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FROM ROLL
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

USAF ACADEMY MICROFILM SERVICE CENTER

ROLL NUMBER: 92-171

PROJECT #: 1-71

SUBJECT: ARNOLD-GREEN COLLECTION ORAL-HISTORY

START FRAME: 1

START DATE: 9-24-92

PHOTOGRAPHER: S.R. MURPHY

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Barringer, Brandon 14 Dec 73

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1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, MD 20910
March 26, 1977

Mr. Brandon Barranger
2106 Two Girard Plaza
Philadelphia, Pa 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

I wish I had better news at this time. I've had publisher trouble and lost my publisher just before I retired from the Air Force. Random House would not buy two volumes - mostly for commercial reasons. You cant sell enough of a multi-volume work. I even contacted Viking which is doing 5 volumes on George Marshall (by Forrest Pogue). The editor there told me it was a "disaster" and that the decision to go ahead, greased by a substantial endowment of the Marshall Foundation, was made by a predecessor.

I've been in touch with a reputable agent in N.Y. who agreed to handle my work if I could cut it to 160,000 words. I already have 200,000 and have just reached Pearl Harbor in 22 Chapters. In consultation with Bruce Arnold (the middle son), I've decided to go ahead and finish my work and then we'll cut, if we have to.

I may decide to go the university press route. Anyway, I've been dawdling for a number of months and have just gotten back into the writing groove.

Please be assured that you shall have an autographed copy when my book comes out in print.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

March 22, 1977

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Did you, by any chance, publish your book?

If so, I would like to order a copy.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

June 26, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Yours of 24 June, received. As shown by the context of General Arnold's letter, my trip to the ETO was made a little before D day. I am sending a copy of this letter to Colonel Preston with whose hosts I stayed for the last ten days or so of about a three week visit. We had a "little blitz" and were expecting the V bombs. He may have a date as he moved in just prior to that, partly, I believe, to arrange a place for me to stay.

Will see whether I have any better record at home in my 201 file, but a date of 31 March 1944 not 1945 as put on the letter would be just about right.

Like your title "Arnold and His Commanders". As I've pointed out they were "his" in the ETO, the Mediterranean, and the South Pacific even when legally "reporting to" the various Theater Commanders and through them to General Marshall. The exceptions were General George and General Chennault. I complained to one of the former's officers that they had reported the B 25's or 26's, I forget which, scrapped and then won the battle of the Bismarck Sea with them!

His answer was: "You'll never get correct reports. We don't trust your headquarters!" (sic). George of course reflected MacArthur, his boss.

Chennault as Theater Commander always reported directly to Marshall, ignoring Arnold completely.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

cc: Colonel Jerome Preston

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20314

24 June 1974

Colonel Brandon Barringer
2106 Two Girard Plaza
Philadelphia, Penna. 19102

Dear Colonel Barringer

You can help me out of another tough one. We're going to use this letter in the compilation I'm working on "Arnold and His Commanders," (working title) and we have no date on the letter. Perhaps we can pin it down by the date of your visit to the ETO. I think it was in 1944.

All good wishes.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

Encl

See P 2 of letter

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[redacted]

Dropped as mission Made !

Source: Europe II, Log Sheets 17-75, 24 May 44 - 11 Aug 44

Copy of a copy.

No date on the letter, however a note at the side in pencil, "Hollister, 31 Mar 1945."

X

[must be 1944 re to Overseas]

31 March 44

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Lt. General Carl A. Spaatz
U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
A.P.O. 633, New York, New York

Dear Tooey:

I have given a great deal of thought to the problems confronting you as the result of the recent Air Force policy rescinding local theater policies covering the return of combat crews to the United States after the completion of an arbitrary number of missions. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind concerning the wisdom of this action. I realize also the many problems involved in the application of this policy to your theater.

With the increased tempo of your operations it is possible for a crew under the old rules to complete its operational tour in one month. With the advent of OVERLORD many of the missions will be of a short range and your rate of operations may still further increase. I am sure that you appreciate that it would be impossible to furnish you with replacement crew support under such conditions. We simply cannot afford to lose the entire war experience of these carefully trained and carefully selected personnel after a period of six weeks to two months.

It is my aim to help you in every way to meet this problem. If you believe that a brief leave period for 15 or 20 days back in the United States will help, I will see that everything is done to accomplish this. I have contacted the Army Service Forces and find that they are willing to provide transportation for combat crew personnel back to this country and will endeavor to return them to the UK on time. As you must know there is a definite limitation on shipping capacity between the U.S. and the UK, but if the numbers are kept within reason I am sure we can swing it.

In returning your crews the formula must be decided by you. This may be on the basis of missions, number of hours, physical condition of crews, replacement flow or any or all of the many other factors involved. I do believe it is important to preserve the integrity of the crew at all times. That is, that it goes home as a crew, returns to the UK as a crew and takes its place back in its group at the end.

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I am sending this letter over with three of my key staff officers: Colonel Ashworth of Training, Colonel Bonnquist of OCAR and Colonel Barringer of Statistical Control. They will explain to you the action we are taking to expedite the flow of replacement crews to your theater and to determine if the goal which we have set will meet your anticipated needs. To meet the increased tempo in crew production we have reduced the training period for bombardment crews from 3 to 2½ months. We are insisting, however, that each bombardment crew get at least 100 hours and fighter pilots at least 50 hours in the HTU's. We have eliminated certain ground instruction. We are using returned combat crew members. We are using Training Command instructors replacing them with newly graduated pilots. In this connection it is likely that you will receive some fighter pilots with 1,000 hours or more total time but only 30 or 40 hours fighter time. The all-around flying experience of these former instructors should compensate for their lack of specialized training and I have no doubt that they will prove excellent in combat. I am pointing out these factors in order that you may make such readjustments as are necessary in your pre-combat training program. I hope that you and your staff will take the opportunity to discuss with the officers mentioned above the details of this replacement crew program. There is also some information which I have asked them to obtain for me.

Please be assured that I am well aware of your difficult morale problem and that I am sympathetic to any solution within our means and which will provide for the vigorous and unrelenting prosecution of the air war.

Sincerely yours,

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U. S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

June 12, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Yours of 10th June. It was General Harper. Good guy. He may remember me, in which case, please give him my regards.

It was Yount, not Young. His son married my first cousin, but I only saw him that one time with Weaver in Gates' office.

Yount:- "I have Statistics but not Statistical Control, what is that?"

Gates:- "It's what tells you whether a thousand men are going to arrive at a base Wednesday, so you'll be ready for them!"

Yount:- "I've got to have him". (meaning our Chief of Statistical Control-Training Command who was also present).

Weaver:- "He's the one man you can't have".

Meanwhile, my memo about being able to merge two office buildings, but not their tops, was, I think, getting to Arnold directly or indirectly and, whether for that reason or some other, he "called the whole thing off". I didn't see him in connection with it.

Thought I had told the story one, rather than thirty, years later in my "Personal History" but could be wrong.

Have copied the dog story for many. Thanks.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

You understand that I was told the whole crazy idea of taking advanced technical training from Weaver and giving it to Yount in return for Weaver's end of flying training was because Arnold wanted to promote Weaver?

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

June 10, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

No need of writing or calling Ketchum unless you want to use the story and need his permission to be quoted. I merely sent him a copy to let him know how I was quoting him having received his permission to do so.

Got a good laugh out of the dog story. Didn't realize Lovett corresponded directly with Spaatz. Think I told you that I got my sister in law to be, the first A 1 priority for a W.A.C. (to marry my brother) not realizing that she was coming A.W.O.L.!

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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20314

10 June 1974

Col Brandon Barringer
2106 Two Girard Plaza
Philadelphia, Penna. 19102

Dear Colonel Barringer

Yours of June 5th is in hand.

That Chief of Training in HQ AAF might have been Robert Harper. I hope to see him in Texas soon.

I don't have that bit about Arnold trying to take all advanced training from Weaver and give it to Young. Do you mean Yount? Also, who did you advise that the AAF could not merge the tops of two office buildings? Did you tell that to Arnold directly? If so, when?

Sorry to be so much trouble. Appreciate your help.

The attachment may amuse.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

June 5, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Thanks for your letter of 3rd June.

One slight correction as to the Weaver story. There were few returning aircrew men in 1942. The hotels were taken for O.T.C. training immediately after the outbreak of the war. My brother Paul went there in about March 1942 and was held over as an instructor. I was with him in February 1943 when I went to help pick men from his O.T.C. for our Harvard Statistical School and, incidentally, to be with my sister-in-law who was waiting there for news of my lost brother Lewin and there were still few, if any, returnees. When they became a flood they were processed at Atlantic City.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

P.S. afterwards Paul called me and said we had gotten nearly every officer candidate they considered executive soldiers and he felt he needed protection in the future. I went to General ? head of training in the Headquarters who said "why disturb the arrangement.

Think I told you how Arnold tried to take all advanced training from Weaver and give it to Young and I was able to block it by saying you couldn't merge the tops of two office buildings !

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

June 3, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I gave you the wrong address for Mr. Ketchum.

Find it is:

314 Chatham Center
Pittsburgh, Pa.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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20314

3 June 1974

Colonel Brandon Barringer
2106 Two Girard Plaza
Philadelphia, Penna, 19102

Dear Colonel Barringer

Once again I am in your debt. Two good anecdotes as I see them.

Would welcome any further contribution from Carlton G. Ketchum.

I interviewed Trubee Davison in Locust Valley, New York, about three years ago. He's in a wheel chair, as you may know, but was OK then.

There is a Weaver story which fits in with the one you gave me. Weaver ran the Technical Training Command from Hq in North Carolina. About 1943, when the first war weary aircrewmen started to return for rehabilitation, somebody sold General Arnold on the excellent idea of the AAF taking over the Miami Beach hotels for that purpose. The hotels were starving to death anyway because of the wartime strictures on long distance transportation.

Weaver told Arnold he could do it in X months. Arnold said he wanted it started "by next Monday." Weaver said that would be impossible. Arnold, expecting that kind of reply, had rigged up a shadow phone conversation with another officer with help from Suzie Adkins. This other officer was all set to agree to take on the job and have the hotels functioning as rehabilitation centers "by next Monday." Weaver went for the bait and said he could do it by then, and so Arnold let him have that job.

All good wishes.

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

May 29, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Have just been swapping World War II stories with (Colonel) Carlton Ketchum, probably the country's leading fund raiser and thought the following anecdotes about Arnold would interest you.

He knew Trubee Davidson from the first war and the latter recommended him to Arnold to set up procurement of able civilians. He laid out a plan of procurement offices in all the big cities (my brother Moreau helped the interviewing for the Philadelphia one while waiting for his commission). Arnold "bought" the idea immediately and asked Ketchum to take a commission to head it up. The latter said he had a big organization to consider and Arnold answered:

"I'm a very reasonable man. I'll give you time to walk all the way around the block while you consider it."

Ketchum decided to "save shoe leather".

Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) Senator Guffey told him to commission an alcoholic bum as a Major and, when he refused, went over his head to Arnold who backed Ketchum up.

Guffey - "General, you may have forgotten the fact that I am Chairman of the Senate Committee which handles Air Force appropriations."

Arnold - "I haven't, and if you make any move to cut them, I'll give this interview, over my signature, to every newspaper in the country."

Another story, possibly second hand, is of a meeting of top generals which hadn't concluded on the day planned and was going over to the following morning.

Weaver - "I've made my plans and I'm going back".

Arnold - "I said I expected each of you to be there at eight tomorrow."

Weaver - "I won't".

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Dr. Murray Green May 29, 1974

Arnold - "You will or I'll ride right over you".

Weaver was there!

Ketchum was attached to then Colonel Elliott Roosevelt's reconnaissance group but tactically in charge. Roosevelt, just to make trouble, repeatedly antagonized the British. At Doolittle's request, Arnold recalled him. Elliott's father, however, promoted him to B.G., gave him a star, and sent him back to replace the new commander of the group!

I think I've told you that the President, and, possibly, Marshall were the only people of whom Arnold was afraid. One couldn't be afraid of Lovett because he is so diplomatic as well as firm.

I'm sending a copy of this to Mr. Ketchum, Chamber of Commerce Building, Pittsburgh, and think he would be glad to verify the above and may have remembered some more if you would like to phone him.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

cc: Mr. Carlton G. Ketchum
Chamber of Commerce Building
Pittsburgh, Pa.

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Ketchum was attached to then Colonel Elliott Roosevelt's reconnaissance group but tactically in charge. Roosevelt, just to make trouble, repeatedly antagonized the British. At Doolittle's request, Arnold recalled him. Elliott's father, however, promoted him to B.G., gave him a star, and sent him back to replace the new commander of the group!

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With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

cc: Mr. Carlton G. Ketchum
Chamber of Commerce Building
Pittsburgh, Pa.

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20314

14 February 1974

Col Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Col Barringer:

Thanks for yours of the 12th - the mail service is improving. Some of your correspondence has taken seven days to get down here. I think that guy trying th alternative method of delivery on a horse scared the Post Office into improvement.

Anyway, I appreciate the additional refinements. I'll add them to the original of the interview. Someday in the Academy Archives, or whatever, another researcher will have the benefit of your recollections, all of which are most appreciated.

I'm off to the Southland for more interviews. I ran into a Colonel H.H.H. Clark who claims to be the original "Hap". He lives in North Carolina and spent 40 years in service starting with EM status in the 7th Squadron at France Field, Panama, under a Capt. Henry Harley Arnold. (P)

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

(F In March - April 1917

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
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PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

February 12, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I'm fascinated by the Arnold letter which I didn't know we were taking over and never previously saw. It was clearly the basis for the decision made while I was in Spaatz's headquarters to cancel the tour of duty until the landings were safe. March 31, 1944 is about right.

I have recounted the fact that I was violently opposed, made calculations showing that we could only add 7% to our sorties by this action, and went to 8th Air Force headquarters to show them. Didn't get to see General Doolittle but told his chief of staff, whose name I forget, that any man who risked 100% of an investment to get 7% was showing poor judgment. Crews were already making "forced?" landings in Switzerland and we might lose more sorties than we gained.

I well remember his comment:

"If we cancel the tour of duty, we'll be fighting in bad faith".

I am sure they revoked the cancellation, or rather didn't cancel, though I believe the 9th Air Force put it into effect.

Berquist's name reminds me that he was commended for his services on this trip though I never knew what they were! Tried to get him to have Colonel Jerome Preston, head of Statistical Control for Knerr and then for Spaatz, commended for his very great services to our mission and he said:

"Oh, you can write him a thank you letter".

It was obvious that he thought commendations were the property of West Pointers!

Am sending Colonel Preston a copy of this with an explanation of our correspondence.

Read your corrected transcript of my tape and turned up the following which I missed on the first reading:

Page 3, Line 4 - not "his" but "Hitler's".
It wouldn't make sense otherwise..

Page 4, Line 4 - "a" thing not "the".

Page 6, Line 2 - insert "when" before "we got" and "it" before "bucked".

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Dr. Murray Green February 12, 1974

Page 6, Line 11 - "south" not "north".

Line 25 - Insert "the plane" before "immediately" and substitute "they" for "there" in the last line. A lot of "brass" was killed on that plane.

Page 8, Line 25 - Strike "there"after successor "was".

Page 10,Line 7 - After Gen. Meyers substitute "Stratemeyer" for "he".

Line 8 - Insert "deliveries" before "the test".

Line 9 - Insert "using" after "kept on" and substitute "as" for "were".

Page 11,Line 23 - "Meyers" not a second "Arnold".

Page 15,Line 22 - Quotes around "I could tell from General Arnold's voice, we are in trouble". (i.e. General Gates speaking).

Page 17,Line 18 - The "of" at the end of the line is wrong. He actually heard the beating.

Page 18,Line 8 - "boss's" not "office's".

Page 23, Line 6 - "later" not "then" Secretary of Defense.

Page 29, Line 8 - "I" not "I'd".

Page 30,Line 20 - "were" not "was" with the staff.

Did Vi tell you about Susie Adkins after a few days saying:

"I've decided you're not after my job".

They then became rather close after that.

Page 31, Line 7 - "a" instead of the first "made".

Mentioned Meyers owning an airplane contractor to the former head of Lockheed yesterday. He thought Meyers didn't control it but had stock in it. It was located in Dayton. He gave me the name but I've forgotten it. You probably know it.

Don't bother to send me another corrected transcript.

Two anecdotes about Lovett. When he was Acting Secretary of State, he had Tex Thornton and me down to suggest a plan of reorganization. Ours was considered too radical at the time but the Hoover Commission later had it adopted. Anyhow he had us to dinner and during cocktails said:

"I hate to admit it but the best years of my life were the years of the war".

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Dr. Murray Green February 12, 1974

I answered:

"Didn't you realize it while it was going on. I did."

"Oh no, I would have been ashamed to".

A year or two earlier, when he was saying good-by to a few of us:

"I hate going. The only thing I would hate worse is for somebody to tell me I couldn't."

He's possibly the greatest man I've ever known.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

cc: Colonel Jerome Preston

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

	INITIALS	ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location) Col Barnes		CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Thanks for taking the time all your suggested changes have been incorporated. I may be back with specific questions.

Regards

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location) Murray Green

DATE 2-8-74

PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

* GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

February 4, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Done 2/8/74

Dear Dr. Green:

It was most revealing to "hear myself as others hear me". I knew my telling of a connected story was bad but didn't know it was that bad!

Just a few corrections where the sense is distorted:

Page 3 Line 3 - It is "Moreau" not "Monroe".

Line 5 - Again "Moreau" not "Lewin". Lewin was not in uniform then.

Line 23- Insert after "Lewin":- "you were".

Line 28- After "experimental work": "a widow and orphans".

Page 5 Line 4 - "Col." not "Gen." Hicks.

Line 12- Strike out "with two of them".

Page 6 Line 2 - "bucked" not "buck".

Page 12 Line 26 - "job" not "mob".

Page 15 - Next to last line: TONNAGE ON JAPAN? UP. ACCURACY?

Page 17 - The fact that Arnold after hearing Carmichael in the war room transferred him to his own office where he served for a year or so before he "asked for and got transferred" is left out.

Page 20- It was WURTS not WERTZ.

- Line 20 - Insert "chance of" before "survival".

Page 22 - Line 21 - "Hopkins" not "I". Wasn't there.

Page 23 - Line 6 - Insert "of Defense" after Secretary and "World" before bank.

Page 26 - Line 21 - Insert "it" after "assumed".

Page 27 - Line 14 - Substitute "in" for "he was".

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Dr. Murray Green February 4, 1974

Page 28 Line 20 - "Alaska" not "hell".

Page 31 Line 6 - "fired" not "hired".

Page 32 Line 21 - Insert "why" after "understand".

At the end of this page it isn't clear that the German ack-ack hadn't enough TNT for their shells. They actually added sand in some to give the necessary weight.

Page 33 Line 27 - "McCormack" not Mc "Cormick". Strike out "A-2".

Thanks for letting me see my "production" and do let me know if there are any further questions and when the book is published.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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Revised 2-8-74

Interview, Col Brandon Barringer, Philadelphia, Pa., 14 Dec 1973

B In 1942 my brother Lewin who had found the local Wings Field from the air as a potential airport, and whose friend then bought it, and he taught gliding there. And one of his pupils or at least a man who came to take a ride with him was Gen Arnold. Lewin mentioned it to me but that was just in passing. Lewin afterwards went out to Arizona to teach pilots out there. I think he had something to do with having had a touch of TB. Dropped out of college for that reason and gone to Arizona. He thought the climate was so wonderful. He knew that there so many good flying days. I think he may have had something to do with persuading Gen Arnold to open up all those fields. And I've always thought that the rapid buildup of Arizona after the war came from all the young men who had trained there, saying: "If I ever get through this and get married, I'm going to come out here and live."

Q What was Arnold's attitude toward gliders and airborne?

B At that time, he had this Colonel Hicks in charge of it and Colonel Hicks, like so many of the regular pilots, really thought that a glider was something ignominious. Lewin had an awful time getting glider pilots made even Petty Officer. What is the thing between an enlisted man and an officer?

Q Warrant officer?

B Warrant officer. He finally, after a big battle--I'm getting ahead of myself--got that status for them. But Lewin was out there teaching pilots to fly--but as a civilian, as a hired civilian. Suddenly, he was asked by Gen Arnold to come and take charge of the whole glider program.

Q When was this?

B This was in '42. Immediately--I can date it this way--it was immediately after the glider invasion of Greece--Crete by the Germans.

Q Then, this was 1941. It preceded Pearl Harbor.

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B Oh yes.

Q Could Arnold have asked him to do this before Pearl Harbor?

B He definitely did. Because, as this starts out, we had a council of war, the three brothers. The fourth brother, Lewin, was already in the service, not in the service, but as a civilian. He ran the glider program as a civilian. He was only commissioned shortly before his death, at the end of '42.

Q Where does Richard Dupont fit in to this?

B Richard Dupont was a great friend of my brother Lewin's. In fact it was one of these extraordinary friendships where Lewin had no money to buy gliders, so he would fly Richard's gliders to beat Richard's records. Richard--I forgot to say that for a while before Lewin was married--he ran Soaring Magazine. He started as editor-in-chief and ran the whole thing. That was done with Richard Dupont's money. Richard paid him a salary.

Q Your brother must have spent a lot of time at Elmira, New York?

B Oh, yes. Soaring headquarters. And he established the American distance record, slope soaring from Elmira.

Q Somebody told me that one of the reasons Arnold got Richard Dupont into the glider program was that he was trying to get the Dupont money to build glider factories.

B Bunk! Completely! He knew Richard Dupont as my brother's friend. When my brother was lost he went to him as my brother's friend, and that's all the story. He got Felix Dupont afterwards. I suppose that was again trying to get Dupont money. It's just simply not so.

Q And there was no Dupont money in the glider program?

B Not at all. Crete happened, and obviously, Hicks wasn't getting anywhere with the glider program. And so Gen Arnold took this kid, really, he showed a remarkable willingness to take somebody who had no executive training. Lewin had once had an airplane mechanic work for him--took him to Iran where he was running an airplane for an archaeological expedition. That's how much executive business Lewin had, and he was put

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in charge of the whole thing. My brother, immediately afterwards, when Pearl Harbor happened, and my brother was out--had just gotten his commission--my brother Moreau--Colonel Hicks said to him--I think I wrote this to you: "The man who sold Arnold gliders is his best friend in the United States." Moreau would have knocked him down, except he suddenly realized they were both in uniform, and you couldn't do that. So, if you'd like, I'll go ahead with the whole glider story. I was at Lewin's desk when I was trying to get my own commission, and picked up the phone, and "Yes, Mr. Douglas." Lewin was talking to Donald Douglas. Lewin had never seen $5,000 in his life. "Yes, Mr. Douglas. I'm so glad that you've got a new design. I can't wait to see it. But, Mr. Douglas, I had to buy something from a drawing board. That's the CG-4-A. I couldn't buy two gliders from a drawing board." It impressed me very much. He was just so sure of himself, and he knew what he wanted. And the CG-4A which he bought off the drawing board was the glider.

Q Did he have anything to do with the CG-10? The 16-place glider?

B No, I don't think so.

Q When was Lewin lost?

B On January 24, 1943. I had the only grown-up--practically--row I had with Lewin sitting--I happened to have the wing of the house next door to the house they had in Washington, and he was talking about the CG-16. And he said: "That really has got to be tried out." And I said: "Lewin, you were the first man to be picked off the ground by a glider. You were the first man to have a glider converted from an airplane by taking the engine out and flew it from Ohio to Washington. If you want to be the first man at taking every chance you're going to leave Helen and your two children exactly the way Eric Spoolberg"--who was a friend of ours in charge of the Belgian Air work--experimental work: a widow and orphans And I said: "That's just indecent." And he said: "I'm sorry. I will never ask a man to do something I haven't done." So he was lost on the way to the Casablanca

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Conference. At the last moment, they asked him to go to plan the glider invasion of Sicily. I'm sure if he hadn't been lost, that the Navy wouldn't have shot down our planes. Because Lewin just went and made friends with everybody that was needed to cooperate in the thing.

Q It was a terrible disaster. They lost 23, I believe. Planes that were shot down over the beachhead.

B You couldn't put Air Force men and Navy men in Sicily in the same bar. Because a fight would start. An awful thing! Then history repeated itself. I was sitting on the same spot on the rug talking to Richard Dupont who had been picked as Lewin's successor almost immediately. I was trying to get him to take Elliott Noyes as his #2. He'd been Lewin's #2. Wonderful diplomat. He did gliding, and he was a tower of strength. And I said: "Don't get one of these West Pointer." I have prejudices, as you can see. Richard said: "I've made up my mind. I've got to cooperate with West Point, and I am going to take a #2 as a West Pointer." That West Pointer was the man at the controls when Richard was killed in that same CG-16. I didn't think to tell Richard: "Don't fly the CG-16," but I don't think it would have done a bit of good if I had. But it almost seemed fated. Then, shall I tell the one I wrote you about Col Hicks? On the way to the Quebec Conference I read a column after Lewin was lost, one of Drew Pearson's columns in which he said: "When is Gen Arnold going to stop putting his social friends"--mind you, I don't think he'd ever seen Lewin at most two or three times when he hired him--"when is he going to stop putting his social friends in charge of the glider program, and get somebody like Col Hicks who really is a professional." Of course the article must have been planted by Col Hicks. I was in Gen Pinky Craig's office. Gen Craig was going to represent the Air Force next day when President Roosevelt had asked to talk to the head of the Air Force. And Gen Craig had given me the extraordinary job, in one hour, working out every question that Roosevelt might ask him, and

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the answer to it. And even while I was doing this thing to the best of my knowledge in his office, the juke box went. It was Gen Giles. "Pinky, theGeneral's tired of killing his friends in gliders. Wire England for Col. Hicks' availability." Immediately after leaving Gen Craig's office, I went to Gen Gates. I got out this clipping of Drew Pearson. I said: "Since when does Drew Pearson pick heads of the glider program? And he said: "Gimme that." Rushed down to see Gen Giles. The 8th Air Force made Col Hicks most available. We never requested him. Then Felix Dupont who is first cousin, I think, of Richard Dupont --since. He's on the board of the Franklin Institute for a good many years--was made head of the glider program. Curiously enough I had been on a glider flight after Lewin was lost, and my youngest brother, then a Major in the ground forces was living with me in Washington, and we didn't say what we were doing during business hours, because he was in Intelligence, and I was close to it. We both met to see this experimental glider flight, and suddenly, I discovered that we were being ushered into it. And I swung on him and gave him the only military order I ever gave a kid brother in my life. I said: "Major, you will take the next flight." Mother had just lost one son and I didn't want her to lose two more right away. Well, I noticed the glider was built by a piano manufacturer whom I had accidentally persuaded to get into gliding during the preparedness. My friend Townsend Ludington, who was a great figure in the early days of aviation, was working there.

Q There was a Nicholas Ludington?

B Nicholas Ludington was always a great friend. Townsend's younger brother. And Townsend wrote me: "The only trouble with our gliders is the wings come off." Well, I looked. This was an experimental tow and I looked to see whether it was made by that particular one of the four CG-A factories, and it was. Well, my friend Ralph Barnaby, who was a Captain in the Navy, and a great glider pilot and still is--he's connected with the

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Franklin--I think he's getting an Air Force medal Monday--was at the controls. That helped a little, but we got the glider bucked behind the tow plane so that I got really scared, especially after we took off. It was still bucking.

Q I want to ask you--you mention that your brother was lost on the way to Casablanca. Was he flying in a glider?

B Oh, no. He was flying in a transport plane with his boss, a Col Smith. Lewin had just been commissioned then as a Major, and the pilot was a young transport pilot. This was a DC-3 on its way to Casablanca, and they were passengers. Nobody knows what happened. The plane was seen going north into an overcast.

Q Was Asa Duncan on that plane?

B No

Q Asa Duncan was lost on the way to Casablanca. He was Chief of Staff to Eaker of the 8th Air Force at the time. This was--I think he was flying either to or from Gibraltar.

B This was flying from Puerto Rico to Trinidad.

Q I see.

B And a front at 10,000 feet--I just don't see how--both Col Smith and my brother were very good pilots, and if the young pilot had lost his head they could have taken over the controls. I just don't know. There is a theory--and it's a far-out one--that a German sub--in those days the Navy let us see their locations. After a while, they decided that we weren't safe. But I saw this German sub working around Trinidad. Immediately behind the President's plane on the way to Casablanca, there was talking normally, the conversation broke off and the plane was found at right angles to that point, crashed in the jungles of Brazil. The third plane, as I heard it, had a shell burst off it. The sub was underneath where my brother was lost, and it's just barely possible, though I've had the logs of all the German subs read for it, that this was a good anti-aircraft gunner on that sub. Because immediately afterwards every sub

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in the Atlantic, instead of diving when our planes appeared, would stay up and fire. And we swopped them plane for sub until they got a little tired of that swop. It was about four to six weeks. But I've never been able in the German records, or anything, to find if this theory has anything to it.

Q There was another man on the glider program, Frederick Dent. Do you fit him into that? He died a couple of years ago.

B Yes. To go back to this airplane, I was in it with Richard Dupont and Felix Dupont. Knowing about the wings falling off, I really was more terrified than I've ever been in my life, and I used a trick which my father had taught me a long time ago which was talking to myself under my breath. What I said was: "Damn you, you want to lie on the floor of this plane? Lie there and kick and scream. It won't save your dirty life, and it will disgrace me." That steadied the situation, and lo and behold, I was told the same glider was flown in St Louis the week afterwards and the wing did come off and killed the Mayor. I don't know whether that's a story but I was told so. I was really scared. That brings me back to the first business of Gen Arnold, when I was down there. He called my brother Lewin into the office, and he said: "I want 10,000 gliders in three months." This, mind you, was the spring of '42, and it was obvious that the plan which, thank Heavens, didn't come to take place...invading Europe...

Q You talked about the President wanting 10,000 gliders, or Arnold wanting 10,000 gliders?

B Yes. Lewin said: "Sir, that's impossible." Arnold said: "The word 'impossible' is never used in my office. My two sons built a glider in the summer, and if my two sons can build one glider the American people can build 10,000."

Q This was in the spring of '42?

B Spring of '42. I called Townsend Ludington, and tried to get over to him whether it was possible for their plant to produce even 200 gliders. Because they were just getting into the jigs, I think they're called, the

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machinery to do it. And he thought I was crazy to be asking such a question. And, of course, thank God the invasion was called off. That's the last. I don't think Gen Arnold ever called Lewin down and said: "What are you doing about my 10,000 gliders?" I think he took "That's impossible" for what it was.

Q You think this was for the ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER? SLEDGEHAMMER was the emergency invasion of the continent in the summer of '42. It was intended to take the pressure off the Russians who were beleaguered at that time?

B No doubt that's what it was. But it could have by this time--I got into the Air Force in April--this was shortly afterwards. But this had to be in the fall, I would think.

Q They couldn't have made 10,000 gliders in six weeks.

Q They originally planned this invasion for the late summer. And, of course, after the Dieppe raid in the summer. You remember Dieppe? It was a disaster, and they postponed the invasion for a whole year, till 1943. But the Russians were putting heat on us.

B Going back for a second to this glider flight where I panicked. Felix Dupont, at that, said to his cousin: "You're seeing a man eating his words." Once we'd dropped the tow, of course the flight was simply beautiful. The glider, there was none of the shaking, or anything else. Felix then became head of the glider program. As I remember it--and don't hold me to this--somebody in the glider program leaked to Drew Pearson that we didn't have self-sealing tanks in the transports, and Felix was sent to Australia. I don't remember who Felix's successor was there.

Q It might have been Dent?

B The name is very familiar and I think I knew. When Richard Dupont was lost in that CG-16, they looked at the desk of his No. 2 who seemed to believe in astrology. I didn't see this, but I was told it at the time, on his pad was: "This is the day to take no risks whatever." So you can

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see that if this story is true--the frame of mind in which he was controlling this hot glider-- Of course, they never built another CG-16. That doesn't prove that it might not have been a good glider, but it started too bad.

Q Do you have any idea about what Arnold's sentiments about airborne were? His feelings?

B Well, he backed Lewin in every possible way when he was in there. As I say, he got the pilots made Warrant Officers. I would say that Lewin was persona grata, the program was persona grata, There's no question about it.

Q One of the problems was that Eisenhower was not hospitable to gliders.

B That I didn't know.

Q That's one of the big problems. In fact, Eaker was not hospitable to them either. Arnold was pushing very hard, and there were very few who believed in gliders. Of course, the experience we had with airborne is sort of mixed. You know you had Operation MARKET GARDEN, you know, Nijmegen and Arnhem.

B Arnhem was a disaster, but I don't know that it was the gliders' fault.

Q It was a combination of things. Airborne also performed with mixed results at Normandy at OVERLORD. There were some questions about how good it was, and whether it did the job, and whether something else could have done it better with fewer casualties. So the results attained were mixed. Arnold supported it, and others, like Eisenhower, were opposed to it.

B Well, I've always felt that the advocates, the two particular advocates of gliders including my brother, being out of the picture, gliding in history has never had a fair chance. I think I might go back to this question of flying the first glider, with the engine taken off. One of the very first jobs I got, when I got in the Air Force was: where, if Gen Meyers was producing 5,000 planes a month, where were they? And I made a study over one night, actually, which showed that he proposed to produce all

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sorts of planes, fighters, bombers, and so on. But if they didn't come up to 5,000 planes a month, he would simply pay for a lot of training planes. His idea of production was paying for a plane whether it had wings on it or not. A lot were training planes. So we were running out of our ears with training planes. When I took that study down to Gen Stratemeyer, I think it was, Colonel Thornton took it forward. From then on I was persona non grata with Gen Meyers. He said: "Why they've got all the grasshoppers in there." So, from then on, we made the test for our figures at least. Meyers kept on. "Acceptances" were the test. "Deliveries" in other words, if an airplane had been flown, it was an airplane. Until it had been flown, we wouldn't call it an airplane. It was an assembly.

Q You differentiated between "acceptances" and "deliveries"?

B Absolutely.

Q He was counting "acceptances?"

B He was counting acceptances in his 5,000 and the accepted undelivered pool was getting bigger and bigger and bigger.

Q What do you know about--you mentioned several things about Meyers. And you were concerned about some things that were rumors and some things that... maybe we can separate some of the rumor from fact. What do you know about Meyers and Arnold?

B Let's finish the other story. By the same token, Lewin wasn't getting the gliders. So Lewin made the outrageous suggestion that you turn airplanes into gliders. And he was able to persuade--I don't know whether he had to go as far as Gen Arnold--he probably did--to take an engine out of a glider--a training airplane--counterweight it, and then himself flew--was towed to Washington in this thing and from then on we turned the Meyers statistics into something of at least some use. These planes were being built just for statistics. They were no use at all, but you could produce--or at least pay for...

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Q You say for statistics? You mean they could never be flown?

B No. They were not needed. But he said: "I'll give you 5,000 planes a month," and that's what he did.

Q What kind of planes were not needed?

B These training--liaison planes--grasshoppers--and training planes.

Q Did he overload the production schedule with those? Who ordered those to be built?

B Meyers did.

Q What about Echols, his boss?

B Echols was a wonderful fellow. I tell the story--really doesn't apply here--of how I got the B-24 killed off, although it really doesn't apply here. I made this comparison and I took it in the Gen Echols. I think his father knew my father in the University of Virginia, way back. At least he knew the name and was always very cordial and I said: "I have a study comparison here, the B-17 and the B-24." And he said he would be very interested to read it. I said: "If you don't mind the whole story is on the first two pages. Do you mind if I just sit down while you read those two pages?" And I did. And he read them and he said: "I knew she was bad. I didn't know she was that bad." The relationship between Meyers and Echols--Echols was his superior officer, but as much that I have to say proves, Meyers had a pipeline above Arnold.

Q Above Arnold or above Echols?

B Above both Arnold and Echols and Arnold was a very energetic man, whereas Echols, I think, seemed a very delightful Southerner in the traditional way, and not nearly so energetic.

Q You think Arnold bypassed Echols to get figures from Meyers?

B Yes. The Meyers statistical department reported for the Materiel Command, and in that sense...

Q Did Echols permit this willingly?

B I don't think he had any option. I told you the story about how Meyers

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was sitting like teacher's pet alongside Arnold, and General Stratemeyer asked for some figures. Meyers said: "I'll get them." Gen Stratemeyer got to his feet, and pointed straight at me, and said: "If you want honest figures, get them from him."

Q And how did Arnold react to that?

B He said: "Meeting dismissed." He pretended it never happened. Now comes the payoff, as it were. I had in my office Vi Duffie, who was a WAC, who was Arnold's personal statistician, and if you can find her--

B Vi Duffie.* She went from 2nd Lieut to Major in about six months, and all my people were awfully upset, but I just told them: "Nature abhors a vacuum," and they had a great table of organization for the WACs, and nothing but 2nd Lieutenants to fill it.

Q I've written to two people. I've written to Mrs. Arnold. I've written to Major Smoak. She was Mrs. Arnold's Aide or Exec. She's now married; they call her Smoky.

B Violet--we used to exchange Christmas cards--Violet Duffie. The story is quite extraordinary. Her father was a very successful contractor who had such a mind for figures that he never kept any books. And he died suddenly, and of course, everybody that owed him money could forget it, and everybody he owed money to couldn't, and the estate went bust. Vi was in the first graduating class of WACs.

Q How did Arnold react to that?

B Arnold asked Jackie Cochran to get a personal statistician. I mean he had all of us, but he wanted his personal statistician.

Q And Duffie was recommended to him? She must have done a good job?

B She did a magnificent job. She shared my office. He wanted to know waht was going on. This brings me...In so doing, being so close to him she knew very well all the girls in Arnold's outer office. Nine days after Roosevelt died--and I heard all this, Truman came in. Meyers had been very uncooperative to Truman's investigating committee, two years before, "the watchdog committee." Meyers had sort of thumbed his nose

* Jacqueline Cochran Odlum Smoak Stratemeyer Meyers Arnold Truman

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at them, and somehow, Truman knew of him. It may have been a connection. Anyhow, over the phone from Arnold's secretary to Vi Duffie came: "Gen Meyers is in Gen Arnold's office and Gen Arnold just said: "Benny, you're a Major." Meyers answered: "I've always been so grateful for your making me a Major General." Arnold said: "Didn't say Major General, Benny. 'Major!' They got you!" It so happened that it was all in the papers that before D-Day a Major General talked about D-Day at a cocktail party.

Q General Miller. That was in London.

B That's right. And he was busted to Major which was his regular rank. Only, if you'll check up, he wasn't busted to Major. It was found by a court that he could not have done such a thing except that he'd had a nervous breakdown. Meyers must have known that because the next thing came over the phone: "He's picked up Gen Arnold's inkwell, and he threw it at the ceiling. He's wrecking the office." And not one of them had nerve enough--God, if I'd been in the office. Not one of them had nerve enough to interfere. Arnold said: "Help." And, lo and behold, the secretary remembered that Gen Grant, the Air Surgeon, had a date of rank ahead of Gen Meyers. She called him, and he came rushing through to the Pentagon building with a hypo and sank it into Meyers' arm. And knocked him out. But that enabled him to be not busted to Major, but just like Gen Miller, to be retired, as a Major General. And after he was retired I saw him once or twice around the Pentagon on special jobs. But he was retired because of this obviously fake nervous breakdown.

Q You bring up several things. About Vi Duffie. When did she come in?

B I think in '44 and served until Gen Arnold left. I think she then left the Air Force. I don't think she stayed on under General Eaker.

Q I will see if I can track her down. You might, if you would, check your old Christmas cards to see if you could locate her.

B I went to Attorney General Biddle. I had this run-in, in a sense, with Meyers, about the procurement of airplanes where he used the accepted

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airplanes instead of the delivered airplanes, and the wrong sort of airplane.

Q Was this run-in in Arnold's office?

B No. It was simply a report which I prepared, and then, Captain Thornton took it around to all the offices.

Q But where was the disagreement? Where did it take place?

B Meyers and I never faced each other at all. I tried at the start. I went to Meyers' statistician who afterwards turned out to be a Commie. I can't think of his name--and said: "Our bosses are fighting, but darn it, there's a war on, and let's you and me swop figures and see where the difference is. Almost always it's a question of definition.

Q I'm sorry I interrupted. You went to Biddle?

B I went to Biddle and I said: "Francis, do you trust me?" Well, I'd done a lot of work for him when he was a lawyer and I was a banker, and he said: "Have you lost your mind? Haven't I always showed I trust you?" And I said: "Will you trust me two FBI men two months worth." And he said: "What do you want them for?" I said: "In other words, you don't trust me." "Not that much. What do you want them for?" I said: "I want them to shadow Gen Bennett E. Meyers and prove that he's taking money from the airplane contractors while he's buying the planes our men fight in. This isn't just stealing money; this is murdering your fellow citizens in time of war." Biddle asked? "Where's your proof?" "If I had any proof would I ask for two FBI men for two months?" He said he'd made a deal with the Army whereby the civilian FBi would not check on the Army if the Army would not check on civilians.

Q You had some indication?

B I hunched it.

Q How did you know? You said in your letter you thought he was making this money available through Harry Hopkins to the Democratic National Committee. How did you know?

B After the war I put two and two together. Howard Peterson, President of the Fidelity, caught a Colonel Rosenblatt--Sol Rosenblatt--

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who was attached and you can talk to...

Q Is he around?

B Yes, but he was in Air Force. I don't know that he knew Arnold, but I think he might tell you the story.

Q I mean, is Rosenblatt still alive?

B He died the other day. He was bad medicine. And he caught him doing something and he was fired from Patterson's office. Rosenblatt was fired from Patterson's office, and was immediately made Benny Meyers' No. 2. He was Counsel for the Democratic National Committee. And I think the tie-in, plus the eventual firing--busting of Meyers immediately after Roosevelt's death, makes me think that the money was flowing--just as it is flowing to the Republican Committee today--it was flowing to the Democratic Committee. I'm not accusing Hopkins of having any of it stick to him. Some of it must have stuck to Meyers or he wouldn't have been jailed for not paying income tax.

Q This happened years later.

B I and Gen Gates caught hell from Gen Arnold once. He had had a meeting in which he had the whole Air Staff say: "We must have more self-criticism," And about that time, some of my people began to put a TOP SECRET newspaper in the form of a newspaper, and Gen Gates called me up and said: "Brandon, we're in trouble. Meet me in the hall." And I got out and said: "What's the trouble?" I could tell from the General's voice, we are in trouble. And we went down to see Gen Arnold and he waved this newspaper which had as a headline: "TONNAGE ON JAPAN? UP. ACCURACY?" And I tried to draw fire. Gen Arnold was not nearly as nasty to us converted merchantmen--I think because he couldn't

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do so much to us--as he was to his fellow regulars. And I tried to draw the fire from Gen Gates, said: "But Gen Arnold, this is the self-criticism you asked us for." Arnold said: "Self-criticism! I found this on Brownell's desk!" This was the assistant to Lovett. That awful business of going over your head to your boss which we didn't intend to do. And I said: "I'm sorry. That's your staff's fault. I said that you ought to see this as soon as you got in." And that was all but Gen Gates pretty soon was sent down to Brazil where we had a band. So he was the only Brigadier General commanding a band.

Q He was pushed out of Washington?

B Finally.

Q Why was Arnold exercised about that?

B Well, because here was Mr. Lovett getting criticism of the Air Force. He didn't mind criticism that didn't go outside of the Air Force, but he very much objected to what had taken place. Gen Gates said to me, early in the day, the whole thing was really like a court. I mean I got the impression--that I didn't know that a big Army Headquarters was really a court. Here was the King; he had his favorites, and Gen Gates said: "Never get close to him." He said "the people who get close to him, he suddenly gets bored with, and they get out of here." And in the time that we were there there were three or four--I can't think of their names now--officers who were very close to Gen Arnold, and--all of a sudden--gone. He was really fickle that way.

Q Could it be that some of them wanted to leave--like Norstad and Kuter?

B No. I don't think so. Carmichael, you mentioned him. I remember one time, Gen Arnold wanted to know where every plane of the last month's production was. I had not been able to get my boss, Col Thornton, to keep 3 x 5 cards. He said: "Everybody keeps 3 x 5 cards. We just want to deal in figures." I said: "Behind the figures always there must be a thing." And we didn't have the 3 x 5 cards. We put them in after this. So we

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tried to run down the individual planes instead of the numbers that had come out of that. As a matter of fact, my people worked all night. I went home, got about three hours sleep and came back because I thought I ought to be there putting that in good shape at the end. And Colonel Carmichael would come rushing out, and say: "Haven't you got it yet?" We said: "Nearly." He said: "Fudge the figures! This is hot!" Evidently Arnold had been asked by Roosevelt for the last month's production. ~~Wire~~.

B We were talking about Carmichael, and the strain of headquarters. I mean this was one of our real heroes, of course. He had taken all that was left of the Air Force in the Philippines after the Japs got through with it, and he took it down to New Guinea. Arnold had him transferred to his own office for a year or so. Carmichael ~~And he~~ gave a talk, I remember it well, in the War Room one morning.

~~Q Carmichael?~~

~~B Carmichael~~. Gen Arnold, I think it was, said: "What can we do for the people out there?" And Carmichael said: "Give us women." He said: "You have no idea what it is to be in New Guinea, and not a white woman anywhere." And Carmichael then proceeded to ask for and get transferred. He was shot down over Japan, as I remember it. At the same time I think Loutzenheiser was shot down. I told me he heard of Loutzenheiser being beaten to death. Somebody called out and said: "Col Carmichael's back." We all thought he was dead. And I was awfully glad they did because he walked into my office. If I hadn't had the warning I'd have thought it was a ghost. I think that covers the points I was going to make, unless others come up on your questions.

Q You had a meeting with Szold, the President's statistician?

B I wrote you about that.

Q And there was this business of planes sitting around? It was a national disgrace? He said or you said?

B He said, in the cab: "It is a national disgrace how few of our planes

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are overseas." I got off at the White House, and so the cab driver wouldn't hear me, let the cab drive off, and exploded, really. I said: "The national disgrace is many are overseas. They're sitting there without crews and the crews are sitting without planes in this country to train them." He said: "oh?" I said: "Come to the office and I'll show you." And he came that afternoon. I showed him our charts, how many planes we needed, how few we had here. How many crews they needed in England, and how few they had. And I said: "It's your office's fault. We're just under pressure from him to get them overseas. And Arnold is saying: "Yes, sir."

Q You thought more planes should have been kept here for training purposes?

B I knew that they should. Szold said: "I think I can take that pressure off you. I don't think the President knows that we train crews in the same planes that they fight in." And when he said: "I don't think the President knows," of course, since he was the President's personal statistician, it means he didn't know. Then as I told you.

Q Whose fault was that? Maldistribution?

B No. The fault was simply that Roosevelt throughout was trying to get planes to England without realizing what he was doing, and Gen Arnold was not telling him that we shouldn't take the planes to England. He was saying: "Yes, sir," and he'd tell us to send the planes over.

Q In other words, we should not have sent so many B-17's over?

B Absolutely not, until they had the crews. The President didn't know that the B-17 crew was trained in B-17's.

Q What is Arnold's role in that, if any?

B Arnold--the President was telling him....

Q And he was just acquiescing?

B He was not only acquiescing. He was saying to people in charge of the movement of planes: "Get more over!" And they were saying: "Yes, sir," and everybody was saying: "Yes, sir."

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Q This letter you sent me, this economic analysis you did for Arnold's chapter: "The Air Force In The Atomic Age"

B You said you had that.

Q I don't have the analysis. I have the published work, not the analysis.

B Gen Arnold was putting terrific pressure on Gen Eaker to run more missions in the early days.

Q This was in '43?

B '43. And run more productive runs instead of milk runs across the Channel. It's pretty clear that Eaker, whether deliberately or not, was fighting within his replacements. Practically no general wants to let his forces be dissipated, have fewer planes. I got this--Eaker sent Arnold during this pressure "What are other theaters doing?" And Arnold sent to me a message: "Eaker, you asked for it. Barringer, fill in." So I gave him the sortie rates in other theaters, which was very unfair because, after all, the other theaters weren't suffering the loss rate per sortie. But I don't think there's any question that Arnold demoted Eaker when he sent him to Africa, and he brought Spaatz up to take care of the Air Force. I guess that's well known in history. Spaatz--this 50-50 chance of survival. My brother when he was Tedder's statistician, was asked by Gen Doolittle: "Work out some way whereby, with your tour of duty business, I don't have to send half my Air Force back every couple of months. And my brother wrote me and said: "Isn't this the answer?" There's only one thing to do, and that's go over strength at the beginning so when the tour of duty runs out of the original survivors, the drop-down does not go below your strength.

Q I think he was sending two or two and a half to one plane.

B That was another thing, that question of the number of crews necessary. We originally had one plane a crew. We made studies which showed that the right ratio was a crew and a half per plane. Of course, the crew needed rest and the plane needed repairs. That's about the way

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it worked out. But in the military you either go hard right rudder or hard left rudder. You never steer a central course. And so, they went from one crew a plane to two crews a plane. Then, we had crews sitting around. I think, eventually, we got back to a crew and a half per plane.

Q Did you ever get involved in the business - this was late in 1944 - we suddenly needed a lot of infantry. This was around the Battle of the Bulge, and a lot of men who were stashed away by the Signal Corps and by the Army Air Forces--aviation cadets who had never been called up to duty. A lot of these fellows were sent into the Infantry. Did you get involved in that?

B No. I got into that in an indirect fashion. A lifelong friend of mine, afterwards a General Wurtz here, though he's a civilian, was statistician with the ground forces, and my youngest brother's boss. And they got very much objecting to our rotation because the poor darned infantryman was over there until he was killed, or so badly wounded that he couldn't be put back into service until the end of the war. And they hadn't planned rotation. We planned rotation because we didn't think that our men were up to it. The British had a 50-mission tour of duty followed by six months rest followed by another 50-mission tour of duty. It was darned near suicide. I mean they only had 3% or 5% survival. So we went on this basis of 50-50 chance of survival. Well, John was comparing Air Force casualties with ground force casualties percent. Of course, he had all the wounded in, and I would point out that he had the same man as a casualty three times. Our casualties were total. What I kept up my sleeve was prisoners of war. So while we fought on a 50-50 chance of survival-basis, bringing back a crew after half their fellows had been lost, the actual chance of survival was a good deal better than that because of the prisoners among the other half. Things got so bad that the Chief of the Chaplains announced that he had figures showing that the Chaplains was the most dangerous job in the Air Force. And I said: "That's silly."

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Whereupon I got a message that I had insulted the honor of an officer, a gentleman, and the Chief of the Chaplains.

Q Was that William Arnold then?

B I don't know who the Chief of Chaplains was.

Q You know, one item on the Benny Meyers business. You know that in 1943 Stratemeyer, at Arnold's behest, put out a questionnaire. This questionnaire went to all senior officers who had procurement responsibilities. They were to fill out this questionnaire listing their stocks, their holdings, their net worth, and things like that. And people like Orval Cook and Echols, and Benny Meyers, and a lot of other people filled these forms out. And Benny Meyers at his trial said he filled his form out incorrectly with the acquiescence of Arnold. Of course Arnold heatedly denied this. Do you have anything to do with the questionnaire that Stratemeyer put out?

B Certainly the questionnaire didn't get as low as my level. I never had to fill one out.

Q You didn't have procurement responsibilities?

B I wouldn't have gotten one, anyway.

Q You wouldn't have gotten one because you didn't have to make decisions to buy this and not that?

B Not in procurement.

Q Did you hear any static on that question?

B Never.

Q I want to ask you about this business of bombs on Japan before the convention. And somebody heard Roosevelt cry: "That's an order!" Can you tell me about that?

B I went to the first Quebec Conference in 1943. This was the one I remember. In the Pentagon my pass was looked at every time. When I showed one of those Canadian Mounties, at the much hotter Quebec Conference, my pass a second time, they said: "But we've seen that! We know you." They were pros.

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Q This is Roosevelt wanting B-29s to attack Japan by the convention.

B Well, for want of anything else to do, my job was to lay out the plans, by the month, of the number of planes that England, the Navy, and we would have at the front by types. The going plans. And I went to the Navy, and I said: "I can't get anything out of you. I've got the British deployment; why can't I get yours?" And this Navy Captain said: "It's perfectly simple. You talked to the British. We're not going to give our plans to anybody who talks to the British." And yet the whole idea was, theoretically, an alliance whereby we would plan together. One night, there being nothing better to do--I think it was Gen Kuter who was our boss there under Arnold. Kuter said: "What would we do if Germany surrendered; what would we do with all those B-24?" Somebody said: "We could do is send B-29s to India and send B-24s to take gas over the Hump.

Q Who made the suggestion?

B I'm quite sure it was Gen Kuter. I was not present, but I got in on the calculations. And we discovered that the bottleneck there, if you please, was the port of Calcutta. The B-24s could carry more gas over the Hump than they could get ships carrying gas into the port of Calcutta. So, just as a matter of interest, Gen Kuter and Gen Arnold went to see Roosevelt, like a king having his bedside levee. Hopkins happened to be sitting alongside of him. And Gen Kuter told this immediately afterwards--we were preparing this study. So though I wasn't there I know it happened. And he explained the plan and Harry Hopkins said: "Bombs on Japan before the Convention." And Roosevelt said: "That's an order!" So we get back to Washington and I was called back on the hot line: "Where are the 1,000 B-24's that you're going to use to supply the B-29's attacking Japan?" And I said: "They're fighting Germany. You can't have those until we get over the German side of the war.

Q They left out the contingency?

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B That's right. They left out the IF. And this fellow said: "That isn't what we heard. We heard "bombs on Japan before the convention."

Q They did get the bombs on Japan on June 15th, 1944, just before the convention.

B Because what we did. We didn't have any B-24s. But we sent the very first B-29s with then Secretary of Defense, now President of the World Bank, McNamara.

Q In other words, you're suggesting there was a political relationship to the military?

B There certainly was in the instance, and once it was an order, it was not up to us to decide...

Q This makes more sense than another speculation I heard that Roosevelt wanted bombs on Japan by the second anniversary of Doolittle's raid, April 18th of '44. Did you ever hear that?

B No. And I would have. Did I tell you about "The Gen Arnold" or did you hear about "The General Arnold."

Q You mean about the general's signature on the plane?

B He forwarded to Gen Arnold--He gave Vi Duffie the job of telling him every morning where "The Gen Arnold" was. The idea was of course he was in a hurry to get them over, and they were delayed here and there. He wanted to find out what the typical reason for delay was--a very sensible idea. And so, morning by morning, in my office, Vi would make her morning report where "The Gen Arnold" was and the last report was "The Gen Arnold" had an engine failure over Manchuria. The last report she set down was: the crew of "The Gen Arnold" are drinking vodka tonight; there will be no more reports.

Q That was the last mission made?

B That's where the Russians got the plans for the B-29. It was out of "The Gen Arnold."

Q There were several planes that landed at Vladivostok.

B I don't know where. It was on the far side of what afterwards became the Iron Curtain.

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Q I want to ask you about Robert S. McNamara. He's a fascinating figure.

B He certainly is. The brightest man I've ever known. I think he's gotten over what I felt was his original fault. He thought other people were as bright, and if they weren't that bright, there must be something awfully wrong with them. Because he used to be very intolerant of some of the other people in the show. But I think he got over that. It was a minor business. Being our best man, we put him with "the white hope" of the Air Force--the B-29s--so that he actually saw them being built. He went over with the first lot, to China.

Q Didn't they project their logistics needs so that they would have on hand what the B-29s needed in advance?

B He could well have. That was his job. I really don't know, but I mean he could well have.

Q Gen Emrick told me McNamara had a crew which did a fantastic job of extrapolating the need.

B Delighted to hear it. I just didn't know it myself. But he did do this figuring, I know, on the bomb carrying capacity--the gas consumption--of each of them, whereby he found that some of them could carry as much as three tons of bombs instead of two per 20 tons of gas. The ratio was there. The amount of gas that you had to fly over the Hump, and the gas used to fly it over the Hump, in order to put one B-29 over Japan. was something out of this world.

Q I think I saw some statistics...

B The whole B-29 bombing from China was very good because they enabled us to get the bugs out of the B-29. But as far as the war, there was picayune damage to Japan.

Q I think the statistic was one ton of fuel to carry another ton of fuel over the Hump. In other words, you start out with two tons of fuel, one of which was consumed in getting the other there.

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B I'd forgotten that, but certainly it then took 18 tons of fuel to carry two tons of bombs to Japan. Unless it was an economical plane, in which case you could smuggle another half ton of bombs aboard.

Q I want to get back to Benny Meyers for just one more thing. You said, I think, that Arnold had to put up with Meyers because Meyers seemed to be under FDR's, or Hopkins', protection. You implied that Arnold did not think much of Meyers. My reading of Arnold and Meyers is quite a bit different. Arnold had a great deal of respect and looked to Meyers for these answers, like statistical questions. You know Meyers gave him the "acceptances." You gave me this fact, whereas a lot of people were counting "deliveries."

B I think we started the counting of deliveries.

Q You started the counting of deliveries. But, I say, Arnold needed some figures and he needed optimistic figures, and Meyers was the man willing to give him optimistic figures. Perhaps Echols was not. Echols was more strait-laced.

B Yes, I guess that's true. And that's why, of course, Meyers, when somebody else began giving him figures that were meaningful...

Q The only point I bring up is that Arnold seemed to like Meyers?

B Well, I thought he did. But the way he fired him indicated that a great weight had been relieved and he had not had a chance to say what he thought. I'm just going by that one episode. It was extraordinary, though, Stratemeyer...

Q You mean where Arnold unloaded him after Truman came into office?

B Yes. That one episode is what made me think.

Q You know, one General told me that it was widely believed in the Air Force that when Meyers was taking, putting his hand in the till, he was taking for two. Some for him and some for Arnold. Have you ever heard this story?

B Good God, no!

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Q I rejected that.

B The answer is: did Gen Arnold leave--you probably have his estate?

Q He had no estate. He had $19,000 in his estate.

B Gen Meyers did tempt Gen Gates once. He said: "I'm making a lot of money by subscribing, the Government is putting out these big bond issues, and they have to go, so the Federal Reserve always bids them to a quarter or a half a point premium. All you have to do is subscribe to $10 million of bonds and you've got a few thousand dollars." Gen Gates asked me about it and I said: "Some day you might be bust and not have any dollars." Anyhow, he said nice business and that was the end of that. So that may have been that Meyers said to Gates that he was making some money that way.

Q I didn't accept this business of Arnold...

B I think it's an absolute lie.

Q Right. I made a note here. You said right at the very beginning that Arnold was an "empire builder." Can you think of any specifics? I'm not disagreeing with you, necessarily.

B What I wrote you about his taking command of the air forces in the theaters. His giving Gen Eaker, I just told you, hell for not running enough missions. Arnold had no authority over Eaker. Eaker was under Eisenhower, who was under Marshall. But, Arnold assumed it, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and nobody questioned him. If that wasn't empire building. Arnold's job by the book was to train the air forces of the United States, not to fight the war.

Q He had certain responsibilities.

B He fought the air war, all right. And another sign of it was his sending those B-29's. They were under his direct command. He sent them to India and China under his own command, not Chennault's, not Stratemeyer's.

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Q Did you ever hear of a thing called the Battle of Kansas? They were trying to get the B-29's out one by one?***

B No

Q You saw Arnold get mad?

B Yes. He was furious at the time that we had this newspaper.

Q He didn't like Drew Pearson who used him and Barney Giles as targets. Pearson socked them all the time. He never saw anything good that Arnold did.

B I didn't know that.

B A friend of mine and her sister who was sort of a girl of Drew Pearson's many years before were asked to spend the night down there in Pearson's house. And the phone--when Pearson was away--the phone was ringing all night long with people giving him tips. I mean a lot of this was coming over what we used to say in publishing over the transom. I mean it was coming to him. He didn't have to go out. I bet that's true of Jack Anderson.

Q Did people fear Arnold when they got called into his office?

B Yes. The Regulars, particularly. We were all a little tense, when we went to the General's office.

Q But you said that the Reserves, that is, two echelons removed from Arnold, like yourself, converted merchantmen. He couldn't do too much to you but the Regulars, he could chew up?

B He could bust them. He could hurt their careers. Whereas we were in it only for the war. If he sent us to Alaska, after all, it would only be for a couple of years.

Q Did he use Susie Adkins as a weather vane? In other words, did you, or did other people call her up and say: "I have a sticky one for the General? Is this a good day to see him?"

B Perhaps Vi Duffie may have. She was talking to Sue Adkins all the time. There was never--I mean we never had anything of the sort.

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Q You didn't have enough direct dealings with him?

B I only came when I was called.

Q And this gave you some trepidation?

B Yes.

Q Because when he called there was usually trouble?

B Well, there was. His voice--you could tell when Gen Gates said: "We're in trouble," it was Arnold's voice. There was another case where something got to Mr. Lovett before it got to Gen Arnold, and I caught hell that time.

Q What about Arnold and Lovett? Do you know anything about their relationship?

B Well, that was a wonderful relationship because Lovett wasn't looking for glory. He wasn't looking for headlines. He let Arnold do everything except, at the last moment, if he was going to far, Lovett would pull him back.

Q Would you call Lovett a balance wheel?

B Oh, a tremendous balance wheel. To give you an idea of Lovett: Gen Eaker, because, perhaps, of that cable or one thing and another, when he took over, he said to everybody that statistical control and program planning were just going to go to Alaska. He would have nothing to do with it.

Q When he came over as Deputy to Arnold?

B No. When he came over to take on his job.

Q You say Arnold's job. Did he expect to be the Number One man?

B He was the Number One man--Eaker. Arnold was retired after that heart attack. We never saw him again.

Q No. Eaker never became Number One. He was Deputy Commander.

B He was running the Air Force.

Q De facto.

B He said he was going to get rid of us.

Q Really?

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B Yes. And so I went to see Mr. Lovett. And I told him I thought he ought to know it. Colonel Thornton being away at the time, I was Acting Chief. He said: "Thank you very much. I think I can fix it." And next morning, when Gen Eaker hadn't been here 48 hours, he called me down, and he said: "Tell me about this wonderful system you have." And I'll go into that if you want.

Q Yes, I'd like that.

B And so I explained a good deal about it. I'd explained particularly this reports control which we put in whereby you ask any figures of the lower echelon--its duty was, standing order, to report the request to the statistical unit and see whether it could be answered by them. In any case, to see whether they didn't have something equally good. Instead of having reports of the status of plans on Wednesday morning, and then, on Thursday afternoon which had been happening, and also killing a lot of unnecessary reports. Anyway, Eaker said: "You know, I was examining, when I was a young 2d Lieut, examining Army posts in the West, and I asked the sentry what his orders of the day were, and he said: "To allow no hostile Indians to come into this post between the hours of sunset and sunrise." And so Eaker, there having been no hostile Indians for 40 years in the West, he investigated and he found out that it was Custer's standing order, and it had never been changed. We changed the form of the morning report. We found that the morning report used special types of typewriters which had been made to fit a packsaddle. And so, it would go just as well on ordinary paper, but they never changed the form. So Gen Eaker, instead of being hostile, he couldn't have been more polite and admiring, apparently.

Q You think Lovett had already gotten to him?

B Yes. I said to Mr. Lovett: "What did you do?" and he said: "Oh, I just told him that I knew that at West Point they hadn't had anything about program planning and statistical control, and it would be perhaps

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simpler if they were just rransferred to my office. So Eaker would have had all the plans of the Air Force, all the figures in the Air Force, going over his head to Lovett. And that was all it took.

Q We're talking of April 1945 when Arnold had just recovered from his heart attack. He took a convalescent trip to Europe. Eaker came in as the Deputy Commander. Did your people or did the people in the Pentagon simply assume Eaker would be the next Chief?

B We thought--I mean in my recollection now--I must have known it at the time--he was the next Chief. I mean--well, the fact he thought he had enough power to send us all to Alaska.

Q Some of Arnold's staff complained that reports were bypassing Arnold's office in Arnold's absence, and going directly to Eaker, so that Arnold's staff could not keep him apprised of what was happening. Some of the people like Fred Dean--remember Fred Dean, Arnold's Exec--and Jim Maher, they complained about this and complained about Eaker's attitude in this matter. Did you ever hear of any friction going on between Arnold's staff and Eaker's staff? This is 1945?

B Yes. I think perhaps because I have an idea that Vi Duffie didn't have the same relationship with Gen Eaker that she did with Gen Arnold. Therefore I wasn't as close, as it was, with the staff.

Q You got information from Vi about what was happening in front?

B We got vibrations from Vi; that's right.

Q And I guess she lost her status when Eaker moved in there?

B I think so; I just don't remember her being around afterwards.

Q How about Susie Adkins? Did she stay on as Eaker's secretary?

B I don't think so but I don't know. She'd get awful mad at Arnold sometimes, and when he was a little rough with her or something, she'd fight back.

Q You know Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and giving them strange assignments, that is, strange to their expertise. Did you ever hear of that?

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B No.

Q People were afraid to walk in the E-ring. Arnold might dragoon them to go to Africa, or to CBI, or do something?

B No, never heard of that.

Q What was Sol Rosenblatt's role? He was sort of a nebulous figure?

B No. He was with Benny Meyers, when Patterson fired him. He was made Colonel then. He was made #2 to Benny Meyers, but his special job was the B-29. And if you talk to Bob McNamara, he can probably give you some information. He was just as bad as Meyers, if not worse.

Q Did McNamara have any contact with Arnold?

B To my knowledge, never. I can't remember.

Q Two or three layers between them?

B That's right. But I'm sure he can tell you about Rosenblatt. You haven't talked to him yet?

Q No. We're talking about the comparative costs of dropping a ton of bombs via carriers or via B-29s?

B That's right

Q Did you get into this?

B Oh yes. That was some of my people. We prepared all those figures.

Q This was a prelude to unification?

B Yes. And a prelude to what was "cost-effectiveness," which has been used in the Defense Department ever since.

Q Did you know Barton Leach?

B I'm so glad you mentioned that because I knew him quite well. And one of my great defeats was I went to his brain trust. Early in the war I said: "Why not make just two targets. Forget this counter battery work where we're knocking the roofs off these sheds in which they collect airplanes. As a matter of fact, the Germans--we got all the German statistics after the war--and they're somewhere down there--produced more airplanes when Germany was coming to pieces in March

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1945 than they produced in any month of the war in spite of our counter battery work. I said: "All you have to do: I've been in the financing of electric power plants and oil refineries and they take two and three years to build. You knock them out and you'll knock Germany out."

Q And they did, afterwards. They came around to the oil targets.

B The oil only. The Germans afterwards never could understand why we didn't go to the electricity. Well, I went to Barton Leach on this and he said: "Now look here. Those are the obvious things. We're not here to do the obvious thing. Ball bearings are the answer. And, very confidentially, that's how we'll knock out Germany." The Committee of Operations Analysis, which Bart was in charge of.

Q He and Perera, and Elihu Root, Jr.?

B Well, Perera is the one who's written these memoirs. Elihu Root, Jr., I remember him.

Q They're the ones that decided on the ball-bearing targets?

B Absolutely. And he said as far as electric power plants go, they've got a power grid there. You knock out a plant and they just bring in electricity from another plant. By God, if they'd only knocked out six or seven plants there wouldn't have been any electricity. And the Germans could never understand why. In the whole war we never made the power plants a target.

Q Power plants were not high up on the target list?

B They just weren't there. Oil refineries, on the other hand, we got them where they lived, By the end of the war, the ack-ack losses dropped to practically nothing. We found out afterwards that not enough (TNT) dynamite was being produced as a byproduct of the oil, They were sending up shells to which sand was added to give the necessary weight. German ack-ack gunners were told "Never shoot at a plane unless you're sure you can hit it. And they didn't have proximity fuses.

Q There's a famous quote attributed to Albert Speer who said that

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Germany would have run out of fuel by July 1945 regardless of the war. The whole German war machine would have come to a stop. They ran out of oil a few months later.

B Until the war was over and I sent these people over to get the German statistics. I discovered, but I couldn't have worried because we had allowed for this so-called box score of ours against theres. You know that they used that all the time. We allowed for exaggeration. But here, our young Americans who were no better than the young Germans...

Q I want to ask you about exaggeration. There were exaggerated statistics as to planes we shot down. This was a bane of Arnold's existence, these counts of the German losses. Did you get involved?

B We knew it was there but I never got involved. But what I couldn't understand was, allowing for that, why we got a box score three to four to one over Berlin having flown all the way from England This young, fresh German goes out. The answer was, he hadn't had enough gas to have but a very few hours in the air before he met his death. Whereas our people had had hundreds of hours in the air. That was the answer. So it hit them in lack of training of their pilots.

Q Another question. Arnold was an amateur historian and he set up a Committee of Historians in 1943 under Professor Edward Mead Earle. And they were asked to draw an analogy between Germany of 1918 and Germany of 1943, to see whether the symptoms which caused Germany to surrender in 1918 might be present in 1943. Were you called upon to supply any statistics?

B None at all. I do want to tell a historical story, though, because I thought it was rather interesting. I had two classmates. One was Al McCormack, who was head of G-2, And the other was--I can't think of his name now, but he was the Army Historian, also in that level. And he started this instant history whereby you went around to a fellow's bedside after he came back wounded.

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Q Hans Christian Adamson? Did you know him?

B No. I've forgotten the name. We sent one of our statistical officers - he was in England - and he volunteered, and got on that one way-bombing ride to Poland, you know, where they bombed Germany, landed in Russia.

Q Operation FRANTIC?

B It was Poltava. Anyhow, the Germans came in and destroyed all the planes on the ground, and he said it was a fantasy to see those Russian women go out and fight the fire. He said he had never seen such bravery. He came out by the long route and, meanwhile, as a professional historian, he wrote up his trip and his conclusions which were, if you weren't nasty to a Russian he didn't respect you. I gave it - because he was a historian - to Livy Wright, my classmate. Livingston Wright, and he started this writing history within - under restricted classification - within weeks or a month after the battle had taken place. A lot of Generals said: "Oh, that's what happened" Because he would get eyewitness accounts. Anyhow, I gave him one right away, and took it home and read it myself. And I thought, this thing's got a lot of intelligence in it. So I sent it down to McCormick, my second copy. Livy called me, I think, the next day, and said; "That thing you sent me has gone to the top, and I mean, the top, and it's had the most tremendous effect." And Al called up the next day and said: "Why did you let Livy have that first?" It was just when relations with Russia were getting tough. And I think it had something to do with Roosevelt's eyes suddenly being opened. At the end of the war, we were actually running out of gas, and we had a Radford Board to allocate the gas. I prepared our justification which was simply: "We're spending practically no gas on training any more. If you give us this much less gas we will fly this much fewer sorties. It's mathematics." And I got the British to do it the same way. Couldn't get the Navy to do much of anything. When we made our presentations, the Navy said; "Admiral, you know that the U.S. Navy never asks for more of anything than they really need." And not only was there a chuckle around the room, but the Admiral laughed. And afterwards, I went up and I said: "Admiral, could it be possible that I can hear the Russians'

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justification?" He said: "Colonel, I asked a question like that once. I heard from Harry - you know who I mean. I dont ask questions like that any more." So, whatever the Russians had, my brother, Lewin, took the Russians - all their glider people - all around his bases, and so on. They asked the most intelligent questions. And they knew nothing whatever about what went on in Russia. It was all a one-way street.

Q It always was.

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20314

22 January 1974

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

Mrs. Vi Duffie and I had a good session last night - about 3 hours. We covered a lot of territory. Much of it is "hearsay", but I did get some clues to events which up to now have puzzled me.

Mrs. Duffie loaned me the contents of her "black book". A few of the items are new to me, not having appeared in the Stat. Digest published at the end of the war.

Enjoyed your Weaver story. I've come to the conclusion that he terminated his career in mid-war and went to work for Victor Emanuel because he got tangled up politically. He was not averse to ringing in two friends, Pa Watson of the White House, and Rep. Lister Hill of Alabama, to accomplish military ends. On one occasion, he got his knuckles rapped by Gen Arnold.

Your interview is being transcribed. Many thanks for your help.

I doubt that Osthagen will be of help, but will call him again.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

Sent transcript 2/1/74

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

January 18, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Thanks for yours of the 15th.

Is the General Weaver General Arnold's ex brother-in-law who used to command the Training Command?

Always enjoyed the story of his saying to Arnold:

"How do you expect me to run the Training Command with a bunch of rejects?"

Answer: "What do you think you are!"

My brother Paul spent his first year under him at Miami. Weaver said he would make no promotions until he got one for himself and was as good as his word!

I described how Arnold tried to take all advanced training away from him and give it to Yount and how I was able to prevent the chaos that would have resulted by pointing out you could merge two whole office buildings but not the top floors of each!

Had half an hour reminiscing with V. Duffie on the phone. You'll have fun Sunday. She's not a romancer and had stories she was too discreet to tell me while they were happening.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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20314

15 January 1974

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

I am grateful to you for taking such an interest in this enterprise. As soon as your letter arrived, I contacted Clarence Osthagen. I worked with him years ago, but I was then very junior and he didnt recall. He's been in the hospital and just came out. He seemed unable to focus on the conversational subjects, so I either took him by surprise or got to him too late to do me any good, so far as this project is concerned. I promised to call back in two weeks, and will let you know of any useful results obtained.

I also phoned Mrs. Duffie (see letter attached) and will let you know on that.

Havent gotten to "One World Or None". Have deadlines to meet. At the present rate, I shall not be into that era until late Summer or Fall, so I may defer searching out a copy until then. I have so many balls bouncing in the air, I find myself unable to catch them all.

Many thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History
AF/CHO

P.S. One of the collateral projects is going through the papers of Maj Gen Walter Weaver. His widow lives at Kennedy-Warren and just got in touch. The papers will ultimately end up at the Air Archives at Maxwell AFB

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

January 11, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Success! My war time secretary, Miss Eleanor Vass, 5301 Nebraska Avenue, N.W., Washington, called:-

Mrs. Ralph Duffie (former Major W.A.C.)
8920 Fairview Road
Silver Spring, Md. 20910
Phone: (301) 589-1724

She would be most happy to help with the biography and, as I've told you, could be of real assistance as she saw General Arnold and all the people in his "outer office" almost daily for upwards of a year. She was also on the other end of the phone getting reports of the Meyers "breakdown".

Miss Vass also suggests you talk to Clarence H. Osthagen, Franklin Park Hotel, 1332 Eye Street, N. W. - Phone: 347-3125. He was close to the General.

Good hunting!

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

cc: Miss Eleanor L. Vass
Mrs. Ralph Duffie

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
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PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

January 4, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Sorry to have been so long in answering your letter of 18 December. Was shocked to find that the binding of "One World Or None" had disintegrated resulting in the loss of part of "our" article. Have made a hunt for the missing pages without success. Do hope your Air Force library or Mrs. Arnold has a copy.

No luck in finding Vi Duffie in my Christmas card list. Lost her somehow. Wrote my Air Force Secretary on the off chance she might know the address but haven't heard.

Did enjoy our talk.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

December 6, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Have yours of the 4th and enclosure for which thank you very much. My Pentagon brother said ditto wouldn't xerox! I will have to tell him he's wrong though it is a bit hard to read.

I am looking forward to your arrival between 10:00 and 10:30 on the 14th. It so happens that I have asked a protege who is going to Rutgers, and can't do it at any other time, to have lunch at my club. Have given up an Academy of Natural Sciences postponed board meeting for this. He's coming to my office at noon and I hope you will join us. You'll find him interesting. Have a 2 o'clock Finance Committee meeting of the local Franklin Institute and then am going to a Nature Conservancy meeting in Washington so we will have to compress the recording into the 1 1/2 to 2 hours of the morning. Sorry but, with my "History", which please bring back with you, hope and believe we can cover the missing ground.

As for parking, there are two garages on 15th Street you could use. See enclosed sketch.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

Encl.

Letter Arrived on Dec 20th

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

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20314

18 December 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

I want to thank you for giving me most of your day last Friday. I havent yet played back the tape, but there are several items which may find their way into my work. The bulk of the remainder will serve a good historical purpose to fill in gaps in the information we have available to us.

It is surprising how much significant history never got written down. Some of it has important bearing on things we are doing or not doing today.

I tried to xerox the Arnold article in "One World Or None" and am distressed to find that the inner section including pp. 29 to 40, including the last five pages of the Arnold article, are missing from your copy. As I had placed it in my briefcase in your office, it couldnt have been lost as I removed it yesterday. I just wonder if those loose pages may be in your office. In any event, I will try to search out another copy, xerox those missing pages and send a set to you.

It was a pleasure meeting your protege, Bill. He's a fine young man and I expect that he will be a credit to the legal profession when he graduates.

I'm also glad I made it last Friday instead of waiting for Monday which was a mess around here due to 10 inches of snow.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

4 December 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

12-14-73

Dear Mr. Barringer:

Enclosed herewith is a copy of your "Personal History" which you may wish to give to Senator Clark. I will either deliver in person or mail separately your "original" ditto copy. The xerox did not come out too well as the blue ditto doesnt reproduce very well. But as long as it is legible that's what counts. It's not a holograph that's irreplaceable, as of itself.

There are several intriguing items in your "Personal History" that we can talk about. I'm presently thinking of Friday, December 14th as a day we can get together.

My plan is as follows:

I will be driving up, leaving early in the AM. My wife will accompany me and I will drop her off in Media, Penna. to visit a friend. I will proceed to Philadelphia, arriving at about 10:00 - 10:30 AM. We can spend as much time as you can afford to give me, with lunch in between. I should like to host that at a place of your choosing, although I wouldnt want to kill too much time at that, as I would hope to pick up my wife on the way back at about 3:00 PM.

Let me know if this plan is convenient for you, if you would. In the event of inclement weather, or predicted inclement weather, I would propose to postpone this meeting until Monday, December 17th, and then carry out the same general plan.

If there is any doubt about the weather, or other factors intervene, I'll phone you. In the event that your business or some other unscheduled item arises at your end, you may wish to phone me:

Office: OX 3-7388 (AC 202)
OX 3-7428
Home: JU-5-0059 (AC 301)

I'll bring along my trusty tape recorder, if I may, and will make a copy of our interview available, if you wish one.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20314

3 December 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

Your "Personal History" just arrived via Certified Mail. I also have your letter of November 23rd.

I'm trying to arrange my schedule to visit you in a week or two. I'll phone to make sure you are available. I'm looking forward to a good session.

Needless to state, thank you for your great interest in this undertaking.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

November 30, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

The original bound copy of the Personal History turned up and I enclose it. You will note that pages 60, 61, 62 and 78 have somehow been bound between pages 1 and 2 and page 77 is missing!

I note that (page 50) I dated the run-in between Stratemeyer and Meyers, mentioned in my recent letter, some months earlier than it actually took place. I was "him" (a Lt. Colonel, I think then) not a Captain. The Szold incident is on pages 54-5 and I see we broke the in U.S. figure three ways, not two.

Other references to General Arnold are on pages 9/10, 22/4, 32, 35, 48/50, 52, 54, 59, 62/5, 73, 76 and 78.

Remind me to give you General Gates' evaluation of him.

Please take the best possible care of what may be the only copy and let me have it back soon.

The story of Meyers' "breakdown" in General Arnold's office and my suspicion that he was passing money from airplane contractors, through Colonel Rosenblatt, to Harry Hopkins and the Democratic National Committee was too hot to include, and may still be, though the Internal Revenue Service did jail him on an income tax charge and the Air Force took back all his decorations. Early in the war, I asked my friend Attorney General Francis Biddle for "Two F.B.I. men two months worth" to investigate him, but didn't get them. Asked the head of one of the biggest airplane manufacturers about it the other day and he said: "It wasn't us, it was the sub-contractors, I think".

Ran into former Senator Joe Clark, who figures in my "book", the other night. He said he had a typescript of Colonel Guido Perrara (also in Management Control) 's memoirs, apparently just written. You may be able to locate the latter. Would appreciate your making an extra Xerox for me as I promised Clark a copy and wouldn't want to part with this original a second time.

Also turned up the Arnold letter to me and enclose a Xerox. You will see it isn't quite as I described it - 75 year old memories of things that happened "only" 27 years ago are, I find, like that.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb
Encl.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON
8 January 1946

Colonel Brandon Barringer
Office of Statistical Control
Room 4C960, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Barringer:

I am informed that your division was responsible for developing the figures used in the economic analysis of strategic bombing prepared for my chapter "The Air Force in the Atomic Age". I should like to express my appreciation of your efforts in this connection; the figures given in this chapter constitute one of the most concrete and striking presentations of the effectiveness of air power that I have seen.

Sincerely yours,

H. H. ARNOLD
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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3 Dec 73

For: Murray Green

Although I am a little skeptical about the validity, accuracy and worth of his "remembrances", I have no objection to you accomplishing what you propose to do -- if it is done with "Permissive Orders, at no expense to the government."

I am reminded of what Malcolm Muggeridge once said when writing about Sir Winston Churchill -

"Participants in public events are seldom reliable chroniclers of them. Their egos are too involved, their views are too prejudiced, for them to achieve an historian's detachment."

If you are going to get meaningful information from Mr Barwick you will have to control him with penetrating, explicit questions, as opposed to him just reminiscing BS,

BRIAN S. GUNDERSON, Brig Gen, USAF
Chief, Office of Air Force History

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

30 November 73

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GUNDERSON:

SUBJECT: Proposed Interview(s) of Brandon Barringer

1. Mr. Barringer is bursting to tell his story. He just cant wait for my letter to arrive when he fires one back with all kinds of intriguing possibilities.

2. He contacted me after reading my shortie in Air Force Magazine in August which triggered some correspondence to the editor between Allan Scholin and myself. In any event, Mr. Barringer's latest ranges over a wide field. For example, he suggests that F,D.R. was pushing Arnold to bomb Japan before the Democratic National Convention of 1944. As you know, I'm sure, the B-29s were not ready for combat when Arnold and Benny Meyers went out to Salina, Kansas to push them out into the CBI, one by one. The early B-29s were plagued by engines catching fire, de-icers inoperative, etc.

3. Mr. Barringer seems to know a lot about the role of Lieut Colonel Robert S. McNamara, a subject of continuing interest to historians. There were five Barringer brothers, four of whom were in the AAF.

4. Mr. Barringer is 74 years of age. I would like to interview him for what he can tell me about General Arnold, and it would appear that he can tell of other matters of broader interest to the AF/CHO community. I would be glad to ask him questions across the board, including any that may come to mind among other historians in the office.

5. Based on my experience, it would be better to conduct the interview in two segments of about two hours each. I have no idea how busy Mr. Barringer is in his office. His masthead says "Chartered Financial Analyst". If anybody wants to ask questions about what happened to the stock market, I can pose those, too.

6. Seriously, I'm suggesting Permissive Orders involving about two days administrative leave. I would plan to drive up to Philadelphia and perhaps stay over until the next day, if this becomes necessary.

7. I would be glad to make available to AF/CHO a copy of the interview transcript.

8. Request that the attached correspondence be returned to me.

Murray Green

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

November 23, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

Yours of the 20th received. Who published the Statistical Control History and who authored it? I would like to get a copy though it's clearly from secondary sources and in places inaccurate.

For example, when a 10% cut in all offices by name of man being sent out was ordered, we gave A-1 the names of those being rotated out anyhow and got an equal number of recruits from Harvard so it didn't bother us at all.

We were also <u>not</u> bothered by officers being taken for renegotiation. It could have ruined the whole system, but we ran the personnel cards by occupation and I told the man in charge to include <u>no</u> 702's (I think that was our spec-number) as they were not available for transfer.

Please try to find my Personal History. I know one went to Historical. Can't find mine and neither, it develops, can my brother.

The single most important early accomplishment came accidentally. I shared a taxi from a meeting with Mr. Szold, the President's statistician. As we neared the White House, he said:

"It's a national disgrace that so few of our airplanes are overseas."

I got out with him so as to prevent the taxi driver's hearing and exploded:

"The national disgrace is so many are! They are sitting around without crews to fly them while the crews sit in this country without planes to train in! Come to our situation room this afternoon and I'll prove it."

He did. Showed him the figures and said:

"We're under terrific pressureto send more".

He answered:

"I think I can take that pressure off you. The President doesn't know we train crews in the same type of plane they fight in"(sic).

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A day or two later, General Arnold called me:

"The President knows we need the planes for training but that column in your daily report "In U.S." still bothers him. Fix it."

We broke it into two columns: "In U.S. Training and Defense" and "Being prepared for Overseas". That's the last we heard about that.

Do think General Arnold should have explained it himself instead of saying "Yes Sir" when told to send more over! As you can see, my admiration for him or for most West Pointers is not unbounded.

One scary moment was, years later, at one of the few Air Staff Meetings I attended. The General swung on me and said:

"That '50-50 chance of survival' is a God damned Statistician's idea not a fighter's. Custer's men had no 50-50 chance of survival".

That time I said "Yes Sir" not daring to say: "Do you want to go down in history like General Custer?" We kept on showing the chances and indirectly regulating the tours of duty.

The way Arnold, based on his membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ran the overseas air forces over the heads of the theater commanders was extraordinary. Only Chennault refused to recognize his authority, always reporting to Marshall instead. The figures of the unit I had sent to China on Chinese soldiers brought back from India didn't reconcile with those of our unit in Calcutta causing an argument between Marshall and Arnold. I tried to get Tex to send me to find the answer, but he sent Lt. Colonel Dunn instead. The answer was really grim:

"The Chinese throw those who get airsick over the 'hump' out!"

We exercised the same sort of "technical control" over our overseas units except the one under MacArthur who wouldn't permit it.

At an earlier Air Staff meeting, Arnold asked for some figures. Meyers, sitting next to him, like "teacher's pet", with the rest of us facing him, said:

"I'll get you the figures, General".

General Stratemeyer, then Chief of Air Staff, got to his feet and said, pointing to me:

"If you want honest figures, General, get them from the Captain!"

I thought we would have no Stratemeyer or no Meyers, but Arnold merely dismissed the meeting and we both got the figures.

Before the war, Arnold was flown in a glider by my brother Lewin who found the local Wings Field from the air and taught gliding there. After the German glider invasion of Crete and as a Colonel Hicks, who was in charge of the glider program, was getting nowhere, Arnold, whom he never saw again, asked Lewin to take over.* My brother

* I mean Arnold never saw Lewin again until he arrived in the Munitions Building. Saw him several times thereafter as I'll explain

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Reau saw Hicks in the Air Service Command shortly thereafter and the latter said:

"The man who sold Arnold on gliders is Hitler's best friend in the United States".

Reau remembered that they were both in uniform just in time!

Lewin and then his successor, Richard DuPont, were lost. On the way to the Quebec Conference, I read a Drew Pearson article saying:

"Why doesn't General Arnold get a military man like Colonel Hicks to run the glider program instead of his social friends".

I boiled but thought there was nothing I could do. However, a week or so later I was in General "Pinkie" Craig's office trying to give him the answers to anything Roosevelt might ask (sic). The "juke box" sounded with General Giles voice:

"General Arnold is tired of killing his friends in gliders. Wire England for Hick's availability".

As soon as I got back to my office, I got out the Pearson clipping and took it in to my "big boss" General Gates, telling him what had happened and asking:

"Since when does Drew Pearson pick heads for the glider program?"

He rushed down to take it to General Giles.

The 8th Air Force made Hicks most available, but he wasn't requested. Felix DuPont, Richard's cousin, succeeded him.

The B 29's got to China with Bob McNamara accidentally. For want of anything better to do at the Quebec conference we figured out that, <u>if</u> Germany fell, we could transfer the 8th Air Force B 24's to Calcutta and have them supply B 29's based in Chungking. Arnold took General Kuter to the President's bedside next morning and had him explain the plan.

Harry Hopkins exclaimed:

"Bombs on Japan before the Convention!"

Roosevelt said:

"That's an order!"

On returning, I was called and told that A 3 couldn't find the thousand available B 24's on my report! I explained they were bombing Germany and would only be available if Germany fell. They answered:

"That's not what we heard, we heard 'that's an order'!"

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Dr. Murray Green November 23, 1973

So Arnold sent the first B 29's to China, accompanied by Bob McNamara. They were directly under Arnold's, not Stratemeyer's or Chennault's, orders. My brother Paul wrote me from Calcutta, "hope 'your children' are being taken care of, nobody here responsible". They ferried their own fuel from Calcutta to Chungking for what raids they made! Bob greatly increased the tonnage dropped (on Japan?) by measuring the gas each individual plane brought back of the 18 tons it took out and substituting bombs for that gas next time. The total capacity being 20 tons, even a ton substituted increased the bomb load by 50%!

Enough of reminiscences, I seem to be rewriting my History and leaving nothing for our talk but cross examination. Bernie Ley told me he had Xeroxed the History. You might be able to get a copy from him.

General Arnold's letter to me is also "spurlos versankt". Sorry.

Looking forward to meeting you. I expect to be here at least through January.

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer

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20314

20 December 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

I was most impressed with the contributions of the Barringer brothers to winning the war, among other achievements.

Enclosed is a not-too-carefully done summary of some highlights of the History of Army Air Forces Statistical Control System 1942-44. I did it for several reasons, not the least to whet some curiosity about the role of Robert S. McNamara, a subject about which historians are asked quite often, and one, which had I known more, would have avoided the error in my little article in AF Magazine.

To respond to your question: yes, I have seen "One World Or None", and knew of Shockley's role, but not of yours. If you could xerox a copy of General Arnold's letter to you, I would appreciate having it.

I will write to "Tex" Thornton when I know my plans to visit the West Coast. I have about a half dozen people out there to contact. I'd hoped to drive out, but the energy shortage has clouded up that plan, at least for now.

Maybe the oil situation will foul up my plans to head north. Tentatively, I was thinking of the week after Christmas. Will you be in your office that week? In any event, please dont change any plans. Very likely, I would phone you if and when plans materialize.

Back to the statistical history. It is mostly disappointing, because it is jammed with gobbledegook, at least for my interest. I'm not writing a definitive history of the Army Air Forces, just the biography of Hap Arnold. There are only one or two places where he is brought into the picture, and then, fuzzily.

Naturally, I would be most interested in your direct, personal contacts with him, perhaps when and if you were called in to brief Arnold. The same applies to Mr. Thornton.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
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AREA 215
561-3676

November 13, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I have your letter of 12 November. The history you refer doesn't seem to be mine which goes through the end of the war and is "Personal:." Would like very much to get a look at it. Wonder where mine was buried!

Unfortunately, I've looked over my whole house - we moved a year ago - without being able to locate a typescript of mine. Am spending the weekend with my brother, Colonel John Paul Barringer, at Princeton and have arranged to borrow his copy for you.

There was always much confusion about the Barringer brothers which can be straightened out by looking us up in Who's Who in America or Who Was Who in America, which five of us "made". To summarize, we are, or were:

1. Colonel Brandon Barringer (1899-) (Legion of Merit) Deputy Chief Statistical Control, Headquarters A.A.F.

2. Colonel Daniel Moreau Barringer (1900-1962) (Legion of Merit) successively:

   (1) Chief, 15th Statistical Control Unit (Air Service Command)
   (2) Chief, Statistical Control, Allied Air Forces, North Africa
   (3) Chief, Statistical Control, 2nd Air Force, Colorado Springs
   (4) Chief, Statistical Control, Continental Air Forces (Gravelly Point?)
   (5) Chief, Statistical Control, Headquarters AAF (succeeding "Tex")

3. Colonel John Paul Barringer (1902-) (Legion of Merit) ended up as A 1 in Chungking 14th (?) Air Force

4. Major Lewin B. Barringer (1906-1943) (Distinguished Service Medal) - lost en route to the Casablance conference. He had charge of all glider procurement, training, and use in the AAF

5. Lt. Colonel Philip Ellicott Barringer (1916-) (Commendation Ribbon) Chief Secretariat, Allied Forces in Berlin. In Department of Defense 1949 to date. Now in charge of Military Rights. Ground Forces so no part of your story.

Tex Thornton's address is:

Charles B. Thornton
Chairman of the Board
Litton Industries, Inc.
360 North Crescent Drive
Beverly Hills, Calif. 90213

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Dr. Murray Green

November 13, 1973

Looking forward to your visit,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

P. S. Have you a copy of "One World or None" (McGraw Hill 1946)? General Arnold's chapter was written by Dr. Shockley (later Nobel Prize winner for his invention of the transistor and highly controversial racial genetecist) and myself. Got a priceless letter from General Arnold as follows:

> "Until I had read (sic) my chapter in "One World or None", I hadn't realized the importance of air power".

Never did a "ghost" get that sort of recognition! Did dig up a copy of that book if you haven't one.

B. B.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 November 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

After reading your prompt response of November 8th and a copy of my previous letter, I realize that I allowed you to infer that I would be coming up your way in the next week or two, which I'm not.

I hope to be up to New York in December to talk to Lowell Thomas and Juan Trippe, both of whom had extensive contacts with Hap Arnold. When those plans materialize, I shall try to advance my plans by some hours to take in a visit with you.

I'm working under great pressure to meet deadlines and just cant break away before.

Incidentally, the History of Army Air Forces Statistical Control System, 1942-44 just arrived in my office from Maxwell AFB. Just thumbing through it, I see on page 55 that the 15th S.C.U. was activated in the Air Service Command "under the command of Captain D.M. Barringer."

If you would send me "Tex" Thornton's address, I'd be pleased to write him directly for an interview..

Incidentally, I talked to General Eaker this morning about a letter he wrote General Barney Giles. He tells me that General Spaatz is not well and has slowed down perceptibly. He used to go down to the Army & Navy Club once a week but has had to give it up. General Spaatz is about 83, I guess.

I will write or phone when my plans firm up and will try to adjust my visit to your schedule. I'm grateful for your willingness to help out.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
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PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

November 8, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green:

I am delighted to hear you are in the Air Force and to be able to help produce accurate Air Force history. Will try to locate a copy of my "Personal History" and, if you can't find one there, let you have it when you come up and, of course, Xerox it. Earlier accounts have largely ignored Statistical Control because, I believe, of interdepartmental jealousies.

I have next Tuesday and Wednesday or the following Tuesday and Wednesday free and would be delighted to take you to lunch on any one of them and reminisce into your tape on a "now it can be told" basis with any publication restricted to insure against libel. Please call me.

Arnold didn't like Meyers. He had to put up with him because he was under Roosevelt's and Hopkin's protection as shown by the fact that he was fired within a week or so of Truman's becoming President. It was called a nervous breakdown and was, as you will learn, spectacular.

Haven't heard from Ley since he was here.

Am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Thornton who had even more contacts with Arnold than I did. You should certainly interview him. Believe he comes to Washington from time to time.

Looking forward to meeting you,

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

cc: Mr. C. B. Thornton

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20314

5 November 1973

Mr. Brandon Barringer
2106 TWO GIRARD PLAZA
Philadelphia, Penna 19102

Dear Mr. Barringer:

I was very pleased to receive your letter. I've been working on the Arnold Biography for Random House for more than three years. I hope it will be a definitive work as I spent an additional 18 months on a Brookings Fellowship researching the Arnold Papers. Your name seems familiar as I recall seeing it in the reference to the Directorate of Management Control run by Brig Gen Byron "Hungry" Gates in whose stable were some powerful "horses" including Robert McNamara, Tex Thornton, Dr. Ed Learned, Guido Perera and Barton Leach - among the few names that come to mind.

I would very much like to have access to your "Personal History of Stat. Control". Somebody here in the Office of the Chief of History seems to recall having seen it at the Air Archives at Maxwell AFB. I have requested it. If for any reason it is not available there, I would be pleased if you would trust me with it. I can send an envelope to assure its safe delivery. Perhaps you would permit me to xerox it, so I can have it here for reference.

Is Beirne Ley still around? I recall he was busy in Hollywood some years ago. In any event, I've also put in for his book.

My source at Colorado Springs was Maj General Marshall "Mickie" Roth. I can only regret that Allan Scholin, a former writing colleague, took that wild swing at me. His nasty letter, which the editors dipped, said that I ought to be made to return the $10, hence my comment about delivering half the "loot" to my Major General informant at the foot of Pike's Peak. Some readers will wonder about this, I'm sure.

As you may know, Hap Arnold was born in Gladwynne, Penna and lived his early years at Ardmore. He attended Lower Merion High School whose athletic field is "Arnold Field". I interviewed J. Herbert Baltz, age 89, a school mate of Arnold's, who now lives inWynnewood.

Your personal contacts with Arnold would be most welcome. I hope to dust off my trusty recorder, and with your permission, tape our conversation to include in about 200,000 feet of transcriptions which I hope to donate to the Air Force Academy Library when I have finished.

Incidentally, I would dearly love to interview Bennett Meyers. As you well know, he was close to Arnold for a period. General E.M. "Pop" Powers who lives in Montclair, New Jersey, said he thought Meyers was up there some place and employed by Ohrbach's in New York. I wrote them as I did a possible

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contact in San Francisco. No luck. I have a good deal of correspondence between Arnold and Meyers. Arnold liked Meyers because he came up with answers when the President or General Marshall were putting the heat on Arnold for such information: "How many B-29s can we put over Tokyo by X date"? Some of those answers were inflated, but by the time the information percolated to the top, the information became true.

I'll save some other comments for our get-together in Philadelphia at a time and place convenient for you. Possibly you get to Washington and we could have a session here.

In any event, I'll look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

Encl

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BRANDON BARRINGER
CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
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PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102

AREA 215
561-3676

October 25, 1973

Mr. Murray Green
Silver Spring, Maryland 20907

Dear Mr. Green:

I note from your letter in the October 1973 AIR FORCE Magazine that you either have published, or are preparing, a biography of General Arnold.

If the latter, I may be able to furnish some side lights having served under him for over three years and having had several rather exciting and revealing personal contacts. Part of my unpublished "Personal History of Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces" was used by Bernie Ley in his "Somebody Had To Do It" book on Tex Thorton. Am too busy to write the story, but would be glad to tell it if you are ever this way.

Is the infamous Major General Bennett E. Myers dead? Much concerns him and might be libelous, not because untrue, but because I couldn't prove all of it. Could he, by any chance, be your Colorado Springs source?

The best source, of course, is Bob Lovett whom you may have contacted. The way he kept in the background, but reined in the General from time to time was masterful.

Bob McNamara, who was, of course, a key factor in our system, served under me when I was Acting Chief of the System, was not teaching Business Administration during the latter half of 1942, but was teaching in our Statistical Officer School at the Harvard School of Business Administration until we sent him to the U. K. as a civilian. He and Myles Morce were commissioned Captains there.

If your book has been published, where can I get it?

Sincerely,

Brandon Barringer

BB:mcb

Brandon Barringer
Former Colonel, Air Corps

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STATISTICIAN TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL

On 2 April 1943, 2nd Lt., later Major, Violette Powers Duffie was sent up by General Arnold who directed that we give her desk space and use of our facilities. From then on she served admirably as his personal statistician, keeping certain notebooks and a little personal control room in the form that he wanted them, the data, of course, coming from our records.

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Bonnuger → I-95

Broad & Market — Off Expressway at Market

South of City Hall across the Street.

Schuylkill Expressway 30th St.

Rise off lower Expressway E. on Market to City Hall

Parking down 15th St

Chestnut — garage

Walnut — garage

Questions

1. Basis of Suspicion that Meyers in Arnolds office was passing money through

see 11 & 12 → See Rosenbeatt to Dem Nat. Comte

2. Air Force decorations back

3. Do you have economic analysis for Arnolds Chapter "The Air Force in Atomic Age"?

Empire Bldg

4. Your meeting of Szold, inviting him to your your situation room to view "national program" of planes sitting around without crews

a) Whose fanes?

b) Arnolds involvement?

Vi Daffin where?

5. Split of plane categories

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6. Please explain what hassle over plane statistics when Arnold said "yes, sir." Did he oppose sending more planes overseas?

7. Explain hassle over figures between Meyers & Stratemeyer. When?

8. When did Lewis fly Arnold? Tell story of gliders. What was Arnold's position?

9. Bombs on Japan before the Conventions who heard Roosevelt say "Hold on order!"

10. McNamara's role in B-29 program?

11. Arnold had to "put up with" Meyers. Meyers under FDR + Hopkins protection.

12. Meyers ~~retired~~ on June 30, 1945 - 2½ mos after Truman Jim Came in.

13 Do you know ~~the~~ Glen Powell. Arnold is supposed to have fired him because he blew whistle on Meyers

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trans Ed Cardo

Interview, Col Brandon Barringer, Philadelphia, Pa, 14 Dec 1973

~~We'll be talking to Mr. s Brett~~

~~Today is Friday the 14th of December 1973~~

Send note to Barringer

B: I don't know whether you know the story of Gen Arnold in the first World War and empire building? I was told in detail, and I can't tell you my source, I can't remember it. ~~that~~ They discovered that he'd ~~bought~~ as a Captain, commandeered or got hold of a fleet of trucks to supply the few American planes there because he said he didn't see why he had should depend on anybody else. So they took the trucks away from him. But it did show that even right at the beginning of things he was a bit of an empire builder

Q Was this while he was in Washington?

B No. I think he was in London as a Captain in ~~the~~ whatever we called the Air Force in the First World War.

Q He spent a very short time in London at the end of the war, ~~and~~ he was a Colonel by then,

B Well that is all I know of the early Arnold. . . just a story I heard and I thought it was rather good, because he was an empire builder. In 1942 my brother Lewin who had found the local Wings Field from the air ~~and~~ as a potential airport, and whose friend then bought it, and he taught gliding ~~riding~~ there. And one of his pupils or at least a man who came to take a ride with him was Gen Arnold. Lewin mentioned it to me but that was just in passing. Lewin afterwards went out to Arizona to teach ~~glider to teach~~ pilots out there, ~~and~~ I think ~~he had it comes back to me~~ he had something to do with having had a touch of TB. Dropped out of college for that reason and gone to Arizona. He thought the climate was so wonderful. He knew that ~~the air~~ there were so many good flying ~~fine~~ days. I think he may have had something to do with persuading Gen Arnold to open up all those

fields. And I've always thought that the rapid buildup of Arizona after the war came from all the young men who had trained there, saying: If I ever get through this and get married, I'm going to come out here and live."

Q What was Arnold's attitude toward gliders and airborne?

B At that time, he had this Colonel Hicks in charge of it and Colonel Hicks, like so many of the regular pilots, really thought that a glider was something ignominious. Lewin had an awful time getting glider pilots made even petty officer, what is the thing between an enlisted man and an officer?

Q Warrant officer?

B Warrant officer. He finally, after a big battle--I'm getting ahead of myself--got that status for them, but Lewin was out there teaching pilots to fly--not as a civilian, as a hired civilian, ~~and~~ suddenly he was asked by Gen Arnold to come and take charge of the whole glider program.

Q: When was this?

B This was in '42. ~~It was~~ Immediately--I can date it this way--it was immediately after the glider invasion of Greece--Crete by the Germans.

Then, this was 1941. OK

Q ~~This~~ preceded Pearl Harbor.

B Oh, yes.

Q Could Arnold have asked him to do this before Pearl Harbor?

B He definitely did. Because, as this starts out, we had we had a council of war, the three brothers. The fourth brother, Lewin, was already in the service, not in the service, but as a civilian. He ran the glider program as a civilian. He was only commissioned shortly before his death, at the end of '42.

Q Where does Richard Dupont fit in to this?

B Richard Dupont was a great friend of my brother Lewin's. In fact it was one of these extraordinary friendships where Lewin had no money to buy gliders, so he would fly Richard's glider to beat Richard's records.

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Richard--I forgot to say that for a while before Lewin was married he ~~was~~ ~~he~~ ran Soaring Magazine. He started as editor-in-chief and ran the whole thing. That was done with Richard Dupont's money. Richard paid him a salary.

Q Your brother must have spent a lot of time at Elmira, New York?

B Oh, yes. Soaring headquarters. And he established the American distance record, slope soaring from Elmira.

Q Somebody told me that one of the reasons Arnold got Richard Dupont into the glider program was that he was trying to get the Dupont money to build glider factories.

B Bunk! Completely! He knew Richard Dupont as my brother's friend. When my brother was lost he went to him as my brother's friend, and that's all the story. He got Felix Dupont afterwards. I supposed that was again trying to get Dupont money. It's just simply not so.

Q And there was no Dupont money in the glider program?

B Not at all. Crete happened, and obviously, Hicks wasn't getting anywhere with the glider program, and so Gen Arnold took this kid, really, ~~and~~ he showed a remarkable willingness to take somebody who had no executive training. Lewin had once had an airplane mechanic work for him--took him to Iran where he was running an airplane for an archaeological expedition. That's how much executive business Lewin had and he was put in charge of the whole thing. My brother, immediately afterwards, when Pearl Harbor happened, and my brother was out--had just gotten his commission--my brother Monroe . Colonel Hicks said to him--I think I wrote this to you: "The man who sold Arnold gliders is his best friend in the United States." Lewin would have knocked him down, except he suddenly realized they were both in uniform, and you couldn't do that. So, if you'd like , I'll go ahead with the whole glider story. I was at Lewin's desk when I was trying to get my own commission, and picked up the phone, and "Yes, Mr. Douglas". Lewin was talking to Donald Douglas. Lewin

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had never seen $5,000 in his life. "Yes, Mr. Douglas, I'm so glad that you've got a new design. I can't wait to see it. But, Mr Douglas, I had to buy something from a drawing board. That's the CG-4A I couldn't buy two gliders from a drawing board." It impressed me very much. He was just so sure of himself, and he knew what he wanted. And the CG-4A which he bought off the drawing board was the glider.

Q Did he have anything to do with the CG-10? The 16-place glider?

B No, I don't think so.

Q When was Lewin lost?

B In January 24, 1943. I had the only grown-up--practically row I had with Lewin sitting --I happened to have the wing of the house next door to the house they had in Washington, and he was talking about the CG-16. And he said, "That's really got to be tried out." And I said: "Lewin, the first man to be picked off the ground by a glider. You were the first man to have a glider converted from an airplane by taking the engine out and flew it from Ohio to Washington. If you want to be the first man at taking every chance you're going to leave Helen and your two children exactly the way Eric Spoolberg--who was a friend of ours in charge of the Belgian Air work --experimental work. And I said, "that's just indecent." And he said: "I'm sorry. I will never ask a man to do something I haven't done." So he was lost on the way to the Casablanca Conference. At the last moment, they asked him to go to plan the glider invasion of Sicily. I'm sure if he hadn't been lost, that the Navy wouldn't have shot down our planes. Because Lewin just went and made friends with everybody that was needed to cooperate in the thing.

Q It was a terrible disaster. They lost 23, I believe. Planes that were shot down over the beachhead.

B You couldn't put Air Force men and Navy men in Sicily in the same bar. Because a fight would start. An awful thing!

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Then history repeated itself. I was sitting on the same spot on the rug talking to Richard Dupont who had been picked as Lewin's successor almost immediately. I was trying to get him to take Elliott Noyes as his #2. He'd been Lewin's #2. Wonderful diplomat. He did gliding, and he was a tower of strength. And I said: "Don't get one of these West Pointers." I have prejudices, as you can see. Richard said: "I've made up my mind. I've got to cooperate with West Point, and I am going to take a #2 as a West Pointer." That West Pointer was the man at the controls when Richard was killed in that same CG-16. I didn't think to tell Richard: "Don't fly the CG-16", but I don't think it would have done a bit of good if I had. But it almost seemed fated. Then, shall I tell the one I wrote you about Col Hicks? On the way to the Quebec Conference I read a column after Lewin was lost, one of Drew Pearson's columns in which he said: "When is Gen Arnold going to stop putting his social friends"--mind you, I don't think he'd ever seen Richard Dupont--except in his own Pentagon office, and he'd seen Lewin at most two or three times when he hired him--"when is he going to stop putting his social friends in charge of the glider program, and get somebody like Col Hicks who really is a professional." Of course the article must have been planted by Col Hicks. I was in Gen Craig's (Pinky) office. Gen Craig was going to ~~be--the nickname is "Pinky"--he was going to~~ represent the Air Force next day when President Roosevelt had asked to talk to the head of the Air Force and Gen Craig had given me the extraordinary job, in one hour, of working out every question that Roosevelt might ask him, and the answer to it. And even while I was doing this thing to the best of my knowledge in his office, the juke box went. It was Gen Giles. "Pinky, the General's tired of killing his friends in gliders. Wire England for Gen Hicks' availability." Immediately after leaving Gen Craig's office, I went to Gen Gates. I got out this clipping of Drew Pearson. I said: "Since when does Drew Pearson pick heads of the glider program?"

And he said:

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And he said: "Gimme that." Rushed down to see Gen Giles. The 8th Air Force made Col Hicks most available . We never requested him. Then Felix Dupont who is first cousin, I think of Richard Dupont since. He's on the board of the Franklin Institute for a good many years. was made head of the glider program.

Q ~~Board of what~~?

B ~~Franklin Institute in Philadelphia~~. Curiously enough I had been on a glider flight after Lewin was lost with the two of them, and my youngest brother, then a Major in the ground forces was living with me in Washington, and we didn't say what we were doing during ~~the~~ hours, business because he was in Intelligence, and I was close to it. We both met to see this experimental glider flight, and suddenly, I discovered that we were being ushered into it. And I swung on Lewin and gave him the only military order I ever gave a kid brother in my life. I said: "Major, you will take the next flight." Mother had just lost one son and I didn't want her to lose two more, right away. Well, I noticed the glider was built by a piano manufacturer whom I had accidentally persuaded to get into gliding during the preparedness, ~~and~~ My friend Townsend Ludington, who was a great figure in the early days of aviation, was working there. ~~and~~

Q There was a Nicholas Ludington?

B Nicholas Ludington was always a great friend. Townsend's younger brother. And Townsend wrote me: "The only trouble with our gliders is the wings come off." Well, I looked. This was an experimental tow and I looked to see whether it was made by that particular one of the four CG-A factories, and it was. Well, my friend Ralph ~~Banesby~~ Arnaby, who was a Captain in the Navy, and a great glider pilot and still is--he's connected with the Franklin, I think he's getting an Air Force medal Monday--was at the controls, ~~and~~ That helped a little, but we got the glider ~~up~~ buck behind the tow plane so that I got really scared, especially after we took off. It was still bucking.

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Q I want to ask you--you mention that your brother was lost on the way to Casablanca. Was he flying in a glider?

B Oh, no. He was flying in a transport plane with his boss, a Col Smith, ~~and~~ Lewin had just been commissioned then as a Major, and the pilot was a young transport pilot. This was a DC-3 on its way to Casablanca, and they were passengers. Nobody knows what happened. The plane was seen going north into an overcast.

Q Was Asa Duncan on that plane? (Asa Duncan was lost on the way to Casablanca. NO) He was Chief of Staff to Eaker of the 8th Air Force. at the time. This was--I think he was flying either to or from Gibraltar

B This was flying from Porto Rico to Trinidad

Q I see

B And a front at 10,000 feet--I just don't see how --both Col Smith and my brother were very good pilots, and if the young pilot had lost his head they could have taken over the controls. I just don't know. There is a theory--and it's a far-out one --that a German sub--in those days the Navy let us see their locations. After a while, they decided that we were safe. But I saw this German sub working around Trinidad. ~~The President's plane~~ Immediately behind the President's plane on the way to Casablanca, there was talking normally, the conversation broke off and the plane was found at right angles to that point, crashed in the jungles of Brazil. The third plane, as I heard it, had a shell burst off it. The sub was underneath where my brother was lost, and it's just barely possible, though I've had the logs of all the German subs read for it, that this was a good anti-aircraft gun on that sub. Because immediately afterwards every sub in the Atlantic, instead of diving when our planes appeared, would stay up and ——→ fire. And we swopped them plane for sub until they got a little tired of that swop. It was about four to six weeks. But I've never been able in the German records, or anything, to find of this theory has anything to it.

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Q There was another man on the glider program, Frederick Dent. Do you fit ~~anything to~~ him into that? He died a couple of years ago.

B Yes. To go back to this airplane, I was in it with Richard Dupont and Felix Dupont. Knowing about the wings falling off , I really was more terrified than I've ever been in my life, and I used a trick which my father had taught me a long time ago which was talking to myself under my breath. What I said was: "Damn you, you want to lie on the floor of this plane? Lie there and kick and scream. It won't save your dirty life, and it will disgrace me." That steadied the situation, and lo and behold, I was told the same glider was flown in St Louis the week afterwards and the wing did come off and killed the Mayor. I don't know whether that's a --- story, but I was told so. I wasn't really scared.

That brings me back to the first business of Gen Arnold, when I was down there. He called my brother Lewin into the office, and he said: "I want 10,000 gliders in three months." This , mind you, was the spring of '42, and it was obvious that the plan which, thank Heavens, didn't come to take place ... invading Europe ...

Q You talked about the President wanting 10,000 gliders, or Arnold wanting 10,000 gliders?

B Yes. Lewin said: "Sir, that's impossible." Arnold said: "The word 'impossible' is never used in my office. My two sons built a glider in the summer, and if my two sons can build one glider the American people can build 10,000."

Q This was in the spring of '42?

B Spring of '42. I called Townsend Ludington, and tried to get over to him whether it was possible for their plant to produce even 200 gliders. Because they were just getting into the jigs, I think they're called, the machinery to do it. And he thought I was crazy to be asking such a question. And, of course, thank God the invasion was called off That's the last. I don't think Gen Arnold ever called Lewin down and said: "What are you

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doing about my 10,000 gliders?" I think he took "That's impossible" for what it was.

Q You think this was for the ~~roundup not the round up but the~~ ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER? SLEDGEHAMMER was the emergency invasion of the continent in the summer of '42, ~~which~~ It was intended to take the pressure off the Russians who were beleaguered at that time?

B No doubt that's what it was. But it could have by this time. I got into the Air Force in April, this was shortly after wards. But this had to be in the fall, I would think.

Q They couldn't have made 10,000 gliders in six weeks.

Q They originally planned this invasion for the late summer And, of course, after the Dieppe raid in the summer. You remember Dieppe? it was a disaster and they postponed ~~it~~ invasion for a whole year, Till 1943. But the Russians were putting heat on us.

B Going back for a second to this glider flight where I panicked. Felix Dupont, at that, said to his cousin: "You're seeing a man eating his words." ~~I've always Because,~~ Once we'd dropped the tow, of course the flight was simply beautiful. The glider, there was none of the shaking, or anything else.

~~tragic that~~ Felix then became head of the glider program As I remember it, and don't hold me to this - [redacted], somebody in the glider program leaked to ~~told~~ Drew Pearson that we didn't have self-sealing tanks in the transports, and Felix was sent to Australia, ~~and~~ I don't remember who Felix's successor was there.

Q It might have been Dent?

B The name is very familiar, and I think I knew. ~~On thing that this is~~ ~~one man~~ When Richard Dupont was lost in that CG-16, they looked at the desk of his No. #2 who seemed to believe in astrology, ~~and all the~~ I didn't see this, but I was told it at the time, on his pad was, "This is the day to take no risks whatever." So you can see

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if that story is true --the frame of mind in which he was controlling this hot glider, of course, they never built another CG-16. That doesn't prove that it might not have been a good glider, but it started too bad.

Q Do you have any idea about what Arnold's sentiments about airborne were? His feelings?

B Well, he backed Lewin in every possible way when he was in there. As I say, he got the pilots made Warrant Officers. I would say that Lewin was persona grata, the program was persona grata. There's no question about it.

Q One of the problems was that Eisenhower was not hospitable to gliders.

B That I didn't know.

Q That's one of the big problems. In fact, Eaker was not hospitable to them either. Arnold was pushing very hard, and there were very few who believed in gliders, of course, the experience we had with airborne is sort of mixed. You know you had Operation MARKET/GARDEN, you know, Nijmegen and Arnhem.

B Arnhem was a disaster, but I don't know that it was the gliders' fault.

Q It was a combination of things. Airborne also performed with mixed results at Normandy at OVERLORD, there were some QUESTIONS about how good it was, and whether it did the job, and whether something else could have done it better with fewer casualties. So the results attained were mixed, and Arnold supported it, and others, like Eisenhower, were opposed to it.

B Well, I've always felt that the advocates, the two particular advocates of gliders, including my brother being out of the picture, gliding in history has never had a fair chance. I think I might go back to this question of flying the first glider, with the engine taken off. One of the very first jobs I got, when I got in the Air Force, was where, if Gen Arnold or Meyers

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was producing 5,000 planes a month, where were they? And I made a study over one night, actually, which showed that he proposed to produce all sorts of planes, fighters, bombers, and so on. But if they didn't come up to 5,000 planes a month, he would simply pay for a lot of training planes. His idea of production was paying for a plane whether it had wings on it or not. A lot were training planes. So we were running out of our ears with training planes. When I took that study down to Gen Stratemeyer, I think it was, Colonel Thornton took it forward, from then on I was persona non grata with Gen Meyers. He said: "Why they've got all the grasshoppers in there." So, from then on, we made the test for our figures at least. Meyers kept on, "acceptances" were the test. "Deliveries", in other words, if an airplane ~~had wings~~, had been flown, it was an airplane. Until it had been flown, we wouldn't call it an airplane. It was an assembly.

Q You differentiated between "acceptances" and "deliveries"?

B Absolutely.

Q He was counting "acceptances"?

B He was counting acceptances in his 5,000 and the accepted undelivered pool was getting bigger and bigger and bigger.

Q What do you know about--you mentioned several things about Meyers, and you were concerned about some things that were rumors and some things that maybe we can separate some of the rumor from fact. What do you know about Meyers and Arnold?

B Let's finish the other story. Lewis By the same token, Lewin wasn't getting the gliders. So he made the outrageous suggestion that you turn airplanes into gliders. And he was able to persuade--I don't know whether he had to go as far as Gen Arnold--he probably did--to take an engine out of a glider--a training airplane --

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counterweight it, and then himself flew--was towed to Washington in this thing and from then on we turned the Meyers statistics into ~~the into~~ something of at least some use. These planes were being built just for statistics. They were no use at all, but you could produce --or at least pay for...

Q You say for statistics? You mean they could never be flown? ~~or~~

B No. They ~~were~~ not needed. But he said: "I'll give you 5,000 planes a month," and that's what he did.

Q What kind of planes were not needed?

B These training--liaison planes--grasshoppers--and training planes.

Q Did he overload the production schedule with those? Who ordered those to be built?

B ~~He did.~~ Meyers did.

Q What about Echols, his boss?

B Echols was a wonderful fellow. I tell the story--really doesn't apply here--of how I got ~~to be~~ the B-24 killed off, although it really doesn't apply here. ~~and~~ I made this comparison and I took it in to Gen Echols. I think his father knew my father in the University of Virginia, way back. At least he knew the name and was always very cordial and I said: "I have a study comparison here, the B-17 and the B-24." And he said he would be very interested to read it. I said: "If you don't mind the whole story is on the first two pages. Do you mind if I just sit down while you read those two pages?" And I did. And he read them and he said: "I knew she was bad. I didn't know she was that bad." The relationship between Meyers and Echols - Echols was his superior officer, but as much that I have to say proves, Meyers had a pipeline above above Arnold

Q Above Arnold or above ~~Echols~~? Echols? Arnold

B Above both Arnold and Echols and ~~also~~ was a very energetic man, whereas Echols, I think, seemed a very delightful Southerner in the traditional way, and not nearly so energetic .

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Q You think Arnold bypassed Echols to get figures from Meyers?

B Yes. ~~There was no~~ The Meyers statistical department reported for the Materiel Command, and in that sense ....

Q Did Echols permit this willingly?

B I don't think he had any option. I told you the story about Meyers was sitting like teacher's pet alongside Arnold, and General Stratemeyer asked for some figures . Meyers said: "I'll get them." Gen Stratemeyer got to his feet, and pointed straight at me, and said: "If you want honest figures, get them from him." ~~Whirled~~

Q And how did Arnold react to that?

B He said: "Meeting dismissed." He pretended it never happened. Now comes the payoff, as it were. I had in my office Vi Duffie, who was a WAC, who was Arnold's personal statistician, and if you can find her---

Q I've written to Mrs. Arnold, but I've never heard of her.

B Vi Duffie. She went from 2nd Lieut to Major in about six months, and all my people were awfully upset, but I just told them: "Nature abhors a vacuum", and they had a great table of organization for the WACs, and nothing but 2d Lieutenants to fill it.

Q I've written to two people. I've written to Mrs. Arnold. I've written to Major ~~Smoke~~ Smoak. She was Mrs. Arnold's aide, & exec. She's now married; they call her Smoky.

B Violet--we used to exchange Christmas cards, Violet Duffie. The story is quite extraordinary. Her father was a very successful contractor who such mind for figures that he never kept any books. And he died suddenly, and of course, everybody that owed him money could forget it, and everybody he owed money to couldn't, and the estate went bust. Vi was in the first graduating class of WACs

Q How did Arnold react to that?

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B Arnold asked Jackie Cochran to get a personal statistician. I mean he had all of us, but he wanted his personal statistician.

Q And Duffie was recommended to him? She must have done a good job?

B She did a magnificent job. She shared my office. He wanted to know what was going on. This brings me... In so doing Being so close to him she knew very well all the girls in Arnold's outer office. Nine days after Roosevelt died - and I heard all this, Truman came in and Meyers had been very uncooperative to Truman's investigating committee, two years before, the watchdog committee" Meyers had sort of thumbed his nose at them, and somehow, Truman knew of him. It may have been a connection. Anyhow, over the phone from Arnold's secretary to Vi Duffie came: "Gen Meyers is in Gen Arnold's office and Gen Arnold just said: 'Benny, you're a Major.' Meyers answered: "I've always been so grateful for your making me a Major General." Arnold said: "Didn't say Major General, Benny. 'Major.' They got you, " It so happened that it was all in the papers that before D-Day a Major General talked about D-day at a cocktail party.

Q General ~~Millard~~ Miller That was in London,

B That's right. And he was busted to Major which was his regular rank, Only, it you'll check up, he wasn't busted to Major. It was found by a court that he could not have done such a thing except that he'd had a nervous breakdown. Meyers must have known that because the next thing came over the phone. "He's picked up Gen Arnold's inkwell, and he threw it at the ceiling. He's wrecking the office." And not one of them had nerve enough--God, if I'd been in the office, not one of them had nerve enough to interfere. Arnold said: "Help", And, lo and behold the secretary remembered that Gen Grant , the Air Surgeon had a date of rank ahead of Gen Meyers She called him, and he came rushing through to the Pentagon building with a hypo and sank it into Meyers' arm. And knocked him out. But that enabled him to be not busted to Major, but just like Gen Miller, to be retired, as a Major General. And after he was retired I saw him once

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or twice around the Pentagon on special jobs. But he was retired because of this obviously fake nervous breakdown

Q You bring up several things. About Vi Duffie, ~~came~~ When did she come in?

B I think in '44 and served until Gen Arnold left. I think she then left the Air Force. I don't think she's stayed on under General Eaker.

Q I will see if I can track her down You might, if you would, check your old Christmas cards, to see if you could locate her

B. I went to Attorney General Biddle

B I had this run in, in a sense, with Meyers, about the procurement of airplanes where he used the accepted airplanes instead of the delivered airplanes, and the wrong sort of airplane

Q Was this run in in Arnold's office?

B No. It was simply a report which I prepared, and then, Captain Thornton took it around to all the offices.

Q But where was the disagreement? Where did it take place?

B Meyers and I never faced each other at all. I tried at the start. I went to ~~his~~ Meyers' statistician who afterwards turned out to be a Commie. ~~Meyers'~~ man, can't think of his name, and said "Our bosses are fighting, but darn it, there's a war on, and let's you and me swop figures and see where the difference is. Almost always it's a question of definition.

Q I'm sorry I interrupted . You went to Biddle ?

B I went to Biddle and I said: "Francis, do you trust me?" Well, I'd done a lot of work for him when he was a lawyer and I was a banker, and he said: "Have you lost your mind? Haven't I always showed I trust you?" And I said: "Well, you trust me two FBI men two months worth." And he said: "What do you want them for?" I said "In other words, you don't trust me." "Not that much. What do you want them for?" I said

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"I want them to shadow Gen Benny Meyers and prove that he's taking money from the airplane contractors while he's buying the planes our men fight in. This isn't just stealing money; this is murdering your fellow citizens in time of war." "Where's your proof?" "If I any proof would I ask for two FBI men for two months?" He said he'd made a deal with the Army whereby the civilians ~~interesting subsequent developments~~ the civilian FBI would not check on the Army if the Army would not check on civilians.

Q You had some indication?

B I hunched it.

Q How did you know? You said in your letter you though he was making this money available through Harry Hopkins to the Democratic National Committee.

B After the war I put two and two together. Howard Peterson, President of the Fidelity caught a Col Rosenblatt - Sol Rosenblatt - who was attached and you can talk to....

Q Is he around?

B Yes, but he was in Air Force. I don't know that he knew Arnold, but I think he might tell you the story

Q I mean, is Rosenblatt still alive?

B

And he caught him doing something and he was fired from Patterson's office. Rosenblatt was fired from Patterson's office, and was immediately made Benny Meyers' #2. He was Counsel for the Democratic National Committee. And I think the tie-in, plus the eventual firing--busting of Meyers immediately after Roosevelt's death, makes me think that the money was flowing --just as it is flowing to the Republic Committee today--~~was~~ was flowing to the Democratic Committee. I'm not accusing Hopkins of having

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any of it stick to him. Some of it must have stuck to Meyers or he wouldn't have been jailed for not paying income tax.

Q This happened years later.

B I and Gen Gates caught hell from Gen Arnold once. He had had a meeting in which he had the whole Air Staff say: we must have more self-criticism, and about that time, some of my people began to put a TOP SECRET newspaper in the form a newspaper, and Gen Gates called me up and said: "Brandon, we're in trouble. Meet me in the hall." And I got out and said: "What's the trouble?" I could tell from the general's voice, we are in trouble. And we went down to see Gen Arnold and he waved this newspaper which had as a headline: "Tonnage on Japanese [redacted] Questionable of accuracy?" And I tried to draw fire. Gen Arnold was not nearly as nasty to us as he was to his fellow regulars. And I tried to draw the fire from Gen Gates, said: "But Gen Arnold, this is the self-criticism you asked us for." Arnold said: "Self-criticism! I found this on Brownell's desk!" This was the assistant to Lovett. That awful business of going over your head to your boss which we didn't intend to do. And I said, "I'm sorry. That's your staff's fault. I said that you ought to see this as soon as you got in." And that was all but Gen Gates pretty soon was sent down to Brazil where we had a band. So he was the only Brigadier General commanding a band.

Q He was pushed out of Washington?

B Finally.

Q Why was Arnold exercised about that?

B Well, because here was Mr. Lovett getting criticism of the Air Force. He didn't mind criticism that didn't go outside of the Air Force, but he very much objected to what had taken place. Gen Gates said to me, early in the day, the whole thing was really like a court, I mean I got the impression that I didn't know that a big Army Headquarters was really a

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court. Here was the King; he had his favorites, and Gen Gates said: "Never get close to him." He said "the people who get close to him, he suddenly gets bored with, and they get out of here." And in the time that we were there there were three or four--I can't think of their names now--officers who were very close to Gen Arnold, and --all of a sudden--gone. He was ~~very~~ really fickle that way.

Q Could it be that some of them wanted to leave--like Norstad and Kuter?

B No. I don't think so. Carmichael, you mentioned him. I remember one time, Gen Arnold wanted to know where every plane of the last month's production was. I had not been able to get my boss, Col Thornton, to keep 3 x 5 cards. He said "Everybody keeps 3 x 5 cards. We just want to deal in figures." I said: "Behind the figures always there must be a thing." And we didn't have the 3 x 5 cards. We put them in after this. So we tried to run down the individual planes instead of the numbers that had come out of that, ~~and~~ as a matter of fact, my people worked all night. I went home, got about three hours sleep and came back because I thought I ought to be there putting that in good shape at the end. And Col Carmichael would come rushing out, and say: "Haven't you got it yet? He said: "Nearly." ~~We~~ He said: Fudge the figures! This is hot!" Evidently Arnold had been asked by Roosevelt ~~what~~ for the last month's production was.

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B We were talking about Carmichael, and the strain of headquarters. I mean this was one of our real heroes, course. He had taken all that was left of the Air Force in the Philippines after the Japs got through with it, and he took it down to New Guinea. And he gave a talk, I remember it, well, in the War Room one morning

Q Carmichael?

B Carmichael. Gen Arnold, I think it was, said "What can we do for the people out there?" And Carmichael said: "Give us women." He said, "you have no idea what it is to be in New Guinea, and not a white woman anywhere." And Carmichael then proceeded to ask for and get transferred. He was not down over to Japan, as I remember it. At the same time I think Lautzenheiser was shot down I told me he heard ~~Lightholser~~ Lautzenheiser being beaten to death. ~~Lutzenhauser and~~ Somebody called out and said: "Col Carmichael's back." We all thought he was dead. And I was awfully glad they did because he walked into my office. If I hadn't had the warning, I'd have thought it was a ghost. I think that covers the points I was going to make, unless others come up on your questions

Q You had a meeting with Szold the President's statistician?

B I wrote you about that

Q And there was this business of planes sitting around. It was a national disgrace. He said or you said...?

B He said, in the cab, "It is a national disgrace how few of our planes are overseas." I got off at the White House, and so the cab driver wouldn't hear me, let the cab drive off, and exploded, really. I said: "The national disgrace is many are overseas. They're sitting there without crews, and the crews are sitting without planes in this country to train them." He said: "Oh?" I said: "Come to the office and I'll show you" and he came that afternoon. I showed him our charts, how many planes we needed, how few we had here. How many crews they needed in England, and how few they had. And I said "It's your office's fault. We just under pressure from him to get them overseas. And Arnold is saying "Yes, sir."

Q You thought more planes should have been kept here for training purposes?

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B I knew that they should, Szold said: "I think I can take that pressure off you." I don't think the President knows that we train crews in the same planes that they fight in." And when he said "I don't think the President knows", of course, since he was it means the President's personal statistician, he didn't know. Then as I told you..

Q Whose fault was that? Maldistribution?

B No. The fault was simply that Roosevelt throughout was trying to get planes to England without realizing what he was doing, and Gen Arnold was not telling him that we shouldn't take the planes to England. He was saying "Yes sir"; and simply he'd tell us to send the planes over

Q In other words, we should not have sent so many B-17's over?

B Absolutely not, until they had → the crews The President didn't know that the B-17 crew was trained in B-17's.

Q What is Arnold's role in that, if any?

B Arnold --The President was telling him, and he was just acquiescing;

Q And

B and he was not only acquiescing, he was saying to people in charge of the movement of planes: "Get more over!" and they were saying "Yes, sir", and everybody was saying "Yes sir."

Q This letter you sent me, this economic analysis you did for Arnold's chapter in "The Air Force and the Atomic Age" You said you had that.

Q I don't have the analysis. I have the published words, not the analysis.

B Gen Arnold was putting terrific pressure on Gen Eaker to run more missions in the early days

Q This was in '43.

B '43. And run more productive runs instead of milk runs across the Channel. and It's pretty clear that Eaker, whether deliberately or not, was fighting within his replacements. Practically no general wants to let his forces be dissipated, have fewer planes I got this--Eaker sent Arnold during this pressure "What are other theaters doing?" And Arnold sent to me a message: "Eaker, you asked for it. Barringer, fill in"

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So I gave him the sortie rates in other theaters, which was very unfair because, after all, the other theaters weren't suffering the losses rate per sortie. But I don't think there's any question that ~~Baker~~ Arnold demoted Eaker when he sent him to Africa, and he brought Spaatz up to take care of the Air Force. I guess that's well known, in history. Spaatz ~~took the~~ this 50-50 chance of survival. My brother when he was Tedder's statistician, was asked by Gen Doolittle: "Work out ~~about~~ some way whereby, with your tour of duty however, I don't have to send half my Air Force back every couple of months. And my brother wrote me and said: "Isn't this the answer ~~which~~?" There's only one thing to do, and that's go over strength at the beginning so when the tour of duty runs out of the original ~~the~~ survivors, the drop-down does not go below your strength.

Q I think he was sending two or two and a half to one plane.

B That was another thing, that question of the number of crews necessary. We originally had ~~a~~ one plane a crew. We made studies which showed that the right ratio was a crew and a half per plane. Of course the crew needed rest and the plane needed repairs. That's about the way it worked out. But in the military you either go hard right rudder or hard left rudder. You never steer a central course. And so they went from one crew a plane to two crews a plane. Then we had crews sitting around. I think, eventually, we got back to a crew and a half per plane.

Q Did you ever get involved in the business of--this was late 1944--we suddenly needed a lot of infantry. This was around the Battle of the Bulge, and a lot of men who were stashed away by the Signal Corps and by the ~~Air Corps~~--Army Air Forces--aviation cadets who had never been called up to duty ~~and a~~ lot of these fellows were sent into the Infantry. Did you get involved in that?

B No. I got into that in an indirect fashion. A lifelong friend of mine, afterwards ~~a~~ general Wertz works here, though he's a civilian, was a

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statistician with the ground forces, and my youngest brother's boss. And they got very much objecting to our rotation because the poor darned infantryman was over there until he was killed or badly wounded that he couldn't be put back into service until the end of the war. And they hadn't planned rotation. We planned rotation because we didn't think that our men were up for it. The British had a 50-mission tour of duty followed by six months rest followed by another 50-mission tour of duty which was darned near suicide. I mean they only had 3% or 5% survival. So we went on this basis of 50-50 survival. Well, John was comparing Air Force casualties with ground force casualties per cent. Of course, he had all the wounded in, and I would point out that he had the same man as a casualty three times. Our casualties were total. What I kept up my sleeve was prisoners of war. So while we fought on a 50-50 chance of survival basis, bringing back a crew after half their fellows had been lost, the actual chance of survival was a good deal better than that because of the prisoners among the other half. Things got so bad that the Chief of the Chaplains announced that he had figures showing that the Chaplains was the most dangerous job in the Air Force. And I said, That's silly. Whereupon I got a message that I had insulted the honor of an officer, a gentleman, and the Chief of the Chaplains.

Q Was that William Arnold then?

B I don't know who the Chief of Chaplains was.

Q You know, one item on the Benny Meyers business. You know that in 1943 Stratemeyer, at Arnold's behest, put out a questionnaire. This questionnaire went to all senior officers who had procurement responsibilities. They were to fill out this questionnaire listing their stocks, their holdings, their net worth, and things like that. And people like Orval Cook and Echols, and Benny Meyers, and a lot of other people filled these forms out. And Benny Meyers at his trial said he filled his form out incorrectly with the acquiescence of Arnold. Of course Arnold heatedly denied this.

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Do you have anything the questionnaire that Stratemeyer pursuant?

B Certainly the questionnaire didn't get as low as my level, I never had to fill one out

Q You didn't have procurement responsibilitees?

B I wouldn't have gotten one, anyway.

Q You wouldn't have gotten one ~~anyway~~ because you didn't have to make decisions to buy this and not that?

B Not in procurement

Q Did you hear any static on that question?

B Never.

Q I want to ask you about this business of bombs on Japan before the convention. And somebody heard Roosevelt cry "That's an order" Can you tell me about that. ~~That's an interesting~~

B I went to the first Quebec Conference ~~and~~ in 1943. This

Q The second Quebec Conference? ~~'43 '44?~~

B It was the one in which we agreed on the invasion of France. '43. Was ~~h~~ there another in Quebec?

Q There was Sextant and then there was Octagon in 1944

B ~~This~~ was the one I remember. In the Pentagon, the four my pass was looked at every time. When I showed one of those Canadian Mounties, at the much hotter Quebec Conference, my pass a second time they said: "But we've seen that! We know you". They were pros.

Q This is Roosevelt wanting B-29s to attack Japan by the convention.

B Well, ~~what happened~~ For want of anything else to do, my job was to lay out the plans, by the month, of the number of planes that England, the Navy, and we would have at the front by types. The going plans. And I went to the Navy, and I said: "I can't get anything out of you. I've got the British deployment; why can't I get yours?" And this Navy Captain said: "It's perfectly simple. You talked to the British. We're not going to give our plans to anybody who talks to the British." And yet the whole idea

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was, theoretically, an alliance whereby we would plan together. One night, there being nothing better to do, I think it was Gen Kuter who was our boss there under Arnold, said: "What would we do if Germany surrendered; what would we do with all those B-24s?" Somebody ~~thought~~ said, ~~what~~ we could do is send B-29s to India and send B-24s to take gas over the Hump, I'm quite sure it was Gen Kuter. I was not present, but I got in on the calculations. And we discovered that the bottleneck there, if you please, was the Port of Calcutta. The B-24s could carry more gas over the Hump than they could get ships carrying gas into the port of Calcutta. So, just as a matter of interest, Gen Kuter and Gen Arnold went to see Roosevelt, like a king having his ~~xxxxx~~ bedside levee. I happened to be sitting alongside of him. And Gen Kuter told this immediately afterwards — we were preparing this study. So though I wasn't there I know it happened. And he explained the plan and Harry Hopkins said: "Bombs on Japan before the Convention." And Roosevelt said: "That's an order." So we get back to Washington and I was called back on the hot line: "Where are the 1,000 B-24's that you're going to use to supply the B-29's attacking Japan?" And I said: "They're fighting Germany. You can't have those until we get over the German side of the war.

Q They left out the contingency?

B That's right. They left out the IF. And this fellow said: "That isn't what we heard. We heard "bombs on Japan before the convention."

Q They did get the bombs on Japan on June 15th, 1944, just before the convention.

B Because what we did. We didn't have any B-24s. But we sent The very first B-29s with ~~now~~ then Secretary, now President of the bank, McNamara.

Q In other words, you're suggesting there was a political relationship to the military?

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B There certainly was at the instance, and once it was an order, it was not up to us to decide...

Q This makes more sense than another speculation I heard that Roosevelt wanted bombs on Japan by the second anniversary of Doolittle's raid, April 18th of '44. Did you ever hear that?

B No. And I would have. Did I tell you about the Gen Arnold or did you hear about "the Bureau of Arnold"

Q You mean about the general's signature on the plane?

B He forwarded to Gen Arnold --He gave Vi Duffie the job of telling him every morning where the Gen Arnold was. The idea was of course he was in a hurry to get them over, and they were delayed here and there. He wanted to find out what the typical reason for delay was -- a very sensible idea. And so, morning by morning, in my office, Vi would make her morning report where the Gen Arnold was and the last report was the Gen Arnold had an engine failure over Manchuria. The last report she set down was: the crew of the Gen Arnold are drinking vodka tonight; there will be no more reports.

Q That was the last ~~mention~~ mission made.?

B That's where the Russians got the plans for the B-29. It was out of the Gen Arnold

Q ~~Were~~ There were several planes that landed at Vladivostok.

B I don't know where. It was on the far side of what afterwards became the Iron Curtain.

Q I want to ask you about Robert S. McNamara. He 's a fascinating figure.

B He certainly is. The brightest man I've ever known. I think he's gotten over what I felt was his original fault. He thought other people were as bright, and if they weren't that bright, there must be something awfully wrong with them. Because he used to be very intolerant of some of the other people in the show. But I think he got over that. It was a minor business. ~~And he went -~~ Being our best man, we put him with the white hope of the

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Air Force~ the B-29s~ so that he actually saw them being built, ~~and~~ He went over with the first lot, to China.

Q Didn't they project their logistics needs so that they would have on hand what the B-29s needed in advance.

B He could well have. That was his job. I really don't know, but I mean he could well have.

Q Gen Emrick told me McNamara ~~he~~ had a crew ~~who~~ which did a fantastic job of extrapolating the need

B Delighted to hear it. I just didn't know it myself. But he did do this figuring, I know, on the bomb carrying capacity --the gas consumption-- of each of them, whereby he found that some of them could carry as much as three tons of bombs instead of two per ~~twenty~~ 20 tons of gas. The ratio was there, the amount of gas that you had to fly over the Hump, and the gas used to fly it over the Hump, in order to put one B-29 x over Japan, was something out of this world

Q I think I saw some statistics . . .

B ~~It was all~~ The whole B-29 bombing from China was very good because they enabled us to get the bugs out of the B-29. But as far as the war, there was picayune damage to Japan

Q I think the statistic was one ton of fuel to carry another ton of fuel over the Hump. In other words, you start out with two tons of fuel, one of which was consumed in getting the other there.

B I'd forgotten that, but certainly it then took 18 tons of fuel to carry two tons of bombs to Japan. Unless it was an economical plane, in which case you could smuggle another half ton of bombs aboard.

Q I want to get back to Benny Meyers for just one more thing. You said, I think, that Arnold had to put up with Meyers because Meyers seemed to be under FDR's or Hopkins' protection. You ~~I guess~~, implied that Arnold did not think much of Meyers. My reading of Arnold and Meyers is ~~slightly~~ quite a bit different. ~~I think~~ Arnold had a great deal of respect and

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looked to Meyers for ~~his~~ these answers, like statistical question. You know Meyers gave him these acceptances. He gave ~~him his~~ "Yes" as a matter of fact. Whereas a lot of people were counting "deliveries"

B I think we started counting the deliveries.

Q You started the counting of deliveries. But, I say, ~~that~~ Arnold needed some figures and he needed optimistic figures, and Meyers was the man willing to give him optimistic figures. Perhaps Echols was not. Echols was more strait-laced.

B Yes, I guess that's true. And that's why, of course, Meyers, when ~~was~~ somebody else began giving him figures that were meaningful...

Q The only point I bring up is that Arnold seemed to like Meyers.

B Well, I thought he did. ~~I just~~ But the way he fired him indicated that a great weight had been relieved and he had not had a chance to say what he thought. I'm just going by that one episode. It was extraordinary, though, Stratemeyer...

Q You mean where Arnold unloaded him after Truman came into office?

B Yes. That one episode is what made me think.

Q You know, one General told me that it was widely believed in the Air Force that when Meyers was taking, putting his hand in the till, he was taking for two. Some for him and some for Arnold. Have you ever heard this story?

B Good God, no!

Q I rejected that.

B The answer is: did Gen Arnold leave you probably have his estate?

Q He had no estate. He had $19,000 in his estate.

B Gen Meyers did tempt Gen Gates once. He said: "I'm making a lot of money by subscribing, the Government is putting out these big bond issues, and they have to go, so the Federal Reserve always bids them to a quart or a half a point premium, and all you have to do is subscribe to $10 of bonds and you've got a few thousand dollars." Gen Gates ask

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and I said: "Some day you might be bust and not have any dollars." Anyhow, he paid nice business and that was the end of that. So that may have been that Meyers said to ~~Arnold that he was to~~ Gates that he was making some money that way.

Q I didn't accept this business of Arnold ...

B I think it's an absolute lie.

Q Right. I made a note here. You said right at the very beginning that Arnold was an "empire builder." Can you think of any specifics? I'm not disagreeing with you, necessarily.

B What I wrote you about his taking command of the air forces in the theaters. His giving Gen Eaker, I just told you, hell for not running enough ~~this wasn't~~ missions, Arnold had no authority over Eaker. Eaker was under Eisenhower, who was under Marshall. But, Arnold assumed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and nobody questioned him. If that wasn't empire building. ~~His~~ Arnold's job by the book was to train the air forces of the United States , not to fight the war. ~~By gosh~~

Q He had certain responsibilities

B He fought the air war, all right. And another sign of it was his sending those B-29's. They were under his direct command . ~~And that's why my brother said they hadn't any~~ He sent them to here. ~~Because he said~~ India and China under his own command, . Not Chennault's, Not Stratemeyers.

Q Did you ever hear of a thing called the Battle of Kansas? They were trying to get the B-29's out one by one. ~~They had trouble with the~~ de-icing equipment, trouble with the engines, all kinds of trouble. Arnold and Meyers went out to Kansas in March 1944 and they put together these planes. They used this as a command post to get this piece of equipment for plane number so-and-so, another piece of eqipment for another plane. They were getting the planes out to K. B. Wolfe, who had just gone out to the CBI, one plane by plane. This was in early 1944. This could fit

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in with "get the planes bombing Japan by convention time. because they were pushing to get them out. Arnold went out to Salina, Kansas. Did you ever hear about that?

B No.

Q You saw Arnold get mad?

B Yes. He was furious at the time that we had this newspaper.

Q He didn't like Drew Pearson, who Drew Pearson used him and Barney Giles as targets. You know Drew Pearson socked them all the time. He never saw anything good that Arnold did.

B I didn't know that.

Q I did research on three years of Drew Pearson. He never said a good word about Arnold. And I just wondered. He had some pets and some hates and he used his newspaper column I'm not saying that a lot of things that he was wrong but there are certain crimes or wrongs that he ignored and certain others that he kept socking.

B A friend of mine and her sister who was sort of a girl of Drew Pearson's many years before were asked to spend the night down there in Pearson's house. And the phone, when Pearson was away--the phone was ringing all night long with people giving him tips. I mean a lot of this was coming over what we used to say he was publishing over the transom. I mean it was coming to him. He didn't have to go out. I bet that's true of Jack Anderson.

Q Did people fear Arnold? When they got called into his office?

B Yes. The Regulars, particularly. We were all a little tense, when we went to the General's office.

Q But you said that the Reserves, that is, two echelons removed from Arnold, like yourself, converted merchantmen, He couldn't do too much to you but the Regulars, he could chew up?

B He could bust them. He could hurt their careers. Whereas we were in it only for the war. If he sent us to Alaska, after all, it would only be for a couple of years.

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Q Did he used Susie Atkins as a weather vane. In other words, did you, or did other people call her up and say: "I have a sticky one for the General, Is this a good day to see him?"

B Perhaps Vi may have. She was talking to Sue Atkins all the time. There was never--I mean we never had anything of the sort.

Q You didn't have enough direct dealing with him?

B I only came when I was called.

Q And this gave you some trepidation? Because when he called there was usually trouble?

B Well, there was. His voice--you could tell when Gen Gates said: "We're in trouble", it was Arnold's voice.

B It was another case where something got to Mr. Lovett before it got to Gen Arnold, and I caught hell that time.

Q What about Arnold and Lovett? Do you know anything about their relationship?

B Well, that was a wonderful relationship because Lovett wasn't looking for glory. He wasn't looking for headlines. He let Arnold do everything except, at the last moment, if he was going too far, Lovett would pull him back.

Q Would you call Lovett a balance wheel?

B Oh, a tremendous balance wheel. To give you an idea of Lovett: Gen Eaker, because, perhaps, of that cable or one thing and another, when he took over, he told everybody that statistical control and program planning were just going to go to hell. He would have nothing to do with it.

Q When he came over as Deputy to Arnold?

B No. When he came over to take on his job

Q You say Arnold's job. Did he expect to be the Number One man?

B He was the Number One man - Eaker. Arnold was retired after that heart attack. We never saw him again.

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Q No. Eaker never became Number One. He was Deputy Commander,

B He was running the Air Force.

Q De facto.

B He said he was going to get rid of us,

Q Really

B Yes. And so I went to see Mr. Lovett. And I told him I thought he ought to know it. Colonel Thornton being away at the time, I was Acting Chief. He said: "Thank you very much. I think I can fix it." And next morning, when Gen Eaker hadn't been here 48 hours, he called me down, and he said: "Tell me about this wonderful system you have." And I'll go into that if you want.

Q Yes I'd like that.

B And so I explained a good deal about it ~~and he said: "You know--~~ I'd explained particularly this reports control which we put in whereby you ~~just don't you~~ ask any figures of the lower echelon--its duty was, standing order, to report the request to the statistical unit and see whether it could be answered by them ~~and~~. In any case, to see whether they didn't have something equally good. Instead of having reports of the status of plans on Wednesday morning, and then, on Thursday afternoon which had been happening, and also killing a lot of unnecessary reports. Anyway, Eaker said: "You know, I was examining, when I was a young 2d Lieut, examining Army posts in the West, and I asked the sentry what his orders of the day were, and he said: "To allow no hostile Indians to come into this post between the hours of sunset and sunrise." And so Eaker, there having been no hostile Indians for 40 years in the West, he investigated and he found out that it was Custer's standing order, and it had never been changed. We changed the form of the morning report. We found that the morning report used special types of typewriters which had been made to fit a packsaddle. And so, it would go just as well on ordinary paper, but they never changed the form. So Gen Eaker, instead of being hostile, he couldn't have been more polite and admiring, apparently.

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Q You think Lovett had already gotten to him?

B Yes. I said to Mr. Lovett: "What did you do?" and he said: "Oh, I just told him that I knew that at West Point they hadn't had anything about program planning and statistical control, and it would be perhaps simpler if they were just transferred to my office. So Eaker would have had all the plans of the Air Force, all the figures in the Air Force, going over his head to Lovett. And that was all it took.

Q We're talking of April 1945 when Arnold had just recovered from his heart attack, and He took a convalescent trip to Europe, and Eaker came in as the Deputy Commander. Did your people or did the people in the Pentagon simply assume Eaker would be the next Chief?

B We thought --I mean in my recollection now--I must have known it was the at the time he was the next Chief. I mean--well, the fact he thought he had enough power to send us all to Alaska, ~~well, do you know that~~ Some of Arnold's staff complained that reports were bypassing Arnold's office in Arnold's absence, and going directly to Eaker, so that Arnold's staff could not keep him apprised of what was happening, and some of the people like Fred Dean--remember Fred Dean, Arnold's Exec?--and Jim Maher, they complained about this and complained about Eaker's attitude in this matter.

Q Did you ever hear of any friction going on between Arnold's staff and Eaker's staff? This is 1945?

B Yes. I think perhaps because I have an idea that Vi Duffie didn't have the same relationship with Gen Eaker that she did with Gen Arnold. Therefore I wasn't all as close, as it was, with the staff

Q You got information from Vi about what was happening in front?

B We got vibrations from Vi, that's right. And I guess she lost her status when Eaker moved in there? I think so; I just don't remember her being around afterwards.

Q How about Susie Adkins? Did she stay on as Eaker's secretary?

B I don't think so but I don't know. She would get awful mad a

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at Arnold sometimes, and when he was a little rough with her or something, she'd fight back.

Q You know Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and giving them strange assignments, strange to their expertise. Did you ever hear of that?

B No People were afraid to walk in the E-ring. Arnold might dragoon them to go to Africa, or to CBI or do something. You heard of that?

B No, never.

Q What was Sol Rosenblatt's role?

B Sol Rosenblatt, as I say...

Q He was sort of a nebulous figure?

B No, he was with Benny Meyers, when Patterson fired him. He was made Colonel then. He was made #2 to Benny Meyers, but his special job was the B-29 And if you talk to Bob McNamara, he can probably give you some information. He was just as bad as Meyers, if not worse.

Q Did McNamara have any contact with Arnold

B To my knowledge, never. I can't remember.

Q Two or three layers between them?

B That's right. But I'm sure he can tell you about Rosenblatt. You haven't talked to him yet?

Q No. I think he may be dead but I'm not sure.

B McNamara?

Q No Rosenblatt. McNamara's around Washington.

B He's head of the International Bank World Bank. I'm sure he's enjoying it more That's his line than being Secretary of Defense. Bob did a hell of a job but an intellectual like him

Q I think that about covers it.

B I will undoubtedly have more.

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Q We're talking about the comparative cost of dropping a ton of bombs via carriers or via B-29s?

B That's right

Q Did you get into this?

B Oh yes. That was some of my people. We prepared all those figures.

Q This was a prelude to unification?

B Yes. And a prelude to what was "cost-effectiveness", which has been used in the Defense Department ever since.

Q Did you know ~~a guy named~~ Barton Leach?

B I'm so glad you mentioned that because I knew him quite well. And one of my great defeats was I went to his brain trust. Early ~~xx~~ in the war ~~and~~ I said": "Why not make just two targets. Forget this counter battery work where we're knocking the roofs off these sheds in which they collect airplanes ~~and~~. As a matter of fact, the Germans--we got all the German statistics after the war--and they're somewhere down there--produced more airplanes when Germany was coming to pieces in March 1945 than they produced in any month of the war in spite of our counter battery work. I said: "All you have to do: I've been in the financing of electric power plants and oil refineries and they take two and three years to build. You knock them out and you'll knock Germany out."

Q And they did, afterwards. They came around to the oil targets.

B The oil only. The Germans afterwards never could understand why we didn't go to the electricity. Well I went to Barton Leach on this and he said: "Now look here. Those are the obvious things. We're not here to do the obvious thing. Ball bearings are the answer. And, very confidentially, that's how we'll knock out Germany."

Q I see. You're talking about this Committee of Operations Analysis.

B Operations analysis, which Bart was in charge of.

Q He and ~~Ferrero~~ Perera, and Elihu Root, Jr.?

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B Well Ferrara (Perera) is the one who's written these memoirs. Elihu Root, Jr, I remember him

Q They're the ones that decided on the ball-bearing targets?

B Absolutely. And he said as far as electric power plants go, they've got a power grid there. You knock out a plant and they just bring in electricity from another plant. By God. If they'd only knocked out six or seven plants there wouldn't have been any electricity. And the Germans could never understand. In the whole war we never made a power plant a target.

Q Power plants were not high up on the target list?

B They just weren't there. Oil refineries, on the other hand. There we got them where they lived, to the point that at the end of the war the ack-ack losses dropped to practically nothing. and we found out afterwards that the dynamite was being produced --TNT--as a byproduct in the oil and they were sending up--German ack ack gunners were told "Never shoot at a plane unless you're sure you can hit it." And they didn't have proximity fuses.

Q There's a famous quote attributed to Albert Speer who said that Germany would have run out of fuel by July 1945 regardless of the war. The whole German war machine would have come to a stop, when they ran out of oil a few months later.

B Well, I- Until the war was over and I sent these people over to get the German statistics. I discovered, but I couldn't have worried because we had allowed for this so-called box score of ours against theirs. You know that they use that all the time. We allowed for exaggeration. But here, our men who were no better than the young American's than the young Germans....

Q I want to ask you about exaggeration. There were exaggerated statistics as to planes we shot down. This was a bane of Arnold's existence, these exaggerated counts of the German losses. Did you get involved?

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B We knew it was there but I never got involved. But what I couldn't understand was, allowing for that, why we got a box score three to four to one over Berlin having flown all the way from England, This young, fresh, German goes out. The answer was, he hadn't had enough gas. to have but a very few hours in the air before he ~~had~~ met his death. Whereas our people had had hundreds of hours in the air. That was the answer. So it hit them in lack of training there ~~xxxxxx~~ of the pilots.

Q Another question. Arnold was an amateur historian and he set up a Committee of Historians in 1943 under Edward Mead Earle, Professor ~~Earle.~~ And they were asked to draw an analogy between Germany of 1918 and Germany of 1943, to see whether the symptoms which caused Germany to surrender in 1918 might be present in 1943. And this committee concluded that the symptoms were present to some degree but not enough for Germany to surrender in the immediate future. In other words, they ~~predicted correctly that Germany would continue~~ to fight. Were you called upon to supply any statistics?

B None at all. I do want to tell a historical story though because I thought it was rather interesting. I had two classmates, One was Al McCormick, who was head of G-2, or A-2. And the other was --I can't think of his name now, but he was the Army Historian, also in that level. And he started this instant history whereby you went around to a fellow's bedside after he came back wounded.

Q Hans Christian Adamson? Do you know him?

B No. I've forgotten the name. We sent one of our statistical officers--he was in England-- and he volunteered and got on that one-way bombing ride to Poland, you know, where they bombed Germany, landed in ~~Poland~~ Russia

Q Operation Frantic?

B It was Poltava. ~~I thought it was Poland.~~ Anyhow, the Germans came in and destroyed all the planes on ground, and he said it was a ~~fantasy~~.

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fantasy to see those Russian women go out and fight the fire. He said he'd never seen such bravery.

~~They Taken about that~~

~~B~~ He came out by the long route and, meanwhile, as a professional historian, he wrote up his trip and his conclusions which were, if you weren't nasty to a Russian he didn't respect you. I gave it--because he was a historian--to Li~~vingston~~ Wright was my classmate. Livingston Wright and he started this writing history within--under restricted classification within weeks or a month after the battle had taken place, ~~and~~ A lot of Generals said, "Oh, that's what happened" Because he would get eyewitness accounts . Anyhow, I gave him one right away, and took it home and read it myself. And I thought, this thing's got a lot of intelligence in it. So I sent it down to ~~Corrigan,~~ McCormick, my second copy. ~~Livy~~ called me, I think the next day, and said: "That thing you sent me has gone to the top, and I mean, the top, and it's had the most tremendous effect." And Al called up the next day and said: "Why did you let ~~Livy~~ have that first?" It was just when relations with Russia were getting tough. And I think it had something to do with Roosevelt's eyes suddenly being opened. ~~Now~~ At the end of the war we were actually running out of gas, and we had a Radford Board to allocate the gas ~~between~~ Admiral Radford, ~~and the~~ -I prepared our justification which was simply "we're spending practically no gas on training any more . If you give us this much less gas we will fly this much fewer sorties. It's mathematics." And I got the British to do it the same way. Couldn't get the Navy to do much of anything. When we made our ~~pr~~ presentations, the Navy said: "Admiral, you know that the United States Navy never asks for more of anything than they really need." And not only was there a chuckle around the room, but the Admiral laughed. And afterwards, I went up and I said: "Admiral, could it be possible that I can hear the Russians' justification?" He said: "Colonel, I asked a question like that once. I heard from Harry, you know who I mean. I don't ask questions like that any more." So, whatever the Russians had,

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my brother Lewin took the Russians--all the glider people--all around his bases, and so on. They asked the most intelligent questions. And they knew nothing whatever about what went on in Russia.

Q Oh yeah?

B It was all a one way street.

Q It always was. ~~As they say down South in another city Thank You Mr. President.~~

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Bartron, Harold & Mrs

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Harold A. Bartron
Brigadier General U. S. A. F. Retired
4590 University Avenue
Riverside, California 92501

10/6/71

Dear Doctor Green:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending me that reminder of another time Elliott outdrew me.

Mrs. Bartron and I both are well and hope you look us up when and if you get out this way.

Bartron

File "Bartron"

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L/C Box #69

7.41

Poker Game in the ETO

Barton?

A letter from BG H.A. Barton, commanding Air Service Command in MTO, to Giles, Feb 23, 1944.

Apparently, Barton and Giles were old poker playing buddies and Barton apologized that they were unable to get in a little poker due to the press of business. He mentioned "a tough one last night." Spaatz was there and it was a seven-handed game including Elliot Roosevelt. Barton dealt the last hand with a $5 ante. The pot was open for $25, three stayers ahead of Barton. He had three kings cold and kicked the pot $60. Everybody got out except Elliot Roosevelt who had only $30 left. Roosevelt drew three cards and made an aces full-house which beat Barton's three kings. He wrote "That guy has taken me so regularly when I had him over a barrel that it has become a habit."

Just note to Col HAB in Rwanda 9-30-71

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
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BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD A. BARTRON (RETIRED)
U. S. ARMY AIR CORPS

Harold Arthur Bartron was born in Frankfort, Indiana, September 17, 1896. Enlisting as a private in the Marine Corps in the fall of 1912, he was discharged four years later in that grade.

When World War I broke out General Bartron was admitted to the first Officers Training Camp at Fort Benjamin Harrison early in April 1917, and was transferred shortly thereafter to Columbus, Ohio, where he was a member of the third ground school class in preliminary training for an aviation career. Upon graduation he was sent to the overseas detachment in New York, having been discharged as a candidate, and enlisted in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps for flying training.

Going to England in September 1917, General Bartron received additional ground instruction at Oxford prior to flying training. His flying training in France consisted of primary training at Tours and advanced training at Issodoun before he graduated in the first class of the American gunnery school at St. Johns de Monts, France. Joining the 13th Squadron of the Second Pursuit Group after completing his training, he remained with it until the cessation of hostilities, returned to the United States, and was honorably discharged as a first lieutenant in February 1919.

Appointed a second lieutenant in the Air Service, Regular Army, in July 1920, after a short tour of duty at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, General Bartron was ordered to Patterson Field, Ohio, moving to Kelly Field, Texas, in 1929, and then Randolph Field, Texas. From there he was sent to the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, graduating in 1939, and then served at March Field, California, and the Panama Air Depot in 1939.

Two years later General Bartron was transferred to Waller Field, Trinidad, and six months later he went to Losey Field, Puerto Rico. In October 1942 he joined the invasion force on the west coast of North Africa, landing in November 1942, and assumed command of the First Area, Northwest African Air Service Command. He was transferred to Constantine in April 1943, and later moved to Tunis. That June he was appointed to command the Air Service Command, Northwest African Theater. With the invasion of Southern Italy he moved to Bari, Italy, and later Naples, remaining there until August 1944 when he returned to the United States.

Assuming command of the Fairfield Air Technical Service Command, in November 1945 he became commanding general of San Bernardino Air Technical Service Command. In August 1947 he was assigned to Air Materiel Command Headquarters, Dayton, Ohio. He retired from active duty June 29, 1948.

MORE

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BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD A. BARTRON, U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS (RETIRED)

General Bartron is married to the former Julia Willey Simpson. They have two children, a daughter, Nancy, and a son, Robert Simpson.

His decorations include the Legion of Merit, and he is rated a command pilot and combat observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant July 1, 1920; to captain December 1, 1932; to major (temporary) August 26, 1936; to major (permanent) November 18, 1939; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) March 15, 1941; to colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to lieutenant colonel (permanent) March 21, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) June 26, 1943.

E N D

Up to date as of June 29, 1948.

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Q: What did you say about Hap Arnold?

Mrs.B: He used to fly in before he came to Wright Field, and he used to say at parties that he was "doing time" for that incident in Washington.

Q: At Ft. Riley?

Mrs.B: He had been shipped to Riley from Washington. You know, of course, about all that.

Q: I know something about it.

Mrs.B: He was given the choice of court martial or resign, you knew all that, that was in Washington.

Q: I knew he was shipped out by Mason Patrick.

Mrs.B: No, they told me....

Q: Mrs. Arnold told you?

Mrs.B: Yes, he wrote a letter, and I can't remember what the letter was about. It was written, I think at the direction of, it's been so long ago that I have forgotten who told him. Anyway, this is nothing military, but the school bus, going from Fairfield into town. We had a child, Nancy, who is about Bruce's age. Isn't he about 50?

Q: Yes, 51.

Mrs.B: And, oh, that bus it was an old GMC truck with canvas side, and those kids, oh, just used to raise Merry Ned on the bus. And so, when Hap came, I remember, he put on an order that anybody, any child that went on the bus that was reported was going to be put off the bus. Well, of course, that was terrible, because you had to drive your child on those cold winter mornings. Our child was quite obstreperous and got a notice that she was put off the bus. I mean they didn't put her off, but she couldn't go any more for we didn't know how long. But a couple of the Arnold kids were put off the bus.

Q: Yes, I know, you know who told me this - Maggie Minor, she told me.

Mrs.B: Oh my, is she still in San Bernardino? I saw her at the McCooks.

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Q: Yes, on 8th St. I interviewed her. She told me that Hank got put off the bus.

Mrs.B: With our Nancy, I had read the riot act to her anyway, I said: "Don't you dare do anything on that bus." Well, the first crack out of the box, they were put off. So were, I think, the Green children. So we took turns driving them in. Well, I don't know whether, it only lasted, I think it originally was to be a month, but it was shortened to a week or two because it was terrible on the mothers, you know. But that I never will forget.

Q: Arnold was very strict with the kids.

Mrs.B: He was erratic. He would sound off, but he was one of the kindest nicest people.

Q: Was he a very impulsive man, did he do things on impulse?

B: He was impulsive, yes.

Q: If he made a mistake, did he say I'm sorry, or did he do something else without admitting that he was sorry.

B: Well, I don't have any direct recollection. All of my experiences with him he was right every time. There wasn't any question about it.

Q: But he made quick decisions?

B: Yes.

Mrs.B: And I'll tell you, if any friend got into any little trouble or anything, he was just right there. We just think a great deal of all of them.

Q: Conger Pratt was the CG at Wright?

B: At a later time.

Mrs.B: Oh yes, he was.

B: I'll tell you a story about Hap Arnold that would be just as good that you didn't put in the book. But I was known as one of the Peck's Bad Boys of the early AF, and while Gen Arnold was in command of Wright Field, I was court martialed. The charges were for engaging in a wordy altercation, to wit, a fistfight, and serving alcholic drinks to people in my home, contrary to the then-existing law.

Q: Prohibition.

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B: To my certain knowledge, Major Arnold went over to Ft. Hayes and pleaded my cause, and his arguments were, "What do you mean court martialing a man because he got in a fight. What in the hell good is a man that won't fight?"

Mrs.B: I never thought I'd laugh at this. Anyway, the CO over there was a classmate of his or somebody. Hap said: "We've gambled, haven't we?" And the man said: "Yes.

Q: Who was the CO?

Mrs.B: I've forgotten the name, and he said: "Well, we've gotten in fights."

B: I believe that the man was Gen Howze, who was the President of the board that cashiered Mitchell, I believe that's who it was, although that would have to be researched. But I believe that's who it was.

Q: But he testified in your behalf?

B: He went over and tried to stop the court martial, saying that it wasn't a sound basis, that it wasn't right to court martial fighting men for fighting, a man that wouldn't fight wasn't any good.

Q: Not to the Air Corps.

B: Yes, but he was unsuccessful and the court martial went through.

Mrs.B: It was because, you know, somebody from Washington had been there. They had some other liquor trouble, and over at Ft. Hayes they said: "We can't let this go," I've forgotten who else it was that they had.

B: Anyhow, as far as Arnold is concerned, he went above and beyond the call of duty and decided to befriend a young officer in his command.

Q: You were a LT at that time?

B: Yes.

Q: And you were acquitted?

B: No, I was not acquitted. I was found guilty and sentenced to the loss of 50 files in rank.

Q: Is that a mild punishment?

B: Oh, that was average.

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Mrs.B: The whole post turned out. They didn't think they ought to do anything.

B: 50 files in rank was estimated at that time, at the rate of promotion at that time, to retard my promotion to the next higher grade by, say, six months. It was, I would say, an average sentence.

Q: Well, they had to give you some punishment otherwise the LTs would flout the regs?

B: The evidence was incontrovertible. I had been in a fight. As a matter of fact, as an entertaining sidelight on the whole thing, as my wife said, we never thought we could laugh about this thing now. But I had a very good friend, a senior officer, who asked to be my defense counsel and he was. In a moment before the trial started, a member of the court, off to one side, said: "Don't worry, we will see that justice is done." My friend said: "Hell, we've got to do better than that."

Mrs.B: That was the last thing we wanted was justice. But there wasn't anything disgraceful about it. Of course, it almost killed me, but, however, you see, Bea and I were such good friends, but it was rather an embarrassing, very embarrassing. It about did me in. But, anyway, I told her, I said: "I don't believe I had better come over any more during this trouble." After all, Maj Arnold is on the other side. (To General Bartron) Remember that night he came over to our house about 10:00. He came over - it was just a little post - came over in his smoking jacket and bedroom slippers. He couldn't do this in the daytime. He sat there and talked. He was just a wonderful friend to us. Of course, he did everything he could not to have this on Harold's record.

Q: He was the Commander of the Fairfield Air Depot?

B: That's right.

Q: What was your job?

B: I was the supply officer. The Fairfield Air Depot, at that time, was the largest Air Service Supply facility. I remember - the thing that I remember chiefly about Major Arnold was - that over a long period of time on many occasions, I went to him and said: "Major, we are not doing our business

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smartly. We are taking air supplies and putting them in boxes, like the infantry would 50 years ago, and then putting them on a freight train and sending them, Lord knows how, down to some station. What we should do is have an airplane, just one airplane. We could practice flying. We could learn about cross country flying. We could save all the money that we are spending on boxing these supplies, and we could get them to our people in a day instead of 2 weeks." By that time, he had gotten into a higher position and he was in Washington and had to do with requesting money for appropriations, etc. He said: "Harold, will you ever understand that we want to do this, but we can't get the money. Every time that we buy one more B-17, a squadron of cavalry has to be decommissioned, and they are fighting with their backs to the walls. This is the way it should be done, and we are trying to do it, but we can't. I hate to think how many years it was after that before we started delivering supplies by air.

Q: Now, you are talking over a span of years?

B: Yes.

Q: Starting when he was at Fairfield, but later when he became Asst Chief in Washington.

B: Yes.

Q: Really bracketing some years?

B: 15 years, 8 or 10 or 15 years.

Q: At Fairfield, I was told that Arnold did not have enough to do on that job, enough to keep him really busy. Partly as a result of this, he got into an altercation with a man named Jan Howard. Do you remember Jan Howard?

B: I remember Jan Howard, but, and I wouldn't know if he got in an altercation. I think that possibly he didn't have enough to do, it was at that time that he spent a lot of time writing these Bruce books.

Mrs.B: Did he write those at Fairfield?

Q: He was writing them at Riley and I think the last of them got finished at Fairfield.

B: I don't think that his not having much to do had anything to do with

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it. I think it was just a difference of thinking and that he differed....

Mrs.B: Of course, that letter episode.

Q: The one in 1926 you are talking about?

Mrs.B: Yes, when he was sent to Riley, I feel sure from what I've heard them say, that that really set his career back a little. Well, of course, it didn't set it back ultimately, but at that time. Of course, Fairfield was a pretty good command, wasn't it?

B: I wouldn't know whether it was considered a good command or not.

Mrs.B: It was the biggest air depot.

B: It was the largest supply depot.

Q: His great break came when he was assigned to March Field. Then he came under the wing of Malin Craig. Malin Craig was up at the Presidio, and Arnold was at March Field, and did all these things. He had Hollywood stars come out, and then he did this great thing at the earthquake, the earthquake in 1933, and he ingratiated himself with Malin Craig. When Malin Craig was sent to Washington, he brought Arnold.

Mrs.B: I've forgotten - Malin Craig was what?

Q: Malin Craig was Chief of Staff and became CS after MacArthur left. You see, this was Arnold's break. Arnold did a good job and he was lucky. A lot of people have done a good job, but they are not as lucky. He was right on his job and he came to Washington and then shortly after he came back, Westover was killed. There he was ready to take over the job. But going back to Fairfield. Of course, I know that Jan Howard was related to him, so he was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister, so they had a divorce. So there was this family friction, but I was told a bit about it. Do you remember that there was a good deal of friction between them?

B: If I ever knew, I have completely forgotten it.

Mrs.B: We were there 6 months at the time of this trouble of Harold's. We were packed up, our furniture was all, we didn't have a thing in our house. Anyway, we were only there - you were called back, you were on that leave that summer. You were called back after Mark Redmond was killed, we were there

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till January 1930, so we were there about 6 months. But during that time, I had never known her before. I had never known Bea.

Q: So you got to know Mrs. Arnold?

Mrs.B: Oh, very well, we were good friends; I just loved her.

Q: When was the next time you had contact with Arnold, after Fairfield?

Mrs.B: He came down to Panama.

B: He came down to Panama, that would be 1939. He came down to Panama, of course, he was then Chief of Air Corps.

Q: And you were commanding?

B: No, no, I was just the supply officer at France Field. He came down and gave a talk to the officers there, trying to bring them up to date on what had come out during the war, oddly enough, at that time, I was in the doghouse with my CO, through no fault of my own at all. These are how things happen in this little Air Corps. There was a CO by the name of "Maud" Strauss. Have you ever heard of him? He was so stubborn. He was a transferee from the Navy, and he was equal in seniority to Tooey Spaatz. He had an uncontrollable temper, and in Panama, he took a dislike to me.

Mrs.B: Suddenly. He had been just crazy about you.

B: We had been friends. Near as I can figure out, it was because I had made some arrangements without clearing with him, which would improve the gasoline service for which we were responsible over to the other side of the Canal. But, anyhow, I had this odd experience of being extremely friendly with this man. Then, the next morning he wouldn't speak to me, he didn't speak to me again until I left, and while I was there. But anyhow, his method of grinding me under his heel was when Gen Arnold came down, and when he knew that Gen Arnold and I had been associated together, he ordered me to stay at my desk until he sent for me, ostensibly, because maybe Gen Arnold would want to go around and make an inspection. But that there would be a meeting at the club at noon. So I waited till noon, although Gen Arnold landed about 10:00 and I went over there, and Gen Arnold said: "Well, Harold, I halfway expected you to meet me at the airplane." And I said: "General, I'm still obeying orders."

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Mrs.B: He had told me that, it was the biggest do you ever heard of. All the women and wives, and when I saw him I was so glad to see him and he was glad to see me, and he said: "Where's Harold, I thought he would be down do the plane." And I said: "Well, I guess he's in his office, I don't know."

Q: Did Arnold ever find out?

B: Whether he ever found out why I didn't, I never told him. I doubt if he ever did find out.

Q: He might have been offended that you were not down to greet him.

B: I don't believe that anybody could make Gen Arnold believe that I would do anything to offend him. When I said that I was still obeying orders I feel certain that he could understand that I was ordered to stay. That I came when I was ordered to come. But at least I had taken that assumption. The point has never been cleared up, never been mentioned at any other time.

Mrs.B: That whole situation was so silly. Eddy House was in command of France Field, and they were, had been for many years, very warm friends of ours. Maud Strauss, I guess, he thought Eddy had a better command than he had, I don't know. But don't you remember how he hated Eddy. Oh, he was terrible.

B: The thing about that was, Maud Strauss who was way, way senior to Eddy House, but Eddy House was the CO, and Maud Strauss was a tenant on his base, although he was way senior to Eddy House. And that rankled him, too. Maud did everything he could to try to call attention to himself, to get himself promoted. But he finished the war a Colonel; he never was promoted.

Q: When did you next have contact with Gen Arnold? After France Field?

B: He made a visit to North Africa, when I was in North Africa. At the time that Churchill came over, the Casablanca conference, January 1943, and I saw him at that time. As a matter of fact, I had gone down to Marrakech, and bought one of these rugs that you see on the floor. I had it out on the floor in the hotel, because I had no other place to store it. It was a good place, the hotel where we were staying. Gen Arnold admired it, and I just happened to say: "This is my rug, I bought it down in Marrakech." He said: "Well, how about getting me one?" And I said: "Fine, I will." So I went down to

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Marrakech, and bought another one for him near like the other one that I could. I brought it back and gave it to Gen Arnold, and I said: "Would it be asking too much when you take yours back, if you would take mine back with you?" So that is one of the first few times where a buck Colonel asked the Chief of Staff to smuggle a rug in for him. So he brought my rug back with him when he came back.

Q: What was your job in North Africa?

B: I was the Chief of Supply and Maintenance of the AF contingent of Gen Patton's landing effort, under the direct command of Joe Cannon, who was then a BG.

Q: You had no operational contact with Arnold?

B: I never had an operational responsibility after the first WW. I was a fighter pilot in the first WW, and my operational experiences ended then. I became a Supply Officer, and I stayed a Supply Officer until I retired.

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold in WWI?

B: No, I ran across Gen Spaatz, who came up to my squadron and flew my airplane on a mission or two. But I didn't meet Gen Arnold during the first war.

Q: Arnold was trying to get overseas desperately. He made it in the last week of the war, and he got to the front and the war ended. He never saw combat. This was something that rankled him, and it left him vulnerable to the pleas of his staff officers. Fellows like Norstad and Cabell who said: "We want to get overseas and make our mark." Arnold could not resist their request, he felt that he himself had missed the opportunity. Do you have recollections of Arnold late in the war, after Casablanca?

B: A little, except that every once in a while I would have some evidence that we were still on friendly terms. There was a Tom Campbell. He was a civilian soldier. He came over there as a Colonel.

Q: Is he from Montana?

B: Yes, he was the great wheat grower in Montana. He came over there on a special mission from Gen Arnold to look around and tell him what he saw.

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I became very friendly with Colonel Campbell. As a matter of fact, he made a great contribution to the war, this Colonel Campbell. He was a very inventive man. He more than any one man was responsible for the inflated tire tread that would run on sand. He had perfected this on his ranch earlier. He had the idea that the incendiary bomb being used was ineffective. It had been dropped in England and they could thwart it's use because it was small. He had the idea that you ought to drop something that couldn't be put out. His notion of doing it was to drop an oil drum with a lighter in it. He said: "I can set fire to a harbor," and he did. He came to me with these notions, and I supplied him with a Major and 16 men to conduct these experiments. Tom Campbell, although he was a great man, a personal friend of Churchill's and Arnold's, and Roosevelt's, in North Africa, when he wanted to do something, he would come to me. I would say: "Tom, I'll help you all I can. You're great, but if you need any help about how to go about these things, let me try to help you." So he would. I gave him these men, and he put on these demonstrations, and did what he said he could do. He set fire to a whole lake, and then he came to me and I said: "Tom, you've done all you can do here. You go back. Now, this should be put in the official channels and developed from here on. You have proven your point." So he came back to the US, and reported to Gen Arnold, and I'm sure he told Gen Arnold that he had. As a matter of fact, he showed me a letter where he referred to me. And I wrote a letter to Gen Arnold and I said that this is a great guy, and it would only be a token, but he should be promoted to the grade of General, because he certainly is not going to be a cross to the taxpayers. He'll get out the minute he can possibly get out, but it should be. Tom got promoted and of course, the war ended. As soon as he could possibly get out, he did so.

Q: Did Arnold sponsor him, as far as you know?

B: Yes.

Q: I've not heard of this story before.

Mrs.B: You said he had orders from Roosevelt.

Q: I'm sure he had a lot of influence around, but Arnold, he was a friend of Arnold's?

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B: He was over directly under the sponsorship of Arnold, and as a matter of fact, he had the damnedest set of orders that I've ever seen. It said: "You go to North Africa, and you can go any place that you want to, and per diem is authorized, and you can stay as long as you want to any place, but get back to the US within 6 months." That's about what the orders said.

Mrs.B: That was signed - didn't you say by Roosevelt?

B: I don't know, seems to me they were signed by Arnold, but anyhow, they were the top orders I've ever seen. He's a great man.

Q: But you say you never served under Arnold in Washington?

B: No, my only service with him was in Dayton.

Q: Do you recall any contacts you had with him after Casablanca, like in late '43 or '44, '45?

Mrs.B: When did he retire?

Q: He retired in 1946.

Mrs.B: We spent the day with him.

Q: Oh, after he retired at the ranch? When he first came back.

Mrs.B: I'm trying to remember the date. Had you retired when he came up there?

B: No, as a matter of fact, I can give you just a little story there. We went up to visit him when he was in Sonoma, not too long before he died.

Mrs.B: Well, we were up there on something. We just spent the day with him.

B: Anyhow, we went to pay him a visit, and he said: "What's this, Harold, I heard you are retiring, and we need depot commanders." And I said: "Well, General, I don't like the way you treat the help." And he said: "What do you mean?" And I said, "If you have 30 years in, they will give you 3/4 of your pay, if you retire. Then if you stay on active duty, you will hold down a job for which is paid roughly something like 1/4 of what you would get if you were in civilian industry. So it looks to me like if you stay on, you are working for 1/4 of what you are worth." I said: "I think the retirement

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policies will only hold two types of people, that is, the people who have handled their money so badly that they can't afford to retire. Or the people who want to try to get more hardware on their shoulder." And neither of those groups includes me." He said: "I Never thought about it that way." I said: "I think it is high time somebody did think about it that way, because the pay is so small that if I wanted to earn any money, I'm not getting out to go to work, I'm getting out because I've got my time in. I think that additional flying is still hazardous and it is accepting too big a hazard for too small a return." He said: "Well, I'll be damned," and that was that conversation.

Q: You spent this day up at Sonoma with him. Was he all settled at his ranch?

B: Yes.

Q: Did you talk anything about the ranch - did he like living at the ranch?

B: He enjoyed working. As a matter of fact, his hands were calloused by hard work.

Q: He was doing some woodwork; he built some furniture.

B: Yes, he was keeping busy.

Mrs.B: Hank was up there with his wife, first wife. Remember, they were painting the patio. Hank was painting that, I remember.

Q: Did he sit you under his oak tree? Did he feel very much at ease on the ranch?

B: Well, yes, I thought he was extremely happy and well adapted to that life.

Mrs.B: That was a happy day, wasn't it?

B: Yes, very, very.

Mrs.B: Last time I've seen Bea. Oh no, he came down here.

B: He came down to Riverside on two or three visits, and we saw him each time.

Mrs.B: He came down and hung the wings at the Mission Inn, and there was a luncheon, then rather a small dinner at the inn, Dewitt Hutchings.

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B: Yes, there is a thing down there called "The Famous Flyers Wall."

Q: Yes, I want to take a look at that.

Mrs.B: And he put Orville Wright in.

B: If you go down there, you will find my name on that wall. The only thing I ever did about being famous was that I didn't get killed, starting as early as I did.

Mrs.B: Don't be belittling yourself.

B: I'm not belitting myself, but I never became a famous flyer.

Q: You kept the other fellows up in the air.

Mrs.B: There aren't a whole lot of people left that flew in the First WW against the Germans.

B: As a matter of fact, let me give you a statistic, and this doesn't have anything to do with Arnold, except maybe he might have had the approval of my going overseas. This might have touched Arnold. Gen Cannon was selected to head the Air arm, when Gen Patton went into Casablanca, and he took a look at the air situation and went to Gen Arnold and said: "Gen Arnold, the air situation here is in awful, awful bad shape, and I've got to get somebody in here to set up the supply end of it. There has been no thinking about it, and it's in awful bad shape, and it's awful late." Gen Arnold said to Gen Cannon: "What do you want?" Cannon said: "I've got to get a man up here right away." And he said: "Who do you want?" Cannon said: "I want Gen Harold Bartron." So I was in Puerto Rico at the time, and I got orders to go up there overnight. I arrived in W shington 13 days before the convoy sailed from NY, and there had been no adequate planning for the provisioning of the Air arm of the North African invasion. As a matter of fact, I didn't know where we were going when I left Wzshington. But, at that time, we had 16 officers and 16 men as the total Air Force commitment to provide the supervision, management and administration of the wing operation that went in there. We learned later on, it took a hqs. of approximately 350 officers and 350 men, and we were that far behind when we left NY, because it hadn't been started early enough.

Q: Did you get in early in the invasion?

B: I landed with the first group.

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Q: Nov 8, 1942?

B: Yes, I didn't land with the first contingent. Joe Cannon called me and said: "I'm taking you in on the first wave." And I said: "You're the boss, but you are making a mistake if you do take me in on the first wave." I said: "I may not be much but I'm all you got. If anything happens to me, then you've got no supply, we are in horrible shape the way it is, but we've got a prayer. But don't get what little you've got, shot up." So I waited for a day or two, and then went in later on.

Q: Did you get involved in the hassle over air support in North Africa, you know, leading to Kasserine Pass and the reorganization of the air support function?

B: No, I know nothing about that.

Q: Fredendall was relieved and then Patton was given his job.

Mrs.B: That came out in the movie.

B: It was brought to Gen Arnold's attention, and it is because I know this, I know that he knows what I'm going to say, and that it had a bearing on the fact that our relations continued very friendly during his entire lifetime. The supply setup in North Africa was organized by a man by the name of Dell Dunton, who never had any supply experience. He was an engineering officer. He suffered a nervous breakdown. Things kept going from bad to worse, and judging from the number of airplanes in commission, the situation was deteriorating. Being an engineering officer - and he set up engineering repair shops in North Africa, where they never belonged - you can't repair an aircraft engine in North Africa with the best mechanics and all the facilities available, even now, and do a job that is comparable to what could be done in the US. There is so much sand and grit that you could never get out of that air that you can't put an engine through block tests and have the bearings good enough to stand up an average length of time. This is only one of the things that was contributing to the situation. But because of his lack of knowledge of supply requirements and how to solve them, Dunton became just terribly apprehensive and had a nervous breakdown, and was sent home in a strait-jacket. Gen Spaatz called me in and told me that I was going to succeed him although

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I was only seventh in seniority in the North African command. When Dell Dunton was sent home, there were 50 or 51% of the airplanes in that theater in commission. When I left the theater a little over a year later, there were 75% of the airplanes in that theater in commission. Now, statistically, that may not sound like much, but let me tell you what it actually means. At that Conference in Casablanca, Gen Arnold made the statement that the bottleneck in American fighting capacity in the air was people, that we could supply an unlimited number of airplanes, but that 12,500 airplanes, combat airplanes, with crews and so forth, ready to drop them, was the total maximum capacity of our war effort. Now, we had 5,000 of those airplanes in North Africa. When 50% of the airplanes are in commission against the enemy, you have 2,500 airplanes to supply. When 75% of the airplanes are in commission, you have 3,750 airplanes in commission against the enemy dropping bombs. That is a difference of 1,250 airplanes a day, which is 10% of the national capacity of this country to produce and keep airplanes flying without buying one. That was the supply picture under those conditions, and Gen Arnold knew this.

Q: The maintenance problem was a rough one throughout the war?

B: Not only rough, but a controlling factor. The number of airplanes you have is secondary to how many are flying.

Q: This is something he was always beating on Eaker, you know, that Eaker was not getting enough of his 8th AF into the sky. This is one of the reasons Arnold made that change - the so-called Big Switch. You know, he took Eaker out. Did you ever get into any of that?

B: No.

Q: He took Eaker out of that command and put Spaatz in?

B: No.

Q: Eaker came down to the Mediterranean. Remember he came down in '44?

B: Yes.

Q: They elevated the job to the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, but Eaker was unhappy.

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B: Yes, as a matter of fact, I was there under Spaatz, and I had the most perfect rapport with Gen Spaatz that I have ever had with anybody. I didn't have the same rapport with Gen Eaker.

Q: Really?

B: As a matter of fact, I disobeyed an order one time that Gen Eaker gave me, which is something that a General Officer should never have to do. But Gen Eaker came down and he called me in and he said: "How many missions are you provisioning for,"and I said: "Well, we are provisioning for something like 20, because we had been going up all the time, and we had gone from 10 to 12, and last month it was 16, and in order to have a little leeway, we are figuring on about 27." Well, he said, "you can cut that way back. From our experience in England, I know we are not going to have over 6 or 8 missions. So you can go back and cut that 20 in something like half." I went back and I told our people that we were going to cut it back to his 20. My people just about dropped dead. They said: "If we cut it back, and if we don't get this drop, your head will come off, and for pete's sake, don't let us know that we ought to cut it back." And I said: "All right, let's just hold it in abeyance." They said: "You get every pound of tonnage that you can." So I said: "All right, temporarily, until we get a buildup. Let's get all we can." Not only did the missions not go down to six, but they went from sixteen to 27. Had I done what Gen Eaker said, and cut down on the supplies, then they wouldn't have had bombs to drop, and then they would have said the SOB that was supposed to have the bombs, didn't have them, and my head would have come off. But I never gave the order and we never, in the year that I was there, we never had a mission fail because there wasn't a load of bombs for it. Sometimes we didn't have the size bomb that they wanted, but we always had bombs.

Q: There was a shortage of bombs in the last of the war. Were you there or had you left?

B: No, I had left.

Q: Where did you go from there?

B: I came back to Dayton, Ohio.

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Q: You were in Dayton, Ohio when - 1944-45?

B: Yes.

Q: Were you under Knudsen?

B: Yes.

Q: And they called it the Air Technical Service Command?

B: Well, I was in command, not at the ATSC, I was in command of where I used to work. I was over at what used to be Wright Field.

Q: Did you take Tony Frank's place?

B: No, I had an area. For supply purposes, US was divided up into nine areas, and one was Hqs. in Dayton and I had the supply service area that was headquartered in Dayton.

Q: Do you know about the Knudsen-Benny Meyers business? What do you know about it?

B: Well, I know that Benny Meyers went to jail.

Q: Well, later. But I'm talking about 1944-45.

B: I don't know about that.

Q: You know, he came out there, he hoped to get Knudsen's job, didn't he?

B: I don't know.

Mrs.B: Well, he did get it.

Q: No, he didn't. Knerr got the job. Meyers wanted Knudsen's job. It was then combined. It was called the Air Technical Service Command, and then Knerr got the job and Meyers retired.

Mrs.B: I'll tell you Harold. Meyers....

B: Meyers was sent to Washington.

Mrs.B: Meyers lived in the CG's house.

B: Yes, Meyers had it for a while, and Knerr had it later, because I reported directly to Meyers.

Q: This is during the war?

B: Yes.

Mrs.B: But Benny Meyers left before we did.

Q: He went to Washington.

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Mrs.B: And Hugh Knerr came.

Q: Right, and then he came, but he wanted that job in 1945, I'm talking about May and June. This is VE Day, he wanted Knudsen's job when Knudsen retired?

Mrs.B: We were at Dayton then.

Q: But he didn't get it, Knerr got the job. Do you know anything about that?

Mrs.B: Listen, what was Benny when he and Ila lived down there in the big house.

B: He had the big job, he was in command.

Q: Were there remors about him at that time.

B: Yes.

Q: He lived very high, didn't he?

B: Yes.

Mrs.B: There were rumors about him 35 years ago.

Q: This goes back to the first WW. He always cut corners. Did you have to fill out the form, a questionnaire, about your stockholdings?

B: Oh yes, yes I did, and I didn't show any conflict of interest. The few shares that I had were inconsequential.

Q: But Benny did fuzz his holdings?

B: I wouldn't know anything about that.

Mrs.B: I think, you remember his flying his personal stuff in goverment airplanes to Long Island. Didn't he retire from Dayton?

Q: Yes, he retired from Dayton.

Mrs.B: Haven't you ever heard about...It was the biggest to-do, and everybody was worried because he was so crazy to do it, you know.

Q: To fly stuff back home?

Mrs.B: In Long Island, they were going....

B: I can tell you a short story about Hugh Knerr that doesn't bear....

Q: I saw Hugh Knerr a couple of months ago, 83 years old.

B: Shortly after the war, some officers started getting letters stating

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that they could expect to be reduced in rank. So I went over to see Gen Knerr and I said I would like to have a talk with you, and I want it understood that I ain't mad at all. But just for planning purposes, I'd like to have you understand my position on a certain thing that is that I understand some people are getting some demotion letters, and I have been reduced to the grade of Colonel and asked to hold down a General Officer's job. Under those circumstances, I shall avail myself of my retirement privileges. I don't think that is the right thing to do. If I'm sent to some place, and my permanent grade is a LT COL and they put me in charge of the Post Exchange as a LTCOL, I'll probably stay on. But I won't stay on and do a General Officer's job as a Col or a LTCOL. Well, Knerr said: "That's interesting to know." I saw him later at a party and I said: "I hope you aren't angry at me for what I said." And he said: "Hell, he said, "I wrote into Washington and told them the same thing."

Q: He was trying to get his third star. He never got his third star.

Mrs.B: You must know that all these people had been back in Dayton back in the 1920s and it was a little post. Rank really wasn't everything.

B: We knew them when they were M jors, and we were 1st Lts.

Mrs.B: But we were all together and there really was no great difference.

Q: Going back to Fairfield, was Arnold a family man, very devoted to his family? Did he take the kids out Sunday, or was he too busy?

Mrs.B: Well, now, I can't tell you. We lived right close, and as far as I can see, he was just fine. It was a very well-rounded family, I think he was, you know, everybody had their faults.

Q: I have been told Lois was hard to get along with, very difficult child.

Mrs.B: At that time I was about 21 years old, and Lois was about 14, I think. So there wasn't a whole lot of difference. I didn't see her very much, she was rather, kind of an awkward sort of girl.

Q: Well, did she act like the daughter of the CO oftentimes?

Mrs.B: Well, that I didn't see. I don't know, because I didn't see. I saw her at home, but she didn't act that way to me.

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Q: She was a very smart girl, but she sort of had emotional problems.

Mrs.B: Yes, we went to Lois' wedding.

Q: Oh, out at San Diego?

Mrs.B: Yes, remember that Sunday, we were stationed at March Field. This was in 1937 or 38. Remember that Sunday morning, the Arnolds came - nobody knew they were on the post - but they came to our house and surprised us. We had an invitation but we didn't know whether we would go down. This was the Sunday before Lois' wedding, I guess it was on a Saturday, I don't remember. But, anyway, so they stayed quite a while there at our house, and we had a nice time. There were not a lot of people going to be at the wedding that they had known before. So we went down and Carlisle Wash drove down with us.

Q: He's still around - Carlisle Wash.

Mrs.B: Oh, he was killed, during the war.

B: About 10 years ago.

Mrs.B: No, he was killed during the war, I went to his funeral at West Point.

Q: I'm confusing him with Carlisle Ridenour. No, Wash was killed.

Mrs.B: We were down there. Is Ernie Snowden still alive?

Q: Yes.

Mrs.B: Is he still in the Navy?

Q: I don't know. But he is still alive, in San Francisco.

Mrs.B: Did they ever divorce?

Q: I don't know, they either separated or got a divorce. I don't knox exactly.

B: ....I know him quite well, and I'm afraid...

Q: This Morton McKinnon story, I don't want to get too deep into the McKinnon side of it, but McKinnon didn't take the job because he wasn't guaranteed a promotion before he went out.

B: He had a chance to go to North Africa on the invasion and he turned it down because he....

Q: Rosenham Beam got the job?

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B: Rosenham Beam got the job.

Q: When did he look Arnold in the eye?

B: This is when Arnold came over to the Casablanca conference, and Arnold was talking with, well, three or four of the area commanders, of whom I was one. I felt embarrassed, because Jack Beam looked Gen Arnold right in the eye and said: "When are we going to be promoted?"

Q: He had been serving in that job, what, two or three months at that time?

B: Yes, something like that, and he was Chief of Staff to Joe Cannon and Gen Arnold, I felt sorry for him, but his reply was, he said: "Well, you'll get promoted when you are recommended from the theater. We never turn down a recommendation from the theater. When you are recommended from the theater, it will go through Washington right away," and that was his answer to that.

Q: Was Beam satisfied with that answer?

B: I don't remember whether he was or not. Of course, he had to be.

Q: But you were surprised that the spoke up like this to Arnold?

B: He had no business, I had the same question at the back of my mind, but it never occurred to me to blurt it out.

Q: There were a couple of guys that spoke up to Arnold from time to time. Did you ever see Arnold very angry?

B: No, I've never seen him angry. In fact, I was always given credit, and rightly so, for being too outspoken, and I've spoken up, as I say, I mentioned trying to get aircraft, etc., but never provoked anything except a proper reception and interest. It seemed to me that he was as easy to speak to as anybody I ever met, but I think you kind of had to have firm ground under you. I have talked to him on a dozen occasions. As far as I knew, there was never anything of any idea that my talk wasn't well received.

Q: Did he have a tendency to fire people when he felt they didn't cut the mustard?

B: Well, I was never close enough to him to know that. I would say,

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offhand, "no," because he had Barney Giles during the whole war. There had to be times come up when things like this came along. I think maybe he was given credit for being impetuous. I think he was really long range in his thinking.

Q: He didn't drink, did he?

B: No, no.

Q: At a party he used to walk around with a glass of sherry?

B: I don't know about that. I never saw him when he...I don't ever remember seeing him take a drink.

Q: I was told that, probably in his younger days, he used to tie on a couple?

B: Wouldn't know. Very likely, being over in the cavalry.

Q: In the year or so after Fairfield, Ohio, at social occasions, he did not drink?

B: No, no.

Q: Arnold strongly disapproved of people who drank or who played around. Did you know this?

B: I didn't know this.

Q: He was a moralist. A number of fellows were playing around and they got the axe.

B: I didn't know this.

Q: He was a little bit of a puritan in his moral attitudes.

B: Well, he was certainly most tolerant with me, because...

Q: I don't mean that he had this attitude towar you, I mean, towards people.

B: Well, I had a reputation, and a well deserved one, for being a poor drinker, and I was. But he never in any of his conversations, one time, as a matter of fact, I was in his office, and somebody had reported the fact that there had been quite a loud party in our quarters. I was called in about it, and I don't remember how the subject was introduced, but I said: "My goodness, is this the first time this had come up?" And he said: "No, about the 16th." So, if that is the situation...He had known about our having made some noise

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in our quarters time after time, but he had never said anything to me about it. I always thought that we got along famously. As a matter of fact, it is probably an immodest thing for me to say, but an officer one time quoted something, I forget the man's name right now, but he was a General Officer who was killed. This comment made about me. He said: "That Bartron is a funny fellow, he can run a squadron or a corps." Now, he made this remark in about 1937, long before we ever thought about any AF officer having any large responsibilities. But I always thought I got along fine with Arnold. For instance, I wrote him a letter about Gen Campbell, and he promoted him, and I know that he knows the entire story. My belief is that he paid a considerable and an accurate judgment: "Does the guy get the job done?" In all immodesty, I will say that I was never told that I fell down on the job.

Q: This was something characteristic of Arnold, I think. That friendship, or emotion, or oldtime sakes, did not interfere with his approach to decisions about people. If a man didn't do the job, he was gone.

B: Well, he should be.

Q: And, of course, sometimes he acted hastily. At least, the man who got fired, thought he acted hastily.

B: I remember one time - and this is a good Arnold story - when I visited him up at Sonoma, I said: "I've often wondered how who got promoted in the war and who didn't. Some people got promoted that I didn't think maybe had it in them, and others didn't get promoted that I thought should." He said: "We gave everybody a chance, and we gave some people two chances. And one man I know, we gave three chances." I think that was Maitland he was talking about. Well, I said: "How about Carl Crane." He more than any other one man, was responsible for pushing the development of blind flying instrumentation. Blind flying was originally conceived by an uneducated ex-Sergeant by the name of Bill Ocker. He had this concept that flying by the seat of your pants was not the McCoy. He had this theory, he sold the theory to Carl Crane, who was a beautifully educated engineering officer. Jointly, they developed the whirling chair that proved to you that your senses slowed down differently than you thought they did. And this Carl Crane made a terrific contribution. Carl Crane had a large

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family, 6 or 7 or 8 children. Well, I said: "Gen Arnold, if everybody got a chance, why isn't Carl Crane a General? He is a Colonel now, and I think he ought to be a LTGEN, and I'd like to work for him. That's how much I think he has over a little fellow like me."

Q: This is a conversation at the ranch?

B: Yes. Well he said: "I ll tell you about Carl Crane." He said: "Early in the war, we sent Carl Crane a warning order, which we sent to everybody. It said: 'Get your affairs in shape because we expect that you will get x-orders in the near future.' Carl Crane wrote back and said, I have a large family and it wouldn't be convenient for me to get my affairs in order in less than 2 or 3 months." General Arnold said: "That finished Carl Crane." Which it should. When a man will allow his personal affairs to interfere with the job for which he had been trained, which was to serve our country in time of war, then he's through. But that was a commentary on the fact that Gen Arnold, at that time, I'm sure he knew the capabilities of every officer in his command.

Q: You know, you mentioned somebody had three chances, and you mentioned Lester Maitland, you know where Maitland is now, he's an Episcopalian Minister, either Phoenix or Tucson.

B: I knew that he was in the clergy, and I knew also - I was up some place north and I was at a party where somebody mentioned General Maitland. I said: "I know Colonel Maitland". Oh no, he was a General, I said: "One will get you give, that he wasn't." "Well, do you know, have you ever seen it in print?" I said: "No, but I have printed material at home." So I went home and looked it up in the retired officer's book. He was retired as a LTCOl.

Q: You know, when Arnold talked about one man getting three chances, I'm not sure he was talking about him or talking about Sue Clagett.

B: It was probably Sue Clagett, I think he was promoted three times.

Q: Did you serve under Sue Clagett at March Field?

B: No. But I considered Sue Clagett - I had an odd experience with Sue Clagett - I walked into a room at an Officer's Club where there were a large

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number of people. Seated on a chair across the room from me, 25 or 30 feet away from me, was a man seated on a chair. I made the involuntary remark, there is the worst bully I have ever seen. I had never seen this man in my life, I didn't know who it was, but his posture on that chair provoked that remark in me. Later on, when they were going to implement Randolph Field, I was the supply officer at Kelly Field. My good friend, Major Warner Robins was then Depot Commander over at Duncan, and responsible for the supply situation for Randolph Field. Well, the quarters at Kelly were terrible. They were old wartime beaver-boards. On an afternoon's drive, we looked at the quarters at Randolph, and I said "Now I'd like to go over there and be stationed there. So I went to Major Robins - and this was in February. They were going to open this place in October. I said to Maj Robins: "If they are going to open that place in October, it's already later than it should be to get somebody over there to do the supply work." So he said: "Well, I'll think about it." So he appointed a board, to which I was one, to make recommendations. There were two people on this board that were...One was dumb, and the other was drunk all the time. So I had to go back to him and say: "Now I have served for Major Robins for 6 or 8 years, and I had close communication with him. He had been my CO, and we spoke directly to each other, and I said: "The board will do no good. One guy talks about Engineering. I don't know anything about Engineering. I don't want to know what he thinks about Supply because he doesn't know anything. So put one man in charge of each. He put me in charge of the recommendations for Randolph Field. When Randolph Field was first supplied with people, there were three officers sent over there and I was one of the first three. The reason this came up is because Col Clagett, whom I had said just involuntary, was the worst bully that I had ever seen, was scheduled to be the CO of Randolph Field. It was from his command that I was supposed to get the Supply people that I would work with. Well, I went to the supply officer there, and all he would give me were his castoffs. So, I went to Major Robins, to whom I took all my problems, and I said: "I'm not getting any place, and I've got to have at least somebody to start to work with."

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He said: "You go over and see Col Clagett, and then come back and report to me what you've done." So I went over to see Col Clagett. Now, I had learned that this Supply man, and it was Brooks Field that was going to move over there, he had a good chief clerk. I had learned this before I went there. So when I went to see Col Clagett, I said: "Col, I've got to have some people to set up the Supply office over there. The quality of the names recommended will not get the work done, and if you come over there, there will be an awful lousy supply situation, and I just want you to know in advance that this,something, has got to be done." He said: "What do you want?" I said: "I want to have something to say about who comes over there, and I want to pick one man to do the job of selecting the personnel. And he said: "Who is that one man?" I said: He's the present head non-commissioned officer in supply office here." And he said: "All right, you can have him." So I got this one man, that's all I could get. But I used him and I built a very nice organization using him. Then, when they moved, when they sent the CO over to command Randolph Field, they didn't send Clagett. They sent the CO from Kelly Field, who was the man I was working for, a man by the name of Fred Martin who was one of God's fine gentlemen, so it turned out all right, even though I had stuck my neck out and looked like I was going to have to work for Clagett, but I never did.

Q: Fred Martin had a bad situation at Pearl Harbor. It wasn't his fault.

B: Yes, he was right, and people over him were wrong.

Q: You know, Clagett blamed his demotions, on one occasion, on Arnold. Did you know that?

Mrs.B: I knew they couldn't stand each other.

Q: Why?

Mrs.B: I was always hearing about different situations. Did you ever hear of Jakey Fickel?

Q: I sure did, I wrote to Mrs. Fickel in San Antonio, but she wouldn't talk to me. Actually, she said I don't have anything of the General's. I asked if she could tell me anything about his relationship with Arnold.

Mrs.B: She's an awful nice woman. But not him. He was at Wright Field.

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Q: You know, he succeeded Arnold at March Field in 1936?

Mrs.B: Oh, no.

Q: In 1936.

B: I think Westover succeeded Arnold.

Mrs.B: Delos Emmons. Jakey Fickel came after Delos Emmons.

Q: Where to, March Field? Clagett was only there 6 months. He was relieved.

Mrs.B: I don't know anything about when he was there at March.

Q: When were you there at March Field?

B: 1937 to 1939. Delos Emmons was there.

Q: Clagett was there in 1936, Arnold left there in Jan 1936. Clagett succeeded him.

B: Fickel came later. Don't you remember?

Mrs.B: Sure, he came when Delos left.

Q: Yes, and do you know that Mary Clagett was writing letters blaming Arnold, for her husband's demotion.

Mrs.B: I think she was kind of crazy.

Q: He had a drinking problem, didn't he? Clagett? He was promoted three times?

Mrs.B: Either he did, or she did, I don't know.

Q: She was writing letters to Washington, blaming Arnold and trying to get....He was a classmate of Andrews, '06.

Mrs.B: They were not a family.

Q: Did you have any contact with Andrews?

B: Very slight. He was in command of the Panama Canal when I was down there.

Q: 1941 or '42.

B: No, '37-39

Mrs.B: No, no, we left March in 1939 and went to Panama. We sailed the day of Pearl Harbor for Trinidad. We were in the Gatun Lake, when we heard about Pearl Harbor.

Q: In 1941....Andrews was then the commander.

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B: As a matter of fact, to give you some idea of how I used to try to think. I went to my CO and we were doing a lot of work about preparing ourselves for defense against an attack over on the East side.

Q: It was a belief that the Panama Canal might catch it.

B: Yes, so I asked permission, and I went over to see Gen Andrews and I said: "I'd just like to stick this notion in the works for what it's worth. The Panama Canal could easily be attacked, but it can't be attacked from the east. It's got to be attacked from the west, because the Japanese have carriers that they can do it with. There is no way in the world that Germany has anything.

Q: Submarines possibly?

B: How can you attack a canal in any useful way?

Q: Sink a ship in the channel.

B: Well, you couldn't get it in. But anyhow, I went over and gave, I guess he was a two star. In fact, we were there when he got his third star. But anyhow, I went over and made this spiel to him, and he said: "Well, thank you very much. It's something we'll think about."

Mrs.B: He was the nicest man. He and Jimmy Hodges.

Q: Jimmy Hodges was A-2 at one time.

Mrs.B: They used to occasionally fly in when Emmons was there, and they both loved to play bridge, and Mrs. Emmons and I used to play with them. That's where I knew them best, although I knew Johnny Andrews real well; General Andrews, too.

Q: She's not alive?

Mrs.B: No.

Q: I heard that Arnold shipped out all his contemporaries so they wouldn't compete for the job - Emmons....

B: I'd heard that rumor.

Q: Emmons...is there any basis for that rumor?

B: I was too far down the ladder to know anything about it.

Q: Do you think anybody else could have done the job that Arnold did? Do you think Andrews could have done the job?

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B: Yes. And so could...

Q: How about Emmons?

B: I wouldn't put Emmons as high up as Andrews, and there was another fellow, a Dutchman who was a contemporary of Arnold's, who was killed....

Q: Horace Hickam?

B: Yes.

Q: You know, everybody speaks very highly of Horace Hickam. They say that he would have gone right to the top if he had lived.

B: Yes, you know going to the top has so many imponderables.

Q: A lot of luck in it, too?

B: Yes, a lot of luck in it. The thing about getting to the top...in my particular case, and this is, I think, the shortest cut to maybe being anything like a success, is somebody over you takes an interest in you, and believes in you, and pushes you, they can do far more for you than you could ever do for yourself. That's what this Major Warner Robins did for me. I don't want to talk about my career, but there have been some very interesting things that have happened to me that have never happened to anybody else.

Q: Warner Robins - when did he die?

B: He was in command - my wife's got the memory - in the early 30's, I guess, or maybe late 1930's. But he was in command at Randolph Field and there's another hardship case. His wife, he had a heart attack and he only had $10,000 insurance. She had to look around. She was a visitor's shopper for a store - Joske's - in San Antonio. They paid her a niggardly wage, but it did enable her to earn Social Security, and she had some few little stocks, and she is now comfortable.

Q: How about Jakie Fickel? Why didn't he get a job during the war?

B: I have a very low opinion of Jakie Fickel's ability, the only reason, Jakie Fickel, in my opinion, got to be a general officer was because he was one of the senior ruling people. I used to say, in my early days, that the worst thing that could happen to a young officer would be to get a superior efficiency report from Jakie Fickel. Let me tell you an experience that I had.

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I was supply officer at Dayton, Ohio, and this was after I had gotten my feet under me, and I had a little bit of a reputation. He was over at the Materiel Command, and he called me up directly. I was the Supply Officer. He said: "How many Air Corps sweaters have you got?" And I said: "I don't know." And he said: "What, an important article like Air Corps sweaters?" I said: "I haven't the slightest idea. We've got 40,000 items in stock, and I make no attempt." So I ran right into my CO, and I reported this conversation on to him, and I said: "I thought we understood how we were trying to do this work. I don't know how to answer a reply like that." So he took care of this Jakie Fickel. But that was the kind of man he was. If he had been in there, he would have tried to know the status of all the important items, and he wouldn't have been thinking anything about policy, or anything like that. In my opinion, he was not General Officer material.

Q: He was 4th AF Commander for a while, right at the start of the war. But Arnold took him out of there, so he never amounted to much. The same thing with Benny Foulois. Did you have any contact with Benny Foulois?

B: No, I didn't have any contact with him.

Q: He never got a job during the war.

B: I wouldn't know about that. I think he was antedated by the time the war started.

Q: How about Frank Lahm? Did you have any contact with him?

B: No, he was too, far, far way ahead of me. These are men that were not usable in the new era that the Air Force produced. They had done their growing up and they were...I'll tell you a little story. A bumblebee was in a meadow and a bull came along and swallowed him...The AF was staffed after the first WW by what we call the CO group, who were castoffs from the other arms. They hadn't learned how to fly; they weren't sympathetic.

Q: People like Westover and Mason Patrick?

B: Yes, and Weaver, and people like that. They weren't wanted in their own arm. They were senior as hell. They saw a chance to get a soft job and flying pay. They came to the AF. There were a few good ones. Fred Martin, a fine

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gentleman, good clear mind. But there were very few of them. Arnold was one. Good fine clear mind, but where there was one good fine clear mind, there were 10 that were just dumped because they were virtually useless. The AF suffered under them during the 1920s to 1940s.

Q: Arnold talked about deadwood in several memoranda. He tried to get rid of the deadwood in the AF. Were you aware of his concern that we had a lot of superannuated officers who should have been retired?

B: I was too far down the ladder, I knew this myself, but I was too far down the ladder to be consonant with any of his thoughts. I knew this to be the case. These men were dodos. They didn't have the capacity to think in any simple direction. The only reason, as I mentioned, I happened to be a general officer, because the Lord, at an early age, gave me some little thinking capacity, and I tried to employ it. Let me tell you why I happen to be trying to get along, and I'm not trying to do this to balloon my own business. When Major Robins was in command, he got an order along in the middle 1920's during the economy period, that the depot there was going to receive a 10 percent cut. So he called in his supply officer and said: "You are going to have to cut 10 per cent in 60 days." The supply officer told him: "It can't be done; we are shorthanded now." Well, I had done a little sleight of hand, and ran a smaller department successfully. So he just took a gamble and he brought me up and he put me in this job, and he told me: "This place has been running for years, and we've got no decrease in workload. As a matter of fact, the workload is getting bigger, but we are going to have to cut 10% and you are going to have to do it. Well, I didn't know anything about the job. The first thing that I did was to take each one of my storekeepers and have them submit to me daily a report of what they did with their men that day. Well, in those days, it was the old Army system. They requisitioned every three months. Then they would have a slack period for 6 or 8 weeks till the end of the quarter. So I just suggested to him that he allow us to have these people submit their requisitions to us on a staggered basis, so that one outfit would requisition on the 1st of the month; the next one on the 10th of the month; the next one on

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the 20th of the month, so that we had an even flow of workload. In three weeks, we were not only able to cut the 10%, but we were able to cut an extra 15% on top of that. Now, that was a small performance - just simple, little, country thinking. But it convinced this CO that here's a boy who will at least try to find out what's going on. That was the difference in my life between being another, stick jocket. After that, while I was in the service - this includes all of my service - I had the best supply job that there was.

Q: I want to ask you about something in the supply area. They brought Knerr in and they sent him out to England. He was in charge, the Deputy CG of the 8th AF for logistics or administration. Do you remember they had all this trouble getting planes ready in the ETO.

B: I was in Africa.

Q: You don't know anything about the ETO problems?

B: No. I went up there, because I thought I could learn something. Everything I saw they were doing was antiquated and poor. As a matter of fact, when Gen Eaker came down to North Africa and I reported to him, he said: "They've got quite a show up there. Why don't you go up and take a look around." So I went up and took a look around and I came back and I said: "We are just skinning the heels off of them. We are doing everything better than they ever thought of doing."

Q: Was Knerr there by that time?

B: If he was, I didn't see him.

Q: Did you have any relations with Tony Frank?

B: Yes.

Q: Tony Frank was bitter at Arnold because he wanted a combat job. He wanted a command and he never got one. Did you know that?

B: I know Tony Frank quite well. I have no respect for the man. Let me tell you an experience with Tony Frank.

Q: He didn't like Arnold?

B: Maybe he didn't, that I don't know. Tony Frank wound up as being in command of the Air Service Command. He had no experience for the job. He didn't

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to the North African theater and the . . brought down a large number of B-24s from England because we cou · missions out of them in North Africa, the weather being what it was, ahan they could in England. When I heard this, I started writing wires and letters and communications to the US. Now the system of supply was antiquated and still is. They furnished supplies based on a requisition, and I wrote to the US and I said: "We are getting in new airplanes". We didn't have a single B-24." We have no way of knowing what to ask for. Make us a forced issue on what they used, based on their consumption, so that when they get down here, we will know. We will have the supplies that they will need. We can't ask for them, because we don't know a thing about them." I said this at least 50 times. Ton Frank and I...he couldn't have said this if he had known anything about the business. As I say, I was not sympathetic about Eaker, because if Eaker had any judgment he wouldn't have permitted this thing to have happened. Eaker had a conference, including all the general officers there, Doolittle, and Cannon and all the rest of them, and then he said: "This is all a frameup. Does anyone have any questions?" Tony Frank was there and he said: "Yes, I've got a question. I would like to know why the rate of cannibalization on B-24s is higher in this theater than it is any place else in the world?" Now, I had suspected - I know the guy - Tony Frank never did anything that didn't enhance his personal interest, and nothing else. He knows nothing else, never did, I had suspected this might come up, and I brought a file that was that thick, trying to show, which would show clearly, that we had tried to get these supplies shipped down to us, and we hadn't received pound #1 when this conference occurred. The airplanes were there, and we were having to cannibalize them to keep any in the air. I outlined this rather completely, and I said: "Here is the documentation of my position, as the responsibility for this condition, lays squarely on the doorstep of the gentleman who asked the question.

Q: What kind of reaction did you get to that?

B: The meeting closed. No one said a word.

Q: Did you know there was some hard feelings between Frank and Arnold because he wanted a combat command?

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B: I was too far down to know anything about that.

Q: You know, I talked to his son-in-law, Brooke Allen and I didn't get any real insight into that problem from him.

B: Of course, bear in mind, you are talking to a LT. I was a LT for 17 years. So these high ranking people, I didn't know anything about these upper level conferences.

Q: A number of other people stubbed their toes as far as Arnold was concerned. Henry Harms, did you know him? He was in Newfoundland.

B: Yes, he was, I think he was probably included in the deadwood category.

Q: And Douglas Netherwood? Remember him?

B: Yes, and Lohman, he was the man as senior as Spaatz and the rest of them.

Q: Lohman was Arnold's Exec at March Field.

B: Yes.

Q: And he sort of fell by the wayside?

B: He was as senior as Arnold, and never promoted. There was a great many of those. As a matter of fact, they controlled the Air Force from 1920 to about 1938.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relations with Marshall?

B: No, too far down. The country needed something for which I had been trained. I was able to give them a decent dividend. Just as my wife said, and it can be proved. I did a beautiful job under war conditions.

Q: You know, this movie that we made over at Norton about Arnold, we called it "Man In A Hurry." This is Arnold, who was impatient with organization charts and paperwork. He wanted to get the job done, and he grabbed people and asked them to do a job. Did he ever grab you to do a job?

B: No, no, never. Of course, I never knew anything except: "Yes,sir," and spin my wheels, and try to do my best. As a matter of fact, had such a thing come up, it never occurred to me to criticize the urgency on the part of a CO. If he said we are in a hurry, we are in a hurry.

Q: You know, Arnold had this Advisory Council - Norstad and Cabell at

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first. Then he had Jake Smart, and then he had Rosie O'Donnell and a couple of other people. They used to go out to the theaters once in a while to sort of be his eyes on some problem. Did they ever come out to bother you?

B: I never saw one of them. As a matter of fact, my whole war experience was just dandy. Everything went wonderfully.

Q: Actually, except for occasional contacts, you didn't have any real, close, continuing contact with Arnold after Wright Field?

B: No, that's right. I was too far down the ladder.

Q: Jan Howard thing - did you know that he and Jan Howard - they had a real nasty conflict?

B: No, I didn't know.

Q: Chidlaw was out there at the time. He told me quite a bit about this.

B: He would be in a position to know.

Q: He was higher up in the situation. What kind of officer was Conger Pratt?

B: I think he was smooth, distinguished representative of the old school.

Q: He wasn't airpower, though?

B: Well, no, he didn't come up through the mill. To me, an AF officer was a flyer in the First WW. Conger was like the rest of the people. He came up through other branches.

Q: Did you have any role in the CCC?

B: No.

Q: How about the air mail?

B: No, I was in charge of a warehouse some place. I was a pure supply officer.

Q: Nate Twining was out at Wright Field and he was one of the alternates for the Alaskan Flight. Arnold didn't call him, and he was kind of teed off at Arnold for not picking him. Did you know this?

B: I didn't know this, this is all over my head.

Q: Do you think Arnold was the best man in the job at the time?

B: Who was that we talked about?

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Q: Horace Hickam.

B: Yes.

Q: He would have done a good job, too?

B: He was my pick. Then I would have put Andrews and Arnold on an equal basis, but both below Horace Hickam.

Q: In your opinion, Horace Hickam would have been the best CG.

B: Yes.

Q: You know, at least a half dozen, maybe more, people have told me that Horace Hickam was the best man in the AF. It was a great tragedy that he lost his life.

NOTE: Mrs. Bartron told me this story. She would not put it on tape. It happened at Dayton, probably in 1929. Mrs. Arnold confided in her that Hap had, she called him "Sunny" at that time, ranted because one of their boys, probably Hank, had gotten 10 on his arithmetic paper. That's 10 out of 100. He stormed up and down the house chastizing the youngster and making a big scene. Finally, Mrs. Arnold said to him: "Sunny, for action like that on the part of another officer, you would have court martialed him."

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Bassett, Harold Huntley 6 May 70

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Typist { Q: for Interviewer / B: for Bassett

Draxe calls ✓ ✓

We are Interviewing General Huntley Bassett, on the 6th of May 1970 and this is a continuation. San Antonio, Texas.

Q: Interviewer - General, you were talking about Crile and the AMS - they did not regard him in the highest official Kirk American Meteorological Society,

B: Bassett - I don't think so, and I'm not sure if he ever was an amateur or not. He may have been a member at one time or another.

Q: Interviewer - Was it because he had tried to commercialize his talent? Bassett - That's the only reason I know. Interviewer - Well what's wrong with that? Bassett - Well there isn't anything wrong, and so maybe that isn't the real reason. Lots of people do it now but they don't combine it with, as far as I know at least, with being the head of the Meteorology Dept. in MIT, or they don't know a CalTech Anymore. I think there were things that I don't know anything about, and I can't even speculate about. I don't think they had a high regard for each other. I guess that's all I'd better say about that.

Q: Interviewer - One of the reasons I'm particularly interested in it is because of Arnold's unorthodoxy in disregarding staff procudures. Arnold would have guys like "Hungry" Gates set up an elaborate staff procedure, then Arnold would procede to violate them, because he was by nature an impatient man. And he had a problem and Bassett had a solution, and he though Bassett had a solution, and he would grab Bassett in the hall, and give him a job which might be alien to his expertise.

Q: Did you ever get grabbed in the hall by him? Given an assignment?

B: Bassett - No, never had anything to do with him other than that one meeting and from then on, never. Interviewer - Did you avoid him? Bassett - No, there was never occasion.

As I mentioned there were three or four echelons of people I was supposed to go thru Gen McClennan was one stp higher - I think he is dead. He was in Washington, There never was any special operation, or any special difficulty that I saw Gen Giles, maybe a few times, and generally, if it was anything that had to go to the front

Bassett: Knew Hoover manager

Bassett: Grabbed in Hall

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office, I saw him, Giles, and it was not a thing that Gen Arnold was interested in, so it just never went to him. There was never anything comparable to the situation that - he never called on me for anything special. Honest, I tried to think and I don't remember seeing him. Interviewer - Was there some occasion where you predicted - did he try to predict the weather for D-Day? Bassett - Who? Interviewer - Krick. Bassett - Well he was in Interviewer - He made some kind of prediction and he was wrong and he rationalized it by saying he was 12 hours wrong. Do you remember it? Bassett - No, but Yates would be the one - he would know. Rationalizing something that he made a mistake on was very typical. That I can believe. And that he did habitually. If he did miss a forecast he could talk to you and in 15 minutes you would begin to think he'd hit it. He is a very pursuasive guy of that sort. Yates would know about it, because by that time, Krick had been banished to Pasadena at the same time as Zimmerman. Interviewer - Had Arnold had his fill of Krick? Bassett - Oh yes, when this thing in late November happened in 1942 when Zimmerman and Krick got into it, (hassle), and Zimmerman was banished and Krick was banished too, back to Pasadena, Zimmerman was at the staff school at Leavenworth. Zimmerman was under the impression that it could be in writing somewhere in the Pentagon. I never saw it, but he had the impression that whatever piece of paper sent Krick to Pasadena said, and there he will stay forever more. I doubt there is any such paper. I think that's what Don wanted to happen, ~~and he - you see~~ about a year later in '43 - by that time they were getting set up in the UK for the invasion, and Yates had been running the Weather Center, the forecast center in the Pentagon, and I was under him, and I was the Chief of the Weather Service or something - forecasting center. ~~He~~ Yates was working for me. And this was in '43 I guess, and then they began to build

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up in the UK, weather services to support the troops and a weather center in SHAEF Headquarters. The British had a part, and we had a part, and maybe somebody else, but the British and us, and Yates was sent to head up that center and to be the No. 1 US weather man in and around SHAEF Hqs. He for whatever anybody wanted him to do. took Ben Holzman - he was a forecaster, pretty good, He went to Cal Tech. was working commercially, and came back during the war. He was Yates' number one guy, and it's my recollection that Yates asked for Krick to be sent as a forecaster from Pasadena where he was teaching school, to the UK to work as a forecaster in this weather unit. Now Yates might say he didn't do that. All I can say is that I'm pretty sure that I didn't think it was a good idea and start the ball rolling. It came from somewhere, is my recollection. It could have come from Yates, it could have come from somewhere else. But once the matter arose, the question was, "is he going or isn't he?" I don't remember the details - it is probably on a bunch of blue sheets or green ones in the Pentagon, but the upshot was, that he went. That always rankled Don Zimmerman because he thought he should stay in Pasadena until he rotted, or longer.

Interviewer - Everything in here is background information. Your knowledge about what you think Zimmerman said about Krick is background information and we have many many tapes. Bassett - Well I'm sure you do, and there are bound to be people who will recollect things differently. But I don't know that it has any importance at all. Anyway the upshot of it was Krick was assigned from whatever he was doing in California to the unit under Yates. I guess, although, again, Yates is the one who could say that Krick and Holzman and Baumgard and three or four other, the best forecasters we had, or the best we thought we had, and Krick had always had a pretty good reputation as a forecaster. He sold the stuff. Anyway he went over there. I don't know just when, but I

Bassett: Krick and D. Day

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guess late in 43 and he worked in there and that group work in conjunction with the British forecasters, and somehow or other they cranked the forecast out that Don or some Britisher ultimately went in and briefed Eisenhower and the whole bunch, and maybe, on occasion, individuals presented their own personal forecast. My guess is that most of the time it was a composite thing, or if there was a difference, for example, between Krick and Holzman both of them Lt Cols wearing an Air Force uniform working in a forecast center, I don't know what happened, Yates may have - maybe he took it in, maybe he said you do it today, but the D=Day forecast - all I can remember at all was that I expect Krick has said he had a hand in it and hit it right on the head. But I don't know., Interviewer - My recollection is that he made a long range forecast, or said he had devised a long range forecast, and he was wrong and when he was called on said that he had missed it by 12 hours. But actually he had the right forecast but there was some fact that had caused him to miss it by 12 hours. Bassett - He was always interested in making long range forecasts, and he had in the Air Force done most of the research, a lot of which consisted in going back and redrawing old weather bureau maps, and he was trying to make several day forecasts, Well, they still can't do it, and neither can he very accurately, they're getting better as time goes on, but something like that, you see, he would make it sound as though he could do it and then after he'd miss, he'd say it was pretty good, it was only 12 hours off, and after all, that's pretty good and it is pretty good if you can do it and only be 12 hrs. off. If you are going to land boats this hour and 12 hours later there's a lot of difference in the weather than the forecast is no good. Interviewer - Did he make people believe he invented weather? I understand that Arnold saw an article in a magazine, Sat. Evening Post or

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Colliers or something. He was working for the Navy. Bassett - He was a reserve officer I believe in the Navy and I think, but again I'm not sure I think Don - Interviewer - Arnold saw him and read this article or it was called to Arnold's attention and Arnold got him into the Air Force. Bassett - That might be. If I were guessing I'd guess Don Zimmerman probably got him transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. That article you are talking about is one about the dirgible disaster off the coast, ~~and~~ its been in magazines starting in 1935, and he got it run in magazines like the Post and Sunday supplements - it came out about every two years for 20 years there. Interviewer - Was that the Shenandoah or the Mobile. Bassett - Yes, wasn't it the Shenandoah or that was in Ohio wasn't it. Well, the story, of course, was that Krick had forecast that this was going to happen and he did a lot of embroidering. He was ~~a great~~ his own best public relations man. He could have been good at that and made a good living at that - it doesn't make any difference whether he was peddling weather or pineapples. And he might have made more money in pineapples. But he just got into weather and he stuck with it. Interviewer - You know I'm interested in another aspect of your career. From August 1940 until shortly after Pearl Harbor, you were ~~in the~~ at Wheeler field in Pearl Harbor. You were with the 18th ~~comb~~ Pursuit Group. Bassett - But I wasn't in it as a matter of fact. I was in the base establishment - I must have had 20 jobs, I guess, in the space of a year. It's just a funny story, but I wasn't part of that tactical unit. Interviewer - ~~Well, let me ask you this.~~ Did you have any contact with Col Farthing and Lawrence Covington and ~~Tom LaRosa~~ Rhodes? They were in Fred Martin's headquarters. Bassett - Yes, not too much then. I knew they were all in his headquarters and it was down at Hickam. I knew Elmer Rose a little bit later when he was in Security Service.

Bassett: F.R.C. Plan

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. . .

Interviewer - the reason I bring this up is that they came ~~over~~ up with a very important plan, ~~They sent the plan in to Martin, he sent it to Short,~~ which he approved it, ~~they sent it to Wash. The plan~~ said that if we had 180 B-17's we could relieve the Navy about any worry about defending Pearl Harbor. This thing went to Wash, ~~and~~ return disappeared. There was no reaction - no official reaction, if there was a reaction it's ~~in~~ been expunged from the files. There was 180 - I'll turn this off only for the reasons that I know what I'm going to say ---

Q: You are talking about Arnold's - Bassett - disposition of the Zimmerman/Krick problem. Don may have given Gen Arnold cause which I'm not aware of, - he could have not so much by what he said or wrote, as the way he did it. He may have irritated Gen Arnold. Of course if he was irritated he tended to be pretty abrupt in what he did Interviewer - Was he a very stong minded man - Zimmerman? Bassett - Yes, ~~and~~ he knew more about the weather service - he had been working with it all the time since he had gotten out of school till the war started. He had been doing a good job of it, because actually after he was gone all those of us who were left did was more or less carry out what he and some of the same people had already planned to do. And that's the way the Weather Service was set up, the way it operated thruout the war. I guess he could have got it all set up and operating better than anybody else. I just thought that was a mistake, but it may not be one that - I suppose anybody could have made - I can't see how Gen Arnold could have kept track of all the details of that particular hassle and there must have been a thousand going on around there all of them bigger in his book than that one. I suppose the only reason maybe he became involved was that there was a personal relationship, friendship, acquaintanceship, reputation, which Krick had in his eyes up until then, ~~and~~ finally, it got to the point where he said

Bassett: Krick vs Zimmerman

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. . . .

"Out" you both go," and they both went out - which was a solution, but I don't think the Air Force or Weather Service was any better off because Zimmerman left, ~~and~~ I think on the other hand that Krick probably had to leave or change his way. and To me it is almost inconceivable that Krick could have changed his ways - I mean he just went on operating, ~~making runs~~ - some people would call it making out runs, or whatever you want to call them, and you can't do that in uniform as a part of a military organization. You can be the advisor to the boss and talk to him privately. ~~and if~~ He expounds your ideas and does something, but you can't have the civilian expert or technician or advisor or whatever he may be - you can't have him getting into hassles with the heads of your military units, be they staff or otherwise. ~~and~~ that's what he allowed to happen, so it was his fault, ~~well,~~ I think it was just a combination of circumstances, and, maybe wasn't anybody's fault. The upshot of it was that both went and - Interviewer - Arnold probably got impatient and cleaned house. Bassett - I suppose that's what happened. Of course I heard it from Don Zimmerman's side and being personally acquainted, and a friend of his, it struck me that he had a bad shake, ~~but~~ - Interviewer - In Dec 1944 you went to Europe Bassett - Then he YATES came back and took my job in the Weather Service Hqs in the Pentagon and Oscar Center of course had been down in Ashville in command of the units - the operational part of the Weather Service. Interviewer - You didn't see Arnold when he got to Europe in May 1945? Bassett - I don't have any recollection of it - I could have. Interviewer - He was on a recuperation trip, he went to the Riviera and went to Paris. He was in Europe during V-E day. Bassett - Yes, I got a foggy recollection of his being there, and I could have been at some kind of a gathering with a few hundred other people - Gen Spaatz ~~Spotts~~ was the boss then. I might have seen him or even shook his hand,

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but as far as talking to him or having any personal ~~contacts or~~ conversation, I did't. I venture a guess that if I had seen him and ~~said and~~ asked you remember the meeting we had at so and so, he'd remember Krick, but I doubt if he'd remember me. I just never had any dealings with him. (Interviewer) - This would be a ~~was~~ second hand speculation on your part, because of your limited contact with Arnold, but do you feel that he did the job as Commander of the Air Force, or what is your impression of his performance? ~~in his job.~~ This is a rather distant evaluation. (Bassett) - Well, I'd say yes he did it, and in light of the way things turned out, he was there, and things turned out as they did, on the minor details you can say, well you think you know, something about it you say no I don't think I have an opinion on that or any basis for it other than the same one that everybody else had that read the news. ~~This is the end of the Bassett interview.~~

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Interview, M/General Huntley Bassett, 6 May 1970, San Antonio, Texas.

Q: General, you were talking about Krick and the American Meteorological Society. They did not regard him in the highest official light?

B: I don't think so, and I'm not sure if he ever was a member or not. He may have been at one time or another.

Q: Was it because he had tried to commercialize his talent:

B: That's the only reason I know.

Q: Well, what's wrong with that?

B: Well, there isn't anything wrong, and so maybe that isn't the real reason. Lots of people do it now but they don't combine it with--as far as I know at least--with being the head of the Meteorology Department in MIT, or they don't have a Cal Tech anymore. I think there were things that I don't know anything about, and I can't even speculate about. I don't think they had a high regard for each other. I guess that's all I'd better say about that.

Q: One of the reasons I'm particularly interested in it is because of Arnold's unorthodoxy in disregarding staff procedures. Arnold would have guys like "Hungry" Gates set up an elaborate staff procedure, then Arnold would proceed to violate them, because he was by nature an impatient man. And he had a problem and Bassett had a solution. If he thought Bassett had a solution, he would grab Bassett in the hall, and give him a job which might be alien to his expertise. Did you ever get grabbed in the hall by him? Given an assignment?

B: No, never had anything to do with him other than that one meeting, and from then on, never.

Q: Did you avoid him?

B: No, there was never occasion. As I mentioned there were three or four echelons of people I was supposed to go through. General McClelland was one step higher--I think he is dead. He was in Washington. There never was any special operation, or any special difficulty that. I saw General Giles, maybe a few times, and generally, if it was anything that had to go to the front office, I saw him, Giles, and it was not a thing that Gen Arnold was interested in. So it just never went to him. There was never anything comparable to the situation that--he never called on me for anything special. Honest, I tried to think and I don't remember seeing him.

Q: Was there some occasion where he predicted--did he try to predict the weather for D-Day?

B: Who?

Q: Krick.

B: Well, he was in....

Q: He made some kind of prediction and he was wrong and he rationalized it by saying he was 12 hours wrong. Do you remember it?

B: No, but Gates would be the one--he would know. Rationalizing something that he made a mistake on was very typical. That I can believe. And that Krick did habitually. If he did miss a forecast he could talk to you and in 15 minutes you would begin to think he'd hit it. He is a very persuasive guy of that sort. Yates would know about it, because by that time, Krick had been banished to Pasadena at the same time as Zimmerman.

Q: Had Arnold had his fill of Krick?

B: Oh yes, when this thing in late November happened in 1942 when Zimmerman and Krick got into a hassle.

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Q: And Zimmerman was banished and Krick was banished, too, back to Pasadena.

B: Zimmerman was at the staff school at Leavenworth. Zimmerman was under the impression that--it could be in writing somewhere in the Pentagon--I never saw it, but he had the impression that whatever piece of paper sent Krick to Pasadena said, "and there he will stay forever more." I doubt there is any such paper. I think that's what Don wanted to happen. About a year later in '43--by that time they were getting set up in the UK for the invasion, and Yates had been running the Weather Center, the forecast center in the Pentagon, and I was under him, and I was the Chief of the Weather Service or something--forecasting center. Yates was working for me. And this was in '43, I guess. Then they began to build up in the UK, weather services to support the troops and a weather center in SHAEF Headquarters. The British had a part, and we had a part, and maybe somebody else, but the British and us, Yates was sent to head up that Center and to be the No. 1 US weather man in and around SHAEF Hqs for whatever anybody wanted him to do. He took Ben Holzman--he was a forecaster, pretty good. He went to Cal Tech, was working commercially, and came in the war. He was Yates' number one guy, and it's my recollection that Yates asked for Krick to be sent as a forecaster from Pasadena where he was teaching school, to the UK to work as a forecaster in this weather unit. Now Yates might say he didn't do that. All I can say is that I'm pretty sure that I didn't think it was a good idea and start the ball rolling. It came from somewhere, is my recollection. It could have come from Yates, it could have come from somewhere else. But once the matter arose, the question was:

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"Is he going or isn't he?" I don't remember the details--it is probably on a bunch of blue sheets or green ones in the Pentagon. But the upshot was, that he went. That always rankled Don Zimmerman because he thought he should stay in Pasadena until he rotted, or longer.

Q: Everything in here is background information. Your knowledge about what you think Zimmerman said about Krick is background information. We have many, many tapes.

B: Well, I'm sure you do, and there are bound to be people who will recollect things differently. But I don't know that it has any importance at all. Anyway, the upshot of it was Krick was assigned from whatever he was doing in California to the unit under Yates. I guess, although, again, Yates is the one who could say Krick and Holzman and Baumgard and three or four others, the best forecasters we had, or the best we thought we had, and Krick had always had a pretty good reputation as a forecaster. He sold the stuff. Anyway, he went over there. I don't know just when, but I guess late in '43 and he worked in there and that group worked in conjunction with a group of British forecasters. Somehow or other they cranked the forecast out that Don or some Britisher ultimately went in and briefed Eisenhower and the whole bunch. Maybe, on occasion, individuals presented their own personal forecast. My guess is that most of the time it was a composite thing, or if there was a difference, for example, between Krick and Holzman both of them Lt Colonels wearing an Air Force uniform working in a Forecaster Center, I don't know what happened. Yates may have--maybe he took it in. Maybe, he

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said you do it today. But the D-Day forecast--all I can remember at all was that I expect Krick has said he had a hand in it and hit it right on the head. But I don't know.

Q: My recollection is that he made a long-range forecast, or said he had devised a long-range forecast, and he was off, and when he was called on said that he had missed it by 12 hours. But actually he had the right forecast but there was some factor that had caused him to miss it by 12 hours.

B: He was always interested in making long-range forecasts, and he had in the Air Force dones most of the research, a lot of which consisted in going back and redrawing old weather bureau maps. He was trying to make several day forecasts. Well, they still can't do it, and neither can he very accurately. They're getting better as time goes on. But something like that, you see, he would make it sound as though he could do it and then after he'd miss, he'd say it was pretty good, it was only 12 hours off, and after all, that's pretty good and it is pretty good if you can do it and only be 12 hours off. If you are going to land boats this hour and 12 hours later there's a lot of difference in the weather then the forecast is no good.

Q: Did he make people believe he invented weather? He was very articulate.

B: Yes.

Q: How did Arnold become attracted to him? I understand that Arnold saw an article in a magazine, Saturday Evening Post or Colliers or something. He was working for the Navy.

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B: He was a reserve officer, I believe, in the Navy and I think, but again I'm not sure. I think Don...

Q: Arnold saw him and read this article or it was called to Arnold's attention and Arnold got him into the Air Force.

B: That might be. If I were guessing I'd guess Don Zimmerman probably got him transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. That article you are talking about is one about the dirgible disaster off the Coast. It's been in magazines starting in 1935, and he got it run in magazines like the Post and Sunday supplements--it came out about every two years for 20 years there.

Q: Was that the Shenandoah or the Mobile?

B: Yes, wasn't it the Shenandoah or that was in Ohio, wasn't it? Well, the story, of course, was that Krick had forecast that this was going to happen and he did a lot of embroidering. He was his own best public relations man. He could have been good at that and made a good living at that--it doesn't make any difference whether he was peddling weather or pineapples. And he might have made money in pineapples. But he just got into weather and he stuck with it.

Q: You know, I'm interested in another aspect of your career. From August 1940 until shortly after Pearl Harbor, you were at Wheeler Field in Pearl Harbor. You were with the 18th Pursuit Group.

B: But I wasn't in it as a matter of fact. I was in the base establishment--I must have had 20 jobs, I guess, in the space of a year. It's just a funny story, but I wasn't part of that tactical unit.

Q: Did you have any contact with Col Farthing and Lawrence Coddington and Rhodes? They were in Fred Martin's headquarters?

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B: Yes, not too much then. I knew they were all in his headquarters and it was down at Hickam. I knew Elmer Rose a little bit later when he was in Security Service.

Q: The reason I bring this up is that they came up with a very important plan, which said that if we had 180 B-17s we could relieve the Navy about any worry about defending Pearl Harbor. This thing went to Washington, and disappeared.

Q: You are talking about Arnold's...

B: Disposition of the Zimmerman/Krick problem. Don may have given Gen Arnold cause which I'm not aware of. He could have not so much by what he said or wrote, as the way he did it. He may have irritated General Arnold. Of course, if he was irritated, he tended to be pretty abrupt in what he did.

Q: Was he a very strong minded man--Zimmerman?

B: Yes. He knew more about the weather service--he had been working with it all the time since he had gotten out of school till the war started. He had been doing a good job of it, because actually after he was gone all those of us who were left did, was more or less carry out what he and some of the same people had already planned to do. And that's the way the Weather Service was set up, the way it operated throughout the war. I guess he could have got it all set up and operating better than anybody else. I just thought that was a mistake, but it may not be one that--I suppose anybody could have made--I can't see how General Arnold could have kept track of all the details of that particular hassle and there must have been a thousand going on around there all of them bigger in his book than that one. I suppose

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the only reason maybe he became involved was that there was a personal relationship, friendship, acquaintanceship, reputation, which Krick had in his eyes up until then. Finally, it got to the point where he said, "Out you both go," and they both went out--which was a solution. But I don't think the Air Force or Weather Service was any better off because Zimmerman left. I think on the other hand that Krick probably had to leave or change his way. To me it is almost inconceivable that Krick could have changed his ways--I mean he just went on operating--some people would call it making end runs, or whatever you want to call them, and you can't do that in uniform as a part of a military organization. You can be the advisor to the boss and talk to him privately. He expounds your ideas and does something. But you can't have the civilian expert or technician or advisor or whatever he may be--you can't have him getting into hassles with the heads of your military units, be they staff or otherwise. That's what he allowed to happen, so it was his fault. I think it was just a combination of circumstances, and maybe it wasn't anybody's fault. The upshot of it was that both went and...

Q: Arnold probably got impatient and cleaned house.

B: I suppose that's what happened. Of course, I heard it from Don Zimmerman's side and being personally acquainted, and a friend of his, it struck me that he had a bad shake.

Q: In December 1944, you went to Europe.

B: Then Yates came back and took my job in the Weather Service Hqs in the Pentagon and Oscar Senter, of course, had been down in Ashville in command of the units--the operational part of the Weather Service.

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Q: You didn't see Arnold when he got to Europe in May 1945?

B: I don't have any recollection of it--I could have.

Q: He was on a recuperation trip, he went to the Riviera and went to Paris. He was in Europe during V-E Day.

B: Yes, I got a foggy recollection of his being there, and I could have been at some kind of a gathering with a few hundred other people--General Spaatz was the boss then. I might have seen him or even shook his hand, but as far as talking to him or having any personal conversation, I didn't. I venture a guess that if I had seen him and asked, "You remember the meeting we had at so and so?" he'd remember Krick, but I doubt if he'd remember me. I just never had any dealings with him.

Q: This would be a second-hand speculation on your part, because of your limited contact with Arnold, but do you feel that he did the job as Commander of the Air Force, or what is your impression of his performance? This is a rather distant evaluation.

B: Well, I'd say yes he did it, and in light of the way things turned out, he was there, and things turned out as they did. On the minor details you can say, well you think you know, something about it you say no I don't think I have an opinion on that or any basis for it other than the same one that everybody else had that read the news.

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

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

7 April 1970

Dear Dr. Green:

I'll be expecting your call when you get to San Antonio.

Sincerely,

H. H. Bassett

H. H. BASSETT
613 Oblate Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78216

822-0940

H/6 Ret

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1 April 1970

Maj. General Harold H. Bassett, USAF (Ret.)
613 Oblate Road
San Antonio, Texas 78212

Dear General Bassett:

My plans are finally set for a visit to San Antonio. I hope to catch the courier to Randolph on Thursday, April 30th. I'll be staying at the base for about 10 days.

I'll phone for an appointment, if I may.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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M/Gen Harold H. Bassett, USAF Ret
613 Oblate Dr.
San Antonio, Tex. 78212

24 February 1970

Dear Dr. Green:

I would be very glad to pass on to you any information I may have which would be helpful in connection with your biography of General Arnold.

I do not have any plans which would interfere with our meeting whenever and wherever might be most convenient for you - so I will be awaiting further word as to the time and place.

Sincerely,

H. H. Bassett
Maj. Gen. USAF (Ret)

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief, Research and Analysis Division
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

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18 February 1970

Dear General Bassett:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and in a conversation with Lt General William O. Senter, he mentioned that you might have some knowledge of the "weather" situation in the AAF including Professor Irving Krick and the special access he had to General Arnold. That "out of channels" operation complicated the management problem for you and for Don Zimmerman and Don Yates who preceded you.

In any event, I'm scheduled to visit San Antonio in about a month to see Generals Barney and Ben Giles, among others. I would be delighted to spend a half hour or so with you, at a time convenient for you.

Please advise me if I may do so. I'll call before hand to set up an appointment.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Major General Harold H. Bassett, USAF (Ret)
613 Oblate Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78212

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Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Major General Harold H. Bassett, USAF (Ret)
613 Oblate Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78212

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD H. BASSETT, USAF

PART I - Narrative

Major General Harold Huntley Bassett was born in Albion, Illinois, on 1 April 1907. After preliminary schooling in Albion and two years at St. John's Military Academy, Delafield, Wisconsin, he entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1925. Upon graduation therefrom in 1929 he was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers but went directly into flying training and upon completion thereof was transferred to the Air Corps. After approximately five years of squadron officer duties in Hawaii and at Randolph Field, Texas, General Bassett took the course in meteorology at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, and, in 1937, when the Air Weather Service was first organized, he commanded one of the three original Weather Squadrons.

Leaving the Weather Service in 1940, he was again assigned to Hawaii where he performed administrative and staff type duties; however, he was selected to participate in the first mass flight of B-17's from the Mainland to Hawaii and, for his part therein, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Shortly after the outbreak of the U.S.-Japanese hostilities in World War II, General Bassett was assigned to the Naval War College as a student. Upon completion of this course he was returned once again to the Weather Service where he remained- in Washington and Europe - until shortly after the end of the war. For his services during this period, General Bassett received the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Bronze Star Medal.

Upon his return to the States in 1947, General Bassett attended the National War College and then spent the following three years in the Joint Staff.

In 1951 he was assigned to the recently organized USAF Security Service as Deputy Commander and, in 1953, succeeded to the command of that organization - a position he held until 1957 when he became Deputy Commander, Taiwan Defense Command. There were two promotions during this period: to Brigadier General on 5 September 1952 and to Major General on 27 October 1954.

Returning to the States in November 1958, General Bassett was assigned as Commander, Air Weather Service, Headquarters, Air Weather Service, MATS, Scott AFB, Illinois.

General Bassett is the son of Arch and Clara Huntley Bassett of Albion, Illinois. He married the former Anita Horner, of Honolulu, T.H., and has one daughter, Frances, who is married to Mr. James R. Hill of North Hollywood, California.

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PART II - Personalized Material

A. Interests

1. Have been playing golf for more than thirty-five years - mostly in the low eighties.

2. No unusual talents or skills.

3. Member of the Protestant Episcipal Church but not active in it.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Likes almost all types of food; conservative in tastes for clothing, housing and furnishings.

2. General but only slightly developed appreciation for music; have sizeable, diversified record collection. Have traveled considerably and would like to do more.

3. "Neither a borrower nor a lender be....", is a favorite motto.

4. No particular qualities emphasized in dealing with others.

5. Have had the good fortune to be associated with two of the Air Force "Services" - the Air Weather Service and the USAF Security Service - in their formative and early stages. The service in these organizations has been the most satisfying and constructive in my career.

6. Has a hard time participating in conversations at social gatherings but is rather verbose on certain subjects and in small gatherings.

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PART III - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data:

1. Born 1 April 1907, Albion, Illinois; Father - Arch Bassett; Mother - Clara Huntley Bassett.

2. Married 5 July 1931; Wife - Anita Horner; Children: Frances - Mrs. James R. Hill

3. Home Town Address: 27 E. Poplar St., Albion, Illinois

B. Education:

1. Graduate St. John's Military Academy, Delafield, Wis., 1925.

2. Graduate U.S. Military Academy, 1929.

3. Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, 1930.

4. Graduate Calif. Inst. of Technology (Meteorology-MS) 1935.

5. Air Corps Tactical School, 1940.

6. Naval War College, 1942.

7. National War College, 1948.

C. Service Dates:

1. July 1925 - June 1929 Cadet, U.S. Military Academy

2. Sept. 1929 - June 1930 Student, ACPFS, March Field, Calif.

3. July 1930 - October 1930 Student, ACAFS, Kelly Field, Texas.

4. November 1930 - January 1933 Squadron duties, 26th and 75th, Wheeler Field, T.H.

5. February 1933 - June 1935 Ass't Comdt, Cadet Det, Randolph Field, Texas.

6. July 1935 - June 1936 Student, CIT, Pasadena, California.

7. July 1936 - June 1937 Base Weather Officer, Hamilton Field, California.

8. July 1937 - August 1940 RCO, 1st Weather Squadron, March Field, California.

9. August 1940 - February 1942 Base Adjutant, S-1, CO 18ABG, Wheeler Field, T.H.

10. March 1942 - June 1942 A-1, Seventh AF, Hickam Field, T.H.

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11. July 1942 - December 1942 Student, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

12. December 1942 - February 1943 Actg. Dir. Weather, HQ AAF, Washington, D.C.

13. February 1943 - March 1943 Dir. of Weather, HQ AAF, Washington, D.C.

14. March 1943 - July 1943 Chief, Flt. Cont. Serv. Sect., Washington, D.C.

15. July 1943 - September 1943 Air Weather Officer, HQ AAF, Washington, D.C.

16. September 1943 - December 1944 Chief, Weather Division, HQ AAF, Washington, D.C.

17. January 1945 - May 1945 Dir. of Weather Sv-USSTAF, St. Germain, France.

18. May 1945 - September 1945 Chief of Weather Sv-USSTAF & USAFE, St. Germain, France.

19. September 1945 - January 1946 Chief of Weather Sv-USAFE, Wiesbaden, Germany.

20. January 1946 - February 1946 C.O. 59th Weather Wing, Wiesbaden, Germany.

21. August 1946 - July 1947 C.O. 5th Weather Group, Wiesbaden, Germany.

22. August 1947 - June 1948 Student, National War College, Washington, D.C.

23. June 1948 - June 1951 Ass't. Dir. JIG, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

24. June 1951 - February 1953 Deputy Commander, USAFSS, Brooks AFB, Texas.

25. February 1953 - August 1953 Commander, USAFSS, Brooks AFB, Texas.

26. August 1953 - February 1957 Commander, USAFSS, Kelly AFB, Texas.

27. March 1957 - Nov 1958 Deputy Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, Taipei, Taiwan.

28. Nov 1958 - Commander, Air Weather Service, MATS, Scott AFB, Illinois.

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D. Decorations and Medals:

Distinguished Flying Cross	1 February 1945
Legion of Merit	29 September 1945
Legion of Merit (OLC)	17 December 1945
Bronze Star	26 June 1945
Commendation Ribbon	28 February 1946
Croix de Guerre	17 August 1946
American Defense	
American Theater	
Vistory	
Occupation	
European Theater	
Pacific Theater	

E. Promotions:

Grade	Temporary	Permanent
Second Lt.		13 June 1929
First Lt.		10 October 1934
Captain		13 June 1939
Major	15 March 1941	13 June 1946
Lt. Colonel	5 January 1942	4 July 1942
Colonel	1 March 1942	2 April 1948
Brigadier General	5 September 1952	27 October 1954
Major General	27 October 1954	

F. Unusual Experiences:

A few narrow escapes from mid-air collisions. Nothing spectacular about any of them except the luck which kept them from happening

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

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Harold Huntley

Interview MG ~~H~~ A Bassett, Randolph AFB, San Antonio, Texas, 6 May 1970

Q: General, do you recall, the first encounter with Hap Arnold, first time you met him ~~or the first time~~

B: Well, I probably had met him some time, maybe at a meeting, but where

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there were a lot of people, but the first one I ever had which was between me and him was when I came in ~~it was~~ Dec 1942, and I mentioned a while ago, I was in the Weather Service for four years, ~~and then~~ the agreement then was if you wanted out, you could get out, so I did, I got out in 1940, and was reassigned, and I was in Hawaii when the war started, and they were looking for someone to go to the Naval War College to learn how to be a staff officer, and come back to the Pacific and join some staff. So I went from Hawaii to the War College, went through to Washington and Don Zimmerman and others were getting the Weather Service organized, and trying to scrape up all the weather officers they could get, and I was one of the few that was in soon enough to have gotten out before the war, he said, "well, I'll see if I can't get you assigned to the Weather Service instead of wherever you would go otherwise." And sure enough, he did, and ~~I'm not answering your question, but~~ he and Krick and others got into the hassle they got into, at the time of, or just preceding the first invasion in Africa, the landings in Morocco, TORCH, yes, and the upshot of that hassle was that he came to the NWC at Newport late in November, Zimmerman he told me about it and said he was on his way to the Staff School in Leavenworth, he had been banished by Gen Arnold, and Dr. Krick was going to Pasadena. Well, about a week or two, I've forgotten the timing, I reported from the school to Washington and by that time, Don was gone, but Krick was still there, and one of the first things that happened was a call on the phone, as I recollect, from him, saying that Gen Arnold wanted to see both of us, the next day, or right away, or something. And of cousse, it struck me as a little peculiar in the first place, that Gen Arnold even wanted to see me,

Q: What was your rank at that time?

B: I was a Colonel, I'd been a Major six months ahead before, then I was a LTCOL for a month or so, and then, I think I was promoted while I was at that Naval War College. Maybe I didn't get promoted until I got to Washington, but I was either a Colonel, or about to be, ~~and I didn't~~, there wasn't any way to find out, it just struck me as a kind of peculiar arrangement, but there wasn't any reason to question it or do anything about it, ~~and~~ so we showed up, and Gen Arnold had just moved into the Pentagon, he was just opening up there, and they didn't have any signs, and all the jokes ~~were~~ there was the basis for them, ~~and~~ Krick sent me around the E-Ring

(6-75) Barnett: Krick is Zimmerman

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two laps and he had set it up I don't know if he had set it up, I've got a feeling that probably he arranged it, he got Gen Arnold's approval for it but I never, he never told me that, and GenArnold didn't but here, the two of us finally found the office and went in and there was a fairly short meeting, as I recollect, the only specific thing that I remember Gen Arnold, somewhere in the conversation, he asked if I had an open mind it was in the context of his having come to the opinion that in this hassle or squabble between Krick and Zimmerman and others, he had, I just don't know how much Gen Arnold knew about it, but he knew there had been one and I had always understood that he, himself, had to settle it there was nobody below him for reasons that I never found out exactly I can speculate but it was just the kind of thing that somebody had to settle, and he knew enough about it, for one reason or another, and he did and It was in that context that I saw him, and I wasn't just too sure why it was he wanted to see me at that stage Krick didn't say very much in the meeting of any consequence I didn't get the impression that Krick was in too great disfavor if he had of been, what was he doing in the meeting with me I was really somewhat confused, I suppose, by the whole arrangement, and here was somebody I had never seen before, and was about four echelons above me, or five in the AF and hereI was, following this hassle which had upset Don, got him thrown out of town, and upset me, He and I were classmates at the Academy, we were classmates at CalTech under Krick taking meterology, and had been associated off and on for four or five years in the Weather Service, just meeting here and there

Q: Where did Don Yates fit into this ?

B: Well, he went to CalTech a little after Zimmerman and I, and he was in the Weather Service somewhere in the eastern part of the country I was in the west

Q: He was down in North Carolina

B: You talking prior to the war ?

Q: No,

B: At what stage do you mean

Q: I was trying to fit when this was going on

B: Well, I'm not positive, because somewhere along in there, Don got involved in some trips to Russia, General sombbody went over there

Q: Follett Bradley?

B: No, maybe I'll think of it, but I guess that was later, after I got there, Don came back and he had a couple of Russians in tow, and I remember we were routing books out. Now, I think he probably was in the weather Central, or whatever they called it, in Washington, where they were making forecasts, operational weather type activities, and I think that that's where Don was and he was working for Don Zimmerman, and that also is the place, the section, where Krick showed up, because he was brought in, as I understood it, to be a forecaster.

Q: At this meeting with Arnold, it was sort of a perfunctory meeting and also puzzling meeting for you?

B: Puzzling to me, because I, Krick had set it up and I had not expected Krick to be in town, from what Zimmerman had told me, I thought both of them were going to be out of town by then, and here he was arranging a meeting with Gen Arnold, and there were 4 or 5 echelons of people, there was Gen McClelland, he was sort of in charge of all the technical training, and weather, that was under him, he had three or four of those, then above him was somebody and then above him was somebody else, the Chief of Staff, Operations, and why was I being taken in

Q: He was getting set for the next guillotine?

B: Sure, and I suppose when Gen Arnold said, "have you got an open mind?" If I had said, no, it's closed, I would have been out at Leavenworth, or even further. All of this kind of fell on me like a ton of bricks, you see, and it was just a peculiar meeting. The impression I got from Gen Arnold, if I can remember any at all, was that, I guess he said something about he didn't like unnecessary hassles, or something, and did I have an open mind about whatever had been going on and I guess I probably said "yes," and that's about all that happened, and we went out and Krick left, and I never had another meeting with Gen Arnold.

Q: Did Krick leave the impression that he was running the weather service?

B: No, no, not then, and I don't think, but here of course, this is speculation; I don't know if you deal in speculation or not, well, no, I don't think so, and I don't think, as best I recollect it, that Krick particularly wanted to run the weather service, and I doubt that it ever caught Gen Arnold's mind to have him do it. Now maybe he did, but it wasn't a very practicable arrangement to bring

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someone in and put him in charge of it. Krick's interest, I think, and it was a perfectly logical one, it seems to me, was to be in the business end, putting out information. That was Krick's ~~policy~~ long suit, he had been doing it commercially while he was running his meteorology course, ~~and~~ he had a knack, he was a very persuasive talker, ~~and~~ he had a knack in the commercial field of finding the key fellow in a company and convincing him he needed weather information, and then he provided it and he always made whoever he sold it to, that it was custom made for his own particular use, and that, I think, is what he wanted to do, and was done ~~and what he had done~~ in the Pentagon, but he couldn't do that, as part of a weather center, for all I know, he was working under Yates, may well have been, but I doubt if things jelled to much, everything was in a state of flux, ~~and~~ he got to dealing with god knows who, I don't, Gen Arnold, ~~people~~ that were very much interested in weather forecasts, especially in connection with the landing operations, ~~and~~ somehow, Krick ~~he~~ did something because that Don couldn't tolerate, I guess, but at the same time, ~~because~~ of who Krick was, half the weather officers had been students of his, I suspect he still thought of them in that light, ~~he~~ Krick and all of them, and some of the other people that didn't know much about Krick, or anything else, knew that he could, when he wanted to, go in and see Gen Arnold, ~~which~~ I'm convinced he could do, and did do, ~~and~~ this other very senior ~~people~~ people around there that, I, and I doubt if Don, would have ~~gone~~ thought of in and talking to, in the same sense, or for the same reason, it was, so he did it, and pretty soon he did something that Don couldn't tolerate, and when he did it, Don couldn't resolve it either, because Krick wouldn't stand still, I guess.

Q: Zimmerman go in there and put the issue on an "either or" basis, either to Arnold, or Giles or somebody

B: Now, he probably told me whether he did or not, in great detail, and I probably should remember it, but honestly, I only know it from hearsay from him, and I can't specifically say that I do remember it. I would venture a guess and he would confirm it, that there were conversations, that he had, I think with Gen Arnold, ~~and~~ it may have been maybe as much as how he said something as what he said, ~~and~~ Don ~~was~~, once he got something like that going, he was, rightly, I guess, one to stand on the principle of Krick being wrong in what he was doing, and insisting on some strong action for Krick, ~~and I don't know,~~ I'm just guessing,

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Q: Well, weather forecasting was a kind of inexact science, where you could get two predictions which were, if not diametrically opposed, at least, wide apart. Where you couldn't get this, say, in procurement and the General wanted to know how many planes in inventory, some specific number, but in weather it was kind of

B: Oh yes, there was a lot of latitude, lot of opinions, and some people had better reputations than others, and again,

Q: Did Krick make end runs, after a weather forecast, or some position paper was firmed up, did he then go around the backdoor and give it to Arnold, or did Arnold call on him for another opinion, a footnote to an agreed-upon paper?

