broadside, at low altitude (50 to 100 feet) at high speed, using medium, light or dive bombardment or bomb carrying pursuit aircraft, release bomb at between 2000 and 1000 feet of the target. Bomb would probably skip or ricochet on the water, then hit the target. In order to give airplane and crew a chance to clear, a two or three second delay fuse, initiated either upon water impact or when striking the target, should be provided. Unless the bomb penetrates the hull of the target, it would be stopped and fall into the water alongside the ship. The fuse should be so timed that the bomb would not have time to fall lower than about the bottom of the ship by the time of detonation. The dropping airplane in the meantime passes over and moves well beyond the target ship.

3. Some of the first information required is on the skip or richochet characteristics of bombs dropped on water from low altitudes and at high speeds.

4. It is suggested that tests be formulated and conducted at the Air Corps Proving Ground under supervision of the Air Corps Board. Colonel S.P. Huff, Ordnance Department of the Air Corps Board, is familiar with the problem.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

Dispatched
JAN 27 1942
AAG

Air AG 385 (7)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES						COORDINATION				
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A A G	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Statistics	Bomb
	EPC ↓										✓

DECLASSIFIED

Air AG 385 (7)

AAF 39

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL:

I. It is requested that a directive, substantially as follows, be sent to the Chief of Air Corps for immediate action:

"1. Tests will be immediately undertaken to determine the feasability of attacking surface vessels with demolition bombs in a manner similar to torpedo attacks from aircraft, and to develop pertinent tactics and technique to accomplish such attacks.

"2. The basic idea is to approach a surface vessel from broadside, at low altitude (50 to 100 feet) at high speed, using medium, light or dive bombardment or bomb carrying pursuit aircraft, release bomb at between 2000 and 1000 feet of the target. Bomb would probably skip or ricochet on the water, then hit the target. In order to give airplane and crew a chance to clear, a two or three second delay fuse, initiated either upon water impact or when striking the target, should be provided. Unless the bomb penetrates the hull of the target it would be stopped and fall into the water alongside the ship. The fuse should be so timed that the bomb would not have time to fall lower than about the bottom of the ship by the time of detonation. The dropping airplane in the meantime passes over and moves well beyond the target ship.

"3. Some of the first information required is on the skip or ricochet characteristics of bombs dropped on water from low altitudes and at high speeds.

"4. It is suggested that tests be formulated and conducted at the Air Corps Proving Ground under supervision of the Air Corps Board. Colonel S. P. Huff, Ordnance Department of the Air Corps Board, is familiar with the problem."

Edgar P. Sorensen

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director of Bombardment.

JAN 24 1942
AAG Rec

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Air AS 385 (7)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Aln/AD LC Date 9/27/74

AAF/A-WPD
FLF/aa

3d Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C. February 24, 1942.
To Chief of the Air Corps.

1. The value of nuisance devices pure and simple, are of questionable tactical merit. Methods and means to confuse the enemy as to the time, place and strength of the impending blow are of course a part of all military plans, but feints that are not followed by some real attack are not justified by the liability of potential losses inflicted on the feinting force.

2. It is believed that the technical and structural features of any device carried by aircraft should be analyzed in the light of its effect on performance of the airplane, production, installation and maintenance problems, before any decision could be reached as to tactical value.

3. It is recommended that the writer of the basic letter be informed to get in touch with the proper section of the Experimental Division, Office, Chief of Air Corps, to have such technical evaluation made.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

1 Incl. n/c

R. C. LEWIS
Major, Air Corps
Acting Assistant Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
Feb 25 1942
AAG

Eq. Army Air Forces
Feb 25
AAG RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Secy Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A. Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
	WJF	RCR					[illegible]				

AAF-39

Air AS 385 (6)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

DECLASSIFIED

War Department
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps
Washington

Jan. 23, 1942

Subject: Noise Making Device.

To: The Chief of the Air Staff.

1. The attached letter dated Jan. 5, 1942 from Harold E. Voss, 1412 No. Austin Blvd. Oak Park, Ill., is forwarded as a matter believed to pertain to your office, since the question involved appears to be the tactical value of such equipment.

2. Development of whistling or screaming devices for airplanes similar to those used by the Germans on dive bombers during the French campaign, is under way at Wright Field. No development along the line proposed is being conducted however.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

F. I. Ordway, Jr.,
Maj., A.C.
Asst. Exec., Mat. Div.

1 Incl.
Ltr. fr. Harold E. Voss 1/5/42

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/22/74

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Noise Making Device

1st Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
to the chief of the Air Corps.

1. Paragraph 2 of basic letter has been noted.

2. Information is requested relative any contemplated procurement of subject devises based upoh current development.

3. It is requested that you take action to reply to attached letter in light of current development.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arnold

1 Incl:
ltr from Mr. Voss,
1/5/42

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General

2nd Ind. (4-E-3)

War Department, Office, Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C.
TO: The Chief of the Air Staff, Attention: Air War Plans Division.

1. Reference Paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement, no procurement of noise making devices is contemplated at this time other than the small quantities necessary for experimental development.

2. Reference Paragraph 3 of 1st Indorsement, reply cannot be

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Noise Making Device.
B/C dated January 23, 1942 fr COAC to COAS

2nd Ind. (Continued) (4-E-3)

War Department, Office, Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C.
TO: The Chief of the Air Staff, Attention: Air War Plans Division.

made to attahced letter in the light of current development as the latter has no bearing on the proposed plan. As stated in Paragraph 1 of basic letter, the question involved is one of the tactical value of the proposed plan rather than the technical value of a particular device since Mr. Voss proposes no device. As such, the attached letter is believed to pertain to your office.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

1 Incl. n/c

F. I. ORDWAY, JR.,
Major, Air Corps,
Asst. Exec., Mat. Div.

DECLASSIFIED

MID 201-Voss, Harold E. January 5, 1942.

John F. Griffee,
First Lieutenant, Infantry,
Assistant Personnel Officer, G-2.

Dear Sir:

With regards to your letter of December 24, 1941, requesting more information about my idea, I will in this letter attempt to explain it the best I can without revealing the plan for the device. It may seem a little impossible, but if we look back to the beginning of these wars, everything that has been done was said to be impossible.

If you can picture in your mind an airplane flying over a city at night equipped with a device to make it sound like a fleet of 20 bombers, I wonder what the affect would be. I think there would be an air raid alarm and most everybody has their sleep interrupted. No bombs are dropped and they think their blackout worked.

The all clear is sounded and everybody goes back to sleep. Then in about an hour, another plane flys over the same city, and the same thing happens. My plan would be to have these planes fly throughout the night, and I am pretty sure that in the morning you would have a confused, tired city, not fit for a good days work. Then to go a little farther, supposing it were to happen again the following night and so forth, don't you think the affect on the people would be a state of confusion, and that is one thing, I believe, that can cause more trouble than the dropping of bombs.

It may be hard to visualize this, but I am putting myself in their place, and I am pretty sure that it would not be capable of doing very much the following day, if I had to get up, or even as much as have my sleep interrupted every hour during the night. And if it were to keep on for a week or so no telling what I would be fit for.

This may explain how I thought it might be used to have a psychological effect on the enemy. If you consider my plan worth while I will gladly co-operate to the best of my ability.

Thanking you for your trouble, I remain

Yours truly,

/s/ Harold E. Voss
1412 No. Austin Blvd.
Oak Park, Ill.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date: 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

AAF/A-4
JFW/mwb

Wrtn 2/1/42

SUBJECT: Noise Making Device.

1st Ind.

War Department, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
FEB 2 1942 To the Chief of the Air Corps.

1. Paragraph 2 of basic letter has been noted.

2. Information is requested relative any contemplated procurement of subject devices based upon current development.

3. It is requested that you take action to reply to attached letter in light of current development.

By Command of Lieutenant General Arn

1 Incl:
Ltr frm Mr. Voss,
1/5/42

JOHN B. COOLEY
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Air Adjutant General

Dispatched
FEB 2 1942
AAG

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES - COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y Air Staff	A.A.G.	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-WPD	A-Insp.	Budget	Statistics	
						TJH/[illegible]					

AAF-39

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Alex/ad LC. Date 9/27/74

Noise Making Device.

JAN 23 1942

The Chief of the Air Staff.

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2. Development of whistling or screaming devices for airplanes similar to those used by the Germans on dive bombers during the French campaign, is under way at Wright Field. No development along the line proposed is being conducted, however.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

F. I. ORDWAY, JR.,
Major, Air Corps,
Asst. Exec., Mat. Div.

1 Incl.
Ltr.fr.Harold E.
Voss - 1/5/42.

23 1942

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cy-890

air ab 385 (6)

MID 201-Voss, Harold E. January 5, 1942.

John F. Griffee,
First Lieutenant, Infantry,
Assistant Personnel Officer, G-2.

Dear Sir:

With regards to you letter of December 24, 1941, requesting more information about my idea, I will in this letter attempt to explain it the best I can without revealing the plan for the device. It may seem a little impossible, but if we look back to the beginning of these wars, everything that has been done was said to be impossible.

If you can picture in your mind an airplane flying over a city at night equipped with a device to make it sound like a fleet of 20 bombers, I wonder what the affect would be. I think there would be an air raid alarm and most everybody has their sleep interrupted. No bombs are dropped and they think their blackout worked.

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It may be hard to visualize this, but I am putting myself in their place, and I am pretty sure that I would not be capable of doing very much the following day, if I had to get up, or even as much as have my sleep interrupted every hour during the night. And if it were to keep on for a week or so no telling what I would be fit for.

This may explain how I thought it might be used to have a psychological affect on the enemy. If you consider my plan worth while I will gladly co-operate to the best of my ability.

Thanking you for your trouble, I remain

Yours truly,

HAROLD E. VOSS.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
by Alm/HD LC Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

January 21, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Reference your letter of January 20, and its inclosure, careful study has been given the questions raised, i.e., the possibility and desirability of American aircraft for leaflet dropping at an early date.

We have studied the British experience in leaflet dropping and extracted the lessons learned therefrom. The British feel that leaflet dropping has a definite and desirable effect. They do the dropping coincidentally with tactical operations. Bombers returning from a raid discharge the leaflets. They feel it would be a mistake for American planes to drop leaflets only. Our first missions should carry leaflets in addition to a powerful cargo of bombs. Any American planes dropping leaflets, predicting American air participation, should be followed within a fortnight by a considerable and effective air attack. This seems sound reasoning to me.

385 (5)

Under our present plans, it will not be possible to deliver bombing attacks before April and then only with a token force of two heavy groups, due to commitments elsewhere.

It is recommended that our first bombing missions in force carry leaflets. It is believed unwise to expose the untrained crews and badly needed tactical aircraft for piece meal operations for leaflet dropping only. By early Summer our bombing force in Great Britain will have reached a proportion where any quantity of leaflets desired can be carried and it is believed that this effective reason should be [illegible] by [illegible].

aaiF-
aS-ICE

COORDINATION											
Chief of Staff	Sec'y A. Staff	A A G	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	A WPD	A Insp	Budget	Statistics	

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

AAF 39

DECLASSIFIED

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 20, 1942

General H. H. Arnold
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum and copy of a cable, which you will note the President requested that I take up with you.

As to the memorandum, I will leave that entirely to you. As to the leaflet operation, please let me know your view so I can send word back to London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

AirAS 385 (5)

No. 147

January 14, 1942
6:00 P.M.

W J D

Ask Arnold about dropping leaflets — Rest is problem of Joint Staffs
F D R

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have just received the following message from our radio man in London:

1. During the last few days, I have had intimate unofficial conversations with Sutton, Morton, and Bowes Lyon, and these conversations lead me to urge, in the strongest terms, that the questions of our providing at least token forces of American airplanes for leaflet operations be vigorously pressed in Washington before we ask the British to handle United States leaflet No. 2.

2. I also urge that it would be extremely valuable if we could give some tangible proof that the question

of token Naval and Air Forces in Africa and the Mediterranean was also being pressed.

3. No American pilots or American-made airplanes participated in the initial leaflet, evidently because unusually increased, specifically, military commitments made their use impractical.

4. As these commitments are, at the moment, so urgent and extensive, the Air Ministry is balking somewhat in continuing to carry out continuous and extensive British leaflet operations, which include Courrier de L'Air and which have included all the major Roosevelt speeches up to now.

5. The Air Ministry has used the United States leaflet operations to take the position that the fulfillment of American requirements should be taken as satisfying all political warfare needs of both

America and Britain.

6. This has obviously created a difficult position for PWE and they feel that a token American Air Force, assigned to the leaflet work, would answer the Air Ministry's argument.

7. The United States leaflet No. 2 has been prepared and will be ready for dropping by the end of the week.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GEORGE:

Mr. Lovett gave me the attached and wished me to call your attention to the photograph and location of the Yawata Imperial Iron and Steel Works, a possible objective.

St. Clair Streett
ST. CLAIR STREETT,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive.

Attachment

385 (4)

Hq Army Air Forces
DEC 31 1941
AAS Received

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

AWPD [illegible] 12/29/41

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date: 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

August 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF:

Subject: Notes on Conference attended by Major Hansell at the State Department.

1. Major Hansell attended a conference in Mr. Cordell Hull's office in the State Department at 9:30 a.m. this date. In addition to Mr. Hull and several representatives of the State Department, the conference was attended by General Gerow, War Plans Division; General Miles, G-2; Lt. Col. Bundy, War Plans Division; Major Hansell, Air War Plans Division; Admiral Turner, Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy, and several Naval officers.

2. Mr. Hull opened the conference by stating that his purpose was to gain the assistance of the military authorities in the shaping of policy by the State Department, particularly with regard to the Near East, Middle East and North Africa. He called upon General Miles who made substantially the following statements:

a. Middle East Theater.

The probability that Germany will turn southward after conquest of the Russian machine may be discussed under three general headings.

(1) The Germans might advance through Turkey on Syria.

(2) They might advance through the Caucasus into Armenia, into Iran.

(3) They might advance through Libia on Egypt.

All three avenues of approach involve considerable transportation difficulties. Turkey and Iran both represent rugged terrain with few communications.

3. G-2 had estimated that if the Germans succeeded in disposing of the Russian war quickly, then they would be able to launch a force of about five divisions through the Caucasus on Iran by

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November and a total of nine divisions by spring. It is estimated that the earliest time a campaign can be launched from Libia is November. Both of these dates are set back by the fact that Russian resistance has been stronger than anticipated. In any event, he ~~we~~ feels that there cannot be an all out effort by the Germans on the Middle East before spring. There may be a limited attack upon Libia by December. The British are obliged to defend the Middle East because Mesopotamian and Persian oil is vital to the British war effort. Due to the political pressure being brought to bear, it is anticipated that the British will themselves launch an offensive ~~on~~ Libia this fall. The climate would not make such an offensive possible before September 15th and probably not before the 1st of October. At that time, they hope to have nine divisions and one and a half armored divisions and a force of about 850 airplanes. There is evidence that the Germans, anticipating such a move, are now reinforcing Sicily by movements of German air force. G-2 estimates that Tabruk will fall sometime in October if it is not relieved.

4. West Africa.

The Germans could move through Spain and down the West coast of Africa at any time they really wish to do so. There is no evidence of their immediate intention to make such a move. If the Germans invade Spain, Gibraltar will become untenable. German occupation of Darkar would constitute a serious threat to British sea communications.

5. Admiral Turner then made remarks substantially as follows:

a. Our tentative agreements with the British provide that the Navy will relieve the British in Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean in order that the British may move to the far East in case of our active participation. In that case, the Navy will attempt to maintain a strong submarine offensive against the sea lanes across the Mediterranean. If Gibraltar is lost, then that submarine offensive must be based on the Azores or the Canaries.

b. The British estimate that the Germans could use the French Navy in about six months if the French collaborate. Morale in the French Navy is very low. The Germans could not man French ships using German sailors for a very long period of time. As to the French in West Africa, it is suggested that every effort be made to make General Weygand dependent upon the United States rather than upon metropolitan France.

6. There then developed a general discussion as to the advisability of giving aid in the form of military supplies to the French in West Africa. There was considerable opposition to such a move on the ground that there is danger that such supplies might be used against us either by the Germans or by the free French. It

was further brought out that we have no supplies at the present time to give anyone and that the best policy to pursue would be one of placating Weygand if possible with promises. Admiral Turner stated that the British were somewhat upset over a tendency among Americans to recommend abandonment of the Middle Eastern theater as untenable. He stated that the British consider the Middle East absolutely essential to their military effort and looked upon it as second only to the British Isles in importance. General Gerow advanced the opinion that in view of the War Department, Singapore was really more important than the Middle East.

7. The meeting concluded without further business.

[signature]

NOTED IN A-2 [illegible] Noted [illegible]

M.F.S.

[illegible]

A-29/r
Ans AG 385 ①

HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD

Box 113 Folder 8

MILITARY

Declined

SAS 365
(55-93)

FCAS
EH/mdg/5246

DECLASSIFIED
000 ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By 46/20 LC. Date 9/27/74

February 6, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

385 (93)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETT:

Subject: Movie Film of RAF Bombing Exhibit.

Reference your discussion with Colonel Grant concerning the feasibility and desirability of making a movie film based on the RAF exhibit of bombing effects, Colonel Grant reports that a technical expert considers this project entirely feasible. I feel, however, that, due to the article in a recent Reader's Digest concerning the bombing offensive against Germany, we should do nothing to stress night area bombardment to the American public.

I discussed this project with one of our experienced Air Corps officers who felt that he could consider it in the same light as a member of the general public due to his lack of technical knowledge concerning bombardment; his reaction was that a film of this nature would be very convincing along the lines that "bombing can certainly burn up a lot of houses".

For the reasons mentioned above, I recommend that nothing further be done on this project, at least until General Arnold's return.

Dispatched
FEB 8 1943
AAG

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of the Air Staff.

File
2/8/43

DECLASSIFIED

Air AG 385 (93)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

AFRDB 25:mlk:vcj
wrtn 1/29/43-2/6/43
Rm. 4D135 - 6458

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Major General Lewis H. Brereton
Headquarters, 9th Air Force

FEB 11 1943

Dear ~~General Brereton~~ Lewis:

In reference to cable number AMSME 4238 of January 26th concerning the use of the technique of minimum altitude bombing attacks, there are several things that should be brought to your attention in order to present the problem in its fullest aspect.

Due to the comparative newness of the development of this type of attack, training circulars are not yet in full accord with the combat developments. I am inclosing copies of the pending revision of FM 1-10 for your information. I trust it will be of assistance in setting up your training program and will give you the necessary basic facts of the employment and practicability of minimum altitude bombing attacks.

It must be emphasized to all personnel operating the airplanes on such missions that the secret of a successful mission, both from the standpoint of the results obtained and from the standpoint of the return of all participating aircraft, lies in the technique of approach to the target and the withdrawal from the target area. The approach should be at minimum altitude outside of effective defensive gun fire range, and that altitude maintained to the immediate vicinity of the target where the correct dropping altitude for the air speed and type of bomb being used should be attained. After the release of the bomb, the withdrawal from the target area should again be at the minimum altitude. Evasive action consisting of weaving should be employed in both the approach and the withdrawal. One of the evident features of the attack is the fact that evasive action can be employed practically up to the moment of the release of the bomb.

You will note from the final report of the Proving Ground Command on minimum altitude attacks that a modified N-3A gun sight is necessary in order to obtain accurate results. Fifty of these sights have been

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AFRDB
25:ml
Wrtn. 1/29/43
Room 4D135
Ext. 6458

obtained for your command and are being shipped by Air Transport. They will leave the United States before February 8th.

A training film has been produced showing, in full detail, all phases of the attack, and it will be forwarded to your command by Air Transport as soon as the first prints are available. At the present time, however, it is still in the process of revision and cannot yet be released.

I believe that you will concur with the opinion that for the time being, the nature of targets selected should be carefully controlled. There is no doubt that this type attack can and will be used against heavily armored and heavily defended naval vessels. At the present time, however, the development of necessary technique and crew experience is not of a high enough order to produce satisfactory results against targets possessing a great amount of defensive fire power.

This headquarters is, of course, extremely interested in the progress of this program as well as the results. I would greatly appreciate any information or suggestions you may have as to developments of training methods and the capabilities and limitations of employment of this type of attack. I realize that you will be unable to supply such information in the immediate future, but would appreciate your remarks as soon as you feel that you have used this method of attack a sufficient period of time.

Dispatched
FEB 11 1943
AAG

Bestech
Strat

George E. Stratemeyer,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

3 Incls:
Incl. 1 - Cy of ltr., subj.: Replacement of Training Circulars 46 and 83.
Incl. 2 - Cy suggested revision with Appendix A and B.
Incl. 3 - Cy final report on Minimum Altitude Attack of Water-Borne Surface Vessels with Aircraft Bombs.

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED
DECLASSIFIED

COPY

SUBJECT: Replacement of Training Circulars 46 and 85.

TO : Assistant Commandant, Bombardment Department,
School of Applied Tactics,
Orlando, Florida

1. Since Training Circulars 46 and 85 were prepared, considerable additional information has become available through actual combat experience and through further refinement of munitions and tactics. It is believed that Training Circulars 46 and 85 should be rescinded and replaced.

2. The Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, in connection with Individual Training, has just prepared a training film on the same subject, and this film and the training circular should be in close agreement. It is desired that the circular contain specific information on the bomb and fuse selection, and other related items so that it can be used as a practical guide and reference. Inclosed is a suggested revision, on which it is requested that you submit your criticisms and recommended changes, after coordinating with the Proving Ground Command.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

2 Incls:
1-Cy suggested revision.
2-Cy Appendix A and B.

RESTRICTED CLASSIFICATION
Removed per E.O. 10501

RESTRICTED Air Ms 385 72

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8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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Data on Low Altitude Bombing

TO: Director of Bombardment

DATE 2-5-43

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 2
WEE:JT 5246

Attached letter should be addressed to General Brereton.

Incls. m/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

Dispatched
FEB 5 1943
AAG

File 2/5/43

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5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date [illegible]

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Article Appearing in The Reader's Digest, February 1943

air ab 385 (91) B

TO: Director of Bombardment

DATE Feb. 24, 1943

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 2
WBH:JT 5246

General Stratemayer desires to talk to Colonel Williamson about this.

Dispatched
FEB 25 1943
AAG

3 Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary, Air Staff

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cc 2/25/43

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By: [illegible] LC, Date: [illegible]

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Destruction of Surface Ships by Aircraft.

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. 2/8/43

A-3, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. (Cont'd). 2
GSP/vme/6110

385 (90)

g. Any combat aircraft, regardless of type, set aside for the unit desired must be diversions from existing approved commitments.

5. Recommend that General Davidson's unit at Eglin Field be used as a test unit to experiment with proper tactics and operating technique, and that it be furnished aircraft in small numbers which would facilitate his work, such as B-17, B-26, P-38, B-40, and B-25 with 75 mm.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl. n/c

TO: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, A-3 DATE 6 March 43

FROM: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff COMMENT NO. 3
MAL/mdg/5265

1. For reconsideration in view of the decision to set-up a fighter group and a medium bombardment group even though no airplanes are available for this purpose.

2. A directive should be furnished General Davidson giving him the means and outlining his training duties.

Dispatched
MAR 7 1943
AAG

Incl.n/c

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.

File
[illegible]
3/7/43

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Air as 385 (90)

Destruction of Surface Ships by Aircraft.

Asst. Chief of Air Staff, A-3. 1-12-43

Deputy Chief of Air Staff. #1

TJH/cmc/6371

1. This project has been approved in principle by General Arnold who has directed that a group be made available for this purpose. General Arnold prefers that heavies be not used for this purpose although he did not make any definite statement that they would not be used.

2. It is requested that you study this plan and make recommendations for the assignment of airplanes, up to a group, to be assigned at the earliest possible moment for training purposes.

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Incl: Secret Ltr to Chief,
AAF, frm Brig.Gen.
H.C.Davidson, dtd 1-7-43,
subject. as above.

Dispatched
JAN 13 1943
AAG

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date [illegible]

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January 7, 1943.

TO : Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Destruction of Surface Ships by Aircraft.

1. In accordance with verbal instructions from the Chief of the Army Air Forces, the following report is submitted.

2. Premise:

The only reason enemy surface ships can ply the seas, is that our aircraft have not the range to get to them with the proper bombs or torpedoes.

3. Bombing of maneuvering surface craft by means of high level bombing has proven very difficult.

4. Attacks on surface craft by means of torpedo bombers have proved very successful. In fact, almost all the results of destruction of enemy warships by our navy have been obtained by torpedo bombers and dive bombers.

5. Low altitude bombing (Buzz bombing) is similar in execution to torpedo bombing and, it is believed, will be about as effective.

6. We are prone to draw erroneous conclusions from the losses suffered by Navy torpedo bombers because the Navy torpedo bomber is a very ineffective weapon. Its range is short, necessitating launching from a carrier.