B: I can't answer because I don't know. It would be a thing that might fit in with Krick's general modus operandi

Q: And also with Arnold's modus operandi

B: Probably with his, too, and I imagine a certain amount of that went on, but Krick was never in good graces of the, I don't know if he was ever a member of the American Meteorological Society or not, but he was, he didn't like those who were, and they didn't like him. They thought he was a sort of a shyster, I suppose, he, In those days, none of the other professors who were in positions equivalent to head of the unit at CalTech, the one at MIT, about the only other one there was, and then there were others later, but they weren't selling weather forecasts on the side, and I'm sure, I don't know whether Krick made it....

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Interview MG Harold Huntley Bassett, Randolph AFB, San Antonio, Texas, 6 May 1970

Q: General, do you recall the first encounter with Hap Arnold, the first time you met him?

B: Well, I probably had met him some time, maybe at a meeting, but where there were a lot of people, but the first one I ever had which was between me and him was when I came in December 1942, and I mentioned a while ago. I was in the Weather Service for four years. The agreement then was if you wanted out, you could get out. So I did. I got out in 1940, and was reassigned, and I was in Hawaii when the war started, and they were looking for someone to go to the Naval War College to learn how to be a staff officer, to come back to the Pacific and join some staff. So I went from Hawaii to the War College, went through Washington and Don Zimmerman and others were getting the Weather Service organized, and trying to scrape up all the weather officers they could get. I was one of the few that was in soon enough to have gotten out before the war. He said: "Well, I'll see if I can't get you assigned to the Weather Service instead of wherever you would go otherwise. And sure enough, he did. He and Krick and others got into the hassle they got into, at the time of, or just preceding the first invasion in Africa, the landings in Morocco, TORCH, yes. The upshot of that hassle was that he came to the NWC at Newport late in November. Zimmerman told me about it and said he was on his way to the Staff School in Leavenworth. He had been banished by Gen Arnold, and Dr. Krick was going to Pasadena. Well, about a week or two, I've forgotten the timing, I reported from the school to Washington and by that time, Don was gone, but Krick was still there, and one of the first things that happened was a call on the phone, as I recollect, from him, saying that Gen Arnold wanted to see both of us the next day, or right away, or something. And of course, it struck me as a little peculiar in the first place, that Gen Arnold even wanted to see me.

Q: What was your rank at that time?

B: I was a Colonel, I'd been a Major six months about, before, then I was a LTCOL for a month or so, and then, I think I was promoted while I was at that Naval War College. Maybe I didn't get promoted until I got to Washington, but I

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was either a Colonel, or about to be. There wasn't any way to find out. It just struck me as a kind of peculiar arrangement, but there wasn't any reason to question it or do anything about it. So we showed up, and Gen Arnold had just moved into the Pentagon, he was just opening up then, and they didn't have any signs, and all the jokes - there was the basis for them. Krick sent me around the E-Ring for about two laps. He had set it up - I don't know if he had set it up, I've got a feeling that probably he arranged it, he got Gen Arnold's approval for it. But never told me that, and Gen Arnold didn't. But here, the two of us finally found the office and went in and there was a fairly short meeting, as I recollect. The only specific thing that I remember Gen Arnold, somewhere in the conversation, he asked if I had an open mind. It was in the context of his having come to the opinion that in this hassle or squabble between Krick and Zimmerman and others. I just don't know how much Gen Arnold knew about it, but he knew there had been one. I had always understood that he, himself, had to settle it. There was nobody below him for reasons that I never found out exactly. I can speculate. But it was just the kind of thing that somebody had to settle, and he knew enough about it, for one reason or another, and he did. It was in that context that I saw him, and I wasn't just too sure why it was he wanted to see me at that stage. Krick didn't say very much in the meeting of any consequence. I didn't get the impression that Krick was in too great disfavor. If he had of been, what was he doing in the meeting with me. I was really somewhat confused, I suppose, by the whole arrangement, and here was somebody I had never seen before, and was about four echelons above me, or five in the AF. And here I was, following this hassle which had upset Don, got him thrown out of town, and upset me. He and I were classmates at the Academy; we were classmates at CalTech under Krick, taking meteorology, and had been associated off and on for four or five years in the Weather Service, just meeting here and there.

Q: Where did Don Yates fit into this?

B: Well, he went to CalTech a little after Zimmerman and I, and he was in the Weather Service somewhere in the eastern part of the country. I was in the West.

Q: He was down in North Carolina.

B: You talking prior to the war?

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Q: No.

B: At what stage do you mean?

Q: I was trying to fit when this was going on.

B: Well, I'm not positive, because somewhere along in there, Don got involved in some trips to Russia. General somebody went over there.

Q: Follett Bradley?

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Q: At this meeting with Arnold, it was sort of a perfunctory meeting and also a puzzling meeting for you?

B: Puzzling to me, because I, Krick had set it up and I had not expected Krick to be in town from what Zimmerman had told me. I thought both of them were going to be out of town by then, and here he was arranging a meeting with Gen Arnold, and there were 4 or 5 echelons of people. There was Gen McClelland, he was sort of in charge of all the technical services.

Q: He was Signal Officer.

B: ....and weather, that was under him. He had three or four of those, then above him was somebody and then above him was somebody else, the Chief of Staff, Operations. Why was I being taken in?

Q: He was getting set for the next guillotine?

B: Sure, and I suppose when Gen Arnold said: "Have you got an open mind?" If I had said, "No, it's closed," I would have been out at Leavenworth, or even further. All of this kind of fell on me like a ton of bricks, you see. It was just a peculiar meeting. The impression I got from Gen Arnold, if I can remember any at all, was that, I guess, he said something he didn't like unnecessary hassles, or something, and did I have an open mind about whatever had been going on and I guess I probably said "yes," and that's about all that happened. We

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Q: Did Krick leave the impression that he was running the Weather Service?

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Q: Zimmerman go in there and put the issue on an "either or" basis, to either Arnold or Giles or somebody?

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B: Now, he probably told me whether he did or not, in great detail, and I probably should remember it. But honestly, I only know it from hearsay from him, and I can't specifically say that I do remember it. I would venture a guess and he would confirm it, that there were conversations, that he had, I think with Gen Arnold. It may have been maybe as much as how he said something as what he said. Don, once he got something like that going, he was, rightly, I guess, one to stand on the principle of Krick being wrong in which he was doing, and insisting on some strong action for Krick. I'm just guessing, that maybe Gen Arnold, and maybe nobody else knew too much about what was going on until it kind of snowballed. Everybody was so far apart that when Gen Arnold did find out about it, he said: "Well, I don't know, I know him and I know him, and it's just a mess. I'll just throw them both out and start over again." I was around there for two or three weeks after that meeting with Gen Arnold, and when I reported, with Don gone, I was the most senior weather officer around. But it was about 3 weeks - I was the interim director of weather, whatever the title was in those days - before I got confirmed. Now, I don't know who was saying what to who during that three weeks. As far as I remember, Krick was out of town, and also as far as I know, General Arnold wasn't involved one way or another as far as I was concerned. And I think that I probably could have walked in a few days later, and I doubt if Gen Arnold would have known me.

Q: Well, weather forecasting was a kind of inexact science where you could get two predictions which were, if not diametrically opposed, at least, wide apart. Where you couldn't get this, say, in procurement and the General wanted to know how many planes in inventory, some specific number. But in weather it was kind of indefinite.

B: Oh yes, there was a lot of latitude, lot's of opinions and some people had better reputations than others, and again...

Q: Did Krick make end runs? After a weather forecast, or some position paper was firmed up, did he then go around the backdoor and give it to Arnold, or did Arnold call on him for another opinion, a footnote to an agree-upon paper?

B: I can't answer because I don't know. It would be a thing that might fit in with Krick's general modus operandi.

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Q: And also with Arnold's modus operandi

B: Probably with his, too, and I imagine a certain amount of that went on. But Krick was never in good graces of the....I don't know if he was ever a member of the American Meteorological Society or not. But he didn't like those who were, and they didn't like him. They thought he was a sort of a shyster, I suppose. In those days, none of the other professors who were in positions equivalent to the head of the unit at CalTech, the one at MIT, about the only other one there was. Then there were others later, but they weren't selling weather forecasts on the side. I'm sure, I don't know whether Krick made it....

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

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Interview, Brig General Rosenham "Jack" Beam, Tampa, Florida, January 29, 1976

Q At one time you were Executive to General Frank Lahm?

B I returned from the Philippines in December 1925. My orders directed that I report to Commanding General Training Command at San Antonio. I reported to Maj Frank Andrews, commanding Kelly Field.

(Told of selecting site for what was to become Randolph Field)

B It was my job to coordinate training activities under General Lahm.

(Told of subsequent assignment - mission to Cuba to train fliers, starting January 1928)

Q Arnold after being exiled, following the Mitchell affair, was interested in commercial aviation. He, Jack Jouett and John Montgomery set up a thing called Pan American Airways which was later taken over by Juan Trippe. They were trying to obtain a francise into Havana to fly the mail. Do you know anything about that?

B I certainly do. They all called on me in Havana after my arrival, and they made me temporary Chief of the Air Force Cuban Army. The individuals that you have mentioned, Vic Chino, who was also with Juan Trippe. The first thing they wanted was permission to use the training field which I had obtained from the Almanderes Hotel for training pilots. This was a very unpopular movement as there had been an 18-hole golf course at the Almanderes Hotel. Nevertheless, they talked us into letting the planes land there, if and when Pan Am began its operations from Key West into Havana. This lasted for 8 months, at which time I gave them notice that they would to stop landing on the field, as during the rainy season, their planes were cutting big ruts and the BP-1's we were using for flying training were turning over on their backs when they hit the ruts. Their local manager, Grant Mason, had applied through Pan Am to hire civilians to cover up the ruts after the planes landed, but he was refused. So I in turn notified them unless they could provide security and fix the ruts they were making, they would have

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one month to get off the field and find other places to land.

Q Did they ever offer you a job with Pan Am?

B Not a job, but a gold pass with which I could fly anywhere that their lines traveled. . . .

Q In exchange for landing rights on the field?

B They didnt make any such offer but I knew what they wanted. Nevertheless, I notified Gen Fechet, the Chief of Air Corps of my actions. He ordered me to report to him privately in Washington. This I did. I told him of the whole thing. He said: "You're absolutely right. You go over and tell the Postmaster General just what you've told me because they claim you're interfering with the handling of U.S. Mail.

Q Arnold didnt stay in that enterprise very long. Juan Trippe and that group sort of pushed him and his group out. By that time Arnold decided that he was going to stay in the Air Corps.

B Bill Pawley was involved in that.

Q Yes, later Ambassador Pawley. I talked to hima couple of years ago. I believe you gave me the lead.

B Originally, a young man came to me. He wanted to start a flying school on land now the Municipal Airport at Havana. Many times, he would come over and chat with me about problems he had in training the few civilians. I got to know him very well. Later, when Pauley left and went to China, I was the A-3 of the 18th Wing in Hawaii. He would often stop over with me overnight on the way to and from China to the U.S.. He kept me well informed of the situation in China at that time. He also later offered me a job at $25,000 a year if I would resign and come out to be his Executive.

Q He was running that airline in China?

B I refused as I loved the Air Corps and wanted to stay. Incidentally, I was a member of the Plans Division under Rush Lincoln when General Westover crashed on the West Coast. General Arnold was moved into Washington to act as

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Chief. This was my first experience in working with General Arnold. In those days there was no Comptroller. The PlansDivision made up the budget and submitted the Air Corps budget to the Army G-4. After he approved it, it was taken to the (House) Military Affairs Committee along with the G-4 of the Army to give them information on questionable points. General Westover's death happened just when we were to present the budget. One of the first things General Arnold wanted to do when he took over was to look at the budget. We told him it would be impossible to change as it had already been approved by the Army - General Spalding, the G-4. Arnold insisted on accompanying us to the House Committee room for the briefing. Brett was commanding the Materiel Division at the time. He came to Washington to answer any questions on aircraft procurement.

In the very first hour of the meeting, the first question was asked by Lister Hill. Was it necessary in the next year to limit pilots to 10 landings or 4 hours of flying a month? General Arnold, being Chief, answered the question. He stated, and I quote: "That's the trouble with being under the Army. If we had a separate air force, it would not have existed." Rep. Hill asked, "Why?"

Arnold said: "Because they control how much gas we can buy and how much of this and that we can buy."

Rep. Hill said to me: "What do you think, Colonel?"

I was a Lieut Colonel at that time. I said: "That's not just exactly the case. Actually, what happened was procurement of a new type engine, a constant speed propeller, and in the fighters, an engine that used a higher octane which we did not budget for in the previous year. We did not realize that the gasoline funds were running out. It's true we didnt know because we did not control the funds. They were controlled by the Army. So we ran out of gasoline. We had to curtail all flying so that the tactical units could do their training."

On several other points, General Arnold had to answer them and knew nothing about them, so he had to be corrected. On the way back from the hearing,

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General Brett and I rode back in t he same car. I recall very, very distinctly his comments: "Well, Jack, you did it."

I said: "Did what?"

He said: "You cut your throat from this ear to that ear. Hap Arnold will never forgive you for those things as long as you live. Just remember that." And he never did!

Q Because you embarrassed him in public before a Congressional Committee?

B He may have been embarrassed but she should have kept his mouth shut because he didnt know what he was talking about. Then, when I got back to the old Munitions Building, and after what Gen Brett had said, I thought I had better go up and apologize to General Arnold, as I did not intend to embarrass him. I just wanted the facts in the record. I went up and Miss Adkins, his Secretary, said: "I dont think he wants to see you. He's furious, but go on in." It was customary for members of the Plans Division to go in at any time on matters pertaining to the Air Corps. I went in, and before I could say a word, he said: "What do you want?"

I said, "I want to apologize if I embarrassed you."

He said: "Get out. I dont want to see you again."

I said, "Yes, sir," and left. At that time, Gen Kilner was his Exec. So I went back to Mike Kilner and said, "Mike, I am in the dog house."

He said, "What for?"

I told him the story. He said: "Well, I think you made a mistake, but let me talk to Hap. Let's see if I can straighten him out."

I said: "Thank you", and went about my business. A few days later, Arnold sent for me. I went up and reported to him. He said:"what are you working on at this moment?"

I said: "We are working on the industrial mobilization plan, but it will be finished in just a few days."

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He said: "When is your tour up here?"

I said: "The sixth of December."

He said: "Well, you're not leaving then."

I said: "Yes, sir, but I know you are familiar with the Manchu Law. I have to be out of Washington in four years."

He said: "I'll take care of that. You'll stay right here. I'll put you on duty in the 3rd Corps area as Air Officer and you'll remain here on TDY until the plan is finished."

I said: "Yes, sir." I also said: "Before General Westover left on his trip to the West Coast, he had discussed with me my termination in Washington and where I'd like to go. I told him I'd like to go to Hawaii as I'd served in all other foreign duty stations, and I'd like to go there. General (Tony) Frank had already said he'd like to have me."

Arnold said: "You want to go out there with that screw ball?"

I said: "Yes, sir. I'd like to go out there."

He said: "Well, I'll tell you when you can go. That's all."

Q Frank had the 18th Wing in Hawaii at that time?

B Yes. The next time I saw Arnold, he and General Marshall in January 1941 came out to Hawaii, presumably on an inspection. At that time, I was A-3 of the 18th Wing. I had made an "Estimate of the Situatinn" based on the knowledge that we were daily getting reports from Navy reconnaissance planes and our own planes about Japanese submarines all around the islands. We had made a plan based on the location of these subs of the possibility that Japanese aircraft carriers could come close enough to launch an attack against the islands. We delivered this estimate to General Arnold. At that time it was photographed in color in 16 mm. film by Bob Candee who was G-2, or A-2, of the 18th Wing. I was under the impression that he gave the film to Colonel Kuter who came to Hawaii with Generals Marshall and Arnold as Aide to General Marshall at that time. Colonel

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Kuter said he'd like very much to take that back to the States. After the briefing was over, General Marshall came up and put his arm around my shoulders and said:"That was an excellent briefing, and it has made a deep impression on me." General Arnold said: "Don't pay any attention to what they're trying to do. They are simply trying to get more airplanes out there and we just dont have them to give."

That, of course,was a very, very bad estimate on the part of General Arnold, as it proved out. About a month later, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. . .

Q Was that General Walter Short?

B No. He was not the C/G at the time. The C/G requested that I be assigned to him as an Air Adviser, as he knew nothing about aviation. After this "Estimate of the Situation," he needed someone to keep him advised on aviation matters. I was assigned to him and remained with him until June 1941, at which time he was relieved, and I was relieved and returned to the States. Upon reaching the U.S, I was assigned to the 1st Air Force, under General Herbert Dargue. I'd only been there after taking 30 days leave, then spent about two months there when General Dargue suggested that I go up to Westover Field and find out what was going on up there. He had had many adverse reports on activities at Westover. I took my wife and drove to Westover field from Mitchel. Upon arriving at Westover, I called on Colonel Richard Ballard, commanding the base. I told him why I was there and I wanted to make a casual visit about the various activities and to see what the problem was, if I could find it. I spent several days there visiting around. There seemed to be a laxity on the part of the field commander and the commander of the units. No one seemed to be in charge. I told Colonel Ballard my opinion of what I'd seen. He was, of course, not happy. I started home on Sunday AM. We stopped at a coffee shop and heard the radio blasting and it told the story of Pearl Harbor. That led me to say to my wife. "There ought to be a

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law against the radio putting out this sort of stuff." I drove on down. When I reached Garden City, Long Island, I found that practically all the female personnel on Mitchel had been evacuated and were parked under the trees in Garden City. I stopped and asked the wife of Colonel Thomas Hand (?): "What in the world are you doing out here?"

She said: "There is a rumor the base is going to be attacked."

I hurried to the field and reported to General Dargue. He said: "I'm glad you're back. Go home and pack a bag. Don't tell your wife where you are going, but we are leaving early in the morning. We are getting Frank Andrews' B-25." I went home and packed a bag and reported back to General Dargue. He then said: "I've got to cancel your going."

I said: "Going where?"

He said: "This is a secret mission, but I've got to go by Washington and pick up 9 General Staff officers. I'll have to do the flying by myself as there just wont be enough room in the plane for you, what with all the luggage." He also said: "Dont mention this to anyone."

Note: General Dargue's plane crashed in the Western United States.

He was enroute to Hawaii to relieve Gen Fred Martin.

Two days later, I was called by General Junius Jones.

Q The Air Inspector?

B The Inspector General. He said: "Jack, I'm going to New Orleans to organize the 9th Air Force HQ. How would you like to go along and be my Chief of Staff?" I agreed. He said:"Get ready to move because you'll get orders within 24 hours." I did. I reported to General Jones at New Orleans. We registered at the old St.Charles Hotel and established the first HQ of the 9th AF. I remained there for approximately a month, working with General Jones, when again, I received a call from Suzi Adkins at 9 PM. She said: "Jack, General Arnold directs that you report to him at 8 AM in his office."

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I said: "8 dclock tomorrow morning?"

She said: "Yes."

I said: "O.K., I'll do my best." I called General Jones and told him of my orders. He said:"The only way you can make it is to take our B-23." At that time it was one of our fastest airplanes and had been assigned to us as our HQ ship. I took off with another officer to bring the plane back. We flew all night. We landed at Bolling Field at about 5 AM. I went to the Army-Navy Club, had breakfast, shaved and reported to General Arnold a few minutes late. He said: "I dont want you. Go down and report to Patton."

I said: "General Patton is here in this building?"

He said: "Yes." Patton was in the next wing of the Munitions Building. I started down to that wing and was halted by a Marine guard who said: "You cant go in here. This is a restricted area ."

I said: "I have been ordered to report to General Patton."

He said:"Do you have your orders?"

I said: "No, it's all oral."

He said:"I cant let you by."

I said: "Cant you call the Corporal of the Guard, or somebody, to get a message in to General Patton?" He did. In a few minutes, General Jeff Keyes, Patton's Deputy, whom I knew very well, came out and said: "Where the hell have you been? We've been trying to locate you."

I said: "What's it all about?"

So he passed me in to Gen Patton's office. Patton said:"I have requested that you be assigned to my Air Support on a secret mission. Would you like to be in?"

I said: "General, I'd be very happy to be your commander of the Air Support Command. May I ask how you knew that I knew anything about air support?"

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He said: "I was one of the participants in the mechanized cavalry maneuvers at Fort Riley when you were Air Corps observer." He said: "I like the way you work." Patton set aside a couple of rooms. He told me to get to work and organized my HQ. "Then," he said, "we'll go into details about the mission." I went back to General Stratemeyer. . .

Q He was then Chief of Air Staff?

B I said: "George, I've got a problem. Gen Patton has directed me to select officers and EM to form a HQ for an Air Support Command." George said: "Go ahead and do it, then bring me the list." I went back and began to pick out key officers that I personally knew who would fit into the various positions of an Air Support Command HQ. I took the list back to Gen Stratemeyer. He shook his head: Hap will never approve it."

Q Why?

B I didnt ask him why. He said, "Wait here." I waited. He came back in fifteen minutes and said: "The list is disapproved. The Chief of Personnel will assign you the appropriate personnel when you get your organization started. I went back to General Patton's HQ and handed him the list, and told him: "Those are the people I wanted but General Arnold has disapproved it and said he would tell Personnel who to give me."

General Patton said: "I'll take the list to the White House. I'm going to have luncheon with the President today anyway. I'll see you about 3:30." He came back and said: "The Chief of AAF is being directed to give you the personnel you requested."

Q That maneuver really aced you in with Arnold?

B That made me his No. 1 boy. The next time I saw General Arnold was after the (North African) invasion and the surrender had taken place.

Interviewer Note: This date was not checked in assumption Gen Beam was referring to a time after May 1943. It later turned out that he was talking about January 1943. The "Surrender" could have been the city of Casablanca itself.

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I had then been moved forward by General Spaatz to support the newly formed 5th Army under Gen Mark Clark who was to make the invasion of Italy. Shortly after arriving at Oujda, Gen Clark's HQ, I again received orders from Gen Spaatz to go back to Casablanca and take over the air defense of the Anfa Hotel for the "Big Five" Conference. He said he felt I knew the area better than anyone, and that there would be a British GCI (Ground Control Interceptor) unit brought in by destroyer that would report to me. Also, I was to select any fighter unit that I wanted to be alerted upon call by me. I went back by car to Casablanca, and to my very pleasant surprise I ran into General Patton. He told me that he had been ordered back to furnish the ground security. He had brought several tank units and infantry outfits back to provide that service. Naturally, I realized this was going to be quite a secret affair. It was finally decided between the two of us that because all the participants in the "Big Five Conference" were coming in by air, that I should meet them and see that they were safely escorted to the Anfa Hotel.

Incidentally, a bit of humor. A British destroyer brought in an armored limousine for the Prime Minister to use, which I promptly took over to use to go over to the airport to meet the various VIP arrivals. Two of the first to arrive were Generals Marshall and Arnold. I met them at the airport. When General Arnold got out of the plane, he said: "Hi, Jack." I said: "General, it's nice to see you again." General Marshall came up, "Well, I'm very happy to see you."

I said: "Thank you, sir." I put them in the car and took them to the Anfa Hotel. General Arnold said: "Will I see you again?

I said: "Yes, sir. I'll be here every day while the Conference is going on."

I then went back and met the various leaders: De Gaulle, P/M Churchill, in fact, Sir Charles Portal, all of them. When the President arrived, they put him inSuite #2 at the Anfa Hotel. It was quite a problem getting the President into

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this car because, as you know, he used a wheel chair. By an improvised ramp, we were able to get him down the ramp and into the car with physical assistance. Then, we got his wheel-chair rolling through the lobby of the hotel and put him into his suite.

The President said to me: "Do you know my son Elliott?"

I said: "Yes, sir."

He said: "Would it be possible for me to see him?"

At that time, Elliott was assigned to a photo unit supporting General Jimmy Doolittle's bomber command. So I got on the military line and got contact with Gen Spaatz and told him I'd like very much for Elliott to report to me at Gazes Airport at Casablanca. He would be there the next day. I met Elliott and was quite shocked. His uniform was filthy. He said: "We're fighting a war. I didnt have time to get my uniform cleaned."

(Beam told of getting Elliott cleaned up and of borriwing a uniform from a staff officer about the same size. He also told of being invited by the President to come in and have a cocktail in the Suite #2 with Elliott and his father. FDR fixed the drinks himself.)

(Beam also told of driving Churchill to the Anfa Hotel and being asked by the P/M: "Has Frankie arrived?" Beam told him that President Roosevelt was already in his quarters.)

B Then P/M Churchill said: "When are we going to take Frankie down to see the G.C.I." I said it would be rather difficult because we had to take him in a wheel-chair and would have to roll it in an open field with camouflage and obstructions. Then, I was approached by General Arnold. He said: "I understand the Prime Minister and the President want to see the G.C.I. I'd like to see it first. General Marshall and I would like to see it." I told him it could be arranged, but we'd have to do it at night because you are outside the bounds of the Anfa Hotel. Also, I told him: "You'll have to wear some old flying jackets because you might be recognized. We have to be careful." Gen Arnold said: "We'll take car of that. I said I would bring my jeep to take him and

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General Marshall, and nobody else. I picked them up at the designated time and drove them down until a British Tommy balked us. I went forward and identified myself. I had clearance but they didn't. The Tommy said: "It's impossible for them to come any closer." If you dont know it, the G.C.I. at that time was so top secret, that the British had them loaded. Before one could be captured, they would blow it up completely. The British Air Marshall Brown, aviation ace, who did not fly but who was given the rating of Air Marshall for tne wonderful job he did in control of night fighters in the Battle of Britain, was in charge. So I asked the Tommy to call for Air Marshal Brown to come down. And he did and said he would like very much forGenerals Marshall and Arnold to come in, but there was only one man in the RAF who could give that permission, and that was Sir Charles Portal. So I made a 2nd trip back to the Anfa Hotel and picked up Sir Charles. He cleared all through and we proceeded to the G.C.I. control. By this time, it was well dark. There were 2 Beaufighters in the air. Brown showed Generals Marshal and Arnold the blips on the screen that showed how high they were and their location. General Arnold said: "Well, that's all right for you, but how do we know they are there?" Brown said: "We will have the Beaufighters intercept heach other." Sir Charles gave assent. Brown invited us outside. He asked us to look to the northeast, and there were two Beaufighters within shooting distance of each other. The lights came on each plane. You could see the lights, one behind the other, at about 4,000 feet. It was amazing.

Q We didnt have anything like that in the AAF?

B No.

Q How did Arnold react to that demonstration?

B General Arnold was amazed. He said:"That is the greatest thing I have ever seen. We will have to get some.

Q Did he do something about that?

B I dont know. Then we brought them all back to the hotel. After that,

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General Arnold seemed more friendly towards me. I had hoped his feelings towards me had changed somewhat. But at the end of the conference, when I took them back to their planes to return to the U.S., General Marshall put his arms around my shoulder and said: "I enjoyed seeing you in action very much and I felt very safe."

Q You were a full Colonel then?

B Yes, I was a Colonel although I had been recommended in writing by General Eisenhower and General Spaatz at Orley to General Arnold. He said:"In time." I have the letter from General Ike yet. I have about 20 letters.

Note by Interviewer: Gen Beam rejected a request to view the letters.

I went back to the 5th Army HQ at Oujda in preparation for the invasion of Sicily and Italy. The paratroopers that came in from the U.S. were encamped adjacent to the 5th Army in Oujda with General Matt Ridgway. Kipling said you can smell Oujda for miles. We began work with the paratroopers who had never made a night jump. Gen Clark asked me to supervise the coordination between the paratroopers and the ground forces, in addition to commanding the 5th Air Support Command. We had one night jump which was disastrous - in the vicinity of Oujda. The paratroopers had not had any training in night jumping whatsoever. Also, in shifting sand, they had no way to tell elevation.

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Interview, Brig General Rosenham Beam, Tampa, Florida, January 29, 1976

B (Discussion of invasion of Sicily in July 1943)

A few days prior to the invasion, the drop planes under General Paul Williams arrived. We spent a week or 10 days with him at 5th Army HQ coordinating the movement of the ground forces and the movement of the paratroopers into Sicily. It was decided that the British 8th Army would land in the area to the south of Mt Etna, and General Patton with the 7th Army would land on the West side of Sicily. They Navy was to stay out of the picture until approximately H +4 hours, as they would give away the fact that additional forces were coming in.

Everything went according to plan except for the Navy. About 15 miles south of the landing area that were blackened out, some of the gunners became trigger happy and started firing when the paratroopers came in at 0200.

Q Who was in charge of the paratroopers? Joe Swing?

B Matthew Ridgway - as it turned out, the accidental firing by one Navy ship invited the others. All started firing with the result that the paratroopers on their proper routes, coming in on their drop zones, began to disperse to try to avoid the Anti-aircraft. Many of the planes crossed over into the other zone with the result that there was a general mixing of the 7th and 8th Army paratroop support. The British Air Division landed partly in the Patton area, and the Patton air support dropped in the British zone. However, the paratroopers, by using little clickers, were able to get together and General Patton began immediately on getting his ground tanks ashore.

Q How many planes were lost in the mixup?

B Over 20. No paratroopers were lost, just the planes. They bailed out. They were all saved. The Mediterranean was literally lined with landing boats, so there was no problem.

Q It was dark. They landed in the water. Were they all saved?

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B They were all saved. The reason the landing was at 0200 was the moon. It came out. Gen Patton got organized and immediately proceeded to mop up the whole west end of Sicily. And before Gen Montgomery had gotten organized his 8th Army, Patton had made a clean sweep, capturing Palermo, all around to the heel. At Mt Etna he was stopped on orders from Gen Eisenhower.

Q What was your job?

B My job then was nothing. All I could do then was watch. Shortly before the invasion of Sicily, General Ike asked me to fly Gen Patton, Gen Edwards (British Army) and Admiral King (??) over to Benghazi to meet Gen Montgomery as the distance between Gen Montgomery's forces at that time and our forces was considerable, and occupied by Rommel and a few German planes. It was advisable to make the trip at night. I took them from Maison Blanche airfield in Algiers, leaving at 9 PM and flying at night to the vicinity of Benghazi, arriving at daybreak.

(Told of problems of finding the Benghazi landing strip; met Gen Freyberg; won Victoria Cross in WW I; also told of meeting between 6 footer Patton and 5'6" Montgomery; conflict between them; also friction between Montgomery and P.M. Churchill; acquired amoebic dysentery. Spaatz sent him home; arrived in Bangor, Maine)

B I called Gen Arnold on the phone from there and asked him for instructions. He said:"Go to Randolph, and report to Jerry Brant." I did. When I got to Randolph, Brant said: "I'm glad to see you." I said: "How did you know I was coming?" He said:"Hap called and said you were coming down."

(Told of Brant's retirement and replacement by Walter Kraus)

I said: "Jerry, I cant be here with Walter Kraus."

He said: "Why not?"

I said: "I was Walter Kraus' boss one time and I dont agree with his policies."

He said:"We can get that changed."

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Q When was this?

B This was November or December 1943. Arnold came in for Brant's retirement. Brant told him I did not want to be assigned to Randolph, and Arnold said: "Tell him to go to Boca Raton and relieve Skippy Harbold as commandant of the Radar School. So I left the next day for Boca Raton. Skippy was quite shocked to know that he had been relieved. I told him 'd had nothing to do with it. I was quite shocked to know I was to be commandant of a radar school. A hurricane hit Boca Raton that fall and flattened it. Meanwhile Gen Barton Yount told me to report to his HQ and he would give me an assignment. I reported to him at Randolph. He told me to report to Sheppard Air Base at Wichita Falls, and I spent the next year there. Then Gen Yount ordered me to report to the 20th Wing HQ at Ellington Air Base.

(Told of convening all overseas base commanders at Ellington which was closed to outsiders. A Secret conference)

General Marshall called me directly and said: "I requested that you be placed in charge of this reception because you know practically all the officers who will be coming there." And he said:"I like the way you operate." He gave me the names of all the officers who were coming: Lawton Collins, Simpson, etc. Many of them I'd been classmates with at the General Staff School.

(Told of the crowded facilities on base. Hoyt Vandenberg and Ira Eaker there. Complained of being confined to the post. Beam exulted: "This is the first time I've ever given orders to you birds.")

Q Why the secrecy?

B They didnt want their presence in the States known. The next day, Gen Marshall called to put them into planes for transportation to Washington. That night there was a tornado and the field was under one foot of water. I called Gen Marshall. He asked me to see if we chuld charter a special train. "They have got to be in Washington," he said.

(Beam told of talking to Marshall pefsonally. They finally flew out the generals the next day)

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(No satisfactory explanation of the secrecy or why the Generals were convened first in Ellington before being flown to Washington)

Q Did you see Arnold or contact him in 1945?

B No.

Q Were you still a Colonel?

B Tooey Spaatz made me a General after the war was over. I never saw Arnold again personally, but I wrote him a letter when I heard he was seriously ill. I got a letter back. He appreciated my letter but felt he would never make it. I never heard from or saw him again.

Q Did he ever indicate to you in words or actions an apology that he held back your promotion.

B The only think I can remember about General Arnold and my promotion was when I asked him after the Anfa Conference when I was taking Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold to their plane, when he said: "Can I do anything for you when I get back to Washington?" I said "Yes, you might forget the mistake I made in the 1938 budget hearing."

His face became livid with anger. He said:"That I will never forget." The other time was when Gen Eisenhower personally wrote and told him he could not understand how I was holding down a position of a Major General and couldnt get promoted. Ike told me personally that Arnold's reply was that he reserved the right to make all his General Officers. He did not give that right to his field commanders.

Q Do you have copies of those letters?

B Yes, sir, a stack that thick. But I cant let you see them. I've got too much confidential information from Ike. He was just like a buddy. I would not let you see them. After Gen Arnold, I was immediately made a General Officer, and Gen Spaatz told me at the time that he regretted the fact that he could not make me A Gen Officer before for my service under him. Then I was assigned as Commanding General at Lowry AFB in Denver for building the cantonment into the Quarters for

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the Air Force Academy. The first class at the Academy was trained at Lowry. Gen Hubert Harmon came by many times to consult with me.

Mr. Symington, Secretary at the time, came out many times to visit the Academy site. (Told also of setting up the Comptroller School at Lowry AFB by contacting I.B.M. and Mr. Tom Watson)

Q Do you feel that, based on your experience with Gen Arnold, that he was a man who bore grudges?

B Gen Arnold was the most vindictive individual I've ever seen. I dont think he ever said: "I'm sorry", or "I've made a mistake", in his life - not to my knowledge.

Q Did he act vindictively towards others as well as towards you?

B I can name hundreds.

Q Name one or two?

B I'll name one or two things that he did to show you how he would never say, "That's a mistake I made", or "I'm sorry." There were twin brothers who became General Officers. I wont call their names, because both were friends and very fine officers. But he told Miss Adkins to have one of them who was a Colonel promoted to Brig General and report to him without delay for assignment. Miss Adkins told the Chief of Personnel to deliver the message. The officer reported to Gen Arnold who said: "What are you doing here?"

He said: "I thank you for my star."

"Hell, I didnt mean you. I meant your brother."

So he promptly let him stay a General and made his brother a General officer. That is the truth, God, so help me.

(Later identified as Ben and Barney Giles)

Another time he made a mistake when Gen Andrews was in Command of Panama. He sent a Brig General home for inefficiency. This officer arrived in Washington and reported to Gen Arnold for assignment. Gen Arnold said:

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"What are you doing here?" He said: "Gen Andrews sent me up here for assignment." He didnt tell him that Gen Andrews had recommended that he be reduced to his permanent grade of Colonel. Gen Arnold a few months later made him a Major General. I dont want to tell you his name either. He's retired and still living. That's the truth. He (Arnold) never apologized to Andrews or anybody else.

Q Was that Tom Darcy?

B Yes, how did you know?

Q I interviewed him in Florida.

B Incidentally, at the Anfa (Casablanca) Conference, Gen Andrews and I reminisced quite a bit, because I served with him. He was one of the first General Officers we ever had. Andrews asked me if I'd like to come to London. I told him I couldnt very well ask to be relieved because I didnt know what my next assignment would be after Anfa. He said: "If you change your mind, just let me know. I'd like to have you on my planning staff and it is a big deal."

I said: "Thank you very much, Andy. I certainly hope I can get free."

Of course Gen Andrews was on his way back shortly after that and was killed in Iceland. We lost one of the finest officers we ever had.

Q Back to 1938 and the planners conference at Chanute and Lester Maitland.

B He was going out from Operations and I was going from Plans to represent the Chief's office at this Conference. Bill McChord was in command at Chanute. Brett was coming down to represent Materiel Command. Gen Westover called me in and said: "I want you to tell Maitland and McChord that if there is any drinking" - the two of them liked to drink together - "if either of them gets tight out there, I'm going to court-martial them. I'm going to put you under oath as to whether you saw them drunk." He said: "Ive got to know. You are going out representing me."

When I got out there, I told McChord and Maitland: "If you get tight, I'm under orders from the Chief to report on your sobriety."

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Q (Told of Maitland's problem and his relief after Arnold visited ETO in 1943. Then he joined ministry. Interviewed in 1974 at Red Bluff, Calif)

Q Back to Darcy. He liked Andrews very much. Do you say Andrews felt Darcy wasnt cutting it?

B He wasnt. Later I was Commanding General and relieved a two star General in Panama. From Andrews up there had never been anything less than a Major General in the job. The one who relieved me was a Brig. General.

Q Let's go back to 1941. Arnold and Marshall went to Hawaii for an inspection, you say. You worked up a plan. You were in Plans under Tony Frank?

B I was A-3.

Q When did Fred Martin come out to Hawaii?

B They came out in March 1941. He became Hawaiian Air Force commander with Bill Farthing. The new HQ took one from 18th Wing. The old group was sent hime. The new commander moved down to Fort Shafter. No longer stayed at Hickam.

Q You say you had a plan that Kuter made a copy of?

B Not Kuter. Bob Candee, he was A-2. I gave a briefing. They had lights and charts. Then when Kuter asked if he could take these things, and Bob Candee said: "I made movies of it." Kuter said: "I'll make copies of the thing." He gave it to Larry Kuter.

Q Arnold did not think much of this plan?

B Arnold thought the whole thing was phoney. We had been talking to Washington almost daily of all these sightings. You could take off on any moonlit night and fly out 50 or 75 miles , or closer than that, and there would be Jap submarines all over the place.

Q When did you leave Hawaii?

B I arrived in the middle of June. I dont know the exact date

Q (Told of the Farther, Rose, Coddington War Plan) Did you have anything

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to do with that plan? It was produced in July 1941, as I recall.

B Coddington served under me. Bill Farthing commanded the other group. I commanded the 5th Bomb Group

Q Wasnt Farthing the Plans Officer for Gen Martin?

B Yes, he was.

Q Did their plan follow your plan? Was it a larger plan or a different plan?

B We didnt make any plan. We just got an estimate of the situation to show what the possibilities were and why we needed additional planes.

Q Was that plan based on your idea in any respect, or was it a different plan?

B We did not draw up the requirements. John B. Cary stated in Plans all during the war. He was my Assistant A-3. Cary was working on a plan when I left there for requirements. He lives in Hawaii. He retired as Lieut General. John Cary was working on requirements. Normally, the reason that Bob Candee was ordered to take all these pictures. Actually an estimate of the situation is supposed to be under A-2. Bob said he didnt want to make the damned thing.

Q Tony Frank and Hap Arnold didnt get along?

B Frank had no confidence in Arnold. He was senior to Hap.

Q No, he wasnt senior to Hap. Arnold graduated in 1907. Frank was a year or two behind

B You're right. Shepler Fitzgerald was senior to Tony Frank. He always held it against Arnold because he didnt get to be a General. He was later broken on resupply of planes via Ascension Island. He was sent home because he was buying up rugs and furniture and sending them back to the U.S. by the plane-load. (Beam told of Shep Fitzgerald in North Africa borrowing his official B-25. He promised to return it in one day; kept it 9 days. It was filthy when returned. He said FitzGerald was loading the plane and selling merchandise, and he got caught)

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Q (Asked about Sue Clagett)

B We had an apt at Shoreham before the war. When Hap came to Washington we decided we should have a party for him in the Blue Room. We invited duty people - Scanlon, Kilner, Bill McChord.

Q What happened at the party?

B (Told of seating arrangements, alternating Gen and Mrs. Arnold and Col and Mrs. Beam) They served win and I stood up."I want to drink a toast to the new Chief of Air Corps." Everybody stood up. Hap didnt stand up. That was alright. But he didnt pick up his glass either, and Doris said - Let me go back - When Hap and I were Lieut Colonels at the same time and temporary Colonels at the same time. I started in 1916. He called me "Jack" and I called him "Hap." My wife said: "Well, arent you going to drink a toast to yourself?"

Hap said: "I dont drink."

Doris said: "Dont tell me you're one of those teetotalers?"

There was a complete silence at the table, and he said: "I dont wish to be embarrassed," and his face turned bright red. It kind of put a damper on the party. This was when he first came in. Incidentally, the Westovers and ourselves - the former Chiefs - had been very friendly. It was a shock in what appeared to be hostility. This was shortly after he got there. The next day, Miss Adkins called. She said Gen Arnold wanted to see me. I went up. He said:"One thing I want to tell you. Wives are not supposed to embarrass Commanding Officers." I said: "Very sorry, Gen Arnold, my wife certainly didnt mean to embarrass you. She jokes with people."

He said: "I dont like jokes, especially if they're played on me."

That was the end of that conversation. But it shows you the kind of individual he was.

Q Let me give you some background (Discussion of the report that Arnold was a heavy drinker and the delay in his appointment by Pres. Roosevelt) Do

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you recal Arnold drinking out in Hawaii?

B I never did see Arnold take a drink.

Q (Told of the rumors in Washington) With that background, maybe Arnold wanted to show the group at this party that you had assembled at the Shoreham that the rumors were untrue. Perhaps the fact that your wife made a joking remark about him, no offense intended, which he took in a very personal way? Could this be related?

B Very well, I didnt know that story. I never did see him drink or be under the influence. But he was the most vindictive man I've ever seen. When you work in Plans you deal directly with the Chief. You dont deal with anybody inbetween, because you are working on his plans or plans you developed for him. Our plans also had to be approved by the Army.

Q Was Arnold an idea man, or did he take ideas that others developed?

B Gen Arnold was a clique man. He surrounded himself with a clique. Did you ever read Larry Kuter's article that was published on Gen Arnold. He said he was put down there by Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall didnt fully trust Arnold so he wanted somebody he could trust in there to know what definitely was going on.* I dont say that Hap evaded the truth. Kuter wrote this article himself. He stated in there that Gen Marshall put him down there and told Gen Arnold: "I'm giving you a Chief of Staff that knows what it's all about."

* See Kuter's comment on p.15

Q Arnold had high regard for Kuter, a great idea man.

B Kuter was a smart hombre.

Q Do you think he was reporting on Arnold to Marshall?

B I thik he would have definitely told Gen Marshall that anything was wrong. I do believe that. However, from relations between the two I would say that Kuter did not report anything was so serious.

Q Do you think that your relations with Arnold were affected by the closeness of your relations to Frank Lahm?

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B Very possible.

Q Did you ever hear Arnold talk about Lahm?

B Never heard him mention Lahm.

Q Did you ever hear Lahm talk about Arnold?

B Yes, I've heard him say several things - Negative ones, yes: "I dont approve of the way he does things," said Lahm.

Q You think Lahm regarded Arnold as being to liberal or forward in the drive for unification, a separate air force?

B Yes, he stated two or three times he thought Gen Mitchell and Gen Arnold were too far out. I heard Gen Lahm say the Army and Navy talked about our limitations.

Q Several people have told me Arnold surrounded himself with guys that worked for him before?

B Nothing but "Yes, men," and that's why he changed the Plans Division. In one year he changed every member of it, including the Chief,because we were not "Yes, men." We didnt agree.

Q Were you Chief of Plans then?

B No. Rush B. Lincoln was.

Q Arnold brought Harold George in there?

B Yes.

Q Then Hansell and Ken Walker?

B Ken was a radical. He served under me in the Philippines. I commanded the 28th BombSquadron in Manila.

" Do you know anything more about Ken Walker? I'm helping a fellow who works with me. He's doing a book on Medal of Honor winners. Tell me about Walker?

B Sure, he served in my outfit. He was an energetic, oversexed individual. He was brilliant. He ad many good thoughts. His many plans on attacking and bombing. He was my A-3 in the 28th BombSquadron, 20th Group. From 1922-25. He was happily married and had a lovely wife, but he was always getting himself mixed up

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with other women. He was always getting himself in trouble. I used to tell him: "What/the hell's the matter with you? You have a lovely wife." But he couldnt resist other women. That was his trouble. I had him in Hawaii. Later, I recommended him to George Kenney and George was present at the Air Corps Tactical School. I sent 2 officers to George up there.

Q When did you have Ken Walker in Hawaii?

B About 1939-40. Ken was my A-3 in the 5th Bomb Group and Walter Agee, Rosie O'Donnel and Bob Travis were there. So was Arnol Luehman.

Q I knew Luehman as head of AF PIO.

B John Cary.

Q I'm going to talk to him when I get back. But I want to get back to what you said about Arnold and his cluque.

B He had a c lique wherever he went. He pulled those people. Harold George was very vocal. He had been Secretary to some congressman on the Military Affairs Committee before he came into the Air Corps. He had a lot of political pull. That's why Hap had him. He got to be quite a guy. Look at the guys who wore the stars and check their backgrounds.

Q A lot of them came up from March Field?

B Right. Mostly, March Field. Take the fairhaired boy who married a wealthy girl and became a Lieut General - Pete Quesada. I had Pete as a 2nd Lieutenant. He is very handsome, attractive, athletic young man. He came down to Cuba as Aide to Ambassador Guggenheim when I had the mission down there. I did him a lot of good. The divorced daughter of Guggenheim liked him. She took Pete out to the Casino, gambled and drank champagne with him. The poor guy was only a Lieutenant.

(Beam told of complaining to Ambassador Guggenheim his daughter was corrupting Pete Quesada. Finally, the Ambassador took some action to break it up)

Q Did Arnold do things for Pete Quesada?

B Arnold thought Pete was a whirl. He kept him in Washington, or at Bolling Field. (Beam told the story of Quesada showing up in North Africa

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as a three-star General. Doubt this story - Beam says Pete Quesada was assigned air defense of Northern Coast of North Africa.

Q (Mentioned previous comment that Arnold preferred a weak No. 2 man - Stratemeyer and Giles)

B That's right. He had people like Tom Hanley as A-4. All the people he put in jobs were "Yes, people."

Q How about Fred Dean?

B Yes. My aide came to me complaining about shortage of .50 cal ammunition. I said we couldnt go into the invasion without it. He said Hanley says we cant have it. I went over to see Tom. We had difficulty talking about North Africa. It was "Top Secret." We had 2 guys talking about it in the Mayflower Hotel and FBI guys stepped out and put them inthe clink until after we sailed.

Back to Tom Hanley. I said I'd better see Gen Arnold. I said: "General, I'm having a little problem. We're loading from Boston to South Carolina, as you know." I was having my ships package-loaded. I was Commander of the 5th Air Support Command. He said: "What's package loading." I said: "Package loading is when one ship goes down, I wont lose everything of one thing like ammunition." He said:"Are you going to put ammunition on those ships that are carrying other thing?" I said: "Yes, sir."

He said: "That's unusual."

I said: "I cant get any .50 cal ammunition. Gen Hanley saiys I cant have any."

He said: "Did he tell you why?"

I said: "Yes, he said he needed it in training back here for combat over in Europe."

He said:"That's it."

I said:"Gen Arnold, you dont mean that?" I had four Navy carriers

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under my command, top loaded with my planes. They couldnt even use the elevators. They couldnt do a damned thing until my boys took off. They'd never seen a carrier before. That's the position I was in. I said: "You surely dont mean. . .?"

He said: "You'll get some from other sources."

I said:"From whom?"

He said:"I dont know. Tell Hanley."

I said: "I've told him."

So I went back and told my A-4 to go back and discuss this with Col Hanley again. George King. He went back and very unfortunately in discussing with Hanley the invasion of North Africa, he said, "We've got to have this." He told Hanley about the four carriers and Tom went up and talked to General. They arrested my A-4 for mentioning triple Top Secret stuff to anybody else. It just burned the hell out of me. I went down to see George Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff. I said: "George, this is absolutely assinine." I said: "I can get this ammunition and I'm going to get it. But I hate to go over Hap's head."

He said: "Jack, I cant do a damned thing. If Hap says "No,", I have to say, "No."

I went up to see George Patton: "General, I'm stumped." He says: "What's the problem?" I said: "I dont have .50 cal ammunition" He said: "What?"

I said, the only thing they will have when they go aboard that carrier will be their belts loaded on those planes. And that's it."

He said: "That's assinine."

I said: "I cant do a thing about it. I've been to Arnold's A-4."

Q I cant understand. Why wouldnt Arnold give you ammunition?

B He thought that was enough. The ammunition we had in the planes.

Q That's really hard to believe or understand.

B I know it's hard to understand. Anyhow, the White House overruled Arnold.

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George King, my A-4, missed going over on the boat. He came with the 97th Group from Langley. They were leaving on D+6, if we captured Gazes airport. That became the entrance point. We lated fixed the field at Marrakech for resupply. We got the ammunition but George King got put in the clink. He has just passed away. He lived in Washington.

Q Some have told me the men who came up under Andrews - Tony Frank, Hugh Knerr, Walter Weaver and other did not get as good jobs as those who came up under Arnold.

B That's right. Knerr was originally Navy, graduated from Naval Academy. Then he got transferred to Army Artillery, then got detailed to Aviation. Hugh Knerr was [redacted] a brilliant officer

Q He was close to Andrews?

B Yes, he was. He was Chief of Staff, GHQ Air Force, at Langley. I knew that whole gang. Conger Pratt. This outfit came in. George King got somebody to fly him down to Langley in time to bum a ride with the 97th. Came in to North Africa by way of Brazil. When he reported, I asked him, "Where the hell have you been?" He told me the story of what they did to him. That's the kind of stuff they pulled.

Q Howa rd Davidson, one Exec to Westover, was telling me that Westover had this t endency to want to read all the correspondence that came in. He could not delegate. Arnold was then Asst Chief. Davidson was Westover's Exec. Westover spent a lot of time reading routing correspondence. He wasnt able to grasp larger concepts and did not know how to delegate. Is this an accurate description?

B I would say "Davey" was a slow thinker., no question of that. He married lots of money. I knew the whole family. The old lady was quite a character. (END)

* Ref page 10 comment, interviewed Gen Kuter in Naples,Fla, three days later, on Sunday, Feb 1, 1976. Kuter denied completely the idea that Gen Marshall assigned him to the Air Staff to keep an eye on Arnold. Kuter also made derogatory comment about Beam, indicating he regarded him as untrustworthy.

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20314

13 January 1976

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Fla 33614

Dear General Beam:

Just working up a tentative schedule. Suppose I put you down for Thursday, January 29th at about 10:30 AM. I'll phone beforehand just to check. If you're feel up to sorts, we'll get together
get together for a brief interview.

Keep well.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

done
1-29-76

TO:

SUBJECT:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

30 December 1975

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Florida 33614

Dear General Beam:

I'm the fellow working on the Biography of General Hap Arnold. You may recall our correspondence of a year ago. You mentioned at that time that you and Mrs. Beam were not in good health, and so I thought to make it another time.

In any event, I'm more than half through the writing at this point and would like to have the benefit of your recollections about General Arnold. I'm hoping to make this work as authentic and accurate as it is humanly possible to do.

As I project my schedule, I will be in the Tampa Bay area between Wednesday, January 28th and Friday, January 30th. If it would be convenient for you to see me in that time period, I would be most appreciative.

I hope your health, and that of Mrs. Beam, has improved since our last communication.

Did I mention that I interviewed Ambassador Pawley in Miami at your suggestion. Yes, sir, we had a fine talk and it was very productive. Somebody ought to be working on his biography - a most interesting man.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

Encl

My dear Doctor:
Mrs Beam died 20 Dec 75
and I have just returned from return
Care from the V.A. Hosp. however give
me a ring when you arrive

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20314

6 January 1976

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Fla. 33614

Dear General Beam:

I'm truly sorry to learn of Mrs. Beam's passing. I know there is nothing one can say that can ease your sense of loss.

Wish I could postpone this trip for awhile, but I'm sort of locked into other commitments. According to plan, I expect to pass through the Tampa Bay area during the last week of January. Suppose I phone you at that time. If you are up to a relaxed hour of reminiscing about General Arnold and the Air Force, I'll come over. Otherwise, we'll defer it until a later time.

Again, my deep regret to learn the news.

Yours sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General
A.P.O. 633

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20314

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Tampa, Florida 33614

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Very sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

Called "Jock" Beam

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

24 December 1974

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Florida 33614

Dear General Beam:

I'm the fellow working on the Biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House and have written to you about the possibility of getting together to chat of your reminiscences about him. We missed connections a couple of years ago because of your health.

Amb Bill Pawley and I had a good talk, thanks to the tip you gave me of his whereabouts.

In any event, I have tentative plans to head southward in February or March 1975. If you are feeling up to par and will be available any time in that span, I'll try to arrange my plans so we can get together, perhaps at MacDill, or wherever you say, for an hour or two.

The enclosure will speed your response. I'd be most appreciative of any help you can give me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

My dear Mr Green:
Due to both my wife as well as my health conditions preclude making a firm date. If & when you come to Tampa Call me at 884-6271 and we'll do my best to see you

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20314

24 December 1974

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Florida 33614

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Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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27 January 1972

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Dr
Tampa, Florida 33614

Dear General Beam:

I have your note and information about Mr. Bill Pawley. I will try to reach him in Miami.

Meanwhile, the very best of luck during your hospital stay. I hope the findings will be negative.

As mentioned in our phone conversation, I had to push on to Coral Gables to work on the papers of General Knerr. I spent a week there and came up with extremely valuable material which will not only clarify some history of World War II but will help the Air Force explain itself. I just got a letter from General Knerr's son (copy attached).

In my research I came across references to "Jack" Beam and sure would like the opportunity to talk with you. I may be back down your way in a couple of months - perhaps May - and if you are feeling up to par, and my plans do materialize, I'll try to plan my trip accordingly. The enclosed envelope is for your convenience.

By the way, I also stopped in to talk to General George Goddard (now re-retired in Boca Raton). He took me out to his fishing boat. Is having a great time down there. Have you read his memoir, OVERVIEW?

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P.S. One item I have that perplexes me has to do with you and Mort McKinnon. Apparently, General Arnold chose you over him for some job that he wanted done, and it caused some ill feeling. McKinnon lives in Riverside, Calif. I talked to him some but without clarification. Does this ring bells with you??

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I got to the hospital for exploratory surgery on the 1st of Feb so will be out of circulation for a while

THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan, presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Hruska, and Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator, and William McManus, research assistant.

Senator MCCLELLAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Counsel, make a brief statement of the nature and purpose of your hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The committee has been conducting hearings into the general subject of the threat to the security of the United States through the Caribbean. In connection with this, the committee has taken a substantial amount of testimony on the situation in Cuba and the intent of the Communist conspiracy with regard to the use of Cuba as a bridgehead against the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Pawley is the witness this morning. May the record show that he appears in response to a subpena. He is a man of very substantial experience in Latin America, has been Ambassador to two of the countries in Latin America and is believed to have information which would be helpful to the committee along this line.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Very well.

The present occupant of the chair is serving in this capacity today at the request of Senator Eastland, chairman of the committee.

Who is your first witness?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. William D. Pawley, sir.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Mr. Pawley, will you be sworn, please, sir.

You do solemnly swear the evidence you shall give before this Senate Select Committee in the pending inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. PAWLEY. I do.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Thank you and be seated.

All right, Mr. Ambassador, if you will identify yourself for the record, please.

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FOR: DR MURRAY GREEN

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM D. PAWLEY

Mr. PAWLEY. My name is William D. Pawley. I am a resident of Miami, Fla. I have here a brief résumé of my activities since 1945.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

1945: Ambassador to Peru.
1946–47: Ambassador to Brazil.
September 20, 1947 to March 15, 1948: On leave in Miami and Washington.
March 15, 1948: Returned to Brazil for 2 weeks, to take leave of post there, having resigned as Ambassador.
April 1948: Bogotá Conference.
May through July 1948: Washington.
August, September 1948: Sailed to Europe for vacation trip, during which visited Spain and negotiated bases. Returned to Paris where U.N. General Assembly in progress. Marshall asked me to assist him, but first I returned to Washington, then to Miami to settle union dispute, then flew back to Paris.
November 1948: Paris, U.N. General Assembly (for 5 weeks).
December 1948: Washington.
Early 1949, as I remember, was spent between Washington, Virginia, and Miami.
September 1949: Havana to negotiate with union, interventor and Government re taking over trolley company.
October through December 1949: Washington, Miami, and elsewhere.
January 1950 through February 1, 1951: Havana Autobuses Modernos.
Korea started in June 1950, and was in Washington in December, when I had talks with Jessup, Marshall and President Truman re China.
February 4, 1951: Miami for Annie Hahr's wedding.
February 19, 1951: Entered State Department as special assistant to Acheson.
June, July 1951: India re wheat and monazite (accompanied by my assistant Lansing Collins)—returned to United States by way of Far East. Walter McConaughy was in Taiwan.
August 1951: Washington.
September 1951: Clifton died, I went to Mexico then Miami and remained there for several weeks.
November 20, 1951: Resigned from State to take effect November 30, 1951.
December 3, 1951: Entered Defense Department as special assistant to Lovett.
January 17, 1952: Sailed on the *America* to Europe (with Edna, Anita, and my assistant Ed Harris).
January through May 4: Paris. Made two trips back to Washington. One was immediately prior to the Lisbon NATO conference. Flew to Washington, then to Miami to settle strike, then back to Washington to board Lovett's plane for Lisbon. The other trip to Washington was a 2-week trip for consultation in the Department (Edna and Anita went to Italy).
May 1952: Resign as assistant to Lovett.
June through September 1952: Farm in Virginia.
September 1952: Edna and I to Europe and Middle East. For several months?
1953: Spent mostly in Miami.
1954: Three separate tours of duty in State Department (April, July, and September, I believe). This was the Guatemala problem.
Nothing official since then (that is no assignments in the Department).

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you born, Mr. Pawley?

Mr. PAWLEY. Florence, S.C.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I had in mind for you to give a little résumé of your official positions you have held.

Mr. PAWLEY. Well, I might, for clarification go back a little further than that.

As an American businessman I had business interests in Cuba, having formed the first Cuban National Airline which is still the only national airline in Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. Compania Cubana Nationale de Aviacion?

Mr. PAWLEY. When we sold that to Pan American Airways I went to China as president of China National Aviation Corp., and when

MR PAWLEY STATED HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS ON HAP'S AND RELATED MATTERS R/B

TEL JE 42406 OR FR 90193 - ARFD 350 MIAMI

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20 January 1972

Brig General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Florida 33614

Dear General Beam:

I'm the fellow working on the Hap Arnold project who phoned you on January 6th as you were leaving for dinner.

Your reply to my previous letter of 25 May 1971 did not reach me - the mail around here is sometimes very bad.

Anyway, I'm pleased to know that you're interested. I may be coming back your way early in June. If you will be in town then, I might be encouraged to come your way.

You mentioned William Pauley. Would you happen to know where I could reach him? General Arnold was keenly interested in cementing our relationship with certain South American countries and I believe Mr. Pauley, working on the Presidential level, was involved in this undertaking.

In any event, I would be pleased to hear from you. Enclosed is an envelope that has a good chance of reaching me.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to Chief
AF History
Office of Air Force History

Encl

If I go—
write

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20314

25 May 1971

Brig. General Rosenham Beam, USAF (Ret)
3950 Versailles Drive
Tampa, Florida 33614

Dear General Beam:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. As a professional historian, I have been associated with the Secretary's Office for nearly a quarter of a century and recently went over to the Historian's Office to complete this assignment.

In my work for the past three years, I've been through the sizable Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress and have interviewed over 100 of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Norstad, Kuter, Kenney, O'Donnell. In the civilian area I've talked with Charles A. Lindbergh, Robert Lovett, Alexander de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Jackie Cochran and others.

I'm planning a trip down South to conduct a number of interviews and expect to pass through the Tampa area. It would be a privilege to talk to you about your association with General Arnold. I have one note about a job which was supposed to go to Morton McKinnon but went to you because General Arnold wanted it that way.

Right now, it looks like I'll be down in the Fall. I'd welcome hearing from you about getting together sometime perhaps in October or November.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to Chief
AF History
Office of Air Force History

Encl

884-6271
Ltr. to write
Wm. Coulter
1-6-72
Hearing from

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Interview, Brig General Rosenham Beam, Tampa, Florida, January 29, 1976

B (Discussion of invasion of Sicily in July 1943)

A few days prior to the invasion, the drop planes under General Paul Williams arrived. We spent a week or 10 days with him at 5th Army HQ coordinating the movement of the ground forces and the movement of the paratroopers into Sicily. It was decided that the British 8th Army would land in the area to the south of Mt Etna, and General Patton with the 7th Army would land on the West side of Sicily. They Navy was to stay out of the picture until approximately H+4 hours, as they would give away the fact that additional forces were coming in.

Everything went according to plan except for the Navy. About 15 miles south of the landing area that were blackened out, some of the gunners became trigger happy and started firing when the paratroopers came in at 0200.

Q Who was in charge of the paratroopers? Joe Swing?

B Matthew Ridgway - as it turned out, the accidental firing by one Navy ship invited the others. All started firing with the result that the paratroopers on their proper routes, coming in on their drop zones, began to disperse to try to avoid the Anti-aircraft. Many of the planes crossed over into the other zone with the result that there was a general mixing of the 7th and 8th Army paratroop support. The British Air Division landed partly in the Patton area, and the Patton air support dropped in the British zone. However, the paratroopers, by using little clickers, were able to get together and General Patton began immediately on getting his ground tanks ashore.

Q How many planes were lost in the mixup?

B Over 20. No paratroopers were lost, just the planes. They bailed out. They were all saved. The Mediterranean was literally lined with landing boats, so there was no problem.

Q It was dark. They landed in the water. Were they all saved?

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B They were all saved. The reason the landing was at 0200 was the moon. It came out. Gen Patton got organized and immediately proceeded to mop up the whole west end of Sicily. And before Gen Montgomery had gotten organized his 8th Army, Patton had made a clean sweep, capturing Palermo, all around to the heel. At Mt Etna he was stopped on orders from Gen Eisenhower.

Q What was your job?

B My job then was nothing. All I could do then was watch. Shortly before the invasion of Sicily, General Ike asked me to fly Gen Patton, Gen Edwards (British Army) and Admiral King (??) over to Benghazi to meet Gen Montgomery as the distance between Gen Montgomery's forces at that time and our forces was considerable, and occupied by Rommel and a few German planes. It was advisable to make the trip at night. I took them from Maison Blanche airfield in Algiers, leaving at 9 PM and flying at night to the vicinity of Benghazi, arriving at daybreak.

(Told of problems of finding the Benghazi landing strip; met Gen Freyberg; won Victoria Cross in WW I; also told of meeting between 6 footer Patton and 5'6" Montgomery; conflict between them; also friction between Montgomery and P.M. Churchill; acquired amoebic dysentery. Spaatz sent him home; arrived in Bangor, Maine)

B I called Gen Arnold on the phone from there and asked him for instructions. He said:"Go to Randolph, and report to Jerry Brant." I did. When I got to Randolph, Brant said: "I'm glad to see you." I said: "How did you know I was coming?" He said:"Hap called and said you were coming down."

(Told of Brant's retirement and replacement by Walter Kraus)

I said: "Jerry, I cant be here with Walter Kraus."

He said: "Why not?"

I said: "I was Walter Kraus' boss one time and I dont agree with his policies."

He said:"We can get that changed."

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Q When was this?

B This was November or December 1943. Arnold came in for Brant's retirement. Brant told him I did not want to be assigned to Randolph, and Arnold said: "Tell him to go to Boca Raton and relieve Skippy Harbold as commandant of the Radar School. So I left the next day for Boca Raton. Skippy was quite shocked to know that he had been relieved. I told him 'd had nothing to do with it. I was quite shocked to know I was to be commandant of a radar school. A hurricane hit Boca Raton that fall and flattened it. Meanwhile Gen Barton Yount told me to report to his HQ and he would give me an assignment. I reported to him at Randolph. He told me to report to Sheppard Air Base at Wichita Falls, and I spent the next year there. Then Gen Yount ordered me to report to the 20th Wing HQ at Ellington Air Base.

(Told of convening all overseas base commanders at Ellington which was closed to outsiders. A Secret conference)

General Marshall called me directly and said: "I requested that you be placed in charge of this reception because you know practically all the officers who will be coming there." And he said:"I like the way you operate." He gave me the names of all the officers who were coming: Lawton Collins, Simpson, etc. Many of them I'd been classmates with at the General Staff School.

(Told of the crowded facilities on base. Hoyt Vandenberg and Ira Eaker there. Complained of being confined to the post. Beam exulted: "This is the first time I've ever given orders to you birds.")

Q Why the secrecy?

B They didnt want their presence in the States known. The next day, Gen Marshall called to put them into planes for transportation to Washington. That night there was a tornado and the field was under one foot of water. I called Gen Marshall. He asked me to see if we could charter a special train. "They have got to be in Washington," he said.

(Beam told of talking to Marshall pefsonally. They finally flew out the generals the next day)

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(No satisfactory explanation of the secrecy or why the Generals were convened first in Ellington before being flown to Washington)

Q Did you see Arnold or contact him in 1945?

B No.

Q Were you still a Colonel?

B Tooey Spaatz made me a General after the war was over. I never saw Arnold again personally, but I wrote him a letter when I heard he was seriously ill. I got a letter back. He appreciated my letter but felt he would never make it. I never heard from or saw him again.

Q Did he ever indicate to you in words or actions an apology that he held back your promotion.

B The only think I can remember about General Arnold and my promotion was when I asked him after the Anfa Conference when I was taking Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold to their plane, when he said: "Can I do anything for you when I get back to Washington?" I said "Yes, you might forget the mistake I made in the 1938 budget hearing."

His face became livid with anger. He said:"That I will never forget." The other time was when Gen Eisenhower personally wrote and told him he could not understand how I was holding down a position of a Major General and couldnt get promoted. Ike told me personally that Arnold's reply was that he reserved the right to make all his General Officers. He did not give that right to his field commanders.

Q Do you have copies of those letters?

B Yes, sir, a stack that thick. But I cant let you see them. I've got too much confidential information from Ike. He was just like a buddy. I would not let you see them. After Gen Arnold, I was immediately made a General Officer, and Gen Spaatz told me at the time that he regretted the fact that he could not make me A Gen Officer before for my service under him. Then I was assigned as Commanding General at Lowry AFB in Denver for building the cantonment into the Quarters for

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the Air Force Academy. The first class at the Academy was trained at Lowry. Gen Hubert Harmon came by many times to consult with me.

Mr. Symington, Secretary at the time, came out many times to visit the Academy site. (Told also of setting up the Comptroller School at Lowry AFB by contacting I.B.M. and Mr. Tom Watson)

Q Do you feel that, based on your experience with Gen Arnold, that he was a man who bore grudges?

B Gen Arnold was the most vindictive individual I've ever seen. I dont think he ever said: "I'm sorry", or "I've made a mistake", in his life - not to my knowledge.

Q Did he act vindictively towards others as well as towards you?

B I can name hundreds.

Q Name one or two?

B I'll name one or two things that he did to show you how he would never say, "That's a mistake I made", or "I'm sorry." There were twin brothers who became General Officers. I wont call their names, because both were friends and very fine officers. But he told Miss Adkins to have one of them who was a Colonel promoted to Brig General and report to him without delay for assignment. Miss Adkins told the Chief of Personnel to deliver the message. The officer reported to Gen Arnold who said: "What are you doing here?"

He said: "I thank you for my star."

"Hell, I didnt mean you. I meant your brother."

So he promptly let him stay a General and made his brother a General officer. That is the truth, God, so help me.

(Later identified as Ben and Barney Giles)

Another time he made a mistake when Gen Andrews was in Command of Panama. He sent a Brig General home for inefficiency. This officer arrived in Washington and reported to Gen Arnold for assignment. Gen Arnold said:

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"What are you doing here?" He said: "Gen Andrews sent me up here for assignment." He didnt tell him that Gen Andrews had recommended that he be reduced to his permanent grade of Colonel. Gen Arnold a few months later made him a Major General. I dont want to tell you his name either. He's retired and still living. That's the truth. He (Arnold) never apologized to Andrews or anybody else.

Q Was that Tom Darcy?

B Yes, how did you know?

Q I interviewed him in Florida.

B Incidentally, at the Anfa (Casablanca) Conference, Gen Andrews and I reminisced quite a bit, because I served with him. He was one of the first General Officers we ever had. Andrews asked me if I'd like to come to London. I told him I couldnt very well ask to be relieved because I didnt know what my next assignment would be after Anfa. He said: "If you change your mind, just let me know. I'd like to have you on my planning staff and it is a big deal."

I said: "Thank you very much, Andy. I certainly hope I can get free."

Of course Gen Andrews was on his way back shortly after that and was killed in Iceland. We lost one of the finest officers we ever had.

Q Back to 1938 and the planners conference at Chanute and Lester Maitland.

B He was going out from Operations and I was going from Plans to represent the Chief's office at this Conference. Bill McChord was in command at Chanute. Brett was coming down to represent Materiel Command. Gen Westover called me in and said: "I want you to tell Maitland and McChord that if there is any drinking"- the two of them liked to drink together - "if either of them gets tight out there, I'm going to court-martial them. I'm going to put you under oath as to whether you saw them drunk." He said: "Ive got to know. You are going out representing me."

When I got out there, I told McChord and Maitland: "If you get tight, I'm under orders from the Chief to report on your sobriety."

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Q (Told of Maitland's problem and his relief after Arnold visited ETO in 1943. Then he joined ministry. Interviewed in 1974 at Red Bluff, Calif)

Q Back to Darcy. He liked Andrews very much. Do you say Andrews felt Darcy wasnt cutting it?

B He wasnt. Later I was Commanding General and relieved a two star General in Panama. From Andrews up there had never been anything less than a Major General in the job. The one who relieved me was a Brig. General.

Q Let's go back to 1941. Arnold and Marshall went to Hawaii for an inspection, you say. You worked up a plan. You were in Plans under Tony Frank?

B I was A-3.

Q When did Fred Martin come out to Hawaii?

B They came out in March 1941. He became Hawaiian Air Force commander with Bill Farthing. The new HQ took one from 18th Wing. The old group was sent hime. The new commander moved down to Fort Shafter. No longer stayed at Hickam.

Q You say you had a plan that Kuter made a copy of?

B Not Kuter. Bob Candee, he was A-2. I gave a briefing. They had lights and charts. Then when Kuter asked if he could take these things, and Bob Candee said "I made movies of it." Kuter said: "I'll make copies of the thing." He gave it to Larry Kuter.

Q Arnold did not think much of this plan?

B Arnold thought the whole thing was phoney. We had been talking to Washington almost daily of all these sightings. You could take off on any moonlit night and fly out 50 or 75 miles , or closer than that, and there would be Jap submarines all over the place.

Q When did you leave Hawaii?

B I arrived in the middle of June. I dont know the exact date

Q (Told of the Farther, Rose, Coddington War Plan) Did you have anything

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to do with that plan? It was produced in July 1941, as I recall.

B Coddington served under me. Bill Farthing commanded the other group. I commanded the 5th Bomb Group

Q Wasnt Farthing the Plans Officer for Gen Martin?

B Yes, he was.

Q Did their plan follow your plan? Was it a larger plan or a different plan?

B We didnt make any plan. We just got an estimate of the situation to show what the possibilities were and why we needed additional planes.

Q Was that plan based on your idea in any respect, or was it a different plan?

B We did not draw up the recuirements. John B. Cary stated in Plans all during the war. He was my Assistant A-3. Cary was working on a plan when I left there for requirements. He lives in Hawaii. He retired as Lieut General. John Cary was working on requirements. Normally, the reason that Bob Candee was ordered to take all these pictures. Actually an estimate of the situation is supposed to be under A-2. Bob said he didnt want to make the damned thing.

Q Tony Frank and Hap Arnold didnt get along?

B Frank had no confidence in Arnold. He was senior to Hap.

Q No, he wasnt senior to Hap. Arnold graduated in 1907. Frank was a year or two behind

B You're right. Shepler Fitzgerald was senior to Tony Frank. He always held it against Arnold because he didnt get to be a General. He was later broken on resupply of planes via Ascension Island. He was sent home because he was buying up rugs and furniture and sending them back to the U.S. by the plane-load. (Beam told of Shep Fitzgerald in North Africa borroving his official B-25. He promised to return it in one day; kept it 9 days. It was filthy when returned. He said FitzGerald was loading the plane and selling merchandise, and he got caught)

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Q (Asked about Sue Clagett)

B We had an apt at Shoreham before the war. When Hap came to Washington we decided we should have a party for him in the Blue Room. We invited duty people - Scanlon, Kilner, Bill McChord.

Q What happened at the party?

B (Told of seating arrangements, alternating Gen and Mrs. Arnold and Col and Mrs. Beam) They served win and I stood up."I want to drink a toast to the new Chief of Air Corps." Everybody stood up. Hap didnt stand up. That was alright. But he didnt pick up his glass either, and Doris said - Let me go back - When Hap and I were Lieut Colonels at the same time and temporary Colonels at the same time. I started in 1916. He called me "Jack" and I called him "Hap." My wife said: "Well, arent you going to drink a toast to yourself?"

Hap said: "I dont drink."

Doris said: "Dont tell me you're one of those teetotalers?"

There was a complete silence at the table, and he said: "I dont wish to be embarrassed," and his face turned bright red. It kind of put a damper on the party. This was when he first came in. Incidentally, the Westovers and ourselves - the former Chiefs - had been very friendly. It was a shock in what appeared to be hostility. This was shortly after he got there. The next day, Miss Adkins called. She said Gen Arnold wanted to see me. I went up. He said:"One thing I want to tell you. Wives are not supposed to embarrass Commanding Officers." I said: "Very sorry, Gen Arnold, my wife certainly didnt mean to embarrass you. She jokes with people."

He said: "I dont like jokes, especially if they're played on me."

That was the end of that conversation. But it shows you the kind of individual he was.

Q Let me give you some background (Discussion of the report that Arnold was a heavy drinker and the delay in his appointment by Pres. Roosevelt) Do

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you recal Arnold drinking out in Hawaii?

B I never did see Arnold take a drink.

Q (Told of the rumors in Washington) With that background, maybe Arnold wanted to show the group at this party that you had assembled at the Shoreham that the rumors were untrue. Perhaps the fact that your wife made a joking remark about him, no offense intended, which he took in a very personal way? Could this be related?

B Very well, I didnt know that story. I never did see him drink or be under the influence. But he was the most vindictive man I've ever seen. When you work in Plans you deal directly with the Chief. You dont deal with anybody inbetween, because you are working on his plans or plans you developed for him. Our plans also had to be approved by the Army.

Q Was Arnold an idea man, or did he take ideas that others developed?

B Gen Arnold was a clique man. He surrounded himself with a clique. Did you ever read Larry Kuter's article that was published on Gen Arnold. He said he was put down there by Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall didnt fully trust Arnold so he wanted somebody he could trust in there to know what definitely was going on.* I dont say that Hap evaded the truth. Kuter wrote this article himself. He stated in there that Gen Marshall put him down there and told Gen Arnold: "I'm giving you a Chief of Staff that knows what it's all about."

See Kuter's comment on p.15

Q Arnold had high regard for Kuter, a great idea man.

B Kuter was a smart hombre.

Q Do you think he was reporting on Arnold to Marshall?

B I thik he would have definitely told Gen Marshall that anything was wrong. I do believe that. However, from relations between the two I would say that Kuter did not report anything was so serious.

Q Do you think that your relations with Arnold were affected by the closeness of your relations to Frank Lahm?

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B Very possible.

Q Did you ever hear Arnold talk about Lahm?

B Never heard him mention Lahm.

Q Did you ever hear Lahm talk about Arnold?

B Yes, I've heard him say several things - Negative ones, yes: "I dont approve of the way he does things," said Lahm.

Q You think Lahm regarded Arnold as being to liberal or forward in the drive for unification, a separate air force?

B Yes, he stated two or three times he thought Gen Mitchell and Gen Arnold were too far out. I heard Gen Lahm say the Army and Navy talked about our limitations.

Q Several people have told me Arnold surrounded himself with guys that worked for him before?

B Nothing but "Yes, men," and that's why he changed the Plans Division. In one year he changed every member of it, including the Chief, because we were not "Yes, men." We didnt agree.

Q Were you Chief of Plans then?

B No. Rush B. Lincoln was.

Q Arnold brought Harold George in there?

B Yes.

Q Then Hansell and Ken Walker?

B Ken was a radical. He served under me in the Philippines. I commanded the 28th BombSquadron in Manila.

Q Do you know anything more about Ken Walker? I'm helping a fellow who works with me. He's doing a book on Medal of Honor winners. Tell me about Walker?

B Sure, he served in my outfit. He was an energetic, oversexed individual. He was brilliant. He ad many good thoughts. His many plans on attacking and bombing. He was my A-3 in the 28th BombSquadron, 20th Group. From 1922-25. He was happily married and had a lovely wife, but he was always getting himself mixed up

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with other women. He was always getting himself in trouble. I used to tell him: "What the hell's the matter with you? You have a lovely wife." But he couldnt resist other women. That was his trouble. I had him in Hawaii. Later, I recommended him to George Kenney and George was present at the Air Corps Tactical School. I sent 2 officers to George up there.

Q When did you have Ken Walker in Hawaii?

B About 1939-40. Ken was my A-3 in the 5th Bomb Group and Walter Agee, Rosie O'Donnel and Bob Travis were there. So was Arnol Luehman.

Q I knew Luehman as head of AF PIO.

B John Cary.

Q I'm going to talk to him when I get back. But I want to get back to what you said about Arnold and his cluque.

B He had a c lique wherever he went. He pulled those people. Harold George was very vocal. He had been Secretary to some congressman on the Military Affairs Committee before he came into the Air Corps. He had a lot of political pull. That's why Hap had him. He got to be quite a guy. Look at the guys who wore the stars and check their backgrounds.

Q A lot of them came up from March Field?

B Right. Mostly, March Field. Take the fairhaired boy who married a wealthy girl and became a Lieut General - Pete Quesada. I had Pete as a 2nd Lieutenant. He's very handsome, attractive, athletic young man. He came down to Cuba as Aide to Ambassador Guggenheim when I had the mission down there. I did him a lot of good. The divorced daughter of Guggenheim liked him. She took Pete out to the Casino, gambled and drank champagne with him. The poor guy was only a Lieutenant.

(Beam told of complaining to Ambassador Guggenheim his daughter was corrupting Pete Quesada. Finally, the Ambassador took some action to break it up)

Q Did Arnold do things for Pete Quesada?

B Arnold thought Pete was a whirl. He kept him in Washington, or at Bolling Field. (Beam told the story of Quesada showing up in North Africa

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as a three-star General. Doubt this story - Beam says Pete Quesada was assigned air defense of Northern Coast of North Africa.

Q (Mentioned previous comment that Arnold preferred a weak No. 2 man - Stratemeyer and Giles)

B That's right. He had people like Tom Hanley as A-4. All the people he put in jobs were "Yes, people."

Q How about Fred Dean?

B Yes. My aide came to me complaining about shortage of .50 cal ammunition. I said we couldnt go into the invasion without it. He said Hanley says we cant have it. I went over to see Tom. We had difficulty talking about North Africa. It was "Top Secret." We had 2 guys talking about it in the Mayflower Hotel and FBI guys stepped out and put them inthe clink until after we sailed.

Back to Tom Hanley. I said I'd better see Gen Arnold. I said: "General, I'm having a little problem. We're loading from Boston to South Carolina, as you know." I was having my ships package-loaded. I was Commander of the 5th Air Support Command. He said: "What's package loading." I said: "Package loading is when one ship goes down, I wont lose everything of one thing like ammunition." He said:"Are you going to put ammunition on those ships that are carrying other thing?" I said: "Yes, sir."

He said: "That's unusual."

I said: "I cant get any .50 cal ammunition. Gen Hanley saiys I cant have any."

He said: "Did he tell you why?"

I said: "Yes, he said he needed it in training back here for combat over in Europe."

He said:"That's it."

I said:"Gen Arnold, you dont mean that?" I had four Navy carriers

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under my command, top loaded with my planes. They couldnt even use the elevator They couldnt do a damned thing until my boys took off. They'd never seen a car before. That's the position I was in. I said: "You surely dont mean. . .?"

He said: "You'll get some from other sources."

I said:"From whom?"

He said:"I dont know. Tell Hanley."

I said: "I've told him."

So I went back and told my A-4 to go back and discuss this with Col Hanley again. George King. He went back and very unfortunately in discussing with Hanley the invasion of North Africa, he said, "We've got to have this." He told Hanley about the four carriers and Tom went up and talked to General. They arrested my A-4 for mentioning triple Top Secret stuff to anybody else. It just burned the hell out of me. I went down to see George Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff. I said: "George, this is absolutely assinine." I said: "I can get this ammunition and I'm going to get it. But I hate to go over Hap's head."

He said: "Jack, I cant do a damned thing. If Hap says "No,", I have to say, "No."

I went up to see George Patton: "General, I'm stumped." He says: "What' the problem?" I said: "I dont have .50 cal ammunition" He said: "What?"

I said, the only thing they will have when they go aboard that carrier will be their belts loaded on those planes. And that's it."

He said: "That's assinine."

I said: "I cant do a thing about it. I've been to Arnold's A-4."

Q I cant understand. Why wouldnt Arnold give you ammunition?

B He thought that was enough. The ammunition we had in the planes.

Q That's really hard to believe or understand.

B I know it's hard to understand. Anyhow, the White House overruled Arnold.

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George King, my A-4, missed going over on the boat. He came with the 97th Group from Langley. They were leaving on D+6, if we captured Gazes airport. That became the entrance point. We lated fixed the field at Marrakech for resupply. We got the ammunition but George King got put in the clink. He has just passed away. He lived in Washington.

Q Some have told me the men who came up under Andrews - Tony Frank, Hugh Knerr, Walter Weaver and other did not get as good jobs as those who came up under Arnold.

B That's right. Knerr was originally Navy, graduated from Naval Academy. Then he got transferred to Army Artillery, then got detailed to Aviation. Hugh Knerr was XXX a brilliant officer

Q He was close to Andrews?

B Yes, he was. He was Chief of Staff, GHQ Air Force, at Langley. I knew that whole gang. Conger Pratt. This outfit came in. George King got somebody to fly him down to Langley in time to bum a ride with the 97th. Came in to North Africa by way of Brazil. When he reported, I asked him, "Where the hell have you been?" He told me the story of what they did to him. That's the kind of stuff they pulled.

Q Howa rd Davidson, one Exec to Westover, was telling me that Westover had this tendency to want to read all the correspondence that came in. He could not delegate. Arnold was then Asst Chief. Davidson was Westover's Exec. Westover spent a lot of time reading routing correspondence. He wasnt able to grasp larger concepts and did not know how to delegate. Is this an accurate description?

B I would say "Davey" was a slow thinker., no question of that. He married lots of money. I knew the whole family. The old lady was quite a character. (END)

* Ref page 10 comment, interviewed Gen Kuter in Naples, Fla, three days later, on Sunday, Feb 1, 1976. Kuter denied completely the idea that Gen Marshall assigned him to the Air Staff to keep an eye on Arnold. Kuter also made derogatory comment about Beam, indicating he regarded him as untrustworthy.

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Interview, Brig General Rosenham Beam, Tampa, Florida, January 29, 1976

B (Discussion of invasion of Sicily in July 1943)

A few days prior to the invasion, the drop planes under General Paul Williams arrived. We spent a week or 10 days with him at 5th Army HQ coordinating the movement of the ground forces and the movement of the paratroopers into Sicily. It was decided that the British 8th Army would land in the area to the south of Mt Etna, and General Patton with the 7th Army would land on the West side of Sicily. They Navy was to stay out of the picture until approximately H + 4 hours, as they would give away the fact that additional forces were coming in.

Everything went according to plan except for the Navy. About 15 miles south of the landing area that were blackened out, some of the gunners became trigger happy and started firing when the paratroopers came in at 0200.

Q Who was in charge of the paratroopers? Joe Swing?

B Matthew Ridgway - as it turned out, the accidental firing by one Navy ship invited the others. All started firing with the result that the paratroopers on their proper routes, coming in on their drop zones, began to disperse to try to avoid the Anti-aircraft. Many of the planes crossed over into the other zone with the result that there was a general mixing of the 7th and 8th Army paratroop support. The British Air Division landed partly in the Patton area, and the Patton air support dropped in the British zone. However, the paratroopers, by using little clickers, were able to get together and General Patton began immediately on getting his ground tanks ashore.

Q How many planes were lost in the mixup?

B Over 20. No paratroopers were lost, just the planes. They bailed out. They were all saved. The Mediterranean was literally lined with landing boats, so there was no problem.

Q It was dark. They landed in the water. Were they all saved?

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

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Q When was this?

B This was November or December 1943. Arnold came in for Brant's retirement. Brant told him I did not want to be assigned to Randolph, and Arnold said: "Tell him to go to Boca Raton and relieve Skippy Harbold as commandant of the Radar School. So I left the next day for Boca Raton. Skippy was quite shocked to know that he had been relieved. I told him 'd had nothing to do with it. I was quite shocked to know I was to be commandant of a radar school. A hurricane hit Boca Raton that fall and flattened it. Meanwhile Gen Barton Yount told me to report to his HQ and he would give me an assignment. I reported to him at Randolph. He told me to report to Sheppard Air Base at Wichita Falls, and I spent the next year there. Then Gen Yount ordered me to report to the 20th Wing HQ at Ellington Air Base.

(Told of convening all overseas base commanders at Ellington which was closed to outsiders. A Secret conference)

General Marshall called me directly and said: "I requested that you be placed in charge of this reception because you know practically all the officers who will be coming there." And he said:"I like the way you operate." He gave me the names of all the officers who were coming: Lawton Collins, Simpson, etc. Many of them I'd been classmates with at the General Staff School.

(Told of the crowded facilities on base. Hoyt Vandenberg and Ira Eaker there. Complained of being confined to the post. Beam exulted: "This is the first time I've ever given orders to you birds.")

Q Why the secrecy?

B They didnt want their presence in the States known. The next day, Gen Marshall called to put them into planes for transportation to Washington. That night there was a tornado and the field was under one foot of water. I called Gen Marshall. He asked me to see if we could charter a special train. "They have got to be in Washington," he said.

(Beam told of talking to Marshall pefsonally. They finally flew out the generals the next day)

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(No satisfactory explanation of the secrecy or why the Generals were convened first in Ellington before being flown to Washington)

Q Did you see Arnold or contact him in 1945?

B No.

Q Were you still a Colonel?

B Tooey Spaatz made me a General after the war was over. I never saw Arnold again personally, but I wrote him a letter when I heard he was seriously ill. I got a letter back. He appreciated my letter but felt he would never make it. I never heard from or saw him again.

Q Did he ever indicate to you in words or actions an apology that he held back your promotion.

B The only think I can remember about General Arnold and my promotion was when I asked him after the Anfa Conference when I was taking Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold to their plane, when he said: "Can I do anything for you when I get back to Washington?" I said "Yes, you might forget the mistake I made in the 1938 budget hearing."

His face became livid with anger. He said:"That I will never forget." The other time was when Gen Eisenhower personally wrote and told him he could not understand how I was holding down a position of a Major General and couldnt get promoted. Ike told me personally that Arnold's reply was that he reserved the right to make all his General Officers. He did not give that right to his field commanders.

Q Do you have copies of those letters?

B Yes, sir, a stack that thick. But I cant let you see them. I've got too much confidential information from Ike. He was just like a buddy. I would not let you see them. After Gen Arnold, I was immediately made a General Officer, and Gen Spaatz told me at the time that he regretted the fact that he could not make me A Gen Officer before for my service under him. Then I was assigned as Commanding General at Lowry AFB in Denver for building the cantonment into the Quarters for

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the Air Force Academy. The first class at the Academy was trained at Lowry. Gen Hubert Harmon came by many times to consult with me.

Mr. Symington, Secretary at the time, came out many times to visit the Academy site. (Told also of setting up the Comptroller School at Lowry AFB by contacting I.B.M. and Mr. Tom Watson)

Q Do you feel that, based on your experience with Gen Arnold, that he was a man who bore grudges?

B Gen Arnold was the most vindictive individual I've ever seen. I dont think he ever said: "I'm sorry", or "I've made a mistake", in his life - not to my knowledge.

Q Did he act vindictively towards others as well as towards you?

B I can name hundreds.

Q Name one or two?

B I'll name one or two things that he did to show you how he would never say, "That's a mistake I made", or "I'm sorry." There were twin brothers who became General Officers. I wont call their names, because both were friends and very fine officers. But he told Miss Adkins to have one of them who was a Colonel promoted to Brig General and report to him without delay for assignment. Miss Adkins told the Chief of Personnel to deliver the message. The officer reported to Gen Arnold who said: "What are you doing here?"

He said: "I thank you for my star."

"Hell, I didnt mean you. I meant your brother."

So he promptly let him stay a General and made his brother a General officer. That is the truth, God, so help me.

(Later identified as Ben and Barney Giles)

Another time he made a mistake when Gen Andrews was in Command of Panama. He sent a Brig General home for inefficiency. This officer arrived in Washington and reported to Gen Arnold for assignment. Gen Arnold said:

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"What are you doing here?" He said: "Gen Andrews sent me up here for assignment." He didnt tell him that Gen Andrews had recommended that he be reduced to his permanent grade of Colonel. Gen Arnold a few months later made him a Major General. I dont want to tell you his name either. He's retired and still living. That's the truth. He (Arnold) never apologized to Andrews or anybody else.

Q Was that Tom Darcy?

B Yes, how did you know?

Q I interviewed him in Florida.

B Incidentally, at the Anfa (Casablanca) Conference, Gen Andrews and I reminisced quite a bit, because I served with him. He was one of the first General Officers we ever had. Andrews asked me if I'd like to come to London. I told him I couldnt very well ask to be relieved because I didnt know what my next assignment would be after Anfa. He said: "If you change your mind, just let me know. I'd like to have you on my planning staff and it is a big deal."

I said: "Thank you very much, Andy. I certainly hope I can get free."

Of course Gen Andrews was on his way back shortly after that and was killed in Iceland. We lost one of the finest officers we ever had.

Q Back to 1938 and the planners conference at Chanute and Lester Maitland.

B He was going out from Operations and I was going from Plans to represent the Chief's office at this Conference. Bill McChord was in command at Chanute. Brett was coming down to represent Materiel Command. Gen Westover called me in and said: "I want you to tell Maitland and McChord that if there is any drinking" - the two of them liked to drink together - "if either of them gets tight out there, I'm going to court-martial them. I'm going to put you under oath as to whether you saw them drunk." He said: "Ive got to know. You are going out representing me."

When I got out there, I told McChord and Maitland: "If you get tight, I'm under orders from the Chief to report on your sobriety."

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Q (Told of Maitland's problem and his relief after Arnold visited ETO in 1943. Then he joined ministry. Interviewed in 1974 at Red Bluff, Calif)

Q Back to Darcy. He liked Andrews very much. Do you say Andrews felt Darcy wasnt cutting it?

B He wasnt. Later I was Commanding General and relieved a two star General in Panama. From Andrews up there had never been anything less than a Major General in the job. The one who relieved me was a Brig. General.

Q Let's go back to 1941. Arnold and Marshall went to Hawaii for an inspection, you say. You worked up a plan. You were in Plans under Tony Frank?

B I was A-3.

Q When did Fred Martin come out to Hawaii?

B They came out in March 1941. He became Hawaiian Air Force commander with Bill Farthing. The new HQ took one from 18th Wing. The old group was sent hime. The new commander moved down to Fort Shafter. No longer stayed at Hickam.

Q You say you had a plan that Kuter made a copy of?

B Not Kuter. Bob Candee, he was A-2. I gave a briefing. They had lights and charts. Then when Kuter asked if he could take these things, and Bob Candee said "I made movies of it." Kuter said: "I'll make copies of the thing." He gave it to Larry Kuter.

Q Arnold did not think much of this plan?

B Arnold thought the whole thing was phoney. We had been talking to Washington almost daily of all these sightings. You could take off on any moonlit night and fly out 50 or 75 miles , or closer than that, and there would be Jap submarines all over the place.

Q When did you leave Hawaii?

B I arrived in the middle of June. I dont know the exact date

Q (Told of the Farther, Rose, Coddington War Plan) Did you have anything

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to do with that plan? It was produced in July 1941, as I recall.

B Coddington served under me. Bill Farthing commanded the other group. I commanded the 5th Bomb Group

Q Wasnt Farthing the Plans Officer for Gen Martin?

B Yes, he was.

Q Did their plan follow your plan? Was it a larger plan or a different plan?

B We didnt make any plan. We just got an estimate of the situation to show what the possibilities were and why we needed additional planes.

Q Was that plan based on your idea in any respect, or was it a different plan?

B We did not draw up the requirements. John B. Cary stated in Plans all during the war. He was my Assistant A-3. Cary was working on a plan when I left there for requirements. He lives in Hawaii. He retired as Lieut General. John Cary was working on requirements. Normally, the reason that Bob Candee was ordered to take all these pictures. Actually an estimate of the situation is supposed to be under A-2. Bob said he didnt want to make the damned thing.

Q Tony Frank and Hap Arnold didnt get along?

B Frank had no confidence in Arnold. He was senior to Hap.

Q No, he wasnt senior to Hap. Arnold graduated in 1907. Frank was a year or two behind

B You're right. Shepler Fitzgerald was senior to Tony Frank. He always held it against Arnold because he didnt get to be a General. He was later broken on resupply of planes via Ascension Island. He was sent home because he was buying up rugs and furniture and sending them back to the U.S. by the plane-load. (Beam told of Shep Fitzgerald in North Africa borrowing his official B-25. He promised to return it in one day; kept it 9 days. It was filthy when returned. He said FitzGerald was loading the plane and selling merchandise, and he got caught)

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Q (Asked about Sue Clagett)

B We had an apt at Shoreham before the war. When Hap came to Washington we decided we should have a party for him in the Blue Room. We invited duty people - Scanlon, Kilner, Bill McChord.

Q What happened at the party?

B (Told of seating arrangements, alternating Gen and Mrs. Arnold and Col and Mrs. Beam) They served win and I stood up."I want to drink a toast to the new Chief of Air Corps." Everybody stood up. Hap didnt stand up. That was alright. But he didnt pick up his glass either, and Doris said - Let me go back - When Hap and I were Lieut Colonels at the same time and temporary Colonels at the same time. I started in 1916. He called me "Jack" and I called him "Hap." My wife said: "Well, arent you going to drink a toast to yourself?"

Hap said: "I dont drink."

Doris said: "Dont tell me you're one of those teetotalers?"

There was a complete silence at the table, and he said: "I dont wish to be embarrassed," and his face turned bright red. It kind of put a damper on the party. This was when he first came in. Incidentally, the Westovers and ourselves - the former Chiefs - had been very friendly. It was a shock in what appeared to be hostility. This was shortly after he got there. The next day, Miss Adkins called. She said Gen Arnold wanted to see me. I went up. He said:"One thing I want to tell you. Wives are not supposed to embarrass Commanding Officers." I said: "Very sorry, Gen Arnold, my wife certainly didnt mean to embarrass you. She jokes with people."

He said: "I dont like jokes, especially if they're played on me."

That was the end of that conversation. But it shows you the kind of individual he was.

Q Let me give you some background (Discussion of the report that Arnold was a heavy drinker and the delay in his appointment by Pres. Roosevelt) Do

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you recal Arnold drinking out in Hawaii?

B I never did see Arnold take a drink.

Q (Told of the rumors in Washington) With that background, maybe Arnold wanted to show the group at this party that you had assembled at the Shoreham that the rumors were untrue. Perhaps the fact that your wife made a joking remark about him, no offense intended, which he took in a very personal way? Could this be related?

B Very well, I didnt know that story. I never did see him drink or be under the influence. But he was the most vindictive man I've ever seen. When you work in Plans you deal directly with the Chief. You dont deal with anybody inbetween, because you are working on his plans or plans you developed for him. Our plans also had to be approved by the Army.

Q Was Arnold an idea man, or did he take ideas that others developed?

B Gen Arnold was a clique man. He surrounded himself with a clique. Did you ever read Larry Kuter's article that was published on Gen Arnold. He said he was put down there by Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall didnt fully trust Arnold so he wanted somebody he could trust in there to know what definitely was going on.* I dont say that Hap evaded the truth. Kuter wrote this article himself. He stated in there that Gen Marshall put him down there and told Gen Arnold: "I'm giving you a Chief of Staff that knows what it's all about."

* See Kuter's comment on p.15

Q Arnold had high regard for Kuter, a great idea man.

B Kuter was a smart hombre.

Q Do you think he was reporting on Arnold to Marshall?

B I thik he would have definitely told Gen Marshall that anything was wrong. I do believe that. However, from relations between the two I would say that Kuter did not report anything was so serious.

Q Do you think that your relations with Arnold were affected by the closeness of your relations to Frank Lahm?

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B Very possible.

Q Did you ever hear Arnold talk about Lahm?

B Never heard him mention Lahm.

Q Did you ever hear Lahm talk about Arnold?

B Yes, I've heard him say several things - Negative ones, yes: "I dont approve of the way he does things," said Lahm.

Q You think Lahm regarded Arnold as being to liberal or forward in the drive for unification, a separate air force?

B Yes, he stated two or three times he thought Gen Mitchell and Gen Arnold were too far out. I heard Gen Lahm say the Army and Navy talked about our limitations.

Q Several people have told me Arnold surrounded himself with guys that worked for him before?

B Nothing but "Yes, men," and that's why he changed the Plans Division. In one year he changed every member of it, including the Chief, because we were not "Yes, men." We didnt agree.

Q Were you Chief of Plans then?

B No. Rush B. Lincoln was.

Q Arnold brought Harold George in there?

B Yes.

Q Then Hansell and Ken Walker?

B Ken was a radical. He served under me in the Philippines. I commanded the 28th BombSquadron in Manila.

" Do you know anything more about Ken Walker? I'm helping a fellow who works with me. He's doing a book on Medal of Honor winners. Tell me about Walker?

B Sure, he served in my outfit. He was an energetic, oversexed individual. He was brilliant. He ad many good thoughts. His many plans on attacking and bombing. He was my A-3 in the 28th BombSquadron, 20th Group. From 1922-25. He was happily married and had a lovely wife, but he was always getting himself mixed up

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with other women. He was always getting himself in trouble. I used to tell him: "What the hell's the matter with you? You have a lovely wife." But he couldnt resist other women. That was his trouble. I had him in Hawaii. Later, I recommended him to George Kenney and George was present at the Air Corps Tactical School. I sent 2 officers to George up there.

Q When did you have Ken Walker in Hawaii?

B About 1939-40. Ken was my A-3 in the 5th Bomb Group and Walter Agee, Rosie O'Donnel and Bob Travis were there. So was Arnol Luehman.

Q I knew Luehman as head of AF PIO.

B John Cary.

Q I'm going to talk to him when I get back. But I want to get back to what you said about Arnold and his cluque.

B He had a c lique wherever he went. He pulled those people. Harold George was very vocal. He had been Secretary to some congressman on the Military Affairs Committee before he came into the Air Corps. He had a lot of political pull. That's why Hap had him. He got to be quite a guy. Look at the guys who wore the stars and check their backgrounds.

Q A lot of them came up from March Field?

B Right. Mostly, March Field. Take the fairhaired boy who married a wealthy girl and became a Lieut General - Pete Quesada. I had Pete as a 2nd Lieutenant. He is very handsome, attractive, athletic young man. He came down to Cuba as Aide to Ambassador Guggenheim when I had the mission down there. I did him a lot of good. The divorced daughter of Guggenheim liked him. She took Pete out to the Casino, gambled and drank champagne with him. The poor guy was only a Lieutenant.

(Beam told of complaining to Ambassador Guggenheim his daughter was corrupting Pete Quesada. Finally, the Ambassador took some action to break it up)

Q Did Arnold do things for Pete Quesada?

B Arnold thought Pete was a whirl. He kept him in Washington, or at Bolling Field. (Beam told the story of Quesada showing up in North Africa

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as a three-star General. Doubt this story - Beam says Pete Quesada was assigned air defense of Northern Coast of North Africa.

Q (Mentioned previous comment that Arnold preferred a weak No. 2 man - Stratemeyer and Giles)

B That's right. He had people like Tom Hanley as A-4. All the people he put in jobs were "Yes, people."

Q How about Fred Dean?

B Yes. My aide came to me complaining about shortage of .50 cal ammunition. I said we couldnt go into the invasion without it. He said Hanley says we cant have it. I went over to see Tom. We had difficulty talking about North Africa. It was "Top Secret." We had 2 guys talking about it in the Mayflower Hotel and FBI guys stepped out and put them inthe clink until after we sailed.

Back to Tom Hanley. I said I'd better see Gen Arnold. I said: "General, I'm having a little problem. We're loading from Boston to South Carolina, as you know." I was having my ships package-loaded. I was Commander of the 5th Air Support Command. He said: "What's package loading." I said: "Package loading is when one ship goes down, I wont lose everything of one thing like ammunition." He said:"Are you going to put ammunition on those ships that are carrying other thing?" I said: "Yes, sir."

He said: "That's unusual."

I said: "I cant get any .50 cal ammunition. Gen Hanley saiys I cant have any."

He said: "Did he tell you why?"

I said: "Yes, he said he needed it in training back here for combat over in Europe."

He said:"That's it."

I said:"Gen Arnold, you dont mean that?" I had four Navy carriers

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under my command, top loaded with my planes. They couldnt even use the elevators. They couldnt do a damned thing until my boys took off. They'd never seen a carrier before. That's the position I was in. I said: "You surely dont mean. . .?"

He said: "You'll get some from other sources."

I said:"From whom?"

He said:"I dont know. Tell Hanley."

I said: "I've told him."

So I went back and told my A-4 to go back and discuss this with Col Hanley again. George King. He went back and very unfortunately in discussing with Hanley the invasion of North Africa, he said, "We've got to have this." He told Hanley about the four carriers and Tom went up and talked to General. They arrested my A-4 for mentioning triple Top Secret stuff to anybody else. It just burned the hell out of me. I went down to see George Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff. I said: "George, this is absolutely assinine." I said: "I can get this ammunition and I'm going to get it. But I hate to go over Hap's head."

He said: "Jack, I cant do a damned thing. If Hap says "No,", I have to say, "No."

I went up to see George Patton: "General, I'm stumped." He says: "What's the problem?" I said: "I dont have .50 cal ammunition" He said: "What?"

I said, the only thing they will have when they go aboard that carrier will be their belts loaded on those planes. And that's it."

He said: "That's assinine."

I said: "I cant do a thing about it. I've been to Arnold's A-4."

Q I cant understand. Why wouldnt Arnold give you ammunition?

B He thought that was enough. The ammunition we had in the planes.

Q That's really hard to believe or understand.

B I know it's hard to understand. Anyhow, the White House overruled Arnold.

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George King, my A-4, missed going over on the boat. He came with the 97th Group from Langley. They were leaving on D+6, if we captured Gazes airport. That became the entrance point. We lated fixed the field at Marrakech for resupply. We got the ammunition but George King got put in the clink. He has just passed away. He lived in Washington.

Q Some have told me the men who came up under Andrews - Tony Frank, Hugh Knerr, Walter Weaver and other did not get as good jobs as those who came up under Arnold.

B That's right. Knerr was originally Navy, graduated from Naval Academy. Then he got transferred to Army Artillery, then got detailed to Aviation. Hugh Knerr was ~~XXX~~ a brilliant officer

Q He was close to Andrews?

B Yes, he was. He was Chief of Staff, GHQ Air Force, at Langley. I knew that whole gang. Conger Pratt. This outfit came in. George King got somebody to fly him down to Langley in time to bum a ride with the 97th. Came in to North Africa by way of Brazil. When he reported, I asked him, "Where the hell have you been?" He told me the story of what they did to him. That's the kind of stuff they pulled.

Q Howa rd Davidson, one Exec to Westover, was telling me that Westover had this t endency to want to read all the correspondence that came in. He could not delegate. Arnold was then Asst Chief. Davidson was Westover's Exec. Westover spent a lot of time reading routing correspondence. He wasnt able to grasp larger concepts and did not know how to delegate. Is this an accurate description?

B I would say "Davey" was a slow thinker., no question of that. He married lots of money. I knew the whole family. The old lady was quite a character. (END)

* Ref page 10 comment, interviewed Gen Kuter in Naples,Fla, three days later, on Sunday, Feb 1, 1976. Kuter denied completely the idea that Gen Marshall assigned him to the Air Staff to keep an eye on Arnold. Kuter also made derogatory comment about Beam, indicating he regarded him as untrustworthy.

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Interview, Brig General Rosenham Beam, Tampa, Florida, January 29, 1976

B (Discussion of invasion of Sicily in July 1943)

A few days prior to the invasion, the drop planes under General Paul Williams arrived. We spent a week or 10 days with him at 5th Army HQ coordinating the movement of the ground forces and the movement of the paratroopers into Sicily. It was decided that the British 8th Army would land in the area to the south of Mt Etna, and General Patton with the 7th Army would land on the West side of Sicily. They Navy was to stay out of the picture until approximately H +4 hours, as they would give away the fact that additional forces were coming in.

Everything went according to plan except for the Navy. About 15 miles south of the landing area that were blackened out, some of the gunners became trigger happy and started firing when the paratroopers came in at 0200.

Q Who was in charge of the paratroopers? Joe Swing?

B Matthew Ridgway - as it turned out, the accidental firing by one Navy ship invited the others. All started firing with the result that the paratroopers on their proper routes, coming in on their drop zones, began to disperse to try to avoid the Anti-aircraft. Many of the planes crossed over into the other zone with the result that there was a general mixing of the 7th and 8th Army paratroop support. The British Air Division landed partly in the Patton area, and the Patton air support dropped in the British zone. However, the paratroopers, by using little clickers, were able to get together and General Patton began immediately on getting his ground tanks ashore.

Q How many planes were lost in the mixup?

B Over 20. No paratroopers were lost, just the planes. They bailed out. They were all saved. The Mediterranean was literally lined with landing boats, so there was no problem.

Q It was dark. They landed in the water. Were they all saved?

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B They were all saved. The reason the landing was at 0200 was the moon. It came out. Gen Patton got organized and immediately proceeded to mop up the whole west end of Sicily. And before Gen Montgomery had gotten organized his 8th Army, Patton had made a clean sweep, capturing Palermo, all around to the heel. At Mt Etna he was stopped on orders from Gen Eisenhower.

Q What was your job?

B My job then was nothing. All I could do then was watch. Shortly before the invasion of Sicily, General Ike asked me to fly Gen Patton, Gen Edwards (British Army) and Admiral King (??) over to Benghazi to meet Gen Montgomery as the distance between Gen Montgomery's forces at that time and our forces was considerable, and occupied by Rommel and a few German planes. It was advisable to make the trip at night. I took them from Maison Blanche airfield in Algiers, leaving at 9 PM and flying at night to the vicinity of Benghazi, arriving at daybreak.

(Told of problems of finding the Benghazi landing strip; met Gen Freyberg; won Victoria Cross in WW I; also told of meeting between 6 footer Patton and 5'6" Montgomery; conflict between them; also friction between Montgomery and P.M. Churchill; acquired amoebic dysentery. Spaatz sent him home; arrived in Bangor, Maine)

B I called Gen Arnold on the phone from there and asked him for instructions. He said:"Go to Randolph, and report to Jerry Brant." I did. When I got to Randolph, Brant said: "I'm glad to see you." I said: "How did you know I was coming?" He said:"Hap called and said you were coming down."

(Told of Brant's retirement and replacement by Walter Kraus)

I said: "Jerry, I cant be here with Walter Kraus."

He said: "Why not?"

I said: "I was Walter Kraus' boss one time and I dont agree with his policies."

He said:"We can get that changed."

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Q When was this?

B This was November or December 1943. Arnold came in for Brant's retirement. Brant told him I did not want to be assigned to Randolph, and Arnold said: "Tell him to go to Boca Raton and relieve Skippy Harbold as commandant of the Radar School. So I left the next day for Boca Raton. Skippy was quite shocked to know that he had been relieved. I told him 'd had nothing to do with it. I was quite shocked to know I was to be commandant of a radar school. A hurricane hit Boca Raton that fall and flattened it. Meanwhile Gen Barton Yount told me to report to his HQ and he would give me an assignment. I reported to him at Randolph. He told me to report to Sheppard Air Base at Wichita Falls, and I spent the next year there. Then Gen Yount ordered me to report to the 20th Wing HQ at Ellington Air Base.

(Told of convening all overseas base commanders at Ellington which was closed to outsiders. A Secret conference)

General Marshall called me directly and said: "I requested that you be placed in charge of this reception because you know practically all the officers who will be coming there." And he said:"I like the way you operate." He gave me the names of all the officers who were coming: Lawton Collins, Simpson, etc. Many of them I'd been classmates with at the General Staff School.

(Told of the crowded facilities on base. Hoyt Vandenberg and Ira Eaker there. Complained of being confined to the post. Beam exulted: "This is the first time I've ever given orders to you birds.")

Q Why the secrecy?

B They didnt want their presence in the States known. The next day, Gen Marshall called to put them into planes for transportation to Washington. That night there was a tornado and the field was under one foot of water. I called Gen Marshall. He asked me to see if we could charter a special train. "They have got to be in Washington," he said.

(Beam told of talking to Marshall pefsonally. They finally flew out the generals the next day)

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the Air Force Academy. The first class at the Academy was trained at Lowry. Gen Hubert Harmon came by many times to consult with me.

Mr. Symington, Secretary at the time, came out many times to visit the Academy site. (Told also of setting up the Comptroller School at Lowry AFB by contacting I.B.M. and Mr. Tom Watson)

Q Do you feel that, based on your experience with Gen Arnold, that he was a man who bore grudges?

B Gen Arnold was the most vindictive individual I've ever seen. I dont think he ever said: "I'm sorry", or "I've made a mistake", in his life - not to my knowledge.

Q Did he act vindictively towards others as well as towards you?

B I can name hundreds.

Q Name one or two?

B I'll name one or two things that he did to show you how he would never say, "That's a mistake I made", or "I'm sorry." There were twin brothers who became General Officers. I wont call their names, because both were friends and very fine officers. But he told Miss Adkins to have one of them who was a Colonel promoted to Brig General and report to him without delay for assignment. Miss Adkins told the Chief of Personnel to deliver the message. The officer reported to Gen Arnold who said: "What are you doing here?"

He said: "I thank you for my star."

"Hell, I didnt mean you. I meant your brother."

So he promptly let him stay a General and made his brother a General officer. That is the truth, God, so help me.

(Later identified as Ben and Barney Giles)

Another time he made a mistake when Gen Andrews was in Command of Panama. He sent a Brig General home for inefficiency. This officer arrived in Washington and reported to Gen Arnold for assignment. Gen Arnold said:

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"What are you doing here?" He said: "Gen Andrews sent me up here for assignment," He didnt tell him that Gen Andrews had recommended that he be reduced to his permanent grade of Colonel. Gen Arnold a few months later made him a Major General. I dont want to tell you his name either. He's retired and still living. That's the truth. He (Arnold) never apologized to Andrews or anybody else.

Q Was that Tom Darcy?

B Yes, how did you know?

Q I interviewed him in Florida.

B Incidentally, at the Anfa (Casablanca) Conference, Gen Andrews and I reminisced quite a bit, because I served with him. He was one of the first General Officers we ever had. Andrews asked me if I'd like to come to London. I told him I couldnt very well ask to be relieved because I didnt know what my next assignment would be after Anfa. He said: "If you change your mind, just let me know. I'd like to have you on my planning staff and it is a big deal."

I said: "Thank you very much, Andy. I certainly hope I can get free."

Of course Gen Andrews was on his way back shortly after that and was killed in Iceland. We lost one of the finest officers we ever had.

Q Back to 1938 and the planners conference at Chanute and Lester Maitland.

B He was going out from Operations and I was going from Plans to represent the Chief's office at this Conference. Bill McChord was in command at Chanute. Brett was coming down to represent Materiel Command. Gen Westover called me in and said: "I want you to tell Maitland and McChord that if there is any drinking"- the two of them liked to drink together - "if either of them gets tight out there, I'm going to court-martial them. I'm going to put you under oath as to whether you saw them drunk." He said: "Ive got to know. You are going out representing me."

When I got out there, I told McChord and Maitland: "If you get tight, I'm under orders from the Chief to report on your sobriety."

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Q (Told of Maitland's problem and his relief after Arnold visited ETO in 1943. Then he joined ministry. Interviewed in 1974 at Red Bluff, Calif)

Q Back to Darcy. He liked Andrews very much. Do you say Andrews felt Darcy wasnt cutting it?

B He wasnt. Later I was Commanding General and relieved a two star General in Panama. From Andrews up there hdd never been anything less than a Major General in the job. The one who relieved me was a Brig. General.

Q Let's go back to 1941. Arnold and Marshall went to Hawaii for an inspection, you say. You worked up a plan. You were in Plans under Tony Frank?

B I was A-3.

Q When did Fred Martin come out to Hawaii?

B They came out in March 1941. He became Hawaiian Air Force commander with Bill Farthing. The new HQ took one from 18th Wing. The old group was sent hime. The new commander moved down to Fort Shafter. No longer stayed at Hickam.

Q You say you had a plan that Kuter made a copy of?

B Not Kuter. Bob Candee, he was A-2. I gave a briefing. They had lights and charts. Then when Kuter asked if he could take these things, and Bob Candee said "I made movies of it." Kuter said: "I'll make copies of the thing." He gave it to Larry Kuter.

Q Arnold did not think much of this plan?

B Arnold thought the whole thing was phoney. We had been talking to Washington almost daily of all these sightings. You could take off on any moonlit night and fly out 50 or 75 miles , or closer than that, and there would be Jap submarines all over the place.

Q When did you leave Hawaii?

B I arrived in the middle of June. I dont know the exact date

Q (Told of the Farther, Rose, Coddington War Plan) Did you have anything

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to do with that plan? It was produced in July 1941, as I recall.

B Coddington served under me. Bill Farthing commanded the other group. I commanded the 5th Bomb Group

Q Wasnt Farthing the Plans Officer for Gen Martin?

B Yes, he was.

Q Did their plan follow your plan? Was it a larger plan or a different plan?

B We didnt make any plan. We just got an estimate of the situation to show what the possibilities were and why we needed additional planes.

Q Was that plan based on your idea in any respect, or was it a different plan?

B We did not draw up the requirements. John B. Cary stated in Plans all during the war. He was my Assistant A-3. Cary was working on a plan when I left there for requirements. He lives in Hawaii. He retired as Lieut General. John Cary was working on requirements. Normally, the reason that Bob Candee was ordered to take all these pictures. Actually an estimate of the situation is supposed to be under A-2. Bob said he didnt want to make the damned thing.

Q Tony Frank and Hap Arnold didnt get along?

B Frank had no confidence in Arnold. He was senior to Hap.

Q No, he wasnt senior to Hap. Arnold graduated in 1907. Frank was a year or two behind

B You're right. Shepler Fitzgerald was senior to Tony Frank. He always held it against Arnold because he didnt get to be a General. He was later broken on resupply of planes via Ascension Island. He was sent home because he was buying up rugs and furniture and sending them back to the U.S. by the plane-load. (Beam told of Shep Fitzgerald in North Africa borrowing his official B-25. He promised to return it in one day; kept it 9 days. It was filthy when returned. He said FitzGerald was loading the plane and selling merchandise, and he got caught)

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Q (Asked about Sue Clagett)

B We had an apt at Shoreham before the war. When Hap came to Washington we decided we should have a party for him in the Blue Room. We invited duty people - Scanlon, Kilmer, Bill McChord.

Q What happened at the party?

B (Told of seating arrangements, alternating Gen and Mrs. Arnold and Col and Mrs. Beam) They served win and I stood up."I want to drink a toast to the new Chief of Air Corps." Everybody stood up. Hap didnt stand up. That was alright. But he didnt pick up his glass either, and Doris said - Let me go back - When Hap and I were Lieut Colonels at the same time and temporary Colonels at the same time. I started in 1916. He called me "Jack" and I called him "Hap." My wife said: "Well, arent you going to drink a toast to yourself?"

Hap said: "I dont drink."

Doris said: "Dont tell me you're one of those teetotalers?"

There was a complete silence at the table, and he said: "I dont wish to be embarrassed," and his face turned bright red. It kind of put a damper on the party. This was when he first came in. Incidentally, the Westovers and ourselves - the former Chiefs - had been very friendly. It was a shock in what appeared to be hostility. This was shortly after he got there. The next day, Miss Adkins called. She said Gen Arnold wanted to see me. I went up. He said:"One thing I want to tell you. Wives are not supposed to embarrass Commanding Officers." I said: "Very sorry, Gen Arnold, my wife certainly didnt mean to embarrass you. She jokes with people."

He said: "I dont like jokes, especially if they're played on me."

That was the end of that conversation. But it shows you the kind of individual he was.

Q Let me give you some background (Discussion of the report that Arnold was a heavy drinker and the delay in his appointment by Pres. Roosevelt) Do

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you recal Arnold drinking out in Hawaii?

B I never did see Arnold take a drink.

Q (Told of the rumors in Washington) With that background, maybe Arnold wanted to show the group at this party that you had assembled at the Shoreham that the rumors were untrue. Perhaps the fact that your wife made a joking remark about him, no offense intended, which he took in a very personal way? Could this be related?

B Very well, I didnt know that story. I never did see him drink or be under the influence. But he was the most vindictive man I've ever seen. When you work in Plans you deal directly with the Chief. You dont deal with anybody inbetween, because you are working on his plans or plans you developed for him. Our plans also had to be approved by the Army.

Q Was Arnold an idea man, or did he take ideas that others developed?

B Gen Arnold was a clique man. He surrounded himself with a clique. Did you ever read Larry Kuter's article that was published on Gen Arnold. He said he was put down there by Gen Marshall. Gen Marshall didnt fully trust Arnold so he wanted somebody he could trust in there to know what definitely was going on.* I dont say that Hap evaded the truth. Kuter wrote this article himself. He stated in there that Gen Marshall put him down there and told Gen Arnold: "I'm giving you a Chief of Staff that knows what it's all about."

* See Kuter's comment on p.15

Q Arnold had high regard for Kuter, a great idea man.

B Kuter was a smart hombre.

Q Do you think he was reporting on Arnold to Marshall?

B I thik he would have definitely told Gen Marshall that anything was wrong. I do believe that. However, from relations between the two I would say that Kuter did not report anything was so serious.

Q Do you think that your relations with Arnold were affected by the closeness of your relations to Frank Lahm?

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B Very possible.

Q Did you ever hear Arnold talk about Lahm?

B Never heard him mention Lahm.

Q Did you ever hear Lahm talk about Arnold?

B Yes, I've heard him say several things - Negative ones, yes: "I dont approve of the way he does things," said Lahm.

Q You think Lahm regarded Arnold as being to liberal or forward in the drive for unification, a separate air force?

B Yes, he stated two or three times he thought Gen Mitchell and Gen Arnold were too far out. I heard Gen Lahm say the Army and Navy talked about our limitations.

Q Several people have told me Arnold surrounded himself with guys that worked for him before?

B Nothing but "Yes, men," and that's why he changed the Plans Division. In one year he changed every member of it, including the Chief,because we were not [redacted] "Yes, men." We didnt agree.

Q Were you Chief of Plans then?

B No. Rush B. Lincoln was.

Q Arnold brought Harold George in there?

B Yes.

Q Then Hansell and Ken Walker?

B Ken was a radical. He served under me in the Philippines. I commanded the 28th BombSquadron in Manila.

Q Do you know anything more about Ken Walker? I'm helping a fellow who works with me. He's doing a book on Medal of Honor winners. Tell me about Walker?

B Sure, he served in my outfit. He was an energetic, oversexed individual. He was brilliant. He ad many good thoughts. His many plans on attacking and bombing. He was my A-3 in the 28th BombSquadron, 20th Group. From 1922-25. He was happily married and had a lovely wife, but he was always getting himself mixed up

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with other women. He was always getting himself in trouble. I used to tell him: "What the hell's the matter with you? You have a lovely wife." But he couldnt resist other women. That was his trouble. I had him in Hawaii. Later, I recommended him to George Kenney and George was present at the Air Corps Tactical School. I sent 2 officers to George up there.

Q When did you have Ken Walker in Hawaii?

B About 1939-40. Ken was my A-3 in the 5th Bomb Group and Walter Agee, Rosie O'Donnel and Bob Travis were there. So was Arnol Luehman.

Q I knew Luehman as head of AF PIO.

B John Cary.

Q I'm going to talk to him when I get back. But I want to get back to what you said about Arnold and his cluque.

B He had a c lique wherever he went. He pulled those people. Harold George was very vocal. He had been Secretary to some congressman on the Military Affairs Committee before he came into the Air Corps. He had a lot of political pull. That's why Hap had him. He got to be quite a guy. Look at the guys who wore the stars and check their backgrounds.

Q A lot of them came up from March Field?

B Right. Mostly, March Field. Take the fairhaired boy who married a wealthy girl and became a Lieut General - Pete Quesada. I had Pete as a 2nd Lieutenant. He's very handsome, attractive, athletic young man. He came down to Cuba as Aide to Ambassador Guggenheim when I had the mission down there. I did him a lot of good. The divorced daughter of Guggenheim liked him. She took Pete out to the Casino, gambled and drank champagne with him. The poor guy was only a Lieutenant.

(Beam told of complaining to Ambassador Guggenheim his daughter was corrupting Pete Quesada. Finally, the Ambassador took some action to break it up)

Q Did Arnold do things for Pete Quesada?

B Arnold thought Pete was a whirl. He kept him in Washington, or at Bolling Field. (Beam told the story of Quesada showing up in North Africa

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as a three-star General. Doubt this story - Beam says Pete Quesada was assigned air defense of Northern Coast of North Africa.

Q (Mentioned previous comment that Arnold preferred a weak No. 2 man - Stratemeyer and Giles)

B That's right. He had people like Tom Hanley as A-4. All the people he put in jobs were "Yes, people."

Q How about Fred Dean?

B Yes. My aide came to me complaining about shortage of .50 cal ammunition. I said we couldnt go into the invasion without it. He said Hanley says we cant have it. I went over to see Tom. We had difficulty talking about North Africa. It was "Top Secret." We had 2 guys talking about it in the Mayflower Hotel and FBI guys stepped out and put them inthe clink until after we sailed.

Back to Tom Hanley. I said I'd better see Gen Arnold. I said: "General, I'm having a little problem. We're loading from Boston to South Carolina, as you know." I was having my ships package-loaded. I was Commander of the 5th Air Support Command. He said: "What's package loading." I said: "Package loading is when one ship goes down, I wont lose everything of one thing like ammunition." He said:"Are you going to put ammunition on those ships that are carrying other thing?" I said: "Yes, sir."

He said: "That's unusual."

I said: "I cant get any .50 cal ammunition. Gen Hanley saiys I cant have any."

He said: "Did he tell you why?"

I said: "Yes, he said he needed it in training back here for combat over in Europe."

He said:"That's it."

I said:"Gen Arnold, you dont mean that?" I had four Navy carriers

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under my command, top loaded with my planes. They couldnt even use the elevators. They couldnt do a damned thing until my boys took off. They'd never seen a carrier before. That's the position I was in. I said: "You surely dont mean. . .?"

He said: "You'll get some from other sources."

I said:"From whom?"

He said:"I dont know. Tell Hanley."

I said: "I've told him."

So I went back and told my A-4 to go back and discuss this with Col Hanley again. George King. He went back and very unfortunately in discussing with Hanley the invasion of North Africa, he said, "We've got to have this." He told Hanley about the four carriers and Tom went up and talked to General. They arrested my A-4 for mentioning triple Top Secret stuff to anybody else. It just burned the hell out of me. I went down to see George Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff. I said: "George, this is absolutely assinine." I said: "I can get this ammunition and I'm going to get it. But I hate to go over Hap's head."

He said: "Jack, I cant do a damned thing. If Hap says "No,", I have to say, "No."

I went up to see George Patton: "General, I'm stumped." He says: "What's the problem?" I said: "I dont have .50 cal ammunition" He said: "What?"

I said, the only thing they will have when they go aboard that carrier will be their belts loaded on those planes. And that's it."

He said: "That's assinine."

I said: "I cant do a thing about it. I've been to Arnold's A-4."

Q I cant understand. Why wouldnt Arnold give you ammunition?

B He thought that was enough. The ammunition we had in the planes.

Q That's really hard to believe or understand.

B I know it's hard to understand. Anyhow, the White House overruled Arnold.

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George King, my A-4, missed going over on the boat. He came with the 97th Group from Langley. They were leaving on D+6, if we captured Gazes airport. That became the entrance point. We lated fixed the field at Marrakech for resupply. We got the ammunition but George King got put in the clink. He has just passed away. He lived in Washington.

Q Some have told me the men who came up under Andrews - Tony Frank, Hugh Knerr, Walter Weaver and other did not get as good jobs as those who came up under Arnold.

B That's right. Knerr was originally Navy, graduated from Naval Academy. Then he got transferred to Army Artillery, then got detailed to Aviation. Hugh Knerr was a brilliant officer

Q He was close to Andrews?

B Yes, he was. He was Chief of Staff, GHQ Air Force, at Langley. I knew that whole gang. Conger Pratt. This outfit came in. George King got somebody to fly him down to Langley in time to bum a ride with the 97th. Came in to North Africa by way of Brazil. When he reported, I asked him, "Where the hell have you been?" He told me the story of what they did to him. That's the kind of stuff they pulled.

Q Howa rd Davidson, one Exec to Westover, was telling me that Westover had this t endency to want to read all the correspondence that came in. He could not delegate. Arnold was then Asst Chief. Davidson was Westover's Exec. Westover spent a lot of time reading routing correspondence. He wasnt able to grasp larger concepts and did not know how to delegate. Is this an accurate description?

B I would say "Davey" was a slow thinker., no question of that. He married lots of money. I knew the whole family. The old lady was quite a character. (END)

* Ref page 10 comment, interviewed Gen Kuter in Naples, Fla, three days later, on Sunday, Feb 1, 1976. Kuter denied completely the idea that Gen Marshall assigned him to the Air Staff to keep an eye on Arnold. Kuter also made derogatory comment about Beam, indicating he regarded him as untrustworthy.

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Beebe, Eugene 1 Oct 69

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INTERVIEW WITH BRIG.GEN. EUGENE H. BEEBE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
OCTOBER 1, 1969

Q: Tell us about that bird shooting expedition with Donald Douglas and General Arnold, and you went along. There is a story I think, in that.

B: That's the last time I've been hunting.

Q: Donald Douglas tells a story about apparently some caretaker heard on the radio about Pearl Harbor.

B: That was Donald Douglas' father.

Q: Oh his father. I don't think he quite realized how important it was?

B: Oh I think the old man did. He was running to meet us. He sure had been running. Pretty hot that day. We had left Washington two or three days before December 7th, and were headed for Hamilton Field and eventually to start the B-17s out on their way to the Philippines. Take off was to take place the night of December 6th. On the way out we stopped by Knoxville, as I recall, and had gone through the aluminum plant there, because aluminum was in short supply. I think General Arnold had to know something personally about its availability in his testimony before Congress. Then we worked our way on out to Hamilton Field, and was there the night of the 6th and got the planes started and on their way to Hawaii. Early on the morning of the 7th we took off for Bakersfield for a little outing. Our party consisted of Donald Douglas and his father, and our Air Corps representative here, I believe his name was Bradshaw. He became a Major General later on. We went out in the country to hunt. I don't remember

whether we hunted quail or dove. I believe it was quail. Anyhow, we had been out in the morning and I had gotten my limit right away. As for the rest of them, I was birddogging for them. So we had a little lunch and went back for the afternoon shoot. There were still a few birds to be taken. On our way back from that, about a half a mile before we got to the cabin where we started from and left our uniforms. Donald Douglas' father came running waving some paper in the air. He had made some notes of this broadcast of the Pearl Harbor situation, and very little was said by anyone. I know we took off our hunting clothes, put on our uniforms, and had the car waiting and dashed right back to the Bakersfield airport, took off immediately from there and went to March Field. And the old man said: "Get ready for a long flight." He said: "I'm going from here to San Francisco to see the General up there." And then he said: "We'll have to get to Washington as fast as we can." So he said: "You'd better get some help." So I asked the commander at March Field to assign me a pilot which he did. After some telephone calls, we took off for San Francisco and on the way out through Tehatchapee Pass, I asked this boy they put in to help me fly this airplane, how much experience he had on DC-3s. He said: "I haven't ever been in one before." So it turned out he was a fighter pilot and I said: "Well, do you know how to use the radio," and he said: "Yes, I can do that." So I said: "You're the radio operator." That's the way we went, and we stopped in San Francisco from perhaps 9 o'clock at night until about midnight. General Arnold went downtown and conferred with the General down there. His name doesn't come to

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mind. And then General Arnold came back out to the field. In the meantime, we had gotten all ready, gassed up. We got some groceries aboard, and we took off for Washington. It was one of those times of year when the whole country was overcast. We saw the ground twice between San Francisco and Washington. Once at Salt Lake, we let down and picked up gas. Next time was at Omaha. We went to just about as high as a DC-3 could go to get through Ohio over the Wright Field area. Had to let down in Washington. We got into Washington about 3 PM the next day. General Arnold grabbed the car and took off for the Munitions Building. I went home, I suppose it was about 5 PM when I got home - we lived at Bolling. They gave me some dinner, and I fell asleep at the dinner table. Later we calculated and I'd been 36 hours flying home from San Francisco.

Q: Tough way to fly.

B: Well, that wasn't unusual. That was a little longer than we had ever kept at it before. But it wasn't unusual to fly 24 hours with General Arnold. He liked to get away from Washington, and get away fast. He wanted to go out to places where activity was going on, operational things, and stuff like that.

Q: Do you recall this other thing, Farthing-Rose-Coddington report?

B: Well, not under that title, I recall that there were jillions of reports made from Hawaii to the Staff.... I know they sent General McNarney over to Hawaii to investigate the situation. I don't recall too much about that particular phase, other than I know we started the B-17s from Hamilton that night

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and they all arrived in Hawaii at a most unsatisfactory time. People used to talk, why couldn't they have shot their way out of this trouble? Well, that was about maximum range for B-17s and they weren't carrying any extra weight at all.

Q: They didn't even have guns, did they?

B: Oh, I imagine the guns were on the plane. Yes, but I don't imagine there was any ammunition. The guns might not even have been installed in the turrets because they were loaded for a special trip.

Q: You continued with Arnold on through that Spring of 1942?

B: Yes, till June 1942....

Q: Drew Pearson never had anything good to say about Arnold, and he would always say something bad whenever he could. And we have never been able to track down any specific incident that led to friction. Do you remember anything that might have caused that attitude?

B: Nothing specific, but Drew Pearson used to come to our office quite often. I think it was on his schedule for at least once a month, maybe more often. And I had a chair by my desk which was right by the side of the door that went into General Arnold's office. This was in the old Munitions Building. Drew Pearson would always plunk himself in that chair, waiting until his appointment time would come up, or when General Arnold would call for him. So we had a system of notifying the General that Mr. Pearson was aboard. Then I always think that General Arnold took great pleasure in baiting him, because he would start calling for people and get them in there and dress them up one side and

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and down the other, and issue a bunch of orders and stuff like this. Somebody would rush in with a big paper and hand it to me, and say: "Take this in immediately!" So, I'd rush in with it and Pearson's ears would just flutter. So then, he would go in and talk to Gen Arnold and they would have a discussion on whatever Pearson wanted to know about. He probably didn't learn anything. This went on for a long time; I don't know how many times. But it got to be a regular ritual and this was the only fellow that we ever pulled this deal on. And I don't know whether General Arnold knew we were doing it, and was contributing, or whether he just had a little deal of his own going on. We never discussed it. But folks in the outer office all knew it, and they were all scared to as soon as Pearson would stick his head in the door. It never bothered me; I didn't care, because I knew he wouldn't learn anything around there - if the General knew he was there. So this probably accounted for some of his cantankerousness. Plus the fact that that was just what he was. He was a scavenger for trouble, and I guess our shop was a good place to find it - I know we had lot of it - not of our own making, but stuff we couldn't help but have. So that may be part of that. Unfortunately, the parties, I guess, are all dead now. Miss Adkins is dead, the General is dead, Pearson is dead. So there is not much support for my statement other than a vivid memory. But I have never forgotten it.

Q: When you left.

B: In June - actually early July 1942.

Q: Arnold seemed to be very good about rotating his staff.

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He realized that most of these people did want to go to war, and he seemed to be very understanding about it. Did you find that so?

B: Oh yes, he used to tell me about the disappointments he had in WW I when they held him in Washington. He said that he wasn't going to do that to anyone. So I just waited, and eventually, he said: "Well, you can go now if you want to."

Q: Is that when Peterson came along?

B: Yes. He gave me enough warning when he said: "Find me somebody to take the flying part of your job." So we had Peterson take that over.

Mrs. B: One of the most beautiful letters I ever read was the one that General Arnold wrote to me after that. After he let him go into the field and I can remember one thing he said: "...I feel like I'm losing my right arm."

B: Fortunately, he had two, so it didn't make any difference.

Mrs. B: Well I never saw such devotion like he had to Gene.

Q: Well, he seemed to inspire devotion himself.

Mrs. B: Well, not in everybody. Now, I should keep quite, but I remember the only man who wasn't afraid of General Arnold. Don't put that in the book. He isn't afraid of anybody.

Q: I could put it in without attribution.

B: Well, I think if you had a clear conscience - people that had clear consciences were never afraid of General Arnold. But unfortunately, there weren't too many who didn't have some problem, and this had to effect their relationship.

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Q: Gen Cabell told us about a letter that either he couldn't remember whether he looked after this, or Larry Norstad, and it was for General Arnold's signature. Somewhere in it was a paragraph that started out: "I'm afraid that we can't do such and such." And Arnold sent it right back, and he said, "I don't want to sign any letter that says we can't do something; I don't want to sign any letters that say'I'm afraid.'"

B: That would be typical, all right.

Q: Was there anybody that General Arnold was leery about?

B: In what respect do you mean - loyalty?

Q: No, no, I'm thinking about more, was there anybody he was afraid of?

B: General Arnold?

Q: Yes, like FDR?

B: Oh, I think, yes, I think he was very leery of President Roosevelt, and I think that President Roosevelt didn't know exactly how to evaluate General Arnold. I distinctly remember one day he came back from a conference at the White House and he said: "Come on in here, I want to tell you something." He said: "Say, I'm in." I said: "What do you mean and he said: "The President just called me 'Hap'." That was the day, I guess he was accepted, and was made one of the team. But up to that time, I know, that they didn't know whether he was the man or not to head the Air Force.

Q: There was a story in the old Army-Navy Journal, about that time, I guess, apparently, somebody had put the bug in FDR's ear, that Arnold was a drinker. And that this was, we were wondering if this was one of the reasons, you know the appointment

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as Chief of the Air Corps was kind of delayed. It seemed to string out for a long time.

B: Oh, I didn't know that. I wasn't there, then.

Q: Apparently somebody was spreading the rumor that he had a drinking problem. We couldn't find any evidence of any kind of a problem any where else, you know, in the correspondence or interviews.

B: General Arnold was very careful about liquor because I think he had a little stomach problem of some kind as far as I recall. He never drank, Period! You might have seen him with a glass in his hand, but I doubt if he drank any of it.

Q: You'd never find any evidence of his not being in control of himself in any situation?

B: I don't recall ever seeing him out of control of himself, in any way, shape or form. He seemed to be pretty stable, a lot more stable than many people around him, I know that.

Q: Well, then, you came back when he had his heart attack in 1945?

B: Well, I returned from overseas in the fall of 1944, and was assigned to a special job in the Pentagon at that time, in the AAF HQs. I was sent over to General MacArthur's Hqs., to make arrangements to build fields for the 20th AF B-29s and then was put on a special committee of two, Rueben Hood was the other fellow, and we were supposed to sit there and think about problems that were coming up eventually, that needed to be solved, and I guess mostly we just thought. I'm afraid we didn't do very well at it. But sometime there in early January or February (1945) the

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Dr. came in - Dave Grant - and said that Gen Arnold was over in his quarters, and Mrs. Arnold was in California. Grant thought that he needed somebody over there. The only times I saw General Arnold, then, were at the morning conferences and I had no business in his office. So, they asked me if I would go over and call him and I did. I went over and he invited me in, and he was in a bathrobe. I asked him how he felt. He said he felt all right, but he thought that he probably had an episode (heart attack) of some kind, and I don't think it was the first one. I think he had problems while I was overseas. He hadn't had any after the time I went overseas, that I know about. I think there were some during that period. And so I asked him if he had competent medical help. He had the post doctor at Ft. Myer, one of the doctors there, and the young doctor. So I asked him if he would consent to going to one of our Air Force hospitals and being checked up, to find out what was going on, because we couldn't run business downtown with him over at Ft Myer very well. He said: "All right. You make the arrangements." So I went right to the phone and called Gen Grant, and he said: "Ok, we'd like to take him to Coral Gables. So Miss Adkins set everything up with Peterson, and there followed a rigamorale they had to go through, and we went right down to Coral Gables.

Q: You went with him?

B: Oh yes. At that time, my job was to organize the Continental Air Command, which Bill Streett was to take command of eventually, but he was still out of the country. We had a headquarters set up. Our plan was to go in and occupy Andrews Field, I don't think it was called Andrews Field.

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Q: Camp Springs?

B: Yes. That's where we wet up our headquarters. I went out and inspected the place 2 or 3 times. So I ran that from headquarters in Coral Gables until General Streett got there. I went right down there with General Arnold and they put him through all the works. And every test he took, I had to take, just to keep him company. He received dispatches and all from Washington every day. Finally they decided what he needed - that he had some trouble, and he would have to be in bed for the usual time. During that period, nobody of an official nature saw him but myself. And I had talked to Ira Eaker and we did things by telephone, that is, here it was absolutely necessary that they have his word on something. So that's the way it ran for a while. And finally, he got back on his feet and we made that trip to Europe.

Q: During the time, apparently Mrs. Arnold had kind of a feud with the doctor that was taking care of General Arnold. Do you remember about that? She talked to us some about it?

B: Yes, there was a problem. They wouldn't let anybody in to see him. And I don't know whether this was confusion, or something, but I know there was some problem there. I stayed away from it completely, because I never in all my service was ever involved in any of their home activities, or any of their official social activities with one or two exceptions, and while I could go in and out of their home, it was more as a friend, than any official deal. Anyway, I know that Mrs. Arnold came down and occupied the room that I had been occupying, right adjacent to General Arnold, but only stayed for a very short time and there was some problem.

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Q: Well, apparently, the doctor - I'm reading between the lines a little bit - she said the Doctor just wouldn't let her see General Arnold, and the impression one gets is that she excited him.

B: Well, that could be her impression of it, because it was very vital that he have nothing to disturb him.

Q: And I think she was convinced that she wasn't disturbing him, that the doctor was exaggerating.

B: I'm sure she would have, anybody's wife is likely to feel that way.

Q: She got real hot under the collar at the doctor; I've forgotten his name....

B: Well, the commander of the hospital was named Chennault, but the doctor taking care of General Arnold was Marquardt. He was a heart expert from Chicago and was a Colonel. He was in charge of medicine at this hospital.

Q: Yes, he was the one that Mrs. Arnold was mad at.

B: He was a cool type.

Q: We have correspondence of Marquardt's widow.

B: Oh, is Marquardt dead? I didn't know that.

Q: Yes, maybe for three or four years. Because we wanted to talk to him, too. And his widow just didn't have much in the way of letters, or anything important.

B: Well, I doubt if there would be any record of this, which would have been a personality problem. I do know that General Arnold got the best of care in the hospital, because I was with him, you might say, all of the time, with the exception of two or three trips where he sent me back to Washington to

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personally do something for him like call on General Marshall and advise him on what the situation was. Things like that.

Q: Did you get the impression at anytime that he thought he was just going to have to quit?

B: Well, I think that the terrible shock of knowing that he'd had something serious was for a few days pretty upsetting to him. But as soon as he overcame that and started to thinking about it, I believe he no longer was worried that he wouldn't eventually get back in the saddle, providing they would just let him alone. And that was mostly, he was afraid, I believe, that General Marshall might become impatient and figure that he had to have an in-resident there in command. But he didn't need to fear that, because General Marshall would have rather had him I'm sure, as Air Commander, sick in the hospital than anybody else who was available. At least that was my impression after talking to General Marshall about it.

Q: Then you went to Europe with him - a sort of recuperation trip in a way wasn't it?

B: No, the purpose of the trip was very serious. The Air people knew that the war was over for all practical purposes, so far as Air was concerned in Europe. And that was what I was getting ready to do with this Continental Air Command, to receive the squadrons and groups from Europe, recondition them, and put them on leave, re-equip and dispatch them to the Pacific. That's what Bill Streett's new job was going to be. So we went to Europe to find out when we could start peeling these units out of Europe. We found out as soon as we got there, that the time

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was present. And so, I believe, they made arrangements to start an orderly movement of squadrons and combat crews, and all types of categories out of Europe and back into the United States and then into the Pacific. While he was over there, that was his primary purpose in making this trip. I think he accomplished everything he went over there to do, except to personally go to England and call on the British Chiefs of Staff. But it became apparent that he couldn't work that in, and I oppose the doctors thought maybe it was a little too strenous. He sent me over and I went around and called on them for him. Jimmy Doolittle was the 8th AF Commander at that time and he arranged all this very nicely, and I imagine it took maybe an hour to do my job. Fortunately, I knew all of these people from Washington days, like Portal.

Q: Did you stay with him then til he retired?

B: No, I stayed with him until he went back to Washington to duty, and then, in course of all this examining around in the hospital and all, the doctors had found out that I could retire if I wished. So General Arnold, the night before he was ready to go back to Washington - I had fixed up the transportation. General Arnold said: "I don't know what I'm going to do with you." He said: "Do you want to go back to Washington with me and then come down here to retire?" He said: "Or do you want to stay here and retire?"

Q: Where was this?

B: At Coral Gables, at the hospital. And I never discussed this matter with him before, and I didn't even know he knew anything

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about it. And I said: "Well do you think I should retire?" And he said: "Yes, I think you should." So I said: "Well, I'll go back to Washington with you, then I'll come back," which I did. I wanted to be sure that somebody didn't pull shenanigan on him when he got back, and start running him up and down stairs and things, which he wasn't supposed to do. Meantime, Mrs. Arnold had had a downstairs bedroom fixed up in the quarters at Ft. Myer. People were pretty well briefed on the way he should be handled. So then I flew, got my own plane, flew back here. I borrowed one of General Arnold's and flew back to the hospital in due course. On the way down to Florida, we had a forced landing in Richmond, Va. We went in on one engine and had to order a new plane down. For awhile I thought maybe I had made one flight too often. So they retired me. I went back to Washington on my way home (to California) and General and Mrs. Arnold entertained me real nice, at Ft. Myer. The kids were all there, Lois and her husband. That's the last time I have seen any of them, with the exception of General Arnold. We went up to March Field one time after he'd retired and made a little thing for him, and I saw him up there.

Q: You haven't seen Mrs. Arnold in all this time?

B: No, nor any of the kids.

Q: Well, I'll have to be sure that Dave gets in touch with you.

B: Yes, I'd love to see him.

Q: I think Bruce gets out here (to California) once in a while. He waltzes Congressmen around, you know, here and there. He's very good at it.

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B: We had some pretty good experts on that liaison thing. There were two brothers; they were from Alabama. I think they are both dead now.

Q: Was one of them, not Persons? One called "Slick."

B: Yes, Slick, and his brother was named Willy. I didn't know Willy, but Slick was liaison man. He was in our office more than anybody.

Q: He later worked for Eisenhower, when Eisenhower was President.

B: Well, of course, Eisenhower certainly knew that he was a good man for the job.

Q: Did you know Emmett McCabe?

B: Yes, real well. He was John Costello's man, as I recall it, in Washington, when Costello was Congressman there. I used to take John Costello on many trips. Whenever we came to California, we always invited McCabe to come along. During the war, he worked for General Arnold in some capacity. I think he was at the hospital with us part of the time.

Q: He's out here, just outside of San Diego.

B: I have never seen anybody talk about Gen Craig's position with regard to the Air Corps. Now, everbody says Gen Craig didn't care about Air. Well, he did, really. He knew that that was a coming thing, and he cared about it so much he didn't want to have his Air Commander in any trouble. I don't think it was just because he liked Arnold, it was because he needed Air, and he knew they needed it.

Q: What about General Marshall?

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B: Of course General Marshall was, I really believe the father of the Air Force. We couldn't have had it without him. I took General Marshall on losts of trips. I took him around through air installations, and in fact, he was in my airplane between Wright Field - where we had just been the night before and Denver when they announced that he was made Chief of Staff. Incidentally, that came over in a Washington Merry-Go-Round dispatch, Drew Pearson. My radio operator copied it and brought it to me. I took it back and said to General Marshall. I said: "I'd like to be the first to congratulate you on being the Chief of Staff." He said: "I didn't know they were going to announce it this soon." And so I'd always been real fond of General Marshall.

Q: He was a pretty formal guy, wasn't he, pretty stiff?

B: Well, he was when there was more than one present, I know. He never was that way with me. He was always friendly when we were flying across country. I liked to let the copilot run the plane. I'd go back and talk to him if he wanted me to, and he asked all kinds of questions about air, this was even before he was Chief. After he became Chief, we couldn't get away so much anymore. But he'd ask all kinds of questions about maps and radio, and weather. "How do you know we are going to be able to land at Montgomery when we get there?" And we'd be over the clouds or something, you know, he was just vitally interested in air. So, on this same trip, after he became Chief, we picked up General Arnold at Denver, and it was somewhere between Denver and Sacramento. Well, I was back talking to him, and he said: "Now, that I'm Chief, I can do a lot of things I couldn't do as Assistant Chief. As soon as we get back to Washington, I want

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you to take Gen McNair and go to the Air Force station that you think is important, and have him see everything that he can, and learn all he can." General Marshall said: "I'm going to send him out to Leavenworth, and he's going to put some Air in that Command and General Staff School." We did this, and General McNair went out there, and that's the first time there was any push, at that school, I understand, to make Air an integral part of this instruction.

Q: Well, you probably were personally responsible for a lot of General Marshall's views.

B: Well, I think so. Yes, I think that General Arnold used to arrange these things so that we could do this, make these trips, and he was trying to educate him.

Q: These were occasions when General Arnold wasn't along.

B: Yes, most of them. There was an occasion when there were some Navy maneuvers off the coast here. Adm Byrd happened to be down at the South Pole at that time, and General Arnold had brought General Marshall to Sacramento. General Marshall had gone out with the Navy on some kind of, joint Army-Navy maneuvers. General Arnold then went down to March Field. I don't recall whether General Marshall had been called back to Washington or whether he was still present, but I went up and picked General Marshall up again, wherever it was. Somewhere between March Field and El Paso, he wrote out a dispatch to Admiral Stark, who was the Chief of Naval Operations. The congratulatory dispatch had to do with the maneuvers. About two days later, the buzzer on my desk went off and it was

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General Marshall, and he said: "Beebe, come down to my office right away." So the rule was that whenever he sent for anybody like that, that Bedell Smith didn't make any attempt to stop you. You just went right in, opened the door to General Marshall's office, and sat down on a chair that was just inside the door. No matter who he was talking to, when he got ready, he asked you, and he'd call you up to his desk. So I did, and he called me up, and he handed me this message from Adm Byrd, and I read it. Adm Byrd was happy to receive General Marshall's message and it went on and on about the contents of it and so forth. General Marshall said: "I didn't send Adm Byrd any message." But, he said, I just was talking to Adm Stark on the telephone and he said he never did get the message that I handed you between March Field and El Paso to send to him. He said: "I want you to find out what happened to that message, and you be here at 2 o'clock this afternoon to tell me." I said: "Yes sir." I got the hell out of there but fast. So I called up the Chief Signal Officer, who was General Maubargne, and told him the story. He says: "Oh my," by 2 PM Gen Maubargne had brought me the complete report. I took it down to General Marshall. You see, we had no communications of our own in the AAF then. So our instructions were to always give our message to the closest Army net station. My radio operator, named Mead, had given this message to El Paso and had gotten a "Roger" for it. So El Paso in getting the message to the War Dept, and we could just as well have worked the War Dept from our airplane up at 10,000 feet in the air as not, you know. El Paso sent it to St. Louis,

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from St. Louis to Pittsburgh - I don't remember the exact course - but some radio operator saw "Stark" on this, and he thought it was "Stork," so he copied it Stork. Some other radio operator saw "Stork", and he thought: "Well, Stork is not what they mean; they mean Byrd." When it got to the War Department, somebody put it in the pneutmatic tube right to the Navy, and 10 minutes later it was down to Adm Byrd. I can't imagine what would Adm Byrd have thought when he got this message. Well, he was a politician, if there ever was one, because he made a beautiful reply to him. So I took this in, and told Gen Marshall what had happened and he looked at me and said: "Well, how are we going to prevent that from happening again?" And I said: "Well, I think the most likely way to do that is to let us in the Air Corps have our own communications system." I told him: "I could just as well have had my radio operator deliver that direct to Washington, as to have to go through this round-about way." General Marshall said: "Next time you see General Arnold, you tell him to get that Air Force Communications System started."

So I paddled back, and meantime, Gen Arnold had come in from the Hill where he'd been all day. I wasn't in the office, and he had asked Miss Adkins where I was and she said I was in General Marshall's office. He said: "What's going on?" And she said: "I don't know, some kind of trouble."

So when I came back, General Arnold wanted to see me right away, and I went in and he wanted to know what it was about, and I told him, and well, he said, get one (probably "McClelland") one of the Signal Officers, on the phone and tell him to get going.

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Now they have a whole field to themselves at Scott AFB. That's the way it started.

Q: Well you played a lot of "behind-the-scenes" roles?

B: Oh yes, I suppose so.

Q: Did you continue flying Gen Marshall up to the time you left Gen Arnold?

B: The status of the airplane that Gen Arnold had used, was that it belonged to the Chief of Staff of the Army. There was no provision in the budget or any place for an airplane for the Air man, so it was jointly used by Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold. And, on any important trips, I usually took Gen Marshall. However, I had a buddy at Bolling named Louis Parker, and when I couldn't be two place at once, Louis would fly Gen Marshall. But I did a lot of flying for Gen Marshall. But they were mostly all short hops.

Q: Was this right up til the time you left for overseas?

B: Yes. Not only in the DC-3, but I remember one time, Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall just had to get away from town, and so Glenn L. Martin invited them up to the Martin plant, to shoot ducks, just for overnight. We went up there and I went along with them. We got on Glenn Martin's yacht, and we went over to his farm and we stayed right there till daylight and then we went out to the blinds, and they had a nice shoot and all. And then we had the pilot from Bolling bring up the amphibian, an OA-9, I think it was called. So that was anchored down at the dock, by the yacht. When we finished hunting, why the two generals and their guns and their ducks, and all loaded into this amphibian, and I flew back to Washington. Back in Washington by noon, the next day, and I'll

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never forget that night, traveling on this yacht, we were up on the bridge, just Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall and myself up there. You know, they always had me standing by in case of, I don't know, to be a witness I suppose, so somebody could hear them talking. Gen Marshall said: "Well, Hap, he said, "I believe from now on, things are going to be better." He says,"I think we have committed all our major mistakes." I'll never forget this.

Q: About what time was this?

B: I could give you the exact date and look it up in the flight log, but it was after Pearl Harbor. It was when they were having all that trouble over in Australia and we were being beaten back from piller to post, and Gen Brett was running from one shell hole to another I guess. (NOTE: Probably late Spring of 1942)

Q: Gen Brett didn't last too long out in the Pacific, did he?

B: Nobody did, that was there to begin with?

B: There wasn't anything wrong with the officers that were there. They had nothing to work with but their hands. Even the British officers, there was Gen Brett was with him in this retreat. Even Wasvell you know, was out. The British officer who commanded Singapore who was our Chief of Staff in the SEAsia command, under Mountbatten, never got anywhere. All of these people who had important jobs at the time of that trouble starting over there seemed to disappear into less important jobs.

Q: You mentioned a story about Gen Arnold, and something that happened at Governor's Island.

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B: For some reason or other, General Arnold wanted to go up and call on General Dru, who was the commander up in that Corps Area. It probably had to do with stations, or maybe some help in appropriations, or something. So we were in civilian clothes. We went on a ferry from the Battery over to Governor's Island - presumably this was in connection with some other affair in NY. So on the ferry going over, we were standing up approaching Governor's Island, and there was the old fort there. It was foggy and pretty dim, and he said "Up on those ports, there used to be a lot of cannon." He said: "When I was stationed there they decided one day that they didn't want those cannon there anymore. So they ordered me to take them down and store them down below somewhere." So he said: "We had to get out the old training manuals, and figure out how to move these cannons, and the old ramp they had originally moved them on was now a stairway so they had to cover it, and they got all the cannon down with no problems except one. That one got away from them and went down the ramp through the mess hall which was located at the foot of this ramp. And apparently the men were eating in there at the time this cannon came tearing through." So I listened to this with a great deal of respect and all. Eventually we docked on Governor's Island, and got in the car and drove up to Gen Drum's office which was in this old fort, I guess. And I looked up and out of these ports where cannons, so I asked General Arnold: "What are those funny looking things up there in those port holes you were telling me about?" And he looked up, and said: "My God, they moved them all back up there again." Sure enough, they had they had become

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antiques in the meantime, he had put all these cannon back up there. After that, he would tell me some story about something, and I'd say: "Yeah, I remember those cannons up there on Governor's Island." He'd give me a dirty look as if he knew I didn't believe what he was telling me. Apparently that had happened all right, and they pretty well patched up the hole in the mess hall, but I can see that it probably happened exactly like he said. I'm sure it did, because right at the foot of this stairway was still there, was the mess hall. It was still in operation; it had been plastered and fixed. I'll bet if you got in there, you'd find where it was not original construction.

B: General Arnold also told me about his going to the Philippines when he was assigned over there - brand new 2nd Lt, I guess. He was a personal escort for a whole bunch of silver money-pesos, I suppose. There was a tremendous amount of it, and it took a lot of people to move it around. He arrived in the Philippines. In those days, you got your tropical uniforms after you arrived there. In fact, somebody would meet you with a suitable uniform, and you would use it till you got yours made, which was 24 hours, I guess. But he couldn't get off the boat with everybody else. He had to sit there and wait for the people to come and move this heavy money, then he had to deliver it to the Quartermaster, Finance Office, somebody and it was way late in the afternoon. This hot sun, with this heavy wool uniform drenched him before he finally made it to the BOQ where he was going to be housed. And the officers there, I guess, played a joke on him. They knew he was coming, and he was in

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pretty messy condition. They made him take off all his clothes and they washed him off with a hose before they let him in the place. And that was his arrival in the Philippines. He told me this.

Q: Did he tell you any other stories like that about the old days?

B: Well, yeah. I don't recall any specific one, but he used to spend all night. He'd tell me stories on the trip from Washington to California, sometimes - about all kinds of things. We'd even try to do the binomial theoren in our heads, and stuff like that. $X^2 + Y^2$, and then he'd get into Euclid, or something in geometry, just to keep our minds going, ust to stay awake or we would have trouble by falling asleep.

Q: He was not a large man, was he?

B: Well, he was 6 feet at least. I think he was a big man. One time at March Field, everyone in the Air Corps had to get so much instrument time in under the hood. Gen Arnold and I would trade. He would fly under the hood for a while. And then he'd trade and be safety pilot for me, while I flew under the hood. On this particular day, we went over to Palmdale out through Cajor Pass, and he flew over and we followed the beam, and he homed in over Palmdale Airport and then he said that he had a friend who lived just a couple of miles down the road, somebody from WW I days. So he said: "Let's go down there; I want to fly by his house." So we did and just right by about 50 feet off the ground. Just across the street - we didn't know this at the time - but right across the street was a large turkey farm. Well, we did that and then we went back to the airport and

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landed. This fellow then came with his car to pick us up; that was the deal, I guess - or to say "hello" anyhow. So all of a sudden, a tremendous dust storm started coming down this road toward the old Palmdale airport, and not only did our friend arrive,but the fellow that owned the turkey farm from across the street arrived. And by then, Gen Arnold had gotten out of his flying costume. But I still unfortunately had my goggles on my head, because I'd been riding in the back seat and had to have goggles while he had been under the hood, and it hadn't bothered him too much. So this fellow came tearing in there, mad as a hornet, and he wanted to know who was the pilot of the aircraft. Well, I said, I was, and I was going to be the pilot going home. So he said I killed 18 or 24 turkeys, and he was really mad about it. He asked, what should he do; he was going to have my commission, and all kinds of things. So I said: "Well, what you've got to do is, first, let me go down and look at your turkeys to be sure they are dead. Then, I'll give you a piece of paper with my name on it, and you'll be able to send that to the Commanding Officer of March Field, and he'll see that you get paid for these turkeys." And I said: "If you want to send the Commanding Officer at March Field a nasty letter about what I did, well, you do that too, and he'll probably discipline me severely." Well, he said he was going to do that, and so we went down there, and sure enough, there were some dead turkeys. You know, turkeys are crazy, they kill each other, panic. So we stayed there about an hour, and then went on back and flew home. I flew under the hood. A couple of days later, Colonel

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Arnold called me into his office and he said: "Here's the letter from Palmdale. I'm going to have to give you some disciplinary action of some kind, or at least tell the guy I did." So I said: "Mostly, you'd better sign a voucher to pay for those turkeys." That was the last I had ever heard of that. But about 2 weeks later, he had to go back east for some reason or other, and he stopped in a field around Denver - it could have been Colorado Springs. He didn't know this, but just prior to his being in there, some service planes - I don't know, Army or Navy - had been in there, and raised a little heck around the place. The Sheriff was still waiting to catch some more aviators making trouble. Arnold said he just went in and made a normal landing and everything, here was this Sheriff arrested him the minute he stepped out of the plane. He said he had to talk his way out of it. He didn't tell him who he was, or anything. But he said to me: "You know, if I hadn't had that Palmdale experience, I wouldn't have known what to tell the guy." So he got out of that one. That was a coincidence.

B: Mr. Churchill came over here for a little vacation. This was after General Arnold and Eisenhower and Clark had been over there on their trip, and one morning, I think, it was about 9:30 or 10:00. Gen Arnold was up at a meeting in Congress, and was going to be there all day. He wouldn't be back in the office all day long. Gen Marshall called me in and said he had a confidential matter to take up with me, and said I wasn't to tell anybody about it - not even Gen Arnold. And he said: "Just a minute, I'm waiting for Clark to come." So Gen Clark came in.

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They had a Hqs., over at old Ft. Washington, I believe. General Marshall said: "The two of you have got to arrange something. Mr. Churchill is to go to Palm Beach and stay in Mr. Stettinius' house. He is there for a little vacation. Will be there a week or so." And Gen Marsahll says: "It is to be known that he's there, but the President wants him provided with adequate safeguards." General Marshall said: "We want artillery; we want plenty of infantry to cut off a certain area around there; we want airplanes on hand with bombs and with plenty of guns," he said, "to take care of any submarines, and all that." He said: "Beebe, I want you to select the commander for this expedition." He says: "Clark will furnish all the artillery and all the infantry necessary. You'll furnish the commander and the aircraft." And he said: "You'll have the commander back here in my office at 2:00 this afternoon and I'll give him a personal letter that will allow him to do whatever is necessary." So here I was, not very important around the place, and I had to arrange all this. So I called the Bolling Field GHQ boys and they sent over a fellow named Randall, I believe his name was. Now, I think he lives out there in California now. I told him what the problem was. He said they had the 3 or 4 aircraft all ready. I guess they were enroute by that time. Gen Marshall gave him a letter signed his name, giving him carte blanche to do anything. General Marshall said: "Now, when you get through with this job, you bring that letter back. So I just sent Randall away, and he was on his way to do this job, and General Arnold came in early, and he said: "What have you been up to today?

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And I said: "Oh, just the usual - not much."

He said: "Nothing special came up or anything?"

And I said: "Oh no, noting in particular,"

He said: "I've got to go see General Marshall." So he went on in to Gen Marshall's office, and was in there quite a long while. Finally, Bedell Smith came out and he says: "Gen Arnold wants you to come down to Gen Marshall's office." So I went down and sat on the seat I was supposed to, and they were still chewing the rag. And finally, the phone rang, and Gen Marshall picked it up, and it was the Secret Service calling from Palm Beach reporting that Mr. Churchill had just safely made it to the house he was going to stay in down there. So Gen Marshall said: "Well, that was Palm Beach. Riley, or somebody from the Secret Service, just called up." Marshall said: "I'm so glad of that." Then Marshall said: "Say, by the way, Hap, did Beebe tell you anything about this operation he was setting up today?" Hap said: "I didn't know anything about any operation." So Marshall said: "You can go now Beebe."

Q: Was that his way of clueing Arnold in?

B: He just wanted to find out if I had told Gen Arnold. So when the General came back to the office directly, he said: "Say, you've been a lot busier today than you let on." I said: "Yes sir." Well, he said: "I'll tell you now the background for this. We were both in the President's office this morning, and talking to Mr. Churchill. They decided what they wanted to do." Gen Arnold said: "I couldn't get away from the meetings I had to go to. So I just told Gen Marshall to call you, and that you would fix it up for him." But he didn't tell me that. And Gen

Marshall was prone to do things like that. He played tricks on you all the time.

Q: Did Arnold have any contact with Eisenhower before he went overseas?

B: After Pearl Harbor, every Sunday morning, Gen Arnold and Gen Eisenhower met in Gen Arnold's office, and they looked at the map all morning long. And I'd sit there with a pad and pencil, and write down any remarks they made. They were trying to learn the geography of the whole world - refresh their memories. Many little islands, with names that nobody knew, were to become quite important later on. I guess those meetings actually started long before Pearl Harbor, come to think of it, because when we went to England that time, I went along (April-May 1941?) Col Vandenberg went along as main paperwork handler. Gens Eisenhower and Clark were both on that trip.

B: Pan American had occasion to establish some bases up in the north; and Pan American had a man who was very familiar with that area, and would be available to help our people up there. But we couldn't send him as a civilian. He had to go as an officer in uniform of some kind. So Gen Arnold decided that he should be a Captain, and he said to call Gen Grant: "I want this man examined and on his way tomorrow morning, and then tell Personnel to get his commission through immediately. It just so happened that this chap wore glasses that were about 1/2" or 3/4" thick, and I can't recall his name. Gen Grant came in and received the orders, and he said to the man: "Come with me right away, we'll have to examine you." So on the way out, Gen Grant stopped by my desk, and he said: "What in the hell is going on. I've done just

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about everything in this war that I can think of, but I've never commissioned a blind man. So this fellow had to hold the paper right in front of his nose to read closely. His distant vision, I guess, was ok. But anyhow, he was on his way the next day, and I suppose very successfully completed what he had to do.

Q: I wonder if he was de-commissioned then?

B: I don't know whether he survived, or what happened. Some of those fellows up there didn't.

Q: Where was it that he was going?

B: Up in the Bluie stations in Greenland. We moved a lot of people up there to observation spots and we had the famous Arctic explorer.

Q: I know who you mean, Vjalmar Stephenson?

B: He was a consultant on all these deals, too, and I think actually was up there. Then Bernt Balchen went up there, too. But this preceded that phase. This was the original installation up there.

Q: Did you know much about Gen Arnold's relations with Lindbergh?

B: Yes, quite a great deal - particularly all the relations there were.

Q: When did they first know each other. Was this right after Lindbergh's flight?

B: I don't know, I presume Gen Arnold knew Lindbergh long before my time there. I'm positive he did. But, Lindbergh was called in to make a tour of the US to check our depots.

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Q: Was this after Pearl Harbor?

B: I can't tell you now whether it was or not. He was a reserve officer, of course, and elgible to fly. Lindbergh was to go around and see what our status and condition was, which we knew wasn't very good. But we needed specific information to correct it. Gen Arnold had a talk and told him what he was supposed to do, and then told me to fix him up with transportation. So I asked Col Lindbergh which aircraft he'd like to use on this trip. He said: "A P-35 would just be fine." So he took off in zero-zero in that P-35. He was really a pilot, that man. And he went around and visited all those places, and came back and made his report. After that, he got in trouble with the President.

Q: Well, that must have been long before Pearl Harbor at a time when he made the trip to Germany.

B: Yes, he was a BG by that time.

Q: He got the German decoration....

B: Was that what it was?

Q: Goering gave him the Iron Cross. There is an interesting letter in the files which Lindbergh wrote Arnold after the trip in which he gave a full report on the German Luftwaffe organization, and the factor setup in his own handwriting.

B: Lindbergh and Larry Bell were over there about the same time.

Q: This was about 1938 and Lindbergh was recommending that Arnold visit Germany. This was when we still had diplomatic relations and attaches.

B: Well General Arnold, according to the stories I remember, first became aware of this German thing when he was in Alaska on

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that flight. He talked to some person in Alaska who had fled from the German air establishment. This man had told him stories about what was going on in Germany that just were hard to believe. Shortly after that, I know we sent Larry Bell over. He was a personal frined of Messerschmitt. And Lindbergh was sent over. But in arranging this stuff for Lindbergh, every time he would come to the Munitions Building, there would be a terrible fracas. All the secretaries, and everybody loused the deal up. So we always had him come in and out thrugh some unbeknownst corridor. And one day we kind of got tied up. Howard Hughes was due just as Lindbergh was leaving. We were using the same route for both of them. And doggone if I wasn't taking Lindbergh out, and we met Howard Hughes comming in. And of course, he knew me, and I said: "Mr. Hughes, have you ever met Colonel Lindbergh?" I introduced them; they had never met before. A remarkable thing.

Q: Two of the most secretive and mysterious figures of our time.

B: Both were pilots, and doing a lot for air you know. So Lindbergh got away without being caught, he walked right through a whole mess of secretaries and they didn't recognize him, and got in a taxi we had waiting for him, and Howard Hughes came in and left and nobody knew him either.

Q: Speaking of pilots, there seemed to be a very distinct coolness between Seversky and Arnold.

B: I read that in these notes, and I don't recall anything like that.

Q: Siversky was one of these guys pushing Frank Andrews and

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he kind of badmouthed Arnold every chance he got. I think that he was, I don't want to put any words in your mouth. If you haven't run into it, I can tell you a little bit about what we have run into, and I think part of it was Seversky's fault. He said that airpower could win the war alone, and thought that Arnold was to conservative and not, you know, pressing for everything that Seversky wanted that the Republic Company should have.

B: I know Seversky used to come to the office quite often, I presumed always by previous appointment, I don't recall, I presume that he wasn't a person who could just walk in and out. There were some that could do that, but he definitely wasn't one of those.

Q: Who were the ones that could walk in and out? (DeSeversky couldn't see Arnold without appointment).

B: I was thinking mostly of people in the building, some of the people in the building such as Navy officers and fellows that Gen Arnold had served with at other places. People like Vannevar Bush had free access. He could come in and drop in and fill his pipe, and I would tell Gen Arnold he was here and he'd let him have a few minutes talk.

Q: Did you know von Karman?

B: No, I never, as far as I know. I never met him. I know who he is of course.

Q: I think they got together, must have been after (?)

B: Well, it could be, they were trying to get as much scientific help as possible there at about the time I left the office. I believe von Karman was the man that consented to head it up.

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Probably by Vannevar Bush's suggestion. Up to that time we had pretty much looked to Mr. Bush for that kind of help.

Q: How do you think Arnold would feel about airpower, the Air Force, events and things in general, if he were around now?

B: Well, I think that would be a difficult question to answer, because he had a flexible mind, and he rolled with the punches. He tried to provide whatever was needed at the time. One of the things that I suppose which started first with the 1st Bomb Wing out at March Field was to explore new ways of doing things. All of a sudden Col Arnold became aware that we didn't even know how to pack our own equipment to take to field. So he made the policy then, that first, airplanes had to be able to go out and spend the night out on a dry lake somewhere, and the crew be suitably provided for. Then a flight had to go, then a squadron, then a whole group had to be able to move out. And this had to be done quickly. So we would get our gear out, and find out what we had. We found out a lot of it wasn't any use to us - old doughboy stuff you know. Some if it we couldn't even carry, it was so heavy, like old kitchens and stuff like that. So we were always looking for innovations. One of the sources for new innovations was the Southern California Automobile Club. And they were of tremendous assistance to us in those days with regard to living out.

Q: I see, you mean camping equipment.

B: Yes, and that's one reason I suppose that Arnold was thought of as quite a sportsman and all. But, really, while he loved to fish and hunt whenever he got a chance. But that wasn't the primary purpose behind all that. It was that type of living had to be done by people that operated aircraft because you

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didn't have those facilities set up in an emergency. You had to be able to grab your hat and enough equipment to sustain yourself for a few days until the rear exhelon could catch up with you.

Q: Well, they've now come up with the same old concept. They call it the bare base concept, where you move in and there's nothing there, without something new.

B: We used to have to take off and go to Calexico or Raleigh or down on the dry lakes someplace, maybe and old field over at Death Valley and spend a night or may be a day and a night, conduct mission from there.

Q: Was he probably the most advanced thinker in the Air Force along those lines?

B: Well he was the only one I knew anything about who was doing this. Maybe it happened in other places. But it definitely happened in the 1st Bomb Wing when he got in a position where he could do things like that. And in order to do it, of couse, you had to have your missions meaningful. You had to have fighters and bombers working together. We had a kind of bad situation to start with, because our bombers were these old B-4s, two-engine Keystones. We had one squadron of a little better craft, liquid-cooled engines. I forget what they were called, then we had fighters that were much faster than our bombers, and one was to fast to work with. Then it came the other way around. We had the P-26 fighters, I believe, they were the last ones before they could pull the gear up. They were fairly fast but not as fast as the Martin bombers, the B-12s. So it worked the other way,

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the bombers could run away from the fighters. But even under those conditions, we did a lot of useful work.

B: Under Col Arnold we innovated things. For instance, we talked earlier about the sending of supplies down here to Long Beach during the earthquate. That night, the Bomb Group had a mission scheduled, to use flares. This hadn't been done before in our area. And while we simulated the bomb, we, each airplance lighted the target for the one following by dropping a flare. And to get the thing started, you had an advance aircraft that would drop a whole mess of flares to get the thing underway. My job was to take this advanced airplane out and drop 30 or 40 flares. Then the bomb group would come and take up from there. They would simulate a raid on a place. So the target that night was Cramers (?) which was a little town over on the Mojave Desert. I left just before dusk, and probably an hour in advance of the bombers in order to get organized, and to get into position. Along about 8:00 that night, my radio operator handed me a message. He said: "You know, I can't find out anything about what's going on." He said, I think that the group took off, but I believe they have been recalled. He said I heard one squadron commander call another and say: "Did you get the order to return?" And he said: "The air is just full of messages." He said: "Something happened." And I said: Well, find out what it is." Meantime, I assumed the group wasn't coming because they were a little overdue by that time. I was supposed to get a message when to start my operation. So I turned and headed back for March Field. I thought well, maybe it was the weather - something turned sour, and I'd best be getting back. Finally, the radio operator said: "There's

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been a disaster, as far as I can pick up from the radio," he says, "Long Beach has been completely destroyed by an earthquake." So we went on back and sure enough, when I got back to March Field, the place was just deserted. There wasn't an airplane out that wasn't staked down. There was nothing going, and I taxied into where my plane belonged, and Colonels Arnold and Spaatz, caught me just as I stepped out of the plane and said: "Can you get us to Long Beach? Can you fly us to Long Beach?" And by then the fog had come in, and it was pretty lousy weather, and I said: "No sir, I couldn't fly you to Long Beach, but I believe if I was in Long Beach I could get you back here." And they said: "That's the wrong way." And they stalked off and disappeared, and they never told me what happened. So nobody else there; nobody to take care of the plane. Everybody was listening to the radio. So when I went home, Margaret told me there had been this terrible earthquake and she had a lot of family living in this area, and said it even shook March Field up pretty bad. She said everybody was worried about what was going on, and then it was in the morning that we started sending supplies and things down to Long Beach. The end result of that was that somebody told somebody to survey this stuff that was lost, that had to be the answer. And I imagine that had to be the answer. And I imagine that had to be Gen Craig. But he probably got orders from somebody higher up, but it wasn't Gen Craig that was raising cain; it was the Staff. There was no conception in lots of headquarters with regard to the flexibility that we were developing in the air, and our equipment problems, and our ability to whip

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out and go somewhere pretty fast, at least at the March Field station.

The fact that anybody would take action on his own with Government property was unheard of. And I know well about that, because the first job I got when I joined up in the Air Corps was Supply Officer. Almost the first thing that happened, the Major, the Inspector General on the Post, called me. It was Ft. Riley, and we had a squadron of airplanes there. He said: "You're accounts are in horrible shape." You're so many blankets short, so many this, and so many that, and I just signed for all this stuff. And he said: "Ill give you two weeks, to get it fixed up since you're just new." So I asked my Supply Sergeant about this, and he said it was probably correct. He asked: "When is he going to come and count them again?" And I said: "Well, he gave me 2 weeks to correct it." He says: "Don't worry."

I can remember that Major's name. His name was Crowley. In a couple of weeks he called me and said: "We're going on inventory of your supply room." I went over there and there wasn't an overage, nor was there a shortage that he could find in the books anywhere. "Well," he said, "I'll have to tell you this. You're going to be a good office. You certainly straightened that out. I hadn't the faintest idea in the world what had happened. So later, I asked the Supply Sergeant - his name was Maxwell- I'll never forget him either. He said: "We have an item that we issue, its called coveralls, and you know, these Cavalry boys just love them. I've been able, through my Supply Sergeant to acquire a few extra coveralls which I fold up in the blankets, so they don't show. I can take one of those around and get 10 or 12

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blankets for it. That's the way to do it." And he says: "Of course, maybe I borrowed a little stuff too." So that's what the supply thing was all about.

That was the attitude they had. You didn't use anything for fear you'd either harm it or lose it, or seomething would happen. This didn't make for very good military training, for losing it, the airplanes or even people.

Q: Was Arnold a good administrator?

B: Oh yes, he didn't like to do it, but he knew the ropes. I suspect though that Gen McNarney was the best that I ever ran into on that. Fortunately, I served with him in his Hqs., and eventually as his Adjutant for long enough to be taught by him something about paperwork. McNarney taught you enough to know you needed a good Sergeant Major. He had been a very fine staff officer in the first war and very well thought of. In fact, he was so well thought of, that he got good jobs under Gen Marshall, because General Marshall liked good staff officers, people that could take the initiative.

Q: Well, I would expect that Marshall had a good deal of confidence in Arnold's administrative ability or he wouldn't have gone so far in putting the Air Corps on its own.

B: Well, I suspect that as long as Mr. Lovett was there, they figured that the combination of Mr. Lovett and Gen Arnold would handle things. Mr. Lovett was a wonderful man, you know, fine from an administrative standpoint. He always thought our shop, he called it way of doing business, was pretty lousy and it was. But up to the time I left there, we didn't have enough people to deal with to make it much other than just a personal

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calling-on-the-phone deal. But he always wanted to get the thing organized, so that you could computerize it, eventually. Lovett just couldn't understand the way we did business. And I supposed that that came in good stead later on, because I know when I came back from overseas, that it was an entirely different place.

Q: He and Arnold always got along well?

B: Oh, beautifully. Yes. Mr. Lovett was on lot of trips with us.

Q: We talked to him in NY about a month ago. He treated us like you, plush office, very nice. I like him very much.

B: He and Gen Arnold pulled a joke on me one time. You know, I came from Idaho, and in my youth I used to ride there in the Sawtooth Forest in the Haley area. They had a Ranger station and I worked one summer near there. So I mentioned one time that I had been through Ketchum, but that was before they went up there and built that resort there, and of course, that was built by Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman.

Q: Oh yes, Sun Valley.

B: One time we were in Atlanta or Mobile, or some place in the South, and we got in late, and we were the only people in the dinning room. Besides it was during the depression. Business wasn't good to begin with. Well, we were hungry. We had been flying all day, visiting stations, and I ordered a big steak and they ordered a steak and baked potato, and particularly, they wanted the Idaho baked potato. Well, here came the meal. They got the steaks. Do you know what I got? One great tremendous Idaho baked potato, and that's all I got. And they never

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ordered another steak for me. I had to eat my potato, and that was it. And they laughed. They thought that was funny. I had to go out to a hamburger stand to get something to eat.

Q: Well, he was a great practical joker, apparently.

B: he loved any little bit of amusement in such a hectic life that they lived.

Q: When did you come in the service?

B: 1928, at March Field. I came in right from college as a flying cadet. I thought I would give it a whirl. I had graduated as a mechanical engineer, and went to March Field and then to Kelly. I trained in "TAC" aviation at Kelly. They said if they couldn't find anything else for you to do, they put you in "TAC."... Anyhow, then I went to Riley, but I always wanted to get into the engineering part. Instead I ended up at March Field as an Adjutant, and I knew less about being an Adjutant than most anybody, except when Gen McNarney had taught me. But I never really worked at that very much. I always seemed to be doing other things.

Q: So it was an Adjutant that you first worked for Arnold?

B: Actually I was in charge of the airplanes over in the bomb group there, that Colonel Arnold liked to fly. There was this business of instrument flying, and then after the bomb group moved to Hamilton, and I went up there and Gen Arnold organized the 1st Bomb Wing. I came back, that's really when my close association with him started and he made me his Adjutant then. Up to that time I don't think I'd been an Adjutant except for a while for the bomb group under McNarney.

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Q: D d you maintain any contact with Gen Arnold after you both had retired?

B: Just by writing, correspondence - and only a few letters. We seemed not to miss that part of it so much.

Q: When did you start flying for him?

B: Gen Arnold asked for me when Gen Craig told him he had to have somebody to take over his flying. At the time my job at Wright Field was bombardment procurement officer - project officer, I guess you would call it. That job called for me to go to the Chief Engineer from Wright Field. I'd come in to Washington quite often for board meetings on the bombers. We were building B-17s and we had B-15s and a B-19, B-18s and all kinds of things in the fire. On one visit to Washington, I had to take over a B-17 and a B-18 and demonstrate them to members of Congress they were trying to sell on this idea of buying some of these B-17s. And so I did quite a bit of flying in the B-17, and carried Gen Arnold. He seemed to like it. We got back in the old swing of March Field. It wasn't too long after that till the Chief (Westover) got killed and so the thing came up. I was the one he thought of at the moment. I never regretted; I enjoyed it. But I don't think I liked the Air Force after the war. I don't think I cared for it. I wouldn't have liked the management.

Q: What do you mean by that?

B: Well, I don't - couldn't anybody have handled it like Gen Arnold did, in my opinion.

Q: You mean the contrast was a bit too much for you? You get spoiled?

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B: Yes, besides, I think I'd been sitting out in Yuma or some place, watching airplanes fly by. But, I've never had anything much to do with the Air Force since I retired. One of the things Gen Marshall told me one time, before he was made Chief when we were on a trip some place. He said, I'd like to get into that post while we're flying over Benning, or some place. There's a lot of things to be straightened out there. But he said: "You know, it's no use you beating your brains out." He said: "Don't try anything unless you've got the power to do it." That's why, on that same trip (in 1939) when he was made Chief, he just had the power then, and that's when he was going to put Air into the Army. And he did, there's no question about it. They became aware of it pretty fast. I think maybe more than the Air Force, the Air Corps did.

Q: Well, that's possible.

B: I'll never forget one time when they were coming back from the West Coast, and we stopped in at Randolph Field. The Commander in charge of all the flight instruction down there wanted to go to Washington, so he had asked Gen Arnold if he could ride with us, and Gen Arnold said, yes he could. So the next morning we went out to take off and it was Zero-Zero - just socked right down to the ground. The operations officer wouldn't give us clearance to take off, but Gen Arnold said: "Ill sign it." The guy couldn't say no. So Gen Arnold signed it. We went out and took off in Zero-Zero, it was only 1,500 feet I think, something like that. It was just a short 2 or 3 minutes until we were on top. We flew all the way to Washington on top of clouds and let down into the Bolling Field area where there was some ceiling.

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There was no trick to that. So, this Colonel we picked up down at Randolph that commanded all this activity said: "You know, that was the most wonderful trip I have ever been on." He said: "I never experienced anything like that before in my life." And you know, it shocked me so, that I thought about it all night. Here was the head man of all our flying activities at Randolph, teaching cadets. He didn't even know what he was teaching them - what was in store for them. I mean, this was a routine matter.

Q: Well, how did you account for his general lack of....

B: He just never had to do it personally and he just had never done it, I suppose. Maybe it was because where he'd been they didn't have bad weather very often. By golly, I told Gen Arnold about that. He said: "I heard him tell you that," he said. "You know, I have been thinking about that all night too." And so, they started moving new younger blood in to Randolph and to a lot of places. Nothing personally against this man. Things had moved away from him, you know. I don't suppose Gen Arnold had done that until he became Chief, because we didn't have very good facilities. At the time we took over the air mail, you know, nobody thought of flying on instruments. Gosh, that was quite a little experience. I'll tell you, it wasn't very long before all of us at March Field knew how to fly on instruments, after we got home from the Air Mail experience.

Q: Apparently, from what I've been able to dig up, Arnold's sector - the Western - was by and large the best run and best operated of the three.

B: Yes, I've heard that.

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Q: I suppose you had some hairy experiences during that time. (Air Mail)

B: Oh nothing in particular. It was just a miserable experience. It seemed like the mail always had to fly between 11 and 12 at night, or 1:00 AM. I was in charge of the route between Reno and Elko. That was as far as we could make. I had to make it two times a week. I had to take the trip. Of course, we made it two trips each way - a day 50 times a week, I took it. I don't know whether I had to or whether I did it just to dot it. But it was a lousy thing. We'd get into Elko eastbound about 1 or 2 in the morning. We'd go down to the old hotel and sleep and get up at 10 AM and go back the other way. We had ice cold open cockpits, and it was pretty lonesome out there, Years later, I went into Reno one day with Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall. They decided some where between Salt Lake City and the West Coast that they were going to spend the night in Reno, and it was about right. Otherwise we would have been fogged in getting into Sacramento. So we landed, and taxiied in. I had a favorite place I used to like to park airplanes, up behind the little hangars there. Somebody had taken a great big ditch-digging machine, and had dug a big ditch across there. I taxiied across there with this DC-3 not seeing it. The plane jerked like that, sideways, and as the one wheel hit, Gen Marshall was just putting on his pants - civilian clothes to go downtown. The jar knocked him off and into his seat, and Gen Arnold was pretty put out about that. I don't blame him a bit - this carelessness. I didn't even see the ditch. Well, after he thought that over for a while,

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he said: "Well, you're the only junior officer I know that had ever knocked the Chief of Staff off his feet." Gen Marshall forgave me for it.

B: There is a story in the time I took General Marshall back to VMI. One afternoon, Gen Marshall's aide, rushed in and said: "Say can you get Gen Marshall up to VMI or whatever that school was he went to near Raleigh." Without thinking, I said: "Sure, we can leave as soon as he's ready." I called Bolling and had a plane ready, and I started looking on the charts to see what kind of flying field they had down there. It was 1200 feet long, and we had a DC-3. I had to call Bolling and asked them how long will it take to train half the gas out of that plane. He said fortunately they were just taking out the gas, and that there was about one tank left. I told him not to put any morein. So Hill Grant went with me, he was the only pilot that could fly copilot, and we took Gen Marshall down there and delivered him. We had no trouble in arriving, but he had to stay over. They wanted him to make a speech there at his Alma Mater. He was going to drive back to Washington. So we waited until he was long gone over the hill before we took off. And then we went down to the end of this runway, and got a couple of fence posts and put them down on the ground. When we hit them, we bounced in the air, and kept right on going. The only remark I heard about it was Gen Marshall told Gen Arnold when he got back: "You know, I worried all night about that." And Gen Arnold said: "What'd you worry about? And Marshall said: About whether they could get that airplane out of there or not.

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Interview, Brig General Eugene Beebe, Long Beach, California,
12 August 1970.

Q: One of the areas which we didn't cover at great length was the March Field experience. This is, in my view, the major turning point in Arnold's record, because he ingratiated himself with Malin Craig, who knew nothing about airpower. And when Craig came to Washington, he brought Arnold. Really, this was his return to the top. Did you have any knowledge of his relationship with Craig?

B: Yes, much as I would have had in my position, but General Craig was our Corps Area Commander then. And I have always been under the impression that General Arnold must have known Gen Craig from a way back somewhere, because we used to get in a couple of P-12s and fly up to the Corps Area when we got in trouble at March Field, and Gen Arnold needed something. Of course, he was a Colonel then. And he operated pretty freely with Gen Craig. Like, we always dove (?) his headquarters to get transportation, and this was against the law and everything. So, I thought that he and Gen Craig were on very friendly terms, and that they liked each other, and thought each other knew something about their business.

Q: Was this throughout, that they liked each other? There was no bumps on the road?

B: As far as I know, there was never any trouble between the two. Personally, there was some trouble because when they had that earthquake here in Long Beach in 1933, Col Arnold, at that time, commanding March Field, sent help down there which included physical items like tents, blankets, and stuff; and I guess some of it, or maybe a lot of it didn't show up again, which is normal I suppose

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for those things. But you know, we never had that sort of problem, I guess, in the service in any extent before. And everybody kept so close accounts of property, that to lose a blanket or something, you get yourself court martialed, and the staff up at the Presidio started to make a big deal out of this. But I was there the day it was settled.

Q: Was this a guy named McIntosh, did he give Arnold trouble?

B: I don't know that name. He might have been Inspector General up there fore Craig, or something like that.

Q: Do you remember the name of the man? I know it was either Chief of Staff or somebody in Operations.

B: There was somebody up at the Presidio that was trying to put the bee on Arnold, I'm sure. But who it was, I don't remember anymore.

Q: I got the impression that Craig took a dim view of Arnold doing this because in those days, if you spent a dollar you had to account for it. The action was so good, that Craig turned around.

B: Well, I don't know what caused it, but the day we flew up, especially, I think, to get this thing settled finally, I was there when Gen Craig put his arm around Gen Arnold's shoulders. There were just three of us in his office there and he said: "Aw, forget it Hap." So I don't know what brought that about.

Q: It may have been there had been such good reactions by this time. Was this the day of the earthquake or sometime later?

B: When the things were....

Q: That was March 9th.

B: ...Sent from March Field down here, it was probably two days after the earthquake happened. The reports were people were starving and hungry and we had the facilities there to alleviate some of that and so Arnold just....

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Q: Took the bull by the horns?

B: Yes, and did which was necessary, which now, any commander is authorized to do, I am sure. But in those days they had a lot of bookkeepers, you know.

Q: Yes, I had this impression that Craig's reaction, which may have been formed by his staff, was a dim one, because...

B: I don't know. I would doubt very much that Gen Craig ever had any dim reaction with regard to Arnold. No, I think he allowed his staff to operate, and if they were to turn up some malfeasance or something, that he certainly would have gone by what the rules and regulations were. But I don't think he ever had any dim views of Gen Arnold.

Q: I know they played golf.

B: In Washington. The first thing that happened when I arrived in Washington to work for Gen Arnold, he says: "Come on, we are going up to the War Dept Building." That was the old State Building up there by the White House. So we went in and there was Gen Craig sitting at his desk, and these two aides there. One of them later became LTGEN in charge of public relations for the Army. The names don't come to me.

Q: Surles?

B: No, he had a whole flock of kids, he had a million kids. Floyd somebody.

Q: Parks.

B: Floyd Parks, he was one of the aides, and Bill somebody was the other. A kind of a senior aide. And he wanted me to get acquainted, because you see, the airplanes, about in 1936.

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Q: He was Asst Chief to Westover?

B: Yes, at that time. No, no, this was just after Westover was killed, and he had become Chief. That's how come I got there, because Craig said Arnold couldn't fly his own airplane anymore. Well, it turned out that Chief of the Air Corps didn't have an airplane, anyhow. So apparently there was some provision in the laws then that said the Chief of Staff of the Army could have an airplane. So the Air Corps fixed up an aircraft for the Chief of Staff of the Army, which was Gen Craig. And Gen Craig said: "Arnold, you get a pilot for it." And he said: "You use it all the time." Arnold said: "I'll never use it." So he whipped me over there to show me to Gen Craig, that he had gotten a pilot, and that everything was lovely. And Gen Craig knew me before, anyhow. So we had a nice talk, but gee, when you whip into the Chief of Staff's office and just flop your hat on his desk and sit down, in front of people in there, you've got a pretty good relationship there. So I think they continued, I think they had a very pleasant relationship.

Q: I wasn't implying that it wasn't, but I got the impression from somebody I interviewed, that the initial reaction of Craig on the earthquake was negative.

B: I couldn't say about that, all I know is that I never heard him eat Arnold out.

Q: As a matter of fact, I'll tell you where part of this occurred. Mrs. Arnold seems to recall. Now, she may have confused this with another thing. But after he had done this, he flew up to the Presidio and came back and he sat down to dinner and he was white as a sheet, because he and Craig apparently had some differences. Did he go up the day of the earthquake to the Presidio?

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B: Not to my knowledge.

Q: She may have confused this. I may have gotten this impresssion wrong. She may have confused this problem with another one. She said he came home and he sat down at dinner and he was white as a sheet.

B: Well, the only time that I can recall that there was any problem, and this was only momentary, was when they had this CCC program break. And we had maneuvers on March Field at that time and Gen Andrews was out. He was the boss of the so-called GHQ AF and we were a wing of it, and we were maneuvering around there. All of a sudden the phone rang, and 9th Corps Area told Arnold to cut out of the maneuvers and get busy putting up tents in the mountains for these CCC camps, and Arnold laughed at hime, and said: "Heck, I've got maneuvers on down here." He said: "I can't do that now." The phone rang again in about 10 minutes, and the voice on the other end, must have been General Craig.

Q: Get busy on CCC!

B: I know Gen Arnold took off out of that headquarters like something was after him, and that was the last that he showed up in the maneuvers. In fact, I guess they called them off, I don't remember now.

Q: This must have been the '33 maneuvers.

B: Yes, I expect that's right.

Q: Right after Roosevelt came in, the CCC was set up?

B: It could have been. It was when, we were told at March Field, that we were going to head up a district, or whatever they called it.

Q: You know, I talked to a number of people in San Antonio who were involved with Arnold, like Lawrence Wood, he was the Quartermaster there.

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B: Yes, he was vitally involved in the CCC. He had to furnish the tents, and of course, he had to keep count of them, too, in those days.

Q: Kept very close count all the time. This is why I got the impression that Arnold, taking the initative on the Earthquake relief, that somebody up there, said wait a minute, you can't go out and spend this money without higher authority. But perhaps the political reaction and the newspaper reaction was so strong and good, that they turned 180 degrees and patted Arnold on the back?

B: Well, that could be. Obviously, that is the most likely answer to a situation such as that. Of course, most of the people in charge then were bookkeepers. They kept track. They counted the rifles, but whether they could fire them or not was never known.

Q: I wanted to ask about the CCC. This was an important phase in Arnold's life, because you know, he wrote to guys like Joe Elliott, some of these outdoorsmen in forestry.

B: Oh, sure, "Death Valley" Scotty. I met all those people except Scotty, never met him, but Elliott.

Q: He was always talking about going fishing, up in the High Sierras. He went on a couple of these trips.

B: I went through the High Sierras with him one time.

Q: '39? Did you go on that trip?

B: We went in at Fresno and came out at Bishop, on horseback.

Q: Was this the one with Marshall during the war or earlier?

B: No, Ira Eaker was along, and Jack Northrop.

Q: I think this was the '39 one.

B: Possibly. I think it could have been in 1938 or '39.

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Q: He went with Marshall. They spent 10 days in the High Sierras in '44.

B: Well, of course, I was gone; I don't know about that.

Q: So Arnold always talked about getting out into the woods.

B: Well, Marshall was supposed to be on this trip, but he couldn't come. As a matter of fact, after the trip was over, and we went to San Francisco, General Arnold was supposed to go to Hawaii with Gen Marshall, and Gen Marshall couldn't come, so I got Gen Marshall's ticket and went to Hawaii with him. I wasn't scheduled to go. We spent 10 days in Hawaii.

Q: That was '39? He went to Hawaii in 1938. But Arnold always talked about going fishing. He went up to Quebec, he went to Mingan.

B: He was a sportsman, he loved that sort of thing, yes.

Q: But relating that to the CCC, I have the impression that he felt that if young fellows could get out in the open, and do some healthy thing, something constructive, and go fishing and build something, that they would come out better men. This was his solution for juvenile delinquency.

B: Well, it could have been.

Q: After the war, he talked a lot about the CCC experience. Now, I don't know if this was sort of an after reaction. At the time of the CCC, he may have regarded it as unnecessary, sort of a tedious burden. But I've been told that he did a great job.

B: Well, I don't think that outside of this original reaction, when the phone rang that day, he had never heard of the CCC. He had no knowledge of what they were talking about, even, except we had some important maneuvers on, and they were. Gen Arnold was sort of a junior amongst these people that were there. He was trying to do a good job

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on the maneuvers. He was the Operations Officer, G-3. But the CCC, then, he had to divide himself in half. He ran his military deal at March Field, and then he had the CCC. Now, I had nothing whatsoever to do with the CCC, except that I did visit some of their camps, and I accompanied Gen Arnold a few times, because I was his Adjutant there, I believe, at that time.

Q: I believe he had about 25 camps.

B: Oh, he had a mess of them. Up in the Sierras, and he'd take officers out of it.

Q: Reserve officers?

B: Yes, we had a lot of Reserves. We had a lot of Regulars out on these camps, too. He was very interested in them, and I think that our CCC action there at March Field was just as good as anybody's anywhere, probably a lot better. We had them in Death Valley, up in the Mountains, down in the Imperial Valley. We had them all over the place.

Q: Were you there when Foulois came out to visit him during the Olympics in 1932?

B: I probably was, but I don't remember that.

Q: He had a lot of visitations out there. Secy Dern came out one time.

B: Well, I have a faint recollection of that, because he was from Salt Lake and that stuck in my mind for some reason.

Q: I've seen a picture of Arnold and Dern on some kind of a patio or balcony, and they were watching the planes fly by.

B: Polisy your sabers and get in your airplanes, sort of incongruous, isn't it?

B: Yes, it was.

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Q: Another interesting phase of Arnold's activity which served him in very good stead was his keen sense of public relations in getting these Hollywood stars out there.

B: I know that John talked about that quite a bit. Of course, I think that his public relations business must have hailed from the Mitchell era. I believe he was public relations, or something, for the Air Corps.

Q: Yes, he was Information Officer. In fact, this got him in trouble.

B: Well, that was part of the problem, I guess, he never talked about that much with me.

Q: Never talked about his Mitchell experience?

B: No, never, that I can recall, other than to mention names now and then of something that he knew him from those days. But he was pretty closemouthed about that. To me he was, I don't know, maybe not to other people.

Q: Seversky, who has lost no love for Arnold, says that he knew all these people in the Billy Mitchell era, and he never heard the name of Arnold mentioned once as a supporter of Billy Mitchell. So, of course, this is his reaction. His reaction stems from another aspect which you may know something about. He claims that Arnold did him dirt on the P-35. Are you familiar with the procurement process? You know, Arnold chose the P-36 over the P-35, the North American over what was then Seversky's Aircraft.

B: This must have been in about '35?

Q: I don't know if Arnold chose it. Arnold was really Asst Chief of the Air Corps.

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B: I was at Wright Field then; I was a Bombardment Project Officer there. Ben Kelsey was the Fighter Project Officer.

Q: He's in Stevensburg, Virginia now. Does he know something about Arnold?

B: He would know about the fighters, if that is what you are interested in. Ben used to go away quite often, and, of course, I did too, and when I went away, Ben would take over my job and when Ben was away, I would look after his fighters. And I remember having to go up to the Curtiss plant to take delivery on the first P-36 that came to Wright. I got into a thunderstorm and had to go into a forced landing. I didn't know much about fighters. I preferred the bigger ships. And I don't think that any individual in the service would ever have said: "Well, now, we'll take that plane over that." You know, they had a Board that met on all those things. There had to be rhyme and reason to this.

Q: Well, this is the impression I have. Of course, Seversky is grinding an axe on this subject, and he carried this feeling throughout the war. Now, you have some knowledge of their relationship, when you came into Washington. Was there hard feelings between them?

B: I never heard them fighting. I know he used to come and call at the office, like other people did. I'm sure that he never showed any ill feeling in the office that came through the door, anyhow, that I could hear.

Q: Arnold regarded him as a gadfly. His articles, beating the drums for airpower. He was ahead of the parade, in a sense, wasn't he? I mean, Arnold wanted airpower, everybody wanted airpower. It was a question of getting it.

B: Well, I never, I don't recall of Gen Arnold ever stating anything about Seversky in my presence, one way or another. That

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wasn't his forte. He never really talked about people very much. What he thought about them may have been something else.

Q: On one occasion, Arnold had Seversky in the office. He sat him down in a chair, and he put tapes on the planes. They held the performance envelopes. And they asked him: "Which plane would you chose?" And Seversky said: "This one, that one, and the other." They took the tapes off, and it turned out to be our planes instead of the enemy's. Seversky had an entirely different version of this incident.

B: I don't remember that.

Q: You were not present?

B: Not when they were picking out the P-35 and P-36.

Q: No, no, this occurred during the war.

B: No, I was away from there in 1942.

Q: You left in '42. You were with Arnold from '39 to '42?

B: No, I was with him from about '36 through '42, six years. Then I came back from overseas in late '44, and I went into that deal when he had the attack and went into the hospital and all. Was with him then until I retired.

Q: Do you recall at the time of Pearl Harbor, Arnold was....

B: You bet your life I recall that deal.

Q: Arnold was shooting quail with Donald Douglas?

B: Donald Douglas and his daddy, and a fellow named Bradshaw, who is a MG.

Q: Aaron Bradshaw?

B: He was the representative at the Douglas plant. Bradshaw, I believe, was the name.

Q: Arnold has been accused of leaking this RAINBOW FIVE to the Chicago Tribune.

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B: That was brought up when John was here, and I never heard of that. I have no idea what that was, or anything about it.

Q: I'm still trying to run this down with the FBI. I've gotten nowhere. This thing was an article in the newspaper in 1963, written by Frank Waldrop, the editor of the now defunct Times-Herald. And he has a guilty conscience about it and he seems to be trying to pin it on Arnold. But you never heard of this story?

B: It is a code word obviously, RAINBOW FIVE means nothing to me. I don't recall ever having heard of it. But I had no access in my own right, to any secret documents, or anything like that. Of course, I saw plenty and carried them around. But to look at them, personally, or know what they were, I never involved myself with that. I wasn't curious in other words.

Q: There was a plan that was produced by three fellows out in the Hawaiian Air Force. Fred Martin's group. Lawrence Coddington, Elmer Rose and William Farthing produced this plan, in August 1941. This is three months before Pearl Harbor. And that plan said that if we had 180 planes, B-17s, on a round-the-clock search, we could protect Pearl Harbor, and the Navy wouldn't have to worry about defending Pearl Harbor. Fred Martin sent this plan to Arnold, directly, and he sent another copy of the plan through the War Dept, and that plan has disappeared from the files in Washington. Have you ever heard of the plan?

B: No, I was asked about that. Of course, it seems to me kind of funny, because we didn't have 150 B-17s in those days, and no prospects of getting 150. (Off-the-record story, that Marshall and Arnold placed priority on getting all available B-17s to the Philippines. On Dec 7th, some of these bombers were caught in the

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attack on Pearl Harbor.)

Q: That was Ted Landon's group?

B: Well, I don't remember who was in command. There were a lot of my friends who were there that night, they took off in that group. I don't think it was an organized group, I think it was just a ferry job to get these planes to the Philippines.

Q: In fact, the guns were in cosmoline. They didn't plan to use them.

B: Yes, I'm surprised they even had them aboard, the way things were going.

Q: Didn't they arrive in the middle of the attack? Ted Landon's group.

B: Yes. Ted Landon, I think, Augie Straubel and I don't remember who all the other fellows were. I'm not sure Augie was there, but it seems to me he was.

Q: Left from Hamilton?

B: Yes.

Q: And then you went quail shooting?

B: Yes, we saw these planes off, last one took off maybe 1:00 in the morning, got a few hours' sleep, and I remember we left Hamilton realy early and went to Bakersfield.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about the reasons for doing what they were doing, mainly, sending them to the Philippines? You see, I have seen correspondence between him and Marshall, memos, and he was writing down in pencil: "We have 2 here and 2 there." They were trying to shuttle them to the Philippines. This was one of the big headaches of getting enough landing areas to shuttle these planes to

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the Philippines. You see, Arnold and Marshall both regarded the Philippines as the No. 1 crisis area. Did he ever talk to you about this? It was understood that the Philippines were the critical area.

B: Well, I think that all the effort that we could bring to bear either from any place in the Army -- I say the Army, because we were part of the Army -- was designed to try to do something about the Philippines, because they were getting pretty badly beaten up over there. We still had places for these planes to operate from, so they wanted to get them in there. And this was the way to do it, fly them over as fast as you could.

Q: They didn't think that Pearl Harbor would be attacked? Did he ever talk about that?

B: No, if we thought Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked, we wouldn't have been quail shooting, I know that.

Q: You wouldn't have done anything like that. This is what puzzles me, I am just guessing now (off-the-record discussion of Coddington-Farthing plan).

B: No, I'm not saying that their plan was, but I say the thing that you are talking about where carriers were involved, and how they could approach a target, and when they would have to launch their planes in order to attack the target advantageously -- just after daylight -- that this established certain lines due to the speed of the carrier and the speed of the aircraft, and the time element. This is all part of the stuff we studied in the navigation course, and I don't know whether Bill Farthing attended that course or not. But it is just possible that some of those people over there did, because that's what we were taught.

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Q: My interest is primarily that they just hit the nail right on the head.

B: That would be very, very simple, because actually there weren't many ways to attack Pearl Harbor, were there?

Q: This is not my greatest interest. I am interested in that aspect.

B: What became of it, huh?

Q: Fred Martin wrote this letter to Arnold.

B: Approximately when was this?

Q: August 25th. I have the letter. He wrote to Arnold, and it came into Hqs and on the bottom of it was written: "To Spaatz." You see, Spaatz was then Chief of Staff, and there is no answer. Now, and I'm guessing this, I mean, Arnold could have written a letter, saying: "This is a very good plan, boys, but we don't have 180 planes, and besides Pearl Harbor is not the prime target. The Philippines are." Something like this. Now, on Dec 8, such a hypothetical statement would look very, very bad in the record. And I'm just guessing that some enterprising staff officer saw such a letter and took it out of the file, because it would make Arnold look bad.

B: You mean, later on?

Q: Yes.

B: What did Spaatz say about it?

Q: I asked Spaatz, and he was incoherent. I got nothing, he doesn't remember many, many things. But as I say, I may have gotten him the wrong time.

B: I don't remember that the people, this, of course, is just memory, but I don't remember that they ever had anything out of Hawaii, except the fact they were afraid somebody was going to burn their

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airplanes up just sitting on the field, and they wanted to group them and protect them. This was all that bookkeeping.

Q: That was another mistake they made. They had the Nov 27th message, the sabotage alert which Arnold sent, and Sherman Miles sent. The sabotage alert was to bring all the airplanes together. If they were sabotaged, they were sitting ducks for an air attack.

B: Well, they were worried about that over there. Everybody was worried about it.

Q: This was a cross-the-board mistake. Of course, Marshall's role on Pearl Harbor Day is hard to explain.

B: Well, I read that nobody knew where he was. Obviously, somebody knew where he was.

Q: His conduct cannot be explained, rationally, and there are some...

B: He was probably sitting up with the President, that's probably what he was doing.

Q: No, he was horseback riding, at least that's what they said.

B: I remember reading that.

Q: Several other things came out of that, are not explainable to me....

B: The old conjecture with me, I only know where General Arnold was, from well, I knew where he was quite a while before that. I'd have to look it up.

Q: You flew, as soon as you heard about it, like 10:00 in the morning, or noon?

B: No, I think it was later in the day; we had been out for a morning shoot, and then we came in for lunch. Then, it seems to me

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we had gone out in the afternoon. We were coming back, everybody had gotten their limit then. Maybe half a mile from a little shed out there on this property where we were hunting, there was a sort of tumbleweed--tremendous things blew up out there--and the old Mr. Douglas, Donald Douglas' father, came running, waving the paper in the air. He had made a few notes from things he had heard on the radio, and he gasped out that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.

Q: This was many hours after the attack, because the attack started on 7:00 or 7:30 Hawaii time.

B: I'm talking about 3 P.M. I think about that time of day, Bakersfield time.

Q: The attack occurred about 10 A.M. or 11 A.M. Bakersfield time.

B: Well, we hadn't heard about it yet from the time after we had our lunch and went back out, which I might guess may have been as early as 12:30, or as late as 1:00.

Q: So, in other words, you didn't really hear about it until four hours after the attack?

B: About 3:00 in the afternoon.

Q: It was at least four hours after the attack.

B: And I know we just hurried from where we were We ran and changed our clothes and got in cars, and drove as fast as we could to the Bakersfield airport.

Q: Is that where your plane was?

B: That's where our plane was.

Q: What kind of plane was it?

B: Douglas DC-3.

Q: Flew all night, I guess.

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B: Well, we flew from there to March Field, first thing. We had to get to communications, and the radio man was trying to pick up all the news we could. So we got to March, and Gen Arnold said: "We are going to be pretty busy," so he said, "you better find somebody here at March to help you fly this thing." He said: "Because I'm not going to be able to." He was the co-pilot, you see. So he rushed into the Hqs there at March and this was, my guess is about 5:00 in the afternoon. I'm just guessing. I do think I had some flight records somewhere that would give an exact time. So I told the OD, or somebody there at March Field, to find me a pilot. He said we will find you one, so he took the Officer of the Guard. And he had his razor there. So he went out. I said: "Look the airplane over; get familiar with it." And I got it all gassed up and we provisioned up and Henry Puzensky, who was our crew chief, was pretty....

Q: Is he dead?

B: I don't know. I haven't heard about him. He generally could produce most anything you needed. So we had provisions on the ship, and stuff like that. It was fixed up real nice, this plane.

Q: When did you get back to Washington?

B: Well, we took off from there to San Francisco. We took off just about dark. I know it was just turning dark when we went through Tehatchepee, and I asked this copilot they had loaded on there with me at March Field, how much experience he had on a DC-3. "Well," he said, "this is the first time I have ever been in one." So I said: "What kind of pilot are you?" And he said: "I'm a fighter pilot." I said: "Well, do you know how to work the radio? Have you ever seen a radio like this?" "Well, no, not exactly," but he said: "I know how to work it." I said: "Okay, you take care of the radio, and I'll do the

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flying." So we flew on up to San Francisco, and General Arnold said: "Now I'm going to run down to see the Corps Area Commander." His name was DeWitt. And he said: "Then I'll be back about 12:00, and we'll have to go on to Washington as fast as we can." He said: "We have to make some provisions about this West Coast protection." So he took off for town and we got serviced up, and went in to try to get a little npa, which we never did get, as I recall. The General came back about 12:00 and we took off for Washington.

Q: Did he go and see DeWitt?

B: Yes.

Q: Because they were worried about an attack on the West Coast.

B: Well, that's what they were primarily, he thought the task force could presumably be coming on. Nobody knew anything.

Q: Well, this was a panic, until we located the Japanese fleet

B: There was lack of knowledge, so they had to make some assumptions to cover the things that might have happened. I suppose that Arnold knew that Washington must be talking to DeWitt. He was the man in the driver's seat, then. Anyhow, Arnold came back and he said: "Let's get to Washington as fast as we can." He went back and went to sleep.

Q: You left after midnight?

B: Yes, about 12:00 or 12:30. We saw the ground twice between San Francisco and Washington It was lousy weather. And we got to Washington the next afternoon, oh, I suppose, mid-afternoon, maybe a little later than that, and let down. We had to go pretty high for this DC-3, 17,000-18,000 feet over Dayton. There was this terrible storm in there. We went churning along and got into Washington about

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3 P.M. or 3:30 and Gen Arnold took off for downtown, and told me to come on down as soon as I could get ready to. I went home and my wife had an evening meal ready and I fell asleep at the table. A long haul, and next morning I went down to work, and we took off from there.

Q: Right after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was putting the heat on Arnold to mount some kind of air attack against Japan. Were you familiar with that activity?

B: Well, only the preparations for Jimmy Doolittle.

Q: But it didn't start out as Jimmy Doolittle. It started out in several other directions.

B: Oh, they had a dozen different plans, of course.

Q: The Halverson HALPRO.

B: Yes.

Q: There was Project AQUILLA. Do you remember a Merion Cooper?

B: Yes, he was in China before I got over there. He was a movie producer.

Q: I went to see him. Was he given some secret mission to try to line up airbases either in China or Siberia from which we could launch an attack?

B: I don't know about that, but I would say that if he were over in China, and I believe he was at the time Doolittle made his deal over there, that perhaps they had sent over inquiries as to where they could land in China, after they had come over from Japan. So he probably was involved in something, but I don't know about it.

Q: Well, you know in January, Arnold had several conferences with the President, and the President told him to let his imagination roam, to figure out some way they could get this attack doing. Of course, Roosevelt....

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B: Well, we had to do something to save face, obviously.

Q: Roosevelt was thinking of the political benefits. Arnold was not enthusastic about the Doolittle raid, because any time you lose most of your airplanes, this is not an efficient mission.

B: Well, of course, we didn't know, at that time, that we were going to, how it was going to turn out. That was an airplane that was not designed for the purpose.

Q: This may be the start of his so-called Advisory Council, or at least one of the reasons he dragged in Norstad and Cabell. Remember in February? According to Cabell, they were to do his thinking for him, on sort of these exotic type missions. Did he ever talk to you as to why he set up the Advisory Council?

B: He probably talked more about that problem than any other. We needed some vision. We needed to enlarge our field of thought and become hep with what was going on in the world, more than we had been, I suppose. I think, you know, we started to get a lot of scientists in along about that time, and I think the thought around there amongst some of the senior officers then was, if we could just get a few brains corralled in from somewhere, maybe we could come up with something to utilize our forces better than we have. This was our small attempt I think to get a few brains together to try to figure something out. Remember, they weren't harassed by all the daily work of running an office, or something, where they could go off in a room and try to study a matter out, and think it out.

Q: Was Arnold thinking directed, or pressured by the fact that they had now joined the JCS or CCS? He was sort of dragged into that, or sort of grew into it, as a result of the ARCADIA Conference. You

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remember the conference that occurred in Washington over Christmas of 1941? Churchill came and the British came.

B: I thought they were held on a boat up off Newfoundland.

Q: That was the Argentia. This was August 1941, before the war.

B: Oh, yes, I remember that one.

Q: Yes, that was before the war.

B: That was after Arnold and Eisenhower and Clark had gone over to Europe or gone over to England, and then Churchill came over here after that. This one you are talking about?

Q: Did Eisenhower, no, I think this was before that. Arnold and Eisenhower went to England, was this in connection with TORCH?

B: No, this was setting up the whole setup over there. Yes, I went over with them.

Q: Was this right after Pearl Harbor?

B: I think it was before.

Q: He was over there in April 1941.

B: That's when it was, I guess.

Q: This is when he went to London. Did you go with him?

B: Yes.

Q: Quesada went with him on that trip, too?

B: Quesada went the first time, and I don't know when that was; I don't remember, but the second time Arnold went over there, I went along, and it seems to me Vandenberg...

Q: Was this before the war?

B: Well, we must have just beginning to get in it. We had started to organize AF Headquarters over there.

Q: This was in May 1942, this is when they set up the 8th AF. Remember Chaney was in England?

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B: Then I must have left Washington just about the time we got back because I left, I think, in the middle of June or July 1942. That was when Gen Eisenhower and Gen Clark and Gen Arnold went over. I know I made a survey of what was happening to American aircraft that we were shipping over there. We were shipping over a lot of what we called B-24s, Liberators, they called them.

Q: Did they have LB-30s at that time?

B: Well, they were that same brand of aircraft, and the British had them all parked up at Prestwick. They had a flock of them up there. The reason they had them parked, they couldn't find the parts to get them out. So, I investigated all of that, and I made a report, I remember, personally, to the Prime Minister on the matter, and got myself in the doghouse.

Q: Yes, you got into "dutch" on that one, because Portal didn't think. I saw the report on this. He thought that you had taken matters too strongly in hand.

B: Yes.

Q: Yes. Well, that is the May 1942 trip.

B: Well, the one before that, I wasn't on.

Q: The one before that, was a year before, it was Argentia.

B: I remember Quesada went over with him.

Q: But I'm talking about three weeks after the war, Christmastime, Churchill came over, and they had the first JCS and CCS meetings.

B: I, of course, wasn't in on any of those meetings, but I remember I moved Mr. Churchill to Stettinius' house in Miami. I think that was the time that happened. The President sent him down there for a couple of weeks' vacation.

Q: Arnold was then accepted in the JCS. Partly due to pressure by the British, because Portal was an equal. The RAF wasn't equal,

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and they wanted the Air Force to meet with them on the same level.

B: Yes, I think that was the basis for the Air ever getting into the picture at all. Because we were going to operate with the British, and we had to set our system up to correspond with them, or we found it probably advantageous to do that.

Q: My interpretation is that the British had as much to do with Arnold gaining equality, as any other factor.

B: Well, that could well be.

Q: Because Marshall never regarded him as quite equal, nor did King. King always wanted to deal...

B: No, I think Marshall regarded him as equal. I think it was King that was the one...

Q: He was equal, but not quite equal. Marshall...

B: Well, according to law, he wasn't even...he was just a Chief.

Q: He was just one cut below Marshall. You know, in their correspondence it was "Dear Arnold."

B: Oh, I think till the day Arnold died, he always felt that Gen Marshall was his boss.

Q: Yes, but the letters would go "Dear Arnold," and the other way, "Dear General." Always, or "Dear General Marshall," or he ducked it and said: "Memorandum for General Marshall." But he never said: "Dear George," in their writing. Did he ever call him "Dear George" verbally?

B: Well, he might possibly, but I don't remember, no, I've been with them when it was just the two of them.

Q: Was it Hap and George?

B: No, I don't think so. I don't remember Gen Marshall ever calling anybody by his first name.

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Q: I don't think the President called him "George." He probably said Gen Marshall.

B: I suspect so.

Q: And I've been told that Mrs. Marshall didn't call him "George," either.

B: I don't know.

Q: He was sort of a distant man.

B: Sandra might be able to tell you, he used to sit in the theater with them every night, my daughter. Yes, at Fort Myer.

Q: Really? You know, I hope to see Frank McCarthy.

B: Yes, I remember him. I didn't know him quite well.

Q: He's the guy who produced PATTON.

B: Is that right? He was a fine brain, that guy.

Q: I saw Godfrey McHugh, and I had a long interview with him. You remember him.

B: Yes, I remember him.

Q: He was always somebody's aide.

B: Well, you know the reason; I feel quite strongly about Gen Marshall, you know. I think he was really the man that got the Air Force on its feet and made it was what it is. Or made it possible for what it is. I think General Arnold, of course, did the work as far as we are concerned. But Marshall made that possible. The reason for that was exactly like the Craig deal, Arnold had no right to an aircraft, so it was Marshall's aircraft. I used to fly Gen Marshall a lot of places.

Q: Was it that Marshall had a lot of confidence in Arnold that he gave him carte blanche?

B: He thought that Gen Arnold, if anybody knew about air, it had to be General Arnold.

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Q: This brings me to another area. Were you aware of the fact that a number of people within the Air Corps, or the AAF, were pushing for a separate air force, specifically Frank Andrews and Hugh Knerr? You know, there was correspondence between them.

B: Oh yes, I don't think there was ever any secret about that, that there was a group that wanted it now. That's like these kids, we don't want to arbitrate. We just want it right now.

Q: Well, the McNarney plan, which was implemented March 9, 1942--this is when the AAF gained equality with the AGF and the ASF--this was sort of a half-way house, or half a loaf. This correspondence that I have seen between Knerr and Andrews showed them very angry at Arnold, for selling out the AAF's aspirations of equality. They said we ought to get it now, we need equality now, and they regarded Arnold as a betrayer of the highest goal of the AAF.

B: Of course, if they did, they never mentioned that around where they could be heard.

Q: That was their correspondence.

B: Yes, but that was between the two of them, not in official papers.

Q: That's right, and Knerr, Knerr was always a political guy. He was always manipulating, writing books and articles under the table. You were aware of his activity, were you?

B: Well, there was a feeling, yes, I suppose.

Q: You know, Knerr retired in 1939.

B: I had a run-in with him one time. I was prejudiced about him. Only two men in my life I ever had trouble with, and he was one of them.

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Q: What happened?

B: Well, it was on that tape we made. I think it was on there. Something to do with Clagett. He wrote a letter out, after Gen Arnold left March Field I was to stay there until they went back to the Engineering School. I was Gen Clagett's Adjutant. That was my job there, at that time. So Knerr wrote Clagett, or I guess Gen Andrews wrote Clagett about something, and Knerr signed it. Clagett wasn't one for writing back to a menial, over his own signature. So he prepared a letter, and he made it for my signature for the CG.

Q: I don't remember that. Was that in the tape?

B: I think it was, or maybe it was what we did afterwards. Anyhow, in about a week or two, came back a rip-roaring letter to me. I thought I was about ready to meet all the Inspector Generals in the world at a court martial--for bawling me out for writing such a letter to the CG of the GHQ AF. So I took it into Gen Clagett and he said: "Forget it!" He said: "I'll take care of this." He really wrote one, and that one he signed himself; I always thought that Gen Clagett at least did support his officers.

Q: You know, Clagett and Andrews were classmates. They wrote each other letters. Clagett blamed Arnold for his trouble. You know, Clagett was writing to Andrews when he was demoted.

B: Yes, this was trouble; I was overseas then.

Q: You were probably there the first time he got demoted. He got demoted twice.

B: I remember one time that he came in with Colonel's leaves on, and I had been a 1st LT or something out here on the Coast, when I was his Adjutant. We both had Colonel wings on at that time. I felt real sorry for him that day. That may have been one of the times he got demoted.

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Q: He got demoted right after March Field. He came to March in March 1936

B: That's probably about the right time, because after I left March Field about two years elapsed before I went to Washington.

Q: And then he got promoted again, and he was demoted again. You know, he was in China when the war broke out, with the Magruder Commission. He got in trouble there, probably due to his drinking, I don't know. Anyway, he wrote letters to Andrews, and Mary Clagett wrote letters to Andrews, denouncing Arnold for his role.

B: Oh yes...

Q: Why did he have it in for Arnold? Do you know?

B: I don't know. I don't know. General Arnold used to tell me lots of stories about these characters we had in the AF. I guess you'd have to call Clagett a character. But my personal contact with him was about this thing. He went to bat for me. I only worked for him just a short time.

Q: Well, he only lasted from March to July 1936 at March Field, and then, they brought in Pirie as a Base Commander and Delos Emmons came in as the Wing Commander. He only lasted three months. Do you remember he put some people on unauthorized flights? A fellow named Malone.

B: I remember Colonel Malone.

Q: Sent Malone on an unauthorized flight and he got in trouble on that.

B: I have a faint recollection of that. I had forgotten about it.

Q: He kept writing these letters. He was writing letters to Congressmen, blaming Arnold. He was asking Andrews to intercede for

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him, to give him another chance at the star. He got it, but he didn't hold it.

B: That could tie into something that happened to me, while I was at Wright Field. There was an officer, Inspector General, Colonel Beebe. He eventually became a General, and he was a personal friend of Gen Marshall's, and his son became a general in the Air Force, Royden Beebe. I don't know what ever happened to Royden. He disappeared. Maybe he is dead now, I don't know, and I was back at Washington on the bomber business with Oliver Echols. We were in something to do with the B-17, I think, in buying more of them, and stuff. Gen Arnold called me into his office--he was Asst Chief then--he said: "Sit down in that chair." And it was his chair at his desk. And I thought: "Holy smoke; what's going on?" And he said: "I want to introduce you to Colonel Beebe." And I thought: "This was some old home week," you know. Colonel Beebe addressed himself to me, and he said: "Captain," or whatever I was, "this is about some secret papers that were lost at March Field after you left there, for which you had signed." It was a code book and something else had disappeared, I guess. They couldn't find them. So they were having a big investigation, and that must have been due to Clagett's turnover, where this had come to knowledge. My recollection at that time was that when I left there, I cleared everything I had with whoever relieved me, and I just didn't know a thing about it. I didn't even remember the papers they were talking about. So they had this little investigation, and Gen Arnold laughed at me about it.

Q: I want to task you about something else at March Field. Do you remember the Bear Lake Camp that he set up? This recreation camp?

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B: Yes, I remember that very well.

Q: And that was built by scrounged material?

B: Yes.

Q: Were you in charge of scrounging or participated in it?

B: No, the only actual physical thing I ever did in regard to that, was I took a load of materials up there one day, and the old Fokler or Ford, I forget which one we had at March Field, as a pinch-hitter. I wasn't a regular pilot of it. It felt awfully heavy when I took off. I landed up there at Big Bear which is fairly high in the area. And gee, did we roll. So I sat there. When they started unloading, see what they had done? They had loaded a whole mess of steam equipment, steam radiators and pipes, and then they covered it with a canvas and they could look like it was nothing. I'll bet that's the heaviest load. of whatever it was, one of these things ever carried in its whole life. It scared me to death.

Q: In other words, you didn't know what you were taking up?

B: I didn't have sense enough to look at what was in there.

Q: But I guess Arnold sort of winked at this, because he felt it was good for morale?

B: No, there wasn't any winking. This was all legitimate, what we were doing. The whole March Field was built that way.

Q: I thought this was sort of, they sort of scrounged materials.

B: When March Field was turned over to us to occupy, they had made no provisions for any shrubs on that desolate desert out there. So Arnold went out and he got the towns around there, to donate palm trees. We would go over with trucks and pick them up. Now, maybe that wasn't legitimate mileage for the trucks or something. I wouldn't

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know about that, but that's the way all the trees got planted at March Field. That's the way we did everything. That's the way we started Everett's Field out there--the bombing base, we started it on a shoestring.

Q: That was an auxiliary field to March.

B: So we would have a place to drop bombs. We had been doing it down in North Island in a little block square down there.

Q: This was a great move by somebody, was it Arnold?

B: Arnold did the whole thing. Sure, he got the whole thing started.

Q: Did Minton Kaye have a role in that?

B: Minton Kaye was our photography officer, and he was active in the bombing range setup. He went out there and took charge of it, because we needed a lot of photographs to lay the place out. It had to be triangulated, and a lot of stuff like that.

Q: Minton Kaye was very close to Arnold. The Kayes were, weren't they?

B: Well, Mrs. Kaye was a very good friend of Mrs. Arnold's. I think, we could put it that way.

Q: So this sort of gave,Minton Kaye had ready access to the CO's office for a time, didn't he? Did he throw his weight around?

B: Well, I don't think any other than in line of duty. I knew him real well and I don't think he had any, you mean, a Palace Guard type of thing. No, I don't think so. He was an efficient officer.

Q: You know, an altercation arose between him and George Goddard, are you familiar with that?

B: Well, George Goddard was a photographer at Wright Field. Well, it could be, they were both in the same business.

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Q: Have you read George Goddard's book?

B: No, I wouldn't read a book by him, if he was talking about smoking cigarettes. He was a screwball, if there ever was one. But he was. Is he still alive? Excuse me, George. I didn't know him very well, except what he did around Wright Field. And, of course, Wright Field was filled with people like that.

Q: Do you consider him an authentic, if not genius....?

B: I would say he was a genius, in those days.

Q: Well, he blames Minton Kaye, for turning Arnold away from him. Do you know anything about that?

B: No.

Q: And he calls Minton Kaye "Colonel Nemesis" in his book, and caused him to be exiled, Arnold exiled him, you know.

B: Exiled who?

Q: Exiled Goddard.

B: He was at Wright Field when I was there.

Q: Well, he came to Washington, and Arnold got rid of him. He developed the strip camera, this famous strip camera, and the Navy bought it. Finally, the AF took him back, but Arnold was alienated from him, and he blames Minton Kaye for this.

B: Well, it could be, I don't know. They were both in the same business, so it might be...

Q: You don't know anything about it?

B: No, I don't recall anything about it, except I remember that Goddard was considered one of the way-out ones that we had at Wright. We had some others there.

Q: He was the kind of guy, he came in and showed you a big display and then after you approved that, he would come in the next day and show you another thing, in another area.

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B: We had people that did that.

Q: So I guess he made himself obnoxious.

B: They were ahead of their time in a lot of the stuff that they did; I guess we didn't understand them too well. But I don't remember about the Kaye-Goddard affair.

Q: Do you remember a guy named Steve Ferson?

B: Yes, he died right at our feet one morning in Arnold's office.

Q: In Arnold's office?

B: Yes.

Q: Were you there?

B: Yes, I wasn't in the room where he died, but I was about four feet away from him.

Q: When he died?

B: Yes.

Q: He died in Arnold's office?

B: Yes.

Q: Was Arnold bawling him out?

B: No, I don't think so. They had just started the meeting.

Q: Oh, there was a meeting?

B: Yes, our Surgeon was there, Dave Grant, and I don't remember who else. But they tried to find a doctor, I guess Dave forgot he was a doctor. But he said, no, he couldn't do anything about it. He had to get the OD, which was a Navy officer that day. Miss Atkins was there, too. The two of us were just outside Arnold's door, and they came running out. I went in and looked, and I knew he was dead right away. He was purple, you know, so did Dave. But we had to get the official doctor.

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Q: I've heard two versions.

B: The meeting broke up, needless to say.

Q: That Arnold was chewing him out and he dropped dead.

B: No, I don't think so. They just walked through the door, and put themselves down. As I remember, Steve was sitting on a table. There were some big tables in the office, and I think the meeting was just getting underway, and he just keeled over.

Q: Another version is that he died in Lovett's office.

B: No, it was in Arnold's.

Q: And one of the reasons, this is like Arsenic and Old Lace. Some people didn't want it known that a man had died in Arnold's office, because they'd assume that he died under great criticism, or great pressure. The story was that he was dragged into Lovett's, the office adjacent, so it wouldn't be associated with Arnold.

B: No, that's not true.

Q: Bill Streett told me he died in Lovett's office.

B: Well, Bill Streett worked for Lovett.

Q: That's what I mean. So, I'm just thinking.

B: Well, they must have dragged him from there back into Arnold's office, because that's where he was lying on the floor.

Q: You weren't there when he keeled over, but you came in subsequently?

B: Well, my desk, they all had to walk back, right by it. And it was only four feet through the door--one of these swinging bar-type doors, ventilated, and all. These folks just filed in, when Arnold buzzed me and said: "Send in everybody." They had just been in there, as I recall, not five minutes, and were just getting organized, and

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getting themselves, positioned, and heard this thud. Dave Grant came running out, and said: "Get a doctor; get a doctor!" And I looked at him kind of crazy, I suppose, because he was our Surgeon. So we got the Navy doctor. He said: "Get the OD over at the Navy. That's the doctor we have to get."

Q: I want to change the subject. Arnold wrote himself a memo for the record, on March 16, 1942. He came back from a meeting at the White House, and he was very much upset because Roosevelt had been building up the European force, BOLERO, second or third to Australia and other requirements. Arnold's greatest interest was building up Europe, because he felt that we had to launch an air attack against the continent, in order to soften up Hitler for the ultimate invasion. So, at this point he felt that the President had been turned away from Europe first strategy to a Pacific first. Did he ever talk to you about this?

B: You said that the President wanted to build Europe, you mean he wanted to build the Pacific first.

Q: Yes, change the priority, yes, to the Pacific.

B: And Arnold wanted to build up Europe first.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about that?

B: No, I don't recall any of that. This would have been things that would have business for the Joint Chiefs and their staff, and I don't recall Arnold ever saying anything about that. The only time I ever remember him coming from the White House, and he was smiling that time. He said: "Gene, I'm in." He said: "The President called me 'Hap.'" Up to then, why, he didn't know, I'm sure in his own heart, whether he would be accepted by Roosevelt or not.

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Q: Was this after Pearl Harbor?

B: I don't remember when it was. It was in that frantic era when we were trying to get organized, I know.

Q: That brings me to talk about Arnold and Morgenthau. Their relationship.

B: Oh, General Arnold didn't like Gen Morgenthau at all.

Q: Were you aware of the incident that occurred in Santa Monica on January 23, 1939?

B: The plane cracked up there?

Q: The plane crack-up with the Frenchman.

B: Yes, I was involved in that.

Q: How were you involved in that?

B: We broke the code that day. Didn't you hear that story? Well, K.B. Wolfe was the man out here then, and North American was building some kind of an aircraft.

Q: A prototype of the A-20?

B: Well, whatever it was, North American--it might have been Douglas, but I think it was North American. Well, of course, I guess we would have to go back a little farther. Mr. Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, thought he was in command of building airplanes for the foreign countries. So whether or not this man got out there and was flying this aircraft under Treasury Dept auspices, or Air Corps' auspices, I don't recall now. But anyhow, the guy cracked the airplane up, or something and he got killed, didn't he? So there had to be some reports rendered and Arnold sent a Coded message to K.B. Wolfe requesting certain information. K.B. Wolfe sent a coded message back to Washington, giving this information. But it must have gotten garbled, because we couldn't make hide nor hair of it. Arnold got

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mad and he grabbed the telephone, and called K.B. and he said: "What the hell did you tell me on that telegram?" And so K.B. gave it to him clear over the telephone. And the Chief Signal Officer than was Gen Mauborgne. Anyhow, he had been at Wright Field. I knew him pretty well. He was in the Signal Laboratory there. And a couple of days later, Mauborgne came storming in, and I could see the fire was flashing out of his eyes. And he said: "Look here, you fellows have broken the code. It is going to cost me $45,000 out of my budget." So I got him into a chair by my desk and said: "Tell me what happened?" So he explained, that this coming back in the clear. Apparently, he must have gotten copies of all the telephone conversations in and out of the War Department up in the Signal Office; somehow, I don't how he found out about it. But, anyhow, he had the dope. And I said: "Oh my, this is terrible." And he said: "Now, can I go in and see General Arnold?" and I said: "Just a moment you can. I'll have to go in and explain to him what it is you want to see him about." So I walked in, and I told Gen Arnold what was going on. And he said: "By gosh, I guess we did. I never thought about that darn code." We weren't used to using codes. They all had to be laboriously worked out in these big books they had. So he said: "Well, tell him to come in." It was just before lunch. So General Mauborgne went in there, and he dressed Hap down, as he called him, real well. Arnold was very sorry that this had happened.

Q: Was Mauborgne two stars?

B: Oh, I don't remember, I suppose. And so Arnold turned to me and he said: "Gene, what can we do about this?" And good old me, I thought real fast, and said: "Well, the only thing I can think that we can really do to show him how sorry we are is to take him to lunch at

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the Officers' Navy Club today." And Mauborgne looked kind of startled. Arnold said: "Will that be all right?" and called him by his name. And Mauborgne said: "Okay, god dammit." We all went to lunch up at the Army-Navy Club, and no more was ever said about it.

Q: There was another aspect of it.

B: That didn't clear up the trouble with Morgenthau and how that finally got cleared up, I don't know. But they got him out of the driver's seat some way. Maybe the President did it, and we got control of the production.

Q: This took a long time. Arnold went up to testify before the Senate Committee.

B: Oh, he was up there all the time.

Q: And of course, he had to put the finger on somebody, and they were asking: "How come a Frenchman--his name was Paul Schmidlin--how come a Frenchman is flying a secret aircraft?"

B: As I say, I don't know what the steps actually were that were taken to get the Treasury Dept and Mr. Morgenthau out of the airplane procurement picture.

Q: He had a couple of Navy captains. One man, Capt Collins, who was his procurement official.

B: Yes, I know Ted Collins.

Q: And they got themselves involved. This was before the war was started in Europe. Morgenthau was strongly interventionist, and he sort of put himself in the job of expediting aid to the British and French. Arnold had just taken the job as Chief of Air Corps. If he gave the best equipment to the British and French, how was he going to build up an Air Corps? This is really a problem.

B: Well, one of the basic problems was that the aircraft that the British wanted didn't include those features which worked with the

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theories that we were working on, or had been using. They wanted different gun positions, different types of guns, different this and different that. Our thought on bombing was--I believe I'm correct in this--we wanted to bomb when we could see the targets, because we had that accurate bombsight, the Norden. We figured that our aircraft were built substantially enough to withstand reasonable fire, and that if we could see the target and put one bomb on it, this was better than putting a thousand bombs, 50 feet away, I mean, accurately, right on the target. The British didn't operate that way. Their aircraft were not built like ours. They were, I suppose the word you would have to say is flimsier, and they didn't carry the firepower, the guns that we did. Their fuel systems weren't fixed so they didn't leak, and stuff like that. They had to fly at night with mass bombing. They bombed areas. Our theory was that we could do better and more efficient work if we could use our bombsight and see what we were working on. So, if we were going to build airplanes to their standards, they weren't going to be the kind we wanted. And, therefore, we should get our production going on aircraft that we could use, and if they could use them, fine, we would make extras. I think that was the basis, and I think that was finally what must have been sold. And that's how come we got production.

Q: The question was then whose specifications are you going to build them to? The British or to the Air Corps?

B: Our books, yes.

Q: And this was part of the controversy?

B: Oh, I'm sure it must have been, and I think it must have been the basis on how it was decided, but how decided it, finally, obviously must have been the President, but why he did it, I don't know.

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Q: Arnold, in his book, GLOBAL MISSION, mentioned the President hinted that there were places like Guam for recalcitrant officers. I think this occurred after a Fulton Lewis broadcast, some comment about controversy over the plane.

B: Well, Fulton Lewis did a lot of broadcasting in those days. His brother, you know, was an Air Force officer.

Q: Millard Lewis. He was A-2.

B: Later on, he was a junior officer in the 31st Bomb Squadron when I was at March, came there from the Point. I never knew him too well, I was around him a few times when he was preparing broadcasts, and even when he made them. But I never knew him too well.

Q: Arnold was not a cussing man, but once in a while, he let loose?

B: Yes, about individuals sometimes.

Q: Like Morgenthau?

B: Yes, I suspect. One time he came back from Gen Marshall's office, and he was chuckling to himself, he said: "Gene, come on in here." So I went in. He said: "I have just been bawled out." And I said: "What in the world did you do?" He had been up to a meeting all day with the British up-town or somewhere, I forget, with Sir John Dill. Dill, I guess, was the man up there then, or one of them. So General Arnold had gone in to tell General Marshall about what happened. You see, General Marshall was very interested in all this--vitally interested. So, every time Arnold came hom from a meeting anywhere, he went right to Marshall's office, and told him every detail that happened. So this time, apparently, according to what General Arnold told me, he had gone stomping in, and slammed the door in Bedell Smith's face, and said to Gen Marshall: "You know what those SOBs

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have done now?" and General Marshall, apparently remembering something that happened to him in the first World War said: "Arnold, to whom are you referring?" And Arnold said: "I'm talking about the god-damned British." And General Marshall said: "Look, do not refer in my presence to our loyal allies in those kind of words." He said: "Don't call our loyal allies those god-damned SOBs anymore." And this kind of set Gen Arnold back; I think Marshall laughed when he said it. But he meant it.

Q: In other words, he was being a littl sarcastic about the British?

B: Yes, he said, in other words, he told Arnold, you don't have to go to all those words to describe it. I know what you are talking about.

Q: Arnold had trouble with Portal all the time about a variety of subjects

B: Well, I suspect because this was the procurement business again. I remember one time, we took Air Chief Marshal Portal--I guess was his title--on a fishing trip down off Florida somewhere. I was with him several days. I think we went around and looked over a lot of those flying schools that we were organizing in Loveland, and that old base there by Lake Okeechobee, and various places. I became quite well acquainted with Portal, at that time. He and Arnold had a good working relationship, but...

Q: Every now and then they had some friction?

B: Official friction. I don't think, ever personal matters. Very seldom was there anything personal amongst those fellows.

Q: Now, this may have happened after you left, one of the issues was that the British were asking for a lot of planes that they weren't using.

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B: That's the ones I looked at over there. That was the start of the whole deal. And that's why Portal got on me on that.

Q: You wrote this report?

B: I didn't write it. I told the Prime Minister at dinner. And Portal was sitting there, and so was Mr. Harriman and so was the Ambassador that shot himself, Winant. He was there. In fact, Harriman was supposed to be at Churchill's left, and I was clear down at the end of the table with Tommy--that was Churchill's Aide. Mr. Churchill said: "Just a minute, before you sit down. Harriman, you and Winant, all move down one." And he called me up, and I sat down at his left hand. After the dinner was over, he said: "Now, Colonel, what have you discovered about this aircraft matter?" So I just blurted it out. I said: "All I discovered was this. There are a lot of American aircraft over here in England," and I said, "there are 55 Liberators or whatever they were, up there at Prestwick. They are sitting there, and not being used for anything. And they tell me up there--and I investigated and found out it's probably true--that they can't find the necessary spare parts to operate them in quantity. So I found out the reason they can't fly them. They don't understand our nomenclature. The parts are there. The warehouse is full of the, but an American sergeant has to go over and find them and bring them back for your people." I said: "I think what ought to happen is for American airplanes all the parts should be furnished and serviced and distributed by Americans. If they are your airplanes, they ought to be done by your people. If we are using some of your airplanes, we will get the parts from you, and you get them from us." Churchill looked down to the Air man, the civilian that was in charge then, and he said: "That's what we'll do." And Portal, I could see his face get red, he never told me

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anything. But he wrote some nasty letters to General Arnold about it.

Q: Did Arnold, when you came over there, Arnold told you roam around and see what you could find out? "Snoop around and make me a report?"

B: Go everywhere we've got equipment. I went over to Liverpool, the big port in England. The warehouses were full of these fighters, that North American had built--Mustangs, weren't they called? They couldn't move them out of there. They couldn't even find out how to unpack them.

B: They were down on the docks at the warehouses. They never had even been moved off the docks. They were full of these things. That was for the same reason. They couldn't find out how to unpack them, even. They didn't know; they didn't have the savvy. And their nomenclature, and the way they handled parts were entirely different from the way we did it. And there was just no chance. I could see if the war lasted another 10 years, they could never have learned it, nor could we have learned their system. That seemed reasonable, and I guess they did. It worked out all right.

Q: Averell Harriman is getting kind of old--do you think he would be worth talking to about Arnold?

B: Oh, he was around that place quite often.

Q: I seem to have the impression that he didn't think too highly of Arnold.

B: I don't know.

Q: Between '39 and early '41, Arnold was sort of dragging his feet on aid to the British, and this was partly the result of the controversy with Morgenthau. Morgenthau wanted to ship everything out.

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B: That gave him a very sour taste in his mouth, I'm sure.

Q: Arnold was trying to keep some of the good equipment home. By sending Arnold overseas and giving him this treatment, Arnold came back and he devised new ways of getting airplanes to the British, via the southern route, and all kinds of improvisations. So it worked, but are you aware that this was a "buttering-up" process?

B: No, I'm aware that I didn't make that trip with him, and I often wondered why, and Miss Adkins told me it was because I wasn't sophisticated enough. She was nice, a good friend. We were all very close. I never did ask General Arnold about it. But after that, of course, I knew it was the only time I never went with him.

Q: You went on most trips with him?

B: Everything after that, while I was still there. Except I didn't go to NY, when he and Gen Marshall slipped up to meet Churchill up on the boat up there.

Q: The Argentia meeting.

B: He almost got caught by Hansen Baldwin, NY Times. We were sitting there eating dinner at the airport, in the hash house there. And he recognized General Marshall. General Arnold came over and chatted with him.

Q: Where was this, what airport?

B: At LaGuardia. We were just catching a bite, because they were about to get into another means of transportation and go on up to this battleship.

Q: I see, didn't they get on a ship in the Harlem River, or at Hellgate-125th Street?

B: I don't know. I probably knew after, but at that time, I had no idea where they were going.

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Q: They weren't leaving from that airport?

B: I don't know. We were going to eat, and they were going to get up and leave. Where they were going, they didn't say. Arnold said: "Look, we are all going to be okay now." He said: "Just pay the bill and go back home."

Q: And this was in LaGuardia Airport. They didn't use LaGuardia aiport. They got on a ship in the East River.

B: I don't know, but that's where we landed. I landed Gen Marshall and Arnold.

Q: You landed Marshall and Arnold there?

B: And we went in, and that's when this incident happened. As I recall it, I don't think I knew who he was at the time. But I think Gen Marshall said who he was.

Q: And they were worried that he would spill the beans?

B: They were worried that he would hang around and try to find out what they were doing there. And I guess we gave him the impression that we were just catching a bite to eat before we took off for Washington. But, anyhow, that was pretty close.

Q: Well, one of the reasons for great secrecy there. The President loved ships. He loved any excuse to get on a ship, was coming up in the Augusta, a cruiser.

B: Well, they were going to meet with the flags flying and all that sort of stuff.

Q: Yes, with the flags flying, but the thing is, the President was sailing up the East Coast, which was infested with German submarines. I mean, this was the time of the worst crisis in the U-boat war. They were sinking hundreds of ships, and President Roosevelt decides to go up there by ship, which was the most dangerous way he could do it.

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B: Well, until a long time after this happened, I had no idea what went on or what they were doing. I don't know to this day exactly how they got from that table there. The Navy took them over.

Q: They got onto a destroyer in the East River.

B: I think they walked out in front of the airport, and somebody picked them up. I think it was all set up and they had a little paper there.

Q: From the airport, to the East River, they could have gotten into a launch and gotten on a destroyer in Long Island Sound.

B: I think it was Louis Parker that was with me that day. We didn't look out the window or try to find out anything. We didn't know anything. Whenever I had a choice of somebody going along to help fly the plane, I took Louis Parker.

Q: One aspect of that, Arnold went up to this Conference, this was really the first conference that he was invited to sit with the mighty.

B: Yes. This was after Roosevelt had accepted him and called him "Hap," I think.

Q: He left with the press pictures. He was going to distribute this to the press, but delayed until the President got back to Washington, because the President would be two days at sea after the Argentia Conference. So, Arnold got back, and one individual he didn't want to see was a newspaperman. When he got back to his house, it seems Mrs. Arnold was there with a newspaperman, but he was there for another reason. They were interviewing her for the Army Emergency Fund, or some such thing. Arnold got terribly agitated about this, that the newspapermen shcuild find him there. He was supposed to be out of town.

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B: Yes, this would have been bad for his image.

Q: Right, if this thing got out...

B: And for Mrs. Arnold. She didn't even know where he had been, I'm sure.

Q: They took off at midnight for Nags Head. This was a favorite place, because she had hayfever.

B: I used to take him down there all the time

Q: They took off in the middle of the night for Nags Head, driving in the car, because they didn't want to be seen in Washington. I'm not sure he went with her. Maybe he did, but he had to be out of town for two days.

B: The chances are that Mrs. Arnold drove down, and I probably flew him down the next morning. I'm just guessing at that, but that might not be true. I don't remember him ever having time to drive down there.

Q: You flew him down there?

B: Oh, lots of times, we had a Grumman amphibian we used.

Q: You'd fly right up to the water's edge?

B: We'd land on the inland side of Nags Head, and taxi up on the sand there.

Q: They had to get out of town, because if it were known that he was in town, and they were out of town, people would start to draw conclusions. Of course, this could have put him in the soup.

B: Oh my, yes. I'll tell you that was pretty hectic when the President was involved on anything. You bet you.

Q: Do you remember--this may have happened after your time--when somebody made the pictures of this special C-54 with the elevator, the President's plane. They got the President's wheelchair up into

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the airplane. Somebody took some pictures of this. Somebody really got reamed for it. This must have been in '44, after your time.

B: The only time I ever saw that aircraft, that the President allegedly flew in, was at Miami, Florida, when I was there with my group, getting some special stuff put on the planes to go on to China. The Presidential aircraft came in there and landed, and was kept under separate guard, not too far from the building I was working from. And they had this hoist, and it went up and down, but nobody ever saw the President. Whether or not the President was in that aircraft or not, I don't know. Or whether that was a decoy to cover his movements someplace else, I'll never know to this day. Nobody knew at the field. At least, none of the air people there did. But that's the only time I ever saw the airplane, or even heard about it.

Q: I want to ask you about another subject. In June or July 1943, the President, at the behest of Churchill, changed the plan from the buildup of Europe for the bombardment program, to North Africa. See, the BOLERO program was to build up the European invasion, for the assault upon Germany. Spaatz and the 8th AF had been set up in Europe, and Churchill was opposed to the invasion. He opposed it all along.

B: He wanted to go at what he called "the soft belly."

Q: Soft underbelly, and of course, they had a plan called SLEDGEHAMMER. This was an emergency invasion, in the event that Russia went under, or was about to go under. This was an invasion of Europe, in order to draw off German reinforcements to help save Russia. This was called SLEDGEHAMMER. Of course, the Russians were in trouble, but they were not in that trouble. Marshall and Hopkins went over, and they had this big knock-down drag-out fight. The President acceded to Churchill's wish to delay the invasion until 1943. At that time,

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they delayed it for one year, and they were going to go into TORCH, into North Africa. Arnold was very disappointed, because he thought that any diversion from the buildup of airpower in the UK was not going to advance the war effort. Were you aware of his drive in this direction, or disappointment when it was changed?

B: No, I think that was all happening just at the time I was leaving Washington.

Q: When did you leave Washington?

B: Either June or July 1942.

Q: It was about that time. Your leaving, were you asking to get your chance in combat?

B: No, I never mentioned it. But you see, it came about this way. In the first World War, General Arnold never got into combat.

Q: Was he sensitive to this subject?

B: He was very sensitive. He didn't think that was a way to treat anybody. He thought every officer should have a chance at his profession, rather than sit in an office somewhere. So when this special deal that I got mixed up in, came up, why he must have selected me for that.

Q: What deal was that?

B: Take the B-24s to China, and get the preliminary data for the future operation of the B-29s. We had to supply ourselves from India, and conduct missions from China, just as the B-29s did later on.

Q: Sort of a test case?

B: Well, it was to find out what the logistic problems were, and whether it was possible to do it. So he allowed me to go, and I got a letter somewhere. He told me why he let me go, and it's primarily due, I'm sure, because of his experience in the first war.

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Q: Several other officers hit him in this vulnerable spot. Norstad, Cabell, were you aware of his interest in a War College, a National War College? This may have happened late in '42, you know, Cabell was his instrumentality in setting up in what ended up the Army-Navy Staff College. Cabell was a student of the first class. This could have come to a head after your time.

B: No, I wasn't aware of any of that group that you called the Advisory Group until I came from from overseas. I don't think at that time it was operating any more, because Gen Arnold took Reuben Hood and myself. That's why I thought you said, and put us down in a room with Muir Fairchild.

Q: He was Director of Military Requirements?

B: Well, it just happened we used the same room down the hall somewhere in the Pentagon. We were supposed to sit there and look out the window and scratch our heads and think up ways and means to move the troops from Europe to the Pacific in the quickest and the fastest. And we dreamed up this Continental Air Force, which Bill Streett was to command, eventually, which I organized, and was the first commander, you might say. I ran it from the Coral Gables hospital for two or three months while I was down there with General Arnold, until Bill Streett got back to the States and took it over.

Q: When did you get back?

B: I got back in the fall of '44, and about the first thing that happened to me outside of this brain thing we were supposed to be working on, they sent me over to see General MacArthur's people, and arrange for the B-29 bases in the Philippines. This is just when they were going into Leyte. I got there about the day they went ashore, but I only went as far as Hollandia, but I got all the information we

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needed from the engineer over there, and brought the maps back to Washington to where they would build these B-29 bases in the Philippines.

Q: Is this Samuel Sturgis?

B: I believe that was his name. And, of course, they were head over heels into getting into the Philippines, just getting a foothold there. But they still had their engineering department going fine into Hollandia. They had all this dope and they knew every foot of the Philippines, of course; and they knew just where we put the fields. I brought all that dope back there to that staff in Washington. Then, just shortly after I got back, which was late December, as I recall, General Arnold had his problem.

Q: He had a heart attack?

B: Well, who knows. What happened, I was working with Reuben Hood down there in the room. We were still thinking about these things and Dave Grant and Miss Adkins asked me to come up to the front office. I went up there, and they said Gen Arnold was over there at Quarters 8, Fort Myer, "and we think he is ill, and Mrs. Arnold is in California, somewhere. And he won't tell us what to do. So would you mind going over?" I guess they figured I was the only one that he might not kick out of the place. So I went over and knocked on the door, and some Sergeant--one of the house boys over there--wanted to know who I was. I hollered real loud who I was and Arnold was upstairs in a bedroom, and he said: "Come on upstairs." So I went up, and I said: "What the heck happened to you?" And he said: "I don't know, but something did." So he said: "I don't feel too well." And I said: "What are you going to do about it?" Well, he said: "I had the local doctor over--Lee Martin, from the base--and he thinks I had some trouble, or other." You see, I didn't know about this thing he had while I was

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overseas. Nobody had told me about it. It was hush-hush, I guess. So I said: "Well, I think that you should do something about this." And he said: "What do you think I should do?" I said: "Well, I'll get the plane ready." And, first thing tomorrow morning we'll take off and go down to Coral Gables, and you will go into the hospital down there and we will find out what the heck's wrong with you." And he said: "All right, fix it up."

Q: You flew him down?

B: Yes. So I stayed with him all the time he was in the hospital. In fact, I was his only communication with the outside world. Ira Eaker was running the show in Washington.

Q: Ira Eaker came in later; Ira Eaker came in April.

B: Well, maybe at the time we went down there it was Barney Giles. The first time I got back to Washington I had to go up and see General Marshall and tell him about something Gen Arnold wanted him to know.

Q: I want to try to pin the date of this down, was it right around Inauguration Day, Roosevelt's last inauguration?

B: I don't know. I don't remember anything about that event associated with it?

Q: Was it right about the time Elliott Roosevelt had the problem with his dog "Blaze?"

B: Oh, it could have been. Arnold didn't know about any of those things, as far as I know.

Q: There is some vagueness in the records. About when Arnold had that major heart attack.

B: I think that was the first of the year, in January. Must have been. I'd been overseas and went back to Washington and came home for a few days, and I got back to Washington about the 1st or 2nd of January. I think it must have been the next day.

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Q: I place it, because he was signing letters for a couple of weeks after that.

B: Well, it was about four or five days after we got to Coral Gables before they diagnosed his problem. He might have been active in signing papers in those days.

Q: He had this heart doctor, Gil Marquardt. And there was some altercation between Marquardt and Mrs. Arnold?

B: Well, that came up when John was out here. I never got involved in any their family arrangements. I wasn't the kind of an aide that went to parties and stuff like that. Oh, they'd invite my wife and myself down there, but we were not what you might call socially inclined. So I never mixed around when General and Mrs. Arnold... Now and then something would happen, and I would drive Mrs. Arnold somewhere in his car--maybe protection for some special deal connected with the Army Aid-AF Aid, or whatever they called it then. But that was about the extent of that, so I never messed around with that. In fact, I moved out of the room I was living in, so Mrs. Arnold could be immediately adjacent to General Arnold in the hospital.

Q: But she didn't stay long?

B: First thing I knew, they called me and said Mrs. Arnold is taking off for Washington. I didn't get a chance to tell her goodbye. Something happened, but it didn't seem to upset the General. Now I don't know what it was, maybe he didn't know about it.

Q: She told me in great detail, what she thinks was the problem. She wanted to bring him his evening pill, or something, and Marquardt didn't want to let her in to see the General. She looked in and the General was playing gin rummy or something with the doctor, and she figured that he wasn't in such a state that she couldn't come in and

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say "Goodnight" and bring him his pill, or warm ilk or something. And she felt that Marquardt was keeping her away from the General. Bit it may be, this is a time of friction, Mrs. Arnold had nearly a nervous breakdown. She went to Spreckles ranch for a period, later on, a couple of months later.

B: I didn't know that.

Q: This was a period of great tension between the General and Mrs. Arnold. I don't know why, but I know this was the case. I think that Arnold did not want to see her.

B: You know, he might have left some instructions that I didn't know about. I didn't see her when she arrived down there, because the head doctor down there at the hospital wanted to be there, and that was his prerogative.

Q: I never asked her why.

B: I was not supposed to leave Arnold's side, more than just a little, and take all the telephone calls. When Gen Marshall called I talked, Gen Arnold couldn't get on the phone. They wouldn't allow him to do anything like that.

Q: Were you down there with him all the time?

B: All the time, that's right. I went to Europe with him on that trip.

Q: I wanted to ask you while he was down there, Pete Peterson was flying down with cables and documents. I see in Arnold's papers, messages that came down during this period. Kuter had taken his place at YALTA. There were one paragraph discussions of problems; Arnold would write through them in pencil we must have done it horizontally-- "No," "Yes," "Let's do it." "Forget it," or something. And he was

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trying to conduct the business, or some of the business from his office while he was down in the hospital. And, of course, Kuter was sending him briefing reports from YALTA. Lovett was very agitated at this time because when Arnold was out of Washington, and after the YALTA Conference, they were bypassing the Army Air Forces because Giles did not have the stature to meet with King and Marshall, and they simply made Army-Navy decisions without consulting the AAF representative. This is partly the reason they brought in Eaker. They figured Eaker had more stature than Giles. Were you aware of this going on?

B: No. The only papers that ever came there from Washington were brought by special courier. This was a paper that had to do with--I don't know--General Marshall got it, I think each Chief of Staff got it. I never saw it myself. In fact, the courier came with a key around his neck, even when Arnold was in the bed, he had this key around his neck. I had instructions what to do with him in case he should die. But what was in there, were, I presume, must have been, the latest briefing, as of the time that it left Washington. But there were no papers for perhaps the first month or two, that ever came from Washington that Arnold saw that I know of. How they got in there, if they did, somebody must have smuggled them in. Are you sure that January and February weren't blanks?

Q: No, I remember distinctly because the YALTA meeting..

B: Well, what must have happened was, they asked me to find out and I phoned it back to them, and they wrote it in. Was it in General Arnold's writing?

Q: I thought it was, but I could not swear. I know his writing very well.

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B: Well, you'd know it if you saw it.

Q: I thought it was in his writing.

B: Well, I don't know how that happened.

Q: He didn't write extensively, I mean. There would be a paragraph. Kuter would send him a message explaining something about YALTA; Kuter sent several of these.

B: This must have been later on. He started getting back active after maybe the 3rd and 4th month down there. And then, he must have been there January, February, March, April.

Q: He came back the last week in March.

B: We went to Europe about the month of April, so there were about four or five months.

Q: He was gone 2 1/2 months in Florida.

B: No, but there were at least four months. If you count the European trip as part of the therapy, you see. And then when we got back from Coral Gables.

Q: You got back from Coral Gables around the 22nd of March.

B: Yes, but we left immediately.

Q: You left a week later, April 1st, for Europe.

B: Yes, and we were over there about a month.

Q: You were there five weeks. On April 1st, Eaker came in to be Deputy Commander, AAF.

B: How long was that before General Arnold got back to Washington?

Q: Arnold got back to Washington, as I read it, around the last week in March. Then, about this time, Eaker came in and took over as Deputy.

B: He'd been on the job a long time before that.

Q: He may have come in a little earlier.

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B: Because I came up there to Washington specifically to see Gen Marshall. And I'm guessing, but it must have been about the middle of February, and Eaker was boss man then, as I recall. He asked me a lot of questions, and I wouldn't tell him anything.

Q: Eaker was asking you a lot of questions? I want to ask you about this aspect of it. Arnold was worried that Marshall would retire him, wasn't he?

B: He was worried that Marshall would get, without any information, except what he picked up through the grapevine, that he might lose heart, and figure that Arnold wasn't going to get back in the job.

Q: And he would get somebody else in there?

B: That would be the conclusion, yes.

Q: There was some feeling been expressed to me by several people that Eaker had aspirations to be the next in command?

B: I would think there was a lot of people that might have had those aspirations.

Q: Yes, but Eaker having gotten the Deputy's job and the No. 1 man being sick, he had an inside track?

B: Well, sure it looked like it would be; I suppose that he thought he was all set.

Q: Do you recall anything by Lovett in writing, of his concern that the Army and Navy were bypassing the AAF at this time?

B: Not specifically. I know Mr. Lovett came down quite often to the hospital. Sometimes he could see General Arnold, sometimes he couldn't. I always talked to him, and we discussed things, and I would get answers for these questions when I had the opportunity. But I don't recall that particular aspect.

Q: How long was Arnold flat on his back?

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B: He was flat on his back for at least two weeks.

Q: Then that would put it into February sometime.

B: Yes, and then for, until we left, maybe a week or two before we left the hospital, they let him up to get his sea legs back. Even then he was under sedation until he got back from Europe. He had a heart that would apparently take off every now and then, and go crazy. So they kept him subdued; he was such an active guy. He'd get his bowels in an uproar. They didn't want that to happen, because that would kill him, probably.

Q: You went right to Cannes or the Riviera?

B: Well, not first. We were in Cannes, but it seems to me we went there from Paris. I believe we went first to Paris. I think that's where we landed first, in Paris. Because I know he sent me over to England to call on the Chiefs of Staff over there, and Jimmy Doolittle was the boss over there then, and he gave me his aide and fixed it all up. And then about one hour, or 1 1/2 hours, the next morning after I got there, I called on all three of the Chiefs of Staff.

Q: He wanted to see his son Hank, he saw him?

B: Yes, I believe he did. I think Hank came. Eisenhower sent him over, I think.