Its armament is poor, consisting of

1 cal. 30 m.g. shooting forward
1 cal. 30 m.g. as a tunnel gun
1 cal. 50 m.g. in a top turret

Its losses have been due to being shot down by enemy fighters against which it is helpless, and not to defensive fire from the target.

7. Another erroneous assumption is that enemy ships are heavily armored against attacks by airplanes and have a formidable array of anti-aircraft guns to bring against attacking aircraft.

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According to the best information obtainable from the Navy Department, our surface ships have the following armor and armament:

Ship	AA Guns				AA Armor	Side Armor
	3"	5"	40 mm	20 mm		
Merchant	1	0	0	8	¼"	None
Destroyer	0	4	4	5	½"	None. Side plates 5/16"
Cruiser	0	12	24	14	1½" on turrets for 5"; ½" around others.	3½" for 5 ft. below water line. 1½" for 4½ ft. above water line.
Carrier	0	24	40	32	3" on turrets for 5"; ½" around others.	1½" around island.

NOTE: On Navy ships the 40mm guns are surrounded by a tub about 3½ ft. high made of ½" armor plate. The 20mm guns have small shields of ½" armor plate.

8. WHAT SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR AIR ATTACK?

The softest spot; the Japanese merchant marine.

To low flying attack the merchant ships can bring only four 20mm guns to bear. One P-38 can neutralize that fire and one B-26 or B-17 can out gun the merchantman.

War ships will be sunk as a matter of course, but the principal hunt should be for merchantmen.

9. Means of attack.

Low altitude (Buzz) bombing.
Torpedo bombing.

10. Types of airplanes best suited to these types of attack.

First choice YB-40 with 4 additional 50 cal. guns in packets on side of nose.

Second choice B-26 with 4 cal. 50 guns in packets on side of nose in addition to one fixed and one flexible cal. 50 gun in the nose.

Third choice P-38 g. with one 300 gal. external tank.

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The YB-40 can carry two torpedoes externally a distance of 2460 miles. If bomb bay tanks are not carried it has a range of 1700 miles with two torpedoes on the external racks and two bombs of 1000 lbs. each carried in the bomb bay. Bomb bay tanks should provide for purging.

See Annex A for performance of YB-40

The B-26 can carry one torpedo or two bombs of 1000 pounds each a distance of 2050 miles. Actually, Captain Muri and others talked to, do not believe a B-26 can operate on a tactical radius of more than 500 miles. This is borne out by cable from General Kenney who says Rabaul is beyond tactical range of his medium bombers.

See Annex B for load and armament of B-26.

The P-38, according to figures put out by the Lockheed Company, can carry a 1100 pound bomb on one external rack and a 300 gallon gasoline tank on the other and have a range of about 2000 miles.

Any one of these types can be used for Buss bombing and in addition the B-17 and B-26 can be used for torpedo bombing. The technique of Buss bombing and torpedo bombing is almost identical, but the sights are slightly different.

11. Method of attack.

Send in P-38's or B-26's to machine gun the AA guns and attack with suitable bombs, generally 1000 lb. If these hit, they will start fires and cause confusion and possibly sink the target ship.

If they do not sink the ship, bring up B-17's with torpedoes and sink it.

All attacks made in groups of not less than three airplanes.

At least two airplanes cover target ship with machine gun fire while third launches bomb or torpedo attack.

Provide enough covering fire to out gun the AA fire of target ship.

12. This method should be service tested on some place like Rabaul. If it is successful, as it gives every promise of being, the attacks should either cease or be carried out very lightly until sufficient airplanes could be brought up and gasoline accumulated on suitable airdromes in China to make a large scale attack, and sink the major portion of the Japanese merchant marine within a few weeks and before they have evolved a defense against this method of attack.

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13. Initial force recommended:

1 wing consisting of

1 group of 3 squadrons XB-40's
1 group of 2 squadrons B-26's, 1 squadron

Necessary bombs, torpedoes and tor;
equipment.

14. The Commanding General at Eglin Field states that Buss bombing and torpedo units could train at Eglin Field.

He will furnish cadres for one B-17 torpedo squadron and one fighter squadron consisting of

4 Pilots
1 Administrative Officer
1 Engineering Officer
50 Enlisted Men

15. Recommendations.

It is recommended that;

(a) Authority be granted to activate a wing for the purpose of destroying enemy surface ships.
The wing to consist of two groups of three squadrons each.

(b) One group of this wing be equipped with XB-40 airplanes.

(c) Until XB-40 airplanes can be made available the group to be equipped with B-17F airplanes with four additional 50 cal. guns installed in packets on the side of the nose. Airplanes altered to permit pilot to release bombs or torpedoes and have additional armor plate to protect cockpit.

(d) The second group of this wing to consist of

2 squadrons B-26's with 4 cal. 50 guns installed in packets on the side of the nose and one fixed and one flexible gun in the nose.
1 squadron of P-38g's equipped with 300 gallon belly tank.

(e) The Materiel Center be instructed to procure necessary torpedo racks for carrying two torpedoes externally on B-17 and one torpedo on B-26's.

(f) The facilities of the Proving Ground be made available for training crews in
Torpedo bombing
Buss bombing

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(g) The cadre for one heavy bombardment squadron for torpedo bombing and one P-38 squadron especially trained in aerial gunnery be furnished by the Proving Ground Command.

(h) Ordnance Department be directed to obtain necessary torpedo handling and servicing equipment.

(i) Immediate action be initiated to secure sufficient quantities of torpedoes for supply of torpedo bomber units, and these with handling and servicing equipment, be laid down in the theater of operations prior to arrival of flying units.

H. C. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Annex A and
Annex B attached.

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By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/76

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ANNEX A

Feasibility of Using B-17
Airplanes for Torpedo-Bombers

a. Douglas Company at Tulsa, Oklahoma, was requested to furnish all available data on this possibility, and Mr. Edward Larralde, the Project Engineer for the YB-40 of Vega Aircraft Company has furnished the following:

"In answer to requests for studies of installations to enable airplanes of the YB-40 type to torpedo and "skip bomb" surface vessels, the following values are offered:

1. The YB-40 airplanes may be adapted to carry two MK13 Modification 1 or 2 torpedoes under the following conditions:

a. The design gross weight will be increased from 58,000 to approximately 62,500 lbs.

b. It will not be necessary to eliminate any of the existing armament equipment.

c. Loss in performance due to increased drag of the torpedoes will be slight, not over 3% in range, climb and speed.

d. The torpedoes will be carried in a Vega designed external cradle which in turn will be adapted to the provisions for external bomb racks now identified with the Materiel Center as BDV changes 316, 318A and 392. This will place the racks between the fuselage and the inboard nacelles, below the lower surface of the wing. These provisions require the addition of certain structural members to the wing ribs No. 1 and 2, to the lower chord of the front spar, and the installation of certain control mechanisms. The nature of these revisions are such that from a manufacturing standpoint it would be more desirable to incorporate them into airplanes at the time of construction rather than at a modification center after the airplanes had been completed.

e. The control provisions required are a release mechanism of the push pull control type and a device now manufactured by Lear Avia (and found acceptable by the Bureau of Navigation) for remotely controlling the depth and directional settings on the torpedo. These devices should not add more than 20 lbs. per installation to the weight of the airplane.

2. The maximum over load weight of 62,000 lbs. has been studied from a structural and performance standpoint by the Vega aircraft Corporation and reports containing applicable data have been submitted to the Materiel Center. However, it should be remembered that these reports were based on the load being added to areas

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within the fuselage. If the loads are added to the wing structure as in the case of the external bomb racks, the reduction to margins of safety, maximum indicated air speed, and load factors will be considerably less.

B-17 airplanes have been flown and operated at gross weights considerably higher than the above figure, therefore it may be reasonably assumed that due to certain safety factors there is a limited hidden over-strength in the B-17 structure. Maneuverability upon sighting the target and while engaged with enemy fighter screens is further increased as the fuel load is consumed and the gross weight thus lessened.

3. In the event it is desired to carry a partial or complete bomb load for purposes of "skip bombing" or to further broaden the tactical value of the airplane, it may be accomplished by the following:

a. For missions under 1700 miles range the bomb bay tanks may be removed and the bomb bay filled with suitable bombs, as well as carrying 4000 lbs. of bombs or two torpedoes on the external racks. For missions over 1700 miles and up to 2460 miles the bomb bay tanks must be used; however, bomb or torpedo loads up to 4000 lbs. may be carried on the external racks.

4. In the event it is desired to equip certain YB-40's for any of the above missions it is suggested that it be accomplished in the following manner:

a. That Vega airplanes above their manufacturing serial No. 70 be used. This will assure the provisions for external bomb racks being incorporated in the production line. Airplanes incorporating this change will be available by January 1, 1943.

b. That a quantity of B-17 airplanes be modified for torpedo carrying and handling only, by the Vega Aircraft Corporation and delivered to the Air Forces for the purpose of training combat crews. Delivery of these airplanes could commence February 1 provided necessary directives are received and there is no delay in delivery of material or GFE.

c. That additional airplanes in quantities as desired be delivered to suitable modification centers for the incorporation of all necessary items to convert them to YB-40's. It is anticipated that airplanes containing necessary structure, suitable torpedo racks, and controls could be delivered from the Burbank Plant, Vega Aircraft Corporation the latter part of the month of January."

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ANNEX B

B-26B & B-26C

RANGE - SPEED - BOMB LOAD

Ferrying	2800 mi/200/No Bombs
Tactical	2050 mi/200/2000#
W/Max.Bombs	900 mi/200/5800#

4000# is practical maximum load.

Bomb Loadings

Normal			Maximum		
20	100#		30	100#	
8	250#		14	250#	
4	325#	DB	8	325#	DB
4	500#		8	500#	
2	1000#		4	1000#	
1	2000#		2	2000#	

	Fuel (gals)	vs Bombs (lbs)
Max.Gas	1462	None
Norm.Gas&Bombs	962	2000
W/Max.Bombs	453	5800

ARMAMENT

Nose: 1-.50cal.fl.-250rds
1-.50cal.fx.-250rds

Turret:
Upper: 2-.50cal. -400rds ea.
(Martin)

Waist: 2-.50cal.fl.-250rds ea.
(L&R)

Tunnel: 1-.50cal.fl.-400rds

Tail: 2-.50cal.-1500rds ea.

Total: 9-.50cal.-5200 rds

4 forward firing fixed .50 fuselage package guns @/200 rds per gun.

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ad. no. 385 (90)

[illegible]AM soup will get more.
Col. McD. leaving

"Daylight Bowling Papers.
Possibly mentioned by Rickenbacher.
For Col Dick.

Return these quickly to
WIDEWING. COL. DICK
FOR TRANSMITAL TO WASH.
PER THEIR REQUEST.
Ed. McDaniel

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

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B-13

Air AS 385

Daylight Operations in Bomber Command.

Director of Intelligence Service (Col.Burgess, Rm 1735, Gravelly Point) 1/12/43

Air Adjutant General. 1

JBC:11 5790

1. Attached are three reports, No. 52, No. 54 and No. 55, issued by the British Air Ministry and dealing with the subject of "Daylight Bombing". It is believed that these are the papers referred to by Capt. Rickenbacker in his "Report on Visit to England".

2. Pursuant to your recent request these papers are transmitted in order that Capt. Rickenbacker may have an opportunity to confirm the fact that these are the papers he referred to.

3. It is understood, as a result of telephone conversation with you today, that you have coordinated the matter with the Director of Bombardment who made the original request for the papers.

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst Air Adj. General.

3 Incls:
#1 - Report #52
#2 - Report #54
#3 - Report #55

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1/12/43

Air AS 385 (89)

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OFFICE SYMBOL	1	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER						
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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16—[illegible]-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943

Dec 6, 1942

RUSH

For: —
Colonel Dick
Air Adjutant General
Hdq. 8th Air Force
Widewing

The enclosed paper should go to Wash. D.C. QUICKLY. Gen. Arnold cabled for it, as a result of Rickenbacker's Report. It was included with my papers for Gen Spaatz in error by the grand boys in A-2.

George C. McDonald
Colonel, A.C.F.

Gibraltar

Lieut. Kenyon
can I see Gen. Arnold's cable calling for this data?
[illegible]

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Atn/AW I.C. Date 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

SUBJECT: Optimum Spacing of Bombs in Train.

1. Since the subject of high and medium altitude bombing has become a major bone of contention, I thought that you might be interested in a development pertaining to the use of bombs in train.

2. The National Defense Research Committee and the A.A.F. Proving Ground Command have independently attacked the problem of determining the best spacing of train released bombs to obtain maximum assurance of the desired number of hits. Our investigations to date have brought to light a number of interesting possibilities, but neither study has gone far enough to do more than show us that considerably more work must be done before we can begin to use it in practical bombing.

3. The attached correspondence is an attempt to steer the development along proper lines and at the same time to prevent duplication of effort.

JAN 4 - '43 PM

E. L. EUBANK
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Director of Bombardment

Attachment:
Ltr to Mr. Warren Weaver,
N.D.R.C. with incls., dated
1/4/43.

20/Jan/43

Noted
GEJ

Paul S. Emrick
PAUL S. EMRICK,
Major, Air Corps,
Executive.

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6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Abr/ISW LC; Date 9/27/74

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AFRDB 23:vej
Rm. 4D135 - 6458
wrtn. 1/3/43

January 4, 1943

Mr. Warren Weaver
Room 5500
49 West 49th Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Weaver:

My answer to your letter of December 21st has been delayed by lack of opportunity to make up a set of diagrams necessary to illustrate the discussion requested.

The attached discussion and diagrams were a part of a report on bombing effectiveness in general and were not intended to give details and all of the possibilities of bombing maneuvering vessels. The method illustrated is only one of several which might be used, dependent upon forces available and other conditions, and even this one method is not covered in detail. However, it is possible that there is sufficient information to illustrate the characteristics of the problem, and, thereby, to stimulate ideas which might improve our technique.

I would like to invite your attention to Diagrams "C" and "D" and particularly to the fact that there is only one aimed bomb in each of the patterns illustrated. The bomb marked "P" in Diagram "C" was aimed at the stern of the vessel, while that marked "P-2" in Diagram "D" was aimed at the rear mast of the vessel. Thus, it may be seen that the individual train which follows after the aimed bomb, and also the entire formation pattern, may be located by the positioning of the first bomb.

When Professor Neyman was here we discussed possible limitations in the number of types of ships which should be considered for level attack from high and medium altitudes. I gave it as my opinion that such attacks should normally be made only against battleships, cruisers, carriers, and large transports or cargo vessels, but I would like to remind you that such an A.A.F. policy does not exist. Heretofore, the decision on this matter has been a prerogative of the theater commander and I believe it should continue so.

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Concerning other aspects of Project 23, I am attaching hereto, in addition to the discussion requested, a copy of a letter which I have initiated on the subject of "Optimum Spacing of Bombs in Train." This letter, if and when it is signed, will forward copies of the data which you have sent me to date on Project No. 23, and it places the matter up to the Commanding General, A.A.F. Proving Ground Command, at Eglin Field, Florida, for further necessary action. I suggest that you await information from him which then will indicate whether this letter was sent in the form indicated.

Yours very truly,

CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON
Colonel, A.C.
Chief, Status of Operations Division
Directorate of Bombardment

Incls:
Discussion of Technique of
High Altitude Bombing of
Maneuvering Surface Vessels
4 Diagrams
Cy of ltr to CG, Proving Ground
Command, Eglin Fld.

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8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

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SUBJECT: Bomb Spacing and Mean Points of Impact and Train Releases.

TO: Commanding General
Proving Ground Command
Eglin Field, Florida

1. Report No. 2-42-6, AFPGC, October 31, 1942, subject: "Optimum Spacing of Bombs in Train," brings to light a number of factors which have been but vaguely realized by personnel concerned with bombing probabilities and with determining the correct spacing of bombs when train releases are used. Independently of this study, the National Defense Research Committee has made a partial analysis of the same subject but along somewhat different lines. In both studies it is brought out that the following factors each independently affect the selection of spacing which gives the greatest chance of obtaining the desired number of hits:

a. Number of hits required.

b. Bomb ballistic dispersion (circular probable dispersion due to irregularities in the bomb).

c. Circular probable error due to personnel errors.

d. Circular probable error due to mechanical and electrical equipment.

e. Shape and size of the target.

f. Direction of bombing approach.

g. Number of attacks which may be made simultaneously or separately.

2. N.D.R.C. has computed data giving optimum spacings and corresponding probabilities for the following sets of conditions:

a. Circular probable error - 200 ft.

b. Bomb radial dispersion - 30 ft.

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Subject: Bomb Spacing and Mean Points of Impact and Train Releases.

c. Target 100 ft. x 600 ft. (50 ft. x 450 ft. in process).

d. Number of bombs in train from 2 to 16.

e. Number of hits required from 1 to 5.

f. Direction of attack perpendicular to long axis of target.

g. Target stationary or moving along in straight line at a uniform rate.

One type of table in which this data is given assumes 100 airplanes available for use against 50 equally important targets each of the size stated above and indicates the proper division of available force and the optimum spacing of bombs for obtaining a given assurance of destruction of various numbers of the 50 targets.

3. Both studies have but barely touched the problem insofar as producing practical data is concerned, yet each study shows that the rule of thumb method for determining bomb spacing as given in paragraph 52 of the Technical Manual 1-251 is not mathematically accurate. Further, although the mass of calculations necessary in obtaining the data for limited number of conditions has been enormous, they are only a fraction of the calculations necessary for giving the same data on the remaining unsolved permutations and combinations of the conditions listed above. N.D.R.C., incidentally, has requested the Army Air Forces' assistance in obtaining I.B.M. machines necessary for carrying their calculations to a logical conclusion.

4. Mere cursory examination of the problem of bomb spacing discloses certain practical aspects which must be considered before applying the optimum spacing data to tactical bombing principles. Tables I and II attached hereto are furnished to picture the rapidity and precision with which release mechanisms must function in order to make changes in spacing as precisely as contemplated in the theoretical calculations contained in both studies. From those tables it may be seen that the known bomb rack delay, varying around 1/15 of a second, produces errors up to about 25 ft. when bombing at 250 miles per hour. Intervalometer errors due to backlash, the time necessary to make and break electrical circuits, and the characteristics of other mechanical features introduce even greater time errors, and even the bombsight itself has certain characteristics which have increasingly adverse effects as bombing speeds go up. These and other various features of bomb release mechanisms, including the entire electrical

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Subject: Bomb Spacing and Mean Points of Impact and Train Releases.

and mechanical system in the airplane, produce variable total errors which now are of such magnitude that the spacing precision contemplated in both studies is at this time out of the question.

5. For the reasons outlined above, and since the Air Forces cannot overlook the improvements and methods visualized by these studies, it is requested that you plan and conduct coordinated programs of development along the two lines shown to be necessary, one designed to produce improvement in mechanical features which will justify the application of theoretical principles discovered by the other. It may be seen that these two projects are intimately related and therefore that they cannot be accomplished without close coordination.

6. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, you should establish and maintain contact with N.D.R.C. through Mr. Warren Weaver, Room 5500, 49 West 49th Street, New York City, N.Y., because their Project No. 23 is along the same lines. For your information in this matter, there are attached hereto copies of the following papers received from Mr. Weaver: letter from Mr. Weaver to Professor S. H. Caldwell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, dated December 23, 1942, and Memo Concerning Project #23, Division 7, N.D.R.C., December 23, 1942, subject: Bombardier's Calculator, AC-27, OD-54. It is thought that all future contact by the N.D.R.C. and Army Air Forces should be through you and that jointly you should arrange for satisfactory continuation of the project along the lines outlined above. The most satisfactory place for the actual computations may be determined by you.

7. The recommendation contained in Paragraph 35, section VIII of your report, is along this line and is concurred in by this headquarters, but it is not thought that mechanical accuracy of our present bomb release equipment is sufficiently far advanced to justify the allotment of calculating machines for this sole project. Therefore, the calculations should be made on available machines at such time as they can be spared for this purpose with the provisions that the program of calculations be intensified when improvement in mechanical features is actually in sight. It is suggested that the Director of Statistical Control be contacted for assistance if necessary.

8. The recommendation contained in Paragraph 34 of your report, to the effect that the rough method of figuring bomb spacing be eliminated

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Subject: Bomb Spacing and Mean Points of Impact and Train Releases.

from Technical Manual 1-251, is not considered to be timely. It is fully realized that paragraph 42 of the Technical Manual does not give a precise solution, but it is not believed that a practical substitute has been devised. Therefore, the substitution of a new method must await a satisfactory completion of the theoretical and practical problems presented herein.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

DAVENPORT JOHNSON
Major General, U. S. Army

4 Incls.:
Cy ltr to Prof. S. H. Caldwell
frm Warren Weaver, 12/23/42.
Cy Memo Concerning Project #23,
Div. 7 - NDRC.
Tables I and II.

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BOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: alr/ac LC. Date: 9/27/74

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Room 5500
49 West 49th Street
New York, N.Y.

December 23, 1942

Professor S. H. Caldwell
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Sam:

The enclosed memorandum pretty well summarizes the present situation in Project #23. As you will see, this project originally asked for a gadget, and so far we have given them only mathematics (see Matthew 7, 9).

We are now, however, very near the instrument stage; and in this letter I want to raise a point for your consideration.

There are two kinds of errors which enter into the position of bombs dropped in train. The "aiming error" applies uniformly to all of the bombs of a given train. It is the displacement, in range and deflection, from the center of the target to the center of a hypothetical train of bombs equally spaced like beads along a straight line. The aiming error is due, just as its name indicates, to various inaccuracies in the aiming process, - inaccuracy in the general flight path of the plane during the bombing run, in the values set into the bombsight, etc. The "dispersion errors" are, on the other hand, errors which apply individually and completely independently to the individual bombs. They are the components, in range and deflection, between the theoretical position of the bead on the straight line and the actual landing point of that individual bomb. The dispersion errors are caused by things which vary from bomb to bomb and which have nothing to do with the aiming process, - variations in loading of bombs, in fins, in chance accelerations of the aircraft at the exact moment of release, all differences in the air structure experienced by the individual bombs, by inaccuracies in the operation of the intervalometer, by variations in the operation of the bomb release mechanism, etc.

The dispersion errors have a standard error in range or deflection of approximately 30 feet at, say, a 10,000-foot altitude. There is mild evidence that this varies approximately with the square root of the altitude. The aiming errors vary widely from crew to crew, etc., but range from some 50 feet to ten or more times that much.

In the case of single releases, the two kinds of errors described above are of course merged together, and they are difficult if indeed not impossible to separate.

There are certain contributions to the aiming error which occur in train bombing and which do not have a counterpart in single releases. A principal one of these arises from the fact that the bombsights were originally made for single releases. Therefore, unless one makes some special provision, a bombsight will

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aim the first bomb of a train at the center of the target rather than (which is obviously what one wants) the middle of the train at the center of the target. To make the necessary correction it has been proposed that one set a false altitude into the bombsight, falsifying this altitude by just such an amount as to displace the train in trail by one-half of the length of the train. On the accompanying memorandum, the first numbered point on page 1 refers to this procedure.

This procedure, however, involves a knowledge of the length of the train, - that is to say, a knowledge of the ground speed and of the actual realized time interval between bombs. Both because the realized time interval is not that set on the intervalometer, and because one can never know the ground speed accurately, one can never know the actual realized length of the train. Therefore, the trail off-set will be in error; and this will appear as a contribution to the aiming error. For this reason one might well expect that the range component of aiming error in train bombing would on the average be greater than it is in single release bombing; and it may be enough larger, from this cause, so that one may not be justified, in train bombing, in assuming that the range and deflection components of aiming error are equal.

Now it is clear that there is another way of going about this whole matter which would eliminate part of this error. I will describe this alternative way in purely fictional functional terms without meaning to imply that the language which I use necessarily corresponds to any sensible way of mechanization.

Suppose that there is attached to the sighting telescope of the bombsight (or simply to the line of sight) a segment of a circle, the mid point of the segment being on the line of sight. Suppose that one sets one dial to the Number, N, of bombs to be used in the train in question, sets another dial to the ground speed, and sets a third dial to the interval between bombs. Suppose that the process of setting these three dials in effect causes N contact points to protrude out from the circular segment in question, these points being symmetrically located with respect to the line of sight and so spaced along the segment that, if one bomb is released when each one of these points in turn makes contact, the result will be a train of bombs with the required spacing. The point of this whole business is that the contact points are symmetrically distributed, inside the bombsight, with respect to the line of sight, and therefore it is automatically assured (no matter what error there is in the ground speed estimate and what error in the realized spacing) that the bombs will actually be distributed symmetrically with respect to the intended aiming point. Thus with this system the range component of aiming error in train bombing would not be increased by the trail off-set procedure, even though the ground speed is mis-estimated and the spacing is in error.

It seems likely that it would be possible to develop this sort of an idea in such a way as to provide for an unequal spacing of bombs in train, still keeping the configuration symmetrical about the intended point of aim. I mention this because one of the most successful bombers who has returned from the South Pacific refuses to use the intervalometer. He knows that multiple hits are

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necessary, and he thinks he can increase his chance of multiple hits by putting the bombs closer together near the middle of the train. We are studying this from a theoretical point of view.

This suggestion would in effect incorporate the intervalometer with the bombsight. Whether the suggestion is in any sense a practical one from an instrumental point of view, I do not know; but I do think it is thoroughly worth your looking into the instrumental problem involved.

Cordially,

(Signed) Warren Weaver.

cc - Brigadier General Crandison Gardner
Colonel Charles G. Williamson

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/76

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December 23, 1942.

MEMO CONCERNING PROJECT #23 DIV. 7, NDRC
(Formerly Project #23, Section D-2, NDRC)

Bombardier's Calculator
AC - 27 OD - 54

The original request for Project 23 was for a Bombardier's Calculator. This device (whether chart, slide-rule, calculating instrument, or whatever) was asked to do three things:

1) To determine the change in the altitude setting on the bombsight so as to aim the center of a train on the target rather than the first bomb.

2) To determine the probability of at least one hit on a target with a train of n bombs, attacking at a certain angle.

3) To determine the optimum spacing of the train.

The first of these three is a relatively simple matter, once the length of train is known. But it seemed to us that we would do the Air Corps a dis-service if we did not investigate points 2) and 3) before attacking 1); for otherwise we would have a mechanism for furnishing bad and misleading answers.

We therefore started a study of the statistics and probability of train bombing. Most of this work has involved considerations that are in no way instrumental (at least yet), and our Service contacts have therefore been largely in Washington, with the various officers of the Directorate of Bombardment, and at Eglin Field, rather than with Wright Field. Our work to date can be briefly summarized as follows:

A) We have calculated the probability of at least one hit on a rectangular target 100' by 600'; for trains containing from 2 to 20 bombs; for standard dispersion errors equal to 25' or 30'; for standard aiming errors from 50' to 800'; for values of bomb spacing which bracket the optimum; and for angles of attack equal to 0°, 26.6°, 45°, 67°, and 90°. These results form Report to Services of Section D-2, NDRC #33.

B) We have been asked to produce similar results for three further targets, namely 50' x 450', 200' x 200', and 1000' x 3000'. The results for the 50' x 450' target are now nearly complete. We shall issue very soon a report which gives these results, and which repeats the results for the first target 100' x 600'. We are repeating the earlier results, because we shall now publish them both in tables and graphs; and on a dimensionless basis

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so they apply to a target of any size whose shape is that of a rectangle six times as long as wide. Thus we shall actually have, eventually, results for rectangular targets of any size, and of shapes nine-by-one, six-by-one, three-by-one, and one-by-one.

C) We have carried out an extensive analysis of the dispersion and aiming errors in a train bombing experiment done at Eglin Field. A further experiment, containing features suggested by us, is now being done at Eglin. At the conclusion of this further experiment we shall issue a report on this subject. The report will be concerned with such matters as

1) Comparison of dispersion errors for practice and service bombs.

2) Dependence of dispersion and aiming errors on altitude.

3) Relation between range and deflection aiming errors in train bombing.

4) Relation between range and deflection dispersion errors in train bombing.

Some of these points have received brief and preliminary treatment in Appendices to Report #33 mentioned above.

D) We have also calculated for the "one-by six" target the probabilities of at least two, at least three, at least four, and at least five hits. This will be done for the other targets.

E) We have carried out a study of multiple hits which is just being written in final form for release. This study considers such questions as these:

1) In continued independent attacks on a target (such as a great factory) one wishes to raise to at least 0.95, say, the probability of at least a certain number of hits. How many planes, with what trains, what spacings? Or what system (if routine bombing is to be employed) maximizes the expected damage per bomb?

2) A certain number of planes have the opportunity to attack a considerable number of targets with trains of n bombs each. The destruction of a target requires at least k hits. The number

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of targets is so large that each plane may attack a separate target; or alternatively the planes may be divided into several groups of s planes each, and each group be assigned a target. What procedure leads to the greatest number of targets destroyed?

These questions are merely illustrative of the many questions one may ask. In studying, in A) and B) above, the dependence of the probability of at least one hit on the angle of approach and on spacing in train, it was found that the probability did not respond very sensitively. Doing the best job was only a very little bit better than doing merely a good job. But in these multiple hit problems we find many cases in which the correct planning exceeds other apparently sensible and natural choices by a factor of 2, 3, or even more. This seemed to us so important that we made an informal and tentative report at once (on December 4th) to a group in the office of the Director of Bombardment, A.A.F.

These multiple hit studies are, moreover, in the process of being checked by an experiment on a Bomb Sight Trainer at Eglin. We planned this experiment, and it was authorized at the Dec. 4th meeting in Washington.

F) We have completed a study to show how serious, in the planning or carrying out of a bombing mission in accordance with the above theories, is the effect of a mis-estimate in either the standard dispersion or the standard aiming error. This report is now being reproduced.

G) Since the calculations involved in these studies are so extremely lengthy and arduous, we are studying the possibility of simplifying the formulae.

WARREN WEAVER,
Chief, Applied Mathematics Panel.

Copies sent to: Major Gen. C. C. Williams
Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardner
Rear Adm. J. A. Furer
Col. F. C. Wolfe and Lt. Col. R. E. Jarmon
Col. Charles G. Williamson
Col. Edgar P. Sorensen
Lt. Col. A. B. Domenesko - for attention Mr. R. H. Kent
Dr. James B. Conant

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TABLE I

Bomb Spacing Table

Desired Spacing in Feet	Ground Speeds				
	150 MPH 220 f/s	200 MPH 293 f/s	250 MPH 367 f/s	300 MPH 441 f/s	350 MPH 513 f/s
20 ft.	0.091 sec.	0.068 sec.	0.055 sec.	0.045 sec.	0.039 sec.
40 ft.	0.182 sec.	0.137 sec.	0.109 sec.	0.091 sec.	0.078 sec.
50 ft.	0.227 sec.	0.171 sec.	0.136 sec.	0.113 sec.	0.098 sec.
60 ft.	0.273 sec.	0.204 sec.	0.164 sec.	0.136 sec.	0.117 sec.
80 ft.	0.364 sec.	0.273 sec.	0.218 sec.	0.182 sec.	0.156 sec.
100 ft.	0.454 sec.	0.341 sec.	0.272 sec.	0.227 sec.	0.195 sec.
120 ft.	0.546 sec.	0.408 sec.	0.327 sec.	0.272 sec.	0.234 sec.
150 ft.	0.671 sec.	0.512 sec.	0.409 sec.	0.340 sec.	0.293 sec.

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TABLE II

Spacing Errors

Possible Errors in Time of Release	Errors in Feet due to Release Time Errors				
	150 MPH	200 MPH	250 MPH	300 MPH	350 MPH
0.05 sec.	11 ft.	15 ft.	18 ft.	22 ft.	26 ft.
0.10 sec.	22 ft.	29 ft.	37 ft.	44 ft.	51 ft.
0.15 sec.	33 ft.	44 ft.	55 ft.	66 ft.	77 ft.
0.20 sec.	44 ft.	60 ft.	73 ft.	88 ft.	103 ft.
0.25 sec.	55 ft.	73 ft.	92 ft.	110 ft.	128 ft.
0.50 sec.	110 ft.	147 ft.	184 ft.	221 ft.	257 ft.
0.75 sec.	165 ft.	220 ft.	275 ft.	331 ft.	385 ft.

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AFRDB 23:vcj-es
Rm. 4D135 - 6458
wrtn. 1/4/43

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

SUBJECT: Optimum Spacing of Bombs in Train.

1. Since the subject of high and medium altitude bombing has become a major bone of contention, I thought that you might be interested in a development pertaining to the use of bombs in train.

2. The National Defense Research Committee and the A.A.F. Proving Ground Command have independently attacked the problem of determining the best spacing of train released bombs to obtain maximum assurance of the desired number of hits. Our investigations to date have brought to light a number of interesting possibilities, but neither study has gone far enough to do more than show us that considerably more work must be done before we can begin to use it in practical bombing.

3. The attached correspondence is an attempt to steer the development along proper lines and at the same time to prevent duplication of effort.

E. L. EUBANK
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Director of Bombardment

Attachment:
Ltr to Mr. Warren Weaver,
N.D.R.C. with incls., dated
1/4/43.

OFFICE SYMBOL	1 AFRDB	2	3	4	5	6
SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	EhEhy P8E					
INTERNAL OFFICE COORDINATION						

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16—20342-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By [illegible] UC Date 9/27/76

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January 25, 1943

Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory.

The Commanding General, 8th Air Force, A.P.O. #887,
c/o The Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

1. It is requested that you furnish this Headquarters with your opinion in the matter of Army Air Force collaboration in the proposed bombing of settlements which have been occupied by the Germans in the eastern territories of the Polish General Government. Your opinion is requested in compliance with paragraph 3 of the enclosed letter from General Marshall to General Sikorski.

2. There is also enclosed for your information a copy of an Aide-Memoire from Colonel Marecki setting forth General Sikorski's request.

2 Incls.
#1 Cy ltr fr Gen Marshall
#2 Cy ltr fr Col Marecki
w/overlay

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/76

Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

TO: Air Adjutant General

DATE 1-25-43

FROM: Chief of the Air Staff

COMMENT NO. 5
WEH:JT 5246

For dispatch by courier

Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: [illegible]

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Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff 1-22-43

Chief of the Air Staff

WEH:JT 5246 3

Due to General Spaatz' present location, General Stratemeyer desires that the letter be addressed to the Commanding General, 8th Air Force instead of to General Spaatz personally.

Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL,
Colonel, G. S. C.

Dispatched
JAN 23 1943

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AFTAG LG, Date 9/27/76

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Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff 1-12-43

Chief of Air Staff 1

MAL:hjb 5265

1. Note the attached

2. For necessary action to comply with the Chief of Staff's statement to the effect that the problem has been referred to our Forces in England.

3. Reply will also be prepared returning these papers to ~~CGS~~ Sec. Gen. Staff stating action actually taken by the Army Air Forces. Mark

MILLARD A. LIBBY
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incl. n/c

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

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SUBJECT: Special Report by Int. Section, Eighth Bomber Command.

3373
GES:nl

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1.	General Strate-meyer	Ass't Chief of Staff, A-2.	12-25	1. Attached hereto is a special report by the Intelligence Section, Eighth Bomber Command on Army Air Force attacks on U-boat bases. This paper and the attached letters have been ~~referred~~ read to Mr. Lovett. 2. Mr. Lovett is securing the services of a Mr. Thompson for special duty in A-2, in order to make up a book showing the evidence of the effects of our bombing attacks in pictures that may from time to time become available. Certain of these pictures will then be used for publicity purposes to inform the American public as to the effects of our precision bombing. Of course, all pictures must be properly screened. When Tompson's services are secured all of his time will be utilized for this one purpose. 3. It is therefore directed that the enclosed pictures and any other pictures that are now on file or that maybe secured be made available to Mr. Thompson. G.E.S. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER Major General, U.S.A. Chief of the Air Staff

Incls:
- Copy of ltr to Gen Arnold frm Gen.Eaker, 11/26/42/w/
- Cpy of ltr to Gen Eaker frm Col.G.C.McDonald,11/20/42
- Info. on bombing of 21/10/42 Submarine Base of Lorient,11/18/42
- Info.on Bombing of 5/9/42-Rouen,11/12/42
- Notes of Recent Movements of German Troops in France, 11/18/42
- Info on Bombing of Fives - Lille, 11/18/42
- Incoming Cryptographed Message No.3065 to Gen.Eaker frm A)C in C Coastal Command
- Message to Gen.Eaker, PNT HQBC NR HBC 2/22 from Admiralty
- Cpy of ltr to CG, 8th A.F. frm Gen.Eaker, 11/20/42 subj: Special Interest Rpt. w/ 8 photos.
- Rpt on AAF ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES, 11/25/42 by Intel. Sec., VIII Bomber Command.

withdrawn A-2

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. . . . . .

Note.-- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF . . . .

SUBJECT: Special Report by Int. Section, Eighth Bomber Command.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
2.	AFABI	General Strate-meyer	12-30	WB:am 4700 1. Noted. 2. The last two inclosures listed have been withdrawn. The Special Interest Report has been turned over to the Technical Information Section for processing in accordance with a normal practice. The incident reported has already been released to the press but without photographs. It may be possible to use these photographs in connection with a future release. The report on AAF attacks on U-boat bases has been transmitted to the Director of Intelligence Service for use in conjunction with the preparation of an evaluation of the United Nations anti-submarine Air Operations requested by Plans Division. 8 Incls. n.c. 2 Incls. w.d. EDGAR P. SORENSEN Colonel, G. S. C.
3	Chief of Air Staff	FILES	1942 1-5	WEH:JT 5246 Noted. Incls. n/c WILLIAM E. HALL Colonel, G. S. C.

DEC 31 '42 PM

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Air Adjutant General

File 1/6/43

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Page No. ---------- Air D 385 (85)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date: [illegible]

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

B[illegible] Evidence in Pictures available Thompson in A-2

Noted & shown to S/W. 11/24/42

December 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETT:

Subject: Report from Gen. Eaker, 11/26/42.

Note the attached report from Eaker. It looks to me as if certain of the information in this report might well be released for publication. I am giving it to you to show the kind of information that is now coming in to A-2 which, if properly screened, could be released.

Please return all of these documents to me after you have gone over them.

H H Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Cpy of Ltr to Gen. Arnold frm Gen. Eaker, 11/26/42 /w/
Cpy of Ltr to Gen. Eaker frm Col. G.C. McDonald, 11/20/42
Info. on bombing of 21/10/42, Submarine Base of Lorient, 11/18/42
Info on Bombing of 5/9/42 - Rouen, 11/12/42
Notes of Recent Movements of German Troops in France, 11/18/42
Info. on Bombing of Fives - Lille, 11/18/42
Incoming Cryptographed Message No. 3065 to Gen. Eaker frm AOC in C Coastal Command
Message to Gen. Eaker, PNT HQBC NR HBC 2/22 frm Admiralty
Cpy of Ltr to CG, 8th A.F. frm Gen. Eaker, 11/20/42 subj: Special Interest Rpt. /w/ 8 photos
Rpt on AAF ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES, 11/25/42 by Intel. Sec., VIII Bomber Command.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/74

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(A)

HEADQUARTERS VIII BOMBER COMMAND
APO 634, C/o Postmaster,
NEW YORK, N.Y.

November 26, 1942.

Lieut. General Henry H. Arnold, USA.,
Commanding General,
U. S. Army Air Forces,
WASHINGTON. D.C.

Dear General,

Hank looks very well. He reminds me so much of his Dad in 1918 when I first knew him. I tried to get General Eisenhower to let him join me but the General would have none of it for the time being. In this connection I must hasten to add that General Eisenhower has supported and helped me in this Command in every human way. He has visited us frequently, acquainted himself with our problems and supported our requests. It is a pleasure to work for such a forceful and thorough going Commander.

It is a remarkable coincidence but Tooey left on the 13th with a plan identical with that suggested in your letter of the 15th. I have no way of knowing whether he and General Eisenhower have submitted it to the War Department, but it does show that both are thinking along the lines of organization indicated by you.

We are all very sad and depressed over the apparent loss of Asa Duncan. We have kept you informed by cable of the progress of the search and of the facts surrounding his loss. The airplane in which he was enroute to Gibraltar caught fire in some unknown and inexplicable way, perhaps due to the breaking of a gas line. They were flying at low altitude and made a very hard, almost a crash-landing in the sea. There was another B-17 right behind them and in formation with them, and the whole thing was seen. The whole wreckage caught fire immediately on hitting the sea and sank within a few seconds. The pilot of the B-17 following behind, circled the site for more than 4 hours. Shortly after the crash he believed that he saw several people in the water. Eventually, he definitely saw one man in a rubber dinghy. Just prior to the time the B-17 pilot had to leave the scene of the crash on account of shortage of gasoline, the one man in the dinghy signalled with his flash-lamp but did not give his name. Apparently the B-17 which was circling the dinghy did not give an accurate fix since we have been unable, despite persistent and thorough search by aircraft, to locate the dinghy containing the one occupant. On the 20th, another aircraft enroute to Malta, reported seeing the dinghy, still with the one occupant. He did not break radio silence to report the location but when he reached Gibraltar he did report it promptly. We have added six of our own Liberators to the Coastal Command effort and are doing everything possible to find the dinghy and its

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occupant. There were ten men in the plane. Asa was the only passenger. He is believed to have been in the radio compartment and would probably have had the best chance of getting into the dinghy. There is no way, of course, of knowing whether he or some crew member was the one man known to have been alive when the scene of the wreckage was last observed by our military personnal.

A surface wind was blowing from the south-east at about 10 m.p.h. which would tend to drift the dinghy out to sea. The search has been extended to cover the possible drift. Coastal Command believes that we should not at this time give up all hope for General Duncan since there are several possibilities : he may have been picked up by a German aircraft ; he may have drifted to land on a hostile or neutral shore ; he may have been picked up by a small fishing vessel without radio. All of these possibilities, it seems to me, are rather remote after a study of the wind and the facts which are available. Asa did not go with the other party since General Spaats desired to have him carry copies of papers he personally was taking, in view of the possibility of enemy action enroute. It is definitely certain that the loss of the B-17 with crew was not due to enemy action but to fire which broke out aboard the aircraft from unknown causes.

Yesterday I received your letters on the subject of photography. As a result, I am having bundled up and sent back to you all the photographs which have been taken to date to make sure that you have there all that we now have. The principal photographs which we are now taking are those of battle damage to aircraft and photographs made from bombers at the time of bombing. Most of our cameras were carried away by the Twelfth Air Force in order to make their organizations complete on this basis. With the equipment that is available we shall put increased emphasis on this subject of photography and send it along to you as quickly as possible.

I am doing everything possible to make the largest number of aircraft available for combat. There is nothing we can do in this theater toward this aim which is not now in progress. A full report on this subject has been prepared and is coming back to you by the first pouch. As Tooey has already told you, our principal handicap in getting planes ready for combat has been the fact that Air Service Command has been expending most of its resources to set up aircraft and otherwise prepare the Twelfth Air Force for its mission. Another factor is the failure of the service troops to get their organizational equipment to this theater. Most of the service squadrons at my airdromes have but a small percentage of their tools and organizational equipment.

The bombing which we have done of the submarine bases has been even more effective than we had hoped for with the force we had available. I am enclosing three reports on this subject :

a. A statement by an eye witness which is believed credible and reliable, who was present at the bombing of Lorient.

b. A summary of the anti-submarine bombing to date.

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c. A brief statement from Admiralty and Coastal Command, the agencies with which we work in this regard, applauding the success of our effort.

I am now more firmly convinced than ever, that if we had ten heavy groups we could eliminate a large part of the submarine activity now launched from the five principal bases on the Brest peninsula. At the time I saw you in Washington you may remember I told you and the President that we could guarantee with ten groups to eliminate 60% of the submarine menace in the Atlantic, since 85% of it was launched from these five bases and we could render them unusable with an Air Force of that size. I can tell you now that all the facts growing out of actual missions definitely support that estimate.

Tooey told you that our operational rate in September and October was much lower than could have been normally expected in view of the average weather for these months. That has been borne out by the fact that we have already executed eight missions during the month of November. On any day when the weather makes an attack on the submarine bases in the Brest peninsula impossible, and when the weather is good, we shall go after submarine building installations in Germany. We have not thought it wise to launch missions against installations in Germany until we had a force of 100-120 bombers. We are now rapidly approaching that period. When the 44th Group goes operational during the coming week we shall pass the hundred mark. To-day we have 80 heavies in the air enroute to their targets.

I understand that George Stratemeyer has stated that after talking to Armstrong, Pardy and company, he feels that some of our practices are contrary to sound theories of bombardment. In view of his statement to that effect I have just made a thorough re-study of our operational practices and I feel that they are and have been sound in view of the conditions which prevailed, to include the enemy we were up against, the targets we had to destroy, and the forces we had available. We shall always welcome any suggestions from you or your staff, of course, and we shall take full advantage of any personnel in whom you have confidence, whom you send to this theater to help out. I have not mentioned George Stratemeyer's comment by way of criticism. I know of no officer whose heart is more squarely in the right place than Strat's. Anything he says gets full attention from me and I know Tooey feels the same way.

I am enclosing some interesting battle damage photos of a plane which came home bearing the scars of 20 m.m. shells. The report of this crews experience is also enclosed.

We are hoping that you can come over to visit us at an early date and see our work and our problems first hand. Please give my best to David and Mrs. Arnold and any of my friends whom you see there.

Sincerely,

IRA C. EAKER
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

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3 Incls.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date [illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
ETOUSA
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff A-2

(D-31-35)

20 November 1942.

Major General Ira C. Eaker,
Eighth Air Force,
ETOUSA.

Dear Ira,

Transmitted herewith are translations of reports originated by the Free French Air Forces on the following:

Information on the Bombing of 21.10.42 - Submarine Base at Lorient,

Information on the Bombing of 5.9.42 of Rouen,

Notes on the Recent Movements of German Troops in France.

Information on the bombing of Fives-Lille was given to you by hand yesterday.

GEORGE C.MCDONALD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff A-2.

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Information on Bombing of
Submarine Base of Lorient contd.....

bombing must be made with more precision and expect a similar raid on the arsenal on a Saturday afternoon or on a Sunday when the civilians do not work.

Report No.2.

A row of lavatories along the quay was raised by the explosion of a bomb nearby - victims.

One bomb fell on the Etab. Le Page, already destroyed during an R.A.F. raid.

The power plant was not hit.

Material damage estimated at several tens of millions.

Victims: Up to the present time approximately 40 Frenchmen, 50 Algerians, Belgians and Dutch, etc...probably 150 Germans (engineers and workmen). Many were drowned or crushed. The wounded are numerous. The French and foreigners - at the Hopital Bodelic, the Germans - at the hopital maritime.

Newspaper reports - Nil. Just one report the next day of a visit to the hopital Bodelic by the sous-prefet, the Maire etc....; no reason given.

Impressions of the population - They deplore the fate of the victims but admire the stunt....Would like, however, raids of this kind to be carried out on holidays.

Report No.3.

The impression caused by the appearance in broad daylight, Wednesday 21/10 of the R.A.F. squadron accompanied by American Flying Fortresses was considerable at Lorient. The bombing of this town has never been so accurate as this time. Most of the bombs hit the right places. The objectives have been partly hit - one of the submarine shelters has been hit by a torpedo (??? bombs), and even if it has not suffered much damage the nearby workshops, which were immense and perfectly equipped for the overhaul of damaged submarines, have been totally destroyed. According to the Germans' own words, the damage as far as the equipment alone is concerned is over the figure of one hundred million francs.

The number of killed and wounded - as much among the Germans as the French and foreign workers - was high; in the number there were about 40 Frenchmen not including the wounded.

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By _____ LC. Date _____

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TRANSLATION DECLASSIFIED

FREE FRENCH
AIR FORCES

Etat - Major

2nd Bureau. London, 18 November, 1942.

INFORMATION ON BOMBING OF 21/10/42.

SUBMARINE BASE OF LORIENT

Report No. 1.

The alert was not given and the bombs had dropped before the anti-aircraft went into action. At the arsenal only a few batteries fired.

Nearly all the bombs fell within the perimeter of the submarine base at Keroman. Two bombs fell astray in an open field. One fell 20 meters from a searchlight post, on the Larmor Road, near the Kennelo Bridge, one at port de peche, in an open field near the slip.

Damaged: 150 meters of quay demolished, 1 floating dock sunk, 2 submarines straddled (bombs close). One large shelter, flat roof, located on the extremity of the point, was hit - 5 bombs penetrated approximately 1 meter 50 in the roof (this roof is 3 meters 50 thick).

Three workshops have been destroyed including a building 50 meters x 50 meters which crumbled (former ateliers Le Page, iron and metals); one bomb near "L'air liquide"; slight damage.

Commissary barracks were destroyed by a bomb and fire.

There are approximately 150 dead and more than half were German; the others were Belgians, Dutch, and a few French.

One Allied bomber was brought down near Douarnenez, after having shot down at least two German fighters; the crew was brought back to Douarnenez.

The whole of the personnel of the aresenal and part of the population regret that the damage was not more severe and at the same time they deplore the death of the few civilians who work in the shop.

The excitement is great among the people due to the fact that this is the first time that Lorient has been attacked by day and by a rather strong force. Many people were in the street and watched the evolution of 15 aircraft flying in formation. All are of the opinion that a day

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Information on Bombing of Submarine Base at Lorient contd....

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Strangely enough following this bombing there were hone of the usual clamours by the collaborationists. There were no cries of pity for the victims of the civilian population which have been spread in the past; in fact the local press is completely mum even after six days since the bombing.