Q: I want to ask you about an interesting meeting that took place on April 19, 1945. Now this is exactly one week after Roosevelt died. There was a new man in the White House, and there was a meeting among Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker--who was traveling around the world--that's another thing, when Eaker took over, Marshall told him to travel around the world especially to the Pacific, because Eaker knew nothing about the Pacific. This was sort of his orientation. He was

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traveling around the world, and Eaker stopped, and I believe it was either Cannes or the Riviera.

B: It was in Cannes, I remember they all met there, Jimmy Doolittle came down for the meeting, and there were some others, I don't remember who.

Q: One of the subjects, the main subject was, unification. The AF was now reaching the end of the war. The AF wanted to push for unification. We have a new man in the White House, and let's try to get him closer to us than the last guy was, who was a Navy man. One of the plans was to put Pete Quesada in the White House as the Air Aide. Do you remember that? Were you at that meeting?

B: No, I wasn't. On that trip, I had no function with regard to what the official business was. I was merely looking after General Arnold's health. Keeping these guys off him.

Q: They just sort of gave him, I know one of the things in Spaatz' headquarters--I saw in his papers. They said, "Don't bring up anything controversial to the Old Man." When he came to briefings, they just brought up all the good things that happened, no problems.

B: Yes, at that time, the war in Europe, for all practical purposes, was over. We had to take immediate steps on somebody's order, to start getting those people out of there, and reconditioning them and getting them over to the Pacific. So Arnold gave the order over there, after he had talked to Marshall on the phone, or something.

Q: He was red hot about redeployment.

B: Redeployment--that's why we organized that, had organized previously that AF thing.

Q: Could you keep him quiet?

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B: Oh, I depended on the doctor's pills for that. The doctor had complete responsibility for that, but I would keep these fellows off. Yes, everybody, of course, wants to see the Boss.

Q: Didn't they go through the motions of an interview of Goering. Didn't he talk to Goering or talk to some of the Germans when they had a captured German pilot or something?

B: Yes, there was one there. They flew one of these jets in; I've forgotten what it was. There was an incident like that. Then I think we went from Paris to Frankfurt. I remember I stayed with, I got mixed up with Patton some way there. I didn't have my right hat on or something. He found out I was in the Air, and then he remembered me, because I'd known him back when they were getting the tank business. We were down there quite often, General Arnold knew Patton, and he found how who I was, and then he let me wear whatever it was I was wearing. But he was a stickler for tin hats or something. I didn't know anything about their rules over there. Probably cared less. But then, we stayed with Omar Bradley. I drove an automobile across country and stayed with O.P. Weyland in his headquarters, which I think was in Frankfurt, overnight.

Q: Does Bradley know anything about Arnold?

B: Well, only I suppose, undoubtedly knew each other real well. But I don't know what he might know. I don't think we actually ever had any dealings with him that I can recall, at least while I was there. Maybe during the war they had a lot, I don't know. Then I think we went from Frankfurt into Florence, or maybe we went to Cannes and then to Florence. That would be more likely, Paris, to Germany and then down to Cannes, that's when they had this meeting, I know gathered there from all over.

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Q: He was in Italy when VE-Day occurred?

B: Then we were in Florence and Bari; Nate Twining was in Bari. Then I was sent back early.

Q: We are talking about the separate AF. You came back early from the recuperation trip in May 1945; Arnold told you --why did he tell you to see Larry Bell, to get the civilian auxiliaries started on generating public relations?

B: I think Larry Bell was an officer in some kind of an Air Force, like the Navy League, something like that. They apparently had the ground plans all laid; I didn't know about it. They were all laid during the war.

Q: And who were you supposed to see, Larry Bell...

B: Larry Bell and Charlies Wilson from....not the one who became Secretary.

Q: Oh, Charlie "Electric" Wilson?

B: Yes, that's the one.

Q: I want to ask you about these air auxiliaries, the Airpower League, and they had the various organizations.

B: They were all organized while I was away. I don't know what they were.

Q: But Arnold didn't join any of them. Arnold was unhappy at the end of the war because he felt that the Air Force effort was fragmented among five or six organizations. In other words, the National Air Council and the Airpower League and the AFA and the Am Vets and two or three others. You know, he joined the AVC and quit it.

B: Let me see, about the last contact I had with General Arnold about the middle of June 1945.

Q: You got sick yourself, didn't you?

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B: Yes, he called me in one day. Part of the therapy at the hospital was, everything General Arnold did, I did. They seemed to think that was a good deal.

Q: When did you have your incident; you had a heart attack?

B: I had the same problem that killed General Arnold, I'm sure, later on, what contributed to his final illness. And so I was going through everything he did. One day, the doctor said: "Well, if you want to retire, you can retire." And I just laughed it off. So he finally talked to Gen Arnold about it. When we came back from Europe, we were stuck over there in the hospital for checks or something. We were sitting up in one of those balconies in the Coral Gables Hospital. He said: "Well, Gene, I don't know what I'm going to do with you." I didn't know what he meant. And he said: You've got a choice. You can either fly back to Washington with me tomorrow, and come back here and retire." Or he said: "You can stay here and retire." And I said: "No, my job is to get you back to Washington. I'll go back with you." So I did. I came back to Washington in a few days....

Q: Was this March 1945?

B: Must have been. Well, I don't remember when I met the Board, but either met it the middle of June or the middle of July. So it was along about the first of June. I had to stay down in the hospital.

Q: He came back from his recuperation trip through South America, he came the southern route.

B: Yes, and he went through Natal.

Q: He came back in the middle of May. He may have stopped....

B: I didn't come back with him; I was up interviewing these people.

Q: You were telling them to go ahead with the separate air force.

B: That had to be done before he got back.

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Q: And then he came back to Coral Gables and you met him or something?

B: No, I went back to Washington, and I think we must have gone, or maybe I met him back in Coral Gables, I don't recall. It is kind of doubtful in my mind. But he hadn't returned, and I don't suppose, to Washington. I think he stopped in Coral Gables for a few days.

Q: This was in May, probably for a checkup. This was after VE-Day?

B: I think he was trying to cut loose from the hospital so he could...

Q: Take this Pacific trip? In June, he took this Pacific trip?

B: He just wanted to get back on duty in Washington. That's what he was headed for. I think the doctor finally told him, under certain conditions he would let him do it. And then that was when this came up about whether I went back with him or stayed there. So I went back on down.

Q: You had no contact with him after that?

B: Only one. I saw him once at March Field.

Q: Have you ever been up at the Ranch?

B: No.

Q: You saw him at March Field after the war?

B: It was after he had retired. I think Jack Warner and some of them gave him a party up there, and they had a review and stuff outside. I forgot exactly what the occasion was. That's the only time that I can recall having seen him after I left.

Q: You know, they never hired Quesada for that job. Harry Truman wanted people from Missouri. He hired Vaughn as his military aide, and Bob Landry as his Air Aide.

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B: There was sure hell to pay when the President died. I can remember that, in the first place; I got kicked out of my room again, because Benny Meyers appeared in the hospital over that night. As soon as Truman got to be President, why, Benny left Wright Field and headed for Coral Gables. He got there, I think -- I don't know when this happened--but he was there in the morning. Took over the suite that we had been in.

Q: To talk to Arnold?

B: Hell no, turn himself in to get retired. You know, he was in trouble with Truman. When Truman came out there with the investigating committee, he bawled him out, or something.

Q: He wanted to retire himself, but he retired in June. I want to ask you about Meyers. Did you have any knowledge of his activities in Washington? I don't mean his hanky-panky, but he was very close to Arnold.

B: You mean in Washington? Yes, I saw him, of course, he was one of the regular customers in our office, he handled the money business.

Q: And Materiel. And Arnold liked him, because he was a doer?

B: Oh yes, he had lots of good ideas.

Q: Did Arnold bypass Echols to give Benny Meyers a lot of projects? You know, Echols was Meyers' boss?

B: Well, what happened--I would imagine what happened. See, I worked for Echols a lot when I was at Wright Field. For a short time, and then he went to the school down at Montgomery for about a year, and was gone from there. A fellow named Richter was Chief Engineer. But what happened, when they had to get the headquarters from the Materiel Division into Washington, they moved Echols and all his staff that he needed to run that part of the deal, in to Washington and that

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left the operation of that place ut at Wright Field and Patterson open. So they sent other people out there to do that, and when I came back, why I found out there, Mr. Knudsen and Benny Meyers, Knudsen was the boss but Benny was running it. And how that happened, I don't know, I haven't the faintest idea. Benny was a good Materiel man. I guess out there, before he got into jackpot trouble.

Q: Well, you know, when Knudsen retired in June 1945, Benny Meyers had aspirations to get that job. But he didn't, so he retired. Knerr got it.

B: That isn't why Benny Meyers retired. I told you why he retired, on account of Truman was going to kill him, if he stayed.

Q: Is that right?

B: Sure he would have. Oh yes.

Q: Did he tell you this, or you assumed?

B: This was common knowledge. Maybe Gen Arnold told me, I don't know.

Q: You know, all these people in Materiel and Procurement had to fill out these questionnaires about their aspects.

B: Oh yes. We always did. I had two shares in North American common or something

Q: Well, Benny Meyers filled this out and he falsified his record.

B: Oh, he did. Benny went off on the wrong track for some reason or other. I don't know what happened.

Q: Well, there were rumors in Wright Field for a couple of years before that. You know, this anonymous letter came in in June 1945. Well, they passed it around a little bit, and then they filed it. Do you know why, or do you have any theory as to why it was ignored? You know, the allegation about his hanky-panky?

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B: You mean with women or with contractors?

Q: With contractors, Aviation Electric. It was shuttled around and then it was filed.

B: I don't know. I remember there was such a thing now.

Q: And then two years later, the Ferguson Committee, which started out looking into Howard Hughes, ended up with Benny Meyers.

B: This all goes back to when Mr. Truman was out at Wright Field.

Q: The Watchdog Committee?

B: Yes, and I think he made a mark in the book. That was a common feeling, I think.

Q: Well, that is very interesting.

B: I know Benny felt that way because he got out in the middle of the night, and he wasn't one to get out in the middle of the night to fly in an airplane, I knew that.

Q: On April 12th, Arnold was in Europe.

B: Yes, when we came back then...

Q: When you came back, Benny met you in Coral Gables?

B: Yes, the suite that we had occupied in that tower was occupied by Benny.

Q: When?

B: When we got back there. Now where we had been, or what we had been going...

Q: You got back about three weeks after Truman was in office.

B: Well, Benny was already there then.

Q: He was getting ready to retire?

B: I know the bedroom I thought I was going to sleep in was occupied.

Q: Arnold had high confidence in him for awhile?

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B: Well, there were two people that handled our money business in Washington. One of them was Lyons, and the other was Benny. We had these conferences all the time, like the one where this fellow Ferson died. So the first thing I remember, I'd heard Gen Arnold talk about what was going on in these things up in the White House, and so forth. So these two fellows just came in one day to have this big conference in there, with how much they needed money-wise. Benny was showing him these figures there. They were standing right there by my desk, and they had them down there, and I said to them: "You guys are wrong. Those figures aren't right." And they looked at me kind of funny, and they said: "What's wrong?" And I said: "The decimal point is in the wrong place. You just move it that way three places." And Benny looked at me kind of funny. He took out his pen and he did it. And then that was just the down payment then. But the thing was that we didn't realize...

Q: Did you feel that he was not right, that he was...

B: No, not at that time. I never knew him when he wasn't right. That is, that I knew about, anyhow. This all happened later on. I don't know what went on.

Q: Do you know where he is now? Is he alive?

B: I think so. I guess he was in jail...

Q: I've heard he was in New Jersey, I've heard he's in San Francisco.

B: I'll bet he's doing all right, wherever he is. He's a brilliant man. Why he got into this trouble, I don't know.

Q: Slightly unethical. You know, he had some trouble back in 1919. Yes, it was a minor thing, but he was fudging on the truth. I think the man was slightly unscrupulous, you know.

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B: Well, he could tell you a lie just as fast as he could talk, but you knew he was telling you a lie because....but I never knew him to lie about any official matters.

Q: Yes, but Arnold had confidence in him. Apparently, he was a doer. He got things done.

B: Oh yes. He didn't say: "Well, everything is going to be all right." You see, that was the thing that General Arnold couldn't stand--just those words. There were a lot of people, now. "Just a minute," they would say. "Everything is going to be all right. Don't get excited." He just couldn't stand there, because he didn't believe everything was going to be all right. Somebody had to do something about it, and you tell Benny to move the Brooklyn Bridge somewhere, if there were just figures it needed to be done, Benny would move the Brooklyn Bridge, he'd buy another one, or do something. It would show up.

Q: So he recorded a big plus with Arnold, then, because he did things like that.

B: Oh yes. He's the only fellow we had that really could do that sort of thing.

Q: You know, up to the time of his denouement, so to speak, in 1947, he almost got Arnold to write him an endorsement, and then Arnold had drafted up a letter, out on the West Coast in support of Benny Meyers. But he never sent it. It's in his file.

B: When this trouble came up?

Q: Yes, October 1947, and I think that somebody in Washington tipped Arnold off that he was in real trouble. He was trying to milk Arnold's support.

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B: I'm just guessing, but I doubt if General Arnold knew about all these details.

Q: But when he found out, Arnold was heartbroken. You remember, he was a sick man. He came to Washington and he talked about the one rotten apple in the barrel. He didn't want the American people to think that Benny Meyers was customary, because Arnold himself was scrupulous.

B: Oh, yes, he was one of the, the only man that I've ever known that had the position of importance that could move around with aircraft people and not become tainted by overexuberance on something. They could have lunch and dinner, and housing and everything else, and it didn't mean a thing to him. In fact, he didn't care whether they did it or not, but it was more convenient lots of times.

Q: Well, did they pick up the check for him?

B: Oh, I imagine, always. Because, he didn't have the money, and I didn't have any money. We would have to go where these people were to meet, Ambassador or some place. You don't move around those places on the pay we got. So there was never any thought about that, and it didn't make any difference, really. But then it got to where it did make a difference, when they got a lot more people involved, they had to put a stop to all that sort of thing, which was correct. But to General Arnold that didn't make any difference.

Q: Do you have any special recollections of his bringing the automobile manufacturers into the aircraft production business?

B: Oh, yes.

Q: He really put the heat to them didn't he?

B: Yes, I took Mr. Knudsen in the plane and whipped around to all our depots and aircraft plants, and General Arnold joined us and

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went to some of them with Knudsen. That was the start of getting the aircraft built by automobile people. We also sent Jimmy Doolittle up to the Ford Company, and I was up there, and Arnold was up there, probably. I think I was there twice without General Arnold. I went up to do things he told me to do, and we got Mr. Ford and his Chief Engineer, Sorensen, interested in this. They were going to make B-24s.

Q: Willow Run?

B: That was before Willow Run. So we went up there one day to see Mr. Ford. It was the day after the first B-24 had been sent up, and a fellow was up there, told us the story about it. I don't think it was Jimmy Doolittle, I think it was one of the other officers there. He said, yesterday, do you see that building where that B-24 was. It was full of machinery. He said: "Mr. Ford walked in, and said, 'Is this building big enough to get that airplane in?'" And they said: "Yes, the doors would accommodate it." And he said: "Clean it out. I want that B-24 sitting right over there at 9:00 tomorrow morning." And thereit sat at 9:00 the next morning, and they wheeled it some way. I don't know how they got it in there. When Mr. Ford told them to do something, boy, it gotdone, but quick. That was a tremendous place up there. Jimmy Doolittle, of course, he's the....

Q: He was very persuasive about the automobile manufacturers?

B: He was our representative there at the start of it.

Q: This was about 1940?

B: Yes.

Q: Did Arnold have any role in Roosevelt's 50,000 plane speech?

B: Yes.

Q: Remember that speech, Roosevelt said suddenly they could have the moon. Up to this time, they were handing out slowly.

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B: I remember one afternoon General Arnold came home from Congress, testifying up there. The day before, the War Dept had refused to allow us to buy three extra B-17s or some number. Maybe it was 13 we wanted to buy, and they said we could only buy three, or whatever. And we couldn't get anywhere with Congress on any kind of funds. Something happened overnight, and what it was, I don't know. It might have been Pearl Harbor; it might have been something else. But he came back from Congress the next day and he said: "You know what happened there today?" And I said: "No." He said: "They just gave me a blank check," and he said: "You fill it in." Money was no longer any problem. You see, I knew that. And the next morning when they had that conference and I told them to move that decimal point, they hadn't found out about it yet.

Q: Oh, I see, this is when you told Benny Meyers to move the decimal way over?

B: Move it three places. I had a little inside dope.

Q: Then you don't recall what national incident caused this?

B: Well, I don't think it was Pearl Harbor, because we were away then.

Q: Could it have been the President's speech on 50,000 planes?

B: I have no idea.

Q: This was, his speech was May 1940?

B: Must have been something happened to us some place, or something.

Q: Was it about the time Jimmy Doolittle went to Detroit?

B: I don't know now.

Q: It was May 16, 1940. The President gave this speech. I was just wondering. This was sort of a blank check.

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B: Yes, it was. Congress completely changed their attitude, and this had nothing to do with the War Dept General Staff They still wouldn't have let us buy airplanes.

Q: I'm guessing now that this was the Roosevelt 50,000 plane speech. You see, that occurred six days after the Nazis invaded Western Europe, and of course....

B: Now that may have been, with those Stutka bombers, now that may have been what caused it.

Q: They just went in there and wiped out France and the British at Dunkirk.

B: I just remember the incident; I don't remember...

Q: Well, then it is associated with that event?

B: Could have been.

Q: Could have been a week or two later because within 30 days, the British were at Dunkirk and the whole French and British Armies had been destroyed.

B: Something made them realize all of a sudden that it was airplanes that we needed. I would imagine it was those dive-bombers that the Germans were using that brought that to a head. That's a reasonable possibility. I don't remember.

Q: It could have been the Polish thing, six or eight months before in September. But I don't think that was such a traumatic thing as the British and French getting clobbered in a couple of weeks by the Germans. They expected the British and French to fight a good battle.

B: Well, apparently, they, if it were those dive-bombers, it was the breeching of the maginet line by air and around the ends by tanks. It got them all stirred up. They might have given the same thing to the Army. I don't know. But I know we were told that whatever we needed, to get it.

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Q: You know, a related subject is the reluctance of the aircraft manufactuers to allow the automobile manufactuers into their business. They figured that once they got in, they would never get them out?

B: Well, they were scared to death of them.

Q: Do you remember anything in connection with them.

B: Oh yes. The system of building aircraft was almost a piece deal, building each aircraft individually, almost you know. And unless they got an order for quite a few of them it was probably more economical to do it that way. Parts weren't necessarily interchangeable on the wings and they tried to establish, I guess, a few points where everything measured the same, you know. But they liked the way they built airplanes, but they couldn't build them fast enough. Gen Arnold knew that. He knew we had to get mass production into aircraft. And who were the mass producers? They were surely the automobile builders, so that was where he moved in on that, and gee, he really went to town on that.

Q: How did Douglas and Kindelberger and some of the others feel about that?

B: I imagine he made them feel all right about it.

Q: Weren't they kind of worried that, you know, Ford and Chrysler would move in and they would never get it back.

B: Oh, I think that they all worried about that, but they worried more about not being able to build airplanes. They were told to do it, and they had to do it.

Q: Didn't Arnold generate a lot of confidence on the part of these people in the sense that he didn't have any money, all he had were Letters of Intent?

B: Well, that was the start of that system yes, which was the same as a promise.

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Q: Do you remember him in '39 going around to see C.C. Moseley and Ryan, and some of these others that he got them to set up these primary training schools? I think there were eight operators set up these schools, 50 guys to a class, because he realized that Randolph Field couldn't do it?

B: Yes, there was Moseley and Ryan, and down south there was the fellow who had been with Curtiss. He was a good friend of mine. He ran motorboats; he's dead now. He was the publicity man for Howard Hughes' round-the-world flight when Tony Thurlow--Lakeland, Florida, was his headquarters. He ran that school down there, and they had them all together, I decided to set 'em up.

Q: Arnold really sold them a bill of goods?

B: Well, this was over the dead bodies of our flying school people?

Q: Oh really, they opposed it. Were you there when he gave them this harangue, this speech?

B: Yes, I think so.

Q: And he sold it, and they bought it?

B: But that wasn't the worst thing that happened. We had an airplane out at Curtiss-Wright. I guess it was a P-36. Our fighter people insisted that they had to have the guns shoot through the propellers so you could aim them like you had a rifle stock in your shoulder. Well, Gen Spaatz had been over, and investigated, and came back with a tale of rockets that they hung under the wings, and all the stuff they were doing; the number of guns on the Hurricanes and the Spitfires. Here we were fooling along with a 50 and a 30 under the hood up here, you might say.

Q: Shooting through the propeller?

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B: Yes, and so, General Arnold, they had a Fighter Board. They weren't getting anywhere with them. So he called up "Burdie" Wright, or I called up Burdie Wright, and told him to take one of those P-36s and put just as many guns on there that he damn well had room to put on. And that's all we told him. Nothing about who was going to pay for it or anything. Burdie Wright did. He got them on there in pretty fair shape. One day they set this deal up and we all flew up there to wherever it was--Buffalo, I guess. Had the Fighter Board up there, and they had this plane's tail up in the air up so they could fire the guns. They turned loose with those machine guns. I think they had four on each side, or something like that. They just tore the heck out of the targets down there. I think that's why I lost my hearing. We forgot to put the plugs in our ears. And the General asked Burdie: "Well, could you do that on all the airplanes?"

Q: Who did he ask?

B: Burdie Wright, he was chief, Burdette Wright, yes. He was a friend from WW I. So he said yes, and it didn't seem to louse up the performance of the aircraft too much. So Arnold got the fighter people together and said: "What do you think of it?" They said: "Oh, we could never fire the guns; we couldn't aim them." Arnold said: "I don't give a damn what you fellows say. We are going to put all the guns on our fighters we can possibly get on them, beginning right now." And that was that. So he overcame another stupidity.

Q: They were still thinking in terms of WW I?

B: Yes,or maybe Paucho Villa.

B:...You can make any comments that are derogatory at anyone, about things. But you have to take that into consideration if you

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want to consider why some things happened. Because everybody sure didn't do right. I guess I mentioned that incident about our G-4 there. He had a steady appointment every morning at 10:00 when we were trying to find...

Q: Was this Pop Powers?

B: No, it was the fellow that got in trouble later in England, MG, Miller.

Q: You mean for telling the secret of OVERLORD?

B: Whatever he did, I never knew what it was, but he was our G-4 there in Washington, and every morning at 10:00 he had to come and tell Gen Arnold what had happened, if they found machine guns that belonged on the ships that were over in Darwin, or wherever they were, you know. And they forgot to put them in the boxes, and all these logistical things that were loused up. Nothing was right. And so, Miller knew he was going to be able to do something about these. Eventually, as soon as he could find somebody to put the bee on where the trouble was, and he'd come in and then finally say: "Now, look, Hap"--he always called Gen Arnold "Hap"--"everything is going to be all right," and I knew that would make General Arnold so doggone mad.

Q: That was the wrong thing to say?

B: So finally after a couple of weeks of this, the swinging doors would be there, and my desk would be here. General Miller would be over there. It was time for him to go in and I would get the signal on my desk. There was a light there. I knew that he was ready for him. So I'd walk over and this was the little rug on there, and I would smooth it all out like this, and I'd stand back and say: "Okay, General," and sure enough, he would come out of that door in about

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five minutes. And he got so he just hated me. But the sequel to that was he left Washington and came out to take over some Materiel deal, maybe at Wright Field, or something, I don't know where he was. Anyhow, I went out there to train the group. I was out at Tucson, and Lowell Smith was the commander there. I was the next senior on the base. So this big group of people came in,the two Millers came in, Tubby Miller and this MG Miller, to inspect us or do something there. And so I was invited to be in the receiving line, and when Gen Miller came to me, he just passed me right by, and Tubby Miller was following. He laughed, he knew what the problem was.

Q: Could I ask you to repeat that little thing about Marshall and Arnold hunting?

B: One time, I don't know when it was exactly, but it was after we got in the war, and Glenn Martin had invited Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall to come up to his ranch to shoot duck or geese.

Q: Somewhere in Maryland?

B: Up in Maryland. We were to fly up to the plant at Baltimore and then go by boat over to the ranch. Then, the next morning we were going to shoot. So after dinner on the yacht, it was pretty cold. We were up, just Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall and myself. We were up in the front of this yacht, before going to bed. I was there because General Arnold always wanted me nearby in case he had some ground idea he didn't want to forget about. I'd write it down. I heard Gen Marshall, after they were discussing the terrible logistical troubles that they were having around the world. Marshall finally turned to Gen Arnold and he said: "Well, I think that we've now committed all our major mistakes." And I thought to myself at the time: "I hope he's right." We sure had a lot of them.

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Q: This must have been well along in the war because...

B: On this trip, they had shot so many of these things, that they couldn't take everybody back to Washington. Once we went back in the amphibian. From the doctor at his Ranch. I remember I got Gen Marshall in there, and all the shotguns and game, and there was freezing ice slightly on the tail feathers. I'm sure that we had to stay in. We taxiied on the water so far before we ever got into the air, I thought we might just as well taxi all the way to Washington; we'd be there pretty soon, if we kept going.

Q: Do you have any recollection of Arnold and Andrews, any feel for their relationship? Were they on very good terms?

B: The only time I ever saw them together was when, that maneuver just before the CCC started; I think they had mutual admiration for each other but whether or not they were particularly friendly or not, I never know.

Q: Is there any merit in the argument, that some of the fellows who came up the West Coast with Arnold got better jobs than the fellows who came up the East Coast route with Andrews?

B: I don't think so; that's the same sort of thing they used to talk about, whether you were a West Pointer or whether you came in from civil life. I don't think there was any differentiation ever made either by Gen Marshall or by Gen Arnold as to how you happened to be there. Neither of them were interested in that. They only wanted to know what you could do.

Q: Arnold was "gunho" for missiles. You know, when the V-1 was coming over he grabbed parts.

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B: There was a fellow out here named Goddard--the father of the missiles--I think he started knowing him right off the bat, because way back in the March Field days when we were over there with these miserable airplanes, we used to do a lot of scientific things with Robert Millikan. And I was always mixed up in that because I did, I don't know, they always kind of got me to do the flying.

Q: Cosmic ray research?

B: Yes, cosmic ray, these things, they had a big ball and we would put it in the plane and take it around.

Q: You know, Arnold wanted to use the German V-1. Remember the JB-2?

B: Oh yes.

Q: And he wanted to drop them by the thousands on the Germans. But then he got sick, and the project was cancelled. Do you remember anything about that one?

B: No, I don't. The only thing I remember about missiles--my first introduction to the fact that there were such things was when Gen Spaatz came back from a trip he had made over in Europe. He talked about rockets and stuff, I knew what skyrockets were, so I knew what they were talking about. That's the first it had ever been discussed, that I know of.

Q: Have you any recollections of him and von Karman?

B: Only to know that he was held in high esteem by everyone. But I never knew him; never met him. But I knew a lot of people that worked for him who did know him.

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Bay B
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6 November 1972

Brig General Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif 90803

Dear General Beebe:

Thanks for your letter of the 2nd. It answers some questions and raises others. Your letter is going to help me straighten out some ideas I had about establishing our own identity in the U.K..

I'm curious about your comment concerning the senior officers who had to be removed. It reminds me of a comment one of my interviewees of recent date had about Arnold's "blacklist". Did he have one? This man said Arnold told the Colonel's assignment branch of AC/AS-1 (Personnel) to let him know if there were any calls for overseas assignment for a number of officers he did not want promoted. You know anything about that?

On the subject of superannuated ranking personnel, Arnold often talked about "deadwood" that should be removed. In the other direction, I've been told that Arnold was soft-hearted about some older types who should not have been kept on, but were. Do you have any recollections along this line?

Another spin-off thought: these names come to mind. They got into trouble with Arnold in one way or another and got the sack or their promotions were withheld: "Sue" Clagett (who was an usher at Lieut H.H. Arnold's wedding in 1913), Douglas Netherwood, Jakie Fickel, Henry Harms, Davenport Johnson, Hugh Knerr, Harold McGinnis, Tony Frank (who wanted a combat command and didnt get it), Harvey Burwell, etc. Did Gen Arnold ever talk to you about any of these gentlemen? Any clues to his relationship with them?

Re Tony Frank and the VIII AF Service Command. Heedidnt stay long.** Returned to Wright-Patt to head the Air Service Command. The 8th AF logistic set-up went sour under Henry Miller, and it wasnt until Hugh Knerr came back on duty under Eaker and Spaatz that the logistics got straightened out. At least, this is my impression. I would welcome yours.

Hope you dont mind me keeping you away from your workshop for a couple of hours while you ruminate over these weighty issues.

All good wishes.

Murray

** Tony Frankford - to Spaatz. Any further?

(*) Add: Newton Longfellow?

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

Oct 2, 1972
[NOV]

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314.

Dear Dr Green:

You must have bested all your buttons, with a boy at the Air Force Academy. Congrats!

Thanks for the news about Miss A. There will never be another to take her place.

I enjoyed seeing the report with attached Memos + Portal letter re same. General A never showed the letter to me but either he or Miss Adkins told me about it. This letter must have arrived just about the time Gen A let me go to the war, as Portal must have that I was fixed.

My recollection of General Arnold's reaction to Portal's letter was to speed up General Franks's assignment before

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

things got any worse. If you read the second sentence of the last para you will understand why.

I believe I mentioned that General Al Lyon, who had Gen Cs full confidence, helped me with my right seeing and report writing. The fact that I had made an eyeball report to the P.M. in which he seemed to concur, was I think one of the reasons that our material and operations did not become just another dweeb of the M.C.P and the K.C.P.

Al Lyon sent word to me later that the head man and several of his assistantes at the M.C.P had been fired, and he that Postal had been called in by the P.M. and asked why nothing had ever been said about these troubles. Perhaps Lord Postal just did not like that. It was a good thing that General Carroll was one of my witnesses, as he had seen the

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

large number of B-24 types at Pyrtewich.

One that comes to mind, have you ever that about the number of senior officers in the Air Corps that had to be removed from their jobs, shortly after the war got going? Leo Devoucha had the answer; gentlemen never win.

Specific answers to your two questions:

1/ On Mc Dinner, nothing comes to mind.

2/ On Gen Frank, A.D.L. told me things got better after he arrived and we got control of our own affairs.

Sorry I have to write long hand but my office help is out to lunch.

Sincerely,

Eugene H. Beebe

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20314

27 October 1972

Brig General Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif 90803

Dear General Beebe:

You'll be surprised to learn (as I was) when I found a copy of the famous Beebe report in my basement. It's a rather involved tale, but the high points are these: I interviewed Brig Gen Harold McGinnis last year; he deserted Washington recently after his wife passed away; he phoned me asking if I would be interested in his files, which I was; McGinnis served from June 1942 until February 1944 as I.G. of VIII Air Force, and he saved almost everything he was involved in.

Anyway, I have been going through McGinnis' files and screening out goodies for my Arnold project. The bulk of it is destined for the Air Archives at Maxwell AFB. I'm especially interested in McGinnis' personal history because he conceived of General Arnold as grinding an axe for him and denying him a deserved promotion until late in the war when he achieved his first star, with some help from the White House. McGinnis guessed wrong. He hitched his career wagon to the Emmons' star and that one never ascended into the firmament. Wonder if you know anything about that?

Anyway, I thought you should like to have a copy of your own report, including Portal's complaint to Arnold.

One thing I dont have clear: what did Arnold do when he received Portal's angry retort to your report? We know here that he sent a copy to "Tony" Frank who assumed the job as VIII Air ForceService Commander. Did Gen Frank investigate your charges? Do you recall the outcome?

Saw Mrs. Arnold about six weeks ago. She came through here en-route back to Sonoma from Germany where she visited David, the only one of the Arnold boys still in active service. She was in fine fettle. We had a gay luncheon at Bolling. Bruce told the story of her being picked up for speeding down the Valley of the Moon. She was charged with driving near her age. Seriously, the policeman let her off with a warning.

The book is making good progress after some unfortunate delays due to Loosbrock retiring from the writing end of the undertaking.

Hope this finds you, Mrs. Beebe and your charming daughter in good health.

By the way, my boy is a Cadet in the U.S. Air Force Academy. I feel like bustin' my buttons.

Sincerely.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

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June 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FRANK: Drew Field, Tampa Fla.

Subject: Supply and Maintenance of American Aircraft in England.

For your information in connection with your new assignment, I am inclosing some papers.

Just before we left for England on this last trip I gave Beebe a directive, copy attached. As a result of this directive he wrote me a report, copy attached, a copy of which I left in England for Portal with a covering memorandum, copy attached. Today I received Portal's reply, copy attached.

I think you will find this matter very interesting as a demonstration of some of the problems you will find confronting you.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Cpy of Sec. Dir. to Col. Beebe, 5/22/42 frm Gen. Arnold re above subj.
Cpy of Report by Col. Beebe re above subj., 6/1/42.
Cpy of cover memo attach. to Portal's cpy of Report
Cpy of ltr to Gen. Arnold frm. Portal, 6/10/42 re above subj.Secret.

FOR DEFENSE
BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HUEBNER:

Subject: Duties while in England

1. During the period that you are in England, it is desired that you concentrate on securing the following information:

a. Complete details of the movements of American built airplanes after they reach the British Isles. This to include the various delays that take place between the time they are received overseas and the time they are actually in combat units.

b. A study of maintenance of American aircraft in the British Isles. This to cover present repair facilities and possible future repair facilities, who operates them, and what use is being made of American spares and of American personnel sent over from the United States.

2. In order to do this most expeditiously, you will work from the office of General Lyon and will make visits to such British installations as are necessary in connection with your duties. A report will be prepared of your inspection of the above activities and submitted to me upon your return.

/s/ H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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- C O P Y -

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces
in
The British Isles

1 June, 1942.

MEMORANDUM: COMMANDING GENERAL, Army Air Forces.

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of American Airplanes, Spares and American Factory Personnel now in England.

1. Your Memorandum of May 22, 1942, directed investigation of the following:

a The routing of American airplanes from point to point of receipt in Britain to a combat squadron.

1) An investigation of any delays in this process.

b The maintenance of American airplanes.

1) Present repair facilities and who operates them.

2) The use being made of:

(a) American spares.

(b) American factory personnel.

3) Possible additional repair facilities for future use.

2. Pursuant to that directive, the following visits were made:

1) Burtonwood: which is a repair depot operated by M.A.P. (civilian) and now employed, among other things, in the repair and modification of Douglas DB-7's, repair of B-17's and overhaul of Pratt & Whitney, Wright and Allison engines, and repair of Curtiss and Hamilton Standard propellers.

2) Marham: (looked over from the air) which is intended as a U.S. Army Air Forces Repair Depot.

3) Henlow: which is an R.A.F. repair station operated by M.A.P. (R.A.F. personnel) and now employed, among other things, in the repair of Lockheed Hudsons.

4) Boscombe Down: which is the R.A.F. flight test station on aircraft armament. (A pressurized Spitfire was seen at this station.)

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- C O P Y -

5) Speke: at which is located one of the Lockheed-managed assembly and modification establishments now employed in the modification of Lockheed Hudsons and Venturas and North American Mustangs.

A list of pertinent questions was prepared and submitted to the Air Officer, U.S.A.F.E.I., the British Ministry of Aircraft Production and the British Air Ministry. See Tab. A.

3. The procedure for dealing with American aircraft is set forth in a document entitled "C.M.A.A.S. Notice American Aircraft Administrative Machinery for Conversion and Subsequent Modifications - P 9900", a copy of which is attached. (See Tab B.) Likewise an example of the application of this system to modifications of a standard type of aircraft in use by the British since the beginning of the war is set forth in Air Ministry document entitled "Application of modifications" prepared in Great Britain, 22nd September 1941, by Cunliffe Owen Aircraft Limited. (See Tab C.)

4. At the present time, modification and repair work on American-built aircraft and engines is accomplished at one principal firm, at least, and twelve sister firms, neglecting sub-contracting firms and specialty manufacturers.

A tabulation showing the principal firms, together with the types of aircraft handled by each, is shown in Tab D.

5. The routing of American-built aircraft upon its arrival in the United Kingdom is in general from a port of debarkation, or Prestwick, to a sister firm indicated in Tab D.

The disposal of the airplanes thereafter in general conforms to the procedure set forth in Tab B. As a rule each new model passes through the following governmental activities:

1) Farnborough, for experimentation and design of changes.

2) Boscombe Down for flight test and check of engineering changes.

3) R.A.F. Station at Duxford for operational tests.

The time lag for a new model aircraft ranges from six months to one year, based upon past experience, with no indication that the process has been improved as of this date.

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After the engine changes and modifications have been agreed upon, then it becomes a matter of production in one or more of the sister firms. Production schedules are in turn dependent upon sub-contractors for parts, also for delivery of parts from Air Ministry stocks, and from the United States. The time lag ex factory in the U.S. is indeterminate for complete aircraft, thereby making schedules of production difficult and resulting in wastage of labor and facilities.

6. At the present time there are approximately 80 American manufacturers' representatives in the U.K., 40 of which are located at Speke (Lockheed) in the employ of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the balance act as technical advisors to the Ministry of Aircraft Production at St. John's House, Smith Square, London, S.W.1.

7. Plans have been made to utilize under American control the following facilities for repair and maintenance of American airplanes and engines:

Langford Lodge, near Belfast, N. Ireland.
Warton, near Blackpool, Eng.
Burtonwood, near Liverpool, Eng.
Molesworth, near Bedford.

In addition it is now planned to establish ten advance repair depots in the Bomber and Pursuit Operational Areas assigned to the United States Army Air Forces.

8. Conclusions: Although the time spent on this investigation was short and all places of importance were not visited, it is the opinion of the writer:

a That there exists an unnecessary time lag between receipt in Britain of American airplanes and engines, and receipt at combat units of these airplanes for the following reasons:

1) Number of man hours spent on modifications which are required, due to use of airplanes on jobs for which they were not intended.

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2) Airplanes being shipped incomplete. (Parts to complete being shipped separately getting "lost").

3) Lack of experienced mechanics familiar with American types.

4) Uncertain deliveries from U.S. factory to U.K.

b That there are now available sufficient repair facilities for the number of airplanes being operated in England, providing they are efficiently operated.

c That American spares for both airplanes and engines with certain exceptions are available either in transit or in Britain in more than adequate quantities.

d That the limited number of American factory personnel at Speke is being used efficiently. The balance are ineffectives.

e That the supply system used by the British for distribution of spare parts is such that prohibitive quantities of spares must be poured into the system before any trickle out to the consumer.

f That up to the present time sufficient action has not been initiated for the maintenance and repair of the airplanes about to be employed in this theater by American forces.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended:

a That actions for the establishment of the Air Service Command and the repair and supply depot system of the United States Army Air Force in the United Kingdom be expedited.

b That the control of American aircraft and supplies of spares incident to the operations of both the R.A.F. and the U.S. Army Air Forces in the U.K. be vested in the U.S. Government for distribution to both the American Forces and the R.A.F.

/s/ EUGENE H. BEEBE

EUGENE H. BEEBE,
Colonel, Air Corps.

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Ques. 3: At what place are American Airplanes received?

Answer All airplanes flown to the U.K. land at Prestwick, those coming by boat may arrive at any seaport.

Ques. 4: What is the routing on American planes from point of receipt to operational squadrons?

Answer The first 4 or 5 aircraft are used for test-work, research, and for inspection conferences to determine the necessary modifications and drawings of same. The remaining aircraft arriving in the U. K. go direct to the modification centers, where the modifications are made and then to the squadrons. In a few instances, the squadrons have been given unmodified aircraft for transition work before receiving aircraft fully modified.

Ques. 5: Which American airplanes require modification after receipt and what is the approximate number of man hours required to make these modifications?

Answer:

Airacobra	Approx.	60 man hours
Fortress	"	40 " "
(modified for Coastal Command less A.S.V.)		
Liberator II	Approx.	4000 man hours
Liberator III	"	50 " "
Mustang	"	115 " "
(modified for Army Cooperation Command)		
Ventura	Approx.	20 man hours

Ques. 6: At which places are American airplanes repaired? Who runs facility?

Answer Due to the B-17 and B-24 being unable to be taken apart in sections and transported, it must be repaired on site if it cannot be flown to a repair depot, which is Prestwick. In the former case, the repairs would be made by Air Ministry if it was not a major repair. In the latter case, the repair would be made by M.A.P. facilities. Air Service Training at Hamble, Southampton does the repairs on P-40's and will do the repairs in the future on B-25's. A-20's, Mustangs and Hudsons are all repaired at Liverpool by Lockheed and is contolled by M.A.P.

Ques. 7: At which places are American engines repaired? Who runs facility?

Answer Wright, Allison, and Pratt & Whitney engines are all repaired at Burtonwood by M.A.P.

Ques. 8: What is the routing on airplane and engine spares manufactured in the U.S.A.? By whom are they controlled?

Answer Spares are controlled by M.A.P. and later turned over to Air Ministry. Point of receipt may be any seaport in the U.K., where the spares are sent to maintenance units. When a squadron desires spares, the requisition is put through the station stores to the maintenance units.

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Tab A

Quss. 1: How many airplanes manufactured in the U.S.A. were received in England up to April 30 1942?

Answer

Airacobra	476
Autogiro	5
Baltimore	6
Boeing Fortress	27
Catalina	104
Catalina Amphibian	8
Douglas DB7	154
Douglas DB7A (Havoc II)	99
Douglas DB7B (Boston III)	293
Boeing Boston III	29
Fairchild F.24	71
Harvard	24
Hudson III	1100
Hudson III (Flight)	354
Hudson V (Flight)	174
Kingfisher (O.S.2.U.2)	30
Kittyhawk	12
Liberator II	56
Liberator III	77
Lockheed Lightning	3
Lockheed XII A.	4
Martlet II	46
Mohawk	209
Mustang	338
Stinson Vigilant	14
Tomahawk	515
Ventura	16

Quss. 2: What is the location of the above airplanes at the present time?

Answer

	Written Off	To be Completed Later	Under Preparation	In U. K.
Airacobra	8	114	125	160
Autogiro				2
Baltimore			1	5
Boeing Fortress			6	21
Catalina	3		12	88
Catalina Amphibian			8	
Douglas DB7	5		1	144
Douglas DB7A (Havoc II)	3	2		86
Douglas DB7B (Boston III)	1	16	39	232
Boeing Boston III			6	19
Fairchild F.24			12	41
Harvard II			1	23
Hudson III	1			97
Hudson III (Flight)		7	38	301
Hudson V (Flight)		2	1	170
Kingfisher (O.S.2.U.3)			22	8
Kittyhawk	1			11
Liberator II	1	7	16	32
Liberator III			4	2
Lockheed Lightning				3
Lockheed XII.A				1
Martlet II				41
Mohawk	12		9	188
Mustang	1		1132	102
Stinson Vigilant	4			10
Tomahawk	3	9	8	441
Ventura			12	

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Ques. 9: How many American factory men are there in England?

Answer Lockheed have 50 men at Speke. There are approximately 30 others representing airplane and engine companies.

Ques. 10: At what places is it planned the U.S. Air Force will utilize for Air Force supply?

Answer It is planned that Liverpool will be used for most of the supply and storage of American spares. The port of entry in this case will be Liverpool. Storage depots other than Liverpool have not yet been decided upon but should be within the next two weeks. Burtonwood, Warton and Langford Lodge are at present to be the repair depots, three others are contemplated. Sub-depots have not yet been decided upon and at present the subject is being investigated; these should be available 90 days.

Ques. 11: What will be the approximate date on which these facilities will be ready?

Answer
Burtonwood	-	now
Langford Lodge	-	September 1st, 1942
Warton	-	Jan. 1st, 1943

5 other next 90 days

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Tab B

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C.N.A.A.S. Notice.

AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FOR A CONVERSION AND SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATIONS.

The attached papers set out in detail the "drill" used in the Ministry of Aircraft Production in dealing with design changes to American aircraft required to meet essential operational needs.

2. Four main subjects are dealt with.

(i) Relative responsibilities of the Ministry of Aircraft Production branches dealing with American aircraft.

(ii) Organisation for scrutiny of our proposals for design changes after the original conversion. The aim is to keep such changes down to the essential minimum.

(iii) Responsibilities of the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the British Air Commission regarding essential changes in design.

(iv) Procedure for modifications to American types outside America.

3. The objects which have been kept in mind in the arrangements have been the limitation of changes to essential needs only and the fullest co-operation with American firms' representatives and Project Engineers in this country.

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS.

A.E.C.	=	Aircraft Equipment Committee.
A.M.C.	=	Airframe Modifications Committee.
A.M.S.O.	=	Air Member Supply and Organisation.
B.A.C.	=	British Air Commission.
C.R.D.	=	Controller of Research and Development.
D.A. (N.A.)	=	Development Branch (American Aircraft)
D.G.E.	=	Director General of Equipment.
D.G.N.D.P.	=	Director General of Naval Development and Production.
D.O.R.	=	Director of Operational Requirements.
D.P.C.A.	=	Director of Purchases Canadian and American.
D.R.M.	=	Director of Repair and Maintenance.
D.S.M.	=	Director of Servicing and Maintenance.
D.T.D.	=	Director of Technical Development.
E.M.C.	=	Engine Modifications Committee.
L.T.C.	=	Local Technical Committee.
M.A.P.	=	Ministry of Aircraft Production.
P.S.	=	Production Secretariat
R.D.A.	=	Research and Development Branch (Aircraft)
R.D.Q.	=	Research and Development Branch (Equipment Installation in Aircraft).
R.T.O.	=	Resident Technical Officer (at Firms)
R.T.P.	=	Records and Technical Publications Branch.

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SECTION 1.

PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH AMERICAN AIRCRAFT

RESPONSIBILITY OF D.P.C.A., D.O.R., D.G.N.D.P., D.T.D. BRANCHES.

1. The procedure outlined in this section is intended to apply only to initial alterations in aircraft of any particular type delivered from the U.S.A. The directorates primarily responsible for the provision and operational suitability of any particular type of American aircraft are D.P.C.A., D.O.R., and D.T.D.; and in the case of Naval aircraft D.P.C.A., D.G.N.D.P., and D.T.D.

2. D.P.C.A. is responsible for purchasing the aircraft, the Air Staff through D.O.R. (or the Admiralty through D.G.N.D.P.) for deciding its role and operational requirements and D.T.D. for interpreting Air Staff policy in detail and deciding how their requirements can best be met; while D.P.C.A. is again responsible for carrying out these requirements when the details have been decided.

3. Liaison between the three Directorates must ensure that the Air Staff requirements are such as can be carried out in practice both from a technical and from a production aspect, and also that the detail arrangements made by D.T.D. are such that they meet the Air Staff requirements in the easiest way for production. All Air Staff requirements will be sent to M.A.P. in triplicate; the action copy going to D.D./R.D.Q. with copies for information to D.T.D., D.P.C.A., D.D.R.D.A. and A.D./D.A.(N.A.).

4. The two deputy directorates concerned in D.T.D. are D.D./R.D.Q. and D.D./R.D.A. the former being divided into four principal branches - R.D.Q.(B), R.D.Q.(C), R.D.Q.(F), and R.D.Q.(N), which deal respectively with bombers, Coastal Command aircraft, fighters and Naval aircraft. Training aircraft are dealt with by R.D.Q. (F). A similar sub-division of branches exists in D.P.C.A.

5. D.D./R.D.Q. in close liaison with D.P.C.A. and D.D./R.D.A. decide in detail what equipment is needed to meet Air Staff requirements and where and how it shall be laid out. R.D.Q.(B) or (C) or (F) or (N) as the case may be, use and co-ordinate the activities of the other specialist branches within their own deputy directorate.

6. R.D.A. is divided into D.A.(N.A.), R.D.N. and R.D.S. dealing with American landplanes, Naval aircraft and flying boats respectively. R.D.L. is divided into three groups of which only R.D.L.2 deals with American aircraft.

The function of D.A.(N.A.), R.D.N. or R.D.S. is broadly to deal with the aircraft as a flying machine, and as such cover all questions affecting the design and safety of the aircraft, such as strength, load, etc. questions relating to its performance as an aeroplane and the control of the movement of aircraft on G.R.D. charge. D.T.D. in conference with the other directorates concerned will lay down a programme of test work and decide where this work shall be done. D.A.(N.A.), R.D.N., and R.D.S. also cover work on the aircraft which is of a purely development nature arising out of new operational requirements.

7. All technical instructions to the firm carrying out the trial installation are to be sent through the R.T.O., who is instructed only to take action on:-

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(a) an annotated form 555 from R.D.Q. or

(b) a letter from R.D.A., copies of which are sent to D.P.C.A. in each case, (a) and (b).

All authorised instructions will be taken up by the R.T.O. through the L.T.C. in the usual manner.

8. Prior to the arrival of a type of aircraft in Great Britain, D.P.C.A. will endeavour to obtain from A.M.S.O. (or D.G.W.D.P. for Naval Aircraft) an indication of the sphere of its eventual employment in the Navy or R.A.F. Copies of correspondence between D.P.C.A. and A.M.S.O. (or D.G.W.D.P.) will be sent to D.T.D. and D.O.R.

9. <u>When the first aircraft arrives in Great Britain:-</u>

(i) D.P.C.A. will notify D.O.R. (or D.G.W.D.P.), D.D./R.D.Q., D.D.R.D.A. and A.D./D.A.(N.A.) of its arrival.

(ii) The aircraft is assembled (unless delivered by air) and flown to its destination under arrangements by D.P.C.A. Allotment action to get the aircraft transferred to C.R.D. charge is made by D.P.C.A. and R.D.A. through P.S.5(d).

(iii) Arrival of the aircraft at its destination is notified to D.O.R. (or D.G.W.D.P.), D.D./R.D.Q., D.D.R.D.A. and A.D./D.A.(N.A.) by D.P.C.A.

10. R.D.Q. arrange a preliminary inspection of the aircraft by D.O.R., (or Naval Staff), D.P.C.A., R.D.Q. and R.D.A. and the American Representative to enable Air Staff to formulate their requirements D.R.M. and D.S.M. will also be asked to attend to study the aircraft from the repair, maintenance and servicing aspect.

11. To enable Air Staff (or Naval Staff) to confirm their requirements in detail (which have been previously notified to D.T.D.) R.D.Q. call a conference comprising D.O.R., (or Naval Staff), D.P.C.A. (including D.G. of E. requirements), R.D.Q., R.D.A., Representative of the Sister firm, R.T.O. at the Sister firm, Signals 1(a), American Representative, Representative of any specialist branch required, the Command, D.R.M. and D.S.M. This conference decides:-

(i) The minimum immediate essential requirements.

(ii) The follow-up requirements.

Sub-paragraphs 11(i) and (ii) are the result of the policy laid down by Air Staff, or Naval Staff.

(iii) Any longterm Air Staff (or Naval Staff) requirements are also considered at this conference.

12. Action by R.D.Q. and R.D.A. with D.P.C.A. together with their specialist advisers for the immediate application of sub-paragraph 11(i) and the initiation of work under sub-paragraph 11 (ii) together with an investigation into the implications of the requirements under sub-paragraph 11(iii).

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13. Concurrently with action in paragraph 12, R.D.Q.5 draw up the Appendix "A" and R.D.A. will initiate action to ensure the issue of:-

(a) flying limitations, and

(b) loading and C.G. diagrams.

NOTE:- Action under paragraph 13 will not arise where this information has been supplied by the British Air Commission at Washington.

14. On completion of the work on the first aeroplane R.D.Q. will call a conference comprising: D.O.R. (or Naval Staff), D.P.C.A., (including D.G.of E. requirements), R.D.Q., R.D.A., Representative of the sister firm, R.T.O. at the sister firm, Signals 1(a), American Representative, Representative of any specialist branch required, the Command, D.R.M. and D.S.M. to -

(i) Check the aircraft to the requirements under sub-paragraph 11(i).
(ii) Clear any outstanding details on the requirements under sub-paragraph 11(ii)
(iii) Decide action to be taken on the requirements under sub-paragraph 11(iii) in the light of the investigation under paragraph 12.

15. Release to the Command must be authorised by C.R.D. in the first instance; prior to this the first aircraft as modified may be required to undergo a test programme arranged by D.T.D.

16. D.P.C.A. arranges quantity conversions in accordance with D.T.D. requirements as proved on the first aircraft.

17. D.P.C.A. arranges with D.S.M. for the services of American personnel to be available to the Command during the initial stages of the Service life of the type concerned.

18. Parallel with the action of modifying the first aircraft, prior to its release to the Command, the second aircraft in an unmodified condition is required to undergo a test programme which is arranged by D.T.D. the principal objects of which are:-

(i) To obtain such performance data as is necessary, to enable Air Staff to plan the operations of the aircraft (where the necessary information is not available from official U.S.A. sources).
(ii) To obtain any necessary comparative data against similar British types.
(iii) To gain advance experience in handling the aircraft.
(iv) To check the effect of the proposed modifications - e.g. handling qualities of the aircraft at increased weight or with a different C.G. position resulting from any alterations made in Great Britain.
(v) To gain first-hand experience on any new feature of the aircraft - e.g. exhaust turbo super chargers.

19. Note.- The above programme is varied, as necessary, on the individual type - for example, in cases of aircraft to British order, action under paragraph 10 is not required.

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SECTION II

SCRUTINY PANEL.

Organisation for scrutiny of proposals for post-conversion Modifications.

1. Purpose. This organisation is concerned with proposals for:-

(i) modifications, over and above the initial conversion, which it is proposed should be executed by M.A.P. and/or the Service. This includes modifications which - though applied in England as a part of the conversion - are also required to be applied post-delivery in Overseas Commands.

(ii) modifications which are proposed to be applied in U.S.A., other than those of purely American origin. This includes conversion modification items to be embodied in U.S.A.

The aim of the organisation is to ensure that:-

(i) M.A.P. modification action is reduced to the minimum.

(ii) proposals to B.A.C. are only forwarded in cases where a strong argument, likely to be acceptable in America, can be made, and to state that argument.

2. Interests primarily concerned.

(i) D.T.D. (D.D./R.D.Q. and D.D./R.D.A.) from the design aspect.

(ii) D.O.R. or D.G.M.D.P. from the operational aspect.

(iii) D.P.C.A. from the aspect of action with B.A.C. and, in some instances, as being responsible for embodiment of modifications at Reception and Assembly Depots.

(iv) Representative of the American firm concerned.

(v) The appropriate Modification Committee from the aspect of modification action by M.A.P.

3. Constitution of Panel.

In the case of Naval types, the Naval Technical Sub-Committee provides a suitably constituted body provided that a D.P.C.A. and the American firm's representative are added.

For R.A.F. types, the Panel, under the Chairmanship of D.D./R.D.Q., shall comprise representatives of D.O.R., D.D./R.D.A., D.P.C.A., and the Chairman of the A.M.C. (or E.M.C.) with secretariat branch dealing with modifications. This Panel should be an ad-hoc body, meeting when necessary and at whatever place is best fitted for the particular matter under consideration. Representatives of the Command concerned and of the American firm may be called.

Where the word "Panel" is used subsequently it is intended to mean either of these bodies.

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4. Proposals for action with B.A.C.

The Panel will require evidence as follows:-

(i) as to the necessity for the modification.

(ii) as to the amount of work likely to be involved.

(iii) as to the reason why it is suggested the work should be done in U.S.A. rather than post-delivery.

(iv) as to the practicability of getting the work done pre-delivery in a reasonable number of aircraft.

(v) as to whether, pending application of the modification in U.S.A. it is desired that existing parts (not required when the modification is fitted) shall be omitted.

(vii) that the most suitable choice as between British and American sources of items of "Appendix A equipment" is utilised, and that - where necessary - appropriate A.E.C. action is taken.

It will be for the branches to support the proposal to provide such evidence, preferably by personal attendance at the Panel meeting.

If the Panel is satisfied that a good case has been made, a statement will be submitted for approval by Higher Authority and for transmission to B.A.C. in the form of a joint request from M.A.P. and Air Ministry, or M.A.P. and Admiralty, the appropriate Modification Committee being informed at the same time.

This statement will set out the nature of the requirement, with an opinion as to the practicability of meeting it and an exposition of the advantage to be gained.

If the Panel is satisfied that modification is desirable but not appropriate for submission to B.A.C., it will remit the proposal only to the appropriate Modification Committee for executive action.

5. Panel to be the sole regular channel for proposals.

Executive action on proposals rests with D.P.C.A. in regard to communications with B.A.C.: and rests with the Modification Committees in regard to modification work by M.A.P. and/or the Service.

6. Differentiation in nature of American aircraft supplies.

The Panel must keep in mind the probable difference in attitude of the American authorities toward modifications as between aircraft built against British contract or those diverted from U.S. Army or Navy contracts; those taken over from foreign orders and those provided under the Lease/Lend Scheme. Proposals for action through the B.A.C. must take account of these factors.

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SECTION III

Responsibilities of M.A.P. and B.A.C. regarding Modifications

1. Purpose. The arrangements must satisfy two main purposes:-

(a) the regular and rapid interchange of technical and allied information without obligation on either side to give executive effect.

(b) the controlled interchange of properly-authorised requests for modification action and reports on action resulting.

2. Channel of communication. Except for wholly unofficial letters between British and American firms, all letters, cables, drawings etc. shall pass through B.A.C. as the centralising office in America, and in England through D.P.C.A. for all correspondence except drawings, for which latter R.T.P. will be the channel.

3. Informative correspondence. In order to keep each other as up-to-date as practicable, B.A.C. and M.A.P. should mutually provide each other with the following:-

(i) any information involving a change in the Appendix A Type Record, Pilot's Notes, Repair Instructions, Spare Part Schedule or other official documents.

(ii) any new drawings or alterations to existing drawings, including full particulars of all modifications irrespective of whether or not action is being taken to request executive action on the modifications.

In addition there should be interchange of information as to probable future developments, both technical and operational. (Covered monthly by Monthly Liaison Letter; C.R.D. Notice to Branches No.127).

4. Requests for modification action. Where drawings and particulars of modifications are forwarded it must be clearly stated what action, if any, is required.

Where a request for executive action is made by the M.A.P., the B.A.C. should forward a reply to D.P.C.A. stating:-

(i) whether such action is being arranged; if it is not, reasons to be stated.

(ii) a forecast as to when action will take effect; to be followed by precise particulars, as early as available, defining which aircraft will be so modified.

(iii) detailed particulars of the design of the modification with drawings as necessary, as soon as available.

(iv) whether parts for retrospective fitment can be supplied; details as to delivery to be given as available.

The initial reply should be urgent, since action by M.A.P. will be dependent upon it.

5. Interchangeability. It is accepted that interchangeability cannot be fully ensured because of difference in production methods, available materials etc; also because requests to B.A.C. for modification action may often precede by some time the availability of drawings for the analogous M.A.P. modification.

To minimise interchangeability difficulties to the utmost, it is essential that prompt and regular interchange of drawing changes shall take place, and to ensure regular receipt of these drawings duplication of transit is essential.

6. Modification Leaflets. Where American parts are supplied for retrospective embodiment, the Firm's Service Bulletin, which is the equivalent of the normal British Vol.II leaflet, is required to accompany them.

7. Approval of U.S. - designed modifications. Approval rests with the B.A.C. The Scrutiny Panel will decide what action, if any, is to be taken, with regard to incorporation of the incorporation of the modifications on aircraft already delivered.

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SECTION XV

Procedure for modifications to American Types outside America.

1. Cases to be considered.

(a) The design of the modification is executed by an English "sister firm" and the parts are supplied from Home Sources. Retrospective Embodiment may be effected:—

(i) at D.P.C.A. assembly depot on aircraft between arrival in England and allocation to the Service.

(ii) In Maintenance Command or at operational units at home, the personnel being found by the Service or under D.C.E. contract action.

(iii) at overseas depots by the Service.

(b) The design of the modification is executed in U.S.A., and the parts supplied by B.A.C. Retrospective embodiment may be effected in either of the three above manners.

(c) Command modifications, wholly arranged by Command concerned, subject to notification to, and over-riding agreement by the Air Ministry or Admiralty in consultation with M.A.P.

(d) In the case of American types shipped wholly to any one overseas command, the Command H.Q. shall have wide powers to modify (in consultation with a representative, where available, of the American firm) since control form England of design and provisioning will not be practicable.

2. Command Modifications. No design or supply action by M.A.P. is necessary. It is necessary, however, that - except under (d) of para. 1 - particulars should be provided for notation by both the American design firm and the English "sister firm" to minimize interference with subsequent design work, and where deemed desirable by the Scrutiny Panel, to arrange for embodiment during production if convenient.

3. American Modifications. Under Section III, D.P.C.A. would receive notification from America that an American modification is considered by B.A.C. to be of sufficient importance to justify supply of parts for retrospective fitting.

D.P.C.A. will report such proposals to the Scrutiny Panel and if the modification is deemed of sufficient importance it would be remitted to the Modification Committee.

Allocation of modification parts, when received, by D.C.E. would follow normal modification practice.

The Firm's Service Bulletin as received from U.S.A. would be reviewed by the "sister firm" and proposals submitted to the Scrutiny Panel.

4. English Modifications. The Modification Committee would receive all these, in the proposal stage, from the Scrutiny Panel.

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If, at a later date, limited design capacity or production and embodiment difficulty arose the Committee would re-open the matter with the Panel.

Modification action would follow normal practice as regards design. The arrangements for supply of parts and for embodiment would be non-standard.

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Appendix "H"

22nd September 1941.

CORRIGENDA NO. 1. TO: -

" APPLICATION OF MODIFICATIONS PREPARED IN GREAT BRITAIN."
(Dated 27th August 1941).

Please make the following corrections: -

Sheets 5, 6, 7, 8. "Modications with limited application."

Under Series 1 column delete the following: -

"Mod. 266 (2) See 302"
"Mod. 302 (2) in lieu of 266 from A.M. 753 to A.M. 803".

(Note: The 32 M.U. Version of R.3003 is fitted to Mark V Series I as stated on Sheet 1.)

Sheet 8.
Under Series2 column add: - "266 (2) up to AM. 753" (Then see 302)

Sheet 8.
Under Series 3 column:- The first item now reads
"299 (2) with 262 and 298"
Amend to read: -
"299 (2) with 298 (2)".

(Signed) E. V. Leak,
Resident Technical Officer,
Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft Ltd.
The Airport, Southampton.

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27th August 1941

APPLICATION OF MODIFICATIONS PREPARED IN GREAT BRITAIN.

HUDSON Mark and Series Numbers -
Main Distinguishing Features -

HUDSON MARK I.

Common Features.	Basic Airframe Model 214. Wright Cyclone G. 102A Engines. T. 1083 R. 1082, T. 3040 R. 3039, T.R.9.D. and 32 M. U. Version of R. 3003. Boulton Paul Turret Type 'C' Mark II
Series I.	Hamilton Constant Speed Airscrew.
Series 2.	Hamilton Hydromatic Airscrew (fully feathering)
Series 3.	Undergun Platform.

.....

HUDSON MARK II.

No Series Numbers to this Mark.
Basic Airframe Model 414.
Wright Cyclone G. 102A Engines.
T.1083 R.1082, T.3040 R.3039, T.R.9.D.
and 32 M.U. Version of R.3003.
Boulton Paul Type 'C' Mark IIA Turret.
Enclosed D/F Loop.

.....

HUDSON MARK III.

Common Features.	Basic Airframe Model 414. Wright Cyclone G.205A Engines. (Two Speed Blower). T.3040 R.3039, T.R.9.D. R.3003 (32 M.U. Version of R.3003 on Series 2). Boulton Paul Turret Type 'C' Mark IIA.
Series 1.	Bendix Radio and Intercomm. Open D/F Loop.
Series 2.	T.1083 R.1082 and enclosed D/F Loop.
Series 3.	Bendix Radio and Intercomm. Open D/F Loop and BLIND APPROACH (Lockheed Version) also U.S.A. Version of T.3040 R.3039 T.R.9.D. R.3003.

.....

HUDSON MARK IV.

No Series Numbers to this Mark.
Basic Airframe Model 414.
Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp SC.3-G Engines.
Boulton Paul Turret Type 'C' Mark IIA
T.1083 R.1082, T.3040 R.3039, T.R.9.D., and
32 M.U. Version of R.3003
Enclosed D/F Loop.

.....

HUDSON MARK V.

Common Features.	Basic Airframe Model 414. Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp S. 3G4-G Engines. (Two Speed Blower). T.3040 R.3039, T.R.9.D. R.3003 (32 M.U. Version of R.3003 on Series 1.) Boulton Paul Turret Type 'C' Mark IIA.
Series 1.	T.1083 Radio and enclosed D/F Loop.
Series 2.	Bendix Radio and Intercomm. and open D/F Loop.
Series 3.	Bendix Radio and Intercomm. and open D/F Loop. BLIND APPROACH (T.3040 R.3039, T.R.9.D. R.3003 U.S.A. Version.)

(Signed) B.V. Leak,
Resident Technical Officer,
Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft Limited.

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- C O P Y -

Hudson Modifications - Prepared by Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft Ltd.

41. To introduce Mark V or Mark VI Bomb Distributor in lieu of Bomb Selector Switch.
201. To provide Armour Protection for Tanks.
202. To provide Armour Protection for Pilot.
203. To provide Cover for Battery to prevent shorting in case of crash.
205. To strengthen Electrical Leads to Engine Cylinder Thermometers.
206. To provide Oxygen Supply Point at Camera Position.
207. To Introduce Houdaille Windscreen Wiper.
208. To Provide Protection for Oxygen Cylinders.
209. To Provide Suspension Hook for Pigeon Baskets.
210. To Introduce one 500 watt A.C.Generator.
211. To Increase Clearance between Vertical Engine Strut and Flange on Tail Pipe Shroud.
212. To Provide Drainage Holes in the lower extremities of the Rudders.
213. To Introduce Azimuth Bracket and Steering Indicator.
214. To Strengthen Support for Carburettor Control Jackshaft Bell Crank.
215. To Modify Exhaust System.
216. To Strengthen Intake Assembly Air Baffle for Cabin Heating.
218. To Provide Cockpit light and Dimmer SC/366 and SC/724 for use when Astral Observations are made.
219. To Reposition Cartridge Stowage.
224. To Introduce Revised National Markings on Fuselage and Fin.
225. To Delete Noe-Out Hose Clips in Fuel System and substitute Jubilee or other approved clips.
226. To Change Material of Connector Block between top and bottom of Rudder from A.M.265 T.4. to D.T.D. 289.
227. To Introduce Fibre Rubbing Strip at Fuel Pump Port.
228. To Reposition F.24 Camera
229. To Provide Throttle Stop for use with 87 Octane Fuel.
230. To Provide for Fitting of T.3040, R.3039 Equipment.
231. To Provide Belling of Pipe Ends on Fuel Lines at Flexible Hose. Connections.
232. To Provide Inter-Communication facilities for second pilot.
233. To Provide Rubber Mounting Block for oil drain cock in engine nacelle
234. To Introduce Glycol Spray for De-icing of the Windscreen Wiper Blades and Pilot's Windscreen.
235. To Reposition Oxygen Bottles from Turret and Provide Suitable Protection.
236. To Provide Revised Instruction Sheet in Aircraft on the operation of "Undercarriage Emergency Operation."
237. To Revise Camouflage and Identification Marking.
238. To Improve Operation of Pilot's Emergency Exit.
240. To Improve Flare Launching Gear.
241. To Provide Window in Bomb Loading Winch.
242. To Provide for Engine Data Plate on Pilot's Instrument Panel.
243. To Improve Support Bracket for Pressure Switch on Hydromatic Airscrew.
244. To Introduce Ice Guards for Air Intake.
245. To Introduce Exhaust Flame Dampers.
246. To Reposition Stowage for Signal Pistol.
247. To Reposition Bomb Firing Switch for Pilot.
248. To Introduce Worth Oil Dilution System.
249. To Provide Hand Hole under W/T. Operator's Seat.
250. To Modify Support Bracket for T.1083 R.1082.
251. To Introduce Beam Guns. (Hudson I Series I and 2.)
252. To Introduce Beam Guns. (Hudson I Series 3 and Marks II, III, IV and V)
253. To Introduce Compass Vertical Corrector.
254. To Eliminate C.O. Contamination in Cabin.
255. To Introduce Luminous Plates for Oxygen Points.
257. To Improve Feathering Control knobs for Hydromatic Airscrew.
258. To Modify Dinghy Stowage.
259. To Improve Operating Handle for Pilot's Sliding Windows.
260. To Introduce Recorder Drift (Lamplough) Mk. II in lieu of Sight, Tail Drift Mark II.
261. To Introduce Additional D/F. Receiver, R.1155 for use of Navigator.
262. To Modify Bulkhead to Permit Application of Mod. 230 (T.3040 R.3039 equipment.)
263. To Introduce Motor Driven A.C.Generator and Reposition Motor.

P.T.O.

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264. To Introduce Pilot's Armour Plate.
266. To Complete R.3003 Installation.
267. To Improve Attachment of Slot De-icing Equipment.
268. To Introduce T.R.9/D.Equipment.
270. To Delete Master Bomb Release Switch.
271. To Introduce Astro Compass Mark II.
272. To Introduce Astrograph Mark I A.
273. Repositioning of Immersion Switch & By-Passing Master Cut Out Switch.
275. To Introduce Electrically Heated Camera Muff.
276. To Strengthen Undercarriage Lower Drag Strut.
277. To Introduce Worth Oil Dilution System, (Hudson Mark III, IV and V)
279. To Cover Miscellaneous Corrections to Drawings.
280. To Improve Cabin Door Stop.
281. To Paint Inside of Fuselage to Reduce Fire Risk near Fuel Tank.
282. To Improve Tachometer Drive for Engine Speed Indicator.
283. To Introduce Sextant Support in Astral Dome.
284. To Introduce Exhaust Flame Dampers on Hudson III.
285. To Introduce Flame Damping Hudson IV & V.
286. To Introduce Armour Protection for Tanks, Hudsons III & IV.
287. To Improve Airscoop Door Mark IV.
288. To Improve Bonding and Screening Mark I and II.
289. To Improve Bonding and Screening Mark III.
290. To Improve Bonding and Screening Mark IV and V.
291. To Introduce Oxygen Economiser.
292. To Provide New Bracket for Limit Switch - Engine Cooling Gills.
293. To Introduce Air Cleaners for Engine Intake.
294. To Introduce Towed Recognition Signal.
A.L. 295. Miscellaneous Amendments to Drawings.
296. To Introduce Blind Approach Equipment.
297. To Delete Flap 70% Limit Stop (Lockheed Mod. 72).
298. To Reposition Motor-Alternator.
299. To Improve & Complete U.S.A. Installation T.3040 R.3039 Units.
300. To Complete Blind Approach (U.S.A. Version).
301. To Complete T.R.9.D. (U.S.A. Version).
302. To Complete R.3003. (U.S.A. Version).
304. To Strengthen Tail Wheel Lock.
305. To Change Camouflage.
306. To Improve Limit Switch Gear for Cooling Gills.
307. To Connect Long Range Tanks to Engine Pump System.
308. To Introduce App. A.D.Type H.
309. To Introduce Fire Extinguisher, Hand Operated.
310. To Introduce Cushion for Bucket Seat, & Stowage for Lap Type Parachute.
311. To Provide Indicator Unit (T.3040 R.3039) for pilot.
312. To Provide Ice Guards Hudson III.
313. To Provide Ice Guards Hudson IV.
314. To Provide Ice Guards Hudson V.
315. To Improve U.S.A. Version of Oxygen Cylinder Protection.

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Sheet 4. 27th August, 1941.

Application of Cunliffe-Owen Modifications.

Hudson Mark I Series 1, 2, and 3. (Up to N. 7404.
" " P. 5165.
" " T. 9365.
Plus R.4059 & N. 7220.

Class 1 or 2 modifications underlined.

Modifications Common to Series 1, 2, and 3.

Mod. & Class.	Mod & Class.	Mod. & Class.
41 (2)	229 (3B)	270 (3B)
203 (3B)	230 (2) with 210	271 (3A)
205 (3B)	231 (3B)	272 (3A)
206 (3A)	232 (3A)	273 (2)
207 (4B)	233 (3A)	275 (3A) (Up to
208 (2)	234 (3A)	T. 9326 when
209 (3B)	236 (2)	Lockheed Mod.
210 (2) with 230	237 (4B) See 224 & 305	70 is fitted.)
211 (3B)	238 (3A)	276 (2)
212 (3B)	240 (3A)	280 (3B)
213 (3A)	244 (2)	281 (3B)
214 (3A)	245 (2)	282 (3B)
215 (2)	246 (3A)	283 (3A)
216 (3A)	247 (3B)	288 (2)
218 (3A)	248 (2)	296 (2) S.O.O.
219 (3B)	249 (3A)	297 (3B)
244 (4B) See 237 & 305.	253 (3A)	305 (4B) (See
225 (2)	258 (2)	234 & 237.)
226 (3A)	259 (3A)	309 (3A)
227 (3A)	260 (3A)	310 (3A)
228 (3A)	268 (2)	

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Modifications with limited application.

Series 1.	Series 2.	Series 3. (T.9266
Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.	& Mod. & Class T.9267
251 (2.S.O.O.)	243 (3A)	243 (3A) T. 9297 to
	251 (2)	252 (2) T. 9365).

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N. B. 4B Modifications are only quoted when they have Class 2 application.

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Sheet 8. 27th August, 1941.

Application of Gunliffe-Owen Modifications.
Hudson Mark II (Up to T.9385)

Class 1 and 2 modifications are underlined.

Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.
41 (2)	235 (2)	282 (3B)
201 (2)	236 (2)	283 (3A)
202 (2) with 250	237 (4B) See 224 & 305.	288 (2)
205 (3A)	238 (3A)	296 (2) S.O.C.
206 (3A)	24C (3A)	297 (3B)
207 (4B)	243 (3A)	304 (2)
208 (2)	244 (2)	305 (4B) See 224 &
209 (3B)	245 (2)	309 (3A) 237
210 (2) with 230	246 (3A)	310 (3A)
211 (3B)	247 (3B)	
212 (3B)	248 (2)	
213 (3A)	249 (3A)	
214 (3A)	250 (2) with 202.	
215 (2)	252 (2)	
216 (3A)	253 (3A)	
218 (3A)	257 (4B)	
219 (3B)	258 (2)	
224 (4B)	259 (3A)	
226 (3A)	260 (3A)	
227 (3A)	268 (2)	
228 (3A)	270 (2)	
229 (3B)	271 (3A)	
230 (2) with 210	272 (3A)	
232 (3A)	273 (2)	
233 (3A)	280 (3B)	
234 (3A)	281 (3B)	

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N.B.4B Modifications are only quoted when they have Class 2 Applications.

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Sheet 6.

27th August, 1941.

Application of Gunliffe-Owen Modifications (Up to T.9465.
(" " V.9254.
Hudson Mark III. Series 1 and 2 and 3. (" " AE.606.
(AAM.930-AM.953.

Modifications Common to Series 1, 2, and 3.
Class 1 and 2 modifications are underlined.

Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.
41 (2)	238 (3A)	282 (3B)
206 (3A)	240 (3A)	283 (3A)
207 (4B)	246 (3A)	284 (2)
208 (2)	247 (3B)	286 (2)
209 (3B)	249 (3A)	289 (2)
212 (3B)	252 (2)	293 (2) S.O.O.
213 (3A)	255 (3A)	297 (3B)
218 (3A)	257 (4B)	304 (2)
219 (3B)	258 (2)	305 (4B) See 224 &
224 (4B) See 237 & 305.	259 (3A)	309 (3A) 237
226 (3A)	260 (3)	310 (3A)
228 (3A)	270 (2)	312 (2)
229 (3B)	271 (3A)	
232 (3A)	272 (3A)	
234 (3A)	273 (2)	
235 (2) Up to V.9065.	277 (2)	
236 (2)	280 (3B)	
237 (4B) See 224 & 305.	281 (3B)	

...1.....

Modifications with limited application.

Series 1. Mod. & Class.	Series 2. Mod. & Class.	(V.9111 & subsequent) Series 3. Mod. & Class.
220 (2) with 262, 263.	202 (2) with 280 (Up to V.9066).	298 (2) with 299.
254 (2)	Lockheed Mod. 97	300 (2)
266 (2)	instead of 202 after V.9066.	301 (2)
268 (2)	220 (2) with 210.	302 (2)
286 (2)	268 (2)	
296 (2) S.O.O.	286 (2) Up to V.9066 then Lockheed Mod. 77 is fitted.	
302 (2) Instead of 266 on V.9066 to V.9111. (Not yet certain)	296 (2) S.O.O.	

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N.B. 4B Modifications are only quoted when they have Class 2 Application.

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Sheet 7 27th August, 1941.

Application of Gunliffe-Owen Modifications.
Hudson Mark IV (Up to AE.638).

Class 1 and 2 modifications are underlined.

Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.
41 (2)	240 (3A)	286 (2)
202 (2) with 250.	246 (3A)	287 (2)
206 (3A)	247 (3B)	290 (2)
207 (4B)	249 (3A)	292 (2)
208 (2)	250 (2) with 202.	296 (2) S.O.O.
209 (3B)	252 (2)	297 (3B)
210 (2) with 230.	253 (3A)	304 (2)
212 (3B)	257 (4B)	305 (4B) See 224 &
213 (3A)	258 (2)	309 (3A) 237.
218 (3A)	259 (3A)	310 (3A)
219 (3B)	260 (3A)	313 (2)
224 (4B) See 237 & 305.	268 (2)	
226 (3A)	270 (2)	
228 (3A)	271 (3A)	
229 (3B)	272 (3A)	
230 (2) with 210.	273 (2)	
232 (3A)	277 (2)	
234 (3A)	280 (3B)	
235 (2)	281 (3B)	
236 (2)	282 (3B)	
237 (4B) See 224 & 305.	283 (3A)	
238 (3A)	285 (2)	

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N.B. 4B. Modifications are only quoted when they have Class 2 Application.

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Sheet 8. 27th August, 1941.

Application of Gunliffe-Owen Modifications.
Hudson Mark V Series 1, 2, & 3 (Up to AM. 909
(" " AE. 657.

Class 1 and 2 Modifications are underlined.

Modifications common to Series 1, 2, and 3.

Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.	Mod. & Class.
41 (2) Embodied in U.S.A.	238 (3A)	280 (3B)
206 (3A)	240 (3A)	281 (3B)
207 (4B)	246 (3A)	282 (3B)
208 (2) (with 315 for Series 3&	247 (3B)	283 (3B)
209 (3A) Series 2 if Mod 86	249 (3A)	285 (2)
213 (3A) is fitted)	252 (2)	290 (2)
218 (3A)	253 (3A)	297 (3B)
219 (3B)	257 (3B) With Hydromatic	304 (2)
224 (4B) See 237 & 305.	Aircrew Only	305 (4B) See 224 & 237.
226 (3A)	258 (2)	306 (2)
228 (3A)	259 (3A)	309 (3A)
229 (3A)	260 (3A)	316 (3A)
232 (3A)	270 (2)	314 (2)
234 (3A)	271 (3A)	286 (2) Unless Lockheed
235 (2) AM. 520 - AM. 569 only	272 (3A)	Mod. 77 is embodied.
(Lockheed Mod. 86 fitted there-	273 (2)	
after)	277 (2)	
236 (2)		
237 (4B) See 224 & 305.		

.....

Modifications with limited application.

Series 1. Mod. & Class.	Series 2. Mod. & Class.	Series 3. (AM 803 & Mod. & Class Subsequent.)
202 (2) with 250.	230 (2) with 262 & 263.	299. (2) with 262
230 (2) with 210.	264 (2) Unless 97 is fitted.	and 298.
266 (2) SEE 302.	268 (2)	300 (2)
268 (2)	302 (2) AM. 753 to	301 (2)
302 (2) in lieu of 266	AM. 803	302 (2)
from AM. 753 -AM.803.	296 (2) S.O.O.	315 (2) with 208.
296 (2) S.O.O.	315 (2) with 208 if	
	Lockheed Mod. 86 is	
	fitted.	

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N. B. 4B Modifications are only quoted when they have Class 2 Application.

(Signed) B.V.LEAK,
Resident Technical Officer,
Gunliffe-Owen Aircraft Ltd.

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Appendix "H"

22nd September 1941.

CORRIGENDA NO. 1. TO: -

" APPLICATION OF MODIFICATIONS PREPARED IN GREAT BRITAIN."
(Dated 27th August 1941).

Please make the following corrections: -

Sheets 5, 6, 7, 8. "Modications with limited application."

Under Series 1 column delete the following: -

"Mod. 266 (2) See 302"
"Mod. 302 (2) in lieu of 266 from A.M. 753 to A.M. 803".

(Note: The 32 M.U. Version of R.3003 is fitted to Mark V Series I as stated on Sheet 1.)

Sheet 8.
Under Series2 column add: - "266 (2) up to AM. 753" (Then see 302)

Sheet 8.
Under Series 3 column:- The first item now reads
"299 (2) with 262 and 298"
Amend to read: -
"299 (2) with 298 (2)".

(Signed) E. V. Leak,
Resident Technical Officer,
Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft Ltd.,
The Airport, Southampton.

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Herewith statement showing Sister Firms, Central Firms and Assembly and Modification Firms for American Aircraft.

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT.	SISTER FIRM.	CENTRAL FIRM.	ASSEMBLY & MODIFICATION FIRMS.
Airacobra	A.S.T. Humble	A.S.T. Humble	B.O.A.C. Colerne
Autogyro	Burtonwood	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
Baltimore (most of these aircraft are going overseas)	Burtonwood	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
Bermuda	Fairey Aviation	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
Boston I & II	A.V.Roe	Burtonwood	Burtonwood & Lockheed, Speke.
Boston III (Turbinlite)	A.V.Roe	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
" " (Intruder)	"	"	"
" " (Bomber)	"	"	Lockheed: Speke & Martin Hearn.
Buffalo I	Fairey Aviation	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
	Hayes		
Belgian Brewster	" "	"	"
Catalina I & II.	Saunders Roe	Saunders Roe	Saunders Roe Beaumaris
Chesapeake	Heston A/C Co.	Heston A/C Co.	Burtonwood
Cleveland	A.S.T. Humble		Burtonwood
Fortress I & II	Vickers Armstrong	Burtonwood	"
Harvards I & II	Helliwells	Helliwells	Helliwells
Havoc I (Turbinlite)	A. V. Roe	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
" I (Pandora)			
" I (Intruder)			
Havoc II (D.B.7.A)			
II (Turbinlite)			
Hudson I,II,III,IV & V	Cunliffe-Owen	Cunliffe-Owen	Lockheeds: Speke
Kittyhawk	A.S.T., Humble	A.S.T. Humble	Scottish Aviation & A.S.T.
Liberator I & II	Handley Page	Scottish Aviation	Scottish Aviation
Lightning I & II	Cunliffe-Owen	Cunliffe-Owen	Lockheeds: Speke
Hartlet I & II	Blackburns	Blackburns	Scottish Aviation & Burtonwood
Maryland I & II	A. V. Roe	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
Mohawk III & IV	A.S.T. Humble	A.S.T. Humble	B.O.A.C. Colerne
Mustang I	" "	" "	Lockheeds: Speke & Abbotsinch
Northrop			Scottish Aviation & Burtonwood
Stinson	Burtonwood	Burtonwood	Burtonwood
Tomahawk	A.S.T. Humble	A.S.T. Humble	Scottish Aviation, B.O.A.C. Colerne, Lockheeds Speke & Cunliffe-Owen.
Vengeance	A.S.T. Humble	A.S.T. Humble	Burtonwood.

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TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	SISTER FIRM	CENTRAL FIRM	ASSEMBLY & MODIFICATION FIRMS.
Ventura Marander B.25	Cunliffe-Owen Burtonwood A.S.T.Humble	Cunliffe-Owen Burtonwood A.S.T. Humble	Lockheeds: Speke Burtonwood Lockheed & 41 Group

Notes: The D.B. 7 (LAM) is the same aircraft as the Havoc I (Pandora) The Vanguard and the Yale are not now coming to this country. The Vanguard is going to China and the Yale has been delivered direct to Canada.

Fairchild F.24 Vought OS2U-3	Burtonwood Saunders Roe	Burtonwood Saunders Roe	Burtonwood Scottish Aviation: Greenock & Prestwick & Lockheed Abbotsinch.
Martlet IV	Blackburns	Blackburns	Lockheed Speke.

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1st June, 1942

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Air Ministry,
King Charles Street, S.W.1.

Dear Sir Charles:

I am attaching a copy of Colonel Beebe's report to me here on the subject of Aircraft Supply, Repair and Maintenance.

I have not had an opportunity to go over the points that Colonel Beebe has raised. However, since the maintenance of American aircraft is of deep concern to both of us, I wanted you to have this for your information.

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieut. Gen., U.S.A.

1 Incl: Colonel Beebe's Report

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My Dear General

Herewith a letter received by signal from Portal which he asks me to give you at once.

Yours ever,

/s/ Jack Slessor

11/June

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Para. 8(f) and 9(a).

I understand that work on depots is proceeding fast and that Langford Lodge is nearly complete. On the other hand, there is no sign of the arrival from America of the plant and personnel required for this depot.

I cannot help thinking that Colonel Beebe rendered his report without going fully into all the relevant facts. I do not believe that General Chaney would accept them, and I hope therefore that you will not regard them as authoritative. I assure you that we are doing and will continue to do all we can to avoid delays on this side of the Atlantic. I am sure you will do everything possible to help us, in particular by seeing that aircraft are as fully equipped as possible for operations before they leave America.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) C. PORTAL.

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BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

10th June, 1942.

AIR STAFF

Dear Arnold,

I have now been able to examine Colonel Beebe's report on supply and maintenance of American aircraft. Future arrangements for supply of American aircraft and spares to R.A.F. and U.S. air forces are now under discussion between Air Ministry and General Chaney's headquarters. (Para. 9(b) of report refers). I thought however you might like to have my comments on some of Beebe's conclusions, which I will reply to by paragraph numbers.

Para. 8(a).

This is an old complaint which has been gone into thoroughly in the past, particularly with General Brett when he was in this country. Reason is that many of aircraft sent over here are incapable of doing job for which they are intended until modified. For example, the lack of defensive power in early marks of the Liberator and lack of any flame-damping device in Liberator and Fortress had to be remedied. To put aircraft into operations without essential equipment would be most inefficient and would certainly result in useless losses. Naturally, we shorten time taken to fit equipment as far as possible, but much of it is of a complicated character and some delay is inevitable. Anything which can be done to fit the equipment in America would shorten the time required here. I understand General Brett made certain recommendations, which were agreed with Air Ministry, but possibly his being posted to another appointment may have delayed introduction of steps he proposed. I very much hope that you can do something to help in this.

Para. 8(c) and (e).

I am afraid that it is simply not the case that sufficient spares are available. For example, work in repair depot at Burtonwood on Allison engines is entirely held up owing to lack of necessary parts. I do not know what evidence led Colonel Beebe to criticise our supply system but I can assure you that his statement is a travesty of the facts. I understand that his view is not accepted by your headquarters in this country.

Lt. Gen. H.H.Arnold,
Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army Air Forces,
War Department

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#21

EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

Jan 5, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr Green:

Royden E. Beebe, Sr. was not related to me. He was the father of Royden Eugene Beebe, Jr. who was an AF Brig. on Gen Kenney's staff in the South Pacific. Royden Jr just seems to have disappeared. I don't know, and have never been able to find out what happened to him. At one time the Air Force started forwarding his mail to me.

I have not met your friend Mike Mayunga. This morning's paper spoke of the new book on Gen Marshall. You will have to take more vitamin Eng E.

A Happy New Year to you, too.

Sincerely,

Eugene H. Beebe

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

B/DOC
Box B
#21

November 10, 1972

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr Green:

I left Washington in either late June or early July of 1942 so was not around again until late in 1944.

I don't remember any "blacklist". General Arnold was one to bend over backwards to help a way ward soul but he would never have stood by for or allowed any one to loose up his job. Both Clagett and Harms were one B'ds. What they did to cause their trouble is only hearsay to me. Clagett relieved Connolly at Ward and I was his adj for a spell. He did not much care for the way I did my job as he said I did it like Arnold would and not like Clagett would.

The last time I saw him was when he came to tell me Good by. One had to feel sorry for him.

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

the others you mention were all on good terms both as persons and as officers, so far as I know, with Gen A. Knerr may have been a bit too forward with the seperate air business but that's just a guess.

In early 1942 there was a group of three or four senior retired Army officers, Gen. Craig was one, that had a suite away in the tower reaches of the old Munitions Bldg. This group had to clear every promotion to General officer. Every few days Gen A would send me down there with a list of names and oral briefing on each listed. These officers knew the officers being recommended better than I, and usually gave me a bad time now and then on some. Gen Craig would usually end up the by saying for me to tell Gen A that the damn list would be approved. I am glad I don't remember the briefings.

One thing I do hope you have found out, Gen A only recommended those officers that were needed early in the war. After the over seas and other units got organized, the local commander had to do it.

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

I have a close friend who I found blamed Gen A for his not making general. When I found this out I explained he was putting his blame on the wrong man and explained who it was that was responsible. He took awhile to believe his boss was responsible but did accept the truth at last.

Perhaps some of the cases you mentioned are or did blame the wrong guy. I would bet that way.

On the idea of our own identity in the U.K.; you might remember that both Gen Marshall and Arnold went thru that trouble with the French in WW I. My guess is they did not intend ever to let our Pres and the P.M. arrange for the same little set up planned by the (our loyal allies). At least I think it had a small early part in the identity thing.

My guess is that Gen Franks was to hold the fort till Gen Spaatz could get there.

Sincerely,
Eugene H. Beebe

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December 27, 1972

Brig General Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif 90803

Dear General Beebe:

Belated thanks for yours of the 10th of November and the good information it contained. At the rate I am writing, I will be using some of it about September 1973.

Right now, in Chapter VII, I'm up to here in the Philippine "bontacs" (probable origin of "boondocks") with First Lieut Arnold having lunch with somebody named Beebe and First Lieut George C. Marshall. The date is 1914.

Looking at the Army Register, I would guess that was First Lieut Royden Beebe. If so, any relation to you?

All the best for a Happy New Year.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

P.S. I have a good friend, civil engineer named Mike Mayuga who works for the city of Long Beach protecting its oil resources. Ever meet him?

Mike is a member of Air Force Intelligence Reserve Group in HQ USAF.

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

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

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

September 8, 1969

Mr. John F. Loosbrock
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Loosbrock:

Regarding your biography of General Arnold, I will be happy to receive both you and Dr. Green at my home in Long Beach at your convenience during the week of September 29. You may reach me by telephone at (213) GE 826-30.

If there is any particular information in which you are interested, you might advise me in advance in case I might have to look through old papers to refresh my memory.

Sincerely,

Eugene H. Beebe

Brig. Gen. Eugene H. Beebe

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September 20, 1969

Brig.Gen. E.H. Beebe, USAF(Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach 3
California, 90803

Dear General Beebe:

Jack Loosbrock made available to me a copy of your letter to him of September 8th. Since I have done a good deal of the research, I thought I would enumerate some of the interest areas:

a. You told the Columbia University Oral History interviewers about some flight General Arnold took where there was an insufficiency of oxygen which in your view contributed to his medical condition.

b. You served with Col Arnold in a lay capacity at March Field throughout his tour there - from 1931 to early 1936. It is our opinion that March Field is the key to Arnold's return from exile and the stepping stone to his rise to high position. Some of the things that we could use more on:

1. His role as leader of men. Specific anecdotes that point up his role as Commander.

2. He was keenly aware of morale and he scrounged enough materials to build the rest camp up in the mountains. Any anecdotes?

3. Arnold had what moderns would probably regard as a simplistic view of the great outdoors as a character builder. Nothing "turned him on" more than talk of a pack trip to the High Sierras for fishing or hunting. If was this life-view, we think that gave him such enthusiasm for the CCC program. His segment of it was probably the most successful in the country. Did you participate in that program?

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4. Arnold's forte was public relations. He sensed what Hollywood could do to put the Air Corps on the map. Col Arnold courted the famous Hollywood stars to come out to March Field. We've seen correspondence with Bebe Daniels, Ben Lyons, Wallace Berry, Ann Harding, Richard Dix, etc. Do you recall any specifics of his courting of Hollywood?

5. Air Mail Operations - 1934 - Any specifics on Arnold's operation out of Salt Lake City, any narrow escapes or near misses?

6. Arnold and Malin Craig - Any anecdotes involving them. Gen Craig was no air power advocate yet, he liked Arnold.

7. Arnold's first star in February 1935 seemed to be a cause for community rejoicing. Why?

8. Earthquake Relief in March 1934 - Arnold almost got into hot water for unauthorized expenditures to keep victims, but when the quick action was publicly praised, the Army reversed itself on Arnold. Is this a fair analysis?

9. Arnold's departure from March Field was nearly a community traumatic experience. Col Clagett who succeeded him in 1936 had large shoes to fill. He didn't.

10. What was the Mount Shasta flap with the Navy all about?

You served as Gen Arnold's "Exec" at a most crucial period of Air Force history - from the establishment of the AAF in June 1941 through most of the first year of World War II. These are many issues of interest:

a. Movement in 1941 to establish a separate Air Force. Many Air Corps officers urged that the Service go "all the way." But Arnold played it conservative. Why?

b. This brings one to discuss his relationship with Gen Marshall.

c. Arnold and the Andrews-Knerr combination.

d. Setting up Air Force Ferrying Command and the Chain of Bases in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. Problems with Pan Am.

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Pearl Harbor

Arnold was convinced, as were most others, that the Japs would strike in the Far East, if they decided to move:

a. Farthing-Rose-Coddington report to protect Pearl Harbor with 180 planes. Sent to Washington by Gen Fred Martin. Disappeared.

b. Leak of RAINBOW FIVE plan three days before Pearl Harbor by Chicago Tribune.

Drew Pearson seldom said a good word about Arnold and frequently criticized him. Apparently there was some slight or snub (real or imagined) in 1940-41. Ring any bells?

Feud between Arnold and Sasha DeSeversky. Apparently goes back to the 1930's. Can you shed any light?

George Brett stubbed his toe out in the Pacific. He was groomed as a comer. What happened?

We have a dozen more queries which we will hold for the interview. As you probably inferred from Jack Loosbrock's letter, this is a "warts and all" biography. We are interested in anything and everything that will give us some clues to the man - Hap Arnold.

I hope I will be able to join Loosbrock out to the Coast for this trip.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

Feb 7, 1972

Dr Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr Green;

Glad to have your letter of the 31st Jan. Gen McNarney died about the same day I received your letter. I wonder if the Establishment plans to balance their budget just on deceased AF officers? There have been several just around here.

Re the Memo to Dr Giler dated March 14, 1945; I just do not remember it. It does refer tho to the meeting held each morning to bring the Chief and others up to date on the events during the previous 24 hours. Following these briefings Gen A would meet with Gen Marshall, so he wanted to know the latest events. I doubt if it was not about a "particular" meeting with Gen Marshall.

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

My guess is that the memo is Gen Arnold's idea of how to shorten a meeting, held each day, that had at this time served its purpose. It is interesting to note that my purpose in Washington at this time was to make arrangements for the trip to Europe. Some one must have told me we would get back!

With regard to the Wedemeyer item; I don't recall this going back to China thing, but Gen Gaskell me one day while we were at the Coral Gables place, if I would be interested in taking Gen W's place at SEA as Gen W was going to leave there. He explained it would be a promotion etc. As I recall it now we both laughed. I figured I was at the place he wanted me to be, and he could certainly use a friend.

Sincerely,

Eugene H. Beebe
Brig Gen USAF Ret.

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31 January 1972

Brig Gen Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif 90803

Dear General Beebe:

Still cranking away at General Arnold. Made some progress but received a setback when Jack Loosbrock got out of it for personal reasons. I've been keeping up with the interview program and have been fortunate enough to have caught over 200 people, including most of the greats, on tape. And that includes Charles Lindbergh, Robert Lovett (twice), de Seversky, Howard Rusk, Eddie Rickenbacker, Jackie Cochran, and of course, a raft of people who were Regulars. Among the key people I missed: Joe McNarney (he's had a stroke) and Howard Craig.

Anyway, I came across an item whose date indicates that you had come back into the office, and General Arnold was due back from Coral Gables in a week or two. My guess is that your proposals to reorganize the office was to lighten the burden on General Arnold when he returned. There is also a reference to his pending meeting with General Marshall. Was this intended to size up General Arnold to determine whether he was strong enough to continue on the job? Any recollections you may have will be welcome.

Incidentally, I ran across another item wherein General Wedemeyer (I've seen him three times) suggested you as Chief of Staff to Chennault late in the war. This is when things threatened to come apart.

All good wishes,

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March 14, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GILES:

1. During the last two days, I have watched the routine of General Arnold's office. I believe that a few simple changes in the use of office space and certain changes in personnel will give the machinery necessary to carry out General Arnold's directive.

2. The changes I propose in the use of office space are as shown on attached room plan. There is no change in total space.

3. The changes I propose in personnel are as follows:

a. Officers to be released -

Col. Dean for reassignment
Maj. Smoak for attendance at British Staff School

b. Officers to be assigned (after the selection has been approved by the C.G.) -

Two officers (one a regular) to Advisory Council.
One officer as my assistant.
One officer as additional ADC to CG.

c. No change in civilian staff is contemplated.

4. I am of the opinion that the morning meeting as now conducted should be modified. The following scheme has certain advantages:

****

In General Arnold's office using small maps - about ten minutes on the air situation - followed by about ten minutes briefing by the following officers on the important items coming up that day:

(1) Chief of the Air Staff
(2) Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Plans and
(3) his Operations man
(4) Chief of Staff, 20th Air Force
(5) Asst. to the CG

****

Following this short meeting with the CG, the CAS could continue with a larger meeting in the conference room.

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I intend to talk this over with General Arnold and will suggest that it be tried. I cannot at the present see any quicker or less painless method of transmitting to General Arnold the information he must have prior to meeting with the Chief of Staff.

5. No change is contemplated on routine of briefing for JCS and CCS meetings.

6. For the time being the only paper action required is to have my duty assignment corrected. An RAR to Management Control, for your signature, is attached.

7. Your comments are requested.

B. M. BYERS
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Incls: Chart - OCS/AAF
RAR to Management Control

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

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

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AIR FORCE MAGAZINE May 1974 (22)

YOU CAN'T MOTHBALL PEOPLE

BY JOHN F. LOOSBROCK
EDITOR, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE

Six thousand warplanes stand waiting at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, preserved in the same benevolent desert air that Indians used centuries ago to dry their meat for future times when kills would be scarce. The aircraft stand there, in the Air Force Logistics Command's Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center, with the mindless patience of inanimate things, waiting to fulfill a purpose that for most of them will never come.

Many of their predecessors got their second chance. During the Korean War, P-51s, B-26s, and B-29s of World War II vintage were stripped of their protective cocoons, refurbished, and sent halfway around the world to fly and fight again. In the early years of Vietnam, B-66s, B-57s, A-1s, even venerable Gooney Birds were rousted from their resting places and put to uses their designers never dreamed of. Over all these years, these great old birds of the American desert have been a rich source for critical, long lead-time components—engines, struts, and dozens of important bits and pieces.

There they stand, ready to be used, cannibalized, or cut up for scrap as the needs and desires of their masters may dictate. You can mothball airplanes and know they'll be there—when, as, or if they may be needed.

But you can't mothball people—and if you try, don't expect them to be there when the crunch comes. People—at least the kind of people the Air Force needs—have to have a sense of purpose, the stimulus of activity, the excitement of achievement, the challenge of doing better what they have been trained to do well.

Every military commander worth his salt knows that. The greatest enemy of morale, esprit, and combat effectiveness is idleness—idleness of mind, idleness of body, idleness of spirit. Occasional relief through the vicarious exercise of military skills only exacerbates the situation. This is why command in peacetime traditionally has been no less demanding of imaginative leadership than it has been in war.

During the ten years of queasy peace between Korea and Vietnam, the Air Force had not to face this problem. They were years not truly of peace but of cold war, quite unlike anything the world had known before. In that decade, the Air Force built a bulwark of aerospace power against a continuously growing Soviet threat. There was more than enough work to keep everyone busy. More important, there was sense of purpose. And there was public support. When Lebanon, the Offshore Islands, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile crisis came along, the Air Force was ready—instantly—its machines and its people.

For a different picture, let us look at another period of peace. In the 1920s and '30s, the country was seized by antimilitary sentiment as an aftermath of World War I. Isolationism was in the saddle. Came the Great Depression. Military budgets were cut to the bone. Fifty hours of flying time a year was about par for our airmen, and a lot of good men who figured their professional skills were being mothballed turned in their suits and sought their challenges elsewhere.

Fortunately for several hundred million people here and abroad, a handful of the most capable stayed on. They invented missions that would keep the rust off their skills—like Hap Arnold's forest-fire patrol and border patrol. They accepted missions they were not equipped to carry out—like flying the air mail in rickety planes. They stunted, devised records to be broken, so that airpower, feeble as it was, would occupy some small place in the public eye. And they became the air leaders of World War II. Fortunately, geography and the efforts of our allies gave them time to recruit, train, and equip the two million airmen without whom the greatest war in history could not have been won.

Neither the peacetime environment of forty years ago nor that of the years between Korea and Vietnam are likely to repeat themselves. But the years ahead may combine elements of both, and there are lessons from both that need to be remembered.

Soviet military power is not going to decline, much less disappear. There is a general, although amorphous, recognition that the US must maintain strong military forces, but remarkably little concern over the seriousness of the Soviet threat, no matter how persuasively it is described by knowledgeable experts. Inevitably, public disinterest in and lack of understanding of defense affairs will create enormous pressures to reduce defense spending.

Personnel costs are irreducible, short of a drastic reduction in the size of the Air Force. Obsolete equipment has to be replaced. This leaves the operations and maintenance area as the only option for funding flexibility. At the same time, the Air Force, as the largest user of fuel among the services, will have to bear its share in energy conservation while paying more for the fuel it does use.

When one remembers that it costs, at today's prices, about $1,500 an hour to fly a B-52H, $2,100 for a C-5, or $900 for an F-4, the net result of all the above factors is likely to be public and congressional pressure to cut operational readiness flying, probably below a safe minimum, and to eliminate virtually all other flying, as in the 1920s and 1930s.

If this happens—and odds are it will, barring public enlightenment as to the dangers of such a course—the effects on morale, retention of highly trained people, and combat readiness are predictably disastrous. Air Force leaders understand the implications and are concerned. But there are few indications that the dangers to national security are understood by the public or by many in Congress.

The energy crisis provides a case in point. The warnings of the knowledgeable few that a serious shortage was at hand went unheeded. But the burden of the predicted results was shared by all.

The Air Force mission, as the saying goes, is to fly and to fight. The flying must come first.

And don't you ever forget it. ■

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Interview with General Beebe
Long Beach, California
October 1, 1969

Q: General Beebe, do you remember the first time you ever met General Arnold? In what circumstances, and what kind of impressions he might have made?

B: No, I don't.

Q: When did you first become associated with him?

B: Well, of course, I met him shortly after he took command of March Field and I imagine that was in about 1931 or 1932.

Q: Yes, in that neighborhood. Is that when you started working for him?

B: No.

Q: When was that?

B: I believe it was after the CCC fiasco we had. And probably at the time we were carrying the air mail. I became better acquainted, at least during that.

Q: Were you at Salt Lake City?

B: I was stationed at Reno, I was 2nd Lt in charge of the air mail out of Reno.

Q: You mentioned when you talked to the Columbia University Oral History people, a flight where there was an insufficiency of oxygen on the flight. You thought there might have been some connection with his later medical problems, do you recall the circumstances of that?

B: Yes, I remember this quite well. Gen Arnold had a very good friend in Los Angeles, with the Automobile Club, and he was also a friend of mine. He'd been up to visit Gen Arnold after Gen Arnold came back home from Washington, his retirement. I believe he just had gotten out of the

hospital down in Palo Alto area somewhere. Gen Arnold was at his home, but this Artie visited him there, and Gen Arnold told him about this and then he relayed it to me. And that was the knowledge I had of it.

Q: Well, was it, in other words, it was a flight that had taken place after his heart attack?

B: Oh yes, it was a flight that had taken place after he'd retired, and gone. He apparently made several trips back to Washington to help get the Air Force organized. I believe Gen Spaatz was in command. This incident was as a result of a trip he made home from Washington, at Hamilton I believe it was, and just I assume, that it must have been prior to his entering that hospital down there for that, that particular time, although I think he had been in that hospital before, but I'm not sure of that.

Q: I'm not sure either, without having access in my own records.

B: But the reason I was particularly, I believed this story was, the same thing had happened to me. Few years before, and it is quite possible that it really did, and I'm sure that in his case, it would have been serious.

Q: We have had the feeling in our research that Arnold's tour at March Field was kind of a turning point in his career. That's when he really began to make long strides and make a name for himself, and become known. We have a feeling that was kind of important part of his career. Looking back, do you have the same feeling?

B: Well, I didn't know anything about Colonel Arnold's past history, at the time he came to March Field, I hadn't been in the service very long myself at that time to be even interested in the senior officers much. However, I would be inclined to agree that the things he did at March Field certainly brought him the attention of a lot of important people.

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Q: Are there any specific instances that you can think of?

B: Well, I think that, I don't know just which followed which, but there was of course, the CCC episode, and there was this bombing range at Muroc that he started. And there was the gathering of plants and trees and shrubbery to build March Field, and all of the activities of the two groups we had there, in their community relationships, and their maneuvers, and things like that. We traveled quite extensively to other California cities and had maneuvers. And I think it was during that period that people became aware of a man named Arnold around there.

Q: Well, he seemed to have a flair for public relations, for example, this business of getting involved with the Hollywood stars.

B: Yes, I think, wasn't that his job in Washington at this time, so-called trouble he got in to back there?

Q: Billy Mitchell?

B: Yes, so he had a natural flair for relationships with important people, Congressmen, important people in the local community and in Los Angeles. But they seemed to gravitate to our place. They liked our place out there at March Field and they used to come out and make pictures and they liked being invited over to the Officer's Club, and we didn't mind having them around, because, God knows, that was a pretty dreary place out there. He became well acquainted personally with lots and lots of people there from - "Death Valley" Scotty right on down to Howard Hawkes and a lot of the people in the moving picture industry.

Q: I know there was Bebe Daniels and Ben Lyon.

B: Yes, I carried Ben Lyon around in an airplane one day, and Bebe Daniels had furnished the Officer's Club out there at the Long Beach Airport. And then Daniels was a reserve officer in the Air Corps, so we were coming down here on maneuvers and we coordinated it with the dedication of this

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Officer's Club. We brought the bomb group and the fighters down one day, and it just happened they assigned Ben Lyon to my flight in the formation to fly down. I put him in the wing plane and successfully delivered him to Long Beach and he got a big kick out of that. But I never met Bebe Daniels, as far as I can remember.

Q: Were you aware of, or involved in any of his relationships with Malin Craig?

B: Oh yes.

Q: He turned out to be a good friend, almost an advocate of Arnold. I was wondering if you had any inside scoop, how that came about? Craig wasn't any great friend of air power, and yet Arnold seemed to get along with him fine.

B: Well, I don't know how Gen Arnold first became acquainted with Gen Craig, but apparently they had served together at some time or other. Of course, Gen Craig was the Corps Area Commander at the Presidio, and March Field was one of his stations. Anything Gen Arnold wanted out of the ordinary, we would have to take it up with Gen Craig. In those days, Gen Arnold liked to fly fighter planes, and by that time, I had been assigned to his headquarters - in the time I'm talking about - and we used to fly quite a bit together. So we would get a couple of fighter planes and fly up to San Francisco and he'd do his business with Gen Craig and then we'd fly back, maybe stop or cross the desert.

Q: There was an incident that involved the earthquake and Arnold rushed blankets and kitchens and all kinds of relief to the victims without checking with his superiors. Apparently, he got into a little hot water and went up and saw Gen Craig and meanwhile, he got a lot of praise for doing this. I was wondering if you had any inside knowledge about that incident?

B: Yes, I went up there with Gen Arnold that day. But, that was one

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of the things that he took up with Gen Craig.

Q: His contacts with Gen Craig, do you feel they helped Arnold in his later career?

B: Oh yes, a very important part. For instance, Gen Craig had standing orders that any aviator that disturbed his headquarters at the Presidio had to come and personally talk to him. On this particular day, I remember distinctly when we got to Crissy Field, Gen Arnold and I dove our fighters right down over Gen Craig's headquarters. Sure enough, there was a car waiting for us with some guards when we got out of the plane. So Gen Arnold - of course, he was Colonel then - said: "Well, that's the way to get transportation up to see the General." They took us up there and they thought sure enough we were in trouble. We went in there and Gen Craig looked up and said: "Damn you, Hap, I thought that was you." So they settled their business, I'm sure very satisfactorily, and actually I don't think it was Gen Craig ever caused him any trouble. It was always the staff officers that caused the problems - never the leaders, as far as I know. So, I wouldn't sit in there while they did all their talking, but I knew Gen Craig, and he knew who I was. On the way home - I guess Gen Arnold was feeling pretty good - because when we went over the Tehatchapee Pass, that stretch across Muroc Lake - we went down about 25 feet off the ground and hedge-hopped all the way home. Gen Arnold liked to do that, but he didn't like the junior officers to know he did.

Q: Was he a good pilot?

B: Oh, he was a dandy; he was a good pilot.

Q: He liked to fly?

B: Yes, loved to fly. So, later on, I would suppose that Gen Craig had a great deal to do with his being made Asst Chief, but this came about when we were on maneuvers in Florida. Gen Arnold was called away from

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maneuvers and sent up, and had to go to Washington. But he came back there and seemed to be happy so I guess they had told him then that he would be the new Asst Chief.

Note: Maneuvers at Vero Beach?

Q: Did you go to Washington with him then? (When he became Asst Chief of Air Corps).

B: No, I got involved after I'd served about two years at Wright Field, after the engineering school, then a year in the bombardment project office, because of the death of the Chief of the Air Corps, General Westover. Gen Craig called Gen Arnold in and said that was all of his flying. Gen Craig said that was the last Chief of Air Corps that would fly by himself, and for Arnold to get a pilot to accompany him on all these flights, and to use two-engine aircraft. So they beat the bushes to find out how they were going to handle this two-engine aircraft, and Gen Craig says: "I want a plane; get me one!" So the Air Corps bought Gen Craig an airplane, which Gen Craig was never in so far as I know of. But that was our first, the first airplane that the Chief of the Air Corps ever had.

Q: You became pilot then?

B : Gen Arnold wrote me a letter at Wright Field and asked if I would come over and work in his office and go with him on all these trips.

Q: What was your rank then?

B: I don't know - it could have been Captain or Major, we all had "Mexican" ranks, you know, and I think I was a Captain when I went over there

Q: What year was that?

B: It was November of 1938.

Q: How long did you stay with him?

B: I stayed with him until June of 1942.

Q: Always as pilot?

B: Always as pilot and mostly worked in the office. Whenever, he

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went on a trip, I went along, with very few exceptions.

Q: Was he a tough guy to work for?

B: Oh no, wonderful. That is, if you got to work early in the morning and didn't mind staying till late at night and then on Sundays.

Q: There are some stories and indications he had a hot temper once in a while, I wonder if he ever vented it on you.

B: Oh, I'm sure he did; but I never bothered with it either.

Q: That's probably why he kept you.

B: His idea of a good time was to work all day in the office, and then he'd probably come in from the last conference with the Secretary - in those days it was Mr. Stimson - then, we'd rush out to Bolling Field, jump in a plane, and fly all night and arrive in Los Angeles the first thing in the morning and then go to about 5 aircraft plants, and then out to somebody's house for dinner that night. And by that time, I was ready to go to sleep, because there were just two of us in the plane, and I'm sure Gen Arnold was napping some of the time during the night.

Q: He had to keep going.

B: He didn't want another pilot along. He wanted to help with the flying and so the two of us, with a DC-3; we'd stop a couple of times. We did this many times.

Q: In 1941, there were a lot of people who thought there should be a separate air force right then, and Arnold kind of held back, feeling it wasn't the right time and place. This apparently he felt that in the light of the situation with Gen Marshall, that the Air Corps could get more by playing ball than not. There were some people like Hugh Knerr who thought we should go further. Do you recall any of that pulling and hauling at that time?

B: Well, yes. This was quite a topic of discussion and conversation, even at my level in the office. I felt that with Gen Marshall as Chief, that I

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would imagine Gen Arnold probably felt the same way. So long as Gen Marshall was Chief, that the slower should we approach this separate Air Force question, and the easier it would be to slip into it. Because Gen Marshall was not against the Air Force, by any means. He was all for it. And this was, of course, prior to the war. Pearl Harbor came along, and that was when things got so frantic, that any separate air force idea went by the board. However, we did have by mid-1942, what amounted to a separate air force. That showed that if we proceeded without the war, or if the war hadn't come along, we would eventually have gotten the separate air force, and it would have been painless. There would have been no problem at all. But we were in no position in those days to have a separate air force. We only had, I imagine, around 1,200 officers. We just didn't have enough people to fill the jobs.

Q: And there were a lot of things that the Army did for the AAF?

B: They did all that for us: Ordnance, Quartermaster. All that was done by the Army.

Q: Did you ever have any evidence that there was a kind of move to push Frank Andrews against Arnold for the top job? I don't think Andrews himself made the move. It was Hugh Knerr and I don't know who else. Anyway, this movement tried to make Andrews the top dog rather than Arnold. Did you have any knowledge of that?

B: Well, I think there could be truth to that. I never associated in my service with Gen Andrews or any of that group in the so-called GHQ AF, fortunately. But I don't believe that Gen Arnold and Gen Andrews ever had an unkind word between them.

Q: No, there is no real evidence of that.

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Beebe; Hunting Trip & December 7, 1941

Priority

Bon Pls make cards - 1 + 1

Interview with Gen Eugene H. Beebe, Long Beach, Calif, October 1, 1969

Q: Tell us about that bird shooting expedition with Donald Douglas and Gen Arnold, and you went along. There is a story I think, in that.

B: That's the last time I've been hunting.

Q: Donald Douglas tells a story about apparently some caretaker heard on the radio about Pearl Harbor.

B: That was Donald Douglas' father.

Q: Oh his father. I don't think he realized quite how important it was?

B: Oh I think the old man did. He was running to meet us. He should have been running. Pretty hot that day. We had left Washington two or three days before December 7th and were headed for Hamilton Field and eventually to start the B17s out on their way to the Philippines. Take off Which was to take place the night of the 6th of December. And on the way out we stopped by Knoxville, as I recall, and gone through the aluminium plant there, because aluminum was short in supply and I think Gen Arnold had to know something personally about its availability in his testimony before Congress, and things like that. Then we worked our way on out to Hamilton Field, and was there the night of the 6th and got all the help, got the planes started and on their way to Hawaii, and early on the morning of the 7th we took off for Bakersfield for a little outing, Our party consisted of that Donald Douglas and his father, and our Air Corps representative here, I believe his name was Bradshaw, He became a MGen MG I believe, later on, and went out We in the country there to and hunt. I don't remember whether we hunted quail or dove, but anyhow, I believe it was quail. Anyhow, we had been out in the morning and I had gotten my limit right away, and for the rest of them, I was birddogging for them. So we had a little lunch and went back for the afternoon shoot, there were still a few birds to be taken, and on our way back from that, about a half a mile before we got to the cabin where we started from and left our clothes, uniforms, Mr. Donald Douglas' father came running waving some paper in the air, and he had made some notes of this broadcast of the Pearl Harbor situation, and very little was said by anyone. I know we took off our hunting clothes, put on our uniforms, and had the car waiting and dashed went right back to the Bakersfield airport, took

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off immediately from there and went to March Field. And the old man said "Get ready for a long flight." He said "I'm going from here to San Francisco to see the General up there." And then he said "We'll have to get to Washington as fast as we can." So he said: "You'd better get some help." So I asked the commander at March Field to assign me a pilot which he did, and after some telephone calls, we took off for San Francisco and on the way out through Tehatchapee Pass, I asked this boy they put in to help me fly this airplane, how much experienced he had on DC-3s, and he said, "I haven't ever been in one before." So it turned out he was a fighter pilot and I said, "well, do you know how to use the radio," and he said, "yes, I can do that." So I said, "you're the radio operator." That's the way we went, and we stopped in San Francisco from perhaps 9 o'clock at night until about midnight and Gen Arnold went down town and conferred with the Gen down there, his name doesn't come to mind, but he's, I should know it, but I don't recall it right now, and then Gen Arnold came back out to the field in the meantime, and we had gotten all ready, gassed up, and got some groceries aboard, and we took off for Washington, and it was one of those times of year when the whole country was overcast. We saw the ground twice between San Francisco and Washington, as I recall. Once at Salt Lake, we let down and picked up gas, next time was at Omaha, then we went to just about as high as a DC-3 could go to get through Ohio over the Wright Field area, had to let down in the Washington. We got in Washington about 3 PM o'clock in the afternoon the next day, and Gen Arnold grabbed the car and took off for the Munitions Building. I went home, and I suppose it was about 5 PM o'clock when I got home, me lived at Bolling, and they gave me some dinner, and I fell asleep at the dinner table, and later we calculated and I'd been 36 hours flying home from San Francisco.

Q: Tough way to fly.

B: Well, that wasn't unusual, That was a little longer than we had ever kept at it before. But it wasn't unusualy to fly 24 hours with Gen Arnold. He liked to get away from Washington, and get away fast, He wanted to get out to places where activity was going on, operational things, and stuff like that.

Q: Do you remember the so-called leak of the RAINBOW FIVE plan?

B: No, I noticed that in here, (submitted) I have never heard of it before.

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Q: The Chicago Tribune printed it, and there have been, there's an article written by former editor of the Washington Times-Herald, that indicated this and he also indicated that the person, he thought it was Arnold who leaked it to the Tribune,

B: Well, what was this plan.

Q: It was the Air part of the War Plan No. 1, I've forgotten, WPD,

B: What

Q: Itwas

B: Japanese you mean,

Q: No, it was sort of a contingency plan, what we would do if we went to war, and whether it would be Germany first, Pacific second, if we got involved before Pearl Harbor.

B: I never heard of it, but then I wouldn't have been in on any of the activity of the Army General Staff things like that, unless just perchance, but I don't recall the plan at all.

Q: Do you recall this other thing, Farthing-Rose-Covington report?

B: Well, not under that titled, I recall that there were jillions of reports made from Hawaii to the Staff. * * *

Q: This was apparently before the plan that called for 180 planes, pretty hard to think about in those days, having that many available, and it was forwarded by Gen Freddy Martin, and there is evidence in the files that the report, study was made, and that it was forwarded, and then it disappeared. It never made any response back or no letter back from Arnold to Martin.

B: Was this prior to Pearl Harbor?

Q: Yes, not very long before.

B: Well, I don't know. I know they sent Gen I believe Gen McNarney over to Hawaii there to investigate the situation, and I don't recall too much about that particular phase, other than I know we started ~~ships got from~~ the B17s from Hamilton that night and they all arrived in Hawaii at a most unsatisfactory time. People used to talk, why couldn't they Paul shot them way out of this trouble? Well, that was about maximum range for B17s and they weren't carrying any extra weight at all. ~~Crew expected to have~~

Boebe; The B-17's That Flew Into P.H. Dec 7, 1941

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Q: They didn't even have guns, did they?

B: Oh, I imagine the guns were on the plane. Yes, but I don't imagine there was any ammunition. The guns might not have been even installed in the turrets because they were loaded for a special trip.

Q: You continued with Arnold on through that Spring of 1942?

B: Yes, till June 1942. I noticed that some time during that period I was ordered from Bolling Field to the AF Hqs., and this is a result of course by the setting up of what in effect was the United States Air Force at that time, although it was just a paper transaction, and establishing a Caribbean Command Hqs., the legal part all still have to be done by the Chief of Air Corps, and that was Gen Brett (?) and he had a little office down the hall somewhere and had to sign all the papers.

Q: How were his relations with Arnold.

B: Well, I think they were always very good.

Q: I know the families were close families.

B: Oh yes. I think Gen Brett was their Asst Chief for quite a while. Kind of lose track, I know Gen Yount was, and Kilmer Kilmer.

Q: ~~Something we noticed, was that~~ Drew Pearson ~~was~~, never had anything good to say about Arnold, and he would always say something bad whenever he could. And we have never been able to track down any specific incident that led to friction, ~~or do you know?~~ Do you remember anything that might have caused that attitude?

B: Nothing specific, but Drew Pearson used to come to our office quite often. I think it was on his schedule for at least once a month, maybe more often. And I had a chair by my desk which was right by the side of the door that went into Gen Arnold's office. This was in the old Munitions Building, and Drew Pearson would always plunk himself in that chair, waiting until his appointment time would come up, or when Gen Arnold would call for him. So we had a system of notifying the General that Mr. Pearson was aboard, and then I always think that Gen Arnold took great pleasure in baiting him, because he would start calling for people and get them in there and dress them up one side and down the other, and issue a bunch of orders and stuff like this, and somebody would rush in with a big paper and hand it to me, and say, "Take this in

Doc re: Arnold & Drew Pearson

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immediately! and I'd rush in with it and Pearson's ears would just flutter. So then he would go in and talk to Gen Arnold and they would have a discussion on whatever Pearson wanted to know about. He probably didn't learn anything. This went on for a long time, I don't know how many times, but it got to be a regular ritual and this was the only fellow that we ever pulled this deal on. And I don't know whether Gen Arnold was knew we were doing it, and was contributing, or whether he just had a little deal of his own going on. We never discussed it. But folks in the outer office all knew it, and they were all scared to death as soon as Pearson would stick his head in the door. It never bothered me, I didn't care, because I knew he wouldn't learn anything around there, but if the General knew he was there. So this probably accounted for some of his cantankerousness. Plus the fact that that was just what he was. He was a scavenger for trouble, and I guess our shop was a good place to find it. I know we had lots of it. Not of our own making, but stuff we couldn't help but have. So that may be part of that. Unfortunately, the parties, I guess, are all dead now. Miss Adkins is dead, the General is dead, Pearson is dead. So there is not much support for my statement other than a vivid memory, but I have never forgotten it.

Q: When you left, ~~May 1942~~

B: On actually June, early July 1942.

Q: ~~This kind of ties in, because~~ Arnold seemed to be very good about rotating his staff. He realized that most of these people did want to go to war, and he seemed to be very understanding about it. Did you find that so?

B: Oh yes, he used to tell me about the disappointments he had in ~~the first~~ WW I when they held it / him in Washington, ~~and~~ he said that he wasn't going to do that to anyone. So I just waited, and eventually, he said, "well, you can go now if you want to."

Q: Is that when Peterson came along?

B: Yes. ~~And I got~~ . He gave me enough warning when he said, ~~now~~ find me somebody to take ~~your plane~~ / the flying part of your job", so we had Peterson take that over.

Mrs. B: One of the most beautiful letters I ever read was the one that Gen Arnold wrote to me after that. After he let him go into the field and I can remember one thing he said: "... I

Arnold Rotates Bobbe Reluctantly - June 1942

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feel like I'm losing my right arm."

B: Fortunately, he had two, so it didn't make any difference.

Mrs. B: Well I never saw such devotion like he had to Gene.

B: Well, he seemed to inspire devotion himself.

Mrs. B: Well, not in every body. Now, I should keep quiet, but I remember the only man who wasn't afraid of Gen Arnold. Don't put that in the book. He isn't afraid of anybody.

Q: I could put it in without attribution.

B: Well, I think if you had a clear conscience, people that had clear consciences were never afraid of Gen Arnold. But unfortunately, there weren't too many who didn't have some problem, and this had to effect their relationship.

Q: Gen Cabell told us about a letter that either he couldn't remember whether he looked after this, or Larry Norstad, and it was for Gen Arnold's signature, and somewhere in a paragraph that stated, "I'm afraid that we can't do such and such." And Arnold sent it right back, and he said, "I don't want to sign any letters that says we can't do something, I don't want to sign any letters that say 'I'm afraid.'"

B: That would be typical, all right.

Q: Was there anybody that Gen Arnold was leery about?

B: On what respect do you mean - loyalty?

Q: No, no, I'm thinking about more, was there anybody he was afraid of?

B: Gen Arnold?

Q: Yes, like FDR?

B: Oh, I think, yes, I think he was very wary of Pres Roosevelt, and I think that Pres Roosevelt didn't know exactly how to evaluate Gen Arnold, I distinctly remember one day he came back from a conference at the White House and he said; "come on in here, I want to tell you something." He said, "say, I'm in." I said, "what do you mean and he said, "The president just called me Hap." That was the day, I guess he was accepted, and was made one of the team. But up to that time, I know, that he was they just didn't know whether he was the man or not to head the Air Force.

Q: You know, there was a story in the old Army-Navy Journal, about that time,

Bebe Not afraid of Arnold

Bebe Arnold & FDR

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I guess, apparently, somebody had put the bug in FDR's ear, that Arnold was a drinker. And that this was, we were wondering if this was one of the reasons, you know the appointment was kind of delayed, ~~it~~ seemed to string out for a long time.

~~B: Appointment for what was this?~~

~~Q:~~ Chief of the Air Corps.

B: Oh, I didn't know that. ~~I don't remember, because~~ I was n't there, then.

Q: ~~As I recall, even my memory may be at fault.~~ Apparently somebody was spreading the rumor that he had a drinking problem. We wouldn't find any evidence of any kind of a problem any where else, you know, in the correspondence or interviews.

B: Gen Arnold was very careful about liquor because I think he had a little stomach problem of some kind as far as I recall. He never drank, Period! You might have seen him with a glass in his hand, but I doubt if he drank any of it.

Q: You'd never find any evidence of his not being in control of himself in any situation?

B: I don't recall ever seeing him out of control of himself, in any way, shape or form. He seemed to be pretty stable, a lot more stable than many people around him, I know that.

Q: Well, then, you came back when he had his heart attack in 1945? ~~is that right, is that when you came back?~~

B: Well, I returned from overseas in the fall of 1944, and was assigned to a special job in the Pentagon at that time, in the AF HQs, and I was sent over to Gen MacArthur's Hqs., to make arrangements ~~for the~~ building of fields ~~for the~~ B-29s for the 20th AF and then was put on a special committtee of two, Ruben Hood was the other fellow, and we were supposed to sit there and think about problems that ~~needed that~~ were coming up eventually, that needed to be solved, and I guess mostly we just thought.

Q: Was this carrying on that same office that started out with Cabell and Gen Norstad and then Rosie O'Donnel was in it for a while.

B: Well, I think this was before that. I think that must have come later. They had apparently, around there at some time, some kind of a committee of people that were supposed to visualize the future and all, but at that time, I don't believe there was any

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not
and I'm/sure whether it happened after this or before it. But at that time ~~,~~ there was nobody else working at this job. And I'm afraid we didn't do very ~~good~~ well at it. But sometime there in early January or February (1945) ~~, after the Christmas holidays,~~ the Dr. came in, Dave Grant, and said that Gen Arnold was over in his quarters, and Mrs. Arnold was in California, ~~and he~~ Grant thought that he needed somebody over there, ~~and I only~~. The only times I saw Gen Arnold, then, were at the morning conferences and I had no business in his office, ~~(or anything like that)~~. So, they asked me if I would go over and call on him and I did. I went over and he invited me in, and he was in a bathrobe, ~~and he said~~. I asked him how he felt, and he said he felt all right, but he thought that he probably had ~~an~~ (heart attack) episode of some kind, and I don't think it was the first one. I think he had problems while I was ~~some~~ overseas. He hadn't had any ~~other at~~ after the time when I went overseas, that I know about. I think there were some during that period, and so I/ asked him if he had competent medical help, and he had the post doctor at Ft. Myer, one of the doctors there, and the young doctor. So I asked him he he would consent to going to one of our Air Force hospitals and being checked up, to find out what ~~the hell~~ was going on, because we couldn't run business downtown with him over at Ft Myer very well. He said: "All right, you make the arrangements." So I went right to the phone and called ~~Stratemeyer~~, Gen Grant, and he said: "~~okay~~ OK, we'd like to take him to Coral Gables. So Miss Atkins ~~did~~ had set everything up with Peterson, there and followed a rigamarole they had to go through, and we went right down to Coral Gables.

Q: You went with him?

B: Oh yes. ~~And I was~~ At that time, my job ~~then~~ was to organize the Continental Air Command, ~~something like that~~, which Bill Streett was to take command of eventually, but he was still out of the country. We had a headquarters set up, ~~there I think~~. Our plan was to go in and occupy Andrews Field, I don't think it was called Andrews Field ~~then but called something else, but anyhow~~, that's where Camp Springs set up our headquarters. ~~Anyway~~ I went out and inspected the place 2 or 3 times. So I ran that ~~out~~ from headquarters in Coral Gables until Gen Streett got there. I went right down there with Gen Arnold ~~him~~ and they put him through all the works. And every test he took, I had to take,

Q: ~~B:~~ Yes. That's where we

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just to keep him company, and he received dispatches and all from Washington every day, and finally they decided that he needed, that he had some trouble, and he would have to be in bed for the usual time, so during that period, nobody saw him but myself, of an official nature. And I had talked to Ira Eaker and we did things by telephone, where it was absolutely necessary that they have his word on something. So that's the way it ran for a while. And finally, he got back on his feet and we made that trip to Europe.

Q: During that time, apparently Mrs. Arnold had kind of a feud with the doctor that was taking care of Gen Arnold. Do you remember about that? She talked to us some about it?

B: Yes, there was a problem. They wouldn't let anybody in to see him. And I don't know whether this was confusion, or something, but I know that there was some problem there, which I stayed away from it completely, because I never in all my service was ever involved in any of their home activities, or any of their official social activities with one or two exceptions, and while I could go in and out of their homes, me it and all, it was more as a friend, than any official deal. Anyway, so I know that Mrs. Arnold came down and occupied the room that I had been occupying, right adjacent to Gen Arnold, but only stayed for a very short time and there was some problem

Q: Well, apparently, the doctor, I'm reading between the lines a little bit, she said the Doctor just wouldn't let her see Gen Arnold, and the impression one gets is that he thought that she excited him.

B: Well that could be her impression of it, because it was very vital that he have nothing to disturb him.

Q: And I think she was convinced that she wasn't disturbing him, that the doctor was exaggerating.

B: I'm sure she would have, anybody's wife is likely to feel that way

Q: She got real hot under the collar at the doctor; give forgotten his name, but

B: Well, the commander of the hospital was named Chennault, but the doctor taking care of Gen Arnold, was Marquardt. He was a heart expert from Chicago and was a Colonel. He was in charge of medicine at this hospital.

Q: Yes, he was the one that Mrs. Arnold was mad at.

Before: Mrs Arnold & Dr. Marquardt

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B: He was a cool type

Q: We have correspondence of his widow, Marquardt's

B: Oh, is Marquardt dead? I didn't know that.

Q: Yes, maybe for three or four years. Because we wanted to talk to him, too. And his widow just didn't have much, in the way of letters, or anything important.

B: Well, I doubt if there would be any record of this, which would have been a personality problem. I do know that Gen Arnold got the best of care in that hospital, because I was with him, you might say, all of the time, with the exception of two or three trips where he sent him back to Washington to personally do something for him like call on Gen Marshall and advise him of what the situation was. Things like that.

Q: Did you get the impression at any time that he thought he was just going to have to quit?

B: Well, I think that the terrible shock of knowing that he'd had something serious was for a few days pretty upsetting to him, but as soon as he overcame that and started to thinking about it, I believe he no longer was worried that he wouldn't eventually get back in the saddle, providing they would just let him alone. And that was mostly, he was afraid, I believe, that Gen Marshall might become impatient and figure that he had to have an in-resident there in command, but he didn't need to fear that, because Gen Marshall would have rather had him I'm sure, as Air Commander, sick in the hospital than anybody else who was available. At least that was my impression after talking to Gen Marshall about it.

Q: Then you went to Europe with him - a sort of recuperation trip in a way wasn't it?

B: No, the purpose of the trip was very serious. The Air people knew that the war was over for all practical purposes, so far as Air was concerned in Europe. And that was what I was getting ready to do with this Continental Air Command, to receive the squadrons and groups from Europe, recondition them, and put them on leave, reequip and dispatch them to the Pacific. That's what Bill Streett's new job was going to be. So we went to Europe to find out when we could start peeling these units out of Europe, and we found out as soon as we got there, that the time was present,

Becker: Arnold's Trip to Cannes 1945

Becker: Arnold Carried Hap Arnold's Letter to Him

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And so, I believe, they made arrangements to start an orderly movement of squadrons and combat crews, and all types of categories out of Europe and back into the United States and then into the Pacific. While he was over there, that was his primary purpose in making this trip, and I think he accomplished everything he went over there to do, except to personally go to England and call on the Chiefs of Staff of the British forces. But it became apparent that he couldn't work that in, and I supposed the doctors thought maybe it was a little too strenuous, so he sent me over and I went around and called on them for him. Jimmy Doolittle was the 8th AF Commander at that time and he arranged all this very nicely, and I imagine it took maybe an hour to do my job. Fortunately, I knew all of these people from Washington days, like Portal, (Tedder), ~~and I just saw the head of each.~~

Q: Did you stay with him then til he retired?

B: No, I stayed with him until he went back to Washington to duty, and then, in the course of all this examining around hospital and all, the doctors had found out that I could retire if I wished. So Gen Arnold, the night before he was ready to go back to Washington, I fixed up the transportation, Gen Arnold said, "I don't know what I'm going to do with you." He said, "Do you want to go back to Washington with me and then come back down here to retire?" He said, "Or do you want to stay here and retire?"

Q: Where was this?

B: At Coral Gables at the hospital. And I never discussed this matter with him before, and I didn't even know he knew anything about it. And I said, "well do you think I should retire?" And he said, "Yes, I think you should. So I said, "well I'll go back to Washington with you, then I'll come back," which I did, and I was, wanted to be sure that somebody didn't pull a Shenanigan on him when he got back, and started running him up and down stairs and things, which he wasn't supposed to do. Meantime, Mrs. Arnold had had a downstairs bedroom fixed up in the quarters at Ft. Myer, people were pretty well briefed on the way he should be handled. So then I flew, got my own plane, flew back there, I borrowed Gen Arnold's and flew back to the Hospital in due course. On the way down to Florida, we had a forced landing ~~on the way back to the hospital~~ in Richmond, Va., we went in on one engine and had to order a new plane down for awhile and I thought maybe I had made one flight too often. So they retired me. I went back

Becca Has Medical Problems Too

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to Washington on my way home (to California), and Gen and Mrs. Arnold entertained me real nice, at Ft. Myer. The kids were all there, Lois and her husband. That's the last time I have seen any of them, with the exception of Gen Arnold. We went up to March Field one time after he'd retired and made a little thing for him, and I saw him up there.

Q: You haven't seen Mrs. Arnold in all this time?

B: No. Nor any of the kids.

Q: Well, I'll have to be sure that Dave gets in touch with you.

B: Yes, I'd love to see ~~them~~ him.

Q: I think Bruce gets out here (to California) once in a while. He waltzes Congressmen around, you know, here and there. He's very good at it.

B: We had some pretty good experts on that liaison thing. ~~One~~, there were two brothers; they were from Alabama. I think they are both dead now.

Q: Was one of them, not Persons? One called ~~Slick~~ "Slick"

B: Yes, Slick, and his brother was named Willy. I didn't know Willy, but Slick was liaison man. He was in our office more than anybody.

Bruce, Emmett McCabe

Q: He was Army.

B: Yes. Of course, we were all Army.

Q: Yes, but I mean he was not Air.

B: Most of his problems were Air.

Q: He later worked for Eisenhower, when Eisenhower was President.

B: Well, of course, Eisenhower certainly knew that he was a good man for the job.

Q: Did you know Emmett McCabe?

B: Yes, real well. He was the John Costello's man, as I recall it, in Washington, when Costello was Congressman there. I used to take John Constello on many trips, and whenever we came to California, we always invited him to come along. McCabe, during the war, he worked for Gen Arnold in some capacity. I think he was at the hospital with us part of the time.

Q: He's out here, just outside of San Diego.

B: There was another boy there who sort of a junior job there with Arnold, as I recall, he was mixed up in the steel business after the war, somewhere, and died, I think, I can't think of his name now. He had something to do with McCabe's work t

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B: As I recall, Do you know, the thing, that I have never seen anybody talk about, Gen Craig's position with regard to the Air Corps. Now, everybody says Gen Craig didn't care about Air. Well, he did, really. He knew that that was a coming thing, and he cared about it so much he didn't want to have his Air Commander in any trouble, and I don't think it was just because he liked Arnold, it was because he needed Air, and he knew they needed it. Gen Marshall was of course, I really believe, the father of the Air Force. We couldn't have had it without him, and I took Gen Marshall on lots of trips. I took him around through air installations, and in fact, he was in my airplane between Wright Field, where we had just been the night before and in Denver when they announced that he was made Chief of Staff. Incidentally, that came over in a Washington Merry-Go-Round dispatch, Drew Pearson. My radio operator copied it and brought it to me. I took it back and said to Gen Marshall, I said, "I'd like to be the first to congratulate you on being the Chief of Staff," he said, "I didn't know they were going to announce it this soon." And so I'd always been real fond of Gen Marshall.

Q: He was a pretty formal guy, wasn't he, pretty stiff?

B: Well, he was when there was more than one present, I know. He never was that way with me. He was always friendly when we were flying across country. I liked to let the copilot run the plane, I'd go back and talk to him if he wanted me to, and he asked all kinds of questions about air, this was even before he was Chief. After he became Chief, we couldn't get away so much any more. But he'd ask all kinds of questions about maps and radio, and weather, "How do you know we are going to be able to land at Montgomery when we get there?" And we'd be over the clouds or something, you know, he was just vitally interested in air. So, on this same trip, after he became Chief, we picked up Gen Arnold at Denver, and it was somewhere between Denver and Sacramento. Well, I was back talking to him, and he said, "now that I'm Chief, I can do a lot of things I couldn't do as Asst Chief," he said, "as soon as we get back to Washington, I want you to take Gen McNair and go to Air Force station that you think is important and have him see everything that he can, and learn all he can," he said. General Marshall said: "I'm going to send him out to Leavenworth, and he's going to put some Air in that Command and General Staff School." We did this, and Gen McNair went out there, and

Q: What about General Marshall?

Beck: Marshall - "Father of the Air Force"

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that's the first time there was any push, at that school, I understand, to talk/ make Air an integral part of this instruction.

Q: Well, you probably were personally responsible for a lot of Gen Marshall's views.

B: Well, I think so. Yes, I think that Gen Arnold used to arrange these things so that we could do this, make these trips, and he was trying to educate him

Q: These were occasions when Gen Arnold wasn't along.

B: Yes, most of them. There was an occasion when there were some Navy maneuvers off the coast here, ~~and there was~~ Adm Byrd happened to be down at the South Pole at that time, and Gen Arnold had brought Gen Marshall to Sacramento, ~~and~~ Gen Marshall had gone out with the Navy on some kind of ~~maneuvers~~, joint Army-Navy maneuvers, ~~we'd~~ General Arnold then went down to March Field, ~~and~~ I don't recall whether Gen Marshall had been called back to Washington or whether he was still present, but I went up and ~~pick~~ picked Gen Marshall up again, wherever it was, ~~and~~ somewhere between March Field and El Paso, he wrote out a dispatch to ~~Cin~~/ Adm Stark, who was the ~~naval~~ Chief of Naval Operations, and the dispatch had to do with the maneuvers ~~and it was~~ congratulatory ~~message, and it~~. About two days later, the buzzer on my desk went off and it was Gen Marshall, and he said, "Bedell, come down to my office right away." So the rule was that whenever he sent for anybody like that, that Bedell Smith didn't make any attempt to stop ~~me~~ you, ~~I~~ you just went right in, opened the door to Gen Marshall's office, and sat down on a chair that was just inside the door, and no matter who he was talking to, ~~or what~~, when he got ready, he asked you, ~~he~~ and he'd call you up to his desk. So I did, and he called me up, and he handed me this message from Adm Byrd, and I read it, ~~and it was~~ Adm Byrd was happy to receive Gen Marshall's message and went on and on and about the contents of it and so forth. Gen Marshall said, "I didn't send Adm Byrd any message, but he said, I just was talking to Adm Stark on the telephone and he said he never did get the message that I handed you between March Field and El Paso ~~and~~/ to send to him. He said, "I want you to find out what happened to that message, and you be here at 2 o'clock this afternoon to tell me." I said, "yes sir," and I got the hell out of there, but fast. So I called up the Chief Signal Officer, who was Gen Mauborgne, Gen Mauburn, and told him the story, and he says, "oh my, ~~and so on by 2000~~ Be 2PM Mauborgne Gen Mauborgne

Becker: Marshall Agrees To AF Communication Service

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had brought me the complete report, ~~on what had happened, and~~ I took it down to Gen Marshall. ~~And what had happened was that~~ you see, the rule was, we had no communications of our own in the ~~Air Force~~ AAF then. So our instructions were to always give our message to the closest Army net station. My radio operator ~~was~~ named Mead, had given this message to El Paso and had gotten a "Roger" for it. So El Paso in getting the message to the War Dept, and we could just as well have worked the War Dept from our airplane up at 10,000 feet in the air as not, you know, and they sent it to St. Louis, from St. Louis to Pittsburgh, I don't remember now the exact ~~know the~~ course ~~but~~ — But some radio operator saw "Stark" on this, and he thought it was "Stork," so he copied it Stork, and some other radio operator saw "Stork," and he thought "well, Stork is not what they mean; they mean Byrd," and when it got to the War Dept, somebody put it in the pneumatic ~~automatic~~ tube right to the Navy, and 10 minutes later it was down to Adm Byrd. I can't imagine what would Adm Byrd have thought when he got this message, Well, he was a politician, if there ever was one, because he made a beautiful reply to him. So I took this in, and told Gen Marshall what had happened and he looked at me and said, "well, how are we going to prevent that from ~~happing~~ happening again?" And I said, "well, I think the most likely way to do that is to let us in the Air Corps have our own communications system, ~~because I said,~~ I told him, "I could just as well have had my radio operator deliver that direct to Washington, as to have to go through this round-about way." ~~Well, he said,~~ General Marshall said, "next time ~~you tell~~, you see Gen Arnold, tell him to get that Air Force communications system started. So I paddled back, and meatime, Gen Arnold had come in from the Hill where he'd been all day, and I wasn't in the office, and he had asked Miss Atkins where I was, and she said I was in Gen Marshall's office. He said, "what's going on?" And she said, "I don't know, some kind of trouble," so when I came back, ~~why he~~ General Arnold wanted to see me right away, and I went in and he wanted to know what it was about, and I told him, and well, he said, get ~~McConnell, or McDonnell~~ ~~from~~ (Probably "McClelland") one of the Signal Officers, on the phone and tell him to get going, and ~~he~~ General Arnold said, "I'd like to have it in commission by tomorrow. So that was the start of the AFCS or whatever they call it, I guess it is still going. Now they have a whole field to themselves at Scott AFB. ~~in the sky~~. That's the way it started.

Q: Well you played a lot of "behind-the-scenes" roles?

B: Oh yes, ~~that was~~ I suppose so.

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Q: Did you continue flying Gen Marshall up to the time you left Gen Arnold?

B: The status of the airplane that Gen Arnold had used, was that it belong to the Chief of Staff of the Army. There was no provision in the budget or anyplace for an airplane for the Air man, so it was jointly used by Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold. And, on any important trips, I usually took Gen Marshall. However, I had a buddy at Bolling named Louis Parker, and when I couldn't be two places at once, Louis would fly Gen Marshall, but I did a lot of flying for Gen Marshall. But they were mostly all short hops.

Q: Was this right up til the time you left for overseas?

B: Yes. Not only in the DC-3, but I remember one time, Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall just had to get away from town, and so Glen L. Martin invited them up to the Martin plant, to shoot ducks, just for overnight, and we went up there and I went along with them. We got on Glen Martin's yacht, and we went over to his farm and we stayed right there till daylight and then we went out to the blinds, and they had a nice shoot and all. And then, we had the pilot from Bolling bring up the amphibian, an OA-9, I think it was called. So that was anchored down at the dock, by the boat, the yacht, and then when we finished hunting, why the two generals and their guns and their ducks, and all loaded into this amphibian, and I flew them back to Washington. Back in Washington by noon, the next day, and I'll never forget that night, traveling on this yacht, we were up on the bridge, and just Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall and myself up there, and you know, they always had me standing by in case of, I don't know, to be a witness I suppose, so somebody could hear them talking, and Gen Marshall said, "well, Hap," he said, "I believe from now on, things are going to be better." He says, I think we have committed our all our major mistakes." I'll never forget this.

Beebe; shooting ducks on G.L. Martin's Place

Q: About what time was this?

B: I could give you the exact date, and look it up in the flight log, but it was after Pearl Harbor. It was when they were having all that trouble over in Australia and we were being beaten back until from pillar to post, and Gen Brett was running from one shell hole to another I guess. (Note: Probably late Spring of 1942)

Q: Gen Brett didn't last too long out there in the Pacific, did he?

B: Nobody did, that was there to begin with?

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Trouble in Asia; Command-early on was

Belo: Guns at Governor's Island

Belo: The Cannons At

B: There wasn't anything wrong with the officers that were there, they had it was just nothing to work with but their hands. And even the British officers, there was a British officer who eventually was General Wavell in India — Governor General. what do they call them in India, the head governor, governor-general. Ohh! He had a patch over his eye, he was a famous British, Wavell. He was with, Gen Brett was with him in this retreat. Even Wavell you know, was out. The British officer who commanded Singapore who was our Chief of Staff in the SEAsia command, under Mountbatten, never got anywhere. All of these people who had important jobs at the time of that trouble starting over there seemed to disappear into less important jobs.

Q: You mentioned a story about Gen Arnold, and something that happened at Governor's Island.

B: For some reason or other, Gen Arnold wanted to go up and call on Gen Drum, who was the commander up in that Corps Area, and probably had to do with stations, or maybe some help in appropriations, or something. So we were in civilian clothes, and I don't know, I don't remember now, but we went on a ferry from the Battery over to Governor's Island, presumably this was in connection with some other affair in NY. So on the ferry going over, we were standing up looking at the approaching Governor's Island, and there was the old fort there, and it was foggy and pretty dim, and he said "Up on those ports, there used to be a lot of cannon." He says "when I was stationed there they decided one day that they didn't want those cannons there anymore, so they ordered me to take them down and store them down below somewhere." So he said "we had to get out the old training manuals, and figure out how to move these cannons, and the old ramp they had originally moved them on, was now a stairway so they had to cover it, and they got all the cannon down with no problems except one, that one got away from them and went down the ramp through the mess hall which was located at the foot of this ramp. And apparently the men were eating in there at the time this cannon came tearing through." So I listened to this with a great deal of respect and all, and eventually we docked on the Governor's Island, and got in the car and drove up to Gen Drum's office which was in this old fort, I guess. And I looked up and out of these ports were cannons, so I asked Gen Arnold, "what are those funny looking things up there in those ports, holes you were telling me about?" and he looked up, and he said, "My God, they moved them all back up there again." Sure enough, they had, they had become antiques in the

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meantime, and had put all these cannons back up there. After that, he would tell me some story about something, and I'd say, "Yeah, I remember those cannons up there on Governor's Island," and he'd give me a dirty look, as if he knew I didn't believe what he was telling me. Apparently that had happened all right, and they pretty well patched up the hole in the mess hall, but I can see that it probably happened exactly like he said, I'm sure it did, because right at the foot of this stairway was still there, was the mess hall, it was still in operation, it had been plastered and fixed. I'll bet if you got in there, you'd find where it was originally constructed. ~~So that was a thing he told me.~~ He also told me about his going to the Philippines when he was assigned over there - brand new 2nd Lt, I guess. He was personal escort for a whole bunch of silver money, pesos, I suppose, there was a tremendous amount of it, and it took a lot of people to move it around, and he arrived in the Philippines, and in those days, you got your tropical uniforms after you arrived there. In fact, some buddy would meet you with a suitable uniform, and you would use it till you got yours made, which was 24 hours, I guess. But he couldn't get off the boat with everybody else, he had to sit there and wait for the pepple to come and move this heavy money, then he had to deliver it to Quartermaster, Finance Office, somebody and it was way late in the afternoon, the hot sun, with this heavy wool uniform drenched him before he finally made it to the ~~bachelor's officers quarters~~ BOQ where he was going to be housed. And the officers there, I guess, played a joke on him. They knew he was coming, and he was in pretty messy condition, ~~he said~~, they made him take all his clothes off and they washed him off with a hose before they let him in the place. And that was his arrival in the Philippines. He told me this.

Q: Did he tell you any other stories like that about the old days.

B: Well, yeah, I don't recall any specific one, but he used to spend all night, he'd tell me stories on the trip from Washington to California, sometimes. And about all kinds of things. We'd even try to do the binomial theorem in our heads, and stuff like that. $X^2 + Y^2$, and then he'd get into Euclid, or something in geometry, just to keep our minds going, just to stay awake, or we would have trouble by falling alseep.

Q: He was not a large man, was he?

B: Well, he was 6 feet at least, I think he was a big man. One time at March Field, everyone in the Air Corps had to get so much instrument time in under the hood,

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Zeebo: Flying Blind - The Turkey Farm At Palmdale

so Gen Arnold and I would trade. He would fly under the hood for a while. And then he'd trade and be safety pilot for me, while I flew under the hood. On this particular day, we went over to Palmdale, out through Cajon Pass, and he flew over and we followed the beam, and he phoned in over the Palmdale Airport and then he said, that he had a friend who lived just a couple of miles down the road, somebody from WWI days. So he said, "let's go down there; I want to fly by his house." So we did and just right by about 50 feet off the ground. Just across the street, we didn't know this at the time - Well, we did that, and then across the street was a large turkey farm, and we went back to the airport and landed. and this fellow then came with his car to pick up us up; that was the deal, I guess. Or to say hello anyhow. So all of a sudden, a tremendous dust storm started coming down this road toward the old Palmdale airport, and not only did our friend arrive, but the fellow that owned the turkey farm from across the street arrived. And by then, Gen Arnold had gotten out of his flying costume, but I still unfortunately had my goggles on my head, because I'd been riding in the backseat and had to have goggles while he had been under the hood, and it hadn't bothered him too much. So this fellow came tearing in there, mad as a hornet, and he wanted to know who was the pilot of the aircraft. Well, I said, I was, and I was going to be the pilot going home. So he said I killed 18 or 24 turkeys, and he was really mad about it, so he asked, what should he do, he was going to have my commission, and all kinds of things. So I said, "well, what you've got to do is, first, let me go down and look at your turkeys to be sure they are dead, and then I'll give you a piece of paper with my name on it, and you'll be able to send that to the Commanding Officer of March Field, and he'll see that you get paid for these turkeys." And I said, "If you want to send the Commanding Officer at March Field a nasty letter about what I did, well, you do that too, and he'll probably discipline me severely. Well, he said he was going to do that, and so we went down there, and sure enough, there were some dead turkeys. You know, turkeys are crazy, they kill each other, panic. So we stayed there about an hour, and then went on back and flew home. I flew under the hood. A couple of days later, Colonel Gen Arnold called me into his office and, Colonel then I guess, he said, "here's the letter from Palmdale, he says I'm going to have to give you some disciplinary action of some kind, or at least tell the guy I did." So I said, "mostly, you'd better find out about sign a voucher to pay for those

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turkeys." That was the last I had ever heard of that. But in about 2 weeks, later ~~not very long after that~~, he had to go back east for some reason or other, and he stopped in a field around Denver, it w could have been Colorado Springs, and He didn't know this, but just prior to his/being in there, some service planes, I don't know, Army or Navy, had been in there, and raised a little heck around the place, and the Sheriff was still waiting to ~~try and~~ catch some more aviators making trouble, and Arnold said he just went in and made a normal landing and everything, and ~~he said~~ here was this Sheriff arrested him the minute he stepped out of the plane, and He said he had to talk his way out of it. He didn't tell him who he was, or anything, But he said, ~~you know~~ do you know, if I hadn't had that Palmdale experience, I wouldn't have known what to tell the guy." So he got out that one. That was a coincidence. ~~Long hours flying all over you know, and I guess these things that come to his mind, he just happened to remember them or something on the ground that would remind him of the incidents.~~ ~~The strange thing that used to happen, for instance~~, Mr. Churchill came over here, after Gen Arnold and Eisenhower and Clark had been over there on their trip, and one morning, I think, it was about 9:30 or 10:00, Gen Arnold was up at a meeting in Congress, and was was going to be there all day, He wouldn't be back in the office all day long, and Gen Marshall called me in and said he had a confidential matter to take up with me, and said I wasn't to tell anybody about it, Not even Gen Arnold. And he said, "just a minute, I'm waiting for Clark to come." So Gen Clark came in, so they had a Hqs., over at old Ft. Washington, I believe, ~~it was, so now,~~ General Marshall said: "The two of you have got to arrange something. ~~He said~~ Mr. Churchill is to go to Palm Beach and stay in Mr. Stettinius' house, He is there for a little vacation, will be there a week or so." And Gen Marshall he says, "it is not to be known that he's there, but the President wants him provided with adequate safeguards," Gen Marshall he said, "we want artillery; we want plenty of infantry to cut off a certain area around there; we want airplanes on hand/~~d~~/with bombs and with plenty of guns," he said, "to take care of any submarines, and all that," ~~I/s/~~ He said, "Beebe, I want you to select the command for this expedition." He says, "Clark ~~will~~ will furnish all the artillery and all the infantry necessary, ~~he says~~, You'll furnish the commander and the aircraft." And he said, "you'll have the commander back here in my office at 2:00 this afternoon and I'll give him a a personal ~~letter that will~~ letter that will allow him to do whatever is

Beebe: Churchill's Vacation At Palm Beach - A Secret

PP B: for a little vacation. This was

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necessary." So here I was, not very important around the place, and I had to arrange all this, so I called the Bolling Field GHQ boys and they sent over a fellow named Randall, I believe his name was. Now, I think he lives out here in California now, and I told him what the problem was, and he said, they had the 3 or 4 aircraft all ready. I guess they were enroute by that time, Gen Marshall gave him a letter signed his name, giving him carte blanche to do anything. Gen Marshall said, now, when you get through with this job, you bring that letter back. So I just sent Randall away, and he was on his way to do this job, and Gen Arnold came in early, and he said, what have you been up to today? And I said, oh, just the usual - not much, he said, nothing special came up or anything? and I said, oh no, nothing in particular, well he said, I've got to go see Gen Marshall. So he went on in to Gen Marshall's office, and was in there quite a long while, and finally, Bedell Smith came out and he says, Gen Arnold wants you to come down to Gen Marshall's office. So I went down and sat on the seat I was supposed to, and they were still chewing the rag. And finally, the phone rang, and Gen Marshall picked it up, and it was the Secret Service calling from Palm Beach reporting that Mr. Churchill had just safely made it to the house he was going to stay in down there. So Gen Marshall said, well, that was Palm Beach. Riley, or somebody from the Secret Service, just called up. Marshall and said, I'm so glad of that, Then Marshall said, say, by the way, Hap, he said, did Beebe tell you anything about this operation he was setting up today? Hap said, I didn't know anything about any operation. So Marshall said, you can go now, Beebe.

Q: That was his way of clueing Arnold in?

B: He just wanted to find out if I had told Gen Arnold. So when the General came back to the office directly, and he said, say, you've been a lot busier today than you let on. I said, yes sir, well, he said, I'll tell you know the background for this, we were both in the President's office this morning, and talking to Mr. Churchill, and they decided what they wanted to do, Gen Arnold and he said, I couldn't get away from the meetings I had to go to, so I just told Gen Marshall to call you, and you would fix it up for him. But he didn't tell me that. And Gen Marshall was prone to do things like that. He played tricks on you all the time.

Q: Did Arnold have any contact with Eisenhower before he went overseas?

B: After Pearl Harbor, every Sunday morning, Gen Arnold and Gen Eisenhower met in Gen Arnold's office, and they looked at the map all morning long, and I'd sit there with a

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pad and pencil, and write down any remarks they made. They were trying to learn the geography of the whole world, refresh their memories, many little islands, with names that nobody knew, were to become quite important later on. I guess those meetings actually started long before Pearl Harbor, come to think of it, because when we went to England that time, I went along, (April-May 1941?) Col Vandenberg went along as main paperwork handler. Gens Eisenhower and Clark were both onthat trip.

B: Pan American had occasion to establish some bases up in the north, (reverse tape)

and Pan American had a man who was very familiar with that area, and would be available to help our people up there, but we couldn't send him as a civilian. He had to go as an officer or in uniform of some kind. So Gen Arnold decided that he should be a Captain, and he said to call Gen Grant, I want this man examined and on his way tomorrow morning, and then tell Personnel to get his commission through immediately. It just so happened that this chap wore glasses that were about 1/2" or 3/4" thick, and I can't recall his name. Gen Grant came in and received the orders, and he said to the man, "come with me right away, we'll have to examine you," so on the way out, Gen Grant stopped by my desk, and he said, "what in the he-- is going on. I've done just about everything in this war that I can think of, but I've never commissioned a blind man. So this fellow had to hold the paper right in front of his nose to read closely. His distant vision, I guess, was OK. But anyhow, he was on his way the next day, and I suppose very successfully completed what he had to do,

Q: I wonder if he was decommissioned then?

B: I don't know whether he survived, or what happened. Some of those fellows up there didn't.

Q: Where was it that he was going?

B: Up in the Bluie stations, in Greenland. We moved a lot of people up there observation spots and we had the famous Arctic explorer, ~~Edmonson, was that the name~~

Q: I know who you mean, Vjalmar Stefansson?

B: He was a consultant on all these deals, too, and I think actually was up there. Then, Bernt Balchen went up there, too, that phase. But this was preceded. This was the original installation up there.

Begin: Arnold & Eaker Comments on a "Blind" Navy Arctic Survey

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Q: Did you know much about Gen Arnold's relations with Lindbergh?

B: Yes, quite a great deal, practically all the relations there were.

Q: When did they first know each other, was this right after Lindbergh's flight?

B: I don't know, I presume Gen Arnold knew Lindbergh long before my time there. I'm positive he did. But, Lindbergh was called in make a tour of the US to check out depots.

Q: After Pearl Harbor?

B: I can't tell you now whether it was or not, and he was a reserve officer, of course, and eligible to fly, Lindbergh was to go around and see what our status and condition was, which we knew wasn't very good. But we needed specific information to correct it, Gen Arnold had a talk and told him what he was supposed to do, and then told me to fix him up with transportation. So I asked Col Lindbergh was aircraft he'd like to use on this trip, he said, "a P-35 would just be fine." So he took off in zero-zero in that P-35, he was really a pilot, that man. And he went around and visited all those places, and came back and made his report. After that, he got in trouble with the President

Q: Well, that must have been long before Pearl Harbor at a time when he made the trip to Germany.

B: Yes he was a BG by that time.

Q: He got the German decoration,...

B: Was that what it was?

Q: Goering gave him the Iron Cross. There is an interesting letter in the files which Lindbergh wrote Arnold after that trip in which he gave a full report on the German Luftwaffe organization, and the factor of step in his own handwriting.

B: Lingbergh and Larry Bell were over there about the same time.

Q: This was about 1938 and Lindbergh was recommending that Arnold visit Germany. This was when we still had diplomatic relations and attaches.

B: Well Gen Arnold, according to the stories I remember, first became aware of this German thing when he was in Alaska on that flight. He talked to some person in Alaska who had fled from the German air establishment,

See Gen Arnold & Lindbergh

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and this man had told him stories about what was going on in Germany that just were hard to believe, and shortly after that, I know we ~~got~~ sent Larry Bell over, who was a personal friend of Messerschmitt, and Lindbergh was sent over. But in arranging this stuff for Lindbergh, everytime he would come in the Munitions Bldg. there would be a terrible fracas. All the secretaries, and everybody loused the deal up. So we always had him come in and out through some unbeknownst corridor. And one day we kind of got tied up. Howard Hughes was due just as Lindbergh was leaving, and We were using the same route for both of them. And doggone if I wasn't taking Lindbergh out, and the men were hurrying Hughes in. And of course, he knew me, and I said, Mr. Hughes, have you got a minute, Col Lindbergh, I introduced them; they had never met before. Remarkable thing.

Q: Two of the most mysterious figures at the time

B: Both were pilots, and I mean, doing a lot for air you know. So Lindbergh got away without being caught, he walked right through a whole mess of secretaries and they didn't recognize him, and got in a taxi, a car we had waiting for him, and Howard Hughes came in and left and nobody knew him either.

Q: Speaking of pilots, there was, there seemed to be a very distinct coolness between Seversky and Arnold.

B: I read that in these notes, and I don't recall any thing like that.

Q: Seversky was one of these guys pushing Frank Andrews and I think

He kind of badmouthed Arnold every chance he got that he was, I don't want to put any words in your mouth. If you haven't run into it, I can tell you a little bit about what we have run into, and I think part of it was Seversky's fault, airpower could win the war alone, and thought that Arnold was too conservative and not, you know, pressing for everything that Seversky wanted that the Republic Company should have.

B: I know Seversky used to come to the office quite often, I presume always by previous appointment. I don't recall, I presume, that so he wasn't a person who could just walk in and out. There were some that could do that, but he defini tely wasn't one of those.

Q: Who were the ones that could walk in and out? (De Seversky couldn't see Arnold without appointment).

B: I was thinking mostly of people in the building, some of the people in the building such as Navy officers and fellows that Gen Arnold had served with at other places, and things

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like that and of course, people like Vannevar Bush. He had free access. He could come in and drop in and fill his pipe, and I would tell Gen Arnold he was here and he'd let him have a few minutes talk. I

Q: Did you know von Karman?

B: No, I never, as far as I know, I never met him. I know who he is of course.

Q: I think they got together, must have been after (?)

B: Well, it could be, they were trying to get as much scientific help as possible there at about the time I left the office, and I believe von Karman was the man that consented to head it up. Probably by Vannevar Bush's suggestion. Up to that time we had pretty much looked to Mr. Bush for that kind of help.

Q: This was, a different direction from what we have been talking about - what in your opinion, how do you think Arnold would think/ feel about airpower, the Air Force, events and things in general, if he were around now?

B: Well, I think that would be a difficult question to answer, because he had a flexible mind, and he rolled with the punches, he and tried to provide whatever was needed at the time. And obviously what was needed at this time was, to fight, not what we had in the last war by anymeans. So I would presume, that had he lived, you know, sort of immortal like, that he would have probably provided us with a guerrilla warfare establishment and I to win thought rather than to lose.

Q: Then he wouldn't have gone to old tactics and

B: Oh, I don't think so. No, that was one of the things that I suppose which started first with the first bomb wing out at March Field was to explore new ways of doing things. All of a sudden Col Arnold became aware that we didn't even know how to pack our own equipment to take to field. So he made the policy then, that first, airplanes had to be able to go out and spend the night out on a dry lake somewhere, and the crew be suitably provided for. Then a flight had to go, then a squadron, then a whole group had to be able to move out. And this had to be done quickly. So we would get our gear out, and find out what we had. We found out a lot of it wasn't any use to us, old doughboy stuff you know. Some of it we couldn't even carry, it was so heavy, like old kitchens and

Arnold & Van Bush

Arnold - A "Flexible" Mind

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stuff like that. So we were always looking for innovations. One of the sources for new innovations was the Southern California Automobile Club. And they were of tremendous assistance to us in those days with regard to living out.

Q: I see, you mean camping equipment.

B: Yes, and that's one reason I suppose that Arnold was thought of as quite a sportsman and all. But, really, while he loved to fish and hunt, whenever he got a chance, but that wasn't the primary purpose behind all that. It was that type of living had to be done by people that operated aircraft because you didn't have those facilities set up in an emergency, and you had to be able to grab your hat and enough equipment to sustain yourself for a few days until the rear echelon could catch up with you.

Q: Well, they've now come up with the same old concept, they call it the bare base concept, where you move in and there's nothing there, without something new.

B: We used to have to take off and go to Calexico or Raleigh or down on the dry lakes someplace, maybe an old field over at Death Valley and spend a night or may be a day and a night, conduct mission from there.

Q: Was he probably the most advanced thinker in the Air Force along those lines?

B: Well he was the only one I knew anything about who was doing this. Maybe it happened other places. But it definitely happened in the 1st Bomb Wing when he got in a position where he could do things like that. And in order to do it, of course, you had to have your missions meaningful. You had to have fighters and bombers working together. We had a kind of bad situation to start with, because our bombers were these old B-4s, two-engine Keystones, we had one squadron of a little better craft, liquid-cooled engines, I forget what they were called, then we had fighters that were much faster then our bombers, and one was to fast to work with. Then it came the other way around. We had the P-26 fighters, I believe, they were the last ones before they could pull the gear up, they were fairly fast but not as fast as the Martin bombers, the B-12s. So it worked the other way, the bombers would run away from the fighters. But even under those conditions, we did a lot of useful work and innovated things. For instance, we talked earlier about the sending supplies down here to Long Beach during the earthquake. That

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night, the Bomb Group had a mission scheduled to use flares. This hadn't been done before in our area. And while what we simulated the bomb, we, each airplane lighted the target for with the one following by dropping a flare. And to get the thing started, you had a advance aircraft that would drop a whole mess of flares to get the thing underway. My job was to take this advanced airplane out and drop 30 or 40 flares and then the bomb group would come and take up from there. They wanted to simulate a raid on a place. So the target that night was Cramers (?) which was a little town over on the Mojave Desert and I left just before dusk, and probably an hour in advance of the bombers in order to get organized, and to get into position and along about 8:00 that night, my radio operator handed me a message. He said, "you know, I can't find out anything about what's going on. He said, I think that the group took off, but I believe they have been recalled. He said I heard one squadron commander call another and say, "did you get the order to return?" And he said, "the air is just full of message," he said, "something happened, and I said, "well, find out what it is, meantime I I was assume the group wasn't coming because they were a little overdue by that time, I was supposed to get a message when to start my operation. So I turned and headed back for March Field. I thought well, maybe it was the weather, something turned sour, and I'd best be getting back. So finally, the radio operator said, "there's been a disaster, there as far as I can pick up from the radio, he says, that Long Beach has been completely destroyed by an earthquake. So we went on back and sure enough, when I got back to March Field, the place was just deserted. There wasn't an airplane out that wasn't staked down, there was nothing going, and I taxied into where my plane belonged, and Colonels Gen Arnold and Spaatz, ~~both Colonels I suppose~~ caught me just as I stepped out of the plane and said, "can you get us to Long Beach? Can you fly us to Long Beach? And by then the fog had come in, and it was pretty lousy weather, and I said, "no sir, I couldn't fly you to Long Beach, but I believe if I was in Long Beach I could get you back here." And they said, "that's the wrong way," and they stalked off and disappeared, and they never told me what happened. So nobody else there, nobody to take care of the plane, everybody was listening ~~I suppose~~ to the radio. So when I went home, Margaret told me there had been this terrible earthquake and she had a lot of family living in this area, and said it even shook March Field up

Beebe; Arnold & Earthquake Relief - 1933

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pretty bad, She said everybody was worried about what was going on, and then it was in the morning that we started sending supplies and things down to Long Beach. The end result of that was that somebody told somebody to survey this stuff that was lost, that had to be the answer. And I imagine that had to be Gen Craig. But he probably got orders from somebody higher up, and it wasn't Gen Craig that was raising cain; it was the Staff. There was an old conception at headquarters in Washington with regard to the flexibility that we were developing in the air, and our equipment problems, and our mentioned, and our ability to whip out and go somewhere pretty fast, at least at the March Field station, and the fact that anybody would take action on his own with Government property was unheard of. And I know well about that, because one of the first jobs I got when I joined up in the Air Corps was Supply Officer. Almost the first thing that happened, the Maj of the Inspector General on the Post, called me, and it was Ft. Riley, and we had a squadron of air planes there. He said: "you're accounts are in horrible shape, he says, you're so many blankets short, so many this, and so many that, and I just signed for all this stuff, and he said, I'll give you 2 weeks to get it fixed up since you're just new. So I asked my Supply Sergeant about this, and he said it was probably correct, he said, "when he going to come and count them again, and I said, well he gave me 2 weeks to correct it. He says, don't worry. I can remember that major's name. His name was Crowley. In a couple of weeks he called me and said, we're going on inventory of the supply room, I went over there and there wasn't an over, nor was there a shortage that he could find in the books anywhere. "Well, he said, I'll have to tell you this, he says, you're going to be a good office, he said, certainly straightened that out." I hadn't the faintest idea in the world what had happened. So later, I asked the Supply Sergeant - his name was Maxwell, I'll never forget him either, well he said, we have an item that we issue, its called coveralls, and you know, these Cavalry boys just love them. And he said, I've been able, through my Supply Sergeant to acquire a few extra coveralls which I fold up in the blankets, so they don't show, and he said I can take one of those around and get 10 or 12 blankets for it. That's the way to do it, and he says, of course, maybe I borrowed a little stuff too. So that's what the supply thing was all about. That was the attitude they had, you didn't use

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anything for fear you'd either harm it or lose it, or something would happen and this didn't make for very good military training, for the essence of being able to do something is not worry about losing it, the airplanes or ~~what~~ people, even.

Q: Was Arnold a good administrator?

B: Oh yes, he didn't like to do it, but he knew the role. I suspect though that Gen McNarney was the best that I ever ran into on that. Fortunatd y, I served with him in his Hqs., and eventually as his Adjutant long enough to be taught by him something about paperwork. He taught you enough to know you needed a good Sergeant Major. ~~because~~ He had been a very fine staff officer in the first war and very well thought of, in fact, he was so well thought of, that he got good jobs under Gen Marshall, because Gen Marshall liked good staff officers, people that could take the initiative.

Q: Well, I would expect that Marshall had a good deal of confidence in Arnold's administrative ability or he wouldn't have gone so far in putting the Air Corps on its own.

B: Well, I suspect that as long as Mr. Lovett was there, they figured that the combination would, Mr. Lovett and Gen Arnold would handle things. Mr. Lovett was a wonderful man, you know, fine from an administrative standpoint. ~~and he~~ He always thought our shop, he called it way of doing business, was pretty lousy and it was. But up to the time I left there, we didn't have enough people to deal with to make it much other than just a personal calling on the phone deal, but he always wanted to get the thing organized, so that ~~well~~ you could computerize it, eventually, ~~and he~~ Lovett just couldn't understand the way we did business. And I supposed that that came in good stead later on, because I know when I came back from overseas, that it was an entirely different place.

Q: He and Arnold always got along well?

B: Oh, beautifully. Yes. Mr. Lovett was on lots of trips with us.

Q: We talked to him in NY about a month ago, he treated us like you, plush office, ~~up the elevator~~, very nice. Like him very much.

B: He and Gen Arnold pulled a joke on me one time. You know, I came from Idaho, and I used to ride there in my youth and the Sawtooth forest in the Haley area, they had a Ranger station, and I worked on one summer near there, and So I ~~mentioned~~

Arnold The Administrator — Role of Lovett

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one time that I had been through Ketchum, but ~~I said,~~ that was before they went up there and built that resort there, and of course, ~~this~~ that was built by Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman, I guess, ~~so one~~ time we were in ~~Orlando~~ Atlanta or Mobile, or someplace in the South, and we got in late, and ~~there were no~~ we were the only people in the dining room. Besides it was during the depression, business wasn't ~~good~~ to begin with, ~~and~~ were ~~so~~ hungry. Well, we had been flying all day, visiting stations, ~~and things~~, and I ordered a big steak and they ordered a steak and baked potato, and particularly, they wanted the Idaho baked potato, and here came the meal. They got the steaks, ~~one~~ Well, do you know what I got? One great tremendous Idaho baked potato, and that's all I got. And they never ordered another steak for me. I had to eat my potato, and that was it. And they laughed, they thought that ~~was~~ was funny, I had to go out to a hamburger stand to ~~eat~~ get something to eat.

Q: Well, he was a great practical joker, apparently.

B: Oh, he loved any little bit of amusement in such a hectic life that they lived.

~~He was~~

Q: When did you come in the service?

B: 1928, at March Field. I came in right from college as a flying cadet. I thought I would give it a whirl. ~~and~~ I had graduated as a mechanical engineer, and went to March Field and then to Kelly, and I trained in "TAC" aviation at Kelly, ~~and I was~~, they said if they couldn't find anything else for you to do, they put you in "TAC". ~~We had some pretty good fellows in there. Tom Imaly and Tommy~~ were together all the time. was one of the California wonder teams fullback, he was fullback, Charlie Urban was quarter, I think, it was quite a famous team, Tommy was the boy that navigated Howard Hughes around the world, and was also worked with and started the real navigation school there as a result of our troubles during the air mail. Anyhow, then I went to Riley, but I always wanted to get into the engineering part, instead I ended up at March Field ~~and ended up~~ as an Adjutant, and I knew less about being an Adjutant than ~~I suppose~~ most anybody, except what Gen McNarney had taught me. But I never really worked at that very much, always seemed to be doing other things.

Q: So it was an an Adjutant that you first worked for Arnold?

Beebe: Comes to work for Arnold at March Field

Beebe: The Idaho Potato

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B: ~~Well, it was,~~ Actually ~~I believe it was~~ that I was in charge of the airplanes over in the bomb group there, that ~~Gen~~ Col. Arnold liked to fly, ~~and~~ There was this business of instrument flying ~~and things like that,~~ and then after the bomb group moved to Hamilton, and I went up there, and ~~he~~ Gen. Arnold 1st Bomb Wing. organized the ~~first wing.~~ I came back, that's really when my close association with him started and he made me his adjutant then. Up to that time I don't think I'd been an adjutant except for a while for the bomb group under McNarney.

Q: Did you maintain any contact with Gen Arnold after you both had retired?

B: Just by writing, correspondence, and only a few letters. ~~I don't know,~~ We ~~never~~ we seemed not to miss that ~~much~~ part of it so much. ~~The thing that got Gen~~

Q: When did you start flying for him?

B: ~~Arnold to ask~~ At the time for me when Gen Craig told him he had to have somebody to take over his flying, ~~was that~~ my job at Wright Field ~~as~~ was a bombardment procurement officer, project officer, I guess you would call it, that job called for me to go to the chief engineer from Wright Field, ~~chief engineer, over~~ Did come in to Washington quite often for board meetings on the bombers. We were building B-17s and we had B-15s, ~~and~~ the B-19, B18s, and all kinds of things in the fire, ~~so I used to have to go over there on these board meetings and one~~ On one visit to Washington ~~time~~ I had to take over a B-17 and a B18 and demonstrate them to members of Congress ~~as~~ they were trying to ~~get~~ sell on this idea of buying some of these B17s. And so I did quite a bit of flying in the B17, and carried Gen Arnold, and he seemed to like it. we got back in the old swing of March Field. It wasn't too long after that till the Chief (Westover) got killed and so the thing came up, ~~and I guess~~ he was the one he thought of at the moment. I never regretted, I enjoyed it. But I don't think I liked the Air Force after the war. I don't think I cared for it, I wouldn't have liked the management.

Bebe; Arnold's pilot

Q: What do you mean by that?

B: Well, I don't - couldn't anybody have handled it like Gen Arnold did, in my opinion.

Q: You mean the contrast was a bit too much for you? You get spoiled?

B: Yes. Besides, I think I'd been sitting out in Yuma or some place, watching airplanes fly by. But, I've never had anything much to do with the Air Force since I retired. One of the things Gen Marshall told me one time, ~~when~~, before he was made Chief, when we were on a trip some place, ~~out~~, he said, I'd like to get into that post while we're flying over Benning, or some place, there's a lot of things to be straightened out

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there. But he said, "You know, just its no use you beating your brains out." He said, "don't try anything unless you've got the power to do it, and that's why, on that same trip (in 1939) when he was made Chief, he just had the power then, and that's when he was going to put air into the Army. And he did, there's no question about it. They became aware of it pretty fast. I think maybe more than the Air Force, the Air Corps did.

Q: Well, that's possible.

B: I'll never forget one time when they were coming back from the West Coast, and we stopped in at Randolph Field, and the Commander in charge of all the flight instruction down there wanted to go to Washington, so he had asked Gen Arnold if he could ride with us, and Gen Arnold said, yes he could. So the next morning we went out to take off and it was zero-zero - just socked right down to the ground. The operations officer wouldn't give us clearance to take off, but Gen Arnold said "I'll sign it." The guy couldn't say no, so Gen Arnold signed it, we went out and took off in zero-zero, and there was only 1,500 feet to break, I think, something like that, and was just a short 2 or 3 minutes until we were on top, and we flew all the way to Washington on top of clouds and let down into the Bolling Field area where there was some ceiling, there was no trick to that. So this Colonel that we picked up at Randolph down there that commanded all this activity, said "you know, that was the most wonderful trip I have ever been on," he said, "I never experienced anything like that before in my life," and you know, it shocked me so, that I thought about it all night. There was the head man of all our flying activities at Randolph, stationed there, teaching cadets, he didn't even know what he was teaching them - what was in store for them. I mean, this is what war a routine matter.

Q: Well, how did you account for his general lack of...

B: He just never had to do it personally and he just had never done it, I suppose. Maybe it was because where he'd been they didn't have bad weather very often, unusual conditions for there. By golly, I told Gen Arnold about that, and he said, "I heard him tell you that," he said, "you know, I have been thinking about that all night too, and so they started moving new younger blood in to Randolph and to a lot of places. Nothing personally against this man, he just things had moved away from him, don't you know. I suppose Gen Arnold had done that until he became Chief, because we didn't have very good facilities, much

Arnold Teaches A Lesson About Flying

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at the time we took over the air mail, you know, nobody thought of flying instruments. Oh
Gosh, that was quite a little experience, ~~well, I'd~~ I'll tell you, it wasn't very long before
all of us ~~Arnold~~ at March Field knew how to fly on instruments after we got home from the air mail experience.

Q: Apparently, from what I've been able to dig up, Arnold's sector, ~~whatever they called the~~ Western, was by and large the best run and best operated of the three.

B: Yes, I've heard that.

Q: I suppose you had some hairy ~~ones~~ experiences during that time. (air mail

B: Oh nothing, ~~nothing~~ particular, it was just miserable experience. It seemed like always the mail had to fly between 11 and 12 at night, or 1:00 A.M. ~~in the morning~~ ~~and one,~~ I was in charge of the route between Reno and Elko, that way as far as we could make, ~~and~~ I had to make it two times a week. I had to take the trip, ~~because~~ of course, we made it two trips a day each way, 50 times a week, I took it. I don't know whether I had to or whether I did it just to do it, but it was a lousy thing, we'd get into Elko eastbound about 2 in the morning, ~~and~~ go down to the old hotel and sleep and get up at 10 AM and go back the other way, We had ice cold open cockpits, and it was pretty lonesome out there, ~~mountain, I remember some of those places~~. Years later, I went into Reno one day with Gen Arnold and Gen Marshall, ~~and~~ they decided some where between Salt Lake City and the West coast that they were going to spend the night in Reno, and it was about right, otherwise we would have been fogged in getting into Sacramento, ~~I landed in, and~~ so we taxiied on, landed, and I had a favorite place I used to like to park airplanes, up behind the little hangars there, ~~and~~ somebody had taken a great big ditching machine, and had dug a big ditch across there ~~and I~~ taxiied across there not seeing it with this DC-3 and the plane jerked like that, sideways, and as the one wheel hit, ~~and~~ Gen Marshall was just putting on his pants, civilian clothes to go downtown, ~~and it~~ The jar knocked him off and into his seat, his feet, and Gen Arnold was pretty put out about that. I don't blame him a bit, this carelessness, I didn't even see the ditch. Well, after he thought ~~that~~ that over for a while, he said, well, you're the only junior officer I know that had ever knocked the Chief of Staff off his feet down. Gen Marshall forgave me for it.

Q: Well, I don't want to take your whole day.

B: I'm sorry I didn't help you much

Q: Oh, I think so, quite a bit.

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B: You know an awful lot of it is There is a story in the same I took General Marshall back to VMI. commanded there, and I took him back, the first time he went back there after he became Chief of Staff, and that had quite a little deal there for him, honor guard out, I know I sat in the plane till all the shooting was over, and lo and behold, the Majors Commanding Field Officer of the Day, commanded the whole ceremony came over and he was the Major that had been in the infantry under ROTC that I belong to when I was in college. So we had quite a little reunion there, he was just coming off duty. As a result of my landing Gen Marshall in that day, he told Gen Arnold not to bet any more DC-3s land at Pearson Field or whatever the name of this field was, it was pretty small in Portland, so I think they closed the field from then on. No big ships, or what they called big ships in those days, ever went in. Then, the afternoon, Gen Arnold's aide, I mean Gen Marshall's aide, rushed in and said, "say can you get Gen Marshall up to VMI or whatever that school was he went to near Raleigh," without thinking, I said, "sure, we can leave as soon as he's ready. I called Bolling and had a plane ready and I started looking on the charts to see what kind of flying field they had down there. It and there and it was 1200 feet long, and we had a DC-3. I had to call Bolling and asked them how long will it take to drain half the gas out of that plane, if its gas, and he said fortunately they were just taking out the gas, and I said how much is in there, and he said only that there was about one tank left. I told him not to and I said that's all, don't put any more in. So Hill Grant went with me, he was the only pilot that could fly copilot, and we took Gen Marshall down there and delivered him. We had no trouble in arriving, but what had happened was he had to stay beyond the time he could make it in a car, and he had to make a speech over. They wanted him there at his Alma Mater, He was going to drive back to Washington. So we waited until he was long gone over the hill before we took off, and then we went down to the end of this runway and got a couple of fence posts and put them down on the ground and we bounced in the air, When we hit them, right and kept on going. It was the only remark I heard made about it was Gen Marshall told Gen Arnold when he got back, he said, you know, I worried all night about that. And Gen Arnold said, "what'd you worry about?" And he said, "about whether they Marshall could get that airplane out of there or not.

Q: I see you weren't flying him back.

B: No, he was going - his automobile was enroute and he was driving.

Q: Well, I think I had better pack my gear, abused your hospitality long enough.

Rule: Flies Marshall to VMI.

End

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

June 11, 1971

Doctor Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Doctor Green:

I did not know about Emmett McCabe and have not heard about him for years. He was John Copeland's right hand, and as General Arnold used to carry them home to Copeland now and then, knew Emmett well enough to welcome him to active duty. I expect he will have his problems, biography wise, too. John should know where he is now.

I have drawn a blank on Gen Bradshaw. It was not he that went to Wichita, but Ray Herrin. My contact thinks he went to Wright Field from the Douglas plant

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
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LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

but other wise the scope shows a complete blank. He is the second Air officer I cant seem to find out about. The other is or was Royden Eugene Beebe Jr. a B/G that was with Gen Kenney in the Pacific. The A.F. used to send me his mail and I was even invited to join some service connected club because they thot I was that Gene.

On the radar thing; I don't think so. On Nov 29, 1939, to be exact, I took Gen A to Red Bank N.J. where we inspected the first radar I had ever seen. It belonged to MG Joseph O. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, who was our host. He and Gen A were good friends and we had been flying some planes off shore at Sandy Hook so Joe could test his gadget. I don't know that even Gen A knew what it

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

were that we were to see that day.
The whole thing was most secret and
the installation was fixed to look
just about like one of our oil well
derricks covered with sheet metal. From
the shore side, that is. There is always
the possibility, of course, that Gen Mauborgne
found out about radar from Gen A, but
I don't think so.

I think tho that from that day
on, the Signal Corps had plenty of
heat applied to it, to get some of them
along this same line. Gen Spaatz came
back from England on an early trip there
with info on how rockets were being
used from fighters. There was considerable
smoke raised on this item also. Who
was first to do something? Gen L or A.?

Keep working!

Sincerely,
Eugene H. Beebe

(31)

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20314

7 June 1971

Brig. General Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Mira Mar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif90803

Dear General Beebe:

Your letter of the 4th is in hand. The U.S. Post Office is really getting on the stick, as they say in these parts. Anyway, I'll look forward to hearing from you again.

Since I wrote, I've interviewed a couple of others of possible interest to you. Former Rep. John Costello, a hard man to catch because he spends most of his time in California, stayed home long enough to tell me a couple of interesting things last week. One of them is his belief that Emmett McCabe is writing a biography of General Arnold. Welcome to the club, I say. Anyway, Have you heard of this? Also, do you have McCabe's mailing address?

Another item: upon re-reading my interview of Frank Collbohm, former President of RAND, I note his comment that Hap Arnold was the first U.S. military man to recognize the military value of radar. How does this grab you?

I should like to amend my last salutation. Best regards to your charming wife and daughter.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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EUGENE H. BEEBE
239 MIRA MAR AVENUE
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90803

June 4, 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr Green:

I will try and get more information on the Bradelaw I mentioned. Will advise you in due time.

I believe that he was relieved at Douglas by H.B. Wolfe soon after Pearl Harbor, and went to Wichita to represent us at the plant Boeing was to build there. In any event I will get some info.

We were pleased to hear of your activities and send our regards.

Sincerely,

Eugene H. Beebe
Brig Gen USAF Ret.

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20314

25 May 1971

Brig General Eugene H. Beebe, USAF (Ret)
239 Miramar Avenue
Long Beach, Calif 90803

Dear General Beebe:

Our very good interview of last August has just been transcribed. Upon reading it over, I came across the reference to General Bradshaw which I assumed to be Aaron Bradshaw. Upon checking, I discovered an Aaron Bradshaw on the Army Retired list. He lives in Washington. I went over to see him and it turned out that he was in Anti-Aircraft Artillery. He was in U.K. on Pearl Harbor Day.

It wasnt a total loss because Hank Arnold served under him, so I got a couple of nuggets. But this leaves me wondering about the Bradshaw you mentioned. There is no General Bradshaw on the Air Force Retired or Active Lists, which is one reason I write to you.

Another is to report on my activities. As you know, Jack Loosbrock will confine his activities to editing my copy because he must devote nearly full time to keeping keeping the Air Force Association afloat (that's not quite the right word).

I've written two chapters - the Air Mail and the Alaskan Flight - and the publisher took no offense. He wants to see more.

I've interviewed 50 people since talking to you, including Robert Lovett, Charles Lindbergh, Rosey O'Donnell, John Smart, Charles Westover (son of Oscar), Edward Bowles, and many others. I've also transferred to the Office of the Historian, a logical change.

I hope this finds you, Mrs. Beebe and your charming daughter in good health and spirits. If you would care to write, the enclosed envelope will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl Copy ltr & Interview

P.S. Was Ltr #84

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESS BRANCH

BRIGADIER GENERAL EUGENE H. BEEBE
ARMY AIR FORCE (RETIRED)

Eugene Harold Beebe was born on September 27, 1906, at Utica, Nebraska. He was graduated from the University of Idaho with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1928.

Enlisting in the Regular Army as a Flying Cadet on June 21, 1928, General Beebe completed flying training and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Reserve on June 22, 1929. He was appointed a second lieutenant in the Regular Army, Air Corps, on September 4, 1929.

General Beebe was assigned to the 16th Observation Squadron at Fort Riley, Kansas, in July 1929. He attended the Aircraft Armament Course at the Air Corps Tactical School, Chanute Field, Illinois, from September 1930 to April 1931, and after graduation was ordered to March Field, California, for duty with the 31st Bomb Squadron. General Beebe assumed command of the Seventh Bomb Group Headquarters there in September 1932. In January 1934 General Beebe went to Rockwell Field, California, on detached service for training in navigation and instrument flying, and after completion was transferred to Reno, Nevada, for duty with the Army Air Corps Mail Operations as an air mail pilot. Returning to March Field in May 1934, he was adjutant of the First Pursuit Wing until July when he became Operations Officer of the Seventh Bomb Group. In April 1935, General Beebe was assigned to the First Pursuit Wing, General Headquarters Air Force, at March Field, as Adjutant and Public Relations Officer.

Assigned to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, in August 1936, General Beebe attended the Air Corps Engineering School, was graduated the following July, and became Assistant Project Officer, Bombardment, Engineering Section, Materiel Division, there. He was designated Project Officer in July 1938. Transferred to Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., in October 1940, General Beebe was Assistant Executive Officer. In July 1941 he was assigned as Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, Headquarters Army Air Forces, in Washington, D.C.

From July 1942 to January 1943, General Beebe served as Group Commander of the 302nd and 308th Bomb Groups successively, at Davis-Monthan Field, Arizona; Wendover Field, Utah; and the Army Air Base at Pueblo, Colorado. He then became Group Commander of the 346th Bomb Group at the Army Air Base, Salina, Kansas. The following March he was assigned to duty in the Asiatic Theater of Operations as a Bomb Group Commander. In November 1943 General Beebe went to the War Planning Staff, Southeast Asia Command, and subsequently became Senior American Air Officer there. Returning to the States in August 1944, he reported to Army Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The following December he was named Acting Commanding General of Headquarters, Continental Air Forces, at Camp Springs Army Air Field, Maryland.

General Beebe retired from active duty on November 30, 1945.

MORE

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Brigadier General Eugene H. Beebe
Army Air Force (Retired)

General Beebe was rated a command pilot, combat observer, technical observer, and senior aircraft observer.

PROMOTIONS

He was commissioned a second lieutenant on September 4, 1929; promoted to first lieutenant on May 1, 1935; to captain (temporary) May 2, 1935; to captain (permanent) September 4, 1939; to major (temporary) March 21, 1941; to lieutenant colonel (temporary) January 5, 1942; to colonel (temporary) March 1, 1942; to brigadier general (temporary) November 11, 1943.

E N D

Up to date as of November 30, 1945.

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September 5, 1969

Brig. Gen. Eugene H. Beebe
239 Mira Mar Ave.
Long Beach, Calif. 90803

Dear General Beebe:

A colleague and I have been working for some time on a biography of General Arnold. My colleague is Dr. Murray Green, a professional researcher and historian, who has served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force ever since the office existed. We are under contract to Random House for publication of the biography. We are working with the knowledge and full cooperation of Mrs. Arnold, whom we have visited several times in Sonoma in the course of our research.

AVA business calls me to Los Angeles the week beginning September 29. If possible I would like to arrange a visit with you during that week. We have found that the written record needs fleshing out with face-to-face interviews with key associates of General Arnold. We have recently had such sessions with Generals Spaatz, Kenney, Baker, Kuter, and Norstad, as well as former Secretary Lovett.

If this time period is satisfactory to you perhaps you would like to indicate which day, time, and [illegible] would be convenient for you. If it all works out, Dr. Green would be accompanying me.

I hope we can get together and I anxiously await your reply.

Sincerely,

John F. Loosbrock
Editor

JFL:L
cc: Murray Green

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Interview with General Beebe
Long Beach, California
October 1, 1969

Q: General Beebe, do you remember the first time you ever met General Arnold? In what circumstances, and what kind of impressions he might have made?

B: No, I don't.

Q: When did you first become associated with him?

B: Well, of course, I met him shortly after he took command of March Field and I imagine that was in about 1931 or 1932.

Q: Yes, in that neighborhood. Is that when you started working for him?

B: No.

Q: When was that?

B: I believe it was after the CCC fiasco we had. And probably at the time we were carrying the air mail. I became better acquainted, at least during that.

Q: Were you at Salt Lake City?

B: I was stationed at Reno, I was 2nd Lt in charge of the air mail out of Reno.

Q: You mentioned when you talked to the Columbia University Oral History people, a flight where there was an insufficiency of oxygen on the flight. You thought there might have been some connection with his later medical problems, do you recall the circumstances of that?

B: Yes, I remember this quite well. Gen Arnold had a very good friend in Los Angeles, with the Automobile Club, and he was also a friend of mine. He'd been up to visit Gen Arnold after Gen Arnold came back home from Washington, his retirement. I believe he just had gotten out of the

hospital down in Palo Alto area somewhere. Gen Arnold was at his home, but this Artie visited him there, and Gen Arnold told him about this and then he relayed it to me. And that was the knowledge I had of it.

Q: Well, was it, in other words, it was a flight that had taken place after his heart attack?

B: Oh yes, it was a flight that had taken place after he'd retired, and gone. He apparently made several trips back to Washington to help get the Air Force organized. I believe Gen Spaatz was in command. This incident was as a result of a trip he made home from Washington, at Hamilton I believe it was, and just I assume, that it must have been prior to his entering that hospital down there for that, that particular time, although I think he had been in that hospital before, but I'm not sure of that.

Q: I'm not sure either, without having access in my own records.

B: But the reason I was particularly, I believed this story was, the same thing had happened to me. Few years before, and it is quite possible that it really did, and I'm sure that in his case, it would have been serious.

Q: We have had the feeling in our research that Arnold's tour at March Field was kind of a turning point in his career. That's when he really began to make long strides and make a name for himself, and become known. We have a feeling that was kind of important part of his career. Looking back, do you have the same feeling?

B: Well, I didn't know anything about Colonel Arnold's past history, at the time he came to March Field, I hadn't been in the service very long myself at that time to be even interested in the senior officers much. However, I would be inclined to agree that the things he did at March Field certainly brought him the attention of a lot of important people.

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Q: Are there any specific instances that you can think of?

B: Well, I think that, I don't know just which followed which, but there was of course, the CCC episode, and there was this bombing range at Muroc that he started. And there was the gathering of plants and trees and shrubbery to build March Field, and all of the activities of the two groups we had there, in their community relationships, and their maneuvers, and things like that. We traveled quite extensively to other California cities and had maneuvers. And I think it was during that period that people became aware of a man named Arnold around there.

Q: Well, he seemed to have a flair for public relations, for example, this business of getting involved with the Hollywood stars.

B: Yes, I think, wasn't that his job in Washington at this time, so-called trouble he got in to back there?

Q: Billy Mitchell?

B: Yes, so he had a natural flair for relationships with important people, Congressmen, important people in the local community and in Los Angeles. But they seemed to gravitate to our place. They liked our place out there at March Field and they used to come out and make pictures and they liked being invited over to the Officer's Club, and we didn't mind having them around, because, God knows, that was a pretty dreary place out there. He became well acquainted personally with lots and lots of people there from "Death Valley" Scotty right on down to Howard Hawkes and a lot of the people in the moving picture industry.

Q: I know there was Bebe Daniels and Ben Lyon.

B: Yes, I carried Ben Lyon around in an airplane one day, and Bebe Daniels had furnished the Officer's Club out there at the Long Beach Airport. And then Daniels was a reserve officer in the Air Corps, so we were coming down here on maneuvers and we coordinated it with the dedication of this

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Officer's Club. We brought the bomb group and the fighters down one day, and it just happened they assigned Ben Lyon to my flight in the formation to fly down. I put him in the wing plane and successfully delivered him to Long Beach and he got a big kick out of that. But I never met Bebe Daniels, as far as I can remember.

Q: Were you aware of, or involved in any of his relationships with Malin Craig?

B: Oh yes.

Q: He turned out to be a good friend, almost an advocate of Arnold. I was wondering if you had any inside scoop, how that came about? Craig wasn't any great friend of air power, and yet Arnold seemed to get along with him fine.

B: Well, I don't know how Gen Arnold first became acquainted with Gen Craig, but apparently they had served together at some time or other. Of course, Gen Craig was the Corps Area Commander at the Presidio, and March Field was one of his stations. Anything Gen Arnold wanted out of the ordinary, we would have to take it up with Gen Craig. In those days, Gen Arnold liked to fly fighter planes, and by that time, I had been assigned to his headquarters - in the time I'm talking about - and we used to fly quite a bit together. So we would get a couple of fighter planes and fly up to San Francisco and he'd do his business with Gen Craig and then we'd fly back, maybe stop or cross the desert.

Q: There was an incident that involved the earthquake and Arnold rushed blankets and kitchens and all kinds of relief to the victims without checking with his superiors. Apparently, he got into a little hot water and went up and saw Gen Craig and meanwhile, he got a lot of praise for doing this. I was wondering if you had any inside knowledge about that incident?

B: Yes, I went up there with Gen Arnold that day. But, that was one

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of the things that he took up with Gen Craig.

Q: His contacts with Gen Craig, do you feel they helped Arnold in his later career?

B: Oh yes, a very important part. For instance, Gen Craig had standing orders that any aviator that disturbed his headquarters at the Presidio had to come and personally talk to him. On this particular day, I remember distinctly when we got to Crissy Field, Gen Arnold and I dove our fighters right down over Gen Craig's headquarters. Sure enough, there was a car waiting for us with some guards when we got out of the plane. So Gen Arnold - of course, he was Colonel then - said: "Well, that's the way to get transportation up to see the General." They took us up there and they thought sure enough we were in trouble. We went in there and Gen Craig looked up and said: "Damn you, Hap, I thought that was you." So they settled their business, I'm sure very satisfactorily, and actually I don't think it was Gen Craig ever caused him any trouble. It was always the staff officers that caused the problems - never the leaders, as far as I know. So, I wouldn't sit in there while they did all their talking, but I knew Gen Craig, and he knew who I was. On the way home - I guess Gen Arnold was feeling pretty good - because when we went over the Tehatchapee Pass, that stretch across Muroc Lake - we went down about 25 feet off the ground and hedge-hopped all the way home. Gen Arnold liked to do that, but he didn't like the junior officers to know he did.

Q: Was he a good pilot?

B: Oh, he was a dandy; he was a good pilot.

Q: He liked to fly?

B: Yes, loved to fly. So, later on, I would suppose that Gen Craig had a great deal to do with his being made Asst Chief, but this came about when we were on maneuvers in Florida. Gen Arnold was called away from

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maneuvers and sent up, and had to go to Washington. But he came back there and seemed to be happy so I guess they had told him then that he would be the new Asst Chief.

Note: Maneuvers at Vero Beach?

Q: Did you go to Washington with him then? (When he became Asst Chief of Air Corps).

B: No, I got involved after I'd served about two years at Wright Field, after the engineering school, then a year in the bombardment project office, because of the death of the Chief of the Air Corps, General Westover. Gen Craig called Gen Arnold in and said that was all of his flying. Gen Craig said that was the last Chief of Air Corps that would fly by himself, and for Arnold to get a pilot to accompany him on all these flights, and to use two-engine aircraft. So they beat the bushes to find out how they were going to handle this two-engine aircraft, and Gen Craig says: "I want a plane; get me one!" So the Air Corps bought Gen Craig an airplane, which Gen Craig was never in so far as I know of. But that was our first, the first airplane that the Chief of the Air Corps ever had.

Q: You became pilot then?

B : Gen Arnold wrote me a letter at Wright Field and asked if I would come over and work in his office and go with him on all these trips.

Q: What was your rank then?

B: I don't know - it could have been Captain or Major, we all had "Mexican" ranks, you know, and I think I was a Captain when I went over there

Q: What year was that?

B: It was November of 1938.

Q: How long did you stay with him?

B: I stayed with him until June of 1942.

Q: Always as pilot?

B: Always as pilot and mostly worked in the office. Whenever, he

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went on a trip, I went along, with very few exceptions.

Q: Was he a tough guy to work for?

B: Oh no, wonderful. That is, if you got to work early in the morning and didn't mind staying till late at night and then on Sundays.

Q: There are some stories and indications he had a hot temper once in a while, I wonder if he ever vented it on you.

B: Oh, I'm sure he did; but I never bothered with it either.

Q: That's probably why he kept you.

B: His idea of a good time was to work all day in the office, and then he'd probably come in from the last conference with the Secretary - in those days it was Mr. Stimson - then, we'd rush out to Bolling Field, jump in a plane, and fly all night and arrive in Los Angeles the first thing in the morning and then go to about 5 aircraft plants, and then out to somebody's house for dinner that night. And by that time, I was ready to go to sleep, because there were just two of us in the plane, and I'm sure Gen Arnold was napping some of the time during the night.

Q: He had to keep going.

B: He didn't want another pilot along. He wanted to help with the flying and so the two of us, with a DC-3; we'd stop a couple of times. We did this many times.

Q: In 1941, there were a lot of people who thought there should be a separate air force right then, and Arnold kind of held back, feeling it wasn't the right time and place. This apparently he felt that in the light of the situation with Gen Marshall, that the Air Corps could get more by playing ball than not. There were some people like Hugh Knerr who thought we should go further. Do you recall any of that pulling and hauling at that time?

B: Well, yes. This was quite a topic of discussion and conversation, even at my level in the office. I felt that with Gen Marshall as Chief, that I

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would imagine Gen Arnold probably felt the same way. So long as Gen Marshall was Chief, that the slower should we approach this separate Air Force question, and the easier it would be to slip into it. Because Gen Marshall was not against the Air Force, by any means. He was all for it. And this was, of course, prior to the war. Pearl Harbor came along, and that was when things got so frantic, that any separate air force idea went by the board. However, we did have by mid-1942, what amounted to a separate air force. That showed that if we proceeded without the war, or if the war hadn't come along, we would eventually have gotten the separate air force, and it would have been painless. There would have been no problem at all. But we were in no position in those days to have a separate air force. We only had, I imagine, around 1,200 officers. We just didn't have enough people to fill the jobs.

Q: And there were a lot of things that the Army did for the AAF?

B: They did all that for us: Ordnance, Quartermaster. All that was done by the Army.

Q: Did you ever have any evidence that there was a kind of move to push Frank Andrews against Arnold for the top job? I don't think Andrews himself made the move. It was Hugh Knerr and I don't know who else. Anyway, this movement tried to make Andrews the top dog rather than Arnold. Did you have any knowledge of that?

B: Well, I think there could be truth to that. I never associated in my service with Gen Andrews or any of that group in the so-called GHQ AF, fortunately. But I don't believe that Gen Arnold and Gen Andrews ever had an unkind word between them.

Q: No, there is no real evidence of that.

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Bell, William 12 Aug 70

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Lv. 11 AM
→ Longboat Key
s/v St. nautical time

20314

18 May 1971

Maj. General William J. Bell, USAF (Ret)
512 Yawl Lane
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Bell:

I have your note of recent date and will look forward to our getting together sometime after 25 September. When my plans firm up, I'll write to alert you well beforehand.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

388-1829

Encl

Home
1-8-72

Wrote 12-27-
will be there
Jan 6 or 7, 1972

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

apr.
19 August 1971

Major General William J. Bell, USAF (Ret)
512 Yawl Lane
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Bell:

Your letter sounded most intriguing. It may be that I will postpone my trip to the Southland for the late Fall. Can you let me know in the enclosure when you plan to come back to Sarasota for the Winter?

I think your experiences with General Arnold are most valuable and I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you in Sarasota at a mutually convenient time.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

Dear Doctor Green,

We will return to Sarasota in September, probably not later than the 25th. Will be happy to meet with you. Sincerely

William J. Bell
Maj Gen USAF, Ret.

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20314

19 August 1971

Major General William J. Bell, USAF (Ret)
512 Pearl Lane
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Bell:

Your letter sounded most intriguing. It may be that I will postpone my trip to the Southland for the late Fall. Can you let me know in the enclosure when you plan to come back to Sarasota for the Winter?

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MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/ajp

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

13 April 1971

Major General William J. Bell, USAF (Ret)
512 Yawl Lane
Sarasota, Florida 33577

Dear General Bell:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold, which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian, presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

In spending about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship, I was able to research all of the vast Arnold collection at the Library of Congress. I also went through the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Eaker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay, and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. Among those interviewed: Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. In mufti, I have been privileged to talk to Charles A. Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Robert Lovett, Jackie Cochran, and a number of others.

I have run across your name in a couple of contexts which may have brought you in some contact with General Arnold. If you feel you can contribute any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebutt which you think has validity, I would be pleased to stop by for a chat during a pending trip to the Southland in early June.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

(over)

If the meager information on the back is of use and you wish any elaboration I'll be happy to try to expand it. Ken Bell

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Attached to 16

4/13/71 File 7.67

Dear Doctor,

Unfortunately I'll be leaving here late in May for a West Point reunion and the summer in Cazenovia, N.Y.

I had very few personal contacts with Gen. Arnold. He came to Hancock Air Base, Syracuse N.Y. approximately early July 1944, to observe some exercises marking the completion of training of the 2nd Combat Cargo Gp which I commanded. I'm a staff car returning from observation of a para-drop, he caught me with my mouth ajar, when he asked how long it would take to retrain the group in C-46 airplanes. Our training had been completed in C-47's, in four months. I ventured a guess of two months. I was to come to Washington in a week with my plans. We finally, with outstanding cooperation from ATC and HQ Troop Carrier Comd. and the Pentagon, were ready to go to S.W. Pacific in 6 weeks.

Confidential

When I went to HQ with my plans I didn't immediately visit Gen Arnold. He had said, "Come see me." I was busy with the staff when I was told to get to Gen Arnold's office immediately. I learned that when he said "Come see me," he really meant it. That was my main contact. I made a personal contact for him in the years since then.

Sincerely yours,

William M. Todd
MAJGEN USAF RET

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20314

13 April 1971

Major General William J. Bell, USAF (Ret)
512 Yawl Lane
Sarasota, Florida 33577

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The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/sjp

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Interview MG William Bell, Sarasota, Florida, Jan 8, 1972

Q: The first impression of the man, do you remember the first time you met him?

B: It was in the Pentagon, in the war years, as I say, I attend these staff meetings which were more like combat meetings. They reviewed happenings in various theaters, things that had to be done

Q: Was each one called upon to make a contribution, around the table?

B: Just the principal staff heads. I was in OC&R, head of the Troop Carrier and Glider Branch, Requirements Division of the OC&R

Q: Did you work for Bozo McKee or Giles?

B: No,

Q: Was it Gross?

B: Yes, Mervin Gross and then he in turn worked for Craig,

Q: Howard Craig, he was head of Plans?

B: Well, he was OC&R, Operations, Commitments and Requirements

Q: So you got involved in building up the glider program?

B: Well, the troop carrier and the glider. I took over after the DuPont boy was killed

Q: Richard DuPont

B: After he was killed, his brother Felix was over at ATC at the time, and they brought him over to head up the glider program, apparently they weren't satisfied with what he was doing. They sent me to the Navy War College, right in the middle of the war. It was a five months course, when I came back, got through there, and they were going to give me a flying assignment, so I was in the Pentagon when they brought me in, they combined the Glider Branch that Felix DuPont had,

Q: Fellow named Locks Laux?

B: Yes, he worked for me. He and Felix are the ones who leaked some information to Drew Pearson on the leakproof tanks,

Q: Oh, is that right?

B: We had worked up a hell of a fine study on that thing, Locks Laux and Dupont worked on that, and I took it up and presented it to Giles Barney Arnold, didn't give it to Arnold directly, but he handled it, and it was a fine study, and we knew where we could get the materials, we knew where we could get the space to do the work. There wasn't any question about the need for it, I mean, these flaming coffin, the Troop Carrier things over Sicily brought it on.

and Giles briefed me completely on it that they understood, they praised the study, that these two boys worked up, that the idea was perfect. But they just could not afford to do it, with other commitments

Q: Was it a question of priorities, for glider program

B: No, this was for the troop carrier air/~~plane~~ planes, that were being shot down in Sicily in planes

Q: There was one very bad incident that occurred.

B: Yes, there were several

Q: Shot down by our own people

B: No, by the other people, by the Italians

Q: Wasnt there a case in Sicily, remember, when the troop carriers?

B: But anyway....

Q: There was the business about the leakproof tanks, and Pearson was hitting Arnold and Giles on it?

B: Well, these two jerks, after they got turned down, and I had a session with Giles for 45 minutes, going over it and everything, that convinced me why they just couldn't do it, providing so, I mean they couldn't afford to take on the program of leakproof tanks for carrier airplanes, and so I came back and explained it to them and the two jerks apparently felt so strongly about it that they got in touch with Drew Pearson, and leaked it to him,

Q: Is this surmise or fact?

B: No, this is fact

Q: Arnold was livid about Drew Pearson on several occasions?

B: Well, he was livid about this time, too. I left just at this time, it didn't happen until after I left

Q: This was about 1944

B: This is 1944 yes, Spring of 1944. I finally managed to get myself a group, they were activating the combat cargo groups. I was the Project Officer in the Pentagon, tried to get the first one, and they said no, they hadn't got it ready yet, but then they let me have the second one. So in the spring of 1944....

Q: Who got the first one?

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B: I don't remember, I remember it went to India, ~~C-B-III~~

Q: Where did yours go?

B: I took mine to the South Pacific, and I introduced the C-46 airplane to the South Pacific. I was one of the first ones to have it. But while I was training in Syracuse, at ~~Endicott~~ Hancock Field up there, still in existence of up there, but then it was strictly a military field, ~~and~~ They sent an inspector up to grill me on this Drew Pearson thing. Actually it had happened after I left the Pentagon, I had been gone 2 or 3 weeks. But they knew who did it. Felix DuPont was sent to the South Pacific, and ~~Locks~~ Lauer was sent to Alaska, just like that.

Q: And Richard DuPont was killed?

B: He had already been dead for a year or more.

Q: I heard that Arnold brought in DuPont because he wanted to get the DuPont family into production of gliders.

B: That isn't what I understood of it. Richard DuPont was one of the top men in gliders in the country at that time, Richard himself

Q: Yes, he had been involved in gliders, Elmira and the races up there. Did Arnold try to get the DuPont money into gliders?

B: Not that I know of. If he did, I wouldn't know.

Q; Well, Arnold was great on airborne?

B: Yes, about that time, this previous time I was talking about, they had the marauders, Alison and Cochran in CBI.

Q: Arnold was gungho on those two guys.

B: Right, yhey brought those two guys into the Pentagon, ~~and~~ They started to run wild until they had to, finally, Arnold gave them carte blanche to do anything they wanted, and they really started doing it, ~~and~~ They had to finally appoint some project officers, and I was appoint project officer for the ~~common~~ combat cargo, the carrier part of it, ~~and~~ Somebody else the materiel on the service squadrons.

Q: Sort of keep these guys inbounds?

B: Yes, I worked very closely with John Alison. ~~, particularly General~~

Q: I've been trying to get John Alison, V.P. at Northrop, he floats aroudd, he comes into Washington once in a while. ~~I've been trying to put salt on his tail and~~

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~~go him~~

B: If you see him, tell him hello, we are old friends.

Q: Yes, I will. Arnold was great for airborne?

B: Yes, he was very much impressed with the capabilities of it.

Q: Arnold was impressed with all new ways and new devices, he was always sort of favor/~~in getting~~// of gimmickry, some stuff didn't work out but a lot of these things did. Marshall was much less persuaded about airborne, so was Eisenhower?

B: Well, I didn't know about Marshall's feeling.

Q: Did you know about the use of airborne in OVERLORD. There was some hassle before they could sell it. And in fact, Eisenhower was against the use of airborne in DRAGOON, in southern France. Did you know anything about that?

B: Well, no I don't, except as far as I know, the airborne operation in OVERLORD

~~Q: Was Normandy~~

B: ~~Yes,~~ it was in the picture right from the beginning. Never any question about it.

Q: There was some, I guess, ~~in~~ in the Army they felt that ~~thing~~ thing would risk a lot of people without enough benefits from it. Airborne worked, but never 100%. There was always some things wrong with it, like Normandy, bad weather. They landed the wrong place, in cow pastures, ~~and~~ Of course, in the most famous airborne operation, MARKET/GARDEN-Arnhem, Nijmegen, I guess mixed results, they achieved ~~something~~.

B: Well I think in airborne operations, there is always a chance you take anyway. You can get mixed up, but still the results are terrific, I mean you didn't have to be 100% operation in order to achieve real good results.

Q: You saw Arnold perform at some of these ~~by~~ command sessions.

B: Oh yes,

Q: Do you have any recollections of him?

B: He was tough. He didn't bawl people out to their face. But he had real strong feelings. I remember particularly Chip Overacker and Robinson who were in Eggladd

Q: Overacker was group commander

B: And so was Robinson, he retired as a MG, Overacker, I think, never got beyond a Colonel. But those two came back from England and they were involved in the bombing

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raids, and they just flatly came out and in one of these combat meetings and condemned the system, they were killing too many people.

Q: With daylight bombing?

B: Yes, daylight or night, these bombing raids, and of course, and it was Arnold's real thing, and he jerked them out of there. I mean, he didn't bawl them out at the meeting. I was at the meeting when they both got up and spoke their piece.

Q: This must have been around '43, when we were taking all those losses, Schweinfurt and Regensburg, we had a lot of losses?

B: Yes, it could have been, ~~and it could have been in the fall of 1943,~~ but those two guys, all of a sudden got orders, and boom, ...

Q: Where did they go?

B: Robinson went to someplace out in Wisconsin, to some remote job, and I forget where Overacker went, they both lost their jobs, boom.

Q: They had been working for Eaker, I think?

B: Yes, yes.

Q: This is the time we were taking all those losses, and there were all kind of wild ideas. Remember the XB-40, an the XB-41, ~~these were ideas to put armor on B-17s and B-24s, and load them up with guns to protect. What happened was they were so slow that they needed protection themselves. Do you remember this coming up in those staff meetings~~

B: No, I can't remember that.

Q: Do you remember the cardboard wing tanks, you know, trying to put wing tanks on the fighters, ~~they had the P-47 and the P-38. The P-51 had not come in yet at that time. Does that register~~

B: Idon't recall.

Q: They were putting these wing tanks on, and Wright Field was working fast enough on them and they got the British to manufacture some of them, they were cardboard, do you remember those

B: No,

Q: Do you remember some of the gimmickry that was tried to extend the range of the escort fighters, this was really the problem, they didn't have the escort fighters?

B: Well, yes, yes.

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Q: Wasn't that the central problem of daylight bombing?

B: Yes, yes.

Q: Do you remember any of those

B: No, because if wasn't in my field,

Q: Did Arnold get red when he got mad?

B: Yes, he'd get a little red.

Q: Was he, did he lose articulation,

B: I don't recall any of his doing that. It was very obvious when he was mad,

Q: Did he keep that smile on his face?

B: No, he got kind of grim.

Q: Some people said the smile on his face didn't mean he was pleased with what you were doing?

B: No, no it didn't.

~~Q: It could precede an explosion.~~

~~B:~~ As a matter of fact it was a little hard to judge, just where you stood and how you stood, because his expressions could belie what his real feelings were,

Q: Did he cut people off if he felt they were wandering from the subject?

B: Oh, ~~no~~ yes, he could be quite curt.

Q: And dismiss somebody?

B: Yes,

Q: You'd had it?

B: Yes. There was no doubt about it. Very curt.

Q: Was Kuter there at the time?

B: Yes

Q: Kuter, Craig, and was Jake Smart there?

B: I don't think Jake was there then, Vandenberg was there,

Q: He was A-3, I guess

B: Yes, and then there was a little BG.

Q: Echols

B: No,

Q: Was Benny Meyers there then?

B: No,

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Q: Echols was sort of a southern gentleman type.

Q: Were you there when Stratemeyer was Chief of Staff, or had he left, Giles had the job?

B: Giles was the No. 2 man

Q: Then that was after 9 1943,?

B: I went in there in June 1943,

Q: Ithink Stratemeyer had just left, or was just leaving. Giles was just taking over, Giles had been OC&R, and he was just taking over.

B: Who was the other fellow that was later hread of

Q: Fairchild

B: Fairchidd was there

Q: What was his job, oh, he was Director of Military Requirements, DMR, ~~right~~

B: It seemed to me that he was right up there at the top,

Q: He was sort of an AF brain, wasn't he.

B: Yes, yes

Q: Sort of

B: Seems to me he was in Arnold's office someplace.

Q: Did you see some of the others in Arnold's office, Horace Shelmire?, Eugene Beebe?

B: I knew Beebe,

Q: Exec, and the guy with the moustache, Horace Shelmire, or he might have left by that time, he was from Pa., one of Arnold's cronies?

B: No, I don't

Q: And there was another crony in his office, Hank Pool, his brother in law, Mrs. Arnold's brother

B: No,

Q: Did you ever get called into Arnold's office, to brief him?

B: The only time I did was when I took this combat cargo group back, that ended up in Syracuse, and we completed our training in 4 months, ~~and~~ / on C-47s, and we were having a sort of little graduation exercise, and Arnold came up, flew his own B-25, and he had the doctor.

Q: Marquardt?

B: No , he was the AF Chief Surgeon.

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Q: Malcolm Grow?

B: No, no, drove his own B-25 I know that,

Q: Had he had an heart attack. He had a mild heart attack in 1943, just before you got there, Just about the time you got there, was he sort of taking it easy, and taking an afternoon rest period?

B: In the Pentagon, I wouldn't know. But he was active in 1944.

Q: Well, he had this mild heart attack, and he wore himself down, ~~and then he had a major heart attack in 1945,~~

B: Well there was one incident on that visit.

Q: When he went to Syracuse?

B: Came up to Syracuse, and we put on this little exercise, and this BG who was head of the Troop Carrier Command out, at Stout Field, I can't say his name, black hair, black moustache,

Q: ~~in Vienna~~ Stout Field in Indiana?

B: Yes, that was the Hqs. Troop Carriers.

Q: Was that Hunter?

B: No, not Monk Hunter, ~~no~~ He had a flat, black moustache, I can't remember his name, but Arnold came there and this fellow came there representing the Troop Carrier Command, and we put on a show, snatched some ~~and~~ gliders, and we dropped some paratroopers, and flew a little formation, and everything. ~~and~~ In the car when we were driving out to where we dropped the ~~parachuters~~, paratroopers, on the way back, I rode with Arnold and this Troop Carrier Command BG, I can't say his name, and Arnold leaned over, I was on the far side, He leaned over to me and said, "Bell, how long would it take you to transition from the C-47s to ~~the~~ C-46s," and out of the blue, ~~and~~ I ~~had~~ had no warning, no ~~gist~~ chance to plan, or anything, ~~and~~ I mumbled a couple of times and said, "well, it would probably take two months," and he said, "well, you and your boss here get together and work up some plans, and come in ~~in~~ 10 days and tell me what you really think you can do," he said, "go over to Buffalo and talk to the C-46, Curtiss people over there, and we will give you some help. The ATC people will give you some help. They already had some airplanes, and pilots that could fly them for instructor training like that, ~~so~~ It was a real program, and he said, "you come in in 10 days, and when you come in, come see me, well" I went in, with the General, and we got together with Harper who had

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Training and he had everybody and his brother in these meetings, including real strong representation from ATC, because they were going to have to furnish airplanes and pilots, instructor pilots

Q: Harold George and C.R. Smith?

B: Yes, and we got going on this meeting, and Arnold said, come see me, and I figured I was in the HQAAF. If he wanted, he called me, but I was already getting together, and they knew we were coming in, and they were actually getting nuts and bolts done on this thing. It was a hell of a fine coordinated effort, fine a job as I think I've ever seen and all of a sudden I'm right in the middle of these meetings, and word comes in that Gen Arnold wants to see you, and I go rushing up to Gen Arnold, and he said, "Bell," he said, "I thought I told you to come to see me," and I said, "yes sir, but I thought you just meant to get into Headquarters and get planning," and he said, "when I say I want to see you, I mean I want to see you," he wasn't unpleasant about it

Q: He was a person to person, eye-ball level type guy?

B: Oh yes

~~Q: level type guy. This story~~

B: Oh yes, when he says he wants to see you, personally.

Q: This was one of the secrets of his success, he dealt with individuals and he remembered them by names, and he dealt with them as one man to another, and you as a cog in a large organization. He individualized people, I think this is one of the keep.

B: He gave me a little job, a little task to do, something to deliver to somebody up in Syracuse, and I can't remember, it was a letter or something, that I had to deliver, but I can't remember.

Q: Did they have the Rome Air Development Center up there then?

B: Oh yes, we worked hand in glove with them. It was Rome Air Material. Oh yes, they were a big help, as a matter of fact, they owned the base that we trained on, and the base commander

Q: I'm sure that experience with Arnold helped you get a lead in the organization. You probably got a good mark?

B: I don't know, I had some bad marks

Q: Who hasn't?

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B: I always admired him

Q: Do you think that, a sort of overall estimate of him, of course, you had very little glimpse of the man, and it really is hard to make a generalization, can you make any generalizations about him as a leader or commander?

B: Ithink at the time, the period and the circumstances, I think he was ideal for the spot.

Q: He was a driver. I've been told that he was a doer rather than a thinker, there were others, like Fairchild and Kuter, who did a lot of thinking. Arnold was a guy who got things done

B: Action man. He was a real action man. In these meetings, call them staff meetings, or combat meetings, he directed people to do things.

Q: When you walked out of there, you had some clear idea of what would be expected of you?

B: Right

Q: And if you didn't perform, you got called on it, I suppose?

B: I'm sure you did

Q: Every man had a very clear of idea of what he was supposed to be doing. I think this is probably the key to his success, that he broke large jobs down to specific tasks, and he followed up on them like he did in your case

B: Yes, he knew he I was in that building

Q: And there were a couple thousand AF types in that building?

B: And with all the things that he had to think about, too.

Q: He didn't forget that you had a part of that larger task. I think that, as you know, an important aspect

B: That was, of course, part of an ~~organization~~ important decision. They decided to make four of these combat cargo groups. They worked with a commando group and each commando had a service group to go with it, and each combat cargo group had a service group to go with it. So the thing was big enough for an operations and in certain combat area in the theater, and that's where what he had in mind, after the experience in Burma.

Q: After the Allison - Cochran thing?

B: Yes

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Q: Did the C-46 behave?

B: Oh yes, it was a fine airplane.

Q: How did it compare to the C-47

B: Well in comparing, it almost double, more than double, almost three times the load.

Q: Right, but it wasn't as reliable, I suppose.

B: Oh yes, it became very reliable, it had a lot of bugs in the beginning, but I had the airplane in the South Pacific, ~~or~~, I averaged about 106-107 airplanes assigned all the time to my gropp and we had some fantastic in-commission rates, something like 90% - 92%, ~~and~~ actually flew up to 80-85 of the 107 airplanes every day, fantastic rate.

Q: You were in the SW Pacific?

B: Yes

Q: Assigned to Kenney's 5th AF.

B: Yes

Q: Where were you stationed?

B: First we were in New Guinea, I was in Biak, I had a squadron back in Finchhaven, ~~and~~ then we moved up to Leyte, Philippines, ~~and~~ stayed there a long time, moving stuff all the way back from Australia, all the way forward, then we moved into Okinawa, and on the strip that the Navy seabees, the camp, it was the first time I had a ready-made camp, beautiful strip, ~~and~~ we were there until the war ended, and then, I got to take 10 airplanes into Japan, the first day we moved in.

Q: The 11th Airborne.

B: No, we just took supplies into Japan. ~~But~~ They let each one of the Troop Carrier Group Commanders take 10 airplanes in the first day, sort of an honorary thing, ~~that~~ But we delivered our supplies, and troops, things like that, for delivery at Atsugi, near ~~Okinawa ... near Tokyo~~ a ~~Q: Yokosuka~~ ~~B: No~~, big city south of Tokyo, ~~and~~ then that was the first day, and then we had to drop our staff and get out of there fast. They only had that one airport and they were taking stuff in and out of there, then I came back about 3 days later and landed at Tachikawa, ~~and~~ K.B. Wolfe was in charge there at the time, ~~and~~ he said,

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I'd been told that I was supposed to park my group at Tachikawa, and I went in and the place was just jammed with airplanes and everything, and I talked to K.B. and I said, "I've got 108 airplanes and said there isn't any room here, and he said, "I know it, it's a mess," he said, "have you got an airplane with you," and I said, "yes, and he said, there's a base over here called Yokota, and the runway is supposed to be pretty well shot, but, he said, there are some good buildings left, and go over there and land, and see if you can use them, you can use it, you can have it," so I went over there, and the runway was a huge, big concrete runway, about 300 feet wide and about 5,000 feet long, and it was half chewed up, but we landed on the side, nice and dry at the time, and it handled beautifully, because it was nice and firm, and we expected it, and there was an awful lot of damage, but there were some fine buildings, a few hangars and some good living quarters, and things like that. So I rushed back over and said, "gee, that's fine, I'll take it," and he said, "okay, it's yours," so I moved into Yokota with my group as fast as I could get them up from Okinawa, and I'd only been there about a month when one of the oldtimers came in, a photographic, Bobzien showed up, and said, "the war was over, the oldtimers were coming home, and he took over,

Q: He was an oldtimer, he was with Arnold on the Alaska flight, he's passed on now, hasn't he?

B: Yes, so there was a Troop Carrier BG over at Tachikawa.....

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Q Was each one called upon to make a contribution, around the table?

B Just the principal staff heads. I was in OC&R, head of the Troop Carrier & Glider Branch, Requirements Division of the OC&R.

Q Did you work for Bozo McKee or Giles?

B No.

Q Was it Gross?

B Yes, Mervin Gross and then he inturn worked for Craig.

Q Howard Craig, he was head of Plans?

B Well, he was OC&R, Operations, Commitments and Requirements.

Q So you got involved in building up the glider program?

B Well, the troop carrier and the glider. I took over after the young DuPont boy was killed.

Q Richard DuPont

B After he was killed, his brother Felix was over at ATC at the time. They brought him over to head up the glider program. Apparently they weren't satisfied with what he was doing. I came in. They sent me to the Navy War College, right in the middle of the war. It was a five months course. When I came back--got through there--and they were going to give me a flying assignment. So I was in the Pentagon. When they brought me in, they combined the Glider Branch that Felix DuPont had.

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Q Fellow named Laux?

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B We had worked up a hell of a fine study on that thing, Laux and Dupont worked on that. I took it up and presented it to Barney Giles. We didn't give it to Arnold directly, but he handled it. It was a fine study, and we knew where we could get the materials, we knew where we could get the space to do the work. There wasn't any question about the need for it. I mean, these flaming coffins, the troop carrier thing over Sicily brought it on. Giles briefed me completely on it that they understood, they praised the study that these two boys worked up, that the idea was perfect. But they just could not afford to do it, with other commitments.

Q Was it a question of priorities, for glider programs?

B No, this was for the troop carrier airplanes, that were being shot down in Sicily in planes.

Q There was one very bad incident that occurred.

B Yes, there were several.

Q Shot down by our own people?

B No, by the other people, by the Italians.

Q Wasn't there a case in Sicily, remember, when the troop carriers?

B But anyway...

Q There was the business about the leakproof tanks, and Pearson was hitting Arnold and Giles on it?

B Well, these two jerks, after they got turned down, and I had a session with Giles for 45 minutes, going over it and everything. That convinced me why they just couldn't do it. I mean they couldn't afford to take on the program of providing leakproof tanks for carrier airplanes. So I came back and explained it to them and the two jerks apparently

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felt so strongly about it that they got in touch with Drew Pearson, and leaked it to him.

Q Is this surmise or fact?

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Q Arnold was livid about Drew Pearson on several occasions?

B Well, he was livid about this time, too. I left just at this time. It didn't happen until after I left.

Q This was about 1944.

B This is 1944, yes, Spring of 1944. I finally managed to get myself a group. They were activating the combat cargo groups. I was the Project Officer in the Pentagon. I tried to get the first one, and they said: "No, they hadn't got it ready yet, but then they let me have the second one. So in the spring of 1944...

Q Who got the first one?

B I don't remember. I remember it went to India

Q Where did yours go?

B I took mine to the South Pacific, and I introduced the C-46 airplane to the South Pacific. I was one of the first ones to have it. But while I was training in Syracuse, at Hancock Field up there--it is still in existence up there, but then it was strictly a military field, a big triangular field. They sent an inspector up to grill me on this Drew Pearson thing. Actually it had happened after I left the Pentagon. I had been gone 2 or 3 weeks. But they knew who did it. Felix DuPont was sent to the South Pacific and Laux was sent to Alaska, just like that.

Q And Richard DuPont was killed?

B He had already been dead for a year or more.

Q I heard that Arnold brought in DuPont because he wanted to get the DuPont family into production of gliders.

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B That isn't what I understood of it. Richard DuPont was known as one of the top men in the country in gliders at that time, Richard himself.

Q Yes, he had been involved in gliders, Elmira and the races up there. Did Arnold try to get the DuPont money into gliders?

B Not that I know of. If he did, I wouldn't know.

Q Well, Arnold was great on airborne?

B Yes, about that time, this previous time I was talking about, they had the Marauders, Alison and Cochran in CBI.

Q Arnold was gungho on those two guys?

B Right, they brought those two guys into the Pentagon. They started to run wild until they had to, finally, Arnold gave them carte blanche to do anything they wanted, and they really started doing it. They had to finally appoint some project officers and I was appointed project officer for the combat cargo, the carrier part of it. Somebody else, the materiel on the service squadrons.

Q Sort of keep these guys in bounds?

B Yes, I worked very closely with John Alison.

Q I've been trying to get John Alison, VP at Northrop. He floats around. He comes into Washington once in a while.

B If you see him, tell him hello, we are old friends.

Q Yes, I will. Arnold was great for airborne?

B Yes, he was very much impressed with the capabilities of it.

Q Arnold was impressed with all new ways and new devices. He was always sort of in favor of gimmickry. Some stuff didn't work out but a lot of these things did. Marshall was much less persuaded about airborne, so was Eisenhower?

B Well, I don't know about Marshall's feeling.

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Q Did you know about the use of airborne in OVERLORD? There was some hassle before they could sell it. And in fact, Eisenhower was against the use of airborne in DRAGOON, in southern France. Did you know anything about that?

B Well, no I don't, except as far as I know, the airborne operation in OVERLORD -- it was in the picture right from the beginning. Never any question about it.

Q There was some, I guess, in the Army they felt that this thing would risk a lot of people without enough benefits from it. Airborne worked, but never 100%. There was always some things wrong with it, like Normandy, bad weather. They landed the wrong place, in cow pastures. Of course, in the most famous airborne operation, MARKET/GARDEN-Arnhem, Nijmegen, I guess they achieved mixed results.

B well, I think in airborne operations there is always a chance you take anyway. You can get mixed up, but still the results are terrific. I mean you didn't have to be 100% operation in order to achieve real good results.

Q You saw Arnold perform at some of these command sessions.

B Oh yes.

Q Do you have any recollections of him?

B He was tough. He didn't bawl people out to their face. But he had real strong feelings. I remember particularly Chip Overacher and Robinson who were in England.

Q Overacker was group commander.

B And so was Robinson; he retired as a MG. Overacker, I think, never got beyond a Colonel. But those two came back from England and they were involved in the bombing raids. They just flatly came out and in one of these combat meetings and condemned the system. They were killing too many people.

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Q With daylight bombing?

B Yes, daylight or night, these bombing raids. Of course, and it was Arnold's real thing. He jerked them out of there. I mean, he didn't bawl them out at the meeting. I was at the meeting when they both got up and spoke their piece.

Q This must have been around '43, when we were taking all those losses, Schweinfurt and Regensburg. We had a lot of losses?

B Yes, it could have been in Fall of 1943. But those two guys, all of a sudden got orders, and boom...

Q Where did they go?

B Robinson went to some place out in Wisconsin, to some remote job. I forget where Overacker went, they both lost their jobs, boom.

Q They had been working for Eaker, I think?

B Yes, yes

Q This is the time we were taking all those losses, and there were all kind of wild ideas. Remember the XB-40, and the XB-41?

B No, I can't remember that.

Q Do you remember the cardboard wing tanks, you know, trying to put wing tanks on the fighters?

B I don't recall.

Q Do you remember some of the gimmickry that was tried to extend the range of the escort fighters? This was really the problem; they didn't have the escort fighters.

B Well, yes, yes.

Q Wasn't that the central problem of daylight bombing?

B Yes, yes.

Q Do you remember any of those

B No, because it wasn't in my field.

Q Did Arnold get red when he got mad?

B Yes, he'd get a little red.

Q Was he, did he lose articulation.

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B I don't recall any of his doing that. It was very obvious that he was mad.

Q Did he keep that smile on his face?

B No, he got kind of grim.

Q Some people said the smile on his face didn't mean he was pleased with what you were doing?

B No, no it didn't. As a matter of fact it was a little hard to judge, just where you stood and how you stood, because his expressions could belie what his real feelings were.

Q Did he cut people off if he felt they were wandering from the subject?

B Oh, yes, he could be quite curt.

Q And dismiss somebody?

B Yes.

Q You'd had it?

B Yes. There was no doubt about it. Very curt.

Q Was Kuter there at the time?

B Yes

Q Kuter, Craig. And was Jake Smart there?

B I don't think Jake was there then; Vandenberg was there.

Q He was A-3, I guess.

B Yes, and then there was a little BG.

Q Echols?

B No.

Q Was Benny Meyers there then?

B No.

Q Echols was sort of a southern gentleman type. Were you there when Stratemeyer was Chief of Staff, or had he left, Giles had the job?

B Giles was the No. 2 man.

Q Then that was after 1943?

B I went in there in June 1943

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Q I think Stratemeyer had just left, or was just leaving. Giles was just taking over. Giles had been OC&R and he was just taking over.

B Who was the other fellow that was later head of....

Q Fairchild?

B Fairchild was there.

Q What was his job? Oh, he was Director of Military Requirements DMR

B It seemed to me that he was right up there at the top.

Q He was sort of an AF brain, wasn't he?

B Yes, yes.

Q Sort of

B Seems to me he was in Arnold's office some place.

Q Did you see some of the others in Arnold's office, Horace Shelmire? Eugene Beebe?

B I knew Beebe.

Q Exec, and the guy with the moustache, Horace Shelmire, or he might have left by that time, he was from Pa., one of Arnold's cronies?

B No, I don't.

Q And there was another crony in his office, Hank Pool, his brother in law, Mrs. Arnold's brother.

B No.

Q Did you ever get called into Arnold's office, to brief him?

B The only time I did was when I took this combat cargo group back, that ended up in Syracuse. We completed our training in 4 months, on C-47s, and we were having a sort of little graduation exercise. Arnold came up, flew his own B-25 and he had the doctor.

Q Marquardt?

B No, he was the AF Chief Surgeon.

Q Malcolm Grow.

B No, no, drove his own B-25, I know that.

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Q Had he had an heart attack. He had a mild heart attack in 1943, just before you got there. Just about the time you got there. Was he sort of taking it easy, and taking an afternoon rest period?

B In the Pentagon, I wouldn't know. But he was active in 1944.

Q Well, he had this mild heart attack, and he wore himself down.

B Well, there was one incident on that visit.

Q When he went to Syracuse?

B Came up to Syracuse and we put on this little exercise. This BG who was head of the Troop Carrier Command out at Stout Field, I can't say his name, black hair, black moustache.

Q Stout Field in Indiana?

B Yes, that was the Hqs Troop Carriers

Q Was that Hunter?

B No, no Monk Hunter. He had a flat black moustache. I can't remember his name. But Arnold came there and this fellow came there representing the Troop Carrier Command, and we put on a show, snatched some gliders, and we dropped some paratroopers, and flew a little formation, and everything. In the car when we were driving out to where we dropped the paratroopers, on the way back, I rode with Arnold and this Troop Carrier Command BG--I can't say his name--and Arnold leaned over, I was on the far side. He leaned over to me and said: "Bell, how long would it take you to transition from the C-47s to C-46s?" And out of the blue. I had no warning, no chance to plan, or anything. I mumbled a couple of times and said: "Well, it would probably take two months," and he said: "Well, you and your boss here get together and work up some plans, and come in in 10 days and tell me what you really think you can do." He said: "Go over to Buffalo and talk to the C-46, Curtiss people over there and we will give you some help. The ATC people will give you some help."

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They already had some airplanes, and pilots that could fly them for instructor training like that. It was a real program, and he said: "You come in in 10 days, and when you come in, come see me." Well I went in, with the General, and we got together with Harper who had training and he had everybody and his brother in these meetings, including real strong representation from ATC, because they were going to have to furnish airplanes and pilots, instructor pilots.

Q Harold George and C. R. Smith?

B Yes. We got going on this meeting, and Arnold said: "Come see me." I figured I was in the HQ AAF. If he wanted, he'd call me. But I was already getting together, and they knew we were coming in, and they were actually getting nuts and bolts done on this thing. It was a hell of a fine coordinated effort, as fine a job as I think I've evern seen. All of a sudden I'm right in the middle of these meetings, and word comes in that "Gen Arnold wants to see you." I go rushing up to Gen Arnold, and he said: "Bell," he said, "I thought I told you to come to see me." And I said: "Yes sir, but I thought you just meant to get into Headquarters and get planning." And he said: "When I say I want to see you, I mean I want to see you." He wasn't unpleasant about it.

Q He was a person-to-person, eye-ball level type guy?

B Oh yes, when he says he wants to see you, personally.

Q This was one of the secrets of his success. He dealt with individuals and he remembered their names, and he dealt with them as one man to another. You as a cog in a large organization. He individualized people, I think this is one of the keys.

B He gave me a little job, a little task to do, something to deliver to somebody up in Syracuse, I can't remember, it was a letter or something, that I had to deliver, but I can't remember.

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Q Did they have the Rome Air Development Center up there then?

B Oh yes, we worked hand in glove with them. It was Rome Air Materiel. Oh yes, they were a big help. As a matter of fact, they owned the base that we trained on, and the base commander..

Q I'm sure that experience with Arnold helped you get ahead in the organization. You probably got a good mark?

B I don't know, I had some bad marks.

Q Who hasn't?

B I always admired him.

Do you think that, a sort of overall estimate of him, of course, you had very little glimpse of the man. Really, it is hard to make a generalization, can you make any generalizations about him as a leader or commander?

B I think at the time, the period and the circumstances, I think he was ideal for the spot.

Q He was a driver. I've been told that he was a doer rather than a thinker. There were others, like Fairchild and Kuter, who did a lot of thinking. Arnold was a guy who got things done.

B Action man. He was a real action man. In these meetings, call them staff meetings, or combat meetings, he directed people to do things.

Q When you walked out of there, you had some clear idea of what would be expected of you?

B Right.

Q And if you didn't perform, you got called on it, I suppose?

B I'm sure you did.

Q Every man had a very clear idea of what he was supposed to be doing. I think this is probably the key to his success, that he broke large jobs down to specific tasks, He followed up on them like he did in your case.

B Yes, he knew I was in that building

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Q And there were a couple thousand AF types in that building?

B And with all the things that he had to think about, too.

Q He didn't forget that you had a part of that larger task. I think that is an important aspect.

B That was, of course, part of an important decision. They decided to make four of these combat cargo groups. They worked with a commando group and each commando had a service group to go with it, and each combat cargo group had a service group group to go with it. So the thing was big enough for an operations and in certain certain combat area in the theater, and that's what he had in mind, after the experience in Burma.

Q After the Alison-Cochran thing?

B Yes.

Q Did the C-46 behave?

B Oh yes, it was a fine airplane.

How did it compare to the C-47?

B Well in comparing, it almost double more than double, almost three times the load.

Q Right, but it wasn't as reliable, I suppose?

B Oh Yes, it became very reliable. It had a lot of bugs in the beginning, but I had the airplane in the South Pacific. I averaged about 106-107 airplanes assigned all the time to my group and we had some fantastic in-commission rates, something like 90% - 92%. Actually we flew up to 80-85 of the 107 airplanes every day, fantastic rate.

You were in the SW Pacific?

B Yes

Q Assigned to Kenney's 5th AF.

B Yes

Q Where were you stationed?

B First we were in New Guinea, I was in Biak, I had a squadron

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back in Finschhaben. Then we moved up to Leyte, Philippines. We stayed there a long time, moving stuff all the way back from Australia, all the way forward, then we moved into Okinawa, and on the strip that the Navy seabees, the camp they built. It was the first time I had a ready-made camp, beautiful strip. We were there until the war ended, and then, I got to take 10 airplanes into Japan, the first day we moved in.

Q The 11th Airborne?

B No, we just took supplies into Japan. They let each one of the Troop Carrier Group Commanders take 10 airplanes in the first day;, sort of an honorary thing. But we delivered an awful lot of supplies and troops, things like that, for delivery at Atsugi, near a big city south of Tokyo. Then that was the first day, and then, we had to drop our stuff and get out of there fast. They only had that one airport and they were taking stuff in and out of there. Then I came back about 3 days later and landed at Tachikawa, K.B. Wolfe was in charge there at the time. He said I'd been told that I was supposed to park my group at Tachikawa, and I went in and the place was just jammed with airplanes and everything. I talked to K.B. and I said: "I've got 108 airplanes right now," xxxx I said: "There isn't any room here," And he said: "I know it, it's a mess," He said: "Have you got an airplane with you," and I said: "Yes" He said: "There's a base over here called Yokota, and the runway is supposed to be pretty well shot," But he said: "There are some good buildings left. Go over there and land there and see if you can use it. If you can use it, you can have it." So I went over there, and the runway was a huge, big concrete runway. It was about 300 feet wide and about 5,000 feet long, and it was half chewed up. But we landed on the sod. It was nice and dry at the time. It handled beautifylly, because it was nice and fir. We expected it, and there was an awful lot of damage, but there were some fine buildings, a few hangars and some good living quarters,

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and things like that. So I rushed back over and said: "Gee, that's fine. I'll take it." And he said: "Okay, It's yours." So I moved into Yokota with my group as fast as I could get them up from Okinawa. I'd only been there about a month when one of the oldtimers came in, an old photographic type, Bob Zien showed up . He said : "The war was over." The oldtimers were coming home, and he took over.

Q He was an oldtimer. He was with Arnold on the Alaska Flight. He's passed on now, hasn't he?

B Yes, so there was a Troop Carrier BG over at Tachikawa

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Bevans, James M.

8 Jan 70
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18 May 1972

Maj Gen James M. Bevans, USAF (Ret)
3200 N.E. 36th Street, Apt 1104
Fort Lauderdale, Fla 33308

Dear General Bevans:

Thanks for your letter of the 16th. I'll look forward to getting together with you. There are several items in the personnel area that arose since we talked.

According to General Wray's biography, he returned to the U.S. in September 1943 to become Chief, Officers Branch, Military Personnel Division, Hq AAF. In July 1945, he became Deputy Chief of the Military Personnel Division, staying until February 1946, when he left for Fort Leavenworth. He came back to Hq AAF in August 1946 as Special Assistant to the Director of Personnel in August 1946.

Enjoyed your comment about General Crow. I didnt expect him to recall your achievement, and I was not surprised.

Offhand, June 7th seems like my best day, but I'll call first to confirm. All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

6-5-72

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JAMES M. BEVANS
MAJOR GENERAL U.S.A.F. (RET.)
3200 N. E. 36TH STREET. APT. 1104
FORT LAUDERDALE. FLORIDA 33308

May 16th, 1972

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Green:

I have your letter of May 12th and hasten to say that I shall be delighted to see you again on or about June 7th. Just call me (305 - 565-4459) when you are in this vicinity and we can get together.

I don't remember any list of 84 never to go overseas. I do, however, remember something about "deadwood" that I can tell you about when I see you.

I am sure that Stan Wray is right about his squawkbox because when Gen. Arnold wanted something done he ignored channels and went to the spot where final action was taken.

In spite of what Gen. Grow says; I say that I won 2nd Place on the "4 foot touch and out " on Old Tourraine at the Spring Horse Show at Fort Riley in 1927.

Sincerely,

J. M. Bevans

P.S. I might be able to pinpoint some things better if I could remember when Stan was in the Officer's Section.
Could you check the records before you come down here ?

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May 12, 1972

Major General James M. Bevans, USAF (Ret)
3200 N.E. 36th Street (Apt 1104)
Fort Lauderdale, Fla 33308

Dear General Bevans:

Still grinding away on the Hap Arnold story. Talked to General Stan Wray and he told me some pretty strong stuff

Since he worked for you during this period, I'd be interested in your comments, looking at the alleged Arnold "blacklist" from the higher perspective.

It just so happens that I will have an interview not too far from your place on or about Wednesday, June 7th. If you feel it would be useful for us to add to your recollections of Hap Arnold, lasting not more than 30 minutes to an hour, I'd be pleased to stop by.

Incidentally, I have since talked to Maj General and Mrs, Robert Grow, U.S. Army, who recalled the Air Corps invasion of their Fort Riley cavalry post with pained tolerance. They had many recollections of those equestrian days but did not recall that any Air Corps type ever beat the Army in riding.

Would be pleased to hear from you. Please say hello to Mrs. Bevans.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Ltr of 8 Plane ride to Wash - Crowd socked in - after A-N game

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INTERVIEW WITH M/GEN JAMES M. BEVANS
FT. LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA
JANUARY 8, 1970

Q: Was Arnold a dominating personality. That is, when he came into a room, did he, did you know he was present?

B: Definitely. Absolutely, positively. He was a dominating character when he walked into a room. He is a big man, big man. Yes, he definitely was.

Mrs. B: A nice man. A genuine man, not the dominating type.....

Q: The man on whom attention was focused?

Mrs. B: Oh yes, and exceptionally good looking, I would say.

B: And also, he had a magnetic personality, so to speak.

Q: Did he remember names well?

B: Well, I would say, so, yes, although I can't answer that definitely. He always remembered my name.

Q: He called you "Jimmy".

B: Jimmy. And he's the only one in the whole outfit that ever called me Jimmy.

Q: Going back to your earliest recollections of Arnold, I guess it was 1927?

B: No, 1926. I was in the Field Artillery, and took flying training and when I graduated from the Advanced Flying School I was ordered to Ft. Riley, Kansas, to the 7th Observation Squadron. He was commanding officer up there, and that was September 1926. And I stayed there about a year I guess, he was a Major

at that time. I was a 1st LT and he made me personnel adjutant of the squadron. I think there were 10 officers there. Tom Bollin, Charley Skow, Ralph Fisher, Gerry Gates, and I remember the flight surgeon was Pat, I think it was, and Charlie Vin. There were about 12 or 13 officers, and 10 pilots, as I recall.

Q: Arnold had just come off, his experience in Washington?

B: I was new in the Air Service, as it was known in those days.

Q: It had just become the Air Corps in '26, July 1926.

B: That's right. So it was the Air Corps. It had been the Air Service before that. Well, as I remember, what I knew about it was, he was sort of sent to Siberia out there, because of his part in the Billy Mitchell trial.

Q: Did he ever talk about that experience?

B: No, not to me, of course, I was just a very junior guy, and he didn't know me. I suppose he talked to some of his old pals that used to come through there once in a while.

Q: You mentioned something about a bulletin board - where people wanted to go.

B: I've forgotten exactly what it was all about, but as I recall it, we had this list of all of us - all of the officers - on the bulletin board. "How long do you expect to be here and where do you want to go when you leave." And somebody put down: "the West Coast," Others said: "the Philippines," and "Hawaii" and what not. As I recall it, he had a question mark after his name, and I've forgotten who it was.

Q: Someone put it up there as a sort of joke?

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B: No, no, Arnold didn't put it up. As I recall, he said, I'll leave here when somebody is no longer Chief of the Air Corps, something like that. Some statement like that. I've forgotten what it was.

Q: Well, this was Mason Patrick. Patrick was then Chief. Mason Patrick had sent him out of Washington.

B: That's right. I guess he said he'd be there as long as Mason Patrick was Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: Patrick left shortly after that and, about the time you came in, Fechet took over as Chief of the Air Corps. This was a Cavalry post, and you were sort of intruders?

B: We were an Observation Squadron stationed at the Cavalry School at Ft. Riley, and our job was to perform observation missions for the cavalry students when they were doing their maneuvers, and also to take the cavalry officers up to give them some idea of what an observation unit could do to help them. So they had a voluntary 10-hour observation course, and any cavalry officer that wanted to take it, voluntarily, signed up for it. And we'd take them out, and one day they'd count the box cars over in Salina. The next time, they'd try to draw a map of something. And to make them feel comfortable, why, we'd let them shoot the machine guns, just to make them feel more at home in the airplane.

Q: Did most of them volunteer for this duty?

B: I've forgotten how many did. I know that we would fly every morning for 4 hours. We would take up 4 students each, and that would be about 40 students a day, and it went on and on and on.

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Q: Were you thoroughly accepted by the cavalry post?

B: Oh yes.

Q: Did you keep to yourselves?

B: No, no. I knew a lot of the cavalry officers. I saw many of them years later, and a funny thing happened to me, tho, about the vavalry. We were wearing the so called ice cream pants at that time, the whip cord,light colored britches. And the commanding general out there thought that it would be a good idea to have the hats of the same material to match. So we tried to conform and I bought a light colored cap to match the light colored britches, and that was fine at Ft. Riley. But one time, a couple of years later, down at Randolph Field, Texas, the Inspector General of the Army came by, and all the officers were out there for inspection, and I thought I was all prettied up, and I wore this off-colored hat to match my britches, and the IG turned to the CO of the post as he passed me, he looked, and said: "Some people will wear anything, won't they?" And I had bought it by order, practically.

Q: Well, this was part of the reputation that the Air Corps had, to try to be different. And you sort of fortified their prejudices about Air Corps types....

B: We got along fine with them, at least I did. I know we had parties. We had a lot of parties, with all of the cavalry officers there, and I lived in the back of the quarters with the cavalry officers.

Q: Mrs. Arnold had David, her youngest, at the post?

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B: That's right. And I was Personnel Adjutant of the squadron at the time. So when he was born, I made out a service record for him, enlisting him in the 7th Observation Squadron, with an excellent character, and took it over to her, at the hospital, I remember that.

Q: He's in the service now, LTCOL. He's stationed at RAND.

Q: You had some Cuban officers who did some training at Riley?

B: Yes, we had some Cuban officers and a Mexican officer, too. But he didn't do any of the flying. But I remember one little Cuban officer came down and volunteered for this flying observation course, and Major Arnold took his turn with all the rest of us, taking students up. He flew 4 hours every morning, just like the rest of us. One of the missions was to make them feel more at home so we would give them a drum of ammunition and make them stand up in the back seat - open cockpits, of course - and shoot the machine gun and make them feel more at home. Well, he didn't think that was a very good idea, apparently. And when they got up in the air, and went over the target area, why, Major Arnold heard this machine gun going off, and he looked around and he couldn't see anything but a couple of hands coming up out of the cockpit, shooting machine guns, and bullets going any place in the world all over Kansas. So Arnold came in and landed and explained to this little Cuban officer what it was all about. He took him up again, and the same thing happened. So he came down and apparently was a little bit put out with this

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fellow. And told him a few things and knowing that I had been born and raised in the service, and my father had been stationed in Cuba, and I could speak a little Spanish, he asked me to take him up. I did, and after trying to explain to him what it was all about, and the same thing happened to me. Well, we were pretty put out with this young Cuban. Well, a few days later - a week or so later - it was time for another mission and on the bulletin board it showed the name of the student and the pilot, and he looked at it. He was assigned to Major Arnold again as pilot. And he says: "Oh, god damn. I just don't like to fly with him," or something like that. There was a little temporary building with our headquarters, and it was only a beaver board partition between our bulletin board and Major Arnold's office, and he heard him. So he decided he'd give this little Cuban a lesson. Well, it had been raining. It was in the winter-time, and it was very cold, and there was still some standing water on the field. Of course, we had no landing strips at that time. It was just a grass field. He took off and kept the wheels on the ground until he had gone through several puddles and splashing water all up in the back rear cockpit, and got this little Cuban pretty wet. And then he took him up and kept him up for an hour. He brought him in, landed, and said: "I guess that will teach him to god-damn me."

Q: Did he have any prejudices in that respect, regarding the Cuban?

B: No, no.

Q: Just a matter of the individual?

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B: That was just a question of this little guy. I'm sure he had no prejudices - at least, not to my knowledge. He could be just as kind as he could be. On the other hand, he could be just as hardboiled as he wanted to be. I remember one - instance. We each had an airplane assigned to us. Mine, for instance - they were all named for planets - mine happened to be "Mars". Somebody else's was "Jupiter," and what not. There was one of the young officers who.....

Q: What were you flying, Jennys?

B: No, at that particular time they were Douglas O-Z's with Liberty motors. We had Jennys there, and we had DHs there, but these new Douglas' had come out. Anyhow, this young lieutenant wanted to take a weekend across country, and something came up. His airplane wasn't available, and he just raised the devil, because he wanted his own particular plane, and he started to sound off about it. Major Arnold called this young lieutenant in and stood him up, and really gave him the business, and just blistered him. So he could do it. I know he could do it, because I've heard him do it. On the other hand, he was just as kind and considerate as anybody could possibly be. But if anybody tried to take advantage of him, or anything else, or anybody, then he'd really give them the stuff.

Q: Was he fair in his attitude?

B: Absolutely, definitely.

Q: No favoritism, in other words. The matter of your job performance determined your standing with him?

B: As far as I'm concerned, yes. I thought so. I felt that way.

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Q: You mentioned something about the Republican River near the base.

B: In the winter of 1926-27, I've forgotten, the only winter I was there, the Platte River froze over. And it backed up, and was causing a flood. The Governor, I guess it was, called for help. The Corps Area Commander, asked if we could help. So we loaded up our planes, about 6 or 8 planes, with 100# bombs, and flew up to Omaha and landed on Offutt Field - a frozen glassy thing, and slid all over the place. That was our main base, and then each morning we would fly out to a dry hell top close to the Platte River and we dropped, or 10 or 12 100# bombs, trying to break up the ice-jam. And of all of those, there were only two that were live bombs and exploded. But luckily, those two of them hit in strategic places, and those two that did go off, did break up the ice, and went down.

Q: This is kind of a sad commentary on the state of the Air Corps at that time.

B: It was 1926-27 and they were WWI planes.

Q: Secy of War Weeks, 1926-27, you have a story about him?

B: About 1927 and spring as I remember it, cause I left in July of 1927 - either the fall of 1926 or spring of 1927, and we got word that Secy of War Weeks was going to go to St. Jo, Missouri, which was his home town, and that we were to go up there and put on a demonstration for him. So the whole squadron flew up there, and we talked about what we were going to do, and how we were going to greet the Secy of War's plane as it came in, flying formation and all that sort of stuff. I remember I personally

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took Charlie Skow up as an observer, and we put on a radio demonstration and so on, so forth. Anyhow, when it was all over, we landed, and Maj Arnold was standing there with the Secy of War, and he called all the officers of the squadron over to introduce them to the Secy of War. And we were standing in sort of a semi circle. And I don't think I will mention the fellow's name but anyhow, he said, LT Bevans, and I said: "yes sir, how do you do," This is LT so and so: "How do you do, LT so and so, LT so and so. "What's the name please?" And Gen Arnold said: "It's the Secy of War." Well, the Kansas City Star got it and one the front page of the next day, it had this story, but they had one more sentence: after Major Arnold: "It's the Secy of War." He was supposed to have said: "What war?" And that was on the headlines of the Kansas City Star the next morning. I won't tell you the fellow's name that did it, but his nickname was Goofy to his face. He was known as Goofy. He did all right later on.

Q: You say Arnold didn't do much riding at that post?

B: No, as a matter of fact, I think he was a little worried about his ulcer at that time. He never took a drink, although we would go to his house, and he would go to parties, and he would serve drinks - although it was prohibition - he would serve the illegal - legal drinks, and we go to parties. In all the time I knew him, the only time I ever saw him take a drink was one time in Washington, he came out to our house when we were stationed there, and...

Q: This was during the war?

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B: Yes, much later. He came out to our house when we lived in Spring Valley. That's the only time I've seen him take a drink, and he drank a glass of sherry.

Q: This is very pertinent to my subject (re story of appointment to succeed Westover)

Q: You knew Arnold for five years?

B: I was with him a great portion of the time from 1926 to 1945, when I went overseas. As far as I am concerned, I saw him take one small glass of sherry.

Q: Sherry was a social drink that he took....

B: It was a cocktail party at my house, and I've been to his house, and he's given me drinks, and I've drunk liquor at parties with him, and I've never seen him take a drink at that point.

Q: Going back to Riley - there was an amusing incident where an Air Corps guy won a prize, stole the prize from the Cavalry, so to speak.

B: Well, that was me. The story on that was that the Cavalry was having their springtime horse show, and it was along towards the end of the year, and of course, every cavalry officer was the first to arrive there in the Fall, so called "Green" mount, this kind of a mount, and that kind of a mount, and they trained them for the whole 9 months that they were there, and at the end of the school year, they put on this horse show to show what they had done. And among other things, were some jumps. Well, they had jumps for green chargers, and jumps for green hunters, and jumps for so and so. There was only one class

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that was open to anybody, and that was what they called the four foot touch-and-out. That meant they had four foot hurles, and your horse had to clear them without touching them. If he touched it, you were out completely. Well, a couple of days before the show, Major Arnold called an officers meeting, and among other things, he said: "How many of you guys are in the horse show?" And nobody, nobody answered. Well, he knew that I had been in the Field Artillery some years before.

Q: This was a horse drawn field artillery?

B: Yes, and I played polo and he knew that, and so he said: "Jimmy" - as I said before, he's the only one that ever called me Jimmy. Everybody else called me Jim. He said: "Jimmy, you represent the Air Corps in the horse show." "Yes sir," was my answer, of course. And then, I started to look for a horse. And I went around to all of the stables, and talked to the stable sergeants and what not. And of course, all the good horses had been selected already. And I only had two days anyhow, and I couldn't practice, and I couldn't train a horse, and I hadn't been on a horse for a couple of years. Finally I went to, I think his name was, Capt Bradford, who was the cavalry officer on the US Olympic Team, and I asked him if he had any suggestions, and he said: "Well no, I don't really have any, but there is only one possibility. There's an old horse down here called Touraina (?). He was the world champion broad jumper, not high jumper, but broad jumper. He jumped something like 22 feet, as I recall, in the 1922 Olympics. Bradford said: "He is here now, but he is blind in one eye." But at least he had some horse show experience.

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Bradford said: "If you want to take a chance on him, okay." So I went down and of course, none of the cavalry officers would get anywhere near Tourain, and so I got Tourain. He had been over in Europe. Well, anyhow, I hadn't been on a horse for a couple of years, and I knew that if I got on a horse and try to get my muscles acclimated, I'd be so stiff in two day, I wouldn't be able to ride. So I just decided I'd get on Rourain just before the show. So I did, about 15 minutes before the whow, and I went out and I adjusted the stirrups, and walked him into the ring, not having any idea that he would get anyplace. It came my turn to go around, and I knew that Rouraine knew more about it than I did. So I make up my mind, I was just going to take a ride on his back,and let him run the show. And as I started him towards the first jump, he knew exactly what it was all about. He picked up the right speed at the right minute and went over there and just sailed over those 4 foot jumps like nothing, and he cleared all of them for the first round. And there was only one other horse, a little horse called Snake ridden by a cavalry officer that did the same thing, so he and I had a jump-off. And we did the samething on the jum-off except on the last jump of the last round, Touraine tipped the hurdle with his hind foot so we came in second instead of first, and not having been on a horse for a long time I'd lost my hat, and was very embarrassed when I had to ride up in front of the grandstand to receive the second prize ribbon. But the Air Corps was pretty proud to have at least an Air Corps officer win the second prize at the Cavalry School horse show.