A great majority of the population does not express any sorrow for the victims, even the French ones, their reasoning being that these French workmen had voluntarily enrolled in these German enterprises because of higher salaries. People just feel that they took a chance on certain risks in order to make more money.

From a humanitarian standpoint no objection can be raised since the bombing took place on objectives strictly military.

The surprise of the Germans was complete; up to the last minute they thought that such an imposing squadron and so audacious, could only be German. The consternation was great when the bombs exploded and again when the Germans realized the damage done. Fright followed the surprise and flak crews were seen to run away from their guns. There was no panic among the population when the siren sounded. I was in the center of the town at the time and I saw the faces of the people of Lorient brighten up with smiles in the midst of the rush of German uniforms. The French looked up quietly and watched the formation flying high and giving the impression of a formidable force.

The collaborationists have meek faces and stay put. Their theory of the deliberate bombings of civilians has crumbled; they had it easy before when they shouted out loud that with the existence of strong anti-aircraft defenses the R.A.F. would never dare to interrupt the construction of the gigantic works at port Keroman, the super modern submarine base. The experience and the facts of 21/10 have shown clearly that it only takes the R.A.F. and the American Air Force a few minutes of bombing, by day, to annihilate partially the "kolossal" work of the past two years. Another little effort with bombs of a large caliber and the rest of the works will follow the same fate.

As a matter of information I have definitely found out that the workmen in these shops do not, for the majority, come to work on Sunday.

I have heard (this is given under reservation since the source of information seems doubtful) that a number of German officers and men who had abandoned their posts during the attack had been judged and severely punished - some shot.

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Information on Bombing of
Submarine Base of Lorient contd...

Report No. 3.

The power plant of the submarine base was heavily hit by the last bombing by day 21/10. At the present time unserviceable. Extent of damage is not yet known. Submarine rudder shafts were being electric-welded there and then brought to the Arsenal to be finished.

Report No. 4.

The official number of victims during the bombing of 21/10/42 excluding Germans is 221 killed, of which 42 were French.

The exact figure of German losses could not be obtained but it is estimated at about 160.

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DOD ltrs
3 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] I.C. Date: [illegible]

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TRANSLATION.

FREE FRENCH AIR FORCES.

Etat - Major.

Second Bureau. London, November 12, 1942.

INFORMATION ON THE BOMBING OF 5/9/42 - ROUEN.

REPORT NO. 1.

Apart from the 27 bombs which fell on Sotteville, the bombing can be considered a total miss and has had a disastrous effect on the population. The German propaganda has utilised with great success the fiasco of this raid and the bitterness that it has created among the population.

The walls are covered with posters put up in pairs. On the left one represents a smiling soldier climbing over barbed wire.

Caption: DIEPPE, 1000 prisoners freed!

On the right, the other represents bombs pulverising houses; with three corpses in the foreground - the father, mother and child with their faces to the ground.

Caption: ROUEN, 140 killed!

The radio propaganda around this raid further succeeded in alienating those who had been sympathetically-disposed towards us. They tried, in vain, to find a word of sympathy for the victims, in the falsely triumphant communique of the B.B.C.

REPORT NO. 2.

The population, in spite of propaganda efforts around it by the Germans, after the raid, remains very much against the latter, but it bears a grudge against the Americans because the losses were heavy on top of all those already suffered in June, 1940. "They bombed us from too high", complained the inhabitants.

It is also known in the town that the losses in human lives would have been much less serious had there not been a lack of rescue squads. The bombing occurred on a Saturday at 11 o'clock in the morning. On Sunday neighbours could still hear groans of people trapped under debris, Without being able to extend any help to the victims since individual rescue had been strictly forbidden by the Germans. It is estimated that of the 140 dead, at least 30 or 40 died owing to the unforgiveable lack of rescue, that one could believe was deliberate.

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[illegible] 385 (85)

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DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: [illegible]

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TRANSLATION.

DECLASSIFIED

FREE FRENCH AIR FORCES.

Etat - Major. London, November 18, 1942.

Second Bureau.

NOTES OF RECENT MOVEMENTS OF GERMAN TROOPS IN FRANCE.

Movements of troops prior to 8 November, 1942:

1. Elements, having as insignia two diamonds or Ace of Diamonds, left around the end of October (29.10.42) from FERTE MILON and from NEUILLY ST. FRONT by railroad in the direction of the COTE d'OR.

2. All the S.S. in the region of MELUN left November 7, in direction of NETERS.

3. The total armoured units having as insignia Y III left November 8, from NIORT for ANGOULEME.

4. Elements of S.S. left November 8 from CHAUNY for TROYES.

These movements seem to indicate that the Germans were thinking of, since that period, the total occupation of France.

Movements of troops after November 8, 1942:-

At noon railroad station of SERQUIGNY loading of armoured unit S.S., three trains of light and medium units, automobiles and complete material, destination unknown. Loading continues. Three A.A. machine-guns in position.

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DOD dir.
8 Feb. 6 20 June 1974
By AH/AD UC Date 9/22/74

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DECLASSIFIED

FREE FRENCH
AIR FORCES

Etat - Major

2nd Bureau

London, 18 November 1942.

INFORMATION ON BOMBING

OF

Fives - Lille

Report Number 1.

The American bombing heavily hit the power plant, the large and medium iron works and the turbines.

Six workmen were killed.

Work started again on October 27th, with the connecting up to another power plant, but it is estimated that the repairs will last at least two months.

At Hellemmes,2 textile factories were hit; not working at all.

At Lesquin, the factory making electrical equipment and Alsthom motors was hit, but work continues.

REPORT Number 2.

Most of the bombs fell on houses surrounding the factory. In the factory the small iron workshops, a workshop and a storage house were hit, the latter being completely destroyed.

The losses among the civilian population reach 130 victims (40 killed and 90 wounded).

In the factory itself, 7 workmen were killed, no alert having been given. As a result of this bombing the Fives-Lille plant stopped working for two days. The vital centers of this plant were not hit. The tempering plant where the Martin furnaces are located would be the thing to hit.

A bomb fell in the yard of the cable plant Helleme, one bomb Chesquiere, two bombs Etienne Dolet, several rue de Chanzy and one on road No.47; two bombs fell on the Cartier-Bresson factory (thread).

One of the bombers fell between Lannoy and Roubaix. The person who informed me of this said that only one of the crew was captured (wounded in the legs), and that the others had escaped.

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The morale of the population after this bombing is very high and wishes are expressed that the plant be completely annihilated as soon as possible.

It would be necessary to attack the railroad works located along the tracks from Lille to Tournai. This plant, very important, repairs 50 to 60 locomotives a month.

Also to be destroyed would be the Fives railroad station where there are day and night and with steam up 4 to 6 locomotives destined to haul troops and materiel.

Report No. 3.

I have been able to make a superficial visit at Fives-Lille (with a friend who has entry there), however only in certain parts of the works, the German guard and control being very strict.

The power plant hard hit is unserviceable for six months. This has been overcome by connecting the plants who the ASCQ plant. If the latter was now destroyed or seriously hit I cannot see how Five-Lille could continue to operate; in any case the activity of the works would be seriously handicapped.

Report No. 4.

Outside of Fives-Lille numerous factories were hit at Hellemmes. They are:

Crespelle	(Linen mill)	destroyed.
Dufour	"	hit.
Droulers	(spinning mill)	hit.
Monneret freres	"	damaged.
Coton L. V.	"	hit.

At petit Ronchin, and at Ronchin, numerous bombs on houses and in the fields.

Bombs at Santes, Watignies, Beaucamps (jardin du College)

At Emmerin: a few wounded.

And a little everywhere bombs in the coun[illegible]

Opinion of inhabitants -

Bombing effected from too high - Too much dispersed.

Reaction of the Population -

Good as a whole, even with those who lost kin or property. But it is asked, generally, that next time the aircraft operate from a lower altitude.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AlA/AD LC, Date 9/27/74

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING CRYPTOGRAPHED MESSAGE

TO: GENERAL EAKER VIII US BOMBER COMMAND Msg Cen No. 3065

FROM: AOC in C COASTAL COMMAND

A 901	20 Nov	1140/20
(Originator's No.)	(Date)	(Time of Origin)

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL EAKER FROM AOC IN C.

AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE VERY GREAT ASSISTANCE OF YOUR COMMAND IN THE ANTI U BOAT WAR. THE ATTACKS OF YOUR AIRCRAFT UPON THE BAY PORTS HAVE BEEN OF THE VERY GREATEST HELP TO US.

A TRUE COPY

John W. McGuire

JOHN W. MCGUIRE
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Executive, A-2.

PNT HQBC NR HBC 2/22

PASS TO GENERAL EAKER, EIGHTH U S BOMBER COMMAND

ADDSD GENERAL EAKER, EIGHTH U S BOMBER COMMAND REPEATED HQCC
FROM ADMIRALTY

YOUR ATTACKS AGAINST THE U-BOAT OPERATIONAL PORTS ARE

GREATLY APPRECIATED AND ARE A VALUABLE COMPLEMENT TO THE

OFFENSIVE BEING CARRIED OUT BY COASTAL COMMAND IN THE BAY.

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Special Report by Int. Section, Eighth Bomber Command

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
9 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/74

WEH:JT 5246

3	Chief of Air Staff	FILES	1942 1-5	Noted.

Incls.
n/c

WILLIAM E. HALL
Colonel, G. S. C.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD 1/5
8 Jan. & 26 June 1974
By [illegible] I.C. Date 9/27/74

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GES:ml

Special Report by Int. Section, Eighth Bomber Command.

1. General Strate-meyer — Ass't Chief of Staff, A-2. — 12-25

1. Attached hereto is a special report by the Intelligence Section, Eighth Bomber Command on Army Air Force attacks on U-boat bases. This paper and the attached letters have been ~~referred~~ read to Mr. Lovett.

2. Mr. Lovett is securing the services of a Mr. Thompson for special duty in A-2, in order to make up a book showing the evicence of the effects of our bombing attacks in pictures that may from time to time become available. Certain of these pictures will then be used for publicity purposes to inform the American public as to the effects of our precision bombing. Of course, all pictures must be properly screened. When Tompson's services are secured all of his time will be utilized for this one purpose.

3. It is therefore directed that the enclosed pictures and any other pictures that are now on file or that maybe secured be made available to Mr. Thompson.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

air ab 385 (85)

Incls: Copy of ltr to Gen Arnold frm Gen.Eaker, 11/26/42/w/
Cpy of ltr to Gen Eaker frm Col.G.C.McDonald,11/20/42
Info. on bombing of 21/10/42 Submarine Base of Lorient,11/18/42
Info.on Bombing of 5/9/42-Rouen,11/12/42
Notes of Recent Movements of German Troops in France, 11/18/42
Info on Bombing of Fives - Lille, 11/18/42
Incoming Cryptographed Message No.3065 to Gen.Eaker frm A)C in C Coastal Command
Message to Gen.Eaker, PNT HQBC NR HBC 2/22 from Admiralty
Cpy of ltr to CG, 8th A.F. frm Gen.Eaker, 11/20/42 subj: Special Interest Rpt. w/ 8 photos.
Rpt on AAF ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES, 11/25/42 by Intel. Sec., VIII Bomber Command.

Dispatched
DEC 26 1942
AAG

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air ab 385 (85)

PREPARED BY ADVISORY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/76

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

December 21, 1942

General Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy,
2633 Sixteenth Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Sikorski:

I appreciated very much your recent letter with which you kindly sent to me a resume of some of your ideas concerning the part that Air Forces should play in the conduct of this war. I am very glad to have in writing your views on this matter which is of such vital interest to all of us. Your paper has been referred to our Plans Division, in order that the information contained therein may be made available to them.

Yours sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Dispatched
DEC 22 1942
AAG

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Copy to AAG

Air AG 385 (84) B

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~~SECRET~~ Air AG 385 (84) B

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

JES/lr 72721

2 Col. Gen. 1942
Cabell Arnold 12/21

1. Recommended reply to General Sikorski is attached.

2. Recommend this paper be referred to Air Plans Division for their information.

Incls: 1. As above &
2. Ltr to Gen Sikorsky, 12/21/42 fr Gen A.

C. P. CABELL
Colonel, A. C.

---

3. Gen. AFAEP 1942
Arnold 12/21

For your information and file.

Incl: 1 Same as in # 1
2. Cy of ltr to Gen S. 12/21/42 fr Gen A.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lt. General, U.S.A.

Dispatched
DEC 23 1942
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Air ad 385 (84)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED

MAR 31 1943

Bombing of German Occupied Polish Territory

X C/S

X Signature

Dispatched
APR 1 1943

AAG

AFAEP
GS:mnh - 71127

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

O. A. ANDERSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Incls: 1. Reply fr C/S to Gen Sikorski (abv subj)
2. Ltr fr Hq AAF to CG/8th Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Operational Plans. AF 1/25/43.(w/1st Ind) w/2 incls (abv subj)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Gen. Sikorski, by Aide-Memoire to the Chief of Staff in early January proposed that our Air Forces bomb German settlements in eastern Poland where mass extermination or deportation of Poles is being carried out. On January 8th a reply was sent to Gen. Sikorski indicating unfavorable consideration but promising that the matter would be referred to our forces in England for comment. This was done and reply has been received from the 8th Air Force stating that the operation suggested cannot be carried out because (1) CCS directive governing our bombing efforts provides for attack against other targets and (2) the range of our aircraft operating in this theatre will not permit it. The draft of letter to Gen. Sikorski, which is attached, informs him that his proposals cannot be placed in effect at this time.

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS RTW.
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Ord. Pr.
Sec. Pr.
Mil. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

Air AB 385 (86)

DECLASSIFIED

File Ai 4/1/43

Air AB 385 (86)

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC: Date: 9/27/74

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322.082 x 373. 1st Ind. E-H-4.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, 23 February 1943. TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. The matter of Army Air Force collaboration in the proposed bombing of occupied settlements in Poland is considered impracticable for the present because of the following:

a. At present the U. S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom operate under a general directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Allied Forces. This directive specifies the areas in which missions may be undertaken, and defines the type targets to be attacked in those areas. The areas under discussion are not included in present directive.

b. From bases in the United Kingdom a tactical radius of 975 miles is required to perform the missions under discussion. Bombardment airplanes in this Air Force at present do not have this tactical radius of action.

2. If subsequent developments permit this Air Force to occupy airdromes within reach of these areas, and targets therein are designated for attack by our forces, it is felt that good results can be obtained.

3. It is believed that it might be well to point out to the Poles that our bombardment effort against German industry in Germany, in effect accomplishes in considerable degree, the purposes they desire. It hastens the conclusion of the struggle and the freedom of Poland. There is one other eventuality which might hasten our ability to attack German targets in Poland and that, of course, is the receipt of longer ranged aircraft in this Air Force.

For the Commanding General:

Incl. n/c

/s/ C. C. Chauncey,

C. C. CHAUNCEY
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

Copy of Basic ltr. and incls in files.

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
War O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Weather
Traffic
Photo. M&C
Tech. Insp.
Pub. Rel.
Dir. Pers.
Mil. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
J. Advoc.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

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AFAEP
GS:mnh - 71127

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AEL/AD DC Date: 9/20/76

A-1/AS
A-2/AS
Intel. S.
A-3/AS
A-4/AS
Plans/AS RKW
Insp/AS
Mil. Req.
A. Def.
Bomb.
Gr. Sup.
Base S.
Tech O&M
Ind. Tr.
Tech. S.
Comm.
Traffic
Tech. Insp.
Dir. Pers.
Civ. Pers.
Surg.
Budget
Fiscal
Mgmt. Con.
Adj. Gen.
Org. Pl.
Stat. Pl.
Leg. Pl.
Mat. C.
A. S. C.
F. C.

General Wladyslow Sikorski
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Sikorski:

Early this year you placed in my hands information of widespread German atrocities being systematically carried out in eastern Poland in an effort to drive your people from these areas. I expressed to you then profound sympathy and the assurance that careful consideration would be given by American strategists both at home and abroad to the proposal that bombing operations be undertaken against the Germans in these areas.

In the intervening period the opinions of the Air Force Commanders in the European theater have been sought in this project and compared with those held by the Air Staff in Washington. From a review of their recommendations I find that it is impossible to undertake these operations without serious dislocation of the present efforts of the United Nations in Europe and Africa. Urgent demands for the use of aircraft against other objectives have dictated their deployment in places from which these operations are not feasible. Limitations on bomb carrying capacity at the range required also weigh heavily against the undertaking. Present operations, moreover, dealing the common enemy heaviest blows where he can be damaged most critically, we believe, are the surest means of gaining relief for all the peoples of Europe.

I regret that there cannot be a favorable response to your proposals at this time. The reprehensible conduct of the enemy in Poland, outraging all civilized ideals, has invoked the deepest sympathy of the American people. You may be assured that should the operations you propose become feasible in the future, the matter will again receive most serious consideration.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED

COPY FOR: AAG

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ala/AW LC; Date 9/27/76

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Cablegram from London

GE S:nc

1. AFCAS Dir. of Bombardment 12-21

1. Your attention is invited to the attached cablegram from London.

2. General Arnold desires that this cablegram be quoted to each Air Force Commander that is operating either B-17's or B-24's, for their information.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

1 Att.
Cablegram No. 183 fr
London 12/20/42

Dispatched
[illegible]
AAB

File
Ce

Air AB 385 (83)

DECLASSIFIED
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Air AB 385 (83)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By AG/AW LC Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

Special Project re Types of Bombing.

Director of Bombardment. 1/22/43

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. 1

1. Instructions have been issued to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-3, to assign three B-26's and three P-38's, and to investigate the possibility of assigning three B-17's to General Davidson to get his special project started.

2. Attached hereto for your information are copies of letter to the Commanding General, subject, "Suitability of Various Airplane Types for Commerce Destroying;" and R&R, item #3, "Types of Bombing." Request return of attachments.

Incls: Memo for CG,AAF, dtd 1/22/43 frm Gen.Davidson; subj: "Suitability of Various Airplane Types for Commerce Destroying," Secret. R&R 1-3 subj: "Types of Bombing," Secret. w/3 incls.

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Dispatched
JAN 23 1943
AAG

air ab 385 (12)

File a 1/24/43

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Air AG

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

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2. AFRDB AFDAS 12/21

18:20/cpw 72485

1. With respect to low altitude bombing, all theaters have been cabled, advising of the new series tail fuzes. Selective distribution of the initial production has been made so that at least a small quantity of these fuzes are in the active theaters. Large production is expected soon so that the supply will be ample. Personal letters were sent to Gen. Harmon and General Kenney, giving details of the tactics. Also Training Circular 46, "Minimum Altitude Attack of Naval Objectives" has been distributed widely.

2. Considerable educational work has been done by Eglin in demonstrations for visiting people from the theaters, and for men just about to leave for the combat zones. The lack of the new type fuzes has been probably the main factor deterring the use of these tactics, and as mentioned above, it is believed this situation has been remedied.

3. With regard to torpedo attacks against enemy surface vessels, all of the available data and reports of recent actions, together with the latest version of tactical instructions, based upon the Midway battle, copy of which is attached, have been disseminated to all theaters.

(Incl # 2 to B&R-DMR)

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DECLASSIFIED

Types of Bombing.

18:20/cpw 72485

2. Cont.	AFRDB	AFDAS	1942 12/21	4. General Davidson's views concerning the ineffectiveness of antiaircraft fire against torpedo planes are not substantiated by reports received from torpedo pilots who have participated in attacks against large concentrations of enemy surface vessels. In this connection attention is invited to attached report of Captain James P. Muri, one of the two surviving B-26 pilots of the Midway action, who is at present in charge of torpedo training at Eglin Field.

2 Incls:
as above.

E. L. EUBANK,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

HCD:flg 72435

3.	Gen. Davidson	Gen. Hanley	1943 1-22	1. On January 5th Captain James P. Muri was interrogated as to the hits on his airplane in the battle of Midway and stated as follows:

> "Fighters are the number one opposition with anti-aircraft secondary. Several hundred bullet holes were found in my airplane, all of which were from fighters. Most of them were from the rear quarter. Captain Collins received one burst of anti-aircraft fire in the nose of his airplane."

2. Captain J. R. Smith was also interviewed at the Material Center and stated that in 14 raids he personally made in A-20's at 50-foot altitude or under strafing, Buna, Lae, and Salamaua he received not a single hit on his airplane. In 44 raids his squadron made, only one airplane was hit so badly it crashed on landing, but it came home on one motor and the pilot and crew were saved. Wing men often received hits from shots aimed at the leading airplane, but no appreciable damage was done except in the one case noted.

3. Copy of Captain Muri's statement is inclosed.

H. C. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Incls. n/c
1 Incl. added.
Capt. Muri's statement.

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Arab 385 (82)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Received from * AIR AG, Headquarters Army Air Forces, the following document:

Addressed to: Director of Bombardment

Subject: Types of Bombing

Type of Corres.: R&R

Date: Dec 18, 1942

Basic Dated:

Number of Incls.: none

PLEASE ACCOMPLISH AND
RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO:

Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Office of Air Adjutant General,
Classified Mail Unit,
Washington, D. C.
Room 3E-989

AAF No. 385 (82) 262514

*Insert symbol of office of origin.

DATE RECEIVED 12/21/42

BY H. W. TITTEL
Name

Major, Air Corps,
Rank Branch

OFFICE OF: AFRDB

W-7236, AF. Rev. 7/20/42.

Air AB 385 (82)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date: 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Types of Bombing.

TJH:emc 637;

1. AFDAS AFRDB 1942 12-18

1. What are we doing to make our Bombardment units conscious of the possibility of low altitude bombing, skip bombing and torpedo attacks? Are we sending them the latest developments on this type of bombing and giving them reports of its effectiveness and methods of attack against surface vessels and their own defense against aircraft?

2. General Davison has told General Arnold that the chances of being hit by enemy aircraft are practically nil and that losses of our torpedos and low altitude bombers have been caused by aerial attack and lack of rear gun protection.

3. Early report is desired.

Dispatched
DEC 19 1942
AAG

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

air ag 385 (82)

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Mr Will

air ag 385 (82)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

High Altitude Bombing Attack on Moving Targets

AN/sl - 3281

1. AFAEP AFCAS 1942 ~~12/25~~ DEC 11 1942

1. Attached is draft of proposed message to Gen. Harmon, recommended to be dispatched to him, in further reference to subject matter of Gen. Arnold's message to Gen. Harmon, AAF EC 1122, number 72, Nov. 16, and Gen. Harmon's reply, (unnumbered) Nov. 22, 1942.

O.A. ANDERSON,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

1. Incls
Incl. #1 - Prpsd drft of reply to Gen. Harmon fm Gen. Arnold.

MAL/imm 5265

2 AFCAS AFAEP 12-12

The message prepared by you was dispatched this date after coordination with AFRDB which was directed by General Stratemeyer.

Dispatched
Dec 13 1942
AAG

Incl. w/d/

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

air ad 385 (80)

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air ad 385 (80)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	4543
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Japs' New Method of Air Attack.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS TJH:eva 6371
1.	AFDAS	AFRDB	1942 12/10	1. Your attention is invited to cablegram No. C1184, December 9th, from Brisbane, and particularly the last paragraph thereof relating to one B-17 on reconnaissance which was attacked by eight to ten Zeroes. 2. This cablegram indicates that a new method of attack has been developed by the Japs. General Arnold directs that this information be sent to all theaters at once with such information as we have which may help in protecting against this type of attack. 3. Master Sergeant Fesmire, 19th Bombardment Group, who has been in some 90 engagements, states that there is no blind spot forward of the #2 engine and that the pilot can bring all guns to bear by altering elevation slightly. It may be that there were so many attacks that there were not enough guns to cover all of them. 4. This confirms my telephone conversation with General Eubank this date. T. J. HANLEY, JR., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Air Staff.
				23:ml 6458
2.	AFRDB	AFDAS	12/15	1. Attached hereto are paraphrased copies of cables sent out in compliance with General Arnold's instructions. 2. As indicated in the cable to Brisbane, it was generally believed that there were no completely blind spots on any B-17 airplanes now in service. The particular spot mentioned was thought to be covered by guns installed in the sides of the B-17 nose. However, it is thought to be possible that the unit to which this B-17 belonged may for some reason have failed to utilize the gun installation kits known to have been forwarded, or that the guns may have been removed. E. L. EUBANK, Brig. General, U.S.A. 2 Incls: Incl 1 - Cy of cble to Brisbane. Incl 2 - Cy of cble to all theaters.

DEC 16 '42 PM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

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SECRET

3-1109 AF

DEC 11 12 PM
IN
OUT
OFFICE OF
DIRECTOR OF BOMBARDMENT

[redacted]EADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORC[redacted]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Japs' New Method of Air Attack

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS MAL/imm 5265
3	AFCAS	AFMAG	1942 12-17	1. General Hanley has noted. 2. For files. MAL. M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C. Incls. n.c.