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Q: Did this have some impact with the Cavalry School that somebody who was not trained did better than a lot of the people who were trained every day riding horses?

B: No, I don't think so. They knew that I had been in the horse artillery. We had an Air Corps officer who was a member of the Cavalry School class Early E.W. Duncan, he was one of my predecessors in Personnel Division. But Early Duncan - he's still out in Denver, if I'm not mistaken. Duncan was a student in the Cavalry School. And a cavalry officer, the first time he'd get thrown off his horse, he would buy a case of champagne for the class. And as I recall it, Early Duncan didn't get fleeced until the last week of the class year.

Q: It costs money to ride poorly.

B: well, after that, several of us went out on the Sunday morning hunts, and would ride the hounds, so to speak.

Q: Arnold didn't ride on those hunts?

B: No, I don't remember him ever seeing him on a horse.

Q: He was ill?

B: I don't remember ever seeing him on a horse.

Q: He received one or two offers to get out of the Service, did he not?

B: As I recall, when I was at Ft. Riley with him, Juan Trippe was just starting the Pan American Airways. As I recall history, he wanted Major Arnold to resign and come in with him. While I'm not sure of the details, it was something like he said: "Well, I'll do it, if you will give me a 5-year contract and $50,000 a year and start off with $50,000 bank deposit."

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Well, I wasn't present at any of the negotiations, so I don't know. He didn't resign; I know that.

Q: Could it be that he made such an impossible price that Trippe could not possibly accept it, because Arnold really didn't want to leave?

B: I don't think he wanted to leave. I think he wanted to stay in the service, because he graduated from West Point in 1907, and this was 1926 or 1927 - 19 or 20 years. And I think he saw what was coming in the air force, I really do.

Q: He had good reason to want to leave, I guess, because having been pushed out of Washington, and in many circumstances, this is the end of a guy's promotion chances.

B: I think that he worried a lot about that, although he never said anything to me. If I had been in his shoes under the same amount of conditions, I would have been worried all over the place.

Q: A lot of guys would have quit.

B: Well yes, because, we've got a few right here in today's newspapers that are doing it, because they realize that - at least they feel that that is the end of their career.

Q: We mentioned Jimmy Doolittle as one who got out of service, went into private industry, made some money. Were there others that got out of that time and came back later?

B: There is one who lives right here in the building - Gene Gillespie. He got out and was a banker in NY for long, long time.

Q: Was he in the Persian Gulf - is that E.F. Gillespie?

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B: Yes. Eugene F. Gillespie.

Q: I didn't know that he was here. He never made General Officer, did he?

B: No. He didn't.

Q: We're talking of his trip to Europe. Gen Arnold was at Caserta. Was this in 1945?

B: 1945, yes.

Q: This was his recuperation trip. April 1945.

B: Well, I've forgotten the date.

Q: Just before VE-Day.

B: Yes, yes. VE-Day was in May. I was still in Italy, and he came through. He had Col Gil Marquardt of the Medical Corps with him.

Q: He just passed away. I wrote to him and his widow sent me a bunch of papers.

B: Gil did?

Q: Passed away in Chicago.

B: Chicago, yes. He was a heart specialist.

Q: Yes, he was the one accompained Arnold down to Florida and then he accompained him on the trip to Europe.

B: Well, I first met Gil Marquardt because he was Chief of the Medical Service down here at the Miami Biltmore. Gen Arnold sent me down there to get over my bad disposition.

Q: Iwant to ask you that. Tell us about your meeting with Arnold in Caserta.

B: Well, he just came through and as you said, it was a recuperation trip, because I took Marquardt around and showed him

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the sights, and he told me that Gen Arnold was pretty sick man. And that Marquardt's job was to make him take a rest every day and to keep checking up on him, and that's the last time I saw Gen Arnold.

Q: Do you remember any discussions with Arnold? Did he talk to you about how you were doing? You met him at Caserta - do you remember anything of that?

B: No, I don't remember a thing about it. Well, of course, he said: "what's going on, and how are you doing," so on, and so forth. And I guess we talked about it, but I haven't the slightest recollection. I mean nothing stands out in my mind.

Q: Were there instructions given to officers not to bring up any controversial problems to Arnold?

B: No, not to me.

Q: Spaatz gave some instructions at his headquarters. He said don't bring up any controversy, because they didn't want Arnold to get excited, because he had this heart condition, and was recovering. And they didn't want to exercise it.

B: I don't remember anything. Maybe it did come up, but I don't remember.

Q: Let's go back earlier in the war. We started talking about Trubee Davison. You were in personnel work.

B: When the Air Force started to expand, it really got too big. Before that we were part of the War Dept General Staff, and then the reorganization came along and they decided to have - Gen Arnold became Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, as I remember, and Walter Weaver became Chief of the Air Corps.

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Q: Wasn't Brett Chief of the Air Corps, Weaver was an Asst Chief, training, wasn't he in training?

B: Yes, later. He left Washington, but for a while, there, he was Chief of the Air Corps, and Brett was something, I've forgotten how it worked out. Well, anyhow, they set up what they called an Air Staff in addition to the War Dept General Staff.

Q: Now this was before Pearl Harbor, around June 1941, I think. They set up the AAF?

B: We were still down in the old Munitions Building, I know.

Q: I know a lot of this, and I'm trying to pin your recollections down to a time.

B: Well, it was very confusing, I can tell you that, because the Air Staff didn't, I'm sure, didn't know exactly how to operate because, to a certain extent, they were still under the War Dept General Staff. And then a little while later, they reorganized again, and Trubee Davision became what they called A-1, I guess. And at that time, I was what they called Director of Personnel. So I was ahead of the operating part and Trubee supposedly was head of the Policy Department, and I never really understood how we were supposed to operate. I used to go over to his office and talk to him, and he'd have conferences. I did all the issuing of orders, and transferring people, and all that sort of stuff. And to be perfectly honest, I'm not so sure that he knew exactly what his job was either.

Q: He was operating out of a wheelchair?

B: No, not then.

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NOTE: Weaver served as Acting Chief of Air Corps from Dec 8, 1941 until March 1942, when the new reorganization became effective. Brett was CAC but was overseas. After P.H. he ended up in Australia.

Q: Later on he was in a wheelchair?

B: I don't remember him in a wheelchair. I remember he used a cane...

Q: I thoutht one of the familiar sights of the Pentagon Was Trubee Davison in a wheelchair going down the corridors.

B: No, I don't remember Trubee ever being in a wheelchair. He cracked up in a Navy plane during WWI. Gen Arnold is the only one I remember in a wheelchair. Maybe Trubee was in a wheelchair after I left, because then they reorganized again, and I became Asst Chief of Staff for Personnel, and Trubee did something else, he went some place else. Didn't see him very much after that.

Q: Then you became A-1.

B: That's right.

Q: You became A-1 probably in March 1942 when the AAF was elevated to equality with the AGF and the ASF. Then it was an equal partner among three.

B: Barney Giles was Chief of Air Staff and I was Asst Chief of Air Staff for Personnel.

Q: Barney Giles came in a year later. Stratemeyer was the first Chief of Air Staff,and Giles came in mid-1943. And that's probably when you came into your own as A-1.

B: I became yes, Asst Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Q: Well, A-1 was probably one of the most difficult jobs in the Pentagon, because you were dealing with high level

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personnel and everybody wanted the top quality men for his theater.

B: Well, for instance, we had trouble with the Signal Corps. The Signal Corps signed up I don't know how many thousands and thousands of college students that were still in school. And they were the kind of people that we needed for Flying Cadets, and we couldn't touch them, and so we had to go through that hassle. We finally fot that worked out through the Air Staff and the War Dept General Staff. Finally got that worked out. It just happens, off the record, that the guy that was going it in the Signal Corps was my brother's brother-in-law - Sage King. He was a little bit off the beam....

Q: You mentioned that Gen Arnold called you on the squawk box one day.

B: About general officers? Well, the Air Force was making generals pretty rapidly at that time. We were expanding so fast, and everything it was time to make a new general,my job was to write up the recommendation to go to the top for approval. And one one particular occasion, I remember, he told me to write up this particular Colonel, and I argued with him. I said: "I don't think you should; I think you are making a mistake; you'll be sorry if you do." And he could do, he toold me that he wanted me to write him up. so I did write him up. And he was right there on duty on his staff in Washington.

Q: Was he on Arnold's immediate staff?

B: Yes, not very long after that, one day I was sitting at my desk, and my intercom box, squawk box buzzed and it was

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General Arnold. And I answered it, and he said: "Get so and so out of town within 24 hours." I knew exactly why he said that, so I came back to him and said: "I told you so." And he didn't think that was very funny.

Q: Did they demote this man?

B: No.

Q: Just moved him out of Washington?

B: Just moved him out and he said something back and forth, and finally he said: "You don't like the General's I'm making?" And I said: "Well, you made a mistake in that one." And he said: "You come up to my office tomorrow morning at 9:30 or 10:00 and tell me what's the matter with my generals." So I went there the next morning and instead of bawling me out, he said: "You go down to the Miami Biltmore Air Force Hospital and take a rest." He said: "Your disposition is bad." So I flew down here to Miami, and went out to the hospital and Col Dan Ogle, was Commanding Officer of the hospital, and I stayed there for about 3 days and I went through some of the clinics and had a strep throat fixed, and a tooth fixed, and a few other things. After about 3 or 4 days, I said: "Well, I'm ready to go back to Washington." So I went to Dan, and I said, thank very much. Nice hotel you have got here. And he said: "You can't go." I said: "why not?" He said: "You are a patient." And I said: "what do you mean, I'm a patient?" And he said: "Well, Gen Arnold called me up and told me to keep you here as a patient for at least 10 days or 2 weeks until you've had a nice rest." And so I stayed there for a length of time, and had a wonderful time. I went back

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to Washington, feeling much better, I'm sure, because my disposition was better.

Q: He showed consideration of his staff?

B: Oh, sure. He knew what pressure was all about, and he could spot it.

Q: I was told this about him by somebody, that he put a lot of pressure on his staff, but he knew instinctively when a man was near the breaking point, and then he laid off of him. He figured that a guy - perhaps he thought you were near the breaking point, and this was a time for you to get away for a period.

B: Well, thats very true. Now here's what he did, one example of putting the pressure on. I think it was on a Monday morning. He called Gen Weaver, who was then [Acting] Chief of the Air Corps, and said: "We are going to open an Officer's Candidate School in Miami Beach. I want it to be in operation on Wesnesday. Two days later, and nothing had been done about it. First we knew about it, well, that school was in operation on Wednesday. We called up Jimmy Stowell, Commanding General at San Antonio and ordered him over there. He went over there. I called up the Field Artillery and the Infantry personnel officers and I borrowed 50 officers from the Field Artillery. And I borrowed 50 officers from the Infantry, and they were down there to be the instructors at the Officer's Candidate School. We called up Biloxi, and said: "Send 300 to 500, or whatever it was, potential officers from the inductees, from the enlisted men and technical schools over there. Jimmy Stowell went over

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there and he requisitioned all of these hotels, and two days later the school was in operation. Now, that's the kind of stuff Gen Arnold said: you know; "the difficult we do, and the impossible we do quicker," whatever the saying is.

Q: Did Stowell know Arnold well? They had some trouble with the school in Miami. For example, Marshall came through there one time and thought that discipline was very lax, no saluting, very unmilitary. First of all, it was resented by the regular military establishment that the Air Force had a training establishment down in Miami. This was like having a convention in Las Vegas. People just don't believe that you are doing serious work down there. And this was a source of contention, I believe the Miami schools were discontinued before the end of the war. This was a source of friction.

B: I didn't know that.

Q: They did a great job here because the Army had the establishment. We had no establishment. We needed facilities in which to train people, and the Miami hotels were an ideal location, because the travel restrictions had cut their business down, and where could you find ready-made comparable structures that you could put people in and start an establishment.

B: And then on top of that, the combat crews started coming back, and we had set the rehabilitation and reassignment stations at Miami Beach and Atlantic City and Santa Monica. That was in addition to the training.

Q: You were involved in that?

B: That was part of my department.

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Q: One of the sore points throughout the war was the rotation system, or the completion of missions problem - whether it was 25 missions and you go home. They had that for a while, and then they'd change it. Arnold said he doesn't want a specific number of missions to be stipulated and then you go home. This policy changed two or three times during the war.

B: I wasn't involved in that angle of it at all.

Q: This was not a personnel problem?

B: No, it had to be more with the theater commanders. The only thing I had to do was when combat crews came back, we had to interview them and decide whether they should go as flying instructors, whether they should be relieved from all flyiny or wether they should go back for another tour.

Q: Was there a problem with guys who would/here be for 30 days and had to go back for another tour?

B: Yes, there was with some of them.

Q: Was this a source of contention or disagreement?

B: Well, the psychiatstists, they were the ones that worried about it. Some of the boys, when they left over there, were all steamed up. "All I need is 30 days home and I'll come back and I'm ready to take another tour." And then they'd get back home here, and didn't want to go back so we had some of that trouble.

Q: Wasn't there trouble with the Army Medical. They felt that Air psychiatric system was coddling the troops. They felt - the Air Force started this business of psychiatric rehabilitation,on the grounds that guys who were combat, and who

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knew, who figured out mathematically, their chances of coming back from the 8th AF were negligible. And you had to contend with that kind of mentality. The Army medical people thought that the Air Force was coddling combat crewmen?

B: Yes, I used to talk to Dave Grant, the Air Surgeon. And of course, that was primarily his problem.

Q: But it was also your problem, because it was a Personnel problem.

B: We needed people to go back for the second tour - combat experienced people. And, of course, the air force commanders in overseas theaters all wanted the best men.

Q: There was also a great problem, 1944, when they ran out of Infantrymen, right about the Battle of the Bulge. We had pilots and navigators running out of our ears, and we discontinued the pilot and navigator training, some of it....

B: That was just as I left Washington. As a matter of fact, in order to find out I had flown across on an inspection trip, the year before. But I wanted to see how they were handling the Air Force replacements or shipboard. So when I was sent overseas for permanent change of station, I elected to go by the Queen Mary, and I sailed on the 1st of January 1945, with 15,000 troops on the Queen Mary, and I wanted to see all the Air Force replacements. Well, there were about 15 AF officers on there and all the rest were Army replacements, going over as replacements for the Battle of the Bulge. Of all the trips, that was quite something, because within an hour after we got out of NY Harbor, and dropped the pilot, we picked up 29 knots and zig zagged

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unescorted all the way over, and ran into a terrific storm. And 14,999 young kids that had never seen anything more than the Mississippi River were lying around all over the corridors, and all seasick; oh, what a mess that was.

Q: They weren't much good for combat replacements for awhile?

B: I suppose they were all right when they got there, but sure out of steam.

Q: This was a bad problem of the Army pulling the Air Force, in forcing a shift in personnel. Did you get into some battles with Marshall's staff on that?

B: No, that was principally on the Air Staff.

Q: Oh, within the Air Staff?

B: Yes, top stuff. I was more involved in actually handling the pleple we had, rather than trying to get more.

Q: Did Arnold have his heart attack at this time?

B: Yes, he had it while I was in Washington.

Q: I'm trying to pin the date down, because it was kept secret and there were not written records. I guess his heart attack occurred within the week of Inauguration Day, this was Roosevelt's fourth term starting January 20, 1945. My guess is it happened a few days before.

B: No, no. He had one before that because I left in Jan 1945, and he was going in a wheelchair before then.

Q: Well, he had a heart attack in 1943 before TRIDENT conference, in Washington. Marshall sent him out to Oregon, in May 1943. He had what I believe was to be a minor heart

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attack. But his major heart attack occurred in January 1945. When was he in a wheelchair?

B: Before I left, and I left in January 1945. January 1st - sailed from NY I mean he had a wheelchair available, he wasn't using it all the time.

Q: Sometime in 1944?

B: Yes, sometime in '43 or '44. The wheelchair was there, and I remember him griping about the fact that he was supposed to ride in this damn thing, and he didn't want to do it.

Q: Well, it could have been after. Well, he could have had several incidents. He never slowed up; he killed himself.

B: I think probably what happened was that he had some slight attacks and they were trying to make him slow down: "Please ride in this thing, instead of walking around."

Q: Marshall was very concerned. Of course, Marshall was devoted to him. But Arnold's conception of a day's work, put in a full day at the Pentagon and call Pete Peterson, his pilot, and tell him they were leaving at 6 PM; meet him down at Bolling Field, and then he would fly all night to the West Coast. Pete was not perepared for this and he had to fly all night. He had no sleep. And then Arnold would start inspecting some plans out on the West Coast, the next morning. He believed in the personal approach, and this man did not know how to pace his time.

Q: Let me ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. Did you get involved in his problems?

B: No, the only thing I know about Elliott Roosevelt is that he had a photographic squadron.

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Q: 325th Photographic Squadron in North Africa.

B: And I remember one time I was in a staff meeting, and he was in there and he was talking about taking this Mosquito aircraft and flying from England across Europe, down to North Africa. But that's all I know.

Q: They wouldn't let him?

B: I've forgotten what heppened. I don't think they did let him, I think he wanted to , but they didn't let him.

Q: About the time you were leaving Washington, his promotion to BG came up.

B: Must have been after I left.

Q: And Spaatz wanted to give it to him, and Arnold said:"No." But he got it. There was something about the general promotion policy. Did the War Dept General Staff feel that there were too many Air Force generals?

B: I think they did.

Q: Did you get any static from Marshall?

B: Not from him personally, no.

Q: Did you ever see Marshall and Arnold together? Other than at like at a cocktail party or receiving line. I mean in a meeting, a JCS meeting, or some plans meeting?

B: No. That was a little bit to high level for me. But I've been in Gen Marshall's office, I've talked to him personally.

Q: What did you talk about?

B: I think it had something to do, when I first went to Washington I was ordered there to go into the Personnal Dept. And when I walked in the front office to report and say hello to

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to Gen Arnold, he said: "Where are you supposed to go?" And I said: " down to Personnel", he said: "You are not, either. You are going to stay right here." And he made me Asst Executive. So I was right in his office, Asst Executive to Ira Eaker...

Q: This was in...

B: When I first went to Washington from Mitchel field, January 1, 1940.

Q: Was a man named Col Richards there? Col Richards, was he in charge?

B: No, Aza Duncan was Chief of Personnel, and Dick Nugent was in the Personnel Division. Ralph Fisher, I think was there.

Q: I wanted to ask you. This is a question that Nugent mentioned. He said for me to ask you about the time Arnold threatened to demote Nugent to his present rank. This was when Nugent had moved to the 1st AF, and they wanted a detail of NCOs to help out in NY, probably for this "Winged Victory", Moss Hart's play. Mrs. Arnold was involved in it. They wanted a detail to help out, either in some administrative or in some other capacity. Nugent turned him down on it. He said: "I don't have qualified personnel for that." Nugent was in G-1 at that time.

B: And Gen Ralph Royce came into me and he had just been assigned as CG,1st AF at Mitchel Field, and he said: "I need a Chief of Staff." He said: "Do you know anybody that could do it?" And I thought of anybody that was immediately available, and I said: "Dick Nugent over in War Dept G-1 would make a good Chief of Staff." So we wrote the orders, and he went over there and was Ralph's Chief of Staff in 1st AF.

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Q: This was a hot seat - NYCity and a lot of political hot potatoes there.

B: Well, the "Winged Victory" outfit was part of my activity, too. Moss Hart used to come into see me and...

Q: The Arnolds' were taken with Moss Hart. They visited him at Bucks County...

B: We went up to the opening night that night.

Q: Was there some fracas involved?

B: Well I think there was an awful lot of mess about the "Winged Victory" and all that. But I don't remember any about Nugent turning anybody down.

Q: Arnold was said to have made many impulsive decisions. You mentioned one or two that he made, in your opinion. Did he ever get mad at you, really mad for something you did, or didn't do?

B: No. He never raised his voice to me. He and I got along fine, for some reason I know I've heard him raise his voice to some people.

Q: What was the telltale sign that he was about to explode? Could you tell when he was ready to erupt?

B: I know what you mean. I know exactly what you mean. I'm trying to think. He could give you hell with a smile on his face, and believe me, you knew you'd had it.

Q: Was this smile deceptive? They called him "Hap", but sometimes people said this smile did not mean that he was happy.

B: That's a pretty fair evaluation.

Q: The fact that he was smiling, didn't mean that you were in good shape with him?

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B: Not necessarily. In other words, if he smiled, it didn't always mean that he was pleased. I have heard him get mad.

Q: Did he use, what kind of language did he use?

B: I've heard him swear, yes. But that wasn't his normal pattern.

Q: Did he have a pretty good vocabulary when he was mad?

B: Wonderful.

Q: Was he articulate when he was mad?

B: Very, very articulate. He was a very intelligent, educated, erudite person.

Q: Did he use sarcasm?

B: Not to me.

Q: In other words, did he ridicule officers?

B: No, I never heard him.

Q: If he did it, it might have been to others?

B: He might have done it to his intimates on a very high level. I will/you tell one funny story. One day he called me into his office and he handed me a stack of 15 cards. These cards had the names of some of the older officers in the AF. And he said: "I don't know what to do with these old buzzards -

Q: "Deadwood"? I saw that document.

B: Yes. Deadwood. He said: "I want to get rid of them. How can I do it?" He said: "work up something for me." So I took these cards, and I took Col A for instance, and got his efficiency report file. And then, I took a piece of graph paper, and I graphed "1933 excellent report," "1934 superior," "1935 so and so." Right across the line, and at the bottom of each

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one I had the name of the corresponding officer. I had this stack of graphs. And I took them in to him one morning and showed them to him and he said: "My God, excellent! superior! Why, he was never that in his live. Who in the hell ever reported him?" I said: "look down at the bottom of the list. Gen Arnold, Arnold, Arnold," He said: "Oh, go on, get out of here!" And he was stuck with these guys. You couldn't get rid of somebody if he had an "superior" and "excellent" efficiency report.

Q: I saw several documents. I don't recall if it was Gilesor Stretemeyer. But they had what they called "deadwood" among high ranking officers, senior Colonels, some general officers that they had trouble getting rid of. How did they get rid of them? Did they get rid of some, or retire them?

B: Some of them retired with physical disabilities. They pout them out to pasture.

Q: How did they prune out undesirables? Senior undesirables? This would have been right up your alley.

B: They just were put down in some subordinate job. I remember one case. I had a commanding officer down in Panama, who was a Major. And I was a 1st LT. The next time I saw him, I landed at this air base, and he was Colonel, and he came out to greet me as a 2-star general. And here he was still a Colonel, and I was a two star general. And he just stayed in a subordinate job, that's all.

Q: I want to ask you about several men of the old school who did not make it big. One was Frank Lahm.

B: Well, he retired so long ago. He made it awful big for his day and age. He was a BG.

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Q: But he lived a long time, and he had no important job during the war.

B: Well, I know, but he was retired.

Q: Well, there were a lot of men retired. But were brought back.

B: Gen Fechet was brought back.

Q: Well Fechet was sort of an elder statesman.

B: He came back, and he was President of the Promotion Board. Then he came over to Italy and just lived over there with Ira Eaker.

Q: He was very close to Ira Eaker. Eaker was his ghost writer for a long time.

B: They lived together. His son in law was lost over there.

Q: Well, I have many letters that Eaker wrote to Fechet. He told him a lot of things.

Q: You say, you wanted to get overseas, and he wouldn't let you go. He had a lot of officers in his staff who wanted to get overseas, Norstad, Kuter, Giles, Stratemeyer, and several others. Cabell, wanted to get overseas, Arnold had, to use a modern idiom, hang-up about his own record. Arnold never got into combat. In WWI he was given basically the job he had in WWII, at a much lower level, and he was trying like the devil to get overseas. He finally got over in Oct 1918, and then got sick. And he got to the front just as the war was over. So this is why he was doubly sympathetic to your feeling that you wanted to get into some action.

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B: Well, all of us wanted to get over there. And he said: "no, no, no. Everything is working nicely now." And then, along about the end of 1944, when he could see daylight and see that the war was about to end, then he let us go over just to get a touch of it. So I got over to Italy in January 1945, and of course, Italy folded in March. And then, Germany folded in May, and Gen Eisenhower wanted some Air Force officers on his staff up there. So I went up. I became his G-1 of the American forces in Europe.....

Q: Is that after VE Day?

B: After VE Day - yes, and Lyman Whitter went up and was G-4. He was only there for a short time. I stayed there for 2 years.

Q: Was part of the problem the overseas commanders didn't want new men. They were satisfied. Why take a man who was doing a job out of his job and put one of Arnold's people who doesn't know the job, into it? Wasn't this part of the problem?

B: Possibly it was my fault for the fact that I stayed in Washington, because I kept saying: "Just the minute somebody learns his job, that he was taken away, and a new man comes in and he had to learn the job. Why not leave somebody in there that knows the job, and can produce something for a certain length of time."

Q: And you wanted to do something you were criticizing?

B: From a personal point of view, I wanted to go. But it would have been riciculous for I had been in there so long - I knew the job - to have somebody come in. I would take him a year to learn the job.

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Q: Was Kenney a particular problem in that area?

B: George Kenney?

Q: Yes, in not wanting to take on untried officers?

B: Doolittle was worse than Kenney, because when...

Q: When he was 12th or when he was 8th AF?

B: When he was 8th - That's the only time I personally saw him. When he was in the 8th AF and I went to see him. He said: "The trouble with you guys in Washington is you don't send me the kind of people I want." And I said: "what kind of people do you want?" And he said: "I want people who have had combat experience; have had excellent or superior efficiency reports. I don't want any other kind." And I'd say: "Well, what about George Kenney?" He'd respond: "I don't care about that. I'm talking about myself." See what I mean. Well, Kenney probably thought the same thing, but he took what we sent him, because he knew that we were trying to make an equal distribution of the load, so to speak.

Q: We are talking about the 99th Squadron.

B: I went over to Italy and the 99th was still in operation and I flew over there and spent the night with - Davis was CO. But I went over there with the colored representative of the Secy of War's office

Q: Truman Gibson or Hastings?

B: One of those two. We went over there, and spent the night. And when we got there, we went into Davis's office, and started to talk, and I thought they might want to talk about their personal problems, you know, the colored problem. So I

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said: "Why don't I just excuse myself, and I'll go out and come back in a little while." No, no, no, they said: "We'd like to have you stay here." And they started to talk, and they let their hair down. And Davis said: "This outfit of mine won't go any place unless I personally am leading them" He said: "I can't send a flight out. They will abort or something. But if I go, they'll go with me. He said: "When they complete their missions, they are all steamed up and they say: "I want to go home and take 30 days leave, and I'm ready to come back for another tour." But when they get back home, they changed their minds, and we don't get them back. They won't come back. And then two of us started talking. I said: "We have got to scrape the bottom of the barrel. We can't find any more qualified people to be pilots."

Q: What was Arnold's atttitude toward the use of colored pilots and personnel? Was he ahead of time, or did he have to stay with War Dept Policy, or was he behind?

B: I think he went along with War Dept Policy. I know as far as civilian personnel was concerned in Washington, I was the goat in that, because the Secy of War and everybody else said:"We will take negro civilian employees." Then I'd get a requisition in my Civilian Personnel Division, for so many stenographers in Intelligence; and so many stenographers in the Secy's office; so many clerks in this office. We sent that over to Civil Service Commission, and they sent us all of these people. Well, maybe half of them would be negroes, girls. We would name off 10, for instance, and send them to Intelligence. They turned them right around and marched them back and say they aren't qualified. So we would

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send them up to the Secy's office. Same thing; we can't use them, they aren't qualified. They would end up in the Personnel Division. It was practically completely colored. Everybody did a lot of talking about it, but nobody did anything about it. And the real integration didn't start until I was back - long afterwards in 1948 - when I was at Wright Patterson. Then we really started integrating.

Q: There was one tremendous problem at Selfridge Field. Do you know about that? The officer's club...

B: Don't remember that/

Q: Mrs. Bevans, do you recall anything about the Arnold's?

Mrs. B: I only had the feeling that she was a lovely, gracious woman, and that her home was lovely, and that she was in love with her family and her husband. It was a lovely family relationship.

Q: Did a lot of ladies make eyes at Arnold?

Mrs. B: I never saw any of that.

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Interview Maj Gen James M. Bevans Ft Lauderdale, Fla. Jun 5, 1972

Q Reminiscing about Fort R iley in 1926 and 1927

B David, the youngest Arnold child, was born then. I was Personnel Adjutant of the 7th Observation Squadron, so I made out a service record and enlisted him as a member of the 7th Observation Squadron and took it over to Mrs. Arnold in the hospital. They were wonderful people, both of them as host and hostess to the member of the 7th Observation Squadron. (Note: Probably 16th Observation Squadron) Major Arnold wasn't drinking at all. We would go to his house, all of us, and have as many drinks as we wanted. Of course we didn't drink too much

Q It was prohibition in those days?

B Yes. In the meantime we were flying the cavalry officers four one-hour missions every morning and that got kind of tiresome and then occasionally he would call all the officers together and say "Where are we going tomorrow morning?" and we'd take a vote. We'd go to Omaha, or St Joe, Missouri or something like that. So then he would call up the Adjutant of the Cavalry School and say "There'll be no flying tomorrow morning. We're going to take off." And the whole squadron would take off and go up to St Joe, have lunch, and relax, and come back that afternoon.

Q Was he popular among the men?

B Definitely. Very popular

Q When did you see Arnold after your Ft Riley experience? Did you see him while he was at March Field?

B No. I saw him in passing. My wife and kids came up from Panama, when I was stationed in Panama, and they came back on the transport Republic and the Arnolds were on board. So she got acquainted with the Arnolds on that trip down and I saw him just in passing when he came through Panama on the way to the West Coast in 1931. Right before Thanksgiving. The

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next time I saw him I was stationed at Mitchel Field, and I was ordered to Washington to the Chief's office, supposedly to go in the Personnel Division. And when I walked in to say hello to Gen Arnold and report in for duty he said: "What are you supposed to be doing here?" I said: "I'm supposed to go down to the Personnel Division." He says: "You are not. You're my Assistant Executive. Go out there and sit down alongside of Ira Eaker." And so I immediately became Assistant Executive. This was first of January 1940. I went from there, finally, after all these reorganizations, then I went down to the Personnel Division, and then, things really started to happen. I became Chief of the Enlisted Section and Chief of the Officers Section, and Director of Personnel, and so on up, until I finally became Deputy Assistant for Personnel, or whatever its title was at that time. There were too darn many titles. I couldn't keep track of them.

Q Gen McCormick was in there. Was he your assistant?

B At first he was with Trubee Davison when they had the Air Staff and I was director of Personnel. And then later, when I became Chief of Personnel, he was my Deputy. So he was my Deputy most of the time I was there.

Q Do you have any comment on the question of Arnold's blacklist?

B I read the comments that Gen Wray made. I was just one of the pick and shovel boys. I wasn't one of the kingmakers and I wasn't up there in the top echelon, I just worked from day to day. Stan Wray came back here in September of '43, as I remember, and I'd left the end of '44. So we were together about a year. He was in the Military Personnel Division and Pinky Wetzel was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. So I would deal with Pinky, and he would deal with Wray, and I very seldom, except just in passing, issued any orders to Wray. You said something about Gen Arnold dealing directly with him. I wouldn't be a bit surprised about that, because when Gen Arnold wanted something done, he did it.

Q He dealt directly with the man who...

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B As far as this blacklist, so-called, that Wray spoke of, I think he said 84 people were on it. I never saw anything like that. The only thing along those lines that I ever had any knowledge of was--Gen Arnold called me in his office one day. He handed me a stack of cards--I don't know how many there were, maybe ten, fifteen, twenty. And he said: "Here's a bunch of old fuds, so to speak, that aren't doing the Air Force any good. We ought to be able to get rid of them." And he said: "See what you can find out so that I can take action." So I took them back to my office and I personally got their Efficiency Report records for the past ten years or something like that and I started a graph of their efficiency reports. Colonel A, on 1936, his efficiency report was so-and-so. I put a spot there, and down at the bottom I would put the name of the reporting officer. And the next one, '37, would be superior, and the name of the reporting officer. And the charts showed almost entirely "Excellent" or "Superior." I took these charts down to Gen Arnold's office and handed them to him. And he said: "Well, what about it?" And I said "Here's your answer, General." He looked at one of these and said: "Excellent! Superior! Superior! Who in the hell ever rated him that much?" And I said; "Look down at the bottom of the chart, and you'll find out, General." And he looked down there, and it was "Arnold, Arnold, Arnold." He just threw up his arms and said: "What am I going to do?" And that's the only list that I know of that had anything to do with trying to get rid of people. Now Wray came to work in the Personnel Division, as I recall, around September 1943. I left in December of '44. He stayed on there until the middle of '45 and became Deputy of the Military Personnel Division. I don't know what happened after I left, but I certainly have no recollection of any list of 84 officers that weren't supposed to go overseas.

Q You mentioned this difference of opinion that you had with Gen Arnold about the promotion of a certain officer. We have named him. And then Arnold sent you down to Coral Gables. You were combat fatigued in his conception.

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B Gen Arnold wanted to promote this officer to Brig Gen. And I told him that I didn't think that he would be pleased with him. And after a certain period of time it proved out that way, because he called me on the squawk box and said: "Get so-and-so out of town before dark" And I said "I told you so, General" and Gen Arnold said "You don't like the generals I am making." I said "Well, in this particular case I warned you against it." And he said: "You come down here tomorrow morning and be prepared to leave." And I went down the next morning, and he said: You go to the Air Force Hospital, the Biltmore Hotel at Coral Gables. I went down there and Col Dan Ogle, who was the commanding officer, put me through the clinics and I had a little strep throat and a tooth, or something like that, and after about three days I said: "Dan, I'm feeling fine. I'll go back to Washington." He said "You will not. You're a patient. Gen Arnold called me and said you were a patient. I was to keep you down here for at least ten days." So I stayed there for ten days and went back to Washington feeling fine.

Q Did he have this compassion or feeling of concern for his staff officers? Was this a general feeling or was this just you?

B Oh no. I'm sure he had that feeling for everyone. I'm sure he ahd the welfare of all his people at heart.

Q I've been told that two things, among others, upset Arnold. If something went wrong, and a man said: "Gen Arnold, leave it to me. I'll take care of it." This used to upset him. He wanted specific answers. If a problem had arisen and a man did not have a concrete solution, he got very unhappy and was not put off with a vague promise that "I'll take care of it." Does this fit in with your recollection?

B I don't quite get what you mean. (off record)

Q You don't remember anything like this making him angry.

B No. I do know this, that when he said he wanted something done that was impossible he wanted it done tomorrow. I can give you an example.

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At that time his title was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army under Gen Marshall.

Q This must have been early in the war.

B And Gen Weaver was at that time so-called Chief of the Air Corps. I've forgotten what the day was, Friday or Saturday. And he told Gen Weaver that the Air Corps would have an Officer Candidate School in operation in Miami Beach by the following Wednesday, about three or four days. That was quite a deal but, believe it or not, we did have it in operation. Gen Weaver called, I think it was Gen Jimmy Stowell in Texas and told him to go to Miami Beach, and set the thing up. We called Sheppard Field and told them to select several hundred trainees there of officer quality and send them there as students. At that time I was--I've forgotten exactly what my official position was, but I called the Field Artillery and borrowed 50 officers from them and I called the Infantry and borrowed 50 officers from them and sent them down as instructors for a period of three months before we--so that during that time we could get our own people down there. And by golly, on the next Wednesday, three or four days later, the school was in operation. That's the kind of steps Arnold demanded and the kind of steps he got from his staff.

Q Somebody told me this story in a slightly different context. It was something to do with a fake telephone call. In other words, he pretended that if Weaver couldn't do it, Arnold was going to call so-and-so, and have him do it. And Weaver said: "Yes, sir, I'll do it." At first Weaver balked. He said he couldn't do it by next Wednesday. And Arnold went through the motions of calling somebody else: "If you can't, I can get somebody who will. And then, Weaver bowed to this pressure.

B I got my instructions from Weaver.

Q Weaver was an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. I think Brett was the Chief then. Weaver was not one of Arnold's favorites?

B I know, but he was a very efficient guy.

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Q He ended up down in North Carolina.

B That's right

Q Did Arnold push him out of there?

B I don't know. It was so confused then with the Air Staff. Sammy Cousins was A-1 over in the Air Staff; so-and-so was Chief of the Air Corps; so-and-so was Deputy Chief of the Army Air Forces on the War Department General Staff. It was awfully confused.

Q This is early in the war. There wasn't a clear organization?

B That's right. And they were continually reorganizing.

Q Arnold brought in, right after Pearl Harbor, two bright young men: Cabell and Norstad, and then he brought in McRae, Bill McRae, a Reserve officer.

B I don't remember him at all. I remember Cabell, Kuter, Norstad.

Q He was a Reserve officer. He is a District Judge now in Jacksonville.

B I wasn't involved with them directly. I used to talk to Cabell and Norstad and Kuter because I had known them personally.

Q I wonder if you touched on the reason that Arnold brought these men in. The organizational structure was so confused that is was sometimes hard to get straightened out who was going to do what, with a particular problem. And Arnold wanted direct responsibility, so he gave the problem to a man working directly for him: Kuter, or Cabell or Norstad and say: "I want this done," and let these guys monitor the problem through the Air Staff. Is this good reasoning?

B I can't answer that definitely but I do happen to know that of those three: Cabell, Norstad, and Kuter, I dealt more with Kuter than any of them. Whether it was because Gen Arnold gave him that particular responsibility or not, I can't answer. As I say, I was just one of the pick-and-shovel boys. I wasn't keeping a diary, which I understand was against regulations anyway. And I knew that I wasn't going to be one of the big shots. I was just doing a day to day job. I wasn't in on a lot of this politicking, so to speak.

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Q Do you know that Arnold kept diaries on all his trips? Teheran, Cairo, Casablanca

B No. He had the gift of being able to write. He wrote books.

Q Do you remember him when he was writing books? at Fort Riley Do you remember anything specific about it?

B Yes. The only thing I remember is, he asked us all there if any of us had any recollection of any individual events that might be of interest to put in a book. As I remember he was writing boys' books.

Q "Billy Bruce" series

B He was trying to find out some experience that any of us had had that might fit in to his books.

Q Let's return to World War II. One of the things that upset Arnold was somebody putting him off, saying "I'll take care of it" without giving him a specific constructive answer. Another thing that upset him was excessive drinking or reports of excessive drinking on his staff members. I think of several.

B One particularly--Maitland--and Claude Duncan. Those are the only two that I personally had any knowledge of.

Q How about Ed Perrin

B No. I don't remember. No experiences with him.

Q He gave Maitland several chances though. He was more tolerant of Maitland than others?

B No. I think with Claude Duncan he was tolerant. Because he gave Claude a command of B 26's and said "Cut the mustard or else." And I think Claude did for a while there, and I don't know whether he reverted.

Q Claude Duncan told me that he got into a situation, a drunken brawl some place, I think probably North Africa and then he was cut back. He finally made his star again.

B Claude was in trouble all the time, even back in Kelly Field in 1926. He and--I think it was John I. Moore--we'd been on a student cross-country--

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I was a student at this time--up to Waco or something like that--and Claude had gotten pie-eyed, and couldn't fly his own airplane back. So they decided that some student would fly his plane back and he'd ride back with John I. Moore. And he was in the back seat of this DH, and John and I had to land at Austin for gas or something and he had no passenger. And he hit a bump or something and Claude had fallen out. He had parachuted. I can remember when John and I came in and landed at Kelly Field and he said: "I have no passenger." Pretty soon Claude telephoned in.

Q He was conscious enough to pull the rip cord?

B Yes

Q Another thing that exercised Arnold. My own analysis: Arnold was a little bit prudish, in other words he was 19th Century in respect to some of his staff fooling around outside the home. There were a couple of people who were supposed to have engaged in activities like this that he sent away from him. One of them was Minton Kaye. Remember him?

B Mint Kaye. Photographic Officer. I never knew that about General Arnold and I didn't know that about Mint Kaye either.

Q I don't know this for a fact about Kaye, but I was told this. Kaye was a favorite of his. For example, you mentioned the USAT Republic in 1931. Kaye was a newly-minted 2nd Lieut. He was on that ship with Helen Kaye, his wife. Mrs. Arnold took a fancy to Helen Kaye, a young bride. When they arrived at March Field, because of the relationship between the Arnolds and the Kayes, Mint Kaye had ready access to Arnold's office.

B I know that he was a favorite of Arnold's. And apparently he got nice jobs, and did a nice job in the photographic business.

Q Well, he did a nice job except that Mint Kaye and George Goddard were at sword's points. Did you know this?

B No

Q Goddard--have you seen his book?--called OVERVIEW. Goddard was sent out of Washington, and Mint Kaye was kept on. Kaye was sort

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of an operator in the photo business whereas George Goddard was a genius. Eventually Goddard came back to Washington, and Kaye was sent out parly because he had angered Arnold for some reason--attributed to have been his fooling around.

B A little extracurricular activity?

Q Yes. I was told Kaye is now remarried. I don't know whether his first wife died or he simply left. Anyway, Arnold used to write these love letters to his own wife. I have seen many of them. So he might have been a little prudish on the matter of extracurricular activities.

B He could have been. I wouldn't be surprised, but I never had any knowledge of . And he never spoke to me about anybody else.

Q Being in the Personnel business, you might know of somebody who strayed and got clobbered.

B Not for those reasons.

Q Several people got on his list. I don't know whether I mentioned to you some of these people. One, I think, was Shepler FitzGerald. Did you have any knowledge why FitzGerald...?

B No. As I said before, I didn't keep a diary. I know there are a lot of names that are oldtimers, older men at that time who were so-called "Deadwood." I'm not going to try to remember any of the names, because I can't. Now, I can remember names of old timers: there are Netherwood, Shep FitzGerald, Sue Clagett, etc. Whether any of those were on that particular list that I've mentioned, I don't know

Q Well, the three that you mentioned, according to Wray, were on his list.

B I know, according to him, they were. But I don't remember that they were. I wouldn't say they were. I wouldn't be surprised if they had been.

Q Arnold never discussed with you Personnel problems about whether a man was suitable? Did he just discuss with you Personnel policy? Rotation of personnel, or some general policy, rather than individuals?

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B He discussed individuals with me, personally, once in a while, about general officers such as that. However, not to the extent of saying: "I think we ought to send so and so over to command the Southwest Pacific, etc." No, not that way. But he used to ask occasionally my opinion of some of the lesser Generals. Now, I have the feeling that he did discuss those things with people like Larry Norstad, people on his personal staff. I wasn't on his personal staff. I was pretty well down. We had a motor-boat that brought us over from Bolling Field over to the Pentagon every morning. Quite a few of us General Officers lived at Bolling Field and we had this boat that took us over every morning.

Q You were one-star then?

B No, I was two-stars. I can remember that Larry Norstad or Pre Cabell, or Jake Smart--that was the one I was trying to think of awhile ago. And they said: "We have to worry about so and so in charge of this... Possum Hansell, maybe he hasn't got it...what do you think?"

Q They talked on the boat?

B On the boat. Just informal. But I was never involved in some of that higher stuff. I used to write up their promotions. And, incidentally, speaking of that, I don't remember ever seeing Stan Wray's name on the list.

Q Wray's name wasn't on the list. Arnold never put him on the list.

B I know, but the list had to be made up, someplace.

Q He must have made General after Arnold left?

B He made it after I left the Personnel business. But as I said--Wray said according to your transcript--that he was on the list of April of 1943, and that was long before he came to Washington.

Q He had a very good combat record in 8th Air Force...

B I know. Stan was a fine officer, and he was a very forceful officer. So I'm not surprised at some of the things he said in that transcript.

Q The transcript accurately reflects his thoughts?

B Yes. I have no comments or complaints about Stan, because I thought

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he was an excellent officer. But I can see where he had very set, personal opinions and ideas.

Q You mentioned Possum Hansell. You were perhaps in the Personnel business high enough to have recalled when Arnold made, or leaned toward a decision that Possum Hansell was not going to make it in the 20th Air Force. Now, the date of this, specifically, was January 1945. Were you there?

B No. I left in December 1944.

Q Hansell had just started out in November 1944 the B-29 raids from Saipan and Guam. Arnold rapidly became disenchanted. He was a very impatient man. If the results did not show up immediately, he was looking to make a change.

B That's right; that was Hap's chief...

Q Would you say he shot from the hip?

B He was a real sudden guy.

Q When he shot from the hip, do you think he gave careful thought to...

B I think he had given careful thought before he did the shooting, but when he made up his mind--bing--there was no "What do you think?" or anything like that. He went. He was a dynamic leader. There is not a question in the world about that.

Q Many people, well, let's say, several people told me that Arnold would rather make a hundred decisions and be wrong in a number of them, let's say, 20 or 30 of them, than not make any decisions in fear or concern that he would make a wrong one.

B I didn't say it, but I agree with that. Boy, he'd make a decision just like that.

Q He was willing to take a chance on being wrong a certain percentage of times. But he wanted to move?

B I don't know if he was willing to be wrong in a certain percentage. He thought he wasn't going to be wrong in any of them. But he would make the decision, a quick one.

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Q If a decision turned out badly, as some of them did, did he say: "I made the wrong move; I want to recoup", and do something else, or did he simply do something else without admitting he was wrong?

B Maybe he did to somebody else; he never admitted to me. And there was no reason why he should. He was the big guy and I was one of the troops.

Q Do you recall any specific decisions that you think were wrong-- in the Personnel field?

B Yes. In the case of the General I mentioned...

Q How about in the rotational policy I mentioned. They had 25 missions. Then they took that off, and then put it back on.

B I can't answer about how he felt about it. I do know what some of the people overseas felt about it. For instance, in June 1944, just when we were about to break out of the Normandy beachhead, I was over in England, and I went to see Jimmy Doolittle. And he said to me: "The only trouble with you guys over there is you don't send me the kind of people I want." And I said: "What kind of people do you want?" And he said: "I don't want any replacements who haven't had combat experience, and have at least an excellent efficiency report." And I said: "Well, after all, everybody doesn't have that particular qualification, and those that we do have with that qualification are distributed evenly around ahe world. What about George Kenney?" He said: "I don't give a damn about George Kenney. I'm just thinking about what I want.' Well you see that put me on the spot. Because I was sitting in Washington and my job was to try to give everybody an equal break. I couldn't give Doolittle all of the good people and Kenney all of the punks--not the punks, but I mean the inexperienced ones. We had to distribute the wealth. And the same thing, coming back. When these colonels would start coming back for rotation everybody would start crabbing about: "I want so-and-so and so-and-so, and it got so bad that once a week, or once every ten days I had a meeting in my office and I had all of the heads, the Training and Supply and Operations, and whatnot,

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all of the generals there. I was then A-1, and I would sit there and I guess Stan Wray at this time would bring in all these colonels who were due for reassignment, and he would read off the record and the history of each one of them, and then we would take a vote. And if this fellow should go to Training, if the others agreed that he should go to Training, he went to Training, and we did that so that they couldn't complain of the fact that we were arbitrarily assigning people to the wrong places. But it was only for the full colonels.

Q You brought up something that brings to mind the attitude of Kenney. Kenney was not kindly disposed toward taking anybody from Headquarters. He wanted to promote his own people to the top jobs. Is this so?

B I don't know

Q Do you recall any problem they had?

B No. He was very receptive. I think he thought that we were doing the best we could. On his own promotions, I don't know. He probably wrote that directly to General Arnold.

Q He did. You had a number of people who were trying to get overseas, who were staff members who had been there a couple of years, and they wanted to get their own combat records. Arnold had trouble sending any of these people to Kenney. Kenney wanted to promote his own people into the key jobs. Do you recall any of that?

B No. When Kenney came to Washington and Doolittle came to Washington, and the Chinese Air Force came to Washington, I talked to all of them, and I just told them that as far as we were concerned here, the replacements that they got, we were going to distribute equally.

Q I may have asked you about this, but I'll just touch on it again. You were in Headquarters when Arnold decided to send Eaker down to the Mediterranean, and bring Spaatz in to ETO and Doolittle into the 8th Air Force. When he brought Doolittle into the 8th and he made Spaatz USSTAF Commander of the Strategic Air Force.

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B I was there but I had nothing to do with it.

Q But did you hear anything or do you recall the rationale behind Arnold's decision to take Eaker out?

B No

Q Eaker was quite unhappy about that. He went down to the Mediterranean. He became MAAF.

B When Idwal Edwards came back I went over, and I was his Deputy.

Q Idwal Edwards was one of Eaker's close associates.

B They had been Executives in the Chief's office years and years before. 1926 as a matter of fact. When I transferred from the Field Artillery to the Air Force, Eaker and Idwal were sitting there alongside of each other.

Q Eaker and Spaatz are still buddies. They're very, very close.

B All I remember about Eaker and Spaatz is that when Spaatz would come down to Italy, they'd have a friendly poker game, and when Eaker went up some place else, they'd get together. I remember shortly after I arrived in Italy, in January of 1945, I think it was the next month was February. I was brand new and I didn't know what was going on. Anyhow, they had a meeting in Cannes and General Eaker asked me to go along. I attended this meeting. Maybe it was March. I've forgotten. Anyhow, I guess the Germans in Italy were just about finished.

Q Was Gen Arnold there?

B No. And Spaatz wanted some of the troops from Italy. They got together, and Eaker said: "You can have so-and-so and so-and-so, and they were very congenial about it and there were no problems. And then, after it was all over, about 11:00 that night they started playing a little poker and I went to bed. Slats Schlatter and I went downstairs and had a drink, and then we came up and went to bed. About four o'clock in the morning, somebody came in and woke me up and said that Eaker's A-4, Colonel Eaton, had just spun in with a B-25 in the south of France. So

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I had to go in and wake up Ira Eaker and tell him that he'd lost his A-4. And as far as I know, Eaton--you might be able to check on this--Eaton was the only one that I know of that was promoted to Brigadier General after he was dead. I understand that his name had gone in, but he was killed in the meantime. And Eaker or somebody pushed it through.

Q This meeting in Cannes that you talked about, was followed by another meeting in Cannes a month later with Arnold present.

B Arnold was never present at any meeting that I was there.

Q This was in April 1945

B Arnold came to Caserta

Q In April '45?

B I've forgotten whether it was April

Q It was right around the end of the war?

B I was in Caserta from January until August, and Arnold came there just once while I was there.

Q I believe he was in Caserta on V-E Day, or somewhere very close to that date, in early May.

B Could have been. I know he had a doctor with him. Doctor Gil Marquand. A heart specialist. I understand he is dead now. And Gil Marquand had been down at Coral Gables when I was down there, so I knew him right well. He and I went around while he told Gen Arnold to go and take a rest in the afternoon. Can't recall dates.

Q This was in either April or May 1945. The reason I bring up this meeting at Cannes--it was on April 19, a week after Roosevelt died. And Eaker was traveling around the world. Eaker had already been made Deputy Commander of the AAF. * * * one of the subjects they talked about was getting close to the new Commander in Chief, Harry Truman. The AAF had felt that it was not in a good position with Roosevelt, a Navy man. And here was a new Commander coming in. One proposal they made was to put Quesada into the job as Air Aide to the President. Do you have any knowledge of that meeting?

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B Never heard of it. That was very high level.

Q Then Eaker came back and he became the Deputy Commander. Meantime, Arnold didn't stay around much in Washington. He went off to the Pacific a month or two later. And when he came back he already had his mind on his farm. Arnold was ready to retire.

B He was going around in a wheel chair at that time. I remember in Washington he had this heart attack and General Marshall said: "You ride around in a wheel chair." He had a mechanized wheel chair.

Q Trubee Davison went around in a wheel chair, too.

B Trubee was crippled, really cracked up. But that wasn't because of a heart attack. He was crippled.

Q I talked to Trubee Davison. He lives in Long Island. He must be 85. I mentioned this Arnold being in a wheel chair. Some people denied it.

B I've seen him in it. He needed it. He hated it but he used it.

Q Eaker was Deputy Executive Commander and he was on the job. Spaatz was in the Pacific and he was head of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. Eaker was really running the Air Force for a period of time. Do you think Eaker had aspirations to take over when Arnold left?

B I'm sure he did. I'm positive. I don't know why I say that but I'm sure he did

Q I have been told by some people that Eaker tried to take over the job and he began to shunt all the paper work away from Arnold's staff into his own office. Do you know anything about that?

B I can't answer that. Along at the end... The only thing I had to do with Eaker was, first, when he was Executive and I was Assistant Executive, and that was in 1941, and that was just plain old routine paper work. The next time I had anything to do with him was when he was Commanding General of MAAF over in Italy, and I went over there in January of 1945 to take Idwal Edwards' place who came home. I wasn't in on any of this high level stuff.

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Q You say that you thought he had aspirations to take over as Commanding General of the Air Force?

B I'm sure.

Q Did he give you any indication in his actions or demeanor?

B No. He didn't say anything to me, but you can just tell when a guy had that feeling.

Q Was there scuttlebutt in the Pentagon that he had aspirations to this job?

B I wasn't in the Pentagon, but I think there was an unconscious reaction that I got hold of that he was fighting Tooey Spaatz for the job. And Tooey Spaatz won out.

Q Tooey Spaatz was senior.

B I know, but senior people have been skipped before.

Q This has to do with a plane ride that Stan Wray took to Washington.

B I read that. I know nothing of it. It could have happened.

Q He took off in socked-in weather and Arnold got mad at him?

B I haven't the slightest recollection. It could have happened. He was the Army Controller.

Q I want to ask you about the decision to take a lot of aviation cadets and make infantry out of them. This is late in the war. Did you get involved in that decision--or in that policy?

B No. But I got involved in the business of when the Signal Corps signed up all the eligible people that wanted to be flying cadets, and they had them signed up for years and years and years in advance, and we couldn't get them. So we went to town on that, and broke that down in the War Department General Staff. It just happens that the personnel officer of the Signal Corps was my brother's brother-in-law. I couldn't stand the guy myself and I thought he was nuts. But he just went completely haywire, and he signed up hundreds of thousands of these kids.

Q Was this Ingles?

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B No. He was Personnel Officer of the Signal Corps and he signed up all of these kids. "You can't do anything except come in the Signal Corps when we call you." And they were all the kind of kids we wanted in the Air Force. We broke that down. No I don't remember anything about the other.

Q Right about the time of the Battle of the Bulge they were running short of infantry.

B I wasn't here then. I did hear something about that. I heard rumblings of it, that they needed more officers for the infantry and that they should take some of the Aviation Cadets. We had air superiority at the time.

Q A lot of guys were sitting around; they were waiting for training.

B And we had air superiority and they figured they could cut down on the air

Q Did I ask you about Elliott Roosevelt?

B You didn't ask me about him. All I know about him is that he had a photographic squadron flying these Mosquitoes down to Africa.

Q He was always causing problems because he was perhaps taking advantage of his position.

B I only saw him once as far as I know. That was at a staff meeting when Gen Arnold was there, and all the rest of us. And he came in and he described what he was doing with his photo squadron, flying down to Africa.

Q Do you recall that he created any kinds of problems? Of course, this dog incident occurred after you left?

B Not to my knowledge

Q There were attempts to promote him in 1944?

B I know that.

Q Arnold opposed it. Did you know that?

B I think I remember something about it.

Q

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Q But over his (Arnold's) opposition he was promoted. Papa had something to do with it. Going back to the early part of the war. I was told that Arnold got rid of his opposition. There were several contenders for the throne, so to speak. Emmons, Andrews, Brett--to name three who might have been the top man. And each of these men was sent overseas, or to some outside post, and this story got around. Did you hear this story?

B Sure I've heard it, but I can't give you any answers on it because, as I say, that was handled by the Chief of Staff not at my echelon. At that time I was a colonel, lieutenant colonel even. And nobody asked me my opinion who I thought should be the Chief of the Air Corps at that time. Andrews was head of whatever they called it at the time. Brett was some place else, and Emmons was some place else. They were all top guys; there was no question about it. Who made the decision to select Arnold? somebody had to make that decision.

Q Marshall did.

B Of course he did. So I would have no idea what it was all about

Q Let me ask you about A-1 and G-1. The G-1 was Hilldring.

B I liked John very much.

Q Did G-1 give A-1 its own way in the matter of Air Force personnel policy?

B When John Hilldring was G-1, War Dept General Staff, there was an A-1 on the Air Force Staff who was Sammy Cousins. I was in Personnel. It wasn't called A-1 over where I was, but I used to go over to John Hilldring; John Dahlquist was there, and Miller White was there and Bob Maylon who was an Air Force General who was over there so I used to go over and talk to them quite frequently. But until the Air Force got rid of all this Air Staff in there in-between, we had no real meeting with them. For instance, we'd make a recommendation for a general officer. Then we'd have to go to Sammy Cousins who was A-1, and A-1 would send us to G-1. You see what

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I mean? In the Army. And it just didn't work out. So damned complicated. It was just hard to understand. But I liked John Hildring very much. He was a good friend of mine.

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Interview Maj Gen James M. Bevans Ft Lauderdale, Fla. Jun 5, 1972

Q Reminiscing about Fort R iley in 1926 and 1927

B David, the youngest Arnold child, was born then. I was Personnel Adjutant of the 7th Observation Squadron, so I made out a service record and enlisted him as a member of the 7th Observation Squadron and took it over to Mrs. Arnold in the hospital. They were wonderful people, both of them as host and hostess to the member of the 7th Observation Squadron. (Note: Probably 16th Observation Squadron) Major Arnold wasn't drinking at all. We would go to his house, all of us, and have as many drinks as we wanted. Of course we didn't drink too much

Q It was prohibition in those days?

B Yes. In the meantime we were flying the cavalry officers four one-hour missions every morning and that got kind of tiresome and then occasionally he would call all the officers together and say "Where are we going tomorrow morning?" and we'd take a vote. We'd go to Omaha, or St Joe, Missouri or something like that. So then he would call up the Adjutant of the Cavalry School and say "There'll be no flying tomorrow morning. We're going to take off." And the whole squadron would take off and go up to St Joe, have lunch, and relax, and come back that afternoon.

Q Was he popular among the men?

B Definitely. Very popular

Q When did you see Arnold after your Ft Riley experience? Did you see him while he was at March Field?

B No. I saw him in passing. My wife and kids came up from Panama, when I was stationed in Panama, and they came back on the transport Republic and the Arnolds were on board. So she got acquainted with the Arnolds on that trip down and I saw him just in passing when he came through Panama on the way to the West Coast in 1931. Right before Thanksgiving. The

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next time I saw him I was stationed at Mitchel Field, and I was ordered to Washington to the Chief's office, supposedly to go in the Personnel Division. And when I walked in to say hello to Gen Arnold and report in for duty he said: "What are you supposed to be doing here?" I said: "I'm supposed to go down to the Personnel Division." He says: "You are not. You're my Assistant Executive. Go out there and sit down alongside of Ira Eaker." And so I immediately became Assistant Executive. This was first of January 1940. I went from there, finally, after all these reorganizations, then I went down to the Personnel Division, and then, things really started to happen. I became Chief of the Enlisted Section and Chief of the Officers Section, and Director of Personnel, and so on up, until I finally became Deputy Assistant for Personnel, or whatever its title was at that time. There were too darn many titles. I couldn't keep track of them.

Q Gen McCormick was in there. Was he your assistant?

B At first he was with Trubee Davison when they had the Air Staff and I was director of Personnel. And then later, when I became Chief of Personnel, he was my Deputy. So he was my Deputy most of the time I was there.

Q Do you have any comment on the question of Arnold's blacklist?

B I read the comments that Gen Wray made. I was just one of the pick and shovel boys. I wasn't one of the kingmakers and I wasn't up there in the top echelon, I just worked from day to day. Stan Wray came back here in September of '43, as I remember, and I'd left the end of '44. So we were together about a year. He was in the Military Personnel Division and Pinky Wetzel was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. So I would deal with Pinky, and he would deal with Wray, and I very seldom, except just in passing, issued any orders to Wray. You said something about Gen Arnold dealing directly with him. I wouldn't be a bit surprised about that, because when Gen Arnold wanted something done, he did it.

Q He dealt directly with the man who...

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B As far as this blacklist, so-called, that Wray spoke of, I think he said 84 people were on it. I never saw anything like that. The only thing along those lines that I ever had any knowledge of was--Gen Arnold called me in his office one day. He handed me a stack of cards--I don't know how many there were, maybe ten, fifteen, twenty. And he said: "Here's a bunch of old fuds, so to speak, that aren't doing the Air Force any good. We ought to be able to get rid of them." And he said: "See what you can find out so that I can take action." So I took them back to my office and I personally got their Efficiency Report records for the past ten years or something like that and I started a graph of their efficiency reports. Colonel A, on 1936, his efficiency report was so-and-so. I put a spot there, and down at the bottom I would put the name of the reporting officer. And the next one, '37, would be superior, and the name of the reporting officer. And the charts showed almost entirely "Excellent" or "Superior." I took these charts down to Gen Arnold's office and handed them to him. And he said: "Well, what about it?" And I said "Here's your answer, General." He looked at one of these and said: "Excellent! Superior! Superior! Who in the hell ever rated him that much?" And I said; "Look down at the bottom of the chart, and you'll find out, General." And he looked down there, and it was "Arnold, Arnold, Arnold." He just threw up his arms and said: "What am I going to do?" And that's the only list that I know of that had anything to do with trying to get rid of people. Now Wray came to work in the Personnel Division, as I recall, around September 1943. I left in December of '44. He stayed on there until the middle of '45 and became Deputy of the Military Personnel Division. I don't know what happened after I left, but I certainly have no recollection of any list of 84 officers that weren't supposed to go overseas.

Q You mentioned this difference of opinion that you had with Gen Arnold about the promotion of a certain officer. We have named him. And then Arnold sent you down to Coral Gables. You were combat fatigued in his conception.

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B Gen Arnold wanted to promote this officer to Brig Gen. And I told him that I didn't think that he would be pleased with him. And after a certain period of time it proved out that way, because he called me on the squawk box and said: "Get so-and-so out of town before dark" And I said "I told you so, General" and Gen Arnold said "You don't like the generals I am making." I said "Well, in this particular case I warned you against it." And he said: "You come down here tomorrow morning and be prepared to leave." And I went down the next morning, and he said: You go to the Air Force Hospital, the Biltmore Hotel at Coral Gables. I went down there and Col Dan Ogle, who was the commanding officer, put me through the clinics and I had a little strep throat and a tooth, or something like that, and after about three days I said: "Dan, I'm feeling fine. I'll go back to Washington." He said "You will not. You're a patient. Gen Arnold called me and said you were a patient. I was to keep you down here for at least ten days." So I stayed there for ten days and went back to Washington feeling fine.

Q Did he have this compassion or feeling of concern for his staff officers? Was this a general feeling or was this just you?

B Oh no. I'm sure he had that feeling for everyone. I'm sure he ahd the welfare of all his people at heart.

Q I've been told that two things, among others, upset Arnold. If something went wrong, and a man said: "Gen Arnold, leave it to me. I'll take care of it." This used to upset him. He wanted specific answers. If a problem had arisen and a man did not have a concrete solution, he got very unhappy and was not put off with a vague promise that "I'll take care of it." Does this fit in with your recollection?

B I don't quite get what you mean. (off record)

Q You don't remember anything like this making him angry.

B No. I do know this, that when he said he wanted something done that was impossible he wanted it done tomorrow. I can give you an example.

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At that time his title was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army under Gen Marshall.

Q This must have been early in the war.

B And Gen Weaver was at that time so-called Chief of the Air Corps. I've forgotten what the day was, Friday or Saturday. And he told Gen Weaver that the Air Corps would have an Officer Candidate School in operation in Miami Beach by the following Wednesday, about three or four days. That was quite a deal but, believe it or not, we did have it in operation. Gen Weaver called, I think it was Gen Jimmy Stowell in Texas and told him to go to Miami Beach, and set the thing up. We called Sheppard Field and told them to select several hundred trainees there of officer quality and send them there as students. At that time I was--I've forgotten exactly what my official position was, but I called the Field Artillery and borrowed 50 officers from them and I called the Infantry and borrowed 50 officers from them and sent them down as instructors for a period of three months before we--so that during that time we could get our own people down there. And by golly, on the next Wednesday, three or four days later, the school was in operation. That's the kind of steps Arnold demanded and the kind of steps he got from his staff.

Q Somebody told me this story in a slightly different context. It was something to do with a fake telephone call. In other words, he pretended that if Weaver couldn't do it, Arnold was going to call so-and-so, and have him do it. And Weaver said: "Yes, sir, I'll do it." At first Weaver balked. He said he couldn't do it by next Wednesday. And Arnold went through the motions of calling somebody else: "If you can't, I can get somebody who will. And then, Weaver bowed to this pressure.

B I got my instructions from Weaver.

Q Weaver was an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. I think Brett was the Chief then. Weaver was not one of Arnold's favorites?

B I know, but he was a very efficient guy.

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Q He ended up down in North Carolina.

B That's right

Q Did Arnold push him out of there?

B I don't know. It was so confused then with the Air Staff. Sammy Cousins was A-1 over in the Air Staff; so-and-so was Chief of the Air Corps; so-and-so was Deputy Chief of the Army Air Forces on the War Department General Staff. It was awfully confused.

Q This is early in the war. There wasn't a clear organization?

B That's right. And they were continually reorganizing.

Q Arnold brought in, right after Pearl Harbor, two bright young men: Cabell and Norstad, and then he brought in McRae, Bill McRae, a Reserve officer.

B I don't remember him at all. I remember Cabell, Kuter, Norstad.

Q He was a Reserve officer. He is a District Judge now in Jacksonville.

B I wasn't involved with them directly. I used to talk to Cabell and Norstad and Kuter because I had known them personally.

Q I wonder if you touched on the reason that Arnold brought these men in. The organizational structure was so confused that is was sometimes hard to get straightened out who was going to do what, with a particular problem. And Arnold wanted direct responsibility, so he gave the problem to a man working directly for him: Kuter, or Cabell or Norstad and say: "I want this done," and let these guys monitor the problem through the Air Staff. Is this good reasoning?

B I can't answer that definitely but I do happen to know that of those three: Cabell, Norstad, and Kuter, I dealt more with Kuter than any of them. Whether it was because Gen Arnold gave him that particular responsibility or not, I can't answer. As I say, I was just one of the pick-and-shovel boys. I wasn't keeping a diary, which I understand was against regulations anyway. And I knew that I wasn't going to be one of the big shots. I was just doing a day to day job. I wasn't in on a lot of this politicking, so to speak.

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Q Do you know that Arnold kept diaries on all his trips? Teheran, Cairo, Casablanca

B No. He had the gift of being able to write. He wrote books.

Q Do you remember him when he was writing books? at Fort Riley Do you remember anything specific about it?

B Yes. The only thing I remember is, he asked us all there if any of us had any recollection of any individual events that might be of interest to put in a book. As I remember he was writing boys' books.

Q "Billy Bruce" series

B He was trying to find out some experience that any of us had had that might fit in to his books.

Q Let's return to World War II. One of the things that upset Arnold was somebody putting him off, saying "I'll take care of it" without giving him a specific constructive answer. Another thing that upset him was excessive drinking or reports of excessive drinking on his staff members. I think of several.

B One particularly--Maitland--and Claude Duncan. Those are the only two that I personally had any knowledge of.

Q How about Ed Perrin

B No. I don't remember. No experiences with him.

Q He gave Maitland several chances though. He was more tolerant of Maitland than others?

B No. I think with Claude Duncan he was tolerant. Because he gave Claude a command of B 26's and said "Cut the mustard or else." And I think Claude did for a while there, and I don't know whether he reverted.

Q Claude Duncan told me that he got into a situation, a drunken brawl some place, I think probably North Africa and then he was cut back. He finally made his star again.

B Claude was in trouble all the time, even back in Kelly Field in 1926. He and--I think it was John I. Moore--we'd been on a student cross-country--

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I was a student at this time--up to Waco or something like that--and Claude had gotten pie-eyed, and couldn't fly his own airplane back. So they decided that some student would fly his plane back and he'd ride back with John I. Moore. And he was in the back seat of this DH, and John and I had to land at Austin for gas or something and he had no passenger. And he hit a bump or something and Claude had fallen out. He had parachuted. I can remember when John and I came in and landed at Kelly Field and he said: "I have no passenger." Pretty soon Claude telephoned in.

Q He was conscious enough to pull the rip cord?

B Yes

Q Another thing that exercised Arnold. My own analysis: Arnold was a little bit prudish, in other words he was 19th Century in respect to some of his staff fooling around outside the home. There were a couple of people who were supposed to have engaged in activities like this that he sent away from him. One of them was Minton Kaye. Remember him?

B Mint Kaye. Photographic Officer. I never knew that about General Arnold and I didn't know that about Mint Kaye either.

Q I don't know this for a fact about Kaye, but I was told this. Kaye was a favorite of his. For example, you mentioned the USAT Republic in 1931. Kaye was a newly-minted 2nd Lieut. He was on that ship with Helen Kaye, his wife. Mrs. Arnold took a fancy to Helen Kaye, a young bride. When they arrived at March Field, because of the relationship between the Arnolds and the Kayes, Mint Kaye had ready access to Arnold's office.

B I know that he was a favorite of Arnold's. And apparently he got nice jobs, and did a nice job in the photographic business.

Q Well, he did a nice job except that Mint Kaye and George Goddard were at sword's points. Did you know this?

B No

Q Goddard--have you seen his book?--called OVERVIEW. Goddard was sent out of Washington, and Mint Kaye was kept on. Kaye was sort

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of an operator in the photo business whereas George Goddard was a genius. Eventually Goddard came back to Washington, and Kaye was sent out parly because he had angered Arnold for some reason--attributed to have been his fooling around.

B A little extracurricular activity?

Q Yes. I was told Kaye is now remarried. I don't know whether his first wife died or he simply left. Anyway, Arnold used to write these love letters to his own wife. I have seen many of them. So he might have been a little prudish on the matter of extracurricular activities.

B He could have been. I wouldn't be surprised, but I never had any knowledge of . And he never spoke to me about anybody else.

Q Being in the Personnel business, you might know of somebody who strayed and got clobbered.

B Not for those reasons.

Q Several people got on his list. I don't know whether I mentioned to you some of these people. One, I think, was Shepler FitzGerald. Did you have any knowledge why FitzGerald...?

B No. As I said before, I didn't keep a diary. I know there are a lot of names that are oldtimers, older men at that time who were so-called "Deadwood." I'm not going to try to remember any of the names, because I can't. Now, I can remember names of old timers: there are Netherwood, Shep FitzGerald, Sue Clagett, etc. Whether any of those were on that particular list that I've mentioned, I don't know

Q Well, the three that you mentioned, according to Wray, were on his list.

B I know, according to him, they were. But I don't remember that they were. I wouldn't say they were. I wouldn't be surprised if they had been.

Q Arnold never discussed with you Personnel problems about whether a man was suitable? Did he just discuss with you Personnel policy? Rotation of personnel, or some general policy, rather than individuals?

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B He discussed individuals with me, personally, once in a while, about general officers such as that. However, not to the extent of saying: "I think we ought to send so and so over to command the Southwest Pacific, etc." No, not that way. But he used to ask occasionally my opinion of some of the lesser Generals. Now, I have the feeling that he did discuss those things with people like Larry Norstad, people on his personal staff. I wasn't on his personal staff. I was pretty well down. We had a motor-boat that brought us over from Bolling Field over to the Pentagon every morning. Quite a few of us General Officers lived at Bolling Field and we had this boat that took us over every morning.

Q You were one-star then?

B No, I was two-stars. I can remember that Larry Norstad or Pre Cabell, or Jake Smart--that was the one I was trying to think of awhile ago. And they said: "We have to worry about so and so in charge of this... Possum Hansell, maybe he hasn't got it...what do you think?"

Q They talked on the boat?

B On the boat. Just informal. But I was never involved in some of that higher stuff. I used to write up their promotions. And, incidentally, speaking of that, I don't remember ever seeing Stan Wray's name on the list.

Q Wray's name wasn't on the list. Arnold never put him on the list.

B I know, but the list had to be made up, someplace.

Q He must have made General after Arnold left?

B He made it after I left the Personnel business. But as I said--Wray said according to your transcript--that he was on the list of April of 1943, and that was long before he came to Washington.

Q He had a very good combat record in 8th Air Force...

B I know. Stan was a fine officer, and he was a very forceful officer. So I'm not surprised at some of the things he said in that transcript.

Q The transcript accurately reflects his thoughts?

B Yes. I have no comments or complaints about Stan, because I thought

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he was an excellent officer. But I can see where he had very set, personal opinions and ideas.

Q You mentioned Possum Hansell. You were perhaps in the Personnel business high enough to have recalled when Arnold made, or leaned toward a decision that Possum Hansell was not going to make it in the 20th Air Force. Now, the date of this, specifically, was January 1945. Were you there?

B No. I left in December 1944.

Q Hansell had just started out in November 1944 the B-29 raids from Saipan and Guam. Arnold rapidly became disenchanted. He was a very impatient man. If the results did not show up immediately, he was looking to make a change.

B That's right; that was Hap's chief...

Q Would you say he shot from the hip?

B He was a real sudden guy.

Q When he shot from the hip, do you think he gave careful thought to...

B I think he had given careful thought before he did the shooting, but when he made up his mind--bing--there was no "What do you think?" or anything like that. He went. He was a dynamic leader. There is not a question in the world about that.

Q Many people, well, let's say, several people told me that Arnold would rather make a hundred decisions and be wrong in a number of them, let's say, 20 or 30 of them, than not make any decisions in fear or concern that he would make a wrong one.

B I didn't say it, but I agree with that. Boy, he'd make a decision just like that.

Q He was willing to take a chance on being wrong a certain percentage of times. But he wanted to move?

B I don't know if he was willing to be wrong in a certain percentage. He thought he wasn't going to be wrong in any of them. But he would make the decision, a quick one.

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Q If a decision turned out badly, as some of them did, did he say: "I made the wrong move; I want to recoup", and do something else, or did he simply do something else without admitting he was wrong?

B Maybe he did to somebody else; he never admitted to me. And there was no reason why he should. He was the big guy and I was one of the troops.

Q Do you recall any specific decisions that you think were wrong--in the Personnel field?

B Yes. In the case of the General I mentioned...

Q How about in the rotational policy I mentioned. They had 25 missions. Then they took that off, and then put it back on.

B I can't answer about how he felt about it. I do know what some of the people overseas felt about it. For instance, in June 1944, just when we were about to break out of the Normandy beachhead, I was over in England, and I went to see Jimmy Doolittle. And he said to me: "The only trouble with you guys over there is you don't send me the kind of people I want." And I said: "What kind of people do you want?" And he said: "I don't want any replacements who haven't had combat experience, and have at least an excellent efficiency report." And I said: "Well, after all, everybody doesn't have that particular qualification, and those that we do have with that qualification are distributed evenly around ahe world. What about George Kenney?" He said: "I don't give a damn about George Kenney. I'm just thinking about what I want.' Well you see that put me on the spot. Because I was sitting in Washington and my job was to try to give everybody an equal break. I couldn't give Doolittle all of the good people and Kenney all of the punks--not the punks, but I mean the inexperienced ones. We had to distribute the wealth. And the same thing, coming back. When these colonels would start coming back for rotation everybody would start crabbing about: "I want so-and-so and so-and-so, and it got so bad that once a week, or once every ten days I had a meeting in my office and I had all of the heads, the Training and Supply and Operations, and whatnot,

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all of the generals there. I was then A-1, and I would sit there and I guess Stan Wray at this time would bring in all these colonels who were due for reassignment, and he would read off the record and the history of each one of them, and then we would take a vote. And if this fellow should go to Training, if the others agreed that he should go to Training, he went to Training, and we did that so that they couldn't complain of the fact that we were arbitrarily assigning people to the wrong places. But it was only for the full colonels.

Q You brought up something that brings to mind the attitude of Kenney. Kenney was not kindly disposed toward taking anybody from Headquarters. He wanted to promote his own people to the top jobs. Is this so?

B I don't know

Q Do you recall any problem they had?

B No. He was very receptive. I think he thought that we were doing the best we could. On his own promotions, I don't know. He probably wrote that directly to General Arnold.

Q He did. You had a number of people who were trying to get overseas, who were staff members who had been there a couple of years, and they wanted to get their own combat records. Arnold had trouble sending any of these people to Kenney. Kenney wanted to promote his own people into the key jobs. Do you recall any of that?

B No. When Kenney came to Washington and Doolittle came to Washington, and the Chinese Air Force came to Washington, I talked to all of them, and I just told them that as far as we were concerned here, the replacements that they got, we were going to distribute equally.

Q I may have asked you about this, but I'll just touch on it again. You were in Headquarters when Arnold decided to send Eaker down to the Mediterranean, and bring Spaatz in to ETO and Doolittle into the 8th Air Force. When he brought Doolittle into the 8th and he made Spaatz USSTAF Commander of the Strategic Air Force.

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B I was there but I had nothing to do with it.

Q But did you hear anything or do you recall the rationale behind Arnold's decision to take Eaker out?

B No

Q Eaker was quite unhappy about that. He went down to the Mediterranean. He became MAAF.

B When Idwal Edwards came back I went over, and I was his Deputy.

Q Idwal Edwards was one of Eaker's close associates.

B They had been Executives in the Chief's office years and years before. 1926 as a matter of fact. When I transferred from the Field Artillery to the Air Force, Eaker and Idwal were sitting there alongside of each other.

Q Eaker and Spaatz are still buddies. They're very, very close.

B All I remember about Eaker and Spaatz is that when Spaatz would come down to Italy, they'd have a friendly poker game, and when Eaker went up some place else, they'd get together. I remember shortly after I arrived in Italy, in January of 1945, I think it was the next month was February. I was brand new and I didn't know what was going on. Anyhow, they had a meeting in Cannes and General Eaker asked me to go along. I attended this meeting. Maybe it was March. I've forgotten. Anyhow, I guess the Germans in Italy were just about finished.

Q Was Gen Arnold there?

B No. And Spaatz wanted some of the troops from Italy. They got together, and Eaker said: "You can have so-and-so and so-and-so, and they were very congenial about it and there were no problems. And then, after it was all over, about 11:00 that night they started playing a little poker and I went to bed. Slats Schlatter and I went downstairs and had a drink, and then we came up and went to bed. About four o'clock in the morning, somebody came in and woke me up and said that Eaker's A-4, Colonel Eaton, had just spun in with a B-25 in the south of France. So

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I had to go in and wake up Ira Eaker and tell him that he'd lost his A-4. And as far as I know, Eaton--you might be able to check on this--Eaton was the only one that I know of that was promoted to Brigadier General after he was dead. I understand that his name had gone in, but he was killed in the meantime. And Eaker or somebody pushed it through.

Q This meeting in C^nnes that you talked about, was followed by another meeting in Cannes a month later with Arnold present.

B Arnold was never present at any meeting that I was there.

Q This was in April 1945

B Arnold came to Caserta

Q In April '45?

B I've forgotten whether it was April

Q It was right around the end of the war?

B I was in Caserta from January until August, and Arnold came there just once while I was there.

Q I believe he was in Caserta on V-E Day, or somewhere very close to that date, in early May.

B Could have been. I know he had a doctor with him. Doctor Gil Marquand. A heart specialist. I understand he is dead now. And Gil Marquand had been down at Coral Gables when I was down there, so I knew him right well. He and I went around while he told Gen Arnold to go and take a rest in the afternoon. Can't recall dates.

Q This was in either April or May 1945. The reason I bring up this meeting at Cannes--it was on April 19, a week after Roosevelt died. And Eaker was traveling around the world. Eaker had already been made Deputy Commander of the AAF. * * * one of the subjects they talked about was getting close to the new Commander in Chief, Harry Truman. The AAF had felt that it was not in a good position with Roosevelt, a Navy man. And here was a new Commander coming in. One proposal they made was to put Quesada into the job as Air Aide to the President. Do you have any knowledge of that meeting?

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B Never heard of it. That was very high level.

Q Then Eaker came back and he became the Deputy Commander. Meantime, Arnold didn't stay around much in Washington. He went off to the Pacific a month or two later. And when he came back he already had his mind on his farm. Arnold was ready to retire.

B He was going around in a wheel chair at that time. I remember in Washington he had this heart attack and General Marshall said: "You ride around in a wheel chair." He had a mechanized wheel chair.

Q Trubee Davison went around in a wheel chair, too.

B Trubee was crippled, really cracked up. But that wasn't because of a heart attack. He was crippled.

Q I talked to Trubee Davison. He lives in Long Island. He must be 85. I mentioned this Arnold being in a wheel chair. Some people denied it.

B I've seen him in it. He needed it. He hated it but he used it.

Q Eaker was Deputy Executive Commander and he was on the job. Spaatz was in the Pacific and he was head of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. Eaker was really running the Air Force for a period of time. Do you think Eaker had aspirations to take over when Arnold left?

B I'm sure he did. I'm positive. I don't know why I say that but I'm sure he did

Q I have been told by some people that Eaker tried to take over the job and he began to shunt all the paper work away from Arnold's staff into his own office. Do you know anything about that?

B I can't answer that. Along at the end... The only thing I had to do with Eaker was, first, when he was Executive and I was Assistant Executive, and that was in 1941, and that was just plain old routine paper work. The next time I had anything to do with him was when he was Commanding General of MAAF over in Italy, and I went over there in January of 1945 to take Idwal Edwards' place who came home. I wasn't in on any of this high level stuff.

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Q You say that you thought he had aspirations to take over as Commanding General of the Air Force?

B I'm sure.

Q Did he give you any indication in his actions or demeanor?

B No. He didn't say anything to me, but you can just tell when a guy had that feeling.

Q Was there scuttlebutt in the Pentagon that he had aspirations to this job?

B I wasn't in the Pentagon, but I think there was an unconscious reaction that I got hold of that he was fighting Tooey Spaatz for the job. And Tooey Spaatz won out.

Q Tooey Spaatz was senior.

B I know, but senior people have been skipped before.

Q This has to do with a plane ride that Stan Wray took to Washington.

B I read that. I know nothing of it. It could have happened.

Q He took off in socked-in weather and Arnold got mad at him?

B I haven't the slightest recollection. It could have happened. He was the Army Controller.

Q I want to ask you about the decision to take a lot of aviation cadets and make infantry out of them. This is late in the war. Did you get involved in that decision--or in that policy?

B No. But I got involved in the business of when the Signal Corps signed up all the eligible people that wanted to be flying cadets, and they had them signed up for years and years and years in advance, and we couldn't get them. So we went to town on that, and broke that down in the War Department General Staff. It just happens that the personnel officer of the Signal Corps was my brother's brother-in-law. I couldn't stand the guy myself and I thought he was nuts. But he just went completely haywire, and he signed up hundreds of thousands of these kids.

Q Was this Ingles?

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B No. He was Personnel Officer of the Signal Corps and he signed up all of these kids. "You can't do anything except come in the Signal Corps when we call you." And they were all the kind of kids we wanted in the Air Force. We broke that down. No I don't remember anything about the other.

Q Right about the time of the Battle of the Bulge they were running short of infantry.

B I wasn't here then. I did hear something about that. I heard rumblings of it, that they needed more officers for the infantry and that they should take some of the Aviation Cadets. We had air superiority at the time.

Q A lot of guys were sitting around; they were waiting for training.

B And we had air superiority and they figured they could cut down on the air

Q Did I ask you about Elliott Roosevelt?

B You didn't ask me about him. All I know about him is that he had a photographic squadron flying these Mosquitoes down to Africa.

Q He was always causing problems because he was perhaps taking advantage of his position.

B I only saw him once as far as I know. That was at a staff meeting when Gen Arnold was there, and all the rest of us. And he came in and he described what he was doing with his photo squadron, flying down to Africa.

Q Do you recall that he created any kinds of problems? Of course, this dog incident occurred after you left?

B Not to my knowledge

Q There were attempts to promote him in 1944?

B I know that.

Q Arnold opposed it. Did you know that?

B I think I remember something about it.

Q

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Q But over his (Arnold's) opposition he was promoted. Papa had something to do with it. Going back to the early part of the war. I was told that Arnold got rid of his opposition. There were several contenders for the throne, so to speak. Emmons, ;Andrews, Brett--to name three who might have been the top man. And each of these men was sent overseas, or to some outside post, and this story got around. Did you hear this story?

B Sure I've heard it, but I can't give you any answers on it because, as I say, that was handled by the Chief of Staff not at my echelon. At that time I was a colonel, lieutenant colonel even. And nobody asked me my opinion who I thought should be the Chief of the Air Corps at that time. Andrews was head of whatever they called it at the time. Brett was some place else, and Emmons was some place else. They were all top guys; there was no question about it. Who made the decision to select Arnold? somebody had to make that decision.

Q Marshall did.

B Of course he did. So I would have no idea what it was all about

Q Let me ask you about A-1 and G-1. The G-1 was Hilldring.

B I liked John very much.

Q Did G-1 give A-1 its own way in the matter of Air Force personnel policy?

B When John Hilldring was G-1, War Dept General Staff, there was an A-1 on the Air Force Staff who was Sammy Cousins. I was in Personnel. It wasn't called A-1 over where I was, but I used to go over to John Hilldring; John Dahlquist was there, and Miller White was there and Bob Maylon who was an Air Force General who was over there so I used to go over and talk to them quite frequently. But until the Air Force got rid of all this Air Staff in there in-between, we had no real meeting with them. For instance, we'd make a recommendation for a general officer. Then we'd have to go to Sammy Cousins who was A-1, and A-1 would send us to G-1. You see what

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I mean? In the Army. And it just didn't work out. So damned complicated. It was just hard to understand. But I liked John Hildring very much. He was a good friend of mine.

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Interview Maj Gen James M. Bevans Ft Lauderdale, Fla. Jun 5, 1972

Q Reminiscing about Fort Riley in 1926 and 1927

B David, the youngest Arnold child, was born then. I was Personnel Adjutant of the 7th Observation Squadron, so I made out a service record and enlisted him as a member of the 7th Observation Squadron and took it over to Mrs. Arnold in the hospital. They were wonderful people, both of them as host and hostess to the member of the 7th Observation Squadron. (Note: Probably 16th Observation Squadron) Major Arnold wasn't drinking at all. We would go to his house, all of us, and have as many drinks as we wanted. Of course we didn't drink too much

Q It was prohibition in those days?

B Yes. In the meantime we were flying the cavalry officers four one-hour missions every morning and that got kind of tiresome and then occasionally he would call all the officers together and say "Where are we going tomorrow morning?" and we'd take a vote. We'd go to Omaha, or St Joe, Missouri or something like that. So then he would call up the Adjutant of the Cavalry School and say "There'll be no flying tomorrow morning. We're going to take off." And the whole squadron would take off and go up to St Joe, have lunch, and relax, and come back that afternoon.

Q Was he popular among the men?

B Definitely. Very popular

Q When did you see Arnold after your Ft Riley experience? Did you see him while he was at March Field?

B No. I saw him in passing. My wife and kids came up from Panama, when I was stationed in Panama, and they came back on the transport Republic and the Arnolds were on board. So she got acquainted with the Arnolds on that trip down and I saw him just in passing when he came through Panama on the way to the West Coast in 1931. Right before Thanksgiving. The

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next time I saw him I was stationed at Mitchel Field, and I was ordered to Washington to the Chief's office, supposedly to go in the Personnel Division. And when I walked in to say hello to Gen Arnold and report in for duty he said: "What are you supposed to be doing here?" I said: "I'm supposed to go down to the Personnel Division." He says: "You are not. You're my Assistant Executive. Go out there and sit down alongside of Ira Eaker." And so I immediately became Assistant Executive. This was first of January 1940. I went from there, finally, after all these reorganizations, then I went down to the Personnel Division, and then, things really started to happen. I became Chief of the Enlisted Section and Chief of the Officers Section, and Director of Personnel, and so on up, until I finally became Deputy Assistant for Personnel, or whatever its title was at that time. There were too darn many titles. I couldn't keep track of them.

Q Gen McCormick was in there. Was he your assistant?

B At first he was with Trubee Davison when they had the Air Staff and I was director of Personnel. And then later, when I became Chief of Personnel, he was my Deputy. So he was my Deputy most of the time I was there.

Q Do you have any comment on the question of Arnold's blacklist?

B I read the comments that Gen Wray made. I was just one of the pick and shovel boys. I wasn't one of the kingmakers and I wasn't up there in the top echelon, I just worked from day to day. Stan Wray came back here in September of '43, as I remember, and I'd left the end of '44. So we were together about a year. He was in the Military Personnel Division and Pinky Wetzel was Chief of the Military Personnel Division. So I would deal with Pinky, and he would deal with Wray, and I very seldom, except just in passing, issued any orders to Wray. You said something about Gen Arnold dealing directly with him. I wouldn't be a bit surprised about that, because when Gen Arnold wanted something done, he did it.

Q He dealt directly with the man who...

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B As far as this blacklist, so-called, that Wray spoke of, I think he said 84 people were on it. I never saw anything like that. The only thing along those lines that I ever had any knowledge of was--Gen Arnold called me in his office one day. He handed me a stack of cards--I don't know how many there were, maybe ten, fifteen, twenty. And he said: "Here's a bunch of old fuds, so to speak, that aren't doing the Air Force any good. We ought to be able to get rid of them." And he said: "See what you can find out so that I can take action." So I took them back to my office and I personally got their Efficiency Report records for the past ten years or something like that and I started a graph of their efficiency reports. ... Colonel A, on 1936, his efficiency report was so-and-so. I put a spot there, and down at the bottom I would put the name of the reporting officer. And the next one, '37, would be superior, and the name of the reporting officer. And the charts showed almost entirely "Excellent" or "Superior." I took these charts down to Gen Arnold's office and handed them to him. And he said: "Well, what about it?" And I said "Here's your answer, General." He looked at one of these and said: "Excellent! Superior! Superior! Who in the hell ever rated him that much?" And I said; "Look down at the bottom of the chart, and you'll find out, General." And he looked down there, and it was "Arnold, Arnold, Arnold." He just threw up his arms and said: "What am I going to do?" And that's the only list that I know of that had anything to do with trying to get rid of people. Now Wray came to work in the Personnel Division, as I recall, around September 1943. I left in December of '44. He stayed on there until the middle of '45 and became Deputy of the Military Personnel Division. I don't know what happened after I left, but I certainly have no recollection of any list of 84 officers that weren't supposed to go overseas.

Q You mentioned this difference of opinion that you had with Gen Arnold about the promotion of a certain officer. We have named him. And then Arnold sent you down to Coral Gables. You were combat fatigued in his conception.

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B Gen Arnold wanted to promote this officer to Brig Gen. And I told him that I didn't think that he would be pleased with him. And after a certain period of time it proved out that way, because he called me on the squawk box and said: "Get so-and-so out of town before dark" And I said "I told you so, General" and Gen Arnold said "You don't like the generals I am making." I said "Well, in this particular case I warned you against it." And he said: "You come down here tomorrow morning and be prepared to leave." And I went down the next morning, and he said: You go to the Air Force Hospital, the Biltmore Hotel at Coral Gables. I went down there and Col Dan Ogle, who was the commanding officer, put me through the clinics and I had a little strep throat and a tooth, or something like that, and after about three days I said: "Dan, I'm feeling fine. I'll go back to Washington." He said "You will not. You're a patient. Gen Arnold called me and said you were a patient. I was to keep you down here for at least ten days." So I stayed there for ten days and went back to Washington feeling fine.

Q Did he have this compassion or feeling of concern for his staff officers? Was this a general feeling or was this just you?

B Oh no. I'm sure he had that feeling for everyone. I'm sure he ahd the welfare of all his people at heart.

Q I've been told that two things, among others, upset Arnold. If something went wrong, and a man said: "Gen Arnold, leave it to me. I'll take care of it." This used to upset him. He wanted specific answers. If a problem had arisen and a man did not have a concrete solution, he got very unhappy and was not put off with a vague promise that "I'll take care of it." Does this fit in with your recollection?

B I don't quite get what you mean. (off record)

Q You don't remember anything like this making him angry.

B No. I do know this, that when he said he wanted something done that was impossible he wanted it done tomorrow. I can give you an example.

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At that time his title was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army under Gen Marshall.

Q This must have been early in the war.

B And Gen Weaver was at that time so-called Chief of the Air Corps. I've forgotten what the day was, Friday or Saturday. And he told Gen Weaver that the Air Corps would have an Officer Candidate School in operation in Miami Beach by the following Wednesday, about three or four days. That was quite a deal but, believe it or not, we did have it in operation. Gen Weaver called, I think it was Gen Jimmy Stowell in Texas and told him to go to Miami Beach, and set the thing up. We called Sheppard Field and told them to select several hundred trainees there of officer quality and send them there as students. At that time I was--I've forgotten exactly what my official position was, but I called the Field Artillery and borrowed 50 officers from them and I called the Infantry and borrowed 50 officers from them and sent them down as instructors for a period of three months before we--so that during that time we could get our own people down there. And by golly, on the next Wednesday, three or four days later, the school was in operation. That's the kind of steps Arnold demanded and the kind of steps he got from his staff.

Q Somebody told me this story in a slightly different context. It was something to do with a fake telephone call. In other words, he pretended that if Weaver couldn't do it, Arnold was going to call so-and-so, and have him do it. And Weaver said: "Yes, sir, I'll do it." At first Weaver balked. He said he couldn't do it by next Wednesday. And Arnold went through the motions of calling somebody else: "If you can't, I can get somebody who will. And then, Weaver bowed to this pressure.

B I got my instructions from Weaver.

Q Weaver was an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. I think Brett was the Chief then. Weaver was not one of Arnold's favorites?

B I know, but he was a very efficient guy.

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Q He ended up down in North Carolina.

B That's right

Q Did Arnold push him out of there?

B I don't know. It was so confused then with the Air Staff. Sammy Cousins was A-1 over in the Air Staff; so-and-so was Chief of the Air Corps; so-and-so was Deputy Chief of the Army Air Forces on the War Department General Staff. It was awfully confused.

Q This is early in the war. There wasn't a clear organization?

B That's right. And they were continually reorganizing.

Q Arnold brought in, right after Pearl Harbor, two bright young men: Cabell and Norstad, and then he brought in McRae, Bill McRae, a Reserve officer.

B I don't remember him at all. I remember Cabell, Kuter, Norstad.

Q He was a Reserve officer. He is a District Judge now in Jacksonville.

B I wasn't involved with them directly. I used to talk to Cabell and Norstad and Kuter because I had known them personally.

Q I wonder if you touched on the reason that Arnold brought these men in. The organizational structure was so confused that is was sometimes hard to get straightened out who was going to do what, with a particular problem. And Arnold wanted direct responsibility, so he gave the problem to a man working directly for him: Kuter, or Cabell or Norstad and say: "I want this done," and let these guys monitor the problem through the Air Staff. Is this good reasoning?

B I can't answer that definitely but I do happen to know that of those three: Cabell, Norstad, and Kuter, I dealt more with Kuter than any of them. Whether it was because Gen Arnold gave him that particular responsibility or not, I can't answer. As I say, I was just one of the pick-and-shovel boys. I wasn't keeping a diary, which I understand was against regulations anyway. And I knew that I wasn't going to be one of the big shots. I was just doing a day to day job. I wasn't in on a lot of this politicking, so to speak.

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Q Do you know that Arnold kept diaries on all his arips? Teheran, Cairo, Casablanca

B No. He had the gift of being able to write. He wrote books.

Q Do you remember him when he was writing books? at Fort Riley Do you remember anything specific about it?

B Yes. The only thing I remember is, he asked us all there if any of us had any recollection of any individual events that might be of interest to put in a book. As I remember he was writing boys' books.

Q "Billy Bruce" series

B He was trying to find out some experience that any of us had had that might fit in to his books.

Q Let's return to World War II. One of the things that upset Arnold was somebody putting him off, saying "I'll take care of it" without giving him a specific constructive answer. Another thing that upset him was excessive drinking or reports of excessive drinking on his staff members. I think of several.

B One particularly--Maitland--and Claude Duncan. Those are the only two that I personally had any knowledge of.

Q How about Ed Perrin

B No. I don't remember. No experiences with him.

Q He gave Maitland several chances though. He was more tolerant of Maitland than others?

B No. I think with Claude Duncan he was tolerant. Because he gave Claude a command of B 26's and said "Cut the mustard or else." And I think Claude did for a while there, and I don't know whether he reverted.

Q Claude Duncan told me that he got into a situation, a drunken brawl some place, I think probably North Africa and then he was cut back. He finally made his star again.

B Claude was in trouble all the time, even back in Kelly Field in 1926. He and--I think it was John I. Moore--we'd been on a student cross-country--

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I was a student at this time--up to Waco or something like that--and Claude had gotten pie-eyed, and couldn't fly his own airplane back. So they decided that some student would fly his plane back and he'd ride back with John I. Moore. And he was in the back seat of this DH, and John and I had to land at Austin for gas or something and he had no passenger. And he hit a bump or something and Claude had fallen out. He had parachuted. I can remember when John and I came in and landed at Kelly Field and he said: "I have no passenger." Pretty soon Claude telephoned in.

Q He was conscious enough to pull the rip cord?

B Yes

Q Another thing that exercised Arnold. My own analysis: Arnold was a little bit prudish, in other words he was 19th Century in respect to some of his staff fooling around outside the home. There were a couple of people who were supposed to have engaged in activities like this that he sent away from him. One of them was Minton Kaye. Remember him?

B Mint Kaye. Photographic Officer. I never knew that about General Arnold and I didn't know that about Mint Kaye either.

Q I don't know this for a fact about Kaye, but I was told this. Kaye was a favorite of his. For example, you mentioned the USAT Republic in 1931. Kaye was a newly-minted 2nd Lieut. He was on that ship with Helen Kaye, his wife. Mrs. Arnold took a fancy to Helen Kaye, a young bride. When they arrived at March Field, because of the relationship between the Arnolds and the Kayes, Mint Kaye had ready access to Arnold's office.

B I know that he was a favorite of Arnold's. And apparently he got nice jobs, and did a nice job in the photographic business.

Q Well, he did a nice job except that Mint Kaye and George Goddard were at sword's points. Did you know this?

B No

Q Goddard--have you seen his book?--called OVERVIEW. Goddard was sent out of Washington, and Mint Kaye was kept on. Kaye was sort

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of an operator in the photo business whereas George Goddard was a genius. Eventually Goddard came back to Washington, and Kaye was sent out parly because he had angered Arnold for some reason--attributed to have been his fooling around.

B A little extracurricular activity?

Q Yes. I was told Kaye is now remarried. I don't know whether his first wife died or he simply left. Anyway, Arnold used to write these love letters to his own wife. I have seen many of them. So he might have been a little prudish on the matter of extracurricular activities.

B He could have been. I wouldn't be surprised, but I never had any knowledge of . And he never spoke to me about anybody else.

Q Being in the Personnel business, you might know of somebody who strayed and got clobbered.

B Not for those reasons.

Q Several people got on his list. I don't know whether I mentioned to you some of these people. One, I think, was Shepler FitzGerald. Did you have any knowledge why FitzGerald... ?

B No. As I said before, I didn't keep a diary. I know there are a lot of names that are oldtimers, older men at that time who were so-called "Deadwood." I'm not going to try to remember any of the names, because I can't. Now, I can remember names of old timers: there are Netherwood, Shep FitzGerald, Sue Clagett, etc. Whether any of those were on that particular list that I've mentioned, I don't know

Q Well, the three that you mentioned, according to Wray, were on his list.

B I know, according to him, they were. But I don't remember that they were. I wouldn't say they were. I wouldn't be surprised if they had been.

Q Arnold never discussed with you Personnel problems about whether a man was suitable? Did he just discuss with you Personnel policy? Rotation of personnel, or some general policy, rather than individuals?

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B He discussed individuals with me, personally, once in a while, about general officers such as that. However, not to the extent of saying: "I think we ought to send so and so over to command the Southwest Pacific, etc." No, not that way. But he used to ask occasionally my opinion of some of the lesser Generals. Now, I have the feeling that he did discuss those things with people like Larry Norstad, people on his personal staff. I wasn't on his personal staff. I was pretty well down. We had a motor-boat that brought us over from Bolling Field over to the Pentagon every morning. Quite a few of us General Officers lived at Bolling Field and we had this boat that took us over every morning.

Q You were one-star then?

B No, I was two-stars. I can remember that Larry Norstad or Pre Cabell, or Jake Smart--that was the one I was trying to think of awhile ago. And they said: "We have to worry about so and so in charge of this... Possum Hansell, maybe he hasn't got it...what do you think?"

Q They talked on the boat?

B On the boat. Just informal. But I was never involved in some of that higher stuff. I used to write up their promotions. And, incidentally, speaking of that, I don't remember ever seeing Stan Wray's name on the list.

Q Wray's name wasn't on the list. Arnold never put him on the list.

B I know, but the list had to be made up, someplace.

Q He must have made General after Arnold left?

B He made it after I left the Personnel business. But as I said--Wray said according to your transcript--that he was on the list of April of 1943, and that was long before he came to Washington.

Q He had a very good combat record in 8th Air Force...

B I know. Stan was a fine officer, and he was a very forceful officer. So I'm not surprised at some of the things he said in that transcript.

Q The transcript accurately reflects his thoughts?

B Yes. I have no comments or complaints about Stan, because I thought

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he was an excellent officer. But I can see where he had very set, personal opinions and ideas.

Q You mentioned Possum Hansell. You were perhaps in the Personnel business high enough to have recalled when Arnold made, or leaned toward a decision that Possum Hansell was not going to make it in the 20th Air Force. Now, the date of this, specifically, was January 1945. Were you there?

B No. I left in December 1944.

Q Hansell had just started out in November 1944 the B-29 raids from Saipan and Guam. Arnold rapidly became disenchanted. He was a very impatient man. If the results did not show up immediately, he was looking to make a change.

B That's right; that was Hap's chief...

Q Would you say he shot from the hip?

B He was a real sudden guy.

Q When he shot from the hip, do you think he gave careful thought to...

B I think he had given careful thought before he did the shooting, but when he made up his mind--bing--there was no "What do you think?" or anything like that. He went. He was a dynamic leader. There is not a question in the world about that.

Q Many people, well, let's say, several people told me that Arnold would rather make a hundred decisions and be wrong in a number of them, let's say, 20 or 30 of them, than not make any decisions in fear or concern that he would make a wrong one.

B I didn't say it, but I agree with that. Boy, he'd make a decision just like that.

Q He was willing to take a chance on being wrong a certain percentage of times. But he wanted to move?

B I don't know if he was willing to be wrong in a certain percentage. He thought he wasn't going to be wrong in any of them. But he would make the decision, a quick one.

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Q If a decision turned out badly, as some of them did, did he say: "I made the wrong move; I want to recoup", and do something else, or did he simply do something else without admitting he was wrong?

B Maybe he did to somebody else; he never admitted to me. And there was no reason why he should. He was the big guy and I was one of the troops.

Q Do you recall any specific decisions that you think were wrong--in the Personnel field?

B Yes. In the case of the General I mentioned...

Q How about in the rotational policy I mentioned. They had 25 missions. Then they took that off, and then put it back on.

B I can't answer about how he felt about it. I do know what some of the people overseas felt about it. For instance, in June 1944, just when we were about to break out of the Normandy beachhead, I was over in England, and I went to see Jimmy Doolittle. And he said to me: "The only trouble with you guys over there is you don't send me the kind of people I want." And I said: "What kind of people do you want?" And he said: "I don't want any replacements who haven't had combat experience, and have at least an excellent efficiency report." And I said: "Well, after all, everybody doesn't have that particular qualification, and those that we do have with that qualification are distributed evenly around ahe world. What about George Kenney?" He said: "I don't give a damn about George Kenney. I'm just thinking about what I want.' Well you see that put me on the spot. Because I was sitting in Washington and my job was to try to give everybody an equal break. I couldn't give Doolittle all of the good people and Kenney all of the punks--not the punks, but I mean the inexperienced ones. We had to distribute the wealth. And the same thing, coming back. When these colonels would start coming back for rotation everybody would start crabbing about: "I want so-and-so and so-and-so, and it got so bad that once a week, or once every ten days I had a meeting in my office and I had all of the heads, the Training and Supply and Operations, and whatnot,

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all of the generals there. I was then A-1, and I would sit there and I guess Stan Wray at this time would bring in all these colonels who were due for reassignment, and he would read off the record and the history of each one of them, and then we would take a vote. And if this fellow should go to Training, if the others agreed that he should go to Training, he went to Training, and we did that so that they couldn't complain of the fact that we were arbitrarily assigning people to the wrong places. But it was only for the full colonels.

Q You brought up something that brings to mind the attitude of Kenney. Kenney was not kindly disposed toward taking anybody from Headquarters. He wanted to promote his own people to the top jobs. Is this so?

B I don't know

Q Do you recall any problem they had?

B No. He was very receptive. I think he thought that we were doing the best we could. On his own promotions, I don't know. He probably wrote that directly to General Arnold.

Q He did. You had a number of people who were trying to get overseas, who were staff members who had been there a couple of years, and they wanted to get their own combat records. Arnold had trouble sending any of these people to Kenney. Kenney wanted to promote his own people into the key jobs. Do you recall any of that?

B No. When Kenney came to Washington and Doolittle came to Washington, and the Chinese Air Force came to Washington, I talked to all of them, and I just told them that as far as we were concerned here, the replacements that they got, we were going to distribute equally.

Q I may have asked you about this, but I'll just touch on it again. You were in Headquarters when Arnold decided to send Eaker down to the Mediterranean, and bring Spaatz in to ETO and Doolittle into the 8th Air Force. When he brought Doolittle into the 8th and he made Spaatz USSTAF Commander of the Strategic Air Force.

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B I was there but I had nothing to do with it.

Q But did you hear anything or do you recall the rationale behind Arnold's decision to take Eaker out?

B No

Q Eaker was quite unhappy about that. He went down to the Mediterranean. He became MAAF.

B When Idwal Edwards came back I went over, and I was his Deputy.

Q Idwal Edwards was one of Eaker's close associates.

B They had been Executives in the Chief's office years and years before. 1926 as a matter of fact. When I transferred from the Field Artillery to the Air Force, Eaker and Idwal were sitting there alongside of each other.

Q Eaker and Spaatz are still buddies. They're very, very close.

B All I remember about Eaker and Spaatz is that when Spaatz would come down to Italy, they'd have a friendly poker game, and when Eaker went up some place else, they'd get together. I remember shortly after I arrived in Italy, in January of 1945, I think it was the next month was February. I was brand new and I didn't know what was going on. Anyhow, they had a meeting in Cannes and General Eaker asked me to go along. I attended this meeting. Maybe it was March. I've forgotten. Anyhow, I guess the Germans in Italy were just about finished.

Q Was Gen Arnold there?

B No. And Spaatz wanted some of the troops from Italy. They got together, and Eaker said: "You can have so-and-so and so-and-so, and they were very congenial about it and there were no problems. And then, after it was all over, about 11:00 that night they started playing a little poker and I went to bed. Slats Schlatter and I went downstairs and had a drink, and then we came up and went to bed. About four o'clock in the morning, somebody came in and woke me up and said that Eaker's A-4, Colonel Eaton, had just spun in with a B-a5 in the south of France. So

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I had to go in and wake up Ira Eaker and tell him that he'd lost his A-4. And as far as I know, Eaton--you might be able to check on this--Eaton was the only one that I know of that was promoted to Brigadier General after he was dead. I understand that his name had gone in, but he was killed in the meantime. And Eaker or somebody pushed it through.

Q This meeting in C[a]nnes that you talked about, was followed by another meeting in Cannes a month later with Arnold present.

B Arnold was never present at any meeting that I was there.

Q This was in April 1945

B Arnold came to Caserta

Q In April '45?

B I've forgotten whether it was April

Q It was right around the end of the war?

B I was in Caserta from January until August, and Arnold came there just once while I was there.

Q I believe he was in Caserta on V-E Day, or somewhere very close to that date, in early May.

B Could have been. I know he had a doctor with him. Doctor Gil Marquand. A heart specialist. I understand he is dead now. And Gil Marquand had been down at Coral Gables when I was down there, so I knew him right well. He and I went around while he told Gen Arnold to go and take a rest in the afternoon. Can't recall dates.

Q This was in either April or May 1945. The reason I bring up this meeting at Cannes--it was on April 19, a week after Roosevelt died. And Eaker was traveling around the world. Eaker had already been made Deputy Commander of the AAF. * * * one of the subjects they talked about was getting close to the new Commander in Chief, Harry Truman. The AAF had felt that it was not in a good position with Roosevelt, a Navy man. And here was a new Commander coming in. One proposal they made was to put Quesada into the job as Air Aide to the President. Do you have any knowledge of that meeting?

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B Never heard of it. That was very high level.

Q Then Eaker came back and he became the Deputy Commander. Meantime, Arnold didn't stay around much in Washington. He went off to the Pacific a month or two later. And when he came back he already had his mind on his farm. Arnold was ready to retire.

B He was going around in a wheel chair at that time. I remember in Washington he had this heart attack and General Marshall said: "You ride around in a wheel chair." He had a mechanized wheel chair.

Q Trubee Davison went around in a wheel chair, too.

B Trubee was crippled, really cracked up. But that wasn't because of a heart attack. He was crippled.

Q I talked to Trubee Davison. He lives in Long Island. He must be 85. I mentioned this Arnold being in a wheel chair. Some people denied it.

B I've seen him in it. He needed it. He hated it but he used it.

Q Eaker was Deputy Executive Commander and he was on the job. Spaatz was in the Pacific and he was head of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. Eaker was really running the Air Force for a period of time. Do you think Eaker had aspirations to take over when Arnold left?

B I'm sure he did. I'm positive. I don't know why I say that but I'm sure he did

Q I have been told by some people that Eaker tried to take over the job and he began to shunt all the paper work away from Arnold's staff into his own office. Do you know anything about that?

B I can't answer that. Along at the end... The only thing I had to do with Eaker was, first, when he was Executive and I was Assistant Executive, and that was in 1941, and that was just plain old routine paper work. The next time I had anything to do with him was when he was Commanding General of MAAF over in Italy, and I went over there in January of 1945 to take Idwal Edwards' place who came home. I wasn't in on any of this high level stuff.

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Q You say that you thought he had aspirations to take over as Commanding General of the Air Force?

B I'm sure.

Q Did he give you any indication in his actions or demeanor?

B No. He didn't say anything to me, but you can just tell when a guy had that feeling.

Q Was there scuttlebutt in the Pentagon that he had aspirations to this job?

B I wasn't in the Pentagon, but I think there was an unconscious reaction that I got hold of that he was fighting Tooey Spaatz for the job. And Tooey Spaatz won out.

Q Tooey Spaatz was senior.

B I know, but senior people have been skipped before.

Q This has to do with a plane ride that Stan Wray took to Washington.

B I read that. I know nothing of it. It could have happened.

Q He took off in socked-in weather and Arnold got mad at him?

B I haven't the slightest recollection. It could have happened. He was the Army Controller.

Q I want to ask you about the decision to take a lot of aviation cadets and make infantry out of them. This is late in the war. Did you get involved in that decision--or in that policy?

B No. But I got involved in the business of when the Signal Corps signed up all the eliegible people that wanted to be flying cadets, and they had them signed up for years and years and years in advance, and we couldn't get them. So we went to town on that, and broke that down in the War Department General Staff. It just happens that the personnel officer of the Signal Corps was my brother's brother-in-law. I couldn't stand the guy myself and I thought he was nuts. But he just went completely haywire, and he signed up hundreds of thousands of these kids.

Q Was this Ingles?

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B No. He was Personnel Officer of the Signal Corps and he signed up all of these kids. "You can't do anything except come in the Signal Corps when we call you." And they were all the kind of kids we wanted in the Air Force. We broke that down. No I don't remember anything about the other.

Q Right about the time of the Battle of the Bulge they were running short of infantry.

B I wasn't here then. I did hear something about that. I heard rumblings of it, that they needed more officers for the infantry and that they should take some of the Aviation Cadets. We had air superiority at the time.

Q A lot of guys were sitting around; they were waiting for training.

B And we had air superiority and they figured they could cut down on the air

Q Did I ask you about Elliott Roosevelt?

B You didn't ask me about him. All I know about him is that he had a photographic squadron flying these Mosquitoes down to Africa.

Q He was always causing problems because he was perhaps taking advantage of his position.

B I only saw him once as far as I know. That was at a staff meeting when Gen Arnold was there, and all the rest of us. And he came in and he described what he was doing with his photo squadron, flying down to Africa.

Q Do you recall that he created any kinds of problems? Of course, this dog incident occurred after you left?

B Not to my knowledge

Q There were attempts to promote him in 1944?

B I know that.

Q Arnold opposed it. Did you know that?

B I think I remember something about it.

Q

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Q But over his (Arnold's) opposition he was promoted. Papa had something to do with it. Going back to the early part of the war. I was told that Arnold got rid of his opposition. There were several contenders for the throne, so to speak. Emmons, Andrews, Brett--to name three who might have been the top man. And each of these men was sent overseas, or to some outside post, and this story got around. Did you hear this story?

B Sure I've heard it, but I can't give you any answers on it because, as I say, that was handled by the Chief of Staff not at my echelon. At that time I was a colonel, lieutenant colonel even. And nobody asked me my opinion who I thought should be the Chief of the Air Corps at that time. Andrews was head of whatever they called it at the time. Brett was some place else, and Emmons was some place else. They were all top guys; there was no question about it. Who made the decision to select Arnold? somebody had to make that decision.

Q Marshall did.

B Of course he did. So I would have no idea what it was all about

Q Let me ask you about A-1 and G-1. The G-1 was Hilldring.

B I liked John very much.

Q Did G-1 give A-1 its own way in the matter of Air Force personnel policy?

B When John Hilldring was G-1, War Dept General Staff, there was an A-1 on the Air Force Staff who was Sammy Cousins. I was in Personnel. It wasn't called A-1 over where I was, but I used to go over to John Hilldring; John Dahlquist was there, and Miller White was there and Bob Maylon who was an Air Force General who was over there so I used to go over and talk to them quite frequently. But until the Air Force got rid of all this Air Staff in there in-between, we had no real meeting with them. For instance, we'd make a recommendation for a general officer. Then we'd have to go to Sammy Cousins who was A-1, and A-1 would send us to G-1. You see what

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I mean? In the Army. And it just didn't work out. So damned complicated. It was just hard to understand. But I liked John Hildring very much. He was a good friend of mine.

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

Dear Murray,

21st December, 1971.

I hope you are not concerned about my silence. I have been busy as hell going over papers and trying to put order into my files so as to make them more useful for the purpose of Air Force History and at the same time of general military historical value for what was in my period the W.D. I will soon be ready to send a rather extensive grist to General Ginsburgh.

I want to be of as great assistance to you as my files and recollections will allow. Of course I want to be sure that these efforts are co-ordinated through General/

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General Ginsburgh who has been so helpful in this rather complex situation.

With all good wishes for Christmas, and for 1972.

Ed (Bowles)

The word above, as underlined, was intended to apply to the useful nose [illegible] collection, not to any implied authority. Sorry!

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

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WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

20th October, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D.C. 20314.

Dear Murray:

I found the visit with General Ginsburgh very helpful, and I am grateful to you for having turned one of my letters that was pertinent over to him, and which brought about this meeting in clarification of the problems on both sides on your Arnold project.

I have had a very busy time of it - Washington, Kodaly, and then Saint Louis, and now a good part of this week devoted to Bentley. Next week I hope to pull together quite a mass of material I have in some organized form, which I will get off to the Air Force for your use.

Sincerely
EWB

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& May 7,

Interview, Dr. Edward Bowles, Wellesley Hills, Mass., May 6, 1971.

Q: How did you come to work for Secy Stimson? I saw some documents, by the way, in his diary on this, I believe it was April 1942 when you first came.

B: You were asking when -- it was April 1, 1942.

Q: I saw documents in his diary where they were concerned about the ASW problem and they called it ASV at that time. Somebody wrote in pencil along a piece of paper in his file, "Dr. Bowles," and they were very much interested in expediting your appointment.

B: Well, let me go back just a little bit to help you, and perhaps help myself. This is not for your purposes, excepting orientation. I came east to take a graduate degree at MIT, I had studied electrical engineering, and in those days, this is 1916 to 1920, power machinery was the thing.

Q: This work and partidpation, you said it was around 1930-31.

B: I can get papers here in no time for the precise date.

Q: Well, Arnold probably was, he might have had his LTCOL, I'm not precisely sure of the date. But up to the end of 1931 he was stationed in Wright Field, Fairfield. He was in charge of the Fairfield Depot, and he was mostly concerned with materiel, supplies, things of this sort. But he always had an interest in R&D.

B: He was our contact man, we knew him in the Munitions Building in Washington. We had to sell King, Arnold and a fellow named Metcalf--one of these periods. I found King not very understanding and very unsympathetic.

Q: Well, he seldom changed from that role.

Q: Let me ask about that particular period, we are talking '39 or '40. Arnold succeeded Westover in Sep 1938, and of course, he

became a member of the NACA and attended meetings of the NACA. One of the principal activities that he was involved in at that time was to sponsor greater cooperation between university research laboratories and the Government. You see, the Army and Navy had concentrated their research in their own arsenals and in-house research. The AF had no in-house research. Maybe they would have done it the same way, so they went out-house.

B: And they went also to the Signal Corps.

Q: Right, they had to work through the Signal Corps because they were a Corps within the Army, and this created, as you better know than anybody else, a problem. Did you get involved in any of the activity, any of the search--MIT was one of the institutions that they canvassed to try to harness the research that MIT and others were doing, to national defense. Did you get involved in any of that?

B: Well, I guess I was one of the first exponents, in the sense of getting tied in with them on all this instrument-landing work. That was the beginning of our association with the military. We went on into fog dissipation and cloud physics and heaven knows what else. At the time of the war, I already had exposure to the Signal Corps, to the Aircraft Radio Lab, and also to the Navy. They had their Lab at Anacostia, I had long since visited there.

Q: Did you have any contact with Arnold in the '39-40 period?

B: Well, I had it only in connection with this work.

Q: Vannevar Bush, of course, set up the NDRC which became the OSRD.

B: That is right.

Q: Did he do that to sort of keep the military at arm's length?

B: Just the opposite.

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Q: Just the opposite?

B: The problem as I see it, goes back to the Civil War. Lincoln tried to regiment the technical forces of the country. At that time, the National Academy of Sciences was formed. This is my understanding of the historical fact. It was supposed to help. I don't find that there were any conspicuous contributions. When World War I came along, there was added to the National Academy, the National Research Council to help. Without meaning to denigrate their efforts, nothing conspicuous coccurred.

Q: This is Bush's view?

B: This is my interpretation of what motivated him. I know the man extremely well. He had the vision to see that if you tried to regiment these technical scientists--the American Academy and the National Academy and the National Research Council, which was still in existence, we would still have a bunch of people arguing committee-like, and not doing anything. So he conceived the idea of setting up a national entity, that although it would recognize the existence of these central professional societies, which really had by now gotten into what you might now call kudos organizations. Well, you get honored by becoming a member rather than anything else. Substituting for that, a body that could act, a body that could have money and authority. And Bush therefore, rather shrewdly, as I see it, set up a National Defense Research Committee, this of course, was with the President's full assent, which comprised the President of the National Academy.

Q: We get to spring 1942. This war has started, the NDRC is organized and the Germans are sinking ships all over the Atlantic coast....

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B: Now Stimson was exercised because he felt that we should make the utmost use of technological resources, particularly was stimulated by the concept of radar. And he had heard what the RAF Coastal Command was doing. No, the Coastal Command was a mongrel organization, in that it worked for the Navy. The admiralty had under its disposal, under its operational command, what was called Coastal Command, an RAF unit to hunt submarines, just for that purpose.

Q: How did Stimson become so interested in that?

B: Well, we were losing our ships to the Army.

Q: But there were many, many other problems. He seemed "obsessed," a very strong word, but this problem engaged his interest more than any other problem at the start of the war.

B: Let me put it this way. Stimson perceived that there was no plan for the Battle of the Atlantic...

Q: Not an organized plan?

B: That's right.

Q: The Navy had its plan; the AAF had its plan...

B: Yes. Now, he came into an environment where the Navy and the Army were fighting -- you might say violently -- and the center of the battle, rather than being the submarine problem in the Atlantic, was the Navy's fear of the Army Air Corps getting any piece of the action. Arnold, in turn -- this is my interpolation -- Arnold, was interested in building a real strategic air force, I mean he had the concept of the long-range bomber. The Navy was scared to death because-- these are my views -- their function was to carry the flag to foreign waters. And so, the fight was between the two of them at that level. The King group, not wanting the AF to build any long-range bomber

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strikes, and the Army Air Corps, particularly with Arnold's interest and energy was to build a strategic air arm. I'm not going to argue about the wisdom, but this engaged our attention when the attention should have been on submarines. Now, I'll come back to Stimson. Stimson comes in the midst of these altercations, these strong differences of opinion. As I heard Marshall say later at a meeting, when Stimson was found to be hard-boiled, he said: "Mr. Secretary, you must remember that I have to work with King." Stimson was all for raising hell. Now to come back to my position which comes in at this point of the battle. We were losing something like 30% of our essential cargo going around archangel. We were losing 20 or 30% of the essential cargo coming up the Coast. And I'll point out later in the study I made which blew the lid off, the study showed that we were sending more ships around the Cape of Good Hope to get them over to Russia then we were sending directly to England. I'm saying these things to kind of answer your questions of Stimson's concern. The emphasis by the Navy was always on ships.

Q: Convoys?

B: No, I meant the statistics, ships sunk when--putting it in Stimson's homely terms--our interest was in the ships that got over. Secondly, our interest was in what was aboard those ships. But if you come back to the simpler element of it, the Germans could have the damn Atlantic if we weren't interested in it. But we were interested in it because we were trying to build up a force of combat strength to invade. That meant being able to carry men and supplies. If we couldn't do that, we couldn't mount our effort. Now, in Stimson's mind, it was just as simple as that. This study that I'll show you here, is on the acute problem of oceanborne transport, men and supplies,

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something like that. To get our mind off of it and on to the essential elements.

Q: Who recommended you to Stimson?

B: Now this I'm getting to right now. Stimson decided he wanted somebody to advise him. He'd been listening to all sorts of suggestions from inside and out. There was a man over in the Under Secretary's office, by the name of--I believe it was--Thompson. He didn't stay with us through the war. As far as I know, he volunteered, and he ought to have me over there. When the Air Force was approached--either Arnold or Lovett--they thought I was going to work for them. I had already been approached. Then as I told you, Culton had suggested to Somervell that they could get me to come down, and the paradox is that I got a call from Culton one morning, wanting to know if I could be in Washington the next morning to see Somervell. I said that I had to talk to Dr. Compton, who was my ultimate boss, before I said "yes." I was to call him back. Well, before I could get to Compton, I got another call from Somervell who wanted me down there the next morning. So I said I would be down, and I went down and consulted Gen Olmstead, Chief Signal Officer. He was to shepherd me around. Then, for some mysterious reason I was told by him that I was first to be taken to Mr. Stimson's office. That puzzled me a little bit. But anyway, I marched in there at the appointed hour--9:30 or whatever it was--I believe Bob Lovett was in there, I believe Jack McCloy was in there, and there were one or two others, maybe Harvey Bundy, I don't know. I shook hands with Stimson. To me he was God almighty, because I had never seen the man, and he was way up in the celestial area.

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Q: Arnold wasn't in there, was he?

B: I doubt it, I have no recollection of him. The passages to the Panama Canal, a report on radar.

Q: Watson Watts, yes, he made it for Stimson. Stimson had just come back from a visit to the Panama Canal.

B: That's right. The Old Man said: "Could you read a report aloud and follow the content?" This I remember vividly, because I was scared to death. And having been in court many times with patent cases, there was no answer but "yes." So he handed me what turned out to be Watson Watts' report of the radar defenses of the Panama Canal. And he said: "I wish you would read each one of these findings and tell me whether you agree or disagree, and why." Well, it was a whole sheaf of paper....

Q: You say the Watson Watt report was "unfortunate?"

B: I meant for him. It gave me the opportunity to find things to talk about, anyway, all of a sudden, after about four points, Stimson said: "That's enough."

Q: Four points of objection?

B: He had four items--the first four items of the report I went through--and that was enough for Stimson. He said -- I think I can recall this almost precisely--he said: "I've been receiving a lot of gratuitious advice on radar, and I want someone in my office to tell me what to do and I'll do it." Then, he said: "I've asked the air force, who would give me a man for the purpose, and they suggested a man, name of Bowles." He said: "I asked Gen Somervell what he was doing about all this." He was going to have a Prof. Bowles come down.

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Q: We want to connect your ASW job to Arnold. What was the first thing you did when you got into that capacity, or you know, the important things?

B: The most foolish thing--I came in and I was scared half to death, asked for copies of the Army regulations so I could learn something about the organization. A flunky started bringing in books and papers into the office. Within 15 minutes I decided I would be getting them all through the war, and do no work. The first thing I did was to check up on where we stood with radar and airplanes. I had a decided advantage in that in NDRC I had been working with the Air Force, the Procurement Division, but, paradoxically, with the Signal Corps, the Aircraft Radio Lab at Wright Field.

Q: Do go back to the ASW. When did your efforts start to meet with some success?

B: I'll fill in just one little gap for you. The reason I had an advantage is that it suddenly occurred to me that we could use this radar, not necessarily for bombers, but surface search.

Q: What did ASV stand for?

B: Air-to-Surface Vessels. Now the British coined the term, and I went up to Halifax, for instance, before I went to Washington to look at the old fashioned ASV, the long-wave ASV that the British had already developed. We had taken on the micro-wave side of it. So, before I went to Washington, I had the idea of taking some of this radar that we were preparing--we were preparing 15 units for the 15 experimental Black Widows. So it suddenly occurred that that radar could be used for surface search. So I got ahold of I don't remember who it was in the AF, "Admiral" Sims.

Q: T.A. Sims, they called him "Admiral."

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B: Yes, I got to admire him very much and he gave us--just before I went to Washington--he gave us quite a rough talk to let us know that we didn't know everthing we ought to know.

Q: He's still in Washington. Does he know something about Arnold?

B: He would know a good deal. He used to work for the Hamilton Propeller. He put this black widow radar into B-18s and go out and try it on submarines. So, the first thing I did when I got to Washington with Stimson, was to collaborate with the AF and set up what we called SADU, which was an experimental anti-submarine unit.

Q: Surface-to-Air Detection Unit (SADU).

B: Using the B-18s and going out and hunting submarines.

Q: Is that what that stood for -- Surface-to-Air Detection Unit? Did it work?

B: Well, if you talk to the Navy, no. They were so angry about it, and I can show you the effects of it. I have all the plots, every week, of their sinkings. We started to use those off the Atlantic seaboard, and they damn well found submarines. Whether or not we sank them was something else, but we certainly were on them with depth charges. You could just see them moving away from the Atlantic seaboard.

Q: What was the essential conflict between the Navy and the AAF? Obviously both wanted to hunt down the submarines, but they either were jealous of one another, this too, but they also had different techniques of doing it, didn't they?

B: I think we can say principally, there was this business of roles and missions. Jealousy--whatever it was--it was an impossibility of working together. The argument centers when you get down to the

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operating level--we were perfectly willing to put airplanes under the operational control of the Navy--but the trouble with that was, that their idea of operational control was that the AF would be flunkies, housekeepers, because they didn't know anything about flying over water.

Q: Did they want Navy pilots to fly the land-based planes?

B: No, but they wanted to determine how and where we flew. It's a complicated thing, because it was a kind of psychosis, to clarify. The Admiralty very quickly learned that you had to treat the submarine problem just like any other Navy fleet problem. They first tried to run it, as Admiral King did--Admiral King ran the thing all through the war from the Navy Building--whereas he would never think of running a Pacific fleet from there. He would put an Admiral in charge of the fleet and give him his broad charges. King never let go of the submarine problem, even when he set up the 20th Fleet. (NOTE: 10th Fleet) Now, the British learned the mistake of their ways, right away quickly. They now picked an Admiral, put him in charge of the submarine work, and put him on the western approaches. The battle with the Royal Air Force was solved. The RAF gave them a unit of aircraft called the Coastal Command and those boys worked under the operational control of the Admiral. But by God, they did their own laying out. Their mission was stated, but from that point out, they did their own hunting of submarines. Now the Navy would accept nothingof that sort from the AF. They had already done some work with putting micro-radar on blimps, and the submarines loved that, because all they had to do was shoot down the blimps.

Q: Did they shoot any down?

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B: As far as I know, yes.

Q: During '42 and '43, do you recall any specific contacts you had with Arnold? Did some issues come up where he'd call you into his office and make policy decisions?

B: The times, you see, I've got to worry about dates here.

Q: Well, I'll try to fill in the dates if you tell me what happened.

B: I have to measure this with the time I went in as his man.

Q: Yes, this was in '43, summer. You worked for Stimson directly for about 15 months before you went into the Army Air Forces--although you may have been working for them unofficially. This report on oceanborne transport is March 1, 1943, which means that you worked for Stimson directly approximately a year, a little less?

B: Yes, indirectly. Of course, with Marshall, nothing that I was doing, wasn't a part of Marshall's and McNarney's office. I was smart enough not to separate myself.

Q: To get back to this question of Arnold calling you in, were there any such occasions during this first year?

B: It was mainly Stimson called Arnold in, while I was in his office.

Q: All right, do you remember any specific occasion, and if so, what issues were kicked around?

B: The bomber problem, using bombers on submarines and...

Q: B-24s?

B: That was always the practical ship, yes. We didn't use many, as I remember, we did use some B-17s later.

Q: They had this LB-30 which was an older ship.

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B: One of my earliest contacts with Arnold was in his office. He was talking about the use of the B-18s.

Q: They had a couple of those kicking around from pre-war?

B: Yes, they had 15 usuable ones after they'd pulled the pieces off of others.

Q: Cannibalized?

B: This was very early, this was within oh, maybe a couple of months after I came down, because it involved AF equipment and Arnold was the first one to help me reach out. He gave instructions to get every god-damned, using his language, one of these things they put together, because he was delighted to compete with the Navy. He supported this operation completely. A thing that I called "settled."

Q: How much of it was competing with the Navy and how much of it was the Navy wasn't doing the job? The Navy was simply not protecting shipping at that time, and you needed some protection.

B: A crisis.

Q: Crisis, right. So how much of it was trying to do the job that had to be done, and how much of it was partisanship on Arnold's part, if any?

B: It's a good question, if I understand it. Arnold was trying his best to have the AF show its ability.

Q: ASW?

B: Right. Its versatility. But it touched his heart when it came to taking four-engine bombers for that purpose, and there he and Stimson, I sort of had quite a few discussions.

Q: Why did it touch his heart?

B: Taking them away, he had two people particularlly in his, I can't remember the name of the division that has to do with

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parceling out, allocations, exactly. One of them was old Orvil Anderson, whom I got to know well later.

Q: Might have been Muir Fairchild, maybe?

B: No, I was very close to him, Muir was in Requirements Division.

Q: Mervin Gross, was it OC&R, Barney Giles was involved in that before he became Chief of Air Staff, was that OC&R.

B: It could have been, I'll tell you who it was....

Q: You were arguing for the over-water use of four-engine bombers and Arnold did not have enough to go around. He considered the first call on the bombers sending them to Europe.

B: That's right.

Q: For this so-called operation BOLERO. They were building up the strategic air force. So he considered, I'm trying to state his position--and correct me if you wish. He saw the number one problem as strategic bombing and perhaps a number two problem ASW, although....

Q: Is that a fair analysis?

B: Tactical support, support of the ground forces, now, he didn't want the ground forces to start developing their own air.

Q: Was he exercised over the fact that the Navy was adamant about this, and these bombers reported to be ComSeaFrontier?

B: You see, he lost these bombers to the Navy, and was scared of this ghost of a Navy strategic command. It just chewed on him. He was smart enough to know....

Q: Did Arnold and Stimson get into these discussions that the Navy wanted these bombers because they wanted to set up their own Navy bombing?

B: Stimson never let that be the subject, he was a practical man, a very good businessman.

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Q: Did Stimson ever make critical comments about the Navy?

B: Not publicly. Oh yes, I was, you will see when you get into this submarine file. I've got the original copies of all this stuff. I was working by that time, right away quick with Marshall, McNarney, I made this remark to you about Stimson saying he had to work.

Q....An overall command of the ASW.

B: Overall command, and we were trying to pattern, what we were doing, after the Coastal Command, after the British, where they had a very harmonious relationship between air and surface. This command worked, and Stimson was all ready to go to Roosevelt, and raise hell about King's stubborness.

Q: Roosevelt was partial to the Navy, wasn't he?

B: I believe so, and I was in this conference. There was Marshall, Stimson and myself. Stimson was so irritated that he wanted to go and raise hell, and there were other reasons.

Q: About the Navy's intransigence?

B: Footdragging or intransigency, any word you want to use, and wanted the President to order King to set up an ASW command.

Q: A single ASW command - under whose control?

B: He was even willing to pick the admiral.

Q: In other words, FDR was willing to put it under an Admiral as long as it was one command?

B: Provided, this is all in documents, provided he did what the British did, and the surface tac unit under a Navy commander given its mission, and the Air under an Air Corps officer. Any Air, no matter whether it was considered by the Navy or the AF. It was then that Marshall said: "Mr. Secy, I must work with King," not wanting this

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to be brought to such an issue. There are other projects. All this material is in a once-upon-a--time top secret file, the various memos....

B: You asked me about exposure to Arnold. We had numerous conferences with him in connection with this ASW problem - always on the level of my being an Assistant to Stimson. But whatever the facts may be, he got so he must have liked me, though that I was a nettle. But the Navy was ordered to let me in on a conference on the allocation of aircraft.

Q: Were you afraid of Arnold? A lot of people were. Did you have butterflies when he called you up?

B: No.

Q: Were you connected to his buzz box, directly?

B: I was to Stimson's. But, wait a minute, you are right, I was.

Q: Later, when you became Expert Consultant for him?

B: That's right. Let me say one thing here. This has to do with me only. The man who brought me up at MIT in 1922, Prof D. C. Jackson, has the same way so you never knew just what was going to hit you.

Q: Was Arnold a man of few words? Did he come right to the point?

B: I have to be very careful here. Let me compare Arnold with Marshall. Marshall, a man of very few words, everyting pre-digested, a man of very orderly mind. Arnold was the colorful character, who would have inspirations. Called you in - never used his staff, never.

Q: Bypassed the staff?

B: The staff was a nuisance; just a necessary evil. This isn't a direct answer.

Q: Yes it is. You mentioned the time he overtook you in the hall. What led to that incident? Were you surprised by it, several questions there. You mentioned it in your letter.

B: I had written a bunch of snide, snooty memorada...

Q: To whom?

B: To Stimson. Now, I'm exaggerating, but I had no sense of military decor in correspondence. I mean I didn't follow procedures.

Q: This sort of made you more appealing to Arnold because he was a man

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who wanted to come to the point?

B: And I think you will see from a memorandum or two - let me back up again - I think this will be useful to you. One of the first things that I did, now that I think of it. Bush's organization had a MAD. Of course, it blew the top out of things, but it didn't get me thrown out, but this was sort of an indication of....

Q: Do you think this brought you to Arnold's attention?

B: You're damned right, and it also,of course, brought me to the Navy's attention because we went over a Navy ship -- I believe it was a destroyer -- and I discovered we had no means of communicating between the Army Air Corps airplanes and Navy ships.

Q: No common cryptographic devices?

B: No common radio.

Q: You mean frequencies? Is that right?

B: All we could do was wave a wing.

Q: This probably infuriated Arnold.

B: Well, it showed to the General,the nature of the situation.

Q: These are the kind of things that led up to his intercepting you in the hall.

B: Bears on your comments on communications which were pretty bad in the AF, and the lack of collaboration between the Signal Corps and the Air Corps. The Air Corps felt the Signal Corps shouldn't be telling them what kind of radar they needed. The Air Corps ought to know that. And they were right. Here were the Signal Corps people sitting behind a desk, pontificating on what kind of operational radar the Air Corps should have.

Q: This led to the Marshall directive of July 26, 1944?

B: Yes, that's right. So, I don't know what to call it. I had a nuisance value to Arnold. Here was a man of tremendous pride. He wanted his Air Force to be something. So instead of wanting to crucify me, or kick me out, it turned out that these very simple memoranda must have made him see that I wasn't trying to ride anybody. The fact that I set up SADU at the start, I think, it impressed Arnold tremendously because it gave him a role that he never dreamed of having.

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Q: SADU?

B: And they are the ones that opened the Navy's eyes, because what we did at SADU - this became a combat laboratory. We had scientists from GE down there. We had Radiation Lab boys (from MIT) come down. We had other people from the industry come down. They could fly with the AF boys flying the airplane, and spend a day with a B-24 about 800 feet above the water with no horizon, I mean where you really had to depend on the altimeter. It opened up a whole new avenue of collaboration between the industry, and the so-called scientists, and the AF. This appealed to Arnold. He helped me on that immensely any time I needed it.

Q: He grabbed you in the hall and he asked you to come to his office?

B: Now, on that occasion, literally, he was always very informal with me. This particular time, it happened exactly that way, I was walking down the hall to some place. Well, let me back up and give you the first instance. This is kind of interesting. I got a whang on the shoulder. And it was a real one. I looked up and here's this constellation. "Bowles! I want to talk to you. Come into my office." So I go down the hall with him, into his office: "I want you to take over all communications. It isn't going right. You know it."

Q: Was there some specific complaint or just a collection?

B: There were complaints, not only that I had written earlier of a modest nature, but there were complaints from the field. And he said: "I'm banishing McClelland."

Q: He said he was banishing McClelland?

B: Sending him down to Orlando. As you may know, that was the pasture.

Q: Staten Island?

B: I was taken aback. I said: "General, you know I'm responsible to Mr. Stimson, and I would have to talk to Mr. Stimson." He said: "You don't have to talk to Mr. Stimson. I can talk to the Secy. When are you ready to start?" I said: "General, I need a day to think this over." And of course, pounding his desk: "I don't want you to take time to think this over." I said: "I will report to you tomorrow morning, yes or no." I said: "You know as well as I do that I need to put my mind together, also to have some words with the

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Secretary. So, with that affirmative position on my part, he didn't fight. I went back in to see Joe McNarney, who,as you know, was next to Marshall.

Q: Deputy Chief of Staff.

B: And I said: "General" - I'd worked with him an awful lot -"I'm in box and I need some help. He looked at me. I told him what Gen Arnold said. He said: "You've come to the wrong place. Gen Marshall and Gen Arnold and I talked about this.

Q: This had already cleared their level?

B: Yes.

Q: Anyway, you came on the next day?

B: No, I didn't. Then I went to Gen Marshall; I had lunch with him.

Q: What was your problem? Why were you hesitating?

B: I'll tell you. I went to talk to Gen Marshall, he suggested we lunch. I told him what Arnold has asked me to do. I said: "If I go into uniform, if I were to accept a Colonelcy for example," I said, "I would be hopelessly lost. I would be hopelessly ineffectual."

Q: Did Arnold want you to come in uniform, or didn't you know how he wanted you to come on?

B: I wanted to know what to tell Arnold. I said: "I've seen Gen Knudsen running around here, three stars or two stars, and not only does he look out of place, but he feels out of place." I said: "I would have no respect of the military man if I had an artificial rank. On the other hand, the solution to this problem that Arnold has depends heavily on solving the problem with Somervell. I would be hopelessly lost with a three star general, and yet, that's where much of our problem lies. Now, I'm in the other fix. If you people have any feeling that I do not want to go into uniform, that I'm unwilling to go into uniform, then I'm lost.

Q: I don't understand.

B: I said: "I'm going to do this job for Arnold, I'm going to need Mr. Stimson's backing; I'm going to need your backing; and Arnold's backing. This will indicate that I must operate as a civilian.

Q: Let me ask this: Why this issue? Did Arnold suggest you put a

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uniform on? Were you anticipating that he would?

B: No, but I was playing my gave. I knew what I needed to do the job. Just to put me in the AF to run something wasn't going to work.

Q: He had already banished McClelland?

B: Marshall said: "I understand." You are talking about words, he never used many, and he said: "I can tell you, you can feel you are one of us." There are other arguments for that which I won't go into, so that solved my problem of power. We never would have gotten that later memorandum through on the transfer of all the things peculiar to the AF, from the Signal Corps, because it was a big battle, in which Arnold was very active. Now, I then fixed up a directive for the power to act for Arnold. Barney Giles was pale with fear because I put this through his hands for editing. Barney went in with me, and the Old Man said: "I won't have it," and he struck out some words. I wasn't going to take it, unless I took it on my terms, and the word he struck out was "electrical." I had written in "electrical communications." So I ended up having a bunch of pigeons, among other things. I had a letter with this - this is where McClelland comes in - I knew I couldn't do this job without pestering Arnold. So I asked that he would let me pick my cadre of staff officers. I asked him to rescind the orders on McClelland. And I'll be damned if he didn't do both. Now, this told me two things. It told me that he was back of picking people that I needed. It also told me that he was willing to reverse himself on the basis of my judgment. Now, I needed McClelland titularly. I wanted a top AF officer.

Q: He was two-star

B: No, he was one star. I got him his econd. He was never the man I would have liked to have, but he was the best one because he got along with the scientists and understood them, with tail between his legs. Then the thing I did, was to get, to pick Tom Rives who was a doer, a Signal Corps Officer, and had him made BG in the Air. That put him under McClelland to make up for McClelland's inability. Now, one more thing. A year later, I was in Arnold's office lunching with him: "Bowles, there is one thing I'd like to ask you. Why did you insist on my rescinding McClelland's orders." Well, I answered:

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"I needed this man in a titular way, because I felt for collaboration in the AF and cooperation, I needed an AF officer. He was the only one literally, who had any rapport with the NDRC side. I said I knew he was weak, but I could reinforce him in Tom Rives, who was a doer. I said: "I had to test you to see if you really meant to back me." The Old Man looked at me.

Q: He didn't get mad at that?

B: No, not at that. Nobody had ever been able to bulldoze the guy.

Q: What was your relationship with McClelland? Were you sort of his assistant titularly? In the pecking order, how did you and McClelland reconcile your roles? He was the Air Communications Officer, which meant he was the top dog on paper. Where did you fit in with him?

B: Everybody knew from the directive that was issued.

Q: Right, but what was your title in respect to him: Special Consultant?

B: I was his boss - plain English - he was my man on communications. Simple as that. Rives knew it as well as McClelland. McClelland was the guy who was - I never liked him - he had no guts. He had no guts in any way. That's the reason Arnold didn't like him.

Q: Surprising he kept him, and didn't put in someone else.

B: I turned around and got an extra star for him. Now the reason I did that was because the Technical Services had a very low rating, and we needed a higher rating for them to get any decent people to come in, because they all knew it was a deadend. But McClelland had his tail between his legs from the Year One, and I didn't give a damn because of Rives, but McClelland could move among the AAF people. To have a nonflyer wouldn't have worked.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of short questions. You said you expected to work for Arnold only a short time?

B: Because he fired everybody. Very few people lasted.

Q: Did he ever get angry with you?

B: Not in the ordinary sense, no. Let me say the meaning here. To illustrate, shown in one of the documents here, we regroomed a whole wing of B-29s with all the radar. We took all the armor off. This was a monumental piece of work. I'm not talking about myself. The industry helped us design this

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unit, and as you will see, it received a citation that never had visual bombing achieved the damage of this Wing.

Q: Was this the radar bombing wing, the 315th?

B: 315th. Now, I went in to see Arnold. There wasn't any officer who dared go in, and I had to be the one. I was master monitor of the project, but I always tried to let the military people do the jobs, because it was their job to do. Nobody wanted to tackle him because B-29s were so sensitive. And he ran those He was in command of the B-29s. I'd go in, and the usual approach, as far as I was concerned, was affirmative. "General, I'd like to take two of the B-29s" of some unit - I don't remember the number - and told him what I was going to do with them. I never said, "Could I do it." I said: "This is what I'm going to do." This was the secret with Arnold,really, the secret. "Bowles, you can't have them. I wouldn't give them to you. I will not disturb those B-29s. And we go through this desk pounding, and his face would get red. He'd calm down. I would just shut up. Now, let's see, if you went to the 23rd, or whatever it was, and take two of those." It had to be. It was a curious kind of face saving. But you never went into that man without an affirmative view. This is what you are going to do. All right, or he would throw you out. We never had a fight.

Q: You know, somebody told me when I asked did Arnold get mad frequently, and he said "Every day."

B: Depends on what you call it.

Q: Was this a release for him?

B: It was, what you might call irascible, I guess. I don't know what word to use. My man Jackson was the same way. He would blow up. If you'd just wait for him to cool off a little bit. Now with Arnold in the military, the boys were scared half to death. They were out of the office before they knew it.

Q: Did Arnold calm down after a while? Did he remember? Did he hold grudges? If he bawled somebody out and the guy didn't do a job

B: Through with him.

Q: But in the case of McClelland, he was considerably merciful, wasn't he?

B: He knew McClelland was chattel for me, and didn't impinge on him at all. He knew I knew McClelland was a weak sister.

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Q: You said that McNarney sort of filled in in areas where Arnold lacked interest, or was weak? Is this organizational?

B: I want to be careful of language, so I don't condemn a man. I'm emotional. I have just a tremendous admiration for Arnold, and when I say "weak" I mean "weak" in some respects. I don't want to have it appear that I told you that. "Weak" is a very strong word, but I'm thinking of - let me again try to illustrate this practically so it means something. McNarney at the instance of Marshall, made an inspection trip of the Caribbean Command. Now, in one sense, this was not the Army troops. Included in it, for one reason or another, was a quizzing of the Army Antisubmarine Command topside, some fighter support to be used against Japansee bombers and carriers. And the Antisubmarine type said that an effort in which they had contributed quite a bit of staff. Arnold did not go on that trip. This was a top level trip. I mean, he didn't participate in things like that; part one, I don't believe they appealed to him.

Q: Trips?

B: I mean inspection trips of that kind. Arnold loved to get out and get among the fighting boys - I'm talking about the bombers and the fighter pilots and the like - and he was a great one to build up their enthusiasm. But a business mission, where you go out to see how things are going from a management standpoint, I'd like to believe that that wasn't Arnold's forte. He was an inspirational guy. Now, don't misunderstand. He had this kind of talent that I believe I recognized from my own experience in the business world - limited as it may be. He would send an officer out as he did, K.B.Wolfe, I believe it was, to set up the B-29 base in India, Kharagpur.

Q: This was the 58th Wing?

B: Now, once it was set up, he was the first one to pull the guy out, much to K.B.'s discomfiture and disappointment, and put a fighter, a combat-minded man in.

Q: Blondie Saunders?

B: Blondie Saunders, absolutely, and that's where, who was the pilot?

Q: I would say this was good management.

B: You bet it's good management. My point is that he didn't have to go

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make trips for that kind of thing. They didn't interest him, but he had his mind on the pulse, he had a tremendous intuitive sense of what to do.

Q: Was he impatient with plumbing charts and briefings, for example? If they gave him a briefing with a lot of organization, who's responsible for what?

B: Results, results, results.

Q: Was he impatient with things like that? Did he cut guys off if they seemed to wander in briefings, or to walk out on them or stop them?

B: I never heard him criticize a man at a briefing.

Q: Did he sit through?

B: Yes, had a chair with his name on it, just like a star. And he was first one. By the way, one of the first things he did when I came to Washington, was to get ahold of me, and insist on my coming to all the AF briefings.

Q: On communications, or a lot of other?

B: Everything, operational, I mean we had a briefing every day, in the morning. I think I went in one time, by Stimson's request to Arnold, and Arnold comes up to me and wants me to come in every day. Even, as I say, before I ever worked for him.

Q: These briefings started with the intelligence estimates, guy named Hodges? Hodges used to take a beating, didn't he? Did Arnold fire questions at him?

B: Very seldom.

Q: Didn't ask questions?

B: Now, let me make a guess here. Arnold got a lot of supersecret instructions, obviously, that never appeared at a briefing. The briefings were essentially "where are we today and where are we going," prognosis. Now the supersecret stuff and that was behind scenes, and even these boys didn't know about it.

Q: Back to this comment that started this train of thinking. You indicated in your letter, that McNarney stood in for some areas where Arnold was either disinterested or....

B: Somebody had to go, to follow Arnold up.

Q: You mean after he had a burst of inspiration?

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B: Exactly, he didn't mean to neglect these important things. They didn't interest him. They didn't keep his attention. He was essentially an operator who operated by inspiration. Now, that's the reason he moved Eaker out of England, and put Jimmy Doolittle up there.

Q: Well, he put Spaatz in there and then Jimmy Doolittle.

B: Oh, Spaatz over that.

Q: Do you know something about that?

B: Well, it depends on what you mean. I'm not trying to duck. There is a limited knowledge I have of all these things. Spaatz was Arnold's main confidante on the business of running the AF.

Q: Eaker was very close to him; they wrote two or three books together.

B: Eaker and what?

Q: Eaker and Arnold, they wrote books together.

B: In the early days.

Q: Yes, they co-authored books. Why did he take Eaker out, in your opinion?

B: I can give you estimates only. He was unhappy. Eaker wasn't aggressive enough.

Q: In the deep missions, you mean? Well, they had suffered some severe losses.

B: No, well....

Q: Schweinfurt-Regensburg twice.

B: Here again, I know little about both those things. They had, in that Regensburg mission - I believe my memory is halfway clear - that operation should never have been carried out because things didn't come to a head properly, before the boys started. There was a situation where the fighters had already had to orbit so long. They lost so much gas they couldn't go with the mission. And instead of Fred Anderson - I think it was Anderson, who was responsible to call t hem back - instead of calling the mission off, scrubbing it and doing it another time, the setup was such that they were pre--doomed, to not have their fighter escorts.

Q: You are probably talking about the so-called "Black Thursday" mission?

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B: I guess so.

Q: That was Oct 14, 1943?

B: And somewhere, it would appear that the slip was there. But Eaker should have been in command and wasn't, unless I am mistaken. Now, Ira, if I measure it, was playing politics, which Arnold would never take.

Q: Politics in England?

B: Yes, he was mixing with the Churchills, this, that and the other. Arnold was a fighter.

Q: What's the basis of that comment about Eaker politicking. Did somebody tell you this, or did you have any knowledge.

B: I watched.

Q: You were over there?

B: I went to their luncheons.

Q: He was in pretty good shape with the British, Eaker, maybe too good shape?

B: But not with Arnold. Ira was - I don't know how to express it - I can only say to you that I was never impressed with him, and I lived with all these people. Arnold never did a thing to me I can criticize. But I don't believe his (Eaker's) mind was always on his business,I mean always.

Q: At that base at High Wycombe? Were you there? Did you visit a number of times?

B: I had assignments on every command, including a group with Spaatz there.

Q: They had some pretty good poker games going there.

B: That's right.

Q: Is this part of it? Poker and drinking sessions they had? I don't mean Eaker himself, but I mean a lot of social activity not related to the mission?

B: That's right. Arnold expected results. Now, the reason that LeMay appealed to him was that LeMay was a blood-and-guts kind. I saw that side of it developing, and that's the reason he moved him over to India at the appropriate time.

Q: And he moved him out of India and put him in Hansell's place?

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B: Possum was a weak sister.

Q: Possum was an intellectual?

B: Likeable but weak.

Q: Did you have any involvement in that, or knowledge of LeMay being moved in there?

B: I talked to Arnold about it and I interviewed LeMay when he came through Washington and all that kind of stuff.

Q: Arnold sent Norstad out to tell Possum Hansell the bad news. At this time, Arnold was having a heart attack down in Coral Gables. Do you remember the heart attack he had? Did you go down to see him?

B: No. As far as I know then, little was allowed. They were so damned scared; and the security was very high on it.

Q: They kept it very quiet, why? Was he afraid Marshall might retire him?

B: No, it was just the morale. Arnold was the AF.

Q: He was "Mr. AF"?

B: He was "Mr. AF." He had a way of getting these boys stirred. As I've already said, if you take the combination of Lovett and Arnold, Lovett was made for Arnold. Lovett never took any public credit. He sat back quietly, he was cool. Now you compare that with McNamara, who damn near stold the Army, I mean.

Q: McNamara didn't sit in the back seat.

B: Damned right. Lovett was smart as could be on this, and he had the dignity and he had the public appeal. Nobody felt he was running that AF.

Q: Would you say Lovett was a balance wheel, where Arnold made impulsive decisions. Once in a while I'm sure he went off too far, and Lovett perhaps called him back.

B: (Shaking his head)

Q: No? How would you describe Lovett's role in respect to Arnold?

B: Let me answer this indirectly, not because I want to get around it. I want to try to give you the best answer I can. During my entire experience with Arnold, I didn't have to go see Lovett more than two or three times. Lovett didn't - it was wrong to say he didn't know what was going on - but

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Arnold stirred up so much, that Lovett didn't have to do much. The military decorum, or the details that had to be taken care of, the housekeeping and all, were pretty well looked after by Joe McNarney. I've got to be awful careful, because it was a high level kind of thing. Marshall thought a great deal of Arnold, and they used to drive. If there was a meeting across the River, and they were going, they would go together always.

Q: Did you attend meetings where Marshall and Arnold were present?

B: In Stimson's office, yes.

Q: Marshall referred to Arnold as "Arnold," and Arnold referred to Marshall as "General." In other words, they were equal, but not quite equal. Is this a fair assumption or evaluation? Did you ever hear him call him "George?"

B: Never. Now let me go at it the other way. Now, Stimson and this guy Marshall rode together and climbed mountains together, but never in the Pentagon did I ever hear "George" or "Henry."

Q: No, nobody called him "Henry." Some called him "Harry" who knew him. But I don't think George Marshall called him Harry.

B: In their life together in the hills, riding and all, it was first names, but never there in the Pentagon.

Q: I didn't think anybody called Marshall "George"?

B: Well..

Q: How about the president? Did the President call him "George?"

B: Of course, this is hearsay. I've got to be awful careful on this. I could ruin myself.

Q: Why?

B: I got to know Marshall, I believe, as a warm friend. Why I don't know. I guess he liked the way I handled things, because I never, ever, gave a sign of using Stimson. Now this submarine report was through McNarney's hands, before Stimson ever talked to Marshall. When Marshall went to see Stimson, Stimson told him of this report; "Yes, I have been through it." He knew, everytime I went on a trip around the world, to any command in Europe, I always saw Marshall first. But to come back, I listened to him one time and it staggered me. Marshall, in an assessment of his own Commander-in-Chief, and the problems

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that were being created, now, I won't detail those, because I don't think it is quite fair. But, talking about Arnold here, Marshall is another story. I hope some day to do a vignette of Marshall,as I saw him. But he did have his problems.

Q: With whom?

B: With the President, his Commander-in-Chief. Now with Stimson, there was, what I could see, as a perfect rapport. There was a clear understanding, that on matters where they differed - and they did on some - if it was essentially a civilian question, Marshall always deferred to Stimson. Conversely, if it was essentially a military question on which they differed, it was always Stimson deferring to Marshall. I know this from both of them, and almost in these words.

Q: All right, now getting to specifics there. I think they had some difference in ASW?

B: You mean Stimson and Marshall?

Q: Yes.

B: The only difference was how to handle King.

Q: All right. Now, Stimson's Diary, which I just finished reading, had some bitter comments about King and the Navy. Of course, he made this comment in his book, about the admirals and their church - King Neptune - but Stimson signed a piece of paper setting up the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, under Westside Larson. Do you remember that?

B: I know Larson well.

Q: I talked to Larson.

B: You say he signed this?

Q: Yes, this is when the informal liaison with the Navy did not work out, so the AAF went ahead - I'm assuming with Stimson's support - and set up its own ASW Command, and put Westside Larson in charge of it. Do you remember that? What led to that decision?

B: I didn't know it as that kind of arrangement. Westside Larson had an Army Air Forces unit. As far as I know, it was under the control of the Navy at 90 Church Street.

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Q: Right, the overall control. But they set up their own immediate control, control of the airplanes. The Navy wanted to control all the planes directly, but the AF interceded this command. Was this the result of the unresolved dispute?

B: I'd have to go back to be sure of myself, I've got it all here on paper. The reason I'm hesitating - the great climax came when presumably King agreed on the idea of a single command under a Navy commander. The surface to be under an Admiral and the air under an AF man, and then he reneged. This is the thing Marshall raved about to me privately. We thought this was settled, and then it ended up not settled. I've got the documentation on all that. It ended up by King setting up the 10th Fleet. Now, there was that break. Now, we come back to your question about Stimson, which puzzles me a bit.

Q: The AAF Anti-Submarine Command didn't last too long, and ultimately, the AAF gave up the whole mission on July 1, 1943. Do you know any of the background of that?

B: Well, I've got it all in writing. In fact, I've sent it to Washington once, because they couldn't find anything down there - concerning the reneging of King. Marshall reported to me one morning that he had met King at a party and they talked about it a little bit.

Q: So Marshall said: "We have more fish to fry?"

B: More important work to do.

Q: Did he persuade Arnold to relinquish the command?

B: That was no problem, yes. I mean, the point being: Arnold was not going to have his air people as housekeepers, and that's what it went back to. They were not to have any part in the combat activity, to keep the airplanes flying.

Q: And there would be Navy flyers?

B: It never got to that point, but, in effect, it was leaving them as housekeepers. Now, no doubt there would have been Army flyers.

Q: I could ascribe two other factors to this. By mid-1943, the buildup of bombers in England became a crucial and principal activity of Arnold's, so

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the ASW activity was of much less importance. Secondly, -- I'm guessing now -- the submarine menace had fairly been solved in 1943?

B: No, I say that, I didn't mean to be contradictory.

Q: No, no, I'm just throwing out speculation. Now, you straighten me out.

B: When I got into a study of what the Navy was doing, we had planned to build 13 ACVs, I guess, auxiliary carriers for antisubmarine work. At that time we had airplanes that couldn't get very far offshore. Neither did the Navy - this is the beginning of the war. And as you probably know, there was a famous...

Q: 100 mile limit?

B: Yes.

Q: Right, going back to '38

B: That's right, and the Navy was watching that very carefully. We had as we said, the AAF building strategic bombers with the idea that they were - I'm exaggerating - going to win the war. But the Navy underestimated, and the AF overestimated, the place of these aircraft and their value. What you said about England is of course, quite right - about the need - but when I checked on where these 13 carriers were, they were all but 1 or 2 in the Pacific. That's all in here. I suppose the reason for that was we got plastered by the Japs out there, early in the war. As you remember, the Battle of Savo Island, and a few other things. Admiral King really had some dreadful things on his hands. We got thoroughly shellacked and the only thing they didn't cashier or hang a few Admirals was, because, in the inner discussion the effect it would have on our country. There was one Admiral missing when he should have been around. I think it was Savo Island, I'm not sure.

Q: We didn't lose any carriers at that?

B: No, but our ships were down one after another. They shot the hell out of us. Now, to come back to all this infighting, the four-engine bomber did begin to get used. You will see in this report a map showing the difference now, in the coverage which practically made it essential for us to get the Azores. If we got the base at the Azores, we now could have the four-engine

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bombers pretty much cover things. I suspect this had an effect on one Admiral King, because he began to see the progress that was being made in spite of him. He now resorted to hunter-killer groups. We had already driven - and this started with out B-18s and radar - driven the submarines from the coast. But now, with the hunter-killer technique, as opposed to the convoy escort technique, once we discovered a submarine with these hunter-killer groups, those little carriers would hang around - and this is before the snorkel - these submarines had to come up for air sooner or later. That was the thing that caused the submarines the trouble. They were in trouble offshore with an airplane search.

Q: Well, what I'm saying is that by 1943 the sinkings had dropped considerably due to a variety of reasons?

B: Yes, you'll find it in these papers.

Q: And I'm guessing now, Arnold was easily persuaded by Marshall to let the whole mission go for the variety of reasons that you cited: (1), that they didn't want to be housekeepers; (2) he had more important missions to perform; and (3) I guess, maybe, that Marshall had to work with King, and King was adamant about ASW.

B: It's a combination of all these factors.

Q: Arnold had more important missions to perform and I guess maybe Marshall had to work with King and King was adamant about it.

B: It's a combination of all these. Now, Arnold, was never, due respect, he was never a great champion of the anti-submarine - the AF getting in the submarine business. Now I think he missed a great bet. I've always argued that.

Q: Right, you know they tried to in the postwar period, the AF, the independent AF tried to get the ASW mission, but they were shot down by Forrestal.

B: That's right - the Truculent Turtle. By that time the AF had a special, I mean the Navy had...

Q: Well, the Truculent Turtle was a gimmick.

B: I agree with you, it was a gimmick. All you've got to do is read Morison's book.

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Q: Watson Watt was recruited right after Pearl Harbor, they were desperate for some solution to the submarine problem.

B: Our worry explicitly, was the Japs shutting off the Panama Canal, and Watson Watt was the great sung hero, decidedly sung. It was Bundy, I think, was the man who got him in on this. He was an arrogant S.O.B., and as you may know, during the entire war in England, he was left in the boondocks. He never did play any part, he was pathetic, arrogant, spent all his time telling you that he had created radar and had developed this, that and the other, whereas we were fighting a war.

Q: They had some curious ideas for defending the Panama Canal, including putting nets over the Locks.

B: First trip I made was down there.

Q: Did they shoot that one down?

B: I can't tell you, because I don't remember.

Q: Well they had no idea, if they put nets down there, it would explode the bombs that they dropped on targets. The first bomb would have destroyed the net.

B: They had nets there for the carrier aircraft. I know what I'm talking about there.

Q: But they weren't very effective were they?

B: We never had any Jap planes. It was a mental hazard.

Q: How about barrage balloons?

B: Oh well, the English used them, too, and it was a hazard.

Q: Mental hazard, but not a real deterrent.

B: I mean this would be like the Kamikaze business because they could send enough airplanes in there to saturate the area at any one point, if they wanted to destroy a gate. Now, they used smoke pots too.

Q: To obscure the target?

B: That's right. They also had anti-air up in the hills, and this was really the most monstrously fantastic idea. I went up all through there, and looked at the whole works.

Q: Did Arnold feel that there was a dangerous threat to the Panama

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Canal? Stimson felt this.

B: Let me say this. We never discussed it.

Q: But there was always the feeling that the Japs might come back?

B: It didn't worry us, really. I say that. I don't know where you found that.

Q: But there was a great feeling. Right after Pearl Harbor there was a great panic that they might hit the Panama Canal.

B: Yes, yes, when you said they might come back. I didn't know what you meant.

Q: I mean they might come back after Pearl Harbor.

B: Sure. Now, here again, I'm interpolating, or rather, it's my belief that Arnold was having his problems down there. Now he had a fellow by the name of,I think it was General Eddy Lyons, in charge of the bombers. He had a few bombers down there, and there was a Gene Randall, somebody like that, in charge of the fighters.

Q: You mean in Panama?

B: Not in charge, but he was down there with Doodles Harmon.

Q: When are you talking about now, what period?

B: This period of scare.

Q: Well, Andrews was the commander down there.

B: Sure, he was also already selected as Commander to go over to the invasion. I got a briefing on the invasion down there.

Q: But that was 1943 when he was selected....

B: No, I went down there in the spring of 1942, and I got my briefing on the OVERLORD operation right from him.

Q: W 11, he might have been selected. Actually, I understood the selection was actually made at Casablanca, in January 1943, but in 1942....

B: He was to go over.

Q: He went to the Middle East first for brief spell.

B: For training.

Q: But in the scare period, right after Pearl Harbor, he was Commander in the Caribbean Sea Frontier.

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B: Caribbean Sea Frontier, what do you call it?

Q: Well, Canal Zone, there were two. This is one of the problms, a guy named Admiral Van Kirk, and you had the same dichotomy of command in the Caribbean as you had at Pearl Harbor. Do you remember Van Kirk?

B: No, I didn't meet him,but Andrews,I went down there in May of 1942. It was then that I got my briefing on OVERLORD, from Andrews.

Q: Let me ask this related question. Somebody told me that Arnold shipped out all of his potential opposition, out of Washington - Andrews, to one place; Emmons to another place. Did you ever hear this talk? If so, did you give any credence to it? Arnold was the star in Washington, the Air star in Washington.

B: He did exactly what I would have done. That's a nasty statement. I didn't mean that egotistically. If a man is given a job to do, he'd better see that he had nobody to undermine him. And these fellows, the one he sent to Alaska, who was it, Emmons. I never heard a good thing about this man with respect to his ability.

Q: He ultimately ended up in Hawaii and he was trying to build up a big operation.

Q: How about Andrews and Arnold? Did you have any knowledge of their association?

B: None whatever, but admiration. Andrews had GHQ AF

Q: You weren't there then?

B: No. He had the GHQ AF and as far as I could make out, highly esteemed, and not simply by air boys, but by all.

Q: Everybody loved Andrews.

Q: All right, let's cover the oceanborne transport and supply. Now you said your report blew the lid off.

B: Well, in the sense that it got the Navy terribly upset about it.

Q: What were the basic conclusions of that report?

B: That the whole thing had been messed up, and we were in a hell of a shape.

Q: You mean competing ocean transport between the Army and Navy, or what?

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B: Failing to do the job that was required.

Q: The Navy's failing to do it?

B: The whole operation.

Q: Failing in what way?

B: Organizationally, we were not fighting in a unified fashion, using our forces efficiently, putting proper emphasis on it. There was absolutely no plan having to do with what was needed to be done. Now, let me say it this way. There was no study on the part of the Army or the Navy on what effect different rates of sinking would have on the time when we could mount the TORCH operation, for instance. The Navy was bragging when we were building ships as fast as the Germans were sinking them. None of these things was realistically dealing with what it was we were trying to do and that was trying to get ready for TORCH and to get ready for OVERLORD.

Q: You went out and you did some work, I believe you and Frank Collbahm went out and did some work on the blind bombing technique in the Pacific?

B: I want to be careful about anything Frank might have told you. That sounds bad, I'd like to clarify this, with respect to Frank's help. I think I ought really to give this to you in outline, because I think it's not any more significant as an achievement than it is as, again, as a description of Arnold's character. It was Arnold who made it possible. Starting here, with the same sort of drama. That is built into it. This is the second of the two times that I got whanged on the shoulder. Typically, going down the hall in the Pentagon, a hand comes down on my shoulder. I look up and here's the Old Man: "Bowles, what are you doing about the B-29s?" Well, General, I'm going to the Air Room each day and watching the progress, "I want you to get on your horse and visit every command, and come back here and tell me what you think we ought to be doing." Well, the end result of this, of course, I had visited manufacturing companies. The end result of this was a trip around the world, visiting LeMay in Kharagpur, and then going off into China, up to Chengtu, out of which we were then flying our missions, LeMay with me. I got a good picture of it.

Q: Blondie Saunders was then out, I think he had been injured in a crash?

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B: Yes, yes. LeMay had been put in command. As I remember it, Norstad was Deputy Commander, and he is also a very good friend. This was typical of Arnold's confidence in me, typical of his way of using people. The Air Staff had nothing to do with this, and wouldn't even know, theoretically, that I was going. It was just that kind of instruction, and it might have been somebody else in uniform. At all events, I visited Saipan, of course, and then, I was in a little difficulty, on account of being in on military planning. I couldn't fly across, I had to go clear down to Australia, around and up, over to Ceylon.

Q: Saipan, was it operational with B-29s?

B: Just beginning.

Q: So that must have been around November or December of 1944?

B: I can't remember without going to the papers. Now, I went up to Boeing. Bill Allen was then President.

Q: Before you went overseas?

B: No, I'd been around. Boeing came afterwards, and I had seen things from the theater standpoint.

Q: And you asked Arnold to let you carry out this?

B: And, in effect, he said: "Go ahead Bowles." I mean it was just about as passive as that. After all these things that we had been doing. So I called up Allen and asked for his Chief Engineer, and said I was going to try to set up a little planning group, made up of military and civilians. Then I called up Don Douglas, and he couldn't help but surrender Arthur Raymond. I had Frank Collbahm in the office as an assistant.

Q: Assistant at Douglas?

B: Yes, and Frank is a very peripatetic kind of a guy. I had run into him in NDRC. What I did was to have all these men, had Ed Wells from Boeing, Arthur Raymond and Frank Collbahm, briefed on what we were doing with the B-29s, briefed on the Japanese intelligence we had, including their fighters on the drawing board. All our military plans for the B-29, and told them to tell us what do with the B-29s. Norstad himself briefed them on the intelligence. They came back in 3 weeks with an interim proposal, and it had to do with

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taking all the armor and armament off. That is, the B-29 was overloaded with radar, gunlaying equipment that didn't hit anything. Deflection shooting had never been successful, up to this point. So the recommendation was that we take all this weight off, and then put the radar range and a 20 mm cannon in the tail. It was on the basis of that, that we put together the "Sally Rand" version, as Gen Harmon called it, stripped B--29s. Now that became the 315th Wing. I had Bill Schockley in my office, Nobel Prize man, who had already spent some time with LeMay out in India on training, because it turned out that in this training system we had, the pipeline out of which these boys came, spewed a miscellany of qualified people, or rather, they were of miscellaneous degrees of training, instead of all a team that you could put together for an air crew. We trained a special crew for each one of these B-29s, so the boys would all move out together, instead of some being lame ducks. It was just like building a football team. Then they went out, and I've got the records here for you. Never had visual bombing achieved the damage of this outfit, or something like that. We had the 316th all ready to go, when the Japs surrendered.

Q: The 316th was going to do the same?

B: Yes. It was the same idea.

B: To me, the important thing here was bringing the industry in, bringing the industry in as a part of a planning operation, instead of a material supplier.

Q: Yes, well this was heavily emphasized in Arnold's IAS speech, which you helped him write, or wrote for him, in July 1946.

B: I wrote the thing. I don't have to be possessive. He changed about three words, that's all.

Q: I want to go into that a little bit later. But this is a sort of precursor to that.

B: The way Arnold did things again. You see, now this generated not getting together with Arnold and laying out a plan. It generated by his coming along and seeing me in the hall, and having a hunch or an idea. That's what I mean by being intuitive. The son of a gun, for some reason....

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Q: I've used this figure of speech, Arnold had 50 balls he was bouncing in the air, and different problems that he had weighing him down. When he was walking down the hall and he saw Bowles, if he could unload one of these balls onto Bowles, he had 49 he need bounce in the air. This is, of course, his disregard for organizational procedure, but he got jobs done.

B: If there was a man who would come back from the war, conspicuous fighter pilot, who had done a noble job, all of a sudden Arnold would think of him for a special assignment. The man's mind was always working. He was illogical, absolutely illogical, and he'd shake his staff up, shake the hell out of it. It would go completely to pieces if it ever had been one piece. I say, by accident, I suppose you would say intuitively, he put together something good out of it. It was that sort of thing that characterized the man. He was a man of imagination, curiously enough.

Q: Did you have anything to do with LeMay's decision to go in at low level?

B: No.

Q: Well we've covered the blind bombing.

B: I had a very able man over there who was regarded very highly - Schockley. LeMay was high in his praise of Schockley.

Q: Did Schockley have some role in that decision?

B: No, but Schockley had a role. LeMay had a feeling, and told me, that his people were not adequately trained. Now, this is specific. His worry was that there was no use to send a good crew out and a bombardier who couldn't hit the target. He protested and protested to Washington, because the training wasn't synchronized. Schockley went out there, and the first thing, Schockley wanted to help LeMay on more advanced ideas. He said: "I can't do the ordinary things." He said: "If you will study my training program for me and help see if I'm right." LeMay told me at once a half dozen times later that what Schockley did for him was to convince him that his analysis that he had been pushing on Washington was right. He said that did him more good than anything else, because then he could stubbornly insist on it. On the low level business, no, I was not brought in that.

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Q: I have one big question - your role in RAND. I know this would be a half-hour lecture, but perhaps you could just give me some of the highlights of your participation in it, selling it to Arnold, Don Douglas' role, and how the thing took off and flew.

B: I was more than disappointed in Frank Collbohm, who I won't say was dishonest - now don't worry about that - but, was, I think, grossly at fault for his presentation of RAND as something that pretty much originated as a Douglas project. I hope, before you leave here, you'll see some of the correspondence that I had with Boeing and others on the subject. I had been irregular in all these things, in that working with Arnold, I always took liberties of trying to put a thing to Arnold in a way that I thought would appeal to him, and it was always affirmative, and it wasn't a matter of going into history of who suggested, or how. I did talk to him about Boeing and Allen, because I thought it would strike a happy note with him, because I knew what he thought of this guy. Frank Collbohm came along toward the end of the war. He had been through the mill with me on things like the special bombing project. Now, that special bombardment project was an attempt at integrating, what I call integrating out resources. It was antedated by the idea of setting up the SADU unit down at Norfolk to elicit cooperation in the industry, the scientific world, and the military, and mix them. I don't know that you will find this in the record, but Andrews let me withdraw one of his anti-submarine men and bring him up here. I sent him up to the Radiation Lab (MIT) to get training.

Q: Who was that?

B: Studright.

Q: Did you generate the original idea?

B: RAND started by Frank Collbohm coming to me and saying that Don Douglas had come to a point in life where he wanted, if you will, to leave a noble memorial. They had been so impressed with some of these jobs that we had done, in collaboration, that he would like to underwrite the setup and establish a civil corporation to devote itself to military problems, and literally, for the purposes at hand, Air. Because we know the sensitivities of invading the Navy, or the Ground forces. So, assuming that this was Douglas'

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idea - now bear in mind, it's after these projects on "Sally Rand", that is, the stripped B-29s, and the work at SADU, and all this business of bringing the three groups together - science, industry and the AAF.

Q: In other words, you had proved in various instances that this was a feasible idea. Now, we are talking postwar?

B: That is right. Now, I believe I sent you the Eisenhower policy paper to start the project.

Q: This is after Collbohm came to you?

B: And I accepted him on faith that Douglas wanted to do this, and in effect, have it as a memorial to himself, to the industry. Now, I then went to Boeing and got their support of this idea. They would be willing to participate.

Q: Financially?

B: Yes. Then, I went to Jack Northrop and, I don't remember now, which - North America, Dutch Kindelberger. The reason for that was I knew Kindelberger's attitude toward Hap Arnold.

Q: Which was?

B: Well, they worked together.

Q: Well, so did all of them really. William Allen, Gross of Lockheed - they all worked pretty close.

B: Then you find in the correspondence here, I've got the whole bunch to come to Washington. Don Douglas seldom came to Washington. Kindelberger invited Spaatz, Arnold, Douglas, and that included McNarney, and so on. This was discussed as a project.

Q: This would have been in late 1945?

B: Yes, and then, Arthur Raymond, who was a prime mover, I always leaned on Arthur.

Q: I talked to Arthur Raymond recently.

B: Is he out...

Q: He's out on the Coast.

B: I visited him a few years ago, living in a new home he had built. I went out to see Arnold when we thought we had this. Wait! The next thing, Douglas and Collbohm and I can't tell you who else, it will be in there, in my

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correspondence, went up to Hamilton Field to visit Arnold, and discuss the project. There was the $10 million that Arnold had made available for us.

Q: This was now 1946, he'd already retired?

B: Yes. We outlined the idea of studying the problem of inter-continental warfare. Arnold turned to me, and he says: "Bowles, now its up to you to put this into form, set it up." Typical Arnold, and it was our money up to this point. I don't remember the chronology.

Q: What do you mean "our money?"

B: Air Force.

Q: You mean the $10 million was Air Force?

B: Not Douglas money. I went out later to talk to Don Douglas about the project, formalizing of it. We were going to set up the headquarters. I discovered to my bewilderment, that either I had been misled, or Don Douglas suffered a lapse because I heard not one word about the idea of a memorial project. His chief concern had nothing to do with RAND, but the fact that he had lost a contract with the AF, a big bomber contract.

Q: Probably the B-48 vs. the B-47?

B: It was transport. They gave the bomber project to Boeing, and the transport project to Douglas.

Q: It was probably Boeing got the B-47.

B: Two things that I want to get at here, Douglas conked out. He ran for cover, and had no interest in the project from that point on. You will see from my letters here.

Q: But it was under Douglas for two years?

B: We were contracting with Douglas, as we would contract with any one of these companies, with the idea that there would be a staff, have to deal with Boeing and Kindelberger, and Jack Northrop. Now, that's all very clear in this interchange of correspondence that you will see in my files, even to the meetings in the Pentagon.

Q: Why did Douglas cool off on it do you think?

B: My feeling is that Frank Collbohm, as a salesman, never ever had the idea sold to Douglas.

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Q: Could it be another reason, that Douglas would have been involved in a conflict of interest, because he wanted to bid on contracts. Obviously, if he was generating ideas for hardware, and then he bids on the hardware that was generated out of the concept, he's in trouble.

B: Well, it could have been. You're on the track, I think. A second thought, I'm sure he got scaref of it, affecting the preferential treatment. And then, he just cooled off completely. Now, I went ahead with the thing, on the basis of this $10 million over which I had control. We now presently had a meeting in Washington of the AAF boys. There was a big protest from Wright Field over this idea.

Q: Conflict of interest?

B: They should have the money to do development work. It was this usual feeling of anti-industry in pooling interests. In other words, the industry should make what the AF boys tell them to make. This is Wright Field's view. Now, in the meantime, I had gotten Tooey, who was now running the AF, to put LeMay in as head of this new research R&D.

Q: Arnold put him in. Did you sell that to Arnold?

B: No. But I meant, Arnold was not in command. Now, Arnold, with Arnold in putting LeMay out in the Pacific, working very close together, both admired him very much. I was criticized heavily by Wright Field for this. My argument was I would rather have a man in charge of research at general staff level who did nothing about research, then to have a man in charge who thought he knew all about it, and didn't.

Q: LeMay came in in 1946; Arnold was already gone?

B: That's right.

Q: Did he come in on Arnold's recommendation, suggested by you to Arnold?

B: Let me put it this way. Toeey and I were the last ones to talk about it, and Tooey agreed to put him in.

Q: Arnold supported it?

B: I wouldn't have touched it without checking with Arnold.

Q: Right, well, in that IAS speech, Arnold takes some credit for putting LeMay in the job.

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close friendship, that Arnold, wanting RAND to take wing, and it needed a time to be an infant industry, to get it off the ground, to get its sea legs, or whatever figure of speech you want to use. Was there any factor like that?

B: It ended up with Douglas wanting to get rid of this as soon as possible. I never, ever, had from Douglas, directly, the story that Frank Collbohm sold me, about Douglas' altruism and his interest.

Q: That he wanted a monument. He could have wanted it as a monument.

Q: Without having looked at some of these documents, I don't see any conflict. Well, I do see a conflict, but what I mean is, Douglas could have had this altruistic impulse, that he wants a monument to Douglas, having been sold on the theoretical concept of this cooperation between industry, and intellectual activity, and the AAF. And then suddenly realizing that his altruism was pinching his pocketbook, so he had a second thought about it.

B: Yes, that's right. It turned out then, the idea was to get rid of it as quickly as possible, set up as a separate entity.

Q: By that time you were out of it?

B: Oh yes. But without Arnold, and if you want to put it another way, without myself plugging this thing, selling it, my selling it to Arnold, it was his imagination again, the same thing that....

Q: His tremendous prestige that he brought to it.

B: Yes, these other things that permitted it to happen.

Q: This phraseology, Arnold deploring the existence of an aristocracy in the military establishment, caused a little static when he made his speech?

B: The fact is, I flew out to Hamilton Field, and went on up to the Valley of the Moon, Sonoma. I sat on the hillside with Gen Arnold, and went over the mabuscript in which he changed just two or three words that suited his vocabulary a little better. Then I flew down with him to a luncheon at Santa Monica. At the luncheon were Don Douglas, Arthur Raymond, Frank Collbohm, and there may have been one or two others. I was prompted to wonder about t his luncheon, excepting for the fact that Arthur Raymond, as President of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, was the person who was going to preside at the meeting that night at which Arnold was going to give his speech. And before I knew it, there was an

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assault on Gen Arnold to try to get him to take this latter part of the speech out.

Q: You had given them advance copies of it?

B: Arthur Raymond had an advance copy because he was President of the establishment. Arnold raised general hell and let them know damn quick that there was going to be no change, that this was his view, and no one was going to tell him how to make a speech, or what to say, or when to say it. So, they were silenced. We went on down to the hotel where the speech was to be given and ran into I believe it was a man by the name of Johnson who was then one of the top clerical boys in the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences. Arnold ran up to him, seemed to have known him very well, and with a more or less slap on the shoulder, said: "What do you think of a man who would tell me what to say in a speech that he has asked me to give?

Q: Dr. Bowles, why do you think Raymond and Douglas wanted the speech changed?

B: To me, it was manifestly clear they were looking, naturally, in the direction of the AF and also the Navy forbidding us. This affected Raymond's point of view. I'm sure he felt that being president, and at the same time, being the chief engineer of Douglas, it wouldn't go very well to sponsor Arnold's speaking in this manner with respect to the Navy. But the Old Man stuck to his guns. As I say, he was going to have no one tell him what to say. But he was in pretty much of a stir at that meeting, even with Don Douglas, an old friend, that is at the luncheon.

Q: Did Symington speak at this meeting?

B: No. One more point occurs to me, and then I'll comment on that. The consequence of this was even more significant in my mind. In that this speech of Arnold's, which, to my way of thinking, was monumental in that it marked his departure from the post of CG of the Army Air Forces, was never published in the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences.

Q: We have this publication that you sent me. What is that?

B: I was so angry, after trying to get it published by them. Raymond had all sorts of excuses. I went to Oliver Echols, and Oliver found money to

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have this thing printed by the AF, so the few copies that are about - and there are not many - were of that vintage, and the copy I sent you, if it's original, not a photocopy, was one of those originals.

Q: You sent me a photocopy.

B: Well, I can give you an original copy.

Q: I accept your version of this.

NOTE: Originally, when I dictated material on the IAS Speech, I indicated that it was from the IAS publication - I just assumed that it was - but that's incorrect.

B: On 26 July 1944, in an order or memorandum, actually, to General Arnold and General Somervell, dealing with the transfer of communications and equipment peculiar to the AAF from the Signal Corps, I'll give you a little background on this. I had been worried because of the fact that by the organizational arrangements within the Army, the Signal Corps had complete control over the development and production of the electronic and other technical equipment for the Army Air Forces. The instance of where there was difficulty was finding the boys in the Signal Corps telling the AAF what kind kind of microwave radar they should use for bombing. This raised a hell of a mess because the AF boys felt the Signal Corps boys had never even flown the equipment. Who the hell were they to tell the pilots what kind of radar they ought to have. There was a good deal of truth in this. This applied in many other areas. There were all sorts of complaints, and it was exceedingly difficult to pin responsibility when something went wrong. I had had experience from Stimson's level. When I first went down, for instance, the Radiation Lab at MIT had a harbor-search microwave radar that was very much needed in North Africa. We had it in the form of lab equipment, but it was exceedingly effective. The Army needed it, and we agreed - "we" being NDRC at that time - to make this stuff ourselves, to avoid all the red tape of going through channels in the military. The Army found it was excellent for their purpose, and wanted now to order some of this equipment on an official basis through regular military channels. I found there was 5 or 6 months delay in a decision because the decision had to be made first by a committee at Somervell's level, before it

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ever got to the Signal Corps. There were many illustrations of that sort where there was delay after delay in what we were dealing with, mostly for the AF. As far as my mission was concerned, was to get the most modern and forefront microwave equipment. So I went to Arnold, and discussed this at length, and all the complaints and the problems when there was a failure - the Signal Corps blaming the AF, and the AF blaming the Signal Corps - I said: "Can we not somehow put the responsibility for all our electronics equipment in the AF. Get rid of the Signal Corps and the overburden of the Army Service Forces." Old Hap looked at me with a glint in his eye - and I really mean it. He said: "Bowles, I've tried that and I've failed." He said: "Echols tried it before me and he had no luck whatever, and I don't think it can be done. You think you can do it?" And I said: "Well, I'll try." He said: "Go to it!" So I said: "Now, I have talked to Mr. Stimson and I believe I have him on my side. I have talked to Lovett,"of course he would approve this. "I have talked to McCloy. He's with me in principle." "And Patterson," I said, "the only person I haven't talked to is Somervell." Again, that glint in his eye, he knew damned well why I hadn't. He said: "Well, you go ahead now." And I said I'd also talked to General Marshall. Gen Arnold said: "You go ahead. I'll handle Somervell." Well, it turned out the Old Man never handled Somervell, but I had a suspicion he wouldn't.

Q: Why?

B: Because he had plans to do this later that I will come to. It demonstrated his intuitiveness. I use the word "intuitive" repeatedly - intuitive in a sense of how to get a thing done. He left Somervell strictly alone. At the start, I thought he had let me down. I went to see Gen Marshall and told him I had talked to Gen Arnold, and I emphasized that I wanted him to understand that I wasn't interested in Army organization, but only how to get some of this new equipment in use during the war. I had no idea of how the organization worked, what it should be in peacetime, but I said: "We are not getting anywhere." And I recited the delays before all these committees that reviewed new developments, and the problem of service-test models and so on. General Marshall listened, I mean it's not necessary to say "attentively,"

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but he did really listen and give me time. Then quietly, he said: "I understand what you mean. How soon could you have a study in my hands." Well, I had already had Tom Rives - whom I've already mentioned to you - make the study. This was on a Thursday or so, and I said, would Monday be all right? He said: Yes."

Q: It kind of floored him, didn't it?

B: Well, he knew about the submarine study long since, and I think he had a hunch.

Q: That you already did some homework?

B: Yes, and I said: "It's my view that if I go to Gen Somervell and discuss this, he'll do just what he did once before. He'll fire the Chief Signal Officer, and say: "There's no problem here. All we need is a new Chief Signal Officer. The present one is inadequate for the task." And that was Somervell's technique to get out of a situation. He had done it once before.

Q: Did he fire Olmstead?

B: Oh, yes.

Q: And put in Mauborgne?

B: No, Mauborgne was before then. He put in Ingles. So I said: "I think the only thing that will move Gen Somervell will be a summary directive from you, if I may be so presumptuous." He said: "Bring in the study, if you will, on Monday." I came in with the study. Of course, I had been talking to McNarney.

Q: And you were getting green lights from him?

B: I had green lights all the way along at Secretarial level. General Marshall said: "I'll get Gen McNarney to put out a directive, but will you please sketch what you think that directive should include insofar as the technical aspects are concerned. My Deputy, McNarney, will put it in military form." So I go to see Joe, and Joe was just as proud as I was, because he was an Air Force man at heart.

Q: You did a great service for him. You ran interference for McNarney in this aspect. These are the kinds of things that he got himself involved in.

B: I didn't forget about it, but I went about my business after I had

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given Marshall all this material. All of a sudden, I get a call on the squawk box from Somervell: "Bowles, when can you come down to my office?" Now, in the meantime, I'd already had a call from Arnold: "Bully for you, Bowles." So I knew the fat was in the fire - and I hadn't seen this yet. I had a man in the office, actually, in truth. And I said: "I have a gentlemen in here, General, Would it be all right if I came down in 15 minutes." Well, of course, that to him was really being nasty. "All right," bang. (Somervell hung up) So I went down there when I got good and ready, and there was Ingles, white as a sheet. He said: "What's the matter, Bowles? Can't you get along with this fellow? Poor old Ingles was ready to get under the table. And I said: "General Somervell, we are not only good friends, but I respect Gen Ingles. Insofar as I'm aware, we've been working together harmoniously. There is no question." I said: "This is a practical manner of saving time and getting things done." By the way, I had told Arnold as far as the AAF was concerned, I didn't feel that they were experts in this field, any more than the Signal Corps was, and that they got tangled up in their own feet, but it was a matter of reducing the number of hqs. through which one had to clear . And I told Gen Marshall the same thing. I think the thing that clinched it with him was when I told him about the delays at the Somervell level of 6 months on some microwave equipment that was needed in North Africa. By the time the Committee got through with it, it was too late. Secondly, in that instance, you couldn't blame the Signal Corps for delay. But, in all events, Somervell was clearly ready to fire Ingles.

Q: He would have liked to fired you?

B: He wanted to fire me, of course. He said: "This situation of you at Mr. Stimson's level is cockeyed." And there was nothing much I needed to say on that one. Then, I'll be damned if, after he dismissed Ingles....

Q: Dismissed him from his presence, you mean?

B: Yes, Somervell virtually pleaded with me to go back to Marshall and get Marshall to rescind. Of course, it was clear he had tried to get to Marshall. Marshall wouldn't see him, I'd found out through Joe McNarney. He had issued this memorandum, and that was it.

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Q: The fact that you had cemented this thing (transfer of CX from Signal Corps) with McNarney sealed the case. Now, if McNarney had not been on your side, it might have been reversed.

B: It wouldn't have worked.

Q: You wouldn't have moved?

B: That's right, and McNarney always got a bit of fun out of these things. I mean by that, satisfaction, when he saw something that ought to be done, he always enjoyed seeing things set in motion to get them.

Q: I've been told he was a dour Scotsman, and found he was humorless. Is this not so?

B: This is a matter of how you define humor. I found him very enjoyable company, when it was time to be company, but strictly business. A man traveled with him in the Caribbean and saw him in the evening over a drink, but I've always seen him sit at a conference table, as he did down there, chatting with the Navy - not chatting but reviewing with the Navy - what's going on, or with the Air boys, and strictly business.

Q: I always suspected that those who take this position were people who were not able to move him at the cocktail hour. At the cocktail hour a lot of business gets transacted, but none with McNarney.

B: No, I've had him up to my summer place, and I think I know the man pretty well.

Q: Did you have social contacts with Arnold?

B: No, no.

Q: Dinner, the Bowles and the Arnolds?

B: No. We lunched in his office many times, but only to get things done, but never social relationship.

Q: How about Mrs. Arnold. Of course, you met her at the ranch?

B: I not only met her there, but at Stimson's affairs, Eisenhower, the whole bunch, all the top side, I would run into that way.

Q: These were more or less formal receiving lines, types of affairs?

B: Right.

Q: No opportunity to really get to know people?

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B: No. Now I believe I told you on an earlier tape about the way Arnold handled this one star business, with Somervell later, on this.

Q: No, I think you mentioned one star for McClelland.

B: Let me go back then, at the expense possibly of repetition, but this is Arnold again, at his best. Somervell of course, was unhappy, and asked for a conference with Arnold.

Q: This was after you left him that day?

B: Yes. In other words, he wasn't getting away with firing the Chief Signal Officer which he had once before when he was under criticism. Arnold, as the senior officer, called the meeting. He asked me to be there. That's how I knew about it. Rives was there. McClelland, who wouldn't dare say anything, Somervell had two or three colonels, and the Chief Signal Officer. I may have told you this. All of a sudden, Somervell is sitting there at Arnold's left, and Arnold turned to me and said: "Bowles, you open the meeting."

Q: You didn't tell me this, I don't recall this.

B: And I was - if you want to put it mildly - mad as hell, because I had butterflies. I didn't perceive what the hell was going on, because I had seen this directive, and, you might say, wonder what the shooting was about. So I made my little speech without being sure of what I ought to say. Then Somervell jumped in and he said: "Hap, the trouble is, this fellow Bowles doesn't get along with Ingles." In other words: "Fire Ingles." Arnold climbed all over Bill Somervell in the presence of these people. He said: "Bill, this is one thing I will not let you say." Pounding the table he said: "I know Bowles, and I know that's not the truth." So Somervell shut up on that one, and then his people argued some more about the difficulties of doing anything like this in time of war. There was a lot of chitchat, and Arnold hadn't said a thing, excepting to lay Somervell down flat. After much useless discussion, or rather, needless and innocuous discussion, I watched Arnold. Then I began to feel what he was up to. He looked at Somervell in a very friendly way, as two fellows who have fought many a battle, I guess. And he said: "Bill, you see how it is. This is the way

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it is going to be." There wasn't any debate between Somervell and Arnold.

Q: He was trying to smooth his feathers and try to make him accept the inevitable?

B: "This is the way it's going to be," he says. That one star, and this brings me back to how futile it would have been for me to try to fool around on the things that I fool around with, in the AAF.

Q: You mean, if you had had one star, it would have been less impressive, or your position would have been less useful?

B: I would have been useless. I never would have even got to do the job, but Arnold's extra star by the same token was what enabled him to get it done.

Q: He was four at this time and Somervell was three?

B: Yes. It was a wonderful demonstration. All Arnold needed to do was sit there and listen, because he had the Supreme Court decision.

Q: He was the ultimate judge?

B: After he laughed about it when I told him how scared I was. Then he began to realize that at the end I saw what his technique was.

Q: You know, it occurs to me that, almost at the same time, a directive came out transferring guided missiles from the Army Ordnance to the AAF.

B: Well, I'm the guilty one, the one who put Nike in Ordnance. Now, this is related to what you are saying, in that the AF went out on a binge and Mervin Gross was the culprit, OC&R, trying to grab all the missile business.

Q: They did. Marshall put out a directive. Somebody persuaded him to put out a directive, giving the guided missile business to the AF. There was a directive, I think, it was sort of modified later on?

B: Damned right it was.

Q: Was that the same time?

B: I can't tell you.

Q: It seemed to me July 1944?

B: The Research & Development Board, or what was it called earlier, new weapons?

Q: Henry Aurand?

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B: Steve Henry had it first, then Aurand - a fine horse's ass, for this purpose. They didn't have anybody in there of strength. This was Eisenhower's inability, because he couldn't pick an able man if he found one. But to finish off this one, the Nike, I got Nike into Ordnance, and Gross was hurting the AAF because he was trying to grab too much. So I went to see Arnold about this one. It's the only time I ever went to Arnold on a man, and I told him I thought this fellow was hurting the AAF's position, its strategic opportunity, by protesting too much and trying to grab. And I said it is setting up an antipathy, an antagonism that keeps these fellows from being able to sit down and talk realistically. The next thing I knew, Gross disappeared. Later, when I went around....

Q: But they didn't relinquish the guided missiles though?

B: They didn't get Nike. They didn't get them all.

Q: You know this was the beginning of a controversy, of whether the projectile had wings or fins, remember that?

B: That's right. I might add, as a touch of humor, when Arnold whacked me on the shoulder and made me go around the world on the B-29 business to visit every command, who should I run into, as my housekeeper in Kunming, but Mervin Gross, in a very menial position.

Q: Talking about Oliver Echols, and I don't think we put this on tape, and Benny Meyers. You had greast respect for Oliver Echols?

B: Oh yes, and worked with him intimately.

Q: I also indicated that, based on my reading and the many people I have talked to, Arnold respected Echols greatly, but he bypassed him, or seemed to bypass Echols on a lot of questions, to go to Benny Meyers. I wondered what your feeling about that was?

B: I know absolutely nothing about that. It may well be, because I never had anything to do with the procurement questions. And I never as much as heard Arnold ever mention Benny Meyers. But that could be natural, too, because we never had occasion to get into that.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's relationship with Echols?

B: Well, let me see if I understand the question.

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Q: I mean, was there a good relationship?

B: Oh yes, excellent. He is one man that Arnold would talk to, I mean in the sense of listening to. With the others it was an ordering.

Q: Echols had a commanding presence himself?

B: A gentleman and a scholar.

Q: And he wouldn't be talked to like that.

Q: In some of the correspondence that I have looked at, you made some comments about von Karman, about his committee falling apart, and von Karman not sticking to his business. This is really the first critical comments I've heard about von Karman. Mostly, everybody is highly praiseworthy of him, maybe because they didn't understand what he was doing. Perhaps you did understand some of what he was doing. I wonder if you can evaluate von Karman and Arnold - or von Karman as a great scientific contributor?

B: I suppose, now I'm judging because I'm not an aerodynamicist, don't presume to be. I believe von Karman was probably the most brilliant man of that day in the field of aerodynamics - unequivocally, undeniably, the world's foremost authority. Now, Arnold wanted again - that's like wanting to leave a legacy - he set up this von Karman committee with the idea of trying to leave a volumen of dictums. I have a lot of that material, by the way.

Q: The report is great.

B: For some reason or other, this activity of von Karman, vis a vis the AAF just sort of attenuated itself.

Q: After Arnold left, or while he was still there?

B: While he was still there. He was concerned about it at one point. He spoke to me about it. Now, I can't say why, except when von Karman used to come in and out of the office, quite a bit. I knew the man. He was deaf, as you may know. He had a hearing aid, and he would come in and talk to you and get off his mind what he wanted, and then turn off his hearing aid, and wouldn't hear you if you had anything to add.

Q: He didn't hear what you had to say?

B: He'd go right through the secretaries, and no matter who was after him, he wouldn't hear the secretaries tell him that so and so wants to see him.

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He was a great individualist. Like so many of these great men, he had one thing on his mind, and that was himself, I mean his own interest. But no question about his qualifications.

Q: That was a tremendous report, Toward New Horizons.

B: That's right, but, I like to believe it's like a lot of other things. A man will put energy into a certain piece of work, and once he gets it done, he's very likely to go on to something else, and leave it. I think it was true of von Karman. He found other things that excited him, and he had no interest in continuing the line, and a lot of these things depended on Army stimulus.

Q: How much of it was Arnold's stimulus, you know, the personal relationship?

B: A great deal.

Q: Do you think that when Arnold left, he may have lost interest. Is t his a contributory cause?

B: That could be, and I'd have to go back and look at the members of his committee.

Q: Ted Walkowicz and some others. You know, Godfrey McHugh was with that committee.

B: Walkowicz was a bright devil. I think that von Karman much preferred to be a solo artist.

Q: I think this is absolutely true, because when Arnold is supposed to have given him his charter, they met in the back of a car at LaGuardia Field. If you've seen his book, Toward New Horizons, he wanted to report only to Arnold. He would not go through a staff, and he would not - unlike yourself - and I think there is a certain comparability in your contributions. You contributed in another area. But you were able to work within a team, and work within the organization, whereas von Karman was shall we call it an iconoclast.

B: There was a certain vanity in the sense a solo artist. He couldn't fiddle around with others. Now with me, not being any expert, I didn't mind navigating around obstacles, figuring out how to go around obstacles.

Q: You were used to this. First of all, you knew the language better, and you had certain experience with bureaucracy. Maybe you were a more patient man?

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B: Like every other idiot, I wonder once in a while, how some of these things happen, because I've had, in many senses, extraordinarily good luck in a lot of foolishness, including revamping companies and taking care of mergers, and things like that.

Q: You know, von Karman started a company which ended up in Aerojet General. He was interested only in making some money.

B: Yes. It seemed to me down there in the Pentagon, there were a few things that I can think of that helped me, and they weren't because of insight. But I might even dare to use the word "intuitive" although not in the refined and highly respectful sense that I use it for Arnold. I never let myself get onto a single committee. The first thing the Navy tried to do was to get me to join some of their committees. If you are on a committee, it is almost dishonorable, if the committee votes something, for you to, if you are the sole decider, to go around and raise hell. This way I could destroy or create. But if I'd been part of a group, I couldn't. It's like the time Arnold called me up on the spreading of the night fighters over Russia, I mean at Poltava, where the Combined Chiefs, or whatever the Communications Committee - the one that had the British aboard as well - they passed and made a resolution or something, that we shouldn't send the Russians any H2S radar airplanes. Well, Arnold calls me for some reason. This is when we had the hell plastered out of us.

Q: Poltava, June 23, 1944?

B: Poltava. Arnold called me for some mysterious reason. "Bowles, what in the hell is this committee doing? You know anything about it?"

Q: The Russians allowed us to sned them night fighter?

B: They did.

Q: They did?

B: Sure. So he said: "I don't understand it." He said: "Here we are, we have lost all these B-17s and the Russians have agreed to protect us, and they are not successful. Now I'm told I can't send these airplanes over because they've got some new radar on them." I said: "General Arnold, I don't know about the committee's deliberations, because I'm not even remotely near it, but we've been

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spreading that equipment all over Germany, because we are using that as a successor equipment to H2S." And I said: "If we can spread it over the German landscape, I don't quite see why we can't send these things to Russia. My advice is to send them." He said: "That's what I'm going to do." So away they went.

Q: They didn't stay very long. After the Poltava incident, both sides became disillusioned with the whole project.

B: This is true.

Q: The Russians were suspicious. I don't know if you are aware of all the attentuated negotiations with the Russians, over how many supporting people would be permitted to come in with the B-17s. Did you know any of this? It was real sticky business. After that attack, well, first of all, this was now the end of June. Normandy seemed to be succeeding. The Russians were moving westward through Poland and Hungary, and some of these other areas. The die was cast, as you might say. The war was going to end, it was just a question of where it was going to end. I think both sides, just about that time, decided, well, we don't need it any more, really. Is that a fair estimate?

B: Well, it died aborning. Really, it never became a great element.

Q: I think part of it was political, in the sense that the British and Americans were starting OVERLORD. You know, the FRANTIC operation started 2 days before, or three days before OVERLORD, on the 3rd of June. This was to show the world that the three major allies were collaborating, one with the other two. It really did not have an operational importance, significance.

B: This typifies his desire for action, really, and protocol to a degree.

Q: I want to ask you about something that I came upon last night. I was tremendously impressed with a paper, a fairly long paper, that Arnold gave to Spaatz. This was at the end of 1945, his valedictory, and something I saw in your papers indicates that you may have had some role in writing it, did you?

B: I guess so.

Q: Did you write it, or wrote part of it?

B: Part of it.

Q: One of the reasons I'm very impressed with this is the fact that

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Arnold stated that wings should not be a criterion for promotion - that if a man flew or didn't fly - he should be judged on his ability on getting promoted. Do you remember that section in it? Did you have anything to do with that?

B: Well, I used to lecture Arnold on it. Let's go back. One of my first problems down there, this is before I started to work for Arnold directly, was electrical communications. The AACS had a problem of taking care of weather information, and we were establishing an air route, a global air route, and that meant global communications route. We ran into two things on that: (1) the theater commander, at that point, had been supreme, and we were sending trucks out with communication equipment, and the theater commanders were throwing the equipment out, and seizing the trucks. This was one of my first encounters with McNarney, because he saw the importance, the essentiality of communications, to get weather information and navigational information around. So we started this exemption business, developing directives that would exempt certain equipment from theater seizure, if you will. The next thing was that Arnold appreciated - I've always respected him for this - that the technology was getting more and more complex. You had to have some military officers, at least, who understood it. The situation was such that the people were running away from the Technical Servies. If you gave an officer an option, because it was a deadend.

Q: In other words, he was interested in and he realized the need for officers who didn't necessarily fly, to be in the AF.

B: That's right, but he also was interested in better training of his officers who did fly, so they could handle these things, these extra problems. Nothing was more important than the weather service.

Q: We were talking about Eaker and the Weather Service.

B: Well, Eaker was having a problem - this is after the war, really, as I remember it - trying to maintain, not necessarily build up, but maintain a weather service. These boys - word gets around pretty quickly - they knew they were deadenders if they continued on, because they were all trying to get out of it.

Q: Don Yates was one of those?

B: That's right. By the way, I will show you, somewhere in my

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correspondence is an appraisal of Don Yates. He was a very difficult character.

Q: He's the guy that put me on to you.

B: I'm the one who put him on to Raytheon. He called me up one time and said he was coming through, and could we get together for oldtimes sake, some such thing. He made a remark to me for which I'll never forgive him, that the guys - this had to do with Ashville, they were trying to get extra help - Yates said the only reason the more people they get on there, the more likely they are to be promoted. That's the way with all these technical people. But what had happened, was that the rise that we enjoyed with Arnold, of getting people into the technical services, and pushing them, was not past, and Eaker was a symbol of this lack of attention, the very thing which - if I may go back to Arnold - Arnold said: "Bowles, why is it we don't have good communications people?" I said: "General Arnold, you ought to be asking yourself that. It's your own damn fault."

Q: Is that the way you said it?

B: Yes.

Q: Did you say, "It's your own damn fault."

B: Sure.

Q: In other words, you had this kind of relationship. You could say that to him?

B: Yes, he was very, like this other guy at Tech. He respected you, if you talked up to him, provided you knew what you were talking about. You couldn't abuse the guy, of course, but he enjoyed a sort of an affirmative dialogue. He was talking about Si Marriner; he was talking about Wally Smith, he was talking about Harold McClelland with whom he had banished, just shortly before.

Q: Did Marriner come in after McClelland? Was he the communications officer after that?

B: Well, they were all at that time. Wally Smith, I believe, was the oldest of the three. Wally was a likeable guy without any oomph, very likeable; everybody loved him. McClelland was a guy with his tail between his legs, very weak sister, but did like the technology. As you know, he went over to CAA later,

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after the war. Then Marriner was almost - with due respect, in terms of the hierarchy - pre-ordained, or pre-destined to be a Colonel-level material. They were the communicators when I went down there. I'm trying to think of the bright little devil at Wright Field, I kind of liked. I stole him from Wright Field right away quick, on this deal I made with Arnold, that I could pick my men.

Q: You said you could not abuse Arnold and you had to know what you were talking about. You had to be pretty solid in the grounding of your subject?

B: Well, I think I have to qualify that because you couldn't expect the poor guy to be omniscient, but I meant that in the manner of speaking with him, he could detect birdseed.

Q: He had inordinate - that sounds derogatory, but I don't mean that - respect for science and scientists. He had this great respect for you; he had this great respect for von Karman, Robert Millikan, others, perhaps, Vannevar Bush. I don't know if he had too much contact with Bush. But anyway, if somebody came in with something he didn't quite understand, but the man seemed to know what he was talking about, he pretty nearly accepted a lot of people of science. Now, another guy who I guess was a pseudo-scientist, although he is now in the business of selling weather information out on the West Coast. That's Irving Krick, and he bought Krick like a pig in a poke. Krick made Don Yates' life miserable, he made Oscar Senter's life miserable, several others, Harold Bassett, some of these people who were in the weather business. Now, why did Arnold buy him like that, I mean, I understand that Krick was a tremendous salesman.

B: Well, I told you why Joe McNarney didn't buy him, when the Navy wanted to give him up. I honestly can't tell you. Arnold, to a limited degree, was gullible. He fell for a certain type of blandishment, there isn't any question. Now, you've asked a question, and strictly speaking, I cannot answer. It's like most any man you run into in the business field. I know quite a few people who have done some foolish things. Yet, taken on the average, they are brilliant. It s like investments. You will find some guy

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investing well. All of a sudden, he gets taken, and you don't know why.

Q: Are you saying that every smart man is entitled to a couple of mistakes and Arnold had 20 chances a day to make a bad mistake and he made a few?

B: That's right.

Q: By the law of averages, he pulled a couple?

B: I'll put it egotistically. With good advice, he was wonderful to work with.

Q: Getting back to Krick, his advice...

B: His forecasts, or whatever they were...

Q: Was demonstrably false. If he told you certain things about the weather, and you wrote them down and the weather didn't turn out the way he predicted, he couldn't do it more than once or twice.

B: Arnold was not analytic. Mrs. Bowles, she has a woman's intuition. She will take things where I could have been a sucker, and she will see through something and just ask me one question. I will begin to realize that my mind was working on that one. Now, Arnold, let me put it this way. Arnold liked pageantry and we all do I think.

Q: He liked fancy charts?

B: That's right. He was colorful with his men, and it had its effect. I mean he didn't put on a show, but there was a kind of decorum, a behavior pattern, that put him out of a class with cold Marshall, for instance. Marshall was very humble, but underneath all that, as a military man, rigid. As an aside, I don't know why this preys on me, but every major commander in the Army was picked by Marshall, not one by Eisenhower. Marshall talked to me about this. He felt his great contribution was that he studied men and knew them. He said that himself.

Q: He was a great judge of men.

B: Now, Arnold....

Q: Was he a great judge of men, Arnold picking his commanders?

B: Arnold picked them after the fact. It reminds me a little of the auditor who knows the company is broke, after he looks at the figures. Arnold

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knew results. He recognized results. He recognized an able commander from what the guy achieved as opposed to being able to look at a group of people and then try to make a pre-judgment as to what kind of a cadre you would want to pull out of that lot around which to build a miliary. I think it was partly that Arnold had no great interest in organization, so he never studied men with regard to organizational performance. Take his staff as an example. He never used them. Of course, if something happened that was unsatisfactory, the guy goes out. But, unlike Marshall, and a McNarney combination, every man was a marked man. You take a man like Tom Handy, then you take Hull. He was another very fine person, conservative as hell, Ed Hull. This guy, when I wrote a communications paper for Eisenhower of about 20 pages, which Eisenhower said he was going to use in order to find the right kind of a Signal Officer, and then he forgot all about it....

Q: Let me embellish that point, about Arnold selecting men and not being an organizational man. You know, Marshall had very strong men supporting him, like McNarney, and Handy and Hull. Arnold, based on your evaluation of him, had fairly weak men, Stratemeyer, Giles.

B: You can tell that by the way that seldom any of them stayed put. If you look at Marshall's operation. These fellows were old reliables, including McNarney. He kept McNarney.

Q: Was Harmon a weak man, Miff Harmon? He was a Chief of Air Staff.

B: He was Chief of Air Staff before my day.

Q: Then Stratemeyer came in, and then Giles.

B: Not Ben, Barney Giles.

Q: But would you say Arnold perhaps chose a weaker man so he could be the Chief?

B: He couldn't work with a strong man.

Q: He couldn't work with a strong assistant?

B: Erratic, and I'm using this respectfully. Arnold was not what I would call an organization man. Marshall was a systematic person who sort of pulled the strings, almost with certainty, and he had McNarney in there to see that these strings were always pulled properly and in order.

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Q: You think that if Arnold had a strong man like McNarney as his No. 2 man that the guy would have quit, or there would have been a struggle between the two. Because Arnold disliked organizations, and McNarney was a very organized man?

B: It's an interesting question. You can speculate to either extreme as I would see it. Either they, if they got along together, not because of common military interests, but just had an affinity for one another, psychologically, as people sometimes do, Arnold would have gone off in the great blue younder, and done wonderful things as an individualist. McNarney would have kept the store and it would have been well kept. He would have had a strong staff.

Q: It could have worked that way.

B: You might argue that this could have happened, excepting that Marshall needed the strongest man he could find. This is Marshall's genius, Marshall's talent, to use that AF, which didn't have any of the disciplines of the Army. Here is the Army ultraconservative. You had to sort of prod them. And here you had the other wild Indians, and he needed his man from the AF had to be...

Q: Maybe Arnold instinctively took, chose weak men to be the No. 2, a weaker man.

B: Let's put it this way; suppose he had this great interest in combat achievement, which would be a natural flair for the spectacular, in that respectful sense. You know what he would do? As he had no organizational interest, he put his weak men where they could do the least harm.

Q: Well, why didn't he get rid of them?

B: He would have to throw them out, either into combat or fix up an Orlando, which he did, and put them out to pasture.

Q: Arnold immediately, after the war started, began this Advisory Council.

B: Are you talking about Norstad and Cabell?

Q: Norstad and Cabell, and O'Donnell, and Jake Smart and Fred Dean.

B: There was another one, I'm trying to think of.

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Q: Well, Kuter was sort of included. What I'm getting at here is, if he had a strong No. 2 man, he wouldn't have needed an Advisory Council.

B: He didn't use that Advisory Council.

Q: He didn't use them?

B: Well, that's an extreme. I got to know them the first thing when I went down. As a matter of fact, my first encounter was with them, and I have a high respect for Larry Norstad...

Q: As individuals?

B: And also, Cabell.

Q: They call him "Pre." His name is Charles P. Cabell. They call him "Pre."

B: And I got to know them on a first name basis, very quickly. And they are bright. There never was any question in my mind. Arnold set them up, it's almost symbolic for him, they really didn't have much of an opportunity to do much, in that position.

Q: Weren't they troubleshooters? Didn't he put them on special problems like setting up the War College, or enlisted pilots. These are some of the things I've been told they were wrestling with. These are problems sort of which crossed over, which straddled staff agencies. They weren't within one staff. He wanted to be sure that there would be somebody to look at both sides, or three or four sides of a question?

B: I may be doing him a disservice. I may be doing them a disservice. I was never aware from the time I came down there, of their being the kind of an asset that Arnold was constantly using or calling on. And they drifted away, as you know.

Q: Well, they stood it for just so long and wanted to get some combat service.

B: The idea may have been that.

Q: I got the impression that these fellows, with their briefcases, two of them, at a time, might have been regarded as intruders by the organized staff agencies?

B: Arnold was groping for something, and putting it in an egotistical

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vein, I think you might say, figuratively, he found me. I don't mean uniquely, but he found in me somebody who could take care of some of his problems instead of making problems. He did use me in an advisory way before he got through on most anything.

Q: Well, you know the fact that he used you, and the fact that he used the Advisory Council, and he used Kirck, and some other special assistants, so-called, reflects his disregard for organization. Because if he was an organization man you would have been somewhere on that chart, "Director of Radar and Communications", something. He would have made you a Director, or given you some official title.

B: He gave me an official directive on communications.

Q: Right, he gave you an official directive. But you were out. You were always in a parallel line on the organization chart. You never had a direct command.

B: Bear in mind, one of the things that amused me, he wanted me to put my office down there in the AAF. I had a pleasant encounter. It would have been unpleasant. I said: "General, you've asked me to do a job, and if I don't do it, you're the one who is going to fire me." I said: "Please don't ask me to tell me where I must have my office." I said: "Let me do the job. If I can't do it, get rid of me."

Q: You see, this didn't offend him, but it might have offended some other commander, who was more organizationally-minded. Arnold was interested in results, not in organization. You came to see him, came to his office on many occasions, you had contacts with Beebe, his aide, Eugene Beebe?

B: That fancy sport?

Q: The one with the moustache, Horace Shelmire?

B: Beebe.

Q: He had several aides in his office.

B: But there was one waxed moustache guy.

Q: Yes, that was Horace Shelmire. This guy grew up in Pennsylvania with him.

B: Beebe, I knew him.

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Q: You don't recall any special contacts?

B: No, never had any dealings.

Q: How about Suzy Adkins, Arnold's secretary?

B: She was very helpful. I got to know her, and then when she moved on, when Arnold left, she moved up.

Q: To Spaatz. Some people tell me that she was a weathervane. If they had some knotty problem to present to Arnold, she might have called and said: "Today is a good day," or "today is a bad day" for whatever it was the man had in mind. Did you ever use her in this vein? That's a joke, "in this vein."

B: Well, yes. We were on a very friendly basis. I don't mean an intimate basis, but I checked with her many a time. I had the habit, if it hadn't been for Miss Neary, who was Stimson's secretary, he brought down from NY, it wouldn't have worked. Bundy would have been so odious. He wanted me to work through him, you see.

Q: Harvey Bundy?

B: Yes, he was a nuisance. Marshall disliked him, and Joe McNarney couldn't bear him. He had this suave, or greasy, or oily way of saying: "I don't think the Secy would like that." Marshall told me one day, he said: "Here is the door between my office and Mr. Stimson's secretaries office." He said: "In past years, we have ridden together, we've climbed mountains together," and he said, "If I want to see Mr. Stimson I go through that door. If he wants to see me, he comes through this door. We do not need a Harvey Bundy."

Q: Did Suzy ever call you and say: "Dr. Bowles, better not today, maybe tomorrow." Did she ever do this?

B: I'll have to say it this way: there were times when I've asked her; many times when I've asked her if this was an appropriate time. She was always good about it. I even visited her after Arnold left Washington. If I was down there, I'd go in and see her. She was an able woman.

Q: Was she "bribable," you know, boxes of candy on Christmas?

B: No, I never gave her anything like that. I never had to.

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Q: This is Benny Meyers and Stratemeyer. We talked about this at lunch. I think you said that if Stratemeyer had not been in that position, Benny Meyers might not have gotten into trouble. Am I stating that correctly?

B: A little differently. If Stratemeyer had done his job of guarding the Chief's castle, the AAF would never have gotten into this fix. Now what would have happened to Benny, whether he would have been cashiered, or thrown out of the AF that's something I don't know.

Q: Well, apparently, he was slightly crooked, or slightly immoral. If he didn't get hung up on that, it might have been something else.

B: My point is, that Stratemeyer, in my judgment, knew enough to be suspicious, and if he wanted to have Arnold's house clean, or fail-safe, as the boys in airplane design say; he would have had that man out. I'm satisfied, that this is hunch, of course, that he knew enough to know that there were irregularities.

Q: What do you think he knew? You meanthe way Meyers was living?

B: I would argue that the human animal is generally not stupid. He is more likely to be reasonably intelligent. If he is associating with somebody, whether it is at bridge, pretty regularly, and they were together a great deal - these surroundings were unusual - you generally know whether a person is - well, you may wonder at least.

Q: Well, Mrs. Arnold told me that Benny Meyers was always a high liver. He always drove a Cadillac, and he lived in sumptuous surroundings. His second wife is supposed to have had money. Some people tell me they thought he was doing well in the stock market. Maybe he was doing well in the stock market in defense stocks. He had a role in the procurement side of it. In June or July 1943, Stratemeyer put out a questionnaire at Arnold's behest, that all officers, Orval Cook, Benny Meyers, Oliver Echols, all these others, were to fill out a questionnaire listing all their stocks and their assets, etc. Benny Meyers filled out his form like all the rest of them. Later at the denouement, Benny Meyers said that he filled out his form incorrectly, with Arnold's knowledge.

B: You might say with "carnal knowledge."

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Q: Carnal knowledge, very good, but Arnold of course, absolutely denied any connection with that.

B: That's generally the way these people work.

Q: But you think that Stratemeyer should have raised, well, the flag up like that. He should have taken note of the danger signals, and protected Arnold?

B: (Nods head)

Q: We talked a bit about Elliott Roosevelt.

B: It's wrong to use the word, "integrity". He may not have had enough sense to be smart, and I wasn't thinking of Stratemeyer as being conniving with Benny. Now Benny as you know, or believe was told, was secretary to John Morton Muir, the naturalist, and then worked his way up and he was one of the fellows who somehow managed to creep into high places, and came out all right.

Q: How about Elliott Roosevelt? You mentioned something about a flight you took with him.

B: He was a menace.

Q: Did you know he had a lot of courage? He volunteered for several dangerous missions, including one to the North Pole when they were investigating the possibilities of a northern flight. He volunteered for the reconnaissance for the FRANTIC, the shuttle bombing to Russia. They would not let him go because of the danger of capture of the President's son. I take the position that if Elliott Roosevelt wasn't the son of a President, he might have performed fairly well, and he wouldn't have taken the liberties that he took, and he took many.

B: You are touching on dangerous ground. I have always had a little bit of fear, the feeling that Arnold here, stooped a bit under the Presidential pressure. He put Elliott in this photographic activity, and Elliott had no more qualifications than the man in the moon. You know, the situation with Ruth Briggs over there, Bedell Smith's secretary?

Q: Oh, he had a relationship with her?

B: Oh, she thought they were engaged, I was mixed up with what you

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might call the "wax works." I had two WACs over there, and then Kay Summersby, Ruth Briggs, as I remember it, lived with the others in this same establishment. As I understand the story, these girls were concerned because Ruth didn't have an engagement ring and they chipped in and got her one, to have a little fun. Roosevelt was playing around with her, but she was serious. Then the news got to Briggs' mother over here in Iowa or some place, and it got out in the newspapers that Elliott and this gal were engaged. All of a sudden, Faye Emerson, the actress.

Q: This is the one he shipped the dog home for? But you think Arnold should have stood up to that situation?

B: No, I didn't really mean to relate those two things. I was just thinking of Elliott's pereginations. But I had a feeling that Roosevelt put a bit of heat on Arnold, and Arnold may have succumbed a little bit. I don't know.

Q: You know, Arnold resisted promoting him to a Brigadier General, and Eisenhower recommended him for his star - Eisenhower and Spaatz - and I think that Roosevelt simply insisted. You see, Arnold was afraid. I've seen the correspondence on this. He was afraid of the possibilities of criticism because of the dog incident.

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April 21, 1970

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
Consulting Engineer
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I'm delighted to have your letter of April 4th. I'll be up to Wellesley Hills before snow flies again. Exact dates remain unclear as I have firm commitments to vist San Antonio next week for about 12 interviews and the mid-South for a dozen more.

I would want to schedule at least 3 or 4 days to talk with you and to sift your files which General Don Yates told me are very complete. Do you think this will provide enough time?

Yes, Dr. Rudy Winnacker is a valued associate of mine. I've taken the liberty of sending him a copy of your letter, by way of best regards from you.

That I.A.S. valedictory is absolutely superb. Nearly a quarter of a century later, you would not want to, or have to, change it much to bring it up to date.

I'm very much looking forward to our meeting, perhaps in July or August.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

April 4, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Office of the Secretary
Research & Analysis Division - SAFAAR
The Pentagon - 4C881
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Your letter did in fact surprise me. It was more a surprise than astonishment. Although I haven't gone to my files, it must be several years since writing to Jack Loosbrock. It is gratifying to know that you are on the pursuit of material respecting a Hap Arnold biography. I not only admired the man, but developed a deep affection for him. The piece I have "Global Mission" in no wise does him justice.

At the conclusion of the War, I tackled Don Douglas hoping he would finance a project of this sort. He seemed interested, but nevertheless, the idea fell by the wayside. The man does deserve recognition for his contribution - a unique one - has never been appreciated by the outside world for which he sacrificed himself. For reasons of my professional respect, admiration and deep affection for the man, naturally I want to do anything I can to help you in this project.

I expect the summer to be relatively clear as far as my being here in Wellesley is concerned. I too find myself occupied and pre-occupied with a good many activities, professional and otherwise, but would certainly sandwich in the time you would want to put in to go over my library of material and in picking my brains with respect to recollections of General Arnold as an individual and our working relationship.

I don't remember whether I mentioned that I came down to work with Mr. Stimson to help him with radar that got me so intimately involved in the anti-submarine problems and the problems with the Navy. I suppose it is too gentle to say I was a thorn in the side of the Navy boys. I did write, I like to believe, the only critique of detail on this vixing problem. I addressed myself to the broad problem of ocean-borne transport and supply. It did blow the lid off. Despite my rather critical piece on Air Force communications, there came a time when as I was walking down the corridor of the Pentagon, a hand came down on my shoulder. Arnold had come up from my rear. As I looked around he was a veritable constellation. He brought me into the office and said he wanted me to take over all electronics for him. I will not go into detail at this

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point as to how we made out, but I enclose a photocopy of the directive that ensued. Somehow one thing led to another, so that I later on got heavily involved with the B-29's. My entire experience with the Air Force was truly a great one in my life - perhaps I can say the greatest professional experience in my life.

When Arnold retired, he wanted me to write his valedictory speech. I will always remember sitting on the hillside at the Valley of the Moon with Arnold in slippers and dressing gown reviewing my manuscript. He changed but a word or two to suit his choice. My butterflies amidships soon vanished. Incidentally, you may know Rudy Winnacker at the Pentagon who is one of my very good friends and a person I admire immensely. It was Rudy who helped me in editing the speech. I also enclose a photocopy of the speech. Rudy was a great ally during my stay in Washington. You may be interested, as a prelude to our meeting, in scanning Hap's address.

Sincerely,

Edward L. Bowles

Edward L. Bowles

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20-11

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, 2 SEPTEMBER 1943

AAF MEMORANDUM)
NO. 20-11)

ORGANIZATION

Communications Consultant to the Commanding General

1. With the consent of the Secretary of War Dr. Edward L. Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, in addition to his present responsibilities, is designated Consultant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces with over-all supervisory responsibility in connection with all matters relating to communications within the Army Air Forces. The field of communications is defined to comprise all forms of communication, radar, countermeasures, radar aids to fire-control and bombing, radio and radar aids to navigation, and related electronic fields.

2. Dr. Bowles is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the medium of the Chief of Air Staff as well as through direct coordination with the several Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and the Air Communications Officer in the determination of policy, in the initiation of projects, and in all matters of planning, training, organization, procurement, and operations in any way concerned with communications.

3. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General directly through the medium of the Air Communications Officer in the implementation of all plans, policies, projects, and programs in any way related to communications.

4. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the Chief of Air Staff as well as directly through the Air Communications Officer in all matters relating to the personnel, organization, and functioning of the Air Communications Division.

By command of General ARNOLD:

BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Air Staff

OFFICIAL:

FRED C. MILNER
Colonel, AGD
Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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September 9, 1970

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I'm the fellow working on the Hap Arnold biography. I've not been able to find the time to head north. But I've been west and have spoken to several people who recall your contributions: Donald Douglas, Arthur Raymond, and Frank Collbohm.

I'm still trying and will check again when wind and tides seem favorable.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-3414

29th September, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D. C. 20314.

Thanks for the transcription covering your interview with me on May 6th and 7th. I plan to go over it in detail, i. e. to peruse it, and make corrections and suggestions on a tape which I will get to you.

Out of deference to King by the way, I notice at the bottom of the first page I appear to have stated "I found King not very understanding, and very unsympathetic", whereas King was the most understanding of the trio, most sympathetic, and the one with whom I had the most helpful discussions. This looks like an accidental blunder of some kind. Perhaps the recording was so poor that the typist did his own inventing.

Taping my comments

I know I will be able to help you by reading along and filling with asides, so as to be sure there are obvious foundations for statements, and perhaps some qualifying observations.

I do appreciate having this material.

Ted B

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20314

21 September 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Ed:

Your letter of September 16th means a lot to me and to the Arnold project.

Hope to see you down here before too long.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
AF History

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

16th September, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D.C. 20314.

Dear Murray

I appreciate deeply the time you have taken to enlighten me on the very complex project you have with respect to the book on Arnold. What you have to say certainly illustrates the complicated nature of what might have been a simple assignment - but for the sheer horse-work of getting together the material and then making something of it. The problem is not simplified by the fact that so many years have elapsed - and the removal of a number of sources by either death or senility adds to your difficulty. Moreover, the human mind has ways of suffering hallucinations in looking back to events of by-gone days, tending to replace fact with imagination, fancy and other psychological delusions.

Unwittingly I have put myself in a solid position with respect to that epochal period in my life due to the wealth of documentation in my possession.

This note is just to let you know that I believe I comprehend the situation and will give whatever help I can both to the Air Force and to you in your own unenviable task on behalf of Mrs. Arnold.

It looks as if there will be a trip to Washington one of these days, doesn't it?

Ted B

!!! Your comments one one S.E. Morison are particularly interesting. I may already have regaled you with the story of how I had several heavy sessions with him, and at one point accused him of hitting below the belt with respect to his comments regarding one Air Force General. The result was that he took a chapter already in page proof and re-wrote it. In the complimentary volume he later gave me, is the inscription: "You won't like this, but Admiral King will like it even less!"

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20314

13 September 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Crsylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

Dear Ed:

It appears that my letter of 1 September not only upset you but gave a terribly wrong impression of me, and especially of the fact that you think I may be using official stationery improperly. Let me try to fill in more of the picture for you.

When I wrote you on Office of Secretary stationery as "Deputy Chief, Research & Analysis Division", the project had green lights all the way, including approval by the General Counsel of the Air Force in September 1968. Under the original contract written with Random House, I was to research the book and Loosbrock was to write it - all perfectly proper and legal. There were letters from General Ben LeBailly, Director of Air Force Information, John Lang, Administrative Assistant to the Secy, and Under Secretary Townshend Hoopes. (See Attachment #1)

The project started to founder in July 1970 when Loosbrock was called in to "fish or cut bait". Despite the mountain of accumulated research handed to him, Loosbrock chose to bug out. Random House wanted to continue the project with me as writer. In that case, I said, I wanted the contract to stipulate me as sole byline, not unusual, if I was going to do all the work.

Everybody agreed to that logical conclusion, but this created a totally new situation. I was a Government person writing a book for private publication. I could retire pre-maturely and take a $14,000 cut in annual income, or I could stay with the project as a Government person provided I waived my royalties.

I chose the latter course, waiving all my royalties, including the 25% I'd already earned, to Mrs. Arnold. She was now to get 75%; Loosbrock was to get 15% - this to reimburse him because he "founded" the project, and also because he is a darned good editor - and the Aerospace Education Foundation was to get the last 10%.

At about this time, I made arrangements to transfer over to the Office of Air Force History. The change was consummated in September 1970 and was to be a temporary transfer until I could finish the book. I was given the title, "Special Assistant to the Chief AF History" with marching orders to devote 100% of my time to finishing the Biography.

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However, nobody anticipated that the J.A.G. would throw a monkey-wrench into the whole project. After several preliminary judgments during which the legal bureaucrats read a very narrow interpretation into the whole proceedings, I dug up a raft of legal precedents to support the case for private publication. I told General Grussendorf I would not permit my project to end up as a G.P.O. publication, for these reasons:

1) G.P.O. publication vs. Random House is like G.I. overalls vs. a Brooks Brothers suit;

2) Mrs. Arnold would lose thousands of dollars, perhaps tens of thousands of dollars, in royalties;

3) Credibility - my book would have less credibility if published with a U.S. Government imprimaturethan Random House;

4) As a related issue - a wholly government-sponsored publication would get blue pencilled down in O.S.D. for reasons other than national security. If I couldnt tell the Hap Arnold story as I developed it from my research, I didnt want any part of it.

I said I would try to get the J.A.G. to reverse himself, and General Grussendorf said he would be pleased for me to get that legal approval, but until that time, I could confine myself to research only, and that I was not to do any writing on office time. To this end, I went into the legal-historical aspects of Government people writing books for private publishers and found many cases where personnel in Government - either military or civilian - were writing books for outside publishers and even participating in royalty arrangements.

I will cite just a few of the cases that I detailed at great length for the JAG - to no avail. He took the position that just because others stretched the regs, he was not going to do it in this case. Anyway, the cases:

1) Craven & Cate (7 volumes) "The AAF in World War II", published by the Univ. Chicago Press. All research and writing done by Air Force personnel on official duty. Even Wesley Craven and James Cate were in AAF uniforms when they wrote most of their final copy.

2) Samuel Eliot Morison (15 volumes) U.S. Navy In World War II. Published by Little, Brown & Company. Admiral Morison received sigable royalties as his work proved to be a best seller. To beat the "conflict of interest" rap, Navy Secretary Forrestal was persuaded to insert in the Preface of Volume 1 a statement that the Morison series was "unofficial". There was no explanation of reconcilation with the fact that millions of dollars of Government funds went into the research and preliminary writing of all 15 volumes. As it stands, there is no official history of the U.S. Navy in World War II. That is a joke!

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3) In 1970 the U.S. Air Force turned over its manuscript on U.F.O. research to the University of Colorado which published it as a book (Bantam Books paperback). The profits, if any, go to the University. The Air Force Director of Information justified this handlingaas "public policy." In the past, official publications on U.F.O's have not had the credibility desired. A segment of public opinion continues to accept the nation that the Air Force wont tell the truth because it will frighten the American people (vis: Orsen Welles, circa 1938)

4) Marine Corps General Lewis Walt's newbook, "Strange War; Strange Alliance" depicting his experiences in Vietnam. He brought back a Colonel, USMC, to help write the book. Both are participating in royalties of publication by Van Nostrand.

As I said, all these plus a dozen other cases were cited to the JAG who took the curious position in a memorandum to General Grussendorf dated 24 November 1970, as follows: "Review of previous historical undertakings were not deemed appropriate or necessary in our review of Dr. Green's proposed agreement with Random House..."

I had hoped for a fresh look at the whole situation when General Ginsburgh took over from General Grussendorf. General Ginsburgh has decided against my petition and has directed me to get on with the "Dear Generals" compilation. It was about this time that your letter of late August came in with the suggestion of a get-together with Dr. Belden and General Ginsburgh. My 1 September letter was written partly in haste, and partly out of concern that you might get a rude reception here. But it turns out my concern was exaggerated. Dr. Tom Belden approached me this morning and suggested that both he and General Ginsburgh would be pleased to talk with you about any subject of mutual interest. He also volunteered the possibility that some correspondence between you and General Arnold (I told him of your vast personal archives) might find its way into my "Dear Generals" opus which will be published in 1972 by G.P.O.

Looking back at the Green/Loosbrock correspondence with you, I'm surprised to note that nowhere is there mention of Random House. I assure you that this omission is accidental. In practically every letter I write requesting an interview, "Random House" is mentioned in the first paragraph. In renewing acquaintance with you in my letter of March 31, 1970, I simply alluded to your previous correspondence of 1966 with Loosbrock. However, reflection must convey the understanding that Loosbrock, as Editor of a non-Government publication,would not, and could not publish under G.P.O. imprimatur.

Summing up, I would like to make two last points:

1) The letters of August 2/3, 1971 from General Spaatz and Baker, respectively, raise the critical issue of publishing the biography by Random House vs. G.P.O. They both feel strongly, as I do, that G.P.O. publication will reduce its effectiveness. They both promised to address the issue to higher authority, so the matter is not yet finally closed.

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I would feel badly to think that both I and my worthy project have lost your esteem through misunderstanding. You have been extremely helpful to me in the research and I am counting on your continued support.

Not least, I hope you will pay us a visit. I want to show you what has been done. If the quality and quantity of research is the measure of a good biography, I think we have a good one in prospect - no less than General Hap Arnold deserves.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
AF History

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20314

13 September 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

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Everybody agreed to that logical conclusion, but this created a totally new situation. I was a Government person writing a book for private publication. I could retire pre-maturely and take a $14,000 cut in annual income, or I could stay with the project as a Government person provided I waived my royalties.

I chose the latter course, waiving all my royalties, including the 25% I'd already earned, to Mrs. Arnold. She was now to get 75%; Loosbrock was to get 15% - this to reimburse him because he "founded" the project, and also because he is a darned good editor - and the Aerospace Education Foundation was to get the last 10%.

At about this time, I made arrangements to transfer over to the Office of Air Force History. The change was consummated in September 1970 and was to be a temporary transfer until I could finish the book. I was given the title, "Special Assistant to the Chief AF History" with marching orders to devote 100% of my time to finishing the Biography.

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However, nobody anticipated that the J.A.G. would throw a monkey-wrench into the whole project. After several preliminary judgments during which the legal bureaucrats read a very narrow interpretation into the whole proceedings, I dug up a raft of legal precedents to support the case for private publication. I told General Grussendorf I would not permit my project to end up as a G.P.O. publication, for these reasons:

1) G.P.O. publication vs. Random House is like G.I. overalls vs. a Brooks Brothers suit;

2) Mrs. Arnold would lose thousands of dollars, perhaps tens of thousands of dollars, in royalties;

3) Credibility -my book would have less credibility if published with a U.S. Government imprèmaturethan Random House;

4) As a related issue - a wholly government-sponsored publication would get blue pencilled down in O.S.D. for reasons other than national security. If I couldnt tell the Hap Arnold story as I developed it from my research, I didnt want any part of it.

I said I would try to get the J.A.G. to reverse himself, and General Grussendorf said he would be pleased for me to gat that legal approval, but until that time, I could confine myself to research only, and that I was not to do any writing on office time. To this end, I went into the legal-historical aspects of Government people writing books for private publishers and found many cases where personnel in Government - either military or civilian - were writing books for outside publishers and even participating in royalty arrangements.

I will cite just a few of the cases that I detailed at great length for the JAG - to no avail. He took the position that just because others stretched the regs, he was not going to do it in this case. Anyway, the cases:

1) Craven & Cate (7 volumes) "The AAF inWorld War II", published by the Univ. Chicago Press. All research and writing done by Air Force personnel on official duty. Even Wesley Craven and James Cate were in AAF uniforms when they wrote most of their final copy.

2) Samuel Eliot Morison (15 volumes) U.S. Navy In World War II. Published by Little, Brown & Company. Admiral Morison received sigable royalties as his work proved to be a best seller. To beat the "conflict of interest" rap, Navy Secretary Forrestal was persuaded to insert in the Preface of Volume 1 a statement that the Morison series was "unofficial". There was no explanation of reconcilation with the fact that millions of dollars of Government funds went into the research and preliminary writing of all 15 volumes. As it stands, there is no official history of the U.S. Navy in World War II. That is a joke!

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3) In 1970 the U.S. Air Force turned over its manuscript on U.F.O. research to the University of Colorado which published it as a book (Bantam Books paperback). The profits, if any, go to the University. The Air Force Director of Information justified this handlingaas "public policy." In the past, official publications on U.F.O's have not had the credibility desired. A segment of public opinion continues to accept the nation that the Air Force wont tell the truth because it will frighten the American people (vis: Orsen Welles, circa 1938)

4) Marine Corps General Lewis Walt's newbook, "Strange War; Strange Alliance" depicting his experiences in Vietnam. He brought back a Colonel, USMC, to help write the book. Both are participating in royalties of publication by Van Nostrand.

As I said, all these plus a dozen other cases were cited to the JAG who took the curious position in a memorandum to General Grussendorf dated 24 November 1970, as follows: "Review of previous historical undertakings were not deemed appropriate or necessary in our review of Dr. Green's proposed agreement with Random House..."

I had hoped for a fresh look at the whole situation when General Ginsburgh took over from General Grussendorf. General Ginsburgh has decided against my petition and has directed me to get on with the "Dear Generals" compilation. It was about this time that your letter of late August came in with the suggestion of a get-together with Dr. Belden and General Ginsburgh. My 1 September letter was written partly in haste, and partly out of concern that you might get a rude reception here. But it turns out my concern was exaggerated. Dr. Tom Belden approached me this morning and suggested that both he and General Ginsburgh would be pleased to talk with you about any subject of mutual interest. He also volunteered the possibility that some correspondence between you and General Arnold (I told him of your vast personal archives) might find its way into my "Dear Generals" opus which will be published in 1972 by G.P.O.

Looking back at the Green/Loosbrock correspondence with you, I'm surprised to note that nowhere is there mention of Random House. I assure you that this omission is accidental. In practically every letter I write requesting an interview, "Random House" is mentioned in the first paragraph. In renewing acquaintance with you in my letter of March 31, 1970, I simply alluded to your previous correspondence of 1966 with Loosbrock. However, reflection must convey the understanding that Loosbrock, as Editor of a non-Government publication,would not, and could not publish under G.P.O. imprimatur.

Summing up, I would like to make two last points:

1) The letters of August 2/3, 1971 from General Spaatz and Baker, respectively, raise the critical issue of publishing the biography by Random House vs. G.P.O. They both feel strongly, as I do, that G.P.O. publication will reduce its effectiveness. They both promised to address the issue to higher authority, so the matter is not yet finally closed.

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I would feel badly to think that both I and my worthy project have lost your esteem through misunderstanding. You have been extremely helpful to me in the research and I am counting on your continued support.

Not least, I hope you will pay us a visit. I want to show you what has been done. If the quality and quantity of research is the measure of a good biography, I think we have a good one in prospect - no less than General Hap Arnold deserves.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
AF History

Encl

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

7th September, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington, D. C. 20314.

Dear Murray,

Your communication of 1st September with its enclosures was indeed a shocker! As you must know, my help was given under the impression that I was making a natural response to an official Air Force enquiry. Doubtless the letterhead used in your correspondence, allied to the title beneath your signature - first of all "Deputy Chief, Research & Analysis Division" and later "Special Assistant to Chief AF History Office of Air Force History" contributed to this, and as there was no word from you to the contrary, I tacitly assumed the Air Force contemplated publishing a biography on General Arnold. I had no inkling of a commitment to Random House, and through Random House, a financial advance to Mrs. Arnold, any more than I knew of the existence of a royalty agreement on your part, or on the part of anyone else.

At all events, although I have put in much time and expense, I shall suspend all activities on the project until there is some clarification of the issue and a specific understanding with the Air Force is reached.

Sincerely,

E.L.B.

(EDWARD L. BOWLES)

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MEMORANDUM

1 September 1971

General Ginsburgh:

Dr. Belden:

Dr. Ed Bowles' letter of August 24th requires a response.

The attachments will suggest some of the impact he had around here when he was Expert Consultant to Secretary Stimson and General Arnold.

I spent three days in May browsing through his vast personal archives up in Wellesley Hills, Mass.

Dr. Bowles is the probable "father" of RAND - I guess he's not as proud of that as he used to be - but anyway, he is the fellow who wrested control of airborne radar, radio equipment, and most important, guided missiles, from the Signal Corps in 1944.

Do you have any suggestions as to what I should tell him?

Murray Green

Encl

Will be back on 13th

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

24th August, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D.C. 20314.

Murray:

In response to your invitation of 2nd August to get together in Washington one of these days, what I would like to do is to come down and spend some time with the Air Force Historical Group. I did a similar thing some years ago with the Signal Corps and found it both interesting and instructive. I would, of course, expect to do this at my own expense. Do you suppose you could arrange such a gathering? How about the week of 20th September for instance?

The material I have promised you is about to be put in the mail. I hope it will be helpful.

STRATHMORE
ERASEABLE BOND
25% COTTON FIBER U.S.A.

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20314

28 April 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

As my schedule is firmed up, I plan to arrive in Wellesley Hills shortly after Noon on Wednesday, May 5th. If my plans should change in any important particulars, I will phone.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

MG/sjp

	Time	Miles
New Haven to Meriden	0:22	19
Meriden to Hartford	0:25	18
Hartford to Worcester	1:25	50
Worcester to Wellesley		38
		124

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AC 617
235-2414

EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

18th March, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D. C. 20314.

Dear Murray:

I like the figure with which you open your letter of 4th March. May I also resort to the same metaphor, if that is what it is, and say that I am about to be more than busy on this dreadful problem of Income Tax Returns, which I have only begun to face. It happens to be a particularly difficult year because of my complicated stock inter-relationships on which I must have legal counsel. I would therefore much prefer to have our meeting after 15th April; there are other commitments that make this temporary postponement important.

Naturally, I am vitally interested in your project, and want to help in every way. Without hesitation I will make available to you any and all material I have, for the reason that I believe the Hap Arnold story, as you call it, must be told to complete the perspective thus far so lacking in the World War II Chronicles.

I can say with modesty that I not only got to know the man on a very personal basis, but developed an immense affection for him. I saw him through many a tantrum, and saw him cut down many a character in that way so characteristic of his manner when he wished to make a point, or to express dissatisfaction.

I enclose a copy of the directive under which I began to work with Arnold. I expected the "coalition" to last out a few weeks, which seemed to be par for the course, but somehow, I stayed with him throughout the remainder of the war. No-one could have given me greater opportunity to contribute.

You speak of Frank Collbohn and RAND. I am anxious to talk with you about this project. It has some interesting features. In a sense I, and thus Arnold, were sold a bit of goods by Don Douglas (actually by Frank). Frank had become a consultant to my office in connection with a special bomber project which should also be discussed in some detail for it was the real precursor of RAND. Frank was brought in to work on this. This Bomber Project I believe was the first instance in which civilians, including industry, collaborated with the military planners. This represented an immense step forward. I doubt it could have been done without a man like Arnold in the driver's/

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driver's seat who had the courage to let me proceed with the idea. The history of that episode alone could make a real accent in anything you wrote about Arnold.

Perhaps I can help (or disconcert) you best by saying that I have here copies of all my Army correspondence - some five years of activity - with Stimson, Marshall and Arnold. This material is supplemented by a mass of reports and other original documents. I therefore hesitate to tell you how much time it would take you to browse through the material to find what is germane to your particular interest. It will certainly be several days. It would be my suggestion that you "hole in" at the Holiday Inn, or at the Marriott Motor Hotel on Route 128, get yourself a rental car so as to be independent and do whatever you want to do here at my home, which is about three miles distant.

I would pro pose to sit down with you at the start with a tape recorder, reviewing this period of my activities with the War Department, with emphasis of course on the Arnold aspect, all designed to help you in your study of my material. Thus only do I see a way to fit Arnold into the framework which necessarily includes Marshall and McNarney along with Stimson. I mention Stimson particularly because of his critical involvement in the anti-submarine problem where of course the Army Air Corps played a critical role not only in warfare with the enemy, but in internecine warfare which at the time was rampant. McNarney is vital because it was he at Marshall's level who was put there to make up for Arnold's lack of interest - weaknesses if you will - in these imperatives, however detailed, that had to do with systematic organizational control and field equipment. I suppose what I am saying to you is that we would have much to discuss, if, as I understand it, you are doing a full study of the Arnold aspect of the War.

To give you a little bit of the human touch that is bound to make me somewhat a victim of my own emotions, if not my age, in this whole matter, I enclose a few additional pieces of paper which may whet your appetite.

Thos

Murray: Your letter of 15 March came just as my letter was to be posted - Hope all goes well with the surgery - we have had a few incidents of that sort ourselves - Please keep me posted Thos

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20-11

AAF MEMORANDUM)
NO. 20-11)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, 2 SEPTEMBER 1943

ORGANIZATION

Communications Consultant to the Commanding General

1. With the consent of the Secretary of War Dr. Edward L. Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, in addition to his present responsibilities, is designated Consultant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces with over-all supervisory responsibility in connection with all matters relating to communications within the Army Air Forces. The field of communications is defined to comprise all forms of communication, radar, countermeasures, radar aids to fire-control and bombing, radio and radar aids to navigation, and related electronic fields.

2. Dr. Bowles is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the medium of the Chief of Air Staff as well as through direct coordination with the several Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and the Air Communications Officer in the determination of policy, in the initiation of projects, and in all matters of planning, training, organization, procurement, and operations in any way concerned with communications.

3. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General directly through the medium of the Air Communications Officer in the implementation of all plans, policies, projects, and programs in any way related to communications.

4. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the Chief of Air Staff as well as directly through the Air Communications Officer in all matters relating to the personnel, organization, and functioning of the Air Communications Division.

By command of General ARNOLD:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
OFFICIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT

BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Air Staff

OFFICIAL:

FRED C. MILNER
Colonel, AGD
Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"B"

4-1610,AF

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 July 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD,
GENERAL SOMERVELL:

I plan to issue the following directive:

"I have been increasingly impressed by the fact that the design and operation of aircraft is becoming more and more inseparably associated with radio and radar development. I have discussed the matter with Dr. Bowles and have come to the conclusion that we should treat these developments as a part of the main problem of aircraft design and operation rather than as accessories.

"Under these circumstances I believe that airborne radar and radio equipment, guided missiles and ground radar and radio navigational aids should be considered as items of equipment peculiar to the Air Forces.

"I do not think it best, at this time, to transfer all production of these items to the Army Air Forces, but I am of the opinion that the Army Air Forces should now assume responsibility for research, development and development procurement.

"A survey conducted for me by Dr. Bowles indicates that this transfer of responsibility should result in the transfer from the Signal Corps to the Army Air Forces of about 195 officers, 170 enlisted men, and 1,470 civilians; approximately $250,000,000; the facilities at Wright Field; the field laboratories at Boca Raton, Florida; Florosa, Florida; and Indianapolis, Indiana; and the field station at Clermont, Florida.

"General McNarney has been directed to take the staff action involved."

Chief of Staff.

7/26/44
To: Gen. Tunbridge -
note & notify
all concerned -
[illegible]

1/26

Ea.

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Arnold's inscription in my copy of "Global Mission"

To
Edward R. Bowles -
a man whose help during
World War II was of utmost importance
to me - He made my task much
easier by the masterful manner in
which he handled administration
critical matters with other arms
and services.

Yours truly
H. H. Arnold

El Rancho Tally
Calif.
12 Oct 46

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Tom B
has Bowles
letter & late Aug 20314

1 September 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Ed:

I'm going to play this one right off the top of the table. Your letter came in at a time when I'm fighting for survival of the Arnold Biography project.

I dont know whether I briefed you on my problem, but some months ago, a JAG bureaucrat made a preliminary determination that there was a possible conflict of interest in my writing a book to be published commercially for private gain (not mine) while I was employed by Uncle Sam. Since then, my bosses have been running scared.

This led to a directive to me to cease and desist on the Biography. I have enlisted the enthusiastic support of Generals Spaatz and Eaker. I also wrote a letter yesterday, but my erstwhile collaborator, Jack Loosbrock, persuaded me last night not to burn my bridges, but to work out a schedule for myself that I put in some daytime hours on their project and work on my own at night.

I took his advice, for the present, anyway. I did not send out the letters yesterday, but wanted to sleep on it. I did, and decided not to fire my main guns.

I tell you this, so you can know some of the climate that exists around here. I have very little respect for all but two or three of the "scholars" who sit around here and collect fancy salaries. So far as I know, only one other fellow is aiming at general publication. The rest are writing these classified "blue books" which are viewed by fellow-squirrels and buried in the vault. Most of it is about Vietnam, you know, "The Air-Ground War in Cambodia-Laoss- 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1966".

In any event, I sent your letter in to General Ginsburgh and will be interested in his response. Meanwhile, I'm leaving this afternoon for Colorado Springs and the AF Academy. My son is in the Class of '75. This weekend, they let the "doolies" out into polite society. However, I'll be back on the 13th, and will write you soon after that.

Let nothing I have said deter you from making a trip down. As a minimum, I hope to have dinner with you.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

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I spent three days in May browsing through his vast personal archives up in Wellesley Hills, Mass.

Dr. Bowles is the probable "father" of RAND - I guess he's not as proud of that as he used to be - but anyway, he is the fellow who wrested control of airborne radar, radio equipment, and most important, guided missiles, from the Signal Corps in 1944.

Do you have any suggestions as to what I should tell him?

Murray Green

Encl

will be back on 13th

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Murray Green

Encl

P.S. Will be back on 13th

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20314

13 August 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

Your letters of the 10th and 11th are in hand. The way things are I shall have nearly a full time job running down the leads which you have been so kind to give me.

The interviews with General Crow and Colonel Jack Davies lived up to expectations. Davies served under General Arnold for four years and didnt like him one bit, although he came to admire him. Davies was close to Pinky Craig and Muir Fairchild. On one occasion, Fairchild put his name on the General Officers list and it was struck off. Davies also recalled Mrs. Arnold and the Arnold clan. It was very valuable.

The Crow interview was less personalized, but no less valuable. He really didnt know Arnold as intimately as he led you to believe, but he told me much about life at Fort Riley and Fort Leavenworth where they both attended the Command and Staff School. One can fairly assume that the same things happened to each man in that environment. I also got some of the flavor of life on an Army Post between the wars. Mrs. Crow came out and declared that "Bob was M.F.H." at Riley. When I professed ignorance, she declared it was "Master of the Fox Hunt," with an air of everybody-ought-to-know-that. Many pictures to accompany the narrative captured some of the tone of Fort Riley.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

11th August, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington, D.C 20314.

PERSONAL

Dear Murray:

Your prompt response to my recent letter regarding Grow and Davies cheers me greatly for I get some measure of your dedication and enthusiasm for the immediate project.

I had many nostalgic conversations with the late Colonel Harvey, and I believe it was he who had the exposure to Santy Fairchild when I come to think of it.

I am interested in your enclosure which mentions the irrepressible and ubiquitous Vannevar Bush having invented RAND. If you were to look at his recent book, of which incidentally I have an inscribed complimentary copy, you would have to conclude that he pretty much won the second world war and was the Royal Pooh-Bah in damn near everything of importance during his active career. You will find in this book - which is entitled "Pieces of the Action" - that he would like to have you believe - although he makes no effort to prove what would be readily provable - that it was through some of his machinery that the Japanese code was broken.

Bush is a complex character, very interesting, paradoxically a good friend, as well as a man whose mechanations I have made it my business to escape ever since I matriculated at MIT in 1920 when I suddenly found myself a member of the staff.

If there was anything Bush wanted during the war, it was to sit at the level or right hand of the Joint Chiefs and as part of that prestigious body. He would probably have made the grade had he had the full confidence of Marshall, King and Arnold.

Insofar as RAND was concerned, you will see from my papers that he did not have the foggiest notion that such a thing was even in the generation stage till I invited him to the luncheon attended by Eisenhower, Spaatz and others of the military, along with the elite - Douglas, Dutch Kindleberter and Egvets. He was no doubt concerned because he was promoting a Joint Research and Development Board with the military.

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The grist of material I have promised is in process. I like to hope it will be a help to you. There will be more to come if you so desire after reviewing what I give you.

Your mention of Bush's name popping up many times in the Arnold papers reminds me of a day when Arnold called me down and thrust into my hands a letter from Bush, with the remark: "Bowles, I can read - but what the hell is this man really after?"

Although this is not the place to go into the subject of the NDRC, which later became OSRD, I do want to say that I believe Bush's concept of setting up this mechanism for using otherwise scattered and unorganized talent was an act of great perception if not genius, for there were vast obstacles to be overcome - after all, we already had a National Academy of Sciences and a National Research Council. It could have been imputed that they were the natural instruments to initiate and guide scientific contribution to our military effort, and had this situation not been upset by Bush's acumen, there would have been nothing but confusion and failure to contribute substantively. This was the apex of his career.

After the fact of RAND's existence, we were involved in discussing possible leaders, and Bush was in on these talks. One of the men we thought would be suitable was Lloyd Berkner, but as Bush had his heart and soul set on getting Berkner for his new military organization battle was not joined on this point.

Van and I are on very good terms, and if you write to him you need not hesitate to use my name. His address is:

304, Marsh Street, Belmont, Mass. 02178.

Sincerely,

S.B.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

10th August, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington, D.C. 20314.

PERSONAL

Dear Murray;

Thanks for your cryptic note of 6th August attached to the 9th Jan./70 interview with Yates. It is my impulse to tell you I do not know how you can make sense out of material of this sort. I admire you for your perseverance.

Yates is an "eager beaver", with perhaps a little too much of the "we" in him. There is reference to Irving Krick. This man has been a problem child to the professional meterologists. He is an ambitious soul of indefatigible energy, and a great exploiter of opportunity. I don't have time to trace him for you, but I believe he runs a commercial weather service out in the West somewhere.

On one occasion when McNarney and I were discussing weather service problems sometime before the cross-Channel invasion (I was interested in seeing us develop the single weather service for the Army and of course including the Army Air Forces)„ he happened to mention Krick who had established himself in the Navy with uniform and rank - there was a gleam in Joe's eye. The Navy had just sent an emmisary to McNarney asking whether the Army would not like to have Krick. It took Joe but a moment to decline the offer, his reasoning being simply that if Krick were worth a damn, the Navy would not offer him to the Army. Krick had charm, and before we knew it he had prevailed upon Arnold to give him refuge in the Air Force. According to Arnold, Krick assured him he could make 30-day forecasts, a feat which I believe to this day is still in the realm of dreams.

You will see from the attached material that Rossby was taken into my office as one of my Consultants. He was a man of unchallenged ability, and at the same time, integrity. As I remember the story, he had been a student of Bjerkness(?), a world authority on meterology in his day, and perhaps the greatest leader in this field. I had known him many years as a colleague at MIT.

Rossby/

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Rossby was brought to this country to make a meterological study for the United Airlines at the time they were projecting a cross-country commercial passenger operation flying directly from the East to Los Angeles and San Francisco instead of resorting to the longer southern route to avoid our harsh winter weather. This was at the same time MIT's opportunity to establish a research and teaching activity in meterology to fit in with its School of Aeronautics - Rossby was invited to join its staff.

As Yates observes, Rossby was a scientist and researcher, but was not bent on being a forecaster. He became an extraordinary, energetic leader in the field of meterology, global in his influence.

Krick's tracks were evident to many. After the war, he tried to get himself affianced to Cal. Tech, but so far as I am aware never made the grade. One of my anxieties at the time was that he might insinuate himself into the forecasting group for the cross-Channel invasion and become a nuisance. I therefore made it a point to discuss the subject with General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, in his office - at 20, Grosvenor Square, London. Ike was always cordial and understanding - always available. Krick's affects were nullified, but this in no wise dimmed his tendency to make exaggerated statements after the war.

You will see reference to Peddersen (not Patterson) in the enclosed papers. He, like Rossby, ranks as a foremost meterologist. Rossby is now dead.

I have much more material on the weather service problem. One of the tasks which I was proud to have brought about was to see that we set up a single service for the Army as a whole, and the other that it be an "exempted service" insofar as the operational rights of the theater commanders were concerned.

With reference to Arnold and Millikan. Millikan, a physicist, was very active in the study of cosmic rays - what was their nature, their source? As I recall the circumstances, he was on one side of the fence and Arthur Holly Compton on the other with respect to theories on the subject. There was need to make measurements with a minimum of the earth's atmosphere intervening. This was in the late twenties or early thirties. Arnold's airplanes were a means of carrying Millikan's experimentalists high into the air, thus into the rarified atmosphere. For many years Millikan was President of Cal. Tech.

I support the statement of Arnold's interest in R & D. Yates' comment that he did not understand it, but knew it was essential and so on is good, and to the point. I could make the same remark on my early days at MIT. Professor Jackson, my boss, who was not only head of the Department of Electrical Engineering but of the then prestigious Consulting firm of Jackson and Moreland, was uncannily similar to Arnold in many ways. Both cantankerous, quixotic and with amazing intuitive ability to do the right thing in taking up the pieces after/

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after a brouhaha. The method of handling the two men was very much the same, and I credit my ability to get on with Arnold to this early training under Jackson.

Moreland, by the way, I had as an Advisory Specialist attached to McArthur's command.

Sincerely

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~~TOP SECRET~~

6 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Arnold.

SUBJECT: The Weather Problem.

As a part of my activities for you on my recent trip to the Central and Southwest Pacific, India, Burma and China, I made a detailed study of the weather service upon which our air operations so heavily depend. I discussed the problem in detail with our various weather officers in the field, and have also gone into the general subject of meteorological service with Air Forces and theater commanders. I am convinced that a new order must be set up in respect to weather service in the Air Forces. Not only is it essential to establish adequate sources of meteorological data in the form of ground observation stations and air weather reconnaissance on a larger scale, but also to set up an organizational structure within the Air Forces with proper War Department approval so that these data can be used intelligently and expeditiously to meet our various forecasting needs. Really comprehensive planning in both operations and research and courageous and imaginative leadership are essential. We have not had them.

On your instructions Dr. Rossby, of my staff, has gone to the Pacific for a conference to get clearly in mind the detailed technical needs of the kind of weather service required by air operations on the present scale. Prior to his departure I reviewed with him the material I brought back from detailed conferences with Colonel Stone, General Harmon's weather officer, and Colonel Ellsworth, General Stratemeyer's weather officer. We also discussed the readjustments of our weather service organization that must be made if we are to achieve the kind of dynamic, progressive service you have every right to demand.

Because of the urgency of this weather problem, as I observed it in the theaters, I did not await your return but reported immediately to General Giles, who asked me to proceed at once with an organization plan so that when Rossby comes back from the Pacific we can review it together prior to putting it before you for approval. In order to establish a fresh point of view, the kind of morale we must have in the field, and to achieve centralization, it is essential to set up a special staff weather officer here in Headquarters and an independent weather wing or command outside the Headquarters. These do not at present exist in the sense that they should. The pattern

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must be similar to that of the Army Airways Communication System and the Air Transport Command. Since weather is a worldwide thing the forecasts for one area, the Japanese for example, depend on weather information from outside that area, namely from India, China and Siberia. Moreover, we must have uniform practices and means for simplifying communication between theaters to carry on efficiently those operations upon which weather forecasting depends, along with many other requirements which can only be met and insured by a centralization of our weather administration.

The plan I have in mind for the centralization of weather is directed toward insuring adequate administration and control. It will not in any way affect the freedom of a tactical unit to obtain weather data and make the forecasts peculiar to its own needs. On the other hand, the tendency to take weather to pieces and give it to tactical units seriously jeopardizes the establishment of a fundamental weather structure of a worldwide character on which local forecasts must obviously be based.

Our weather must not depend on the whims of the enemy. For example, in the past we have been depending far too much on Japanese weather data, fortuitously acquired, and only recently have been badly hampered by their having changed the code and made it most complicated. Again, our Russian data has been uncontrolled and most meager. In China there has been obvious, and perhaps rather natural, reluctance to do the housekeeping necessary to give us ample weather stations to insure properly effective forecasts in the area of Japan.

It is clear that our air weather reconnaissance has been inadequate and its associated administration too often inefficient and ambiguous, and that even the B-25's which have finally been given to the job represent only the beginning of the necessary air reconnaissance effort. I am sure it will turn out to be essential that we use B-29's out of both the Marianas and India-China to obtain the kind of air weather reconnaissance necessary for efficient operations against Japan. When I visited Saipan - and as I remember it this was confirmed by General LeMay's experience in China - it turned out that, of the B-29 missions forecast to be visual, only 50% of those flown over Japan turned out actually to be so. Yet, I am satisfied that we have able weather people in both the Central Pacific areas and India-Burma-China. We simply have not, in my opinion, the right kind of leadership to visualize what our problems are going to be for more extensive strategic operations in that area. I refer to leadership with the vision, drive and fight necessary to achieve an essential result.

Edward L. Bowles

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27 January 1944

[illegible] you this memorandum.

Subject: [illegible] operation on combined level.

1. In pursuance of our recent conference on the subject of weather service for the Supreme Allied Command, I am now ready to make recommendations to you.

2. I attach a memorandum on the overall subject of weather organization, prepared for me by Dr. C. G. Rossby of my own office. This memorandum has been reviewed by General Spaatz and General Anderson. They concur in the recommendations contained therein. I likewise believe these recommendations sound and have therefore obtained approval to transmit them to you for such action as you may wish to take. They are as follows:

[illegible]

a. That a request be made through the U.S.A.F. to the British Meteorological Office for the assignment, on a temporary basis, of Mr. Ivor Petterssen, now with the British Forecasting Centre at Dunstable, as special consultant to the Weather Service Unit of your staff (Page 4, Section III, of attached memorandum).

b. That steps be taken through the U.S.A.F. to have Dr. Spilhaus, the British representative on your weather staff, mobilized and placed in uniform in his rank of Group Captain, to ensure that he will be responsible solely to the Supreme Allied Command (Page 3, Section II, 1), of attached memorandum).

c. That [illegible] there be established at Reading a system of regular weather briefings for designated members of your staff by [illegible] these briefings to be presented by Dr. Petterssen or Colonel Colman in the [illegible] of your staff weather officers (Page 4, Section II, IV, of attached memorandum).

3. I am convinced that these moves are in the interest of [illegible] effectiveness for weather forecasting in this area.

[illegible] B. Bowie,
Expert Consultant to Secretary of War.

Incl: [illegible] as stated.

Copy to Gen. [illegible]

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27 January 1944

[illegible] General Spaatz,

[illegible] Air War Operations.

1. In accordance with our understanding yesterday morning, I have prepared a memorandum for General Eisenhower, a copy of which I enclose (see Tab "A"), which I have placed in the hands of General Kuter with for transmittal, suggesting to him that before it is placed before General Eisenhower you have an opportunity to review it. I will appreciate it if you will then let General Smith know that it has your approval. I am quite sure that this memorandum is in accordance with the principles of our discussion last night.

2. In connection with the last page of the Rossby memorandum, herewith enclosed with the memorandum to General Eisenhower (see Tab "B"), unless I hear from you to the contrary I am taking up with General Arnold the matter of releasing Colonel Senter to replace Colonel Tiemann. It is understood, in accordance with the Rossby memorandum, that in addition to replacing Colonel Tiemann in his present capacity, Colonel Senter would also serve in an administrative capacity with the CG, ATC.

3. I have discussed your recommendations for additional observation points in the Atlantic with Dr. Rossby, who has prepared for me the attached memorandum (see Tab "C"). I plan to take up this matter in Washington immediately upon my arrival.

With best personal regards,

[illegible]
[illegible] Consultant to Secretary of War,
Communications Consultant to the CG, AAF,
Room 4-E-936 Pentagon Building,
Washington 25, D.C.

[illegible] Memo to Gen. Eisenhower.
Memo sub. re Weather Organization.
Memo sub. re Weather Stations in Atlantic.

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26 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. C. L. Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War.

SUBJECT : Weather Organization.

I have reviewed the Weather Organization for the American Air Forces and for the Supreme Allied Commander in the British Isles with a number of experts, including representatives for the British Meteorological Office, the Army Air Forces Weather Service, the Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Weather Service. As a result of these conferences, the following points are fairly well agreed upon:

1. Weather Service for American Air Forces. An American Weather Central Forecasting and Climatological Unit will be set up at Widewing under the direction of Colonel Yates. Colonel Yates directed the Weather Information Branch in Washington in a very creditable way and is a good executive.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Holzman will be the chief forecaster in this new organization. Colonel Holzman is outstanding in short range forecasting and is thoroughly acquainted with the techniques as well as with the limitations of various proposed medium range forecasting techniques.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Krick will be the second forecaster in this new unit. Under the proposed organization it is reasonable to expect that it should be possible to utilize effectively his services while at the same time restraining any over-confidence which might result from his enthusiasm for one particular type of technique.

4. Dr. Landsberg will be brought in as consultant on maximum time length assignment in the new climatology section. His services should and must be used also by the Weather Organization set up to serve the Supreme Allied Commander.

5. Colonel Yates should be appointed staff weather officer to General Anderson for the purpose of serving as liaison officer between both the 18th and 21st Weather Squadrons on the one hand, and Washington and Asheville on the other hand. (The 18th Squadron serves the Strategic Air Forces and the 21st the Tactical Air Forces).

6. Colonel Loorman, who is in charge of the 21st (Tactical) Weather Squadron is doing splendid work and should be retained. He should be provided with a few more experienced forecasters and efforts are now being made to arrange for side assignments.

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7. Colonel Simenson, who is in charge of the 18th (Strategic) Weather Squadron, has been recommended for assignment to operational duty by Colonel Sewter, and in this recommendation I concur. Colonel Simendson has maintained excellent relations with the British and has built up an effective organization in the British Isles. However, as a result of his occupation with administrative functions he has drifted away from the technical side of meteorology, which now becomes more important than ever. He might well be replaced with one of the younger men who have grown up with the Weather Service in the old Bomber Command.

8. It is absolutely essential for the operational forecasting for both the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces that some improvement be made in the regularity and speed of the transmission of weather data (surface and upper air) collected at great expense in Baffins Land, Labrador, Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland.

This data is perishable and a few hours delay may mean loss of an operational opportunity, since the forecasters cannot take chances with an unknown weather picture to the west. A large party of the delay is said to be attributable to slowness in redistribution of the data from the British Communications and Weather Central at Dunstable.

Assignment of two thoroughly competent and tactful AACS and Weather Liaison Officers to Dunstable may assist in finding the reason for the delays.

9. For joint operations between this theatre and the Strategic Air Forces in the Mediterranean, a direct radio teletype connection between the 8th and 15th Air Forces is essential. It is my understanding that plans are under way for such a link. Their execution should be accelerated.

10. Until we have assurance that the new Weather Central functions in a thoroughly reliable fashion, it is important that the thoroughly tested Weather Service for the Eighth Air Force be given a free hand and not be over-ruled in the direction of over-confidence from the new Weather Central. The same applies to the joint operations with the 15th Strategic Air Force in the Mediterranean.

II Weather Service for the Supreme Allied Commander.

A short time before my arrival here, in a meeting in the British Meteorological Office between British (including Admiralty) representatives and several representatives for the AAF weather service in the British Isles, a weather organization for SAC was agreed upon. Under this plan a small joint staff weather office was organized, consisting of

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Dr. Stagg as the senior member (from the British Meteorological Office) and Colonel Tiemann as the junior and American member. The functions of this unit, which will move with General Eisenhower to Widewing, are twofold:

a. To prepare or cause to have prepared climatological and other weather studies, utilizing existing British and American organizations, and to study operational plans already formulated without complete consideration of climatological data. In this work the assignment of Dr. Landsberg to the Widewing Weather Control is extremely helpful.

b. To present to SAC, during a preparatory period and at the time of the invasion, forecasts on the basis of which the invasion machinery can be set in motion. These forcasts are supposed to represent the composite opinion of the British Weather Central at Dunstable, the American Weather Central at Widewing, the Admiralty Weather Section and the Staff Weather Officer of Allied Air Forces. The American Navy will be working in direct contact with the Admiralty. The composite opinion will be ascertained through a daily scrambler telephone conference between these parties, with Dr. Stagg or Colonel Tiemann acting as chairman.

Most of the officials (British or American) with whom I have talked recognize that this solution is far from ideal, but do not wish to change it. Consequently, the comments below are entirely my own. The difficulties are:

1. Dr. Stagg is a civilian, responsible to Sir Nelson Johnson, Director of the British Meteorological Office, and at best serves two masters. I believe he holds the rank of Group Captain and it is my understanding that Colonel Tiemann has taken it upon himself to request from his superior officers that Dr. Stagg be mobilized and put in uniform to more clearly define his disposition and responsibility to General Eisenhower.

This action should certainly be completed without delay. Dr. Stagg is conscientous, thoroughly imbued with the importance of his assignment. He has been forecasting off and on, but is not known to Americans as a forecaster.

2. Dr. Stagg and Colonel Tiemann will not have personal access to full weather data for the purpose of briefing the Supreme Allied Commander, unless they make use of the maps prepared in the American Weather Central, which will have the same location as SAC headquarters. Dr. Stagg is almost certain to refuse to do so, since the British Admiralty and U.S. Navy are thoroughly concerned about Colonel Krick's influence and his long-range forecasting techniques.

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iii. To remedy this situation Dr. Stagg apparently has in mind to set up a small weather section of his own (British) so that he will be able to take a map with him when he briefs General Eisenhower or his Chief of Staff. This unit, however, would not be a major unit, but would presumably be manned by junior men. The British still expect to formulate their basic (or official) forecasts at Dunstable. On the other hand, Colonel Tiemann would rather completely accept and represent the Widewing point of view.

iv. In my opinion, General Eisenhower or his representative should be briefed on weather daily, or at frequent intervals, during the preparatory period, but this briefing should be done by senior, experienced, professional meteorologists and not by staff people transmitting secondhand information and thus unable to answer questions not previously raised in the telephone conference. This cannot now be done except by turning the briefing over to Colonels Holzman and Krick, and the British as well as the U.S. Navy would not be pleased with this arrangement.

III In the British Forecast Section at Dunstable the Upper Air Section is under the direction of Dr.Sverre Petterssen, one of the outstanding practical meteorologists of our day, formerly head of the Norwegian Government Weather Service for western Norway, formerly head of the Meteorology Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and now a colonel in the Norwegian Air Forces, but working on a loan basis for the British at Dunstable.

Dr. Petterssen has long experience in forecasting for this part of the world and his technical ability is respected by all partners in our joint undertaking.

It is my sincere belief that the best interest of both the British and American would be served by the assignment of Dr.Petterssen to Widewing for the next few months, so that all briefings of General Eisenhower or his representative may be done in the presence of Dr. Stagg or Colonel Tiemann by Dr. Petterssen or by Colonel Holzman, both competent, experienced and respected by all. Dr. Petterssen might then have a small unit of his own or work from the American data which he would be able to use with discrimination.

From the British point of view, there will be serious and real difficulties in this proposal since it would deprive Dunstable of Dr. Petterssen's services which are important in the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. However, in view of the fact that the results of Dr. Petterssen's work at Dunstable are transmitted by teletype and not by personal contact, it would appear that he should be able to carry out the same work from Widewing, if necessary, with a few assistants and with improved communications facilities.

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It is a fairly generally held opinion that Dr. Petterssen's talents are not now utilized to full capacity.

From the American side there may be some feeling that the briefing of the SAC should be handled by regular Army staff weather officers. In view of the enormous significance of the coming undertaking, I am very strongly of the opinion that the briefing should be handled directly by experts, particularly in view of the fact that both of the men recommended, Colonel Holzman and Dr. Petterssen, are clear cut, quick-witted and to the point.

Colonel Tiemann has served in this theatre for nearly 20 months and has performed an extremely fine job for which adequate recognition has not yet been forthcoming. This should be rectified. In view of the need for organizational talent, maturity and tact in the top organization, it may however be desirable to replace him with a man who can work well with our Allies, who, for administrative purposes, can serve as Staff Weather Officer to General Eisenhower in his capacity as Commanding General of the European Theatre. For this assignment, if a change should appear desirable, I wish to recommend as first choice Colonel Semter, C.O. of the Weather Wing, and as second choice Colonel Stone, Executive Officer of the Weather Wing.

C. G. Rossby

C. G. ROSSBY,
Expert Consultant,
Office of the Secretary of War.

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27 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. L. L. Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War.

SUBJECT : Weather Reports from the Atlantic.

1. According to Colonel Simenson, R.C.O. for the 18th Weather Squadron, the Admiralty is now receiving from 8 to 20 ship weather reports per day from perhaps an average of five ships in the Atlantic. These reports are made available daily to both the 18th and 21st Squadrons by telephone.

2. The establishment, through co-operation with the U.S.Navy, of a few additional floating weather stations in the North Atlantic fully equipped for surface and radio sonde observations, is sound and highly desirable. The U.S.Navy and the U.S.Coast Guard are now maintaining two such stations, but additional units are desirable. Because of the shortage of trained weather personnel in the Navy, it is desirable that the U.S.Air Forces should offer to supply personnel for the weather stations on these ships.

3. To be useful, these ships must be in constant radio communication with shore stations. This raises the question of their protection against enemy submarines.

4. It is equally important for the success of the Weather Service in the British Isles to insure rapid transmission of land station observations from Baffins Land, Labrador, Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland. Improvements may result from:

a. The establishment of a direct channel from Prestwick to the principal U.S. weather forecast stations in the U.S.

b. A co-operative effort by British and American communications and weather experts to determine causes of delay in the British weather communications redistribution center at Dunstable.

C. G. ROSSBY,
Expert Consultant.

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April 30, 1943.

Dear Dr. Rossby:

A serious communication problem has arisen as a result of the urgent need for acquisition and transmission of rapidly increasing amounts of meteorological intelligence. I have asked you to serve in this office on a part time basis as a consultant to assist in the solution of this problem.

Weather information and forecasting are becoming increasingly important as the tempo of our military operations increases and as their scope tends completely to encircle the globe. The best scientific methods and technical means must be made available to those planning for this essential military service.

As discussed with you, the problem for your immediate consideration stems from the need for very extensive communication facilities in order to collect and disseminate weather information. In fact, the provision of such information now constitutes a major traffic load on communication facilities along all air ferry routes. Such communication facilities are now generally overloaded and will be called upon to carry even greater loads as military transport and operations increase. The ether spectrum is now so crowded with radio assignments that there is little prospect of greatly increasing the number of communication channels which can be made available. It is, therefore, of vital importance that means be found to provide adequate weather information without undue interference with the transmission of other essential military information. The proper solution of the above problem will require a judicious balance between meteorological requirements to give satisfactory information and the technical feasibility of providing communication facilities.

Your activities in developing a solution to this problem should be coordinated through Major General B. M. Giles, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements; Brigadier General H. M. McClelland, his deputy; and with those officers responsible to them for the operation of the Army Air Forces Weather Service. You will also, of course, be working in close cooperation with Mr. M. E. Strieby, who is acting as consultant on communications in this office.

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Because of your previous long experience in the field of meteorology, first, as Director of the Department of Meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, later as Assistant Chief of Weather Bureau and finally, as Director of the Institute of Meteorology at the University of Chicago, you are well qualified to provide assistance in connection with any meteorological problems that may arise from time to time. Your present position as Chairman of the University Meteorology Committee which now serves as an Advisory Board to the Army Air Forces Technical Training Command and to other branches of the Army and Navy, makes it possible for you to draw for expert assistance upon the best qualified civilian meteorologists in the country. In view of these various connections, I expect that you will be called upon to render assistance in connection with meteorological problems other than the one now under consideration, and I hope it will be possible for you to give such assistance insofar as to do so may be compatible with your responsibilities as Director of the Institute of Meteorology at the University of Chicago.

You have been appointed an Expert Consultant with headquarters in this office and with responsibility to me.

Sincerely,

Edward L. Bowles,
Expert Consultant to
the Secretary of War.

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27 June 1943

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In order to carry out the spirit of your original instructions to me I have found it expedient from time to time to bring into my office specialists on specific phases of radar, communications, and related technical fields. Some of these men are giving full time to their duties; most of them, however, are on a part time basis.

Only four of these men are receiving compensation from the War Department in the nature of a salary for their services. The services of two extremely capable men have been donated by their companies, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the General Radio Company respectively. The rest have received only per diem in lieu of subsistence while working for us.

In this way I have been able to enlist the services of the best qualified specialists in various fields. These consultants are working directly out of my office and in conjunction with the various headquarters to which their work relates. In three instances technical consultants, although attached to this office, are actually working in those headquarters which requested the assistance.

This procedure has, I believe, thoroughly proven its effectiveness, both directly in terms of specific results

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achieved, and indirectly by demonstrating the need for technical strength at levels primarily concerned with policy and planning. Its reception and the way in which it has been assimilated by the existing military organization has been in every respect gratifying.

In the course of this activity I have come more and more to see the need for providing highly qualified technical personnel at top planning levels. I believe, therefore, that the method must be regarded as an interim measure and that we must endeavor to provide for technical personnel of high caliber in appropriate places within the military organizational framework itself. I am taking every opportunity to further this end.

My work up to the present has included radar, communications, meteorology, and antisubmarine warfare. Recently at the instance of the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Army Air Forces I have given considerable effort to organizational problems in relation to communications and radar. I propose to continue as I have in the past giving consideration to other technical problems which require attention from your office and on which I feel qualified to act.

For your perusal I attach a list of the consultants who now comprise my staff, together with a statement of their present fields of specialization. Also included are copies of the letters of instruction to each of them briefly defining their respective responsibilities.

Sincerely,

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CONTENTS

Tab

1. Letter from E. L. Bowles to the Secretary of War, 27 June 1943.

2. List of Consultants.

Letters of Instruction

3. Dr. Julius A. Stratton, 10 December 1942.
   Appointed 5 August 1942.

*4. Dr. David T. Griggs, 18 August 1942 and 4 March 1944.
   Appointed 10 August 1942.

5. Dr. Harold H. Beverage,
   Appointed 28 August 1942, terminated 29 March 1943.
   Reappointed 6 September 1943.

*6. Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, 4 November 1942 and 4 March 1944.
   Appointed 4 November 1942.

7. Dean O. W. Eshbach, 9 December 1942.
   Appointed 10 November 1942, terminated 29 March 1943.

8. Dr. I. A. Getting, 24 November 1942.
   Appointed 28 November 1942, terminated 13 November 1943.

9. Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, Jr., 21 January 1943.
   Appointed 9 December 1942.

10. Mr. M. E. Strieby, 31 December 1942.
    Appointed 14 December 1942, terminated 30 September 1944.

11. Mr. Donald G. Fink, 28 December 1942 and 20 October 1943.
    Appointed 28 December 1942.

12. Mr. Frank D. Lewis, 15 March 1943 and 9 October 1943.
    Appointed 11 January 1943.

13. Dr. Dale R. Corson, 21 January 1943.
    Appointed 12 January 1943, transferred to Headquarters Army Air Forces 15 October 1943.

14. Dr. Lewis M. Hull, 15 March 1943.
    Appointed 11 February 1943.

15. Dr. Robert F. Bacher, 25 February 1943.
    Appointed 22 February 1943, terminated 18 May 1943.

*See Tab 33.

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16. Dr. Douglas H. Ewing, 29 March 1943.
Appointed 20 April 1943, terminated 29 September 1943.

17. Dr. N. H. Frank, 4 May 1943.
Appointed 3 May 1943.

18. Dr. C. G. Rossby, 30 April 1943.
Appointed 3 May 1943.

19. Dr. Louis A. Turner,
Appointed 30 June 1943.

20. Mr. Melville Eastham, 17 June 1943.
Appointed 1 July 1943.

21. Mr. Richard D. Campbell, 24 July 1943.
Appointed 24 July 1943, terminated 30 September 1944.

22. Mr. Laurance M. Leeds, 2 September 1943.
Appointed 27 August 1943.

23. Mr. Nils E. Lindenblad,
Appointed 9 September 1943, terminated 30 June 1944.

24. Mr. Harold A. Rhodes, 27 September 1943.
Appointed 25 September 1943, transferred to Signal Corps 17 January 1944.

25. Dr. K. C. Black, 9 October 1943.
Appointed 5 October 1943.

26. Mr. George G. Jones, 14 October 1943.
Appointed 11 October 1943.

27. Mr. Harold S. Osborne, 15 November 1943.
Appointed 18 October 1943.

28. Mr. Howard K. Morgan, 19 November 1943.
Appointed 16 November 1943.

29. Mr. B. J. Thompson, 10 December 1943.
Appointed 3 December 1943, terminated 4 July 1944.

30. Dr. William B. Shockley, 4 January 1944.
Appointed 1 January 1944.

31. Dr. Harold E. Edgerton, 15 February 1944.
Appointed 11 February 1944.

*32. Dr. Victor H. Fraenkel, 4 March 1944.
Appointed 1 March 1944.

*See Tab 33.

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33. Advisory Specialist Group Directive, 4 March 1944.

*34. Dr. H. P. Robertson, 4 March 1944.

35. Mr. A. B. Clark, 7 March 1944.
Appointed 6 March 1944.

36. Dr. C. G. Suits, 17 April 1944.
Appointed 20 April 1944.

*37. Mr. D. K. Martin, 26 April 1944.
Appointed 25 April 1944.

38. Mr. Albert Tradup, 23 September 1944 and 12 October 1944.
Appointed 6 March 1944.

38a. Mr. Hartley Rowe, 5 April 1944. Appointed 6 May 1945.

39. Mr. H. W. Hitchcock, 18 May 1944.
Appointed 15 May 1944.

40. Dr. F. B. Llewellyn, 26 June 1944.
Appointed 22 June 1944.

41. Mr. L. J. Henderson, 25 August 1944.
Appointed 24 August 1944, and 8 June 1945.

42. Mr. Frank R. Collbohm, 8 September 1944 and 16 October 1944.
Appointed 6 September 1944.

43. Mr. Arthur E. Raymond, 8 September 1944.
Appointed 6 September 1944.

44. Dr. R. D. Huntoon, 14 September 1944 and 24 April 1945.

45. Mr. Robert A. Cushman, 1 November 1944.
Appointed 27 September 1944.

46. Dr. E. G. Schneider, 29 September 1944.
Appointed 29 September 1944.

47. Mr. E. C. Wells, 4 October 1944.
Appointed 2 October 1944.

48. Mr. Gene B. Williams, 6 December 1944.
Appointed 4 December 1944.

49. Mr. King E. Gould, 6 December 1944 and 31 January 1945, and 29 Jan 45.
Appointed 4 December 1944.

*50. Dr. John G. Trump, 13 November 1944.
Appointed 11 December 1944.

51. Dr. S. J. Simmons, 29 January 1945.

*See Tab 33.

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52. Mr. William H. Ratliff, 9 January 1945.
Appointed 9 January 1945.

53. Mr. Marvin P. Hooker, 30 January 1945.
Appointed 30 January 1945.

54. Mr. Charles S. Rhoads, 24 February 1945.
Appointed 2 February 1945.

55. Mr. Philip J. Herbst, 21 February 1945.
Appointed 21 February 1945.

56. Lieut. Colonel Joe Mountain, 4 April 1945.

57. Mr. Aldon L. Melzian, 17 April 1945.
Appointed 16 April 1945.

58. Mr. Warren T. Dickinson, 20 April 1945.
Appointed 19 April 1945.

59. Dr. Frederick Seitz,
Appointed 24 April 1945.

60. Dr. John B. Russell, 12 April 1945.
Appointed 1 May 1945.

61. Dr. Lan Jen Chu, 19 July 1945.
Appointed 17 May 1945.

62. Mr. John E. Faulkner, 19 July 1945.
Appointed 7 July 1945.

63. Mr. Edward L. Moreland, 27 July 1945.
Appointed 14 July 1945.

64. Mr. Laurence W. Morrison, 4 August 1945.
Appointed 26 July 1945.

65. Mr. Frank L. Klingberg, 27 July 1945.
Appointed 27 July 1945.

66. Mr. T. L. Watson, 8 August 1945.

67. Mr. Thomas R. Putnam, 22 August 1945.
Appointed 22 August 1945.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

28th July, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington, D C. 20314.

Dear Murray,

At a recent cocktail party in Washington, I encountered two people who may be able to help you with respect to Arnold. The first, Major-General Robert Grow, of 3250 Valley Lane, Falls Church, Virginia, 22044, spent a good deal of time with Arnold in their young army days at Fort Riley, where, so far as I know, riding was the 'tour de force'. Airplanes were asserting themselves, however, and Arnold's assignment there was as Air Officer. He took these various horseback boys for rides in the air to familiarize them with this more elevated form of transport!! Grow could give you some very interesting anecdotal background on Arnold, for it is clear they saw a lot of each other on a very friendly basis and that their association was not limited to what I describe. At the party he and I got so engrossed in the subject of one Hap Arnold that we had to be separated by our respective wives for the usual purposes of circulation &c.

The second man is Colonel G. Roger Harvey, likewise of Falls Church (3230 Valley Lane). He seems to have remained a Colonel an unduly long time. He is a very good friend of Pinkie Craig, and might help you there. About the time I went to Washington he was doing a tour of duty with A's anti Fairchild.

I have not forgotten my promise to get a bundle of material for you. It is in process.

Cordially,

(EDWARD L. BOWLES)

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5 August 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

You will be pleased to learn that I have interviews pending on August 10th (Tuesday) with General Robert Crow and Colonel Jack Davies, his neighbor, who served with Arnold at March Field in the 1930's. Davies may provide a missing link. He was in charge of the Service Squadron at March. One of his duties, he already told me, was to run this Bear Lake Camp which Colonel Arnold set up in the mountains to provide opportunities for rest and relaxation for his men. Since dollars were awfully hard to come by in those years, the camp was built by "scrounging" lumber, pipe, etc. Davies was in the middle of this, apparently.

Davies is a neighbor of the widow of the late Colonel G. Roger Harvey whom you mentioned in your letter.

On another subject, I see where Vannevar Bush claims credit for having invented RAND. This is one of the myths I hope to set straight.

On a related thought, it might be appropriate to interview Dr. Bush. I see his name pop up many times in the Arnold papers. "Who's Who" shows an MIT address, but the news clip says he's retired. Do you happen to have his address? I'm sure I could get it from MIT but that might take some time.

Anyway, I hope to see you again some time soon.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

P.S. Note, alas, the Navy is putting in a bid too.
What is your opinion?

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LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY - 29 JULY 1971 (3 AUGUST) Calendar filed

U.S. Making Waves In Think Tanks

Oh, The Rand Corporation is the boon of the World;
They think all day long for a fee.
They sit and play games about going up in flames:
For counters they use you and me, Honey Bee,
For counters they use you and me.
—folk song by Malvina Reynolds

By Dennis Duggan
Newsday New York Bureau Chief

All across the U.S. the 350 or so think tanks that service the country's defense and aerospace programs are feeling the backlash caused by the release of the Pentagon papers. And while it's fairly certain that the government won't pull its financial props out from under them, it is clear that the men who work at such companies are going to be put under far closer scrutiny than in the past.

It's all a result of the publication of the Pentagon papers that were allegedly copied at the Rand Corporation by former staffer Daniel Ellsberg and then passed on to the press.

"The Ellsberg business could close us down," Thomas W. Robinson of Rand's Santa Monica division tells Business Week. He adds: "If we can't talk openly with our colleagues, if we can't publish our private papers—if we can't have these freedoms, why work here."

A Rand spokesman later disputes the quote claiming it was "totally incorrect." Another source points out that the magazine even confused pictures of Rand president Henry S. Rowen and Robinson misidentifying both.

Still, there is no disputing the fact that the Air Force is taking custody of the 170,000 or so confidential documents housed in Rand's Santa Monica and Washington, D.C. offices or a strong statement by Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr. of "some deficiencies" in Rand's security clearance programs.

At Herman Kahn's casual and homely Hudson Institute complex in Croton-on-Hudson, the burly Kahn sighs and predicts that "a lot of government agencies have been hostile to outside groups such as ours because we are often critical of their work. Now they have another excuse to avoid using our services.

Adds Kahn: "I don't think we're going to lose any jobs as a result of the Ellsberg affair, but I do think that the closeness of our relationship with government will be affected."

Kahn admits that he's already felt the hot breath of the Pentagon. "Yes, we've had a security review here and we've been reminded by the Pentagon to check over our top-secret clearances and to cut down on the number of people who have access to top-secret information."

The father of the modern-day think tanks is Dr. Vannevar Bush, now 81, who recently retired as honorary chairman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after 20 years in that post. Retired "but not disappearing," says the man who inspired the U.S. Air Force to form Project Rand (an acronym for research and development) which in 1948 became the Rand Corporation. Last year Rand received $11,000,000 of its $27,000,000 income from the Air Force.

Bush agrees with Kahn that security regulations will be considerably tightened but of the future of think tanks he says firmly: "No, I don't think they'll be abolished, they're just too useful."

Bush, who headed the famed Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II and who reported directly to President Roosevelt during that time, says the country's security programs will be reviewed to "first see that things are tightened up generally and second, to see that papers get cleared when they should."

He adds: "I think most of the Pentagon papers would have been released anyway because they were history," but he also says, "I don't condone Ellsberg for what he did. He should have gone to a senator with the papers. He happens, however, to be one of those self-important types."

On the same subject, Herman Kahn, who authored "On Thermonuclear Warfare" and "The Year 200," and whose Hudson Institute which is regarded as less hawkish than Rand, says: "I wasn't surprised at the leak; the leaking of documents is quite common. What I was surprised at was the size of the leak—47 volumes. The trouble is that many people who go from academia to the think tanks are convinced that Hitler has been replaced by the U.S. It's a bizarre attitute but it's easy to see why a person who feels that way is going to leak documents."

At Rand and at Hudson, spokesmen insist that there has been no change of policy in the wake of the Ellsberg release of the papers. But officials at both corporations concede the government has put a tighter clamp on their activities. Air Force personnel have been stationed in Rand's offices and have taken physical possession of the secret documents held by Rand; in the future, the corporation's access to government secrets will not be automatic, but will have to be justified in each case.

The security crackdown at such institutions as the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Center for Naval Analyses and the Research Analysis Corporation for which the U.S. Army is a chief customer will delight many politicians and military leaders in the country. Politicans resent the growing power of the tight-knit groups of scientists and scholars whose advice is highly regarded by the executive. The military see in the think tanks a challenge to their authority. As British writer P. I. Slee Smith writes: "They may still have their finger on the trigger but the weapon is sighted by someone else." Even industry and commerce, adds Smith, long accustomed to being regarded as centers of research, tend to resent the "intruders."

Which is why Kahn says: "This gives them another reason for not wanting to or having to do business with us." Kahn's institute includes 60 staff people, half of them clerical or support workers, as well as 200 consultants. The Hudson Institute is now working on such programs as an examination of the Nixon Doctrine in various areas of the world and a study of the volunteer army.

The Ellsberg explosion hit Rand at a bad time in its 25 year history. The company has been trying to pick up nondefense related work, now about 25 per cent of its total and it's also trying to attract thinkers concerned with urban problems. Last week it was still in a state of shock over the incident and over the fact that Air Force officers—instead of Rand officials—are now presiding over the central reading and storage rooms at Rand. /II

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

Laird Orders 'Crackdown' on RAND Corp. Security

THE PENTAGON ordered a 2 July crackdown on all "Think Tanks" across the nation which hold a large number of classified Defense Department papers.

It was the RAND Corp., a West Coast "Think Tank", which held copies of the controversal Vietnam War history now known as "The Pentagon Papers" or "McNamara Papers". The Corporation had possession of two complete sets of the highly classified papers. It is the government's contention that the papers were somehow removed from the corporation's classified files by RAND employee Daniel Ellsberg and copied.

The JOURNAL has learned from local think tank sources that over two years ago RAND was warned that Daniel Ellsberg, purloiner of the "McNamara Papers," was a security risk. This was after he began speaking out publicly against the Vietnam War while still on RAND's payroll. Evidently, RAND took no heed.

Secretary of Defense Melvin A. Laird, who left Andrews AFB on 2 July for the Far East, gave the first indication that the Defense Department would crack down on security procedures outside the Department. Within hours Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Z. Henkin distributed copies of a memo titled RAND Access To Classified Material which had been presented to Secretary of Air Force Robert C. Seamans, jr, and signed by Laird. The letter ordered the Air Force to withdraw all classified documents from the security custody of RAND Corporation and place them in the USAF custody.

The documents, Laird indicated, would not be removed from the RAND offices in Santa Monica and Washington, but would be taken over by USAF personnel physically located on the contractor's premises.

In addition to taking possession of all

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the classified papers at the RAND offices the Department of Defense ordered a "complete inventory" of all documents and materials in the corporation's possession and a determination of RAND's "need to know" concerning classified details of certain subjects.

Information classified "Special Access", a classification considered higher than Top Secret, were to be withdrawn from RAND facilities and the need for RAND to possess such documents will be "redetermined". Special Access includes such subjects as strategic war plans, codes, and nuclear weapon design.

DoD actions taken include a request that the Air Force notify all government agencies doing business with RAND and all subcontractors of the corporation of the adverse action.

In the opinion of Service officers who had regular dealings with government contract think tanks, their security practices have long been notoriously poor. Part of the problem is confused thinking on the part of think tank officials who mistakenly view their activities in the light of permitting supposed academic freedom rather than functioning as part of the governmental apparatus where bureaucratic, but necessary and required, security procedures must be followed. In one case, about nine years ago, the source recalled, a large portion of Stanford Research Institute had its security clearance lifted for gross violations. The result was a virtual shutdown of SRI with most of its highly paid professional staff, who work daily with classified documents, laid off.

No Shut Down

Asked by The JOURNAL if the move would shut down RAND activities, Secretary Henkin replied that it would not. The Corporation does 75% of its business with the Defense Department, about 46% of which is contracted by the Air Force. During FY 71 the Corporation held $18.6-million in DoD contracts.

"Lax security practices among Defense contractors can no more be tolerated than will such practices within this Department," Laird said in his memo to Seamans and asked that the Air Force present him with a detailed status report by 16 July.

Think Tank Business

The DoD "Think Tanks" fall into three categories (JOURNAL 28 Sept 1968): aerospace, physical sciences plus operations and systems research. The RAND Corp. is engaged in the latter.

Think Tank origins go back to World War II when in May 1942 an Anti-submarine Warfare Operations Research Group was organized by Dr. Philip M. Morse of MIT. He recruited physicists, mathematicians, chemists, biochemists and actuarial experts to form a study team. The organization later became known as the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) and exists still in the Navy.

In recent years the military contracted for a variety of studies with various research companies. In 1969 contracts in excess of $300-million were held by sixteen companies (JOURNAL 25 Jan 1969).

Currently DoD lists contracts with twelve different corporations for a total of approximately $226-million. The largest contract is an Air Force contract with Aerospace Corporation of Los Angeles, a systems engineering group, for $67.8-million.

The DoD announcement apparently took RAND by surprise. The JOURNAL was informed that it would be "several hours" before a spokesman would be available for a statement. Later that afternoon Henry S. Rowen of the California office released a statement of confidence saying that the research efforts of the company devoted to national security would continue to be conducted in an effective manner under the security arrangements Secretary Laird had instructed would be placed into effect.

The Air Force had no announcement four days later as to how they would proceed with the instruction that it would withdraw all classified documents from the security custody of RAND, but added that an inventory of documents was currently underway by Defense Contracts Administrative Services. A routine security check, held each quarter, was completed in June by DCAS, the Air Force said. The quarterly inspection was a "spot check", the Air Force said, and the inventory underway was a detailed inventory of documents by the DoD agency. Until the audit is complete the Air Force cannot accept the responsibility for them.

Locking the Barn Door

Meanwhile, as The JOURNAL goes to press, in a move akin to locking the barn door after the horse is stolen, DoD security inspectors had invaded Washington area think tanks. The investigation is in response to White House orders to ensure compliance with security regulations and to compile a list of all persons having access to top secret documents. Reports are due 10 July and few if any of the research organizations are expected to meet the deadline, according to sources.

As of 6 July the Defense Department was unable to state the exact number of classified documents possessed by RAND.

Secretary Henkin did indicate on 2 July that from this point on "Work will be done under more stringent rules." RAND has approximately 1100 employees, 500 of whom are professionals.

Employees, operating under security regulations, must be cleared for access to classified information. Persons may be cleared for Secret, Top Secret and Special Access. When a document is released to a researcher it is signed out to him or her. When it is returned the record is cleared. It is customary practice, and acceptable, that employees retain possession of classified documents and be responsible for proper security. Documents can be retained in individual offices in three-combination safes. Documents may not be removed from company offices or grounds without prior authority and accounting.

Secretary Henkin summed up the Laird memo with the statement that "We are going to take whatever action necessary to protect classified information." ■/■

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

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20314

2 August 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

Your letter of July 28th is in hand. You may be sure that I shall track down General Grow and Colonel Harvey. Needless to state, I am looking forward to receiving that "bundle" you mentioned.

On your next visit to Washington, I hope you will honor me as my guest at luncheon or cocktails, or whatever, as you busy schedule allows.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

Vannevar Bush
MIT
Cambridge Mass 02139

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20314

28 June 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I seldom pass around extracts of another interview for comment, but this subject seems so important, and since it involves you, I felt you should have direct access.

I also took the liberty to drop Dr. DuBridge a note, requesting his comment. I'm a bit behind times. He has left the service of the President and has re-retired to Laguna Beach, California, or so I'm told.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

Encl

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20314

28 June 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

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All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

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20314
26 June 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

You have been so very helpful, I'm presumptuous enough to come back for more. A couple of issues have come up which seem to center about you and impress me still more with the critical role you played in the prosecution of the war.

1. General Arnold and Radar - the tape of a recent interview with Frank Collbohm has been transcribed. He talks of a meeting in Donald Douglas' office. Collbohm was then with the Radiation Lab, and so was Lee DuBridge. It seems as though they were unable to get anybody in the U.S. military to show interest in radar. Douglas apparently phoned Arnold. He came out there (to California) received a briefing and gave the go-ahead. Collbohm recalls Douglas calling him down to his office. He doesnt recall the time frame - as to whether it was before "Pearl Harbor", or afterwards. Do you have any recollection of this incident?

2. I'm told that you, Louis Ridenour and Frank Collbohm visited General "Possum" Hansell in the Pacific theater (probably Guam) around Christmas 1944. You tried to sell him on low-level bombing by the B-29's, but Hansell was said to have been unyielding. Apparently, you or the team, wrote a report. Arnold's decision to replace Hansell with LeMay at least in part was attributed to that report.

3. Setting Up of RAND Board of Directors - I've been told that Air Staff opposition developed to including you on the Board of Directors of RAND. I dont wish to pry into things that ought not concern me. But if this is a fact, I wonder if Arnold knew about this opposition that I must attribute to envy or some other black motive. I feel that Arnold would have interceded to include you on the Board, considering your role in getting the whole idea off dead-center.

If you would care to drop me a note, I'd welcome getting your viewpoint. No special hurry, as I'm some time and distance removed from addressing this subject in my work.

Hi to Mrs. Bowles.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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15 March 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I was glad to have Margaret Sarginson's letter of the 6th.

I will have to defer my travel plan for some weeks due to the fact that my wife will be in the hospital for surgery which was unexpected when I wrote you. I will write again when my plans are more predictable.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Asst to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
WELLESLEY HILLS, MASS. 02181

617 235-2414

6th March, 1971.

Dr. Murray Green,
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO),
Washington D.C. 20314.

Dear Dr. Green,

Your letter of March 4th addressed to Dr. Bowles has been received during his absence from the country on holiday. He returns Friday next, 12th March, and I am sure will write you as soon as possible afterwards.

Very truly yours,

Margaret Sarginson.

(MARGARET SARGINSON,
Secretary).

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

March 4, 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

The winds and tides referred to in a previous letter look favorable for the last week in March. I shall be up in the New York - New England area catching up on some interviews, among them Charles Lindbergh and Robert A. Lovett, both of whom were very close to General Hap Arnold, my favorite subject, for certain periods of time.

If the last week in March is convenient for you, would you please so indicate and return to me in the enclosure.

You made a significant contribution to the Hap Arnold story. In fact, Frank Collbohm and I talked about you and RAND when I visited him in his enormous "trailer" house in Huntington, California where he spends the few days a year he is not in his boat.

I hope you had a good winter. Washington's was its usual tricky bad self. It was 70° last Saturday and Sunday. This morning it snowed three inches and driving was treacherous. At least New England has an honest winter, or that's what I read.

I'll look forward to hearing from you. Incidentally, General Don Yates told me you have extensive files in your basement. Do you have any idea of how long it would take me to browse through the material significant for me? I'm presumptuous to assume you would allow it. Anyway, I'll be on a fairly tight schedule and am trying to block in my time.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

March 4, 1971

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass 02181

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Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief AF History
Office of Air Force History

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September 9, 1970

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, MA 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I'm the fellow working on the Hap Arnold biography. I've not been able to find the time to head north. But I've been west and have spoken to several people who recall your contributions: Donald Douglas, Arthur Raymond, and Frank Collbohm.

I'm still trying and will check again when wind and tides seem favorable.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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April 21, 1970

Dr. Edward L. Bowles
~~Consulting Engineer~~
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

Dear Dr. Bowles:

I'm delighted to have your letter of April 4th. I'll be up to Wellesley Hills before snow flies again. Exact dates remain unclear as I have firm commitments to vist San Antonio next week for about 12 interviews and the mid-South for a dozen more.

I would want to schedule at least 3 or 4 days to talk with you and to sift your files which General Don Yates told me are very complete. Do you think this will provide enough time?

Yes, Dr. Rudy Winnacker is a valued associate of mine. I've taken the liberty of sending him a copy of your letter, by way of best regards from you.

That I.A.S. valedictory is absolutely superb. Nearly a quarter of a century later, you would not want to, or have to, change it much to bring it up to date.

I'm very much looking forward to our meeting, perhaps in July or August.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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EDWARD L. BOWLES
CONSULTING ENGINEER

15 GREYLOCK ROAD
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April 4, 1970

Dr. Murray Green
Office of the Secretary
Research & Analysis Division - SAFAAR
The Pentagon - 4C881
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Green:

Your letter did in fact surprise me. It was more a surprise than astonishment. Although I haven't gone to my files, it must be several years since writing to Jack Loosbrock. It is gratifying to know that you are on the pursuit of material respecting a Hap Arnold biography. I not only admired the man, but developed a deep affection for him. The piece I have "Global Mission" in no wise does him justice.

At the conclusion of the War, I tackled Don Douglas hoping he would finance a project of this sort. He seemed interested, but nevertheless, the idea fell by the wayside. The man does deserve recognition for his contribution - a unique one - has never been appreciated by the outside world for which he sacrificed himself. For reasons of my professional respect, admiration and deep affection for the man, naturally I want to do anything I can to help you in this project.

I expect the summer to be relatively clear as far as my being here in Wellesley is concerned. I too find myself occupied and pre-occupied with a good many activities, professional and otherwise, but would certainly sandwich in the time you would want to put in to go over my library of material and in picking my brains with respect to recollections of General Arnold as an individual and our working relationship.

I don't remember whether I mentioned that I came down to work with Mr. Stimson to help him with radar that got me so intimately involved in the anti-submarine problems and the problems with the Navy. I suppose it is too gentle to say I was a thorn in the side of the Navy boys. I did write, I like to believe, the only critique of detail on this vexing problem. I addressed myself to the broad problem of ocean-borne transport and supply. It did blow the lid off. Despite my rather critical piece on Air Force communications, there came a time when as I was walking down the corridor of the Pentagon, a hand came down on my shoulder. Arnold had come up from my rear. As I looked around he was a veritable constellation. He brought me into the office and said he wanted me to take over all electronics for him. I will not go into detail at this

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point as to how we made out, but I enclose a photocopy of the directive that ensued. Somehow one thing led to another, so that I later on got heavily involved with the B-29's. My entire experience with the Air Force was truly a great one in my life - perhaps I can say the greatest professional experience in my life.

When Arnold retired, he wanted me to write his valedictory speech. I will always remember sitting on the hillside at the Valley of the Moon with Arnold in slippers and dressing gown reviewing my manuscript. He changed but a word or two to suit his choice. My butterflies amidships soon vanished. Incidentally, you may know Rudy Winnacker at the Pentagon who is one of my very good friends and a person I admire immensely. It was Rudy who helped me in editing the speech. I also enclose a photocopy of the speech. Rudy was a great ally during my stay in Washington. You may be interested, as a prelude to our meeting, in scanning Hap's address.

Sincerely,

Edward L. Bowles

Edward L. Bowles

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The Past Predicts the Future

GENERAL OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD

Introduction

It is indeed a great pleasure to be with you tonight. It is like coming back home, being with old friends with whom you have shared many common experiences—friends who helped you in past struggles and battles, and who have devoted their life's work to the same interests and ideals as you have. I know of no civilian group that did more to further the war effort, cooperated more wholeheartedly with the armed forces, or made more valuable contributions to the achievement of final victory than the men associated with the Institute. We in the Army Air Forces have come to know most of you very well and have learned to appreciate your abilities. Many of us have become close friends. During the recent war you have set an example of civilian-military cooperation for the entire nation. It is this cooperation which, in the last analysis, formed the real strength of our country and was the cornerstone of victory.

I wanted to come here this evening, not merely to thank you for your accomplishments in the past, but, above all, to talk to you about the task which you will have ahead of you for the future, as indicated by experiences gained and the lessons learned during the late struggle; to talk to you about the sacrifices which you, and the nation as a whole, will have to make in order to lay the foundation for a secure America and to contribute to the reorganization of a world in which law, and not force, will rule.

It is not a topic which I would like to choose. Personally, I would have preferred to reminisce with you about the beginnings of air power; for, from my back seat under the Oak tree at Sonoma, I see the past, forecasting, pointing the way for, the future. In those early days few people realized the place air power was to take in future wars. Even today I am not so sure that there are not too many people still clinging to archaic ideas for the future well-being of our country.

We have come a long way since World War I, but, unfortunately, the dangers which we and the nation face have changed but little. We are confronted at the close of World War II—the greatest in all history—with the same blindness among large groups of our fellow citizens to the threats the future holds for American security. We are again in danger—after having won a war—of throwing away the fruits of victory; of failing to make the necessary sacrifices for the establishment of a world in which not only the United States, but all the other nations, can feel secure. We cannot let this happen again; and it will depend to a large degree upon all of us—you in the aeronautical sciences, as well as others—whether the America we have built for our children will be the hope of the world or the battleground of the next great conflict.

Preparing for the Future

The future security of the United States lies in the air—there is no doubt of that. At the close of this war we had the greatest air power in the world, were the arsenal of the world, and were the dominating country to whom all the small nations looked for leadership. If we lose our position, if we allow ourselves to be complacent, our country will be vulnerable to attack and devastation as never before in its history. This is not merely my firm conviction, but the considered opinion of everyone who has analyzed the experience of the last war and calculated the probable development of air power in the near future and its ability to carry atomic, biological, and chemical warfare to every corner of the globe.

During the past months our civilian and military leaders have warned the public again and again of the chaos and destruction which a new war would entail. People are sick of war, are tired of the emotional strain of the past years, are worn out by the physical and mental effort of the recent conflict, and have closed their minds to the possible nature of another world war and the dangers we face. This attitude is fateful in its consequences for the future. The same cooperation and sacrifice which citizens gave to the war effort are required now, as never before, in order for us to create the world we all hope for—a world in which the United Nations Organization will make it impossible for a new aggressor to arise.

To achieve this goal we must have a well-armed America, acting as a moral force, and able to back its desire for world peace with a strength which any potential aggressor will respect. Any other course will not only prevent us from reaching our goal, but will invite the destruction of our nation. This firm belief of mine is founded on the lessons of history, the experience of the last war, and the predictable development of air operations and transport which will inevitably occur during the next few years. I want to lay before you tonight the reasons for this belief.

Any history book on international relations during the last forty years will show you how the unpreparedness of the United States, and other democratic countries, has been one of the major factors in the calculations of aggressors, which either considered an isolationist America of negligible importance or hoped to impose their will upon the world before the might of the United States could enter the struggle. The fact that these calculations were based on false assumptions did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, the unrestricted submarine campaign in 1917, the Japanese war against China, the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, nor the Axis moves into Poland, the invasion of Holland and Belgium, nor the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The United Nations

Disarmament conferences and diplomatic appeals had no effect. As we look back we can see that a modern and adequately armed United States, able to back up its diplomatic warnings to aggressor nations, might have been a decisive, preventive factor in the chain of events that led to war. We have learned by bitter experience that the desire to remain aloof from major struggles—or to carry an umbrella—is not sufficient in the modern world. The outcome of wars in far distant continents can present now, even more than in the past, serious threats to our security and way of life. The United States, seemingly against its will, has become involved in world affairs in a big way. Whether we like it or not, isolationism has not only proved a failure, but has become an impossibility. Congress recognized this fact when it supported by overwhelming majority a policy supporting the United Nations.

This organization is now in an interim period during which

Address delivered at the I.A.S. Annual Summer Meeting Dinner, Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California, July 19,

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its growth will largely be determined by the firmness and determination with which we support it. Unilateral disarmament would not be interpreted as evidence of peaceful aims, but as shirking common responsibilities. Only by backing with military power our firm intention to prevent aggression leading to another world war can we instill hope in other nations that the slow, but steady, progress of mankind toward a world of law-abiding people is continuing. This task demands continued sacrifices, but its reward in case of success is worth every ounce of effort spent. Only by evolving a transcending moral force, supported by an armed force, effective in the judgment of foreign powers, can we as a nation bring this interim period to a successful conclusion. Then could we start to turn over the responsibility for the security of the nation to an international police force, and not before. Experience has shown that without such forces, the chance we have now to further our ideal will be irretrievably lost.

Scientific and Technological Development

Such a policy is dictated by history, by the terrible experience of the last five years and by the coming development of space transport, of which you will be the main architects. Scientific and technological advance during the recent conflict has—as you all know—changed the nature of war. It has also revolutionized the strategic position of the United States. The great advantages which we possessed over other nations during the last two wars have either disappeared or threaten to become unimportant. The conquest of space, which differentiated the late struggle from all other wars, has now progressed so that even the vast oceans to the east and west of us present no effective security. Reliance can no longer be placed on geographical security, which, together with the help of our allies, gave us in the past the time to build our military machine after the outbreak of war.

At the same time, the development of atomic, biological, and chemical warfare has threatened the importance of our natural resources and industrial capacity as decisive factors in war. It can be safely assumed that the United States, which, by throwing its power into the scales, decided the last two struggles, will be the first to be attacked in the future, as aggressor nations acquire atomic and biological weapons carried by airplanes, rockets or guided missiles capable of destroying our industrial capacity, and making useless our natural resources. We should also solemnly note that, of all the great nations, none is more vulnerable to such surprise attacks than we are.

This dire prospect—not a sneak attack against an outlying naval base, but a shocking blow against our major cities and other vulnerable resources from coast to coast—can only be prevented by preserving during the interim period the military and scientific leadership which we possessed at the end of the war. Some security might be obtained by building vast underground factories and by a wide dispersal of industry; but our people cannot become moles, and they should not. Still the best defense will be to convince other countries that the United States is fully prepared immediately to retaliate with far greater destructive force against any aggressor; that we will answer any unprovoked attack by wholesale devastation. Physicists, chemists, and other scientists must preserve American leadership in their various fields, but particularly you in the aeronautical sciences carry the responsibility to develop the strategic means of delivery—whether the load be a warhead, a bomb, or biological or chemical weapon; cargo or men; whether the vehicle be piloted or pilotless; whether it traverse the air envelope alone, or course through space beyond the atmosphere. New weapons will be useless unless delivered to the required spot at the right moment.

This is a heavy responsibility. It involves the entire future of the nation. To carry it successfully the Air Forces and the aeronautical scientists and technologists will have to continue to improve the cooperation which developed between them during the war. Even this will not be sufficient unless we develop a broader approach to the solution of our problems than we have on many occasions in the past. Not merely new devices, but the kind of training which leads to intellectual understanding is needed if the United States is to keep its world leadership in science and aeronautics.

The Integration of Resources for Warfare

The need for continued cooperation between the armed forces and science and industry is one of the main lessons we learned during the last war. By the integration in the war effort of the cumulative resources of the natural and social sciences, and of the talents and experience furnished by economists, scientists, technicians, management and labor, the armed forces were enabled to have at their disposal many new techniques and weapons with which to outwit and overwhelm the enemy.

I cannot help but reflect with sadness on the fact that we as a nation did not develop this cooperation voluntarily, but that the enemy, himself, by his attack on Pearl Harbor, became the great catalyst. That was the shock we needed to bring us together for a common purpose, to make us renounce our self-complacency and the smug doctrine of isolationism. Only war—the ultimate challenge to a nation's ability to live—made us adopt a practice which common sense should have told us long before was necessary for protecting the security of the nation.

Our fear that the enemy, himself, had integrated his great scientific and industrial resources into the military structure impelled us to counter his effort by a coordinated effort of our own. Our great national achievement in this field is now history. I suspect it will become legend to future generations as they look back upon the vast contributions to the war effort of our industry and of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and the advancement of aviation spurred by the work of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. It will be an enduring source of satisfaction to me to reflect on the progress we have made, both military and civilian, in this field of integration. Through the use of select civilians, we in the Air Forces were able many times to avail ourselves of the vital resources they commanded, whether these resources lay primarily in the intellect of the individual or in the organization with which he was associated.

It is not my purpose to review in detail the contributions which scientists and technologists made to the war effort, but I do want to point out some examples which illustrate the type of cooperation which we will have to develop in the future.

I shall never forget the enthusiasm and confidence with which one of our leading physicists approached the problem of analyzing whether or not the B-29's paid. His conclusions as to the sufficiency of radar bombardiers' training, in terms of combat efficiency, gave us a numerical measure of our shortcomings. The originality of his evaluation technique, in which the overall problem was reduced to a comparison of man-hours cost to us and to the enemy, was in itself a revelation.

Another conspicuous contribution was made by a small panel of aeronautical engineers, two of whom were chief engineers of leading aircraft concerns. To these men was put the question whether to attack Japan by pilotless aircraft, guided bombs, or B-29's. They concluded in favor of the B-29's, and, at the same time, proposed a compelling plan for the improvement and more effective use of the B-29's. I am proud to say that it was my privilege to support these recommendations, and with equal pride I recall with what eagerness they were received, and, in fact, reinforced, by Staff and by the B-29 Command cooperation.

The contribution of these engineers is an example of what can be achieved by a complete exchange of confidence between

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us. Before they began their study, they were briefed completely on the current plans for strategic air operations against Japan, and later they had access to any and all sources of information available. By this procedure the Air Forces obtained in their planning the benefit of the knowledge and resources of the industrial facilities from which these men had been borrowed. It was a truly integrated effort in planning—a procedure for bringing together industrial and military resources so that we might jointly execute a military operation.

I want to emphasize that this operation was not a small scale experiment. It was on these plans that I dispatched the 315th and 316th Wings to the Pacific Theater. Although the 316th Wing did not have an opportunity to get into combat before the Japanese surrender, the 315th distinguished itself by its superb radar bombing. I quote but one of the three commendations which this unit received from the USASTAF Commander, Gen. Carl Spaatz:

> "Have just been shown photographs of night attack on 5/6 August against the Ube Coal Liquefaction Company by 315 Bombardment Wing. This operation, using blind bombing technique, shows precision bombing which has not been exceeded by visual methods in daytime. Please convey my congratulations to all concerned."

Another type of fruitful cooperation between civilians and military personnel is best illustrated by the development of radar techniques in the operations of our Tactical Air Force in Europe. Here we were able to study the tactical possibilities of certain radar instruments, still in their prestandardization stage, in what, to all intents and purposes, was a combat laboratory.

Scientists, technicians, and industrialists who developed these instruments worked together with our air commanders and their combat personnel in testing the usefulness of these inventions under combat conditions. Only the civilian knew the ultimate capacity of the instrument. Only the military could demonstrate the characteristics required. Thus, a direct connection between OSRD and industrial laboratories, on one side, and our tactical air, on the other, was established.

Integration for National Security

Through this technique of mixing scientific and operational talent we were able to develop the application of devices for blind bombing and the control of tactical air which otherwise would never have reached the combat theater. Not information of the nebulous, wishful type so often found in the enumeration of military characteristics, but vital and specific first-hand information reached the research and development agencies, enabling them to adapt equipment to specific combat needs without loss of time. Aside from the immediate material benefits, there came from this cooperative procedure a mutual understanding which, I am convinced, stimulated the imagination of the scientists, and inspired them to new and greater creative achievements.

It is your duty, and that of the Air Forces, to make sure that the pattern of integration created by the war is translated into a peacetime counterpart, which will not only familiarize the military with the advances made in science and industry, but will attract into our planning for national security all the civilian resources which can contribute directly and indirectly to the defense of the nation.

We in the Air Forces know, and are grateful for, what you scientists, technologists, and industrialists have done to create our air force and bring it to full stature. Our confidence in you and our understanding of the need of basic research in aeronautics is probably best illustrated by the postwar creation in the Army Air Forces of an office at the Deputy Chief of Staff level solely responsible for research and development in the broadest sense. By this, one of my last acts as Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, we aimed to separate research from procurement in order to give the creative type of mind full opportunity to exercise its inventive genius. I can best convey to you the character and the scope of this new office by quoting the substance of the directive:

> ". . . . . The Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development will direct and supervise research and development and test activities of the AAF in order to provide coordination, integration and completeness and to eliminate duplication of effort; and will direct and prosecute long range projects in the field of research and scientific study. . . . .
>
> "(The Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development will) be responsible for the preparation and defense of the budget required for research and development and for the allocation of budget funds for this purpose."

However, the announcement of principles without assuring at the same time that their spirit would be carried out might have been nothing but an idle gesture. So that there be no question as to my intent, I chose as the Deputy a general who not only distinguished himself in the European Theater, but whose great achievements in the Pacific operations are familiar to you all. By the selection of General LeMay I wanted to proclaim the importance of this new administrative element in our administrative structure and make sure that this new office would have the respect not only of the services, but of the civilians upon whom the success of this new undertaking in large part depends.

Moreover, in order to promote this integration to the utmost, it was planned that the Air Forces would borrow from educational institutions or industry a civilian scientist for a period of one or two years to act as Director of Research of the new office. By this procedure the Air Forces will obtain over a period of years the benefits of diverse talents, while universities and industry will, through the return of these men to their parent organization, obtain an intimate knowledge of our problems and objectives. This arrangement, exposing as it does our weaknesses and our strengths, should, I believe, produce the kind of advice, mutual confidence, and support which we most earnestly desire and which we must have to do the job entrusted to us.

While I am proud that this action was taken while I was still commanding the Air Forces, I am sure that this development was inevitable, since General Spaatz and I think on air matters alike, share the same inner conviction, and look into the future with the same confidence. This I know personally, but it is evident for anyone to see who has watched the constant support which he gave and is giving to scientists in the field. His leadership in establishing the Advisory Specialist Group as a part of his headquarters and his encouragement of civilian scientists to study at firsthand the complex problems of air warfare should serve as an inspiration to us all.

Long-Range Planning

The program for the constructive integration of our national resources in the development of our Air Forces is by this time well under way. In the midst of the war we called together a committee, headed by one of the greatest authorities in the field of aerodynamics, to consider not our immediate problems, but the kind of planning—planning covering all phases of air operations—necessary to lay the foundation for our work during the next two decades. After a year's deliberation this committee turned in a report which has met every expectation and is serving at the moment as a valuable guide to the Air Forces. The benefit which we derived from the counsel of this elite group of scientists made us establish the Scientific Advisory Panel to furnish us continued support in this important field.

Not only have we made great progress in the integration of civilian and military resources in the planning activities within the Air Forces, but we have also taken positive steps to

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contract for broad research in the field of air warfare outside of the armed forces. No longer do we intend to secure your cooperation by the former limited method of presenting to industry the military characteristics required for a device, but we want to take you into our full confidence and let you solve the problems we face with the utmost freedom in research possible. It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that competent, long-range strategic planning cannot be undertaken without a competent evaluation of our research, development, and production capabilities. Conversely, if research is to contribute most effectively to our national security, those responsible for the administration of research must have full knowledge of our military capabilities.

I should also point out that this attitude is not limited in the Army to the Air Forces. As you know, General Eisenhower has established in the War Department a Director of Research and Development on the same level with the other General Staff Directors. He has outlined the policy which this new office is to follow in a far-reaching directive on scientific and technological resources as military assets. I recommend that all of you read this paper. It is an endorsement of Air Forces policy on research and development and is also a magnificent testimonial of the confidence of the War Department in our great body of professional men. I believe you will agree with me that there could be no finer expression of appreciation.

In other words, the armed services have laid the foundation for a thorough integration of civilian and military resources and have already taken positive steps ahead to implement their program. It is now the obligation of the civilian to answer this call of duty. We who have seen the selfless way in which you gave your knowledge and energy to the war effort have no doubts that you will respond to the new challenge. The stakes we play for are as important as those during the war, when the survival of the nation was in jeopardy.

You who will strive for the maintenance of American leadership in the air are working to implement your country's ideal: to achieve a world state in which aggression will no longer be known. Success in this task will give you the satisfaction of having been an important cog in the construction of an effective United Nations organization. Even if, through circumstances beyond our control, we fail to realize our national ideal, you will have given inestimable service to your country's security. I am sure that both you and we in the Air Forces will meet this challenge.

Research and Intellectual Leadership

The federalization of civilian and military resources, however, is only one of the steps ahead which we will have to take in order to reach our ideal. To proclaim the importance of research is one thing; to achieve results is another. This problem is not one which can be solved by directive or edict. Research, being the inspired product it is, cannot be purchased like a commodity. It is the product of the human mind—of intellectual leadership. We would be living under false security if we believed—as many of our fellow citizens seem to—that research as such is an effective antidote for all of our ills and dangers.

All of the funds and facilities devoted to research will be wasted, unless we possess at the same time competent intellectual leadership. The mere appropriation of funds by Congress—no matter how generous the appropriations may be—will not necessarily bring about efficient and effective research and development. Without inspired leadership, only wasteful mediocrity and extravagant expenditure of funds will be the end result. What I wish to emphasize is my conviction that the basic element essential to fruitful research activity is the wise selection and encouragement of personnel with special aptitudes and outstanding intellectual abilities. The proper cultivation of the human mind is to me the most important task we face.

Educational Programs

In the field of education the Air Forces are now committed to a program of training which, I am sure, will greatly strengthen their organization. Through the medium of an air university, there is about to begin an instructional program for basic tactical training as well as advanced strategy and logistics. An Air Forces Institute of Technology functions as a part of this university structure. By these means we hope to give officers and men an opportunity for scholarly enterprise and develop a procedure for singling out for further training personnel with special aptitude or possessed of outstanding intellectual ability.

This additional educational task will be shouldered by our civil institutions of higher learning, but we in the service have the responsibility to encourage our best men with every means available to take advantage of these educational opportunities.

We are often prone to talk glibly on the subject of advanced educational programs for the military without analyzing clearly some of the most obvious difficulties. For example, the Air Forces would benefit greatly if each year a certain number of appropriately trained men with Masters' and Doctors' degrees, and even with postdoctorate training, were injected into the organization.

Such a program presupposes that some able officers will take several years out of their professional military career to qualify themselves for these degrees, but under current policies ambitious young men may decide to forego these educational opportunities because of the penalty they may have to pay in their future military career. In other words, if the Air Forces are to build strength in professional fields in scientific spheres of activities, they must offer a long-term incentive or candidates for technical training will be few.

It is imperative that we take steps to put a premium on professional training. In our future program for advanced education the candidate must be assured at least of the same promotional opportunities as his less broadly trained colleagues. It remains for us to make the opportunities for command and promotion in the professional areas equal to those now prevalent in the operational field.

I am convinced that such essential subjects as communications and meteorology, for example, have suffered seriously for the reasons I have given. If we are to have an Air Force inspired by professional thinking, and I am convinced that we must have it if we are to be custodians of this country's air power, these difficulties must and, I am sure, will be overcome.

Outside of the Air Forces I envision our educational institutions for higher learning as the great catalyst, bringing together military and civilian talent in the pursuit of studies bearing directly and indirectly on our national security. As officers and civilians explore together the problems of political, social, economic, biological, and natural sciences, there will arise friendships and a spirit of cooperative endeavor which should greatly aid our nation's security by spreading an understanding and interest in our basic problem of defense.

I even cherish the hope that this association will lead some talented civilians to enter the Air Forces to follow their professional specialty, whether this specialty consists of technological or scientific experience useful in our laboratories, or of economic, political, and geographical knowledge valuable to our planning activities.

In the same manner, some of our officers and men will probably decide to leave the service and continue their professional career in industry or educational institutions. I know of no better means of breaking down the barriers between military and civilian, whether these are fancied or real. I know of no better way of laying the foundation in times of peace for the complete integration of our national resources in times of emergency or war.

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Evaluation of Our Air Effort

To be more specific, let us analyze the mutual advantages industry and the services would derive from a project which had as its objective a comprehensive evaluation of our air effort during the war. This would involve an analysis of the wealth of knowledge gained by the Air Forces in tactical, strategic, and transport activities—of the great contributions made by science and industry to our wartime air force—and of the enemy's plans and achievements, particularly in the field of the V-2 weapons. Such a study would not be a post-mortem examination, but an unusual opportunity for analysis of possible trends on the basis of data which otherwise might soon be dissipated, thus making us subject to speculation, rumor, and hearsay, with all the danger implied therein.

The conclusions derived from such a study are likely to affect every field of knowledge. By a study of the V-2 development, we should be able to visualize future stratospheric techniques. A careful examination of the Air Forces' vast transport operations should reveal conclusions of great value to our commercial air organizations. The Loran and radar techniques for the control of tactical operations should be translatable into peacetime terms and might become the basis for a rational program of efficient air control.

An analysis of the Air Forces' world-wide flights and of mandatory long-distance operations would point out the essential limitations of our understanding of basic weather phenomena. Of equal importance is a study of projected air developments and their possible effect on national transport and thus on our national economy, as well as the economy of other nations. From such a study we should be able to predict possible future conflicts of interest and thus aid those responsible for our foreign relations.

The services and industry are, I believe, not now qualified to carry out this type of research, but our great educational institutions have the talent necessary for research of this breadth, and they would gain thereby an unusual opportunity to place before our graduate students a first-rate illustration of a problem related to our national security.

This type of training I consider of utmost importance, for the future of the Air Forces will and must depend to a large degree on the support they derive from outside resources. Our educational institutions in many instances have research talent pre-eminently qualified to investigate important projects for us. The value of these projects is to be measured not simply in terms of specific contribution, but also by the extent to which the project contributes to the vital problem of training. Foresight demands that we consider it a strategic responsibility to examine thoroughly the resources of our institutes of higher learning, in order to ensure a training reservoir adequate in scope, quality, and distribution.

Cooperation on Common Problems

The Air Forces' dependence on industry should need no further explanation. It is bound to become greater and greater. Here, too, we must build for strength, quality, character, and distribution. Wherever research and development can be done outside—whether it be in educational institutions or in industry—it is our responsibility to turn to the outside resources, to take them into our confidence, and to cooperate closely in the solution of our common problems. We can never gain strength should our policy be otherwise. Moreover, in the future, as in the past, we shall depend upon the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which, it is presumed, will continue to represent the Government's subsidy to the field of aviation. Prior to the war we relied upon the N.A.C.A. for much basic research. During the war this organization, just like many other research centers, suffered because of the burden of [illegible] development work. Fortunately, [illegible] can revert to its normal peace-[illegible]

I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I use the past work of the N.A.C.A. as an example of the broader approach to research we have to develop in the future. The N.A.C.A. was established in 1915 with the object of giving Government support to aviation and to interest itself in problems of flight. During the course of its history it has done aviation many great services. However, I believe we were wrong either in interpreting the scope of N.A.C.A. work too narrowly, or else in not having established complementary subsidization to make up for deficiencies as they developed in the following years. Technologists who worked on the program thought that the study of the "problems of flight" was limited to the vehicle itself. Such an interpretation might be compared to the use of a government subsidy solely for the technical development of the automobile without paying any attention to roads and other complementary facilities.

I have often wondered—and here you gentlemen are probably far better qualified than I to give the answer—whether the training of our scientists and technologists may not often be far too narrow. I am reminded of this because frequently technologists and even scientists are beguiled by the fascination of physical devices. Even in this war, where the physical scientists particularly distinguished themselves for their contributions, there was, I believe, a tendency toward overemphasis on the importance of the device itself.

Operational Research

Rare was the scientist whose interests led him to consideration of what I may call diffuse problems, connected especially with operational research. The number of scientists and technologists who applied themselves to the solution of the difficult problems associated with operations was pitifully small. I suspect this failure is a reflection upon our method of training. It seems to me we must do something to encourage greater interest in the application of the scientific method of reasoning to the evaluation of problems which deal not alone with machines, but with the integrated combination of men and machines.

But to return to the problem of the N.A.C.A. It seems to me to be significant that between 1915 and the beginning of this war we failed miserably to recognize the importance of investigation of those factors which enable the airplane to operate over vast distances or which make of it a vital element in our social and economic structure. I am thinking especially of our relative ignorance of basic meteorological phenomena and of our failure to appreciate the importance of air navigation techniques and facilities.

Our lack of adequate study of basic meteorological factors seems to me another illustration of the overbearing appeal to scientists and technologists of work that leads to devices, rather than to intellectual understanding. I believe it is also fair to say that this defect is a reflection upon our planning, both in scientific centers and in strictly military organizations. Had we in 1915 and the following years visualized the limitations of weather and given as much attention to the solution of this problem as was devoted to the development of the aircraft itself, our air force might have conducted its operations at a saving fantastically large.

I believe that even had we taken during the war the country's best young minds and trained them to the best of our ability as forecasters, we should have achieved negligible improvement, because these men would have been working without the benefits of long-term basic research on the factors upon which precise forecasting must be predicated. Here was a weakness which in the emergency we could not correct by all our industrial resources nor by a mass attack of scientists. One can go just so far in buying time.

The study of the techniques and instrumentalities of air navigation represents another field which demands your full attention. With our plethora of committees it is going to take a major Filadelfia to remedy the [illegible]

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unless we take drastic action. Let me recall to you that in the operation of our B-29's against Japan the two principal navigation aids, Loran and radar, were each developed after the beginning of hostilities. We owe this blessing not to far-sightedness or long-range planning, but rather to the grace of God! Here we are today on the threshold of a great new adventure—the conquest of the stratosphere—yet we fail to heed the warning that our first requirement is to understand better this tenuous envelope of gas surrounding the earth.

Again, why is it that our experts in hydrodynamics are so captivated by the intricacies and subtle beauty of the flow of air about an airfoil, and yet callous to the implications of what might be thought of as the transformation of this problem, in which the fluid is within the boundary of the structure—I refer to the atmosphere. Perhaps our wind tunnels with their shapely models have a siren-like intrigue to many minds.

The solution of the problem demands an application of funds and brains to a degree commensurate with its seriousness. This may demand nothing short of a crusade for which we will require the help not only of meteorologists, but also of our great mathematical physicists, those who hold in trust our great computational developments, as well as those familiar with hydrodynamics, thermodynamics, and the broader aspects of electricity and gravitation.

Lest I be forced back by adverse weather conditions, I had best return to my primary base, that of the war and the Army Air Forces. I feel so strongly on this subject of intellectual training, because I believe that a broad approach and understanding of air problems are absolutely essential.

Lessons Learned from the War

As I reflect on the last war, I fear often that many of our fellow citizens labor under the false impression that our victory was inevitable or at least relatively easy. Such misconceptions might have grave implications for our future welfare.

Let us not forget that in this war, as in any other one, one of the main factors in victory was the enemy's blundering. I am not merely thinking of such strategic mistakes as Hitler's attack upon Russia or his failure to follow through after Dunkirk. Suppose the Germans, instead of stopping work on the proximity fuse because they thought the war was won after their dash across the Lowlands, had continued this development and solved it as we eventually did. In this case our great bomber offensives would have been met with deadly antiaircraft fire, and we would have been unable to operate as we did after German air opposition had been reduced. Even with our great resources, we might never have been able to accept the losses which they could have inflicted upon us.

Suppose again that Hitler's judgment had dictated the application of jet propulsion to fighters, rather than bombers, and then envision to what extent our air effort would have been limited. Think too of the disproportionate amount of energy the Germans put into the development of the V-1 and V-2 weapons, which by themselves could never have won the war. In the field of radar too the Germans erred because of overconfidence. Their strategy was predicated upon inevitable victory. Later on, when they needed radar sorely, there was no time for its adequate development.

What would have been the outcome of the Battle of Britain if the British had followed the same philosophy and had not been ready with their radar at the right time to thwart the German air offensive?

Perhaps one of the greatest German mistakes was their failure to capitalize fully on their vast resources in the natural sciences. The German scientist, although he was used as an individual, was never brought closely enough to the real problem of war to give the kind of assistance his training afforded. There was a lack of confidence and, above all, a lack of trust. Scientists and technologists were in general barred from the [illegible] of their products. It is from mistakes such as these that we can draw valuable lessons. Flexibility of mind, broad vision, and a full understanding of the general implications of a new device are required characteristics for both civilians and the military if the country is to remain secure.

It is with this attitude of mind that we must attack the problems which are presented to us by the development of the V-2 weapon. Though its use in the war was not, and probably could not have been decisive, the further development of the V-2 has staggering possibilities, breathtaking in their social and military implications. As you know, the Germans developed a weapon with a range of 200 miles—a distance it covered in some five minutes. It had a maximum velocity of the order of 1 mile per sec., and rose to a height of 60 miles in its trajectory. In the use of these weapons against London at this range the Germans were able to achieve an average error of but 4 miles. They hoped that with an additional booster stage the V-2 might travel 3,500 miles in the span of half an hour. There were plans to apply this technique to the transport of cargo and men.

The challenge of mastering the addition of yet another stage, and thus opening up the possibilities of orbital transport, is, I am sure, not being ignored by you. You and I know that this is not idle fantasy—that there is a real possibility of developing a true space ship, a rocket-propelled vehicle which will climb above the atmosphere and accelerate to such a velocity that its centrifugal force balances the attraction of gravity, enabling it to become a true satellite, capable of one or more trips around the world. I am told this velocity is of the order of 26,000 ft. per sec.—but five times that already attained by the V-2.

The significance of such a development we must all be thinking about. We must envision the establishment of a new system of intercontinental transport, the possible political and social effects of a world shrinking more rapidly in size than ever before, and above all the effects of such developments on the security of the United States. Let us remember that past engagements were opened at the greatest distance current weapons would permit.

Intercontinental Warfare

In the event of another conflict we should in all probability find ourselves engaged in intercontinental warfare. We must today accept as a fact for future planning purposes that we could be very well within but thirty minutes of our enemy's territory. It is this fact which forces us to re-evaluate all of our former concepts of military organization, strategy, and security, especially since simultaneous with the conquest of space new and awesome weapons have been developed, capable of hitherto unequal devastation.

I share with all of you the feeling that the appearance of the atomic bomb is a new and compelling reason to work with ever greater effort for the establishment of world peace, but the atomic bomb in itself is just another bomb with terrifically increased destruction power. It is what it may develop into that causes us apprehension. However, I fear that in this general emphasis on the atomic bomb and its effects, we might forget the equally devastating warfare which might be waged with biological weapons, able to spread disease, starvation, and death upon entire nations. The possibilities of biological, as well as atomic, warfare deserve full attention by all of us.

But while we must strive with all of our might to achieve a philosophy which will help us to live on this earth despite the diabolically destructive creations of man, we in the services and you in the aeronautical sciences have the obligation to face the consequences presented by these developments in a spirit of cool analysis. Until world-wide measures for security have been approved by all nations, we must accept the challenge of those people who tell us that there is no defense against the new weapons. Certainly, there is no direct means of neutralizing an artillery shell or a bomb about to descend upon us, but indirect defenses against both have been created.

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In this respect it may be air alone which will hold the key to the future defense of the nation.

I have reviewed somewhat at length the problems which we now face and the lessons we learned from the war, because I feel that nobody can overemphasize the importance of a broad intellectual approach to our problems. Without the highest type of intellectual leadership we shall lose the ascendancy we now possess in the world and thus impair our nation's security. It is only natural that in view of my past experience I should have stressed the military aspects of aviation and the role it will have to play in our country's defense. But you as well as I know that there is no borderline between civilian and military aviation, that gains made in one field are immediately transferred to the other, that ours is a cooperative venture, a common faith.

The Conquest of Time and Space

Think of the progress made during the war under the auspices of the Army Air Forces which has already affected civilian air transport and will do so even more in the future. You and we together doubled the flying time of our combat aircraft in the course of two years. In the B-29 operations in the Pacific, we were flying three times the range at one-half the cost of equivalent operations in the European Theater. For every dollar we invested in the overall operation against the Japanese, the enemy lost $50. Moreover, the Air Transport Command blazed the way for a network of air routes and landing fields covering the entire globe. By July, 1945, we were operating 146,647 route miles outside this country and within our boundaries an additional 35,000 miles of military routes. Likewise, in that same July, 1945, we were flying 175,000,000 ton-miles a month, and 618,000,000 passenger-miles—all this with 2,873 aircraft specifically assigned to this purpose. Recall the great transport drama in the Burma campaign, when the early goal of 100,000 tons a month over the hump—at one time thought impossible—was soon exceeded and a schedule calling for 150,000 tons a month substituted in August, 1945. I am relating these facts to remind you that the conquest of space was in fact a victory for the concept of space transport. This was true whether the load was a bomb secured to the nose of the vehicle, whether it hung from the wings or in the belly, whether the load was cargo or humans. This applies whether the vehicle be piloted or pilotless, winged or wingless. It is all a part of strategic transport, the achievement of which is uniquely our goal.

As I have watched the evolution of the Army Air Forces from its inception, and in later life as I assumed responsibility for it and guided its growth, I have been impressed with the systematic continuity of its development. It has been fascinating to witness each step from those days when a flight immediately above the ground was an epoch of achievement, to the time when we were able to mount to high altitudes through the medium of the supercharger. I have watched our speeds increase almost phenomenally. In the twilight of my professional career I have had the satisfaction of observing the development of jet propulsion, which in turn has carried us to even greater speeds. Our rate of growth is at this point so rapid that chrysalis-like we are in the process of splitting the atmospheric envelope. Inescapably we are projecting our thinking and extending our techniques in a manner that makes inevitable the invasion of the stratosphere. Whereas this was a fantasy but a generation ago, it is so near today that it is the natural extension of ordinary aerial flight.

In this spectacular conquest of time we already have on the horizon the techniques, which when realized will cause us to measure distance in terms not of miles, but minutes.

Military Integration

In conclusion, let me say one more word on a subject which is closely connected with the future of air

ation, but also the security of our nation. I am speaking of the proposed merger of the armed forces.

Just as it has taken a war to reveal to us the great potentialities of a federation of civilian and military interests, so it has taken a war to show us the need for a correspondingly healthy pattern of integration within our military structure. We are no longer at the stage where science, industry, and the individual components of our armed forces can independently assert their sovereignty. Our security demands *complete* integration.

One needs only to consider the implications of space transport, where intercontinental distances are rapidly approaching time intervals of less than an hour, to realize that there is being generated an entirely new array of techniques demanding a complete revamping of our concept of organization to meet new problems. There was a time when the mobility of our military forces was measured in months of travel and organizational structures were adapted at that time to meet that current tempo. Today, with the unprecedented rate of advance of techniques, we are shrinking our time scales so fast that our organizational concepts are lagging pitifully behind. We can no longer afford military organizations whose reaction times are of another order.

Our ability to plan and act by air must not be subjected to the dangers that come from an organizational structure predicated on outmoded techniques and procedures. The applications of air power must be made by an organization conditioned to think in terms of the mobility of air, and the same may be said with respect to our surface forces and our ground forces. Moreover, if we are to integrate these forces so as to be able to use them in cooperation as expeditiously and as economically as I am sure our future enemies will compel us to do, we must abandon our present fixations, bury our pride, and jointly strive to evolve a unity of force in which we shall not be hampered by the kind of delays from which we seemed not to be able to extricate ourselves in the conduct of the war just finished.

In our earlier history there was a natural boundary separating the functions of our ground and sea forces. By this very fact their respective missions were uniquely defined. These days have now gone forever.

It was through the courage and vision of a body of pioneers interested in the conquest of air that there arose our present military air arm, an arm unhampered by traditions, inspired by the conviction of those who believe in the destiny of this great new form of transport. The value of air power to this nation must now be measured in terms of survival.

In the Army Air Forces, just come to maturity, the nation possesses a spiritual force and a military force, each of which is essential to our future security. There is a momentum to these forces we must preserve if we are to capitalize to the full the sacrifices that have been made in the past.

At this very time the development of air power is threatened by a difference of opinion within our family. The issue it seems to me is crystal clear. Are we to build an entire military structure involving ground, sea, and air forces around the existing naval organization, or are we to recognize the Air Forces as a great investment in national security, which has already paid handsome dividends?

To destroy this spirit that has endowed the nation with the strength symbolized by this great Air Force, and thus to break faith with that great body of men who created it, would be a catastrophe.

I have seen the cost to this nation of a military structure where tradition, pride, and struggle for sovereignty have at times dangerously threatened combined efficiency. The issue is, I believe, a simple one. Is the Navy, along with its control of the sea, to be given the control of the air, or shall we once and for all recognize that air power has come of age and earned a place in its own right beside our ground and sea forces?

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This nation cannot afford, either financially or for security reasons, to permit a situation in which our sea forces and our air forces find themselves engaged in an insidious struggle because of our failure to entrust to a single arm the responsibility for land-based air.

I have heard the argument that competition is healthy. If that argument applies, perhaps we should duplicate our armies and our sea forces, our troop transports and our destroyers and cruisers, along with our air forces. This nation pleads for a democracy of arms in which there is no caste and no aristocracy, but in which our ground forces with all the pride of their tradition will carry out their responsibility, and our sea forces with their great background of achievement will with their usual energy apply themselves to discharge their particular responsibility, and where, side by side with these two traditional arms, our land-based air in full maturity will take its place with complete and unchallenged responsibility for the part it has clearly demonstrated it is best qualified to play—the role of strategic air transport in all of its military applications.

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20-11

AAF MEMORANDUM)
NO. 20-11)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, 2 SEPTEMBER 1943

ORGANIZATION

Communications Consultant to the Commanding General

1. With the consent of the Secretary of War Dr. Edward L. Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, in addition to his present responsibilities, is designated Consultant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces with over-all supervisory responsibility in connection with all matters relating to communications within the Army Air Forces. The field of communications is defined to comprise all forms of communication, radar, countermeasures, radar aids to fire-control and bombing, radio and radar aids to navigation, and related electronic fields.

2. Dr. Bowles is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the medium of the Chief of Air Staff as well as through direct coordination with the several Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and the Air Communications Officer in the determination of policy, in the initiation of projects, and in all matters of planning, training, organization, procurement, and operations in any way concerned with communications.

3. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General directly through the medium of the Air Communications Officer in the implementation of all plans, policies, projects, and programs in any way related to communications.

4. He is empowered to act for the Commanding General through the Chief of Air Staff as well as directly through the Air Communications Officer in all matters relating to the personnel, organization, and functioning of the Air Communications Division.

By command of General ARNOLD:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
OFFICIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT

BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Air Staff

OFFICIAL:

FRED C. MILNER
Colonel, AGD
Air Adjutant General

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cc-Dr Yates

March 31, 1970

Mr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Road
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

Dear Mr. Bowles:

I have been sitting on your letter exchange with my collaborator Jack Loosbrock (on the Hap Arnold biography project) for several years now, and have been hoping to take advantage of the opportunity to get into your files in respect to the Hap Arnold story.

My researcher's appetite was further whetted when I talked to Gen Don Yates in Palm Beach and he told me some more about your files.

In any event, the time is approaching when I shall want to take a look for myself.

We have not been exactly idle. I've spent the past two years, most of the time on a Brookings Fellowship, researching the vast Arnold Collection (90,000 separate items) in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress which also houses the Baker, Spaatz, Mitchell, Andrews and other manuscript collections totaling well over 250,000 documents.

We have also interviewed most of the key figures associated with General Arnold including Hon Robert Lovett and Generals, Baker, Spaatz, O'Donnell, LeMay, Cabell, Smart, Norstad, Kuter, Kenney, Edwards, Walsh, Knerr, Weikert, Kepner, Hunter, Tibbets, Nugent, Everest and at least 20 others, including Donald Douglas and Reuben Fleet.

In any event, I'm thinking about visiting New England this summer and would hope to spend as much time with you as you deem warranted. If you could let me know your plans for July and August, I'll try to gear mine accordingly.

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Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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November 15, 1966

Mr. Edward L. Bowles
15 Greylock Rd.
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 02181

Dear Mr. Bowles:

If you had not written to me I surely would have contacted you sooner or later. Your name keeps cropping up in the research, most recently when I had a session with Frank Collbohm on the formation of the RAND Corporation.

I am grateful for the enclosure. One of the problems, of course, lies in just how and how much to quote General Arnold's speeches and articles when one knows full well that mostly they were prepared by someone else -- one knows not whom. My assumption has been that in each case he personally OK'd the material. But it is not quite like dealing with a Churchill, who was his own ghost writer.

Assisting me on the Arnold book is Dr. Murray Green, a trained researcher who is in the Office of Research and Analysis in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Our problem is the mass of material that is available. We have been through a large collection of taped interviews of contemporaries that is in the Oral History section at Columbia University. We have just returned from several days with Mrs. Arnold at the ranch, where we obtained copious notes and several boxes of material which is being shipped to Washington. Mrs. Arnold has been a big help. In addition, there are case after case of Arnold papers in the Library of Congress, which we have only barely tapped. Many persons have responded by mail, as you have, and I have interviewed a dozen people or more, such as Donald Douglas, Sr., Emmett McCabe, General Cabell, etc.

I think it will be necessary for one or both of us to visit you, if you don't mind, and sift your files. On the same trip I would like also to see Bob Proctor, who must be a key source. General Spaatz has agreed to make his papers available. And we must talk to Generals Norstad and Kuter, as well as Secretary Lovett, in New York at an early date.

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The target date for a manuscript is next fall but as the material unfolds I have small hope of hitting it. But the friendly cooperation of persons such as you is making the job easier than it might have been.

I want to do a "warts and all" book -- not iconoclastic but realistic. This is another problem, since most people tend to remember the good and forget the bad.

If there are other close associates to whom you think we should talk, I would value your suggestions.

Again, thanks much and I will be in touch again, if you can put up with a prying visitor.

Sincerely,

John F. Loosbrock
Editor

JFL:L
cc: Murray Green ✓

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Bowman, Harold K.

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September 15, 1970

B/Gen H.W. Bowman
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, FL 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for keeping those tidbits for me. They make up the flesh and bones of history.

The writing has about started and I hope to go on all cylinders.

I may come back to you later on for some matters that seem vague in my mind and notes.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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P.O.Box 418
Jupiter, Fl. 33458
Sept. 9, 1970

Dr. Murray Green - SAFAAR
Dep't of the Air Force
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Murray:

While cutting down on my files today, I ran across the enclosed bits, which may or may not be of value. If not, toss them away - I'm thru with them, and my wife insists that I save too many pieces of paper.

There's a personal touch to the TEN COMMANMENTS. Whiää While I was living in Park House, outside of Paris, with Gen. Spaatz, in 1945, he believed the war to be coming to a close, and became convinced that the big job upcoming was to renew the fight for unification. He opined that his military career was also nearing the retirement phase, and therefore he could blast forth his convictions - even becoming a martyr if necessary.

I suggested that:

1. His prejudices and strong convictions were so well known that he might not be the most effective proponent.
2. Once he was tossed out his influence would wane.
3. The most effective voices were those of the journalists, many of whom were his friends, and were widely read. They were frequent guests.

His response: O.K. Prepare for me ten commandments - reasons for the separate Air Force, unified with the other services and co-equal. Then ten reasons whay not - and knock them down.

When the final draft was approved, we stamped it CONFIDENTIAL to make it more attractive, and "carelessly" left it on the mantle over the fireplace, where he often chatted with guests after dinner and cocktails. The rest was easy. One of us would steer the conversation to the subject and Gen. Spaatz would casually hand the study to the correspondant. Several very helpful and nationally read articles resulted.

Sincerely,

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

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July 11, 1969

Brig.General Harold W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P. O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Jack Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are doing a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House. The research phase is nearly completed. We have been through the huge Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress and have plumbed a number of other key sources, including the FDR Library at Hyde Park.

We are now hopeful of filling in some of the cracks and have a number of interviews planned for the immediate future. We have appointments in New York City next week with Hon. Robert Lovett, and Generals Lauris Norstad, Larry Kuter and George Kenney.

In mid- or late August, I hope to visit Florida to conduct a few key interviews. I would be honored if you could find some time to talk about your association with General Arnold which I believe was close and extended over 15 years or more. For example, I have some interesting notes taken at the Library of Congress indicating that you served as a PIO on his staff in the early 1930's when he commanded March Field.

Nostalgically, I should also mention that I worked for you when you headed OIS in the Pentagon in 1946. I was signed on in April of that year, upon returning from the wars, as a researcher with the Personnel Narratives Division, headed by Hans Christian Adamson. Enough of that.

In any event, I promise not to take more than a couple of hours of your time on a date and hour of your choosing.

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Just for ball-park estimates, I'll be coming through Jupiter on the way down about Sunday or Monday, August 24-25, and will be coming back North about Friday, September 5th. I should also mention that I have another tentative visit to Florida scheduled for the end of December, if next month is unsuitable for you.

I am enclosing an envelope for your convenience. I hope that we can get together, even if only for a short visit. I hope, also, that this letter finds you in good health and that you are enjoying your retirement.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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July 25, 1969

Brig.General Harold W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Your letter sounds just great. You must really be enjoying your well-earned retirement, something General Arnold looked forward to for years, but he just wore himself out. Incidentally, I had a note from Mrs. George Stratemeyer who reported that the General is "desperately ill." As you know, I'm sure, he is in Winter Park.

And now for our rendezvous. I will be driving down on a combined business-vacation trip. I would suggest Friday, August 22nd, Saturday, August 23rd, or Monday, the 25th, as possibilities. I'll know more about my plans in a couple of weeks. I think my family wants to stop off at the Cape, so we may do this on Sunday, the 24th.

I note that Lantana is just below Palm Beach. Via the Sunshine Parkway, it can't be more than 30 minutes away from your place. I am writing to General Burroughs, suggesting a three-way conversation. I would like to suggest luncheon as my guests at a neutral zone, perhaps in Palm Beach, after which we could repair to some convenient spot for our interview. Inasmuch as both you and General Burroughs served at March Field, you might spur each other's recollections.

If for any reason this ambitious plan cannot be worked out, we'll just leave my interview of General Burroughs for another time. As I mentioned, I'll be coming through again in December or January.

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You mentioned General Bill Garland. Yes, he did a bang-up job here in Headquarters, USAF, and is leaving very shortly to take the 1st Missile Wing at Vandenberg.

Believe me, General Bowman, I'm looking forward to our get-together next month.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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July 25, 1969

Brig.Gen. Paul E. Burroughs
812 N. Atlantic Drive
Hypoluxo Island
Lantana, Florida 22462

Dear General Burroughs:

Jack Loosbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are doing a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House. The research phase is nearly completed. We have been through the huge Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress and have plumbed a number of other key sources, including the FDR Library at Hyde Park.

We are now hopeful of filling in some of the cracks and have a number of good interviews under our belts and a dozen more pending. In this connection, I recall that you were associated with Colonel Hap Arnold at March Field in the early 1930's and perhaps elsewhere. I would welcome an opportunity to talk with you next month during my visit to Florida.

I am planning to see General Harold Bowman on this trip and the thought occurred to me that perhaps the three of us could lunch together, as my guests. Afterwards, we could repair to some mutually satisfactory spot and reminisce for a couple of hours.

Specifically, I'm thinking of Friday, August 22nd, or Saturday, August 23rd, or possibly Monday, August 25th. Please let me know how this sounds to you. If none of these dates is convenient for you, I can catch you on the way back, some time in early September. I have another tentative trip to Florida in December pending, and perhaps we could do it then, if next month is inconvenient for you.

In any event, I welcome your response and have enclosed an envelope for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Dr. MURRAY GREEN, Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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12 NOV 1969

Brig.Gen. H.W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I appreciate the opportunity to take a look at your "prized pieces." Several are indeed gems. I took the liberty to extract the Max Miller article about how you, Spaatz and Miller went exploring for that Spring on North Island; also a couple of sentences from the Billy Mitchell article which said it in his usual blunt way.

That management guidance: "How to Keep Out of Trouble" in the Pentagon has evoked some smiles around here. I've seen some other current versions of how to survive in "Disneyland East" - probably stolen from your original.

I'm returning all of this material with thanks. Also enclosed is a "cleaned up" version of our interview. I hope that none of it does violence to your thoughts or recollection of events.

The Arnold research is fairly complete. I'm back to work at the Pentagon while my collaborator begins the unenviable task of writing the book. I hope to pitch into that with him before too long.

I will be making another trip South in early January. This time I'll be taking my daughter back to school. Enroute to or from Florida, I am planning some interviews, including Generals Twining, Possum Hansell and Paul Tibbets. We'll be on a tight schedule as I hope to get in a week's rest.

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Recently, as you know, we lost Stratemeyer some months ago. More recently, Coddington passed away. He was one of the authors of that plan to protect Pearl Harbor which you briefly mentioned in your memoirs. That plan disappeared when it arrived in Washington, and I'm trying to find out why.

One of my most recent research assignments was to figure out why Drew Pearson didn't like General Arnold. One clue is in what Beebe told us about the "game" they used to play in the Munitions Building. When Drew Pearson used to come around on one of his regular stops, they'd sit him just outside of Arnold's office, and begin to drop hints about pending adventures - e.g., a secret base in Siberia - which would make Pearson's mouth water and his ears tingle. Inevitably Pearson must have found out they were pulling his leg. Is this the cause of his antagonism or is there something more substantive?

I tell you this in the possibility that it might stir something deep in the recesses of your own recollection. Secondly, you were in the OIS slot (1946-47) when Pearson's attitude towards the Air Force changed 180°. From what I can gather, the accession of Symington to high position in the Pentagon was a major reason for the switch. If I were a suspicious man - which I'm not, I would say that somebody in the USAF began to do something for Pearson which they hadn't done before. All throughout the roles and missions struggle (1946-50) the USAF could do no wrong in his column, and the Navy could do no right. Inasmuch as Pearson had found little that was right under Arnold, and especially Giles, some external event(s) must have happened to set him straight. This is a long shot and I'm enclosing an envelope just in case I ring a bell.

In any event, Loosbrock and I are shooting for a finished manuscript in 1970, but only time will tell.

Again many thanks.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

Enclosures

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September 17, 1969

Gen. Charles P. Cabell, USAF(Ret)
2506 Ft. Scott Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Cabell:

I have been rereading your portion of the interview pertaining to General Arnold's trip to the South Pacific in September 1942.

I am left with the impression that Admiral Ghormley's "Dog-in-the-Manger" attitude about providing more shipping to maintain our position at Guadalcanal will ultimately have caused the Marines to die on the vine.

Can we assume that Admiral Ghormley's policies were known and approved by Admiral Nimitz? What purpose was this policy supposed to serve?

Will you be attending the AFA functions next week? If so, I hope to see you at one of them.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Enclosure

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September 26, 1969

Brig.Gen. H.W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I'm sorry I delayed in returning your original manuscript but I wanted to read it through. I found it very interesting and I think some publisher is missing a good bet and not picking up the option.

Once again many thanks for all the assistance.

Very sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

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100 River Dr.
Sequesta, Fl. 33458
2-15-74

Dr. Murray Green
Office of AF History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Murray:

Thanks for Bea Arnold's address. I'll drop her a line. She's a dear soul.

You're indeed welcome to use the story about Bill Morris in my MS pp 180-1. The title of the MS, never published, is LADDER TO THE MOON.

Best

Hal Bowman

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20314

13 February 1974

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for yours of the 8th. Mrs. Arnold's address:

Mrs. H. H. Arnold
El Rancho Feliz
Sonoma, Calif 95476

She wrote me a letter the other day, so she must be back to near normal. I think she would be pleased to hear from you.

I'd like to use that story about Captain Bill Morris in your MS on pp. 180-1. For footnote purposes, do you have a title for your book?

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

Encl

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100 River Drive
Sequesla, N. 33458
Feb. 8, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Hq. USAF/CHO
Washington, D.C. 20314

Re yours 4 Feb. & mine Jan. 29

Dear Murray:

yes, so far as I'm concerned, you're welcome to use the Spaatz name story and "Dining In" (we called it "wing ding") with attribution. Of course I can't speak for Spaatz, but I'm sure he'd smile a yes. The Eaker part is still confidential.

Re Harold George. no, my remarks regarded the post-war period. Probably 1946. The AAF was being criticised for withholding info. as a PIO running the show, I got the blame. Hal G. & I arranged a blow-out at Wright Field, for the press. at the banquet, George blew the lid off security, promised the works, & got great applause, natch. and again I got the blame. I was called into a staff meeting (Vandenburg, De May, etc.) and asked to explain the security leaks. I was chopped off short without a chance to say my piece.

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next time you write, please give me Bea Arnold's address. She's a great gal & we'd like to tell her so.

no, I knew nothing of the incident of Eaker's denial of transport for Mrs. A.

Our 401 Bomb. Group is working on a reunion - our first. Probably at Harlingen, Tex. next Aug. That's Hq. for the "Confederate Air Force"!! and me a yankee!

Sincerely,

Hal Bowman

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20314

4 February 1974

Brig Gen Harold W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for your good letter of the 29th and the ample postscript. I'll respect your confidence. I take it, however, that I can use the Spaatz name story and the "Dining In" with attribution. The Eaker story I've heard in several versions - all of them confirming the basic idea that when he arrived on the scene in April 1945 as Deputy Commander AAF, most people assumed he was the next Chief.

You said something about Harold George blowing the lid off security. Is this incident different from the one that happened in E.T.O.? He gave an interview to Bob Considine who published a lot of details about the 8th AF operations. When called on the carpet, George denied telling some of the things Considine published. I talked to General George at length about this when I visited Hollywood a couple of years ago. Are you talking about the same incident in 1943?

On the subject of our recent correspondence, you'll be amused to read in the current Newsweek a reviewof a two volume biography of Eugene O'Neill which got a great writeup. The author spent 18 years and 1,000 interviews pursuing the ghost of O'Neill. I hope to improve on his timing somewhat and would like to get the ssame sort critical reviews.

Mostly, I'm trying to finish up this biography in Mrs. Arnold's lifetime. Sometimes I get worried about that. As I previously mentioned, she has spent a lot of time recently in the hospital. Today, however, I received a good letter from her. Bruce and Hank have arranged for a nurse/maid/secretary to be with her full time. She still answers my questions. Her mind is sound.

As the story gets closer to the time you served during Arnold's stewardship, I probably will be back to you with more questions, and hope you will continue to favor me with your recollections. Mrs. Arnold has told me more than once that she wants it "warts and all" and is confident the image of Arnold will stand up ten feet tall. So do I; otherwise, I would not have started the project.

Did you know, for example, that Eaker as Deputy CG, refused Mrs. Arnold permission to visit the RAF Aid Society using official transport? It happened in 1945, but I havent been able to pin it down precisely in time. Gen Arnold was either in the hospital or on one of his trips. When he heard of it, he hit the ceiling. His relationship to Eaker deteriorated after that. Any recollections?

Best wishes,

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Jan. 29, 1974

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of AF History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Murray:

I appreciated your comments. Agree completely that Kissinger is doing a great job. My only additional comment is that he gets all the credit, while his boss gets only the criticism.

No, you shouldn't, and I won't write Ira Eaker about his errors. I've written him occasionally in response to his columns, and find him responsive only to compliments. When I've disagreed with him he freezes. The ego of a typical PIO. Write it as it is and forget his fading memories.

As to the spelling of Spaatz (Spatz): If memory serves, his daughters objected to the pronunciation, which rhymed with those things people used to wear to keep their ankles warm - spats, so persuaded him to change the spelling. Did I ever tell you about the drunk G.I. at March Field, where Tooey was wing commander under Arnold? If so, skip this. Well, Tooey was all over the base, checking, inspecting, and needling, day and night. (1932). One night an MP brought a drunk GI to the hospital for a sobriety test. The medic put him thru the paces. Walk a straight line. Talk. Etc. Then, waving something before the lad's eyes, the medic asked, "Do you see spots before your eyes?" The answer was, "I see that S.O.B. whereever I go". The story got back to Ruth, who told it to Tooey, who enjoyed it immensely.

Carded

The "dining in"? Yes I know about that. When Arnold returned from his Alaskan photo trip, he had been greatly impressed with Canadian Wing Dings, and directed me to set one up to start an equally important Air Force tradition. It was to start with a highly formal, dressed-to-the-hilt dinner. No drinks, no smoking, until after dinner and a toast to COUNTRY. Then later, a complete reversal. Skits, no holds barred, razzing everybody to the hilt, get rough. Then everybody gathered for a fun night. Maybe I carried it too far. I took Arnold seriously. Big pilots riding tricycles, supposedly having trouble landing. No names, mentioned, of course, but there was Barnold, Baker, etc., which all recognized. Our base exec. had trouble making up his mind, as all knew. Eaker was running around chisseling supplies to make his sqadron best. And so it went. Arnold, who was a sadist at heart, got a kick out of it. Eaker hid behind the drapes and left. That night was the start of the present dining in tradition.

I will respect your request for confidentiallity. Please respect mine. Once when I had some PIO's in for a conference in the Pentagon, I invited Eaker to speak. One bit of advice: pick people who are comers, latch yourself to them, and climb with them. He did quite well by latching onto Arnold and Spaatz. But when WW II was over, he fell second to Spaatz. He tried, but failed, to get everybody but him to retire. He retired.

Hal Bowman

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P.S. Still confidential. my personal biases.
When I arrived back to D.C. in 1945, it was
by agreement between Spaatz (Paris) and Barney Giles
(Arnold's C/S) that if Spaatz would release me
for the top PIO spot, a star would be
available. So Spaatz released me for the job.
Then Eaker became the BIG BOSS. He called
the staff together and made his announcement.
all old-timers were encouraged to retire.
Arnold was sick. His prestige was
vital. But, he, Eaker, would run the
show. Nobody would go over his head.
PIO? I couldn't even get to him.
Promotion? Our new organization required
an organization chart. Obviously, I was
charted as a B/G. Reduced to Col. Then
there was so much public relations
contention that all Hell broke loose.
Eaker called me in and, in effect, told
me that I was doing fine; if I were
a general, all would be well. So he
gave three star Harold George additional
duties as PIO, (he was still C/S Air Transport Command)
did all the work. George blew the lid
off security and I got the blame, (Steve)
Symington brot in a pip-squeak (Leo),
put him under me as a spy, and
eventually made him boss. So I was
out as long as Symington + Vandenburg
ruled the roost. Bitter? Yes. Of course.
(over)

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Symington brot in B/G Emmett O'Donnel as #10, promoted him to M/G. I still did the work. I was on the promotion list for years, but my name was mysteriously eliminated until Symington was out! I could tell you a few reasons, but won't bore you. alibi's don't count.

as for Eaker, I'm sure he is fully convinced, and always has been, that because he's so right, what's good for Eaker is good for America.

He's a compulsive, articulate, and persuasive writer. His books were written in 4 A.M. hours before early office hours. a hard worker. a driver. an opportunist. any means to justify his ends. get that fastest. with the mostest. But I'm happy to say that he agreed with Arnold & Spaatz, whatever his motives, and was the better salesman. He served them well. and reaped considerable reward. Perhaps not as much as he had hoped for.

all of this was hard for me to understand because Eaker had picked me as a "comer" and guided much of my career.

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20314

24 January 1974

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for the compliment. Henry Kissinger is restoring the good name to diplomacy. We owe him a great debt.

I would like very much to visit England as I have a few interviews there to make. I've been corresponding with Peter Masefield who is the British Equivalent of our chief of F.A.A. As you well recall, he was one of the doubters about strategic daylight bombardment and was won over, perhaps by you. I interviewed him in the lobby of the Mayflower hotel here in Washington. He promised to arrange some U.K. interviews for me, if and when I got over.

In respect to your last paragraph, I am working on the book from 8 to 14 hours a day, Saturdays and Sundays included. But I am trying to write biography, not a biographical novel. As a case in point, you mentioned General Eaker's recent writing. I presume you refer to his current article in Aerospace Historian. As history, it is just awful. I thought to tell General Eaker, but I dont know how to do it without him getting mad at me. I dont want any more enemies for my book.

I have keyed by number errors in his text:

(1) He couldnt have told his wife about Marshall in 1909 as Arnold wasnt married until September 10, 1913

(2) Arnold was demoted in June 1920 to Captain, then received an immediate promotion to Major on 1 July 1920

(3) He became Air Information Officer in January 1925 after completing a five-month tour at Army Industrial College.

(4) This is the worst error. Arnold as Air Information Officer was trying to make Mitchell more responsive to questions by the Morrow Board and the Court Martial, although Arnold testified in his behalf. This text makes it appear that Arnold was the one stirring the pot.

(5) Nobody ever warned Arnold and Spatz (note spelling at that time) not to testify. In fact, Harold George (who also testified) told me that the high brass expected the junior officers to tell the truth under oath.

(6) It was Patrick who threatened Arnold with court-martial. Arnold dared him to do so. Patrick backed off. This will be one of the key

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contributions of my book.

(7) Arnold was made CO of March Field in November 1931

(8) Fort McArthur (spelling)...named for another McArthur.

(9) The dining-in came out of Arnold's experience in Canada, enroute to Alaska in 1934. He never left the Western Hemisphere during those years. The first time Arnold exchanged views with the RAF on their home grounds was in April/May 1941.

There are many other little things in Baker's article I could carp at. I'm just citing for you the errors in fact in just two pages of his writing.

I dont think General Baker is doing this deliberately. I think he feels that, being one of the few principals of that era still around he is the only one who knows what happened, and he writes "off the top".

You're a friend of General Baker's. If you choose to approach him in this matter, I know you will keep me out of it.

When I saw General Baker last May at the Knerr Drive dedication, I asked him when he is going to write his Memoirs. On second thought, if he is going to write them out of Memory, I hope he defers until I have been able to publish documented truth.

Keep the faith in me. I will finish this book. I am driving to finish it in Mrs. Arnold's lifetime. She and Bruce Arnold are the ones encouraging me to tell it like it really happened and "let the chips fall where they may." She has been in the hospital recently with a respiratory condition. It was just bronchitis, but at age 86+ everything becomes serious. Anyway, she is now out and making a good recovery, according to a letter I just received.

This letter is confidential between us, especially the comments about General Baker.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

Encl

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Jan. 19, 1974

Dr. murray Green
Office, Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Murray:

You and Kessinger are doing a great job in international relations. It's a toss-up.

Thanks for arranging to have those 175 pictures sent to our good friends in England. Long live the Queen. And US.

I've sent your memo on to Vic Maslen in England. He's already told me how much he appreciates your help, and his historical group will share his sentiments. Maybe some day you can visit them and exchange facts for posterity.

Please finish and publish your Hap Arnold historical book before I die. If I have to look down on you from Heaven when it's published, I'll haunt you. Come, now, you don't have to wait until the year 2000 to get the "historical viewpoint". Of course you do have a problem. As Ira Eaker recently wrote, Arnold was a bit aloof, so nobody really felt close to him. But don't let's get too far away.

Thanks again for your help.

Sincerely,

H.W. Bowman
Brig. Gen.,USAF (Ret.)

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Bowman Project

1/18 Sent first batch to Masten - 2 batches

12/28 Sent 54 more pix

1/4 Sent 28 more

1/11 Sent 54 more

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33558
Nov. 29, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
AF/CHO 20314

Dear Murray:

Yes, that was Rush B. Lincoln I told you about in my last note.

One anecdote about "Hap" I may not have mentioned - not especially significant. At March Field in about 1932. Of course in these days if you live on an AF base you get accustomed to planes flying in and out around the clock. And you sleep thru the sounds unless something disturbs your subconscious. (When I commanded a C-124 Wing at Moses Lake in the fifties, I woke up one night, reached for the phone, called Ops, and said "What happened?" I was used to all-night operations, but my subconscious heard engines stop after takeoff. Sure 'nuff, a plane had crashed after takeoff). Well, W.C.Morse and I took off from March Field in a B-2 Curtiss Condor bomber for a "training flight" to Blythe, near the Arizona border. We just happened to have our shotguns with us and it was the dove season, and sunset was the best time. We got a good bag. But when we got to the airport, we had engine trouble. Winnie was a good mechanic, and after several hours, we got off and landed at March about 2:00 A.M. But unfortunately, the base residents were not accustomed to such late arrivals, and there were complaints. So the order came out: Hereafter, any time a pilot finds that he might arrive at March Field late at night, he will arrange somewhere else for overnight accommodations and come home next day. No disruption of sleep tolerated!

Now, here's one that has little to do with Arnold, but in case one of your histerical pals may be working on a biography of Sec. War Henry Stimson, it should be recorded. This was told to me by Parker and confirmed by Turner. The Characters involved:

Gen. George Marshall
Henry Stimson
Lewis Parker (now retired at Shalimar, Fl.)
Howard M. Turner, deceased.

Arnold had assigned Turner to be Stimson's personal pilot, and Parker for Marshall. Both pilots were outstanding, of course, or they would not have been so assigned. At one time Stimson had a speech to make in Seattle, and since Marshall had some visits to make in the West, they decided to go together. So both pilots went, taking turns as pilot and copilot. They landed at Spokane for fuel and weather reports, because conditions were marginal, and the Cascade Mts. are high and rough. The forecast was for stinko weather, with zero visibility and icing. But both pilots knew they could make it and the schedule was important. So off they went. Over the Pass ice banged against the plane from the props and turbulance bounced the plane around. Parker was at his turn at the controls and Turner was handling the radio and navigation. Marshall's Aide noted that his boss seemed a bit nervous and uncomfortable, so felt obligated to wield a bit of influence or authority. So he walked forward and stood

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between the pilots, looked over the maze of instruments he didn't understand, and tried to figure out something intelligent to say. "How high are we?" Turner, quite busy while Parker flew on instruments, replied,"10,000 feet", and continued his duties. "How high are the mountains around here?" "11,000", Turner answered. Of course they were flying thru the pass. The aide shuddered a bit but couldn't figure it out. "Are we doing alright?" "Yea". The aide gave up and returned to his seat. Soon Stimson's aide felt called upon to check up. They went thru the same process. At last Turner slammed his map on the floor, pushed the aide aside, and stalked back to the passenger compartment. He sat down between Stimson and Marshall and said, "Gentlemen, there are just two guys in this plane we give a good Goddam about, and that's Parker and Turner. And we're not going to crack 'em up". And strode back to work. No more was said until they landed back in Washington. The big car whisked the two VIP's away. Then turned back. Stimson got out of the car, went over to Slim Turner, and said, "Son, I'm sorry I was such a sissy on this trip".

So again I apologize for being so loquatious at 2:00 A.M.

Sincerely,

Hal

H.W.Bowman

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

26 November 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I wish you eight hours of restful sleep each night from here on in. BUT just in case you have insomnia again some night, I hope you will think about your experiences with General Arnold and let me have the benefit of them. Please keep that typewriter close at hand.

There are at least three new stories in your letter that I had not seen before.

Incidentally, was that Lincoln you mentioned, Rush B. Lincoln? I interviewed him in Boulder, Colorado, recently. It must have been a sight to behold. He is deaf and near blind (about 88 years old). I had my left arm around his shoulder, with the mike in my right hand, and shouting questions into his earphone.

I shall forward the photos to Mr. Maslen as soon as they arrive.

Enclosed is an envelope...just in case.

And a Merry Christmas to you and to yours. My son is in the Air Force Academy, as I may have mentioned. He missed out coming home over Thanksgiving - they cut out all the "hops" due to the energy crisis. We hope to see him over the Christmas holiday.

All good wishes to all the Bowmans.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

Encl

PS Jim Moody says hi.

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Nov. 23, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
AF/CHO
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Murray:

First: I remember our first meeting, when your patient wife and son visited us in Florida, and so please join me in wishing you and them a Merry Christmas.

Since we just talked while they waited, and you recorded our conversation, I have two problems:

1. I didn't have much chance to get acquainted with them.
2. I don't remember all the things we talked about, so forgive me if I repeat reminiscences.
3. Will I be called before Sen. Irvin or the courts to repeat verbatim things I may have said in some of your "missing tapes"?

But all kidding aside, I rushed down to our local hardware store and had a copy made of your letter, and will get it off to my pen pal Vic Maslen, airmail tomorrow. He will appreciate, as I do, your great effort in favor of our historical efforts and international relations. You will also be interested to know that my Christmas greeting to him was a subscription to Aerospace. Also made a sly suggestion to the magazine Hq. that they might be interested in putting our British friends on the complimentary list when the current subscription expires.

Either you are a very efficient administrator, or you have a great secretary. Presuming the latter, let me tell you about a historical bit from WW II, for her ears only. During the height of the hysterical push in the expansion, I was an administrative executive. Having been involved in all the buildups from 1939, I got pushed into all the nitty-gritties. Including secretaries not yet dry behind the ears. Cleo Jones was a pretty youngster, just in from Kansas, who became my secretary. She was quite naive, and the few old-timers took turns pulling her pretty legs about nasty old men and the dangers of kids in D.C. working for nasty old men such as me. One day when going was especially rough and I had a study to get out quickly while all other Hell was breaking loose, I turned to Cleo and demanded, "Cleo, we're going into the conference room and close and lock the door." She gave me that I-think-I-shouldn't-look with her big, green eyes and asked,"But, sir, do you think we should?"

Yes, indeed, please send the pix directly to Vic when they arrive. Cuts out one unnessary channel and time. And some of my louzy typing.

Well, back to your letter and the interesting copy of Shaefer's page in his guest book. I recall only one inspection trip I was on with Hap Arnold. Beebe, as always, was pilot, and I was on this trip co-pilot. Not long after departure from Washington we were crossing the Appelachians and I was navigating in the right seat. Arnold came forward, took a look around, and asked,

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"Hal, where do you put us?". I pointed to a guess on the map, since there were no accurate checkpoints in the area and I figured he couldn't know. He replied, "No, I'd say here". He was right.

The only other recollection of the trip was Lowry Field. He had several staff people in the plane and at each stop gave each a specific task to dig into while he hob-nobbed and diverted the brass. After completing my inspection, I reported in and, without warning, he demanded of me, "Turn in a fire alarm". I did and the response was O.K. I also remember at the same base that the C.O. was Lincoln - I think then a Colonel, maybe a B/G Gen. Arnold found an excuse not to attend a reception, with the excuse confidentially that if he went, Mrs. Lincoln would spent the evening needling the Boss about why Lincoln needed a promotion. Arnold resisted any pressures on promotions, from congressmen, or anyone else, according to second-hand rumors. I remember one I cannot authenticate, when a congressman was reportedly in Hap's office, pushing for a local man. Arnold informed him that the officer might get a promotion if performance so dictated, not because of, but in spite of, the political pressure, but there would be some prejudice. I was sort of "operations officer" in the Chief's Office, as an assistant exec., just before WW II. When the Boss planned a trip, or when authorized governmental officials were entitled to flights, it was my duty to arrange it with Bolling Field. Our biggest headache was a congresman, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, wh o was entitled to flights for official purposes. He abused the privilege. (Shaefer?). Demanded week-end trips home, etc. He was fond of one particular plane - an early DC 3 or DC 2 type plushed up. Once when he phoned me I informed him his favorite plane was committed, but the alternate would be ready, he got irate. Arnold was already set up for a flight with crew standing by. I told Arnold. He phoned the Congressman and all I heard on our end was Arnold's calm reply, repeated several times, "You will be provided a airplane." He had supported my arrangements without pulling any punches.

Then there was the time he called me in and asked about the weather forecast for his trip next morning. Those were the days when weather reports were completely undependable. And you never made any committments without reservations. I answered with a show of confidence, "Sir, it will be zero zero, stinko, stinko". He looked up startled by such confidnece and asked, "How do you know that?" I replied, "Sir, because the weather officer at Bolling says it will be clear and unlimited". He chuckled and said, "I'll buy that".

I think I surely must have told you in our previous interviews that Arnold was a DRIVER to the point of being sadistic, and thoroughly enjoyed watching people squirm and suffer, but in a way that they worked their hearts out for him with admiration and trembled in fear. You had to be always on the run and working 'round the clock or you weren't producing, and never got any thanks. I remember when I was his PIO and Assistant Base Ops Officer at March Field, when he was away for a spell on an inspection trip. I turned to my secretary and remarked, "Col. Arnold is back". She asked, "How do you know?" I replied, "Because I just saw Bill Morris, Wing Ops. Officer, RUNNING down the hall toward the front office. I was right. Within minutes, my phone rang too. And I ran. My secretary laughed as I left.

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Which reminds me of a story I would not have remembered except that that he told it to me and it was so typical of his personality that I must repeat it to you: He said he was hunting in the mountain country with friends, in the winter, when they became lost. They finally ran across a cabin and went in to accept the hospitality of a mountain country fellow who was rather curt but helpful. Trying to force the conversation during the chilly evening, Arnold noted two holes in the single door, where cold air breezed in. "Why the holes"? "I got two cats". "Well, wouldn't one hole be enuf?". The mountaineer replied,"Mister, when I say 'scat', I mean 'SCAT' ".

I'm sure you must have read Larry Kuter's article in AIR FORCE. He was so accurate about Arnold's unorthodox methods. I wrote Larry my agreement and added this note about how Hap would go out of channels for no known reason: Shortly before I left the Pentagon for combat, I was a few echelons removed from the Boss. One day I saw him in the hall. He said,"Hal, I want you to write me a recommendation. Should we have a separate Air Force now?" And walked away. He and Spaatz and Knerr and many others were the experts on that subject, and he had a planning staff which had produced volumes on such subjects. It was over my head vs. such experts. But after interviewing Fairchild and others with more know-how than I had, I turned in a paper, shaking in my boots, suggesting that during the war it would be pre-mature to upset the applecart. That's the last I heard of it.

Hap was no ameteur in public relations, having once been chief of info in Hq. When I was his PIO at March Field in about 1932 I became very frustrated with columnist Larry Carr of the L.A. Times, who wrote nasty articles about flying. I wrote the editor, asking for eqal time. The reply came from Carr. I wrote other papers without results. Finally, I walked into Arnold's office, and said,"Colonel, I'm stumped. I don't know what to do next." Without hisitation, he ordered,"Write a letter for my signature, inviting Larry Carr to be my guest at one of our Saturday morning aerial reviews and inspections, and for lunch in my quarters." A great lesson for me. The week following Carr's appearance, his column started,"My new love is the Air Corps".

But he could also be rough. I took a freelance writer in to Hap's office at March Field for an interview. The guy started off with some snide remarks about ameteurs who wrote books and thus took money out of the mouths of pros (Arnold had written the Bruce Boys series, I think it was called, about flight). Arnold let him have it full force. As well as I can recall his response after all these years:"So you're a professional writer. What did you ever write for my sons to read about aviation? I wouldn't trade my background in aviation for all your writing ability. And when my kids needed such books, I had to write them, because you pros didn't know the professional aviation background." The guy sat mute. After that the interview went well. Hap knew when to punch.

But now, after all that blah, you asked about the Shaefer guest book record. I don't remember stopping at Wichita with Arnold. But I did stop there another time, and here's the story. I'd been in the office too long, needed flying time and a close touch with "the field", and we had many ground-grippers, recruited from civilian life, who were doing great work without knowing what the base problems were. So I called base ops at Bolling and asked

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with some bravado for their plush DC 3. The ops officer laughed at me and informed me that only VIP's got such treatment. So, knowing that a B/G Corps of Engineers Officer, who was responsible for construction of AF bases, was planning a trip to MO., I told the guy I had a B/G aboard. Then I went to the B/G and suggested that since I was flying westward anyway, maybe he'd like to go along, and we'd be glad to drop him off. He thot that was fine. So I got the VIP treatment and loaded the plane with ground-grippers who needed the experience. One was an oldster, "Doc" Lint, a Ph D in agriculture, who was a great guy and a great brain, and was one of my favorite administrators and promoters. We landed at Wichita, where his wife prepared a great chicken dinner for us all. Altho I don't remember Shaefer, that must have been the time. The signature is certainly mine. Doc Lint is no longer alive. The B/G was dropped off at a little grass field in Mo., where we learned later it was unsuitable for our plane to land and in fact impossible. Quite flattering to my ego, but we made it over a high tension line and into a short field. Thank goodness my ground-gripping passengers didn't know the hazards. The passengers included my brother, Army Signal Corps. When I tried to be a good host in Calif. and flew my guests from the lowest spot in U.S., Death Valley, "on the deck", to the highest, Mt. Whitney, a short time later, I had a call in my earphones from the chief of A F library services, who was deathly ill, "Sir, just dump me over. I'm not interested in scenery today".. The air was pretty rough. He's now retired in Calif. and so far as I know his morale is O.K.

Well, you didn't ask for this long-winded discourse, historical and otherwise, but at 2:00 A.M. when sleep evades me, I sometimes think too much, and these notes, if helpful, are my way of saying thanks for your thotfulness.

Sincerely,

Hal

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen., USAF (Ret.) (More or less).

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20314

19 November 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I'm pleased to report that Mr. Maslen's request for about 175 prints of the 401st Group will be honored. Since they dont need them until 1975, the project is being handled as "Routine" business which means it will be about two months in process.

One other matter of interest: as between 8 x 10 glossies which cost Uncle Sam about $1.25 per and the matted pictures which are twice as expensive, I settled for the regular glossies. I suppose Mr. Maslen will have them made up in a book for viewing by the guests who attend the reunion.

It was not one of our routine projects. The first counter-proposal was that we get prior clearance from the Embassy and U.S.I.A. to certify the international goodwill aspects of the project. We beat that one down, I think.

I thought you might wish to inform Mr. Maslen yourself. If all goes well, the pictures will be enroute sometime in January 1974.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

P.S. Your good letter of the 16th arrived while I was banging out this one. We'll withhold applause until the pix arrive. They will send them to me, and I'll forward them to Maslen directly, unless you would like to send them yourself. However, there would be a big chunk of postage which Uncle Sam can better afford.

P.P.S. While we're at it, I have literally uncovered a page from your past. The page is in J. Earl Schaefer's guest book (out in Wichita, Kansas). Youfre in very distinguished company. Besides Hap Arnold's scrawl, I can make out Ben Chidlaw and Benney Meyers. My guess is you were out there in an earlier party (perhaps Nov 8, 1940) while Arnold and Meyers came out in February 1941. Can you recall why you came out, and possibly, why Arnold & Meyers came out? Schaefer cant recall. Best,

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

12 November 1973

Mr. Ed Weinberger
1361st Photo Squadron
Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (MAC)
1221 South Fern Street
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Ed:

General Harold Bowman, USAF (Retired) has asked for a favor on behalf of international amity and advancement of the historical cause of the United States Air Force. General Bowman, as you may recall, was Public Information Officer for General Hap Arnold, a subject of some interest to the undersigned.

Prior to his service under General Arnold, General Bowman served Generals Eaker and Spaatz in a similar capacity, when they commanded the strategic Air Forces in Europe during World War II. Hence, Bowman is the recipient of a request from sponsoring groups in the U.K. in behalf of a reunion of the 401st Bomb Group. I should also mention that Colonel Bowman was the second CO of the group, having served in the critical period of World War II between June 1943 and December 1944. The Group received a Distinguished Unit Citation for combat activity during Colonel Bowman's stewardship, according to our records.

I mention this as a prelude to endorsing a request by Mr. S.V. Maslen, forwarded through General Bowman, to this office. Mr. Maslen will serve as one of the hosts for the reunion of the 401st which is scheduled for 1975. That request is for one copy of each of 175 prints which I have jotted down in the margin of the identity cards. These people in England who worked with our boys are dedicated to preserving the great memory of their achievements. They also are not affluent and it would put a sizable dent in their very limited budget to have to underwrite the cost of these photos at $1.50 per.

I request that a copy of the photos be made and the cost be borne by the U.S. Air Force in the interest of the wartime alliance which contributed so much to victory, and to furthering historical interest and international friendship. If you agree, you can send the photos directly to Mr. Maslen, or send them to me and I will forward.

You may wish to show my correspondence with General Bowman to any higher authority you may need to gain the necessary approval.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief

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[illegible]

Rip Hinman 8/18/40

Ray Hinman

(1)

A grand host & hostess 8/18/40

Carl Price

This appreciation to the great apothecaries
Catherine + Earl (must judge)
Harold Bowman

Jane Lingle 11/8/40

Earl:- He who is about down with the
curse "Bottle-Necks"

Tom Shirley 11-8-40

Good dinner - good food - and a grand host.

H. H. Arnold — 2/18/41

From one of the suburbs of Baltimore

Peggy Ellegers 2/18/41

Ann Lingle

E. H. Burke 2/18/41

[illegible]

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Nov. 16, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
AF/CHO 20314
Washington, D.C.

Dear Murray:

I've pulled your leg and needled you now and then about the opposite viewpoints of historians and public relations people: the accurate, time-will-tell vs. the high pressure hit-the-deadline-and-hope-it's-right approach. Unless I live long enough to read your Arnold biography, I can't fully judge your talents as a historian. But I can surely attest to your skills in public relations, and will be happy to serve as a reference if you wish to apply somewhere for a moonlighting job. What's wrong with a Dr. Jekyl/Mr. Hyde approach to life in Washington? It might result in toning down frustrations both ways, as counter-balances.

But seriously, that was a great sales job you did in your letter to Mr. Weinberger on behalf of our British historical friends. It's just gotta ~~gotta~~ succeed, lest the British Government fall and our President get another arrow in his cap.

I only hope that you didn't overshoot the runway with your salesmanship flight into the PR realm, and that they limit the number of pix. I have visions of the 40lst photos descending like chaff by the tons. During WW II they had balloons over there to hold up the Island when so much American tonnage pushed it downward. I wonder if the gas bags are still available to counteract the shipment and keeping them from sinking into the sea!

A C-5 overload of thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

Hal

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen.,USAF (Ret.)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

12 November 1973

(25) 4-11104
(26) 4-11105
(28) 4-11106
(24) 4-11131
(24) 4-11132
(24) 4-11133
4-11195

Mr. Ed Weinberger
1361st Photo Squadron
Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (MAC)
1221 South Fern Street
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Ed:

General Harold Bowman, USAF (Retired) has asked for a favor on behalf of international amity and advancement of the historical cause of the United States Air Force. General Bowman, as you may recall, was Public Information Officer for General Hap Arnold, a subject of some interest to the undersigned.

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I request that a copy of the photos be made and the cost be borne by the U.S. Air Force in the interest of the wartime alliance which contributed so much to victory, and to furthering historical interest and international friendship. If you agree, you can send the photos directly to Mr. Maslen, or send them to me and I will forward.

You may wish to show my correspondence with General Bowman to any higher authority you may need to gain the necessary approval.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)

16 NOV 1973

Ed -
P/S return correspondence at your leisure. MG

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74-602

S. V. MASLEN,
7, BYRON ROAD,
CORBY,
NORTHANTS, ENGLAND
2nd November, 1973.

Dr. Murray Green,
Special Assistant to the Chief of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314.

Dear Dr. Green,

General Bowman has forwarded your letter of 26th October to me, regarding the photographs of the 401st Bomb Group.

I enclose the correspondence I received from Arlington, giving all the information you requested in your letter to General Bowman.

The members of the 401st Historical Society are deeply grateful to the American Air Force, and former members of the 401st, for all the help we have received in our research over the years.

Regards
S V Maslen

16 NOV 1973

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74-602

100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Oct. 29, 1973

Mr. S.V. Maslew
7, Byron Road
Corby
Northants, England

Dear Vic:

Enclosed is a letter received today from Murray Green, in reply to my letter to him asking for his assistance in obtaining photos of the 401st Bomb. Group for your files and exhibits honoring the famous WWII Group stationed at Deenethorpe.

I have informed him that I cannot answer his questions, due to complete ignorance, but that you would correspond with him directly. I feel sure the direct correspondence will be far faster and more effective. How is that for proving my ability as a commander in passing the buck?

Please write him airmail:

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Regards,

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen.,USAF (Ret.)

Copy to Green

16 NOV 1973

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Oct. 29, 1973

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Murray:

Thanks for your prompt response to my request for help in getting photos of the 401st Bomb. Group for our historian friends in England. Sorry I hadn't caught up with your new address.

As you will note from the enclosed copy of my letter to Vic Maslew in England, I've passed the buck to him for direct reply, since I am completely ignorant of the background leading to his frustration.

Obviously I didn't do a very good job in my letter to you. Surely they don't want 200 copies of one picture! All they could do with so many would be to fly over Egypt and scatter them like chaff. No, they know of 200 different pix. Vic will explain better than I can.

Your interest in our international/historical relations is sincerely appreciated.

Regards,

Hal

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

Total 175 prints desired

16 NOV 1973

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74-602

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 October 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I will try to help resolve your problem and have a friend who may address the good will aspects of making the photos available for a good public relations purpose.

We need to know more about the photos desired:

1) Are they physically located at Randolph AFB or are they up here in Washington?

2) Are we talking about 200 copies of one photo of the 401st or are there more photos and we want a total of 200 prints?

3) Can you identify the photos by official AAF number?

We need this information so we can have an idea of the dimensions of the problem.

Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience. Your letter took an extra day or two, being routed through the Pentagon. I'm over in the Forrestal Building now.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO)

Encl

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74-602

100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
Oct. 21, 1973

Mr. Murray Green, History Office
SAFAAR
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Murray:

Well, I've been keenly interested in AF history and your research. Now I have a problem.

Some of the neighbors around my old base in England (Deenethorpe), are organized and very active in researching and recording the history of the 8th AF and the 401st Bomb. Group, WWII. They pay all their expenses out of their own pockets. In 1975 they will host a reunion of the "I'll Be Seeing You" crew. Many of us have bled our files and memories to provide help in their patriotic efforts.

Now here's the problem. Our British friends wrote to Randolph AFB to inquire about getting copies of some 200 photos of the 401st and have been informed that the price is $1.50 each. That is more than they can afford. In the light of Anglo-American friendship, and our appreciation for their efforts, isn't there some way they can be provided copies without cost? History? Public relations? International relations?

What can be done for them?

Sincerely,

Hal

H.W.Bowman
Brig. Gen.,USAF (Ret.)

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74-602

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1361ST PHOTO SQ, AEROSPACE AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICE (MAC)
1221 SOUTH FERN STREET
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

REPLY TO ATTN OF: 1361PS/DOA

27 August 1973

SUBJECT: WWII Photography
(Ref ltr ~~dtd~~ rec'd 13 August 1973)

TO: Mr. S. V. Maslen
7, Byron Road,
Corby, Northants, England

1. The following action has been taken on your request.

A. Work order(s) #_____applies to your request and shipment will be made as soon as our workload permits.

*B. Listing and information sheets attached.

Margaret B. Livesay
MARGARET B. LIVESAY
Chief, Depository Services Section

2 Atch
1. Information Sheet
2. Listing

16 NOV 1973

"Global in Mission-Professional in Action"

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1361st PHOTO SQUADRON
AEROSPACE AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICE
DEPOSITORY SERVICES SECTION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
ARLINGTON, VA. 22202

INFORMATION SHEET

The Depository Services Section maintains the still photographic records and operates the United States Air Force Central Still Photographic Depository for the United States Air Force.

Pictorial and Documentary Photography includes prints of U.S.A.F. aircraft, guided missiles, ground equipment, personnel and historical photography of U.S.A.F. installations, record-establishing flights, events and projects.

Copies of unclassified photography are made available to the public for a nominal charge to cover the cost of services and reproduction. Since military requirements are given priority, requests will be filled as research and reproduction capabilities permit. The subject or a description of the subject requested should be defined when ordering pictorial or historical photography.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PURCHASING PRINTS
FROM DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE NEGATIVES

1. Payment for U.S. Air Force Photography:

a. Requestors Located in the Continental United States: Payment should be made by postal money order or certified check. Personal checks will be accepted for amounts of $10.00 or less. Reimbursements should be made payable to the TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES and must accompany print order.

b. Requestors located in Foreign Countries: Payment must be made by international money order made payable [redacted] and should bear a notation "For U.S.A.F. Still Photography." To Treasurer of the United States

2. Monies in excess of one dollar ($1.00) will be refunded for any part of an order not filled. No refunds will be made for one dollar ($1.00) or less. Since prints are custom processed for each order they cannot be returned for credit or refund.

3. Print reductions are not furnished; nor are selected parts of prints available for purchase.

4. No more than three (3) prints of any single negative may be sold to an individual. If more than three (3) prints are desired, it is recommended that a single glossy print be ordered, from which any commercial photographer can obtain a copy negative to produce the desired number of prints. This procedure can also be used to obtain prints with the selected cropping desired. Black and white negatives are not sold.

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5. Prints are sold with the distinct understanding that the purchaser will not use them to imply, by inference or otherwise, that the Department of the Air Force indorses any product or project, nor does the furnishing of Documentary type prints waive the privacy rights of individuals shown in official photographs. No exclusive rights to any official photograph may be claimed by an orgainzation or individual.

6. Shipment by parcel Post up to four (4) pounds is prepaid.

7. The following price list is to be used when ordering prints of U.S. Air Force photography:

BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPHY:

8x10 single weight glossy finish, first print.....$1.25
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$1.00 ea

8x10 double wieght matte finish, first print.....$1.75
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$1.50 ea

11x14 double weight matte finish, first print.....$3.50
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$2.50 ea

16x20 double weight matte finish, first print.....$4.75
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$3.00 ea

20x24 double weight matte finish, first pring.....$6.50
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$4.80 ea

35mm black and white transparencies (plastic mount).....$0.50 ea

COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY:

35mm color transparencies (plastic mount).....$3.50 ea

4x5 color transparencies or color negatives.....$6.75 ea

8x10 color transparencies or color negatives.....$14.00 ea
(not to exceed 3 copies of any one view)

8x10 Ekta Color type "C" print, first print.....$4.50
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$1.75 ea

11x14 Ekta Color type "C" print, first print.....$8.00
2d & 3d prints from same negative as first print.....$3.00 ea

16x20 type "C" print.....$17.50 ea

16x20 Type "C" print mounted on 20x24 cardboard.....$19.25 ea

8. The prices listed above are subject to change without notice and does not include fees for research services, charged at the rate of $5.00 per hour, minimum charge of $3.00.

Revised 5 August 1972

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74-602

65534 ACV

65796✓

65757✓

65764✓

A-65764✓

B-65764✓

65771✓

A-65771✓

B-65771✓

65749✓

A-65749✓

65727✓

65798✓

Card #55

(over)

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65668 A ✓

65690 ✓

65697 ✓

65587 ✓

65532 ✓

65530 ✓

65527 ✓

65555 ✓

65738 ✓

65739 ✓

65741 ✓

65742 ✓

65668 AC - Wounded crew member, 401st Bomb Group, is placed on stretcher. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) MEDICAL

65690 AC - A.../. personnel inspecting Dri... "Lonesome", (401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) MISC.

(65697 AC - S/Sgt. Roberts presented a $100 Victory Bond, (which he won, by Maj. Garland, 401st Bomb Group. Filed: (War Theatre #12 (England) MISCELLANEOUS

(65587 AC - Men of 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Grp., casting (votes in 1944 election. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) (MISCELLANEOUS

65532 AC - Men of 401st Bomb Grp attending religious service at an 8th AF base. 1 May 1944. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) RELIGION

(65530 AC - Medics of 401st Bomb Grp scan skies for B-17 (after bombing Kiel, 13 Dec. 43. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) MEDICAL

(65527 AC - Combat crew members of 401st Bomb Grp, 8th AF (briefing for a bombing mission. 29 Jan. 45. Filed: War (Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

(65555 AC - Crew members around a B-17 of the 401st Bomb (Grp. after bombing attack on Paris 16 Dec. 43. Filed: (War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Ground

(65738 AC - ...t. Drauer operates a shadowgraph, 401st (Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

(65739 AC - Thanksgiving Day Services at Cranesley Church (401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12

(65741 AC - English youngsters were entertained at a ...by men of 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War (Theatre #12 (England) RECREATION

(65742 AC - Action Scene - B-17's in need of ...ntenance, (401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England)

16 NOV 1973

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74-602

B-65782 Ac ✓

C-65782 " ✓

65667 ✓

65666 ✓

65778 ✓

A-65778 ✓

B-65778 ✓

C-65778 ✓

65605 ✓

65675 ✓

65694 ✓

A-65694 ✓

65676 ✓

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74-602

65630 AC

A65630

65634

65654

(65654 AC & A - Officers, 401st Bomb Group, on catwalk of control tower peer into skies to count B-17's returning from mission. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

65497

65636

65658

65655

(65497 AC - Men of 401st Bomb Grp. look over a T-81. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Ground

(65636 AC - Lt. Fesmire, 401st Bomb Grp. talks it over with crew after returning from first bombing mission, 26 Nov 43. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65658 AC - Flyers of 401st Bomb Grp., on way to interrogation room in jeep. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65655 AC - Flyers, 401st Bomb Grp., enjoy "Java & sinkers" while being interrogated. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

65790

65680

65724

65723

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74-602

65644 AC ✓

A - 65644 ✓

B-65644 ✓

65639 ✓

A - 65639 ✓

B - 65639 ✓

C - 65639 ✓

65702 ✓

65610 ✓

65598 ✓

65725 ✓

65556 ✓

A65556 ✓

65548 ✓

[illegible] - 16 October 1944
[illegible] - 24 July 1944
"[illegible]" - 18 August 1944
B-17's of 401st Bomb Group. Filed: Miscellaneous War
Theatre - NICKNAMES

(65639 AC - "[illegible]" - 6 May 1944
A - "[illegible]" - 16 October 1944
B - "LADY LUCK" - 11 November 1944
C - "[illegible]" - 31 October 1944.
B-17's of 401st Bomb Group. Filed: Miscellaneous War
Theatre - NICKNAMES

(over)

401 Card #38 UNITS

(65702 AC - Aug. 15, 1944, Col. Bowman, 401st Bomb Group
presenting Stars & Stripes to Bishop of Peterborough.
Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) [illegible] & DECORATIONS

(65610 AC & A - Wreckage of 401st Bomb Group B-17. Filed:
War Theatre #12 (England) WRECKS

(65598 AC [illegible] - Wreckage of B-17, 401st Bomb Group. Filed:
War Theatre #12 (England) WRECKS

(65725 AC - [illegible] sparks from torch cutset to explo-
sive in [illegible] system. 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre
#12 (England) WRECKS

(over)

401 Card #20 UNITS

(65556 AC - B-17 of the 401st Bomb Grp makes smooth landing
at an 8th AF base after bombing Wilhelmshaven, on 3 Feb.
1944. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Landing

(A-65556 AC - B-17 of the 401st Bomb Group [illegible] down
the runway at an 8th AF base after bombing Wilhelmshav
(3 Feb. 1944. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLA
(Landing

(65548 AC - The [illegible] of 401st Bomb Grp target practice at
skeet range of an 8th AF base. 22 Jan. 1944. Filed: War
Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

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Card #31

74-602

65645 AC -

A-65645 -

B-65645 -

(65643 AC - "[illegible]" - 12 April 1944
(A - "THE SHAPE" - 3 May 1944
(B - "FRITCH'S HANDMAIDEN" - 3 May 1944
(C - "MOVING PICTURE" - 20 August 1944
(B-17's of 401st Bomb Group. Filed: Miscellaneous War
(Theatre - MICROFILMS

65643

A-65643

B-65643

C-65643

(over)

(65465 AC - S/Sgt. Sherman, 401st Bomb Grp, wears the DFC
(& Air Medal. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INDIVIDUAL
(PERSONNEL.

65465

(A-65465 AC - Lt. Crate, 401st Bomb Grp., wears DFC & Air
(Medal. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INDIVIDUAL
(PERSONNEL

A-65465

(65511 AC - Marlene Dietrich entertains men, 401st Bomb Grp
(Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) RECREATION.

65511

(65484 AC - Lt. McKinney, 401st Bomb Grp. examines hole in
(wing of his B-17. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIR-
(PLANES - Battle Damage.

65484

(65510 AC - Volley ball helps men pass time between mission
(401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England)
(RECREATION

65510

(65485 AC - Shell damage to B-17, 401st Bomb Grp. Filed:
(War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Battle Damage

65485

(A-65485 AC - Flak damage to tail of B-17 (A/F #210302)
(401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES
(- Battle Damage

A-65485

(B-65485 AC - Flak damage to B-17 (A/F #231863) Filed: War
(Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Battle Damage.

B-65485

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74-602

65596 AC ✓

65614 ✓

65613 ✓

A-65613 ✓

65673 ✓

65682 ✓

65683 ✓

65605 ✓

63557 ✓

65693 ✓

65791 ✓

65568 ✓

[illegible] - [illegible] crew members elect. missions of 401st Bo[illegible] "[illegible] CAN SMITH". Filed: War Theatre #12 (Eng-[illegible]

(65614 AC - Insignia of 612th Bomb Sqdn., 401st [illegible]b Grp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INSIGNIA

(65613 AC - Insignia of 612th Bomb Sqdn., 401st [illegible]mb Grp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INSIGNIA

(A-65613 AC - Insignia of 612th Bomb Sqdn., 401st Bomb Grp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INSIGNIA

401 Card #54 UNITS

(65673 AC - [illegible] crew of 401st Bomb Gp. to return to base after bombing Berlin beside plane "Pool's Luck", 6 March 1944. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65682 AC - Officers of 614th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Gp. (25 Mar 44. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP [illegible]GROUP

(65683 AC - Lt. Stimson and crew of 614th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Gp. beside B-17, 11 April 44. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65605 AC - Armament Section, 612th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Gp., 16 Oct 44. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP [illegible]GROUP

(over)

401 Card #40 UNITS

([illegible] AC - B-17 "MAN OF WAR", 401st Bomb Group, England, [illegible] Feb. 1944. Filed: Misc. War Theatre - [illegible]

([illegible] AC - [illegible]fficers on catwalk of control tower peer into [illegible] to [illegible] planes returning. 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

([illegible] AC - [illegible]ain, 401st Bomb Grp., with very pistol in [illegible] pointed into skies for sight of B-17's. Filed: War [illegible] #12 (England) OPERATIONS

([illegible] AC - [illegible]rs of 401st Bomb Grp. [illegible] crew have [illegible] they are interrogated after mission. [illegible] War Theatre #12 (England) [illegible]

[illegible]r)

16 NOV [illegible]

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Card #28 UNITS

74-602

65552 AC ✓

65528 ✓

~~65527~~

65547 ✓

65541 ✓

(65552 AC - High ranking officers of the 401st Bomb Grp, (seen skies for B-17s returning from enemy attack on 22 Dec. 1943. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

(65528 AC - Combat crew of 401st Bomb Grp is interrogated (after bombing mission over Bremen on 1 Dec. 1943. Filed (War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

(65547 AC - Combat crew of 401st Bomb Grp are transported by (truck to interrogation section 26 Nov. 1943. Filed: War (Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65541 AC - A B-17 of the 401st Bomb Grp comes in for a (landing at an 8th AF base. 30 Nov. 1943. Filed: War (Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Landing

(over)

Card #52 UNITS

65628 ✓

65624 ✓

65578 ✓

65577 ✓

B-65772

C 65772

65755

65787

A-65787

(65628 AC - Col. Bowman and lead crew over Ludwigshafen, (18 Oct 44. Crew 2 of 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Gp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) (AUG) PARTICIPANTS

(65624 AC - Col. Bowman talks with crew after raid, 26 Nov (1943. 401st Bomb Gp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England)

(65578 AC - Col. Bowman, CO of 401st Bomb Gp. is awarded (Medal of Honor. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England)

(65577 AC - Crew of 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Gp. in (England, 18 May 44. Filed: War Theatre #12

(over)

(65772 AC - Lt. Bradley & crew on wing of B-17, 26 Dec 44.

(65772 AC - Lt. Carson & crew in front of B-17, 14 Dec 44.

(Crew of 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War (Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(B-65755 AC - Croix de Guerre to men of 401st Bomb Group, (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CEREMONIES &

(65787 AC - Crew of 615th Bomb Sqdn., 401st Bomb Grp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

(65787 AC - Lt. Ford & crew, 612th Bomb Sqdn, 401st (Bomb Grp. Seated: 17 Wounded 8th. 10 May 1944. Filed: (War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

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74-602

65571

65584

65585

65590

65561

65562

65564

65567

Card #24

65526

65529

65538

(over)

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74-602 Acc

65544

65550

65551

65545

(65545 AC - 401st Bomb Grp chapel altar at an 8th AF base. (29 Feb. 1944. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) RELIGION

Card #37

65735

A65735

(65735 AC - S/Sgt. Allen gives instruction to S/Sgt. Mach- (asick of 401st Bomb Gp., gunnery section, 25 Oct 44. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

(65735 AC - Gunnery training in 401st Bomb Group, 22 Oct (19... Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

65786

A-65786

B-65786

(65786 AC - Lt. Post and crew beside B-17, 12 Apr 45. (" - Lt. Wolf and crew beside B-17, 12 Apr 45. (" - Lt. Gerber and crew beside B-17, 20 Apr 45. (Crews of the 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Group. Filed: (War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS

A65770

(A-65770 AC - Lt. Udy and crew of 615th Bomb Sq. 401st B.G. (21 Oct 44. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CREWS (over)

65865

(65865 AC - Man of 401st Bomb Grp. convalescing in hospital (Filed: ... Theatre #12 (England) MEDICAL

65595

(65595 AC - Flak t crew member who wounded receives medical (attention. 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) MEDICAL

65596

(65596 AC - Combat crew member, 401st Bomb Grp., who was (wounded ... transferred to an ambulance. Filed: War Theatre (#12 (England) MEDICAL

65570

65659

(65659 AC - Crew of B-17 standing by helplessly as one of (their ... (England) MEDICAL

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74-602

65690 AC

65575

65574

65576

65572

(65576 AC - Engineers at work at an 8 AF base. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) ATTACKS & INVASIONS (40lst Bomb Grp.

(65672 AC - Interior of Sergeants Club. 40lst Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) ATTACKS & INVASIONS

65710

A-65710

B-65710

(65710 AC - "[illegible]" - 18 October 1944
(A - "[illegible]" - 2 October 1944
(B - "[illegible]" - 12 May 1944
Jackets worn by crew members of B-17's, England. 40lst Bomb Group. Filed: Misc. War Theatre - MISCELLANEOUS

65729

(65729 AC & A - Officers of 40lst Bomb Grp. relax in officers' lounge. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) INFORMATION

65589

(65589 AC - Aug. 15, 1944, Col. Bowman, 40lst Bomb Group, presenting Stars & Stripes to Bishop of Petersborough. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CEREMONIES & DECORATIONS

65650

65640

65656

65631

(65650 AC - Ten happy flyers - crew of 40lst Bomb Grp. B-17 "Tee-Pee-Joe" - around interrogation table after completing [illegible] mission, 13 Dec 43. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) OPERATIONS

(65640 AC - Lt. Kaufman presented the D.F.C. by Col. Bowman [illegible] Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) [illegible]

(65656 AC - GI's of 40lst Bomb Group visit entertainers [illegible] show. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) [illegible]

(65631 AC - Pvt. Barnes & Cpl. Prequiff help Pvt. Pennestri [illegible] fighting outfit. 40lst Bomb Group. [illegible] War Theatre #12 (England) [illegible]

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CHRMS

74602

65750 AC ✓

A- 65750 AC ✓

B 65780 AC ✓

C - 65780 AC ✓

65779 AC ✓

(65779 AC - Capt. J.J. Brown & Crew, 614th Bomb Sqdn., 401st Bomb Grp., in front of B-17, 26 Feb. 1945. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) CHRMS

(over)

65481 AC ✓

(65481 AC - Sgt. Hampton examines battle damage to B-17 (401st Bomb Group, Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIR-(TRMES - Battle Damage.

65487 AC ✓

(65487 AC & A & B - Wreckage of a B-17 (Aircraft #42-37835) (401st Bomb Grp., Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) WRKCKS

65488 AC ✓

(65488 AC - B-17 (Aircraft #1414) belly landed, 401st Bomb (Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) WRECKS

65489 ✓

(65489 AC - Landing gear of B-17 (Aircraft #239023) damaged (when it landed, 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) WRECKS

65493 ✓

(65493 AC - B-17 (Aircraft #2393) crashed, 401st Bomb Grp. (Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) WRECKS

65812 ✓

(65812 AC - [illegible] Panel Board ("Micky Set") Installe[illegible] Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) (TRMES - Radar (Airborne) Bombing & Navigation

65813 ✓

(65813 AC - [illegible] improve skill in operation of SC ([illegible] 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

65814 ✓

(65814 AC - [illegible] training aids were used by 401st Bomb (Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) TRAINING

65748 ✓

(65748 AC - [illegible]nel of Engineering Sect., 613th Bomb Sqd. [illegible] 3 Feb 45. Filed: War Theatre #12 (ENGCOMBL

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65795

65802

65803

65804

A-65804

(65802 AC & A - [illegible] B-17, 615th Bomb Sqdn., 401st Bomb Grp. crowded with full load on bombs. [illegible] War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Taxiing, Radio, Training, Test and Maintenance

(65803 AC & A - B-17, 615th Bomb Sqdn., 401st Bomb Grp. crowded with full load on bombs. [illegible] War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES

(65804 AC - British Lancaster "PUMMY FUMKIN II" lands on runway. 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Landing

(65804 AC - U.S. personnel inspect British Lancaster "PUMMY FUMKIN II". 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) MISCELLANEOUS

(A-65804 AC - Same as above.

65475

65469

65507

65498

A-65498

B-65498

65499

A-65499

(65475 AC - Ordnance section, 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL

(65469 AC - Medical section, 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL

(65507 AC - B-17's, 401st Bomb Grp., on the line. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) AIRPLANES - Ground

(65498 AC & A & B - Engineers constructing runway, 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) FIELDS & INSTALLATIONS

(65499 AC & A - Engineers laying cement for runway, 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) FIELDS & INSTALLATIONS

65467

65468

65477

65472

(65467 AC - Capt. Piper & Cap. Irwin stand by B-17 "SOCHE MUSTER", 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL

(65468 AC - Men of 401st Bomb Grp. wearing medals they have been awarded. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL - Ceremonies & Decorations

(65477 AC - Supply personnel, 615th Bomb Sqd., 401st Bomb Grp. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL

(65472 AC - [illegible] of 615th Bomb Sqd, 401st Bomb Group. Filed: War Theatre #12 (England) GROUP PERSONNEL

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	POSITIVE		
	SLIDE		
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	PRINTS		
	SLIDE		
PHO-TO-STAT	NEGATIVE		
	POSITIVE		
DEVELOP			
OTHER		10	
TOTAL		24	8X10

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65757 A65786
65764 B65786
A65764 65790
~~B65764~~ 65791
65770 66587
65771
~~A65771~~
B65771
65778
A65778
~~B65778~~
C65778
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A65780
B65780
C65780
B65782
~~C65782~~
~~65780~~

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	PRESS	~~1 ea~~	8 x 10
	PORTRAIT		
BLACK AND WHITE FILM	COPY		
	DUPLICATE		
	POSITIVE		
	SLIDE		
COLOR	NEGATIVE		
	TRANSP.		
	PRINTS		
	SLIDE		
PHO-TO-STAT	NEGATIVE		
	POSITIVE		
DEVELOP			
OTHER			
TOTAL		24	8X10

DESCRIPTION *(Include any other information significant to request.)*

65634 ✓ 65659 ✓
65636 ✓ 65666 ✓
65640 ✓ 65667 ✓
65643 ✓ 65668AC ✓
A65643 ✓ 65673 ✓
B65643 ✓
C65643 ✓
65644 ✓
A65644 ✓
B65644 ✓
65645AC ✓
A65645 ✓
B65645 ✓
~~C65645~~ ~~Wing Trag~~
65650 ✓
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M65658 ✓
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	PRESS		8 x 10
	PORTRAIT	1 ea	
BLACK AND WHITE FILM	COPY		
	DUPLICATE		
	POSITIVE		
	SLIDE		
COLOR	NEGATIVE		
	TRANSP.		
	PRINTS		
	SLIDE		
PHOTO-STAT	NEGATIVE		
	POSITIVE		
DEVELOP			
OTHER			
TOTAL		24	8X10

DESCRIPTION *(Include any other information significant to request.)*

65507 65556
65510 A65556
65511 65561
65527 65562
65528 65564
65529 65567
65530 65568
65532
65538
65541
65544
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65551
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65396 ACA65498
65463 B65498
A65463 65499
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B/Gen H. W. Bowman
Tequesta, FL 33458

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65683 65739
65690 AC 65741
65693 65742
65694 65748
A65694 65749
65697 A65749
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65534 AC	A65787
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B65639	65803
C65639	65804
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100 River Drive
Sequesta, FL 33565-8
Sept. 13, 1993

Mr. Murray Green
AF/CHO 20314

Dear Murray:

Sorry I don't know Eugene T. Gillespie. I faintly recall a Gillespie by name, with no recollection of who, where, or when. Both Bevans and Nuckols I knew quite well-off-and-on.

I'm delighted that you won't be pulling a Norman Mailer type book on Hap. He may have had his share of faults and prejudices, but I never once saw evidence of scandal, or even heard rumors of such.

He gave Jackie Cochran a heavy work load, which she carried loyally and ably.

Altho he was not a drinker, I don't have the impression that he was a prude about it. In fact, I don't remember his having mentioned it except the FDR incident he mentioned in his book.

Sincerely,

Hal Bowman

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

11 Sept 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for your good letter of the 4th. I agree based on my research that you were one of those who never lost sight of the difference between the historian and the P.I.O.

I meant to ask you in my last: did you ever know an AAF officer named Eugene F. Gillespie. He was a Wall Street broker and was stationed in the Middle East early in the war. I interviewed him down in Fort Lauderdale. He lives in a fancy neighborhood. Among his neighbors are General Jim Bevans and General Bill Nuckols. There is some kind of a legal contest going on between Nuckols and possibly Gillespie who is a name-dropper and who has some of his neighbors believing he was General Arnold's right hand man. Gillespie told me he tried to sell Arnold on the idea of becoming a candidate for high office but Arnold would have none of it. Some interesting sidelights that I cant use in my book, unfortunately.

Re: MacKinlay Kantor, I have only respect and admiration for his prolific and good writing. Andersonville is a great "historical novel"; so is Mission With LeMay, but it is billed "biography".

Believe me, I would love to write an "historical novel" about Hap Arnold. It would sell more copies than his biography will -- and make a better movie. For example, Arnold was a prude about drinking and extra-marital sex life, and, according to my research, he unloaded a couple of Air Staffers who overstepped conventionality in these areas. It would make a heck of a movie if we could associate Arnold with Mary Pickford or Margaret Lindsay in a romantic way. In fact, one or two people have done this in interviews with me - tying Arnold in with Jackie Cochran. I could sell copies to do what Norman Mailer has just done - tying Marilyn Monroe in with Robert F. Kennedy, without a shred of evidence to support.

Anyway, does your knowledge of Arnold support my conclusion?

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

(R) Galt Ocean Mile

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20314

11 Sept 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for your good letter of the 4th. I agree based on my research that you were one of those who never lost sight of the difference between the historian and the P.I.O.

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Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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100 River Drive
Sequesta, Fl. 33458
Sept. 4, 1973

Dear Murray:

Bravo. I agree completely with your differentiation between public relations and history. The best foot forward vs facts. But is it that simple? Since there can historian with soul so dead who never to himself hath said, this is a fact because I think it so? Or a PIO who hasn't distorted or failed to report all the facts in favor of public reaction? But I've always prided myself on PR honesty, even tho I took advantage of techniques favoring the "image": D.E. "get thar firstest with the mostest!" If there was a bad story, I put it out fully and fast - before it leaked into a "hidden" scandal. It ended up on the back pages in one issue instead of making watergate-like headlines forever. "B-26's bombed friendly ground troops at Malmedy, due to a navigation error". (One issue in Stars and Stripes).

Vs. the incident when the navy shot down a formation of C-47½. (Med) Kept secret to save embarrassment. But a reporter broke the story. Scandal & headlines for days.

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Back to Bruce Hopper. a fine, purist. a gentleman. Don't know what happened to him or his files. But since he was an old man in WW II, history must surely be with him in Heaven. He & I lived in Park House with Spaatz (St. Germain). He used to say, "Decisions are made around the poker table. So I must be present to record them for history." So he sat nearby far into the night, listening to the conversations as Spaatz, Eaker, Jock whitney, etc. played. Records? I dunno.

Kantor? I agree - there's a conflict there between accuracy from the historical viewpoint and sensationalism To sell books (42 to date). He covers it neatly by the tag "historical novel", like Andersonville, filling in where necessary with sex and alley-talk. But we enjoyed our visit with Mack and Irene when they were here last week.

Thanks for your letter. I fully agree with your deletions. and I look forward to your Hap History.

Sincerely,

Hal B.

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"Colonel" Mitchell was demeaned by reassignment as Air Officer, 8th Army Corps Area, in San Antonio, Texas, but he wasn't silenced. Calvin Coolidge who agreed to his exile is quoted as having told Secretary Weeks about Mitchell: "That man has talked more in the last three months than I have in my whole life." 63/

63/ Harold W. Bowman, Unpubl. Memoir. p 85

Mitchell's departure triggered an editorial field day, as the nation's press chose up sides. Down in Texas, he reveled in it, gave some speeches to keep the pot stirring, and finished his book "Winged Defense" based mainly on his Saturday Evening Post series. The manuscript was eagerly sought by several publishers. G. P. Putnam, the New York publisher, won Mitchell's nod and was probably sorry he did. Six months after publication, Mitchell received a short, apologetic note with a royalty check of only $310.80. His publisher wrote: "I can't remember a non-fiction book which in one way or another stirred up so much attention and at the same time sold so disappointingly." 64/63

63 64/ Ltr, George P. Putnam to Col William Mitchell, Jan 28, 1926 (Mitchell MSS, Box #12)

Betty Mitchell did not accompany her husband to Texas. She returned to Detroit, her father's home, to have her baby. Eleanor Arnold strongly believes that "if Betty had been with him in San Antonio, he never would have talked to the press. She was a wonderful influence. But. . . the minute she left, they grabbed him." 65/64

64 65/ Interview, Mrs. H. H. Arnold, Sonoma, Calif, October 30, 1967

Many people in Washington had no doubt Mitchell would seek out trouble. The question was when and in what circumstances. He chose to fire his ammunition at the Army and Navy in a rather explosive reaction to several aviation accidents involving the Navy, especially the destruction of the airship, Shenandoah, in the early hours of September 3, 1925. The airship was enroute West, to make an appearance over the fairgrounds at Des Moines, Iowa. The ship ran into a storm over Caldwell, Ohio, and was destroyed, killing fourteen men, including Captain Zachary Lansdowne, the skipper. 65A/65

65/ 65A/ Washington Post, September 3, 1925, page one

Three days later, Mitchell handed out a statement to waiting reporters charging "incompetency. . . criminal negligence, and the almost

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31 Aug 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for your prompt response. That Coolidge quote was probably written by the same guy who attributed to him the statement: "Why does the Air Service want more airplanes? They already have one; let them take turns flying it."

Some famous Italian said something that includes the words "Si Ben Trovato" which, interpreted for me, is that Coolidge could have said it, or would have said it if he thought of it, but we cannot prove that he did. Since I'm dealing in facts, I'm trying very hard to authenticate everything I say.

Having spent about half my professional life in Public Relations and the other half in the Historical field, I can say that the only thing they have in common is that they deal with facts. In PIO, we select only those facts that put our best foot forward. In AF/CHO we report the facts as they happened: "....chips fall where they may..." If some readers ascribe to me the role of PIO for Arnold, then my purpose is defeated. I didnt have to spend 15 months in the Library of Congress culling out the facts of Hap Arnold's life, or interviewing 230 people all over the country. I could have stuck a wet finger up in the air and made up the quotes.

About Bruce Hopper, I wonder what happened to that great history of the 8th AF and biography of Spaatz he was going to write. He tooled around over Europe, going first class all the way and never produced one product that anyone around here can identify. I agree with your appraisal there.

Anyway, I'm sorry to have to delete the Bowman quote. I have taken the liberty of using one or two others whenyou talk of Hap Arnold from first hand knowledge.

I had the pleasure of talking to MacKinlay Kantor over the phone last year. He is one of the giants in the field, although his work on LeMay suffers from some of the problems mentioned above.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Encl

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

20 August 1973

Brig General Harold W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
100 River Drive
Tequesta, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

It's been some time since you heard from me. I'm still working on the Arnold Biography. I'm about 40% thru the writing. I've done 95% of the research and have interviewed 230 people.

I'm working on a December 1974 deadline and hope to make it.

Anyway, I just finished Chap XI dealing with the Billy Mitchell situation and have a quote in my file taken from Harold W. Bowman's unpublished memoir, p. 85. It quotes Calvin Coolidge as having told Secretary of War Weeks about Mitchell: "That man has talked more in the last three months than I have in my whole life."

Chap XI
p. 39

I wonder if you can put your finger on the original source of that Coolidge quotation?

Please say hello to Mrs. Bowman. All good wishes.

Just received a letter from Mrs. Arnold, 86 years young. She still is in great shape.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History
AF/CHO

Encl

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8-22

Murray—

Good to hear from you and to learn of progress on the Arnold biography. So sorry I can't give you the source of the Coolidge quote. After years of research and writing my unpublished "book", I culled out my files so my survivors would not have the problem. All sources are kaput. Told to see Wm. Weeks, my script says.

I deeply respect the historical viewpoint, and the urge for accuracy. But forgive me as an old public relations type if I wander from your fold.

I've been trying to remember the name of a highly respected (Harvard?) historian who lived with us in Spaatz's Park House in Paris. He had been closely associated with Spaatz (Spatz then) in WWI. He too had a high regard for the historical viewpoint and was strongly critical of my daily press releases, which admittedly did not have the 20 year backlook of the true analyst. I enjoyed the philosophical arguments. "How can you put out such stuff?" "It's news." "How do you know it's 100% accurate?" "I don't, but it's the best we have today." "Why don't you wait for TIME to prove it?" "Then it's no longer current and of little news value." "So what?" "Well," I'd answer, at least I put out something for

Bruce Hopper - I got it!

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2/

public consumption. What have you told them?" Back in D.C. he was still collecting tons of data and was "intended when Spaatz made him write speeches. So far as I remember he never published history. Since he was an old man, I presume his "viewpoint" went with him to his grave. I like to think my on-the-spot reports contributed something if not "historical viewpoint." Please push forward on your Arnold work and get the remaining 60% finished before death do us part!

McKinlay Kantor will be visiting us, with his wife Irene, Friday. He's too busy "writing a book" to stay over. But will enjoy even the brief visit.

Mrs. Arnold! Bless her 86 year old (young) heart. a great gal.

Sincerely,

Hal Bowman

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100 River Drive
Tequesta, Fl. 33458
June 5, 1992

Murray ——

Thanks for your thotfulness in sending copy of Aerospace Historian. My subscription copy hasn't arrived yet.

I found your piece on Knerr especially interesting, and altho I knew both Arnold and Knerr, was never aware of the conflict.

Hal Bowman

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Interview with BG Harold W. Bowman
August 23, 1969

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

B: Well, the first time I had ever met General Arnold was at Rockwell Field, about 1929, when I first got my commission in the Air Force - my first station. As a local Public Relations Officer, I had become very interested in an old bit of the history of Rockwell Field, and through the Base Commander I got an appointment with LTCOL Arnold.

Q: He wrote a history of Rockwell Field, or did you write it?

B: Well, I wrote it, but I guess it was his.

Q: I have it, the original. It's been turned over to the Library of Congress.

B: That was based upon my interview with him, and my research. But anyway, I was particularly interested in an old spring at North Island and he gave me the lead that helped me discover it. With the help of Max Miller, a local writer, who wrote the story about it, we discovered it. We dug it out, and developed it, and it probably has long since been covered up.

Q: I know this has recurred in some of the files - his interest in the source of the spring. This is something psychological in it. Arnold had a great fascination in finding a source of water supply on his own ranch in California. Maybe it has to do with discovering a source of life. Well, that's my speculation. Anyway, you say you wrote the history in 1929?

B: Yes, that's about it.

Q: He was long since gone from Rockwell. In 1929 he was in Fairfield, Ohio. Did you have any contact with him there, or in Washington?

B: No. My first real contact, other than that, my first contact was with him was in 1931 at March Field when our 7th Bombardment Group under Maj Spatz, moved up to March Field to replace the Training Command.

Q: So you really got to know Arnold at March Field.

B: Yes, that's where I knew him quite well.

Q: March Field, in my interpretation, is the turning point in Arnold's career, because prior to that, he was exiled at Ft. Riley from Washington. At March Field, he did a fine job, then he came back to Washington. At March Field he did a number of unusual things, like running the CCC and flying the mail. Did you have a role in that?

B: Oh yes, as his Public Relations Officer for the CCC, and for the air mail, and for everything else that he got into.

Q: I know that you were very much involved in the air mail. Was Col Arnold aware that the Air Corps was not prepared for that job?

B: Oh yes, he knew the problems involved. It was the low point in the Army Air Corps at that time, financially. We had no equipment; we didn't have enough money for gasoline. It was a time when Pres Hoover said that in order to balance the budget, everybody - all officers in the Air Corps were to be sent on leave without pay for a month. But as Arnold said, we still have to work. We can't just run off and let the place run, so we'll expect everybody to stay on duty. So that's one thing I'd always resented - the fact that for one month we were on leave without pay in order to balance the budget, but we still had to work. Arnold knew this. We had had no training gasoline; we had no equipment; we were at the lowest ebb probably of the Air Corps status at the time the Air Mail problem hit, and within a week, we had to start carrying the air mail all over the United States.

Q: He wrote a number of letters to Mrs. Arnold. He was temporarily at Salt Lake City, and she was at Riverside, California. In his letters he would say to her that Foulois was in hot water again - this was with Congress, and of course, there were some crashes. There were three administrative

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zones. Horace Hickam had the Central Zone I believe, and B. Q. Jones had the Eastern Zone.

B: And Arnold had the Western Zone. He was in the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake City. He rented several floors in the hotel. He was in business within a week, and his airplanes had dispersed around the whole Western Zone.

Q: Were you stationed at the Newhouse Hotel with him?

B: Not originally. We had just gotten over the hump of the CCC. We had just finished "bombing" the Indians with food, and all that. But mainly with what training we could afford, he moved up to Salt Lake City with some of his staff. I went back to March Field, and I got a call one evening when he had come back to March Field overnight. He said, you get yourself into an airplane and get yourself up to Salt Lake City tomorrow morning, starting at 6:00 AM and he said: "We have had so much lousy publicity; I want good publicity. I want a lot of it, I don't care what you do" he said. "You can cover a bathing beauty with air mail stamps, and send her to the Governor of California. You can send a box of oranges to somebody else. I don't care what you do, but we've got to overcome all of this unfavorable and unfair publicity. We've got to get this thing on a paying basis." So the next day I was in Salt Lake City. My wife drove up and joined me there. We had a room in the same hotel, and we were there for the rest of the air mail period.

Q: His wife and daughter drove up from Riverside on one occasion, and he told her to pack a gun for the drive through the desert. There were some rough characters one might encounter on the road. This was depression and some people were desperate.

B: I wish I had had that foresight, because my wife drove up alone. She ended up late one night in a little honky-tonk town on the way up, and the

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only room available was a little swinging door someplace with drunks running up and down the hall from the bar, and she was pretty scared. But she made it all right. One of the experiences that live with you.

Q: The CCC, in a sense, was one of Arnold's pet projects. For several reasons, one of which is a recurring expression during his career, he had a belief, perhaps as part of his psychological makeup, that if young fellows got out in the open, and did an honest day's work, like chop down trees or fishing or hunting, or some outside activity, it would somehow be a cleansing agent. You know, this was his solution to juvenile delinquency after the war. He talked about setting up a national CCC. Did you notice this; did he talk about this?

B: I think perhaps that was a philosophy he developed as a result of the CCC, rather than his having generated anything to start it, because when it first came up, he protested. He got a telegram from the 9th Corps Area Commander in San Francisco (Craig) asking if he could set up and operate the camps in his area. He sent back a message saying he was in the middle of the new Annual Air Corps maneuvers at March Field. The company was split. Part of them were at March Field. I happened to be on maneuvers being held at the same time in the East, so I wasn't there at the time. But I remember, and believe it was in Global Mission. He said: "I cannot handle this at the present time because I'm having maneuvers." The answer came back from San Francisco, something like this, as I recall: "You don't understand, this is from the President of the United States, so be there tomorrow." Something of that sort. And really, this new mission threw everything into a lot of confusion. Everything was scattered all over the countryside, truckloads of lumber and everything else. Kids were coming in by the thousands. But, he organized it. He had 25 camps in his area. I was his public relations officer for that, too.

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Q: He probably had the best organization of CCC operations in the country.

B: Is that right? I haven't analyzed it from that standpoint.

Q: Well, somewhere along the line, he became very enthusiastic about it.

B: Oh yes. Once he took over something, you couldn't stop him. It was a-round-the-clock, and everybody else went with him. I mean he was running, and if you weren't running, you were in trouble.

Q: This reminds me, there was some talk about the terrible tempered Hap Arnold. Now, was he impetuous?

B: Impetuous, yes, but based on so much experience, that most of the time, he was right. But, he was intolerant. He demanded results, and he wanted them now. Everybody had to be working around the clock, or they were in trouble.

Q: He didn't like anybody that had a negative approach to something; anybody who didn't think it could be done?

B: Oh no. He had a tremendous imagination. He always was thinking big, and he had no patience with anybody who didn't.

Q: Were you with him during the earthquake at Long Beach in March 1934?

B: Yes.

Q: Now, I have different accounts of what happened there, and they seem to be confused, particularly in relation to General Malin Craig's reaction. One account has Malin Craig very pleased that Arnold went out without orders and helped the victims. Another account has Craig unhappy originally. And then he realized that Arnold had done a good thing.

B: I don't remember Craig's reaction at all. All I do remember of that - I was living on the base at March Field at the time - but I do recall

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that in a matter of hours, Arnold had organized and sent into the area soup kitchens, everything that was needed to help. He wasn't a guy who was late in anything like that. He had the ability to grasp facts, make his analysis, crack the whip and get things rolling. Spectacular, if he could make it.

Q: And if he didn't he was in trouble.

B: If he didn't, he would make it spectacular. He never failed to make it spectacular, because his philosophy was going to be that he had to make his underlings move. It wasn't entirely a matter of public relations, although he had a lot of basis for public relations, but he had the ability to crack the whip at his underlings.

Q: When he came into a room, did he dominate the room?

B: Absolutely.

Q: All eyes on him?

B: That's right.

Q: Did he have a commanding presence?

B: Very much so.

Q: Did you go up to Alaska with him.

B: No, I was at March Field at the time he went.

Q: I know there was some shifting of chairs about who was to go with him on the Alaskan flight.

B: I'm not familiar with that.

Q: This was July, August 1934.

B: I was there at the time, and stayed at March Field, but actually that was all handled completely outside of my bailiwick as public relations man.

Q: I want to ask you about Hollywood. Now, while he was at March Field, he courted Bebe Daniels, Ben Lyons and all the rest. I have correspondence from Richard Dix, Ann Harding, Wallace Beary, all the greats in

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motion pictures. Arnold put on a number of shows - you probably organized the air shows out there. Can you tell me something about his courting of Hollywood?

B: Well, I can recall all these things, and, I was very much involved in these things, because he went along with it. He was all for it, and my job was to go out and do some work and

Q: Get these people out there?

B: Yes, and as a matter of fact, I arranged probably the things that you are talking about. For instance, Bebe Daniels actually paid for and built the officer's club at Long Beach reserve organization. We had our maneuvers over there - an air show one time, in which I was very much involved.

Q: They had an air show out there, and he was trying to get all the VIPs to come out. We have a lot of letters from stars who couldn't come, or who were on location, or something like that.

B: Well, I don't recall all of them, but it is quite possible that, probable, that I was involved in them.

Q: Did you work with William Sweeley? He was involved in these activities.

B: Yes, Bill Sweeley. Well, at the time I knew Bill Sweeley, he was not under Gen Arnold directly, but had a sort of reserve assignment.

Q: Sweeley seemed to be involved. He was sort of the messenger boy in a lot of these errands for Hollywood. Were you at March Field until Arnold left?

B: No, from 1931 to 1934.

Q: Then you weren't there when he became a BG in 1935. When was the next time you came in contact with him?

B: Well, the next time was second-hand when Eaker, under him in

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Washington, sent me out to Wright Field. But the next time I was directly involved was in 1939 when I was called into Washington from Wright Field to become Arnold's Asst Executive. He had several assistants and I was one of them. Bob Duncan, Luke Smith, and myself were the three Asst Execs, and Eaker was the Executive.

Q: Were you there when a Colonel Ferson was there.

B: I vaguely remember the name.

Q: This Col Ferson was terribly afraid of rank, and he was highly sensitive, he was in the Air Staff. I can't recall what his specific job was. One day he was in Arnold's office, and Arnold chewed him out for something, and the guy had a heart attack and dropped dead. This was around 1941.

B: Vaguely yes. I'm not sure if it was in Arnold's office, however. I think he had been in Arnold's office and went back to his office, and later dropped dead and whether it was connected, I don't know.

Q: This (the death of Col Ferson in Arnold's office) is something someone told me last week, and it kind of shocked me. I just never heard it before, and we've had many conversations with Mrs. Arnold, out at the ranch. This sounds like a ghoulist practical joke. Was Arnold a jokester? I heard that he was.

B: Arnold,of course, he had rather basically a good sense of humor. But in a rather sadistic way. He just tried to hit somebody, embarrass them, and of course he knew why. He and Spaatz were just side by side, great friends, mutual admiration society, but of course, he liked to needle Spaatz, just like he tried to needle everybody else. And one time, at March Field, there was a party. I guess it was at Arnold's house, Spaatz was going to be there, and he called in from Hollywood, this professional needler, insulter, I've forgotten the guy's name - Vince Barnett (or Bartlett) or something like that. This fellow had a reputation for going around and hiring himself out as

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an insulter, just for fun. Arnold called him in and briefed him about Spaatz' hatred for the Navy and hatred for carriers, and so forth. And it almost ended up in a fistfight. And I guess Arnold straightened it out, I wouldn't dare. But the story went around the base, and everybody got a big kick out of it, because Spaatz didn't see very much humor in the Navy.

Q: This guy was talking strong Navy?

B: Oh yes. He'd go up to Spaatz, who didn't have any idea of who the guy was, and make some crack about the future being all for carriers. Or he would ask Spaatz, what did he mean by trying to say airpower was better than Navy. You know, but that type of insulting remark. To Spaatz that was a red herring. And very successful from the standpoint of a professional insulter.

Researcher Note: Arnold hired this guy - Barnett or Bartlett again, in 1943 to needle George Marshall. There is an article in Saturday Evening Post which I extracted at the G.C.M. Library in Lexington, Va.

Q: I want to ask you about unification. In the 1939-41 period there were a lot of people in the Air Corps who were pushing for a separate air force. In my study of Arnold, I believe that he realized that Marshall was opposed to a separate air force. So was the War Dept General Staff, but there were others in the Air Corps, like Emmons for example, who wanted it. Did you get any of this flak?

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, here's an interesting sideline on Arnold that you may have missed. Arnold, of course, always believed, the same as the rest of the people, in the requirements for a separate air force. I recall during the air mail mission, a letter came up inviting all officers of the Air Corps to submit their thoughts. And whatever happened to that I don't know, but at least they went through channels. I never did get any reaction to that. It probably went into the files and was forgotten. Then later, when Arnold

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got into his command position, he probably was watching for opportunities. He was very much held down, and figured it out strategically when the best time for that might arise. I recall that while I was still in the Pentagon - I left in 1943 - not too long before I left, this incident occurred which gives an insight into the heart of Arnold's personality. He had a very fine planning staff - Vandenberg, Kuter, Possum Hansell, few others, very intelligent, thoughtful people, who did all of the writeup on that type of thing. By that time, I was no longer his Asst Exec, but after the reorganization, was part of the Operations Division, lower echelon in the Pentagon and again, as Asst Exec, I was in a Division rather than in his office. So I had no direct relationship with Arnold, except through several channels. I saw him in the hall one day and he said: "Hal, I want you to submit a study to me - should we, or should we not, have unification of the armed forces now, and in what way?"

Q: Could you pin this down on time, was this after Pearl Harbor?

B: Oh yes, this must have been 1942, maybe. The war was well along. Maybe 1943 before I left, but probably 1942. Well, that completely hit me by surprise, because in the first place, it was not my job. He had brilliant people who knew all the background. I had never been in on the fight. I didn't know the pros and cons except on general principle, but I played with the idea in general. But in the middle of the war, that was quite a different problem. Obviously, to me, it simply meant that he wanted somebody else's viewpoint - a fresh viewpoint. I went into Gen Fairchild, who was then my boss.

Q: He was a great intellectual.

B: Yes. I told him: "Look, I'm no guy to do that." He said: "Look, General Arnold wants your viewpoint; don't ask me. Just go out and do the best you can, and give it to him," which I did, and I never heard anything

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more about it. First time in my life that I ever knew what his reaction was when I read his book, Global Mission, years later, way after the war, when he made the statement that he had found that, during the war, was not the time for unification. That had been my recommendation, and I thought: "Gee, there's my career gone, but I've got to be honest, he asked for it." But, I was very pleased to know that at that particular time he agreed that this was not the right time.

Q: Arnold had this penchant for grabbing people in the hall, E-Ring, and giving them jobs. Did you ever get grabbed?

B: That was an occasion. That was in the hall, I was walking down the hall, and he said, "Hal....!"

Q: Did he ever do this to you again?

B: I think that was the only time, that particular thing happened. The only other occasion that was close to it was when I was sitting in my office early one morning before my boss came in - that was in the Operations Division. General Arnold called up, and the conversation went something like this. Let me also say, it was very early in the morning, and he always tried to beat everybody in so he could embarrass them.

Q: Really?

B: Oh yes. He was a sadist. He wanted everybody on his toes. Well, on this occasion, he said: "How many airplanes have we got going to North Africa as of this morning?" And I said: "Well, b-b-b-General, I would be glad to find out. The boss isn't in at the moment - it was Gen Johnson at that time - but I'll be glad to have him call you." And Arnold said: "All right, have him call me, and when he does, I'll tell him he's wrong, because I know exactly how many there are. There are so many on the way; there are so many in the mill; there are so many over there; and it isn't enough. He doesn't know, and I do!" And he did! He would get the statistics, and call

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people up like that on the interphone. The buzzer rang, and I just went into the boss' office and touched the button, and all I could do was stutter, and all the boss could do was stutter. But he knew, and he was just trying to keep everybody on their toes. He wanted everybody to have the statistics faster than he did, and he beat them to it every time. He would get there at 7:30 in the morning. Nobody could get a copy of the night cables until he had had his copy. And I used to try to beat him to the punch for my boss, to keep him from getting embarrassed, by going in at 7:31 and getting the second copy. I'd go down the log of the previous day. I'd start pushing buttons, and say: "Please, get this stuff together because the boss is going to be in a few minutes, and Gen Arnold is going to start pushing buttons." Part of the time, I'd beat him, but not all the time.

Q: Well, this is a way he had of keeping his staff ready to go all the time. And he often asked for the same statistics from different people.

B: Right. He worked two ends against the middle any time he could, and he would embarrass them anytime he could. Because that was his way of keeping them going.

Q: I've heard where he would push all the buttons and had everybody running down the hall, and then he'd assemble them all and say to some individual: "I want you; And the rest of you can go!" Did you ever have an occasion like that?

B: No, I wouldn't doubt it though.

Q: This was from Norstad. He would get them all, and then finger the man he wanted. This was the way he kept them all going.

B: It may have been one way to find out how early we got to work in the morning. I don't know. It sounds like him.

Q: Did he get in at 7:30 AM and start pushing buttoms at 7:31?

B: Well, the first thing he would do would be to read the statistics,

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and he'd get a jump on everybody, by knowing before he pushed the button. And when he pushed the button, he'd know they were going to be wrong, and he'd tell them so. So half an hour later they would know. Of course, he was on the spot himself.

Q: Was he unfair in doing this?

B: Well, from the standpoint of results, he got results. So, yes and no.

Q: If a guy was in a bad way for some information, and the problem wasn't his sole fault, did Arnold ever sock him when he was down?

B: Oh yes, there were no alibis. You never had it all right. He'd set you up anytime. There was never a time when you were all right. As long as I worked for that man, I never once got a compliment. I hated him and I loved him, I feared him, and he worked by fear, primarily. He was a driver, a sadistic driver. You had to be loyal to him, though. You couldn't help it. You had to love the guy, you couldn't help it. And yet, you were scared of him every time you saw him.

Q: Did he know when a man was close to his breaking point? He could drive a man up to a certain point and then the guy disintegrates?

B: I don't know, because I never saw him stop.

Q: You never saw him ease up on somebody when he realized that if he kept pushing this man, he would break?

B: No, not from that viewpoint. I've seen him ease up on people when he thought he was getting the right answer. That was the closest he'd ever came to a compliment - when he let the pressure off.

Q: Right after Pearl Harbor, Feb 1942, he yanked Cabell, and Norstad out of their jobs and set up this so-called Advisory Council, "the heavenly twins." Did they interfere with the Air Staff machinery?

B: I don't think so, I never noticed any interference.

Q: Did they ever look over your shoulder and sort of second guess you?

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B: No, they weren't operators in that sense.

Q: He told them he didn't want them to be operators.

B: I don't recall any instance where they ever interfered. He always had a bunch of people around him of that sort - special staff - within his own little office, in whom he had great confidence - intellectuals, etc. He was always pushing for ideas. Then he would take these ideas and needle people and stimulate them and scare them and pound the table, but I think he was the one who usually picked up the ball and ran with it.

Q: I talked to Cabell last week, and he said exactly what you said. He said Arnold told him at the outset: "I'm not an idea man; you're my idea man. You generate ideas, if I ever catch you operating, I'll cut your throat. I just want you to think up ideas and let me have them, and I'll take it from there."

B: That was my impression.

Q: How about Kuter? Was Kuter a special favorite of his?

B: Yes, he was favorite of the boss, but I think for two very good reasons. Kuter was smart. He had a tremendous intellect, tremendous ability. But he also had a way of losing (sic) the ball. Anybody who couldn't go into Gen Arnold and communicate, could go to Kuter, and Kuter would go in and in his quiet, calm way, smooth the troubled waters, and kind of lay the ground work. He was a beautiful go-between between Arnold and people that Arnold couldn't communicate with satisfactorily because of the drive, and because of people who couldn't take the drive.

Q: When Kuter left, who took his place as the smoother-outer?

B: Let me see, I've forgotten. There were Giles, Stratemeyer

Q: Well, Stratemeyer preceded Giles. Was Stratemeyer very close to Arnold?

B: Quite close, but I think Giles was closer, and partly because at

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the time when Giles went in, Arnold was over the hump during the war. Things were smoothing out, and Arnold had had a heart attack and Giles was to some extent, running things. Then came Eaker, towards the end of the war, and Eaker was a real smoothie, a sort of political strategist - an ambitious guy who I'm sure wanted to become the next Chief, and who was very, I'm sure, was very upset and bitter when he didn't get it. But, Arnold let him run the show, because Arnold was a sick man towards the end of the war. He realized he had to slow down.

Q: Well, Marshall had Eaker come in at the end of the war, Apr 1, 1945, Marshall sent Arnold to Europe on this recuperation trip.

B: I was there.

Q: Were you in on that meeting they had with Spaatz in Europe. This was about two or three days after President Roosevelt had died. They had this planning session. The theme was: "The king is dead, long live the king," in the sense that Roosevelt was never really a man who understood airpower and now that he was dead, Harry Truman was in power. They wanted to get airpower closer to Harry Truman because they felt this was the time to move toward equality. One of the plans was to have Quesada come in to be Aide to the President. This never came to fruition. Were you in on any of that planning?

B: No.

Q: It was about Apr 15th.

B: I know when it was, because I went down to Cannes at that time. But the only thing that I got into - Arnold came first to Paris. He was in a hotel in Paris, and he had just had his heart attack and he was supposed to take it easy. Everybody was doing what they could to give him his head, but to keep him resting.

Q: Spaatz told his people - I believe you were at the meeting: "Don't bring up any controversial things in Arnold's presence."

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B: Right. We'd bring in a prisoner of war and let Arnold talk to him. Things, you know, gee, yeah, they sure bombed us, you know, that sort of thing. Just to keep his mind occupied without the controversial things. He used to go for his walks. I went for a walk with him out in a park in Paris one day and we got to reminiscing and so forth, and he'd say the usual things, and he told thisstory which isn't new. I think he told it in his book. He told about his argument with Adm King about unification. Adm King as you know, was heartily opposed to it. And King says - Arnold raised his voice when he recalled: "Do you know what that fellow told me?" he said. "All right, if you want unification, the Navy's got Army, Navy and Air Force. All you have to do is turn national defense over to Navy." Just in telling about it, he got red. I tried to joke it off and calm him down a bit. So, I said: "Okay, so what, all you do is change the Navy's name to Department of National Defense, and then you've got unification!" He said: "You go to hell." So we changed the subject. But, anyhow, then he went down to Cannes, and he was there several days. Some days later, I got a message to come down to Cannes, by that time, Giles had sent in a message saying: "How about Bowman coming back down as Arnold's deputy for public relations there in Paris at that time." Having been pulled out of my group, again over protest, and Giles had this message saying Bowman was available to come back to the Pentagon for public relations. You see, the War Dept had finally agreed that the AAF could handle a public relations department which had been taken away from them earlier in the war, as you know. And so we had to organize it, and staff it, and operate it with what was available. Rex Smith was in charge. Anyhow, all Smith had was a speechwriting department, and the annual report, things of that sort, for Arnold. And anyhow, Ted Curtis asked me if I wanted to go, and I said: "No, not until the war is over. When the war is over, I'll be perfectly happy to go back home. But I've got a job to

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do here. You've got a job to do and until the war is over, I'd like to help finish it up. So, then the answer came back: "Please let him come; this is urgent, I think we can find a star for him." Which, incidentally, didn't occur.

Q: Yes, I worked for you in 1946, and you were a Colonel.

B: Yes, I got back and everybody forgot about the star. But, anyhow, I got orders to come back. Well, Arnold knew while he was at Cannes that I was coming back to the Pentagon, so I was called down to Cannes. And he said: "Here's my problem. You've got a lot of technical stuff, about development, speed of airplanes, about how the Navy is winning the war, things of that sort." He said: "Congressmen and other people come in my office all the time and they just don't understand what's going on in the Air Force." He said: "I would like a simple sort of a little album with a little text that says in the simplest terms, what the Army Air Forces has done in Europe in WW II. Something that the guy who reads with his lips can understand. Some of the Congressmen are not too smart." So, he said: "When you come back to Washington, which is only about 2 weeks away, I want you to bring me something on that book." Well, that was quite a problem. I didn't know how to cope with it. Fred Anderson had a brilliant idea. They knew a guy that I had never heard of before, McKinlay Kantor.

Q: Yes, the writer; he did LeMay's biography.

B: Also, Andersonville, etc. Anyhow, he was flipping around Europe, he'd gone through a certain number of missions. He is a very fine writer. They said: "Well, let us get you McKinlay Kantor to help you out." So I said: "That's great; I don't know the guy." So we played around, found Kantor and brought him into Paris. We sent cablegrams to every command under Spaatz, got tons of statistics in, broke them down, analyzed them, simplified them, got pictures, everything, and in a matter of about 10 days,

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we have this little album. I've still got 4 copies of it, in which Mac Kantor wrote a letter to Mr. & Mrs. Zilch, or some ficticious name, whose son was killed in the war. He was a pilot and "here's what your son accomplished" - that type of thing. Beautifully written.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's arrival in March Field.

B: Right, in 1931. Protocol was that we had to call on the Commanding Officer the first night, well, that meant every officer on the base had to call the first night. They had no choice, and we had no choice, so we dressed up in our best bib and tucker and walked in. And here was this great big blank living room with hardly a stick of furniture, except a few GI chairs that the Quartermaster gave him. And they were very gracious hosts. And weeks later, Bee Arnold could call every wife by her first and last name. Now isn't that true? (addressed to Mrs. Bowman who mentioned that Mrs. Arnold had a receiving line to meet the officers and their wives).

B: She had a wonderful memory and a most gracious person, wonderful personality.

Mrs. B: She probably had "The Air Force takes care of its own" more deeply embedded in her than anyone I've ever known.

Q: This is my feeling, if he didn't originate that phrase, she is the one who practiced it more than anyone else.

B: Etta (Bowman?) was working very closely with Mrs. Arnold during WWII. She stayed in Washington - the "Spotters"(?) which was a woman's organization to help the wives all over the world, wherever they were located, and Etta was the Chairman of the Spotters committee for Mrs. Arnold, and got to know her quite well. When we were at March Field, she had wonderful admiration for her.

Q: We were talking about McKinlay Kantor. This product of his

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was not published?

B: It was called "The American Air Victory Over Germany." Just a few copies of that were made.

Q: Never released?

B: As I recall, there were only 4 copies, I'm sure Mac must have saved one, he gave one to me, as I worked with him on the whole thing. He gave one which I carried back by hand, to Arnold and never heard of it again. I never knew whether he used it or not. I never got any reaction from him, whatsoever, which is typical. Where the fourth copy went, I don't know. Spaatz must have been given one.

Q: Well, I went through the Spaatz papers in the Library of Congress. There are a lot of publications in file, but without the story to tell, it would have no particular meaning. But Arnold had a great sense of history.... He was not happy with the Craven & Cates volumes, the official history. Were you aware of that?

B: No, actually I didn't get too deeply into that because with all that was going on in the front office and everywhere else, the unification fight which started right in the middle of it, and everything else, I didn't get involved in that in any other detail than the fact that I was for it, I encouraged it, helped wherever I could. I have a complete set of the books which the historians from Maxwell sent me about 10 years later, but I was not really very closely involved in that. It was a matter of someplace to put the units for general administrative supervision.

Q: One of the faults of the history was that it was written too soon after the events. They didn't have all the materials, and they didn't have the perspective. Anyway, the University of Chicago publicist sent the first volume to Arnold and asked him for a blurb they could use on the dust jacket or for advertising purposes. And he wrote back saying: "What I have to say

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about this book, you wouldn't be able to use.

B: Oh really? I didn't know that.

Q: I want to get a little on the post war, the unification struggle. Now Larry Norstad, I think he was A-5 after the war, and Hank Everest and Bart Leach served on a committee. But basically, it was Symington and Norstad working with Forrestal and Sherman on unification. Now, I've had some static that Arnold was unhappy that Norstad agreed to a unification plan which perhaps gave away too much in the way of compromise in order to win the Navy's support.

B: I never got any such reaction, but I can give you a little background on the unification pitch from my own vantage point. While I was with Spaatz over in Europe, just before I came back, Spaatz started spouting off. He was a little radical on the subject, and felt very strong, probably not mellowed as much as Arnold was by that time on the subject. But, I lived with Spaatz in Park House over there. Almost every evening there would be guests in the house, standing around talking, and I got to know Spaatz quite well. Spaatz, one evening, when he, Ted Curtis and I were standing around in front of the fireplace, he started spouting off about how the war was about over, and it was just a matter of time, before the oldsters would be retiring. He said: "I'm thinking seriously of spouting off, starting the big fight....I said: "Look, if you get yourself fired. If you get the reputation for being a bitter radical, you will become a has-been and your influence will be decreased." And I said: "It just so happens in the six months I've been here - 5 maybe by that time - I've heckled you with a lot of people to lunch, and dinner. I brought these people in one at a time, or two or three at a time to meet you, because that's where you shine the greatest." Spaatz had no talent for standing up in front of a press conference and making a speech." So I said: "Why become a martyr and lose your influence. It just so happens that we've

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got a lot of friends, Collie Small of the (Saturday Evening) Post. There are all sorts of people who love the Air Force. They are presumably unprejudiced. Their influence will be far greater than yours will be as a prejudiced martyr. You'll be far more beneficial to the cause if you stay in the AAF and use your influence through others who can say it better because they are professionals who have the outlet to say it and who are considered rightly or wrongly as unprejudiced. So why don't you work through these people. It is better than becoming a martyr. The Air Force still needs you." Spaatz said: "Hal, you write me 10 commandments, why we should have a separate air force; then write me 10 answers why we shouldn't." I went around to a lot of people who knew more about it than I did - Hugh Knerr, who was on his staff, and an old fighter for unification, and a lot of the old timers were gathered around in that headquarters at that time. With their advice, I wrote up 10 commandments. Curtis asked 10 answers "why not," and I answered them as briefly as I could. Then I stamped it "Confidential" to make it more interesting. Put it up on the mantle over the fireplace, and the tactic was that, anytime we had a fresh guest in that we had confidence in, we started bringing up the subject, kind of bring up the problem, and get Spaatz to discussing it. And then he'd end up saying: "Well, this is confidential." In other words, Spaatz would say: "I trust you," and so forth. He'd tell the guest to "go over in the corner and read this if you would like to, but don't quote me, no attribution, but whatever I get out of this, you are welcome to think about."

Q: What reactions did Knerr give you?

B: Well, Knerr, of course, like Spaatz, was an oldtime fighter for unification. He was one of the original people who got into trouble with Arnold and Spaatz and others who supported Mitchell.

Q: I was asking you about Knerr. When Knerr was a very strong

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advocate of unification, he was very close to Andrews.

B: I didn't know that, I knew there was a very close balance there, not necessarily friendship, a balance between Andrews and Arnold. I never was closely associated with Knerr. I always admired him from afar, but never served directly over him or directly with him except when that short tour in Europe, when he was Chief of the Services organization. I went to him to help me with the 10 commandments. I knew him, but he probably wouldn't even remember me.

Q: Tell me about your role in the unification battle of 1946.

B: When this battle broke in Washington, I was right in the middle of that. Spaatz, by that time had been tagged for the Chief, but was kind of at loose ends temporarily. Arnold had appointed him as a kind of undercover "chief of a unification plot." Spaatz had a little office from which he kind of directed the battle. Spaatz was a great strategist, and had a quiet way to get things done. Well, my part was in public relations. We had a staff meeting every morning. Norstad was, of course, working with Spaatz on some of the above board work. I had a chart that I would brief him on every morning, and it was quite a national campaign. Quite a bit of this was under cover. One thing that we pulled, which I thought was very successful, knowing that Norstad was brilliant in so many ways, so fast on his feet, although not an orator by any means, because he didn't talk too well. But his thinking was so good, he was so sharp - by that time he was a BG. I arranged that Admiral "Min" Miller, the Navy PIO would come in for a debate. There would be dinner at a hotel, at which we invited the staff and other employees. Min Miller vs. Larry Norstad. Well, you know who won that battle, Larry Norstad did a beautiful job. He laid the Navy out cold. However, I must say, Miller did a beautiful job, but he wasn't that good. Miller spoke well, but Larry had the comeback. That was a typical example of the things that went

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on as part of the unification battle.

Q: Admiral "Min" Miller became special counsel to the Hinshaw-Brewster Congressional Aviation Policy Board, and he then became Executive Director.

B: Marvelous personality; smart guy. He did a fine job for the Navy, but he just wasn't quite as sharp as Norstad.... Before he retired, Arnold got in a couple of good licks for unification. When Arnold retired, and

Q: That should have been around February 1946.

B: Yes, about that time. The Overseas Press Club in NY asked to have him as their guest, at a farewell dinner. I was, of course, involved in making the arrangements,and going with him and so forth, to the hotel in NY. First there were accolades and what not. But during the intermission, Arnold got to talking - I was with him - about things not going very fast. Everything was kind of routine. Nobody was getting into any controversy. Arnold said to me: "See if you can whip up something. Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star was there. This was Arnold's idea. He said: "Let's get into a fight." Roy Roberts agreed. So it was decided when Arnold got up for questions, Roy Roberts would ask him some question about the Air Force vs. Navy carriers. Sure enough, Roy Roberts got up and gave some blast that was designed ostensibly to make Arnold mad. And so Arnold ostensibly got mad. And he raised his voice, and he pounded the table. Roy Roberts shouted back at him, and Arnold shouted back at Roy Roberts. At the end of the program - everything was going to be ready anyhow - I had the car all warmed up out in front, and I was standing at the door, per instructions. And so, when Arnold got so mad, presumably, that he couldn't stand it any longer, he stalked out of the meeting, and he ran down and got into the car, and laughed like everything.

Q: Did you get a lot of reaction in the papers the next day?

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B: We sure did. After leaving the dinner, we rushed out to the airport and came back by plane. On the way out - and your speaking of Norstad reminds me of this postscript to that evening, I thought this would be a wonderful time, on the way out to the airport, to reminisce or to looking into the future because Arnold had a great talent for looking into the future. So, just to stimulate the conversation, after things had been quiet for a few seconds, I said: "Do you know, I'll bet I can forecast who's going to be Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 10 years." And he said: "You do? Who?" I said: "Larry Norstad." I thought, "Boy, this will get him started." But do you know his only reaction was: "What makes you think so?" He never reacted, and he wasn't going to commit himself on that subject, and I never could quite understand it until just now when you mention this story of snubbing Norstad. It might have had something to do with it.

Q: This might have been that period when he felt, in 1946 - he was extremely unhappy because they expected unification right after the war ended. You know, the President in December 1945 had made his first unification statement. Somehow, the AAF expected that this would be a matter of course. They didn't reckon with the Navy opposition, and the Navy wasn't going to let go of the status quo until they could have a unification bill which was acceptable to them. So Norstad, being a politician, probably came to realize that it was either this compromise bill or you wouldn't have anything. The Navy stalled unification. In other words, it was whether the AAF would accept half a loaf.

B: Yes, well, Norstad was more the diplomat.

Q: This might have been during that period when Arnold felt that it wasn't moving too fast, and perhaps he partly blamed Norstad for it.

B: I think Arnold would have been more apt to accept that, having

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been sort of leavened during the war by contact with all these other people. He was more practical, than maybe Spaatz, or some of the people who had not gone through quite so much of the leavening process. And I could imagine that Arnold would be more ready to accept a compromise at that period, than would have Spaatz or Knerr.

Q: When Eaker came home in April 1945, did he figure that he would become Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

B: Well, I think he must have, and here's the story that I heard. I can't authenticate this. But, I do know this. I was in a staff meeting in which Eaker said: "Gen Arnold is a sick man, and we must try to take all the load off him we can, other than to attain the maximum benefit from his prestige and so forth, for the Air Force.

Q: Now, this must have been right about VE Day.

B: No, it was after VE Day, but before VJ Day. Eaker said: "We must take the load off of his shoulders, so far as running the AAF. He is indispensable in our relationships with the high levels of government. His prestige and experience are of tremendous value to the air force, but he cannot do it all." In effect, what Eaker said was: "I am the boss. We're going to take the load off his shoulders, and just don't go over my head." The general meaning of his little speech was: "I'm running the Army Air Forces." And we accepted that, and understood it. As a matter of fact, it was very logical. Arnold brought him back for that purpose. Then, this happened after I left, and this is purely rumor, because I don't know it first-hand at all. That Eaker had the Strategic Board, when a Chief of Staff to a successor to Arnold was about to be selected, the minute his resignation, his request for retirement came in, Arnold accepted it. And according to a secretary in Arnold's office who was in a very good position to know

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Q: Suzy Adkins?

B: She's dead now, so I guess I can attribute it to her because you can't prove she didn't and I can't prove she did. But anyhow, according to Suzy Adkins, Eaker was fit to be tied. He wouldn't speak to anybody for days, he was bitter, hard to get along with.

Q: Because Arnold had accepted?

B: That was presumably the reason.

Q: Well, how did it get unaccepted. He stayed on, obviously.

B: I think he was on for a while, but not very long.

Q: Well, he stayed on till 1947.

B: I think so, but anyhow, he was always a very ambitious guy. In fact, he said one time - the way to get along with Air Force is to pick the right people to follow. Stick with them and they will carry you along.

Q: How about Lovett? I've got one version of Lovett's role, as a balance wheel, to keep Arnold in perspective. You know, Arnold was said to be impetuous. Lovett would say to him: "Now, Hap, let's take a look at this thing. I agree with you, Hap, and then sort of put it in File 13. Is this your impression of Lovett's role?

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, when Lovett first arrived as Asst Secy of War for Air, his Exec was to be Bill Streett. I think Streett was in Hawaii at the time and it was about a month or 6 weeks delay, and Arnold sent me up to Lovett's office to be his Executive pending the arrival of Streett. So I did get to know Lovett fairly well at that time, for a short period of time, and that was my impression. Suave, diplomatic, thoughtful, brilliant. I had great respect for him, and it was my conclusion from what little I knew of him and from more I knew of Arnold, that it must have been a wonderful balance.

Q: Arnold and Patterson were not of the same chemistry. Do you

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recall the relationship there?

B: No, I didn't know Patterson at all, personally. The only thing I knew about him was, other than having heard him make a couple of speeches, was told to me by Symington, who was to be the first Secretary of the Air Force. When he first came to Washington, he went to his friend, Patterson, and asked for his advice on how to survive in this town. The one thing that I recall his repeating was this:never let anybody write your speeches for you. When you make a speech, it's got to be your speech, and Symington, I think, lived up to that, he may have had a lot of people to help him, but when he did it, it was his personality and his thoughts. It was good advice.

Q: Were you aware of any relationship or strain between Arnold and Drew Pearson?

B: No more than any of the rest of us had, I guess. Nothing that I know of personally, except the fact that when I was Public Relations there at the end of the war, I do know this. The first thing I used to have to do every morning was to read Drew Pearson and try to find out what he was talking about, and get the answer up to Arnold real fast, because Secy Stimson was going to call him on the squawk box as soon as he got in. And Drew Pearson was the bane of our existence. The first order of business every morning was to go on the defensive. Arnold had to go on the defensive to Stimson, first thing in the morning.

Q: I want to ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. I think he mostly did a great job. However, he was a curious sort of fellow and wanted certain privileges. He didn't have the eyesight, and without the wings, he couldn't be a commander, and he couldn't be a general. Were you in on this?

B: No, not in on the controversy, Elliott did visit Spaatz at Park House at the time I was living there. I met him, and the general attitude around the headquarters at that time, was that he had a lot of influence, he's

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got a Poppa. But the guy has done a good job, and I think they had considerable respect for him in spite of his tendency to be overbearing.

Q: Was he overbearing?

B: I mean that in the way that he wanted everybody to know who Poppa was. But I think the general concept was that he was very capable and did a fine job....

Q: Right, well my feeling is that he probably would have gone farther if his father wasn't the President. It was sort of a handicap for him, because he undertook missions like out at Baffin Bay as part of planning the ferry route early in 1941.

B: Well, it started with a headline across the country: "I Want To Be A Captain Too!" Do you recall all that controversy, when Arnold personally appointed him a Captain in the Air Reserve? That was an innovation because we just didn't appoint people as officers in the Air Corps without a little more service background than that. But that was Arnold's forward looking imaginative approach. He wanted to make the best use of anybody who had talent to offer.

Q: I want to ask you about De Seversky. Now, he and Arnold didn't get along. Do you have any knowledge of that?

B: Not too much. When I was out at Wright Field we used to see Seversky out there. Naturally, he was right in the middle of everything. He, again, was a hairshirt. He was highly critical and I can imagine that there would be controversy, although I think there was also mutual respect. In fact, he was a wide open thinker, who probably was even farther with some of the Air Force radicals.

Q: While he was gone, Arnold had to run the Air Force.

B: Yes, that's his nature. I don't know personally of any controversy between them.

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Q: Well, this is, he would write these articles and say: "We're not doing this, or we're not doing that." Of course, Arnold was naturally critical of unsolicited advice.

Q: I want to ask you about the alleged exaggerations of our kill scores by the 8th AF. Now, you were in public relations. You were probably right in the middle of that.

B: Yes, but having also spent a year as a Combat Group Commander before we got up there, my impression was that early in the war, they didn't have the system that was later developed because of what I think was probably a very wholesome criticism. It forced the services into a system of checks and balances. During the time I was in combat, I can assure you that nobody got a kill credited to his account, unless he had enough people to prove it. Now, you can't always prove it 100%, if 500 gunners are shooting at one lone bogey. That claim goes up through channels, so that somebody in each channel tries to evaluate how many people were shooting at it. And I think that well before the end of the war, that the records were not only accurate, but probably conservative.

Q: Well, this was a very touchy subject, incidentally, between Arnold and Patterson, the lawyer. There were some sarcastic comments about the exaggerated kill scores in the 8th AF, and Arnold jumped on Eaker a couple of times. And so this was a very touchy subject. Arnold was concerned that whatever information came back would be credible. There were writers like Peter Masefield who were very critical of the 8th Air Force daylight bombing, and Arnold was always pushing Eaker, then later Spaatz, we've got to get the story to the people. Do you have any special recollections of reactions to the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid?

B: Well, that was a phase just before my arrival at his command, but I know some of the reactions. My only personal reaction is this, I'm

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sure you read more of the background on it than I have, and all that I have, so I'll try to repeat official history, but when I arrived over there - it was in November 1943 - with my group, and as a newcomer, I went to one of the neighboring bases. I sat in on their briefings before missions and I can recall everybody was awfully sensitive about the high loss rate and they had made missions in which they had to go part of the way without escorts, like Regensburg and Schweinfurt, and had gotten pretty badly mauled. At the first briefing I attended, the announcement was made that we would have fighter escorts all the way in and all the way out for the first time, on a long mission. You could have heard the cheers clear to Berlin. I mean, hats were thrown in the air. The guys were ecstatic. For the crews, it was a tremendous load lifted off their chests. Now, by the time I got really into combat, we did have fighter escorts, P-51s which got in there late in '43, and that's about the time we got into action.

Q: Well, before this, a fellow who had to complete 25 missions didn't have more than a 50-50 chance to survive.

Q: You mentioned that Arnold was very sparing with praise. Well, one of the guys with whom he was very generous was Curt LeMay. LeMay replaced Hansell on the B-29 job at the end of 1944. Arnold admired LeMay because he never said: "Well, we can't do it, for this reason or that reason." LeMay went out and did it. Do you have any knowledge of that relationship between them?

B: Not specifically. I do recall being in the Chief's office at the time when LeMay with his B-17 group was headed toward the Far East. I can remember seeing messages back and forth, and suddenly turned around and headed for England, I served with LeMay when he was in that first bombardment group - over at Langley Field - the first B-17s that came out, because I was supposed to be part of that unit. LeMay was in that group.

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Q: He had the B-17s that spotted the Rex. Were you in on that?

B: No, I wasn't in the group. I was Asst Base Operations Officer. But anyhow, so I had known LeMay since 1937-38, but LeMay was another guy who had a great deal in common with Gen Arnold's approach to leadership - rough, tough and dirty. Don't give anybody an inch; crack the whip, if anybody gets in your way - fire him. And LeMay was even dirtier than Arnold.

Q: Well, I had this impression that LeMay was cut in the mold of Arnold's conception of leadership.

B: Yes. He was a driver. Never mind being fair or unfair, get results and fire anybody who doesn't and keep picking them until somebody gets results, and then forget the reason why.

Q: Arnold had a great interest in R&D. Do you recall any special incident that would document that ?

B: Well, when I was at March Field, when Millikan came out, and asked Arnold, if Arnold would let our Curtiss Condor bombers - the B-2 - fly his 500# lead-ball equipment up to various altitudes for automatic recording devices to record the rays, and what not, at various atmospheric altitudes. Amold of course, readily agreed. I was one of the pilots who took his turn flying up to 21,000 feet. Millikan as I recall, would sit down below in the hangar and wait for the mission to return. I don't recall his having any discussions with Arnold. I wasn't in on them. But I do recall one incident, that had to do with a little genius that we had in our squadron. This guy was a mathematician, a typical scientist type, and they would sit down in the hangar and argue about mathematical formulas hour after hour, while the airplane was flying up above.

Q: How about Arnold and von Karman? He was very close to von Karman.

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B: I never met von Karman but I think Millikan brought them together. My only connection there with the R&D type of thing was when I was PIO in Washington. Just before Arnold retired, and he got this idea of looking forward and so forth, and this became quite a fixation with him. He called me in one day and said: "We've got to get out of the habit of thinking in the past and start looking into the future. We are already doing a lot of it, but the public doesn't understand. We've got to work up a program, a public relations program." Arnold said: 'Call it the Buck Rogers Plan," in which we can go all-out and tell everything that possibly can do. You know when he went all-out on something, he was inclined sometimes to exaggerate a little bit, I think it actually flared back on us a little bit because, in my enthusiasm to carry out his program, I probably was guilty of some exaggeration.

Q: Well, when you people showed enthusiasm, this gave him more impetus.

B: Yes, the program was very effective from the standpoint of what he directed, and which I concurred completely. But sometimes, we went so far as to go overboard on letting out of the bag some of the future secret projects, and so forth, and got quite terribly criticized for them. People like LeMay and Vandenberg were very critical about the number of secrets we were letting out.

Q: Right at the beginning of our conversation, we talked about Goddard, and his relationship with Arnold. What was the trouble between Goddard and Arnold?

B: I don't know whether there was any personality clash there or not. I know Goddard quite well. I knew him for a long time, in fact, he was the guy who needled year after year, and finally got me back to Wright Field, simply because at one time when he was experimenting with silent motion

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pictures, he tried to get a sound man from studios in Hollywood to put on the sound track, and they said why we'd be delighted to furnish you one, but we listen to the air raid announcer out here, and if you can find out who that was, we'll find a voice that's just as good as any we have here. And with all due modesty, I was the guy that got stuck with this job of going down and helping-with Arnold's approval - Goddard to make the first motion picture navigation film down at Rockwell.

Q: Arnold and Goddard had a falling out along the way. Minton Kaye had a role in that.

B: Out at March Field, Minton Kaye and his wife, became close personal friends of the Arnolds to the point where there was some lifting of eyebrows about bootlicking and what not.

Q: Were they related in any way?

B: Not that I know of, but that close relationship continued to exist, and Minton Kaye, any time there was a question about it, why Minton could do no wrong. On the other hand, I knew Goddard from having served with him there at Wright Field quite well, and very closely with him because he broke me in on my job. But, Goddard was a man with a tremendous imagination for things that could be done ahead of time, and as soon as he proved to himself in the research and development phase, that it was practical, he would completely lose interest. So, there was never any follow through, and George Goddard never got credit for the things that he developed, and Mint Kaye was just the guy who could do it. He could take the credit for anything and be happy to do so. And both of them had their assets so far as the Air Force was concerned. Mint Kaye was a guy who probably was a better organizer and a better follow-upper. But, Goddard could develop anything along the photographic line, then just drop it as soon as he lost interest in it.

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Q: You know, he speaks of "Col Nemesis" in his book, and of course, it was probably Minton Kaye. And he talks of Arnold as having scored him. Goddard went over on temporary duty to the Navy and then the Air Force brought him back. He went over to the ETO.

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, Spaatz was having reconnaissance trouble, and he got wind of the fact that Goddard was some place over in the US, this sounds exaggerated, somebody said they saw him in charge of logistics having responsibility for the VD program.

Q: At Charlotte AFB. And he tells a story about how he was put in charge of that mission.

B: I didn't know if that was a rumor or not. But anyhow, I knew he was in the doghouse. But I also know that Spaatz got his fingers in it, brought him over to the ETO and said we need low level reconnaissance that shows close-up pictures of the ground. In a matter of days, Goddard went around a little mill shop, and he worked up this thing, and he brought it in to the Park House. I sat there and watched the thing. And he showed reconnaissance still photographs that were just as clear as a bell taken at F-51 high speeds, that was pretty fast at that time, 300 or 400 miles an hour, right down on the ground. He had worked up the concept - a perfectly simple fact that the film moves across the shutter with the relative speed of the plane. And it got perfectly clear pictures, just like that. He developed this thing.

Q: Well, then, the friction between him and Arnold was probably generated by Kaye, as a result of Kaye's relationship with Arnold?

B: I think partly that, and partly the fact that you had to admit and I would be the first one to admit, that, as much as I admired George Goddard, that to take advantage of his talent, you had to have a good adjutant to pick it up and run with it. Now if the relationship had been such that George Goddard was the boss and Mint Kaye was a low subordinate who would pick

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up the ball and run with it, you would have had a wonderful combination.

Q: In practice, Kaye was his boss and he was the idea man created the problems.

B: So naturally, every idea then that Goddard came up with, was wrong as far as Kaye was concerned, because there was professional competition, and I don't think Kaye was the type of personality who would take competition. He was in there polishing boots, and he wasn't going to brook any interference, and Goddard, although he was a tremendously enthusiastic salesman about any idea he was running with, he dropped the ball more than anybody I knew.

Q: I think this is the best explanation I have had of this relationship. You know,Goddard's book, as you will see, as a matter of fact, I have the galley, when I send this back, I'll send you the galley.

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dave

12 NOV 1969

Brig.Gen. H.W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

I appreciate the opportunity to take a look at your "prized pieces." Several are indeed gems. I took the liberty to extract the Max Miller article about how you, Spaatz and Miller went exploring for that Spring on North Island; also a couple of sentences from the Billy Mitchell article which said it in his usual blunt way.

That management guidance: "How to Keep Out of Trouble" in the Pentagon has evoked some smiles around here. I've seen some other current versions of how to survive in "Disneyland East" - probably stolen from your original.

I'm returning all of this material with thanks. Also enclosed is a "cleaned up" version of our interview. I hope that none of it does violence to your thoughts or recollection of events.

The Arnold research is fairly complete. I'm back to work at the Pentagon while my collaborator begins the unenviable task of writing the book. I hope to pitch into that with him before too long.

I will be making another trip South in early January. This time I'll be taking my daughter back to school. Enroute to or from Florida, I am planning some interviews, including Generals Twining, Possum Hansell and Paul Tibbets. We'll be on a tight schedule as I hope to get in a week's rest.

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~~Recently,~~ As you know, we lost Stratemeyer some months ago. More recently, Coddington passed away. He was one of the authors of that plan to protect Pearl Harbor which you briefly mentioned in your memoirs. That plan disappeared when it arrived in Washington, and I'm trying to find out why.

One of my most recent research assignments was to figure out why Drew Pearson didn't like General Arnold. One clue is in what Beebe told us about the "game" they used to play in the Munitions Building. When Drew Pearson used to come around on one of his regular stops, they'd sit him just outside of Arnold's office, and begin to drop hints about pending adventures - e.g., a secret base in Siberia - which would make Pearson's mouth water and his ears tingle. Inevitably Pearson must have found out they were pulling his leg. Is this the cause of his antagonism or is there something more substantive?

I tell you this in the possibility that it might stir something deep in the recesses of your own recollection. Secondly, you were in the OIS slot (1946-47) when Pearson's attitude towards the Air Force changed 180°. From what I can gather, the accession of Symington to high position in the Pentagon was a major reason for the switch. If I were a suspicious man - which I'm not, I would say that somebody in the USAF began to do something for Pearson which they hadn't done before. All throughout the roles and missions struggle (1946-50) the USAF could do no wrong in his column, and the Navy could do no right. Inasmuch as Pearson had found little that was right under Arnold, and especially Giles, some external event(s) must have happened to set him straight. This is a long shot and I'm enclosing an envelope just in case I ring a bell.

In any event, Loosbrock and I are shooting for a finished manuscript in 1970, but only time will tell.

Again many thanks.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div

Enclosures

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Murray —

It was a real pleasure to see you and your attractive family. And I thoroughly enjoyed the stimulating conversation.

I went thru my files while your interests were still fresh in my mind. The enclosed gems may or may not be of interest to you. But since they are prized pieces to me, I'd appreciate their return.

Good luck in your research.

Y'all come see us again.

Sincerely,

Hal Bowman

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P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Fla. 33458
Aug 28

Dear Murray -

Just a quickey in answer to your note

We enjoyed meeting you and yours. Come again. And the nostalgic interview was great fun.

After deciding to drop my efforts at publication of my ms. I discarded my stacks of supporting notes and references. But I'd be reluctant to set myself up as an authentic original historical source. Actually, on the subject of Pearl Harbor, I got all info from historical publications. I have no first-hand details as to the proposals or warnings. I may or may not have seen them. But if I did, they did not leave an impression that has lasted into 1969.

As to the "airman's dream", that too was copied, but I agree. yes, I meant that we left ourselves wide open to an imaginative, aggressive, prepared enemy.

Here's my guess - not having the airplanes available at the time to support the proposed plan for air defense and recon for Hawaii; not having Army or Navy support for air concepts; not having the influence to counter

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Roosevelt's fair-haired Navy; the AF being still generally considered a bunch of wild-blue-yonder, Billy Mitchel type braggarts; those in positions of greatest influence simply didn't take it seriously enuf to react. Especially when the idea of Pearl Harbor was not generally accepted. Considering the infertile environment, how could one expect the seed to sprout?

Is it also possible that such a radical, controversial, and top-secret that might have been discussed and answered orally? By messenger?

Here's a little tid-bit I'm quite sure I deleted from the book, for obvious reasons. I add it here in view of your "internal plumbing" interest.

While tossing about in my bunk one night worrying about the problem of in-flight urination, the thot suddenly struck: condoms. They were plentiful. The high VD rate had stimulated the automatic flow of huge stacks of them at all bases. At 2:00 A.M., when the ops order for

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the day's mission arrived in my office, I sent for major Julius Pickoff, my group bombardier. I told him briefly of my proposed solution and said, "Pick, you are now the group pee officer. Draw 200 rubbers from supply and issue them to all crews before takeoff." Pick later told me what happened. He telephoned the group supply officer, who was sound asleep in his bunk. "Out of bed, boy. Push right down to supply. The old man wants 200 rubbers right away." He was accustomed to tricksters but this was too much, even from Pickoff. He replied in a sleepy, irritated voice, "That old bastard?" and went back to sleep. Pickoff had to take a jeep and go after the dissheliner. This is true.

See why my wife wouldn't let me put it into the book? Maybe you'll have better luck.

(Pickoff recently retired as a full Col. — missile wing C.O.)

Hal B.

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P.S. –

Miami Beach. The scene of one of my favorite recollections. "It's in the book". Read all about it! Walter Weaver's one-man double-whammie leased the works and actually started operating the Officers' Candidate School, students et al. Can't you just see it: Hundreds of ambitious young greenhorns guarding all those swimming pools – most of them empty – with unloaded guns, 24 hours a day – for training? On an inspection trip I seem to recall that my bill for an overnight stay at one of the better hotels, as befitted my eagles, was $1.50. I'm not sure of that figure.

Hal.

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P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Fla. 33458
July 14, 1969

Dr. Murray Green
Deputy Chief
Research & analysis Div
Office of the Secretary
Dept. of the Air Force.
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr. Murray Green:

Yes, I remember you and am pleased to be considered in your research on Gen. Hap Arnold. My worm's-eye view, may, I hope, help round out the picture. The Arnold-Spaatz-Eaker triumvirate largely dominated my career. It's hard to separate the three, but Arnold was the dominant influence on us all. Or should I say "domineering".

As a permanent resident here, with wife, children, and grandchildren, plus three homes to which my amateur talents are devoted, you can be assured that:

1. I won't be going anywhere.
2. I'm happily busy.
3. My time is flexible.
4. I welcome the old man's privilege to reminesce.

So - you name it and I'll join you anywhere, anytime, for as long at it takes.

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you didn't say how you're traveling, but if you fly in to West Palm Beach, I'd be glad to pick you up. It's only a 30 minute drive.

no doubt you will be in contact with Hugh Knerr — I believe he's still in Miami or Coral Gables. B/G Paul Burrows was Hap's adjutant at March Field - 1931+. He's in Cantana, Fla. — between here & Miami.

By the way, Gen. Garland appears to be doing a top-notch job as Info. chief. He was one of my squadron commanders in the 401st Bomb. Gp. in England (WW II). A great guy, and I hope he's still married to that sweet little gal Jean (I think that was her name. I met her in Spain in 1957).

Just let me know when you'll be thru here and I'll do my best to dredge up the poop on Hap. You'll find most of my recollections reflect my admiration for the man and the leader, but I won't hold back on some of the heartaches he inflicted.

Regards,

Hal Bowman

Brig. gen. H. W. Bowman
USAF (Ret.)

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July 11, 1969

Brig.General Harold W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P. O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Jack Lopsbrock, editor of Air Force/Space Digest Magazine, and I are doing a biography of General Hap Arnold for Random House. The research phase is nearly completed. We have been through the huge Arnold Collection at the Library of Congress and have plumbed a number of other key sources, including the FDR Library at Hyde Park.

We are now hopeful of filling in some of the cracks and have a number of interviews planned for the immediate future. We have appointments in New York City next week with Hon. Robert Lovett, and Generals Lauris Norstad, Larry Kuter and George Kenney.

In mid- or late August, I hope to visit Florida to conduct a few key interviews. I would be honored if you could find some time to talk about your association with General Arnold which I believe was close and extended over 15 years or more. For example, I have some interesting notes taken at the Library of Congress indicating that you served as a PIO on his staff in the early 1930's when he commanded March Field.

Nostalgically, I should also mention that I worked for you when you headed OIS in the Pentagon in 1946. I was signed on in April of that year, upon returning from the wars, as a researcher with the Personnel Narratives Division, headed by Hans Christian Adamson. Enough of that.

In any event, I promise not to take more than a couple of hours of your time on a date and hour of your choosing.

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Just for ball-park estimates, I'll be coming through Jupiter on the way down about Sunday or Monday, August 24-25, and will be coming back North about Friday, September 5th. I should also mention that I have another tentative visit to Florida scheduled for the end of December, if next month is unsuitable for you.

I am enclosing an envelope for your convenience. I hope that we can get together, even if only for a short visit. I hope, also, that this letter finds you in good health and that you are enjoying your retirement.

Very sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Fla. 33458
July 30, 1969

Dept. of the Air Force
Office of the Secretary
Dr. Murray Green
Research & Analysis Div.
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Dr Green:

I'll be looking forward to seeing you aug. 22, 23, or 25. Or Sun. aug 24 is OK too. You mentioned "my family"; but didn't say what size. We have a pool at our home and perhaps they'd enjoy a swim and some refreshments while you & I talk.

Paul Burrows had a stroke a year or so ago and I don't know his current condition. So I'd suggest you make both stops. He's probably an hour from here - portal to portal.

I'm looking forward to seeing you.

In case you wish to call when you approach, the phone number is:
Area 305 - 746 4323.

Sincerely,

Hal Bowman

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July 25, 1969

Brig.General Harold W. Bowman, USAF(Ret)
P.O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Your letter sounds just great. You must really be enjoying your well-earned retirement, something General Arnold looked forward to for years, but he just wore himself out. Incidentally, I had a note from Mrs. George Stratemeyer who reported that the General is "desperately ill." As you know, I'm sure, he is in Winter Park.

And now for our rendezvous. I will be driving down on a combined business-vacation trip. I would suggest Friday, August 22nd, Saturday, August 23rd, or Monday, the 25th, as possibilities. I'll know more about my plans in a couple of weeks. I think my family wants to stop off at the Cape, so we may do this on Sunday, the 24th.

I note that Lantana is just below Palm Beach. Via the Sunshine Parkway, it can't be more than 30 minutes away from your place. I am writing to General Burroughs, suggesting a three-way conversation. I would like to suggest luncheon as my guests at a neutral zone, perhaps in Palm Beach, after which we could repair to some convenient spot for our interview. Inasmuch as both you and General Burroughs served at March Field, you might spur each other's recollections.

If for any reason this ambitious plan cannot be worked out, we'll just leave my interview of General Burroughs for another time. As I mentioned, I'll be coming through again in December or January.

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You mentioned General Bill Garland. Yes, he did a bang-up job here in Headquarters, USAF, and is leaving very shortly to take the 1st Missile Wing at Vandenberg.

Believe me, General Bowman, I'm looking forward to our get-together next month.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

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

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February 5, 1970

Brig. General H. W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
P. O. Box 418
Jupiter, Florida 33458

Dear General Bowman:

Thanks for straightening me out on Goddard. You're so right about him. I'm having him address my Air Intelligence Reserve Group on Wednesday, February 11th. He's bringing in some 3D equipment to view his slides.

We're having an "autograph party" and we've sold 51 books to the group. Gen. Goddard will inscribe them to each man.

I interviewed General Dick Lindsay yesterday and he put me on to General Tom Darcy, a neighbor of yours in Tequesta Village, in connection with air aid to Russia during the war.

Some time later this year, I'll be back in Florida. If and when--I'd like to stop by and say hello.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Division

Bowman ltr y 2/1/70 filed 6.16

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Interview with BG Harold W. Bowman
August 23, 1969

Q: When did you first meet General Arnold?

B: Well, the first time I had ever met General Arnold was at Rockwell Field, about 1929, when I first got my commission in the Air Force - my first station. As a local Public Relations Officer, I had become very interested in an old bit of the history of Rockwell Field, and through the Base Commander I got an appointment with LTCOL Arnold.

Q: He wrote a history of Rockwell Field, or did you write it?

B: Well, I wrote it, but I guess it was his.

Q: I have it, the original. It's been turned over to the Library of Congress.

B: That was based upon my interview with him, and my research. But anyway, I was particularly interested in an old spring at North Island and he gave me the lead that helped me discover it. With the help of Max Miller, a local writer, who wrote the story about it, we discovered it. We dug it out, and developed it, and it probably has long since been covered up.

Q: I know this has recurred in some of the files - his interest in the source of the spring. This is something psychological in it. Arnold had a great fascination in finding a source of water supply on his own ranch in California. Maybe it has to do with discovering a source of life. Well, that's my speculation. Anyway, you say you wrote the history in 1929?

B: Yes, that's about it.

Q: He was long since gone from Rockwell. In 1929 he was in Fairfield, Ohio. Did you have any contact with him there, or in Washington?

B: No. My first real contact, other than that, my first contact was with him was in 1931 at March Field when our 7th Bombardment Group under Maj Spatz, moved up to March Field to replace the Training Command.

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Q: So you really got to know Arnold at March Field.

B: Yes, that's where I knew him quite well.

Q: March Field, in my interpretation, is the turning point in Arnold's career, because prior to that, he was exiled at Ft. Riley from Washington. At March Field, he did a fine job, then he came back to Washington. At March Field he did a number of unusual things, like running the CCC and flying the mail. Did you have a role in that?

B: Oh yes, as his Public Relations Officer for the CCC, and for the air mail, and for everything else that he got into.

Q: I know that you were very much involved in the air mail. Was Col Arnold aware that the Air Corps was not prepared for that job?

B: Oh yes, he knew the problems involved. It was the low point in the Army Air Corps at that time, financially. We had no equipment; we didn't have enough money for gasoline. It was a time when Pres Hoover said that in order to balance the budget, everybody - all officers in the Air Corps were to be sent on leave without pay for a month. But as Arnold said, we still have to work. We can't just run off and let the place run, so we'll expect everybody to stay on duty. So that's one thing I'd always resented - the fact that for one month we were on leave without pay in order to balance the budget, but we still had to work. Arnold knew this. We had had no training gasoline; we had no equipment; we were at the lowest ebb probably of the Air Corps status at the time the Air Mail problem hit, and within a week, we had to start carrying the air mail all over the United States.

Q: He wrote a number of letters to Mrs. Arnold. He was temporarily at Salt Lake City, and she was at Riverside, California. In his letters he would say to her that Foulois was in hot water again - this was with Congress, and of course, there were some crashes. There were three administrative

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zones. Horace Hickam had the Central Zone I believe, and B. Q. Jones had the Eastern Zone.

B: And Arnold had the Western Zone. He was in the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake City. He rented several floors in the hotel. He was in business within a week, and his airplanes had dispersed around the whole Western Zone.

Q: Were you stationed at the Newhouse Hotel with him?

B: Not originally. We had just gotten over the hump of the CCC. We had just finished "bombing" the Indians with food, and all that. But mainly with what training we could afford, he moved up to Salt Lake City with some of his staff. I went back to March Field, and I got a call one evening when he had come back to March Field overnight. He said, you get yourself into an airplane and get yourself up to Salt Lake City tomorrow morning, starting at 6:00 AM and he said: "We have had so much lousy publicity; I want good publicity. I want a lot of it, I don't care what you do" he said. "You can cover a bathing beauty with air mail stamps, and send her to the Governor of California. You can send a box of oranges to somebody else. I don't care what you do, but we've got to overcome all of this unfavorable and unfair publicity. We've got to get this thing on a paying basis." So the next day I was in Salt Lake City. My wife drove up and joined me there. We had a room in the same hotel, and we were there for the rest of the air mail period.

Q: His wife and daughter drove up from Riverside on one occasion, and he told her to pack a gun for the drive through the desert. There were some rough characters one might encounter on the road. This was depression and some people were desperate.

B: I wish I had had that foresight, because my wife drove up alone. She ended up late one night in a little honky-tonk town on the way up, and the

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only room available was a little swinging door someplace with drunks running up and down the hall from the bar, and she was pretty scared. But she made it all right. One of the experiences that live with you.

Q: The CCC, in a sense, was one of Arnold's pet projects. For several reasons, one of which is a recurring expression during his career, he had a belief, perhaps as part of his psychological makeup, that if young fellows got out in the open, and did an honest day's work, like chop down trees or fishing or hunting, or some outside activity, it would somehow be a cleansing agent. You know, this was his solution to juvenile delinquency after the war. He talked about setting up a national CCC. Did you notice this; did he talk about this?

B: I think perhaps that was a philosophy he developed as a result of the CCC, rather than his having generated anything to start it, because when it first came up, he protested. He got a telegram from the 9th Corps Area Commander in San Francisco (Craig) asking if he could set up and operate the camps in his area. He sent back a message saying he was in the middle of the new Annual Air Corps maneuvers at March Field. The company was split. Part of them were at March Field. I happened to be on maneuvers being held at the same time in the East, so I wasn't there at the time. But I remember, and believe it was in Global Mission. He said: "I cannot handle this at the present time because I'm having maneuvers." The answer came back from San Francisco, something like this, as I recall: "You don't understand, this is from the President of the United States, so be there tomorrow." Something of that sort. And really, this new mission threw everything into a lot of confusion. Everything was scattered all over the countryside, truckloads of lumber and everything else. Kids were coming in by the thousands. But, he organized it. He had 25 camps in his area. I was his public relations officer for that, too.

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Q: He probably had the best organization of CCC operations in the country.

B: Is that right? I haven't analyzed it from that standpoint.

Q: Well, somewhere along the line, he became very enthusiastic about it.

B: Oh yes. Once he took over something, you couldn't stop him. It was a-round-the-clock, and everybody else went with him. I mean he was running, and if you weren't running, you were in trouble.

Q: This reminds me, there was some talk about the terrible tempered Hap Arnold. Now, was he impetuous?

B: Impetuous, yes, but based on so much experience, that most of the time, he was right. But, he was intolerant. He demanded results, and he wanted them now. Everybody had to be working around the clock, or they were in trouble.

Q: He didn't like anybody that had a negative approach to something; anybody who didn't think it could be done?

B: Oh no. He had a tremendous imagination. He always was thinking big, and he had no patience with anybody who didn't.

Q: Were you with him during the earthquake at Long Beach in March 1934?

B: Yes.

Q: Now, I have different accounts of what happened there, and they seem to be confused, particularly in relation to General Malin Craig's reaction. One account has Malin Craig very pleased that Arnold went out without orders and helped the victims. Another account has Craig unhappy originally. And then he realized that Arnold had done a good thing.

B: I don't remember Craig's reaction at all. All I do remember of that - I was living on the base at March Field at the time - but I do recall

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that in a matter of hours, Arnold had organized and sent into the area soup kitchens, everything that was needed to help. He wasn't a guy who was late in anything like that. He had the ability to grasp facts, make his analysis, crack the whip and get things rolling. Spectacular, if he could make it.

Q: And if he didn't he was in trouble.

B: If he didn't, he would make it spectacular. He never failed to make it spectacular, because his philosophy was going to be that he had to make his underlings move. It wasn't entirely a matter of public relations, although he had a lot of basis for public relations, but he had the ability to crack the whip at his underlings.

Q: When he came into a room, did he dominate the room?

B: Absolutely.

Q: All eyes on him?

B: That's right.

Q: Did he have a commanding presence?

B: Very much so.

Q: Did you go up to Alaska with him.

B: No, I was at March Field at the time he went.

Q: I know there was some shifting of chairs about who was to go with him on the Alaskan flight.

B: I'm not familiar with that.

Q: This was July, August 1934.

B: I was there at the time, and stayed at March Field, but actually that was all handled completely outside of my bailiwick as public relations man.

Q: I want to ask you about Hollywood. Now, while he was at March Field, he courted Bebe Daniels, Ben Lyons and all the rest. I have correspondence from Richard Dix, Ann Harding, Wallace Beary, all the greats in

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motion pictures. Arnold put on a number of shows - you probably organized the air shows out there. Can you tell me something about his courting of Hollywood?

B: Well, I can recall all these things, and, I was very much involved in these things, because he went along with it. He was all for it, and my job was to go out and do some work and

Q: Get these people out there?

B: Yes, and as a matter of fact, I arranged probably the things that you are talking about. For instance, Bebe Daniels actually paid for and built the officer's club at Long Beach reserve organization. We had our maneuvers over there - an air show one time, in which I was very much involved.

Q: They had an air show out there, and he was trying to get all the VIPs to come out. We have a lot of letters from stars who couldn't come, or who were on location, or something like that.

B: Well, I don't recall all of them, but it is quite possible that, probable, that I was involved in them.

Q: Did you work with William Sweeley? He was involved in these activities.

B: Yes, Bill Sweeley. Well, at the time I knew Bill Sweeley, he was not under Gen Arnold directly, but had a sort of reserve assignment.

Q: Sweeley seemed to be involved. He was sort of the messenger boy in a lot of these errands for Hollywood. Were you at March Field until Arnold left?

B: No, from 1931 to 1934.

Q: Then you weren't there when he became a BG in 1935. When was the next time you came in contact with him?

B: Well, the next time was second-hand when Eaker, under him in

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Washington, sent me out to Wright Field. But the next time I was directly involved was in 1939 when I was called into Washington from Wright Field to become Arnold's Asst Executive. He had several assistants and I was one of them. Bob Duncan, Luke Smith, and myself were the three Asst Execs, and Eaker was the Executive.

Q: Were you there when a Colonel Ferson was there.

B: I vaguely remember the name.

Q: This Col Ferson was terribly afraid of rank, and he was highly sensitive, he was in the Air Staff. I can't recall what his specific job was. One day he was in Arnold's office, and Arnold chewed him out for something, and the guy had a heart attack and dropped dead. This was around 1941.

B: Vaguely yes. I'm not sure if it was in Arnold's office, however. I think he had been in Arnold's office and went back to his office, and later dropped dead and whether it was connected, I don't know.

Q: This (the death of Col Ferson in Arnold's office) is something someone told me last week, and it kind of shocked me. I just never heard it before, and we've had many conversations with Mrs. Arnold, out at the ranch. This sounds like a ghoulist practical joke. Was Arnold a jokester? I heard that he was.

B: Arnold, of course, he had rather basically a good sense of humor. But in a rather sadistic way. He just tried to hit somebody, embarrass them, and of course he knew why. He and Spaatz were just side by side, great friends, mutual admiration society, but of course, he liked to needle Spaatz, just like he tried to needle everybody else. And one time, at March Field, there was a party. I guess it was at Arnold's house, Spaatz was going to be there, and he called in from Hollywood, this professional needler, insulter, I've forgotten the guy's name - Vince Barnett (or Bartlett) or something like that. This fellow had a reputation for going around and hiring himself out as

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an insulter, just for fun. Arnold called him in and briefed him about Spaatz' hatred for the Navy and hatred for carriers, and so forth. And it almost ended up in a fistfight. And I guess Arnold straightened it out, I wouldn't dare. But the story went around the base, and everybody got a big kick out of it, because Spaatz didn't see very much humor in the Navy.

Q: This guy was talking strong Navy?

B: Oh yes. He'd go up to Spaatz, who didn't have any idea of who the guy was, and make some crack about the future being all for carriers. Or he would ask Spaatz, what did he mean by trying to say airpower was better than Navy. You know, but that type of insulting remark. To Spaatz that was a red herring. And very successful from the standpoint of a professional insulter.

Researcher Note: Arnold hired this guy - Barnett or Bartlett again, in 1943 to needle George Marshall. There is an article in Saturday Evening Post which I extracted at the G. C. M. Library in Lexington, Va.

Q: I want to ask you about unification. In the 1939-41 period there were a lot of people in the Air Corps who were pushing for a separate air force. In my study of Arnold, I believe that he realized that Marshall was opposed to a separate air force. So was the War Dept General Staff, but there were others in the Air Corps, like Emmons for example, who wanted it. Did you get any of this flak?

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, here's an interesting sideline on Arnold that you may have missed. Arnold, of course, always believed, the same as the rest of the people, in the requirements for a separate air force. I recall during the air mail mission, a letter came up inviting all officers of the Air Corps to submit their thoughts. And whatever happened to that I don't know, but at least they went through channels. I never did get any reaction to that. It probably went into the files and was forgotten. Then later, when Arnold

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got into his command position, he probably was watching for opportunities. He was very much held down, and figured it out strategically when the best time for that might arise. I recall that while I was still in the Pentagon - I left in 1943 - not too long before I left, this incident occurred which gives an insight into the heart of Arnold's personality. He had a very fine planning staff - Vandenberg, Kuter, Possum Hansell, few others, very intelligent, thoughtful people, who did all of the writeup on that type of thing. By that time, I was no longer his Asst Exec, but after the reorganization, was part of the Operations Division, lower echelon in the Pentagon and again, as Asst Exec, I was in a Division rather than in his office. So I had no direct relationship with Arnold, except through several channels. I saw him in the hall one day and he said: "Hal, I want you to submit a study to me - should we, or should we not, have unification of the armed forces now, and in what way?"

Q: Could you pin this down on time, was this after Pearl Harbor?

B: Oh yes, this must have been 1942, maybe. The war was well along. Maybe 1943 before I left, but probably 1942. Well, that completely hit me by surprise, because in the first place, it was not my job. He had brilliant people who knew all the background. I had never been in on the fight. I didn't know the pros and cons except on general principle, but I played with the idea in general. But in the middle of the war, that was quite a different problem. Obviously, to me, it simply meant that he wanted somebody else's viewpoint - a fresh viewpoint. I went into Gen Fairchild, who was then my boss.

Q: He was a great intellectual.

B: Yes. I told him: "Look, I'm no guy to do that." He said: "Look, General Arnold wants your viewpoint; don't ask me. Just go out and do the best you can, and give it to him," which I did, and I never heard anything

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more about it. First time in my life that I ever knew what his reaction was when I read his book, Global Mission, years later, way after the war, when he made the statement that he had found that, during the war, was not the time for unification. That had been my recommendation, and I thought: "Gee, there's my career gone, but I've got to be honest, he asked for it." But, I was very pleased to know that at that particular time he agreed that this was not the right time.

Q: Arnold had this penchant for grabbing people in the hall, E-Ring, and giving them jobs. Did you ever get grabbed?

B: That was an occasion. That was in the hall, I was walking down the hall, and he said, "Hal....!"

Q: Did he ever do this to you again?

B: I think that was the only time, that particular thing happened. The only other occasion that was close to it was when I was sitting in my office early one morning before my boss came in - that was in the Operations Division. General Arnold called up, and the conversation went something like this. Let me also say, it was very early in the morning, and he always tried to beat everybody in so he could embarrass them.

Q: Really?

B: Oh yes. He was a sadist. He wanted everybody on his toes. Well, on this occasion, he said: "How many airplanes have we got going to North Africa as of this morning?" And I said: "Well, b-b-b-General, I would be glad to find out. The boss isn't in at the moment - it was Gen Johnson at that time - but I'll be glad to have him call you." And Arnold said: "All right, have him call me, and when he does, I'll tell him he's wrong, because I know exactly how many there are. There are so many on the way; there are so many in the mill; there are so many over there; and it isn't enough. He doesn't know, and I do!" And he did! He would get the statistics, and call

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people up like that on the interphone. The buzzer rang, and I just went into the boss' office and touched the button, and all I could do was stutter, and all the boss could do was stutter. But he knew, and he was just trying to keep everybody on their toes. He wanted everybody to have the statistics faster than he did, and he beat them to it every time. He would get there at 7:30 in the morning. Nobody could get a copy of the night cables until he had had his copy. And I used to try to beat him to the punch for my boss, to keep him from getting embarrassed, by going in at 7:31 and getting the second copy. I'd go down the log of the previous day. I'd start pushing buttons, and say: "Please, get this stuff together because the boss is going to be in a few minutes, and Gen Arnold is going to start pushing buttons." Part of the time, I'd beat him, but not all the time.

Q: Well, this is a way he had of keeping his staff ready to go all the time. And he often asked for the same statistics from different people.

B: Right. He worked two ends against the middle any time he could, and he would embarrass them anytime he could. Because that was his way of keeping them going.

Q: I've heard where he would push all the buttons and had everybody running down the hall, and then he'd assemble them all and say to some individual: "I want you; And the rest of you can go!" Did you ever have an occasion like that?

B: No, I wouldn't doubt it though.

Q: This was from Norstad. He would get them all, and then finger the man he wanted. This was the way he kept them all going.

B: It may have been one way to find out how early we got to work in the morning. I don't know. It sounds like him.

Q: Did he get in at 7:30 AM and start pushing buttoms at 7:31?

B: Well, the first thing he would do would be to read the statistics,

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and he'd get a jump on everybody, by knowing before he pushed the button. And when he pushed the button, he'd know they were going to be wrong, and he'd tell them so. So half an hour later they would know. Of course, he was on the spot himself.

Q: Was he unfair in doing this?

B: Well, from the standpoint of results, he got results. So, yes and no.

Q: If a guy was in a bad way for some information, and the problem wasn't his sole fault, did Arnold ever sock him when he was down?

B: Oh yes, there were no alibis. You never had it all right. He'd set you up anytime. There was never a time when you were all right. As long as I worked for that man, I never once got a compliment. I hated him and I loved him, I feared him, and he worked by fear, primarily. He was a driver, a sadistic driver. You had to be loyal to him, though. You couldn't help it. You had to love the guy, you couldn't help it. And yet, you were scared of him every time you saw him.

Q: Did he know when a man was close to his breaking point? He could drive a man up to a certain point and then the guy disintegrates?

B: I don't know, because I never saw him stop.

Q: You never saw him ease up on somebody when he realized that if he kept pushing this man, he would break?

B: No, not from that viewpoint. I've seen him ease up on people when he thought he was getting the right answer. That was the closest he'd ever came to a compliment - when he let the pressure off.

Q: Right after Pearl Harbor, Feb 1942, he yanked Cabell, and Norstad out of their jobs and set up this so-called Advisory Council, "the heavenly twins." Did they interfere with the Air Staff machinery?

B: I don't think so, I never noticed any interference.

Q: Did they ever look over your shoulder and sort of second guess you?

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B: No, they weren't operators in that sense.

Q: He told them he didn't want them to be operators.

B: I don't recall any instance where they ever interfered. He always had a bunch of people around him of that sort - special staff - within his own little office, in whom he had great confidence - intellectuals, etc. He was always pushing for ideas.. Then he would take these ideas and needle people and stimulate them and scare them and pound the table, but I think he was the one who usually picked up the ball and ran with it.

Q: I talked to Cabell last week, and he said exactly what you said. He said Arnold told him at the outset: "I'm not an idea man; you're my idea man. You generate ideas, if I ever catch you operating, I'll cut your throat. I just want you to think up ideas and let me have them, and I'll take it from there."

B: That was my impression.

Q: How about Kuter? Was Kuter a special favorite of his?

B: Yes, he was favorite of the boss, but I think for two very good reasons. Kuter was smart. He had a tremendous intellect, tremendous ability. But he also had a way of losing (sic) the ball. Anybody who couldn't go into Gen Arnold and communicate, could go to Kuter, and Kuter would go in and in his quiet, calm way, smooth the troubled waters, and kind of lay the ground work. He was a beautiful go-between between Arnold and people that Arnold couldn't communicate with satisfactorily because of the drive, and because of people who couldn't take the drive.

Q: When Kuter left, who took his place as the smoother-outer?

B: Let me see, I've forgotten. There were Giles, Stratemeyer

Q: Well, Stratemeyer preceded Giles. Was Stratemeyer very close to Arnold?

B: Quite close, but I think Giles was closer, and partly because at

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the time when Giles went in, Arnold was over the hump during the war. Things were smoothing out, and Arnold had had a heart attack and Giles was to some extent, running things. Then came Eaker, towards the end of the war, and Eaker was a real smoothie, a sort of political strategist - an ambitious guy who I'm sure wanted to become the next Chief, and who was very, I'm sure, was very upset and bitter when he didn't get it. But, Arnold let him run the show, because Arnold was a sick man towards the end of the war. He realized he had to slow down.

Q: Well, Marshall had Eaker come in at the end of the war, Apr 1, 1945, Marshall sent Arnold to Europe on this recuperation trip.

B: I was there.

Q: Were you in on that meeting they had with Spaatz in Europe. This was about two or three days after President Roosevelt had died. They had this planning session. The theme was: "The king is dead, long live the king," in the sense that Roosevelt was never really a man who understood airpower and now that he was dead, Harry Truman was in power. They wanted to get airpower closer to Harry Truman because they felt this was the time to move toward equality. One of the plans was to have Quesada come in to be Aide to the President. This never came to fruition. Were you in on any of that planning?

B: No.

Q: It was about Apr 15th.

B: I know when it was, because I went down to Cannes at that time. But the only thing that I got into - Arnold came first to Paris. He was in a hotel in Paris, and he had just had his heart attack and he was supposed to take it easy. Everybody was doing what they could to give him his head, but to keep him resting.

Q: Spaatz told his people - I believe you were at the meeting: "Don't bring up any controversial things in Arnold's presence."

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B: Right. We'd bring in a prisoner of war and let Arnold talk to him. Things, you know, gee, yeah, they sure bombed us, you know, that sort of thing. Just to keep his mind occupied without the controversial things. He used to go for his walks. I went for a walk with him out in a park in Paris one day and we got to reminiscing and so forth, and he'd say the usual things, and he told this story which isn't new. I think he told it in his book. He told about his argument with Adm King about unification. Adm King as you know, was heartily opposed to it. And King says - Arnold raised his voice when he recalled: "Do you know what that fellow told me?" he said. "All right, if you want unification, the Navy's got Army, Navy and Air Force. All you have to do is turn national defense over to Navy." Just in telling about it, he got red. I tried to joke it off and calm him down a bit. So, I said: "Okay, so what, all you do is change the Navy's name to Department of National Defense, and then you've got unification!" He said: "You go to hell." So we changed the subject. But, anyhow, then he went down to Cannes, and he was there several days. Some days later, I got a message to come down to Cannes, by that time, Giles had sent in a message saying: "How about Bowman coming back down as Arnold's deputy for public relations there in Paris at that time." Having been pulled out of my group, again over protest, and Giles had this message saying Bowman was available to come back to the Pentagon for public relations. You see, the War Dept had finally agreed that the AAF could handle a public relations department which had been taken away from them earlier in the war, as you know. And so we had to organize it, and staff it, and operate it with what was available. Rex Smith was in charge. Anyhow, all Smith had was a speechwriting department, and the annual report, things of that sort, for Arnold. And anyhow, Ted Curtis asked me if I wanted to go, and I said: "No, not until the war is over. When the war is over, I'll be perfectly happy to go back home. But I've got a job to

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do here. You've got a job to do and until the war is over, I'd like to help finish it up. So, then the answer came back: "Please let him come; this is urgent, I think we can find a star for him." Which, incidentally, didn't occur.

Q: Yes, I worked for you in 1946, and you were a Colonel.

B: Yes, I got back and everybody forgot about the star. But, anyhow, I got orders to come back. Well, Arnold knew while he was at Cannes that I was coming back to the Pentagon, so I was called down to Cannes. And he said: "Here's my problem. You've got a lot of technical stuff, about development, speed of airplanes, about how the Navy is winning the war, things of that sort." He said: "Congressmen and other people come in my office all the time and they just don't understand what's going on in the Air Force." He said: "I would like a simple sort of a little album with a little text that says in the simplest terms, what the Army Air Forces has done in Europe in WW II. Something that the guy who reads with his lips can understand. Some of the Congressmen are not too smart." So, he said: "When you come back to Washington, which is only about 2 weeks away, I want you to bring me something on that book." Well, that was quite a problem. I didn't know how to cope with it. Fred Anderson had a brilliant idea. They knew a guy that I had never heard of before, McKinlay Kantor.

Q: Yes, the writer; he did LeMay's biography.

B: Also, Andersonville, etc. Anyhow, he was flipping around Europe, he'd gone through a certain number of missions. He is a very fine writer. They said: "Well, let us get you McKinlay Kantor to help you out." So I said: "That's great; I don't know the guy." So we played around, found Kantor and brought him into Paris. We sent cablegrams to every command under Spaatz, got tons of statistics in, broke them down, analyzed them, simplified them, got pictures, everything, and in a matter of about 10 days,

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we have this little album. I've still got 4 copies of it, in which Mac Kantor wrote a letter to Mr. & Mrs. Zilch, or some ficticious name, whose son was killed in the war. He was a pilot and "here's what your son accomplished" - that type of thing. Beautifully written.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's arrival in March Field.

B: Right, in 1931. Protocol was that we had to call on the Commanding Officer the first night, well, that meant every officer on the base had to call the first night. They had no choice, and we had no choice, so we dressed up in our best bib and tucker and walked in. And here was this great big blank living room with hardly a stick of furniture, except a few GI chairs that the Quartermaster gave him. And they were very gracious hosts. And weeks later, Bee Arnold could call every wife by her first and last name. Now isn't that true? (addressed to Mrs. Bowman who mentioned that Mrs. Arnold had a receiving line to meet the officers and their wives).

B: She had a wonderful memory and a most gracious person, wonderful personality.

Mrs. B: She probably had "The Air Force takes care of its own" more deeply embedded in her than anyone I've ever known.

Q: This is my feeling, if he didn't originate that phrase, she is the one who practiced it more than anyone else.

B: Etta (Bowman?) was working very closely with Mrs. Arnold during WWII. She stayed in Washington - the "Spotters"(?) which was a woman's organization to help the wives all over the world, wherever they were located, and Etta was the Chairman of the Spotters committee for Mrs. Arnold, and got to know her quite well. When we were at March Field, she had wonderful admiration for her.

Q: We were talking about McKinlay Kantor. This product of his

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was not published?

B: It was called "The American Air Victory Over Germany." Just a few copies of that were made.

Q: Never released?

B: As I recall, there were only 4 copies, I'm sure Mac must have saved one, he gave one to me, as I worked with him on the whole thing. He gave one which I carried back by hand, to Arnold and never heard of it again. I never knew whether he used it or not. I never got any reaction from him, whatsoever, which is typical. Where the fourth copy went, I don't know. Spaatz must have been given one.

Q: Well, I went through the Spaatz papers in the Library of Congress. There are a lot of publications in file, but without the story to tell, it would have no particular meaning. But Arnold had a great sense of history.... He was not happy with the Craven & Cates volumes, the official history. Were you aware of that?

B: No, actually I didn't get too deeply into that because with all that was going on in the front office and everywhere else, the unification fight which started right in the middle of it, and everything else, I didn't get involved in that in any other detail than the fact that I was for it, I encouraged it, helped wherever I could. I have a complete set of the books which the historians from Maxwell sent me about 10 years later, but I was not really very closely involved in that. It was a matter of someplace to put the units for general administrative supervision.

Q: One of the faults of the history was that it was written too soon after the events. They didn't have all the materials, and they didn't have the perspective. Anyway, the University of Chicago publicist sent the first volume to Arnold and asked him for a blurb they could use on the dust jacket or for advertising purposes. And he wrote back saying: "What I have to say

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about this book, you wouldn't be able to use.

B: Oh really? I didn't know that.

Q: I want to get a little on the post war, the unification struggle. Now Larry Norstad, I think he was A-5 after the war, and Hank Everest and Bart Leach served on a committee. But basically, it was Symington and Norstad working with Forrestal and Sherman on unification. Now, I've had some static that Arnold was unhappy that Norstad agreed to a unification plan which perhaps gave away too much in the way of compromise in order to win the Navy's support.

B: I never got any such reaction, but I can give you a little background on the unification pitch from my own vantage point. While I was with Spaatz over in Europe, just before I came back, Spaatz started spouting off. He was a little radical on the subject, and felt very strong, probably not mellowed as much as Arnold was by that time on the subject. But, I lived with Spaatz in Park House over there. Almost every evening there would be guests in the house, standing around talking, and I got to know Spaatz quite well. Spaatz, one evening, when he, Ted Curtis and I were standing around in front of the fireplace, he started spouting off about how the war was about over, and it was just a matter of time, before the oldsters would be retiring. He said: "I'm thinking seriously of spouting off, starting the big fight....I said: "Look, if you get yourself fired. If you get the reputation for being a bitter radical, you will become a has-been and your influence will be decreased." And I said: "It just so happens in the six months I've been here - 5 maybe by that time - I've heckled you with a lot of people to lunch, and dinner. I brought these people in one at a time, or two or three at a time to meet you, because that's where you shine the greatest." Spaatz had no talent for standing up in front of a press conference and making a speech." So I said: "Why become a martyr and lose your influence. It just so happens that we've

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got a lot of friends, Collie Small of the (Saturday Evening) Post. There are all sorts of people who love the Air Force. They are presumably unprejudiced. Their influence will be far greater than yours will be as a prejudiced martyr. You'll be far more beneficial to the cause if you stay in the AAF and use your influence through others who can say it better because they are professionals who have the outlet to say it and who are considered rightly or wrongly as unprejudiced. So why don't you work through these people. It is better than becoming a martyr. The Air Force still needs you." Spaatz said: "Hal, you write me 10 commandments, why we should have a separate air force; then write me 10 answers why we shouldn't." I went around to a lot of people who knew more about it than I did - Hugh Knerr, who was on his staff, and an old fighter for unification, and a lot of the old timers were gathered around in that headquarters at that time. With their advice, I wrote up 10 commandments. Curtis asked 10 answers "why not," and I answered them as briefly as I could. Then I stamped it "Confidential" to make it more interesting. Put it up on the mantle over the fireplace, and the tactic was that, anytime we had a fresh guest in that we had confidence in, we started bringing up the subject, kind of bring up the problem, and get Spaatz to discussing it. And then he'd end up saying: "Well, this is confidential." In other words, Spaatz would say: "I trust you," and so forth. He'd tell the guest to "go over in the corner and read this if you would like to, but don't quote me, no attribution, but whatever I get out of this, you are welcome to think about."

Q: What reactions did Knerr give you?

B: Well, Knerr, of course, like Spaatz, was an oldtime fighter for unification. He was one of the original people who got into trouble with Arnold and Spaatz and others who supported Mitchell.

Q: I was asking you about Knerr. When Knerr was a very strong

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advocate of unification, he was very close to Andrews.

B: I didn't know that, I knew there was a very close balance there, not necessarily friendship, a balance between Andrews and Arnold. I never was closely associated with Knerr. I always admired him from afar, but never served directly over him or directly with him except when that short tour in Europe, when he was Chief of the Services organization. I went to him to help me with the 10 commandments. I knew him, but he probably wouldn't even remember me.

Q: Tell me about your role in the unification battle of 1946.

B: When this battle broke in Washington, I was right in the middle of that. Spaatz, by that time had been tagged for the Chief, but was kind of at loose ends temporarily. Arnold had appointed him as a kind of undercover "chief of a unification plot." Spaatz had a little office from which he kind of directed the battle. Spaatz was a great strategist, and had a quiet way to get things done. Well, my part was in public relations. We had a staff meeting every morning. Norstad was, of course, working with Spaatz on some of the above board work. I had a chart that I would brief him on every morning, and it was quite a national campaign. Quite a bit of this was under cover. One thing that we pulled, which I thought was very successful, knowing that Norstad was brilliant in so many ways, so fast on his feet, although not an orator by any means, because he didn't talk too well. But his thinking was so good, he was so sharp - by that time he was a BG. I arranged that Admiral "Min" Miller, the Navy PIO would come in for a debate. There would be dinner at a hotel, at which we invited the staff and other employees. Min Miller vs. Larry Norstad. Well, you know who won that battle, Larry Norstad did a beautiful job. He laid the Navy out cold. However, I must say, Miller did a beautiful job, but he wasn't that good. Miller spoke well, but Larry had the comeback. That was a typical example of the things that went

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on as part of the unification battle.

Q: Admiral "Min" Miller became special counsel to the Hinshaw-Brewster Congressional Aviation Policy Board, and he then became Executive Director.

B: Marvelous personality; smart guy. He did a fine job for the Navy, but he just wasn't quite as sharp as Norstad.... Before he retired, Arnold got in a couple of good licks for unification. When Arnold retired, and

Q: That should have been around February 1946.