File
ai 8/17/42

air ab 385 (79)

SECRET

PAGE ____

air ab 385 (79)

3-1100 A.F.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ahn/Bz LC: Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

PARAPHRASE COPY

Cable To: Brisbane, Australia 15 December 1942

SECRET ROUTINE

Give any additional data available on apparent new type enemy fighters mentioned in cable No. C-1184. AFRDB. Account of coordinated attack by four Zeros on one B-17 not entirely clear. Statement made that no guns could bear on one particular airplane attacking from front quarter. Request comments and more specific information as to front guns in that particular B-17. AFRDB. Realize earlier Baker Seventeen had no side firing guns in nose, but later airplanes had such guns and kits were sent for making installation in earlier airplanes.

ARNOLD

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

a a b 385 (79)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
By ... NARS Date ...

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

PARAPHRASE COPY

Cable To: Australia, Cairo, Hawaii, Alaska, India, New Caledonia, 8th Air Force, and European Theater of Operation.

SECRET ROUTINE

1. One theater report describes new method of fighters attacking one lone B-17 as follows:

> "Two Zeros attacked from front quarters while two others followed out of turret gun range and outside field of fire of the tail gun. The two Zeros in rear began attack still out of tail gun field when turret turned to the front. One Zero attacked in the blind spot made by No. 2 engine and propeller, pressed the attack to within fifty feet, rolled and raked B-17 along entire length. Eighteen such attacks were made."

2. Suggest this attack be considered in planning defensive tactics.

3. This report further states that no guns could be brought to bear on the Zero which used No. 2 engine blind spot. Comments desired separately:

a. On whether such blind spots exist when a number of B-17's form a mutually supporting field of fire,

b. And on use of front side firing guns stating whether any such guns are now installed in B-17's in your command and whether any have been removed.

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AAF 385 (79)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] LC; Date 4/22/74

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Japs' New Method of Air Attack

MAL/imm 5265

3 AFCAS AFMAG 1942 12-17

1. General Hanley has noted.

2. For files.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incls.
n.c.

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Air A 8 385 (79)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

Japs' New Method of Air Attack.

TJH:eva 6371

1. AFDAS AFRDB 1942 12/10

1. Your attention is invited to cablegram No. C1184, December 9th, from Brisbane, and particularly the last paragraph thereof relating to one B-17 on reconnaissance which was attacked by eight to ten Zeroes.

2. This cablegram indicates that a new method of attack has been developed by the Japs. General Arnold directs that this information be sent to all theaters at once with such information as we have which may help in protecting against this type of attack.

3. Master Sergeant Fesmire, 19th Bombardment Group, who has been in some 90 engagements, states that there is no blind spot forward of the #2 engine and that the pilot can bring all guns to bear by altering elevation slightly. It may be that there were so many attacks that there were not enough guns to cover all of them.

Dispatched
DEC 11 1942
AAG

4. This confirms my telephone conversation with General Eubank this date.

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

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Air AS 385 (A) Mr Will

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Aln/[illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

High Altitude Bombing of Maneuvering Targets.

29/rsm 71578

3. ~~AFRDB~~ AFCAS 12/9

1. Letters to all theaters herewith for your signature.

2. Necessary action to comply with paragraph 2 of comment 1 is being taken. A complete resume of current training in the high altitude bombing of maneuvering targets will be forwarded you in the near future.

8 Incl Added - Identical letters to CGs 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, & 12th Air Forces w/2 Incls.

E. L. [illegible]ANK,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

MAL/imm 5265

4 AFCAS AFRDB 12-12

1. The letters referred to in paragraph 1, preceding item, have been signed and dispatched with the following exception:

a. The letter prepared for the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force was directed to Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining for his information and guidance in operations of the 13th Air Force.

2. In view of the foregoing, it is directed that a more appropriate letter be prepared for the Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force informing him that the information he transmitted in cable AMSME 2769 was disseminated throughout all our Air Forces. The copy of the memorandum of November 27, 1942, from General Arnold to Admiral King should be included. Appropriate recognition of the fine service rendered by General Andrews in making such valuable observations available should also be made in the proposed letter.

Dispatched
DEC 13 1942
AAG

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Incls.
Ltrs w/d and forwarded
Cable AMSME 2769 11-25-42
Memo for Admiral King, 11-27-42
copies of ltr sent with incl

Air AS 385 (68)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Air AS 385 (68)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jany & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/76

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COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters of the Army Air Forces
Washington

DEC 12 1942

SUBJECT: Bombing Accuracy.

TO: Commanding General,
Second Air Force,
Fort George Wright,
Spokane, Washington.

1. The present state of bombing accuracy of all heavy bombardment aviation is not satisfactory. Careful analysis of reports of bombing from combat zones indicates that our units are bombing with a circular error of 1,000 feet from altitudes between 20,000 and 28,000 feet. Such conditions indicates a misuse of our precision bombing equipment and reflects directly on our training methods. A recent report of the Air Forces Board discloses the following facts relating to bombing accuracy for the period January 1 to June 30, 1942:

a. Bombing accuracy of the Air Forces has decreased to levels comparable with those in fiscal year 1936. The over all average of the Air Forces adjusted to 12,000 feet altitude is 391 feet for the period mentioned.

b. Records indicate that a total of only 156 normal individual day releases were made above 20,000 feet with the M-series bombsight.

c. Use of AFCE decreased from 11% of total releases in the first half of fiscal year 1942 to 6% in second half.

d. The rate of faulty releases continues to increase. On the average, one out of every two releases were made with acknowledged faulty technique on the part of the bombardier, pilot, or both.

2. Such conditions can not be accepted. Horizontal precision bombing is the backbone of our offensive Air Force effort. Our methods and equipment have been carefully developed and are undoubtedly sound and efficient. By accepting large circular errors we are committed to operations involving unnecessarily large expenditures of

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CC AFACT

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

personnel and equipment. It is imperative that immediate steps be taken to insure that bombing accuracy of our heavy bombardment units now being prepared for combat is brought up to an acceptable standard.

3. It is believed that one of the principal causes for present inaccurate bombing is the lack of proficiency of pilots in properly handling their airplanes during the bombing approach. Bombardiers arriving for initial assignment in OTU's, accustomed to skillful bomb approach pilots, are quickly discouraged by the inability of their pilots to fly four-engine aircraft properly on bombing approaches. The development of efficient pilot-bombardier teamwork is therefore greatly retarded and in some cases entirely prevented. Bombardiers throughout the Air Forces complain that our pilots are not skilled in this important phase of flying.

4. AFCE has been put to little use in this country and practically no use in combat zones. It is believed that the principal cause of this condition is a general lack of knowledge on the part of pilots in the operation and adjustment of this equipment. As an aid to bombing accuracy, especially from high altitudes, AFCE has proven itself to be of outstanding value. Difficulties involved in indoctrinating pilots and bombardiers in the proper use of this equipment must be overcome. It is believed reasonable to expect that the AFCE can be efficiently employed by the lead ship of a formation on bombing approaches even when evasive action is required, considering the fact that the maneuverability of a formation of heavy bombardment airplanes is limited to a great extent. The type of evasive action now being used by formations in combat zones lends itself to the use of AFCE.

5. It is desired that you initiate in your Air Force an intensive training program to correct present bombing deficiencies. The following action will be taken:

a. Intensify training of pilots on flying bombing approaches by manual control. It is believed necessary that pilots understand the bombing problem and bombsight operation in order that they may become proficient as bomb approach pilots. Each first pilot will be given instruction in the bomb trainer, "dry runs" during flight, and individual bomb releases. Pilots should be carefully instructed in the proper technique employed in following the PDI by competent pilot-bombardier instructors.

b. Thoroughly indoctrinate all pilots and bombardiers in the operation and adjustment of the AFCE.

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Subject: Bombing Accuracy.

c. Establish throughout your Air Force a system of close supervision of bombing practice to insure that proper methods are employed, that mistakes are not repeated, and that efficient pilot-bombardier teamwork is developed. This will require an intensive program to indoctrinate all group and squadron commanders, flight commanders, pilots and bombardiers of model crews comprising static instructor personnel of your OTU's and RTU's in the proper use of bombing equipment and proper method of supervising bombing training.

6. To assist you in initiating the training program as outlined above, it is contemplated sending a group of highly qualified bombardier-pilots and bombardiers accompanied by AFCE technical experts for a period of temporary duty. Personnel have been selected on a basis of their ability and experience in bombing and in supervising bombing training. These officers will visit stations to be designated by your for the purpose of indoctrinating static instructor personnel as outlined above.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of the Air Staff.

For and in the Absence of:

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

File Ci 12/14/42

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Air Ag 385 (28)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/74

SECRET DECLASSIFIED

Bombing Accuracy

MAL/imm 5265

1942
1 AFCAS AFRDB 12-30

1. Note the attached reply of the Commanding General, Second Air Force, to letter of December 12, 1942, same subject as above, which was prepared by you for signature by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

2. Any comment which appears pertinent thereto should be stated hereon with return of these papers to this office.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Dispatched
DEC 30 1942
AAG

2 -Incls.
Ltr to CG AAF fr Gen Olds dated 12/20/42, above subj.
Ltr to CG 2d AF fr Gen. Arnold, dated 12/12/42, above subj.

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AVG 2 385 (78)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: AM/AW LC, Date 9/27/74

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

Comparison of Bombing Results of the ARBASV equipment with the British Oboe Method of Blind Bombing.

MAL/imm 5265

1 AFCAS AFRDB 1942 12-11 General Stratemeyer has noted the attached with great interest, and desires to be kept informed of developments along this line at appropriate intervals.

M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Dispatched
DEC 11 1942
AAG

1 Incl.
Memo to CAS fr RDB dated 12/8/42, above subject.

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all att 385 (76)

CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED

air a 2 385 (76)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD file
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Alnkas LC, Date 4/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

Conference with Dr. Bush re Chemical Device.

TJH:CMC 6371

3. AFDAS AFABI 1942
Colonel 12-4
Sorensen

1. Will you please take note of item #1 in connection with our conversation on diabolical devices and then forward this to A-4 for action. Both you and A-4 should take cognizance of a group of scientists now on duty in the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Management Control's office. One of these individuals might be chosen as the person in charge of all developments such as this and the individual General Arnold can talk to on similar subjects.

2. A-4 can possibly arrange for immediate production, distribution and use of the chemicals mentioned in this R&R. They were discovered by accident by chemists who can be contacted through OSS or maybe through Dr. Bush. The development of a protection against such a chemical should keep pace with the development of the chemical itself because our enemies may us it on us.

Dispatched
DEC 5 1942
AAG

File
Ci

3. I would like to be kept informed of the progress on this matter and the name of the individual desired by General Arnold.

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

air ab 385 (75)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Will

air ab 385 (75)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Aln/RD LC Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

Conference with Dr. Bush re Chemical Device.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: LC Date

1 General Arnold — General Stratemeyer — 1942 12/3

1. In conference this date with Dr. Vannevar Bush, the following developments were discussed:

a. Possibility of using a chemical of some kind which would cloud the windshields of airplanes during flight. This substance purportedly is a chemical compound, fairly cheap, which can be supplied from other airplanes. It might profitably be used in action against airplanes taking off or airplanes parked.

b. Possibility of using ferrous chloride or some other chemical compound mixed with T.N.T. in bombs to produce rust in factories or machine shops.

2. Dr. Bush states that this is entirely practical and that the explosion of T.N.T. will not, in any way, affect the chemical properties of the rust producing substance.

3. In connection with the above, it is believed that these matters should be given considerable thought and study by some of our people with a view of their utilization. This points more than ever before to the necessity of having one man in charge of all of these devices and developments that I can talk to and that I can put in touch with the proper authorities in the other agencies and departments of the Government.

H. H. A.

2. General Stratemeyer — General Hanley — 1942 12-4 — ~~33-73~~ GES/hd

1. Will you please handle this one.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Miss Ingram
Rev A D 385 (75)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Ain/BD LC Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

Conference with Dr. Bush re Chemical Device.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
6 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By ____ LC Date ____

1 General Arnold — General Stratemeyer — 1942 12/3

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H. H. A.

2. General Stratemeyer — General Hanley — 1942 12-4 — 33-73 GES/hd

1. Will you please handle this one.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

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Miss Ingram
Ar A D 385 (75)

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jul. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 4/27/76

December 2, 1942

Major General Carl Spaatz,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
European Theater

Dear Toohey:

You will be interested in the attached paper which is a direct extract from General Arnold's Staff Meeting on December 1st. Note that he states that he doesn't believe in holding two thousand bombers in England. I am sure his meaning there was that he didn't believe in holding two thousand bombers in England when weather did not permit their operating, as I am confident that he would like to have ten thousand bombers in England to work on Germany if it were possible. The point, I am sure, that he was trying to put over to the Staff was that we must have one Air Force Commander for the European Theater and as the time arises when the mass of this striking force should be moved as far East as Egypt, why that was the thing to do, but by having one commander, he could swing it back into England where he knows, and I know, and you know we can reach the critical bombardment targets and destroy them.

There is terrific pressure at this time put on us for transports and bombers from all theaters and our policy is going to be to give everything possible to you and furnish to Kenney only those bombers and transports that he needs to hold the Japs.

It sure was tough in losing Asa Duncan. Of course we are all in hopes that through some miracle or otherwise, he will show up in France.

I still can't understand why Ike Eisenhower hasn't put in a recommendation for your third star. He must have the very best advice on the use of Air Forces. You are that person or he wouldn't have you there. When he can promote Clark to a three-star general for an exploit and has not recommended promotion for you as

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December 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff: Program Planning Unit: Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, Plans: The Air Surgeon: Dir. of Military Personnel: Dir. of Personnel: Dir. of Air Defense: Dir. of Base Services: Dir. of Bombardment: Dir. of Air Support: Dir. of Individual Training: Dir. of War Organization and Movement: Dir. of Technical Services: Dir. of Communications: Director of Weather: Air Service Command: Air Transport Command: Materiel Command: Dir. of Military Requirements.: Advisory Council: Gen. Spaatz.

Subject: General Arnold's opinion on How to Win the War.

SAS 385 (74)

1. During General Arnold's Staff Meeting December 1st, it was requested that he state his views on the subject: "How to Win the War". The statement as made by General Arnold is herewith quoted for your information. I desire to emphasize General Arnold's statement that he does not want his Staff to be "parrots" but to think for themselves and if they have any different ideas from those expressed below, they should be made known.

"I don't want you all to be "parrots" and just go along with what my views are on winning the war. It might be that you have different ideas and I would like to hear different ideas. It may be that I am wrong and that you can show me where I am wrong. I think that it will be done by developments; that is, developments of what we have and what we are doing and what we can do as compared with what the enemy has and what he can do. In my opinion, this war is going to be won by defeating Germany and then the Japs. Not by defeating the Japs first. That is the way I see and I am convinced that the only way you can hit Germany is through Air. You can't do it by land or sea. This movement into North Africa is annoying to Germany, but it will not win the war. It does put us in position to gain air superiority over Germany.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5200.30, June 18, 1979
By [signature] L.C., Date 9/27/76

FILE

Ari AS 385 (74)

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"If Germany is willing to throw in 2,000 planes against us, I think we ought to take a chance. I think we can do it. As things now stand, we are turning out 4,000 planes a month; England is turning out 2,500 a month, or a total of about 7,000 a month. The best information I can get is that Germany's is not more than 1,800 a month. We ought to do it if Germany is willing to go in there. On the other hand, if we are not ready and they raise hell with us, we will have to start all over again.

"There is no doubt in my mind that our sweeps over France have played an important part in the German air deterioration. We are certainly not getting the same resistance that we did when we started. Instead of running into one or two hundred, we get only thirty or forty.

"There are a number of things, in my opinion, that have helped this German drop in air strength. I think one thing is the British bombing. Take us, if your workers in a ball bearing plant go on strike, all production stops. We find one little thing wrong with generators and it slows us up. Suppose in bombing, you just happen to hit a ball bearing plant; an oleo plant, or a tail works. If you just happen to hit any of those, you stop German production immediately. It will take them longer to build up that factory than it does us to get over the strike. That undoubtedly has played its part.

"They have their troubles with raw materials; manpower troubles, and probably transportation. All those things added together probably caused the recent drops in German production. Concentrated bombing on German critical objectives such as industry; transportation; and assembly points will have a very definite effect on their total production of war materials and morale of their people. You can't hit a town like Cologne without its having a definite effect upon the morale of the entire German people.

"One of our jobs is the elimination of the submarine. That is one of our primary problems. I think that in order to lick them we must do four things: First, hit them where the component parts are made; second, hit them where they are assembled; third, hit their operating bases; and fourth, hit them out in the ocean. Those are the four definite places where we must hit them and that is one of our major problems. Spaatz has already started by hitting their operations along the French coast. Britain is hitting their assembly and production.

"Out of that picture, this is what I see. We must assemble in the European Theater all the bombers we can get our hands on - all the bombers we don't need to hold the Japs - and have them under one command so they can be moved around. I can't see this business of holding two thousand bombers in England. I think you must always have a limited

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5200.10, June 18, 1979
By [illegible] N.C., Date: 9/27/76

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"As a matter of fact, I think that if Italy starts to crumble that Germany will put an army of occupation in there just as she did in France.

"In my opinion, after we lick Germany it will not be much of a job to lick Japan. Russia will help by giving us operating bases in Siberia and we will be able to move up through the Islands.

"The Jap air force has dropped from four thousand down to less than two thousand and I don't think that the Japs have facilities to build up again to their four thousand airplanes. The way we are going, four thousand airplanes is comparatively nothing.

"There is not a single theater in which we have not had air superiority.

"That, gentlemen, in general terms is the way I look at it, but I don't want you to take that as a 100% doctrine. You should each do some thinking."

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5200.30, June 18, 1979
By [illegible] (L.C.) Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

a commander, I just can't in my humble way understand it. Anyway, Toohey, you can't tie yourself down to the command of the Eighth Air Force. You must be in command of the Twelfth, as well as the Eighth, and even Louis Brereton's outfit, the Ninth, if that should develop.

I am working awful hard here trying to help "Hap" and I believe that I have taken considerable load off of his shoulders.

Please give my best to Kuter, Eaker, Pop Hansel, Hamp Atkinson, and the rest of the gang. I am, with very bestest to you from Annie and myself,

Yours,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl:
Cy of memo to all members
of the Air Staff from Gen.
Stratemeyer, dtd 12-2-42

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Air Ds 385 (74)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Ltr.
5 Jan & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] 1/O, Date 9/27/74

EXTRACT OF GENERAL ARNOLD'S STAFF MEETING
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1942

"HOW TO WIN THE WAR".

General Stratemeyer. Have you anything, Colonel Smart?

Colonel Smart. I would like very much for General Arnold to give us his views with regard to winning the war. There is a lot of talk on how to win the war. I think if General Arnold would present to the Air Staff his views on the subject, we would all be in position to speak the same views.

General Arnold. (I don't want you all to be "parrots" and just go along with what my views are on winning the war. It might be that you have different ideas and I would like to hear different ideas. It may be that I am wrong and that you can show me where I am wrong. I think that it will be done by developments; that is, developments of what we have and what we are doing and what we can do as compared with what the enemy has and what he can do. In my opinion, this war is going to be won by defeating Germany and then the Japs. Not by defeating the Japs first. That is the way I see and and I am convinced that the only way you can hit Germany is through Air. You can't do it by land or sea. This movement into North Africa is annoying to Germany, but it will not win the war. It does put us in position to gain air superiority over Germany.

If Germany is willing to throw in 2,000 planes against us, I think we ought to take a chance. I think we can do it. As things now stand, we are turning out 4,000 planes a month; England is turning out 2500 a month, or a total of about 7,000 a month. The best information I can get is that Germany's is not more than 1800 a month. We ought to do it if Germany is willing to go in there. On the other hand, if we are not ready and they raise hell with us, we will have to start all over again.

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There is no doubt in my mind that our sweeps over France have played an important part in the German air deterioration. We are certainly not getting the same resistance that we did when we started. Instead of running into one or two hundred, we get only thirty or forty.

There are a number of things, in my opinion, that have helped this German drop in air strength. I think one thing is the British bombing. Take us, if your workers in a ball bearing plant go on strike, all production stops. We find one little thing wrong with generators and it slows us up. Suppose in bombing, you just happen to hit a ball bearing plant; an oleo plant, or a tail works. If you just happen to hit any of those, you stop German production immediately. It will take them longer to build up that factory than it does us to get over the strike. That undoubtedly has played its part.

They have their troubles with raw materials; manpower troubles, and probably transportation. All those things added together probably caused the recent drops in German production. Concentrated bombing on German critical objectives such as industry; transportation; and assembly points will have a very definite affect on their total production of war materials and morale of their people. You can't hit a town like Cologne without its having a definite effect upon the morale of the entire German people.

One of our jobs is the elimination of the submarines. That is one of our primary problems. I think that in order to lick them we must do four things: First, hit them where the component parts are made; second, hit them where they are assembled; third, hit their operating bases; and fourth, hit them out in the ocean. Those are the four definite

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Out of that picture, this is what I see. We must assemble in the European Theater all the bombers we can get our hands on - all the bombers we don't need to hold the Japs - and have them under one command so they can be moved around. I can't see this business of holding two thousand bombers in England. I think you must always have a limited number there to meet emergencies. The rest should go to North Africa, the Middle East and possibly to Turkey if she gets in the war, but all under one command. By doing that, I believe that we can break German Morale. I believe that by breaking German morale, it will make the final show down comparatively simple for the ground troops. I think in order to do that we will have to reduce all German operating bases. I think we will have to move over and operate against critical points in Italy and she will go out of the war. But that will not help much, for I can't see our ground forces moving up through the Alps or the Brenner Pass.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/27/74

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December 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff: Program Planning Unit: Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, Plans: The Air Surgeon: Dir. of Military Personnel: Dir. of Personnel: Dir. of Air Defense: Dir. of Base Services: Dir. of Bombardment: Dir. of Air Support: Dir. of Individual Training: Dir. of War Organization and Movement: Dir. of Technical Services: Dir. of Communications: Director of Weather: Air Service Command: Air Transport Command: Materiel Command: Dir. of Military Requirements: Advisory Council: General Spaatz/

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Air AG 385 (74)

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COPY FOR MR. GRAY

- air AG 385 (74)

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"There is no doubt in my mind that our sweeps over France have played an important part in the German air deterioration. We are certainly not getting the same resistance that we did when we started. Instead of running into one or two hundred, we get only thirty or forty.

"There are a number of things, in my opinion, that have helped this German drop in air strength. I think one thing is the British bombing. Take us, if your workers in a ball bearing plant go on strike, all production stops. We find one little thing wrong with generators and it slows us up. Suppose in bombing, you just happen to hit a ball bearing plant; an oleo plant, or a tail works. If you just happen to hit any of those, you stop German production immediately. It will take them longer to build up that factory than it does us to get over the strike. That undoubtedly has played its part.

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GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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a 12/4/42

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air ag 385 (78)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Received from * AIR AG, Headquarters Army Air Forces, the following document:

Addressed to: Director of Individual Training

Subject: General Arnold's opinion on How to Win the War

Type of Corres.: cc Memo

Date: Dec 2, 1942

Basic Dated:

Number of Incls.: none

Col Saunders
Col Subase } 20 rep + return to AC.

Rpd 12/6

Rpd
Jgs
RNR

air ag 385 (74) N

PLEASE ACCOMPLISH AND
RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO:

Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Office of Air Adjutant General,
Classified Mail Unit,
Washington, D. C.
Room 3E-989

AAF No. 385 (74) N

*Insert symbol of office of origin.

Returned to A.G.

DATE RECEIVED Dec 8

BY [signature]
Name

Lt Col AC
Rank Branch

OFFICE OF: AFRIT

File (Recvd back from AFRIT 12/11)

HDG 12/12/42

W-7236, AF. Rev. 7/20/42.

air A. G. 385 (74) N

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December 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of the Air Staff: Program Planning Unit: Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, Plans: The Air Surgeon: Dir. of Military Personnel: Dir. of Personnel: Dir. of Air Defense: Dir. of Base Services: Dir. of Bombardment: Dir. of Air Support: Dir. of Individual Training: Dir. of War Organization and Movement: Dir. of Technical Services: Dir. of Communications: Director of Weather: Air Service Command: Air Transport Command: Material Command: Dir. of Military Requirements.

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GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Nrs.
9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date: 9/22/74

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2. AFRES AFMAG 1942
13 12/7

RBS-13
TAD/crd 72552

1. Reference is made to item 1 above. The attached cable covering protective measures has been approved by General Hanley and coordinated with OPD (Colonel Tansey). Request that it be transmitted to all Theaters.

1 Incl.
Draft of Cable

L. P. WHITTEN,
Colonel, Air Corps.

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3 AFMAG AFMCM 1942
12/10

HHH/bhm 5791

For necessary action.