B: Yes, about that time. The Overseas Press Club in NY asked to have him as their guest, at a farewell dinner. I was, of course, involved in making the arrangements,and going with him and so forth, to the hotel in NY. First there were accolades and what not. But during the intermission, Arnold got to talking - I was with him - about things not going very fast. Everything was kind of routine. Nobody was getting into any controversy. Arnold said to me: "See if you can whip up something. Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star was there. This was Arnold's idea. He said: "Let's get into a fight." Roy Roberts agreed. So it was decided when Arnold got up for questions, Roy Roberts would ask him some question about the Air Force vs. Navy carriers. Sure enough, Roy Roberts got up and gave some blast that was designed ostensibly to make Arnold mad. And so Arnold ostensibly got mad. And he raised his voice, and he pounded the table. Roy Roberts shouted back at him, and Arnold shouted back at Roy Roberts. At the end of the program - everything was going to be ready anyhow - I had the car all warmed up out in front, and I was standing at the door, per instructions. And so, when Arnold got so mad, presumably, that he couldn't stand it any longer, he stalked out of the meeting, and he ran down and got into the car, and laughed like everything.

Q: Did you get a lot of reaction in the papers the next day?

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B: We sure did. After leaving the dinner, we rushed out to the airport and came back by plane. On the way out - and your speaking of Norstad reminds me of this postscript to that evening, I thought this would be a wonderful time, on the way out to the airport, to reminisce or to looking into the future because Arnold had a great talent for looking into the future. So, just to stimulate the conversation, after things had been quiet for a few seconds, I said: "Do you know, I'll bet I can forecast who's going to be Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 10 years." And he said: "You do? Who?" I said: "Larry Norstad." I thought, "Boy, this will get him started." But do you know his only reaction was: "What makes you think so?" He never reacted, and he wasn't going to commit himself on that subject, and I never could quite understand it until just now when you mention this story of snubbing Norstad. It might have had something to do with it.

Q: This might have been that period when he felt, in 1946 - he was extremely unhappy because they expected unification right after the war ended. You know, the President in December 1945 had made his first unification statement. Somehow, the AAF expected that this would be a matter of course. They didn't reckon with the Navy opposition, and the Navy wasn't going to let go of the status quo until they could have a unification bill which was acceptable to them. So Norstad, being a politician, probably came to realize that it was either this compromise bill or you wouldn't have anything. The Navy stalled unification. In other words, it was whether the AAF would accept half a loaf.

B: Yes, well, Norstad was more the diplomat.

Q: This might have been during that period when Arnold felt that it wasn't moving too fast, and perhaps he partly blamed Norstad for it.

B: I think Arnold would have been more apt to accept that, having

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been sort of leavened during the war by contact with all these other people. He was more practical, than maybe Spaatz, or some of the people who had not gone through quite so much of the leavening process. And I could imagine that Arnold would be more ready to accept a compromise at that period, than would have Spaatz or Knerr.

Q: When Eaker came home in April 1945, did he figure that he would become Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

B: Well, I think he must have, and here's the story that I heard. I can't authenticate this. But, I do know this. I was in a staff meeting in which Eaker said: "Gen Arnold is a sick man, and we must try to take all the load off him we can, other than to attain the maximum benefit from his prestige and so forth, for the Air Force.

Q: Now, this must have been right about VE Day.

B: No, it was after VE Day, but before VJ Day. Eaker said: "We must take the load off of his shoulders, so far as running the AAF. He is indispensable in our relationships with the high levels of government. His prestige and experience are of tremendous value to the air force, but he cannot do it all." In effect, what Eaker said was: "I am the boss. We're going to take the load off his shoulders, and just don't go over my head." The general meaning of his little speech was: "I'm running the Army Air Forces." And we accepted that, and understood it. As a matter of fact, it was very logical. Arnold brought him back for that purpose. Then, this happened after I left, and this is purely rumor, because I don't know it first-hand at all. That Eaker had the Strategic Board, when a Chief of Staff to a successor to Arnold was about to be selected, the minute his resignation, his request for retirement came in, Arnold accepted it. And according to a secretary in Arnold's office who was in a very good position to know

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Q: Suzy Adkins?

B: She's dead now, so I guess I can attribute it to her because you can't prove she didn't and I can't prove she did. But anyhow, according to Suzy Adkins, Eaker was fit to be tied. He wouldn't speak to anybody for days, he was bitter, hard to get along with.

Q: Because Arnold had accepted?

B: That was presumably the reason.

Q: Well, how did it get unaccepted. He stayed on, obviously.

B: I think he was on for a while, but not very long.

Q: Well, he stayed on till 1947.

B: I think so, but anyhow, he was always a very ambitious guy. In fact, he said one time - the way to get along with Air Force is to pick the right people to follow. Stick with them and they will carry you along.

Q: How about Lovett? I've got one version of Lovett's role, as a balance wheel, to keep Arnold in perspective. You know, Arnold was said to be impetuous. Lovett would say to him: "Now, Hap, let's take a look at this thing. I agree with you, Hap, and then sort of put it in File 13. Is this your impression of Lovett's role?

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, when Lovett first arrived as Asst Secy of War for Air, his Exec was to be Bill Streett. I think Streett was in Hawaii at the time and it was about a month or 6 weeks delay, and Arnold sent me up to Lovett's office to be his Executive pending the arrival of Streett. So I did get to know Lovett fairly well at that time, for a short period of time, and that was my impression. Suave, diplomatic, thoughtful, brilliant. I had great respect for him, and it was my conclusion from what little I knew of him and from more I knew of Arnold, that it must have been a wonderful balance.

Q: Arnold and Patterson were not of the same chemistry. Do you

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recall the relationship there?

B: No, I didn't know Patterson at all, personally. The only thing I knew about him was, other than having heard him make a couple of speeches, was told to me by Symington, who was to be the first Secretary of the Air Force. When he first came to Washington, he went to his friend, Patterson, and asked for his advice on how to survive in this town. The one thing that I recall his repeating was this: never let anybody write your speeches for you. When you make a speech, it's got to be your speech, and Symington, I think, lived up to that, he may have had a lot of people to help him, but when he did it, it was his personality and his thoughts. It was good advice.

Q: Were you aware of any relationship or strain between Arnold and Drew Pearson?

B: No more than any of the rest of us had, I guess. Nothing that I know of personally, except the fact that when I was Public Relations there at the end of the war, I do know this. The first thing I used to have to do every morning was to read Drew Pearson and try to find out what he was talking about, and get the answer up to Arnold real fast, because Secy Stimson was going to call him on the squawk box as soon as he got in. And Drew Pearson was the bane of our existence. The first order of business every morning was to go on the defensive. Arnold had to go on the defensive to Stimson, first thing in the morning.

Q: I want to ask you about Elliott Roosevelt. I think he mostly did a great job. However, he was a curious sort of fellow and wanted certain privileges. He didn't have the eyesight, and without the wings, he couldn't be a commander, and he couldn't be a general. Were you in on this?

B: No, not in on the controversy, Elliott did visit Spaatz at Park House at the time I was living there. I met him, and the general attitude around the headquarters at that time, was that he had a lot of influence, he's

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got a Poppa. But the guy has done a good job, and I think they had considerable respect for him in spite of his tendency to be overbearing.

Q: Was he overbearing?

B: I mean that in the way that he wanted everybody to know who Poppa was. But I think the general concept was that he was very capable and did a fine job....

Q: Right, well my feeling is that he probably would have gone farther if his father wasn't the President. It was sort of a handicap for him, because he undertook missions like out at Baffin Bay as part of planning the ferry route early in 1941.

B: Well, it started with a headline across the country: "I Want To Be A Captain Too!" Do you recall all that controversy, when Arnold personally appointed him a Captain in the Air Reserve? That was an innovation because we just didn't appoint people as officers in the Air Corps without a little more service background than that. But that was Arnold's forward looking imaginative approach. He wanted to make the best use of anybody who had talent to offer.

Q: I want to ask you about De Seversky. Now, he and Arnold didn't get along. Do you have any knowledge of that?

B: Not too much. When I was out at Wright Field we used to see Seversky out there. Naturally, he was right in the middle of everything. He, again, was a hairshirt. He was highly critical and I can imagine that there would be controversy, although I think there was also mutual respect. In fact, he was a wide open thinker, who probably was even farther with some of the Air Force radicals.

Q: While he was gone, Arnold had to run the Air Force.

B: Yes, that's his nature. I don't know personally of any controversy between them.

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Q: Well, this is, he would write these articles and say: "We're not doing this, or we're not doing that." Of course, Arnold was naturally critical of unsolicited advice.

Q: I want to ask you about the alleged exaggerations of our kill scores by the 8th AF. Now, you were in public relations. You were probably right in the middle of that.

B: Yes, but having also spent a year as a Combat Group Commander before we got up there, my impression was that early in the war, they didn't have the system that was later developed because of what I think was probably a very wholesome criticism. It forced the services into a system of checks and balances. During the time I was in combat, I can assure you that nobody got a kill credited to his account, unless he had enough people to prove it. Now, you can't always prove it 100%, if 500 gunners are shooting at one lone bogey. That claim goes up through channels, so that somebody in each channel tries to evaluate how many people were shooting at it. And I think that well before the end of the war, that the records were not only accurate, but probably conservative.

Q: Well, this was a very touchy subject, incidentally, between Arnold and Patterson, the lawyer. There were some sarcastic comments about the exaggerated kill scores in the 8th AF, and Arnold jumped on Eaker a couple of times. And so this was a very touchy subject. Arnold was concerned that whatever information came back would be credible. There were writers like Peter Masefield who were very critical of the 8th Air Force daylight bombing, and Arnold was always pushing Eaker, then later Spaatz, we've got to get the story to the people. Do you have any special recollections of reactions to the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid?

B: Well, that was a phase just before my arrival at his command, but I know some of the reactions. My only personal reaction is this, I'm

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sure you read more of the background on it than I have, and all that I have, so I'll try to repeat official history, but when I arrived over there - it was in November 1943 - with my group, and as a newcomer, I went to one of the neighboring bases. I sat in on their briefings before missions and I can recall everybody was awfully sensitive about the high loss rate and they had made missions in which they had to go part of the way without escorts, like Regensburg and Schweinfurt, and had gotten pretty badly mauled. At the first briefing I attended, the announcement was made that we would have fighter escorts all the way in and all the way out for the first time, on a long mission. You could have heard the cheers clear to Berlin. I mean, hats were thrown in the air. The guys were ecstatic. For the crews, it was a tremendous load lifted off their chests. Now, by the time I got really into combat, we did have fighter escorts, P-51s which got in there late in '43, and that's about the time we got into action.

Q: Well, before this, a fellow who had to complete 25 missions didn't have more than a 50-50 chance to survive.

Q: You mentioned that Arnold was very sparing with praise. Well, one of the guys with whom he was very generous was Curt LeMay. LeMay replaced Hansell on the B-29 job at the end of 1944. Arnold admired LeMay because he never said: "Well, we can't do it, for this reason or that reason." LeMay went out and did it. Do you have any knowledge of that relationship between them?

B: Not specifically. I do recall being in the Chief's office at the time when LeMay with his B-17 group was headed toward the Far East. I can remember seeing messages back and forth, and suddenly turned around and headed for England, I served with LeMay when he was in that first bombardment group - over at Langley Field - the first B-17s that came out, because I was supposed to be part of that unit. LeMay was in that group.

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Q: He had the B-17s that spotted the Rex. Were you in on that?

B: No, I wasn't in the group. I was Asst Base Operations Officer. But anyhow, so I had known LeMay since 1937-38, but LeMay was another guy who had a great deal in common with Gen Arnold's approach to leadership - rough, tough and dirty. Don't give anybody an inch; crack the whip, if anybody gets in your way - fire him. And LeMay was even dirtier than Arnold.

Q: Well, I had this impression that LeMay was cut in the mold of Arnold's conception of leadership.

B: Yes. He was a driver. Never mind being fair or unfair, get results and fire anybody who doesn't and keep picking them until somebody gets results, and then forget the reason why.

Q: Arnold had a great interest in R&D. Do you recall any special incident that would document that?

B: Well, when I was at March Field, when Millikan came out, and asked Arnold, if Arnold would let our Curtiss Condor bombers - the B-2 - fly his 500# lead-ball equipment up to various altitudes for automatic recording devices to record the rays, and what not, at various atmospheric altitudes. Amold of course, readily agreed. I was one of the pilots who took his turn flying up to 21,000 feet. Millikan as I recall, would sit down below in the hangar and wait for the mission to return. I don't recall his having any discussions with Arnold. I wasn't in on them. But I do recall one incident, that had to do with a little genius that we had in our squadron. This guy was a mathematician, a typical scientist type, and they would sit down in the hangar and argue about mathematical formulas hour after hour, while the airplane was flying up above.

Q: How about Arnold and von Karman? He was very close to von Karman.

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B: I never met von Karman but I think Millikan brought them together. My only connection there with the R&D type of thing was when I was PIO in Washington. Just before Arnold retired, and he got this idea of looking forward and so forth, and this became quite a fixation with him. He called me in one day and said: "We've got to get out of the habit of thinking in the past and start looking into the future. We are already doing a lot of it, but the public doesn't understand. We've got to work up a program, a public relations program." Arnold said: 'Call it the Buck Rogers Plan," in which we can go all-out and tell everything that possibly can do. You know when he went all-out on something, he was inclined sometimes to exaggerate a little bit, I think it actually flared back on us a little bit because, in my enthusiasm to carry out his program, I probably was guilty of some exaggeration.

Q: Well, when you people showed enthusiasm, this gave him more impetus.

B: Yes, the program was very effective from the standpoint of what he directed, and which I concurred completely. But sometimes, we went so far as to go overboard on letting out of the bag some of the future secret projects, and so forth, and got quite terribly criticized for them. People like LeMay and Vandenberg were very critical about the number of secrets we were letting out.

Q: Right at the beginning of our conversation, we talked about Goddard, and his relationship with Arnold. What was the trouble between Goddard and Arnold?

B: I don't know whether there was any personality clash there or not. I know Goddard quite well. I knew him for a long time, in fact, he was the guy who needled year after year, and finally got me back to Wright Field, simply because at one time when he was experimenting with silent motion

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pictures, he tried to get a sound man from studios in Hollywood to put on the sound track, and they said why we'd be delighted to furnish you one, but we listen to the air raid announcer out here, and if you can find out who that was, we'll find a voice that's just as good as any we have here. And with all due modesty, I was the guy that got stuck with this job of going down and helping-with Arnold's approval - Goddard to make the first motion picture navigation film down at Rockwell.

Q: Arnold and Goddard had a falling out along the way. Minton Kaye had a role in that.

B: Out at March Field, Minton Kaye and his wife, became close personal friends of the Arnolds to the point where there was some lifting of eyebrows about bootlicking and what not.

Q: Were they related in any way?

B: Not that I know of, but that close relationship continued to exist, and Minton Kaye, any time there was a question about it, why Minton could do no wrong. On the other hand, I knew Goddard from having served with him there at Wright Field quite well, and very closely with him because he broke me in on my job. But, Goddard was a man with a tremendous imagination for things that could be done ahead of time, and as soon as he proved to himself in the research and development phase, that it was practical, he would completely lose interest. So, there was never any follow through, and George Goddard never got credit for the things that he developed, and Mint Kaye was just the guy who could do it. He could take the credit for anything and be happy to do so. And both of them had their assets so far as the Air Force was concerned. Mint Kaye was a guy who probably was a better organizer and a better follow-upper. But, Goddard could develop anything along the photographic line, then just drop it as soon as he lost interest in it.

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Q: You know, he speaks of "Col Nemesis" in his book, and of course, it was probably Minton Kaye. And he talks of Arnold as having scored him. Goddard went over on temporary duty to the Navy and then the Air Force brought him back. He went over to the ETO.

B: Yes, as a matter of fact, Spaatz was having reconnaissance trouble, and he got wind of the fact that Goddard was some place over in the US, this sounds exaggerated, somebody said they saw him in charge of logistics having responsibility for the VD program.

Q: At Charlotte AFB. And he tells a story about how he was put in charge of that mission.

B: I didn't know if that was a rumor or not. But anyhow, I knew he was in the doghouse. But I also know that Spaatz got his fingers in it, brought him over to the ETO and said we need low level reconnaissance that shows close-up pictures of the ground. In a matter of days, Goddard went around a little mill shop, and he worked up this thing, and he brought it in to the Park House. I sat there and watched the thing. And he showed reconnaissance still photographs that were just as clear as a bell taken at F-51 high speeds, that was pretty fast at that time, 300 or 400 miles an hour, right down on the ground. He had worked up the concept - a perfectly simple fact that the film moves across the shutter with the relative speed of the plane. And it got perfectly clear pictures, just like that. He developed this thing.

Q: Well, then, the friction between him and Arnold was probably generated by Kaye, as a result of Kaye's relationship with Arnold?

B: I think partly that, and partly the fact that you had to admit and I would be the first one to admit, that, as much as I admired George Goddard, that to take advantage of his talent, you had to have a good adjutant to pick it up and run with it. Now if the relationship had been such that George Goddard was the boss and Mint Kaye was a low subordinate who would pick

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up the ball and run with it, you would have had a wonderful combination.

Q: In practice, Kaye was his boss and he was the idea man created the problems.

B: So naturally, every idea then that Goddard came up with, was wrong as far as Kaye was concerned, because there was professional competition, and I don't think Kaye was the type of personality who would take competition. He was in there polishing boots, and he wasn't going to brook any interference, and Goddard, although he was a tremendously enthusiastic salesman about any idea he was running with, he dropped the ball more than anybody I knew.

Q: I think this is the best explanation I have had of this relationship. You know, Goddard's book, as you will see, as a matter of fact, I have the galley, when I send this back, I'll send you the galley.

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Bowman, Kendell H. 25 Oct 71

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Interview with Maj Gen Wendell W. Bowman, Colorado Springs, Colo.
Oct 25, 1971

Q Do you recall the first time you saw General Arnold, or encountered him in the hall?

B I sure do. I went out to flying school at March Field in the fall of 1932. He was wing base commander. They had a lot of other people who became famous, such as Tooey Spaatz, McNarney--Smokey Joe--Monk Hunter. The first time I saw Lieut Colonel Arnold--that was high rank in those days. Everybody was a 2nd Lieut.

Q And you were a year or two out of West Point?

B Yes, a little over one year out. The first real contact that I had with Hap, he called me in his office one day and said: "Boy, do you know anything about horses?" I said: "Yes, sir, a little. I was raised on a farm, and horses were our primary means of transportation." He said: "Tell you what. We used to play a lot of polo around here, but don't play any polo. We have a bunch of ponies. One in particular. I'm going to put you in charge of the stables. I want you to clean a lot of this stuff we have down there and see if you can sell it, and I want you to get rid of this horse because the kids and the women tried to ride this polo pony, and he thinks he is still playing polo. And they keep falling off of him." He went on. I can't remember in detail what he said. Before I left, I asked him: "Sir, how much do you think I ought to ask for that pony?" He said $150. I talked around a little bit. A man came in to see me. He wanted a pony for his son. He looked at the horse and said: "Pretty good pony. Has got good moves. What did you want for him?" I said $150. He said, awful, that was 1932. There were not too many $150 horses. He offered to swap a good saddle horse with me when I told him about the women falling off the

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polo pony. He came back in a few days with a pony. I rode him around a little bit and we made a deal. The next time I saw, then Colonel Arnold, he said: "The wife and kids and everybody think you made an awfully good trade. They like that horse." After we had traded, I asked the guy: "How much did you pay for that horse?" He said: "$18.50"

Q You're the original horse trader?

B Well, I didn't have the guts to tell Arnold that. Fortunately he didn't ask me.

Q He at one time loved to ride. Mrs. Arnold and their daughter Lois, a teen-ager at that time.

B Teen-ager kept falling off this pony and that's the reason he said "Get rid of that damn horse. My daughter keeps falling off it." They wouldn't let him alone and I guess a polo pony, if you give him the wrong squeeze or something, they'll just cut like a jack rabbit. And he'd make that move and they'd just go on off.

Q They're trained differently than riding horses? Were you assigned to the fighter squadron?

B No. I was 31st Bomb Squadron.

Q Who was the commander of that, then?

B Ralph Snavely was commander of the Squadron. McNarney had the Group. There were three squadrons, the 9th, 31st, and 11th.

Q I've been trying to get in touch with him and he wrote me recently. He is down in Rio Chaparral, Texas. He was on the Alaskan flight with Arnold in '34. How long did you stay at March?

B Got there in '32, and I left in the summer of '34 and went back ao the Signal School at Fort Monmouth. That started me in Communcations for quite a few years, even though I never did know much about it.

Q You were there during a critical period in Arnold's development. This is when he made himself known to his boss, General Malin Craig up at the Presidio, 9th Corps Area command. And this is the beginning

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of Arnold's come back to promise. He was (cough) because of his association with Billy Mitchell. When Craig came to Washington to succeed MacArthur as Chief of Staff, he brought in Arnold as Assistant Chief of Air Corps. The key to his career is March Field. Do you have any recollections of the earthquake at March?

B I have one very vivid recollection because we were going to do a little night flying, and I was standing in the Operations office, just about to go out and get in the airplane and buzz these old Keystones around some. First time I'd ever felt an earthquake, but there wasn't any doubt in my mind what it was, because I was on this concrete floor. I could feel this thing. I was standing there with a parachute on my shoulder and everybody said: "Earthquake." Of course it didn't really shake up anything at March too much. We were too far away but you could feel it.

Q There was some response by Colonel Arnold. Did he send in some soup kitchens and communications equipment? Didn't he respond very quickly to the civil disaster?

B As I recall it, he did. Exactly what they sent, of course... Our communications equipment in those days was so antiquated, it wouldn't have been much help, but I'm pretty sure he sent in soup kitchens and blankets and all that stuff and everything he could. I really don't remember any response on the earthquake. There was a lot in the papers and radio. That's all I had there for several days. Specifically, their treatment of Colonel Arnold and the Air Corps response, I dont recall.

Q There was another area where Arnold bloomed in the estimation of his superiors. He ran Air Shows with Hollywood types, Wallace Beery, Bebe Daniels, Mary Pickford. Did you get involved in any of those air shows?

B Just flying around in an old bomber in formation is about all. I didn't get involved in any details.

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Q You were too far down?

B A pilot, Second Lieutenant, Supply Officer, and in charge of the stables. They didn't ask my opinion.

Q Another important facet. How about the CCC?

B I was in the CCC camp in the mountains outside of San Bernardino. Woggie Towle was commander. My time at March Field was spent. There were a lot of things other than training for the Air Corps mission than CCC camp. Then somebody said, if you want to cancel the mail contract we'll carry it. They pulled everybody out overnight almost in anything that could get off the ground, and went out to Salt Lake and started carrying mail.

Q Going back to CCC for a minute; you were Assistant to Woggy Towle?

B In the camp?

Q Do you remember anything specific about Arnold and the CCC?

B Not specific. Generally, he uprooted practically everybody required to go out and man these camps and command them. I'm sure in logistics they helped to the extent the law would allow on, giving stuff. But specifically no. I don't think I can add anything.

Q Arnold did visit a lot of the CCC camps, but not yours?

B He didn't visit mine while I was there.

Q Let's talk about the air mail. They were very hungry for flying funds and the Postmaster General, Farley, and his assistant, Harllee Branch, asked Gen Foulois if he could fly the mail and he said "Give us a week or ten days" So they gave him ten days, and of course he had some accidents. Were you flying mail?

B I flew from Salt Lake City to Cheyenne the whole time the mail was on. We lost quite a few boys on that run. It was a rough one and we were flying just anything we could get, the old Bellanca transport. We'd fly Keystone bombers, P-12's, those little observation aircraft, O-2's, and O-35's. The airplanes either didn't have a radio in it or if they

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did, didn't have one that worked.

Q Very primitive navigation equipment. You weren't familiar with the terrain.

B And the aircraft did not have the instrumentation that they had later. About all you had to fly instruments was a needle and ball. And that, when you get into rough weather...

Q And that February was rough weather.

B It was rough weather.

Q Arnold had his headquarters at Salt Lake at the Newhouse Hotel. Do you remember him there? What do you remember about him?

B It's not very important. One of the things I remember about him. Some of us was out on the town one night, with Monk Hunter. I ran into him in the hall next morning. He said: "Say, what did you boys do to Monk last night?" I said: "We didn't do anything, Sir." I was thinking: "What were you doing out there?" He said: "I'll tell you, old Monk is not in too good shape this morning."

Q He was always the ladies' man. Did he have a big moustache:

B Yes. But it seemed to me like on the staff that they had there in the hotel, that anybody, if he's Captain or above, he's on the staff. The Second Lieutenants flew the mail. That's the size of it.

Q I guess they slept on cots. They had rooms in the hotel, some converted to offices. Then there was a paoblem with per diem. You didn't get your money until later, $5 per day. Wasn't everybody on the cuff?

B Yes, for a long while.

Q Did you have financial problems?

B Not too much, because things were cheap. I didn't have real personal financial problems, but I do recall that it took us a while to get our money. I think it was along in that area, too, or maybe a little after, they said: "Everybody, take a month's leave but you're not going to get paid for it."

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Q That was the Economy Act. You worked for twelve months and got paid for eleven. Were you actually on leave or did you have to produce without pay?

B As I recall you could take leave. Of course, most of us couldn't afford to take leave. You couldn't go anywhere.

Q Do you remember anything about Arnold? Did he have pretty good control of the situation out at Salt Lake City?

B I'm sure he did. I can think of nothing to indicate he didn't have control of the situation. Of course he had an awful can of worms there to try to control, flying in that type of weather with just picked-up miscellaneous type aircraft. And a lot of us were recently out of flying school, and we had not, generally speaking, had enough instrument training. That's what killed those boys. And he did set up--brought old Swede Larsen up from Rockwell Field down in San Diego, and started to run an instrument school right there at Salt Lake, which we needed very badly. When you weren't on a run you were out there with a hood over you, and Swede setting in the back seat heckling you, trying to learn to fly instruments a little better.

Q Arnold told them not to fly in bad weather?

B We had restrictions on flying in bad weather, but unfortunately, the weather reporting and weather data we had, was nothing comparable to what it is today. You didn't know exactly what the weather was going to be. So you'd take off in Salt Lake City and, going along, everything would look pretty good. All of a sudden, off the Wasatch Mountains, here'd come a snowstorm, shower, not a general snow, just a snow squall, and you're in it! And if you couldn't fly instruments, you're going to cream yourself. You just couldn't forecast it.

Q You flew from Salt Lake City to Cheyenne?

B Yes, and back, of course. As an example, it's kind of interesting. I was flying across there one night in an old C-27 Bellanca with one

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engine sitting out on a goose neck. I got in this snow storm, and I couldn't see anything hardly but straight down and just by figuring out where I was, and fortunately, I apparently did it kind of accurately, and got a rough course to Larami. Fortunately I went over the field at Laramie and I saw this green flashing light. I don't want to lose that; that's the airport. I want to get on the ground. I don't care where it is, preferably in one piece. I finally landed and I couldn't see well enough to see where to go, so I taxied over to the boundary lights, and finally found the little CA shack and cut her off, and went in, and introduced myself.

Q This was CAA?

B CA then. Later it became Civil Aeronautics Administration. I said: "I've got 2,200 lbs of mail out here and about five or six sacks of it is Registered. I'd like to use your phone, want to get hold of a Post-master. And he said: "Post Office is closed." So I said: "I'm sure it is but there must be some way to get hold of him." I finally got hold of him and he said: "Everybody is closed. Haven't got a truck. If you can get it down to the Post Office, I'll send a man to open the rear door so you can put it in there." I said: "Sir, I've just got an airplane. I haven't got a truck." So he said: "That's the best I can do for you." By that time a lot of cars had pulled up. They'd come out to see the crash. They'd heard me milling around. I could set there all night, and it's cold and snowing. Or I can take a chance of filling up the rumble seats and back seats of these cars which had been offered and taking it down there, which I did. The weather cleared up the next day and I flew on in to Cheyenne just across the mountain, and I told the postal people about it. They wouldn't quite believe it. I said: "Ask that CA guy out there, and ask all the other people, if you don't believe it." I came back in to Cheyenne on the next run, four or five days later, and I went into the little Post Office place they had set up there

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receive the mail. I said: "How's the boy over at Laramie getting ong?" They said: "He doesn't live there any more." They fired him.

. You had all this Registered mail

I got the mail on the ground. It was his responsibility to do some- ing about it. That's got nothing to do with Arnold.

It does, in a way. It has very much to do with my story, because se young men were very dedicated, and they were taking a lot of ces. And it was sort of a virility test. All these young pilots were g their necks with lousy equipment, navigation equipment, just to ney could get the job done. There were some heroics and fourteen were killed over the country, a couple in the Western Mail zone. Four that I know of on the first two weeks of my run.

Do you remember Will Rogers coming in to the Newhouse Hotel to k with Arnold?

I knew he was there. Again I was down on the bottom shelf, and idn't get in on it.

In fact he had an article the next day in the newspaper, pleading th the young pilots that: "If there's any danger--don't fly." Didn't y stop the mail for a week or two, about eight days? When there re a lot of casualties? The President ordered the air mail stopped a while?

Now that you mention it we did have a little layoff period. I don't nk it was up to eight days.

It seems to me, toward the end of the run, around May 1934 when y finally got some skill they took the Air Mail away from the Air Corps y were finally doing a fine job.

We finally got some B-10's there at Salt Lake. It's funny all the cedure you got to go through and study and answer questionnaires on airplane. They show you how to fly it and all that. Nobody had wn one, and they wanted me to go out on a run with one. I said I'd ver been in one at all. They said: "Nothing to it at all. It's got

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wings, got an engine--two of them as a matter of fact. Get in and fly it." I said: "Okay" Got in, looked around, read a little piece of the book and flew that airplane.

Q That was a great airplane for its time, wasn't it?

B Yes, it was a big improvement. It had instrumentation, artificial horizon, and turn indicator and all that. You could fly instruments with it, and it didn't take you a week to get there.

Q It had about 200 miles per hour speed which was pretty good for its day?

B Little better than that if you opened it up.

Q Right after that they had the Alaskan Flight?

B Yes. I left immediately after the air mail closed. I got back down to March. And around May or early June, and somebody came in to see the paper and said: "You're going to Fort Monmouth." I said: "Where's that?" It was the Signal School. We had a quota, you know, eenie, meenie, minie, mo. If we want to get rid of Bowman, we'll send him there.

Q Do you remember Harold Bowman? I talked to him in Florida.

B Hal Bowman. He ought to know a lot. He used to write Arnold's speeches. I could remember that. He could be very helpful because he was close to him.

Q Yes, he was. He's trying to sell his own book on that. Do you remember experiences at March Field itself, the Officers Club? Arnold believed in a very closely knit group, and he did a number of things to improve the social relationship among the officers at March Field. The "Wing Ding." This may have come later. He got the idea on the Alaskan flight, later, the dining in.

B He hadn't started that. I was there less than two years. They hadn't started the "Wing Dings" then. I lived there in the BOQ. I'd hate to record everything that happened there. I was 23 or 24 years old. I don't really remember, other than we did have a good time, and it was a good club.

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Q There was one occasion--they were flying some aviation cadets--didn't they use aviation cadets to fly the mail? They paid them less money than a 2d lieutenant? Benny Schriever was an aviation cadet there for a while?

B Benny graduated from flying school in my class but he went through it. He was not an Academy man. He was a Reserve officer. He was wearing brown breeches, and all that.

Q Was there some occasion when somebody, possibly the club officer, said the aviation cadets could not use the Officers Club and Mrs. Arnold appealed to Colonel Arnold and he overruled this club officer?

B I think you're right. I do remember a little rhubarb there. It didn't last very long after Mrs. Arnold got hold of it.

Q Somebody made a decision that these aviation cadets were not officers, therefore could not use the club, and they barred them from the club, and Mrs. Arnold defended the aviation cadets, and they were allowed to use it?

B I vaguely remember that.

Q You remember Mrs. Arnold?

B Yes. Again, I stood in awe of both Colonel Arnold and Mrs. Arnold. What I do recall of her she was a very gracious lady and understanding.

Q She still is. She's in good health. She's 84 years old. Didn't they make a big thing out of Sunday night? They had sort of gambling night or family night, or some such thing? Of course you were a swinging bachelor. This activity may not have appealed to you.

B I don't remember anything specific to be useful. I do remember that they used the club facilities for many things, and I'm sure, in later years, and having commanded quite a number of bases and what not, that your club turns on--whether it's good or bad, active or dead--turns on your commander and, more specifically, the commander's wife.

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Whether it's good or bad, active or dead. If she gets her back into it and pushes things, and gets the other women out, and everything, then you're going to have an active club. If she sits back and sews and plays bridge fourteen hours a day, as I've seen done, the club just falls apart.

Q Very good point. It's the first time anybody had made this point in such a succinct fashion, and it's true. I've been in the Air Force myself as a Reserve Officer. I've seen a number of facilities. Do you have any overall recollection, did the young officers feel Arnold was a good leader, a great leader, gung ho, a man they would follow to the ends of the earth, things like that?

B I think this was the general feeling among the junior officers. We lt he was a good strong, tough, but fair leader. It didn't take people , if you happened to be called up in front of him for a meeting, icularly if you were called up in his office, to realize that what looked a smile on his face really wasn't, and it was not a good idea to mile back. He had what looked like a smile on his face, but he could be pretty upset. The worst thing in the world you could do was to misinterpret that as a smile of humor and then smile back because you were liable to get your head chopped off.

Q A number of people have told me this, the smile was misleading. Don't take it as a sign of pleasure. Were you ever present when he exploded? He did have this tendency later.

B I was never present. I was aware of this susceptibility to exploding, but I obviously was never on his principal staff, or around in staff meeting or where these explosive type problems might be discussed.

Q Remember Major Lohman? He was an Exec, and got in trouble with Arnold?

B I don't remember any occasions?

Q Arnold was displeased with him, so he never made it. Later on when Arnold rose to positions of power, Lohman did not get anywhere.

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A lot of fellows who did a good job at March ended up in very good positions.

B Particularly those who were relatively senior, and it seems silly to say senior, but a Captain was pretty senior.

Q Did you have any post-March Field experiences with Arnold? During the war?

B Not personally. I was in what they called the old Army Airways Communication System during the war.

Q Down at Greenville?

B No, it started out at Gravelly Point, and then, we finally moved on to Asheville, N.C. I do remember a funny thing. It didn't happen to me personally, but I did know about it. We were down at Asheville and had an elderly guy--seemed elderly to me at the time--G.G. Jones, who was from the A.T.&T long lines branch, and General Arnold, I think, had personally gotten a lot of these guys in, and Jones didn't have a specific job, just general overall advisor, "Scattergood Baines" type. Colonel Ivan Farman was Commander. We had worked up to where we had 40,000 or 45,000 people in this scattered all over the world. Mr. Jones figured that everybody was being made General, and though they ought to have a general officer space in this outfit--it was big enough. So he could get in to see Arnold, throw his old slouch hat on the desk, and go in and talk to him, where we couldn't. I was the Deputy Commander. Ivan Farman was the commander. He went up and broached the subject of making Farman a general. Jones told me this. Arnold hit the ceiling. He said: "Farman? Why he never shined his shoes in his life; the seat of his breeches comes to his knees. That's the last guy I'd make a general.. As a matter of fact he did make General.

Q Ivan was in Communications before you were, and at March Field--this is another one of Arnold's stunts to bring air power to public attention. They conducted some communications tests--some broadcasts

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from the air--Ivan Farman flew an airplane around--Arnold was on the ground. They had a big show, and Farman told this story, not to me, that the script blew away, and he had to improvise the script. Do you remember him performing at March Field?

B Oh, yes.

Q Was Arnold this strong for public relations; of getting the Air Corps on the map?

B Yes, I think he was. A lot of these little things that you've made reference to indicate that he was-bringing the people up from Hollywood--putting on these little shows, with whatever we had to put on a show. He was trying to get it in front of the general public, and I think he would have made an awfully good public relations man.

Q This is why he was so close to Harold Bowman. Bowman was very good at this kind of activity, and Farman tells this story. Some VIP's were with Arnold and Farman was to make certain responses. He was trying to fly the airplane and hold the script down.

B I think he was flying an old P-12.

Q Any other involvement with Arnold during the war? Were you down in Asheville for any length of time?

B Couple of years in Asheville.

Q Did you get overseas?

B I went overseas initially in April of '42. I went over and took over the African-Middle East region, was stationed there at Accra, then the old British Gold Coast, the AACS.

Q Did Arnold ever come through there?

B He came through Dakar and then when he finally got into North Africa, I got a frantic message: "Get up there and put in some stuff" at some of these places, Casablanca and Oran. We put in a control tower and a range and of course, the problem was we didn't have the equipment. I remember a story, true or not. First time Arnold came

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through and Tooey Spaatz was overall Air Force Commander over there in Africa. Arnold was through there on a visit and said: "Tooey, how's the war going?" He said: "I'll tell you, Hap, not much war, but I guess it's better than no war at all." Something that Spaatz might say.

Q Did Arnold have a reputation, in your opinion, of being ruthless? Of cutting people off, if they didn't do their job?

B Yes, that was the impression, not unfairly, but he just wouldn't stand for mediocre performance. If you messed up, socially or otherwise, he could be pretty ruthless and, matter of fact, it kept us young bucks back there toeing the line pretty good. We knew what would happen if we got into serious trouble, or didn't do our job.

Q He was kind of strait-laced morally, about drinking and chasing around?

B Yes. He didn't go for that too much, and wouldn't tolerate any-- I mean he didn't go for it at all, and wouldn't tolerate it on the part of others, if he knew about it. So it caused a lot of 2d lieutenants to do things in a rather surreptitious manner.

Q Which reminds me. Do you remember a fellow named Minton Kaye? He was very close to Arnold.

B Yes, he was.

Q Why?

B I don't know why but he was all the time I was at March. Kaye was very close to Arnold. I never had occasion to go up there. I was at Asheville. I went there in '43. Arnold had already been Chief.

Q Where were you right at the start of the war?

B I had an AACS Region at Wright Patt Field.

Q I guess their sending you to Monmouth in '34 changed your whole career?

B Yes. Got me into the communications racket. We had very few people who had any training in communications in the Air Corps, because Signal Corps is supposed to do it all. And then when the war started,

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Signal Corps, like everyone else, was swamped. They didn't have people; they didn't have the equipment; and what not, for this almost overnight expansion worldwide.

Q Did you work for Harold McClelland at any time?

B Yes, I worked for Harold McClelland and directly for Lloyd Watney.

Q Do you remember Edward Bowles?

B Yes. He was involved in radar, communications. He was a specialist sitting right off the top shelf. I had no contact with him.

Q He told me about McClelland who apparently was not effective in his job, and Tom Rives was brought in there to carry on. Do you remember that?

B I don't know the reason for it, but Gen McClelland was eased out, and when people are eased out, they're either not doing a job, or somebody in a position of authority doesn't think he is. It's about the same thing. I can't think of anything specific and I don't know that I've been very helpful.

Q You have been on the March Field period, especially. Did you see Arnold when the war ended? Were you around the Pentagon when he gave his farewell address to the assembled staff in the auditorium?

B No.

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Interview with Maj Gen Wendell W. Bowman, Colorado Springs, Colo.
Oct 25, 1971

Q Do you recall the first time you saw General Arnold, or encountered him in the hall?

B I sure do. I went out to flying school at March Field in the fall of 1932. He was wing base commander. They had a lot of other people who became famous, such as Tooey Spaatz, McNarney--Smokey Joe--Monk Hunter. The first time I saw Lieut Colonel Arnold--that was high rank in those days. Everybody was a 2nd Lieut.

Q And you were a year or two out of West Point?

B Yes, a little over one year out. The first real contact that I had with Hap, he called me in his office one day and said: "Boy, do you know anything about horses?" I said: "Yes, sir, a little. I was raised on a farm, and horses were our primary means of transportation." He said: "Tell you what. We used to play a lot of polo around here, but don't play any polo. We have a bunch of ponies. One in particular. I'm going to put you in charge of the stables. I want you to clean a lot of this stuff we have down there and see if you can sell it, and I want you to get rid of this horse because the kids and the women tried to ride this polo pony, and he thinks he is still playing polo. And they keep falling off of him." He went on. I can't remember in detail what he said. Before I left, I asked him: "Sir, how much do you think I ought to ask for that pony?" He said $150. I talked around a little bit. A man came in to see me. He wanted a pony for his son. He looked at the horse and said: "Pretty good pony. Has got good moves. What did you want for him?" I said $150. He said, awful, that was 1932. There were not too many $150 horses. He offered to swap a good saddle horse with me when I told him about the women falling off the

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polo pony. He came back in a few days with a pony. I rode him around a little bit and we made a deal. The next time I saw, then Colonel Arnold, he said: "The wife and kids and everybody think you made an awfully good trade. They like that horse." After we had traded, I asked the guy: "How much did you pay for that horse?" He said: "$18.50"

Q You're the original horse trader?

B Well, I didn't have the guts to tell Arnold that. Fortunately he didn't ask me.

Q He at one time loved to ride. Mrs. Arnold and their daughter Lois, a teen-ager at that time.

B Teen-ager kept falling off this pony and that's the reason he said "Get rid of that damn horse. My daughter keeps falling off it." They wouldn't let him alone and I guess a polo pony, if you give him the wrong squeeze or something, they'll just cut like a jack rabbit. And he'd make that move and they'd just go on off.

Q They're trained differently than riding horses? Were you assigned to the fighter squadron?

B No. I was 31st Bomb Squadron.

Q Who was the commander of that, then?

B Ralph Snavely was commander of the Squadron. McNarney had the Group. There were three squadrons, the 9th, 31st, and 11th.

Q I've been trying to get in touch with him and he wrote me recently. He is down in Rio Chaparral, Texas. He was on the Alaskan flight with Arnold in '34. How long did you stay at March?

B Got there in '32, and I left in the summer of '34 and went back ao the Signal School at Fort Monmouth. That started me in Communcations for quite a few years, even though I never did know much about it.

Q You were there during a critical period in Arnold's development. This is when he made himself known to his boss, General Malin Craig up at the Presidio, 9th Corps Area command. And this is the beginning

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of Arnold's come back to promise. He was (cough) because of his association with Billy Mitchell. When Craig came to Washington to succeed MacArthur as Chief of Staff, he brought in Arnold as Assistant Chief of Air Corps. The key to his career is March Field. Do you have any recollections of the earthquake at March?

B I have one very vivid recollection because we were going to do a little night flying, and I was standing in the Operations office, just about to go out and get in the airplane and buzz these old Keystones around some. First time I'd ever felt an earthquake, but there wasn't any doubt in my mind what it was, because I was on this concrete floor. I could feel this thing. I was standing there with a parachute on my shoulder and everybody said: "Earthquake." Of course it didn't really shake up anything at March too much. We were too far away but you could feel it.

Q There was some response by Colonel Arnold. Did he send in some soup kitchens and communications equipment? Didn't he respond very quickly to the civil disaster?

B As I recall it, he did. Exactly what they sent, of course... Our communications equipment in those days was so antiquated, it wouldn't have been much help, but I'm pretty sure he sent in soup kitchens and blankets and all that stuff and everything he could. I really don't remember any response on the earthquake. There was a lot in the papers and radio. That's all I had there for several days. Specifically, their treatment of Colonel Arnold and the Air Corps response, I dont recall.

Q There was another area where Arnold bloomed in the estimation of his superiors. He ran Air Shows with Hollywood types, Wallace Beery, Bebe Daniels, Mary Pickford. Did you get involved in any of those air shows?

B Just flying around in an old bomber in formation is about all. I didn't get involved in any details.

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Q You were too far down?

B A pilot, Second Lieutenant, Supply Officer, and in charge of the stables. They didn't ask my opinion.

Q Another important facet. How about the CCC?

B I was in the CCC camp in the mountains outside of San Bernardino. Woggie Towle was commander. My time at March Field was spent. There were a lot of things other than training for the Air Corps mission than CCC camp. Then somebody said, if you want to cancel the mail contract we'll carry it. They pulled everybody out overnight almost in anything that could get off the ground, and went out to Salt Lake and started carrying mail.

Q Going back to CCC for a minute; you were Assistant to Woggy Towle?

B In the camp?

Q Do you remember anything specific about Arnold and the CCC?

B Not specific. Generally, he uprooted practically everybody required to go out and man these camps and command them. I'm sure in logistics they helped to the extent the law would allow on, giving stuff. But specifically no. I don't think I can add anything.

Q Arnold did visit a lot of the CCC camps, but not yours?

B He didn't visit mine while I was there.

Q Let's talk about the air mail. They were very hungry for flying funds and the Postmaster General, Farley, and his assistant, Harllee Branch, asked Gen Foulois if he could fly the mail and he said "Give us a week or ten days" So they gave him ten days, and of course he had some accidents. Were you flying mail?

B I flew from Salt Lake City to Cheyenne the whole time the mail was on. We lost quite a few boys on that run. It was a rough one and we were flying just anything we could get, the old Bellanca transport. We'd fly Keystone bombers, P-12's, those little observation aircraft, O-2's, and O-35's. The airplanes either didn't have a radio in it or if they

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did, didn't have one that worked.

Q Very primitive navigation equipment. You weren't familiar with the terrain.

B And the aircraft did not have the instrumentation that they had later. About all you had to fly instruments was a needle and ball. And that, when you get into rough weather...

Q And that February was rough weather.

B It was rough weather.

Q Arnold had his headquarters at Salt Lake at the Newhouse Hotel. Do you remember him there? What do you remember about him?

B It's not very important. One of the things I remember about him. Some of us was out on the town one night, with Monk Hunter. I ran into him in the hall next morning. He said: "Say, what did you boys do to Monk last night?" I said: "We didn't do anything, Sir." I was thinking: "What were you doing out there?" He said: "I'll tell you, old Monk is not in too good shape this morning."

Q He was always the ladies' man. Did he have a big moustache:

B Yes. But it seemed to me like on the staff that they had there in the hotel, that anybody, if he's Captain or above, he's on the staff. The Second Lieutenants flew the mail. That's the size of it.

Q I guess they slept on cots. They had rooms in the hotel, some converted to offices. Then there was a paoblem with per diem. You didn't get your money until later, $5 per day. Wasn't everybody on the cuff?

B Yes, for a long while.

Q Did you have financial problems?

B Not too much, because things were cheap. I didn't have real personal financial problems, but I do recall that it took us a while to get our money. I think it was along in that area, too, or maybe a little after, they said: "Everybody, take a month's leave but you're not going to get paid for it."

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Q That was the Economy Act. You worked for twelve months and got paid for eleven, Were you actually on leave or did you have to produce without pay?

B As I recall you could take leave. Of course, most of us couldn't afford to take leave. You couldn't go anywhere.

Q Do you remember anything about Arnold? Did he have pretty good control of the situation out at Salt Lake City?

B I'm sure he did. I can think of nothing to indicate he didn't have control of the situation. Of course he had an awful can of worms there to try to control, flying in that type of weather with just picked-up miscellaneous type aircraft. And a lot of us were recently out of flying school, and we had not, generally speaking, had enough instrument training. That's what killed those boys. And he did set up--brought old Swede Larsen up from Rockwell Field down in San Diego, and started to run an instrument school right there at Salt Lake, which we needed very badly. When you weren't on a run you were out there with a hood over you, and Swede setting in the back seat heckling you, trying to learn to fly instruments a little better.

Q Arnold told them not to fly in bad weather?

B We had restrictions on flying in bad weather, but unfortunately, the weather reporting and weather data we had, was nothing comparable to what it is today. You didn't know exactly what the weather was going to be. So you'd take off in Salt Lake City and, going along, everything would look pretty good. All of a sudden, off the Wasatch Mountains, here'd come a snowstorm, shower, not a general snow, just a snow squall, and you're in it! And if you couldn't fly instruments, you're going to cream yourself. You just couldn't forecast it.

Q You flew from Salt Lake City to Cheyenne?

B Yes, and back, of course. As an example, it's kind of interesting. I was flying across there one night in an old C-27 Bellanca with one

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engine sitting out on a goose neck. I got in this snow storm, and I couldn't see anything hardly but straight down and just by figuring out where I was, and fortunately I apparently did it kind of accurately, and got a rough course to Laramie. Fortunately I went over the field at Laramie and I saw this green flashing light. I don't want to lose that; that's the airport. I want to get on the ground. I don't care where it is, preferably in one piece. I finally landed and I couldn't see well enough to see where to go, so I taxied over to the boundary lights, and finally found the little CA shack and cut her off, and went in, and introduced myself.

Q This was CAA?

B CA then. Later it became Civil Aeronautics Administration. I said: "I've got 2,200 lbs of mail out here and about five or six sacks of it is Registered. I'd like to use your phone, want to get hold of a Post-master. And he said: "Post Office is closed." So I said: "I'm sure it is but there must be some way to get hold of him." I finally got hold of him and he said: "Everybody is closed. Haven't got a truck. If you can get it down to the Post Office, I'll send a man to open the rear door so you can put it in there." I said: "Sir, I've just got an airplane. I haven't got a truck." So he said: "That's the best I can do for you." By that time a lot of cars had pulled up. They'd come out to see the crash. They'd heard me milling around. I could set there all night, and it's cold and snowing. Or I can take a chance of filling up the rumble seats and back seats of these cars which had been offered and taking it down there, which I did. The weather cleared up the next day and I flew on in to Cheyenne just across the mountain, and I told the postal people about it. They wouldn't quite believe it. I said: "Ask that CA guy out there, and ask all the other people, if you don't believe it." I came back in to Cheyenne on the next run, four or five days later, and I went into the little Post Office place they had set up there

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to receive the mail. I said: "How's the boy over at Laramie getting along?" They said: "He doesn't live there any more." They fired him.

Q You had all this Registered mail

B I got the mail on the ground. It was his responsibility to do something about it. That's got nothing to do with Arnold.

Q It does, in a way. It has very much to do with my story, because these young men were very dedicated, and they were taking a lot of chances. And it was sort of a virility test. All these young pilots were risking their necks with lousy equipment, navigation equipment, just to show they could get the job done. There were some heroics and fourteen people were killed over the country, a couple in the Western Mail zone.

B Four that I know of on the first two weeks of my run.

Q Do you remember Will Rogers coming in to the Newhouse Hotel to talk with Arnold?

B I knew he was there. Again I was down on the bottom shelf, and I didn't get in on it.

Q In fact he had an article the next day in the newspaper, pleading with the young pilots that: "If there's any danger--don't fly." Didn't they stop the mail for a week or two, about eight days? When there were a lot of casualties? The President ordered the air mail stopped for a while?

B Now that you mention it we did have a little layoff period. I don't think it was up to eight days.

Q It seems to me, toward the end of the run, around May 1934 when they finally got some skill they took the Air Mail away from the Air Corps they were finally doing a fine job.

B We finally got some B-10's there at Salt Lake. It's funny all the procedure you got to go through and study and answer questionnaires on the airplane. They show you how to fly it and all that. Nobody had flown one, and they wanted me to go out on a run with one. I said I'd never been in one at all. They said: "Nothing to it at all. It's got

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wings, got an engine--two of them as a matter of fact. Get in and fly it." I said: "Okay" Got in, looked around, read a little piece of the book and flew that airplane.

Q That was a great airplane for its time, wasn't it?

B Yes, it was a big improvement. It had instrumentation, artificial horizon, and turn indicator and all that. You could fly instruments with it, and it didn't take you a week to get there.

Q It had about 200 miles per hour speed which was pretty good for its day?

B Little better than that if you opened it up.

Q Right after that they had the Alaskan Flight?

B Yes. I left immediately after the air mail closed. I got back down to March. And around May or early June, and somebody came in to see the paper and said: "You're going to Fort Monmouth." I said: "Where's that?" It was the Signal School. We had a quota, you know, eenie, meenie, minie, mo. If we want to get rid of Bowman, we'll send him there.

Q Do you remember Harold Bowman? I talked to him in Florida.

B Hal Bowman. He ought to know a lot. He used to write Arnold's speeches. I could remember that. He could be very helpful because he was close to him.

Q Yes, he was. He's trying to sell his own book on that. Do you remember experiences at March Field itself, the Officers Club? Arnold believed in a very closely knit group, and he did a number of things to improve the social relationship among the officers at March Field. The "Wing Ding." This may have come later. He got the idea on the Alaskan flight, later, the dining in.

B He hadn't started that. I was there less than two years. They hadn't started the "Wing Dings" then. I lived there in the BOQ. I'd hate to record everything that happened there. I was 23 or 24 years old. I don't really remember, other than we did have a good time, and it was a good club.

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Q There was one occasion--they were flying some aviation cadets--didn't they use aviation cadets to fly the mail? They paid them less money than a 2d lieutenant? Benny Schriever was an aviation cadet there for a while?

B Benny graduated from flying school in my class but he went through it. He was not an Academy man. He was a Reserve officer. He was wearing brown breeches, and all that.

Q Was there some occasion when somebody, possibly the club officer, said the aviation cadets could not use the Officers Club and Mrs. Arnold appealed to Colonel Arnold and he overruled this club officer?

B I think you're right. I do remember a little rhubarb there. It didn't last very long after Mrs. Arnold got hold of it.

Q Somebody made a decision that these aviation cadets were not officers, therefore could not use the club, and they barred them from the club, and Mrs. Arnold defended the aviation cadets, and they were allowed to use it?

B I vaguely remember that.

Q You remember Mrs. Arnold?

B Yes. Again, I stood in awe of both Colonel Arnold and Mrs. Arnold. What I do recall of her she was a very gracious lady and understanding.

Q She still is. She's in good health. She's 84 years old. Didn't they make a big thing out of Sunday night? They had sort of gambling night or family night, or some such thing? Of course you were a swinging bachelor. This activity may not have appealed to you.

B I don't remember anything specific to be useful. I do remember that they used the club facilities for many things, and I'm sure, in later years, and having commanded quite a number of bases and what not, that your club turns on--whether it's good or bad, active or dead--turns on your commander and, more specifically, the commander's wife.

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Whether it's good or bad, active or dead. If she gets her back into it and pushes things, and gets the other women out, and everything, then you're going to have an active club. If she sits back and sews and plays bridge fourteen hours a day, as I've seen done, the club just falls apart.

Q Very good point. It's the first time anybody had made this point in such a succinct fashion, and it's true. I've been in the Air Force myself as a Reserve Officer. I've seen a number of facilities. Do you have any overall recollection, did the young officers feel Arnold was a good leader, a great leader, gung ho, a man they would follow to the ends of the earth, things like that?

B I think this was the general feeling among the junior officers. We felt he was a good strong, tough, but fair leader. It didn't take people long, if you happened to be called up in front of him for a meeting, particularly if you were called up in his office, to realize that what looked like a smile on his face really wasn't, and it was not a good idea to smile back. He had what looked like a smile on his face, but he could be pretty upset. The worst thing in the world you could do was to misinterpret that as a smile of humor and then smile back because you were liable to get your head chopped off.

Q A number of people have told me this, the smile was misleading. Don't take it as a sign of pleasure. Were you ever present when he exploded? He did have this tendency later.

B I was never present. I was aware of this susceptibility to exploding, but I obviously was never on his principal staff, or around in staff meeting or where these explosive type problems might be discussed.

Q Remember Major Lohman? He was an Exec, and got in trouble with Arnold?

B I don't remember any occasions?

Q Arnold was displeased with him, so he never made it. Later on when Arnold rose to positions of power, Lohman did not get anywhere.

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A lot of fellows who did a good job at March ended up in very good positions.

B Particularly those who were relatively senior, and it seems silly to say senior, but a Captain was pretty senior.

Q Did you have any post-March Field experiences with Arnold? During the war?

B Not personally. I was in what they called the old Army Airways Communication System during the war.

Q Down at Greenville?

B No, it started out at Gravelly Point, and then, we finally moved on to Asheville, N.C. I do remember a funny thing. It didn't happen to me personally, but I did know about it. We were down at Asheville and had an elderly guy--seemed elderly to me at the time--G.G. Jones, who was from the A.T.&T long lines branch, and General Arnold, I think, had personally gotten a lot of these guys in, and Jones didn't have a specific job, just general overall advisor, "Scattergood Baines" type. Colonel Ivan Farman was Commander. We had worked up to where we had 40,000 or 45,000 people in this scattered all over the world. Mr. Jones figured that everybody was being made General, and though they ought to have a general officer space in this outfit--it was big enough. So he could get in to see Arnold, throw his old slouch hat on the desk, and go in and talk to him, where we couldn't. I was the Deputy Commander. Ivan Farman was the commander. He went up and broached the subject of making Farman a general. Jones told me this. Arnold hit the ceiling. He said: "Farman? Why he never shined his shoes in his life; the seat of his breeches comes to his knees. That's the last guy I'd make a general.. As a matter of fact he did make General.

Q Ivan was in Communications before you were, and at March Field--this is another one of Arnold's stunts to bring air power to public attention . They conducted some communications tests--some broadcasts

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from the air--Ivan Farman flew an airplane around--Arnold was on the ground. They had a big show, and Farman told this story, not to me, that the script blew away, and he had to improvise the script. Do you remember him performing at March Field?

B Oh, yes.

Q Was Arnold this strong for public relations; of getting the Air Corps on the map?

B Yes, I think he was. A lot of these little things that you've made reference to indicate that he was-bringing the people up from Hollywood--putting on these little shows, with whatever we had to put on a show. He was trying to get it in front of the general public, and I think he would have made an awfully good public relations man.

Q This is why he was so close to Harold Bowman. Bowman was very good at this kind of activity, and Farman tells this story. Some VIP's were with Arnold and Farman was to make certain responses. He was trying to fly the airplane and hold the script down.

B I think he was flying an old P-12.

Q Any other involvement with Arnold during the war? Were you down in Asheville for any length of time?

B Couple of years in Asheville.

Q Did you get overseas?

B I went overseas initially in April of '42. I went over and took over the African-Middle East region, was stationed there at Accra, then the old British Gold Coast, the AACS.

Q Did Arnold ever come through there?

B He came through Dakar and then when he finally got into North Africa, I got a frantic message: "Get up there and put in some stuff" at some of these places, Casablanca and Oran. We put in a control tower and a range and of course, the problem was we didn't have the equipment. I remember a story, true or not. First time Arnold came

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through and Tooey Spaatz was overall Air Force Commander over there in Africa. Arnold was through there on a visit and said: "Tooey, how's the war going?" He said: "I'll tell you, Hap, not much war, but I guess it's better than no war at all." Something that Spaatz might say.

Q Did Arnold have a reputation, in your opinion, of being ruthless? Of cutting people off, if they didn't do their job?

B Yes, that was the impression, not unfairly, but he just wouldn't stand for mediocre performance. If you messed up, socially or otherwise, he could be pretty ruthless and, matter of fact, it kept us young bucks back there toeing the line pretty good. We knew what would happen if we got into serious trouble, or didn't do our job.

Q He was kind of strait-laced morally, about drinking and chasing around?

B Yes. He didn't go for that too much, and wouldn't tolerate any-- I mean he didn't go for it at all, and wouldn't tolerate it on the part of others, if he knew about it. So it caused a lot of 2d lieutenants to do things in a rather surreptitious manner.

Q Which reminds me. Do you remember a fellow named Minton Kaye? He was very close to Arnold.

B Yes, he was.

Q Why?

B I don't know why but he was all the time I was at March. Kaye was very close to Arnold. I never had occasion to go up there. I was at Asheville. I went there in '43. Arnold had already been Chief.

Q Where were you right at the start of the war?

B I had an AACS Region at Wright Patt Field.

Q I guess their sending you to Monmouth in '34 changed your whole career?

B Yes. Got me into the communications racket. We had very few people who had any training in communications in the Air Corps, because Signal Corps is supposed to do it all. And then when the war started,

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Signal Corps, like everyone else, was swamped. They didn't have people; they didn't have the equipment; and what not, for this almost overnight expansion worldwide.

Q Did you work for Harold McClelland at any time?

B Yes, I worked for Harold McClelland and directly for Lloyd Watney.

Q Do you remember Edward Bowles?

B Yes. He was involved in radar, communications. He was a specialist sitting right off the top shelf. I had no contact with him.

Q He told me about McClelland who apparently was not effective in his job, and Tom Rives was brought in there to carry on. Do you remember that?

B I don't know the reason for it, but Gen McClelland was eased out, and when people are eased out, they're either not doing a job, or somebody in a position of authority doesn't think he is. It's about the same thing. I can't think of anything specific and I don't know that I've been very helpful.

Q You have been on the March Field period, especially. Did you see Arnold when the war ended? Were you around the Pentagon when he gave his farewell address to the assembled staff in the auditorium?

B No.

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BACHELOR AND VISITING OFFICER QUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Brosman - 8:30 Monday 10-25-71
Exit Route 24 - West to 21st St - 1 mile -
Left on 21st St Battery -
South on 21st - 1st right -
R: Parking up hill - Left to
Taurus Drive

OK
Oct 25

Jensen - 471-1346 - Meeting - call Monday
11:30 Tues 10-26-71

Alness - 632-0620
off Lake Ave - 3 blocks - Left.
2:30 Monday -
OK
Oct 25, 1971

Thomas Moore - call him - 473-8860
Tues 26th 10 AM

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Maj. Gen. W. W. Bowman USAF (ret.)
1001 Taurus Drive
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80906
DEPARTMENT OF THE Air F

9/28/71

Dear mr. Green,

Thank you for your letter of Sept 24.

As you said I was somewhat junior during Gen. Arnold's time. I did, however, have some contact with him from 1932 – 1934 at March Field when he was Wing/Base C.O.

I would be happy to talk a bit anytime you are out this way.

Phone, 636-1823

Sincerely
W. W. Bowman

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20314

24 September 1971

done 10-25-71

Maj General Wendell W. Bowman, USAF (Ret)
3295 South Newport Street
Denver, Colorado 80222

Dear General Bowman:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and have been at it for a couple of years now. I was fortunate enough to obtain a Brookings Institution Fellowship which allowed me to work through the Arnold Manuscript Collection (about 90,000 documents) at the Library of Congress. While there, I went into the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Andrews, Eaker, LeMay, Knerr, etc., Collections.

More recently, I have been interviewing some key AAF personalities who were associated with General Arnold at various times during his colorful career in aviation stretching for nearly 40 years, from 1911 to 1950, when he passed on. I've talked to Generals Spaatz, Eaker, LeMay, O'Donnell, Kuter, Kenney, Norstad, Pre Cabell, K.B. Wolfe (who died just the other day), Jimmy Doolittle, and probably 100 others. Outside the regular Air Force, I have talked with Hon. Robert Lovett, de Seversky, Charles Lindbergh, Jackie Cochran, and other key figures.

Needless to state, this is intended as a "warts and all" biography and will be published by Random House. Because of my association with the Air Force in an official capacity, I've waived any royalties. Most will go to Mrs. Arnold who, as you may know, could use the income.

While I appreciate the fact that you were junior during World War II, I've seen your name in the files, and there is no way to tell whether you had some personal dealings with General Hap. If so, I would be delighted to have an opportunity to reminisce with you for an hour or so when I come out to Colorado late in November. Mrs. J. Price Arnold, sister-in-law of General Arnold, lives in the Denver area. I should also mention that on an earlier trip, I was fortunate enough to talk to Generals Atkinson, Gerhart, Strother, Partridge, Chidlaw, Bob Lee and O.K. Niess.

In any event, I would appreciate hearingffrom you in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

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Boyd, William L. 8 Mar 70

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May 18, 1970

Col William M. Boyd, USAF(Ret)
708 Canterbury Hill
San Antonio, Texas 78209

Dear Colonel Boyd:

Our interview the other day was short but very informative and I appreciate getting this information about General Arnold.

I hope you will be kind enough to jot down any other recollections of Gen Arnold that may come to mind and send them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

Love
8 May 70

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Interview:

Colonel William L. Boyd, San Antonio, Texas, May 8, 1970.

Q: You say you didn't serve directly under Arnold?

B: No, I never served under him. I think one of the funniest experiences, though, when I was out at Biggs Field (El Paso), at that time. It was nothing but an old balloon base. But all it was was a glorified gas stop there, and Hap had the wing out on the West Coast.

Q: Oh, March Field?

B: I think it was.

Q: This was sometime between 1931 and 1935?

B: Yes, in the '30s.

Q: Was he a General at that time?

B: He was a BG.

Q: It must have been 1935.

B: Well, yes, I was there for five years and a half. And he came through, and ther was a sandstorm going on. Oh, it was sorry, so I wouldn't give him a clearance to go to Tucson.

Q: Were you the base commander?

B: I was the only officer there. I just had a handful of men, and I wouldn't give him a clearance. And he said: "Well, you know, I'm a General Officer now. I can go without a clearance." And I said: "Yes, but I'll wire ahead to Tucson that you left without clearance." And he left and got there, and I wired without clearance, but as long as he got there, he was a general officer, he was all right. But, he said: "Would you go?" And I said: "Yes, I would go," because I'd been flying back and forth between Tucscon and El Paso for so long I knew every fence post and everything. Well, he said, "if you can make it, I can make it." So he went.

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Q: You know, Andrews had a lot of confidence in his own flying ability. I've been told that Andrews took off in weather that most people with discretion would not have flown.

B: Oh yes, I remember George Kenney one time came through El Paso with Frank Andrews, and George was no coward himself. George said: "By God that man will go through anything, he gets there, except that last trip." He wasn't flying.

Q: He wasn't? I was told that he was, or someone said that they thought he was at the controls.

B: Well, I've heard different stories,but he wasn't at the controls. He was in command, of course.

Q: But they took off in very questionable weather?

B: Oh yes.

Q: Where did you serve during the war?

B: I was at Hickam Field at the beginning of the war.

Q: Were you at Pearl Harbor at the time?

B: Yes.

Q: Were you assigned to the 19th Group?

B: No. I had been Post Exec, when they came along. I had a supply group, and 30 minutes after the Japs hit us, I was Base Commander.

Q: Do you remember Col Bill Farthing?

B: Oh yes.

Q: Coddington and Rose?

B: Farthing was the one who made me base commander because a Brig General (forgot his name) was in command of the wing down there at Hickam. As soon as the Japs hit, he ran to the hospital and

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stayed in there. Bill Farthing moved up, and took the so-called wing, they had just organized, and turned around to me and said: "You are base commander as of now."

Q: I'm particularly interested in a war plan which Farthing, Coddington and Elmer Rose produce, in the pre-Pearl Harbor period, around August 1941. They came up with a speculative plan calling for 180 B-17s. They said, if we had 180 B-17s we could release the Navy from defense of Pearl Harbor and we would protect Pearl Harbor. Their request was approved by Fred Martin, and approved and endorsed by Gen Short, who was the Army Commander, sent to Washington. And then the plan disappears. Did you ever have any knowledge of that plan?

B: No, that's -- Elmer Rose lives right here.

Q: I know I talked to him at length the other day. He mentioned you. I just wondered if you had any recollection of that?

B: No, I never heard of that.

Q: After the war started, were you at Selfridge Field?

B: Yes, I went from Hickam to Selfridge.

Q: Then you probably got in the middle of that fracas?

B: Oh, I inherited the post after they had this riot.

Q: When did that riot occur?

B: Well, 1943, sometime before I got there. But the CO of the post was accused of shooting one of the officers, something like that, and he was court martialed.

Q: Who was the commander at that time, do you remember?

B: He was a youngster, I forget his name.

Q: Colonel?

B: Yes, he was a Colonel, and they sent Bill Wright up from Tampa, temporarily to take over until I got there.

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Q: You were there, Monk Hunter came out. He was 1st AF Commander: He gave them a talking to. Did they ever settle that issue?

B: Yes, they settled it, by relieving me and ordering me court martialed.

Q: Who ordered you, Arnold?

B: No, Eleanor Roosevelt.

Q: There was something that had to do with building a second officer's club?

B: I had the second officer's club being built, and it was going to be better than the white one. But they didn't want that; they stopped construction on it.

Q: Did Arnold, I think he sent an order not to have it built?

B: Well, I don't know whether Arnold was in Washington at that time. You see, most of the time during the War, Arnold was in the hospital and Barney Giles was running the Air Corps for months and months.

Q: Was Giles running the AF at this time when this thing broke?

B: Yes, I'm pretty sure.

Q: This must have been 1945?

B: No, not it was '44, Spring of '44.

Q: Of course, Monk Hunter was probably the wrong man to send out there, because I saw him a couple of months ago; he also mentioned you. I saw him down in Savannah.

B: He is "Mr. Savannah."

Q: He's like Khrushchev once said: "To put a goat in charge of a cabbage patch."

B: I was ordered summarily relieved of duty out there, but I was in town. One evening, I was in Detroit Athletic Club,and Monk got

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me on the phone, and ordered my routine transfer to Mitchel Field, so he said: "Now, when you get back, you will find a telegram. Pay no attention to that. You won't really receive a routine transfer to Mitchel." So I went there.

Q: When you went back, the other thing was a court martial?

B: No, no, well, Monk said: "If you court martial Col Boyd, I'll be the first man on the stand. He followed every order that I gave him." That's what I was doing. Hunter said: "So you will have to court martial me." Then he said, "if you go on up the line," he said, "I don't know how General Arnold would do on this thing," so they settled. I got a reprimand from the Secretary of War. Monk handed the reprimand to me. I could read it, but I couldn't keept it.

Q: Did this hurt your promotion chances?

B: Well, I don't know if it did or not. I never got any. A reprimand from the Secretary of War doesn't help your record.

Q: How did we get embroiled in such an impasse, you know, where a lot of people became very angry, and you had a confrontation? How did this develop?

B: We had a bunch of youngsters with their 50-mission caps on that came back. They were instructors up there. They were disgusted with the job that they had, because these boys, it looked as though they didn't want to fly.

Q: Colored boys?

B: Yes.

Q: This was the 332nd?

B: No, the 99th Squadron. Well, it was more than that. Eventually, this was a Group. B.O. Davis came out there, took command of it and took it overseas.

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Q: They went to Italy?

B: Yes.

Q: They were trained in Tuskegee, weren't they?

B: I think they came from all over.

Q: In any event, when you got there, they were at Selfridge Field?

B: Oh yes, I had thousands of them. And nothing for them to do. Up at this little town about 150 miles north of there, up in Michigan, no airplanes on the field. I had 2,000 or 3,000 troops up there. Not a thing, not an airplane, or anything else.

Q: And you had command of this group?

B: That was a sub base under Selfridge, and it was no good.

Q: That wasn't Godman, was it?

B: The field didn't have any name, except the name of the town, at that time.

Q: Was there somebody named Selway in it?

B: Oh, Bob Selway...

Q: He was involved in that thing, too, wasn't he?

B: Yes. He had the group until B.O. Davis got out there.

Q: Anyway, you had thousands of these Negroes under your command, no airplanes?

B: Well, at Selfridge, we had a training program. But up at this... lumber town up there, there wasn't anything for them to do. That's all there was to it. Down at Selfridge, I was worried about these youngsters who came back. They were disgusted. They had been fighting a war, and here were these birds who apparently didn't want to. And I was afraid that they would start a riot, right on the post, by socking somebody. So the only way I could figure out was to segregate them, keep them apart.

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Q: The Negroes insisted on coming into the white officers' club?

B: Well, not very much, no. One 1st LT came in one time, but I lived pretty close to the club, and they called me, and I got him out without any trouble. But it was just touch and go, and I just, loud as hell, I wasn't going to have a riot. That's all there was to it.

Q: Wasn't there some plan? Who decided to start building the second club? Was that your decision?

B: No, no, this was Washington. I don't know just who did it. But it came from Washington, I didn't start it.

Q: I saw in Arnold's papers, he ordered it not to be built. Apparently, somebody just went ahead and figured they'd get it done.

B: Well, this was, it was half constructed.

Q: When he ordered it dismantled?

B: Well, I guess he ordered it, I don't know.

Q: Monk Hunter told me that Arnold was bitter at him, and made some crack to him. Of course, they were good friends for a time, and they had a falling out as a result of that. Do you recall that parting of the ways?

B: Monk and Hap Arnold were friends all their lives. They would have battles and would tear at each other. You'd think that they were going to shoot each other, but they always ended up friends again.

Q: Well, Hunter said something to me that, when he was retiring, Arnold couldn't resist taking a last shot at him, and Hunter apparently resented that. So apparently, at the end of their official careers, they did not part on the best of terms.

B: Well, I don't know about that, but they battled all their lives. They were good friends, but they battled back and forth.

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Monk would stand up and tell Arnold, right from the shoulder, without any hesitation, which a lot of people wouldn't do, because, if you get in wrong with Hap Arnold, you were in wrong for keeps.

Q: Was he a man that kept grudges?

B: As far as I know, yes. I think he was. Because I know several friends of mine that were perfectly good officers and should have gone places. But they just spoke out of turn about something and that was the end of the career.

Q: Can you think of anybody who fell by the wayside?

B: Well, one of the best big ship pilots we had, Eddie McReynolds who was the B-17 outfit from the very beginning and all. I don't know, he got in wrong with the Navy file or something.

Q: Do you remember anybody that got in wrong with Arnold and sort of hurt his career?

B: Well, yes, Eddie McReynolds; he was made an IG, was out inspecting the uniforms in my outfit out there at Selfridge. Here was one of the best B-17 men.

Q: What did he do to make Arnold mad at him?

B: No, it was a Britisher. He told, this Britisher was driving him nuts, calling him up and telling him to come to his office, all hours of the day and night, and Eddie apparently, from what I've heard, told him to go to, and stay there, and so that was the end of that.

Q: Do you remember anybody else who crossed Arnold directly?

B: Yes.

Q: How about Elmer Adler?

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B: I don't think Elmer crossed Arnold; I don't know about that. But this guy was the best big ship pilot, we had running loose. He was in Dayton in the section for years.

Q: Oh, Jan Howard?

B: No.

Q: Do you remember anything about Jan Howard and Arnold?

B: No, I served under, well not under Jan Howard, he was in the Engineering out at McCook. I was in the Test Section.

Q: He and Arnold were ex-brother-in-laws?

B: Yes, I knew that.

Q: And whether that was a factor or not, but personality-wise, they clashed.

B: I didn't know Jan well enough to know much about it, but I understand that they just...

Q: Well, Jan was supposed to have been a brilliant officer, but he had a sort of an irritating personality.

B: Well, yes, he was basically an engineer. He was certainly no diplomat.

Q: Was Arnold a diplomat?

B: No. In my mind, no.

Q: Did you ever get bawled out by him? Everybody seems to have gotten bawled out by him.

B: No, he never bawled me out. As far as I know, but he used to razz me quite a bit, when I'd see him.

Q: On what subject:

B: Well, I had a pretty pot belly, and he was always kidding about that. Then when I was up at Selfridge, I was down there in Washington and ran across him, over at the Ft. Myer Club. And he was

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razzing me about the trouble I had up there at Selfridge, and I allowed as how I didn't have any trouble, and the trouble was all right here in Washington.

Q: Was it Dean Hastie or Truman Gibson who resigned from the job. They had a Negro judge who was Special Assistant to Stimson. Was it Dean Hastie or Truman Gibson? One of them resigned because of the problems. He felt that the Army was not trying to absorb the Negro into the ranks.

B: I don't remember that. B.O. Davis, they called him. He had been retired as a colonel, and they called him back to active duty and made him a BG.

Q: Then, his son, of course, took the unit?

B: Yes, that was his son out there.

Q: This officer's club, when they built the second officer's club, was it ever finished and occupied?

B: I don't know whether it was or not, because I left there, and I've never been back.

Q: I recall reading something about that particular thing, where they had these two clubs, and they assigned one to permanent party personnel. They called that Club No. 2, and Club No. 1 was for training officers. Of course, all the Negroes were in a training capacity, and all the whites were in permanent party. This was the way they tried to segregate.

B: That was after my time.

Q: Did Selway come in after you?

B: No, he left about, a month or so after I left. He went down and took part of this outfit, some place down south.

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Q: Wasn't it Godman Field, in Kentucky?

B: Well, it was in Kentucky or the Carolinas, or somewhere.

Q: But they had to take the unit out of there, because the thing had gotten out of hand?

B: Yes, they swallowed it up.

Q: But they never did court martial you for that, they just threatened to?

B: No, I got a reprimand.

Q: Where did you go after that tour?

B: I took command at Andrews.

Q: They set up the Continental Air Command at that time?

B: I moved down to Bolling. I was Base Commander down there, when the Continental Command under Billy Streett started. About the time it started, I was moved from Andrews down to Bolling.

Q: When Arnold kidded you about being overweight, did he have a fettish about physical condition?

B: I think he did. He seemed to work on that; of course, he had this heart trouble all the time.

Q: He had a severe heart attack in 1945; that's when Giles was running the ship.

B: He was running it in '43.

Q: He had a mild one in '43.

B: He spent a lot of time down there in Coral Gables in the hospital down there.

Q: Arnold did not have any aspirations to rule the roost after the war. He was anxious to leave Washington. He bought this ranch. Did he ever talk to you about his post-war wishes?

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B: No, he never talked to me, but Santy Fairchild saw him out on the West Coast, and he told Santy: "You know, I'm the only five star general alive that isn't on a job somewhere." Well, of course, he wasn't in any shape. He worked himself to death. There wasn't any question about that.

Q: You know, he was trying to, he was talking to Fairchild about coming back on active duty. Fairchild talked him out of it. He wanted to come back on active duty so he could get these enlisted men as aides. You know, Arnold died with an estate of $19,000.

B: Well, I knew that Bea was just flat broke, that's all.

Q: Yes, she had to go to work to sell real estate.

B: Yes, I don't understand that.

Q: Do you know what her pension was? $78 a month. They increased it later on, but that's what it was when he died.

B: Oh yes, I remember that. I don't know what she gets now...

Q: But it is not enough.

Q: It's a sad commentary on how we look after our military people.

B: Oh yes, the survivors, in other words, the widows.

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Bradley, Mark & Hetzel H.

19 Aug 70

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28 May
1974

My dear Mr Green,

I received the copy of our conversation - I'd almost forgotten about it.

Yes, we made a very stimulating & hurried tour of a small portion of Russia. I'm glad I went - but won't do it again -

Thank you very much for sending the write up. I'd be interested in seeing your book ——

Sincerely

Mark E. Bradley

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20314

21 May 1974

General Mark E. Bradley, USAF (Ret)
30327 Oceanaire Dr
Palos Verdes Peninsula, CAL 90274

Dear General Bradley:

My wife tells me of her conversation with you on a tour bus in Leningrad the other day.

I thought you might be interested in having a copy of our interview about General Hap Arnold. As I recall you were very busy the day I stopped by.

Of course, I see Bruce Arnold frequently in Washington. He has been very helpful in editing my copy. We have 16 chapters in the can at this writing - about halfway there.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

Encl

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done 19 Aug 70

August 7, 1970

General Mark E Bradley, USAF(Ret)
30327 Oceanaire Drive
Palos Verdes Peninsula, Calif. 90274

Dear General Bradley:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm coming out to the West Coast in a week to interview key people who were associated with him.

I'll be traveling around in the next few days, so will be out of contact with my office. If you can see me, would you leave word with Col. Marshall Ryder, 805 Leonard Road - Code 213-476-5062. I hope to see you some time during the week of August 17th at your convenience.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Transc._____
Cards _____

Interview General Mark Bradley, and Harry Wetzel, Garrett Corp., Los Angeles, California, 19 August 1970

Q: Are you related to Pinky Wetzel ?

W: No, I've been asked that question about 400 times.

B: He used to get asked when he first went into the service: "Are you Pinky's brother?"

W: Never met either one of them, either Pinky or his brother.

Q: He had some dealings with Arnold, he lives in Lawreceville, New Jersey, and I have to track him down. He had some dealings with Arnold. But you mention that you were out here playing with young Douglas?

W: 1933 or '34, in there?

Q: Arnold was up here visiting from March Field?

W: Yes, apparently so, we were out flying model airplanes behind the Douglas plant. This then Army officer, just came up and asked us what we were doing. He looked at the model, and wanted to know if we would sell it. Sure! We put a very high price of 50¢ on it. He bought it on the spot. Being a profitable business transaction. I ran in and told my father about it, and he came busting through the door.

Q: Your father was...?

W: General Manager of Douglas at that time. Excitedly telling him about it, this fantastic sale. I ran into the office, Arnold was sitting behind me, so I didn't see him. I was very embarrassed to be introduced to him, as it turned out he was the man that had just bought the airplane.

Q: You know, three or four years before that, Arnold and St. Clair Streett were involved in trying to patent a toy airplane, and he was

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playing around with this idea. He was a gadgeteer; he always loved to fool around. He loved guided missiles, and gadgets. If you had some gadget that could solve some operational problem you had a ready audience with Arnold. I'm wondering, that's why I say there's another aspect of this. I'm wondering if he admired the way your plane flew. Did you put this thing together yourself?

W: Yes, but it wasn't anything very fancy. It was an ordinary common variety, what we used to call ROG, Rise Off Ground. It was very simple. It was just in being, and he probably wanted to take it cack to Bruce at March Field.

Q: Well, I'm sure that was part of his plan, but he might have had this other thing in mind.

W: No, I'm sure it wasn't the other thing. It wasn't anything that novel. How old is Bruce now?

Q: Bruce ought to be around 52.

W: Well, he was still a young boy then, I'm sure.

Q: Bruce was born around 1917-18.

W: We're all about the same age.

Q: I see Bruce very frequently. He's Senate Liason Officer.

W: Are there any other sons?

Q: Yes, two other sons, one younger, one older. This could have been for David. David might have been like 6 or 7 years old. You had another experience with Arnold in 1941?

W: Yes.

Q: Did you have any intervening between that time and 1941?

W: No. I was engineering officer in the old Army Air Corps Reserve. I went on active duty out of college in Oct 1941 at McClellan Field. It was then called, I believe, the Sacramento Air Depot.

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Q: Was it Mather Field?

W: No, Mather Field was a flight training base, and McClellan was a repair and overhaul base for airplanes and engines. Being the newest and youngest engineering officer, I got the next project which was a modification program on, started out to be B-17E aircraft. Subsequently, some B-17Cs, as I recall, were also added to it. The modifications were basically structural type modifications, and rather minor modifications. When they gave it to me, being an easy project, as I was a green officer, I probably got the one at the lowest end of the priority. But between then and the night of Dec 6, 1941, the priority kept increasing all the time. More things were being done to the airplane. Boeing sent an engineer down to assist me who was quite helpful. We were just talking about him earlier today. That was Dick Nelson, a very young engineer there at the time. We had to make detailed status reports to send to Arnold's office every day, and to Wright Field everyday. But the gist of the thing was that we had to have, as I recall the number now, I think it was approximately 24 B-17Es ready to be at Hamilton Field on Dec 6, 1941. And they were being picked up by the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups.

Q: I talked to Truman Landon the other day. He headed a flight of eight of them, which left that night of Dec 6.

W: These were the same airplanes the commander of the group was Hegenberger (of Hegenberger Maitland fame), and the engineering officer was Al Boyd. They were quite helpful, it turned out to be one of these round-the clock operations, to get these airplanes out. We got them all all out about noon that day, and my commanding officer said, "We were really burning the midnight oil. Got a big pat on the cack for a job well done. When I got to the gate, we lived off the post in those

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days, the guard said go back to the Colonel's office. Then he informed me he just had word that Gen Arnold was coming in that night, and I had to be there. So I said: "I'd better re-do all my dog eared status charts." And he said: "Oh no, it would look like a put up job. Just the way they are. Don't go home; stay right here." And I had an old leather jacket on; it was dirty because I had been there all night. When he came in, why there were about 10 or 12 people from McClellan Field, officers, in the room, ready to greet him. I was obviously low man on the totem pole as far as rand goes. The first thing Arnold said, and I'll never forget that smile on his face all the time. And his eyes. He had the most unusual eyes, color. I'm not one who ever notices the color of anybody's eyes, but these really stood out. And he said: "Well, gentlemen, are my 48 B17Es on the way to Honoluly?" And that was, there was a big long silence, and they said: "No, 24. Actually, they weren't all B17s; they were combinations. There were some Cs in there. He really blew up when the word was given to him. Then it was up to me to go through all the files, get all of the telegrams from Wright Field out, which were our instructions, and pass them on to him. He seemed to calm down, was not pacified, but at least he was mad at somebody else, instead of us, and left, and went on down to Santa Monica that night. This meeting lasted, I would say, about 45 minutes. You certainly knew you were in the presence of a very, very positive personality, to say the least.

Q: Had Wright Field indicated to him, 48?

W: I don't know where this came from. That just the number he threw out. We knew we had every B17E in the world, tracked by that time. I don't think there were 30 of them in existence. They came off the line Boeing. There were still a few up there, and we had them all the next night that were available.

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Q: Sometimes he deliberately increased the number. He always had you stretching out to cahieve an objective a little beyond your reach. So you never sat back and said: "I did the job, I can take it easy now." He always had you going to do a little more than you could have done."

W: There was no way in this case, there just were no more airplanes. There wasn't a B17 on the field on that night of Dec 6th. They were all gone.

Q: Was Beebe with him, he may have been a Captain?

W: He had some aides; but I don't remember the names.

Q: Beebe, I saw Eugene Beebe, he lives in Long Beach, I saw him a couple of days ago. He was on that trip. Then Arnold and Donald Douglas went quail shooting. Douglas had a place up near Bakersfield.

B: That was a bad day to be going.

Q: That was abad day to be going and they were out in the field. Douglas' father, heard this thing on the radio, and apparently didn't think it was too improtant. Arnold didn't find out about Pearl Harbor until the way I figure, 4 or 5 hours after the event. Then all hell broke loose, as he shuttled about. He came into San Francisco and called Marshall and called Marshall and a number of other people. Of course, they were worried about the West Coast. There was great concern that the Japs might be coming to the West Coast next. The aircraft factories, there was a great concern.

W: We had a blackout that night, so-called, at McClellan Field. They wheeled in 3 or 4 old French 75mm guns, would elevate about 8 degrees. Doug Halls, who runs the tailpost down there, the local artillery officer was, I know, up with my CO who was a West Pointer. They were working on fuse timings . They set these fuses for God knows what altitude. It was a pretty pathetic deal. You know, all those airplanes that left our place went out without guns.

Q: I know, all the guns were in cosmolenes. They were not

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mounted.

B: Yes, but our instructions were not to put guns on them prior to Dec 6. They were going to be put on, as I recall, either at Hickam Field or Clark Field. We got them all back, anything that was anywhere in the world, to get their hands on the next night. Down fromSeattle, where they had some B-17s. They just came from everywhere, and we had them that night at McClellan Field, any B-17s. We started a gun shop that night. Somebody shipped in guns in cosmolene, and it was the worse mess you've ever seen. One of the guns, some way, got a shell in it. It went off in the shop. It went through a couple of work benches, stuff like that. It was a real assembling match going on around there, all night; couldn't find it; was scared to death. Ran around the field with a bicycle. It was a dark night. They really had it backed out; wasn't any question about that.

Q: You mentioned having been struck by the look on Arnold's face-blue eyes?

W: Yes, particularly that. I never usually notice that.

Q: Ruddy complexion?

W: Well, it was really the eyes and that smile. I heard that's where he got the nickname "Hap." It sure didn't mean he was happy. He could be the maddest guy in the world; he'd still have the smile.

Q: And if you interpreted this as be his being pleased with you, as I was told, look out.

W: My impression was not that at all, I just understood how he got the name .

Q: This was the only personal encounter, these two incidents?

W: Yes.

Q: We're talking to General Bradley now. Arnold used to bypass Echols, who was Benny Meyers boss for a period of time, and he went

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to Benny Meyers, and he had great confidence in Benny Meyers. Do you have any idea why?

B: Well, I would say that, why he had the confidence in him, I don't really know. I'm sure that's right, that he did. Benny was the kind of a guy that indicated - in general he got results. He sort of had proven, apparently, to General Arnold that he could get results. Sometimes I can recall, he would, he was under the gun for so many airplanes in a month. And as I recall - I've heard lots of people say - they were counting airplanes that had hardly gotten the first two rivets in them. So, Benny was getting results, but I'm not sure they were all too accurate.

Q: He was prone to give Arnold optimistic reports?

B: I'd say so, yes.

Q: But didn't he get caught?

B: I don't think, really, not seriously, in that phase.

Q: Was it generally known?

B: He did get some pretty good results by heavy handedness, he pushed without particular regard. He just pushed for results, you know. I'm talking about Benny.

Q: He lived very well, all the time. Was there any speculation about how he came by his affluence?

B: No, it was commonly considered that he made money in the stock market.

Q: Strattemeyer was the Chief of Air Staff, before he left Arnold's side. Arnold had everybody fill out a questionnaire about their financial assets. Perhaps you had to fill one out. Were you in procurement?

B: Yes, but I never had to fill one out.

Q: List your stockholdings?

B: I was very junior. Had no stockholdings.

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Q: But the senior personnel. Well, whether you had them or not, if you had procurement responsibilities, especially among seniors, had to list their stockholdings. Benny Meyers fudged on his report. He claimed that Arnold knew about. Later when he was exposed, he claimed that Arnold knew. Of course Arnold was irate. Arnold was also a sick man. He came to Washington and he didn't want the American people to think that Benny Meyers was characteristic of other military people. Of course, Arnold as you know, had an estate of $19,000 when he died. So he was terribly hurt by what he considered this betrayal of his confidence. You know, Benny Meyers aspired to be Chief of the Air Technical Service Command - we are talking 1945 - remember when Knudsen was leaving? This is in June 1945, were you around?

B: Yes.

A: Remember, Knudsen was leaving, Benny Meyers had aspirations to get that job.

B: He got it.

Q: No he didn't; Knerr got it.

B: Well, Benny had it for a while.

Q: Well, he was acting, but Knerr got the job.

B: He sat in the office for a shile, I remember.

Q: Do you remember that?

B: Well, Knerr got it after I left. I don't think Knerr was there when I left. I was there until - oh wait a minute, maybe he did.

Q: This was like a month after VE Day.

B: Yes, Benny had it when I left there.

Q: He was Acting...

B: I left Wright Field, and I headed the Flight Test Section for the last 6 months or so that I was there, and I left 1 Dec 1944 Benny was running the place then.

Q: In '44?

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B: And he had just put the two bases back together, the Technical Command and the Service Command. They had split the base. Tony [illegible]k was the king of the Air Service Command. He had Patterson Field, the club, and the quarters, and the other folk, I guess, ran the show. Somebody before that had the other part - Technical Command.

Q: When did they combine them into the Air Technical Service Command?

B: They combined them when Benny Meyers took over, which would be some time in 1944. Now, maybe, he was just Deputy at that time to Knudsen. But Knudsen wasn't there.

Q: He might have been traveling around the country, But on paper Knudsen was the Chief, I believe.

B: I wee.

Q: I believe that Knudsen signified his intention of retiring and Benny Meyers had aspirations...

B: Undoubtedly.

Q: To the job, but he didn't get it. You know, somebody told me - made the comment- that when Roosevelt died in April 1945 and Truman came in, Benny Meyers made tracks to retire, because the Truman Investigating Committee had been out to Wright Field, and had given Benny a hard time. Now that Truman was President of the US, ,Benny didn't want any part of that job. Does that strike you...?

B: I don't know.

Q: Strictly speculation?

B: I just wouldn't know. I didn't know Benny very well.

Q: Do you know where he is now?

B: Last time I heard anything about him he was reported to be up in NJ, but that was 15 years ago.

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Q: I've been told he's in NJ, and I've been told he's in San Francisco. I'd like to see him. He's probably changed his name because he served a term?

B: I don't know whether he changed his name or not. The people, fellow who saw him in NJ didn't say he changed his name. That was a long time ago.

Q: I will make a renewed effort to track that one down. I want to ask you about Tony Frank. Tony Frank was unhappy with Arnold?

B: Yes.

Q: Why?

B: I don't know, I didn't know Tony well.

Q: I talked to General Brooke Allen, his son-in-law, but he couldn't throw any light on it. My guess is-I saw some correspondence--that Tony Frank wanted a combat command. Arnold wouldn't give him one.

B: Probably, something like that, I don't know, I guess Tony was probably senior to him wasn't he? At one time?

Q: I don't know. Was Tony Frank in the same class as Frank Andrews? He was one of Andrews' disciples you know, GHQ AF. but Arnold was one year behind Andrews.

B: I wouldn't be a bit surprised but that Frank was senior to him.

Q: I would guess that he was not senior to Arnold, but he was very close to Arnold in seniority. He was far senior to all the men Arnold put in combat jobs.

B: You are probably right.

Q: So he felt he deserved a spot?

B: Yes, he was an ambitious old boy.

Q: Do you know anything about Arnold and Knerr?

B: No.

Q: Knerr didn't like Arnold; he liked Andrews?

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B: I didn't know that. I didn't know Knerr at all. I served under Andrews a little while at Seldridge Field in '33. He was a wonderful guy.

B: He was a LTCOL then and he was a terrific guy. Everybody was crazy about him. Last time I ever served under him.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of his relationship with Arnold?

B: No.

Q: Most of his men swore by Andrews, very loyal to the guy. I was told-these are speculations, partly based on fact- that Arnold didn't look after his men in regard to promotions and decorations. How does that strike you?

B: I don't think-I wasn't close enough. I wouldn't be surprised if it were true. He was a very intense guy on gett8ng a job done. He didn't want anybody necessarily giving him a bunch of medals for doing it, you know. He was that kind of a fellow. So I wouldn't be surprised, but I wouldn't know.

Q: Arnold had a reputation for being impulsive?

B: I think he was.

Q: Did he make some bad decisions in the material area?

B: Well, I don't know who made them, which ones were bad. You know there were some bad decisions made, but whether Arnold made them?

Q: There were some failures to anticipate situations, like the long range escort?

B: Well, yes, but I don't know that that is Arnold's fault. The command, the combat command should have been putting on the drive, for the capability of the long range escort. They really weren't, I was in the middle of that. I had the Fighter Branch, and I was trying to get.

Q: Fighter Branch at Wright Field?

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B: Yes, I was trying to get the long range on the airplane, then we got it on, but we didn't get it on soon enough, and the reason we didn't was because there wasn't any requirement. I put the first set fo long range tanks on the airplane, the P-40. I put drop tanks on the bomb racks, used to make ferry tanks out of it, to make it go further. From then on, it became the thing to put drop tanks on all fighters. But it was really... there was no real urgent requirement stated in the requirements for the things. Until all of a sudden they raninto the Germans and started losing all the bombers. Then there was a hell of a rush ot put on long range tanks.

Q: Would you attribute this to the doctrine developed by the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field? They were bomber happy, perhaps?

B: That's right, I always though they were, yes.

Q: Not enough emphasis on fighters?

B: We used ot have a lot of arguments before the war. I was always in the fighters.

Q: Chennault was fighters, too, wasn't he?

B: And these guys would say we don't need any fighters.

Q: Who are these guys?

B: Oh, the bomber boys.

Q: Kuter?

B: Well, I won't say who, all of them that were in bombardment.

Q: Was Arnold identified with any school of thought?

B: I don't think so.

Q: He was not an idealogue? He was not a conceptual man? He was a doer, wasn't he, more than a thinker type?

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B: Yes.

Q: Was Andrews an all out bomber man?

B: He was command of the Fighter Wing up at Selfridge Field.

Q: But he was pushing the B-17s?

B: I think that he and most of these folks got into the bombers as time went on, yes. LeMay started out in fighters and he turned out to be a big bomber man.

Q: You know in 1943 when Schweinfurt and Regensburg came we were really suffering, the 8th AF, there was a call for wing tanks. We ended up getting some cardboard wing tanks from the British to put on the P-38s and P-47s, and Wright Field was not too fast in coming through with wing tanks?

B: Coming through as fast as they could.

Q: Did somebody fail to anticipate taht problem?

B: No. Well, somebody failed to anticipate it, yes. But they didn't anticipate,for this reason, you see the British were over there, fighting for years without any tanks, no range. Our people were backing their plans and their war-fighting the British the way the British had been going. So they got over there and, all of a sudden, the long range bombers go out in the daytime and getting shot at. They wanted tanks immediately on the fighters. There is a story about how we really did get to Berlin. Even if you put drop tanks on a fighter, how far you go depends on what you can have inside of it. It should be protected from bullets, etc.. If you drop your tanks then you've got to have enough to get back home on. So you can't have more on the outside than you've got on the inside. At least it doesn't do you very much good. They were building the P-75s for this purpose to go to Berlin. It was pretty late to be starting one when they needed it right then. The

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P-75 didn't turn out to be a very good airplane. In fact, it was terrible. When I flew one for the first time, why I recommended to Gen Cook that this plane would never be worth a damn, and they had better get rid of it. They had many thousands ordered. So he said: "How are you going to escort these bombers." I said: "Well I think we can make the P-51 do." He said: "Well you do it then." I guess I talked to Echols, and I told him: "Cook" and he put Echols on the phone. He said: "All right, you go do it." So I went out and did it. I called up Kindelberger, and I told him what I thought. I'd been out looking at the hangar. We took a lot of that radio crap out ot the back of the seat. You could put some gas in there, tanks, self sealing tanks-maybe 50 or 60 gallons. I'd like to have them take it out, put it in there and then come out and flying. So thet brought it in there in about 3 or 4 days, a week. I came out and picked it up at Edwards, and took off with two drop tanks and a tank in the back. The airplane was unstable, you had to be careful with it, but you could get it up and down if you were careful. I flew with it on combat mission out to Albuquerque and back, and everything was fine, was there in about lead time, which was maybe a month. We had kids over in Europe, putting them in.

Q: This was just about the time of Schweinfurt-Regensburg or afterwards?

B: Afterwards, when they went to Berlin. That's when the stories came out about Goering and the P-51, somebody said that he said: "If the P-51s ever show up over Berlin my name is Meyer, and he went out to see how the war was going and the P-51s chased him in Poland.

Q: You originated this concept of puttint the tank...

B: In the back end of the P-51.

Q: Back end of the internal; in addition to the wing tanks.

B: We already had the wing tanks on.

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Q: That makes my trip worthwhile.

B: Eaker knows that story.

Q: You know Eaker was taken out of the 8th AF before, just about the time the 8th AFwas really going to show its stuff. Spaatz was put in; do you know anything about that?

B: No.

Q: Eaker was not happy about it.....Arnold was never pleased with Wright Field?

B: Oh no, he was always raising hell with them. I guess he thought that KB was pretty good, but the rest of them were pretty lousy. That's the way he acted.

Q: He liked KB Wolfe?

B: Yes.

Q: But he liked Meyers, didn't he?

B: Yes, I'm talking about people that ran it.

Q: How about Orval Cook? Did he have trouble?

B: I don't think so, but he wasn't close to Orville like he was the others-he made a lot of decisions-but did he back off and do something else and apologize?

B: I don't think he ever did. I don't know, but I don't think so.

Q: This thing about the P-43 that you came to see him personally?

B: .....It won a competition?

Q: For what?

B: To be put into production to build 13 of them, service test models, one of the new programs started and I went into Washington to present this, the Board had decided this was to get him to approve it.

Q: What was its special qualifications?

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B: It was just a little better performing airplane than the P-35 which preceded it up at Seversky. It was just about the best industry could do at the time, thats all, it wasn't anything big, it was the predecessor of the P-47.

Q: Seversky, I talked to him; he's not too happy wiht Arnold.

B: No, probably not.

Q: Do you know why?

B: No why?

Q: He felt that Arnold took him out of the Seversky aircraft and it became Republic. He felt that he got squeezed out of his corporation by Arnold. Was Arnold rough on people?

B: Oh yes.

Q: But on those he liked, he was?

B: People were scared of him. I don't know, I never was.

Q: Were you scared of him?

B: No, I never was close enough.

Q: People avoided him in the E Ring.

B: I imagine they did.

Q: He used to latch on to people and give them jobs which were foreign to their expertise.

B: Yes, KB always did that? He'd give people jobs that they had nothing to do with. He's a great guy for picking a guy and handing him a job.

Q: Sometimes foreign to his expertise?

B: Yes.

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Bradshaw, Aaron 21 May 71

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Home:
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MAJOR GENERAL AARON BRADSHAW, JR., U.S.A. RTD.
6606 BARNABY STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20015

April 26, 1971.

Dear Doctor Green:

Thanks for your letter of April 21 re biography of General Arnold.

In answer to your enquiry re Quail Hunt on Pearl Harbor Day, I was in England and not there.

But I do have many recollections of General Arnold and his son who was a member of my command in Italy. They all highlight his greatness as a leader, his sterling character, kindness and great understanding.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Aaron Bradshaw

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21 April 1971

Maj. General Aaron Bradshaw, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret)
6606 Barnaby Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C. 20015

Dear General Bradshaw:

I phoned earlier today and was informed you were out, so I thought to write you a letter. I had trouble tracking you down through the Air Force active and retired lists - for good reason. You are U.S. Army (Retired).

In any event, I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold and have been engaged in this project for more than three years. I'm a professional historian and have been associated with the Department of Defense for nearly 25 years. In my research I have been fortunate enough to interview some of the military greats, including: Generals Spaatz, Eaker, O'Donnell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter and perhaps 100 others in the Air Force. Among the Army personnel, I recently talked to General TomHandy, Jimmy Burns, Leslie Groves (just before he died last summer), Albert Wedemeyer (twice), among others.

I was out to the West Coast to interview some people, among them Gene Beebe, and he mentioned that fateful quail hunt with Donald Douglas on Pearl Harbor day at which you were said to have been present. If this is so, and you also have some recollections of General Hap Arnold, good or bad, I'd welcome the opportunity to chat with you for a half hour or so at a time and place convenient for you.

My office phones: OX 3-7388 and OX 3-7428. If you wish to write to me, the enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief
AF History
Office of Air Force History

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I was out to the West Coast to interview some people, among them Gene Beebe, and he mentioned that fateful quail hunt with Donald Douglas on Pearl Harbor day at which you were said to have been present. If this is so, and you also have some recollections of General Hap Arnold, good or bad, I'd welcome the opportunity to chat with you for a half hour or so at a time and place convenient for you.

My office phones: OX 3-7388 and OX 3-7426. If you wish to write to me, the enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Spec. Assistant to Chief
AF History
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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Interview MG Aaron Bradshaw, Washington, D.C., 21 May 1971

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Q: The German ships, this is off Hampton Roads.

B: Yes, and so the heavy artillery was to fire at a certain range and he was going to drop bombs at the same height, you see. This was, I think, the start of his real trouble with Gen Hugh Drum and the court martial. He came down there, and if you knew him, you couldn't help but like him. But he was so enthusiastic about what he wanted to achieve, the means meant nothing to him.

Q: This is Billy Mitchell?

B: Yes, so that's when I first knew Gen Arnold.

Q: He was a Major then?

B: And Spaatz flew down there.

Q: This is at Ft. Monroe?

B: Yes, but they were at Langley Field, Va. So they came down there, and they had these tests. We fired these 12" rifles at the ship that they would try to drop on. Well, it happened that it wasn't a day for the bombers, and they didn't hit the ship. I don't know whether we did much better, but they didn't hit the ship.

Q: What was the purpose of firing the guns?

B: They wanted to have a test between the effectiveness of bombing and the effectiveness of artillery fire against these vessels. Gen Mitchell came back to Washington and Steve Early, who was Secy to Roosevelt, he came back and he was with the Associated Press, and he cost Steve Early his job. They came out in a big blast: "Bombing Succeeds." General Mitchell, I don't know whether he told them that, or what he did, but that's one of the reasons I think he got tried. He came back and gave this impression. Now, I don't think Gen Arnold or Gen Spaatz or any of the other representatives were backing up his enthusiasm, or his counter claims which could stand up in a

court martial. But that was my first association with him.

Q: With Arnold?

B: Yes.

Q: Do you remember Arnold was exiled to Ft. Riley - this is a Cavalry post - after the Mitchell trial. Did you know that?

B: No, I didn't know that, but all my contact with him, I tried to impress you over the phone, all my contact with him was, he was a forthright, fine gentleman, that was professionally 100%.

Q: Did you have any contact with him in the 1930s?

B: I don't think so.

Q: And during the war?

B: During the war, my contact with Arnold....my brother had three sons. One of them was a graduate of West Point. He was an aviator. The other one was an aviator, and my son was an aviator. And so, Gen Arnold's son came to me as a regimental or group commander.

Q: Hank Arnold?

B: Yes, a fine commander.

Q: This was in the Mediterranean?

B: Yes, in Italy.

Q: He was in the AA Coast Artillery.

B: Yes, antiaircraft artillery, which I was the Chief of.

Q: You were Chief of the Army antiaircraft?

B: Yes, and heavy artillery, I was Gen Eisenhower's Chief of antiaircraft artillery and heavy artillery. Then I left him to go with Patton, and then, at the time that I knew young Arnold, I think I was with my classmate, Gen Mark Clark, in the 5th Army.

Q: Do you remember on one or two occasions, Gen Arnold came through Italy?

B: Yes, that's right.

Q: Did you see him when he came through?

B: I think I saw him both times.

Q: I think he stopped off at Caserta?

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B: Yes, that's right.

Q: He saw Eaker, and some of the others there?

B: Yes, that's right.

Q: Do you have any recollections of meeting him there?

B: Yes, I have a recollection of meeting him because I think, at one of these meetings, I told him about my wife being sick, and he said: "Well, there was a plane," I think his plane was flying back, and he'd like to give me a ride.

Q: So you rode back with him?

B: I rode back with him, and I remember seeing Mrs. Arnold at that time, telling her about her son, and the job he was doing was a good job.

Q: He was a LTCOL then, wasn't he?

B: I don't know.

Q: He did a good job out there?

B: Oh yes, yes, he was a LTCOL, that's young Arnold.

Q: Well, he served more combat time than any of the rest of the Arnold family did.

B: I wouldn't say that because I think Gen Arnold served a lot of combat time.

Q: No, he wasn't in combat.

B: Not maybe directly, but....

Q: Yes, sure, but young Arnold never made a star.

B: He didn't? I don't know why.

Q: He did a good job in your command, didn't he?

B: Couldn't have done a better. And he was a very forceful, fine leader.

Q: He just retired recently.

B: He did?

Q: Yes, he's out in Wyoming.

B: Well, he did a good job over there. He was dependable.

Q: You know, there were letters from Mrs. Arnold to Gen Arnold when he was overseas and talked about how they ought to take Hank out of the line,

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because he had an awful lot of time in the combat zone.

B: I had five years of it, so I don't know.

Q: I don't think he had that much, but he had a lot of time there. Are you familiar with the difficulties between the Army and the AAF in control of the artillery?

B: Yes, my direct contact was with Larry Norstad, and also Vandenberg, but mostly Larry Norstad.

Q: Yes, he was in Plans.

B: Yes, and I was in Plans at that time. Naturally, and I don't hold it against him. He wanted to grab everything

Q: Well, the argument they had was that if the Army Air Forces has control of the air defense, that is, the pursuit or interceptor planes, they also needed control of the antiaircraft artillery. Otherwise, you are going to have your own artillery shooting down our own planes.

B: Well, it happened to work out the other way.

Q: Yes.

B: The bombers, the accuracy that Billy Mitchell and everybody else predicted just doesn't exist. It doesn't exist today, with the finest mechanism. But we were starting to get electronic equipment, and it has gotten so that I, being prejudiced, was convinced that we could do a better job than they could, because we fire from a stable base. I've always thought, I've got an article upstairs, some day to get published. The money that they put in interceptor planes is lost money. They ought to have rockets, you see, to control, that are fired from a stable base, that can be controlled. Now, I went to MIT and I got a lot of this from Vannevar Bush's treatments. He came down to Washington and touted these arguments. They just laughed at him. And he said: "We will get a missile so that you can take it, and turn it around, and chase around." Interceptors can't do that. And he said: "We'll get it so that it will home on the target," and they laughed at him. That's exactly what they have today.

Q: You don't feel interceptors have a role, then?

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B: No, I don't think they have any role. I think in those days it was wasted money.

Q: Of course, during the war they didn't have missiles, antiaircraft missiles I mean they didn't have any. They had the VT fuse.

B: They were getting it like the proximity fuse. They were getting so Vannevar Bush used to hammer at me, and he came down here to Washington and made this, they just gave him the brush.

Q: Vannevar Bush was no fan of missiles. He didn't believe there would ever be an intercontinental missile.

B: Well, I don't talk about any kind of missile. I talked about any kind of interceptor missile. He was saying we could get, we could fire from the ground on a stable base.

Q: Yes, the AAF tried to get control of the antiaircraft artillery from you, or from the Army, and they didn't succeed.

B: No, they succeeded in getting quite a bit.

Q: They didn't do too badly. How about this fellow, Sanderford Jarman. What was his job?

B: His job, my first connection goes back with Sanderford Jarman, was in the Philippines when I was a youngster. Then I came back, came to duty in the Office of Chief of Artillery, and I'd been down on the Artillery Board. I came back, and in all my relations with Sanderford Jarman were most pleasant. He was all for Sanderford. Be had one big fault. He liked to take, like I prepared the antiaircraft defenses of the Philippine Islands, Sanderford Jarman, which changing even a dot in my plans, he took and put his name on them. A lot of people in my branch didn't like that part of him. But he was a fine officer.

Q: When the Army Air Forces was trying to take over the Army anti-aircraft artillery, did he try to get into the AAF?

B: I don't know. I wouldn't be able to surmise. Jarman with his fine mind and all his fine technical ability, and everything else, he was mostly for Sanderford Jarman.

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Q: This is a disease that afflicts a lot of us.

B: At my age maybe, if I had to do it over again, I would have leaned that way a little bit.

Q: You were in Washington for some time? What years did you serve in Washington?

B: I came here first....

Q: During the war, I mean, WWII.

B: WWII, I came here in 1936, and I left in 1940. The war wasn't on, and when I left, I left in about sometime in 1940. I went down and I took the 7th Regiment of NY National Guard and converted them from Infantry to Antiaircraft Artillery, and I took them down to Camp Stewart, Ga. Then I went from Camp Stewart, Ga., to the camp down in Texas where I was Director of Training.

Q: Fort Hood.

B: No, it was further down, Camp Wallace, Texas, and I was the Chief of Training there, and then I left there to go overseas and I went over when we were going to invade southern Ireland. I went over the with 5th Corps.

B: Ireland, there was a big move on to invade, it was a submarine base and everything, and so I went there, and then I went to London as Chief of Artillery.

Q: Where were you in London?

B: I was in London in 1942.

Q: They were building up the AF - the BOLERO PLAN - do you remember BOLERO?

B: Yes.

Q: And Eaker and Spaatz were in there. Did you see Arnold when he came over there a couple of times?

B: I'm sure I did.

Q: But you don't have any specific recollections? Any dealings with him?

B: No.

Q: Did you see him and Marshall together?

B: No.

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Q: How about McNair and Arnold together?

B: No. There was another Bradshaw.

Q: Who was killed in the war?

B: He was a graduate of West Point, and he was in the AF. His name was Paul Bradshaw.

Q: And how is he related to you?

B: He was my nephew, my brother's child. My namesake, Aaron Bradshaw, he was in the AF, and Henry Bradshaw, who was the oldest son, was a machine gunner, and he had such a brilliant record, and he was killed just the day before the Armistice over there. I went to see Hap Arnold, and I talked with him and I told him: "Well, my namesake is still in the AF, and I think they lost two boys." I told him I wasn't speaking for my brother. I was speaking for my mother.

Q: She lost, you say, two boys or one?

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Q: And that was one of the few contacts you had with Arnold?

B: Yes.

Q: Somebody told me that Arnold used to get mad every day, he had a way of blowing up. Did you ever see him mad?

B: No, I've never seen him mad, and all I know of him is that when I, like last time I really saw him was with Mrs. Arnold. I went over there, and she is a gracious, and I'd say, very stable woman.

Q: Where did you see them?

B: Over at Ft. Myer.

Q: His Quarters 8 over there?

B: Yes. And that angle you bring to me, is foreign to any of my thoughts.

Q: What I mean is, I don't mean this in a derogatory sense, I mean that

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B: I don't know that side of him. I know the other side of him. I know, he was like his son, I know he was a forceful man.

Q: Did you know the other sons, Bruce Arnold, he was in the anti-aircraft artillery during the war. But I don't think he got overseas.

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Q: Do you remember Arnold was exiled to Ft. Riley - this is a Cavalry post - after the Mitchell trial. Did you know that?

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Briggs, James "Buster" & Mrs.
Farman, Ivan & Mrs.
7 Jan 72

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Interview - Brig General and Mrs. Ivan Farman; Lieut Gen and Mrs. James "Buster" Briggs, Bradenton, Fla., 7 Jan 1972

Q We were talking about your star and I asked you if Arnold helped you get your star, and I think you said that you didn't know if he did that, but if he opposed your getting a star, you would have heard of it.

F That didn't apply only to me

Q Then we started talking about your evaluation of Arnold, was he a demanding man?

F Yes, I said he was a demanding man. I said that he, in my opinion, he had the extreme facility of not only demanding the best in people, but he could make you produce beyond what you even thought were your own capabilities. When he wanted something, you produced, that's all. You were a sorry person, if you didn't.

Q And the men respected him?

F I think so, I had the utmost respect for him.

Q March Field was a critical point in his career. He had been in exile after the Billy Mitchell thing. In March Field he did a great job, and then, was lucky enough to be under Malin Craig, so when Malin Craig came to Washington to succeed MacArthur, he brought Arnold in as Asst Chief of Air Corps. Did you know that?

F No, I didn't know that, but Arnold had another extremely critical assignment during that period. Arnold was the organizer and commander of the mission, when we flew the mail.

Q The air mail, right. I wanted to ask you about that.

F At Salt Lake City

Q Did you serve under him?

F Yes, I was the communications officer for what was called Air Mail Route #5. That was from Seattle to Portland, up to Columbia River Gorge to Boise, to Salt Lake

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Q You just had that single route?

F I was the Communications Officer

Q Who commanded that? Eaker had #4

F. Yes, wait a minute, I'll think of it. Charlie...

Q Charlie Howard?

F No, Charley Howard wasn't there. Charley was, he was in GHQ at that time.

Q In any event.

F I'll tell you who he was, his job, when he went up there, he was the Commander of the 7th Group at March Field.

Q Were you stationed at the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake?

F No, I was in our headquarters at Vancouver Barracks, old Pearson Field. We took over for living quarters the old Evergreen Hotel in Vancouver.

Q In the State of Washington?

F In the State of Washington, right across from Portland

Q Do you remember Arnold during that period?

F I never had any personal contact with him. My contact was with McClelland, McClelland was responsible for all the communications. So my only immediate contact was with McClelland.

Q Did you ever hear anything about Foulois, perhaps, shooting his wad before he was ready, in a sense, they asked him: "How long will it take you to fly the mail?" He said: "Give us a week or 10 days."

F All I know about the Air Mail is one weekend my wife and I had gone in to visit her folks in LA. We came back. There was a note on the door for me to call the Group Commander. So I went down to see him and he told me to pack my bag and be ready to take off at 6:00 the next morning for an indefinite stay. He was a busy man and he would tell me later. I went home and my wife got from the wives' underground. She knew what it was all about.

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F Yes, all they had to do was get on the phone, and you could find out anything, I think. So when I got home, she told me I was going out and fly the air mail.

Q Right. How did Mrs. Arnold get along with the wives?

F. You'd better ask my wife. I think very, very well

Q She had a very good memory for names, didn't she?

F I think so

Q A number of people have told me, when they were introduced to her, she associated the name with the face, and seldom forgot it.

F Well, both Mrs. Briggs and my wife. We were all together out at March Field

Q Was Briggs out at March Field, too?

F Yes, we were all there at the same time

Q I'll ask him a couple questions if I catch him. Anyway, General, to wind down this thing that I read from the memorandum to Gen Eaker from McClelland. McClelland sent you a copy of his letter to Eaker opposing the changeover in the communications system. His letter to you is dated July 9, 1947. Why did he send it to you - because you were so closely identified with the...did you originate the system?

F No, McClelland did

Q You had a great role in it?

F In the early days there were very few communications people, and I worked when McClelland was a Captain. He was the Air Communications Officer. I worked with him from 1930, continuously. I worked with or for McClelland, and I was the commander of the AACS. First, I went from instructor to communications school, out to CalTech to become a meteorologist. I was happily engaged in the meteorology when war broke out and I was sent to Newfoundland under Gen Jerry Brant. I was the Communications Officer and meteorological officer for the Newfoundland Base Command. In addition to my other

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duties, I was made commander of the North Atlantic Communications, the AACS, the 8th region.

Q That was a touchy job

F That was in the bad part

Q Because we lost some airplanes flying over the North Atlantic.

F Well, that came not until 1942. But I was the guy that was responsible for getting that communications in for the Air Corps across the North Atlantic. McClelland, at that time, was in London, as a liaison officer, and Si Marriner was the Chief Communicator, Lloyd Watney was the Commander of the AACS. So I was under both of those for part of my duties, and under Gen Brant for the other. Then, in 1943, Lloyd Watney was relieved, and I was made Commander of the AACS. Of course, by that time, Gen McClelland was back in the Pentagon directly under Arnold. He was responsible for all communications-electronics. There were all these people trying to break it up. Somebody would say: "I'm the theater commander; I should control this here." So this letter was not new. It went on all the time. So I was, of course, constantly working with Gen McClelland. So, later, when he ran into it again, when I was in the Orient, he sent me a letter telling me: "Boy, it broke loose again, and here's what we did about it."

Q Let me ask something in this area. McClelland was in the R&D area. This may be beyond your immediate situation. He was sort of bypassed by Arnold. Arnold gave a lot of this function to Edward Bowles, the R&D man

F Yes, I knew Ed, Dr. Bowles.

Q I talked to him, and Dr. Bowles and McClelland did not get along so well?

F Not too well, no.

Q As a result, they brought in Tom Rives.

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F He was Deputy

Q Deputy to McClelland. But it got to a point where when McClelland and Bowles had to make a policy decision, McClelland bowed out of it and he passed the thing on to Rives, he didn't want to meet with Bowles. Did you know anything about this?

F No, I don't know, I just know there was some kind of friction there. Because, lots of times I would have to deal with Bowles around McClelland. Bowles would call me in, and he was a civilian. As far as I was concerned, he was the Secy, or something. I don't know just what he was.

Q Expert Consultant to Arnold and to Stimson

F So Bowles sometimes would ask me to come in directly.

Q In a sense, this was Arnold's responsibility, where he brought Bowles in at a high level without clarifying his relationship with McClelland.

F Yes, it was sort of mixed up. Mac told me one time, one of his problems. I think Gen Arnold got annoyed with Gen McClelland because Gen McClelland got himself posted to England as a Liaison Officer, and Arnold didn't want him to go or something.

Q This is part of the friction between them?

F I think so

Q If Arnold didn't want McClelland, why didn't he just fire him. He fired a lot of people

F Because a very good reason was when all of the requirements for communications became so urgent, after the North Atlantic, and then we had the South Atlantic, and you had the Pacific, and McClelland was in London, not doing Communications, and he had been Arnold's Chief Communications Advisor from the time I first knew them both...

Q When did he go to Europe and London? Was it before Pearl Harbor?

F I don't know, it was before that. Because I saw McClelland in London in 1942.

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Q Do you think Arnold was upset that he left?

F I thought so, because when things got very critical, he called McClelland back, and McClelland told me one time, in 1942, I saw him in London. He said: "Well, I'll be seeing you, because Arnold said I've got to come back and take over the Directorate. The next thing I knew Mac again was the Chief Communicator, but I think Arnold was a little annoyed with him, that he had to even go get him.

Q Was he annoyed with Arnold for bypassing him?

F I don't know; I don't think so.

Q Did he ever comment on Arnold?

F Never said anything to me, except that Arnold, he told me one time, that he thought Arnold was a bit annoyed with him because he had gone to London.

Q Let me ask you about your relationship with Irving Krick. You studied under Krick?

F Yes

Q Where?

F CalTech

Q And when did you graduate?

F I was twice at CalTech. I graduated there with a Bachelor's degree in 1926. I went back and got my Master's degree in meteorology when I was a LT. I got the degree in 1939.

Q And did Don Yates graduate with you?

F Yes, Don Yates and Eastman and Bob Fulton and Don...

Q Zimmerman?

F No, he was way ahead of us.

Mrs. F (told about Arnold and Farman) Col Pulver went up to show him how communications could really work and the object was, Arnold was going to be on the ground and give the orders, and the airplane would respons. As he would say: "Turn right," the airplane was

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supposed to turn, as he would say "Dive," the airplane was supposed to dive. Hap Arnold would sit down there at the microphone and nothing happened. The airplane just flew straight and level without a response to anything, until, finally, Hap Arnold said" "That old duffer is so god-damned deaf he can't hear anything."

Q Any recollections about any anecdotes of Mrs. Arnold and Gen Arnold?

Mrs. F Not probably anything I haven't already told you

Q Professor Krick?

F Dr. Krick

Q He was a Professor

F Professor of Meteorology at CalTech for a number of years

Q Arnold loved him and a number of people hated him, people who felt he had cut in on their mission, people like Donald Yates and Don Zimmerman, Huntley Bassett. These are some of the weather people I've talked to.

F Yes, I know all of the people. I was a student under Krick at CalTech, '38 to '39. Then when the AF was trying to get people trained as meteorologists which we had practically none when the war was coming along, I was the Control Officer of the 1st Weather Region, that was from Denver to the Pacific. There were five colleges that they were going to send. If you had a Bachelor of Science degree, the Air Corps put up the scholarship and would send you to one of these five colleges. Two of them were CalTech and UCLA. So I was responsible for getting the students for CalTech and UCLA. In this way I had almost constant contact with Dr. Krick and with Dr. Joseph Kaplan out at UCLA, because I couldn't enlist anybody that I wasn't sure these schools would accept in their graduate school. So I frequently had contact with Dr. Krick, for this period of 2 years. I have the utmost respect for him. I think he is probably the outstanding practical

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meteorologist in the world. And I know of a conflict between Dr. Krick and other professors of meteorology. Also, I think you will find in the AF those of us that were in the Weather Service, there will be some that are contrary to Dr. Krick. Some like myself and Harold Smith out in Seattle, who were strong supporters of Dr. Krick.

Q Arnold thought the world of Krick?

F Well, so did some of us, and otherwise. I think the basis in the civilian world and the scientific world, the basis of the conflict between them is because, when Dr. Krick was at the School at CalTech, he also was operating a weather service that was forecasting for the moving picture people, and mining people in Alaska, the tomato growers in Texas, Southern California, the Edison Company in Ohio. He was making a lot of money. I think the basic conflict in the scientific world where a bunch of renowned people sort of referred to him as a charlatan, he was simply making 10 times as much money as they were, because he was using his knowledge for a practical purpose, whereas they thought a scientist, I guess, should just be a theoretician. Krick put his brains to work and made a lot of money.

Q People may have resented him?

F Yes, of course. That's what I think was the basis. I don't know what the conflict was between Yates and them, because Krick was brought into the AF and was sent over to...

Q He was in the Navy; Arnold had him transferred to the AAF.

F Okay, he went to England, I think that's where there was some controversy about the time of OVERLORD. But I don't know any of the details or anything about it except I know there was a controversy. If I was involved in it, I would be on Krick's side.

Q Well, those who don't like him say that he did not predict the weather accurately, and he was very quick to say that he was just 12 hours off in his prediction.

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F I think he probably...when we were going through CalTech in the weather course, every day, every student had to make a prediction for the next day for selected places. Krick would put on the board. The next day, he would put his prediction on after we left, and then see who could come closest. Insofar, as I remember it, there wasn't anybody ever made any predictions that were anywhere near the overall accuracy of Krick

Q Arnold found out about him when he read an article in a magazine

F I don't know how he found out about Dr. Krick

Q You think Krick did an outstanding job in the service?

F I never was connected with him at all when he was in the service. He was over in England, but I was only connected with him during the period that I was either in the school, or getting students to put in the school. I kept up acquaintance with him, in fact, I visited him last summer. We were going to spend two weeks up in British Columbia in a boat up in the San Juan Straits, and in June of this year. Dr. Krick gave Marty and I a two week forecast for the last week in July, and the first week in August, and he hit it right square on the nose, that much in advance for every day we were up there. The only day he said we would have a little bad weather, that's the day we had it. So that's my version of it.

Q I guess that's what makes him an interesting man. He's controversial

F Yes

Q We are talking to Gen Buster Briggs, maybe you can tell us a story about Arnold

B This is 1944, summer of '44, I was in OPD, and I hadn't seen Gen Arnold in person in 10 years. I happened to be in the hall, walking in the opposite direction in the Pentagon, Gen Arnold, he's coming back from Gen Marshall's office. He turned around and stopped, and said: "You're Buster Briggs." I had been a 2nd LT under him 10 years

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before. I was now a Colonel. He said: "Golly!" He grabbed me by the arm--broke my arm, practically--and he said: "I'm sorry, Gee, I'd like to talk to you. Come on down to my office with me." And he said: "How's Kay? And your son, Spike, he was born there with us, wasn't he? How's he?" As O'Donnell would have said: "I'm his man from then on."

Q You know, Mrs. Arnold had the same kind of fabulous memory. I was told the story only yesterday, two days ago. Don Darrow was out there at March Field, Mrs. Arnold called him by some nickname, and she associated his name with his face, and she never forgot it.

B When we had this dinner, on the 10th of December. We had a dinner, about 10 of us, the Falcon Foundation, gave a dinner for Mrs. Arnold and we got a guy to go up and get her and bring her down from Sonoma. Mrs. Arnold, she was sitting, and I was sitting on the floor next to her. She named about 15 people at March that are still around somewhere, most of them are, and then named their wives' first name, 2nd LTs, all of them. Just amazing, oh, she would talk about Ann, you know, Ann Anderson, that kind of thing. She would say: "Where are they now?"

Mrs. B. When we were all out on the air mail in Salt Lake City, and about to drive home, Mrs. Arnold and Lois had gone up to visit Gen Arnold. I had driven up with Alberta Snavely, and Buster Briggs, when I got there, he was on his way through from Rock Springs, Wyoming, and going over to Oakland, Calif. So I had just a brief time with him and then I was, turned loose, really, to start back home. Gen Arnold said he was driving Mrs. Arnold back to March Field, part way, the next day, and would I ride along with them. What was so interesting then, was that he was a completely and totally devoted husband.

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Q She had a gun, right?

Mrs. B I don't remember that

Q He had her bring a gun because they drove through the desert and there were a lot of hobos.

Mrs. B. But he really and truly, he could hardly bear it, to get out of that car. Somebody was going to pick him up, and take him back as soon as he telephoned and said: "I'm at such and such a place." He kept going a little farther and a little farther so he could stay with Mrs. Arnold and Lois. He acted as if he had no care in the world at all, nothing but a holiday with his wife. He was a perfectly delightful and charming person--just able to put all his cares and worries aside.

Q This was over the Easter weekend?

Mrs. B I believe so, we stopped at Boulder Dam, near Las Vegas. We stopped there. They were in the process of building it.

Q Mrs. Briggs, I might have trouble selling this book because Arnold was a 19th Century man. He was totally devoted to his wife. This will never sell copies.

B You've got to have several amours

Mrs. B. He was absolutely a delightful husband

Q And she saved all his letters. You know, from Forest Lawn. You mentioned Forest Lawn. They were engaged from Decoration Day to Sept 10, 1913, when they married. In those days, the mail used to be delivered twice a day, and faster than it does today. She was in Forest Lawn during that summer vacation. The letters were pouring in, he had to write it to get the mailman in the afternoon, so she some days would get two letters a day. So she must have well over 100 letters for that period. Of course, they were engaged. But he wrote letters to her, endearing letters to her 20 years after they were married.

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B They were engaged from what year to what year.

Q They were engaged from Decoration Day 1913 until Sept 10, 1913 when they married. Three months, that summer. He visited her over the summer. There were complicated logistics about transferring to Rochester on some train, going down to Philadelphia, very complicated. Do you remember any situation at March Field when the Aviation Cadets were not permitted into the Officers' Club?

B No

Q Mrs. Arnold interceded with somebody?

B I don't know about that We were 2nd LTs. Nobody could figure out what they were. That's all.

Mrs. B They came on active duty as cadets, instead of officers. Not enough money

Q I'm not sure who made this ruling. It might have been Eugene Lohman

B Oh, "Fud" Lohman, garbage can inspector?

Q Yes, that's right

Mrs. B This was during the time of the air mail

B Right, we were gone when the cadets came in

Mrs. B That's right, and nobody did know whether they were fish or fowl

Q And they were not permitted into the club. Somebody told me Mrs. Arnold interceded, and said they would be. She went to Lt Col Arnold and he issued an order that they be allowed in the club.

Mrs. B I'd forgotten that

B They were doing the same work as everybody else. There is a whole bunch of well known names in those cadets that came in. Class of Feb 1934

Q Do you remember Arnold and the earthquake? Were you there?

B I was there, but I don't remember him involved in it.

Q He had a great story on that one, flying over the hotel

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Q Do you remember the Hollywood people coming out, Wallace Beery and Beebe Daniels

B Gary Cooper

Mrs. B The movie "Dinner at Eight"

B She once asked: I wonder how those palm tress are we planted there at March

Q She was great for ecology, long before it became popular

Mrs. B We had to buy trees at $1 a tree. They were called shade trees, and when the trees were delivered, everybody teased us because the Briggs had to buy three because we were on the corner. Everybody else was buying two. It was going to cost us $3 and other families $2. Don't think this wasn't quite a problem, this difference between the $2 and $3.

Mrs. F We never had $3

Mrs. B Well, anyway, we kept saying: "But think of the shade we will have. We will be so popular with all the shade of these shade trees. Well, the trees were delivered to us and put in for us. The sticks that held them up were much bigger and thicker than the trees. But they have all grown up now.

B They are pretty now

Q Was that a good experience, March Field?

Mrs. B Oh, it was wonderful

B You were supposed to call on the Commander. The LTs used to wait and see. Maybe they wouldn't be home. Then, one guy would get elected to stuff all the cards under the door. One time, Mrs. Arnold opened the door on a LT one time when he was down on his hands and knees, poking cards under the door.

Q What was he doing?

B You had to leave your card

Q So he was slipping the card under the door for everybody

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B Everybody's. One guy would get elected, and he was down on his hands and knees and I think Mrs. Arnold opened the door.

Q Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

Mrs. B. He had a perpetual grin. When he was coming, we were told, to inspect the quarters. Everyone was simply terrified. He came and he had two or three people with him. He never took his eyes off the face of the hostess, or the one who was responsible for the quarters. He grinned the entire time, a beautiful, lovely grin. He was a handsome man, and apparently, did not look in any of the quarters. But I have an idea that the men who came with him had sharp eyes, to see if we were good housekeepers.

Mrs. F Of course, we were scared to death, because we all had home brew hidden around. That's the thing we were all frightened of.

Mrs. B I don't think we had any at that time. They were very...

B $5 for five gallons

Q Did Arnold himself drink?

B He gave me a glass one night.

F They got so military for awhile. Your wife had to have evening clothes on at home. You had to have your uniform on after retreat, unless you were going some place. We'd leave the clothes on the chair and if the doorbell rang, put the coat on. We were just going somewhere.

Q Do you remember the wing dings?

B We had them for awhile at March

Mrs. B That was Hawaii?

Q The wives weren't invited. The men went, dressed formally. Did you attend any of those?

B No. That's later.

Q That was after the Alaskan flight. He got that idea from the British

Q It was in March Field, Sept 1934. It was a month after they came back from Alaska.

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Mrs. B We left in July 1934

F Never know whether you are going to come out alive or not. I had an officer who was being posted back to England, in NATO, and his replacement doesn't show up and he doesn't show up. My Deputy was a Group Commander. I had to call the Air Ministry to find out when the heck this guy is coming. So he came back in and sort of laughed, and said: "He'll be here in a few days. The squadron gave him a dining in and they broke his leg."

Mrs B Our AF cadets were the ones who really learned plenty from the dining-in, in Great Britain, when they went over.

Q Arnold started this thing because he felt it was a great morale booster. The officers got to know one another. It built this esprit de corps, at least.

F That smile, that was when it was not a good smile. I had occasion to get one of them one time.

Q Everybody takes his own signs. I talked to Sgt Bruce Simmons, his chauffeur. He talked about that dangerous smile.

B At Rockwell, my whole daily schedule was get to work at 7:30 and then sit around and wonder what you do. We'd talk about that for an hour, and have some coffee while the troops were rolling out the airplanes. Then, well, we would fly an hour, Monk Hunter would say something. We would go out and fly an hour and come back and play three games of squash and we were all done.

Q Was there a lot of sitting around at March Field?

F No. Afternoons in the hot weather we would be off, after working 7 working hours a day. I think the way I got in the communications business was I never, U used to play tennis with Charlie Howard every afternoon. I was Asst Operations. Audit took me 10 minutes. I'd take pencil and graph paper and show everybody's flight time, cumulative.

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I was monkeying around Rockwell one day and I saw a little shack and I looked in the window, and I saw all this radio equipment, vacuum tubes, and my "ham" blood started to boi. The next afternoon I was playing tennis with Charley, and I said: "What's that room out there with all those vacuum tubes in it." and he said "How'd you know they were vacuum?" And I said: "I'm a ham," The next day, I was Group Communications Officer.

Q Do you remember that Arnold was tremendously impressed with the CCC experience. This carried over into his later life. He had this idea that if you take young people, put them out in the woods, and make them do some useful task, then let them play some baseball and take a swim, and they would come out cleaner and morally cleansed.

B Thinking of the camp, of course

Q But he had this fixation about juvenile delinquency. He talked about the CCC for years after that. Did he ever give any pep talk about the CCC, and about what a great experience it was?

B I don't know, probably did to the senior officers. One of his classmates was an old pal of mine. He'd come up and visit us. Gen Arnold asked him over to the house, and he'd have to ask me. So we'd get invited over.

Q (Re Lone Pine Camp)

F 's I remember it, they had those old FWD's, and tore up the highways. The Highway Dept said they couldn't run them up any more. So we flew the rest of the stuff up in old Curtiss Condors. I know one time I was taking a load up there. We had a big box in the bomb bay. It was full of sacks of tomatoes, When I got up there, they were all squashed. One of the things they wanted was an anvil. So they dumped an anvil in the bay.

Q Do you remember scrounging equipment, pipes, etc.?

B No. That was up to the guys building it.

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Q The Quartermaster?

B That was not a good idea

Q Was it popular or not?

B Really stupid. Not more than 10 people ever went up there. It was hard to get to.

F I went up almost every other day, flying the Condor up. But it was used as a recreational center.

Q It was too far away

B Water was too cold to swim. I just landed. We scraped the runway out. I landed right on the side of the lake, so to speak. We put a runway out there.

F Early part, up in the North Atlantic, no one knew anything about Greenland, Iceland, there was a chap named Paul Oscanyon. Paul had been the radio operator on one of those expeditions to the North Pole, or something. Paul wanted to get in the AF, but Paul wore glasses that were about a half inch thick. He was practically blind. Arnold evidently heard about him and called him down. Talked to him in his office. He said: "You couldn't possibly get me in the AF. I can hardly see." Arnold called in the Chief Flight Surgeon, and pointed at Paul, and said: "I said that man can see." That was Arnold's ability to see what's important. Well, Paul, then, he was assigned to Communications. We had him for most of the war. Now he's blind. He walks around with a cane.

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Transcribe cards w/

Interview - [redacted] Bradenton, Fla., 7 Jan 1972 (Part)

Brig Gen and Mrs Ivan Farman; Lieut General and Mrs James "Buster" Briggs

Q: We were talking about your star and I asked you if Arnold helped you get your star, and I think you said that you didn't know if he did that, but if he opposed your getting a star, you would have heard of it.

F: That didn't apply only to me.

Q: Then we started talking about your evalution of Arnold, was he a demanding man?

F: Yes, I said he was a demanding man, and I said that he, in my opinion, he had the extreme facility of not only demanding the best in people, but he could make you produce beyond what you even thought were your own capabilities. When he wanted something, you produced, that's all, you were a sorry person, if you didn't.

Q: And the men respected him?

F: I think so, I had the utmost respect for him.

Q: March Field was a critical point in his career, he had been in exile after the Billy Mitchell thing, and in March Field he did a great job, and then, was lucky enough to be under Malin Craig, so when Malin Craig came to Washington, to succeed MacArthur, he brought Arnold in as Asst Chief, Air Corps, did you know that?

F: No, I didn't know that, but Arnold had another extremely critical assignment during that period. Arnold was the organizer and commander of the, when we flew the mail mission,

Q: The air mail, right, I wanted to ask you about that.

F: At Salt Lake City.

Q: Did you serve under him?

F: Yes, I was the communications officer for what was called Air Mail Route #5, and that was from Seattle to Portland, up to Columbia River Gorge to Boise, to Salt Lake

Q: You just had that single route?

F: I was the Communications Officer.

Q: Who commanded that? Eaker had #4.

F: Yes, wait a minute, I'll think of it. Charlie...

Q: Charlie Howard?

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F: No, Charley Howard wasn't there, Charley was, he was in GHQ at that time.

Q: In any event

F: I'll tell you who he was, his job, when he went up there, he was the Commander of the 7th Group at March Field.

Q: Were you stationed at the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake?

F: No, I was, our headquarters was at Vancouver Barracks, old Pearson Field, and we took over for living quarters, the old Evergreen Hotel in Vancouver.

Q: In the State of Washington?

F: In the State of Washington, right across from Portland.

Q: Do you remember Arnold during that period?

F: I never had any personal contact with him. My contact was with McClelland, McClelland was responsible for all the communications, and so my only immediate contact was with McClelland.

Q: Did you ever hear anything about Foulois, perhaps, shooting his wad before he was ready, in a sense, they asked him, "how long will it take you to fly the mail," he said, "give us a week or 10 days."

F: All I know about the Air Mail is one weekend my wife and I had gone in to visit her folks in LA, we came back, there was a note on the door for me to call the Group Commander, so I went down to see him and he told me pack my bag and be ready to take off at 6:00 the next morning for an indefinite stay, and he was a busy man and he would tell me later. I went home and my wife got from the wives underground, she knew what it was all about.

Q: The wives had a pretyy good underground there?

F: Yes, all they had to do was get on the phone, and you could find out anything, I think. So when I got home, she told me I was going out and fly the air mail,

Q: Right. How did Mrs. Arnold get along with the wives?

F: You'd better ask my wife, I think very, very well.

Q: She had a very good memory for names, didn't she?

F: I think so

Q: A number of people have told me, ~~they~~, when they were introduced to her, she associated the name with the face, and seldom forgot it.

F: Well, both Mrs. Briggs and my wife, we were all together out at March Field

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Q: Was Briggs out at March Field, too?

F: Yes, we were all there at the same time.

Q: I'll ask him a couple questions if I catch him. Anyway, General, to wind down this thing that I read from the memorandum to Gen Eaker from McClelland. McClelland sent you a copy of his letter to Eaker opposing the changeover in the communications system, and his letter to you is dated July 9, 1947. Why did he send it to you - because you were so closely identified with the, ... did you originate the system?

F: No, McClelland did,

Q: You had a great role in it?

F: In the early days there were very few communications people, and I worked when McClellnd was a Captain, and he was the Air Communications Officer, I worked with him from 1930, continuously, I worked with or for McClelland, and I was the commander of the AACS. First, I went from instructor to communications school, out to CalTech to become a meterologist, and I was happily engaged in the meterologist when war broke out and I was sent to Newfoundland under Gen , Jerry Brant. I was the communications officer and meterological officer for the Newfoundland Base Command, and in addition to my other duties, I was made commander of the North Atlantic Communications, the AACS, the 8th region.

Q: That was a touchy job.

F: That was in the bad part.

Q: Because we lost some airplanes flying over the North Atlantic.

F: Well, that came not until 1942, but I was the guy that was responsible for getting communications in for the Air Corps across the North Atlantic, and McClelland, at that time, was in London, as a liaison officer, and Sy Mariner was the Chief Communicator, and Lloyd Watney was the Commander of the ACS. So I was under both of those for part of my duties, and under Gen Brant for the other, and then, in 1943, Lloyd Watney was relieved, and I was made Commander of the ACS, and of course, by that time, Gen McClelland was back in the Pentagon directly under Arnold. He was responsible for all communications-electronics, and there were all these people trying to break it up, somebody would say, "I'm the theater commander; I should control this here," So this letter was not new. It went on all the time, so I was, of course, constantly working with Gen McClelland.

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So, later, when he ran into it again, when I was in the Orient, he sent me a letter telling me, "boy, it broke loose again, and here's what we did about it."

Q: Let me ask something in this area. McClelland was in the R&D area, This may be beyond your immediate situation. He was sort of bypassed by Arnold, ~~and he~~ Arnold gave a lot of this function to Edward Bowles, the R&D man

F: Yes, I knew Ed, Dr. Bowles.

Q: I talked to him, and Dr. Bowles and McClelland did not get along so well?

F: Not too well, no.

Q: As a result, they brought in Tom ~~Reeves, as~~ Rives.

F: He was Deputy

Q: Deputy to McClelland, But it got to a point where when McClelland and Bowles had to make a policy decision, McClelland bowed out of it and he passed the thing on to Reeves, he didn't want to meet with Bowles, Did you know anything about this?

F: No, I don't know, I just know there was some kind of friction there, Because, lots of times I would have to deal with Bowles around McClelland. Bowles would call me in, and he was a civilian, As far as I was concerned, he was the Secy, or something, I don't know just what he was.

Q: Expert Consultant to Arnold and to Stimson.

F: So Bowles sometimes would ask me to come in ~~to~~ directly.

Q: In a sense, this was Arnold's responsibility, where he brought Bowles in at a high level without clarifying his relationship with McClelland.

F: Yes, it was sort of mixed up. Mac told me one time, one of his problems. I think Gen Arnold got annoyed with Gen McClelland because Gen McClelland got himself posted to England as a ~~Legal~~ Liaison Officer, and Arnold didn't want him to go or something, ~~I think~~

Q: This is part of the friction between them?

F: I think so

Q: If Arnold didn't want McClelland, why didn't he just fire him, He fired a lot of people.

F: Because a very good reason was when all of the requirements for communications became so urgent, after the North Atlantic, and then we had the South Atlantic, and you had the Pacific, and McClelland was in London, not doing Communications, and he

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~~and he~~ had been Arnold's Chief Communications Advisor from ~~that~~ the time I first knew them both.

Q: When did he go to Europe and London. Was in before Pearl Harbor?

F: I don't know, it was before that, because I saw McClelland in London in 1942, ~~and~~

Q: Do you think Arnold was upset that he left?

F: I thought so, because when things got very critical, he called McClelland back, and McClelland told me one time, in 1942, I saw him in London, ~~and~~ He said, "well, I'll be seeing you, because Arnold said I've got to come back and take over the Directorate, ~~and~~ The next thing I knew Mac again was the Chief Communicator, but I think Arnold was a little annoyed with him, that he had to even go get him.

Q: Was he annoyed with Arnold for bypassing him?

F: Idon't know; I don't think so.

Q: Did he ever comment on Arnold?

F: Never said anything to me, except that Arnold, he told me one time, that he thought Arnold was a bit annoyed with him because he had gone to London.

Q: Let me ask you about your relationship with Irving Krick. You studied under Krick?

F: Yes

Q: Where?

F: CalTech

Q: And when did you graduate?

F: I was twice at CalTech, I graduated there with a Bachelor's degree in 1926, ~~and~~ I went back and got my Master's degree in Meteorology when I was a LT, I got the degree in 1939.

Q: And did Don Yates graduate with you?

F: Yes, Don Yates and Eastman and Bob Fulton and Don ...

Q: Zimmerman?

F: No, he was way ahead of us.

Mrs F: ~~.....so then~~ (told about Arnold and Farman) Col Pulver went up to show him how communications could really work and the ~~#~~ object was, Arnold was going to be on the ground and give the orders, and the airplane would bespond. As he would say, "Turn ~~around~~ right", the airplane was supposed to turn

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around, as he would say ~~turn right, the airplane was supposed to turn right~~, "dive," the airplane was supposed to dive. Hap Arnold would sit down there at the microphone and nothing happened. The airplane just flew straight and level without a response to anything, until, finally, Hap Arnold said, "that old duffer is to god-damned deaf he can't hear anything."

Q: Recollections about any anecdotes of Mrs Arnold and Gen Arnold?

F: Not probably anything I have it already told you.

Q: Professor Krick?

F: Dr. Krick

Q: He was a Professor

F: Professor of Meteorology at CalTech for a number of years

Q: Arnold loved him and a numberof people hated him, people who felt he had cut in on their mission, people like Donald Yates and Don Zimmerman, Huntley Bassett, These are some of the weather people I've talked to.

F: Yes, I know all of the people. ~~I went~~, I was a student under Krick at CalTech, '38 to '39, and then when ~~we were~~ the AF was trying to get people trained as meterologists which we had practically none when the war was coming along, I was the Control Officer of the ~~First~~ 1st Weather Region, that was from Denver to the Pacific, and There were five colleges that they were going to send, If you had a Bachelor of Science degree, the AF Air Corps put up the scholarship and would send you to one of these five colleges, and Two of them were CalTech and UCLA. So I was responsible for getting the students for CalTech and UCLA, and In this way I had almost constant contact with Dr Krick and with Dr. Joseph Kaplan, ~~of UCLA~~ at UCLA, because I couldn't enlist anybody that I wasn't sure these schools would accept in their graduate school, So I frequently had contact with Dr. Krick, for this period of 2 years, and I have the utmost respect for him. I think he is probably the outstanding practical meterologist in the world. And I know a conflict between Dr. Krick and other professors of meterology, and also, I think you will find in the AF those of us that were in the Weater Service, there will be some that are contrary to Dr Krick, and Some like myself and Harold Smith out in Seattle, who were strong supporters of Dr. Krick.

Q: Arnold thought the world of Krick?

F: Well, so did some of us, and otherwise, and I think the basis in the civilian

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world and the scientific world, the basis of the conflict between them is because, when Dr. Krick was at the School at CalTech, he also was operating a weather service that was forecasting for the moving picture people, and mining people in Alaska, the tomato growers in Texas, Southern California, the Edison Company in Ohio, and he was making a lot of money, and I think the badic conflict in the scientific world where a bunch of renowned people sort of referred to him as a charlatan, he was simply making 10 times as much money as they were, because he was using his knowledge for a practical purpose, whereas they thought as a scientists, I guess, should just be a theoritician, and Krick put his brains to work and made a lot of money.

Q: People may have resented him?

F: Yes, of course, That's what I think was the basis, I don't know what the conflict was between Yates and them, because Krick was brought into the AF and was sent over to...

Q: He was in the Navy, Arnold had his transferred to the AAF.

F: Okay, he went to England, I think that's where there was some controversy about the time of OVERLORD, But I don't know any of the details or anything about it except I know there was a controversy, and If I was involved in it, I would be on Krick's side.

Q: Well, those who don't like him say that he did not predict the weather accurately, and he was very quick to say that he was just 12 hours off in his prediction.

F: I think he probably, when we were going through CalTech in the weather course, every day, every student had to make a prediction for the next day for selected places, and Krick would put on the board, the next day, he would put his prediction on after we left, and then see who could come closest, and Insofar, as I remember it, there wasn't anybody ever made any predictions that were anywhere's near the overall accuracy of Krick

Q: Arnold found out about him where he wead an article in a magazine,

F: Idon't know how he found about about Dr. Krick.

Q: You think Krick did an outstanding job in the service?

F: I never was connected with him at all when he was in the service, He was over in England, but I was only connected with him during the period that I was either in the school, or getting students to put in the school, and I kept up acquaintance with

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him, in fact, I visited him last summer, and we were going to spend two weeks up in Britich Columbia in a boat up in the San Juan Straits, and in June of this year, Dr. Krick gave Marty and I a two week foreaast for the last week in July, and the first week in August, and he hit it right square on the nose, that much in advance for every day we were up there, and the only day he said it we would have a little bad weather, that's the day we had it, so that's my version of it

Q: Iguess that's what makes him an interesting man, he's controversial.

F: Yes

Q: We are talking to Gen Buster Briggs, maybe you can tell us a story about Arnold

B: This is 1944, summer of '44, I was in OPD, and I had not seen Gen Arnold in person in 10 years, and I happened to be in the hall, walking in the opposite direction in the Pentagon, as Gen Arnold, he's coming back from Gen Marshall's office, promptly turned around and stopped, and said, "You're Buster Briggs," I had been a 2nd LT under him 10 years before, and I was now a Colonel, and he said, "golly," he grabbed me by the arm, broke my arm, practically, and he said, "I'm sorry, Gee, I'd like to talk to you, Come on down to my office with me, And he said, "How's Kay? And your son, Spike, he was born there with us, 'wasn't he? How's he? As O'Donnell would have said, "I'm his man from then on."

Q: You know, Mrs. Arnold had the same kind of fabulous memory, I was told the story only yesterday, two days ago, Don Darrow was out there at March Field, and Mrs. Arnold called him by some nickname, and she associated his name with his face, and she never forgot it.

B: When we had this dinner, on the 10th of December, we had a dinner, about 10 of us, the Falcon Foundation, gave a dinner for Mrs. Arnold and we got a guy to go up and get her and bring her down from Sonoma, and Mrs. Arnold, she was sitting, and I was sitting on the floor next to her, and she named about 15 people at March that are still around somewhere, most of them are, and then named their wives first name, 2nd LTs, all of them, Just amazing, oh, she would talk about Ann, you know, Ann Anderson, that kind of thing, and she would say, "where are they now?"

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Mrs. B: When we were all out on the air mail in Salt Lake City, and about to drive home, Mrs. Arnold and Lois had gone up to visit Gen Arnold, and I had driven up with Alberta Snavely, and Buster Briggs, when I got there, he was on his way through from Rock Springs, Wyoming, and going over to Oakland, Calif. So I had just a brief time with him and then I was, turned loose, really, to start back home. Gen Arnold said he was driving Mrs. Arnold back to March Field, part way, the next day, and would I ride along with them. What was so interesting then, was, that he was a completely and totally devoted husband

Q: She had a gun, right?

Mrs.: I don't remember that,

Q: He had her bring a gun because they drove through the desert and there were a lot of hobos.

Mrs. B: But he really and truly, he could hardly bear it, to get out of that car, somebody was going to pick him up, and take him back as soon as he telephoned, and said, "I'm at such and such a place," and he kept going a little farther and a little farther, so he could stay with Mrs. Arnold and Lois, and he acted as if he had no care in the world at all, nothing but a holiday with his wife, He was a perfectly delightful and charming person, just able to put all his cares and worries aside

Q: This was over the Easter weekend?

Mrs. B: I believe so, we stopped at Boulder Dam and, near Los Vegas. We stopped there. They were in the process of building it.

Q: Mrs. Briggs, I might have trouble selling this book because Arnold was a 19th Century man, He was totally devoted to his wife, This will never sell copies.

B: you've got to have several amours.

Mrs.B: He was absolutely, a delightful husband

Q: And she saved all his letters. You know, from Forest Lawn, You mentioned Forest Lawn, and They were engaged from Decoration Day to Sept 10, 1913, when they married, and In those days, the mail used to be delivered twice a day, and faster than it does today, and She was in Forest Lawn during the summer, at vacation, and the letters were pouring in, he had to write it to get the mailman in the afternoon, so she somedays would get two letters a day, So she must have well over 100 letters for that period. Of course, they were engaged, But he wrote letters to her, endearing letters

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to her, 20 years after they were married.

B: They were engaged from what year to what year

Q: They were engaged from Decoration Day 1913 until Sept 10, 1913 when they married. Three months, that summer, ~~and~~ he visited her over the summer, ~~and it was~~ There were complicated logistics about transferring to Rochester on some train, going down to Philadelphia, very complicated. Do you remember any situation at March Field when the Aviation Cadets were not permitted into the Officer's Club?

B: No,

Q: Mrs. Arnold interceded with somebody?

B: I don't know about that, we were 2nd LTS. Nobody could figure out what they were. That's all

Mrs.B: They came on active duty as cadets, instead of officers, Not enough money

Q: I'm not sure who made this ruling, It might have been ~~Curtis Lowman~~, England Lohman

B: Oh, ~~Fred~~ "Fud" Lowman, garbage can inspector,

Q: Yes, that's right

Mrs.B: This was during the time of the air mail.

B: Right, we were gone when the cadets came in.

Mrs.B: That's right, and nobody did know where they fish or fowl.

Q: And they were not permitted into the club, ~~and~~ Somebody told me Mrs. Arnold interceded, and said they would be, She went to Lieut Col Arnold and he issued an order that they be allowed in the club,

Mrs B: I'd forgotten that

B: They were doing the same work, as everybody else. There is a whole bunch of well known names in those cadets that came in. Class of Feb 1934, [redacted]

Q: Do you remember Arnold and the earthquake, Were you there?

B: I was there, but I don't remember him involved in it.

Q: He had a great story on that one, flying over the hotel.

Q: Do you rmember the Hollywood people coming out, Wallace Beery and Beebe Daniels

B: Gary Cooper

Mrs.B: The movie "Dinner at Eight"

B; She once asked! "I wonder where those palm trees, ~~there~~. are planted there, at March.

Q: She was great for ecology, long before it became popular.

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We had to buy trees,

Mrs.B: A $1 a tree, and they were called shade trees, and when the trees were delivered, everybody teased us because the Briggs' had to buy three, because we were on the corner, and everybody else was buying two, It was going $3 and each other family $2, we never had $3. Don't think this wasn't quite a problem, difference between the $2 and $3. Well, anyway, we kept saying, But think of the shade we will have, We will be so popular with all the shade of the shade trees, Well, the trees were delivered to us, and the sticks that held them up were much bigger and thicker than the trees, But they have all grown up now.

B: They are pretty nice

Q: Was that a good experience, March Field?

Mrs.B: Oh, it was wonderful.

B: You were supposed to call on the Commander, and the LTs used to wait and see. Maybe they wouldn't be home. Then, under the door. One time, Mrs one guy would get elected to stuff all the cards, Arnold opened the door and a LT one time when he was down on his hands and knees, poking cards under the door.

Q: What was he doing?

B: You had to leave your card

Q: So he was slipping the card under the door for everybody

B: Everybody's, one guy would get elected, and he was down on his hands and knees and I think Mrs Arnold opened the door.

Q: Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

Mrs.B: He had a perpetual grin, and he was coming, we were told, to inspect the quarters, and everyone was simply terrified, He came and he had two or three people with him, He never took his eyes off the face of the hostess, or the one who was responsible for the quarters, He grinned the entire time, beautiful, lovely grin, He was a handsome man, and apparently, did not look in any of the quarters, But I have an idea that the men who came with him had sharp eyes, to could see if we were good housekeepers, first, Mrs F: Of course, we were scared to death, because we all had home brew hidden around, That's the thing we were all frightened of.

Mrs. B: I don't think we had any at that time, They were very,...

B: $5 for five gallons

Q: Did Arnold himself drink?

B: He gave me a glass one night

F: They got so Military for awhile, and the wife had to have evening clothes on at home, and you had to have your uniform on after retreat, unless you were going someplace, We'd leave the clothes on the chair, and if the doorbell rang, put the coat on, we were just going somewhere.

Q: Do you remember the wingdings?

B: We had them for awhile at March

Mrs. B: That was Hawaii?

Q: The wives weren't invited, the men went, dressed formally, did you attend any of those

B: No, that's later

Q: That was after the Alaskan flight. He got that idea from the British.

Q: It was in March Field, Sept 1934, it was a month after they came back from Alaska.

Mrs B: We left in June 1934

F: Never know/ whether you are going to come out alive or not, I had an officer who was being posted back to England, in NATO, and his replacement doesn't show up, and he doesn't show up, so my Deputy was a Group Commander, I had to call the Air Ministry to trim, Embassy, and find out when the heck this guy is coming, so he came back in/[illegible]/and sort of laughed, and said, "he'll be here in a few days, the squadron gave him a dining in and they broke his leg."

Mrs B: Other AF cadets were the ones who really learned plenty from the diningsins, in Great Britain, when they went over.

Q: Arnold startdd this thing because he felt it was a great morale booster, and the officers got to know one another, and built Dr feel this espirit de corps, at least

~~[illegible]~~

F: That smile, that was when it was not a good smile, I had occasion to get one of them one time

Q: Everybody takes his own signs. I talked to Sgt Bruce Simmons, his chauffeur.

We talked about that dangerous smile

B: at Rockwell, my whole daily schedule was get to work at 7:30 and they sit around and wonder what you do, and we'd talk about that for an hour, and have some coffee, while the troops were rolling out the airplanes, they when, well, we will fly an hour, Monk Hunter would say something, and we would go out and fly an hour and come back and play three games of squash and we were all done.

Then would

Q: Was there a lot of sitting around at March Field?

F: No. Afternoons in the hot weather we would be off, after working 7 working hours a

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day, I think, the way I got in the communications business was I never, I used to play tennis with Charlie Howard every afternoon, ~~and I think~~, I was Asst Operations, andit took me 10 minutes, I'd take pencil and graph paper and show everybody's flight time, cumulative. ~~and~~ I was monkeying around Rockwell one day and I saw a little shack, and I looked out the window, and I saw all this radio equipment, vacuum tubes, and my "ham" blood started to boil, ~~and~~ the next afternoon I was playing tennis with Charley, and I said, "What's that room out there with all those vacuum tubes in it," and he said "how'd you know they were vacuum," and I said "I'm a ham." and next day, I was Group Communications Officer.

Q: Do you remember Arnold was tremendously impressed with the CCC experience, ~~and~~ this carried over into his later life, He had this idea that if you take young people, put them out in the woods, and make them do some useful task, let them play some baseball and take a swim, and they would come out cleaner and morally cleansed

B: Thinking of the camp, of course,

Q: But he had this fixation about juvenile delinquency, ~~and~~ He talked about the CCC for years after that, Did he ever give any pep talk about the CCC, and about what a great experience it was?

B: I dont know, probably did to the senior officers. One of his classmates was an old pal of mine, He'd come up and visit up, ~~and~~ Gen Arnold asked him over to the house, and he'd have to ask us. So we'd get invited over.

Q: (Re Davis Dam Camps)

F: As I remember it, they had those old ~~Mack~~ FWD's, and tore it up the highways. The Highway Dept said they couldn't run them up anymore, So we flew the rest of the stuff up in old Curtiss Condors. I know one time I was ~~stationed~~ (was taking a load) up there, we had a big box in the bomb bay (was full of sacks of tomatoes, ~~and~~ When I got up there, they were all squashed. One of the things they wanted was an anvil, So they dumped an anvil in the bay.

Q: Do you remember scrounging equipment, pipes, etc.

B: No, that was up to the guys building it.

Q: The Quartermaster?

B: That was not a good idea.

Q: Was it popular or not.

B: Really stupid. Not more than 10 people ever went up there, It was hard to get to it,

F: I went up almost every other day, flying the Condor up, but I was used as a recreational center.

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Q: It was too far away

B: Water was too cold to swim.

I just landed. We scraped the runway out, I landed right on the side of the lake, so to speak. We put a runway out there.

F: Early part, up in the North Atlantic, no one knew anything about Greenland, Iceland, there was a chap named Paul Oskernian, and Paul had been the radio operator on one of those expeditions to the North Pole, or something, and Paul wanted to get in the AF, but Paul wore glasses, that were about a half inch thick, and he was practically blind, and Arnold evidently heard about him, and called him down, and talked to him in his office, and he said, you couldn't possibly get me in the AF section, I can hardly see, and Arnold called in the Chief Flight Surgeon, and pointed at Paul, and said, I said that man can see. That was Arnold's ability to see what's important. Well, Paul, then, he was assigned to Communications, we had him for most of the through the war, he's now blind. he walks around with a cane.

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Interview - Brig General and Mrs. Ivan Farman; Lieut Gen and Mrs. James "Buster" Briggs, Bradenton, Fla., 7 Jan 1972

Q We were talking about your star and I asked you if Arnold helped you get your star, and I think you said that you didn't know if he did that, but if he opposed your getting a star, you would have heard of it.

F That didn't apply only to me

Q Then we started talking about your evaluation of Arnold, was he a demanding man?

F Yes, I said he was a demanding man. I said that he, in my opinion, he had the extreme facility of not only demanding the best in people, but he could make you produce beyond what you even thought were your own capabilities. When he wanted something, you produced, that's all. You were a sorry person, if you didn't.

Q And the men respected him?

F I think so, I had the utmost respect for him.

Q March Field was a critical point in his career. He had been in exile after the Billy Mitchell thing. In March Field he did a great job, and then, was lucky enough to be under Malin Craig, so when Malin Craig came to Washington to succeed MacArthur, he brought Arnold in as Asst Chief of Air Corps. Did you know that?

F No, I didn't know that, but Arnold had another extremely critical assignment during that period. Arnold was the organizer and commander of the mission, when we flew the mail.

Q The air mail, right. I wanted to ask you about that.

F At Salt Lake City

Q Did you serve under him?

F Yes, I was the communications officer for what was called Air Mail Route #5. That was from Seattle to Portland, up to Columbia River Gorge to Boise, to Salt Lake

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Q You just had that single route?

F I was the Communications Officer

Q Who commanded that? Eaker had #4

F. Yes, wait a minute, I'll think of it. Charlie...

Q Charlie Howard?

F No, Charley Howard wasn't there. Charley was, he was in GHQ at that time.

Q In any event.

F I'll tell you who he was, his job, when he went up there, he was the Commander of the 7th Group at March Field.

Q Were you stationed at the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake?

F No, I was in our headquarters at Vancouver Barracks, old Pearson Field. We took over for living quarters the old Evergreen Hotel in Vancouver.

Q In the State of Washington?

F In the State of Washington, right across from Portland

Q Do you remember Arnold during that period?

F I never had any personal contact with him. My contact was with McClelland, McClelland was responsible for all the communications. So my only immediate contact was with McClelland.

Q Did you ever hear anything about Foulois, perhaps, shooting his wad before he was ready, in a sense, they asked him: "How long will it take you to fly the mail?" He said: "Give us a week or 10 days."

F All I know about the Air Mail is one weekend my wife and I had gone in to visit her folks in LA. We came back. There was a note on the door for me to call the Group Commander. So I went down to see him and he told me to pack my bag and be ready to take off at 6:00 the next morning for an indefinite stay. He was a busy man and he would tell me later. I went home and my wife got from the wives' underground. She knew what it was all about.

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F Yes, all they had to do was get on the phone, and you could find out anything, I think. So when I got home, she told me I was going out and fly the air mail.

Q Right. How did Mrs. Arnold get along with the wives?

F. You'd better ask my wife. I think very, very well

Q She had a very good memory for names, didn't she?

F I think so

Q A number of people have told me, when they were introduced to her, she associated the name with the face, and seldom forgot it.

F Well, both Mrs. Briggs and my wife. We were all together out at March Field

Q Was Briggs out at March Field, too?

F Yes, we were all there at the same time

Q I'll ask him a couple questions if I catch him. Anyway, General, to wind down this thing that I read from the memorandum to Gen Eaker from McClelland. McClelland sent you a copy of his letter to Eaker opposing the changeover in the communications system. His letter to you is dated July 9, 1947. Why did he send it to you - because you were so closely identified with the...did you originate the system?

F No, McClelland did

Q You had a great role in it?

F In the early days there were very few communications people, and I worked when McClelland was a Captain. He was the Air Communications Officer. I worked with him from 1930, continuously. I worked with or for McClelland, and I was the commander of the AACS. First, I went from instructor to communications school, out to CalTech to become a meteorologist. I was happily engaged in the meteorology when war broke out and I was sent to Newfoundland under Gen Jerry Brant. I was the Communications Officer and meteorological officer for the Newfoundland Base Command. In addition to my other

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duties, I was made commander of the North Atlantic Communications, the AACS, the 8th region.

Q That was a touchy job

F That was in the bad part

Q Because we lost some airplanes flying over the North Atlantic.

F Well, that came not until 1942. But I was the guy that was responsible for getting that communications in for the Air Corps across the North Atlantic. McClelland, at that time, was in London, as a liaison officer, and Si Marriner was the Chief Communicator, Lloyd Watney was the Commander of the AACS. So I was under both of those for part of my duties, and under Gen Brant for the other. Then, in 1943, Lloyd Watney was relieved, and I was made Commander of the AACS. Of course, by that time, Gen McClelland was back in the Pentagon directly under Arnold. He was responsible for all communications-electronics. There were all these people trying to break it up. Somebody would say: "I'm the theater commander; I should control this here." So this letter was not new. It went on all the time. So I was, of course, constantly working with Gen McClelland. So, later, when he ran into it again, when I was in the Orient, he sent me a letter telling me: "Boy, it broke loose again, and here's what we did about it."

Q Let me ask something in this area. McClelland was in the R&D area. This may be beyond your immediate situation. He was sort of bypassed by Arnold. Arnold gave a lot of this function to Edward Bowles, the R&D man

F Yes, I knew Ed, Dr. Bowles.

Q I talked to him, and Dr. Bowles and McClelland did not get along so well?

F Not too well, no.

Q As a result, they brought in Tom Rives.

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F He was Deputy

Q Deputy to McClelland. But it got to a point where when McClelland and Bowles had to make a policy decision, McClelland bowed out of it and he passed the thing on to Rives, he didn't want to meet with Bowles. Did you know anything about this?

F No, I don't know, I just know there was some kind of friction there. Because, lots of times I would have to deal with Bowles around McClelland. Bowles would call me in, and he was a civilian. As far as I was concerned, he was the Secy, or something. I don't know just what he was.

Q Expert Consultant to Arnold and to Stimson

F So Bowles sometimes would ask me to come in directly.

Q In a sense, this was Arnold's responsibility, where he brought Bowles in at a high level without clarifying his relationship with McClelland.

F Yes, it was sort of mixed up. Mac told me one time, one of his problems. I think Gen Arnold got annoyed with Gen McClelland because Gen McClelland got himself posted to England as a Liaison Officer, and Arnold didn't want him to go or something.

Q This is part of the friction between them?

F I think so

Q If Arnold didn't want McClelland, why didn't he just fire him. He fired a lot of people

F Because a very good reason was when all of the requirements for communications became so urgent, after the North Atlantic, and then we had the South Atlantic, and you had the Pacific, and McClelland was in London, not doing Communications, and he had been Arnold's Chief Communications Advisor from the time I first knew them both...

Q When did he go to Europe and London? Was it before Pearl Harbor?

F I don't know, it was before that. Because I saw McClelland in London in 1942.

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Q Do you think Arnold was upset that he left?

F I thought so, because when things got very critical, he called McClelland back, and McClelland told me one time, in 1942, I saw him in London. He said: "Well, I'll be seeing you, because Arnold said I've got to come back and take over the Directorate. The next thing I knew Mac again was the Chief Communicator, but I think Arnold was a little annoyed with him, that he had to even go get him.

Q Was he annoyed with Arnold for bypassing him?

F I don't know; I don't think so.

Q Did he ever comment on Arnold?

F Never said anything to me, except that Arnold, he told me one time, that he thought Arnold was a bit annoyed with him because he had gone to London.

Q Let me ask you about your relationship with Irving Krick. You studied under Krick?

F Yes

Q Where?

F CalTech

Q And when did you graduate?

F I was twice at CalTech. I graduated there with a Bachelor's degree in 1926. I went back and got my Master's degree in meteorology when I was a LT. I got the degree in 1939.

Q And did Don Yates graduate with you?

F Yes, Don Yates and Eastman and Bob Fulton and Don...

Q Zimmerman?

F No, he was way ahead of us.

Mrs. F (told about Arnold and Farman) Col Pulver went up to show him how communications could really work and the object was, Arnold was going to be on the ground and give the orders, and the airplane would respons. As he would say: "Turn right," the airplane was

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supposed to turn, as he would say "Dive," the airplane was supposed to dive. Hap Arnold would sit down there at the microphone and nothing happened. The airplane just flew straight and level without a response to anything, until, finally, Hap Arnold said" "That old duffer is so god-damned deaf he can't hear anything."

Q Any recollections about any anecdotes of Mrs. Arnold and Gen Arnold

Mrs. F Not probably anything I haven't already told you

Q Professor Krick?

F Dr. Krick

Q He was a Professor

F Professor of Meteorology at CalTech for a number of years

Q Arnold loved him and a number of people hated him, people who felt he had cut in on their mission, people like Donald Yates and Don Zimmerman, Huntley Bassett. These are some of the weather people I've talked to.

F Yes, I know all of the people. I was a student under Krick at CalTech, '38 to '39. Then when the AF was trying to get people trained as meteorologists which we had practically none when the war was coming along, I was the Control Officer of the 1st Weather Region, that was from Denver to the Pacific. There were five colleges that they were going to send. If you had a Bachelor of Science degree, the Air Corps put up the scholarship and would send you to one of these five colleges. Two of them were CalTech and UCLA. So I was responsible for getting the students for CalTech and UCLA. In this way I had almost constant contact with Dr. Krick and with Dr. Joseph Kaplan out at UCLA, because I couldn't enlist anybody that I wasn't sure these schools would accept in their graduate school. So I frequently had contact with Dr. Krick, for this period of 2 years. I have the utmost respect for him. I think he is probably the outstanding practical

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meteorologist in the world. And I know of a conflict between Dr. Krick and other professors of meteorology. Also, I think you will find in the AF those of us that were in the Weather Service, there will be some that are contrary to Dr. Krick. Some like myself and Harold Smith out in Seattle, who were strong supporters of Dr. Krick.

Q Arnold thought the world of Krick?

F Well, so did some of us, and otherwise. I think the basis in the civilian world and the scientific world, the basis of the conflict between them is because, when Dr. Krick was at the School at CalTech, he also was operating a weather service that was forecasting for the moving picture people, and mining people in Alaska, the tomato growers in Texas, Southern California, the Edison Company in Ohio. He was making a lot of money. I think the basic conflict in the scientific world where a bunch of renowned people sort of referred to him as a charlatan, he was simply making 10 times as much money as they were, because he was using his knowledge for a practical purpose, whereas they thought a scientist, I guess, should just be a theoretician. Krick put his brains to work and made a lot of money.

Q People may have resented him?

F Yes, of course. That's what I think was the basis. I don't know what the conflict was between Yates and them, because Krick was brought into the AF and was sent over to...

Q He was in the Navy; Arnold had him transferred to the AAF.

F Okay, he went to England, I think that's where there was some controversy about the time of OVERLORD. But I don't know any of the details or anything about it except I know there was a controversy. If I was involved in it, I would be on Krick's side.

Q Well, those who don't like him say that he did not predict the weather accurately, and he was very quick to say that he was just 12 hours off in his prediction.

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F I think he probably...when we were going through CalTech in the weather course, every day, every student had to make a prediction for the next day for selected places. Krick would put on the board. The next day, he would put his prediction on after we left, and then see who could come closest. Insofar, as I remember it, there wasn't anybody ever made any predictions that were anywhere near the overall accuracy of Krick

Q Arnold found out about him when he read an article in a magazine

F I don't know how he found out about Dr. Krick

Q You think Krick did an outstanding job in the service?

F I never was connected with him at all when he was in the service. He was over in England, but I was only connected with him during the period that I was either in the school, or getting students to put in the school. I kept up acquaintance with him, in fact, I visited him last summer. We were going to spend two weeks up in British Columbia in a boat up in the San Juan Straits, and in June of this year Dr. Krick gave Marty and I a two week forecast for the last week in July, and the first week in August, and he hit it right square on the nose, that much in advance for every day we were up there. The only day he said we would have a little bad weather, that's the day we had it. So that's my version of it.

Q I guess that's what makes him an interesting man. He's controversial

F Yes

Q We are talking to Gen Buster Briggs, maybe you can tell us a story about Arnold

B This is 1944, summer of '44, I was in OPD, and I hadn't seen Gen Arnold in person in 10 years. I happened to be in the hall, walking in the opposite direction in the Pentagon, Gen Arnold, he's coming back from Gen Marshall's office. He turned around and stopped, and said: "You're Buster Briggs." I had been a 2nd LT under him 10 years

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before. I was now a Colonel. He said: "Golly!" He grabbed me by the arm--broke my arm, practically--and he said: "I'm sorry, Gee, I'd like to talk to you. Come on down to my office with me." And he said: "How's Kay? And your son, Spike, he was born there with us, wasn't he? How's he?" As O'Donnell would have said: "I'm his man from then on."

Q You know, Mrs. Arnold had the same kind of fabulous memory. I was told the story only yesterday, two days ago. Don Darrow was out there at March Field, Mrs. Arnold called him by some nickname, and she associated his name with his face, and she never forgot it.

B When we had this dinner, on the 10th of December. We had a dinner, about 10 of us, the Falcon Foundation, gave a dinner for Mrs. Arnold and we got a guy to go up and get her and bring her down from Sonoma. Mrs. Arnold, she was sitting, and I was sitting on the floor next to her. She named about 15 people at March that are still around somewhere, most of them are, and then named their wives' first name, 2nd LTs, all of them. Just amazing, oh, she would talk about Ann, you know, Ann Anderson, that kind of thing. She would say: "Where are they now?"

Mrs. B. When we were all out on the air mail in Salt Lake City, and about to drive home, Mrs. Arnold and Lois had gone up to visit Gen Arnold. I had driven up with Alberta Snavely, and Buster Briggs, when I got there, he was on his way through from Rock Springs, Wyoming, and going over to Oakland, Calif. So I had just a brief time with him and then I was, turned loose, really, to start back home. Gen Arnold said he was driving Mrs. Arnold back to March Field, part way, the next day, and would I ride along with them. What was so interesting then, was that he was a completely and totally devoted husband.

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Q She had a gun, right?

Mrs. B I don't remember that

Q He had her bring a gun because they drove through the desert and there were a lot of hobos.

Mrs. B. But he really and truly, he could hardly bear it, to get out of that car. Somebody was going to pick him up, and take him back as soon as he telephoned and said: "I'm at such and such a place." He kept going a little farther and a little farther so he could stay with Mrs. Arnold and Lois. He acted as if he had no care in the world at all, nothing but a holiday with his wife. He was a perfectly delightful and charming person--just able to put all his cares and worries aside.

Q This was over the Easter weekend?

Mrs. B I believe so, we stopped at Boulder Dam, near Las Vegas. We stopped there. They were in the process of building it.

Q Mrs. Briggs, I might have trouble selling this book because Arnold was a 19th Century man. He was totally devoted to his wife. This will never sell copies.

B You've got to have several amours

Mrs. B. He was absolutely a delightful husband

Q And she saved all his letters. You know, from Forest Lawn. You mentioned Forest Lawn. They were engaged from Decoration Day to Sept 10, 1913, when they married. In those days, the mail used to be delivered twice a day, and faster than it does today. She was in Forest Lawn during that summer vacation. The letters were pouring in, he had to write it to get the mailman in the afternoon, so she some days would get two letters a day. So she must have well over 100 letters for that period. Of course, they were engaged. But he wrote letters to her, endearing letters to her 20 years after they were married.

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B They were engaged from what year to what year.

Q They were engaged from Decoration Day 1913 until Sept 10, 1913 when they married. Three months, that summer. He visited her over the summer. There were complicated logistics about transferring to Rochester on some train, going down to Philadelphia, very complicated. Do you remember any situation at March Field when the Aviation Cadets were not permitted into the Officers' Club?

B No

Q Mrs. Arnold interceded with somebody?

B I don't know about that We were 2nd LTs. Nobody could figure out what they were. That's all.

Mrs. B They came on active duty as cadets, instead of officers. Not enough money

Q I'm not sure who made this ruling. It might have been Eugene Lohman

B Oh, "Fred" Lohman, garbage can inspector?

Q Yes, that's right

Mrs. B This was during the time of the air mail

B Right, we were gone when the cadets came in

Mrs. B That's right, and nobody did know whether they were fish or fowl

Q And they were not permitted into the club. Somebody told me Mrs. Arnold interceded, and said they would be. She went to Lt Col Arnold and he issued an order that they be allowed in the club.

Mrs. B I'd forgotten that

B They were doing the same work as everybody else. There is a whole bunch of well known names in those cadets that came in. Class of Feb 1934

Q Do you remember Arnold and the earthquake? Were you there?

B I was there, but I don't remember him involved in it.

Q He had a great story on that one, flying over the hotel

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Q Do you remember the Hollywood people coming out, Wallace Beery and Beebe Daniels

B Gary Cooper

Mrs. B The movie "Dinner at Eight"

B She once asked: I wonder how those palm tress are we planted there at March

Q She was great for ecology, long before it became popular

Mrs. B We had to buy trees at $1 a tree. They were called shade trees, and when the trees were delivered, everybody teased us because the Briggs had to buy three because we were on the corner. Everybody else was buying two. It was going to cost us $3 and other families $2. Don't think this wasn't quite a problem, this difference between the $2 and $3.

Mrs. F We never had $3

Mrs. B Well, anyway, we kept saying: "But think of the shade we will have. We will be so popular with all the shade of these shade trees. Well, the trees were delivered to us and put in for us. The sticks that held them up were much bigger and thicker than the trees. But they have all grown up now.

B They are pretty now

Q Was that a good experience, March Field?

Mrs. B Oh, it was wonderful

B You were supposed to call on the Commander. The LTs used to wait and see. Maybe they wouldn't be home. Then, one guy would get elected to stuff all the cards under the door. One time, Mrs. Arnold opened the door on a LT one time when he was down on his hands and knees, poking cards under the door.

Q What was he doing?

B You had to leave your card

Q So he was slipping the card under the door for everybody

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B Everybody's. One guy would get elected, and he was down on his hands and knees and I think Mrs. Arnold opened the door.

Q Did Arnold have a sense of humor?

Mrs. B. He had a perpetual grin. When he was coming, we were told, to inspect the quarters. Everyone was simply terrified. He came and he had two or three people with him. He never took his eyes off the face of the hostess, or the one who was responsible for the quarters. He grinned the entire time, a beautiful, lovely grin. He was a handsome man, and apparently, did not look in any of the quarters. But I have an idea that the men who came with him had sharp eyes, to see if we were good housekeepers.

Mrs. F Of course, we were scared to death, because we all had home brew hidden around. That's the thing we were all frightened of.

Mrs. B I don't think we had any at that time. They were very...

B $5 for five gallons

Q Did Arnold himself drink?

B He gave me a glass one night.

F They got so military for awhile. Your wife had to have evening clothes on at home. You had to have your uniform on after retreat, unless you were going some place. We'd leave the clothes on the chair and if the doorbell rang, put the coat on. We were just going somewhere.

Q Do you remember the wing dings?

B We had them for awhile at March

Mrs. B That was Hawaii?

Q The wives weren't invited. The men went, dressed formally. Did you attend any of those?

B No. That's later.

Q That was after the Alaskan flight. He got that idea from the British

Q It was in March Field, Sept 1934. It was a month after they came back from Alaska.

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Mrs. B We left in July 1934

F Never know whether you are going to come out alive or not. I had an officer who was being posted back to England, in NATO, and his replacement doesn't show up and he doesn't show up. My Deputy was a Group Commander. I had to call the Air Ministry to find out when the heck this guy is coming. So he came back in and sort of laughed, and said: "He'll be here in a few days. The squadron gave him a dining in and they broke his leg."

Mrs B Our AF cadets were the ones who really learned plenty from the dining-in, in Great Britain, when they went over.

Q Arnold started this thing because he felt it was a great morale booster. The officers got to know one another. It built this esprit de corps, at least.

F That smile, that was when it was not a good smile. I had occasion to get one of them one time.

Q Everybody takes his own signs. I talked to Sgt Bruce Simmons, his chauffeur. He talked about that dangerous smile.

B At Rockwell, my whole daily schedule was get to work at 7:30 and then sit around and wonder what you do. We'd talk about that for an hour, and have some coffee while the troops were rolling out the airplanes. Then, well, we would fly an hour, Monk Hunter would say something. We would go out and fly an hour and come back and play three games of squash and we were all done.

Q Was there a lot of sitting around at March Field?

F No. Afternoons in the hot weather we would be off, after working 7 working hours a day. I think the way I got in the communications business was I never, U used to play tennis with Charlie Howard every afternoon. I was Asst Operations. Audit took me 10 minutes. I'd take pencil and graph paper and show everybody's flight time, cumulative.

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I was monkeying around Rockwell one day and I saw a little shack and I looked in the window, and I saw all this radio equipment, vacuum tubes, and my "ham" blood started to boi. The next afternoon I was playing tennis with Charley, and I said: "What's that room out there with all those vacuum tubes in it." and he said "How'd you know they were vacuum?" And I said: "I'm a ham," The next day, I was Group Communications Officer.

Q Do you remember that Arnold was tremendously impressed with the CCC experience. This carried over into his later life. He had this idea that if you take young people, put them out in the woods, and make them do some useful task, then let them play some baseball and take a swim, and they would come out clearer and morally cleansed.

B Thinking of the camp, of course

Q But he had this fixation about juvenile delinquency. He talked about the CCC for years after that. Did he ever give any pep talk about the CCC, and about what a great experience it was?

B I don't know, probably did to the senior officers. One of his classmates was an old pal of mine. He'd come up and visit us. Gen Arnold asked him over to the house, and he'd have to ask me. So we'd get invited over.

Q (Re Lone Pine Camp)

F 's I remember it, they had those old FWD's, and tore up the highways. The Highway Dept said they couldn't run them up any more. So we flew the rest of the stuff up in old Curtiss Condors. I know one time I was taking a load up there. We had a big box in the bomb bay. It was full of sacks of tomatoes, When I got up there, they were all squashed. One of the things they wanted was an anvil. So they dumped an anvil in the bay.

Q Do you remember scrounging equipment, pipes, etc.?

B No. That was up to the guys building it.

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Q The Quartermaster?

B That was not a good idea

Q Was it popular or not?

B Really stupid. Not more than 10 people ever went up there. It was hard to get to.

F I went up almost every other day, flying the Condor up. But it was used as a recreational center.

Q It was too far away

B Water was too cold to swim. I just landed. We scraped the runway out. I landed right on the side of the lake, so to speak. We put a runway out there.

F Early part, up in the North Atlantic, no one knew anything about Greenland, Iceland, there was a chap named Paul Oscanyon. Paul had been the radio operator on one of those expeditions to the North Pole, or something. Paul wanted to get in the AF, but Paul wore glasses that were about a half inch thick. He was practically blind. Arnold evidently heard about him and called him down. Talked to him in his office. He said: "You couldn't possibly get me in the AF. I can hardly see." Arnold called in the Chief Flight Surgeon, and pointed at Paul, and said: "I said that man can see." That was Arnold's ability to see what's important. Well, Paul, then, he was assigned to Communications. We had him for most of the war. Now he's blind. He walks around with a cane.

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Burge, Vernon 13 May 70

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May 18, 1970

Col Lawrence Burge, USAF(Ret)
240 Rosemary Avenue
San Atnonio, Texas 78209

Dear Colonel Burge:

I enjoyed very much our conversation the other day, especially your recollections of the good ole days of flying with Benny Foulois and with Hap Arnold.

If any other recollections of Hap Arnold come to mind, I hope that you will favor me by jotting them down and sending them to me in the enclosure.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Interview Colonel Vernon Burge, San Antonio, Texas, May 13, 1970.

Q: Colonel, I was interested in your having been associated with Benny Foulois, going back to what, 1909?

B: 1908.

Q: When he had that Wright Flyer-A?

B: Yes, when they were doing the Wright tests.

Q: You mean, Humphrey?

B: Yes, Humphrey was there, and Lahm and Benny.

Q: Was he learning to fly by correspondence?

B: Benny was there as an observer, you might say, he and Lahm both. He actually was in the final test flight when they accepted the plane. They went down to Alexandria and back. He didn't have any instructions at all, in air; practically taught himself to fly.

Q: Were you assigned to College Park during 1911-12 when Arnold was learning to fly?

B: Yes, I was out there for a while, and then we came down here.

Q: He and Tommy Milling?

B: Yes, Milling was there,and they sent Welch. He was a civilian. In fact, they sent Frank Coffyn later on. They had Parmalee and Coffyn and Welch. They had four or five of those original instructors. But they sent Parmalee down here after Benny had been here about six months. Paramalee gave them some dope. He was a pretty good flyer.

Q: Do you have any recollections of Arnold in that period?

B: Yes, I remember him very well.

Q: Anything special, you know he made that flight, Mackay Trophy.

B: Oh yes, he was in on that, he and Tommy Milling. They went in on that. Then Milling was in on a flight up in Marblehead, Mass.

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Q: Yes, Arnold and Milling were up there. That's when they went into the drink.

B: Yes, that's right, I remember that.

Q: That's the famous story of the two old men sailing by them. They looked at this airplane, and said: "It will never get off the ground." They couldn't figure out what it was. But, do you have any special recollections of Arnold, did you ever talk to him or have any association with him?

B: Not very closely, any more than being on the post with him.

Q: You were an enlisted man at that time?

B: Yes. I was commissioned in '17. At March Field, I was a Major under him there when I came back from the Philippines in '29.

Q: You were at March Field starting in 1929. He got there in '31.

B: '31 rather, and I got back from the Philippines in '32, Mitchel Field '29 and '32 to the Philippines and March Field. I stayed there till '35, and went to Tactical School.

Q: At March Field, he asserted himself pretty strongly as commander?

B: Oh boy, he ran the show. There was no question about it.

Q: Did the men admire him?

B: Oh, I think so. They all liked him. They were scared of him, but Arnold was all right. He just demanded they do the job.

Q: If you did the job, he liked you, if you didn't?

B: It would be too bad. He wouldn't fool with them.

Q: You were a Major, what was your job?

B: I was up at Tinker in a Pursuit Group for a while.

Q: Which Pursuit Group was this, do you remember? They had the 19th Bomb Group there.

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B: Yes, and they had a Pursuit Group too, Haynes was in there.

Q: Caleb Haynes?

B: Not Caleb, the other one that died. Tinker had it for a while--a lot of the old gang down there.

Q: At March Field Arnold thought a lot about doing something for the men, recreation-wise. He set up this Bear Lake Camp, didn't he?

B: Oh yes, that was a pretty big setup.

Q: Did you have anything to do with setting that camp up?

B: No, but a quartermaster named Woods, that's retired and living here, did all that.

Q: He's down here?

B: Yes, he's a good man, too.

Q: What's his first name?

B: Lawrence -- Woods. He's a dandy. In fact, Arnold used him on that CCC. He did all the transportation stuff, and he was good.

Q: You mean Woods did all the transportation for the CCC?

B: Yes, it was a big setup, scattered all over California and every place else.

Q: Did you ever get up that Bear Lake Camp?

B: Oh, I was there once or twice, but it was a honey.

Q: Arnold really scrounged material to get that thing going?

B: Oh yes, they always did that. Of course, he used the quartermaster, too. Woods was the Post Quartermaster. He was a Captain then.

Q: I only have one more day here, I'll see if I can get to talk to him.

B: It would be interesting, you could get some good dope from him.

Q: Do you get to see him often?

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B: I see him every week, over there playing bingo once a week.

Q: Now, there was an earthquake in March 1934 (NOTE: Actually 1933).

B: Yes, I was there then.

Q: What did Arnold do about this?

B: He didn't wait for any order at all. We heard the damn thing. We didn't know what it was all about. In fact, I was standing out in the yard, the whole house was shaking, and the wires. My wife was wondering "what was going on here." Then they had an earthquake over in Compton, wrecking all the buildings. Luckily it was right after school hours, school had been let out, too. Arnold took it on himself to send a squadron right over there. He didn't even wait for the Corps Area to react. Craig was in command up there then.

Q: And what did he do -- he sent supplies?

B: Oh yes, supplies, trucks, everything over there.

Q: Food and blankets?

B: Yes, that's one thing about Arnold. He didn't wait for anything. He could take a chance.

Q: Did he catch hell at first for doing this without authority?

B: No, I don't think he did. I'm not sure about that, but I don't imagine. They may have criticized him, but he did the right thing.

Q: Everybody praised him I suppose for responding without waiting for orders.

B: You see, he had that Alaskan flight, too, remember?

Q: That happened a couple of months later. But, did he get some good editorial comments as a result of that?

B: Oh, I think so, the papers praised him because Arnold had a lot on the ball.

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Q: He was really a ball of fire, wasn't he?

B: Oh yes.

Q: Do you remember anything about the Olympics in 1932? Arnold tried to tie the military into the Olympics, I think, Foulois came out there at that time for an official visit. Do you remember that?

B: Yes, I remember. Benny came out there.

Q: And Arnold sort of kept him in tow for the Olympics. Foulois was then Chief.

B: Yes, that's right.

Q: Was there anything special about the CCC Camps?

B: No, in fact, they were going to have a big maneuver there. They brought in a lot of, practically all the officers, and camped overnight. Up there the CCC thing broke. They just told Arnold, "That's your baby," and he got busy and ordered...

Q: Who told him it was his baby?

B: Craig, CG. He said, "That's your baby. You've got your men out there." Then they called off this big maneuver. Every officer on that post was at the camp. I had one sent me up to Monterey.

Q: How many camps did Arnold have under him?

B: He must have had 15 or 20 up there, scattered all over the mountains there, even up into Washington. All over...

Q: And he supervised them all?

B: Yes.

Q: Did he do a good job?

B: Did a wonderful job, and that's when this Quartermaster came in.

Q: This fellow Woods?

B: Yes.

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Q: I'll see if I can talk to him today. Did Arnold ever come up to your camp in Monterey?

B: No, he didn't get up there. That's one camp he didn't visit. I don't think he liked old Ben Lear who was commanding the Cavalry.

Q: That's "Yoo-hoo" Ben Lear; he and Ben Lear didn't get along?

B: I don't know if they got along or not, but would have been kind of stepping on his territory. That's the only camp that wasn't right around March, that area.

Q: How did Foulois and Arnold get along?

B: I think they got along all right. In fact, they were always, they were LTs together in the old days in the Infantry.

Q: Do you remember anything about the air mail? That was going on about a year after the earthquake.

B: Yes, just a little after that. All we had, I wasn't in on it. We had practically everything out on that air mail, we had headquarters up at Oakland.

Q: Arnold had his headquarters at Salt Lake City?

B: Yes, and they had a big setup, worked out of Oakland. They had everything up there.

Q: Did you have any responsibility in that air mail?

B: No, I was on leave when that thing broke, and then when I came back, I was lucky in a way, because they got to ferry back all these P-26s from Seattle. They were just coming in. They only had four or five pilots there. We would fly up one day and get planes and bring them back the next. We ferried back 30 or 40 of them, P-26s.

Q: Foulois got in trouble with the President on that?

B: Yes, there was a question, he made some rather wild statement what they could do.

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Q: Well, he said give us 10 days to get ready. They gave him 10 days and they started having those accidents.

B: Of course, we never had any real night flying experience, anyway, instruments and staff, like the mail pilots did.

Q: Well, he was thinking of that money that the Post Office had, that we could use for flying training. He didn't think about equipment, flying over the Rockies in February.

B: With P-12s and things like that, that's ridiculous.

Q: Do you think Foulois made a mistake?

B: I think he did, he kind of overstepped there a little, but you can't blame him for trying.

Q: Well, Arnold tried to do the best job possible?

B: Why, of course, they did do a good job, when you come right down to it, when you consider equipment and everything.

Q: Did you have any involvement in the Alaskan flight?

B: No, I didn't. I was there when they took off.

Q: From where?

B: They took off from the East, Arnold was in command of that.

Q: And then Hugh Knerr.

B: Yes, Knerr was on it, Royce and all that, there were four or five of them. I think they started at Dayton, didn't they?

Q: I think they started in Washington. They went back to Washington and started from there, and went across country.

B: Did a pretty good job on that.

Q: In fact, 10 planes, B-10s. They all made it.

B: They were lucky on that; they didn't have any trouble at all.

Q: Do you have any recollection, did Arnold get any special commendation for that flight?

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B: Probably did, I don't know, record, I don't know why he shouldn't have.

Q: Hugh Knerr, I talked to him, and he's a little upset that Arnold didn't get a DFC for the boys that flew in that mission. Did you ever hear any static about that?

B: No, I didn't, but I don't know why they shouldn't. When you think some of them got it for little or nothing.

Q: Arnold tried to get commendations from Hugh Drum. Drum was the No. 2 man in the War Dept, but he didn't have any sympathy for airpower.

B: I don't think he liked the Air Force. He was quite a character.

Q: Did you have any direct contacts, personally, with Arnold during this period? Did you ever come in to see him? You were with the squadron at March Field. Did you ever have to have business with Arnold?

B: Not any more than I was just down in the Pursuit Group, see him every day or two, but Bob Self(?) was his Adjutant there, got killed. Lloyd Keisling was, too. He was very close to Arnold. In fact, I knew Keisling at Mitchel Field.

Q: Do you remember Arnold ever coming in giving the boys a pep talk?

B: Once in a while he did, got them up there Headquarters, particularly the squadron commanders.

Q: Did you have any contact with Mrs. Arnold?

B: I knew her, but not very close to her, she was a very lovely lady and well liked. She is yet, I guess.

Q: She planted some trees there, remember those poplar trees?

B: Oh yes.

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Q: They are now over 100 feet tall. Archie Old told me.

B: I was in March Field in 1920 when the old field was abandoned, then they opened it up again, back in 1928 or 1929.

Q: Did Arnold try to make the base pretty?

B: Oh yes, it was still under construction when I got there in '32, some of those old hangars were still there.

Q: From WW I?

B: Yes.

Q: So there was a lot of regard for Arnold. High regard?

B: I think so, everybody loved Arnold. Because he was tough, but then hell, that's no different from anybody else.

Q: Did you ever see him get mad?

B: Oh boy, he'd blow up, I've seen him.

Q: Did he ever get mad at you?

B: Me, no, but he cussed a lot of them out. But that's one thing, Lloyd Keisling was his Exec. He could handle Arnold, and he would get in a meeting, and he would be cussing everybody out. Lloyd would call up about 10 minutes later and tell them all to forget it. He got in, he told Arnold. That was one of his failings, blow his top.

Q: Blow his top, and then they'd cool him off. Were you there when he got his star, in 1935?

B: No, I left in 1935, went to Maxwell Field in the Spring.

Q: Well, he got his star in February 1935, that was about the time you left?

B: Yes, I guess it was. We were under orders to go to the Tactical School.

Q: They had a bib celebration down there when he got his star?

B: Yes, we used to have all those birds out there, like W.C. Fields and all...

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Q: He used to have all these Hollywood people?

B: Oh yes, they took pictures over there, too.

Q: Yes, I saw one with Wallace Beery?

B: Yes, he was a Commander in the Navy Reserve, a pilot.

Q: Yes, he had Bebe Daniels, Ben Lyons?

B: In fact, one of those pictures was taken over there. We practically everybody on the post in the grandstand.

Q: He used to put on these air shows for Hollywood. He was great on public relations?

B: Oh yes, he used to go over to Tucson and Phoenix, and take the whole damn group or wing over there.

Q: To put on a show, huh? Remember Mary Pickford coming out there, he put on a show for her, and he had them escort her in, didn't he? Do you remember anything special about that?

B: Oh, I remember her in 1915 at North Island. They took a picture over there. "The Girl of Yesterday." I remember her very well, we had her over there before she married Douglas Fairbanks. She was standing behind the planes. They were jerking the controls and a flipper hit her. She was a nice little person.

Q: Arnold gave her a medal right after WW I, down at Rockwell Field. Were you there?

B: Yes, I was down there then.

Q: There was a picture of that.

B: Yes.

Q: You were at North Island, in 1915. You knew Arnold? Were you there in 1916?

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B: I left there, '15 and then I went back in '19 and took the Pursuit course, I was there in 1919, then went over to Ellington Field.

Q: You weren't at North Island in 1916?

B: I may have been there early in '16.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold came back into Air Service? He had just come back from the Philippines. He got his Captaincy then?

B: Oh yes, that was about the time they took that bunch over to Corregidor.

Q: He came in and got his Captaincy. Do you remember when those two guys got lost, in '17?

B: Oh yes, Robertson and this other Cavalry officer.

Q: Arnold got in some trouble with Lahm over that, didn't he?

B: I don't know what.

Q: Wasn't there a delay in starting a search for those two?

B: There may have been. They were cutting across to Yuma in those days. That was quite a thing. They went down in the desert there, and they damned near died.

Q: Until they found them, You don't remember anything special about that, do you?

B: No, I don't.

Q: Do you remember anything about Arnold and Lahm at North Island?

B: Well, they were there, but I don't remember.

Q: I don't think they got along too well.

B: I don't know. Lahm, I don't know whether he was senior to Arnold or not. Lahm came out of the plant way back. He was a 1st LT in 1908, so was Benny.

Q: Arnold came out of the West Point in '07.

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Q: You were at Selfridge in the late '30s when Clagett was the Base Commander?

B: Yes, Clagett was in command when I was there. I came up from Panama.

Q: You know, he succeeded Arnold at March Field. He lasted about six months, and then got broken.

B: Yes, I knew he was busted back to a Colonel.

Q: And then he went to Selfridge. I guess that's when you worked for him.

B: Yes, he came up to Selfridge. He was a Colonel then. I think later on I was ordered up to Boston as Air Officer. Clagett, I don't know if he got his star back or not.

Q: Yes, he got his star back. He went overseas, and he was broken again. Do you remember anything? He didn't like Arnold?

B: I don't think so, they didn't hit it off very well.

Q: Did he ever say anything to you?

B: No, he never did.

Q: You just heard that he and Arnold did not see things together. He was a classmate of Frank Andrews.

B: Yes, I knew about that. He was an old timer.

Q: He and Andrews were pretty close. Do you have any recollections of Andrews?

B: Oh, I knew him out here at Kelly when he was a Major. He was a nice person; everybody liked Andrews.

Q: He would have been a great commander, if he had lived.

B: Oh yes, he had that GHQ Air Force, and boy, he did a good job on that.

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Q: Did you know Knerr?

B: Yes, I knew him. Knerr, too, was out there at Kelly. In fact, I knew him when he first came to the AF, when he learned to fly. He was a good man.

Q: When Arnold came into Washington as Asst Chief of Air Corps, and Chief, you didn't have contact with him?

B: No, I was out at the Tactical School, then I went out to Mitchel and then I went to Panama.

Q: Colonel Burge, you were telling me how Jimmy Doolittle got that job,the Tokyo Raid.

B: Yes, I've known Jimmy a long time. When he heard that that was in the making, Jimmy rushed into the Chief's office, and Miff Harmon was Chief of Air Staff. Jimmy told Harmon: "Hap Arnold told you to put me in charge of that flight." He issued the orders, and then he told Arnold about it, and Arnold blew his top, but he backed him up in it. He said: "I didn't tell him any damn thing." That just showed how Jimmy operated.

Q: But Arnold said as long as he got the job, let him do it.

B: Yes, he knew Doolittle was a good man.

Q: But Arnold had given no such order?

B: No, he hadn't, but that just showed that Jimmy was quite a boy.

Q: Yes, he just sort of grabbed the bull by the horns.

B: Sure he did, nobody else would, I don't know how he got hold of it.

Q: So it was sort of impromptu that Jimmy got it. How did Jimmy hear about that mission? It was kept pretty secret?

B: That's what I'd like to know; nobody could figure how he got word of it.

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Burns, James H. 9 Dec 70

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

30

Tom Stumm,

Another insurance.

Hurry!

Murray

P/s return

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THE STAR and NEWS
Washington, D. C.
Wednesday, Nov. 29, 1972

Maj. Gen. James Burns, 87, Lend-Lease Aide in 2nd War

Retired Army Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, 87, an assistant to the late Harry Hopkins in supervising the lend-lease program during World War II, died Monday in Sleepy Hollow Manor nursing home in Annandale. He lived on Connecticut Avenue NW.

Gen. Burns' appointment in 1941 provided Hopkins with a handle tecchnical aspects of qualified military adviser to lend-lease. Later that year he was a member of the Harriman mission that visited Moscow to arrange an aid program for the Soviet Union under provisions of the Lend-Lease Act.

Gen. Burns, an ordnance officer most of his career, in 1942 was assigned to duty with the Munitions Assignments Board, a wartime organization under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also was an alternate chairman of the Presidents' Soviet Protocol Committee and chairman of its shipping and supplies operating committees.

He retained duties with Munitions Assignments until September 1944, three months before he retired.

In 1949 he became a consultant to the secretary of Defense on foreign military affairs. He left the department in 1951 as an assistant to the secretary in connection with the Mutual Assistance Pact.

Gen. Burns, born in Pawling, N.Y., was a 1908 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy .His early assignments included attending the school of musketry at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., duty in Vera Cruz, Mexico, and with the chief of ordnance here. During World War I he held ordnance assignments in France and here. In the 1930s he was an ordnance officer of the Philippine Department.

He leaves three sisters, Mrs. Mary G. Porter of Columbia, Pa.; Mrs. Eleanor B. Johnston of Arlington and Christina I. Burns of Pawling, and a brother, Sylvester J., of Poughkeepsie, N.Y.

Mass will be said at 10 a.m. Friday at the Catholic Shrine of the Most Blessed Sacrament, 6001 Western Ave. NW, with burial in Arlington Cemetery.

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September 18, 1970

M/Gen James H. Burns, US Army(Ret)
3901 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20008

Dear General Burns:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

Your name shows up in connection with the lend lease of planes to Russia and in General Arnold's relationship with FDR through Harry Hopkins.

In any event, you probably have some memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX5-3862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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EM 3-4303
Wed - 2 PM

Done 9 Dec 70

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Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

(X) Golf at Col. Country Club

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Interview - MG James H. Burns, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1970

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Hap Arnold, the first time you met him?

B: We probably met up at West Point. He was a graduate of Class 1907, I was a graduate of Class 1908. I was up there at West Point with him for three years.

Q: Do you have any recollections of him at West Point? He was a member of the Black Hand.

B: Oh, I remember that group. There was a fellow up there name of Hand who was the ringleader of it.

Q: Oh, they named it after a guy named Hand?

B: I guess so. That wasn't typical of Happy, though. Hand was a kind of a what do they call these wild jackasses in Texas? Arnold was a very kind, considerate, decent fellow.

Q: They called him Pewt in those days, didn't they?

B: Yes, I don't know why they did that.

Q: I think they named him after a cartoon. Wasn't there a cartoon?

B: Maybe so, I don't know.

Q: Do you remember anything about him at West Point? He was supposed to have been involved in some mischief, like putting the cannon on top of one of the parapets.

B: That might have been, that happened all right. I saw it, but I never associated him with it. He wasn't a mischief maker.

Q: Was he very serious?

B: No, he was happy go lucky. But he wasn't a mischief maker. He was a

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good soul.

Q: He was on the track team.

B: Maybe so, I don't know.

Q: He was also a second string football player?

B: That's right. I remember that.

Q: Did you play in any sports?

B: No, I tried for the baseball team and couldn't make it. I didn't have enough body for the football team.

Q: You were always on the thin side, weren't you?

B: Yes.

Q: Do you remember in 1907, this is early 1907, some Frenchman came and tried out his balloon at West Point. Do you remember this, a balloonist came to West Point. You don't remember?

Q: Do you remember Ben Castle?

B: Oh sure.

Q: At West Point. He was sort of the ringleader of the class there, wasn't he?

B: I think he was Class President for a while, nice man.

Q: His son, Fred Castle was a General, and he was killed and he got the Congressional Medal of Honor.

B: Is that so?

Q: Remember that?

B: I'm glad he got the Medal of Honor. I'm not glad he was killed.

Q: Do you remember his son? His son was the class baby, wasn't he?

B: Might have been, I don't know.

Q: Was Tony Frank in your class?

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B: No, I think he was in the class of 1909. I knew Tony Frank, though.

Q: Where did you go after you left West Point, after you graduated?

B: Went to San Francisco, Field Artillery, Presidio. I loved it.

Q: Arnold was out in the Philippines, from 1907 to 1909. Then he came back in 1909, and he was at Governor's Island, and then he got into aviation. Did you have any dealings with him in WWI or about that time? Did you know him about that time?

B: No, I don't think so.

Q: What were your first dealings with Arnold?

B: Well, they were pretty late in life. I got affiliated with aircraft activity when I was Executive for the Asst Secy of War, Mr. Louis Johnson.

Q: In 1938?

B: Yes, that's the first time I remember getting affiliated with Happy. Then we both got on the same team because we both wanted the same thing. We both believed in lots of good airplanes.

Q: Did Louis Johnson give him some trouble or cause some trouble there? Was he trying to get to be Secy of War?

B: Yes, he sure was.

Q: Harry Woodring was the Secy.

B: Yes, that's right.

Q: Was there some competition?

B: Oh, terrific.

Q: Between Louis Johnson and Woodring?

B: Well, I don't know if it was competition so much. I think that Louis Johnson wanted to be Secy of War, though. I think he did everything he could. But I don't recall any effort on the part of Mr. Woodring to get into a fracas

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with Mr. Johnson.

Q: Do you remember some of the issues that arose in 1938 when Arnold first took over as Chief of Air Corps?

B: Yes, I remember one issue. Mr. Roosevelt, he really wanted to furnish good airplanes to the countries that he figured we would be affiliated with. Mr. Woodring didn't want to do that, and I think that Hap Arnold was on Mr. Woodring's side at that time. I never was on Mr. Woodring's side. I always thought he was wrong, but I never had any quarrel with Happy about it because we didn't believe in fighting with each other. We were too good friends. But Happy, really, at heart, he wanted a good, big, powerful American AF. That's what he wanted, and of course, I did too. But he thought perhaps the better way to do it was to stop giving planes to our allies. I felt that this was not really our war, it evolved into our war, but the best thing for us to do to help the others do the main fighting.

Q: Was he concerned that if we give away our best airplanes, we won't be able to train our men.

B: Well, yes, I guess to some extent. He thought it would dwarf the American AF. But at that time there was a great deal of ambition on the part of the Air Corps officers. They all wanted to be promoted. They wanted to go up fast and high. And they were quite resentful of anything that would keep them from flying high and fast. Well, there is such a thing as going too high and too fast, too. Those things have to be done in moderation, so that there was always that fight.

Q: Was Arnold pushing for high rank, too?

B: No, he was not a selfish man. He wanted to do what was best for the country. I think a great deal of Gen Arnold.

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Q: Do you remember an incident that occurred out in Santa Monica? There was a Frenchman in an airplane that crashed in a parking lot in January 1939. Do you remember that? Arnold got called into Congress. Bennett Champ Clark and some others were questioning him and he got into a hassle with Morgenthau.

B: I have faint memories of that now. Morgenthau, he was kind of hard to get along with. He wanted to run the Air Corps. Quite difficult to get along with him. He was a very positive character. He knew all the answers, or at least thought he did. Well, he was smart enough, I don't say he wasn't. But he was ambitious, too.

Q: And he was close to Roosevelt?

B: Well, to some extent. How really and truly close he was, I don't know. The man who Mr. Roosevelt relied upon in airpower more than he did on Morgenthau was Harry Hopkins. And he very quickly, of course, Mr. Roosevelt is like all these people in big places - they've always got to guard their position. He never had any fears about Harry Hopkins. I don't think he was that sure about Mr. Morgenthau. I think he had to watch his step with Mr. Morgenthau. That's my impression. But he didn't have to watch with Mr. Hopkins. I worked for Mr. Hopkins for a long while.

Q: How many years did you work for Hopkins?

B: Well, I went with him along about '38 or '39, and I stayed with him until, I guess, about 1943 or '44. Then I went sick and he went sick, too.

Q: He was completely loyal to Mr. Roosevelt?

B: Absolutely, that's my opinion. I don't know about Mr. Morgenthau. I don't think you get many people as loyal to the boss as Mr. Hopkins.

Q: Roosevelt reposed a lot of faith in him?

B: Oh yes.

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Q: Morgenthau wanted to control the Air Corps and perhaps the Army?

B: He was trying to build himself up a lot, no doubt about it.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold was called to testify on that crash, that airplane crash?

B: No, I don't.

B: At that time I wasn't quite so intimately acquainted with the activities of the AF, as I was a little bit later.

Q: Do you remember that Arnold was trying to build up, when Arnold first got the job after Westover was killed, they had a conference at the White House, and they were talking about 10,000 planes. You are smiling, do you remember anything about that conference?

B: What you say is true. There were a lot of people working on the President to get him to increase airpower. Happy Arnold was, the politicians were, too, because most of them sensed that airpower was going to be terribly important. So there was a good deal of pressure from all sides on the President to build up airpower. They talked in fantastic figures for awhile, of course. Those fantastic figures always had to be boiled down to good sense. So they talked about 10,000 or 50,000 airplanes, and everything else. So various studies started, and then when we got through with these studies, then we had to report to the President and he had quite a number of conferences with us. Happy Arnold was always there, and I think I was generally there, too, and Gen Craig, Chief of Staff of the Army, he was always there. They always had a Navy man there, Chief of Naval Operations.

Q: Stark?

B: He was there sometimes.

Q: Later on, Adm King?

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B: He made himself heard and felt more than Adm Stark. Well, the figures got so fantastic they sort of scared the President. And then, he finally sat up there one day. He said: "You people are throwing figures too big for me. I can't go along with those big figures." And he said: "Now, I want to" - I hesitate to say this because my memory isn't sharp on it - I think he gave us an ultimatum that we should figure out how to spend $300 million for airplanes. I think that was the figure. And he said: "I want you to come back here very quickly" and he made a definite date. So when we got - that's what makes me laugh - because the Navy wanted to convert that $300 million into Navy warfare, hardware they called it. And Mr. Woodring and the General Staff wanted to convert it all into the Army hardware, and finally Mr. Roosevelt said: "I called this conference to get airplanes." And he said: "I'm getting everything in the world but airplanes." He said: "We've got to revamp it."

Q: Wasn't Marshall in that, too?

B: Yes, but he never talked much, though. He didn't know much about it. As a matter of fact, a great many of the Army people resisted the idea of more airplanes. That's unfortunate, but that's true. I guess, I don't know about the Navy, whether the Navy people resisted airpower or not. But the main thrust had to come from our own air force. Well, I remember, he (FDR) said: "I want 3,000 airplanes, and I'm willing to spend" - I think he said - "300 million." When we had this meeting, the Navy wanted it all for Navy hardware and the Army wanted it all for Army hardware.

Q: Arnold was a junior member of the firm then, wasn't he?

B: Yes, he was.

Q: Did he talk much in that meeting?

B: Oh yes, he didn't try to dominate the meeting, but he held his own.

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Anyway, the President finally said, now you give me everything in the world but fighting airplanes." He said: "I'm not interested in training airplanes. I want some fighting airplanes." He said: "How are we going to help France if we just give them a few training airplanes." He said: "You've got to work this out again." Well, they did. Mr. Roosevelt had a hard time getting any fighting aircraft.

Q: Everybody wanted to use that money for his own purpose?

B: Yes, and I think the Air Corps, they wanted to use the money for training airplanes. See, Mr. Roosevelt's concept and some of these people in the services had different concepts. Mr. Roosevelt's concept was to help the other fellow defeat the Germans. Our own people wanted to lick the Germans ourselves, you see. The result is quite different.

Q: What did Arnold want at this meeting? Did he want training planes?

B: Yes, he had to go along with his people on that. Well, they got a good many of them, too, to be honest about it. Slips occurred. I was on the side of Mr. Roosevelt, because I believed he had it sized up right. I really had a good deal of influence because my boss was Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Johnson wanted airplanes, too. So we scrambled the eggs a little and we got started on fighting planes. But those were really interesting days.

Q: At that meeting was Arnold taking some notes in a diary?

B: I couldn't answer that.

Q: Did Arnold used to take notes in his diary?

B: I think he used to have a notebook around a good deal.

Q: Did he ever get chastised for taking notes of the President's conference?

B: I never heard anyone chastised.

Q: Was he in Roosevelt's doghouse for awhile?

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B: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Well, according to his book, Global Mission, he was in the President's doghouse for a little bit when he had this altercation with Morgenthau, but then, he was restored to the President's good graces. Do you recall any of that?

B: I don't remember any of it now, I'll tell you, that's the way it would work out. Here's the reason I say that. Mr. Hopkins thought a great deal of Hap Arnold.

Q: Yes, he did, and Arnold thought a great deal of Hopkins, too.

B: Yes, and in the long run, Mr. Roosevelt would side with Hopkins against anybody else. He knew that Hopkins was completely loyal. He wasn't so damn sure of the rest of them, that's the way I figure it. But I don't believe that Mr. Roosevelt would go against Mr. Hopkins. I think he'd turn down Mr. Morgenthau before he would Hopkins. Hopkins knew that Happy Arnold wanted a good air service, and I did too. But I didn't want to put all the money at the start on our own Air Force, I wanted to see them give some to France and give some to the other people.

Q: Britain and France?

B: Yes, there were two ways of winning that war. One was to take charge over here in America and make the other people our assistants, and the other was to let those people have charge and let us help them. In the start, I thought the best way was to let them be responsible for the war - England, and France, and the others. Help them, especially with fighting equipment. I think that's the way Mr. Roosevelt looked at it, too, and I think that's the way Mr. Hopkins looked at it. I know I had a very strong feeling that way.

Q: On May 16, 1940, President Roosevelt came out in a speech and shocked a lot of people. He called for 50,000 planes a year. Remember that speech?

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B: Yes, I remember it very well.

Q: Did Arnold have anything to do with that speech, with that figure?

B: I can't answer that. I doubt it.

Q: Where did he get the 50,000 figure?

B: There were figures floating around all the while. There was somebody in the paper writing an article on it. Those figures weren't well thought out. 50,000 airplanes - that's a lot of airplanes.

Q: Especially when we hardly had any airplanes at that time.

B: We had the training planes, some of them, not all of them. We were just starting in production on some of these fighters, fighting planes of one kind or another. Oh, I think they picked that out of the air.

Q: You think the President picked it out of the air?

B: He had a way of doing that. He thought in big terms, and he would pick a big term like that out. He wanted to arouse the American people, that was the easy way to do it.

Q: But it was impractical, wasn't it, at that time? To call for such a large figure when we had so little?

B: No, it wasn't. It was a little bit too high.

Q: Yes, that's what I mean. Did Hopkins have anything to do with that figure?

B: I don't know about that.

Q: The President decided that Louis Johnson and Woodring were political liabilities. He needed a Republican in there, and he chose Stimson.

B: That's right.

Q: Do you remember anything about that?

B: Of course, I wouldn't be in any conference in which the President would be talking with his assistants about the selection of somebody to be in his

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cabinet. That was too high for me. But I do know, I'm pretty sure I know why Mr. Woodring got fired.

Q: Why?

B: He got fired, really, basically, because he didn't want to send American airplanes to France and Britain. I got involved in that, and I can tell you that if you are interested. They were having a good deal of discussion about what we would buy and all the rest of it. Finally, one afternoon, one of their reporters, Bomar, it was, came in to see me, nice man.

Q: What paper did he work for?

B: I can't remember. I think it was AP.

Q: Might be, his name is not familiar to me.

B: He died shortly after that. Nice man. He was a very honest man. I liked him. He said: "I've just come from the White House. I thought you might like to know what happened up there." He said: "The President is having a discussion of airplanes, and he's made up his mind that he's going to turn airplanes over to France." Bomar said the question came up about secrecy and the President said: "Don't talk to me about secrecy about airplanes. They've only got one secret in the airplane, and that's the Russian sight." I forget the name of the sight, that we got from the Russians.

Q: Not the Norden bombsight?

B: I think so, that sounds right. "We got that from the Russians," the President said. "We've got no other secret at all." He said: "I'm going to see to it that the French get airplanes." So that night, Mr. Woodring was having a conference about airplanes, and I told Mr. Johnson what had happened, told him the President was mad about this, and that he was going to get action, and he wanted to make sure that France got some airplanes. They had the conference

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in there, and all the big wigs were there. They kept on telling how they weren't going to give any airplanes to the French. I couldn't swallow it any more, and I said: "Look it here. I can't hold my tongue any longer." I said: "We all work for the President of the US, and we've got to do what he wants us to do." I said: "This idea of thinking that we are not going to have to obey his orders is a lot of tommyrot."

Q: Who was in this conference?

B: Woodring was in it, and Johnson was in it; and Gen Marshall was in it; and Happy Arnold was in it, too. He leaned a little bit on that side, because he wanted those airplanes for America. I think that after he thought it through, he didn't follow that. But anyway, Mr. Woodring said: "I haven't heard anything about this conference. This is all brand new to me." He said: "I'll have to postpone this meeting, and get the facts so we know what we are talking about." Well, he did postpone it. In the meantime, somebody released information to the President that Mr. Woodring was calling another conference. I don't know who let that out of the bag. And so we foregathered at the appointed time after recess and Mr. Woodring's bell rang. And he said: "Yes, Mr. President;" no, Mr. President;" "yes, Mr. President." Then, I just forget how it ended up, but I think it did end up anyway. And the next day, the President fired Mr. Woodring because he felt that he was bucking him on giving airplanes to the French.

Q: Why didn't Johnson get the job?

B: I think Mr. Roosevelt had that figured out pretty well. I don't know, do you want to know my private opinion? I don't think Mr. Johnson measured up: He was too ambitious without having the goods.

Q: They later sent him out to India. Wasn't he on a mission for the President in India?

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B: Yes, but that was after he was fired.

Q: Did the President, at that time feel - this was the election campaign of 1940. Remember he was running against Wilkie - did the President then feel that he had to have bipartisan support?

B: Now you are asking me questions that I, of course, am not able to answer. I don't know what the President had. Once in a while in a conference he would disclose his opinion of something that I was involved in. When it came to politics, I wasn't in it at all.

Q: You stayed out of it?

B: They never brought me in, and I certainly didn't want to get in.

Q: Arnold was not enthusiastic about giving planes to the British and French, and you said he was not bitter about it. The British tried to soften Arnold up. There was an exchange of dispatches and they wanted Arnold to come over to England, to see how the British were fighting the Battle of Britain. They softened up Arnold, when he came back he was gungho for helping the British. Do you remember that?

B: No, not too well. I know that, to my mind, Arnold didn't really resist the idea of giving help to the British. He may have at the start. I think he did. I know at that conference I was telling you about, that Happy - General Arnold, Mr. Woodring and the rest of the what you might call "the foot-soldier people" were...they didn't like it very much.

Q: In the spring of 1941 there was a change of messages between Hopkins and Harriman. Averell Harriman was then in England. And the exchange went something like this: "General Hap Arnold is not too enthusiastic about helping the British. We would like to send him over to England to look at what the British are doing to fight the Battle of Britain." Well, they sent Arnold over. He went over in

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April 1941. They really rolled out the carpet for Arnold. He got to see the King for 45 minutes; he got to see Churchill, Beaverbrook and all the rest, and when Arnold came back, he wouldn't do enough to help the British. Do you remember that?

B: No, no, passed over my head.

Q: Now, Arnold and Marshall, you saw them together a lot, didn't you?

B: Yes.

Q: How did Marshall feel about airplanes?

B: I don't think he had grown up to them.

Q: At the beginning?

B: No, he hadn't grown up to them. I don't think he was against them. He just didn't realize their potency.

Q: But he learned later on?

B: Oh yes. You see, Gen Marshall was a man without many prejudices, he might have a prejudice against some officer that he didn't think was working as well as he ought to. But on a broad principle he was pretty free of prejudice in my experience with him.

Q: And he turned this over to Arnold? He gave Arnold control of airpower, didn't he?

B: I can't answer that one either.

Q: Now, how about Hopkins and Arnold?

B: I think they got along well together.

Q: Hopkins, when the Russians got into the war, was very anxious to give the Russians all kinds of help - airplanes.

B: Yes.

Q: Arnold was not too enthusiastic about that either, was he?

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B: Well, I don't know. In some of these things I wasn't in on. I was never a big shot, you see. I was on the fringe of being a bit shot, but I was never really a big shot. I knew a lot that went on, but not everything.

Q: Yes, remember they set up these protocol, these were the lend lease to help the Russians, and the Russians were trying to get all kinds of airplanes.

B: Yes.

Q: And, of course, everybody was competing for the same airplanes. The Russians wanted bombers, didn't they?

B: Yes.

Q: How did Arnold feel about that?

B: I've given you about all I know on that. I was never in on any conference between him and the Russians.

Q: He had some meetings with a fellow named Belyaev.

B: Oh yes, I remember him. I knew pretty much all the people you are talking about.

Q: And Kudyakoff, remember him?

B: No.

Q: But Belyaev. He was pushing for a lot of airplanes, wasn't he?

B: Yes.

Q: And Harry Hopkins was very favorable towards helping the Russians in any way possible, was he not?

B: I think that was quite logical, because they were the ones who were fighting the Germans. We weren't fighting.

Q: Was Arnold helping the Russians as a good soldier, or was he really of the belief that we should help them more?

B: I think it was primarily being a good soldier. You can't expect an

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ambitious Army officer, or AF officer or Navy officer to give up equipment with which he fights, in order to help some other country win a battle. He instinctively hangs on to it. Now I think Happy Arnold was always a good soldier, but he also had his own concept. He had to be loyal to his own group, the Air Corps. So I don't think they were so keen about giving up their equipment. But when you get up to the political zone, they looked at it differently. Now, you see, Mr. Roosevelt, he wanted to win the war, but it was good politics for him to win the war at the least expense of the US - either in men or wealth. So, the obvious thing for him to do was seek arrangements with Russia, and whatnot to help them win the war. Now that basic policy is in there everywhere. In some of them, I wasn't affiliated. I was in the Ordnance Dept at the time, and I wasn't trying to lead troops. The leading of troops had nothing to do with my future, so you might say I was neutral.

Q: Do I understand you to say that since the Russians were killing Germans, we should try to help them with all the equipment possible?

B: That's exactly right. That was my concept.

Q: And this was Harry Hopkins' concept, too?

B: I think so. It wasn't always that way, though.

Q: It wasn't? When did he change?

B: People worked on him. I'll have to tell you this story because it is quite interesting. I played a great deal of golf when I got free down there at the office. I would go out to Columbia Club and play golf, and I'd very seldom get around to golf without a message coming out that, "the White House wants you." I would go down there and find out what Mr. Hopkins wanted. One day this happened. Mr. Hopkins said to me - he always called me "General." Most of these people you would call by their first names, but never me. I don't

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know why. He always kept his distance from me, and I did from him, too, for that matter. He said: "General, I'm going to recommend to the President that we stop sending all kinds of equipment and munitions to Russia. And we'll tell Russia that we will get ready to open up a second front as of some date." He said: "What do you think of it?" I said: "I think, Mr. Hopkins, you couldn't do anything worse." He said: "What!" I said: "You couldn't do anything worse. You take all the loyalty that the Russians have toward us out, and you make them discouraged. They will think they've got to go alone." I said: "Don't spoil the team by doing a thing like that." I never heard another damn word.

Q: This was sort of a temporary letdown?

B: Aberration, he had. He never mentioned it again, I've always laughed at that.

Q: When was this, about 1943?

B: Yes, I suppose so. It was about a year or so, I guess, before we started that second front. He saw right away that that wouldn't do.

Q: We are talking about the leak of RAINBOW FIVE. This man told me that Harry Hopkins was a very sloppy housekeeper, and he kept a lot of secret documents all over his desk and he didn't take good care of his classified materiel and that somebody could have picked this document off Harry Hopkins' desk and photographed it and then returned it without him knowing about it. Do you have any comment on that?

B: Of course, I know nothing of it, I don't remember a single thing about it. But I can't say that Mr. Hopkins was a neat housekeeper, although he was guarded pretty well. He always had a secretary up there, and all the rest of us that watched out for him. Of course, you can make lots of assumptions.

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Q: Does that make any sense to you?

B: Oh, in a way it does, but I don't believe it, just the same.

Q: The name of the man who wrote the story is Chesly Manly. Does that name mean anything to you?

B: No.

Q: He just died a few months ago. I never did get to see him, he worked for the Chicago Tribune.

B: Of course I've heard of the Chicago Tribune. While I was working down there with Mr. Hopkins I heard about it, and I know the Chicago Tribune didn't like Mr. Roosevelt.

Q: No, they didn't.

B: They didn't have a rosy reputation either.

Q: No, that's right. But the truth is, they did get the war plan because they published whole sections of it. The RAINBOW FIVE plan said, in essence: "If we get into a war, we will fight all out against Hitler, and hold in the Pacific until we lick Hitler, and then we'll take care of the Japanese." That was the plan. All right, now, this plan in great detail spelled out how AEF would go to Europe and help the British fight the Germans. Publishing this plan, the Chicago Tribune said: "See, we told you, Roosevelt is trying to get us into the war, and here's proof of it." Now, somebody leaked this plan to the newspaper. There is no question about it. I'm trying to get at the bottom of the mystery. Who did it.

B: I can't help you, I never heard of the incident before. Maybe if I heard of it, but certainly don't remember it.

Q: A lot of people have forgotten it and the reason they have forgotten it is that Pearl Harbor happened so soon after that it simply overwhelmed this little

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investigation, and I do know Wedemeyer was one of the suspects.

B: Oh, I remember him.

Q: But do you remember that he was investigated?

B: I have a hazy memory of that, but not a very distinct memory.

Q: You see, Wedemeyer was of German extraction. He had gone to the German War College, and he was an Asia-first man. In other words, he could have had a motive for embarrassing Roosevelt, for going all out against Hitler. The backfire, the publicity from disclosure of this plan could have turned us around toward fighting the Japanese. Some people wanted us to do that.

B: I don't know a thing about it. Don't remember it.

Q: You don't remember anything about this plan.

B: No. I played a peculiar part in the war. A lot of these things never reached me officially. In things like that I would be involved in the line of communications. But in some of the overall picture, I did have a good deal of knowledge. I really had quite a little influence, too.

Q: With Hopkins?

B: With Hopkins, oh yes. I would just give my honest opinion about something like I did about his scheme, and he quit that.

Q: He took your advice - you mean about cutting off aid to the Russians?

B: Yes.

Q: How about the Chinese, did you get involved in airplanes for the Chinese, Chiang Kai-Shek?

B: I was involved in helping the Chinese. I was tied in with Lend Lease and everybody went to Lend Lease for help, including the Chinese. So I was involved in that, too, but I don't remember any of the details.

Q: Do you remember Lauchlin Currie?

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B: Oh yes, very much.

Q: He was a Presidential assistant, and he had the China problem, didn't he?

B: That's right, I worked with him. I wasn't under him or anything like that, but he was among the contacts that I had to do business with.

Q: Do you have any knowledge of Arnold's role in helping the Chinese?

B: No.

Q: After Casablanca, Arnold went out and had a conference with Chiang Kai-shek and CKS was pushing for more airplanes, more logistics, and of course, the Chinese theater did not have the highest priority. There was a great deal of pressure on Arnold to help the Chinese, remember this?

B: Well, no, I didn't distinctly remember it any more, but what you say, I know it makes sense.

Q: How about the B-29 problem? The President was pushing to get the B-29s out into the CBI, and he wanted to bomb Japan. Do you remember that?

B: No, I ought to, but I don't.

Q: The President is supposed to have put a lot of pressure on Arnold, to get those B-29s out there, and start the bombing of Japan. Do you remember that?

B: No, it doesn't come back to me.

Q: How about the Doolittle raid? Did you have any involvement in that?

B: No, I was surprised. That was a great secret, just like the big bomb. I didn't know anything about that either.

Q: You didn't know anything about the atomic bomb either?

B: No, and fortunately, I wasn't inquisitive. I think that was one of my pleasant assets.

Q: Maybe this is why you survived so long in that job.

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B: I suppose so.

Q: If you were more nosy, somebody would have figured....

B: Suspected me.

Q: You ought to be out of there.

B: I have to laugh at the Russians. They sent me over there twice on some jobs. The Russians, they are wholeheartedly secret. They won't tell you anything. They don't want to tell you anything. No give. They want to know everything, but they won't give. Well, I didn't give a damn because I didn't want any information from them.

Q: Did Arnold ever talk to you about that? This is one thing that bothered him about the Russians. That they would never tell him anything.

B: I didn't care, you see, because I knew the sensible thing to do was help the Russians, and if they had some secrets, I was perfectly willing to let them have them.

Q: Do you remember Arnold was trying to get permission from the Russians to fly airplanes into Siberia?

B: Yes, and I think I tried to help get the information for him, and I never got it.

Q: The Russians wouldn't allow Americans to fly in. They would take over the airplanes at Fairbanks, Alaska. Do you remember the Alsib route? Alaska-Siberia route. Remember we were sending planes in?

B: Yes, I flew over that damn thing myself.

Q: But they wouldn't allow Americans to fly in. Do you remember Operation VELVET.

B: I don't remember that.

Q: This is the time that Stalingrad was under great pressure and the Germans

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were going into Baku. They endangered the oil areas, and the Russians finally backed out, when they stabilized their military situation. They said: "All right, thank you, forget about it." But Arnold was one of those who didn't want to give them the airplanes unless we could send the pilots in there with them. He felt the Russians were not skilled enough to handle our bombers.

B: Well, then I suppose he always had that fear, that when they got the airplanes, and didn't take our personnel. We weren't building our own force up as much as we might, because an airplane without pilots is no damn good at all.

Q: Of course, the other fellow could fly them.

B: I know, but I mean....

Q: He felt they didn't have the skills.

B: Here in America and didn't have the skilled people to fly them, we wouldn't have an air force, would we?

Q: No.

B: Wouldn't have half it. The leaders instinctively wanted personnel as well as planes.

Q: The Russians tried very hard to get four engine bombers. Did we ever give them any?

B: I don't remember. I had a good deal to say about Lend Lease, but I never tried to tell just what people would get, because we had it so worked out, that went to a group of people to make the decision.

Q: Did you get involved in the Persian Gulf supply.

B: Oh yes, I was involved in Baku too, I was in Baku. I was in Siberia. I was every place.

Q: Do you remember the Follett Bradley mission? Tell me about it.

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B: Oh yes, I don't know enough about it, but he was a self-seeker too, Bradley was. I don't know where he went.

Q: He had a heart attack, but they had a mission to Russia there for awhile. This thing soured relations between US and Russia.

B: Follett Bradley was quite a self-seeker, and these self-seekers will get you in trouble, if you don't watch them very closely. If somebody is working for Uncle Sam, and his heart is to help Uncle Sam, he won't get you in trouble, but if he's working for Uncle Sam and most of the time thinking about himself, he will get you into trouble. You have to worry about the Presidency, whether they want to win an election, do something for the country, or do something for themselves.

Q: You mentioned that you were an avid golfer. You played golf with Arnold?

B: That's right.

Q: What kind of a golfer was he?

B: Fine. I think I was a good golfer myself, and he and I played about the same.

Q: Did you bet on your games?

B: Yes, not much.

Q: How much did you bet?

B: I think we played a buck the first nine, $1; second nine, $1; and a $1 on the match. We weren't gamblers.

Q: Did he ever make a hole in one, or a round or a great shot that he talked about?

B: No, he wasn't a bragger.

Q: Did he ever have an accidental good shot that he talked about?

B: I don't remember. He didn't boast very much. He was just a very whole

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hearted good fellow. He didn't drink to excess...

Q: Did he drink at all?

B: Yes, yes, he drank, but in a perfectly gentlemanly way.

Q: Sherry?

B: He liked sherry. It seems to me for a while he drank sherry, and it does seem to me that after awhile he gave up sherry. My understanding is that Hap had developed an ulcer.

Q: Yes, back in the '20s?

B: About the time that I used to play with him, which was in the '40s, I guess, he had recovered pretty well from that ulcer. He'd act out there in the Columbia Club on the 19th hole just the same as the rest of us. I've got a picture. The 19th hole.

Q: Is that a bar?

B: They had a nice bar there. But then they had a big room where a waiter served the drinks, all tied in. It's a nice club.

Q: You played foursomes with him and Floyd Parks and Malin Craig?

B: And Gen Craig, that's right. Let's see how that worked out. Happy and I were generally partners, and we played Floyd Parks and Gen Craig, because Floyd Parks was the best of us, and Gen Craig was the poorest. Happy and I were in the middle.

Q: Did you bet money when you played them foursome?

B: Yes, that $1.

Q: $1 on each line, and $1 for overall match?

B: That's right, then I think we also, whoever lost had to treat.

Q: Did you give them a handicap, or did you play even up?

B: Yes, we had to give them a handicap. We have a very famous man running

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the players. An old redheaded fellow "Red Bannigan." He's a grand man. He'd say: "You go down there to play"and he'd say, "all right, you start out now, and you get two up or two down."

Q: You couldn't appeal his decision?

B: We all loved Red Bannigan. I went to his funeral.

Q: What kind of a relationship did Arnold have with Marshall?

B: Well, I think he had a very close, happy relationship.

Q: Did Marshall call him "Hap"?

B: I can't answer that; I don't remember.

Q: Marshall, in their correspondence, he would write "Dear Arnold."

B: I think that's probably what he called him because he was a soldier of the old school. Myself, I never got into the habit of first name until this war.

Q: Roosevelt liked to call people by their first names, didn't he?

B: Yes, he liked to be on friendly terms.

Q: Right, but did he ever call Marshall "George"?

B: Yes.

Q: I thought nobody called Marshall "George."

B: Yes, he did, let me tell you. I answered the phone one day, and the voice said: "How are you George?" And I said: "I'm afriad, Mr. President, you've got the wrong line." "Oh" he said, "I thought you were George Marshall." The girls down there at the switchboard, they made a mistake.

Q: How about Hopkins? Did he call him George or General Marshall?

B: I wouldn't be surprised but what he called General Marshall "General." He called some people, I think he called Hap by his first name. I think he called some people but not all. He never called me by my first name.

Q: You know, I was told about Arnold that he had great loyalty above and

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on his level, but sometimes his loyalty to his subordinates in getting them promotions and decorations was not the greatest in the world. Have you ever heard that?

B: No, I never heard it, I don't know whether it is so or not. I have great admiration for Gen Arnold. I think he would treat them pretty honestly, below and above, and on the side, too.

Q: What about Arnold and Andrews? Did you know anything about their relationship?

B: I knew a little something about it all right, but not too much. My impression was that he and Andrews got along well together, but you can't always tell, because jealousy creeps into organizations pretty easily.

Q: Was there jealousy for the top spot in the Air Corps?

B: Well, I never noticed it when Happy got in there, because they accepted Happy as the natural leader of that Corps.

Q: You say Pa Watson was the class of '06?

B: Yes, and '07, and he graduated with '08.

Q: They kept him back - what happened.

B: Well, he didn't make the grades, and they gave him another chance.

Q: They didn't fire him out of there?

B: No, he was a great fellow. A very, very fine man. You'd love to be with Pa Watson and they felt that he had, I think, I don't know, they think he had a fine personality to lose it, but in order to get him through they had to keep him up there for, I think, it was 6 years. He started in with '06. That would have been four years, and then he passed '07, that would be five years. Then he graduated with '08.

Q: I was told that he was partial to Andrews, he liked Frank Andrews?

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B: Oh, I don't know about that.

Q: In any event, the President had this report that Arnold drank to excess and he delayed appointing Arnold as Chief of the Air Corps to succeed Westover. Did you ever hear that story?

B: I never heard it, and I don't believe it, because I was pretty close to Hap Arnold, and you know, when you go out to a club and play golf, it's very to drink too much. But I don't ever remember seeing Happy Arnold take more than he should.

Q: I don't say there is any truth in it. I'm just saying that there was a rumor about this, in order to discourage the President.

B: Rumors, you don't know whether they are true or wrong. I don't believe it was right.

B: He was very good at talk, too.

Q: Who's that - Arnold?

B: Yes, very good at it, and he put life into it.

Q: He had leadership qualities?

B: Yes, outstanding.

Q: How about Andrews - did he have leadership qualities?

B: Well, I don't think he had - well, he must have had some because he got up pretty high rank, but I don't think he had the equivalent of Happy Arnold's.

Q: Arnold used to explode a lot. Did he cool off pretty quick?

B: Yes, sure.

Q: Was he a forgiving man, or did he harbor grudges?

B: I don't think he harbored grudges, I think you would have liked him. I did. I liked him and respected him.

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Q: In recollection of social occasions with the Arnolds.

B: Here's a funny thing that happened. We were invited to a cocktail party which the Arnolds were giving, and they lived on that street just north of Chevy Chase Club.

Q: Was that Hampden Lane?

B: It wasn't that, but something like that, right across the street from Chevy Chase Club. So my wife and I went to this party, and we went through the receiving line, and the faces were all strange to me. I finally discovered that we were in the wrong house. That's the last time I went to a party with him. But I did see Mrs. Arnold since. Five or six years ago, I went to California, and I knew that Happy bought a ranch up in Sonoma. I was out there with my niece, we had a car, and I told her the one thing I wanted to do was go to Sonoma and call on Mrs. Hap Arnold. We did, and we had a nice time. They had a very nice ranch, I spent a very nice half hour with her.

Q: When I write to her I'll mention that I saw you.

B: Tell her that. I like her.

Q: What kind of family were the Arnolds?

B: What I saw of them...

Q: Their girl, they had Lois.

B: I don't believe I saw her. I saw one of his sons. I think that son married a Douglas.

Q: Yes, that's the middle son, Bruce.

B: That's pretty well accepted by most people.

Q: That Arnold is one of the heroes?

B: I think so. Well, he was in the not quite so high as Gen Marshall, but I think he was one of the heroes of America. He had a great deal to do

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with building up our airpower, and starting it to fight.

Q: Do you think anybody else could have done that job as well, like Emmons or Andrews?

B: Of course, that's a matter of opinion. I think Happy did a very fine job. As to whether those people could have done it better, I don't know. I don't think so.

Q: Do you have any correspondence with Arnold? Did you save any correspondence with him? Did you write letters to each other?

B: No, no. When I was tied in with Gen Arnold, I was on duty down in the Munitions Building, and the Air Corps had its Hqs. there in the Munitions Bldg. Mr. Johnson was in close contact with the Air Corps, so I was daily in touch with Air Corps people.

Q: After Johnson got fired from that job, the President sent him to India.

B: Quite a while afterwards.

Q: Was that to get rid of him?

B: I can't tell because I wasn't in that group then.

Q: He was politically potent. He was American Legion Commander and there was a lot of votes there. So I guess they had to treat them gently.

B: But he got it.

Q: Yes, he finally got to be Secy of War, it was 10 years later, and he didn't last long in that job.

B: No.

Q: Then the Korean war happened, he was gone. Remember, he said if the enemy attacks us at 4:00 o'clock, we will be ready at 5:00 o'clock. But he was talking about the Russians, not the North Koreans.

B: I'll tell you about Mr. Johnson. He was a very, very loyal friend to me.

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Very loyal friend.

Q: Did you like him?

B: I liked him, but I didn't always respect him. I thought that he was too ambitious.

Q: How about Arnold? I mean, did Arnold like him?

B: I can't answer that.

Q: Did you ever talk about him?

B: No.

Q: Did you ever talk shop with Arnold when you played golf?

B: Not at that time, I talked shop with Happy about problems but not about persons. We didn't get involved in personalities. But I rather doubt if he rated Mr. Johnson too high.

Q: Do you think there should have been a separate AF? Do you think it was a wise thing to have a separate AF?

B: Yes, I do.

Q: But as an evolutionary thing?

B: Yes, yes. It seems to be working all right now, doesn't it?

Q: Yes. Some people felt that Arnold didn't push too hard for it.

B: I don't know, I don't believe they can prove it. And if anybody said he pushed too hard, I can't prove that either.

Q: Willkie was supposed to come out for a separate AF in 1940. Remember that?

B: No.

Q: And a lot of fellows came out to back Willkie because of that.

Q: Did the War Dept General Staff give airpower a measure of equality, or did they keep it suppressed. This is like 1940-41?

B: I don't think they were sympathetic enough for a bigger air force at

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that time.

Q: This is the reason Arnold was pushing so hard?

B: That might be, I don't know.

Q: Some others felt he didn't push hard enough.

B: That's certainly true to human nature, isn't it.

Q: Steve Ferson...you saw him die?

B: I saw him die.

Q: Where?

B: In Arnold's office. Mr. Lovett was there. We were all sitting around talking about something, and all of a sudden he got up on his feet, and in a strange way, and his face turned red....

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Cabell, Charles P. 30 Jul 69

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1405 Red Oak Drive
Silver Spring, Md. 20910
August 17, 1969

General Charles P. Cabell, USAF (Ret)
2506 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, Va.

Dear General Cabell:

I wanted to thank you again for the time you took to give Jack Loosbrock and me some of your incomparable experience, to say nothing of an excellent lunch at the Army-Navy Club, during that pleasant day when we reminisced about General Arnold. I have just received a rough draft of the transcript as it came off the tape. Reading through it confirms the initial impression that it was the most lucrative interview from our standpoint of the half dozen or so that we've conducted to date.

I've "cleaned it up" somewhat without, I hope, changing any of the substantive meaning you wished to convey. We shall have a clean transcript in a week or two. When it is ready, we would be glad to send you a copy of it, if you desire.

A new, but related subject....I've spoken to General John Patton, Gen. Dan Dyer and a few other senior members of our AFNIN Reserve Intelligence group about our most successful interview with you. Loosbrock, in fact, commented upon your having corrected me on BOLERO and "Big Week" as to dates. I've checked back on the records and they reveal that your recollection was precisely accurate.

Anyway, Patton and Dyer asked me to invite you to be our honored speaker at this year's Christmas banquet which will probably be held on Wednesday evening, December 17th, either at the Bolling or Andrews Club. As you knew, this is our stellar event of the year. Predecessor speakers within the past five years have included Under Secretary Norman Paul, Assistant Secretary of State Covey Oliver, Dr. Henry Rowen of RAND, General Tommy White and a long list of distinguished citizens over the past 20 years.

As your presentation topic, it could be one entirely of your own discretion. Inasmuch as your experience includes tours in the top policy making councils during World War II in the operational and intelligence areas, plus the fact that you are now doing consulting for NASA, looking to the future, I feel like a sailor in the harem when confronted with a choice of topics that might be of interest to our group. Offhand, I would say that your fields of expertise of interest to us are practically boundless. So we would leave that up to you with a suggestion of a random 30 to 45 minute random sampling of your own choosing.

As I may have mentioned when we met, I am leaving for Florida this coming Thursday to interview Gen. Hugh Knerr, Paul Tibbetts and Harold Bowman. I had hoped t

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hoped to see General Stratemeyer, but, as you perhaps saw in the paper the other day, he passed away.

May I phone you sometime Wednesday, perhaps in the afternoon, as I know you play golf in the AM. On behalf of our AFNIN group I am hopeful of a favorable response on the Christmas banquet.

Incidentally, I announced at our AFNIN planning group meeting that you were writing your own memoirs. Needless to state, their completion will be looked for with uncommon interest around these parts.

Very sincerely,

Murray Green

P.S. I should say something about this Brookings stationery, if I didnt mention it before. I'm on a Brookings Fellowship to complete the Arnold research. It will last until October 1st which accounts for my present haste to complete my interview schedule.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 28, 1970

Gen Charles P. Cabell, USAF(Ret)
2506 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Cabell:

They advertise that getting there is half the fun. I would say that getting to Colorado Springs was at least half the fun of participating in the Symposium because I especially relished those candid hours we spent talking about General Arnold and several other subjects.

I mentioned to Col Tom Mostain your interesting experiences in connection with the Powers-Abel exchange and your association with the Bay of Pigs Planning. I also suggested sometime convenient for you it would make a marvelous presentation for our Intelligence Reserve Group. I have in mind some Wednesday night, perhaps in the early Spring. There is no need to respond to this as I will see you at our Christmas banquet on December 9th.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN

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Retired 1/31/62

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF

PART I

Charles Pearre Cabell was born in Dallas, Texas, October 11, 1903. He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy June 12, 1925, and commissioned a second lieutenant of Field Artillery.

For five years following his graduation from the Academy, Lieutenant Cabell served with the 12th Field Artillery at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He then was assigned to the Air Corps Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas, from which he was graduated in February 1931 when he went to Kelly Field, Texas. He completed the observation course at the Air Corps Advanced Flying School in June 1931, and remained at Kelly Field as a flying instructor. He was transferred to the Air Corps July 11, 1931.

Lt. Cabell joined the Seventh Observation Squadron at France Field, Panama Canal Zone, as Adjutant in October 1931. He subsequently served as Commanding Officer of the 44th Observation Squadron, the 24th Pursuit Squadron, and the 74th Pursuit Squadron, successively, at Albrook Field, C.Z.

In September 1934 he became a flying instructor at the Air Corps Primary Flying School at Randolph Field, Texas. Captain Cabell later served as Post Adjutant and in September 1938 entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, from which he graduated in June 1939. In August 1939 he was detailed to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from which he was graduated in February 1940.

The following June Major Cabell went to Wright Field, Ohio, where he was assigned to the Photographic Laboratory in the Experimental Engineering Division. After a period as an observer with the R.A.F. in the United Kingdom, he was transferred to Washington, D. C., in April 1941 for duty in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, as Chief of the Photo Unit. In February 1942 Lt. Colonel Cabell was made Assistant Executive for Technical Planning and Coordination. The following month he became Chief of the Advisory Council to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. From June to October 1943 Colonel Cabell attended the first course at the Army and Navy Staff College.

He was assigned to the Eighth Air Force in the European Theater in October 1943 and on December 1, 1943, assumed command of the 45th Combat Bombardment Wing. In April 1944 Brigadier General Cabell became Director of Plans for the U. S. Strategic Air Force in Europe, and three months later was made Director of Operations and Intelligence for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces with headquarters at Caserta, Italy.

In May 1945, General Cabell was assigned to Air Force Headquarters, where he became Chief of the Strategy and Policy Division in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans. In December 1945 he was assigned with the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, and after attending the London Conference, remained on duty with the United Nations in New York, as Deputy and later as U. S. Air Force Representative on the Military Staff Committee.

General Cabell was assigned to Air Force Headquarters in August 1947 as Special Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, and the following two months served as Acting Deputy to the Director (Designate) of the Joint Staff. In November 1947 Major General Cabell became Chief of the Air Intelligence Requirements Division in the Office of the Director of Intelligence. On May 15, 1948, he was appointed Director of Intelligence of the U. S. Air Force.

On November 1, 1951, General Cabell was named Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lt. General Cabell was sworn in as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on April 23, 1953.

General Cabell has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster. He also has been made an Honorary Commander of the British Empire, a Chevalier in the French Legion of Honor, a wearer of the French Croix de Guerre, and a member of the Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus of Italy.

He is a rated technical observer, and command pilot.

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PART II - Personalized Material

A. Interests

Enjoys spectator sports, plays golf, fond of fishing, swimming, and horseback riding. Is an avid reader and enjoys good classical music. Has the habit of taking a morning constitutional.

B. Opinions, Tastes and Evaluations

1. Enjoys Mexican cooking, particularly a good bowl of chili; partial to beef and fresh lemon pie.

2. Likes Western stories and good music. Tells a good story and has a sense of humor. Enjoys travelling, prefers warm climate areas.

3. Is a firm believer in General Arnold's philosophy that there is no such thing as "can't be done".

4. Stresses intellectual integrity; loyalty and sincerity of relationships; precision and decisiveness; and frowns on premature judgment, shortcuts, cure-alls, talkativeness and bombasticity.

5. Penetrating in his evaluations of people and tasks. Has tremendous energy with ability to contain pressure. Is frank and direct, exercising integrity and fairness in all decisions.

6. His colleagues and associates have stated that, "when working with General Cabell, personal integrity, leadership, and patience abound. The General is always fair and open-minded, and inconsideration is unknown to his behavior".

PART III - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Date and place of birth: 11 October 1903, Dallas, Texas
2. Parents: Ben E. and Sarah Earle Pearre Cabell
3. Date of marriage: 18 September 1934
4. Wife: Jacklyn deHymel Cabell
5. Children: Lt. C. P. Cabell, Jr., USAF (12 July 1936)
   Catharine DeWitt Cabell (27 Oct 1938)
   Ben deHymel Cabell (5 Oct 1940)
6. Hometown address: 4017 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas

B. Education - Civilian and Military

Civilian - Dallas, Texas, and San Diego, California
High Schools - 1921

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Military - USMA, West Point, N. Y. - 1925
Air Corps Primary & Advanced Flying Schools - 1930-31
AC TACT School - 1939
C&GS, Regular - 1940
Army-Navy Staff College, Regular - 1943

C. Service

1. June 1925 - June 1930-Various Company Duties at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas

2. July 1930 - June 1931-Stu, AC Prim & Adv Flying Schools, Brooks and Kelly Fields, Texas

3. July 1931 - Sept 1931-Flying Instructor, Obsn Sec, ACAFS Kelly Field, Texas

4. Oct 1931 - Sept 1934-Various Duties, France Field and Albrook Field, Canal Zone

5. Sept 1934 - Sept 1938-Various Duties, Randolph Field, Texas

6. Sept 1938 - Sept 1939-Stu, AC Tact School, Asst Post Adj, Maxwell Field, Alabama

7. Sept 1939 - Feb 1940-Stu, C&GS School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

8. Feb 1940 - May 1940-Air Liaison Office, Hq IV Corps, Ft. Benning, Ga. and Sabine Area, La.

9. July 1940 - Apr 1941-Exp Engineering Section, Photo Lab., later Tech Data Section, Wright Field, Ohio

10. April 1941 - Nov 1941-Operations Section, Tng & Opns Division, OCAC, Washington, D.C.

11. Nov 1941 - Feb 1942-Photo Unit, Svc Section, Opns Division and later Tech Coord Branch, Tech Plng & Coord, OCAC, Wash., D.C.

12. Feb 1942 - Oct 1943-Chief, Gen Arnold's Advisory Council, Hq AAF, Washington, D.C.

13. Oct 1943 - Feb 1944-CG, 45th Bomb Wg, 8th AF, European Theater Operation

14. Mar 1944 - July 1944-Director of Plans, Hq USSTAF, European Theater Operation

15. July 1944 - May 1945-Director of Operations & Intelligence, Hq, MAAF, Mediterranean Theater Operation

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16. June 1945 - May 1946-Chief, Strategy & Policy Division, OAC/AS-5, Hq AAF, Washington, D.C.

17. May 1946 - Sept 1947-Mor, Mil Staf Com UN, OJCS w/sta at Ft Totten, N.Y, Washington, D.C.

18. Sept 1947 - Nov 1947-Sp Asst to Dir, Plans & Operations, DCS/O, Off of Dir of Plans & Operations, Hq USAF, Washington, D.C.

19. Nov 1947 - May 1948-Chief, Air Intel Reqmts Div, DCS/O, Off of Dir of Intel, Hq, USAF, Washington, D.C.

20. May 1948 - Oct 1951-Dir of Intel, Directorate of Intel, DCS/O, Hq USAF, Washington, D.C.

21. Nov 1951 - July 1952-Dir, Jt Stf, Cen Con Gp, OJCS, Hq USAF, Washington, D.C.

22. July 1952 - Apr 1953-Dir, The Jt Stf, JCS, Washington, D.C.

23. April 1953 to date - Dep Dir of Cen Intel, CIA, Washington, D.C.

Rated -- Command Pilot, Technical Observer

D. Decorations and Medals

Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal
Air Medal w/1 Oak Leaf Cluster
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
National Defense Service Medal

Foreign Awards

Order of the British Empire (Honorary Commander)
National Order of the Legion of Honor, Degree of Chevalier (France)
Crois De Guerre with Palm (France)
Commander, Order SS Maurice and Lazarus (Italy)

E. Promotions

Grade	Temporary	Permanent
2d Lt	12 June 1925	
1st Lt		1 Nov 1930
Captain		21 Aug 1935
Major	25 June 1940	12 Jun 1942
Lt Colonel	24 Dec 1941	
Colonel	27 Apr 1942	

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Grade	Temporary	Permanent
Brig General	26 Feb 1944	
Major General		27 Jan 1950
Lt General	5 Jul 1952	
General	11 Jul 1958	

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copy in Carl

2506 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202
September 29, 1969

Dr. Murray Green
Department of the Air Force, SAFAAR
The Pentagon, 4C 881
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Murray:

I have just returned from a trip and found your letter of 17 September 1969.

I'm glad you wrote because evidently I gave several erroneous impressions. First, Admiral Ghormley's position cannot properly be described as "Dog-in-the-Manger." He was faced with the reality of having both warships and supply ships sunk in Guadalcanal waters. It was a costly operation, and perhaps too costly, to send any ship there for any purpose.

Secondly, in my verbal description I did not intend to convey the thought that he had in fact already made the firm decision to stop all shipping. At this distance in time I cannot be certain whether at the time of our visit the decision had been made or just was about to be made. In any event, because of being in the throes of making the decision, the dispatch of the Americal Division had been held off by Ghormley. Arnold's report influenced the later action to proceed with the relief.

Thirdly, whereas I can sympathize with Ghormley's reluctance to accept the expected, continuing shipping losses and the most soul-tearing decision involved, it was wrong to block the reinforcement, relief or adequate resupply of the Marines. Worse than that is my severe criticism that he apparently did nothing to exonerate the Army of popular charges that they were running out on the Marines.

Reference your question concerning Admiral Nimitz, he was not involved. Ghormley was C.-in-C. South Pacific, and independent of Nimitz, C.-in-C. Central Pacific. (MacArthur was C.-in-C. Southwest Pacific.) These were coequal commanders.

I hope that I have made it plain that Ghormley did not have a policy as such of keeping out the Army. It was simply that as the responsible Theater Commander he saw his resources: warships, supply ships and transports (perhaps loaded with soldiers) being destroyed.

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The alternative of having the Marines die on the vine was perhaps less of a risk in his eyes; support by air transport might just be sufficient.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

C. P. Cabell

C. P. Cabell
General, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)

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I

MAJOR ASSIGNMENTS (Active Duty)

TITLE	DATES	RANK
Student) United States Military Academy, ~~West Point~~	1921 - 1925	CADET
12th Field Artillery, Ft Sam Houston	1925 1930	2nd LT.
Student) Pilot ~~Flying~~ School ~~Training~~, Brooks & Kelly Fields	1930 1931	1st LT.
7th Observation Sqdn., France Field, Canal Zone	1931 1934	1st LT.
Flying Instructor, Randolph Field	1934 1938	Capt.
Student Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field	1938 1939	Capt.
Student Command & General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth	1939 1940	Capt.
Experimental Engineering & Photo Laboratory, Wright Field	1940 1940	Major
Hq AAC Observer in United Kingdom	1940 1941	Major
Office, Chief of Army Air Corps	1941 1942	Lt. Col.
General Arnold's "Advisory Council"	Feb 42 May 43	Colonel
Student, Army and Navy Staff College (later NWC)	May 43 Oct 43	Colonel
C.O. 45th Bomb Wing, 8th Air Force, ETO	Oct 43 MAR 44	B/Gen
Director of Plans, Hq. USSTAF, ETO	Mar 44 Jul 44	B/Gen
Director of Operations & Intelligence, Hq Med. Allied AF, MTO	Jun 45 Dec 45	B/Gen
USAF Representative, military Staff Committee, US Delegation to UN	Dec 45 Sept 47	B/Gen
Special Assistant to Director, P&O, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	Sept 47 - Nov 47	B/Gen
Chief, Air Intelligence Requirements Division; Deputy and later Director of Intelligence, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	Nov 47 Oct 51	M/Gen
Director, Joint Staff, OJCS	Nov 51 Apr 53	L/Gen
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency	Apr 53 - Jan 62	GENERAL

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GENERAL CABELL

The contribution of Charles Pearre Cabell to the national defense and the security of the United States over the past ~~four~~ three decades has been equaled by few living Americans. During a normal developmental period of 15 years up to 1940, following his graduation from West Point in June 1925, Lt Cabell served one tour with the Field Artillery before he was accepted for flight training in 1930. Upon completion of flight training, he served tours in the Panama Canal Zone and as a flying instructor at Randolph Field. He also graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field in 1939 and the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth in 1940.

As the invasion of Western Europe climaxed hostilities in the spring and summer of 1940, Major Cabell, then on assignment to the Experimental Engineering Division, Photographic Laboratory at Wright Field, was sent to the United Kingdom in August 1940 to observe RAF reconnaissance techniques and hardware. His observations caught the eye of General "Hap" Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces and he was brought into the Office of the Chief of Air Corps in mid-1941. In the post-Pearl Harbor crisis environment of Washington, Gen Arnold selected Lt Colonel Cabell in February 1942 to head his "Advisory Council", the other member being Major Lauris Norstad. Gen Arnold gave his two young counselors "carte blanche" to "do my thinking for me", and Cabell found himself immersed in the principal planning emergencies confronting the Army Air Forces buildup. In the dark days of defeat and disillusion following the twin disasters in Hawaii and the Philippines, the Army Air Forces had emerged as the sole American military force which was likely to strike a blow for America in support of the Allied cause within the months ahead to slow down the Nazi juggernaut.

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In part based on the rationale provided by his "Advisory Council", General Arnold began a campaign of intensive advocacy of a strategy which became known as BOLERO, involving a massive buildup of U.S. strategic bombing capability in the United Kingdom. Since any cross-Channel ~~invasion~~ counterattack in 1942 (and as it turned out, in 1943, as well) would have been suicidal, General Arnold's staff ~~and his advisors~~ devised a Combined Bomber Offensive involving a systematic destruction of the German military and industrial capacity to wage war.

This ~~buildup~~ strategy to implement it was not achieved without a continual struggle at the staff and policy levels in Washington among competing requirements for the output of our "Arsenal of Democracy", which in 1942 was still ~~several~~ years removed from full-tide production. Heavy pressure was being exerted in favor of other demands which would have diverted production from A-1-A priority on four-engine bombers.

However, General Arnold persevered with General Marshall and President Roosevelt and won acceptance ~~in favor~~ of the BOLERO strategy. Much of the logic and persuasion which was brought to bear in support of that strategy originated in the fertile brain of Colonel Cabell. To single out one effort in a year-long campaign, he presented an incisive, closely reasoned paper on the Combined Bomber Offensive in March-April 1943 in support of the initial breakthrough won by General Ira C. Eaker with Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Casablanca Conference. Colonel Cabell's arguments found ~~won acceptance~~ reluctant, at first, then enthusiastic support at the highest governmental levels, and established the precise planning and targeting basis for the round-the-clock bombing

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President Roosevelt ~~in favor~~ of the BOLERO strategy. Much of the logic and persuasion which was brought to bear in support of that strategy originated in the fertile brain of Colonel Cabell. To single out one effort in a year-long campaign, he presented an incisive, closely reasoned paper on the Combined Bomber Offensive in March-April 1943 in support of the initial breakthrough won by General Ira C. Eaker with Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. Colonel Cabell's arguments ~~won acceptance~~ gained ~~[illegible]~~ at the highest governmental levels, and established the precise planning and targeting basis for the round-the-clock bombing which, by June 6, 1944, had virtually shot the Luftwaffe out of the skies or grounded it for lack of logistic support.