H. H. HEWITT
Lt. Colonel, A.G.D.
Assistant Air Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Draft of Cable.

DECLASSIFIED

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Air A.D. 385 (73)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs
3 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

SECRET

Protection Against Enemy Gas. DECLASSIFIED

TJH:cmc 6371

1. AFDAS AFRBS 1942 11-30

1. Cable No. 51 from Stockholm, dated November 28th, indicates that the enemy may be preparing to use gas. Please prepare a cable, outlining simple protective measures which can be taken by our Air Forces and instructions for the application of these measures. Also, collect and start moving decontamination material to our theaters, if such is not available therein.

2. When cable is prepared, submit to this Headquarters to be cleared by General Arnold.

Dispatched
NOV 30 1942
AAG

File
Ci

T. J. HANLEY, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

air ag 385 (73)

DECLASSIFIED

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Mr Will

air ag 385 (73)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/76

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DECLASSIFIED

Summary of Army Air Forces Bombardment Data.

GES:me 3373

1. AFCAS Dir. of Bombardment (Atten: Colonel Anderson) 11-29

1. To confirm instructions given you this morning in my office, it is desired that you have prepared in your Directorate, a summary of Army Air Forces bombardment activities, by theaters throughout the world, and kept up-to-date in the Bombardment Directorate. Periodically this summary should be sent to me for presentation to General Arnold. If there is any other subject matter of extreme interest reference bombardment training or activities, as for example the Colonel Garland mission to the Eighth Air Force including his preparatory studies and work, such interesting items should be included.

2. It is believed that this summary should be setup in such a manner that it can be presented to General Arnold, through me, about every two weeks. You will continue to obtain from Colonel Hunter (A-2) his tables and reports on sinkings of Naval vessels and other bombardment data. This can be incorporated in your summary.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U. S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

Dispatched
NOV 29
AAG

Copy to:
Colonel Hunter (A-2)
Advisory Council
Dir. of Military Requirements.

Air Ad 385 (21)

DECLASSIFIED Mr. Gray

~~SECRET~~

Air as 385 (21)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] NC, Date 4/29/74

DECLASSIFIED

Cablegram #A-1193 from General Kenney

1	General Arnold	Director of Bombardment	1942 11/28	Note the attached copy of cablegram #A-1193 from Kenney relative methods employed in bombing surface vessels. This looks to me to be a very sensible point of view.

Incl: Cpy of above cablegram. H. H. A.

23:ml 6486

2	Director of Bombardment	General Arnold thru AFDMR and AFCAS	12/4	1. Improvised employments described in General Kenney's message are essentially the same as those found necessary for similar reasons in other theaters. 2. However, those methods of employment are not new, or different from established doctrines, except in that, though it is not so stated, most of the remarks probably apply to the uses of heavy bombers. Exigencies in various theaters appear to have forced the use of heavy bombers against targets more suitable for medium and light bombers, thereby necessitating adoption of the tactics and techniques of the lighter airplanes. Also, it appears that this and other extraneous employment of heavy bombers has precluded theater training and practice in their proper role as well as prevented there being sufficient heavy bombers available at any one time for mutual and legitimate missions. 3. In some theaters, it seems to be a policy to use heavy bombers for almost front line support rather than for delivering heavy blows at a considerable distance in the enemies rear against targets which are not so vulnerable to other weapons; but in the case of Australia, because of the rearward location of the bomber bases, it cannot be said that the above statement is entirely true. However, the condition is so general that there is a growing misapprehension of the relative value of heavy bombers as a striking force, and it is believed that unless forceful action is taken to insure actual demonstration of proper and full capabilities against surface vessels of the larger types, there is some danger of a disasterous reversal of certain policies.

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air ag 385 (20)

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Cablegram #A-1193 from General Kenney.

23:ml 6458

2 (cont'd) Dir. of Bombardment.	Gen. Arnold thru AFDMR and AFCAS	12/4	4. It is believed that the special analysis unit now being set up will do much toward giving the true picture, but the picture itself must be modified before completely adequate results can be attained.

1 Incl:
m/c

E. L. EUBANK
Brig. General, U.S.A.

3 AFCAS AFMAG 12/11

File
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air d 385 (70)

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Hrs.
9 Jan. to 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

C
O
P
Y

Message Rec'd. TIME REC'D.
FROM

Brisbane 0909Z
No Sig 11/28/42
11937

No. A-1193, November 27, 1942.

This is in reply to basic (book) message No. 3705 of November 16th which requested that Hq. AAF be notified whether missions have ever employed nine airplanes or larger formations against fast moving targets.

General Kenney replies by stating that conclusions in this theater are that fast moving and maneuvering targets such as destroyers or light cruisers are exceedingly difficult to hit from any altitude in daylight regardless of the method employed. Best results have been at night with flares using both level and skip bombing. The weather has limited bombing of moving vessels, both day and night, to working under a cloud base of 1200 to 2000 feet or bombing through holes in clouds. Seldom are nine bombers in commission at one time in any squadron and never have weather conditions allowed the use of nine plane pattern against moving targets. With freedom from A/A interference and decided lessening of interference from hostile fighters high level bombing against fixed or stationary targets has definitely proven itself. Daylight air attacks from any height and by any method are unprofitable against the maneuvering naval vessel if hostile fighters are permitted to interfere with bombing and at altitudes under 15,000 feet we must expect losses from A/A fire. Effective are dive bombing, torpedoing and skip bombing of destroyers and cruisers but A/A fire causes high percentage of losses and damage. It has been necessary to improvise and adapt our procedure to meet existing conditions in this theater such as distances involved, weather, lack of suitable airdromes, and shortage of sufficient heavy bomber strength for the job and inadequacy of replacement schedule. Not all of these conditions were visualized when our standard procedure was evolved. We are anxious to use the standard method of attack on fast moving targets if the opportunity presents itself and means are made available at the proper time and place. Up to now available means and opportunity have not been coincident.

For Arnold signed Kenney.

ACTION COPY TO:

Dir. Bombardment
Info. copies to:
A-3
Plans
Dir. Mil. Require.

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Air A S 385 (70)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC. Date 9/27/76

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Preparation of letter to General Spaatz 3373 GES:nl

Director of Bombardment 1-4-43

General George E. Stratemeyer 1

1. Your attention is invited to a letter from General Spaatz to me under date of December 25, 1942.

2. This is in reply to a letter prepared in your Directorate for my signature reference General Eaker's staff.

3. It is desired that reply to the attached letter be prepared for my signature making an apology to General Spaatz if I have attempted to assume some of his perogatives. Make it clear to him that we were only trying to help and were not attempting to do his job, or tell him who he should have on his staff or on Eaker's Staff.

Dispatched
JAN 4 1943
AAG

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Attachment:
Ltr to Gen Stratemeyer
from Gen Spaatz, 12-25-42

Air Ab 385 (69)

File
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

Miss Ingram
Air Ab 385 (69)

November 26, 1942

Major General Carl Spaatz,
Commanding General, 8th Air Force,
ETOUSA.

Dear Toohey:

I have been thinking about a question for some time with reference to Baker's staff. He needs a good strong bombardment man either as Chief of Staff or as his A-3. As I understand it, he has an ex-pursuiter as his A-3 and Bubb as his Chief of Staff. Please understand me. I do not mean to criticise Baker or even to state that the officers that he has selected are not good and doing efficient jobs. I do feel though that the Bomber Command of the Eighth Air Force is about the most important bomber command in our entire Air Forces and therefore feel that Baker should have on his staff a strong and thinking bombardment man. If he would consider replacing his Chief of Staff, we could make available Truman H. (Ted) Landon or Don Lyon, both of whom are outstanding bombardment people and if they make good they could get their promotion as Baker's Chief of Staff.

If he does not desire to change his Chief of Staff, then he might put in a good bombardment man as A-3. If our man Garland who is coming over to see you is satisfactory to Baker, then we would release him for the A-3 assignment. He is not sufficiently high ranking to be considered as the Chief of Staff.

This is just a thought, Toohey, and I pass it on to you for your consideration and that of Baker. This whole effort of ours is so wrapped up with the heavy bomber and what we all feel we can do with it that Baker should have available to him some of the very best bombardment brains that we can make available.

Best regards,

Yours,

P.S: I can also make available Hegenberger or Robert F. Travis, both of whom are Wing Commanders under Bob Olds in his Bomber OTU's. All four of these men are "tops". GES

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Air Ag 385 (69)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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DECLASSIFIED

November 26, 1942

Major General Carl Spaatz,
Commanding General, 8th Air Force,
ETOUSA.

Dear Tooney:

We all back here are tremendously pleased in the success that you have had with your Air Forces in the African operations. Having gotten Africa in our hands instead of that of the enemy will give us many advantages. We realize that the opening of this theater naturally increases the demands upon us for equipment, personnel, and supplies of all kinds. It must be realized that all of these things, with the exception of large airplanes, must be sent by boat. The Army Air Forces now have six active combat theaters all of which must be supplied from the United States largely by boat. Long before we eliminate the Japs we must retake Burma and open up the Burma Road and this along will require much more shipping. As I see this picture, it is necessary that we do something drastic about the German submarine situation, in order that we may more effectively supply the United Kingdom, The Middle East and North Africa. We cannot hope to establish and maintain another active theater, with its shipping difficulties, until we can make sure that the stuff we send is not going to be lost at sea. I notice from our cables that you are doing something about this in your attacks on Lorient, St. Nazaire and Brest. Something more drastic even than what you are doing must be done.

The Staff here want to help and have proposed special training for certain units to prepare a well coordinated attack to destroy the submarine bases and assembly plants. Their plan is: hit a base with a force of about two groups of heavy at high altitude, scattering fragmentary bombs over the local defenses to create as much damage, confusion and cover taking to the local defenders, as possible. Immediately follow the high altitude attack with a low altitude attack, with each aircraft assigned a single gun defense

Cy sent to Bombardment
atten: Colonel Anderson

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Mr Gray

to knock it out. This last attack to be followed immediately by medium bombers at zero altitude laying 2000 pound bombs loaded with an RDX mixture in the slipways and shops as the coup de grace.

This type of attack, particularly for the low altitude units, would require special training to work out the precision and timing necessary. Our Bombardment people propose selecting units here for this job and constructing model shipyards and defenses to scale to make the training realistic; and then simulate in every way possible the conditions they will find over there. The chances are that this type of attack will suffer a relatively high percentage of losses but it is believed that the results to be gained will more than warrant the losses and they won't have to repeat.

If you think this scheme worthwhile, we will go to it. It will be necessary for you to furnish us with complete and detailed information on the various bases, their defenses, balloon barrages, construction, landmarks, photographs, etc. We will then select the very best available personnel for key positions in the selected units, especially training all personnel and do everything that we can to give you units who will do a thorough job. It is estimated that the special training for the low altitude units will delay their arrival in England by approximately one month.

Colonel Garland, who is being sent to England to assist you in connection with precision bombing, knows of this plan and can serve as liaison officer on the project if you approve it. Since a project of this kind will require a great deal of planning and preparation over a long period of time we want to get to work at once. We will do this as soon as you indicate your approval and give us your ideas as to how best to proceed.

Was out to Ruth's last Sunday afternoon to a cocktail party that she had for Slessor and met a lot of your friends, all of whom are very proud of you and what your Air Forces are doing. Both the girls were there and they both look fine, although Becky is sure in love with that cadet of hers. Ruth is all right too, so don't worry about her "busted" leg.

With very bestest from Annalee and myself, I am

Sincerely,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

(n-0 2 385 (69)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date: 9/27/74

Commanding General,
8th Air Force,

Dear Tooey:

Needless to say I am highly pleased at the success that we have had in our African operations. Having North Africa in our hands instead of the enemies' gives us many advantages. The opening of this new theater naturally increases the demands upon us for equipment, personnel and supplies of all kinds, and all of these things, with the exception of large airplanes, must be sent by boat. We now have our Air Forces in active combat in six theaters, all of which must be supplied from the United States largely by boat. Long before we can eliminate the Japs we must retake Burma and open the Burma Road and this will require much more shipping. As I see this picture, it is necessary that we do something drastic about the German submarine situation, in order effectively to supply the United Kingdom, Middle East and North Africa. We cannot hope to establish and maintain another active theater, with its shipping difficulties, until we can make sure that the stuff we send is not going to be lost at sea. You are doing something about this in your attacks on Lorient, St. Nazaire and Brest, but I believe more drastic action is necessary.

My people here want to help and have proposed special training for certain units to prepare a well coordinated attack to destroy the submarine bases and assembly plants. Their plan is hit a base with a force of about two groups of heavy at high altitude scattering fragmentary bombs over the local defenses to create as much damage, confusion and cover taking to the local defenders as possible. Then immediately follow the high altitude attack with a low altitude attack, with each aircraft assigned a single gun defense to knock out. This attack to be followed immediately by medium bombers at zero altitude laying 2000 lb. bombs loaded with an RDX mixture in the slipways and shops as the coup de grace.

This type of attack particularly for the low altitude units would require special training to work out the precision and timing necessary. My people propose selecting units here for this job and

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

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constructing model shipyards and defenses to scale to make the training realistic; and simulate in every way possible the conditions they will find over there.

This type of attack will no doubt suffer a relatively high percentage of losses but it is believed that the results to be gained will more than warrant the losses and they won't have to repeat.

If you think this scheme worthwhile, we will go to it. It will be necessary for you to furnish us with complete and detailed information on the various bases, their defenses, ballon barrages, construction, landmarks, photographs, etc. I will select the best available personnel to key positions in selected units, especially train all personnel and do everything I can to give you units who will do a thorough job. It is estimated that the special training for the low altitude units will delay their arrival in England by approximately one month.

Colonel Garland, who has been sent to England to be of what help he can in connection with precision bombing, knows of this plan and can serve as liaison officer on the project if you approve it. Since a project of this kind will require a lot of planning and preparation must necessarily be made over a long period of time, we want to get to work at once. We will do this as soon as you indicate your approval and give us your ideas as to how best to proceed.

Kindest regards as always -

Yours sincerely,

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 30 June 1976
By: [illegible] LC; Date: [illegible]

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FO[redacted]
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

~~SECRET~~
By Authority of
The Commanding General
File No. ~~Army Air Forces~~
[illegible] DATE [illegible] INITIALS

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

SUBJECT: Letter for Signature.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS DRL:cb 72936
1	AFRDB	AFDMR Attn:Gen. Fairchild	1942 11/24	In accordance with verbal instructions, attached letter is forwarded for your signature. E. L. EUBANK, Brig. Gen., U. S. A. 1 Incl: Ltr to CG, 8th AF.

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(Do not use reverse side) F-4091, AF. Rev. 8/16/41

Page No. [redacted]

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Air ad 385 (69)

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS A.A.F.

1942 NOV 25 PM 3 57 1942 NOV 25 AM 9 03 1942 NOV 25 AM 10 13

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 9/27/74

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AFRDB 25:vej
Rm. 4D137 - 6458
wrtn. 12/28/42

DEC 30 1942

SUBJECT: High and Medium Altitude Bombing of Maneuvering Vessels.

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force

1. Information transmitted to this headquarters in Cable AMSME 2769 has been disseminated to all Air Forces. In addition to that valuable information, a copy of a memorandum of November 27, 1942, from General Arnold to Admiral King was attached. A copy of that memorandum is inclosed for your information.

2. It is realized that not all points mentioned in your cable can apply to each theater. However, the basic ideas of employment laid down must be considered to produce more satisfactory results. Proper modification of training policies are now being made so that personnel and units will arrive in theaters with a better understanding of this function. It is essential, however, that Air Force commanders exercise the same ingenuity in finding expedients to produce results comparable to those attained in your command.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

Dispatched
DEC 30 1942
AAG

George C. Kenney,
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief of the Air Staff.

1 Incl:
Cy of memo frm Gen. Arnold to
Admiral King, dated 11/27/42.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
3 Jan. & 29 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/74

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: High and Medium Altitude Bombing of Maneuvering Vessels.

TO:

1. There is attached hereto for careful consideration a copy of a message recently received from the Commanding General, USAFME, stating facts and conditions pertaining to the bombing of maneuvering surface vessels in that theater. That message further describes a reasonable solution and depicts the preliminary improvement noted even before the plan could be fully utilized. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum of November 27, 1942, from General Arnold to Admiral King, quoting that message in part and indicating the importance of the ideas expressed.

2. It is realized that not all of the points mentioned can apply to each theater. However, the basic ideas of employment illustrated in that message are such that the lessons learned must be considered in every theater, and no effort may be spared toward attainment of more satisfactory results in this type of bombing. Proper modifications of training policies are now being made so that personnel and units will arrive in theatres with a better understanding of this function; but it is essential that Air Force commanders exercise ingenuity similar to that described in finding expedients which will produce results with what forces they have even now.

3. A few points which possibly might be of assistance are as follows:

a. Every effort should be made to maintain a sufficient number of airplanes for striking to insure a reasonable expectancy of success when maneuvering surface vessels are to be attacked:

b. Do everything possible toward building up and maintaining proficiency of personnel and units in the tactics and technique essential to this type of bombing;

c. Whenever possible, avoid splitting the already limited number of airplanes between many objectives when concentrating all or most of them on one at a time would certainly give greater assurance of success against all objectives;

d. When a number of enemy surface vessels relatively close to each other are attacked at one time, it has been demonstrated that the most thorough target selection procedure is essential to insure proper concentration upon the correct vessels, one after another.

4. Difficulties which may be encountered in complying with these suggestions are fully understood, but it is thought that these principles must be in mind at all times. Whereas the necessity for attacking vessels after they have reached harbor may continue to occur, the generally decreased danger of attacking them in the open sea certainly is to be preferred if results can be improved. Therefore, all energies must be applied toward this goal.

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/s/ Gen. Stratemeyer

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir.
5 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/74

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High Altitude Bombing of Maneuvering Targets.

1	General Arnold	General Strate-meyer	1942 11/27

INCLS:
Cable AMSME 2769, 11-25-42 frm General Andrews.
Cy memo to Adm. King, 11-27, frm Gen. Arnold.

1. Note copy of attached cablegram from General Andrews and copy of my memorandum to Admiral King. See that a copy of this goes to all theaters along with the memorandum, emphasizing the necessity for taking advantage of this knowledge in attacking ships in the open sea.

2. Also see that a copy is sent to the Director of Bombardment, and that he starts such training as is possible in his O.T.U.

H.H.A.

2	AFCAS	Director of Bombardment	1942 11-27

3373
GES/hd

1. Read carefully General Arnold's comment #1. Prepare letters for my signature to the Commanding Generals of the following Air Forces: Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth, including as attachments to each letter, a copy of General Arnold's memorandum to Admiral King and a copy of the attached cablegram from General Andrews. Emphasize in each letter, the necessity for taking advantage of what General Andrews has stated in attacking ships in the open sea.

2. With reference to paragraph 2 of General Arnold's comment, take the necessary action in your directorate.

3. The enclosed papers will be returned to me by comment hereon, attaching the letters for my signature and stating that you have taken the necessary action to comply with paragraph 2 of comment #1.

Dispatched
NOV 23 1942
AAG

Incl: n/c

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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Miss Ingram

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ab/Ae/ic Date: 9/27/74

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Presentation of Data on AAF Bombing

JES/bj 72721

1 AFCAS AFRDB 1942
11-25

1. You will set up within your directorate, an agency whose object will be the compilation of data with respect to AAF bombing and offensive capabilities and to devise ways and means of presenting this information in the simplest form, and in the most understandable and interesting manner.

2. The manner of presentation must be that which will be best understood by and most convincing to the person or persons to whom the particular presentation is made. Data presented must be factual. Any resemblance to propaganda will defeat our purpose. The presentation must be such as will stir the imagination of the listener. It is necessary, therefore, that the data be prepared by persons with imagination, who have been trained in selling new ideas. The person charged with preparation of data must know and believe his subject. His daily work should be in connection with bombing activities. The logical assignment for persons doing this work is therefore with the Directorate of Bombardment.

3. Data should be prepared for the following specific purposes.

a. For presentation to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Chief of Air Staff and other members of the Air Staff, in order that these individuals may in their incidental contacts with interested persons or appropriate agencies be prepared to intelligently and interestingly acquaint them with current activities of our bombing forces, to include the targets bombed and the direct and indirect effects of such bombing. Data for this purpose should be revised daily and presented at frequent intervals or on call, in order that Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and others might be briefed for discussion of current activities as they appear in newspapers, or are otherwise made known to certain persons or groups. The Air Room presentation may be utilized as an occasion for this purpose.

b. For presentation to the press at regular or special press conferences. These releases may take the form of analyses by Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Director of Bombardment, or some other member of the Air Staff, or they may be in the form of an announcement of news value, or a human interest story.

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air ab 385 Mrs. Ingram (67)

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c. For presentation by any officer designated to address special individuals or groups as set forth in detail in paragraph 4 below. These presentations should be carefully prepared, using when practicable, photographs, sketches and illustrations. These presentations must be kept current. Illustrations, charts, etc. used in the presentation must be of such size as to permit their being easily carried in a brief case.

d. For release within the Army Air Forces and to civilian agencies having connection with the Army Air Forces. These releases will be designed to appeal to students at Flying Schools, Technical Schools, Replacement Centers, etc. and should be made suitable for publication in school or local newspapers.

4. Data must be especially prepared for presentation to individuals or special groups by designated officers. These presentations will be made as the opportunity presents itself or is created. Data for these purposes must be especially designed to interest and appeal to the persons or groups to whom the presentation is made. Special presentations should be prepared regularly and kept current for the following persons or groups: (The remarks following each person or group are offered with the view of stimulating thought. They are not to be construed as a directive).

a. The President of the United States

(1) Stress the fact that the heavy bomber is a powerful weapon capable of directing great force against the head and the heart of the enemy. All other weapons attack the fringes.

(2) The heavy bomber is the only weapon that can destroy at its source the enemy's war making capacity.

(3) Point out that the effects of bombing productive facilities have far reaching effect in that it destroys the enemy's capacity for waging war in the weeks and months to come.

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(4) Stress the little cost of such operations in man and materiel. One thousand bombers and a few thousand men can in a single mission destroy an enemy aircraft factory costing the enemy millions of man hours work and thousands of tons of vital strategic materiel.

b. The Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(1) Stress that the bomber is an independent striking weapon. It does not replace nor deny the need for ground forces or naval forces.

(2) That its most effective use is against enemy productive installations, the destruction of which has far reaching, rather than immediate spectacular effects. Point out that frequently the extent of damage may not immediately be known. That damage is cumulative.

(3) Stress the need for employment in mass, pointing out that effectiveness increases materially with numbers - twice the number of bombers having much more than twice the effect.

(4) Stress the fact that bombers carry the war to the enemy, whereas other arms fight against the fringes, the armed forces.

(5) Point out that Bombardment Aviation is a fine example of utilizing the machine rather than great manpower to carry the war to the enemy.

(6) Point out the comparatively small losses in men and materiel.

c. The Chief of Naval Operations, or others who are largely concerned with the Navy.

(1) The heavy bomber is of the greatest value to the fleet in that it performs missions the fleet is incapable of performing, namely:

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(a) It destroys factories directly and indirectly supporting the enemy fleet.

(b) It destroys docks and facilities for building and repairing and maintaining enemy war vessels.

(c) It destroys airplane factories producing airplanes for enemy carriers and shore installations.

(d) It destroys the submarine menace at its source.

(e) Avoid any comparison between the Bomber and the battleship, or any remark that high level bombing against enemy Naval forces reduces the need for our Naval surface forces.

(f) Stress that the primary role of our bombers is the destruction of enemy war making facilities.

(g) Point out that the Air Forces are not competing with the Navy, or denying their need or effectiveness.

d. Members of Congress.

(1) Point out that their foresight in appropriating money for the development of the heavy bomber in time of peace is now paying dividends.

(2) Stress the damage done to the enemy at so little cost in money and American lives. Compare the cost of 1,000 heavy bombers with a battleship or a division of ground troops and compare results obtained.

(3) Stress our losses in combat compared with enemy losses.

5. The agency will consist of 2 or more individuals as approved by Director of Management Control. These men should be obtained from whatever source is available. Since the success of this plan depends almost entirely upon the individual ability of the persons performing this duty.

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great care must be exercised in their selection. Final approval of the persons selected by the Director of Bombardment will be obtained from Chief of the Air Staff. While these men are assigned to Director of Bombardment they must work closely with A-2 and Public Relations.

6. Consider the manner of presentation by the Director of Flying Safety of his Integrated Flight Control Program.

7. A progress report on this directive is desired by December 15, 1942.

Dispatched
NOV 23 1942
AAG

File

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Copy to: A-2
Director of Management Control

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Air As 385 (67)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 4/27/76

[redacted] HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORC[redacted]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Bombing Presentation Data.