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When General Eisenhower told the embarking Allied troops on D-Day: "If you see any planes they will be ours," he was paying tribute to the vision and foresight and achievement of the men whose advocacy and formulation and consummation of the Combined Bomber Offensive had made it possible for the cross-Channel expedition to succeed, and for the war in Europe to be won with casualty rates substantially below anticipated planning projections.

General Cabell won his spurs both as a planner and achiever. However, once the CBO gained official acceptance, Colonel Cabell had held General Arnold to a promise for his release to an overseas combat assignment, although not before Colonel Cabell's orders were countermanded by General Arnold reversed at the very last moment to enable him to attend the first course given at the Army and Navy War College between May and October 1943.

Gen Arnold had correctly seen this professional institution as the forerunner of a National War College, a foundation stone for real equality for air power and interservice cooperation unification in the post-war period, which would provide a proper setting for joint training of Army, Navy and Air Force officers. General Arnold had won General Marshall and Adm King over to accepting the concept of a joint service professional school, and General Arnold also wanted the judgment of one he fully trusted as to whether the curriculum and organizational set up of the Army and Navy Staff College conformed to his long range idea.

Colonel Cabell's strongly affirmative report to General Arnold has reflected a keen interest which has been carried forward for the past quarter of a century. General Cabell is today, and has served for the past 23 (twenty-three) years, as a member of the National

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In October 1943, as the emphasis of the Air war campaign in Europe moved decisively from a planning to an operational stage, General Cabell assumed command of the 45th Combat Wing (3 combat groups), and was a key figure in the strategic bombing campaign climaxed by the famous "Big Week" in late February 1944. Nearly 4,000 bomber sorties in six days softened Germany up for the June landing at Normandy. In April 1944 he became Director of Plans of the Strategic Air Forces in Europe and played probably the most vital part in establishing the rationale for the pinpointed targeting of German synthetic oil and aircraft factories during the ten crucial weeks before D-Day which virtually stripped the defenders of "Festung Europa" of air support during the crucial period of beachhead lodgment, 6-9 June 1944.

After the Normandy invasion was safely assured, General Cabell in July 1944 became Director of Operations and Intelligence in the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. He was an architect of the final air support plan successful for the invasion of Southern France and the Italian campaigns for the remainder of the European war.

After V-E Day, General Cabell returned to the US to become Chief of the Strategy and Policy Division in Air Force Plans, and after V-J Day, he was assigned to duty at Lake Success, New York to help implement Article 45 of the United Nations Charter. This crucial article in the Charter would have placed international military forces at the disposal of the United Nations, and thereby give ing some enforceable meaning to its deliberations. General Cabell served as the US Air Force representative

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deliberations. General Cabell served as the US Air Force representative
to the Military Staff Committee of ~~the~~ our United Nations delegation.

~~In August 1947, on the eve of unification of the military~~
~~services,~~ enactment of the National General Cabell was called back to Washington to help set
up the Intelligence ~~in~~ the new Department of the Air Force, and he

In July 1947, President Truman signed
the National Security Act, ~~[illegible]~~ in
August

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served for 3½ years between May 1948 and November 1951 as Director of Intelligence, US Air Force.

General Cabell's services were enlisted at still a higher level, on a defense wide basis in November 1951, when he was named Director of the Joint Staff, in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For 18 months, his principal efforts were concerned with the military problems of the Korean conflict.

Still a higher calling reached out for him, in April 1953, he was sworn in as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and served in that capacity with the greatest distinction for nearly nine years. He retired from the Central Intelligence Agency and from active duty on Jan 31, 1962. His years of service during a succession to the National Security in that capacity of Cold War crises reflect sustained, brilliant and dedicated service. His nine year tour of duty with the Central Intelligence Agency at the highest policy-making level is unsurpassed in the history of that sensitive agency.

Since his official retirement in 1962, General Cabell has remained very active in the National Security field. He have served as a consultant to five major defense and space-oriented contractors, providing them with technical advice in the planning and execution of long range programs. He has interpreted military requirements to scientists and engineers, and has helped them keep abreast of tactical and strategic doctrine. He has specialized in the areas

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GEN. CHARLES P. CABELL (USAF RET)

SOURCE OF INFOR: Stmts of employment filed with Accounting & Finance Center, Denver (Miss Putman, 8-553-1510 Ext. 6243)

18 Feb. 1962 — not employed

April 1962 — Bissett-Berman Corp
Santa Monica, Calif.

Part-time Consultant - provided technical guidance and consultant services covering the general field of information requirements, techniques and procedures of interest to the Bissett-Berman Corp.

7 May 1962 — Sperry Gyroscope Co.
Great Neck, N. Y.

Performed services as technical consultant in connection with programs relating to U.S. intelligence and disarmament and relations with NATO and the European Common Market.

24 July 1962 — Hughes Aircraft Co.
El Segundo, Calif.

Job as member of group of consultants to advise and counsel management in planning and execution of programs,, interpret military requirements to scientists and engineers of the counpany, keep abreast of tactical and strategic doctrines, visit test centers, ranges and commands, and observe performance of the company's weapons in defense organization's electronic products and components.

March 1963 — United Aircraft Corporate Systems Center
United Aircraft Corp.
Farmington, Conn.

Performed services as technical consultant on systems and sub-systems components and research and development, studies in the field of intelligence and reconnaissance, data processing and handling, command and control.

April 1965 — General Electric Co.
Space Technology Center
Phila., Pa.

Consultant in management and technology matters--systems and sub-systems, reentry space systems.

July 1, 1965 — NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Office of the Administrator

Recorded he started with NASA as a consultant "on organization and management."

NASA picked him up on yearly basis. Current contract runs into 1970.

Note: These records do not indicate any activity with Project Forecast

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CHARLES PEARRE CABELL, General, USAF 70A

BIRTH DATE: 11 October 1903

YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: Over 36 years as of January 1962

SCHOOLS ATTENDED AND DEGREES: USMA, BS; AC Primary & Advanced Flying School; AC Tactical School; Command & General Staff College; Army-Navy Staff College

AERONAUTICAL RATINGS: Command Pilot

MAJOR PERMANENT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS:	FROM	TO
Ch, Photo Unit, Opns Div, Off Ch of AC, Washington, D C	Nov 1941	Jan 1942
Ch, Tech Coord Br, Intell Div, Off Ch of AC, Washington, D C	Jan 1942	Mar 1942
Mbr, Gen Arnold's Advisory Council, Hq AAF, Washington, D C	Mar 1942	Oct 1943
Comdr, 45th Bomb Wg, 8th AF, ETO	Oct 1943	Feb 1944
Dir of Plans, Hq USSTAF, ETO	Mar 1944	Jul 1944
Dir of Opns & Intell, Hq MAAF, MTO	Jul 1944	May 1945
Ch, Strategy & Plcy Div, OAC/AS-5, Hq AAF, Washington, D C	Jun 1945	Dec 1945
USAF Representative on Mil Stf Committee, JCS for dy with United Nations, Washington, D C & Ft Totten, N Y	Dec 1945	Sep 1947
Sp Asst to Dir, Plans & Opns, DCS/O, Hq USAF, Washington, D C	Sep 1947	Nov 1947
Ch, Air Intell Reqmts Div, Dep & later Dir of Intell, DCS/O, Hq USAF, Washington, D C	Nov 1947	Oct 1951
Dir, The Jt Stf, Cen Con Gp, OJCS, Washington, D C	Nov 1951	Apr 1953
Dep Dir, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D C	Apr 1953	

PROMOTIONS:	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT
Second Lieutenant		12 Jun 25
First Lieutenant		8 Nov 30
Captain		26 Aug 35
Major	28 Jun 40	10 Jul 42
Lieutenant Colonel	5 Dec 41	
Colonel	27 Apr 42	
Brigadier General	9 Mar 44	19 Feb 48
Major General	19 Feb 48	27 Jan 50
Lieutenant General	5 Jul 52	
General	11 Jul 58	

MEDALS AND AWARDS:

Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Distinguished Flying Cross; Bronze Star Medal; Air Medal and one (1) Oak Leaf Cluster; American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal and six (6) Bronze Service Stars; World War II Victory Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Air Force Longevity Service Award with one (1) Silver Oak Leaf Cluster and two (2) Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters; Order of the British Empire (Honorary Commander); National Order of the Legion of Honor, Degree of Chevalier (France); Croix de Guerre with Palm (France); Commander, Order of Sts Maurice and Lazarus (Italy).

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INTERVIEW OF GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL
July 30, 1969

Q: Do you remember the first time you met Arnold?

C: Yes....

Q: And what were those circumstances? What was your impression?

C: It was very casual meeting when I went on a cross-country flight to March Field, the base commander, Maj Lohman, a former commanding officer of mine, took me in to meet LTCOL Arnold

Q: Lohman was his Exec at the time, wasn't he?

C: Exec or base commander,...it was about in 1934 or 35. It was...a casual meeting and my impressions were unimportant because it was just simply that of being quite impressed with this man who already had somewhat of a reputation. I remember my next meeting with him, though, which was much more important. That was in January 1941, when I was detailed to be an Observer with the Royal Air Force from the Photo Laboratory at Wright Field. I came through Washington to be briefed before going over, and I was taken in to be briefed by Arnold, among other people. And he was then...Chief of the Air Corps, or just been made Deputy Chief of Staff...for Air - in that transition period. He backed me up against the wall and shook his finger at me and charged me with all the ills, past sins of photography and reconnaissance. I was a neophyte really in the field. I had only been there in that job for a few months.

Q: Were you working with George Goddard?

C: I was Goddard's deputy at that point so I thought this guy was crazy - this guy Arnold. It wasn't a completely rational performance to me that I, a Major, would be backed up against the wall, fingers shook under my nose. He accused me of all these dire things. I thought the guy was really nuts.

Q: What was he unhappy about?

C: There was a lot wrong with photography, in other words, he didn't think it was properly structured or properly equipped, or the right doctrine for handling it was available in the Air Corps. That was one of the purposes of my going over to the UK - to see what the Royal Air Force had learned in photography during the war to date. Arnold had taken quite an interest in that subject himself. That ended my second session with him, and the next time I saw him, really, was when he called me in to give me a job with Larry Norstad.

Q: Adverting to his unhappiness with the photo situation, you may know that Goddard has produced a book. It is in manuscript form now....

C: Yes, I have read part of it. (NOTE: Cabell in 1941 was Deputy to Goddard)

Q: He said he went to England. Did you go with Goddard? Goddard went in late 1941, I believe...

C: He went later than that.

Q: Was it later than Pearl Harbor?

C: Yes, I'm quite sure it was after Pearl Harbor.

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Q: And he said that Arnold sort of rushed him out of his office.

Q: He said that Arnold did roughly the same thing to him that he did to you.

C: Goddard would have deserved it.

Q: It was part of his responsibility.

C: Yes, and I'm not saying that against Goddard, because I think he's the finest photographer the Air Forces ever developed - up to this time. As a matter of fact, I was sent in place of Goddard by the Chief's office here in Washington because of Goddard's known ideosyncrasies. They knew his great talent as a salesman. He was always selling, and they figured rightly that he went over there to observe the RAF, he would spend all of his time telling them what we had, and trying to sell them on our system, and wouldn't come back with a damn bit of information as to what they had.

Q: When you talk about a Colonel "Nemesis", is this Minton Kaye?

C: It is Minton Kaye. That could be a long subject itself.

Q: Well, the only thing is, we were interested in this subject, because in George Goddard's book - the Minton Kaye episode, Arnold just doesn't come out looking very well at all... propably read that

C: Well, I could amplify that.

Q: I think that would be useful because this is a kind of gray mark against Arnold

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Q: He doesn't explain why Arnold was unhappy.

Q: He doesn't explain why Kaye was unhappy with George Goddard.

C: All right. I think I can explain that. In the first place I believe that Kaye was a nephew by marriage of Arnold. There was a family tie. Also, Kaye was a long time photo officer. He was a specialist as a photo officer. And I think he was a photo officer at March Field at the same time that Col Arnold was stationed at March Field. Arnold knew him to be a specialist in photography. So, about the same time that I was sent to the UK to observe the Royal Air Force, with the Chief's office having the intent, that upon completion of that duty, for me to come into the Chief's office, and to try to put into effect the lessons that I would have learned in the UK. That stirred Arnold's deeper interest in photography and he immediately thought of his friend, relative Minton Kaye, a photo officer, and called him in. Arnold told Kaye that he wanted him to come into Washington and straighten out photography, those were about the terms that I think he used. So when I got back from observing the UK in late March 1941, and came up to the Chief's office about the 1st of April, Minton Kaye arrived about the same time or just days before, I believe. He had a mandate from the big boss... Arnold, who was above Brett, the Chief of Air Corps at that time, to straighten out photography and to "let me know if you have any trouble." Kaye had complete, easy access to Arnold and he had a blank check. On the other hand, I was brought in by...Gen Brett, who was absent when I got there, Davenport Johnson was head of

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the...Operations Training Division, where I was assigned, and Col Steve Ferson was head of the Operations Section or Branch.... So we were in channels, I was in channels, let's say. I was under instruction to coordinate photography. Well, I found that damn few people want to be coordinated - quite early I learned that. And also, I found that Kaye was operating quite handsomely. His ideas and mine were a complete opposite ends of the pole. He was...most interested in mapping photography. Whereas, I came back from the UK with the lessons that I had learned. I saw battle-type photography, that is reconnaissance - for ground battles and for air battles - as the more important of the classes of photography. And that's where we were the most woefully lacking. Kaye had not any concept of battle photography at all. This is no reflection on him but he...had come up through the conventional photo route, and the active element of photography in those days was working with the Corps of Engineers in making maps. So, everything that I was trying to do which was leaning towards reconnaissance, Kaye would undo, leaning toward mapping photography. And, I was completely frustrated, and in addition to that, I was not getting any sort of backing from my boss, Col Ferson.Every time that I could come to him and make a report, he wanted to know if I was having any difficulties. I would say: "Yes, such is..." And he would say: "Back off from that." Or if sometimes I said: "I need your help in going to such and such," he would say: "No, no, no, justdrop it." Here was a man who was literally scared to death of seniors. He had stars in his eyes

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so bad, that he didn't want to in anyway cross anyone who could conceivably affect his promotion which he wanted so badly. Other than that, he was a most able officer and a fine officer, that's Col Ferson. I might digress a moment, when I say scared to death of rank, this related to Arnold. Some months later, when I was working for Arnold, I came into Arnold's outer office on a Sunday morning, just as they were carrying out the body of Col Ferson, who had been standing in front of Arnold's desk, and Arnold was shaking his finger, you know, and literally scared Ferson to death. He dropped dead of a heart attack right in front of him - which was a terrible experience for General Arnold.

Q: This seems pertinent. How does it tie in with the Goddard-Kaye situation?

C: Well, I was trying to coordinate the photography set up, and all this time, Goddard was tearing his hair too, because... Goddard didn't like what Kaye was trying to do either. Kaye was throwing his weight around and throwing Arnold's weight around to beat the band, and it did not make for a happy situation. Me trying to coordinate people who didn't want to be coordinated. As a result, a lot of people in the Chief's office, and various places around Washington got a bellyful of us photographers because they were being approached from two different angles. Well, a few months later, the Army Air Forces were being organized along with the Army Ground Forces and Army Services Force, and reorganization of the HQs, or the establishment of the Army Air Forces, it was decided that there would be a Director of Photography, among other Directors.

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Q: This was after Pearl Harbor? March 1942?

C: Yes, right after Pearl Harbor. So, everyone assumed, including myself, that Kaye would be that Director of Photography because he had been pounding the table for a Director of Photography in the Chief's office. On the other hand, I had said there was no need for a Director of Photography. All there needs to be is one having coordinating authority, but not directing authority. So that was one of the clashes that Kaye and I had. I assumed that this, as everyone else did, that come the establishment of the office, Kaye would be the incumbent, and I was delighted to have that prospect, but before that could come about was when I would go to Arnold's office.

Q: When you got out of the photography business....you and Norstad became the first "twins," so called.

C: Well, I might just go into the business of that. Larry Norstad and I found ourselves waiting together in Arnold's outer office one morning. We had each been told to report in at 0900 that morning. This was in the early part of February 1942, after Pearl Harbor. And we began to put our heads together, and wondered why the two of us had a joint appointment with Arnold. The only thing that we could find as a common denominator, was that each of us had been observers with the RAF...and it must have something to do with the UK. It turned out that that was not the case, but that we had both been nominated to Arnold for this job that Arnold had in mind by General Miff Harmon who had known both of us through out observership in the UK.

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Q: He was just leaving as Chief of Air Staff?

C: Pretty soon. Very shortly after that. So that when we two went into Arnold's office, he told us about the upcoming reorganization of the Army into Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces. He says, now here is the organization chart for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces Office, and he showed us his box, "Commanding General," and the other various boxes...and he pointed to a little box stemming from his, which said "Advisory Council." He siad: "That's you." And he said, I don't have a very clear idea as to what the office should do, but I and the framers of the organization, feel that there is a need for a small office to work directly under me, not beholden to the rest of the Air Staff, to do the things that I want them to do. I know that I want you to do my "blue-sky thinking." Because I just don't have time to reflect and do the thinking that ought to be done. I need somebody to do that. He said: "Ill do the operating, and if I ever catch you two boys operating, I'll skin you alive. No operating, just be thinkers. Now as to the size of your office, I don't have any ideas, except that it should be relatively small, but you decide how big it should be." Arnold also said: "Whatever you are doing, drop it. You are working for me. And you go back to your own office, and you decide how you are going to organize your own office. But remember now, you are working for me and you're not to operate." That ended our conversation with him.

Q: What was the first big job he gave you?

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C: I guess the first job he gave us that I would call a big job was to prepare a letter to Gen Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, proposing that the mass of the pilots in the Army Air Forces be Enlisted and not Officers. He went through his reasoning for this, and then he said: "I want you to prepare the letter to Gen Marshall on it." So, the two of us went back to our office. Just to back up a bit, Larry and I adopted the practice of habitually going to him together, and that's why we got the name of the "twins." Because we felt that it was important that when Arnold had a job for us to do, that we got all the nuances of it at one time and we didn't have to go back and say: "What did you really mean?" We would get off that by two of us working at him from both directions. We decided that it was a pretty good idea to do our research the same way, so that we could get all the nuances out of the people we were asking judgments and information. We wouldn't have to go back to them so that's why we became known as the "twins." Also, although I was the senior - I believe I was a LTCOL and he was a Major at this point - I made it clear to Larry that we were not going to operate as Junior or Senior. We had to operate as a team. Whenever responsibility had to be taken, I would take it. But that we would try to operate as two members of a team rather than as junior and senior. That's the practice we adopted and followed throughout this time. Larry and I went back to the office and began our research into this problem. We came to the conclusion that Arnold had been sold a bill of goods. He would have been worked on over the months, and maybe over the years, by the

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Ground people that shouldn't be this mass of officers. They agreed that there should be some officer-leaders, pilot-leaders, but not every pilot had to be a leader, and therefore and officer. It was damned expensive. They had got through to him, finally, and he had agreed. But the more we looked into it, the more we thought Arnold was wrong. But nevertheless, we went ahead and drafted the letter, after this dealy of getting a lot of conversation. Larry laid the two-page letter on his desk. He read it, and every once in a while nodded his head. Clearly we had gotten through to him. We had picked up the ball, and used expressions that he wanted to use. He got to the end, and reached over to his pen to sign the letter.And then I said: "General, before you sign that, would you mind looking over this alternate draft. He said: "What the hell do you mean - alternate draft?" He said: "This is just what I want!" I said: "Yes sir, but we have another letter here that we'd appreciate you having a look at before you sign. We didn't begin to tell him what was in the alternate or even hint that it was an opposite type of conclusion. So, very grumpily he started reading that alternate draft and, as he read a few paragraphs, it became quite clear that it was going to end up the opposite recommendation. Well he was not to happy with it, but he read it through. He got up and left his desk, and went over to the window, and this was a frequent habit of his, to leave his desk and go to the window to reflect. After a while, he turned to us, and said: "Which one of these do you boys recommend I sign?" And one of us said: "General, we recommed that you sign

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the alternate letter." He said: "You boys are right, you know." And he went over and signed the alternate draft. That's how close we came to having enlisted pilots in the Army Air Forces. Also, I would say that the Advisory Council was made at that point. We proved to him: (1) That we could carry out orders. We did so by drafting the letter exactly the way he wanted it, in the terms that he wanted it, and the words that he liked to use. But we also showd him that we were not just "yes men," that we had ideas of our own, and we had powers of judgment, and we intended to express them to him.

Q: Did he bring you in on the problem of bombing Japan? Right after Pearl Harbor, the President was very must exercised about bombing Japan and he turned loose a lot of people, and he wanted some free ideas on how we could bomb Japan, i.e., getting bases in Siberia, getting bases in China, and out of all this cerebration came the Doolittle raid. Did you get involved in this?

C: Negative. We did not participate in the preparation for or the concept of the Doolittle raid - other than the General said to us one time, very cryptically. "Anything that Doolittle wants; help him get." Without telling us what Doolittle was doing, and we did not inquire. And we did not have occasion to do anything for the Doolittle raid.

Q: I seem to recall that Norstad was involved to some degree in discussing alternatives, like getting a base in China... in Siberia, could the Russians agree to US bases in Siberia?

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C: I'm sure that we did get involved in that, but my recollection is not good on it. Certainly, we did not go to the point of being able to make a recommendation, or of doing a great amount of research on it. Would have been reasonably casual.

Q: Do you remember Merian Cooper? He was involved in a survey of possible bases in Siberia. Of course, this thing fell through.

C: Now later, we became involved, Larry and I did, with respect to getting support into China was not too long after this other instance that I told you about.... General Arnold told us that he had had many discussions with the President with respect to how the US was going to support Nationalist China on the mainland of China. So he wanted our office to make a study as to the most feasible way of getting support to China. We went to work, and it was awfully difficult to get much information in those days about China. I mean just plain geographical information, not political. The vast areas of Central Asia were really unknown. We got more information out of a National Geographic Society cartgographer by the name of Dr. Williams, than we did anybody else. We noticed his name as cartographer on one of their maps, and we called him in. He was a relative gold-mine, in that he had fairly recently traveled extensively to Tibet, and the Himalayas. And so he gave us a lot of help. After studying all the material that we could find, we found that there was just about three alternatives. One was a land route over what was called the Old Caravan route, which went to

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Siukiang Province, westward into Siberia into about Alma Ata in Turkestan. There were two other caravan routes. One that ran into Kashmir, and another into Ladakh. Those were traditional very meagenly traveled routes, very difficult. We came to the conclusion that those two southerly routes were not really feasible because of the terrain. We concluded that the Alma Ata route was long, and it would consume most of its tonnage in supplying and keeping itself open, plus the fact - and this was really the telling point to us - it was terminated in Russia and it would be at the mercy of the goodwill and the physical capabilities of the Russians to support it. And we felt that the Russians, in the final analysis, would use it as a blackmail. That they would allow something to trickle through when they were good and ready to, and at other times they would shut it off. So that didn't look like a good prospect to us. Now, the land routes into the Burma Road, at that time, was occupied. It didn't look feasible to us, within any planned period of time to have territory where you could build a parallel road, such as the Ledo road, which went in later. So we came to only one conclusion, and that was the air route. Although it would be expensive and it would be low in tonnage that we could get across, it could be done, and it would be under our control at the terminal end - "ours" being US and Britain. This was in the spring of 1942.

Q: Did Lauchlin Currie get on your tail? He used the White House influence to press for aid to China?

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C: I don't remember ever contacting Lauchlin Currie, but we could have because we contacted a lot of people for the purpose of getting information on the feasibility of these various routes.

Q: I was up in Hyde Park two or three months ago, and Lauchlin Currie seemed to be in every one of these projects. He was pushing - just like Hopkins was pushing for Russian aid all the time - Lauchlin Currie was pushing for aid to China and was pushing Arnold on it.

C: Well, it could have been. But Arnold didn't need the pushing, when Arnold came to us, he had already been pushed by somebody far enough so that he had made up his mind that we had a job to do, and the only question was not whether, but how? And so he put it up to us on that basis. We made our report to him that the recommended solution was the airlift over the Hump. He then called in T.V. Soong, Ambassador from China, who was a brother of Madam Chiang Kai-shek. Arnold had Larry and me present to Soong our findings as to the feasibility and our recommended solution. Soong agreed. He said: "I think you have come to the right conclusions." Arnold siad: "All right, now, in the meantime, I'll talk it over with the President. The President then approved that we were going to open this route. We are going to initially allocate about 50 C-46 type aircraft to the operation. Well, at this point, Soong literally cried. He said: "I didn't dream that you would find it feasible to get in any help in China. We have just about reached the end of our rope, physically and emotionally, and I'm really overcome.

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I'm particularly overcome by the fact that you are going to allocate us the 50 very scarse transport aircraft to this operation." He said: "I think its wonderful." So that's how the Hump operation began.

Q: It seems to me that later on in the war, they dropped that humility. Soong, and some of the other Chinese leaders - they demanded more planes, and they were irate that we were not sending more transports on that run.

C: Well, howwould you be if you were at the other end?

Q: No, I'm saying that this role of being very grateful quickly wore off and became very insistent....

C: Well, we had a commitment from then on, and we didn't produce those 50 aircraft right away. I mean, all of them. We had trouble with those we did produce, because the C-46 had growing pains. It had carburetor trouble and had prop troubles. It really needed four-engine aircraft for that route....

Q: Were you involved in any way in setting up the Alsib supply to Russia via Fairbanks, Alaska?

C: Practically none, so I really don't have anything to say about that. Although I think that we would have not disapproved...that because we were among those that felt that one of the ways to lick Germany was to help Russia.

Q: This next situation developed before you joined Arnold's staff, so you may not be familiar with it. There was a disclosure of RAINBOW FIVE by the Chicago Tribune three days before Pearl Harbor. Are you familiar with that?

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C: Not too familiar. But I remember it and it made me so damned mad that I called up the Washington Times Herald and told them they could take my subscription.... This was a treasonable act in my opinion. I had not been involved in that - I had not had any part, really, in the preparation of this plan which was really grown up in the Air War Planes Division.

Q: Did you see the article by Frank Waldrop in the Washington Post a couple of years ago? He was Managing Editor of the Times Herald at that time. And he published this article in the Washington Post which did everything except flat-out say that the source of that leak was Gen Arnold.

C: I did not see that.

Q: This is one we have been trying to really pin down.

C: It's hard for me to believe that.

Q: It's hard for us to believe that, because we couldn't, when you start looking at opportunity-plus-motive, it just doesn't add up to Arnold.

Q: We went out to see Waldrop and he told us personally, that he had been told it was Arnold.

Q: There was an investigation, presumably by the FBI, and we asked Gen Kuter about this last week, and he said: "I was told to forget about it; the problem was settled, and just to forget about it."

C: Well Kuter was involved in the preparation of that plan.

Q: There was an investigation which was promptly ended and everybody was told to forget it. This was before you were brought in.

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C: I was not in the Advisory Council then. We didn't go into the Advisory Council until early February 1942.

Q: Did you ever hear of who might have been the culprit. According to Senator Wheeler's biography, YANKEE FROM THE WEST, he says that an Army Air Forces Captain, turned a copy of the RAINBOW FIVE plan to him and he turned it over to Chesly Manly of the Chicago Tribune. Waldrop, who has written a sympathetic biography of Robert McCormick since then, wrote about Arnold being disgruntled because the Army General Staff did not give autonomy to the Air Corps.... He implied it was Arnold, and he has told us privately that it was Arnold....

C: I do not believe Arnold did it. I will not swear or insist that Arnold did not in some way leak some of it inadvertently. In other words, these people have to talk. They have to have conversations with others. It's awfully difficult to avoid leaking some hint in various conversations. But it is not in Arnold's character to have leaked this deliberately. When I say not in his character, I don't believe that he would have estimated at that point that it would be profitable to do it. It would have been in his character to do it had he concluded that it would be profitable. And when I say "profitable" - for the country's sake, or for the sake of the advancement of the Air Force or autonomy of the Air Force for again, the sake of the country, because he believed that autonomy of the Air Force was important to the good of the country. But I believe at this particular period he had a

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concept of not going all out for autonomy hell-bent. He had his reservations about the readiness of the Air Corps, then the Army Air Forces, for full autonomy. I think he looked back to see how many officers we had in the Air Corps, how many of those had good staff training, and whether or not, therefore, we could fulfill our responsibilities as we were given them on a silver platter. So I think what he had was the concept of a more gradual approach to autonomy, but a definite step-by-step, no backward step, and no standing still at all.

Q: If anybody leaked it, ...he wanted to turn the course of American strategy, Now RAINBOW FIVE, AWPD-1, called for an all-out strategy against Germany, and we hold on Japan.

C: Arnold wanted it that way...

Q: Arnold wanted it that way. So it doesn't add up. So it would have had to be a man who wanted a Pacific strategy, and it would have to be a man who had access to the plan. In other words, if you look for a man, you look for a motive...and access. Arnold didn't have a motive, because he wanted to go all-out in Europe and to hold in the Pacific.

C: The reason is proof that he wanted to go all out in Europe. That was one of the very early and important assignments that he gave to Larry and me was ....to prepare a letter to Marshall opposing the impending decision to go through North Africa. Arnold thought that going through North Africa was a diversion from the main effort which had to be made eventually against Germany on the continent of Europe, whether by air or by land, or a combination of air and land. But we were not

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going to lick Germany by peripheral actions in North Africa or any other damn place. It had to be zeroed in on Germany proper. Gerneral Arnold thought this North African operation was a delaying tactic on the part of the British, that they were getting cold feet about using UK as a vast air base, which would be, therefore, more subject to attack than it already was subject to attack. And so this was their cute way of getting out of the cross-channel invasion. Churchill had begun to talk about this soft underbelly stuff. And so, Arnold told us to write this letter to Marshall, who also was thinking in the same direction as Arnold was. Arnold wanted the letter in part to help give Marshall ammunition against the President and the British. Because the President was tending towards the North African operation. So we prepared this letter, and General Arnold signed it and sent it in to Marshall. I frankly think that we were wrong. We were wrong in the arguments that we advanced and we were not complete. We really prepared a selling document, and not a reall staff study that would show the opposing views and develop the opposing arguments so this could be a weighing job. We just marshalled all the "pro" arguments that we could give, and shot it in. Arnold liked it; this is what he wanted. But I think we were wrong in our concept. I think its a good thing if we did go through North Africa. I think we weren't ready to go into the continent of Europe, and I think that before we did go into the continent of Europe we would have come to that conclusion. And so, the eventual landing on the continent, or the eventual completion of the softening-up

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by air would have delayed the invasion of the continent. That would have been very disadvantageous. The Russians would have raised hell because we had not have established as promised the second land front. And the Germans wouldn't be expending resources that they couldn't afford to expend by the trans-Mediterranean supply line of theirs. We were able to get at their supply lines across the water and eat up resources.... But more than anything else, I think we weren't plan ready from the standpoint of training. We were short of landing craft, and all such sort of things. But mainly, we were short of training. Our troops, leadership was not ready to lead; our leadership did not have the experience in working with allies. It takes time to learn how to do that. New we learned how to do it in the less-than-big-league situation in North Africa than we could have been thrown into on the continent of Europe itself. That would have been a big league game without any preparation for it. So, I'm glad that we lost the argument to oppose the North African landing. Another argument that we had, for example, and this was a valid one, but didn't turn out. We pointed out how at Gibralter, which was the only staging base possible for allied fighters to cover any part of the landing, was such a small base. We warned that our fighters would practically be doubledecked on this tiny airfield at Gibralter, making both a dead giveaway to reconnaissance of what was going to come off, and making a very juicy target for German bombers to come in and work on. But the Germans, like they did so often in the war, just didn't have adequate

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reconnaissance to spot this and they didn't conduct any air operations to oppose it. But we never were willing to believe these ineptitudes, this stupidity of the German Air Force. So that's how the North African landing worked out, and as I say, I'm glad that Larry's advice and my advice was not taken.

Q: That letter was say around May?

C: About May or June 1942.

Q: On the subject of diversion in North Africa, we have a piece of White House stationery, which has Roosevelt's handwriting on it. The date of the meeting was March 16, 1942. FDR listed the priorities: No. 1 Pacific, No. 2 North Africa and No. 3 Europe, etc. In other words, he had moved the Pacific and North Africa ahead of Europe. Now, this is the President thinking at one stage of the game. One may guess that the Navy, perhaps Adm King, had gotten to FDR a short time before that.... Well, Arnold came back and wrote himself a Memo for the Record expressing his great concern with the President's thinking of changing the priorities around. Arnold was hopeful of selling the concepts of building up the Air to soften up Europe for the invasion which was first planned for the Spring of 1943. I was talking about the date March 16, 1942, you were probably just getting your teeth into problems.

C: We were with him a month. Teeth, hell. We were up in everything over our necks by this time. We didn't have a teething period.

Q: Do you remember anything in that early period when Arnold was expressing concern that the President was shifting the priorities to the Pacific?

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C: Yes, this was a continual worry and it never was settled, ever. It was always subject to change without notice, because we were dealing with a coalition, the coalition being the Army, the Army Air Forces and the British. All believed in the Europe-first concept. The Navy was independently Pacific first. And by virtue of it being a coalition, it had all the weaknesses of a coalition. Every time the Navy would see a little disagreement between several members of the coalition, or wavering on the enthusiasm for the coalition, they would charge in and try to take advantage of it and break up the group. Arnold was fearful that the argument to go into North Africa would be thrown against us. The Navy would say: "See, you don't want to go to Europe; you want to mess around with a peripheral show such as North Africa. If that's the way you guys are going to do, why don't you come to, the British, you can see/they don't want Europe first. They want a periphery first. So why don't you get wise and join us, the Navy, and let's go for the No. 1 enemy of ours, the Japanese." That was continually hanging over all of our heads, and so, the President was vacillating. He was really torn. His interests were both in Europe, his ties were in Europea ideologically. But his service ties were with the Navy, and so he was being pulled back and forth like a tug of war. It was never then settled.

Q: Before the Battle of Midway, I'm talking about May 1942, did you know we were breaking Jap codes?

C: Negative.... I will always be grateful to Arnold. He managed to keep from Larry Norstad and me the disclosure of

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such things that would compromise us, and ground us. He really accepted our pleas - we were continually reminding him, Larry and I, that one of these days, he was going to let us get out and fight the war, and he was sensitive to that. He wasn't going to have us disqualified by having us privy to a certain kind of intelligence or the atomic secret. He kept us from those things, and I'm very grateful to him. It was very thoughtful on his part to do that.

Q: On this subject of grabbing people in the E Ring. We have had people comment that Arnold had this propensity. Can you recall any specific instances where he gave somebody a job that was alien to his background?

C: No, I can't. I will swear on a stack of Bibles, that it happened numerous times, and as a matter of fact, it happened so often, that none of us, I never felt the need to document it. It was just such a well known characteristic of his. We did more, the creation of the Advisory Council, to break that than anything else. As a matter of fact his habit was, just to repeat that propensity, was as he was walking down the hall of the Munitions Building or the Pentagon - after we moved over there. He would have an idea, he would have a problem, it would be occupying his mind, he walked down the hall. He'd badly need somebody on which to unload it, because he wanted to clear the deck so he could then take on another idea, another problem.

Q: Were you involved in any efforts to thwart diversions of aircraft from ETO?

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C: I don't think that we prepared any paper to turn him back from any course of giving the first priority to the Pacific, but we were continually running into that problem, and we were continually alerting Arnold to any manifestation of that problem that came to our attention and recommending to him various things that he needed to do to re-establish the proper priority. That was a hazard of the course that Arnold was alerted to, we were alerted to, and we sort of "ad hocked" it as each deviation came up.

Q: General, let's talk about Arnold and Andrews. Were you in on any decision made to give Andrews the job as CG, ETO. This was at Casablanca.

C: Now, let me say that our office seldom got in on personalities. We tried to discourage Gen Arnold from involving us in personalities, because we felt that if we became tarred with that brush, our effectiveness as advisers to Arnold on substance would be very harmful to the cause.

Q: By personalities, you mean in effect, assignments....

C: Assignments of individuals to jobs, and the conduct of individuals, and things like that. We really shied away from those problems, and Arnold respected that attitude on our part, and agreed with it and sort of shielded us from it, so unless we got in on it casually, we didn't. So the answer, especially on this one, we did not and I don't think Larry...had anything to do with the proposed assignment of Andrews.

Q: When did you go to the UK?

C: Well, I went to the UK in Oct 1943 to work for Eaker.... I'd always kept after Arnold - " you are going to let me go

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over and fight the war, aren't you?" - because he believed in that. He didn't believe in freezing onto his key officers. He believed in having the professionals get out and get combat experience. So I had gone over in October of 1943.

Q: You were a valuable man. Did Arnold try to hang on to you?

C: Let me tell how I got to Eaker. Arnold had appointed a group of Operations Analysts, Elihu Root, Jr. as the Chairman, with Perera and Leach. Gates was the staff director of the activity; Sorensen was on it; Dr. Edward Mead Earle, and a very fine cast of citizens and he had formed this Committee of Operations Analysts in early 1942 for the purpose of studying target opportunities in Germany. The COA was to study their economy, their structure and their organization to help us determine what should be the target systems to select for air attack. Our office was very much in favor of that, very interested in it. We saw it as a very necessary step to be taken, and we sort of kept tabs with its progress. When we saw that it was nearing completion, I went to Arnold and asked him to let us get in on the act when that report was submitted. And he was dubious: "What do you want to do with it; what's it going to be good for." Come this moment, now, he wasn't sure that the Committee report was going to do any good, so we suggested that it really ought to form the basis for operational plans of the strategic air force. Well, he liked the kind of comments that we made concerning the purpose and use to which this could be put.

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So when Root came in and he brought his Committee in, and they made their report to General Arnold, and handed him the original copy of the report, Arnold thanked them for a job well done, and then they left the office, and he immediately hit the squawk box and called us down. He says: "Here's that report you've been talking about - it's all yours." So we took it down to the office and prepared letters, one to Andrews, who was then commanding the European theater for US; one to Eaker, commanding then the 8th AF for the US, heavy bombers, and one to RAF Marshall Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, suggesting that those three individuals consider concerting an operational plan for bombing based upon the findings of this report.

Q: When was this?

C: This was February 1943, when they turned in the report. We then took those letters back to Arnold, and a copy of the report. In the meantime we had made additional copies of the report. We left them on Arnold's desk with the draft letters. A couple of days later, he called me in, handed me the report and the three letters, now signed, and said: "Get on your horse; you are going to the UK!" No further instructions; no questions. It's clear that he was satisfied with the concept of what we thought ought to be done with the report,and he like the letters, and he thought I ought to hand-carry them, because he knew there might be questions, and it might need a selling job to be done over there on this. So I caught a plane the very next morning for the UK and carried this report and some extra copies. I called on all three of these people (Andrews, Eaker and Portal) and they were very cordial and very enthusiastic about the

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letters. Andrews suggested to Eaker that he, Andrews, didn't need to involve himself in it directly; that Eaker could represent him. So Eaker and Portal proposed that they form a committee to prepare this operational plan, and Eaker asked me if I would stay and serve on that committee, which I agreed to do. Possum Hansell was assigned as the Chairman of the committee, B/G Fred Anderson was assigned as a member of it, Col Agan, who is now Commanding the Air Defense Command, Col John Hardy, who is now Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Col Richard D. Hughes, who was a retired officer, a British Sandhurst graduate, who had been in the British Army and in the Indian Army and retired from it, came back to this country because he had been born in this country while his father was Consul General in Salt Lake City, and took up American citizenship, because on the boat coming to this country from India, he had met an American girl and married her. So he came to this country and when we neared getting into the war, he saw we had to get into it; couldn't stay out of it. He had to get into it, so he got into the Army Air Forces and got into target work. So he was one of the people who helped draft AWPD-1 and was now Eaker's Targets man. So he and I were on the Committee. And the Royal Air Force members were Air Commodore Sidney Bufton, and Group Captain Arthur Morley. Fufton was then Deputy Director of Bomber Ops, and Morley was in his office. So then, this group sat down and drafted what became known as the Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive. By the way, when I reported to Eaker, and handed him this letter, it was the first time I had

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ever met the man in my life. So when the plan was completed, Eaker and Andrews and Portal approved it, and it was decided that the next step was then a presentation to Arnold, who in turn, would present it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. Eaker drove me to the airfield and had his plane standing by to haul me to Prestwick to catch the air transport flight back. On the way to the field, I persuaded Eaker that he personally had to come back when it was presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and make the presentation to them and be there to answer questions because we were awfully skeptical of the reaction of the sailors, particularly, to this thing. They were not hankering to have any strategic bomber offensive, especially one in Europe.

Q: Was this the famous Eaker presentation, or is this second presentation?

C: No, this was his presentation.

Q: Didn't he make a presentation in Casablanca in January 1943?

C: I'll give you that in a minute.... This plan now, we called for the principal target systems attacked to be the German submarine facilities, in particular, the submarine pens in France. The submarine campaign, was a thing most on everybody's mind. In that period of history the success of the German submarine campaign was about to dry up Britain, and about to deny Britain as a base for anything, even a viable economy. Also, tactically, we felt that we had to pay a little deference to the sailors, and so, the submarine target system would

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accomplish that. And then a third point - the 8th AF really needed close targets for its early missions to do its teething on. They weren't well trained; they hadn't developed their system; they didn't know much about combat,...so they had to do it on pretty close targets. I urged Eaker to come back and make the presentation, because he was the only one who could impressively and authoritatively answer to many questions that the skeptics were going to have. So he agreed. He said let me know when its going to be, and I'll come back, and you prepare the briefing aids. I had the briefing aids prepared. So come the day, here comes Eaker but Arnold was marked sick in quarters by his doctor, he had a little flurry came in, so he couldn't attend that crucial CCS meeting, and my heart really sand on that one.

Q: Was that TRIDENT - was that May 1943?

C: No, no, this was not - remember now that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were a regular body which consisted of the US Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff resident in Washington. Sir John Dill was their senior member. They had plenary powers from their Chiefs of Staff back in England. Now, only periodically, did the US Air Chiefs sit down with the British Chiefs in person for Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings which were regularly scheduled, almost weekly affairs in Washington.

Q: When was this briefing of Gen Eakers?

C: This took place in about late March 1943, about then.

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(NOTE: If this was a heart attack it preceded the moderate seizure Arnold had two months later, in May 1943 when Marshall shipped him to Oregon. He missed TRIDENT.)

C: With Arnold not present for the crucial CCS meeting on the strategic bombing plan, I recommended to Gen Arnold that he send Santy Fairchild to be his stand-in for that meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he did. Santy was the most intellectual and the most articulate advocate of strategic bombing, so I felt that he would be the best stand-in for Arnold. Eaker gave a splendid presentation. Fairchild ad-libbed a number of things and kept the tone and the conversation going and everything. The upshot was that the plan was approved by the CCS - sailors and all.

C: Let's back up now. Eaker, on his trip taking me to the airplane, had said, talking about the CBO plan, said: "Look, how about you coming back and working for me?" And I said: "Sure. He said: "Will the Old Man let you go?" and I said: "Sure!" And he said: "How do you know?" And I said: "He has already promised, and he has a replacement." He had found Rosie O'Donnell as my replacement. Rosie had had his wartime experience in the Pacific, and could bring that combat experience to the office, and Arnold was quite conscious of the need to have around him somebody who had been in combat. Arnold had already told me that I could go any place that I wanted to. He said: "I like the job you have done for me, so you can pick your theatre." My heart was in that strategic bombing effort, so I was all set. So then, following Eaker's presentation, he wanted to go right

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back at his desk the next day. Arnold and Eaker confirmed that I would be made available. But Arnold, also said: "I don't want him to go until after the May conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (TRIDENT) which takes place in Washington." That's the one you were talking about. Arnold said: "As soon as that is over, he can go." So it was all set for me to go. I think that answers the bombing plans.

Q: How does it fit in with the earlier presentation by Eaker that sold Churchill?

C: Now, this session that Eaker had in Casablanca - it is hearsay on my part. I didn't participate in it because by the time of Casablanca in January 1943, Norstad had left the Advisory Council to go to the UK with Spaatz, in turn to go with Eisenhower in the fall of 1942 complete the planning for the North African operation. So I had gotten Jake Smart to replace Norstad in the Advisory Council. I had gone to the Pacific with Arnold on a trip in September 1942, and so, come the time of the Casablanca conference in January 1943, Arnold asked me who should go with him to that. I suggested Jake Smart because I had just been with him on the Pacific run, and it ought to be Jake's turn. So at Casablanca, Jake Smart was with him, I was not. According to my information, Arnold got word that Churchill was going to twist Roosevelt's arm to have him step in and order the US Army Air Forces to stop this silly daylight bombing and go to night bombing, as the Royal Air Force long since had been forced to do. The RAF had tried the daylight bombing and got its teeth kicked in and had to go to night bombing.

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Churchill was going to tell FDR the AAF was going to lose their shirts, but were to damned stubborn to realize it. Churchill was going to ask the Americans to to to night bombing to save their own skins. Or there wouldn't be any 8th AF left. Well, this is pretty strong medicine. Arnold knew that Churchill's influence on Roosevelt was quite heavy, and particularly on matters in which he had experience behind him. So Arnold cabled Eaker to come on down fast. Eaker cranked up a B-17 and went on down to North Africa. Arnold met him and first thing he said to him was "How would you like to have your orders changed to require you to get to night bombing?" Well, Eaker said, "I wouldn't like it." As a matter of fact, I think you had better get a new commander of the 8th AF if that happens, because I don't believe in it. My heart wouldn't be in it, and I don't think you ought to have a commander whose heart is not in what he is doing. You'd better get somebody else who thinks that's a good idea, because I don't." So Arnold said: "That's just what I wanted to hear from you. Now, here is the problem." This was one of Arnold's techniques, of getting a guy all steamed up, so that Arnold could see just what his heading was. And then, if Arnold liked that heading, and thought that he was properly steamed up, Arnold then would pop the question to him, and get him committed. He had Eaker all committed here, in the right direction, and with the right head of steam. So Arnold told him all about this thing, and said: "You are the best man in the world, to try and talk Churchill out of this. You have a pretty good rapport with Churchill." That was true

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Eaker had established wonderful relations with Churchill, the King, with Trenchard, with Bomber Harris, with Portal.... And so, Arnold said: "It's up to you. I've got an appointment for you to see Churchill tomorrow at 11:00. This was at night, so Eaker went back to his billet and worked up a briefing memorandum. He knew Churchill's habit was to get more from the printed word than he got from the spoken word. He prepared this briefing memorandum with the intention of handing it to Churchill, and he did. Eaker had his appointment with Churchill, and Eaker said: "I've prepared this briefing memorandum and it presents my argument." and Churchill preceded to read it. Well Eaker had his copy of it, and he watched Churchill, and he noted, or knew already, that Churchill is a lip reader. In other words, as he read, he formed the words with his lips so he could follow Churchill in this briefing memorandum by watching his lips. So everytime Churchill would shake his head over something, Eaker knew exactly what he was shaking his head about, and there were no nods, and nothing but shakes, until he got to the punchline. The punchline that Eaker had written, was something like this: "With the 8th AF bombing by day and the Royal Air Force bombing by night, we will face those devils with round-the-clock bombing." Eaker could see Churchill go back and reread that punch paragraph over and over again. Churchill sort of rolled those words around in his mouth, like you and I would roll a lemon drop. He savored every bit of it, and Churchill looked up and said: "All right, General, if that's the way you feel about it, go to it, said I'm for you. I'll call off my dogs." That's the way

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it turned out. So the decision adopted at Casablanca was just that. The American air force was to bomb by day, and the Royal Air Force was to bomb by night until the will and capacity of the Germans for continued resistance were at an end, or words to that effect. A sequel to this, by the way, Eaker told me, was when he got back to the UK after the conference was over. He got a call from Churchill's office to see him in the Distinguished Visitor's Gallery in the House of Commons at a cetain time and date, which he did. Churchill came in on the floor and made his report to the House of Commons on the Casablanca conference. When he got to this part, he said we have decided that the American Air Force will bomb by day and the Royal Air Force will continue its bombing by night, and thus we will face those devils with round-the-clock bombing. Then he paused and dramatically looked up into the Galley, straight at Eaker, and held his gaze for a matter of about a minute. That was his way of giving Eaker the credit for that statement. But that's how close we came to losing our daylight bombing concept.

Q: Then this second round with Elihu Root is really an implementation of the Eaker presentation?

C: It was timed beautifully, but without planned timing. It was well coordinated because fresh on the heels of that, I hit Portal and Andrews and Eaker with this proposal to concert a plan. And the climate was all set for them.

Q: General, would you tell us about Marshall and Arnold?

C: Well, as far as I am concerned, Marshall, in that relationship between the two, I would say was decisive in the

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creation of the US Air Force. There wouldn't have been a US Air Force, had there been, in my opinion, a different relationship between those two men. Their cordiality towards one another went back many years. When Marshall came into senior position, Arnold concluded that Marshall was the key to the advancement of the Air Corps towards autonomy. When Arnold decided that, he followed that concept and was most careful in what he said and did, and how he said and did things, so as to keep that relationship a sweet one. This was not just guile on his part, because he had a deep affection and respect for Marshall, aside from recognition of Marshall as a key character in the aspirations of the Air Corps. There would be many a time when we would brief Arnold on a subject before the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff. That was one of our continuing responsibilities, we'd brief him and recommand a certain action for Arnold to take on that occasion and frequently he'd say: "Well, your recommendation is intrinsically correct, that's what my inclination is to follow, but I don't think that Gen Marshall is ready for this one. I haven't prepared the ground for this solution. So I've got to go easy on it for a time. We shall have to postpone this issue on this showdown until I prepare the ground. And this happened numerous times. Again, I emphasize, it wasn't because of just plain guile, but because Arnold felt that he needed Marshall's backing, and that Marshall was entitled to have advanced explanations and preparations for those showdowns.

Q: I think that is the most critical characteristic of Arnold in my view, and this applies to a lot of things, like

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unification, for example, where Arnold knew what was polite, what could be accomplished and what was impossible. Some of the other fellows just drove their heads into the wall.

C: Now, this is counter to the general impression of him as being a very impulsive guy, and a guy always out of channels. And this just isn't true. When it served his purpose to be completely restrained, he could be restrained. He could plan ahead every little move that needed to be made. But when it was not necessary to do that, I think his inclinations were to be impulsive and his inclinations were to do things out of channels. Hence, the corridor problems that we were talking about.

Q: Is it fair to say that he was more likely to go out of channels when he was going down than when he was going up?

C: Exactly.

Q: It was his decision to make whether to use the channels or not.

Q: General, you mentioned something about the War College, the Staff College. You were supposed to go to Eaker's headquarters in the Sping of 1943, but Arnold decided that you were to stay on. Would you tell us about that again?

C: Well, this Army-Navy Staff College which began on the 1st of June 1943, was the result of an idea that we in the Advisory Council had dreamed up and presented to Gen Arnold. We saw the bad manifestations of interservice rivalry. There was a great amount of it, as you well know. We felt that part of that could be alleviated by better communications between officers in the separate services. We finally came to conclude

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that an old school time among the services, the associations between key important staff officers, would show that other service officers did not have horns and tails, and that they could develop certain common terminologies and common approaches to problems. So we decided that a school was one of the necessities. There is no one single solution to the problem, but a school would alleviate the problem. So we came up with this idea proposing that there be established at one, not at the end of the war - at once - a United States War College - of something less than a year in attendance for that particular time, but leading toward making it a full blown yearly course come postwar. We worked up what was considered to be a general kind of curriculum, general procedures, who should be the students, and we included in that idea that there should be students from the other government agencies that came in contact with the Armed Forces, so that there would be that same relationship and understanding developed there, too. We worked this up as a proposal and gave it to Gen Arnold, and he was taken with the idea, and agreed to sponsor it in the JCS, which he did. This paper, like all other papers presented in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to stand in line for its place on an agenda. This was not a very urgent matter, or one in which anybody else had any interest. So, it kept getting postponed. We finally suggested to Gen Arnold that he needle the Secretary of the JCS to put it on the agenda, and it was done. Nobody was particularly interested in it, and they just had a sort of <u>pro forma</u> hearing. But the Navy expressed considerable disagreement with the idea, and

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the action taken was to refer it to the respective Services, meaning Army and Navy, for comment and recommendation. That left the Army Air Forces out of the commenting and recommendation upon it. Now, if they had referred it to a Joint Committee, the Army Air Forces would have been brought in as a member of that triumvirate, whereas the respective services were two - Army and Navy. This was a Navy proposal. Everything that the Navy could do, throughout all this time, was to perpetuate the two, the Army and Navy, and only give the most grudging of attention to the joint aspects of things. During the war, since there were 3 on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that meant there would be three on the committee. Well, we persuaded Gen Marshall's advisors - the Operations Division, War Dept General Staff, to whom he turned the problem over for the preparation of his comments and recommendations. We sold them on the idea, but we got nowhere with the Navy. The Navy, in the meantime, referred their paper for comments to the President of the Naval War College at Newport. He doublecrossed them, because he wrote a ringing endorsement of the idea. He said not only would it be a good idea, but he would love to be the first Commandant. He thought a good place to have it would be at Newport. That sort of pulled the rug out from under the Navy, so it was agreed then in the JCS in principle that there would be established such an institution. They referred it again to an Army and Navy committee to prepare a detailed plan. We again sat in with the Army people, and really did the Army's work for them. The Navy still opposed it, but only a foot-dragging way, because the decision has been made

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to approve it in principle. The Navy members now objected to the "United States War College" as too pretentious. They wanted it called "Army-Navy Staff College. We said: "That's all right; let's get the show on the road. Never mind the name; it will stand and fall on its merits, on the kind of faculty it has, and on the kind of instruction it put out. The Army-Navy Staff College was established in order to begin its first term 1 June 1943. Gen Arnold decided he wanted me to attend that first course so as to observe it for him, and to come back and tell him if the ball had been picked up properly....

Q: Then, he had a problem with Eaker, you were supposed to join his staff?

C: Gen Arnold was thinking about this. So just when Eaker took off for the UK, with a promise in his pocket that I would go to work for him as soon as the TRIDENT conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff conference was over, Arnold called me in and said: "Before you go to Eaker, I want you to go to the first class of that school. "And so he cabled Eaker to that effect, and I had to draft the cable telling Eaker I was going to be delayed. He came back with a blistering cable, to Gen Arnold, saying he needed officers now, not 6 months from now. He was badly in need of them, and how come all this messsing around. Arnold said okay, because it hit him in a weak spot. He believed in getting officers out to the field, so his bluff was being called by Eaker to take one of his own key officers away. So he agreed to let me go but then thought about it some more. One day Arnold sent a cable off, and called me in and said: "Listen I've changed

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my mind again, and I'm going to stick to it this time. You are not going to go to Eaker until you go to that school. Now cable Eaker to hold his horses. So I did, and I went to that school....

Q: You mentioned that you accompained Arnold out to the SOPac in September 1942. There were some dealings with MacArthur on that trip, the Navy wanted some B-24s

C: No, B-17's....

Q: But didn't he have some run-ins out there with MacArthur and the Navy?

C: Let me set you straight on that. Arnold went on this trip on about the 20th of September 1942. This was at the very low point in the war in the Pacific. The Japs were the closest they ever got to Port Moresby - about 14 miles from our bases at Port Moresby. We had made this first brave counteroffensive of ours in the Pacific early in August at Guadalcanal and we were just about to get thrown off of it. The operation was just about ready to fail. So when Arnold got to New Caledonia, which was the headquarters of the South Pacific theater commanded by Vice Admiral Ghormley, Cinc, South Pacific, we found things in a god-awful mess. In the meantime, Miff Harmon, had been sent out there by Arnold to be CG, AAF South Pacific. Harson and his crew, including Nate Twining, were trying to make some sense out of this arrangement out there. The harbor at Noumea was just chock-a-block with shipping at anchor. The stuff was not being unloaded because they had pulled their rank - that is to say, priority. The South Pacific was given a very high priority shipping largely because of the Guadalacanal counter-offensive and the Navy had

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taken full advantage of that, and every ship that they could fill up, they had headed for the South Pacific, but with no facilities for unloading them. So the harbor was chock-a-block with ships that had been there, some of literally for months, awaiting unloading. The Navy carried out a dog-in-the-manger policy. They had the priority, they exercised the policy - to hell with everybody else. As a result, the Army and Navy were at each other's throats. The Marines on Guadalcanal were screaming to high heaven because their concept was that they would train and equip to make highly professional amphibious landings. Immediately upon seizing the initial small beachhead, they expected to be relieved by Army troops who would come in an expand the beachhead, and hold it, and man it, and develop it as a base. The Marines would be withdrawn, re-equipped, re-trained to make another highly technical, highly professional amphibious operation. It didn't happen that way. Here the Marines went in there. They had seized the beach, they had expanded it a little bit, and no Army. So they were raising hell about the cowardly Army and the doublecrossing Army for not coming in there. We saw the commander of the Army division, the Americal Division, Gen Patch. We saw him at Noumea and talked to him there. And he was foaming at the mouth to get to Guadalcanal - ready, able, willing and anxious to get to Guadalcanal - but the theater commander, Adm Chormley, had said: "No soap." He was opposed to more shipping being sent to Guadalcanal, both in naval craft or cargo ships - because they were being sunk. And so, he was about to make a decision that there would be no more shipping going into Guadalcanal. Certainly

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no troop ships. Guadalcanal, to the extent that it could be supported by air transport, would be, and otherwise, it would die on the vine. But Ghormley knew, and everybody knew, of the great shortage of air transport at that time. So, therefore, he was the one who had blocked the Americal army division from going in there. Yet he was saying or doing nothing to stop this backbiting all over the place - that the Army was doublecrossing the poor Marines. So that was the kind of situation that we found in Noumea. We only stayed there the one day and headed for Brisbane, Australia to see Gen MacArthur.

Q: Wasn't Ghormley relieved as a result of this backbiting with the Japs knocking at the door?

C: As a result of Arnold's trip, I never knew for sure, but I assume that Arnold's report was critical in the decision to relieve Ghormley, but I don't remember that.

Q: There is a very interesting report on unification by Gen LeRoy Lutes.

C: He was Army Service Forces

Q: Yes, did you ever see that report by Lutes about Noumea. He said the Army had some docks and wouldn't let Navy ships unload; while the Navy had docks and they wouldn't let the Army unload.

C: There were not enough docks for everybody.

Q: That's right, and there were the ships sitting there idly, and there was a battle going on between the Army Base Commander and the Navy Base Commander in Noumea about whose ships would be landed first.

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C: Well, this is entirely consistent with what I have said.

C: Now, to continue our trip to Australia. We left Noumea and got over to Brisbane and were met there on landing - we were in a converted B-24, a C-87, it was called. We had to overshoot Brisbane and go to a military base about 60 miles beyond it, because we couldn't get intc the smaller field. George Kenney met us with an operational Lockheed Hudson. It had no seats at all in it, and then he ferried us on into the close-in airport. George Kenney squatted on his haunches alongside Arnold who was sitting on a coil of rope in this operational Hudson. Then George briefed us on his situation in the SWPac. We had just come from this gloomy place, full of tragedy and backbiting and intervecine fighting. Then we got a decidely different picture. This little old bantam rooster, George Kenney - he was going places. "Me and MacArthur are going to do such and such." Me and MacArthur... - we've got a winning team." This was just champagne to Arnold, who liked optimistic things to start with. His morale which has been down about his shoetops, was now being lifted by this little bantam rooster, George Kenney.

Q: He liked Kenney because Kenney never said he couldn't do a job?

C: Not only that, but he said, I've got a plan and he did have a plan. As a matter of fact, Kenney said the Japs were just about to overrun our bases. He said he'd persuaded General MacArthur to bring forward a American ground division to beef up the Aussies in New Guinea. He said we ought to get them over there by air transport. In other words, Kenney said MacArthur had

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sanctioned, by commandeering every airplane in Australia that has wings on it and one seat beside the pilot - literally, he was taking two seaters - and ferrying Army troops over to Port Moresby, New Guinea. And he said: "They have just started today." Arnold's morale - you could just see the man's spirits rising like a barometer from this kind of talk, because Kenney's two predecessors, had not gotten along with MacArthur. That's why Arnold had sent Kenney over there, and MacArthur was a difficult guy to get along with. As a matter of fact, MacArthur's ideas on the application of airpower were god-awful until Kenney got over there and started educating the guy. He really took off, and Kenney was against the opposition of most of MacArthur's staff, but Kenney was saying:"Me and MacArthur, don't you worry about us anymore. You can worry about other things; you don't need to worry about this theater. We know that we are low on the totem pole for supplies. We will take all we can get, but we'll make out." This is the kind of talk that Arnold liked.

Q: What kind of interview did Arnold have with MacArthur. Were they on good terms - distant but friendly, or what?

C: Well, I wouldn't call it an interview. (Gen Cabell didn't want us to use this item. Wanted it for his own book. He tells about MacArthur's soliloquy, at the conclusion of which MacArthur terminated the interview. This story is at variance with Gen Kenney's account which records a lively give and take. However Kenney tended to confuse Arnold's two trips to SWPac - Sept 1942 and June 1945).

Q: General, let's talk about Europe after you got over to Eaker's command. You got over there in October 1943. This was a bad time for the strategic bombing effort. They had the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid of Aug 17th and the raid of Oct 14. They lost 60 planes in each and Arnold must have been very unhappy about this.

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C: Oh yes, sure, he was very unhappy and very concerned. During the time of the Schweinfurt operation which, by the way was part of our plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive that I had worked on. At the time it was launched in August, I was at the Army-Navy War College, and was not in Arnold's active company.

Q: There was a problem with the long range escort?

C: Well, they didn't have any.

Q: Who is at fault on that and what's the background? Why didn't they anticipate the need?

C: Well, I think this problem was of long standing really. At the time the Boeing bomber came out, its performance was better than any fighter that we had in the inventory. And this sort of led the bomber people to swell their chests and to assume that the day when the fighter can overtake and shoot down the bomber is pretty much gone, because the bombers can outperform the fighters - altitude-wise and speed-wise. And the fighter people pretty much laid down in front of that feeling. I'm not too well versed in it at the time it was going on, because I was in the Training Command, but this is looking back over history hindsight. The fighter people just, sort of, almost gave up the ghost as far as thinking that they could build a suitable escort. It was certain that they couldn't even go as far as the bomber could, that is, even half way to the target. It was reasoned, if fighters couldn't intercept one, they agreed to, let's put our money in bombers, and not put our money in fighters. On the basis of this reasoning, the fighters were sort of starved for R&D, as well as starved for confidence that they could do a job.

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Now who was responsible, well everybody. The Chiefs of the Air Corps and all the senior people during that time - that would have been in the 1930's.

Q: There was a move to build the B-40 and the B-41 armored bombers. This was to be an escort for the bombers - just a defensive weapon. But that was too slow to keep in formation.

C: That's right, because you were loading it down with things that prevented it from keeping formation.

Q: That was a real bust. It failed - who's responsible?

C: Don't ask me, because I am ignorant....

Q: Then there was this business with the cardboard wing tanks. This was a jerry-built idea, and it was sort of hung on to the fighter escorts. After building up this very extensive air force, we end up with carboard wing tanks, and they were beating Wright Field over the head. Now, I'm talking about our program of October-November 1943 - would you agree this is really a failure of planning?

C: Yes, but again the failure was in large part due to this lack of confidence that the fighter escort could do the job?

Q: If you make an assumption that the figters didn't have the range, they didn't get the money nor the R&D.

C: When we finally got around to developing the P-47, a decision was made not to put attachments on them that could take bombracks, because the fighter people were getting so that they didn't want to think about having their fighters siphoned off to become bombers. They thought they could stop that if we don't put hooks on them that you can hang bombs on. So that order went into effect for a little while.

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Q: Let's talk about Leigh Mallory - he gave the 8th AF a fit.

C: He gave Cabell a bigger fit than all the rest of the 8th AF put together.

Q: Well, what was the problem with Leigh-Mallory?

C: The problem was that he was a penny-ante guy in a big league position. That's it in a nutshell. The job was way too big for Leigh-Mallory. That I must say that I learned to dislike the man so intensely - I had such run-ins with him, that I am not objective, I'm a very biased witness on this fellow.

Q: Everybody was sort of opposed to him, except Eisenhower, who apparently didn't want to hurt his feelings.

C: Right, he was stuck with him, but Eisenhower didn't have any use for him.

Q: They found him a job in Southeast Asia, didn't they?

C: Yes, he got himself killed enroute. He got himself involved, Leigh Mallory did, in a power play. He had the ambitions to become the Commander-in-Chief, accent on Commander in Chief, of the greatest aggregation of airpower ever assembled in the history of the world. I saw him one day at his operations headquarters, going into the Operations room, and climb up on the ladder. They had very high boards, maps where they had posted units, and it took a long long ladder to hang symbols on the upper reaches of it. I saw him one day personally go up on the ladder one day, and personally move one unit symbol to another area, because he got a great kick out of it. He was an overgrown young Operations officer!

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Q: One of the points at issue between the Americans and British during the pre-OVERLORD period was; you wanted to knock out the POINTBLANK targets, and Leigh Mallory, as I understand it, wanted to go against the tactical targets before you and General Spaatz thought you were ready for that.

C: Well, this is a little bit distorted. The issue was sharpened more that than. And I can even tell you the day it happened. I reported to Gen Spaatz' Hqs on the 11th of Feb 1944, with orders to report for temporary duty. I was then commanding a bombardment wing of B-17s, the 45th Combat Wing. Fred Anderson met me. He was Spaatz' Deputy for Operations. Fred outlined the problem. There had just been laid on Gen Spaatz' desk a draft plan for the employment of the heavy bombers to support the upcoming OVERLORD operation which provided that these heavy bombers, beginning the 1st of March 1944, were to attack the marshalling yards and locomotive repair facilities in northern France and the Low Countries. Now, this draft plan was on Spaatz' desk seeking his initials concurring with the plan. "But Gen Spaatz before he concurs," this is Fred Anderson talking, "would like to have you form a small task group of officers in this headquarters, and review the plan and give him your recommendations." Now, Gen Spaatz called for me because I had been involved for the plan of the Combined Bomber Offensive. I have been involved when I first reported on duty with Eaker, in an updating of that plan, and so I had been in combat for a while, so I was sort of the logical fellow in Fred's mind and Spaatz' mind, to do this examination. Well, I formed this small group, the principal

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member of which was Dick Hughes, the man I told you about, the former British Army type, and several others. We then began to look through this draft plan. Gen Spaatz told us; "I'm not sure if there is anything wrong with this plan at all, but I'd like to have you all look it over carefully before I indicate concurrence." Well, the more we looked at the plan, the more we disliked it. In the first place, because it meant diverting the heavy bomber effort from Germany to France and the Low Countries, whatever the targets, taking the pressure off of Germany. They were doing it the 1st of March, and D-Day for Normandy wasn't about until the 6th of June. As we went into it, we formed the judgment that even if successful in France and the Low Countries, it would not accomplish the purpose intended which was, "to create a railway deser" in the northern France and the Low Countries, so that the German forces headed for the threatened beachhead would be unable to traverse the rails in heading for the beachhead. They would have to use other transportation, roads and what have you, which would have slowed them down. In our study we came to the finding that diverting the bombing effort wouldn't accomplish that, because of no stretch of imagination would attacks on marshalling yards and locomotive repair shed would 100% destroy that rail system or anywhere near 100%. We found that the tonnage of traffic required by the Germans for military purposes is about 5% of the tonnage being hauled over that railway system. Under no stretch of imagination would any damage ever get down above 95% so the 5% would always get through by the imposition of rigid

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priorities, which the Germans were perfectly capable of doing. We decided that therefore it would not have the effect that the planner had expected. Spaatz asked us for a progress report as we were getting along on this, and we gave him this preliminary report. This wasn't final yet, because we felt we had to give him more alternatives, not just to oppose this one, but what were the alternatives, and we hadn't come up with any yet. So Spaatz then read us a lecture. He said: "You sure had better come up with some good ones, because let me tell you that this plan is essentially the plan that I have been proposed to all those leaders that came up from North African to run this show. During my year down there, I'm the guy that sold them on the fact that the best contribution the Air Force could make to the invasion of Normandy was take out the railroads." Spaatz said: They bought it and got a plan for it, asking for my initialling, and now you tell me that it's all wrong. Now that's asking a little bit too much.

C: So, in our study, we looked over the possible target systems. One of the earliest systems mentioned before was the synthetic oil refineries in Germany. However, "oil" had been looked into before and had been discarded. However, my recollections for the reasons to pass over oil was because we found at the time, that it was beyond the capacity of the bomber force. There were pinpoint targets, the targets were recoupable, requiring reattack and our force wasn't up to that. In the earlier days, we had targets that were easier, so we went to those other targets. But now, I contended, we needed to reexamine the oil target

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system in the light of our force today and in the light of our hopeful acquisition of longer fighter escorts.

This is mid-Feb of 1944. Our fighter escorts were just coming in at this point, that could go the distance. So then our group re-studied the proposition and kept oil on the list as one of the feasible and profitable target systems. And the more we studied it, the more it became our chosen target system, and it did become our chosen target system. We reported to Gen Spaatz and had a session with him that lasted nearly the entire night presenting to him this concept as ours as the alternative. Now, this didn't mean that we were abandoning any tactical concern. We said it was too early. Anywhere near the first of March was too early. By this time, however, it was already into March because it had taken time to make our assessment. We thought the tactical assault should come several weeks before D-Day. We, the heavies, should go after the rail system, but against chokepoints and bridges and knock them out. They were the hardest points to repair. However, in the marshalling yard attacks - you were attacking a railroad where it was the easiest to repair. They have extra rails and extra ties and extra men in an urban center where there were labor forces and material already around. That's the easiest place in the world to repair the damage. It was our view that we destroy the bridges and other chokepoints which were more difficult to repair. Well, Gen Spaatz then accepted that concept. He said:"I can't shoot you down; I agree with what you are saying. Now, I've got the hardest job I've ever had in my life. I ve got to go back to

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Eisenhower and all these leaders." By this time, there was a real tug of war in existence. Everybody had dug in his position - everybody except Ike. I mean not only was it Air against Ground, but the Royal Air Force had run out on us. "Bomber" Harris had run out on us. Initially he intended to go with us in this oil approach, rather than the marshalling yards, and then he turned. And I'll explain to you in a moment, diagnosis of why he had changed.

All the ground commanders - Montgomery, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Bradley - they were all in favor of this railway attack because they could visualize the results of a rail attack. They could not visualize the battlefield results of oil refinery attacks in anytime frame that would be useful to them. So Spaatz said: "I've got to reverse all of them and it's going to be hard to do." He went to Ike, and Ike said: "I'm going to have difficulty, I'll call a meeting of everybody."

So Spaatz sent me back to see Gen Arnold. He wanted to enlist Arnold's aid, and he sent me back to see if we couldn't get Arnold to pick up the torch for us, and I came rushing back to see Arnold. Arnold listened, and said: "I agree with you. I think everything you say makes sense, but I'm helpless. As a member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff I have gone on record long since to the effect that when Ike says he needs the efforts of all the heavies, along with all the tactical he'll get it against the targets of his selection." Because everybody was fearful of this freaded bloodbath that was being proclaimed by

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propaganda. Nobody wanted to in any way indicate that he was going against the wishes of the ground soldiers who had to face the bloodbath. Arnold said: "I can't do it, because I'm already committed. You've got you hose turned on the wrong garden, you've got to go back and work on Ike. He's the key to this."

I knew that. Spaatz knew that, but forlornly he sent me to see if he couldn't get something else out of Arnold. At the meeting that Eisenhower called - sort of a council of war, you might say - Spaatz presented his proposal, Leigh Mallory presented his. Ike took a canvass of the table, only one vote for the oil, and everybody else was in favor of the rail attacks. And Ike said: "I have no choice, the decision is to go after the rail targets.

Q: Where does the "Big Week" fit into this?

C: During this period when I was working with the small group with respect to this targeting, the "Big Week" came and that gave us even more confidence that we could do it. That came before the Ike conference. The "Big Week" came in late Feb. The Ike conference came in March.

Q: Didn't the "Big Week" persuade anybody that strategic attack could do it?

C: No it didn't influence anybody, but gave us more confidence that we now could see the ability to penetrate, and that the target that we had been fearful of before in early eras, you might say, that we said we could now do. That week gave us greater confidence that we in fact could do them, because we were going to be able to penetrate.

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Q: When Arnold came with the JCS to the Normandy beachhead about June 9 or 10th, in his own diary, he wrote that he mistrusted the RAF. He said the RAF intelligence had misled us and wished our intelligence with believing that the GAF would be out in great force, and that a lot of this preparation had gone for naught. It would not be fair to say he was disappointed, but he was astonished that the Germans did not put up a better show at the Normandy beachhead. He thought that the British intelligence had misled us. Did you get into that situation?

C: No. General Arnold was plain wrong about that. This was a superficial reaction of his. Again, you've got a Cabell bias here that is beginning to show itself, more and more. But Spaatz at this pre D-Day meeting with Ike and all these commanders, said: "Now, hold on gents, before we break up, I'd just like to have confirmed for me what each of you ground commanders wants most out of the air forces - come D-Day." Everybody says: "We want most from you come D-Day, assurance of air supremacy over the beachhead." And Spaatz, said: "Okay, that's the one thing that you will probably not get, as a result of the decision just made. Because the attack of the marshalling yards in France and the Low Countries will have no effect upon the capacities and capabilities of the German Air Force, come D-Day." He said: "They will not fight for the targets in France and the Low Countries, so they will be rehabilitating themselves. They will recuperate from this Big Week we've had, and that will have gone partly in vain. We need to capitalize on it.

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Everybody was looking out the window at this point. But come early April 1944, when he had been ordered to embark upon the rail attacks, and was attacking those as our daily diet, Spaatz' predictions were now being borne out. No fights, the German Air Force was licking its wounds and rehabilitating itself. So Spaatz then went to Ike and said: "Ike, what I told you before as a forecast, I can now give you evidence that it's taking place. So you are not going to have air supremacy come D-Day."

This really hit Ike in a pretty rought place. He said: "Well, what are we going to do?" Spaatz said: "We have to beat down the German Air Force, and just ain't doing it. We've got to attack Germany, and make that Air Force fight, and get them out."

Ike says: "I guess that means that damned oil business again."

And Tooey said: "It means just that. That's what we have to go after - the oil in Germany. We've got to go after Germany, and my judgment as to the best target in Germany to go after is oil, because that will beat down the GAF.

Q: You wanted to get the GAF up there to shoot them down....

C: Well, yes, and you have to make them fight, and against a target that is itself hurting....

Q: You've got to get them up to protect a target they think is worth defending....

C: Not only is worth defending, but attack of it itself is weakened, so you have to double-barreled attack on the German Air Force. Hit them where it hurts and make them come out to fight for it and lose in the process.... And so Ike said:

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"I'll give you three days to attack anything you want to." We waited until we got three days in a row. By the way, by this time I had been relieved from my combat wing and made Spaatz' Director of Plans, USSTAF Hqs. Our approach was - let's don't, for Gods sake, tip our hand that we are going after oil until we can see three good weather days in a row, and get the most out of it. So we missed one cycle, about the 10th or 11th of May before we found that prospects on the weather charts of a cycle of 3 days and then we clobbered German oil. Now the big problem in our trying to sell oil targets before, had been our unwillingness - and this bears up a little bit Arnold's problem about the intelligence - to promise Ike and his commanders that there would be an immediate effect on the battlefield from the attack on the refineries. You see, we had no good evidence as to the extent of the stored reserves of refined products. They might be leading a hand-to-mouth existence, or you might say, a refinery to-pump in the field existence, or they might be building up extensive reserves. We really had no evidence on that and this was where our intelligence was at fault. Because we could not see that evidence, we would not promise the ground soldiers that there would be this immediate effect. We said we were fairly confident it would happen. We were certainly confident that if we started it now it would take effect before D-Day. But we could not promise that it would be immediately the day after effect. We would not promise them something if we didn't have the evidence to warrant it.

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Q: Was the fact that there was almost no German opposition over D-Day a surprise to Eisenhower, and to you?

C: It was a pleasant surprise to everybody. We knew that we had whittled them down so that they would not be unacceptable in strenght to us over the beachhead. But in our wildest dreams we did not believe that we could whittle them down to the fact that there was literally no more airplanes than you could count on your fingers over the beachhead on D-Day. We never thought that we could whittle them down that far by any system of attack. But we thought we could whittle them down to acceptable size, which we did. But the thing was, it turned out that their stored reserves were nearly nil. They were literally living a hand-to-mouth existence in fuel and immediately, things happened. The German Air Force issued an order no more training per se. Now, think what it does to an Air Force when you stop all training. When an airplane would land from a mission, it would shut off all engines before it stopped rolling, and it would be towed off the runway by horses and oxen. Tanks were being driven off the road when they ran out of fuel. So this kind of thing began to happen and this showed immediately in all intelligence reports.

Q: Where does the British request that we divert bombing effort for CROSSBOW targets fit in to this picture?

C: Certainly the British were demanding that we divert to CROSSBOW, but that was not over our dead bodies, because Spaatz, Ike and all of them could see the dangers, no only to the cities of Britain but to our invasion base, the port, our cantonments, and everything else which was just as good a target as London,

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and so, those CROSSBOW targets were multiplying like mushrooms, and we didn't have too good a reading as to what was behind those CROSSBOWS. As a matter of fact it took us a long time to find out what the CROSSBOW sites were. Take the ski sites, for example. We thought there was some magic in this ski configuration. It turns out to be just a design, a floor plan, just a floor plan. And when they once designed a floor plan, why not follow it? And the turn that this thing made,making it look like a ski slope, had no magic to it whatsoever.

Q: As I recall it, there was resistance by Spaatz to the bombing the ski sites for the reason that he did not want to convert from the strategic targets.

C: Well, this was resistance, but I would say this was half hearted resistance.

Q: I think it ended up with the British bomber command hitting those sites.

C: I feel quite sure that had not the British got around to saying positively we should do this, I don't think we would have said no at all. I think that we, or our own hook, would have accepted the necessity, no matter how much we abhorred this necessity, because it was the greatest diversion conceivable and it was god-awful, but even we, in privacy, admitted the necessity. I was sleeping in a shelter. I'd been through the Battle of Britain without ever going into a shelter but now come those buzz bombs around Gen Spaatz/ billet, he had holes dug for us out in the yard, bunks put down in these holes, and that's where we slept. And I liked it. We were pretty damn conscious of those buzz bombs.

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Q: Arnold was urging Spaatz to become the No. 1 air man of the unified air forces. There was a movement to unify the RAF and the 8th AF, to have one strategic air force - and there was some problem with Portal. Portal in the earliest directive of Casablanca, had been given overall supervision of the strategic air?

C: No, he was given the authority to let us say the British Chiefs of Staff were given the authority to nominate the targets in Southeastern Europe. He was not given the power to decide the targets from UK bases.

Q: The British wanted, like Bucharest, some of these other targets hit.

C: That's in Southeast Europe.

Q: Right, and Spaatz, who controlled the 8th and 15th, USSTAF, did not want the 15th diverted to these Balkan targets and there was a fracas with the British. This is in '44 - this was after the Normandy invasion.

C: No, this is straddling it.

Q: This created some friction, did it not?

C: Norstad was down with Eaker then in the Mediterranean as Eaker's Director of Operations and Intelligence, and was on top of this problem. After D-Day, I went down and took Norstad's place in that assignment.

Q: Would you tell us something about the Big Switch - Spaatz and Eaker - Eaker was very unhappy about having to leave the 8th AF.

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C: No, I can't tell you anything about it, because at that time I was commanding that combat bomb wing under Eaker and never seeing Eaker then because I was out in LeMay's division and was not involved in that in any war, shape or form. But I never have accepted the fact that Eaker was too upset in the first place. This represented a promotion for Eaker. This was very logical for the team, Ike to bring his team up to run the show. Eaker was not a part of Ike's team, Spaatz was. Spaatz was always senior to Eaker, and nobody knew that better than Eaker and of all of the two men whom I would say have the nearest Damon and Pythias relationship, it's been Eaker and Spaatz. So I don't believe that a promotion for Spaatz or assignment of Spaatz ever has upset Ira Eaker.

Q: There was some correspondence that indicated that....

C: I know, but Eaker never was a man to run out on a problem or a job. He was disappointed to leave that operation.

Q: He had just built up his force for the Big Show, and then was taken out of it....

Q: You are talking about the oil problem - the targeting of oil and the fact that the RAF deserted you on the issue.

C: Yes, I had mentioned that, although originally, the Royal Air Force seemed to favor the oil approach, that suddenly they changed, beginning with "Bomber" Harris. We had our diagnosis as to the reason of that, and I have never had it confirmed. I still think it is a correct one. In retrospect, we can see that "Bomber" Harris had been suffering very severe losses in

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in his night bombing in Germany. The German night fighter force had become very effective. The German anti-aircraft at night was becoming very effective. Harris was standing off, he didn't think that he could continue to sustain and maintain the morale of his forces. At the same time, here he was offered a target system that was his kind of target, that is, it was an area target, a marshalling yard normally right in the center of a city. Therefore, it was easy to find the concentration. Whether you found the marshalling yard specifically within it or not, you hit something. You weren't dropping your bombs in plowed fields. These targets were easy to find, and all of his career, he had been beat over the head for opposing the Army, for wanting to conduct a side show all on his own, to hell with the Army. And now the Army was coming at him, at all of us, demanding that the heavy bombers go after a certain target system - his kind of target. He could recoup his losses and get credit for helping the Army, all in the process. So that was for him, and I think that was the explanation for his run-outs on us.

Q: You mention the British being hesitant about certain bombing. Weren't the British also very gunshy about hitting the sub pens at La/Pallice, St Nazaire, etc.

C: Rightly so.

Q: Because it was daylight bombing, and the Germans had really loaded up the AA in that area.

C: Not only that, but it took extremely heavy bombs to do it and they doubted that we could carry enough of those heavy bombs.

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Q: Don't you think that they don't want to suffer the losses? Their planes were not equipped to do precision bombing in daylight. They weren't equipped to do this kind of thing. The only positive result was by getting a direct hit on the sub pens.

C: No. The RAF was never called upon automatically to bomb the same targets that we were. The Combined Bomber Defensive Plan was really quite flexible in regard to this. We felt that it would be unrealistic, we the planners, to require the Royal Air Force to tag along behind us and because we attack a system, they must attack the same one. Their capabilities were different, their methodology was different. But it was specified in there, that to the extent feasible, so it was always with enough latitude in there that the Royal Air Force would follow our lead, if feasible.

Q: Well Adm King and Adm Pound were screaming for somebody to bomb those pens. This was when the U-boats were really knocking out our shipping. They wanted something to be done against the sub pens.

C: That's why we put them in our plan - one of the reasons.

Q: But didn't they refuse to participate?

C: The British were saying: "It's not within our capabilities to do it. It would just be wasting our effort to go after those targets."

Q: It was one of the toughest assignments, really. It didn't pay off, because you have to have a direct hit to get any kind of result.

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C: But we thought we might be able to do it with daylight precision bombing. As a matter of fact, we had to get some experience at bombing something. We didn't have any experience there, and we needed it badly, whether it turned out to be unsuccessful attacks, and whether it turned out to be successful, we would learn lessons from it.

Q: Did you get in on the Caucasian Air Task Force? This was the emergency British-American air task force that was conceived in Sept 1942. This is when it appeared that the Nazis would overwhelm the Russians in the Baker oil fields. There was a plan to go in there and try to stop the German advance and at the last minute it was cancelled. Were you in on that?

C: Only peripherally. The Advisory Council was going on at that time. We would have become involved in it, but our involvement in such things was never certain. Whenever there was a problem which clearly involved a standard staff section of the Air Staff, such as, Air Plans, Air Ops, or something like that, we only got in to the extent of needling Arnold, of commenting upon the plan that would come out of the regular staff section. But plans such as that always would have been formed by the Air Staff section concerned in Air Plans. So our interest in this was not heavy at all. We were not the ball players.

Q: What were Arnold's relations, if any, with Wedemeyer?

C: Very good, I think he liked Wedemeyer personally. I think he recognized him as being "gung-ho", and he also recognized him as being quite close to Marshall.

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Q: Wedemeyer was the son-in-law of Embick.

C: Embick in turn being very close to Marshall.

C: Embick was no fan of airpower.

Q: No, but we hemmed him in. Santy Fairchild hemmed him in and that was the story connected with that, if you want to talk about that for a bit.

Q: Does it have a bearing on Arnold?

C: Marshall proposed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff creation of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. It consisted of some senior officers, general officers, full time, that would sort of get an over-view of the war, the operations and the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So somebody was needed to look over the shoulders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to look over the shoulders of the other committees which were all part time. The Joint Staff Planners, for example, did all the strategic and tactical planning of the JCS. It was a part time body; it was the planners of each of the three services getting together. They had their responsibilities back in their own Services all the time. Marshall feared for the continuity of activities in the JCS. So he proposed this Joint Strategic Survey Committee. Our shop, the Advisory Council, which had for Arnold the responsibility of receiving all of his JCS papers - this was the one regular function that he had us perform. The other were, you might say, "ad hoc" at his whim and at our whim. He had us receive all these papers from the JCS and Combined Chiefs of Staff, process them, see that the papers received the proper

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consideration by the proper staff section in the Air Staff, do the research on them, find out and recommend to him what his position should be on them in the JCS and the CCS and prepare his brief to use at those meetings, and for one of us to attend the meetings with him.

As soon as we saw this paper of Marshall's we jumped on it with both feet, this is the best thing that happened since the invention of the wheel. Because here was a proposal of Marshall's that tactically, Arnold could jump on the band-wagon for and get Kudos for that from Marshall. Even if he didn't like it, he could do that. But he did like it, for this reason: that it means that in the senior direction of the war, the senior body which would be giving the over-view, it would be on a three man basis - Army, Navy and Army Air Forces - and this would be a big leg up in our bootstrap struggle.

So we went to Arnold, and said: "This was something to jump on with both feet for both of these reasons." And Arnold said: "Boys,you've got something there. I'm all for it. Now, who are we going to get to represent us on the JSSC?" Well, there was only one man for that and that was Santy Fairchild.

And Arnold said: "Get the hell out of my office!" Everybody wants Santy Fairchild for every job that comes down the pike. I can show you a list of the jobs that they want Santy Fairchild to do. Everytime anybody came in with a project, or proposition, they want Santy Fairchild.

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Q: Wasn't he Director of Military Requirements?

C: Yes, and of course, Santy was recognized throughout the Air Force as the intellectual member or leader of the Air Force. I don't think there was any question on the part of the Air Force in general that Santy Fairchild was the intellectual leader.

Arnold said: "I want no part of that."

And I said: "Now, wait a minute, General. What are you saving him for?' This is the thing that he wants.

Arnold: "He wants to get out in the field....

Cabell: "Every officer wants to get out in the field. We want to get out in the field, but maybe some of us won't make it. Fairchild is the man for this job, because this is the kind of thing that I think you would have been saving him for. He will have influence all across the board. If you put Santy Fairchild on that Committee, it will be a Santy Fairchild committee, no matter who is the chairman. Let's expose these guys to Santy Fairchild. We've been looking for a forum in which to use Fairchild. Now, he's done his work. The things he has gotten underway in the Military Requirements field can be carried on by other people."

Arnold agreed. But he said: "All right, you can tell him." So we had the job of going to Santy Fairchild and breaking the news to him, and he squaled like a stuffed pig.

Q: What time frame are we talking about?

C: I think I am talking about Jake Smart and me now. In fact, I know I am, so that would have been in the fall of 1942.

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Q: Can you tell us something about Arnold and Lovett?

C: Well, I think this relationship of Lovett and Arnold was a very admirable one for me to look at. I greatly appreciate the attitude that Mr. Lovett took which I think was the ideal one. I think Lovett had decided that he could make his greatest contribution to the successful conduct of that war by joining forces with Arnold, rather than setting himself up as an intermediate superior between Arnold and the Secy of War. Lovett saw this relationship between the military chiefs, what they thought was a successful relationship. The military chiefs in concert formed the Joint Chiefs; in concert with the British formed the Combined Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs reported directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief and the Combined Chiefs reporting to the two heads of state jointly. Lovett seemed to think - no I haven't sat down and discussed this with Lovett, but this is my evaluation of it - he seemed to think that that was the right way to run a war, and that it was the job of the respective secretaries to facilitate that, and to take care of the non-strategic and non-tactical aspects of the organization and management of the military establishment. And so Lovett decided that his greatest contribution would be to help Arnold do those non-military things and make life more bearable for him and just to get the country behind him, and get industry behind him, and do those things, rather than involve himself with the day to day creation and operation of an Air Force.

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Q: Did he serve as a balance wheel, in the sense that Arnold sometimes was flamboyant or impulsive? Did he tone Arnold down?

C: I can only assume that the answer is yes. But I never witnessed a situation in which Lovett was saying "hold on" to Gen Arnold. But I think their relationship was a very cordial one and a very intimate one. I know that Arnold was forever going to Lovett to talk things over with him, and so I can only assume that the answer is "yes" to your question.

Q: I wanted to ask you about Knerr in the ETO. Was Knerr the originator of the "Deputy" system?

C: I cannot answer.

Q: Knerr raised an issue right near the end of the war of a bomb shortage, and he really raised the devil with Giles. Arnold was sick at the time - this was Feb 1945. Do you remember anything like that on the bomb shortage?

C: I remember we had a bomb shortage along with an ammunition shortage generally throughout the armed forces. The expenditure rates were just a lot higher than anybody had ever dreamed we would attain. And so, I was in the Mediterranean at time time, though, as Director of Operations, but I ner was affected by any bomb shortage, so this was sort of a paper shortage.

Q: This is what Giles thought, and thought Knerr was making too much of this issue.

C: Well, it turned out to be, but Knerr didn't think he was, and had the war lasted longer - I don't mean dragged out longer - had the temp of operations in 1945 been continued much

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Knerr would have been right....

Q: Arnold was very unhappy with DeSeversky. Did you ever hear any talk about DeSeversky?

C: Negative, I'm not sure that he was unhappy about him, this is news, I'm sure that he had his reservations.

Q: Yes, well we have very solid evidence unhappy. How about Drew Pearson? Drew Pearson never said good things about Arnold.

C: I have no recollection on Drew Pearson - wasn't very much of a power in those days to me.

Q: Did you have any knowledge of Arnold's relation with Lindbergh? After the war started, he brought Lindbergh in as a consultant?

C: Yes, I was in favor of the idea, and it looked to me like ti was profitable.

Q: Lindbergh did a job out there in the Pacific.

C: Very quite, unassuming job.

Q: What role did he perform?

C: Well, I can't reconstitute it too well. I think, in the way of operational techniques, in the way of modification of aircraft. We should remember that out in the Pacific we were always modifying aircraft to fit their particular opportunities, capabilities and limitations out there. They developed this skip bombing technique for example. I don't think Lindbergh had anything to do with that....

Q: He is supposed to have developed the range particularly of the P-38s.

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C: Yes, cruise control, that kind of thing.

Q: How about Robert E. Wood. He came over to the ETO in 1943.

C: Well, I know he is one of my favorite characters. He and I have a very affectionate relationship.

Q: He was a close friend of Arnold's.

C: Yes, Wood was at the Military Academy before Arnold.

Q: As a matter of fact Wood was....teaching mathmatics there when Arnold was a Cadet.

C: He could have been. I just don't remember. Wood was a class behind my uncle at the Academy, and my uncle and Wood were close friends. I have been close to Wood over the years as a result of that introduction.

Q: Well, he did a great job in the supply area for Arnold?

C: He was looked upon with a lot of respect for what he had done in Sears and Roebuck. He also had a wonderful record in the Panama Canal Zone. He was a good gin rummy player.

Q: Arnold liked to play gin rummy too?

C: I never did play gin rummy with him. I was never around when he had time to play gin rummy. As a matter of fact, our relationship was a very peculiar one. Arnold made the gracious advances early in our association to bring me more into his family, and I had the belief - in the first place I wanted no part of being a Military Aide - any kind of relationship like that. I didn't even want to be an Executive Officer type. I wanted to be an advisor. I believed what he said to us the first few minutes of our conversation with him. And I felt that our

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relationship should be a little bit at arms length. So, that my professional dealings with him could be always kept on a professional basis.

Q: How about Norstad?

C: Norstad and I pretty much followed the same practice; I think I a little bit more so than Norstad. I never went into his quarters but once in my life, and that was to deliver an urgent cable that came in at an odd hour.

Q: You didn't get to know Mrs. Arnold?

C: Not well at all, but this was by my decision. The Old Man early in the game made the gracious advances, but I think he detected what I was trying to do and approved that, and quit pushing.

Q: Was Emmett McCable there when you served under Arnold?

C: Yes, Now, Emmett McCabe had a different relationship with him. He was a personal aide-type for him.

Q: How about Horace Shelmire?

C: So was Shelmire.

Q: I think Emmett ran a lot of errands on the Hill. He had been on the Hill. He worked for a Congressman in California.

C: But I just steered away from those things completely. I just ran out on him, before I got involved.

Q: Did you and Norstand run into a lot of resentment and opposition from the people you had to work with on Arnold's behalf?

C: Yes, initially everybody looked at us with a great amount of suspicion because the history of such offices - any comparable

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office - anybody getting close to the throne, as they use those offices to feather their nests and also to use that office to ride to fame and fortune. We just decided from the beginning that we were going to serve the Old Man and nothing else, and we also were both channels men. We both had discipline.

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Callahan, Daniel F. 18 Jul 74

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20314

13 April 1971

Major General Daniel F. Callahan, USAF (Ret)
21 Crystal River Drive
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Dear General Callahan:

I'm working on a biography of General Hap Arnold, which is to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian, presently assigned to General Grussendorf's office in order to complete this assignment.

In spending about 18 months on a Brookings Institution Fellowship, I was able to research all the vast Arnold collection at the Library of Congress. I also went through the Billy Mitchell, Spaatz, Baker, Andrews, Knerr, LeMay, and other collections.

Aside from the written word, I have tried to interview the most important Air Force people who had contacts with General Arnold some time during his colorful career. Among those interviewed: Generals Spaatz, Baker, O'Donnell, Cabell, Norstad, Kenney, Kuter, and perhaps 100 others. In mufti, I have been privileged to talk to Charles A. Lindbergh, Alex de Seversky, Eddie Rickenbacker, Robert Lovett, Jackie Cochran, and a number of others.

I have run across your name in a couple of contexts which may have brought you in some contact with General Arnold. If you feel you can contribute any anecdotes, insights, or even scuttlebutt which you think has validity, I would be pleased to stop by for a chat during a pending trip to the Southland in early June.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

MURRAY GREEN
Special Assistant to
The Chief of Air Force History
Office of Air Force History

Enclosure

MG/ajp

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

Gen Callahan: Appointment Thurs, July 18th at 11:30 AM

Coming up from Tullahoma: off Interstate 24 Exit Harding Place.

Over Highway to left (West

Stay on Harding Place about 5 or 6 miles; pass Hillsboro Road

1 mile to Linwood (4 way stop)

Keep going 1 block to Westview

Right turn - 1 mile, down steep hill

to intersection of Glen Eden & Westview. Corner House

437 Westview Ave, Nashville, TN 37205
Phone: AC 615 - 298-1557

done 7-18-74

Phoned July 5

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

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437 Westview Ave.
Nashville, Tn 37205
Tel. 615-298-1557

24 June 1974.

Dr. Murray Green
Special Assistant to the Chief
of Air Force History (AF/CHO)
Forrestal Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

Dear Dr. Green,

In response to your 21 June letter, you have me well identified. Although I have reservations as to the value of my contribution to General Arnold's biography, I would consider it a privilege to try.

I will not be available during the day on Wed, 17 July but the afternoon of the 18th or any other day that week will be fine. Yours, Lew L. Callaway
MAJ. GEN. USAF-RET.

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20314

21 June 1974

Maj General Daniel F. Callahan, USAF (Ret)
437 Westview Avenue
Nashville, Tenn. 37205

Dear General Callahan:

I'm working on a Biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. It's taken most of the past five years to research all of the subject and write about half of it todate. In the Library of Congress Manuscript Division which houses the Arnold Papers (about 250,000 of them) I've run across your name in a couple of contexts. Of course you were an observer in North Africa when the war broke out and you spent some years in the CBI. I'm not certain of this, but perhaps you saw Arnold when he came through after Casablanca (February 1943).

Anyway, you served in the Pentagon late in the war and probably saw Arnold him his contacts with General St. Clair Streett, his very close friend. Incidentally, I saw General Streett and had a long talk with him down at Lusby, Maryland, about 2½ years ago, shortly before he passed away. As you know, I'm sure, he suffered from emphysema. I've been back to Lusby for another talk with Mary Streett who was close to the Arnold family..

Another subject of interest is the formation of SAC in early 1946. You probably had a hand in that and know about General George Kenney being brought in to head that. I saw General Kenney in N.Y. before he moved to Florida a couple of years ago.

In any event, I am going on another long interview trip next month and will be passing not far from Nashville. If you are near home base around Thursday, July 18th, and feel you can make a contribution to my effort, I would be delighted to make a point of stopping in for an hour or so.

One more point: this is intended as a "warts and all" biography, encouraged in this direction by Mrs. Arnold whom I will be seeing at the tail end of this trip. Incidentally, she is in great shape. I received a letter from her yesterday. She just passed her 87th Birthday.

The enclosure will speed your reply.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

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Retired 31 May 63

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NOTE CHANGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION

MAJOR GENERAL DANIEL F. CALLAHAN, USAF

PART I - Narrative

Major General Daniel Francis Callahan was born in Zenda, Kansas on 10 June 1910. He graduated from high school in Wichita, Kansas in 1927 and received an appointment to the United States Military Academy. He graduated from West Point on 11 June 1931 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of Field Artillery.

The West Point Annual, "The Howitzer", of 1931 predicted General Callahan's Air Force career when it said "for Callahan a life without airplanes would be just like a life without bread and butter." This prediction came true when General Callahan began flying training the following September. He was given his wings in October, 1932, and assigned to the 25th Bomb Squadron at France Field in the Panama Canal Zone. In the Canal Zone he also served with the Panama Air Depot and the 7th Observation Squadron.

Lt. Callahan was transferred to the Air Corps on 25 January 1933. He entered the Air Corps Technical School at Chanute Field, Illinois in May, 1935 and, after graduation the following June, was assigned as engineering officer of the 12th Observation Squadron at Brooks Field, Texas. He continued his specialized engineering and logistics training when he entered the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, Ohio in June 1937. He graduated in September 1938 after which he took a post-graduate course in Engineering Mechanics at the University of Michigan. The following June (1939) he became Chief of the Service Liaison Unit of the Power Plant Laboratory at Wright Field.

In November 1941, General Callahan, then a major, went overseas as Air Engineering Officer of the U. S. Military Mission in North Africa. The following May he organized and was named chief of the Maintenance Division of the 10th Air Force in the China-Burma-India Theatre, establishing and assuming command of the 5309th Air Service Command there in November 1943.

A year later, General Callahan was assigned to a special study group in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans at Army Air Force Headquarters. In January 1945, he was named Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply and Maintenance of the Continental Air Forces at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C., and a year later he assumed the same position

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with the Strategic Air Command at Andrews Field, Maryland.

In August 1947, Colonel Callahan entered the Air War College at Maxwell Field, Alabama. He graduated the following June and became Assistant Chief of the Logistics Plans Group in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel at USAF Headquarters, becoming chief of that group in August. He was named Assistant for Foreign Aid in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel in July 1949.

General Callahan was appointed Deputy to the Senior U. S. Member of the Permanent Working Staff of the Military Production and Supply Board of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in London, England in January 1950, and the following June he was designated Senior U. S. Member and served as chairman of the Permanent Working Staff for the remainder of 1950. In August 1951 he was named Alternate U. S. Representative on the North Atlantic Defense Production Board in London, followed by his assignment as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in the United Kingdom in May 1952.

General Callahan was transferred to Air Force Headquarters in Washington in October 1953 and named Deputy Assistant for Programming in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He became Assistant for Programming of that office in June 11, 1955. He became Commander, Mobile Air Materiel Area, the position he now occupies on 24 July 1957.

[illegible]EN DANIEL F CALLAHAN, 57DA
[illegible]COMMENT: Relieved from Hq MOAMA, AFLC, Brookley AFB, Ala from [illegible] as Comdr, MOAMA; assigned Central Control Gp (Office, JCS), [illegible]SAF, WashDC for duty as Director for Logistics (J-4), The Joint [illegible]f.
[illegible]RTING DATA: DDALVP. Report not later than 27 Jul 61. EDCSA: Jul 61.

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II - Personalized Material:

A. Interests:

1. Primary sporting interest is swimming; likes hunting (duck, pheasant, deer) and fishing when time permits; enjoys spectator sports, especially football and baseball. Is consistently engaged in civic work of various types. Was advocate of and worked for establishment of Air Force Academy.

2. Has a tremendous capacity for work; enjoys fixing things around the house and is a talented do-it-yourselfer.

3. Member, Rotary Club; Vice-President and Member of Board of Directors, Mobile County United Fund; Member, Advisory Board of Providence Hospital; Member, Friendly Sons of Saint Patrick; Member Ends of the Earth Club (Anglo-American Relations); Member, English Speaking Union; Member, Board of Directors, American Red Cross, Mobile, Alabama; Member, Air Force Association.

B. Opinions, Tastes, Evaluations:

1. Really enjoys eating and is a connoisseur of fine food. Roast beef and blueberry pie are his favorites, but likes all food except bananas and strawberries; is a conservative dresser and prefers blue and gray suits, but likes cheerful ties; prefers colonial architecture, likes unusual or antique furniture but prefers comfort to show.

2. Is a very thorough reader of newspapers, has little time for other reading but enjoys books of Hemingway; enjoys music, finds it restful; musical tastes are varied, but prefers light classics or semi-popular; enjoys the beach and a climate permitting him to go often; likes to travel on vacations.

3. Is very alert to every situation; easy going and tireless; emphasizes "Golden Rule", his favorite motto, and lives by it; believes in giving others the benefit of the doubt. During a congressional hearing, a Congressman, not satisfied with the book definition of "logistics" called upon General Callahan to define the word. General Callahan qualified this as a "stoopnagle" definition and said, "Logistics is the stuff, which, if you do not have it, the war will not run as well as if."

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Look Magazine published the definition and it was read by people throughout the United States.

4. Stresses fair play in his personal dealings and among all members of his command; stresses accuracy and sincerity in all relationships; insists on getting the most of every Air Force dollar and on a full days work for a days pay.

5. Will not tolerate slip-shod work, insincerity or premature judgment; is skeptical of short-cuts, cure-alls, easy solutions; is an advocate of accuracy and conciseness.

6. Mr. William Kaufman, Executive Director of the Mobile County United Fund, has this to say about General Callahan: "warm, friendly, sincere and dedicated; the kind of person who is a credit to the Government, to the Air Force, and the community that is fortunate enough to have him. When requested to do something, doesn't commit himself freely, but when he does, he follows through to the end. I'm proud to call him my friend." These sentiments have been voiced both by business and civic leaders and by the so-called "common man" throughout the community.

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III - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data:

1. Born 10 June 1910 in Zenda, Kansas. Father: Dan F. Callahan, president of Zenda, Kingman and Wichita, Kansas, banks.

2. Married 23 February 1946; Wife: Mary Preston of Nashville, Tennessee; Children: Daniel F. III, 10; Timothy P., 8; Marguerite E., 3.

3. Home Town Address; c/o Dr. W. P. Callahan (uncle), 8 Lakeside Blvd., Eastborough, Wichita, Kansas.

B. Education:

1. Graduate High School, Wichita, Kansas, 1927.

2. Graduate, U. S. Military Academy, 1931.

3. Graduate Flying Training, 1932.

4. Graduate Air Corps Technical School, Chanute Field, Illinois, 1935. (Maintenance Engineering and Armament Courses.)

5. Graduate Air Corps Engineering School, Wright Field, Ohio, 1937.

6. Post Graduate (MS) Engineering Mechanics, University of Michigan, 1939.

7. Graduate Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1948.

C. Service Dates:

1. July 1927 - June 1931 Cadet, U.S. Military Academy.

2. September 1931 - October 1932 Flying Training.

3. November 1932 - May 1935 Assigned 25th Bomb Squadron at France Field, Panama Canal Zone, and also served with Panama Air Depot and the 7th Observation Squadron.

4. January 1933 Transferred to Air Corps.

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5. June 1935 - June 1936 Student of Air Corps Technical School, Chanute Field, Illinois.

6. July 1936 - June 1937 Engineering Officer of 12th Observation Squadron, Brooks Field, Texas.

7. July 1937 - August 1938 Air Corps Engineering School, Wright Field, Ohio.

8. September 1938 - June 1939 University of Michigan.

9. June 1939 - November 1941 Chief, Service Liaison Unit, Power Plant Laboratory, Wright Field, Ohio.

10. November 1941 - May 1942 Air Engineering Officer, U. S. Military North African Mission.

11. May 1942 - November 1943 Chief, Maintenance Division, 10th Air Force (China-Burma-India).

12. November 1943 - September 1944 Commander, 5309th Air Service Command, China-Burma-India.

13. November 1944 - January 1945 Special Study Group, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Headquarters, USAF.

14. January 1945 - January 1946 Assistant Chief for Supply and Maintenance, Continental Air Force, Bolling Field, Washington, D. C.

15. January 1946 - August 1947 Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply and Maintenance, Strategic Air Command, Andrews Field, Maryland.

16. August 1947 - June 1948 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

17. July 1948 - August 1948 Assistant Chief, Logistics Plan Group, Headquarters, USAF.

18. August 1948 - July 1949 Chief, Logistics Plan Group, Headquarters, USAF.

19. July 1949 - January 1950 Assistant for Foreign Aid, Headquarters, USAF.

20. January 1950 - June 1950 Deputy to Senior Member Working Staff NATO, Headquarters USAF.

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Decorations and Medals:

Legion of Merit	-	1944
1st Oak Leaf Cluster to Legion of Merit	-	1945
Air Medal	-	1944
Commendation Ribbon	-	1945
1st OLC to Commendation Ribbon	-	1946
Dept. of Defense Identification Badge	-	28 June 1950

American Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal

American Defense Service Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Award w/ 1 Bronze OLC

E. Promotions:

Rank	Temp.	Permanent
First Lt.	30 Mar 38	1 Aug 38
Captain	3 Oct 40	11 Jun 41
Major	22 Jul 41	
Lt Col	23 Jan 42	
Colonel	17 Aug 42	2 Apr 48
Brig General	11 Aug 50	7 Apr 54
Maj General	27 Oct 54	10 Mar 58

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21. June 1950 - May 1951 Senior U. S. Representative on Permanent Working Staff, Military Production and Supply Board, NATO, London, England. (Chairman Permanent Working Staff, June-December 1950).

22. May 1951 - May 1952 Alternate U. S. Representative Defense Production Board, NATO, London, England.

23. May 1952 - September 1953 Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, United Kingdom, London, England.

24. October 1953 - June 1955 Deputy Assistant for Programming, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters USAF.

25. June 1955 - July 1957 Assistant for Programming, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters USAF.

26. July 1957 - August 1957 Director of Programs, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Headquarters, USAF.

27. August 1957 - Present Commander, Mobile Air Materiel Area, Air Material Command, Brookley Air Force Base, Alabama.

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F. Henry Richardson
Manchester, TN
Mfg Exec Off. AFEDC

1. Power Plants W/F Before W WII
Kelsey?
2. Benny Meyers? Armed & BM
3. Stilwell vs Chennault
4. Award in Feb 1943? CBI
5. In Plans - 1944 - Kuter
Lindsey
Landgerheiser
6. Post war planning?
7.

Elmer Adler

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 Edited 1/22/75

Q Do you recall the first time you saw him or had an encounter with Gen Arnold?

C No, I really dont. It would have been back probably while I was at Wright Field, he came in during that period

Q About '38, '39?

C I was there from '37 to '41 A year out at Ann Arbor for school

Q And you were in the power plant laboratory?

C The first year I was there going to engineering school and then I went to Ann Arbor and then the year after that I came back to the power plant laboratory, the trouble department

Q Do you remember him coming into Wright Field?

C I don't think I can help you in this area. Let me, if I may, go through with the notes I've got here which will get out what few things I can remember about him. As I indicated to you, I'm afraid they're not going to be a great deal of use, We were talking about him and Maj Gen Junius W. Jones who was the Air Inspector in the period of 1942, 1943-4-5, along in there, and right after that period. The thing that I remember in this regard is that he was at the Jones's--Junius Jones is my brother-in-law, He and Mrs. Arnold were there for dinner one evening, and My sister's boy, Laurence, who was a youngster of about nine or ten years of age then, interrupted me a couple of times while I was talking to Gen Arnold. I brushed him off. General Arnold stopped me on this, and made the point that it was highly important to be responsive to these youngsters, and that I should take the time to do that, because it all went into making them better people, or words to that effect. But his interest in children and helping them develop was something that was generally known. If I recall correctly he had written some children's books

Q Six books

C Was it with Ira Eaker?

Q No. These books were separate. He wrote them in the late 20's. They were entitled "Billy Bruce," named for his son: "Billy Bruce Goes To

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West Point, "Takes Flying Training," "Forestry", all this kind of thing. So he cranked his own experiences into these boys' books. He was very much interested in adolescent development

C This was something that stuck with him over the years, and I appreciated it as far as I was concerned, personally. I tried to pass it along Later on then, as I mentioned I was at a dinner party which the Jones's gave for General and Mrs. Arnold and a number of their friends at the Shoreham Hotel the night before his heart attack which signaled his retirement. This is something that I have a recollection of --that Mrs. Arnold, at that dinner party, was terribly concerned about him because during the course of the day, he'd been at a meeting with some naval officers and they had gotten him so worked up, he was just completely angry, that she was concerned about his overstressed condition for his heart

Q I want to ask you this question. He had two heart attacks during the war, one was in May 1943, a mild heart attack. The other one was a day or two after the inauguration of Roosevelt, for his last term

C This would have been the latter. I was not in Washington until I reported in in November '44. I was in India, in Assam.

Q It must have been the January '45 heart attack. Do you remember that he was shipped out of town. They took him down to Coral Gables.

C Yes. Gene Beebe who was his aide at that time went down there with him. I recall that very well.

Q His major heart attack. He was out of action two months. Do you remember that they kept that very secret? That it was not noised about Washington

C That's my recollection.

Q Was there any reason given for keeping that very quiet?

C I don't recall that it was stated.

Q One of the reasons, I was told, was that he was afraid Marshall might retire him, and he wanted to finish the war.

C Of course this ties in in a way to the assignment I had when I came back

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from CBI As I indicated, I left September '44, and I reported in early in November 1944 to the Pentagon. Larry Kuter was Assistant Chief of Staff of Plans. I reported to his organization for assignment to a Special Study Group in Plans. And the task of that special study group was to set up a cadre of the headquarters which would then be a command headed by Gen Arnold as he moved out to run the air war in to Japan. We found then, in due course, that things had not gone as well in Europe or as rapidly as they had anticipated. You had the officers who had been assigned into this organization, the study group, to make up part of this cadre, efforts were being made to get them relieved so that they could go on into assignments that were critical at the time. So that the result was that there was some kind of a conference or conferences held, and determination made that they should go ahead and terminate that particular study group as such. We then changed over and became the cadre that formed the Headquarters Continental Air Forces.

Q My guess is that the reason for that delay is the Battle of the Bulge which was in December 1944 and Arnold among others had lived in expectation
C That's right.
Q the war might be over by Christmas, 1944 And, suddenly, the Bulge thing broke out and there was a realization this war would carry on into 1945. That delay you speak of might be tied into the Bulge.

C It was directly tied into that. And there was of course a tremendous movement of troops over, as a result of that, additional troops into Germany.

Q There was a lot of Air Force switchover to the Infantry. Aviation cadets for example, were brought into the Infantry because they needed to fill the ranks.

C I recall hearing of that

Q There was a lot of static on that?

C I heard of it, but I was not involved.

Q This Headquarters to fight a Pacific war. Was Arnold to take a direct role in that?

C He was to command it. As I understood he was to leave Washington and take active command in the Pacific.

Q The 20th Air Force had already been set up in Washington under his command

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C Yes

Q And Lauris Norstad was his Deputy. He was functioning as the commander of the 20th Air Force, but in Washington DC. This is very interesting. You say that this command that you were going to set up provided for Arnold to leave Washington and take command of the B-29's or the overall strategic effort in the Pacific

C I think it was the total air war. That was my understanding I had the materiel job, to put that together.

Q Did Kuter give you this understanding based on briefings that you had?

C He must have. The officer who was in direct charge at that time, if my recollection is correct, was Don Wilson, and I believe he was a Major General, and had come back from the Pacific.

Q He was Assistant Chief of Air Staff. He lives in Carmel, California.

C I haven't thought of him for years. Reuben Hood was with the group for Supply. I don't recall who else made it up. Mind you, I reported in in November, somewhere around Christmas time the determination was made to call a halt to that activity, because my recollection is the fourth of January we began the organization of Continental Air Forces.

Q That was well into the Bulge crisis?

C Yes they were directly related to that, no question about it.

Q I never had it put to me in those terms.

C The story was that earlier on and presumably during the summer, the estimates had been that the war in Europe would be wound up in October. And this simply did not come to pass. They found that the war was going to have to continue over there.

Q Did you ever hear anything related to Arnold's moving out into the Pacific theater to take physical command? In connection with that is Arnold's frustration in two wars. He never got into combat?

C I recall that I heard of that. I do not recall that he made this statement. But I know that it was a matter that was appreciated. There was that

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appreciation

Q He was trying to get overseas in World War I and made it just about Armistice Day. But every time he got to a place the war had ended yesterday. And he had a terrible frustration of not having served in the war, and this led to his having perhaps an exaggerated respect for men like Rosie O'Donnell and ~~Bobby~~ Blondie Saunders. I don't mean that these men didn't deserve all this respect--but if a man had a combat record Arnold had a great deal of admiration for him. Did this ever come into play when you came back? You had a record in the CBI. Did you ever hear him talk about this or did it ever affect you?

C I could not cite any comments where it would be directly attributed. However, I would have to assume that my performance in CBI was of such quality that it led me into the assignment of participating and putting that staff together to go on out into the Pacific.

Q That was going to be my next question. Do you recall any specific recommendation made by anybody to bring you back into Washington, or did you apply for that transfer?

C No, I didn't apply for it.

Q Very few did to go back to Washington

C That's right. I did not.

Q So it must have been a recommendation?

C At that point I was a Colonel and I had been recommended for promotion to general officer by several different people, including Stilwell and Chennault and Stratemeyer, and probably Brereton, Elmer Adler had been my immediate boss when I went out to Cairo, and then on to India. So that this would all fit the pattern I could not quote anybody

Q Elmer Adler was taken out of the Middle East jr. Do you remember why?

C Very well. I'd be glad to tell you about that. On the 23rd of May 1942 it will take a little while to tell this. I went out with Elmer Adler as his

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Engineering Officer. I was Engineering Officer of the U.S. North African Mission to Cairo on November of 1941. We had two Lend-Lease projects, one to put a depot into Eritrea, the other to set up an aircraft assembly and delivery point at the head of the Persian Gulf to deliver airplanes to Russians. The depot in Eritrea was to back up the Royal Air Force on the desert. We, of course, then had Pearl Harbor come off in December, and it wasn't long before we knew we also had responsibilities for the ferrying across Africa. We then knew that Brereton and the air elements that were out in the Philippines had gone down to the Dutch East Indies. They were run out of there and came on into India. It was anticipated, and they were at that time, B-17's, that had come out of the Philippines were in India, and it was anticipated that they would continue to be based there. Adler requested, and it was agreed, and the staff was sent out to replace us in the Middle East so that we could go over and be with, and support our air service command type support, materiel support, our units in India and CBI. The result was that in April of '42 Elmer Adler and Reuben Hood, who headed up the Supply--he was my opposite number in supply and maintenance--went on to India. At this time I was over at Basra--I went over there in March --I was there from March until May getting the delivery of aircraft going to the Russians. So I was a month late following Adler, and Hood, and Bob Oliver, who was the Executive Officer and Chief of Staff to Adler on out to India. On the 23rd of May I followed them. When I got to New Delhi, Adler and Hood were off down in Indore for the weekend on a tiger hunt with the Maharajah of Indore. And General Adler killed a very fine specimen. There are a number of pictures that were taken of it, one of which showed him standing with one foot and his rifle resting on this tiger that was laid out on the ground. I think the other officers were with him. I don't know as they were in all of them. In some pictures they were. I don't recall whether the one that caused the great difficulty was there or not. General Adler felt that there could be some--when he got the pictures back they'd been developed--that there could be some real merit in getting the message home that our fellows were able to get a little recreation out there. It was a long

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ways; we were half way around the world, and get some message back that our fellows were able to get in a little diversion on the side What happened then was, that by the time the pictures got printed it was two months later. It was in July, and I saw the front page of the San Antonio Express which had a full spread of Elmer Adler's picture with the tiger on the ground and his foot resting on it. ~~and~~ The headlines were that "Tobruk Falls to the Germans in North Africa" and "American General Kills Tiger". Well, since we're talking about Gen Arnold, General Arnold came on out to CBI subsequent to that time. I don't recall the exact date.

Q He got there in February 1943. This incident occurred when?

C The tiger was killed in May 1942. The newspaper account was published two months later, in July. By then Elmer Adler was over in Cairo. By then, Louis Brereton took him to Cairo to head up his support activities on the desert. And our U.S. air units were being moved in there. The big fight - as far as the big support of air activity went into North Africa rather than into India. So we were out on the end of the line. But, at any rate, General Arnold came on out, as you indicate, I knew it was in that winter time, but I didnt know just when - February 1943. I had breakfast with him. We had a tete-a-tete. There were three or four there. It was in the hotel in Calcutta, as I recall, the Great Eastern Hotel. I raised the question about General Adler and what happened to him, and how he was, after he got back to the states. But I was very fond of him.

Q Had he been fired already?

C Well, he wasnt fired, but he didnt get promoted. He was not fired.

Q Well, he was taken out of his job, really.

C He may have been moved out of the Middle East as a result of that. That I do not know.

Q I was told that.

C It is very reasonable. But General Arnold's comment was that he had gotten into a real problem on account of that tiger hunt picture, because of the timing of it. He said, if the release had occurred immediately, in May 1942, the conditions would not have

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so disastrous.

Q I cannot recall who told me that, but do remember the story very well. The picture was published in the Washington Post, or the Washington newspapers, along with some black headlines, about the progress of the war. And Arnold was supposed to have said: "If our officers can't find something more contributory to the war to do than hunt tigers, then we've got to make some changes." According to this account he was pulled out of there shortly after. I think he ~~was a~~ he made Brigadier General. Was he a colonel at the time or was he a Brigadier.

C He was made Brigadier General direct from Lieutenant Colonel before we went to Cairo on that assignment. And then --well, he became major general, best I recall. I could be wrong.

Q I seem to recall--I wouldn't swear to this--that he ~~had made~~ remained the Brigadier General. I wouldn't swear to that.

C That could very well be. He went on assignment when he went back to the States to Wright-Patterson, in the Planning organization

Q He was already gone by the time Arnold came out there in February '43?

C Oh yes

Q He went shortly after that picture was published?

C I would imagine that's true.

Q What you tell me confirms a story that I heard and I can't remember. Somebody told me this, and he was also fairly close to it, so it apparently was true I interrupted your story.

C I think that really is the only personal contact I had with General Arnold other than that in New Delhi on that trip. I recall very well there was a gathering, of course, all the principal staff out there.

Q Before the Calcutta breakfast?

C It would have been before because he would have gotten to New Delhi before he got to Calcutta.

Q There was some problem with the British when Arnold got to India.

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Air Marshal ~~Pearse~~ Peirse was the man in charge. And I was told that the British were saying they needed additional logistics, additional supplies and they were going to move on Burma in May 1943. And Rosie O'Donnell is supposed to have demurred on that estimate, and publicly disagreed with the British estimate. Arnold was supposed to have been taken by Rosie O'Donnell's courage in disagreeing publicly with the British estimate.. And this led to his being recalled to Washington to join Arnold's personal staff. This was in February '43. Rosie O'Donnell came back some time shortly thereafter. Did you work with him, with O'Donnell?

C Yes. Rosie and I went into China. We wrote the terms of reference for the Chinese Air Force which moved Chennault into the ~~U.S.~~ Army Air Forces, Took

Q This was July 4, 1942. Did you work with Rosie O'Donnell or have contact with him in the CBI between July and February 1943 when Arnold came out? 1942

C Sure I would have. I put the Maintenance in the CBI and Rosie was in Operations

Q There was some briefing at which the problem of getting the British to move faster against the Japanese in Burma came up. Did you happen to attend that briefing?

C I don't recall.

Q Do you recall that Rosie O'Donnell left shortly after Arnold came back to the States and the story I get is that Arnold was impressed with his courage in publicly disagreeing with the British.

C But I don't recall. I would like to leave you with this thought. That my own personal experience with the Royal Air Force in CBI was a good experience. There was an Air Marshal by the name of Carter in New Delhi who headed up their support activities. And I never went. I was putting maintenance in out there. I never went to him with a problem but what he either did what I wanted, gave me what I was seeking, or came up with a satisfactory alternative. We had good support there; we had good support in the Middle East.

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There was an Air Vice Marshal Graham Dawson. He provided the Royal Air Force support to assemble the airplanes we were to deliver to the Russians. Whereas we were supposed to have had contractor personnel in the Abadan area for that purpose. But the shipping got stopped after Pearl Harbor so they were held in hotels on the East Coast. We had the job to get done and we delivered a hundred airplanes --ro nd numbers--to the Russians before the people got there that were supposed to do the job. Then there was a man I was trying to recall last night. Somebody mentioned his name. He was a banker from New York and he was in CBI as a colonel. And he was a wheeler-dealer type and he tried to get promoted to general. He lives in Florida now. And after the war he tried to get Arnold to run for office. I can't think of his name. He was a Wall Street broker. I wish I could think of his name; you probably (Gillespie)

Q Neither of us recalled his name

C I remember him; I could turn up his name but I can't think of it right at the moment

Q I know who it is and I'll send you his name when I get back. He was supposed to have been a wheeler-dealer out there and they took him out of there. Do you remember anything about him?

C No. I think you've got him properly identified. But I really don't recall any specific instances. He made reference to his personal relationship with General Arnold; I recall that. But, no, I don't recall.

Q Jim Bevans, who lives in the same project was asking me questions about him because this guy,...

C Jim Bevans was in charge of personnel.

Q And Jim Bevans ~~was~~ lives in the same project in Fort Lauderdale I'll send you his name when I get back.

C Dont' worry about it.

C I want to ask if you had any knowledge of the Stilwell vs Chennault business. They were chewing each other up pretty good. Did you get involved?

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C Not really. But certainly there was no love lost between them. And it was my personal opinion that Chennault had a relationship established with the Chinese that was of tremendous value and it was not adequately exploited. Certainly it paid dividends in what he was able to accomplish with the resources that were made available to him but much more could have been done if that relationship could have been fully developed.

Q Rather than go to my material, let's work on yours?

C I don't think there's a great deal more There's one thing that had to do with that trip out there. This is the kind of thing that I would not want you to write up unless you had the agreement of the principals involved. And it will become apparent why. But when General Arnold made his trip into China--that was in February of '43, as you indicated he was being flown by Lou ~~Peter~~ Parker and Clair Peterson.

Q Getting lost? That's in his book. It's already in print.

C Anyway, Bissell had a pilot aide by the name of Anderson who was a former Eastern Air Line pilot He was Captain about that time and he made that ride with them. And if he hadn't been along General Arnold would have probably been lost.

Q I don't know that, but I do know the other, Louis Parker, I talked to him down at Shalimar, Florida He admits the responsibility for it. They overshot Kun ming

C That's right I just wanted to mention this. If it's been covered that's probably alright

Q It was covered to the extent that he was lost but this business about Anderson, I don't know that.

C Bissell sent Anderson along. I don't know who suggested it. He sent him along so that there would be somebody on board that was familiar with that area out there. This is the part of it that's a little awkward. What happened was that--and this is just my recollection--I was not there. The story that I got was that on taking off from up in Assam to go over the Hump

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into China

Q They were going from Assam to Kun ming?

C That's my recollection. On takeoff, once you hit the end of the runway lights there were no more lights up there and it was just like flying in the inside of your hat, and The airplane began to settle back down, which meant it would have gone back down into the trees in Assam Valley. The extent to which this occurred I don't know, but it was to the extent that it worried Captain Anderson who apparently was standing up between the two of them. At least he was in a position to watch the instruments, and he called to Parker or Peterson, whichever one was in the driver's seat, and said, "Pull up, you're settling down," or words to this effect. And they pulled back, and cleared the obstacles.

Q I haven't heard that.

C You wouldn't have heard that from Parker.

Q No, I talked to Peterson too.

C After they then cleared and got on up and were stabilized in their climb, as I understand it, Lou Parker turned around to Anderson and dismissed him from the cockpit area. "Just go on back and sit down." And they'd take care of flying the airplane. And Anderson then went on back and of course after he realized when they got up into China that the elapsed time was such that they should have been going in for a landing and they were still charging merrily on to the east. And actually, as I understand it, there were on the eastern edge of just leaving Chinese ground not at the time when, or had gone off it. At any rate they were over beyond Kweilin, in that area, Anderson, realizing that they were well overdue, started talking to the radio operator, to find out what was going on. He found out that the radio operator was not able to raise the stations in China, the ground stations. This wouldn't be the crew's fault at all, Parker or anybody else, but they'd been given information presumably that was to be put into effect, but was not yet in effect because Anderson then gave the radio operator the frequency to

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contact the ground stations based on his flying up in that area. They established contact, and then were directed back into Kunming.

Q Anderson was Clayton Bissell's pilot?

C Yes.

Q He was a commercial airlines pilot?

C He was an Eastern Airline pilot before--he wasn't then, He was on active duty but he had been an Eastern Airlines pilot, very fine pilot.

Q Much more experienced than they were at these things?

C He was experienced flying in the theater because he'd flown Bissell up into China a number of times.

Q Why did Arnold fly at night? Was it so urgent for him to get to an appointment? Why did they do this under the most hazardous conditions? Did you ever hear any story on that?

C No. I was given no reason for that. He might very well have elected to go in there at night on the basis that they'd be less subject to air attack from the Japanese.

Q He might have been trying to meet a schedule with Chiang?

C The word was undoubtedly out that he was coming into China.

Q He was a man in a hurry and he might have been pushing his appointment with Chiang Kai-shek. He was due to meet him shortly there after.

C I have the words very clearly in mind that came floating back. ~~from~~ General Arnold had a meeting the next morning with the crew and he really ripped them up And the words that came across were that they were too casual in their approach to that navigation problem. I don't know whether Lou Parker gave me those words,

Q He got reamed out.

C No question about that.

Q He admitted his role in that. He was fairly candid about it.

C They were both real fine types and this is the kind of thing that could happen to anybody. ~~I would hope~~ This is critical of his performance

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in the case of that takeoff. He's flying fine now. I wouldn't want to be the source of information unless it's confirmed. I was not on board the airplane so I don't know This is just the story.

Q I haven't heard that. Several People told me several versions. I don't recall specifically about the takeoff but I may have been told about it.

C There'd be no reason for that story to get around very much.

Q I guess not. Your knowledge of it is secondhand, so I will respect it on that basis I wanted to ask about your work with Kuter. You were assigned to Kuter's staff. He was a hotshot. Kind of a second star. He was very young, 36 or 37 He was on the rise. Did he ever talk to you about his relationship with Arnold?

C I don't recall

Q Did you work with Dick Lindsay?

C Yes He was Director of Plans when I was Director of Programs. As a matter of fact, this will be of interest to you. We were on the Installation ~~force~~ Board at Air Force Headquarters, and we became very concerned that decisions were being taken about the Air Force Academy at the time its construction was being planning and that sort of thing was being firmed up without active participation by blue-suiters. Dick and I went up and saw Nate Twining

Q This was long after the war?

C Yes As I said this is an aside doesn't have any bearing on this but since you've got a son out there I thought it would be interesting. He and I went up and saw Nate Twining and complained because we weren't getting into the act. The result was that Secretary Quarles established a construction panel for the Air Force Academy and put Dick and me and Dick Carmichael who was then the proper staff fellow on training on this panel along with some senior architects. They had ~~a man for~~ the head of architecture from MIT and a Bechtel from out in California, and a fellow named of Robertson, a friend of FDR's from down in Florida.

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Q Frank Roberts

C I don't think that was his first name. Anyway, Carmichael was one of Arnold's favorites too. He saw early combat and Arnold brought him back into Headquarters

C He went over with those first three B-17's that were sent to the UK

Q He was not suited for staff or desk work He was very unhappy and couldn't wait till he got out of there. I talked to him too. Joe Loutzenheiser was killed. He was one of Arnold's favorites too, wasn't he?

C I'm sure that he was. I knew him, but not well.

Q Let me ask you the magic two words. Benny Meyers. Did you have some contact with him?

C Yes but not in a business sense. It was really more on the social side. I was stationed at Wright Field when he was, so I saw a deal of him out there, and not very much in Washington.

Q Benny Meyers and Arnold were very close for a time, Did you know that?

C Yes, I'm sure they were.

Q I have heard from one or two people --Benny Meyers had a hand in the till, and these one or two people among a hundred I've asked about this said that Benny was taking for two, some for himself and some for Hap Arnold. Did you ever hear anything like that?

C No

Q I take the position: if he was taking for Hap Arnold, where was it? It didn't show up in his estate, and he was not a big spender. And I know where he got the money to buy his ranch.

C He sure didn't get it.

Q He got the money to buy his ranch from Jack Warner (told story)

C I can recall General Arnold talking about the very limited resources that he had available to him, and putting together an article or articles for the National Geographic Magazine which he did, and they were splendid articles.

Q They came out just before he died. This was after the war.

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C Time phasing I don't recall

Q He did one in 1939 or '40

Q It could well have been that one that he was referring to because the impression I got was that he'd had to really just do it all, It was a do-it-yourself project that other people in other agencies had tremendous resources available to them to get the job done, and he'd had to do it almost single-handed.

Q Did he tell you this personally, or you heard him say it?

C I was with him when he said it. I think it was one of the times that he was out to dinner with the Jones'. Other than that I would just say that the thing that impressed me about him was his insistence on high standards of performance. In my book he was the one five-star general we had in our air forces and have ever had and that's exactly where he rates. Top of the whole group.

Q Was there anybody else that could have done the job he did?

C I would not say that somebody like Frank Andrews could not have done the job because he was a man of tremendous capacity and people held him in comparable regard. You never know what a person could do until they have the opportunity and Arnold was in the position and he did the job. He had to.

Q Did you ever see Arnold get mad?

C A little. But I couldn't tell you what it was about.

Q Was this in headquarters?

C I never really saw him blow, if you want to put it that way But I know that he was capable of that

Q Did people avoid him because of that? Avoid the E-ring?

C I'm sure they stayed away from him if they could when they felt they were vulnerable.

Q Some people worried when they heard the buzz box sound off because he was on the horn wanting something done immediately. Did this become a psychological thing with some officers Did you hear them talk about it?

C Yes. I did hear that. He was a dominant personality and he didn't

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take no for an answer. He had a job to do and he was going to get it done. And I can't do anything but admire him for it.

Q When you were in the Pentagon do you recall any situation where he pulled somebody off one job and sent him on to another, perhaps overseas the same day?

C I couldnt name any circumstance like that but certainly he did. I heard of such cases, but couldnt name any. I was not close enough to him personally.

Q Did you get your star when you came back and were in this planning group?

C No. I was recommended during that period, but I finally got it later.

Q Did you get it after the war ended?

C I got it actually in London.

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Carmichael, Richard 30 Sep 70

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September 18, 1970

M/Gen Richard H. Carmichael, USAF(Ret)
5051 Overlook Road, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Dear General Carmichael:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name popping up in a couple of contexts. In one instance you were sort of buffer, or maybe "firebreak" between Jackie Cochran and Oveta Culp Hobby.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX-53862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Interview, MG Richard Carmichael, Washington, D.C., Sept 30, 1970

Carmichael: Talks to Arnold — Nov 1942

6.21

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Arnold?

C: Well, when the 19th Bomb Group got back from Australia in November 1942, we had complained so bitterly about getting the short end of the stick out in the Pacific where the Hitler strategy, you know, everything going to Europe, ~~that~~ old man Arnold directed that I bring two of my squadron commanders and several staff officers from the 19th Bomb Group back for a debriefing in the Pentagon, although I don't think they called it debriefing then. And we had, I guess about ~~2 days or~~ 3 mornings in the Pentagon, ~~and~~ at least the first morning I remember, I led off as group commander. Old Man Arnold was there, and the whole room was filled with his staff. We were the first of the combat group staffs to have returned to the Pentagon, and as such, we were quite a novelty, but we also had a lot of complaints. After this was all over, he said to Jim Bevan, his personnel officer, ~~he said,~~ "Jim, could you keep that young fellow here and put him in my office until some of his complaints are cleared up, and that's how I got to know him. I got in his office. He figured that he needed somebody else. I don't know when Gene Beebe had left, but he had three people in there then, he had Uncle Horace Shelmire. Uncle Horace took care of mostly his personal, and his social, and all the very intimate things, because he and Uncle Horace went to high school together, or Mrs. Arnold, somewhere in Pennsylvania

Q: Yes, he came from Pennsylvania. I missed talking to him.

C: There was a fellow named Peterson, materiel ~~guy~~ type, and R&D type, and he took care of the technical side. Then there was a young fellow from LA, I believe, and I can't remember his name, except that it started with a "Mac", he was a lawyer type

Q: Was it Bob Proctor, his lawyer?

C: No, the legistative side of things.

Q: Oh, McIntyre, Jim McIntyre, I saw him down in Montgomery, Alabama, he was the first L&L. I saw him about two or three months ago.

C: Right, so the old man took me in, and I would take care of the tactical,

combat side, only trying to keep him informed, and Then of course, there was Suzy Atkins, she took care of everything. But that was the family, for nine months. I got there, I guess I started work with Arnold in December 1942, and he booted me upstairs into the B-29s in August of 1943.

Blondie left about that time, too, Blondie Saunders. I think that old man Stratemeyer and General Arnold found out that Blondie and I weren't cut out for that type of work anyway, we didn't have experience to really be of any help to him.

Q: By that time Giles had replaced Stratemeyer?

Q: Oh, that's right, Barney Giles came in.

Q: Stratemeyer left around a month or two before you did

C: Sure, that's right. Barney Giles came in right after that.

Q: What were some of the projects that Arnold gave you to do?

C: The first thing he did was to send me out, I think, out of the kindness of his heart, to give me a chance to catch up after having been gone a year, he sent me out on a six weeks, more or less sightseeing tour. At the same time, this more or less set the pattern for what I did for him thereafter. I wasn't a troubleshooter like St. Clair Streett, I was an observer. I would go out and report back to him. But I went on about a six-weeks trip. I got an airplane of my own. It was a single engine biplane Cessna, and I took off, my God, I went down to Marietta, Georgia. I saw the B-29, I saw Blondie Saunders down there, too. I went down into Florida, to see the 3rd AF, Jim Parker. I went throggh Selfridge. As I remember, the only thing specific the Old Man told me to look for was to go to Tucson and find out what I thought about the quality of the training of the B-29 crews, under, I believe, Lowell Smith, and

Q: Bob Harper involved in that training?

C: I think Gen Harper, I believe Gen Harper was in the Pentagon

Q: Yes, he was in charge of the whole training. But was that under the 2nd AF, wasn't Davenport Johnson in it.

C: Tucson, Arizona

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Q: It was a subsidiary training establishment.

C: I'm not sure whether Lowell Smith was there at Tucson, well, I know Walter Agee was, because I had known Walter previously.

Q: Were you aware of some of the problems that the training process had. Under Davenport Johnson, there were a lot of complaints.

C: I remember Davenport Johnson coming into the office in the Pentagon, and I remember it, because as I recall, he had two or three Distinguished Service Crosses, Distinguished Cross with two or three oak leaf clusters, and that naturally, attracted my eye, as an old combat man. But I don't remember, that you had implied the trouble that Davenport got into, or if he was having trouble at all, or even where he was.

Q: He was in charge of the 2nd AF, and there were a lot of complaints about inadequate aerial gunnery training, and high altitude flying, and some of the other problems.

C: I know that that was a state of affairs that was in Old Man Arnold's mind, and I'll get to this later on. But at any rate, he didn't, as I recall, he didn't tell me what he thought the situation was out there before he sent me out. In other words, it was pure objective. It was only when I got back to the Pentagon and discussed my report with him, that I discovered that things were not happy in his mind about the B-29, B-17 training. Oh, I'll tell you who I saw out there, Nathan Bedford Forrest in Tucson. That turned out to be the most important point, as a matter of fact, the only point that sticks in my mind about that whole six weeks trip, and you asked about the things he had me do, and as I said, he would send me out and I'll describe some of the other trips later, to observe and come back and write him a short, very short report.

Q: Was he a one page man. Wanted it on one page.

C: No, but I was. And besides, I was pretty green, young and I just didn't have a hell of a lot to say, frankly, I didn't know a hell of a lot about many things. I knew something about some of the things, but not many. I wasn't what you would call broad-shouldered, if I ever had that, I certainly wasn't at that point. But at any rate, I remember one amusing incident about this report, which

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proves your point that something was wrong with that B-17 training. Mr. Lovett was a protector of mine, for some reason, he tried to ease the way for me, he was my coach, and he tried to coahh me in what Gen Arnold expected, and how to get along with Gen Arnold, and all of this. I remember one of the things he said to me, ~~he said,~~ "Dick, now you are up there because the Old Man wants to talk with you, and he just doesn't want ~~to/get~~ a "yes man" there, he wants somebody intelligent and knowledgeable," ~~and he said,~~ Lovett I remember the way he demonstrated it, ~~he said,~~ "when he throws that ball to you, you throw it right back." Well, after that trip, I wrote Gen Arnold this one page report and I had a good report on the B-17 training, it looked good to me, of course, I didn't know any good B-17s, anyway. I wouldn't have known good training from bad training, but at any rate, I was in his office there, talking about this one page report, ~~and~~ he liked the short one page report/// idea, but he didn't agree with me about the quality and the state of training out there. Now, as I recall the story, it wasn't so much the quality of the training, they weren't turning out crews fast enough for Europe. So I think it was ~~f~~ both the quality and the quantity of the crews we were Gen ~~turn~~ing out. But at any rate, whether I was right, or whether he was right, I remember what Mr. Lovett had told me about throwing that ball back, and I thought, "well, by gosh, what do you know, this is one of those occasions," So he would come out against these guys that were letting him down out there in Arizona, they don't know their backsides from a gin whistle, and they are turning out lousy crews, and they are not turning out enough of them, and all of this, ~~and~~ I was arguing just the other way, throwing the ball back, ~~and~~ I don't think he realized that I was even there, or that I was just a real young junior guy, all at once he happened to stop and looked at me like he just finally realized, here I was wet behind the ears, arguing with him, and he was three stars at that time, - the head airman. so he pulled himself up, and he said, "Carmichael, he said, let's stop. I want to tell you something. He said, "from now on, you work on the assumption that I know what the hell I am talking about." And I said, "yes sir," and walked out.

Carmichael: Talks Back to Lovett. Lovett Gives Him Guidance

6.21 x 5.65

Q: He suddenly caught himself up short, that here was a give and take with a junior officer, you were what, a Col or LTCOL?

C: I had just been made a full Colonel. So I walked down the hall and s~~aw~~

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I said, "Mr. Lovett, that didn't work."

Q: He threw the ball back to you?

C: I don't know whether Mr. Lovett remembered it or not.

Q: I saw him in NY, he's in very good shape.

C: He's a wonderful guy. I liked and admired both Bob Lovett and Old Man Arnold.

Q: You know, based on what you say, it recalls to mind, something Lovett said about his trying to act as a balance wheel to sort of fend off problems, you know, Arnold was an impulsive man, I guess, and sometimes if Lovett felt he went too far in one direction, he sort of tried to rectify things, bring it back to an even keel and I guess Lovett felt that Arnold was a man of great ability but impetuous, perhaps, and so he was a stabilizing force. Is that correct?...

C: I think you are absolutely right. I think you are. He was the gyroscope that would get things going in the right direction, and I think he and Old Man Arnold were a very fine pair together. They complemented each other, and Old Man Arnold had the conviction and the brilliance, the forcefulness. He was a very forceful guy. And Mr. Lovett was, he's been sitting back, more intelligent of the two, I think, overall, and older and wiser, and he didn't get upset, and he didn't get mad, and want to fight. I've seen Old Man Arnold, as a matter of fact, old Gen Grant the Flight Surgeon, Dave Grant, was really worried about Gen Arnold. I remember he made him put a cot in one of those offices next to his office, and forced him to take a nap to relax for a half hour every afternoon, as a matter of fact, I remember now, that was part of my job, if the old man couldn't sleep, we would go in there and talk about bird hunting or duck hunting or golf or anything that he wanted to talk about, except the war. It was supposed to be a half hour of either sleep or relaxation. He had a condition which I later found out was called tachycardia. It's a fast pulse.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me, is that an athletic heart, so of?

C: Well, I think you could call it that.

Q: The technical term for it?

C: Let's see, do you remember that old Secretary named Talbott, he had the same thing. Harold had the same thing, because I remember the Flight Surgeon in the

Carmichael: Grant Tries To Shield Arnold's Health 6-98

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Carmichael: POW – Arnold Takes Fatherly Interest

6.2

Pentagon in the mid 50's, Grover, was treating Talbot and later, I got the same thing, so that's the reason I know. It was tachicardia that old man Arnold had, and he would bounce up a pulse that they couldn't even measure on whatever you call this gadget.

Q: You know, I asked somebody, did you ever see Arnold mad? I think it was Beebe who said, he got mad every day. Did he get mad in you?

C: I would say that he got mad at somebody two or three times a day. I think that was part, that made his day, I don't think he could really call it a complete, successful day unless he got mad at two or three people.

Q: Did he get mad at you ever?

C: Well, it was like throwing the ball back and forth. It was one of the instantaneous red in the face, flushed, he was what you might call mad, but it was just off the top of his head, it didn't mean anything.

Q: It wasn't a grudge or anything?

C: Oh no, he always treated me very kindly and fatherly, and I was later shot down and taken prisoner you know, after he put me with the B-29s, and came back on Barney Giles airplane, Barney Giles, I guess, was still Chief of the Air Staff,

Q: Was that when the three planes came back right at the end of the war?

C: Right. Well, Barney came over and Phil Best, do you remember him?

Q: I remember his name

C: He was Barney Giles' pilot, he was later Fairchild's pilot. And Gen Giles came to Japan just at the end of the war, just about VJ Day, and Dick King and I had been taken out of prison camp and put on the USS Benevolence, a hospital ship in Tokyo Bay, and old man Giles came to visit and he said, "look, ~~he said~~, Dick, I'm going, ~~both of us, he said I'm going~~ to take one of those three B-29s and we are going to fly from the northern island Hokkaido ~~Iwojima, Okinawa~~) to Washington." He said, you are all can have my airplane and Phil Best will fly you back home to Washington, D.C., and meet me there. And that's what happened, except Dick King couldn't come with us, I think they thought he had something, tuberculosis, they wanted to keep him on the hospital ship longer. I flew

Q: ~~So you flew back in those three planes, LeMay and Giles, and I guess was~~

~~It O'Donnell,~~

~~G: I don't know. I didn't fly back in the B-29. I~~ flew back in the old man's C-54. See, he went to Japan in his C-54, ~~and~~ while he was over there, then he decided to transfer and fly one of the B29s, ~~fly in one of the B-29s,~~ so he had to send his C-54 back home, ~~and~~ he said, "you take it, or you can come home in it." And to tie that back in to Gen Arnold, he didn't meet the airplane, but Gen Giles did, and my wife was on board, ~~with me clear up to~~ we picked her up at Hamilton in California, ~~and~~ Gen Giles said, "well, come on Dick, you and ~~Mary~~ Muriel," and we got in a staff car and we went right over to General Arnold's quarters, ~~and~~ he got mad again, this time at the Japanese, and the stories I told him about the way we had been treated. He got mad and indignant, but that getting mad was just part of General Arnold. I mean, that was his personality.

Q: A relief ease of energy?

C: I think everybody expected. As a matter of fact, aside from Bob Lovett, Suzy Adkins was also my coach, from the woman's point of view, of how to get along with Gen Arnold, what he expected, and what he wanted.

Q: She was sort of a weathervane, wasn't she?

C: Suzy had been with old man Arnold so long that I think she knew him, she knew his temperament, and his immediate temper, whether he was in a good mood, whether receptive to this type of thing, or whether you better stay the hell out of there.

Q: I understand she would call somebody up ~~and~~ where, somebody would want to see the general, and she would say, "not today," ~~and~~ then she would call them up the next day, and say, "today's a good day." So she was a weathervane and gave you the climate. Perhaps somebody who would want to see Gen Arnold, would come in and ask her, "do you think he would like to hear about this?"

C: She did, she was more than a secretary, she was an ~~Exe~~ Exec tive secretary, ~~and~~ certainly, she would handle the old man. She was very concerned about his pulse rate and his heart condition, ~~and~~ she was ~~also~~ more or less was the implementer of anything that David Grant said, she said, "you've got to do this now," or come in and remind him it was time to take his nap, or

Q: Did he have a short heart attack during the TRIDENT conference. Now, you were in the office at the time, this is May 1943, you remember, Churchill came, the ~~British~~

(6:21) Anecdotes: Suzy Adkins - Weathervane -

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British staff came, and they had conferences in Washington in May 1943 and Arnold did not participate in those conferences he went out to Oregon my reasoning is that Marshall told him to take it easy I don't know if it was diagnosed as a heart attack, but maybe just overwork ~~and of course,~~ at that time, he was looking for a ranch out on the west coast, and I think he and Mrs. Arnold went out to the MacKenzie river, somewhere around there, about that time. Does that register in your recollection?

C: No. I don't remember that

Q: Do you remember that conference with the British coming here?

C: ~~I think~~ this gets back to this business of sending me as his observer, and I think, at the time you speak of, that I was in England and North Africa there was a survey being made to determine the maximum potential of the British Isles for taking B-17s. Nobody knew just exactly how many could we take over there. Considerations of air space, and how many we could park on a base, and the whole logistic air space situation. So he sent me over as his ~~representative,~~ personal representative to participate in that, and that must have been May 1943 because I got back, and I went on a third trip to Alaska, for an entirely different purpose. So I don't think I was there (in Washington when he had a heart attack).

Q: What purpose did you go to Alaska for?

C: To observe the invasion of Kiska and if you know,

Q: That was an embarrassing moment, wasn't it?

C: Kiska never came off. Our invasion, to get ahead of myself, but to get up to the edd result was that the Japanese pulled their forces out by submarine before we ever invaded

Q: And we didnt know.

C: They found an empty island

Q: Right, wasn't that embarrassing.

C: That, I don't remember I wasn't there long enough, I wasn't part of the ground forces but I would imagine, now that you mention it, I think it was pretty much of a fiasco all the way through.

Q: It was an intelligence fiasco they failed to discern the fact that the Japanese had evacuated. We had this big landing force, and there wasn't a Jap on the island.

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C: That's right. The old man told me and Uncle Horace Shelmire to go to Alaska. There was an invasion coming off up there to kick the Japanese out of Kiska, and that he wanted a personal representative up there to report back to him. I think I went along because I was a B-17 pilot, somewhere along the line, Felix Vidal came along. So Felix and I went to West Point together, and we were old friends, so I said, hey, Felix, come on, and you be the copilot in the B-17. he's a fighter pilot.

Q: He's around here, did he know Arnold?

C: I don t know that he ever worked directly for General Arnold, but Felix and I were just out at the polo game a couple of weeks ago. We were talking about some of these old times. Not Arnold, but we were talking about Alaska. And we had a secondary mission, he wanted us (General Arnold) not only to observe this invasion that didn't come off, but he wanted us to land in every airfield up there in a B-17 and give him our impression of the suitability of the field, parking areas, and ramps, and all of this. So that's what we did. We picked up Bob Sherrod, Time Magazine, in Anchorage, he was an old friend of mine in the Pacific. he was still with Time then. I ran into, later, one of the many editors of Saturday Evening Post, before it folded. But Bob Sherrod joined us at Anchorage, and we went out on a cold day, Umnak, Amchitka, and we finally ended up at Adak with old man Bruce Butler who had the 11th AF, and then they still were poised at Adak. I guess, I guess it was the closest island to Kiska. So that's where the ground force was, and the naval force. They had a hell of a big Navy force out there. I remember we had to come in over the Navy to land in Adak. Well, we went on out to Attu because a very close friend and classmate of mine was the G-2 of the infantry division out there, that had come from southern California, I think, into Attu to kick the Japanese out, and they had a hell of a big battle. They were still shooting, I think, when we landed at Attu. So we spent a night or two there, and then came on back to Adak, and I think it was then that we found out everything had been called off on the invasion. That there were not any Japanese over there.

Q: Didn't they actually send a landing force in, and then they discovered no Japs? When did they find out there were not Japs? [illegible]....

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C: That I don't remember.

Q: ~~I don't believe~~, Of course, this is not an AF thing primarily, but I believe that the landing force ~~was~~ went in, they had the amphibious craft and everything else, and they went into the beach and no opposition. They found no Japs, it was one of the embarrassing moments of the war.

C: I won't go any further into that, because to tell you the truth, I just don't remember. That particular point doesn't register on me, it is not as vivid in memory as going out to Atu, or picking up Bob Sherrod, or some of these other things.

Q: You know, a couple of months after Kuter, ~~that~~, Bruce Butler was promoted by Arnold. Arnold had a high regard for him, and he put Davenport Johnson out there. He took him out of the 2nd AF and put him out in the 11th AF.

C: I don't quite remember that. Except Arnold was very fond of old man Bruce Butler, because after the war, I went down to the Air University in the first class of the Air Command and Staff School, and I stayed on later, after graduation, for 2 years on the staff and worked for Del Spivey and Pearl Robey, and one day Dale Smith called up ~~and said~~ the Research Division, ~~but~~ which later became the Evaluation Division. We worked on a lot of problems that had been passed to the University when they did away with the old Tactical Board at Orlando, they had a lot of problems working

Q: Yes, School of Applied Tactics, they called it?

C: Yes, that's right. We took that over. Or Dale Smith took it over first and then later Pearl Robey and he was under Delmar Spivey who I think was the Deputy for Academic Instruction, Air University, under Schlatter and Fairchild.

Q: Let's go back to Arnold's office, your tour there. Was his brother-in-law Hank Pool, in that office, was he around there at that time, Mrs. Arnold's brother? He was a Colonel, J. Henry Pool. Does that register?

C: I don't think he was around the Pentagon for any length of time when I was there. I do remember meeting him, though.

Q: He died last week, by the way.

C: Is that right? I do remember meeting him, but I don't know, nothing sticks to my mind about him being there frequently, or even ~~having~~ hanging around.

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Q: He was a hunting companion, he hunted, fished and when Arnold went somewhere, he took him on trips. Arnold was always talking about hunting and fishing, and he seldom went, but it was a great diversion for him. I have looked at many letters ~~about~~, thousands of letters that he wrote, and anybody that could talk about hunting or fishing, that ~~opened, that~~ was the key that opened the door, and then he would write a long letter. Sometimes he'd get a letter and write some note in the corner, and he would have somebody on the staff answer it. But if it was hunting and fishing, invariably, he would answer it himself. You mention these relaxation periods.

C: I was ~~always~~ not an experienced hunter and fisher, hunting pheasants quite a bit, but he and I didn't engage in that too much, although I remember that in this room, where he had this cot or bed, and was supposed to relax every afternoon, it was filled with Fish ~~and~~ & Stream and all these ~~hunting~~ hunting magazines. He and I, for some reason, didn't talk about hunting. As a matter of fact, I think he had just about exhausted, he gotten just about everything he thought he could from me, and as I say, I was out on these trips for quite a while, I was six weeks touring ~~Rome~~/on that first trip to look at the ~~B-17~~ B-17 training, specifically, then I went to England, and somewhere or another, we ended up in North Africa, to visit General Spaatz, ~~and~~ we ran into another party there, with Mr. Lovett, now who was the old General that had a heart attack over there in North Africa

Q: Was it Follett Bradley?

C: Follett Bradley. There was a mix up in the change of airplanes because I came home with Mr. Lovett on his airplane, but we toured North Africa and ~~no one~~ Nelly ~~you know, it~~ Major General Nelson, Nelson?

Q: Otto Nelson?

C: No, I don't know what his first name is

Q: Is he AF or Army? (Note: maybe Erik Nelson)

C: They call him Nelly. He's AF. He was on this survey and we went to England first, ~~and~~ we talked to LeMay, first time I ever met LeMay, he and I were both full Colonels, I was one of these boy colonels, and he was a little bit older, we sat across the table from each other, ~~and~~ I ostensibly equal rank, ~~and~~ but

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not in equal power. But, then we went on down to North Africa, but to make a long story short, that must have taken four or five weeks, the trip to Alaska, as I recall, was three weeks

Q: So a good deal of the time you were out of the office?

C: A good deal of that, I was there less than 9 months, and I would say I was out of the office ~~(more than,~~ maybe 2/3 of the time.

Q: Do you think that his relieving Davenport Johnson was in any way related to your report on the training progress? Did you ever associate the two?

C: My report on the training was favorable. And it came about principally from talking with Walt Agee, a little bit with Nathan Bedford Forrest, and I'm not sure whether old Lowell Smith was up there or not. Maybe that was later. ....~~favorable and~~ to go back to Davenport Johnson, which seems to be of interest to you, I really don't know much about what happened to Davenport Johnson. I didn't even know that he was out there in charge of B-29s, or B-17 training, and I didn't remember it until you mentioned it, that he had been sent to relieve Gen Butler.

Q: You know, Butler was a favorite son of Arnold's, Butler got a job in the OVERLORD ~~invasion~~ operation, and he got in trouble with Leigh Mallory. Remember Leigh Mallory of the British? He was in charge of the AEAF.

C: Well, I didn't finish off the point. In my service at the Air University, old man Butler lived in Pratt Field, just north of Montgomery. So I saw quite a bit of Bruce Butler after the war

Q: Did he ever tell you about him and Leigh Mallory?

C: No, you are telling me a lot of things that I haven't heard of.

Q: About the B-29 program. ~~Now~~, this was one of Arnold's pets. He had great interest in that, because this was the weapon they were going to use to finish off the Japs. Did he talk to you about his aspirations for the B-29?

C: I'm not sure whether it was the old man or not, but I know that by the time I left the Pentagon, I knew that the B-29s were about the hottest thing in the books, ~~and that~~ we had a mission to do to get bombs on the Japanese islands, and that we had a time limit, and that old man Arnold had committed himself to the President to do such and such. I don't /think/ think I remember the timing of that.

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I don't think I knew the timing. He didn't reveal all of his innermost secrets to me, I was still just a junior birdman from the field. But I knew that it was important, and it was a great honor to me, in my youth at that time, to be selected to be one of the commanders of those four groups, at the same time, it gave old man Arnold a very easy way of getting somebody else in his office, because he told me one time, he said, "Dick, you're just not cut out for this type of work, at this particular period in your development," and I said, "General, I know that." So he made it easy. I think the same thing may have happened to Blondie Saunders, I mean the same reasoning.

Q: Blondie Saunders was also one of his favorites?

C: Because Blondie wasn't much of a staff guy, either.

Q: He had the 11th Group out there, and I'll tell you something, again, that I think I know. Arnold never had any combat experience himself, the first war he tried to get overseas and by the time he got there, the war ended,

C: Suzy Adkins told me all of this.

Q: So he had this sensitivity and admiration for somebody who had combat, and here you and Blondie Saunders came back, and you were really one of the first people who had extended combat in WWII, and he had great admiration and respect for you fellows.

C: As a matter of fact, you know, he picked those four group commanders himself. I think he picked everybody that K. B. Wolfe got, and as I remember the story, he rewarded K.B. for K.B. was an old materiel type but for having brought the B-29 along, he rewarded K.B. with this combat command, the 20th AF.

Q: Right, this was, he gave Wolfe what, the 58th Wing?

C: No, the 20th AF was formed at Salina, Kansas, and the 58th Wing simultaneously under, at Salina, Kansas. K.B. Wolfe had the 20th AF and Blondie Saunders had the 58th Wing. Now Howard Engler, Al Hardy, very, and [illegible], Jake Harmon [illegible] and I were the four group commanders, and we reported directly to Blondie Saunders, as far as our efficiency or effectiveness reports were concerned. But, in effect, BLondie and K.B. Wolfe were both sitting up there in the No. 1 spot. There was very little distinction or separation of the 58th Wing Hqs and the 20th AF Hqs. It was there on paper, but in practice, it didn't turn out that way at all. As a

matter of fact, Arnold was so impressed with combat, that he had put a requirement that anybody that took one of those B-29s groups, or at least these first four to India, had to have combat experience. Lou Parker, was one of the group commanders designates of these first four and he, and I believe, Howard Engler, who had no combat experience, or Jake Harmon, one of the two, two of them went to Great Britain, to England, to fly a few combat missions in order to qualify for the B-29 commanders. And Lou Parker got shot down and was taken prisoner.

Q: I talked to him, I wasn't aware of that. Tell me about the trip to Kansas.

C: Parker went to England to get some instant combat experience and one of them was shot down and spent the rest of the war in a German prison, and I am almost certain, but not sure, that it was Lou Parker.

Q: I think you are right. I think earlier than that he had served as Arnold's pilot, second pilot. Pete Peterson was Arnold's No. 1 pilot. But tell me about the trip to Kansas, Arnold's trip to Kansas.

C: This was later in the year, we got there in August I guess by Sept we had gotten a few B-17s, B-26s and I think one or two B-29s. The schedule got behind so we didn't get any B-29s, and all of our people, of course had the old three wheel, two main gear tail wheel type of training, and very few, if any, had the nose wheel type like the B-29 had. So they gave us some B-26s, Martin B-26s, so that we could get experience landing those gear airplanes. Well, the APQ-13 was a brand new radar set that was to go on the airplane, the B-29, it got behind schedule as a matter of fact, I guess, everything got behind schedule because of these things, perhaps even the training, I don't remember.

Q: Weren't the engines catching fire?

C: Yes, swallowing valves, and catching fire. We lost one at 30,000 feet right over my field at Walker, Kansas. But things got behind to the extent it needed some high level push. So for what it was worth, old man Arnold came to Kansas.

Q: Was this in March 1944?

C: Latter part of February or March.

Q: It was very cold out there?

Carmichael: Arnold's Trip to Kansas on B-29's - March 1944

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C: Very cold, but he came out and he was giving everybody hell about everything.

Q: He came out there with Benny Meyers?

C: I believe so.

Q: And he was using this as sort of a headquarters for modification of these planes? I mean ~~he was~~, was he having suppliers bring in parts to fix different planes?

C: We were getting that, we were getting things directly from the factory on the highest priority basis in the AF.

Q: How logg did he stay?

C: We were getting field representatives out there; we were getting anything we wanted, we were the first priority in the AF.

Q: How long did he stay?

C: That I don't remember.

Q: Benny Meyers stayed there for some time, didn't he?

C: I don't know, but I will tell you Blondie Saunders would know, because all of this took place at Blondie's Headquarters. So Blondie and K.B. Wolfe, have you interviewed either of those?

Q: Yes, I have, K.B. Wolfe I have.

C: Well then you might ask Blondie, when you see him, about old man Arnold's spring trip to Kansas, to push the B29s off.

[illegible]

C: ~~.....couple of years~~, I don't know whether I read it somewhere or somebody told me, and I did not know this when I left the Pentagon, I ~~did~~ thought that old man Arnold had committed himself to the President to have bombs on Japan the first of March 1944. And that we didn't hit that date, and he was just giving everybody hell, he was raking everybody up and down the line

Q: Yes, he was

C: Civilian, military, everybody.

Q: He was raking everybody up and down, you are right. He had given these promises, and then the B-29 encountered ~~some~~ problems. The engines and the training, the radar, all kinds of things, it was a radically new airplane and it had a lot of bugs.

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C: We, in effect, we just really service tested the B-29 in India, we didn't hurt Japan. About the most good that we accomplished in India, flying over the Hump to China, and then on to Japan, we just wrung that airplane out in the old 3350 engine ~~and the~~, the only thing wrong with the B-29 was that it had a right engine, if it had a Pratt & Whitney engine it would have been a wonderful airplane, as later the B50 was, I had the 93rd Group with B-~~50~~s which was the old B29 with a 4360 Pratt Whitney engine, which was a beautiful airplane

Q: Yes, those Wright Cyclones did not do the job.

C: We had a wonderful group of TechReps, and I remember we had three in my group alone, from the Wright Engine people, ~~and~~ there was a design deficiency in the ~~fourth~~ forced lubrication of the valve on top, ~~and~~ somehow or other, this top three valves up there, were not getting their fair share of oil, and they were getting hot, break, and then the valve stem would fall down in the cylinder, and it would just tear the hell out of the engine and catch on fire. The prop would run away. It was a hell of a big headache; it was a principal headache.

Q: Do you have any specific recollection of Arnold out at Salina, any specific incidents of Arnold running around or chewing people out, or doing anything out there?

C: As a matter of fact, I can't remember really whether I saw him or whether this is all something that I just heard from Blondie or K.B. Wolfe.

Q: I see, you were not out there at the time?

C: I was at Walker, this base about 25 or 30 miles away. That was my base, and I think maybe the old man came over there to visit me, but just to take a look at another base. And I don't remember that he raised hell with me, or any of the group commanders, I think it was just K.B. Wolfe and Blondie Saunders that caught hell, ~~[illegible]~~. I'll tell you an incident with Arnold.

C: One of my duties while I was in the Pentagon was to prepare his briefing book when he went up to the President, and aside from keeping it fancy, I was supposed to keep it accurate, ~~and~~ in order to do this, airplane production and deployment statistics were a vital part of what the president wanted to know. How many have we got, and where are they? How many are over there; how many are here? General Arnold had to be able to answer those things ~~at a~~ flip ~~of~~ a page.

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Well, I had to go to Benny Meyers to get a figure, so I went down to Planning, I got another figure from Orvil Anderson, I went to a Wright Patterson representative I believe, or maybe that's what Benny Meyers was, but, at any rate, I got three different sets of figures, and I had a hell of a time getting those things straight in Old Man Arnold's book. One time I didn't get them straight, I didn't check it carefully enough, he got up there, and wouldn't you know, the president asked him something, and he had to refer to my figures twice, and somehow in the discussion there was an error of 5,000 airplanes, and apparently, old man Arnold caught hell from the president, in a good natured way, oh, you don't know what you are talking about, a 5,000 airplane error, go on back home, or something. The Old Man came in the room, I remember this, I was sitting at the desk, four of us, with Suzy Atkins right at the entrance, and he came in and he threw that book at me, and he said: "Carmichael, he said, that's the God-damnest book I've ever seen, let somebody else prepare it for me from now on." It was only later that I found all of this out.

Q: This probably contributed to his opinion that you were not cut out for staff work.

C: The same thing, to go back to your original point about Jackie Cochran. And I think you probably know all the background on Jackie trying to get a separate woman's flying corps in uniform and away from the WACS, at that time I was a pretty good looking young junior colonel, and it just happened to fall in the field of tactics, I guess, that is the reason I was assigned the job to try to help Jackie to get a separate woman's AF. So she came to the office, and I made an appointment with Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, and we went up to see her, well, we got out the door, as I remember, and I thought, maybe it would be a good idea if these two girls are going to agree to anything, and I was optimistic, we ought to take this down and be sure that it's on the record, not just talk. So I called one of the pretty little secretaries to come along with me and asked Suzy to send someone with me, we got up to Oveta's office, and I hadn't realized at all, all through this I realized the mistake I had made, having a secretary sitting off in the corner, unobstrusively I hoped, taking all this down in shorthand. I wanted something back in writing to take into the old man, anyway. Well I had no sooner gotten back to the office, and I didn't get any reaction, I don't remember any reaction from Jackie that something

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was wrong. But I got back to the office and Gen Stratemeyer sent for me and he said; I went across the hall and he said; Dick, what in the hell have you done? He said; I just got a call from Mrs. Hobby that you insulted her." And I told Gen Stratemeyer this whole thing, and he said; well, it was a mistake to take that secretary along, to take the notes on the meeting." And then, of course, Gen Strat later that day had to report all this to Gen Arnold, and I remember Gen Arnold came out of the office again, he didn't have anything to throw at me, like that book, and he said; Carmichael," he said, you messed it up. He said you set this woman's program back three months. Don't ever let me catch you talking to the women again.

Q: This caused a very stiff, formal conference between them. Hobby and Cochran?

C: Right.

Q: And no agreement, of course.?

C: No. As a matter of fact, I later found out - you can correct me if you know more about it than I do - that Oveta Culp Hobby wasn't about to agree to anything like that, or anything that Jackie wanted, anyway.

Q: These two girls didn't see anything eye to eye.

C: They didn't see anything eye to eye. They came from completely different backgrounds, completely different interests, and completely different in every way.

Q: Cochran told me, from her viewpoint, that Oveta Culp Hobby wanted to take over the WASPS, she wanted to integrate them into the WACS, and Cochran wasn't about to let them go.

C: Yes, I guess that's it. But the WASPS had no official status

Q: Right, they were civilians.

C: As a member of the armed forces.

Q: Jackie Cochran wated to get them commissions?

C: Right. As a separate corps, under her control, under her command.

Q: And Hoby wanted to absorb the WASPS? They were throwing knives?

C: That's it. And Jackie wouldn't agree to let them go into the WACS. And Oveta wouldn't let them to be a separate entity.

Q: So they were throwing knives at each other. And the stenographer took all this down?

C: Oh, good heavens....

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C: I was sitting there, innocent and naive, fat and happy, and I didn't even realize what was going on. But I guess that's where Jackie, I've seen here many times since, she remembers it because of my innonence in dealing with a couple of sharp women. I just didn't have the intuition to keep up with it.

Q: Hoby had kept her waiting sometime, did she? Or maybe it was at another meeting. She kept her waiting a long time, ~~this all led~~

C: It wasn't affable. As a matter of fact, Jackie came over during the Korean war, and they had some sort of a reception for her over there. I forget what her mission was, but she had some commission from, I'm not sure whether it was Chief of Staff, or the President or something, but she was over there, in Tokyo, in some sort of official status, and somebody had a big party for her at the University Club, because I remember she was in the receiving line and I came in from Yakota, I had the FEAF Bomber Command, and I came in and went down the line, and later talked with her and she was...

Q: She always remembered that?

C: She was recalling the incident.

Q: She was the one who told me to be sure to see you and get this insight.

C: She, incidentally, is a very good buddy of Connie Lamath who is staying with us.

Q: Let me take you back to the 19th Bomb Group. ~~This is the one~~, were you part of the group that flew into Pearl Harbor in the middle of the attack. Were you with Ted Landon?

C: That's not the 19th. This is a story that Fredette was interested in, one of them. I was part of the old 7th Group, and we got orders to go to the Philippines under a code name PLUM, none of us knew that it was a code name, but we suspected it. I knew it, because I was the group operations officer until Bob Pirtle was killed just two weeks before we were to leave, and Bob Pirtle had the 88th Reconnaissance Squad, which was the leadoff squadron of the 7th Bomb Group, four squadrons to go. He took his family to Denver and flew back to Salt Lake City in a B-18, and they got iced up and they had to bail out, and the airplane came around and killed him while he was in his parachute descending. Now, the 88th Reconnaissance Squadron belonged to the 7th Bomb Group. The 38th Reconnaissance

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Squadron, which was Ted Landon's squadron, was a part of the 19th Bomb Group which was already in the Philippines, and why they were late deploying and going to the Philippines, I don't know. But we both got to Hamilton the night of December 6th, we were lying there Friday or Saturday, but, and Old Man Arnold was out there.

Q: Right, did you see him there?

C: He called Ted and me in. Ted's squadron was due to take off at 9;30 which it did, and mine was due to take off at 10 PM, which we did. Six airplanes out of eight in each case, each squadron. Old Man Arnold, I think, had been out hunting somewhere.

Q: He was going out the next day with Donald Douglas

C: He stopped by Hamilton, and I remember we were in a hangar there that night just waiting for the takeoff, and it must have been around 7:30, 8:00, and old man Arnold showed up and he called Ted Landon over, and somebody sent for me, and I came over and he took us into a little room in the hangar, and we talked for quite a while, he said, "look boys, he said, things are getting real serious, he said, I know you've got guns on your airplanes, but they are in cosmoline. he said, Now, the first thing you do when you get to Hawaii tomorrow, you have them take those guns out and clean them and load them up with ammunition for the flight on from Hawaii to the Philippines," he said, "things are getting real serious and something could happen at any time," of course, he hadn't anticipated Pearl Harbor. But he knew, and he told us, that things were getting hot.

Q: Both he and Marshall figured that if the Japanese attacked, it would be the Philippines.

C: I don't think anybody but Mitchell figured it was going to be Pearl Harbor. I don't think Arnold had any particular foresight or prescience that anybody else didn't have, but he had a lot of intelligence that none of us had. We were fat and happy, we didn't think anything was going to happen. As a matter of fact, we weren't even thinking about that, we were so concerned and worried about heavy weight takeoff, flying all that distance over water to the Philippines.

Q: Let me ask you - Did General Arnold have a sense of humor? He had a smile on his face.

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C: He could appreciate a joke, but he was a real busy man, he was always running, mentally and physically, almost, but he had so much to do at that time, that he didn't sit around and leisurely mull them up and tell a joke. Now, we would get back into his room, as I remember, he was either getting something from me about Australia, or B-17 operations, or there was somebody else there, Mr. Lovett used to come in. I don't remember him as a humorous fellow. It didn't stick to my mind that he was like Rosie O'Donnell, or that he either was looking for or tell a joke. I don't connect humor with him at all

Q: I guess there was no time to sit around and tell a joke?

C: He was not inclined to be really intimate with anybody except his old buddies, West Point classmates, as I remember, and his old friends from the Air Corps. I don't mean this in any way, hostile, but there was a generation gap there.

Q: You are absolutely right. You were at least a generation behind him. Who were some of the people that he was convivial with? Do you remember?

C: I had always thought that he got along very well with Gen Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and the two or three times that Davenport Johnson, I always thought they were pretty intimate, althoggh as I told you, I didn't know Gen Davenport Johnson very well at all

Q: How about Jakie Fickel, did you ever see them together?

C: Yes, Gen Fickel was out at Hamilton the night we took off for Pearl Harbor

Q: Right, he had the 4th AF out there.

C: Right, I think they were good friends. Oh, Dave Grant, he and Dave were always together, as a matter of fact, Gen Grant used to come into those afternoon sessions more or less enforcing his own suggestion, or therapy

Q: You mean to give him a half hour a day relaxation? Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and giving them some assignment foreign to their experience or job. Did you ever hear of this happening, somebody getting grabbed in the hall?

C: No, I don't ever remember walking down the hall with Gen Arnold. Pete Peterson more or less acted as his aide, as well as his pilot while I was there, but I was not that intimate, really. I was just one of four. I wasn't the No. 1

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man in his office. As a matter of fact, I think he was very close to Horace Shelmite, he and Uncle Horace and Uncle Horace used to come into these afternoon relax sessions.

Q: They got along very well?

C: Yes. Uncle Horace was what, was he kin to Mrs. Arnold?

Q: No, not kin, but a lot of people thought he was kin. They were brought up in the same town and I'm not sure, schoolmates, or old friends from Pennsylvania, way back.

C: He believed outdoors was good for anybody, everybody.

Q: Did he ever talk about Joe Elliott?

C: He used to go hunting with Glen Martin, was there some where around Baltimore?

Q: Yes, Middle River, they went duck hunting. I think Marshall went with them to. I know at lease on one occasion, they went up there duck hunting. Did he ever mention Joe Elliott to you, he was one of the foresters out on the west coast, and he used to correspond with these foresters. He had gone on a hunting trip, or a fishing trip in the High Sierras in 1939 or 1940, and in 1944 he and Marshall took a week on a pack horse trip into the High Sierras. This was after you left, because, Marshall used to envy Arnold after the war. Now, about Arnold and Marshall. Did you ever see them together?

C: I remember that Gen Arnold took me down and introduced me to Gen Marshall and I remember taking a paper or book or answer to a question up there a couple of times, but I don't know that I was ever in the audience at the same time the two of them got together

Mrs.C: Another person that would know them well would be Mrs. Patterson.

Q: Yes, she lives in the area.

Mrs.C: Have you seen her too?

Q: No ...he was the Under Secy of War.

Mrs.C: It's a Junior Army Navy Girl, they first started out like candy stripers are now, and she organized these young girls in JANGLE

Q: Mrs. Patterson organized them?

Mrs.C: Yes.

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Q: Mrs. Arnold was very active in the Army Emergency Relief

Mrs.C: Yes

Q: Did you work fot her in that group?

Mrs.C: No.

C: I'll tell you, this Army Navy Relief reminds me of a very close friend of Gen Arnold's I think that you haven't mentioned.

Q: Moss Hart?

C: General Howard Davidson.

Q: I saw him.

Mrs.C: He was the head of that for years.

Q: Right.

C: He was in and out of Gen Arnold's office even back when I was there in 1943.

Q: He doesn't live very far from you. I talked to him.

C: "The AF is going to take care of their own."

Q: Somebody told me that Mrs. Arnold is supposed to have originated that slogan.

C: I wouldn't be surprised, but I know it goes way back, it's not something new.

Q: Mrs. Arnold had a great feeling for people, too. Mrs. Arnold was a great helper for him. You say, she helped you get an apartment when you arrived in Washington?

C: She was very kind to us, we loved her. She was very kind to my young bride, child bride, as a matter of fact, after I was shot down ...

Q: When were you shot down?

C: August 1944, after I was shot down, the Arnolds were instrumental, partly and Muriel went to work for Ralph Royce, whom you know, was in the 1911 class of 1914, and probably the old timer that I knew the best, and Muriel went to work for Ralph Royce at some sort of a personnel center in Pauling, NY.

Q: Oh yes, this was the rehabilitation center?

C: Maybe that was it.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was very interested in that. This was something that Howard Rusk setup.

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C: Yes, I broke my leg in Hawaii and spent almost a year in the hospital. When I got out of Letterman in 1939, and reported for work out at Hamilton, old man Ralph Royce was commander of the 7th Group, he wasn't when we later went overseas. He had been pulled off to go to England, someplace, promoted and he was a MG then. But, the Arnolds had a hand in getting Muriel a job up there at Pauling, ~~and Royce,~~ The first Mrs. Royce, I think, was still alive, they were up there, and they were all, including my wife, good friends of Lowell Thomas, who lives up there, maybe still does.

Q: Yes, he still does. He's one of these people I haven't interviewed. I'm trying to get to see him.

C: He probably will tell you, as a matter of fact, I don't connect him with Gen Arnold, I think they were friends.

Q: Yes they were. Mrs. Arnold, anything about her,

C: No, I think that

Q: She remembered names, didn't she? She had a very good memory for names.

C: That I don't recall. But I know that she, too, treated me in a very kindly way. She wasn't coaching me, but I think she knew that her husband was a pretty rough guy to get along with, so she went out of her way to be nice to me and my wife. I guess, kind of compensating, as a wife will do.

Q: Was your wife a little scared about being thrown into this Washington society?

C: Not too much, No she was a pretty sophisticated person. When I married her she had just graduated from the American Academy of Dramatic Arts and she had all the poise. I got her away from MGM. We were young and green, but I don't know that she was scared.

Q: Some people have told me, this is before the war, a young wife coming into a base, Col Arnold is the big man on campus, and Mrs. Arnold tried to make the young brides feel very much at home. Most of the women say that.

C: I think she would do that. As I remember Mrs. Arnold, because Gen Arnold was a very big, forceful, impressive man.

Q: Did he dominate a room?

C: Oh yes, he didn't have the same type of magnetism or magnetic personality

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that MacArthur had, and rhetoric, articulation, but his presence was there. The same way with Gen Marshall. All of these great men had a great presence in a room. Marshall, Arnold, MacArthur, I knew Gen MacArthur, I guess a little bit better than, well, no, I guess I didn't know him better, but I had several occasions to see Gen MacAthur, but his is the type of, well, like seeing a bird startled, that was the effect he had on me. It was just so close to the sun, you were seared.

Q: MacArthur had this tremendous personality. Arnold had a high pitched voice, though, didn't he? Was he an impressive speaker?

C: No, I don't remember that. I remember Omar Bradley did. Bradley was on the Tactical Board as a Major at West Point when I was a cadet, and he was one of the guys that gave me a 6 and 20. Six demerits and 20 confinements one time. Omar had a high voice, we called him Omar Khayam at West Point. But I don't remember that about Gen Arnold. He favored the

Q: ~~Did Arnold speak off the cuff~~

C: ~~I~~ very terse, short sentences, like Bob Hope, one line throw away, he didn't philosophize and analyze, and talk, or articulate like Gen MacArthur.

Q: When you were there, he had this so-called Advisory Staff, he had Cabell and Norstad, and then Jake Smart came in there, and later on Rosie O'Donnell came in there. These were the so-called thinkers that he had, did you have any contact with them?

C: No, I think that was just getting started about in 1943. I do remember though that they were just a long range thinking group down the hall. Kuter, was the one I connected with that

Q: Kuter, Loutzenheizer, and Lindsay some of the others

C: I remember they were getting started. I remember Gen Cabell

Q: You say Arnold was not a philosophizer, somebody who, a conceptual man, he was a doer, wasn't he, more than a thinker?

C: Right, right. I don't think you could classify him as a thinker.

Q: He wasn't a great strategic thinker?

C: He had a fixed idea about the ~~Army~~ theory, most of which I think he Doubet believed. I know he believed that you could send these airplanes, the bombers, daylight unescorted.

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Q: Was he very strong for daylight bombing?

C: As I remember, he, somewhere, and I would assume that it must have had at least his concurrence, there was this theory that came from the old tactical school, as I recall, that daylight bombing was feasible, economical, and the best way to do the job, ~~and I~~ don't know that he was the principal advocate of all of this, but I think that certainly he went along with it. He must have been a part of the force behind that daylight bombing.

Q: He tried to carry it through, but they were caught short in long range pursuits. The P51 came along later, and of course, we suffered some terrible losses in Europe. Do you have any comment as to why we did not anticipate the need for long range escort?

C: I think it was just kind of a general theory that was taught before the war that these things were impregnable, or at least to the extent that the losses were going to be those that we could economically absorb without escort, I know that my boss in Australia, when Gen Kenney came over and Ennis Whitehead, was Ken Walker.

Q: He was killed later

C: Medal of Honor winner

Q: He had been an instructor at the Tactical School before WWII down at Maxwell. They all believed in this impregnability of the feasibility of daylight bombing without escort.

Q: There was one time when the bomber was faster than the fighter, so you didn't need a shower plane to protect it.

C: That might have been part of it too.

Q: I want to ask you about your experiences in Australia. Brett was there. He was the leading Air man, and he ran afoul of MacArthur, and MacArthur got him out of there, and they brought Kenny in. Do you have any knowledge as to what happened?

C: I was down on the staff for three months in Melbourne, but I was working directly for Ralph Royce, who was Gen Brett's tactical man, at least on the American side of it, there was some RAAF Air Vice Marshal that Ralph Royce was working with. I can't remember his name. I remember vaguely that there was

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friction down there after Gen MacArthur got there, but in July 1942 I left to go take command of the 19th Bomb Group in Marceba, way up in the York peninsula, inland from Cairns. I later heard the story that there was friction. You talk about Kenney when he worked for old man Douglas, he would know he was down there on the staff in Melbourne all through that time. It was after I got to Marceba that Gen Brett and Gen Royce went home, and Gen Kenney, Ennis Whitehead and Ken Walker came over to replace them, so I was out in the sticks. I didn't know, had no way of knowing about the infighting.

Bill Hipps

Q: We are talking about Arnold's trip to the Pacific, Sept and Oct 1942. You had breakfast with him.

C: I don't remember exactly those dates, but I remember we were in Port Moresby and we were up there, I think, we had just come back from a raid. I guess it was a night mission over Rabaul, and we were having breakfast that morning, and it was a wooden building, I remember, in came Gen Arnold and his staff. As a matter of fact, that's the first time I ever met Jim Bevans, and I started complaining then about what we were getting, but the thing I was complaining then about to Gen Bevans, I believe he was a BG then, and to Gen Arnold was that I still had six navigators who were flying cadets. They had never gotten their commissions, and they had been fighting the war for six months over there, on $75.00 a month. And it just so happened that the navigator on Gen Arnold's airplane was a classmate from the Pan American navigator's school in Miami of one or more of my navigators who were still flying cadet and this classmate, Gen Arnold's navigator, was a Captain, and these poor guys that I had were still flying cadets, at $75 a month.

Arnold in Pacific; Gets Jolt on Washington - Nov 1942

Q.21

4.38 Continued:

Q: Then he fixed that up when he got back. You know, when he came out there he left a whole stream of directives to change things, didn't he? When he went on this special trip?

C: He did, and as a matter of fact, that ties into why he kept me in his office, because it was just a couple of months later, that I got back, and he had been out there, and he had heard our spiel there, the whole staff complaining, and that all ties in as to why he kept me there, get some of these things straightened out, so you are right; I'd forgotten it, but it was to ride

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herd on some of these orders that he had previously issued before I got in to his office.

Q: Your coming back was related to his meeting you out there? So you could follow up on some of the recommendations you had made to him.

C: Right, I was certainly intimate with the situation.

Q: Tell me about Arnold at Port Moresby at that time?

C: He was up there, I guess, Gen Kenney was with him, and Ennis Whitehead. Whitehead was Kenney's forward commander at Port Moresby, and Freddy Smith was up there. He was Chief of Staff to Kenney.

Q: I talked with Freddy Smith

C: Is he still in Washington?

Q: Yes Your estimate of Arnold—

Q: You liked him?

C: We were two of those that liked him. He was just a real big man of great stature, I don't mean physically, but I mean he impressed me as just the finest type of leader that we had.

Q: Do you think that anybody else could have done the job he did?

C: Well, I don't think that anybody had the earmarks of the No. 1 man around the Air Staff that I saw in the way to the extent that Gen Arnold did. He was obviously the boss, no question about it.

Arnold: Arnold as leader 6.90

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Interview, MG Richard Carmichal, Washington, D.C., Sept 30, 1970

Q: Do you remember your first encounter with Arnold?

C: Well, when the 19th Bomb Group got back from Australia in November 1942 we had complained so bitterly about getting the short end of the stick out in the Pacific where the Hitler strategy, you know, everything going to Europe. Old Man Arnold directed that I bring two of my squadron commanders and several staff officers from the 19th Bomb Group back for a debriefing in the Pentagon, although I don't think they called it debriefing then. And we had, I guess about 3 mornings in the Pentagon. At least the first morning I remember, I led off as group commander. Old Man Arnold was there, and the whole room was filled with his staff. We were the first of the combat group staffs to have returned to the Pentagon, and as such, we were quite a novelty, but we also had a lot of complaints. After this was all over, he said to Jim Bevans, his personnel officer: "Jim, could you keep that young fellow here and put him in my office until some of his complaints are cleared up, and that's how I got to know him. I got in his office. He figured that he needed somebody else. I don't know when Gene Beebe had left, but he had three people in there then. He had Uncle Horace Shelmire. Uncle Horace took care of mostly his personal, and his social, and all the very intimate things, because he and Uncle Horace went to high school together, or Mrs. Arnold, somewhere in Pennsylvania.

Q: Yes, he came from Pennsylvania. I missed talking to him.

C: There was a fellow named Peterson, materiel type, and R&D type, and he took care of the technical side. Then there was a young fellow from LA, I believe, and I can't remember his name, except that it started with a "Mac." He was a lawyer type.

Q: Was it Bob Proctor, his lawyer?

C: No, the legislative side of things.

Q: Oh, McIntyre, Jim McIntyre, I saw him down in Montgomery, Alabama. He was the first L&L. I saw him about two or three months ago.

C: Right, so the Old Man took me in, and I would take care of the tactical

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combat side, only trying to keep him informed. Then, of course, there was Suzy Adkins, she took care of everything. But that was the family for nine months. I got there, I guess I started work for General Arnold in December 1942, and he booted me upstairs into the B-29s in August of 1943. Blondie left about that time too, Blondie Saunders. I think that old man Stratemeyer and General Arnold found out that Blondie and I weren't cut out for that type of work anyway. We didn't have experience enough to really be of any help to him.

Q: By that time Giles had replaced Stratemeyer?

C: Oh, that's right, Barney Giles came in.

Q: Stratemeyer left around a month or two before you did.

C: Sure, that's right. Barney Giles came in right after that.

Q: What were some of the projects that Arnold gave you to do?

C: The first thing he did was to send me out, I think, out of the kindness of his heart, to give me a chance to catch up after having been gone a year. He sent me out on a six weeks, more or less, sightseeing tour. At the same time, this more or less set the pattern for what I did for him thereafter. I wasn't a trouble-shooter like St. Clair Streett, I was an observer. I would go out and report back to him. But I went on about a six-weeks trip. I got an airplane of my own. It was a single engine biplane Cessna. And I took off. I went down to Marietta, Georgia. I saw the B-29, I saw Blondie Saunders down there, too. I went down into Florida to see the 3rd AF, Jim Parker. I went through Selfridge. As I remember, the only thing specific the Old Man told me to look for was to go to Tucson and find out what I thought about the quality of the training of the B-29 crews, under, I believe, Lowell Smith.

Q: Bob Harper involved in that training?

C: I think Gen Harper, I believe Gen Harper was in the Pentagon.

Q: Yes, he was in charge of the whole training. But was that under the 2nd AF, wasn't Davenport Johnson in it?

C: Tucson, Arizona.

Q: It was a subsidiary training establishment.

C: I'm not sure whether Lowell Smith was there at Tucson. Well, I know Walter Agee was, because I had known Walter previously.

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Q: Were you aware of some of the problems that the training process had. Under Davenport Johnson there were a lot of complaints.

C: I remember Davenport Johnson coming into the office in the Pentagon. I remember it because as I recall he had two or three Distinguished Service Crosses, DSC's with two or three oak leaf clusters, and that naturally, attracted my eye, as an old combat man. But I don't remember, as you had implied the trouble that Davenport got into, or if he was having trouble at all, or even where he was.

Q: He was in charge of the 2nd AF, and there were a lot of complaints about inadequate aerial gunnery training, and high altitude flying, and some of the other problems.

C: I know that that was a state of affairs that was in Old Man Arnold's mind, and I'll get to this later on. But at any rate, as I recall, he didn't tell me what he thought the situation was out there before he sent me out. In other words, it was pure objective. It was only when I got back to the Pentagon and discussed my report with him, that I discovered that things were not happy in his mind about the B-29, B-17 training. Oh, I'll tell you who I saw out there. Nathan Bedford Forrest, in Tucson. That turned out to be the most important point, as a matter of fact, the only point that sticks in my mind about that whole six weeks' trip. You asked about the things he had me do. As I said, he would send me out - and I'll describe some of the other trips later - to observe and come back and write him a very short report.

Q: Was he a one-page man? Wanted it on one page?

C: No, but I was. And besides, I was pretty green, young and I just didn't have a hell of a lot to say, frankly. I didn't know a hell of a lot about many things. I knew something about some of the things, but not many. I wasn't what you would call broad-shouldered. If I ever had that, I certainly wasn't at that point. But at any rate, I remember one amusing incident about this report which proves your point that something was wrong with that B-17 training. Mr. Lovett was a protector of mine. For some reason, he tried to ease the way for me. He was my coach, and he tried to coach me in what Gen Arnold expected, and how to get along with Gen Arnold, and all of this. I remember one of the things he said to me:

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"Dick, now you are up there because the Old Man wants to talk with you, and he just doesn't want a 'yes man' there. He wants somebody intelligent and knowledgeable." Lovett said; I remember the way he demonstrated it: "When he throws that ball to you, you throw it right back." Well, after that trip, I wrote Gen Arnold this one page report and I had a good report on the B-17 training. It looked good to me. Of course, I didn't know any good B-17s, anyway. I wouldn't have known good training from bad training. But at any rate, I was in his office there, talking about this one page report. He liked the short one page report idea, but he didn't agree with me about the quality and the state of training out there. Now, as I recall the story, it wasn't so much the quality of the training. They weren't turning out crews fast enough for Europe. So I think it was both the quality and the quantity of the crews we were coming out. But at any rate, whether I was right, or whether he was right, I remember what Mr. Lovett had told me about throwing the ball back. And I thought: "Well, by gosh, what do you know. This is one of those occasions." So he would come out against these guys that were letting him down out there in Arizona. They don't know their backsides from a gin whistle, and they are turning out lousy crews, and they are not turning out enough of them, and all of this. I was arguing just the other way, throwing the ball back. I don't think he realized that I was even there, or that I was just a real young junior guy. All at once he happened to stop and looked at me like he just finally realized. Here I was wet behind the ears, arguing with him, and he was three stars at that time - the head airman. So he pulled himself up, and he said: "Carmichael," he said, "let's stop. I want to tell you something." He said: "From now on, you work on the assumption that I know what the hell I am talking about." And I said: "Yes sir," and walked out.

Q: He suddenly caught himself up short, that here was a give and take with a junior officer. You were what, a Colonel or LTCOL?

C: I had just been made a full Colonel. So I walked down the hall and I said: "Mr. Lovett, that didn't work."

Q: He threw the ball back to you?

C: I don't know whether Mr. Lovett remembered it or not.

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Q: I saw him in NY. He's in very good shape.

C: He's a wonderful guy. I liked and admired both Bob Lovett and Old Man Arnold.

Q: You know, based on what you say, it recalls to mind, something Lovett said about his trying to act as a balance wheel to sort of fend off problems. You know, Arnold was an impulsive man, I guess. Sometimes if Lovett felt he went too far in one direction, he tried to rectify things, bring it back to an even keel. I guess Lovett felt that Arnold was a man of great ability, but impetuous, perhaps, and so he was a stabilizing force. Is that correct?

C: I think you are absolutely right. I think you are. He was the gyroscope that would get things going in the right direction. I think he and Old Man Arnold were a very fine pair together. They complemented each other, and Old Man Arnold had the conviction and the brilliance, the forcefulness. He was a very forceful guy. And Mr. Lovett was - his alter ego - sitting back, more intelligent of the two, I think, overall. Older and wiser, and he didn't get upset, and he didn't get mad, and want to fight. I've seen Old Man Arnold. As a matter of fact, old General Grant, the Flight Surgeon, Dave Grant, was really worried about Gen Arnold. I remember he made him put a cot in one of those offices next to his office, and forced him to take a nap to relax for a half hour every afternoon. As a matter of fact, I remember now, that was part of my job, if the Old Man couldn't sleep, we would go in there and talk about bird hunting or duck hunting or golf or anything that he wanted to talk about, except the war. It was supposed to be a half hour1 of either sleep or relaxation. He had a condition which I later found out was called tachicardia. It's a fast pulse.

Q: Mrs. Arnold told me, is that an athletic heart, sort of?

C: Well, I think you could call it that.

Q: The technical term for it?

C: Let's see, do you remember that old Secretary named Talbott, he had the same thing. Harold had the same thing, because I remember the Flight Surgeon in the Pentagon in the mid 50's, Gruver, was treating Talbott. Later, I got the same thing, so that's the reason I know. It was tachicardia that old man Arnold had.

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And he would bounce up a pulse that they couldn't even measure on whatever you call this gadget.

Q: You know, I asked somebody: "Did you ever see Arnold mad?" I think it was Beebe who said: "He got mad every day." Did he get mad at you?

C: I would say that he got mad at somebody two or three times a day. I think that was part, that made his day, I don't think he could really call it a complete, successful day unless he got mad at two or three people.

Q: Did he get mad at you ever?

C: Well, it was like throwing the ball back and forth. It was one of the instantaneous red in the face, flushed. He was what you might call mad, but it was just off the top of his head. It didn't mean anything.

Q: It wasn't a grudge or anything?

C: Oh no, he always treated me very kindly and fatherly. I was later shot down and taken prisoner you know, after he put me with the B-29s. I came back on Barney Giles airplane, Barney Giles, I guess, was still Chief of the Air Staff.

Q: Was that when the three planes came back right at the end of the war?

C: Right. Well, Barney came over and Phil Best. Do you remember him?

Q: I remember his name.

C: He was Barney Giles' pilot; he was later Fairchild's pilot. And General Giles came to Japan just at the end of the war, just about VJ Day. Dick King and I had been taken out of prison camp and put on the USS Benevolence, a hospital ship in Tokyo Bay. Old man Giles came to visit and he said: "Look, Dick, I'm going to take one of those three B-29s and we are going to fly from the northern island Hokkaido to Washington." He said, you all can have my airplane and Phil Best will fly you back home to Washington, D.C. and meet me there. And that's what happened, except Dick King couldn't come with us. I think they thought he had something, tuberculosis. They wanted to keep him on the hospital ship longer. I flew back in the old man's C--54. See, he went to Japan in his C-54. While he was over there, then he decided to transfer and fly one of the B-29s. So he had to send his C-54 back home. He said: "You take it," or you can come home in it. And to tie that back to Gen Arnold. He didn't meet the airplane, but Gen Giles did, and my wife was

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on board. We picked her up at Hamilton in California. Gen Giles said: "Well, come on Dick, you and Muriel, and we got in a staff car and we went right over to General Arnold's quarters. He got mad again, this time at the Japanese, and the stories I told him about the way we had been treated. He got mad and indignant but that getting mad was just part of General Arnold. I mean, that was his personality.

Q: A release of energy?

C: I think everybody expected it. As a matter of fact, aside from Bob Lovett, Suzy Adkins was also my coach, from the woman's point of view, of how to get along with Gen Arnold, what he expected, and what he wanted.

Q: She was sort of a weathervane, wasn't she?

C: Suzy had been with Old Man Arnold so long that I think she knew him. She knew his temperament, and his immediate temper, whether he was in a good mood, whether receptive to this type of thing, or whether you'd better stay the hell out of there.

Q: I understand she would call somebody up where somebody would want to see the general, and she would say: "Not today," then she would call them up the next day, and say: "Today's a good day." So she was a weathervane and gave you the climate. Perhaps somebody who would want to see General Arnold, would come in and and ask her: "Do you think he would like to hear about this?"

C: She did, and she was more than a secretary, she was an Executive Secretary. Certainly, she would handle the Old Man. She was very concerned about his pulse rate and his heart condition. She was more or less the implementer of anything that David Grant said. She said: "You've got to do this now." Or come in and remind him it was time to take his nap.

Q: Did he have a short heart attack during the TRIDENT conferences. Now, you were in the office at the time, this is May 1943. You remember, Churchill came. The British staff came, and they had conferences in Washington in May 1943. Arnold did not participate in those conferences. He went out to Oregon. My reasoning is that Marshall told him to take it easy. I don't know if it was diagnosed as a heart attack, maybe just overwork. At that time, he was looking for a ranch out on the

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West Coast, and I think he and Mrs. Arnold went out to the MacKenzie River, somewhere around there, about that time. Does that register in your recollection?

C: No. I don't remember that.

Q: Do you remember that conference with the British coming here?

C: This gets back to the business of sending one of his observers, and I think, at the time you speak of, that I was in England and North Africa. There was a survey being made to determine the maximum potential of the British Isles for taking B-17s. Nobody knew just exactly how many could we take over there. Considerations of air space, and how many we could park on a base, and the whole logistic air space situation. So he sent me over as his personal representative to participate in that. That must have been May 1943 because I got back, and I went on a third trip to Alaska, for an entirely different purpose. So I don't think I was there (in Washington when he had a heart attack).

Q: What purpose did you go to Alaska for?

C: To observe the invasion of Kiska and if you know,

Q: That was an embarrassing moment, wasn't it?

C: Kiska never came off. Our invasion, to get ahead of myself, but to get up to the end result was that the Japanese pulled their forces out by submarine before we ever invaded.

Q: And we didn't know?

C: They found an empty island.

Q: Right, wasn't that embarrassing?

C: That, I don't remember. I wasn't there long enough, I wasn't part of the ground forces. But I would imagine, now that you mention it, I think it was pretty much of a fiasco all the way through.

Q: It was an intelligence fiasco. They failed to discern the fact that the Japanese had evacuated. We had this big landing force, and there wasn't a Jap on the island.

C: That's right. The Old Man told me and Uncle Horace Shelmire to go to Alaska. There was an invasion coming off up there to kick the Japanese out of Kiska, and that he wanted a personal representative up there to report back to him. I think I went along because I was a B-17 pilot, somewhere along the line, Felix

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Vidal came along. Felix and I went to West Point together. We were old friends, so I said: "Hey, Felix, come on, and you be the copilot in the B-17." He's a fighter pilot.

Q: He's around here, did he know Arnold?

C: I don't know that he ever worked directly for General Arnold, but Felix and I were just out at the polo game a couple of weeks ago. We were talking about some of these old times. Not Arnold, but we were talking about Alaska. We had a secondary mission. General Arnold wanted us not only to observe this invasion that didn't come off, but he wanted us to land in every airfield up there in a B-17 and give him our impression of the suitability of the field, parking areas, and ramps, and all of this. So that's what we did. We picked up Bob Sherrod, in Anchorage, he was an old friend of mine in the Pacific. He was still with Time then. I ran into, later, one of the many editors of Saturday Evening Post, before it folded. But Bob Sherrod joined us at Anchorage, and we went out on a cold day, Amnak, Amchitka. We finally ended up at Adak with Old Man Bruce Butler who had the 11th AF. Then they still were poised at Adak. I guess it was the closest island to Kiska. So that's where the ground force was, and the naval force. They had a hell of a big Navy force out there. I remember we had to come in over the Navy to land in Adak. Well, we went on out to Attu because a very close friend and classmate of mine was the G-2 of the infantry division out there, that had come from southern California, I think, into Attu to kick the Japanese out. They had a hell of a big battle. They were still shooting, I think, when we landed at Attu. So we spent a night or two there, and then came on back to Adak. I think it was then that we found out everything had been called off on the invasion. That there weren't any Japanese over there.

Q: Didn't they actually send a landing force in, and then they discovered no Japs? When did they find out there weren't Japs?

C: That I don't remember.

Q: Of course, this is not an AF thing primarily, but I believe that the landing force went in. They had the amphibious craft and everything else, and they went into the beach and no opposition. They found no Japs. It was one of the embarrassing moments of the war.

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C: I won't go anv further into that, because to tell you the truth, I just don't remember. That particular point doesn't register on me. It is not as vivid in memory as going out to Attu, or picking up Bob Sherrod, or some of these other things.

Q: You know, a couple of months after Kiska, Bruce Butler was promoted by Arnold. Arnold had a high regard for him, and he put Davenport Johnson out there. He took him out of the 2nd AF and put him out in the 11th AF.

C: I don't quite remember that. Except Arnold was very fond of Old Man Bruce Butler, because after the war, I went down to the Air University in the first class of the Air Command and Staff School, and I stayed on later, after graduation, for two years on the staff and worked for Del Spivey and Pearl Robey. One day Dale Smith called up the Research Division which later became the Evaluation Division. We worked on a lot of problems that had been passed to the Air University when they did away with the old Tactical Board at Orlando. They had a lot of problems working.

Q: Yes, School of Applied Tactics, they called it?

C: Yes, that's right. We took that over. Or Dale Smith took it over first and then later Pearl Robey and he was under Delmar Spivey who I think was the Deputy for Academic Instruction, Air University, under Schlatter and Fairchild.

Q: Let's go back to Arnold's office, your tour there. Was his brother-in-law Hank Poole, in that office? Was he around there at that time? Mrs. Arnold's brother? He was a Colonel, J. Henry Pool. Does that register?

C: I don't think he was around the Pentagon for any length of time when I was there. I do remember meeting him, though.

Q: He died last week, by the way.

C: Is that right? I do remember meeting him, but I don't know. Nothing sticks to my mind about him being there frequently, or even hanging around.

Q: He was a hunting companion. He hunted, fished and when Arnold went somewhere, he took him on trips. Arnold was always talking about hunting and fishing, and he seldom went, but it was a great diversion for him. I have looked at many letters, thousands of letters that he wrote. And anybody that could talk about hunting or fishing, that was the key that opened the door, and then he would

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write a long letter. Sometimes he'd get a letter and write some note in the corner, and he would have somebody on the staff answer it. But if it was hunting and fishing, invariably, he would answer it himself. You mentioned these relaxation periods.

C: I was not an experienced hunter and fisher, hunting pheasants quite a bit, but he and I didn't engage in that too much, although I remember that in this room, where he had this cot or bed, and was supposed to relax every afternoon, it was filled with Fish & Stream and all these hunting magazines. He and I, for some reason, didn't talk about hunting. As a matter of fact, I think he had just about exhausted, he'd gotten just about everything he thought he could from me. As I say, I was out on these trips for quite a while. I was six weeks touring on that first trip to look at the B-17 training, specifically. Then I went to England, and somewhere or another, we ended up in North Africa, to visit General Spaatz. We ran into another party there, with Mr. Lovett. Now who was the old General that had a heart attack over there in North Africa?

Q: Was it Follett Bradley?

C: Follett Bradley. There was a mix up in the change of airplanes because I came home with Mr. Lovett on his airplane. But we toured North Africa and Nelly Nelson, you know Major General Nelson?

Q: Otto Nelson?

C: No, I don't know what his first name is.

Q: Is he AF or Army? (Note: Maybe Erik Nelson)

C: They call him Nelly. He's AF. He was on this survey and we went to England first. We talked to LeMay. First time I ever met LeMay, he and I were both full Colonels. I was one of these boy colonels, and he was a little bit older. We sat across the table from each other, ostensibly equal in rank, but not equal in power. But, then we went on down to North Africa. But to make a long story short, that must have taken four or five weeks. The trip to Alaska, as I recall, was three weeks.

Q: So a good deal of the time you were out of the office?

C: A good deal of that, I was there less than 9 months. I would say I was out of the office maybe 2/3 of the time.

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Q: Do you think that his relieving Davenport Johnson was in any way related to your report on the Training progress? Did you ever associate the two?

C: My report on the Training was favorable. And it came about principally from talking with Walt Agee, a little bit with Nathan Bedford Forrest. I'm not sure whether old Lowell Smith was up there or not. Maybe that was later..... To go back to Davenport Johnson, which seems to be of interest to you, I really don't know much about what happened to Davenport Johnson. I didn't even know that he was out there in charge of B-29s, or B-17 training, and I didn't remember it until you mentioned it, that he had been sent to relieve Gen Butler.

Q: You know, Butler was a favorite son of Arnold's. Butler got a job in the OVERLORD Operation and he got in trouble with Leigh Mallory. Remember Leigh Mallory of the British? He was in charge of the AEAF.

C: Well, I didn't finish off the point. In my service at the Air University, old man Butler lived in Pratt Field, just north of Montgomery. So I saw quite a bit of Bruce Butler after the war.

Q: Did he ever tell you about him and Leigh Mallory?

C: No, you are telling me a lot of things that I haven't heard of.

Q: About the B-29 program. This was one of Arnold's pets. He had great interest in that, because this was the weapon they were going to use to finish off the Japs. Did he talk to you about his aspirations for the B-29?

C: I'm not sure whether it was the Old Man or not, but I know that by the time I left the Pentagon, I knew that the B-29s were about the hottest thing in the books. We had a mission to do to get bombs on the Japanese islands, and that we had a time limit, and that Old Man Arnold had committed himself to the President to do such and such. I don't think I remember the timing of that. He didn't reveal all of his innermost secrets to me, I was still just a junior birdman from the field. But I knew that it was important, and it was a great honor to me, in my youth at that time, to be selected to be one of the commanders of those four groups. At the same time, it gave Old Man Arnold a very easy way of getting somebody else in his office, because he told me one time, he said: "Dick, you're just not cut out for this type of work, at this particular period in your development." And I said: "General, I know that."

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So he made it easy. I think the same thing may have happened to Blondie Saunders, I mean the same reasoning.

Q: Blondie Saunders was also one of his favorites?

C: Because Blondie wasn't much of a staff guy, either.

Q: He had the 11th Group out there. I'll tell you something, again, that I think I know. Arnold never had any combat experience himself.

C: Right.

Q: During the first war he tried to get overseas. By the time he got there, the war ended.

C: Suzy Adkins told me all of this.

Q: So he had this sensitivity and admiration for somebody who had combat, and here you and Blondie Saunders came back, and you were really one of the first people who had extended combat in WWII. He had great admiration and respect for you fellows.

C: As a matter of fact, you know, he picked those four group commanders himself. I think he picked everybody that K.B. Wolfe got, and as I remember the story, he rewarded K.B. Wolfe for - K.B. was an old Materiel type - but for having brought the B-29 along, he rewarded K.B. with this combat command, the 20th AF.

Q: He gave Wolfe what, the 58th Wing?

C: No, the 20th AF was formed at Salina, Kansas, and the 58th Wing simultaneously under it, at Salina, Kansas. K.B. Wolfe had the 20th AF and Blondie Saunders had the 58th Wing. Now Howard Engler, Al Harvey, and Jake Harman and I were the four group commanders. We reported directly to Blondie Saunders, as far as our efficiency or effectiveness reports were concerned. But, in effect, Blondie and K.B. Wolfe were both sitting up there in the No. 1 spot. There was very little distinction or separation of the 58th Wing Hqs and the 20th AF Hqs. It was there on paper, but in practice, it didn't turn out that way at all. As a matter of fact, Arnold was so impressed with combat, that he had put a requirement that anybody that took one of those B-29 groups, or at least these first four to India, had to have combat experience. Lou Parker, was one of the group commander-designates of these first four. He, and I believe, Howard Engler, who had no combat experience,

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or Jake Harman, one of the two, two of them went to Great Britain, to England, to fly a few combat missions in order to qualify for the B-29 commanders. And Lou Parker got shot down and was taken prisoner.

Q: I talked to him, I wasn't aware of that.

C: Parker went to England to get some instant combat experience. One of them was shot down and spent the rest of the war in a German prison, and I am almost certain, but not sure, that it was Lou Parker.

Q: I think you are right. I think earlier than that he had served as Arnold's pilot, second pilot. Pete Peterson was Arnold's No. 1 pilot. But tell me about Arnold's trip to Kansas.

C: This was later in the year, we got there in August. I guess by September we had gotten a few B-17s, B-26s and I think one or two B-29s. The schedule got behind so we didn't get any B-29s, and all of our people, of course, had the old three wheel, two main gear tail-wheel type of training. Very few, if any, had the nose wheel type like the B-29 had. So they gave us some Martin B26s so that we could get experience landing those gear airplanes. Well, the APQ-13 was a brand new radar set that was to go on the airplane, the B-29. It got behind schedule. As a matter of fact, I guess, everything got behind schedule because of these things, perhaps even the training, I don't remember.

Q: Weren't the engines catching fire?

C: Yes, swallowing valves, and catching fire. We lost one at 30,000 feet right over my field at Walker, Kansas. But things got behind to the extent it needed some high level push. So for what it was worth, old man Arnold came to Kansas.

Q: Was this in March 1944?

C: Latter part of February or March.

Q: It was very cold out there?

C: Very cold, but he came out and he was giving everybody hell about everything.

Q: He came out there with Benny Meyers?

C: I believe so.

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Q: And he was using this as sort of a headquarters for modification of these planes? I mean was he having suppliers bring in parts to fix different planes?

C: We were getting that. We were getting things directly from the factory on the highest priority basis in the AF.

Q: How long did he stay?

C: We were getting field representatives out there; we were getting anything we wanted. We were the first priority in the AF.

Q: How long did he stay?

C: That I don't remember.

Q: Benny Meyers stayed there for some time, didn't he?

C: I don't know, but I will tell you Blondie Saunders would know, because all of this took place at Blondie's headquarters. So Blondie and K.B. Wolfe, have you interviewed either of those?

Q: Yes, I have, K.B. Wolfe I have.

C: Well, then you might ask Blondie, when you see him, about old man Arnold's spring trip to Kansas, to push the B-29s off.

C: ...I don't know whether I read it somewhere or somebody told me, and I did not know this when I left the Pentagon. I thought that old man Arnold had committed himself to the President to have bombs on Japan the first of March 1944. And that we didn't hit that date, and he was just giving everybody hell. He was raking everybody up and down the line.

Q: Yes, he was.

C: Civilian, military, everybody.

Q: He was raking everybody up and down. You are right. He had given these promises, and then the B-29 encountered problems. The engines and the training, the radar, all kinds of things. It was a radically new airplane and it had a lot of bugs.

C: We, in effect, we just really service-tested the B-29 in India. We didn't hurt Japan. About the most good that we accomplished in India, flying over the Hump to China, and then on to Japan. We just wrung that airplane out

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in the old 3350 engine. The only thing wrong with the B-29 was that it had a Wright engine, if it had a Pratt & Whitney engine it would have been a wonderful airplane, as later the B-50 was. I had the 93rd Group with B-50s which was the old B-29 with a 4360 Pratt Whitney engine. It was a beautiful airplane.

Q: Yes, those Wright Cyclones did not do the job.

C: We had a wonderful group of TechReps, and I remember we had three in my group alone, from the Wright Engine people. There was a design deficiency in the forced lubrication of the valve on top. Somehow or other, the top three valves up there were not getting their fair share of oil, and they were getting hot, break, and then the valve stem would fall down in the cylinder, and it would just tear the hell out of the engine and catch on fire. The prop would run away. It was a hell of a big headache; it was a principal headache.

Q: Do you have any specific recollection of Arnold out at Salina? Any specific incidents of Arnold running around or chewing people out, or doing anything out there?

C: As a matter of fact, I can't remember really whether I saw him or whether this is all something that I just heard from Blondie or K.B. Wolfe.

Q: I see, you were not out there at the time?

C: I was at Walker, this base about 25 or 30 miles away. That was my base, and I think maybe the Old Man came over there to visit me, but just to take a look at another base. And I don't remember that he raised hell with me, or with any of the group commanders. I think it was just K.B. Wolfe and Blondie Saunders that caught hell.

C: I'll tell you an incident with Arnold. One of my duties while I was in the Pentagon was to prepare his briefing book when he went up to the President. And aside from keeping it fancy, I was supposed to keep it accurate. In order to do this, airplane production and deployment statistics were a vital part of what the President wanted to know. How many have we got, and where are they? How many are over there; how many are here? General Arnold had to be able to answer those things in just flipping a page. Well, I had to go to Benny Meyers to get a figure. I went down to Planning. I got another figure from Orvil Anderson. I went to a

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Wright Patterson representative, I believe, or maybe that's what Benny Meyers was. But, at any rate, I got three different sets of figures, and I had a hell of a time getting those things straight in old man Arnold's book. One time I didn't get them straight. I dicn't check it carefully enough. He got up there, and wouldn't you know, the President asked him something, and he had to refer to my figures twice. Somehow in the discussion there was an error of 5,000 airplanes. Apparently, old man Arnold caught hell from the President, in a good natured way. "Oh, Christ, you don't know what you are talking about. A 5,000 airplane error." He said: "Go on back home,"or something. The Old Man came in the room - I remember this. I was sitting at the desk. Four of us, with Suzy Adkins right at the entrance. He came in and he threw that book at me, and he said: "Carmichael," he said, "that's the God-damnest book I've ever seen. Let somebody else prepare it for me from now on." It was only later that I found all of this out.

Q: This probably contributed to his opinion that you were not cut out for staff work.

C: The same thing, to go back to your original point about Jackie Cochran. And I think you probably know all the background on Jackie trying to get a separate woman's flying corps in uniform and away from the WACS. At that time I was a pretty good looking young junior Colonel. It just happened to fall in the field of tactics, I guess, the reason I was assigned the job to try to help Jackie to get a separate woman's AF. So she came to the office, and I made an appointment with Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby. And we went up to see her. We got out the door, as I remember, and I thought, "maybe it would be a good idea if these two girls are going to agree to anything" - and I was optimistic, "we ought to take this down and be sure that it's on the record. Not just talk." So I called one of the pretty little secretaries to come along with me, and asked Suzy to send someone with me. We got up to Oveta's office. I hadn't realized at all - all through this - didn't realize the mistake I had made, having a secretary sitting off in the corner - unobtrusively I hoped -- taking all this down in shorthand. I wanted something back in writing to take in to the Old Man, anyway. Well, I had no sooner gotten back to the office, I didn't get any reaction, I don't remember any

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reaction from Jackie that something was wrong. But I got back to the office and Gen Stratemeyer sent for me. I went across the hall and he said: "Dick, what in the hell have you done?" He said: "I just got a call from Mrs. Hobby that you insulted her." And I told Gen Stratemeyer this whole thing, and he said: "Well, it was a mistake to take that secretary along, to take the notes on the meeting." Then, of course, Gen Strat later that day had to report all this to Gen Arnold. I remember Gen Arnold came out of the office again. He didn't have anything to throw at me, like that book, and he said: "Carmichael," he said, "you messed it up. You set this woman's program back three months. Don't ever let me catch you talking to the women again."

Q: This caused a very stiff, formal conference between Hobby and Cochran?

C: Right.

Q: And no agreement, of course?

C: No. As a matter of fact, I later found out - you can correct me if you know more about it than I do - that Oveta Culp Hobby wasn't about to agree to anything like that, or anything that Jackie wanted, anyway.

Q: These two girls didn't see anything eye to eye.

C: They didn't see anything eye to eye. They came from completely different backgrounds, completely different interests, and completely different in every way.

Q: Cochran told me, from her viewpoint, that Oveta Culp Hobby wanted to take over the WASP. She wanted to integrate them into the WAC, and Cochran wasn't about to let them go.

C: Yes, I guess that's it. But the WASP had no official status.

Q: Right, they were civilians.

C: As a member of the armed forces.

Q: Jackie Cochran wanted to get them commissions?

C: Right. As a separate corps, under her control, under her command.

Q: And Hobby wanted to absorb the WASP? They were throwing knives?

C: That's it. And Jackie wouldn't agree to let them go into the WACs. And Oveta wouldn't let them to be a separate entity.

Q: So they were throwing knives at each other.

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C: Oh, good heavens....

Q: And the stenographer took all this down?

C: I was sitting there, innocent and naive, fat and happy, and I didn't even realize what was going on. But I guess that's where Jackie - I've seen her many times since - she remembers it because of my innocence in dealing with a couple of sharp women. I just didn't have the intuition to keep up with it.

Q: Hobby had kept her waiting some time, did she?

C: I guess so.

Q: Or maybe it was at another meeting. She kept her waiting a long time.

C: It wasn't affable. As a matter of fact, Jackie came over during the Korean war, and they had some sort of a reception for her over there. I forget what her mission was, but she had come commission from - I'm not sure whether it was Chief of Staff, or the President or something. But she was over there, in Tokyo, in some sort of official status. Somebody had a big party for her at the University Club, because I remember she was in the receiving line and I came in from Yakota, I had the FEAF Bomber Command. I came in and went down the line, and later talked with her and she was...

Q: She always remember that?

C: She was recalling the incident.

Q: She was the one who told me to be sure to see you and get this insight.

C: She, incidentally, is a very good buddy of Connie Lamath who is staying with us.

Q: Let me take you back to the 19th Bomb Group. Were you part of the group that flew into Pearl Harbor in the middle of the attack. Were you with Ted Landon?

C: That's not the 19th. This is a story that Fredette was interested in, one of them. I was part of the old 7th Group, and we got orders to go to the Philippines under a code name PLUM. None of us knew that it was a code name, but we suspected it. I knew it, because I was the group operations officer until Bob Pirtle was killed just two weeks before we were to leave. Bob Pirtle had the 88th Reconnaissance Squadron, which was the leadoff squadron of the 7th Bomb Group, four squadrons to go. He took his family to Denver and flew back to Salt Lake City

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in a B-18. They got iced up and they had to bail out. The airplane came around and killed him while he was in his parachute descending. Now, the 88th Reconnaissance Squadron belonged to the 7th Bomb Group. The 38th Reconnaissance Squadron, which was Ted Landon's squadron, was a part of the 19th Bomb Group which was already in the Philippines. Why they were late deploying and going to the Philippines, I don't know. But we both got to Hamilton the night of December 6th. We were lying there Friday or Saturday, but, and Old Man Arnold was out there.

Q: Right, did you see him there?

C: He called Ted and me in. Ted's squadron was due to take off at 9:30 which it did, and mine was due to take off at 10 PM, which we did. Six airplanes out of eight in each case, each squadron. Old Man Arnold, I think, had been out hunting somewhere.

Q: He was going out the next day with Donald Douglas.

C: He stopped by Hamilton, and I remember we were in a hangar there that night just waiting for the takeoff, and it must have been around 7:30, 8:00. Old Man Arnold showed up and he called Ted Landon over, and somebody sent for me. I came over and he took us into a little room in the hangar, and we talked for quite a while. He said: "Look, boys,"he said, "things are getting real serious." He said: "I know you've got guns on your airplanes, but they are in cosmolene. Now, the first thing you do when you get to Hawaii tomorrow, you have them take those guns out and clean them and load them up with ammunition for the flight on from Hawaii to the Philippines." He said: "Things are getting real serious and something could happen at any time." Of course, he hadn't anticipated Pearl Harbor. But he knew, and he told us, that things were getting hot.

Q: Both he and Marshall figures that if the Japanese attacked, it would be the Philippines?

C: I don't think anybody but Mitchell figured it was going to be Pearl Harbor. I don't think Arnold had any particular foresight or prescience that anybody else didn't have. But he had a lot of intelligence that none of us had. We were fat and happy. We didn't think anything was going to happen. As a matter of fact, we weren't even thinking about that. We were so concerned and worried about heavy weight takeoff, flying all that distance over water to the Philippines.

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Q: Let me ask you - Did General Arnold have a sense of humor? He had a smile on his face?

C: He could appreciate a joke, but he was a real busy man. He was always running, mentally and physically, almost. But he had so much to do at that time, that he didn't sit around and leisurely mull them up and tell a joke. Now, we would get back into his room, as I remember, he was either getting something from me about Australia, or B-17 operations, or there was somebody else there. Mr. Lovett used to come in. I don't remember him as a humorous fellow. It didn't stick to my mind that he was like Rosie O'Donnell, or that he either was looking for or tell a joke. I don't connect humor with him at all.

Q: I guess there was no time to sit around and tell a joke?

C: He was not inclined to be really intimate with anybody except his old buddies, West Point classmates, as I remember, and his old friends from the Air Corps. I don't mean this in any way hostile, but there was a generation gap then.

Q: You are absolutely right. You were at least a generation behind him. Who were some of the people that he was convivial with? Do you remember?

C: I had always thought that he got along very well with Gen Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and the two or three times that Davenport Johnson, I always thought they were pretty intimate, although as I told you, I didn't know Gen Davenport Johnson very well at all.

Q: How about Jakie Fickel? Did you ever see them together?

C: Yes, Gen Fickel was out at Hamilton the night we took off for Pearl Harbor.

Q: Right, he had the 4th AF out there.

C: Right. I think they were good friends. Oh, Dave Grant. He and Dave were always together. As a matter of fact, Gen Grant used to come in to those afternoon sessions more or less enforcing his own suggestion, or therapy.

Q: You mean to give him a half hour a day relaxation?

C: Yes.

Q: Arnold had a reputation for grabbing people in the hall and giving them some assignment foreign to their experience or job. Did you ever hear of this happening, somebody getting grabbed in the hall?

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C: No, I don't ever remember walking down the hall with Gen Arnold. Pete Peterson more or less acted as his aide, as well as his pilot while I was there. I was not that intimate, really. I was just one of four. I wasn't the No. 1 man in his office. As a matter of fact, I think he was very close to Horace Shelmire - he and Uncle Horace. Uncle Horace used to come into these afternoon relax sessions.

Q: They got along very well?

C: Yes. Uncle Horace was what, was he kin to Mrs. Arnold?

Q: No, not kin, but a lot of people thought he was kin. They were brought up in the same town. I'm not sure, schoolmates, or old friends from Pennsylvania, way back.

C: He believed outdoors was good for anybody, everybody.

Q: Did he ever talk about Joe Elliott?

C: He used to go hunting with Glenn Martin. Was there somewhere around Baltimore?

Q: Yes, Middle River, they went duck hunting. I think Marshall went with them too. I know at least on one occasion, they went up there duck hunting. Did he ever mention Joe Elliott to you? He was one of the foresters out on the West Coast. He used to correspond with these foresters. He had gone on a hunting trip or a fishing trip in the High Sierras in 1939 or 1940. In 1944 he and Marshall took a week on a pack horse trip into the High Sierras. This was after you left. Marshall used to envy Arnold after the war. Now, about Arnold and Marshall. Did you ever see them together?

C: I remember that Gen Arnold took me down and introduced me to Gen Marshall and I remember taking a paper or book or answer to a question up there a couple of times, but I don't know that I was ever in the audience at the same time the two of them got together.

Mrs.C: Another person that would know them well would be Mrs. Patterson.

Q: Yes, she lives in the area.

Mrs.C: Have you seen her, too?

Q: No....he was the Under Secy of War.

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Mrs.C: It's a Junior Army-Navy Girl, they first started out like candy stripers are now, and she organized these young girls in JANGLE.

Q: Mrs. Patterson organized them?

Mrs.C: Yes.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was very active in the Army Emergency Relief?

Mrs.C: Yes.

Q: Did you work for her in that group?

Mrs.C: No.

C: I'll tell you, this Army Navy Relief reminds me of a very close friend of Gen Arnold's I think that you haven't mentioned.

Q: Moss Hart?

C: General Howard Davidson.

Q: I saw him.

Mrs.C: He was the head of that for years.

Q: Right.

C: He was in and out of Gen Arnold's office even back when I was there in 1943.

Q: He doesn't live very far from you. I talked to him.

C: There was a slogan: "The AF is going to take care of their own."

Q: Somebody told me that Mrs. Arnold is supposed to have originated that slogan.

C: I wouldn't be surprised, but I know it goes way back, it's not something new.

Q: Mrs. Arnold had a great feeling for people, too. Mrs. Arnold was a great helper for him. You say, she helped you get an apartment when you served in Washington?

C: She was very kind to us, we loved her. She was very kind to my young bride, child bride. As a matter of fact, after I was shot down...

Q: When were you shot down?

C: August 1944. After I was shot down, the Arnolds were instrumental, partly, and Muriel went to work for Ralph Royce, whom you know, was in the class of 1914,

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and probably the old timer that I knew the best. Muriel went to work for Ralph Royce at some sort of a personnel center in Pauling, NY.

Q: Oh yes, this was the rehabilitation center?

C: Maybe that was it.

Q: Mrs. Arnold was very interested in that. This was something that Howard Rusk set up.

C: Yes, I broke my leg in Hawaii and spent almost a year in the hospital. When I got out of Letterman in 1939, and reported for work out at Hamilton, old man Ralph Royce was commander of the 7th Group. He wasn't when we later went overseas. He had been pulled off to go to England, someplace, promoted and he was a MG then. But, the Arnolds had a hand in getting Muriel a job up there at Pauling. The first Mrs. Royce, I think, was still alive. They were up there, and they were all, including my wife, good friends of Lowell Thomas, who lives up there. Maybe still does?

Q: Yes, he still does. He's one of these people I haven't interviewed. I'm trying to get to see him.

C: He probably will tell you. As a matter of fact, I don't connect him with Gen Arnold, I think they were friends?

Q: Yes, they were. Mrs. Arnold, anything about her?

C: No, I think that....

Q: She remembered names, didn't she? She had a very good memory for names.

C: That I don't recall. But I know that she, too, treated me in a very kindly way. She wasn't coaching me, but I think she knew that her husband was a pretty rough guy to get along with. So she went out of her way to be nice to me and my wife. I guess, kind of compensating, as a wife will do.

Q: Was your wife a little scared about being thrown into this Washington society?

C: Not too much. No, she was a pretty sophisticated person. When I married her she had just graduated from the American Academy of Dramatic Arts and she had all the poise. I got her away from MGM. We were young and green, but I don't know that she was scared.

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Q: Some people have told me - this is before the war - a young wife coming into a base, Col Arnold is the big man on campus, and Mrs. Arnold tried to make the young brides feel very much at home. Most of the women say that.

C: I think she would do that. As I remember, Mrs. Arnold, because Gen Arnold was a very big, forceful impressive man.

Q: Did he dominate a room?

C: Oh yes, he didn't have the same type of magnetism or magnetic personality that MacArthur had, and rhetoric, articulation. But his presence was there. The same way with Gen Marshall. All of these great men had a great presence in a room. Marshall, Arnold, MacArthur - I knew Gen MacArthur, I guess a little bit better than, well, no, I guess I didn't know him better. But I had several occasions to see Gen MacArthur. But his is the type of, well, like seeing a bird startled, that was the effect he had on me. It was just so close to the sun, you were seared.

Q: MacArthur had this tremendous personality. Arnold had a high pitched voice, though, didn't he? Was he an impressive speaker?

C: No, I don't remember that. I remember Omar Khayam Bradley did. Bradley was on the Tactical Board as a Major at West Point when I was a cadet, and he was one of the guys that gave me a 6 and 20. Six demerits and 20 confinements one time. Omar had a high voice, we called him Omar Khayam at West Point. But I don't remember that about Gen Arnold. He favored the very terse, short sentences, like Bob Hope, one line throw away. He didn't philosophize and analyze, and talk, or articulate like Gen MacArthur.

Q: When you were there, he had this so-called Advisory Staff, he had Cabell and Norstad, and then Jake Smart came in there, and later on Rosie O'Donnell came in there. These were the so-called thinkers that he had. Did you have any contact with them?

C: No, I think that was just getting started about in 1943. I do remember though that they were just a long range thinking group down the hall. Kuter was the one I connected with that.

Q: Kuter, Loutzenheizer, and Lindsay some of the others.

C: I remember they were getting started. I remember Gen Cabell.

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Q: You say Arnold was not a philosophizer, somebody who, a conceptual man, he was a doer, wasn't he, more than a thinker?

C: Right, right. I don't think you could classify him as a thinker.

Q: He wasn't a great strategic thinker?

C: He had a fixed idea about the Douhet theory, most of which I think he believed. I know he believed that you could send these airplanes, the bombers, daylight unescorted.

Q: Was he very strong for daylight bombing?

C: As I remember, he, somewhere, and I would assume that it must have had at least his concurrence, there was this theory that came from the old Air Corps Tactical School, as I recall, that daylight bombing was feasible, economical, and the best way to do the job. I don't know that he was the principal advocate of all of this, but I think that certainly he went along with it. He must have been a part of the force behind that daylight bombing.

Q: He tried to carry it through, but they were caught short in long range pursuits. The P-51 came along later, and of course, we suffered some terrible losses in Europe. Do you have any comment as to why we did not anticipate the need for long range escort?

C: I think it was just kind of a general theory that was taught before the war that these things were impregnable, or at least to the extent that the losses, without escort, were going to be those that we could economically absorb. I know that my boss in Australia, when Gen Kenney came over and Ennis Whitehead, was Ken Walker...

Q: He was killed later.

C: Medal of Honor winner that Fredette was talking about. He had been an instructor at the Tactical School before WWII down at Maxwell. They all believed in this impregnability of the....

Q: Bomber.

C: The feasibility of daylight bombing without escort.

Q: There was one time when the bomber was faster than the fighter, so you didn't need a slower plane to protect it.

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C: That might have been part of it too.

Q: I want to ask you about your experiences in Australia. Brett was there. He was the leading Air man, and he ran afoul of MacArthur, and MacArthur got him out of there. They brought Kenney in. Do you have any knowledge as to what happened?

C: I was down on the staff for three months in Melbourne, but I was working directly for Ralph Royce, who was Gen Brett's tactical man, at least on the American side of it. There was some RAAF Air Vice Marshal that Ralph Royce was working with. I can't remember his name. I remember vaguely that there was friction down there after Gen MacArthur got there. But in July 1942 I left to go take command of the 19th Bomb Group in Mareeba, way up in the York peninsula inland from Cairns. I later heard the story that there was friction. You talk about knowing Bill Hipps when he worked for old man Douglas. He would know. He was down there on the staff in Melbourne all through that time. It was after I got to Mareeba that Gen Brett and Gen Royce went home, and Gen Kenney, Ennis Whitehead and Ken Walker came over to replace them, so I was out in the sticks. I didn't know; I had no way of knowing about the in-fighting.

Q: We are talking about Arnold's trip to the Pacific, in September and October 1942. You had breakfast with him?

C: I don't remember exactly those dates, but I remember we were in Port Moresby and we were up there. I think we had just come back from a raid. I guess it was a night mission over Rabaul. We were having breakfast that morning, and it was a wooden building, I remember. In came Gen Arnold and his staff. As a matter of fact, that's the first time I ever met Jim Bevans, and I started complaining then about what we were getting, but the thing I was complaining then about to Gen Bevans, I believe he was a BG then, and to Gen Arnold was that I still had six navigators who were flying cadets. They had never gotten their commissions, and they had been fighting the war for six months over there, on $75.00 a month. And it just so happened that the navigator on Gen Arnold's airplane was a classmate from the Pan American navigator's school in Miami of one or more of my navigators who were still flying cadets and this classmate, Gen Arnold's navigator was a Captain. These poor guys that I had were still flying cadets at $75 a month.

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Q: Then he fixed that up when he got back. You know, when he came out there he left a whole stream of directives to change things, didn't he? When he went on this special trip?

C: He did, and as a matter of fact, that ties into why he kept me in his office, because it was just a couple of months later, that I got back, and he had been out there, and he had heard our spiel there, the whole staff complaining. That all ties in as to why he kep me there, get some of these things straightened out. So you are right; I'd forgotten it, but it was to ride herd on some of these orders that he had previously issued before I got in to his office.

Q: Your coming back was related to his meeting you out there? So you could follow up on some of the recommendations you had made to him?

C: Right, I was certainly intimate with the situation.

Q: Tell me about Arnold at Port Moresby at that time.

C: He was up there, I guess, Gen Kenney was with him, and Ennis Whitehead. Whitehead was Kenney's forward commander at Port Moresby, and Freddy Smith was up there. He was Chief of Staff to Kenney.

Q: I talked with Freddy Smith.

C: Is he still in Washington?

Q: Yes.

Q: Your estimate of Arnold - you liked him?

C: We were two of those that liked him. He was just a real big man of great stature, I don't mean physically. But I mean he impressed me as just the finest type of leader that we had.

Q: Do you think that anybody else could have done the job he did?

C: Well, I don't think that anybody had the earmarks of the No. 1 man around the Air Staff that I saw in the way to the extent that Gen Arnold did. He was obviously the boss, no question about it.

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

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Telecon between Dr Green and Major General Richard Carmichael, 19 August 1971

Q: Blondie Saunders sent me a letter telling me about an incident which occurred when Arnold opened the door of the Advisory Council and threw a briefing pamphlet at you. You had prepared it for him.

C: What had happened was that Arnold had found the figures of aircraft off by about 2,000 or 2,500. Blondie later told me that I had forgotten to take into account the pipeline.

Q: Did Arnold get mad about this?

C: Yes, he threw that thing at me and said: "Boy, don't you ever give me any more figures. I'll get them from somebody else." Or something to that effect, I don't remember exactly.

Q: You weren't on the Air Staff for every long?

C: No, I was only there 9 months.

Q: What was Blondie Saunders doing at this time?

C: Well, as I remember Stratemeyer was Chief of Air Staff then. They set up three Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff below him. Blondie was one of the three.

Q: How about Reuben Hood?

C: That must have been later. I remember Barney Giles was around there at that time, but I don't remember.

Q: He was OC&R.

C: Blondie would remember better. He had three cohorts. They were all Deputy or Assistant Chiefs.

Q: You were happy to get out of there?

C: Well, yes, you could say that. I was real happy to get that first B-29 group.

Q: Within the 58th Wing?

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C: Yes, the 58th Wing came under the 20th AF. K.B. Wolfe had the 20th Bomber Command. Arnold had rewarded him for his engineering work on the B-29. And Blondie headed up the 59th Wing. I had one of the four ~~squadrons~~ groups under the 58th. Walker Kansas (?) had one, Al Harvey had one, and Jake Harman had the fourth group.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold went out to Salina, Kansas?

C: Arnold had a March deadline to the President. He was to have bombs over the Japanese mainland. So theold man came out to Salina to find out about production and modifications on the plane. There was something wrong on every plane.

Q: How long did he stay?

C: I'm not quite sure, but I remember him coming to Walker Field, which is about 50 miles west of Hayes, Kansas. Then he went to Salina and Walker Field. Yes, either that, or Blondie took us there.

Q: Do you remember anything about Arnold's wanting to get the planes over Japan on the 2nd anniversary of the Doolittle Raid? Somebody told me that.

C: I'm not sure, I think I remember something about a March 15 deadline. It's hard for me to remember. I remember the Old Man did come to Kansas and I saw him. We may have been late or headed for trouble.

Q: You were having pretty bad weather in Kansas at that time?

C:I don't remember. I only remember one bad snow storm while I was there and then we were stranded on the base for a few days.

Q: Was this about March '44?

C: Yes, that's about the right time.

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Q: K.B. Wolfe didn't stay in India for very long. Do you remember why?

C: Well, I don't know anything first hand. What I would tell you would be just rumors I've heard. Do you know Dwight Montieth? He was on Blondie's and Wolfe's combined staff. He would know more about it.

Q: Could it be that K.B. turned out to be a better Materiel man than a commander?

C:Yes, I guess so, I don't have any first-hand knowledge. Talk to Montieth. He would remember about the inner workings of the staff and the rumors.

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Wed
Sept 30 - 0330
- 767-3998 -

September 18, 1970

Lives Nebraska -
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Blenderwick - R.
Have Guide Copy

M/Gen Richard H. Carmichael, USAF(Ret)
5051 Overlook Road, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Dear General Carmichael:

I'm writing a biography of General Hap Arnold to be published by Random House. I'm a professional historian in the Secretary's office and I've been on a Brookings Fellowship to research the book.

I've had the pleasure of interviewing most of the Air Force greats including Generals Spaatz, Eaker, Twining, LeMay, Harold George, Norstad, Kenney and about 60 others. I've also talked to Robert Lovett, Trubee Davison, Alexander de Seversky and Eddie Rickenbacker.

I recall your name popping up in a couple of contexts. In one instance you were sort of buffer, or maybe "firebreak" between Jackie Cochran and Oveta Culp Hobby.

In any event you probably have many memories of your association with General Arnold and I'd like to get the benefit of some of them at a time and place convenient for you. Local phone OX-53862.

If you'd care to drop me a note, the enclosure will speed it through the Pentagon tangle.

Encl

Sincerely,

DR. MURRAY GREEN
Deputy Chief
Research & Analysis Div.

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Gen Richard Carmichael

Wash DC

Jackie Cochran tells -

Howes Arnold's office - Asked

J.C to take him to

see Hobby re integrating

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

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Letter from Blondie Saunders
11/3/70

Saunders: A Shortage of Airplanes in Carmichael's Report

Did Dick Carmichael tell you about the time General Arnold opened the door of the Advisory Council and threw a briefing pamphlet at him? Carmichael made up some briefing material on airplanes in the overseas commands for Arnold as he had to go up to F.D.R. on request. There was a shortage of 2,500 airplenes in AAF report (Carmichael's) compared with FDR's; Dick had forgotten the airplanes in the pipeline.

Wrote Carmichael 11/18/70 36 - 3998

File Carmichael

cc: Carm →

In box/Dwight Monteith →

Kharagpur

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Carpenter, Charles L. - 29 Apr 74

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24 December 74

Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
716 North Shore Drive
P.O. Box 206
Milford, Del 19963

Dear General Carpenter:

Thank you for sending back the edited transcript. You did a fine job, and I will amend my copies to conform.

Yes, I did talk to Ulysses Nero. We had a fine session and I'm grateful to you for putting me in touch.

Have been working steadily on the Biography. Some accomplishment to date, but a long way still "from the barn."

Merry Christmas to you and to Mrs. Carpenter. Keep well.

You shall have a copy of the opus, if and when, but dont hold your breath.

Mrs. Green and I hope for you both a good and healthy New Year.

Sincerely

Murray Green
Office of AF History

Amended transcript

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Dear Murray

Do I owe you an apology — and I apologize — first lazyness on my part — I'm indeed sorry — Give me another chance and I'll do better

I've made some corrections — most of them put in the rank of the officer about whom we are talking — I'm a little ~~bugs~~ "bugs" on calling these men by their last names only —

The initial is being slumed to you by special cover — Please let me hear from you — did you talk to Col. Dew?

Sincerely

"Bud"

!

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Interview, Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
Milford, Delaware, 29 April 1974

Q When did you first meet Hap Arnold?

C I was ordered into Washington in about July of 1942. I came into the War Department after about four years at Langley Field.

Q In what capacity?

C I was assigned to a new post they called Air Chaplain. It was actually a staff chaplain for the Army Air Corps. And General Arnold was commanding at that time.

Q Who was Chief of Chaplains?

C Major General William Arnold. Very, very fine gentleman.

Q Your job, what did it consist of?

C No one knew what it was when I came in. I was put in the office commanded by, at that time, Colonel David Stinson.

Q What was his job?

C He was in Personal Services in the AAF. I'd been in Langley Field when Col. Stinson was Deputy Base Commander. They brought me in there, and I was told that my job was to organize an Air Force Chaplaincy. Nobody had told Chaplain Bill Arnold, Chief of Chaplains in the Army, that ~~that~~ was going to be done. Nobody sat down with him and discussed this thing. They just had pulled me in and said: "Organize an Air Force Chaplaincy!" Over in the Army Chief of Chaplains they had an office called Air Force Liaison. Ordinarily, the Liaison office is to a group. But the Air Force Liaison over there was an Army Chaplain who stayed in the Chief of Chaplains' office, and liaisoned over to the Air

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Force which meant that he came over to see me. I was supposed to be working under him in the Chief's office, as far as the Army was concerned, but I was working under the Army Air Forces out of the Air Force Chief of Staff's office, as far as the Army Air Corps was concerned.

Q Did you have contact with Hap Arnold at that time?

C Not at first. When I first came in there, no. I was working... in The Personnel Services Division it was a pretty low relationship staff office. It had to do with, really, base services, post exchange, Chaplains, all that kind of thing. I think there was just an attempt to organize an Army Air Corps HQ. I sat down and tried to work out a relationship. But I found that chaplains' reports coming from the field from Air Corps units, never came to Air Corps Headquarters. They always went straight to the Chief's office. So there was no acknowledgment of the fact that the Air Corps Headquarters had anything to so with Chaplains at all. I felt that one of the first things that needed to be done was to get the communication channel straightened out. I went in to the Chief's of Chaplain's office to try to work this thing out, and I found everybody there was dead set against it. They wouldn't change any regulations to send any of these reports in through Air Corps headquarters because that would mean to acknowledge that the Air Corps was sort of a separate service. Nobody over in that Army setup was interested in acknowledging the Air Corps was anything except supportive. We went along with this for a long time, and I'd taken a copy of an amendment to a regulation down to the Chief's office, but nobody would publish it. I took it back up to the office, and was trying to figure how in the world to get it published. One day--you know the Pentagon was physically divided up, a section for the War Department, and a section for the Navy--different sections. I got into a section of the War Department, the Secretary of War section. I was walking down the hall and had this regulation in my pocket. I heard a voice: "Hey, Carp, where are you going?" I turned around and walked into the room there and there sat a Colonel Lynch. Col. Lynch had been at

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Langley Field with me. I ~~said~~ asked: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I work for the Secretary of War in the supply department. I keep an eye on the supplies for the Army Air Corps."

Q Joe Lynch?

C Yes, big tall fellow. This is the story I can't publish but I'm going to tell you. He says: "What are you doing?" I said; "Right now, Joe, I'm trying to find how I can get a regulation published that will send the Chaplain's reports from the Chaplains that are serving in the Army Air Corps units up to this headquarters before they go to the Chief of Chaplain's office." He says: "You got the regulation?" I said" "Yes." I handed it to him. He looked at it and said: "There's nothing wrong with that." I said: "I can't get the Army to agree to it." "Well," he said "don't let that worry you." He reached in his desk drawer, pulled out a stamp which said on the bottom of it "By Order of the Secretary of War" stamped my regulation change and threw it in the OUT basket. I said: "Joe, what are you doing? Somebody will see that thing ~~you've cooked up there~~ coming out of a supply office and you'll be in trouble." He said: "By the time that hits the distribution center they won't know whether it came out of supply, or where it came ~~out of~~ from." Then I went merrily on my way. In about two weeks, the amendment to the Army Regulations was published and the Chaplains were informed that they were to send their reports to the Air Corps Headquarters. The Chief of Army Chaplains office ~~They~~ didn't like it, and I was called ~~into the Chief Army Chaplain's office~~ To come down. As I went in the Chief of Chaplains office I said: "I'm glad you called me. I was just coming down to thank you for publishing that amendment to the Regulations, and making it possible for those reports to come through the headquarters of the Air Corps.

Q What was your rank at the time?

C I was a Major. ~~And he~~ The Deputy Chief of Chaplains said: "I just called you up to ask you how this thing got published." And I said: "I just came down to thank you for publishing it. I didn't know anybody else could publish it but you." And

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then ~~came~~ the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, George Rixie, ~~and he~~ was mad ~~as hook~~ because ~~he was the guy that was holding up all this stuff, and~~ he didn't want any acknowledgment made of any Air Corps separation. ~~And~~ I went back up to the office and told the other Chaplain on duty, Connie Zielinski: "Connie," I said, "I guess we've gotten away with it, but we'd better keep quiet." ~~And~~ that was the beginning ~~and the start of this~~ whole ~~thing~~. After I'd been ~~there~~ a short time, they set up a personnel office under Colonel Jim Bevans. When they set that up, ~~that's~~ the first time I met Hap Arnold. Colonel Bevans called me one day and said: "General Arnold wants to see you. He wants me to go with you to see him." I said: "Fine." So I met ~~him~~ in his office and he took me ~~all~~ over. I was moving around in very sacred territory down there in that General Staff of the Army Air Corps area. ~~He~~ took me in and introduced me to General Arnold. We sat down and General Arnold began to talk. He talked for about ten minutes of what he felt the duties of a Chaplain were with Air Corps personnel. It wasn't a question of extraneous things. It was a good solid type of thing that one minister would talk to another, in regard to the development of morals; in regard to the development of high standards of ethics; in regard to the development of high standards of living. This was the thing he wanted developed ~~among~~ the Chaplains who served in the Air Corps. I would have the full support of his office at any time that I wanted it. ~~And~~ at the end of about ten minutes, he said: "Now, that's your job. Do you understand it?" And I said: "Yes sir, I think I do." And we turned and walked out and as we walked down the hall, Jim Bevans said to me: "I am constantly amazed by that man." He said: "You can sit down and talk to that ~~man~~ about anything that pertains to Air Corps, Aircraft, supplies, anything, but I never have heard him do a thing like this before, ~~but~~ I've never ~~seen~~ him ~~in~~ this field. The standards of morality and leadership and the qualities of manhood. He said: "~~He just~~ constantly amazes me and how big the dream is he has for Army Air." ~~And~~ it was true. I found it was a

great dream.

Q Did he talk about a day ahead when the Army Air Forces would be separate?

C No. It was a completely different story. Hap Arnold never talked to me about a separate Air Corps in that sense. He talked about the Air Corps having the best of everything in the Chaplaincy. Now when we went to war, and went overseas...

Q We were in the war at the time?

C This was some time in '42. I had nothing to say about the movement of Chaplains in the Air Corps units out of the country until we began to get these reports coming through which acknowledged the right of headquarters to have anything to say. I made a deal with the Army Chief of Chaplains. He would give me a list of men coming out of the Chaplains School at Harvard each month and I would suggest Air Corps assignments for them. I would go up and visit that group at Harvard once a month and talk to each one individually, and give him his assignment, and then go on back to Washington. This way I got to know these fellows. I did this every month, ~~and~~ I'd go up and do this job. ~~With~~ the result that we were beginning to get the younger men assigned to Air Corps units which brought a real problem later on in Europe. Because I later went over to Europe as a Staff Chaplain on General Spaatz's staff and ran into the Army Chaplain over there who was on General "Court House" Lee's staff under Eisenhower, and found that he was getting all the older men who were unfit for work. ~~And~~ he was complaining. He worked out a deal with General Lee whereby he was to reach into the Air Corps to take out a hundred men that he wanted and give me a hundred men that he wanted to get rid of. Just carte blanche. ~~And~~ I went in to General Spaatz on ~~that~~. ~~Came~~ back a couple of days later with his request, and he said: "Forget it. It's not going to happen." I ~~said~~: "What's ~~the matter~~?" ~~He~~ said: "I talked to

General Eisenhower and told him I didn't want to lose any of these Chaplains." I said: "General, we made these choices back in Washington, getting these younger men. We did it with the cooperation of the Army Chief of Chaplains. We trained these men in the Air Corps, and we're sending them into Air Corps units, And we want to keep them in Air Corps units." So we won that one. ~~But~~ this was another episode with General Arnold. Two other things came out of this relationship. We were having trouble at that time in some of the installations with strip tease in the Officers' Clubs and Enlisted Men's Clubs. I had assigned a ~~Deputy to me~~, Deputy Air Chaplain, a Catholic named Constantine Zeilinski. Quite a guy! He went up one day to Spokane, Washington, on a visit to the Chaplain, and while there, he found that they were having a strip tease that night. The Commanding Officer of the base had sent a C-47 into San Francisco to pick up the girls. ~~And he~~ went in to see the base commander and said: "I think you're in a lot of trouble on this thing, Colonel, because this is completely contrary to General Arnold's desires. First place, transporting these girls in military aircraft is going to get you into trouble. The second thing, putting this strip tease on out here is not going to be a very happy incident for you." The Colonel said to him: "Look, Chaplain. You're just a Chaplain out of the Headquarters and you go on about your business and I'll run this base." "Well" Zielinski said, "I wanted to tell you because when I go back to Washington I shall make a report to General Arnold." He came back into Washington after his visit and came to me and said: "What am I going to do?" I said: "You told him what you were going to do. You were going to make a a report to General Arnold." So we called down to General Arnold's office. Suzie Adkins!

Q She's passed away

C She came from down the shore, near Salisbury, Md.

Q She was ~~his~~ Girl Friday.

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C And she was my Girl Friday. She was the best liaison a guy could ask for. She kept watch on my interests down there as if she was an Assistant Chief of Chaplains. ~~And~~ I called up Suzie, and she made an appointment with General Arnold, and Connie went in and told his story. What was the ultimate result? The base commander out at Spokane was relieved and broken back to a Major from a Colonel. It was the first time I'd ever seen this thing done, but you know, when that word got around the Air Corps, that the boss didn't put up with this kind of stuff, it was the last of this kind of foolishness we had ~~much of.~~

Q I want to ask you a question along that line. Arnold was a very moral guy in respect to allowing any hanky-panky among his staff officers. Any guy that fooled around outside the marital relationship--there are a couple that I can think of--were canned.

C He didn't put up with it. ~~And~~ We ran into this almost immediately. Anything that was going to tear down the morals of the command, whether it was enlisted men or officers, if you reported to him, there was no fooling around. He had his Inspector General out there in a hurry and that thing was cleaned up, or somebody was canned.

Q Was there any argument presented to him or to you that these men have just come back from combat, or are about to go into combat, and you're being "nice-nellie", or too puritanical about this matter?

C No. I never even heard that type of approach to him because I don't think he would have listened to it. ~~And~~ I think the person who would have dared to make that kind of approach would have been in trouble. It would have been a negative thing and Arnold just didn't put up with that pap. You know, that wasn't just true of Arnold. That came all the way down through the command. I was there when Arnold and Spaatz and Vandenberg and Twining and Tommy White were in command. Every one of them did the same thing. I had an instance with General Twining in which a Catholic Chaplain out in Japan--there was a Brigadier General out there

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who had been a National Guard General. He was commanding a wing. ~~And~~ he set up a show of this kind in the Officers' Club and this young Catholic Chaplain went to him and said: "General, this is contrary to the Regulation ~~that says this doesn't go.~~ You're getting yourself in trouble." The General called in his Personnel Officer and said: "Ship this man back to the States." I knew nothing about it. ~~I was on my way West, or on my way over.~~ To the Far East. I was then Chief of Chaplains with two stars. I was on my way to the Far East, and when I hit Hawaii, The Staff Chaplain of the Pacific Command came to me and said: "We have a Catholic Chaplain being returned to the States who's very bitter." I said: "What's the problem?" He told me and I called in the boy, and he told me the story. I said: "What are your orders?" He told me--~~I don't know what it was.~~ ~~But~~ I said: "You follow the orders you've got. Sit tight and say nothing and let me worry about this." ~~And~~ I got a cable off right away to Washington. The C.G. ~~They~~ not only relieved ~~him~~ the General from command out ~~there~~ in Japan but relieved him from duty with the Air Force. This occurred in Japan. The guy was commanding a base there. It was in Yokahama. It was the airport for the city of Tokyo, the Headquarters Command. I got back into Washington later and got a call ~~to~~ in the office one day. My secretary said: "General So-and-so wants to see you," and it was this Brigadier. He came in and he told me this story.

Q They didn't break his rank?

C No. They just broke him out. Back to the Guard. They couldn't do much with him. They just relieved him from duty and sent him back to the Guard. He came in to see me, and said: "I don't like this. Will you go to General Twining and ask him not to discharge me?" And I said: "General, I can't do that. You fired one of my Chaplains out there and sent him home because he called your attention to this ~~thing~~ whole situation." He said: "I did. I made a mistake." I said: "You did," and I said: "That boy happened to meet me in Hawaii and I put the word in to General

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Twining of what had happened and that started the investigation that involved your break. I can't go and ask for anything for you. You knew better than this. You'll just have to take your medicine." This was Twining. This thing was handed down. Arnold's standards came down. Arnold to Spaatz. When we were in Europe, I served on Spaatz's command over there for about a year during the war. I went over in '44; came back in '45. And when we moved into the Continent over there, the Army units were bringing over the gals--the English secretaries with them. these boys were bringing them over all the time. And Spaatz said: "This will not go on in the Air Force. That's all there is to it." And it didn't. Of course, what they did, they'd bring their secretaries over and get them jobs in Army units nearby, but he wouldn't let them put them in jobs in the Air Corps. The standards stayed the same right down: Vandenberg, Twining, Tommy White. There's a man. There never was a finer man in the Air Force. A real gentleman, a military man, a good officer.

Q His widow lives in Washington. She turned over his papers to us. Back on Hap Arnold. Did Arnold ever call you in on some special problem that arose?

C You remember Arnold really had one philosophy: "The Air Force takes care of its own." You've heard that before. And he had set up a quite elaborate operation of personal affairs. Mrs. Arnold set it up. But Hap stood right behind her and said: "Do this." Then there came a time when Congress cut personnel, were going to get rid of all that. Do you remember Charlie Maylon, Brigadier General? That was a great man. He came up through the ranks. When I first went into Washington in '42, Charlie Maylon was a Sergeant Major, and he was appointed a Colonel. He was in General Jim Bevans' office. And I worked with him a good bit of the time. He was the greatest friend the Chaplaincy ever had. I went to him, and

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said: "Charlie, I know General Arnold's attitude in this thing and this is too important to lose. Get the word on up to him that I'd like to talk to him." So I got a call from General Arnold then, and I said: "I think the Chaplaincy can do something to help you. You are losing your officer strength. We can use our Chaplains' strength, plus our enlisted strength to transfer this whole casualty assistance program into the Chaplaincy." And ~~they~~ we did. We picked up and handled it for three or four years until the Air Force got the manpower. And General Arnold was tremendously pleased that we were willing to carry this ~~thing~~ program, because he had an obsession about the Air Force taking care of its own.

Q On that subject, we'll read your anecdotes into this tape. I was told that Arnold had a great personal concern over casualties?

C He had a tremendous personal concern over casualties. I got a call one day from him asking me to come down. And I went down--I don't know if you've run into it, but he had an obsession about keeping his desk clean. Nothing on the desk at any time except what he was working on at that moment.

Q Did he have a one-page mania?

C No. That was Gen Spaatz. Did he have a one page mania! If you got it on a second page, it never got read. That's all there was to it. He didn't even look to see where it came from. But Gen Arnold didn't. You could write to Gen Arnold what you felt you had to write. But he did like a clean desk. That morning he handed me a casualty list. And he said: "Chaplain, look at that item number 15." I looked, and it said: "Lieutenant So-and-so died from drowning while being baptized." And he said: "How did that occur?" And I said: "General Arnold, that sounds crazy." He said: "I want a full report on it." So I went back to my desk and started looking for the answer. I went almost by smoke signal until I got way out to Indiana. And the story was this, given to me by a telephone operator. This young boy had gone into the service in the Air Corps from there. He had gotten

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his commission and his wings and was going to be ordered overseas. He came home to see the folks before he left. When he came home, he expressed a desire of being baptized in the church of his parents, which was the Baptist church ~~there~~. They made all the arrangements for ~~it~~ the baptism on a Sunday afternoon in a creek near the church and the choir singing on the bank. A crowd ~~had~~ was gathered. The Minister and the Lieutenant walked out into the water and both disappeared. They were able to save the Minister but they never saved the Lieutenant. Nobody had ever checked the bottom to see what it was like and how far out they could afford to go before they got in trouble. ~~And he~~ the Lieutenant actually had drowned in the process of baptizing. When I got the story I went back down to see General Arnold. I told him what had happened. ~~And~~ He said it was unbelievable. He said we're losing an awful lot of men in combat. We can't afford to lose people by baptizing. Let's be careful in that field. Then he got off on a subject I'd never heard before. He said to me: "When I was a kid, I was raised...

Q It was Ardmore, Penna.

C He was raised ~~down in~~ there, and he said his parents, as he was growing up, were very much interested in making him a Baptist preacher. ~~And~~ He said that he was interested, too. This was the intent, that he was going to be a Baptist preacher. He said: "Somewhere in the process, I ended up in the military."

Q It was planned for his brother to go into the military.

C One of them had to be a Baptist preacher. But he said to me: "Now I read these casualty lists and look at our problems overseas, and I'm not so sure I shouldn't have been a Baptist preacher."

Q Were there any other occasions, any special cases where he called you down to consult with you, or to tell you something?

C ~~For the most part, on that very first occasion, where he took me in to Jim Bevans' to tell~~ When I was introduced by Scott Arnold to him, me what my job was, and that was my job. The only thing I had to do to see him was if I found trouble anywhere in the

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command that I couldn't get worked out, I'd see him. But his attitude on the whole question of moral leadership and high standards of conduct was known at that headquarters. Everybody knew it. When I went to ~~him~~ anyone with anything from the standpoint of a ~~program~~ to help build ~~that type~~ morals or morale ~~of thing~~ among the enlisted or officer personnel, there was ~~we got~~ nobody bucking it. Gen'l Arnold ~~He~~ left it to me to work out the program.

Q I was told that Arnold had a built-in smile on his face. It was facial structure, perhaps. Some people got into trouble mistaking that for pleasure. Did this ever strike you?

C No, never. He was very much of a gentleman. He apparently had a tremendous respect for the clergy and the ministry. He took me just on that basis and I was his minister. This was the thing he allowed to be seen in all of his operations with me. I remember ~~passing one time~~ at a dinner over at Bolling Field. The dinner was over and ~~I guess~~ there was going to be a dance. ~~Anyhow, they were milling around.~~ People were in huddles talking, and I was moving from one part of the room to another. I really hadn't noticed that he was in this group that I was passing by. ~~And~~ but as I passed by, a hand reached out and grabbed my wrist. ~~He~~ IT was Gen'l Arnold he stopped me, and he swung out of that group just enough to say "Chaplain, I just want to tell you how much I appreciate what you're doing." He dropped my wrist and went back to his group. It was the kind of thing that made you feel that he had a tremendous personal interest in you.

Q Something you read to me before we went on tape. You talked about his magnetic personality?

C This was true. I have never been any place when he entered a room when it didn't become electric. There were just two men that I can remember that made this experience ~~it~~ ever happened to me. Two men--Gen'l Hap Arnold and Gen'l George Marshall.

Q People have told me that. A charisma that magnetized you.

C Something happened. The whole room began to come alive. Almost you could put your finger out and hit the sparks flying, just when Gen'l Arnold ~~he~~ came in.

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They tell me he could get angry. But he never got angry with me. They tell me he could get mad, and when he did, he could express himself. But I've seen him in a room where he was going to speak to a group of officers, and there'd be a conversation in the room. Then somebody called them to attention. But as he walked in wherever it was, on a platform or just an open gathering, or whatever it was, the room became charged with electricity. He was just that kind of a guy.

Q Was he very articulate?

C Yes, I thought he was.

Q He had a high pitched voice. His message carried?

C You mean as far as the quality of voice in a room? I'd say yes.

Q Also the quality of his message?

C Whatever he had to say, he knew what he was talking about. You got a feeling that if anybody knew the United States Air Corps and its needs, he knew it.

Q We talked about Suzie Adkins. I have been told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her up in advance and ask if this was a good time to see the Old Man about something or, and she would say: "Not today, try me tomorrow," or some such thing. Or she might say: "It's a good time."

C I had an experience with this thing. I went down for something; I don't know what it was. Either he called me or I'd asked to come down. And I went down. They had a set of swinging doors to his office. They didn't go all the way to the top or all the way to the bottom. You pushed them, and they went in. He had Barney Giles in there and he was raising the dickens. I mean really was. I went in. I said to Suzie: "Should I?" And she said: "It will soon be over." And the door swung open and Barney left, and she said: "Go ahead in" and I thought to myself: "This is going to be good; I'm walking in on top of this; I'll most likely get killed before dark." I walked in that room and you'd never know that he'd been mad at anybody. His mood had completely changed. "Come in,

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Chaplain. What can I do for you?" And we sat and chatted a few minutes. That was it. Suzie was a great personality. She was, really. She was his Girl Friday in every way. She knew not only Hap Arnold but she knew the Air Force. And she knew what he was doing for the Air Force. And she had that ability to bring things into line to him as they should come in and not out of harmony with him. In complete harmony, so that he'd get them, naturally.

Q Anybody else on his staff? Did you work through Fred Dean?

C No. I worked directly. I didn't even work through ~~Barney~~ Gen'l Giles.

Q When some Chaplain's problems came up, you went to see him?

C No. I went to ~~Jim~~ Gen'l Bevans, talked with him.

Q He was your administrative superior?

C The chances are that Gen'l Bevans could settle the thing without anybody else.

Q Bevans left late in the war. He got his chance overseas. I think Idwal Edwards came in?

C Gen'l Idwal Edwards came in.

Q By that time Gen'l Arnold was gone?

C No, I think Gen'l Arnold was still there. ~~Idwal~~ Gen'l ~~Harold~~ Edwards was a Baptist preacher's son.

Q He lives in Arlington, Virginia.

Q There was a Chaplain named Axton?

C He was in the Army.

Q He was out at March Field in the thirties when Arnold was the CO out there. They were trying to get money to build a new chapel out at March Field. And Arnold suggested that they have a Sunday night service and sort of mix it up with games, you know, game night. The Chaplain didn't think this was consistent with religious practice. Arnold had a sort of pragmatic approach toward things like church services.

Q Axton, I think, became Chief Chaplain of the Army. If I'm not mistaken he was a Methodist.

Q Leading up to Arnold's approach to religion as sort of pragmatic. Did you ever think that?

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C I never really went into it. Of course when I came in to this job I'd been under this strait-laced operational setup in the Army Chaplain's office. The Army Chaplain could be asked to do anything. He could be Library Officer; he could be Post Exchange Officer. The first thing I asked for was to have that stopped. And Gen'l Arnold agreed with it and published a regulation for me stating it. The Chaplain's duties were religious and he was to perform no function not in accord with the abilities of the religious leader.

Q Did he ever tell you to stop doing anything?

C No, I never was at any time upbraided by Gen'l Arnold for anything. The fact of the matter is in my whole time with the first five Chiefs, I never had anything said to me in criticism. The only ~~guy~~ individual that ever did was ~~that~~ a little incident with Air Secretary Quarles. I never got very close to him. I had a fairly good relationship with most of the other Secretaries, but never got very close to Secretary Quarles. The greatest thing that ever came to Washington in the civilian personnel ~~outfit~~ Type Secretary was Anna Rosenberg when she was a Deputy for Personnel for OSD. That was a great gal. If you ever want to see a person that stood foursquare behind religion, and morality, and ideals, she stood. That was much later on when the three services were there and they'd set up the Chaplain's Board which was under the Secretary of Defense, and under her. She had a habit. ~~That thing~~ the Chairmanship was supposed to rotate every year. The Chairman of each Service got it. She had a habit of slipping that by and I was in there one time for three years as Chairman of the Board because she wouldn't change it. She was a tremendous person.

I got on an airplane with Gen'l Spaatz going to Maxwell Field. It was his ship. As I got on everybody sat down, and he sat down and I noticed that there was a compartment ahead there with a table, and a set of cards. I said to him: "Do you mind if I play some solitaire?" "Go ahead." I sat down and in a few minutes he swung in to the other side of the table and ~~said~~ asked: "What ~~are you playing~~ do you play?" I said: "Gin," "Let's go." And we played gin all the way to Maxwell Field. ~~And~~ The question at the beginning that was the last word he

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said to me ~~when he sat down: "Let's go."~~ As we got to the end of the trip he said: "You beat me. I'll play you coming back." And that was the entire conversation. I had a funny one with him. I married his daughter in the house in Georgetown where they lived. And they had said to me the wedding was going to be December 3rd on a Friday. They wanted me to come over Thursday. Mrs. Spaatz is quite a ~~gal~~. She wanted to talk over the wedding and sort of see how the thing was going to be fitted into the house. I was to be there at four o'clock, and I got there a few minutes before four and General Spaatz answered the door. He said: "My wife is out. She'll be back. She told you four o'clock; she should have been here at four o'clock. She shouldn't keep you waiting." So we went in and sat down and there was not much conversation, because it was hard to get a conversation going with him. And, anyhow, Mrs. Spaatz came in with the daughter. We were going to have a dry run of the wedding and Spaatz was going to give away the daughter. ~~And it was going to be~~ in front of the fireplace, ~~and so forth~~. We went through the ceremony and I said: "At this point, General, I'll ask who giveth whatever the girl's name is to be married to this man and you'll say: 'I do.'" He said: "Yes." I started out, and his wife said to him: "Carl, now say what you're supposed to say on this." I said: "You can say: "I do," or "My wife and I do." and he turned to her and said: "I don't need to." And that was the end of it. Now we went all through the rehearsal. ~~When~~ the wedding ~~was over~~ the next day, he said what he ~~had~~ to say. The thing was all over, the whole wedding was done. People were beginning to mill around. He came over to me and he said: "I didn't need a rehearsal, did I?"

Q Very taciturn man. Did you meet the Arnold family? You met Mrs. Arnold.

C Yes. I knew Mrs. Arnold.

Q How about the three boys and the daughter?

C I don't think I've ever met the daughter. I knew the boys. There was

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one in Washington--Bruce. Of course you know General Arnold's love for Robert Dunbar over at the Officers' Club.

Q We go to that party every year.

C I go to it, too.

Q That started with Hap, I interviewed Dunbar at great length.

C There's a guy that should have a million stories.

Q He told me quite a few.

C You were talking about Spaatz and this one-page-paper idea. Back in '49 when the Air Force broke away from the Army, the Chaplaincy didn't. I sat down and worked up a paper for General Spaatz ~~that he had asked for,~~ as to why we should have our own Chaplaincy. ~~And~~ I wrote this up and took it down to him one morning. He read it over and said to me: ~~"I'll keep this.~~" I'm supposed to see General Miller this afternoon." ~~He~~ was then the Army Chief of Chaplains. I suppose this was about 10:00. He said: "I'm supposed to see him at eleven o'clock." And I said: "You take the paper with you. I don't think we're going to have a separate chaplaincy." I took the paper and came back upstairs. By then I had a staff of four or five chaplains. I said: "I don't know, boys. It looks like we're going wherever the Army decides to put us." The Army Chief's office at that time was very anti-Air Force. All they had to do was get Carpenter and Zielinski out of there so they could their hands in to do what they pleased. They were having us to fight all the time. I went down to dinner that day, came back from dinner and the telephone rang. Spaatz's secretary said: "Come down. Bring that paper with you." I brought it down. When I went in to see him, he said "You ~~got~~ that paper?" I said: "Yes," and he took it and folded the bottom under so you couldn't see my signature, and put it under the glass on his desk. He said: "General Miller's coming back at three o'clock. We're going to have our own chaplaincy. We're not going to fool with the Army." Then I walked out. I never was able to find out why until about a year ago. I ran into

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somebody on the staff and I don't remember who it was. He said to me that when Chaplain Miller came in, ~~the first thing~~ he made his presentation and Spaatz was favorable until Miller said to him: "All Chaplains will change in the Air Force every three years. They'll stay with you, and then they'll be back in the regular flow. We're making an immediate change in the Air Chaplain here, and I'll send General O'Neil over. That will give you ~~and~~ a General rank Chaplain here, I'll send him over." And Spaatz said: "We expect to keep Carpenter." "No," Miller said. "He's been here long enough. We'll send General O'Neil." ~~Jimmy~~ General O'Neil was the Deputy Chief of Army Chaplains. And Spaatz said: "I'll talk to you later." And that changed the whole thing around. He decided right after that to keep the setup as is.

C It was some time in November of 1943, I came into my office to find a request that I report to General Arnold immediately. When I reported to General Arnold he showed me the morning copy of the Washington Post. It carried a headline: "Chaplain Says Troops Will Be Home By Christmas 1943." And he asked me: "Who is this chaplain?" I said: "He's the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." "He was the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." General Arnold said. "I want you to go to Europe, to England, take his replacement with you, and see that the Chaplain is home by Christmas." With this order, a chain of experiences began that were really interesting. Air travel to Europe was in its infancy. You usually either went by combat plane which had extra gas tanks put on it or by ship, whichever you wanted to do. I chose to go over in a convoy. So I had the replacement meet me at Camp Kilmer. I got there and there were about nineteen Air Corps Chaplains waiting to be shipped out. ~~And~~ We took over the postal operation for the base for the time. I was working there in the post office one day when An Air Force captain came to me and said: "Chaplain, would you come up to my mess hall and have dinner with me tomorrow?" So I said: "Yes, I'd be glad to," and I went up. There had been some complaints these boys had been

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registering, and they couldn't get anybody to listen to about the cleanliness of the food-handlers, and the silverware, and the preparation of the food. They had been complaining for some time and nobody had paid any attention. The Captain He came to me because it was customary in the Air Force at that time that Chaplains kept an eye on the mess halls, both enlisted and officers. If there was anything needed to be checked up they would pick up the complaint and take it to the commanding officer of the installation. I said: "I'll try to see what I can do." So I went down to see the Base Commander. I told him what I had run into, and he was impatient. When I got through he said: "Chaplain, thank you very much but that's all there is to this. I'm not going to listen to a lot of yelling by a bunch of officers just passing through here as to what the conditions are. I'm sure they're all right, or my inspector would have picked it up." I said to him: "Colonel, I'm not trying to threaten you, but I do want to say this to you. I think you're going to end up in a lot of ptomaine poisoning in that mess. But that's up to you." I was waiting for quite a while for shipment and I had a weekend, so I went home. And when I went home I ran into Charlie Maylon. At that time he was Colonel Maylon in the Office of the Chief of Personnel. And he said: "How are things going?" I told him this story, and really, I didn't think that what I told him, that I was making a complaint to the top. But I told him the story, and then, I came on back to Kilmer on Monday on Sunday night. On Monday I was working down in the Post Office and the telephone rang. One of the boys said: "Somebody wants you." I went to the phone and the voice on the other end of the line introduced himself as a Colonel on the Staff of the Inspector General of the 2nd Army out in New York. He said: "Are you the Staff Officer who made a personal complaint to General Arnold this weekend about the food conditions in an Air Corps mess here at Camp Kilmer? I said: "Come to think of it, I guess I am." He said: "I want to tell you I've inspected that mess, and I'm satisfied that it's all right, and we don't appreciate you going back and telling tales

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out of school." I said: "You understand, of course, Colonel, that I'm on General Arnold's staff. And I'm not telling tales out of school. I'm taking care of the Air Force personnel, whether they're at home or wherever they are." He said: "I just want you to know we've inspected, and it's all over with, and that's all there is to it." Well, Wednesday morning of that week, about seven o'clock in the morning, there was a ~~they~~ knock ~~at~~ at my door at my barracks, ~~and~~ I got up sleepily, and went to the door in pajamas. There stood a corporal who saluted me and said: "Colonel, your car is here." And I said: "Corporal, I didn't order any car. You got the wrong guy." He looked at his slip and said: "You're Colonel Charles I. Carpenter?" I said: "Yes." He said: "Your car is here." I said: "Go back to the motor pool and find out where the mistake is, because I ordered no car." And I went back to bed. About nine o'clock I got up, and as I was dressing, a knock came on the door again, my corporal. He said: "Colonel, this is your car. It's been ordered to you, not only for you here, but it's on permanent assignment to you." I said: "This I don't understand. And I don't think I need a car." "Well," he said, "You know, Colonel, if you have a car you don't have to have a pass off the base at night. You can go into New York any time." I said: "Corporal, you won the day. I accept the car." So I went on down to the Post Office. When I hit the Post Office one of the Chaplains came over to me and said: "Carp, did you hear the story?" I said: "What's the matter?" "Three hundred and some cases of ptomaine up in that officers' mess you reported on. And they didn't do anything about it." Then I began to see the reason for my car. I was being bribed to shut up. So I accepted the car, and when we shipped out overseas, everybody else that night went into the Hoboken docks by bus, but I drove in in my private car.

Q Did they ever do anything to that Colonel?

C I don't know if they ever did or not but at the same time the Army Air Forces reached out and got results even though 300 boys had to get sick to do it.

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Q There was a complaint about the Newfoundland--Gander stop enroute to overseas. General Henry Harms was taken out of there because there were some complaints about bad food.

C Hap was very strict on that. He was on the bases. But this had been an Air Corps situation even when I was at Langley Field. We were inspecting messes then. I remember I went in one day. The Catholic Chaplain came to me and said: "I want you to go out to the Aviation Engineers mess today with me." And I went out. And they had boiled potatoes. And as he went down the line he stuck his fork in a potato, put it in his plate, and the potato jumped. And he picked the thing out with his fingers and threw it across the floor. It hit the floor and bounced against the wall, and never broke open. He picked the potato up and went looking for the Mess Sergeant. Then he found the Mess Officer and they gave him a hard time. He came back to me and said: "What do I do now?" So I said: "Let's go up and see the Old Man." So we went up to see the Base Commander and it was a Colonel Lohman. And, boy, Lohman chewed himself out a Mess Officer in a hurry.

Q Was that Ernest "Fud" Lohman?

C That's the guy.

Q He was Base Commander under Arnold at March Field. Arnold didn't care too much for him.

C Lohman was quite a character. I flew with Lohman out at Langley Field when I was there. In 1940--before '41, before the war. And they used to tell me I was crazy. I came into Washington one day with Lohman to Bolling Field. We came in an A-17. That thing was just a flying casket. And he hit that base coming in there, jumped about 17 feet in the air. Bang, we went up, and just bounced ourselves down on the ground. Somebody asked me: "Do you know who you're flying with?" I said: "Yeah." He said: "Do you like the way it's being done?" I said: "No, but I got to get home."

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Q They called him also "Crash and Burn" Lohman.

C That's the guy. officer

Q He used to give them this sermon about "If you don't do this or that, you will crash and burn."

C Well, you know those A-17's were really flaming torches, almost. I enjoyed Col Lohman him. He was a great guy for me. He and I...

Q People at March Field who came up with Arnold in the 1930's didn't like him at all. He was sort of stiff. Very unbending.

C Yes. He lives or did live at San Antonio.

Q I think he's probably passed away.

C He was an excellent officer. Tell you what he did out there. In those days in the Air Bases, you know, because they were on Federal property, they'd run slot machines. And Col Lohman agreed to let them have a slot machine in the Officers' Club and Enlisted Men's Club provided the Chaplain's Fund got 10% of it every month. ~~And they'd come up to me~~ every month out of the Officers' Club, some young lieutenant would come up and hand me a check, and say: "Here, Capone, here's your cut."

Q You know, something you brought up before about the quality of life among the enlisted men at the base. One of the characteristics that Arnold was said to have had: whenever he came into a base he steered away from the red carpet treatment and always went down to the maintenance shack or the enlisted men's mess where he knew a lot of enlisted men, some of the men who had flown with him back in the old days. He felt this was where the problems were. He oftentimes went to the maintenance shack or the hangar and talked to the enlisted men.

C He had brought out to me in that first talk he had with me that in many instances the enlisted man had no contact with the Chaplain. And he said: "Sometimes they can't get through when they need to get through to get action. If they can get to you, then the Chaplains should see that the action is brought to the attention of the commander." And this was a Program that Gen Arnold's thing that all his Chaplains had been trained in.

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Q Did he subscribe to the theory that the old Chiefs are the guys that really run an air base?

C He subscribed to ~~the~~ That theory ~~that~~ and I subscribed ~~to~~ also. You can take the command anywhere you want but just give me a few good old time sergeants, and let me loose with them, and I'd have anything I wanted. Incidentally, have you ever run into the name of Nero, Colonel Ulysses S. Nero?

Q I've seen the name.

C Sam Nero is an oldtimer and he lives right down here in Rehoboth. He flew with Billy Mitchell on that aircraft that they dropped the bomb down the smokestack. He's the guy that dropped the bomb for Billy. ~~And this guy sits down here.~~ He was a Sergeant on the base at Langley Field with the 8th Pursuit under Gen'l Kepner. Gen'l Kepner had the 8th Pursuit. ~~He's~~ Col Nero is down in Rehoboth and he's loaded with ancient history on the Air Force and the Billy Mitchell days.

Q Likes to talk about it?

C Loves to. And he would come into this whole area, Gen'l Arnold and all the rest of them.

Q Maybe I'll look him up.

C Somebody put out a moving picture on religion where some pilot was flying. I don't know what the story is, but here's what happened. The moving picture people came into the headquarters and wanted to present to the Air Force a C-47 to be set up for the Chief of Chaplains as an office and as a chapel to be his to use. Sort of a flying chapel. And Gen'l Arnold called me down and told me of the OSS on ~~said this~~. He named the motion picture company. I listened to the setup. To me it just didn't make sense. It had no purpose at all. I didn't need the office, and there was nothing to be done with the chapel. I mean, you couldn't do anything about it. Because it was just too small. It had no meaning. And yet, the Old Man was in real trouble. He was trying to get C-47s to fly gas up to Patton. He was trying to get C-47s and we were short. After Gen'l Arnold told me the story,

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he said: "If you won't accept this, I'll accept it for you." And I said: "General, I just don't think it makes any sense." I said: "You need C-47s. Why should we take one out of service just to put this kind of a thing which is pure and simply a show. It's pure and simply an advertisement for the movie people, and I don't need the ~~cockeyed~~ airplane. When I want to go somewhere, I call down, and I have an airplane that I can use. And I don't take it out of operations." He said: "I'm glad you feel that way about it. I wasn't going to attempt to tell you what to do, and if you wanted it you could have it. But," he says, "we can use that C-47 without getting it involved in that. . .

Q Could it have been Warner Brothers?

C I don't remember. There was some movie about religion in the military forces. . .

Q There was a song "A Wing and a Prayer?"

C "Coming in on a Wing and a Prayer." Yeah, I think that had something to do with it. ~~I don't remember it particularly~~. I don't remember it particularly but it was going to be done as an ad for that picture.

Q It was a religious kick. Remember the Chaplains that went down on the Dorchester?

C Yes. The Four Chaplains Merit Award out of Boston was given to me.

Q It might have been that movie?

C ~~It~~ could have been. I don't know. But to my mind it wasn't practical. It didn't make sense.

Q Talking about your visit to the Mediterranean. Probably the 15th Air Force out at Foggia.

C Yes visited there
~~And~~ I went down. When I went in there I found this story. Cardinal Spellman traveled through the war on a letter from President Roosevelt. In Italy all those Catholic priests wear the little flat hats and flowing robes. And they all look alike. And Cardinal Spellman had sent a message in that he anticipated arriving at a certain time, at a certain place. ~~And it~~ came
at Air Force Base
the message

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in to the Chaplain of the Air Force, who was a boy named Rhodes. And I'd been a little bit opposed to Rhodes being the 15th Air Force Chaplain because I thought he was too immature. ~~And~~ this letter came in, and Rhodes just did nothing with it. He had done nothing whatsoever with the letter. The next thing you know, at the airport out there, the Cardinal arrives, and there's nobody there to meet him, so he gets hold of somebody with a jeep and they take him into town. He goes up into the 15th Air Force headquarters, and is sitting in the office of the Chief of Staff and nobody's paying much attention to him. He's just another little Catholic priest running around Italy. All of a sudden, Twining comes out of the office and walks through and goes right back in and calls the secretary in and said: "Who's the Catholic priest sitting out there?" He says: "He says he's Cardinal Spellman." Twining says: "He says he's what? Get him in here!" ~~He went out there right away,~~ dressed the whole thing up, fixed it all up. I had gone in there just before that ~~thing~~ occurred. I had said to Twining at the time: "Let me change your staff chaplain." "Oh," he says, "he's a nice guy." I said: "He's a nice guy but he's going to get you in trouble." ~~And~~ I just had gotten home when a cable came in, care of Arnold to me: "Get me a new Chaplain." ~~This joker~~ had just thrown it aside, and hadn't bothered to send anybody out to meet ~~him~~, hadn't paid any attention to him, hadn't given him any respect, hadn't arranged for any transportation, or anything else. Boy, Twining had a job getting out of that one.

Q I would think so. While we're talking about Cardinal Spellman, maybe you can tell me off the top this story of his insisting on paying for Air Force transportation?

C Cardinal Spellman always insisted on paying his own way on military aircraft, no matter where he went. ~~When he came back to Washington~~ I always met all of the planes that came into Bolling that had any religious leaders on them. When ~~he~~ was on there I'd go to meet it, and he'd

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always end up with a conversation something like: "Well, Chaplain," -- he was on his way to the Mayflower where he stayed--"You'll see that my bill is ready for me tomorrow." And I'd always say, "Yes." I'd come back in to my office the next morning and send a note down to the Comptroller and tell him that Cardinal Spellman wanted a bill from Newfoundland to Washington, and to make it up. Well, on this particular morning I did this, and in about five or ten minutes I get a telephone call saying: "Secretary Quarles wants to see you." ~~And~~ I went down. To the Office Apparently, somebody had gotten the idea I was pulling something here, or persecuting the Catholics, Because when I went into Secretary Quarles' office, he was mad. He said: "What's this idea of charging Cardinal Spellman for flying on military aircraft?" I said: "Mr. Secretary, this is the Cardinal's request. He wants to pay his own way, and I've only done what he's asked me to do." He said: "I want you to understand that from here on out Cardinal Spellman will fly on military aircraft, and on Air Force aircraft at the expense of the Air Force. I don't want any more of this going on." I said: "Mr. Quarles, would you be so kind-- Cardinal Spellman is at the Mayflower. Would you call him and tell him this, because I've only done what the Cardinal asked." "Well," he said, "I'm going to take care of this matter. You can just forget it. It's in my hands from now on. You stop worrying about it." So I went back to the office. In about half an hour the phone rang. Would I come back down in the Secretary's office. I didn't know what was going to happen then. I went down and it was a completely different Secretary. He apologized to me for being rough with me. He was sorry he'd messed into this thing at all. He'd talked to the Cardinal. He understood the Cardinal's desires. From here on out, anything the Cardinal wanted would be done the way he wanted it. I thanked him and went on about my business. But Cardinal Spellman always asked for that. Now we had a fellow over in the Protestant Church, the National Council of Churches, who traveled.

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He was very jealous of the Cardinal. He wanted to be sure when an order was written that he had the same rank as the Cardinal was given. If it was the rank of a Major General, Lieutenant General, whatever it was, he had to have it and he had to have the same treatment. And I used to get quite a few letters from him ~~bitching~~ complaining about this, and that, and something else. But He never asked me to send him a bill, so he could pay for it. I have a tremendous respect for Cardinal Spellman. He was one of the greatest men I ever knew.

Q I think he did a great job out in the field?

C Always. He would walk into a hospital and start with the first bed. Get the boy's name and talk a few words to him, then take the next one, and the next one. When he came back home he wrote to every parent of every boy with whom he had talked. Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, black or white. And told them he'd seen him, had some little thing to say about him, or something of that kind. And it would do a great job.

Q Did he have a secretary, taking notes?

C He had somebody with him who took the notes, as they went along. Just one man went along and all he did was pick up the names of the boys.

Q Very personal thing and appreciated.

C I can give you another story. But I don't know that's good for publication. I got a call from the Commanding General of what used to be the Northeast Air Command saying to me: "Will you get this Protestant out of here? He's ruined the religious life of this whole community and I want him out of here as soon as we can get him out." I said: "What's the matter?" "Well," he said, "he comes up here and he goes into a hospital. He picks out the guy who looks the worst. One fellow had a broken leg, or something, with a lot of stuff all around his bed. He calls in the photographer and takes a picture of himself standing there talking to him, and walks out, and doesn't even say the time of day to the rest of the troops. He's doing this all over the command. He's done more to set

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Protestantism back in this command than anybody that's been up here and I want him out of here, and don't let him come back again!"

Q This was the CO?

C This was the Commanding General, Glenn Barcus. Have you talked to Barcus?

Q No. You think he knew anything about Arnold?

C I don't know, Barcus was pretty junior. Barcus was commanding a squadron down at Langley Field. I have a picture in my 8 millimeter camera, and stuff I took of the inspection that was held with Roosevelt of the old Air Corps at Langley Field when every B-17 that we had was on the line--all ten of them.

Q This must have been about '38 or '39?

C It was around about '39 maybe '40. Before they even expanded. Roosevelt came down to Langley, and brought a southern Senator that was very much interested in the military.

Q Byrd, maybe?

C No. Started with an "S"—

Q ~~Not Stennis~~?

C He brought this ~~guy~~ down ~~here~~. They had quite a setup. The Old Man let me off the inspection so I could take pictures and I got movies of the whole thing. Everywhere the movie cameras went, Carpenter went. I was as close with my camera to Roosevelt's face as I am to you. I got some great pictures.

Q They're worth preserving.

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Interview, Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
Milford, Delaware, 29 April 1974

Q When did you first meet Hap Arnold?

C I was ordered into Washington in about July of 1942. I came into the War Department after about four years at Langley Field.

Q In what capacity?

C I was assigned to a new post they called Air Chaplain. It was actually a staff chaplain for the Army Air Corps. And General Arnold was commanding at that time.

Q Who was Chief of Chaplains?

C Major General William Arnold. Very, very fine gentleman.

Q Your job, what did it consist of?

C No one knew what it was when I came in. I was put in the office commanded by, at that time, Colonel David Stinson.

Q What was his job?

C He was in Personal Services in the AAF. I'd been in Langley Field when Stinson was Deputy Base Commander. They brought me in there, and I was told that my job was to organize an Air Force Chaplaincy. Nobody had told Bill Arnold, Chief of Chaplains in the Army, that that was going to be done. Nobody sat down with him and discussed this thing. They just had pulled me in and said: "Organize an Air Force Chaplaincy!" Over in the Army Chief of Chaplains they had an office called Air Force Liaison. Ordinarily, the Liaison office is <u>to</u> a group. But the Air Force Liaison over there was an Army Chaplain who stayed in the Chief of Chaplains' office, and liaisoned over to the Air

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Force which meant that he came over to see me. I was supposed to be working under him in the Chief's office, as far as the Army was concerned, but I was working under the Army Air Forces out of the Air Force Chief of Staff's office, as far as the Army Air Corps was concerned.

Q Did you have contact with Hap Arnold at that time?

C Not at first. When I first came in there, no. I was working...it was a pretty low relationship staff office. It had to do with, really, base services, post exchange, Chaplains, all that kind of thing. I think there was just an attempt to organize an Army Air Corps HQ. I sat down and tried to work out a relationship. But I found that chaplains' reports coming from the field from Air Corps units, never came to Air Corps Headquarters. They always went straight to the Chief's office. So there was no acknowledgment of the fact that the Air Corps Headquarters had anything to so with it at all. I felt that one of the first things that needed to be done was to get the communication channel straightened out. I went in to the Chief's office to try to work this thing out, and I found everybody there was dead set against it. They wouldn't change any regulations to send any of these reports in through Air Corps headquarters because that would mean to acknowledge that the Air Corps was sort of a separate service. Nobody over in that Army setup was interested in acknowledging the Air Corps was anything except supportive. We went along with this for a long time, and I'd taken a copy of an amendment to a regulation down to the Chief's office, but nobody would publish it. I took it back up to the office, and was trying to figure how in the world to get it published. One day--you know the Pentagon was physically divided up, a section for the War Department, and a section for the Navy--different sections. I got into a section of the War Department, the Secretary of War section. I was walking down the hall and had this regulation in my pocket. I heard a voice: "Hey, Carp, where are you going?" I turned around and walked into the room there and there sat a Colonel Lynch. Lynch had been at

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Langley Field with me. I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I work for the Secretary of War in the supply department. I keep an eye on the supplies for the Army Air Corps."

Q Joe Lynch?

C Yes, big tall fellow. This is the story I can't publish but I'm going to tell you. He says: "What are you doing?" I said; "Right now, Joe, I'm trying to find how I can get a regulation published that will send the Chaplain's reports from the Chaplains that are serving in the Army Air Corps up to this headquarters before they go to the Chief's office." He says: "You got the regulation?" I said" "Yes." I handed it to thim. He looked at it and said: "There's nothing wrong with that." I said: "I can't get the Army to agree to it." "Well," he said "don't let that worry you." He reached in his desk drawer, pulled out a stamp which said on the bottom of it "By Order of the Secretary of War" and threw it in the OUT basket. I said: "Joe, what are you doing? Somebody will see that thing you've cooked up there coming out of a supply office and you'll be in trouble." He said: "By the time that hits the distribution center they won't know whether it came out of supply, or where it came out of." Then I went merrily on my way. In about two weeks, the amendment to the Army Regulations was published and the Chaplains were informed that they were to send their reports to the Air Corps Headquarters. They didn't like it, and I was called into the Chief Army Chaplain's office. As I went in the office I said: "I'm glad you called me. I was just coming down to thank you for publishing that amendment to the Regulations, and making it possible for those reports to come through the headquarters of the Air Corps.

Q What was your rank at the time?

C I was a Major. And he said: "I just called you up to ask you how this thing got published." And I said: "I just came down to thank you for publishing it. I didn't know anybody else could publish it but you." And

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then came the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, George Rixie, and he was mad as heck because he was the guy that was holding up all this stuff, and he didn't want any acknowledgment made of any Air Corps separation. And I went back up to the office and told the other Chaplain on duty, Connie Zielinski: "Connie," I said, "I guess we've gotten away with it, but we'd better keep quiet." And that was the beginning and the start of this whole thing. After I'd been there a short time, they set up a personnel office under Colonel Jim Bevans. When they set that up, that's the first time I met Hap Arnold. Colonel Bevans called me one day and said: "General Arnold wants to see you. He wants me to go with you to see him." I said: "Fine." So I met him in his office and he took me all over. I was moving around in very sacred territory down there in that General Staff of the Army Air Corps area. He took me in and introduced me to General Arnold. We sat down and General Arnold began to talk. He talked for about ten minutes of what he felt the duties of a Chaplain were with Air Corps personnel. It wasn't a question of extraneous things. It was a good solid type of thing that one minister would talk to another, in regard to the development of morals; in regard to the development of high standards of ethics; in regard to the development of high standards of living. This was the thing he wanted developed among the Chaplains who served in the Air Corps. I would have the full support of his office at any time that I wanted it. And at the end of about ten minutes, he said: "Now, that's your job. Do you understand it?" And I said: "Yes sir, I think I do." And we turned and walked out and as we walked down the hall, Jim Bevans said to me: "I am constantly amazed by that man." He said: "You can sit down and talk to that man about anything that pertains to Air Corps. Aircraft, supplies, anything. I never have heard him do a thing like this before, but I've never seen him in this field. The standards of morality and leadership and the qualities of manhood. He said: "He just constantly amazes me and how big the dream is he has for Army Air." And it was true. I found it was a

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great dream.

Q Did he talk about a day ahead when the Army Air Forces would be separate?

C No. It was a completely different story. Hap Arnold never talked to me about a separate Air Corps in that sense. He talked about the Air Corps having the best of everything in the Chaplaincy. Now when we went to war, and went overseas...

Q We were in the war at the time?

C This was some time in '42. I had nothing to say about the movement of Chaplains in the ir Corps units out of the country until we began to get these reports coming through which acknowledged the right of headquarters to have anything to say. I made a deal with the Army Chief of Chaplains. He would give me a list of men coming out of the Chaplains School at Harvard each month and I would suggest Air Corps assignments for them. I would go up and visit that group at Harvard once a month and talk to each one individually, and give him his assignment, and then go on back to Washington. This way I got to know these fellows. I did this every month, and I'd go up and do this job. With the result that we were beginning to get the younger men assigned to Air Corps units which brought a real problem later on in Europe. Because I later went over to Europe as a Staff Chaplain on General Spaatz's staff and ran into the Army Chaplain over there who was on General "Court House" Lee's staff under Eisenhower, and found that he was getting all the older men who were unfit for work. And he was complaining. He worked out a deal with General Lee whereby he was to reach into the Air Corps to take out a hundred men that he wanted and give me a hundred men that he wanted to get rid of. Just carte blanche. And I went in to General Spaatz on that. Came back a couple of days later with his request, and he said: "Forget it. It's not going to happen." I said: "What's the matter?" He said: "I talked to

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General Eisenhower and told him I didn't want to lose any of these Chaplains." I said: "General, we made these choices back in Washington, getting these younger men. We did it with the cooperation of the Army Chief of Chaplains. We trained these men in the Air Corps, and we're sending them into Air Corps units. And we want to keep them in Air Corps units." So we won that one. But this was another episode with General Arnold. Two other things came out of this relationship. We were having trouble at that time in some of the installations with strip tease in the Officers' Clubs and Enlisted Men's Clubs. I had assigned a Deputy to me, Deputy Air Chaplain, a Catholic named Constantine Zeilinski. Quite a guy! He went up one day to Spokane, Washington, on a visit to the Chaplain, and while there, he found that they were having a strip tease that night. The Commanding Officer of the base had sent a C-47 into San Francisco to pick up the girls. And he went in to see the base commander and said: "I think you're in a lot of trouble on this thing, Colonel, because this is completely contrary to General Arnold's desires. First place, transporting these girls in military aircraft is going to get you into trouble. The second thing, putting this strip tease on out here is not going to be a very happy incident for you." The Colonel said to him: "Look, Chaplain. You're just a Chaplain out of the Headquarters and you go on about your business and I'll run this base." "Well" Zielinski said, "I wanted to tell you because when I go back to Washington I shall make a report to General Arnold." He came back into Washington after his visit and came to me and said: "What am I going to do?" I said: "You told him what you were going to do. You were going to make a a report to General Arnold." So we called down to General Arnold's office. Suzie Adkins?

Q She's passed away

C She came from down the shore, near Salisbury, Md.

Q She was his Girl Friday.

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C And she was my Girl Friday. She was the best liaison a guy could ask for. She kept watch on my interests down there as if she was an Assistant Chief of Chaplains. And I called up Suzie, and she made an appointment with General Arnold, and Connie went in and told his story. What was the ultimate result? The base commander out at Spokane was relieved and broken back to a Major from a Colonel. It was the first time I'd ever seen this thing done, but you know, when that word got around the Air Corps, that the boss didn't put up with this kind of stuff, it was the last of this kind of foolishness we had much of.

Q I want to ask you a question along that line. Arnold was a very moral guy in respect to allowing any hanky-panky among his staff officers. Any guy that fooled around outside the marital relationship--there are a couple that I can think of--were canned.

C He didn't put up with it. And we ran into this almost immediately. Anything that was going to tear down the morals of the command, whether it was enlisted men or officers, if you reported to him, there was no fooling around. He had his Inspector General out there in a hurry and that thing was cleaned up, or somebody was canned.

Q Was there any argument presented to him or to you that these men have just come back from combat, or are about to go into combat, and you're being "nice-nellie", or too puritanical about this matter?

C No. I never even heard that type of approach to him because I don't think he would have listened to it. And I think the person who would have dared to make that kind of approach would have been in trouble. It would have been a negative thing and Arnold just didn't put up with that pap. You know, that wasn't just true of Arnold. That came all the way down through the command. I was there when Arnold and Spaatz and Vandenberg and Twining and Tommy White were in command. Every one of them did the same thing. I had an instance with General Twining in which a Catholic Chaplain out in Japan--there was a Brigadier General out there

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who had been a Guard General. He was commanding a wing. And he set up a show of this kind in the Officers' Club and this young Catholic Chaplain went to him and said: "General, this is contrary to the Regulation that says this doesn't go. You're getting yourself in trouble." The General called in his Personnel Officer and said: "Ship this man back to the States." I knew nothing about it. I was on my way West, or on my way over. I was then Chief of Chaplains with two stars. I was on my way to the Far East when I hit Hawaii. The Staff Chaplain of the Pacific Command came to me and said: "We have a Catholic Chaplain being returned to the States who's very bitter." I said: "What's the problem?" He told me and I called in the boy, and he told me the story. I said: "What are your orders?" He told me--I don't know what it was. But I said: "You follow the orders you've got. Sit tight and say nothing and let me worry about this." And I got a cable off right away to Washington. They not only relieved him from command out there but relieved him from duty with the Air Force. This occurred in Japan. The guy was commanding a base there. It was in Yokahama. It was the airport for the city of Tokyo, the Headquarters Command. I got back into Washington later and got a call to the office one day. My secretary said: "General So-and-so wants to see you," and it was this Brigadier. He came in and he told me this story.

Q They didn't break his rank?

C No. They just broke him out. Back to the Guard. They couldn't do much with him. They just relieved him from duty and sent him back to the Guard. He came in to see me, and said: "I don't like this. Will you go to General Twining and ask him not to discharge me?" And I said: "General, I can't do that. You fired one of my Chaplains out there and sent him home because he called your attention to this thing." He said: "I did. I made a mistake." I said: "You did," and I said: "That boy happened to meet me in Hawaii and I put the word in to General

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Twining of what had happened and that started the investigation that involved your break. I can't go and ask for anything for you. You knew better than this. You'll just have to take your medicine." This was Twining. This thing was handed down. Arnold's standards came down. Arnold and Spaatz. When we were in Europe, I served on Spaatz's command over there for about a year during the war. I went over in '44; came back in '45. And when we moved into the Continent over there, the Army units were bringing over the gals--the English secretaries with them. these boys were bringing them over all the time. And Spaatz said: "This will not go on in the Air Force. That's all there is to it." And it didn't. Of course, what they did, they'd bring their secretaries over and get them jobs in Army units nearby, but he wouldn't let them put them in jobs in the Air Corps. The standards stayed the same right down: Vandenberg, Twining, Tommy White. There's a man. There never was a finer man in the Air Force. A real gentleman, a military man, a good officer.

Q His widow lives in Washington. She turned over his papers to us. Back on Hap Arnold. Did Arnold ever call you in on some special problem that arose?

C You remember Arnold really had one philosophy: "The Air Force takes care of its own." You've heard that before. And he had set up a quite elaborate operation of personal affairs. Mrs. Arnold set it up. But Hap stood right behind her and said: "Do this." Then there came a time when Congress cut personnel, were going to get rid of all that. Do you remember Charlie Maylon, Brigadier General? That was a great man. He came up through the ranks. When I first went into Washington in '42, Charlie Maylon was a Sergeant Major, and he was appointed a Colonel. He was in General Jim Bevans' office. And I worked with him a good bit of the time. He was the greatest friend the Chaplaincy ever had. I went to him, and

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said: "Charlie, I know General Arnold's attitude in this thing and this is too important to lose. Get the word on up to him that I'd like to talk to him." So I got a call from General Arnold then, and I said: "I think the Chaplaincy can do something to help you. You are losing your officer strength. We can use our Chaplains' strength, plus our enlisted strength to transfer this whole casualty assistance program into the Chaplaincy." And they did. We picked up and handled it for three or four years until the Air Force got the manpower. And General Arnold was tremendously pleased that we were willing to carry this thing, because he had an obsession about the Air Force taking care of its own.

Q On that subject, we'll read your anecdotes into this tape. I was told that Arnold had a great personal concern over casualties?

C He had a tremendous personal concern over casualties. I got a call one day from him asking me to come down. And I went down--I don't know if you've run into it, but he had an obsession about keeping his desk clean. Nothing on the desk at any time except what he was working on at that moment.

Q Did he have a one-page mania?

C No. That was Spaatz. Did he have a one page mania! If you got it on a second page, it never got read. That's all there was to it. He didn't even look to see where it came from. But Arnold didn't. You could write to Arnold what you felt you had to write. But he did like a clean desk. That morning he handed me a casualty list. And he said: "Chaplain, look at that item number 15." I looked, and it said: "Lieutenant So-and-so died from drowning while being baptized." And he said: "How did that occur?" And I said: "General Arnold, that sounds crazy." He said: "I want a full report on it." So I went back to my desk and started looking for it. I went almost by smoke signal until I got way out to Indiana. And the story was this, given to me by a telephone operator. This young boy had gone into the service in the Air Corps from there. He had gotten

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his commission and his wings and was going to be ordered overseas. He came home to see the folks before he left. When he came home, he expressed a desire of being baptized in the church of his parents, which was the Baptist church there. They made all the arrangements for it on a Sunday afternoon in a creek near the church and the choir singing on the bank. A crowd had gathered. The Minister and the Lieutenant walked out into the water and both disappeared. They were able to save the Minister but they never saved the Lieutenant. Nobody had ever checked the bottom to see what it was like and how far out they could afford to go before they got in trouble. And he actually had drowned in the process of baptizing. When I got the story I went back down to see General Arnold. I told him what had happened. And he said it was unbelievable. He said we're losing an awful lot of men in combat. We can't afford to lose people by baptizing. Let's be careful in that field. Then he got off on a subject I'd never heard before. He said to me: "When I was a kid, I was raised...

Q It was Ardmore, Penna.

C He was raised down in there, and he said his parents, as he was grow- ing up, were very much interested in making him a Baptist preacher. And he said that he was interested, too. This was the intent, that he was going to be a Baptist preacher. He said: "Somewhere in the process, I ended up in the military."

Q It was planned for his brother to go into the military.

C One of them had to be a Baptist preacher. But he said to me: "Now I read these casualty lists and look at our problems overseas, and I'm not so sure I shouldn't have been a Baptist preacher."

Q Were there any other occasions, any special cases where he called you down to consult with you, or to tell you something?

C For the most part, on that very first occasion, where he took me in to Jim Bevans' to tell me what my job was, that was my job. The only thing I had to do to see him was if I found trouble anywhere in the

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command that I couldn't get worked out, I'd see him. But his attitude on the whole question of moral leadership and high standards of conduct was known at that headquarters. Everybody knew it. When I went to him with anything from the standpoint of a programmer to help build that type of thing among the enlisted or officer personnel, we got nobody bucking it. He left it to me to work out the program.

Q I was told that Arnold had a built-in smile on his face. It was facial structure, perhaps. Some people got into trouble mistaking that for pleasure. Did this ever strike you?

C No, never. He was very much of a gentleman. He apparently had a tremendous respect for the clergy and the ministry. He took me just on that basis and I was his minister. This was the thing he allowed to be seen in all of his operations with me. I remember passing one time at a dinner over at Bolling Field. The dinner was over and I guess there was going to be a dance. Anyhow, they were milling around. People were in huddles talking, and I was moving from one part of the room to another. I really hadn't noticed that he was in this group that I was passing by. And as I passed by, a hand reached out and grabbed my wrist. He stopped me, and he swung out of that group just enough to say "Chaplain, I just want to tell you how much I appreciate what you're doing." He dropped my wrist and went back to his group. It was the kind of thing that made you feel that he had a tremendous personal interest in you.

Q Something you read to me before we went on tape. You talked about his magnetic personality?

C This was true. I have never been any place when he entered a room when it didn't become electric. There were just two men that I can remember that it it ever happened to me. Two men--Hap Arnold and George Marshall.

Q People have told me that. A charisma that magnetized you.

C Something happened. The whole room began to come alive. Almost you could put your finger out and hit the sparks flying, just when he came in.

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They tell me he could get angry. But he never got angry with me. They tell me he could get mad, and when he did, he could express himself. But I've seen him in a room where he was going to speak to a group of officers, and there'd be a conversation in the room. Then somebody called them to attention. But as he walked in wherever it was, on a platform or just an open gathering, or whatever it was, the room became charged with electricity. He was just that kind of a guy.

Q Was he very articulate?

C Yes, I thought he was.

Q He had a high pitched voice. His message carried?

C You mean as far as the quality of voice in a room? I'd say yes.

Q Also the quality of his message?

C Whatever he had to say, he knew what he was talking about. You got a feeling that if anybody knew the United States Air Corps and its needs, he knew it.

Q We talked about Suzie Adkins. I have been told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her up in advance and ask if this was a good time to see the Old Man about something or, and she would say: "Not today, try me tomorrow," or some such thing. Or she might say: "It's a good time."

C I had an experience with this thing. I went down for something; I don't know what it was. Either he called me or I'd asked to come down. And I went down. They had a set of swinging doors to his office. They didn't go all the way to the top or all the way to the bottom. You pushed them, and they went in. He had Barney Giles in there and he was raising the dickens. I mean really was. I went in. I said to Suzie: "Should I?" And she said: "It will soon be over." And the door swung open and Barney left, and she said: "Go ahead in" and I thought to myself: "This is going to be good; I'm walking in on top of this; I'll most likely get killed before dark." I walked in that room and you'd never know that he'd been mad at anybody. His mood had completely changed. "Come in,

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Chaplain. What can I do for you?" And we sat and chatted a few minutes. That was it. Suzie was a great personality. She was, really. She was his Girl Friday in every way. She knew not only Hap Arnold but she knew the Air Force. And she knew what he was doing for the Air Force. And she had that ability to bring things into line to him as they should come in and not out of harmony with him. In complete harmony, so that he'd get them, naturally.

Q Anybody else on his staff? Did you work through Fred Dean?

C No. I worked directly. I didn't even work through Barney.

Q When some Chaplain's problems came up, you went to see him?

C No. I went to Jim Bevans, talked with him.

Q He was your administrative superior?

C The chances are that Bevans could settle the thing without anybody else.

Q Bevans left late in the war. He got his chance overseas. I think Idwal Edwards came in?

C Idwal Edwards came in.

Q By that time Arnold was gone?

C No, I think Arnold was still there. Idwal was a Baptist preacher's son.

Q He lives in Arlington, Virginia.

Q There was a Chaplain named Axton?

C He was in the Army.

Q He was out at March Field in the thirties when Arnold was the CO out there. They were trying to get money to build a new chapel out at March Field. And Arnold suggested that they have a Sunday night service and sort of mix it up with games, you know, game night. The Chaplain didn't think this was consistent with religious practice. Arnold had a sort of pragmatic approach toward things like church services.

Q Axton, I think, became Chief Chaplain of the Army. If I'm not mistaken he was a Methodist.

Q Leading up to Arnold's approach to religion as sort of pragmatic. Did you ever think that?

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C I never really went into it. Of course when I came in to this job I'd been under this strait-laced operational setup in the Army Chaplain's office. The Army Chaplain could be asked to do anything. He could be Library Officer; he could be Post Exchange Officer. The first thing I asked for was to have that stopped. And Arnold agreed with it and published a regulation for me stating it. The Chaplain's duties were religious and he was to perform no function not in accord with the abilities of the religious leader.

Q Did he ever tell you to stop doing anything?

C No, I never was at any time upbraided by Arnold for anything. The fact of the matter is in my whole time with the first five Chiefs, I never had anything said to me in criticism. The only guy that ever did was that little incident with Quarles. I never got very close to him. I had a fairly good relationship with most of the other Secretaries, but never got very close to Quarles. The greatest thing that ever came to Washington in the civilian personnel outfit was Anna Rosenberg when she was a Deputy for Personnel for OSD. That was a great gal. If you ever want to see a person that stood foursquare behind religion, and morality, and ideals, she stood. That was much later on when the three services were there and they'd set up the Chaplain's Board which was under the Secretary of Defense, and under her. She had a habit. That thing was supposed to rotate every year. The Chairman of each Service got it. She had a habit of slipping that by and I was in there one time for three years as Chairman of the Board because she wouldn't change it. She was a tremendous person.

I got on an airplane with Spaatz going to Maxwell Field. It was his ship. As I got on everybody sat down, and he sat down and I noticed that there was a compartment ahead there with a table, and a set of cards. I said to him: "Do you mind if I play some solitaire?" "Go ahead." I sat down and in a few minutes he swung in to the other side of the table and said: "What are you playing?" I said: "Gin," "Let's go." And we played gin all the way to Maxwell Field. And that was the last word he

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said to me when he sat down: "Let's go." As we got to the end of the trip he said: "You beat me. I'll play you coming back." And that was the entire conversation. I had a funny one with him. I married his daughter in the house in Georgetown where they lived. And they had said to me the wedding was going to be December 3rd on a Friday. They wanted me to come over Thursday. Mrs. Spaatz is quite a gal. She wanted to talk over the wedding and sort of see how the thing was going to be fitted into the house. I was to be there at four o'clock, and I got there a few minutes before four and General Spaatz answered the door. He said: "My wife is out. She'll be back. She told you four o'clock; she should have been here at four o'clock. She shouldn't keep you waiting." So we went in and sat down and there was not much conversation, because it was hard to get a conversation going with him. And, anyhow, Mrs. Spaatz came in with the daughter. We were going to have a dry run of the wedding and Spaatz was going to give away the daughter. And it was going to be in front of the fireplace and so forth. We went through the ceremony and I said: "At this point, General, I'll ask who giveth whatever the girl's name is to be married to this man and you'll say: 'I do.'" He said: "Yes." I started out, and his wife said to him: "Carl, now say what you're supposed to say on this." I said: "You can say: "I do," or "My wife and I do." and he turned to her and said: "I don't need to." And that was the end of it. Now we went all through the rehearsal. When the wedding was over the next day, he said what he had to say. The thing was all over, the whole wedding was done. People were beginning to mill around. He came over to me and he said: "I didn't need a rehearsal, did I?"

Q Very taciturn man. Did you meet the Arnold family? You met Mrs. Arnold.

C Yes. I knew Mrs. Arnold.

Q How about the three boys and the daughter?

C I don't think I've ever met the daughter. I knew the boys. There was

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one in Washington--Bruce. Of course you know General Arnold's love for Robert Dunbar over at the Officers' Club.

Q We go to that party every year.

C I go to it, too.

Q That started with Hap, I interviewed Dunbar at great length.

C There's a guy that should have a million stories.

Q He told me quite a few.

C You were talking about Spaatz and this one-page-paper idea. Back in '49 when the Air Force broke away from the Army, the Chaplaincy didn't. I sat down and worked up a paper for General Spaatz that he had asked for, as to why we should have our own Chaplaincy. And I wrote this up and took it down to him one morning. He read it over and said to me: "I'll keep this. I'm supposed to see General Miller this afternoon." He was then the Army Chief of Chaplains. I suppose this was about 10:00. He said: "I'm supposed to see him at eleven o'clock." And he said: "You take the paper with you. I don't think we're going to have a separate chaplaincy." I took the paper and came back upstairs. By then I had a staff of four or five chaplains. I said: "I don't know, boys. It looks like we're going wherever the Army decides to put us." The Army Chief's office at that time was very anti-Air Force. All they had to do was get Carpenter and Zielinski out of there so they could their hands in to do what they pleased. They were having us to fight all the time. I went down to dinner that day, came back from dinner and the telephone rang. Spaatz's secretary said: "Come down. Bring that paper with you." I brought it down. When I went in to see him, he said "You got that paper?" I said: "Yes," and he took it and folded the bottom under so you couldn't see my signature, and put it under the glass on his desk. He said: "General Miller's coming back at three o'clock. We're going to have our own chaplaincy. We're not going to fool with the Army." Then he walked out. I never was able to find out why until about a year ago. I ran into

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somebody on the staff and I don't remember who it was. He said to me that when Miller came in, the first thing--he made his presentation and Spaatz was favorable until Miller said to him: "All Chaplains will change in the Air Force every three years. They'll stay with you, and then they'll be back in the regular flow. We're making an immediate change in the Air Chaplain here, and I'll send General O'Neil over. That will give you and General rank here, I'll send him over." And Spaatz said: "We expect to keep Carpenter." "No," Miller said. "He's been here long enough. We'll send General O'Neil." Jimmy was the Deputy Chief of Army Chaplains. And Spaatz said: "I'll talk to you later." And that changed the whole thing around. He decided right after that to keep the setup as is.

C It was some time in November of 1943, I came into my office to find a request that I report to General Arnold immediately. When I reported to General Arnold he showed me the morning copy of the Washington Post. It carried a headline: "Chaplain Says Troops Will Be Home By Christmas 1943." And he asked me: "Who is this chaplain?" I said: "He's the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." "He was the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." General Arnold said. "I want you to go to Europe, to England, take his replacement with you, and see that the Chaplain is home by Christmas." With this order, a chain of experiences began that were really interesting. Air travel to Europe was in its infancy. You usually either went by combat plane which had extra gas tanks put on it or by ship, whichever you wanted to do. I chose to go over in a convoy. So I had the replacement meet me at Camp Kilmer. I got there and there were about nineteen Air Corps Chaplains waiting to be shipped out. And we took over the postal operation for the base for the time. I was working there in the post office one day. An Air Force captain came to me and said: "Chaplain, would you come up to my mess hall and have dinner with me tomorrow?" So I said: "Yes, I'd be glad to," and I went up. There had been some complaints these boys had been

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registering, and you couldn't get anybody to listen to about the cleanliness of the food-handlers, and the silverware, and the preparation of the food. They had been complaining for some time and nobody had paid any attention. He came to me because it was customary in the Air Force at that time that Chaplains kept an eye on the mess halls, both enlisted and officers. If there was anything needed to be checked up they would pick up the complaint and take it to the commanding officer of the installation. I said: "I'll try to see what I can do." So I went down to see the Base Commander. I told him what I had run into, and he was impatient. When I got through he said: "Chaplain, thank you very much but that's all there is to this. I'm not going to listen to a lot of yelling by a bunch of officers just passing through here as to what the conditions are. I'm sure they're all right, or my inspector would have picked it up." I said to him: "Colonel, I'm not trying to threaten you, but I do want to say this to you. I think you're going to end up in a lot of ptomaine poisoning in that mess. But that's up to you." I was waiting for quite a while; I had a weekend, so I went home. And when I went home I ran into Charlie Maylon. At that time he was Colonel Maylon in the Office of the Chief of Personnel. And he said: "How are things going?" I told him this story, and really, I didn't think that what I told him, that I was making a complaint to the top. But I told him the story, and then, I came on back to Kilmer on Monday or Sunday night. On Monday I was working down in the Post Office and the telephone rang. One of the boys said: "Somebody wants you." I went to the phone and the voice on the other end of the line introduced himself as a Colonel on the Staff of the Inspector General of the 2nd Army out in New York. He said: "Are you the Staff Officer who made a personal complaint to General Arnold this weekend about the food conditions in an Air Corps mess here at Camp Kilmer? I said: "Come to think of it, I guess I am." He said: "I want to tell you I've inspected that mess, and I'm satisfied that it's all right, and we don't appreciate you going back and telling tales

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out of school." I said: "You understand, of course, Colonel, that I'm on General Arnold's staff. And I'm not telling tales out of school. I'm taking care of the Air Force personnel, whether they're at home or wherever they are." He said: "I just want you to know we've inspected, and it's all over with, and that's all there is to it." Well, Wednesday morning of that week, about seven o'clock in the morning, they knocked at my door at my barracks, and I got up sleepily, and went to the door in pajamas. There stood a corporal who saluted me and said: "Colonel, your car is here." And I said: "Corporal, I didn't order any car. You got the wrong guy." He looked at his slip and said: "You're Colonel Charles I. Carpenter?" I said: "Yes." He said: "Your car is here." I said: "Go back to the motor pool and find out where the mistake is, because I ordered no car." And I went back to bed. About nine o'clock I got up, and as I was dressing, knock on the door again, my corporal. He said: "Colonel, this is your car. It's been ordered to you, not only for you here, but it's on permanent assignment to you." I said: "This I don't understand. And I don't think I need a car." "Well," he said, "You know, Colonel, if you have a car you don't have to have a pass off the base at night. You can go into New York any time." I said: "Corporal, you won the day. I accept the car." So I went on down to the Post Office. When I hit the Post Office one of the Chaplains came over to me and said: "Carp, did you hear the story?" I said: "What's the matter?" "Three hundred and some cases of ptomaine up in that officers' mess you reported on. And they didn't do anything about it." Then I began to see the reason for my car. I was being bribed to shut up. So I accepted the car, and when we shipped out overseas, everybody else that night went into the Hoboken docks by bus, but I drove in in my private car.

Q Did they ever do anything to that Colonel?

C I don't know if they ever did or not but at the same time the Army Air Forces reached out and got results even though 300 boys had to get sick to do it.

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Q There was a complaint about the Newfoundland--Gander stop enroute to overseas. General Henry Harms was taken out of there because there were some complaints about bad food.

C Hap was very strict on that. He was on the bases. But this had been an Air Corps situation even when I was at Langley Field. We were inspecting messes then. I remember I went in one day. The Catholic Chaplain came to me and said: "I want you to go out to the Aviation Engineers mess today with me." And I went out. And they had boiled potatoes. And as he went down the line he stuck his fork in a potato, put it in his plate, and the potato jumped. And he picked the thing out with his fingers and threw it across the floor. It hit the floor and bounced against the wall, and never broke open. He picked the potato up and went looking for the Mess Sergeant. Then he found the Mess Officer and they gave him a hard time. He came back to me and said: "What do I do now?" So I said: "Let's go up and see the Old Man." So we went up to see the Base Commander and it was a Colonel Lohman. And, boy, Lohman chewed himself out a Mess Officer in a hurry.

Q Was that Ernest "Fud" Lohman?

C That's the guy.

Q He was Base Commander under Arnold at March Field. Arnold didn't care too much for him.

C Lohman was quite a character. I flew with Lohman out at Langley Field when I was there. In 1940--before '41, before the war. And they used to tell me I was crazy. I came into Washington one day with Lohman to Bolling Field. We came in an A-17. That thing was just a flying casket. And he hit that base coming in there, jumped about 17 feet in the air. Bang, we went up, and just bounced ourselves down on the ground. Somebody asked me: "Do you know who you're flying with?" I said: "Yeah." He said: "Do you like the way it's being done?" I said: "No, but I got to get home."

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Q They ealled him also "Crash and Burn" Lohman.

C That's the guy.

Q He used to give them this sermon about "If you don't do this or that, you will crash and burn."

C Well, you know those A-17's were really flaming torches, almost. I enjoyed him. He was a great guy for me. He and I...

Q People at March Field who came up with Arnold in the 1930's didn't like him at all. He was sort of stiff. Very unbending.

C Yes. He lives or did live at San Antonio.

Q I think he's probably passed away.

C He was an excellent officer. Tell you what he did out there. In those days in the Air Bases, you know, because they were on Federal property, they'd run slot machines. And Lohman agreed to let them have a slot machine in the Officers' Club and Enlisted Men's Club provided the Chaplain's Fund got 10% of it every month. And they'd come up to me every month out of the Officers' Club, some young lieutenant would come up and hand me a check, and say: "Here, Capone, here's your cut."

Q You know, something you brought up before about the quality of life among the enlisted men at the base. One of the characteristics that Arnold was said to have had: whenever he came into a base he steered away from the red carpet treatment and always went down to the maintenance shack or the enlisted men's mess where he knew a lot of enlisted men, some of the men who had flown with him back in the old days. He felt this was where the problems were. He oftentimes went to the maintenance shack or the hangar and talked to the enlisted men.

C He had brought out to me in that first talk he had with me that in many instances the enlisted man had no contact with the Chaplain. And he said: "Sometimes they can't get through when they need to get through to get action. If they can get to you, then you see that the action is brought to the attention of the commander." And this was a thing that all his Chaplains had been trained in.

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Q Did he subscribe to the theory that the old Chiefs are the guys that really run an air base?

C He subscribed to the theory that I subscribed to. You can take the command anywhere you want but just give me a few good old time sergeants, and let me loose with them, and I'd have anything I wanted. Incidentally, have you ever run into the name of Nero, Colonel Ulysses S. Nero?

Q I've seen the name.

C Sam Nero is an oldtimer and he lives right down here in Rehoboth. He flew with Billy Mitchell on that aircraft that they dropped the bomb down the smokestack. He's the guy that dropped the bomb for Billy. And this guy sits down here. He was a Sergeant on the base at Langley Field with the 8th Pursuit under Kepner. Kepner had the 8th Pursuit. He's down in Rehoboth and he's loaded with ancient history on the Air Force and the Billy Mitchell days.

Q Likes to talk about it?

C Loves to. And he would come into this whole area, Arnold and all the rest of them.

Q Maybe I'll look him up.

C Somebody put out a moving picture on religion where some pilot was flying. I don't know what the story is, but here's what happened. The moving picture people came into the headquarters and wanted to present to the Air Force a C-47 to be set up for the Chief of Chaplains as an office and as a chapel to be his to use. Sort of a flying chapel. And Arnold called me down and said this. He named the motion picture company. I listened to the setup. To me it just didn't make sense. It had no purpose at all. I didn't need the office, and there was nothing to be done with the chapel. I mean, you couldn't do anything about it. Because it was just too small. It had no meaning. And yet, the Old Man was in real trouble. He was trying to get C-47s to fly gas up to Patton. He was trying to get C-47s and we were short. After Arnold told me the story,

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he said: "If you won't accept this, I'll accept it for you." And I said: "General, I just don't think it makes any sense." I said: "You need C-47s. Why should we take one out of service just to put this kind of a thing which is pure and simply a show. It's pure and simply an advertisement for the movie people, and I don't need the cockeyed airplane. When I want to go somewhere, I call down, and I have an airplane that I can use. And I don't take it out of operations." He said: "I'm glad you feel that way about it. I wasn't going to attempt to tell you what to do, and if you wanted it you could have it. But," he says, "we can use that C-47 without getting it involved in that. . .

Q Could it have been Warner Brothers?

C I don't remember. There was some movie about religion in the military forces. . .

Q There was a song "A Wing and a Prayer?"

C "Coming in on a Wing and a Prayer." Yeah, I think that had something to do with it. I don't remember it particularly. I don't remember it particularly but it was going to be done as an ad for that picture.

Q It was a religious kick. Remember the Chaplains that went down on the Dorchester?

C Yes. The Four Chaplains Merit Award out of Boston was given to me.

Q It might have been that movie?

C I could have been. I don't know. But to my mind it wasn't practical. It didn't make sense.

Q Talking about your visit to the Mediterranean. Probably the 15th Air Force out at Foggia.

C And I went down. When I went in there I found this story. Cardinal Spellman traveled through the war on a letter from President Roosevelt. In Italy all those Catholic priests wear the little flat hats and flowing robes. And they all look alike. And Cardinal Spellman had sent a message in that he anticipated arriving at a certain time, at a certain place. And it came

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in to the Chaplain of the Air Force, who was a boy named Rhodes. And I'd been a little bit opposed to Rhodes being the 15th Air Force Chaplain because I thought he was too immature. And this letter came in, and Rhodes just did nothing with it. He had done nothing whatsoever with the letter. The next thing you know, at the airport out there, the Cardinal arrives, and there's nobody there to meet him, so he gets hold of somebody with a jeep and they take him into town. He goes up into the 15th Air Force headquarters, and is sitting in the office of the Chief of Staff and nobody's paying much attention to him. He's just another little Catholic priest running around Italy. All of a sudden, Twining comes out of the office and walks through and goes right back in and calls the secretary in and said: "Who's the Catholic priest sitting out there?" He says: "He says he's Cardinal Spellman." Twining says: "He says he's what? Get him in here!" He went out there right away, dressed the whole thing up, fixed it all up. I had gone in there just before that thing occurred. I had said to Twining at the time: "Let me change your staff chaplain." "Oh," he says, "he's a nice guy." I said: "He's a nice guy but he's going to get you in trouble." And I just had gotten home when a cable came in, care of Arnold to me: "Get me a new Chaplain." This joker had just thrown it aside, and hadn't bothered to send anybody out to meet him, hadn't paid any attention to him, hadn't given him any respect, hadn't arranged for any transportation, or anything else. Boy, Twining had a job getting out of that one.

Q I would think so. While we're talking about Cardinal Spellman, maybe you can tell me off the top this story of his insisting on paying for Air Force transportation?

C Cardinal Spellman always insisted on paying his own way on military aircraft, no matter where he went. When he came back to Washington I always met all of the planes that came into Bolling that had any religious leaders on them. When he was on there I'd go to meet it, and he'd

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always end up with a conversation something like: "Well, Chaplain," -- he was on his way to the Mayflower where he stayed--"You'll see that my bill is ready for me tomorrow." And I'd always say, "Yes." I'd come back in to my office the next morning and send a note down to the Comptroller and tell him that Cardinal Spellman wanted a bill from Newfoundland to Washington, and to make it up. Well, on this particular morning I did this, and in about five or ten minutes I get a telephone call saying: "Secretary Quarles wants to see you." And I went down. Apparently, somebody had gotten the idea I was pulling something here, or persecuting the Catholics. Because when I went into Secretary Quarles' office, he was mad. He said: "What's this idea of charging Cardinal Spellman for flying on military aircraft?" I said: "Mr. Secretary, this is the Cardinal's request. He wants to pay his own way, and I've only done what he's asked me to do." He said: "I want you to understand that from here on out Cardinal Spellman will fly on military aircraft, and on Air Force aircraft at the expense of the Air Force. I don't want any more of this going on." I said: "Mr. Quarles, would you be so kind-- Cardinal Spellman is at the Mayflower. Would you call him and tell him this, because I've only done what the Cardinal asked." "Well," he said, "I'm going to take care of this matter. You can just forget it. It's in my hands from now on. You stop worrying about it." So I went back to the office. In about half an hour the phone rang. Would I come back down in the Secretary's office. I didn't know what was going to happen then. I went down and it was a completely different Secretary. He apologized to me for being rough with me. He was sorry he'd messed into this thing at all. He'd talked to the Cardinal. He understood the Cardinal's desires. From here on out, anything the Cardinal wanted would be done the way he wanted it. I thanked him and went on about my business. But Cardinal Spellman always asked for that. Now we had a fellow over in the Protestant Church, the National Council of Churches, who traveled.

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He was very jealous of the Cardinal. He wanted to be sure when an order was written that he had the same rank as the Cardinal was given. If it was the rank of a Major General, Lieutenant General, whatever it was, he had to have it and he had to have the same treatment. And I used to get quite a few letters from him bitching about this, and that, and something else. He never asked me to send him a bill, so he could pay for it. I have a tremendous respect for Cardinal Spellman. He was one of the greatest men I ever knew.

Q I think he did a great job out in the field?

C Always. He would walk into a hospital and start with the first bed. Get the boy's name and talk a few words to him, then take the next one, and the next one. When he came back home he wrote to every parent of every boy with whom he had talked. Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, black or white. And told them he'd seen him, had some little thing to say about him, or something of that kind. And it would do a great job.

Q Did he have a secretary, taking notes?

C He had somebody with him who took the notes, as they went along. Just one man went along and all he did was pick up the names of the boys.

Q Very personal thing and appreciated.

C I can give you another story. But I don't know that's good for publication. I got a call from the Commanding General of what used to be the Northeast Air Command saying to me: "Will you get this Protestant out of here? He's ruined the religious life of this whole community and I want him out of here as soon as we can get him out." I said: "What's the matter?" "Well," he said, "he comes up here and he goes into a hospital. He picks out the guy who looks the worst. One fellow had a broken leg, or something, with a lot of stuff all around his bed. He calls in the photographer and takes a picture of himself standing there talking to him, and walks out, and doesn't even say the time of day to the rest of the troops. He's doing this all over the command. He's done more to set

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Protestantism back in this command than anybody that's been up here and I want him out of here, and don't let him come back again!"

Q This was the CO?

C This was the Commanding General, Glenn Barcus. Have you talked to Barcus?

Q No. You think he knew anything about Arnold?

C I don't know, Barcus was pretty junior. Barcus was commanding a squadron down at Langley Field. I have a picture in my 8 millimeter camera, and stuff I took of the inspection that was held with Roosevelt of the old Air Corps at Langley Field when every B-17 that we had was on the line--all ten of them.

Q This must have been about '38 or '39?

C It was around about '39 maybe '40. Before they even expanded. Roosevelt came down to Langley, and brought a southern Senator that was very much interested in the military.

Q Byrd, maybe?

C No. Started with an "S"

Q Not Stennis?

C He brought this guy down here. They had quite a setup. The Old Man let me off the inspection so I could take pictures and I got movies of the whole thing. Everywhere the movie cameras went, Carpenter went. I was as close with my camera to Roosevelt's face as I am to you. I got some great pictures.

Q They're worth preserving.

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Interview, Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
Milford, Delaware, 29 April 1974

Q When did you first meet Hap Arnold?

C I was ordered into Washington in about July of 1942. I came into the War Department after about four years at Langley Field.

Q In what capacity?

C I was assigned to a new post they called Air Chaplain. It was actually a staff chaplain for the Army Air Corps. And General Arnold was commanding at that time.

Q Who was Chief of Chaplains?

C Major General William Arnold. Very, very fine gentleman.

Q Your job, what did it consist of?

C No one knew what it was when I came in. I was put in the office commanded by, at that time, Colonel David Stinson.

Q What was his job?

C He was in Personal Services in the AAF. I'd been in Langley Field when Stinson was Deputy Base Commander. They brought me in there, and I was told that my job was to organize an Air Force Chaplaincy. Nobody had told Bill Arnold, Chief of Chaplains in the Army, that that was going to be done. Nobody sat down with him and discussed this thing. They just had pulled me in and said: "Organize an Air Force Chaplaincy!" Over in the Army Chief of Chaplains they had an office called Air Force Liaison. Ordinarily, the Liaison office is to a group. But the Air Force Liaison over there was an Army Chaplain who stayed in the Chief of Chaplains' office, and liaisoned over to the Air

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Force which meant that he came over to see me. I was supposed to be working under him in the Chief's office, as far as the Army was concerned, but I was working under the Army Air Forces out of the Air Force Chief of Staff's office, as far as the Army Air Corps was concerned.

Q Did you have contact with Hap Arnold at that time?

C Not at first. When I first came in there, no. I was working...it was a pretty low relationship staff office. It had to do with, really, base services, post exchange, Chaplains, all that kind of thing. I think there was just an attempt to organize an Army Air Corps HQ. I sat down and tried to work out a relationship. But I found that chaplains' reports coming from the field from Air Corps units, never came to Air Corps Headquarters. They always went straight to the Chief's office. So there was no acknowledgment of the fact that the Air Corps Headquarters had anything to so with it at all. I felt that one of the first things that needed to be done was to get the communication channel straightened out. I went in to the Chief's office to try to work this thing out, and I found everybody there was dead set against it. They wouldn't change any regulations to send any of these reports in through Air Corps headquarters because that would mean to acknowledge that the Air Corps was sort of a separate service. Nobody over in that Army setup was interested in acknowledging the Air Corps was anything except supportive. We went along with this for a long time, and I'd taken a copy of an amendment to a regulation down to the Chief's office, but nobody would publish it. I took it back up to the office, and was trying to figure how in the world to get it published. One day--you know the Pentagon was physically divided up, a section for the War Department, and a section for the Navy--different sections. I got into a section of the War Department, the Secretary of War section. I was walking down the hall and had this regulation in my pocket. I heard a voice: "Hey, Carp, where are you going?" I turned around and walked into the room there and there sat a Colonel Lynch. Lynch had been at

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Langley Field with me. I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I work for the Secretary of War in the supply department. I keep an eye on the supplies for the Army Air Corps."

Q Joe Lynch?

C Yes, big tall fellow. This is the story I can't publish but I'm going to tell you. He says: "What are you doing?" I said; "Right now, Joe, I'm trying to find how I can get a regulation published that will send the Chaplain's reports from the Chaplains that are serving in the Army Air Corps up to this headquarters before they go to the Chief's office." He says: "You got the regulation?" I said" "Yes." I handed it to him. He looked at it and said: "There's nothing wrong with that." I said: "I can't get the Army to agree to it." "Well," he said "don't let that worry you." He reached in his desk drawer, pulled out a stamp which said on the bottom of it "By Order of the Secretary of War" and threw it in the OUT basket. I said: "Joe, what are you doing? Somebody will see that thing you've cooked up there coming out of a supply office and you'll be in trouble." He said: "By the time that hits the distribution center they won't know whether it came out of supply, or where it came out of." Then I went merrily on my way. In about two weeks, the amendment to the Army Regulations was published and the Chaplains were informed that they were to send their reports to the Air Corps Headquarters. They didn't like it, and I was called into the Chief Army Chaplain's office. As I went in the office I said: "I'm glad you called me. I was just coming down to thank you for publishing that amendment to the Regulations, and making it possible for those reports to come through the headquarters of the Air Corps.

Q What was your rank at the time?

C I was a Major. And he said: "I just called you up to ask you how this thing got published." And I said: "I just came down to thank you for publishing it. I didn't know anybody else could publish it but you." And

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then came the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, George Rixie, and he was mad as heck because he was the guy that was holding up all this stuff, and he didn't want any acknowledgment made of any Air Corps separation. And I went back up to the office and told the other Chaplain on duty, Connie Zielinski: "Connie," I said, "I guess we've gotten away with it, but we'd better keep quiet." And that was the beginning and the start of this whole thing. After I'd been there a short time, they set up a personnel office under Colonel Jim Bevans. When they set that up, that's the first time I met Hap Arnold. Colonel Bevans called me one day and said: "General Arnold wants to see you. He wants me to go with you to see him." I said: "Fine." So I met him in his office and he took me all over. I was moving around in very sacred territory down there in that General Staff of the Army Air Corps area. He took me in and introduced me to General Arnold. We sat down and General Arnold began to talk. He talked for about ten minutes of what he felt the duties of a Chaplain were with Air Corps personnel. It wasn't a question of extraneous things. It was a good solid type of thing that one minister would talk to another, in regard to the development of morals; in regard to the development of high standards of ethics; in regard to the development of high standards of living. This was the thing he wanted developed among the Chaplains who served in the Air Corps. I would have the full support of his office at any time that I wanted it. And at the end of about ten minutes, he said: "Now, that's your job. Do you understand it?" And I said: "Yes sir, I think I do." And we turned and walked out and as we walked down the hall, Jim Bevans said to me: "I am constantly amazed by that man." He said: "You can sit down and talk to that man about anything that pertains to Air Corps. Aircraft, supplies, anything. I never have heard him do a thing like this before, but I've never seen him in this field. The standards of morality and leadership and the qualities of manhood. He said: "He just constantly amazes me and how big the dream is he has for Army Air." And it was true. I found it was a

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great dream.

Q Did he talk about a day ahead when the Army Air Forces would be separate?

C No. It was a completely different story. Hap Arnold never talked to me about a separate Air Corps in that sense. He talked about the Air Corps having the best of everything in the Chaplaincy. Now when we went to war, and went overseas...

Q We were in the war at the time?

C This was some time in '42. I had nothing to say about the movement of Chaplains in the ir Corps units out of the country until we began to get these reports coming through which acknowledged the right of headquarters to have anything to say. I made a deal with the Army Chief of Chaplains. He would give me a list of men coming out of the Chaplains School at Harvard each month and I would suggest Air Corps assignments for them. I would go up and visit that group at Harvard once a month and talk to each one individually, and give him his assignment, and then go on back to Washington. This way I got to know these fellows. I did this every month, and I'd go up and do this job. With the result that we were beginning to get the younger men assigned to Air Corps units which brought a real problem later on in Europe. Because I later went over to Europe as a Staff Chaplain on General Spaatz's staff and ran into the Army Chaplain over there who was on General "Court House" Lee's staff under Eisenhower, and found that he was getting all the older men who were unfit for work. And he was complaining. He worked out a deal with General Lee whereby he was to reach into the Air Corps to take out a hundred men that he wanted and give me a hundred men that he wanted to get rid of. Just carte blanche. And I went in to General Spaatz on that. Came back a couple of days later with his request, and he said: "Forget it. It's not going to happen." I said: "What's the matter?" He said: "I talked to

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General Eisenhower and told him I didn't want to lose any of these Chaplains." I said: "General, we made these choices back in Washington, getting these younger men. We did it with the cooperation of the Army Chief of Chaplains. We trained these men in the Air Corps, and we're sending them into Air Corps units. And we want to keep them in Air Corps units." So we won that one. But this was another episode with General Arnold. Two other things came out of this relationship. We were having trouble at that time in some of the installations with strip tease in the Officers' Clubs and Enlisted Men's Clubs. I had assigned a Deputy to me, Deputy Air Chaplain, a Catholic named Constantine Zeilinski. Quite a guy! He went up one day to Spokane, Washington, on a visit to the Chaplain, and while there, he found that they were having a strip tease that night. The Commanding Officer of the base had sent a C-47 into San Francisco to pick up the girls. And he went in to see the base commander and said: "I think you're in a lot of trouble on this thing, Colonel, because this is completely contrary to General Arnold's desires. First place, transporting these girls in military aircraft is going to get you into trouble. The second thing, putting this strip tease on out here is not going to be a very happy incident for you." The Colonel said to him: "Look, Chaplain. You're just a Chaplain out of the Headquarters and you go on about your business and I'll run this base." "Well" Zielinski said, "I wanted to tell you because when I go back to Washington I shall make a report to General Arnold." He came back into Washington after his visit and came to me and said: "What am I going to do?" I said: "You told him what you were going to do. You were going to make a a report to General Arnold." So we called down to General Arnold's office. Suzie Adkins?

Q She's passed away

C She came from down the shore, near Salisbury, Md.

Q She was his Girl Friday.

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C And she was my Girl Friday. She was the best liaison a guy could ask for. She kept watch on my interests down there as if she was an Assistant Chief of Chaplains. And I called up Suzie, and she made an appointment with General Arnold, and Connie went in and told his story. What was the ultimate result? The base commander out at Spokane was relieved and broken back to a Major from a Colonel. It was the first time I'd ever seen this thing done, but you know, when that word got around the Air Corps, that the boss didn't put up with this kind of stuff, it was the last of this kind of foolishness we had much of.

Q I want to ask you a question along that line. Arnold was a very moral guy in respect to allowing any hanky-panky among his staff officers. Any guy that fooled around outside the marital relationship--there are a couple that I can think of--were canned.

C He didn't put up with it. And we ran into this almost immediately. Anything that was going to tear down the morals of the command, whether it was enlisted men or officers, if you reported to him, there was no fooling around. He had his Inspector General out there in a hurry and that thing was cleaned up, or somebody was canned.

Q Was there any argument presented to him or to you that these men have just come back from combat, or are about to go into combat, and you're being "nice-nellie", or too puritanical about this matter?

C No. I never even heard that type of approach to him because I don't think he would have listened to it. And I think the person who would have dared to make that kind of approach would have been in trouble. It would have been a negative thing and Arnold just didn't put up with that pap. You know, that wasn't just true of Arnold. That came all the way down through the command. I was there when Arnold and Spaatz and Vandenberg and Twining and Tommy White were in command. Every one of them did the same thing. I had an instance with General Twining in which a Catholic Chaplain out in Japan--there was a Brigadier General out there

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who had been a Guard General. He was commanding a wing. And he set up a show of this kind in the Officers' Club and this young Catholic Chaplain went to him and said: "General, this is contrary to the Regulation that says this doesn't go. You're getting yourself in trouble." The General called in his Personnel Officer and said: "Ship this man back to the States." I knew nothing about it. I was on my way West, or on my way over. I was then Chief of Chaplains with two stars. I was on my way to the Far East when I hit Hawaii. The Staff Chaplain of the Pacific Command came to me and said: "We have a Catholic Chaplain being returned to the States who's very bitter." I said: "What's the problem?" He told me and I called in the boy, and he told me the story. I said: "What are your orders?" He told me--I don't know what it was. But I said: "You follow the orders you've got. Sit tight and say nothing and let me worry about this." And I got a cable off right away to Washington. They not only relieved him from command out there but relieved him from duty with the Air Force. This occurred in Japan. The guy was commanding a base there. It was in Yokahama. It was the airport for the city of Tokyo, the Headquarters Command. I got back into Washington later and got a call to the office one day. My secretary said: "General So-and-so wants to see you," and it was this Brigadier. He came in and he told me this story.

Q They didn't break his rank?

C No. They just broke him out. Back to the Guard. They couldn't do much with him. They just relieved him from duty and sent him back to the Guard. He came in to see me, and said: "I don't like this. Will you go to General Twining and ask him not to discharge me?" And I said: "General, I can't do that. You fired one of my Chaplains out there and sent him home because he called your attention to this thing." He said: "I did. I made a mistake." I said: "You did," and I said: "That boy happened to meet me in Hawaii and I put the word in to General

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Twining of what had happened and that started the investigation that involved your break. I can't go and ask for anything for you. You knew better than this. You'll just have to take your medicine." This was Twining. This thing was handed down. Arnold's standards came down. Arnold and Spaatz. When we were in Europe, I served on Spaatz's command over there for about a year during the war. I went over in '44; came back in '45. And when we moved into the Continent over there, the Army units were bringing over the gals--the English secretaries with them. these boys were bringing them over all the time. And Spaatz said: "This will not go on in the Air Force. That's all there is to it." And it didn't. Of course, what they did, they'd bring their secretaries over and get them jobs in Army units nearby, but he wouldn't let them put them in jobs in the Air Corps. The standards stayed the same right down: Vandenberg, Twining, Tommy White. There's a man. There never was a finer man in the Air Force. A real gentleman, a military man, a good officer.

Q His widow lives in Washington. She turned over his papers to us. Back on Hap Arnold. Did Arnold ever call you in on some special problem that arose?

C You remember Arnold really had one philosophy: "The Air Force takes care of its own." You've heard that before. And he had set up a quite elaborate operation of personal affairs. Mrs. Arnold set it up. But Hap stood right behind her and said: "Do this." Then there came a time when Congress cut personnel, were going to get rid of all that. Do you remember Charlie Maylon, Brigadier General? That was a great man. He came up through the ranks. When I first went into Washington in '42, Charlie Maylon was a Sergeant Major, and he was appointed a Colonel. He was in General Jim Bevans' office. And I worked with him a good bit of the time. He was the greatest friend the Chaplaincy ever had. I went to him, and

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said: "Charlie, I know General Arnold's attitude in this thing and this is too important to lose. Get the word on up to him that I'd like to talk to him." So I got a call from General Arnold then, and I said: "I think the Chaplaincy can do something to help you. You are losing your officer strength. We can use our Chaplains' strength, plus our enlisted strength to transfer this whole casualty assistance program into the Chaplaincy." And they did. We picked up and handled it for three or four years until the Air Force got the manpower. And General Arnold was tremendously pleased that we were willing to carry this thing, because he had an obsession about the Air Force taking care of its own.

Q On that subject, we'll read your anecdotes into this tape. I was told that Arnold had a great personal concern over casualties?

C He had a tremendous personal concern over casualties. I got a call one day from him asking me to come down. And I went down--I don't know if you've run into it, but he had an obsession about keeping his desk clean. Nothing on the desk at any time except what he was working on at that moment.

Q Did he have a one-page mania?

C No. That was Spaatz. Did he have a one page mania! If you got it on a second page, it never got read. That's all there was to it. He didn't even look to see where it came from. But Arnold didn't. You could write to Arnold what you felt you had to write. But he did like a clean desk. That morning he handed me a casualty list. And he said: "Chaplain, look at that item number 15." I looked, and it said: "Lieutenant So-and-so died from drowning while being baptized." And he said: "How did that occur?" And I said: "General Arnold, that sounds crazy." He said: "I want a full report on it." So I went back to my desk and started looking for it. I went almost by smoke signal until I got way out to Indiana. And the story was this, given to me by a telephone operator. This young boy had gone into the service in the Air Corps from there. He had gotten

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his commission and his wings and was going to be ordered overseas. He came home to see the folks before he left. When he came home, he expressed a desire of being baptized in the church of his parents, which was the Baptist church there. They made all the arrangements for it on a Sunday afternoon in a creek near the church and the choir singing on the bank. A crowd had gathered. The Minister and the Lieutenant walked out into the water and both disappeared. They were able to save the Minister but they never saved the Lieutenant. Nobody had ever checked the bottom to see what it was like and how far out they could afford to go before they got in trouble. And he actually had drowned in the process of baptizing. When I got the story I went back down to see General Arnold. I told him what had happened. And he said it was unbelievable. He said we're losing an awful lot of men in combat. We can't afford to lose people by baptizing. Let's be careful in that field. Then he got off on a subject I'd never heard before. He said to me: "When I was a kid, I was raised...

Q It was Ardmore, Penna.

C He was raised down in there, and he said his parents, as he was growing up, were very much interested in making him a Baptist preacher. And he said that he was interested, too. This was the intent, that he was going to be a Baptist preacher. He said: "Somewhere in the process, I ended up in the military."

Q It was planned for his brother to go into the military.

C One of them had to be a Baptist preacher. But he said to me: "Now I read these casualty lists and look at our problems overseas, and I'm not so sure I shouldn't have been a Baptist preacher."

Q Were there any other occasions, any special cases where he called you down to consult with you, or to tell you something?

C For the most part, on that very first occasion, where he took me in to Jim Bevans' to tell me what my job was, that was my job. The only thing I had to do to see him was if I found trouble anywhere in the

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command that I couldn't get worked out, I'd see him. But his attitude on the whole question of moral leadership and high standards of conduct was known at that headquarters. Everybody knew it. When I went to him with anything from the standpoint of a programmer to help build that type of thing among the enlisted or officer personnel, we got nobody bucking it. He left it to me to work out the program.

Q I was told that Arnold had a built-in smile on his face. It was facial structure, perhaps. Some people got into trouble mistaking that for pleasure. Did this ever strike you?

C No, never. He was very much of a gentleman. He apparently had a tremendous respect for the clergy and the ministry. He took me just on that basis and I was his minister. This was the thing he allowed to be seen in all of his operations with me. I remember passing one time at a dinner over at Bolling Field. The dinner was over and I guess there was going to be a dance. Anyhow, they were milling around. People were in huddles talking, and I was moving from one part of the room to another. I really hadn't noticed that he was in this group that I was passing by. And as I passed by, a hand reached out and grabbed my wrist. He stopped me, and he swung out of that group just enough to say "Chaplain, I just want to tell you how much I appreciate what you're doing." He dropped my wrist and went back to his group. It was the kind of thing that made you feel that he had a tremendous personal interest in you.

Q Something you read to me before we went on tape. You talked about his magnetic personality?

C This was true. I have never been any place when he entered a room when it didn't become electric. There were just two men that I can remember that it it ever happened to me. Two men--Hap Arnold and George Marshall.

Q People have told me that. A charisma that magnetized you.

C Something happened. The whole room began to come alive. Almost you could put your finger out and hit the sparks flying, just when he came in.

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They tell me he could get angry. But he never got angry with me. They tell me he could get mad, and when he did, he could express himself. But I've seen him in a room where he was going to speak to a group of officers, and there'd be a conversation in the room. Then somebody called them to attention. But as he walked in wherever it was, on a platform or just an open gathering, or whatever it was, the room became charged with electricity. He was just that kind of a guy.

Q Was he very articulate?

C Yes, I thought he was.

Q He had a high pitched voice. His message carried?

C You mean as far as the quality of voice in a room? I'd say yes.

Q Also the quality of his message?

C Whatever he had to say, he knew what he was talking about. You got a feeling that if anybody knew the United States Air Corps and its needs, he knew it.

Q We talked about Suzie Adkins. I have been told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her up in advance and ask if this was a good time to see the Old Man about something or, and she would say: "Not today, try me tomorrow," or some such thing. Or she might say: "It's a good time."

C I had an experience with this thing. I went down for something; I don't know what it was. Either he called me or I'd asked to come down. And I went down. They had a set of swinging doors to his office. They didn't go all the way to the top or all the way to the bottom. You pushed them, and they went in. He had Barney Giles in there and he was raising the dickens. I mean really was. I went in. I said to Suzie: "Should I?" And she said: "It will soon be over." And the door swung open and Barney left, and she said: "Go ahead in" and I thought to myself: "This is going to be good; I'm walking in on top of this; I'll most likely get killed before dark." I walked in that room and you'd never know that he'd been mad at anybody. His mood had completely changed. "Come in,

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Chaplain. What can I do for you?" And we sat and chatted a few minutes. That was it. Suzie was a great personality. She was, really. She was his Girl Friday in every way. She knew not only Hap Arnold but she knew the Air Force. And she knew what he was doing for the Air Force. And she had that ability to bring things into line to him as they should come in and not out of harmony with him. In complete harmony, so that he'd get them, naturally.

Q Anybody else on his staff? Did you work through Fred Dean?

C No. I worked directly. I didn't even work through Barney.

Q When some Chaplain's problems came up, you went to see him?

C No. I went to Jim Bevans, talked with him.

Q He was your administrative superior?

C The chances are that Bevans could settle the thing without anybody else.

Q Bevans left late in the war. He got his chance overseas. I think Idwal Edwards came in?

C Idwal Edwards came in.

Q By that time Arnold was gone?

C No, I think Arnold was still there. Idwal was a Baptist preacher's son.

Q He lives in Arlington, Virginia.

Q There was a Chaplain named Axton?

C He was in the Army.

Q He was out at March Field in the thirties when Arnold was the CO out there. They were trying to get money to build a new chapel out at March Field. And Arnold suggested that they have a Sunday night service and sort of mix it up with games, you know, game night. The Chaplain didn't think this was consistent with religious practice. Arnold had a sort of pragmatic approach toward things like church services.

Q Axton, I think, became Chief Chaplain of the Army. If I'm not mistaken he was a Methodist.

Q Leading up to Arnold's approach to religion as sort of pragmatic. Did you ever think that?

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C I never really went into it. Of course when I came in to this job I'd been under this strait-laced operational setup in the Army Chaplain's office. The Army Chaplain could be asked to do anything. He could be Library Officer; he could be Post Exchange Officer. The first thing I asked for was to have that stopped. And Arnold agreed with it and published a regulation for me stating it. The Chaplain's duties were religious and he was to perform no function not in accord with the abilities of the religious leader.

Q Did he ever tell you to stop doing anything?

C No, I never was at any time upbraided by Arnold for anything. The fact of the matter is in my whole time with the first five Chiefs, I never had anything said to me in criticism. The only guy that ever did was that little incident with Quarles. I never got very close to him. I had a fairly good relationship with most of the other Secretaries, but never got very close to Quarles. The greatest thing that ever came to Washington in the civilian personnel outfit was Anna Rosenberg when she was a Deputy for Personnel for OSD. That was a great gal. If you ever want to see a person that stood foursquare behind religion, and morality, and ideals, she stood. That was much later on when the three services were there and they'd set up the Chaplain's Board which was under the Secretary of Defense, and under her. She had a habit. That thing was supposed to rotate every year. The Chairman of each Service got it. She had a habit of slipping that by and I was in there one time for three years as Chairman of the Board because she wouldn't change it. She was a tremendous person.

I got on an airplane with Spaatz going to Maxwell Field. It was his ship. As I got on everybody sat down, and he sat down and I noticed that there was a compartment ahead there with a table, and a set of cards. I said to him: "Do you mind if I play some solitaire?" "Go ahead." I sat down and in a few minutes he swung in to the other side of the table and said: "What are you playing?" I said: "Gin," "Let's go." And we played gin all the way to Maxwell Field. And that was the last word he

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said to me when he sat down: "Let's go." As we got to the end of the trip he said: "You beat me. I'll play you coming back." And that was the entire conversation. I had a funny one with him. I married his daughter in the house in Georgetown where they lived. And they had said to me the wedding was going to be December 3rd on a Friday. They wanted me to come over Thursday. Mrs. Spaatz is quite a gal. She wanted to talk over the wedding and sort of see how the thing was going to be fitted into the house. I was to be there at four o'clock, and I got there a few minutes before four and General Spaatz answered the door. He said: "My wife is out. She'll be back. She told you four o'clock; she should have been here at four o'clock. She shouldn't keep you waiting." So we went in and sat down and there was not much conversation, because it was hard to get a conversation going with him. And, anyhow, Mrs. Spaatz came in with the daughter. We were going to have a dry run of the wedding and Spaatz was going to give away the daughter. And it was going to be in front of the fireplace and so forth. We went through the ceremony and I said: "At this point, General, I'll ask who giveth whatever the girl's name is to be married to this man and you'll say: 'I do.'" He said: "Yes." I started out, and his wife said to him: "Carl, now say what you're supposed to say on this." I said: "You can say: "I do," or "My wife and I do." and he turned to her and said: "I don't need to." And that was the end of it. Now we went all through the rehearsal. When the wedding was over the next day, he said what he had to say. The thing was all over, the whole wedding was done. People were beginning to mill around. He came over to me and he said: "I didn't need a rehearsal, did I?"

Q Very taciturn man. Did you meet the Arnold family? You met Mrs. Arnold.

C Yes. I knew Mrs. Arnold.

Q How about the three boys and the daughter?

C I don't think I've ever met the daughter. I knew the boys. There was

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one in Washington--Bruce. Of course you know General Arnold's love for Robert Dunbar over at the Officers' Club.

Q We go to that party every year.

C I go to it, too.

Q That started with Hap, I interviewed Dunbar at great length.

C There's a guy that should have a million stories.

Q He told me quite a few.

C You were talking about Spaatz and this one-page-paper idea. Back in '49 when the Air Force broke away from the Army, the Chaplaincy didn't. I sat down and worked up a paper for General Spaatz that he had asked for, as to why we should have our own Chaplaincy. And I wrote this up and took it down to him one morning. He read it over and said to me: "I'll keep this. I'm supposed to see General Miller this afternoon." He was then the Army Chief of Chaplains. I suppose this was about 10:00. He said: "I'm supposed to see him at eleven o'clock." And he said: "You take the paper with you. I don't think we're going to have a separate chaplaincy." I took the paper and came back upstairs. By then I had a staff of four or five chaplains. I said: "I don't know, boys. It looks like we're going wherever the Army decides to put us." The Army Chief's office at that time was very anti-Air Force. All they had to do was get Carpenter and Zielinski out of there so they could their hands in to do what they pleased. They were having us to fight all the time. I went down to dinner that day, came back from dinner and the telephone rang. Spaatz's secretary said: "Come down. Bring that paper with you." I brought it down. When I went in to see him, he said "You got that paper?" I said: "Yes," and he took it and folded the bottom under so you couldn't see my signature, and put it under the glass on his desk. He said: "General Miller's coming back at three o'clock. We're going to have our own chaplaincy. We're not going to fool with the Army." Then he walked out. I never was able to find out why until about a year ago. I ran into

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somebody on the staff and I don't remember who it was. He said to me that when Miller came in, the first thing--he made his presentation and Spaatz was favorable until Miller said to him: "All Chaplains will change in the Air Force every three years. They'll stay with you, and then they'll be back in the regular flow. We're making an immediate change in the Air Chaplain here, and I'll send General O'Neil over. That will give you and General rank here, I'll send him over." And Spaatz said: "We expect to keep Carpenter." "No," Miller said. "He's been here long enough. We'll send General O'Neil." Jimmy was the Deputy Chief of Army Chaplains. And Spaatz said: "I'll talk to you later." And that changed the whole thing around. He decided right after that to keep the setup as is.

C It was some time in November of 1943, I came into my office to find a request that I report to General Arnold immediately. When I reported to General Arnold he showed me the morning copy of the Washington Post. It carried a headline: "Chaplain Says Troops Will Be Home By Christmas 1943." And he asked me: "Who is this chaplain?" I said: "He's the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." "He was the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." General Arnold said. "I want you to go to Europe, to England, take his replacement with you, and see that the Chaplain is home by Christmas." With this order, a chain of experiences began that were really interesting. Air travel to Europe was in its infancy. You usually either went by combat plane which had extra gas tanks put on it or by ship, whichever you wanted to do. I chose to go over in a convoy. So I had the replacement meet me at Camp Kilmer. I got there and there were about nineteen Air Corps Chaplains waiting to be shipped out. And we took over the postal operation for the base for the time. I was working there in the post office one day. An Air Force captain came to me and said: "Chaplain, would you come up to my mess hall and have dinner with me tomorrow?" So I said: "Yes, I'd be glad to," and I went up. There had been some complaints these boys had been

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registering, and you couldn't get anybody to listen to about the cleanliness of the food-handlers, and the silverware, and the preparation of the food. They had been complaining for some time and nobody had paid any attention. He came to me because it was customary in the Air Force at that time that Chaplains kept an eye on the mess halls, both enlisted and officers. If there was anything needed to be checked up they would pick up the complaint and take it to the commanding officer of the installation. I said: "I'll try to see what I can do." So I went down to see the Base Commander. I told him what I had run into, and he was impatient. When I got through he said: "Chaplain, thank you very much but that's all there is to this. I'm not going to listen to a lot of yelling by a bunch of officers just passing through here as to what the conditions are. I'm sure they're all right, or my inspector would have picked it up." I said to him: "Colonel, I'm not trying to threaten you, but I do want to say this to you. I think you're going to end up in a lot of ptomaine poisoning in that mess. But that's up to you." I was waiting for quite a while; I had a weekend, so I went home. And when I went home I ran into Charlie Maylon. At that time he was Colonel Maylon in the Office of the Chief of Personnel. And he said: "How are things going?" I told him this story, and really, I didn't think that what I told him, that I was making a complaint to the top. But I told him the story, and then, I came on back to Kilmer on Monday or Sunday night. On Monday I was working down in the Post Office and the telephone rang. One of the boys said: "Somebody wants you." I went to the phone and the voice on the other end of the line introduced himself as a Colonel on the Staff of the Inspector General of the 2nd Army out in New York. He said: "Are you the Staff Officer who made a personal complaint to General Arnold this weekend about the food conditions in an Air Corps mess here at Camp Kilmer? I said: "Come to think of it, I guess I am." He said: "I want to tell you I've inspected that mess, and I'm satisfied that it's all right, and we don't appreciate you going back and telling tales

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out of school." I said: "You understand, of course, Colonel, that I'm on General Arnold's staff. And I'm not telling tales out of school. I'm taking care of the Air Force personnel, whether they're at home or wherever they are." He said: "I just want you to know we've inspected, and it's all over with, and that's all there is to it." Well, Wednesday morning of that week, about seven o'clock in the morning, they knocked at my door at my barracks, and I got up sleepily, and went to the door in pajamas. There stood a corporal who saluted me and said: "Colonel, your car is here." And I said: "Corporal, I didn't order any car. You got the wrong guy." He looked at his slip and said: "You're Colonel Charles I. Carpenter?" I said: "Yes." He said: "Your car is here." I said: "Go back to the motor pool and find out where the mistake is, because I ordered no car." And I went back to bed. About nine o'clock I got up, and as I was dressing, knock on the door again, my corporal. He said: "Colonel, this is your car. It's been ordered to you, not only for you here, but it's on permanent assignment to you." I said: "This I don't understand. And I don't think I need a car." "Well," he said, "You know, Colonel, if you have a car you don't have to have a pass off the base at night. You can go into New York any time." I said: "Corporal, you won the day. I accept the car." So I went on down to the Post Office. When I hit the Post Office one of the Chaplains came over to me and said: "Carp, did you hear the story?" I said: "What's the matter?" "Three hundred and some cases of ptomaine up in that officers' mess you reported on. And they didn't do anything about it." Then I began to see the reason for my car. I was being bribed to shut up. So I accepted the car, and when we shipped out overseas, everybody else that night went into the Hoboken docks by bus, but I drove in in my private car.

Q Did they ever do anything to that Colonel?

C I don't know if they ever did or not but at the same time the Army Air Forces reached out and got results even though 300 boys had to get sick to do it.

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Q There was a complaint about the Newfoundland--Gander stop enroute to overseas. General Henry Harms was taken out of there because there were some complaints about bad food.

C Hap was very strict on that. He was on the bases. But this had been an Air Corps situation even when I was at Langley Field. We were inspecting messes then. I remember I went in one day. The Catholic Chaplain came to me and said: "I want you to go out to the Aviation Engineers mess today with me." And I went out. And they had boiled potatoes. And as he went down the line he stuck his fork in a potato, put it in his plate, and the potato jumped. And he picked the thing out with his fingers and threw it across the floor. It hit the floor and bounced against the wall, and never broke open. He picked the potato up and went looking for the Mess Sergeant. Then he found the Mess Officer and they gave him a hard time. He came back to me and said: "What do I do now?" So I said: "Let's go up and see the Old Man." So we went up to see the Base Commander and it was a Colonel Lohman. And, boy, Lohman chewed himself out a Mess Officer in a hurry.

Q Was that Ernest "Fud" Lohman?

C That's the guy.

Q He was Base Commander under Arnold at March Field. Arnold didn't care too much for him.

C Lohman was quite a character. I flew with Lohman out at Langley Field when I was there. In 1940--before '41, before the war. And they used to tell me I was crazy. I came into Washington one day with Lohman to Bolling Field. We came in an A-17. That thing was just a flying casket. And he hit that base coming in there, jumped about 17 feet in the air. Bang, we went up, and just bounced ourselves down on the ground. Somebody asked me: "Do you know who you're flying with?" I said: "Yeah." He said: "Do you like the way it's being done?" I said: "No, but I got to get home."

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Q They called him also "Crash and Burn" Lohman.

C That's the guy.

Q He used to give them this sermon about "If you don't do this or that, you will crash and burn."

C Well, you know those A-17's were really flaming torches, almost. I enjoyed him. He was a great guy for me. He and I...

Q People at March Field who came up with Arnold in the 1930's didn't like him at all. He was sort of stiff. Very unbending.

C Yes. He lives or did live at San Antonio.

Q I think he's probably passed away.

C He was an excellent officer. Tell you what he did out there. In those days in the Air Bases, you know, because they were on Federal property, they'd run slot machines. And Lohman agreed to let them have a slot machine in the Officers' Club and Enlisted Men's Club provided the Chaplain's Fund got 10% of it every month. And they'd come up to me every month out of the Officers' Club, some young lieutenant would come up and hand me a check, and say: "Here, Capone, here's your cut."

Q You know, something you brought up before about the quality of life among the enlisted men at the base. One of the characteristics that Arnold was said to have had: whenever he came into a base he steered away from the red carpet treatment and always went down to the maintenance shack or the enlisted men's mess where he knew a lot of enlisted men, some of the men who had flown with him back in the old days. He felt this was where the problems were. He oftentimes went to the maintenance shack or the hangar and talked to the enlisted men.

C He had brought out to me in that first talk he had with me that in many instances the enlisted man had no contact with the Chaplain. And he said: "Sometimes they can't get through when they need to get through to get action. If they can get to you, then you see that the action is brought to the attention of the commander." And this was a thing that all his Chaplains had been trained in.

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Q Did he subscribe to the theory that the old Chiefs are the guys that really run an air base?

C He subscribed to the theory that I subscribed to. You can take the command anywhere you want but just give me a few good old time sergeants, and let me loose with them, and I'd have anything I wanted. Incidentally, have you ever run into the name of Nero, Colonel Ulysses S. Nero?

Q I've seen the name.

C Sam Nero is an oldtimer and he lives right down here in Rehoboth. He flew with Billy Mitchell on that aircraft that they dropped the bomb down the smokestack. He's the guy that dropped the bomb for Billy. And this guy sits down here. He was a Sergeant on the base at Langley Field with the 8th Pursuit under Kepner. Kepner had the 8th Pursuit. He's down in Rehoboth and he's loaded with ancient history on the Air Force and the Billy Mitchell days.

Q Likes to talk about it?

C Loves to. And he would come into this whole area, Arnold and all the rest of them.

Q Maybe I'll look him up.

C Somebody put out a moving picture on religion where some pilot was flying. I don't know what the story is, but here's what happened. The moving picture people came into the headquarters and wanted to present to the Air Force a C-47 to be set up for the Chief of Chaplains as an office and as a chapel to be his to use. Sort of a flying chapel. And Arnold called me down and said this. He named the motion picture company. I listened to the setup. To me it just didn't make sense. It had no purpose at all. I didn't need the office, and there was nothing to be done with the chapel. I mean, you couldn't do anything about it. Because it was just too small. It had no meaning. And yet, the Old Man was in real trouble. He was trying to get C-47s to fly gas up to Patton. He was trying to get C-47s and we were short. After Arnold told me the story,

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he said: "If you won't accept this, I'll accept it for you." And I said: "General, I just don't think it makes any sense." I said: "You need C-47s. Why should we take one out of service just to put this kind of a thing which is pure and simply a show. It's pure and simply an advertisement for the movie people, and I don't need the cockeyed airplane. When I want to go somewhere, I call down, and I have an airplane that I can use. And I don't take it out of operations." He said: "I'm glad you feel that way about it. I wasn't going to attempt to tell you what to do, and if you wanted it you could have it. But," he says, "we can use that C-47 without getting it involved in that. . .

Q Could it have been Warner Brothers?

C I don't remember. There was some movie about religion in the military forces. . .

Q There was a song "A Wing and a Prayer?"

C "Coming in on a Wing and a Prayer." Yeah, I think that had something to do with it. I don't remember it particularly. I don't remember it particularly but it was going to be done as an ad for that picture.

Q It was a religious kick. Remember the Chaplains that went down on the Dorchester?

C Yes. The Four Chaplains Merit Award out of Boston was given to me.

Q It might have been that movie?

C I could have been. I don't know. But to my mind it wasn't practical. It didn't make sense.

Q Talking about your visit to the Mediterranean. Probably the 15th Air Force out at Foggia.

C And I went down. When I went in there I found this story. Cardinal Spellman traveled through the war on a letter from President Roosevelt. In Italy all those Catholic priests wear the little flat hats and flowing robes. And they all look alike. And Cardinal Spellman had sent a message in that he anticipated arriving at a certain time, at a certain place. And it came

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in to the Chaplain of the Air Force, who was a boy named Rhodes. And I'd been a little bit opposed to Rhodes being the 15th Air Force Chaplain because I thought he was too immature. And this letter came in, and Rhodes just did nothing with it. He had done nothing whatsoever with the letter. The next thing you know, at the airport out there, the Cardinal arrives, and there's nobody there to meet him, so he gets hold of somebody with a jeep and they take him into town. He goes up into the 15th Air Force headquarters, and is sitting in the office of the Chief of Staff and nobody's paying much attention to him. He's just another little Catholic priest running around Italy. All of a sudden, Twining comes out of the office and walks through and goes right back in and calls the secretary in and said: "Who's the Catholic priest sitting out there?" He says: "He says he's Cardinal Spellman." Twining says: "He says he's what? Get him in here!" He went out there right away, dressed the whole thing up, fixed it all up. I had gone in there just before that thing occurred. I had said to Twining at the time: "Let me change your staff chaplain." "Oh," he says, "he's a nice guy." I said: "He's a nice guy but he's going to get you in trouble." And I just had gotten home when a cable came in, care of Arnold to me: "Get me a new Chaplain." This joker had just thrown it aside, and hadn't bothered to send anybody out to meet him, hadn't paid any attention to him, hadn't given him any respect, hadn't arranged for any transportation, or anything else. Boy, Twining had a job getting out of that one.

Q I would think so. While we're talking about Cardinal Spellman, maybe you can tell me off the top this story of his insisting on paying for Air Force transportation?

C Cardinal Spellman always insisted on paying his own way on military aircraft, no matter where he went. When he came back to Washington I always met all of the planes that came into Bolling that had any religious leaders on them. When he was on there I'd go to meet it, and he'd

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always end up with a conversation something like: "Well, Chaplain," -- he was on his way to the Mayflower where he stayed--"You'll see that my bill is ready for me tomorrow." And I'd always say, "Yes." I'd come back in to my office the next morning and send a note down to the Comptroller and tell him that Cardinal Spellman wanted a bill from Newfoundland to Washington, and to make it up. Well, on this particular morning I did this, and in about five or ten minutes I get a telephone call saying: "Secretary Quarles wants to see you." And I went down. Apparently, somebody had gotten the idea I was pulling something here, or persecuting the Catholics. Because when I went into Secretary Quarles' office, he was mad. He said: "What's this idea of charging Cardinal Spellman for flying on military aircraft?" I said: "Mr. Secretary, this is the Cardinal's request. He wants to pay his own way, and I've only done what he's asked me to do." He said: "I want you to understand that from here on out Cardinal Spellman will fly on military aircraft, and on Air Force aircraft at the expense of the Air Force. I don't want any more of this going on." I said: "Mr. Quarles, would you be so kind-- Cardinal Spellman is at the Mayflower. Would you call him and tell him this, because I've only done what the Cardinal asked." "Well," he said, "I'm going to take care of this matter. You can just forget it. It's in my hands from now on. You stop worrying about it." So I went back to the office. In about half an hour the phone rang. Would I come back down in the Secretary's office. I didn't know what was going to happen then. I went down and it was a completely different Secretary. He apologized to me for being rough with me. He was sorry he'd messed into this thing at all. He'd talked to the Cardinal. He understood the Cardinal's desires. From here on out, anything the Cardinal wanted would be done the way he wanted it. I thanked him and went on about my business. But Cardinal Spellman always asked for that. Now we had a fellow over in the Protestant Church, the National Council of Churches, who traveled.

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He was very jealous of the Cardinal. He wanted to be sure when an order was written that he had the same rank as the Cardinal was given. If it was the rank of a Major General, Lieutenant General, whatever it was, he had to have it and he had to have the same treatment. And I used to get quite a few letters from him bitching about this, and that, and something else. He never asked me to send him a bill, so he could pay for it. I have a tremendous respect for Cardinal Spellman. He was one of the greatest men I ever knew.

Q I think he did a great job out in the field?

C Always. He would walk into a hospital and start with the first bed. Get the boy's name and talk a few words to him, then take the next one, and the next one. When he came back home he wrote to every parent of every boy with whom he had talked. Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, black or white. And told them he'd seen him, had some little thing to say about him, or something of that kind. And it would do a great job.

Q Did he have a secretary, taking notes?

C He had somebody with him who took the notes, as they went along. Just one man went along and all he did was pick up the names of the boys.

Q Very personal thing and appreciated.

C I can give you another story. But I don't know that's good for publication. I got a call from the Commanding General of what used to be the Northeast Air Command saying to me: "Will you get this Protestant out of here? He's ruined the religious life of this whole community and I want him out of here as soon as we can get him out." I said: "What's the matter?" "Well," he said, "he comes up here and he goes into a hospital. He picks out the guy who looks the worst. One fellow had a broken leg, or something, with a lot of stuff all around his bed. He calls in the photographer and takes a picture of himself standing there talking to him, and walks out, and doesn't even say the time of day to the rest of the troops. He's doing this all over the command. He's done more to set

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Protestantism back in this command than anybody that's been up here and I want him out of here, and don't let him come back again!"

Q This was the CO?

C This was the Commanding General, Glenn Barcus. Have you talked to Barcus?

Q No. You think he knew anything about Arnold?

C I don't know, Barcus was pretty junior. Barcus was commanding a squadron down at Langley Field. I have a picture in my 8 millimeter camera, and stuff I took of the inspection that was held with Roosevelt of the old Air Corps at Langley Field when every B-17 that we had was on the line--all ten of them.

Q This must have been about '38 or '39?

C It was around about '39 maybe '40. Before they even expanded. Roosevelt came down to Langley, and brought a southern Senator that was very much interested in the military.

Q Byrd, maybe?

C No. Started with an "S"

Q Not Stennis?

C He brought this guy down here. They had quite a setup. The Old Man let me off the inspection so I could take pictures and I got movies of the whole thing. Everywhere the movie cameras went, Carpenter went. I was as close with my camera to Roosevelt's face as I am to you. I got some great pictures.

Q They're worth preserving.

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20314

10 April 1974

Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
716 North Shore Drive
Milford, Delaware 19963

Dear General Carpenter:

My plans are more settled. I'm hopeful we can have our interview in Milford about General Hap Arnold on Monday, April 29th.

I would plan to drive out and arrive about 1300 hours. My wife and I plan to spend the night at Ocean City, Maryland.

I hope you will find this time convenient for our talk about my favorite subject. The enclosure is for your convenience.

I have your phone number (AC 302)422-4269. Should any last minute development occur, I'll phone you. And if your plans should change, I can be reached in my office at AC 202-693-7388 or 693-7428. My home phone is JU 5-0059. Please call me "Collect" if you find it necessary to phone.

Sincerely,

Murray Green

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

Encl

Send transcript
5/14/74

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20314

10 April 1974

Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
716 North Shore Drive
Milford, Delaware 19963

Dear General Carpenter:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20314

22 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GUNDERSON

SUBJECT: Proposed Interview with General Charles Carpenter, USAF (Ret)

1. As you may recall, General Carpenter was Chief of Chaplains during a good part of World War II. I was put in touch with him through the good offices of Bruce Arnold. The General is a good storyteller and is supposed to have some good ones about General Arnold.

2. I have touched base with Dr. Hildreth, and as I have done in the recent past, would make a copy of the transcript available to AF/CHO.

3. The General lives in Milford, Delaware, about 125 miles distant from Washington. Request "Permissive Orders" involving one day's administrative leave. As usual, orders would stipulate: "No cost to the Government."

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History(AF/CHO)

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20314

11 March 1974

Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 206
Milford, Delaware 19963

Dear General Carpenter

You probably wondered what happened to me. I see by our correspondence that it has been nearly two years since I wrote to inquire as to your availability for interview in connection with the Arnold Biography.

I have been trying to write and to interview key people all at once. We have 15 chapters "in the can" and I have Hap Arnold into the 1930's, involved in his March Field experience.

By the way, I just received a nice letter from Mrs. Arnold, who had spent some time in the hospital around Christmas. She is up and around. The Arnold boys now have a nurse/housekeeper on the premises. Mrs. Arnold doesn't like the invasion of her privacy, but is putting up with it. She sounds more like her own pesky self these days.

Incidentally, I talked to Robert Dunbar not too long ago. He's still hitting on all cylinders at age j93, I believe.

If the gas situation continues to improve, I hope to be able to come out your way on a Friday late in April. In any event, I have your phone number: AC 302-422-4269. I will call you to pin down a specific date once my plans firm up.

The enclosure will speed your reply

Sincerely

MURRAY GREEN
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO)

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July 6, 1971

Dear Dr. Green.

I can be available on Friday August 6th - 20th or 27th — or on Monday August — 2nd - 9 - 16 - 23rd - 30th. — Or you see most of any time is free and I would be happy to talk with you.

My home phone is code 302 - 422 - 4269 — you may have difficulty reaching me by phone since we are in and out of the house a good bit. However, don't hesitate to call at ~~night~~ night since when we are home we are "night hawks" and do not mind late calls.

Sincerely

Mark Rapetes

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20314

29 June 1971

Maj Gen Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
P.O. Box 206
Milford, Delaware 19963

Dear General Carpenter:

Colonel Bruce Arnold sent me a copy of your letter to him of June 17th. It would be an honor to have the opportunity to chat with you about General Hap Arnold.

My map indicates that Milford is not too far away from Rehoboth Beach, so it might be possible to combine two objectives, if we can arrange an interview either on a Friday afternoon or a Monday mid-morning.

The best time for me right now seems to be August. Could you let me know in the enclosure which weekend(s) in August that you would be likely to be at home? When my schedule becomes clear, I'll try to phone in advance to set up a time and date convenient for you.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History (AFCHO)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

24 June 1971

Dr. Murray Green
Hq, United States Air Force
AFCHO
Washington, D. C. 20314

Dear Murray,

I told you I was writing Chaplain Carpenter, and I think you will be interested in his reply. Hope you are able to get in touch with him soon.

Since you were last seen stranded at Andrews, I am wondering whether you got out, and whether you made your appointment.

Please give me a call.

E. J. Bruce
E. J. BRUCE

Encl.

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Charles I. Carpenter
P. O. Box 206
Milford, Delaware 19963

June 19, 1971

Dear Colonel Arnold

Thank you very much for your recent letter. I may have a problem re a copy of the sermon for your mother. I do not write a sermon in full but work from a set of "pulpit notes". I do, however, appreciate the addition you gave me — I'll write her.

I would be more than happy to co-operate with Mr. Murray Green in any way — You have my address — please pass it on to him — my telephone number is code 302-422-4262 — This is my home phone — and we're out and around a good bit but I could be reached there eventually.

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It is always a pleasure to be in touch with you and again let me thanks you for your letter -

Sincerely "Lucas"

Lucas Kaufer

Liechtenstein -

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

29 June

TI Pruco:

Thanks for the tip on Carpenter. I've written and hope to make contact.

I phoned Col Higgins (Air Nat Gd) about another matter. We talked also about your youngster. The word he has passed by a Col Barfoot (?)) in Denver is that the young man seemed less than anxious to make a military commitment, and seemed to want to leave open his options.

Higgins said that once the draft bd sends [illegible] a notice, your options shrink. However, he said the new draft bill may have an amendment to permit a draftee to select a service commitment even after a letter arrives. Anyway, this is one of the proposed amendments, but he didnt know whether it survived in the final version of the draft extension now before the Congress.

I told Higgins your impression, that the Nat. Gd. official in Denver seemed perfectly content not to press matters to a conclusion.

Anyway, if you desire to re-start this matter, Higgins said the Denver ANG would find a place for your son right now, if he indicates a desire to sign up. Higgins may be reached on OX 52847 or OX 56957. I would be glad to carry the ball on this, if you wish it.

Money

[illegible] this matter. Above is an easier [illegible]

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Interview, Maj General Charles I. Carpenter, USAF (Ret)
Milford, Delaware, 29 April 1974

Q When did you first meet Hap Arnold?

C I was ordered into Washington in about July of 1942. I came into the War Department after about four years at Langley Field.

Q In what capacity?

C I was assigned to a new post they called Air Chaplain. It was actually a staff chaplain for the Army Air Corps. And General Arnold was commanding at that time.

Q Who was Chief of Chaplains?

C Major General William Arnold. Very, very fine gentleman.

Q Your job, what did it consist of?

C No one knew what it was when I came in. I was put in the office commanded by, at that time, Colonel David Stinson.

Q What was his job?

C He was in Personal Services in the AAF. I'd been in Langley Field when Stinson was Deputy Base Commander. They brought me in there, and I was told that my job was to organize an Air Force Chaplaincy. Nobody had told Bill Arnold, Chief of Chaplains in the Army, that that was going to be done. Nobody sat down with him and discussed this thing. They just had pulled me in and said: "Organize an Air Force Chaplaincy!" Over in the Army Chief of Chaplains they had an office called Air Force Liaison. Ordinarily, the Liaison office is to a group. But the Air Force Liaison over there was an Army Chaplain who stayed in the Chief of Chaplains' office, and liaisoned over to the Air

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Force which meant that he came over to see me. I was supposed to be working under him in the Chief's office, as far as the Army was concerned, but I was working under the Army Air Forces out of the Air Force Chief of Staff's office, as far as the Army Air Corps was concerned.

Q Did you have contact with Hap Arnold at that time?

C Not at first. When I first came in there, no. I was working...it was a pretty low relationship staff office. It had to do with, really, base services, post exchange, Chaplains, all that kind of thing. I think there was just an attempt to organize an Army Air Corps HQ. I sat down and tried to work out a relationship. But I found that chaplains' reports coming from the field from Air Corps units, never came to Air Corps Headquarters. They always went straight to the Chief's office. So there was no acknowledgment of the fact that the Air Corps Headquarters had anything to so with it at all. I felt that one of the first things that needed to be done was to get the communication channel straightened out. I went in to the Chief's office to try to work this thing out, and I found everybody there was dead set against it. They wouldn't change any regulations to send any of these reports in through Air Corps headquarters because that would mean to acknowledge that the Air Corps was sort of a separate service. Nobody over in that Army setup was interested in acknowledging the Air Corps was anything except supportive. We went along with this for a long time, and I'd taken a copy of an amendment to a regulation down to the Chief's office, but nobody would publish it. I took it back up to the office, and was trying to figure how in the world to get it published. One day--you know the Pentagon was physically divided up, a section for the War Department, and a section for the Navy--different sections. I got into a section of the War Department, the Secretary of War section. I was walking down the hall and had this regulation in my pocket. I heard a voice: "Hey, Carp, where are you going?" I turned around and walked into the room there and there sat a Colonel Lynch. Lynch had been at

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Langley Field with me. I said: "What are you doing here?" And he said: "I work for the Secretary of War in the supply department. I keep an eye on the supplies for the Army Air Corps."

Q Joe Lynch?

C Yes, big tall fellow. This is the story I can't publish but I'm going to tell you. He says: "What are you doing?" I said; "Right now, Joe, I'm trying to find how I can get a regulation published that will send the Chaplain's reports from the Chaplains that are serving in the Army Air Corps up to this headquarters before they go to the Chief's office." He says: "You got the regulation?" I said" "Yes." I handed it to thim. He looked at it and said: "There's nothing wrong with that." I said: "I can't get the Army to agree to it." "Well," he said "don't let that worry you." He reached in his desk drawer, pulled out a stamp which said on the bottom of it "By Order of the Secretary of War" and threw it in the OUT basket. I said: "Joe, what are you doing? Somebody will see that thing you've cooked up there coming out of a supply office and you'll be in trouble." He said: "By the time that hits the distribution center they won't know whether it came out of supply, or where it came out of." Then I went merrily on my way. In about two weeks, the amendment to the Army Regulations was published and the Chaplains were informed that they were to send their reports to the Air Corps Headquarters. They didn't like it, and I was called into the Chief Army Chaplain's office. As I went in the office I said: "I'm glad you called me. I was just coming down to thank you for publishing that amendment to the Regulations, and making it possible for those reports to come through the headquarters of the Air Corps.

Q What was your rank at the time?

C I was a Major. And he said: "I just called you up to ask you how this thing got published." And I said: "I just came down to thank you for publishing it. I didn't know anybody else could publish it but you." And

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then came the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, George Rixie, and he was mad as heck because he was the guy that was holding up all this stuff, and he didn't want any acknowledgment made of any Air Corps separation. And I went back up to the office and told the other Chaplain on duty, Connie Zielinski: "Connie," I said, "I guess we've gotten away with it, but we'd better keep quiet." And that was the beginning and the start of this whole thing. After I'd been there a short time, they set up a personnel office under Colonel Jim Bevans. When they set that up, that's the first time I met Hap Arnold. Colonel Bevans called me one day and said: "General Arnold wants to see you. He wants me to go with you to see him." I said: "Fine." So I met him in his office and he took me all over. I was moving around in very sacred territory down there in that General Staff of the Army Air Corps area. He took me in and introduced me to General Arnold. We sat down and General Arnold began to talk. He talked for about ten minutes of what he felt the duties of a Chaplain were with Air Corps personnel. It wasn't a question of extraneous things. It was a good solid type of thing that one minister would talk to another, in regard to the development of morals; in regard to the development of high standards of ethics; in regard to the development of high standards of living. This was the thing he wanted developed among the Chaplains who served in the Air Corps. I would have the full support of his office at any time that I wanted it. And at the end of about ten minutes, he said: "Now, that's your job. Do you understand it?" And I said: "Yes sir, I think I do." And we turned and walked out and as we walked down the hall, Jim Bevans said to me: "I am constantly amazed by that man." He said: "You can sit down and talk to that man about anything that pertains to Air Corps. Aircraft, supplies, anything. I never have heard him do a thing like this before, but I've never seen him in this field. The standards of morality and leadership and the qualities of manhood. He said: "He just constantly amazes me and how big the dream is he has for Army Air." And it was true. I found it was a

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great dream.

Q Did he talk about a day ahead when the Army Air Forces would be separate?

C No. It was a completely different story. Hap Arnold never talked to me about a separate Air Corps in that sense. He talked about the Air Corps having the best of everything in the Chaplaincy. Now when we went to war, and went overseas...

Q We were in the war at the time?

C This was some time in '42. I had nothing to say about the movement of Chaplains in the ir Corps units out of the country until we began to get these reports coming through which acknowledged the right of headquarters to have anything to say. I made a deal with the Army Chief of Chaplains. He would give me a list of men coming out of the Chaplains School at Harvard each month and I would suggest Air Corps assignments for them. I would go up and visit that group at Harvard once a month and talk to each one individually, and give him his assignment, and then go on back to Washington. This way I got to know these fellows. I did this every month, and I'd go up and do this job. With the result that we were beginning to get the younger men assigned to Air Corps units which brought a real problem later on in Europe. Because I later went over to Europe as a Staff Chaplain on General Spaatz's staff and ran into the Army Chaplain over there who was on General "Court House" Lee's staff under Eisenhower, and found that he was getting all the older men who were unfit for work. And he was complaining. He worked out a deal with General Lee whereby he was to reach into the Air Corps to take out a hundred men that he wanted and give me a hundred men that he wanted to get rid of. Just carte blanche. And I went in to General Spaatz on that. Came back a couple of days later with his request, and he said: "Forget it. It's not going to happen." I said: "What's the matter?" He said: "I talked to

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General Eisenhower and told him I didn't want to lose any of these Chaplains." I said: "General, we made these choices back in Washington, getting these younger men. We did it with the cooperation of the Army Chief of Chaplains. We trained these men in the Air Corps, and we're sending them into Air Corps units. And we want to keep them in Air Corps units." So we won that one. But this was another episode with General Arnold. Two other things came out of this relationship. We were having trouble at that time in some of the installations with strip tease in the Officers' Clubs and Enlisted Men's Clubs. I had assigned a Deputy to me, Deputy Air Chaplain, a Catholic named Constantine Zeilinski. Quite a guy! He went up one day to Spokane, Washington, on a visit to the Chaplain, and while there, he found that they were having a strip tease that night. The Commanding Officer of the base had sent a C-47 into San Francisco to pick up the girls. And he went in to see the base commander and said: "I think you're in a lot of trouble on this thing, Colonel, because this is completely contrary to General Arnold's desires. First place, transporting these girls in military aircraft is going to get you into trouble. The second thing, putting this strip tease on out here is not going to be a very happy incident for you." The Colonel said to him: "Look, Chaplain. You're just a Chaplain out of the Headquarters and you go on about your business and I'll run this base." "Well" Zielinski said, "I wanted to tell you because when I go back to Washington I shall make a report to General Arnold." He came back into Washington after his visit and came to me and said: "What am I going to do?" I said: "You told him what you were going to do. You were going to make a a report to General Arnold." So we called down to General Arnold's office. Suzie Adkins?

Q She's passed away

C She came from down the shore, near Salisbury, Md.

Q She was his Girl Friday.

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C And she was my Girl Friday. She was the best liaison a guy could ask for. She kept watch on my interests down there as if she was an Assistant Chief of Chaplains. And I called up Suzie, and she made an appointment with General Arnold, and Connie went in and told his story. What was the ultimate result? The base commander out at Spokane was relieved and broken back to a Major from a Colonel. It was the first time I'd ever seen this thing done, but you know, when that word got around the Air Corps, that the boss didn't put up with this kind of stuff, it was the last of this kind of foolishness we had much of.

Q I want to ask you a question along that line. Arnold was a very moral guy in respect to allowing any hanky-panky among his staff officers. Any guy that fooled around outside the marital relationship--there are a couple that I can think of--were canned.

C He didn't put up with it. And we ran into this almost immediately. Anything that was going to tear down the morals of the command, whether it was enlisted men or officers, if you reported to him, there was no fooling around. He had his Inspector General out there in a hurry and that thing was cleaned up, or somebody was canned.

Q Was there any argument presented to him or to you that these men have just come back from combat, or are about to go into combat, and you're being "nice-nellie", or too puritanical about this matter?

C No. I never even heard that type of approach to him because I don't think he would have listened to it. And I think the person who would have dared to make that kind of approach would have been in trouble. It would have been a negative thing and Arnold just didn't put up with that pap. You know, that wasn't just true of Arnold. That came all the way down through the command. I was there when Arnold and Spaatz and Vandenberg and Twining and Tommy White were in command. Every one of them did the same thing. I had an instance with General Twining in which a Catholic Chaplain out in Japan--there was a Brigadier General out there

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who had been a Guard General. He was commanding a wing. And he set up a show of this kind in the Officers' Club and this young Catholic Chaplain went to him and said: "General, this is contrary to the Regulation that says this doesn't go. You're getting yourself in trouble." The General called in his Personnel Officer and said: "Ship this man back to the States." I knew nothing about it. I was on my way West, or on my way over. I was then Chief of Chaplains with two stars. I was on my way to the Far East when I hit Hawaii. The Staff Chaplain of the Pacific Command came to me and said: "We have a Catholic Chaplain being returned to the States who's very bitter." I said: "What's the problem?" He told me and I called in the boy, and he told me the story. I said: "What are your orders?" He told me--I don't know what it was. But I said: "You follow the orders you've got. Sit tight and say nothing and let me worry about this." And I got a cable off right away to Washington. They not only relieved him from command out there but relieved him from duty with the Air Force. This occurred in Japan. The guy was commanding a base there. It was in Yokahama. It was the airport for the city of Tokyo, the Headquarters Command. I got back into Washington later and got a call to the office one day. My secretary said: "General So-and-so wants to see you," and it was this Brigadier. He came in and he told me this story.

Q They didn't break his rank?

C No. They just broke him out. Back to the Guard. They couldn't do much with him. They just relieved him from duty and sent him back to the Guard. He came in to see me, and said: "I don't like this. Will you go to General Twining and ask him not to discharge me?" And I said: "General, I can't do that. You fired one of my Chaplains out there and sent him home because he called your attention to this thing." He said: "I did. I made a mistake." I said: "You did," and I said: "That boy happened to meet me in Hawaii and I put the word in to General

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Twining of what had happened and that started the investigation that involved your break. I can't go and ask for anything for you. You knew better than this. You'll just have to take your medicine." This was Twining. This thing was handed down. Arnold's standards came down. Arnold and Spaatz. When we were in Europe, I served on Spaatz's command over there for about a year during the war. I went over in '44; came back in '45. And when we moved into the Continent over there, the Army units were bringing over the gals--the English secretaries with them. these boys were bringing them over all the time. And Spaatz said: "This will not go on in the Air Force. That's all there is to it." And it didn't. Of course, what they did, they'd bring their secretaries over and get them jobs in Army units nearby, but he wouldn't let them put them in jobs in the Air Corps. The standards stayed the same right down: Vandenberg, Twining, Tommy White. There's a man. There never was a finer man in the Air Force. A real gentleman, a military man, a good officer.

Q His widow lives in Washington. She turned over his papers to us. Back on Hap Arnold. Did Arnold ever call you in on some special problem that arose?

C You remember Arnold really had one philosophy: "The Air Force takes care of its own." You've heard that before. And he had set up a quite elaborate operation of personal affairs. Mrs. Arnold set it up. But Hap stood right behind her and said: "Do this." Then there came a time when Congress cut personnel, were going to get rid of all that. Do you remember Charlie Maylon, Brigadier General? That was a great man. He came up through the ranks. When I first went into Washington in '42, Charlie Maylon was a Sergeant Major, and he was appointed a Colonel. He was in General Jim Bevans' office. And I worked with him a good bit of the time. He was the greatest friend the Chaplaincy ever had. I went to him, and

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said: "Charlie, I know General Arnold's attitude in this thing and this is too important to lose. Get the word on up to him that I'd like to talk to him." So I got a call from General Arnold then, and I said: "I think the Chaplaincy can do something to help you. You are losing your officer strength. We can use our Chaplains' strength, plus our enlisted strength to transfer this whole casualty assistance program into the Chaplaincy." And they did. We picked up and handled it for three or four years until the Air Force got the manpower. And General Arnold was tremendously pleased that we were willing to carry this thing, because he had an obsession about the Air Force taking care of its own.

Q On that subject, we'll read your anecdotes into this tape. I was told that Arnold had a great personal concern over casualties?

C He had a tremendous personal concern over casualties. I got a call one day from him asking me to come down. And I went down--I don't know if you've run into it, but he had an obsession about keeping his desk clean. Nothing on the desk at any time except what he was working on at that moment.

Q Did he have a one-page mania?

C No. That was Spaatz. Did he have a one page mania! If you got it on a second page, it never got read. That's all there was to it. He didn't even look to see where it came from. But Arnold didn't. You could write to Arnold what you felt you had to write. But he did like a clean desk. That morning he handed me a casualty list. And he said: "Chaplain, look at that item number 15." I looked, and it said: "Lieutenant So-and-so died from drowning while being baptized." And he said: "How did that occur?" And I said: "General Arnold, that sounds crazy." He said: "I want a full report on it." So I went back to my desk and started looking for it. I went almost by smoke signal until I got way out to Indiana. And the story was this, given to me by a telephone operator. This young boy had gone into the service in the Air Corps from there. He had gotten

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his commission and his wings and was going to be ordered overseas. He came home to see the folks before he left. When he came home, he expressed a desire of being baptized in the church of his parents, which was the Baptist church there. They made all the arrangements for it on a Sunday afternoon in a creek near the church and the choir singing on the bank. A crowd had gathered. The Minister and the Lieutenant walked out into the water and both disappeared. They were able to save the Minister but they never saved the Lieutenant. Nobody had ever checked the bottom to see what it was like and how far out they could afford to go before they got in trouble. And he actually had drowned in the process of baptizing. When I got the story I went back down to see General Arnold. I told him what had happened. And he said it was unbelievable. He said we're losing an awful lot of men in combat. We can't afford to lose people by baptizing. Let's be careful in that field. Then he got off on a subject I'd never heard before. He said to me: "When I was a kid, I was raised...

Q It was Ardmore, Penna.

C He was raised down in there, and he said his parents, as he was growing up, were very much interested in making him a Baptist preacher. And he said that he was interested, too. This was the intent, that he was going to be a Baptist preacher. He said: "Somewhere in the process, I ended up in the military."

Q It was planned for his brother to go into the military.

C One of them had to be a Baptist preacher. But he said to me: "Now I read these casualty lists and look at our problems overseas, and I'm not so sure I shouldn't have been a Baptist preacher."

Q Were there any other occasions, any special cases where he called you down to consult with you, or to tell you something?

C For the most part, on that very first occasion, where he took me in to Jim Bevans' to tell me what my job was, that was my job. The only thing I had to do to see him was if I found trouble anywhere in the

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command that I couldn't get worked out, I'd see him. But his attitude on the whole question of moral leadership and high standards of conduct was known at that headquarters. Everybody knew it. When I went to him with anything from the standpoint of a programmer to help build that type of thing among the enlisted or officer personnel, we got nobody bucking it. He left it to me to work out the program.

Q I was told that Arnold had a built-in smile on his face. It was facial structure, perhaps. Some people got into trouble mistaking that for pleasure. Did this ever strike you?

C No, never. He was very much of a gentleman. He apparently had a tremendous respect for the clergy and the ministry. He took me just on that basis and I was his minister. This was the thing he allowed to be seen in all of his operations with me. I remember passing one time at a dinner over at Bolling Field. The dinner was over and I guess there was going to be a dance. Anyhow, they were milling around. People were in huddles talking, and I was moving from one part of the room to another. I really hadn't noticed that he was in this group that I was passing by. And as I passed by, a hand reached out and grabbed my wrist. He stopped me, and he swung out of that group just enough to say "Chaplain, I just want to tell you how much I appreciate what you're doing." He dropped my wrist and went back to his group. It was the kind of thing that made you feel that he had a tremendous personal interest in you.

Q Something you read to me before we went on tape. You talked about his magnetic personality?

C This was true. I have never been any place when he entered a room when it didn't become electric. There were just two men that I can remember that it it ever happened to me. Two men--Hap Arnold and George Marshall.

Q People have told me that. A charisma that magnetized you.

C Something happened. The whole room began to come alive. Almost you could put your finger out and hit the sparks flying, just when he came in.

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They tell me he could get angry. But he never got angry with me. They tell me he could get mad, and when he did, he could express himself. But I've seen him in a room where he was going to speak to a group of officers, and there'd be a conversation in the room. Then somebody called them to attention. But as he walked in wherever it was, on a platform or just an open gathering, or whatever it was, the room became charged with electricity. He was just that kind of a guy.

Q Was he very articulate?

C Yes, I thought he was.

Q He had a high pitched voice. His message carried?

C You mean as far as the quality of voice in a room? I'd say yes.

Q Also the quality of his message?

C Whatever he had to say, he knew what he was talking about. You got a feeling that if anybody knew the United States Air Corps and its needs, he knew it.

Q We talked about Suzie Adkins. I have been told that she was sort of a weathervane. People would call her up in advance and ask if this was a good time to see the Old Man about something or, and she would say: "Not today, try me tomorrow," or some such thing. Or she might say: "It's a good time."

C I had an experience with this thing. I went down for something; I don't know what it was. Either he called me or I'd asked to come down. And I went down. They had a set of swinging doors to his office. They didn't go all the way to the top or all the way to the bottom. You pushed them, and they went in. He had Barney Giles in there and he was raising the dickens. I mean really was. I went in. I said to Suzie: "Should I?" And she said: "It will soon be over." And the door swung open and Barney left, and she said: "Go ahead in" and I thought to myself: "This is going to be good; I'm walking in on top of this; I'll most likely get killed before dark." I walked in that room and you'd never know that he'd been mad at anybody. His mood had completely changed. "Come in,

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Chaplain. What can I do for you?" And we sat and chatted a few minutes. That was it. Suzie was a great personality. She was, really. She was his Girl Friday in every way. She knew not only Hap Arnold but she knew the Air Force. And she knew what he was doing for the Air Force. And she had that ability to bring things into line to him as they should come in and not out of harmony with him. In complete harmony, so that he'd get them, naturally.

Q Anybody else on his staff? Did you work through Fred Dean?

C No. I worked directly. I didn't even work through Barney.

Q When some Chaplain's problems came up, you went to see him?

C No. I went to Jim Bevans, talked with him.

Q He was your administrative superior?

C The chances are that Bevans could settle the thing without anybody else.

Q Bevans left late in the war. He got his chance overseas. I think Idwal Edwards came in?

C Idwal Edwards came in.

Q By that time Arnold was gone?

C No, I think Arnold was still there. Idwal was a Baptist preacher's son.

Q He lives in Arlington, Virginia.

Q There was a Chaplain named Axton?

C He was in the Army.

Q He was out at March Field in the thirties when Arnold was the CO out there. They were trying to get money to build a new chapel out at March Field. And Arnold suggested that they have a Sunday night service and sort of mix it up with games, you know, game night. The Chaplain didn't think this was consistent with religious practice. Arnold had a sort of pragmatic approach toward things like church services.

Q Axton, I think, became Chief Chaplain of the Army. If I'm not mistaken he was a Methodist.

Q Leading up to Arnold's approach to religion as sort of pragmatic. Did you ever think that?

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C I never really went into it. Of course when I came in to this job I'd been under this strait-laced operational setup in the Army Chaplain's office. The Army Chaplain could be asked to do anything. He could be Library Officer; he could be Post Exchange Officer. The first thing I asked for was to have that stopped. And Arnold agreed with it and published a regulation for me stating it. The Chaplain's duties were religious and he was to perform no function not in accord with the abilities of the religious leader.

Q Did he ever tell you to stop doing anything?

C No, I never was at any time upbraided by Arnold for anything. The fact of the matter is in my whole time with the first five Chiefs, I never had anything said to me in criticism. The only guy that ever did was that little incident with Quarles. I never got very close to him. I had a fairly good relationship with most of the other Secretaries, but never got very close to Quarles. The greatest thing that ever came to Washington in the civilian personnel outfit was Anna Rosenberg when she was a Deputy for Personnel for OSD. That was a great gal. If you ever want to see a person that stood foursquare behind religion, and morality, and ideals, she stood. That was much later on when the three services were there and they'd set up the Chaplain's Board which was under the Secretary of Defense, and under her. She had a habit. That thing was supposed to rotate every year. The Chairman of each Service got it. She had a habit of slipping that by and I was in there one time for three years as Chairman of the Board because she wouldn't change it. She was a tremendous person.

I got on an airplane with Spaatz going to Maxwell Field. It was his ship. As I got on everybody sat down, and he sat down and I noticed that there was a compartment ahead there with a table, and a set of cards. I said to him: "Do you mind if I play some solitaire?" "Go ahead." I sat down and in a few minutes he swung in to the other side of the table and said: "What are you playing?" I said: "Gin," "Let's go." And we played gin all the way to Maxwell Field. And that was the last word he

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said to me when he sat down: "Let's go." As we got to the end of the trip he said: "You beat me. I'll play you coming back." And that was the entire conversation. I had a funny one with him. I married his daughter in the house in Georgetown where they lived. And they had said to me the wedding was going to be December 3rd on a Friday. They wanted me to come over Thursday. Mrs. Spaatz is quite a gal. She wanted to talk over the wedding and sort of see how the thing was going to be fitted into the house. I was to be there at four o'clock, and I got there a few minutes before four and General Spaatz answered the door. He said: "My wife is out. She'll be back. She told you four o'clock; she should have been here at four o'clock. She shouldn't keep you waiting." So we went in and sat down and there was not much conversation, because it was hard to get a conversation going with him. And, anyhow, Mrs. Spaatz came in with the daughter. We were going to have a dry run of the wedding and Spaatz was going to give away the daughter. And it was going to be in front of the fireplace and so forth. We went through the ceremony and I said: "At this point, General, I'll ask who giveth whatever the girl's name is to be married to this man and you'll say: 'I do.'" He said: "Yes." I started out, and his wife said to him: "Carl, now say what you're supposed to say on this." I said: "You can say: "I do," or "My wife and I do." and he turned to her and said: "I don't need to." And that was the end of it. Now we went all through the rehearsal. When the wedding was over the next day, he said what he had to say. The thing was all over, the whole wedding was done. People were beginning to mill around. He came over to me and he said: "I didn't need a rehearsal, did I?"

Q Very taciturn man. Did you meet the Arnold family? You met Mrs. Arnold.

C Yes. I knew Mrs. Arnold.

Q How about the three boys and the daughter?

C I don't think I've ever met the daughter. I knew the boys. There was

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one in Washington--Bruce. Of course you know General Arnold's love for Robert Dunbar over at the Officers' Club.

Q We go to that party every year.

C I go to it, too.

Q That started with Hap, I interviewed Dunbar at great length.

C There's a guy that should have a million stories.

Q He told me quite a few.

C You were talking about Spaatz and this one-page-paper idea. Back in '49 when the Air Force broke away from the Army, the Chaplaincy didn't. I sat down and worked up a paper for General Spaatz that he had asked for, as to why we should have our own Chaplaincy. And I wrote this up and took it down to him one morning. He read it over and said to me: "I'll keep this. I'm supposed to see General Miller this afternoon." He was then the Army Chief of Chaplains. I suppose this was about 10:00. He said: "I'm supposed to see him at eleven o'clock." And I said: "You take the paper with you. I don't think we're going to have a separate chaplaincy." I took the paper and came back upstairs. By then I had a staff of four or five chaplains. I said: "I don't know, boys. It looks like we're going wherever the Army decides to put us." The Army Chief's office at that time was very anti-Air Force. All they had to do was get Carpenter and Zielinski out of there so they could their hands in to do what they pleased. They were having us to fight all the time. I went down to dinner that day, came back from dinner and the telephone rang. Spaatz's secretary said: "Come down. Bring that paper with you." I brought it down. When I went in to see him, he said "You got that paper?" I said: "Yes," and he took it and folded the bottom under so you couldn't see my signature, and put it under the glass on his desk. He said: "General Miller's coming back at three o'clock. We're going to have our own chaplaincy. We're not going to fool with the Army." Then I walked out. I never was able to find out why until about a year ago. I ran into

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somebody on the staff and I don't remember who it was. He said to me that when Miller came in, the first thing--he made his presentation and Spaatz was favorable until Miller said to him: "All Chaplains will change in the Air Force every three years. They'll stay with you, and then they'll be back in the regular flow. We're making an immediate change in the Air Chaplain here, and I'll send General O'Neil over. That will give you and General rank here, I'll send him over." And Spaatz said: "We expect to keep Carpenter." "No," Miller said. "He's been here long enough. We'll send General O'Neil." Jimmy was the Deputy Chief of Army Chaplains. And Spaatz said: "I'll talk to you later." And that changed the whole thing around. He decided right after that to keep the setup as is.

C It was some time in November of 1943, I came into my office to find a request that I report to General Arnold immediately. When I reported to General Arnold he showed me the morning copy of the Washington Post. It carried a headline: "Chaplain Says Troops Will Be Home By Christmas 1943." And he asked me: "Who is this chaplain?" I said: "He's the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." "He was the Staff Chaplain of the 8th Air Force." General Arnold said. "I want you to go to Europe, to England, take his replacement with you, and see that the Chaplain is home by Christmas." With this order, a chain of experiences began that were really interesting. Air travel to Europe was in its infancy. You usually either went by combat plane which had extra gas tanks put on it or by ship, whichever you wanted to do. I chose to go over in a convoy. So I had the replacement meet me at Camp Kilmer. I got there and there were about nineteen Air Corps Chaplains waiting to be shipped out. And we took over the postal operation for the base for the time. I was working there in the post office one day. An Air Force captain came to me and said: "Chaplain, would you come up to my mess hall and have dinner with me tomorrow?" So I said: "Yes, I'd be glad to," and I went up. There had been some complaints these boys had been

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registering, and you couldn't get anybody to listen to about the cleanliness of the food-handlers, and the silverware, and the preparation of the food. They had been complaining for some time and nobody had paid any attention. He came to me because it was customary in the Air Force at that time that Chaplains kept an eye on the mess halls, both enlisted and officers. If there was anything needed to be checked up they would pick up the complaint and take it to the commanding officer of the installation. I said: "I'll try to see what I can do." So I went down to see the Base Commander. I told him what I had run into, and he was impatient. When I got through he said: "Chaplain, thank you very much but that's all there is to this. I'm not going to listen to a lot of yelling by a bunch of officers just passing through here as to what the conditions are. I'm sure they're all right, or my inspector would have picked it up." I said to him: "Colonel, I'm not trying to threaten you, but I do want to say this to you. I think you're going to end up in a lot of ptomaine poisoning in that mess. But that's up to you." I was waiting for quite a while; I had a weekend, so I went home. And when I went home I ran into Charlie Maylon. At that time he was Colonel Maylon in the Office of the Chief of Personnel. And he said: "How are things going?" I told him this story, and really, I didn't think that what I told him, that I was making a complaint to the top. But I told him the story, and then, I came on back to Kilmer on Monday or Sunday night. On Monday I was working down in the Post Office and the telephone rang. One of the boys said: "Somebody wants you." I went to the phone and the voice on the other end of the line introduced himself as a Colonel on the Staff of the Inspector General of the 2nd Army out in New York. He said: "Are you the Staff Officer who made a personal complaint to General Arnold this weekend about the food conditions in an Air Corps mess here at Camp Kilmer? I said: "Come to think of it, I guess I am." He said: "I want to tell you I've inspected that mess, and I'm satisfied that it's all right, and we don't appreciate you going back and telling tales

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out of school." I said: "You understand, of course, Colonel, that I'm on General Arnold's staff. And I'm not telling tales out of school. I'm taking care of the Air Force personnel, whether they're at home or wherever they are." He said: "I just want you to know we've inspected, and it's all over with, and that's all there is to it." Well, Wednesday morning of that week, about seven o'clock in the morning, they knocked at my door at my barracks, and I got up sleepily, and went to the door in pajamas. There stood a corporal who saluted me and said: "Colonel, your car is here." And I said: "Corporal, I didn't order any car. You got the wrong guy." He looked at his slip and said: "You're Colonel Charles I. Carpenter?" I said: "Yes." He said: "Your car is here." I said: "Go back to the motor pool and find out where the mistake is, because I ordered no car." And I went back to bed. About nine o'clock I got up, and as I was dressing, knock on the door again, my corporal. He said: "Colonel, this is your car. It's been ordered to you, not only for you here, but it's on permanent assignment to you." I said: "This I don't understand. And I don't think I need a car." "Well," he said, "You know, Colonel, if you have a car you don't have to have a pass off the base at night. You can go into New York any time." I said: "Corporal, you won the day. I accept the car." So I went on down to the Post Office. When I hit the Post Office one of the Chaplains came over to me and said: "Carp, did you hear the story?" I said: "What's the matter?" "Three hundred and some cases of ptomaine up in that officers' mess you reported on. And they didn't do anything about it." Then I began to see the reason for my car. I was being bribed to shut up. So I accepted the car, and when we shipped out overseas, everybody else that night went into the Hoboken docks by bus, but I drove in in my private car.

Q Did they ever do anything to that Colonel?

C I don't know if they ever did or not but at the same time the Army Air Forces reached out and got results even though 300 boys had to get sick to do it.

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Q There was a complaint about the Newfoundland--Gander stop enroute to overseas. General Henry Harms was taken out of there because there were some complaints about bad food.

C Hap was very strict on that. He was on the bases. But this had been an Air Corps situation even when I was at Langley Field. We were inspecting messes then. I remember I went in one day. The Catholic Chaplain came to me and said: "I want you to go out to the Aviation Engineers mess today with me." And I went out. And they had boiled potatoes. And as he went down the line he stuck his fork in a potato, put it in his plate, and the potato jumped. And he picked the thing out with his fingers and threw it across the floor. It hit the floor and bounced against the wall, and never broke open. He picked the potato up and went looking for the Mess Sergeant. Then he found the Mess Officer and they gave him a hard time. He came back to me and said: "What do I do now?" So I said: "Let's go up and see the Old Man." So we went up to see the Base Commander and it was a Colonel Lohman. And, boy, Lohman chewed himself out a Mess Officer in a hurry.

Q Was that Ernest "Fud" Lohman?

C That's the guy.

Q He was Base Commander under Arnold at March Field. Arnold didn't care too much for him.

C Lohman was quite a character. I flew with Lohman out at Langley Field when I was there. In 1940--before '41, before the war. And they used to tell me I was crazy. I came into Washington one day with Lohman to Bolling Field. We came in an A-17. That thing was just a flying casket. And he hit that base coming in there, jumped about 17 feet in the air. Bang, we went up, and just bounced ourselves down on the ground. Somebody asked me: "Do you know who you're flying with?" I said: "Yeah." He said: "Do you like the way it's being done?" I said: "No, but I got to get home."

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Q They called him also "Crash and Burn" Lohman.

C That's the guy.

Q He used to give them this sermon about "If you don't do this or that, you will crash and burn."

C Well, you know those A-17's were really flaming torches, almost. I enjoyed him. He was a great guy for me. He and I...

Q People at March Field who came up with Arnold in the 1930's didn't like him at all. He was sort of stiff. Very unbending.

C Yes. He lives or did live at San Antonio.

Q I think he's probably passed away.

C He was an excellent officer. Tell you what he did out there. In those days in the Air Bases, you know, because they were on Federal property, they'd run slot machines. And Lohman agreed to let them have a slot machine in the Officers' Club and Enlisted Men's Club provided the Chaplain's Fund got 10% of it every month. And they'd come up to me every month out of the Officers' Club, some young lieutenant would come up and hand me a check, and say: "Here, Capone, here's your cut."

Q You know, something you brought up before about the quality of life among the enlisted men at the base. One of the characteristics that Arnold was said to have had: whenever he came into a base he steered away from the red carpet treatment and always went down to the maintenance shack or the enlisted men's mess where he knew a lot of enlisted men, some of the men who had flown with him back in the old days. He felt this was where the problems were. He oftentimes went to the maintenance shack or the hangar and talked to the enlisted men.

C He had brought out to me in that first talk he had with me that in many instances the enlisted man had no contact with the Chaplain. And he said: "Sometimes they can't get through when they need to get through to get action. If they can get to you, then you see that the action is brought to the attention of the commander." And this was a thing that all his Chaplains had been trained in.

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Q Did he subscribe to the theory that the old Chiefs are the guys that really run an air base?

C He subscribed to the theory that I subscribed to. You can take the command anywhere you want but just give me a few good old time sergeants, and let me loose with them, and I'd have anything I wanted. Incidentally, have you ever run into the name of Nero, Colonel Ulysses S. Nero?

Q I've seen the name.

C Sam Nero is an oldtimer and he lives right down here in Rehoboth. He flew with Billy Mitchell on that aircraft that they dropped the bomb down the smokestack. He's the guy that dropped the bomb for Billy. And this guy sits down here. He was a Sergeant on the base at Langley Field with the 8th Pursuit under Kepner. Kepner had the 8th Pursuit. He's down in Rehoboth and he's loaded with ancient history on the Air Force and the Billy Mitchell days.

Q Likes to talk about it?

C Loves to. And he would come into this whole area, Arnold and all the rest of them.

Q Maybe I'll look him up.

C Somebody put out a moving picture on religion where some pilot was flying. I don't know what the story is, but here's what happened. The moving picture people came into the headquarters and wanted to present to the Air Force a C-47 to be set up for the Chief of Chaplains as an office and as a chapel to be his to use. Sort of a flying chapel. And Arnold called me down and said this. He named the motion picture company. I listened to the setup. To me it just didn't make sense. It had no purpose at all. I didn't need the office, and there was nothing to be done with the chapel. I mean, you couldn't do anything about it. Because it was just too small. It had no meaning. And yet, the Old Man was in real trouble. He was trying to get C-47s to fly gas up to Patton. He was trying to get C-47s and we were short. After Arnold told me the story,

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he said: "If you won't accept this, I'll accept it for you." And I said: "General, I just don't think it makes any sense." I said: "You need C-47s. Why should we take one out of service just to put this kind of a thing which is pure and simply a show. It's pure and simply an advertisement for the movie people, and I don't need the cockeyed airplane. When I want to go somewhere, I call down, and I have an airplane that I can use. And I don't take it out of operations." He said: "I'm glad you feel that way about it. I wasn't going to attempt to tell you what to do, and if you wanted it you could have it. But," he says, "we can use that C-47 without getting it involved in that. . .

Q Could it have been Warner Brothers?

C I don't remember. There was some movie about religion in the military forces. . .

Q There was a song "A Wing and a Prayer?"

C "Coming in on a Wing and a Prayer." Yeah, I think that had something to do with it. I don't remember it particularly. I don't remember it particularly but it was going to be done as an ad for that picture.

Q It was a religious kick. Remember the Chaplains that went down on the Dorchester?

C Yes. The Four Chaplains Merit Award out of Boston was given to me.

Q It might have been that movie?

C I could have been. I don't know. But to my mind it wasn't practical. It didn't make sense.

Q Talking about your visit to the Mediterranean. Probably the 15th Air Force out at Foggia.

C And I went down. When I went in there I found this story. Cardinal Spellman traveled through the war on a letter from President Roosevelt. In Italy all those Catholic priests wear the little flat hats and flowing robes. And they all look alike. And Cardinal Spellman had sent a message in that he anticipated arriving at a certain time, at a certain place. And it came

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in to the Chaplain of the Air Force, who was a boy named Rhodes. And I'd been a little bit opposed to Rhodes being the 15th Air Force Chaplain because I thought he was too immature. And this letter came in, and Rhodes just did nothing with it. He had done nothing whatsoever with the letter. The next thing you know, at the airport out there, the Cardinal arrives, and there's nobody there to meet him, so he gets hold of somebody with a jeep and they take him into town. He goes up into the 15th Air Force headquarters, and is sitting in the office of the Chief of Staff and nobody's paying much attention to him. He's just another little Catholic priest running around Italy. All of a sudden, Twining comes out of the office and walks through and goes right back in and calls the secretary in and said: "Who's the Catholic priest sitting out there?" He says: "He says he's Cardinal Spellman." Twining says: "He says he's what? Get him in here!" He went out there right away, dressed the whole thing up, fixed it all up. I had gone in there just before that thing occurred. I had said to Twining at the time: "Let me change your staff chaplain." "Oh," he says, "he's a nice guy." I said: "He's a nice guy but he's going to get you in trouble." And I just had gotten home when a cable came in, care of Arnold to me: "Get me a new Chaplain." This joker had just thrown it aside, and hadn't bothered to send anybody out to meet him, hadn't paid any attention to him, hadn't given him any respect, hadn't arranged for any transportation, or anything else. Boy, Twining had a job getting out of that one.

Q I would think so. While we're talking about Cardinal Spellman, maybe you can tell me off the top this story of his insisting on paying for Air Force transportation?

C Cardinal Spellman always insisted on paying his own way on military aircraft, no matter where he went. When he came back to Washington I always met all of the planes that came into Bolling that had any religious leaders on them. When he was on there I'd go to meet it, and he'd

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always end up with a conversation something like: "Well, Chaplain," -- he was on his way to the Mayflower where he stayed--"You'll see that my bill is ready for me tomorrow." And I'd always say, "Yes." I'd come back in to my office the next morning and send a note down to the Comptroller and tell him that Cardinal Spellman wanted a bill from Newfoundland to Washington, and to make it up. Well, on this particular morning I did this, and in about five or ten minutes I get a telephone call saying: "Secretary Quarles wants to see you." And I went down. Apparently, somebody had gotten the idea I was pulling something here, or persecuting the Catholics. Because when I went into Secretary Quarles' office, he was mad. He said: "What's this idea of charging Cardinal Spellman for flying on military aircraft?" I said: "Mr. Secretary, this is the Cardinal's request. He wants to pay his own way, and I've only done what he's asked me to do." He said: "I want you to understand that from here on out Cardinal Spellman will fly on military aircraft, and on Air Force aircraft at the expense of the Air Force. I don't want any more of this going on." I said: "Mr. Quarles, would you be so kind-- Cardinal Spellman is at the Mayflower. Would you call him and tell him this, because I've only done what the Cardinal asked." "Well," he said, "I'm going to take care of this matter. You can just forget it. It's in my hands from now on. You stop worrying about it." So I went back to the office. In about half an hour the phone rang. Would I come back down in the Secretary's office. I didn't know what was going to happen then. I went down and it was a completely different Secretary. He apologized to me for being rough with me. He was sorry he'd messed into this thing at all. He'd talked to the Cardinal. He understood the Cardinal's desires. From here on out, anything the Cardinal wanted would be done the way he wanted it. I thanked him and went on about my business. But Cardinal Spellman always asked for that. Now we had a fellow over in the Protestant Church, the National Council of Churches, who traveled.

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He was very jealous of the Cardinal. He wanted to be sure when an order was written that he had the same rank as the Cardinal was given. If it was the rank of a Major General, Lieutenant General, whatever it was, he had to have it and he had to have the same treatment. And I used to get quite a few letters from him bitching about this, and that, and something else. He never asked me to send him a bill, so he could pay for it. I have a tremendous respect for Cardinal Spellman. He was one of the greatest men I ever knew.

Q I think he did a great job out in the field?

C Always. He would walk into a hospital and start with the first bed. Get the boy's name and talk a few words to him, then take the next one, and the next one. When he came back home he wrote to every parent of every boy with whom he had talked. Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, black or white. And told them he'd seen him, had some little thing to say about him, or something of that kind. And it would do a great job.

Q Did he have a secretary, taking notes?

C He had somebody with him who took the notes, as they went along. Just one man went along and all he did was pick up the names of the boys.

Q Very personal thing and appreciated.

C I can give you another story. But I don't know that's good for publication. I got a call from the Commanding General of what used to be the Northeast Air Command saying to me: "Will you get this Protestant out of here? He's ruined the religious life of this whole community and I want him out of here as soon as we can get him out." I said: "What's the matter?" "Well," he said, "he comes up here and he goes into a hospital. He picks out the guy who looks the worst. One fellow had a broken leg, or something, with a lot of stuff all around his bed. He calls in the photographer and takes a picture of himself standing there talking to him, and walks out, and doesn't even say the time of day to the rest of the troops. He's doing this all over the command. He's done more to set

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Protestantism back in this command than anybody that's been up here and I want him out of here, and don't let him come back again!"

Q This was the CO?

C This was the Commanding General, Glenn Barcus. Have you talked to Barcus?

Q No. You think he knew anything about Arnold?

C I don't know, Barcus was pretty junior. Barcus was commanding a squadron down at Langley Field. I have a picture in my 8 millimeter camera, and stuff I took of the inspection that was held with Roosevelt of the old Air Corps at Langley Field when every B-17 that we had was on the line--all ten of them.

Q This must have been about '38 or '39?

C It was around about '39 maybe '40. Before they even expanded. Roosevelt came down to Langley, and brought a southern Senator that was very much interested in the military.

Q Byrd, maybe?

C No. Started with an "S"

Q Not Stennis?

C He brought this guy down here. They had quite a setup. The Old Man let me off the inspection so I could take pictures and I got movies of the whole thing. Everywhere the movie cameras went, Carpenter went. I was as close with my camera to Roosevelt's face as I am to you. I got some great pictures.

Q They're worth preserving.

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Carroll, Franklin 1 Sep 72

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9-25-72

Dear Murray:

I think Friday 1 Sept at 10:00 a.m. will be O.K.

Give our regards to the Arnolds. Last time we saw them & their mother was at Tullahoma when Pres. Truman dedicated AEDC and named it for Gen Arnold.

See over for map.

Sincerely

Frank Carroll

done
9-1-72

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

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swing West

D-8Q
Kelly Johnson
& Lockheed
visit in 100 days

20314

18 August 1972

Maj General Franklin O. Carroll, USAF (Ret)
1107 Juniper Avenue
Boulder, Colorado 80302

Dear General Carroll:

I have a nice note from General "Mish" Roth who suggested that I write you concerning our getting together during my trip out West.

I'm delighted to have this opportunity to interview you because you were a key contributor to the history of the Air Corps and AAF, and so, you can help me fill in this vast mosaic of General Arnold's life.

Anyway, some of my plans are firmed up. As I look over the schedule, my best time would be on Friday morning, about 10:00 AM, September 1st.

If this is convenient for you, would you drop me a note at the home of General Arnold's son, in Sheridan, Wyoming. Enclosed is an envelope for your convenience. I'll be traveling south from Wyoming to Colorado Springs and will swing west off I-25 to meet with you, if you can see me at that time.

If you cannot, perhaps we can swing it at a later time, as I expect to be making another trip out in the late Fall or early Spring.

I'm trying to write an honest biography of General Arnold. Needless to state, I've had a lot of good said about him, and some bad. My job is to put it all into a proper perspective. General Roth was most helpful to me, and I know you and I will have a good talk.

Incidentally, I have talked with General Chidlaw, Lawrence Craigie, E.M. "Pop" Powers, Don Keirn, Hugh Knerr at great length, and many others who had some knowledge of Wright Field. I have been trying to locate Benny Meyers without success.

I hope we can get together.

Sincerely,

Murray Green
Office of Air Force History

Encl

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

Arnold would have spent more time writing aviation books but was between publishers and was having trouble making another connection. The Arnolds and the Streetts became close friends in Dayton. Mayy and Bee got along splendidly. [redacted] Bill Jr and David were two years old and shared a birthday party.

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Edit pub Transcript card

Interview, Maj Gen Franklin Carroll, Boulder, Colorado, 1 Sept 1972

Q: Do you remember when you first met the man, your first encounter with Arnold?

C: Yes, but the first time I heard of him was on that Billy Mitchell affair, when he dared to write letters to all the Congressmen backing up the strategic ideas of General Mitchell, and that's when he got fired and sent out to Ft Riley to an old cavalry outfit.

Q: He was an Information Officer in Washington? Where were you in 1925?

C: I guess I was down in Kelly Field, but I had been at old McCook Field from 1921 until the middle of 1924. In those days, every officer had to spend at least one year out of four with operational units. So I was sent down to Kelly Field again with the 30th Attack Group. Then I came back to McCook in the latter part of 1925, and then stayed until I was sent to Panama in 1931, but in the late 1920's and early 1930's, Arnold was assigned to Wright Field. We moved to Wright Field in 1927.

Q: So you knew him at Wright Field?

C: That's where I first met him and knew him.

Q; He had the Fairfield Air Intermediate Depot.

C: At the time I first saw him at Wright Field, he was what you might call the Deputy Commander of Wright Field.

Q: He was a Major then?

C: I guess he was.

Q: What was your job?

C: At that time, I was Chief of the Airplane Branch at Wright Field.

Q: Do you remember anything about him, any meetings, dealings with him?

C: This is what might be called the bad part. But he didnt make any bones about it. He didnt think too much of Wright Field, and after I came back from Panama, I came up the West Coast to San Francisco, and I had some friends at March Field, and so, we drove down there. Colonel Arnold was in command at March Field, so I went around to pay my respects to him. He wanted to know where I was going to be assigned, and I said: "I am assigned to Wright Field." He said:"Dont go back there. That place is going to sink." There was lots of argument around the country in those days about Wright Field and the Engineering Division. A lot of people in industry didnt think we needed it. They thought they could do it. And Col Arnold, I'm sure, had that idea, because he wanted me to stay at March and be there with him.

Q: He liked you?

C: I suppose. He offered me a job.

Q: You had met him first at Wright Field? (Yes) Do you remember any dealings you

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had with him at Wright Field?

C: I was down pretty low on the totem pole in those days. A Major was a pretty high guy in those days. I met him off and on and we talked to each other. But I dont recall any particular thing that happened, etc.

Q: Were you impressed with him?

C: Yes, I liked him. Then, he changed, though. He changed radically about the beginning of the war with respect to Wright Field, and what we were doing in R & D, particularly after he became acquainted with people like von Karman and, who was head of the Research & Development Board?

Q: Vannevar Bush?

C; Yes, Vannevar Bush. He began to see what you could do to build up an air force and get the right kind of equipment we needed through R & D, and R & D facilities. I know he changed radically, as far as that was concerned.

Q: For the good or bad?

C: For the good. All during the War, he supported Wright Field very well.

Q: During the war, what was your job?

C: I was at Wright Field, from June 1939 to August 1945, I was Chief of the Engineering Division, which was in charge of all R&D. Dr. Bush, in War Dept R&D had a lot of projects with Universities and other outfits, etc. More removed from the physical equipment that we needed for our operational people.

Q: Did Arnold think Wright Field was doing a good job during the war?

C: Yes, he did. He came out there frequently and I became very well acquainted with him. We used to give him the $64 tour of the place. A good many things that we showed him, he nearly always say: "What do we do next?" I'd recommend a lot of things to him. He'd say "OK, let's do them," and we did.

Q: Did he give you a hard time?

C: No, he didnt. I suppose he thought I'd done pretty good, because I was there over six years. He didnt fire me.

Q: Who was your immediate boss at Wright Field?

C; Generl Brett first assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division. Then, after he left, Oliver Echols was there for a long time. Then Oliver went to Washington. George Kenney was there for awhile, headed the whole division. Of course, we had the Production Section, the Flight Test Division, things like that, R & D.

Q: Where did Benny Meyers fit into that picture?

C: Meyers was in what you might call the Budget Section. He handled the funds, etc.

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He did a good job in those days.

Q: Arnold was impressed with him in those days?

C: Yes. He was a bright guy when it came to handling funds for the Air Force. He got into trouble on the side and getting tangled up with some company with which he was more or less involved.

Q: Bleriot LaMarre? He set up this Aviation Electric and was feeding some contracts to them?

C: Yes, I guess so.

Q: Meyers was living well out at Wright Field. Was there any suspicion that he had his hand in the till.

C: I never heard of any at the time.

Q: There was an anonymous letter sent in to Hq AAF about him in 1945. It was ignored. This came out later. Do you remember this?

C: I never heard of that.

Q: Stratemeyer, who was Chief of Air Staff, distributed a questionnaire in 1943 to procurement officers. Did you have to fill one out? Quesionnaire about your financial status?

C: Yes. I filled out one. In 1929, ~~xxx~~ before the big bust in October, Black Friday, or whatever they called it. I owned 100 shares of Consolidated Aircraft. That was Reuben Fleet's old outfit up in Buffalo. But I sold it before, there was some date, 30 June 1930. You weren't supposed to own any stock after that. I sold mine. I filled out the form and sent it in. I never heard any more about it. I never owned any more stock, in that company or any other.

Q; During the War?

C: During the war.

Q: Did you hear any rumors that some Air Force people were profiting from stock in Aircraft companies?

C: Yes, before that date was set. There were some officers who bought stock like I did.

Q: That was 1930. I'm talking about WW II?

C: No, I never heard of anybody.

Q: What was Knudsen's job out there?

C: He was head of the Air Materiel Command, everything, Field Service, Wright Field, the whole works.

Q: Was he Echols' boss?

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C: Yes.

Q: I heard that Arnold oftentimes bypassed Echols to go to Benny Meyers to get answers to questions? Was Meyers pretty good on supplying answers to questions?

C; He probably was on Budget matters.

Q: How about procurement, did Meyers get into procurement?

C: Not directly, that I ever knew of. I forget the date, but Maud (?) Strauss was head of production. So was Oliver Echols at one time. He was Chief of both Production Division and Engineering Division. Strauss never did get a star, for some reason. I dont know whether there was any friction between him and Arnold or not.

Q: When Arnold came on Inspections, I have been told that, oftentimes, he didnt go to the front office, but went down to the Maintenance Shack or do to the hangars and talked to the men who handled the problems and got direct answers. Did you have any experience like that with him?

C: Most of the time, it would happen this way. He'd come out and he was always interested in the Engineering Division. Of course we had all of our branches, our Aircraft, Engines, and Propeller, Equipment, Aeromedical Branches. All of them were under me. We'd take him on a tour, and usually we set up a lot of demonstrations for him. He would talk to the people in the different Branches, sure.

Q: Was he an impatient man?

C: He wanted things done right now. A story he told. He went before the National Science Foundation. He wanted to know if they couldnt do something with some project he wanted done in six months.

Q: Do you remember what it was?

C: No, I've forgotten. Anyway, they said: in R & D you cant set a final date as to when you'll accomplish something once you start out from scratch and try to develop it. That's one instance. That was his job. He wanted to get things done. He was running the Air Force. He didnt want to fiddle around. The war was on. You couldnt take forever to wait for something to be done.

Q: Did he ever show impatience with you?

C: No, he didnt. In fact, all during the war, my outfit, Craigie, Don Putt, we'd investigate proposals from the aircraft manufacturers for new airplanes. If we were satisfied that we should go into building it. I'd go in to Washington and talk to Echols. He never did turn me down on anything. We went into Arnold's office. He'd come back and Arnold told him: "All right, go ahead." So we'd go right ahead. We didnt have 19 committees you had to go through. It would go from my boys to me, to Echols, to Arnold, and back down the line and we'd enter into a contract for the mfg. manufacture.

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Q: Arnold believed in the direct method, rather than a lot of discussion, committees, etc.

C: Yes. He apparently had faith in what we were going to do.

Q: When you were giving him briefings when he came out to Wright Field, did he make decisions right on the spot: let's do this; let's not do that?

C: Yes. These big fire trucks they have on every field in the U.S. and the world? We put on a demonstration of the first one at Wright Field, and they had an old airplane we set on fire, and we had people in asbestos uniforms, and we had the first truck. After the fire got going good, they drove it in and smothered the fire, and the rescuers went in and got the dummies out. So he turned to me and said: "What do we do now?" and I said: "Let's build 100 of them." And he said: "OK, go ahead." So that was the start of all these big trucks you see around fields all round the world. Another time: he was out there, and we were talking about what we could do to improve airplanes, and I mentioned that Ordnance had offered us 200 - 75 mm rifle barrels, and I suggested to him that we put them in B-25s. He said "OK, go ahead." So we did.

Q: That was a very successful maneuver, putting the 75s in the B-25?

C: They did a lot of good work in North Africa.

Q: Did you have a major problem of getting the recoil action solved?

C; No. Dutch Kindelberger at North American handled it.

Q: Did you ever see Arnold get mad?

C; No, I dont think I ever did. [redacted] Arnold was head of the whole AAF. He had the whole Operational responsibility; he had had all the Training responsibilities. That's where Jack Curry was. He had one of the training commands. So Arnold had a lot of things to think about. For one cog in the wheel to tell where the guy was steering it was going was hard.

Q: He believed in doing things himself, instead of deputizing assignments? If there were trouble areas, did he come out himself to try to solve it?

C: I dont remember that he did, but he used to send lots of problems that came up down through the line, and a lot of them landed on me.

Q: Did he call you up?

C: No he never did.

Q: Did he prefer the personal method rather than the telephone?

Q: Did he try to take a look for himself, or did he handle things on the phone?

C: Not of my outfit. He did a lot of traveling around to training outfits, He had a great interest in getting pilots trained, etc. On the production side of it, there was a great daily coun

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planes, from the puddle jumpers to the bombers, They kept track of how many would come out each day to meet the total number we were supposed to have.

Q: Going back to Wright Field, 1929-30, when you met Arnold, I talked to Ben Chidlaw who said Arnold didnt have enough to do there?

C: That's probably true.

Q: Do you recall a guy named Jan Howard?

C: He was my boss for a long time. I was his assistant at Wright Field. He assigned me as Chief of the Airplane Branch in late 1929.

Q: Do you recall any friction between him and Arnold?

C: No, of course there were rumors, friction between this one and that. That was beyond me.

Q: He was related to Arnold by marriage. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister? They were divorced a couple of years before. Arnold and Howard were supposed to dislike one another.

C: I guess I remember that. Nothing else.

Q: Where were you in the middle 1930's?

C: From 1931-34 I was in Panama. Came back to Wright Field in latter part of 1935, Then in 1937, I went down to the Air Corps Tactical School for a year. Then I was assigned as Assistant Rep at North American. Then later I was assigned as AF Rep at both Douglas and North American.

Q: What year were you at Douglas?

C: In 1938-39, and in 1939, I was assigned to Wright Field again.

Q: Were you there when K.B. Wolfe was at Douglas?

C: K.B. took over from at Douglas.

Q: You took over from K.B,? Do you remember a little trouble with the French, a mission to fly the DB-7 at Douglas.

C: That was a funny thing. I was setting in my office at North American one day about noon. I just happened to look out the window, and there was that airplane spinning right down into the parking lot, right on top of a lot of cars. I ran out there. The pilot had been thrown out and was killed, and the airplane was on fire. I walked out to the entrance to the airplane in the back, to see if there was anybody else in it. Here came this Frenchman. He was crawling out of the place, and he got out. He could walk but he had a broken leg. There was a lot of talk and argument about how come he was in there. Well, as far as I know, he was over here, and he was working in the airplanes, same as buying, and he was offered a ride in the airplane. It was

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still a Douglas airplane. We hadnt accepted it yet.

Q: It had U.S. Government equipment in it, did it not?

C: All new airplanes were furnished with GFE - engines ,radios, propellors, etc. Always shipped for the manufacturer to install. He didnt buy the engines directly from engine mfger. We did and gave it to the airframe mfger.

Q: There was one Frenchman in the plane that was killed. I think his name was Paul Chemidlin.

C: He wasnt killed then.

Q: Was there just one Frenchman in that plane?

C: Yes, just one.

Q: And he crawled out with a broken leg?

C: Yes. I dont know how bad it was, because I saw him walking away from the airplane myself.

Q: You said it was the North American parking lot. I thought it was the Douglas parking lot. Or were they adjacent to one another?

C: Well, it was a North American parking lot. But as I remember, Douglas had a hangar there. It was at old Mines Field, the old international airport. Northrop had flying rights on there. Douglas did. They were flying the first of what we later called the B-26.

Q: Did you know that Arnold got into trouble because of that incident?

C: I heard there was a lot of argument about it.

Q: He got in trouble with Henry Morgenthau, then Secretary of the Treasury, and he got into trouble with FDR.

C: I didnt know about that.

Q: K.B. Wolfe was the Air Corps Resident Representative there. Apparently, he authorized the Frenchman to ride that airplane. This was apparently in violation of law because we had secret equipment aboard that plane. Arnold was placed in a situation of having to testify one way or another. If he said he authorized the arrangement, he was violating the law. If he said that Morgenthau forced him, then he was putting him on the spot with Congress, and that was going to be putting him in Dutch with the President.

C: I didnt know that * * * I remember there was a lot of argument about that but it was all in Washington .

Q: When that accident occurred, were you assigned to Douglas?

C: K.B. was at Douglas, and I was at North American.

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Q: K.B. got into a little trouble on that? He had authorized the Frenchman to fly. He had to testify. Did he ever talk to you on that?

C: No. I was on the board that investigated why the airplane crashed.

Q: Why did it crash?

C: What had happened, the airplane must have been coming around. It was headed up north. When I saw it, it was literally spinning down outside my window. On the board. K.B. was on it; I was on it. In checking later We found that the tail had failed, where it was attached to the main fuselage. He lost control of it and it went into a spin.

Q: (Arnold [redacted]) and his trouble with FDR. Threatened with shipment to Guam.

C: No I never heard anything on that.

Q: Did Arnold do right by you, promotion-wise?

C: Yes, I think so. All of us, Chidlaw was in Washington at that time with Oliver Echols. And there was a general feeling that we were a little slower than the operational boys in getting our first star. I got promoted to BG in the latter part of 1942.

Q: I have a note here on Irving Krick. Did you know him? He was a weather man He was Arnold's weather man. Did you have any connection with him?

C: Yes, but no connection. He got his reputation out in California, making weather predictions for the orange growers, to set up their heaters, etc.

Q: Arnold got him from the Navy. He made life miserable for people like Don Yates & Don Zimmerman. Did you know this?

C: I didnt know.

Q: Craigie told me you knew something about him.

C: (Silence)

Q: What about the jet? the Whittle jet? Arnold was enthused about it.

C: Well, I'll tell you. Arnold went to England, about 1941, and he was shown Frank Whittle's jet engine and he was very much impressed with it. He came back. He had made a deal of some kind. That's something I'd like to ask you to see if you can find out. I have never seen what that deal was - in writing - whether it was a contract, whether it was a mutual written agreement between the British and General Arnold. But anyway, the essential part of it was, they were having a lot of trouble with it. The Germans had jet engines. They were having trouble with the rotor blade because they were running hot exhausts from the combustion chambers, and it took us over 25 years to develop those rotor blades. We ~~sought it~~ started with General Electric back in 1917, 1918 to

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develop an exhaust turbine supercharger. And the first one was mounted on a Liberty engine and tested down there on top of Pike's Peak, because there was no test chamber anywhere in the world in those days where you could simulate altitude. They went to the highest place in the U.S. they could get to, up Pike's Peak. This was in 1917-18. We had continual contracts with General Electric, and Old Dr. Moss was the man behind all that development. But we worked from that time until the beginning of World War II before we got a really operational exhaust-driven turbine. And all it was was something to pump air into the carburetor of an engine as you gained altitude and your oxygen became thinner. The agreement with the British essentially was: They would let us build the Whittle engine. We would give them the formulas to build the turbine blades for their jet engine, because they hadnt solved that. That took us 20-25 years to build. But I would like to see, maybe you can find out, was there a written agreement? Was there a contract? Anyway, that is what happened, and we assigned Don Keirn to be in charge of jet development and Ralph Swofford to be in charge of airplane development. Bell had been building a P-59, that was the one with the 37 mm cannon through the propellor shaft./ We called the jet the The P-59A, [redacted] to indicate it was just another variation of the plane, in order to keep it a secret. It was quite a project. A two engine jet built by Bell. G.E. built more or less a copy.

Q: Were you involved in the experimentation at Pike's Peak with the turbine blade?

C: No. That was 1917-18.

Q: You say, we continued to work on that between the wars?

C: Yes.

Q: How long did it take us to perfect that?

C: It took us over 20 years. The first airplanes that came out with it were the P-38s.

Q: Who worked on it? for the Air Corps?

C: Our Engine Branch at Wright Field.

Q: Did NACA work on it down at Langley?

C: No.

Q: Who had the Engine Branch?

C: Don Keirn was our Project Engineer, but he was an officer in the Power Plant Branch.

Q: During the 1930's?

C: That was during the war.

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Q: The turbine blade was perfected betwen 1918 and 1938, or 1939. Who was in charge of that progras?

C: The Power Plant Branch.

Q: Who gets credit ~~there?~~ for having done that?

C: A lot of people worked on it. A civilian named Berger, I think. The man that G.E. had was old Dr. Mahler (?) It was a lifetime project for him from the beginning until the war.

Q: And he succeeded? There was a deal: our turbine blades for their Whittle engine?

C: Yes. * * *

Q: You say, Arnold was involved in the deal with the British?

C: I gave him great credit for having the foresight to see that there were big potentialities in the jet.

Q: He was very secretive about it?

C: Top Secret for a long long time. He even set out, built a special hangar at Muroc Air Force Base where it was handled out there and the transfer made. The first man to fly it - it was a twin engine - was Bob Stanley, head of Stanley Aviation Company of Denver now. The first Air Force officer to fly the American jet was Lawrence Craigie.

Q: We never really got the jet going until the end of the war? The P-80?

C: The P-80 was the first. About the middle of the war, old Kelly Johnson who was the Chief Engineer with Lockheed, he came in. They were trying to develop a new type of engine, it wasnt a jet. I told him we had a jet engine. We practically designed the P-80 that day in my office.

Q: You and Kelly Johnson?

C: Yes, and some other boys around; I forget who they were. But the first engine we could get hold of had been built by Westinghouse. So, we gave Kelly permission to go out to Muroc and see the P-59A, and look at the engine. So we got the Westinghouse engine at about 2,000 lbs thrust, and Kelly Johnson built a P-80 in 100 days.

Q: When was this, about 1944?

C: Maybe a little earlier

Q: If I understand you correctly, the P-59 was dawdling along, not making too much progress, and when you got together with Kelly Johnson the thing....

C: Oh, no. The P-59 was a regular fighter airplane.

Q: The P-59A?

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C: We built quite a few of them. We set up a plant at West Lynn, Mass where General Electric built the I-16, the first swivel engine. It had 1,600 lbs thrust. We built the I-40 later which went into the P-80, with 4,000 lbs thrust. And then we had an airplane that would make over 500 mph. The first airplane to make more than 500 mph was the P-80.

Q: But it wasnt until you got together with Kelly Johnson that that project came to a climax? When was that?

C: Yes. About 1943 or 1944. We had quite a few P-80s before the war ended. We sent a bunch of them to Italy

Q: Did they fly operationally?

C: Yes, they did, down in Italy. Right at the end of the war.

Q: Was there great concern that the Germans were way ahead of us on the jet?

C: No, let me tell you something. We still get a lot of flak about the development of rockets. Dr. Goddard, etc, and all of his theories. The Germans received all that information, and Hitler, he had an idea he could wreck England with his missiles, the buzz bomb first, then the rockets, the V-2. He decided that was the way for the Germans to win the war. That became their national effort. In the meantime, they'd just begin - Goering was out there, head of the German Air Force - they'd come out with their first jet airplanes, and we got one of them after the war - the ME-262, a twin engine plane. Goering and his people wanted to put the effort into jet aircraft. And they were beginning to get dangerous right at the end of the war. They also had the rocket job. That was becoming a very dangerous airplane as far as our bombers were concerned.

Q: You mean the German rocket plane, the ME-163?

C: No the ME-262. But anyway, that which everybody blames us for failing to build the big rockets, which we didnt need, we were trying to get airplanes across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and we depended (up) on the bomb sight. As the boys said, we could put the bomb "in the old pickel barrel". But Hitler, he wanted to build these rockets.

Q: You think he made a mistake?

C: I think it was the biggest blunder he ever made.

Q: You think he should have stayed with his FW 190, and ME-109s?

C: Yes.

Q: He nearly won the war with his jets and rockets. By that time we had an overwhelming

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strength and we had destroyed his aviation gas and...

C: We could go over and pinpoint targets, like roller bearing targets and all kinds of special factories that you had to hit. It was our daylight bomb sight, in big formations with fighter protection, that we were able to take out these ....

Q: We had trouble for awhile. We didnt have a good fighter to escort our ~~figh~~ bombers. The P-38s and P-47s didnt have enough legs to escort the bombers. It wasnt until the P-51 came along that we were doing the job. Is that a correct statement?

C: No, because we had belly tanks on ouf fighters that could escort the bombers all the way to Berlin.

Q: The P-47s were able to go all the way, even with the belly tanks. Were they able?

C: Yes, I think so.

Q: How about the P-38s?

C: The P-38s were used mostly down in Italy, werent they?

Q: They used some in ETO

C: Tell you a story about the P51. When the American Air Force got organized over in England, they were given Spitfires and Hurricanes. They were real good local defense airplanes, but they didnt have any range. Anyway, Eleanor Roosevelt went over there one time - she went everywhere, you know - and she went down to see the boys in the Spitfire squadrons. They had just, by that time, began to get the P-51s. Like all of us, with new airplanes, you'd say: "Give me back my old DH." Those boys said: "Give me back my old Spitfire." The Spitfire wouldnt go anywhere, but the P-51s with the belly tanks were a much better airplane to accompany the bombers over to Europe. Eleanor more or less said: "I'll fix that up. I'll go back and talk to Harry Truman" who was head of the Investigating Committee. The Truman Committee called on the Air Force command and had explained why we were given the P-51 instead of letting them keep their old Spitfires. Well I appeared before the Committee, and some others from Washington. We showed what you could do with the P-51s in the way of range, that we could accompany our bombers, but you couldnt accompany the bombers with Spitfires and Hurricanes beyond the Channel, because then they had to come back. Anyway, the Truman Committee listened to the story and we continued to furnish them with P-51s and P-47s.

Q: We were a little slow on the P-51. We had the P-51 in 1940-41. It had the Allison engine and it wasnt worth a damn as a high altitude fighter. The British put the Merlin engine in it, the Rolls Royce 61...

C: What happened there, we had a contract with Curtiss for the P-46. It had the Allison

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engine. It wasnt showing up too good. It was decided that we wouldnt build it as a production airplane because,..and so, North American bought the engineering details and the rights to build it out in L.A. They changed the wings a little bit and they did ~~mmmk~~ put the Merlin engine in it which was being built at that time by R..

Q: Rolls Royce?

C: It was a Rolls Royce engine, but it was being built up in Detroit. But if you set the two airplanes on the line, unless you were an expert, you couldnt tell the difference between them. But there's no doubt that the P-51 had the outstanding engine, and we did the right thing and changed it. The P-46 never got into production.

Q: Would you say the AAF was slow in recognizing the P-51? Does this fit in? Werent the British ...didnt we abandon the first version of the P-51? It was a low altitude fighter.

Q: Did Tommy Hitchcock hade anything to do with that? He worked for Amb Winant.

C: I remember there was a man named Tommy Hitchcock. I dont remember whether he had any connection with it, but he might have.

Q: We were taking a lot of bomber losses in 1942-43 because the escort, whatever we had, were not able to escort the bombers all the way. Not until the P-51 came in early in 1944 that the bombing campaign really got underway. Is that correct?

C: Yes, about that time.

Q: Did you feel some of the pressure, that we werent getting the long range fighters into production?

C: I dont remember, specifically, but there was some criticism, yes. Maybe we were a little slow in getting fighters that would go all the way.

Q: Could this have been due to the doctrine handed out at the Air Corps Tactical School - you were there in 1937-38 - when the big bomber advocates sort of took over there? Do you recall Chennault there? He advocated fighters.

C: Yes. I dont remember that the big bomber men took over.

Q: At least their ideas ~~took over~~ dominated?

C: Muir Fairchild was down there then. He was head of the bomber section of the staff. They naturally backed up the bombers.

Q: Looking back at the war experience, you feel we went too heavily into bombers and recognized the fighters a little late?

C: Hard to say.

Q: Did you have anything to do with - at Wright Field in late 1930s - trying to get money for the B-17s. Do you remember that campaign?

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C: Yes, they were.Either 1939-40, we were able to buy only about 39 B-17s.

Q: Did the War Dept sit on the Air Corps at that time, not giving them enough money? for bomber procurement?

C: That was above me.

Q: How did Arnold feel about that? He'd just become Chief of AC. Was he pushing hard for bombers?

C: I think he was.

Q: Do you remember Andrews?

C: Lot of us thought that if he hadnt run into a mountain in Iceland that he would have been Chief of the Air Force. He would have been it before Arnold. Arnold wouldnt have beenChief of the Air Corps.

Q: Arnold was Chief when Andrews ran into that mountain?

C: Maybe so. No, he wouldnt have taken over, but maybe he should have been.

Q: Do you think he was a better leader than Arnold? How do you evaluate them? They were the two top leaders in the Air Corps?

C: I really evaluate Andrews as the better man.

Q: Why?

C: Hard to say.

Q: Did he engender more confidence among his man?

C: He was better known, I think, among the Operational people.

Q: Was he more respected among the operational people?

C: Hard to say. He was sort of, among people that I knew, probably the top officer in the Air Corps.

Q: There were several other competitors for the top job: Brett was a contender?

C: I worked for him at Wright Field. He was the one who assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division./ *** I thought he was a good officer, professionally and otherwise.

Q: How about Delos Emmons?

C: Dont remember much * * *

Q: Could anybody have done a better job than Arnold in running the Air Corps or AAF during the war? Could Andrews do a better job ?

C: Monday morning quarterbacking.

Q: Let me put it another way. Do you think Arnold did a good job?

C: Yes.

Q: You think he did a great job ?

C: Yes, a great job.

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Q; Are there any areas where he could have done a better job?

C: Consider the overall AF operation during the war, all of our relations with our Allies during the war, it'd be awfully hard to answer.

Q: I have a note about Jake Harman and you. Probably has to do with the B-29s. Remember Jake Harman?

C: (Asks Mrs. Carroll who says: "Somebody says he kicked off")

Q: Do you remember the B-29 procurement. It was a big headache?

C: I helped to get it started.

Q: It had (lots of) problems, with the engine....

C: Every airplane has problems. We had problems with engines, (we had problems with ulation,) electrical installations. We had a lot of problems.

Q: Any special problems? Arnold had promised the President...was pushing B-29. Did he come out and bug you on B-29?

C: No. He did urge the Production Division. We had two divisions at Wright Field: The Engineering Division, in charge of R&D, and the Production Division which worked with the contractors to get the airplanes out. Most of the problems were in the production airplane. The Engineering Division did help to solve the problems that they were having. But in general the responsibility was in the Production Division after we got into operational production.

Q: Arnold came out to Salina, Kansas in 1944. He and Benny Meyers came out there...Do you remember that?

C: No. (Ref to Arthur Raymond) We had many dealings with him.

Q: Did you get involved in getting Doolittle's B-25s ready for the Tokyo raid?

C: Not directly

Q:(Ref to Hugh Knerr and Arnold)

C:(Only vague responses)

Q:(Ref to Arnold and Douglas) Did Arnold give any preference to Douglas in procurement?

C: My general opinion, he wouldnt give Douglas any special favors over anybody else.

Q: Did he lean backwards to avoid showing favoritism?

C: He was more or less neutral.

Q: Did Arnold show anybody favoritism in procurement? Any treatment you felt was undeserved?

C: No. On practically every aircraft that we ever bought, we had special boards set up, first, to tackle the design proposals. When the first airplane came out, we

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had another board to inspect the airplane to make possible changes, etc. And when the first production airplane came out, there would be another group. So, far as I know, he never changed any recommendation of those boards, and D was on practically all of them

Q: Could he have, if he wanted to?

C: I suppose he could. He was Chief of the Air Corps.

Q: Did you ever feel, or did any of your associates ever feel, that Arnold put some pressure on to buy one plane against another?

C: No.

Q: Back to Benny Meyers (Snicker by Mrs. Carroll) Arnold had great confidence in him, and many people told me that (off tape)

Mrs. Carroll: Referred to 2nd wife (has hesitation to be on tape.)

Q: Did he ever do you dirt, in your opinion?

C: Not that I know of. He didnt fire me for six years?

Q: Do you remember James Powell? He lives in Vienna, Va, a few miles out of Wash DC He was fired. He worked for Meyers in aircraft procurement, of falsifying numbers. Apparently, Meyers was keeping two sets of books * * *

C: (KnewPowell, but no comment)

Q:(Ref to Stratemeyer Questionnaire)

C: Meyers met me in a restaurant, asked me if I remembered seeing or signing a paper like that. I said: "Sure. I owned some stock in 1929 and I sold it during that year, or in 1930" * * * All he asked me is if I'd ever heard of such a paper

Q: (Ref to lavish living of Meyers)

C: Later when the trouble was aired, they produced the books of all the stock operations he had been engaged in. That's one of the reasons why he asked me if there was, or ever been a paper we were supposed to sign.

Q: Did Meyers give you all the support you could have wanted?

C: (Ref to lack of restrictions on Auto Mfgers in building safety factors today). Building an airplane we were trying to save every ounce. We had certain safety regulations as to what the strength of the airplane would be in operation. We built right to that hairline in order to get the performance out of the airplane. We took chances on building airplanes; we still do, that you dont have on automobiles. Why do these autos have to be recalled by the hundreds of thousands? We have 100 airplanes. We get a shank in the wings or tail, or something, the country gets to bounce off the roof about it.

Q: In 1940-41, the aircraft mfgers didnt want to let the auto mfgers into their business.

They were afraid, once the mass production techniques went into aviation, the aircraft

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would get hurt. You remember anything on that? Arnold went out there, gave a talk, and sort of rapped these guys across the knuckles on that subject. The acft mfgers were dragging their feet. You remember anything on that?

C: No, I dont. You cant build aircraft like you built trucks or autos * * *

Q: By the same token, the car mfgers in 1940-41 didnt want to get into it, because they were making money on autos. Arnold went out and gave a talk to the acft mfgers? Remember that? He went out to Detroit to kick them in the shins.

C: No. Dont remember.

Q: Is there anything about Arnold, good or bad, that I should know. I'm trying to understand the man. Your wife indicated there was something (Note: Mrs. Carroll engaged the General in whispered conversation when we were talking about Meyers)

C: He treated me all right. You dont work for a guy six years without . . .

Q: He was impulsive?

C: He wanted to get things done right now.

Q: Did he shoot from the hip?

C: Maybe so, sometimes.

Q: Did he ever make bad decisions on aircraft procurement? Perhaps he was too impulsive on something?

C: Not as far as I'm concerned. He approved every project that I recommended to him.

Q: The XXXXXXXX B-32. That turned out to be somewhat of a lemon?

C: We started the B-29 and B-32 at the same time; we decided to pressurize both of them, They got worried in Washington as to whether the pressurization would work all right at high altitudes. So the decision was made to go ahead with pressurization on only one of the projects. Luckily, the high authorities decided on the B-29; so we left the pressurization out of the B32. Some of the B-32s got out into the Asiatic theatre. They had them on Okinawa for awhile, but I dont think any of them ever made any combat missions.

Q: A couple made some in Kenney's theatre. In SWPac, one squadron of them, I think

C: Well, maybe so. They were really a backup for the B-29s in case the pressurization didnt work. When you pressurized an airplane that required an entirely different armament set up, flexible gun setups. They had to be able to operate them while the crew was under pressurization.

Q: Arnold was gungho about airborne, and about gliders. He thought this was a great contribution to aerial warfare. He put on a lot of heat on the glider program. Did this

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come under you?

C: Yes. Grandison Gardner and I were the first boys on a technical mission to Europe in 1940, and we saw some of the work of the British over there. So I came back and initiated the first contract for gliders, and they got the first school for glider pilots set up - Freddie Dent was Chief Project Officer on that. Nobody was interested in it, and eventually, we were the production unit on these gliders. North American had a big plant out at Kansas City where we were supposed to build gliders. The first ones built were 15-passenger gliders. It was used as a trainer.

Q: Do you remember when Arnold was gungho for airborne? He pushed it very hard Did you feel any pressure from him on this program?

C: No. we started it out at Wright Field, and got it going, and then it was taken over, and the first operations were under Louis Brereton, when they made a big invasion of Europe.

Q: ~~Did~~ Eisenhower ~~is opposition to gliders.~~ didn't think much of airborne,

After note: When Gen Carroll left the room, Mrs. Carroll volunteered these thoughts: Carroll "didnt like Gen Arnold very much." When I asked Gen Carroll about his opinions of Gen Arnold, he seemed to equivocate, saying he and Arnold got along fine.

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Interview, Maj Gen Franklin Carroll, Boulder, Colo. 1 Sep 1972

Q Do you remember when you first met the man, your first encounter with Arnold?

C Yes, but the first time I heard of him was on that Billy Mitchell affair, when he dared to write letters to all the Congressmen backing up the strategic ideas of General Mitchell, and that's when he got fired and sent out to Ft Riley to an old cavalry outfit.

Q He was an Information Officer in Washington? Where were you in 1925?

C I guess I was down in Kelly Field, but I had been at old McCook Field from 1921 until the middle of 1924. In those days, every officer had to spend at least one year out of four with operational units. So I was sent down to Kelly Field again with the 30th Attack Group. Then I came back to McCook in the latter part of 1925, and then stayed until I was sent to Panama in 1931, but in the late 1920's and early 1930's, Arnold was assigned to Wright Field. We moved to Wright Field in 1927.

Q So you knew him at Wright Field?

C That's where I first met him and knew him.

Q He had the Fairfield Air Intermediate Depot.

C At the time I first saw him at Wright Field, he was what you might call the Deputy Commander of Wright Field.

Q He was a Major then?

C I guess he was.

Q What was your job?

C At that time, I was Chief of the Airplane Branch at Wright Field

Q Do you remember anything about him, any meetings, dealings with him?

C This is what might be called the bad part. But he didn't make any bones about it. He didn't think too much of Wright Field, and after I came back from Panama, I came up the West Coast to San Francisco,

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and I had some friends at March Field, and so, we drove down there. Colonel Arnold was in command at March Field, so I went around to pay my respects to him. He wanted to know where I was going to be assigned, and I said: "i am assigned to Wright Field." He said: "Don't go back there. That place is going to sink." There was lots of argument around the country in those days about Wright Field and the Engineering Division. A lot of the people in industry didn't think we needed it. They thought they could do it. And Col Arnold, I'm sure, had that idea, because he wanted me to stay at March and be there with him.

Q He liked you?

C I suppose. He offered me a job.

Q You had met him first at Wright Field? (Yes) Do you remember any dealings you had with him at Wright Field?

C I was down pretty low on the totem pole in those days. A Major was a pretty high guy in those days. I met him off and on and we talked to each other. But I don't recall any particular thing that happened, etc.

Q Were you impressed by him?

C Yes, I liked him. Then, he changed, though. He changed radically about the beginning of the war with respect to Wright Field, and what we were doing in R & D, particularly after he became acquainted with people like von Karman and--who was head of the Research & Development Board?

Q Vannevar Bush?

C Yes, Vannevar Bush. He began to see what you could do to build up an air force and get the right kind of equipment we needed through R & D, and R & D facilities. I know he changed radically, as far as that was concerned.

Q For the good or bad?

C For the good. All during the war, he supported Wright Field very well.

Q During the war, what was your job?

C I was at Wright Field, from June 1939 to August 1945, I was

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Chief of the Engineering Division, which was in charge of all R&D. Dr. Bush, in War Dept R&D, had a lot of projects with Universities and other outfits, etc. More removed from the physical equipment that we needed for our operational people.

Q Did Arnold think Wright Field was doing a good job during the war?

C Yes, he did. He came out there frequently and I became very well acquainted with him. We used to give him the $64 tour of the place. A good many things that we showed him, he 'd nearly always say: "What do we do next?" I'd recommend a lot of things to him. He'd say: "OK, let's do them," and we did.

C Did he give you a hard time?

C No, he didn't. I suppose he thought I'd done pretty good, because I was there over six years. He didn't fire me.

Q Who was your immediate boss at Wright Field?

C General Brett first assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division, Then, after he left, Oliver Echols was there for a long time. Then Oliver went to Washington. George Kenney was there for a while, headed the whole division. Of course, we had the Production Section, the Flight Test Division, things like that, R&D.

Q Where did Benny Meyers fit into that picture?

C Meyers was in what you might call the Budget Section. He handled the funds, etc. He did a good job in those days.

Q Arnold was impressed with him in those days?

C Yes. He was a bright guy when it came to handling funds for the Air Force. He got into trouble on the side and getting tangled up with some company with which he was more or less involved.

Q Bleriot LaMarre? He set up this Aviation Electric and was feeding some contracts to them?

C Yes. I guess so.

Q Meyers was living well out at Wright Field. Was there any suspicion that he had his hand in the till.

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C I never heard of any at the time.

Q There was an anonymous letter sent in to Hq AAF about him in 1945. It was ignored. This came out later. Do you remember this?

C I never heard of that.

Q Stratemeyer, who was Chief of Air Staff, distributed a questionnaire in 1943 to procurement officers. Did you have to fill one out? Questionnaire about your financial status?

C Yes. I filled out one. In 1929, before the big bust in October, "Black Friday," or whatever they called it. I owned 100 shares of Consolidated Aircraft. That was Reuben Fleet's old outfit up in Buffalo. But I sold it before, there was some date, 30 June 1930. You weren't supposed to own any stock after that. I sold mine. I filled out the form and sent it in. I never heard any more about it. I never owned any more stock, in that company or any other.

Q During the war?

C During the war.

Q Did you hear any rumors that some Air Force people were profiting from stock in aircraft companies?

C Yes, before that date was set. There were some officers who bought stock like I did.

Q That was 1930. I'm talking about WW II.

C No, I never heard of anybody.

Q What was Knudsen's job out there?

C He was head of the Air Materiel Command, everything, Field Service, Wright Field, the whole works.

Q Was he Echols' boss?

C Yes.

Q I heard that Arnold oftentimes bypassed Echols to go to Benny Meyers to get answers to questions? Was Meyers pretty good on supplying answers to questions?

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C He probably was on Budget matters.

Q How about procurement, did Meyers get into procurement?

C Not directly, that I ever knew of. I forget the date, but Maud (?) Strauss was head of production. So was Oliver Echols at one time. He was Chief of both Production Division and Engineering Division. Strauss never did get a star, for some reason. I don't know whether there was any friction between him and Arnold or not.

Q When Arnold came on Inspections, I have been told that, oftentimes, he didn't go to the front office, but went down to the Maintenance Shack or down to the hangars and talked to the men who handled the problems and got direct answers. Did you have any experience like that with him?

C Most of the time, it would happen this way. He'd come out and he was always interested in the Engineering Division. Of course we had all of our branches, our Aircraft, Engines, and Propeller, Equipment, Aeromedical Branches. All of them were under me. We'd take him on a tour. Usually, we set up a lot of demonstrations for him. He would talk to the people in the different Branches, sure.

Q Was he an impatient man?

C He wanted things done right now. A story he told. He went before the National Science Foundation. He wanted to know if they couldn't do something with some project he wanted done in six months.

Q Do you remember what it was?

C No. I've forgotten. Anyway, they said: in R&D you can't set a final date as to when you'll accomplish something once you start out from scratch and try to develop. That's one instance. That was his job. He wanted to get things done. He was running the Air Force. He didn't want to fiddle around. The war was on. You couldn't take forever to wait for something to be done.

Q Did he ever show impatience with you?

C No, he didn't. In fact, all during the war, my outfit, Craigie,

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Don Putt, we'd investigate proposals from the aircraft manufacturers for new airplanes. If we were satisfied that we should go into building it, I'd go in to Washington and talk to Echols. He never did turn me down on anything. We went into Arnold's office. He'd come back and Arnold told him: "All right, go ahead." So we'd go right ahead. We didn't have 19 committees you had to go through. It would go from my boys to me, to Echols, to Arnold, and back down the line and we'd enter into a contract for the manufacture.

Q Arnold believed in the direct method, rather than a lot of discussion, committees, etc.

C Yes. He apparently had faith in what we were going to do.

Q When you were giving him briefings when he came out to Wright Field, did he make decisions right on the spot: let's do this; let's not do that?

C Yes. These big fire trucks they have on every field in the U.S. and the world? We put on a demonstration of the first one at Wright Field. They had an old airplane we set on fire, and we had people in asbestos uniforms, and we had the first truck. After the fire got going good, they drove it in and they smothered the fire. The rescuers went in and got the dummies out. So he turned to me and said: "What do we do now?" And I said: "Let's build 100 of them." And he said: "OK, go ahead." So that was the start of all these big trucks you see around fields all round the world. Another time: he was out there, and we were talking about what we could do to improve airplanes, and I mentioned that Ordnance had offered us 200 - 75 mm rifle barrels, and I suggested to him that we put them in B-25s. He said: "OK, go ahead." So we did.

Q That was a very successful maneuver, putting those 75s in the B-25?

C They did a lot of good work in North Africa.

Q Did you have a major problem of getting the recoil action solved?

C No. Dutch Kindelberger at North American handled it.

Q Did you ever see Arnold get mad?

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C No, I don't think I ever did. Arnold was head of the whole AAF. He had the whole Operational responsibility; he had had all the Training responsibilities. That's where Jack Curry was. He had one of the training commands. So Arnold had a lot of things to think about. For one cog in the wheel to tell where the guy steering it was going was hard.

Q He believed in doing things himself, instead of deputizing assignments? If there were trouble areas, did he come out himself to try to solve it?

C I don't remember that he did, but he used to send lots of problems that came up down through the line, and a lot of them landed on me.

Q Did he call you up?

C No, he never did.

Q Did he prefer the personal method rather than the telephone? Did he try to take a look for himself, or did he handle things on the phone?

C Not of my outfit. He did a lot of traveling around to training outfits. He had a great interest in getting pilots trained, etc. On the production side of it, there was a great daily count of planes, from the puddle jumpers to the bombers. They kept track of how many would come out each day to meet the total number we were supposed to have.

Q Going back to Wright Field, 1929-30, when you met Arnold, I talked to Ben Chidlaw who said Arnold didn't have enough to do there?

C That's probably true.

Q Do you recall a guy named Jan Howard?

C He was my boss for a long time. I was his assistant at Wright Field. He assigned me as Chief of the Airplane Branch in late 1929.

Q Do you recall any friction between him and Arnold?

C No. Of course there were rumors, friction between this one and that. That was beyond me.

Q He was related to Arnold by marriage. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister. They were divorced a couple of years before. Arnold and Howard were supposed to dislike one another.

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C I guess I remember that. Nothing else.

Q Where were you in the middle 1930's?

C From 1931-34 I was in Panama. Came back to Wright Field in latter part of 1935. Then in 1937 I went down to the Air Corps Tactical School for a year. Then I was assigned as Assistant Rep at North American. Then later I was assigned as AF Rep both at Douglas and North American.

Q What year were you at Douglas?

C In 1938-39, and in 1939 I was assigned to Wright Field again.

Q Were you there when K. B. Wolfe was at Douglas?

C I took over from K. B. at Douglas.

Q You took over from K. B. ? Do you remember a little trouble with the French, a mission to fly the DB-7 at Douglas?

C That was a funny thing. I was setting in my office at North American one day about noon. I just happened to look out the window, and there was that airplane spinning right down into the parking lot, right on top of a lot of cars. I ran out there. The pilot had been thrown out and was killed and the airplane was on fire. I walked out to the entrance to the airplane in the back, to see if there was anybody else in it. Here came this Frenchman. He was crawling out of the place, and he got out. He could walk but he had a broken leg. There was a lot of talk and argument about how come he was in there. Well, as far as I know, he was over here, and he was working in the airplanes, same as buying, and he was offered a ride in the airplane. It was still a Douglas airplane. We hadn't accepted it yet.

Q It had U. S. Government equipment in it, did it not?

C All new airplanes were furnished with GFE--engines, radios, propellers, etc. Always shipped for the manufacturer to install. He didn't buy the engines directly from engine manufacturer. We did and gave it to the airframe manufacturer.

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Q There was one Frenchman in the plane that was killed. I think his name was Paul Chemidlin.

C He wasn't killed then.

Q Was there just one Frenchman in that plane?

C Yes, just one.

Q And he crawled out with a broken leg?

C Yes. I don't know how bad it was, because I saw him walking away from the airplane myself.

Q You said it was the North American parking lot. I thought it was the Douglas parking lot. Or were they adjacent to one another?

C Well, it was a North American parking lot. But as I remember, Douglas had a hangar there. It was at old Mines Field, the old international airport. Northrop had flying rights on there. Douglas did. They were flying the first of what we later called the B-26/

Q Did you know that Arnold got into trouble because of that incident?

C I heard there was a lot of argument about it.

Q He got in trouble Henry Morgenthau, then Secretary of the Treasury, and he got into trouble with FDR.

C I didn't know about that.

Q K. B. Wolfe was the Air Corps Resident Representative there. Apparently, he authorized the Frenchman to ride that airplane. This was apparently in violation of law because we had secret equipment aboard that plane. Arnold was placed in a situation of having to testify one way or another. If he said he authorized the arrangement, he was violating the law. If he said that Morgenthau forced him, then he was putting him on the spot with Congress, and that was going to be putting him in Dutch with the President.

C I didn't know that*** I remember there was a lot of argument about that but it was all in Washington.

Q When that accident occurred, were you assigned to Douglas?

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C K.B. was at Douglas, and I was at North American.

Q K.B. got into a little trouble on that? He had authorized the Frenchman to fly. He had to testify. Did he ever talk to you on that?

C No. I was on the board that investigated why the airplane crashed.

Q Why did it crash?

C What had happened, the airplane must have been coming around. It was headed up north. When I saw it, it was literally spinning down outside my window. On the board, K.B. was on it, I was on it. In checking it over we found that the tail had failed, where it was attached to the main fuselage. He lost control of it and it went into a spin.

Q (Arnold and his trouble with FDR. Threatened with shipment to Guam.)

C No, I never heard anything on that.

Q Did Arnold do right by you, promotion-wise?

C Yes, I think so. All of us, Chidlaw was in Washington at that time with Oliver Echols. And there was a general feeling that we were a little slower than the operational boys in getting our first star. I got promoted to BG in the latter part of 1942.

Q I have a note here on Irving Krick. Did you know him? He was a weather man. He was Arnold's weather man. Did you have any connection with him?

C Yes. But no connection. He got his reputation out in California, making weather predictions for the orange growers, to set up their heaters, etc.

Q Arnold got him from the Navy. He made life miserable for people like Don Yates and Don Zimmerman. Did you know this?

C I didn't know.

Q Craigie told me you knew something about him.

C (Silence)

Q What about the jet? the Whittle jet? Arnold was enthused about it.

C Well, I'll tell you. Arnold went to England, about 1941, and he was shown Frank Whittle's jet engine and he was very much impressed

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with it. He came back. He had made a deal of some kind. That's something I'd like to ask you to see if you can find out. I have never seen what that deal was--in writing--whether it was a contract, whether it was a mutual written agreement between the British and General Arnold. But anyway, the essential part of it was, they were having a lot of trouble with it. The Germans had jet engines. They were having trouble with the rotor blade because they were running hot exhausts from the combustion chambers, and it took us over 25 years to develop those rotor blades. We started with General Electric back in 1917, 1918 to develop an exhaust turbine supercharger. And the first one was mounted on a Liberty engine and tested down there on top of Pike's Peak, because there was no test chamber anywhere in the world in those days where you could simulate altitude. They went to the highest place in the U.S. they could get to, up Pike's Peak. This was in 1917-18. We had continual contracts with General Electric. Old Dr. Moss was the man behind all that development. But we worked from that time until the beginning of World War II before we got a really operational exhaust-driven turbine. And all it was was something to pump air into the carburetor of an engine as you gained altitude and your oxygen became thinner. The agreement with the British essentially was: They would let us build the Whittle engine. We would give them the formulas to build the turbine blades for their jet engine, because they hadn't solved that. That took us 2 -25 years to build. But I would like to see--maybe you can find out--was there a written agreement? Was there a contract? Anyway, that is what happened, and we assigned Don Keirn to be in charge of jet development and Ralph Swofford to be in charge of airplane development. Bell had been building a P-59. That was the one with the 37 mm cannon through the propeller shaft. We called the jet the P-59A, to indicate it was just another variation of the plane, in order to keep it a secret. It was quite a project. A two engine jet built by Bell. G.E. built more or less a copy.

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Q Were you involved in the experimentation at Pike's Peak with the turbine blade?

C No. That was 1917-18.

Q You say, we continued to work on that between the wars?

C Yes.

Q How long did it take us to perfect that?

C It took us over 20 years. The first airplanes that came out with it were the P-38s.

Q Who worked on it for the Air Corps?

C Our Engine Branch at Wright Field.

Q Did NACA work on it down at Langley?

C No

Q Who had the Engine Branch?

C Don Keirn was our Project Engineer, but he was an officer in the Power Plant Branch.

Q During the 1930's?

C That was during the war.

Q The turbine blade was perfected between 1918 and 1938 or 1939. Who was in charge of that program?

C The Power Plant Branch.

Q Who gets credit for having done that?

C A lot of people worked on it. A civilian named Berger, I think. The man that G.E. had was old Dr. Mahler (?) It was a lifetime project for him from the beginning until the war.

Q And he succeeded? There was a deal: our turbine blades for their Whittle engine?

C Yes***

Q You say, Arnold was involved in the deal with the British?

C I gave him great credit for having the foresight to see that there were big potentialities in the jet.

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Q He was very secretive about it?

C Top Secret for a long long time. He even set out, built a special hangar at Muroc Air Force Base where it was handled out there and the transfer made. The first man to fly it--it was a twin engine--was Bob Stanley, head of Stanley Aviation Company of Denver now. The first Air Force officer to fly the American jet was Lawrence Craigie.

Q We never really got the jet going until the end of the war? The P-80?

C The P-80 was first. About the middle of the war, old Kelly Johnson who was the Chief Engineer with Lockheed, he came in. They were trying to develop a new type of engine, it wasn't a jet. I told him we had a jet engine. We practically designed the P-80 that day in my office.

Q You and Kelly Johnson?

C Yes, and some other boys around; I forget who they were. But the first engine we could get hold of had been built by Westinghouse. So, we gave Kelly permission to go out to Muroc and see the P-59A, and look at the engine. So we got the Westinghouse engine at about 2,000 lbs thrust, and Kelly Johnson built a P-80 in 100 days.

Q When was this, about 1944?

C Maybe a little earlier.

Q If I understand you correctly, the P-59 was dawdling along, not making too much progress, and when you got together with Kelly Johnson the thing...

C Oh, no. The P-59 was a regular fighter airplane.

Q The P-59A?

C We built quite a few of them. We set up a plant at West Lynn, Mass. where General Electric built the I-16, the first swivel engine. It had 1,600 lbs thrust. We built the I-40 later which went into the P-80, with 4,000 lbs thrust. And then we had an airplane that would make over 500 mph. The first airplane to make more than 500 mph was the P-80.

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Q But it wasn't until you got together with Kelly Johnson that that project came to a climax? When was that?

C Yes. About 1943 or 1944. We had quite a few P-80s before the war ended. We sent a bunch of them to Italy.

Q Did they fly operationally?

C Yes, they did, down in Italy. Right at the end of the war.

Q Was there great concern that the Germans were way ahead of us on the jet?

C No. Let me tell you something. We still get a lot of flak about the development of rockets. Dr. Goddard, etc,, and all of his theories. The Germans received all that information. Hitler, he had an idea he could wreck England with his missiles, the buzz bomb first, then the rockets, the V-2. He decided that was the way for the Germans to win the war. That became their national effort. In the meantime, they'd just begun--Goering was out there, head of the German Air Force--they'd come out with their first jet airplanes, and we got one of them after the war--the ME-262, a twin engine plane. Georing and his people wanted to put the effort into jet aircraft. And they were beginning to get dangerous right at the end of the war. They also had the rocket job. That was becoming a very dangerous airplane as far as our bombers were concerned.

Q You mean the German rocket plane, the ME-163?

C No, the ME-262. But anyway, that which everybody blames us for, failing to build the big rockets, which we didn't need. We were trying to get airplanes across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and we depended upon the bomb sight. As the boys said, we could put the bomb "in the old pickle barrel." But Hitler, he wanted to built these rockets.

Q You think he made a mistake?

C I think it was the biggest blunder he ever made.

Q You think he should have stayed with his FW-190, and ME-109s?

C Yes.

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Q He nearly won the war with his jets and rockets. By that time we had an overwhelming strength and we had destroyed his aviation gas and...

C We could go over and pinpoint targets, like roller bearing targets and all kinds of special factories that you had to hit. It was our daylight bomb sight, in big formations with fighter protection, that we were able to take out these...

Q We had trouble for w awhile. We didn't have a good fighter to escort our bombers. The P-38s and P-47s didn't have enough legs to escort the bombers. It wasn't until the P-51 came along that we were doing the job. Is that a correct statement?

C No, because we had belly tanks on our fighters that could escort the bombers all the way to Berlin.

Q The P-47s weren't able to go all the way, even with the belly tanks. Were they able?

C Yes, I think so.

Q How about the P-38s?

C The P-38s were used mostly down in Italy, weren't they?

Q They used some in ETO

C Tell you a story about the P-51. When the American Air Force got organized over in England, they were given Spitfires and Hurricanes. They were real good local defense airplanes, but they didn't have any range. Anyway, Eleanor Roosevelt went over there one time--she went everywhere, you know--and she went down to see the boys in the Spitfire squadrons. They had just, by that time, begun to get the P-51s. Like all of us, with new airplanes, you'd say: "Give me back my old DH." Those boys said: "Give me back my old Spitfire." The Spitfire wouldn't go anywhere, but the P-51s with the belly tanks were a much better airplane to accompany the bombers over to Europe. Eleanor more or less said: "I'll fix that up. I'll go back and talk to Harry Truman" who was head of the Investigating Committee. The Truman Committee called

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on the Air Force command and had explained why we were giving the P-51 instead of letting them keep their old Spitfires. Well, I appeared before the Committee, and some others from Washington. We showed what you could do with the P-51s in the way of range, that we could accompany our bombers, but you couldn't accompany the bombers with Spitfires and Hurricans beyond the Channel, because then they had to come back. Anyway, the Truman Committee listened to the story and we continued to furnish them with P-51s and P-47s.

Q We were a little slow on the P-51. We had the P-51 in 1940-41. It had the Allison engine and it wasn't worth a damn as a high altitude fighter. The British put the Merlin engine in it, the Rolls Royce 61...

C What happened there, we had a contract with Curtiss for the P-46. It had the Allison engine. It wasn't showing up too good. It was decided that we wouldn't build it as a production airplane because...and so, North American bought the engineering details and the rights to build it out in L.A. They changed the wings a little bit and they did put the Merlin engine in it which was being built at that tine by ...

Q Rolls Royce?

C It was a Rolls Royce engine, but it was being built up in Detroit, But if you set the two airplanes on the line, unless you were an expert, you couldn't tell the difference between them. But there's no doubt that the P-51 had the outstanding engine, and we did the right thing and changed it. The P-46 never got into production.

Q Would you say the AAF was slow in recognizing the P-51? Does this fit in? Weren't the British...didn't we abandon the first version of the P-51? It was a low altitude fighter. Did Tommy Hitchcock have anything to do with that? He worked for Ambassador Winant.

C I remember there was a man named Tommy Hitchcock. I don't remember whether he had any connection with it, but he might have.

Q We were taking a lot of bomber losses in 1942-43 because the escort, whatever we had, were not able to escort the bombers all the way.

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Not until the P-51 came in early in 1944 that the bombing campaign really got under way. Is that correct?

C Yes, about that time.

Q Did you feel some of the pressure, that we weren't getting the long range fighters into production?

C I don't remember, specifically, but there was some criticism, yes. Maybe we were a little slow in getting fighters that would go all the way.

Q Could this have been due to the doctrine handed out at the Air Corps Tactical School--you were there in 1937-38--when the big bomber advocates sort of took over there? Do you recall Chennault there? He advocated fighters.

C Yes. I don't remember that the big bomber men took over.

Q At least their ideas dominated?

C Muir Fairchild was down there then. He was head of the bomber section of the staff. They naturally backed up the bombers.

Q Looking back at the war experience, you feel we went too heavily into bombers and recognized the fighters a little late?

C Hard to say.

Q Did you have anything to do with--at Wright Field in late 1930s--trying to get money for the B-17s. Do you remember that campaign?

C Yes, they were. Either 1939-40, we were able to buy only about 39 B-17s.

Q Did the War Dept sit on the Air Corps at that time, not giving ehem enough money for bomber procurement?

C That was above me.

Q How did Arnold feel about that? He'd just become Chief of AC. Was he pushing hard for bombers?

C I think he was.

Q Do you remember Andrews?

C Lot of us thought that if he hadn't run into a mountain in Iceland

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that he would have been Chief of the Air Force. He would have been it before Arnold. Arnold wouldn't have been Chief of the Air Corps.

Q Arnold was Chief when Andrews ran into that mountain?

C Maybe so. No, he wouldn't have taken over, but maybe he should have been.

Q Do you think he was a better leader than Arnold? How do you evaluate them? They were the two top leaders in the Air corps?

C I really evaluate Andrews as the better man.

Q Why?

C Hard to say.

Q Did he engender more confidence among his men?

C He was better known, I think, among the Operational people.

Q Was he more respected among the Operational people?

C Hard to say. He was sort of, among people that I knew, probably the top officer in the Air Corps.

Q There were several other competitors for the top job: Brett was a contender?

C I worked for him at Wright Field. He was the one who assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division.*** I thought he was a good officer, professionally and otherwise.

Q How about Delos Emmons?

C Don't remember much...

Q Could anybody have done a better job than Arnold in running the Air Corps or AAF during the war? Could Andrews do a better job?

C Monday morning quarterbacking.

Q Let me put it another way. Do you think Arnold did a good job?

C Yes

Q You think he did a great job?

C Yes, a great job.

Q Are there any areas where he could have done a better job?

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C Consider the overall AF operation during the war, all of our relations with our Allies during the war, it'd be awfully hard to answer.

Q I have a note about Jake Harman and you. Probably has to do with the B-29s. Remember Jake Harman?

C (Asks Mrs. Carroll who says: "Somebody says he kicked off")

Q Do you remember the B-29 procurement. It was a big headache?

C I helped to get it started.

Q It had lots of problems, with the engine...

C Every airplane has problems. We had problems with engines; we had problems with electrical insulation. We had a lot of problems.

Q Any special problems? Arnold had promised the President...was pushing B-29. Did he come out and bug you on B-29?

C No. He did urge the Production Division. We had two divisions at Wright Field: the Engineering Division, in charge of R&D, and the Production Division which worked with the contractors to get the airplanes out. Most of the problems were in the production airplane. The Engineering Division did help to solve the problems that they were having. But in general the responsibility was in the Production Division after we got into operational production.

Q Arnold came out to Salina, Kansas in 1944. He and Benny Meyers came out there... Do you remember that?

C No. (Ref to Arthur Raymond) We had many dealings with him.

Q Did you get involved in getting Doolittle's B-25s ready for the Tokyo raid?

C Not directly.

Q (Ref to Hugh Knerr and Arnold)

C (Only vague response)

Q (Ref to Arnold and Douglas) Did Arnold give any preference to Douglas in procurement?

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C My general opinion, he wouldn't give Douglas any special favors over anybody else.

Q Did he lean backwards to avoid showing favoritism?

C He was more or less neutral.

Q Did Arnold show anybody favoritism in procurement? Any treatment you felt was undeserved?

C No. On practically every aircraft that we ever bought, we had special boards set up, first, to tackle the design proposals. When the first airplane came out, we had another board to inspect the airplane to make possible changes, etc. And when the first production airplane came out, there would be another group. So, as far as I know, he never changed any recommendation of those boards, and I was on practically all of them.

Q Could he have, if he wanted to?

C I suppose he could. He was Chief of the Air Corps.

Q Did you ever feel, or did any of your associates ever feel, that Arnold put some pressure on to buy one plane against another?

C No

Q Back to Benny Meyers (snicker by Mrs. Carroll) Arnold had great confidence in him, and many people told me that (off tape)

Mrs. Carroll; Referred to 2nd wife (has hesitation to be on tape)

Q Did he ever do you dirt, in your opinion?

C Not that I know of. He didn't fire me for six years.

Q Do you remember James Powell? He lives in Vienna, Va. a few miles out of Washington DC. He was fired. He worked for Meyers in aircraft procurement, or getting numbers. Apparently, Meyers was keeping two sets of books***

C (Knew Powell, but no comment)

Q (Ref to Stratemeyer Questionnaire)

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C Meyers met me in a restaurant, asked me if I remembered seeing or signing a paper like that. I said: "Sure. I owned some Consolidated stock in 1929 and I sold it during that year, or in 1930" *** All he asked me is if I'd ever heard of such a paper.

Q (Ref to lavish living of Meyers)

C Later when the trouble was aired, they produced the books of all the stock operations he had been engaged in. That's one of the reasons why he asked me if there was, or ever had been a paper we were supposed to sign.

Q Did Meyers give you all the support you could have wanted?

C (Ref to lack of restrictions on Auto Mfgrs in building safety factors today). Building an airplane we were trying to save every ounce. We had certain safety regulations as to what the strength of the airplane would be in operation. We built right to that hairline in order to get the performance out of the airplane. We took chances on building airplanes; we still do, that you don't have on automobiles. Why do these autos have to be recalled by the hundreds of thousands? We have 100 airplanes. We get a shank in the wings or tail, or something, the country gets to bounce off the roof about it.

Q In 1940-41, the aircraft mfgers didn't want to let the auto mfgers into their business. They were afraid, once the mass production techniques went into aviation, the aircraft manufacturers would get hurt. You remember anything on that? Arnold went out there, gave a talk, and sort of zapped these guys across the knuckles on that subject. The aircraft manufacturers were dragging their feet. You remember anything on that?

C No, I don't. You can't build aircraft like you build trucks or autos***

Q By the same token, the car manufacturers in 1940-41 didn't want to get into it, because they were making money on autos. Arnold went out and gave a talk to the aircraft manufacturers. Remember that? He went out to Detroit to kick them in the shins.

C No. Don't remember.

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Q Is there anything about Arnold, good or bad, that I should know. I'm trying to understand the man. Your wife indicated there was something. (Note: Mrs. Carroll engaged the General in whispered conversation when we were talking about Meyers)

C He treated me all right. You don't work for a guy six years without...

Q He was impulsive?

C He wanted to get things done right now.

Q Did he shoot from the hip?

C Maybe so, sometimes.

Q Did he ever make bad decisions on aircraft procurement? Perhaps he was too impulsive on something?

C Not as far as I'm concerned. He approved every project that I recommended to him.

Q The B-32. That turned out to be somewhat of a lemon?

C We started the B-29 and B-32 at the same time; we decided to pressurize both of them, the first of the big airplanes to be pressurized. They got worried in Washington as to whether the pressurization would work all right at high altitudes. So the decision was made to go ahead with pressurization on only one of the projects. Luckily, the high authorities decided on the B-29; so we left the pressurization out of the B-32. Some of the B-32s got out into the Asiatic theatre. They had them on Okinawa for a while, but I don't think any of them ever made any combat missions.

Q A couple made some in Kenney's theatre. In SWPac, one squadron of them, I think.

C Well, maybe so. They were really a backup for the B-29 in case the pressurization didn't work. When you pressurized an airplane that required an entirely different armament setup, flexible gun setups. They had to be able to operate them while the crew was under pressurization.

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Q Arnold was gungho about airborne, and about gliders. He thought this was a great contribution to aerial warfare. He put on a lot of heat on the glider program. Did this come under you?

C Yes. Grandison Gardner and I were the first boys on a technical mission to Europe in 1940, and we saw some of the work of the British over there. So I came back and initiated the first contract for gliders, and they got the first school for glider pilots set up--Freddie Dent was Chief Project Officer on that. Nobody was interested in it. Eventually, we were the production unit on gliders. North American had a big plant out at Kansas City where we were supposed to build gliders. The first ones built were 15-passenger gliders. It was used as a trainer.

Q Do you remember when Arnold was gungho for airborne? He pushed it very hard. Did you feel any pressure from him on this program?

C No. We started it out at Wright Field, and got it going, and then it was taken over. The first operations were under Louis Brereton, when they made a big invasion of Europe.

Q Eisenhower didn't think much of airborne.

After-note: When Gen Carroll left the room, Mrs. Carroll volunteered these thoughts: Carroll "didn't like Gen Arnold very much." When I asked Gen Carroll about his opinions of Gen Arnold, he seemed to equivocate, saying he and Arnold got along fine.

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Interview, Maj Gen Franklin Carroll, Boulder, Colo. 1 Sep 1972

Q Do you remember when you first met the man, your first encounter with Arnold?

C Yes, but the first time I heard of him was on that Billy Mitchell affair, when he dared to write letters to all the Congressmen backing up the strategic ideas of General Mitchell, and that's when he got fired and sent out to Ft Riley to an old cavalry outfit.

Q He was an Information Officer in Washington? Where were you in 1925?

C I guess I was down in Kelly Field, but I had been at old McCook Field from 1921 until the middle of 1924. In those days, every officer had to spend at least one year out of four with operational units. So I was sent down to Kelly Field again with the 30th Attack Group. Then I came back to McCook in the latter part of 1925, and then stayed until I was sent to Panama in 1931, but in the late 1920's and early 1930's, Arnold was assigned to Wright Field. We moved to Wright Field in 1927.

Q So you knew him at Wright Field?

C That's where I first met him and knew him.

Q He had the Fairfield Air Intermediate Depot.

C At the time I first saw him at Wright Field, he was what you might call the Deputy Commander of Wright Field.

Q He was a Major then?

C I guess he was.

Q What was your job?

C At that time, I was Chief of the Airplane Branch at Wright Field

Q Do you remember anything about him, any meetings, dealings with him?

C This is what might be called the bad part. But he didn't make any bones about it. He didn't think too much of Wright Field, and after I came back from Panama, I came up the West Coast to San Francisco,

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and I had some friends at March Field, and so, we drove down there. Colonel Arnold was in command at March Field, so I went around to pay my respects to him. He wanted to know where I was going to be assigned, and I said: "i am assigned to Wright Field." He said: "Don't go back there. That place is going to sink." There was lots of argument around the country in those days about Wright Field and the Engineering Division. A lot of the people in industry didn't think we needed it. They thought they could do it. And Col Arnold, I'm sure, had that idea, because he wanted me to stay at March and be there with him.

Q He liked you?

C I suppose. He offered me a job.

Q You had met him first at Wright Field? (Yes) Do you remember any dealings you had with him at Wright Field?

C I was down pretty low on the totem pole in those days. A Major was a pretty high guy in those days. I met him off and on and we talked to each other. But I don't recall any particular thing that happened, etc.

Q Were you impressed by him?

C Yes, I liked him. Then, he changed, though. He changed radically about the beginning of the war with respect to Wright Field, and what we were doing in R & D, particularly after he became acquainted with people like von Karman and--who was head of the Research & Development Board?

Q Vannevar Bush?

C Yes, Vannevar Bush. He began to see what you could do to build up an air force and get the right kind of equipment we needed through R & D, and R & D facilities. I know he changed radically, as far as that was concerned.

Q For the good or bad?

C For the good. All during the war, he supported Wright Field very well.

Q During the war, what was your job?

C I was at Wright Field, from June 1939 to August 1945, I was

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Chief of the Engineering Division, which was in charge of all R&D. Dr. Bush, in War Dept R&D, had a lot of projects with Universities and other outfits, etc. More removed from the physical equipment that we needed for our operational people.

Q Did Arnold think Wright Field was doing a good job during the war?

C Yes, he did. He came out there frequently and I became very well acquainted with him. We used to give him the $64 tour of the place. A good many things that we showed him, he 'd nearly always say: "What do we do next?" I'd recommend a lot of things to him. He'd say: "OK, let's do them," and we did.

C Did he give you a hard time?

C No, he didn't. I suppose he thought I'd done pretty good, because I was there over six years. He didn't fire me.

Q Who was your immediate boss at Wright Field?

C General Brett first assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division, Then, after he left, Oliver Echols was there for a long time. Then Oliver went to Washington. George Kenney was there for a while, headed the whole division. Of course, we had the Production Section, the Flight Test Division, things like that, R&D.

Q Where did Benny Meyers fit into that picture?

C Meyers was in what you might call the Budget Section. He handled the funds, etc. He did a good job in those days.

Q Arnold was impressed with him in those days?

C Yes. He was a bright guy when it came to handling funds for the Air Force. He got into trouble on the side and getting tangled up with some company with which he was more or less involved.

Q Bleriot LaMarre? He set up this Aviation Electric and was feeding some contracts to them?

C Yes. I guess so.

Q Meyers was living well out at Wright Field. Was there any suspicion that he had his hand in the till.

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C I never heard of any at the time.

Q There was an anonymous letter sent in to Hq AAF about him in 1945. It was ignored. This came out later. Do you remember this?

C I never heard of that.

Q Stratemeyer, who was Chief of Air Staff, distributed a questionnaire in 1943 to procurement officers. Did you have to fill one out? Questionnaire about your financial status?

C Yes. I filled out one. In 1929, before the big bust in October, Black Friday, or whatever they called it. I owned 100 shares of Consolidated Aircraft. That was Reuben Fleet's old outfit up in Buffalo. But I sold it before, there was some date, 30 June 1930. You weren't supposed to own any stock after that. I sold mine. I filled out the form and sent it in. I never heard any more about it. I never owned any more stock, in that company or any other.

Q During the war?

C During the war.

Q Did you hear any rumors that some Air Force people were profiting from stock in aircraft companies?

C Yes, before that date was set. There were some officers who bought stock like I did.

Q That was 1930. I'm talking about WW II.

C No, I never heard of anybody.

Q What was Knudsen's job out there?

C He was head of the Air Materiel Command, everything, Field Service, Wright Field, the whole works.

Q Was he Echols' boss?

C Yes.

Q I heard that Arnold oftentimes bypassed Echols to go to Benny Meyers to get answers to questions? Was Meyers pretty good on supplying answers to questions?

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C He probably was on Budget matters.

Q How about procurement, did Meyers get into procurement?

C Not directly, that I ever knew of. I forget the date, but Maud (?) Strauss was head of production. So was Oliver Echols at one time. He was Chief of both Production Division and Engineering Division. Strauss never did get a star, for some reason. I don't know whether there was any friction between him and Arnold or not.

Q When Arnold came on Inspections, I have been told that, oftentimes, he didn't go to the front office, but went down to the Maintenance Shack or down to the hangars and talked to the men who handled the problems and got direct answers. Did you have any experience like that with him?

C Most of the time, it would happen this way. He'd come out and he was always interested in the Engineering Division. Of course we had all of our branches, our Aircraft, Engines, and Propeller, Equipment, Aeromedical Branches. All of them were under me. We'd take him on a tour. Usually, we set up a lot of demonstrations for him. He would talk to the people in the different Branches, sure.

Q Was he an impatient man?

C He wanted things done right now. A story he told. He went before the National Science Foundation. He wanted to know if they couldn't do something with some project he wanted done in six months.

Q Do you remember what it was?

C No. I've forgotten. Anyway, they said: in R&D you can't set a final date as to when you'll accomplish something once you start out from scratch and try to develop. That's one instance. That was his job. He wanted to get things done. He was running the Air Force. He didn't want to fiddle around. The war was on. You couldn't take forever to wait for something to be done.

Q Did he ever show impatience with you?

C No, he didn't. In fact, all during the war, my outfit, Craigie,

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Don Putt, we'd investigate proposals from the aircraft manufacturers for new airplanes. If we were satisfied that we should go into building it, I'd go in to Washington and talk to Echols. He never did turn me down on anything. We went into Arnold's office. He'd come back and Arnold told him: "All right, go ahead." So we'd go right ahead. We didn't have 19 committees you had to go through. It would go from my boys to me, to Echols, to Arnold, and back down the line and we'd enter into a contract for the manufacture.

Q Arnold believed in the direct method, rather than a lot of discussion, committees, etc.

C Yes. He apparently had faith in what we were going to do.

Q When you were giving him briefings when he came out to Wright Field, did he make decisions right on the spot: let's do this; let's not do that?

C Yes. These big fire trucks they have on every field in the U.S. and the world? We put on a demonstration of the first one at Wright Field. They had an old airplane we set on fire, and we had people in asbestos uniforms, and we had the first truck. After the fire got going good, they drove it in and they smothered the fire. The rescuers went in and got the dummies out. So he turned to me and said: "What do we do now?" And I said: "Let's build 100 of them." And he said: "OK, go ahead." So that was the start of all these big trucks you see around fields all round the world. Another time: he was out there, and we were talking about what we could do to improve airplanes, and I mentioned that Ordnance had offered us 200 - 75 mm rifle barrels, and I suggested to him that we put them in B-25s. He said: "OK, go ahead." So we did.

Q That was a very successful maneuver, putting those 75s in the B-25?

C They did a lot of good work in North Africa.

Q Did you have a major problem of getting the recoil action solved?

C No. Dutch Kindelberger at North American handled it.

Q Did you ever see Arnold get mad?

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C No, I don't think I ever did. Arnold was head of the whole AAF. He had the whole Operational responsibility; he had had all the Training responsibilities. That's where Jack Curry was. He had one of the training commands. So Arnold had a lot of things to think about. For one cog in the wheel to tell where the guy steering it was going was hard.

Q He believed in doing things himself, instead of deputizing assignments? If there were trouble areas, did he come out himself to try to solve it?

C I don't remember that he did, but he used to send lots of problems that came up down through the line, and a lot of them landed on me.

Q Did he call you up?

C No, he never did.

Q Did he prefer the personal method rather than the telephone? Did he try to take a look for himself, or did he handle things on the phone?

C Not of my outfit. He did a lot of traveling around to training outfits. He had a great interest in getting pilots trained, etc. On the production side of it, there was a great daily count of planes, from the puddle jumpers to the bombers. They kept track of how many would come out each day to meet the total number we were supposed to have.

Q Going back to Wright Field, 1929-30, when you met Arnold, I talked to Ben Chidlaw who said Arnold didn't have enough to do there?

C That's probably true.

Q Do you recall a guy named Jan Howard?

C He was my boss for a long time. I was his assistant at Wright Field. He assigned me as Chief of the Airplane Branch in late 1929.

Q Do you recall any friction between him and Arnold?

C No. Of course there were rumors, friction between this one and that. That was beyond me.

Q He was related to Arnold by marriage. He was married to Mrs. Arnold's sister. They were divorced a couple of years before. Arnold and Howard were supposed to dislike one another.

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C I guess I remember that. Nothing else.

Q Where were you in the middle 1930's?

C From 1931-34 I was in Panama. Came back to Wright Field in latter part of 1935. Then in 1937 I went down to the Air Corps Tactical School for a year. Then I was assigned as Assistant Rep at North American. Then later I was assigned as AF Rep both at Douglas and North American.

Q What year were you at Douglas?

C In 1938-39, and in 1939 I was assigned to Wright Field again.

Q Were you there when K.B. Wolfe was at Douglas?

C I took over from K.B. at Douglas.

Q You took over from K.B.? Do you remember a little trouble with the French, a mission to fly the DB-7 at Douglas?

C That was a funny thing. I was setting in my office at North American one day about noon. I just happened to look out the window, and there was that airplane spinning right down into the parking lot, right on top of a lot of cars. I ran out there. The pilot had been thrown out and was killed and the airplane was on fire. I walked out to the entrance to the airplane in the back, to see if there was anybody else in it. Here came this Frenchman. He was crawling out of the place, and he got out. He could walk but he had a broken leg. There was a lot of talk and argument about how come he was in there. Well, as far as I know, he was over here, and he was working in the airplanes, same as buying, and he was offered a ride in the airplane. It was still a Douglas airplane. We hadn't accepted it yet.

Q It had U.S. Government equipment in it, did it not?

C All new airplanes were furnished with GFE--engines, radios, propellers, etc. Always shipped for the manufacturer to install. He didn't buy the engines directly from engine manufacturer. We did and gave it to the airframe manufacturer.

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Q There was one Frenchman in the plane that was killed. I think his name was Paul Chemidlin.

C He wasn't killed then.

Q Was there just one Frenchman in that plane?

C Yes, just one.

Q And he crawled out with a broken leg?

C Yes. I don't know how bad it was, because I saw him walking away from the airplane myself.

Q You said it was the North American parking lot. I thought it was the Douglas parking lot. Or were they adjacent to one another?

C Well, it was a North American parking lot. But as I remember, Douglas had a hangar there. It was at old Mines Field, the old international airport. Northrop had flying rights on there. Douglas did. They were flying the first of what we later called the B-26/

Q Did you know that Arnold got into trouble because of that incident?

C I heard there was a lot of argument about it.

Q He got in trouble Henry Morgenthau, then Secretary of the Treasury, and he got into trouble with FDR.

C I didn't know about that.

Q K. B. Wolfe was the Air Corps Resident Representative there. Apparently, he authorized the Frenchman to ride that airplane. This was apparently in violation of law because we had secret equipment aboard that plane. Arnold was placed in a situation of having to testify one way or another. If he said he authorized the arrangement, he was violating the law. If he said that Morgenthau forced him, then he was putting him on the spot with Congress, and that was going to be putting him in Dutch with the President.

C I didn't know that*** I remember there was a lot of argument about that but it was all in Washington.

Q When that accident occurred, were you assigned to Douglas?

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C K.B. was at Douglas, and I was at North American.

Q K.B. got into a little trouble on that? He had authorized the Frenchman to fly. He had to testify. Did he ever talk to you on that?

C No. I was on the board that investigated why the airplane crashed.

Q Why did it crash?

C What had happened, the airplane must have been coming around. It was headed up north. When I saw it, it was literally spinning down outside my window. On the board, K.B. was on it, I was on it. In checking it over we found that the tail had failed, where it was attached to the main fuselage. He lost control of it and it went into a spin.

Q (Arnold and his trouble with FDR. Threatened with shipment to Guam.)

C No, I never heard anything on that.

Q Did Arnold do right by you, promotion-wise?

C Yes, I think so. All of us, Chidlaw was in Washington at that time with Oliver Echols. And there was a general feeling that we were a little slower than the operational boys in getting our first star. I got promoted to BG in the latter part of 1942.

Q I have a note here on Irving Krick. Did you know him? He was a weather man. He was Arnold's weather man. Did you have any connection with him?

C Yes. But no connection. He got his reputation out in California, making weather predictions for the orange growers, to set up their heaters, etc.

Q Arnold got him from the Navy. He made life miserable for people like Don Yates and Don Zimmerman. Did you know this?

C I didn't know.

Q Craigie told me you knew something about him.

C (Silence)

Q What about the jet? the Whittle jet? Arnold was enthused about it.

C Well, I'll tell you. Arnold went to England, about 1941, and he was shown Frank Whittle's jet engine and he was very much impressed

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with it. He came back. He had made a deal of some kind. That's something I'd like to ask you to see if you can find out. I have never seen what that deal was--in writing--whether it was a contract, whether it was a mutual written agreement between the British and General Arnold. But anyway, the essential part of it was, they were having a lot of trouble with it. The Germans had jet engines. They were having trouble with the rotor blade because they were running hot exhausts from the combustion chambers, and it took us over 25 years to develop those rotor blades. We started with General Electric back in 1917, 1918 to develop an exhaust turbine supercharger. And the first one was mounted on a Liberty engine and tested down there on top of Pike's Peak, because there was no test chamber anywhere in the world in those days where you could simulate altitude. They went to the highest place in the U.S. they could get to, up Pike's Peak. This was in 1917-18. We had continual contracts with General Electric. Old Dr. Moss was the man behind all that development. But we worked from that time until the beginning of World War II before we got a really operational exhaust-driven turbine. And all it was was something to pump air into the carburetor of an engine as you gained altitude and your oxygen became thinner. The agreement with the British essentially was: They would let us build the Whittle engine. We would give them the formulas to build the turbine blades for their jet engine, because they hadn't solved that. That took us 2 -25 years to build. But I would like to see--maybe you can find out--was there a written agreement? Was there a contract? Anyway, that is what happened, and we assigned Don Keirn to be in charge of jet development and Ralph Swofford to be in charge of airplane development. Bell had been building a P-59. That was the one with the 37 mm cannon through the propeller shaft. We called the jet the P-59A, to indicate it was just another variation of the plane, in order to keep it a secret. It was quite a project. A two engine jet built by Bell. G.E. built more or less a copy.

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Q Were you involved in the experimentation at Pike's Peak with the turbine blade?

C No. That was 1917-18.

Q You say, we continued to work on that between the wars?

C Yes.

Q How long did it take us to perfect that?

C It took us over 20 years. The first airplanes that came out with it were the P-38s.

Q Who worked on it for the Air Corps?

C Our Engine Branch at Wright Field.

Q Did NACA work on it down at Langley?

C No

Q Who had the Engine Branch?

C Don Keirn was our Project Engineer, but he was an officer in the Power Plant Branch.

Q During the 1930's?

C That was during the war.

Q The turbine blade was perfected between 1918 and 1938 or 1939. Who was in charge of that program?

C The Power Plant Branch.

Q Who gets credit for having done that?

C A lot of people worked on it. A civilian named Berger, I think. The man that G.E. had was old Dr. Mahler (?) It was a lifetime project for him from the beginning until the war.

Q And he succeeded? There was a deal: our turbine blades for their Whittle engine?

C Yes***

Q You say, Arnold was involved in the deal with the British?

C I gave him great credit for having the foresight to see that there were big potentialities in the jet.

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Q He was very secretive about it?

C. Top Secret for a long long time. He even set out, built a special hangar at Muroc Air Force Base where it was handled out there and the transfer made. The first man to fly it--it was a twin engine--was Bob Stanley, head of Stanley Aviation Company of Denver now. The first Air Force officer to fly the American jet was Lawrence Craigie.

Q We never really got the jet going until the end of the war? The P-80?

C The P-80 was first. About the middle of the war, old Kelly Johnson who was the Chief Engineer with Lockheed, he came in. They were trying to develop a new type of engine, it wasn't a jet. I told him we had a jet engine. We practically designed the P-80 that day in my office.

Q You and Kelly Johnson?

C Yes, and some other boys around; I forget who they were. But the first engine we could get hold of had been built by Westinghouse. So, we gave Kelly permission to go out to Muroc and see the P-59A, and look at the engine. So we got the Westinghouse engine at about 2,000 lbs thrust, and Kelly Johnson built a P-80 in 100 days.

Q When was this, about 1944?

C Maybe a little earlier.

Q If I understand you correctly, the P-59 was dawdling along, not making too much progress, and when you got together with Kelly Johnson the thing...

C Oh, no. The P-59 was a regular fighter airplane.

Q The P-59A?

C We built quite a few of them. We set up a plant at West Lynn, Mass. where General Electric built the I-16, the first swivel engine. It had 1,600 lbs thrust. We built the I-40 later which went into the P-80, with 4,000 lbs thrust. And then we had an airplane that would make over 500 mph. The first airplane to make more than 500 mph was the P-80.

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Q But it wasn't until you got together with Kelly Johnson that that project came to a climax? When was that?

C Yes. About 1943 or 1944. We had quite a few P-80s before the war ended. We sent a bunch of them to Italy.

Q Did they fly operationally?

C Yes, they did, down in Italy. Right at the end of the war.

Q Was there great concern that the Germans were way ahead of us on the jet?

C No. Let me tell you something. We still get a lot of flak about the development of rockets. Dr. Goddard, etc,, and all of his theories. The Germans received all that information. Hitler, he had an idea he could wreck England with his missiles, the buzz bomb first, then the rockets, the V-2. He decided that was the way for the Germans to win the war. That became their national effort. In the meantime, they'd just begun--Goering was out there, head of the German Air Force--they'd come out with their first jet airplanes, and we got one of them after the war--the ME-262, a twin engine plane. Georing and his people wanted to put the effort into jet aircraft. And they were beginning to get dangerous right at the end of the war. They also had the rocket job. That was becoming a very dangerous airplane as far as our bombers were concerned.

Q You mean the German rocket plane, the ME-163?

C No, the ME-262. But anyway, that which everybody blames us for, failing to build the big rockets, which we didn't need. We were trying to get airplanes across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and we depended upon the bomb sight. As the boys said, we could put the bomb "in the old pickle barrel." But Hitler, he wanted to built these rockets.

Q You think he made a mistake?

C I think it was the biggest blunder he ever made.

Q You think he should have stayed with his FW-190, and ME-109s?

C Yes.

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Q He nearly won the war with his jets and rockets. By that time we had an overwhelming strength and we had destroyed his aviation gas and...

C We could go over and pinpoint targets, like roller bearing targets and all kinds of special factories that you had to hit. It was our daylight bomb sight, in big formations with fighter protection, that we were able to take out these...

Q We had trouble for w awhile. We didn't have a good fighter to escort our bombers. The P-38s and P-47s didn't have enough legs to escort the bombers. It wasn't until the P-51 came along that we were doing the job. Is that a correct statement?

C No, because we had belly tanks on our fighters that could escort the bombers all the way to Berlin.

Q The P-47s weren't able to go all the way, even with the belly tanks. Were they able?

C Yes, I think so.

Q How about the P-38s?

C The P-38s were used mostly down in Italy, weren't they?

Q They used some in ETO

C Tell you a story about the P-51. When the American Air Force got organized over in England, they were given Spitfires and Hurricanes. They were real good local defense airplanes, but they didn't have any range. Anyway, Eleanor Roosevelt went over there one time--she went everywhere, you know--and she went down to see the boys in the Spitfire squadrons. They had just, by that time, begun to get the P-51s. Like all of us, with new airplanes, you'd say: "Give me back my old DH." Those boys said: "Give me back my old Spitfire." The Spitfire wouldn't go anywhere, but the P-51s with the belly tanks were a much better airplane to accompany the bombers over to Europe. Eleanor more or less said: "I'll fix that up. I'll go back and talk to Harry Truman" who was head of the Investigating Committee. The Truman Committee called

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on the Air Force command and had explained why we were giving the P-51 instead of letting them keep their old Spitfires. Well, I appeared before the Committee, and some others from Washington. We showed what you could do with the P-51s in the way of range, that we could accompany our bombers, but you couldn't accompany the bombers with Spitfires and Hurricans beyond the Channel, because then they had to come back. Anyway, the Truman Committee listened to the story and we continued to furnish them with P-51s and P-47s.

Q We were a little slow on the P-51. We had the P-51 in 1940-41. It had the Allison engine and it wasn't worth a damn as a high altitude fighter. The British put the Merlin engine in it, the Rolls Royce 61...

C What happened there, we had a contract with Curtiss for the P-46. It had the Allison engine. It wasn't showing up too good. It was decided that we wouldn't build it as a production airplane because...and so, North American bought the engineering details and the rights to build it out in L.A. They changed the wings a little bit and they did put the Merlin engine in it which was being built at that tine by ...

Q Rolls Royce?

C It was a Rolls Royce engine, but it was being built up in Detroit, But if you set the two airplanes on the line, unless you were an expert, you couldn't tell the difference between them. But there's no doubt that the P-51 had the outstanding engine, and we did the right thing and changed it. The P-46 never got into production.

Q Would you say the AAF was slow in recognizing the P-51? Does this fit in? Weren't the British...didn't we abandon the first version of the P-51? It was a low altitude fighter. Did Tommy Hitchcock have anything to do with that? He worked for Ambassador Winant.

C I remember there was a man named Tommy Hitchcock. I don't remember whether he had any connection with it, but he might have.

Q We were taking a lot of bomber losses in 1942-43 because the escort, whatever we had, were not able to escort the bombers all the way.

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Not until the P-51 came in early in 1944 that the bombing campaign really got under way. Is that correct?

C Yes, about that time.

Q Did you feel some of the pressure, that we weren't getting the long range fighters into production?

C I don't remember, specifically, but there was some criticism, yes. Maybe we were a little slow in getting fighters that would go all the way.

Q Could this have been due to the doctrine handed out at the Air Corps Tactical School--you were there in 1937-38--when the big bomber advocates sort of took over there? Do you recall Chennault there? He advocated fighters.

C Yes. I don't remember that the big bomber men took over.

Q At least their ideas dominated?

C Muir Fairchild was down there then. He was head of the bomber section of the staff. They naturally backed up the bombers.

Q Looking back at the war experience, you feel we went too heavily into bombers and recognized the fighters a little late?

C Hard to say.

Q Did you have anything to do with--at Wright Field in late 1930s--trying to get money for the B-17s. Do you remember that campaign?

C Yes, they were. Either 1939-40, we were able to buy only about 39 B-17s.

Q Did the War Dept sit on the Air Corps at that time, not giving ehem enough money for bomber procurement?

C That was above me.

Q How did Arnold feel about that? He'd just become Chief of AC. Was he pushing hard for bombers?

C I think he was.

Q Do you remember Andrews?

C Lot of us thought that if he hadn't run into a mountain in Iceland

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that he would have been Chief of the Air Force. He would have been it before Arnold. Arnold wouldn't have been Chief of the Air Corps.

Q Arnold was Chief when Andrews ran into that mountain?

C Maybe so. No, he wouldn't have taken over, but maybe he should have been.

Q Do you think he was a better leader than Arnold? How do you evaluate them? They were the two top leaders in the Air corps?

C I really evaluate Andrews as the better man.

Q Why?

C Hard to say.

Q Did he engender more confidence among his men?

C He was better known, I think, among the Operational people.

Q Was he more respected among the Operational people?

C Hard to say. He was sort of, among people that I knew, probably the top officer in the Air Corps.

Q There were several other competitors for the top job: Brett was a contender?

C I worked for him at Wright Field. He was the one who assigned me as Chief of the Engineering Division. *** I thought he was a good officer, professionally and otherwise.

Q How about Delos Emmons?

C Don't remember much...

Q Could anybody have done a better job than Arnold in running the Air Corps or AAF during the war? Could Andrews do a better job?

C Monday morning quarterbacking.

Q Let me put it another way. Do you think Arnold did a good job?

C Yes

Q You think he did a great job?

C Yes, a great job.

Q Are there any areas where he could have done a better job?

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C Consider the overall AF operation during the war, all of our relations with our Allies during the war, it'd be awfully hard to answer.

Q I have a note about Jake Harman and you. Probably has to do with the B-29s. Remember Jake Harman?

C (Asks Mrs. Carroll who says: "Somebody says he kicked off")

Q Do you remember the B-29 procurement. It was a big headache?

C I helped to get it started.

Q It had lots of problems, with the engine...

C Every airplane has problems. We had problems with engines; we had problems with electrical insulation. We had a lot of problems.

Q Any special problems? Arnold had promised the President...was pushing B-29. Did he come out and bug you on B-29?

C No. He did urge the Production Division. We had two divisions at Wright Field: the Engineering Division, in charge of R&D, and the Production Division which worked with the contractors to get the airplanes out. Most of the problems were in the production airplane. The Engineering Division did help to solve the problems that they were having. But in general the responsibility was in the Production Division after we got into operational production.

Q Arnold came out to Salina, Kansas in 1944. He and Benny Meyers came out there... Do you remember that?

C No. (Ref to Arthur Raymond) We had many dealings with him.

Q Did you get involved in getting Doolittle's B-25s ready for the Tokyo raid?

C Not directly.

Q (Ref to Hugh Knerr and Arnold)

C (Only vague response)

Q (Ref to Arnold and Douglas) Did Arnold give any preference to Douglas in procurement?

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My general opinion, he wouldn't give Douglas any special favors nybody else.

Did he lean backwards to avoid showing favoritism?

He was more or less neutral..

Did Arnold show anybody favoritism in procurement? Any treatment lt was undeserved?

No. On practically every aircraft that we ever bought, we had l boards set up, first, to tackle the design proposals. When the irplane came out, we had another board to inspect the airplane to possible changes, etc. And when the first production airplane came here would be another group. So, as far as I know, he never d any recommendation of those boards, and I was on practically them.

Could he have, if he wanted to?

I suppose he could. He was Chief of the Air Corps.

Did you ever feel, or did any of your associates ever feel, that put some pressure on to buy one plane against another?

No

Back to Benny Meyers (snicker by Mrs. Carroll) Arnold had great nce in him, and many people told me that (off tape)

Carroll; Referred to 2nd wife (has hesitation to be on tape)

Did he ever do you dirt, in your opinion?

Not that I know of. He didn't fire me for six years.

Do you remember James Powell? He lives in Vienna, Va. a few ut of Washington DC. He was fired. He worked for Meyers in procurement, or getting numbers. Apparently, Meyers was wo sets of books***

well, but no comment)

ratemeyer Questionnaire)

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C Meyers met me in a restaurant, asked me if I remembered seeing or signing a paper like that. I said: "Sure. I owned some Consolidated stock in 1929 and I sold it during that year, or in 1930" *** All he asked me is if I'd ever heard of such a paper.

Q (Ref to lavish living of Meyers)

C Later, when the trouble was aired, they produced the books of all the stock operations he had been engaged in. That's one of the reasons why he asked me if there was, or ever had been a paper we were supposed to sign.

Q Did Meyers give you all the support you could have wanted?

C (Ref to lack of restrictions on Auto Mfgrs in building safety factors today). Building an airplane we were trying to save every ounce. We had certain safety regulations as to what the strength of the airplane would be in operation. We built right to that hairline in order to get the performance out of the airplane. We took chances on building airplanes; we still do, that you don't have on automobiles. Why do these autos have to be recalled by the hundreds of thousands? We have 100 airplanes. We get a shank in the wings or tail, or something, the country gets to bounce off the roof about it.

Q In 1940-41, the aircraft mfgers didn't want to let the auto mfgers into their business. They were afraid, once the mass production techniques went into aviation, the aircraft manufacturers would get hurt. You remember anything on that? Arnold went out there, gave a talk, and sort of zapped these guys across the knuckles on that subject. The aircraft manufacturers were dragging their feet. You remember anything on that?

C No, I don't. You can't build aircraft like you build trucks or autos***

Q By the same token, the car manufacturers in 1940-41 didn't want to get into it, because they were making money on autos. Arnold went out and gave a talk to the aircraft manufacturers. Remember that? He went out to Detroit to kick them in the shins.

C No. Don't remember.

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Q Is there anything about Arnold, good or bad, that I should know. I'm trying to understand the man. Your wife indicated there was something. (Note: Mrs. Carroll engaged the General in whispered conversation when we were talking about Meyers)

C He treated me all right. You don't work for a guy six years without...

Q He was impulsive?

C He wanted to get things done right now.

Q Did he shoot from the hip?

C Maybe so, sometimes.

Q Did he ever make bad decisions on aircraft procurement? Perhaps he was too impulsive on something?

C Not as far as I'm concerned. He approved every project that I recommended to him.

Q The B-32. That turned out to be somewhat of a lemon?

C We started the B-29 and B-32 at the same time; we decided to pressurize both of them, the first of the big airplanes to be pressurized. They got worried in Washington as to whether the pressurization would work all right at high altitudes. So the decision was made to go ahead with pressurization on only one of the projects. Luckily, the high authorities decided on the B-29; so we left the pressurization out of the B-32. Some of the B-32s got out into the Asiatic theatre. They had them on Okinawa for a while, but I don't think any of them ever made any combat missions.

Q A couple made some in Kenney's theatre. In SWPac, one squadron of them, I think.

C Well, maybe so. They were really a backup for the B-29 in case the pressurization didn't work. When you pressurized an airplane that required an entirely different armament setup, flexible gun setups. They had to be able to operate them while the crew was under pressurization.

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Q Arnold was gungho about airborne, and about gliders. He thought this was a great contribution to aerial warfare. He put on a lot of heat on the glider program. Did this come under you?

C Yes. Grandison Gardner and I were the first boys on a technical mission to Europe in 1940, and we saw some of the work of the British over there. So I came back and initiated the first contract for gliders, and they got the first school for glider pilots set up--Freddie Dent was Chief Project Officer on that. Nobody was interested in it. Eventually, we were the production unit on gliders. North American had a big plant out at Kansas City where we were supposed to build gliders. The first ones built were 15-passenger gliders. It was used as a trainer.

Q Do you remember when Arnold was gungho for airborne? He pushed it very hard. Did you feel any pressure from him on this program?

C No. We started it out at Wright Field, and got it going, and then it was taken over. The first operations were under Louis Brereton, when they made a big invasion of Europe.

Q Eisenhower didn't think much of airborne.

After-note: When Gen Carroll left the room, Mrs. Carroll volunteered these thoughts: Carroll "didn't like Gen Arnold very much." When I asked Gen Carroll about his opinions of Gen Arnold, he seemed to equivocate, saying he and Arnold got along fine.

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