3373
GES/hd

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFCAS	Colonel Cabell (Advisory Council)	1942 11-19	1. This is to confirm instructions issued this morning in General Arnold's office reference the preparation of precision bombing data. 2. It is desired that you expedite the preparation of a paper for my approval as to how best we can have prepared data to present our precision bombing accuracy, type of targets that can be destroyed, altitudes from which bombing should be made, etc. This data should be prepared in such a manner that it can be utilized by General Arnold in order to discuss the subject with Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, The President, The Speaker of the House, or other data that could be taken by the Director of Bombardment, myself, or a member of the Air Staff to discuss with other Army officers or Navy officers or members of other Departmental Agencies and then other data that could be utilized to discuss this subject with experts. 3. With reference to this subject it is desired that consideration be given to the manner of presentation of Integrated Flight Control as prepared by the Director of Flying Safety. This is a method that presents the subject graphically and very thoroughly. 4. This must be given immediate attention as the only reason for all of our entire Air Force setup is to drop bombs on the target and we have not sufficient data in proper form to accomplish what General Arnold desires. If necessary, we must borrow or get into the Service without delay, personnel with imagination that can get the subject matter in the proper form for use by all members of the Air Staff, as well as General Arnold, to educate people into the capabilities of bombardment aviation.

Cy to:
Director of Bombardment
Director of Management Control
Director of Flying Safety (Col.Harris)
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2
General Hanley

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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3-1109 A.F.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Bombing Presentation Data

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS JES/bj 72721
2	Advisory Council	AFCAS	1942 11-25	1. Attached is recommended directive to Director of Bombardment which is designed to carry out instructions contained in Item #1 above. 2. Extra copies have been prepared for distribution to Director of Management Control and A-2. C. P. CABELL Colonel, Air Corps.

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3-1109 A.F.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD ltrs.
8 Jan & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/76

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

I. OBJECTIVE

To determine ways and means of compiling and presenting in the simplest, most interesting and understandable form data with respect to precision bombing.

II. DISCUSSION

1. The manner of presentation must be that which will be best understood by and most convincing to the person or persons to whom the presentation is made.

2. Data presented must be factual. Any resemblance to propaganda will defeat our purpose.

3. The presentation must be such as will stir the imagination of the listner. It is necessary, therefore, that the data be prepared by persons with imagination, who have been trained in selling new ideas.

4. The person charged with preparation of data must know and believe his subject. His daily work should be in connection with bombing activities. The logical assignment for persons doing this work would therefore be to the Directorate of Bombardment.

5. In all presentation, it must be stressed that the bombardment airplane is a new weapon whose principal use is for the destruction of enemy productive capacity. That in playing its leading role it is to a great extent independent of Army Ground Forces or Naval forces. It is not in competition with these forces.

Its secondary role is the support of Ground forces and Naval forces.

~~III.~~

6. It is believed that data should be prepared for presentation

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to the following individuals or groups. (The remarks following each person or group listed are those of the Advisory Council. They are not to be construed as a recommended directive, but rather the expression of opinions which are offered with a view of stimulating thought.)

a. The President of the United States.

(1) The force that can be delivered against the enemy at great distances from our bases, force being directed against the enemy's productive capacity, destroying his ability to wage war in the weeks and months to come. Stress that bombardment attacks the head and heart of the enemy. All other weapons attack the fringes.

(2) Stress the little cost of such operations in men and material. One thousand bombers and a few thousand men can in a single mission destroy an enemy aircraft factory costing the enemy millions of man hours work and thousands of tons of vital strategic material.

b. The American public.

(1) The effectiveness against the enemys war making capacity. The destruction of the sources of airplanes, bombs, guns, submarines and naval vessels that would otherwise be used against American boys.

(2) Stress the fact that crews live in comparative safety long distances from the enemy, that when they expose themselves for short periods, the odds are on our side since bombers destroy more German planes than we lose.

c. The Chief of Naval Operations or others who are pro-Navy.

(1) The heavy bomber is of the greatest value to the fleet in that it performs missions the fleet is incapable of performing, namely,

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a. It destroys factories directly and indirectly supporting the enemy fleet.

b. It destroys docks and facilities for building and repairing and maintaining enemy war vessels.

c. It destroys airplane factories producing airplanes for enemy carriers and shore installations.

d. It destroys the submarine menace at its source.

e. Avoid any remarks which indicate that the Bomber is effective against battleships, or that high level bombing against enemy Naval forces reduce the need for our Naval surface forces.

f. Stress that the primary role of our bombers is the destruction of enemy War making facilities.

g. Point out that the Air Forces are not competing with the Navy, or denying their need or effectiveness.

d. Members of Congress.

1. Point out that their foresight in appropriating money for the development of the heavy Bomber in time of peace is now paying dividends.

2. Stress the damage done to the enemy at so little cost in money and American lives. Compare the cost of 1000 heavy bombers with a battleship or a division of ground troops and compare results obtained.

3. Stress our losses in combat compared with enemy losses.

7. It is believed that two or more persons should be charged with compiling data needed to comply with General Arnold's directive.

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These men should be obtained from wherever they can be found. Possible sources are Army Air Force Public Relations, A-2 current intelligence section, or O.S.S. The persons selected should be furnished new information of our activities as soon as received. They should immediately obtain from it facts which can be given to General Arnold in such a manner that he can intelligently and convincingly convey to whomever it may have occasion to talk the effectiveness and importance of the mission or missions about which the information pertained. They should next prepare press releases for General Arnold. Thirdly, they should fit this new information into the pattern of presentations designed for special persons or groups.

7. It might be appropriate for General Arnold to give the press informally from time to time, reports upon our bombing activities. He might likewise give to members of Congress, in the form of personal letters, information which will further our cause.

8. The Army Air Forces should use its many contacts with civic activities to convey to the general public the Air Forces aims and its accomplishments. The civilian flying schools is an excellent medium.

III. Recommendations

1. That our proposed action be kept confidential and disclosed to as few people as possible.

2. That the Chief of Air Staff personally select two or more officers or civilians who can be made available for accomplishing this objective.

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3. That Chief of Air Staff charge public relations office, A.A.F., A-2, the Advisory Council and any other appropriate agency with recommending persons for this duty.

4. That the Chief of Staff or someone delegated by him call on Colonel Donovan of the O.S.S. in an effort to obtain from him a man qualified for this purpose. (Col. Donovan must be approached carefully, preferably by one who knows him and may therefore know what and how much to say to him about our proposed activities. Such a person might well recommend against this action.)

5. That persons selected be assigned to Director of Bombardment, but be permitted to work directly with the Air Staff.

6. That the persons selected be directed to function in the manner outlined in preceding discussion and in such other ways as they may be directed, or as in their own judgment is necessary to best accomplish their objective.

7. That the Army Air Force use its many contacts with civilian institutions, particularly the civilian flying schools to disseminate information as to our aims and our accomplishments.

8. That certain persons on duty with the Air Staff be charged with keeping abreast of current developments, particularly the especially prepared presentations, in order that they may be delegated to appear before any person or group to explain in detail reports of our activities that may have been given verbally by General Arnold, The Chief of Air Staff or by the press.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Abr/AW LC, Date 9/27/74

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November 18, 1942

Major General Ira C. Eaker,
Commanding General, Bomber Command,
Eighth Air Force,
London, England.

Dear Ira:

I have ordered to duty with your command, 1st Lt. Reagan McCrary who is the bearer of this letter. My reason for this assignment is a desire for you to have a well qualified officer on your staff who is capable of writing up and presenting to the American people the true potentialities of air power which are factually supported by operations in your theater. The excellent example which you are setting in Anglo-American relations is also worthy of factual presentation so as to point the way to closer Anglo-American relations in other fields. All of these facts can best be presented by news stories originating in London or the African theater and by the use of radio broadcasts originating in your theater.

Data that is written up here in Washington or the United States and then published either by radio or through the press, although truly factual, does not carry nearly the weight as does such data when released by the radio or press from one of our active combat theaters. In order properly to demonstrate just what our long range and heavy bombers are doing and are capable of doing, we must fully inform this country of the success that we have had with them to date and point out forcibly that through their use from Europe in ever increasing numbers we can crush Germany's capacity to wage war at the source.

You personally, Ira, can do this job from your theater much better than anyone else here in the United States or in other theaters. For example, once a week you might broadcast to America a consolidated round-up of the air war as being fought all around the world. It should be tied in closely to the operations of your own Bomber Command

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in the European Theater and should indicate that it is in furtherance of the policies of the Army Air Forces. I feel that such a broadcast alone would perform a great service. Such a broadcast, I am sure, would rapidly attract an audience far larger than that of any news commentator, for the reason that it would be from an operational theater and would therefore be accepted as really news from our fighting forces.

Understand that my sole desire is to present facts, or conclusions that are borne-out by facts. Extravagant claims will not engender the confidence in us which is justified and which the people are entitled to have.

I am of the opinion that Lt. McCrary can help you tremendously. His background is as follows: He was born and raised in Texas, graduated from Yale, was once an editor of the Literary Digest. He was editorial chief of the Tabloid New York Daily Mirror. He has produced a weekly news reel that has had national distribution and has put on a nightly news broadcast. He thoroughly understands all media of reaching and directing public opinion. He also has a deep understanding of the capabilities of air power, particularly as concerns the heavy bomber in its mission in the European theater. I feel sure that he can be helpful to you and the Army Air Forces.

For obvious reasons, please treat this letter as one of strict confidence between you and myself. I am sure you can realize the effect of its misinterpretation.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC, Date 9/27/76

November 18, 1942

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Commanding General, Bomber Command,
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With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

NOV 19 1942 Original to Lt. McCrary for delivery

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cc 11/21/42

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Bombing Presentation Data.

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GES/td

1 AFCAS Colonel 1942
Cabell 11-19
(Advisory Council)

1. This is to confirm instructions issued this morning in General Arnold's office reference the preparation of precision bombing data.

2. It is desired that you expedite the preparation of a paper for my approval as to how best we can have prepared data to present our precision bombing accuracy, type of targets that can be destroyed, altitudes from which bombing should be made, etc. This data should be prepared in such a manner that it can be utilized by General Arnold in order to discuss the subject with Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, The President, The Speaker of the House, or other data that could be taken by the Director of Bombardment, myself, or a member of the Air Staff to discuss with other Army officers or Navy officers or members of other Departmental Agencies and then other data that could be utilized to discuss this subject with experts.

3. With reference to this subject it is desired that consideration be given to the manner of presentation of Integrated Flight Control as prepared by the Director of Flying Safety. This is a method that presents the subject graphically and very thoroughly.

4. This must be given immediate attention as the only reason for all of our entire Air Force setup is to drop bombs on the target and we have not sufficient data in proper form to accomplish what General Arnold desires. If necessary we must borrow or get into the Service without delay, personnel with imagination that can get the subject matter in the proper form for use by all members of the Air Staff, as well as General Arnold, to educate people into the capabilities of bombardment aviation.

Cy to:
Director of Bombardment
Director of Management Control
Director of Flying Safety (Col. Harris)
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2
General Hanley

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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Out By hand 11-19-42

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8 Jan & 30 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date: 9/27/74

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385 (63)

Paper for presentation of bomber attack in Europe

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GES ml

1. AFCAS Director 11-10 of Bombardment.

1. Enclosed are two secret papers and three secret charts. General Arnold desires that a study be made and in brief terse statements a paper be prepared for his presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ~~of your~~ ideas as to what the bomber offensive of Germany should be.

2. It is desired that in the preparation of this paper that you consult with Colonel Cabell, Advisory Council; General Anderson, Plans Division; and Colonel Harper, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3.

3. It is also desired that the preparation of this paper be expedited as General Arnold might have to present this a week from today for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or maybe earlier at a special meeting, if it should be called.

Incls:
(1) Document C.O.S.(42) Copy no. 4 "An estimate of the effects of an Anglo-American Bomber offensive against Germany.
(2) Paper entitled, "American-British Strategy. Germany or Japan First".
(3) Chart-Bombing accuracy as shown by five raids
(4) Plot of night photograph of Duisburg
(5) Plot of night photograph of Dusseldorf

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

~~COPY FOR GENERAL ANDERSON~~

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DOD Ltr.
8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
By: AG/Rec2 LC, Date: 9/27/74

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Possible bombing of German and Japanese Coke Plants.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFDAS	AFABI	1942 11-8	MAL/imm 5265 General Hanley directs you consider this matter and report your conclusion not later than November 9, 1942. MAL M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C.
				2 Incls. Memo for the C/S from Gen. Lowe, dated 11/5/42, above subject. Disp Form Fr Gen Staff to Gen. Hanley, dated 11/6/42 for necessary action.
2	AFABI	AFDAS	11-9	WB:mep 4700 1. Reply to the attached memorandum is contained in memorandum for the Chief of Staff prepared for General Stratemeyer's signature transmitted to AFCAS by Item 2 this date, November 9 on his R&R subhect: "Coke Plants in Germany." W Bell for EDGAR P. SORENSEN Colonel, G. S. C. 2 Incl. n/c
3	AFDAS	AFMAG	11-10	FOR FILES. MAL M. A. LIBBY, Lt. Col., G.S.C.

Hq. Army Air Forces
NOV 10 1942
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Incls. w/d & sent to Miss McShane, OCS
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3-1100 A.F.

Rec. 1050 (See Rec. 951)

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By Alm/ac LC. Date 9/27/74

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385 (61)

German Bombing of Britain—1941.

AFDIS-ID/3
REF:IER/11 5908

1 AFDIS AFABI NOV 5 1942

1. Attached is study on the effect on England of German bombing during 1941 for transmittal to Commanding General, Army Air Forces. (See R&R of your office, 9/27/42, subject, "Effectiveness of Bombing", copy attached.)

2. Study is not yet considered complete. When more pertinent material becomes available more information will be submitted.

A. W. BROCK, JR.,
Colonel, G. S. C.

2 Incls-
Incl 1-Cy. R&R, 9/27/42, w. comment 2.
Incl 2-"German Bombing of Britain—1941", Secret, 11/2/42, (in dup.).

EPSImep 5613

2 AFABI General Arnold thru AFCAS 11-6

1. [illegible] is information.

Hq. Army
NOV 6 1942 3:50 pm
AAG Received

EDGAR P. SORENSEN
Colonel, G. S. C.

2 Incls. n/c

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By _____ Date _____

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9 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By [illegible] Date 9/27/76

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Effectiveness of bombing.

			1942	EPSamp 5613
1	AFABI	AFDIS	9/27	1. Several weeks ago a number of pictures brought or sent here by General Baker were sent to DIS for examination and for use in connection with the preparation of a brief paper for General Arnold which would help him to refute statements frequently heard that bombing has been ineffective. The sources of information were not necessarily to be limited to the pictures furnished at that time. 2. A statement is desired showing the status of this study and an estimate of its date of completion. EDGAR P. SORENSEN Colonel, G. S. C.

AFDIS-IB/3
EEF:IEE/11 5908

2	AFDIS	AFABI	10-3-42	1. The attached study is submitted as further evidence of the value of precision bombing in retarding German production. 2. No additional information has been received on the Renault Raid since report submitted to your office on or about August 22, 1942. Any details which appear will be submitted immediately. 3. A study is now being made on the effect on England of German bombing during 1941.
3	AFCAS	AFMAG	11-10	1 Incl- Study, "Precision Bombing—Matford Works, Abbeville/Drucat, Flushing", Secret. A. W. BROCK, JR., Colonel, G. S. C.

Hq. Army Air Forces
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M. A. LIBBY,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

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M.C.

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] Date 9/27/76

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November 2, 1942

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GERMAN

BOMBING OF BRITAIN—1941

The British Isles were subjected to 389 air attacks during the year 1941. The main effort was concentrated on the coastal towns and ports, and took place during the first half of the year prior to the German move against Russia.

Out of a total of 6,699 Key Points, such as Docks, Factories, Utilities, 884, or 13.2%, were hit one or more times. The results, briefly, were as follows:

DOCKS

Twenty-seven attacks in the Liverpool area rendered 69 out of 144 berths unusable (48%). Sixteen ships, to a total of 91,927 tons, were sunk, plus damage to one hundred sheds, two locks and a floating crane. Plymouth had thirty raids, and, although the yards suffered little partly due to decoy fires, there was a large loss in buildings and stores. The greatest effect on output was attributed to the damage inflicted on workers' homes. The Portsmouth Dock Yard, in spite of violent bombing, was able to fulfill 85% of its functions at the end of the year.

FACTORIES

Out of a total of 558 key factories affected by raids, eight were so completely destroyed that work ceased altogether or was moved elsewhere. The aircraft industry lost three to four weeks' output of Manchester bombers, a week's delay at Short Bros. (Stirlings), one parachute factory completely, and several severe balloon plant fires. Metal losses were measured by man-hours lost during air raid warnings, but the total in no way hindered industry in 1941. The inland ordnance factories escaped reasonably intact. One cordite plant, hit by incendiaries, was out sixty days.

FOOD SUPPLY

Six food storage points were completely destroyed (out of 70 bombed), and the total loss for the year was estimated at 271,500 tons. In pre-war days, 80% of the Nation's food stocks were concentrated in the port areas. At the end of 1941, dispersal schemes had reduced this figure to 45%.

OIL SUPPLIES

Commercial losses amounted to 1/2% of the total oil stocks and 1 1/2% of the tankage in commission. Naval losses were about twice these amounts.

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ELECTRICITY

Electric power was reduced by 73,000 kw. at the end of the year, although at one period 190,000 kw. had been immobilised. The Grid System prevented any serious interruption to industry. Nearly one quarter of the raids did some degree of damage to gas installations, but here again a Grid System operated successfully. Water supply had no reservoir destruction and only occasionally a 24-hour interruption of service. Railroad traffic generally was moving within a day after a raid, except in the London area when a severe May bombing followed two attacks in the previous month. At the end of the May raid only one terminal was left in operation, and it was not until October 20 (five months) that all main terminals and freight exchanges were open.

CASUALTIES

Total casualties in the 1941 bombings of Britain have been estimated at 32,168, of which 12,030 were fatal (37.3%). The raids averaged around 90 planes each and the casualties inflicted by each plane amounted to 3.83 persons.

SUMMARY

The German effort in 1941 was essentially area bombing and frequently covered several districts on the same night. Heavy damages that resulted often received only temporary repairs. Had the attacks been more concentrated and had they continued into the winter months, it is believed that serious disruption of industrial output might have followed.

The Ministry of Home Security, referring particularly to the gas situation in London, has stated: "The troubles of the first six months arising from the continual breaking of mains showed the result of a great effort from the speed in which repairs were effected, but it must be remembered that these repairs were rather of a first-aid character. Consequently, if London had been attacked during the winter months towards the end of the year there is no doubt whatsoever that the situation would have been serious".

The most persistent, although not vital, factor in reducing industrial output for short periods was the shattered glass and destroyed roofs, which prevented night crews from operating until the damage was repaired. Unexploded bombs likewise contributed to short stoppages.

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8 Jan. & 30 June 1974
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Coke Plants in Germany.

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1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2 1942 11-6

Dispatched
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1. Your attention is invited to the enclosed memorandum to me from General Marshall. It is desired that you prepare a reply to General Marshall for my signature, calling his attention to our thorough study of these coke plants in Germany. It might be a very good idea to do what General Marshall has suggested and get these fellows down here to your section for a conference and tie it in with the Director of Bombardment. Anyway give me a reply for my signature to General Marhsall.

File
Ci

Incl:
Memo to Gen. Stratemeyer dtd 11-5 fr Gen. Marshall with incls.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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File No. _____

Tally No. AAF _____

Note -- A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

385 (58)

SUBJECT: Bomber Command Quarterly Review

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	General Arnold	General Stratemeyer	1942 11/3	This is a quarterly report gotten out by Harris and has considerable information in it which would be of benefit to our higher command. I don't think it would be much good to our lower eschelons. I can get two copies for the Staff, and my present plan would be to give one copy to the Director of Bombardment and one copy to the Director of Military Requirements or Plans. If I can get a third copy I will have one additional. [signature]
Incl:	Bomber Command Quarterly Review, April - May - June, 1942. #1.			
2	AFCAS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2	1942 11-4	3373 GES/hd 1. Note General Arnold's comment #1. It is my opinion that if only two copies are received that the first copy should go to the Director of Bombardment and that a second copy should go to your office. If a third is received it could well go to Plans. Your recommendations are desired. [signature] GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, Major General, U.S.A., Chief of the Air Staff.
Incl:	n/c			
3.	AFABI	AFCAS	1942 11/5	WB:bje 4700 1. The Intelligence Service habitually receives limited numbers of copies of publications similar to the Bomber Command Quarterly Review and is equipped to circularize them among appropriate sections of the Staff. 2. In view of this fact, the enclosure has been withdrawn and transmitted to the Director of Intelligence Service with instructions to distribute to the Directors of Bombardment and Military Requirements and the Chief of the Plans Division before any other distribution is made. [signature] EDGAR P. SORENSEN, Colonel, C. S. C. Incl: w/drawn.

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Air Adjutant General

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC; Date 7/27/74

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3. AFABI AFCAS 1942 11/5

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Incl: w/drawn.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN,
Colonel, G. S. C.

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Air Adjutant General

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Bomber Command Quarterly Review

1	General Arnold	General Stratemeyer	1942 11/3

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H.H.A.

Incl: Bomber Command Quarterly Review, April - May - June, 1942

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2	AFCAS, Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2	1942 11-4	

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GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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Mr Gray

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: Ah/AW LC; Date: 9/27/76

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Axis Submarine Installations.

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GES/ad

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	AFCAS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-3	1942 11-3	1. Do you consider that any further comment is necessary? As it stands now, the Eighth Air Force select their target after thorough study with the Royal Air Force and with General Eisenhower. In that study they consider the overall European war objects and set up their priorities accordingly. 2. Your comments, coordinating same with Plans, are desired. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, Major General, U.S.A., Chief of the Air Staff.
2	AFACT	AFCAS	11/6	OSP:vme 6110 A-3 and Plans recommend that this correspondence die. 2 concur Incl. n/c ROBERT W. HARPER Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl: NOV - 6 '42 AM
Memo for Gen. Arnold from Gen. Somervell dtd 10-28-42

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Air Adjutant General

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by
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ci 11/7/42

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3-1100 A.F.

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DOD ltrs.
8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
By: [illegible] LC Date 9/27/74

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Axis Submarine Installations.

3373
GES/hd

1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-3 1942 11-3

1. Do you consider that any further comment is necessary? As it stands now, the Eighth Air Force select their target after thorough study with the Royal Air Force and with General Eisenhower. In that study they consider the overall European war objects and set up their priorities accordingly.

2. Your comments, coordinating same with Plans, are desired.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Incl:
Memo for Gen. Arnold from Gen. Somervell dtd 10-28-42

2 AFACT AFCAS 11/6

OSP:vme 6110

A-3 and Plans recommend that this correspondence die.

ROBERT W. HARPER
Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl. n/c

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CGSP October 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

I am glad to get the information contained in your memorandum of October 27, 1942, in reference to Axis Submarine Installations.

Dispatches of today serve only to confirm in my own mind my previous recommendations. That is, that the submarine is the greatest menace to our success at the present time and that a third priority will not be sufficient to secure the necessary results.

I hope that this matter can be given further intensive study and that some action can be taken which will furnish some real relief to the menace on present sea lines.

Somervell
BREHON SOMERVELL,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

11/1/42
Gen. Strategy note — comment
AHW

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

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8 Jan. & 20 June 1974
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Axis Submarine Installations.

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GES/hd

1 AFCAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-3 1942 11-3

1. Do you consider that any further comment is necessary? As it stands now, the Eighth Air Force select their target after thorough study with the Royal Air Force and with General Eisenhower. In that study they consider the overall European war objects and set up their priorities accordingly.

2. Your comments, coordinating same with Plans, are desired.

Dispatched
NOV 3 1942
AAG

File

Incl:
Memo for Gen. Arnold from Gen. Somervell dtd 10-28-42

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

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~~SECRET~~ Acc no 385 (57) Mr. Gray

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9 Jan. & 30 June 1974
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Special Studies on Bombing Results

385 (56)

WEH:JT 5246

7 AFCAS ~~AFACO~~ A-2 1942 11-11 Evaluation contained in Item #5; general conclusions contained in paragraph 2 of that Item.

Incls.
n/c

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Air Staff

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GES:nl

Special studies on bombing results.

1 GEN ARNOLD GEN STRATEMEYER 11-2-42 for proper evaluation

3373
GES:nl

2. AFCAS Ass't Ch. 1942 Of Staff 11-2 A-2 1. For compliance with General Arnold's directive in comment #1.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

Incl n/c

---

3. AFABI AFCAS 11-5 WB:lh 4700

NOV - 6 42 AM

RECEIVED
Air Adjutant General

1. The attached studies were prepared by the Intelligence Service, and for that reason it is felt that an evaluation could best be made by some other Staff Division. In view of the subject matter of the studies, it is recommended that they be sent to the Director of Bombardment for that purpose.

EDGAR P. SORENSEN
Colonel, G. S. C.

3 Incls. n/c

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C.G.A.A.F. for
A.C. of S., A-2
10/19/42 [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SPECIAL STUDIES OF BOMBING RESULTS #3

Distribution: SPECIAL October 19, 1942

AFACG	AFRDB	AFAMC	O.S.S.
AFCAS	AFRIT	AFASC	Ea. Air Force - 3
AFABI	AFDTS	AFATC	Air Group, MIS - 6
AFACT	AFPGC	AFTCK	AFTS
AFAEP	AFTTC - 3	AFTCC	Advisory Council
AFDMR	AFFTC - 4	J.I.C.	Air Intel. School

R.A.F. ATTACK ON OSNABRÜCK

The information contained herein has been derived from official sources and has been coordinated with the Director of Bombardment. Trends and summaries portrayed are furnished for purposes of information only. The conclusions drawn or opinions expressed are those of the Intelligence Service, Army Air Forces and not necessarily those of the War Department.

* * * * * *

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Description of Target	6
Detailed Bomb Damage Assessment	7
Analysis of Raid	8
Tabulation of Effort	9
Sketch of Marshalling Yard	10
Annotated Mosaic	11

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DISCUSSION OF OSNABRÜCK RAID

On the one hand it would seem erroneous to infer that this was a typical example of the effectiveness of a sizeable R.A.F. bomber force operating against an alternate target. On the other hand it appears that this raid was executed against not only a large, but an especially compact rail transportation objective during good weather. Visibility was reported good, the target was definitely identified, and the resistance encountered appears not to have been too effective. Yet not a single high explosive bomb burst is visible within the target area. The majority of high explosive and incendiary bombs which dropped within the general objective area fell more than a half a mile from the target.

Consequently it appears that this attack against Osnabrück might well serve as a striking example of the ineffectiveness of R.A.F. night bombing, not only against specific targets but against a large target area containing several important individual targets.

Although the bombing of an alternate target in the manner in which Osnabrück was bombed is infinitely preferable to jettisoning a bomb load, it holds little promise as a means of seriously affecting vital enemy transportation and industrial establishments. Nor is it probable that similar forces dispatched on scattered light night raids would inflict any noticeable injury upon important enemy installations, although they undoubtedly would have a certain nuisance value.

Nevertheless the fact that the British, by means of sheer determination, have been able to break off an unsuccessful attack against one objective and then definitely locate and release their bomb load over an assigned alternate objective without the loss of a single bomber, should be a source of encouragement.

It is indicative, at least, that one of the primary reasons for the general ineffectiveness of R.A.F. continental bombing is inaccurate bomb release. If British studies substantiate such a finding, the awareness of the problem will undoubtedly lead to a more careful selection of bombardiers, more intensive and prolonged bombardier training, improved bombardier-pilot coordination, and to technical refinements in the construction of bomb sights.

It behooves one to recognize at the outset that glowing accounts of what could be accomplished if only one had twice as many, 50 or 100 times as many bombers — could be achieved equally as well by effecting the same proportional increase in the accuracy of the bombs dropped with the present force available.

It is not difficult to conceive of one bomber, capable of doing precision bombing, inflicting more damage upon transportation in Osnabrück than was achieved by the 28 bombers which carried out the attack. Judging from the effect of this raid one might reasonably estimate, for example, that the target could be completely neutralized by dispatching a force 50 times as large or 1400 bombers.

It is equally conceivable, however, that comparable results could be achieved by dispatching against the target 50 bombers capable of doing precision bombing. The ultimate answer to the problem of effectively applying the destructiveness of air power, is not only increased striking power but increased bombing accuracy. At a time when attention is focused upon bomber procurement, it is well to bear in mind that the actual effectiveness of these weapons against the enemy will depend in a large measure, upon the skill of the bombardier and the excellence of his equipment.

PURPOSE:

The R.A.F. attack against Osnabrück on the Night of June 19/20, 1942 resulted when 59 of 195 bombers dispatched against Emden failed to attack the primary target. Of these 58 bombers, 28 subsequently attacked Osnabrück, the alternate target. The ostensible purpose of this attack against Osnabrück was

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the disruption of the extensive transportation facilities located in this area.

WEATHER:
No cloud. Visibility was reported generally good. Both the town and individual railroad buildings were identified although some ground haze was reported in the area.

PLANE PARTICIPATION:
Of the 28 bombers which attacked Osnabrück as an alternate target 15 were 4-engine bombers and 13 were 2-engine bombers.

BOMBING ALTITUDE:
No detailed operating or bombing data is available, but it seems reasonable to believe that most of the bombing was done from 11,000-15,000 feet.

BOMBS DROPPED:—High explosives: A total of 27.5 tons of high explosives was released over Osnabrück. Of this total 18 tons were dropped by 4-engine bombers and 9.5 tons by 2-engine bombers.

Incendiaries: A total of 15,166 incendiary bombs weighing 32.838 tons was dropped over Osnabrück. Of this total, 4-engine bombers released 10,846 incendiary bombs weighing a total of 25.124 tons. Two engine bombers dropped 4,320 incendiaries weighing 7.713 tons.

Total Bomb Tonnage: A total of 60.338 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs was released over Osnabrück. Four-engine bombers are credited with 43.124 tons of this total and 2-engine bombers 17.213 tons.

RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED:
No information is available regarding resistance encountered. In view of the fact that no losses were reported as a result of this raid against an alternate target it seems that whatever resistance was encountered probably was not particularly effective.

PLANE LOSSES:
No losses reported as a direct result of this attack against Osnabrück.

AVERAGE BOMBER EFFICIENCY:
Since no bombers were lost in the attack against Osnabrück, bomber efficiency was high — measured both in terms of bombers lost per ton of bombs dropped and in terms of bombers lost to bomber participation. A total of 60.338 tons of bombs was released over Osnabrück without the loss of a single plane.

GENERAL BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Transportation:
Direct damage —
No visible damage to the railroad tracks or roadbed, nor to the roundhouse, marshalling yards, switching "hump", or rolling stock.

Indirect damage —
None apparent.

Industrial Damage:
Direct damage —
No significant direct plant damage is apparent.

Indirect damage —
Approximately 9 small sheds adjacent to industrial establishments were destroyed or badly damaged.

Residential Damage:
An estimated minimum number of 75 houses (or a maximum of 85) have been destroyed. Of these houses, 12 to 15 were destroyed by the blast effect of two 2000-lb. demolition bombs. The remaining 63 to 70 houses apparently were destroyed by fire. An additional 9 or 10 houses and buildings, including the opera house, were damaged.

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Bombing Effectiveness:

Of the 60.338 tons of bombs released over Osnabruck, it appears that the following bombs were dropped within the general objective area:

The point of impact of the following high explosive bombs may be confirmed on the enclosed annotated mosaic.

High Explosives:

No. 14 —	One high explosive burst estimated to have been a 1900-lb. bomb	1900 lbs.
	One high explosive burst estimated to have been a 500-lb. bomb	500 lbs.
	Two high explosive bomb bursts at 500 lbs.	1000 lbs.
No. 15 —	One high explosive burst at 2000-lbs.	2000 lbs.
No. 16 —	One high explosive burst at 2000-lbs.	2000 lbs.
No. 17 —	One high explosive burst at 2000 lbs.	2000 lbs.
No. 18 —	One high explosive burst at 4000 lbs.	4000 lbs.
	Total	13,400 lbs. (or 5.982 tons)

Consequently it is estimated that of the 27.5 tons of high explosives released over Osnabrück 5.982 tons, or 21.7%, fell within the general objective area.

Incendiary Bomb Tonnage:

In the absence of any accurate method of calculating the number of incendiaries which fell within the general objective area, it appears reasonable to assume that two tons of the incendiaries (equivalent to 1120 4-lb. incendiaries), or 6.9% of the incendiary tonnage released over Osnabrück fell within the general objective area.

Total Bomb Tonnage:

Of the total high explosive and incendiary bomb tonnage released over Osnabrück (60.338 tons) an estimated total of 7.982 tons, or 13.2% of the bomb tonnage released, fell within the general objective area.

Effectiveness Against the Primary Target:

With the exception of the destruction by fire of one shed measuring approximately 100' x 60', which belonged to the Klöckner Iron and Steel Works, no visible direct, indirect, or incidental damage was inflicted upon the primary target either by high explosive or incendiary bombs. Consequently it is not unreasonable to assume that less than ½ of 1% of the total bomb tonnage released over Osnabrück was effective against the primary target.

Damage Inflicted Upon Important Industrial Establishments Outside the Primary Target Area but Lying Within the General Objective Area:

Damage, other than residential property damage within the general objective area was confined to the destruction of 6 or 8 small sheds belonging to the Hannersen weaving mills; this destruction resulted from the blast effect of a single 4000-lb. bomb.

Consequently 1.78 tons or 2.8% of the total bomb damage released over Osnabrück may be considered to have been effective in causing damage to installations within the general objective area.

Damage Inflicted Upon Residential Areas Lying Within the General Objective Area:

The major portion of the residential damage seems to have resulted from the concentration of incendiary bombs (see number 2 on the annotated mosaic, Pg. 11). It is believed that a reasonable estimate of the incendiary tonnage dropped in this area of the city of Osnabrück might be 1½ tons, Significant residential damage was also inflicted by three 2000-lb. high explosive bombs (2.67 tons).

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As a result, it seems that approximately 4.7 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs, or roughly 6.9% of the total bomb tonnage released, was effective against residential sections of the city of Osnabrück

Recapitulation:

Consequently it seems that although 13.2% of the total bomb tonnage released fell within the general objective area, less than ½ of 1% of the total bomb tonnage released inflicted direct, indirect, or incidental damage upon the primary target.

An estimated 2.9% of the total tonnage released inflicted damage upon industrial establishments outside the primary target but located within the general objective area. An additional 6.9% of the total tonnage released caused incidental, mainly residential damage, within the general objective area.

In other words, ½ of 1% of the total tonnage released was effective against the primary target while an additional 8.8% inflicted damage within the general objective area adjacent to the primary target. Approximately 10.3% of the tonnage released was effective in some way against the general objective area.

Discussion:

The fact that it was possible for 28 of the 58 bombers which abandoned the assigned mission against Emden to locate, identify, and drop 66.338 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs over the alternate target is, in itself, an admirable feat.

The excellence of this achievement, however, seems to have been almost completely nullified by an inability on the part of the attacking force either accurately to bomb or to concentrate its bombing effort within a target area as extensive as that presented by Osnabrück.

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CONCLUSIONS:

1. Harassing attacks or light night raids against scattered transportation objectives may cause inconvenience in making-up and dispatching trains, but they are an ineffective means of adversely affecting enemy transportation.

2. Night "area" bombing is a costly and undependable method of interrupting rail traffic for more than a very short period of time.

3. Rail traffic appears to be seriously affected, primarily as a result of direct damage to the tracks and roadbed, rolling stock, and repair facilities.

4. The repair of direct damage to tracks and roadbed depends largely upon their accessability and consequently is usually quickly accomplished. Railroad switches, over-and-under-passes, bridges, "cuts" along the main line, and the entrance and exits to tunnels are vulnerable points in the rail net. Direct damage inflicted upon any of these points is not easily repaired and may seriously disrupt traffic for a considerable period of time thus causing serious delays and the costly re-routing of traffic.

5. A concentrated high explosive and incendiary attack upon overcrowded marshalling yards and adjacent warehouses appears to offer a promising means of reducing the amount of rolling stock in use.

6. Direct damage to roundhouses, turntables, and repair shops, as a result of high explosive and incendiary attack, seems to be an effective means of reducing the efficiency of the enemy's rail transportation system, particularly if his rolling stock is in a poor state of repair and his facilities and skilled man power are already overtaxed.

7. Railroad marshalling yards, as a result of their size, distinctive appearance, and ease of location may offer favorable alternate or last resort targets for bombers abandoning an attack against an assigned objective. In the absence of an ability on the part of an attacking force to bomb accurately or to effect a concentration of bombing effort on the vital parts of such an objective, it is unlikely that decisive results will be achieved by such attacks.

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DESCRIPTION OF TARGET

OSNABRÜCK

Location: Latitude 52° 17' N.
Longitude 08° 05' E.

Population: 94,000

General Layout of Osnabrück:

Osnabrück is an important rail junction in northwestern Germany. Traffic from northern and central Germany flows through Osnabrück enroute to the industrial sections along the Ruhr and the Rhine as well as to the Low Countries. Although Osnabrück is industrialized, industry is of secondary importance.

The greater part of the city of Osnabrück is situated in a V-shaped area between two rail lines which converge just east of the city. The point at which these rail lines intersect is the apex of an L-shaped marshalling yards extending roughly in a westerly and southwesterly direction. Southwest of these yards is a large semi-circular roundhouse, a switching "hump", a triangular rail junction and several warehouses.

Still farther south is a large weaving mill known as the F.H. Hammersen, A. G. Northwest of the roundhouse is located the Klöckner-Werke A. G., a producer of iron and steel.

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DETAILED BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

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Number on Annotated Mosaic	Bomb Damage:
1.	Opposite the Dom are 5 or 6 gutted houses.
2.	An area of approximately 9 acres has been devastated by fire and approximately 45 to 50 houses within the area have been gutted. Also a portion of the opera house and a few buildings spanning the Cathedral were damaged by fire.
3.	Roof damage approximately 20' x 20' to one building of the Schloss (Palace).
4.	A small building in the center of the square gutted by fire. One house destroyed. Roof damage to another.
5.	A large building gutted by fire.
6.	A house gutted by fire.
7.	A house gutted by fire.
8.	A house gutted by fire.
9.	A house gutted by fire.
10.	Two houses gutted by fire.
11.	Probably roof damage to 4 or 5 houses.
12.	3 houses gutted.
13.	Probable roof damage to 2 buildings.
14.	A stick of craters on open ground parallel to the railway line to Münster.
15.	An estimated 5 or 6 houses destroyed or badly damaged by high explosives (probably a 2000-lb. demolition bomb).
16.	An estimated 7 to 9 houses destroyed or badly damaged by high explosives (probably a 2000-lb. demolition bomb).
17.	6 or 8 small sheds adjoining the main buildings of the cotton weaving mills known as the F. H. Hammersen A. G. were destroyed or damaged by high explosive blast effect (probably a 4000-lb. demolition bomb).
18.	A small building destroyed and 2 others damaged.
19.	A shed adjacent to the Klöckner Factory A. G. (iron and steel works). The shed, which measured approximately 100' x 60', has been demolished apparently by fire.

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ANALYSIS OF RAID

1. Objective: Osnabrück

2. Date of Raid: Night, June 19/20, 1942

3. Plane Participation:

a. Bombers dispatched against objective	28	
b. Bombers engaged in diversion effort		
c. Fighters	—	
Total plane participation		28

4. Bomb Tonnage dropped over objective:

a. Number of high explosive bombs	27.5 tons	
b. Weight of high explosive bombs	14,670	
c. Number of incendiary bombs @ 4 lbs.	496	
" " " " @ 30 lbs.		
" " " " @ 250 lbs.		
Number of flares		
Total number of bombs dropped		
d. Weight of incendiary bombs @ 4 lbs.	26,196 tons	
" " " " @ 30 lbs.	6,642 tons	
" " " " @ 250 lbs.		
Weight of flares	—	
Total weight of bombs dropped		60.338 tons

5. Plane Losses:
   a. Losses resulting from enemy aircraft:
      i. Bombers dispatched against objective
      ii. Bombers engaged in diversion effort
      iii. Fighters
      Total plane losses resulting from enemy aircraft
   b. Losses resulting from enemy antiaircraft fire:
      i. Bombers dispatched against objective
      ii. Bombers engaged in diversion effort
      iii. Fighters
      Total plane losses resulting from enemy antiaircraft fire
   c. Losses incurred from other miscellaneous causes:
      i. Bombers dispatched against objective
      ii. Bombers engaged in diversion effort
      iii. Fighters
      Total plane losses incurred from other miscellaneous causes
   d. Total plane losses incurred:
      i. Bombers dispatched against objective
      ii. Bombers engaged in diversion effort
      iii. Fighters

6. Plane Crashes:
   a. i. Bombers dispatched against objective
      ii. Bombers engaged in diversion effort
      iii. Fighters
      Total plane crashes

7. Remarks: No cloud, and visibility was reported generally good, with some ground haze. Bursts were clearly observed in the center and southwest of the town and on the railway buildings. Numerous fires were started.

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TABULATION OF EFFORT

OBJECTIVE: Osnabrück

DATE OF RAID: Night, June 19/20, 1942

PLANE PARTICIPATION: TYPE OF AIRCRAFT: BOMBERS: 4-Engine	Dispatched	Reported Attacking General Area	Losses	Crashes	Bombs Dropped H.E. Tons	Bombs Dropped Incends. No.	Bombs Dropped Incends. Tons	Total Bomb Tonnage Dropped	Ratio of Bombers Lost to Ton of Bombs Dropped	Ratio of Bombers Lost to Bomber Participation
Halifax		6			8.	3240 @4 288 @30	9.642	17.642	0:17.642	0:6
Lancaster		4			7. (4 @ 4000)	2790	4.982	11.982	0:11.982	0:4
Stirling		5			3	4320 @4 208 @30	10.500	13.500	0:13.500	0:5
Sub-Total		15			18	10,846	25.124	43.124	0:43.124	0:15
2-Engine Hampden		3			1.5	1080	1.929	3.429	0:3.429	0:3
Wellington		10			8. (2 @ 4000)	3240	5.786	13.786	0:13.786	0:10
Sub-Total		13			9.5	4320	7.713	17.213	0:17.213	0:13
GRAND TOTAL		28			27.5	15.166	32.838	60.338	0:60.338	0:28

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OSNABRÜCK (Germany)

Railroad Marshalling Yard

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Circles: 1 mile
Scale: 1:63,360

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F. H. HAMMERSEN A.G.
(CLOTH WEAVING)
SWITCHING HUMP
GAS WORKS
OVERPASS
MARSHALLING YARDS
ROUNDHOUSE
KLOCKNER-WERKE A.G.
OSNABRUCK
Damage to individual objectives within the area
S-75, AF

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(AFACG)

AAF 385

October 30, 1942.

Employment of Air Forces.

385 (55)

Each Air Force Commander Throughout the World.
Each Air Force Task Commander.

1. I am greatly concerned reference reports of bombing I have received from various combat theaters. A careful study and analysis of these reports indicate that the versatility of our bombardment and other aircraft has not been exploited to the fullest extent and that there is not enough initiative displayed. In some operations, heavy bombardment is used for high altitude bombing regardless of target, opposition, weather, and other conditions. In like manner, medium altitude bombardment is employed along academic lines when some other method might obtain better results. There are times when even fighter airplanes can be used effectively for bombardment.

2. Bombardment commanders must approach their problems with open minds and use methods which have the best chances of success of placing the bombardment load on the target. The minimum altitude bombing (skip bombing) and torpedo attack have demonstrated their value when properly used. It is possible that these two weapons have not been used to the maximum effectiveness in all types of airplanes because of a certain rigidity of mind on the part of bombardment commanders that certain type airplanes must be employed on a certain type of operation. In theaters where weather conditions cause low cloud formations which obscure the target from high altitudes, it may be possible to use bombardment of the heavy, medium or light classes beneath the ceiling, in spite of the possibility of anti-aircraft and small arms fire causing undue losses.

3. This letter is not intended to be a criticism of anything which you have accomplished in your theater but is only an expression of my opinion that all of us must constantly seek better methods of operation, must be ever on the alert to accept new ideas, must have flexible minds on procedure and technique in our missions, to obtain the maximum efficiency from our Air Force.

Dispatched
NOV 2 1942
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Ci

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of Staff, W. D.
AC of S, G-3, W. D.
AC of S, OPD, W. D.
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CG Eastern Defense Command
CG European Theater of Operation
CG Caribbean Defense Command
CG Hawaiian Department
CG USAF in South Pacific Area
C in C, Southwest Pacific Area
CG USAF in India, Burma and China
CG USAF in the Middle East
CG USAF in Central Africa
CG Newfoundland Base Command
CG Alaska Defense Command
CG Panama Canal Dept
CG Puerto Rican Dept
CG Trinidad Base Command
CG USAF in Iceland
CG USAF in New Caledonia

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(AFACG)

AAF 385

October 30, 1942.

Employment of Air Forces.

Each Air Force Commander Throughout the World.
Each Air Force Task Commander.

1. I am greatly concerned reference reports of bombing I have received from various combat theaters. A careful study and analysis of these reports indicate that the versatility of our bombardment and other aircraft has not been exploited to the fullest extent and that there is not enough initiative displayed. In some operations, heavy bombardment is used for high altitude bombing regardless of target, opposition, weather, and other conditions. In like manner, medium altitude bombardment is employed along academic lines when some other method might obtain better results. There are times when even fighter airplanes can be used effectively for bombardment.

2. Bombardment commanders must approach their problems with open minds and use methods which have the best chances of success of placing the bombardment load on the target. The minimum altitude bombing (skip bombing) and torpedo attack have demonstrated their value when properly used. It is possible that these two weapons have not been used to the maximum effectiveness in all types of airplanes because of a certain rigidity of mind on the part of bombardment commanders that certain type airplanes must be employed on a certain type of operation. In theaters where weather conditions cause low cloud formations which obscure the target from high altitudes, it may be possible to use bombardment of the heavy, medium or light classes beneath the ceiling, in spite of the possibility of anti-aircraft and small arms fire causing undue losses.

3. This letter is not intended to be a criticism of anything which you have accomplished in your theater but is only an expression of my opinion that all of us must constantly seek better methods of operation, must be ever on the alert to accept new ideas, must have flexible minds on procedure and technique in our missions, to obtain the maximum efficiency from our Air Force.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ air ag 385 (55)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DECIMAL

DECLASSIFIED

TALLY NO.	
FILE NO.	

SUBJECT: Employment of Air Forces.

ITEM NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
				MAL:af 5265
3.	AFCAS	AFMAG	1942 11/1	1. General Stratemeyer directed that this letter be reproduced and given distribution as shown. 2. For necessary action. MILLARD A. LIBBY, Lt. Colonel, G. S. C. Incl.

1:42 PM

RECEIVED

Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____

Note. — A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Tally No. AAF _____

SUBJECT: Employment of Air Forces.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	COMMENTS
1	General Arnold.	General Strate-meyer	1942 10/30	I have about made up my mind to send the attached. Unless you have some serious objections, get it in the proper form so that I can sign the original letter. H.H.A.
Incl:	Draft of Memo to Each Air Force Throughout the World and Each Air Force Task Commander 10/29/42 for Gen. Arnold's signature, re above subj.			
				3373 GES/hd
2	AFCAS	General Arnold	1942 10-30	1. With reference to the enclosed letter, I have re-written it making three minor changes which I believe should be incorporated. The changes that I have made in my letter take the place of those parenthesised in yours. I have also underlined one statement. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, Major General, U.S.A., Chief of Air Staff.
Incl:	1 added Draft #2 re above written by Gen. Stratemeyer			

(Do not use reverse side) W-4071, AF, Rev. 8/14/41

Page No. _____

air ag 315 (55)

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2

WAR DEPARTMENT

IN REPLY REFER TO:

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942

SUBJECT: Employment of Air Forces.

TO: Each Air Force Commander Throughout the World.
Each Air Force Task Commander.

1. I am greatly concerned ~~in~~ reference reports of bombing I have received from the various combat theaters. A careful study of and analysis of these reports indicate that perhaps in many instances tactical doctrine learned in our schools and utilized at the beginning of the war is being followed too closely that there is not enough initiative displayed. In some operations, heavy bombardment is used for high altitude bombing regardless of target, opposition, weather, and other conditions. In like manner, medium altitude bombardment is employed along academic lines when some other method might obtain better results. There are times when even fighter airplanes can be used effectively for bombardment.

2. Bombardment commanders must approach their problems with open minds and use methods which have the best chances of success of placing the bombardment load on the target. The skip bomb and torpedo have demonstrated their value when properly used. It is possible that these two weapons have not been used to the maximum effectiveness in all types of airplanes because of a certain rigidity of mind on the part of bombardment commanders that certain type airplanes must be employed on a certain type of operation. In theaters where weather conditions cause low cloud formations which obscure the target from high altitudes, it may be possible to use bombardment of the heavy, medium or light classes beneath the ceiling, in spite of the possibility of anti-aircraft and small arms fire causing undue losses.

3. This letter is not intended to be a criticism of anything which you have accomplished in your theater but is only an expression of my opinion that all of us must constantly seek better methods of operation, must be ever on the alert to accept new ideas, must have flexible minds on procedure and technique in our missions, to obtain the maximum efficiency from our Air Force.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

air ag 385 (55)

Employment of Air Forces.

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3373
GES/hd

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GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief of Air Staff.

Incl: 1 added
Draft #2 re above
written [illegible]

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air [illegible] 375 (55)

Employment of Air Forces.

MAL:af 5265

S. AFCAS AFMAG 1942
11/1

1. General Stratemeyer directed that this letter be reproduced and given distribution as shown.

2. For necessary action.

MILLARD A. LIBBY,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.

Incl.

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air ab 385 (25)

THE END

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